

Doc. 4029 Evid

Folder 6

(163)

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 4029

10 June 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Photostats: File of Foreign Ministry (State Sec'y, Japan, vol. 2e)-Telegrams and memos concerning relations between Germany and Japan.

Date: 1 Aug-27 Sep 1940 Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: German.

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No (x)  
Has it been photostated? Yes (x) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable):  
Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Nurnberg

PERSONS IMPLICATED: SHIRATORI; KURUSU; MATSUOKA; OSHIMA; OTT

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Conspiracy (Germany) Preparation for aggressive warfare.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

1. Memo, dated 1 Aug 1940, re incorrect reports of the DOMEI agency, which were brought to KURUSU's attention (136372)
2. Enclosure to previous item citing occasions on which representatives of the DOMEI agency, working outside Germany, had given false reports and rumours which would harm German aspirations and policies. Nine examples are given and the letter is signed by BASSLER. (136373-4)
3. Memo from WEIZSACKER dated 1 August 1940. The Japanese Ambassador complained about Swedish journalists in BERLIN whose reports are derogatory to Japan. One such report was attributed to the appearance of an article in the June issue of "GEOPOLITIK" by general HAUSHOFER. (136375)

4. Memo from WEIZSACKER to Reich Foreign Minister dated 1st August 1940. In a conversation KURUSU mentioned the role of the new Japanese cabinet in major politics. He had received no instructions from the new government, but he thought that the general outline of the new Japanese foreign policy would soon be made known. KURUSU could either wait for instructions or he could advise his government on the current situation before the government decided anything. In either case, a discussion with the REICH Foreign Minister or WEIZSACKER would be necessary. For himself, KURUSU thought that Japanese politics would have to be based on a long term view. He thought that the next twelve months would be tense, and Japan's relations with the USA and USSR were most important. But Japan's relations with USA and USSR must be applied in accord with German and Italian intentions, so as to decide when the weight of Japan should be placed in the balance of war. "If, for instance, Japan on her part would push towards a war, while, on the other hand, Germany believes that the end of the war is at hand in expectation of a quick victory she /Japan/ would act against German desires".

OTT thinks that KURUSU expects of the new course in Tokyo a tendency towards an intervention in the war. KURUSU would appreciate hints as to what advice he is to give to his government e.g. in the question of desirability of a rapprochement with Russia or regarding the tempo of the anti-British policy of the new cabinet. WEIZSACKER contradicted KURUSU's belief that the war might last a long time. (136377-8)

5. Letter from WEIZSACKER to the Reich Foreign Minister dated 5 August 1940, re: anticipated request by KURUSU to see the Reich Foreign Minister. (136379)

6. Telegram from Ambassador OTT in Tokyo, 2 August 1940, to Secretary of State. This report of a conversation with Foreign Minister MATSUOKA shows the extremely conciliatory attitude and the promises of MATSUOKA regarding a number of German wishes. This is identical with Item 5 in IPS Doc. 4025. (13680-2)

7. Telegram in code from WEIZSACKER, 9 August 1940, BERLIN, to German Ambassador, Tokyo, in reference to telegram No. 765 of 2 August.

The Japanese Ambassador in conversation with WEIZSACKER, raised two questions on the subject of general political orientation of the new Japanese cabinet, whether Germany still considered the Japan-Russia rapprochement as important as formerly, and whether she desires a sharp or perhaps more moderatetempo in the anti-Anglo-Saxon policy of the new cabinet.

Concerning OTT's conversation with MATSUOKA, on which KURUSU seemed to be most precisely informed, KURUSU expanded on the question of the planned Japanese New Order in the East Asian area, which, as he explained, would be organized by Japan on a broad basis, embracing the South Seas. Japan wished to create in this area a situation in which there would be no conquest, no oppression and no exploitation; where each should have his right. Just as Japan intended to maintain these three basic principles, so must she also expect no third power to violate them. The Ambassador named Japan, Manchukuo and China as the center of the Great East Asian Sphere, and called them the "East Asian Axis".

The Ambassador, who evidently spoke as advised by Tokyo, went so far as to say that MATSUOKA and KONOYE must see clearly our standpoint for the purpose of orientation of their overall foreign policy and for the cabinet discussions in this connection. (136383-4)

8. Memo from WEIZSACKER to WIEHL (Ref. St.-S. 610) dated 1 August 1940, Berlin.

WEIZSACKER informed KURUSU that to put the German-Japanese economic discussion on the customary footing, that WIEHL should conduct these discussions. (136385)

9. Memo from WEIZSACKER to Reich Foreign Minister (Ref. St.-S. No. 611) dated 2 August 1940, Berlin.

"I would like to add to the memo about the conversation with the Jap-Ambassador on the previous day the following: KURUSU hoped that Japan might belong to the New Order after the war, and that she would not be forgotten in the new partition of the world." (136386)

10. Telegram from OTT, 2 August 1940.

1. OHASHI, member of the MANCHURIAN State Council, and former Manchurian Vice Foreign Minister, has been appointed Vice Foreign Minister. He is known in Berlin because of his visit in 1937. His appointment signifies the further strengthening of the influence of the Manchurian group in the new Government.

2. Ambassador SHIRATORI informed OTT confidentially that he had declined the post of Vice Foreign Minister. It is to be considered that he will now be appointed permanent advisor to the Foreign Minister. He hopes to be able to exercise great influence in this capacity. (136387)

11. Telegram, without signature from WASHINGTON, 2 August 1940. Re: Prohibition of export of oil and metal scrap to Japan. (136389)

12. Memo from WOLFFMANN, 5 August 1940. Councillor of the Embassy KASE asked re rumours of a German-Russian-Chinese Alliance circulated in connection with trip of two Chung-King officials to Moscow and Berlin. (136390)

13. An enclosure to previous item, consisting of a note on DOCTOR CHU CHIA-HUA, who is one of the two officials mentioned in Item 12,

The enclosure gives details of CHU's career, and stated that he was close confidant of the Marshal. He had great sympathy for Germany by virtue of his long stay there. (136392)

14. Memo from WIEHL, Berlin, 5 August 1940. Re: memo presented by State Councillor HELFFERICH on economic experiences during his travels in Japan.

15. Memo to Reich Foreign Minister, 7 August 1940, Berlin. (Ref. St.-S. No. 634).

The letter mentions the suggestion of the Japanese Ambassador of a discussion with Ribbentrop about the overall political orientation of the new Japanese cabinet.

The Ambassador came today to discuss the conversation between MATSUOKA and OTT /Telegram Tokyo No. 765/ in which OTT had clearly stated that a conflict between Germany and Russia was not to be expected. Japan might - if necessary with German assistance - make arrangements with Russia. /comp. Item 7/ (136396-7)

16. Telegram from OTT, 8 August 1940, Tokyo /No. 796 of 8.8/ Re: Note delivered to the Foreign Minister by the British Ambassador re: extension of the English blockade against Germany, Italy and Japan, etc.

"Japan is endeavouring since the change in cabinets to pull out unobtrusively her ships from all regions, which make seizure by England likely." (136398)

17. Telegram from OTT, 9 August 1940, Tokyo.

"Refer to D.N.B's telegram 288-290 on the open letter of "HOCHI" to Germany, with the request to Germany to give Japan a free hand in Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies." (136399)

18. Telegram from SHANGHAI dated 10 August 1940, re: Japanese air attack on CHUNGKING. (136400)

19. Telegram from OTT, 10 August 1940, Tokyo. British Embassy informed Japanese government that British troops were being withdrawn from PEIPING, TIENTSIN and SHANGHAI for use elsewhere. Britain reserved all her rights under the PEKING Protocol of 1901. Action viewed in Tokyo as an attempt to alleviate the tension in the Far East, and prevent any closer association by Japan with the axis powers, and also an indication of British military weakness. (136401)

20. Telegram from RINTELEN to German Ambassadors in TOKYO and SHANGHAI, dated 12 August 1940, Berlin.

The Chinese Ambassador introduced the topic of the Indo-China question today, and explained that Japan demanded the passage of troops through Indo-China, in order to attack China; France would prepare for resistance, but would fear Germany's attitude. China hoped that Germany would restrain Japan in the interest of her own markets in the Far East and strengthen the French intention of resistance.

The Ambassador was told that German influence on French policy was less than the ambassador seemed to think, and the Chinese Government should treat first of all with Vichy. (136402-3)

21. Telegram from OTT, dated 13 August 1940, which states that the Japanese were setting up a Cabinet Information Bureau to replace the Information Division of the Foreign, Army and Navy Ministries. Ambassador ITO had been appointed Chief of the Bureau. (136404)

22. Telegram from OTT, dated 14 August 1940, Tokyo, about reaction to the extension of the Americas export license system to oil and scrap. (136405-6)

23. Telegram from WOERLANN, dated 12 August 1940, to German Ambassador, Tokyo, re: protection of German interests in bombings of CHUNGKING. (136407)

24. Telegram from OTT, dated 15 August 1940, Tokyo.

OTT had spoken to the Foreign Minister about the report that Japan was ready to make a non-aggression pact with the powers interested in the South Seas area. The Foreign Minister stated that the report was false and that it was far from Japan to have such intentions. (136408)

25. Telegram from OTT, dated 15 August 1940, Tokyo.

MUKAI, General Director of the NITSUI concern had left with companion for BATAVIA via MANILA in a private capacity to try to guarantee Japanese acquisition of raw materials thru private economic channels. (136409)

26. Telegram from OTT, dated 15 August 1940, Tokyo.

The head of the European division had been sent to OTT by the Foreign Minister to inform him the French Ambassador had altered the basic acceptance of the three Japanese demands, so that France wanted a guarantee that Japan would renounce all territorial claims before making a decision on the Japanese demands. The Japanese Foreign Minister demanded that the ambassador inform his government to maintain their previous consent. The question of territorial guarantee could be adjusted in accordance with declaration by the Foreign Minister. "The Foreign

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Minister requests the German Government to support the Japanese demands by influencing the French Government. (136410)

27. Memo from WOERMANN, dated 10 August 1940.

WOERMANN was informed by Ambassador's advisor KASE of news sent by the Japanese Ambassador in LONDON /SHIGEMITSU/ to his government on 12 August 1940. The Ambassador in London mentioned Germany's intention to invade England, English policy in the Mediterranean, Italian, Spanish intention, and Russia's aims in TURKEY. (136411-12)

28. Telegram from OTT, 23 August 1940.

The Japanese Government had recalled many diplomatic representatives abroad in order, according to MATSUOKA, this was necessary to guarantee the new foreign policy which he had introduced. Also it was necessary to replace most of the division heads in the Ministry with new personalities. According to OTT, the main intention was obviously to render harmless pro-Anglo-Saxon exponents of Japanese foreign policy.

With the aim of further preparations for the adjustment of State affairs on an authoritarian model, the Government had formed a commission of twenty-four leading personalities. Ambassador SHIRATORI was appointed the representative for foreign political matters in the Commission. The Commission consists mostly of followers of the reform movement and of the policy of cooperation with the Axis Powers, which is constantly demanded by this movement.

The diplomatic adjustment /REQUIREMENT/ and the composition of the commission, show again the efforts of the Government to follow a new course. (136413-4)

29. Telegram from OTT, 24 August 1940, Tokyo.

A report from the South Manchuria Railway on oils and beans awaiting transportation, and comments by OTT on the difficulties involved. (136414-A)



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30. Telegram from OTT, 26 August 1940, Tokyo, giving the English version of a Memorandum from the Foreign Ministry with regard to the chartering of German vessels to be used as coal freighters in the Empire area. (136414-B-C)

31. Telegram from OTT to REICH Minister, dated 10 September 1940.

OTT had given MATSUOKA, Ribbentrop's ideas on the cooperation of Germany, Italy and Japan with the aim of neutralizing America, and requested a quick decision.

In his answer, the Foreign Minister stressed the extraordinary increase of American pressure upon Japan and the growing danger of a sudden entry into the war against Germany. He asked for full details of the reliability of the German-Russian alliance. OTT had the impression that "the atmosphere was favourable for the German plan because of America's attitude and the strong internal political pressure upon the Cabinet, which the Foreign Minister could not conceal". MATSUOKA promised to keep negotiations secret. (136415)

32. Telegram from OTT, 14 September 1940, stating that Telegram No. 744<sup>7</sup> had been decoded at 1915 Tokyo time. (136415A)

33. Telegram from OTT, 14 September 1940, re: protests by German Embassy against DOMEI reports. (136415B)

34. Telegram from OTT, 16 September, Tokyo.

OTT had talked with the Vice Foreign Minister on the subject of repatriation of German nationals from the Americas. Japan was ready to accede to the German request and had sent respective instructions to diplomatic representatives in LIMA and SANTIAGO. (136415C)

35. Telegram from THOMSEN, dated 21 September 1940, WASHINGTON.

It had been revealed by a reliable source of information but not published in the American press, that Russia and Japan, with the cooperation of the Secretary

of State KEPLER had agreed on a treaty fixing the spheres of influence in the Far East, and the Manchurian border, and containing a twenty-five year non-aggression clause. (136451D)

36. Dispatch from the German Armistice Commission WIESBADEN, 20 September 1940. A note presented by General BOYEN of the French delegation /included in IPS Doc. 4025/. (136416-7)

37. Telegram from OTT, dated 22 September 1940, Tokyo

The press devoted much space to the increase of Anglo-American cooperation in the Pacific and to the question of SINGAPORE, whose common usage by America was seen as a definite intention. Japan should not delay with political and military counter measures. The cession of SINGAPORE to America would signify that America would take over the English position and actually enter the war. This development would threaten Japanese naval supremacy in the West Pacific, and could not be accepted silently by Japan. Leasing of SINGAPORE is definitely a measure directed against Japan. (136418)

38. Memo from WOERMANN to Ambassador VON DORNBERG dated 24 September 1940, Berlin. (not relevant) (136419)

39. Memo: by WOERMANN dated 24 September 1940.

WOERMANN had tried for an interview with OKAMOTO who had come from LONDON to BERLIN, as the LUFTWAFFE was interested in his information. KASE told WOERMANN that OKAMOTO would rather not have such a meeting. KASE promised to pass on all the information he could get from OKAMOTO, and so would the military attache.

The information which KASE passed on from OKAMOTO was not very detailed or substantial. (136420)

40. Memo from DORNBERG to the Foreign Office, dated 8 December 1940, Berlin.

This reported that the Embassy in MADRID had advised that OKAMOTO, Suyemasa, would soon arrive in MADRID en-route to JAPAN via GERMANY and U.S.S.R. (136421)

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41. Telegram from OTT to Reich Foreign Minister dated 27 September 1940, re: decoration of Ribbentrop with Grand Cross of the Rising Sun, with PAULOWNIA the highest decoration according to the Imperial Household law. (136422)

Analyst: N. K. St. Clare-Tregilgas  
S/Lt. R.N.V.R.

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電報

(秘密 略号法)

東京 一九四〇年(昭和十五年)八月二十三日二時〇〇分  
着 一九四〇年( )、二十三日十時〇〇分

八月二十三日附第八五三號

(一) 政府ハ外交人事ノ大規模ナ刷新ヲ發表シタ。

召還サレルモノハ次ノ如クデアル。

米國、佛蘭西、土耳其、伯刺西爾、駐上各

大使並十九公使、就中 匈牙利、西班牙、芬蘭、

勃牙利、四維馬尼、アルゼンチン、埃及、地、陀、真

在ノ諸公使、右ノ外五大使館參事官(兼中)

英國及蘇聯邦駐在參事官 並二十總

領事、就中 紐育、中俄、又及市、倫敦、

漢堡、フラーケ駐在領事。

外務大臣ハ、今回、処置ハ彼等ノ行ハレル

新外交政策ヲ確保シ、日本外務省ヲ新

政治状態ニ即慮サ、爲中要トナツタト記者團

ニ發表シタ。此ノ理由、爲外習者、各局

長、大多數ノ者ヲ新人物ト更迭サセルコトモ亦必

要デアル。右更迭ノ發表ハ向モナク行ハレルテ

アラウ。本日ノ全新聞ハ、數新聞ニ於テ

To 倫敦

グレートターレット迄稱セラレタ此ノ急激ナ、且日本歴史ニ於テ唯一ノ刷新ニ終始シタ。政府此ノ過激ナ行動ハ先ヅ第一ニ親英米方針ノ代表者ヲ無害ノモノニスルコトヲ明ニ意思圖シテキル。此ノコトハ亦新南ニ依テ非常ニ強調サレテキル。召還サレタ外交官ノウチ他ノ地位ニ於テ使用サレル者ハ極ク少部分ニ過ギヌデアラウ。

(二) 独裁主義ニ則ツテ全國家制度ヲ調整シタル爲、適當ナ行動ヲ更ニ準備スル目的ヲ以テ政府ハ二十四名ノ指導的人物ヨリ成ル委員會會ヲ組織シタ。白鳥大使ハ右委員會ノ對外政治事項ノ代表ニ任命サレタ。右委員會ハ大部分改革運動ノ信託者及此ノ運動ニ依テ常ニ要求セラレル樞軸國トシテ協調政策ノ信託者ニ依リ構成サレテ居ル。

(三) 外交的刷新モ右委員會ノ組織モ共ニ新方針ヲ執ラントスル政府ノ努力ヲ再ビ示シテキル。

オット

余、W. P. Cumming カミングハ正ニ宣誓シテ次ノ諸項ヲ  
證言ス

一 余ハ合衆國國務省附、同國獨逸關係事項政治顧問  
同部長タル事、及右ニ據リ余ハ（合衆國）獨逸  
軍政部代表ノ一員タルコト、且如上表明セル資  
格ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸柏林所在、柏林文書本部ニ  
於ル爾獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫、原本ノ  
占有、保管、管理ニ任シアル事。

ニ 上述獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合  
國遠征軍最高司令部ノ指揮下ニ在ル軍隊ニヨリ  
テ爾獨逸取得セラレ、其確保ノ下ニ、初メ獨逸國  
マールブルグニ於テ該軍隊ニヨリテ軍文書本部  
ニ蒐集セラレ、後該聯合軍擔任官ヨリ上述セル  
／柏林／文書本部ニ移管セラレタルモノナル事

三 余ハ一九四五年八月十五日、獨逸マールブルグ  
ニ於テ、上述文書本部適當ヲ命セラレタル事。  
是ニ仍リテ該爾獨逸外務省集積文書並文庫原  
本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ陸在當時、初メテ  
余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ歸シ、爾來引續キ余ノ  
占有、保管、管理ノ下ニアル事

四余ノ此供述書ノ添附セララル、所ノ文書ハ上述ノ  
獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫トシテ、白隠セラ  
レ、余ノ占有、保管ニ歸シ、且余ノ管理ノ下ニ  
置カレタル、獨逸外務省文書原本ノ、真正精確  
ナル直接復寫寫眞ノ謄本タル事

茲ニ添附セラレタル直接復寫寫眞謄本ノ文書原  
本ハ、余ノ保管、留保ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ  
點檢閱覽ニ資スル如クナシアリ、爲ニ該原本ヲ  
流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫眞謄本ヲ提  
供シ且ツ之ガ證明ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユー・ピー・カミング

(W. P. Cummings)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且  
宣誓ス

中佐 ジー・エツテ・ガード

Cf. H. Garde

高級副官事務取扱

Lt. Colonel AGD

Acting Adjutant General

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部

Ex 509

4029 E

電報 (秘密暗號法)

東京 一九四〇年(昭和十五年)八月十五日 十九時

着 " " 十五日 十七時二十分

至急

八月十五日付第八二三號 十四日付電第八一五號補遺

外相ハ唯今歐洲局長ヲ遣ハシテ私ニ次ノ様ナコトヲ知ラセマシタ。

フランス大使ハ今日日本ノ印度支那ニ關スル三ツノ要求ノ以前ニ通知セル原則的受諾ヲ、フランスハ先ヅ一切ノ領土權ヲ放棄スルト云フ日本側ノ保證ヲ希望シ、ソシテ始メテフランスハ日本側ノ要求ノ考慮ヲ決定スルダラウト云フ風ニ變更スルト。外相ハフランス大使ニ、政府ガ前ニ發表シタ、原則的ナ贊成ヲ保持スルコトヲ忠告スル様ニ切ニ要求シタ。

領土保證ノ問題ハ外相ガ要求シテ居ル宣言ニ基イテ調整サレ得タ。外相ハドイツ政府ガフランス政府ヲ抑ヘル事ニヨツテ日本側ノ要求ヲ支持シテ贊ヒタイト依頼シテ居ル。

(一部不明)局長ハ約束シタガ八月十二日附ノ電報第六五四號ノ法的聲明ニ關シテ我々ガフランスノ政策ニ及ボス影響ハ余リ無イトイフコトヲ指摘シタ。

オハット



供 述 書

余、W. P. Ho Cumming  
カミングハ正ニ宣誓シテ次ノ諸項ヲ  
証言ス

一 余ハ合衆國國務省附、同國獨逸關係事項政治顧問部長タル事、及右ニ據リ余ハ（合衆國）獨逸軍政部代表ノ一員タルコト、且如上表明セル資格ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸柏林所在、柏林文書本部ニ於ル獨逸獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫、原本ノ占有、保管、管理ニ任シアル事

ニ 上述獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合國遠征軍最高司令部ノ指揮下ニ在ル軍隊ニヨリテ獨逸取得セラレ、其確保ノ下ニ、初メ獨逸國マールブルグニ於テ該軍隊ニヨリテ軍文書本部ニ蒐集セラレ、後該聯合軍擔任官ヨリ上述セル／柏林／文書本部ニ移管セラレタルモノナル事

三 余ハ一九四五年八月十五日、獨逸マールブルグニ於テ、上述文書本部當當ヲ命セラレタル事。是ニ仍リテ該國獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫原本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ駐在當時、初メテ余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ歸シ、爾來引續キ余ノ占有、保管、管理ノ下ニアル事

曰余ノ此供述書ノ添附セララル、所ノ文書ハ上述ノ  
獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫トシテ、鹵獲セラ  
レ、余ノ占有、保管ニ歸シ、且余ノ管理ノ下ニ  
置カレタル、獨逸外務省文書原本ノ、眞正精確  
ナル直接復寫寫眞ノ謄本タル事

茲ニ添附セラレタル直接復寫寫眞謄本ノ文書原  
本ハ、余ノ保管、暫保ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ  
點檢閱覽ニ資スル如クナシアリ、爲ニ該原本ヲ  
流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫眞謄本ヲ提  
供シ且ツ之ガ證明ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユー・ピー・カミング

(W. P. Cumming)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且  
宣誓ス

中佐 ジー・エツテ・ガード

G. H. Garde

高級副官事務取扱

Lt. Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部

538

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 2 August 1940 19.55 hours  
Arrival " " " 18.55 hours

No. 770 of 2.8

1. A member of the Manchurian State Council and former Manchurian Vice Foreign Minister, OHASHI, has been appointed Vice Foreign Minister. He is known in Berlin because of his visit in 1937. OHASHI stepped forward repeatedly as a convinced adherent to the German course of Japanese Foreign Policy. His appointment signifies the further strengthening of the influence of the Manchurian group in the new government.

2. Ambassador SHIRATORI informed confidentially that he had declined the post of Vice Foreign Minister. It is to be considered that he will now be appointed permanent advisor to the Foreign Minister. He believes he can exercise a far reaching influence in this capacity.

OTT

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming  
\_\_\_\_\_  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
\_\_\_\_\_  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

電報(秘家暗號法)

東京

一九四〇年(昭和十五年)

八月二日 十九時五五分

着 一九四〇年(昭和十五年)

八月二日 十八時五五分

八月二日附ヤモロ号

一、現満洲国参議負並ニ元満洲国外交部次長大橋  
か外務次官ニ任命セタ

彼ハ一九三七年、訪問ヨリ、ベルリンニテ知ラレテ居ル。大橋

ハ、日本外交政策、ドイツ的ニ対スル。確信見追隨  
者トシテ、数次ニ直ツテ登場シタ。彼、任命ハ、新政府ニ  
於イテ満洲国グループノ一層、勢力強化ヲ意味シテ  
居ル

二、白鳥大使ハ外務次官ノ地位ヲ拒否シタ事ヲ内密ニ  
打明ケタ。今ヤ彼カ外務大臣ノ永久顧問ニ任命  
サレデアラウ事ハ考ヘラレル事デアル。彼ハ比ノ資格テ  
廣汎ナ勢力ヲ振フ事ガ出来ルト信ジテ居ル。

オット

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供 述 書

余、W. P. P. Cumming  
カミングハ正ニ宣誓シテ次ノ諸項ヲ  
證言ス

一 余ハ合衆國國務省附、同國獨逸關係事項政治顧問部員タル事、及右ニ據リ余ハ（合衆國）獨逸軍政部代表ノ一員タルコト、且如上表明セル資格ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸伯林所在、伯林文書本部ニ於ル國獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫、原本ノ占有、保管、管理ニ任シアル事。

二 上述獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合國遠征軍最高司令部ノ指揮下ニ在ル軍隊ニヨリテ國獨逸取得セラレ、其確保ノ下ニ、初メ獨逸國マールブルグニ於テ該軍隊ニヨリテ軍文書本部ニ蒐集セラレ、後該聯合軍擔任官ヨリ上述セル／伯林ノ文書本部ニ移管セラレタルモノナル事

三 余ハ一九四五年八月十五日、獨逸マールブルグニ於テ、上述文書本部擔當ヲ命セラレタル事。是ニ仍リテ該國獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫原本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ駐在當時、初メテ余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ歸シ、爾來引續キ余ノ占有、保管、管理ノ下ニアル事

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獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫トシテ、自發セラ  
レ、余ノ占有、保管ニ歸シ、且余ノ管理ノ下ニ  
置カレタル、獨逸外務省文書原本ノ、真正精確  
ナル直接復寫寫眞ノ贈本タル事

五 茲ニ添附セラレタル直接復寫寫眞贈本ノ文書原  
本ハ、余ノ保管、留保ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ  
斷續閱覽ニ資スル如クナシアリ、爲ニ該原本ヲ  
流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫眞贈本ヲ提  
供シ且ツ之ガ證明ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユー・ビー・カミング

(W. P. Cummings)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且  
宣誓ス

中佐 ジー・エツテ・ガード

Ct. H. Garde

高級副官事務取扱

Lt. Colonel AGD

Acting Adjutant General

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部

4029 B

Ex 540

ST. I S. 第六一號

印字電信機ニヨル

(ST. I S. 第六〇九號宛)

ベルリン 一九四〇年八月二日

昨日ノ私ト日本大使トノ會談ノ覺書ニ更ニ

左記ヲ追加シタイ

「來栖ノ言葉ハ / aus KURUSU sprach die Hoffnung /  
日本ガ戰後ノ新秩序ニ / 關シテ / 意見ヲ聞キ入レ  
ラレ、又 / 日本 / ガ世界ノ新分配ノ際ニ等閑視サ  
レヌ様ニトノ彼ノ希望ヲ示シテキタ。」  
以上外務大臣ニ / 提出ス /

ヴァイス サツカー (署名)

「寫シノ配布先

「U. S. I S. PO1

「Dg. PO1

「リッター大使

「Director W.

「U. S. - S. Recht

「Chef A. O.



供 述 書

余、W. P. Cumming カミングハ正ニ宣誓シテ次ノ諸項ヲ  
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是ニ仍リテ該國務獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫原本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ駐在當時、初メテ余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ歸シ、爾來引續キ余ノ占有、保管、管理ノ下ニアル事

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置カレタル、獨逸外務省文書原本ノ、眞正精確  
ナル直接復寫爲眞ノ謄本タル事

三 茲ニ添附セラレタル直接復寫爲眞謄本ノ文書原  
本ハ、余ノ保管、習保ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ  
點檢同覽ニ資スル如クナシアリ、爲ニ該原本ヲ  
流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ爲眞謄本ヲ提  
供シ且ツ之ガ證明ヲナハモノナル事

ダブルユー・ピー・カミング

(W. P. Cumming)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且  
宣誓ス

中佐

ジー・エツテ・ガード  
G. H. Garde

高級副官事務取扱

Lt. Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部

テレタイプに依り

Zx. 542

STIS. 第六〇九號 伯林・一九四〇年八月一日

本日、余ハ日本國大使ト目下ノ用件ヲ完了  
 シタノデアルガ、同大使ハ結局ト新日本内閣ガ  
 大政策ニ於テ、演ジナケルバナキヲ後刻ニ  
 閣スル詔ヲスルニ至ツタ。来栖ハ始メカラ、  
 未タ本國新政府カラ何等ノ新案ニ接シテ  
 居ナイカ言ハ明シタ。来栖ハ新案ニ接シテ  
 外交政策ノ大綱ガ説明セラルトラ何時迄モ  
 待ツテ居ルベキデハナイトノ所信ヲ有シテ居タ。  
 来栖自身ノ仕事トシテハニノ方有ク考慮セラル。  
 即チ、来栖ハ本國政府ガ訓令ニ依リテ  
 待機スベキカ、然ラザレバ本國政府ノ能ハ  
 度確定前ニ、本國政府ニ對シテ  
 當方ノ視野ニ依ツテ、  
 カデアアル。何レノ場合ニ於テモ、我々トノ會談  
 ハ、其ノ會談ガ、獨國外相トノ會談デア  
 ラウト、余トノ會談デアラウト必要デアルト。  
 同大使ハ詳細ニハ述ベナカッタガ、来栖  
 個人ノ時局ニ関スル見解ト一致スル彼自身  
 ノ觀察ヲ若干語ツタ。来栖ハ日本ノ

政策ハ、將來ノ見透シヲツケテ調整サレナ  
 ケレバナラナイト信ジテ居タ。明カニ、東栖ハ戰  
 争ノ急速ナル終結ヲ考へ慮セズ、何レニシ  
 テモ、数年間繼續スルト推量ルベキ緊要迫  
 セル状態ヲ豫想シテ居ルガ、斯ル状態ニ在  
 ツテハ、日本ト米・蘇向ノ關係ガ、當然一彼ニ  
 最モ重ニ要トナル。同大使ハ私ニ、彼ハ独外  
 相ガ繰返シ日本ニ對シ、ロシアトノ協定ヲ催  
 シタト云フ事實ヲ知ツテ居ルト、速ベク然ラシ  
 乍ラスノ如キ行爲ハ日本ノ對米態度ト共ニ、  
 独伊兩國ノ意思嚮向ト調和スルモノデアルト。  
 同大使ハ、独外相ハ佐藤公使ノ訪問ニ際シ、  
 独日ノ親善ト協カトラ極メテ重要ナモソト  
 説明シテ居タト云フ事實ヲ想起サセメ。  
 ソレニモ因ラズ東栖ハ我々が如何ニ此ノ  
 日独協カヲ詳細ニ一旦ツテ考へテ居ルカト云フ  
 事、特ニ我々が現在ノ戰爭ニ日本ノ武力ガ  
 加ヘラレルノシ見タイト望ミンデ居ルカ如何カ、  
 又如何ナル時ニソレヲ見タイト望ミンデ居ルカラ  
 正確ニハ知ラナカッタ。例ヘバ、若シ日本が自ラ  
 戰爭ニ邁進シ、米國ト戰爭ヲ開始シ、此ノ  
 向他方独逸ハ急速ナル勝利ヲ期シテ、近キ  
 將來ニ於ケル戰爭ノ終結ヲ信ジテ居タトスレバ、

恐ラク日本ハ独逸ノ希望ニ反シテ行動スル  
 居ル事ニナルデアラウ。然レ乍ラ、若シ日本が現在  
 戦争ニ介入シナケレバ、日独伊三國ノ一員トシテノ  
 日本、特ニ日本艦隊ハ、日独伊三國內ニ於テ  
 將來必クヤ隠然タル大勢力ヲ持ツニ至ルデ  
 アラウト。

私ハ末栖が日本政府ノ新方針ハ戦争介  
 入ノ傾向ガアルモノト豫期シテ居ルガ、然レ独逸  
 ノ見解ニ依ラテ此ノ介入ハ全ク時機ヲ得テ  
 居ナイト云フ事ヲ私カラ聞キタガツテ居ラマシ  
 感心シタ。

末栖大使ハ、彼ガドノ勸告ヲ日本政府ニ対  
 シテ爲スベキカニ就イテ、獨外相個人カラデモ、  
 或ハ私カラデモ、近イ將來ニ於テ暗示ヲ得ル  
 事ガ出来ルナラバ、必クヤ感心スルデアラウ。  
 彼ハ此ノ勸告ガ完全ニ日独親善政策ノ枠  
 内ニナケレバナラナイト云フ事實ヲ克ク知ラテ居ル。  
 然レナガラ、末栖ハ我々が從來通リ依然  
 日露、妥協ヲ同様ニ重要ト看做スカド  
 ウカ、又、新日本内閣ハ、以前ヨリモ速ク  
 或ハ決心ラク最初ハ普通ノ速度デ、及英  
 米方針ヲ遂行スルカドウカニ就イテハ確信  
 ガナイカモ知レナイ。

NO 4

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本質的ニ、私ハ同大使ノ聲明ヲ只承認シタガ、  
ソレニ對スル回答ヲ彼ガ期待シタ標ニ與フヘ  
ナカツタ。私ハ、戦争ハ極メテ長期間向繼續  
エルデアラウ、ソレテ、更ニ長期ニ一旦ル際示由ノ  
状態ガ戦争ニ續クデアラウト云フ末柄ノ  
意見ニ一及對デアワタ。

独逸國外務大臣宛

署名 ヴァイズセツカー

供 述 書

余、W. P. P. Cumming  
カミングハ正ニ宣誓シテ次ノ諸項ヲ  
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流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫眞贈本ヲ提  
供シ且ツ之ガ證明ヲナシモノナル事

ダブルユー・ピー・カミング

(W. P. Cumming)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且  
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中佐

ジー・エツテ・ガード

G. H. Garde

高級副官事務取扱

Lt. Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部



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4029-1

寫シ

S.T.S. 第六三四號

伯林 一九四〇年（昭和十五年）八月七日

日本大使ハ八月一日（S.T.S. 第六〇九號）日本ノ新内閣ノ政治的全方針ニ就テノ獨逸國外務大臣トノ意見交換ヲ述べタ。其ノ當時日本大使ノ二ノ問題ハ、我々ガ日蘇妥協ヲ尙依然、同ジク重大ナモノト思ツテキルカ否カ、茲ニ日本ノ新内閣ノ反米英政策ノ尖銳ナ或ハ恐ラク穩健ナ調子ガ我々ニ望マシイカ否カト云フ事デアツタ。

今日ハ大使ハ松岡外相トオツト大使トノ間ノ會談ニツイテ語り出シタ。（東京電報報告第七六五號）此ノ會談ニ於テ、來栖ノ情報ニ依レバ、オツト大使ハ再ビ非常ニ明確ニ語ツタ、蘇聯ト獨逸ノ間ニハ將來ニ於テモ衝突ハ尙待サレ得ナイト。日本ハ一若シ必要ナラバ獨逸ノ援助ニ就ツテ一途ノ例ニ於テモ露西亞ト和解シタガツテキル。

來栖ガ本日ノ彼ノ訪問デ長々ト語ツタ其ノ點ハ、日本ノ露西亞、米國或ハ英國ニ對スル關係デハナクテ、日本ニ依ツテ注目サレタル所謂大東亞圈ノ新秩序デアル。オツト大使ハ彼ノ電報報告ニ於テ此ノ題目ニモ觸レテキルガ、來栖ハ松岡ノ聲明ヲ更ニ詳細ニ繰返シ而モ次ノ如ク、日本ハ南洋ヲ含

4029-2

メル大東亞圈ヲ廣汎ナル基礎ノ上ニ組織化セン事ヲ希望シテキルノデアルト。松岡ハオツトニ對シ次ノ如ク述べテキル。此ノ大東亞圈ニ於テ何等ノ征服抑壓及ビ擄取ノ存在シナイ様ナ状態ヲ創造スル事ヲ日本ハ望ンデキル。各人ハ其處デハ正義ヲ得ベキデアリ、日本ハ自己何デハ此ノ三原則ヲ堅持セントスルガ、總テノ歐洲及ビアメリカノ國々ハ此ノ原則ニ違背シナイト期待シナケレバナラヌ。此ノ際問題ニナルノハ、正シク理解スレバ、一般ノ利益ニナル理想ト云フ事デアルト。此ノ東亞圈ノ中核トシテ來栖ハ日本、滿洲國及ビ支那ヲ舉ゲ、ソレニ東亞「樞軸」ト云フ概念ヲ用ヒタ。

來栖ハ續ケタ。佐藤大使ハ玆程此處カラ、日本ニ對スル獨逸ノ滄ラザル友好態度ノ印象ヲ受ケテ行ツタガ、然シ此ノ友情ノ發展ノ方法ヤ手段ニ就テハ充分明カニサレテキナイカラ、今ヤ大東亞圈ニ對スル此ノ日本ノ諸計畫ニ對スル獨逸ノ見解ヲ知ルニ至ル時デアラウト。

大使ハ、松岡ト近衛ハ彼等ノ全外交政策ノ調整ノ爲及ビソレニ屬スル東京ノ内閣々議ノタメ、先ツ第一ニ我々ガ之ニ對シ如何ナル意見ヲ持ツテキルカラ、明瞭ニ知ラネバナラヌトサヘ言フニ至ツタ。來栖ハ、本年五月日本人ニ對シ表明サレタル

4029-3

ノ諸君同是ニ對スル我々ノ無關心ニハ言及シテ  
カツタガ彼ガ狙ツタ事ハ東京ノ指令ニヨリ明白ニ  
語ツタ事ハ明カデアツタ。

來栖ノ説明ニ依レバ、私ガ本日此ノ會談ニ引キ  
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外務大臣ト近キ將來ニ於テ會談出來ル様、希望ヲ  
述べタ。

之ヲ獨逸國外務大臣へ。

一三六三九六一一三六三九七

供 述 書

余、W. P. Cumming  
カミングハ正ニ宣誓シテ次ノ諸項ヲ  
證言ス

一 余ハ合衆國國務省附、同國獨逸關係事項政治顧問部員タル事、及右ニ據リ余ハ（合衆國）獨逸軍政部代表ノ一員タルコト、且如上表明セル資格ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸柏林所在、柏林文書本部ニ於ル國獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫、原本ノ占有、保管、管理ニ任シアル事。

二 上述獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合國遠征軍最高司令部ノ指揮下ニ在ル軍隊ニヨリテ國獨逸取得セラレ、其確保ノ下ニ、初メ獨逸國マールブルグニ於テ該軍隊ニヨリテ軍文書本部ニ蒐集セラレ、後該聯合軍擔任官ヨリ上述セル／柏林／文書本部ニ移管セラレタルモノナル事

三 余ハ一九四五年八月十五日、獨逸マールブルグニ於テ、上述文書本部擔當ヲ命セラレタル事。是ニ仍リテ該國獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫原本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ駐在當時、初メテ余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ歸シ、爾來引續キ余ノ占有、保管、管理ノ下ニアル事

四余ノ此供述書ノ添附セララル、所ノ文書ハ上述ノ  
獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫トシテ、自獲セラ  
レ、余ノ占有、保管ニ歸シ、且余ノ管理ノ下ニ  
置カレタル、獨逸外務省文書原本ノ、真正精確  
ナル直接復寫寫眞ノ屬本タル事

茲ニ添附セラレタル直接復寫寫眞原本ノ文書原  
本ハ、余ノ保管、留保ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ  
斷續閱覽ニ資スル如クナシアリ、爲ニ該原本ヲ  
流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫眞原本ヲ提  
供シ且ツ之ガ證明ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユー・ピー・カミング

(W. P. Cunningham)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且  
宣誓ス

中佐 ジー・エツチ・ガード

Ct. H. Gardle

高級副官等務取扱

Sr. Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部

St. - S. No. 634

Berlin, August 7, 1940

KURUSU,

On 1 August (St. - S. No. 609) the Japanese Ambassador suggested an exchange of points of view with the German Foreign Minister concerning the entire political orientation of the new Japanese cabinet. His two questions at that time were, whether we still consider the Japan-Russia rapprochement as important as formerly, and also whether we desire a sharp or perhaps more moderate tempo in the anti-Anglo-Saxon policy of the new cabinet.

Today the Ambassador spoke of the conversation between Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and Ambassador OTT (Telegraphic Report Tokyo No. 765). In this conversation, according to KURUSU's information, Ambassador OTT had again clearly stated that between Soviet Russia and Germany a conflict can also now be expected in the future. Japan may - if necessary with German help - also arrange its differences with Russia.

The specific point, however, with which KURUSU concerned himself for the longest period of time at his present visit today, was not Japan's relationship to Russia, America, or England, but the new order in the so-called Great East Asia sphere, which Japan is aiming at. Ambassador OTT also touches this subject in his telegraphic report, but KURUSU repeated MATSUOKA's statements in greater detail, in the following way: Japan wants to organize the East Asia sphere, including the South Seas, on a broad basis. MATSUOKA mentioned to OTT that Japan wants to create in this area a situation in which there would be no conquest, no oppression, and no exploitation. Everybody should come to his rights there. Japan for her part would adhere to these three basic principles, but would then expect that no European or American country would violate these principles. The matter concerns itself with ideals, which if correctly understood, lie in the common interest. KURUSU named Japan, Manchukuo, and China as the core of the Great East Axis sphere, for which he used the term East Asia "Axis".

KURUSU went on to say that, though Minister SATO had received the impression of an unchanged friendly German attitude toward Japan here, he was not quite clear on the ways and means of enlarging upon this friendship, and now would be the time to learn the German conception of these Japanese plans for the East Asia sphere.

The Ambassador went so far to say that MATSUOKA and KONOYE, in order to adjust their foreign general policy and the corresponding cabinet talks in Tokyo would first have to clearly see how we stand regarding the above. KURUSU did not refer to the desinteressenent on these overseas problems, which we expressed to the Japanese in May of this year, but it was clear - and he obviously spoke under orders from Tokyo - what he was aiming at.

According to the description by KURUSU, OTT did not allow himself any more than I today to be drawn into this field of discussion.

At the end, KURUSU expressed the hope, to be able to discuss these far-reaching problems soon with the Reich Foreign Minister.

Herewith

To the Reich Foreign Minister.

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming  
\_\_\_\_\_  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
\_\_\_\_\_  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)



## "Telegraph

"St - S. No. 309

Berlin, 1 August 1940

"The Japanese Ambassador, with whom I carried out current business today, in the end brought the talk to the role that the new Japanese cabinet would have to play in big politics. KURUSU declared from the beginning that he had not yet received any instructions from his new government; he was of the belief that they should not wait too long for the definition of the general lines of the new Japanese foreign policy. For his, KURUSU's, own work two methods could be considered: either he is to wait until his government gives him instructions, or he is to take up a position in accordance with the outlook here so as to advise his government, before it firmly fixes /its position/. In both cases a talk with us is necessary whether it be with the Foreign Minister of the Reich or with me.

"The Ambassador did not go into details but gave some of his own observations which might correspond to his personal view of the situation. He believed that Japanese politics must now be orientated by taking a long view. Apparently KURUSU is not thinking of a speedy end to the war and reckons at any rate on a state of tension which has to be estimated to last for years in which the relations of Japan with Russia and the USA are naturally most important. The Ambassador told me that he is conscious of the fact that the Foreign Minister of the Reich had suggested repeatedly to Japan agreement with Russia. Such an action as well as the Japanese attitude towards USA should be harmonized with the German and also Italian intentions. The Ambassador reminded /of the fact/ that the Reichs Foreign Minister, on the occasion of the visit of Minister SATO, had pictured the German-Japanese friendship and cooperation as being very important.

"Nevertheless, he, KURUSU, did not know exactly how this cooperation is pictured by us in detail, especially if and at what time we wish to see the Japanese weight thrown on the scale of the present conflict. If, for instance, Japan would push, on her part, towards a war and enter into the war against America, while, on the other hand, Germany believed the end of the war near, expecting a quick victory, Japan would, probably, be acting contrary to German wishes. If, however, Japan would not intervene now, the factor Japan, and, especially her fleet, in the triangle Berlin-Rome-Tokyo would by all means have great potentialities in the future.

"I had the feeling that KURUSU expects of the new course in Tokyo a tendency towards intervention in the war but wished to hear from me, that this /intervention/ would not be quite timely according to German opinion.

"The Ambassador would certainly be grateful if he could obtain a hint in the near future - either through the Reichs Foreign Minister personally or through me - as to which advice he should give his government. He is clear about / the fact / that this / advice / must fully lie within the framework of the German-Japanese policy of friendship. He may not be quite certain, however, whether we still regard the Japanese-Russian rapprochement as equally important/as hitherto/ and whether the new Japanese cabinet should follow its anti-Anglo-Saxon course with an accelerated or, possibly, at first with a moderate speed.

"Fundamentally, I just accepted the statements of the Ambassador and did not anticipate a reply, to be given to them. I opposed his opinion that the war may still last a very long time and may be followed by a still longer period of tension.

"To  
The Reichs Foreign Minister

Signed WEISAECKER:

Doc. No. 4029 B

Page 1

St. - S. No. 611

By Teletype

(to St. - S.No. 609)

Berlin, 2 August 1940

In addition to the memorandum concerning my talk yesterday with the Japanese Ambassador, I would like to add the following: KURUSU's words expressed his hope /aus KURUSU sprach die Hoffnung/ that Japan may belong to the New Order after the war and that /Japan/ not be forgotten in the new apportionment of the world.

Hereby /submitted/ to the German Foreign Minister.

(Signed) WEIZSACKER

Copy for:  
U.St. - S. Pol.  
Dg. Pol.  
Ambassador Ritter  
Director W.  
U. St. - S. Recht  
Chef A. O.

1 Copy given to Chef AO

/136386/

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 2 August 1940 19.55 hours  
Arrival " " " 18.55 hours

No. 770 of 2.8

1. A member of the Manchurian State Council and former Manchurian Vice Foreign Minister, OHASHI, has been appointed Vice Foreign Minister. He is known in Berlin because of his visit in 1937. OHASHI stepped forward repeatedly as a convinced adherent to the German course of Japanese Foreign Policy. His appointment signifies the further strengthening of the influence of the Manchurian group in the new government.

2. Ambassador SHIRATORI informed confidentially that he had declined the post of Vice Foreign Minister. It is to be considered that he will now be appointed permanent advisor to the Foreign Minister. He believes he can exercise a far reaching influence in this capacity.

OTT

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 15 August 1940 1900 hours  
Arrival 15 August 1940 1720 hours

No. 823 of 15.8 Appendix to Tel. No. 813 of 14.8

URGENT!

The Foreign Minister sent just now the head of the European Dept. to instruct me about the following:

The French Ambassador had today changed the previously announced basic acceptance of the three Japanese demands regarding Indo-China /to the attitude/ that France wanted first a Japanese guarantee for renouncement of all territorial claims and only then would she decide about the considerations of the Japanese demands. The Foreign Minister had urgently demanded the French Ambassador to advise his government to maintain their previously announced basic agreement. The question of territorial guarantee could be adjusted based on the demanded declaration by the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister requests the German government to support the Japanese demands by influencing the French government. (1 group garbled) Ministry Director promised, but it was pointed out that with reference to legalistic statements in Telegram No. 654 dated from August 12 that our influence on French policy is limited.

OTT

/136410/

## Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo: 23 Aug. 1940 0200 hours  
Arrived: " " " 1100 hours

No. 853 of 23 August

1. The Government announces an extensive revirement of the Foreign Service. Recalled are the Ambassador of the U.S., Ambassadors of France, Turkey, Brazil and also nineteen ministers, among them representatives in Hungary, Spain, Finland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Argentina, Egypt, Canada, besides them five embassy councillors / among them the councillors from England and Russia/ and finally eleven Consul Generals, among them the Consuls from New York, Chicago, San Francisco, London, Hamburg, and Prague. The Foreign Minister declared to the press, that this action had become necessary in order to secure the new foreign policy introduced by him and to bring the Japanese Foreign Service into coordination with the new Japanese conditions. For this reason it is also necessary to replace most of the division heads of the Foreign Ministry with new personalities. Publication of these changes will soon take place. The whole press of today is governed by this radical and, in Japanese history, unique revirement, which is called a 'coup d'Etat' in several papers. The drastic action of the government evidently intends in the first place to render harmless the exponents of pro-Anglo-Saxon courses. This is also strongly underlined by the press. Only a few of the recalled officials will be used in other posts.

2. With the aim of further preparation of suitable actions for the adjustment of State affairs on an authoritarian model, the government had formed a commission of 24 leading personalities. Ambassador SHIRATORI was appointed the representative for foreign political matters in the commission. The commission consists mostly of followers of the reform movement and of the policy of cooperation with the Axis powers which is constantly demanded by this movement.

3. Both the diplomatic adjustment and the composition of the commission, show again the efforts of the government to follow a new course.

OTT.

NOTE

22 August 1946

4029-a through f

(Frames: 136376-378, 136386; 136387; 136410;  
136413-414)

have been withdrawn for

use as evidence in court

by Mr. Hyde -

W. H. Wagner

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION 8

Doc. No. 4029

Date 29/5/46.

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: PHOTOSTATS: File of Foreign Ministry  
(State Secy Japan, vol 2e) Telegrams and memos, relations between Germany and Japan

Date: 1 Aug - 27 Sep 1940 Original ( ) Copy (X) Language: GERMAN.

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No (X)

Has it been photostated? Yes (X) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

DOCUMENT DIVISION

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: NUREMBERG.

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

SHIRATORI, KURUSU, MATSUOKA, OSHIMA, OTT, KURUSU

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Conspiracy with Germany  
Preparation for aggressive warfare  
Policy along anti-anglo-saxon line

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Memo, dated 1 Aug 1940

- 1.) Letter [Reference No. 607] from unknown originator addressed to Press Director, Under Secretary for State Affairs. The letter states that the Japanese ambassador had been informed of the incorrect reporting of news reports of the DOMEI agency, which were brought to disrupt German politics, and that the matter should be dealt with in TOKYO, although KURUSU's attention to it was appreciated [Frame 136372]

Analyst: S/LT. N. K. ST. CLARE-TREGILGAS R.N.V.R. Doc. No.



- 2). Enclosure to previous item [~~St. S. No 607~~], citing occasions in which representatives of the DOMEI agency, working outside Germany, had given false reports and rumours which would harm German aspirations and politics. Nine examples are given and the letter is signed by BASSLER [136373-4 frames].
- 3) <sup>Memo</sup> ~~letter~~ from WEIZSÄCKER dated 1 August 1940 [~~Ref St. S. No 608~~]  
 The Japanese Ambassador complained <sup>about</sup> ~~of the activities~~ whose reports are derogatory to Japan. Swedish journalists in BERLIN. Count BRACH had already been informed of derogatory reports from the Swedish press, which were of German origin. KURUSU, naturally did not like to have his government spoken of in such a way, and requested assistance. One such report was attributed to the appearance of an article in the June issue of "GEOPOLITIK" by General HAUSHOFER. KURUSU had written to the Japanophile HAUSHOFER for an explanation and WEIZSÄCKER would do likewise after he had read the article in question. [Frame 136375]
- 4). <sup>Memo</sup> from WEIZSÄCKER [~~Ref St. S. No 607~~] <sup>to REICH Foreign Minister</sup> dated 1st August 1940, BERLIN. In a conversation KURUSU mentioned the role of the new Japanese cabinet in major politics. He had received no instructions from the new government, but he thought that the general outline of the new Japanese foreign policy would soon be made known. KURUSU could either wait

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A

"If, for instance, Japan on her part would push towards a war, while, on the other hand, Germany believes that the end of the war is at hand in expectation of a quick victory, she (Japan) would act against German desires".

OTT thinks that KURUSU expects <sup>of the new course in Tokyo,</sup> a tendency towards an intervention in the war. KURUSU would appreciate hints as to what advice he is to give to his government e.g. in the question of desirability of a rapprochement with Russia <sup>regarding</sup> or the tempo of the anti-British policy of the new cabinet. Weiszaecker contradicted KURUSU's belief that the war might last a long time. [136377/8]

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for instructions or he could advise his government on the current situation before the government decided anything. In either case, a discussion with the REICH Foreign Minister or WEIZSÄCKER would be necessary. For himself, KURUSU thought that Japanese politics would have to be based on a long term <sup>view</sup> policy. He thought that the next twelve months would be tense, and Japan's relations with the USA and USSR were most important. But Japan's relations with USA and USSR must be applied in accord with German and Italian intentions, so as to decide when the weight of Japan should be placed in the balance of war. <sup>Must A</sup> ~~KURUSU thought that the war would last for some time but WEIZSÄCKER contradicted this.~~

[Frame 136376-8]

- 5). Letter from WEIZSÄCKER to the Reich Foreign Minister dated 5 August 1940. <sup>re: anticipated request by KURUSU</sup> ~~WEIZSÄCKER stated that he would be dealing with the Japanese Ambassador on the following day, and as he would not see the Reich Foreign Minister, ~~WEIZSÄCKER wanted information on the point~~~~

[Frame 136379]

- 6). Telegram from Ambassador OTT in Tokyo, 2 August 1940, to Secretary of State. [Ref. No 765 of 2.8.]. This report of a conversation with Foreign Minister MATSUOKA <sup>shows the extremely conciliatory</sup> ~~raised these points etc.~~ attitude and the promises of MATSUOKA regarding a number of German wishes <sup>discussed on the previous day. This is identical with Item 5 in</sup>

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I) Transit deliveries: - MATSUOKA <sup>promised greater con-</sup> sideration to ~~German wishes than under preceding government.~~ <sup>had been up to</sup> ~~that the present German government had~~ <sup>expectation in his deliveries.</sup>

II) China <sup>damages</sup> ~~incident~~: - MATSUOKA <sup>promised to urge</sup> hoped to create a permanent settlement.

III) Press: - MATSUOKA recognized the <sup>unbearability</sup> ~~unavoidability~~ of certain anti German publications in English, <sup>printed in Tokyo,</sup> and promised stricter control through the Home Ministry. <sup>Other promises made by MATSUOKA referred to repatriation of Germans and the soya-bean problem.</sup> MATSUOKA asked for Germany's attitude to Japan's economic <sup>great</sup> ~~expansion~~ plans <sup>for a great sphere</sup> in East Asia. OTT stated that Germany could only express an opinion, if Japan proposed a concrete plan, which must guarantee Germany perceptible and valuable advantages. MATSUOKA asked the Reich Foreign Minister to be informed that from the time of Japan's exit from the League of Nations, he had advocated that the policy of self-isolation was impossible for Japan, and that co-operation with Germany was the only thing. Now as Foreign Minister he was glad to be able to put this into practice.

At the end of the interview MATSUOKA informed OTT that he had seen the French Ambassador shortly before this, and requested him to apply for an agreement with the French Government for the passage of troops through

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North Indo China and the construction of two airfields as only in this way was an attack on the YUNNAN Road and KUNMING possible. He had assured the French Ambassador that Japan had no territorial claims on INDO CHINA and would leave the district later. The Foreign Minister hoped that the French Government would agree to this, so as not to make it necessary for the Japanese Army to march through by force of arms. The French Ambassador pointed out that since the Armistice, <sup>France</sup> could not decide by herself, and must get permission from the Armistice Commission. MATSUOKA said he would be gratified if the REICH government raised no objection to the Japanese wishes and if it influenced the French government in the matter.

[~~711~~ 13680-2]

- 7). Telegram in code from WEIZSÄCKER, 9 August 1940, BERLIN, to German Ambassador, TOKYO, in reference to Telegram No. 765 of 2 August.

The Japanese Ambassador in conversation with WEIZSÄCKER, raised two questions on the subject of general <sup>front</sup> political orientation of the new Japanese cabinet whether Germany <sup>still</sup> considered the Japan-Russia <sup>reapprochement</sup> alliance <sup>as formerly</sup> and whether she desires <sup>more</sup> a sharp or perhaps moderate <sup>is</sup>

4029

tempo in the anti-anglo-axon policy of the new cabinet.

Concerning OTT's conversation with MATSUOKA, on which KURUSU seemed to be most precedely informed, KURUSU expanded on the question of the planned Japanese New Order in <sup>the</sup> East Asian <sup>area</sup>, which, as he explained, would be organized by Japan on a broad basis embracing the South Seas. Japan wished to create in this area a situation in which there would be no conquest, no oppression and no exploitation; where each should have his right. Just as Japan intended to maintain these three basic principles, so must she also expect no third power to ~~interfere~~ <sup>violate them</sup>. The Ambassador named Japan, Manchoukuo and China as the <sup>center</sup> ~~kernel~~ of the <sup>Great</sup> East Asian <sup>Sphere</sup> Area, and called them the "East Asian Axis."

The Ambassador, who evidently spoke as advised by Tokyo, went so far as to say that MATSUOKA and KONOYE must see <sup>clearly our standpoint</sup> ~~their way clear~~ for the purpose of orientation of their overall foreign policy and for the <sup>in this connection</sup> ~~present~~ joint policy and cabinet discussions ~~thereon~~, ~~as we have here.~~

[7-136383-4]

8). <sup>Urgent</sup> ~~letter~~ from WEIZSÄCKER to ~~MINISTER~~ WIEHL [Ref St.-S. 610] dated 1 August 1940, Berlin.

WEIZSÄCKER informed KURUSU that to put the German-Japanese economic discussion on the customary

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footing, that ~~Minister~~ WIEHL should conduct these discussions since he was more competent upon economic problems than the Foreign Minister [ ~~File~~ 136385 ].

9) <sup>Memo</sup> letter from HEISSÄCKER to Reich Foreign Minister

[Reference St-S. No 611] dated 2 August 1940, Berlin.

"I would like to add ~~the following~~ <sup>memo about the conversation with the Jap Ambassador on</sup> to the ~~date~~ <sup>date</sup> of the previous day [Ref St-S. No 609].  
~~to the following:~~  
 may be added that KURUSU hoped that Japan might belong to the New Order after the war, and that she would not be forgotten in the new partition of the world."

[ ~~File~~ 136386 ]

10) Telegram from OTT, 2 August 1940 [Ref No 110 of 2.8].

- 1) OHASHI, member of the MANCHURIAN State Council, and former Manchurian Vice Foreign Minister, has been appointed Vice Foreign Minister. He is known in Berlin because of his visit in 1937. His appointment signifies the further strengthening of the influence of the Manchurian group in the new Government.
- 2) Ambassador SHIRATORI informed OTT confidentially that he had declined the post of Vice-Foreign Minister. It is to be considered that he will now be appointed permanent adviser to the Foreign Minister. He hopes to be able to exercise great influence in this capacity.

[ ~~File~~ 136387 ]

11) Telegram, without signature from WASHINGTON, 2 AUGUST 1940.

[Reference No 1602 of 2.8] referring to telegram No 832 of 30.7. re: ~~extension~~ prohibition of

~~The export of oil and metal scrap to Japan has been prohibited, to extend the effect of the proclamation of 2 July. This would affect Japan greatly, since she was the principal consumer of American steel scrap and a great consumer of America oil products. This prevents the shipment of fifteen million gallons of AVGAS awaiting shipment in Pacific and Gulf ports, and the execution of an order for 250,000 fifty gallon cans of AVGAS to be delivered by the end of September. [From 136389]~~

12) ~~Message~~ <sup>Message</sup> from WOERMANN, 5 August 1940.

~~ambassador~~ <sup>Councillor of the Embassy</sup> WASE asked <sup>re: rumours of a German-</sup> ~~for the state of affairs~~ Russian-Chinese Alliance circulated in connection with <sup>trip of</sup> ~~now~~ that there was a report that the Chinese Ministers <sup>two Chung-King officials to Moscow and Berlin,</sup> SUN KO and the former Chinese Minister Professor CHU CHIA-HUA had been sent by the CHUNG KING government to Moscow, and that CHU CHIA-HUA would then go to BERLIN. It was rumoured in TOKYO that the CHUNG KING government was striving for a German-Russian-Chinese alliance. WOERMANN considered the rumour a ridiculous matter. [From 136390]



- 13) An enclosure to previous item, consisting of a note on  
 DOCTOR CHU CHIA-HUA, <sup>who is one of the 2 officials mentioned in item 12)</sup> ~~composed by KNOLL, 31 July 1940~~  
~~Berlin.~~

The enclosure gives details of CHU's career, and stated that he was close confidant of the Marshal. He had great sympathy for Germany by virtue of his long stay there

[From 136392]

- 14) <sup>Memo</sup> ~~A note~~ from WIEHL, <sup>Berlin,</sup> 25 August 1940, Berlin.  
 re: memo presented by State Councillor HELFFERICH ~~had visited WIEHL to discuss the~~  
 memorial of the REICH Foreign Ministers on economic experiences during his travels in Japan.

~~HELFFERICH wanted to know the situation about buying 100,000 tons of soya beans from MANCHURIA, but WIEHL told him that MANCHURIA had sold all to Japan. HELFFERICH thought that the German-Japanese economic relations difficulties could be attributed to the fact that the Japanese until recently had reckoned on an English and French victory, and not to any errors on the part of the Germans. But with the appearance of German successes and the introduction of a new Japanese government, a new policy was to be expected. HELFFERICH suggested government committees when this expected new policy came into effect.~~

Memo

15) ~~Assigned letter~~ to Reich Foreign Minister, 7 August 1940, Berlin [Reference St. S No 634].

The letter mentions the suggestion of the Japanese Ambassador <sup>with Ribbentrop about</sup> ~~of~~ a discussion <sup>over all</sup> of the ~~joint~~ political orientation of the new Japanese cabinet.

The ambassador came to-day to discuss the conversation between MATSUOKA and OTT [Telegram Tokyo No 715] in which OTT had clearly stated that a ~~conflict~~ <sup>conflict</sup> between Germany and Russia was not to be expected. Japan might - if necessary with German assistance - ~~make~~ make arrangements with Russia [Comp Item 7]

~~KURUSU was now concerned with the Great Asia Sphere new Order, and gave the same gist as MATSUOKA. KURUSU continued, since Minister SATO had returned with an impression of an unchanged friendly attitude of German interest, although everything was not yet clear, the time had now come to learn the German views on the Japanese plans for the East Asian sphere. [Frames 136391-7]~~

16) Telegram from OTT, 8 August 1940, Tokyo. [No 796 of 8.8]  
 At the end of the ~~present~~ <sup>note, delivered to the Foreign Minister by the</sup> ~~note~~ <sup>British</sup> Ambassador had informed the Foreign Minister by Note of Point I <sup>re:</sup> of ~~an~~ extension of the English blockade against Germany, Italy and Japan. <sup>etc</sup> ~~points~~ ~~from~~ ~~the~~ ~~secret~~

"Japan is endeavouring since the change in cabinets to pull out <sup>unobtrusively</sup> ~~her~~ ships from all regions, which ~~are~~ make seizure by England likely." (11)

~~mentioned at all. Consequently Japan was preparing a Note of Protest. Japan could not agree with the English measures, and even if Japan did not accede to the proceedings, England would do nothing to harm Japan, so as not to strengthen the Japanese attachment to the Axis powers. [From 136398]~~

17) Telegram from OTT, 9 August 1940 Tokyo. [No 800 of 9.8]

"Refer to D.N.B.'s telegrams 288-290 on the open letter of "HOCHI" to Germany, with the request to Germany to give Japan a free hand in Indo China and the Netherlands East Indies." [From 136399]

18) Telegram from <sup>SHANGHAI</sup> ~~ALTBURG~~, 10 August 1940, <sup>dated</sup> SHANGHAI.

<sup>re: Japanese air attack on</sup> ~~CHUNGKING~~ ~~which~~ ~~that~~ ~~some~~ ~~bombs~~ ~~had~~ ~~been~~ ~~dropped~~ ~~close~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~embassy~~ ~~when~~ ~~120~~ ~~aircraft~~ ~~made~~ ~~a~~ ~~raid.~~ Tokyo advised. [From 136400]

19) Telegram from OTT, 10 August 1940, Tokyo.

British Embassy informed Japanese government that British troops were being withdrawn from PEIPING, TIENTSIN and SHANGHAI for use elsewhere. But air reserved all her rights under the PEKING Protocol of 1901. Action viewed in Tokyo as an attempt to alleviate the tension in the Far East, and prevent any closer association by Japan with the Axis powers, and also an indication of British military weakness. [From 136401]

20). Telegram from RINTELEN to German Ambassadors in TOKYO and SHANGHAI, dated 12 August 1940, Berlin.

The Chinese Ambassador introduced the topic of the Indo China question to-day, and explained that Japan demanded the passage of troops through Indo China, in order to attack China; France would prepare for resistance, but would fear Germany's attitude. After the Armistice Agreement France retained part of her navy expressly for the defence of her colonies.

Japan would seize a favourable opportunity to occupy Indo China. This would be contrary to Germany's desires, for if Japan should reach her goal of controlling China and the South Sea, the trade markets of the Far East would be barred to Germany. China hoped that Germany would restrain Japan in the interest of her own markets in the Far East and strengthen the French intention of resistance.

The Ambassador was told that Germany had no diplomatic relations with France, and that the only relation between the two countries depended on Article 10 of the Armistice agreement, which stated that France might not undertake any action contrary to the interests of Germany. The Article stated nothing about relations between France and a third power. German influence on French policy was less than the ambassador seemed to think, and the Chinese Government should tread with Vichy <sup>first of all</sup> in the first place.

- 21) Telegram from OTT, dated 13 August 1940; which states that the Japanese were setting up a Cabinet Information Bureau to replace the Information Divisions of the Foreign, Army and Navy Ministries. Ambassador ITO had been appointed Chief of the Bureau, and President of the Planning Office and Cabinet Secretary upon his return from Europe where he was known. [Frame 136404]
- 22) Telegram from OTT, dated 14 August 1940 Tokyo. <sup>about reaction to</sup> Press and authorities were quiet on the extension of the American export licence system, <sup>to oil and scrap.</sup> since the situation was favourable. 75-80% of scrap and 90% of oil imports were left undisturbed. HIGASHI, Director of the Fuel Bureau in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry said that the effects of the American measures against Japan were negligible. [Frame 136405-6]
- 23) Telegram from WOERMANN, dated 12 August 1940 to German Ambassador, Tokyo. re: <sup>protection of</sup> German interests in bombing of CHUNGKING. Special treatment should be demanded from the Japanese Foreign Ministry for German interests, in view of the continued air raids on Chungking. [Frame 136407]
- 24) Telegram from OTT, dated 15 August 1940, Tokyo. OTT had spoken to the Foreign Minister about the

report that Japan was ready to make a non-aggression pact with the powers interested in the South Sea area.

The Foreign Minister stated that the report was false and <sup>that it was</sup> ~~for~~ <sup>Japan to leave</sup> ~~for~~ <sup>any</sup> such intentions of Japan

[Frame 136408]

25.) Telegram from OTT, dated 15 August 1940, Tokyo.

MUKAI, General Director of the MITSUI concern had left with companions for BATAVIA via MANILA in a private capacity. ~~MUKAI was supposed to try to guarantee~~ <sup>Japanese acquisition of raw materials</sup> through private economic channels, ~~Japanese need~~ materials, and to improve the conditions of Japanese residents. ~~There was a possibility of trying to increase Japanese exports.~~

The official despatch that former Overseas Minister, General KOISO was a special ambassador has not been realized [Frame 136409].

26.) Telegram from OTT, dated 15 August 1940, Tokyo.

The head of the European division had been sent to OTT by the Foreign Minister to inform him the French Ambassador had altered the basic acceptance of <sup>demands</sup> the Japanese claims, so that France wanted a guarantee that Japan would renounce all territorial claims before making a decision on the

demands. Japanese ~~claims~~ <sup>demands</sup>. The Japanese Foreign Ministry demanded that the ambassador inform his government to maintain this previous consent. The question of territorial guarantee could be adjusted <sup>in accordance with declaration</sup> ~~with an explanation~~ by the Foreign Minister. "The Foreign Minister requested the German Government to support the Japanese demands by influencing the French government" [~~From~~ 136410]

27) <sup>Memo</sup> ~~Article~~ from WOERMANN, dated 16 August 1940.

WOERMANN was informed by Ambassador's adviser KASE of news sent by the Japanese Ambassador in LONDON <sup>[SHIGEMITSU]</sup> to his government on 12 August 1940.

The Ambassador in London mentioned Germany's intention to invade England, English policy in the Mediterranean, Italian, Spanish intentions, and Russia's aims in Turkey. [~~From~~ 136411-12]

28) Telegram from OTT, 23 August 1940.

The Japanese Government had recalled many diplomatic representatives <sup>abroad</sup> in order to <sup>according to MATSUOKA, this was necessary</sup> ~~guarantee~~ of the new foreign policy which he had introduced. Also it was necessary to replace most of the division heads in the Ministry with new personalities. <sup>according to OTT,</sup> The main intention was <sup>obviously</sup> to ~~freeze~~ <sup>remove</sup> ~~the~~ ~~positions~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~Anglo-Saxon~~ ~~exponents~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~Japanese~~ ~~foreign~~ ~~policy~~.

With the aim of further preparations for the adjustment of State affairs on an authoritarian model, the Government had formed a Commission of twenty-four leading personalities. Ambassador SHIRATORI was appointed the representative of foreign political <sup>affairs</sup> ~~importance~~ in the Commission. The Commission consists mostly of followers of the reform movement and ~~has~~ <sup>of the</sup> constantly demanded policy of <sup>cooperation</sup> ~~agreement~~ /ZUSAMMENGEHEN/ with the Axis Powers, which is constantly demanded by this movement. The diplomatic adjustment /REVIREMENT/ and the composition of the Commission, showed <sup>again</sup> the ~~new~~ efforts of the Government to follow a new course.

[Frame 136413-4]

29.) Telegram from OTT 24 August 1940, Tokyo.

A report from the South Manchuria Railway on oils and beans awaiting transportation, and comments by OTT on the difficulties involved.

[~~Frame~~ 136414-A]

30.) Telegram from OTT, 26 August 1940, Tokyo, giving the English version of a Memorandum from the Foreign Ministry with regard to the chartering of <sup>German</sup> vessels to be used as coal freighters in the Empire area.

[Frame 136414-B-C]



31). Telegram from OTT to REICH Minister, dated 10 September 1940.

OTT had given <sup>MATSUOKA</sup> ~~the Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop's~~ ~~Minister's~~ ideas on the <sup>cooperation</sup> ~~s rapprochement / ZUSAMMENGEHEN~~ of Germany, Italy and Japan with the aim of neutralising America, and requested a quick decision.

In his answer, the Foreign Minister stressed the extraordinary increase of American pressure upon Japan and the growing danger of a sudden entry into the war against Germany. He asked for full details of the <sup>reliability</sup> ~~authenticity~~ of the German-Russian alliance. OTT had the impression that "the atmosphere was <sup>atmosphere was</sup> favourable ~~atmosphere~~ for the German plan because of America's attitude and the strong internal political pressure upon the Cabinet, while the Foreign Minister could not conceal. <sup>1) Matsuoka promised to keep negotiations secret.</sup> He ~~for the requested information on the principal~~ ~~agreements of the Italian Government.~~ [From 136415]

32). Telegram from OTT, 14 September 1940. Stating that Telegram No 744<sup>1)</sup> had been snatched at 1915 Tokyo Time. [From 136415 A]

33) Telegram from OTT, 14 September 1940. Refers to ~~Telegram No 735 of the 12<sup>th</sup> and No 739 of the 13<sup>th</sup>.~~

re: protests by German Embassy against <sup>DOMEI</sup> ~~Domei~~ - reports.  
 OTT had protested about a declaration by DOMEI Radio  
 whose first sentence was ~~just invented with regard~~  
 to Telegram 735, and a sharp protest to DOMEI had  
 brought an apology and a promise to prevent repetition  
 [From 136415 B]

34) Telegram from OTT, 16 September, Tokyo.

OTT had talked with the Vice Foreign Minister on  
 the subject of repatriation of German nationals from the  
 Americas. Japan was ready to accede to the German  
 request <sup>and had sent respective instructions to diplomatic representatives in LIMA and SANTIAGO.</sup> ~~but there were difficulties because the English~~  
 Secret Service was watching all Germans. He thought it  
 best to carry out transport step by step. If it  
 did not seem that the British Government would  
 risk another "ASAMA MARU" incident there was a  
 danger in manufacturing great numbers of questionable  
 Germans, as British warship captains could stop Japanese  
 shipping and provoke incidents, as example of  
 English ~~misconduct~~ <sup>misconduct</sup> had shown during the war.

~~Arrangements are then set out~~ [From 136415 C]

35) Telegram from THOMSEN, dated 21 September 1940  
 WASHINGTON.

It had been revealed by a reliable source of information  
 but not published in the American press, that

Russia and Japan, with the co-operation of the Secretary of State KEPPNER had agreed on a treaty fixing the spheres of influence in the Far East, and the Manchurian border, <sup>and containing</sup> as well as a twenty-five year non-aggression clause. [Frame 136415 D]

36.) Dispatch from the German armistice commission WIESBADEN 20 September 1940. A Note presented by General BOYEN of the French delegation <sup>[included in I PS Doc 4025]</sup> ~~to General~~ VON STÜLPNAGEL, which stated that there had been negotiations in HANOI between the Governor General and a Japanese military delegation since the beginning of September, to facilitate the passage of Japanese troops through Indo-China. A basic agreement was reached on 5 September, which stipulated the details. When the technical settlement of the agreement seemed to be reached, the Japanese delegation introduced a set of entirely new demands. On the pretext of building airfields, the Japanese wished to bring 37,000 men into Indo-China. The acceptance of this desire would mean, in fact, the military occupation of TONKING.

After the Japanese military authorities stated that whatever stage the negotiations might have reached,

their troops would march into TONKING at midnight on the 22 September, the French government informed Admiral DECOUX that it was the wish of the French government to hasten the proceedings, but that an extension of time was necessary because of the slow progress. If the Japanese threat materialised he was to oppose it but to try to localise the incident. The French Ambassador in Tokyo was to instruct to inform the Japanese Government similarly.

[Frame 136416-7]

37). Telegram from OTT, dated 22 September 1940, Tokyo.

The press devoted <sup>much</sup> great space to the increase of Anglo-American co-operation in the Pacific and to the question of SINGAPORE, whose common usage by America was seen as a <sup>definite</sup> permanent intention. Japan should not delay with political and military counter measures. ~~The ASATT thought that as for the Anglo-American rapprochement / ZUSAMMEN GEMEN / would increase political and economic pressure upon Japan. The cession of SINGAPORE to America would signify that America would take over the English position and actually~~

enter the war. This development would threaten Japanese naval supremacy in the West Pacific, and could not be accepted silently by Japan.

The "NICHU NICHU" noted a deterioration in Japanese-American relations in the leasing of SINGAPORE.

The leasing of a British colony in the ATLANTIC would be directed against Germany and Italy. In the leasing of SINGAPORE it definitely <sup>directed</sup> ~~measures~~ <sup>a</sup> measures against Japan. The "YOMIURI" suspected a secret Anglo-American agreement over the lease of SINGAPORE and the possibility of establishing a United States of England and America was being considered.

The "HOCHI" noticed in the fascist efforts of America and England to stretch the operational basis of the American fleet as far as SINGAPORE, warning signs to Japan to renounce her desire to maintain peace in the Pacific. [Frame 136418]

38) <sup>Memo</sup> letter from WOERMANN to Ambassador VON DÖRNBERG dated 24 September 1940, Berlin, (not relevant)

WOERMANN mentions the action that could be taken to counter the fast driving in cars of the diplomatic corps. [Frame 136419]

39) <sup>Memo</sup> ~~Statement~~ by WOERMANN dated 24 September 1940

## BERLIN.

WOETEMANN had tried for an interview with OKAMOTO who had come from LONDON to BERLIN, as the LUFTWAFFE was interested in his information.

~~From Ambassador's Adviser~~ KASSE told WOETEMANN that OKAMOTO would rather not have such a meeting.

As KASSE promised to pass on all the information he could get from OKAMOTO, and so would the military attaché, ~~WOETEMANN~~ decided not to attempt a personal interview with OKAMOTO.

The Information which KASSE passed on from OKAMOTO was not very detailed or substantial.

This information is then detailed. [Frame 136420]

40). <sup>Memo</sup> ~~Letter~~ from DÖRNBERG to the Foreign Office, dated 8 December 1940, BERLIN.

This reported that the Embassy in MADRID had informed that the Japanese Ambassador's Adviser to the Ambassador in LONDON, OKAMOTO, SUYEMASA, would soon arrive in MADRID en route to JAPAN via GERMANY and USSR.

[Frame 136421]

41) Telegram from OTT to Reich Foreign Minister dated 27 September 1940, Tokyo.

re: decoration of Ribbentrop with

~~This reported that the Foreign Minister had been~~  
~~awarded with the Grand Cross of the Rising Sun,~~  
with PAULOWNIA ~~Medals~~ - the highest decoration  
according to the Imperial Household law.

[From 136422]

State Secy

Japan

Vol 2

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A. K. Blau - Freige

5/24/50 R.V.R.

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4029C

"Telegram from OTT to Berlin

"Tokyo, 2 August 1940

"1. A member of the Manchurian State Council and former Manchurian Vice Foreign Minister, OHASHI, has been appointed Vice Foreign Minister. He is known in Berlin because of his visit in 1937. OHASHI stepped forward repeatedly as a convinced adherent to the German course of Japanese Foreign Policy. His appointment signifies the further strengthening of the Manchurian group in the new government.

"2. Ambassador SHIRATORI informed confidentially that he had declined the post of Vice Foreign Minister. It is to be considered that he will now be appointed permanent advisor to the Foreign Minister. He believes he can exercise a far reaching influence in this capacity."

4029C  
not

#4029  
-C

September 11/10

~~NAKAJIMA,~~  
Kaku

オットヨリベルリン宛  
~~電報~~ 電報

東京 一九四〇年 ~~昭和十五年~~ 八月二日

一、現滿洲國會議員並ニ前滿洲國外務次長

キヤル大橋が、今回我が國、外務次官ニ任命サレタ。彼

ハ一九三七年ノ訪問ニヨリ、ベルリンニテ知ラレテ居ル。大橋

ハ日本外交政策ヲドイツ的ニ對スル  
取ルベキナルト、確

信ヲ持ツ者トシテ、次々ト兼出シタ。彼ノ

任命ハ、新政府内ニ於テ滿洲國グループが更ニ

鞏固ニサレタ事ヲ意味シテ居ル。

ニ白鳥大使ハ外務次官ノ地位ヲ拒否シタ事ヲ内

~~4099c~~  
No. 2

#4092  
c

~~NAKATA MA~~  
Kaoru

密ニ打聞~~明~~ケタ。 今ヤ彼カ外務大臣ノ永久顧問ニ

任命サレルテアラウ事ハ考ヘラレル可キ問題デアル。 彼ハ

此ノ職~~ヲ~~ヨリ廣ク範圍ニ及ブ大キナカラ揮フ

事~~ノ~~カ出来ルト信ジテ居ル。

4029e

*Telegram by OTT, Tokyo, 15 August 1940*  
"Oitot"

"The Foreign Minister sent just now the head of the European Dept. to instruct me about the following:

"The French Ambassador had today changed the previously announced basic acceptance of the three Japanese demands regarding Indo-China /to the attitude/ that France wanted first a Japanese guarantee for renouncement of all territorial claims and only then would she decide about the considerations of the Japanese demands. The Foreign Minister had urgently demanded the French Ambassador to advise his government to maintain their previously announced basic agreement. The question of territorial guarantee could be adjusted by correspondingly demanded declaration by the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister requests the German government to support the Japanese demands by influencing the French government. (1 group garbled) Cabinet Secretary promised, but it must be admitted that in relation to legalistic statements in Telegram No. 654 dated from August 12 it was pointed out that our influence on French policy is limited. OTT"

*correspondingly demanding*



#4029e

Translated by  
Hector Squelbi  
5/21/44

~~オット~~ ~~カウ~~ ~~ノ~~ ~~電~~ ~~報~~

申す。一九四四年一月十日

ニ  
電  
報

外相ハ唯ニ一歐洲ニ向テ進ハシテ 我ニ依ルナク

ニト  
~~カウ~~ ~~ノ~~ ~~電~~ ~~報~~ マニタ。

~~カウ~~ ~~ノ~~ ~~電~~ ~~報~~ ハ 日中ノ協定ニ依リテ

スルニ西側ニテ 原則的ニ 我ニ依ルナク 進ハシテ

我ニ依ルナク ~~カウ~~ ~~ノ~~ ~~電~~ ~~報~~ ハ 日中ノ協定ニ依リテ

スルニ西側ニテ 原則的ニ 我ニ依ルナク 進ハシテ

テナケルハ 日中ノ協定ニ依リテ 我ニ依ルナク 進ハシテ

ラハシテ 我ニ依ルナク 進ハシテ 外相ハ

スルニ西側ニテ 原則的ニ 我ニ依ルナク 進ハシテ

44029e

ヲ保持スル ~~事~~ <sup>コトヲ</sup> 申スル様ニ ~~事~~ <sup>ト</sup> 申シ候。 ~~事~~ <sup>ト</sup> 申シ候。

領工洋誌の題ハ ~~比~~ <sup>比</sup> 対シテ 外相が由ある ~~事~~ <sup>テ</sup> 居ル ~~事~~ <sup>ト</sup> 申シ候。

~~事~~ <sup>ト</sup> 申シ候ニ ~~依~~ <sup>依</sup> 然テ 謝意ヲ ~~得~~ <sup>得</sup> 多ク ~~事~~ <sup>ト</sup> 申シ候ハ 外相ハ

~~事~~ <sup>ト</sup> 申シ候ハ ~~事~~ <sup>ト</sup> 申シ候ニ ~~依~~ <sup>依</sup> 然テ 謝意ヲ ~~得~~ <sup>得</sup> 多ク ~~事~~ <sup>ト</sup> 申シ候ハ 外相ハ

日4. 例ノ由あるヲ ~~事~~ <sup>ト</sup> 申シ候ニ ~~依~~ <sup>依</sup> 然テ 謝意ヲ ~~得~~ <sup>得</sup> 多ク ~~事~~ <sup>ト</sup> 申シ候ハ 外相ハ

一部 不詳 ( ) 内閣尋ねたい ~~事~~ <sup>ト</sup> 申シ候ハ 外相ハ

一 度 報 告 事 宜 由 此 事 法 的 声 ぬ 二 内 閣 事 務 局 へ 申 出 せ ば 可 也 ~~事~~ <sup>ト</sup> 申シ候ハ 外相ハ

つうして ~~事~~ <sup>ト</sup> 申シ候ニ ~~依~~ <sup>依</sup> 然テ 謝意ヲ ~~得~~ <sup>得</sup> 多ク ~~事~~ <sup>ト</sup> 申シ候ハ 外相ハ

いふことか ~~事~~ <sup>ト</sup> 申シ候ニ ~~依~~ <sup>依</sup> 然テ 謝意ヲ ~~得~~ <sup>得</sup> 多ク ~~事~~ <sup>ト</sup> 申シ候ハ 外相ハ

オウト

40296

"St. - S. No. 611

By Teletype

"(to St. - S. No. 609)

Berlin, 2 August 1940

"In addition to the memorandum concerning my talk yesterday with the Japanese Ambassador, I would like to add the following: KURUSU's words showed his hope /aus KURUSU sprach die Hoffnung/ that Japan may be heard /in regard/ to the New Order after the war and that /Japan/ may not be forgotten in the new apportionment of the world.

"Hereby /submitted/ to the Foreign Minister.

(Signed) WEIZSACKER

"Copy for:

"U. St. - S. Pol.

"Dg. Pol.

"Ambassador Ritter

"Director W.

"U. St. - S. Recht

"Chef A. O.



~~Yamamoto~~

~~July 5, 1946~~

~~July 5, 1941~~

社一〇第ノ二五

印字電信機ニヨル

先陣の第幾。九号の宛

一九四〇年

ベルリン

昭和十五年八月二日

昨日、私と日本大使との會談ノ總見書ニ

更ニ左記ヲ追加シタイ。

「來栖ノ言葉ハ」 aus KURUSU sprach die Hoffnung

~~日本が~~ 戦後ノ新秩序ニ関シテノ意見ヲ入ル

~~又日本が~~ 世界ノ新配分ノ等閑視サレヌ様ニトノ

彼ノ希望ヲ示シテナク

以上外務大臣ニ提出ス

グアイズサワカー (署名)

「寫シノ配布先

#4029-6

「D. 氏 - S. Pol

「Dg. Pol

「リッダー大使

「Director 氏

「D. 氏 - S. Recht

「Chef A. D.

Document No 40293.

Spencer 1/19

Rest

Child by KUROSAWA, Kotaro.

40293d "St.-S. No. 634" Translated by Michiko YOSHII  
"St.-S. 第六三四号" 一九四五年八月七日 (コリン登)

日本の来栖大使の訪問中最も長い時分にわたり彼が

日本の露路・米・英に対する

関係した(特別な)論議は露路米関係又は日英関係でほななく、

且日本が目指し居るいわゆる大東亞圏に於ける新秩序

の事であった。オット本大使も其の電文報告書の中で此の英

問題

に觸れて居るが、来栖大使は左の如く更に詳細にわたり松岡

外務大臣の聲明を繰り返した。即ち日本は南方を引くる

のであった。

めたるるの範圍にわたる基盤に基く東亞圏の建設を要迫を

するものがある。松岡氏はオット本大使に日本は此の圏内に

征服

略も圧制も採取も来栖は認むない(地歩を)生み出

す事を要迫し居ると言ひ出した。あつての人はそよ於

正当に要求出来るものを求めたものである。

ける彼等の義務を果す事は日本とてはこれ等三つの基礎

するの必要が、同時に「欧米諸國も

的意義を固執し、いかに好むに如何なる甲乙、ヤアアメリカの早急唯

此等の主義に違背することを期するも

此等の主義に違背せぬ事を期待するものである。此の事は、

理想にキ與する所の事柄は若く正しく理解せられたら、

共同理想心に関することである。

亦軍の利益に存する事である。 柔福は日本・滿洲子及

中國

東那と大東亞國の中核と呼び、又これ等の子々に對して

東亞「軸子」といふ言葉を用ひてゐる。

尚語を續ける

当地に於て「独逸」の

柔福は、佐藤大使は、トイハル社も、由独親善

対日 友好的

に何等の変化も、如能心腹か、其も柔福にあつたといふ印象を以てしたが、彼等は

友好關係

その親善を如何に深むるに於てか、その方法を手段が

ほうきくそぬきを ~~し~~ <sup>もつ</sup> ~~し~~ 東亞圏に對する

日本の計畫に對して ~~し~~ <sup>純逸</sup> ~~し~~ 如何なる概念を持つて居るのを

知つて ~~し~~ <sup>つたの</sup> ~~し~~ 果すよの時であらうかと、云ひ張けなうであつた。

7  
来栖大使は、松岡氏と近衛氏は彼等の外交一般政策及び

それに関連した東京に於ける ~~議案~~ <sup>閣内の</sup> 合談を調整する為

は、先づ ~~議案~~ <sup>立場</sup> ~~に~~ <sup>に</sup> 右の事に關して如何なる立場にあるかをほうきく

見極め ~~し~~ <sup>(云々)</sup> ~~し~~ 来栖氏は、我が本年

五月に日本人に對して ~~し~~ <sup>問題</sup> ~~し~~ 言及したこれらの海外政策に關して ~~し~~ <sup>する無関心</sup> ~~し~~

の件には、言及したことが、  
来栖氏は興味を持つて居ないとは言はるゝが、だが彼の目指す

ところ所はほうきくそぬき ~~し~~ <sup>尚岡氏は</sup> ~~し~~ 来栖氏が東京から命令の

もとどい話した事は極明瞭である。

今日の小生は此方面の論議に

来栖楓の後には依れば、オフト大使は那も余りまゝの  
引込みまゝの御手紙に、と云ふ事がある。  
るに、あるある議論の分野より、何と云ふか、外は云ひ及ば

かたといふ事もある。

是れに、来栖木使は、これ等の遠大なる問題について、  
外務

大臣と来栖木使の話し合ひが出来る様にと、希望を述べ

たのである。

兼

独逸  
外務大臣殿

レ

4029a

"Telegraph

"St - S. No. 609

Berlin, 1 August 1940

"The Japanese Ambassador, with whom I carried out current business today, in the end brought the talk to the role that the new Japanese cabinet would have to play in big politics. KURUSU declared from the beginning that he had not yet received any instructions from his new government; he was of the belief that they should not wait too long for the definition of the general lines of the new Japanese foreign policy. For his, KURUSU's, own work two methods could be considered: either he is to wait until his government gives him instructions, or he is to take up a position in accordance with the outlook here so as to advise his government, before it finally fixes /its position/. In both cases a talk with us is necessary whether it be with the Foreign Minister of the Reich or with me.

"The Ambassador did not go into details but gave some of his own observations which might correspond to his personal view of the situation. He believed that Japanese politics must now be orientated by taking a long view. Apparently KURUSU is not thinking of a speedy end to the war and reckons at any rate on a state of tension which has to be estimated to last for years in which the relations of Japan with Russia and the U.S.A. are naturally most important. The Ambassador told me that he is conscious of the fact that the Foreign Minister of the Reich had suggested repeatedly to Japan agreement with Russia. Such an action as well as the Japanese attitude towards U.S.A. should be harmonized with the German and also Italian intentions. The Ambassador reminded /of the fact/ that the Reichs Foreign Minister, on the occasion of the visit of Minister SATO, had pictured the German-Japanese friendship and cooperation as being very important.

"Nevertheless, he, KURUSU, did not know exactly how this cooperation is pictured by us in detail, especially if and at what time we wish to see the Japanese weight thrown on the scale of the present conflict. If, for instance, Japan would push, on her part, towards a war and enter into the war against America, while, on the other hand, Germany believed the end of the war near, expecting a quick victory, Japan would, probably, be acting contrary to German wishes. If, however, Japan would not intervene now, the factor Japan, and, especially her fleet, in the triangle Berlin-Rome-Tokyo would by all means have great potentialities in the future.

"I had the feeling that KURUSU expects of the new course in Tokyo a tendency towards intervention in the war but wished to hear from me, that this /intervention/ would not be quite timely according to German opinion.

"The Ambassador would certainly be grateful if he could obtain a hint in the near future - either through the Reichs Foreign Minister personally or through me - as to which advice he should give his government. He is clear about /the fact/ that this /advice/ must fully lie within the framework of the German-Japanese policy of friendship. He may not be quite certain, however, whether we still regard the Japanese-Russian rapprochement as equally important /as hitherto/ and whether the new Japanese cabinet should follow its anti-Anglo-Saxon course with an accelerated or, possibly, at first with a moderate speed.

"Fundamentally, I just accepted the statements of the Ambassador and did not anticipate a reply, to be given to them. I opposed his opinion that the war may still last a very long time and may be followed by a still longer period of tension.

"To

The Reichs Foreign Minister

Signed WEISAECKER"



Zx. 542

Ax. 200. 71

Document No. 4029-A

Page 1

"Telegraph

"St - S. No. 309

Berlin, 1 August 1940

"The Japanese Ambassador, with whom I carried out current business today, in the end brought the talk to the role that the new Japanese cabinet would have to play in big politics. KURUSU declared from the beginning that he had not yet received any instructions from his new government; he was of the belief that they should not wait too long for the definition of the general lines of the new Japanese foreign policy. For his, KURUSU's, own work two methods could be considered: either he is to wait until his government gives him instructions, or he is to take up a position in accordance with the outlook here so as to advise his government, before it firmly fixes /its position/. In both cases a talk with us is necessary whether it be with the Foreign Minister of the Reich or with me.

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"To  
The Reichs Foreign Minister

Signed WEISAECKER

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.
2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.
3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.
4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.
5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming  
\_\_\_\_\_  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
\_\_\_\_\_  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Telegramm

(Geh.Ch.V.)

Tokyo, den 9. August 1940 - 20.10 Uhr  
Ankunft: " 9. " 1940 - 17.55 Uhr

Nr. 800 v. 9.8.

Hinweise auf deutschen Nachrichten-<sup>büros-</sup>Telegramme  
288 - 290 über offenen Brief "Hochi" an Deutschland  
mit der Bitte an Deutschland, Japan in Indochina  
und Niederländisch-Indien freie Hand zu lassen.

Ott.

**Bereinstellt in 20 Stück**

**Davon sind gegangen:**

Nr.	an	Presse	(Art. St.)
" 1	"	RAM.	
" 2	"	St. S.	
" 3	"	Chef AG	
" 4	"	RAM.	
" 5	"	U. St. Pol.	
" 6	"	U. St. Recht	
" 7	"	Exr. Paris.	
" 8	"	Exr. Pol.	
" 9	"	Exr. U.	
" 10	"	Exr. U.	
" 11	"	Exr. U.	
" 12	"	Exr. Recht	
" 13	"	Exr. Kult	
" 14	"	Exr. "	
" 15	"	Exr. Presse	
" 16	"	Exr. Prot.	
" 17	"	Exr. Dacht.	
" 18	"	Exr. Prot.	
" 19	"	Exr. Stab (Hamel)	
" 20	"	Exr. Landw. Pol.	

**Abgegeben Nr. \_\_\_\_\_**

136399

St.-S. Nr. 607

Berlin, den 1. August 1940.

Der J a p a n i s c h e Botschafter wurde heute von mir darauf aufmerksam gemacht, daß die japanische Nachrichten-Agentur "Domei" von ihren außerhalb Deutschlands arbeitenden auswärtigen Vertretern oft Falschmeldungen und Gerüchte bringe, die geeignet seien, die ~~Ziele~~<sup>Absichten</sup> der deutschen Politik zu stören. Ich zitierte dem Botschafter aus der anliegenden Aufzeichnung etliche Fälle, die der Botschafter aufmerksam anhörte. Ich habe Kurusu gesagt, daß die Sache zwar in Tokio betrieben würde, ich aber doch für sein Interesse an diesen sich wiederholenden Irrtümern von Domei dankbar sei.

Der Botschafter bat mich, ihm einen Auszug von Nachrichten zukommen zu lassen, welche unter die von mir erwähnte Rubrik fallen.

Herrn U.St.-S. Pol.

" Dg. Pol.

" Direktor Presse (mit der Bitte, mir eine Aufzeichnung vorzulegen, die ich mit Visitenkarte dem Botschafter zukommen lassen kann.)

136372

Aufzeichnung.

Die Meldungen der japanischen Nachrichtenagentur Domei haben, soweit sie von Vertretern kamen, die außerhalb Deutschlands arbeiten, eine starke anti-deutsche Tendenz gezeigt und durch Verbreitung von Falschmeldungen und Gerüchten dazu beigetragen, die deutschen Ziele und Politik zu stören.

- 1.) Am 17.6. Domei aus New York: In den späten Vormittagsstunden des Sonntags sind nach einer deutschen Rundfunkmeldung deutsche Truppen in die Schweiz einmarschiert.
- 2.) 21.6. aus Belgrad: Italien und Deutschland geben sich die größte Mühe, die Freundschaftsbande Jugoslawiens mit der Sowjetunion zu zerstören.
- 3.) 29.6. aus Budapest: Hitler soll Teleki zugesichert haben, daß Deutschland die territorialen Forderungen Ungarns gegen Rumänien unterstützen wird.
- 4.) 30.6. aus Bukarest: Deutschland und Italien haben Rumänien zu Lande und in der Luft Unterstützung zugesichert, falls Rußland über die bisher abgetretenen Gebiete hinweggeht.
- 5.) 2.7. aus London: Der deutsche Angriff auf England werde wegen der inzwischen erfolgten Besetzung Bessarabiens und der Bukowina durch Rußland möglicherweise aufgeschoben, da die Entwicklung auf dem Balkan Deutschland und Italien aus den Händen gleiten könne.
- 6.) 6. 7. aus London: Seit Abschluß des Waffenstillstands hat Hitler fortwährend Pétain gedrängt, Großbritannien den Krieg zu erklären.
- 7.) 27.7. aus Istanbul: Die rote Armee werde in Bessarabien täglich verstärkt. Es wird allgemein befürchtet, daß die Sowjets einen neuen Einfall in Rumänien planen. Einige Beobachter glauben, daß die russischen Interessen auf dem Balkan durch die Salzburger Besprechungen zwischen

zwischen Deutschland und den Balkanländern gefährdet werden könnten.

- 8.) 31.7. aus Bern: Mit Zustimmung Hitlers wird offiziell mitgeteilt, daß Italien Truppen und Flugzeuge an der englischen Kanalküste zusammengezogen hat, die an der bevorstehenden deutschen Invasion in England teilnehmen sollen.
- 9.) 31.7. aus New York: Die deutsche Invasion in England kann jeden Augenblick erfolgen. Kleine italienische U-Boote hätten Montag nacht per Eisenbahn in Richtung Armelkanal den Brenner passiert.

(gez.) Baßler.

Berlin, den 1. August 1940.

Der J a p a n i s c h e Botschafter benützte ein von mir begonnenes Gespräch über Pressefragen dazu, um mir ihm mißliebige Stimmen schwedischer Journalisten aus Berlin zur Kenntnis zu bringen. Er sagte, Fürst Urach sei über solche abfällige Bemerkungen der schwedischen Presse über Japan, genährt aus deutscher Quelle, bereits unterrichtet, es sei ihm, Kurusu, natürlich lästig, von seiner Regierung darauf angesprochen zu werden. Vielleicht könnten wir ihm behilflich sein.

Gewissermaßen beiläufig erwähnte der Botschafter dann, daß eine jener unerfreulichen schwedischen Stimmen zurückgehe auf einen Artikel des Generals Haushofer im Juniheft der "Geopolitik". Der Botschafter sagte, er habe durch einen seiner Mitarbeiter an Haushofer bereits privat schreiben lassen, um den bewährten Japanfreund Haushofer um eine Äußerung zu bitten.

Ich habe dem Botschafter angeboten, auch meinerseits an Haushofer eine Zeile zu richten, nachdem ich von dem Inhalt des beanstandeten Artikels in der "Geopolitik" Kenntnis genommen hätte.

(gez.) Weizsäcker

Herrn U.St.-S. Pol.

" Dg. Pol.

" Direktor Kult

Inf.

Presse (bitte um Vorlage des Artikels nebst Stellungnahme der Presseabteilung)

w. v. nach 8 Tagen

136375

B



Berlin, den 5. August 1940.

Dem Herrn Reichsaußenminister.

Ich sehe den J a p a n i s c h e n Bot-  
schafter morgen, Dienstag Mittag, bei Tisch. Er wird  
mich wahrscheinlich danach fragen, ob er in diesen  
Tagen den Herrn Reichsaußenminister in Berlin sehen  
könne. (Vergl. meine Aufzeichnung Nr. 609). Bitte  
um Weisung.

(gez.) Weizsäcker

136379

Telegramm

(Geh.Ch.V.)

Nr. 51  
Verschlußsache  
indeln.

Tokio, den 2. August 1940 - 13.20 Uhr  
Ankunft: " 3. " 1940 - 8.40 Uhr

Nr. 765 v. 2. 8.

C i t o !

Für Staatssekretär.

Außenminister Matsuoka bat mich gestern zu erster politischer Aussprache und mitteilte, daß drei erste Wünsche aus Bereich laufend gesammelter Arbeit der Botschaft, die ich ihm durch Vertrauensmann hatte übermitteln lassen, auf Grund Rücksprache mit Ressortminister erfüllt würden:

1.) Transitlieferung. Außenminister erklärte, er habe mit Bedauern gehört, daß bisherige Regierung Deutschland in Transitgeschäften mangelndes Entgegenkommen gezeigt habe. Er habe sofort bei zuständigem Ministerium weitgehendste Berücksichtigung deutscher Wünsche veranlaßt.

2.) China-Schäden. Außenminister zusagte, sich nachdrücklich für endlich befriedigende Vollbereinigung Angelegenheit einsetzen zu wollen.

3.) Presse. Außenminister anerkannte vollkommene Untragbarkeit ständiger anti-deutscher Hetze in gewissen, englisch geschriebenen, hiesigen Blättern und zusagte verschärfte Kontrolle durch Innenministerium.

Weiterhin zusicherte Außenminister Beseitigung der in letzter Zeit von japanischen Auslandsbehörden bei Heimschaffung deutscher Reichsangehöriger aus amerikanischen Ländern gemachten Schwierigkeiten.

Von sich aus brachte Außenminister Gespräch auf Sojabohnen-Frage und erklärte sich zu tatkräftiger Unterstützung unserer Wünsche bereit. Ich habe Gesandtschaft Hsinking um Mitteilung über gegenwärtigen Stand Angelegenheit gebeten.

Anschließend übergang Außenminister, der Gespräch in überaus herzlichem Ton führte, zu allgemeinen Fragen

136380

Fragen deutsch-japanischen Verhältnisses und fragte insbesondere, welche Haltung Deutschland voraussichtlich zu bekannten wirtschaftlichen Groß-Raum-Plänen Japans in Ostasien einnehmen werde. Ich verhielt mich Ausführungen gegenüber receptiv und erklärte, daß deutsche Stellungnahme nur möglich, wenn Japan konkreten Plan vorlege, der Deutschland greifbare, wertvolle Vorteile garantieren müßte. Außenminister anerkannte Berechtigung dieses Standpunktes.

In diesem Zusammenhang begründete Außenminister Inhaltlosigkeit gestriger Regierungserklärung und eigenen Vermittlungsvorschlag (vergl. DNB Tokio 199 bis 204) mit Unmöglichkeit, wirkliche Absichten Regierung jetzt schon bekannt zu geben. Inzwischen habe scharfes Vorgehen gegen britische Propaganda-Organisation in Japan ja schon durch die Tat bewiesen, welchen Kurs Japan steure. Matsuoka bat mich, Reichs-Außenminister mitzuteilen, daß er schon seit Japans Austritt aus dem Völkerbund Standpunkt vertreten habe, daß dauernde Selbstisolierung Japans unmöglich und deshalb Ablehnung an Deutschland einzig gegebener Weg, er freue sich daher, jetzt als Außenminister diesen Gedanken verwirklichen zu können. Ausdrücke Wunsch, mit mir ständig engsten Kontakt zu halten.

Ich ließ Außenminister keinen Zweifel darüber, daß Japan vieles nachholer müsse, um erst einzig und allein Zustand wirklich wohlwollender Neutralität gegenüber Deutschland herzustellen.

Außenminister sagte mir am Ende der Unterredung, er habe kurz zuvor französischen Botschafter empfangen und ihn gebeten, Einverständnis französischer Regierung einzuholen für Durchmarsch japanischer Truppen durch Nordindochina und Anlage von zwei Flugplätzen, da nur auf diesem Wege Angriff auf Junnan-Bahn und Kunming möglich. Er habe französischem Botschafter versichert, daß Japan keine territorialen Absichten auf Indochina habe und Gebiet später wieder räumen werde. Außenminister hoffe, daß französische Regierung

Regierung dieser Forderung Verständnis entgegenbringen werde, um nicht japanische Armee in Notwendigkeit zu versetzen, Durchmarsch gewaltsam zu erzwingen. Französischer Botschafter habe Weiterleitung zugesagt unter Hinweis darauf, daß Frankreich nach Waffenstillstandsverhandlungen nicht allein entscheiden könne und Angelegenheit daher Waffenstillstands-Kommission zur Entscheidung vorgelegt werden müsse. Außenminister sagte, er wäre dankbar, wenn Reichsregierung gegen japanischen Wunsch keine Einwendungen erheben und auch auf französische Regierung in dem Sinne einwirken würde. Ich zusagte Weiterleitung ohne selbst Stellung zu nehmen.

Ott.

136382

Berlin, den

9 August 1940.

zu Pol VIII 2246 g

H. S.  
Dg. Pol

D i p l o m a

T o k y o .

Nr. 6447

T e l e g r a m m i. Ziff.  
(Geh. Chiffr. Verf.)

Nur zur persönlichen Information.

Mit Beziehung auf Drahtbericht vom 2. d. M.-  
Nr. 765-.

Japanischer Botschafter hat in Gespräch mit ~~Staatssekretär~~ über Thema gesamtpolitischer Orientierung neuen japanischen Kabinetts von sich aus die beiden Fragen aufgeworfen, ob wir japanisch-russischen Ausgleich noch immer für gleich wichtig halten sowie ob uns ein scharfes oder vielleicht gemäßigtes Tempo der anti-angelsächsischen Politik neuen Kabinetts erwünscht sei.

Abknüpfend an Ihr Gespräch mit Matsuoka, über das Kurusu genauestens unterrichtet ist, verarbeitete dieser sich über Frage geplanter japanischer Neuordnung ostasiatischen Großraumes, der, wie er erklärte, die Südsee mitumfassend, von Japan auf breiter Grundlage organisiert werden würde. In diesem Großraum wünsche Japan einen Zustand zu schaffen, in welchem

Ref. L. i. V. : LR. Voskamp

136383

welchem es keine Eroberung, keine Unterdrückung und keine Ausbeutung gäbe; jeder soll dort zu seinem Recht kommen, und so wie Japan seinerseits sich an diese drei Grundregeln zu halten gedächte, müsse es auch erwarten, daß keine dritte Macht gegen sie verstoße. Als Kern ostasiatischen Großraumes nannte Botschafter Japan, Mandschukuo und China, für welche er Begriff "ostasiatischer Achse" <sup>ausgesprochen</sup> prägte.

Botschafter, der offensichtlich auf Weisung von Tokyo sprach, ging so weit zu erklären, daß Matsuoka und Konoye für Regelung ihrer auswärtigen Gesamtpolitik und für dazugehörige Kabinettsbesprechungen zunächst einmal klar sehen müßten, wie wir hierzu stehen.

Zur Klärung aufgeworfener Fragen hat Botschafter Aussprache mit Reichsaußenminister nachgesucht.

*Weizsäcker*  
~~Rintelen~~

136384

一九四〇年(昭和十五年)八月九日

附四、二四六号、

附四、

ディプロマツル

東京

カニ四七号

附四、電報

(秘密電報)

個人的情報、為メノミ、

本月二日、電報カゴカセ六五号ニ宛連シテ

日本大使ハ、日本ノ新内閣、有之ル全般對テ政治的カ向ヲ示シ  
懸トセル余ト一談話ニ於テ、征自ラ次ニニツ、内閣ヲ提出  
シ、ハハチ、我々ハ今以テ尚、日ソ間ノ均衡ヲ今迄ト同シク  
重要ト考フニキルカ不カ。又、我々ニツテハ新内閣、及テ  
ニツテサクソノ政策、速度カ急速ナリカ望ミコシカ  
或ヒハソノ速度カ緩ヤカナリカ望ミコシカト、  
未極ハ、下ノ松岡ト一會談ニツテ、確實ニ知リテキル  
如ク、是レエソカ、征ハソノ會談ニ連関セテ、日本ノ計画

しるべき大東亞圏、新秩序ノ問題ニ及ぶ。コト大東亞  
圏ハ紐ノ説明ニ及所コトト南洋ヲモ含メテ、日本コトリ  
範十基礎ニシテ形成サレモ、タトハコトアル、日本ハ  
コト圏内ニ在リ、影響モ正シモ擔取モ無ク、新ニ秩序  
ヲ成立サセ、格ト為モコトキルト、ソコテハ各々カ  
キテ、地位  
ヲ維持シヤウトモ、コトキルカ故ニカニ國モ亦、コト原則ヲ破ラ  
ハナラヌ。大使ハ、大東亞圏ノ核心ニナルモ、トシテ日本、滿洲  
國、支那ヲ挙げ、コトモ、ニシテ「東亞輻輳」ト云フ名  
ヲ用ヒタ。

大使ハ、明コトカコト東京ニリ、訓令ヲコト會談ヲシタノ如ク  
次ニ、トテ、聲明ニシテ、程ヲマツタ、年々松岡ト近衛ハ、紐  
ノ全外交政策調整ノ為メ、又、ソレノ圈内ニ閣内會議ノ為  
メ、コト先ヅ一度、我ニトシ、カ、如何ナル態  
度ヲ有スルカキハ、ン  
キリ、知ラサレ、バ、ナラ、ナ、イ、ノ、テ、ア、リ、ト。

大使ハ、紐ノコト、内閣ヲ、解明スル、為メ、外相ト、會談ヲ  
申請シタ。

ワイスゼンダー



Berlin, den 1. August 1940.

Ich habe heute dem J a p a n i s c h e n Botschafter gesagt, nach dem Eindruck des Herrn Reichsaußenministers liefen die Besprechungen zwischen ihm und dem Auswärtigen Amt in Wirtschaftsfragen nicht so, wie das sonst bei den deutsch-japanischen Beziehungen natürlich wäre. Ich möchte den Botschafter im Auftrage des Herrn Reichsaußenministers davon unterrichten, daß Ministerialdirektor Wiehl zu diesen wirtschaftlichen Besprechungen ihm, dem Botschafter, zur Verfügung stehe. Ministerialdirektor Wiehl trage über die wirtschaftlichen Fragen dem Herrn Reichsaußenminister unmittelbar vor.

Der Botschafter wich zunächst leicht aus, indem er seine eigene Kompetenz in Wirtschaftsfragen in Zweifel stellte. Er befasse sich nur mit den allgemeinen Linien dieser Politik, über welche er in den seltenen Fällen, wo das notwendig würde, mit dem Herrn Reichsaußenminister oder mir sprechen könne. Ich habe Herrn Kurusu aber dann nochmals auf den direkten Kontakt mit Herrn Ministerialdirektor Wiehl verwiesen, was er dann auch hinnahm.

Unter den Fragen, welche gegenwärtig z.B. zu besprechen wären, erwähnte ich die in dem anliegenden Vermerk erwähnten.

Hiermit

Herrn Min-Dir. W i e h l

(gez.) Weizsäcker

136385

B

*Jap.*



Doc. No. 4029 B

Ex. 543

88  
Ax. zu 72  
Page 1

St. - S. No. 611

By Teletype

(to St. - S.No. 609)

Berlin, 2 August 1940

In addition to the memorandum concerning my talk yesterday with the Japanese Ambassador, I would like to add the following: KURUSU's words expressed his hope /aus KURUSU sprach die Hoffnung/ that Japan may belong to the New Order after the war and that /Japan/ not be forgotten in the new apportionment of the world.

Hereby /submitted/ to the German Foreign Minister.

(Signed) WEIZSACKER

Copy for:  
U.St. - S. Pol.  
Dg. Pol.  
Ambassador Ritter  
Director W.  
U. St. - S. Recht  
Chef A. O.

1 Copy given to Chef AO

**FILE COPY**  
**RETURN TO ROOM 361**  
/136386/

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming  
\_\_\_\_\_  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
\_\_\_\_\_  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Telegramm  
(Geh. Ch. V.)

Washington, den 2. August 1940 - 2.27 A.  
Ankunft; " 2. " " - 13.25 Uhr

Nr. 1602 vom 2.8. Auf Telegramm vom 30.7. Nr. 832<sup>+</sup>)

+ ) W VII 1603

Nach einstimmiger Beurteilung hiesiger Wirtschaftskreise und Presse richtet sich Ausdehnung Ausfuhrsperrre auf Öl und Schrott in erster Linie gegen Japan. Dies beweist vor allem die Tatsache, dass Eisen- und Stahl-Schrott sowie Ölprodukte in erste Proklamation des Präsidenten vom 2. Juli nicht einbezogen wurden und zwar, wie allgemein angenommen wurde, um Spannungen im Verhältnis zu Japan zu vermeiden. Wenn Präsident dennoch drei Wochen später in besonderer Verordnung Ausfuhrsperrre ausgerechnet auf Öl und Schrott erstreckte, so zeigt dies eindeutig, dass die ursprünglichen Rücksichten auf Japan fallengelassen worden waren und anti-totalitäre Kreise die Oberhand gewonnen hatten. Da Japan Hauptabnehmer amerikanischen Stahl-Schrotts und Grossabnehmer amerikanischer Ölprodukte ist, wogegen Achsenmächte heute völlig untergeordnete Rolle spielen, ist Zweck Massnahme zweifellos darauf abgestellt, Lieferung dieser kriegswichtigen Produkte an Japan zu verhindern, zum mindesten auf Grund gesetzlicher Handhabe zu kontrollieren. Präsident musste sich auch völlig klar darüber sein, dass Anordnung vom 25. Juli nur so verstanden werden konnte. Zweck der neuen Verordnung

wird noch durch Entscheidungen bundesstaatliche Schiffahrtsbehörden unterstrichen, die Vercharterung vier amerikanischer Tankdampfer und zwei Frachtdampfer an japanische Interessenten zur Verschiffung von Öl und Schrott nach Japan rundweg Zustimmung versagten.

Hinzukommt heutige Proklamation des Präsidenten, durch welche Ausfuhr von Fliegerbenzin nach Ländern ausserhalb der westlichen Hemisphäre vorbehaltlos verboten wird, wobei angeblich gleichzeitig auch Vorsorge dafür ge-

*Vorgestellt in 7 Stücken  
Davon sind gegangen:*

- Nr. 1 an W (Arb. St.)
- " 2 - R. A. M.
- " 3 - St. S.
- " 4 - B. R. A. M.
- " 5 - U. St. S. Pol.
- " 6 - Dir. W.
- " 7 - Dg. W.

Dies ist Nr. \_\_\_\_\_

136388

*Jap*

troffen wird, dass Fliegerbenzin nicht auf indirektem Wege über Länder der westlichen Hemisphäre nach ausserhalb gelangt. Dieses absolute Verbot trifft wiederum in ausgesprochener Weise Japan. Wie stark Japan betroffen, beweisen Angaben amerikanischer Ölin- dustrieller, dass japanische Interessenten kürzlich 250 000 Fass Fliegerbenzin zu je 50 Gallonen, lieferbar Ende September, bestellt und dass insgesamt 15 Millionen Gallonen Fliegerbenzin in pazifi- schen und Golf-Häfen zur Verschiffung nach Japan bereit liegen.

Wenn gegenüber diesen unmissverständlichen Tatsachen amtierender Staatssekretär Welles hiesigem japanischen Botschafter Erklärung abgegeben hat, dass ein Embargo gegen Japan nicht beab- sichtigt sei, so ist dies ein Spiel mit Worten, da man hier Wert darauf legt, von einem Ausfuhrlizenzverfahren zu sprechen und sich stets dahinter verschanzen kann, dass das Erfordernis einer Aus- fuhrlizenz lediglich eine Beschränkung der Ausfuhr im Interesse der Landesverteidigung ermöglichen solle.

Hiesige japanische Botschaft hat daher auf Presseanfra- ge durch Vertrauensleute bereits auf den Ernst der neuen Entwick- lung hingewiesen.

(ohne Unterschrift eingegangen)

136389

電報 (抄録)

一九四〇年(昭和十五年)八月二日 二時二七分 A

電報 一九四〇年

八月二日 一三時二七分

八月二日 電報

八月二十日 電報 八月三十一日 終

W VII 1603

各地一統清界及び新南界一致の判断を以て石油及び屑鉄輸出禁止ノ抗議を以て日本に対するモノが  
あり、ニューヨークの事実は示し、八月二日、  
七月二日、大統領が一回、言明し、石油、鉄屑、銅鉄  
屑及び石油製品の輸入を禁止する事である、  
もし大統領が日本に対して、關係ヲ緊張せしめ、  
八月二日、大統領が特別法令を以て  
八月二日、八月二日、八月二日、八月二日、

輸出禁止トシ

特ニ石油ト屑鉄とニテ及ボコトノハ日本ニ対スル最モ初

顧慮ガ打テ捨テラレ、及全体主義カシリ、ソカノ得勢ト

ナラメトシテ明瞭ニ示シテキレ、日本ガアメリカ鋼鉄屑

ノ生産ヲ購ノ国デアリ、又アメリカノ油製取ルテ大量ニ

購入スル国デアリ、ソノ対テ軸國ハ金ノハノイタ割

シカ果シテタイデ、アメリカニ取理ノ目的ガ、ソノ國學

軍需品ヲ日本ニ供給スルコトヲ好喜スルコトナリ、サレ

ソラ法律ト「取理」ノ基本イテ、ソノトニスルコトナリ、

ハ「取理」トシ、

ナリ、ソノ法律ハ「取理」ノ法令ガ、カノ如ク、ソノ理解

サレ、ソノトニ、ソノ大統領自身ガ明瞭ニ示シテ、

「取理」ノ新法令、目的ハ、日本向テ石油屑鉄ヲ移ラ

テ、アメリカノ石油船四隻、火油船二隻ヲ日本國領海ニ

シテ、<sup>キリ</sup>「取理」トシ、<sup>拒絶</sup>ソノ各州ノ船運當局ニ決定シテ、更

ニ強調サレ、

ソノハ、ソノ大統領ノ命令、ソノ「取理」トシ、西半球ニ

ソノ「取理」トシ、~~輸出禁止トシ~~、禁輸トシ、



同時に飛行機用ガソリンが西半球の国々を通じて同様の  
こと以外に国を達すに際しては輸入制限を課せられたり  
斯く思はれ、この結果は禁制品の輸入に際しては日本に  
向けてはモーターオイルの輸入に際しては日本に對しては  
アメリカのアメリカの石油業者のストライキが原因となつた  
日本との関係は九月末に引き渡さるべきものであるが  
飛行機用ガソリンの輸入に際しては日本に對しては  
向かうに際しては飛行機用ガソリンが大太平洋及びメキシコ  
の港に日本へ向けに積むべきものであることをアメリカに  
この誤解の余地のない事實として政府の国務長官の  
ズが各地に在る日本大使に日本に對しての出港禁止を企  
図してはならないと聲明するアメリカの空軍の空軍  
スモーターオイルの輸入に際しては輸入制限を課せられたり  
禁制品の輸入に際しては日本に對しては日本に對しては  
利益の増大を目的として輸出制限が課せられたり  
輸入の増大を目的として輸入制限が課せられたり

よる也ー日本大使館ハシノ故ニ、新南一府ノ向ニ好ニ信報者ヲ  
用ヒテ、其事能ク、新ノ展用、持ク、重要件ニ既ニ注意ス  
ル喚起スル。

(Ames + J. N. 1914-15)

EXHIBIT NO. 538

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 2 August 1940      19.55 hours  
Arrival " " "      18.55 hours

No. 770 of 2.8

1. A member of the Manchurian State Council and former Manchurian Vice Foreign Minister, OHASHI, has been appointed Vice Foreign Minister. He is known in Berlin because of his visit in 1937. OHASHI stepped forward repeatedly as a convinced adherent to the German course of Japanese Foreign Policy. His appointment signifies the further strengthening of the influence of the Manchurian group in the new government.

2. Ambassador SHIRATORI informed confidentially that he had declined the post of Vice Foreign Minister. It is to be considered that he will now be appointed permanent advisor to the Foreign Minister. He believes he can exercise a far reaching influence in this capacity.

OTT

**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

AFFIDAVIT

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s/ W. P. Cumming  
\_\_\_\_\_  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
\_\_\_\_\_  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

# EXHIBIT NO. 547

Doc. No. 4029-E

Page 1.

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 15 August 1940 1900 hours  
Arrival 15 August 1940 1720 hours

No. 823 of 15.8 Appendix to Tel. No. 813 of 14.8

URGENT!

The Foreign Minister sent just now the head of the European Dept. to instruct me about the following:

The French Ambassador had today changed the previously announced basic acceptance of the three Japanese demands regarding Indo-China /to the attitude/ that France wanted first a Japanese guarantee for renouncement of all territorial claims and only then would she decide about the considerations of the Japanese demands. The Foreign Minister had urgently demanded the French Ambassador to advise his government to maintain their previously announced basic agreement. The question of territorial guarantee could be adjusted based on the demanded declaration by the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister requests the German government to support the Japanese demands by influencing the French government. (1 group garbled) Ministry Director promised, but it was pointed out that with reference to legalistic statements in Telegram No. 654 dated from August 12 that our influence on French policy is limited.

OTT

/136410/

**FILE COPY**  
**RETURN TO ROOM 361**

AFFIDAVIT

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G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Berlin, den 5. August 1940.

Botschaftsrat K a s e fragte heute auf Grund einer telegrafischen Weisung der Japanischen Regierung an, welche Bewandnis es mit der Nachricht habe, daß der chinesische Minister Sun Ko und der frühere chinesische Minister Professor Chu Chia-hua im Auftrag der Chungking-Regierung nach Moskau und der an zweiter Stelle Genannte von dort nach Berlin fahren sollte. In Tokio liefen Gerüchte um, daß die Chungking-Regierung ein deutsch-russisch-chinesisches Bündnis anstrebe.

Ich habe geantwortet, mir sei erinnerlich, daß über die Reise von zwei Chinesen Pressenachrichten vorlägen; an uns sei man von chinesischer Seite nicht herangetreten. Die Gerüchte über Möglichkeiten eines deutsch-russisch-chinesischen Bündnisses habe ich lecherlich gemacht.

Über Chu Chia-hua gibt die beiliegende Aufzeichnung von Legationsrat Knoll Auskunft.

gez. Woermann

RAM.

St.S. *M*

Dg. Pol.

Pol. VII

Abt. P.

136390

*Fass.*

Abschrift.

Minister a. D. Dr. Ch Chia hua.

Chu Chia hua trat im Dezember 1935 von seinem Posten als Verkehrsminister der Chinesischen Nationalregierung zurück. Als Grund wurde angegeben, daß er als ausgesprochener Gegner Japans bei der damals in Nanking vorhandenen Absicht, einen Ausgleich mit Japan zu finden, hinderlich sein konnte. Dr. Chu wurde hintereinander Generalsekretär der Academia Sinica, Generalsekretär der Kuomintang und zu Beginn dieses Jahres zum sogenannten Organisationsdirektor der Kuomintang ernannt. Dieser Posten ist dem Rang eines Ministers gleichgestellt.

Chu Chia hua hat mehrere Jahre in Deutschland Bergfach studiert und hier auch sein Doktordiplom erworben. Nach China zurückgekehrt hat er sich nach der Revolution der radikalen Richtung angeschlossen und sich als Führer der chinesischen Studenten bei der revolutionären Bewegung hervorgetan. Er war Professor an der Pekinger Universität und Zivilgouverneur der Provinz Kwangtung. Er ist Mitglied des Zentralen Executiv-Ausschusses der Kuomintang und des Zentralen Politischen Rates. Er war Zivilgouverneur der Provinz Chekiang und vorübergehend Präsident der Universität in Canton. 1931 wurde er Präsident der Zentralen Universität in Nanking, 1932 Unterrichtsminister und von 1932 bis 1935 Verkehrsminister. 1935 wurde er Gouverneur der Provinz Szechuan, von welchem Posten er Ende 1936 zurücktrat.

Dr. Chu Chia hua spielt auch heute noch im politischen Leben Chinas eine bedeutende Rolle und geht zu dem näch-



sten Vertrauenskreise des Marschalls. Er hat auf Grund seines langen Aufenthaltes in Deutschland und der genauen Kenntnis deutscher Einrichtungen starke Sympathien für Deutschland. Er hat sich besondere Verdienste für die Förderung der deutsch-chinesischen Beziehungen erworben durch Unterstützung der deutsch-chinesischen Tungchi-Schule durch Berufung von deutschen Professoren nach Canton und insbesondere durch die Gründung des deutsch-chinesischen Kulturverbandes, dem er heute in Chungking noch vorsteht und der in der Hauptsache die aus Deutschland zurückgekehrten chinesischen Studenten umfaßt.

Die hiesige Chinesische Botschaft stellt die Nachricht von der Mission Chu Chia hua's, wie von dritter Seite verlautet, in Abrede bzw. hält sie für wenig wahrscheinlich. Die Angelegenheit ist auf dem letzten Parteikongreß der Kuomintang in Chungking ohne Beschlussfassung erörtert worden und hierbei wohl von den Japanern, die sie verbreitet haben, aufgegriffen worden.

Berlin, den 31. Juli 1940

Hiermit

über Dg. Pol.

Herrn Unterstaatssekretär  
ergebenst vorgelegt.

gez. Knoll

Berlin, den 5. August 1940.

A u f z e i c h n u n g  
- - - - -

Staatsrat H e l f f e r i c h besuchte mich heute, um entsprechend der Aufforderung des Herrn Reichsaussenministers seine Denkschrift über wirtschaftliche Erfahrungen seiner Japan-Reise mit mir zu besprechen.

Er kam im Laufe der zweistündigen Unterredung auch mehrfach auf die in der Denkschrift enthaltene Kritik an der bisherigen amtlichen deutschen Handelspolitik gegenüber Japan zu sprechen. Ich habe ihm auf die einzelnen Punkte entsprechend den Aufstellungen von W VII geantwortet. Er liess sich wenig überzeugen und blieb insbesondere bei seiner Behauptung, es sei im Januar 1940 möglich gewesen, in Mandschukuo 100.000 t Sojabohnen zu kaufen. Die Gelegenheit sei jedoch deshalb versäumt worden, weil das Reichsfinanzministerium der Deutschen Oelmühlengesellschaft die von dieser beantragte Ausfallbürgschaft für das Geschäft nicht habe geben wollen. Ich erklärte darauf, dass er falsch unterrichtet sei und das mandschurische Sojabohnenangebot in jener Zeit nicht an den von ihm angegebenen Gründen, sondern daran gescheitert sei, dass tatsächlich in der Mandschurei keine Sojabohnen mehr für uns zu kaufen waren, weil die Mandschuren alles an Japan verkauft gehabt hätten. Er wollte dies jedoch nicht gelten lassen und behauptete, seine Informationen von einem Herrn Daiss von der Deutschen Oelmühlengesellschaft zu haben.

Im Ergebnis stimmte Herr Helfferich meiner abschliessenden Feststellung zu, dass die Schwierigkeiten in den deutsch-japanischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen jedenfalls nicht so sehr auf etwaige deutsche Fehler zurückzuführen seien, sondern hauptsächlich darauf, dass die Japaner bis vor kurzem mit einem Siege Englands und Frankreichs gerechnet hatten und aus diesem Grunde (sowie auch aus einer Verstimmung über die deutsch-russischen Abmachungen vom August 39) sich den deutschen Wirtschaftsbelangen gegenüber ablehnend oder mindestens zurückhaltend verhielten. Wir waren darüber einig, dass in dieser japanischen Haltung in letzter Zeit  
auf

136393

Jap.

auf Grund unserer Kriegserfolge eine Aenderung eingetreten ist und dass von der neuen japanischen Regierung voraussichtlich eine andere Politik uns gegenüber verfolgt werden würde, was abzuwarten sei.

Herrn Helfferich lag hauptsächlich daran, die Stellungnahme des Amtes zu den beiden praktischen Vorschlägen seiner Denkschrift zu hören,

1) Einsetzung einer Persönlichkeit grossen Formats und mit grossen Vollmachten als besonderer deutscher Beauftragter für die deutsch-japanischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen. Hierzu erklärte ich ihm, die bereits bestehende Organisation <sup>des</sup> handelspolitischen Ausschusses und der Regierungsausschüsse und fügte hinzu, dass die Vorsitzenden der deutschen Regierungsausschüsse für die einzelnen Länder diejenigen Persönlichkeiten seien, die mit der besonderen verantwortlichen Betrauung der deutschen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen mit den betr. Ländern beauftragt seien. Diese hätten durch ihre Verhandlungsführung mit dem fremden Land sowohl die genaueste Kenntnis der einschlägigen Fragen als auch die besten Beziehungen zu den auf der Gegenseite mit der Bearbeitung und Entscheidung dieser Fragen beauftragten Persönlichkeiten. Sie hätten ausserdem den Vorteil, in ihrem Regierungsausschuss jeweils die Stellungnahme aller beteiligten Ressorts rasch einzuholen und auf diese Weise die erforderlichen Entscheidungen beschleunigt herbeizuführen, die auch eine Persönlichkeit der Art, wie sie Herrn Helfferich vorschwebte, nicht ohne Beteiligung der Ressorts würde treffen können. Dieses Verfahren habe sich seit langen Jahren bewährt und sei von allen entscheidenden Instanzen, insbesondere dem Reichsaussenminister und Reichsmarschall gebilligt. Nach meiner Auffassung empfehle es sich, daran festzuhalten. Wenn solche, sozusagen über den Ressorts ~~bestehenden~~ Sonderbeauftragten nach dem Vorschlag Helfferichs bestellt werden sollten, so sei dies vielleicht gegenüber anderen Wirtschaftsräumen, an denen das deutsche oder auch das kontinentaleuropäische Wirtschaftsinteresse grösser sei als ~~dem~~ japanischen oder fernöstlichen Wirtschaftsraum, wichtiger, z.B. gegenüber Südamerika, Nordamerika, dem brit. Empire, Russland. Auf diese Art könne

man

136394

man zu einem Gremium von Wirtschaftsdiktatoren, welche die Tätigkeit der Reichsministerien mehr oder weniger ausschalten könnten, von denen jeder jedoch nur seinen eigenen Ausschnitt sehe. Um ein daraus entstehendes Durcheinander zu vermeiden, müsste man sie doch wieder unter eine einheitliche Leitung bringen, nämlich unter die ~~der~~ dafür zuständigen obersten Reichsressorts.

Herr Helfferich schien dies einzusehen und stimmte zu, dass demnach die Einsetzung eines deutschen und eines japanischen Regierungsausschusses zu gegebener Zeit, d.h. wenn auf Grund der erwarteten Änderung der bisherigen japanischen Haltung wirklich etwas zur Wiederherstellung und zum Ausbau des deutsch-japanischen Wirtschaftsaustausches geschehen kann, ins Auge zu fassen sei.

2) Errichtung von Ausschüssen führender Wirtschaftspersönlichkeiten in beiden Ländern, die sich durch die gegenseitigen Besuche und Austausch von Anregungen um die Intensivierung der Wirtschaftsbeziehungen in privater bzw. halbamtlicher Weise kümmern sollten. Ob dies ähnlich wie bei den deutsch-italienischen Industriebesprechungen in amtlicher Form zu vereinbaren sein werde oder ob es durch die bestehenden deutschen Organisationen der Industrie und des Handels (Reichswirtschaftskammer, Reichsgruppe Industrie Reichsgruppe Handel) oder durch die bestehenden privaten Organisationen (Ostasiatischer Verein oder durch <sup>eine</sup> besondere Wirtschaftsgruppen <sup>der</sup> Deutsch-jap. Gesellschaft) geschehen solle, bedarf dabei noch der Erwägung.

Hierzu erklärte ich, dass <sup>an</sup> sich gegen die Verwirklichung des Gedankens in einer noch zu prüfenden Form zu gegebener Zeit wohl im Auswärtigen Amt keine Bedenken beständen.

Abdr.an: *W. 8/38*  
St. S.  
U. St. S. Pol.  
Pol. VIII  
Dg W

gez. Wiehl

Ges. Schmurre  
W VII mit der Bitte um kurze Stellungnahme  
wegen des Sojabohnenangebots vom  
Januar 1939.

136395

スウェーデン一九四〇年(昭和十五年)八月五日

手記

ヘルゼリウヒを議 (Statensbank) の本日、余が訪し、外相、要中、從  
つて、日、本、旅、行、の、後、に、経、済、上、の、息、衝、の、用、に、日、紙、が、甚、だ、し、  
變、書、を、つ、い、て、余、と、話、す、る。

日ハニ時向続イタ会談ヲ對面ニ互リ日ハ變書一申ニモ書カ  
レテキル今此一日本ニ對スルドイツ政府ノ商業政策ニ對スレ  
批判ニ言及シタ、余ハ個々ト大ニシテ、W IV ハ叙述ニ滿立

シツ、日ニ答ヘタ、日ハ保シテ答ヘニ余リ満足セズ、特ニ一九四

〇年一月ノ滿洲國ダナク、大ニシテ、  
答ヘトシ、日ハ、~~答ヘ~~、  
ドイツ製油会社 (Deutsche Ölwerkengesellschaft) 及

ニリ、取リ到キ、際、日、大藏省ニ申請シテ、  
証、大藏省が、~~答ヘ~~、

ルト、余ハ、~~答ヘ~~、日ハ、~~答ヘ~~、  
々、情、報、ヲ、得、タ、ト、又、~~日~~、  
果、タ、大、臣、ノ、取、引、ハ、日、が、  
申、出、ス、ル、理、由、が、  
取、引、ハ、日、が、  
申、出、ス、ル、理、由、が、

ノチハナク、満洲国が大皇帝ノ全部日本ニ属スルヲ為メコ

トイン<sup>ガ</sup>ソ<sup>ク</sup>ノ<sup>カ</sup>軍<sup>ヲ</sup>軍<sup>上</sup>、満洲国ニハナク、大皇帝モ残ラナ

カツカ為メアルト云ツタ。此ハ併シ余ノ言ツタ事ト云フ信

セズ。此一情報ハドイツ<sup>ノ</sup>製油会社ノダイス&ト云フ人ヨリ

得タモトアルト云フ也。

総局、ヘルゼリウ&ハ、日独由一経済関係ニ於テハ困難

ハ何レモ此等カドイツ例ノ誤謬、為メト云フヨリモ

寧<sup>ニ</sup>ト<sup>シ</sup>テ、日本が此等ノ事ヲ英佛ノ勝利ヲ以テ

ナリ、ニ一理由(及び一カニ九年ノ月、独ノ協定ニ於テハ

滿)ニリテ、ドイツノ一経済的関ラ事ニ於テ拒絶的ニ

ニハナクモ、滿洲の經濟的関ラ事ヲ持ツテキタ為メアルト云フ

余ノ<sup>経済</sup>論ニ同意スルコトヲ取テ、此ニ於テハ日本ノ一經濟

ハドイツが<sup>穀米</sup>ヲ<sup>奉</sup>ダシ、為メニ変化シタリテアルト云フ。

然レテ見ナクハ、解ラナイが、由テ、新政府ハドイツニ於テ

ニ今迄ト異ツタ政策ヲ採リ、此ニ於テハ、ドイツニ於テハ

併ト余ト、此等ノ見ニ一致スル

ノ事ニテ、ドイツノ事ト云フニ、此ハ一國ノ事ナク、此

ニシテ實際的標準を以てシテドイツ政府が如何に能く度々  
出ルナリ固ク之トが實ニ事ヲツク

(一) 且独能清關係、為ナドドイツ側一特別委員會トシテ、<sup>全権</sup>十権能ヲ有スル大抵ヲ之ニ任ズルコト。之ニ対シテ余ハ、既に

之ノ外、西條氏等ノ委員及ビ政府ノ諸委員會ノ如キ組織  
が所立シテキリト證明シ、更ニドイツ政府、各國ニ對スル

諸委員會ノ一委員會トシテ、各國ニ對スルドイツノ經  
済關係ニツキ特ニ責任ヲ以テ委任サシタル人々アルト

附ケ加ヘタ、こしうノ人々ハ、外國トノ交渉ニツキ、該内閣  
ニツキ非ナキ正當ノ知識ヲ有シテ居リ、又、相手ノ側ニ

於テ、該内閣ノ決定ニツキ、該内閣ノ決定ニツキ、該内閣ノ決定ニツキ、

該内閣ノ決定ニツキ、該内閣ノ決定ニツキ、該内閣ノ決定ニツキ、該内閣ノ決定ニツキ、

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該内閣ノ決定ニツキ、該内閣ノ決定ニツキ、該内閣ノ決定ニツキ、該内閣ノ決定ニツキ、





サネバナラズ、然局ソレゾレノ向テリテ管轄スル政府機関  
ニ所属サセズバ、ソノメニトニソルト余ハ語ツタ。

ハルエリツヒ余ハ余ノ意思ニ従ツタカ、特ニ是エタ然レテ  
適カシ時期ニ、即ハ今ニソレノ日本ノ態度ヲ期待スル如  
クニ變リテ、日独經濟關係ノ再建ト完成ノ為ニ何事カ  
實現スルヲナストカ、アツタラドイフタビ日本ガソレソレ政府  
ヲ再建シテ、今ヲ設クスルニ於テ、定ム可キ市場ニソレニ  
同カシタ。

(二) 日独兩國ニ於テ、經濟界ノ指導的人物ニソレニ委員  
會ガ設ケラレ、ソノラノ人々ハ相互ニ訪問シテリテ、提議シテリスル  
ニトニソレテ、私的ニテ、或ハ半官的ニテ、經濟關係  
ノ強化ニ對シテカスルニト、ソレニトガ、ソレニテ、形ヲ見ハレテキ  
独伊内ノ工業界會議ノ如クニ、協定スルニトカ、出キルカスレカ。  
或ハハ、<sup>ソレニトガ</sup>工業界、商業、現存ノドイツ諸機關(ドイツ經濟局、  
工業部、商業部)カ、現存ノ私的組織(東亞會)  
或ハハ日独協會、特別ノ經濟ソレニ(ソレニ通ジテナサレ  
カ、否カ考ヘ、或サル可キテ、アツタラド、ソレハソレ。

之に對し予余ハ答へて、左らにタ考へが、~~海峽十時~~  
リーガ河に形ヲ行ハシカハナホ研究ノ余也アニモ、~~海峽~~  
十時~~海峽~~ノ美致サシト云フニト對シテハ外器者何ニハ  
外器ノ危懼モ存シタイト云ツタ。

ルマーニ (Amis?)

Telegramm ( geh. Ch. V. )

Tokio, den 8. August 1940 13.04 Uhr  
Ankunft: " 9. " " 0.35 "

Nr. 796 v. 8.8.

Auf Multex 190<sup>x</sup>) vom 3. August.

x) W VI 1855.

Ende vergangener Woche hat englischer Botschafter durch Note an Aussenminister nur Punkt eins Erweiterung englischer Blockade gegen Deutschland - Italien - Japan notifiziert. Punkt zwei und drei sind überhaupt nicht erwähnt. Entwurf japanischer Protestnote im Geschäftsgang. Sachbearbeiter betonte, Japan könne englischem Vorgehen nicht zustimmen, auch wenn Japan wnglischen Massnahmen sich nicht fügt, werde England nach seiner Meinung nichts gegen Japan unternehmen, um japanischen Zug zu Achsenmächten nicht zu verstärken. Im übrigen bemüht sich Japan seit Kabinettswechsel, seine Schiffe unauffällig aus allen Gebieten, die einen Zugriff Englands wahrscheinlich machen, zurückzuziehen. Weiterer Drahtbericht vorbehalten.

Ott.

**Hergestellt in 7 Stücken**

**Davon sind gegangen:**

- Nr. 1 an W (Arb. St.)
- 2 . R A M
- 3 . St. S
- 4 . B. R A M.
- 5 . U St. S. Mol
- 6 . Du. W
- 7 . Do W.

Nr. 3  
Aus Nr. \_\_\_\_\_

136398

Jagd

**EXHIBIT NO. 544**

St. - S. No. 634

Berlin, August 7, 1940

On 1 August (St. - S. No. 609) the Japanese Ambassador suggested an exchange of points of view with the German Foreign Minister concerning the entire political orientation of the new Japanese cabinet. His two questions at that time were, whether we still consider the Japan-Russia rapprochement as important as formerly, and also whether we desire a sharp or perhaps more moderate tempo in the anti-Anglo-Saxon policy of the new cabinet.

Today the Ambassador spoke of the conversation between Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and Ambassador OTT (Telegraphic Report Tokyo No. 765). In this conversation, according to KURUSU's information, Ambassador OTT had again clearly stated that between Soviet Russia and Germany a conflict can also now be expected in the future. Japan may - if necessary with German help - also arrange its differences with Russia.

The specific point, however, with which KURUSU concerned himself for the longest period of time at his present visit today, was not Japan's relationship to Russia, America, or England, but the new order in the so-called Great East Asia sphere, which Japan is aiming at. Ambassador OTT also touches this subject in his telegraphic report, but KURUSU repeated MATSUOKA's statements in greater detail, in the following way: Japan wants to organize the East Asia sphere, including the South Seas, on a broad basis. MATSUOKA mentioned to OTT that Japan wants to create in this area a situation in which there would be no conquest, no oppression, and no exploitation. Everybody should come to his rights there. Japan for her part would adhere to these three basic principles, but would then expect that no European or American country would violate these principles. The matter concerns itself with ideals, which if correctly understood, lie in the common interest. KURUSU named Japan, Manchukuo, and China as the core of the Great East Axis sphere, for which he used the term East Asia "Axis".

KURUSU went on to say that, though Minister SATO had received the impression of an unchanged friendly German attitude toward Japan here, he was not quite clear on the ways and means of enlarging upon this friendship, and now would be the time to learn the German conception of these Japanese plans for the East Asia sphere.

**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

The Ambassador went so far to say that MATSUOKA and KONOYE, in order to adjust their foreign general policy and the corresponding cabinet talks in Tokyo would first have to clearly see how we stand regarding the above. KURUSU did not refer to the desinteressement on these overseas problems, which we expressed to the Japanese in May of this year, but it was clear - and he obviously spoke under orders from Tokyo - what he was aiming at.

According to the description by KURUSU, OTT did not allow himself any more than I today to be drawn into this field of discussion.

At the end, KURUSU expressed the hope, to be able to discuss these far-reaching problems soon with the Reich Foreign Minister.

Herewith

To the Reich Foreign Minister.

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming  
\_\_\_\_\_  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
\_\_\_\_\_  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Telegramm

(Nicht Geh.Ch.V.)

Shanghai, den 10. August 1940 - 12.27 Uhr

Ankunft: " 10. " " - 9.25 "

Nr. 226 vom 10.8.

Auf 199 vom 26.

Chunking drahtet unterm 9. August:

"Bei heutigem Grossangriff mit etwa 120 Flugzeugen, der teils auf Südufer gerichtet, einige Bomben Nähe Botschaft niedergegangen." Tokio verständigt.

Altenburg

**Hergestellt in 20 Stück**

**Davon sind gegangen:**

**Fnl VIII (Arb. 20)**

Nr.	1 an	
"	2 "	RAM.
"	3 "	St. S.
"	4 "	Chef AO
"	5 "	BRAM.
"	6 "	U. St. Pol.
"	7 "	U. St. Recht
"	8 "	Ex. Pers.
"	9 "	Leg. Pol.
"	10 "	Leg. U.
"	11 "	Leg. U.
"	12 "	Leg. Recht
"	13 "	Leg. Recht
"	14 "	Leg. "
"	15 "	Leg. Presse
"	16 "	Ass. Prot.
"	17 "	Ref. Umw.
"	18 "	" Pers.
"	19 "	pers. Inst. (Haupt)
"	20 "	Landw. Pol.

Was ist Nr. ....

136400

Fazio

Telegramm  
(Geh.Ch.V.)

Tokio, den 10. August 1940 2.00 S Uhr  
Ankunft: 10. " " 13.30 "

Nr. 806 vom 10.8.

Britische Botschaft mitteilte japanischer Regierung, sämtliche britische Truppen aus Peking, Tientsin, Shanghai zurückzuziehen, um sie anderweitig zu verwenden. Britische Regierung vorbehielt sich hierbei all ihr aus Peking-Protokoll 1901 zustehenden Rechte.

Ämtliche Presse und Presse bemühen sich, englischen Schritt, der hier grosses Aufsehen erregt, als längst fällige Massnahme darzustellen, die erst jetzt unter dem Druck europäischer Lage als billige Freundschaftsgeste gegenüber Japan ergriffen. England versucht dadurch in letzter Stunde Fernen Osten Spannung zu mildern und womöglich weitere Annäherung Japans an Achsenmächte zu verhindern. Blätter unterstreichen übereinstimmend, dass einer wirklichen Besserung japanisch-englischer Beziehungen eine völlige Umstellung englischer Ostasienpolitik vorangehen müsse. Verschiedentlich wird Zurückziehung Truppen auch als Zeichen grosser militärischer Schwäche Englands kommentiert, das in Verteidigung seines Weltreiches selbst auf solch geringe Streitkräfte nicht verzichten könne. Einige Blätter bringen englisches Entgegenkommen mit jüngsten Verhaftungen Engländer und anti-britischer Welle in Japan in Zusammenhang und bezeichnen es als ersten Erfolg neuen Aussenministers. Bei aller Einschränkung begrüsst Presse englischen Entschluss als weiteren Fortschritt in Zurückdrängung britischen Einflusses aus Ostasien.

Ott.

Hergestellt in 20 Stück  
davon sind gegangen:

Nr.	an	Presse	(Arb. St.)
" 1	"	RAM.	
" 2	"	St. S.	
" 3	"	Chf. AG	
" 4	"	B.R.A.	
" 5	"	U. St. Adv.	
" 6	"	U. St. Recht	
" 7	"	Int. Pers.	
" 8	"	Int. Pol.	
" 9	"	Int. W.	
" 10	"	Int. W.	
" 11	"	U. St. Recht	
" 12	"	Int. Recht	
" 13	"	Int. W.	
" 14	"	Int. W.	
" 15	"	Int. W.	
" 16	"	Int. W.	
" 17	"	Int. W.	
" 18	"	Int. W.	
" 19	"	Int. W.	
" 20	"	Int. W.	

Wie ist Nr. ....

136401



Abschrift

Berlin, den 12. August 1940

zu Pol. VIII 999

1.) Diplogerma

T o k y o

Nr. 654

Telegr.-i. Ziff.

(Geh. Chiffr. Verf.)

2.) Diplogerma

S h a n g h a i

Nr. 169

Zur Information.

Chinesischer Botschafter hat hier Indochinafrage zur Sprache gebracht. Botschafter erklärte, Japan fordere Durchmarsch durch Indochina, um China anzugreifen. Frankreich bereite Widerstand dagegen vor, fürchte jedoch ablehnende Haltung Deutschlands. Nach Waffenstillstandsvertrag behielt Frankreich Teil Kriegsmarine ausdrücklich zum Schutze seiner Kolonien. Japan wolle offenbar günstige Gelegenheit benutzen, um auch Indochina zu besetzen. Japans Unternehmen werde sicherlich Deutschlands Wünschen widersprechen; denn wenn Japan Ziel, China und Südsee zu beherrschen, erreichen sollte, werde Handelsmarkt Fernen Osten Deutschland gesperrt sein. China hoffe daher, daß Deutschland Japan von Vorgehen abhalte und somit Widerstandswillen Frankreich festige.

Dem Botschafter wurde geantwortet, daß Japanische Botschaft sich in Angelegenheit hoch nicht hierher gewendet und Deutsche Regierung sich damit noch nicht befasst

136402

*Jan*

befasst habe.

Wir hätten mit Französischer Regierung keine diplomatischen Beziehungen, unser Verhältnis ginge lediglich auf Waffenstillstandsvertrag zurück, dessen Kernsatz in Artikel 10 bestimme, daß Frankreich gegen Deutsches Reich keine feindseligen Handlungen unternehmen dürfe. Wegen Verhältnisses Französischer Regierung zu dritten Staaten besage Artikel nichts. In Wirklichkeit sei daher unsere Einflussnahme auf französische Politik viel geringer als Botschafter anzunehmen scheine. Chinesische Regierung müsse sich wegen ihres Anliegens in erster Linie nach Vichy wenden.

Rintelen.

136403

支那

シクリビ 一九四〇年(昭和十五年)八月十一日

(一) テイポロカリス 東京 カ六五四〇〇

(二) テイポロカリス 上海 カ一六九〇〇

Pol. VIII. 九九九〇〇

暗号電報 (秘密暗号法)

情報一為メモ

支那大使ハ此処テ印度支那内務ニシテ決シタ大使ハ日本ハ  
 支那ヲ攻撃スル為メニ印度支那通過ヲ要スルニキリト證明  
 シタ。 フランスハ此ニ対シテ反抗ヲ用スルニキリトドイツハ  
 拒否的態度ニ出スルニキリト。 休戦條約ニシテフランス  
 スハ特ニソノ植民地ノ擁護ノ為メ海軍ノ一部ヲ保持シキリ  
 日本ハ明ラカニ印度支那ヲモト欲スル為メ好機會ヲ利用シ  
 ヤウトニキリ。 日本一企業がドイツノ敵ヲ為スルニトハ確カ  
 テアリス。 何トナシバ若シ日本ガ ~~自國~~ 支那ト南洋ヲ支配ス  
 ニトシテソノ目的ヲ達スルニ極東ト云フ中 ~~塔~~ 塔トイフハ中ナ  
 出シテ今フテアラシカラシ。 支那ハソレ故ニドイツガ日本ヲ一

企てから引き止まりしニシテフランスに抵抗する志を強はるに  
ニトシテ希望するにト。

大使はしこり答へ、日本大使館ハニシテ之を聞しテ之が意カ  
ハ申し込ニテ居ラズ。従ッテドイツ政府ハソシタニ之が取り合  
はずイト。

我々フランス政府ト外交関係ハ有シテ居ラズ。我々、関係ハ  
日軍之休戦條約ニ歸スルニシテ然レテニシテニシテニシテニシテ  
ニシテニシテニシテニシテニシテニシテニシテニシテニシテ  
取リテモ許サレヌト決定シテ中ニ、ニシテニシテニシテニシテ  
国ニ対スル関係ニシテモ觸レテナイ。サレニシテ、我々、フランス政  
策ニシテハニシテニシテニシテニシテニシテニシテニシテニシテ  
ハシテニシテニシテニシテニシテニシテニシテニシテニシテ  
何レモ之をシテニシテニシテニシテニシテニシテニシテニシテ

リニテト

Telegramm  
(geh.Ch.V.)

Tokyo, den 13. August 1940 9.55 Uhr  
Ankunft den 13. August 1940 17.40 Uhr

Nr. 812 vom 13.8.40

Regierung beschloß heute Ausbau bisherigen Kabinettsinformations-Büros zu zentraler Informationsstelle japanischen Kabinetts, der Informationsabteilungen des Außen-, Kriegs- und Marineministeriums unterstellt werden sollen, um Einheitlichkeit zu gewährleisten. Organisation im einzelnen noch nicht feststeht. Zum Leiter neuen Amtes, der im Rang Präsident des Planungsamtes und Kabinettssekretär gleichstehen soll, wurde von Europareise zurückgekehrter, dort bekannter Gesandter Ito ernannt.

Ott.

Hergestellt in 20 Stück

Davon sind gegangen:

Nr.	1 an	Pol. VII	(Arb. St.)
"	2	RAM.	
"	3	St. S.	
"	4	Chef AO	
"	5	BRAM.	
"	6	U. St. Pol.	
"	7	U. St. Recht	
"	8	Dir. Pers.	
"	9	Dg. Pol.	
"	10	Dir. W.	
"	11	Dg. W.	
"	12	Dg. Recht	
"	13	Dir. Kult	
"	14	Dg. "	
"	15	Dir. Presse	
"	16	Abt. Prot.	
"	17	Ref. Dtschl.	
"	18	" Partei	
"	19	pers. Stab (Haupt)	
"	20	Länderref. Pol.	

Dies ist Nr. ....

136404

Zap

Telegramm  
(Geh.Ch.V.)

Tokio, den 14. August 1940 10.25 Uhr  
Ankunft: " 14. " " 19.45 "

Nr. 813 vom 14.8. Im Anschluss an Telegr.vom 6.Juni  
Nr. 539 +) und auf Telegr.vom 5.Nr.  
633 ++)

+) bei W

++) W VII 1631

Presse und Behörden aufnahmen die Ausdehnung des amerikanischen Ausfuhr-Lizenz-Systems auf Öl und Schrott sehr ruhig. Die amerikanischen Massnahmen liessen einmal 75 - 80 Prozent der japanischen Schrotteinfuhr, 90 Prozent der japanischen Ölbezüge unberührt. Japan hoffe sodann, dass für den Rest Amerika von Fall zu Fall Ausfuhrbewilligungen erteilen werde. So liess es schon zwei Genehmigungen für Verschiffung von Schrott erster Klasse erteilen. Erst die praktische Handhabung des Ausfuhr-Lizenz-Systems könne erweisen, ob Amerika die Diskreditierung Japans beabsichtige. Andererseits sei nicht zu verkennen, dass die amerikanische Regierung nun mehr eine wirksame Waffe besitze, um Japan an wirtschaftliche Abhängigkeitsfaktoren seiner Aussenpolitik nachhaltig zuerinnern. Letzterer Gesichtspunkt kam jedoch erst nach der Verlängerung des amerikanischen Handelsabkommens mit Russland am 6. August auf.

Auch das Ausfuhrverbot für Flugzeugbenzin nach Ländern ausserhalb der westlichen Hemisphäre sei nicht gegen Japan in erster Linie gerichtet, da der Export nach allen Ländern, England nicht ausgenommen, verboten sei. Der japanische Protest vom 3. August solle Gründe und Tragweite des Ausfuhrverbotes (Ausfuhr von Flugzeugbenzin nach England über Kanada) sowie die praktische Handhabung des Ausfuhr-Lizenz-Systems für Öl und Schrott aufklären. Amerikas Antwort vom 9. August ist nicht veröffentlicht.

Die Marine

Bestellt am 7. August

von dem folgenden:

- Nr. 1 an W (Arch. St.)
- 2 - R. A. M.
- 3 - St. S.
- 4 - H. K. A. M.
- 5 - U. S. S. Post
- 6 - Dir. W.
- 7 - Fig. W.

Man 100 Nr.

136405

Die Marine teilte mit, dass sie über sehr grosse Vorräte verfüge, sodass sie durch die amerikanischen Massnahmen nicht ernstlich getroffen würde. Ausserdem verfüge sie über zahlreiche Raffinerien, die anderweit beschafftes Öl verarbeiten könnten. Andererseits habe die Armee Riesenaufträge in Flugzeugbenzin nach Amerika vergeben. Diese würde hart betroffen, zumal sie über keine eigenen Raffinerien verfüge. Die Marine werde erst in Mitleidenschaft gezogen, wenn es sich als notwendig herausstellen sollte, eigene Bestände an die Armee abzugeben. Bei Auftreten ernstlicher Schwierigkeiten müsse sich daher Japan~~s~~ Zug nach den Ölfeldern Niederländisch-Indiens wesentlich verstärken. Der Direktor des Brennstoff-Büros im Handels- und Industrieministerium, Higashi, wiederum bagatellisierte die Auswirkung der amerikanischen Massnahmen auf Japan.

Eine auffallend zuversichtliche Gesamtbeurteilung soll über den ungenügenden technischen Stand der japanischen Kohleverflüssigung und unzureichende Kohlenförderung hinwegtäuschen.

Ott

136406

Berlin, den ~~12.~~ August 1940.

bleibt!

zu Pol VIII 995

*R.S.*  
*W.H.S.*  
Dg.Pol.

D i p l o m a

T o k y o .

Nr. . *656* :

Telegr. i. Ziff.

(Geh.Chiffr.Verf.)

Mit Beziehung auf dortigen Drahtbericht Nr. 666 und Drahtbericht Shanghai vom 10.d.M.

Angesichts fortgesetzter japanischer Luftangriffe auf Chungking, die teils auf Südufer gerichtet, bitte wegen Einbeziehung bezeichneter deutscher Häuser in Sicherheitszone bei Außenministerium erneut vorstellig zu werden und Schonung unserer Interessen fordern. Dabei wäre auf die in Drahtbericht Shanghai vom 26.v.M. angeführten Gründe hinzuweisen, daß Übersiedlung in verkleinerte Sicherheitszone nicht durchführbar.

Drahtbericht erbeten.

*Glaslermann*

Ref.L.i.V.:LR.Voskamp

136407

*Jap.*



Telegramm

(Geh. Ch. V.)

Tokio, den 15. August 1940 12.40  
Ankunft, 15. August 1940 11.20

Nr. 819 vom 14.8.

Habe Aussenminister gestern auf angebliche  
Äusserung Sprechers Aussenministeriums angesprochen,  
wonach Japan bereit sei, mit den an Südsee-Gebieten  
interessierten Mächten Nichtangriffspakte abzuschlies-  
sen. Aussenminister erwiderte mir, dass Nachricht  
falsch und Japan derartige Absichten fern lägen.

Ott

**Hergestellt in 20 Stück**

**Davon sind gegangen:**

Nr. 1 an **Pol. VII** (Arch. St.)  
" 2 " **RAM.**  
" 3 " **St. S.**  
" 4 " **Chef AO**  
" 5 " **BRAM.**  
" 6 " **U. St. Pol.**  
" 7 " **U. St. Recht**  
" 8 " **Dir. Pers.**  
" 9 " **Dg. Pol.**  
" 10 " **Dir. W.**  
" 11 " **Dg. W.**  
" 12 " **Dg. Recht**  
" 13 " **Dir. Kult**  
" 14 " **Dg.**  
" 15 " **Dir. Press**  
" 16 " **Abt. Prot.**  
" 17 " **Ref. Dschl.**  
" 18 " **" Partel**  
" 19 " **pers. Stab (Haupt)**  
" 20 " **Länderref. Pol.**

Was ist Nr. <sup>3</sup> ~~.....~~

136408

*Japan*

Telegramm( Geh. Ch. V. )

Tokio , den 15.8.40 8058

Ankunft den 15.8.40 18.10 Uhr

Nr. 821 vom 15.8.40

x) W VII 1543

Auf Telegramm vom 19. Nr. 591x)

Generaldirektor Mitsui-Konzern , Mukai, und Begleiter ab-  
reisten gestern in Privateigenschaft über Manila nach Batavia.  
Mukai soll auf privatwirtschaftlichem Wege Sicherstellung japa-  
nischer Rohstoffbezüge gegenüber Störungs-und Vorratskäufen Eng-  
lands und der Vereinigten Staaten versuchen, zur Besserung Lage  
japanischer Residenten beitragen, Möglichkeit Erhöhung japa-  
nischer Ausfuhr prüfen, ausserdem Gegnerschaft Errichtung neuer  
Handels-und Industrieunternehmen Japans klarstellen, sowie Ein-  
reise und Aufenthaltserleichterungen für Japaner vorbereiten.

Amtliche Entsendung früheren Überseeministers General Koiso  
als Sondergesandter bisher nicht zustandegekommen.

Ott.

Vorgestellt in 7 Stück

Konten sind gegangen

Nr 1 - W (Arch. St.)  
2 - K A M  
3 - S. S.  
4 - B R A M  
5 - U S S Pol  
6 - Dr. W  
7 - Dg W

Nr 10 Nr \_\_\_\_\_

136409

709

Berlin, den 18. August 1940

Nach einer Mitteilung des Botschaftsrats Kase hat der Japanische Botschafter in London am 12. August seine Regierung folgendes berichtet:

1) Eine deutsche Angriffsaktion auf England stehe unmittelbar bevor.

2) England habe den Plan gehabt, gegen Djibuti vorzugehen, Italien sei aber England durch seine Aktion in Englisch-Somaliland zuvorgekommen. Die italienische Absicht sei wahrscheinlich den Suezkanal von Süden und Norden anzugreifen und so den britischen Einfluß in der arabischen Welt zu brechen.

3) Spaniens Haltung hänge davon ab, ob Italien sich bei seinen jetzt unternommenen Aktionen durchsetzen könne.

4) Die Sowjetunion wende sich nach Erfüllung ihrer baltischen Wünsche dem Iran und der Türkei zu. In der Türkei herrsche starke Beunruhigung gegenüber der Sowjetunion. Der englische Einfluß sei dort im Abnehmen.

5) England biete jetzt alles auf, um zwei schwache Punkte, nämlich Ägypten und Indien, zu halten. Die englischen Kriegsmittel seien dort, wie überhaupt, wesentlich verstärkt.

Herr Kase fügte hinzu, Botschafter Saigemitsu berichte immer reichlich allgemein. Ich gab Herrn Kase

zu,

RAM.  
St. S.  
DG. Pol.  
Pol. VIII  
Abt. P

136411

322

zu, daß es uns lieber wäre, konkrete Angaben über die materielle und moralische Wirkung der deutschen Fliegerangriffe zu erhalten, so wertvoll auch seine übrigen Informationen seien.

gez. Woermann

136412

## Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo: 23 Aug. 1940 0300 hours  
 Arrived: " " " 1100 hours

No. 853 of 23 August

EXHIBIT NO. 548

1. The Government announces an extensive revirement of the Foreign Service. Recalled are the Ambassador of the U.S., Ambassadors of France, Turkey, Brazil and also nineteen ministers, among them representatives in Hungary, Spain, Finland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Argentina, Egypt, Canada, besides, then five embassy councillors / among them the councillors from England and Russia/ and finally eleven Consul Generals, among them the Consuls from New York, Chicago, San Francisco, London, Hamburg, and Prague. The Foreign Minister declared to the press, that this action had become necessary in order to secure the new foreign policy introduced by him and to bring the Japanese Foreign Service into coordination with the new Japanese conditions. For this reason it is also necessary to replace most of the division heads of the Foreign Ministry with new personalities. Publication of these changes will soon take place. The whole press of today is governed by this radical and, in Japanese history, unique revirement, which is called a 'coup d'Etat' in several papers. The drastic action of the government evidently intends in the first place to render harmless the exponents of pro-Anglo-Saxon courses. This is also strongly underlined by the press. Only a few of the recalled officials will be used in other posts.

2. With the aim of further preparation of suitable actions for the adjustment of State affairs on an authoritarian model, the government had formed a commission of 24 leading personalities. Ambassador SHIRATORI was appointed the representative for foreign political matters in the commission. The commission consists mostly of followers of the reform movement and of the policy of cooperation with the Axis powers which is constantly demanded by this movement.

3. Both the diplomatic adjustment and the composition of the commission, show again the efforts of the government to follow a new course.

OTT.  
**FILE COPY**  
 RETURN TO ROOM 361

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming  
-----  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
-----  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Telegramm ( geh.Ch.V.)

Tokio, den 24. August 1940

11.22 S

Ankunft: " 24. " "

22.50 Uhr

Nr. 855 vom 23.8.

Im Anschluss an Drahtbericht vom 16. August Nr. 830.

Südmanschurische Eisenbahngesellschaft teilt mit, dass 4200 Tonnen Walöl Manschuli nicht abtransportiert, ausserdem auf Abtransport wartend 8000 Tonnen Bohnen. Mitsui Harbin angibt nur insgesamt 8500 Tonnen Walöl und Bohnen. Die Südmanschurische Eisenbahngesellschaft hat dem zufolge für Sibirien-Transport von Dairen täglich die Waggongestellung auf 20 für Walöl, 7 für allgemeine Waren herabgesetzt. Ausserdem 3 Waggon ab Harbin für Harttran-Transport Korea. Alle manschurischen Waggon Fassungsvermögen 30 Tonnen.

Dagegen haben Russenwaggon nur Fassungsvermögen von 16 ( Gr.verst.) bis 18 Tonnen. Nach bisherigen Erfahrungen werden durchschnittlich im besten Falle nur 30 solcher Russenwaggon täglich gestellt. Gestrige Mitteilung Südmanschurischer Eisenbahngesellschaft: Während letzter drei Tage überhaupt nicht russische Waggongestellung.

In Dairen sind zur Zeit eingetroffen und warten auf Abtransport ca. 15000 Tonnen Walöl in Fässern. Falls nicht sofort in entsprechendem Umfange für Walöl allein wenigstens 50 Russenwaggon täglich zur Verfügung stehen, kann vorgesehener Abtransport nicht durchgeführt werden, der auf bestimmter Zusage basierte, dass Russengestellung überhaupt keine Schwierigkeiten mache. Angekündigte Einstellung Transports und Abladung verursacht erhebliche Kosten für Lagerung, Demurrage für geschlossene Schiffsfracht usw.

Gleichlautend an Moskau, Hsinking, Engel  
Ott

Hergestellt in 7 Stücken

Darvon sind gegangen:

Nr. 1	an	W (Arb. St.)
- 2	-	R 4 M
- 3	-	S S
- 4	-	B K A M
- 5	-	U St. S Pol
- 6	-	M W
- 7	-	12 W

~~136415~~

136417 A

Telegramm  
(Geh.Ch.V.)

Tokio, den 26. August 1940 22.30 Uhr  
Ankunft, 26. August 1940 21.20 Uhr

Nr. 863 vom 26.8.

C i t o !

x) W XII 5118/40

Auf Telegramm vom 7. Nr. 643 x).

Aussenministerium übergab heute vertrauliches Memorandum, dessen englische Fassung lautet:

1st) The charterer shall be the Tekoku Senpaku Kasiki Kaisya.

2nd) The charterer will have no objection to returning the "Ermland" and the "Muensterland" at four weeks' notice at any time.

+ ) wahrscheinlich "war"

3rd) (a) The charter shall be an (Gr.verst.)+ time charter. Consequently, the ordinary insurances of the vessel are to be effected by the shipowner and the war risk insurance by the charterers.

(b) The charterage shall be in the neighbourhood of the standard charterage in Japan and it is desired to pay it as much as possible in Japanese currency.

The Japanese Government desire to know the charterage of each vessel as soon as possible.

(c) The expense of cleaning and painting the ships' bottoms shall be borne by the shipowners.

(d) It is desired to charter the vessels for as long a period as possible and the period of the charter shall not expire before the end of October this year.

4th) The vessels shall be used chiefly for the carriage of coal between the following places:

(a) between North Tyosen and Kyusyu,

(b) between Karafuto and Hokkaido on one side and Tokio, (Gr.verst.), Ise Bay, Osaka and Kobe on the other.

1364143



As regards the transport of Japanese whale oil to Wladiwostock and Dairen, to which reference is made at the end of the German Embassy's memorandum, the Japanese Government will give most favourable consideration to the matter.

Das Aussenministerium erbat beschleunigte Stellungnahme, da der Chartervertrag Ende Oktober ablaufen soll.

Ott

1364HC  
~~1364HC~~

Telegramm (geh.Ch.V.)

Tokio, dem 10. September 1940 20.05 Uhr s  
Ankunft: 10. " " 10.30 "

Nr. 919 vom 10.9.

Citissime !

Für Herrn Reichsminister.

Habe Außenminister im Beisein Botschafters weisungsgemäß Ideengänge des Herrn Reichsministers über Zusammengehen Deutschland-Italien-Japan zwecks Neutralisierung Amerikas vorgetragen und auf Notwendigkeit schneller Entscheidung eindringlich hingewiesen.

Außenminister erkannte diese Notwendigkeit an, stimmte für seine Person der Zielrichtung auf Amerika zu und sagte zu, beschleunigte Vorschläge des Kabinetts erwirken zu wollen. In seinen Äußerungen unterstrich er die außerordentliche Verstärkung des amerikanischen Druckes auf Japan und die wachsende Gefahr eines plötzlichen Kriegseintritts gegen Deutschland und fragte eingehend nach der Zuverlässigkeit des deutsch-russischen Bündnisses. Zweistündiges Gespräch verlief in freundschaftlicher Offenheit. Habe Eindruck, daß Atmosphäre für unser Vorhaben günstig infolge Haltung Amerikas und starken innerpolitischen Druckes auf Kabinett, den Außenminister nicht verhehlen konnte. Geheimhaltung Besprechungen hat Außenminister zugesichert. Außenminister erbat Mitteilung prinzipiellen Einverständnisses der Italienischen Regierung, um in beiderseitigem Interesse möglichst Zeit zu ersparen.

Stahmer.

Ott

*DA 116*  
*Manusk.*  
*Wartteilung*  
*Von Piro*  
*DA 116, davon DA 116*  
*überhaupt Wartteilung*  
*müßig*

*DA*

*136415*

*Fuss*



企図に対する空襲ハ、アメリカ艦隊ハ、為メ又、外相ハ  
カウズニトシテ来ナカシタ。政府ニ対スル内政上、強ク圧力  
為メ有利トシテ持テ出ルヲ得タ。外相ハ、今議事  
秘密ニシテカウズニトシテ保証シタ。外相ハ、西國ノ利益ヲ為メ  
ニシテ来シタ時、同ヲ保証シタ。メキシコイタリー政府ガ京  
野ニ同義トシテカウズニトシテ保証シタ。報章ヲ余ニ依拠シタ。

カウズニ


カウズニ

**C E R T I F I C A T E  
O F O R I G I N**

I, YALE MAXON, Chief of the Document Division, IPS,  
hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of  
the International Prosecution Section, GHO, SCAP, and  
as such have possession, custody, and control of orig-  
inal or copies of all documents obtained by the said  
Section.

2. That frames 136380-136382 being 3 sheets of a  
photostatic copy of telegram 765 from otte to  
Berlin of 2 Aug 1940 and <sup>contained in</sup> ~~constituting~~ IPS  
Document 4029 were received by the IPS from the  
office of the Chief of Counsel of the Nurenburg War Crimes  
Trials.

  
YALE MAXON

Telegramm  
(Geh.Ch.V.)

Tokio, den 14. September 1940

Ankunft: " 14. " " - 17.15 Uhr

Ohne Nummer


C i t i s s i m e

Telegramm Nr. 744<sup>+</sup>) vorlag entziffert 19 Uhr 15  
Tokioer Zeit.

Ott

+) B.R.A.M.

*Letzte Prüfung  
14/9/40*



*28*

*1x Büro d. A. 16 (Mab. Gegenstand)  
2x A. A. 16.*

*Jap*

136415A

Telegramm (Geh.Ch.V.)

Tokio, den 14. September 1940  
Ankunft den 15. " " "

11.0 S Uhr  
3.00 Uhr

Nr. 950 vom 14.9.

+ ) P 16059

1.): Auf Telegramm vom 12.Nr. 735 +)

Behauptung Domei-Funk erster Satz reine Erfindung.  
Nach zweitem Satz hat Domei Einladung Luftattachés zu  
üblichen Pressebekanntgaben entstellt wiedergegeben. Da  
gesamte japanische Presse in richtiger Form Erklärungen  
Attachés über die überwältigende deutsche Luftüberlegen-  
heit klar zum Ausdruck brachte und Ereignisse mittler-  
weile in dieser Richtung weiterfortschreiten, habe ich  
bei Domei protestiert, aber Berichtigung nicht verlangt.

+ ) P 16091

2.): Auf Telegramm vom 13.Nr. 739 +)

Scharfer Protest bei Domei führte zu Entschuldigung und  
Versprechen Wiederholung ähnlicher Vorfälle zu verhindern.  
Habe ausserdem Aussenminister persönlich von Protest-  
schritt und Entschuldigung Domei unterrichtet, gleichzeitig  
Entstellung Interviews Gronau zur Sprache gebracht.

+ ) Pol I M 12682 g

3.): Auf Telegramm vom 13.Nr.740 +)

Bitte Luftwaffenführungsstab Attaché-Gruppe von Vorstehen-  
dem Kenntnis geben.

Hergestellt in 11 Stck.  
Davon sind gegangen:  
Nr.1 an Presse (Arb.St.)  
Nr. 2 an RAM.  
Nr.3 an St.S.  
Nr.4 an Chef AO.  
Nr.5 an BRAM.  
Nr.6 an U.St.S.Pol.  
Nr.7 an U.St.S.Recht  
Nr.8 an Min.Dir.Pers.  
Nr.9 an Dg.Pol.  
Nr.10 an Min.Dir.Presse  
Nr.11 an Ref. Pol I g

Dies ist Nr

Ott

Vermerk

Durch Fernschreibstelle an R.L.M.  
G.-Schreiber weitergegeben.  
Tel.Ktr. 15.9.1940.

Jap.

136 4/58

Telegramm  
(Geh.Ch.V.)

44

Tokio, den 16. September 1940 19.48 Uhr  
Ankunft, 16. September 1940 17.10 Uhr

Nr. 956 vom 16.9.

C i t o !

x) W 4300 g

Auf Telegramm vom 12. Nr. 734 x).

Vizeausenminister, mit dem ich vor einigen Tagen erneut eingehende Aussprache über Heimschaffung Reichsdeutscher aus amerikanischen Ländern hatte, liess mir heute folgendes mitteilen: Die japanische Regierung grundsätzlich bereit, deutschen Wünschen in jeder Beziehung entgegenzukommen. Schwierigkeit liegt jedoch darin, dass englischer Secret Service fast jeden Deutschen genau beobachtet und bei allen Reichsangehörigen, die nach englischer Ansicht für deutsche Kriegsführung wertvoll (Flieger, Techniker, u.s.w.) gegen Visumerteilung und Beförderung auf japanischen Schiffen sowohl an Ort und Stelle wie sogar in Tokio dringende Vorstellungen erhebt. Die japanische Regierung nicht gewillt, englischem Druck nachzugeben, hält es indessen für ratsam, Abtransport dieser Deutschen nur etappenweise durchzuführen. Wenn es auch unwahrscheinlich sei, dass britische Regierung in ihrer heutigen Lage einen zweiten (Asama - Maru) = Fall riskiert, so besteht doch Gefahr, dass bei Transport grösserer Anzahl fraglicher Deutscher nachgeordnete britische Stellen, wie Kapitäne englischer Kriegsschiffe eigenmächtig japanischen Dampfer anhalten und Zwischenfall provozieren könnten, zumal Erfahrungen Kriegs-mehrfach englische Skrupellosigkeiten bewiesen hätten.

Zu schwebenden Einzelfällen erklärte Ausenministerium

- 1.) Japanische Gesandtschaft in Lima sei zu Entgegenkommen telegrafisch angewiesen.
- 2.) Abtransport der von Botschaft Santiago (vergl. angezogenes Telegramm) und Gesandtschaft Panama, die sich unmittelbar hierher gewandt hat, namhaft gemachten Deutschen, soll tunlichst mit nächstem Dampfer erfolgen.
- 3.) Übrige Fälle Südamerikas sollen anschliessend erledigt werden.

Annehme, dass Verständigung Missionen Südamerikas von Berlin aus erfolgt.

Ott

Hergestellt in 7 Stück  
von dem folgenden

Nr.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	W	1	Arb.	St.			
			R	A	M		
			S.	S			
			A	R	A	M	
			U	S.	S.	Pol.	
			D.	V			
			D.	V			

von dem folgenden

136415C



Telegramm ( Geh.Ch.V.)  
Washington, den 21.9.40 247 PV  
Ankunft den 22.9.40 1.55 Uhr

Nr. 2005 vom 20.9.40

Meistens gut unterrichtete Informationskorrespondenz bringt folgende in der amerikanischen Presse bisher nicht veröffentlichte Nachricht: Unter Mitwirkung des Staatssekretärs Keppler, der sich kürzlich von Tokio nach Moskau begeben habe, verhandeln Russland und Japan über den Abschluss eines Vertrages, der die Festsetzung der Einflussgebiete im Fernen Osten und die mandschurische Grenze, sowie eine 25 jährige Nichtangriffsklausel enthalte.

Thomsen

Hergestellt in 15 Stück

Davon sind gegangen:

Nr. 1 an **Pol.VIII** (Arb. St.)  
" 2 " RAM.  
" 3 " St. S.  
" 4 " Chef AO  
" 5 " BRAM.  
" 6 " U. St. S. Pcl.  
" 7 " U. St. S. Recht  
" 8 " Dir. Pers.  
" 9 " Dg. Pol.  
" 10 " Dir. W.  
" 11 " " Presse  
" 12 " " Kult  
" 13 " Disz. d.  
" 14 " pers. Stab (Heck)  
" 15 " Länderref. Pol.

Dies ist Nr. 3

136450

zap

Deutsche Waffenstillstandskommission Wiesbaden  
Fernmündliche Mitteilung 20.9.1940 23.- Uhr

Der Vorsitzende der Französischen Abordnung bei der Waffenstillstandskommission General Boyen hat heute abend dem Vorsitzenden der Deutschen Waffenstillstandskommission General von Stülpnagel eine Note folgenden Wortlauts übersandt:

Herr General !

Im Auftrage meiner Regierung habe ich die Ehre, Ihnen folgendes mitzuteilen. Seit Beginn des Monats September waren in Hanoi zwischen dem Generalgouverneur und einer japanischen Militärabordnung Verhandlungen über die den japanischen Truppen in Indo-China zu gewährenden Durchmarscherleichterungen im Gange. Eine grundsätzliche Einigung wurde am 5. September erzielt, welche die Einzelheiten dieses Durchmarsches festlegte. Als die technische Bereinigung dieser Einigung soweit erreicht schien, hat die japanische Delegation eine Reihe von vollkommen neuen Forderungen vorgebracht. Unter dem Vorwand, Flugplätze einzurichten, verlangen die Japaner in der Tat eine dauernde Unterbringung von 32.000 Mann in Indo-China. Die Annahme dieses Verlangens würde in der Tat die militärische Besetzung Tonkings bedeuten, sie würde ferner die Gefahr ernster Reaktionen von seiten der Bevölkerung in sich bergen.

Nachdem nunmehr japanische Militärbehörden zum Ausdruck gebracht haben, daß, welches auch immer der Stand der Verhandlungen sein möge, sie am 22. September um Mitternacht ihre Truppen in Tonking einmarschieren lassen würden, hat die Französische Regierung den Admiral Decoux angewiesen, den japanischen Militärbehörden mitzuteilen, daß es der Wunsch der Französischen Regierung sei, die Beendigung der im Gange befindlichen Verhandlungen, soweit irgend möglich, zu beschleunigen, daß jedoch auf Grund der langsamen Verbindungen eine Verlängerung der

Hergestellt in 15 Stück  
Davon sind gegangen:

Nr.	Pol. (Arb. St.)
2	RAM.
3	St. S.
4	Conf. AO
5	Bl. AM.
6	U. St. S. Pol.
7	U. St. S. Recht
8	Lit. Pers.
9	Dir. Pol.
10	Dir. W.
11	Presse
12	Kult
13	Dir. Ad.
14	pers. Stab (Hewel)
15	Länderref. Pol.

Dies ist Nr. ....

136416

Lapan

der Frist aus sachlichen Gründen notwendig sei. Im Fall, daß die japanische Drohung zur Ausführung kommen sollte, soll der Admiral Decoux sich ihr mit Gewalt widersetzen, jedoch bemüht bleiben, den Zwischenfall zu lokalisieren. Der Französische Botschafter in Tokio ist beauftragt worden, der Japanischen Regierung eine entsprechende Mitteilung zu machen.

Am 21.9.1940 1.30 Uhr mit Telegramm Nr. 1319 an Botschaft Rom zur Unterrichtung des Herrn Reichsaußenministers weitergeleitet.

Tel.Kontrolle

136417

Telegramm (offen)

Tokio, dem 22. September 1940 2.20 Uhr s  
Ankunft: 22. " " 9.35 "

Nr. 986 vom 22.9.

Presse widmet breiten Raum Verstärkung englisch-amerikanischer Zusammenarbeit im Pazifik und Frage Singapore, dessen Mitbenutzung durch Amerika als feststehende Absicht angesehen wird. Japan solle nicht mit politischen und militärischen Gegenmaßnahmen zögern. Asahi glaubt, daß weiteres englisches amerikanisches Zusammengehen politischen und wirtschaftlichen Druck auf Japan verstärken werde. Überlassung Singapores an Amerika bedeute, daß Amerika die englische Machtposition übernehme und tatsächlich in den Krieg eingetreten sei. Diese Entwicklung werde japanische Seeherrschaft über Westpazifik bedrohen und könne von Japan unter keinen Umständen stillschweigend hingenommen werden. Nichi Nichi sieht in Verpachtung Singapores Verschärfung japanisch-amerikanischer Beziehungen. Verpachtung englischer Kolonialgebiete im Atlantik sei gegen überwältigende deutsch-italienische Macht gerichtet. Im Falle Singapores handele es sich zweifellos um Maßnahmen gegen Japan. Yomiuri vermutet bereits bestehendes amerikanisch-englisches Geheimabkommen über Verpachtung Singapores, auch Möglichkeit Bildung Vereinigter Staaten von England und Amerika wird ernsthaft in Erwägung gezogen. Hochi sieht in fieberhaften Bemühungen Amerikas und Englands bei Absicht Operationsbasis amerikanischer Flotte bis Singapore auszudehnen, Warnungszeichen für Japan, daß dann auf seinen Wunsch Frieden im Pazifik zu halten verzichten müßte. Vergl. auch DNB-Telegramm 134 folgende.

Ott

Hergestellt in 19 Stück

Davon sind gegangen:

Nr. 1 an ~~Presse~~ (Arb. St.)  
" 2 " RAM.  
" 3 " S. S.  
" 4 " C. A. O.  
" 5 " L. A. I.  
" 6 " U. S. S. Pol.  
" 7 " U. S. S. Recht  
" 8 " Dir. Pers.  
" 9 " L. Pol.  
" 10 " L. W.  
" 11 " Eg. W.  
" 12 " L. Recht  
" 13 " L. Kult  
" 14 " Eg. "  
" 15 " L. Presse  
" 16 " " L. Bild.  
" 17 " " Prot.  
" 18 " pers. Stab (Tewel)  
" 19 " Landerref. rol.

3

Tag i-1 Nr. ....

136418

電報 (公用)

東京 一九四〇年(昭和十五年)九月二十二日 二時二〇分

到着 一九四〇年

九月二十二日

九時三十分

九月二十二日、カカハト

一付送付

新聞ハ太平洋に於テ、英米ノ協力ヲ強化セシメ、  
カカハトノ協力が強化する事、  
カカハトノ協力が強化する事、

アメリカモ亦利用スルコトヲ既ニ確定シタ企圖ト見シコト  
カカハトノ協力が強化する事、

大々的ニ報章ヲシテ、日本ハ之ニ對シテ  
政治的・軍事的對策ヲ講

フコトナク、講和ヲ可キバ、  
朝日ハ、英米協力ハ今、日本ニ對ス

テ政治的・軍事的に  
強化するモ、  
信じて、  
カカハトノ

アメリカニ對シテハ、  
アメリカが  
英國ノ勢力地位ヲ支テ、  
維テ、

事實上、  
戦争ノ後、  
カカハトノ  
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Berlin, den 24. September 1940.

Der J a p a n i s c h e Botschaftsrat K A S E  
brachte heute als letzten Punkt bei einem längeren Besuche im  
Auftrage des Botschafters das Schreiben zur Sprache, das der  
Chef des Protokolls am 15. September (Prot. A 18814 VI 12) an  
die Missionschefs in der Frage des Schnellfahrens im Kraft-  
wagen gerichtet hat. Herr Kurusu sei der Ansicht, daß die in  
dem Schreiben enthaltene Androhung, daß in besonders schweren  
Fällen die Abberufung des Missionsmitgliedes oder die Entlas-  
sung des Kraftfahrers die Folge sein werde, doch etwas scharf  
formuliert sei. Die Angelegenheit gebe im Diplomatischen Korps  
Anlaß zu lebhaften Diskussionen.

Ich habe Herrn Kase gesagt, es gebe im Diplomatischen  
Korps, wenn auch sicher nicht in der Japanischen Botschaft,  
hartgesottene Sünder, gegen die man schon eine scharfe Sprache  
führen müsse.

Herr Kase blieb dabei, daß der Botschafter Kurusu die  
Formulierung, soweit sie die Japanische Botschaft betreffe, für  
zu scharf halte, daß er aber nichts weiter wolle, als freund-  
schaftlich hierauf hinzuweisen.

Hiermit

Herrn Gesandten Freiherr von Dörnberg.

gez. Woermann

Durchschlag

an St. S.  
Dg. Pol.  
Pol. VIII

136419

# Geheim

Berlin, den 24. September 1940.

Ich hatte Ende voriger Woche versucht, über die Japanische Botschaft Kontakt mit dem in Berlin aus London eingetroffenen bisherigen dortigen Botschaftsrat Okamoto zu bekommen, für dessen Mitteilungen sich auch die Luftwaffe sehr interessierte. Botschaftsrat K a s e gab mir heute zu verstehen, daß Herr Okamoto eine solche Zusammenkunft lieber vermeiden möchte. Im Foreign Office habe man ihm nahegelegt, den Rückweg nicht über Deutschland sondern über Amerika zu wählen. Anscheinend hat Okamoto, wenn Kase dies auch nicht mit dürren Worten gesagt hat, im Foreign Office in dieser Hinsicht Erklärungen abgegeben, Herr Kase erklärte sich aber bereit, seinerseits uns streng vertraulich alles mitzuteilen, was er von Okamoto erfahre. Der Militärattaché sei auch bereit, den deutschen militärischen Stellen entsprechende Mitteilungen zu machen. Ich habe unter diesen Umständen den Gedanken eines persönlichen Zusammentreffens nicht weiter verfolgt.

Die Mitteilungen, die mir Herr Kase über die Beobachtungen Okamotos machte, waren nicht gerade sehr inhaltsreich, und nicht sehr substanziiert. Okamoto hat London am 15. September verlassen. Bis dahin hätten die deutschen Luftangriffe in London sehr starke Schäden verursacht. England sei aber noch zum Widerstande bis zum Ende entschlossen. Lebensmittel seien reichlich vorhanden. Der persönliche Eindruck Okamotos gehe dahin, daß England nicht durch Luftangriffe allein zur Kapitulation gezwungen werden könne. Eine deutsche Landungsoperation in England werde sicher auf große Schwierigkeiten stoßen. Deutschlands Stellung im Kontinent sei so stark, daß der Zeitfaktor nicht gegen Deutschland arbeiten werde sondern eher gegen England.

~~St. 3~~  
Dg. Pol.  
Pol. VI  
Pol. VIII  
Pol. I M

136420





Nur als  
Verschlusssache  
zu behandeln.

Telegramm  
(Geh.Ch.V.)

Tokio, den 27.Sept.1940  
Ankunft: " 27. " " , 10.45 Uhr

Nr.1015 v.27.9.                      Citissime!

Für Herrn Reichsaussenminister.

Aussenminister mitteilt soeben, dass  
Kaiser Reichsaussenminister Grosskreuz aufgehender Sonne  
mit Paulownia-Blumen verliehen hat. Dies ist die nach  
dem kaiserlichen Hausgesetz höchstmögliche Auszeichnung.

Sthamer.

Ott.

Chef AO.  
U. St. S. Pol. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
U. St. S. R. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
U. St. S. Habicht  
Bolsch. Ritter  
Dir. Pers.  
" W.  
" Kult  
" N. P. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
Chef Prot.  
Dg. Pol. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
Ref. Dtschld.  
V.L.R. Hewel  
Herrn Stahmer  
Arb.-Exp. bei *Prof.*

136422

*W. J.*