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**NOTICE**

**OF MR. ADAMS' EULOGIUM**

**ON THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF**

**JAMES MONROE.**

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*By John Armstrong*

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# NOTICE

OF

## MR. ADAMS' EULOGIUM

ON THE

### Life and Character of James Monroe.

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"If we owe regard to the memory of the dead, there is yet more respect to be paid to knowledge, wisdom and truth.".....*Johnson's Rambler.*

It makes no part of our present purpose to speak of this work as a specimen of eloquence; nor (could the task be avoided) are we more disposed to pronounce on the merit or demerit, of the portrait it professes to exhibit. Eulogy, as its name sufficiently imports, is a song of praise—an effusion of fancy and friendship—an outpouring of gratitude for benefits conferred; and as such, has a strong and obvious tendency to exaggeration, in some cases, and to concealment in others. To remedy this evil, philosophy, which alone has the right of giving laws to literature, has prescribed a general rule, equally sustained by good taste and good morals; viz: that, "Panegyrick shall employ no misrepresentation, either in excuse, or in praise, of its own subject, nor in censure of any other." An apparent indifference to both branches of this injunction, is the circumstance, in the work before us, which most attracts our notice, and gives rise to the following remarks.

1. At page 73 of the pamphlet, we find the disaster at Washington, in 1814, characterised as the heaviest of the war; "the *heaviest*, because its remembrance must be coupled with *shame*."

That this disaster furnishes no room for national vanity, is true—nor is it less so, that the *exclusiveness* of Mr Adams' censure with regard to it, is unjust. Was there no other blot in our escutcheon, that could warm and redden the cheek of the Rhetorician? Had he forgotten, that in 1812, a strong fortification, a considerable army, and an entire territory, had been surrendered to an inferior force, without firing a gun? Bad as the disaster at Washington was, that at Detroit was worse, whether examined in relation to the extent, or duration, or character, of the evils it inflicted on individuals or the nation. Yet according to Mr. Adams' estimate, it was only the former, that was coupled with *shame*—the latter, might be remembered *without blushing!*

2. Mr. Adams' next step is to indicate the causes of this unparalleled calamity. "*It should have been remembered,*" says he, "*that in war, heedless security on one side, stimulates to desperate expedients on the other; and that the enterprise, surely fatal to the undertaker when encountered by precaution, becomes successful achievement over the helplessness of neglected preparation. Such*

“had been the uniform lesson of experience in former ages; such had it emphatically been in our own revolutionary war.”

As an abstract proposition, nothing is truer, than that, “in war heedless security and neglected preparation” lead to defeat and disgrace; and on meeting the maxim here, we should have passed it by without notice, had we not found the Rhetorician, after carefully exempting his patrons from the punishment he meditated,—not only barbing his arrow, but directing its flight and leaving it to rankle in the sides of the less favored members of the Cabinet of 1814. “No” he exclaims, “Messrs. Madison and Monroe, incurred no blame in this business—they, saw the danger afar off—they, had not forgotten the lessons taught by the war of the revolution—they, knew well the value and necessity of prompt and ample preparation.” And what then? Was the danger avoided? Not so; the *army was beaten, the city was sacked, and the Capitol burned*. What! a President of the United States, specially charged with the duty of seeing that the republic suffered no injury,—thoroughly impressed with the nature and extent of the approaching danger—knowing sufficiently the means of meeting and repelling it—possessing, at the same time, the whole power of the Nation for executing his purposes, and aided, besides, with the constant presence of his *Fidus Achates*, (that oracle, according to Mr. Adams, of energetic councils)—is it credible, we ask, that under the guardianship of one so gifted, so instructed, so disposed and so sustained, the metropolis of the Union should have fallen a victim to “heedless security and neglected preparation?” The two facts assumed by Mr. Adams, cannot both be true; they expressly contradict each other, and instead of presenting to the mind any clear and probable conclusion, they offer only a silly and contemptible paradox. Such is the “bad eminence” on which the praises and prejudices of the Eulogist, have placed the venerable Madison! But enough of this—we hasten to the rescue, and have no doubt of being able to shew, by testimony equally abundant and authentic, that the cause assigned by him for the disaster at Washington, is a mere *fiction*;—the product of an irritable temperament and irregular mind, and even less worthy of credit, than his cunningly devised fable of federal treason and disloyalty.

It will be remembered, that in September 1814, the Congress of the Union assembled, on the ashes of the Capitol. The moment was one of great excitement; and among the public objects most interesting, was that of promptly and thoroughly investigating the causes of the calamity and disgrace which had befallen the nation. To this end a committee of seven was appointed, of whom we need only say, that they were able and honorable men, having the best means of judging, and no possible temptation to give an unjust verdict. (1) And what, after long and patient enquiry was their report?

(1) The members were, Mr. Johnson of Kentucky, Mr. Lowndes of South Carolina, Mr. Stockton of New Jersey, Mr. Miller of New York, Mr. Goldsborough of Maryland, Mr. Barbour of Virginia, and Mr. Pickens of South Carolina—*four* federalists and *three* republicans, according to the party denominations of that day.



“That in the opinion of the committee, the means authorised for the security of the 10th military district, by the President of the United States, in a cabinet council of the 1st of July, were ample and sufficient, as to the extent of the force; and seasonable, as to the time, when the measures were authorised.”

Of the Cabinet measures, referred to by the Committee in the preceding extract, Mr. Monroe has given the following detail:—“On or about the 1st of July last, the President convened the heads of departments and the attorney general, to consult on the measures which it would be proper to adopt, for the safety of this city and district. He appeared to have digested a plan of the force to be called immediately into the field; the additional force to be kept under orders to march at a moment’s notice; its composition and necessary equipment. It seemed to be his object, that some position should be taken between the Eastern branch and the Patuxent with two or three thousand men; and that an additional force of ten or twelve thousand including the militia of the district, should be held in readiness in the neighboring states, to march when called on; the whole force to be put under the command of an officer of the regular army. The measures suggested by the President, were approved by all the members of the administration.”

Such was the substance of the President’s plan of defence and the extent of the means, deemed necessary by him, for that purpose. Let us now see, what were the measures, taken to give effect to this plan; so far as its execution depended on the War Department.

“On the 2d of July” says the Report of the Committee, “the 10th military district was constituted and the command given to General Winder. On the 4th, the requisition upon the states for 93,500 men was made. On the 14th, the Governors of Pennsylvania and Virginia acknowledged the receipt of the requisition of the 4th, and promised promptitude. About the 10th, the Governor of Maryland was served with a requisition, and took measures to designate a corps of 6,000 men—the whole quota from that state. On the 12th, General Winder was authorised, in case of *menaced* or actual invasion, to call into service the whole quota of Maryland. On the 17th, the General was further authorised, to call into actual service not less than 2 nor more than 3,000 of the drafts assigned to his command, to form a permanent force; to be stationed in some central position between Baltimore and the City of Washington. On the same day, he was authorised to call on the state of Pennsylvania for 5,000; on Virginia for 2,000; on the militia of the District of Columbia (in a disposable state) for 2,000; together with the 6,000 from Maryland, making an aggregate force of 15,000 drafted militia; 3,000 of which, authorised to be called into actual service (the residue in case of actual or *menaced* invasion) besides the regular troops, estimated at 1,000—making 16,000, independent of marines and flotilla men [600]. This was the measure of defence contemplated for military district No. 10, and the

“measures taken by the War Department up to the 17th of July, in execution of it.” Thus we see, that at the last mentioned date (*five weeks before the enemy's attack on Washington*) every thing either ordered, or indicated, by the President in relation to the kind or degree of force to be employed, or to General Winder's authority for assembling and employing it, was in full execution; so far, as the agency of the War Department was necessary to the attainment of these objects.

Our next subject of enquiry is—what employment was made of the authorisations, thus given by the War Department, for calling out the troops designated for the defence of District No. 10? On this point the Report of the Committee with its accompanying documents, furnish full and decisive evidence. General Winder, in the exercise of his new function, and after having made a topographical tour of the District—suggested in a letter of the 9th of July an alteration in the President's plan; and instead of 2, or 3,000 men, proposed that 4,000 should be promptly called and formed into *two camps*, the one to be located “between the metropolis and the head of *South Bay*”—the other in the neighborhood of *Baltimore*. To this suggestion the General added, that “he had little doubt, but that the Executive of Maryland would *cordially co-operate* in affording such means, as should be thought advisable,” and that he was then about “to fix upon the most eligible spot for the camp, intended to defend Washington.” The Secretary's reply to this letter is dated on the 12th; and the General's proposition being entirely approved, he was directed to call for such portion of the quota of Maryland [6,000,] as circumstances might render necessary or proper. On the 16th, the General announced “the neighborhood of *Upper Marlborough*, as the *only place of tolerable convenience*, “with reference to the objects of defence, or an encampment,” but was still embarrassed in choosing between two points—the one, “on the road to Piscataway; the other on that leading to Bladensburg.” At the close of this letter he says “the Governor and *Council have taken steps* immediately to comply with the requisition of the general government; but I fear from my recent experience, it will be in vain to look for any efficient aid from a *sudden call* upon the militia.” To get over the General's fears on this subject, the Secretary thought it advisable to place at once, the whole force designated for the defence of the district, at his disposition; and accordingly on the 17th of July apprised him, that “in addition to the whole quota of Maryland (given by the letter of the 12th) he was authorised to draw from that of Virginia 2,000, and from that of Pennsylvania 5,000, and that the whole militia of the District of Columbia, (2,000) was kept in a disposable state, and subject to his orders.” In a second letter from the Secretary of the same date, the General was reminded, that “it was the President's wish, that not less than 2, nor more than 3,000 of the drafts under the requisition of the 4th be *organized, embodied and encamped* at

“some *middle point between Baltimore and Washington.*” (1) In a letter of the 20th, acknowledging the receipt of the Secretary’s of the 17th, the General says—“I have seized this moment to proceed to this place to arrange the calling out the Maryland militia, demanded by the requisition of the 4th inst. *This will be immediately attended to by the Governor.*” Again: in a letter of the 23d, he says “the Governor *has issued orders* for calling out 3,000 of the drafts; and has, at my request, appointed *Bladensburg*, as “the place of rendezvous.” Yet on the 13th of August, twenty one days after the Secretary had been thus informed—the General lets him into the secret—that of the drafts to form the camp at Bladensburg, there would be nearly a *total failure*; as, “instead of being 3,000, they would not exceed as many hundreds,”—a prediction unfortunately verified by the event; for, on the field of battle, this central camp furnished but 250 men!

Perceiving then, as early as the 23d of July, that there was a hazard of failure on the part of Maryland; and finding on the 13th of August, that this hazard was reduced to a certainty—what were the means employed by General Winder, to make good the deficiency? Did he recur to the authority given him on the 17th, to draw from the quota of Pennsylvania 5,000 men; from that of Virginia 2,000; and from the District of Columbia, an equal number? No. The letter conveying the authority to do so “*from his frequent change of place*” had not reached him, though steadily and vigorously pursuing him, from the 17th of July to the 6th or 8th of August! And does he then put the Government in the possession of the fact, so that if any evil had accrued, they might have sought and applied a remedy? Does he express any regret at the circumstance, as one having an unfavorable bearing on his measures of defence? And above all, does he hasten to give execution to the long suspended order? Nothing of this kind—for in his subsequent correspondence with the Government, not a word on this subject escapes him; and so far from acting on the instruction, he consigns it quietly to his portfolio, where it might have slept forever, but for a demonstration made by the enemy on the 17th of August. On this day it was, that finding the enemy’s fleet much re-inforced, he recurred to his last authorisation, and though making no calls yet on either Virginia or the District of Columbia, he on that day, but required from Pennsylvania a *single regiment!*

Still it must not be forgotten, that with all these drawbacks on the calculations of the Cabinet, the General was enabled, on the 24th of August, to present to the enemy *a line of 7,000 combatants*; a force greatly superior to that of his adversary; (2) and dou-

(1) The *limitation* in this order, was expressly intended to leave sufficient defences for other points liable to attack—as for example Baltimore and Annapolis; two places offering, in the General’s opinion, great temptations to the enemy. See pages 98, 114-15.

(2) Nothing could be more vague than the estimates made of the numbers of the British army before the battle. Among the wildest of these conjectures, was that of Colonel Monroe; who stated them to be 7,000 men. Colonel Beall, with the same means of judging, estimated them, at 4,000. After the battle they were fixed by Dr. Catlett and others, at 3,500; of which 1,500 only participated in the action. See Admiral Cockburn’s official letter, &c.

ble the number given to General Jackson, to combat a veteran army amounting to more than 12,000 men!

Having taken this view of the General's conduct in assembling the militia destined to his command, our next and last duty, under this head, will be to consider the use made, by himself and others, of the force actually assembled, and of the conduct of that force in defending the Capitol.

The details given by the General of his labors, during this short campaign of seven days, furnish sufficient evidence of zeal, activity and courage,—nor are his statements (in these respects) impaired by the reports of others, having a competent knowledge of what he did, and a sufficient capacity to decide on its character and effects. But *here* our approbation must end—as many well authenticated facts lead to conclusions, much less favorable, with regard to his *professional knowledge and judgment*. Of these, we shall present the following series, sustained by appropriate evidence.

1st. Passing over the omission to call for the Pennsylvania and Virginia drafts, which has already been sufficiently indicated, the General's hesitancy to assemble the forces within the District and at all times subject to his disposition, had an unfortunate influence on the issue of the campaign. Though informed, on the 19th of August, of the arrival in the Patuxent of the invading armament, and the preparations making at Benedict, for debarking troops—the General on the 21st suspended the march of Stanbury's brigade near Baltimore till the morning of the 22d, under an apprehension, as expressed by himself, that "*it would reach Bladensburg too soon.*" (1) On the same day (21st) he directed Colonel Sterret, (commanding a detachment from Striker's Brigade, which had not yet left Baltimore) to advance *slowly* as far as Snowden's, and *there* await further orders. At 2 o'clock P. M., of the 22d, these further orders were received, and directed an immediate and forced march to Bladensburg. Again: a corps of 800 men, stationed at Annapolis and taken as part of the Maryland quota on the 13th of August, was not called till the 23d, and was barely able to reach Bladensburg, six or eight minutes before the action began. The effect of these delays and the forced marches they made necessary, on the fighting condition of the troops, will be best seen by recurring to the reports of the three commandants.

"Early in the morning of the 24th," says Stanbury, "I despatched Major Woodyear to Washington to inform General Winder of my movements and situation—of the exhausted state of the troops and the impracticability of their meeting the enemy, in their present fatigued state, with any prospect of success unless re-inforced." Of Sterret's corps we have even a worse account: "My men," says this officer, "by a forced march on the 23d from the Buck tavern, or Snowden's, reached Bladensburg without halting

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(1) P. 296.

“ to cook; and had been *under arms the whole night without sleep or food.* Major Pinkney’s riflemen and the two companies of artillery were in the same situation, and *completely worn down and exhausted.*” Colonel Beall’s account of his corps does not differ from the preceding. “ Having marched” he says, “ about sixteen miles that morning (the 24th) *before the battle,* my men were *fatigued and exhausted.*” See pages 179, 80, and 243, of the Report.

With regard to Minor’s regiment, the General’s inattention was still greater; for after having given them a position in front of the Capitol, with instructions *there* to await further orders, he in the hurry of the day, entirely forgot them, and of course, lost the aid of 600 infantry and 100 horse in the battle. (1)

2d. The General had altogether *mistaken the character of defensive war;* which, (while careful to avoid a general action, unless given under circumstances the most favorable, or imperative,) incessantly employs itself in harrassing the march, and disquieting the positions of the enemy—obstructing roads, breaking up bridges, assailing patrols, videttes and pickets—and, in a word, refusing to him a moment’s repose, for the purpose of sleep or food:—a state of things, which will sooner break down the strength and spirit of the best disciplined army, than repeated and even stubborn actions, under ordinary indulgencies; and which, had it been produced, even in a slight degree on the part of Ross, would have effectually prevented his visit to Washington. Such was not however General Winder’s opinion; for though this course was distinctly indicated to him on the 19th of August, (2) he adopted and pursued one of a character directly the reverse—avoiding all collision with the enemy—rarely going within sight of him—leaving his march from Benedict to Marlborough, entirely undisturbed by night or by day; and lastly, after executing for him, his projected vengeance on Barney’s flotilla—withdrawing every man to his front; and leaving him nothing to apprehend for either *flank* or *rear!* Such an invitation could not be resisted—the condition, (3) on which Ross had agreed to risk a coup de main on Washington, had now arisen; and he accordingly began his march for that place on the evening of the 23d of August.

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(1) P. 232 of the Report. (2) See Secretary of War’s letter of this date, directing the General to push forward his cavalry on the enemy’s front. McLane’s Journal; “ Secretary advised the General, to push forward Tilghman’s Militia Dragoons at once, and clear the enemy’s line of march, of cattle, horses &c. and with his best infantry, attack wherever the ground favored it; while General Stewart’s Brigade, should be employed on his rear in the same way.” “ Wrote the General on the 22d, to place Barney’s and other troops on the west of Nottingham, to menace the enemy’s rear and his communications; and on the 23d (after seeing the army) repeated the advice, to form and place a corps so as to attack the rear of Ross’s column, should he move from Marlborough to Washington—by no means to risk a field fight; but to retire on the Capitol and defend *that, to the last.*” “ Your men” he said, “ will do well under cover—badly in the field. The enemy is not now prepared for siege or investment, being without cannon, baggage or provision train. What he does, must be done at once, and by storm. Resist his first attack, and he is beaten; and may be routed and captured.”

(3) The attack on Washington was *contingent*—“ if it might be made with any prospect of success;” Cockrane’s official letter.

An opportunity now presented itself for the *field fight* by which the General had hoped to redeem the time he had lost in movements without an object, and which, directly tended to break down the moral as well as physical strength of his troops. "The "enemy" says Colonel Mouroe, (in a note to the President of the 23d) "are advanced six miles on the road to the Wood-yard, and "our troops retiring. *They were on their march to meet him, but "in too small a number to engage: General Winder proposes to "retire, until he can collect them in a body."*

3d. The General's next error lay, in not taking the most direct means to accomplish his own object—that of *concentrating his forces*; for instead of immediately repairing to Bladensburg, where he would have found the Baltimore troops and Cramer's battalion, amounting to 3,000 combatants, he retreated to the Eastern-branch bridge, on the very improbable supposition,—that the *enemy would avail himself of that pass* (so easily defended or destroyed) *to get into the city.* The character of this retreat was unfortunately worse than its direction; for according to the report of the committee, "the march of the army was *extremely rapid and precipitate*; and "orders were occasionally given to the Captains to *hurry* on the "men, who were *extremely fatigued and exhausted*, before they "reached the camping ground near the Eastern-branch bridge."

Having passed the night here and in quiet, and secured ample means for shutting out the enemy from this avenue to the city, (1) it was to be expected that he would have pursued his professed intention of concentrating his force. But though advised, early in the morning of the 24th, of the perturbed state in which Stanbury's division had passed the preceding night; and of its entire unfitness to meet the enemy, unless promptly re-enforced, (2) he continued to be tenacious of his separate position; and contented himself with a peremptory order to Stanbury—"to give battle to the enemy, should "he appear at Bladensburg;" "in which case" he says "if necessary; I will join you." And again: though advised as early as ten o'clock, A. M., that Ross was in full march (not, as he had expected, to the Eastern-branch bridge, but to Bladensburg) it was *eleven o'clock*, before he detached General Smith to that point. See Smith's Report.

4th. Another error of the General, will be found, *in fighting a battle, on dispositions not made by himself*, and of which he was *nearly or altogether ignorant*, until the moment of conflict; and which, (to say the least of them) betrayed an utter ignorance of the art of war.

On these points, we have the benefit of the General's narrative; in which he says—"If I had had longer time, or [were] to repeat the "action of Bladensburg, I could correct several errors which might "materially have effected the issue of that battle. 1st. The advance-

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(1) See p. 159 of the Report (2) See p. 179.

“ ed force ought to have been nearer to the creek along the edge of  
 “ the low ground; where they would have been skirted with bushes  
 “ and have avoided the inconvenience of the cover which the orch-  
 “ ard afforded the enemy. 2d. The edge of the low grounds, on the  
 “ right of the road, ought to have been lined with musketry and a  
 “ battery of cannon planted in the field, on the right of the road, di-  
 “ rectly fronting the bridge. 3d. If Barney’s heavy artillery, with  
 “ his more expert artillerists, had occupied the position which the  
 “ advanced artillerists did, the enemy would not have crossed the  
 “ river at that point; but have been obliged to make a circuit round  
 “ to his right and have crossed above at the upper end of the town:—  
 “ or 4th. If the whole force had been posted at the position of the  
 “ second line, with all the advantages it afforded, and have acted  
 “ with tolerable firmness and courage, the event might have been  
 “ different.”

This confession, with a single exception, is sufficiently candid; but fails altogether, in ascribing to *a want of time*, what was notoriously the result of *a very different cause*. The simple fact, without concealment or distortion, is—that the reported march of the enemy to Bladensburg found the General in a kind of extra-cabinet (composed of the President, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, Commodore Tingey, and Colonel Wadsworth) and much too busy in discussing *what ought to be the enemy’s mode of proceeding*, to pay much regard to the information just given, of *his actual movement*. It was under these circumstances, that Colonel Monroe, quite as charitable as energetic, proposed to set out for Bladensburg to *assist General Stansbury in giving an order of battle for the day*. The proposition was immediately approved by the *President* and the *General*, (1) and the Colonel, knowing the value of time, hastened to the camp and entered at once, and without any kind of ceremony on the exercise of his new functions.

From the following statements it will appear, that the assistance rendered by the Colonel on this occasion was particularly mischievous.

“ While” says Stansbury, “ I was giving some directions to the  
 “ artillery, I found *Lieutenant Colonel Ragan and Schutz’s regi-*  
 “ *ments had been moved from the place where I had stationed them,*  
 “ and marched out of the orchard up the hill, and formed in order of  
 “ battle about 250 yards above the orchard, and *upwards of 500 yards*  
 “ *in the rear of the artillery and riflemen.* Thus uncovered by the  
 “ trees of the orchard, their situation and numbers were clearly seen  
 “ by the enemy from Lowndes’s hill, and the *flanks of the artillery*  
 “ *and riflemen were unprotected*, and laid liable to be turned, *our main*  
 “ *body being placed too far off to render them any aid.*” “ Again: *The*  
 “ *5th Regiment was taken out of the orchard*, marched up the hill,  
 “ and stationed on the left of Colonel Schutz’s regiment; that of

(1) See p. 86.

“ Colonel Ragan being on the right, its right resting on the main road; but as I before observed, the *whole at so great a distance from the artillery and riflemen, that they had to contend with the whole British force*, and so much exposed, that it has been a cause of astonishment they preserved their ground so long, and ultimately succeeded in retreating. *Whose plan this was, I know not; it was not mine, nor did it meet with my approbation.*”

Pinkney's estimate of this new order of battle, was not better than Stansbury's. In his narrative he says; “ The 5th Regiment *which had been removed from its position, where it might have contrived to repulse the enemy in his attempts to leave the vicinity of the bridge, had now, to the great discouragement of my companies and of the artillery, been made to retire to a hill, several hundred yards in our rear, but visible nevertheless to the enemy; where it could do little more than display its gallantry. The two companies of General Stansbury's brigade, acting as riflemen, had changed their station, so that I no longer perceived them. The residue of General Stansbury's brigade had been moved from the left, and made to take ground (invisible to us by reason of the intervening orchard) on the right of the 5th regiment; with its own right resting upon the main road, and disclosed to the enemy.*” *Such was the assistance*, derived from Colonel Monroe's interference on this occasion; and what made the thing worse was, that the blunders were incurable; for Winder tells us, that though invited by Colonel Monroe to examine his labors, he was but able to correct *one* of them before the action began, when all farther examination and amendment became impossible. See p. 163.

5th. The propriety of the General's retreat presents a question of more difficulty. Smith's division believed, or affected to believe, that the order was given too soon, as they were prevented by it from fleshing their maiden swords upon the enemy; while that of Stansbury (who had made the experiment) were entirely convinced, that the order was judiciously given. (1) Still, a preliminary and highly important measure, concerning which there can be no doubt, was altogether omitted. We here allude to a designation, before the battle, of some well known point in the rear, as a place for re-union, in the event of retreat. This was, as we have stated, unfortunately forgotten; and what rendered the case worse was, that the two routes at last indicated by the General, the one to the Capitol, the other to Georgetown, so far diverged from each other, as to prevent the troops from meeting until after they had passed the latter of these places, and thus furnished the only plausible argument given against defending the Capitol, as advised by the Secretary of War. (2)

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(1) Major Pinkney's Report. (2) Colonel McLane's journal; “26th August, at 10 o'clock A. M. General Winder (being advised of Ross's retreat the preceding night from Washington) began his march for Baltimore: Regretted much his not defending the Capitol, as advised to do by General Armstrong, as it was now plain, that the enemy's movement was a mere *Cossack Hurrah*, as General A. called it.”



6th. Though this last mentioned functionary did at length assent to the retreat on Georgetown, it was under an express understanding 1st, that it should not extend beyond that place; and 2d, that a light corps should be promptly organized and employed, within the city, in watching the movements and striking at such small detached parties of the enemy, as might be met with during the night. But neither condition of this agreement was fulfilled. Such of the militia as pleased retired to their own houses; while the remainder, were led by the General to Montgomery Court-house. The effect was, that *during a single night*, a British detachment of *two hundred men*, were permitted to inflict on the place all the mischiefs it suffered. (1)

Lastly: On the morning of the 24th, before making any experiment of his strength with the enemy, General Winder (believing Fort Washington to be untenable) despatched an order to Young's brigade to cross the Potomac immediately; and to Captain Dyson to follow the example so soon as he had reason to expect an attack on his rear. The Secretary of War, having received an intimation of this order, and fearing that its effect would be mischievous, immediately despatched a *counter order*—instructing General Young “to hold fast his position in the rear of the fort, until *assured* that “the enemy was in force and about to attack him; and in the mean “time, to keep his videttes well posted on every road.” The General, whom this instruction found in the act of crossing the Potomac, hastened to resume his position on Oxen Hill, and immediately sent back the express, with advice that he was doing so. The carrier of the message, not finding the Secretary, delivered it to the *President* and *General Winder* and took back their orders, “that the “Brigade should pursue its first intention, and pass the Potomac.” (2) The issue is sufficiently known. *Two days after the British army had retreated from Washington* Captain Dyson, without either *seeing* or *hearing* an enemy, *dismantled the fort* and *crossed the river!* The event has shown, that there would have been no hazard in leaving General Young in his covering position; nor will any one believe, that had he been left in it, either the loss incurred at Alexandria, or the disgrace suffered at Fort Washington, would have taken place. His patrols, would have kept him advised of Ross's movements; his communications with the City, would have been re-established, and his authority and example, would have fortified the mind, or at least restrained the madness, of Captain Dyson—and in either case, the post would have been secure, and its flag not dishonored.

Having thus pointed out the errors of the Commanding General, it but remains under this head to shew what was the conduct of the troops:—a story, which, as Mr. Adams truly says, cannot even now be heard without blushing. General Ross's strength, on leaving Marlborough, amounted to 3,200 men; who, from the excessive heat of the weather and the long disuse of their legs on ship-board, were

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(1) Wilkinson's Memoirs. (2) Young's Report, p. 222.

reduced before their arrival at Bladensburg to 1,500 combatants;—a circumstance, which could hardly have failed to impose some degree of restraint on a leader of cooler temperament, or one having more respect for his enemy, than this disciple of Wellington, who, refusing to wait a moment for his main body, or artillery dragged by seamen, (1) dashed at once across a narrow bridge—threw out a few skirmishers on his flank, and with the remainder of his infantry, struck at the very heart of our battalions, and defeated them, in as short a time as Cæsar defeated Pharnaces at Zela. But here, we must invoke the aid of Mr. Rush, Colonel Sterett and General Winder, to go on with the story—which, were it not shameful, would be highly ludicrous. The first of these gentlemen, (a mere spectator of the combat, who had under his eye the whole theatre of the war,) says—“When the President arrived, the dispositions for the battle, whatever they may have been, were apparently made. It [the battle] commenced in a very few minutes; and *in not many more, some of our troops began to break.*” Colonel Sterett’s summary view, is brief and pointed.—“The imposing front of the enemy” he says, “never was disconcerted by *the fire of the artillery, or the riflemen;* and General Stansbury’s brigade was seen to *fly, as soon as the action became serious. No second line appeared to support us;* and we were *outflanked and defeated, in as short a time, as such an operation could well be performed.*”

“Our advanced riflemen,” says General Winder, “now began to fire, and continued it for *half a dozen rounds*, when I observed them to *run back to an orchard*. They halted there, and seemed, for a moment, about returning to their original position; but, in a few minutes, *entirely broke and retired to the left of Stansbury’s line*. The advanced artillery, *immediately followed the riflemen*, and retired on the left of the 5th Baltimore regiment; which had been pushed forward to sustain them. The first three or four rockets fired by the enemy, being *much above the heads of Stansbury’s line*, now received a *more horizontal direction*, and passed *close above the heads of Schutz and Ragan’s regiments*, composing the centre and left of Stansbury’s line. *A universal flight of the two regiments*, was the consequence. The 5th, and the artillery still remained, and I hoped would prevent the enemy’s approach; but they [the enemy] advancing *singly*, their fire *annoyed the 5th considerably*; when I ordered it to retire, for the *purpose of putting it out of reach of the enemy*. This order was however immediately countermanded, from an aversion to retire before the necessity became stronger, and from a hope, that the enemy would issue in a body, and enable us to act upon him on terms of equality. But *his fire beginning to annoy this corps* [the 5th regiment] *still more, by wounding several of them*, and a strong column passing up the

(1) General Ross’ Division orders of the 17th of August, (a copy of which was dropt at Washington) shew that his whole train of artillery consisted of *one 3 pounder*, commanded by Captain Carmichael, R. A.

“road and deploying on its left, I ordered them to retire:—*their retreat* became a *flight of absolute and total disorder*;" (1) a fact, furnishing the General with a conclusion, that “no advantage of position, is *proof against groundless panic*, and the *total want of discipline, skill and experience*.”

With these quotations, we close our remarks on this head—having, as we trust sufficiently shewn, that the disaster of Washington was, not the effect of *heedless security* and *neglected preparation*, as asserted or insinuated by Mr. Adams, but, of *mismanagemnt*, on the part of the *General*, and misconduct, on that of *the troops*. (2)

3. At page 93 of the Eulogium, we find the following passage:—“Follow him through a long series of years of laborious travels and intricate negociations, at imperial courts and in the palaces of kings, winding his way amidst the ferocious and party colored revolutions of France, and the life-guard favorites and camarillas of Spain. Then look at the map of United North America, as it was at the definitive peace of 1783. Compare it with the map of that same empire, as it is now, limited by the Sabine and the Pacific ocean, and say, the *change, more than of any other man living or dead, was the work of James Monroe*.”

To try the correctness of this conclusion, we accept the invitation, and shall proceed to take a view, as brief as may be consistent with perspicuity, of Mr. Monroe's *diplomatic labors*.

The policy of the United States, in relation to the war waged in Europe in 1794, was that of *strict neutrality*; and Mr. G. Morris, our minister at Paris, was recalled at the instance of the French government, and on a suggestion made by it, that *he had not sufficiently respected that system*. To supply his place Mr. Monroe was selected, (3) under the hope that he would have filled it, if not with more general ability, at least with a greater degree of *circumspection*. Old politicians who have bad memories, and young ones who have little instruction, will permit us to remark, that many causes of irritation, besides those growing out of the indiscretion of political agents, had now arisen between the two republics; that the French government had wantonly and injuriously embargoed many of our ships; that they had issued a decree, violating the provisions of the 23d and 24th articles of our treaty of commerce; and that under this decree, *many seizures* had been made of *American vessels and cargoes*, by *their cruizers*. Against these outrages, Mr. Monroe was instructed to *remonstrate*, and in the latter cases “to *insist on compensation*.”

(1) Winder's Narrative, p. 165 of the Report. (2) Had Mr. Adams, before pronouncing his diatribe of *neglected preparation*, taken the trouble of consulting the records of the War Department, he would have found that the Secretary of that Department as early as the month of June 1813, made a report to the Military Committee of the Senate, on the subject of sea-board defence, which had for one of its objects, an ample supply of regular troops and additional fortifications, for district No. 5. (3) According to Mr. Adams, Mr. Monroe was General Washington's first choice, for the mission to France, after the recall of Mr. Morris. A better acquaintance with the records of an office, over which the writer presided for eight years in succession, would have taught him, that the appointment was first offered, not to Mr. Monroe, but to the late Chancellor Livingston.

It is certainly an extraordinary fact, perhaps *an unique* in diplomatic history, that the first official letter from our new minister, after being accredited to the French government, should have caused his own to question the wisdom of the selection they had made, and to extort, from the delicacy and forbearance of Washington, a pointed admonition to greater caution,—to more self-respect,—to a temper less ardent and amatory in his intercourse with the French government, and lastly, to a stricter adherence to *the letter of his instructions*.

If such was the effect produced by Mr. Monroe's first despatch, "exhibiting only the details of his triumphal entry into the bosom of the French Convention," how much greater must have been the astonishment and mortification of his own government on receiving his second, dated on the 15th of September, 1794; in which he says—"I was not instructed to desire the repeal of the decree, under which our ships had been seized by French cruizers; and did not know but what it had been tolerated, from the soundest motives of political expediency." Again: in a memorial to the French government (of which he enclosed a copy to his own) he says,—"It is my duty to observe to you, that I am under no instructions to complain of, or request the repeal of the decree, authorising a departure from the 23d and 24th articles of the treaty of amity and commerce, on the contrary, I well know, that if upon consideration, after the experiment made, you should be of opinion, that it [the capture of our ships and cargoes] produces any solid benefit to the republic, the American government and my countrymen in general, will not only bear the departure with patience, but with pleasure." (1)

The following, made part of the answer of the American Secretary of State—"If my letter of July the 30th, has not already stimulated you to remonstrate against the decree, do so without delay. We do not wish you to swerve from the line of conciliation, marked out in the last paragraph in your letter. On the contrary, conciliation which does not detract from the dignity of his government or its rights, or from his own self-respect, is a valuable quality in a minister. We only hope, that the Committee of Public safety may not continue in the belief, that the *Executive are of opinion, that it will be satisfactory to dispense with the articles 23 and 24 of the treaty of commerce.*"

Unfortunately, correction does not always produce amendment; and our Minister was perhaps of that order of animals, which is made not less, but more intractable, by its application. Instead of kissing the rod, he disputed its justice and continued his follies—the next of which, in the order of time, was an attempt to extort from Mr. Jay, a copy of the treaty he had just concluded with England, and for the express purpose of communicating it to France, before it had been submitted to our own government. (2) Assurances given by

(1) Monroe's view of the conduct of the Executive of the United States, p. 27 and 34.

(2) Monroe's view, p. 144 and 146.

the Secretary of State, that Mr. Jay had no authority to enter into any stipulation which should derogate from the rights of France, and that if he should do so, the government would reject such stipulation, was not sufficient to satisfy either his own impatience, or that of the French cabinet. The latter, claimed the communication of *the whole secret of the negotiation*, and the minister openly lent himself to the support of this claim, and even refused to receive the communication under any injunction which should restrain him from extending it to the French government. In the present cool and reasonable condition of public opinion and feeling towards foreign nations, these facts will be reviewed with astonishment and pity, and be regarded only as evidences of mental derangement in the minister. It was perhaps in this mild view of the subject, that the Secretary of State, in his letter of the 7th of April 1795, says, "the obligation of all prior treaties is expressly saved; France, from the circumstance of being the most favored nation, immediately inherits upon equal terms, the concessions, indulgencies, or conditions made to other nations; and the confining its contents to the President and the Secretary of State, is not from any thing sinister towards France, but from the usage in such cases; not from an unwillingness that the Executive conduct should be canvassed, but from a certain fitness and expectation, arising from such a diplomatic act."

Other instances of Franco-mania in the minister occurred about the same time, and gave disquietudes to the government, which were not expressed with equal good humour. In his letter of the 10th of December 1795, and consequently after knowing that the treaty had been acted upon by the Senate, and after having been specially admonished, on the 7th of April preceding, that the invariable policy of the President was to be as independent as possible of all foreign nations—he endeavors to seduce the Cabinet from this wise and wary policy; connect it by new and more intimate ties with France, and embark the United States in the war which then desolated Europe! "Without compulsion" says he "we know we shall not gain from England, what we are entitled to; and if this compulsion is to be procured from France, will it not be more efficacious when she [England] sees that our harmony with France is complete, and beyond her reach to disturb it? But can we accomplish what we wish by the fortunes of France, by any kind of negotiation we can set on foot, *without any efforts of our own*; and if any such effort is to be made, of what kind must it be? To this I can give no answer, other than by referring you to my former letters on that head (1) for latterly, I have had no communication with this government on it. If it can be done, the above is the way to do it, but to ensure success, by embarking this government with full zeal in our behalf, and striking terror into England, it will be necessary to lay hold of her property within the United States, take the posts, and invade Canada. This would not only secure

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(1) Suggesting a loan of money, Monroe's view p. 72, and a letter of the 20th November.

“to us completely our claims upon Britain, and especially, if we likewise cut up her trade by privateers—but by making a decisive and powerful diversion in favour of France, promote, and very essentially, a general peace.” Can any sober man recalling the circumstances of the times, read these wild and extravagant notions, and retain any high degree of respect for the understanding of James Monroe? “The ideas you have detailed are quite foreign to the views of the government of the United States”—was the short, comprehensive and contemptuous answer, of the Secretary of State.

We now hasten to the catastrophe of this gentleman's first mission. Nor, after what we have seen of his diplomatic talents, can we express any surprise at either the shortness of its duration, or the character of its end. The biographer of Washington, presents it in the following words: “In the anxiety which was felt by the Executive, to come to full and immediate explanations on this treaty, the American minister at Paris had been furnished, even before its ratification, and still more fully afterwards, with ample materials for the justification of his government. But misconceiving the views of the Administration, he reserved these representations, to answer complaints which were expected, and omitted to make them in the first instance, while the course to be pursued by the Directory was under deliberation. Meanwhile, his letters kept up the alarm, which had been excited, with regard to the dispositions of France, and intelligence from the West Indies served to confirm it.”

“The President had relied with confidence on early and candid communications for the removal of any prejudices or misconceptions, which the passions of the moment might have occasioned. That the French government would be disappointed at the adjustment of those differences, which had threatened to embroil the United States with Great Britain, could not be doubted; but as neither this adjustment nor the arrangements connected with it, had furnished any real cause of complaint, he had cherished the hope, that it would produce no serious consequences, if *the proper means of prevention should be applied in time*. He was therefore dissatisfied with delays which he had not expected; and seems to have believed, that they originated in *a want of zeal to justify a measure*, which neither the minister himself, nor his political friends had ever approved.”

“It being thought essential to the interests of the United States, that they should be represented at Paris, by a person who would enter cordially into the views of the Administration, the resolution was taken to appoint a successor to Colonel Monroe.” (1)

Mr. Monroe's second mission to France, took place in the year 1803. Various causes combined to produce it. This gentleman, to whom public patronage was never inconvenient, was a personal

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(1) Marshal's life of Washington.

friend and *Elève* of the President; one of the pillars elect of Virginia-supremacy; and lastly, a martyr to the doctrines, in relation to France, which had characterised the Jeffersonian school. To console feelings deeply wounded, and to abate or extinguish, the odium which Washington's declared want of confidence had created, became therefore, with the head of that school, not merely a dictate of private regard and humanity, but of political justice. An occasion, well calculated to begin these experiments of friendship and policy, offered early in 1803. Spain had ceded Louisiana to France: this change of neighbors could not be indifferent to the United States, and the less so, as Bonaparte, (appearing to set a high value upon the acquisition he had made) was professedly employed in sending thither a large naval and military armament, and had in the mean time refused to our Minister, all explanation on the subject of our right of deposit at New Orleans—a right, gained by treaty, from Spain. Mr. Jefferson was among the few politicians, on this side of the Atlantic, who conjectured the real object of these measures. Parma had been seized for the purpose of extorting money from Spain—the treasury of his Catholic Majesty was not in a condition to supply the demand, and Louisiana was taken as a *commodity that might be profitably brought to market*. The whole operation was one of finance, and the armament in Holland, while its pretended destination deceived us, was really meant to alarm England. (1) With this clue, every thing was intelligible to the President; and believing that the cession to France was more extensive than it really was, our Minister at Paris was instructed to ask,—whether, if the United States were disposed to buy, France would be willing to sell, the Island of Orleans and the two Floridas to the United States? The prosecution of this policy produced the occasion, on which Mr. Monroe was to be called back to national confidence and distinction; and the more strongly to mark the circumstance, Paris, which had been the theatre of his disgrace, was now to be made that of his triumph. He was accordingly associated with Mr. Livingston, in an *extraordinary* mission to the French republic; and joined his colleague at Paris, on the 12th of April, 1803.

If the treaty which followed, and which was signed on the 30th day of April, presents any peculiar claim to public gratitude and respect, we confidently assert, that this belongs, not to Mr. Monroe, but to Mr. Livingston. The latter, had opened the subject as early as the 11th of the preceding December, and had pressed the cession, on the part of France, by a number of informal notes written between that period and the 25th of February. (2) On this day, he addressed a letter to the First Consul, in which a cession of territory and a discharge of debts, due by France to American citizens, were

(1) And produced its full effect. See Canning's Speech in the House of Commons, November 1802. (2) Where is the evidence of any labors, oral, or written of Mr. Monroe's, having a similar character and tendency? Can a single line of *his* on this subject, or any other connected with the treaty of 1803, and intended to operate on the French Government, be produced? To these questions we say—No. If in doing so, we are wrong, give us the proof that we are so.

the objects recommended for notice and provision. The result, as respected the debts, was prompt and fortunate. The First Consul gave him the fullest assurance, that they should be equitably settled and honorably discharged.

Nor can it be reasonably doubted, but that Mr. Livingston's remonstrances on the subject of our right of deposit at New Orleans, and a territorial cession of a part of Louisiana to the United States, made as already stated on the 11th of December 1802, had their influence on the subsequent decisions of the French cabinet—a conclusion, that Mr. Monroe himself could not have resisted, if he had taken the trouble to compare the language and arguments employed by Mr. Livingston on that occasion, with those offered by the First Consul, when, on the 22d of March and 10th April, he *manifested his intention of ceding Louisiana to the United States.* (1) The better to comprehend the force of this comparison, it may be necessary to subjoin the following extracts from Mr. Livingston's letter above mentioned, and the details given by the French minister, Barbe de Marbois, of the motives which induced Napoleon to adopt the project of a cession. "I am going to propose" says Mr. Livingston (in a note to Mr. Talleyrand) "what I believe to be the true policy of France to adopt, and what will fulfil all her views; at the same time that it will be a means of conciliating the affection of the United States and securing the permanency of the settlement.

"1st. France shall cede to the United States *that part of Louisiana which is above the mouth of the river Arkansas;* there will thus be interposed between the French part and Canada, a barrier, without which the province might be easily attacked and lost to France before the arrival of assistance. (2)

"2d. France shall cede to the United States *West Florida, New Orleans and the territory on the left bank of the Mississippi.* This cession is only valuable to the Americans, inasmuch as it gives them the embouchure of the Mobile and other small rivers which pass through their territory, and would calm their anxiety respecting the Mississippi.

"If any other course be adopted, *the whole settlement will fall into the hands of the English, who at the same time that they command the sea, have within reach a warlike colony possessing all the means of attack;* and while the fleet blockades the harbors, they may without the least difficulty, cause New Orleans to be attacked through Canada, by fifteen or twenty thousand men, aided by hordes of Indians.

"France by seizing on a wilderness and an insignificant city, and *thus throwing the United States into the scale on the side of England,* is going to make this power the mistress of the new world: the possession of Louisiana and of Trinidad, will put the Spanish colonies at her mercy; and by taking away the Floridas from Spain

(1) P. 260 Marbois' History of Louisiana. (2) This passage contains the first intimation given by any functionary of the United States of a desire on their part, to purchase any portion of Louisiana, on the western side of the Mississippi.



“ and getting possession of the gulph of Mexico, she will command the West Indies; *the two Indies will then pour their treasures into her ports, and the precious metals of Mexico, united with the treasures of Hindostan, will furnish the means of buying nations, whose forces she will employ to secure her power.*” (1)

About the middle of March, a note from Lord Hawkesbury, (substantially refusing to withdraw the British army from Malta) was transmitted to Paris, and being there considered as deciding, affirmatively, the question of the renewal of war, drew from the first Consul, the following sentiments, addressed to his council of state, in a private conference held at the Thuilleries.—“ Leave commerce and navigation in the exclusive possession of a single people and the globe will be subjected by their arms and by the *gold which supplies the place of arms.* To emancipate nations from the commercial tyranny of England, it is necessary *to balance her influence by a maritime power, that may one day become her rival; that power is the United States.* The English aspire to dispose of all the riches in the world. I shall be useful to the whole universe, if I can prevent their *ruling America as they rule Asia.*” Again: on the 10th of April, he said, “The English have successively taken from France, Canada, Cape Breton, New Foundland, Nova Scotia and the richest portions of Asia. They have now twenty ships of war in the gulph of Mexico, and sail over those seas as sovereigns. The conquest of Louisiana would be easy, if they only took the trouble to make a decent there. I have not a moment to lose in putting it out of their reach. I wish, if there is still time, to take from them any idea which they may have of ever possessing that colony. *I think of ceding it to the United States.* They only ask of me one town in Louisiana, but I already consider the colony as entirely lost, and it appears to me that, *in the hands of this growing power, it will be more useful to the policy, and even to the commerce, of France, than if I should attempt to keep it.*” (2) These extracts, made from a work of admitted authority, abundantly show the *co-incidence* to which we alluded; and even prove, that *Napoleon's determination to sell, was taken on considerations, substantially identical with those, which Mr. Livingston, (to produce this very effect) had submitted to the French Cabinet, as early as the 11th of the preceding December.*

We need scarcely remark, that with the First Consul, to resolve, was nearly the same thing as to execute; and having now made his decision, he at daybreak on the 11th, called his minister plenipotentiary and gave him the following orders: “I renounce Louisiana. It is not only *New Orleans I will cede, but the whole colony without reservation.* I direct you to negotiate this affair with the Envoys of the United States. *Do not even wait the arrival of Mr. Monroe, and have an interview this very day with Mr. Livingston.* If

(1) Mr. Livingston to Mr. Tallayrand, 4th Dec. 1802. (2) P. 263-4, Marbois' Hist. of Louisiana.

" I should regulate my terms, according to the value of these vast regions, to the United States, the indemnity would have no limits. " I will be moderate: I want *fifty millions*, and for a *less sum I will not treat.*" Mr. Marbois lost no time in entering on these new duties. As directed, he saw Mr. Livingston on the 11th, and declared himself openly on the three objects of the proposed negotiation: 1st. The entire cession of Louisiana: 2d. The price to be paid for it; and 3d. The amount of indemnity to be granted to American citizens, for spoliations committed on their property by French cruizers. On the first of these subjects he said, " I am authorised to sell the whole of Louisiana and not a part. On the second and third, " I am restricted also, but give us sixty millions of francs and assume the debt due by us to your citizens of twenty millions, and I will see what may be done." (1)

Such was the state of the business on the 11th, when as Mr. Marbois tells us, information was *first* received of Mr. Monroe's landing at Havre. (2) But a fact still more important to the purposes of this investigation is, that after this minister's arrival at Paris, which did not take place until the 12th, neither his presence nor his labors, produced the smallest possible change in these decisions. " As soon," says Mr. Marbois, " as the negotiation was entered upon, the American ministers declared, that they were ready to treat on the footing of the cession of the *entire colony*; and did not hesitate to take on themselves *the responsibility of augmenting the sum that they had been authorised to offer.*" The reasons which governed them, in thus promptly assenting to the terms proposed by the French negotiator, were (according to a statement of Mr. Monroe, made to the American Secretary of State on the 7th of June, 1803) of a character so imperative, as left them without a choice. " We found" he says, " that Mr. Marbois was *absolutely restricted to the disposition of the whole* [province,] and of course, that it was *useless to urge it.* [the sale of a part.] Again: " the first proposition made to us [as to price] was, that we should pay *eighty millions*, sixty in cash and the *balance to our citizens*, and the whole in one year, and from *the quantum he never would depart.*"

Here then is proof the most conclusive, derived as well from Mr. Monroe's own official letter, as from Mr. Marbois' narrative of the negotiation, that the endeavors of the former, whatever they may have been, altogether failed in making any change in the *principles* of the treaty, as announced to his colleague, the day preceding his own arrival in Paris. Nor shall we find, that in what followed and was merely technical, this minister's agency was either more active or more useful. He was willing to take the *form*, as he had already taken the *substance* of the treaty from the French negotiator, (3) and on the 30th of April, the draft prepared by this functionary, with

(1) P. 277 Marbois' Louisiana and Mr. Livingston's letter to Mr. Madison, 13th of April, 1803. (2) P. 278, Marbois' Louisiana. (3) Marbois' history of Louisiana, p. 283.

a single and unimportant alteration, (1) was executed by the three plenipotentiaries. (2)

It does not however follow, that because a public agent has been unable to do good, that he on the same occasion, has been unwilling to do mischief. If the atmosphere of Paris was, in 1794, unfriendly to either the moral sense, or sound discretion of Mr. Monroe, it was scarcely less so in 1803. His disorder, at the former of these epochs, led him to give assurances to the French Government, that if on experiment, they found the spoliation of our commerce convenient to them, they might safely multiply and prolong it; as the people and government of the United States, would not only bear it patiently, but be *delighted* by having their friendship and attachment to the Great Nation, so tested. So in 1803, when his colleague, after many trials and much trouble, had obtained a promise of prompt and substantial justice (for the very wrongs which his [Mr. Monroe's] conduct had no tendency to restrain or diminish) and when at last, the French government was in a condition and humour to fulfil its engagement, what was the creed and the conduct of our Envoy Extraordinary?—To *disavow all approbation of that provision in the treaty, which gave to American citizens twenty millions out of the eighty*, (the price of Louisiana;) and to express an opinion that “*the whole sum should have been paid into the French Treasury.*” To relieve his anxiety on this score, his colleague hastened to assure him in a letter of the 25th of November, that in his reply to the Secretary of State, “*he would charge himself with the whole responsibility of this act.*” (3)

The next theatre on which we discover our Plenipo- itinerant and Extraordinary, is the court of Spain,—whither his patron had sent him to complete his arrondissement of fame and wages. The man or the minister, who accomplishes one half of his objects, has little reason to complain, and such was the case of Mr. Monroe at Madrid. He got the wages, but the fame escaped him. (4) Returning

(1) Substituting *stock for cash*—a mere pro forma business,—as that great alchemist, Alexander Barring, was on the spot and prepared to commute the paper into gold and silver.

(2) Yet with a full knowledge of all these facts, Mr. Monroe publicly asserted, in his last letter to Congress on the subject of his claims, that “*nothing was done, nor intended to be done in the opinion of the First Consul, until his arrival, and that whatever was accomplished afterwards, was attributable to his mission.*” See pages 9, 10, of his letter.

(3) Mr. Livingston to Mr. Monroe, 25th of November, 1803, “*You mention a fact of which I was then, and till the receipt of your letter, continued to be totally ignorant, viz:—“that it was your sentiment, that the twenty millions, should have been paid to the French government, rather than to our citizens.*”

(4) Mr. Adams asserts, that much ability was shewn in this abortive negotiation by Mr. M. and his colleague Mr. P. Does he forget, or has he overlooked the *admission* to be found in Mr. M's preliminary letter to Talleyrand—“*that we had bought from France, only what France had bought from Spain?*” By this admission, the question became one, not of construction, but of fact. It was no longer, what the terms of the treaty of St. Ildefonso would warrant us in demanding? but how those terms were understood by the parties to that instrument? Spain denied, that she had ceded West Florida to France; and France denied, that she had either sold, or intended to sell to us, more than she had bought from Spain. Such was the *Pons Asinorum*, which stopped the progress of Mr. M. and his colleague at Madrid. By the way—the construction given to the treaty of St. Ildefonso on which the United States so long and pertinaciously relied and which Mr. Madison's ingenuity made so plausible—was a suggestion of Mr Livingston's, submitted by him to his government and adopted by it, but to which Mr. M. for some time, refused his assent. See Mr. L's official correspondence with Mr. Madison in the Spring of 1803.

to London in the spring, or summer of 1805, he entered upon a new and highly interesting negociation with the British cabinet; and in his haste to do something, concluded a treaty which his own government peremptorily rejected:—a fact the more extraordinary in itself, as the instructions given him in 1804, and repeated in 1806, left no room for misconception. The following is an extract from them:—  
 “The importance of an effectual remedy for this practice [*impress-*  
 “*ment*] derives urgency from the licentiousness with which it is still  
 “pursued. So indispensable is some adequate provision for the case,  
 “that the President makes it *a necessary preliminary, to any stipula-*  
 “*tion requiring a repeal of the act, shutting the market of the*  
 “*United States against certain British manufactures.*” The ne-  
 gociation opened on the 26th of August 1806, and ended in a treaty  
 of amity, commerce and navigation, on the 31st December following.  
 A letter of the 27th of that month from Messrs. Monroe and Pinckney,  
 preceded this instrument, and thus announced its character and ap-  
 proach. “We have the pleasure to acquaint you, that we have this  
 “day agreed with the British commissioners to conclude a treaty *on*  
 “*all the points which had formed the object of our negociation;* and  
 “on *terms,* which we trust our government will approve. It will  
 “require only a few days to reduce it to form. When that is done,  
 “we shall transmit it to you by a special messenger. We hasten to  
 “communicate to you this interesting intelligence; for the information  
 “and *guidance of our government,* in such measures as may have  
 “reference to the subject.”

A letter, in terms thus assured and self-complacent, could not fail to deceive. It was received by the President in full faith, that what was asserted, was true—that *all the points in discussion,* were at last settled in a way the government could approve; and, in this faith, was communicated by him to congress. Judge then of his surprise and mortification, on receiving the treaty itself, and on finding *the leading point of impressment,* entirely omitted, and the instrument otherwise so objectionable, as to forbid the ordinary measure of submitting it to the Senate! What was the result? Why, that this diplomatic chef-d’œuvre, of twenty nine articles, from which he had hoped so much, and which he had forwarded by a special messenger for the information and *guidance* of the government, was sent back with a long list of minor objections, which might be got over, and one nearly as long, of others which were deemed *insuperable.* Such was the last of Mr. Monroe’s missions to Europe. And on which of these, we ask, is it, that any intelligent and unprejudiced enquirer, would rest the evidence of that *universally acknowledged ability,* and *deep self-devotion to the interests of his country,* which the Eulogist ascribes to his patron and predecessor? Not surely, on his willingness to leave England, in the exercise of her cruel and illegal doctrine of *impressment?* Not, on his avowed opinion, that the twenty millions of francs, made payable by the treaty of 1803, to American sufferers under French spoliation, should have been left to swell the French

treasury? Not on the support he gave to the impudent pretensions of the French Bureau, to be made acquainted with the contents of Mr. Jay's treaty, even before the instrument had been submitted to the inspection of his own government? Not, on his avowed policy of conniving at the robberies, committed by French cruizers on the legitimate commerce of the United States? And most assuredly not, on his repeated efforts to divert Washington from that system of *neutrality*, which he had so wisely adopted—and by a strict adherence to which he had been able, like a second Moses, to lead his people safely through the Red Sea of crime and misery, connected with the French Revolution?

4. At pages 72-3, we find the following passage. "It may suffice to say, that until the war broke out and during its continuance, the duties of the offices held by Mr. Monroe, at the head successively of the Departments of State and War, were performed *with untiring assiduity, with universally acknowledged ability and with a zeal of patriotism, which counted health, fortune, and life itself, for nothing in the ardor of self devotion to the cause of his country.* It is a tribute of justice to his memory to say, that *he was invariably the adviser of energetic councils; nor is the conjecture hazardous that had his appointment to the Department of War preceded by six months its actual date, the heaviest disaster of the war, would have been spared, as a blotted page in the annals of our Union.*"

Of Mr. Monroe's *management* of the State Department, we shall say nothing; believing as we do, that *this* was merely nominal, and that every thing important coming from it was so revised and altered by Mr. Madison, as (in the famous case of Sir John Suckling's stockings,) to make it doubtful, whether enough of the original labor was left, to give the Secretary any degree of claim to the production as amended. Thus restricted in our object, we proceed to an examination of his ministry of the *War Department*. It has not been forgotten, that after a few months trial of Dr. Eustis' war directing faculties, that gentleman was invited to withdraw, and make room for Mr. Monroe; of whose aptitude for military business, an experiment was also to be made. If the armour of Achilles fitted the Colonel, he was destined to wear it—but if on the other hand, it was found to be neither adapted to his shape nor his size, or too cumbrous for his strength, in either or in all of these cases, he was in his turn, to lay it aside, and re-invest himself in the less splendid, but safer habiliments of the State Department. A short trial, satisfied at once the incumbent and his friends, that this new vocation was neither suited to his talents, his knowledge, nor his views. Besides the intrinsic objections, arising from the variety and importance of its duties, it was seen that a prompt, steady and impartial execution of these, without which the progress and end of the war must be alike unsuccessful, had no tendency either to make a man popular, or to keep him so. (1)

To an ambitious and calculating aspirant, (already the heir apparent ex-officio of the Presidency) this circumstance alone, would probably

(1) "I much regretted your acceptance of the War Department. Not that I know a person who I think would better conduct it: But conduct it ever so wisely, it will be a sacrifice of yourself. Were an angel from heaven to undertake that office, all our miscarriages would be ascribed to him. Raw troops, no troops, insubordinate militia, want of arms, want of money, want of provisions, all will be charged to want of management in you. No Generals have yet an interest in shifting their own incompetence on you, no army agents, their rogueries." Letters to Mr. Monroe, p. 246 vol. 4 of Jefferson's correspondence.

have been a sufficient dissuasive; but what left him no hesitation on the subject, was the farther discovery—that in all cases of improvidence in the Government, incapacity in its Generals, or inefficiency in its troops, the Secretary of the War Department was to be selected as the victim on whom the sins of the whole people were to be laid and expiated. He accordingly about the 23d of February 1813, retired to the asylum prepared for him.

But, though the period of this first incumbency, was short—it was one of no small or ordinary interest to the United States—involving the organization of a general staff—the creation of a new and competent code of military rules and regulations—the means best calculated for completing the rank and file of the army—the instructions to be given to the general officers and others, with regard to the future conduct of the war; and lastly—the measures to be adopted for giving to important and exposed places, an increased security. Now we ask—to what extent and in what manner, were these several duties performed by Mr. Monroe? What, for instance, under the last of these heads, did he either do, or suggest, for placing the metropolis of the union, beyond the reach of injury or insult? To this question we answer—nothing! And how is conduct so extraordinary to be explained? Was it that the example of three successive administrations which had hitherto neglected this object, outweighed the present belligerent policy of the union? Was it that the liability of the Capitol to attack, was less apparent in 1812, than in 1814? Was it that this early stage of the contest, was deemed less proper for *defensive* measures, than one of later date? Was it that the enemy's occupation in Europe furnished a sufficient shield against his enterprises here? Had the uses, formerly made by the British of that great Estuary the Chesapeake, and its tributary streams, been lost sight of? Can it be possible, that they who so well remembered the prudential lessons taught by the revolution, should have forgotten the losses and humiliations inflicted on their native state, by two small British corps, under Arnold and Cornwallis—and which could only be terminated by the interposition of Washington and the combined French and American armies in 1781? However these questions be answered, the fact was as we have stated it—*nothing* was either done or *projected*, for the *increased security of the seat of Government, during Mr. Monroe's first direction of the War Department.*

With respect to the other subjects, enumerated in the preceding paragraph, and requiring, on the part of the Secretary, the most prompt attention, but *two* of them were permitted to occupy his thoughts; and on these, his decisions were palpably wrong and extensively mischievous. We allude to the *expedient* employed for increasing the army; and to the *carte-blanche*, given to General Harrison to continue his winter-crusade on the elements and the Treasury. On each of these points, some detail may be necessary.

1st. The losses arising from sickness, desertion, capture and death, sustained by the army during the summer and autumn of 1812, sufficiently indicated the necessity of immediately employing means for filling up the chasms thus created in its rank and file. But though each monthly return furnished a new and increased admonition to promptitude, so tardily did this business go on, that it

was not till the 29th of January, 1813, that any definitive act was taken by the Government upon it. This delay was generally, perhaps justly, ascribed to a want of decision in the War Department—whose duty it was to investigate and recommend the means, best adapted to accomplish the purpose. Of those under deliberation, but two are worthy of notice—the one, proposing an immediate recurrence to the revolutionary policy of classing and drafting the militia, which should, from time to time, supply all losses sustained by the Regiments already authorised by law;—the other, the creation of a new and distinct corps of twenty thousand men, destined to *local* defence, and engaged for the service of a *single* year—with pecuniary inducements, little, if at all, inferior to those proffered to recruits for the more permanent corps. The question of preference, between these two plans, was at last decided by the acting Secretary—who, in despite of all his revolutionary lessons, adopted the *latter*,—not because it was the *cheapest*, the most *efficient*, or the *safest*, but because its rival “was less likely to be acceptable to the people.” (1)

2d. When in December 1812, Mr. Monroe took the direction of the War Department, the campaign in the West (begun and prosecuted against all the admonitions of wisdom and experience) (2) though now degenerated into a hopeless struggle with bad roads and inclement weather—was still pending. The General to whom the direction of it had been given, under some new and special revelation of military principles, had not only divided his army (intended to act *offensively*) into *three* corps—but had so located these, that in the event of an attack, they could not by any possible exertion sustain each other;—and what was yet more extraordinary, had selected a position on the west bank of the Miami, 70 miles in front of his own head quarters, as the *site of his magazines*, and was now hurrying thither the million of rations without which he thought it imprudent to go on with the enterprise. The custody of this *sine qua non*, was given to his advanced corps; now reduced by fatigue, sickness, and hunger, to less than 1000 combatants; (3) destitute alike of fortification or cannon, and twenty miles nearer to the enemy’s main body, than to their own. Yet was Mr. Harrison, under these circumstances meditating, and *actually ordering*, a *farther reduction of this diminished corps*, for the *laudable purpose of saving a few cents, on the transportation of the rations, necessary to keep*

(1) “The Session is, I fear too far advanced for any of the changes you suggest in the law for raising 20 additional Regiments. The *conscription* principle was suggested by Col. Cushing, and considered by the Acting Secretary as the true one—but was laid aside by him from an apprehension, that it would be *unpopular in practice*.” I am &c.

D. R. WILLIAMS,  
Ch. Mil. Committee.

Secretary of War.

(2) “The Army of Gen. Wayne, after a whole summer’s preparation was unable to advance more than 70 miles from the Ohio, and the prudent caution of Gen. Washington placed it in Winter Quarters at the very season, that our arrangements were commenced.” Gen. Harrison’s official letter to the War Department of the 8th of December, 1812.

(3) See Winchester’s statements, &c.—McAffee’s History of the Late War, &c. page 189

*them alive.* (1) A state of things, more alarming in all its aspects, could not have arisen, and required, on the part of the Government, an interposition the most active and vigorous.

But instead of a peremptory order, either to re-enforce his advanced guard, or to withdraw it without a moment's delay—the Secretary satisfied his sense of duty, by writing a long letter to the General, beginning with compliments to his knowledge and judgment, and ending with a permission “to do what he pleased.” All know that it pleased that functionary to do nothing, and that the consequences of the two omissions (the Secretary's and the General's) were—the capture or slaughter of *Winchester's corps*—the conflagration of the supplies collected at the Rapids, and the General's own precipitate and ill-judged flight to the river Portage.

Mr. Monroe's second ministry of the War Department, began in September, 1814, and ending with the war, necessarily embraced the defences of *Plattsburgh* and *Baltimore*—the termination given to the Campaign on the *Niagara* and the defeat of the *British Army before New Orleans*. On this branch of our subject, we have therefore to examine—how far the agency, personal or official, of the new Secretary, was useful or otherwise, on these several occasions?

On this question, and in relation to the *first* and *second* of the events above mentioned, our enquiries, often and carefully made, result in the belief—that no direct aid, furnished by the advice or authority of Mr. Monroe, contributed to their successful issue. The gallant officer who commanded at *Plattsburgh* (though left in circumstances of great peril by General Izard) was not honored with any notice from the War Department, till fifteen days after his battle with Sir George Prevost, had been fought and won—when the Secretary transmitted to him an authority (which he had already possessed and exercised) of calling to his aid the New York and Vermont militia! Nor was the attention paid to the veteran charged with the defence of *Baltimore*, characterised by more of either efficiency or foresight. Both Commanders were, in fact, left to the use of means either previously accumulated, or directly produced, by the excitement and accidents of the times. Of this latter species, were the militia aids rendered in the north by Generals Moore and Strong; and in the south, by the Virginia Brigade of General Douglass—by several volunteer corps from Pennsylvania and Maryland, and by a formidable body of seamen brought from Philadelphia by Commodores Rodgers and Porter and whose presence at Washington, (had Secretary Jones better understood his duty) would, in all probability, have terminated General Ross's career on the heights of *Bladensburg*, or the vestibule of the Capitol.

With regard to the *third* event in our series, the following letter from the late Major General Brown is so full and clear, as to render all comment on our part unnecessary.

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(1) Harrison's letter of the 8th of December to the War Department.



Sackett's Harbour, November 23th, 1814.

MY DEAR SIR:

Here I am with the remains of my Division once more. The Fleet, that last summer shyed all co-operation with the Army and would pursue only the high destiny given to them by the Naval Secretary—have again, taken refuge in port, and not believing that its own force, and that of a regular garrison of near 1200 combatants, with the land batteries to back them—will afford a sufficient protection—have sounded the customary alarm at Washington, and to such purpose, that the new Secretary of War has called for the militia in mass of several populous counties, who were here and on their way here, to the tune of at least 6000 men. My first duty, on my arrival, was to investigate the reports on the credit of which an armament so large, and which will cost the United States from 3 to 400,000 dollars, was called out. The result of a careful and minute investigation was, that the enemy's force at Kingston, at no time during the present campaign, exceeded 3000 men—1,200 of whom were sent up the Lake to Drummond's assistance (37th and 90th Regiments) about ten days after General Izard's arrival in my camp. The balance is therefore but 1,800, who are more afraid of being attacked, than willing to make an attack on this place. Having ascertained these facts, I did not hesitate to do what I believed to be my duty—I dismissed this militia army to their own firesides, where I am sure they will be more useful as well as comfortable—have taken on my own shoulders the whole responsibility of the measure, and have written a respectful, but free letter to the Secretary, in the hope that it may hereafter put him on his guard against alarms as imaginary as the late one—and which are so troublesome to the militia and so exhausting to the treasury.

Of the conclusion of our campaign on the Niagara, you must already know all that has been published—but many things occurred in it that may not have reached you, and which I shall now mention. It was the 26th of September before Gen. Izard got to Batavia, where I found him on the 27th, and to my surprise, learnt from him, that his intention was to beseige Fort Niagara with his division, while I was to remain on the Canada side to watch and amuse Drummond. With this view, he got on to Lewistown in the course of *nine* days—on the evening of the 5th of October, I took with me Gen. Porter, and made him a second visit. During this, we prevailed upon him to give up his absurd plan, which, however succesful, would have given him a useless fortress and a few convalescents and invalids, who made up the garrison—while to Drummond, it would give, what was to him all-important, *time to get up his expected re-inforcements and supplies from Kingston*. It was now determined, that we should cross the Niagara and concentrate our whole force on Drummond's position. This was done on the 10th and 11th. The army being now concentrated and being in high spirits and discipline, and little short of double the number of the enemy—I now proposed to at-

tack Drummond, *who had neither received as yet, reinforcements or supplies*, and who, as our information stated—was even *badly off for ammunition*. The plan was simple and sure—viz: that while one of the divisions turned his right and compelled him to change his front—forego the use of some of his redoubts and fight a battle with a deep and rapid river in his rear—the other should pass the stream that separated them from his left, and by a rapid assault on that side, compel him to a ruinous retreat or a speedy surrender. To this proposal, he gave rather a reluctant assent, but he did give one; when I set out to make some necessary preparations, but before concluding them, I was recalled and informed, that on further reflection, he had changed his mind and determined to act on the *defensive*; and that to this change of opinions, he was led by two great considerations—the *eminent danger that threatened the fleet*, now that it was driven into port; and the *importance of keeping the strength of the army entire for the next campaign*. (1)

Being now satisfied, that all active service on the Straight was at an end, and that the strength of Drummond's army was to be kept entire, as well as that of our own, for the next campaign; I asked permission to march the remains of my division to this place, in the safety of which I felt more than an ordinary interest. This request was immediately granted, and on the 20th, I accordingly took my departure and was followed by Gen. Winder and the division on the 24th.

In the whole of Gen. Izard's conduct with regard to the projected co-operation against Drummond, we have evident signs of an indisposition to fulfil the orders you gave him—nothing could be more unwise, or unfounded, than the preference he gave to the round-about route by Lake George, Glenn's falls &c. instead of the direct one by Chateaugay to the Harbor, unless it was the two pretences under which he did it—the *want of money* in the hands of the Quarter Master, and the *dread*, that the *enemy had already beset that route and would cut him to pieces on the road*. (2) Mr. Parish offered to supply the first; and Major Brown, who had travelled the road to his camp at Champlain, was able to assure him, that no enemy would be found upon, or near it; but notwithstanding this, he adhered to a route, that nearly doubled the distance, and of course, the time necessary to travel it. At setting out, his belief was, that Prevost would anticipate him and push on reinforcements to save Drum-

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(1) In the General's letter of the 16th of October, to Mr. Monroe, we find a third reason for his *pacific and conservative* system, viz: that "he could discern no object [on the Niagara] worthy of the risk which would follow any attempt to obtain it." And this he says, when at the head of nearly 7000 combatants and in the front of an enemy, little, if at all, exceeding 3000 men! It is not on this occasion, improper to remark, that the defeat and capture of Drummond and his army in the month of October, would have done more to produce a peace—than six months talking of our five commissioners at Ghent. Even Mr. Monroe is compelled to say, in his letter of the 24th of October: "If it be practicable to *demolish the army before you* (and Gen. Brown shews that it was so) it would certainly be a *happy event*. The good effects of it would be felt through the whole Northern and Western frontier—along the coast [of the Atlantic] and in Europe.

(2) See Gen. Izard's letter of the 23d of August, —14.

mond; but a despatch from the former to the latter, fell into the hands of Col. Mitchell, who immediately sent it to him—by which he found, that he had yet *full time to reach the Harbor and execute your orders at the head of the Lake*, before any re-inforcement could reach Drummond. Yet of this circumstance he did not avail himself. On getting to Sackett's Harbor he found the fleet was out—but Chauncey soon got in, and offered to carry him directly to his object; after manœuvring a good deal to get from the Commodore something that would furnish him with an excuse for disobedience—and failing in this, he, the very night before he sailed, came under the most solemn promise to Gen. Swartwout, that he would proceed to execute exactly your plan of campaign—believing that the *best and most important consequences would follow*. (1) Yet after sleeping on this promise, he broke it—landed at the Genesee and as we have seen, made no haste in joining me.

I should not perhaps have gone into these details at present, but from a curious circumstance which occurred shortly before the General's arrival on the Niagara and which if taken literally, will lead to some strange conjectures on the policy and conduct of some of our great men at Washington, as well as on those of Major Gen. Izard. The story is substantially as follows—Col. Snelling, late of General Izard's Staff and entirely in his confidence, came on here as his forerunner from Champlain, and asserted without any qualification whatever, that *Gen. Izard would not co-operate, as ordered, with my division—that he disapproved the whole plan* (2) and had a *patron in the Cabinet, who could and would protect him in this act of disobedience*—as he had already done, when the Gen. refused to fortify Rouse's point, though ordered to do so by you. (3) This person and patron, he added was *Mr. Monroe*, the Secretary of State—whose confidential letters to Gen. Izard he [Snelling] had seen and read. My first impression was, that Snelling was directed to hold out this language, hoping that it might induce me to abandon my po-

(1) Letter from Gen. Izard to Gen. Brown. (2) There was a moment, but only a moment, when Gen. Izard's head was sufficiently clear, to obtain a glimpse of the advantages of the plan prescribed to him. In his letter of the 13th of September to Gen. Brown, he says—"should nothing intervene to alter my destination, I will proceed to the head of the lake and place myself in the rear of the British forces in your front. Should the reinforcements destined to the enemy not join him before we land," [and it was more than a month after the date of this letter before they did join him] "*the happiest consequences may result from this movement.*"

(3) During the early part of the campaign, Commodore McDonough recommended to his proper Department an *increase of naval means on Lake Champlain* and (should that be inconvenient or impracticable) that a *fortification at the Narrows* should be substituted for it; which with the aid he could afford, would have the effect of *shutting up the British fleet in the Sorrel*. Mr. Jones, having declined to adopt the first suggestion, sent the Commodore's letter to General Armstrong, who immediately directed Izard to occupy and fortify *Rouse's Point*. The Gen. disapproving the plan, quite as much as he did that for capturing Drummond—gave no public attention to the order—thought a battery on *Cumberland head*, would better answer the purpose of shutting up the British fleet in the Sorrel, and *secretly* requested his friend Mr. Monroe to obtain for this opinion, the sanction of the President. The sanction, was given in the same secret way in which the request had been made—and the Secretary of War was thus left to confide in a work, that never was executed. It is to this transaction that Gen. Brown alludes in the letter making part of the text.

sition, and cross the Niagara, and by so doing, furnish some plausible ground for Izard's intended plan of doing nothing. More acquaintance with Snelling, induces me to think differently, and to believe the facts to have been just as he stated them and without intention to deceive me into such a movement. I shall probably after a while, go on to Washington and shall not neglect seeing you as I go along. Believe me, &c.

GEN. ARMSTRONG.

JACOB BROWN.

To this document we shall but add a single paragraph, from Gen. Izard's letter of the 20th of October, 1814; which will be found to verify at once, the extent and value of Mr. Monroe's patronage during the late war; and the total want of both judgment and justice, with which, on this occasion, it was exercised. It is in the following words—"It is *exceedingly satisfactory to find*, that *my conduct has met the approbation of the President, and your own.* There are few attractions in our career: the reward that I have it most at heart to obtain is, (with the consciousness of having done my duty) *the applause of the government which employs me, and of the honest and independent portion of the community.*"

We may here safely conclude, that the preceeding cases furnished no sufficient ground for any new claim, on the part of the Secretary, to national favor—nor, indeed, have we any satisfactory evidence, that he made the events in question, a pretext for setting up such claim. Whether this forbearance was the result of a sense of justice or a matter of mere calculation, cannot now be either well, or readily, ascertained. Selfishness the most rapacious, will occasionally listen to the demands of equity; and the wildest ambition, sometimes attempt to cover itself under the mask of modesty and moderation. On this point therefore, our decision must be conjectural; and, but amounts to this—that on examination, the honors hitherto gained, were in the opinion of the Secretary, neither sufficiently brilliant nor abundant, to justify the risk of a contest for them.

Such could not however be the conclusion, with regard to the laurels won in the great and finishing act of the war;—the *spolia opima*, of a *commander slain* and an *army routed*; forming, at once, the pride of the nation, the glory of the winner, and a title to all that *freemen* could give, or a *freeman* accept. A state of things so extraordinary and unexpected, and of such doubtful operation on the great object of the Secretary's ambition [a succession to the Presidency] could not fail to embarrass that functionary. The first project resorted to was, to break down the fame of one, who might probably become a rival; and, with this view, *the records of the Seminole War*, were, for the *first* time, carefully examined and weighed; but the result, appearing to be doubtful, if not dangerous, this expedient was exchanged for another—that of so practising on public opinion, through executive, and other government-channels; as to create a belief, that the *eventual success of the General*, was but a *natural and*

*necessary consequence, of the skill, activity and foresight of the Secretary.* To give color to this pretension, it was boldly asserted—that New Orleans had been twice won by the adroitness and vigor of Mr. Monroe—first by negotiation with France in 1803; and again in 1814, by the wisdom and promptitude, with which he provided the means and directed the measures, necessary for the safety of the city. (1) Let us briefly examine these pretensions.

1st. His agency in producing the treaty of Paris of 1803, has been already discussed, and shewn to have been wholly *inoperative*; inasmuch, as Bonaparte, *before Mr. Monroe's arrival in Paris*—(and on reasoning, employed by Mr. Livingston as far back as December 1802)—*had determined to sell Louisiana to the United States*—*had declared the terms on which he would do so*—*had directed M. Marbois to open the negotiation* instanter with Mr. Livingston, and “*without even waiting the arrival of Mr. Monroe,*” and lastly—inasmuch, as Mr. Monroe, *after his arrival* either did not attempt to obtain any change in the terms offered to his colleague, or entirely failed to obtain an alteration of them. Such was the character and fate of Mr. Monroe's diplomacy in 1803;—leaving to him a credit only (which the horses that brought him from Havre to Paris, shared in common with himself) of being the *bearer of a despatch*, authorising a negotiation, on the part of the United States, for the purchase of the Floridas, &c.

2d. The important services said to have been performed in 1814 in defence of New Orleans and ascribed to Mr. Monroe, are made to rest on the following assumptions—1st, that foreseeing the impending storm, and desiring in Jackson the qualities best fitted to repel it, he hastened to select him from the crowd—despatched him to the South and vested him with the command of district No. 7. 2d, that with a similar degree of circumspection and diligence, he supplied the Gen. with men, arms, ammunition and other articles, useful and necessary to the service; and 3d, that *money* being also indispensable, yet apparently unattainable by ordinary means, (as the Treasury, at this epoch, was known to be *empty* and the nation believed to be *insolvent*) he did not hesitate, though already burthened with the duties of *two* departments, to take on himself the great and essential functions of a *third*; and by an effort of personal credit, founded on the well known extent of his property and the proverbial punctuality with which he discharged all his pecuniary engagements—he soon and triumphantly supplied the great desideratum of the crisis and the country, and thus verified at once and in no small degree, the fables of Atlas and Cræsus;—carrying the nation on his back, and converting into gold whatever he touched.

How lamentable that a picture so impressive, of foresight, judg-

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(1) Mr. Monroe's pretensions stated substantially as above, (and given on the faith of declarations made by *himself* and Mr. James Brown, formerly a Senator from New Orleans and more recently a Minister resident of the United States at Paris) appeared in a New York Journal, after the war.

ment, efficiency and patriotism, should be merely a dream of empty pretension; altogether unsupported by facts, and evidently got up to lessen the lustre of achievements, with which he well knew no action of his own life—(not even that which covered him with glory at Trenton) (1) could bear the smallest comparison. That this judgment is neither hasty nor uncharitable, will be sufficiently shewn by the following details—

1st. General Jackson's designation to the command of District No. 7, (of which New Orleans made a part) took place in May 1814; and so far from being a measure of Mr. Monroe's suggesting, was not even fortunate enough, when adopted, to meet his approbation. His eye, like that of the President, was directed to *him*, who by some strange perversion of language and ideas, has been denominated the Washington of the West. (2)

2d. Mr. Monroe's *foresight* with regard to the views of the enemy and the means best adapted to defeat them, was even less judicious, than would have been his selection of a commander. The British Cabinet, in forming it's project of campaign for 1814 (of which the capture of New Orleans was the principal object) was thoroughly apprised of the importance of giving such occupation to the militia of Tennessee and Georgia, on their respective frontiers, as would have the effect of depriving Louisiana of those means of defence, which otherwise, would be directed to her security. To this end therefore, were detached from the West Indies, (in the month of June) British agents and troops, who found in the town and harbor of Pensacola, a position in all respects favorable to their purposes; and what was neither less convenient or useful, a government, nominally *neutral*, but perfectly willing to supply their wants, and secretly disposed, perhaps instructed, to promote their designs. With such objects and under such auspices, the work of mischief

(1) Lieutenant Monroe "bleeding in all his glory at Trenton." Query—Is it a fact that he lost a drop of blood on that occasion? What documentary evidence have we of it? The Commander-in-Chief either knew nothing of it, or thought the injury too inconsiderable to be mentioned. No historian of the war ever heard of it, and what is yet more extraordinary, it appears to have entirely escaped the notice of the Daily and Weekly Chronicles of the Times. By the way—the Eulogist should have at least remembered the general character of the battle of Trenton—which was by no means remarkable for bloodshed. Gordon, says of it—"The Americans lost *about two* men, besides two or three frozen to death," the only officer *wounded* according to him, was Captain W. Washington.

(2) In May 1814, Gen. Jackson was appointed a Brigadier General in the Army of the United States. The commission sent to him, on this occasion, was accompanied by a promise, that he should fill the first vacancy occurring in the grade of Major General. A few days after this promise had been made and transmitted, Gen. Harrison's resignation was received at the War office, which furnished the means of immediately fulfilling the engagement above mentioned. Under the circumstances, the Secretary, (in the absence of the President who was then on a visit to his friends in Virginia,) considering the arrangement as settled, hastened to send the promised commission to the General. A letter from the President, received by the next post, corrected this error, and shewed, that he, (the President) had either forgotten the promise made to Gen. Jackson, or had considered its terms less obligatory, than Gen. A. had supposed them to be. In a conversation on this subject between the Secretaries (M. and A.) the former remarked, that the President's hesitation in this case, probably arose from a desire to ascertain, whether Gen. Harrison's objections to a continuance in the Army might not be removed, by giving him the command of District No. 7?

began. Partisans, of every name and complexion,—Hostile Indians, Runaway Negroes, Spanish Culprits and French Banditti, were alike invited and equally welcome to the British standard; and *fed, clothed, armed and drilled* for future service.

Such was the condition of things in Eastern Florida, when General Jackson, in the month of July, set out for the Alabama, to hold a treaty of peace with what remained of the hostile Creeks. During his journey thither, and while the treaty was pending, he received abundant evidence of the facts, stated in the preceding paragraph; and having no doubt, but that the measures, adopted by the enemy, were the precursors of some enterprise, of higher character and deeper interest than would attach to a mere border-war—he hastened to communicate to the Government the information he had acquired, and to seek from it such increase of authority, as would enable him to strike at Pensacola, as the measure *most obvious and efficient for crushing in the germ, the approaching evil*. Unfortunately, neither the General's report of facts, nor proposition founded upon it, was favorably received. "The latter" it was said, "could only be justified by the *correctness* of the former"—and of *this*, many doubts existed, founded, as is believed, on the deceptive diplomacy of the period. All therefore that the Secretary of War was permitted to say in reply was, that, "if, on full investigation, the patronage and aid, said to be afforded by Spanish authorities to British operations, were already established, as the result of a *spontaneous compliance*—in that case and *in that alone*, he might go on to execute the proposed attack." (1) Qualified as this new authority was, (and it will be seen that, by its express terms, it approached as nearly as possible to a prohibition to do any thing) it was believed to be dangerous; and though written, signed, sealed and despatched in the ordinary way, means were secretly employed to stop its farther progress; nor was it permitted to reach its destination, till the middle of January, 1815. (2) Whence it necessarily follows—that

(1) See Gen. Armstrong's letter of the 18th July, 1814.

(2) That the President had a right to stop the letter in question at any point of its progress, and to keep it out of sight as long as he pleased, never has been doubted; but in exercising this right, why should there have been any concealment? Why was not the Secretary made the instrument for stopping it, or rather for writing another expressly forbidding the projected enterprise? An open, no less than a decided course, was due as well to him as to the General and the more so, as they united in opinion not merely with regard to the expediency, but the necessity also of taking Pensacola. As the thing was managed, they were respectively subjected to the reproach of neglecting to do, what both were desirous of accomplishing. Jackson's opinions on this point are already sufficiently known. What those of General Armstrong were, will be found in the following extracts from his official correspondence of 1813.

War Dept. 24th July, 1813.

"If these [disturbances among the Creeks, affecting the peace of our Southern Frontier,] are found to be the result of Spanish, as well as British intrigue, and that the agents of the former give them nourishment and support, it will be an act of war, which may leave us at liberty to strike at Pensacola—a point which, from local and other circumstances, in my judgment, is essential to the safety of our frontier on the Gulf."

Major General Pinckney.

Sacketts Harbor, 26th Sept. 1813.

"By Gen. Flournoy's letter of the 27th of June—it appears that the Spanish Government of E. Florida, is determined to furnish us with sufficient cause of war. Such being the case,

the *agency of the Government*, so far as it went on this occasion, had the *direct effect of leaving to the enemy the undisturbed prosecution of his plan for rekindling an Indian war in the South.*

And is it, we ask, in a policy, thus timid and juggling, (of which Mr. Monroe was an active agent) that we are to look for evidences of that sagacity, which foresees the intentions of an enemy; or of that energy, which finds, or makes, the means best calculated to repel him?

3d. The regular force, assigned by Mr. Monroe's predecessor, for the defence of District No. 7, consisted of the 2d, 3d, 7th, 38th and 44th U. S. Regiments of Infantry and three companies of the corps of artillery. To these were added of *Militia drafts*—from Kentucky 5,500, from Tennessee 2,500, from Louisiana 1,000; and from the Mississippi Territory 500—making an aggregate of 9,500 troops, of the latter description. This arrangement, made and promulgated as early as the 4th of July, gave ample time for preparation and movement; but though General Jackson's Alabama report was followed by others, equally demonstrative of the hostile intentions and conduct of both British and Spanish authorities—so inveterate was the incredulity of the Cabinet, that no measure, in conformity to his views and in relation to either the attack on Pensacola or the security of New Orleans, was taken, *before the 27th of September.* On that day, the movement of the Kentucky and Tennessee militia, as designated in July, was directed by the new Secretary; but it will not be forgotten, that though the impediments to a rapid march, were greatly and fortunately lessened by physical and other causes, (1) not a man of the Kentucky corps, was able to reach the American camp, until after the invading army had placed itself within grasp of its object; and was only prevented from seizing it, by the interposition of a battle fought in the night against great odds, and by men, the majority of whom had been brought together exclusively by Gen. Jackson's influence. (2)

4th. Mr. Monroe's efforts to produce a physical force, (commensurate with the exigencies of the case,) being thus tardy, injudicious and inefficient, those adopted for equipping what of this species of force was assembled, were still more so. Though admonished by Jackson early in September, of the existing want of arms, tents, and camp kettles in District No 7, it was not until the 2d or 3d of November, that the Secretary found time to order a supply of these articles from the North. And even at that advanced period, instead of directing a speedy transmission of them, under the custody of a conductor amenable to military law, (which ought never to be omitted) the Secretary prescribed only, that "they should

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the force, assembling for the reduction of the hostile Creeks, will be competent to the reduction of Pensacola also. Should your decision authorise this course, I will have measures taken by Flournoy, which will soon place him within stroke of this object."

*The President of the U. S.*

(1) An uncommon rise in the Cumberland river. Eatons life of Jackson, p. 193.

(2) Coffee's Tennessee Volunteers. Idem pages 226 & 7.



be forwarded to the commanding officer at Baton Rouge"—leaving of course, to the knowledge and discretion of the store keeper at Pittsburgh, the entire control of the *time* and *manner*, of performing this important service. (1) Under pretext (professedly) of saving a few dollars to the U. S., but, more probably, for the purpose of securing to some friend or partner, a profitable job—the arms &c., were sent, not by a *Steamboat*, (which offered to convey and deliver them, quickly and safely) but by two River Traders, known to be in the practice of stopping at every landing place on the route, that offered a market for the sale of any part of the produce they carried. Fortunately, one of these vessels was fallen in with, on the Mississippi (in the month of December) by General Carroll, who soon found means to quicken her passage to New Orleans; and thus secured to the service, the use of such portion of the public supplies as had been confided to her conveyance. The other, carrying the remaining arms and left entirely to her commercial operations, did not reach her destination, until after the fate of the campaign was decided—a fact, which (according to General Jackson's estimate of its mischievous tendency) *deprived him of the means of capturing or destroying the whole British army.* (2)

5th. The last ground of distinction set up for Mr. Monroe, is the successful direction given to his *personal credit*, in aid of the Treasury Department, during the last months of 1814; and without which, the display made of courage and energy at New Orleans, would have been lost to the national glory.

This pretension, improbable in itself, is rendered utterly incredible, by what is known of the practice and principles of money lenders; by what is believed to have been the condition of Mr. Monroe's pecuniary means and credit, at that period; and lastly, by certain well authenticated historical facts, which have fallen under our notice, and of which we offer the following examples. The moment that the enemy's plans were so far developed, as left little if any doubt, but that New Orleans was their point of attack; the removal of the army from the neighborhood of Mobile to that place, became indispensable. But the means necessary for doing this, were wanting. Of actual funds in the hands of the Quarter Master, there were *none*; and of national credit, at that remote point of the Union, too little, to supply the want. In this dilemma, as in many others, Jackson was compelled, to look to his own resources and by *the use of his limited funds*, and *of loans effected on his personal responsibility*—he was enabled to move the army to the place of its destination. (3) Again: When, on the 27th of September, the Secretary

(1) The records of the War Dept. contain no *order* of Mr. Monroe's for a supply of arms—one is however presumed, because in a letter to Gov. Blount, he says—"an order for 5000 arms for the supply of the Tennessee and Kentucky militia, has been sent to Pittsburgh." It was not uncommon, to give Col. Wadsworth (then at the head of the Ordnance Dept.) *verbal orders* on the magazines, for arms &c.

(2) Jackson's letter of the 8th of Jan. 1815. (3) Eaton's life of Jackson, page 243.

directed the movement of the Kentucky militia to New Orleans, he entirely forgot, that money was at all necessary to give execution to the order. To supply an omission, so extraordinary in itself and so menacing to the campaign, a few patriotic individuals of that State came forward, pledged their names and property, raised the necessary funds and expedited the march of the troops. (1) And lastly, when from a change of season and the wear and tear, arising from sudden movements by night and by day, the summer dress of the army had ceased to furnish a comfortable covering, and had even become a fruitful source of disease among them—neither clothing, nor money to buy it, was found in the hands of any public agent of the War Department, at New Orleans. As in the former case, a provision against a circumstance of this kind, had entirely escaped the Secretary's revolutionary foresight, so that had it not been for the *interposition of the State Legislature*, (2) the army must have become useless, or have been permitted to clothe itself, at the expense of its morality and discipline.

With these details we terminate our remarks on the Eulogy—which, it may be thought, has, already, been permitted to occupy more of our attention, than either its own merit, or that of its subject, could justly have claimed.

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(1) Eaton's Life of Jackson, p. 266.

(2) *Idem*, p. 331.

Add to the first note (page 2,) relative to the committee appointed by the H. of R. on the disaster at Washington, that—their Report, of which the conclusion is here given, and the documents which are herein referred to, were published by order of Congress on the 29th of November, 1814.

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\* \* \* Circumstances, altogether personal and private, prevented the writer of the foregoing remarks from seeing the "Eulogium" to which they apply, for several months after its publication;—and others of a similar character, happening to the publisher since their reception, may have too long retarded their appearance:—but, with the judicious and unprejudiced, these facts will have no unfavorable bearing on either the statements or conclusions, to be found in the *Notice*.

Washington, 1832.







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