

constructs. It is a great accomplishment to construct a philosophy of nature which shall do justice to the facts on which the theory of relativity is based; but is it not going too far to say that such a philosophy alone can give us meanings for position, perpendicularity, timeless space, and various other concepts that we as a race have been using for centuries, before the theory of relativity was ever thought of? This criticism, if valid, would not invalidate Professor Whitehead's general theory; it would only invalidate the claim made for it that it alone, of all extant theories, gives meaning to certain current and practically justified conceptions.

I am not sure that I have understood Professor Whitehead aright. On so many points where at first I had thought I had found him wrong, I have come after study to revise my judgment. It may be that further study will necessitate a revision here. But up to the present it appears that the above criticism is justified.

The book is not easy reading. It is very difficult reading for a man who has not had much mathematical training, and perhaps most philosophers have not had much. But one of the merits of the theory of relativity is that it requires us to polish up our mathematical equipment. But so far, it seems to me that the greatest philosophical achievement of the theory of relativity is the fact that it has brought forth a work of such profound philosophical importance as *The Concept of Nature*. Every philosopher should not only read it, but study it; and when he does, he will undergo a searching of heart. The prestige of the author will secure for him many readers among men of science—they will inevitably revise their old conceptions; and from the fact that in this book philosopher and scientist will have to meet, much good will come, at least to the philosopher.

EVANDER BRADLEY MCGILVARY.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.

*Spiritual Pluralism and Recent Philosophy.* By C. A. RICHARDSON.

The University Press, Cambridge, 1919,—pp. xxxi, 335.

Contemporary critics of idealism should read this book. Whatever its effect on their metaphysical theories it could not fail to enlarge their over-limited conception of idealism and to convince them that idealism is not bound to take either one of the two shapes in which they are wont to attack it, to wit, a subjectivism derived from Berkeley and an impersonal monism of the Bosanquet type.<sup>1</sup> And

<sup>1</sup> For a recent instance of criticism of this sort, cf. S. Alexander, *Space, Time and Deity*, Vol. I, pp. 5-7.

idealists, in particular personal idealists, should read the book for the concreteness of the detail in which Mr. Richardson describes and argues for his spiritual universe. The volume, as the writer tells us in his introduction, consists of a "series of essays" written in an "endeavor . . . to establish a certain ontological hypothesis—spiritual pluralism." The titles of the essays indicate the scope of the book and the concreteness of the material with which the writer deals. The first, on "scientific method in philosophy and the foundations of pluralism" and the substance of the fourth on "the notion of a deterministic system" are republished from this REVIEW (May, 1918, and January, 1919), while the third on "the philosophical problem raised by the Weber-Fechner law" appeared in the January, 1919 number of *Mind*. The remaining essays discuss "certain criticisms of pluralism"—in particular Pringle-Pattison's and Bosanquet's; "the intensity of sense-data"; "immortality"; and finally "subconsciousness and certain abnormal phenomena". For all their variety of topic, the essays, as the writer truly says, "form the development of a single coherent line of thought" (p. xv).

In the form in which Mr. Richardson conceives and supplements it, spiritual pluralism involves and implies the following positions: (1) "Reality comprises selves alone differing simply in mental development, though the diversity is indefinitely various" (p. 9). The organic world is made up of "individuals differing only in degree from ourselves" (p. 52), whereas inorganic matter "may be regarded as comprising individuals of an extremely low order of mentality, who therefore exhibit the minimum of spontaneity and the maximum of habit in their reactions [and] are thus particularly susceptible of an almost complete description in general terms" (p. 53). . . . "Experience consists in action and reaction between self and other selves" (p. 9). (2) This interaction, "whereby subject is linked to subject and the many made one" (p. xxi) implies the existence of "a single universal entity in which the many exist" (p. 250). (3) The basis for this personalistic hypothesis is the realization of one's own existence. "Each of us knows that *one* self exists (p. 9). . . . We cannot speak simply of the existence of thoughts and feelings. There is always the implication of 'one who feels and thinks'" (p. 20). The Humian conception of self as a series of mental phenomena really implies "the existence of the very entity which it is attempting to dispose of" (p. 20). And (4) "the existence of at least one self being granted we proceed to assume the existence of other

selves. This assumption is . . . justifiable, for it in no way conflicts with the facts" (p. 21); it is "most valuable for it at once opens to us an immense fresh store of knowledge by description, in addition to the knowledge we have through our own immediate sense-experience" (p. 22). (5) The personalistic hypothesis affords an explanation of the facts of experience more satisfactory than that of any other theory (pp. 30, 38 f). Even the physicist's entities—luminiferous ether and the material particle, for example (p. 13)—are "merely constructions . . . based on individual perceptions" (pp. 6, 46); whereas "the data of sense, the indubitable concrete facts," are always given to a subject (p. 21) and the fundamental categories of science may and indeed must ultimately be conceived in personal terms.

This skeletonized account of Mr. Richardson's basal teaching is necessary to the somewhat more detailed study which follows, of certain of his more characteristic doctrines, namely: (1) his comparison of spiritual personalism with realistic doctrine; (2) his conception of the body-mind relation; and (3) his interpretation of the facts of abnormal psychology.

I. "The final synthesis," the author asserts, between the new realism (or scientific method<sup>1</sup>) and spiritual personalism "consists . . . in a recognition of the fact that each is necessary to the complete fulfilment of philosophic purpose, and in a determination of the . . . domain and limitations of each" (p. 4). "Scientific method," or the neo-realistic point of view, is characterized in two-fold fashion. It "lays stress", in the first place, "on the objective side of experience. It investigates the object of experience, not in relation to the subject, but considered *per se* and therefore in abstraction from the subject" (p. 16). It is, in the second place, a 'conceptual' and 'symbolic' description of actual experience. Mathematical continuity, for example, the legitimate though abstract and artificial conception of the 'objective side of experience' as a compact series of discrete sense-data, is a symbolic and inadequate representation of that 'indivisible unity', the individual experience (p. 23). And scientific causality, or the generalized statement of observed sequences, is a highly conceptualized representation of causality in the "true meaning" of the term, namely "the realization of our own efficiency as active individuals" (p. 37). Both because of its exclusive concern with the objective side of experience, and because of its conceptual character,

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Richardson uses the two terms almost interchangeably. Cf. pp. 1, 4 ff.

neo-realism falls short of ultimacy as a metaphysical system. For first, "the failure to take the existence of the subject . . . into account in the analysis of experience . . . leads to the inevitable result that certain most important characteristics of existence"—facts of the moral life, for example—"are entirely overlooked or regarded as invalid conceptions" (p. 17). And second, "the essential privacy of concrete individual experience can not be comprehended in a descriptive formula" (p. 26). Indeed, contrasted with these categories, continuity and causality, which may be interpreted either scientifically or personally, are the purely personal categories of means and end, or purpose—categories which "are only significant in application to a universe containing individual subjects of experience" (p. 51). Mr. Richardson concludes, as he began, by accepting neo-realistic categories simply as practically useful in the attempt to represent conceptually the object of experience "so far as it can be thus represented" (p. 49). "Keeping in mind," he says, "these limitations" of the scientific method, "its critical and constructive value in its own field is apparent" (p. 55). On the other hand we must energetically oppose the assertion of "the supporters of the new scientific method . . . that [spiritual] pluralism cannot be true because the conceptions on which it is based conflict with their results" (p. 16).

2. To the spiritualistic pluralist, according to our author, a man's body consists in three sets of sense-data,—first, the visual and tactile sensations essentially similar to those which constitute his body as experienced by other people; second, the "musculo-motor and organic sensations . . . to which . . . there is nothing corresponding in the presentations of other people" (p. 193); finally, certain sense-data—observations of the brain, for example—"which may be perceived by other people under suitable conditions, but which are never perceived" but only inferred by him.<sup>1</sup> "The relation of this group of sense-data to the individual subject whose body it is, is a presentational relation" (p. 194). Hence the solipsist interprets all three sets of sensations as "purely subjective modifications or states" of the subject (p. 196). But the spiritual pluralist, like the realist, rejects solipsism "on grounds of *a priori* improbability and philosophical sterility" and postulates "a ground of our sense-data in existent entities other than ourselves" (pp. 196-197). For the

<sup>1</sup> For a similar account of the body, in terms of Spiritualistic pluralism, cf. a paper by the present writer, "The Personalistic Conception of Nature," this REVIEW, March, 1919, XXVIII., pp. 135-138.

spiritual pluralist these other entities must be subjects, or selves, since all sense-data must be regarded as the appearances to a subject "of the existence of other subjects", the manifestation of its interaction with them (pp. 249, 319). "The body is such an object or complex of sense-data, regarded as peculiarly our own" both because "some or other of its elements are invariably presented to us" and also because "certain of its elements (organic sensations, for example) have a character which is quite unique" (p. 199). And the subjects of which our body is the appearance are interpreted by Richardson, who here follows Leibniz and Ward, as a group of subjects (or monads) subordinate to the "dominant monad . . . commonly called the 'mind' of the organism" (p. 200). It follows that "no statement of the relation of body and mind in terms of relations of the kind distinguished in the object of experience"—for example, in terms of causal relation—can be considered "satisfactory," since "we are here dealing with existent entities," not with "phenomenal objects" (p. 201). In somewhat more detail: "the instinctive reaction of the subordinate monads," of which the body is the appearance, may be conceived as the ground of "the bodily reflexes in which the dominant consciousness is not involved" (p. 208). And in this sense "the body may be regarded almost as the tutor" of the mind (p. 208). Yet the mind, or dominant self, "eventually attains to a higher level of experience than its subordinates" and "acquires a more and more complete control over the body" (p. 209). Indeed, "after a certain maximum is reached the presence of the body becomes in many respects a hindrance rather than an aid to the attainment by the mind of higher levels still, and the bond gradually loosens" (p. 209). . . . "But we have no reason", in Mr. Richardson's opinion, "to believe in the complete cessation of these powers [of the mind] after death. . . . Nor does the acquisition of a new body seem to be a necessity," though it is a possibility, "of the future life" (p. 242). The "profoundly intimate" relation which is "realized" between body and mind, though "ultimately indefinable", may be called the "'immanence' of the dominant monad in the subordinate monads" (pp. 212-213). And "mind immanent in the body" interacts "as a *whole* with the environment" (p. 218), which of course, on the theory of spiritual pluralism, itself consists of subjects of experience.

3. Mr. Richardson introduces his discussion of subconsciousness and abnormal phenomena by anticipating the "possible objection

based on the ground of lack of evidence for the phenomena. . . . No doubt," he says, "trickery has been widely practised. But one can only say that the body of evidence now produced and attested by men trained to scientific methods of experimentation and criticism of the highest order of precision is so overwhelming that anyone who pretends to an open mind cannot help but accept [it] . . . as being *in general* of the same order of certainty as other more ordinary phenomena investigated by science, whatever may be true of any *particular case*" (p. 247).

Richardson's purpose throughout is to show that the "facts thus accepted" are describable and, to greater or less degree, explicable in the terms of his spiritual pluralism. He begins with 'ultraliminal impressions'. These he characterizes as impressions that modify 'the presented whole' though incapable of becoming the focus of consciousness; and he explains them as "the manifestation or appearance to the subject concerned of the vast majority of other subjects which go to make the universe." When this interaction (of subject with environing subjects) is not intense enough to be manifested as sense-impression-above-the-threshold-of-consciousness, its outcome is the ultraliminal impression (p. 251).

At the other extreme, abnormal perception or clairvoyance, "the perception of objects in circumstances in which they would not ordinarily be perceived" (p. 283), is "simply the manifestation of the subject's interaction with certain other subjects under somewhat unusual conditions (p. 286). . . . The difficulties generally felt [in regard to abnormal perception] are not," Richardson declares, "real difficulties at all. For the ground of perception, whether normal or abnormal, is the interaction of the percipient subject with other subjects. Now subjects are not in space, so that difficulties such as those of distance are not really what they seem. No doubt certain spatial correlations of sense-data are the manifestation of the noumenal conditions necessary, in general, for that type of interaction between certain subjects which is the ground of perception. But it does not follow that these conditions are the only sufficient ones. For . . . since the ground of the interaction of the many is one,<sup>1</sup> it follows that each subject acts and is acted upon by every other. . . . The action of others upon him, who are, so far as their ordinary phenomenal manifestations are concerned, hidden or at a distance, is manifested by ultraliminal sense impressions. If, for any reason,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. pp. 515-6, below.

some of these become infraliminal, abnormal perception of distant or hidden objects occurs" (p. 285).

The "perception of human apparitions" (or phantasms) differs in origin from the abnormal perception of inanimate objects. The abnormal perception of distant or hidden objects is due primarily to the abnormally concentrated and directed attention of the perceiver. The consciousness of phantasms, on the other hand, is brought about by the activity of the agent—in other words, of that subject of whom the phantasm is the manifestation to the perceiver (p. 289).

Telepathy, finally, "must be carefully distinguished from abnormal perception" in that, here "the object presented to the recipient" (or perceiver) is not the manifestation of another subject or self "but an image similar to an impression or image presented" to this other self, the telepathic agent (p. 297). "Evidently," Mr. Richardson continues, "telepathy is explained by the immanence of a single concrete entity in the individuals composing the world. But . . . such an entity [which] must be postulated to explain any interaction between individuals . . . will not suffice to account for the particular form which telepathy takes. Both in telepathy and in perception (whether normal or abnormal) the activity of one individual influences that of another, but [in abnormal perception] . . . we have *reciprocity* of action between agent and percipient [whereas in telepathy] we have rather *community* of action between agent and recipient" (p. 299).

The author concludes that "broadly speaking", in a universe constituted by "a plurality of . . . spiritual agents, in virtue of the immanence in them of a single entity," the abnormal phenomena "we have been considering" are not only "in every case susceptible of interpretation and explanation" by the hypothesis of spiritual pluralism but also "rather of a type to be expected than to be regarded as bizarre and dissociated from ordinary life" (p. 325).

To turn from summary to comment: In the reviewer's opinion, Mr. Richardson has made an important contribution to the contemporary discussion of personalistic philosophy. He vigorously enforces, in the first place, the cardinal advantage of the personalistic metaphysics: the fact that "it attempts to put everything in terms of things [namely, ourselves] whose nature we actually realize and which may therefore be simply indicated without the necessity of formal conceptual specification. . . . The assertion of the existence of the self," he continues, "is not an assumption" (p. 63); it is rather

“the central and unique fact of our existence” (p. 56).<sup>1</sup> Hence, he rightly argues, since a self “certainly” exists, no hypothesis which denies or ignores its existence “can explain the universe [or] even completely describe it” (p. 16).

Mr. Richardson furthermore analyzes acutely the conception of this self or subject which is for him “the central fact of the universe” (p. 58). The self as he conceives it, is first of all (1) “the subject of experience” (p. 8), that which attends or cognizes (p. 187), feels and is active (p. 139), that to which objects are presented (p. 92). A self is, further, (2) “essentially individual, for it is unique” (p. 11). Indeed, “subjects and their experiences are the only true individuals” (p. 30). (3) “The self,” in the third place, “combines . . . the principles of identity and change. In spite of change I realize myself to be the same individual that I once was” (p. 43). “In a somewhat analogous way (4) . . . the individual subject [is] an entity transcending space and time. His existence can only be specified as a whole; it is neither punctual nor instantaneous” (p. 42). In every case, Mr. Richardson adds, in which any proposition relating to the subject has a “spatial or temporal reference” this reference is “entirely to the object of experience” (p. 44). The self or subject is, finally, (5) contrasted with the ‘logical conception’, as concrete and (6) with the mere ‘appearance’, the sense-datum, as an existing entity.

Mr. Richardson’s treatment of contemporary criticisms of ‘spiritual pluralism’ is, once more in the opinion of the present writer, both discriminating and conclusive. Thus, he effectively argues that neo-realism arbitrarily limits the domain of philosophy in ignoring the existence of the subject of experience (p. 56); he points out that Bosanquet’s criticism of the spiritualist’s account of consciousness is “largely vitiated by the fact that he adopts an attitude which appears to tend very strongly to [the] Cartesian dualism of mind and matter” (p. 71); and he argues that one of Pringle-Pattison’s criticisms is due to a misconception of the spiritual pluralist’s account of law (pp. 75 ff.), and that the other ignores the conception of the unity which is, for Richardson, ground of the interaction of subjects with each other (p. 79 f.).

But in spite of the effective dealing with the criticisms which he recognizes, Richardson does not answer all the questions which his

<sup>1</sup> Cf. pp. 19, 46, 58, 61, *et al.*



'hypothesis' raises. The final paragraphs of this review set forth and discuss some of the difficulties which he ignores.

1. To begin with a minor criticism, Mr. Richardson is not justified in referring habitually to his system as 'pluralism', omitting the prefix 'spiritual'. He says, for example, that "the spiritualistic hypothesis, namely that the beings whose appearance we perceive are other subjects of experience . . . constitutes pluralism" (p. 104). But surely, both the dualism of Descartes and Locke and the neo-realistic doctrine of existent and subsistent entities are rightly described as forms of pluralism. Only confusion can result when a term of such wide connotation, applicable to a whole class of varying theories, is appropriated to the exclusive use of one among them.<sup>1</sup>

2. It is even more important to note that Richardson's philosophy is not even a spiritual pluralism. From the very start (p. xx) he admits "the necessity of supplementing spiritual pluralism by some principle of unity." And the 'principle of unity' turns out to be a 'concrete entity' necessary to explain that interaction of subjects of experience which, according to spiritual pluralism, is the very heart of experience. "The existence of the Many," Richardson repeatedly asserts, "consists in their interaction with one another but the condition of the possibility of this interaction is the immanence of the One" (p. 300). Between spiritual pluralism of this type and personal absolutism of the right wing Hegelian or the Roycean type, there is certainly nothing to choose. Mr. Richardson even says definitely that "the Many are not self-existent" though he adds at once "but neither are they merged in the One so as to lose all individuality." This, of course, is precisely the contention of Royce. Only forms of absolutism which conform to the oriental type deny the individuality of the Many included in the One; and Royce shows explicitly how the individuality of each included, interacting subject may be conceived as the expression of one unique purpose of the including One.

The truth is that Mr. Richardson has said too little (or too much) about this single, concrete entity. The attentive reader cannot agree with him that "the determination of its exact nature is unnecessary for the matter in hand" (p. xxi). On the contrary, it is imperatively necessary to know whether the immanent One is or is not to be conceived as a self. If as a self, of which the many selves are members, it follows inevitably that we are dealing with an ultimately monistic,

<sup>1</sup> In *The Realm of Ends*, Ward still further limits the meaning of 'pluralism' applying it to non-theistic spiritual pluralism.

not pluralistic, form of spiritualism. But if, on the other hand, this underlying concrete entity, demanded by the existence of the interacting selves, is conceived as itself other than a subject of experience, the genuinely spiritualistic character of Richardson's universe disappears.

3. A criticism of a different sort must be made of Richardson's repeated assertion that "we cannot *know* the self" (p. 19). His grounds for this Kantian limitation of the conception of knowledge he states in various ways. At first it seems to him obvious. "Evidently," he says, "the subject or knower cannot be an object of knowledge" (p. 14, footnote). A little later he argues the point: "The concrete self", he says, "is the *knower*. Knowing," he proceeds, here in agreement with the neo-realists, "is a relation between two entities so that evidently the subject cannot know itself" (p. 19).<sup>1</sup> And again he insists that the awareness of self "cannot be subsumed under any one of the three types of knowledge proper—knowledge by acquaintance, knowledge by description, and knowledge of logical truths" (p. 14). To the reviewer this restriction of the term knowledge seems artificial and misleading. To assert, as Mr. Richardson asserts, that the self is "a unique, supremely intimate fact" (p. 14), and then to deny that it is known, seems nothing less than a verbal quibble. Curiously enough there is at least one passage in which Richardson also indirectly refers to the subject's awareness of itself as knowledge. "No entity other than myself," he says, "can be given to me as an object of knowledge in such a way that I realize what it is in its actual essence. We cannot in experience *know* anything else as it really is in itself" (p. 68). This statement is at once qualified by the reminder that not "even the self is given as *an object of immediate knowledge* in experience," but the significant implication of a knowledge of self remains.

It is essential to add that Richardson's denials of self-knowledge are accompanied by the most unequivocal insistence on our awareness of self. "We have," he says, "the central and unique fact of the 'realization' of our own existence" (p. 19). And this realization is an immediate certainty, a direct awareness, not an inference or deduction or conclusion. "The existence of the subject," he says, "may certainly be inferred—immediately inferred, indeed, from every single fact of experience—[but] there is, in addition, the far more

<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 202, footnote 2.

important central and unique fact of our experience, namely, the concrete realization of our own existence" (p. 56).

4. A kindred difficulty concerns the place, in the author's epistemological system, of those other selves or interacting subjects to which he makes such constant reference. Are these other selves, we ask, the object of our knowledge? No, for a subject is knower, not known. Are they 'realized'? No, for only my own experience is realized. Are they then objects of experience? No, for only sense-data or constructions based on sense-data, are experienced. As a matter of fact, Mr. Richardson at many points ignores this unsolved problem, contenting himself with the assertion that these interacting subjects exist. Most often he states that "pluralism makes the assumption of the existence of other selves" (p. 58), though he says in one place, that "the assertion of the existence of other people is not, strictly speaking [an assumption] but rather the first step in the application of the pluralistic hypothesis to the explanation of the facts of experience" (p. 63). But he never offers such a psychological analysis of 'assumption' as would equate it with terms 'knowing', 'realizing' and 'experiencing'. His closest approach to a solution of the problem is in the implication that we "realize *indirectly*, as it were, the nature of any other entity . . . when this entity is essentially similar in certain respects to ourselves" (p. 202, footnote). But this conception is fraught with difficulty. For to describe a case of realization as indirect is covertly to rob the word of its essential meaning, namely, direct consciousness of our own existence, already characterized as a 'unique fact' (p. 19).

5. A final group of difficulties centre in the conception, common to Richardson with Ward, of 'experience' and, in particular of the 'object of experience'. One would expect that a spiritualist of Richardson's type would regard experience as the fundamental character or attribute of the subject, or self. And, indeed, we may find in his pages traces of this simple conception. He says, for example, that "we are essentially experiencing subjects. Our existence consists entirely in our experience" (p. 163). And, more concretely, he asserts that "the life of any being such as ourselves consists in sensations, feelings, desires, thoughts and acts," and adds, "all these we group together under the term 'experience'" (p. 187). This comprehensible doctrine of experience as the sensing, feeling, desiring and thinking of any self is supplemented, not set aside, by a second defini-

tion. "The individual experience", Richardson now asserts, "consists in the interaction of the subject with other subjects" (p. 112); and again, "the living experience of the subject consists actually in his interaction with other subjects" (p. 70). Thus conceived, a self's experiencing—its perceiving, feeling, or willing—really is its relatedness, or else its relating of itself to other selves.<sup>1</sup>

But Mr. Richardson's formal definitions of experience introduce another conception—that of the object of experience. Experience becomes a duality of subject and object. "The fundamental fact," he says, "is the unity of the individual experience which comprises a duality (p. 71) . . . for in it are distinguished two fundamental factors. A subject who attends or cognizes and an object which is attended to or cognized" (p. 187).<sup>2</sup> This definition, it may be observed, would be entirely compatible with the truly spiritualistic conceptions, already formulated, of experience as a self's consciousness and of consciousness as inter-relation of self with other selves, provided only these other selves or subjects were regarded as themselves the objects of experience. Thus interpreted, the definition of experience as duality of subject and object would amount to the conception of experience as interaction of one self, the subject, with others, the object-selves. But Richardson is hampered by the conventional unwillingness to regard a self both as subject and object. Accordingly, he strictly limits the application of the term 'object' to the sense-object. His 'object of experience' is explicitly described as a complex of sense-data or else as a 'construction of sense-data' constituting some 'unit of the world of physics' (p. 59). The crucial difficulty with this theory lies in its uncritical adoption of the essentially realistic conception of the 'sense-datum'. For to the spiritualist there can be no sense-datum, except the sensation, or 'sensing', admittedly a character of the self. Thus, through the introduction of this *tertium quid*, the object or complex of sense-data, the spiritualistic conception as, concretely, a self's sensing or thinking or feeling which constitutes its inter-relation with other selves, is transformed into the artificial conception of experience as consisting "essentially in the presentation of an object to a subject" (p. 92).<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 112.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. pp. 18, 71, 167, 329, *et al.*

<sup>3</sup> Cf. a discussion, by the present writer, of "The equivocal position of the presentation in the psychology of James Ward," *Psychological Bulletin*, 1921, pp. 429-432.

It is perhaps permissible, in conclusion, to deprecate a certain narrowness in the writer's outlook. An unsophisticated reader might readily be left with the impression that Leibniz, Ward, and Richardson himself are virtually the only adherents to the personalistic form of idealism. Reference to the allied doctrines of Fechner and of Royce, to name no others, would have enriched the book while throwing into stronger relief the considerable individual contributions of its writer.

MARY WHITON CALKINS.

WELLESLEY COLLEGE.

*Reconstruction in Philosophy.* By JOHN DEWEY. New York, Holt and Co. 1920. 213 pp. and index.

Not only professional students of philosophy but everyone who takes a thoughtful interest in the possibility of reconstructing any of the traditional structures of civilization which are visibly breaking down, is profoundly indebted to the invitation of the Imperial University of Tokyo to Professor Dewey to give the lectures which comprise this little book. The book is an attempt to interpret and to make articulate the deeper and only half conscious strivings and impulses which have made our present western civilization differ from the civilizations of antiquity and of the middle ages. The aim which is expressed in the prefatory note, "to exhibit the general contrasts between older and newer types of philosophic problems rather than to make a partisan plea in behalf of any one specific solution of these problems", is abundantly achieved, and with a lucidity and directness which philosophical writings, including Dewey's earlier writings, seldom exhibit. Of philosophic argument, in the familiar sense, there is very little. "See what has been going on," the author might say, "in our life and society since the collapse of feudal and authoritative ways of living and of thinking. I will show you the ideas which really move modern men and modern societies, the motives and aspirations which have come to the surface with ever increasing frequency in the actual life of men. Can you, as philosophers, continue to do your professional thinking as if all these forces and currents meant nothing, or as if they were simply aberrations, or as if they were irrelevant to the business of philosophy?" And when one attempts not only to see what manner of thing it is that has been transforming civilization in modern times, when one attempts to appraise the fruits of the modern revolution in science, industry, and govern-