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Congress of the United States

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

February 2, 1946

Washington, D. C.

Pages: ... 9655 to 9858 ...

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S. Con. Res. 27

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Saturday, February 2, 1946

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Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at
10:00 a.m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,
Ferguson and Brewster.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel;
Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel, and John E.
Masten, of counsel, for the Joint Committee.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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The Chairman: The committee will be in order.

Counsel, I believe, was still examining the witness.

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN LAURANCE FRY SAFFORD

(Resumed)

Mr. Richardson: Captain, have you a copy of Exhibit 142 before you?

Captain Safford: I have.

Mr. Richardson: As I understand it, the first winds message that was intercepted was Circular No. 2353 shown in Exhibit 142; is that correct?

Captain Safford: Not necessarily.

Mr. Richardson: Well, was there one before that?

Captain Safford: Circulars 2353 and 2354 were intercepted on the same date, and I do not know which came first. Circular 2354 was translated by us two days before 2353.

Mr. Richardson: Then the only two intercepts establishing the so-called winds codes are contained in circulars 2353 and 2354?

Captain Safford: The only ones that we had in the Navy Department.

Mr. Richardson: The only ones we knew anything about at the time of this episode?

Captain Safford: Yes.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Mr. Richardson: And after those messages came in every effort was made that could be made to see to it that stations were warned to monitor, for the executes under those messages?

Captain Safford: Nothing was done until we had received a message from the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, containing the translation of the same messages made by the British at Singapore.

Then we made every effort to monitor for those messages.

Mr. Richardson: How long after this message came in on November 19 then was the first monitoring direction given to intercepting stations?

Captain Safford: It was sent out about 6 p. m. Washington time on November 28, 1941.

Mr. Richardson: Was it sent generally to all stations that it was felt might be in a position to intercept the execute?

Captain Safford: It was sent to all stations which we considered had the personnel problem, the trained personnel, available personnel, and proper material, to intercept the message.

Mr. Richardson: How many stations do you know picked up the messages now identified as 2353 and 2354?

Captain Safford: I cannot tell you off-hand. I will

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

h4

1 have to search through the records.

2 Mr. Richardson: Were there a great many of them?

3 Captain Safford: There were at least two in the
4 United States Navy, because they had translated the message,
5 the Dutch must have intercepted it because they trans-
6 lated it, and the Australians knew about it, and I don't
7 know how they got it.

8 Mr. Richardson: Now, how did 2353 come in in the
9 first instance to the intercepting station in the United
10 States?

11 Captain Safford: It was in the intercept of a radio
12 message from Tokyo to San Francisco, but addressed to
13 Washington.

14 Mr. Richardson: Was it in code?

15 Captain Safford: It was in code, in the Japanese
16 code which we call J-19.

17 Mr. Richardson: Was it in the form of message in
18 which the Japanese were accustomed to send out weather
19 broadcasts?

20 Captain Safford: I don't understand that question.

21 Mr. Richardson: Do you know of weather broadcasts
22 the Japanese stations were sending out generally?

23 Captain Safford: The Japanese sent out weather
24 forecasts on most of their broadcasts just the way the United
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Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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States sent out weather forecasts on most of its official broadcasts.

Mr. Richardson: Would the form of broadcast as sent out by the Japanese be the form in which Circular 2353 came in?

Captain Safford: No, because a weather broadcast would consist of nothing but weather, and this prescribed that an apparent or false weather report be inserted in the middle of news. That was never done in the Japanese broadcasts.

Mr. Richardson: Was 2353 sent out in Morse code?

Captain Safford: I do not understand.

Mr. Richardson: You understand what the Japanese sending messages in the Morse code in Japanese means?

Captain Safford: Yes.

Mr. Richardson: Was this message 2353 sent out in that way?

Captain Safford: That was sent out in International Morse code, because it had to be received by American operators at San Francisco who did not know the Morse code.

Mr. Richardson: And that was true of 2353?

Captain Safford: It was true of 2353 and true of every translation given in this book.

Mr. Richardson: That would include 2353?

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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1 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

2 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, the witness had some paper
3 in his left hand when he said everything in there was by
4 International Morse code. May we have what that paper
5 is? He had it in his left hand. He said everything was
6 International Morse code.

7 Mr. Kaufman: That is Exhibit 142.

8 Captain Safford: Every message quoted in Exhibit 142,
9 also the message quoted in Exhibit 1, was sent out in
10 International Morse code.

11 Mr. Murphy: Every message?

12 Mr. Richardson: That is right.

13 Now, in that code, the Japanese words which are shown
14 in Circular 2353 as appear in Exhibit 142, appear as shown:

15 HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.

16 The three Japanese words were in the message as sent
17 out in International code?

18 Captain Safford: The words HIGASHI NO KAZEAME and
19 the other two Japanese expressions were taken after decrypt-
20 ing the original Japanese message and converting the codes
21 language into Japanese.

22 Mr. Richardson: And then the next step would be to
23 translate the Japanese?

24 Captain Safford: The next step would be to translate
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

h7

1 the Japanese into English, but leaving the code expres-
2 sions alone because we didn't want to alter the exact
3 wording used.

4 Mr. Richardson: Well, the meaning of the Japanese
5 words that remain in Circular 2353 as it appears in Exhibit
6 142 is the meaning that appears in the lower left-hand
7 corner:

8 EAST WIND RAIN, would be HIGASHI NO KAZEAME;

9 NORTH WIND CLOUDY -- you pronounce that --

10 Captain Safford: Kitanokaze Kumori.

11 Mr. Richardson: WEST WIND CLEAR.

12 Captain Safford: Nishi no kaze hare.

13 Mr. Richardson: All right.

14 Now, when you turn to Circular 2354, the only difference
15 between the two messages would be that under 2354 only
16 a single word indicating a compass point would be included
17 in the general intelligence broadcast referred to in that
18 dispatch?

19 Captain Safford: That is partially correct. There
20 was also the further requirement that that single word
21 be repeated five times at the beginning and at the end
22 of the message. 2353 required that phrase be added in
23 the middle of the daily Japanese language shortwave broadcast.

24 Mr. Richardson: As a matter of fact there were three
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Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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requirements to comply with 2353?

Captain Safford: That is correct.

Mr. Richardson: The signal had to be in the middle, it also had to be at the end, the broadcast had to be a weather forecast, and each sentence had to be repeated twice?

Captain Safford: And it had to be in the Japanese language.

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Mr. Richardson: Where do you find in circular 2353 that it had to be in the Japanese language?

Captain Safford: It says: "The following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast."

Mr. Richardson: You interpreted that to mean that in addition to being in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast the words themselves had to be in Japanese?

Captain Safford: That is true and the rest of the broadcast had to be in Japanese also.

Mr. Richardson: Well, it doesn't say so, does it?

Captain Safford: It does say so.

Mr. Richardson: Where?

Captain Safford: It says: "The daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast."

Mr. Richardson: Yes, it says that the warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

Captain Safford: That is correct.

Mr. Richardson: But it does not say what is put in the middle had to be in Sanskrit or Latin or English or Japanese, does it?

Captain Safford: It merely gave the words which they

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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would use.

Mr. Richardson: Right. Now, on 2354, Captain, the first requirement was that the dispatch -- the notice was to be a general intelligence broadcast?

Captain Safford: That is correct.

Mr. Richardson: Would that mean a radio broadcast?

Captain Safford: That meant a radio broadcast.

Mr. Richardson: And then those compass words that we have referred to that are shown in 2354 had to be at the beginning of that broadcast?

Captain Safford: And at the end.

Mr. Richardson: And at the end of the broadcast and had to be repeated five times?

Captain Safford: That is correct.

Mr. Richardson: And included at the beginning and end?

Captain Safford: That is correct.

Mr. Richardson: All right. Now, unless the execute or an alleged execute that came to your attention complied with the directions contained in one or the other of those two code messages would you interpret it to be an execute of the original message?

Captain Safford: If it departed radically from those instructions we would regard it as having nothing to do with the expected execute of those messages.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Mr. Richardson: Suppose it did not appear in the middle, would that eliminate it?

Captain Safford: Not necessarily but we would regard it with suspicion.

Mr. Richardson: Suppose it was not in a short wave news broadcast, would that eliminate it?

Captain Safford: The word on "short wave" was incorrectly translated by a green translator. The correct translation of that word was "overseas broadcast".

Mr. Richardson: Well, now, just wait a minute. You do not understand the Japanese language yourself, do you?

Captain Safford: That is correct.

Mr. Richardson: Well, then, are you in a position of your own knowledge to tell us what that correct translation would be?

Captain Safford: I suggest that the committee get a correct translation both in 2353 and 2354, a full translation with no words on it at the discretion of the translator.

Mr. Richardson: And the only message that you knew anything about when this episode on the winds execute came up was this message 2353 and 2354?

Captain Safford: Oh, no, we had the British translation at the same time and we had probably verified our own translations immediately we found a conflicting translation coming

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 in from the Navy, from the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet.

3 That was custom.

4 Mr. Richardson: I don't want any probably business in
5 this. Was there another translation of the Japanese broadcast
6 that was the basis for 2353 that was made by our authority
7 here? If so, where is it?

8 Captain Safford: There is no other on record.

9 Mr. Richardson: Well, then the only one that you had
10 available to you that was over our own stations was 2353 and
11 2354 on the morning of December 4th?

12 Captain Safford: That is correct if we are restricted
13 to what was intercepted by our own stations.

14 Mr. Richardson: That is right. Now, the only other one
15 available to you was the one sent in from the Commander of
16 the Asiatic Fleet?

17 Captain Safford: That is correct, up until shortly af-
18 ter we had actually intercepted the winds execute message.

19 Mr. Richardson: The fact is, is it not, Captain, that
20 in your earlier testimony before Admiral Hewitt and in your
21 earlier testimony before Admiral Hart you testified, did you
22 not, that the interpretation that was placed upon the message
23 that you saw on the morning of December 4th was based upon
24 the meaning given to you by the Foote and the Thorp broadcast
25 that had come in from Canberra and Batavia? Didn't you so

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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testify?

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Captain Safford: I will have to check that.

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Mr. Richardson: All right.

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Captain Safford: What page is that on?

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Mr. Richardson: I am referring first to page 748 of the Navy Court of Inquiry. My point is, Captain, - I want you to get the point, - didn't you in your testimony there base your interpretation of the meaning of this execute on the Dutch translation and the Foote translation and that you did not say anything whatever about the Hart translation?

Mr. Murphy: Hart? The Hart translation?

Mr. Richardson: Admiral Hart, the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet.

Captain Safford: What page is that again, please?

Mr. Richardson: This is 748 of the Navy Inquiry.

Captain Safford: I answered those questions as you stated.

Mr. Richardson: All right. And in your written statement that you have read to the committee in this proceeding you base your interpretation on the message that had come in on November 28th from the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet.

Captain Safford: That is correct.

Mr. Richardson: Now, isn't the reason that you changed because you discovered that the Foote message and the Thorp

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 message had come in after you made your interpretation of the
3 message on the morning of December 4th and, therefore, you
4 could not have relied on it and then didn't you turn to the
5 message from the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet as
6 the source of your interpretation? Isn't that a specific
7 reason why you did it?

8

Captain Safford: No.

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Mr. Richardson: All right, that is all; that answers it.

10

Now, will you turn to l-C in exhibit 142? It is about

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the third or fourth page.

12

Captain Safford: I see it.

13

Mr. Richardson: Now, that is a copy of our message from

14

the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, isn't it?

15

Captain Safford: That is correct, sir.

16

Mr. Richardson: And that is the one that in your state-

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ment to the committee you relied on for your interpretation

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of the message that you got on the morning of December 4th?

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Captain Safford: At the time the winds message was

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intercepted and translated by Kramer and sent up to higher

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authority, that is correct.

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Mr. Richardson: All right. Now, will you tell me what

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there is in that message that says that the language that was

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to be used meant war? Read it to me from the message.

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Captain Safford: "NISHI NISHI ENGLAND INCLUDING OCCUPA-

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 TION OF THAI OR INVASION OF MALAYA AND NEI", which
3 is an abbreviation for Netherlands East Indies.

4 Mr. Richardson: Now, stop right there. We had been
5 getting messages, had we not, for ten days with reference to
6 the movements of the Japanese toward the Thai Peninsula and
7 the occupation of Malasia, hadn't we?

8 Captain Safford: We had numerous signs indicating that
9 they were possibly contemplating an act of war, correct.

10 Mr. Richardson: Toward those places, toward the Thai
11 Peninsula and Malasia?

12 Captain Safford: That is correct.

13 Mr. Richardson: So there wasn't anything in that language
14 with reference to "NISHI NISHI" that was either new or parti-
15 cularly startling to us, was there, at that time?

16 Captain Safford: Nothing except the confirmation of our
17 suspicions or deductions.

18 Mr. Richardson: And the only thing you could draw, the
19 only deduction you could draw from it fairly, Captain, would
20 be that if the execute message came in that said "NISHI NISHI"
21 it would mean that the Japs were going after England by going
22 upon that occupation, did it not, or invasion of Malaya?

23 Captain Safford: And the Netherlands East Indies, that
24 is correct.

25 Mr. Richardson: Now, proceed and show me what there is

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 in that dispatch that shows war on the United States?

3 Captain Safford: There is nothing in the literal trans-
4 lation of that dispatch which says war on the United States.

5 Mr. Richardson: Now, when you turn back, Captain, to
6 1-A, which is 2353, you find the phrase "HIGASHI NO KAZEAME",
7 with the definition, "Japan-U.S. relations in danger."

8 Do you find anything in the dispatch from the Commander-
9 in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet that changes that interpreta-
10 tion of "HIGASHI NO KAZEAME", or whatever it is?

11 Captain Safford: There is nothing that changes the
12 translation of that phrase.

13 Mr. Richardson: All right. This dispatch that you say
14 was the execute, which you say was what you had been looking
15 for, which was the great triumph of the Navy over the Army,
16 you say came in on the morning of December 4th about eight
17 o'clock?

18 Captain Safford: After 8:30; shortly before 9.

19 Mr. Richardson: Well, now, you testified at least twice
20 before, didn't you, Captain, that it came in on the evening
21 of December 3rd?

22 Captain Safford: I was testifying from memory and doing
23 the best I could without the aid of the written notes which I
24 had unfortunately destroyed in December 1941.

25 Mr. Richardson: Well, they were still destroyed when you

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 made your statement here to the committee, weren't they? They
3 still remained destroyed, didn't they?

4 Captain Safford: Those notes remained destroyed, yes.

5 Mr. Richardson: Well, what you mean is after you testi-
6 fied in these earlier hearings you sat down with yourself and
7 your pencil and you made some new notes, is that true?

8 Captain Safford: I got new written evidence about two
9 weeks ago which up till that time had not been in my posses-
10 sion. It helped me tremendously in reconstructing what had
11 happened as well as refreshing my memory.

12 Mr. Richardson: Well, now, Captain, let us go into this
13 question.

14 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, may I request that the
15 written evidence be now produced so that we may examine it?
16 I ask that his written evidence that was produced two weeks
17 ago be submitted to the committee.

18 The Vice Chairman: He said he obtained written evidence
19 about two weeks ago that refreshed his memory. Mr. Murphy
20 asks that that written evidence be produced.

21 Mr. Murphy: And that it be spread on the record.

22 Mr. Richardson: What was that written evidence, Cap-
23 tain, what is the nature of it?

24 Captain Safford: Monthly reports from the interceptor
25 stations at Winter Harbor, Maine and at Cheltenham, Maryland,

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 which I had requested two years ago and had been informed
3 could not be discovered. We made one more attempt about two
4 weeks ago and those particular reports were located and my
5 assistant read them and got pertinent parts for me and I
6 have his penciled copies of that stuff. I have quoted those
7 parts in my testimony, in these extracts from the logs --
8 rather the monthly reports of Winter Harbor, Maine and Chel-
9 tenham, Maryland.

10 Mr. Richardson: But it is true, Captain, is it not, that
11 at least twice before under oath you placed the date of the
12 receipt of this execute message that you testified concerning
13 on the evening of December 3rd?

14 Captain Safford: I believe I said December 3rd or 4th.
15 I think I made it broader than that.

16 Mr. Richardson: I don't think you did. Let me call
17 your attention to your testimony at page 361 of the Hart in-
18 vestigation. Didn't you testify there as follows:

19 "The winds message was actually broadcast during the
20 evening of December 3, 1941 Washington time, which was
21 December 4th by Greenwich time and Tokyo time."

22 Captain Safford: That is correct.

23 Mr. Richardson: And then to make sure that that was not
24 an error didn't you testify a little later in that same ex-
25 amination as follows:

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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"The winds message was received in the Navy Department during the evening of December 3rd while Lieutenant (J.G.) Francis M. Brotherhood, USNR, was on watch."

Captain Safford: That is correct.

Mr. Richardson: Well, now, Captain, you do not know yourself of your own knowledge when the message was received, do you?

Captain Safford: I do not know from first hand knowledge exactly what time it was received.

Mr. Richardson: All you know, Captain, is that Kramer came to you with a piece of paper in his hand that had a message on it?

Captain Safford: It was a piece of paper which I recognized as the yellow paper from a roll on a teletype machine.

Mr. Richardson: All right. Now, before we go into that let me inquire, Captain, along this line. Now, after all of this episode had transpired and you had destroyed your notes-- by the way, do you now contend that you made notes of what occurred at the time this message came in?

Captain Safford: I made notes while events were fresh in my memory as to the things which were not matters of official record and were important to know, such as such things as times of deliveries of certain messages, and so forth. The winds message was then in existence. I could have re-

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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ferred to it for anything that I wanted and there would be no occasion to try to check the exact time at which it was intercepted.

Mr. Richardson: You testified before the Army Board, didn't you?

Captain Safford: Correct.

Mr. Richardson: And I refer now to page 160 of the Army Board. Didn't you testify as follows there, Captain:

"Captain Safford: Kramer made his statements of 8th and 9th of December immediately after the event when I discussed it fully with him. I called for statements. I talked to everybody concerned to see if my people had been negligent in any way, that this thing had been our fault. I made a very careful investigation.

"General Russell: Did you make any records of that investigation?

"Captain Safford: No, sir."

Was that true?

Captain Safford: There was no written record made. All the notes I had in the rough form were destroyed when I got the orders.

Mr. Richardson: All right. Now, Captain --

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, may I -- well, I don't want to interrupt. He testified yesterday the meeting was on the

1 Witness Safford Questions by: Mr. Richardson
 2 15th and now he says there were notes made on the 8th and now
 3 he says that on the 14th or 15th they were destroyed.

4 Mr. Richardson: Captain, after all of this episode and
 5 at the time of this episode you had been a very busy man,
 6 hadn't you?

7 Captain Safford: That is correct, yes, sir.

8 Mr. Richardson: You might almost say that you worked
 9 day and night.

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10 Captain Safford: Not quite that much but I was working
 11 long hours.

12 Mr. Richardson: And your staff was working hard?

13 Captain Safford: That is correct.

14 Mr. Richardson: And your office had never been as busy
 15 as it was during this week before the Pearl Harbor attack, had
 16 it?

17 Captain Safford: That is correct.

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 Mr. Richardson: And after this episode with reference
2 to this so-called winds execute, you never turned your
3 attention to that matter until prior to the summer of
4 fall of 1943, did you, approximately two years?

5 Captain Safford: Approximately two years; a few
6 months less.

7 Mr. Richardson: And the fact is, is it not, Captain,
8 that in the fall of 1943, you concluded that you might be
9 a witness, and then you undertook, by inquiry, by investi-
10 gation, by conversation, by letters, to try and remember
11 what occurred during that period before the attack in
12 December, 1941?

13 Captain Safford: I was doing more than that at that
14 time. I was engaged in writing up a history of radio in-
15 telligence from 1924 to 1941 by the direction and instruc-
16 tion of the Director of Naval Intelligence. That was
17 carried for seven months in my monthly report of progress,
18 in addition to doing that work.

19 Mr. Richardson: It was the official work you had
20 to do. You were very deeply exercised in trying to make up
21 your mind as to what you might testify to, if you were
22 called as a witness?

23 Captain Safford: I was trying to do double duty with
24 the same set of data.
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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Mr. Richardson: And the other duty, I repeat again, was to try and get your mind made up as to what the facts were, so if you were called as a witness you could testify?

Captain Safford: So I could testify and not be confused on the witness stand by counsel.

Mr. Richardson: Now, Captain, I want you to know that I do not care a tinker's damn whether the winds execute message came in or whether it did not. I am only interested in whether there should be reviewed by the committee all of the reliable facts that can be adduced so they can reach a conclusion,

I do not want to mislead you or browbeat you, if I talk rather loudly. It is because I am a rather loud talking individual.

I just want to make it clear that when you started, in the fall of 1943 to prepare yourself as a witness, your whole recollection was exceedingly hazy as to what had happened two years before, wasn't it?

Captain Safford: There were a few outstanding facts and the details linking them together were very hazy.

Mr. Richardson: Now, let me read you what you testified to on that point in the Hewitt investigation, at page 112:

"Captain Safford: In the fall of 1943, it appeared

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

h3

1 there was going to be a trial, a court martial of Admiral
2 Kimmel. It was hinted in the newspapers and various
3 people in the Navy Department were getting testimony
4 ready for it. I realized I would be one of the important
5 witnesses, that my memory was very vague, and I began
6 looking around to get everything that I could to prepare
7 a written statement which I could follow as testimony.

8 "That was the time when I studied the Roberts report
9 carefully for the first time, and noted to reference to
10 the winds message, or to the message which McCollum had
11 written, and which I had seen, and which I thought had
12 been sent, and then I began talking to everybody who had
13 been around at the time and who knew I had been mixed up
14 in it, to see what they could remember to straighten me
15 out on the thing, and give me leads to follow down to
16 where I got my hands on official messages, and things so
17 it would be a matter of fact and not a matter of memory.

18 "I also talked the thing over with whatever Army
19 people were still around at the time, and had anything in
20 this line, and bit by bit these facts appeared to come
21 together.

22 "The investigation was conducted, if you call it that,
23 for the purpose of preparing myself to take the stand as
24 a witness in a prospective court martial of Admiral Kimmel."
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

h4

1 Now, you regard that today, do you not, Captain,
2 as a fair statement of how you brought your mind to a
3 factual conclusion as to what happened during that period,
4 that week prior to Pearl Harbor, in the fall of 1943?

5 Captain Safford: That is correct.

6 Senator Lucas: 1941?

7 Mr. Richardson: 1943.

8 Now, Captain --

9 Captain Safford: May I add something to that statement?

10 Mr. Richardson: Yes.

11 Captain Safford: At the time I did this, I expected
12 to be called as a witness for the prosecution, to repre-
13 sent the Navy Department, in the charges which I thought
14 would be preferred against Admiral Kimmel.

15 Mr. Richardson: Well, that made it all the more import-
16 ant, did it not, Captain, that you should testify as to
17 what you knew and not what you found out from what somebody
18 told you, because you were then dealing with the guilt or
19 innocence of a human being?

20 Captain Safford: That is correct.

21 Mr. Richardson: Now, Captain, you were exceedingly
22 anxious to get hold of an execute message to the winds
23 code, were you not?

24 Captain Safford: I first looked for the --
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Mr. Richardson (interposing): No, no. I am asking you as to your mental condition. You were very anxious, while you waited to see what the monitoring stations would send in to see when an execute code would come in?

Captain Safford: That is correct.

Mr. Richardson: All right. Now the first time you ever saw the message that you say in your statement was an execute message, was when Kramer brought it to you, sometime after 8 o'clock on the morning of December 4?

Captain Safford: That is correct.

Mr. Richardson: You were not a Japanese linguist?

Captain Safford: No.

Mr. Richardson: You did not decode the message?

Captain Safford: No.

Mr. Richardson: Do you know under whose watch station the message came in?

Captain Safford: Lieutenant Murray was on watch at the time.

Mr. Richardson: Did not you specifically testify in the former hearing that it came in to Lieutenant Brotherhood?

Captain Safford: I did on the first hearing, when I was under the belief that it had come in on Brotherhood's watch, because he told me it had.

Mr. Richardson: Well, I will take up the Brotherhood

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

h6

1 matter with you a little later.

2 I want to pursue this matter just a moment.

3 Now, Kramer brought you this message, is that cor-
4 rect?

5 Captain Safford: That is correct.

6 Mr. Richardson: Now, there was some writing on the
7 message when he brought it to you?

8 Captain Safford: There was writing on the message.

9 Mr. Richardson: Now, outside of that writing, what
10 was on that message when he brought it to you?

11 Captain Safford: He had underscored the code words
12 in the middle of the message, so they stood out very
13 plainly.

14 Mr. Richardson: Just tell me Captain, in what form
15 was this message? Was it in English?

16 Captain Safford: The message was in Japanese.

17 Mr. Richardson: All of it?

18 Captain Safford: All of it.

19 Mr. Richardson: And you could not read Japanese?

20 Captain Safford: I can read a few words in Japanese,
21 if they point it out by underscoring, and I compared them
22 with the original words of the two winds codes.

23 Mr. Richardson: Now, let us not go quite so fast on
24 that, Captain.

25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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When the message was brought to you by Kramer, was it typewritten?

Captain Safford: It was the teletype message as it came in the machine.

Mr. Richardson: In Japanese?

Captain Safford: In Japanese.

Mr. Richardson: And with the exception of these specific words, that you were watching for, you did not attempt to read it in Japanese?

Captain Safford: I did not attempt to read it.

Mr. Richardson: Now, there was some writing on that message, was there not?

Captain Safford: That is correct.

Mr. Richardson: In handwriting?

Captain Safford: In handwriting.

Mr. Richardson: In English?

Captain Safford: In English.

Mr. Richardson: What was written in longhand on that message?

Captain Safford: "War with England including NEI," and so forth. "War with the U.S." or possibly United States, and "Peace with Russia."

That is to the best of my recollection after four years.

Mr. Richardson: Well, it is not quite four years,

Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

h8

1 in view of the fact that this is the 5th time you are
2 testifying on it, is it, Captain?

3 Captain Safford: That is correct.

4 Mr. Richardson: Was there anything else written in
5 longhand on this message in Japanese, except those three
6 phrases?

7 Captain Safford: There was nothing in Kramer's hand-
8 writing.

9 Mr. Richardson: Well, there was no other handwriting
10 on it but Kramer's?

11 Captain Safford: No.

12 Mr. Richardson: The only other writing there was on
13 the paper was the teletype message in Japanese?

14 Captain Safford: And the identifying data, such as
15 the frequency, time of intercept, station which sent it,
16 which I glanced at, but promptly forgot.

17 Mr. Richardson: Well, that is not unreasonable.

18 Now, then Captain, that message that you got, with
19 respect to the Japanese words that were underlined which
20 you say Kramer interpreted in longhand on the message,
21 was a dead ringer execute for the original code message
22 2353 that had been sent out, was it not?

23 Captain Safford: That is correct, except that it
24 reversed it in the case of Russia, because we thought no
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

h9

1 war would be no mention, but they gave a positive, speci-
2 fic mention as to Russia, but in a negative sense, which
3 we concluded meant peace, or not war as yet.

4 Mr. Richardson: Well, then, Captain, we can dismiss
5 from our attention in connection with any examination of
6 you, or any contention of you as to the winds execute
7 circular 2354, cannot we?

8 Captain Safford: Let me see that.

9 Mr. Richardson: Because this execute could not have
10 been in completion of Circular 2354, could it?

11 Captain Safford: 2354 is out completely, except for
12 the fact that is what we expected to find in a Morse code
13 message, and it did not turn out that way.

14 Mr. Richardson: So that the only code message, winds
15 code message, so far as your testimony is concerned, that
16 the committee need pay any attention to is 2353?

17 Captain Safford: That is correct.

18 Mr. Richardson: All right.

19 Now, were the words HIGASHI NO KAZEAME in the middle
20 of the broadcast?

21 Captain Safford: That is the place they were under-
22 scored.

23 Mr. Richardson: Were they also at the end?

24 Captain Safford: I do not know now. They were not
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

h10

1 underscoring at the end if they were there.

2 Mr. Richardson: That would be a very important item
3 in order to ascertain whether this was intended to be an
4 execute of 2353, would it not?

5 Captain Safford: Not necessarily. They would be
6 repeated at the end only as a precaution so that if they
7 missed the early part of the broadcast, they could pick
8 it up at the last and not lose it.

9 Mr. Richardson: Just a minute, Captain. 'Don't you
10 think you are extending your authority a little when you
11 interpret what the Japanese meant in a code direction? Did
12 not you tell me a few minutes ago that everyone of those
13 directions that were contained in 2353 were important to
14 be considered in determining whether or not a given message
15 was an execute message?

16 Captain Safford: I said they were important, that
17 is correct.

18 Mr. Richardson: Well, you did not even look to find
19 out whether these three sets of words that had been trans-
20 lated were also at the end of the message, did you?

21 Captain Safford: I never made such a statement.

22 Mr. Richardson: Well, you did not?

23 Captain Safford: I said I cannot remember whether they
24 were repeated at the end or not. I was well satisfied that
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

h11

1 that message was authentic, an authentic signal of the
2 execute given by the Japanese Government.

3 Mr. Richardson: Captain, I am not the least interested
4 in whether you are satisfied or not. I am only interested
5 in ascertaining whether, when you saw the message, you
6 endeavored to ascertain, as a careful, trained Intelligence
7 man, whether it was an execute of the winds code message
8 2353, and consequently I asked you first, was it in the
9 middle and you said yes; and I then asked you was it at the
10 end, and you said you did not look.

11 Now third, was each sentence repeated twice?

12 Captain Safford: I did not say I did not look. I
13 said I could not tell you from present memory.

14 Mr. Richardson: Well, then, you cannot give us any
15 help as to whether it was at the end, can you?

16 Captain Safford: I can give you no help at the present
17 time.

18 Mr. Richardson: But the fact that it was in the message
19 just impressed you, so that to this day you can remember
20 just those words that were underlined, cannot you?

21 Captain Safford: I can remember them because we had
22 the words preserved in the written record in Circular 2353.
23 I cannot remember the words in my mind. I can only leave
24 them to this which had been preserved in the written record,
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

h12

1 and I knew it was this form, and not the other form.

2 Mr. Richardson: And when you looked at 2353, right
3 in front of your nose was the phrase that all three of
4 these phrases had also to appear at the end of the broad-
5 cast message, but that did not seem to impress you as
6 being important.

7 Have you any reaction on that now? Does your mind
8 give any reaction on that now?

9 Captain Safford: I have no doubt that I checked
10 through the rest of the message, and found everything in
11 due form and technically correct, according to 2353, but
12 I cannot swear from memory to it at this late date.

13 Mr. Richardson: Well, at the present time, Captain,
14 regardless of what you had no doubt of, you have no recol-
15 lection, under oath, that you saw anything in that message
16 except the three phrases underlined by Kramer in the mes-
17 sage he handed you?

18 Captain Safford: That is correct. Those are the things
19 that remain in my memory through all this period of time.

20 Mr. Richardson: Now do you have any recollection,
21 Captain that these sentences, these groups of words were
22 repeated twice in the message? That would be important,
23 would it not?

24 Captain Safford: It is my impression they were, but
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

h13

1 I am not certain.

2 Mr. Richardson: Was this message, Captain, a short
3 wave news broadcast?

4 Captain Safford: It was a shortwave news broadcast.

5 Mr. Richardson: How do you know?

6 Captain Safford: Because the frequency was recorded
7 on the message, and we could not hear the longwave or low
8 power stuff anyhow, the only thing we could hear in
9 Washington from Tokyo was on shortwave.

10 Mr. Richardson: How did you know it was news if you
11 could not read Japanese?

12 Captain Safford: I counted on Kramer to do that.

13 Mr. Richardson: Well, you could have counted on Kramer
14 to do it, but now you have not testified that you asked
15 him anything about it.

16 Captain Safford: Kramer told me when he gave me the
17 paper, he said, "This is it." There is no question in
18 my mind or the mind of anybody else what he meant by it.

19 Mr. Richardson: Now, let us just temporarily, because
20 I am going to question you about it again, Captain, probe
21 that question.

22 You know, do you not, Captain, now that Kramer has
23 three times in his sworn testimony heretofore, denied that
24 he saw anything in this message with reference to Japanese
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

h14

1 words relating to the United States, and says that the
2 only thing there was in the message he saw had reference
3 to Russia. You know that, don't you?

4 Captain Safford: I did not know that.

5 Mr. Richardson: He told you that, didn't he?

6 Captain Safford: Kramer never told me anything
7 about Russia.

8 Mr. Richardson: Did not he tell you that he was
9 completely uncertain as to what the Japanese words were in
10 this message?

11 Captain Safford: I think that Kramer had been pretty
12 well befuddled by the middle of 1945.

13 Mr. Richardson: Had been pretty well what?

14 Captain Safford: Well, befuddled.

15 Mr. Richardson: Well, did the befuddling, Captain
16 apply only to Kramer? Were you befuddled at all in 1945?

17 Captain Safford: In 1945 there was a determined effort
18 made to have me reverse my testimony before previous in-
19 vestigations and to say I had never seen the winds message.

20 Mr. Richardson: All right.

21 Now, explain to the committee in detail just who started
22 to exercise influence on you to make you change your testi-
23 mony. Give names and dates, and the full conversations.

24 Mr. Murphy: May I request, Mr. Chairman, that we also
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson
Senator Lucas

h15

1 have him produce the original memorandum he made two
2 weeks ago?

3 Mr. Richardson: I did not hear that.

4 Mr. Murphy: I would like to request that we have
5 presented the written memorandum of two weeks ago. He
6 said he had a written memorandum of two weeks ago that he
7 just got for the first time.

8 Mr. Keefe: He already identified it.

9 Mr. Murphy: I would like to have that produced.

10 Mr. Richardson: Go ahead and read it in detail. Give
11 us now all of the evidence that you have to indicate that
12 anybody tried to get you to change your testimony in just
13 as much detail as you can, Captain.

14 Senator Lucas: Mr. Counsel, may I inquire when this
15 statement was prepared?

16 Mr. Richardson: Which statement?

17 Senator Lucas: What he is about to read.

18 Captain Safford: This statement was prepared on the
19 14th of July, 1945.

20 Senator Lucas: How did you happen to prepare that
21 statement at that time?

22 Captain Safford: There were certain things that occur-
23 red that struck me as quite unusual. I had never seen any-
24 thing like it in all my experience as a commissioned officer
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Lucas
Mr. Richardson

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of the Navy, and I made notes on the spot, and combined it all into one memorandum while the events were still fresh in my memory.

Senator Lucas: You did not have this previously?

Mr. Richardson: No, this is the first I have heard of it.

The Vice Chairman: Do you set out in that statement what those certain events were that impressed you?

Captain Safford: I have it here. I merely had it with me to refresh my memory. I did not expect to produce it as evidence. I am now asked to produce it, and I have it here, if it is desired by the committee.

The Vice Chairman: Go ahead.

Captain Safford: I would just as soon not go into this here.

Mr. Richardson: I think it would be well, if he read his paper rather than testifying from it, simply in refreshing his recollection.

The Vice Chairman: Yes, just read your paper completely to the committee, please, sir.

Senator Ferguson: May I suggest, counsel, if there is anything that is not in this memorandum that he recalls, that he give that also?

Mr. Richardson: Yes. I thought it was all oral, when

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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I asked the question.

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

The Vice Chairman: Read your paper completely, and distinctly, so we may all hear it, and then when you have finished reading it, why you may supplement it by any other statement you desire to make on this subject, in response to the question counsel has asked you.

Senator Ferguson: Might I suggest that he read it not so fast.

Captain Safford: All right.

Senator Ferguson: I have difficulty at times hearing you.

Captain Safford: This paper is dated 14 July, 1945:

"MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH ADMIRAL HEWITT'S INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR DISASTER."

Mr. Richardson: This was after you had testified before Admiral Hewitt?

Captain Safford: This was after I had testified before Admiral Hewitt.

Mr. Richardson: All right, go ahead.

Captain Safford: I believe -- I am not certain on the dates.

Mr. Murphy: The Hewitt testimony was taken between May 14, 1945 and July 12, 1945, and this memorandum is

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

hl8

1 July 14, two days after Admiral Hewitt concluded taking
2 testimony.

3 Captain Safford (reading):

4 "1. This memorandum is prepared, while events are
5 still fresh in my mind, for possible use in connection
6 with future Investigations of the Pearl Harbor Disaster,
7 or Court-martials in connection with Pearl Harbor. It
8 includes certain acts which strike me as irregular, or
9 unusual, and probably illegal.

10 "2. On or about Friday, 11 May, 1945, I was called
11 to an unofficial conference (or meeting) conducted by
12 Lieutenant Commander John Sonnett, U.S.N.R., in room 1083A,
13 Navy Building."

14 The Vice Chairman: Spell that man's name.

15 Captain Safford: S-o-n-n-e-t-t.

16 Mr. Richardson: Now, Captain, he had been connected
17 with the Hart hearing, had not he?

18 Captain Safford: He had not.

19 Mr. Richardson: What hearing was he connected with?

20 Captain Safford: He was connected with the Hewitt
21 hearing.

22 Mr. Richardson: I mean the Hewitt hearing. What was
23 his function in the Hewitt hearing? Do you remember?

24 Captain Safford: He was a legal adviser to Admiral
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Hewitt, and a special representative of the Secretary
of the Navy.

Mr. Richardson: And took part in that investigation?

Captain Safford: And took part in that investigation.

Mr. Richardson: All right. Now go ahead.

Captain Safford (continuing reading):

"He was in civilian clothes, as he has been on every occasion on which I have seen him. Sonnett told me that he had been assigned as a legal assistant to Admiral Hewitt in an investigation of the responsibility for the Pearl Harbor Disaster, that he was also a special representative for Secretary Forrestal in this investigation and that he was authorized to handle Top-Secret and Secret information and documents. He showed me papers signed by Secretary Forrestal and Fleet Admiral King verifying these statements.

"At my request he let me read the Precept which directed Admiral Hewitt to conduct the investigation. It was my understanding that Admiral Hewitt had not yet returned to Washington and that Sonnett was getting things lined up to expedite matters after the Admiral's arrival.

"3. I answered many questions pertaining to my testimony before previous investigations, and discussed discrepancies between my testimony and the testimony of other

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

h20

witnesses."

Mr. Richardson: Let me stop you right there, Captain.

Does not it commence to dawn on you that this statement of yours was made before you testified in the Hewitt examination?

Captain Safford: Some of the notes were made before, but it was written up and typed and dated afterwards.

Mr. Richardson: I see. But this conversation that you had with Sonnett took place before you testified in the Hewitt investigation?

Captain Safford: That is correct.

Mr. Richardson: All right.

Captain Safford (continuing reading):

"Sonnett requested that I give him, by the end of the next week, written memoranda to be used as a basis of study and examination (under oath) on the subjects listed below. This was done and the memoranda submitted as follows:

<u>"Subject</u>	<u>Date Submitted</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
'Winds Message' (6-pages)	15 May 1945	Withdrawn on 18 May 1945 at the suggestion of Lt. Comdr. Sonnett. Original retained for possible future use."

Mr. Richardson: By the way, have you a copy of that paper that you gave to Sonnett?

Captain Safford: I believe I have.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

h21

Mr. Richardson: All right, go ahead.

Mr. Murphy: Will the Captain go a little more slowly?

Captain Safford: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: There was something said before 15 May 1945. What was that?

Captain Safford: "Six pages."

Mr. Murphy: All right.

Captain Safford:

<u>"Subject</u>	<u>Date Submitted</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Evaluation of messages of 26 Nov. 1941 (6-pages.)	17 May 1945	Also lists the 6 carriers described by Com 16 as 'all known first and second fleet carriers.'
Evaluation of 'UTU' broadcasts (8-pages)	19 May 1945	No action was taken because Jap invasion fleet had been sighted by RAF planes off Kota Bharu.
Tatuta Maru and the President Madison (1 page)	21 May 1945	Indicates that on 7 Dec. 1941 the CNO refused to believe that the U.S. would be involved in the war that was imminent in East Asia.

"On Sonnett's request, I prepared and furnished him copies of certain U. S. Naval messages, the Station "H" Chronology for 1-6 December, 1941, and Com 14 Daily CI Summaries for 1 Nov.-6 Dec. 1941.

"4. It was apparent to me on my very first meeting with Lieutenant Commander Sonnett that he was acting as

Witness Safford

h22

1 a 'counsel for the defense' for the late Secretary Knox,
2 and Admiral Stark rather than as the legal assistant to
3 the investigating officer. His purpose seemed to be to
4 refute testimony (before earlier investigations) that was
5 unfavorable to anyone in Washington, to beguile 'hostile'
6 witnesses into changing their stories and to introduce an
7 element of doubt where he could not effect a reversal of
8 testimony. Above all, he attempted to make me reverse my
9 testimony regarding the 'Winds Execute' Message and to make
10 me believe I was suffering from hallucinations.

11 "5. I talked to Sonnett the second time on 18 May
12 1945, and the third time a day or two later. On these
13 latter occasions, like the first, Sonnett tried to persuade
14 me that there had been no 'Winds Execute' Message, that my
15 memory had been playing me tricks, that I had confused the
16 'False Winds Message' with what I had been expecting, and
17 that I ought to change my testimony to permit reconciling
18 all previous discrepancies and thereby wind up the affair.
19 In some cases the idea was stated outright, in some cases
20 it was implied, and in other cases it was unexpressed but
21 obviously the end in view."

22 Senator Lucas: The what?

23 Captain Safford: "The end in view."

24 "6. I distinctly recall Lieutenant Commander John
25

Witness Safford

h23

Sonnett, U.S.N.R., making the following statements to me during the course of the above-mentioned conferences:

"You are the only one who seems to have ever seen the 'Winds Execute' Message.

"How could the 'Winds Execute' be heard on the east coast of the U. S. and not at any of the places nearer Japan?"

"It is very doubtful that there ever was a 'Winds Execute' Message.

"It is no reflection on your veracity to change your testimony."

"It is no reflection on your mentality to have your memory play you tricks - after such a long period."

"Numerous witnesses that you have named have denied all knowledge of a 'Winds Execute' Message."

"You do not have to carry the torch for Admiral Kimmel."

"7. I testified before Admiral Hewitt the first time on or about 24 May 1945, before he went to Pearl Harbor. I testified before Admiral Hewitt a second time on 22 June, 1945, after his return from examining witnesses at Pearl Harbor. Upon completion of my testimony (in which the 'Winds Execute' Message had figured, I asked him, 'off-the-record'

Witness Safford

h24

1 if there was still any doubts in his mind as to the 'Winds
2 Message' having been sent by Japan and disseminated in the
3 War and Navy Departments. The Admiral looked startled,
4 and before he could reply Sonnett said:

5 "Of course, I am not conducting the case, and I do
6 not know what Admiral Hewitt has decided, but to me it is
7 very doubtful that the so-called 'Winds Execute' Message
8 was ever sent."

9 "Admiral Hewitt thought a minute or two more, and then
10 said:

11 "You are not entitled to my opinion, but I will
12 answer your question. There is no evidence of a 'Winds
13 Execute' Message beyond your unsupported testimony. I do
14 not doubt your sincerity, but I believe that you have con-
15 fused one of the other messages containing the name of a
16 wind with the message you were expecting to receive."

17 Maybe I ought to go on with paragraph 9.

18 "8. For my part, I do not doubt Admiral Hewitt's
19 integrity" --

20 The Vice Chairman: Just a minute. You are reading
21 everything that is on that paper?

22 Captain Safford: I am reading everything that is on
23 this paper.

24 The Vice Chairman: All right. Go ahead.
25

Witness Safford

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Captain Safford: "For my part, I do not doubt Admiral Hewitt 's integrity, but I do believe that Sonnett has succeeded in pulling the wool over his eyes.

"9. I also believe that Sonnett employed similar tactics on other witnesses whose testimony had favored Admiral Kimmel, particularly Rochefort and Kramer.

"10. Copies of the memorandum described in paragraph 3 are appended hereto. Also appended is a memorandum to Admiral Hewitt dated 22 June, 1945, clarifying my testimony regarding the 'Winds Execute' Message and indicating that Sonnett had attempted to trick me into stating the opposite of what I intended to say."

Signed, "L. F. Safford,

Captain, U. S. N."

Mr. Murphy: There are more pages?

The Vice Chairman: Does that complete your statement?

Captain Safford: That completes my statement. The other pages appended are copies of the memoranda which were referred to in paragraph 2.

The Vice Chairman: All right, proceed and read them, read every word of those papers attached to your statement.

Captain Safford:

"SECRET

"MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUT. COMMANDER JOHN F. SONNETT, U.S.N.R."

Witness Safford

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Captain Safford: "For my part, I do not doubt Admiral Hewitt 's integrity, but I do believe that Sonnett has succeeded in pulling the wool over his eyes.

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Signed, "L. F. Safford,

Captain, U. S. N."

Mr. Murphy: There are more pages?

The Vice Chairman: Does that complete your statement?

Captain Safford: That completes my statement. The other pages appended are copies of the memoranda which were referred to in paragraph 2.

The Vice Chairman: All right, proceed and read them, read every word of those papers attached to your statement.

Captain Safford:

"SECRET

"MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUT. COMMANDER JOHN F. SONNETT, U.S.N.R."

Witness Safford

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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The Vice Chairman: Permit me to ask you, is that your memorandum?

Captain Safford: That is my memorandum.

The Vice Chairman: Prepared by you?

Captain Safford: Prepared by me.

The Vice Chairman: Go ahead and read it.

Captain Safford: "Subject: Winds Message.

"1. To the best of my knowledge and believe, the following officers knew, in December, 1941, that the Winds 'Execute' message had been broadcast from Tokyo on (or about) 4 December, 1941 (and prior to 7 December 1941) although some of them did not learn about it until after the attack on Pearl Harbor:"

Then I have listed the name, present rank, station and duty on 7 December, 1941, first for the Army, and second for the Navy.

The Vice Chairman: Are those names there?

Captain Safford: The names are there, which I will read, if you are interested.

The Vice Chairman: All right, go ahead.

Captain Safford (reading):

Witness Safford

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1	<u>Name</u>	<u>Present Rank</u>	<u>Station and Duty on 7 December 1941</u>
2	George C. Marshall	General of the Army	Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
3	Leonard T. Gerow	Lt. Gen. U.S.A.	Director, War Plans Div.
4	Dawson Olmstead	Maj. Gen. U.S.A. (Ret.)	Chief Signal Officer
5	Sherman Miles	Maj. Gen. U.S.A.	Director of Military Intel- ligence.
6	Clayton Bissell	Maj. Gen. U.S.A.	War Plans Division, (WDGS)
7	Otis K. Sadtler	Col. U.S.A.	Army Communications, Office of Chief Signal Officer.
8	Rufus S. Bratton	Brig. Gen. U.S.A.	In charge, Far Eastern Section, Military Intelligence."
9	10	11	12
13	I believe I was mistaken. He was only a Colonel at the time.	14	15
14	The Vice Chairman: That is the first time you heard of him being a Brigadier General?	16	17
15	Captain Safford: I heard he had been promoted. That was my mistake. That is what it should be. (Resumes reading:)	16	18
16	"Rex W. Minckler Col., U.S.A.	17	Chief of Signal Intel- ligence, Service, Office of Chief Signal Officer.
17	Harold Doud Col., U.S.A.	18	In charge, Japanese Section, SIS, Office of Chief Signal Officer
18	Robert E. Schukraft Col., U.S.A.	19	In charge, Intercept Section, SIS, Office of Chief Signal Officer
19	20	21	22
20	23	24	25

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Safford

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Frank B. Rowlett	Lt.Col.(Signal Corps Reserve), U.S.Army	Principal Cryptanalyst Japanese Section, SIS Office of Chief Signal Officer.
H.R.Stark	Admiral U.S.Navy	Chief of Naval Operations.
H.E.Ingersoll	Admiral, U.S.Navy	Asst., Chief of Naval Operations
R.K.Turner	Vice Adm., U.S.N.	Director, War Plans Division
T.S.Wilkinson	Vice Adm., U.S.N.	Director of Naval Intelligence
Leigh Noyes	Rear Adm., U.S.N.	Director of Naval Communications
J.R.Beardall	Rear Adm., U.S.N.	Naval Aide to the President
J.R.Redman	Rear Adm., U.S.N.	Asst. Director of Naval Communications
F.E.Beatty	Rear Adm., U.S.N.	Aide to the Secretary of the Navy
L.F.Safford	Capt., U.S.N.	Op-20-G. In charge, Security Section, Naval Communications
A.H.McCollum	Capt., U.S.N.	Op-16-F2. In charge, Far Eastern Sect., Naval Intelligence
G.W.Welker	Capt., U.S.N.	Op-20-GK . In charge Intercept and Direction Finding Section
A.D.Kramer	Capt., U.S.N.	Op-20-GZ. In charge, Translation and Dissemination Section. (Actually attached to Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence.)

Witness Safford

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L.W.Parke	Comdr., U.S.N.	Op-20-GY. In charge, Cryptanalytical Section.
A.A.Murray	Lt.Comdr.,U.S.N.R.	Watch Officer in Op- 20-GY.
H.L.Bryant	Chief Ship's Clerk, U.S.N.	Confidential Yeoman in Op-20-GZ.

Larry
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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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follows
Shack 11:15
AL-1

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Lucas
Mr. Richardson

1
2 Senator Lucas: May I ask one question? Are those
3 names you read those who are presumed to have seen the
4 winds message?

5 Captain Safford: Seen or have been told about it;
6 knew about it at the time. Whether they have forgotten it
7 since I have no idea.

8 Senator Lucas: I see.

9 Mr. Richardson: You might indicate at this point
10 which ones of these names according to your information
11 actually saw this message that you say was the winds execute.

12 Senator Ferguson: Those that were in position to see
13 it or that did see it.

14 Mr. Richardson: That he knows saw it.

15 Captain, I don't want the report, or anything, but I
16 want your own knowledge as to which ones of these names saw
17 it.

18 Captain Safford: In this memorandum which I gave
19 Commander Sonnett I only told him which ones knew about the
20 winds message either before December 7 or shortly after.

21 Mr. Richardson: Then you don't know of your own
22 knowledge that any one of these persons so named ever actually
23 saw the message?

24 Mr. Keefe: Except Kramer, who he has testified gave
25 him the message.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. Richardson: Wait just a minute --

Captain Safford: So far as direct evidence is concerned I have no knowledge that any of those people saw it. These are turned in as a list of prospective witnesses on the winds code.

Mr. Richardson: You do know that Kramer saw it?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson: That is the only one.

Captain Safford: And I saw it.

Mr. Richardson: Yes.

Captain Safford: And I sent it to Admiral Noyes and the courier who took it up reported, "Message delivered".

Mr. Richardson: Now, have you anything further?

Captain Safford: I have a great deal more.

The Vice Chairman: Go right ahead from where you left off.

Senator Ferguson: Will counsel inquire as to whether these exhibits he is now reading were turned over to Commander Sonnett?

Captain Safford: These were all turned over on the days indicated. He talked to me about these things and asked me to write a complete statement to help him and Admiral Hewitt in the subsequent investigation conducted. They were not evidence. These were leads. Off the record and

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Lucas
Mr. Richardson

1 private examinations.

2 Mr. Richardson: But all given to Sonnett?

3 Captain Safford: Yes, sir, to help him and help
4 Admiral Hewitt.

5 Senator Ferguson: That is what I wanted.

6 Senator Lucas: Do I understand that just Kramer and
7 yourself saw this message?

8 Mr. Richardson: That is of his own knowledge.

9 Captain Safford: That I know from my own knowledge.

10 Senator Lucas: McCollum didn't see the message?

11 Captain Safford: I have no direct knowledge that
12 McCollum ever saw it.

13 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, in the statement he gives
14 us he said they all had them delivered to them. He is
15 only reading now the memorandum.

16 Captain Safford: Yes; on this list were people who
17 knew about it, not people who necessarily had copies.

18 The Vice Chairman: Go ahead, Captain, read from the
19 point you left off.

20 Captain Safford: "2. An element of confusion was
21 caused by the Tokyo weather forecast or "false" winds
22 message intercepted by the FCC at 2200 GCT, 4 December 1941,
23 and phones to Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood during the
24 evening of 4 December 1941. It is believed that certain
25

Witness Safford

1 officers attached to Op-20-G --"

2 The Vice Chairman: Not quite so fast.

3 Captain Safford: (Continuing) --"in December 1941
4 had in mind the "false" winds message when they informed
5 me that they knew of the "winds message". Their names are
6 as follows:

7 Lieutenant Commander G. W. Linn, U.S.N.R."

8 Senator Lucas: Pull the microphone in front of you,
9 please.

10 Captain Safford:

11 "Lieutenant Commander F. M. Brotherhood, U.S.N.R.

12 Lieutenant Commander A. V. Pering, U.S.N.R.

13 Lieutenant F. L. Freeman, U.S.N.

14 Ensign Wilmer Fox, U.S.N.

15 "The FCC interception of another winds execute message
16 between 0002 and 0035 (GCT), 8 December 1941, proves that
17 the Japanese Government did use this system for broadcasting
18 war warnings.

19 "3. There never has been any doubt in my mind that
20 the winds execute message was broadcast from Tokyo two or
21 three days prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor and forwarded
22 to the Navy Department. The points in doubt, which I sought
23 to clarify by sighting the incoming Japanese message (or its
24 translation), were:
25

Witness Safford

1 "(a) Exact date 1.e. December 4 (Thursday) or
2 December 5 (Friday) 19417.

3 "(b) Exact wording of the original Japanese broadcast.

4 "(c) Station call, time and frequency of the Japanese
5 Radio Station which broadcast it. (This would reconcile
6 'skip' phenomena.)

7 "(d) Whether received in voice or Morse code.

8 "(e) Station which intercepted the message.

9 "4. After receiving the winds 'execute' message I
10 discussed with Lieutenant Commander Welker (Op-20-GX) the
11 advisability of discontinuing the special intercept watches
12 being maintained to pick up the winds 'execute'. However,
13 only two days previously we had translated Tokyo Circular
14 #2409 (JD #6985) dated 27 November 1941 - setting up a system
15 for sending out 'Hidden Word Messages' (INGO DENPO) in
16 event of strained relations. Although we expected these
17 would come over regular commercial circuits (as proved the
18 case on the morning of 7 December 1941), we could not be
19 sure, and it seemed advisable to continue the existing
20 set-up which covered all possibilities (even though it
21 meant the operators continuing their doubled-up watches),
22 and required no further orders and no possibility of mis-
23 understanding and confusion. It is my impression that
24 Welker discussed the matter with Captain Schukraft, and
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy
Mr. Richardson

1 the Army made a similar decision. I have not discussed
2 this with Welker since September 1942 and I have no idea
3 how well he remembers this incident.

4
5 "5. Somebody must have notified the War Department
6 about the winds 'execute' message because Colonel Bratton
7 telephoned to Admiral Noyes and requested a copy of the
8 original Japanese broadcast so that he could verify the
9 translation. (This was customary in highly important
10 intercepts). Admiral Noyes got quite indignant and told
11 Colonel Bratton that the Navy's translation was correct and
12 that the War Department would not be furnished a copy of
13 the original message."

14 Mr. Murphy: May I ask if you are now speaking of the
15 actual intercept which you claim you saw right there?

16 Captain Safford: Speaking of what account I could
17 get of the winds message from people in the War Department,
18 and this was not testimony, this was furnished as a lead.

19 Mr. Richardson: But it referred to your winds execute
20 message?

21 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

22 Mr. Murphy: All right.

23 Captain Safford: "The foregoing incident, if verified
24 by Colonel Bratton, will prove that the winds 'execute'
25 got as far as Rear Admiral Noyes and G-2.

Witness Safford

1 "6. There is one possible source of information on
2 the winds message which has not been checked, namely - the
3 Australian C.I. Organization. The Australians had a small
4 C.I. Organization and in December 1941 they were intercept-
5 ing Japanese diplomatic radio traffic and reading messages
6 in the J-19 system. (The Dutch in Java were also reading
7 J-19, as well as the British in Singapore and London and
8 the U.S. Army and Navy in Corregidor and Washington.) The
9 Australian C.I. Unit had liaison with the Singapore C.I.
10 Unit, including exchange of translations and keys, except
11 for the purple and red machines. The winds 'set-up' message
12 (Tokyo Circulars #2353 (JD #6875) and #2354 (JD #6850),
13 dated 19 November 1941) were in J-19. Singapore sent
14 translations to Corregidor (CinCAF 281430 (COPEK) to OpNav)
15 and undoubtedly sent these same translations to Australia.
16 The Australians may have intercepted the winds 'execute'
17 message on 4 December 1941. If so, this was the basis
18 of Senator Ferguson's 'Australian War Warning' which
19 received much publicity in December 1943."

20 Mr. Murphy: Read that again, please.

21 Captain Safford: "The Australians may have intercepted
22 the winds 'execute' message on 4 December 1941."

23 Mr. Murphy: Yes.

24 Captain Safford: "If so, this was the basis of Senator
25

Witness Safford

1
2 Ferguson's 'Australian War Warning' which received much
3 publicity in December 1943."

4 Maybe it was 1944.

5 Mr. Murphy: Senator Ferguson's Australian war warning?

6 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Keefe: You heard it the first time.

8 Captain Safford: "This hypothesis could be easily
9 prover or disproved."

10 And remember this is written in July 1945.

11 Senator Ferguson: Might I inquire whether or not that
12 was to Australian Minister Dixon?

13 Captain Safford: That is what I was referring to, yes.

14 Mr. Richardson: Go ahead.

15 Captain Safford: I think I have a newspaper clipping
16 of it. That is what I was referring to.

17 "This hypothesis could be easily proved or disproved.
18 The following secret message to the Fleet Radio Unit,
19 Melbourne, is suggested:"

20 And I have a proposed message from the Secretary of
21 the Navy to that Unit in which they were being asked to
22 contact the Australians and see if the Australians would
23 tell them yes or no. I will quote the message if desired.

24 Mr. Richardson: Quote it.

25 Captain Safford: (Reading)

(2)

Witness Safford

1
2 "FROM: SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
3 "TO: FLEET RADIO UNIT MELBOURNE

4 "REFERRING CINCAF TWENTYEIGHT FOURTEEN THIRTY NOVEMBER
5 NINETEEN FORTYONE AND TOKYO CIRCULARS TWENTYTHREE FIFTYTHREE
6 AND TWENTYTHREE FIFTYFOUR DATED NINETEEN NOVEMBER SAME YEAR
7 IN JIG NINETEEN DID AUSTRALIANS INTERCEPT OR KNOW OF SUCH
8 A WARNING BROADCAST FROM TOKYO ON OR ABOUT FOUR DECEMBER
9 NINETEEN FORTYONE X IF AFFIRMATIVE FORWARD BY AIRMAIL
10 CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT OF BROADCAST AS RECEIVED WITH NOTATION
11 AS TO DATE X TIME X FREQUENCY X VOICE OR MORSE X CALL
12 LETTERS OF TRANSMITTING STATION X LOCATION OF INTERCEPTING
13 STATION AND OTHER RELEVANT DATA"

14 "7. Lieutenant Colonel Rowlett heard of the winds
15 'execute' by office gossip a day or two before the Japanese
16 attack on Pearl Harbor. A few days after the attack Colonel
17 Sadtler came to him and said, 'I would like to see the winds
18 message,' or words to that effect. Rowlett referred him
19 to Major Doud, in charge of the section, who in turn re-
20 ferred him to Colonel Minckler, the Chief of SIS. The rest
21 of the story belongs to the Army Investigation rather than
22 the Navy Investigation except for the fact that it furnishes
23 further proof of the authenticity of the winds 'execute'
24 message and that some written record of it did exist in the
25 War Department in December 1941.

Witness Safford

1 "8. A complete exposition of radio wave propagation
2 would be very lengthy and out of place. It is sufficient
3 to say that the radio frequencies used between Japan and
4 the United States were quite erratic in performance, and
5 that long distance radio communications in an East-West
6 direction are more difficult and less reliable than those
7 in a North-South direction. A few pertinent examples can
8 be given, namely:

9 "(a) The long fourteen (14) part Tokyo Serial #902
10 (JD-1 #7143) was intercepted solid at Bainbridge Island,
11 Washington. Part Two (of Tokyo Serial #902) and Tokyo
12 Serial #904 (JD-1 #7144) were also copied at Cheltenham,
13 Maryland, and forwarded to the Navy Department and used
14 for the actual decryption. (This is verified in the GY
15 Log for 6 December 1941.) The rest of Tokyo Serial #902
16 was 'uncopyable' at Cheltenham."

17 I would like to add after the memorandum, outside the
18 memorandum, that that statement was possibly incorrect,
19 but it was my recollection at the time.

20 "(b) Part Two of the very important three-part Tokyo
21 to Berlin #985 (JD-1 #6943) was missed but the first and
22 third parts were copied solid."

23 I would like to add, this is not in the memorandum,
24 that both Corregidor and England missed, and we only have
25

Witness Safford

1 the first and third parts here. We received a copy from
2 London as well as a copy from Corregidor.

3 "(c) We finally had to call on Corregidor to cover
4 the Berlin-Tokyo circuits as the combined efforts of inter-
5 cept stations in the East Coast, West Coast, Hawaii and
6 England could not provide better than about fifty (50)
7 percent coverage. During the period 1 December - 7 December
8 1941, the Navy Department received seventy (70) Japanese
9 diplomatic intercepts from Corregidor as compared with
10 seventy-three (73) from Bainbridge Island, twenty (20) for
11 all other U.S. Navy Stations, and ninety-three (93) for all
12 U.S. Army stations. The Japanese were trying to reach Rio
13 and Buenos Aires as well as San Francisco, Mexico City,
14 and Washington. (See distribution of Tokyo Serial #2354).
15 It is not at all surprising that the frequency used to reach
16 Washington, Rio, and Buenos Aires skipped over the West
17 Coast and Hawaii. There is a possibility that this frequency
18 was heard in Australia even though it skipped over Manila,
19 Singapore and Java."

20 I would like to add also, off the memorandum, that
21 this is written many months ago, when I did not have informa-
22 tion which I now have.

23 "9. There is one final place where written confirmation
24 of the winds 'execute' message may exist - the Record of
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Proceedings of the Roberts Commission. I cannot believe
3 that they could cover up so completely that some mention
4 of the winds 'execute' did not slip into the record. First
5 they said I didn't know what was going on around me; now
6 they claim I am suffering from hallucinations. Under the
7 circumstances it is only fair that I be permitted to search
8 through the record for such evidence in order to prove my
9 sanity, as well as my intelligence and my veracity.

10 "10. In conclusion the following quotation from my
11 secret memorandum to Colonel West, dated 2 October 1944,
12 is submitted for consideration: --"

13 Mr. Richardson: Just one moment, Captain. Was
14 there a memorandum that you gave to Colonel West?

15 Captain Safford: There was a memorandum.

16 Mr. Richardson: Have you a copy of that memorandum?

17 Captain Safford: I believe I can find a copy.

18 Mr. Richardson: Will you produce it so that we may
19 see it, if you can? You don't need to do it now.

20 Captain Safford: I will later.

21 "The reason for my stressing the "winds message"
22 so much in my testimony (in all three cases) is because
23 we could afford to talk about it, even print it in the
24 newspaper, without detriment to the war effort. Even the
25 Dutch knew of the code and the FCC listened for the message.

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

Witness Safford

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2 We had the same information - at the same time - from
3 more secret but less dramatic sources. Also the "winds
4 set-up" was the nearest thing to a warning CINCPAC ever
5 got. If the "winds execute" had been heard at Pearl
6 Harbor, the fleet would not have been surprised. And
7 because CINCPAC was given no information that the "winds
8 execute" had been sent, everybody at Pearl Harbor believed
9 it had not been sent and that the Japs were still making
10 up their minds as to the next step."

11 Mr. Murphy: There is still more?

12 Captain Safford: That is the end of that memorandum
13 on the winds message, which is official and before the
14 investigation given to Mr. Sonnett to help him and Admiral
15 Hewitt get leads for their investigation.

16 The Vice Chairman: What else do you have?

17 Mr. Richardson: Have you finished with that statement?

18 Captain Safford: Yes.

19 Mr. Richardson: Have you some other memorandums?

20 Captain Safford: The other memorandums do not have
21 a bearing on the winds message.

22 Mr. Richardson: Let me ask you this: You prefaced
23 this reading with a statement that efforts had been made
24 to silence you and influence you. Have you any other record
25 of any kind, manner of description, that shows or tends to

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1
2 show or relates to any pressure or influence exerted upon
3 you or towards you to get you to change your testimony or
4 give no testimony?

5 Captain Safford: This has been the only time and it
6 was before the investigation. Not during the investigation.
7 I want to make that very distinct.

8 Mr. Richardson: Then you have no more to add to what
9 you have read?

10 Captain Safford: That is correct.

11 Mr. Richardson: Now, after you wrote that and gave
12 that to Sonnett you were examined before Admiral Hewitt?

13 Captain Safford: I was examined before Admiral Hewitt.

14 Mr. Richardson: And you were given an opportunity to
15 testify fully and completely on every subject that you wanted to?

16 Captain Safford: That is correct.

17 Mr. Richardson: And you were sworn on that testimony?

18 Captain Safford: I was sworn on that testimony.

19 Mr. Richardson: And after the testimony was taken and
20 transcribed you read it and signed it, did you not?

21 Captain Safford: I do not believe that I ever read it
22 or was given the opportunity to verify it.

23 Mr. Richardson: Have you ever read it since?

24 Captain Safford: I have read it since.

25
Shefner
follows
11:40

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Mr. Richardson: It is correct, is it not, Captain?

3

Captain Safford: It is correct with a few minor errors

4

in typing where they left out some words.

5

Mr. Richardson: Oh, I see. But generally speaking --

6

Captain Safford: General speaking it is correct.

7

Mr. Richardson: (Continuing) -- it was a correct report?

8

Captain Safford: That is right.

9

Mr. Richardson: Now, Captain --

10

Mr. Keefe: May we understand what these other items are

11

that are attached to this so-called exhibit that he has there?

12

He says it does not have reference to the winds code but it

13

may have quite a bearing on this case. They are part of the

14

same exhibit.

15

The Vice Chairman: Captain, tell us --

16

Captain Safford: Could I explain them?

17

The Vice Chairman: Tell us as plainly and as completely

18

as you can what the other papers are that you have in your

19

hand in addition to what you have read to the committee?

20

Captain Safford: I believe there were two conflicting

21

Intelligence reports, one sent on the 26th of November 1941,

22

one was sent from the 14th District at Pearl Harbor and the

23

other from the 16th District at Manila, this concerning the

24

question of the possibility of Japanese carriers in the Man-

25

dated Islands. They did not agree.

1 Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 This is a long dissertation on that giving my impres-
3 sion or evaluation of it for their benefit. I was also asked
4 to explain what the Commandant 16th District meant when he
5 said, "All known first and second fleet carriers." That is
6 the number and their identity.

7 The Vice Chairman: That is the contents of the second
8 memorandum after the point where you stopped reading?

9 Captain Safford: That is correct.

10 The Vice Chairman: Then tell us what the next is. Each
11 additional paper that you have in your hand, tell us what
12 it is.

13 Mr. Murphy: May we find out how many pages there are
14 on the carriers?

15 Captain Safford: Six pages.

16 Mr. Murphy: You say there are only six between what you
17 read and what you have there in your hand, you mean there are
18 only six pages there?

19 Captain Safford: That is correct. It is that one
20 (indicating.)

21 Mr. Murphy: Oh, I see.

22 Captain Safford: It was the one I just read.

23 Mr. Murphy: All right, Captain, excuse me.

24 Captain Safford: On the 5th of December 1941 -

25 The Vice Chairman: Well, now, what is this, - a memo-

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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randum?

Captain Safford: This is the evaluation of the "UTU" broadcasts.

The Vice Chairman: This is a memorandum from you?

Captain Safford: It is a memorandum of eight pages from me to Mr. Sonnett.

The Vice Chairman: From you to whom, please?

Captain Safford: To Lieutenant Commander Sonnett.

The Vice Chairman: All right. Give us an idea of what is in it.

Captain Safford: Dated the 19th of May 1941 and it is my evaluation, --

Mr. Murphy: May I just inquire, Mr. Chairman? The six pages on the carriers was also given to Sonnett?

Captain Safford: That was also given to him.

Mr. Murphy: All right.

Mr. Richardson: Go ahead.

The Vice Chairman: Tell us what these eight pages are that you have before you now?

Captain Safford: On the 5th of December 1941 the Commandant 14th Naval District reported to the Commandant 16th District and Chief of Naval Operations by a message identified as 052220:

"UTU's, are being sent by HA FU 6 (Tokyo Radio)

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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on 32 kilocycles instead of 39 kcs as before,"
and there had been a lot of discussion. I explained it all
to Mr. Sennett and then he asked me to give him a complete
writeup, as much as I could tell him about it, which I did.

The Vice Chairman: And what does this relate to now?

Captain Safford: Tokyo normally broadcast messages to
the fleet on 39 kilocycles. On the 5th of December 1941 they
suddenly discontinued their 39 kilocycles and opened up on 32.

The Vice Chairman: And that is what this eight page
memorandum is?

Captain Safford: This is all about what significance
that might have had as a war warning or as regards Japanese
intentions of a naval war.

The Vice Chairman: All right.

Mr. Murphy: Now, Mr. Chairman, I think that it is im-
portant that we go into that for the reason that the Captain
in his statement said that the codes were changed on De-
cember 4th.

Captain Safford: That is correct.

Mr. Murphy: He now says that there was a change on
December 5th.

Captain Safford: In the broadcasting frequency.

Mr. Murphy: All right, and the Naval narrative says--

Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, that is not a correct state-

1 Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 ment of the witness, that he testified to a change in code.

3 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, I move that we proceed in
4 order.

5 Mr. Murphy: I am taking it from the statement of the
6 witness. So far as I know the witness is now referring to
7 December 5th.

8 Captain Safford: That is correct.

9 Mr. Murphy: In his statement he refers to December 4th.

10 Captain Safford: That is correct.

11 Mr. Murphy: And the Naval narrative refers to December
12 1 on the change of signals. I think we ought to have it
13 shown.

14 The Vice Chairman: Do you request that this eight page
15 memorandum be read?

16 Mr. Murphy: I request that it be examined over the noon
17 hour by counsel to see whether or not it is of help to the
18 committee.

19 The Vice Chairman: Without objection it will be so
20 ordered. Now, what is the next, Captain?

21 Captain Safford: The final memorandum was a one page
22 memorandum from myself to Commander Sonnett dated 21 May 1945
23 concerning the TATUTA MARU and the American passenger ship
24 President Madison.

25 The circumstances of that were there had been a lot of,

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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I believe newspaper talk, possibly something elsewhere, that the Japanese had sent the TATUTA MARU over as a kind of a spy, a decoy, and that we had been taken in with it and I just brought out that they had arranged it long in advance, they had clearance from the State Department, that everything was in proper order and that no significance could have attached to this whatever, to this trip of the TATUTA MARU, so far as I could see.

10

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The Vice Chairman: Now, does that complete either a reading or a description of all the papers that you have there before you?

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Captain Safford: Those were all that were referenced in this memorandum. I had some additional papers clipped together for convenience, so that they would not get displaced. I will hand them in if you care to have me to.

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The Vice Chairman: What is that now?

Captain Safford: I had some additional papers clipped to this other bunch for convenience so they would not get displaced.

21

22

Mr. Richardson: Where are those papers that were clipped? What were they?

23

24

25

Captain Safford: I have a memorandum addressed to Admiral Hewitt dated 22 June 1945 correcting some of my previous testimony before him, where I had slipped and said

1 Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 things which were not quite correct and I was able to verify
3 it on the spot and turn it in so that my testimony would be
4 corrected.

5 The Vice Chairman: Well, I think you had better read
6 that memorandum. It was addressed to Admiral Hewitt?

7 Captain Safford: It was addressed to Admiral Hewitt.

8 The Vice Chairman: About your testimony?

9 Captain Safford: About my testimony.

10 The Vice Chairman: All right, read it, please, sir.

11 Captain Safford: (Reading)

12 "SECRET

13 22 June 1945

14 "MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL HEWITT

15 "Subj: Pearl Harbor Investigation.

16 "Ref: (a) My testimony given this date.

17 "1. I now recall that Lieut. Commander Brother-
18 hood told me that he did not receive a written copy of
19 the 'False' Winds Message from the F.C.C., but merely
20 received the information by telephone. The only writ-
21 ten version of the 'False' Winds Message we ever had
22 prior to 1944 was a memorandum of the phone call in
23 Brotherhood's handwriting. Only one significant word
24 (North) appeared and it was in English. It was this
25 memorandum that Kramer threw in the 'burn bag' after

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1
2 telling Brotherhood that this was not what we were look-
3 ing for.

4 "2. The Winds 'Execute' Message which passed
5 through my hands on the morning of 4 December 1941 was a
6 teletype copy (typed on yellow teletype paper) of the
7 entire Japanese broadcast about 200 or 300 words long.
8 Three significant words (Kita, Higashi, and Nishi) ap-
9 peared and they were in Japanese. Kramer's transla-
10 tion appeared in pencil, or colored crayon, at the bot-
11 tom of the sheet. There was very little chance of con-
12 fusion.

13 "3. I would like to make one correction in the tes-
14 timony I gave today:

15 "Mr. Phillip Gate, Japanese translator, employed
16 by the Navy Department is still alive. It was his
17 brother, employed as a Japanese translator by the
18 War Department, who died a few weeks after the at-
19 tack on Pearl Harbor."

20 Respectfully,

21 L. F. Safford,

22 Captain, U.S. Navy."

23 The Vice Chairman: All right. What else is there?

24 Mr. Richardson: What is the date of that memo?

25 Captain Safford: That is the 22nd of June 1945.

1 Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 Mr. Richardson: And that was to Sonnett?

3 Captain Safford: No, that was to Admiral Hewitt.

4 Mr. Richardson: Oh, yes, I see.

5 Captain Safford: That was referring to --

6 Mr. Richardson: 22nd of what?

7 Captain Safford: June. He will have that with his pa-
8 pers.

9 Mr. Richardson: All right.

10 The Vice Chairman: 22nd of June 1945?

11 Captain Safford: Yes. In going over it afterwards I
12 realized that possibly my answers had not been clear or cor-
13 rect in one case, where I had him alive, Cate, and I was
14 simply trying to make minor corrections in the testimony I had
15 given.

16 The Vice Chairman: I think we understand your reasons
17 for the memorandum. Now, what is the next?

18 Captain Safford: The other, the final one is a memo-
19 randum of a conversation with Mr. Walter Foote at the State
20 Department on Wednesday, May 30, 1945 and I have a note,
21 "Not given to Admiral Hewitt or Lieutenant Sonnett", but I
22 did discuss it with them and I gave a very, very brief sum-
23 mary of this memorandum, which I believe is contained in the
24 record of the Hewitt investigation.

25 Mr. Walter Foote was the American Consul General at

1 Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 Batavia who sent one of the winds code messages and he was in
3 touch with the situation.

4 When he came back to the United States I talked with him
5 to see if he could recall any further information on the sub-
6 ject. Mr. Foote said that he was positive that the Dutch
7 in Java had not received the execute on the winds message.

8 The Vice Chairman: And that is what is covered in that
9 statement?

10 Captain Safford: No, this is a part of it; that is the
11 substance of it.

12 The Vice Chairman: All right.

13 Captain Safford: And it was in the Hewitt report.

14 The Vice Chairman: That was a memorandum from you?

15 Captain Safford: That was a memorandum of me to myself
16 just so I would not forget what Mr. Foote had said on the sub-
17 ject.

18 The Vice Chairman: It was not given to Sonnett or Hew-
19 itt?

20 Captain Safford: It was taken in and they merely asked
21 me to take it and condense it in one paragraph in my testi-
22 mony, which I did.

23 The Vice Chairman: All right. What else can you think
24 of?

25 Captain Safford: The other papers here are merely cop-

1 Witness Safford Questions by: Mr. Richardson
2 ies of the various circulars and forms of the winds code to
3 refresh my memory.

4 The Vice Chairman: What do you mean by "circulars and
5 copies"?

6 Captain Safford: Tokyo circular 2353, 2354.

7 Mr. Richardson: Just copies of those exhibits?

8 Captain Safford: Copies of those exhibits.

9 The Vice Chairman: All right. Anything else?

10 Captain Safford: That is all.

11 The Vice Chairman: That is all, all right. Please go
12 on now. Please hand that to counsel so they may examine the
13 part they were requested to examine.

14 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I think this is important and
15 I ask that all of the papers from which the witness read be
16 made an exhibit and that we have an exact copy of those pa-
17 pers.

18 The Vice Chairman: Well, of course, all that he read
19 has gone in the transcript of the record.

20 Mr. Murphy: All that he read and quoted from here is in
21 the record.

22 The Vice Chairman: Now, counsel has been requested to
23 examine the other parts that he did not read and when he re-
24 ports to us on that we will be prepared to pass on that ques-
25 tion, I imagine.

1 Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 Mr. Murphy: I am just being thorough. I think counsel
3 ought to examine what was read in connection with what we
4 actually heard here and see if we have all of the papers in
5 the record that are in the group.

6 Mr. Richardson: I do not care, Mr. Chairman, to raise
7 any question that the Captain has read his records correctly.
8 I am perfectly willing to examine them but I do not raise
9 any question but what he read them correctly and the record
10 has all of them in, unless there is a point to the Congress-
11 man's point that if these were in an exhibit they would be
12 a little easier of examination by the committee possibly as a
13 unit than to follow it through the transcript.

14 The Vice Chairman: Well, probably it might be helpful to
15 have them as exhibits so that we might have them together.
16 You can have it mimeographed for us and furnish it to the com-
17 mittee. Without objection then that will be done.

18 Now, I would think that the reporter might want to re-
19 fer to the part that the Captain read because there were a
20 great many names and some Japanese words that most any re-
21 porter might have difficulty in getting exactly right, so,
22 Captain, will you please hand them over to counsel?

23 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

24 The Vice Chairman: All right. Counsel will proceed.

25 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question of

1 Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 the Captain?

3 The Vice Chairman: Senator Lucas.

4 Senator Lucas: Are these some of your personal papers,
5 part of your personal files that you are reading from now?

6 Captain Safford: This is a part of my personal records
7 which I have made up in connection with these investigations
8 from the beginning.

9 Senator Lucas: But do you care to have them at some time
10 returned to you?

11 Captain Safford: I do not care to have them returned.
12 This is final, I hope.

13 The Vice Chairman: We hope so, too. All right, counsel
14 may proceed.

15 Mr. Richardson: Our hopes synchronize on that last, Cap-
16 tain.

17 Two things came to my attention as you read. You have no
18 doubt that the Dutch stations did not get any execute of the
19 winds message.

20 Captain Safford: I have it from two sources now; an
21 officer who was there serving in liaison with the Dutch and
22 Mr. Foote.

23 Mr. Richardson: And they both said they did not get it?

24 Captain Safford: And they both said they did not get it.

25 Mr. Richardson: And that station did get the original

1 Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 winds message?

3 Captain Safford: They knew about the original message,
4 either got it direct or possibly the British sent it to them
5 or we presumed they got it themselves.

6 Mr. Richardson: Now, a second thing that caught my at-
7 tention was that in one of these documents that you wrote for
8 your own reference you said that the message that came in had
9 the single words "HIGASHI NISHI" and something else. Now, there
10 is no doubt in your mind, is there, that the execute message
11 you saw had the three groups of Japanese words that are con-
12 tained in 2353, with the exception of the negative being
13 applied to Russia?

14 Captain Safford: That is correct.

15 Mr. Richardson: All right.

16 Captain Safford: I was trying to clarify the question of
17 misinterpretation of one of those compass directions which were
18 the governing things.

19 The Vice Chairman: If counsel permits an interruption,
20 the Captain states that in his written statement on page 12.

21 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

22 Mr. Richardson: Now, Captain, in circular 2353 the
23 emergency which gave birth to the desire for the new code,
24 winds code, is recited as "the danger of cutting off of our
25 diploma tic relations and the cutting off of international

1 Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 communications", is it not?

3 Captain Safford: That is correct.

4 Mr. Richardson: That would mean, would it not, that the
5 Japanese felt that there might come a time when because of
6 the status of their diplomatic relations and their interna-
7 tional communications that they would have to have some new
8 way of communicating and to furnish that new way they in-
9 vented this so-called "winds" code?

10 Captain Safford: This so-called "winds" code which was
11 to be used there by their broadcasts and not by the commere
12 cial telegraph companies.

13 Mr. Richardson: Well, now, it is a fact, is it not,
14 Captain, that on the 4th of December all of the methods of
15 communication were open to the Japanese that had been open at
16 any time since the 1st of January 1941, were they not?

17 Captain Safford: That is correct.

18 Mr. Richardson: So there wasn't any reason on the basis
19 of a loss of other methods of communication on December 4th to
20 use this winds code at all, was there?

21 Captain Safford: There was no reason that you could ac-
22 count for but we had been listening for it from the 28th of
23 November and we had made every effort to get it.

24 Mr. Richardson: Now, keeping in mind your testimony
25 that the message which Lieutenant Kramer brought to you was in

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Japanese and in that message, in the middle of that message were the phrases in Japanese which are used as 1, 2 and 3 and mentioned in circular 2353, keeping that in mind can you point to any record then in existence of which either you or Kramer had any knowledge that interpreted or translated those words as meaning war?

Captain Safford: War was the meaning that we gave it and war was what appeared in the translation, whether justified or not.

Mr. Richardson: All right. Except for the written words that Lieutenant Kramer put on this dispatch there is no known writing emanating from Japan or any other source at that time that puts the interpretation on the language "HIGASHI NO KAZEAME" as meaning war with the United States, is there?

Captain Safford: If that word had appeared alone it might have merely meant the breaking off of diplomatic relations, they might have meant nothing else.

Mr. Richardson: Now, Captain, you pay attention to my question. I want to find out whether you can put your finger on any existing authority that up to the time you saw the message interpreted the phrase "HIGASHI NO KAZEAME" to mean war with the United States?

Now, let me carry it further. The message from the

1 Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 Commander of the Asiatic Fleet does not so say, does it?

3 Captain Safford: Not for "Higashi", and so forth.

4 Mr. Richardson: And the message 2353 does not so say,
5 does it?

6 Captain Safford: No.

7 Mr. Richardson: And you did not have the Foote or Thorp
8 messages available at eight o'clock on the morning of December
9 4th, did you?

10 Captain Safford: That is correct.

11 Mr. Richardson: So that so far as you know the defini-
12 tion of those words that appeared on that message that morning
13 was the invention of Lieutenant Kramer?

14 Captain Safford: I would not call it that.

15 Mr. Richardson: Well, it was the act of Lieutenant Kram-
16 er.

17 Captain Safford: I would say that all the higher author-
18 ity --

19 Mr. Richardson: Now, wait a minute, I am speaking about
20 this specific message when it was brought to you by Lieuten-
21 ant Kramer and I want to know what authority he had, if you
22 know, for translating the phrase "HIGASHI NO KAZEAME" as
23 meaning war with the United States?

24 Captain Safford: I do not know now what authority he
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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had for using those words.

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Mr. Richardson: All right. And it was the first time in your whole life up to that point that you had ever seen the word "War" used as a part of the definition of the words "HIGASHI NO KAZEAME"?

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Captain Safford: In written form, correct.

Mr. Richardson: That is right. But when this yellow sheet was brought to you with Lieutenant Kramer's notation on it 'he had written out, as I understand it, "War with the United States" in English?

Captain Safford: In English.

Mr. Richardson: Are you sure about that, Captain?

Captain Safford: As sure as I can be about anything when I first recorded it in writing at the end of two years.

Mr. Richardson: Well, now, was that point, Captain, one of the things which you said was very hazy in your mind when you commenced to remembering in the fall of 1943 under your testimony that I have read to you? Was that one of the points that was very hazy in your mind, as to just what that interpretation of Lieutenant Kramer read?

Captain Safford: I wanted verification of my memory that he used the actual word "War." That was the only word that I could remember.

Mr. Richardson: But you remembered the word "war"?

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Captain Safford: Rather than merely the weaker form,

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"Relations in danger."

4

Mr. Richardson: Well, the form "relations in danger"

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would be a good deal weaker, wouldn't it, Captain?

6

Captain Safford: It would be very much weaker.

7

Mr. Richardson: It would be right along the line of the

8

various messages that had been going back and forth for sever-

9

al days, wouldn't it?

10

Captain Safford: That is correct, as far as the wording

11

is concerned.

12

Mr. Richardson: You knew that the Japanese-United States

13

relations were in danger?

14

Captain Safford: We had known that for three months.

15

Mr. Richardson: Now, after you saw the message, the

16

yellow message that had the written words on it from Lieuten-

17

ant Kfamer you sent that to Admiral Noyes?

18

Captain Safford: I sent it up to Admiral Noyes exactly

19

as it was.

20

Mr. Richardson: And who took it up to Admiral Noyes?

21

Captain Safford: One of the officers serving under me

22

and I cannot be certain who it was. It was probably Lieuten-

23

ant Howes.

24

Mr. Richardson: Lieutenant who?

25

Captain Safford: Howes.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Mr. Richardson: Spell it.

3 Captain Safford: H-o-w-e-s. The natural presumption
4 would be that Kramer or Morey had taken it up there but both
5 of them said they did not and I should think their memory on
6 that is better than mine.

7 Mr. Richardson: Then your idea as to who took it up
8 is just a guess on your part at this time?

9 Captain Safford: I stated in my written statement it was
10 taken up by one of the officers serving under me, I did not
11 take it up myself, and I received a report from him "Message
12 delivered."

13 Mr. Richardson: But you have no recollection what offi-
14 cer it was?

15 Captain Safford: I cannot be certain, which of about five
16 officers who might have taken it up actually took it up.

17 Mr. Richardson: Now, give us the names of the five offi-
18 cers, one of whom must have taken it up.

19 Captain Safford: From memory it was Howes -- I can give
20 you the initials later -- Peterson, Densford, Clark or White,
21 P. R. White, Paul R. White.

22 Their names and present stations are:

23 Commander Robert L. Densford, U.S.N., Staff, Commander-
24 in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, headquarters Pearl Harbor, Hawaiian
25 Islands.

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1 Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 Commander William C. Howes, USNR, 142 Southwest 17th
3 Court, Miami, Florida. I believe that he has been demobilized.

4 Lieutenant Commander Frederick A. Peterson, Jr., USNR,
5 Southborough, Massachusetts. He has also been demobilized.

6 Commander C. F. Clark, USNR, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

7 And finally Lieutenant Commander Paul F. White, USNR,
8 who is on duty in Naval Communications in Washington.

9 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, as I understand it this was a
10 list of the possible persons who might have been the one who
11 took the paper to Admiral Noyes.

12 Captain Safford: That is correct.

13 The Vice Chairman: Well, he said, as I understood him,
14 one of those named would have.

15 Captain Safford: One of those named.

16 The Vice Chairman: Would have had to have taken it to
17 Admiral Noyes?

18 Captain Safford: Yes.

19 The Vice Chairman: All right.

20 Mr. Richardson: One thing further I neglected to call to
21 your attention in circular 2353 and that is the notation to-
22 ward the end, "When this is heard, please destroy all code
23 papers."

24 Captain Safford: That is correct.

25 Mr. Richardson: You are familiar with that?

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Captain Safford: Very definitely; I was familiar with that.

3

4 Mr. Richardson: Now, as a matter of fact, Captain, before this message was received there had been a series of messages sent out by the Japanese by other methods of communication all over the world directing the destruction of codes?

5

6 Captain Safford: That is correct.

7

8 Mr. Richardson: So there wasn't any reason to use this message on December 4th for that purpose either, was there?

9

10 Captain Safford: Not for just the destruction of codes.

11

12 Mr. Richardson: I see.

13

14 Mr. Gearhart: But there was a purpose indicated by you in your original statement, was there not?

15

16 Captain Safford: That is correct.

17

18 Mr. Gearhart: The British had destroyed their codes. There were no Japanese codes in London. This is the only way they had of informing the Japanese at London that something was imminent?

19

20 Captain Safford: That is correct, and the same situation existed at Singapore and Hong Kong.

21

22 Mr. Richardson: I would like at this point, in view of the interrogation of the Congressman, to advise the committee that under date of January 31, 1946 we have a memorandum from the War Department reading as follows:

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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"Pursuant to your request the War Department has made inquiry of the British concerning the number of coded messages sent by the Japanese representatives in London subsequent to December 2, 1941.

"The War Department has been informed that two coded messages were sent by the Japanese representatives in London on the 3rd of December 1941 and one coded message on the 5th of December 1941 and one coded message sent on the 6th of December 1941 and all four messages were sent on the code system known as BA-KV"

indicating that coded messages were proceeding to England both before and after December 4th.

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, may we request that we have produced the memorandum which the witness acquired two weeks ago? If there was information made available to him two weeks, I think it should be produced at this time.

Mr. Gearhart: May I inquire of counsel? I am interested in it very, very much. If that is true, as reported by the British, it merely means the British Ambassador had violated the instructions and had not destroyed his codes; isn't that right?

Mr. Richardson: I am not going into the implication.

Captain Safford: May I explain that?

There were two systems that were exempt from destruction. One was PA-K2, and the other was LA, neither of which were considered by ourselves as secret, and we presumed the Japanese did not consider them secret.

Mr. Richardson: The only point, Captain, involved in it would be there was still a method open to the Japanese to communicate with the British outside of the winds code.

Captain Safford: Yes, but not to communicate secretly. I used that word "secretly" in my statement.

Mr. Gearhart: That is the point.

Senator Lucas: Does the counsel now know what messages went from Japan?

Mr. Richardson: I read everything that the War Department

Witness Safford que

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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1 gave us.

2 What is the system known as PA-K2?

3 Captain Safford: That is a minor system which had been
4 in effect for a very long time, and was used for matters
5 of negligible importance, but they presumably wanted to keep
6 up with the newspapers, minor money matters, visas, things
7 like that.

8 I believe there were only three or four PA-K2 messages
9 that had ever been submitted in evidence before this investi-
10 gation and that were sent by Pearl Harbor after Pearl Harbor
11 had destroyed its J-19 system, and I do not -- I won't go
12 into that.

13 Mr. Richardson: Are you sure, Captain, that you are
14 correct when you say that important messages were not sent
15 in this code PA-K2?

16 Captain Safford: Until after Pearl Harbor had destroyed
17 its J-19 system, which really had some security.

18 Mr. Richardson: Let me read you from Exhibit 2, page
19 29, which is a message that went from Honolulu to Tokyo
20 on December 6, 1941. It is No. 254.

21 "1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships
22 which entered port were - - - - and one submarine tender.
23 The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:

24 "9 battle ships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders,
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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1 17 destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers,
2 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and air
3 plane carriers have all left).

4 "2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being
5 conducted by the Fleet air arm."

6 That would be a rather important message, would it
7 not, Captain?

8 Captain Safford: That is correct, and that message
9 was sent after the Japanese Consulate had destroyed its
10 J-19 system.

11 Mr. Richardson: Well; there was in existence, between
12 Honolulu and Tokyo, after the winds code had been promulgated
13 and after the codes had been directed to be destroyed, a
14 method of communicating under PA-K2 that took care of
15 important messages, was there not?

16 Captain Safford: There was not.

17 Mr. Richardson: There was not?

18 Captain Safford: PA-K2 was specifically exempt from
19 destruction by the orders telling them to destroy the other
20 things.

21 Mr. Richardson: All right. It was in existence,
22 wasn't it?

23 Captain Safford: There was a code of a very low
24 security substantially no better than plain language, which
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Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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they had, and could use.

Mr. Richardson: Just forget the low security for a moment. The code was in existence, wasn't it?

Captain Safford: That is correct.

Mr. Richardson: And it was in use, was it not?

Captain Safford: It was in use by one man.

Mr. Richardson: Well, it was in use, was it not?

Captain Safford: It was in use at one station.

Mr. Richardson: Well, we only live once. It was in use by one station, then?

Captain Safford: Correct.

Mr. Richardson: And that man at that one station could send in that code to Tokyo?

Captain Safford: Correct.

Mr. Richardson: And he could send important messages to Tokyo?

Captain Safford: That is correct.

Mr. Richardson: Was there any reason that London could not send under that code to Tokyo?

Captain Safford: But Tokyo was not sending anything important to London in that code, or to Honolulu.

Mr. Richardson: Let us not go into that. Let us inquire whether it was possible for London to use that code for communicating with Tokyo.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Captain Safford: It was physically possible.

Mr. Richardson: All right.

Now, do you see anything particularly exciting in a code that only broadcasts the weather message? Is not that a very low degree of secret information?

Captain Safford: That was set up in what the Japanese considered one of the high security systems, their second level of security.

Mr. Richardson: Then it is your idea is it, that the Japanese, in promulgating a weather report, a daily weather report in the ordinary news broadcast, was putting it into their most difficult code in order to convince them that it was an ordinary weather broadcast? Is that your testimony?

Captain Safford: Not at all.

Mr. Richardson: Well, wherein do not we agree?

Captain Safford: I do not follow you, that is all, sir.

Mr. Richardson: What I am interested in is this.

It was my idea of the winds code, Captain, that it was to be used to deceive other nations, because the broadcasting of weather information in a news broadcast was relatively unimportant, and by injecting certain key words in that message you could use the humble method of a news broadcast

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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to convey very important information.

Now, was that right?

Captain Safford: That is not correct.

Mr. Richardson: Well, all right. Give me your explanation.

Captain Safford: The Japanese Government had been sending these news broadcasts to its stations overseas, diplomatic posts, for several months. They were always copied; they knew they could be heard, and therefore if they wanted to send a message not through any commercial channels and be certain it would not be held up by censorship or delayed purposely, as sometimes happens, to be absolutely certain of it, they could include a war warning message or anything else of that nature in one of their own news broadcasts, which they controlled.

They could not afford to send it out in plain language, that "we are going to have war," they had to give it a somewhat disguised form which could be understood when received.

Mr. Richardson: Why would they put it in a weather message?

Captain Safford: Because that is merely the form that they happened to choose for it. If we had merely the word "higashi" and the rest of it, and had not had the translation of these messages, we would not have had the slightest idea

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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what they were talking about.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, the witness has said this could be translated easily, as I understand it, the one sent from Honolulu to Tokyo. I think it is important, since it says "it appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the Fleet air arm."

I do not see why it could not have been translated before December 8. It is of the utmost importance.

Mr. Richardson: I did not get your point.

Mr. Murphy: It was sent out on the 6th, and not translated until the 8th, and it says, "it appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the Fleet air arm."

That was an important message from Honolulu to Tokyo, so why was not it translated before the 8th?

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 Mr. Richardson: Well, my associate suggests to
2 me that that is an Army translation.

3 Mr. Murphy: He said it is easy. It is one of the
4 most important messages.

5 Mr. Richardson: Well, you can take it up with him.

6 Now, Captain, will you turn --

7 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, I suggest that we let
8 counsel proceed in order so as not to interrupt his train
9 of thought.

10 The Vice Chairman: Yes, I think it is better if counsel
11 proceeds.

12 Go ahead, counsel.

13 Mr. Richardson: Captain, let me call your attention
14 to Document No. 4 -- 3(d) of Exhibit 142.

15 Captain Safford: That is what?

16 Mr. Richardson: It is 3(d).

17 Captain Safford: That is correct.

18 Mr. Richardson: Entitled "Document No. 4."

19 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

20 Mr. Richardson: Now, referring back to 2353, what did
21 West Wind Clear mean when translated under the Japanese
22 phrase, according to 2353?

23 Captain Safford: According to the full and correct
24 translation of 2353, it meant Japan-British relations in-
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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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cluding invasion of Thailand and occupation of Malay and the Netherlands East Indies.

Mr. Richardson: Now, turning to document 4, that you have there, have you not, a full admitted execute of the winds message 2353, don't you?

Captain Safford: That is correct.

Mr. Richardson: And the words "West Winds Clear" are repeated twice?

Captain Safford: That is correct.

Mr. Richardson: At the end of the document?

Captain Safford: It would appear they were repeated twice in the middle of the document rather than the end.

Mr. Richardson: Did that message "Document No. 4" did that look anything like the message that you saw on the morning of December 7?

Captain Safford: No, sir, because this was a transcript of a voice broadcast, and what I saw was the Morse broadcast.

Mr. Richardson: Then the only actual execute that we all agree was sent, didn't look anything like the message that Kramer handed to you on the morning of December 4, did it?

Captain Safford: That is correct.

Mr. Richardson: Now, you have been very much concerned about this wind execute, haven't you, Captain, for a number