

中國經濟發展史

論文選集 上

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序

第二次世界大戰以後，貧窮國家（即經濟落後或開發中國家）忽然在國際上受到特別的重視，他們在新成立的聯合國中，佔了大多數，他們在美俄冷戰中，變為雙方爭取的對象。很多人認為他們的動向——是親俄或親美——與他們的經濟情況密切相關，即他們愈貧窮，則愈易向蘇俄看齊，走共產主義的路線。因此，他們的經濟發展問題，受到許多人的注意。同時，從人道立場來看，這些國家擁有世界上三分之二的人口，如何提高其生活水準，也值得大家關心。故貧窮國家的致富問題，無論在經濟先進國家或是在開發中國家，都一時成為學者們熱心研究的對象。而對這個問題的主要研究者——經濟學家——也帶來了一個新的挑戰。

研究貧窮國家的致富問題，本不是一個新的問題，遠在一七七六年亞當斯密司的「國富論」即已討論這個問題。不過自他以後，經濟學家興趣轉移到資源利用及所得分配問題。一九三〇年代，全世界鬧經濟不景氣，凱恩斯的一套理論應時而出，雖然其主要討論對象，是在如何提高整個國民

所得，但他的重點是在從如何避免經濟蕭條及如何增加就業率，增加國民所得；他的討論中心是經濟不景氣，而不是經濟發展。有些學者認為經濟循環與經濟成長息息相關，因而對經濟成長問題發生興趣。然而，他們只是重視經濟先進國家的成長問題，至於經濟落後國家的致富問題，却仍在經濟學家的研究主流之外。所以，直到一九五〇年代，經濟學家對貧窮國家之致富問題，仍欠研究，甚至連一本可充當大學用的教科書都找不到。

就是在這種情況下，經濟學家開始研究「開發中國家」的經濟發展問題。他們很自然地要問經濟富有國家究竟是如何才有今日的成就？為什麼他們會有「工業大革命」？又為什麼經濟落後國家則一直革不起這個命來？要想回答這些問題，就不能不往後看，那也就是不能不研究經濟發展史了。

經濟先進國家的經濟史，向來極爲人所重視，而今爲了進一步地了解經濟發展的過程，許多學者乃舊地重遊，從經濟發展角度，有系統的運用經濟理論及統計資料來重新整理經濟史。在這方面，顧志耐(Simon Kuznets)的研究結果，可算是成功的。此外，還有學者應用新興的經濟計量方法，重新研究經濟史。至此，研究經濟史的學者始受到了普遍的重視。

也就是在這種爲了了解經濟發展過程而致力於研究經濟史的風氣下，中國經濟史的研究，進入了一個新的階段。在美國推動這種研究的主要動力，就是美國哈佛大學的東亞研究中心。從一九五八年到現在，這個中心已出版了近百本關於中國近代史之專著，其中涉及近代經濟史者，不下二、三十本之多。

研究中國經濟史大致可分兩個階段：近代經濟發展史及近代以前經濟發展史。我們不必太計較「近代」到底是從甚

麼時候開始。有人用鴉片戰爭作分期點，這自然沒有什麼不可以；更重要的還是我國近代經濟的特徵，一般學者認為「近代」的主要定義是指我們的經濟開始發生了基本的改變，即從農業社會走向工業化，走向現代化。

到目前為止，雖然我們已有許多有關中國近代經濟史之研究與專著，可是對於中國近代經濟演變之了解仍只是個開始，甫入大門，需要進一步研究之處至多；諸如國民所得之估計，政府與經濟發展之關係，現代經濟部門與傳統經濟部門之關係，各種經濟制度的相關性，抗戰期間自由地區與淪陷地區經濟之演變，都是應該深入研究而尚未研究的問題。

研究中國經濟發展史，不管是近代部分，或是近代以前部分，我們不但要着重統計資料的整理，而且要運用經濟理論來解釋經濟現象。近年來關於經濟發展（現代化或工業化）的專著很多，同時也有許多新的經濟發展理論出現。研究中國近代經濟發展史的人，對於這些理論應該有深入的了解，拿中國近代經濟史當作一個經濟發展的實例。

研究中國近代以前的經濟更為重要，同時也更加困難。近代以前的中國經濟可以說是一個傳統經濟。現代經濟學家對於傳統經濟，尤其是非西方國家的傳統經濟很少研究，恐怕連「一知半解」的程度都不夠。我們知道，任何一個經濟理論或學說，其主要目的是在了解與推測經濟現象。若我們對傳統社會中的經濟現象一無所知，就是最有技巧的理論家，也是「英雄無用武之地」。中國不但有悠久的歷史，更可貴的是，擁有大量的史料。我們當前的第一任務是要好好的把這些寶貴資料，作有系統的整理並善加分析。尤其是在統計數字方面，更要特別下一番功夫。當然整理資料也不能憑空捏造，或毫無目的亂抄資料。即使我們還沒有大家所公認的理論來解釋傳統經濟，我們總還有一些理論來解釋一

個經濟如何從傳統經濟演變為現代經濟之過程。一般大學所開的「經濟發展」課程就是討論這個問題；這些理論仍可作為研究傳統經濟的出發點。

同時我們還有一大套所謂新古典 (neo-classical economics) 經濟學。這些新古典經濟理論雖然是針對有自由競爭的經濟制度而建立起來的，但其對中國之傳統經濟也許具有相當的解釋能力，起碼我們應該試一試。

研究中國近代以前的傳統經濟，不但可以幫助明瞭中國過去的經濟生活方式，同時也可使研究經濟發展理論的學者大開眼界，發現很多從來沒有聽見過的經濟現象；而研究中國經濟史很可能為經濟發展理論開闢一條新的路線出來。

在臺灣，關於中國經濟發展史的研究，近來受到了相當大的重視，這當然是可喜的現象。我們自己國家的經濟發展史，當然要首先由我們自己盡力去研究，這是責無旁貸的，願國人共勉之。

侯繼明

于宗先

民國六十八年六月

導言

劉翠溶

這一部「中國經濟發展史論文選集」主要是為大專院校學生修習有關課程作為參考讀物而編輯的。我們希望藉着收集在一起的便利，這部選集能夠提供讀者一些線索，在研讀前人的論文之後，能夠進一步自己發掘問題，探討研究，這才是編輯這部選集的旨趣所在。

這部選集收入中英文論文共四十二篇，不可能將現代中外學者對中國經濟史各方面之研究包羅無遺。這個限制主要來自兩方面：一則由於篇幅的關係，只能容納有限的篇數；二則由於涵蓋的時間是中國數千年的歷史，實不可能周顧每一時期每一專題。因此，這部選集之不完備是必然的。此外，本選集以論文為主，故對於已成書之專著，不再斷章截取。至於已成專集的論文，例如，全漢昇先生的「中國經濟史論叢」二冊和「中國經濟史研究」三冊，皆係最近出版，讀者不難閱取，故亦不再從中選錄。除了這些考慮之外，我們儘可能選取較富有啟發性的論文，以期能夠刺激讀者作進一步的研究。

由於上面所說的兩點限制，在編排上勢難細分時期和項目，因此，大體上就粗分為四部分，每一部分再按時間先後為序。以下就簡單的介紹各部分選錄的論文。

第一部分是方法及一般趨勢之探討，包括七篇論文。民國二十年代，我國學術界對於經濟史研究逐漸蔚成風氣，當時討論經濟史研究方法的文章，無論為翻譯西方學者論經濟史研究之作，或為本國學者對於研究中國經濟史之初步構想，均為數不多，而且我國學者多偏重於如何從史籍中整理出經濟史資料；嚴格地說，只是整理資料的方法，不是研究方法¹。同一時期，也有人努力想由經濟史之研究出發，把史學建立為一種科學，例如，陳嘯江曾擬作一部「比較經濟史導論」，但未成書²。總之，直至目前為止，關於中國經濟史研究之方法實尚未有系統之論著。這選集的第一篇，是楊聯陞先生對於中國經濟史上數字與單位之討論，提醒大家運用統計數字時應該注意的一些問題，可以說是一篇關於方法的較為具體的論文，值得細讀。第二篇指出西洋學者所提出的各種階段論，並不適合生硬地用於研究中國史，作者強調「抽出問題」來探討各時期的社會經濟特徵。

其他五篇是關於不同時期中，經濟發展趨勢之探討。第三篇雖短，討論的卻是一千七百餘年的經濟轉移，它是食貨半月刊創刊一年多以後，以論文形式而非以史料集抄出現的一篇論文，有些論點還值得商榷，但長期趨勢之探討對於研究經濟史的人來說，是一種挑戰。第四篇由兩位歷史學者和一位經濟學者合作，提出了一個分析中國近世 (early mo-

¹ 例如，鞠清遠，「地方志的讀法」，食貨，1.2 (1934年12月)，41-45；高松暉，「分工研究的方法」，食貨，2.2 (1935年6月)，3-5。

² 陳嘯江，「建立史學為獨立的（非綜合的之意）法則的（非敘述的之意）科學新議」，現代史學，2.4 (1935年10月)，1-24。其「比較經濟史導論」擬議，見同期一頁廣告。

dern China) 經濟轉變的架構，讀者可以從其中尋索許多進一步研究的題目。第五篇是對於民國四十年代中國大陸學者研究成果的批評，選這篇書評乃是取意於「他山之石可以為錯」。第六篇以現代經濟發展理論探討清代的經濟，第七篇則討論鴉片戰爭後經濟發展的二元性，以理論結合實證，是最近經濟史研究的趨勢。

第二部分收集十四篇有關制度演變的論文。制度演變不但為一般史學研究所重視，也是經濟史研究的重要一面。自古以來，與一般人的經濟生活及整個國家的經濟發展密切相關的制度均相當複雜。在史籍中記載較詳的大致是與土地、戶口、稅制、財政、貨幣等制度有關的資料，而從來學者研究的也多半偏於這些制度之敘述，對於個別的制度已有不少專著問世。這裏包含的十四篇固然不能代表所有的制度，況且每一篇的論點也各自不同。但大體言之，這些論文大多不只是鋪陳史實，而且注重分析，可以加深我們對制度演變的瞭解。

井田制度始終是討論中國古代田制時不可少的題目，本選集第八篇批評民國八年至二二年間討論井田諸說及作者個人的看法。當然，他的看法並不是最後的，因為以後還有人繼續討論井田制度³。不過，這篇文章中舉出其他國家的制度來互相比較，是其長處。第九篇討論漢代的雇傭制度，肯定漢代在農工業生產方面的勞力是以雇傭為主。這個問題的背後，則有民國二十年代許多學者對於中國古代社會型態之論戰⁴。第十篇對於秦漢隋唐間之田制，加以分析比較，透

³ 參見 Lien-sheng Yang, "Notes on Dr. Swaun's *Food and Money in Ancient China*," in his *Studies in Chinese Institutional History* (Cambridge Mass., 1961), 92-95。

⁴ 參見，王興瑞，「中國社會史細分派的批判」，現代史學，2.1-2，(1934年5月)，165-208。當時參與社會史論戰之論文，多數登在讀書雜誌。回顧這一段學術論戰的歷史，也許可以使我們免於重蹈前人的覆轍。

視其演變之跡，實為討論田制的一篇佳作。第十一篇指出中唐以後由租庸調法改為兩稅法，為制度上由仿北朝轉為仿南朝之開始，這種轉變又與當時經濟發展有關。兩稅法實行以後，稅制上的另一次大轉變是明中葉以後逐漸實行的一條鞭法。關於明代的稅制、梁方仲有數篇論文，偏於史實之鋪陳，讀者可以參閱⁵。對於一條鞭法實行後成為清代所沿襲的制度，第十六篇有所分析。第十七篇則為討論太平天國前後長江沿岸各省的減賦運動。另外，第十八篇是關於釐金制度，第十九篇是關於清季賠款之償還。讀者由以上這幾篇有關田制與稅制的論文，至少可以對這些制度的演變有基本的認識。

至於第十二、十三兩篇討論元、明兩代之漕運，只是漕運制度研究之舉例；第十四、十五兩篇對於租佃制度之研究，也是舉例，而第十四篇的主題是千年來的變遷，又是長期趨勢探討之一例⁶。

第二十篇討論傳統帝制時期各種公共事業之經濟意義，這一篇正與楊聯陞先生的其他論文一樣，內容涉及很廣，是需要細讀的文章。

第二十一篇是關於西元 2 年至 1953 年中國人口的統計。當然，這篇文章與其他討論制度的文章並列主要的是因為人口的統計也涉及歷代戶口登記制度之演變。由這篇文章所引用的書目，可知中外學者對中國歷史上人口問題之興趣，多限於一個時期人口之研究，本篇之特點即在於它涵蓋了中國有人口統計數字以來的所有時期，並且對於人口成長

⁵ 例如，「明代兩稅稅目」，中國近代經濟史研究集刊，3.1（1935年5月），50-66；「一條鞭法」，中國近代經濟史研究集刊，4.1（1936年5月），1-65。

⁶ 讀者可參閱 M. Elvin, *The Pattern of Chinese Past* (Stanford University Press, 1973)，以便更進一步瞭解 Elvin 之論點。

的趨勢有所分析。

以上這些論文中，沒有專門討論貨幣制度的，這並非由於貨幣制度不重要，而是楊聯陞先生有一本很重要的專書，對於認識歷代貨幣與信用制度可說是必讀的文獻⁷。

第三部分是農業部門，包括六篇論文。中國自古以農立國，農業應該是經濟史上的大問題，而這裏僅收六篇文章，顯然是不夠的。但是，我們知道史籍記載與農業有關之資料往往與田制稅制相關，因此，收在第二部分中的若干論文可以互相參照。此外，在若干斷代的經濟史專書或論文中，總要討論到農業的情形，而近年來更有若干以農業發展為主題的經濟史著作出版。故我們建議讀者不要以讀這幾篇為滿足。

第二十二篇由古籍之文字材料，推考我國古代北方的農作物，指出古代中國主要之民食，在西周以前為黍稷，故當時的文化可稱為黍稷文化；自春秋以至戰國，主要民食為粟麥，故該期之文化可稱為粟麥文化。第二十三篇討論的是古代灌溉工程之起原，主張由東而西之說。這兩篇論文皆以古籍為主要文獻，而論旨又都與中國文化之淵源有關，可以加強我們對中國文化的認識。至於運用考古資料討論古代農業的，近年亦有專著可供參考⁸。

第二十四篇討論早熟稻在中國傳播之過程及其經濟意義，這是農業史上重要的一頁。第二十五、二十六和二十七篇，分別列出了宋明兩代有關戶口與田地的統計數字，雖其題旨並不是純為研究農業發展的情形，但是這些數字搜集得

⁷ Lien-sheng Yang, *Money and Credit in China* (Cambridge, Mass., 1952)。

⁸ 例如，何炳棣，*黃土與中國農業的起源*（香港，中文大學，1969）；許倬雲，「兩周農作技術」，中央研究院歷史語言研究所集刊，（1971），803-827。

相當完整，可供進一步研究之依據。

關於明清以來的農業發展，近年外國學者有幾本重要的專著出版⁹。國人在這方面的著述反相形見絀，實在需要大家多多努力。

第四部分是工商業部門，包括論文十五篇。探討工商業在傳統農業經濟社會中之發展，為研究中國經濟發展的另一重要課題。這裏選錄的十五篇雖未能觸及工商業之各方面，亦足以顯示學者對一些重要問題探討的結果。「重農輕商」為中國經濟史重要問題之一，第二十八篇探本溯源檢討戰國秦漢間，這個理論如何發生及其實際施行之情形。第二十九篇討論傳統中國政府對商人的控制與利用，在漫長的傳統時期中有許多損益；換言之，「重農輕商」並不是一成不變的政策。第三十篇討論周代的都市與商業，引用資料兼及古籍與考古發現，並且有詳細的地圖。第三十一篇討論南朝的錢幣問題，旨在說明中國的「中古」時期，並不全然是自然經濟流行的時期，讀者可參閱全漢昇先生的「中古自然經濟」（收在中國經濟史研究上册）。第三十二篇討論唐代的市場制度，點出唐末宋初經濟的發展。第三十三篇研究中國農村市場和社會結構，這是一篇引起許多討論的文章。

除了商業之外，工業的發展如何呢？第三十四篇討論宋代的煤鐵工業，指出當時中國的煤鐵產量比十六、七世紀的英國毫不遜色。第三十五篇更進而討論宋代鋼鐵工業的結

⁹ Dwight H. Perkins, *Agricultural Development in China, 1368-1968* (Chicago, 1969); Ramon H. Myers, *The Chinese Peasant Economy: Agricultural Development in Hopei and Shantung, 1890-1949* (Cambridge, Mass., 1970); Evelyn Rawski, *Agricultural Change and the Peasant Economy of South China* (Cambridge, Mass., 1972); 關於民國二十年左右的農業狀況則有 R. H. Tawney, *Land and Labor in China* (1932)。另外，日人天野元之助，*中國農業史研究*（東京，1962），偏重農作物及技術之考證，亦值得參考。

構、技術與市場。第三十六篇討論宋元時代的造船業，指出明代造船遜於宋元，其興衰之原因值得進一步探討。第三十七篇討論十九世紀以前清代的礦業，指出清政府的「招商」政策與清季之「官督商辦」制度或有關連。

在中國傳統經濟中，既然工商業相當發達，為何中國不產生資本主義呢？這個問題是大家常問的。第三十八篇以揚州鹽商為主角討論十八世紀的中國商業資本，就是嘗試解釋這個問題。

至於國際貿易的情形，第三十九篇是縱的敘述，由漢代至清初的對外貿易制度由此可得一個概括的認識。第四十篇討論明代國際貿易與銀的輸出入，第四十一篇分析清代物價長期的變動，第四十二篇探討晚清沿海的新貨幣及其影響，這幾篇牽涉到的是一連串國際貿易與國內經濟相互作用的問題，也是中國近代經濟史中尚待研究的許多問題。

最後，關於近代工業發展的問題，讀者可參閱全漢昇先生的幾篇論文及其他學者的若干專著¹⁰。

在結束這篇導言以前，回顧一下我國學術界對中國經濟史研究的努力，也許對將來的研究有些幫助。我國近代學者對中國經濟史研究的興趣早在民國二十年前後就發生了。第一份以經濟史為名的學術刊物是由中央研究院社會科學研究所主編的中國近代經濟史研究集刊，於民國二十一年十一月出版第一卷第一期。該刊自第五卷起改名為中國社會經濟史集刊，至民國三十八年一月，共出了八卷。這份學術刊物實為導至今日研究中國經濟史和社會史之嚆矢。值得注意的是，它創刊的時間比美國經濟史學會出版的 *Journal of*

¹⁰ 例如，趙岡、陳鍾毅，中國棉業史（臺北聯經，1977）；Albert Feuerwerker, *China's Early Industrialization: Sheng Hsuan-huai and the Mandarin Enterprise* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958)。

Economic History (1941年5月創刊)還要早八年，足見我國學術界對經濟史研究之興趣發生得並不很晚。

風氣既開之後，當時各研究機構和大學出版的史學刊物，也紛紛刊載研究經濟史專題的論文。例如中央研究院歷史語言研究所集刊，不斷有研究經濟史的論文出現，其作者之中最有名的當推全漢昇先生。此外，國立中山大學史學研究會主編的現代史學於第一卷第三、四期合刊（民國二十二年五月）出版了「中國經濟史研究專號」，包括論文十一篇，反映了當時大學中研究中國經濟史的風氣。隨後，民國二十三年十二月，陶希聖先生主編的食貨半月刊創刊，更是以研究社會史和經濟史相號召。抗戰期間，研究的風氣並未因環境之艱苦而消退，例如，顧頡剛先生主編的文史雜誌第四卷第五、六期合刊（民國三十三年九月）又是一期「中國經濟史專號」，除了論經濟史研究的社論外，另有六篇論文一篇書評。這些例子都說明了經濟史研究一直是受到重視的。

至於大陸淪陷後，學者研究中國經濟史雖受制於教條，仍有不少論著刊行，本選集的第五篇文章就是對這些大陸學者論著的批評。此外，侯繼明先生亦曾指出大陸學者的研究對英美學者及「海外學人」研究中國近代經濟史產生了推動力¹¹。足見學術上的競爭是國際間競爭的重要一面，是我們要時時注意的。

最近幾年我國學術界漸漸產生對經濟史研究的新風氣。兩年前（民國六十六年）更因「中國近代經濟史」會議之召開，使中外歷史學家和經濟學家能夠會聚一堂討論，掀起了一陣研究經濟史的高潮。但是學術研究不能止於會議，而是要平時不斷的研究。經濟史研究更需要歷史學與經濟學兩方

¹¹ 侯繼明，「漫談研究中國近代經濟史」，中國論壇，4.10（1977年8月），10-11。

面的學者共同努力。

我們希望藉着這部論文選集，讀者能够品嚐一些現代中外學者在大約半個世紀中研究中國經濟史的成果，從而潛心研究，使中國經濟史這塊園地結出更豐碩的果實。

劉翠溶

民國六十八年五月

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方法及一般趨勢之探討

Numbers and Units in Chinese
Economic History
by
Lien-sheng Yang

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The British scholar J. H. Clapham¹ has remarked that the methodological distinctiveness of economic history “hinges primarily upon its quantitative interests.” In dealing with quantities it is of course necessary to have a thorough understanding of the numbers and units in use. As a student of economic history, I have found that there are certain precautions which should be observed in the use of numbers and units in Chinese texts. The principles involved may seem to be commonplace and may not be limited to texts in the Chinese language. Constant recurrence of the same old examples and constant discovery of new ones indicate that these general precautions are nevertheless worth attention.

The first precaution is to watch out for misprints

¹ “Economic history as a discipline,” in *Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences* 5.327.

and copyists' errors. The Chinese characters for one, two, and three are easily confused because they are written with one, two, and three horizontal strokes respectively. The number four in its archaic form has four horizontal strokes and thus adds to the confusion. Archaic forms of the characters for seven and ten resemble each other even more than their modern forms. Both are represented by a cross, the only difference being that the vertical stroke in the character for ten is much longer.² Modern characters for ten and thousand differ by only one stroke on the top.

Numerous examples of misprints of numbers may be found in Chinese texts. To avoid such mistakes, careful Chinese have introduced what may be called alteration-proof forms of numbers. There are special forms for numbers from one to ten, and also for hundred and thousand.³ Some of these forms can be traced back to a few centuries B. C., although the whole set of ten or more alteration-proof forms is datable only from the end of the seventh century.⁴

Among misprints in units the most important is the use of *shêng* 升 for *tou* 斗 and *tou* for *shêng* (two measures

² For example, see the article by Liu Fu (劉復) on a Han sundial in *KHCK* 3.4 (1932). 589.

³ 壹貳參肆伍陸柒捌玖拾佰仟。

⁴ In T'ang texts the alteration-proof form 漆 is used instead of 柒. The forms 壹貳參伍陸漆 already appear individually in texts of Han or earlier date. Cf. Ting Fu-pao 丁福保 *Ku-ch'ien ta-tz'u-tien* 古錢大辭典, *Tsung-lun* 總論 5a and 9b.

of capacity: ten *shêng* equal to one *tou*). From medieval manuscripts discovered in Tun-huang, we learn that these two characters in their semi-cursive forms are so similar to each other that the reader can easily mistake one for the other.⁵ The similarity was probably noted by medieval contemporaries and precautions accordingly taken. In documents of T'ang and Sung date one finds not only alteration-proof forms (勝 and 斛) for *shêng* and *tou* but also one (碩) for *shih* 石, which contains ten *tou*.

Copyists' errors may be committed by the historian himself when he carelessly transcribes figures from documents. For example, the *T'ung tien* 通典 6.34b gives the total revenue in the year 780 in round numbers as follows: cash collected 30,000,000 strings, of which 9,500,000 strings were for expenses in the capital and 20,500,000 for the other parts of the Empire; grain collected 16,000,000 *shih*, of which 2,000,000 *shih* were for the capital and 14,000,000 were for the rest of the Empire. The *Hsin T'ang shu* 新唐書 52.1b records the same amounts of cash collection but gives different figures for the grain collection: 16,000,000 *shih* for expenses in the capital and 14,000,000 *shih* for expenses in other parts of the Empire. This is apparently an error, probably resulting from a careless transcription

⁵ For references, see Lien-sheng Yang, "Notes on the Economic History of the Chin Dynasty," HJAS 9 (1946). 130, note 116.

of the figure in the *T'ung tien*. Three other sources⁶ put the cash collection in the same year at 10,898,000 strings and grain collection at 2,157,000 *shih*. Although these figures are somewhat larger than the amounts for expenses in the capital as given in the *T'ung tien*, they do support the theory that the *Hsin T'ang shu* is erroneous.

The second precaution is to distinguish pseudo numbers from real numbers. Numbers used symbolically rather than scientifically are pseudo numbers and are not to be understood in their literal sense. For example, the expression *ch'ien chin* 千金 often indicates merely a large amount of wealth and not necessarily one thousand units of gold,⁷ In a famous essay on three and nine⁸ the Ch'ing scholar Wang Chung 汪中

⁶ *Tzū-chih t'ung-chien* 資治通鑑 226.18a; *Ts'ê-fu yüan-kuei* 冊府元龜 488.1a-2b; *Chiu T'ang shu* 舊唐書 12.10a. These figures have been discussed by Ch'üan Han-sheng 全漢昇 in his article on public revenue in the T'ang and Sung periods in *CYYY* 20.1 (1948). 193-195.

⁷ Katō Shigeru 加藤繁 is perhaps not justified in taking the expression *ch'ien-chin* in some T'ang texts as a real number meaning one thousand *liang* 兩 of gold in his *Tōsō jidai kingin no kenkyū* 唐宋時代金銀の研究 pp. 29, 36-37.

⁸ *Shih san chiu* 釋三九 in Wang's *Shu hsüeh* 述學 (*Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an* ed.) 2a-3b. In this essay in three parts, Wang distinguishes *chih-tu chih shih-shu* 制度之實數, "real numbers in institutions," from *yen-yü chih hsü-shu* 言語之虛數 "pseudo numbers in language." His interpretation of the use of *san* and *chiu* as pseudo numbers may be paraphrased as follows: "Three" is the sum of the odd number "one" and the even number "two" and therefore represents the accumulation of numbers. When a number becomes as large as "ten," it will be represented by the numeral "one" again. Therefore "nine" represents the end of counting. For similar reasoning in the West, see V. F. Hopper, *Medieval Number Symbolism* (New York, 1938), pp. 1-11 ("Elementary number symbolism").

(1745-1794) has proved conclusively that in many old texts the numbers three and nine are used only to mean "several" and "many" irrespective of their literal sense.⁹ Liu Shih-p'ei 劉師培 (1884-1919) has developed this thesis and has suggested that numbers like 300, 3000, 36, and 72 in ancient texts may also be pseudo numbers.¹⁰

On the other hand, some numbers may appear to be pseudo numbers which are actually real. First we may give *pan* 半 "half" as an example. According to the "Treatise on Officials" attached to the *Hou-Han shu*, the salary of officials in Later Han times was paid half in cash and half in grain 半錢半穀. The text gives the amounts in cash and grain for officials of nine different ranks. Two Japanese scholars¹¹ have done some mathematical work with these figures and have concluded that the ratio of cash to grain was about 7 to 3. This is incorrect because they ignored the difference between husked (*mi* 米) and unhusked grain (*ku* 穀).

⁹ Professor E. O. Reischauer has called my attention to a similar use of the number "eight" to mean "many" in a number of compounds in Japanese.

¹⁰ There are six short essays called "Ku-chi to hsü-shu shuo" 古籍多虛數說 in his *Tso-an chi* 左盒集 (*Liu Shên-shu hsien-shêng i-shu* 劉申叔先生遺書 *ts'ê* 40) 8. 6a-9a. I thank Professor J. R. Hightower for this reference. Also see Lü shu-hsiang 呂叔湘 *Chung-kuo wên-fa yao-lüeh* 中國文法要略 (Chungking, 1942) 2. 15-16 for his discussion on thirty per cent and seventy per cent, meaning roughly one third and two thirds.

¹¹ Utsunomiya Kiyoyoshi 宇都宮清吉 and Yabuuchi Kiyoshi 藪内清: 續漢志百官受奉例考 in *Tōyōshi kenkyū* 東洋史研究 5.4 (1940). 271-282.

A modern Chinese scholar¹² has shown that by taking into consideration this difference and by assuming the price of a *shih* of unhusked grain to be one hundred coins, four out of the nine cases are exactly half and half. We are not certain whether the other five contain misprints, but the “half” in this text is at least partly valid.

Another example is the use of the expressions *t'ai-pan* 太半 (or *ta-pan* 大半, lit., “big half”) and *shao-pan* 少半 (or *hsiao-pan* 小半, lit., “small half”), which are used to mean more than half and less than half in ordinary modern texts. In Han or earlier times, however, they were used to mean two thirds and one third. This may be proved by calculations of figures given in some ancient texts, by definitions given in early commentaries,¹⁴ and by references to a mathematical work probably of Han

¹² Wang Shih 王拭: 漢代的官俸 in *Ssū-hsiang yü shih-tai* 思想與時代 32.8 (1943).

¹³ For example, in *Mo-tzū* 墨子 15 (*Tsa-shou* 離守) on the amounts of the daily provision for people in a besieged city (for collations of this passage, see Wu Yü-chiang 吳毓江 *Mo-tzū chiao-chu* 墨子校註 15.28a-b); in *Kuan-tzū* 管子 (*Ssu-pū ts'ung-k'an* ed.) 22.2a (*Hai-wang* 海王) on the amounts of salt consumed per month by male and female adults and children.

¹⁴ For example, the commentary by Wei Chao 韋昭 to *Shih chi* 7.28b, and the commentary by Yen Shih-ku 顏師古 to *Han shu* 24A.7b.

¹⁵ The *Chiu-chang suan-shu* 九章算術 For discussion on this work, see Ch'ien Pao-tsung 錢寶琮 *Chung-kuo suan-hsüeh shih* 中國算學史 Pt. 1 (Peiping, 1932). 31-39.

The compounds *t'ai-pan* (or *ta-pan*) and *shao-pan* also may be found on Han bronze inscriptions; for examples, see J. C. Ferguson, *Li-tai chu-tu chi-chin mu* 歷代著錄吉金目 (Shanghai, 1939), pp. 447, 612, 819, 835, 836, 838, 843, 844, 858, 1066, 1145-1146. The example on p. 612 is even earlier than Han and, according to one authority, dates from the sixth century B. C.

date.¹⁵ In recently published Han documents on wood, which contain records about provisions for garrison troops on the northwestern frontier of China, we find *t'aipan* and *shao-pan* shortened to *t'ai* (written *ta*) and *shao*, meaning exactly two thirds and one third.¹⁶

The third precaution is to keep in mind that figures which were meant to be real numbers in Chinese history may have different degrees of reliability, which can be determined only after a careful examination of the background. Population figures and amounts of cultivated land are probably the most notorious examples. In the

¹⁵ Many examples may be found in Lao Kan 勞幹 *Chū-yen Han-chien k'ao-shih, Shih-wên* 居延漢考釋、釋文 (Li-chuang, 1943). Lao Kan however offers no interpretation of these shortened forms. In *Les documents chinois découverts par Aurel Stein dans les sables de Turkestan oriental* (Oxford, 1913), Chavannes mistranslated the *ta* in documents no. 223 and no. 226 by "grand mesure" (pp. 57-58). He also misunderstood the expression *ch'ang ssu-ts'un-ta-pan-ts'un* 長四寸大半寸 in documents no. 320 as "long de 4 pouces, épais d'un demi-pouce" (p. 75), which may be rendered as "4 $\frac{3}{8}$ inches long". The *Liu-sha chui-chien* 流沙墜簡 (1914) 2. 29a-30a contains a few examples of these abbreviations, on which Wang Kuo-wei 王國維 made no comment. Cf. Lien-sheng Yang, *op. cit.*, p. 141, note 40.

It is interesting to add that the characters *dai* 大 *han* 半 and *shō* 小 appear in old Japanese documents on acreage data-ble from the twelfth century. *Dai* was used to mean two thirds *han* one half, and *shō* one third, indicating portions of a *tan* 段 which was 360 *bu* 步. Again, in 16th century documents after the survey of land under Toyotomi Hideyoshi, we find the expressions *daibu* 大步 (200 *bu*), *hambu* 半步 (150 *bu*) and *shōbu* 小步 (100 *bu*) referring to portions of *tan* 反 (300 *bu*). Cf. *Koji ruien* 古事類苑, *Seijibu* 政治部 72. Also *Nihon keizaishi jiten* 日本經濟史辭典 (Tōkyō, 1940), under *Daihanshō* 大半小 and *Chōtanbu* 町段步。

majority of cases there was under-reporting mainly because of the inability on the part of the government to register the land owned by and the people subordinate to powerful individuals.

In some rare cases the smaller figures were reported by local officials out of good will—that is, their desire to help the people in general. For example, in the middle of the Ming period, through a survey of land it was discovered that many people owned more than the amounts they had registered. The local officials, fearing that the central government might want to increase the already heavy taxes, converted the standard *mu* into various sizes of larger *mu* and thus deceived their superiors in their reports. According to the *Kuang-p'ing fu-chih* 廣平府志¹⁷ land in that prefecture in modern southern Hopei was converted according to its fertility at different rates, which in some cases were as large as seven or eight *mu* to one *mu*.

Examples of over-reporting can also be found in Chinese history. The increase of cultivated land from 19, 404, 267 *ch'ing* 頃 (100 *mu* equal to 1 *ch'ing*) in 589 to 55, 854, 040 in *ca.* 610 has been questioned in the *T'ung tien* 2. 15c. The large population figures in the later part of the eighteenth century may have been fabricated

¹⁷ 1745 ed. 6.2a. A text with slight differences is quoted in the *Jih-chih lu* 日知錄 (*Ssü-pu ts'ung-k'an* ed.) 10.2a-4a. Also see *Ming shih* 明史 27.6b.

in part to please the ambitious Emperor Ch'ien-lung.¹⁸ It is, of course, an open secret that generals over-report the numbers of their soldiers and exaggerate their military achievements.¹⁹

The fourth precaution is that the same unit may indicate different amounts in different places and at different times. It is well known that official standards of weights and measures have been increased throughout Chinese history.²⁰ Sometimes the old units and the new ones may even be used concurrently. For example, in Sui and T'ang times, there were *ta-ch'ih* 大尺 and *hsiao-ch'ih* 小尺, *ta-tou* 大斗 and *hsiao-tou* 小斗, and *ta-liang* 大兩 and *hsiao-liang* 小兩. The ratios between the three pairs were 1 to 1.2, 1 to 3, and 1 to 3, respectively. According to T'ang regulations,²¹ the small units, which

¹⁸ Otake Fumio 小竹文夫 *Kinsei Shina Keizaishi Kenkyū* 近世支那經濟史研究 (Tōkyō, 1942), pp. 271-282.

¹⁹ For a discussion on the tradition of making the numbers of heads and captives ten times larger in reports by generals in the third century, see Miyazaki Ichisada 宮崎市定: 讀史劄記 *Shirin* 21.1 (1936). 134-135.

The fabulous total (over six hundred million) of people reported (*Ming shih* 309.32b; Erich Hauer, *Asia Major*, vol. 3) to have been killed by troops of the rebel leader Chang Hsien-chung 張獻忠 (1605-1647) has been discussed by Liu I-cheng 柳詒徵 in an article on methodology in the studies of economic history in *Shih-hsüeh tsa-chih* 史學雜誌 1.4 (1929). 1-5.

²⁰ For a summary, see Wu Ch'eng-lo 吳承洛 *Chung-kuo tu-liang-heng shih* 中國度量衡史 (Shanghai, 1937), pp. 54-76. Also see J. C. Ferguson: "Chinese Foot Measure," *MS* 6 (1941). 357-382.

²¹ Reference passages from the *T'ang hui-yao* 唐會要 ch. 66, *T'ang liu-tien* 唐六典 ch. 3, *T'ang-lu su-i* 唐律疏議, ch. 26, *Po K'ung liu-t'ieh* 白孔六帖, ch. 13 and *Chiu T'ang shu*, ch. 48 are conveniently put together in *Tōryō shūi* 唐令拾遺, pp. 842-846 by Niida Noboru 仁井田陞

were more ancient, were used for musical instruments, measurements of shadow on the sundial, medicine, and ceremonial caps. For all other purposes, private and official, the large units were used. However, it is possible that the small weights and measures were not limited to the uses specified in the regulations. In the diary kept by the Japanese monk Ennin 圓仁,²² who made a pilgrimage to China in the middle of the ninth century, we find mention of *sha-chin* 砂金, "sand gold", in both *ta-liang* and *hsiao-liang*, or large and small taels.

In this connection, it is interesting to note that the expressions *ta-shih* 大石 and *hsiao-shih* 小石 in Han wooden documents were entirely different from these large and small units of the T'ang. Under the Han,

²² *Nittō guhō junrei gyōki* 入唐求法巡禮行記 (*Dainihon bukkyō zensho* 大日本佛教全書 (ts'e 113) pp. 176, 178 and 188. The first chapter of this important work has been translated with an introduction by Professor E. O. Reischauer in his "*Nittō guhō junrei gyōki*, Ennin's Diary of His Travels in T'ang China (838-847)" (Harvard Doctoral Thesis, 1939). In this diary there are two puzzling passages concerning the weight of sand gold. On one occasion (p. 176) four small taels of sand gold were weighed as one large tael and *êrh-fên-pan* 二分半. On another (p. 178), two large taels of sand gold were weighed in the market as one large tael and seven *ch'ien* 錢 and the seven *ch'ien* were allowed to be counted as 准當 *ta-êrh fên-pan* 大二分半. The unit *ch'ien* must have been one tenth of a tael, as it still is today. The *fen* however could not have been the normal one tenth of a *ch'ien*. I suppose *êrh-fên-pan* stood for one quarter and *ta-êrh-fên-pan* for three quarters. These two fractions were also known as *jo-pan* 弱半 (one fourth) and *ch'iang-pan* 強半 (three fourths) in some old mathematical works. The Japanese monk was given the advantage of counting his 1.70 tael as 1.75 tael.

they were the same unit, but were called large or small according to what was measured. *Hsiao-shih* indicated unhusked grain and *ta-shih* husked grain.²³ The ratio between them was 5 to 3,

Besides the official standards, different local weights and measures have been used at different places and even at the same place. A modern investigation into twenty-two villages in the district Wu-hsi 無錫 in Kiangsu finds at least 173 sizes of *mu* in use, ranging from 2. 683 to 8,957 *are*.²⁴ (The standard *mu* is 6 2/3 *are*.) This may be an extreme case, but it is by no means uncommon to have several weights and measures used concurrently at one place.²⁵ The Chinese government nominally has always tried to standardize weights and measures, but has never had much success. Apparently people of vested interests have enjoyed these discrepancies in units.

These variations may be partly accounted for by the fact that a larger unit may not contain the same number of smaller units. For example, under the Ch'ing dynasty for the survey of land a standard *kung* 弓 (or *pu* 步) contained 5 *ch'ih*. According to a memorial which was approved by the Emperor in 1750, there were in use several kinds of *kung* which ranged from

²³ Cf. Lien-sheng Yang *op. cit.*, p. 142, note 47. Also see *Jih-chih lu* 11.4b-5b and *Shih-chia-chai yang-hsin-lu* 十駕齋養新錄 (Ch'ien-yen-t'ang *ch'üan-shu* 潛研堂全書 ed.) 19.10a-b.

3.2 to 7.5 *ch'ih*.²⁶ Nor was the official standard of 240 *kung* or *pu* (i. e., sp. *pu*) in a *mu* always observed.

As for measurements of time, according to the Chinese lunar calendar, a year may have twelve or thirteen months and a month twenty-nine or thirty days. These differences were also taken care of in some institutions. Under the T'ang dynasty an able-bodied adult male was required to render labor service to the government for twenty days. In an intercalary year he had to work for two more days, i. e., ten per cent extra.²⁷ The Ch'ing dynasty levied various additional taxes in an intercalary year; their amounts, however, were usually smaller than a 1/12th proportion.²⁸ These additional charges were abolished by the Republic in 1917.²⁹ Under the Ch'ing dynasty, in a shorter month (*hsiao-chien* 小建) the regular monthly pay to a soldier

²⁴ *Mu-te ch'a-i* 畝的差異 (Nanking, 1929) by Ch'en Han-sheng 陳翰笙 and others.

²⁵ See Wu Ch'êng-lo, *Chung-kuo tu-liang-heng shih*, pp. 298-314.

²⁶ *Ta-Ch'ing hui-tien shih-lí* 大清會典事例 (1818 ed.), ch. 165. Also see *Jih-chih lu* 10. 1b-2a.

²⁷ *Tōryō shui*, p. 668. This sounds unfair. However, according to what was probably T'ang tradition, "Throughout a year, with the exception of the intercalary month, there are two months, namely the fifth and the tenth (one version gives the ninth), which are agricultural months and in which labor services are exempted" (trans. from *Hsia-hou Yang suan-ching* 夏侯陽算經 [Wu-ying-tien chü-chen-pan 武英殿聚珍版 ed.] A7b.) Thus the average service for the other ten months was also two days per month.

²⁸ Amounts are given in most local gazeteers.

²⁹ Chia Shih-i 賈士毅 *Min-kuo hsü ts'ai-cheng shih* 民國續財政史 (Shanghai, 1934) 7.21.

was reduced by the amount for one day, which was supposed to make up a part of the additional payment in an intercalary month.³⁰ This practice may have come from an ancient tradition according to which a soldier's provisions were computed on a daily basis as was done in the Han times.³¹

The Chinese Republic has tried to standardize weights and measures since 1930 by linking them to the French or International System. One *shêng* is equivalent to one litre, two *chin* 斤 to one kilogram, and

³⁰ *Hu-pu tse-li* 戶部則例 (1851 ed.) 80.4a-b; *Ta-Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li* 203.5b, 204.16b, and other places. These deductions together with those made when a soldier was absent were known by the technical term *chien-k'uang* 建曠. This term has also been defined as the surplus amount of taxes which was collected on the extra day in a longer month but was not forwarded (*Shina hōsei daijiten* 支那法制大辭典 quoted from the *Liu-pu ch'êng-yü chu-chieh* 六部成語注解. The latter work was available only in manuscript form before its publication in 1947 in Kyōto). I have not been able to find other documentation for this interpretation.

³¹ *Liu-sha chui-chien* 2.28a-29a. (For *liu-jih* 六日 in line 4 on 28b read *i-jih* 一日) Wang Kuo-wei has concluded that the daily provision for a soldier under the Han dynasty was 6 *sheng* of grain. However, I have discovered from Han wooden documents that provisions were paid at two different rates. One was 6 *sheng* of husked grain per day (i. e., 1.8 *shih* of husked grain or 3 *shih* of unhusked grain in a full month of 30 days), and the other was 6 $\frac{3}{4}$ *sheng* of husked grain per day (i. e., 2 *shih* of husked grain or 3 $\frac{3}{4}$ *sheng* of unhusked grain in a full month of 30 days). The higher rate seems to have been used for officers and soldiers regularly guarding the watchtowers, whereas the lower one seems to have applied to convicts, soldiers working on agricultural colonies, and officers and soldiers who served on the frontier for short periods.

three *ch'ih* to one metre. This is called the one-two-three system. But official standards in history were not always so neat. This was particularly true under the Sung dynasty, when "short catty" 省稱, "short bushel" 省斛³², and "short hundred" (of cash) 省陌 were officially recognized. A short catty was four fifths of a full catty; a short bushel eighty-three per cent of a full bushel, and the short hundred was actually only seventy-seven coins. These probably represented compromises of various kinds of units in use. The amazing thing is that these odd units were made official and were maintained_x for almost the whole period. This must have been a considerable headache to accountants, because we find in mathematical works³³ of Sung date sections on how to convert the short units to the full units and vice versa.

³² In the *Shu-shu chiu-chang* 數書九章 by Ch'in Chiu-shao 秦九韶 (author's preface 1247, *I-chia-t'ang ts'ung-shu* 宜稼堂叢書 ed.) 2.1b and 11.17a, the *sheng-hu* or "short bushel" is called *kuan-hu* 官斛 and *wen-ssü-yüan hu* 文思院斛. *Wen-ssü yüan* was the bureau of manufactures under the Sung dynasty. Its title alluded 時文思索, to the first line of the inscription on a standard measure of capacity mentioned in the *Chou li* (*Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an* ed.) 11.26a, which Biot has rendered as "Ceci est le résultat des meditations et des recherches d'un prince de haute vertu." (*Le Tcheou-li* 2.505.)

³³ Mathematical works (*I-chia-t'ang ts'ung-shu*, *ts'e* 41, 42) by Yang Hui 楊輝 (13th cent.) also contain several questions on such conversions. For Ch'in and Yang, see Ch'ien Pao-tsung, *Chung-kuo suan-hsüeh shih*, 125-142; for Yang, also see Li Yen 李儼 *Chung-suan shih lun-ts'ung* 中算史論叢 (Shanghai, 1935) 2, 93-119.

社會經濟史的分段及其缺點

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一

社會學的基本概念是社會制度。孔德 (Comte)、斯賓塞 (Spencer)、華爾德 (Ward)、鮑惠爾 (Powell) 等一般社會學者，均主張社會學是研究社會制度的科學；當代社會學者佛高奈 (Favconnet) 與莫斯 (Mauss) 曾說：「社會學就是研究各種制度的科學」；韋柏 (Webb) 夫婦，亦認為社會學為研究各種特殊的社會制度之一門科學。同樣，經濟學的基本概念是經濟制度。這一點尤為德國的歷史學派及美國的制度學派所主張。所謂經濟制度，即在經營某種形式的經濟生活中，所形成的一定的組織，在這種組織當中，受一定的經濟意識所支配，根據一定的經濟計劃去經營，並且應用一定的技術去生產。

社會制度與經濟制度，都是一定形態的歷史現象。因為人類的社會組織，乃是由現實的生活尤其是經濟生活所反映而成；我們雖不主張唯物史觀，但是經濟的因素是構成社會

組織一個重要條件，則不能不承認。經濟的活動，本都是爲了要滿足需要，即人類在生活的進程中對物質所發生的自然需要。但是這種需要，並不是由個人的自由意志所能任意決定，而是在一定的時代推移中，在一定的社會組織內，所能得到的一定分量和一定種類。因爲每一個時代都有它一定限度的生產能力，並有它一定形態的生產組織，一個分子所能得到的生活必需品享樂品或奢侈品，即完全爲那時的生產力和生產組織所決定。一個石器時代的原人，和一個工場制度下的勞動者，其滿足需要的方式和所得的數量完全不同，而這個不同，便顯然是由於在不同的時代中，有不同的生產方法和不同的生產組織之故。所以經濟現象，不僅是一種社會現象，而且是一種特定形態的歷史現象。我們理解這個現象的整個體系，只有從一種現實的歷史環境中去想像，才能夠真實的把握。

社會現象和經濟現象既是一定形態的歷史產物，則社會學和經濟學的一切概念，即不能是一類單純抽象的或邏輯的概念，而必須屬於經驗的或現實的歷史範疇。一種抽象的邏輯的概念，並不因時代變易而有所不同，它可以離開時間及空間的關係而單獨成立。社會現象和經濟現象，則是在一定的社會組織和一定的文化水準之內，由實際生活所彙成；換言之，即是在一定的時間和一定的空間之內的一種具體的存在。其實不僅社會制度和經濟制度是如此，所有政治、法律、宗教、藝術等等所謂精神文化亦無不如此。我們不能瞭解一種抽象的文化，而只能瞭解一種特定形態的文化；我們不能在抽象的意義上去認識政治、法律、宗教、藝術等現象的性質，而只能在一定的歷史存在中，認識某種形態的國家組織，和某種形態的宗教及藝術生活。社會制度和經濟制度既都爲一定的物質條件所決定，故必然是因時因地而不同，

絕無抽象的社會制度及經濟制度之存在，所有的是在一定的歷史範疇內，一種實際的社會生活和經濟生活。

即單就經濟制度而論，它既然是在一定的歷史範疇內，和一定的社會制度下所形成的一種經濟組織，則經濟史所研究的對象，便天然是在過去社會制度的經濟面；換言之，即研究在過去不同的時代推移中，在過去不同的社會組織內，經濟制度形成及演變的種種過程。因此，經濟史在本質上應屬於普通制度史的部門，而不能與經濟學同科。經濟學或經濟理論雖然也是在研究一個社會組織之內的經濟制度，然而經濟理論則可以孤立離開各種伴生的勢力和因素，在假定「其他情形不變」(other things being equal)的狀態下，去作演繹的推論，用以達到一種經濟的普遍概念。經濟史的性質與此不同，歷史的研究不僅不能孤立離開各種勢力及因素，反而須將任何一種勢力或因素加以細微的分析，以找出其來龍去脈，求出其因果關係，並注意其影響之深淺及大小。正因為經濟學與經濟史在本質上有所不同，故研究的方法遂大異其趣。經濟學可以把一切經濟現象還元為數量關係，用數量的方法(quantitative method)去研究；經濟史雖然也同樣注意經濟的數量關係(如人口的增減，物價的變動，貨幣的數量及其影響等等)，然而它必須在整個的社會組織中找出這些數量的相互關係及其變遷和影響，所以它不能用單純的數量方法。加以經濟史所研究的，乃是過去社會制度內的經濟生活，古代調查之術既不精，數字的統計材料又缺乏，事實上亦無法去作單純的數量分析，而不得求助於社會學，考古學，人類學，地理學等等科學的知識，去作綜合性的研究。這是經濟學與經濟史在本質上及方法上一個重大的分歧點。

經濟史既不同於經濟學，而必須從整個社會組織內作綜

合性的研究，則與經濟史關係最密切的自無過於社會史。社會史當然自有其特殊的對象，然而因為社會制度大都為該社會內一定形態的經濟生活所反映，故社會史中大部分的研究對象都是經濟史的問題。經濟史雖不必去研究社會制度的每一面，然而大部分的經濟面則是它的主題，而且這個經濟面乃是整個社會機構當中的一面，則在以歷史的方法解剖這一面時，實不能遺棄同一體的另一面，因此，社會史與經濟史，在許多方面屬於同一的領域，這便是大多數經濟史的著作，而以社會經濟 (social and Economic) 標題的主要原因。

二

社會史和經濟史所研究的對象，既都是歷史現象，而歷史現象則是一種切不斷的因果連環，因為時間是賡續的，現象自然也是賡續的，一個現象在成為另一個現象的原因之前，其自身早已是前一個現象的結果。同樣，社會機構雖一時期有一時期的基本特質，然而從其發展的全過程來看，也是一個連續不斷的長期演化。在過去的歷史進程中，絕沒有一個新的社會制度可以突然生成，實際上每一個新的社會制度，都是在舊的社會機構內慢慢的胚胎孕育，並且要經過長時期的潛滋暗長，逐漸增加其內容，逐漸擴大其勢力，久而久之，舊的機構便感覺到壓迫而無法包容，於是其聯繫的紐帶逐漸鬆弛，其結構也逐漸解體，待發展到一個相當的階段時，新制度便站在一個支配的地位，以建立自己的基礎，形成自己的體系。但是舊制度的殘餘，不但不隨着新制度的產生而完全消滅，反而遺留在新制度之中，可以並存到很久的時期。所以由一個歷史的時期過渡到另一個歷史的時期，尤其是由一種社會制度轉變到另一種社會制度，其間絕沒有任

何顯著的鴻溝，可以為兩個時期或兩種制度的分界，而實是前後交錯，新舊並存，成爲一種交互錯綜的現象，所有人爲的分期，實際上都是非常勉強，而且是每每陷於錯誤。

關於這一點，德國的社會學者和經濟學者曾作過不少的努力，從李斯特 (Friederich List) 起，幾乎每一個學者都在傾其全力去劃分時期或階級：例如李斯特將社會經濟的演進分爲五個階段，即(一)原始野蠻時期；(二)牧畜時期；(三)農業時期；(四)農工業時期；(五)農工商業時期。羅瑟爾 (Roscher) 依據生產要素分爲三個階段：(一)依賴自然時代；(二)勞力時代；(三)資本主義時代。希爾布蘭 (Bruno Hildebrand) 依交換形態分爲：(一)自然經濟；(二)貨幣經濟；(三)信用經濟。馬克斯 (Karl Marx) 依生產關係分爲：(一)古代的；(二)亞細亞的；(三)封建的；(四)近代資產階級的四種生產方式。畢雪 (Karl Bücher) 依生產至消費間的距離分爲：(一)獨立的家庭經濟；(二)城市經濟；(三)國民經濟。施穆勒 (Gustav Schmoller) 依經濟體之大小分爲：(一)農村經濟；(二)城市經濟；(三)區域經濟；(四)國民經濟。宗巴特 (Werner Sombart) 依社會化的程度，分爲：(一)自給經濟時代；(二)過渡經濟時代；(三)手工業經濟時代；(四)資本主義經濟時代。諸如此類的分段方法尙有很多，此處不過僅僅是舉例罷了。即此數例，已可見各人的意見紛歧，彼此的出發點既不同，而方法亦迥異。但是他們卻有一點是相同，就是都在想以經濟發達的階段，來代替正統學派所範成的普遍原則。他們認爲經濟演進的階段既屬不同，自不能產生一種相同的法則更不能普遍適用這個法則於各個發展不同的階段。他們認爲正統學派的經濟法則，充其量只能適用於現在，然而現在乃是由過去演變而來，其本身並不是一成不變，不久又要爲將來所代替，所以歷史學派於此便建立了一種經濟法則或理論與歷史事實互相配合的

相當論，認為經濟學家的最大任務，便在從歷史的研究中，找出經濟演進的階段。

歷史學派的經濟學者雖傾其全力於經濟階段之劃分，然而實際上他們所劃分的階段，個個都是困難重重，沒有一個能夠完全成立。各家的分段標準雖在理論上各有其卓越新穎之點，然而按之歷史事實，則又顯此失彼，不能互相吻合。例如希爾布蘭所劃分的自然經濟，貨幣經濟，與信用經濟三個階段，在學術界中即曾引起很多的討論，而為多數學者所不取。因為照希爾布蘭的分段，則自然經濟可以包括由最原始到最複雜的各種不同的社會組織在內。如古代埃及，大體上是在實行物物交換，然而古埃及的文化與原始的日耳曼人及現在不知使用貨幣的野蠻社會相比較，實絕少相同之點，可是在經濟上則是屬於同一階段。並且除去史前期及早期的歷史不計外，使用貨幣與不使用貨幣的社會常常是並存着，即在現在貨幣使用極為發達的社會中，依然殘留着不用貨幣的自然經濟。信用的事實，亦係在人類早期的歷史中即已存在，但是卻從來沒有站在支配的地位，以之作爲一個獨立的經濟階段，實大成疑問。並且希爾布蘭所謂貨幣經濟，乃是指金屬貨幣而言，這樣以幣材的種類來作爲劃分階段的標準，則困難更多。因為一種物品能不能成爲貨幣，並不看它是不是金屬，而是看它能不能具備貨幣的機能，這是普通貨幣學上早已確定的問題，即在今日，也沒有一個單純使用金屬貨幣的社會。如中國，則更是一個金屬貨幣與物品貨幣（如布帛穀粟皮鹽等）長期並用的社會，有時且在金屬貨幣異常發達之後（如戰國及秦漢時代），反而有一個以物品貨幣爲主的時期（如魏晉南北朝），這與希爾布蘭所定的發展階段完全不合。

再如畢雪所劃分的三個階段，是以生產到消費中間的距

離來作為標準的，在獨立的家庭經濟階段內，生產完全是為了個人的需要，這時沒有交換，生產與消費發生在同時；在城市經濟階段內，生產品係直接由生產者轉移於消費者，成爲一種直接交換的階段（stage of direct exchange）；在國民經濟的階段內，生產品在達到消費者之前，須經過許多中間人之手，成爲一種商品流通的階段（stage of the Circulation of goods）。畢雪這個分段方法，也同樣是缺乏實際的歷史根據，尤以前兩個階段爲然。因爲照畢雪的分段，則由史前的原始社會，直到中世紀的封建社會，都應包括在獨立的家庭經濟階段之內，把時間這樣悠久，社會制度和文化水準大相懸殊的社會，併在一個經濟階段之內，其不合於實際歷史，至屬顯然。交換的事實早在原始社會中即已存在，更不能把中世紀的封建社會當作一個完全沒有交換的社會。城市之成爲一個經濟的單位（即以城市及其周圍爲工業的中心，而與農村站在對立的地位），在歐洲亦是與封建的采邑經濟同時並存的，城市團體與農村莊園（manor）係爲同一的經濟意識所支配，它們是並存的兩個生產的單位，而不是兩個前後交替的階段。如中國，那種歐洲式的城市經濟組織，即顯然不曾存在，自足的家庭也不能成爲一個獨立的經濟階段，因爲它從來沒有站在支配的地位。

總之，各家所劃分的階段，雖各有其獨特之點，各有其一部分的理由，然而沒有一家的學說能夠與實際的歷史完全契合。所以這些分段都不免是一些理想的範疇，韋勃（Max Weber）稱之爲「理想的類型」（ideal types），蓋謂其非真正客觀的歷史，而係雜有作者主觀的成分在內。並且拿一種呆板的，簡單的類型，來範圍複雜的，變動的人類歷史，則對於若干界限不明，類型不合，及無法納入預定範疇中的事實，自不能不加以傳會、曲解、甚至割棄，以便削足適

屢。所以分段的辦法，在社會經濟史的研究上雖不無若干便利，然過度運用的結果，每每是害多而利少。

在中國，階段論被應用得最廣的，無過於馬克斯的主張。馬克斯在其「政治經濟學批評」(*The Critique of Political Economy*)的序文中，把歐洲社會經濟的發展，分爲亞細亞的(Asiatic)，古代的(classical)，封建的(feudal)以及近代資產階級的(modern bourgeois)等四種生產方式。馬克斯自己並沒有把這四個階段作詳細的解釋，尤其沒有把「亞細亞的」和「古代的」兩個模糊的概念下一清楚的界說，這兩個概念，一個是地理的概念，一個是歷史的概念，其所指的究竟是一個社會的前後兩個階段？抑是在兩個不同的社會中(即歐羅巴的社會及亞細亞的社會)兩種個別的現象？郭沫若先生倒是很肯定的替馬克斯下了一個定義，他認爲亞細亞的生產方法，係指原始共產主義而言；古代的生產方法，指古代希臘羅馬的奴隸制度而言；封建的生產方法，指歐洲中世紀的行會制度及諸侯政治而言；資產階級的生產方法，指近代資本主義制度而言(見郭氏所著中國古代社會研究)。這樣說來，社會經濟制度的發展有四個演進的階段，而且必須是四個階段。

馬克斯的意見和郭沫若的解釋是否正確，這裏姑不具論，即使這個學說完全正確，但是應用到中國歷史上來，亦是錯誤百出。中國的馬克斯主義者爲了要使中國歷史符合這四階段的公式，每每去曲解歷史，甚至改造歷史。例如封建制度，在中國歷史上本是段落最分明，特質最顯著的一個時期，但是公式主義者爲了要在它以前安排上「亞細亞的」和「古代的」兩個階段，於是封建制度產生的時代遂成了一個聚訟不決的問題。有的把它排在西周，有的把它排在東周，有的把它排在秦朝，有的把它排在漢末，有的把它排在五胡

十六國；其崩潰時期有的認為在春秋戰國，有的認為在唐末五代，有的認為在鴉片戰爭。一個社會制度可以上下移動，其生成與毀滅的時代可以前後相差到二三十年之久，則中國歷史豈不成了一個不可理解的怪物？但是大家之所以見仁見智，紛歧若此，其主要原因便是由於大家不管客觀的史實是如何，而一定要把中國歷史剛好排列成馬克斯所說的四個階段。郭沫若所以要把封建制度拖到秦始皇，因為這樣好把周代作為「古代的」即奴隸社會，殷商作為「亞細亞的」即原始共產主義社會，至於這個結論是否與歷史的事實相符合，那就可以不問，因為歷史「應當」如此發展。例如他說：「秦始皇不愧是中國社會上完成了封建制度的元勳，他把天下統一了，把天下的兵器都沒收了，來作了十二個巨大的銅人」；又說：「我們不要為文字所拘泥了，周室在古時雖號稱為封建，但是事實上在周官有鄉遂縣鄙之分，並不是全無郡縣；秦以後雖號稱郡縣制，但漢有諸王，唐有藩鎮，明末有三藩，清有年羹堯，就是一般的行省總督，都號稱為封疆大吏，並不是就不是封建制度。我們到了現在假使要說中國的封建社會在秦時就崩潰了的話，那簡直是不可救藥的錯誤」（見中國古代社會研究）。在他最近出版的「青銅時代」一書中，雖然承認了西周有井田制度，但仍咬定西周是奴隸社會，他說：「西周奴隸社會的見解，我始終是毫無改變，井田制是存在過的」。其所以如此，便是為了要符合公式。其實中國過去什麼時候都有奴隸，而蓄奴最盛的反倒是在秦漢時代，這又顯然與公式不合，故有人索性把封建制度放在五胡十六國，而以秦漢為「古代的」奴隸社會階段，例如王宜昌君曾說：「封建制度是起於五胡十六國。……不僅是從秦漢兩代中廣大的奴隸存在，可以證明秦漢之為奴隸制度，從周代，以至春秋戰國之奴隸城邑，證明他們為奴隸制

度」（見讀書雜誌中國社會史論戰第一輯）。這種意見，揆諸歷史雖覺離奇，但從公式的觀點來看，亦尚是一個合乎邏輯的推論。又在公式上，封建制度以後乃是資本主義制度，如說封建制度崩潰在戰國，則秦漢以後的歷史便無法解釋。爲了使歷史切合於公式起見，自不妨把由西周初年直到鴉片戰爭，這長約三千年之久的中國社會，一律作爲封建制度！例如李達君曾說：「西周初年，相當於西歷紀元前1122年，鴉片戰爭，發生於 1840 年，其間的距離是二千九百六十二年。這長約三千年之久的中國社會，屬於封建社會的階段，這是近來研究中國社會史的人們所確認的」（見文化雜誌一卷二期，李達著「中國社會發展遲滯的原因」一文）前幾年也有人表示過同樣的意見，不過認爲秦以後不是純粹的封建制度：「把由秦代至清鴉片戰爭以前的一段歷史，認爲是封建制度，大體上是沒有什麼錯誤，雖然不是純封建制度，但其最基礎的生產方法是封建的」（見王禮錫「中國社會發展史之謎的時代」，載讀書雜誌二卷七八期合刊）。其他類此的意見還有很多，這裏沒有備引的必要；但即此數例，已經可以看出大家對於這個問題的意見之龐雜矛盾了。

由上所述，可知利用任何一家的分段標準來強繩中國歷史，其結果都是錯誤，因爲社會階段論本身就是一個不健全的學說，過度應用的結果，必然是害多而利少。本來階段論乃是德國歷史學派的學者所作的一種嘗試，而歷史學派的學者都具有濃厚的國家主義的色彩，他們爲了反對英國正統學派的那種世界主義普遍法則，爲了反抗外來的知識統制，才就他們自己的歷史，去探求社會經濟演進的階段，他們絕沒有要把他們根據德國歷史所劃分的階段普遍地適用到全世界，如果他們的公式亦是放諸四海而皆準，則與他們所反對的正統學派豈不完全一樣？所以利用他們任何一個現成的

公式來解釋中國歷史，在原則上都與歷史學派的根本精神抵牾。就連馬克斯所分的四種生產方式，據根斯柏 (M. Ginsberg) 教授所說，亦只是在說明歷史的交互性與連續性，就人類文化的特徵，說明其發展的可能性罷了 (見 Ginsberg: *Studies in Sociology*, pp. 88-85)。蘇聯的馬克斯主義者蒲列罕諾夫 (G. Plekhanov) 亦曾詳細申論馬克斯所分的四個階段不能適用於中國及埃及，其原因便是由於社會的發展受了地理環境的影響 (見 Plekhanov: *Fundamental Problems of Marxism*, pp. 50-51)。蓋應用階段公式，不僅階段論本身成問題，而且還忽視了各國歷史的特殊性。人類儘可以有共同的起源，但不一定有共同的歷史。地理的條件不同，取得生活資料的方式不同，社會的結構不同，文化的內容不同，則歷史演進的道路自不會相同。所以各民族各國家的歷史，一方面雖有其普遍的共同性，一方面則又強烈地表現其個別的特殊性。中國歷史自有其結構的形態，自有其演進的路線，我們不能把西洋各國的歷史當作常態，而把中國歷史當作變態：我們不妨與西洋社會作比較，而研究其所以同及所以異，但絕不可以把中國社會比附到西洋社會，務求故同而捨棄其異。

總之，社會經濟制度的發展乃是一個連續的過程，其推演遞嬗之間，是前後交錯，有時是新舊並存，純一形態的社會在事實上並不存在，故研究中國社會經濟史，既不可以強分階段，更不可以拿西洋學者根據其自己的歷史所劃分的階段來應用於中國社會，因為一個預定的簡單範疇實不能範圍複雜的歷史現象，更不能範圍不同的社會組織。

社會經濟史之不可以強分階段固如上述，然這並不是說各時代的社會經濟制度完全沒有差異，實際每一個時代其社會經濟制度必有若干顯著的特徵。不論這些制度是同時並

存，抑係前後交替，將它們的特徵一一提出，而研究其來龍去脈，找出它們相互的因果關係，乃是社會經濟史所必須達到的任務。這樣，抽出問題而不強分階段，則各個社會制度所由產生的複雜因素自不致因遷就人爲的階段公式而被擯棄。

從西周到隋初之一千七百餘年的經濟轉移

馬乘風

本文原發表於食貨半月刊第二卷第九期，民國二十四年十月。

一 緒論

當我們讀歷史的時候，固然應從小處下手，對於歷史之一年一月甚而至於一日一刻的紀載，以及一事一物的出現，均不可不加以注意，因為歷史的因素都不是偶然長成的。但是，當我們分析歷史的時候，就不能不從大處着眼，我們必須取出歷史長流中的若干大的段落來看，從各主要的事象上，加以仔細的比較，以求出前一段與後一段之不同的徵點何在，這個時候，微小的事象都為大的徵點所掩蔽了，年月日的差別都為大的段落所代替了，我們腦海中的印象，不復是雜亂叢散的野草細枝，而是行列分明的拱木高幹了。反之，如果我們單釘住一個極短的時間來看，我們將永遠難於求出此一短時期之歷史的特徵何在。打一個具體的史例來說，我們要想知道漢代之社會階級的構成若何，單知道漢代一小段的歷史是不夠的，必須把漢代以前及漢代以後的社會階級之結構弄清楚纔行，把歷史拉長，從大處加以確當的比

較，則漢代社會階級之結構，自然被陪襯出來了。因之，我們的分析和說明，纔能達於正確。我在這裏所以拿出一千七八百年的長時期作為題目，就是在如此意義之下，想展開我的見解。

在此一千七百餘年的歷史進程中，我們若是把經濟範圍內之各主要部門加以前後的比較，則顯然有三個大的階段，出現在眼前，牠們各自演着異樣的姿態。

這三個大的階段，在時間上我們如何處置牠呢？我的見解是這樣：從西周到戰國初期約六百餘年屬於一段，從戰國後期到東漢之末將近七百年另屬一段，從三國時代到隋朝初葉將及四百年又屬一段，這三大段，無論從社會經濟的總和上來看，從生產方法上來看，從商業活動上來看，從社會階級的構成上來看，或從土地制度、貨幣制度、賦稅制度，各方面來看，各段各有其所以異於他段的確切特徵，決不是無中生有的任意分割。茲依次論之。

二 從生產過程上看經濟轉換

先從生產工具說起，在第一大段之內，已經開始了農業生活，開發土質的工具，是銅製的耒耜，完全用人力推動，畜力尚未被使用，論語上曾有「犁牛之子騂且角」一語，有人即把牠當作是「犁」與「牛」連帶使用的證據，在我則覺其作證據之力量，殊形微弱，除此之外，紀載上沒有告訴過我們春秋時代及其前代以任何用「犁」及「牛」之形跡者。又有人以詩經之「取厲取鍛」一語，認為西周時代已為鐵器時代，姑無論「取厲取鍛」之「鍛」字，能否解作「鐵」，即使承認當時略有「鐵」之萌芽，但「萌芽時代」是不是就可以當作「支配時代」？鐵之出現是否可以由「萌芽時代」於一朝之間跳到「支配時代」？進一步來說，我們把詩經上

所用之金屬器具完全歸納起來，知道當時明明白白是銅器時代，難道一切用具都是「銅器時代」，獨獨耕作用具進於「鐵器時代嗎」？這顯然是不合邏輯的。

歷史一進到第二大段，情形就完全異樣了。鐵製的耕具，普遍的應用，這是一讀孟子韓非子荀子呂氏春秋墨子管子戰國策越絕書諸書，即可瞭然的。以人力推動的耒耜，進而為以牛力拉動的鐵犁了，這是前漢書食貨志上所啓示我們的。這種進步，在中國農業史上值得大書特書。

到了第三大段，生產工具方面並沒有甚麼進步，主要的原因，是因為當時的社會秩序太荒亂了，初時是幾個割據的軍人相互戰爭，繼而蠻人入寇，中國更鬧得不像樣子，人民除了死亡以外，便是各地的流離。幾乎沒有一片安淨土，使他們得以安居樂業下去，這樣，生產工具方面，也就難以會有進步的。

再從培育種子的方法上來說，培育種子主要的是灌溉和施肥，在第一段內，灌溉和施肥都僅僅有了萌芽，在多數場合，還是憑天由命，一遇到天旱的時候，只會祈求上帝，此外，只有束手無策。到了第二段的時候，灌溉和施肥都已經有了大大的進步了。此一讀孟子韓非子呂氏春秋管子前後漢書即知，尤其關於水利工事，國家且用極大的經費去經營，地方官吏之良否，亦以能否興修陂池，福國利民為其評價之一，其為社會所重視，可想而知。迨至第三段之內，水利事業比着第二段是差池了一點，雖然，也有對於水利工事之零星的修作。

復次，從當作耕作的地盤之土地的利用上來說，在第一段內，土地所有權握之於公子貴族之手，一般農民沒有所有權，只是耕作於公子貴族的土地之上，於收入中供給貴族以若干生產物；或則，一面耕貴族之田，自己得收入之全部，

一面以自己勞力於若干時間內為貴族耕作，全部收穫，此時則全歸於貴族。總之，土地私有制在當時未普遍於耕作的農民中，只在貴族手中反覆的進行着，清清楚楚，農民是勞動力的所有者，而貴族乃是土地的所有者。到了第二段，土地私有制逐漸的底於完成，只要有貨幣，就可以購買土地而取得土地的所有權，農奴們也隨着被解放而為自由民。此時，在土地制度上發生了一個新的問題，即是：土地兼并問題，直弄得「富者田連阡陌，貧者無立錐之地，」階級鬭爭，亦於此展開了一個新的陣勢。及至第三段內，內亂和外寇，把社會秩序，弄得騷亂萬分，人民或則流亡，或則被虜，總之，與土地失去了定着關係，誠如司馬朗所言：

今承大亂之後，民人分散，土業無主，皆為公田。（魏志本傳）

在這個時候，得到便宜的只有兩種人，一種是握有自衛武力的土豪，他們結寨屯聚，流民歸其保護，土地多被佔壟，因之而形成豪族莊園；另一種人即是握有政權的軍事首領，他們因逼於農民流亡，土地荒蕪，穀糧不給，乃不得不使其部下兵士從事耕作，或則租與農民每年出若干租物，但無土地所有權，因之而形成國家莊園。大體上說，豪族莊園盛行於南朝，國家莊園盛行於北朝，這兩種土地制度的成立，就是說明土地私有權比以前又反形模糊了。

最後，再從勞動編制上來說，在第一段的時候，農奴是提供勞動力的主要階級，貴族完全脫離了生產過程，對立的主要陣勢存在於農奴與貴族之間。到了第二段的時候，農奴大多解放而為自由民，他們之中起了分化，有的上昇而為自由地主，有的則降而為自由貧農，同時，昔日之貴族於此時亦起了分化，有的沒落了，有的變而為新興地主，這個時候，對立的主要陣勢，存在於自由貧農與自由地主之間。所

謂自由貧農，包括百畝地以中小自耕農及僱農，這般人是當時社會生產所賴以支撐的臺柱。

有不少的人，抱着另一種見解，以為兩漢是奴隸社會時代，當然認為奴隸是當時社會生產的主要階級了。這一種人所以認兩漢為奴隸社會時代，並非是在兩漢書上找出什麼堅固的證據，乃是受了(一)公式上有這麼一段，(二)為奴隸社會之標準型態的希臘羅馬恰與兩漢在時代上相對，這兩種勢力之不知不覺的迷亂，不從真實的因素上探究，而從相似的表形上誇張，這是頗大的毛病。我們首先要考慮的是：奴隸社會是必經的歷史階段嗎？如果不是的話，就用不着照抄公式。其次再把兩漢社會拿來和標準形態的奴隸社會相比：(一)在生產勞動上來說，兩漢社會生產是以奴隸勞動為基礎抑是以另外的勞動勢力為基礎？(二)在奴隸來源上來說，兩漢的奴隸也如同希臘羅馬似的由於對外戰爭之大批俘虜而來的嗎？(三)在人口比例上說，兩漢奴隸的總數能否與標準奴隸社會之奴隸比自由民超過了三倍以上的估額相比？即是說：兩漢奴隸，在這時五千萬人口中能否有三四千萬之多？(四)在耕作制度上來說，兩漢是大農場耕作制呢抑是分散的小農場耕作制？(五)在剝削關係上來說，兩漢有閒階級之存在和消費是以對奴隸之剝削為其主要源泉抑是以對自由農民之剝削為其主要源泉？(六)在階級關係上來說，兩漢的主力的階級鬭爭，是存在於自由民與奴隸之間抑是存在於自由地主與自由農民之間？(七)在國家政權的性質上來說，兩漢是否如希臘羅馬之為商人以及地主而商人化之政權？(八)在地理背景上來說，希臘羅馬與兩漢之差別何在？其差別，是否足以影響於其社會性質？……把這些問題加以多方的考慮之後，然後再反覆的細讀兩漢書，一篇一傳都深深的加以吟味，要自反自問：「這種現象是在奴隸社會之下，可能發生的嗎？」把這種現象置

之於何種社會之下，纔能圓滿無憾的說明呢？」不僅從直接正面的材料上審問牠，還要從反面的材料上詰難牠，從全盤的社會意義下判斷牠，如此纔不致陷於一知半解或曲解附會的羊腸小道中。

爲了對付這個問題，我在拙著中國經濟史第二冊內費了五萬字的工夫，結論是：

我們是企圖着從多方面的辯難以考察兩漢是否爲奴隸社會一問題。從生產過程上看，奴隸勞動不及自由農民與租佃勞動之勢力的重要；從耕作制度上看，兩漢之土地耕作是細分耕作制而非希臘羅馬之大農場耕作制，從階級鬭爭上看，兩漢的階級鬭爭是進行於自由民與自由民之間，即是進行於大地主與貧農無產者之間，而非進行於自由民與奴隸之間；從國家政權的性質上看，兩漢是地主政權，而非希臘羅馬之奴隸主政權；從人口比例及社會組織上看，兩漢是自由農社會，奴隸在全人口中爲數甚少，非希臘羅馬之奴隸占人口總數三分之二以上者可比；從奴隸來源上看，兩漢之奴隸大多是本國內之赤貧的農民所轉化而成，而非希臘羅馬以對外戰爭爲狩取奴隸並以爲其維持奴隸社會之重要的支柱者可比，所以兩漢之奴隸來源較之希臘羅馬遠爲細弱；從國家政權的轉移上看，漢家政權是亡於農民暴動中，非如希臘羅馬之亡於奴隸來源的涸竭之中。

不過，我仍然承認奴隸在勞動編製上之應有地位，因爲歷史上確切有奴隸參加於生產過程之證據，但是，牠不及自由農民勞動勢力之廣大和重要。

到了第三大段的時候，勞動編制的變化，是：從自由農民到農奴。農民耕作於大族莊園或國家莊園之上，不復是耕作於自己的土地之上了。當然在這時，仍有多量的自由農之

存在。不過，牠不復是一個支配形態罷了。

三 從工商業上看經濟轉換

工業應當也在前一個小題目內講到，但因為牠與商業有密切關係，所以擱在這一個小題目內來講，倒覺方便。

在第一大段內，工業製造工具，咸爲銅器，製造品亦無特別精良可紀者，據考工記稱：「攻木之工七，攻金之工六，攻皮之工五，設色之工五，刮摩之工五，搏植之工二」可謂略具分工規模。工人完全寄養於官府而爲官家工作，沒有自由工人，沒有私人製造場所，也沒有工資。製成品，原以應貴族之直接消耗，非如商品生產之以消售於市場爲目的者可比。

到了第二段的時候，工業上，就有了幾個顯著的進步標誌，第一、是鐵製工具之使用，管子上講得很清楚，不用多述。第二、自由工人之出現，昔日束於官府之工奴，今則獲得解放，擇業自由，行住自由，以一定的金錢代價，也可以自由的把一定的勞動力付之。第三、商品生產性質之逐漸顯現，在以前是爲直接消耗而製造，現在則已滲透了若干爲市場而製造的商品生產的性質，史記貨殖傳講：

船長千丈，木千章，竹竿萬個，輶車百乘，牛車千兩，木器繫者千枚，銅器千鈞，素木鐵器若卮鬲千石，僮手指千，筋角丹沙千斤，帛絮細布千鈞，文采千匹，褐布皮革千石，漆千斗，狐貉裘千皮，羔羊裘千石，旃席千具。

這樣的大量製造，當然非一身一家之所能消耗完盡，甚且全不消耗，而以之提供於市場，希圖贏利，這種情形，在第一段內是看不到的。第四個進步的標誌，是鹽鐵煮鑄工業之突飛的活躍，尤其在秦漢之際，鹽鐵業家大多財累萬金，

僮奴成千，與封君侔富。其餘在各方面都有進步，不過，我們只提出這四種重大的表現罷了。

在第三大段之內，我們不但看不到有什麼進步，反而各方面都沒有以前的光芒活亮了。只有一件事情，我想是比前進步了，那就是造船工業，當時的南北戰爭，以及南朝的內戰，不斷的舉行於長江之上，水中戰爭，最重要的武器便是戰船了，所以各國都競造戰船，規模務求其廣大，行駛務求其堅牢，據史書所載，有的船上簡直能馳馬，其大可想而知。

我們再講商業。在第一大段內，商業只進於貴族之間，農奴很少參加於交換過程，即使在貴族之間，所交換的只是奇寶珍物，別的東西少見。交換手段只是粟帛之類，金鑄貨幣未有使用，我們可稱牠為「物物交換」時代。

到了第二大段，交換的廣度和密度都比以前強大了。因為社會分工的發達，所以交換的商品種類，比以前也多了，鹽鐵工業的發達，為當時商業奠立了一個最光彩的舞臺，鹽鐵業家差不多都是以煮鑄家之身而兼操行銷的機能，這樣，牠們的贏利越發可觀，權勢越發輝耀，使握有政權之地主階級的頭子，頓覺臥榻之旁，竟有「他人愁睡」之懼：到後來，毅然收鹽鐵為國有，雖係國家財政窮困使然，抑亦階級鬭爭之一大事變也。交換手段，從物物交換，到貨幣交換，西漢一代，金幣之大量的行使，尤足驚人。新的商業都市，各處都已形成，戰國策所謂：「千丈之城，萬家之邑相望，」其都市繁榮，可想而知。據史記貨殖傳所載，當時有名的都市，如關中區域之長安、巴蜀、天水、隴西、北地、上郡；三河區域之平陽、陳、溫、軹、洛陽、潁川、宛；燕趙區域之邯鄲、燕都；齊魯梁宋之臨淄、睢陽、陶；楚越區域之江陵、吳、壽春、合肥、番禺；皆殷富大都，街衢五

通，商賈之所臻，萬物之所殖，誠如鹽鐵論所謂：

燕之涿薊，趙之邯鄲，魏之溫軹，韓之滎陽，齊之臨淄，楚之宛丘，鄭之陽翟，二周之三川，富冠海內，皆爲天下名都。

在這些都市之中，商業發達，民戶繁盛，人口最多的地方，有至三四十萬之衆者，怪不得歷史家這樣的描寫牠們：「臨淄之塗，車轂擊，人肩摩，連衽成帷，舉袂成幕，揮汗成雨。」

到了第三段時候，商業在各種表象上比以前的神色都灰喪了，商業的統通範圍，因到處的割據荒亂，而大受限制，人民愁困饑餓，購買力爲之縮減，貨幣經濟大有返於物物交換之勢，最顯著的是商業都市之破壞，讀鮑明遠蕪城賦，不禁感慨系之矣！其辭曰：

當昔全盛之時，車挂轡，人駕肩，塵閉撲地，歌吹沸天……出入三代五百餘載，竟瓜剖而豆分，木魅山鬼，野鼠城狐，饑鷹厲吻，寒鴟嚇雛，崩榛塞路，崢嶸古墟，白楊早落，塞草前衰，通池既已夷，峻嶠又已頽，直視千里外，唯見起黃埃，凝思寂聽，心傷已摧——若夫藻扃翻帳，歌堂舞臺之基，璿淵碧樹，弋林釣渚之館，皆薰歇燼燼，光沉響絕，東都妙姬，南國麗人，蕙心紈質，玉貌絳唇，莫不埋冤幽石，委骨窮塵，豈憶同與之娛樂，離宮之辛苦哉？天道如何，吞恨者多，抽琴命操，爲蕪城之歌，歌曰：「邊風急兮城上寒，井陘滅兮丘隴殘，千齡兮萬代，共盡兮何言！」（見六朝文絮）

以前是那樣的繁榮熱鬧，那樣的一個五光十色的花花世界，到如今只落得草木黃落，狐鼠悲鳴，歌臺傾頽，丘隴荒殘，怎不叫多情善感的騷人墨客爲之擊腕傷傷耶？

鮑明遠所嘆嗟的雖只限於蕪城一域，但以之追悼當時的

全部商業都市亦無不合，以長安而論，據史記所示：「長安富甲天下，量其富什居其六」，又據三輔黃圖所示：長安之都市建築，均極華貴，又西京賦亦言：「九市開場，貨別隄分」，是知長安之繁華，已達高峯。但好花不常，盛筵難再，曾及何時，而董卓倡亂，胡馬繼踏，長安之瓊樓玉宇，盡為瓦礫，史書言董卓亂後，關中數年間無復行人，在此種情況之下，還有什麼商業之可言？永嘉亂後，長安更淪絕境，晉書言「永嘉之亂，天下崩離，長安城中，戶不盈百，牆宇頽毀，蒿棘成林。」以視漢時元平間擁有三十萬左右人口之長安，幾前後若兩地也。

再看洛陽。洛陽經董卓李傕郭汜蹂躪之後，破壞不堪，三國志言，董卓離洛陽的時候，殺人放火，因之，二百里內無復鷄犬，其慘苦達於極點。其後，繼之以三國爭霸，兵荒馬亂，洛陽毫無恢復之望，所謂：「魏武定霸，三方鼎立，生靈叛蕩，關洛荒蕪。」（晉書地理志）乃至晉世，懷愍不建，洛陽為胡寇所圍，「王師累敗，府帑既竭，百官飢甚，比屋不見煙火，飢人自相啖食。」（晉書食貨志）誠如孫楚傳所謂：「中原蕩蕩，一時橫流，百郡千城，曾無完郭，蒼生殄滅，百不遺一，河洛丘墟，函夏蕭條，井煙木刊，阡陌夷滅，生靈茫茫，永無依歸！」（晉書）宋劉裕到洛陽的時候，看見這種情形，就非常痛心，他說：「伊洛榛蕪，津塗久廢，山川無改，城闕為墟，宮廟隳頓，鐘簾空列，觀宇之餘，鞠為禾黍，塵里蕭條，鷄犬罕音，感舊永懷，痛心在目。」（見六朝文絜，傅亮著：為宋公至洛陽謁五陵表）

長安洛陽是西漢盛時之最光榮的都市，今竟凋零如此，其他大都市之沒落，亦比比皆然。

四 從政治社會的組構上看經濟轉移

在縱的關係上來說，經濟是政治社會組構的基礎條件，在橫的關係上來說，政治社會組構，又是經濟活動的主客條件，這兩者之間，存有密切難離的統一關係，不應當機械的把某一部分輕視。

第一段的政治社會組構，可稱為分封的采邑政治時代，這是氏族社會破壞後緊接着的一段封建社會之形成期，所以在本階級之內，還可以看到不少氏族社會的形跡，有人稱此期為氏族社會之末期，不無相當理由，本來在歷史上也有於氏族社會結束後即繼之以封建社會者，這兩個時代好像子母相尅而又緊緊相接，所以不妨有人稱之為氏族社會末期，而我們則視之為封建社會的初成期。這一個時期，合采邑的封君握有經濟的政治的支配權，在當時，唯一的生產憑藉是土地，而土地即完全為封君的私有物，廣大的農奴羣衆全無染指的可能，他們只是在封君底下當作不自由的牛馬使用。但是，在經濟生產上，封君也很認識了農奴羣衆的重要地位，因為死的土地必有待於活的農奴之開發，纔能產出一定的經濟價值，非然者，土地簡直是廢物。所以在當時不斷的發動戰爭，而戰爭之所以發動，百分之九十九都是基因於對土地和農奴之掠奪。階級鬭爭存在於封君與農奴之間，但農奴們缺乏的是自覺意識，所以少有偉大的革命鬭爭，不過，零星的怠工和叛亂，我們已經看見了。

第二大段，可稱為君主集權的統一政治時代，已經不是從前那樣的羣龍無首，亂打亂鬧的樣子了。因為土地私有制之展開，商業交換作用之擴張，貨幣之鑄造和大量行使，過去之社會結構，隨之轉化，貴族轉化為大地主或趨於沒落，農奴獲得解放，有上昇為地主或更趨窮困而流亡而賣身為奴隸，總之，此時社會之對立狀態，在上面站着握有土地和貨幣的大地主和富商大賈，下面站着握有少許土地或根本無土

地而供給勞動力的中小自由農民，赤貧的自由農民、僱農、及奴隸，在經濟情況的極度惡化之下，雙方的鬭爭，便大規模的暴發，所謂遍地的農民暴動是也。此外，地主與商人間之鬭爭，亦現出火燄萬丈的煙霧，原因是由於商人階級之勢力熾赫，地主階級爲固持政權之穩確，不得不以法令限制或暴力摧殘之，因此，雙方間的鬭爭，在歷史上也留下了不可磨滅的痕跡。在社會關係上看，人與人之間，還有相當的自由精神，不像前一時代和後一時代那樣的貴族與農奴之間的鴻溝天隔不可飛渡的情勢。那怕你是大地主，我是貧農，在經濟上你比我優厚，在社會地位上，我們同是「編戶齊民」，決不是前一時代「士之子恆爲士，農之子恆爲農，工之子恆爲工」，也不是後一時代「紫臺之路，常滿縉紳之儔，組纓之閣，必係金張之胤」者可比，自由活動精神，在這一大大段內是相對的顯著的事，當然，在階級社會未消滅以前，人們不會是絕對意義的自由。

第三大段可稱爲割據的莊園政治時代，此時，統一政治破壞，國內擾亂，繼續了數百年之久，野蠻人鐵騎所至，人物俱碎，中國不曾有強力政府，籌劃驅抗之對策，只是偏竄江南，而又互相篡殺。地主們在對政府失去了依恃的信心之後，就不能不自籌保衛之方，以冀其生命財產之得以苟全於亂世，於是屯塢自守，或築寨禦敵，晉書郭默傳言：「永嘉之亂，默率遺衆，自爲塢主。」晉書魏凌傳言：「杜尹爲弘農太守，屯宜陽界一泉塢。」南齊書魏虜傳言：「秦雍間七州民皆響震，衆至十萬，各自保壁。」梁書蕭景傳言：「時，天下未定，江北人僞楚，各據塢壁。」可見聚塢結寨是當時年頭荒亂中之必然的自衛組織。這種自衛組織的領導權，如何會握之於地主階級之手呢？其理由是因爲貧農無所留戀，所以到處流亡，至於地主階級則不然，他不能把大批

的田產，棄如敝蕪，他不願以高貴的身分，下與流民爲伍，所以他必須設法自衛，守死不去，聚塢結寨，乃其自衛之表現耳。其後，有兩種原素，幫助了此種組織形態的發展，第一：野心的軍事首領，爲擴張聲勢，奪取政權計，往往以金錢地位勾引他們，因爲他們直接掌握着各地方的軍事武力和經濟大權，在地方上素有聲勢，登高一呼，自有成千成萬的人們去附和他，如南齊書垣崇祖傳所謂：「崇祖父伯並爲淮北州郡門族布在北邊，百姓所信，一朝嘯咤，事功可立。」可見他們號召力量之大。他們有兵有馬，抓住了他們，卽是無代價的抓住了千兵萬馬，梁書康絢傳言：「宋永初中，穆舉鄉族三千餘家入襄陽之峴南，永元元年，義兵起，絢舉郡以應高祖，身率敢勇三千人，私馬二百五十匹以從。」當時的部曲制度，卽是在此種情勢之下形成的。第二：一般流民亦往往向大的莊塢乞求保護，於是莊塢人口大量集中，如魏志載：「管寧……避亂遼東，避亂者皆來就之，旬月而成邑。」「邴原在遼東，一年中往歸原居者，數百家。」晉書載：「時，百姓遭難，流移此境，流民多庇大姓以爲客。」這般客戶對莊塢領主之義務，是：戰則爲兵，耕則爲農，自由農之成分已褪，而農奴之氣味加濃。由此，足證莊園實爲當時政治社會之基本礎石，上面建立着龐大的統治結構，下面統制着廣大的農奴羣衆。國家政權及政治活動，只限於大家名門，一般農民幾難有過問餘地。在社會地位上，富貴貧賤，分得清清楚楚，卽使一個庸夫昏童，只要是官家豪門所出，不愁沒有官做，沒有社會地位，反之，卽使一個精明強幹的青年，不幸而出身寒門，也就該倒霉終生，永無出頭露面之一日。個人前途之發展，不繫於個人之努力與否，個人社會地位之高低，不繫於個人立身行事之是非善惡，這樣的政治社會，可謂惡劣到萬分了。我們讀南北朝諸史，關於此

種材料紀載觸目皆是，茲略舉數則如下：

膏梁年少，何患不達？（南齊書王僧虔傳）

金張世族，袁楊鼎貴，膏腴見重，事起於斯。（南齊書褚淵傳）

今臺閣選舉，徒塞耳目，九品訪人，惟問中正，故據上品者，非公侯之子孫，則當塗之昆弟也，二者苟然，則華門蓬戶之士，安有不陸沉者哉？（晉書段灼傳）

夫道學之貴游，閭邑之縉紳，皆高門之子，世臣之胤。

（晉書夏侯湛傳）

江謚寒士，誠當不得競爭華儕。（南齊書江謚傳）

上品無寒門，下品無勢族。（晉書劉毅傳）

淵既世族，儉亦國華。（南齊書何求傳）

每見選師傅，下至羣吏，率取膏梁擊鐘鼎食之家，希有儒素。（晉書閻續傳）

立中正不考人才行業，空辨氏族高下。（魏書崔亮傳）

士庶之際，實自天隔。（宋書王弘傳）

郡姓者，以中國士人差第門閥爲之，制：凡三世有三公，曰：膏梁；有令僕者，曰：華腴；尚書領護而上者，爲甲姓；九卿若方伯者，爲乙姓；散騎常侍大中大夫者，爲丙姓；吏部正員郎爲丁姓，凡得入者，謂之四姓，北齊因仍，舉秀才州主簿郡功曹，非四姓不得選。

（新唐書柳沖傳）

豪族們怕的他們的血族混亂，或寒士頂冒，所以對於族譜，非常注意，南齊書賈淵傳載：「淵三世傳學，凡十八州士族譜合百帙七百餘卷，精悉莫此比。」可見各地方對於家譜看得是非常要緊的。

因爲避胡人之亂，所以中原華族多入江左，因之與江南的舊貴族大生衝突，晉書周處傳言：「時，中國亡官失守之

士，避亂來者多居顯位，駕御吳人，吳人頗怨。」鬭爭的結果，是南方的貴族失敗，政治上遠不及北方移入的貴族之優勢，晉書何循傳言：「荆揚二州，戶各數十萬，今揚州無郎，而揚州江南乃無一人為京城職者！」南齊書沈文季傳言：「世祖謂文季曰：南土無僕射，多歷年所，文季對曰：南風不競，非復一日！」足證南方貴族被排擠之一般。

因為經濟上，各地方是互相隔離，各莊塢差不多都是一個自給自足的小單元，所以政治上也是割據的，各地方連接不斷的互相攻打，經濟情勢，愈加惡化了。

五 從社會經濟的總合上看經濟轉移

這一個小題目的意向，是要從社會秩序上，人口狀況上，以及社會的生活情形上，觀察此一千餘年間之經濟轉換。

在第一大段的時候，社會秩序非常紊亂，諸侯間互相爭奪，今日甲國的土地被佔，明日乙國的人民被俘，所以人民無從致力於有計劃的勞動工作。各國雖皆提倡人口生育，但因為戰亂連年，所以死亡的也不在少數，人口不見有多量的增加。生活方面，在貴族當然要舒適得多，在農民則苦痛不堪，所謂「無衣無褐，何以卒歲？」所謂「十月蟋蟀入我牀下，穹室熏鼠，塞向瑾戶。」所謂「采荼薪芻，食我農夫」（皆見詩經）都是說明一般下層民衆之衣食住如何的不像樣子。

到了第二大段，社會秩序總算是比較的安定，和平期間比戰爭的期間要多，農民得以安居樂業，致力耕作，所以社會上表現着一種欣欣向榮的發揚精神，尤以前漢之文景及後漢之明章諸帝時代，社會經濟透露着愉快的光亮。史記平準書載：「漢興七十餘年之間，國家無事，非遇水旱之災，則

民人給家足，都鄙廩庾皆滿，而府庫餘貨財，京師之錢累巨萬，貫朽而不可校，太倉之粟，陳陳相因，充溢露積於外，至腐敗不可食，衆庶街巷有馬，阡陌之間成羣，而乘字牝者擯不得聚會，守閭閻者食梁肉，爲吏者長子孫，居官者以爲姓號，故人人自愛而重犯法，先行義而後黜恥辱焉。」這一段美麗的文字，正道出當時社會經濟充實豐溢的景象，我們這般後之讀史者，覺得愉快的很。固然，這種飽和狀態在其後的若干年間是被破壞了，但是，一度破壞過後，即有另一穩定狀態繼之，而且在這大段內之所謂破壞，較之前一段或後一段內之所謂昇平，猶有過之。人口急突的增加了，元平之時，竟達五千萬之多，在一兩千年中，不但是空前，而且是絕後。人民的生活總算是進步了，最值得慶幸的是從不自由的農奴變而爲自由的社會成員，也許有人看到當時流民之多，罵這種自由是饑餓的自由，但是，在歷史的意義上來看，總是進步了。

從愉快轉到憂鬱，從繁榮轉到喪亂，從致平轉到騷戰，從穩步實進的人生轉到清談玩世或鑽營苟且的人生，這是意味着歷史要從快樂的舞臺跌到不幸的深淵了。在第三大段之內，社會直無秩序之可言，戰爭頻繁，內外交逼，人民流亡死傷，性命莫保，當然，經濟生產不能平穩進行，因之，社會經濟之窮困，隨以俱來，此種情形，在當時史書中，舉之不勝其舉，茲隨手抄舉數則，以見一般。

關東諸州郡起兵，衆數十萬，皆集滎陽及河內，諸將不能相一：縱兵抄略，民人死者且半。（三國志司馬朗傳）

今日名都空而不居，百里絕而無民者，不可勝數。（仲長統昌言）

今中國蕭條，或百里無煙，城邑空虛，道瑾相望。（吳志江表傳）

舊京空虛，數百里中無煙火。（同上）

自董卓作亂以至今，近出百年，四海勒瘁，丁難極矣。

（晉書劉頌傳）

自初平之元，訖於建安之末，三十年中，萬姓流散，死亡略盡，斯亂之極也。（晉書山濤傳）

時（惠帝）諸郡百姓飢饉，白骨蔽野，百無一存（晉書賈疋傳）自頃國遭無妄之禍，社稷有綴旒之危，寇羯飲馬於長江，兇狡鷓張於萬里，遂使神州蕭條，鞠為茂草，四海之內，人跡不交。（晉書戴若思傳）

臣自涉州疆，目睹困乏，流移四散，十不存二，死亡委積，白骨橫野，哀呼之聲，感傷和氣。（晉書劉琨傳）

江州蕭條，白骨塗地，豫章一郡，十殘其八。（晉書王鑿傳）

這是從三國以至於晉朝的整個情形。社會荒亂到這種地步，人民饑餓到不像樣子，皇帝還拿出「幽默」的語句，向人民開玩笑，你看晉書上講：「時，天下荒亂，百姓餓死，帝（惠帝）曰：何不食肉糜？」這真是一個昏庸的「混蛋」！

繼此，而南北分爭，戰亂尤甚，社會經濟，更無恢復之望，人口最多時，比之漢元平間，也要相差十倍了。

Economic Change in Early Modern China: An Analytic Framework

by

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I. The Chinese Economy in the Perspective of Worldwide Economic Development

This paper tries to characterize broadly the process of economic change in China during the century of disturbance which ended with the collapse of the Ch'ing dynasty in 1911. In approaching this task we focus particularly upon the factors that retarded growth. In order to gain perspective upon this century of economic transformation in China and place it in the context of world economic development, we first outline briefly and schematically several paths which industrial-

ization has followed since 1750 in different parts of the world.

A. Phases of the Industrialization Process

Although the process of industrialization has characteristically moved through certain definite phases, both the number and the sequence of these phases have varied in different countries. At the risk of oversimplification we may distinguish two basic models, with the early starters, and particularly England, falling into one pattern and many of the underdeveloped countries of today fitting into the other.

The industrialization process among these latecomers may be divided into five phases characterized by (1) traditional equilibrium, (2) the rise of disequilibrating forces, (3) gestation, (4) breakthrough or as some prefer to call it, take-off, and (5) self-sustaining growth. Typical features of these periods may be generalized as follows:

In phase one, minor growth, innovation and technological change may occur but they are not sufficient to break the rigid and inhibiting bonds of the traditional framework of social and economic institutions.

In phase two, disequilibrating forces which arise are typically exogenous, originating outside the society and subjecting it to the shocks of war, invasion, colonial rule or the like.

In phase three, these shocks weaken the traditional

forms of political, legal, social and economic organization, while new institutions and modes of production are introduced and clash with the old. Disruption is mingled with construction to produce increasing tension between the technically possible and the institutionally feasible. Gestation is evidenced in the creation of certain external economies (e. g., transport, modern commercial or banking facilities), certain industrial nuclei and technically skilled labor, all prerequisite for a breakthrough.

Phase four sees a rapid spurt in the rate of industrial production based in turn on increased rates of investment. Typically industrial growth tends to be most rapid during the breakthrough or take-off, since it is at this stage that the shifts in the production functions are most marked; for many of these are based on once-for-all economies exemplified by shifts from handicraft to machine methods of production. Usually the active leadership in this process is in one or two sectors--textiles, mining, or foreign trade. Industrial growth is accompanied by continuing changes in agriculture.

In phase five, the new industrial economy eventually enters a stage of self-generating growth which continues at a higher rate than under the old order, although less rapidly than during the period of breakthrough. As the growth of established industries slows down, new industries arise to take the lead in the process,

indicating that the economic institutions of the society have now become truly industrial--that is, such factors of production as labor and capital have acquired a high degree of mobility and the institutional obstacles to change have been minimized. Economic change and growth, in short, have become institutionalized.

This model fits the experience of India, China, and most other Far Eastern areas (with the exception of Japan) better than it does the experience of the West European countries. For them, the British model is much more applicable. Professor Rostow's three-stage model outlined in his most stimulating article on "The Take-off into Self-Sustained Growth" ¹ applies mainly to this British Experience.

The distinguishing feature of the British model is that the traditional preindustrial order itself provided a framework for gestation. The commercial revolution of the mercantile period and the agricultural revolution following it were the necessary precursors of the industrial revolution in England. Endogenous, i. e. internally generated, forces played a dominant role in the rise of disequilibrating forces in the form of new inventions, advances in technology and innovations. Precisely because the disequilibrating forces in the English case arose as the culmination of a long process of preparation, they led directly to a breakthrough,

¹ *Economic Journal*, LXVI, 261, 1956, pp. 25-48.

rather than to a prolonged pre-industrial period of tension and gestation as in the Far Eastern case.

In between these two patterns or models are a number of intermediate cases in which intricate interplays of exogenous and endogenous factors produced the disequilibrating forces. For instance, in Japan gestation (in the form of growing commercialization during the late Tokugawa era) evolved endogenously as in Britain; but at the same time, unlike the British case, disequilibrating forces arose exogenously in the shock of foreign contact after Perry "opened" Japan. However, with the period of previous preparation, the Western impact on Japan--unlike that on China--led directly to a breakthrough during the Meiji era.

B. Phases of Industrialization in China

The above scheme can be applied to China by assuming that the Chinese economy of the early nineteenth century was in the first phase, that of traditional equilibrium. The old order had already begun to be disturbed by the population growth of the eighteenth century (the process of domestic decline, which became manifest in rebellion, awaits further appraisal). Meanwhile, the best known agent of change in the nineteenth century was exogenous--the growth of Western trade at Canton, which drew China into the network of expanding world trade. The disequilibrating

force of the Opium War of 1840 and the Western political and commercial impact thus coincided with the growth of domestic problems of population pressure and administrative decay typical of a period of dynastic decline. These changes began a century-long process of disintegration, transformation and slow gestation within the traditional Chinese order. During this long period, as we shall see, new institutions grew up side by side with traditional ones, a modern economy was built up on the periphery of the old economy, and there was sporadic and scattered growth in some areas (export trade and railroadbuilding), paralleled by decline or collapse in other sectors (rural handicrafts, particularly cotton spinning). These developments in the latter part of the nineteenth century began to generate an acute degree of tension, in the minds of proud conservatives and later in the minds of modern patriotic Chinese-- a tension between the vision of changes which seemed technologically possible for the growth of national strength and the betterment of Chinese life, and the frustrating realities that prevented national self-realization and industrialization within the institutional structure of the old Chinese society. This tension gradually built up to explosive proportions, until the shackles of the old order were violently broken and the Chinese economy erupted at long last into an industrial take-off under totalitarian control which we are witnessing

today.

The vigor and violence of the present breakthrough under Communist auspices seems to have been exacerbated by the unusually prolonged period of gestation. China's remarkable early slowness in responding to the Western economic impact may lie behind her present rapidity of change. The fact that the rise of disequilibrating forces and the period of gestation, according to our model, together occupied at least a century suggests a major problem in the study of Chinese economic history--namely, the institutional stability of the old order, which remained remarkably inert long after the traditional equilibrium had been disturbed.

Two concepts may be suggested to account for China's tardiness of response. One is the view that the traditional Chinese order, within the limitations of its inherited technology and value system, had become over the centuries a strongly integrated society with institutions which, developed over long periods, had attained a high degree of sophistication. The old China was thus a firmly-knit and thoroughly tested society with a culture of great vitality. It was also enormous in size, as well as far removed from the aggressive Atlantic society at the other end of the Eurasian land mass. It could not easily adopt Western ways without a fundamental remaking of the entire social order.

The second concept explains China's slow response

in terms of political institutions: it suggests that China's political tradition inhibited the growth of a nation state. The Middle Kingdom had remained a universal empire in Eastern Asia, subject to the periodic control of non-Chinese dynasties whose alien rule at Peking frustrated the growth of modern nationalism. Hence China lacked both the public sentiment and the political leadership necessary for a Japanese type of rapid Westernization.

However China's slowness may be explained, the modern century of her economic history presents us with a record of retarded development. While this cannot be called a period of "stagnation" in the literal sense of "standing still," it was at least one of far-reaching social and economic disorganization, which may even have resulted in an actual decline of per capita product. Should further research support this hypothesis, such a decline could be viewed as a concomitant of this period of disturbance, representing the price China had to pay for future growth. Perhaps the disturbance and decline constituted social and economic costs the country had to bear in order to create the preconditions for subsequent economic growth.

II. The Old Order

Before we proceed with an analysis of the Chinese economy of a century ago, certain generalizations are necessary. First, while the old order in China exhibited

many characteristics typical of a pre-industrial economy, there were some notable differences between the preindustrial economies of Europe and China. The Chinese economy existed in an institutional and cultural framework distinctly different from that of Western societies. For example, the single fact of a rice economy based on widespread use of water had far-reaching implications affecting the relationship between land and labor, the density of population, and the forms of village, family and kinship organization. These cultural and institutional differences affected the capacity of the economy to adapt itself to change, to grow and to industrialize.

A second general point is that the economy of early nineteenth-century China approximated rather closely Malthus's and Ricardo's model of a "stationary state," with a population pressing against resources close to the margin of subsistence. The prevailing level of technology remaining more or less static, both the Malthusian population checks and the law of diminishing returns were operative. In sum, the China of the early nineteenth century had a circular-flow economy in which production was absorbed in consumption, with very little if any net saving, so that the economy merely reproduced itself without advancing.

Finally, one basic general factor in China's economic destiny was the rapid population growth in the eighteenth century which led to a doubling, or more, in the mere

number of the Chinese people, without much immediate change in the character of their economy, culture and institutions. This demographic growth had been made possible by agricultural expansion in the early Ch'ing period of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, which was facilitated both by the peace and order established under the strong Manchu dynasty after 1644 and its comparatively efficient administration, and by the earlier introduction of new crops like maize, sweet potatoes and peanuts in the period after 1500. The new crops greatly widened the food base by making previously marginal soils productive. By the early nineteenth century, however, the margin or reservoir obtained through the introduction of new crops and varieties was probably exhausted, so that population was pushing against the limit of available resources at the prevailing level of technology. While living standards may have risen in the eighteenth century (on this we lack data), it seems probable that they were forced down in the early nineteenth century. The population expansion had not been accompanied by an agricultural revolution comparable to that of eighteenth century England, while the growth of foreign trade and a money economy during the late Ming and early Ch'ing periods (manifest, for example, in the "single-whip" tax reform) had been contained within the traditional social order.

In effect, the period of the late Ming and early Ch'ing can be characterized as one of extensive, rather

than intensive, growth based on expansion of cultivated land area and population. The new crops were not in the category of major technological innovations likely to affect the basic modes of production in either agriculture or processing. While there was some commercialization of the economy, it was not a major or disequilibrating change.

Thus we begin with the general assumption that the Chinese peasantry, through their adaptation to environment, had attained an optimum efficiency in resource use and allocation at a more or less stationary level of technology.

We divide the old Chinese economy of the period 1800-1850 into three levels: (1) the agrarian (rural) level, (2) the commercial level, which is superimposed on the agrarian, and (3) the governmental level which is superimposed on both the agrarian and the commercial.

A. The Agrarian Level

The agrarian level was that of the villages where seventy to eighty per cent of the Chinese people lived.

The capital equipment of the economy at this level included a large accumulation of man-made installations which had been inherited over the centuries--for example, paddy fields with their embankments, dikes and sluiceways, as well as terraced fields for dry farming, irrigation canals of all sorts together with the wooden contrivances for lifting water, wells, the usual village

and farmstead buildings together with groves of mulberry trees, tea bushes, and other resources for handicraft production. Accumulating over many generations, these installations represented an extensive and long-continued investment of labor and in turn made possible a more efficient application of manpower to the soil. It was noteworthy that among these items of capital equipment such as wooden plows and stone grain-grinding rollers there was a minimum of metal equipment and machinery. Irrigation water might be lifted, for example, by a rather simple foot treadle or, alternatively, by a mere bucket with ropes held by two persons. Technical devices commonly in use were geared to the ready availability of cheap manpowers.

The natural resources available to the agrarian economy, combined with the capital installations mentioned above, set the character of economic activity. After the eighteenth century extension of cultivation, the additional resources of water and soil available for an increase of cultivation were not great. Similarly, by that time the destruction of forest cover had proceeded very far while degree of reforestation was insignificant. Coal deposits, although abundant in the northwest and other areas, were not developed and coal was used only on a small scale for local industries. Among the extractive industries, fisheries were rather well developed, both inland and on the coast. Copper, tin and lead were mined in the southwest but had perhaps

reached diminishing returns. Iron mining was comparatively undeveloped. In short, the Chinese peasants' use of natural resources was pretty much at the bamboo and wattle level.

Labor in the village was comparatively plentiful per unit of cultivated area. The population increase, under way since the eighteenth century, had left a high proportion of the people in the younger age brackets. Rich culture in South and Central China and the comparable garden-farming methods of North China created a high seasonal demand for hands, and a corresponding need for handicraft production to absorb farm labor power in the off seasons. Cropping systems, ranging from the double-cropping of rice in the far south to the winter wheat of North China, made use of this farm labor power, but its year-round employment was made possible only by the subsidiary handicraft industries--especially cotton, silk, and tea production. These industries in South China, together with the longer growing season, provided the basis for somewhat higher consumption standards than in North China, where seasonal unemployment and chronic underemployment were more prevalent. The abundance and cheapness of labor fostered and perpetuated the labor-intensive methods of farm production--for example, those used in the tea, silk and cotton industries, in hand or manpower irrigation, in transplanting and harvesting of rice and other crops; and also in the use of manpower

for transportation by pole, barrow, chair, or the rowing, sculling or tracking of vessels. In other words, not only agriculture but also transport was labor-intensive.

Farm technology, through an age-long and continuous process of adaptation between land and labor, had come to be based on highly intensive land use with comparatively high yields per unit of land but a low yield per unit of labor. The stability of this technology was posited on the whole economic and institutional structure. The relative abundance of labor tended to minimize the inducement to innovate, while the scarcity of capital impeded the capacity to do so. At the same time, the traditional assumptions of the peasantry and the landlord-gentry militated against rapid technical change.

Land tenure, based on a general freedom to buy and sell land, cannot be called "feudal" in the Western European sense, and there were few legal shackles on the peasantry (such as serfdom or villainage). Yet the hard facts of the population-resource balance, aggravated by the prevailing systems of agricultural taxation, credit and marketing, kept the peasant near the margin of subsistence. As the nineteenth century wore on, owner operators were in increasing danger of having to sell their land to make ends meet in a bad year. Tenants were in similar danger of getting so heavily into debt that absconding into pauperism or banditry was their only way out. The system of land tenure lent itself to

an increasing concentration of land holding, tenancy and absentee landlordism in modern times.

The social structure and customs, although they provided a stable matrix for the various factors of farm production, included certain institutions which particularly inhibited an increase in the efficiency of production. For example, the lack of primogeniture and the customary fragmentation of land holdings among all the sons, and the comparatively enormous expenditures expected for marriage and funeral ceremonies, all served to inhibit saving. Above all, the distinction between the literate upper classes of landlords, merchants, officials and city-dwellers on the one hand, and the great mass of the illiterate peasantry on the other hand, set a limit to the latter's capacity for innovation. The difficulties of the ideographic script kept the Chinese peasant at the coolie level, able to use his manpower with certain time-tried techniques and devices, but unable to rise easily into the upper strata of society. Conversely, men of trained intelligence with leisure to innovate would not often be found in the fields or workshops. The Chinese class structure, reinforced by Confucian ideology, made a sharper division between hand-worker and brain-worker than in Western Europe. Thus the philosopher Chu Hsi might make his famous observation that the stones on a mountain-top had once been in the sea, but he was in no position to become Francis Bacon. None of China's great painters, though

ipso facto scholars, could become a Leonardo.

Entrepreneurship had little opportunity to develop at this rural level. The manufacture of consumer goods like cloth shoes, cotton textiles for clothing, silk and tea were naturally subordinate to agriculture and were generally geared to supplying a strictly local market by using limited capital resources, except as we shall note below. Extractive industries like mining, fishing and lumbering, while somewhat more specialized for the market, shared the same difficulties of being fragmented, labor-intensive and capital-poor, with little chance for expansion of production or of marketing.

B. The Commercial Level

This level of economic life served as a sort of highway or bridge linking the agrarian with the governmental level. It performed the distributive and exchange functions which met the closely related needs of inter-regional trade and rural-urban interchange.

The market structure of old China was extremely complex. The agrarian level of economic life was of course self-sufficient only in a relative sense: the share of the agricultural product entering trade channels was rather small, while the dependence of the rural sector upon non-farm purchases was also only of marginal importance. Broadly speaking, rural self-sufficiency was broken in two ways: (1) through unrequited

shipments of tax grain and (2) through an exchange of a variety of special products for salt and similar necessities, the few important staples that had to be purchased, and for a few luxury products. On the other hand, trade in the traditional economy can be considered as the supply system for the Chinese upper classes--that combination of large landowners, scholar literati, officials and merchants who constituted the mobile top strata over the inert peasant mass. These people provided the chief market for luxury products, just as they were also the population groups not directly engaged in the process of agricultural production.

Trading activity took place within a quite complex, inefficient and highly fragmented market organization characterized by a marked proliferation of middlemen. The market structure was inevitably peppered with strong monopolistic and monopsonistic tendencies. Trade in staple commodities, the demand for which was quite inelastic, was mostly subject to government monopoly. However, the system of official regulation and licensing frequently broke down in practice, as illustrated by the operation of the salt monopoly, where as much as half the salt might be distributed through illegal smuggling channels which were not secret so much as connived at by the lower officialdom. Of course, breaches of this type in the power of monopoly, far from leading to invigorated competition, merely involved a change from an official to an extra-legal system of licensing.

Within this framework, commodity flows ran through an interlocking maze of local, regional, and to some extent even international markets.

Local trade, to begin with, was part and parcel of rural life, centered on the local market towns with their fairs and periodic (typically, tenth-day) village markets to which merchants regularly brought their wares. This local trading activity had a regularity and rhythm comparable to the other cycles of rural activity which carried the villagers through their daily routines, through the seasons of the year, and through the span of human life in an established context of goals, expectations and techniques. Local trade distributed necessary consumer goods like salt, metal ware and paper to the peasant households, together with items considered to be luxuries, like porcelain, tea or silk. This distribution was effected with an extensive use of barter and personal credit arrangements. In exchange for goods brought in through local trade, the farm surpluses, if any (pigs, fruit, etc.), and special local products like wood oil or opium, were shipped out. Our typical picture of local trade is that it radiated out from the market town or fair about the distance that goods could be transported in one day on a round trip by carrying pole or sampan. This created a cellular pattern of local economy in which a region could survive indefinitely when nature was favorable and similarly might be devastated by natural calamity.

Interregional trade was superimposed on this cellular and interwoven pattern of local trade. Interregional trade was in part merely one aspect of the general urban-rural interchange, i. e., the aforementioned bridge between the agrarian and official levels. However, over and above this, it was a reflection of a certain amount of regional specialization. Among such regionally traded commodities were salt, which was made by a variety of means in some eleven officially established production areas and distributed thence by licensed merchants; tea and silk, which in much of South and Central China were local products of low grade but became goods for regional trade when produced in their highest quality (for example, the teas of Northern Fukien and Kiangsi; and the silk of the Huchow region inland from Shanghai); porcelain, which was specially produced under imperial auspices at Ching-te-chen in Kiangsi; copper, tin and lead which came particularly from Yunnan; or heavy timber such as was brought down the Yangtze.

International trade, against this background, may be viewed as merely a special, and from the point of view of the Chinese economy a rather unimportant, form of interregional trade. Chinese commodities which had gone abroad from ancient times had included the silks which crossed the ancient Central Asian route to Rome; Sung porcelain and copper coins, which went by sea throughout the Indian Ocean region; and brick tea,

which was taken from the Wuhan region up the Han River route toward Mongolia and Russia. Over the centuries the balance of trade had generally favored China, where the wide range of latitude from the tropics to Manchuria made for an essentially self-sufficient economy. There had been a general flow of gold and silver bullion from Japan, and especially from Mexico by way of the Philippines, with some later increments from Europe and India directly. The early Portuguese had facilitated the exchange of Chinese silk for Japanese silver through Macao. Meanwhile the major commercial development of pre-industrial China was carried on over the junk routes. The fleets of Ningpo exchanged a wide range of produce with the Korean peninsula and southern Manchuria. The main southern route centered on Amoy and went around the Southeast Asian coast to the straits of Malacca. Over this route came a variety of woods, spices and edibles, including sugar. However, none of these forms of international trade had dealt in staple consumer goods until the late eighteenth century, when raw cotton began to be imported from India.

The transport network which made possible this regional exchange within China as well as abroad was well developed within the limits of prevailing technology. The paths suitable for carrying-poles or barrows between villages were supplemented in Central and South China by waterways. Where the North China

coolie might compete with donkeys and on the northern border with camels, the chief carrier in the Yangtze basin and southward was the sampan powered by human muscle. Large gangs of transport coolies were available for the portages on the water routes—for example, the tea coolies who after 1850 carried shipments from Northern Fukien into the water network of Kiangsi. The water transportation of South and Central China by river, lake and canal served the great bulk of the Chinese population. The accumulated public works of centuries had produced a nexus of canal and sampan routes, fed by the broad continental system of rivers and lakes which were in turn nourished by the heavy precipitation over the hills and mountains of South China. As a result it was possible to move persons and goods by water routes that were continuous or almost continuous from Canton to Peking and from the southeast coast to the borders of Tibet.

The efficiency of Chinese inland water transport was remarked upon by the the early Western embassies to China in the late eighteenth century. Both the British Macartney embassy of 1793 and the Amherst embassy of 1816 on their return from Peking used the canal barge route all the way to Canton except for the brief portage of twenty-four miles or so over the Meiling Pass north of Canton. The Dutch embassy of 1794-95 used this route in both directions. These European observers estimated that Chinese rafts could carry

twenty tons on one foot of water.

Meanwhile, coastal transport by the seagoing junk fleets, which totaled on the order of 10,000 vessels, also provided a channel of domestic transportation all the way from Hainan Island to Manchuria. Sea transport of the grain supply for Peking by junk fleets around the Shantung promontory provided an alternative to the Grand Canal even before the decline of the latter after 1852. While not capable of the speed of clipper ships, Chinese junks with their lateen sails were remarkably efficient carriers, especially when using steady seasonal winds on established coastal routes.

All in all, we may regard the complex and pervasive network of Chinese water transport as comparable to the traditional farm economy--that is, highly developed within its technological limitations.

The supply of capital for the operation of this economy was comparatively limited. Savings might be accumulated by the enlarged family in the form of real estate, particularly land, but such savings were not liquid and were seldom available as a basis for credit creation except as security against loans. Rural moneylenders secured high rates of interest but did not become institutionalized as bankers or even as professional moneylenders. The most common kind of rural credit was that granted by landlords to tenants against the security of future crops. Towns and cities naturally had more institutions for capital accumulation. For

example, the pawnshops did a lucrative business and were extensively invested in by wealthy officials. Typically, this was a nonproductive type of investment. The hoarded capital of merchant guilds and of licensed merchant-guild members (like the large salt merchant families or the family firms in the Canton Cohong) was sometimes used to finance commercial operations. One of the most rewarding forms of investment was to purchase a licensed position in one of the many monopolies sanctioned by the government--for instance, in the salt gabelle. In other words, money was to be made less by producing goods than by transferring or handling goods or funds, including taxes and fees.

Typical of this situation was the fact that the famous Shansi remittance banks, which were simple partnerships with branches elsewhere in China operating on capital funds on order of 100,000 or 200,000 taels, were engaged not in deposit banking or lending of funds for productive enterprise but rather in the simple remitting of funds from place to place, mainly for the official class. These banks were developed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to replace the more primitive escort agencies (*piao-chü*) which had been established to escort and protect the movements of bullion funds from place to place. However, in the course of performing this transfer function in its more sophisticated form--through drafts--they did not become agencies for the creation of credit in the fashion of

modern banks. With credit formation thus handicapped, the commercial economy was all the more dependent on the supply of currency, in the form of copper cash or silver bullion. The fluctuations in the rate of exchange between these two media greatly complicated the difficulties of trade in nineteenth-century China, as we shall note below.

The currency and exchange system, like the system of weights and measures generally, was remarkably complex because the major unit of account, the tael (liang or ounce) was not uniform but varied from place to place and trade to trade. The classical description of this situation is that of Dr. H. B. Morse, for the city of Chungking:

Here the standard weight of the tael for silver transactions is 555.6 grins, and this is the standard for all transactions in which the scale is not specified. Frequently, however, a modification of the scale is provided for, depending in some cases upon the place from which the merchant comes or with which he trades, and in others upon the goods in which he deals. A merchant coming from Kweichow, or trading with that place, will probably, but not certainly, use a scale on which the tael weighs 548.9 grains; a merchant from Kweifu, a town on the Yangtze a hundred miles below Chungking, will buy and sell with a tael of 562.7 grains; and between these two extremes are at least ten topical weights of tael, all "current" at Chungking. In addition to these twelve topical "currencies," there are others connected with commodities.

One of the most important products of Szechwan is salt, and dealings in this are settled by a tael of 556.4 grains, unless it is salt from the Tzeliu well, in which case the standard is 557.7. A transaction in cotton cloth is settled with a tael of 555.0 grains, but for cotton yarn the tael is 556.0 grains and for raw cotton the tael is 547.7 grains.

This seems confusion, but we are not yet at the end. Up to this point we have dealt only with the weight on the scale, but now comes in the question of the fineness of the silver with which the payment is made. At Chungking three qualities of silver are in common use--"fine silver" 1,000 fice current throughout the empire, "old silver" about 995 fine, and "trade silver" between 960 and 970 fine; and payment may be stipulated in any one of these three qualities. Taking the score of current tael-weights in combination with the three grades of silver, we have at least sixty currencies possible in this one town.

It seems evident that the tael system's complexity suited the interests of exchanges of currency rather than the interests of sellers or buyers of goods; at any rate it favored all of these persons rather than the producer or the ultimate consumer. We must understand it as an institution tied in with the vested interests of the middleman-merchant class and its patrons the official class, rather than with the interests of entrepreneurs seeking to produce goods or to develop new products and markets. Every time goods or funds passed through the commercial network, a percentage was levied for

the costs of exchange operations. Half a dozen such levies and operations would not be unusual in an ordinary transaction between one province and another. Furthermore, the complexity of the tael system was so great as to make exchange an esoteric subject, monopolized by specialists and insiders with a knowledge of the system. This facilitated an inefficient proliferation of services, in which the distributive process involved more layers and more manpower than was really necessary. This inevitably must have impeded commodity flows, causing numerous delays, wastage and spoilage. Moreover, the distributive margin between buying and selling prices was thus increased because of the excessive number of persons who derived support from it.

Management and entrepreneurship at this level of the economy were generally inhibited by the subordination of merchants to officialdom. The patronage of the upper stratum of landlords, literati and officials was essential to commercial operations. In theory, the state was expected not only to preempt certain monopolies like salt and iron, but also to regulate commercial and industrial activities by licensing and other means, and in general limit capital accumulation and expenditure by individuals. The merchant had no legal safeguards to protect his property against exactions from the governmental level, since the officials represented the law. Thus while bureaucratic patronage and protection were essential to commercial operations of all sorts, the

official class retained the spirit of tax-gatherers rather than of risk-taking entrepreneurs. Their gentry-landlord background and the scholarly disesteem for the merchant class from ancient times, all imposed strict limits to merchant initiative and innovation. Economic enterprise was carried on within a framework in which the power of officialdom was the final recourse, rather than a system of impersonal law which the merchant might invoke to protect himself. By using official patronage and power, a merchant capitalist could secure certain lucrative opportunities represented by licenses or monopolies, the right to distribute salt, contracts for the transport of grain, or sales orders for the imperial household or official establishments. The merchants' aim was to seek comparatively safe forms of profit-making and therefore to secure an opportunity for levying fees and charges, both official and unofficial, upon one of the great staples of commerce. In each case this opportunity had to be secured on a personal basis and preserved with the support of official power. Thus the whole prevailing structure of incentives was such as to encourage and perpetuate established forms and norms of commerce while at the same time discouraging risk-taking, the seeking out of new markets, or innovation.

C. The Governmental Level

By this we mean the economic activities organized, superintended, or indirectly controlled by the official

class on behalf of the imperial government at the capital and in the provinces.

The role of government in the economy was posited on the fact that the official class retained the ultimate power in Chinese society. The government in one sense was rather active in the country's economic life, but in another sense its role was limited and passive. On the one hand, the dead weight of official and quasi-official forms of taxation bore heavily upon the country's economy, as did also the various forms of state monopoly, licensing and the like. All of these, in effect, entailed a negative type of interference. On the other hand, the services performed for the economy by the Chinese state were minimal--largely confined to the maintenance of the waterworks and the stocking of granaries as a safeguard against famine. The active promotion of mercantile activity, the concept of the development of the economy as a whole--i. e., an implicit or explicit concept of economic growth--or the idea of building up the country's economic power as a prerequisite for augmenting state power, all seem to have been minimal in the Chinese tradition. This accords with the fact that the whole notion of international competition and thus of economic nationalism, even in its mercantilist sense, was absent. This can be illustrated by the fact that there was no idea of a protective tariff, and that similar tariff rates were applied to exports and imports. This general attitude was also clearly reflected in fiscal

practice.

The Ch'ing fiscal system was very pervasive, but highly inefficient. It operated within an imposing facade of regulations including quotas for revenue collections by regions, fixed charges on these collections and allocations of payments, both to the capital and to other provinces by transfer directly. Collections were partly in kind but major revenue collections were in money terms. According to the imperial bookkeeping in the statutes, surplus-revenue provinces regularly paid sums to revenue-deficit provinces and all sums entered were allocated to specific purposes. In actual fact, however, it is plain that much larger sums were handled within each province, if only to maintain the bureaucracy and its activities, without being accounted for to the capital. When under pressure for funds, the officials commonly collected contributions or in other words, made levies upon merchants or indeed upon anyone known to have money. Since such persons usually had secured their funds in part through official patronage, this system of contributions was perhaps not inequitable. Literary degrees and official titles and, in extreme cases, even official positions were conferred upon the contributors. The sums so levied sometimes reached millions of taels from major monopolists in the salt trade or the foreign trade at Canton. But this form of quasitaxation was certainly not a type of levy to encourage capital formation.

Land tax and labor service formed the backbone of the fiscal system and were aimed at garnering for the government the surpluses of agricultural products and rural manpower which formed the chief economic resources of traditional China. These taxes had a long and necessarily complex history coming down through more than two millenia. In general, by the nineteenth century they had been combined into a complex system of payments in money terms. Expected receipts were listed as quotas, both for provincial and for local areas at different levels. Statutorily, the local quotas were intended to maintain the official post stations, local public works and the bureaucracy, at the discretion of the local officialdom. Provincial quotas were also set for amounts to be made available to the Board of Revenue at Peking. The actual collection of local taxes, as noted above, was several times the statutory amount of the various quotas listed at Peking. The estimation of the amount of taxation actually levied is one of the more important problems awaiting study by economic historians. In general, officialdom was put somewhat in the position of tax farmers, required to report a minimum to their superiors and expected to collect enough in addition to maintain themselves and their activities.

The efficiency of tax collection depended upon the degree of dynastic vigor at the time. During periods of dynastic strength, official corruption tended to stay

within bounds and thus fiscal efficiency could be maintained. This frequently meant a lighter tax burden, more equitably distributed, with a larger proportion of receipts finding their way to Peking and with a better performance of public services. However, in the course of dynastic decline, official corruption tended to be reinforced by the growth of local vested interests, by a decline of morale, and by an increased need for official funds. In such circumstances the efficiency of collection would decline, many large households and favored families would get themselves off the tax registers, and in the end a higher tax total would be collected if possible from a dwindling and impoverished segment of the rural population. The classic result would be rebellion followed by a new dynasty and a beginning of the dynastic cycle.

The grain tribute collected in the Yangtze provinces was a special form of tax to provide the stipendiary food supply of the imperial capital. There was a widespread and intricate administrative network for the transport of this tribute grain to Peking. The grain transport administration had to cope with the problem of maintaining the Grand Canal and the lower reaches of the Yellow Rive dike system so that grain shipments from the Yangtze delta could traverse the regions normally flooded by the Yellow River system—a major engineering problem as well as an administrative one. The alternative to the Grand Canal was the system of sea transport by junk fleets from the Shanghai area around the Shantung

promontory, on a route probably as much subject to shipwreck as the canal route was subject to pilfering or banditry. The grain tribute performed several economic functions: it fed the swollen bureaucracy surrounding the imperial court and the Manchu military garrisons in the north and provided supplies for the maintenance of emergency stocks. At the same time, it played an important role in internal trade and in limiting the self-sufficiency of the rural sector.

The military establishment, with its large stipends to maintain garrisons of Manchu and other bannermen and their families, was one of the great vested interests and administrative problems. The local territorial troops, or constabulary, the so-called Army of the Green Standard, were maintained from local land-tax sources. By the nineteenth century, both the garrisons of bannermen and the constabulary had proved ineffective to quell local rebellion. The eighteenth-century expeditions on China's borders and into neighboring regions like Tibet, Annam or Central Asia had drained funds from the government with questionable economic return. In the ten great campaigns under the Ch'ien-lung Emperor we can see at work the ever-present urge to contain the barbarians, combined with a vested military interest on the part of Manchu commanders who led large forces in border operations and requisitioned even larger sums to support them. It is a question whether the financial profit to be derived from these expeditions was

not an important incentive for them. After the White Lotus Rebellion at the turn of the century, however, the traditional military forces had lost their capacity and morale and represented a net drain upon the state economy.

III. Pre-industrial China and Pre-industrial Europe

A comparison of the pre-industrial economies of Europe and China may help us to identify the factors and processes that facilitated growth in the former and retarded it in the latter. Such a comparison yields a number of striking similarities and also some major differences:

A. Similarities

In both societies a primarily agrarian economy supported a small superstructure. It was based on a "natural economy" of local barter with a low degree of commercialization and minimal use of money. Money served more as a standard and store of value than as a medium of exchange and payment. The monetary system was inefficient. The low degree of commercialization was also indicated by the extensive barriers to trade in the form of tolls, dues and taxes on the movement of goods; the poor development of roads and communications except for water transport; and the general scarcity of capital as measured by high and usurious rates of interest. As a result, these were essentially what

Heckscher has called "storage economies," in which consumption largely depended upon accumulated stocks. Such inventories of grain and other foodstuffs were needed not only to meet inter-harvest requirements, but also to serve as a protection against natural and man-made disasters. Thus a considerable proportion of China's current resources were tied up in an unproductive form of investment. Other similarities to the pre-industrial European scene included the low status of the merchant and money-lender, and the extensive use of guild organization to protect and also control merchant activities.

B. Dissimilarities: Foreign Trade and City Growth

The dissimilarities between China and pre-industrial Europe are perhaps even more notable: for example, in pre-industrial Europe possibly the two most important factors contributing to the process of economic change were the growth of foreign trade and the growth of autonomous cities. Europe's development and expansion overseas after 1492 were marked by a widening in the extent of the market and the commercialization of the economy together with extensive capital accumulation, all facilitated through foreign trade. These developments also depended upon the growth of urban centers, with their legal status as chartered cities or city states and the special privileges extended to the burghers. The growth of the bourgeoisie symbolized the rise of modern

Europe.

Neither of these elements had a counterpart in China. Foreign trade in proportion to the total economy, even during the Sung period, never reached the degree of importance which it had in Europe. The reasons for this smaller role of foreign trade in the case of China are many and varied. First, the geographical configuration of the Chinese setting put its centers of ancient population on the broad irrigated plains of the Wei and Yellow Rivers. Only later did dense populations accumulate in delta regions like those of Canton and Shanghai, after China's social institutions had been well established. When seaports eventually developed, their growth was handicapped by China's comparative isolation from other major states. Korea remained an appendage, accessible by land as well as sea. Japan and Annam were comparatively small and peripheral. Chinese expansion was chiefly absorbed in the subcontinent of the modern Chinese area--for example, into the Southwest or into Central Asia. With half a dozen domestic provinces, each bigger than any accessible foreign state, China's trade remained oriented toward the domestic market and not based upon seafaring. Arab traders from Southeast Asia had taken the lead in developing commercial sea contact with Chinese ports. Only afterward, in the Sung and Yuan periods, had Chinese merchants become principal participants in maritime trade. From the Ming period, the cultural and social

institutions of China became still more firmly ethnocentric in character, with little emphasis upon voyaging abroad (as in the European crusades to the Holy Land or later to Asia on the track of Marco Polo).

Against this background, the deliberate government policy of regulating and restricting foreign trade in the Ming and Ch'ing periods is quite understandable. The big Ming expeditions into the Indian Ocean were governmental experiments and were discontinued after the middle of the fifteenth century. The Manchu dynasty came down from the north and controlled South China last. Not until the end of the seventeenth century did it resume the Ming system of tributary trade. Even then it was always ready to sacrifice maritime commerce in the interest of maintaining local order and preventing the influx of subversive foreign influences. China remained largely self-sufficient within her own borders between the tropics and Siberia.

At the same time, the Chinese city was under the domination of officials rather than of merchants. The major urban centers were administrative rather than commercial. The tradition of government monopoly or regulation of all forms of large-scale association and economic activity kept commercial growth subordinate to the political, administrative and military interests of the noncommercial ruling strata.

Lying behind the contrast between China and Western Europe are the differing institutional frameworks

and cultural values within which their economies developed. The West, except in Egypt, had little counterpart to the irrigated rice economy which had such far-reaching influence on Chinese life. The Mediterranean Basin facilitated the growth of city-states and sea trade, and Western European geography with its radiating peninsulas later fostered the development of nation-states and overseas exploration. These same factors promoted the introduction and diffusion of new technologies and new ideas. In contrast, the Chinese empire from the beginning was turned in upon itself by the Central Asian land mass and the expanse of the Pacific Ocean. It early developed a bureaucratic empire in which the legal system remained a tool of the official class. Feudalism in China was wiped out at the time of the Ch'in unification. From the Han period on, the bureaucratic network and the ideal of imperial unity militated against the rise of detached and particularistic political-economic areas. In spite of the barbarian inroads after the Han dynasties, the geographical environment and cultural and institutional inheritance of the Chinese people were so strong as to lead to a revival of unified empire. This meant that the pluralistic and multifocal institutional structure of Western Europe, with its struggles and rivalries among the crown, the nobles, the lesser gentry, the cities and burghers, between church and state and between nation and nation within Christendom, had no counterpart in Chinese experience.

Where European development out of the chaos of feudalism stimulated dynamic and individualistic innovation and adventure, the Chinese empire remained a bureaucratic colossus bestriding all social life. This was reflected in the legal system which did not protect the individual within the family nor the individual property holder nor, least of all, the merchant; and also in the Confucian ethic, which did not give the individual the same incentive as the Protestant ethic.

It would be a mistake, on the other hand, to regard Chinese society, with its dominant bureaucratic overlay, as the equivalent of a modern centralized state. On the contrary, the old China inculcated the particularism of family-centered kinship relations and village or market-town-centered economic relations. At both of these levels personal relationships remained more important than the universalistic and rational criteria which have developed, rather recently, in modern European society. In short, the different economic growth of Europe and China is symptomatic of the total cultural difference between them.

IV. China's Economic Development, ca. 1760-1914

In essence, the disequilibrating forces and the pattern of disturbance in China were similar to those in most underdeveloped areas. Yet in China economic

change followed a different path conditioned by extraterritoriality and the rise of the treaty ports. They served as a means for transplanting not only of Western capital and entrepreneurs, but of Western legal institutions and commercial practices as well. This was possible because the treaty ports were protected from the arbitrary exactions of officialdom and the other impediments to economic activity referred to above. These conditions encouraged the accumulation of capital in the ports, both by Western and by Chinese enterprise.

Therefore, in effect, the prime agents of economic change in nineteenth-century China are comparable to those seen earlier in Europe--foreign trade which provided the impetus, and special city status formalized through extraterritoriality which provided the opportunity. However, unlike Europe, China's new economic growth did not radiate out into, and become diffused throughout, the traditional economy. The institutional barriers in the traditional sector of the economy, and the failure of the government's efforts to achieve an industrial breakthrough under official auspices, seriously impeded factor mobility between the hinterland and the treaty ports; growth did not take root outside the ports, but remained bottled up in them. One part of the economy remained based on the traditional order while another grew up in the coastal and riverine cities. Thus industry was concentrated in the treaty ports in order to secure the institutional advantages of greater legal protection

of property and investment. The metropolis of Shanghai and its dominant position in Chinese manufacturing at the end of the treaty century are outstanding examples of this phenomenon, as are also Tientsin and Canton.

In analyzing the pattern of economic change during this century of disturbance, it is useful to distinguish several sub-periods.

A. The Drawing of China into the World Economy, 1760-1842

The domestic economic developments of this period have been little studied but presumably centered about the phenomenal population increase. Under the stimulus of factors operating in the early eighteenth century which need not detain us here, the population more or less doubled in this period. Present estimates give an order of magnitude somewhere around 230 million for 1760 and 430 million for 1842. The economic implications of such growth can be imagined but have not been extensively traced in the record.

Foreign trade in this period centered at Canton as the sole port. It was based on a barter of Chinese tea and silk for Western silver and Indian produce, carried on mainly by the licensed guild known as the Cohong and the British East India Company within a framework of bilateral monopoly. At the Chinese end this trade was conducted on a bargaining basis with a price solution

that was necessarily indeterminate. The triangular Chinese-British-Indian trade, balanced by the so-called Country Trade from India, has been studied to some degree. China engaged in a passive trade, in which the foreigner took the initiative by coming to Canton. After arrival, the East India Company vessels had to dispose of their cargoes of British woolens and other products. Very generally, the Hong merchants could take these goods at a loss and consequently had to raise their tea and silk prices to cover this loss. There was an increasing tendency for the Hong merchants to borrow capital from the East India Company. Hong debts and Hong bankruptcies consequently plagued the British company operations. The increasing tea and silk exports which grew in response to the European demand were made possible only by the imports of raw cotton and opium from India. After about 1819 opium eclipsed cotton as the chief means of "laying down funds" in Canton for the continually growing export trade. But while exports passed outward through the established channels of the Hong merchants and the East India Company, the opium import trade was illegal and centered elsewhere, in the hands of the opium merchants both foreign and Chinese. Thus the Canton system with its British East India Company and Cohong monopolists ceased to be the channel for the major import, and was left standing, so to speak, on one leg only. When the tea exports rose to twenty

million pounds a year and above, the result was that opium smuggling, administrative collapse, disorder and friction grew proportionately. All of this culminated in the Opium War and the unequal treaties, which led to the abolition of the Canton monopoly and permitted trade expansion.

The repercussions of the opium dispute of the late 1830's on the domestic economy have not been fully analyzed. The growth of the Shansi banks in the early nineteenth century and the simultaneous accumulations of capital by Cantonese Hong merchants and by salt monopolists in the lower Yangtze and other self-producing regions would suggest that there was a general growth of money economy within China during this period. Another indication is in the increased valuation of silver in terms of copper cash--a complex subject of the Opium War period. Chinese officials ascribed the increased cost of silver to its outflow in exchange for opium, overlooking its attendant inflow to pay for tea and silk. Debasement of the copper coinage, the increased demand for silver as the chief medium of exchange in an expanding money economy, hoarding in a period of disorder, to say nothing of population increase, are other factors lying behind this phenomenon.

B. Economic Disorganization and Decline, 1842-1864

The treaty system established a new institutional framework for foreign trade. In the treaty ports the

lead was taken by commission or agency houses, like Jardine, Matheson and Co., Dent and Co., or Russell and Co., which developed services for trade expansion through chartering ships, insuring cargo, and buying and selling on a commission basis for Western merchants at a distance. On the Chinese side, these Western treaty port firms used Chinese compradores, who had formerly been merely buyers of supplies, but who now undertook both to collect export cargoes and to distribute import goods on a commission basis. With the assistance of Cantonese compradores inherited from the earlier period, new trade outlets and trade routes were rapidly developed. They centered particularly on Shanghai, which was closer than Canton to the major centers of tea and silk production. While exports continued to grow, the trade remained handicapped by the small Chinese demand for Western textiles and other manufactured imports. The result was a steady increase of illegal but well organized opium imports.

The impact of this treatyport trade after 1842 upon the Chinese economy as a whole is still obscure. The domestic living standard recorded in literary references seems to have been characterized by a Confucian austerity and frugality among the ruling strata in the seventeenth century, followed by a more lavish display and consumption of goods in the prosperous eighteenth century. Similar literary references suggest an increasing economic stringency

and imperial parsimony in the early nineteenth century. Under the impact of population increase, the decline of the dynasty's administrative competence seems to have been evidenced by an increased incidence of natural calamities, the declining efficiency of the Grand Canal transport route, and the growth of piracy and opium smuggling on the coast. At any rate, the impact of the early foreign trade must be fitted into this larger domestic context more persuasively than has yet been done. The Marxist-Leninist contention that foreign imports depressed native living standards by wiping out rural handicraft production cannot be substantiated for the period before the 1860's. On the contrary, it may be argued that with the phenomenal increase of tea and silk exports, per capita product may have risen in some areas. In any case, such estimates must vary according to the regions considered--the lower Yangtze tea and silk areas may have prospered while the hinterland of Canton in Kwangsi may have suffered from the new treaty system.

The Taiping Rebellion of 1851-1864, on balance, must be regarded as a product of domestic causes, with foreign factors playing a minor role. Its impact upon the economy was devastating, though this is another subject that has not been sufficiently explored. The great rebellion and the smaller disorders which accompanied and followed it curbed population growth, and perhaps resulted in an actual decline of population. Key

areas of the countryside were ravaged and the channels of trade were disrupted. All of this was made worse by the deterioration of the water control system and consequent flooding of the Yellow River, which changed its course from south to north of the Shantung peninsula after 1852. Thus rice supplies for the capital had to be transported by sea instead of the Grand Canal.

One of the most significant effects of the rebellion was the cutting off of the land tax of South and Central China. In response, the imperial government had recourse to expedients like the issue of paper currency and casting of large copper or iron cash. Its chief recourse, however was to institute taxes on trade, among which the new Maritime Customs at the treaty ports were most important. Unofficially, new taxes were also levied on opium imports. Most important of all was the new provincial tax on goods in transit, i. e., *likin*, which got started in 1853.

The general result of the rebellion was thus a restructuring of the fiscal system with a shift from direct to indirect forms of taxation. This meant a greater dependence of the imperial government upon foreign trade revenues, at a time when the enforced treaty revisions of 1858 and 1860 made it dependent also on political cooperation with the foreign powers.

C. The Abortive Breakthrough, 1864-1895

This was a crucial period during which Japan

succeeded in breaking out of the vicious circle of economic backwardness, while similar attempts to bring about a state-led industrial revolution failed in China, for reasons which we shall try briefly to indicate.

The decade of the active restoration of Confucian government, after the suppression of rebellions, was attended by the use of foreign arms and the setting up of arsenals at Shanghai and Foochow to make guns and gunboats. At the same time, the revised treaties opened the Yangtze River and North China treaty ports to foreign trade, foreign steamships developed these new routes, and China now lay open to complete foreign access by water, along the coast and in the interior. The power of the foreign trade impact was signalized by the growth of such port cities as Shanghai, Tientsin, and Hankow, and the rise of foreign banks, like the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation formed in 1864.

Foreign trade in this period increased steadily, and the treaty port cities began their economic domination of the commercial hinterland, into which their goods were flowing. The decline in staple exports led to a diversification of trade as reflected in the export growth of a variety of new products--tung oil, dried eggs, bristles, and similar products of the agrarian economy. At the same time, kerosene and tobacco began to develop their mass markets, symbolized later by the wide distribution networks of the Asiatic Petroleum

Company and the British-American Tobacco Co.

Technology and training in industry were given some stimulus from translation programs and from the dispatch of students abroad. Yet here again the traditional social structure and cultural values kept the trained men of superior intelligence from pursuing mechanical or even mercantile aims.

Under the impact of all of these developments combined, domestic handicraft production now began to be subjected to the competition of Western textile imports, while at the same time the transplanting of tea plants to India led to serious competition with Chinese tea exports, and the opening of Japan to foreign trade stimulated Japanese competition in silk exports. China suffered in this competition because the standardization of product and organization of marketing and finance were more advanced in India and Japan. It is extremely difficult, however, to get a balanced estimate of the trends of Chinese farm economy and subsidiary handicraft industries of this period. For example, one imponderable factor was the degree of destruction inherited from the period of rebellion. Government efforts to replant mulberry trees for silk production and to revive agriculture generally, and the evidence of widespread destruction in the countryside of the lower Yangtze provinces indicate the magnitude of this factor. In these decades Indian opium imports began to be displaced by steadily rising domestic opium

production, so that in the 1880's these imports actually declined.

This is the period which also signalizes the early efforts at industrialization under official sponsorship. Many industries were begun. The China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company under government auspices and compradore management began to compete with foreign shipping after 1872. The Kaiping Mines were developed north of Tientsin from the late seventies to provide coal for the steamship lines and for Shanghai. Eventually China's first railroad line was built to service these coal exports under central government auspice. The institutional mechanism for these development in general was that of "official supervision and merchant operation" (*huan-tu shang-pan*). This in effect was an attempt to make an industrial breakthrough while leaving the institutional framework essentially untouched. The reasons for the failure of this attempt have now been assessed by Dr. Albert Feuerwerker's volume on *China's Early Industrialization*.² They will also be clearly illustrated in a forthcoming study by Dr. Kwang-Ching Liu which analyzes the failure of one of the leading enterprises under this system, the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company. The precursor of this system of "official supervision and merchant operation" had been the traditional Chinese salt administration, a

2. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1959.

government salt monopoly which was essentially a fiscal institution. The attitudes and practices characteristic of such an institution consequently affected the management of all the enterprises set up under this system. They were viewed by the officials as a source of "squeeze" and personal income; this attitude was typical of all the levels of officialdom, all the way up to the imperial court. At the same time, enterprises operating under this system were used as instruments for broadening the regional power of the different cliques which vied for primacy within the nineteenth-century Chinese state. This attitude then spread to the managers of these enterprises, who viewed them basically as objects of despoliation. Thus both the sponsors and the operators of these would-be-modern enterprises were motivated by a taxfarming rather than an entrepreneurial spirit.

If we look more closely at the function and the role of official sponsorship under the *kuan-tu shang-pan* system, we see that it first of all provided encouragement and sanction for the founding and initial promotion of the enterprise. This encouragement might take several concrete forms: the granting of certain monopoly rights by the state or its organs to the new company (e. g., shipment of tribute rice); government loans or other types of grants of government capital to the enterprise; and protection of the enterprise by its official sponsors against exactions by other officials. In

return the official sponsors would appoint the managers of the enterprise, thereby assuring effective supervision. This inevitably affected the character of management. Managers usually held official rank, and at the same time represented the shareholders. They therefore faced two ways, toward their official sponsors and toward the shareholders. In this situation management tended to be particularistic.

Similarly the investment and financial policies of the company were likely to be characterized by shortterm borrowing at high rates of interest, by guaranteed dividend payments, and by inadequate allowances for depreciation. These attitudes and practices were not confined to the late nineteenth century alone, but were widespread in Chinese business and government up to the very advent of the Chinese Communist regime.

Thus the system of "official supervision and merchant operation" was self-defeating. To overcome the dead weight of stagnation in nineteenth century China a massive effort was required, involving large outlays on capital-intensive projects with low prospective rates of return; by raising the marginal productivity of capital such projects could then create a more favorable economic milieu for the growth of private business enterprise. However, an effort of such magnitude could only be mounted by the State and in reality the enterprises fostered by Chinese officials at the time in shipping, mining, communications, etc. were precisely

of this type. But because of the very nature of the state and its officialdom, they were doomed to fail.

D. Economic Imperialism and the Beginnings of Industrialization, 1895-1914

The economic repercussions of China's defeat by Japan in 1895 were immediately apparent in the large foreign loans which China had to contract in order to pay the war indemnity. Japan used these funds to develop heavy industry and to build up her monetary reserves prior to a shift to the gold standard, thus forging further ahead of China. The foreign loans were secured on the Maritime Customs revenue and, from this time onward, ate into that reliable and increasing source of central government income. Japan's victory also touched off the scramble for concessions, which were extorted mainly in economic terms. The spheres of interest secured over various regions of China by the imperialist powers included ninety-nine year leases of major ports like Dairen, granted to Russia, or port sites like Tsingtao, granted to Germany. Running inland from these ports were railroads financed by, mortgaged to, and run by, the foreign powers. The Chinese Eastern Railway cutting across Manchuria to Vladivostok, as arranged in 1896, was now joined to the South Manchurian Railway running to Dairen under Russian control. The Germans developed a railroad in Shantung

on similar lines. In both cases, mining rights along the railroad right of way were also granted the foreign power. In effect, these concessions permitted the imperialist power to invest in China's industrialization, mainly in the form of transportation and extractive industry. In retrospect it may possibly appear to future students that the imperialist powers on balance invested more than they profited from these arrangements--at least this may be true of Germany in Shantung.

The Japanese treaty had also permitted foreign industrial establishments to be set up in the treaty ports on Chinese soil. Thus the last bar to direct foreign leadership in China's industrialization was removed, but it was a leadership which also meant control over large sectors of the economy. In these same years under government auspices leading officials began official enterprises--for example, the textile mill at Shanghai under Sheng Hsuan-huai or the coal and iron complex at Han-yeh-p'ing in the Wuhan area under Chang Chih-tung.

The Boxer Rebellion of 1900 was another disaster which diverted still more of China's revenues to pay debts to foreigners under the Boxer indemnity. In the decade which followed, the central government reform program created new administrative and economic institutions, such as government banks and a central ministry of commerce and communications. A new army was built up with native and foreign equipment, the

provision of which constituted a new industry. Railroad building had its first major decade of accomplishment under Sino-foreign auspices, and there was a considerable degree of economic growth, the extent of which has not yet been estimated. This process involved the rise of new industries and economic institutions and the decline of old ones. For example, the century-old Shansi banks began their final decline, being unsuited to modern banking needs. The new and enterprising merchants of Japan and Germany pushed their distribution networks among the Chinese mercantile communities of the interior and developed their markets with less dependence on Chinese compradores. Groups of provincial gentry, merchants and officials initiated railroad projects in competition with those of the central government, although they usually failed to secure adequate finance and management. A few individual entrepreneurs emerged from the Chinese upper strata, like the top scholar Chang Chien, who developed his own cotton mill and other enterprises in his native place of Nantung, Kiangsu. Remittances from overseas Chinese communities began to flow back to China, playing an increasingly important role in the country's balance of payments. Capital accumulated by overseas Chinese from the Canton and Fukien areas was also flowing back into such investments as department stores in the treaty ports. Naturally there was great regional differentiation in this scattered and sporadic economic growth.

It centered undoubtedly in the Canton and Shanghai areas. But there was also, for example, a forward movement under official leadership on the Inner Mongolian frontier, where Chinese agricultural expansion was facilitated by the completion in 1910 of the railroad from Peking through Kalgan to Suiyuan.

Evidences of the continued growth of foreign influence over, if not actual domination of, the Chinese economy can also be seen in the first decade of the twentieth century. Financial development agencies like the Peking Syndicate or the British and Chinese Corporation were formed with funds invested by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and the British firm of Jardine, Matheson and Company. British interests secured control of the Kaiping Mines. British funds were used to build the Shanghai-Nanking railroad and other lines in the lower Yangtze as a British sphere. Negotiations for American financing of Manchurian railroads were prosecuted (to little avail) by Willard Straight and others, and for the Hankow-Canton railroad by an international consortium of bankers. This era of "dollar diplomacy" and projected financial developments under foreign control in various parts of China was climaxed by the collapse of the dynasty in 1911. The foreign bond holders were immediately reassured when the inspector general of Chinese Maritime Customs, Sir Francis Aglen, for the first time took actual receipt of Chinese customs revenues and deposited them for safekeeping in the

foreign banks in the treaty ports. This was followed by the Reorganization Loan of 1913 to the new ruler, Yuan Shih-k'ai, from which the United States abstained. The era of financial imperialism was cut short only by the outbreak of the First World War.

As evaluated half a century later, financial imperialism may have seemed more threatening to Chinese patriots in the early twentieth century than it might actually have become in the unfolding of its own operations. Possibly the bark of imperialism was worse than its bite. The fact remains, nevertheless, that from 1896 until the Second World War China's payments abroad on loans and indemnities constituted a sizable and constant financial drain which inevitably impaired her capacity for domestic capital formation, both governmental and private.

E. The Example of Railroads

The various factors facilitating and impeding economic growth may be seen in the history of railroads. In most countries railroads served to widen the extent of the market, stimulate the rapid commercialization of agriculture, the growth of cities and of a money economy, while at the same time the railroad itself provided a market for the iron, steel and engineering industries. But in the crowded countryside of China proper the coming of the iron horse was in no way comparable to its role in the opening, for example,

of the American West.

Among many obvious reasons for this, the following may be suggested: First of all, the abundance of water communications in South and Central China, which reached to the capital, serviced by abundant manpower, maintained a severe competition for any railroad enterprise. In the densely populated countryside, land values for a right of way were costly and public opinion on geomantic grounds was superstitiously opposed to railroads. Another factor was the lack of sufficient capital and credit in a society where capital could not easily be mobilized by bond issues or other measures of credit creation. Moreover, the railroad, coming as the tool of the foreigner, met a rising patriotic opposition which was explicitly stated by leading officials: unless and until the Chinese government could build its own railroads and control them, it was preferable to have none. From the beginning it was realized that railroads under foreign control provided strategic means of military as well as economic ingress and invasion.

The railroad pattern which actually emerged was in part a product of the strategy of commercial exploitation through imperialist spheres of influence. Railroads were built under foreign domination from treaty ports inland through the peninsula of southern Manchuria and the peninsula of Shantung, as well as from Shanghai over the Yangtze delta. The Chinese Eastern Railway in the north, for Russia, and the Hanoi-Yunnan Railroad

in the south, for France, served as the most obvious strategic spearheads. A similar plan was evident in the Peking-Suiyuan line, the first one to be built by China, which facilitated the "secondary imperialism" of China's expansion into Inner Mongolia.

Geography constituted an added barrier to railroad development--first, in the form of mountains which, for example, kept the railroad effectively out of Szechwan until recently. Meanwhile the Yangtze itself is so pre-eminent a highway that, as the geographer George Cressey has noted, the railway lines tend to be at right angles rather than parallel to the river. It is no accident that the Chinese railroad network has been built more extensively in North than in South China. We suggest, in short, that the retardation of railroad development was due to the interplay of a variety of factors, a study of which may serve to demonstrate in microcosm the impediments to China's industrialization.

In sharp contrast, we see an entirely different course of development in Manchuria. In that region the railways assumed the role of "leading sector." They turned out to be highly profitable, almost from the very beginning of their operation. At the same time, unlike the situation in China proper, these profits were largely plowed back into investment, not only in the railroads themselves but in other enterprises as well. Consequently railroad earnings constituted one of the important sources for financing the development of

other social overhead facilities and also contributed to the founding of other industries. This railroad development greatly stimulated the commercialization of Manchurian agriculture, drawing it into the world trading network. At the same time the railroads themselves provided an important market for engineering, repair, and machine-building services. Railroad development thus became the center of a broadening pattern of economic growth, which spilled over into agriculture, industry, and trade. Moreover, and again unlike the situation in China proper, this growth did not remain confined to the coastal strip of Manchuria. The example of railroad development illustrates the difference in the course of Manchurian, as opposed to Chinese, economic development in general. This difference may be viewed as the result of three categories of factors: (a) the much more favorable population-resource balance in Manchuria; (b) the comparative absence of institutional barriers to modernization such as prevailed in China proper; and (c) the injection of Japanese control and entrepreneurship coupled with large-scale capital imports into Manchuria.

V. Conclusion: Patterns of Retardation

The preceding survey has touched upon two central questions: (1) what were the active agents of economic change in nineteenth century China? and (2) what were the chief factors that retarded economic growth? By way of conclusion, let us summarize briefly the roles

played by the treaty ports, as principal centers of change, and by certain Chinese institutions as factors of retardation.

The Western impact transmitted through the ports was a multiple challenge, military, political, economic, social, ideological and cultural. The new influences were inevitably subversive of the old order. Thus the Chinese leaders were plunged into a dilemma. They felt the necessity to meet the challenge, but were unable or unwilling to understand that this could not be done without a radical remaking of practices and institutions, even ideas, in every sphere. This was, of course, one of the great differences between nineteenth-century China and Japan.

The transformation of Chinese life was accompanied by an erosion of the traditional economic order which was evidenced, for example, in the decline of handicrafts and later in the displacement of native banks. This decline of the old was paralleled by the creation of a new order in the treaty ports and in Manchuria. The result was a century of growth and decline occurring side by side.

The data now available do not permit the drawing up of a net balance sheet. We cannot measure the rate of growth in the expanding sectors and the rates of decline in the contracting sectors. In our present state of knowledge, we cannot determine whether the Chinese economy as a whole was expanding or contracting during

this period. Foreign trade appears to have been the most important disequilibrating force in the economic realm. It performed the rôle of a "leading sector," generating an almost classic text-book-type process of cumulative economic growth which, however, remained confined to the treaty port segment of the Chinese economy.

The growth process here was interacting and cumulative. The gradual rise of foreign trade in the early nineteenth century stimulated a demand for the development of financial facilities. Up to the middle of the century, foreign trade had to be financed by the trading firms themselves. This necessarily limited the scope of the trade and the number of firms that could enter it. However, the rise of modern banking and insurance companies, particularly between 1858 and 1864, facilitated the entry of smaller merchants into foreign trade. We see here a sequence--the growth of foreign trade giving rise to a demand for banking facilities, which in turn facilitated the further expansion and widening of foreign trade which led to the processing of export products, such as tea and silk, in the treaty ports, and also to the processing of certain import products which were consumed in the treaty ports. The latter involved the growth of such food-processing industries as flour-milling, sugar-refining, and brewing. In turn, the development of the treaty ports, with a growth of foreign trade and of allied industries,

necessarily led to population growth in the ports. This stimulated, the demand for public utilities such as water, gas, electricity, and local transport. The development of public utilities and of shipping both stimulated the demand for coal. At the same time, there was a need for engineering shops and small works to service all of these enterprises. The expanding population in the treaty ports naturally demanded housing services. This stimulated housing construction, which gave rise to a growing demand for cement and other building materials. Meanwhile as the market for imported textile manufactures widened, it became increasingly profitable for foreign firms to build and operate textile mills in the treaty ports. A similar development occurred with respect to cigarettes and tobacco, canned goods and certain other consumer products.

However, the question still remains as to why this self-generating process of economic growth remained largely bottled up in the treaty port segment of the economy and why the multiplier effect of investment was thus largely confined to that segment. The precise reasons, the factors and variables, that may account for this require further exploration. On the basis of presently available evidence we surmise that there were three types of factors that hindered the spread of economic stimuli from the treaty ports to the Chinese hinterland: ⁽¹⁾ institutional as well as physical (transport) barriers to

the movement of goods and, even more important, to the movement of factors of production; ⁽²⁾ leakages from the treaty ports to foreign countries through the medium of profit remittances, so that some of the multiplier effects of investment upon income and employment were felt in the home countries of the foreign firms rather than in China itself; ⁽³⁾ the development of public utilities, banking facilities and other “external economies,” which raised the marginal productivity of investment and thus reinforced the economic advantages already enjoyed by the treaty ports as compared with the economy of the Chinese hinterland.

On balance, the treaty port performed certain very important historic functions in China's long-run development. First of all, it created the aforementioned “external economies.” It built up the modern commercial network, not only external but internal. It fostered the development of railroads and provided a framework within which modern factory production could be initiated, with primary emphasis upon light consumer-goods industries.

Secondly, as a result of this factory and business development, the treaty ports provided a training ground for Chinese technical and managerial personnel and for Chinese entrepreneurship. It is important to bear in mind that the Chinese compradore and his successor, the Chinese merchant and entrepreneur, built up the Chinese portion of the modern economy under the wing of the

foreigner's privileges. In fact the treaty ports became jointly administered centers of joint economic growth, from which the Chinese entrepreneurial class were by no means excluded. On the contrary, the ports attracted Chinese talent and capital. Even socially the bifurcation between natives and foreigners became less distinct than in colonial countries.

Through the Chinese merchant and official classes, the ports also served as a means for mobilizing Chinese savings and channeling them either into the modern banking system or into direct investment in treaty port enterprises. To the extent that these enterprises did not remit profits abroad or invest some of their earnings in enterprises abroad, they too created pre-conditions for a later take-off into industrialization.

Thus a more meaningful view of the significance of the treaty ports might see them as the spearheads of a modern Sino-foreign economy, which was encroaching upon the traditional scene. In a physical sense the treaty ports served as entrance points into traditional network of Chinese water-borne communications. The aim of the foreign merchant from the beginning was to get his goods flowing into this already well-developed distribution system. Western steamers on the Yangtze plying all the way to Szechwan, symbolized this process. It is significant that the British in the late nineteenth century were carrying three fifths of China's steamer cargo.

This process was similar to that by which the fore-

igner joined with the Manchu-Chinese official class in such administrative institutions as the Imperial Maritime Customs Service or the Salt Revenue Administration and Post Office. In a comparable fashion the foreign merchant teamed up with his Chinese compradore and the growing Chinese merchant and banker class to dominate the modern sector of the economy, and spread its influence over the hinterland.

To say all this does not resolve that underlying question: Were the treaty ports in the long view a help or a hindrance to China's economic growth? Many considerations must be brought to bear on this thorny question. It involves among other thing that difficult task, to prove a might-have-been--that China could have broken out of her traditional order and achieved a modern industrial growth in the absence of a Western impact such as was actually delivered through the treaty ports. We suspect that when another generation has finally gleaned and winnowed all the evidence it will be found that the influence of the treaty ports on Chinese economic life varied markedly over time: that they were a stimulus in the nineteenth century, becoming by degrees more of a hindrance in the twentieth.

Capital accumulation in the age of imperialist domination centered increasingly in the treaty ports for reasons mentioned above. On balance it seems plain that after 1895 a considerable proportion of the capital surplus in the Chinese economy was siphoned off to

meet indemnity and loan payments abroad. Such payments must be taken as net withdrawals from China's economic resources, in other words, a tax on the economy. The effect was probably to handicap economic growth.

Yet, without minimizing the evils of imperialism, it would be shortsighted to place the center of China's economic development outside of Chinese society. Its retardation, like the long slow process of dynastic collapse, was in large measure a function of the interplay of domestic institutions and conditions. It is these that must be studied to gain further insight into China's economic growth.

If we define "institutions" in the broad sense as long-established patterns of social conduct, we may see their inhibiting influence primarily under the subheads of state activity and the administrative practices of the official class. First of all, the Chinese state failed to provide certain of the minimum pre-conditions essential to economic growth outside the treaty ports. For example, the Chinese authorities singularly failed in the maintenance of peace and order during the whole modern century. They were also unable to create a uniform currency and unified monetary standards. There was no uniform system of weights and measures. There was no stable administrative framework within which an effective market organization could develop. Transport and communications remained poor. Education, health and

welfare measures were minimal. The inability of Chinese leaders to create the minimal pre-conditions for economic development was most clearly evidenced in the *kuan-tu shang-pan* system for “official supervision and merchant operation.”

Glossary

- Chang Chien 張謇
Chang Chih-tung 張之洞
Ching-te-chen 景德鎮
Cohong 公行
Huchow 湖州
Kuan-tu shang-pan 官督商辦
liang 兩
likin 釐金
piao-chü 票局
Sheng Hsuan-huai 盛宣懷

From "Feudalism" to "Capitalism"
in Recent Historical Writing
from Mainland China

by

Albert Feuerwerker

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Chung-kuo tzu-pen chu-i meng-ya wen-t'i t'ao-lun chi
*Collected Papers on the Problem of the Incipency
of Capitalism in China*. Edited by the Chinese History
Seminar of the Chinese People's University. Peking:
San-lien shu-tien, 1957. 2 vols., 8+1102pp.

Ming-Ch'ing she-hui ching-chi hsing-t'ai ti yen-chiu
*Studies in the Society and Economy of the Ming
and Ch'ing Periods*. Edited by the Chinese History
Seminar of the Chinese People's University. Shan-
ghai: Shanghai jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1957. 7+357
pp.

Ming-Ch'ing-shih lun-ts'ung *Collected Essays on Ming
and Ch'ing History*. Edited by Li Kuang-pi.
Wuhan: Hupei jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1957. 294pp.

An unrelieved prolixity characterizes much of recent historical writing from the People's Republic of China. The subject of China's modern economic history—subsumed in these writings under the heading of the abortive transition from feudalism to capitalism—seems to lend itself particularly to loquacity. If the name of Stalin no longer appears in the burgeoning footnotes, his literary style has left its traces in the pleonasm that mars many of the flood of articles and pamphlets on early modern economic history that has appeared principally since 1955.

Three collections published in the past year offer the Western student an opportunity to evaluate the range and quality of Chinese Communist historical work in a field as yet unfortunately little investigated in the West, and to attempt to ascertain to what extent, beneath the jargon and easy labels, this work “opens” the subject for further study. *Chung-kuo tzu-pen chu-i meng-ya wen-t'i t'ao-lun chi*, the most extensive of the three, reprints thirty-three items from various journals, newspapers, and pamphlets, including ten from the leading historical publication, *Li-shih yen-chiu* [*Historical Studies*]. *Ming-Ch'ing she-hui ching-chi hsing-t'ai ti yen-chiu* contains four long studies, one of which also appears in the previous item. There are nineteen shorter articles collected in *Ming-Ch'ing-Chih lun-ts'ung*, all but five reprinted from the magazine for teachers of history, *Lishih chiao-hsüeh* [*The Teaching of History*].

These writings are manifestly exegetical; the classical text that they elucidate was composed by Mao Tse-tung in Yen-an in 1939: "As China's feudal society developed its commodity economy and so carried within itself the embryo of capitalism, China would of herself have developed slowly into a capitalist society even if there had been no influence of foreign imperialism."¹ The task of the exegetes is to document the existence of the capitalist embryo—the word used is *meng-ya*, "sprouts, shoots, *bourgeois*," a vague term at the best—within the feudal womb, to determine the level of its maturation before it was aborted, and to explain the slowness of its growth and the causes of its eventual demise. The composite interpretation of modern Chinese economic history which emerges—space does not permit a detailed consideration of the idiosyncracies of the individual contributors to the discussion—is this:

Imperial China since 200 B. C. was a despotic feudal society. At least from the beginning of the Ming dynasty in the fourteenth century, and perhaps as far back as T'ang and Sung, a commodity economy began to develop within the alleged natural economy of the feudal society. On the basis of this development, traces (*meng-ya*) of capitalist production appeared and by the sixteenth century—the Wan-li reign of the Ming dynasty—were flourishing in many handicraft industries and to

¹ "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party", in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (London, 1954), III, 77.

some degree in agriculture as well. (One may surmise that this date is hardly fortuitous; was it not to the sixteenth century that Marx ascribed the appearance of capitalism in Europe?)

There were a number of special circumstances in the Ming period, it is asserted, which accelerated the growth of incipient capitalism. In particular, four are pointed out. (1) Chu Yuan-chang, the founder of the dynasty, by favoring peasant agriculture restored the economy from the decline which it had suffered under harsh Mongol rule. At the same time, by means of differential taxation which forced the peasantry to seek subsidiary occupations, he fostered the cultivation of commercial crops and the development of handicraft in the lower Yangtze and southeast coastal provinces. (2) Technological advances in several fields accompanied the expansion of peasant handicraft and induced its differentiation from agriculture. Sung Ying-hsing's *T'ien-kung k'ai-wu* has been combed for examples such as the introduction of a new cotton spinning contrivance operated by foot power and producing three or four threads simultaneously. (3) The growth of the commodity economy was reflected in and spurred on by the "single-whip" tax system (*i-t'iao pien-fa*). This measure is interpreted by Communist historians as an attempt by the Ming government to counteract the fall in its revenues resulting from the concentration of land in the hands of gentry and official families who were able to avoid full taxation. The

"single-whip" reform, by combining the numerous land tax and labor service categories under a few heads and assessing them in money on the basis of landowning alone, benefited the small peasant whose tax load in the past had been inflated by the regressive assessment of labor services according to the number of adult males in a household. But a greater proportion of the total tax bill now fell on large landowners. This is said to have decreased the attractiveness of land as an object of investment and to have encouraged gentry and merchants to invest in large-scale handicraft. Moreover, the need for cash with which to meet tax obligations accelerated the development of a money economy by inducing the cultivation of commercial crops, especially textile fibers. (4) A further impetus to the growth of capitalist-type handicraft production was the weakening (and final abolition at the beginning of the Ch'ing dynasty) of the Ming system of forced levies of skilled labor. The demise of the *kung-chiang* system, as it was called, which at its peak encompassed 250,000 workers in sixty-two specialties serving in shifts at Peking and other points, is considered to have contributed to the growth of a free labor market. And this, of course, is one of the Marxist prerequisites for the appearance of capitalist relations of production.

Support for the contention that an accelerated growth of the commodity economy resulted from these four booster shots is forthcoming in the form of data purporting to show a breakdown of the purely local market

relations characteristic of a natural economy, and also the development of external trade to unprecedented levels. The production of raw cotton in Honan and Hopei and its transportation to Kiangnan for manufacture into cloth that was then marketed throughout China is a typical example in the case of the domestic market. Foreign trade, which grew despite Ming restrictions, is illustrated by accounts of the large-scale exportation of porcelain from the Ching-te-chen kilns in Kiangsi, of teas and silks, and even of iron implements from Kwangtung.

In the next stage of the process depicted by Chinese Communist historians, market forces acted to bring about an increasing differentiation of handicraft from agriculture. This separation led ultimately to the appearance of handicraft factories which are presumed to have fulfilled Marx's criteria for capitalist production. Examples are cited from the silk industry of Soochow where evidence is found of three or four thousand or more looms and thousands of wage workers. The following excerpt from the gazetteer of Su-chou-fu is often quoted and may serve us as an example:

[During the Wan-li period] the people of Soochow had no savings. Many earned their livelihood from silk weaving. The whole northeastern section of the city was inhabited by weavers.... Each laborer had a specialized skill. He had a regular employer and received his wages daily. If for some reason [he had to be

absent], a laborer with no [regular] employer was summoned to take his place.... These laborers without regular employment would stand and wait on various bridges from an early hour.... They stood in crowds of tens and hundreds, craning their necks and waiting, and dispersing after the breakfast hour. If work was scarce in the weaving establishments, they had no means to obtain their daily necessities of food and clothing.

In some instances, a single family might control twenty or thirty or as many as several hundred looms, and hire workers to operate them. It is admitted that cotton spinning and weaving probably remained peasant subsidiary handicrafts, but evidence is cited for the existence of handicraft factories employing dozens of workers for dyeing and processing the cotton cloth. Other fields in which the existence of handicraft factories is claimed are pottery, especially at Ching-te-chen, iron smelting and the manufacture of farming tools and household articles at Fo-shan in Kwangtung, paper making, and the mining of copper in Yunan.

On what bases are these enterprises called capitalist? Invariably we have the following recital: they were operated on a larger scale than peasant or guild handicraft; they employed free wage labor; they produced for a market; their technological level was comparatively high and the division of labor well advanced; and,

finally, their capital, it is asserted, often consisted of investments by merchant entrepreneurs. Even in such fields as cotton spinning and weaving, where capitalist relations of production are not claimed, the presence of large numbers of merchants who purchased and distributed the output of peasant households in Kiangnan and in turn provided them with raw cotton, is taken as evidence of something akin to the *Verlag* system of early modern Europe. In Marxist terms, merchant capital had penetrated petty household production and organized it on a capitalist basis.

Because Marx had stated that the “really revolutionary way” that industrial capital develops (as distinguished from merchant investment in manufacturing) is for a section of the craftsmen themselves to accumulate capital and become merchants and capitalists, evidence of this process must also be adduced. A favorite item employed for this purpose is the well-known colloquial language story “Shih Jen-ts’e Meets a Friend at T’an-ch’üeh,” from the early seventeenth-century collection *Hsing-shih heng-yen*, in which the small weaver Shih Fu through luck and diligent application rises to be a capitalist possessing thirty or forty looms and property worth thousands of taels.

As is well known, Marx defined Capitalism as a system of production for the market in which labor power itself has become a commodity, that is in which

labor is free of any compulsion other than the market in accepting or rejecting employment. The works we are considering assert that free wage labor in this sense came into existence during the Ming and Ch'ing periods. The key development was the unprecedented concentration of landholding. Many peasant owner-cultivators, as a consequence of differential abilities to respond to market demands, lost their holdings and either became tenants and farm laborers or were forced off the land into the towns where they found employment in handicraft enterprise or petty commerce. (The description of this process—as well as the postulate appearance in Kiangnan of a new genus of managing landlords who engaged in capitalist-type estate farming with hired labor—smacks more than a little of the English enclosure movement and of the gentlemen farmers of the late eighteenth century, on which one may venture to guess it is in fact modeled.)

A further sign of economic change that is strongly emphasized was the remarkable growth of the cities and towns of the Kiangnan area, and the transformation of many of them from purely military-administrative centers into centers of trade and handicraft. In addition to such large cities as Soochow, Nanking, Sungkiang, Hangchow, and Wuhu, it is noted that in the late sixteenth century there were at least four towns in southeastern China with populations exceeding 50,000, one with

35,000, and seven others with from 10,000 to 20,000. While these towns were still dominated by the feudal official and landlord-gentry classes, new social classes such as rich merchants (described as “commercial capitalists”), owners of large handicraft establishments, and wage workers now appeared prominently on the urban scene. The Communist historians point out that these social changes are reflected in the negative reactions of the feudal classes to the luxurious style of life that developed in the cities (quoting profusely from the *pi-chi*, collected jottings, of late Ming and Ch’ing writers).

The culmination of all of these developments, it is declared, was that at least in southeastern China embryonic (or incipient) capitalism was flourishing at the end of the Ming, and was seriously beginning to undermine the feudal society that obstructed its further development. Peasant rebellion, endemic in Chinese history at the end of a dynasty, was joined now by new social forces centering in the cities and led by the urban lower classes. (In proof, the histories of at least twenty-six urban uprisings that occurred in the early part of the seventeenth century have been abstracted from the *Ming shih-lu*.) The ideological leadership of the popular movement is assigned to such men as Ku Yen-wu, Huang Tsung-hsi, and Wang Fu-chih (by analogy with the Russian radical writers of the nineteenth century, such as Cherneshevsky). Their criticisms of seventeenth-

century Chinese society are interpreted as quasi-democratic utterances reflecting the attitudes of the new bourgeoisie and of sections of the local gentry (represented by the Tung-lin party) who joined with them in opposing the corruption of the last years of the Ming.

As unrest reached the boiling point, the popular urban movement coalesced with the peasant rebellion under Li Tzu-ch'eng to overthrow the dynasty and with it all obstructions to the development of incipient capitalism. This revolution, which is compared to that of seventeenth-century England or 1789 in France, was just on the point of organizing a new state power to act in the interests of the bourgeoisie when the barbarian Manchu hordes, at the behest of the desperate Ming feudal remnants, poured through the Shanhaikwan pass, and with unprecedented ferocity crushed the revolution, laid waste the land, and set back by at least a hundred years the development of the capitalist embryo in China.

But, it is recounted, all was not lost; nothing can resist the ineluctable progress of economic forces. Despite the harshness of Manchu rule, the economy slowly recovered, and by the Yung-cheng and Ch'ien-lung reigns incipient capitalist production was flourishing within the still dominant feudal society at a level higher even than the glorious days of the Wan-li reign. And in proof of this, data of the same kind that buttressed their account of late Ming times are cited in even

greater profusion by the Communist historians. But the restrictive policies of the despotic Ch'ing rulers, who feared that these new forces would undermine their dominion, combined with the oppression of the feudal landlords to obstruct the further expansion of the capitalist mode of production. Obviously both the Ch'ing state and the feudal land system would have to be swept away before China could really enter on the road to capitalism.

It was this goal that might have been achieved by the great Taiping rebellion of the mid-nineteenth century, if the foreign imperialists had not joined with the traitorous dynasty to defeat the Taipings and so prolong the life of the feudal regime. The internal oppression of Manchu rule prior to the Opium War and its subservience to foreign imperialism after 1842 at the expense of the economic interests of the Chinese people, was a new combination blocking the natural development of the Chinese economy in the direction of capitalism. And so was brought into being the stagnation and retardation of the past century.

This telling of the story raises at least two major problems for us. First, to account for the current pre-occupation with the economic history of the late Ming and Ch'ing periods; the second, more fundamental, to decide whether, after all, the way the problem is formulated by the Communist historians and the conclusions they reach really have any relevance to the study

of Chinese history in the Occident.

It is relatively easy, I believe, to dispose of the first of these difficulties. Obviously the concern to establish that China's economy prior to the nineteenth century was in fact evolving in the manner asserted stems from a need to fit Chinese history to the Marxist normative stages of societal development—from primitive communism through slavery, feudalism, capitalism, and socialism to the communist paradise. The intractability of Chinese historical fact before this procrustean paradigm has forced mainland scholars to devote numerous pages to particularly knotty problem of the transition from feudalism to capitalism.² Clearly these are loose ends in the developmental scheme that must be tidied up, put in order, as part of the intellectual *Gleichschaltung* of the Communist regime.

Nationalism, both of the common garden variety and as modified by acceptance of the Leninist theory of imperialism as *the* explanation of evil in modern Chinese history, is a further source of the effort to show that China was progressing toward capitalism during the Ch'ing period. Communist China's bid for great-power status might seem historically justified by the claim to

² The transition from slavery to feudalism presents a similar problem to Chinese historians who are now writing at length on this subject as well. See *Li-shih yen-chiu pien-chi-pu* [The Editors of *Historical Studies*], compilers, *Chung-kuo ti nu-li-chih yü feng-chien-chih fen-h'i wen-ti lun-wen hsüan-chi* [Collected Articles on the Problem of the Division Between the Period of Slavery and That of Feudalism in China] (Peking, 1957).

an identical pedigree with the West. Moreover, to assert that China was developing along the same lines as the same lines as the Western power who humiliated her, that Chinese society was not fundamentally different, and to ascribe the humiliations endured to the joint conspiracy of the Manchu dynasty and its successors with the imperialist powers, is doubtless a means whereby self-respect may be preserved and the positive value of tradition maintained³.

The second problem raised for us here is whether any explanatory model phrased in terms of “feudalism” and “capitalism” can aid in disentangling the thorny issues of China’s economic retardation and growth. Is the abortiveness of the transition from feudal society to capitalist society in China a real problem?

A minority of the participants in the discussion of the abortiveness of capitalism have contested one or more parts of the composite story as I have related it. No one, of course, would claim that capitalism was the dominant mode of production in the Ming or Ch’ing periods, only that embryonic capitalism was developing rapidly and undermining feudal society. But these dissidents have their doubts about the magnitude and signifi-

³ Perhaps the concern with the feudalism-capitalism transformation is also a delayed reaction to the recent discussions among English-speaking and Japanese Marxists occasioned by Maurice Dobb’s *Studies in the Development of Capitalism* (London, 1947). See *The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism: a Symposium* by Paul M. Sweezy [and others] (New York: Science and Society, 1954).

cance of the changes that they agree were taking place. There are warnings against committing the error of equating a commodity economy with capitalism—the shade of the Soviet historian M. N. Pokrovsky who strayed onto this path and ended in disgrace is invoked. Moreover, they take issue with the specific data offered by the “official” historians (Shang Yüeh for one). For example, the text from the Soochow gazetteer that I quoted earlier is discounted as proof for the existence of handicraft factories in the silk industry on the grounds that the size of the labor market indicated therein can be adequately explained on the basis of individual petty producers each hiring one or two workers to make up the necessary complement of two or three men per loom.

Questions are raised also as to whether references to hired labor in the *pi-chi* and gazetteers are in fact evidence of free wage labor in the Marxist sense. Can the characters *ku* and *yung* which appear in these texts really be taken as the equivalent of the modern term *ku-yung*, “to employ labor”? And, is there adequate evidence of merchant investment in large-scale handicraft undertakings, or of peasant flight to the cities? The epitome of the critical position is that while it is true that capitalist *meng-ya* were growing, it would be wrong to exaggerate their amplitude. The basic class conflict in Ch’ing (and *a fortiori* Ming) China was still that between landlord and peasant; the bourgeois-feudal issue

was a less pressing one. Many of the data cited to illustrate it are in fact less proof that feudal society was disintegrating than that a dynasty was coming to a close in the classical pattern.

Although these exceptions are well taken—and sometimes carried to a point where the critics come dangerously close to accepting the heterodox thesis the “Asiatic mode of production” was a principal cause of the retardation of incipient capitalism—the discussion remains safely within the parameters of Marxism in Chinese dress. This, I would suggest, obscures the basic problems of China’s economic history in the past century. The question that is really relevant to China’s experience is why she failed to be transformed from an agricultural to an industrial society—what were the factors making for retardation and which for growth—and not why feudal society failed to be transmuted into capitalism.

One should not fail to note that the feudalism-capitalism dichotomy is a semantic nightmare even with respect to the European experience from which it is derived. Strictly speaking, the concepts feudalism and capitalism are of a different order and not wholly comparable. What corresponds to capitalism, understood as an economic system, is manorialism—the prevalent economic system in medieval Western Europe. Feudalism is most accurately employed as a designation for the system of political organization of medieval Europe, and stands in contrast to the politically integrated

nation-state and state system that superseded it. Apart from this consideration, the emphasis within the paradigm has clearly always been on tracing the origins and development of a capitalism that successfully grew out of medieval society and much less on analyzing the antecedent feudal order. In the case of China, our primary concern must still be with the traditional society that prevented the emergence of either. The decisive factor in checking the autonomous growth of modern industrial-capitalist society in China was the remarkable stability of the internal structure of the agricultural economy and the land system. While the search for traces of incipient capitalism a not an uninteresting quest, it distracts us from the equally interesting, probably more difficult, and certainly more important undertaking of producing a useful anatomy and physiology of this traditional economy. And despite the virtues of its structural-functional approach, for this task we shall need subtler tools than Marxism.

On the other hand, if we take the terms "feudalism" and "capitalism" not as ultimate realities, the existence and development of which we must diligently prove or disprove, but rather as rough constructs that potentially may direct us to crucial points for detailed research, then the work of the Chinese historians under review here may be of considerable value. Their description of a process of transition from a feudal to a capitalist stage implies that early modern Chinese society was undergoing

significant changes, and in so doing corresponds to a view that seems increasingly prevalent among non-Marxist scholars. If Professor Kracke's excellent paper on Sung society may be taken as an indicator,⁴ no one will today accept the unqualified label "natural economy" for post-Sung China. In fact the main trend of scholarship since Naitō Torajirō has taken late-T'ang and Sung as a watershed at which a number of new features came into prominence and altered the character of Chinese society.⁵ While the Naitō hypothesis does not stress economic change, it takes note of it. Kracke's account of "change within tradition" also points to the development in the Sung of "an economy apparently far more complex than any of earlier times," and describes in particular "the rise of the great city" and "a genuine alteration of Chinese social patterns" that accompanied it. These new features continued to develop in the Yuan,⁶ and presumably in Ming and Ch'ing times. It may well be that in the small amount of work that has been done in early modern economic history to date scholars have underestimated the degree to which change within the traditional economy was occurring. The old adage about the connection between smoke and fire would seem

⁴ E. A. Kracke, Jr., "Sung Society: Change Within Tradition," *FEQ*, XIV (August 1955), 479-488.

⁵ See Professor Naitō's posthumous work *Chūgoku kinsei shi* [*History of Modern China*] (Tokyo, 1947).

⁶ Herbert Franz Schurmann, *Economic Structure of the Yuan Dynasty* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), vii, 4-5, 8-9, and *passim*.

to justify the tentative conclusion that the evidence produced by the Communist historians necessitates an upward revision on this score. That would be nothing extraordinary in the light of European historiography which, ever since Sombart introduced the concept of "capitalism" into academic discussion, has been reacting against his designation of the medieval economy of Western Europe as precapitalist in type.⁷

One of the more interesting questions raised by the data offered by the Chinese Communist historians relates to the relative technological level and output of Chinese and European metallurgical industry prior to the industrial revolution. The data are offered, of course, to substantiate the politically motivated claim that Ch'ing China possessed all the economic prerequisites for successful industrialization, but that this transformation was foiled by political backwardness. It is nevertheless startling to read of the existence in eighteenth-century China of an iron smelting establishment with a daily output of 3,600 catties ($2\frac{1}{2}$ tons) which employed 1,000 miners, charcoal burners, carriers, ironworkers, etc., to produce that total. These figures stand up well with those for seventeenth-century England when the output per furnace is estimated at 2 or 3 tons of pig iron daily with a total

⁷ See M. Postan, "Medieval Capitalism," *Economic History Review*, 1st Ser., IV (1932-34), 212-227.

annual production of about 25,000 tons.⁸ But what we do not know in the case of China is how many of these large-scale establishments there were, and how long such an enterprise survived. It need hardly be said that we cannot competently revise our picture of the traditional Chinese economy without systematic testing of hypotheses against empirical fact. The mere citation of suggestive data without methodical elimination of alternative explanations will get us nowhere.

What the works that I am discussing have done is to transplant wholesale to Chinese soil models drawn from a nineteenth-century understanding of European history, and then to tend them with infinite care, pouring on them bucket after bucket of fertilizing quotation from the choicest literary sources, seeking to produce a fruit to rival that grown in early modern Europe. The few genuine shoots of the plant hitherto unknown to China are eagerly seized upon as qualitative changes whose magnitude (or quantity) is exaggerated to the point where, in a perversion of the Hegelian dialectic, they give birth to even more radical qualitative changes. Thus from the proven existence of a few large-scale handicraft enterprises, it is assumed that there were many more, and the many more are taken as proof of the flourishing of incipient capitalist production. The impli-

⁸ H. R. Schubert, *History of the British Iron and Steel Industry from c. 450 B.C. to A.D. 1775* (London, 1957), 244.334, and Appendix IV, "Output Figures."

cation to be drawn from China's failure to undergo an industrial revolution is that the conditions that favored the industrialization of England, and of Japan, were fortuitous. Chinese society was not different—only unlucky!

In no case that I have examined are the available materials for any region or any functional sector of the economy exhaustively surveyed to furnish an account of all the instances—capitalist and noncapitalist—so that a proper evaluation can be made of the magnitude and distribution of change. The question of the degree to which industries producing for the market were fragmented, labor-intensive, and capital-poor is not raised. Nor—with the possible exception of Yen Chung-p'ing on Yunan copper mining⁹—has there been a study in detail of any single firm such as would allow us to judge to what extent these were really enterprises of a new type and not merely more of the same.

Is it not just as convincing to argue that the presence of large-scale petty commerce which the Communist historians invoke as proof of incipient capitalism is in fact a mark of retardation, a reflection of limited markets which, because the division of labor is not far advanced and opportunities for paid employment few, encourages every producer to be a “penny capitalist”? And are not

⁹ Yen Chung-p'ing, *Ch'ing-tai Yün-nan t'ung-cheng k'ao* [A Study of the Copper Industry in Yunnan During the Ch'ing Dynasty] (Peking, 1957).

the genuine middlemen—for example, the monopoly merchants—tied to and dependent upon the *ancien régime*? Agreed that there were many uprisings in Soochow and other cities at the end of the Ming, but is this a new phenomenon, and is the incidence statistically significant as compared with other times? Is it valid to describe pawnshops, *ch'ien-chuang*, *yin-hao*, and the Shansi banks as modern enterprises? Was landholding *always* being concentrated from the Sung down to the twentieth century, and tenancy correspondingly *always* on the increase? Or can we discern, if we try, significant cyclical variations in these closely related processes?

In part the shortcomings of this work stem from the kind of materials on which the writers rely. While several new collections of source materials on agriculture and handicraft are now appearing,¹⁰ for the most part they are put together from staple stuff (only more of it): gazetteers, *pi-chi*, memorials, and edicts. Some hitherto unprinted documents from the Ch'ing archives are included, and also examples of such private documents as tenant contracts. But for evidence of the central arch of their thesis—the flourishing of capitalist-type

¹⁰ See P'eng Tse-i', comp., *Chung-kuo chin-tai shou-kung-yeh shih tzu-liao* (1840-1949) [*Source Materials on Handicraft Industry in Modern China (1840-1949)*] (Peking, 1957), 4 vols.; and Li Wen-chih, comp., *Chung kuo chin-tai nung-yeh shih tzu-liao*, 1840-1911 [*Source Materials on Agriculture in Modern China, 1840-1911*] (Peking, 1957)—there are two additional volumes in this collection, compiled by two other scholars and dealing respectively with the periods 1912-27 and 1927-37.

handicraft factories—there are no first-hand materials. This forces the Chinese Communist historians back to dangerous dependence on the pseudo-numbers of literary texts¹¹—not to mention the unhappy fact that what is recorded in a *pi-chi* in any case is more likely there because it was rare and exceptional than because it was flourishing.

Paradoxically, it is this dependence on traditional sources and their citation in profusion (and with footnotes) that is also probably the chief value of the recent writings from mainland China on early modern economic history. Despite the Marxist framework—perhaps because of it—these are still very much in the scissors and paste tradition that has an honored place in Chinese historiography, and as such can offer us rich data to filter through finer sieves.

Glossary

Ch'ien-chuang 錢莊

Hsing-shih heng-yen 醒世恒言

Huang Tsung-hsi 黃宗羲

i-t'iao pien-fa 一條鞭法

ku 雇

Ku Yen-wu 顧炎武

kung-chiang 工匠

Li Kuang-pi 李光壁

Li Tzu-ch'eng 李自成

¹¹ See Lien-sheng Yang, "Numbers and Units in Chinese Economic History," *HIAS*, XII (June 1949), 216-225.

meng-ya 萌芽

Ming shih-lu 明實錄

pi-chi 筆記

Sung Ying-hsing 宋應星

T'ien-kung k'ai-wu 天工開物

Tung-lin 東林

Wang Fu-chih 王夫之

Yen Chung-p'ing 嚴中平

Yin-hao 銀號

yung 備

清代經濟芻論

王業鍵

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自從十七世紀中葉到第一次世界大戰前夕，人類世界產生了一連串的經濟革命：商業革命、農業革命、工業革命、以至於金融革命。這些革命把西方諸國以及東方的日本一個個地轉變為工業化的國家。但是在滿族統治下的中國，經濟上並無根本改變，大多數人民仍然以耕種為生，過着和千年前老祖宗同樣的生活方式。雖然在十九世紀後半清政府曾試圖建立重工業，作為自強運動的磐石，但是這一運動根本失敗。中日甲午一戰，證明幾十年洋務派的慘淡經營，我國依然船不堅砲不利，遑論工業化。此外，清末也有不少外商和本國企業家在通商口岸設立各種新式工廠，以機器製造來代替傳統的手工業；然而，這些新興企業也沒有普遍發展。事實上，很多傳統手工業仍能和現代企業相抗衡而並存¹。因

¹ Cf. Chi-ming Hou, "Economic Dualism: the Case of China, 1840-1937," *Journal of Economic History*. 13. 3 (September 1963), pp. 277-297.

此，中國經濟並未產生結構上的改變，即使到二十世紀中葉依然非常落後。

清代我國經濟究竟如何遲滯與落後，可以從下面幾個簡單的數字顯示出來。如所週知，當一個國家或一個區域邁進現代經濟成長 (modern economic growth) 的境界時，它的經濟結構也隨着轉變；而在這個轉變過程中最顯著的特色便是農業部門在整個勞動力和全部國民生產中所佔比重的降低。就以近代的日本來說，從大約 1880 年到二十世紀中葉其農業部門的勞動力在全國勞動力中所佔比例從 83% 減低到 48%，同時製造業和勞務 (service) 部門所佔比例則從 17% 增加到 51%。在同一期間日本農業部門在全國國民生產中所佔比例從 65% 降低到 24%，而製造業和勞務部門所佔比例則從 35% 擴大到 76%²。雖然我們沒有關於清代的類似數字，劉大中教授和葉恭嘉博士所著中國大陸的經濟 (1933-1959) 可資借鏡。按照他們的估計，1933 年我國農業部門在全國勞動力中所佔比例為 79%，而在全國國民生產中所佔比例為 65%。即使在其餘的 35% 國民生產額中，傳統的非農業部門 (主要為手工業) 佔了幾乎 20%，政府部門的貢獻佔了幾乎 3%，因此現代化部門 (modern sector) 所貢獻的還不到 13%³。由此可見，遲至 1933 年我國經濟依然停滯不前，其水準和 1880 年工業化前夕的日本不相上下。

那麼，從十九世紀後半到二十世紀初中、日兩國幾乎同時試圖工業化，何以彼成我敗？對於這個問題，中外學者

² Simon Kuznets, *Six Lectures on Economic Growth*, New York, the Free Press of Glencoe, 1961, p. 52.

³ Ta-chung Liu and Kung-chia Yeh, *The Economy of the Chinese Mainland, 1933-1959*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 66, 69.

專家站在不同的角度去看，而提供了若干不同的答案⁴。當然，晚清中國工業化之失敗原因多端，觀念上、制度上、以及客觀形勢上種種因素牽連錯綜，絕非簡單的一元論所能充分解釋。不過，從經濟發展的觀點看來，我認爲有二點特別值得檢討：這就是政府部門和農業部門在這一發展過程中所應負起的艱鉅任務。

今天的社會科學界幾乎一致認爲，要打破落後國家極度貧困的惡性循環 (the vicious cycle of extreme poverty)，政府部門必須肩負起下列空前重要的積極任務：(一)掃除對經濟成長的制度上障礙，(二)動員現有資源以供工業投資，(三)推廣教育以培植勞工和科學技術人才，(四)建設交通及其他公用事業以促進工業發展。——如要完成這些任務，就必須有一個強有力的中央政府才能領導舉國人民朝向既定的方向前進。明治維新的日本便是一個好例子。

維新領袖們取得政權後所做第一件事便是廢除各種封建限制：諸如宣佈社會階級平等，承認土地私有，准許人民自由遷徙、自由選擇職業，取消行會，廢除水陸交通的關隘等

⁴ 例如揚聯陞、費正清 (John K. Fairbank)、費慰愷 (Albert Feuerwerker) 等強調制度上的阻力使中國工業無法發展。賴特 (Mary C. Wright) 則認爲根深蒂固的中國傳統價值觀念與現代經濟發展格格不入。侯繼明、柏金斯等則以爲我國政治不安定，缺乏強有力的領導人物。請參考下列著作。J. K. Fairbank, A. Eckstein, & L. S. Yang, "Economic Change in Modern China: An Analytic Framework," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 9.1 (October 1960), pp. 1-26; Albert Feuerwerker, *China's Early Industrialization*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1958, Chap. 7; Mary C. Wright, *The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1957, pp. 191-194; Chi-ming Hou, *Foreign Investment and Economic Development in China 1840-1937*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1965, pp. 155-163; Dwight H. Perkins, "Government as an Obstacle to Industrialization: the Case of 19th Century China," *Journal of Economic History*, 27.4 (December 1967), pp. 472-492.

等，不一而足⁵。其目的便是掃除種種限制經濟發展的制度上障礙。結果，國內勞動力得隨各地需要而流動，國內市場因此統一，各地知識的相互交流從而增進。其次，如何籌集巨額資金以供工業化之需，是所有後進國家的難題。雖然日本在德川幕府時代（1600-1867）國內商業資本的發展很可觀，但是私人資本的累積遠不足以應付各種現代企業建設之需求，而且當時國內信用機構仍然很落後，無法將社會上的點滴儲蓄匯集成流，轉移到工業部門去投資。至於大舉外債，惟恐有損國權，大違國策。為了解決這個急迫的資本問題，明治政府於 1873 年實施土地改革，廢除德川時代各地領主（大名）對於土地的封建特權，將全國土地稅統歸中央政府控制。這樣一來，中央政府有了一宗可靠而豐富的財源，於是不但可以建設鐵路、電信、鋼鐵、造船等大規模企業，而且有能力補助許許多多私人企業，十年間便為工業化奠下一個初步基礎⁶。再次，明治政府於 1872 年實施通盤教育改革，規定所有兒童須接受四年（後改為六年）的義務教育。除此以外，並廣設中等學校及高等技術學校，在東京並成立東京帝國大學，作為全國學府之冠。結果，到十九世紀終了前文盲幾乎全部掃除，造成一股推進工業的最大動力。無疑的，對於培養人力的投資比較物質方面投資的貢獻還來

⁵ G. C. Allen, *A Short Economic History of Modern Japan*, 1857-1937, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1963, p. 31.

⁶ 關於土地改革內容，請參考 James I. Nakamura, *Agricultural Production and the Economic Development of Japan, 1873-1922*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966, Appendix A. 此一改革對於日本工業化的貢獻，可參看 Gustav Ranis, "The Financing of Japanese Economic Development," *Economic History Review*, 2nd Series, 11.3 (April 1959), pp. 440-454. 關於籌集資本，除土地改革外，現代銀行體系的建立也有莫大貢獻，見 Allen 前引書，頁四七至六〇。

得大⁷。

和明治時代的日本相較，晚清的中國情形迥異。自從太平天國革命之後，滿清帝國是在分崩離析的過程中，中央政府的威望以及對各省的控制都日漸微弱。因此，即使滿清政府力求工業化，它也沒有力量號召全國朝向這個目標前進。它既不能克服許多制度上和社會上阻止經濟發展的障礙，也不能籌集足夠的資金以供發展工業所需人力、物力兩方面的大量投資。雖然政府創辦了若干現代企業如鐵路、造船、煤、鐵、機器之類，這些都是由幾位對洋務稍有認識的督撫（例如，李鴻章、張之洞）勉力經營。各人資力有限，又兼各自為政。中央與地方既多離違，地方與地方又往往不協調。在這種情形下，我國工業之遲遲不展，自不足怪。

其次，讓我們再看看中、日兩國農業部門的表現。一般說來，經濟落後國家並無大量商業資本的累積以供工業發展之用。如果沒有巨額外資的流入，那麼，建設工業所必需的資金就非得取之於農業部門不可。同時，農業部門還要生產出足夠的糧食以供給日益增加的人口，以及為工業產品提供一個不斷擴充的市場。要完成這些任務，農業部門就必須充分提高其生產力。在這方面明治時代的日本又是成績斐然。據大川一司和羅索夫斯基（Henry Rosovsky）兩教授的估計，在 1878-82 年與 1913-17 年期間內，其土地生產力提高 80%，農業勞動生產力上升 138%。結果，在這個半世紀中農業部門的每年平均成長率高達 2.4%，同時農業部門就

⁷ William W. Lockwood, *The Economic Development of Japan*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1968, pp. 509-512; Koichi Emi, *Government Fiscal Activity & Economic Growth in Japan, 1868-1960*, Tokyo, Kinokuniya Bookstore Co., 1963, pp. 125-131.

業人口的真實所得增長過倍⁸。這一成就主要歸功於封建制度的廢除，水利灌溉的改良、優良品種的選擇、耕耘方法的改善，以及化學肥料的使用。正因為農業生產力和農民所得提高，所以農業部門不但能向政府提供更多的租稅作為各項投資之用，而且能向工業部門購買更多的產品。這是日本工業化成功的一個最重要因素。

反觀我國，從十九世紀中葉到第一次世界大戰終止，無論農業勞動生產力或土地生產力均無多大改進。這可從下列三方面看出來，第一、傳統農業資本形成最重要的一部分是水利建設，但是根據最近柏金斯 (Dwight H. Perkins) 教授的研究，我國水利設施在十八世紀興修者有八一八起，十九世紀減少過半，只達三九四起⁹。第二，傳統農業的技術並未改觀。二十世紀初期在鄉村常見的農具如耕犁、水車之類和二個世紀以前民間所使用者比較起來，並無不同¹⁰。第三，在本世紀中葉前農民極少使用化學肥料。農業部門依然牛步，工業怎能起飛？

⁸ Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, "The Role of Agriculture in Modern Japanese Economic Development," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 9.1, Part II (October 1960), pp. 43-67. 關於明治時期日本農業成長率問題過去幾年更有若干爭論，讀者如有興趣，可參考 James I. Nakamura, "Growth of Japanese Agricultural, 1875-1920," and Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, "A Century of Japanese Economic Growth," in William W. Lockwood, ed., *The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 47-92, 249-324; Henry Rosovsky, "Rumbles in the Ricefields: Professor Nakamura vs. the Official Statistics," *Journal of Asian Studies*, 27, 2 (February 1968), pp. 347-360.

⁹ Dwight H. Perkins, *Agricultural Development in China, 1368-1968*, Chicago, Aldine, Publishing Co., 1969, p. 61.

¹⁰ 參閱東亞同文會纂，*支那經濟全書*，東京，1908年，第八冊，頁一六三至一七〇；弘書編，*授時通考*，乾隆六年序，1956年版，頁六三八至六五九，七四五。

檢討中、日經濟中這二個重要部門（政府和農業）的表現，我們便不難瞭解在十九世紀後半這二個東亞鄰邦的經濟發展何以這樣懸殊！概括地說，明治時代的日本，全國都在一個統一的強有力的政府領導之下。這個政府最主要目標是要使日本現代化——富國強兵，與西方列強抗衡。爲了達成這個目標，他首先掃除許多阻擋社會經濟發展的封建障礙，隨着實行多種重要改革：尤其重要的是土地改革，把一大部分的農業資源轉移到工業部門去投資，和教育改革，不但掃除了文盲，而且爲科學技術的發展奠下基礎。同時，農業部門也由於封建制度的廢除，知識交流的增進，以及政府的積極協助（例如、選擇優良品種、設立農業學校和農事試驗站等等）而有長足進展。它不但成爲工業投資的源泉，而且向工業部門提供了一個可靠的市場。農業既能支持和促進工業成長，工業因而能吸收農業部門的過剩勞力，兩者相輔相成。結果，日本終於超越了貧困的惡性循環，成爲亞洲第一個工業化的國家。相形之下，晚清的中國，中央政權衰落，農業又遲滯不展，只好對現代經濟成長望門興歎！

二

中國經濟結構在清代沒有改變是一個很顯然的事實，但是，我們不能因此就認爲清代經濟處於完全停滯的狀態，從另外一個角度看來，它仍然呈現得很有活力，創下了廣泛性成長（*extensive growth*）的紀錄。所謂廣泛性成長，就是一個經濟單位所生產的物資與勞務總量的增加，而每人平均產量則未改觀。在過去的幾個世紀，我國國民生產的增加，主要由於人口的增長與耕地的擴張，資本投入（*capital inputs*）的貢獻甚少，技術改進更微不足道。

關於以往幾個世紀我國人口及耕地的增加，何炳棣和柏

金斯的研究對我們在這方面的瞭解有不可磨滅的貢獻¹¹。如表一所示，我國人口在公元 1400 年到 1957 年期間從六千五百萬至八千萬左右增達六億四千七百萬。這就是說，在這

表一 中國的人口與耕地面積 (1400—1957)

年 別	人 口 (百萬)	耕 地 面 積 (百萬市畝)	每畝所產糧食估計 (斤)
1400	65—80	370	139
1600	120—200	670(a)	—
1650	100—150	600(b)	—
1685	—	740	—
1750	200—250	900(c)	—
1770	270	950	203
1850	410	1,210(d)	243
1873	350	1,210	—
1893	385	1,240	—
1913	430	1,360	—
1933	503	1,534(e)	242
1957	647	1,678	276

註：(a) 筆者認為柏金斯的估計（五百萬市畝）過低，今就明末 1572—82 年全國清丈結果所得數字折算。

(b) 筆者估計數字，蓋明末內亂，荒蕪田地不少，

(c) 筆者估計數字，蓋 1685—1750 年間，政治安定，經濟向榮，耕地應有相當增加。

(d) 筆者估計數字，蓋太平天國時期荒廢田地到 1873 年大致均已恢復生產。

(e) 筆者認為柏金斯估計過低，今採劉大中等估計數字。

資料來源：Dwight H. Perkins, *Agricultural Development in China, 1368-1968*, Chicago, Aldine Publishing Co., 1969, pp. 16-17, 216 240; Ta-chung Liu & Kung-chia Yeh, *The Economy of Chinese Mainland, 1933-1959*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 129, 178.

¹¹ Ping-ti Ho, *Studies on the Population of China, 1368-1953*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1959. Dwight H. Perkins, *Agricultural Development in China, 1368-1968*, Chicago, Aldine Publishing Co., 1969.

五個半世紀內，我國人口數目上升了八倍至十倍。像傳統中國這樣一個農業社會，人口的大量增長必須農業生產有相對的增加，才能維持。那麼，過去幾個世紀我國糧食問題如何解決呢？據柏金斯的研究，在這個期間內我國耕地擴張四倍，同時，耕地單位面積產量約上升一倍，兩者並進，因此糧食增產能大致滿足人口增加的需要¹²。

對整個清代來說，我們可就人口及耕地的增長情形將它劃分為二個時期，從十七世紀中葉到十九世紀中葉是一個空前的成長時期。在這二個世紀間，我國人口增加了二倍（從一億至一億五千萬上升至四億一千萬），同時耕地擴張了一倍（從六億畝增至十二億一千萬畝）。但是從十九世紀中葉到第一次世界大戰前夕是一個遲滯不展的時期，因為在這個期間，我國人口僅增加 5%，耕地也不過擴充 10%。所以，根據表一觀察，我們大致可以說，在第一個時期內，隨着人口的成長，不但耕地面積增長，耕地的單位產量也同時上升。然而在第二個時期，糧食增產全依賴耕地面積的擴張，耕地的單位產量並未顯著上升。


從廣泛性成長的觀點來看，清代經濟最為顯著的變動就是農業的擴充。在這種擴充過程中，我們可以看出大致三個階段：首先，人口增加的結果，有一部分人便從人口密集的地區遷移到土地較為豐富的地區。其次，人口移動的結果，不但導致耕地的增加，而且水利灌溉的建設也隨着擴充。第三，隨着耕作及灌溉面積的擴大，不但總產量而且單位面積產量也跟着增加。這種連鎖性的發展是我國過去二千年來經濟發展最簡單的寫照¹³，而在清代經濟中表現得尤為明顯。

¹² Perkins, *Agricultural Development*……, p. 33.

¹³ 讀者如有興趣，可參考 Chao-ting Chi, *Key Economic Areas in Chinese History*, New York, Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1963.

基於同一觀點，我們現在可以把清代的中國劃分為三個區域：一為東部的「已開發區域」(the “developed area”) 一為「開發中區域」(the “developing area”) ——包括中西部、東北、和臺灣，一為邊陲的「未開發區域」(the “underdeveloped area”)。「已開發區域」有幾個主要的特色：(一)農業資源已大為開發，(二)人口與土地的比例甚高，(三)手工業頗為發達(後來又加上少量的現代工業)。「開發中區域」的特點是人口與土地的比例較低以及自然資源的不斷開發。至於「未開發區域」，不但人口與土地比例極低，而且人民經濟生活以游牧為主。

清代我國人口移動圖



爲了大致區分這三個區域，我們可在地圖上繪二條線：第一條線從山海關開始朝西至晉陝交界的河曲，然後朝南經潼關、漢口、曲江至廣東雷州半島的南端；第二條線起於東北的瀘濱、朝西南沿內蒙邊界至嘉峪關，然後朝南一直到雲南的騰衝(見圖)。自東而西觀察，第一個區域爲「已開發區域」。它包括我國人口最多的十個省份：直隸、河南、山

東、山西、江蘇、浙江、安徽、江西、福建、廣東。第二個區域為「開發中區域」，包括東北、陝西、甘肅、湖北、湖南、廣西、四川、雲南、貴州、和臺灣¹⁴。第三個地區——「未開發區域」——包括我國西北部的廣大區域：外蒙古、內蒙古、新疆、西藏、及青海。雖然第一個地區在清代仍經閱某種程度的成長，農業上發展最快的當推第二個地區。至於第三個地區，在二十世紀中葉前，可說變動微不足道。因此，我們討論清代經濟時可將這個地區置而不論，而把我們的注意力集中到前面二個地區。

中國人口在整個清代朝着四個方向不斷地從「已開發區域」往外移：一為朝向湖北、湖南，特別是四川的大量移民；清末更西漸而及於雲、貴、廣西諸省；次為朝向漢水流域（包括湖北北部、河南西南部、陝西南部、及甘肅的東南角）的移動。第三是清末的往東北移民，最後為臺灣的開發（見圖）。所有移民都以第二個地區為終點。結果這個地區的人口和耕地乃大為增加。

可惜我們沒有完整的人口與耕地的統計數字。表二中所列數字雖然有些很成問題，大致說起來是比較可靠的。這些數字很明顯地表示，從十八世紀下半葉至二十世紀初「開發中區域」的人口與耕地增加率遠比「已開發區域」來得快。在這個期間內前一區域的人口上升 155%，但後一區域不過增加 31%。同時，前一區域的耕地幾乎擴張達開始時的三倍，後一區域不過增長 7%。由於這二個區域的不均衡發

¹⁴ 「開發中地區」還可約略區分為二部分：邊地和內地。前者包括東北、臺灣、廣西、貴州、雲南；後者包含湖北、湖南、四川、陝西、和甘肅。邊地省份人口和耕地的顯著增加，在清代可說還是首次。內地省份情形則不同。在滿清入主中國以前這些省份的農業資源已相當開發，但在明末清初遭受天災及戰禍的嚴重破壞，以致人口銳減，田地荒蕪。清代東南各省移民來此，恢復農業生產，可說是重新開發。

表二 我國人口與耕地面積的變動 (1766—1933)

區域與省份 (1)	人 口 (百萬)			耕地面積 (百萬畝)		
	1787 (2)	1933 (3)	(3)與(2)的% (4)	1766 (5)	1933 (6)	(6)與(5)的% (7)
「已開發地域」	209.0 (71%)a	274.2 (55%)a	131	699 (74%)a	747.2 (40%)a	107
直隸 (河北)	23.0	34.6b	160	120	118.2b	99
山東	22.6	40.3	179	121	120.6	96
河南	21.0	36.3	173	107	123.0	115
山西	13.2	12.4	114	51	55.8	109
江浙	31.4	41.0c	131	84	92.2c	110
浙江	21.7	22.0	101	42	51.1	122
安徽	28.9	24.0	83	82	70.6	93
江西	19.2	16.5	86	47	43.0	92
福建	12.0	13.1	109	14	23.3	166
廣東	16.0	34.0	213	31	50.0	161
「開發中區域」	83.5 (29%)a	212.7 (42%)a	255	242 (26%)a	711.9 (46%)a	294
東北	1.0	35.3	3,530	21	235.0	1,119
陝西	8.4	9.7	115	59d	54.0	145d
甘肅	15.2e(?)	6.5	43(?)	—	29.2	—
湖北	19.0	27.3	144	51	84.0	165
湖南	16.2	33.4	206	50	79.3	159
廣西	6.4	16.6	259	9	43.0	478
四川	8.6	55.4	644	41	129.0	315
雲南	3.5	15.9	454	8	36.0	450
貴州	5.2	12.6	242	3	22.4	747
「未開發區域」	—	16.2 (3%)a	—	1	74.6 (5%)a	7,460
總 計	292.5	503.1	172	942	1,533.7	162

- 註：(a) 括弧內數字為各個區域在全國人口或全國耕地面積中所佔比例。
 (b) 包括兩個特別市……北平和天津 (假定這兩個特別市在四個特別市全部人口和耕地所佔比例為40%)。
 (c) 包括兩個特別市……上海和南京。
 (d) 包括甘肅。
 (e) 1851年以前官方的甘肅人口數字值得懷疑，已由柏金斯教授指出，見下引著作頁二〇七至二〇八。
 (f) 包括內外蒙古、新疆、青海、和西藏。

資料來源：(1) Ping-ti Ho, *Studies on the Population of China, 1368—1953*, p. 283.

(2) Perkins, *Agricultural Development in China*, p. 234.

(3) Ta-chung Liu and Kung-chia Yeh, pp. 129, 178.

展，各個地區在全國人口與耕地中所佔比例也就發生相當大的變動。正如表中所示，同一時期中「開發中區域」在全國人口中所佔比例由 29% 增達 42%，而在全國耕地中所佔比例從 26% 擴大到 46%。事實上，如果我們能有十七世紀末期或十八世紀初期的可靠的人口與耕地數字，這種變動趨勢更要明顯。

如果我們進一步推究，便會發現清代這二個地區之間的經濟關係和今天的先進國與開發中國家 (developing countries) 之間的經濟關係頗為相像。「已開發區域」向「開發中區域」輸出资本、工業產品、技術知識，以及給予財政上援助，後者則向前者輸出原料及糧食等產品。很顯然的，隨着人口的移動，若干資本和生產技術也傳入新開發的地區。還有，國內各區域間貿易所需的商業資本，也絕大部分由「已開發區域」的商人所供給。在清代的區域之間貿易大部分都由二個集團的商人所壟斷：山西商人和徽州商人。山西商人精於銀錢滙兌業務，徽州商人則在全國米穀、鹽、茶、鐵、瓷器、紡織品的販運方面有極大勢力¹⁵。

至於工業品的出口，江蘇棉紡織品是個很好的例子。這些產品的市場幾遍及全國——沿長江而達內地各省，由海運而至東北，由陸路而至西北¹⁶。在清代的最後幾十年，當現代的機器紡織技術傳入中國時，江蘇（尤其是上海）又成為全國最大的機器棉紡織業中心。例如，在 1918 年江蘇擁有的紡錠數佔全國紡錠總數 80%。即使其餘的 20% 也大多集中於「已開發區域」。作為「開發中區域」唯一紡織工業中

¹⁵ Lien-sheng Yang, *Money and Credit in China*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952, pp. 82-83; 藤井弘, 「新安商人の研究」(二), 東洋學報, 三十六卷二期 (1953年9月), 頁三二至六〇。

心的湖北僅擁有全國紡錠總數的 8%¹⁷。因此，後一地區對於棉織品的需要必須仰賴東南沿海較為先進的地區來供給。

這二個區域之間的另一經濟關係是財政資源的移轉。從十八世紀初期開始滿清政府把中國本部各省按其財政之豐嗇分為三組——自足省份，不敷省份，和有餘省份。自足省份包括福建、廣東、和廣西，其稅收除解送中央的部分之外尙足以維持本省軍、政各項支出。不敷省份包括陝西、甘肅、四川、雲南、貴州，其稅收不足應付本省支出的需要。有餘省份包括山西、河南、直隸、山東、江西、湖北、湖南、和浙江，其稅收除繳送中央部分外應本省財政支出而有餘。因此朝廷規定有餘省份應協濟不足省份，財政上互通有無¹⁸。如果我們把這一事實和表二對照一下，便會發現大多數有餘省份都在「已開發區域」之內，而所有不足省份都座落於「開發中區域」。除四川一省後來成為有餘省份以外，這種情形一直到清末仍未改觀¹⁹。

無疑地，為交換物資與勞務的進口，「開發中區域」所能提供大抵都是初級產品 (primary products)。它所能輸出的最重要產品當然是糧食。在整個清代糧食的轉運是一直不斷地從「開發中區域」往「已開發區域」流——從四川、湖廣至江、浙，從臺灣至福建，從廣西至廣東，從東北至直

¹⁶ 全漢昇，「鴉片戰爭前江蘇的棉紡織業」，清華學報，新一卷，第三期（民國四十七年九月），頁二五至五一。

¹⁷ 方憲廷，中國之棉紡織業，上海商務版，民國二十三年，頁十五至十六。

¹⁸ 彭雨新，「清末中央與各省財政關係」，社會科學雜誌，九卷一期，民國三十六年六月，頁八三至一一〇。江蘇、安徽二省未列入，這二省應屬有餘省份，至少應屬自足省份。

¹⁹ Chuan-shih Li, *Central and Local Finance in China*, New York, Columbia University, 1922, note 4 in p. 54.

隸、山東以及東南沿海，從陝西至山西²⁰。正由於中西部各省，臺灣和東北的開發，「已開發區域」的糧食不足問題乃得解決。「開發中區域」其次一項重要輸出物為雲南的銅。由於銅為鑄幣主要材料而其他省份又無豐富的銅礦，雲南在清代（尤其是十八世紀）對於供應幣材貢獻極大。此外，東北及西北各省並對「已開發區域」輸出木材、皮革、毛裘之類。由此可見，儘管清代經濟結構無甚改觀，由於以上兩個區域間的經濟交流它經閱一種空前的廣泛性成長。此一事實實不可忽視。

²⁰ 全漢昇、王業健，「清雍正時期的米價」，中央研究院歷史語言研究所集刊，第三十本（民國四十八年），頁一五七至一八九；安部健夫，「米穀需給の研究」，東洋史研究，十五卷四期（1954年3月），頁一二〇至二一三；吉林省財政說明書，民國四年，經濟學會發行，頁五九；黑龍江志稿，民國五十四年，臺北重印本，頁一七八八；China's Maritime Customs, *Decennial Reports, 1901-1911*, Vol. II, p. 312.

Economic Dualism: The Case of China, 1840-1937*

by

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A persistent argument in condemning foreign economic intrusion in China (1840-1937) is that the "traditional" or the "indigenous" sector of the economy was "hampered," "disrupted," or even "ruined." It is maintained that the handicrafts, small mines, native banks, junks, and coolie carriers were all helplessly depressed because of competition from their counterparts in the modern sector of the economy, which was an outgrowth

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of external trade and foreign investment in China¹. Some have argued that the supposed decline in the traditional sector was a net loss to China, since the limited development in the modern sector was not large enough to offset losses in the traditional sector, or that gains in the modern sector were primarily reaped by countries which traded with or invested in China. Others have taken a more moderate view: that the net effect of foreign economic penetration in China cannot be ascertained, because gain and losses in the two sectors cannot be compared quantitatively. But in either case there is the assertion that there was a decline in the traditional sector².

¹ This is not to say that foreign enterprises alone were responsible for the growth of the modern sector. An interesting fact was that the Chinese share in the modern sector of the Chinese economy was remarkably stable over time, indicating that the Chinese-owned modern enterprises were, in the long run, able to grow as fast as the foreign enterprises in China. On this point, see my "External Trade, Foreign Investment, and Domestic Development: The Chinese Experience, 1840-1937," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, X (Oct. 1961), 21-41; also my "The Oppression Argument on Foreign Investment in China, 1895-1937," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, XX (August 1961), 435-48.

² For a presentation of the advocates of these views, see P'eng Tze-yi, ed., *Source Materials on the Modern History of Chinese Handicrafts* (1840-1949) [in Chinese] (4 vols.; Peking: San-lien Book Store, 1957), especially Vols. II and III; see also Fang Hsien-ting (H. D. Fong), *Rural Industries in China* (Tientsin: Chihli Press, 1933). It may also be added here that Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and Mao Tse-tung have all emphasized the destructive effect of foreign economic penetration on the traditional sector of the Chinese economy.

The traditional sector of the Chinese economy included those fields which made essentially the same goods and services in the 1930's as in, say, the 1840's, with essentially the same production techniques and organization³. Thus, agriculture, handicrafts, native banks, coolie carriers, carts and junks, and most commerce and services belonged to this sector. I do not mean that there had been no change whatever in the quality of the products or in the production functions, but that the changes, if any, were small, and the differences between the traditional way and the modern way of doing things were still distinct and easily recognizable in the 1930's.

There is little doubt that the Chinese economy in the 1930's remained predominantly traditional. Agriculture accounted for 62 per cent of net national product in 1933, but aside from an increasing extent of commercialization of crops, the degree of modernization was negligible despite attempts to improve it⁴. In mining, modern coal

³ While this definition is generally followed in this paper, some exceptions are to be made. For instance, in handicrafts we will include, for reasons of availability of data, small scale workshops producing commodities which had never been produced in "traditional" China, such as electrical instruments, cigarettes, etc. (see Table 2). But these exceptions were not significant enough to alter our conclusions. Furthermore, these workshops, though producing new commodities, were basically traditional in operation and organization.

⁴ The various modernization measures will be briefly described below. For the increase of the extent to which agricultural commodities were commercialized, see J. L. Buck, *Land Utilization in China* (Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1937), p. 357.

and iron⁵ mines made substantial progress. In 1912 they produced no more than 57 per cent of coal, 31 per cent of iron ore, and 5 per cent of pig iron⁶, but by 1933 they were overwhelmingly predominant, as shown in Table 1. For other minerals, however, the small native mines were important even to the 1930's, although their exact share in total production cannot be determined⁷.

In manufacturing, all manufacturing firms of the factory type with an employment of more than thirty persons and using motive power are included in the modern sector, whereas the traditional sector included all handicrafts. The relative importance of handicrafts varied considerably in different industries, as Table 2 shows. Of the fifty-five categories of industries included in Table 2, there are thirty-two industries, half or more of whose net product was accounted for by-handicrafts.

Transportation included air, railroad, shipping, automobiles, tramcars, and human carriers. Inasmuch as animal-drawn carts and animal carriers are not included, the figure on transportation in Table 1 underestimates the relative importance of the traditional sector. It is interesting to note in that shipping, which in pre-1937

⁵ A modern mine is one which uses machines of a Wtesern type.

⁶ See Yen Chung-p'ing, ed., *Selected Statistics on Modern Economic History of China* [in Chinese] (peking: Science publishing House, 1955), p. 104.

⁷ *General Statement on the Mining Industry*, Special Report of Geological Survey of China, various issues.

Table 1
 Relative Significance of the Traditional and
 the Modern Sectors of the Chinese
 Economy, 1933 (in Per Cent)

<i>Industry</i>	<i>Modern Sector (per cent)</i>	<i>Traditional Sector (per cent)</i>
1. Coal production	78	22
2. Pig iron production	82	18
3. Iron ore production	77	23
4. Manufacturing	28	72
5. Shipping	14	86
6. Transportation (all types)	42	58
7. Banking	66	34
8. Exports (1930)	23	77

Sources: For 1, 2, 3, and 8, see Yen Chung-p'ing, ed., *Selected Statistics on Modern Economic History of China* [in Chinese] (Peking: 1955), 104 and 73. Export from the modern sector include products by modern mines and factory-made, semimanufactures, and manufactures. For 4, 5, 6 and 7, see Ou Pao-san, "Revision of 'National Income of China, 1933'," *Quarterly Review of Social Sciences* [in Chinese], IX (Dec. 1947), 92-153 and his *National Income of China* ([in Chinese] Shanghai: 1947,) I, 97, 98, and 114. All figures refer to the percentage share of the two sectors in the respective industries, in terms of net product (value added). In banking, insurance companies are not included.

China was the most important means of transportation in terms of contribution to national income, and where there was often direct competition between modern and traditional means since both steamers and junks plied the same water, traditional means still dominated in the 1930's, accounting for more than 85 per cent of the total value added by shipping to net national product in 1933.

Table 2
 Percentage Share of Handicrafts in Total
 Manufacturing* in Terms of Net Product
 (Value Added), 1933

<i>Industry</i>	<i>Per Cent</i>
woodworking industries	95.1
Saw mills	92.1
wooden articles	93.6
Bobbins	99.9
Machine works	32.6
Founding	63.8
Machines, manufacturing and repairs	31.2
Metal industries	32.6
Metal instruments	52.6
Money	—
Electrical instruments	11.4
Transportation	91.8
Shipbuilding	83.6
Vehicles	96.2
Bricks, earthenware, etc.	78.5
Bricks	84.5
Glass	26.5
Chinaware, earthenware	90.9
Cement	97.8
Others	31.8
Water, gas, electricity	—
Water	—
Electric works	—
Gas	—
Chemicals	37.4
Matches	13.9
Shavings and splints	—
Soap	72.1
Enameled ware	12.5
Artificial resin	.7
Dyes, varnish, inks	25.1
Oils	82.1
Medicine	19.0
Acids and others	4.8

<i>Industry</i>	<i>Per Cent</i>
Textiles	62.9
Cotton fluffing and ginning	98.3
Cotton spinning	11.7
Cotton weaving	83.6
Silk reeling	43.9
Silk weaving	75.2
Wool spinning and weaving	32.7
Linen weaving	85.0
Clothing industries	83.2
Leather rubber	73.6
Tanning	73.8
Leather products	99.8
Rubber	61.4
Rubber goods	.3
Food, drinks, tobacco	90.3
Rice mills	98.7
wheat flour mills	93.3
Tea	97.3
Cigarettes	64.3
Alcohol	98.9
Sugar	88.2
Refined salt	—
Oil	91.7
Soda water and others	24.0
Egg products	6.0
Others	85.2
Paper and printing	70.6
Paper	80.8
Paper products	96.3
printing	45.3
Scientific and musical instruments	52.8
Miscellaneous	92.6
Totals (weighted average)	72.0

* Total manufacturing includes both handicrafts and factories. A factory is defined as a manufacturing firm which has more than thirty employees and uses mechanical power.

—Negligible or none.

Source: Ou Pao-san, "Revision of 'National Income of China'," pp. 130-33.

In Table 1, the traditional sector of banking includes the native banks (*p'iao-hao ch'ien-chuan*, and *yin-hao*) and pawnshops. These banks were active in all commercial centers of the country and were engaged in all types of financing, especially in internal trade and exchange and in dealing with small merchants and business firms. Even in Shanghai, where modern banks grew most rapidly, the "financial strength" of the native banks, according to one estimate, was equal to over one third of that of the Chinese modern banks in the 1930's.⁸ It may also be noted that the figure in Table 1 does not include that part of rural credit supplied by relatives, friends, landlords, and merchants--the greatest source of supply of rural credit.

In the field of foreign trade, agricultural products comprised the largest part of Chinese exports. In 1930, for instance, the components of China's exports were: agricultural products, 45.1 per cent; minerals, 4.6 per cent; and semi-manufactured goods, 15.7 per cent; and manufactured goods, 34.4 per cent. Taking all these categories together, machine-made products contributed only 23 per cent.⁹ However, in 1873 the share of the machine-made products was not quite 2 per cent.

⁸ Yang Yin-p'u, *Private Finance in China* [in Chinese], p. 68, cited in Leonard G. Ting, "Chinese Modern Banks and the Finance of Government and Industry," *Nankai Social and Economic Quarterly*, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (Oct. 1935).

⁹ Yen Chung-p'ing, ed., *Selected Statistics*, p. 72.

For the economy as a whole, the modern sector contributed very little to total national income in the 1930's. According to Ou's estimate, the total contribution to net national product by the modern sector in mining manufacturing, transportation, and banking amounted to only 6.6 per cent in 1933.¹⁰ There was, of course, a modern element in other fields such as construction, commerce, and professional services, but its significance cannot be quantitatively determined. In view of the relative unimportance of these fields in total national income, the total contribution to national income of the modern sector in all fields of the economy in the 1930's could not be large, perhaps no more than 10 per cent.¹¹

Predominance of the traditional elements in the Chinese economy is not surprising; otherwise China would not have been labeled an underdeveloped economy. It is interesting to note that in Japan, where there has been rapid economic growth for decades, the "indigenous components" of the economy are still of considerable importance today.¹²

¹⁰ Ou Pan-san, "Revision of 'National Income of China, 1933'," pp. 93, 136, 149.

¹¹ The shares of various industries in their contribution to net national product, according to Ou's estimates, are as follows: agricultural, 61.5 per cent; mining 1.1 per cent; manufacturing, 9.2 per cent; construction, 1.1 per cent; transportation and communication, 4.5 per cent; commerce, 12.4 per cent; banking and finance, 1.0 per cent; housing, 4.6 per cent; professional services, 0.8 per cent; domestic services, 0.7 per cent; public administration, 31 per cent; see *ibid.*, p. 93.

The fact that the traditional sector dominated the Chinese economy in the 1930's does not necessarily reveal whether that sector had grown or declined. Obviously it declined relative to the modern sector, for prior to the 1840's the traditional sector was almost identical with the total economy, the only modern element being imports from abroad, which were of minor importance. But in absolute terms the traditional sector could have increased, declined, or remained constant, depending on changes in aggregate income. Facing a declining or a constant aggregate demand, an increase of goods and services either imported from abroad or supplied by modern enterprises at home would mean an absolute decline of the traditional sector. The reason commonly given for the assertion that there was an absolute decline in the traditional sector is simply that there was an increase both in imports and in modern production at home. But can it be assumed that aggregate demand remained constant or even declined? The increase in exports and the development of the modern sector might have resulted in a net increase of aggregate demand. Modern products may have been consumed primarily in the treaty ports, and the consumption of such products in the rural sector have been offset by the increase of its

¹² See Henry Rosovsky and Kazushi Ohkawa, "The Indigenous Components in the Modern Japanese Economy", in *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, IX (April 1961), 476-501.

exports to the modern sector or to foreign countries.

There was certainly a rise in external demand for Chinese traditional products. The physical quantity of China's commodity exports increased at a rate of 2.4 per cent a year from 1867 to 1932.¹³ While modern enterprises contributed more and more to China's exports, the traditional sector also showed an increase and remained the main source of supply. According to one estimate, total exports contributed by the traditional sector amounted to Chinese \$1,074 million in 1930 as compared to Chinese \$106 million in 1873.¹⁴ Allowing for general price increase, this means a rise of 433 per cent, or an annual rate of growth of 2.6 per cent.¹⁵

Using a rather strict definition, Herman reports that the value of Chinese handicrafts (at 1913 prices) increased from 8.8 million Hai-kwan taels in 1875 to 33.4 million in 1938 (an increase of about 2.6 per cent

¹³ The computation is based on the quantity index of exports of China as published by the Nankai Institute of Economics. (See *Nankai Social and Economic Quarterly*, X, No.2 [July 1937], pp. 346-47.) The equation of the trend of exports is $Y = 30.59 + (1.024)^x$ with the origin at 1866.

¹⁴ Yen Chung-p'ing, ed., *Selected statistics*, p. 70.

¹⁵ The price index used is the index number of wholesale prices calculated by Franklin L. Ho, as given in Yang Twan-liu, Hou Hou-pei and others, *Statistics of China's Foreign Trade During the Last Sixty-five Years* (Nanking: National Research Institute of Social Sciences, Academia Sinica, 1931), p.3. The base year of the index is 1913. The 1873 export figure is deflated by the 1874 index number and the 1930 export figure by the 1928 index number.

a year), although their share in total commodity exports declined consistently, from about 15 per cent in the 1880's to about 5 per cent in 1930.¹⁶ With a broader definition of handicrafts, a recent study shows that the total value of the exports of sixty-seven handicraft articles, after adjustment for changes in the general price level, also increased at 1.1 per cent per year from 1912 to 1931, as shown in Table 3, although their share in total commodity exports declined from 42 per cent in 1912 to 29 per cent in 1931.¹⁷

Not every item of traditional exports increased or even remained constant. Two conspicuous examples are hand-reeled silk, and tea. As filature silk gained increasing importance, hand-reeled silk not only declined as a percentage of total silk exports (from 71 per cent in 1895 to 18 per cent in 1929) but also suffered an absolute

¹⁶ The export figures are supplied to me by Professor Theodore Herman of Colgate University who has also generously shared with me some of his expert knowledge on Chinese handicrafts. The index number used for deflation is Professor Ho's, as cited above. Herman defines a handicraft article as one which most of the value and/or sales appeal of the end-product results from the effort, skill, or artistry of one person or several people working closely together and using very little mechanical power. See his "An Analysis of China's Export Handicraft Industries to 1930", a doctoral thesis at University of Washington, 1954.

¹⁷ P'eng Tze-yi, ed., *Source Materials* vol. III, Appendix 3. Many items such as tea and silk which are excluded by Herman's definition are included in this study.

Table 3
Selected Indicators of the Traditional
Sector of the Chinese Economy

<i>Indicators</i>	<i>Annual Rate of Growth (+) or Decline (-) (per cent)</i>
1. Chinese junks entered and Cleared in Chinese customs	
1864-1903	6.3 (+)
1904-1914	2.4 (+)
1904-1922	0
1914-1930	4.4 (-)
2. Tonnage of Chinese junks in Yangtze, 1890-1919	0.7 (+)
3. Coal production	
1912-1923	6.2 (+)
1914-1934	0
1923-1937	1.6 (-)
4. Pig iron production	
1912-1928	0
1928-1937	1.6 (-)
5. Iron ore production	
1912-1931	0
1929-1937	4.3 (-)
6. Exports of selected handicrafts	
1875-1928	2.6 (+)
7. Exports of 67 handicrafts	
1912-1931	1.1 (+)
8. Exports (traditional sector)	
1873-1930	2.6 (+)
9. Cloth industry in Ting-hsien	
a. 1892-1899 (cloth production)	6.6 (+)
b. 1892-1933 (cloth production)	2.5 (+)
c. 1900-1913 (cloth exports)	10.2 (+)
d. 1912-1932 (number of improved looms)	11.9 (+)
10. Number of hand looms in the Kao-yang region	
1912-1929	19.3 (+)

Sources:

For the data on 1, see Yang Twan-liu, Hou Hou-pei, and others, *Statistics of China's Foreign Trade During the Last Sixty-five Years*, p. 140, and Bank of China, *Statistics of China's Foreign Trade 1912-*

1930 (Shanghai, 1931), p. 72. For data on 2-5, and 9, see Yen Chung-p'ing, ed., *Selected Statistics*, pp. 70, 103, 235. Data on 6 are provided by Theodote Herman of Colgate University, and are deflated by the wholesale price index prepared by Franklin L. Ho (as given in Yang, Hou, and others, *Statistics of China's Foreign Trade*, p.3). For data on 7, see Peng Tze-yi, ed., *Source Materials*, III, Appendix 3. The data are deflated by the index of wholesale prices of imports and export commodities in China compiled by the Nankai Institute of Economics as given *Silver and Prices in China* (China Ministry of Industries, 1935), pp. 2-4. For data on 9, see Chang Shih-wen, *A Survey on Rural Industries in Ting Hsien* [in Chinese] (Hopei: 1936), pp. 47, 113. For data on 10, see Wu Chih, *A Study on Rural Cloth Industry* [in Chinese] (Shanghai: 1936), p. 18.

All the annual rates of change (except two) are calculated on the basis of the values the trends which are all fitted by free-hand method. The two exceptions are 8 and 9b, where only the values of the beginning and the ending years are taken. The cloth production figure for Ting-hsien in 1933 is given in Yen Chung-p'ing, *A Draft History of Chinese Cotton Spinning and Weaving* [in Chinese] (peking: 1955), p. 272.

decline of 7.6 per cent a year from 1895 to 1932,¹⁸ all this when total silk exports continued to rise during the period.

If we go back, not to the 1890's but to the 1840's, when foreign economic invasion of China began, we find quite a different picture. Prior to the 1840's, the export of hand-reeled silk was around 8,000 *piculs* a year¹⁹ as compared with 19,300 *piculs* in 1932.

The same may be said of tea exports. In 1830-1833,

¹⁸ Calculations are based on figures given by Fang Hsien-ting, *Rural Industries in China*, p. 14. The trend line is fitted by freehand method.

¹⁹ Yen Chung-p'ing, *Selected Statistics*, p. 16.

the yearly export of tea was about 330,000 *piculs*,²⁰ It increased to 2,167,000 *piculs* in 1888; thereafter a slightly downward trend developed. After the First World War, there was a sharp drop, culminating in 1920 with total exports of only 306,000 *piculs*. Recovery was under way; the export figure reached 926,000 *piculs* in 1928, slightly less in the 1930's.

The decline of China's tea export since the 1880's can hardly be attributed to whatever economic modernization occurred in China. On the contrary, it was due to lack of progress in tea production in China, as compared to competitors such as India and Ceylon, that China suffered a loss in the world tea market. China's tea was still almost entirely prepared by the traditional method in the 1930's.

Given rising external demand, the question of whether there was an absolute decline in the traditional sector of the Chinese economy depends on the change in domestic demand.²¹ To what extent, if any, did foreign imports and domestic modern production replace the demand for traditional products? In the absence of comprehensive data, a few individual industries may be examined.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Here it is implied that in the long run the elasticity of aggregate supply was greater than zero. That is, an increase of production in the export sector and in the modern sector does not require a declining availability of resources for development of the traditional sector.

In shipping, which served domestic as well as external trade, Chinese junks displayed remarkable resistance to the competition of steamers. Tonnage of Chinese junks (vessels built and owned by Chinese) entered and cleared in the Chinese customs continued to rise from 1864 to 1914, and fluctuated around a rather constant trend line from 1904 to 1922. It did not drop to a low level until the 1920's. The same may be said of Chinese junks on the Yangtze River. The trend continued upward from 1890 to 1917, with a sharp rise in the early 1920's. A similar sharp decline occurred in the 1920's for Chinese junks plying the route from Nan-ning to Wu-chou. The reason for these sharp declines is not clear. It may be that modern steamers finally caught up with them, or that the Chinese junks were hampered by internal wars. The interesting point is that for a few decades before the 1920's, Chinese junks not only survived the competition of steamers but actually grew.

Those Chinese junks sailing waters where modern steamers could not navigate must have experienced growth in view of the considerable increase of the volume of trade. Railways undertook an increasing share of the total volume of transportation, but they were not so situated as to be a substitute for the numerous waterways suitable only for junks.

In mining, where modern mines grew by leaps and bounds in the share of total production, the small native mines nevertheless survived. In coal production, indi-

genous mines continued to grow from 1912 to 1923, then experienced a downward trend. In 1936, production was still 57 per cent more than in 1912.

For iron ore and pig iron, indigenous mines maintained their production from 1912 to around 1930, when decline set in. But in 1936 the production level was still 83 per cent (in the case of pig iron) and 87 per cent (in the case of iron ore) of that in 1912.²²

In the modern sector of the Chinese economy, one of the most developed industries before 1937 was cotton textiles. Cotton yarn spindles increased at a yearly rate of nearly 12 per cent from 1897 to 1936. After a period of stagnation from 1897 to the First World War, power looms grew at the rate of 13 per cent a year from 1918 to 1936.²³ In addition, the import trend of cotton yarns was distinctly upward from 1867 to 1899 (15 per cent a year), and then remained constant at the peak level until 1917. A marked downward trend developed only after 1918. Import of cotton goods increased at a rate of 2.4 per cent a year from 1891 to 1928.²⁴ In spite of all this modern development, handicraft textiles, especially weaving, stood up surprisingly well.

²² Yen Chung-p'ing *Selected Statistics*, p. 103.

²³ Based on data given in *ibid.*, pp. 134-35.

²⁴ The value of the import of cotton goods is deflated by professor Ho's index cited above. For the import data of cotton yarn and cotton goods, see Yang, Hou and others, *Statistics of China's Foreign Trade*, pp. 20, 46.

In the case of hand weaving of cotton cloth, the experience of the Kao-yang area (1912-1933) and Tinghsien (1892-1932) in Hopei is most revealing.²⁵ The cloth of these two regions, which were among the most important hand-weaving centers in China before 1937, was sold in places where imported cloth or cloth made in Chinese factories was also available; yet the hand-weaving industry in both regions witnessed a rapid growth, as shown in Table 3.²⁶ The same appears to be true of Nan-tung, another hand-weaving center which prospered despite its location in a province which was the leading center in the development of modern textiles.²⁷

In the case of hand weaving primarily for private consumption (a widespread phenomenon throughout the countryside in China), its resistance against the competition of foreign of factory cloth should even be greater. Hand weaving was primarily done in spare time; hence an

²⁵ For the Kao-yang area, see Wu Chih, *A Study on Rural Cloth Industry* [in Chinese] (Shanghai: 1936). For Ting-hsien, see Chang Shih-wen, *A Survey on Rural Industries in Ting-Hsien* [in Chinese] (Ting-hsien: Association for the Promotion of Mass Education in China, 1936).

²⁶ The industry in Kao-yang area declined sharply from 1929 to 1933, but it cannot be determined whether it was a temporary decline or a new trend. No data are available for later development.

²⁷ For Nan-tung area, see Yen Chung-p'ing, *A Draft History of Chinese Cotton Spinning and Weaving* [in Chinese] (Peking: Science Publishing House, 1955), pp. 260-61.

important cost--that of labor--could be ignored.²⁸ High transportation costs should also reduce the competitive power of modern textiles in the interiors.

If hand weaving did not suffer a decline in the first three decades of the twentieth century, as evidenced by the development in Kao-yang or Ting-hsien,²⁹ it could hardly have declined during the latter half of the nineteenth century. As noted before, imported cotten yarns continued to increase from 1867 to 1900, and machine yarns made in China also showed some increase. Since very little machine yarn was exported or used on power looms, and since there was no decline in the quantity of hand-spun yarn, as shown below, it follows that the hand-weaving industry could not have declined.

²⁸ Odell has observed: "The cloth that is woven on these [hand] looms is extremely popular among the natives, and although that sold in the market is often as expensive as similar foreign goods, it must be remembered that a large proportion of it is made in the homes of the people for their own use; and as long as they can buy raw cotton and spin it into yarn or buy foreign yarn at low prices for weaving into cloth in seasons when they are not occupied in the fields, they will likely find this a more economical method of providing themselves with clothing than to buy foreign goods." See Ralph M. Odell, *Cotton Goods in China* (Washington: U. S. Dept. of Commerce, 1916), p. 193.

²⁹ There is also evidence to show that new cloth-weaving workshops were constantly being established in various hand-weaving centers after the turn of the century. But such evidence cannot be considered conclusive, though suggestive, of growth of the industry, for failures must also have occurred from time to time. For the newly established workshops, see peng Tze-yi, ed., *Source Materials*, Vol. II, chs. xii and xv.

Table 4

Production and Consumption of Cotton in
China, 1913-1936 (Million Pounds)

	1913 (<i>ca.</i>)	1932-1936 (<i>average</i>)
<i>Estimate I:</i>		
Domestic production	1,000 (100)	2,202 (220)
Exports	116 (1904-1913)	77
	884	2,125
Consumption by factories	17	980
Traditional consumption	867 (100)	1,145 (131)
<i>Estimate II:</i>		
Domestic production	750 (100)	2,202 (294)
Traditional consumption	617 (100)	1,135 (184)
<i>Estimate III:</i>		
Domestic production	563 (100)	2,202 (391)
Traditional consumption	430 (100)	1,135 (264)

Sources:

For 1913 figures, see Ralph M. Odell, *Cotton Goods in China* (Washington: 1916), p. 199. The highest two estimates on cotton production were made, according to Odell, by "a firm of cotton dealers and exporters that has branches in all the important cotton markets in China and operates a number of bale-pressing establishments." The lowest estimate was noted in an editorial note.

For 1932-1936 figures of cotton production and factory consumption, see Yen Chung-p'ing, *A Draft History*, p. 308. Manchuria is not included in Yen's figure, but cotton production in Manchuria was small. Yen's figures are corrected by using the following conversion rate between *quintals* and *piculs*: 1 *quintal* = 1.6534668 *piculs*.

Imported cotton is not included here because it was rarely used for hand spinning.

The hand-spinning industry has become a classical example to show how a handicraft is destroyed by machine production. But even here, evidence thas this

industry actually suffered a severe decline in pre-1937 China is by no means conclusive. In the absence of production figures for hand-spun yarn, one might speculate on the fate of the industry from the production and consumption data of cotton. As shown in Table 4, estimates of cotton production in China around 1913 vary considerably, ranging from 563 million pounds to 1,000 million pounds. While the accuracy of these estimates is difficult to ascertain, it is not unreasonable to assume, in light of the 1932-1936 production figures, that the actual production of cotton in 1913 was somewhere near the higher estimate. Commodity terms of trade moved favorably from 1913 to 1936 for cotton growers vis-à-vis non-cotton growers.³⁰ Cotton acreage almost doubled from 1904-1909 to 1929-1933.³¹ Whether an increase of cultivated area would mean a proportionate increase in production would depend on such factors as the scale of production and the quality of marginal land, on both of which our knowledge is very limited. But during the period there seemed to be some improvement in cotton seeds, which should result in an

³⁰ Yen Chung-p'ing, *A Draft History*, p. 334.

³¹ According to Buck, the cultivated area of cotton constituted 11 per cent, 14 per cent, 18 per cent and 20 per cent of total crop area in China for 1904-1909, 1914-1919, 1924-1929 and 1929-1933 respectively. See John Lossing Buck, *Land Utilization*, p. 217. Total crop area is estimated to have been the same during the period. See Yen Chung-p'ing, ed., *Selected Statistics*, p. 357. The reasons given by Buck for the increase of cotton acreage were high price and high yield.

increase of output per unit of land.³²

The traditional consumption of cotton was basically for two purposes: hand spinning and wadding. Assuming the total cotton consumption for wadding purposes was the same both for 1913 and 1932-1936,³³ there would be a rather significant increase of cotton consumption by the hand-spinning industry from 1913 to 1936. Alternatively, if the proportion of cotton used for wadding and hand spinning is assumed to have been the same from 1913 to 1936, then the figures of cotton available for traditional consumption in Table 4 would indicate the change in the quantity of cotton available or used for hand spinning during the period.

How realistic are the various assumptions made above must remain unknown until new evidence is found. But the data presented here seem to provide ground to question the widely held assertion that hand-spinning industry declined sharply during the period under discussion.

For the years before 1913, statistics on the fate of the hand-spinning industry are even scarcer. But the

³² It may be noted that the highest estimate of cotton production for 1913 in Table 4 is quite close to the figure of 1,127 million pounds which, according to one estimate, is the cotton production figure for 1918-1919. See Fang Hsien-ting, *The Cotton Textile Industry in China* [in Chinese] (Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1934), p. 26

³³ For the various estimates on cotton consumption for wadding purposes in the 1920's, see Yen Chung-p'ing, *A Draft History*, p. 308. Yen's own estimate, which appears on the high side, was 533 million pounds per year for 1932-1936.

following facts make it highly unlikely that the industry had suffered any serious decline: (1) there was probably an increase in cotton production partly because of the various private and governmental efforts to improve cotton production (especially by using American cotton seeds),³⁴ and partly because of the increase of cotton crop area in certain provinces; (2) export of cotton was negligible before 1890; and (3) the quantity of domestic cotton used for machine spinning was small.

If it can be assumed that the hand-spinning industry did not suffer any serious decline, one can go further and speculate on the fate of the hand-weaving industry nationally. Available data indicate an increase in the amount of machine-spun yarn available for hand weaving and "other uses" as shown in Table 5. Since the "other uses," which refers to knitting and miscellaneous purposes, were small, the Consumption of machine-spun yarn on hand looms may be regarded as having increased. Assuming a constant yarn-cloth ratio, the handweaving industry must have grown.

In economic terms, the coexistence of traditional and modern sectors in an economy is primarily a matter

³⁴ American cotton seeds were introduced to China in the 1860's, perhaps first by foreign merchants and then by the Imperial government. In the 1890's, American cotton seeds were even forced upon some Chinese cotton growers by Chang Chih-tung. An Imperial edict was issued to improve cotton seeds and plantation methods in 1908. Further efforts were made from time to time by both textile firms and the government in later years. See Yen Chung-p'ing, *A Draft History*, pp. 8 324-30.

Table 5
Consumption of Machine-made Yarn on Hand
Looms in China, 1913-1935 (Million Pounds)

<i>Machine-made Yarn</i>	1913 (<i>ca.</i>)	1930	1934-1935 (<i>av.</i>)
production	200	982	1,088
Import	358	23	3
	558	1,005	1,091
Export	—	44	46
	558	961	1,045
Consumption on power looms	15	207	418
Hand looms and other uses	543	754	627
	(100)	(139)	(115)

—denotes negligible.

Sources:

For 1913 figures, see Ralph M. Odell, *Cotton Goods*, p. 185. For 1930, see Fang Hsien-ting, *The Cotton Textile Industry*, P. 276. The 1934-1935 figures are based on data given in Yen Chung-p'ing, *A Draft History*, ch. viii, p. 309. However, Yen's export figures seem to be a little low and are replaced here with figures given in Yen Chung-p'ing, ed., *Selected Statistics*, p. 74.

of factor prices and factor proportions dictated by technology. In the traditional sector, the technology employed uses more labor relative to capital, while more capital-intensive technology is employed in the modern sector. If the price of labor is low relative to that of capital, as is the case in an underdeveloped economy, the unit cost of production in the traditional sector may be no higher than in the modern sector, even though labor productivity is lower than in the modern sector. Both Eckaus and

Hirschman have ably demonstrated this.³⁵ Their analysis is facilitated by the assumption that in the traditional sector, wage rates (relative to productivity) are lower and the price of capital is higher than in the modern sector because of various imperfections (labor unions, social legislation, etc.).

In the case of China, it is hard to substantiate whether there were wage differentials in the two sectors. In both sectors considerable differentials existed within an industry: in the traditional sector, wages were often paid in kind, and a substantial number of apprentices were employed without pay except room and board. All this makes comparison of wage levels in the two sectors difficult, given the available data.³⁶

A wage differential would certainly help the competitive position of the traditional sector, but it is not always necessary. In the early 1930's, there existed a large number of hand looms in the Shanghai area; no less than 50,000 people earned their living by hand weaving in the International Settlement in Shanghai, a leading center of the modern textile industry in China.³⁷

³⁵ K. S. Eckaus, "The Factor Proportions Problem in Underdeveloped Areas", *American Economic Review*, XLV (Septs. 1955), 539-65; A. O. Hirschman, "Investment policies and 'Dualism' in Underdeveloped Countries", *American Economic Review*, XLVII (Sept. 1957), 550-70.

³⁶ For some of the scattered wage data available, see P'eng Tze-yi, ed., *Source Materials*, Vol. II, ch. xviii and vol. III, ch. xxi.

³⁷ Yen Chung-p'ing, *A Draft History*, p. 255.

Such coexistence cannot very well be accounted for by a difference in wage levels. The situation in which wage rates are the same and yet labor-intensive technology is able to compete with capital-intensive technology is demonstrated on the next page.

In Figure 1, the ordinate measures capital and the abscissa labor, both in physical units. M is the expansion path of a production process in the modern (capital-intensive) sector, and T in the traditional (labor-intensive) sector. Both processes require a certain fixed proportion of inputs. Wage rate and price of capital are assumed to be the same for both sectors. OC and OD represent the same level of output. AB is the constant-expenditure line, meaning the same total cost for OC and OD. It may readily be seen that equality of total cost for OC and OD is maintained when $\frac{i}{w} = \frac{HF}{EG}$, where i is the price of capital, w the wage rate, HF the difference in the quantity of labor and EG the difference in the quantity of capital used in the two production processes.

The fact that hand weaving or even hand spinning could survive in China can be explained in terms of the above analysis. Given low wage rates and the high price of capital, modern technology was not superior to traditional technology in terms of unit cost, reflecting not only the productivity of labor and capital but also their price. As a consequence, modern technology could do no more than concentrate on products which were beyond the reach




Figure 1

Same Unit Cost With Different Factor Proportions

of traditional technology. Thus, hand weaving and hand spinning produced coarse cloth and yarn while their modern counterparts specialized in finer products. The masses continued to use the coarse products not simply because of tradition-determined tastes; they could not afford the finer, more expensive products. For what they could afford, traditional technology could well compete with modern technology and survive.

Our analysis does not exclude other factors which help the traditional sector of an economy survive. High transportation costs would strengthen the competitive power of traditional production if modern development is located—as it was in China—in a certain small part of the country. Some consumption habits are not easily altered and are satisfied only by traditional products. For inst-

ance, there were a large number of Chinese, poor and rich, illiterate and educated, who continued to use a certain traditional medicine which, because either of a secret formula or of a centuries-old reputation, was free from the competition of modern drugs.

The effects on the traditional sector of the development of the modern sector need not be always destructive. In the case of China, there is reason to believe the modern sector in some ways actually helped the traditional sector to survive. Railroad building, for instance, created a demand for many goods and services provided by the traditional sector. Modern products such as matches, soap, and cigarettes were imitated by the handicrafts. Development of the modern sector itself meant an increasing demand for a variety of traditional products which were still an essential part of the consumption of even urban residents.

For certain industries, the more important contribution made by the modern sector lay on the supply side. It provided the traditional sector not only with certain goods and services necessary for its growth, but with certain technology which strengthened its competitive power. The hand-weaving industry is a case in point. The yarn consumed on the hand looms in the Kao-yang area, for instance, was largely supplied first by imports and then by textile factories established in China. Without such a regular and reliable source of supply, the hand-weaving industry in Kao-yang would probably

never have been able to develop as it did. For the country as a whole, machine-made yarn was an important source of supply for hand weaving in the 1930's. The hand-weaving industry also relied on the modern sector for other materials, such as dyes.

An essential factor responsible for the growth of hand weaving in many areas, including Kao-yang, Ting-hsien, and Pao-ti is believed to have been the introduction of hand looms of iron, replacing the age-old wooden type.³⁸ But these more efficient looms were made available first by imports from Japan. The technical knowledge to operate them was spread to the masses by the establishment in the 1900's of scores of Bureaus of Industries and Arts in various places in Hopei. Such establishments were part of the "selfstrengthening" efforts of the Imperial government, its officials, and the people in response to what was regarded as a foreign economic invasion in China.

Improvement in technology may also be found, though on a very limited scale, in other handicraft industries such as silk reeling, oil pressing, soap manufacturing, flour milling, and cotton fluffing and ginning. Improvement was sometimes made because of the pressure of competition from the modern sector, sometimes because of participation in investment by foreign as well as Chinese merchants. In rare cases, this improvement was such that a handicraft

³⁸ P'eng Tze-yi, ed., *Source Materials*, II, 691.

was completely converted into a modern factory.³⁹

The favorable, or spread, effects of the modern sector, to use a phrase coined by Myrdal, were undoubtedly weak in China.⁴⁰ The traditional sector, though improved, was far from being modernized, and it experienced no significant growth. Why the spread effects were weak in China cannot be answered here, but it is very doubtful that they were outrun by what is called by Myrdal the backwash effects.

In Myrdal's analysis, the development of a region (the modern sector in the Chinese case) tends to have, on balance, an unfavorable effect on the underdeveloped regions (the traditional sector in the Chinese economy). The net unfavorable effect may be in the form of an increasing share of national income accrued to the developed region, or in the form of an absolute decline of the undeveloped regions. Unfavorable effects are brought about by the penetration of products from the developed region, by emigration of labor and capital, by a change

³⁹ *Ibid.*, II, 392, 403, 691; III, 72.

⁴⁰ Myrdal attempts to analyze the relationship between the developed and the underdeveloped regions of a country. Since the modern sector of the Chinese economy was developed primarily in the coastal and riverine regions, Myrdal's analysis seems to be applicable. For Myrdal's analysis, see Gunnar Myrdal, *Rich Lands and Poor: The Road to World Prosperity* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1957). A. O. Hirschman, in his article "Investment Policies and 'Dualism' in Underdeveloped Countries," addresses himself to the same problem. His trickling down effects are similar to Myrdal's spread effects and his polarization effects similar to Myrdal's backwash effects. But his emphasis and conclusions are not quite the same as those of Myrdal's.

in the commodity terms of trade, or by a decline in public revenue and hence public investment in undeveloped regions.

In the case of China, a great deal of research remains to be done on all of these unfavorable effects. The matter of competition with modern products has been noted above. Regarding the emigration of capital, it should be noted that industrial capital in China was primarily supplied by *compradores*, treaty-port merchants, officials, and foreign investors. Landlords, though they also participated in industrial development, were of very slight importance.

There was undoubtedly emigration of labor to the modern sector, though not on any large scale.⁴¹ It may be true that those who migrated into the cities were abler and more enterprising than those who remained in the countryside, but whether their talents would have been utilized in the countryside is quite another matter. Besides, migration might also relieve to some degree any disguised unemployment in the countryside. The fact that the Chinese, however far from home they may have gone, rarely severed the ties with their homeland, may have been a useful channel between the modern and

⁴¹ The population of 33 cities increased from 7 million in 1904 to 13 million in 1931, or at an annual rate of 2.3 per cent. The increase cannot be entirely accounted for by natural increase in these cities. For population data, see Shanghai: *The Maritime Customs, Reports and Returns of Trade, and Foreign Trade of China*, various years.

the traditional sectors and have promoted the flow of modern knowledge or habits to the traditional sector.

Movement of the terms of trade in the traditional sector vis-à-vis the modern sector is difficult to predict,⁴² as are the consequences of the movement. A deterioration of the single factoral terms of trade would mean a decline in real income, but an increase in the prices of the traditional sector's products might force the modern sector to look elsewhere for its sources of supply.⁴³ In the Chinese case, the matter of the terms of trade, which moved in favor of the traditional sector from 1906 to 1930,⁴⁴ may not be so important as it appears to be. As noted previously, the share of the modern sector in national income was small, suggesting that the traditional sector was largely self-sufficient. The peasants did of course consume certain items from the modern sector, but these constituted a rather small proportion of their total budget. The modern sector's demand for products of the traditional sector, at least for certain industrial raw materials, especially cotton, appeared to be increasing.

⁴² See, for instance, W. A. Lewis, "Unlimited Labor: Further Notes", in *The Manchester School of Economics and Social Studies*, XXVI, No. 1 (Jan. 1958), 22-23; H. G. Johnson, "Economic Expansion and International Trade" in same journal, Vol. XXIII, No. 2 (May 1955).

⁴³ For a discussion of this possibility, see Albert O. Hirschman, *The Strategy of Economic Development* (New Haven, 1958), p. 189.

⁴⁴ The terms of trade referred to are the commodity terms of trade. Computations are based on data given by John Lossing Buck, *Land Utilization*, p. 319.

In response to Western economic penetration, the Chinese government undoubtedly undertook or attempted to undertake certain measures toward economic modernization.⁴⁵ But these measures were not at the expense of the traditional sector, which the government also tried to improve. Around the turn of the century, for example, the Imperial government attempted a number of measures to improve Chinese agriculture: establishing agricultural societies and schools to spread scientific knowledge, translating Western books on agriculture, founding experiment stations, introducing Western seeds, improving farming tools and techniques, and establishing industrial bureaus to improve handicrafts. Similar measures were also tried by the Peking government (1912-1927) and by the National government.⁴⁶ Few of these measures had any significant effect, but further research seems necessary to determine why or how they failed.

The government probably paid more attention to the modern sector than to the traditional sector. Factory-made products were exempted from the troublesome transit tax, *likin*; agricultural and handicraft products were not. But it is doubtful that the burden of the

⁴⁵ For some of these measures, see my article "External Trade, Foreign Investment, and Domestic Development: The Chinese Experience, 1840-1937," in *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, X (Oct. 1961).

⁴⁶ See Li wen-chih, ed., *Source Materials on the Modern History of Chinese Agriculture* [in Chinese] (Peking: 1957), Vol. I, ch. viii; Vol. II, chs. ii, iii, iv. Also p'eng Tze-yi, ed., *Source Materials*, Vol. II, ch. xvii.

modernization efforts was unduly assumed by the traditional sector. In fact farm taxes, an important burden to the peasant, did not rise as fast as did farm prices (1906-1933).⁴⁷

To conclude, there is little factual support for the common belief that the traditional sector of the Chinese economy suffered a general decline because of the development of the modern sector.⁴⁸ The traditional sector was still predominant in the 1930's. Even the traditional textile industry held on quite well despite the rapid development of its modern counterpart. I have also suggested that the prolonged coexistence between the traditional and the modern sector may be explained, in large part, by factor prices and factor proportions.

From the viewpoint of economic development, what would be the implications of such a prolonged coexistence? Would it help or hinder development? The fact that

⁴⁷ John Lossing Buck, *Land Utilization*, pp. 316, 330.

⁴⁸ This is not to say that every handicraft survived modern competition; for instance, the wide use of kerosene certainly displaced much of the vegetable oil for lighting, and modern needles displaced traditional ones. In localities near the treaty ports, many handicrafts became victims of their modern counterparts. But there is also evidence to suggest that when one handicraft became threatened, people began to turn to other fields. The shifts from cotton spinning to weaving in Kwangtung, and from textiles to straw braid manufacture in Shantung are cases in point. A general decline in the traditional sector, unless offset by the modern sector, would involve rising rural unemployment or "disguised unemployment". There are no data to indicate whether the trend of such unemployment was rising, if this type of unemployment ever existed at all.

traditional technology is able to compete with modern technology must have a retarding effect on modern development. No capital, domestic or foreign, is likely to enter into or stay long in a field where tough competition is expected from traditional products. To be sure, the resisting power of traditional technology would eventually diminish as the economy develops. Purchasing power of the people will be greater, thus enabling them to buy goods which the traditional technology cannot produce, and wage rates would be pushed higher, thus lessening the competitive power of traditional technology. But all this may take a long time.

From another viewpoint, economic dualism may not really be undesirable. If traditional technology can meet the demand for textiles, for instance, would it not be better for new capital to develop industries which are beyond the capabilities of traditional technology? It does not make much economic sense to build a road with bulldozers if there is plenty of cheap labor and capital is scarce. Technological progress should include creative adaptation of the traditional methods rather than concentrate entirely on purely modern technology, especially in a country where traditional technology has been developed for a long time and seems able to take care of much of the demand of the masses.

制度之演變

井田制度有無問題之經濟史上的觀察

朱 傑

本文原發表於東方雜誌第三十一卷第一號，民國二十三年元月。

一 導言

近十餘年來，疑古之精神，極爲發達。辨古工作之結果，對於中國古代井田制度之有無，引起極大爭論。然井田制度之有無，本爲經濟史上之重要問題，非兼具經濟的與歷史的眼光，本客觀的態度，有充分的論據，不能解答；固非僅用整理國故之方法，所可勝任者也。竊以爲近年辨古者流，其疑古精神堪嘉，其懷疑之勇氣足取；然有若干專門之問題，亦往往貿貿然用不充分之根據，非專家之眼光，遽下斷論。結果古史愈辨愈紛，愈考去真相愈遠。此實爲吾國目前治古史者之「時髦病」，而於井田制度有無之辨，尤爲顯著。作者近年來致力於中國財政問題及經濟史財政史的研究，考古代田賦，適至井田制度，見井田制度有無之爭，往往僅用「整理國故」舊法，至今尙無結果；因從經濟史立場出發，觀察井田制度之有無，而作此篇。謹提前發表，以貢一得之愚。請先略舉各派之見解，然後再加以批評。分論如

下：

二 井田制度有無之辨正反的理由

關於古代井田制度之有無，最初討論者為建設雜誌。民國八年，胡漢民作中國哲學史之所謂唯物的研究，以為古代真有井田制（建設第一卷第三第四號）；胡適則不謂然，於是函牘往返，辨論以興。參加討論者，除胡漢民，胡適外，有廖仲愷，朱執信，季融五，呂思勉諸人，分載建設二卷，一，二，五，六各號。胡適文存第一集卷二亦載之，惟僅收開端諸篇。民國十九年十月，上海華通書局又綜合各文，編行井田制度有無之研究一書。（約四萬七千字，一四七面）。此外萬國鼎有井田之謎一文，載金陵學報一卷二期，更有中國田制史（南京書店發行，民國二十二年初版），卷首詳論古書傳說之不可信，倡「采地制」之說，以為「儒者所傳之井田制，實無其事」；若謂「井田純屬憑空虛造，亦不盡然」。——蓋取折衷之說。謝无量更有中國古田制考一書，（商務印書館國學小叢書之一，約四萬字，民國二十一年十二月初版）。則以連帶之複雜兵役制度，證井田制之必有，以周禮為根據。茲簡單介紹否定，肯定，折衷派之說，並加以批評如下：

先述建設所載兩派之爭執：

（一）胡適謂井田論為孟子虛造，戰國以前未嘗有人言及。詩經之「雨我公田」，「東南其畝」，「十畝之間」，均非明白無疑之證。春秋之「初稅畝」原與井田無涉。胡漢民謂孟子以前雖無人言井田，然孟子以前人本少具體說明一政制者；今既不能於古書中發見土地私有制於孟子以前，即不能絕對懷疑，謂孟子憑空杜撰。——（易言之，即僅有消極的論證，而無積極的根據，即不能下一斷語。孟子以前雖未見

有人言井田，然孟子以前，文獻散佚殆盡，安得根據僅存的文獻，以未見井田之說，遽爾斷定井田為虛造？近代疑古作者，懷疑精神可嘉，然無積極的證據，實為其通病）。

(一)胡適及季融五引詩經「人有土田，女覆奪之」，與左傳所記貴族田邑之受，辭，反，致，歸，賂，爭，奪等事，及論語「管仲奪伯氏駢邑三百」，謂係土地所有權之證。胡漢民謂「人有土田」與「人有人民」對舉，顯無私有之意；采地食邑與私有地不同，私有土地事至戰國末期始發見。朱執信謂貴族田邑之受辭爭奪等，謂即所有權之證，未免太早，蓋祇有限定的收益之采地，亦可受辭爭奪。

(二)胡適謂孟子的井田制度祇是一種「經界」的計畫，並非「根本解決的」共產制度。胡漢民謂孟子明白提出方里而井一段的辦法，使家家有田百畝，何得謂祇是「分田制祿」的經界計畫？

(三)胡適因孟子「夫世祿滕固行之矣」句，謂孟子的私田，仍是貴族的祿田，種田的農夫係佃民，不是田主。胡漢民謂孟子明說八家皆私百畝，同養公田，何得謂私田仍是卿大夫之祿田？更謂渠本未認農夫為田主，當私有制未發生時，農夫在一定時期內有用益權而無處分權。卿大夫對於采地食邑，亦祇有一部分收益權，而無處分權。

(四)胡適謂孟子理想中耕田百畝的農夫，耕田的報酬不過是僅够五人至九人的吃食，並不能「享有」這百畝之田。又謂古者百畝，至少當今一百一二十畝。胡漢民謂周尺一尺合今工部營造尺六尺，周以六尺為步，步百為畝，故周百畝合今十五畝。以十五畝田養五人至九人，安得有餘？

(五)胡適謂井田論係漢儒依據孟子之言，逐漸補添而成。呂思勉謂孟子，韓詩，書大傳，公，穀二傳，何氏解詁等同祖一說，並非逐漸增補；孟子尚係沿襲前人。

(七)胡適及季融五均言中國古代甚錯雜，決不能做到王制周禮等所言之整方塊之封建，豆腐干塊之井田制亦不可能。胡漢民則因孟子之言及春秋時尚無發生土地所有權之確證，故承認井田制度之可能，然始終未承認如周禮等書所言之整齊，其所言之異同精確與否，與彼之本旨無涉。呂思勉謂周禮等書為託古改制者甚言之詞，鄭注固明以為設法也；古代自無推行天下綿歷千載之井田，而行之一時一地之井田，則不能謂其無有也。

(八)季融五謂奴隸制度見於左傳，並據嚴譯社會通詮之言，謂游牧時代即已發生階級制度，有階級，即不能有共產制。胡漢民謂土地共有制度固不必滅盡階級。

(九)季融五根據社會通詮，謂一知利用土地，即發生土地所有權；古代從未有共產社會。胡漢民謂井田制係中國古代私有制未發生以前之一種土地共有制。他書所舉農耕民族將土地為團體共有之例甚多，何得偏信社會通詮一書¹？爭執結果：各是其是，各非其非。胡漢民一派，承認古代有井田制度，但不必如周禮等書所言之整齊。胡適一派，則否認古代有井田制度。

次述萬國鼎及謝无量之見解：

萬國鼎於中國田制史卷首，即先論古書傳說之不可信，以為商代無領主農奴之別，亦無公田私田之分，與西周之采地制判然不同；故商代猶未有所謂井田制也。「蓋自商亡周興，社會經一絕大變革。商為氏族社會，土地為村落共有；周則一變而為奴隸社會，土地為新興之貴族分割而據為己有矣。……大抵周民族自陝西東侵，次第征服東土，其貴族衆戚各分得若干土地與人民，建立不少原始封建式之殖民地。

¹ 參閱地政月刊（中國地政學會出版）第一卷第一期書報述評。

（！）然貴族不能自耕其田，耕作之勞，必委之於庶人（農奴）。利用庶人耕作之方式，大抵不出兩種：一為直接畜養之而驅使力作，一為每夫授地若干畝，使其自養，而用其力以耕公田，公田所出，則貴族（領主）之收益也。前者為純粹奴隸墾殖制，後者為采地制，即所謂藉而不稅之制也。觀乎詩經，小雅，大田篇『雨我公田，遂及我私』，及國語魯語孔子曰：『先王制土，籍田以力，若子季孫欲其法也，則有周公之籍矣』云云，二者皆言西周事。然則此種藉而不稅之采地制，當係事實。……」至於春秋，「猶因襲西周之采地制；惟歷時既久，風會漸變，其性質自難盡同。西周為純粹采地制，領主各專其土地與人民。逮春秋則君權漸強，以田為祿，稍似後世之食邑。然未幾而貴族專政，往往在其封疆，儼若一獨立集權之國，此又一變革也。……」其論采地制與井田論，則曰：「采地制既有公私田之分，及藉而不稅之制，私田授之庶人，當亦不無授還法之規定，其形式絕類所謂井田制。然有一根本不同之點在：儒者所以歌頌井田者，為其均貧富也；而采地制則為領主壓迫（！）農奴，榨取（！）利益之一種制度。周既以力服商，對於被征服者，謂其將如儒者所傳，採用理想的均貧富之井田制，誰實信之！余於上文曾論西周庶人終歲勤勞而窮困，較之領主之安閑快樂而有餘，誠有天淵之別，然則此豈儒者所欽慕之井田制度下之農民生活哉！即此可見井田論之非事實矣。……然則井田純屬憑空虛造乎？亦不盡然。……春秋之世，齊使井田疇均，鄭使廬井有伍，楚則井衍野，皆以井田為整理土田之法，使田疇均整，便於量入修賦，是則井田之名，早生於春秋，或猶在春秋以前矣。……在西周采地制中，或即劃分為井形，以授庶人；然公田蓋為整大片，必不在一井之中，而距庶人之居不近，否則不必『以其婦子，饁彼南畝』

也，至若春秋齊，鄭，晉之井田制，則並公田而無之矣。」

謝无量於其中國古田制考中，謂「井田制在古代決定是有的。因為井田制尚連帶着他那種複雜的兵役制度。這樣的兵役制度，非有如井田的精密分配方法，是不能行的。並要像周官那樣提倡道德聖智，養成人民尊君親上相友相助的習慣，然後纔能行的」。「周禮總有一部分是周朝的制度，或也有一部分是六國附益。但說到古田制，他實有許多條理分明的記載，我們拿他和別的书參證，可以尋得一些頭緒」。故謝氏之研究，以周禮為中心，而肯定井田制度。

三 何謂井田制度

欲解決井田制度有無之問題，須先解答何謂井田制度。因近人對於井田制度，不追本求源，但憑幾個觀念不清晰之名詞加以臆測，故不可不辨。最初言井田者，首推孟子，孟子滕文公上：

……使畢戰問井地。孟子曰：「子之君將行仁政，選擇而使子，子必勉之。夫仁政，必自經界始；經界不正，井地不均，穀祿不平。是故暴君污吏，必慢其經界。經界既正，分田制祿，可坐而定也。夫滕壤地褊小，將為君子焉，將為野人焉。無君子，莫治野人；無野人，莫養君子。請野九一而助，國中什一使自賦。卿以下必有圭田，圭田五十畝；餘夫二十五畝。死徒無出鄉；鄉田同井，出入相友，守望相助，疾病相扶持，則百姓親睦。方里而井，井九百畝，其中為公田，八家皆私百畝，同養公田；公事畢，然後敢治私事，所以別野人也。此其大略也。若夫潤澤者，則在君與子矣。」

孟子之言井田，本甚單簡，蓋滕文公使畢戰問井地，孟子答

以如此：近人目爲「理想的計劃」²，已嫌偏於主觀。至漢儒始演繹爲詳備之井田論。周禮地官大司徒云：

凡造都鄙，制其地域而封溝之，以其室數制之。不易之地家百畝，一易之地家二百畝；再易之地家三百畝。

小司徒又謂：

乃均土地，以稽其人民，而周知其數。上地家七人，可任也者家三人；中地家六人，可任也者二家五人；下地家五人，可任也者家二人。……乃經土地而井牧其田野：九夫爲井，四井爲邑，四邑爲丘，四丘爲甸，四甸爲縣，四縣爲都，以任地事而令貢賦凡稅斂之事。

漢書食貨志：

六尺爲步，步百爲畝，畝百爲夫，夫三爲屋，屋三爲井。井方一里，是爲九夫，八家共之，各受私田百畝，公田十畝，是爲八百八十畝，餘二十畝以爲廬舍。……民受田，上田夫百畝，中田夫二百畝，下田夫三百畝。歲耕種者爲不易上田，休一歲者爲一易中田，休二歲者爲再易下田，三歲更耕之，自爰其處。……

至其極，明徐光啓更根據周禮漢書，作井田圖³，遂分析爲九圖：——畝百爲夫，夫三爲屋，屋三爲井，四井爲邑，四邑爲丘，四丘爲甸，四甸爲縣，四縣爲都，四都爲同，——皆爲四方形之面積，整齊劃一，殆難令人置信。此種演繹詳備之井田論，其材料既不可靠，其制度又過於整齊，蓋漢代兼併之後所發生之反響，稍有歷史批評眼光者，固皆知其係託古改制之作也。

茲專根據孟子，以辨井田制之有無。——至若胡適等以

² 萬國鼎，中國田制史，上冊，59頁

³ 見農政全書卷四。

戰國以前除孟子以外，未嘗有人言及井田，便爾斷定井田爲孟子虛造，是犯邏輯上推論之法則，蓋僅有消極的前提，不足以產生積極的斷語也。茲先辨明何謂井田制度如下：

- (1)井田制度並非近代所謂共產制度。
- (2)井田制之有無，與土地私有之有無，係兩個分別的問題。即使證明春秋以前已偶然發生土地私有，無傷井田制度之存在。
- (3)井田制自非綿連千載，推行全國之制度，亦非如周禮等書所載整齊劃一之井田制，蓋係行之一時一地，未必全合幾何上分割精密之田制。
- (4)即使承認孟子所謂井田，係一種理想，然有一種理想，必有其歷史背景，此產生井田理想之歷史背景，爲吾人治經濟史所宜注意者。

試申論如下：

近人對於井田制度普遍的誤解，以爲井田制度，即共產制度。故以爲能證明古代從未有共產社會，或階級制度下不能有共產制度，即足以推翻井田制度。夷考經濟史上土地私有權之發生，實經過以下各階段：

(一)私有權之發生，在動產爲早，在不動產爲遲。在一般原始民族，漁獵民族，游牧民族，地廣人稀，無土地私有之必要，故土地私有之狀態 (Zustand) 尙未發生，遑論土地私有權 (Recht)？故原始經濟之下，土地公有 (Gemeineigentum) 爲自然之現象。近代經濟史家及經濟學者，如 Karl Bücher⁴ A. Hesse⁵ Philippovich⁶ 皆主是說。

⁴ Karl Bücher: *Das Ureigentum* Leipzig 1879.

⁵ Conrad-Hesse: *Allgemeine Volkswirtschaftslehre* Jena 1927, S. 59.

⁶ Philippovich: *Grundriss der Politischen Ökonomie* I. Bd. Tübingen 1923. SS. 100-101.

(二)經濟生活由游牧漸變為土著，漁獵變為農業，個人對於土地，漸有使用權，但尚無所有權。於是土地分為二部分：一為公田，或“*Allmend*”土地公有。其他為私田，但個人須受田還田，或週期的重行分配（如十六世紀時俄國之“*Mir*”）；祇有使用權而無所有權。及經濟狀況演進，農業進步，人口增加，有才幹者對於其所耕種之土地，加意經營，思永久據為己有，於是土地私有逐漸發展，成為普遍的狀態後，土地私有權始以發生⁷。

(三)及法國大革命起，頒布人權宣言，承認財產自由，私有權不但及於生前，且可支配於死後（繼承），於是土地私有權始完全確立。但即在財產自由之下，森林，公產，仍為國有；土地公有之制度，並未完全消滅，尚保留其遺蹟於私有土地之間。今日土地公用徵收，勵行社會政策，土地私有制度又受若干限制矣。

由上觀之，土地私有制度及土地私有權之發展，為漸進的；並無一明顯之時期，可作為土地公有及土地私有之分界。至於近代之共產制度，係土地所有權過於發展後所引起之反響，以言井田制度，當時私有權根本尚未發達，自不能牽強附會，稱井田制度即為「共產制度」。又據以上分析，土地私有係漸進的，在井田制度之下，一部分為公田，一部分為私田，雖個人對於土地，初僅有使用權而無所有權，但即有土地使用權，已可發生「受，辭，反，致，歸，賂，爭，奪，等事，」——且正因個人對於土地無私有權，所以須受田，反田，致田；分配不均或發生爭執之時，自可發生爭奪等事。「管仲奪伯氏駢邑三百」，無傷乎井田制之存

⁷ 參閱 Conrad-Hesse: *Die Allgemeine Volkswirtschaftslehre*, Jena 1927, S. 60.

在，蓋戰爭攻擊，自古已然，即此尚不足以證明土地私有，更不足以證明土地所有權。更進一步言之，井田制度本為從土地公有至土地私有之過渡，從土地使用權至土地私有，相差不過一間，原不妨同時存在。故即使證明春秋以前有土地私有之「狀態」，尚不足以推論井田制度係孟子虛造。總之一般誤認井田制度為近代式之「共產制度」，而共產制度則不容土地私有權存在，故只須證明春秋以前已有土地私有權，即可推翻井田制度。其錯誤之處：一在誤認井田制度，而牽強附會以共產制度之名稱；二在無經濟史眼光，以為土地公有與土地私有，可以明確的分劃時代界線。不知井田制度與土地使用權及土地私有，原不妨同時並存。其中心理由既已不能成立，則胡適，季融五等之主張可不攻而自破矣。

四 經濟史的觀察

更證以歐洲經濟史，在同一經濟發展階段，同一物質的環境之下，往往發生相類似之制度。在歐洲經濟史上，亦有與吾國井田相類似之制度，足以為井田之旁證者。關於古代土地制度研究最早之著作，厥推比利時人 Emile de Laveleye 之 *De la propriété et de ses formes primitives* (1874) 氏首先闡明原始時代之土地，概為公有制度。德國經濟史家 Karl Bücher 更譯為德文，加以補充，於一八七九年出版 *Das Ureigentum* (原始所有權)，為研究古代土地制度重要之書籍。據該書所舉：古代土地公有制度，例如北歐各國之「田地公有」(Feldgemeinschaft)，德國之「鄉村共同團體」(Markgenossenschaft)；近代之土地公有制度，例如俄國之鄉村團體，南斯拉夫之家庭集產團體(Zadruga)。此種組織，或完全土地公有；或一部分公有，一部分私有，多少類似井田制度。試略述如左：

所謂田地公有，係指鄉村個員，公共週期的分配田地之謂（有似井田制度受田還田之制）；鄉村團體，對於灌溉，播種，收穫，耕作次序等，往往有嚴格的規則，人人皆須遵守，（有似「八家皆私百畝，同養公田，公事畢，然後敢治私事。」）所謂 *Flurzwang* 是。其未經分配之地 (*Allmende, gemeine Mark*) 是謂公田，人人得以利用。此種田地公有制度，在英國直延至中古時代，依然存在⁸。

其次，為德國古代之鄉村共同團體。此處所謂 *Mark*，係指該鄉村團體之全體土地 (*der Gesamtbesitz einer Gemeinde an Länderein*)。此種鄉村團體，並非將全部土地認為公有；其一部分之田，已認為私業 (*Sondergut*)，——與前者不同之點，——但仍受團體種種限制；而牧場，森林，溝渠，道路，橋梁，則仍為公有，稱為 *Allmende*；或 *gemeine Mark*⁹。所以“*Flurzwang*”依然存在。但土地私有制度，已由此「私業」逐漸演進而成立；惟森林牧場，則至近代仍有為公地者。

復次，為十六世紀時俄國之農村團體 *Mir*——直至俄國革命時止，*Mir* 尚為俄國大部分農業組織之基礎。在此種鄉村團體之下，土地不但週期的重行分配於農民，且農民納稅之時，亦共同聯合繳納¹⁰。其土地公有之性質，蓋最為顯著。

⁸ 參閱 Nasse: *Über die Mittelalterliche Feldgemeinschaft in England*, 1869; Meitzen: *Art. Feldgemeinschaft in Hdw. d. Stw.*

⁹ 參閱 Maurer: *Geschichte der Markenverfassung in Deutschland*, 1856; Sombart: *Der Moderne Kapitalismus*, I, Bd. SS. 47-49

¹⁰ Kaussler: *Zur Geschichte und Kritik des bauerlichen Gemeindebesitzes in Russland*, 1876-1887; Simkhowitsch: *Art "Mir" im Hdw. d. Stw.*

最後為南斯拉夫之家庭集團——Zadruga。此種家庭經濟，純為集產團體，家長用父老的權力 (patriarchal) 支配一切財產及勞力。「無論何種財產——土地與動產——都是公有財產，除裝飾品及武器以外，別無個人私有財產。此外亦無所謂繼承權。一切勞力，一切享樂財產，一切贏餘，皆為公有。」¹¹ 此種鄉村組織，完全建築在集產的基礎之上，視俄國今日之消費依然私有，可謂更進一步。

由上舉種種實例觀之，在農業經濟發展之初，即從土地公有演進至土地私有之階段，原有種種過渡形式，——或土地尚完全公有；或個人僅有使用權而無所有權，土地週期重行分配；或已有私有土地，但尚保留一部分土地公有。則我國之井田制度，亦係經濟生活演進中自然之一階段，從經濟史之立場觀察，原為可能之土地制度也。

且更進一步言之：吾國土地私有制度之發展，雖已起原於戰國末期；然土地私有制度之完全確立，則實自唐開元以後。何以言之？秦廢井田，制阡陌，其極造成兩漢之兼併；土地公有私有之爭，歷六朝而不決。漢儒董仲舒，師丹，已倡限民名田之議——名田者，占田也。——王莽實行之，收天下之田曰王田，不得買賣，其男口不盈八而田過一井者，分餘田與族黨，犯者罪且至死。王莽雖歸失敗，然均田之思想，終於勝利。晉武帝平吳，始置戶調之式¹²，限王公田宅及品官占田¹³，已略含有均田之意。北魏孝文，從李安

¹¹ Meitzen: *Art "Feldgemeinschaft" in Hdw. d. Stw*; Markovic: *Die Serbische Hauskommunion*, 1903.

¹² 戶調之法，男子一人，占田七十畝，女子三十畝；其外丁男課田五十畝，次丁男半之，女則不課。丁男之戶，歲輸絹三疋，綿三斤，女及次丁為戶者，半輸。

¹³ 王公於京城得有一宅，大園限田十五頃，次園十頃，小園七頃。又限品官占田，品第一者占五十頃，每降一品，減田五頃；至第九品，則為十頃。

世言，爲均田之法：諸男夫十五以上，受露田（不栽樹者）四十畝，婦人二十畝。人年及課（謂十五以上）則受田，老免，及身沒，則還田。男夫一人，得占桑田二十畝，不在還受之列。蓋全國人民，有無田之戶，亦多逾分之田，均之甚難，故其制，令有盈者無受無還，不足者受種如法；盈者得賣其盈，不足者得買所不足；不得賣其份，亦不得買過所足。蓋土地公有私有之制兼用，師董仲舒之議而略加變通也。均田之制，歷東西魏，周，齊而至於唐。唐承前代遺制，定租庸調之法；其均田之制，先定口分世業之田：凡天下丁男，年十八以上者，給田一頃，以二十畝爲永業，餘爲口分。狹鄉授田，減寬鄉之半；授工商者，寬鄉減半，狹鄉不給。庶人徙鄉，貧無以葬者，得賣其永業田，自狹鄉而徙寬鄉者，得並賣口分田，已賣，不復授；死者，收之以授無田者。蓋其均田之法，已無前代謹嚴，必要時得賣其口分田，公有私有之制表面雖仍並行，然已趨向私有制度矣。及開元以後，天下戶籍，久不更造；丁口轉死，田戶賣易；於是口分世業之田壞而爲兼併；及兵興財屈，租庸調之法，亦不得不變而爲兩稅矣。當代宗時，始以畝定稅，而斂以夏秋。楊炎作兩稅法，定戶無主客，以見居爲簿；人無丁中，以貧富爲差；其不居處而行商者，就所在州縣稅三十之一。其田畝之稅，以大曆十四年（代宗年號）墾田之數爲定而均收之，由是天下之民，不土斷而地着，不更版籍而盡得其虛實。均田之制，至此完全破壞；故曰：吾國土地私有制度之完全確立，實自唐開元以後也。

設春秋以前，果無井田之制；何以井田制之潛勢力，如是宏大；何以公有私有之爭，綿連兩漢，魏，晉，六朝而不決？均田之制，隱然取法井田而加以變通。若古無井田，土地私有制度已經確立，豈有從土地私有制度再演回至公有制

度，而後復變為私有制度耶？

五 結論

近人或以采地制之名詞，以表示封建關係，而否認井田制度，以井田論三字代之，以示其係理想而非事實¹⁴。實則井田制與封建制，並非矛盾；所謂「普天之下，莫非王土；率土之濱，莫非王臣」，原不過表示一種抽象之土地最高主權，與實際上之公田私田制度，自可並行。（例如北歐諸國之田地公有制度，德國之 Markgenossenschaft，皆與封建制度並行）。「且八家皆私百畝，同養公田；公事畢，然後敢治私事」，以「養君子」，正合於封建制度。若目「采地制」為「領主壓迫農奴，榨取利益之一種制度」，以為與儒者所歌頌均貧富之井田，截然不同，則實引用近代資本主義下之「壓迫」「榨取」等名詞，於古代之封建制度，未免附會。凡屬封建制度，地主與佃戶之關係，當然存在，只須耕者有其地，得以耕作生存，較之「富者田連阡陌，貧者身無立錐之地」，自己高出數倍，無怪兼併之極，儒者之所以歌頌井田，而欲托古改制也。

總之孟子所言之井田制度，衡之各國經濟史，考之吾國古代農業演進情形，皆極合理，既不能主觀的視為「理想的計劃」，更不能以戰國以前未嘗有人言及井田，遂遽爾斷定為孟子虛造。近人辨古工作，類皆用不充分之根據，非專家之眼光，一知半解，似是而非，結果愈辨愈不能分別真偽，愈考古而去古代真相愈遠。井田有無之辨，實為最顯舉之例。故特提出之，詳論之，以明孟子所言之井田非偽，而漢儒所演繹之井田論，則確係理想而非事實也。

¹⁴ 萬國鼎，中國田制史，上冊，10-17 頁。

漢代的雇傭制度

勞 翰

本文原發表於中央研究院歷史語言研究所集刊第二十三期上，民國四十年。

中國漢代的奴隸制度，是曾經被許多人注意到的，例如從 C. M. Wilbur: *Slavery in China during the Former Han Dynasty* 後面所附的徵引書目來看，就知道這個問題是如何的被時人看重。然而大致分析的結果，是漢代確有奴隸，並且曾用來作生產事業，但其工作上的效用雖是相對的重要，卻還要受到若干限制的。

奴隸的勞動，在漢代說來只能算做社會上一種重要的工作來源，而不能算做唯一的工作來源。並且就其重要性而言，公私奴隸之間，有一個很大的差異，官奴隸的工作較為重要，而私奴隸就要差些。再就時代來說，漢初奴隸的勞動力較為重要，武帝以後要差些，到東漢就要更差些。——但就另一方面來說，國家和私人都同樣的需要勞力，假如奴隸的數目減少了，也就是雇傭的數目增加。因此只要看一看漢代雇傭制度在當時的重要，也就說明了漢代不是一個奴隸社會。

一 官家雇傭的使用

漢代的大帝國是接收了秦代的發展而來的，但無疑的，秦代卻是一個官奴隸建築成的大帝國。秦代是嚴刑峻法的，而嚴刑峻法的目的，也可以說一方面便於集權的統治，另一方面卻是利用嚴刑造成了大量的刑徒來使用不費錢的勞動力。如：史記秦始皇本紀三十五年：

營作朝宮渭南上林苑中，先作前殿阿房。……

隱宮徒刑者七十餘萬人，乃分作阿房宮或作麗山。

又：九月葬始皇鄜山，始皇初即位，穿治鄜山，及並天下，天下徒送諸七十餘萬人。

漢代初年，仍然採用着秦代的習慣，如：漢書惠帝紀：

三年六月，發諸侯王，列侯徒隸二萬人城長安。

又景帝紀：

中四年，秋，赦徒作陽陵者，死罪欲腐者許之。

景帝時的官徒多少現在雖然不能明瞭，不過據惠帝三年修長安的記載，發長安六百里內的老百姓為「男女十四萬六千人」，而奴隸不到二萬人，比起了秦代的七十萬人，業已不成比例了。

在這樣的情形下，大量的雇傭要用的着。漢書吳王濞傳：

其居國以銅鹽，故卒踐輒予平賈。註：服虔曰，「以當為更卒，出錢三百，謂之過更，自行為卒，謂之踐更，吳王欲得民心，為卒者顧其庸，隨時月與平賈也。」

這是文帝或景帝初年之事，還是西漢的早期。但服虔注稱的「出錢三百」出於漢律，乃武帝以後之制，不能早至文景時代（參看臺灣大學文史哲學報三期，論漢代官俸文中）所以出錢三百之數是靠不住的。只是平賈二字，見於漢書本文。那就縱然不定是三百錢，平賈這件事還是有的。古代賈和價二字相通，平賈即平價，亦即給予公平的工值。此處特別說

明吳王給卒徒平賈，可見漢室中央是不給予平賈的。亦即漢代初年的中央或地方的官家，對於給予兵卒以合理傭值之事是不常有的。

但到了成帝時代卻就不然了，陳湯傳：

上封事言，初陵京師之地，最為肥美，可立一縣。天下民不徙諸陵，三十餘歲矣。關東富人益衆，多規良田，役使貧民，可徙初陵，以彊京師。……於是天子從其計，果起昌陵邑。……後卒不就。羣臣多言其不便者，下有司儀，皆曰：「昌陵因卑為高，積土為山……卒徒工庸，以鉅萬數，其然脂夜作，取土東山，且與穀同賈。」

這裏所說的卒徒工庸，便是兵卒和刑徒（刑徒亦即官奴隸的一種）的工值，但工值如何計算，卻沒有說到。

漢書溝洫志：

河堤成……以五月為河平元年。卒治河為著外繇六月（注：師古曰，「以卒治河有勞，雖執役日近，皆得著繇成六月也」）。……後二歲，河復決平原，……作治六月廼成……治河卒非平賈為著外繇六月（注：蘇林曰：「平賈，以錢取人作卒，顧其時庸之平賈也。」如淳曰：「律說，平賈一月得錢二千」）。

照這裏來看，平賈的解釋，很清楚的是公平的傭價，亦即傭人的時價。在漢代的兵卒是可以給予「平賈」的，也有不給予「平賈」的。換言之亦即兵卒的薪餉，一般說來，是低於雇工的工資，除非是臨時雇用的兵卒，那才給以當時雇工的待遇。在河平年間治河的有兩種，第一是平賈的，按照一般雇工的工資，第二是非平賈的，此時按照士卒的待遇，但因治河有成績，又另外發給六個月的薪餉（外繇的解釋，可以有時算作薪餉的錢，見本集刊十本「漢代兵制及漢簡中

的兵制」)。

在居延所發現的漢簡，大率爲昭帝和宣帝時代，在敦煌所發現的漢簡，大率爲東漢初年，這裏有幾條有關於雇傭的居延簡：

……史嘗卒延壽里上官霸 僦人安故里譚昌 (4.25)

……月積一月廿七日運發僦直 (350.12)

出錢四千七百一十四 賦僦人表是萬歲里吳成三兩半
已入八十五石 少二石 八斗三升 (505.15)

口成承祿償居延卒李明長願錢二千六百 (116.40)

出錢千三百卅七賦就人會水宜祿里蘭子房一兩 (506.27)

又敦煌簡

出糜二斛 元和四年八月五日 僦人張季元付平望西部
候長憲 (Txiv. a. i. 1)

這都是公家用的傭工，從漢簡中看來，漢代烽燧中，大致除去主管的候長或燧長之外；第一是吏員，如卒史，書佐之類；第二是兵士，本地人爲騎士，外處來的爲戍卒，田卒，渠卒；第三是刑徒，亦即官奴隸或奴工。此外便是雇工或傭工，這一類在漢簡中發現的次數雖然不如前三類的次數多，但在烽燧中有時也用得着，卻是事實。

二 奴隸制度和私雇傭的發展

據上節來看，漢代官家確有對於雇傭的使用增加的趨勢，但其使用範圍之廣，還不如兵卒和奴隸兩大類。至於漢代的私人，對於雇傭的使用，卻遠較公家爲廣泛。這一點可以說和私人奴隸使用的漸次減少，有密切的關係。

在西漢的前期，確曾有使用大量的奴隸來生產的奴隸主人，史記貨殖列傳：

蜀卓氏……致之臨邛，卽鐵山鼓鑄，運籌策，領漢蜀之

民，富至僮千人。齊俗賤奴虜，而刁間獨愛貴之。桀黠奴人所患也，唯刁間收取使之，逐漁鹽之利。

夫用貧求富，農不如工，工不如商。……通邑大都酤一歲千釀，醢醬千瓠，醬千瓠，屠牛羊豕千皮，販穀糴千鍾，薪藁千車，船長千丈，木千章，竹竿萬個，其輶車百乘，牛車千兩，木器繫者千枚，銅器千鈞，素木鐵器若扈齒千石，馬蹄躐千，牛千足，羊彘千雙，僮手指千，……此亦比千乘之家，其大率也。

這就是說，有百個奴隸，就可比「千乘之家」，但是照一般記載來看，大量私人奴隸的奴主，卻只有張安世家僮七百人（漢書五十九本傳），楊僕七百人（水經穀水注），王氏五侯（漢書九十八元后傳），王商（漢書八十二），馬防兄弟（後漢書五十四），濟南王康（後漢書七十二），竇融（後漢書五十三）等均有奴隸千人以上。這都是世胄貴族，不是一般的「編戶齊民」所敢望其肩背。

所以現在的推想，貨殖傳所說的是武帝以前的情形，但到了武帝以後，在武帝壓抑商人的經濟政策之下，豪富的商人不容易自存，而商人所用的奴隸也要抽重稅，這對於奴隸主人是不合算的，可能因此就減少下去。史記平準書：

公卿言部國頗被蓄，貧民無產業者，募徙廣饒之地，陛下損膳省用，出禁錢以振元元，寬貸賦而民不齊出於南畝。商賈滋衆，貧者畜積無有，皆仰給縣官。異時算輶車賈人緡錢皆有差，請算如故。諸賈人未作賈貸買居邑稽諸物及商以取利者，雖無市藉各以其物自占，率緡錢二十而一算，諸作有租及鑄，率緡錢四十一算，非吏比者，三老，北邊騎士，輶者以一算（漢書食貨志作「輶車一算」），商賈人輶車二算，船五丈以上一算，匿不自占，占不悉，戍邊一歲，沒入緡錢，有能告者，以其

半畀之。賈人有市藉著，及其家屬，皆無得藉名田以便農。敢犯令，沒入田僮（漢書作「沒入田貨」）。

又漢書孝惠紀：

六年，女子年十五至三十不嫁，五算。注：「漢律，人出一算，賈人與奴隸倍算。」

這就是說武帝對於商人的算賦，是加倍來抽稅，再據惠紀注引的漢律，對於奴隸的算賦，亦是加倍的。假如商人而兼爲奴隸主，除去自己加倍抽算賦之外，他的奴隸也是加倍來抽算賦。

武帝加倍抽奴隸，自然爲的是打擊商人，但這尚不是致命的打擊，因爲一算只有一百二十錢，倍算爲二百四十錢，按照傭工最低之價三百錢一月的數目來算，也還不至於使商人不能擔負。但是還有別的方法加上去。史記平漢書：

楊可告緡編天下，中家以上大抵皆過告，杜周治之，獄少反者。乃分遣御史廷尉正監，分曹往。即治郡國緡錢，得民財物以億計。奴隸以千萬數。田大縣數百頃，小縣百餘頃，宅亦如之。於是商賈中家以上大抵破，民偷甘食好食，不事畜藏之產業。

買人不得名田，犯着沒入田僮，再加以告緡，也沒入大量的奴隸，並且中家以上大率破產，那就顯然的商人中的大奴隸主沒有一個能於倖免了。這就是除去貴族之外，大奴隸主不能再行存在的大原因。

儒家是反對奴隸制度的，哀帝時師丹已主張限制，到王莽始建國元年再爲限制。

莽曰……「又置奴婢之市，與牛馬同闕，制於民臣，顯斷其命，姦虐之人，因緣爲利，至略賣人妻子，逆天心，誅人倫，繆於天地之性人爲貴之義……今更天下田曰王田，奴婢曰私屬，皆不得賣買。」……坐賣買田宅

奴婢鑄錢，自諸「侯卿大夫，至於庶民，抵罪不可勝數。」（漢書王莽傳上）

至光武時更屢次解放奴隸，後漢書光武紀：

建武六年：「詔王莽時吏人沒入為奴婢，不應舊法者皆免為庶人。」

建武七年：「詔吏人遭饑亂及為青徐所略為奴婢下妻欲去者，恣聽之，敢拘制不還，以賣人法從事。」

建武十二年：「詔隴蜀民被略為奴婢自訟及獄官未報，一切免為庶民」

建武十三年：「詔益州民自八年以來被略為奴婢者，諸一切免為庶民，或依託為人下妻，欲去者，恣聽之，敢拘留者，比青徐二州，以略人法從事。」

建武十四年：「詔益涼二州奴婢，自八年以來，自訟在所官，一切免為庶民，賣者無還值。」

其中最可注意的是「賣人法」，或「略人法」，也就是後代的「拐賣人口法」應當是即承王莽時的制度而來。這個法律，雖歷代不見得盡力執行，但確是人道主義上的一線光明。

後漢書鄭興傳言：「侍御史舉奏興奉使私買奴婢，坐左轉蓮勺令」，這是說平民本不該私買賣人口，奉使而私買奴婢，更是有玷官箴，所以因此坐罪。

東漢時代除去一般貴冑有大量的奴隸之外，民間不常有大量的奴隸的，只有一個較為希有的證據，後漢書方術傳：

折像字伯式，廣漢雒人也。其先張江者，封折侯，曾孫國為鬱林太守，徙廣漢。因封氏焉。國生像。國有貲財二億，家僮八百人。像幼有仁心，不殺昆蟲，不折萌芽，能通京氏易，好黃老言，及國卒，感多藏厚亡之義，乃散金帛資產，周施親疏。

折像的高祖雖然封侯，但在他這時候，已不是侯爵了。因此

不便就附入貴胄之列。應當只能算作富人。又後漢書樊宏傳：

父重，字君雲，世善稼穡，好貨殖，重性溫厚，有法度。三世共財。子孫朝夕禮敬，常若公家。其管理產業，物無所棄，課役童隸，各得其宜，故能上下戮力，財利數倍，乃開廣田土三百餘頃。

此處所謂「課役童隸」，似乎只是一個僕役的泛稱，並非專指奴隸而言。（樊重雖為西漢時代的人，但見於後漢書，其用語和方術傳是屬於同一的用法。）甚至於折像傳中的「家僮八百人」也可能已經接近了唐人「家僮掃蘿逕」，「久歎家僮散」，宋人「花落家僮未掃」的用法。在這僮字用法之中，西漢的司馬遷是常用「僮」字來代表奴隸，東漢的班固已經儘量的慎重使用。「僮」字多出於司馬遷的原文，有時還將「僮」字改掉。其班固所述非由司馬遷原文的，如史丹傳：「賞賜累千金，僮奴以百數，」亦是「僮奴」二字連稱，而不只用一個「僮」字。到了後漢書又屢用「僮」字，除上引兩段之外，如馬皇后紀：「后時年十歲，幹理家事，勅制僮御，內外諮稟，事同成人」。史弼傳：「又下廷尉詔獄，平原吏人奔走諸闕訟之，前孝廉魏劭毀變形服。詐為家僮，瞻護於弼」。這些僮字都使人不能知曉為雇傭的僕役或買賣的奴隸。因此在折像這一條中，所謂家僮的性質仍是不能完全明瞭，當然可以認為全是奴隸，卻也未嘗不可以認為全不是奴隸。

這種奴隸和雇傭不分的事實，顯示着一種特殊的情況。便是自東漢以還以至劉宋，雇傭和奴隸的身分，逐漸混淆。在好的一方面來說，是從西漢以來，對於奴隸在法律上的人身地位，逐漸加以保護的結果。在壞的一方面來說，便是士大夫已經成了一顯著的階級，凡不屬於士大夫階級的，不論

其爲自由人或奴隸，都是同在一個很低的身分待遇上。

最使人觸目的，便是「奴客」二字的連用：

後爲渭城令甚有聲。值昭帝幼、皇后父上官將軍與帝姊蓋主私夫丁外人相善，外人驕恣，怨故京兆尹樊福，使客射殺之。客藏公主廬，不敢捕，渭城令建將吏卒圍捕。蓋主聞之，與外人上官將軍多從奴客往犇，射追吏，吏散走。（漢書胡建傳）

是時大將軍霍光秉政，諸霍在平陽，奴客持刀入市鬪變，吏不能禁，及翁婦爲市吏，莫敢犯者。（漢書尹翁歸傳）

成帝鴻嘉之間，好爲微行出游，選從期門郎有材力者，及私奴客，多至十餘，少五六人。皆白衣幘帶，持刀劍，或乘小車御者在茵上，或皆騎，出入市里郊野。

（漢書五行志）

雖俱驕縱而（竇）景爲尤甚，奴客緹騎，依倚形勢，侵陵小人。（後漢書竇憲傳）

又聞或有使奴客名作，在職家人，冒之出入，往來禁輿，交通書疏，有所探問。（魏志董昭傳）

時以行客質作富家，爲之奴使，一歲數千，衣出其中，餘少可視，積十餘歲，可得自用。（太平經一一四卷）

朱璜者，廣陵人也。少病毒癩，就睢山上道士阮丘。丘憐之。……璜曰：「病愈當爲君作客三年，不致自還。」（列仙傳）

客就是雇傭，和奴的地位不同的只有一點，便是去就自如。在作客的時候和奴是同樣的工作，同樣的地位。太平經所說的「行客質作富家，爲之奴使」，便是非常顯著的。而列仙傳稱朱璜應允道士阮丘，願「作客三年，不致自還。」也就顯然的雇傭的義務，和奴隸有若干的相類。

又據羣書治要引崔實政論說：

夫百里長吏，荷諸侯之任，而食監門之祿，請舉一隅，以卒其餘。一月之祿，得粟二十斛，錢二千，長吏雖欲崇約，猶當有從者一人。假令無奴，當復取客。客庸一月千錢。芻，膏，肉五百。薪炭柴菜又五百。二人食粟六斛，其餘才足給馬。豈能供冬夏衣被，四時祠祀，賓客斗酒之費乎，況沒迎父母致妻子哉？

從這一段來看，客和奴都稱為「從者」（漢書李廣利傳「負私從者不與」和此處意同。）工作是相同的，只是客支傭資而奴不支傭資罷了。

三 雇傭的應用

自秦漢以來，中國就成了一個整片土地的大國家。國家財政上的主要來源是男耕女織；至於商人和手工業者對於國家的經濟貢獻，並不顯著。所以主持國家財政的人要盡力的務本抑末，亦即是勸農桑，抑商賈。由於農業發展及政權集中之影響，大都市要發展起來，大商人利用他們的資本經營商業及手工業，也會發展起來。但從政府立場看來，他們只是些取巧的浪費者。在西漢初年以至文景之世，如史記貨殖傳所述，確在社會上是有支配力量的，但這是由於政府的縱容，而不是由於政府的同情和培植。當時的政府，走的是黃老主義的路徑。而老子的主張卻是：

小國寡民，使有什佰之器而不用。使民重配而不遠徙。雖有舟輿，無所乘之。雖有甲兵，無所陳之。使人復結繩而用之。甘其食，美其服，安其居，樂其俗，鄰國相望，鷄犬之聲相聞，民至老死不相往來。

顯然和商業的發展是取並不同情的意見的，司馬遷是傾向於道家的人，所以史記貨殖傳序也說：

老子曰，「至治之極，鄰國相望，鷄犬之聲相聞，民各甘其食，美其服，安其俗，樂其業，至老死不相往來」，必用此爲務，輒近世塗民耳目，則幾無行矣。太史公曰，夫神農以前，吾不知己，至若詩書所述，虞夏以來，耳目欲極聲色之好，口欲容芻豢之味，自安逸樂而心誇矜，勢能之榮，使俗之漸民久矣。雖戶說以眇論，終不能化。故善者因之，其次利道之，其次教誨之，其次整齊之，最下者與之爭。

這正是代表西漢的「道家者流」的看法。雖然不同意於商人的發展，卻主張不加以干涉。因此許多富商大賈能以鹽鐵起家，他們擁有了礦山和鹽場，成爲生產者而兼販賣者。他們聚積貲財的結果，又轉向土地投資，因此他們也就兼爲大地主和牧場主人。並且因爲政府對於鑄錢事業加以放任，因此他們又兼爲造錢工廠的主人。他們的經濟勢力可以左右一個區域的市場，是無庸懷疑的。但卻有一點要注意，就是當時的政權並不在他們自己或其代理人手中，因此也就決定不了國策。所以我們可以意識到，西漢初年商人資本的勢力，在社會的發展上，是一個重要的勢力，卻還够不上說是一個決定的勢力。

從別一方面來看，漢武帝統制鹽鐵，加倍算貲，鑄造五銖錢，禁商人名田，甚至採用「告緡」之法來打擊商人。於是舊日的富商大賈破產了，而奴隸主人的奴隸，也變成了官奴，以至太僕牧師諸苑，可以擁有三萬個官奴婢（漢舊儀），其他未見於記載的，尙不知多少。但此時國土增加了，對外交通的道路開放了。對商人也等於開闢了若干新的天地。況且楊可告緡，也就是那一次，此後商人貲財經過了一番休養生息，當然也可以漸漸的恢復。（漢書哀帝卽位詔「賈人不得名田爲吏」可知當時商人又可以置田宅了）所以

昭宣以後，仍然有富商大賈。只是規模和力量，可能不如漢初，而漢初的手工業在奴隸手中的，至此便轉為要使用雇傭了。

先從農業來說，是早就使用雇傭來耕種的事，曾見於韓非子外儲說左。又史記陳涉世家：

陳勝者陽城人也字涉……陳涉少時嘗與人傭耕，輟耕之壟上，悵恨久之。曰：「苟富貴毋相忘。」傭者笑而應曰：「若為傭耕，何富貴也。」陳涉太息曰：「燕雀安知鴻鵠之志哉？」

又如漢書食貨志：

教民相與庸輓犂

都是在武帝時代及其以前之事。至於武帝以後的，如

隱居窮澤，身自耕傭。（後漢書孟嘗傳）

少孤貧，常傭耕以養兄嫂，有閑暇則以學文。（後漢書第五訪傳）

表置屯田都尉二人，領客六百夫，於道次耕種菽粟，以給人牛之費。（三國志梁習傳）

所以農田之上是用着雇傭的，從戰國一直到三國都是如此。誠然，並非說農田上不曾使用奴隸，然而雇傭的應用似乎比較奴隸重要。因為在兩漢書及三國志中，並未提到奴隸耕種之事，只在王褒的僮約見到（類聚三十五引風俗通，則為年長謹信之奴主持耕種，非是耕種者）。而雇傭耕種之事，卻屢屢出現。

但是在工業或礦冶方面，情況就不同了。史記外戚世家：

竇太后……弟曰竇廣國，字少君，少君年四五歲，家貧為人略賣，不知其處，傳十餘家，至宜陽，為其主人作炭。寒臥岸下百餘人，岸崩盡壓殺臥者，少君獨得脫不

死，自卜數日當爲侯。

至於在貨殖傳中，更可以比附出來。在武帝時期，則稱「大農置工巧奴，與從事爲作田器」（漢書食貨志）。到成帝時「潁川鐵官徒申屠聖等百八十人殺長吏，盜庫兵，自稱「將軍」（成帝紀陽朔元年）。「山陽鐵官徒蘇令等二百二十八人攻殺長吏，盜庫兵，自稱將軍」（成帝紀永始三年）。漢書貢禹傳亦稱：「諸鐵官置卒徒，攻山取鐵銅，一歲功十萬以上」。所以武帝以後鐵官的鑄造，是使用官奴（刑徒）的，而官奴的使用，正表現着未接收鑄鐵工廠以前，廠中用的私人奴隸。

但是到了東漢時期，就不同了。

乃自翦須，變形入林慮山中，隱匿姓名，爲冶家傭。親突煙炭，形貌毀瘁。後馥弟靜乘車馬，載縑帛，追之涇陽市中。（夏馥傳）

家貧傭爲漆工。（中屠婦傳）

這便可以看出來，東漢的工藝及礦冶要用傭工來做了。

此外如後漢書中所記雇傭的各條，如：

兄爲郡吏，頗愛禮遺，均數諫不聽，則脫身爲傭，歲餘，得錢帛歸。（鄭均傳）

遂至吳，依大家臯伯通，居廡下，爲人賃。每歸，妻爲具食，不敢於鴻前仰視，舉案齊眉。伯通察而異之曰：「彼傭使其妻敬之如此，非凡人也」乃方舍之於家。

（梁鴻傳）

變姓名爲酒家傭。（李固傳）

盜皆饑寒傭保，何足窮其法乎？（張儉傳）

家貧無資，常客傭自給。（桓榮傳）

時公沙穆來游太學，無資糧，乃變服客傭爲祐賃舂，祐與語大驚。遂訂交於杵臼之間。（吳祐傳）

庾乘游學宮，遂爲諸生傭。（郭太傳）

少孤貧，依宗人居，恆傭作爲資，暮輒還，斲柴以讀書。（第五訪傳）

南陽孔嵩，家貧親老，乃變姓名爲新野阿里街卒。……嵩以先傭未竟，不肯去。（范氏傳）

這都是一般的傭工。所以大致看來，東漢時代自由傭作的工人，可能的較前增加起來。但是到了魏晉以後，因爲世兵及投靠之風盛行，所謂「客」的一個名稱，又帶着農奴的意味。錢大昕恆言錄云：

晉書王恂傳：「魏氏給公卿以下租牛客戶，數各有差。自後小人憚役，多樂爲之，動以百數。又大原各郡，以胡人爲田客，多者數十，武帝卽位，治禁募客。」食貨志：「官品第一至於第九，各以貴賤占田。又得蔭人以爲衣食客及佃客。官品第一第二者，佃客無過五十戶，第三品十戶，第四品七戶，第五品五戶，第六品三戶，第七品二戶，第八第九品一戶。」

這種投靠的風氣，已經被政府法律的承認了，至於戶數的限制，不過具文而已。一直到唐部曲之制仍然盛行，見於唐代記載中更可看的清楚。至於後漢書朱儁傳：

光和元年，卽拜儁交趾刺史。令過本郡，簡家兵，及所調，合五千人，分從兩道而入。

家兵二字據唐章懷太子註，則爲：

家兵童僕之屬，調謂調撥之。

東漢並無世兵之制，所謂家兵，只是私人招募的軍隊。但是到唐代，解釋就不同了。可見魏晉以後的動亂，又給社會上新增加一個不平等的因素，而西漢末年以迄東漢一代逐漸減少的奴隸制度，又得到了一個新的生命。

秦漢隋唐間之田制

谷霽光

本文原發表於政治經濟學報第五卷第三期，民國二十六年。

一

秦漢隋唐間田制，名目繁多。重要的有秦國名田，西漢限田，新莽「井田」，西晉占田，以及北魏北齊北周和隋唐幾代的均田。制度的因沿損益，史籍言之不詳，而每一制度又復頭緒紛繁，研求亦極不易。近人對於田制的個別研究，似有相當注意，然尙未能得到真切的瞭解。至於綜合探討，其立論多難自圓其說，稍強人意的，也止於個別研究之綜合敷陳，各個制度之連繫與相關，仍然得不到一種解答。這可以說分析與綜合兩方面，都有續加努力之必要。

田制研究的最大困難，一是制度本身之不易明瞭，一是制度的規定與實行往往不能相符。兩者之難於解決，最重要的原因，當然是材料缺乏，考證不易；然而論證之不易正確，亦往往涉及技術與心理問題。譬如占田均田等名詞，涵義極不明顯，如解釋不當，很可以阻碍制度本身之研究。又如崇信法令的普遍心理，能影響到制度實施和制度損益的推

求。普通研究田制，便以為按照法令述說已足。這都是一種通弊，願首先提出，以與研究田制者共同商討。

本文的目的，在於瞭解每一制度的內容而求其相互關係，制度的由來和實施，亦願依次加以說明。考證與論斷，誠然未敢自信，但望本文提出的意見，能得到學人的批評與討論，或許於問題解決，間接也有些助益。

二

封建制度破壞以後，一班享有經濟特權而兼政治特權的貴族隨之消失。代貴族而起的，政治上有官僚集團，經濟上有地主集團和工商集團；而農業社會中，地主集團，尤為重要。新興的地主，或出身貴族，或依附官府，或由工商，或由農業，大抵自春秋時代已啓其端，而戰國以後則又日趨興盛。興盛的原因，在於田地之可以自由買賣，而田地之自由買賣，又起於封建社會中規定地權之片面契約失效以後，此時期握有廣額土地的豪富，便可稱之為自由大地主。

田地自由買賣，始於何時，仍難確定。左傳襄公四年(569B. C.)：「狄人貴貨易土，土可買也」，似為自由轉換之開始，然此限於邊境，非指中土。至戰國時代，記載上亦有中土買賣田地的事實，韓非子外儲說上：「中牟之人，棄其田耘，賣宅圃而隨文學者之半」，則買賣田宅，或許早已通行。

田地自由轉換，為構成大地主集團主要原因，然在農業尚屬簡陋和工商未甚發展以前，地主兼併，有賴於政治勢力與經濟勢力之相合，故官僚與地主，自始即有合一之趨勢。例於史記卷八一趙括列傳：「今括一旦為將，……王所賜金帛，歸藏於家，而日視便利田宅，可買者買之」，是為較早之事實。漢時亦如此，史記卷五三蕭相國世家：「客有說相

國曰：君滅族不久矣，……今君胡不多買田地賤貰貸以自汙，上心乃安。……民遮道行上書言相國賤疆民田宅數千萬」；而漢書卷三九蕭何列傳則云：「何買田宅，必居窮僻處……曰後世賢，師吾儉，不賢毋為勢家所奪」。蕭何買田，原係依仗政治勢力，既買之後，又怕子孫失勢後為另一有勢的人所奪，所以買田「必居窮僻處」，可見地主與政治勢力之難於分離。這樣的情形，在中國歷史中支持了很長的時期，此討論田制時應當首先注意的一點。

討論秦漢以後的田制，對於秦以前田制，仍當略為述說。自封建制度漸趨破壞以後，農村日形紊亂，土地糾紛，也就愈演愈劇。爭田奪地案件之多，在左傳中便可以得到不少例證，可見地籍整理，已屬刻不容緩。其次，春秋時代，集權國家漸次形成，政治機構增強，國家經用日廣，如是增賦與增稅，又為當代重要事件之一，因之土地與人口之清查，亦屬必要，所以春秋時代，便發生各國整理地籍的事實。國語齊語記有齊之「井田均疇」和「相地差征」，左傳記有襄公三十年鄭置「田洫」，和襄公二十五年楚「書土田……井沃衍，量入修賦」。至於戰國時代，孟子主張正經界均井地，尤足示土地整理之必要與趨勢。

秦國「名田」之施行，可說是春秋以後土地整理所產生的比較固定之田制。「名田」為商鞅改革方案之一，其事當在秦孝公三年（359B. C.），制度詳情，已不可考，其綱要如史記卷六八商君列傳所云：「明尊卑爵秩等級各以差次，名田宅臣妾衣服以家次，有功者顯榮，無功雖富，無所芬華」。「名」就是「占」的意思，也就是「註冊」的意思¹；

¹ 顧師古曰：「名田占田也。各為立限，不使富者過制，則貧弱之家可足也」。占即註冊之義，當於下論之。

「以家次」似乎是指爵秩的等級，原文上句已經說明，而本句所言「臣妾衣服」，也係以爵秩限定奴婢的多少和衣服的貴賤。司馬貞注史記，說是「謂各隨其家爵秩之班次，亦不使僭侈踰等」，可云恰當。

商鞅「名田」，在田制史上亦自有其重要地位，商鞅企圖澈底廢除封建制度下的田制（漢書食貨志云「除井田，民得買賣」，所謂井田，乃史家所加的一個名詞，用來代表封建制度下之田制），另樹立一集權國家直接統制的土地政策。「有功榮顯」，法律上又許可多佔土地，人民企圖多佔土地，自然要為專制君主努力。然而商鞅所謂「有功」，主要在立功戰場——首功，其目的在於強兵，這種政策的出現，純為列國爭雄的結果，秦時如此，後代仍不免有相似的現象發生。

商鞅對於「名田」的數額規定，現已無可稽考，對於一般人民的土地佔有，亦無法知其概要。不過商鞅的主旨，雖規定田地佔有應有差次，然而普通人民的田地，似乎不曾有過嚴格的限制。一因商鞅提倡農戰，只要地無遺利，那麼大地主存在，於國無損；一因商鞅定立「無功雖富，無所芬華」的辦法，但也不摧抑「無功」和「無所芬華」的純粹地主。後來秦始皇三十一年（216B. C.），使黔首自實田，纔完全採取放任政策。這樣的發展，在人口稀少時，尚可相安，到兩漢中葉，因為人口滋生的加速，土地便成為很嚴重的問題了。

漢代田制法令的頒布，始於哀帝綏和二年（7B. C.），此時頒布的田制，稱為限田制。所謂限田，是指政府限制人民廣額土地的佔領，也就是說人民對於地權的享用，須受相當限制。

限田的規定，極為簡單，吏民田地最高額為三十頃，三十頃以內，政府承認其所有權，三十頃以外，便為非法。人

民自動處理法外過多田地的期限，定為三年，三年以後，犯者田土沒收。這是對於關內侯以下一般吏民的限制，史籍言之極詳，無容備述。法令方面最有問題的，就是王侯公主田地有無限定，漢書上兩處記載即含糊不明，卷一一哀帝紀：

有司條奏：諸王列侯得名田國中；列侯在長安，及公主名田縣道；關內侯吏民名田，皆毋得過三十頃。諸侯王奴婢二百人，列侯公主百人，關內侯吏民三十人。

卷二四上食貨志則云：

丞相孔光大司空何武奏請：諸侯王列侯，皆得名田國中；列侯在長安，公主名田縣道；及關內侯吏民名田，皆毋得過三十頃。（奴婢數與哀紀同）

食貨志所載，對於王侯公主，除地域限制外，數目似乎也限止三十頃。但哀帝紀所謂「皆毋得過三十頃」，是否包括王侯公主在內，從文義上很難肯定，從分級限制奴婢的事實來看，則王侯公主異於關內侯吏民，亦屬可能。這點只能從疑；但比較可靠的說法，當取食貨志記載。也就是說田地不超過三十頃的規定，普施於一班的尊卑官吏與人民²。

限田的由來，當從漢代不健全之社會組織中，尋其本末。漢代社會基礎，奠立在一般地主之上，國家對於地主既特別優待，而社會上其他地位優越的兩集團——官僚與商人，又都有與地主合一的傾向，即使官僚與商人本非地主，至少也有變成地主的可能。地主在漢代，雖不能說自成固定的一個階級，但能自成另一集團。地主勢力之優越，在於擁

² 漢書卷一一哀帝紀如淳注：「名田國中者，自其所食國中。既收其租稅，又自得私田三十頃。名田縣道者，令甲：諸侯在國，名田他縣，罰金二兩。今列侯有不之國者，雖違食其國租稅，復自得田於他縣道，公主亦知之，不得過三十頃」。依此說當較可靠。

有巨量土地，土地領有權，在綏和二年以前，曾無明令限制，集中的趨勢，自屬不可避免。土地愈集中，社會矛盾現象愈明顯，限田也就成爲消極補救的一種方法。提議限制田地奴婢而被採用的一人，要算師丹，師丹限田的理由，漢書哀帝紀記載很詳，原文云：

成帝時（32-7B. C.），天下亡兵革之事，號爲安樂，然俗奢侈，不以畜聚爲意。永始二年（15B. C.），梁國平原郡比年傷水災，人相食，刺史守相坐免。哀帝即位（6-1B. C.），師丹輔政，建言古之聖王，莫不設井田，然後治迺可平。孝文皇帝，承亡周亂秦兵革之後，天下空虛，故務勸農桑，帥以節儉，民始充實，未有兼併之害，故不爲民田及奴婢爲限。今累世承平，豪富吏民，訾數鉅萬，而貧弱愈困。蓋君子爲政，貴因循而重改作，然所以有改者，將以救急也。亦未可詳，宜略爲限。

土地集中於豪富吏民的趨勢，大概從文帝（179-157B. C.）以後，特別顯著，這在師丹的建議中，已經指出。武帝（140-87B. C.）時代，情勢更見分明，田土限制，亦屬刻不容緩。首先注意及此的爲董仲舒，董仲舒所提辦法，與師丹立意完全相同，目的在「限民名田，以澹不足」，爲消極的補救，而非積極的改革³，也可以說董仲舒的建議，正是師丹後日改革的先導。

師丹提議的限田，確被採納，並且限田方案，也出於大臣孔光何武等奏請的，可見限田是公認的急切事業，並非由於一二人特見或卓識。不過建議已成爲正式方案，且已頒布實行，只因王公大臣和貴戚佞幸之阻撓，結果詔書用「且須

³ 漢書卷二四上食貨志。

後」三字，把全部事業擱置了。勢家的阻撓，自然是維護地主本身利益。他們握着政治的優越權力，即使法令已實行，也有方法去阻止，或是正式違抗，至於事先的牽制，朝廷更難着手。無疑的，此次改革，只能算是議程上的曇花一現而已⁴。

三

限田制度，既未施行，其結果則社會問題，終不能得到解決，即日後土地分配一般情形，亦難望絲毫改善。自此以後，民不聊生，與社會紛擾，日益增加⁵，仍不能不有第二次田制改革的倡導。此次倡導和施行，都由王莽，王莽對於整個的政治社會，均圖改善，田制不過其中之一。

王莽始建國元年(9A. D.)頒行的田制，稱為「井田」，「井田」內容，實際上為澈底的限田制度，並不與孟子所載的井田制相符合。其制度要點，如漢書卷二四上食貨志所記：

平帝崩，王莽居攝，遂篡位。……下令曰：漢氏減輕田租，三十而稅一，常有更賦，罷癯咸出。而豪民侵陵，分田劫假，厥名三十，實什稅五也。富者驕而為邪，貧者窮而為姦，俱陷於辜，刑用不措。今更名天下田曰「王田」，奴婢曰「私屬」，皆不得買賣。其男口不滿八而田過一井者，分餘田與九族鄉黨。

這個法令的規定，田地限制，仍然有相當伸縮，那就是說男口不滿八，田不得過一井；反之男口超過八人，田地也可超過一井。不過規定田地不得買賣，豪富勢家，在法律上無兼

⁴ 同上。當時田地一度貶值，而又詔令緩行，此實效上亦屬曇花一現。

⁵ 漢書卷七二貢禹傳，鮑宣傳，卷七四魏相傳，卷二七上五行志成帝鴻嘉三年。

併土地的權利，算是消極補救中的一點積極方略，我所謂「井田」爲澈底的限田制度，也是指此⁶。

「井田」方案，比較限田爲合理，問題仍在實施與否及實施的程度如何。王莽個人對於改革田制具有決心，當無疑義。第一次頒布的法令，因外患內憂並至，不得不暫行擱置⁷。上述「井田」方案，又是他第二次的再度頒布；所以施行的意志，更爲堅強。當日預爲的制裁方法是：(一)「犯令法至死」，(二)「敢有非井田聖制，無法惑衆者，投諸四裔，以禦魍魎」⁸。法令雖嚴，終於不能勝過「吏緣爲姦」的阻力，於是新莽的「井田」制，又在始建國四年(12A.D.)正式撤消了法令中王田不得買賣的部份，剩下的田地數額規定，因變亂不休，自然同於具文。

「井田」施行，還不曾達到消極的防制田地兼併的目的，卽已宣告停止。田制改革方案，陷於整個的失敗，在漢代可算第二次。兩次失敗主因，由於官吏，官吏阻力如此之大，真不能不令我們驚訝。官吏多出身地主，或是有變爲大地主之可能，上面已經說過；所以田制不改革則已，要改革必然損及地主權益，損及地主權益，必然遭遇強力反對而難施行，這在官僚政治已經成熟的漢代，仍然可以說是必然結果。以後政治與社會，如有重大變革，我們更不能不注視這官僚集團的勢力，而爲一切政治社會改革動向的判定。

⁶ 與田制有關的幾種改革，如封建制可說是施行「井田」的基礎條件之一，五均六筦制可說是推行「井田」的輔助方案之一，均見漢書卷二四食貨志及卷九九王莽傳。

⁷ 漢書卷九九王莽傳：「予前在大麓，始令天下公田口井，時則有嘉禾之祥，遭反虜逆賊且止」。此爲第一次公布的「井田」制。按「前在大麓」，係指漢元始四年至初始元年之間(4-8A.D.)，元始四年王莽加號宰衡，但頒布確年未詳。

⁸ 分見漢書卷二四上食貨志及九九王莽傳。

四

新莽失敗，東漢繼興。東漢百餘年中，土地制度，不聞變革。至於三國時代，除官地荒地有公營及私營之特殊規定外，仍然沒有過整個的改革方案。到西晉統一區宇，纔有一種新制度出現，即為依次所應討論的占田。

先論「占」字的涵義。漢書昭帝紀：「罷榷酤官，令民得以律占租。」師古注云：「占謂自隱其實，定其辭也。占音章贍反。」又食貨志：「工商能采金銀銅連錫，登龜取貝者，皆自占司市錢府，順時氣而取之」。師古注：「各以其所采之物；自穩實於司市錢府也。」知占即隱實之義。又宋書紀六：「名山大澤，往往占固」，梁書武帝紀：「豪家富室，多占取公田，貴價賦稅，以與貧民，傷時害政，為蠹已甚。自今公田，悉不得假與豪室，已假者特聽不追」；又陳書紀六：「私業久廢，咸許占作」。依據文義，知占亦即隱實之謂，以現代名詞解釋之，頗與「註冊」二字相近。

「占」字涵義，既已明瞭，可進而討論占田制度。晉頒布占田制，在平吳之後，平吳在太康元年（280A. D.）三月，頒布當在四月或四月以後，時期不能完全確定。其內容則為介於限田與「井田」之間的一種制度，規定比較限田為嚴密，而立意不及「井田」之澈底，其詳如晉書食貨志所載：

男子一人，占田七十畝，女子三十畝。其外丁男課田五十畝，丁女二十畝，次丁男半；女則不課。……其官品第一至於第九，各以貴賤占田；品第一者占五十頃，第二品四十五頃，第三品四十頃，第四品三十五頃，第五品三十頃，第六品二十五頃。第七品二十頃，第八品十五頃，第九品十頃。而又各以品之高卑蔭其親屬，多者

及九族，少者三世，宗室國賓先賢之後，及士人子孫亦如之。而又得蔭人以爲衣食客及佃客，品第六以上得衣食客三人，……其應有佃客者：官品第一第二者，佃客毋過五十戶，第三品十戶，第四品七戶，第五品五戶，第六品三戶，第七品二戶，第八品第九品一戶。

占田制要點；(一)承認丁男有占田七十畝丁女有占田三十畝之權，這是除官員外一般人民可以享受同等權利，也同樣的受到限制。(二)按照官品，節級占田；同樣有佃戶的規定，又彷彿漢代的限制奴婢一樣，但是都比限田規定來得嚴密確定。

何以說占田制不及「井田」制改革之澈底呢？這從制度本身上已可窺見。「井田」無官品等級差別，其田地多寡伸縮，限於丁男；基於此點，又知奴婢不限制數目，實亦等於限制，因爲農業社會，奴婢多事田作，法律既不許多佔田地，奴婢也會減少。占田制度，迥乎不同，社會上領田最高額和最低額的差數，達四千九百畝⁹，高下之間，可云天壤之別。又衣食客佃戶雖有規定，奴婢仍不能免，這也是制度上附帶條件所不周到的地方。再則占田制非一種社會政策，乃是基於國家財政與王公權利而規定的，占田作爲賦役基礎，而節級占田，又純爲大臣着想，並沒有顧到土地分配一般的情形¹⁰。

官品占田，大致亦爲承認已成事實。三國時代，中原一帶土地，因「大亂之後，民人分散，土業無主，皆爲公田」¹¹。及社會稍趨安定，這些公田，便爲豪富勢家所有。

⁹ 丁男丁女合占田百畝，姑以此作一戶計，與第一品占田五十頃相較，亦相差四千九百畝。

¹⁰ 參閱晉書卷二四食貨志。占田實施，最初在限制王侯在京城附近宅的佔領，再次爲便於課田與賦稅的訂立，使蔭戶數目有定，而民戶均須納稅。所以占田實行後，也得到「天下無事，賦稅平均，人咸樂其業」的效果。

¹¹ 三國志卷十五司馬朗傳。

其占取方法，或由賜給，或由買賣，或由佔領，大抵田地已有集中之勢，則爲事實¹²。同時佃田客戶，也早有一種節級制限的趨勢，曹魏時已如此。這可與官品占田作一件事看，不妨引證原文，藉供考訂，晉書卷九三王恂傳：

魏氏給公卿已下，租牛客戶數各有差。自後小人憚役，多樂爲之，貴勢之門，動有百數。又太原諸郡，亦以匈奴胡人爲田客，多者數千，武帝卽位，詔禁募客，恂明峻其法。

此曹魏時代，卽已承認公卿以下節級領有客戶的權益，也就是西晉規定佃客的張本。不過西晉時奴婢佃客，似乎是日形增加，因有恬和請限奴婢表奏，晉書卷四六李重傳云：

時（約咸寧太康間 275-289A. D.）太中大夫恬和表陳便宜，稱漢孔光魏徐幹等，議使王公已下，制奴婢限數，及禁百姓賣田宅。中書啓可屬主者爲條奏。重奏曰……人之田宅，旣無定限，奴婢不宜偏制其數，懼徒爲之法，實碎而難檢。

恬和所奏，未能見諸實行，但占田法令，係受恬和影響，似無疑義¹³。大抵豪富勢力之田宅佃客與奴婢太多，對於社會民生，大有影響，因之國家財政，也難望維持原狀，改革一事，自爲衆所公認。國家定制，如果在不妨害大官僚利益的原則之下，也就易於公布施行。

占田法給實施的成績，史籍中不曾概括的述說過，但從幾個特例推測當日情形，知道一班豪富勢力，仍然有占田踰制的。譬如王戎「廣收八方田園水碓，周徧天下」¹⁴；石崇「水碓三十餘區，倉頭八百餘人，他珍寶貨賄田宅稱

¹² 晉書卷四六李重傳。

¹³ 恬和上奏，約在平吳之前，從李重傳中可推定其年代。

¹⁴ 晉書卷四三王戎傳。

是」¹⁵；史冊上雖未說明占田數目，從文義上可以窺測出「占田踰制」的情形來。又如龐宗官不過疆弩將軍，而有田二百餘頃¹⁶，顯然超出應占數額之上。此雖特例，也可見當代社會中，仍然有不遵占田法令的豪富勢家。

占田制公布不久，西晉政治又走入混亂途徑，其後外族侵入，一切規制，即隨朝代而消滅。元帝建國江左，政治社會，都不穩定，田制更談不到。東晉一朝的情形，大致為豪富勢家自由強佔，而無防檢。雖人口稀少，土地分配，尚不致發生嚴重問題，然膏腴之地，仍感人多地少。尤其是封禁山湖一事，歷朝都未能採取有效辦法來制止，於民生影響極大。宋時雖有官品占山的法令，僅示封禁山湖問題之日趨嚴重，實際情形，恐未能得到多少效果¹⁷。

五

南朝沒有正式頒布的田制；北朝初期，也是如此。當西晉解體之後，中原一帶，臨時成為外族戰場，紛紜擾攘，達百餘年¹⁸，可算一長期混亂時代。到北魏太武帝太延五年(439A. D.)，纔又把中國北部完全統一，社會秩序，也漸形安定。此時北魏一方面為的抵禦北邊外族，一方面又企圖吞併南朝，不能不加緊增強國力，亦即不能不注意國民經濟，以增進國家財富與境內人口。於是北魏政治，又有着重國計

¹⁵ 晉書卷三三石崇傳。

¹⁶ 晉書卷六〇張輔傳。

¹⁷ 東晉及宋，兼併之盛，可參閱宋書卷二武帝紀。官品占山之制，見宋書卷五四羊玄保傳，其辦法為：「官品第一第二占山三頃，第三第四品二頃五十畝，第五第六品二頃，第七第八品一頃五十畝，第九品及百姓一頃。皆依定格，條上贊簿。若先已占山，不得更占，闕少依限占足」。此可與官品占田對看，亦一時趨向如此。

¹⁸ 晉書匈奴傳云：「其為戰國者，一百三十六載」。蓋始晉惠帝永興元年(394A. D.) 劉淵稱漢，盡北魏太武帝太延五年(439A. D.) 魏滅北涼。

表一 北魏均田制度表*

		男夫	婦人	奴	婢	牛	舉戶 穡無授田者	老小 殘年十一以上 成戶者	七十以上 成戶者	寡婦 志	守 者
數	露田○	40	20	40	20	30	20	20	40	20	
	桑田△ 世業	20									
額	麻田+	10	5	10	5						
	公田×	刺史15頃太守10頃治中別駕各8頃縣令郡丞各6頃									
時日	還受	民田恒以正月還受若始受田而身亡及買賣奴婢牛者皆至次年正月始得還受									
地域	寬鄉	隨力所及官借民種蒔有土居者依法封授不得無故遷移									
	狹鄉	聽逐荒空不限異州他郡唯不聽避勞就逸									
原則	遠近	進丁受田者恒從所近									
	貧富	同時俱授先貧後富先正田後倍田									
	親疏	諸遠流配謫無子孫及戶絕者宅墟桑榆盡為公田以供授受授受之次給其所親未給之間亦借其所親									
伸縮	露田	所授之田率倍之三易之田再倍之以供耕作及還受之盈縮									
	桑田	所領桑田亦通計於露田倍田之內於分雖盈沒則還田不得以充露田之數不足者以露田充倍									
	狹鄉	有進丁受田而不樂遷者則以其家桑田為正田分不足不給倍田又不足家內人別減分無桑之鄉準此為法									
地權	還受	桑田世業終身不還恒從見口有盈者無受無還不足者受種如法									
	買賣	桑田世業盈者得賣其所盈不足者得買其所不足不得賣其分亦不得賣過所足									

* 止表根據魏書食貨志編成。

○ 露田亦稱口分田，及課則受，老免及身死則還。

△ 桑田亦稱永業田，非桑之土，男夫另給一畝課蒔雜果。

+ 麻田限麻布之鄉，非出麻布之土不授。

× 公田即日後之職分田。

日 受田的牛，只限四尾，其實亦係極高數額，據齊民要術雜說載：「凡人家營田須量已力寧可少好不可多惡。假如一具牛總管得小畝三頃，據齊地大畝一頃三十五畝也。」據此四牛可耕小畝十二頃，大頃五頃四畝，並非太少。

民生之一種趨勢。不過此時社會生產，重在農業，農業之收效，又在農村復興，而農村復興，亦賴土地制度之改革以安

定之。均田制度，也就應運而生。均田在北魏，固屬一代宏規，而在中國田制史上，尤佔重要地位，如果我們把限田「井田」占田看作一個系統的話，均田可說是田制史中的另一開展。

均田制頒布，在孝文帝太和九年（485A. D.），制度要點，係法律規定每人應有田地的數額，內中包涵土地所有權與享用權兩種，分別制定。同時規定土地均由國家授予，授予標準，也是有成文法訂定的。其詳細內容，魏書食貨志記載亦不清晰，茲詳加分析，列表於前，以明條理，而便檢閱（表一）。

專從法令的規定來看，知道北魏均田制，是極富伸縮性的一種法規：（一）奴婢不限制人數，多有田地者，可以多報奴婢數目，以符法令之田地數額規定；豪富勢家能佔田地者，亦可增加奴婢，以免與法令抵觸。（二）寬鄉狹鄉田地之領有，可以依照情形，斟酌盈縮。至寬鄉官借民種，和狹鄉之聽逐荒空，執行時尤其可以高下其手。（三）桑田買賣，亦有限度內之自由，非絕對不得買賣，亦非絕對剝奪人民地權以充授受公田。（四）絕戶之地，雖充公田，但許先給所親，也就是人民私地，有自由過戶之權限，實在情形如何，政府可不過問。類此規定，實行時伸縮性很大，如吏治清明，土地分配，可望相當平均，否則法令自法令，事實自事實，於事無補，此點容後論及。

均田來由，着重在國計民生，上面已經說過，太和九年頒布的均田詔書，亦已鄭重說明¹⁹，但法令規定，為什麼這

¹⁹ 魏書卷七孝文本紀：「朕承乾在位十有五年。每覽三王之典，經綸百氏，儲蓄既積，黎元永安。爰暨季葉，斯道陵替，富強者兼併山澤，貧弱者墮絕一廛，致令地有遺利，民無餘財，或爭訟以亡身，或因饑飢以棄業，而欲天下太平，百姓豐足，安可得哉？今遣使者循行州郡，與牧守均給天下之田，還受以生死為斷，勸課農桑，興富民之本。」

樣圓活而不完全限定呢？要解釋此現象，可以分兩方面：

1. 從制度本身立論。均田本義，在於法律上承認每人有若干定額的田，乃係以口為單位之「均」（大致平均且無論良奴），而非以戶為單位之「均」，「均」的意義，可以如此解釋。均田原則，並不否認人民私產之存在，這和新莽「井田」，完全不同。「井田」以「王田」作為實行根據，理論上人民已無所謂私產——所有權，而僅有享用權，所以土地分配，能定為比較平均的制度。但新莽為牽就古制起見，只能得到以戶為單位之「均」，以口論則仍有差異。依此論均田，均田既不否認人民有私產，又想要達到耕者有其田和田地有人耕的雙重目的，只有讓人民在限度內去轉讓買賣，也只能讓人民做到耕地與人力之比較合理地步。田多的戶，奴婢亦計入耕者之列，所以均田法令只認定以口為單位之「均」，不計及以戶單位之「均」，寬鄉狹鄉，係人口分布之不均，也就涉及地方肥瘠問題。一例授受，諸多困難，同時從充分利用地利與民力之立場說，也不適宜。

2. 從制度由來立論。北魏君主，都極務農，其希望為地無餘利，民無餘力，並且總設法使希望完全實現。例如俘虜降人，都計口授田，或且兼給耕具；又如耕牛缺乏，便令民牛力相償，違令者一門不仕；墾地不闢，便令民記名種植，成績好的，也有獎勵；諸如此類，無非法誘導人民力事農作²⁰。因此之故，政府必須設法使有力耕種者得有土地，而人力與田額的比例，自然要限制一翻，此其一。自漢末以後，變亂相尋，人口稀少，荒地必多，歷來都有把公田實行井田的論調，北魏時也有些人主張墾田授受，權歸政府，用

²⁰ 魏書卷四恭宗本紀，卷七孝文本紀。

表二 北魏田制與賦稅關係略表*

均田以前 之賦稅	賦稅種類	○ 一戶之賦	五十家均分 一戶之賦	三十家均分 一戶之賦	二十家均分 一戶之賦	十家均分 一戶之賦
	粟(石)		22.9	.46弱	7.60強	1.14強
帛(匹)		7	.14	.23強	.35	.70
絮(斤)		2	.04	.06強	.10	.20
絲(斤)		2	.02	.03強	.05	.10
均田以後 之賦稅	賦稅種類	△ 五十床之賦	三十床之賦	二十床之賦	十床之賦	一床之賦
	粟(石)	100	60	40	20	2
	帛(匹)	50	30	20	10	1
比較並 說明	均田後賦 稅種類趨 于單純	均田前有五十家合為一戶者均田後以五十家之大小戶內至少可增收粟七十餘石			均田後十床之賦約當均田前一戶之賦弱	均田後一床之賦約相當於均田前十一家大戶內一家應納之賦亦即均田後增賦十倍

- * 單就一床之賦計算，其數約相當於均田前十家大戶內應納之賦。假定均田前納稅戶之平均家數為 10，(陰冒及單家之假定平均數)則均田後單室家之賦即已增加十倍，再加未娶者及奴婢牛之賦，其倍更大。因此更假定均田前納稅之平均家數為五，則均田後亦增賦四倍以上。依此計算，知均田後賦稅收入必增，而人民負擔且較平均。
- 均田前賦稅以戶為單位，但多五十三家合為一戶之事，此假定 50, 30, 20, 10 家合戶，而計算其每家應納之稅。
- △ 均田後納賦以一夫一婦為單位，後來通稱「一床」。戶內之未娶者及奴婢牛應納之賦，尚未計入。

意在使公地不成私產，非指一般土地而言，此其二²¹。久亂之後，地權之爭，成為社會上一嚴重問題。但因年代疏遠，

²¹ 魏書卷一九任城王澄傳，卷五七崔孝芬傳。任城王建議墾田授受之制八條，為孝芬所定。

既無人證，又無官廳地籍可憑，政府對於這些田地，當有通盤籌畫之必要，此其三²²。均田制度，在於樹立一比較平允的賦稅基礎，奴婢亦納輕微賦稅，便可以增加國庫的收入，而人民納賦以一夫一婦為單位，亦可免除合戶避賦的弊病²³。兩種合計，賦稅負擔的人增加，政府收入必多（表二），此其四²⁴。此外還有一重要原因，即鮮卑貴族，奴婢為其重要資產之一，其入中原後，當利用奴婢為之經營農業²⁵。中原一帶，既在鮮卑族統治之下，田制出發點，當顧及本族利益，這點從北齊的均田制中可以窺見，當於下節述及。

基於上述兩層，便可知道北魏均田制極富有伸縮性之理由，在於國家財富和國家財政兩方面着眼，並非一種社會政策。所以法令頒布後，土地分配問題，仍不能完全解決，豪富勢家的兼併，也不能避免²⁶。最顯著的一種現象，就是社

²² 魏書卷五三李安世傳：「安世乃上疏曰：……竊見州郡之民，或因年儉流移，棄賣田宅，漂居異鄉，事涉數世。三長既立，始返舊墟，廬井荒毀，桑榆改植。事已歷遠，易生假冒，……愚謂今桑井難復，宜更均量，審其經術，……又所爭之田，宜斷年限，事久難明，悉屬今主，然後虛妄之民望十觀視，守分之士永免於凌奪矣。高祖深納之。均田之制，起於此矣」。其事應在太和九年以前。

²³ 魏書卷五三李冲傳：「舊無三長，惟立宗主督護，所以民多隱冒，五十三十家方為一戶。冲以三正治民，所由來遠，於是創三長之制而上之」。按均田以前賦稅以戶為單位，九品混通，按戶徵收，所以有五十三十家為一戶的弊病。

²⁴ 馬端臨文獻通考田賦考三。

²⁵ 當日戰爭頻仍，俘虜多為國家營戶，或軍將奴婢。奴婢為軍隊中戰利品之一，賞賜奴婢之例亦多，魏書北齊書中多此記載，不具錄。

²⁶ 魏書卷二一咸陽王禧傳：「昧求貨賄，奴婢千餘，田業墮廢，偏于遠近，臣吏僮僕，相繼經營，世宗頗怒之。」又八九崔暹傳：「坐遣子析戶分隸三縣，廣占田宅，藏匿官奴，……免官。……以女妓園田貨元叉……。」豪富勢家，充分利用其權力以占田宅，於此可見。

會上奴婢增加²⁷；這誠然是勢所必至，但足表示富有伸縮性而不澈底的均田制，不能達到均田詔書所提及的要求。

均田制既富有伸縮性，豪富勢家便可充分利用其權力，以滿足一己之慾望，民生問題，當難解決，即政府所希望的地無遺利民無餘力，亦難實現。社會上仍然感到貧富過於不均，而人力與地畝的比例，亦不完全相稱。均田制施行後四年，就有人再提「計口授田」的辦法來補救，魏書卷六〇韓麒麟傳：

太和十一年（487A. D.），京都大饑，麒麟表陳時務曰：……今京師民庶，不田者多，遘食之口，三分居二。蓋一夫不耕，或受其饑，況於今者，動以萬計？今秋京都遇旱，穀價踊貴，實由農人不勤，素無儲積故也。……故令耕者日少，田有荒蕪，穀帛罄於府庫，寶貨盈於市里，衣食匱於室，麗服溢於路，饑寒之本，實在於斯。愚謂凡珍玩之物，皆宜禁斷，吉兇之禮，備為格式，令貴賤有別，民歸樸素。制天下男女計口受田，宰司四時巡行，臺使歲一按檢，勤相勸課，嚴加賞罰。數年之中，必有盈贍，雖遇災兇，免於流亡矣。

計口授田，一方面確實給予有力耕種者以公地，固亦歷來舊制；一方面是驅民歸農，附有強迫耕種的性質；都與均田制有別。

由上討論，對於北魏均田內容，已可瞭然。總括作為結論，可以說：北魏均田制的頒布，係在遷就事實，兼救時弊，如是成為一富有伸縮性而不澈底的空泛法令。實行結

²⁷ 魏書卷八世宗紀：「延昌二年（513A. D.）二月癸卯，定良奴之制，以景明（500—503A. D.）為斷。」自太和九年到延昌三年，必多良丁為豪富勢家奴婢的事實，故有此令。以「景明為斷」者，景明元年距太和九年僅十五年，時代比較相近。

果，則又不免發生事實上困難，而制度本身亦不免引起其他弊病，終於未能解決國計與民生兩大問題。此北魏均田情形，大略如此，為進一步的明瞭起見，仍當研究周齊隋唐的均田制及其異同。

六

北齊在河清三年（564 A. D.），也公布均田法令。受田數目，與北魏稍有不同。據隋書食貨志記載：男夫受口分田八十畝，世業田二十畝，婦人口分田四十畝。奴婢依官品限制多寡，受口分田依良丁。牛一頭，受田六十畝，限止四牛。是知受田數目，大體多於北魏。此外尚有三點，可以特別注意：一是授田的地域分配，一是奴婢的限制方式，一是人民受田的實際，茲分別敘述於次。


1. 授田之地域分配。北齊均田法令，明白指示種族之差異，地域分配，就按照種族決定的。「京城四面諸坊之外，三十里內為公田，受公田者三縣代遷，內執事官一品已下逮於羽林虎賁已上，各有差」²⁸，此京都一帶重要田地，圈定為高齊及胡化漢人親貴所有，原住華人不得染指。「其外畿郡，華人官第一品已下，羽林虎賁已上，各有差」²⁹，也是身仕北齊的華人，所享受的特權，不過次於外族一等而已。至於人民受田在方百里外³⁰，地域更遠，授受亦不確定，分佈情形約如下圖。

外族大批的侵入，當然要在中國境內佔領田地，不過外族由邊境大批移入內地的，非止一次，所以法律承認他們的佔領，或是法律規定他們的田地，也不止一次。此種現象，

²⁸ 隋書卷二四食貨志。

²⁹ 同上。

³⁰ 同上。



在各個民族史上都可見到，並非特例，研究此時期的田制，尤當特別提及，否則田制變化由來，難於完全瞭解。

2. 奴婢數目的限制。奴婢為外族重要資產之一，所以北齊限制奴婢，也是有條件的：一是以官品為標準分別多少；一是僅限受田的奴婢，不受田的，可以自由增減。隋書卷二四食貨志載：

奴婢受田者，親王止三百人，嗣王止二百人。第二品嗣王已下及庶姓王，止一百五十人。正三品已上及王宗，止一百人。七品已上，限止八十人。八品已下至庶人，限止六十人。奴婢限外不給田者，皆不輸。

這點與北魏均田制迥不相同，而使大官僚的田地，也受相當限制，一般豪富，也得以規定數額的奴婢受田。

3. 人民受田的實際。據隋書食貨志記載：「職事及百姓請墾田者，名為受田」。由這兩句的文義中，可以看出北齊時代人民受田的實際情形，完全空泛而不確定。法令規定人民可以受田多少，是法律承認人民有最低限額的田地；也就是說，人民在法律範圍之內，可以開墾或買入多少產業，政府不加干涉，甚至可以依法保護，並不一定由政府直接支

配田地。這點在田制施行上，當很重要，結果北齊均田，亦於百姓無益，杜佑通典卷二田制下引宋孝王關東風俗傳：

其時強弱相陵，恃勢侵奪，富有連畛亘陌，貧無立錫之地。昔漢氏募人徙田，恐遺墾課，令就良美；而齊氏全無斟酌。雖有當年權格，時暫施行，爭地文案有三十不了者，此由授受無法者也。

吏治不良，均田法令，不惟無益於民，且增紛擾，而豪富勢力得以逞其所欲，同書又云：

天保之代（550-559 A.D.），曾遙壓首人田，以充公簿，比武平以後，橫賜諸貴及外戚佞寵之家，亦以盡矣。又河渚山澤，有司耕墾，肥饒之處，悉是豪勢，或借或請，編戶之人，不得一墾。糾賞者，依令口分之外，知有買匿，聽相糾列，還以此地賞之；至有貧人實非贖長買匿者，苟貪錢貨，詐吐壯丁口分，以與糾人，亦既無田，即使逃走。帖荒者，帖荒田七年，熟田五年，錢還地還，依令聽許。……廣占者，依令奴婢請田，亦與良人相似，以無田之良口，比有地之奴牛。宋世良天保中獻書，請以富家牛地，先給貧人，其時朝列，稱其合理。

總論北齊均田，很顯然的注重在分給高齊親貴以大量土地，從制度實情說，又反回到限田的疇範內去。其以官品定奴婢，奴婢定田額，則官高可以多佔，依次等差，又有點類似西晉的官品占田，這種變化，自極重要。

北周田制，比較簡單，凡丁男受百畝，有室者百四十畝，其數目仍和北齊相同³¹。其他史不詳載，亦不另行考訂。

³¹ 隋書卷二四食貨志。

七

隋唐均田，仍跟着北齊規制發展，其最大的差異，即隋唐兩代，不授奴婢以田地。關於此點，或不免有人懷疑：(一)歷朝最成問題的官僚勳貴，隋唐君主難道全不顧及嗎？此問題可以得到正面的答案，隋唐兩代，最注意官僚勳貴，他們都有一定的永業田或世業田³²，最高數目雖不及西晉占田北齊均田多³³，然而總是顧到他們的利益，並且特別重視他們的利益³⁴。(二)豪富和非現役官吏的高門，豈非損及他們的權利？此問題比較難於解答，唐代對於商人限制給田，寬鄉只授普通人半數，狹鄉不授，這是當時輕商政策的表現³⁵，而影響到田制的。另外一個原因，便是專制政治之尖銳化，凡不為國家現役官吏或勳門，田地應受法律的限制，人民要得多量田地，又非向入仕途徑努力不可。這與隋唐時代的科舉制度，政策同，目的同；所謂輕商亦是如此。所以隋唐二代不授奴婢以田地，而代以永業田，又係均田制隨政治而走入另一階級。

隋唐均田，關於人民授田及官吏授田辦法，表列於次，表中並追湖北魏北齊之制，互相比較，俾易明瞭（表三，表四，表五）。

根據下列三表。可知隋唐的均田，都係根據北魏和北齊制度，加以改變而加以整齊劃一。普通人民受田的差別：(一)北齊和隋婦人可以受田，唐代則否。(二)北齊庶人有奴婢可以

³² 隋唐依官品授永業田，或世業田，即由北齊以官品限奴婢以奴婢限田地蛻變而來。

³³ 參閱頁二四二表四。

³⁴ 唐天寶十一年(752A. D.)特許官吏累計勳蔭占田，見冊府元龜卷四九五詔書。又均田破壞，官吏永業田，仍然照授，見新唐書食貨志。

³⁵ 新唐書食貨志。

表三 唐均田制略表* (附北齊及隋田制)

		唐					北齊				隋				
田地數額		丁男	中男	老幼	篤疾	老妻寡妾	黃小老	寡篤疾	當戶者	丁男	婦人	奴	婢	丁男	婦人
	口分(畝)	80	80	40	30			30		80	40	80	40	80	40
	永業(畝)	20	20					20		20				20	
授田規定	時日	若應收之田皆起十月里正勸造簿歷十一月縣令親自給授十二月內畢													
	地域	諸給口分田務從便近不得隔越若因州縣改隸地入他境者聽依舊受													
	寬狹	諸狹鄉田不足者聽於寬鄉遷受													
	貧富	授田先貧及有課役者													
	職業	工商為業者永業口分田各減半給之在狹鄉者並不給													
	地權	諸庶人有此身死家貧無以供葬者聽賣永業田即流移者亦如之樂遷就寬鄉者并聽賣口分諸買地者不得過本制其實者不更請													
	處分	(一) 諸佔田過限者一畝答十 (三) 諸里正依令授人田課農桑若應受而不授應還而不收應課而不課如此事類違法者失一事答四十													

* 此表根據通典冊府元龜唐六典唐律疏義編成。大致係開元二十五年所頒。武德田制與開元田制當有小異，如田地買賣，永徽及開元二十三年均在禁止之列，開元二十五年始有此規定。兩唐書食貨志唐會要未詳年代，通典冊府元龜則載開元二十五年所頒田制，故從之。又通典及冊府元龜均誤寡妻當戶者口分三十畝為二十，茲據唐戶籍簿輯叢改正。

表四 唐代官貴永業田定額表* (北齊及隋附)

唐		隋		北齊	
品 位	畝 數	品 位	畝 數	品 位	田地最高額
親王	10000	諸王	10000	親 王	24000
正一品 職事官	6000			嗣 王	16000
郡王及從 一品職官	5000				
國公及正 二品職官	4000			二品以下 王及庶	1200
郡公及從 二品職官	3500				
縣公及正 三品職官	2500			三品已 上及王 宗	8000
從三品 職事官	2000				
侯及正四 品職事官	1400			七 品 已 上	6400
伯及從四 品職事官	1000				
子及正五 品職事官	800				
男及從五 品職事官	500				
六品七品	250				
八品九品	200			八品已 下	4800
庶 人	20	庶 人	20	庶 人	4800

* 北齊田地最高額，係按男奴最高口數乘應受田數而得，若奴婢合計，當少於此。又奴婢受田應計入口分之內，然受田之後，實同永業，故附於此，以示法律上承認受田額數之高。

表五 唐內外官職分田定額表* (北魏附)

唐			北 魏		
京 官 畝 數		外 官 畝 數		外 官 畝 數	
一 品	1200	一 品		刺 史	1500
二 品	1000	二 品	1200	太 守	1000
三 品	900	三 品	1000	治中別駕	800
四 品	700	四 品	800	縣令縣丞	600
五 品	600	五 品	700		
六 品	400	六 品	500		
七 品	350	七 品	400		
八 品	250	八 品	300		
九 品	200	九 品	250		

* 隋有職分田，其制未詳。

受田，隋唐則否。可知對於庶民限制，是愈來愈嚴。官貴受田有永業職分之差，但職分相當於口分，其制與民無異。除此之外，尚有勳田³⁶，勳田雖不與永業田並給，但可從多受田，即不仕亦可繼續佔有，亦達官貴人佔領大量田地法律根據之一³⁷，處處都是對官僚限制愈來愈寬的表現³⁸。

均田在隋唐，仍然未能達到制度所期望的目標，其困難有三：

1. 人口之分佈難均。田制中雖有寬狹鄉之分，但狹鄉

³⁶ 新唐書食貨志：「上柱國三十頃，柱國二十五頃，上護軍二十頃，護軍十五頃，上輕車都尉十頃，輕車都尉七頃，上騎都尉六頃，騎都尉四頃，駉騎尉飛騎尉各八十畝，雲騎尉武騎尉各六十畝。……有官爵及勳者惟從多，不並給」。

³⁷ 勳田多未全授，見食貨半月刊卷四期五，唐戶籍簿叢輯。

³⁸ 冊府元龜卷四九五天寶十一載詔書。

表六 唐開元天寶戶籍殘卷授田統計表*

戶主	戶數	口數	應授田數	已授田數	應分田數	已分田數	應授世業田數	已授世業田數	應勸田數	已勸田數	買田數
□常	1	2	80	28	60	8	20	20			
□張	1	2	130	17	110	0	20	17			
□文	1	3	230	75	190	35	40	40			
□□	1	12	340	70	280	10	60	60			
□□	1	1	100	36	80	16	20	20			
□王	1	2	100	10	80	0	20	10			
□曹	1	2	150	50	130	30	20	20			
□曹	1	13	360	61	300	1	60	60			
□劉	1	8	50	44	50	44	0	0			
□陰	1	7	160	67	140	47	20	20			
□徐	1	1	50	0	30	0	20	0			
□程	1	6	260	47	220	7	40	40			
□程	1	6	110	30	90	10	20	20			
□程	1	17	360	78	300	18	60	60			
□程	1	13	150	64	110	15	40	40			
□程	1	8	50	31	30	0	20	17			9
□程	1	12	3100	81	80	61	20	20	3000		0
□程	1	8	160	67	80	47	20	20	60		0
□程	1	16	180	91	80	71	20	20	80		
□程	1	1	50	0	30	0	20	0			
□令	1	2	50	7	30	0	20	7			
□杜	1	12	3420	76	309	16	60	60	3060		
□懷	1	12	180	40	140	0	40	40			
□恩	1	12	230	99	190	47	40	40			12
□鄭	1	9	230	57	190	7	40	40			10
□□	1	18	100	6	80	0	20	6			
總數	26	205	10380	1232	9600	490	780	697	6200	33	12
每戶平均田數			399	47.4							
每口平均田數			50.6	6							

* 此表根據食貨半月刊第四卷第五期，唐戶籍簿業輯頁 0195—0208 頁編成。戶籍簿多屬隴右道甘州瓜州等地，不限一鄉，也不限於同一時代。但此殘卷為偶然遺留，輯印也非經過選擇。如果我們假定當日戶籍的變動不大（其實變遷極少，官吏因循敷衍大抵因襲前文而已）便可以作為統計，代表授田的一般情形。（至少隴右道一方面的授田規制，能讓我們明瞭一個大概）材料缺乏，求備殊不可能，這當然是不得已的辦法。計算的結果，每戶平均已授田數為47.4畝，此點與實在情形相去必不甚遠，此可斷言。（參閱通典田制）。但每戶平均應授田數為399畝，似乎不合實情，其原因乃由材料關係。按此表26戶中有二戶為上柱國勳，合授田6000畝，唐代授勳雖濫，亦不致十三戶中有一戶為上柱國勳，所根據材料既為偶然遺留與輯印，則此勳戶之收斂，也算是偶然。假定此二十六戶中無此勳戶，亦即二十六戶田地中，不包涵如此巨量勳田，依此計算，則每戶平均應授田數，為168畝，與當日全國人口田地統

亦知此表數字，尚有幾分可靠程度。

表中數字悉依原本。原本錯誤今改正者：①頁 0196 上行 2，三十三畝為五十三畝之誤。②頁 0201 下行 4，三十八畝為三十畝之誤。③頁 0206 上行 5，三三二五畝為三四二五畝之誤。④頁 0198 下行 10，卅為冊之誤。其他誤冊為卅者甚多，不具錄。原本殘缺今據補者：①頁 0196 上口數為 2，其田為 $50+30=80$ 畝。②頁 0197 上口數為 12，其田為 $(100 \times 2)+50+(30 \times 3)=344$ 畝。③頁 0197 上，口數為 1，其田為 100 畝。④頁 0199 下，應漏亡兄寡妻一口，其田為 $(100 \times 3)+(30 \times 2)=360$ 畝。⑤頁 0206 下，口數為 12，其田為 $50+100+30=180$ 畝。⑥頁 0208 上，口數為 9，其田為 $(100 \times 2)+30=230$ 畝。⑦頁 0208 上，口數為 18，其田為 100 畝。原本列入園宅畝數，今未計入，寮戶二亦刪去。

以人口過多，田地過少，往往不給。隋時京輔及三河之地，有的一丁才得二十畝³⁹；唐時關中之地，亦有一丁才得三十畝者⁴⁰，隴右一帶，也只是受足永業的多，能足口分田的，幾無一戶（見表六），這與應受田額，相去太遠。本來狹鄉人民可徙寬鄉，但因兵役關係，不讓人民自由遷徙，以免妨及徭役，結果無田的人與逃戶，相映成趣，形成社會不斷的紛擾⁴¹。這是由於地理關係而加上政治因素，影響隋唐均田，所以隋開皇中墾田雖多，而感田地不足⁴²，唐開元中剝田州亦不減三四十州，仍然有少多不得耕地⁴³，可見地域之

³⁹ 通典卷二，開皇十二年文帝以天下戶口歲增，京輔及三河地少而入衆，議者咸欲徙就寬鄉。帝乃發使四出，均天下之田，其狹鄉纔至二十畝，老小又少焉。

⁴⁰ 冊府元龜卷一一三帝王部，貞觀十八年帝幸靈口，村落偏側，問其受田，丁三十畝。遂夜分而寢，憂其不給，詔雍州錄允少田，並給復移之于寬鄉。

⁴¹ 新唐書卷一九一崔善為傳，太宗貞觀九年，朝議戶數之處，聽徙寬鄉，陝州刺史崔善為上表曰：「畿內之民是謂戶殷，丁壯之人悉入軍府，若總移轉，便出關外，此則虛近實遠」。後李嶠上言，以為徙增逃戶之數不便，見唐會要卷八五逃戶。

⁴² 通典卷二，隋開皇九年墾田千九百四十萬四千二百六十頃，每戶二頃餘。又大業中墾田五千五百八十五萬四千四十一頃，每戶各得五頃。此種數目，當難盡信，然墾田必多，大致亦可窺見。

⁴³ 冊府元龜卷四九五邦計部，開元十八年宣州刺史裴耀卿奏：竊計剝田者不減三四十州，取其剝田通融支給，……棄地畫作公田，狹鄉總移寬處。

分配，亦非易事。

2. 豪富勢家之兼并。豪富勢家之兼并，比地理原因，更為重要，往往制度推行未久，豪富勢家即設法因緣為姦，而發展亦被阻止。隋開皇中遣使四出均田，但大業中，又下均田詔令，顯然是均田已被破壞⁴⁴。唐代情形，也是如此，其造成此兼并之主因有四：(一)利用政治勢力，侵佔田地，例如太宗時澤州前後刺史張長貴趙士達，並占境內膏腴之田數十頃⁴⁵；其後肅宗時涇州大將焦令謨，也取人田自占，仍給貧民耕種，取其半租⁴⁶；此種事件，如果遇着賢明官長，還可以利用政治勢力去摧抑，否則便無辦法，但我們所見的賢明長官，確是太少，而兼并之徒，實在太多⁴⁷。(二)利用資財，廣事兼并，此以富商大賈為多⁴⁸，本來均田不得買賣，永徽開元，又兩次重申舊令⁴⁹，然而買賣之事，仍然很多，到開元二十五年再定田制，便也允許有限度的買賣，如是貧人失業，豪富兼并，而均田之制，即無法維持。(三)官吏因循敷衍，致事業難施。執行授田的屬於田曹司田參軍和縣令，而他們最重要的職責，便是戶籍和田籍清查，和田地之公平分配。但唐自開元以後，戶籍失實，官吏以舊文呈報了事，因此人戶存亡，田畝轉換，政府根本即不知之，那由按法還授⁵⁰？此其一。分配不均和分配不得其當，也是推行均田

⁴⁴ 隋書卷三場帝紀上大業五年詔天下均田。

⁴⁵ 舊唐書卷五八長孫順德傳。

⁴⁶ 白孔六帖卷八一田訟。

⁴⁷ 舊唐書賈敦頤傳，永徽中洛多豪右，占田驗制，敦頤舉沒三千頃餘賦貧民。參閱冊府元龜卷四九五天寶十一載詔書。

⁴⁸ 白孔六帖卷八一田制牛僧孺策，此亦一向情形如此。

⁴⁹ 新唐書食貨志及冊府元龜卷四九五邦計部。

⁵⁰ 唐會要卷八三：「楊炎上疏曰：……至開元中玄宗修道德以寬仁為治本，故不為版籍之書。人戶寢溢，隄防不禁。丁口轉死，非舊名矣；田畝轉換，非舊額矣；貧富升降，非舊第矣。戶部徒以空文總其故書，非得當時之實。」

大阻碍，而唐代又確有如此情形⁵¹，此其二。四賦稅過重，人民不願耕田。唐代授田，多不足額，多少既異，而所出賦稅相同，到不能負擔時，只有逃亡⁵²，開元中，「戶版凋隱，人多去本，浮食閭里，詭脫徭賦，豪弱相併，州縣莫能制」⁵³，以是匿戶羨田極多，亦可窺見一斑。由上四個原因，促成豪強兼併，而豪強兼併結果，則為一班無田可耕之人，託庇於豪強之下，受其剝削⁵⁴。大抵兼併之風愈盛，則一般人民受田之數愈少，本來的自耕農，也就變成佃農了⁵⁵。

八

漢唐間田制，除屯田課田等當另論外，見諸法令的，只是上述幾種。制度方面，略予分析以後，對於個別情形，當可有幾分明瞭。但是有了個別的認識，如果不進一步的尋求各個的連繫，便有使我們感到頭緒紛繁，而不能得到演變概要的不便。

⁵¹ 白孔六帖卷八○公田：「元稹奏均田狀云：或有隔越之村，被配一畝二畝之者，或有身居市井，亦今虛頭出稅之者。」

⁵² 唐之租庸調法，租為二石，但受田不足額的人，也須交納二石，與受田較多的人相比，負擔輕重，分別甚大。唐戶籍簿輯叢內有一戶受田十畝，不足額九十畝，亦附注云納租二石，其情形可想見。

⁵³ 唐書卷一三四宇文融傳。

⁵⁴ 新唐書卷一五三段秀實傳：「初秀實為營田官，暹大將焦令謩取人田自占，給與農，約熟歸其半。是歲大旱，農告無入，令謩曰：我知入不知旱也。責之急，農無以償，往訴秀實。……」

⁵⁵ 隋時已有民田不贖現象，隋書卷四○王誼傳「太常卿蘇威立議；以為戶口滋多，民田不贖，欲減功官之地以給民」，即其一例。唐代民田亦少，如表六所示，每戶均受田僅四十七畝。隴右尚非人口極稠之區，而少如此，一因官地所佔多，一即豪強兼併。每戶田雖少，或當另行佃種，熾煌撰項中集：「大阿龍前錄業簿，夫主早喪，有男義成，先蒙大王世上，身着瓜州，所有多少屋舍，先向出賣與人。只殘宜秋口分田二十畝。……分付兄懷義佃種，」如佃種當極通行。

表七 秦漢隋唐間田制演變略表*

田 制		朝代及頒布時期	田地數額之規定		多佔田地數額之標準	
			最低額 (畝)	最高額 (畝)		
第一期	名田	秦國 (孝公三年 593B. C.)	(未詳)	(未詳)	官 爵	名田宅以家次 家男口不盈八田不得過一井
	限田	西漢 (綏和二 年 7B. C.)	(未限定)	3000	(未定)	
	井田	新 (始建國元 年 9A. D.)	900	① 900 ② (多於一井)	人 口	
	占田	西晉 (太康元 年? 280A. D.)	100	5000	官 品	
第二期	均田	北魏 (太和九 年 485A. D.)	140○	(未限定)	人 口	以奴婢為主要準則 且無限數 以官品定奴婢數以 奴婢定田地數
	均田	北齊 (河清三 年 564A. D.)	140△	24000	官 品	
	均田	北周 ()	140	10000	官 品	
	均田	隋 ()	140	10000	官 品	
	均田	唐 (開元二五 年 737A. D.)	100	10000	官、品	

- * 地數額之規定，兩漢及新原係以戶為單位。西晉至唐原係以口為單位。此表均以戶計算，如原規定為口，則以一夫一婦為一戶，藉供比較。
- 北魏露田，男丁 40 畝，婦人 20 畝，但均加倍授田，即一夫一婦得 120 畝。再加桑田 20 畝，共得 140 畝。
- △ 北齊庶人亦有奴婢，如有奴婢而受田，則最低額不止此數，參閱表四。

田制演變，自有其必然線索，尋求線索的方式有二：一是內在的，從制度本身出發；一是外在的，從政治社會各方面起始。本文既已對田制分別敘述，即由制度本身着手，而推及於政治社會各方面。關於田制比較，略如表七所示，演變情形，亦可根據此表，加以討論。

表中所列田地數額規定，因各朝所取單位——或口或戶——不同，故不能嚴格從數字討論，僅能指示出一個大概情形，參閱所附注文即知。本文所要注意的，是第一期和第二

期田制內容的分辨，以及第一期和第二期轉變的主要趨向。兩時期的田制，數額等級與標準，都由人口進到官品，這種同一之點，當非偶然的。同樣，第二期的人口成分，包涵「奴」「良」兩種，外表上與第一期似不相同，這種差異，當亦有其內在的因素。

最初的均田制，包涵奴婢受田的規定，係便利一班外族和身仕外族的華人吸收大量土地，前面已略述及。類似的現象，在後來歷史上，仍然可以見到，如金如清，都庇護本族人領占民地，且容許其擁有奴婢爲之耕種⁵⁶。所取方式，雖不盡同，要可示其一貫的策略，中國既歷代遭遇外族內侵，外族內侵，對於田制的影響，自不能不予注意。

田制的演變，都歸結於依照官品節級制田，這在官僚政治興盛時期，固毋足怪。各朝頒布的土地法令，本不過已成事實之承認，而限制將來過度集中之流弊，仍可說是一種協調和漸革的辦法，應不致再有阻撓。然而田制的破壞，多由官吏或與官吏有關的豪家爲多。西漢限田，爲貴幸不滿而停止進行；西晉占田，北魏均田，也看到大小官僚和親貴的廣佔園田；隋唐情形，大抵亦同，因此各朝的田制，更不能不顧到官僚集團的利益，唐代特允官吏和親貴累計勳蔭，頗足爲此點之有力證明，茲節錄詔令原文，以供參考⁵⁷。

天寶十一載十一月乙丑，詔曰：周有均土之宜，漢存墾田之法，將欲明其經界，定其等威，食祿之家，無廣擅於山澤，貿遷之伍，罕爭利於農收，則歲有豐穰，人無胥怨，永言致理，何莫繇茲。如聞王公百官，及富豪之家，比置莊田，恣行吞併，莫懼章程。借荒者皆有熟

⁵⁶ 參閱萬國鼎先生中國田制史，頁三五二至三六二。及尚希聖先生滿族未入關前的俘虜與降人（食貨半月刊卷二期一二）。

⁵⁷ 冊府元龜卷五四九邦計部。

田，因之侵奪；置牧者唯指山谷，不限多少，爰及口分永業，違法賣買，或改籍書，或云典貼。致令百姓，無處安置，乃別停客戶，使其停食，既奪居人之業，實生浮惰之端，遠近皆然，因循亦久，不有釐革，為弊慮深。其王公百官勳蔭等家，應置莊田，不得踰於式令，仍更從寬典，務使弘通，其有同籍周眷以上親俱有勳蔭者，每人占地頃畝，任其累計某蔭外，有餘如舊是無勳蔭地合賣者，先用鐵買得，不可官收，限勅到百日內，容其轉賣。其先不合蔭，又蔭外請射，兼借荒及無馬置牧地之內並從合蔭者，並不在占限，……

農業社會中，土地佔有，最為重要，舍此亦難以致富。然佔有土地，宜於權勢兼備，故入仕又為致富捷徑，中國歷史中，誠不乏清廉官吏，但貪污總難絕跡，尤其中央政治機構運用不靈的時候，更易因緣為姦，上例亦可代表一般。

豪富勢家，在於多佔田地，政府也是如此，關於此點，我們不能不轉到財政問題討論。當日政府大部分收入是田租口賦或戶口稅，而商品稅收，則為數甚少，所以政府的財政出路，在於如何增加田賦或戶口稅的收入，然而增加收入，並非增賦或加稅，全在保護小農，安定農村，如是小農所能耕種的田地，政府不能不予以法律的承認，這與依照官品依次制田以穩定政治機構，同為歷朝田制——妥協調和及漸革的田制——產生之兩大主因。只是調和終難維持長久的效力，也就影響到土地問題，農村問題，財政問題。在此情勢之下，政府便非另謀財政上之救濟不可。

談到政府的財政補救方略，又不能不略述財政困難的所在。漢唐間中央政府支出，除皇家私用外，辦公費和官俸兵餉，均佔重要部份；地方支出，則辦公費與官俸兩種較多。此等支出中最感困難的，要算兵餉，每當戰事發生，籌辦軍

表八 唐開元中諸道屯數表*

道名	地名及屯數	總數
關內	北使 2 鹽州 4 太原 1 長春 10 單于 31 定遠 40 東城 45 西城 25 勝州 14 會州 5 鹽池 4 夏州 2 豐安 27 中城 41	251
河東	大同 40 橫野 42 雲州 37 朔州 3 蔚州 3 嵐州 1 蒲州 5	131
劍南	舊州 8 松州 1	9
河北	(幽州至渝關)	208
河南	(陳州至壽州)	107
隴右	(渭州至西使)	172
河西	(赤水至天山)	156
諸道總數		1034

- * 1. 此表根據玉海卷一七七食貨九田部引六典。
 2. 關內道數原作258，今從各地總數為251。
 3. 玉海注云，「河西隴右260屯」，但六典數為328，今從六典。
 4. 六典諸道總數為 992，唐志亦如此。但總合各道計算之，應為1034，疑後來增置。

費極不容易，即邊防固定的常備軍，歷朝也感難於給養，這可說是一種普遍的現象。次則官俸，官俸的高低，數目的多少，各朝不同；但機關增加，官員增加，則為通例。開支既增，如收入不多，官俸也就成為財政上一大難題。綜此二端，均各朝財政努力改善的兩大目標，然其方式，除賦稅整理外，都有趨於國營農業的趨勢。

農業國營或公營，歷朝都認為解決財政或解決財政某一部份問題的最善方法，因此官地也特別多。雖有時政府不自經營，給民耕種，然而不曾完全放棄國營或公營農業的方略。自漢以來，政府即漸次握得大量田地，始終成為一個大地主，這與官品制田同為此時社會——工商業不發達而停滯

表九 唐天寶八年諸屯收穀概數表*

道 名	開元中設屯約數	天寶八年收入屯穀石數
關 內	251	563810
隴 右	172	440902
河 北	208	403280
河 西	156	268008
河 東	131	245880
總 數	918	1921880

- * 1. 此表根據通典卷二食貨及玉海引六典作成。通典總數作1913960石，疑計算或傳寫之誤。
2. 設屯約數，係開元中數目，後來不免有變更，故僅能指示大概情形。
3. 表八河南道有107屯，開元二十五年撤廢，劍南道情形不詳。

於簡陋的農業——的必然發展。為明瞭社會變化的趨勢起見，對漢以後的屯田課田，北魏以後的職分田，和隋以後的公廩田，仍須簡略的加以說明。

自漢至唐，屯田的發展，可分三方面；(一)自地域言之，由邊境而發展至內地⁵⁸（表八）；(二)自勞力言之，由兵卒而奴婢，更及於百姓⁵⁹；(三)自數量言之，由狹小區域而至於大規模的設置（表八）⁶⁰。王應麟云：「漢文帝募民耕塞下，已有屯田之說，武帝屯渠梨，始有屯田之規。成於昭宣，廣於魏晉，而極盛於唐」⁶¹。此語極為中肯，唐天寶中，屯田

⁵⁸ 宋書州郡志有由屯改縣之例，又魏書食貨志：「又別立農官，取州郡戶十分之一，以為屯民，相水陸之宜，斷頃畝之數，……尋施行焉」。

⁵⁹ 晉書食貨志，魏書食貨志，及新唐書食貨志。

⁶⁰ 玉海卷一七七。

⁶¹ 同上。

略減，其歲收穀仍有百九十餘萬石，（表九）依度支總收穀二千五百餘萬石計算，約為十二分之一，從整個的收入上講，數目仍然甚大。⁶²

課田為官營農業之另一方式，其收入或屬中央，或分屬地方，各朝情形不同。漢時已有課田，中央與地方均曾施行⁶³，到魏晉時更為普遍⁶⁴。田農既廣，因是成為政府大宗收入之一。北魏時始有職分田⁶⁵，隋唐因之未廢，（表五）且增設公廩田，以給公費，職分田與公廩田都可說是擴大而且確定的課田制度⁶⁶。由於這一類官田的收入，對於國家財政——無論中央或地方——，必有相當補助；同時官田的增加，更可以昭示歷代政府佔領的土地，未嘗稍減，地主既係政府，固無論屬於中央或地方。

由上討論，可以看到國家為地主，國家所屬的機關，也節級的成為大地主。官員和豪富亦然，大小官員或豪富勢家，亦多為大小地主，而有享受等差田數的權益。這種半封建式的經濟機構組成以後，普通人民，便只能從小量地畝中分得一點耕地，否則必至託庇在大地主之下，甚者至於傭耕中討生活亦不可能⁶⁷。一向被人歌頌的幾種田制，其實情不過如此，我們如果將其分析而加以綜合的透視，或不至重作復古迷夢而知有所鑒戒。

民國二十六年二月十日

⁶² 通典卷六食貨六賦稅下。


⁶³ 漢書食貨志：「農官往往即郡縣比沒入田田之」。又後漢書卷一一〇上黃香傳：「延平元年，遷魏郡太守。郡舊有內外園田，常與人分種，收穀歲數千斛，……乃悉以賦人，課令耕種」。

⁶⁴ 晉書食貨志及三國志鄧艾傳。

⁶⁵ 通典卷二食貨二田制下。

⁶⁶ 作者另有漢中國歷代之官田一文，茲不贅。

⁶⁷ 翻閱唐戶簿叢料，即知民田界限，多在官田之中，其他各地，類此者必多。關於此點，萬國鼎先生中國田制史頁二〇二至二一六，請參閱。



中唐以後稅制與南朝稅制之關係

楊聯陞

本文原發表於清華學報第十二卷第三期，民國二十六年。

唐初田制爲均田，稅制爲租庸調，租庸調基於均田制而二者皆襲自北朝，此向來學者之所習知。中唐以降，田制大壞，兼併盛行，租庸調一變而爲兩稅。兩稅之前身，乃出於先是已有之戶稅地稅與青苗錢，此晚近學者之所昌言。然竊意研討唐後半期之稅制，不宜專重兩稅本身。蓋茲法雖云兩稅之外不取一錢，實只爲人丁田畝賦稅之簡單化。唐之財政殊非專此所能維持，是以雜征衆歛，旋即繁興。併合觀之，仍是複雜稅制。今所欲說明者，此複雜稅制，與南朝稅制頗多相似之點。歸納言之，大端凡二：一曰多以資產定稅，二曰多取諸農業以外之工商諸業。

南朝稅制，史無專篇。近人之研究經濟史者，率亦闕置不論。今試就瑣屑史文，鈎稽概貌。根本上可注意者，即南朝絕無均田制，用是，不能專重對於人戶之課稅，而稅目遂甚夥頤。其中若宋孝武大明五年制天下民戶歲輸布四匹（宋書卷二孝武帝本紀，通典卷四）與梁武帝天監元年詔勿收逋布口錢（梁書卷二武帝紀），此布與錢之徵收，顯是以人戶

爲本。顧無人人有田之理論（均田制大半只爲理論）爲之基礎，則稅率或非過巨。此外南朝有所謂三調，蓋又稱三課，衆調，屢見於蠲免之詔書。三調之目不詳，通鑑卷一三八胡注曰：「三調謂調粟調帛及雜調也」，言之鑿鑿，宜當可信。三調或是計人爲輸，其輕重已不可知，但蠲免常限於下貧及尤貧之家，推知此於富者或非甚重之負擔也。南朝諸稅目中，最爲論者所痛心反對之法，厥惟自宋已有之資產稅。

宋孝武之初，周朗上言：

又取稅之法，宜計人爲輸，不宜以貲。云何？使富者不盡，貧者不蠲。乃今桑長一尺，圍以爲價；田進一畝，度以爲錢；屋不得瓦，皆責貲實。民以此樹不敢種，土畏妄墾，棟焚榱露，不敢加泥。豈有剝善害民禁衣惡食若此者。方今若重斯農，則宜務削茲法。（宋書卷八十二周朗傳）

此與陸贄反對兩稅之疏若合符節。贄之言曰：

先王之制賦入也，必以丁夫爲本。……兩稅之立則異於斯。唯以資產爲宗，不以丁身爲本。資產少者則其稅少，資產多者則其稅多。曾不悟資產之中，事情不一，有藏於襟懷囊篋，物雖貴而人莫能窺；有積於場圃屯倉，直雖輕而衆以爲富。有流通蕃息之貨，數雖寡而計日收贏；有廬舍無用之資，價雖高而終歲無利。一概計估算緡，宜其失平長僞。由是務輕費而樂轉徙者，恆脫於徭稅；敦本業而樹居產者，每困於徵求。此乃誘之爲姦，毆之避役。閭井不得不殘，賦入不得不闕。（陸宣公集卷二十二）

二君皆謂資產定稅，不利農業，遂以爲崇末抑本。實則政府於困迫之際，惟望收入之豐，於農商諸業，初未必有軒輊之念。二君言非時宜，自難見用。代宋之齊，一仍舊貫。

竟陵王子良，復奏陳其弊曰：

三吳奧區，地惟河輔。百度所資，罕不自出。宜在蠲優，使其全富。而守宰相繼，務在哀剋。圍桑品屋，以准資課。致令斬樹發瓦，以充重賦。破民財產，要利一時。（南齊書卷四十竟陵文宣王子良傳）

明帝亦僅「詔所在結課屋宅田桑，可詳減舊價」（南齊書卷六明帝紀），利之所在，未能廢也。

歷梁至陳，沿而不改。陳後主詔：「其有新闢墾畝，進墾蒿萊，廣袤勿得度量，征租悉皆停免。」（陳書卷六後主紀）舊墾田地，似仍不得免稅。

唐之兩稅，定以資產，已如宣公所論。後增雜稅，如建中四年始稅間架，屋兩架爲一間，上價間稅二千，中價一千，下價五百，與南朝之圍桑品屋，尤有虎賁之似。間架稅蓋亦甚重之擔負，是以涇原兵變，叛者乃以不奪汝商貨儼質不稅汝間架除陌爲安撫百姓之口號。資產定稅，在南朝與唐後期同爲重要之國入，從可知矣。

至於對農業以外諸業課稅之多，尤爲南朝稅制之特色。前論當時政府殊少崇抑本末之念，此亦足相發明，蓋工商之稅殊不下於農田也。南朝之交易稅通過稅等，詳記於隋書食貨志：

晉自過江，凡貨賣奴婢馬牛田宅，有文券，率錢一萬，輸估四百入官，賣者三百，買者一百。無文券者，隨物所堪，亦百分收四，名曰散沽。歲宋齊梁陳如此以爲常。以人競商販，不爲田業，故使均輸，欲爲懲勸。雖以此爲辭，其實利在侵削。

又都西有石頭津，東有方山津。各置津主人，賊曹一人，直水五人，以檢察禁物及亡叛者。其荻炭魚薪之類過津者，並十分稅一，以入官。其東路無禁貨，故方山

津檢察甚簡。

淮北大市百餘，小市十餘所。大市備置官司。稅斂既重，時甚苦之。

津稅收入，爲數頗巨。如南齊褚炫「罷江夏還，得錢十七萬於石頭」（南齊書卷三十二褚炫傳），此與當時「廣州刺史，但經城門一過便得三千萬」（南齊書卷三十二王琨傳）雖尚不足相擬。而炫自處甚廉，且所得乃爲餽饈，正式稅入，當必若干倍此。

南齊以其時由中原至建康者皆道壽春至采石渡江，故於其地置津徵稅，是爲南津，亦曰南州津。此津取稅當亦甚重，故有商舶交通豪人大吏以圖免稅者。如南齊荀伯玉「度絲綿與崑崙舶營貨，輒使傳令防送過南州津」（南齊延卷三十一荀伯玉傳）。

宋後廢帝時，尚書虞玩之表陳時事曰：

民荒財單，不及曩日。而國度引廢，四倍元嘉。二衛臺坊，人力五不餘一；都水材官，朽散十不兩存。備豫都庫，材竹俱盡，東西二塢、埽瓦雙匱。敕令給賜，悉仰交市。（宋書卷九後廢帝本紀）

末二語足見商稅在國入上之重要。

唐之除陌錢，稅商賈，正與南朝之散沽津稅相當，亦涇原叛衆之列入口號者也。稅商賈，依唐會要（卷八十四），始於建中元年，用趙贊條奏，諸道於津要都會置吏，閱商人財貨，計錢每貫稅二十文。然依通典，則肅宗時舉行強迫公債之後，已有稅商之法：

自天寶末年，盜賊奔突，克復之後，府庫一空。又所在屯師，用度不足，於是遣御史康雲開出江淮，陶銳往蜀漢，豪商富戶，皆籍其家資所有財貨畜產，或五分納一，謂之率貨。所收巨萬，蓋權時之宜。其後諸道節度

使觀察使，多率稅商賈以充軍資雜用，或於津濟要路及市肆間交易之處，計錢至一千以上，皆以分數稅之。

（通典卷十一註）

此稅商賈似是資產稅或通過稅，除陌法則是交易稅無疑。除陌法者，天下公私給與賚易，率一貫舊算二十，建中四年，「益加算爲五十。給與他物，或兩換者，約錢爲率算之。市牙各給印紙，人有買賣，隨自署記，翌日，合算之。有自貿易不用市牙者，給其私簿，無私簿者，投狀自集。」（唐會要卷八十四）此一貫算二十，若徵之於買賣雙方，則合爲四十與南朝散沽之一萬輸四百者其率正同。徵五十則合爲一百，恰應除陌之義。然此種解釋，史文未有明徵，不敢必也。

南朝雖有酒租，地位似不重要。唐則於鹽鐵茶酒，或榷或稅。而鹽利尤豐，大曆之末，歲入已六百餘萬，「天下之賦，鹽利居半，宮闈服御，軍饗，百官祿俸，皆仰給焉。」（唐書卷五十三食貨志）此亦勅令給賜悉仰交市之變相也。

上引通典記肅宗時有所謂「率貨」乃於軍國急需之頃，向富人舉行強迫公債。此種政策，亦正仿自南朝。宋元嘉二十七年，後魏南侵，軍旅大起，用度不充，乃詔揚南徐兗江四州富有之家，貲滿五十萬，僧尼滿二十萬者，並四分借一，過此率計，事息即還。（通典卷十一，宋書卷九十五索虜傳同）肅宗不過改四分借一爲五分借一而已。唐之仿此，不止一度。建中三年之括富商錢，其道正復相類，惟成績殊劣：

時兩河用兵，月費百餘萬緡。府庫不支數月。太常博士韋都賓陳京建議，以爲貨利所聚，皆在富商。請括富商錢，出萬緡者，借其餘以供軍。……上從之。甲子，詔借商人錢，令度支條上。判度支杜佑，大索長安中商賈

所有貨，意其不實，輒加榜捶。人不勝苦，有縊死者。長安囂然，如被寇盜。計所得纔八十餘萬緡。（通鑑卷二二七）

此等雖屬臨時收入，卻有合於稅富稅商之整個精神。

如上所述，以資產定稅與多稅工商等業，皆兩朝稅制共有之特徵。除陌借商諸端，尤顯有模仿之痕跡。本乎此，則吾人謂中唐以後之複雜稅制，淵源遠在南朝，應屬不誤。由租庸調時期變入兩稅法時期，正是由仿北朝時期變為仿南朝時期也。

此結論似屬新穎。然苟承認一代之稅制必根據於其時之一般經濟情況，則二者之相似正在意中。吾人咸知南北朝經濟有一大區別，即北朝專主農業，而南朝工商並盛。大唐統一之後，政治上得較長時期之安定，工商諸業，突飛猛晉，全國經濟情況，漸變為南朝社會之放大。此諸新興之企業者，既具有甚大之納稅能力，在財政上有需要時，自為不能放過之稅源。而艱困之際，尤不得不多取之於富人。雖大唐為混一之世而南朝為偏安之局，僅政令所及之遠近有殊，政令之基本性質，原應無大差異也。


The Controversy over Grain
Conveyance During the
Reign of Qubilai Qaqa, 1260-94

by
Jung-pang Lo

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One of the first and most pressing problems to confront Qubilai, after his election as khan in 1260, was the problem of food supply for the military and civilian population of the imperial capital. This was a problem which had plagued rulers of China long before the coming of the Mongols, ever since the rise of the lower Yangtze area as the economic center of China. During the Sui, T'ang and Northern Sung periods, a fairly adequate solution had been found in a system of waterways which, running in a northwesterly direction, carried food supplies to the nation's capitals, located far inland. This system of waterways became the lifeline of China for over five centuries.¹ But, when Qubilai

¹ Cf. Ch'üan Han-sheng 全漢昇, *T'ang Sung ti-kuo yü yü-n-ho* 唐宋帝國與運河 (The T'ang and Sung Empires and the Canal), (Nanking, 1947), *passim*.



Qaqan established his administrative headquarters at the northern corner of the great Yellow Plain close by the sea, food supply again became an urgent problem and new solutions had to be found.

Qubilai's first capital, Shang-tu, situated on the edge of the Gobi Desert, could be supplied only by food carried overland by carts and packed cattle. The difficulty of transportation was one of the reasons which obliged the khan to transfer part of his government to the old Chin capital of Yen-ching in 1264. The population of the auxiliary capital immediately grew. A few years later when Marco Polo visited it he remarked the "city of Cambaluc hath such a multitude of houses and such a vast population inside the walls and outside that it seems quite past all possibility."²

To ease the crowded conditions, Qubilai Qaqan began in 1267 the building of a new city half a mile northeast, at the site of modern Peiping. Three years later, while the city was still under construction, it already boasted a population of over four hundred thousand registered civilians.³ In 1272, when the city was completed and Qubilai named it Ta-tu, the Great Capital, the residents had outstripped the local food supply and faced their first famine.

² Henry Yule and Henri Cordier, *The book of Ser Marco Polo*, (New York, 1903, 3rd edition), 1:412.

³ Sung Lien 宋濂 *et al.* (editors), *Yuan shih* 元史 (1369), (Kiangsu Printing Office edition, 1875), 58:2.

Ta-tu became the capital of the mighty Mongol empire and the nerve center of military, political and economic enterprises unprecedented in magnitude, and with the swelling of its population grew the demand for food. The government organized the Directorate of Grain Transportation (*Ts'ao-yün Ssu* 漕運司) and the system of Ever-normal Granaries (*P'ing-ch'ang Ts'ang* 平常倉) to stabilize food distribution, and deepened the Wei River, which formed the northern section of the Sui system of waterways, to accommodate large-size transports. But the efforts proved disappointing. The agricultural production of North China, devastated by decades of war, was below normal and famines were almost an annual occurrence.

In 1276, when Bayan conquered the fertile regions of the Lower Yangtze, it was hoped that the food problem would be solved. But again there was disappointment when no way could be found to convey the grain to the capital in the north. Crop failures in Shantung and Shansi in 1277 brought a severe famine that winter. Prices soared in the Great Capital. The crisis forced the government to devise and adopt immediate measures to bring up food from the southeast.

For people who remembered the great system of canals and rivers which had served as arteries of transportation during the Sui, T'ang and Sung periods, the obvious solution was to repair and utilize the waterways. At the northern end, the Wei River was opened to

navigation as far south as Ch'i-men [near Ch'i-hsien] in Honan. At the southern end, the Han Kou, opened in pre-Christian times and repeatedly widened and repaired in successive dynasties, ran north from Yang-chou to as far as Huai-yin. But the middle sections had been erased so that houses were built and wheat grown on the canal beds. They had been silting up in the beginning of the twelfth century. The Sung troops then damaged them when they tried to halt the advance of the Jurchen horsemen. Finally, in 1194, the Yellow River completed the destruction when it broke its dykes and sent its silt-laden water rampaging in a new course southward into the Huai River.

The Yüan government spared neither cost nor labor in its efforts to utilize the existing waterways. Since the middle sections were obliterated, other ways were found to overcome the difficulties. Grain transports, which had sailed up the Han Kou, turned westward at a point north of Huai-yin to enter the Yellow River. Teams of trackers then towed the barges upstream to Chung-luan [near Feng-ch'iu 封邱 on the north bank of the Yellow River], where the grain was unloaded and transferred to carts and pack animals for the sixty-mile overland haul to Ch'i-men. At Ch'i-men, the grain was loaded again on barges for the trip up the Wei River to Chih-ku, in the vicinity of Tientsin, and eventually to the Great Capital. It was a highly unsatisfactory route, detouring hundreds of miles into the interior, and, more-

over, the cost and labor of overland haulage and of loading and unloading limited the amount of grain that could be transported to the capital.

Finally, in 1280, when the conquest of China had been completed with the destruction of the Sung fleet off the Kwangtung coast, the Mongol court was able to turn its attention to the matter of finding a shorter and easier route to bring grain to the capital. Qubilai as emperor had the energy and the determination to demand a solution and he had the manpower and resources to carry suggested plans to fruition.

The Mongols and their Chinese colleagues attacked the problem with vigor and resolution, and the solutions which they evolved were daring and spectacular. One was the opening of new waterways, and the final result of this solution was the Grand Canal, a magnificent engineering feat which for over five centuries played a vital role in the economy of the Yüan, Ming and Ch'ing empires. The other was establishment of a sea transport service, and the result was the achievement, during the Yüan period, of the greatest amount of grain ever shipped on a yearly basis in the history of China.⁴ Each of these routes had its

⁴ Over three and a half million piculs were transported in 1329 as compared to the one million piculs during the Yung-lo period (1403-24) and a million and a half piculs during the Tao-kuang period (1821-50), [see Pai Shou-i 白壽彝, *Chung-kuo chiao-t'ung shih* 中國交通史 (History of communications in China), (Shanghai, 1938), 162]. The highest amount of tribute rice shipped by steamer was in 1909--three million piculs. [See Edwin J. Dingle and F. L. Pratt, *Far Eastern products manual* (Shanghai, 1921), section on rice.]

staunch advocates who were convinced that theirs was the best route. Each faction was determined to see that its project be adopted and the project of its rival discarded. Their struggle to attain their ends, fought in the provinces and at the imperial court, was marked by intrigues and violence, and gave rise to one of the most acrimonious controversies in the eventful reign of Qubilai Qagan.⁵

Plans for New Waterways

The idea for a short direct route through Shantung had been conceived long before the Mongol period. During the Northern Sung period, the Han Kou had

⁵ The principal source used in the preparation of this study is the *Ta-Yüan hai-yün chi* 大元海運記 (Records of maritime transportation of the Great Yüan), edited by Hu Ching 胡敬 [tzu: Ichuang, 以莊 native of Jen-ho in Chekiang, chin-shih in 1805, and an expositor in the Han-lin Yüan, circa 1830] and published in Lo Chen-yü's collection, *Hsüeh-t'ang Ts'ung-k'e* 雪堂叢刻.

This work was originally the chapters on maritime transportation in the *Yüan ching-shih ta-tien* 元經世大典, 880 plus 14 *chüan*, which was commissioned in 1329, completed in 1331, and presented to the throne in 1332. Portions of the *Ching-shih ta-tien*, including the sections on economic affairs (*shih huo*) and military affairs (*ping*) were incorporated into the *Yung-lo ta-tien* and remained the parts which were preserved when the rest of the *Ching-shih ta-tien* was lost.

It was from the *Yung-lo ta-tien* that Hu Ching copied the passages on maritime transportation which were published under the title *Ta-Yüan hai-yün chi*. His work anticipated that of Wen T'ing-shih (see Arthur W. Hummel, *et al* (editors), *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period* (Washington, D. C., 1943), 855-56)

who, with Wang Kuo-wei, extracted passages from the *Yung-lo ta-tien* which they edited and published under the title *Ta-Yüan ts'ang-ku chi* 大元倉庫記 (Records of Granaries of the Great Yüan) in the *Kuang-ts'ang hsueh-chiung ts'ung-shu* 廣倉學齋叢書 (1916).

These two works, together with a third work, *Yüan hai-yün chih* (A Sketch of Maritime Transportation during the Yüan [period]) by Wei Su 危素 (late Yüan-early Ming), were reprinted in No. 37 of the *Kuo-hsüeh Wen-k'u* 國學文庫 (Peiping, n. d.). Wei's short work appears to be mainly extracts from the *Ching-shih ta-tien*.

The *Ta-Yüan hai-yün chi* is in two *chüan*. The first *chuan* is a chronological account of grain conveyance from 1282 to 1313, while the second *chüan* contains a description of the system of maritime transportation down to 1329. For a review of the book, see the article by Aritaka Gen 有高辰 "Gen-dai no kaiun to *Dai-Gen kaiun-ki* (Maritime transportation during the Yüan period and the *Ta-Yüan hai-yün chi*)", *Tōyō gakuho*, 7 (1917): 412-24.

Despite the wealth of information, the *Ta-Yüan hai-yün chi* has to be used with caution, as its text contains discrepancies as to names and dates and numerous errors due to careless transcription.

The chief corroboratory source is the *Yüan shih*. Unlike the other standard histories of China, the *Yüan shih* (and similarly the *Hsin Yüan shih* by K'ö Shao-min (1919) does not have a section on *ts'ao yün* i. e. grain transportation via the waterways. On the contrary, it has two separate *chüan* in its economic section exclusively devoted to maritime transportation. *Chuan* 93 is based on the *Ching-shih ta-tien* and contains information up to the year 1328. *Chüan* 97, based on the *Liu-t'iao cheng-lei* 六條政類 (1347-48), is a brief summary of events down to 1338.

Other sections of the *Yüan shih* which threw light on the subject include the annals of Shih-tsu (Qubilai Qaghan) (*chüan* 4-17), rivers and canals (*chüan* 64-65), geography (*chüan* 58), government (*chüan* 91-92) the tables of ministers in the *Chung-shu Sheng* (*chüan* 112), and the biographies of some of the leading personalities (*chüan* 129, 131, 166, and 205). The biographies of Chu Ch'ing, Chang Hsüan, and Lo Pi may be found in *Hsin Yüan shih*, (*chüan* 182).

been extended north to Tsining. But between Tsining and the town of Lin-ch'ing on the Wei River, a distance of a hundred and thirty-five miles, the elevated terrain rendered the construction of a canal a difficult engineering task. In 1275, Bayan, while engaged in the war against Sung, had made enquiries concerning the feasibility of such a canal, and he was assured by Ma Chih-chen 馬之貞 deputy head of the Directorate of Water Control (*Tu-shui Chien* 都水監) that such a canal could be built if the Wen 汶 and Ssu 泗 Rivers were used to furnish the water. Kuo Shou-ching 郭守敬, the noted astronomer, mathematician and engineer, who was then head of the Directorate of Water Control, personally surveyed the area between Tsining and Lin-ch'ing. Upon his return, he submitted maps and his favorable recommendations on the plan to the khan.

The conquest and consolidation of South China occupied the attention of the Yüan court until 1280 when, at last, it could turn its attention to the solution of the transportation problem. Early in the year, Keng Jen 耿仁 and Ali 阿里 councillors (*ts'an-chih cheng-shih*) in the Department of the Grand Secretariat (*Chung-shu Sheng*) which had charge of the civil administration of the Mongol empire,⁶ jointly submitted a memorial. In

⁶ "The Department of the Grand Secretariat (*Chung-shu Sheng*) was in charge of general administration, the Privy Council (*Shu-mi Yüan*) was in charge of military authority, and the Censorate (*Yü-shih T'ai*) was in charge of dismissal and promotion." (*Yüan shih*, 85:1)

it they voiced support for the proposal of one Yao Yin 姚演, a native and director-general (*tsung-kuan*)⁷ of the district of Lai-chou in Shantung. Yao's plan called for, first, the extension of the canal from Tsining northward to the vicinity of Tung-o. By this way, grain barges, sailing north on this canal, could continue their voyage via the Ta-ch'ing River to the sea at Li-chin [Litsing], and from there on sail up the coast to Chih-ku. This would necessitate the excavation of a fifty-mile long canal. Second, he proposed the deepening of the hundred-mile long Chiao-lai River across the Shantung Peninsula. By this way, grain ships leaving the Huai River could sail north along the coast and enter the Chiao-lai River at Chiao-chou [Kiaochow]. Coming out of the Chiao-lai River, the ships could sail along the coast of the Po Hai to Chih-ku, and thus avoid sailing around the perilous Shantung Promontory.

The khan referred the proposal to Achmad (A-hama-te 阿哈瑪德), then a minister (*p'ing-chang cheng-*

During the reign of Qubilai Qagan, the Grand Secretariat did not have a president (*ling* 令) and not all the offices of the ranking ministers were filled, although as organized this deliberative body consists of eight officials:

Two ministers of state (*ch'eng-hsiang*), right and left.

Four ministers (*p'ing-chang cheng-shih*).

Four assistant ministers (*ch'eng*), two right and two left.

Two councillors (*Ts'an-chih cheng-shih*)

⁷ An officer in charge of civilian population. There were several grades of these officers; a senior director or director-general (*shang tsung-kuan*) had authority over a population of a hundred thousand. (*Yüan shih*, 91:10).

shih) in the Grand Secretariat, who approved it. In the following year, Achmad also approved Yao's request to earmark the taxes and to mobilize the manpower of I-tu and two other districts in Shantung for the construction of the canals. A hundred thousand former Sung soldiers were also ordered to Shantung to augment the labor forces. Yao Yin was given authority over the dredging of the Chiao-lai River and Abači (A-pa-ch'i 阿八齊、烏巴赤), commanding general at I-tu and neighboring districts,⁸ was appointed to take charge over the deepening of the Ta-ch'ing River. Early in 1282, Ogruč'i (Ao-lu-ch'i 奧魯齊、鄂囉赤), president of the Board of War, was sent, with a member of the Directorate of Water Control and an accountant, to estimate the cost of constructing a canal between Tsining and Tung-o.

The plan for waterways was barely launched when it suffered a setback. Achmad was murdered by an army officer from I-tu in late spring of 1282, and among his many associates, Keng Jen was executed and Ali dismissed from office. A new group of men rose to power as ministers in the Grand Secretariat.

First Shipment of Grain by Sea

The disgrace and death of Achmad and his associates

⁸ *Yüan shih*, 129:1-2. However, the rank of *hsüan-wei shih* was usually reserved for military governors of provinces. *Ibid.*, 91:3.

delayed the scheme to build waterways and provided an opportunity for the government to try an alternative plan.

Table 1
Grain Deliveries by the Sea Route, 1283-94*
(in piculs)

Year	Amount shipped at Yang-chou	Amount unloaded at Chih-ku	Amount lost in transit	Percentage of losses
1283	46,050	42,173	3,877	8.4
1284	290,500	275,610	14,890	5.1
1285	100,000	90,772	9,228	9.2
1286	578,520	433,950	144,570	25.
1287	300,000	297,546	2,454	.8
1288	400,000	397,656	2,344	.6
1289	935,000	919,934	16,057	1.6
1290	1,595,000	1,513,856	81,144	5.
1291	1,527,150	1,281,615	245,535	16.
1292	1,407,400	1,361,513	45,887	3.2
1293	908,000	887,591	20,409	2.2
1294	514,533	503,534	10,999	2.1

*The amounts and the percentages are from the *Hsü wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao*, 31:18-19, which based its statistics on the *T'ai-ts'ang hsien-chih*.

In the 19th year of Chih-yüan [1282] the Grand Tutor Bayan, seeing how the inland rivers were silted and how the efforts to open waterways to transport grain had been in vain, recalled that in the 12th year of Chih-yüan [1276] he had transported the charts, books and other spoils captured from the Sung [capital, Hang-chou] to the capital by sea. He asked that the court instruct [the ambulatory government (*hsing-sheng*) of] Chiang-huai to have sixty flat-bottom ships constructed within sixty days and then to await orders.⁹

⁹ Hu, 1:1.

The men who performed the service for Bayan in 1276 were two former pirates, Chu Ch'ing 朱清 and Chang Hsüan 張瑄, who in the fall of 1275, had joined the Yüan forces with a fleet of five hundred vessels at a time when the Mongols badly needed ships to undertake the maritime phase of their campaign against Sung. After the capitulation of the Sung capital, they undertook to ship the spoils of war by sea to Ta-tu. They, and a third man named Lo Pi 羅璧, fought in the coastal campaigns and in the battle of Yai-shan in 1279 where the Sung fleet was finally destroyed. For their service and for the fact that the Mongols needed men with naval experience, they were singled out for special honors in 1280. Lo Pi was appointed to be director-general for Shanghai while Chu and Chang were placed in command of naval units to operate in clearing the seas of pirates and remnants of the Sung forces.¹⁰

Respectability was dull and unremunerative for these ex-pirates, so when they heard of the difficulties of grain transportation they immediately approached their old friend Bayan and suggested the scheme of shipping grain by sea, prompting Bayan to "recall" the events

¹⁰ In 1281, they brought about the surrender of the Sung admiral Ts'ui Shun 崔順 and his fleet of five hundred ships, which after the fall of Sung, was still raiding the coast. According to the *Hsin Yüan shih*, 182:2, they served under Ataqui (A-t'a-hai 阿塔海) who commanded the naval forces, but the statement that they sailed in expeditions against Japan in 1283 and against Champa in 1284 is apocryphal.

of 1276 and to bring the suggestion to the attention to the khan. ¹¹

Upon receipt of the instructions from the court, the government of Chiang-huai authorized Lo Pi to work with Chu Ch'ing and Chang Hsüan in building ships and in recruiting seamen. They gathered large and small ships until they had a fleet of a hundred and forty-six vessels. In September, when the orders came, this fleet sailed to Yang-chou where it picked up a cargo of 50,000 piculs¹² of rice. It then sailed down the Yangtze and out to sea. On this voyage, the sailors were men of the imperial navy, very ilikely from the units under the command of Chu and Chang, but the pilots and helmsmen were hired civilians.

The season was already late when they started and it took a whole month for the fleet of transports to round the Shantung Promontory and enter the Po Hai. By then they encountered cold weather and rough sea, so the captains decided to winter in the harbor of Liu-chia-tao, now called Liu-kung-tao near Weihaiwei. In April, 1283 they resumed their voyage and shortly afterward they reached Chih-ku where they unloaded the grain. Six ships were lost in the voyage. The remaining hundred and forty ships carying 46,050 piculs of rice, unloaded 42,172 piculs. The difference was due

¹¹ T'ao Tsung-i 陶宗儀, *Cho-keng Lu* 輟耕錄 (1366) (*Ts'ung-shu chi-ch'eng* edition) 5:85.

¹² *Tan*, 120 catties or nearly 160 lbs.

to losses suffered from pilferage, handling, spoilage and destruction by rats.¹³

Expansion of the Plan for Waterways

A severe drought beset North China in 1282 resulting in a critical food shortage by winter of that year. In January, 1283, when the Grand Secretariat held an emergency meeting to discuss the situation, it was brought out that two million piculs of grain from southeast China were needed to supplement the food supply of the Great Capital. But, because of the bottleneck between Chung-luan and Ch'i-men, the maximum amount that could be transported via that route was only three hundred thousand piculs.

To increase the efficiency of this route, the Directorate of Grain Transportation was reorganized. It was divided into two directorates, one for the metropolitan area to handle transportation north of the Yellow River, and one for the province of Chiang-huai to handle

¹³ The beginning of coastal shipping in China goes back to the fifth century B. C. [see Lao Kan 勞幹, "Lun Han-tai chih lu-yün yü shui-yün 論漢代之陸運與水運 (On land and water transportation during the Han period)," *Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology of the Academia Sinica* 16 (1947): 81ff., and Shih Nien-hai, *Chungkuo chih yün-ho* 中國之運河 (China's Canal) (Chungking, 1944), 166 note 215]. Grain was shipped by sea during the Han, Sui and T'ang periods in the wars against Korea. Tu Fu wrote several poems celebrating maritime transportation, one of which, freely translated, reads: "Yu and Yen (North China) are places of war. /To send supplies is laborious /Wu-men (Sochow) produces grain and wealth, /Which are shipped [north] by way of P'eng-lai." T'ao, 11:176.

transportation south of the Yellow River. The old staff of the directorate was dismissed and new men appointed. A merit system was worked out whereby the amount transported to the capital each year was reviewed and the officials responsible for transporting more than their assignments were promoted and those who transported less were demoted.

But neither administrative reforms nor the arrival of grain by sea were enough to alleviate the situation. In July, when the Department of the Grand Secretariat held another meeting, this time in the presence of the khan, the Assistant Minister of the Right (*yu-ch'eng*) Mas'ud-Din (Mai-su-ting 麥速丁、麥朮鼎), declared that he had had a discussion with a former Sung official named Wang Chi-weng 王積翁,¹⁴ who told him that during the Northern Sung period the capital at Kaifeng received six million piculs of grain a year from the southeast by way of the canals, and that now, with the price of grain so cheap in the southeast, it would not cost much to ship it to the Great Capital. The more waterways in operation, Wang argued, the greater amount of food for the capital.

The other ministers also asserted that something must be done to increase the volume of grain transported by the inland route and the khan agreed and told them to

¹⁴ Wang surrendered Foochow to the Mongols in 1277, rose to be president of the Board of War in 1279, and in 1281 was in the capital awaiting his commission to go to Kiangsi as councillor.

discuss the matter with Wang Chi-weng.

Following a series of conferences, the proposals of Wang were approved. His proposals were largely based on the plan suggested by Yao Yin two years before. They were:

1. To deepen the canal between the Wei River and the Yellow River so as to relieve the overland transportation between Chung-luan and Ch'i-men,
2. To carry out the dredging of the Chiao-lai River across the Shantung Peninsula,
3. To deepen the canal south of Tsining and to supply it with water from mountain streams, and
4. To open a canal between Tsining and Tung-o and to dredge the Ta-ch'ing River.

Agents were sent to survey the courses of the waterways and a report was made embodying the ministers' recommendations and containing maps and estimates of the cost of each project and the annual amount of grain each waterway could transport. When Qubilai Qagan had studied it he told his ministers: "I have seen the maps and believe that what you have recommended should be carried out."¹⁵

The approval of the emperor gave impetus to the scheme for waterways. Abači, assisted by Loqsi (Lo-shih 樂師) had begun work in June and, by unsparing use of the lash and the headsmen's sword, he compelled

¹⁵ Hu, 1:3.

his men to finish the dredging of the Ta-ch'ing River in three months. The government then transferred him to superintend the work on the Chiao-lai River, begun by Yao Yin, and conferred on him the new title of Director of Grain Transportation by the Chiao-lai and Sea Routes, with the rank of Commander of Ten Thousand (*Wan-hu* 萬戶).

The task of extending the canal northward from Tsining to Tung-o to meet the Ta-ch'ing River, entrusted to Oqruqči, was more difficult. With the area around Tsining on an elevation, a canal dug through it needed a continual supply of water. For this purpose, ditches were dug to enable the waters of the Wen, Kuang and Ssu rivers to flow into the canal in the vicinity of Tsining. Next, to regulate the flow of water, embankments and *cha* 閘¹⁶ were built on the main

¹⁶ These are barriers built across rivers and Canals to regulate the flow of water, and from Westerners have received "les noms plus ou moins impropres de 'diques, èclus, cataractes, sauts,' etc." (Domin. Gandar, *Le canal imperial, Varietes Sinologiques*, 4 (Shanghai, 1894), 27). Actually, *cha* is a general term for several types of water barriers. Some are sluices to retain or to discharge water. Others are so contrived so as to permit the passage of ships to higher or lower levels. Ships pass through the *cha* in two ways:

1. To enable ships to descend from one level to another, in places where the drop was small, the flood-gates were opened at certain hours to allow the ships to proceed through with the downrush of water. The loss of water occasioned by the opening of the flood-gates was soon replaced by streams feeding into the canal. (George Staunton, *A historical account of the embassy to the Emperor of China*, (London, 1797), 3:205).

canal as well as on the feeding streams. The *cha* on the canal were contrived in such a fashion as to dam the water and still permit the passage of ships. A total of fourteen stone *cha* were built for the fifty-mile stretch of the canal from Tsining to Tung-o, but they were not enough. In the following year, when Ma Chih-chen, deputy head of the Directorate of Water Control, inspected the canal, he recommended that more *cha* be built to check the flow of water in the feeding streams and more stone embankments be constructed to strengthen the canal south of Tsining.

Tsining became a thriving city, prospering from the

The flood-gates (*tou-men* 斗門) were usually located at a short distance from the *cha*. On the T'ung-hui Canal built by Kuo Shou-ching in 1293 between T'ung-chou and the capital, the flood-gates were one *li* (third of a mile) from the *cha* (*Yüan Shih*, 204:8). This method of lowering ships was not an invention of the Yüan engineers. It was already in use during the T'ang period. (Cf. Ou-yang Hsiu, *Hsin T'ang shu* (Chekiang Printing Office edition, 1873), 33A:7)

2. The method of raising ships from one level to another was more difficult. The ships were hauled over inclined planes built onto the *cha* by huge windlasses manned by three or four hundred men. (W. R. Carles, "The Grand Canal of China," *Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 31 (1896-97):105, also John F. Davis, *China, a general description*, (London, 1875, revised edition), 1:189). This method was mentioned in the *Jami el Tawarikh* (1307) by Rashid'ud-Din, who wrote that the canal from Ta-tu to Hang-chou had "many sluices to distribute water over the country. When vessels arrived, they were hoisted up by means of machinery, whatever their size, and let down the other side." (cited in Henry Yule and Henri Cordier, *The book of Ser Marco Polo*, 2: 175-6, note 2).

influx of engineers, soldiers and laborers employed on the canal, and it became a busy port when, later in the year, grain ships began to pass through. Marco Polo and other European travellers who visited the city called it Sinjumatu.¹⁷

The Sea Route vs. Waterways

The realization of the scheme to build waterways immediately spurred the proponents of maritime transportation to action. In September 1283, Qorqosun (Hoerh-ho-sun 和爾霍孫), Minister of State of the Grand Secretariat, presented a memorial to the emperor stating that the first trial shipment of grain by sea had succeeded and that the amount transported to the capital was almost as much as the total amount, 52,000 piculs, conveyed by way of the new waterways.

Citing the advantages of maritime transportation, Qorqosun went on to stress the fact that the first shipment by sea was in the nature of an experiment and that the grain fleet had been delayed by the pilots' unfamiliarity with the route. The captains had told him, he said, that it was dangerous to sail along the coast lined with sandbanks and rocks and they had expressed the wish that the government would send men and ships to chart the coast and to find a safer route.

¹⁷ A. C. Moule, "Marco Polo's Sinjumata," *T'oung pao*, ser 2, 2 (1911): 431-33, and Sudō Ken 須藤賢, *Saishū Batō* 濟州碼頭 (Ritsumeikan, Literature no. 40, Tokyo, 1948).

Qorqosun's arguments in favor of maritime transportation were strengthened by the arrival of the second shipment of grain by sea, a total of 275,610 piculs. This amount almost equaled the total volume of grain, 280,000 piculs, that came up by way of the Wei River and more than five times the amount carried by the new waterways. This success had been achieved through the efforts of Chu Ch'ing and Chang Hsüan who were anxious to demonstrate to the court the advantages of the sea route as compared to the waterways.

Besides the advocates of the sea route, there were other critics of the new waterways. Local officials of the districts through which the waterways passed complained that the employees of the Directorate of Grain Transportation had acted in a high-handed manner, that the crew and guards of the grain transports had interfered with merchant shipping and molested the passengers, and that, in demanding wine and meat from villages along the canal, they had assaulted and, in some cases, killed people.

In their rapacity, the employees of the new waterways had followed the example of their superiors. The work of excavating canals, building dams and dredging rivers, and the management of the transportation service through the waterways became a means for self-enrichment. Abači and Yao Yin were accused of misappropriating public funds, to the amount of 2,400 *ting* (120,000 taels) in currency, but they were only

admonished and ordered to make restitution.

The charges of coercion and graft levelled at the waterway transportation service did no harm so long as they were able to deliver food to the imperial capital. These criticisms were but petty annoyances compared to the troubles that soon befell them.

The difficulty lay in keeping open the new waterways. Sandbars formed at the entrances of the Tach'ing and the Chiao-lai Rivers so that the grain ships could only sail over them at high tide. By November, barely two months after the opening of the new waterways traffic became so difficult that the Grand Secretariat had to approve two suggested plans for improvement. One was to build small ships that could sail over the shoals and the other was to transport grain overland from Tung-o to Lin-ch'ing, on the Wei River.

The opponents of the waterways, capitalizing on the situation, wasted no time in bringing their case to the attention of the court. In December, when a conference of the Grand Secretariat was held in the khan's presence:

Qorqosun and other ministers submitted a memorial stating that the waterways which Abači had opened... required a hundred and ninety-four ships to carry 48,961 piculs of rice. But [only] a hundred and four ships arrived, and of their [cargoes of rice] 5,051 piculs were spoilt. Ninety ships carrying 23,990 piculs of rice were lost.

[The ministers declared:] We have made a list of

the total amount of rice which was delivered and the total amount which was lost, and presented the list to the throne. Whereupon a decree was issued demanding an explanation from Abači. Abači replied that the ships built at Yang-chou nowadays were not as sturdy as those formerly built and that many ships had been wrecked when they sailed too close to shore. Their loss was not his fault. He [declared that] out of the fifty ships under his command he had lost only four. The other ships were not lost [he said], only delayed by wind.”

The ministers [went on to say that] the waterways which Abači had opened could only be navigated at high tide and, even then, large numbers of ships were wrecked and the crew suffered much hardship. The disadvantages [of the new waterways] far outweigh the advantages. . .

The emperor asked: “Does the route favored by Bayan join the waterways opened by Abači?” [The ministers] replied, “It does not. [Moreover,] what Abači had said was not true. [Last year,] when the sea route was first tried, a hundred and forty-eight ships arrived and a decree was sent asking Manggudai to explain why seven other ships had failed to arrive. Manggudai’s messenger is on the way. This summer, two hundred and seventy ships were used to transport grain by sea. Nineteen ships were [at first] reported lost, but later all of them showed up.”

The emperor said: “If it is as you say, then Abači cannot be employed. Manggudai is a good man. When his messenger arrives, we will adopt his plan for transportation by sea. We will not use the waterways opened by Abači.”¹⁸

¹⁸ Hu, 1: 10.

Manggudai (Mang-ku-tai 忙古帶), who had been Governor of Fukien (*p'ing chang cheng-shih*), Superintendent of Merchant Ships (*Shih-po Shih* 市舶使) at Ch'uan-chou 泉州, and an associate of Chu Ch'ing, Chang Hsüan, and that wily Arab tycoon P'u Shou-keng.¹⁹ was regarded by the Mongol court as an expert on maritime affairs. His recommendations carried weight.

Manggudai sent word that he had conferred with the two "Southerners (*nan-jen* i. e. Chinese)" —Chu Ch'ing and Chang Hsüan—and they had suggested that if the government would pay the freight costs, they would use their own ships and men to transport a hundred thousand piculs of rice to the Great Capital. Bayan and two ministers of the Grand Secretariat, Jasan (Cha-san 扎散) and Mas'ud-Din, supported Manggudai's recommendation.

The result was the establishment of two Offices of the Commander of Ten Thousand for Maritime Transportation (*Hai-yün Wan-hu Fu* 海運萬戶府).²⁰ Chu

¹⁹ Kuwabara Jitsuzo 桑原隲藏 *Sō-matsu no teikyo Shihaku saikijin Bu Ju-ko no jiseki* 宋末の提舉市舶西域人蒲壽庚の事蹟 (Concerning the man of the western regions, P'u Shou-keng, who was Superintendent of Trading Ships during the end of the Sung dynasty), (Tokyo, 1923), translated by Feng Yu 馮攸 as *Chung-kuo A-la-po hai-shang chiao-t'ung shih* (History of Maritime Relations between China and Arabia), (Shanghai, 1934, 2nd editio), 262 note 5.

²⁰ Hu, 1:11 and *Yüan shih*, 93:14. But in Hu, 1:1 and *Yüan shih*, 166:4, it was stated that three Offices of Maritime Transportation were established, the third being under Lo Pi.

Ch'ing and Chang Hsüan were both promoted to be Commanders of Ten Thousand (*Wan-hu*),²¹ and Manggudai was made governor of Chiang-huai with the rank of *darugarči* and also given control over the Directorate of Transportation (*Chüan-yün Ssu* 轉運司).

Defeat of the Waterways Program

To make things worse for the advocates of the new waterways they lost one of their most enthusiastic supporters. Wang Chi-weng, who had been a prime mover of the program to open waterways, was sent as an envoy to Japan. Wang set sail from Ch'ing-yüan (Ningpo) but he never reached the island kingdom. While on the high seas, the crew of his ship murdered him. There was no clue to the motive of the crime nor to the master-mind who caused it to be committed. However, Chu and Chang as former pirates had thousands of associates among the seafaring men of the coast and they were known to have not hesitated at killing men who crossed their path.²² The case was closed shortly afterwards when, at an inquest held on orders from the Censorate, it was revealed that the crew of the ship had been discharged and no one knew their names.

The campaign to discredit the waterways steadily gained ground. In March, Mas'ud-Din, who a year before had supported the program of Wang Chi-weng,

²¹ Hu, 1:11.

²² *Hsin Yüan shih*, 182:1-4.

reported to the emperor that he had received three letters from Manggudai strongly critical of the newly opened waterways.²³ Manggudai had pointed out that the waterways were a waste of money and labor since there was a limit to the volume of goods they could carry. And Manggudai had suggested, Mas'ud-Din went on, that if the ships and men under Abači's command were transferred to him, he and his associates would be able to ship a million piculs of grain to the capital by sea.

Others joined in the attack on the new waterways; censors who said that the Chiao-lai River was too shallow for shipping, local officials who charged that the employees of the Directorate of Grain Transportation had mistreated villagers, and even some of the employees of the Directorate who agreed that the sea route was faster and easier than the waterways.

Apprised of the opposition against him and his waterways, Abači sent a personal representative to the capital to plead his cause. The Chiao-lai River, he argued, was a safe route and ships going through it would not have to run the risk of sailing around the Shantung Promontory. As for the Ta-ch'ing River, he pointed out that smaller ships had no trouble sailing

²³ *Yüan shih*, 65:6-8, stated that it was the assistant minister Minjurdan (Min-chuerh-tan 敏珠爾丹) who received three letters from Onowunordai (O-no-wu-no-erh-tai 鄂諾烏諾爾帶) suggesting the disbandment of Abači's command.

over the sand bars.

The issue was debated in a joint meeting of the Grand Secretariat and the Privy Council. Mas'ud-Din stated that he and Bayan had discussed the matter and they believed that the discontinuance of all the waterways, as Manggudai had suggested, would be too drastic a step to take. They proposed, instead, a compromise. This was to suspend the work of operation and maintenance on the Chiao-lai River and to transfer half of its ships and personnel to the Ta-ch'ing River to bolster the service and half to Yang-chou for use on the lower section of the canal.²⁴

The khan approved the suggestion. In an edict issued in May 1285, the court ordered the abolition of the Directorate of Grain Transportation by the Chiao-lai and Sea Routes and the transfer of half of its complement of twenty thousand men and a thousand ships to the Ta-ch'ing River. However, instead of sending the other half to Yang-chou, the court ordered that it be sent to Chekiang to be placed under the command of

²⁴ Evidently the order was only for the suspension of the maintenance work on the Ta-ch'ing and Chiao-lai Rivers, not the traffic. The new waterways, as they were called, continued to be used for grain conveyance until they were entirely unnavigable. The *Yüan shih* is incorrect in its account of the "Chichou Canal" (65:8) when it states that the canal between Tsining and Tung-o was discontinued. It is also wrong in telescoping all the events which took place from 1283 to 1286 into the space of one year, and it makes a further mistake in stating that that year was the 31st year of Chih-yüan [1294].

Manggudai who was to incorporate it into the imperial navy in preparation for the projected third invasion of Japan. The construction of three thousand small ships was authorized for use on the canal between Yang-chou and Tung-o.

The supporters of the Chiao-lai route, however, did not give in without a struggle. With his ships then busy plying between Yang-chou and Chih-ku, Abači knew that it would take several months to collect them for the transfer and he exerted his efforts to ship as much grain as possible while he still had the vessels at his disposal. His friends at the capital also got busy and early in 1286 they presented their case to the court. First a number of censors were induced to issue a statement charging that the guards and sailors of the maritime transportation service had been guilty of rowdyism in ports. In March, Boromis Haiya (Pu-lu-mi-shih Hai-ya 不魯迷失海牙), a member of the Grand Secretariat, submitted a memorial in which he contended that the waterways were better than the sea route. He cited the 1285 figures. Out of 1,000,000 piculs delivered to the Great Capital, 600,000 piculs came by way of the Chiao-lai River, 300,000 piculs by way of the Tsining-Tung-o canal, but only 100,000 piculs came by sea. In other words, according to his figures, ninety percent came by way of the new waterways and only ten percent by sea.

But these arguments did not prevail, and the disso-

lution of Abači's command was duly carried out. At the suggestion of Sejegen (Hsüeh-che-kan 薛徽干) early in 1287, the Grand Secretariat authorized the suspension of the Ta-ch'ing Rive route and the abolition of the Directorate of Grain Transportation for Chiang-huai. Their staff and equipment, consisting of thousands of men and hundreds of ships, were added to the Offices of Maritime Transportation.

The directors of the new waterways were also removed. Both Abači and Oqruc̄i were ordered to frontline duty in the invasion of Annam. But their feud with the proponents of maritime transportation followed them abroad, for the man appointed to command the fleet to bring supplies to the Mongol forces in Tongking was none other than the son of Chang Hsüan. When he failed to show up, the Mongols were compelled to forage for food, and in one of the raids Abači was killed.

Triumph of Maritime Transportation

The advocates of the sea route had won and, for a while, there was no one to challenge their monopoly in conveying grain to North China. Early in 1284, a system of hiring private ships to transport grain was worked out which relieved the imperial navy of this responsibility. In the business transactions Chu Ch'ing and Chang Hsüan acted in dual roles. They were government officials, yet it was as private individuals

that they negotiated a contract with the government to furnish ships and seamen to transport grain from the Lower Yangtze area to the Great Capital. The government on its part agreed not only to pay for the freight charges but also to pay the crew members four bushels of rice a month and to exempt their families from taxation.

Having triumphed over their rivals, the two ex-pirates were in a superb bargaining position and they were out to reap all the profit they could from their monopoly. In 1284, when the price of rice in the Yangtze Valley was only three taels a picul, they charged the government 8.59 taels to transport a picul, and it was only after much bargaining that they consented to reduce it to a flat rate of 8.5 taels, and in 1291 to 7.5 taels.

Even considering the operational expenses and the risks involved, the rates were exceedingly high, a fact which the records of the period were careful to note.

At this time the currency was stable and prices low. Rice in Chiang-nan [Lower Yangtze area] cost only three taels a picul in Chung-t'ung [1260-64] currency. To pay eight taels and five candareens to transport one picul of rice was to pay almost three times the cost of rice. The freight charges were paid each year in the ninth and tenth months in sound currency. The shipping people then bought materials for building ships. The construction cost of a ship of one thousand units [i. e. with capacity for a

thousand piculs] was only a 100 *ting* [or 5,000 taels], but by merely shipping one thousand piculs of rice [to the north] they make 170 *ting* [8,500 taels]. With such large profits everyone was eager to build ships and to engage in transportation business.²⁵

Besides transporting grain for the government, the ships were another source of income for Chu Ch'ing and Chang Hsüan. They were used to engage in the lucrative trade with the states of Southeast Asia. Although foreign trade was then a government monopoly, they were able, through the influence of their friend Manggudai, to obtain a share in it. Manggudai also arranged the transfer to them of the old ships originally built for the invasion of Japan, and, for a while before he left for Annam, Abači had the job of superintending the repair of these ships. In addition, Chu and Chang were granted the franchise to print paper money for the government.

So far their careers had been favored by good fortune. They became two of the wealthiest and most influential men in southeast China. But, they were not satisfied, and their ambition caused their first major contretemps.

In the summer of 1286, their fleet loaded a cargo of 578,520 piculs of rice at Yang-chou. It was the largest shipment they had ever undertaken. A strong southerly wind carried the fleet swiftly up the coast, then,

²⁵ Hu, 1:26.

just when it reached the rock-studded promontory of Shantung, a typhoon struck. The fleet scattered. Many ships sank, others were wrecked ashore, and still others were lost when abandoned by their terror-stricken crew. The loss of the cargo was 144,570 piculs, or twenty-five percent.

At other times, the loss would perhaps have been regarded as negligible. But in 1286, the North China harvest was bad, the worst in many years. In November, the Yellow River broke its dykes above Kaifeng flooding the overland route between Chung-luan and Ch'i-men. As a result, Ta-tu and other North China cities faced a severe famine. The government sold rice to stabilize prices, exempted taxes from the stricken areas and suspended nonessential work throughout the nation.

In December, when the Department of the Grand Secretariat held an emergency meeting to discuss the critical situation, a number of ministers questioned the wisdom of discontinuing the use of the new waterways. The losses off the Shantung coast were cited as evidence of the costliness and unreliability of maritime transportation. But Sejegen defended the sea route by claiming that actually the losses were not as great as they appeared. The bushel in South China was smaller than North China's, he said, and moreover, the losses from handling and from destruction by rats should be taken into account.

The court sent a messenger to ask Manggudai for

his opinion on the matter. Manggudai's reply fully vindicated the sea route. As for the losses, he wrote that Chu and Chang would make it up by greater shipments in the following year.

Food was one problem which confronted Qubilai Qaqan. Equally serious was the problem of money to maintain his extravagant court and to finance his foreign wars and vast construction programs. So early in 1287, when an Uighur named Sangga claimed that he would be able to increase government revenue and solve the economic problems, the khan made him the chief minister. While Sangga was able to curb inflation for a while by limiting the issuance of currency and he was able to please the khan by bringing in greater revenue from taxes and from government enterprises, his brutal and extortionate methods increased the burden and suffering of the people. He placed his own men in office and attempted to subordinate the Grand Secretariat and reorganize the government, and one of his first actions was the reorganization of the maritime transportation service.

Chu Ch'ing and Chang Hsüan were promoted to the rank of military governors (*hsüan-wei-shih* 宣慰使)²⁶ after they were deprived of their authority over the sea transportation service. A new organization, entitled the Ambulatory Office for Ch'uan-chou (*Hsing Ch'üan Fu*

²⁶ In December 1288, perhaps to compensate them for depriving them of their grain transportation business.

Ssu 行泉府司)²⁷ was created which had charge of the transportation service as well as, for a time, the management of foreign trade. As directors of this office, Sangga appointed two of his trusted men, Sab'ud-Din (Sha-pu-ting 沙布丁) and Omar (Wu-ma-erh 烏瑪爾).²⁸ Under it were four Offices of Maritime Transportation each in the charge of a commander of ten thousand. They were:

1. The head office at Ch'üan-chou, under the command of the Senior Commander of Ten Thousand

²⁷ This appears to be a special agency and not the Directorate of Ch'üan-chou (*Ch'üan-chou Tsung-kuan Fu*). The Ambulatory Office for Ch'üan-chou was created by Sangga in 1287 for the specific function of managing maritime transportation and foreign commerce. During the Yüan period, there was no fixed rule for creating mobile administrations (*hsing-sheng*). They were established as the occasion arose to handle specific jobs for the state. (*Yüan shih*, 91:1. Also cf. Maeda Naonori 前田直典, "Genchō gyōshō no seiritsu katei (The process of creating *hsing-sheng* in the Yüan dynasty)," *Shigaku zasshi*, 56 (1945): 637-46, and T'an Ch'i-jang 譚其驥 "Yüan Fuchien *hsing-sheng* chien-chih yen-ke k'ao (Study of the development an establishment of the *hsing-sheng* in Fukien during the Yüan period)," *Yü-kuang* 2 no 1 (Sept 1, 1934:2-4).

The Directorate of Ch'üan-chou, on the other hand was established in 1283 and remained in existence to the end of the Yüan period.

²⁸ The minister of state Altun (An-t'ung 安童) objected strongly to the appointment of these two men. Sangga waited till he was away from the capital to appeal directly to Qubilai Qagan to the authorize ir appointment. Sab'ud-Din was responsible for cutting down the food allowance of the members of the mission to Argun, Il-khan of Persia, when it left Ch'üan-chou in 1290, accompanied by Marco Polo. (Yang Chih-chiu and Ho Yung-chi, "Marco Polo quits China," *HJAS*, 9 (1945):51).

(*Shang-wan-hu*), Yisu (I-su 亦速), assisted by Chang Wen-lung 張文龍.

2. The P'ing-chiang 平江 (Soochow) office under Manggudai, assisted by Fei Kung-chen 費拱辰 and Chang Wen-piao 張文彪²⁹

3. The Shanghai office under Boralki (Po-lan-ch'i 孛蘭奚), assisted by Chang Wu 張武.

4. The Foochow office under Cecektu (Che-che-tu 徹徹都), assisted by Chu Hu 朱虎.

A New Waterway

In the fall of 1288, Sangga and his advisers formulated plans which they claimed would remove the threat of food shortage from the metropolitan area of North China. One was to increase the shipment of grain by sea to one million piculs a year and the other was to open a canal between Tung-o and Lin-ch'ing so that grain transports could sail all the way from the Yangtze to the Great Capital without interruption.

With the khan's authorization, he had special granaries built at Chih-ku so that the ships could unload their cargoes of rice upon arrival, he sent officials to offer sacrifices to the goddess T'ien-fei, patron deity of Chinese mariners, and he issued regulations limiting the loss of grain in transit to four percent. The maritime transportation service rose to the occasion, and, in the

²⁹ Elsewhere, the name of Chang Hsüan's son was given as Chang Wen-hu 虎 e. g. *Yüan shih*, 15:3 and 209:17.

following year, succeeded in shipping to the Great Capital a total of 935,000 piculs--almost a million. In 1290, they surpassed their previous records by bringing up one and one-half million piculs. As a reward for this achievement, the heads of all four Offices of Maritime Transportation received fur robes from the khan.

The results of Sangga's second plan were, at the time, less impressive. Actually, it was not Sangga's idea nor a new one. The proposal for a canal between Tung-o and Lin-ch'ing was first made in a memorial by Han Chung-hui, magistrate of Shou-chang in Shan-tung.³⁰ In February 1287 when the Ta-ch'ing River supply route was abandoned, the Directorate of Water Control had sent men to survey the area between Tung-o and Lin-ch'ing and they returned with a report that a canal would be possible. Meantime, with the suspension of the other waterways, all the grain coming up the canal from Yang-chou to Tsining had to be funnelled across the land route between Tung-o and Lin-ch'ing. For this reason, the Directorate of Grain Transportation at Tsining was elevated to a Directorate-general (*Tu Ts'ao-yün Ssu*) with authority over the entire route from Yang-chou to Chih-ku.

It was Sangga, however, who pushed the plans to fruition. He estimated that the construction of this

³⁰ According to the *Hsin Yüan shih*, 53:8-9, the suggestion was first made in 1280.

canal would require two to three million laborers and would cost the government 30,000 *ting* (or 1,500,000 taels) in currency in addition to rice and salt for the men. But when completed, he pointed out, the canal would relieve three thousand men needed to haul the grain overland, and it would save the government 28,000 *ting* a year. In other words, he argued, the cost of constructing the canal would be only a little more than what the government normally spent in a year, and such a canal would benefit the nation "for ten thousand generations."

The construction of the Tung-o-Lin-ch'ing section turned out to be as difficult an engineering job as the section between Tsining and Tung-o. In some places the water of the canal flowed between dykes built above the plain. In other places there was need for reservoirs (*shui-kuei* 水櫃) to conserve water from the feeding streams and *cha* to check the flow of the water and at the same time to allow ships to go through. In all, twenty-one *cha* were built for the eighty-five mile stretch of the canal. Since there were already fourteen *cha* for the section between Tsining and Tung-o, this made a total of thirty-five *cha* for the 135 miles between Tsining and Lin-ch'ing.

The excavation of the canal was supervised by Abači's old partner, Loqsi, while the building of the sluices, locks and embankments was carried out under the direction of Oqruqči's former assistant, Ma Chih-

chen. The job was completed early in 1289 and Qubilai Qaqan named it the Hui-t'ung Canal 會通河.

As it would be expected, the officials of the sea transportation service would not countenance any competition to their monopoly and they immediately moved into action. In February 1289, as soon as the Hui-t'ung Canal was completed, the Office of Maritime Transportation³¹ sent a memorial to the court charging that transportation by way of the new costly and ineffective since the grain barges had to traverse so many water barriers and it could never carry more than two hundred thousand piculs a year. The sea was a much better medium of transportation, it concluded.

Actually, there was little cause for alarm. Considerable engineering work was needed to keep the canal open. In 1290, heavy rains washed away sections of the dykes and the embankments had to be faced with stone slabs. The water of the canal was found to be too rapid and more *cha* had to be built to slow it down. Even when it was declared completed, in 1325, it was still too shallow and too narrow for large vessels to pass through and its annual volume was at best only several hundred thousand piculs.³² It offered no competition to the sea route throughout the Yüan period.

³¹ According to Shao Yüan-p'ing 邵遠平, *Yüan shih lei-pien* 元史類編 (1669, in the *Ssu-ch'ao pieh-shih* 四朝別史) 28:22, Chu Ch'ing and Chang Hsüan were the authors of the protest.

³² *Ibid.*, Section entitled "Hai-yün t'u-k'ao 海運圖考" 5.

The Transport Service in Overseas Campaigns

The maritime transportation service steadily expanded under the patronage and favor of the khan, not only for its economic function as a carrier of supplies but also for its military value as an auxiliary of the imperial navy. Qubilai Qaqan needed ships and men for his farflung wars and the maritime transportation service fulfilled his needs. Besides assisting in military operations by moving men and supplies across the seas, it constituted a reserve of sea-going ships and naval personnel. This may explain why the Offices of Maritime Transportation were military organizations under the command of soldiers while the Directorates of Grain Transportation were subsidiaries of the Board of Revenue and were under the control of civilians.³³

The Offices of Maritime Transportation were called upon to take part in overseas campaigns from the time of their establishment. In 1283, the Office of Grain Transportation by the Chiao-lai and Sea Route, under

³³ Except for the supply route between Ta-tu and Shang-tu which was operated by the Board of War.

On the connection between maritime transportation and the development of the navy, cf. the statements of Ch'iu Chun 邱濬 (1420-95) in *chüan* 34 of his work *Ta-hsüeh yen-i pu* 大學衍義補, as cited in *Kuo-hsüeh wen-k'u*, no 37, 123. When Chang Hsüan and Chu Ch'ing died, Kao Hsing, who commanded the expedition against Java in 1293, wept and said: "A navy without Chang and Chu and an army without Liu Erh Batur [Liu Kuo-chieh]. I have nothing for which to live." (*Hsin Yüan shih*, 181:7)

Abači, and the Offices of Maritime Transportation, under Chu Ch'ing and Chang Hsüan, were ordered to stand-by to transport supplies to Korea. Chu and Chang were also ordered to report to Chang Lin, Master of Artillery at the Great Capital (*Ta-tu Hui-hui-p'ao Chiang* 大都回回砲匠), to assist in the training of naval officers.

In May of 1285, when the Chiao-lai Office was abolished, half of its twenty thousand men and its thousand ships were sent to Chekiang for incorporation into the navy, and in November, these ships were sent to rendezvous with warships from South China and Korea. A recruiting campaign was launched to obtain experienced seamen to man these ships. Chu Ch'ing and Chang Hsüan received instructions to convey a million piculs of rice to the Korean port of Happo [now Masampo] by April of 1286, and, when all was in readiness, the invasion of Japan was to be launched in September.

But the third invasion of Japan was cancelled when the Mongols launched their third campaign against Annam. Chang Wen-hu, the son of Chang Hsüan and deputy chief of the four Offices of Maritime Transportation, was appointed commander of a fleet of ships carrying 170,000 piculs of rice to the Yüan forces in the neighborhood of Hanoi. The fleet set sail in the winter of 1287. By February of the following year, the supplies of the Mongols were exhausted but there was no sign of the transport fleet. Finally in April the

grain fleet appeared off the coast of Tongking but before it could unload its cargo it was attacked by Annamese warships. After losing eleven ships carrying 14,300 piculs of rice, the panic-struck Chang fled with his fleet of transports to Hainan Island. The Yüan army was now compelled to withdraw, its soldiers raiding the countryside for food as it went. Abači was killed in action while leading a foraging party.

Early in 1292, Chang Wen-hu was appointed to be one of the commanders of the abortive expedition against Liu-ch'iu [Formosa], and in the following year, Chu Ch'ing and Chang Hsüan received instructions to ship a hundred thousand piculs of rice for the invasion of Java.³⁴

Lo Pi, the colleague of Chu and Chang, was more successful in supporting the military operations of Qubilai Qaqa. In 1288, he commanded a fleet of grain ships which brought supplies to Manchuria for the khan's forces engaged in subduing the rebellion of Prince Nayan, and in the next year, he brought food supplies to Manchuria again to relieve a famine which followed in the wake of war.

Because of the gravity of the food shortage in Manchuria, particularly among the followers and allies of Prince Nayan, the sea transportation service made two more shipments of grain to the north. This job of

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 177:21.

famine-relief thus diverted a large number of ships when there were other needs for them.

The solution to this problem came from an unexpected quarter. Sab'u-Din and Omar, as directors of the Ambulatory Office for Ch'üan-chou, had charge of both the Superintendency of Merchant Ships and the four Offices of Maritime Transportation, and they had used the grain transports to ship to the Great Capital the treasures and the rare and valuable goods which had come as merchandise and as tribute from abroad. In 1288, for example, four hundred catties of pearls and thirty-four hundred ounces of gold were among the cargoes sent to North China. Now they wrote to the court that they had misgivings about the shipment of treasure as most of the crewmen were former Sung sailors, and they suggested that these men be replaced by the followers of Prince Nayan.

The court adopted the suggestion with alacrity. The followers of Prince Nayan were brought down from Manchuria to man some of the ships. Warships of the imperial navy were also assigned to escort the transports carrying "the tribute of the foreigners and the rare merchandise of the merchants," and a line of fifteen "sea stations (*hai-chan* 海站)" from Ch'üan-chou to Hang-chou were established. But the employment of Manchurians on transports and the system of "seastations" both turned out to be failures and were discontinued in 1291.

Chu and Chang Regain Control

During the years when the maritime transportation service was under government operation, Chu and Chang were not idle. They visited the capital to plead their case and to invoke the assistance of their friends in court. Then, in the summer of 1291, their fortune turned. The Offices of Maritime Transportation had shipped a total of 1,527,150 piculs of rice from Yang-chou, but only 1,281,615 piculs arrived at Chih-ku. The loss was sixteen percent. More important was the disgrace and execution of Sangga and the dismissal of his associates from office in August. The Department of the Grand Secretariat, which had been in eclipse during Sangga's administration, once more asserted its authority. This was the opportunity for which Chu and Chang had waited. In September

Buqus (Pu-hu-su 不忽速、不忽朮) and other ministers reported to the emperor that Chu Ch'ing and Chang Hsüan, who formerly had charge of the transportation of grain by the sea route, had written to say that in the past there were two Offices of Maritime Transportation of which they were the heads, but now Sab'ud-Din is head of the Ambulatory Office for Ch'üan-chou and two more offices [of Maritime Transportation] had been added. The additional offices have increased the burden of the people.....They beg [your majesty's] compassion and suggest that either the two new offices be abolished or that [Sab'ud-Din] be replaced.

The emperor declared: "What they say is true. Two

offices are sufficient to transport grain.”

[The ministers] reported that Chu and Chang had said that there were many [people at court] who do not trust them and they requested that they leave their sons as hostages.

The emperor said: “There is no need for this kind of talk. Let Chu and Chang be given full charge over grain transportation.”³⁵

The khan then issued an edict which abolished the Ambulatory Office for Ch'üan-chou and merged the four Offices of Maritime Transportation into two, one under Chu Ch'ing and the other under Chang Hsüan. Both men received the honorary rank of general (*piao-ch'i Chiang-chün* 驃騎將軍).

Chang Hsüan, apparently the more aggressive of the two men, had control of eight “wings” (翼) or squadrons of ships and was responsible for the conveyance of sixty percent of the grain, while Chu Ch'ing had seven “wings,” and was responsible for forty percent. However, this proportion was readjusted in 1295 and the amount of grain shipped was equally shared.

In 1292, at the initiative of Chu Ch'ing, a new sea route was found. But this was abandoned when the third route was discovered in the following year. Instead of following the shoreline, this last route went far out in the sea, touching only at Chiao-chou [Kiaochow]. Contemporary accounts attest that grain fleets using this

³⁵ Hu, 1:15.

route could reach Chih-ku in the space of about ten days, a marked improvement over the old coastal route which took at least one month and sometimes two months. The grain fleet made two voyages a year, the first starting in March and returning in May and the second starting in June and returning in September.

The ships were at first of two sizes, the small ones with a capacity of three hundred piculs and the large ones with a capacity of a thousand piculs. They had to be small in size in order to navigate the shallow coastal waters and they had much difficulty in sailing round the perilous Shantung Promontory. The opening of the deep-sea route encouraged the building of large ships, some of which were giant vessels capable of carrying eight thousand piculs of grain.

Chu Ch'ing and Chang Hsüan prospered from their near monopoly of the grain transportation business. They made their headquarters not far from Shanghai, at a small fishing village named T'ai-ts'ang, which, under their development, rose to become a flourishing seaport. Here

... grain transports and merchant ships gathered like clouds. More than a hundred members of the households of [Chu] Ch'ing and [Chang] Hsüan wore gold and silver badges. Merchants from foreign lands brought gifts of rare objects, rhinoceros horns and peacock feathers to

³⁵ *Hsin Yüan shih*, 182:3.

fill the warehouses. Their pomp was imposing and their wealth the greatest in the southeast.³⁶

More than mere local magnates, they were also influential figures on the national scene.

They, father and sons, rose to become ministers, while their brothers and nephews became high officials. They had estates and warehouses in almost every part of the country. Their great ships sailed to foreign lands while their carts and riders blocked the streets and gateways.³⁷

After Qubilai Qagan

Qubilai Qagan died in 1294 but Chu Ch'ing and Chang Hsüan were able to retain their control over the maritime transportation service, growing richer and more powerful. They arrogated to themselves honors they did not merit, as, for instance, when they landed at Chih-ku they demanded an honor guard of a thousand men to welcome them, and thus aroused the jealousy and enmity of many ministers of the court. They tyrannized the residents of their own bailiwick, condemning to death any one who defied their authority, and thus incurred the hatred of the local officials. The successors of Qubilai Qagan were no longer interested in overseas Campaigns and had no need for their services. So when, in 1302, they were accused of treason, a charge trumped-up by their enemies, there was no one to defend them. Chu Ch'ing committed suicide in a fit of rage. His son,

³⁷ T'ao, 5:85.

Chu Hu, along with Chang Hsüan and his son, Chang Wen-hu, were executed in Ta-tu. Their deaths were followed, a few years later, by the execution of Loqsi, the builder of waterways, on charges of graft.

This was the chance for Sab'ud-Din to play his hand. Discreetly hinting that the volume of grain conveyed by the sea route was limited by the insufficiency of ships, he ventured a solution. This was the appointment of his brothers, Qobis (Ho-pi-ssu 和必斯) and Mohammad (Ma-ha-mo-te 瑪哈默德), who happened to be ship-owners and also experts on transportation, as Commanders of Ten Thousand in charge of the two Offices of Maritime Transportation. The court approved the recommendation.³⁸

As in 1287, the change of administration seemed to have a salutary effect on the sea transportation service. The annual shipment immediately increased. By 1309, it reached two and a half million piculs and in 1310, three million piculs. After a slight drop for several years, it finally reached the peak in 1329 when over three and a half million piculs of rice was shipped to the Great Capital.

There are no statistics beyond this period, but it is doubtful if the annual amount could have exceeded the 1329 record. On the contrary, there was a steady

³⁸ Ch'i Huang 松璜, (editor), *Hsü wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao* (Chekiang Printing Office, 1887), 31: 16.

decline, due, not so so much to comdetition from the Hui-t'ung Canal, as to offical abuses, inflation and rising prices, inclement weather and plunder by searovers.³⁹

The reduction of food supply to the metropolitan area hamstrung the administration of the Yüan empire, and as the government weakened, chaos and unrest spread. The Mongol court, grown accustomed to depending upon the Yangtze Valley, could find no alternative source of food supply. So when rebel armies bestrode the region through which the Grand Canal passed, when the piratical harassment of Fang Kuo-chen severed the sea route, and when the authority of Chu Yüan-chang, founder of the Ming Dynasty, held sway over the food-producing provinces of the Lower Yangtze, the economy of the Mongol government collapsed. This was a vital factor which contributed to the fall of the Yüan empire.

³⁹ *Yüan shih*, 97:1.

明代之漕運

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一 序言

語云：「江浙熟，天下足。」又曰：「蘇常熟，天下足。」此非空諺也，實則東南富饒之區，常運米於江北寒瘠之地。如唐玄宗時，年輸江南米二百五十萬石，宋太宗時，驟增至五百五十萬石；元時年輸江南米三百萬石，明清大約為四百萬石¹。而此等糧米，一時未屆，則京華荒饑。唐德宗時，以漕運不通，長安瀕多餓死；後江淮轉運使韓晃運至

¹ 每年運米若干，頗不易考。元史敘海運，每歲輸米若干，何時達到，皆有詳細記載。明史謂：「初運糧，未有定額；成化八年，始定四百萬石，自此以後為常」。故元明之運米數目，大略可考。至唐宋之時，別議論紛如，蓋彼常有變改也。新唐書食貨志即主此說。玄宗時河南尹李傑為水陸運使，歲運米二百五十萬石，又京兆尹裴耀卿兼江淮都轉運使，三歲之間，運米七百萬石。觀此可見運米之重要。惟米之運輸，與督運者之能力，關係頗大，故李傑死後，而數量大減。後崔希逸為河南陝運使，能運米百八十萬石。宋史敘漕運事，謂太宗時運米五百五十萬石，雖以水旱而豁免民租，但此數未減。至真宗時，定歲額六百萬石，然有運四百萬石或七百萬石之時；仁宗時從六百萬石權減五十萬石，以後又漸漸減少。本文所引用之數量，想係最妥當者也。

江南米三萬斛，德宗與太子至相慶曰：「吾父子得生矣！」²又元末以戰亂頻仍，漕運杜絕，大都之米，殘餘無幾，每斗貴至值銀六兩，勳戚權勢之家，至有着錦繡，抱珠玉而餓死者³。

由是觀之，漕運一事，殊為重要。隋煬帝開鑿運河，雖蒙詬千載，乃以其奢侈淫樂使然，而其開河功績，並不足泯。實則中國出米區與荒瘠區，懸殊甚巨；而首都所在，又非產米之所，故即非煬帝開鑿，而有為之君，亦當設法溝通之也。然則在煬帝以前，或早有小規模之運河，煬帝以後，又屢經開濬。惟元一代，以黃河氾濫，淤塞運河，而開掘疏通，又需款甚巨，反不若從海路輸送之為便，海運因之以起。明初開國，尚承元遺制；至永樂徙都，始改河運。沿至有清中葉，猶行此法；及中葉以還，則以海道大通，當然又改為海運矣。

有明一代之漕運，可依明史所述之漕運——見卷七十九食貨志——按時代而分類觀察之。洪武時為海運；自永樂元年以後，海運與陸運兼行；至永樂十三年時，始易為河運。河運為余所定之名辭，即明史所謂「漕運」也。漕運在吾人今日，可解為河運，亦可解為海運，故不如易作河運之為佳。明之河運凡三變：(一)洪熙元年為支運法。支運為軍民分擔之運米法。(二)宣德六年易為兌運法。兌運多為以軍人運輸，民出資以供其運費，但民欲自運者，亦聽之；故亦稱為兌運支運兼用之時代。(三)成化七年易為改兌法，即改良兌運之義也。軍人輸運，遠至長江之南，民運之路程減短，而軍運之距離加長，故亦名長運。吾人可列一表如次：

² 見通鑑唐紀德宗二年。

³ 見大學衍義補卷三十四，「漕輓之宜」。

洪武——海運

永樂元年——海運陸運兼用

永樂十三年——河運 { 洪熙元年——支運
宣德六年——兌運支運併用
成化七年——改兌

然明史所述之漕運，平心衡之，記敍之中，雜有議論，唯今姑依之說明而已。

二 海運

在明史所述之漕運中，關於洪武時海運之記事，僅不過如次：

中書省符下山東行省，募水工，發萊州洋海倉，餉永平衛；其後海運餉北平，遼東爲定制。

此因未載年代，故不悉其確爲何時，但從記事之前後與夫中書省之存在觀之，——中書省於洪武十三年廢止——當爲洪武初年。在洪武實錄初年有如下之記事：

三年正月，命中書省符下山東行省，召募水工，於萊州海倉，運糧以餉永平衛。時永平軍儲所用數多，道途勞於輓運，故有是命。

六年四月，詔以蘇州府糧十二萬石，由海道運赴定遼，十萬石運赴北平，以時方用兵遼左及迤北故也。

由是可知在洪武初年，永平（河北省東部）固不必論，由北平（即今北平）至遼東之兵糧，亦專賴海運輸送也。

惟名山藏之「漕運記」謂⁴：

高帝始有天下，用海運，顧以給遼左一方而已。

明史謂海運兵餉，以給北平遼東，名山藏謂太祖時之海運，僅爲供給遼左，兩書之記事不同。名山藏爲明末何喬遠所

⁴ 見名山藏河漕記。

著，修明史時，嘗據爲底本，所言非爲無稽。吾常反覆考之，洪武初年之海運，固亦運餉於北平。蓋洪武之初，征元甚急，故不得不從南方運糧。迨征伐既已，始無運糧之必要，前所引用明史之記事，正指洪武初年，盛行討伐之時，非謂洪武晚年也。恐燕王所都之北平，因無討伐軍屯駐，故亦失其固有之都市繁榮而漸即蕭索。反之，遼東方面，因洪武二十年，元遺臣納哈出來降，遂不斷運輸兵餉。而北平方面，或可從運河送米。但遼東方面，則只能從海道運輸，並無他途。此海運不指北平，而係供給遼東之謂也。名山藏之「海運遼左一方而已」，蓋指此而言。

然則所謂遼東海運，果何如乎？明史之漕運，於海運方面幾無記載，已如上所述；僅名山藏之「漕運記」謂：

所給遼東軍士，一用海運，而舳艫侯朱壽，航海侯張赫常掌之。

明史卷百三十，有張赫傳；卷百三十二藍玉傳之後附有朱壽傳。朱壽傳謂「與張赫督漕運有功，洪武二十年封舳艫侯」張赫傳之敘述，則稍詳盡，曰：

會遼東漕運艱，軍食後期，帝深以爲慮。以赫習海道，命督海運事。久之，封航海侯，予世券。前後往來遼東十二年，凡督十運，勞世備至，軍中賴以無乏。

此段最可注意者，爲「往來遼東十二年，凡督十運」句，於詳確計算之年代，並無記載。然朱壽旣以漕運之功，被封舳艫侯，事在洪武二十年，意者張之被封爲航海侯，亦爲是歲耳。今觀洪武實錄，幸記其被封之年。故張赫之「往來遼東十二年」亦應自洪武二十年起算。但若以「久之」遙置於督海運之後，而封爲航海侯，以讀解之，則余之解釋，或不無錯誤。然吾人細玩此文，「久之」卽「久而」意，漢文以「之」代「而」，亦爲常例。意卽以其督航海久，而封爲侯

也。若此假定不誤，則張赫之初往遼東時，從洪武二十年逆推上十二年，即洪武八年也。在八年與二十年之間，張赫往來遼東，凡十次⁵。

要之，吾人可綜合名山藏及明史所載，而得一假定曰：掌海運者為朱壽與張赫，而其掌管之年代，則係從洪武八年至洪武二十年。惟明之經營遼東，至遲必始於洪武四年；自四年至八年之兵餉，當亦由海運輸送。至其經營者為誰，此則非為朱壽張赫，而全為另外之人矣。

明經營遼東之始，全邊略記「遼東略」謂起自洪武三年⁶：
洪武三年春，故元遼陽行省平章劉益藉其軍馬錢糧之數，並遼東州郡地圖，遣使奉表求降。上嘉其誠，斷事吳立持詔往諭，置遼東指揮使司，以益同知指揮事。

洪武實錄則以經營遼東在洪武四年：

四年二月，故元遼陽行省平章劉益，以遼東州郡地圖，並藉其兵馬錢糧之數，遣右丞董遵，僉院楊賢奉表來降，其辭曰：「……愚衷賣劍買牛，乞放歸於田里。」上覽表嘉其誠，詔置遼東衛指揮使司，以益為指揮同知。詔曰：「……朕甚嘉焉，今特置遼東衛指揮使司，授爾益同知。」

遼東志卷一地理志，亦謂「洪武四年置定遼都衛」，故洪武四年之說，或不誤也⁷。然則全邊略記何以誤為洪武三年

⁵ 十二年中，十次航海，確為一相當之時日。從江南運米遼東，至遼須十個月，運則一年有餘。如洪武實錄五年，載吳禎正月出發，十一月歸還。又在他處（一時不易檢得確在何年）見有運米北平，需時一年以上，深為太祖所不滿。故十二年中，十次航海，確為一相當之年限，時朱棣張赫，恐專致力於航海也。

⁶ 全邊略記卷十。

⁷ 明史百三十卷，有仇成傳：「洪武三年，僉大都督府事，鎮遼東；久之，以屯戍無功，降永昌衛指揮使，尋復官。」觀此則遼東經營，似始於洪武三年。又洪武實錄五年六月：「遣使勸赴遼東，諭都督僉事仇成曰：兵戍遼陽，已有年矣。」此可與明史仇成傳互相發明。然成為都督僉事，在洪武三年，鎮守遼東，或在其後，亦未可知。且即仇成於洪武三年赴遼東，亦非大規模之運輸，故未書於史冊耳。實際言之，調查海運而經營遼東，當始於劉益之降明。（劉益之降，恐非自動的，或為仇成所勸說，亦未可知。）

乎？蓋洪武四年二月入太祖之手；而出發自遼東，則在洪武三年。全邊略記爲敘述上之便利，從吳立之爲使，至衛之設立，一氣敘下。而太祖實錄即以太祖之受降在四年，故在四年條下，敘盡此事之原委。二者所記之年代不同，而實無差誤。由此觀之，並未隔年，於太祖五年時，即以海運送米遼東矣。

弁山堂別集有總督漕運兼巡撫鳳陽等處都御史年表⁸，謂：

太祖有天下，漕東南粟於海，以營遼東；五年屬靖海侯吳禎，後卒，乃遣都督朱壽張赫領之。

從遼東海運之始，迄朱壽張赫爲侯，吳禎實與其役。在洪武實錄中，可反覆見出，海運初興，始自五年；但吳禎與朱張之間，又有數人，每年互相更替，以從事海運⁹。如：

五年正月，命靖海侯吳禎率舟師運糧遼東，以給軍餉。

六年三月，命德慶侯廖永忠督運定遼糧儲，仍以戰衣皮襪各二萬五千，給其軍。

七年正月，戶部言定遼諸衛，初設屯種兵食未足，遂詔命水軍右衛指揮同知吳邁，廣洋指揮僉事陳權，率舟師出海，轉運糧儲，以備定遼邊餉。

總之，自洪武五年迄七年，司航運者，歲歲易人，並無人負完全海運之責。至洪武八年，朱壽張赫等出，始有專司海

⁸ 見弁山堂別集卷六十一御表。

⁹ 通觀洪武實錄，關於遼東海運，本文已摘舉略盡。茲再舉片段數事列下：七年六月，定遼衛都指揮馬雲等運糧一萬二千四百石出海，值暴風，覆四十餘舟，溺死官軍七百七十七人，馬四十餘匹。十五年五月，命靖海侯吳禎，督浙江諸衛舟師運糧，往給遼東軍士。」「三十七年二月，命江陰衛指揮僉事朱信等率軍士，運糧往遼東。」洪武七年，運米二次——正月一次，六月一次——此為特別之例。自五年至七年，每歲運米一次，大約均為正月，至遲為三月。自八年至二十年，朱壽張赫等掌航運，則五月航運，亦不為例外矣。

運，略具有永久性之負責者也。

三 海運陸運之併用

普通以海運陸運之併用，肇自永樂元年，此本為便利上之說法，非在永樂以前，海運陸運，截然無有也。惟在永樂以前，北平非為首都，對於運米之需要程度，自與後來不同，即如前節所言，海運僅注重於遼東而已。陸運為饋餉於長城一帶，特指名北平而運者不多。今之倡以北平為運輸目的者，實不足道也。蓋永樂間運輸之事甚多，遂溯至永樂初年，亦為海運陸運併用耳。茲將海運與陸運之變化，分別說明之：

海運——名山藏河漕記謂：

太祖都金陵，餉悉仰給于南：江西湖廣之粟，江而至；兩浙吳會之粟，浙河而至；鳳泗之粟，淮而至；河南山東之粟，黃河而至。

依此觀之，江西，湖廣之粟，固無論矣，即鳳泗河南山東之米，尚由河運運往金陵，可見於海運並不十分重視也。但自成祖嗣位，徙都北京，則情勢大變，蓋北方農產不豐，不得不倚江南之米，且運輸上，亦必從海路也。名山藏河漕記所謂海運極便，即指此時。其略曰：

成祖治京於燕，自上供以及百官六軍，悉仰江南梁稻，則用海運法。兩浙自浙入於海，吳會自三江入於海，淮北河南自河淮入於海，山東各濱海州縣入于海，皆會直沽，達於天津，……輸京師。

將此文更具體證明者，為明史紀事本末。紀事本末之河漕轉運謂：「永樂初，北京軍儲不足，以陳瑄充總兵，帥舟師海運，歲米百萬石，建百萬倉於直沽尹兒灣，城天津衛，籍萬

人戍守」¹⁰，即上述意也。

陸運——亦昉於永樂以前。前既言之，陸運係運兵餉於長城一帶，非僅指北平一處也。明史述漕運，有如下之記載：

洪武元年北伐，命浙江江西及蘇州等九府，運糧三百萬石於汴梁，已而大將軍徐達令忻崞代堅臺五州，運糧大同。

由浙江江西等地，運赴汴梁之米，與徐達命山西五州運向大同之米，同米歟？抑別米歟？雖言之不明，恐此三百萬石之米，非僅從汴梁運至北平，且亦運於大同。即由文章上言之，「已而」似亦有聯絡上下文之意。且從當時之情勢考之，北京尚未屯兵六衛三萬人，非後世之繁昌北京者比。三百萬石之米，即使一部運赴北京，其餘之大部分，當亦運向山西各地。況大同於洪武元年時，即有戰亂，兵燹之餘，徵租匪易；因使山西太原府五州之民，運米於大同，以紓其難，但並不僅限於大同而已也。明史續謂：「其西北邊則浚開封漕河，餉陝西，自陝西轉餉寧夏河州」，名山藏漕運記亦謂：「憲宗末年，以河淮以北之八百萬石供邊境」，皆可以補上說之不足。

自永樂徙都北平，始直向北京運米，明史「漕運」尚述及此事：

永樂元年，納戶部尚書郁新言，始¹¹用淮船受三百石以上者，道淮及沙河，抵陳州穎岐口跌坡，別以巨舟入黃河，抵八柳橋，運赴衛河，輸北平

陳州在開封之南，八柳樹即明史「黃河」之新鄉八柳樹，新

¹⁰ 見明史紀事本末卷二十四永樂四年。

¹¹ 海運在洪武時既已存在，陸運當亦非昉自永樂元年，故此「始」字係指始用淮船受三百石以上，決非與道淮河以下相連。

鄉在河南衛輝府，可見陸運達於河岸¹²。

此路之特色，在以陸運使黃河與衛河溝通。惟陸運之距離，則說者不一：名山藏河漕記謂長百七十里；明史河渠志載嘉靖時之上奏，論元之漕運，謂此段百八十里；又明史紀事本末河漕轉運永樂元年之條，引用瀋陽中屯衛軍士唐順之上奏，謂五十里；彼此之差，數目甚巨，恐名山藏及明史所載為陸運之實際距離，而明史紀事本末所載者，或為黃河與衛河之地理的距離，前者就事實立論，而後者則希望改善而便利者也¹³。

以上所述之海運陸運，永樂以前固亦有之；永樂元年以後，更有一海運陸運並稱之新意。明史「漕運」每謂「海運與陸運相參」，「淮海運道凡二」，而實則海運危險，陸運糜費，前者有倭寇與海賊之虞，有覆沒遲延之患；後者於百七十八里之間，設八遞運所，而必苛使山西河南之民，故不得不易為河運也。

四 河運

河運亦非突然起自永樂十三年，自永樂元年以來，海運陸運並稱，已有小規模之運河輸送。名山藏漕運記云：

文皇作都於燕，初仍海運之故，為一運；別起淮儀歷黃衛，水陸灌輸，遞抵都下，為一運；其北則德倉所儲為一運。

¹² 明史卷八十三河渠志一，黃河。

¹³ 明史記黃河：是時（嘉靖）光祿少卿黃綰，詹事霍輜，左都御史胡世寧，兵部尚書李承勳，各獻治河之議。……元人漕舟涉江入淮至封邱北，陸運百八十里，至洪門入御河，達京師，御河即衛河也。」

然明史又謂：「永樂元年，瀋陽中屯衛軍士唐順上言……衛河……南距黃河五十里，若開衛河……受南京所運糧餉，轉致衛河交運，則公私交便也。」

從文章之內容比較之，可證知余意不誤。

明史及明史稿之纂修，嘗以此書為底本，故亦有類似之記述。明史稿謂海運道凡二，而臨清倉亦以輸北平，合而計之，為三運。明史為使臨清倉儲內容之具體化，復加河南山東之粟。即改二運為三運，而第三運為以河南山東之粟集於臨清倉，再由河運¹⁴。運河自元代以來，即早淤塞，只自山東北部，至天津一段，可以利用，故第三運之用處，實際甚微，而海運陸運則較為重要。迨至海運危險，陸運耗費，運河開濬之聲遂起，而河運始為重要也。

關於運河之開濬，有高學士曾撰「元代海運與大元海運記」一文¹⁵，謂成祖永樂九年及十三年，濬治運河，並謂會通河在山東之北半部¹⁶。此文於元代海運解釋殊詳惟關於明代河運，則說明未盡。永樂九年開濬，未見於史籍；而永樂十三年之開濬，名山藏有之。名山藏謂：「十三年會通河成，海運暨衛罷」，大明會典：「永標十三年濬復會通河，奏罷海運」¹⁷，此記載海運與陸運之廢止，而並記其理由者。海運之廢止與會通河之濬復，恐非起自永樂十三年也。

以文史無徵，吾人與其空言，不如直接穿鑿其事實。第一，明史宋禮傳謂永樂九年之開濬，二十旬成，其年八月¹⁸宋禮還都，論功行賞。夫既云論功行賞，則會通河必確已開濬成功，至於十三年之再行開濬，關於開濬之情形，不能無

¹⁴ 河運非指黃河運輸，而係以運河輸米之謂也。海運陸運，各有其名稱，而河運則否；為利便計，與上相對，設此一辭，即水運之意。

¹⁵ 見東洋學報七卷三號，頁四二二，大正六年九月出版。

¹⁶ 明史卷百五十三，宋禮傳，於會通河有極簡要之敘述：「永樂九年，命開會通河。會通河者，元至元中，以壽張尹韓仲暉言：自東平安民山，鑿河至臨清，引汶絕濟，屬之衛河，為轉漕道，名曰會通。」即從山東兗州府東平縣，至山東東昌府臨清縣間之運河。

¹⁷ 見大明會典卷二十七。

¹⁸ 明史宋禮傳謂永樂九年開濬，二十旬而工成。又「是年」本指作一事之開始，此後八月還京師，論功行賞第一；二十旬後，疑為永樂十年；但以是年之前行詞為永樂九年，故仍暫定為該年也。

詳細之記載，特名山藏及明史未詳爲記鉅耳。

第二，大明會典記漕運：

永樂十二年令湖廣造淺船二千隻，歲於淮安倉支糧運赴北京；其舊納太倉糧，悉改納淮安倉收貯。又令北京，山東，山西，河南，中都，直隸，徐州等衛俱選官軍運糧。（此漕運之始）

由此觀之，則永樂十三年之開始漕運，並不可據；最早漕運之始，當爲永樂十二年。永樂實錄十二年正月「命北京，山東，山西，河南，中都，直隸，徐州等衛，不分屯守，各選軍士，以指揮千戶百戶率領，都指揮總率隨軍運糧」，亦可證明其無誤也。自十二年始運至揚子江口太倉州（即今江蘇淮安府之倉），再運至江蘇淮安府之倉庫，又使軍人以淺船運赴北京；故普通謂十三年行河運，實則自十二年即已開始矣。通常之書，皆謂永樂十三年，海運陸運並廢，河運獨行；後世遂以海運陸運之廢，爲河運推行之原因。然實際考之，河運之行，並無原因。海運陸運如先已廢除，而單靠河運，此爲冒險之策；聰慧如永樂帝，深謀遠慮如陳瑄，必計不出此。蓋於十二年試行運輸，十三年正式河運，海運陸運遂斷然廢除。不然，貿然從事，恐京華之民有饑荒之虞也。

五 支運

關於支運之意義，則似可解，似不可通，殆成一含混籠統之詞。明史漕運志謂：

支運之法，支者不必出當年之民納，納者不必供當年之軍支，通數年以爲衰益，期不失常額而止。

如斯說明之，或可解其意義，即軍人之支給者，不必出其年之民納，通數年以平均之，不失其常額而已。是支運者，即「支給」或「輸送」之謂也。但大明會典則作如次之解說：

凡漕運，先年俱民運淮徐臨德四倉，軍船接運入京通二倉，名為支運。

名山藏漕運記載：「陳瑄復言，支運法，民與軍均勞，甚善！」蓋先民運，次軍運，成為聯合的運輸。辭源：「支，支離分赴」，亦有分擔意。「支運」之名，蓋以此。

在以上所引之解釋，——大明會典，或名山藏——均甚洽當。今更由河運之變遷史上考之，初海運以官家運輸，陸運由民間運輸。依明史漕運志，即可知海運為官運；依大明會典漕運，名山藏河漕記，即可知山西河南之車夫丁夫，為陸運。再後，則為兌運，亦為官運。故由海運陸運之併用時代，易為兌運時代，中間必有官運民運聯合之支運產生，蓋否則已用之官軍與丁夫，勢必有一方面放棄不用，此政策中之最下者也。

上述支運之字義如無錯誤，則官運與民運如何接連不得不提出討論之。然此亦實際問題，如何說明則殊為費解。且照最完善的配列順序求之，恐亦不易觀也。初以承陸運民運之餘，在通州有河運之支運，官軍運輸之。尋改由淮安，徐州，德州，通州等倉，官軍各自輸送。而最後則改為由淮安倉，徐州倉，臨清倉，通京二倉，輸送。總之，即使民間運輸之距離漸短，而使軍人輸送之距離增長。以今史料證之，頗不難考見此等趨勢。大明會典漕運：

永樂十三年，……令浙江：嘉，湖，杭，與直隸：蘇，松，常，鎮，等府秋糧，除存留並起運南京及供給內府等項外，其餘盡撥運赴淮安倉。揚州，鳳陽，淮安三府秋糧內，每歲定撥六十萬石，徐州並山東兗州府秋糧內，每歲定撥三十萬石；俱運赴濟寧倉。以淺河船三千隻，支淮安糧，運至濟寧；二千隻支濟寧糧，運赴通州倉；每歲通運四次。其天津並通州等衛官軍，於通州接

運至北京。

河運之始，肇於永樂十三年，當時支運情形如此。但大明會典續此段之紀事，則有截然不同之記載：

又令浙江都司并直隸衛，分官軍於淮安運至徐州，置倉收囤；京衛官軍於徐州運糧至德州，置倉收囤；山東河南都司官軍於德州運糧至通州交收。

此則非起自通州，而從德州，徐州，淮安，均以官軍運送。大明會典雖爲永樂十三年以後追記，但終屬時代較早；後在明史漕運志，亦有類似之文句。恐自永樂十三年，迄於後世仍行之也。

自濬會通河，帝命都督賈義，尚書宋禮，以舟師運。禮以海船大者千石，工窳輒敗，乃造淺船五百艘，運淮，揚，徐，充糧百萬，以當海運之數。平江伯陳瑄繼之，頗增至三千餘艘。時淮，徐，臨清，德州，各有倉，江西，湖廣，浙江民運糧至淮安倉，分遣官軍就近輓運：自淮至徐，以浙直軍；自徐至德，以京衛軍；自德至通，以山東河南軍；以次遞運，凡四次，可三百餘萬，名曰支運。

此言宋禮陳瑄督漕運時均行此策。此文前半謂淮，徐，臨清，德州各有倉，共指四倉；而後半則謂淮安，徐州，德州，通州四倉，無臨清倉矣。又明史漕運志於另一段之記事，則謂淮安，徐州，臨清與京通二倉，無德州倉矣。依時代之前後，其亦可考見漕運盛衰之故歟？今錄其另一段記事如下：

宣德四年瑄及尚書黃福建議復支運法。乃令江西湖廣浙江民運百二十萬石於淮安倉；蘇，松，寧，池，廬，安，廣德民運糧二百七十四萬於徐州倉；應天，常，鎮，淮，揚，鳳，太，和，徐，民運糧二百二十萬石於臨清倉；令官軍接運入京通二倉。民糧既就近入倉，力

大減省。……惟山東，河南，北直隸則徑赴京倉，不用支運。

支運之施行，自永樂十三年至宣德四年，其間之演變已如是不同，不得謂非驚人矣。故所謂支運，並不能簡言之為洪熙元年始有之事；在明史中，與前所述相印證之史料甚多。即在實錄及其他史料中，亦無決定支運在洪熙元年者。

六 兌運支運之併用

兌運者，兌換之謂，交易之意。名山藏漕運記：

……是曰兌運法，兌之為言易也，軍與民交易也。

然則如何兌運乎？蓋以民運之路程，使軍人運之，使人民擔其運費。再具體言之，即民運至淮安，徐州，臨清等較遠之處，頗荒農事，不便殊甚，故改使運至最近之淮安或瓜州，由此以北，則全為軍運矣。名山藏漕運記，於此曾加說明，——民往還殆歲，不無病舍穡——但嫌太疏略耳。茲復引明史漕運志說明之：

江南民運糧諸倉，往返幾一年，誤農業；令民運至淮安瓜州，兌與衛所官軍，運載至北。

所謂諸倉，當即指淮安，臨清，徐州等倉。又瓜州在大明一統志卷十二揚州府瓜州鎮中謂：

在府城南四十五里，蓋揚子江之沙磧，其狀天瓜；居民稠密，商賈畢集，鎮有瓜州渡，以通鎮江。

想即此也。

次於費用一節，亦加以說明。所謂費用，實不僅指旅費，而尚有耗米。明史漕運志：「給與路費耗米」，陳瑄傳：「量給耗米及道里費」，皆兼指二者而言。

旅費——洪武間，此等旅費由民自籌。洪武實錄載：

詔天下……歲解諸稅課赴京者，無間遠邇，皆給鈔二十

錠，爲道里費。

惟此不能僅拘字面上之解釋，所謂道里費者，恐係特賜之恩賞，且細推敲此記事之內容，則知爲自措旅費甚明。蓋此等之史料甚少，故不得不將實錄之文加以活用也。

耗米——積米不運，猶可傷耗，況運輸乎？運輸米時，自不無毀棄覆沒之虞，然亦由人民負擔，是謂耗米。僅洪武實錄中有一例外，則爲僅見之貴重史料也。

長淮泰州衛軍士，運糧至淮安，遇風覆舟，漂沒米二百七十餘石。戶部請責其償，上曰：「軍士遇風濤覆舟，豈得已也！」令勿償。

此則因爲風濤之險，故完全免除。然細觀「戶部奏請」之意，則免除不過一時之權，而照米賠償，則爲經常狀態也。

觀此，則知旅費及耗米，概由人民負擔。但如視此爲明代之虐政，則亦大謬。蓋明代之糧米，其運向指定地點者，爲若干斗，若干石；佃戶小民，據地無多，其運入倉，數目遂亦甚少；故旅費及耗米，令人民負擔，並不甚重也。洪武實錄十四年三月載，運船有置私物轉市，以償路費者：

蘇州民以官船運米入京，而附載私物，有司請罪之，上曰：「運米勞苦，以私貿易爲路費耳」，釋之。

此後民運廢除，易爲軍運，人民所出旅費與耗米遂變爲糧米之附加稅。明史漕運志：

民有運至淮安，兌與軍運者，止加四斗。

後以民甚便之，行之者遂多。

然民既以兌運之不便，往往自己運輸，至此遂變爲兌運支運並行時代矣。至其比例，名山藏漕運記謂兌居十六，支居十四；明史漕運志則謂：

正統初，運糧之數，四百五十萬石，而兌運者二百八十萬石；淮，徐，臨，德四倉支運者，十之三四耳。

至其施行之年代，在明史中則謂昉自宣德，而於其他之記載中，則殊多違異。明史紀事本末河漕轉運載：

宣德五年三月，陳瑄言：支運法，軍民均勞甚善，但民病舍檣往還，不若益耗兌軍便。帝是其議，改爲兌運法。

大明會典則溯源於永樂之末：

永樂末，始令民赴淮安瓜州，補給腳價，兌與軍船便運，名爲兌運。

其他記載，亦有不詳著其實施年月者。恐此種制度仍爲自然的演變而來，如斷定何年，想無此理，惟爲便利上遂規定爲宣德六年耳。

七 改兌

從字義上觀之，改兌者，即將兌運改良之謂。但如何改良乎？依明史稿漕運志：

成化七年應天巡撫滕昭令瓜淮官軍過江兌運，加耗之外，復添腳米。

明史滕昭傳中，雖無此等記載，但此解釋或大體不誤。今以淮南瓜州至江北之民運，易爲軍運，即在江南亦行軍運也。因此，附加之米外，更添腳米。

明史漕運志，於此曾有較爲具體的記載：

至成化七年，乃有改兌之議，時應天巡撫滕昭，令運軍赴江南水次交兌，加耗外復石增米一斗，爲渡江費。

成化實錄七年九月條，則變爲六升：

戶部會官，議巡撫漕運官所陳事宜……一瓜，淮二處糧米，聽官軍過江各就水次交兌，每石除加耗外，再加腳米六升。

余從史料之性質上考之，則贊成每石增附加稅六升之說。

從此，前之所謂民運者，均改爲軍運，輸送糧米，可一舉直達之矣。明史中雖無此等記載，惟就史稿觀之，則明甚。史稿中將改兌釋爲長運之意。改兌乃指將兌運手續改良之謂，兌運指從淮瓜改爲江南而言。明史稿漕運志：

由是兌運悉變爲改兌，而官軍長運，遂爲定制。又續謂：「先是成化間，行長運之法」，故從表面上觀之，雖名辭不同，實則二而一者也。

改兌既行，支運或兌運遂廢。初，兌運施行時，支運尚有殘存；及行改兌，遂完全廢止。明史漕運志：

帝乃命淮，徐，臨，德四倉，支運七十萬石之米，悉改水次交兌，由是悉變爲改兌。

明史稿漕運志亦謂「自兌運變爲改兌」云云。綜合兩志觀之，知支運，兌運，殆已立即廢止也。

然則改兌之行，昉於何時乎？明史漕運志，謂在成化七年，亦猶謂支運昉自洪熙元年，兌運肇自宣德六年，皆前此卽有存在之史實，不可據爲信史，改兌亦然。改兌雖云肇自成化七年，但有史料證明其前此卽有。他書無論矣，卽在明史¹⁹自身中，便可獲得若干反證。陳瑄傳及漕運志中有論及改兌者，皆在成化七年以前，將改兌誤混於兌運。陳瑄傳：

宣德六年，瑄言：「……又江南之民運糧，赴臨清淮安徐州，往返一年，失悞農業，而湖廣，江西，浙江，及蘇松，安慶軍士，每歲以空舟赴淮安載糧。若令江南民撥糧與附近衛所官軍，運載至京，量給耗米及道里費，則軍民交便。」帝命黃福及侍郎王佐議行之。更民運爲兌運，自此始也。

¹⁹ 在明史成書前之名山藏，其漕運記云：「宣德六年，瑄復言：支運法，民與軍均勞，甚善，然民往運殆歲，不無病穡，湖廣等軍船達駕就兌，勞費亦虛，竊謂令民益耗附近兌軍便幸。」明史所記，殊嫌敷衍簡略，今姑仍就正史述之。

漫不經意讀之，覺此爲一堂堂之論兌運策也。但若細心考之，則知其言頗多漏洞。蓋江南之民運赴臨清，淮安，徐州者，乃支運也；軍士從淮安載糧者，乃兌運也。而以江南附近衛所運米，則變爲改兌；況又量給以耗米及道里費，更知其爲改兌無疑。漕運志中所載，亦同樣含混：

宣德六年，瑄言：「……江南民運糧臨清倉，往返幾一年，誤農業，令民運至淮安瓜州，兌與衛所官軍，運載至北，給與路費耗米，則軍民兩便，是爲兌運。」命羣臣會議，吏部蹇義等上；官軍兌運民糧，加耗則例，以地遠近爲差。每石湖廣八斗，江西浙江七斗，南直隸六斗，北直隸五斗。民有運至淮安兌與軍運者，止加四斗。如有兌運不盡，仍令民自運赴諸倉；不願兌者，亦聽其自運。

陳瑄流中所謂：「江南民運糧臨清倉往返幾一年，誤農業，令民運至淮安瓜洲，兌與衛所官軍，運載至北」云云，本指兌運。蹇義等所議，前半段爲輸米細則，後半段係補充瑄疏所未及。前半段之「湖廣八斗，江西浙江七斗，南直隸六斗，北直隸五斗」，豈非指由附近衛所輸米之兌運乎？又與下之「民運至淮安，兌與軍運」，豈非對立之文？故前半段非指改兌，而後半段亦非指兌運也。如以此作爲成化七年以前之改兌，則極恰當明晰，恐係以明史引用各種史料，漫無決擇區分，因而相混。夫一一究明分晰之論文，猶難免有誤，況編纂官書者，於此等處又不注意者乎？

余既以陳瑄及蹇義之疏，殊無理由，故不主以上之說。今從運米設倉上，可得一旁證。漕運糧米，至行支運或兌運時，交通當已甚便，大倉庫之設置已極良美，至行改兌時，江南各地之小倉庫更不得不星棋羅置。然此等小倉庫，何時

始置之乎？王圻續文獻通考²⁰ 謂：

宣德元年八月，巡撫侍郎周忱奏，置蘇松等府濟農，水次倉，以備賑恤。

是在宣德時，水次倉已漸建置。單有水次倉，與本文原無關係，惟水次倉實亦即各地之小倉庫。明史漕運志：

先是成化間，行長運之法，江南州縣運糧至南京，令官軍就水次兌支，計省加耗輸輓之費，得餘米十萬石有奇；貯預倉，以資緩急之用。

其所謂預備倉，即水次倉也。然而水次倉與改兌有不可分離之關係，而從水次倉記事之內容上與夫字義上，皆一望而知為建築於水旁之倉庫。倉庫之建，原所以貯運輸之米者，故各鎮市中均有之。今將此等倉庫均置於水濱，蓋輸米於距水遠處，既不方便，且耗運費，與江南之實行舟運者，殊多不適也。

然則如斯便利之水次倉，早已肇建於宣德時，何以至成化間始漸發達乎，蓋以運輸軍人不足耳。宣德實錄：

五年三月，平江伯陳瑄言餽運四事：一，南京及直隸衛所運糧官軍遞年選下西洋，及征進交趾，分調北京，通計二萬人。又水軍右等衛官軍，今年選下西洋者亦多，俱無軍撥補。

斯可解釋一半之原因；其餘一半原因，則以也先入寇，許多軍士均開赴北京，因致無人運米。明史漕運志：

景泰六年，瓦剌入貢，乃復軍運。

也先之瓦剌於景泰始入貢，因以警備之軍士，使之漕運。

八 結語

漕運之制，雖逐漸改良，但其弊害亦隨之而生，除索取

²⁰ 王圻續文獻通考卷四十一，國用考，賑恤。

旅費及耗米外，尙增索極多之附加米。故明史紀事本末河漕轉運謂：

行之既久，耗亦納官，失初意矣。

旅費及耗米，本應歸於運輸之軍人，今反納於政府之倉庫，其失原意何甚！又明史稿漕運志記官吏之剝削：

聽選官陳倫言：「兌運加耗已增至六七斗以上，而官吏糧里，又索他費，多者至三四斗，且俱淋尖收之。計納正稅一石，通用二石三斗，朝廷之取於民也廉，而下人之刻剝也甚。宜令都察院檄示禁止！」從之。

明史漕運志亦有同樣之記事：

軍與民兌米，往往恃強勒索，帝知其弊，敕戶部委正官監臨，不許私兌。已而頗減加耗米，遠者不過六斗，近者至二斗五升，以三分爲率，二分與米，一分以他物準。正糧斛面銳，耗糧俱平槩。

皆言官吏剝削之甚也。明史漕運志載禁止官吏勒索，即使遠者不得過六斗，以三分爲率，一分得以他物準，卽史稿中所謂「以物折之」也。其所謂正糧斛銳，耗糧平槩，卽史稿中所謂「正糧尖斛，耗糧俱平斛」也。

夫一種制度之漸卽崩潰，決非政府法令所克牽挽，敗壞之程度愈深，江南之租糧愈重，而官吏之誅求亦愈甚，終必釀成社會變亂而後已也。今姑述之至此。

一九二七年十一月二十三日作，

一九三五年十一月十二日譯畢。

(本文翻譯有節略處)

The Last Thousand Years of Chinese History: Changing Patterns in Land Tenure*

by

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It is immediately apparent to anyone who juxtaposes those two massive works of scholarship and patient investigation, Sudō Yoshiyuki's *History of Land Tenure Systems in China*,¹ which is mostly concerned with the Sung dynasty, and John Lossing Buck's *Land Utilization in China*,² which describes the early 1930s, that in the intervening thousand years the character of

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¹ Sudō Yoshiyuki, *Chūgoku tochi seido shi kenhyū (History of Land Tenure Systems in China)*, Tokyo, 1954.

² John Lossing Buck, *Land Utilization in China*, 3 vols., Chicago, 1937.

Chinese rural society changed, and changed radically.

Sudō's book shows us a world of manors whose fields were either worked by serfs, by tenant-serfs or by tenants who were very similar to serfs, being bound to the soil and subjected to numerous and irksome restrictions.

Buck's shows us, in contrast, a world of free smallholders, owning fragmented plots, fiercely competitive, untrammelled by status barriers, and whose individual fortunes clearly rose and fell with some rapidity. In the North China plain at this time over four-fifths of the cultivated area was farmed by those who owned it. In the Yangtze valley the corresponding proportion was about three-fifths and in Kwangtung and Szechwan slightly over half. The quantities of land held by landowners who did not themselves farm can easily be seen from his figures to have been too small to have served as an adequate basis for a distinct and socially dominant landlord class. Other data confirm this latter point. Thus William Hinton's admirable recent work on a North Chinese village shows that landlords owned about three acres each, rich peasants two acres each, middle peasants one acre each and poor peasants about half an acre.³

These thumbnail sketches of rural society in Sung times and in the early part of the present century are

³ W. Hinton, *Fanshen, A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village*, New York, 1967, pp. 209, 592.

both, needless to say, much too simple. But they serve a useful purpose in highlighting an important fact. To move from the first to the second there must have been a series of far-reaching changes, both touching and touched by almost every other aspect of Chinese society; but no one, with the possible exception of the late Henri Maspero in his brief brilliant essay 'Land tenure systems in China from their origins down to the present day',⁴ has tried to describe or analyse them. To raise but one of the problems, when and how did serfdom disappear?

There is a gap at the centre of the social and economic history of China over the last thousand years. Until it is filled it will remain impossible to attain much understanding of such matters as, for example, the lowest levels of the political structure or patterns of overall social mobility. It also seems reasonable to assume that changes in the nature of rural society will turn out to be related in a variety of ways to the more or less well-known patterns of demographic expansion, commercialization, urbanization, and even, possibly, of intellectual and technological advance and stagnation.

There is thus considerable justification at the present time for trying to advance some testable hypothesis, however speculative. The stakes, in terms of the possibility of advancing our understanding of premodern

⁴ Henri Maspero, *Mélanges posthumes sur les religions et l'histoire de la Chine*, Vol. III, Paris, 1950. pp. 147-92.

Chinese history, are too high for prudence to appear an attractive proposition.

I propose to sketch here what seems to me to be one defensible solution of the problem, and then to consider some of its implications in more detail. However, three observations of a general nature need to be made at the outset.

First, the high degree of regional variation between the different parts of China is a major complicating factor. In surveying these thousand years we must be careful not to interpret regional differences as evidence for, or against, changes over time. As Sudō Yoshiyuki has shown in his *Studies on the Economic History of the Sung Period*⁵ technological advances in agriculture took place at widely differing times in different parts of the country, and the same must often have been true of social developments. The following passage written by Yü Ch'üeh, the fourteenth-century scholar-general, provides an illustration of such regional variation:

Che-tung [the southern, mountainous part of present-day Chekiang] lay in ancient times within the kingdom of Yueh. Its land is divided into small units. There are no very rich or poor persons. In its hilly valleys there live people whose dwelling-houses occupy a sixth of an acre of land, and whose fields amount to $1\frac{2}{3}$ of an acre, the property having been handed down intact from one

⁵ Sudō Yoshiyuki, *Sōdai keizai-shi kenkyū* (*Studies on the Economic History of the Sung Period*), Tokyo, 1962, especially pp. 73-205.

generation to the next. The land is not fertile, and these humble folk have to toil for their living. Even persons of quality are modest and frugal, being imbued with respect for the *Book of Odes* and the *Book of Documents*. They are unlike the men of Wu [southern Kiangsu and northern Chekiang] with their high-handed, land-grabbing great families whose harvests each year amount to several million *hu* while none of the poor have anything at all to store away.⁶

We can see a principle at work here which also operated in modern times, namely, that tenancy tends to be higher the higher the productivity of the soil, and hence the higher the surplus above subsistence yielded by a man's labour.

In the present analysis I shall mainly confine myself to south-eastern and central China, by-passing developments in the North and in the provinces of Kwangtung and Szechwan. Since at this time the economic and cultural centre of the country lay in the lower Yangtze valley, this seems a justifiable limitation for a preliminary venture.

Secondly, I shall be more concerned with the manner in which land was owned and managed than with the rather sterile question of how much land was owned by how many people at a given time. A Sung manor concentrated in a single village (as many of them were), worked by serfs and tenants under the personal control

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 542-3.

of the owner or his manager, possessing much of its equipment, pumps, rollers, ploughs and draught-animals, as manor property, was a different social and economic entity from a statistically equivalent collection of fragmented holdings, possibly dispersed over several counties, owned by an early twentieth-century Kiangnan landlord who lived in a town, collected his rents through an agency, was personally unknown to his tenants, never co-ordinated their work or provided them with tools, and exercised a most attenuated power over them since many had the right of permanent tenure, and all were free to leave if they so wished. The prevalence of this latter situation is apparent from Fei Hsiao-t'ung's classic work on peasant life in Kiangnan,⁷ and from a more recent work by Muramatsu Yūji.⁸

On the other hand, since one of the major problems with which we are faced is to account for the transition from a predominantly manorial system to a predominantly small-holder system, we must at some point come to grips with the question of the process by which ownership was dispersed among a larger number of people. This was almost certainly the by-product of the slowly changing pattern of investment of funds accumulated by officials, members of the gentry and

⁷ Fei Hsiao-t'ung, *Peasant Life in China*, London, 1939, especially pp. 189-90.

⁸ Y. Muramatsu, 'A Documentary Study of Chinese Landlordism in Late Ch'ing and Early Republican Kiangnan', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 29, 1966, pp. 566-99.

merchants. As the economy grew more commercialized it seems that agricultural land became a relatively less desirable object of investment. It was chiefly valued in the later part of our period for the security which it offered; much higher returns could be had from urban real estate, pawn-broking and commerce. As a result of this, the forces making for the repeated new accumulation of large landholdings by powerful persons were much weakened; and a freer rein was given to the Chinese system of inheritance, which was based on the allocation of approximately equal shares among male heirs, to fragment existing holdings comparatively unchecked. Changes of this sort are hard to date, but for many reasons the eighteenth century would seem to be the obvious turning point.

Thirdly, the evolution which I believe took place in Chinese land tenure has many points of similarity with that which occurred during the Tokugawa period in Japan. This latter has been the subject of a masterly analysis by Professor T. C. Smith in his *Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan*,⁹ and I am indebted to Professor Smith for having drawn the parallel to my attention.

Let us now consider the main features of the model which I propose for the last thousand years of premodern Chinese rural social history.

The year A.D. 1000 makes a convenient starting

⁹ T. C. Smith, *The Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan*, Stanford, 1959.

point. The development of land tenure in the preceding millennium has been fairly intensively studied, in the last generation by scholars such as Maspero, Katō Shigeshi, Niida Noboru and Stefan Balazs, and in the present one by Yang Lien-sheng, Sudō Yoshiyuki, Denis Twitchett, Ho Ch'ang-ch'ün and others too numerous to mention. The main themes are the familiar ones of the decline of the earlier relatively autonomous peasant communities, the introduction and eventual failure of a variety of systems of state-controlled allocation of lands, and the rise and consolidation of the private estate. We may therefore begin our analysis by asking what form the latter had assumed in the Sung dynasty.

In the twelfth century, Hu Hung wrote as follows of what he considered to be the normal state of affairs:

There is a chain of obedience stretching down from masters to tenants, and it is by means of this that the state is supplied. It cannot be dispensed with for a single day. Since this is so, how can tenants be allowed to do as they please? This would result in their masters being unable to control them! Tenants depend on their masters for their livelihood and so they have to provide them with services and submit to their discipline. Officials should inflict a vigorous punishment on tenants, and forbid them to act in accordance with their own pleasure, in the event that a master lays a plaint on any of the following grounds: (1) that his tenants are behaving perversely and refusing to recognize the distinction between superior and inferior; (2) that they are practising commerce and not

working hard at farming and sericulture; (3) that they are drinking or gambling without restraint, or are committing robbery, and are unamenable to discipline; (4) that, being unmarried, they are enticing other men's wives away; or (5) that, having many adult males in their family and more than enough food and clothing, they have been able to buy half an acre or an acre of farmland and a house, have set up a tax-paying household of their own and wish to leave their master.....

Masters should see to it however that their tenants have a secure livelihood. They should encourage them in their farming, and give them a fair share of the harvests. They should show sorrow at their misfortunes and congratulate them upon happy events, so that while they are alive they may have sufficient to be content, and may die without a feeling of resentment. If a master acts in this way, they will serve him for generation after generation. Even if he drove them away, they would still not go.

If a master does not know how to give loving protection to his tenants, bawls orders at them as if they were slavish dogs, makes use of them like cows or sheep, causing their parents, wives and children to exchange angry glances, to lose their feeling of contentment, to forget their natural sentiment of cherishing the soil, and to be anxious only to leave as fast as they can, then it is the master who is at fault. Under such circumstances an official should rebuke the master and reject his plaint.¹⁰

Tenants were generally regarded by landowners,

¹⁰ Sudō Yoshiyuki, *op. cit.*, (1954), pp. 118-20.

if not always by the state, as being bound to the soil. They were customarily sold along with the land, either on the same contract or a parallel one. They were thus almost indistinguishable from serfs.

The prohibition against tenants deserting their masters was given greatest emphasis in Hupeh and Szechwan. It was in these two provinces that landlords were most given to poaching each others' tenantry. In 1184 the Ministry of Finance ruled with respect to them that:

If, in the future, any household lays a plaint that its tenants have been pilfered, this should be dealt with in accordance with the special law (of 1052).¹¹ Henceforth, in dealing with tenants who have absconded and gone to live elsewhere: (1) Those who have done so within the past three years shall be compelled to return, with all their relatives, to their former masters. Notices will be posted throughout the prefecture that if runaway families return to their lands within two months they shall not be recklessly seized because of their failure to fulfil their obligations; and (2) Those have done so more than three years ago, and are living peaceably and do not wish to return, shall be allowed to do as they please. If, in the future, any families are made to move then the authorities shall pursue them and bring them back, regardless of any question of a three year limit. If violence has been used to effect the forcible removal of tenants, this shall be

¹¹ Which provided for the arrest and return of tenants absconding from official manors in K'uei-chou province, and from private properties in Shih and Ch'ien prefectures.

judged in accordance with the laws on kidnapping.¹²

In the southern and south-eastern provinces the law at least was gentler. A decree of 1027 laid it down that:

According to the *old regulations* for the prefectures of the provinces of Chiang, Huai, Liang-Che, Fu-chien, Ching-hu and Kuang-nan, the agricultural tenants of private persons may not inopportunoely move away. They are only allowed to live elsewhere if their masters send them and furnish them with permits. Many of them are maltreated by their masters and prevented from moving. *Henceforth* tenants shall no longer need a permit from their masters if they are to move, but they must give notice of their intention to move once they have gathered in the harvest from every field. Thus the master will obtain certainty and the tenants their convenience. That is to say, they not untimely move away in accordance with their personal whims. If this system is used, then their masters will not obstruct them or force them to stay.¹³

Sudō is of the opinion that this reform was never observed in practice, but the difference in legal provisions probably reflected a difference in institutions and practice between the densely populated south-east and the sparsely-populated west. R. E. F. Smith has noted in his *Enserfment of the Russian Peasantry*¹⁴ that in

¹² Sudō Yoshiyuki, *op.cit.*, (1954), p. 114.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 116-17. (My italics)

¹⁴ R. E. F. Smith, *Enserfment of the Russian Peasantry*, Cambridge, 1968, p. 4.

medieval Russia the shortage of manpower led landowners to be much more concerned with preventing the defection of their serfs than was the case in Western Europe. It seems likely that there was an analogous contrast between western and eastern China at this time.

Besides the tenants there were serfs, that is, hereditary personal dependents of their masters. Both groups had to perform all sorts of services for their superiors. They could not sue them at law, marry off their daughters to persons of their own choice, or buy land. Although the pressures of debt and coercion meant that some independent peasants continued to fall into a state of serf-like dependency, and accumulation of resources that some tenant-serfs gradually emancipated themselves (as suggested by Hu Hung's remarks quoted above), and although perhaps the most wretched of all agricultural labourers were the unattached day labourers who did much of the work on demesne estates, there was, generally speaking, a social gulf between free and unfree.

With a number of regional variations (such as Sungchiang Prefecture where over 80 per cent of the land was nominally 'official land') this remained essentially true up to the sixteenth century. Here is a description of a not untypical estate of mid-Ming times, that belonged to Madame Kung, aunt of Wang Shih-chen, a well-known official:

Madame would make her toilette at dawn, seated in her bedroom. Her hundred serfs, young and old, male

and female, would all come to report upon what they had been doing. Madame would pick out the laziest and have them given a flogging. For those who had toiled diligently she would prepare a goblet of wine with her own hand and mix in marrow to make it ready for drinking. Those who tasted this wine would leave flushed with happiness, and compete with each other to work hard, unmindful of their burdens. Those who had been beaten would blame themselves and say, 'What point is there in not making every effort for her ladyship, and being rewarded with a beaker of wine?' In this way everyone whom Madam employed proved himself capable; her lands supported cattle by the hundred, her streams bred fish and turtles by the picul, and her gardeners tended fruit, melons, mustard and vegetables by the tens of acres.¹⁵

Numerous estate owners of this time are described as having 'led their serfs in person', going into the fields themselves. Here is how the famous statesman Ho Liang-chün wrote of his father, who probably farmed around 1500:

He bought a large number of serf for his rich and splendid agricultural properties. Depending upon the season of the year he would supervise ploughing, sowing, cutting down undergrowth, dyke-building and the repair of the irrigation ditches. From one year's end to the next he would disregard the wind, the rain, the cold and the heat

¹⁵ Fu I-ling, *Min-tai Chiang-nan shih-min ching-chi shih-t'an* (An Enquiry into the Economy of the Urban Population of Kiangnan during the Ming Dynasty), Shanghai, 1963, p. 61.

to go regularly in person to see to matters. He never missed a day out of idleness. A programme of work was laid out for each of the serfs whom he organized. He would give them encouragement if the going was hard and, since he had a shrewd idea of the inner feelings of other people, they all had confidence in him and worked diligently. For this reason his income gradually increased until it was ten times as much as he had had to start with.¹⁶

In the course of the seventeenth century this system of serfdom and serf-like tenancy almost wholly disappeared. The most immediate cause of this was the famous series of serf and tenant uprisings which took place at this time, most of them explicitly aimed at the overthrow of the existing status order. Fu I-ling has described these in his *Rural Society and Economy in the Late Ming and Early Ch'ing*,¹⁷ and there can be no doubt about the powerful egalitarian spirit which surged through them. The barbaric treatment which was meted out to masters (who replied in kind when they had the chance) must have served as a deterrent to the revival of the institution in the long run. Here, by way of illustration, is an account of a small uprising of this kind in Kiangsi:

There had earlier been a major disturbance in Chichou in 1644 and 1645. The serfs had risen in swarms, and had been followed by the tenant-tithings and a crowd

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

¹⁷ Fu I-ling, *Ming-Ch'ing nung-ts'un she-hui ching-chi (Rural Society and Economy in the Late Ming and Early Ch'ing)*, Peking, 1961.

of mean and worthless fellows. They formed societies with the [ritual] slaughter of a bull and a pig, and engaged in shameless pillaging. In every village there were hundreds or thousands of them under rebel leaders. They ripped up pairs of trousers to serve as flags. They sharpened their hoes into swords, and took to themselves the title of 'Levelling Kings', declaring that they were levelling the distinction between masters and serfs, titled and mean, rich and poor. The tenants seized hold of their masters' best clothes; they broke into the homes of important families and shared their mansions with them. They opened the granaries and distributed the contents. They tied the masters to pillars and flogged them with whips and with lashes of bamboo. Whenever they held a drinking bout they would order the masters to kneel and pour out the wine for them. They would slap them across the cheeks and say: 'We are all of us equally men. What right had you to call us serfs? From now on, it is going to be the other way around!'¹⁸

Similar events took place in most of the south-east and south.

None of this was wholly new. There had been serf and tenant risings under the Sung. The problem is to explain why they were so effective in the seventeenth century. Serfdom at least does not reappear as a major issue in the eighteenth century or thereafter. The well-known policy adopted by the Yung-cheng Emperor (*reg.* 1723-35) of liberating hereditary occupational groups such as 'musician

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 179.

households', 'fallen households' and 'companionate serfs'¹⁹ was a reflection of the general loosening of the status order at this time.

The critical change was probably the greatly increased commercialization of economic life. This new level was distinguished from the already high level attained in Sung times chiefly by the high degree of regional interdependence in a number of commodities of everyday use, especially grain, cotton cloth, and iron tools and cooking vessels. This has been shown by Fujii Hiroshi,²⁰ and by Fu I-ling in his *Enquiry into the Economy of the Urban Population of Kiangnan under the Ming Dynasty*. One symptom of it was the rapid growth in the numbers of interregional mercantile guilds in the seventeenth and even more in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as may be seen from the recent book on the subject by Professor Ho Ping-ti.²¹

Increased commercialization was a pervasive phenomenon which weakened the old rural social order in a number of ways. First, landlords of any importance moved into the cities and market towns. By 1600 urban absentee landlordism was becoming significant in such

¹⁹ Terada Takanobu, *Yōsei-tei no semmin kaihō-rei ni tsuite'* ('The Yung-cheng Emperor's Edicts Liberating Persons of Mean Status'), *Tōyōshi kenkyū*, XXVIII, iii, December 1959, pp. 124-41.

²⁰ In his 'Shin-an shōnin no kenkyū' (A Study of the Merchants of Hsin-an), *Tōyō gakuho*, XXXVI, i, 1953, part 1.

²¹ Ho Ping-ti, *Chung-kuo hui-kuan shih-lun* (A Historical Survey of *Landmannschaften* in China), 1966.

areas as the south-east coast, the Yangtze delta, and the central Yangtze valley. By the early nineteenth century, according to a Soochow gazetteer of that time, about half the landlords in Kiangnan lived in county cities, and a further third in market towns. Their holdings were said to be 'scattered all over the place', even if they amounted to no more than five acres in all.

The personal discipline and control formerly exercised by proprietors or proprietors' agents over their work-people slackened. Tenants began to rent land from more than one landowner at one time. An increase in subsidiary rural industries made many peasants less dependent than before on the goodwill of their landlords for sheer survival. One eighteenth-century writer remarked of the counties of Wu-hsi and Chin-kuei that, 'the country folk only live off their fields for the three winter months... During the spring they close their doors, and spin or weave'.²² This new independence showed itself in combined, well-organized resistance to the payment of rents.

The conflict between the city and the countryside that has been so prominent a theme of Maoist China, dates from this time. The city was the centre of landlord power. An early nineteenth-century gazetteer

²² Quoted in Koyama Masaaki, 'Minmatsu Shinsho no daitochishoyū toku ni Kōnan deruta chitai no chūshin shite', (Large Land-ownership in the Late Ming and the Early Ch'ing with Especial Reference to the Kiangnan Delta), *Shigaku zasshi*, LXVI, xii (1957) and LXVII, i (1958), part 2, p. 59.

from Fukien province made the interesting remark that 'The peasants near the suburbs still fear the laws, and do not dare farm as if *they* were the landlords!'²³ If a large landowner now came to the countryside at all, it was probably only at harvest time. Otherwise his sharecroppers would only see him when they carried his rents into the city. If, as sometimes happened, he had set up granaries in the countryside to spare them the journey, they would only see his agents.

Such alienation sometimes led to direct warfare between the country and the town. The most dramatic instance I know of occurred in Ninghua county in 1645. According to the local gazetteer:

The great households in the county city and the tenant labourers in the rural areas hated each other like enemies. It so happened that at this time Huang Tsu-fu had broken up the bones of Huang T'ung's father, Liu-ming, razing the latter's grave. T'ung repeatedly spoke of making his way into the county city and exacting his revenge. The tenantry also had hopes of going to the county city for the pleasure of working off their customary petty grievances; and they joined together to incite T'ung to carry out this plan.

Whenever any of the inhabitants of the county city who were engaged in trade with other parts met T'ung's forces, they would be obstructed. In this way T'ung placed an embargo on all fuel and rice which had previously

²³ Fu I-ling, *op.cit.*, (1961), p. 189.

come into the county city from all sides. The people inside the city were unable to contain their rage and grief. Rascally market spies secretly brought news to T'ung of the state of affairs within the walls, and he decided to take advantage of it. He came by stealth from An-le and broke in through the north gate. The people in the county city were taken by surprise and were without any idea as to what to do. T'ung and his comrades thereupon proceeded to murder their enemies, and to loot the rich. Each tenant had the satisfaction of vengeance. They burned down almost all the fortified posts outside the city and demolished more than a hundred feet of the walls, having destroyed an incalculable amount of property within the city.²⁴

Under these conditions land became a less attractive investment for those with surplus funds. Rent collection was too problematical. Agricultural land constituted a rather small proportion of the few great eighteenth-century fortunes about whose composition we have detailed knowledge, ranging between 2 per cent and 20 per cent of the total.²⁵

The collapse of the manorial order opened up a new means of exploiting the peasants, and one which had the added charm of being more lightly taxed than land-owning. This was pawn-broking. The advancing of money or grain at interest to cultivators who were in

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 179.

²⁵ Hatano Yoshihiro, *Chūgoku kindai kogyō shi no kenkyū* (*Studies on the History of Early Modern Industry in China*), Kyoto, 1961, pp. 16-17.

the usual seasonal difficulties because of the long turnover period in farming had previously been mostly handled by the manorial organization. With its demise other means had to be found. It is this which explains the phenomenal growth in the number of pawn-shops in the eighteenth century long ago noted by Yang Lien-sheng in his *Money and Credit in China*.²⁶

One seventeenth-century writer observed that tenants 'would rather default on their landlord's rent than dare not to pay back their debt to the grain-lender, for fear that in the latter case they might be unable to borrow again the following year'.²⁷ Another, in the eighteenth century, was of the opinion that 'these days the activities of rich persons in agriculture consist in the exercise of skill in lending money at interest'.²⁸ These fragments of evidence suggest that the possession of financial resources was becoming in many ways a more important source of social and economic power in the countryside than the ownership of land *per se*.

Absentee landlordism brought its familiar concomitants: rights of permanent tenure and multiple ownership. In much of southern China the original proprietor had the so-called rights to the sub-soil, while the permanent tenant had the rights to the surface, both of which could be sold separately. How this arose is not entirely

²⁶ Yang Lien-sheng, *Money and Credit in China*, Cambridge, Mass., 1952, pp. 73-4.

²⁷ Fu I-ling, *op. cit.*, 1961, p. 162. *t*

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

clear. Sometimes land lords granted permanent tenure as an incentive to more efficient farming and the making of improvements; but perhaps the simplest general explanation is the Chinese proverb: 'Long tenancy becomes property.' The forces that were at work may be sensed from the following obscure but suggestive passage from an early nineteenth-century gazetteer for a department in Fukien:

Lung-yen is a mountainous land. Not much of it is fit for agriculture. There are numerous peasant farmers and often, when they see that there is some surplus land available for renting, they will offer a large sum of money [to the incumbent tenant] so that they may privily take over the tenancy. This causes a steady drain on their resources. If there is a bad harvest they will beg for their rent to be reduced, and even in good years they will be dilatory about paying. When their unpaid debts to the landlord have piled up over a number of years these tenants are in effect farming as if *they themselves* were the landlords.....

In recent years the land-owners have started numerous lawsuits [against tenants] on account of the latter's resistance to paying rents and their cultivating lands without having been given permission to do so. The authorities punished Ying-shih rural area, and its obstinate tenants were somewhat subdued. The other areas have, however, imitated these evil practices and they have by no means been completely rooted out. Even lands which have been bequeathed by the ancestors of a clan to provide for

sacrifices will, if given to tenants for cultivation for many years in succession, simply be occupied by the latter as their hereditary property. In cases of this sort there have been changes of tenancy, with several changes of surname, without any attention being paid to the landowner; and the rent for the surface has been double the original [subsoil] rent. These are extreme instances of title being piled upon title.²⁹

The transition from this point to the rural world of the first half of the twentieth century is now relatively obvious. The gap has been bridged, at least in a provisional way. The manorial status order has been dissolved; the major landlords have been removed into the cities; and we are left with a relatively egalitarian, competitive and fragmented rural society. Perhaps the finest brief description of this society remains Muramatsu Yūji's somewhat neglected work, *The Social Structure of the Chinese Economy*, in those passages dealing with agriculture.³⁰

Some major problems remain. Was China, on the eve of the Communist conquest, *not* a landlord society? Was this not what the revolution was mostly about?

Strictly speaking, the answer is 'No'. That revolution was more about power than about land. As

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 188-9. By the twentieth century between one-third and two-fifths of the land farmed by tenants in the lower Yangtze valley was held in permanent tenure according to Muramatsu Yūji, *Chūgoku keizai no shakai taisei (The Social Structure of the Chinese Economy)* Tokyo, 1949, p. 31g.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, especially pp. 284-337.

easily accessible proof of this I would instance Hinton's *Fanshen, A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village*, both because his general attitude is so different from mine, and also because from his carefully presented evidence it is possible to draw rather different conclusions from those he does himself. Both Hinton's villagers and the cadres who came in from outside at the time of land reform had difficulties in many cases in deciding just who were 'landlords', and a few of the latter in the end turned out to own less land than certain middle peasants, being differentiated from the latter chiefly by the fact that they did not work it themselves. The economic gap between the top and the bottom was not great, and relative positions were constantly changing. Moreover, power in the village depended more on institutional position than on the personal ownership of land. The village was somewhat unusual in view of the strength of the Catholic Church in it, but I believe that if due allowance is also made for the power of grain merchants and pawnbrokers, the conclusion could be generalized.

Water-control institutions afford an interesting illustration of the relative divorce of rural power from landholding *per se* in pre-Communist China.

There were many varieties of these, but essentially they were collective bodies, usually covering at least several villages and often many more. They possessed in common the necessary installations, that is to say the canals, embankments and lock-gates. Often they

owned some agricultural land as well, the rents from which yielded a part of their running expenses. Labour and money were levied from the members, and the leaders of the collectivity determined the times and places at which water would be allocated to each member's fields, and in what quantity. They supervised this allocation, and settled disputes.

In manorial times, as one would have expected, these organizations were mostly associations of a small number of well-to-do landowners. In a few areas of critical hydraulic importance, such as Sungchiang, the state conscripted the better-off landlords to manage conservancy work. In the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries three new developments took place, all to some extent related to changes in the system of land tenure. Communal institutions appeared, especially in North China, managed by so-called 'small tithings'. These persons were powerful individuals but rarely large landowners, owning on average from half an acre to an acre of land, and in some cases possessing no water rights themselves. Their posts were often hereditary but could be purchased; sometimes they depended on some form of public selection or election.

Water control also became commercialized. Irrigation systems became profitable businesses, controlled by merchants. Rights to water were bought, sold and borrowed independently of the ownership of irrigable land. Powerful persons first began to sell 'water shares'

in the sixteenth century, but the first purely commercialized system only emerged in the early nineteenth century, around Paotow. By the early twentieth century, if not before, peasants in many parts of Honan and Shansi had to buy their water from commercialized water conservancy associations.

Finally, landlord administration, both in the voluntary and the conscripted form, gave way to 'gentry' management, that is to direction by local notables possessing imperial degrees or titles. This shift becomes apparent in Shanghai county in the later eighteenth century, and in the polder-lands of the Canton delta at about the same time. Although these members of the gentry were no doubt often the owners of substantial amounts of land, they worked as professional managers, not as land-owners. In this, as in other ways, the gentry directors described by Chang Chung-li in his two books on the nineteenth-century Chinese gentry³¹ were of more recent origin than is perhaps always realized.³²

³¹ Chang Chung-li, *The Chinese Gentry: Studies on Their Role in Nineteenth-Century Chinese Society*, Seattle, 1955, and *The Income of the Chinese Gentry*, Seattle, 1962.

³² There is a useful bibliography of the main Japanese articles on water conservancy organizations in Morita Akira, 'Kanton-shō Nankai-ken Sang-yuan-wei no chisui kiko ni tsuite', ('The Structure of Water Control in Sang-yuan Polder in Nan-hai County in Kwangtung') *Tōyō gakuho*, XLIV (1964), p. 65. For an extensive discussion see M. Elvin, 'Market Towns and Water ways'. The County of Shanghai from 1480 to 1910' in G.W. Skinner (ed.), *The City in Late Imperial China*, Stanford, 1970 (forthcoming).

There were comparable changes in tax collection. The tribute grain was collected in the fourteenth century by local Grain Tax Administrators. These were landowners *without* official rank, chosen from 'rich families who paid much grain and capitation tax'. They had special legal privileges and fine opportunities for extortion. According to a Chia-ting county gazetteer, in early Ming times, 'fathers, mothers and elder brothers gave instruction to their sons and with younger brothers the object of fitting them to hold the post of Grain Tax Administrator, and so enjoy high esteem. They had no desire for the glory of passing the state examinations, for this honour was not so easy to transmit through numerous generation'. This system began to break down in the sixteenth century and collapsed in the seventeenth. This was partly because the authorities had deliberately weakened the position by giving it to persons of moderate means who proved unable to stand up to the predatory local clerks. Partly, no doubt, it was due migrations of too many eligible large landowners to the towns.

To oversimplify a tangled story, the upshot was that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the degreeholding gentry took over much of the collection. According to a passage in the Ch'ing *Veritable Records* for 1806:

It has been reported that when the tribute grain is collected the local officials in the provinces collect more

than the amount sanctioned by law. They make arrangements to have gentry of bad character to act as their agents in coercing payment. They first make enquiries as to who, among the gentry, are habitually fond of meddling. Then they bribe them in advance, granting them the right to contract for a certain portion of the tribute grain. The rustics and the poor have a redoubled burden because these persons can levy an excess amount from them just as they please.

T'ao Chu, who was chiefly famous for his reform of the salt monopoly, commented on this practice in 1827:

Some of them do not own a single *mou* of land, yet contract for the payment of up to several hundred piculs worth of tax. There are cases, too, when not a pint of rice is taken but only 'tribute rice silver', in amounts ranging from several tens to several hundreds of taels. In the most densely populated areas there may be as many as 300 *sheng-yuan* and *chien-sheng* [i. e., holders of the first degree], and the tribute rice money may amount to 20,000 or 30,000 taels.³³

Nakahara Teruo has suggested that many of those who contracted for the collection of the tribute grain were the proprietors of grain shops. There is no doubt that grain merchants could be powerful figures. In 1814, a censor reported that:

³³ On the collection of the tribute grain see Hoshi Ayao, *Mindai sōun no kenkyū* (*Studies on the Ming Grain Tribute System*), Tokyo, 1963, Chapter III; and Nakahara Teruo, 'Shindai ni okeru sōryūno shōhinka ni tsuite', ('The Mercantilization of the Tribute Grain under the Ch'ing Dynasty') *Shigaku zasshi* LXX (1958).

In the region of the two market towns, Shuang-ho and San-ho, in the neighbourhood of Liu-an in Lu-chou in this province [i. e., Anhwei], there is a rice merchant called Lu. He has built granaries along the river for over 23 miles, and has dominated this area for many a year. At harvest time he gathers in a million piculs, buying cheap and selling dear.³⁴

Often it was the control of land, rather than its ownership, which conferred power. The managers of church land, as in Hinton's village, or of clan lands,³⁵ or lands belonging to temples or charitable foundations, all gained significant wealth and power from their positions.

We are thus forced away from the over-simple notion that rural China in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was what it indubitably had been at the beginning of the sixteenth, namely a landlord society.

The foregoing constitutes a rough outline of the development of the Chinese countryside from the Sung to the Ch'ing. If it approximates in some measure to the truth then some interesting consequences arise.

Social mobility must have increased in the Ch'ing period with the passing of serfdom and serf-like tenancy. In his generally brilliant book, *The Ladder of Success in Imperial China, Aspects of Social Mobility*, 1368

³⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 51.

³⁵ Muramatsu Yūji *op. cit.*, (1949), p. 237; Wolfram Eberhard, *Social Mobility in Traditional China*, Leiden, 1962, pp. 41 *et seq.*

to 1911,³⁶ Professor Ho Ping-ti ignores this side of the matter. This is perhaps legitimate for someone who is concerned, as he is, primarily with the highest level of society, but it leaves an unsatisfactory picture of society as a whole. Is it really right to say, as Professor Ho does, that 'the chances of reaching the final mobility goal in Ming times seem to have been many times greater than during the Ch'ing' (p. 190)? The opposite is surely nearer to the truth.

Extensive changes in the lowest levels of the rural political structure must have accompanied the changes which we have surveyed in rural society. The breakdown of the Ming system of conscript administration, the famous 'cantons and tithings', marked more than the trough of a dynastic cycle. The Ch'ing did not try to revive the assignation of duties to landowners in specific areas. With the more important landlords in the towns, and holdings ever more fragmented, this was no longer a viable approach.

It is probably from this time that there dates the bifurcation in political structure described by Hsiao Kung-ch'uan in his *Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century*.³⁷ The upper level consisted of the 'gentry directors'. The lower level consisted of professional wardens, bailiffs and tax-prompters, persons

³⁶ Ho Ping-ti, *The Ladder of Success in Imperial China, Aspects of Social Mobility, 1368 to 1911*, New York, 1962.

³⁷ Hsiao Kung-ch'uan, *Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century*, Seattle, 1959.

of modest status and liable to instant corporal punishment if they failed in their duties. Most of them purchased their posts and lived off 'squeeze' extracted from the populace. In two contrasting ways a professionalization of the lowest tier of rural administration was necessary to replace the crumbling framework of manorialism.

There was often a close working relationship between the two new types of professional. In Wu-hsi and Chin-kuei counties they were even integrated into a single institutional framework, that of the so-called Rural Compact Boards. These boards had originally been concerned with giving edifying public lectures, but grew to be auxiliary organs of government. The regulations for them reveal this in indirect fashion. When the county magistrate and gentry directors, they say, come on one of their regular visits to an area, the scholars and commoners

ought to wait until the lecture is finished before they discuss at the Board all public matters of benefit to the locality regarding which something may usefully be done.

The link between the gentry and the lower-level professionals, who were here called 'Rural Compact Leaders', appears from a further passage.

The Rural Area Directors must come in rotation to the Boards in order to facilitate discussions. In each subdistrict they shall visit the Board twice a year At these times, one day before they come to the Board, the

directors of the sub-district shall call together the various canton directors in their sub-district and also the Rural Compact Leaders of the various urban and rural areas to a meeting in their own sub-district office, at which they will proceed to discuss all local matters which may with advantage be acted upon. Then, when the appointed time comes, each sub-district director shall go with four or five canton directors and the Rural Compact Leaders from the urban and rural areas to the General Board, where they will report upon the matters discussed in the various cantons, with the intent that further deliberations and then action will be undertaken.³⁸

The linked working of directors and 'wardens' was found, in somewhat comparable fashion, in nineteenth-century Shanghai.³⁹

A more remote possibility is that there was a connexion between the dissolution of the manorial order and the approximate doubling of the Chinese population in the eighteenth century. The timing is certainly attractive. The example of the Stein-Hardenberg reforms in Prussia suggest that a relaxation of status bonds may gradually lead to increased agricultural productivity,⁴⁰ and the

³⁸ Yü Chih, *Te-i lu* (Te-i Records, 1869), XIV, 1 pp. 18a-19b. I am indebted to Mr Piet van der Loon for drawing this remarkable book to my attention.

³⁹ M. Elvin, 'The Gentry Democracy in Shanghai, 1905-1914' (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Cambridge), 1968, pp. 115-16, 130-5.

⁴⁰ H. W. Graf Finck von Finckenstein, *Die Entwicklung der Landwirtschaft in Preussen u. Deutschland, 1800-1930*, Marburg, 1960, pp. 99-100.

shift in Tokugawa Japan from an agriculture organized through kinship and status links to one based more on economic links⁴¹ points in a somewhat similar direction. Greater freedom to move may have contributed to the increased opening up of some areas, notably the central Yangtze valley and (although it was technically illegal) Manchuria. Given the nature of intensive rice cultivation it also seems probable that operation (as distinct from ownership) in family farm units was more efficient than the largescale operation with directly managed serfs or tenants who had previously been responsible for a substantial share of Chinese agricultural output. The argument bristles with difficulties, but it seems one of the few approaches capable of explaining how China roughly doubled its agricultural output in a hundred years without anything like doubling the area under crops, or using any techniques not already known, if not always widely used, in early Yuan times at the latest. More doublecropping, use of New World plants, and prolonged internal peace certainly also played a part.

Last of all, did the gradual removal of the élite from prolonged personal contact with the realities of farming and subsidiary industries in and after the seventeenth century end by blunting their appreciation of technology? Did they become so enveloped in their literary-financial-administrative environment that only

⁴¹ T. C. Smith, *op. cit.*, Chapters VIII to XI.

the shock of the Western impact could free them from it? The timing is once again attractive. The waning of what had seemed to be a late Ming renaissance of interest in scientific studies coincides with the passing of the manorial order.

These last two suggestions are of course highly speculative. They are put forward here chiefly in order to illustrate the wealth of new and intriguing correlations that emerge as stimuli to thought when the attempt is made to analyse one of the underlying trends in Chinese history over a sufficiently long span.

Glossary

chien-sheng 監生

Fei Hsiao-t'ung 費孝通

Fu I-ling 傅衣凌

Hatano Yoshihiro 波多野善大

Ho Ch'ang-ch'ün 賀昌群

Ho Liang-chün 何良俊

Ho ping-ti 何炳棣

Hoshi Ayao 星斌夫

Hsiao Kung-ch'uan 蕭公權

hu 斛

Katō Shigeshi 加藤繁

Koyama Masaaki 小山正明

Morita Akira 森田明

Muramatsu Yūji 村松佑次

Nakahara Teruo 中原晃雄

Niida Noboru 仁井田陞
sheng-yuan 生員
Sudō Yoshiyuki 周藤吉之
T'ao Chu 陶澍
Te-i-lu 得一錄
Wang Shih-chen 王世貞
Yang Lien-sheng 楊聯陞
Yü Chih 余治

A Documentary Study of Chinese Landlordism in the Late Ch'ing and Early Republic Kiangnan

by

Muramatsu Yūji

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I

In current studies of the problem of landlordism in twentieth-century China there is a fundamental conflict and contradiction between the interpretations of the socioeconomic historians, whose major thesis is often the inevitable process of progressive weakening and eventual decline of the control of "feudal" landlords over land and peasants, and the actual conditions and facts of contemporary Chinese history, in which the decay of landlord power seems to have been far from inevitable, and where such persons as P'eng Pai and Mao Tse-tung have had to exert great revolutionary efforts to forcibly destroy the landlords' dominance.

There can be no doubt, however, that such socio-

economic developments as the progressive commercialization and monetarization of the Chinese rural economy did have a great effect upon the freeing of the peasantry from the direct control exercised by their gentry landlords and by the local authorities. But even if we accept this as a general tendency, or as a valid theoretical generalization, much specific factual historical research remains to be done before we can say with confidence to what extent, in which areas, and at what time, this general tendency actually took effect.

It is the generally accepted view that there is a lack of adequate documentary source materials available to permit us to make direct concrete studies in depth of Chinese landlords and their exploitation and control of the peasantry, both from the institutional aspect and also in action. As a result really exhaustive and thorough studies of Chinese landlordism have been very few. However, the generally accepted notion that primary sources for modern Chinese economic history are scarce or lacking is true only to a limited degree. In recent years I have discovered considerable numbers of landlord documents, including lists of tenants, rent-rolls, tax-books, rent-collectors' letters and various procedural documents deriving from landlord bursaries, in the libraries of the Tōyō Bunko, the National Diet, the Jimbun Kagaku Kenkyūjo of Kyōto University, the Tōyō Bunka Kenkyūjo of Tōkyō

University, and the Harvard-Yenching Institute.¹ In these collections at least several hundred items of manuscript source materials are available for study. Up to the present I have myself been able to work through only 100 or so of these, and have published the results of my research in a series of articles in Japanese which are listed below.²

¹ A great many scholars have helped and encouraged me in this study. I would particularly like to express my gratitude to the librarians of the institutions in which the manuscripts are preserved, and also to Professors L. S. Yang of Harvard and D. C. Twitchett London, who have gone carefully through my English MS before publication.

² My principal studies relating to this topic are as follows. For the sake of brevity, I refer to them in subsequent notes as Muramatsu (1), etc.

- (1) "*Niju-seiki shotō ni okeru So-shū kimbō no ichi so-san to sono kosaku-seido—Kōso-shō Gok-ōken Hi-shi Kyōju-san kankei 'Soseki-bensa-satsu' no kenkyū*" 二十世紀初頭における蘇州近傍の一租税とその小作制度——江蘇省吳江縣費氏恭壽棧關係「租籍便壺」冊の研究 'A landlord bursary in the neighbourhood of Su-chou at the beginning of this century and its tenant-system—a study of the Kungshou-chan bursary of the Fei clan of Wuchiang county, Kiangsu'. pp. 47-237
- (2) "*Shin-matsu So-shū fukin no ichi so-san ni okeru jinushi shoyūchi no chōzei kosaku kankei—Kōso-shō Go-ken Fu rin-ichi-san chitei-sōryō kankei bosatsu ni tsuite*". 清末蘇州附近の一租税における地主所有地の徴税小作關係——江蘇省吳縣馮林一棧關係地下漕糧簿冊について 'Tax payment and rent collection by a landlord bursary of late Ch'ing Su-chou—a study of the tax books of the Feng Lin-i chan bursary in Wu-hsien, Kiangsu'. pp. 391-636.
- (3) "*Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan shūzō no 'Gyorin satsu' ni tsuite*" 國立國會圖書館收藏の「魚鱗冊」にいて 'On the "Fish-scale books" possessed by the National Diet Library, Tokyo.' pp. 239-312.
- (4) "*Shin-matsu Konan ni okeru kosaku jōken to kosakuryō no saitsui ni tsuite — Kōso-shō Go-ken Han-shi Gisō, onajiku*

These establish clearly, I believe, that landlordism in China remained overwhelmingly powerful at least until the early 1920's and that one vital factor in the maintenance of this power was the institution known as the

Go-shi Yokei-san no shōyu, shōran, soyū, jijō, sekkyaku, oyobi 'shus-setsu bi-sa' satsu no kenkyū 清末江南における小作条件と小作料の催進について——江蘇省吳縣范氏義莊，同吳氏翁裡棧の召由，承攬，租由，字彙，切脚および「出切備査」冊の研究 'On the conditions of tenant cultivation and extraction of rent payments in late Ch'ing Kiangnan—a study of documents such as *Chao-yu, Ch'eng-lan, Tsu-yu, Tsu-t'iao, Ch'ieh-chiao*, and "*Ch'u-ch'ieh pei-ch'a*" issued by the Charitable Estate of the Fan clan, and the Yü-ching tsu-chan bursary of the Wu clan of Wu-hsien county. Kiangsu'. pp. 313-390.

- (5) "*Shin-matsu Min-sho no Kōnan ni okeru hōran kōnkei. no jittai to sono kessan-hōkoku—Soshū Go-shi Yokei-san 'Hōshō kokugō bisa' satsu no kenkyū*" 清末民初の江南における包攬關係の實態とその決算報告——蘇州吳氏翁裡棧「報銷各號備査」冊の研究 'The realities of tax-farming and the balance of a tax-farming enterprise—a study of the *Pao-hsiao ke-hao pei-ch'a* account books of the Yü-ching chan bursary of the Wu clan'. pp. 679-745
- (6) "*Saikin gūmoku shita jakkan no Chūgoku jinushi-sei kankei monjo ni tsuite—Hofutsu-Yenkei Kenkyūsho shūzō no soyō sono ta*" 最近通目した若干の中國地主制關係文書のいて——哈氏燕京研究所收藏の租額その他 'On some more Chinese landlord documents recently studied—such as the *tsu-yu* possessed by the Harvard-Yenching Institute and others'. pp. 637-678.
- (7) "*Kindai-Chūgoku no jinushi monjo ni tsuite—sono shurui to seishitsu*" 近代中國の地主文書について——その種類と性質 'On the landlord documents of modern China, their types and nature'. pp. 1-46.
- (8) "*Chūgoku kindai-ka no tochi-mōdai*" 中國近代化の土地問題 'The land problem in the modernization of China', *Rekishī Kyōiku*, XIII, 12, 1965, 1-12.

“landlord bursary” (*tsu-chan*, 租棧) which has previously received comparatively little scholarly attention.³

Roughly speaking a landlord bursary or *tsu-chan* was an organization for the large-scale exploitation and management of lands owned by landlords. It was usually established and owned by a gentry⁴ landlord with some official background and therefore with considerable local influence and social standing. Such a landlord bursary did not only manage the landed properties owned by the

³ Until very recently, the only studies of the bursary institution apart from my own were those in Amano Motonosuke's 天野元之助 *Shina nōgyō-keizairon* 支那農業經濟論 Tokyo, 1940, and *Shina nōson zakki* 支那農村雜記 Tokyo, 1942, and in the chapter on the tenancy system of the *Chung-kuo ching-chi nien-chien* 1934 中國經濟年鑑—民國二三年, Nanking, 1935.

[Readers may be interested to compare this documentary study with the classical field-study of a neighbouring district, K'ai-hsien-kung, published before the war by Fei Hsiao-t'ung 費孝通 in his *Peasant life in China* (London, 1939). Fei mentions the institution of the landlord bursary, which he calls a 'rent-collecting bureau', and which in K'ai-hsien-kung was called a *chii* (局?) rather than *chan* 棧 on pp. 188 ff. Fei is writing of a later period even than the latest of the documents cited here, when the process of breakdown had gone still further. As he says, 'economic depression.....has made rent a heavy burden on the peasant, and the income derived from rent much more vulnerable to the landlord'. The death of Fei Chung-shen, mentioned on p. 11, was shortly followed by a peasant rising in the Su-chou district, which was put down with much bloodshed.]

Last year another article appeared dealing with the subject, Chou Ch'i-chung 周其忠 "*Ti-chu chieh-chi ti lien-ho tsu-hsi—P'ing-hu tsu-chan lien-ho pan-shih-suo ti chi-chien tsui-cheng*" 地主階級的連合組織——平湖租棧運合弁事的幾件罪證, *Wen-wu*, 1965, no. 3, 6-7, 11.

⁴ In this study I employ the term 'gentry', in spite of the difficulties which this raises, in roughly the same sense as does Chang Ch'ung-li in his study *The income of the Chinese gentry*, Seattle, 1962.

owner of the bursary, but also accepted as agents lands owned by other landowners who found it more convenient to deposit their landholdings with the bursary rather than to manage them directly for themselves. The bursary collected rents from tenants and paid the taxes due to the local government in respect of all the lands under its management. The rents received from the tenants of lands accepted for management from landowners other than the owner of the bursary were remitted annually by the bursary to their owners after deduction of taxes, bursary commission (*chan-fei* 棧費), and other expenses.

The authorities recognized the convenience of the landlord bursary in the collection of taxes on behalf of the local government, and it became customary to dispatch regularly runners from the *fu* or *hsien* administration (*Fu-ch'ai* 府差 or *Hsien-ch'ai* 縣差) or other lower-ranking official underlings, such as *chou-p'an* 舟盤, to assist the rent-collectors to force the tenants to pay their rents to the bursaries.⁵

⁵ Throughout the Ch'ing period (and indeed from the early years of the Ming) strict prohibitions were repeatedly promulgated by the central government against the existence of any institution or persons acting as intermediaries in the payment of taxes between the actual taxpayer and the local authorities. However, the very repetition of such orders proves the futility of the government's attempts to enforce the principle which it called *tzu-feng t'ou-kuei* 自封投櫃 'personally wrapping and personally putting into the chest'. In actual fact there was a great deal of such intervention of third parties, which was known by the general term *pao-lan* 包攬. Most of the edicts embodying such prohibitions point out the local influential families and gentry members as the chief culprits. I am of the opinion that the landlord bursaries were among the most confirmed offenders. In any case, whatever prohibitions the central government chose to issue, local officials were still forced to depend upon the goodwill and assistance of landlord gentry to collect their taxes.

The landlord bursaries permanently employed such personnel as clerks (*shih-yeh* 師爺), workmen (*kungjen* 工人), and rent-collectors (*ts'ui-chia* 催甲). The former were allocated tasks in the store-houses (*chants'ang* 棧倉) book-keepers' office (*chang-fang* 賬房) and cashier's office (*kuei-fang* 櫃房) maintained by the bursary. The rent-collectors usually lived in the countryside, were and each responsible for the collection of rents due from a certain specified number of tenants. They collaborated with the runners and other official underlings sent out by the local authorities, to press for payment of rents from the tenants, and to bring the rents in to the bursary.

Among the individual landlord bursaries for the study of which significant amounts of relevant documents are available are the following:

- (1) The Kung-shou-chan 恭壽棧 or Kung-shou-sheng-chan 恭壽盛棧 of the Fei 費 clan. The documents relating to this are in the Tōyō Bunko.⁶
- (2) The Yü-ching tsu-chan 俞經租棧 of the Wu 吳 clan. The documents relating to this are in the National Diet Library.⁷
- (3) The Ching-yü tsu-chan 經俞租棧 of the Ts'ai 蔡 clan. The documents relating to this are in the Jimbun Kagaku kenkyūjo, Kyōtō University.
- (4) The Tzu-ching tsu-chan 資敬租棧 of the Wang 王 clan. The documents relating to this are in

⁶ See Muramatsu (1).

See Muramatsu (4) and (5).

the National Diet Library.

- (5) The Feng-ho-chan 豐和棧 of the P'an 潘 clan. The documents relating to this are in the National Diet Library.
- (6) The Yung-an-chan 永安棧 of the Hsü 徐 clan. The documents relating to this are in the Tōyō Bunka Kenkyūjo, Tōkyō University.
- (7) A bursary of which neither the name of the bursary nor that of the owner clan is known, but which apparently had a close relationship with the Feng-lin-i-chan 馮林一棧 possessed by Feng Kueifen 馮桂芬. The documents relating to this are in the Tōyō Bunko.⁸
- (8) The Kung-hao-tsu-chan 公號租棧 of the Pin-hsing Kung-suo 賓興公所. The documents relating to this are in the Harvard-Yenching Institute Library.⁹
- (9) The Charitable Estate of the Fan clan, i. e. the famous *Fan-shih I-chuang* 范氏義莊. Documents relating to this are in the National Diet Library

⁸ See Muramatsu (2). The covers of the rent and tax-books from this bursary held by Toyo Bunko give the name neither of the bursary nor of its owner clan. However on some is the note 馮林一棧備考 'Held by the Feng Lin-i bursary for future reference'. Feng Lin-i was, of course, the well-known scholar official Feng Knei-fen (1809-74), in whom see Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period*, Washington, 1943: Huang Ts'ui-po 黃浚伯 "C'hi-shih nien ch'ien ti Wei-hsin jen-wu Feng Ching-t'ing" 七十年前的維新人物: 馮景亭, *Chung-shan Wen-huah Chiao-yü-kuan Chi-k'an*, IV, 2, 1937, 96-116; Momose Hiroshi 百瀬弘, "Hyō Keifun to sono chojutsu ni tsuite" 馮桂芬とその著述について *Tōa Ronsō*, II, 1940, 95-122; and Muramatsu (2), 525-49.

⁹ See Muramatsu (6) and (7), particularly postscript 3 to the latter.

and in the Tōyō Bunka Kenkyūjo.¹⁰

Of these bursaries, the first six were all established and owned by individual clans, and the seventh, too, was probably also of the same type. The eighth was a bursary established by a group of gentry families for the special purpose of donating grants to meet the travel expenses of candidates visiting the metropolis or the provincial capital to sit for the official examinations.¹¹ The last was the famous charitable clan estate of the Fan clan, which had been kept continuously in existence since 1050 and lasted until our own days. There are already some good studies of this.¹²

All of these bursaries were, it seems, situated in the same province of Kiangnan, Kiangsu, and most of them were in the same district of Su-chou. However, very recently Chou Ch'i-chung has published a study of

¹⁰ See Muramatsu (4).

¹¹ See Ho Ping-ti, *The ladder of success in Imperial China*, New York, 1962, also Yang Lien-sheng 楊聯陞, 'Ko-chu shih-tai ti fu-k'ao lu-fei wen-ti 科舉時代的赴考旅費問題 *Ching-huah Hsueh-pao*, new ser., II, 2, 1961, 116-28.

¹² See Shimizu Morimtsu 清水盛光 *Chugoku zokusan seido ko* 中國族產制度考, Tokyo, 1949; D. C. Twitchett, 'The Fanclan's charitable estate, 1050-1760' (in A. F. Wright (ed.), *Confucianism in action*, Stanford, 1959) and 'Documents on clan administration: I. The rules of administration of the charitable estate of the Fan clan', *Asia Major*, NS VIII, 1, 1960, 1-35; Niisa Noboru, 仁井田陞, 'Chugoku no dozoku mata wa sonraku no tochi shoyu mondai' 中國の同族又は村落の土地所有問題 in *Chugoku hoseishi kenkyu*, 3, Tokyo, 1962, 683-740; Makino Tatsumi 牧野巽, *Kinsei Chugoku sozoku kenkyu* 近世中國宗族研究, Tokyo, 1949, 121-34; Kondo. Hideki 近藤秀樹, 'Hanshi giso no henshen' 范氏義莊の變遷, *Toyoishi Kenkyu*, XXI, 4, 1963, 93-138.

the activities of similar landlord bursaries in P'ing-hu county in Chekiang province,¹³ and it is thus clear that the landlord bursary was not an institution confined to the very special Su-chou district. Just how widely it was distributed, however, will only be ascertained by future research.

The dates of the surviving documents cover the period from the late Ch'ing until the 1930's. For example, rent books of the Kung-shou-chan (bursary no. 1 above) dated 1906, 1907, 1908, 1909, 1910, 1911, 1912, 1922, 1927, 1928, and 1929 are available. In addition, the National Diet Library possesses the tenancy contracts, which range in date at least from 1868 to 1919. From the books of the Yü-ching tsu-chan (bursary no. 2) we can reconstruct an almost continuous record of its land management from 1893 to 1928. Thus, although these materials concern a rather small and restricted area geographically, the documents may sometimes be used to provide a long and continuous chronological series of statistical materials.

II

One of the principal groups of surviving landlord documents comprises rent-books entitled *Tsu-pu* 租簿, *Tsu-chi* 租籍, or *Tsu-chi pien-ch'a* 租籍便查, from certain of the bur saries. These books were usually

¹³ See p. 3, n. 3.

compiled annually by the bursary clerks, and recorded in respect of every individual plot of land (*a*) the names of its tenants, (*b*) its dimensions, (*c*) the amount of rent, (*d*) the rent payments made during the year, (*e*) credits given to the tenants, if any, and (*f*) any other relevant details concerning the particular landlord-tenant relationship.¹⁴ The rentbooks thus give us not only a general picture of the estates managed by the bursary as a whole, but also provide a variety of detailed information about the rents of these lands, the tenants who cultivated each plot, the amounts of rent collected both in kind and in monetary equivalents, the payments of rent, and outstanding arrears.

The total acreage of lands managed by a single bursary often amounted to several thousand *mou*, which was quite extensive in comparison with the average scale of landed property in the Yangtse valley region in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For example, in 1908 the total acreage controlled by the Kung-shou-chan (bursary no. 1) amounted to 2913.709 *mou*,¹⁵ while those of the unnamed bursary no. 7 totalled 5884.450 *mou*.¹⁶ A Part of these lands was actually owned by

¹⁴ The Tōyō Bunko possesses 24 volumes of rent-books for lands belonging to the Kung-shou'ang, Hung-hsin-hao, I-tai, and Chün-hao, administered by the Kung-shou-chan bursary. All bear the bursary's name either on the cover or printed in the block centres (*p'an-hsin*) of each page. Other rent-books in the block centres (*p'an-hsin*) of each page other rent-books in the Diet Library, Jimbun Kagaku Kenkyūjo, Kyōto, and the Harvard-Yenching Institute are in very similar form.

¹⁵ See Muramatsu (1), 73.

¹⁶ See Muramatsu (2), 559.

and the owner of the bursary, but the bursary also managed controlled other lands belonging to other landowners, some of them fellow-clansmen of the owner, but others members of other clans. An interesting feature of the bursary institution is that the bursary owner himself was usually not the owner of the largest acreage administered by the bursary. Almost always the largest landed property under a bursary's management belonged to some outside landowner. The acreage of lands belonging to various owners which made up the estate managed by the Kung-shou-chan (bursary no. 1) are set out in table I.¹⁷

Among these landowners, the first two, i. e. the Fei and Ku clans, belonged, as I shall show below, to the gentry class. Both of their landed estates bear the designation *t'ang* 堂 ("hall"), that is to say the land was family or clan property. Of the other four land-

Table 1
Ownership of Lands under the Management of
the Kung-shou-chan Bursary of the Fei clan

Kung-shou-t'ang of the Fei clan (費恭壽堂) (the bursary owner)	<i>mou</i> 368.185
Lo-shou-t'ang of the Ku clan (顯樂壽堂)	182.727
Ho-hao (合號)	479.610
Hung-hsin-hao of the P'u clan (溥鴻新號)	1883.187
I-t'ai (怡泰)	100.684
Chun-hao (駿號)	<u>840.428</u>
Total	<u>3854.821</u>

¹⁷ See Muramatsu (1), 73.

owners, which include the owners of the two largest estates, those of the Hung-hsin-hao and Chün-hao, three did not bear the designation *t'ang* but were instead entitled *hao* 號 which was normally used for the title of business or commercial organizations.¹⁸ Perhaps most, or at least some of the landowners who preferred to deposit their lands with such gentry-managed bursaries were in fact absentee landlords who had to live in the cities because of their involvement in their urban enterprises.¹⁹

Of the Fei and Ku families mentioned above, the latter was unquestionably a gentry family with an official background, since in the rent books of the bursary both the family name Ku and the title of its hall (*t'ang*) also bear an official title--*Shih-hsi yün-ch'i-wei*. 世襲雲騎尉²⁰ I have also been able to identify and obtain some information about the Fei family. Between the leaves of the rent-book dated 1907 of the Kung-shou-chau bursary owned by the Feis, I discovered an empty envelope used for an obituary gift addressed by a certain Wang Ta-jen 王大人 in Peking to a person by the name of Fei Chung-shen 費仲深 living in the Hun-t'ang-hsiang 混堂巷 in Su-

¹⁸ See Muramatsu (1), pp. 76-77, and p. 224, n. 13.

¹⁹ This does not imply that absentee landlords whose principal business was in the cities deposited lands with bursaries because these were in the countryside. Most bursaries were not, but were established in a town like Su-chou (see Muramatsu (6), 655-59). The advantage which the bursary had to offer was that through the gentry-official status of its owner it was able to control and manage peasants even from its urban headquarters.

²⁰ See Muramatsu (1), 76.

chou. It seemed reasonable to assume that this Fei Chung-shen was either the head, or at least an important member of the Fei clan who owned the bursary. Working upon this assumption it has proved possible to discover quite a lot of material on the history of this Fei clan from contemporary local gazetteers and the collected works of local persons.²¹

According to these sources, the Feis had been locally eminent in the Su-chou region during the Sung and Yüan dynasties, but later fell into a decline, and hardly any record remains of them during the Ming period. In early Ch'ing times one of their members, Fei Hung-hsüeh 費洪學 acquired the *chin-shih* degree in 1700 and was appointed magistrate of the county of Po-yeh in Pei Chih-li province. But even after this the family remained poor, and Fei Chen-hsün 費振勳 (1738-1816), Fei Hung-hsüeh's descendant and the great-great-grandfather of Fei Chung-shen mentioned above needed great determination and powerful ambition to undertake the study required to pass the official examinations with high ranking. Fei Chen-hsün passed the *chü-jen* examination in 1768 and the *chin-shih* in 1775. He later held a succession of both important and lucrative offices such as Reviser of the Wen-yüan-ke 文淵閣檢閱, secretary of the Szechuan

²¹ See Muramatsu (1), 78-80; Chen Yung-kuang, 'Fei Chi-chien chia-chuan' 費給諫家傳, in *T'ai-i-chou wen-chi* 太乙舟文集, 3; Chang Chung-jen 張仲仁 'Fei chün chung-shen chia-chuan' 費君仲深家傳, *chih-yüan pan-yüeh-k'an*, 5; *Wu-chiang hsien hsü-chih*, 19; etc.

Office of the Board of Finance 戶部四川司主事, senior secretary of the Shantung Office of the Board of Finance 戶部山東司郎中, Superintendent of the Pao-ch'üan-chü Mint 監寶泉局, Supervising Censor of Shantung Province 山東監察御史, etc. Most of these posts must have been lucrative ones, since they were specially concerned with such duties as the regulation of the salt business, the minting of coin, and water-conservancy works on the Yellow River. After his retirement from office Fei Chen-hsün taught for seven years in the famous Cheng-i shu-yüan 正誼書院 academy.

It was undoubtedly in Fei Chen-hsün's time that the Feis established their position as a wealthy and influential landlord gentry family. After him at least three clan members acquired the *chin-shih* degree and two others became *chü-jen*. Fei Chung-shen's immediate ancestors had remarkable academic success. His father was a *chinshih*, his grandfather a *chü-jen*, and both his great-grandfather and great-great-grandfather were *chin-shih*. All of them, moreover, were employed in active official posts and two of them were posthumously enshrined, one as a "Country Sage" (*Hsiang-hsien* 鄉賢) and the other as an "Official of Distinction" (*Ming-huan* 名宦).

Fei Chung-shen himself (1884-1935), influenced doubtless by the sudden change in the social, political, and intellectual atmosphere which followed the first Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, did not apply himself very rigorously in preparing for the official examinations.

Having failed in one autumn examinaion, he purchased the official status of assistant secretary, and was given a magistrate's post in Pei Chih-li, but in fact worked as a secretary to Yüan Shin-k'al (1859-1916),²² at that time Governor-General of Chih-li, and later the president of the Chinese Republic. Both Fei Chung-shen and Yüan's eldest son were married to daughters of Wu Ta-cheng 吳大澂 (1835-1902)²³ a very eminent civil and military official who was also a noted archaeo-logist, painter, and calligrapher. Wu was a very important gentry-member from Su-chou, where his clan had long been extremely influential.

In 1909, after Yüan Shih-k'ai temporarily fell from political power. Fei Chung-shen was given a post as second secretary in the Board of Transportation and Communications. But in the next year he returned home to Su-chou to observe the ceremonial period of mourning for his mother, and then remained living in retirement in Su-chou as an influential member of the local gentry. In 1911, the former Viceroy Ch'eng Te-ch'üan 程德全 was installed as head of the "republican" army in Kiangsu, and asked Fei to participate in establishing a new government.²⁴ But Fei Chung-shen rejected any official post

²² See Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period*, 950-3.

²³ *ibid.*, 880-2.

²⁴ See Muramatsu (1,) p. 225, n. 26. See also Kuo Hsiao-ch'eng 郭孝成, *Chiang-su kuang-fu chi-shih* 江蘇光復記事, included in Chung-kuo Shih-hsueh hui (ed.), *Hsin-hai ko-ming* 辛亥革命 VII, 1-32.

and devoted himself to restoring and maintaining order in the district after the revolution.

He established an electrical company to compete with the enterprises operating on foreign capital. He also set up the first local farmers' bank to provide financial support for farmers and landowners to "protect" them against the reckless exploitation of the traditional style moneylenders. He negotiated with the local officials to decrease the amount of tax payable in years of bad harvests, and dredged and embanked harbours and canals around the Taihu lake. He restored the local shrine of Confucius, and edited biographies of the elders of Wu-chiang his native county. But at the same time he sent his own sons to study abroad, one to Oxford and another to the United States. In 1915 he paid a short visit to Peking, which was at the time under the dictatorship of his former patron Yüan Shihk'ai. He was offered an official post, but having remonstrated against the plot of Yüan and his followers to enthrone Yüan as emperor he returned to Su-chou and remained there until his death in 1935.

In 1924 the first repercussions of the civil war, resulting from the growing independence of the provincial war-lords and from the antagonism between the Conservative north and the revolutionary south, began to reach the districts of Su-chou and Wu-chiang. First the army of the war-lord Sun Ch'üan-fang 孫傳芳, then the Manchurian army of Chang Tso-lin 張作霖 poured into the district, and soon after, in 1927, came the Kuomintang Northern Expeditionary Army.

In the midst of the consequent disorders, Fei Chung-shen made great efforts to promote the charitable activities of the Red Cross, and to assist generally in the restoration and maintenance of public order in the province.

After the revolution of 1927 it would appear that the financial prosperity of the landlord enterprises of the Fei clan rapidly deteriorated. This was partly the result of the increasing independence of their tenants, and partly the result of the development programme initiated by the new Nationalist Government, established in 1928 in Nanking, which suddenly aggravated the tax burdens on their lands. This situation became still more grave with the onset of the general economic depression after 1931. According to a history of the Fei family compiled by Change Chung-jen, 600 *mou* of their hereditary lands in the counties of Chen-tse 震沢 and Wu-chiang 吳江 in the neighbour-hood of Su-chou suffered bad harvests in successive years, and even though the Feis sold some of these lands to pay off their tax arrears, this was still insufficient. Fei Chung-shen in desperation petitioned the government to have all the family lands confiscated in settlement of their outstanding tax debts, but naturally his request was rejected. He could not press his poverty-stricken peasants to pay rent, and so in 1935 he addressed another long and extremely moving letter to the government. But before this could be sent he fell sick and died.²⁵

²⁵ After Fei Chung-shen's death, none of his three sons succeeded him as a landlord bursary owner. Two became engineers, and the other a university professor. See Muramatsu (1), p. 83.

I have gone into some detail about their case, because the Feis, and Fei Chung-shen as the head of their clan, were in many ways representative of the condition of the more prosperous scholar-official gentry and their families in Kiangsu during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The Feis were a locally important clan, who had enjoyed unusual academic success and access to office in successive generations. Fei Chung-shen had, moreover, been able to strengthen their position still further by a marriage alliance with another very influential local clan, He and his clan thus had a solid and substantial basis for establishing a landlord bursary. Nevertheless, the Feis were not themselves owners of the largest share of the lands which were managed by their bursary. The largest single share of their lands was accepted for management from the Hung-hsin-hao of the P'u clan, which was probably a non-agricultural business organization possessed by a different family.

Another important feature of the landholdings recorded in the rent-books of the landlord bursaries is that they were almost invariably composed of a large number of very small fragmented plots. In this respect there was no difference between the lands owned by the bursary owners and those of other landholders who had deposited their lands with the bursary for management. Not only were the individual plots always very small, but their situations were always widely dispersed. They

were usually scattered across the borders of such minor administrative sub-districts as the *tu* 都 and *t'u* 圖, and sometimes even extended into more than one county (*hsien*) or prefecture (*fu*), intermingled with other plots owned or held by many other landlords or managed by other landlord bursaries. So that the statement above that the total area of lands which were held and managed by a single bursary often amounted to several thousand *mou* does not in any way imply the existence in a certain fixed location of a large, integrated, continuous estate of that total acreage. Nor does it imply that the scale of farming on a bursary's lands was larger than the normal.

Table 2

Size Distribution of Plots Making up the Lands
by the Fei clan's Kung-shou-chan

Owner	Kung-Shou-	Hung-hsin-	Lo-shou-	Ho-hao	I-tai	Chün-hao
Size (<i>mou</i>)	t'ang	hao	t'ang			
Below 0.99	27	97	22	15	11	59
1.0-1.99	53	138	27	50	4	71
2.0-2.99	45	165	29	42	9	68
3.0-3.99	21	112	12	41	8	45
4.0-4.99	12	52	2	15	6	28
5.0-5.99	6	43	2	8	1	27
6.0-6.99	—	21	1	3	—	9
7.0-7.99	—	6	—	2	—	2
8.0-8.99	—	12	—	1	—	3
9.0-9.99	—	4	—	—	1	—
Above 10	1	9	—	—	—	2
Total	165	659	95	177	40	314

Table 3

Average Size of Plots Making up the Lands Managed
by the Fei clan's Kung-shou-chan

Owner	Total acreage (<i>mou</i>)	Number of plots	Average size of plot (<i>mou</i>)
Hung-hsin-hao	1883.187	659	2.85
Kung-shou-t'ang	368.185	165	2.23
Lo-shou-t'ang	182.727	95	1.92
Ho-hao	479.610	177	2.70
I-tai	100.684	40	2.51
Chün-hao	840.427	314	2.67
Total	3854.820	1450	2.65

To give a picture of the small size of individual plots, I tabulate, in tables 2 and 3 (p. 380, 381), the sizes of plots making up the landholdings managed by the Kungshou-chan (bursary no. 1) which was owned by Fei Chung-shen and his family.²⁶

Table 2 shows clearly that at least 75 per cent and in some cases more than 90 per cent of the plots making up each property were smaller than 3 *mou*. It also shows a slight difference between the plots comprised in the larger properties such as that of the Hung-hsin-hao, and those of the smaller owners such as the Lo-shou-t'ang. The larger properties included a smaller percentage of plots under 3 *mou* in size than the smaller. There is also a difference in composition between the two clan properties (Kung-shou-t'ang and Lo-shou-t'ang) and the properties of the urban-based *hao*, the average size of plots being much greater among the latter than

²⁶ See Muramatsu (1), 91-92.

the former. But in any case, as is shown in table 3, the difference was not very great. The larger the acreage of a domain became, the larger the number of its component strips, and the average size of the individual plots remained about 2.5 *mou*.

Of course there were some cases of tenant farmers whose tenancy extended over a number of individual plots of land.²⁷ But in the majority of instances the plots rented to individual tenants corresponded with the area farmed by the tenant's family. In pre-war central China the acreage generally accepted as necessary for subsistence was 3 *mou per capita* (not per family). So it is clear that the scale of cultivation undertaken by the tenants who farmed the lands managed by the landlord bursaries was really very small, and not very far above bare subsistence level.

It is possible also to get a clear idea of the wide dispersal of the plots managed by a bursary, since the rent-books usually give the position of each strip by specifying the *yü* 圩 or embanked area in which it was located. The *yü* was an official cadastral subdivision of the *t'u* and *tu*, and since it was usually quite small these indications enable us to locate the plots with some precision, for local gazetteers of the locality²⁸ permit us

²⁷ See Muramatsu (1), 120-23, 129-31 for example. The problem of the rights, legal status, and so on of tenants is taken up below.

²⁸ See *Wu-chiang hsien-chih* (Chien-lung ed.), 3, 乾隆序; 吳江縣志; *Ch'ang-chou hsien-chih* (recut in 1765), 1, 乾隆三十年重鵬長洲縣志; etc. It would appear that the district subdivisions of *tu*, *t'u*, and *yü* in this region underwent little change during the Ch'ing period.

to discover to which *t'u* and *tu* each *yü* belonged. Table 4²⁹ shows us the very wide dispersal of the plots owned by the Kung-shou-t'ang and administered by the Fei clan's Kung-shou-chan bursary.

Table 4

Dispersal of Plots Leased out by Kung-shou-t'ang

County	<i>Tu</i>	<i>T'u</i>	Distance of <i>tu</i> from county town
Wu-hsien	1	1	more than 20 <i>li</i> north-west
	3 [East]	6, 10, 11, 12	more than 20 <i>li</i> south
	22	1	55 or 56 <i>li</i> south
	23 [East]	3, 9, 17	45 <i>li</i> south
	24	2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10	more than 40 <i>li</i> south-west
	28	20, 24	45 <i>li</i> south-east
Chen-tse	2 [South]	1	15 <i>li</i> south-west
	18	14	more than 50 <i>li</i> south-west

Note. 1 Chinese *li* was equivalent to $\frac{1}{3}$ mile.

Since the county yamen of Chen-tse was in the town of Wu-chiang, which was some 15 miles south of Wu-hsien the yamen of which was in Su-chou city, the plots of land owned by the Kung-shou-t'ang of the Fei clan were scattered widely over the two counties, and the distance separating the most widely dispersed plots must have been at least 25 miles. This, however, refers only to the holdings of the Kung-shou-t'ang itself. The Kung-shou-chan bursary, as we have seen, administered lands of five others owner, the Chün-hao, owning some plots in yet a third county, Yüan-ho hsien.

The multiple ownership and the widely dispersed location of bursary landholdings naturally made their

²⁹ See Muramatsu (1), 93-116.

management and administration very difficult. But this did not inhibit the landlord bursaries from exerting a very strong, direct, and minute control both over the plots of land under their management and over the peasants who tilled them. It is to this problem which I shall now turn.

III

In discussing the actual relationship between landlord and peasant, it is essential to discuss three distinct aspects of the relationship between tenant farmer and bursary; first, the legal status of the tenant peasants; second, the amount of rent which they paid in relation to the tax load which the bursary bore in respect of their land; and third, the landlord's control and authority over the person of his tenant.

In connexion with the legal status of tenant peasants, I have located two distinct groups of new source material. First are the details relating to individual tenants entered in the rent-books referred to above, and second are the surviving tenancy contracts. In examining the landlord documents in the collection of the National Diet Library in Tokyo I discovered some 50 single-sheet documents which had been inserted between the leaves of rentbooks and other bursary documents bound up in book form. Among these were tenancy contract deeds of the types designated *chao-yu* 召由 and *ch'eng-lan* 承攬 drawn up by tenants and addressed to their landlord

These are dated between 1876 and 1919. Most of them were found in the rent-books of the charitable estate of the Fan clan, and concern the tenant relationships between individual peasant tenants and the Fan estate. One other item refers to a peasant tenant of the Tzu-ching tsu-chan bursary of the Wang clan (bursary no. 4).³⁰

Although the tenant deeds were of two separate forms--*chao-yv* (literally "recruitment of tenant" or "recruited tenant") and *ch'eng-lan* ("acceptance of undertaking"), the actual contents of the undertaking entered into by the tenant were fundamentally similar, in fact virtually identical. In either type of deed the tenant said that he had not enough land to cultivate (*fa-t'ien keng-chung* (乏田耕種) and so agreed to be recruited as a tenant (*chan-yv*), or agreed to undertake (*ch'eng-lan*) the cultivation of so many *mou* of land, situated in a certain *yü* 圩 of a certain *t'u* 圖, and promised to pay rent of so many *shih* of rice, plus an extra rent charge of so much to cover the cost of transportation of the rent grain (*li-mi* 力米). In case of any natural disaster such as drought, flood, gale or insect damage, the rent was to be reduced, in accordance with the custom of the area (*ssu-fang ta-li* 四方大例). The deed was drawn up to guarantee the keeping of the undertakings verbally given.³¹

³⁰ See Muramatsu (4), 315-25.

³¹ See Muramatsu (4), table 1, p. 329. Full texts of 12 tenancy contracts are reprinted in the same article, pp. 318-24.

The deeds were signed by tenant peasants, by tenants and intermediaries (*yang-chung* 央中), by tenants (*hsien-chao* 見召 written for 現召 or *hsien-lan* 見攬) and former tenants, or by the tenant and a guarantor of payment of his rent (*pao-tsu* 保租). Many of the tenant peasants, former tenants, and even the intermediaries and guarantors, presumably illiterate, have simply made a cross beneath their names which had been written in by some literate person in place of signing themselves.

There are currently two diametrically opposed theories which predominate among Japanese scholars concerning the nature of the landlord-tenant relationship in post-Sung China. Some claim that the relationship was essentially a pure contractual relationship, purely economic in nature, between the peasant without land and the landlord without labour power. The other party assume the existence of "serfdom" or of a certain lower stratum of the peasantry who were semi-permanently put under restraint to cultivate a certain plot of land, and personally subordinated to the authority of a certain "feudalistic" landlord,

The contracts in the possession of the National Diet Library state that the tenants need the land because they have not themselves enough land to cultivate, and are thus willing to pay a certain amount of rice or its equivalent value to the landowner as rent, which would certainly seem to indicate the economic nature of the contract. But at the same time none of the 12 deeds

which I have discovered and published specifies the time when the tenant relationship will expire. Some even state specifically that the rent will be so much in the first year, but that it will be increased by so much in the second, third, fourth, or the next normal year (*p'ing-nien* 平年), which would suggest that both parties to the tenancy presupposed that it would continue for a term of several years.

In connexion with the long-term or semi-permanent nature of these tenancies, the tenant records in the rent-books provide a great deal of evidence showing the inheritance of a tenancy from father to son. The column of the rent-books which lists the tenants occupying each plot frequently shows two or three tenants of the same surname cultivating plots of the same, or almost identical size in the same embanked subdivision of the same *t'u*. This would suggest that these plots had originally formed the plot cultivated by a tenant, which had been inherited by his sons when he died or became too old to work, and subdivided according to the traditional principle of equal division of inheritance.³²

In other cases a plot is listed as jointly allocated to two or three tenants of the same surname without having been divided into parts. A rent book of the Hung-hsin-hao lands administered by the Kung-shon-chan bursary dated 1907, contains the following entry:

徐大元 二畝 三四分 釐 毫

³² See Muramatsu (1), 116-19.

degree of social mobility certainly existed both between small tenants and large tenants and between tenants and landowners, if not between tenant farmers and bursary owners. And hereditary succession to tenancy was not a universal rule. According to the evidence of the rent-books tenants were not always replaced by their sons or members of their own family. Many tenants' names are erased to be replaced by new tenants of a different surname. The tenant farmers were in no way a class of hereditary serfs.

As we have seen, when the tenancy of a plot was inherited by several sons, it was usually equally subdivided among them, a process which tended constantly to diminish the scale of individual tenancies. But there were other cases where a single tenant concentrated under his single tenancy a large number of plots, and undertook comparatively large-scale cultivation. For instance, between 1908 and 1912 a tenant of the Kung-shou-chan bursary named Ling Wu-i 凌五一 extended his tenancy over 19 plots totalling 58 *mou* belonging to the Ho-hao estate, and over another plot of 12.7 *mou* belonging to the Hung-hsin-hao. His name is also recorded in connexion with yet another plot of 4.5 *mou* of land belonging to the Hung-hsin-hao, but in this case he was not the tenant, but a subtenant or actual cultivator (*hsien-chung* 現種) under another tenant.³⁶

Ling Wu-i was thus tenant of 20 plots amounting

³⁶ See Muramatsu (1), 119-31.

to a total of more than 70 *mou*, and was thus engaged in farming on a much larger scale than that of the average farmer in the area at that time. At the same time he was himself cultivating a small plot as a sub-tenant. The plots over which he had extended his tenancy were scattered in various embankments (*yü*) and a number of *tu* and *t'u*. In listing the various plots of which Ling Wu-i was the present tenant, the rent-books also list the names of many former tenants (*yüan-tien* 原佃) of the plots³⁷. It is almost certain that some at least of these former tenants were in fact still cultivating their original plots, but were now doing so as Ling's subtenants. The records of the rent-books show that Ling Wu-i was paying the rents due from the plots of which he was tenant promptly and on time, and Ling must then have been charging these actual cultivators rent as subtenants a little higher than the rent which he was paying as tenant-in-chief.³⁸

Ling Wu-i's name is entered in the rent-books with the annotation *k'o-min* 客民 "immigrant". From similar annotations to the names of other tenants listed in the rent-books we know that many immigrants were at this time coming into the fertile Kiangnan region, especially from the Chiang-pei area north of the Yangtse where the drier climate and alkaline soils permitted far poorer average crop-yields. This Chiang-pei region later became

³⁷ See Muramatsu (1), 120-23.

³⁸ See Muramatsu (1), 129-30.

one of the major sources of the supply of unskilled labour in the industrial and urban complexes of Shanghai and Nanking.

In many cases the annotation "immigrant" appears with the name of new tenants who had replaced former tenants in the rent-books, and there is evidence to show that such immigrants were willing to be content with rather poor conditions to get a start in life as tenant farmers. For example, the Kung-shou-t'ang of the Feis (bursary no. 1) held eight plots in Nan-fu-yü, 6th *t'u*, 24th *tu*, of Wu-chiang county (吳江縣二十四都六圖南富圩), four of which were newly reclaimed land from which, naturally, poorer yields were to be expected. Three of these inferior plots were tentened by immigrants from north of the Yangtse (*Chiang-pei k'o-min* 江北客民).³⁹ But none the less some of these people were able, by hard work and by exercising economy, quickly to improve their economic condition. In the rent-books of the kung-shou-chan bursary we can find many immigrant tenants other than Ling Wu-i who, like him, had collected a large number of plots under their single tenancy, and were presumably subletting the lands to subtenants.⁴⁰

Among the landlord documents held by the Tōyō Bunko are land books and tax registers connected with

³⁹ See Muramatsu (1), 134-39.

⁴⁰ See Muramatsu (1), 137-38.

the landholdings in Wu-hsien and Ch'ang-chou counties by bursary no. 7 (the name of which is unknown).⁴¹ There are among them eight volumes entitled *Chang-i ch'u-yu kuei-t'u-ts'e* 長邑出由歸圖冊 dated 1885 which list the plots held in Ch'ang-chou county, under each *t'u* and *tu*, giving their site (*yü* 圩 or *ch'iu* 坵) dimensions, tenants, and amount of rent. The total area of land held by the bursary in Ch'ang-chou county and rented to tenants was 3189.96 *mou*, from which the total amount of rent due was 3269.357 *shih* of rice. There are no similar land books for the bursary's holding in Wu-hsien.

We do, however, have at our disposal another source of information, three volumes which are untitled, but which for convenience I will call the "land books B" of bursary no. 7. These "land books" record the acquisitions of land by purchase or mortgage during 1866 and 1870. For each of the 78 transactions completed during the period, the date, name of vendor or mortgager, intermediaries through whom the transaction was conducted, the site (*tu. t'u, yü*), tax-rate classification (*k'o-tse* 科則), dimensions, amount of rent in rice (*yüan-e mi* 原額米) and name of the tenant are given. The books also record the sale (*shou-chu* 售出) or the termination of the mortgage through redemption (*pa-ch'ü* 拔去 or *pa-chü tzu-chung* 拔去自種) of the land the acquisition of which had been recorded. This record of

⁴¹ See Muramatsu (2) 396-99.

sales and redemptions covers the period from 1866 to 1910.⁴²

I have so far been unable to prove the identity of this bursary no. 7. But since the covers of some of the documents bear the inscription *Feng Lin-i chan pei-k'ao* 馮林一棧備考 on the cover, it seems very likely that the books have been kept in a bursary owned by Feng Lin-i, better known as Feng Knei-fen 馮桂芬 (1809-74), an outstanding scholar official of Su-chou, who served as secretary to Li Hung-chang during the years when the latter was engaged in the suppression of the T'ai-p'ing rebellion in the Yangtse delta region in the early 1860's.⁴³ The land books show that the holdings of the bursary, both in Wu-hsien and Ch'ang-chou counties, increased rapidly during the late 1860's and early 1870's that is directly after the suppression of the T'ai-p'ings.⁴⁴

At this time the bursary was clearly lending money, on the security of lands, and increasing its holdings of land through subsequent foreclosures. In most of these

⁴² The 'land books B' employ only one term for acquisition, *chih-te* 置得, which can mean either purchase or mortgage, since later some of the lands were sold off (*shou-ch'u* 售出) and others redeemed (*shu-ch'u* 贖出). For details on disposal by sale (*shou-mai* 售売), redemption (*hui-shu* 回贖), and partial cession (*hsi-ch'u* 折出) see Muramatsu (2), 511-24. The 'land books B' record lands acquired between 1866 and 1870. The records of disposals by sale or redemption cover a far longer period, from 1866 to 1910. It seems probable that the land book is incomplete. See Muramatsu (2), 433-35.

⁴³ See Muramatsu (2), 536-49.

⁴⁴ See Muramatsu (2), 549-58.

transactions the former owners of the land seem themselves to have been landlords who either sold or mortgaged large amounts of land, often widely dispersed in different localities, to the bursary. If in fact that bursary was that of Feng Kuei-fen, who complained so loudly in his works about the inequalities existing between the gentry 大戶 and the common populace 小戶, and who made such violent attacks in his writings against the tyranny of the powerful gentry *shen-chin hao-hu*, 紳衿豪戶⁴⁵, there is indeed a remarkable contrast between the discussions developed in the essays in his *Chiao-pin-lu k'ang-i* 校邠廬抗議 (completed 1861, published 1885) and his literary works *Hsien-chih-t'ang kao* 顯志堂稿 (published 1877), and the actual behaviour of his bursary.

Among the other documents connected with this bursary no. 7 held by the Tōyō Bunko are a variety of tax-books.⁴⁶ These classify the plots held by the bursary in Wu-hsien and Ch'ang-chou counties according to the *tu* and *t'u* in which they were situated, and list their size, tax-rate classification, title holder, amounts of both *ti-ting* 地丁 (land-poll tax) and *ts'ao-liang* 漕糧

⁴⁵ See Huang Ts'ui-po 黃浚伯, 'Ch'i-shih nien ch'ien chih wei-hsin jen-wu Feng Ching-t'ing' 七十年前之維新人物馮景亭, *Chung-shan Wen-huah Chiao-yü-kuan Chi-k'an*, IV, 2, 1937.

⁴⁶ There are three sets of such books entitled: (1) *Wu-i ko-tu-t'u ts'ao-mi tsung-ts'e* 吳邑各都團漕米總冊 compiled about 1870; (2) *Ch'ang-i wu-jun ts'ao-mi tsung-ts'e* 長邑無閭漕米總冊 compiled about 1868-9; (3) *Ch'ang-i wu-jun t'ien-tan ts'e* 長邑無閭田單冊 dated 1894, together with some other volumes of the same type which have lost their covers or titles. See Muramatsu (2), 400-07, 456-66.

(tribute grain) taxes to be paid, and record the actual tax payments made during the year. By comparing the records of these tax-books with the land books of the same bursary, it is possible to find many plots which occur in both sets of records, and it is possible to compare the amount of rent collected from a given plot with the amount of tax paid in respect of the same land.⁴⁷ Selecting only those plots for which both rent and taxes were paid up without any arrears, it is possible to arrive at the figures given in table 5 on p. 396.⁴⁸

The *ti-ting*, or land and poll tax was charged in silver, while the *ts'ao-liang* or tribute rice was naturally collected in kind. If we convert the silver paid as *ti-ting* in these tables into rice at the contemporary rate of three *liang* of silver=one *shih* of rice, we have an overall average tax payment per *mou* of 0.1350 *shih* compared with average rent receipt of 1.0266 *shih* in Ch'ang-chou county, and an average tax payment of 0.1339 *shih* compared with a rent receipt of 1.0710 *shih* for Wu-hsien. The generally accepted average rice yield in Kiangnan was 2 *shih* per *mou* in the late nineteenth century. We may thus say that the average tenant was paying something more than 50 per cent of his rice crop in rent to his landlord, while the landlords were paying only some 13 per cent of these receipts in taxes to the government.

⁴⁷ See Muramatsu (2), 577-630.

⁴⁸ See Muramatsu (2), 561-72.

Table 5

Tax Rates and Rent on Lands in Possession of Bursary No. 7

A. Ch'ang-chou county

Tax-rate classification of land	Acreage (<i>mou</i>)	Tax payments		Rent-receipts	
		<i>Ti-ting</i> (silver: <i>liang</i>)	<i>Ts'ao-liang</i> (grain: <i>shih</i>)	Acreage (<i>mou</i>)	Rent (<i>shih</i>)
<i>kuan-tse</i> (官則)	1673.605	178.506	166.643	1633.795	1729.526
<i>erh-tou-tse</i> (二斗則)	5.006	0.329	0.419	5.006	4.900
<i>min-tse</i> (民則)	20.074	2.712	1.887	20.752	20.805
<i>huang-min-tse</i> (荒民則)	5.283	0.588	0.561	5.283	5.536
<i>hsia-ti-tse</i> (下地則)	2.479	0.118	0.143	2.579	2.470
Total	1706.447	182.253	169.653	1717.415	1763.237

B. Average tax-assessment and rent per mou (Ch'ang-chou county)

Tax-rate classification	Tax payments		Rent receipts
	<i>Ti-ting</i> (<i>liang</i>)	<i>Ts'an-liang</i> (<i>shih</i>)	(<i>shih</i>)
<i>kuan-tse</i>	0.1066	0.0995	1.0272
<i>erh-tou-tse</i>	0.0657	0.0831	0.9788
<i>min-tse</i>	0.1351	0.0940	1.0364
<i>huang-min-tse</i>	0.1131	0.1061	1.0478
<i>ksia-ti-tse</i>	0.0475	0.0576	0.9577
All lands	0.1068	0.0994	1.0266

C. Wu-hsien county

Tax-rate classification of land	Acreage (<i>mou</i>)	Tax payments		Rent receipts	
		<i>Ti-ting</i> (silver: <i>liang</i>)	<i>Ts'ao-liang</i> (grain: <i>shih</i>)	Acreage (<i>mau</i>)	Rent (<i>shih</i>)
<i>kuan-tse</i>	672.595	78.956	64.890	674.095	722.036
<i>i-tou-tse</i> (一斗則)	35.200	2.722	3.050	35.200	38.510
<i>erh-tou-tse</i>	12.000	0.877	0.930	12.000	12.000
Total	719.795	82.555	68.873	721.295	772.546

D. Average tax-assessment and rent per mou (Wu-hsien county)

Tax-rate classification	Tax payments		Rent receipts
	<i>Ti-ting</i> (<i>liang</i>)	<i>Ts'ao-liang</i> (<i>shih</i>)	(<i>shih</i>)
<i>kuan-tse</i>	0.1173	0.0964	1.0711
<i>i-tou-tse</i>	0.0763	0.0866	1.0940
<i>erh-tou-tse</i>	0.0730	0.0775	1.0000
All lands	0.0888	0.0868	1.0550

IV

To sum up what has already been said, Chinese landlords during the late Ch'ing and early twentieth century may be said: (1) to have owned large numbers of very small plots of land, widely scattered and often dispersed over several *yü*, *t'u*, and *tu*, or even over more than one county (*hsien*). (2) These plots were rented to numerous peasant tenants, a few of whom managed to concentrate a considerable amount of land under their individual tenancy, but most of whom worked their individual plots and engaged in farming on a very small scale. (3) Many of the landowners were engaged in business other than agriculture, and moved their residence to the towns or cities. They continued, however, to be landlords and often invested the profits from their urban businesses in land. (4) Since such absentee landlords could no longer exercise direct personal control over their lands and tenant peasants, they usually deposited these lands for management with a bursary *tsu-chan*. Such bursaries were set up and owned by gentry landlords who held great local influence by virtue of their official backgrounds. (5) Their tenants paid annually a rent of about one *shih* of rice, or its equivalent, per *mou* of land, out of which the landowner had to pay some 0.13 *shih* or 13 per cent of the total

rent received to the government in taxes, including both the land and poll tax (*ti-ting*) and tribute grain (*ts'ao-liang*). (6) The bursary collected the rents and paid the taxes due on the lands owned both by the bursary owner and by other landlords who had entrusted their lands to the bursary for management.

The rather high level of rents placed a very heavy burden on the tenant farmers, who had to pay slightly more than half of their total crop to the bursary. Tenant farmers entered into their contracts freely and voluntarily, and that they should have been willing to accept such unfavourable conditions is a reflection of the very high density of rural population and intense demand for cultivable land.

On the subject of rent payments, we have available two distinct types of source material, the procedural documents such as the *tsu-yu* (租由 or 租繇), *ch'ieh-chiao* (切脚), etc., and the various account books recording rent payments and arrears. The *tsu-yu* were the notices issued by the bursary to its tenant farmers notifying them that the storehouse would be opened for the receipt of rents (*k'ai-ts'ang shou-tsu* 開倉收租). The National Diet Library has such documents issued by the Charitable Estate of the Fan clan dated 1875,⁴⁹ while the Harvard-

⁴⁹ See Muramatsu (4), 325-26.

Yenching Institute has 25 *tsu-yu* from the period 1920-30.⁵⁰ There is no noticeable difference in form between those issued under the Ch'ing in the 1870's and those issued in Republican times. In either case they are single-sheet documents of regular form, on which is stated the date when the storehouse will be opened, the site and acreage of the plot and the rent due from it, and the name of the tenant. They are marked with the name and situation of the bursary⁵¹ and carry its seal. Sometimes they prescribe fixed time-limits known as *na-hsien* 納限, *fei-hsien* 飛限, *t'ou-hsien* 頭限, *erh-hsien* 二限, or *san-hsien* 三限, and promise a discount⁵²

⁵⁰ See Muramatsu (6), 639-49.

⁵¹ See Muramatsu (6), 641-49, and photographs 1-4. The site of the bursary storehouse or the place where payment is to be made is always clearly stated on the *tsu-yu*. For example, 交租在關門內桃花塢東第二百五十號 'Rent is to be paid over at No. 250, east of T'ao-huah-wu, inside the Ch'ang-men gate (of Su-chou)' or 飲馬橋東張思良巷內棧門收納 'Rent will be accepted at the bursary gate in Chang Ssu-liang hsiang lane at the east end of Yin-mach'iao bridge.' The bursary storehouses and granaries of the Fan Charitable Estate can be seen on the plan of the clan buildings in Su-chou reproduced in Twitchett, *Asia Major*, NS, VIII, 1, plate 2.

⁵² The promise of discount was not always honoured, or at least some of the tenants who paid up promptly actually had to pay more than those who reluctantly paid rent after being called upon to do so by therent collectors. Although it was stated that after the expiry of the time-limit the payment of rent in full would be demanded without mercy, in practice this could not be enforced. On the basis of my recalculation of the data in the rent-books, it is clear that the bursary clerks always treaded carefully, and often underestimated, the rents due from substantial tenants holding a number of plots, such as Ling Wu-i mentioned above. poverty-stricken tenants who were really incapable of paying in full within the time-limits were also carefully watched, and treated considerately. They were given credit, allowed extension of the time-limit for payment, and their rent underestimated to lighten their burdens. For my detailed calculations see Muramatsu (1), 148-62.

on rents paid before the expiration of the time limit. They are often written in an authoritative tone, and order that the tenant be informed (by the rent-collector, *ts'ui-chia* 催甲) to bring in in good time well dried, clean and high-quality rice for his rent, so that it can be straightway transferred as tax payment, and warning that non-payment or arrears will be punished without mercy.

The sites of the bursaries which issued the *tsu-yu* in the Harvard-Yenching Library were almost always in big cities like Su-chou, usually on a canal. They were not necessarily in the business district, but were often situated in the residential quarters, and probably annexed to some large gentry mansion, as was the case with the Fan Charitable Estate.

The *tsu-yu* were issued at the bursary, and the rent-collectors delivered them to the tenants in the countryside. We possess daily journals of the bursary storerooms of the Ts'ai clan (bursary no. 3) entitled *ju-ao* 入厰⁵³ for 1865, 1878, 1891, and 1894, and of the Fan Charitable Estate, entitled *jih-shou* 日收 for 1865 and 1903.⁵⁴ These show a rather prosperous situation, with many tenants actually paying rents into the bursary even before the opening date, and most rents

⁵³ These documents, entitled *Ching-yü-t'ang li-chi* 經翁堂利記 are possessed by the Jimbun Kagaku Kenkyūjo, Kyoto.

⁵⁴ These, entitled *Fan-shi i-chuang jih-shou* 范氏義莊日收, are possessed by the National Diet Library.

being paid well on time. But other rent-books, such as those of the Kung-shou-chan (bursary no. 1), parts of which we possess for various dates in the twentieth century, show a very different picture.

Table 6 (p. 402) shows the frequency of arrears (*pu-ch'ing-ch'i* 不清訖), successive failure to pay rent (*li-nien ch'üan-ch'ien* 歷年全欠), and demands for payment (*chai-chui* 差追) shown in the rent-books of the Kung-shou-chan.⁵⁵ The frequency of rent arrears shown here is really very considerable. For example, 50.6 per cent of the lands belonging to the Hung-hsin-hao managed by the bursary were in arrears in 1909, 87.5 per cent of the I-tai lands in 1910, and 47.7 per cent of the Chün-hao lands in 1929. Even on the lands which were the actual property of the bursary owner, the Fei Kung-shou-t'ang, there were from 20 to 30 per cent of the plots in arrears from 1906 to 1909, and in 1906, 10 per cent had failed to pay rent for successive years. But repeated demands by the rent-collectors were apparently effective in producing eventual payment. Arrears and non-payment of rents were particularly frequent in the case of lands deposited with the bursary by other landlords. In these cases there is virtually no record of the issue of demands for payment.⁵⁶

It was essential for the bursary to employ the services of rent-collectors to press tenants to pay their

⁵⁵ See Muramatsu (1), 196-97.

⁵⁶ See Muramatsu (1), 194-202.

Table 6

Kung-shou-chan Bursary: Frequency of Rent Arrears,
Non-payment, and Demands for Payment of Rent

Owner	Year	Number of plots	Rent in arrears	Rent unpaid	Demands once	twice	payment more often
Kung-shou- t'ang	1906	165	32	12	56	3	0
	1907	165	34	3	25	12	1
	1908	165	63	3	26	7	0
	1909	151	46	1	33	0	0
Ku Lo-shou- t'ang	1906	95	33	13	21	6	0
	1907	95	19	3	17	17	6
	1908	95	23	3	4	8	0
	1909	105	42	3	7	0	0
Hung-hsin- hao	1907	659	311	68	0	0	0
	1908	660	305	55	0	0	0
	1909	662	335	59	0	0	0
	1910	660	314	54	0	0	0
Ho-hao	1908	178	76	5	0	0	0
	1910	177	86	6	0	0	0
	1911	178	68	0	0	0	0
	1912	177	72	5	0	0	0
I-tai	1909	40	15	0	0	0	0
	1910	40	35	0	0	0	0
Chun-hao	1922	314	98	0	0	0	0
	1927	314	87	0	0	0	0
	1928	314	94	0	0	0	0
	1929	314	150	0	0	0	0

rents. For example, in 1909 the Kung-shou-chan bursary employed 27 rent-collectors to supervise their own Kung-shou-t'ang lands, which comprised 165 plots scattered over 31 *yü*. But in the same year 7 collectors were employed to supervise the lands of the Ku Lo-shou-t'ang lands, comprising 95 plots in 10 *yü*, and only 7 more to deal with the far larger Chün-hao properties which

included 314 plots dispersed over 90 different *yü*. It is clear that some collectors were responsible for collection only from one or two embankments (*yü*), while others had to collect rent from dozens of plots scattered in many different *yü*. It is also apparent that the bursary exercised far closer control over its own lands than over the properties entrusted to it for management.

The Kung-shou-chan bursary employed two quite distinct types of rent-collector. The first category were themselves tenants of bursary land, whose own arrears of rent sometimes appear in the record. Among them are to be found the widows of former tenants, Buddhist priests, and the priests of village shrines (*miao*) who could usually be expected to belong to the lowest income groups in Chinese rural communities.⁵⁷ The second category of rent-collector included many headmen in charge of embankments (*yü-chia* 圩甲) and other official underlings employed in the collection of taxes. The former type of rent-collectors naturally undertook responsibility for a smaller area and fewer tenants than the latter, each of whom exercised control over a wide area, sometimes including a dozen or more *yü* embankments scattered over several *t'u* or even several *tu*.⁵⁸

The National Diet Library in Tokyo possesses 53 letters written by rent-collectors employed by the Yü-

⁵⁷ See Muramatsu (1), table 20, pp. 184-84, and table 21, pp. 188-89.

⁵⁸ See Muramatsu (1), 181-93.

ching tsu-chan of the Wu clan (bursary no. 2) and addressed to the clerks *shih-ye* 師爺 in the bursary at Su-chou. These were discovered placed between the pages of a book kept by the bursary entitled *Ch'u-ch'ieh pei-ch'a* 出切備查 which was a register of the issue of documents called *ch'ieh-chiao* 切脚 or warrants for the arrest of tenants who either could not or would not pay their rents on time. The letters illustrate the actual mechanism by which surplus agricultural production was bled off from the villages to the cities and towns. They also show, in vivid detail, how tenants were pressed for rents not only by the bursary rent-collectors, but also by official underlings and village elders acting with the authorization of the local government.⁵⁹

The letters, which are without any fixed form and are written on irregular-sized sheets of paper, mostly report the arrival in the small town or *chen* 鎮 where the rent-collector was living of yamen runners (*ch'ai-yu* 差友) or boatmen (*chou-p'an* 舟盤) from the *hsien* city. These runners and boatmen were minor employees or retainers of the local government whose original duties were to act as messengers, collect taxes, maintain law and order, watch and arrest dissidents, and to perform miscellaneous services around the local yamen. However, in these letters from the bursary rent-collectors it is clear that they were employed as a coercive force to

⁵⁹ See Muramatsu (4). pp. 334-46, where I reprint in full the texts of the available letters.

press tenants to pay their rents. They appear to have been dispatched from various *hsien* governments in the area,⁶⁰ and are referred to as “Ch’ang-ch’ai” 長差 i. e. runners from Ch’ang-chou *hsien*, “Yüan-ch’ai” 元差 i. e. runners from Yüan-ho *hsien*, or “Fu-ch’ai” 府差 i. e. runners from the prefectural government at Su-chou.

These official runners brought with them a list of tenants who were in arrears or had defaulted, the *Ch’ien-tien k’ai-tan* 欠佃開單 which had been prepared for them by the bursary clerks and called upon each tenant for payment. If they wanted to take a tenant into custody and thus force him to pay his rent they required the warrant (*ch’ieh-chiao*) referred to above, and they also had to carry an official tablet (*kuan-p’ai* 官牌) authorizing their mission. The village elders such as *ching-ts’ao* 經造 and *ching-pao* 經保, who were also responsible for the maintenance of order and for the collection of taxes, also regularly collaborated with the bursary rents-collectors and yamen runners, especially in the case of arresting defaulting tenants.⁶¹

⁶⁰ Presumably the runners came from the county yamen in whose jurisdiction the lands lay. The register of warrants of arrest of the Yü-ching tsu-chan bursary of the Wu clan mentions not only runners from the local authorities mentioned in the text, but also those from Wu-hsien (Wu-ch’ai 吳差). It thus seems that the bursary’s lands were scattered over the *fu* of Su-chou, and in the three counties of Ch’ang-chou, Yüan-ho and Wu-hsien.

⁶¹ See Muramatsu (4), 365-68. See also Naitō Kenkichi 內藤乾吉 *Rikubu seigo chūkai* 六部成語註解, reprinted Tokyo, 1960, 41, and Hsiao Kung-chuan, *Rural China: imperial control in the nineteenth century*, Seattle, 1960, 63-6.

The official underlings employed in the private task of collecting rents on behalf of a landlord bursary naturally tried to claim the most pretentious official authority for their mission. But at the same time the entire expense of their trip to collect rents was borne by the bursary, and was usually paid in advance by the rent-collectors and recovered from the rents remitted to the bursary. The runners were given daily remuneration according to a roughly fixed scale,⁶² varying according to whether they were travelling alone by land (*tan-han* 單旱) or in pairs by land (*shuang-han* 雙旱), alone by boat (*tan-shui* 單水) or in pairs by boat (*shuang-shui* 雙水). The rent-collectors paid all the expenses of their accommodation "food, room, oil, and firewood" (*fan-fangyu-huo* 飯房油火). A special customary charge also had to be paid for their carrying the official tablet of authorization (*kuan-p'ai*), known as "tablet charge" (*p'ai-fei* 牌費), and those carrying these tablets were also entitled to a special personal *pourboire* known as

⁶² The *Ch'u-ch'ieh pei-ch'a* register mentioned in the text gives (on p. 50 b) the following rates of remuneration paid to runners from Ch'ang-chou county in the winter of 1897. One runner going alone by land 425 cash *per diem*; a pair going by land 750 cash; fee for taking one tenant into custody, 600 cash; fee for putting one tenant in a cangue, 490 cash; accommodation for one runner *per diem* 60 cash. For further detail, see Muramatsu (4), 371-73

jun-chih 潤志.⁶³

Thus official duties and the serving of private interests were very closely interrelated. Some authors, such as T'ao Tzu-ch'un (1821-91) 陶子春, a scholar official, poet, and philanthropic physician of Su-chou, claimed that "the official lictors of the county yamens (*hsien-shu li-i* 縣署隸役) were always in short supply during the winter month when the collection of rent arrears was usually carried out, because so many of them had had to be sent out into the countryside to collect rents for so many landlords. As a result, the *hsien* government usually had to hire city layabouts (*ch'eng-shih chiu-po wu-lai-jen* 城市酒博無賴人) who were sent to the bursaries to act as official runners. When the landlord or bursary sent out to collect rents in the villages, the collectors were always accompanied by such "lictors." The boat by which these people travelled along the canals was commonly called the "lictors' boat" (*ch'ai-chuan* 差船), and everybody was frightened and disturbed by its appearance.⁶⁴

⁶³ Among the documents from the Yü-ching tsu-chan in the Diet Library was found a bill requesting the payment of such *jun-chih* consideration of two silver dollars for the runners bearing the official tablet entitling them to collect rents (*chui-tsu-p'ai* 追租牌). This bill was addressed by a certain Wan Ch'ing-hsüan of the Office of Rites in the yamen of Su-chou fu, to a graduate named Wu En-ch'ing, who must have been the owner of the bursary, and the *shih-yeh* or clerks of the bursary, at its office in She-chia hsiang lane, Su-chou. See Muramatsu (4), p. 346, and document no. 68

⁶⁴ See T'ao Tzu-ch'un 陶子春, *Tsu-ch'üeh* 租權, 1a-4a, 11a, 12a-b, 14a.

V

The landlord bursaries, then, sometimes had their tenants arrested when they defaulted in paying rent. But of course not all tenants who fell into arrears with their rent payments were automatically arrested. For one thing there were so many of them that it would have been impossible to confine them all in any "tenants" lock-up.⁶⁵ For another, such action would in the long run have been counter to the interests of the landowning class. In the four volumes of rent-books from the Kung-shou-chan bursary listing payments of rent from lands owned by the Kung-shou-t'ang and Ku Lo-shou-t'ang for the four-year period 1906-9, 175 out of a total of about 250 tenants fell into arrears with their rent, while 19 were continuously in default. None the less, during these years only 7 tenants were actually arrested.⁶⁶

As is shown in table 7, in each of these seven cases no rent whatever had paid for the current year until the time of arrest, but apart from the third case, some at least of the previous year's rent had been paid. I have attempted to trace the history of the families involved in these seven cases, and have found that all were very poor peasants whose rents had in the past fallen into arrears in successive years, and some of them were tenants of lands which had been flooded. None

⁶⁵ See Amano Motonosuke, *Shina nōson zakki* (p. 568, n. 3), chapter entitled 'So-shū no kosaku-seido' 蘇州の小作制度。

⁶⁶ See table 6 above, also see Muramatsu (1), 196-97.

Table 7

Cases of Arrest of Tenants of Lands of the Kung-shou-t'ang and Ku Lo-shou-t'ang Estates Administered by Kung-shou-chan Bursary

Case no.	Acreage of plot (<i>mou</i>)	Rent paid current year	Rent paid previous year	Period of detention	Remarks
1	3.10	nil	paid	11 Dec. -?	
2	1.35	none until arrested	paid	16-23 Nov.	rent paid 20 Nov.
3	4.80	none until arrested	nil	16-24 Nov.	rent paid 24 Nov.
4	0.76	none until arrested	paid	?-16 Nov.	rent paid 29 Nov.
5	3.80	nil	arrears	21-24 Nov. 22-24 Nov.	tenant's wife, and son also arrested
6	3.26	nil	arrears	20 Nov. - 4 Dec.	
7	3.50	nil	arrears	?	

the less, none of them had defaulted completely for successive years (*li-nien ch'üan-ch'ien*) and most had paid at least something every year. At the same time the same rent-books include many other tenants who had paid nothing for several successive years without suffering arrest.⁶⁷ In three of the cases recorded, the rent was paid after the tenant had been detained for a few days, but in the other cases there is no statement that rent was paid, and yet the tenant was released. In the fifth case the bursary had the tenant's wife and then his second son, who was still young, arrested.

⁶⁷ See Muramatsu (1), 205-6.

Case no. 3 is particularly interesting. It concerns a tenant called Wu Yüan-chang, who was tenant of two plots in different *yü*. His rent fell into arrears both in 1905 and in 1906. In 1906 he did not pay when the rent collector demanded payment for the second time, and was arrested. Now Wu Yüan-chang was not only himself a tenant, he was also a rent-collector for the bursary, and the headman of a *yü* 圩甲 He was thus certainly not among the poorest class of tenants, and it is possible that he was arrested not because he was too poor to pay his rent, but because he was too independent to do so.

It is clear that the bursary clerks and the rent-collectors gave considerable thought to each case before ordering an arrest. But when an arrest was considered feasible, and when it was judged to provide an example to others and to correct the offender, they did not hesitate to have not only the tenant but members of his family and even the local headman taken into custody. Sometimes the arrested man placed in a cangue or wooden collar *chia* 枷⁶⁸ and imprisoned in a tenants' lock-up, in an attempt to force the tenant, his family, or his neighbours to pay the rent and have the hostage released.

The regular legal process for taking a tenant into custody was as follows. (1) The bursary clerks pre-

⁶⁸ See H. G. H. Woodhead, *A Journalist in China*, London, 1934, 24; Naitō Kenkichi, *Rikubn seigo chūkai*, 104.

pared a list of defaulting tenants who were further described in such terms as “disorderly tenant” (*luan-tien* 乱佃) “intractable tenant” (*han-tien* 悍佃), “bad tenant” (*pi-tien* 秕佃 or 庇佃), or “bad tenant who refuses to pay his debts” (*pi-kang-tien-hu* 庇抗佃戶). (2) The prefect or magistrate then issued a warrant (*ch'ieh-chiao* 切脚) ordering the headman of the locality to apprehend the tenant. (3) The runners from the local yamen went out to the countryside to serve the warrant. (4) The runners, local headmen, and rent-collectors jointly went to make the arrest.

The actual warrant was served upon the local headman, *ching-ts'ao* or *ching-pao*, and it is thus unlikely to have found its way into library collections. I have only located one incomplete *ch'ieh-chiao* issued by the Fan Charitable Estate in 1878, which is in the National Diet Library. However, both the National Diet Library and the Tōyō Bunko possess blank forms for making out such warrants, which are cast in almost exactly the same form as the example issued by the Fan Charitable Estate. The blank in the National Diet Library has been cut in half and the reverse side used to make a memorandum of rents received. At the Tōyō Bunko I also discovered about 20 blank forms of a Republican period document which, although cast in very different form, clearly had the same purpose as the *ch'ieh-chiao* employed in the Ch'ing period.

These Republican period documents were found bet-

ween the pages of the rent-book for the lands owned by the Chün-hao estate and administered by the Kung-shou-chan bursary in 1929. Although they are blank forms rather than actual warrants, almost all the wording is printed on them with spaces left only for the insertion of concrete details such as the name of the tenant to be arrested, the title of the bursary, and the site of the lands involved. These *pro forma* warrants are thus valuable evidence about the arrest of defaulting tenants.

The blank form comprises a statement addressed to the county (*hsien*) authorities that a certain refractory tenant (*wan-tien* 頑佃) named.....had dared to resist the collection of his rent and refused payment (*t'ing-kang pu-wan* 挺抗不完), followed by a request that the authorities should strictly enforce his arrest (*ch'ih-t'i yen-chui* 飭限嚴追). It then states that a list of tenants in arrears had already been placed on file, and that, none the less, the tenant had persisted in refusing to pay his rent. It then continues that, since the taxes due on the land come from the rents paid by the tenant, unless the bursary requested the aid of the authorities in arresting him and forcing him to pay his rent there would be no way for the landlord to meet his tax liability. The local authorities were thus requested to order the yamen runners responsible rent collection (*ts'ui-tsu li* 催租吏) quickly to take the tenant into custody at the local branch police post (*kung-an fen-chü* 公安分局), and there

together with the head of the local watch, press him to pay. If he still refused, he should be detained for a while and ordered to complete his payment within a specified time limit. If by any chance he still continued to resist, his case was to be referred to the committee for settling rent payments (*tien-tsu chu-fen wei-yüan hui* 佃租處分委員會) and punished in accordance with the law, so as to teach him a lesson.⁶⁹

The most important feature of this wording is the rationalization which it gives for the exercise of official authority, by the employment of the police and the police lock-up, to collect private rents and enforce the payment of private rent liabilities, on the grounds that failure to collect rent would lead to non-payment of taxes. This same theorization was also to be found on the *tsu-yu* documents, and must have been repeated, often explicitly, in many other instances. But even when it was not spelled out, it was always tacitly understood in dealings between local authorities and landlord bursaries.

The *ch'ieh-chiao*, then, was an official warrant for the arrest of a private person on official authority. It should thus have been lawfully drawn up and issued by the local government. But on close examination the surviving examples *ch'ieh-chiao* not only show some variations in wording, which would not be expected in an official document, but also each bears a *printed* seal of

⁶⁹ See Muramatsu (1), 216-20.

the bursary or the charitable estate on whose behalf they were to be issued.⁷⁰ It would thus appear that blank forms of *ch'ieh-chiao* warrants must have been printed and kept ready in the bursaries. This assumption is supported by the large number of loose blank warrant forms found between the pages of the Kung-shou-chan rent-book, and by the other example where the reverse of one of these forms had been used to write a memorandum. It would seem that not only were the local authorities co-operating with the bursaries to collect rents, but that the bursaries themselves were not simply pressing their tenants for payment, but were exercising a pseudo-official authority over their tenants by themselves drawing up and issuing warrants for official execution.

The *Ch'u-ch'ieh pei-ch'a* of the Yü-ching tsu-chan bursary was, as I have said, a register of the issue of such warrants, and gives us valuable and detailed information about the employment of official employees in the collection of rent. One section of the book is an account⁷¹ of the number of days spent by the runners from various county offices in calling upon defaulting tenants, and of other incidental expenses⁷² which this involved, such as costs of accommodation and customary fees for carrying the official tablet (*chih-p'ai* 執牌),

⁷⁰ See Muramatsu (4), 326-27, (6), 667.

⁷¹ See Muramatsu (4), 368-77.

⁷² *ibid.*

for putting the refractory tenant in a cangue (*tsu-t'i-chia* 租提枷 or simply 枷), and for making or arrest (*chiao-chü* 叫拘), etc.⁷³

Another part of the register lists tenants (佃), bad tenants (*pi-tien* 庇佃), or bad refractory tenants (*pi-k'ang tien-hu* 庇抗佃戶) with their addresses, and the name of the headman (*ching* 經 or *ching-ts'ao* 經造) of the sub-district where they lived. This list is a chronological one and is clearly a memorandum of the tenants who were to be arrested, and the local headmen who were to be requested to assist. A third section of the register gives details of the arrest of various individual tenants.

Through this register, the arrest of tenants of the bursary can be traced in vivid detail. For example, in the autumn of 1890 the bursary had 17 tenants arrested, and in 1891 more than 20.⁷⁴ In the spring of 1900 31,200 cash were paid out in expenses and fees for the runners from Ch'ang-chou county, and no less than 82,175 to those from Yüan-ho county.⁷⁵ We can also follow in detail the process of such an arrest.

For example, because of non-payment of rents by a tenant called Han Lao-hu 韓老虎 holding land in the 11th *tu* of the 24th *tu* of Yüan-ho county, a certain Wang

⁷³ See Muramatsu (4). 375-77.

⁷⁴ See Muramatsu (4). 360-62.

⁷⁶ See Muramatsu (4). 368-70.

王⁷⁶ was taken into custody on 20 October 1890. On 28 October, 5 November, and 9 November the local headman was called to account (*pi* 比)⁷⁷ and on the last date somebody (presumably the detainee) was put in a cangue (*chia* 枷). On 12 November the *pi* order was rescinded (*k'ai-pi* 開比) but the obstinate tenant was exhibited to the populace at the gate as an example (*fa-t'ou-men* 發頭門).⁷⁸ The headmen and constables of various *t'u* connected with the case were called to account (*pi*) again on 17 and 20 November and 2, 8, 12 December. On 13 February of the following year Wang was again arrested. *Pi* orders were issued to the local headmen on 19 and 26 February and 3 and 16 March. On 3 March Wang was again put in a cangue and exhibited to the populace at the gate.

Obviously a single case could cause a great deal of trouble, and in addition many arrested tenants became ill during their detention, owing to the very bad conditions of confinement, and had to be released through sickness (*ping-shih* 病積). In the the spring of 1892 three of bursary's tenants were arrested, all of whom

⁷⁶ Several surnames, such as Wang 王, Yü 虞, Chou 周, Ch'eng 程 etc., repeatedly appear in the documents as sureties. These must be the names of local elders or headmen who went surety not only for the payment of taxes, but also for the payment of rent within the prescribed time-limit.

⁷⁷ The precise meaning of *pi* 比 is obscure. But it seems to mean 'to call a local headman to account.' See Giles's dictionary, p. 1092, under 比差.

⁷⁸ The meaning of *fa-t'ou men* is also unclear. The interpretation given was suggested by Professor L. S. Yang.

had subsequently to be released because of illness.⁷⁹ The reason why this was done is made clear by a case recorded in another rent-book, of an unidentified bursary, held by the Tōyō Bunka Kenkyūjo.⁸⁰ Here a tenant called Chang A-ts'ao, who had been cultivating 11.2 *mou* of paddy and paying 11.9 *shih* of rice as rent, had fallen into arrears and in 1931 failed to make any rent payment. He was arrested and detained in a tenants' lock-up (*tien-tsu ch'u fen so* 佃租處分所) where he fell sick and died. The rent-collector who had had the tenant detained then consulted with the relatives of the deceased man, who agreed not to press a case against him on condition that 100 silver dollars Mex. should be paid to them in compensation, and all outstanding liabilities for rent cancelled. The deceased's son also accepted a coffin for his father's burial from the rent-collector, and the affair was settled.

VI

The landlord bursary in late Ch'ing Kiangnan thus functioned as a little state within the state, and its owner and even his clerks could exercise real authority. We find, for example, letters written by local officials to bursary owners and bursary clerks⁸¹ in which, even when

⁷⁹ See Muramatsu (1), 212-15.

⁸⁰ This book has no title. The block-centre of each page is inscribed *Cheng-tsu ts'e* 正租册.

⁸¹ See Muramatsu (6), 664-65, and documents from the Ching-yü tsu-chan in the National Diet Library.

the authorities were demanding taxes due from bursary land, the tone and wording usually remains very courteous and respectful.⁸²

We have seen how the bursaries arrogated official authority in the issue of warrants. There is a further field where they may have usurped official responsibility. There are already a number of excellent and thorough studies on the documents known as “Fish-scale maps” (*Yü-lin t'u-ts'e* 魚鱗圖冊), the official cadastral registers and plans which had been compiled since Sung times as a basis for land-tax collection.⁸³ But recently I have formed the impression that some at least of the surviving “Fish-scale maps”, some at least of those Ch'ing period land books listed by libraries in this category, were not in fact such documents compiled officially by the state for the purpose of tax collection, but were rather private compilations made by landlord bursaries for the purpose of their own private collection of rents.⁸⁴

⁸² See Muramatsu (6), 664-65.

⁸³ See Niida Noboru, *Chūgoku hōseishi kenkyū* 2. *Tochi-hō: Torihiki-ho*, Tokyo, 1960, 277-321.

⁸⁴ See Muramatsu (3), especially 247-50, 252-61, 267-73, 278-9, and 317-23. The reasons for my belief that some of these *Yü-lin t'u-ts'e* are private compilations made by landlords or bursaries are as follows. First, the numbers of the *ch'iu* 丘 embanked areas in which the land-strips are listed are not consecutive, and are often very discontinuous. This would certainly mean that the listing of land-strips in these books is not exhaustive but selective. Next, the amounts of rice given against each plot are often as large as one *shih* per *mou*. This can hardly represent tax, but would on the other hand make sense if interpreted as rent. See Muramatsu (5) on this problem.

The landlord bursary exercised a semi state power over its lands and tenants, then, in various ways.⁸⁵ But this should not be taken to imply that the state gave any formal and explicit recognition to the political or legal independence of the bursary within its own lands as a result of the limited power of local authorities to exercise strict control over remote districts. The bursaries' control of their lands and their peasants depended in fact upon the theory that the payment of taxes to the state was a common duty of both the landlords and their peasant tenants. It was only on these grounds that the bursaries could invoke the aid of the state in their dealings with tenants who had defaulted in payment of their private liabilities, have them arrested, detained, sometimes even killed, and treated as criminals.

The bursaries remained really powerful at least until the early 1920's. Until then, it was the accepted thing for a scholar or official who had had a successful career and managed to save some capital, to invest this in land and settle down as a gentry landlord. In the social and institutional situation of the late nineteenth century this was the most easy, secure, and respectable way of living a prosperous, independent, and influential life.

But, as we have seen from the case of the Kung-shou-chan bursary and its owner Fei Chung-shen, in the present century the situation was radically changed.

⁸⁵ See the works of Amano Motonosuke and Chou Ch 'i-chung cited above, p. 21, n. 3.

Table 8

Change in the Net Profit from Lands Belonging to the Chi-hao and under the Management of the Ching-yu Tsu-chan Bursary, 1893-1928

	Acreage (<i>mou</i>)	Income		Expenditure		Net gain paid to the owner (1,000 cash <i>yüan</i> *)
		Rents (<i>shih</i> of irce)	Monetary equivalent (1,000 cash, <i>yüan</i> *) ^a	Tax (1,000 cash, <i>jüan</i> *)	Total (1,000 cash <i>jüan</i> *)	
1893	55.338	44.380	97.635	28.648	40.712	56.923
1899	55.338	40.144	116.415	35.497	46.589	69.826
1900	55.338	42.849	108.076	35.896	46.174	61.902
1901	55.338	37.596	114.704	34.322	51.185	63.519
1902	55.338	41.203	135.972	41.717	58.165	77.807
1903	55.338	35.514	121.520	44.854	53.248	68.277
1904	55.338	42.366	130.254	41.711	63.366	66.888
1905	54.261	41.505	118.976	39.743	57.121	61.815
1906	58.029	33.045	146.143	46.441	65.844	80.299
1907	58.029	45.712	190.203	59.705	79.436	110.767
1908	58.029	40.408	243.010	58.248	89.808	153.202
1909	58.029	36.005	213.464	62.652	90.943	122.521
1910	58.029	45.325	252.093	69.709	101.133	150.960
1912	58.029	37.832	*169.046	*40.843	*56.969	*112.077
1913	58.029	45.633	*193.797	*41.793	*51.995	*136.201
1914	58.029	39.626	*176.347	*45.118	*61.630	*114.715
1915	58.029	45.416	*211.317	*46.258	*62.447	*148.870
1916	58.029	49.392	*219.564	*46.258	*62.794	*156.770
1917	58.029	39.641	*175.799	*37.614	*56.372	*119.427
1918	58.029	43.922	*196.074	*40.549	*59.720	*136.326
1922	58.029	45.473	*301.045	*36.273	*57.627	*243.418
1923	58.029	49.533	*347.749	*49.187	*63.783	*283.966
1927	58.029	41.447	*344.010	*79.707	*121.380	*230.072
1928	58.029	43.029	*368.539	*82.196	*154.691	*213.848
Total	1,370.091	1,005.771	19,88.465	597.143	843.724	1,144.701
			*2,703.289	*545.796	*809.408	*1,895.690
Average	57.057	41.907	152.958	45.934	64.901	88.053
			*245.753	*49.617	*73.582	*172.335

^a After the beginning of the Republic in 1911 the standard unit of currency was changed from the copper cash to the silver dollar (*yüan*).

Immediately after the Nationalists came to power in 1927-8 Fei's landlord enterprise ceased to be profitable, and in the early 1930's he was petitioning the state to confiscate his lands in payment of his tax liabilities. His sons did not dream of becoming landed gentlemen or bursary owners. Two became engineers after studying in Shanghai and abroad, the third became a university professor. It is clear that the tremendous radical fundamental transformation of Chinese society as a whole which began to gather momentum in the 1920's had also deeply affected landlordism.

The last material which I wish to present directly illustrates this transformation. It comprises 24 volumes entitled *pao-hsiao ko-hao pei-ch'a* 報銷各號備查, which are possessed by the National Diet Library, Tokyo. These are account books compiled by the Yü-ching tsu-chan bursary between 1893 and 1928, which preserve an almost unbroken record of the annual balance of land managed by the bursary for various outside landowners. The bursary made an annual report to each owner of rents received, taxes paid, and expenses incurred by the bursary including bursary commission (*chan-fei* 棧費) and the various payments made to the local authorities or to their employees.⁸⁶

Of the 34 landowners (*hao*) depositing lands with the bursary in 1893, three at least are still to be found in the list for 1928, and had kept their land continuously

⁸⁶ See Muramatsu (5), 681-99.

under the bursary's management.⁸⁷ The information given in the accounts about the lands managed on behalf of these owners have made it possible for me to trace their profits and losses for 24 years in the period 1893-1928. The results show some of the startling changes in the economics of landed investment. which undoubtedly were a vital factor in preparing the stage for the land reforms later undertaken by P'eng Pai and Mao Tse-tung.

In table 8 (p. 420) I have taken one of these three




Figure 1

Change in net profit from landed property of Chi-hao managed by Ching-yü tsu-chan bursary, 1893-1928.

⁸⁷ See Muramatsu (5), 705-08.

owners, the Chi-hao 祭號 as representative case, and try to give a balance sheet of the profits from their lands over this period.⁸⁸

These changes can be seen even more clearly in the graph above

It is clear that the period falls into at least four stages. (1) During the years down to 1905, income, tax, and other expenses of the landlord all remained relatively stable and roughly in equilibrium. (2) During the period from the Russo-Japanese war to the 1911 Revolution, rents rose steeply, but taxes and other expenses lagged behind, resulting in a rapid increase in net profits. (3) The period 1912-17 remained very profitable for the landlord with rising income from rents and relatively steady tax rates and other expenses. (4) After 1918 or 1919 the growth of income from rents evened out and stopped, while expenses, particularly tax demands, grew suddenly and ever-increasingly, resulting in a sudden and dramatic decline in net profits during the 1920's.⁸⁹

On the surface landlordism in the late nineteenth century and the 1920's and 1930's shows many of the same features, and in reading the procedural documents connected with rent-collection and tenants' arrests from before and after the 1911 revolution I have always

⁸⁸ For my detailed argument on the reasons for selecting this particular property as representative. see Muramatsu (5), 716, 729.

⁸⁹ See Muramatsu (5), 716-39, for a detailed analysis of these figures.

been impressed by the apparent lack of change in the attitudes of the authorities towards the landlords and bursaries, and in the powerful domination which landlord and bursary were able to exercise over their lands and tenants. But it seems clear that this surface lack of change in fact masks the steady advance of fundamental economic changes which suddenly became manifest in the period immediately after the first World War, and set the scene for the decades when China at last plunged into fundamental and revolutionary social changes.

An Analysis of the Land Tax Burden in China, 1650-1865

by

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I. Introduction

In an agrarian economy, the purpose of land taxation is to enable the government to acquire sustenance (food and clothing) for the labor force it hires or recruits. In the early T'ang period (618-906) when the adult male (*ting*) was the tax base, laborers were acquired by corvée (*yung*) and tax in kind was levied separately for food (under the name of *tsu*) and cloth (under the name of *tiao*).¹ But this tax system, toge-

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¹ A glossary of Chinese terms and names used in this article is available in duplicated form from the authors.

ther with the closely related land allotment system, finally ceased to function by the end of the eighth century.² Thereafter, the evolution of the land tax system was mainly due to the development of the market system and to population pressure. Peacetime corvée was gradually replaced by "contractual" hiring in the market; payment in kind was partly commuted into monetary payment. Land gradually took on relative and absolute scarcity value and replaced labor as the tax base. During the Ch'ing period (1644-1911) the traditional land tax system inherited from Ming times underwent its final stage of evolution: the practice of commutation (*che-yin*) was institutionalized, and the shifting of the incidence of the *ting* tax into a land tax (*t'an-ting-ju-ti*) established land as the sole tax base.

The Ch'ing land tax system functioned smoothly through the end of the eighteenth century when the dynasty was at its prime of prosperity. By the second half of the nineteenth century, however, this system had lost its efficiency and was unable to help increase revenue for government programs of industrialization undertaken in response to the impact of the West. The land tax system's inflexibility may be accounted one of the major institutional disadvantages that hindered the transition of the traditional Chinese economy.

To investigate the weakness of this tax system, we

² For details of the *tsu-yung-tiao* and the *chun-t'ien* systems, see D.C. Twitchett, *Financial Administration under the T'ang Dynasty* (Cambridge, 1963), chs. 1-2.

should pay attention to the concept of tax burden.³ The weakness of the Ch'ing land tax system is manifested in the gradual reduction of the tax burden which, from the viewpoint of the government, meant that tax revenue decreased. The purpose of this paper is to trace this weakness to two practices, that of commutation, and of the shifting of the incidence of labor services into land tax.

We shall first sketch briefly the basic features of the Ch'ing land tax system, then provide a model to analyze the commutation practice and the fixed tax quota and their impact on the tax burden. In order to implement the theoretical analysis, we shall in turn explain how our statistical data are used, and apply the theory to interpret the data. (In the appendix we briefly discuss the nature of our primary data source.)

Our conclusions are twofold: (1) the tax burden had decreased enormously and (2) this decrease resulted from the lack of automatic adjustability of the land tax system. Government revenue was affected, therefore, by factors unanticipated by the designers of the system, which had at least corresponded to the policy and the needs of the Ch'ing government prior to the nineteenth century. In the second half of the nineteenth century,

³ For a recent discussion on this topic, see Yeh-chien Wang, *Land Taxation in Imperial China, 1750-1911* (Cambridge, Mass., 1973), pp. 110-28.

the Ch'ing land tax system had already lost its efficiency; it would inevitably give way to a new system in the course of institutional evolution.

II. Basic Features of the Land Tax System during Ch'ng Times

The Ch'ing land tax system was an adoption and modification of the Ming system. During the long period of Ming (1368-1644) there were two major developments in the evolution of the land tax system: labor service payment was absorbed into the land tax (*i-t'iao-pien* or "single whip" as known in Ming and *t'an-ting-ju-ti* as known in early Ch'ing) and the practice of commutation into silver (*che-yin*). Since these were the two chief characteristics adopted in the design of the Ch'ing land tax system, let us investigate their economic significance separately.

The Practice of Commutation

From the Ming system the Ch'ing land tax system inherited the feature that although a tax quota for a piece of land was stipulated in terms of rice (or other kinds of grain depending on the crop regions), the fulfillment of that tax obligation involved payment in rice or payment in silver. The latter, the practice of commutation, arose for an obvious reason. In a large agrarian empire characterized by heterogeneity of crop regions (for example, rice, wheat, millet,

etc.) such as China, the central government must select one commodity as the standard of value for taxation purposes.⁴ Because of its intrinsic properties rice was the natural candidate. On the one hand, the government wanted to stock rice for supporting soldiers and for famine relief; on the other, of all the commodities rice was the best proxy for money.⁵ Thus, for a non-rice growing region commutation is an indispensable device.⁶

Even for such rice-growing regions as Sung-chiang and Su-chou (which will be analyzed later in our paper) the commutation practice was used to increase the efficiency of the tax system since the land tax system itself was a device for "spatially oriented unilateral transfers." Let us use an example to illustrate this idea.

In Figure 1a suppose Sung-chiang, represented by a

⁴ John L. Buck, *Land Utilization in China* (Nanking, 1937), ch. 2. Buck classified eight crop regions.

⁵ In the theory of money, before the age of a metallic standard a commodity possessing the following properties is most likely to be selected as "money": 1) divisibility, 2) durability, 3) homogeneity, 4) discernibility (familiarity), and 5) stability in quantity. That rice, more than any other commodity, has all these properties can be inferred from the fact that during the Sino-Japanese War (1937-45), rice was chosen as the standard of value for many transactions, including compensation for civil servants, as the formal monetary system was disrupted by inflation.

⁶ Under rare circumstances the government might require the special products of a region to be used for purposes of tax payment.

point (or "vertex") S, is to pay a total tax payment of 100 ounces of silver, of which $S_1=30$ ounces will be spent in Peking (P_1) and $S_2=70$ ounces in Ta-t'ung (P_2) This spatial pattern of unilateral transfer ($S_1=30$, $S_2=70$) in terms of silver is merely an accounting device to accommodate a commodity transfer (rice) produced by taxpayers in Sung-chiang and transferred to beneficiaries in Peking and Ta-t'ung. If one assumes the price of rice is 2 ounces of silver, then the amount of rice transfer to Peking is $T_1=15$, and to Ta-t'ung, $T_2=35$. This real resources transfer is facilitated by the merchants who make the actual rice shipment to the beneficiaries in Peking and Ta-t'ung. These beneficiaries make consumption expenditures of $C_1=30$ and $C_2=70$




Figure 1

Spatial pattern of unilateral transfer

which are financed by the tax revenue.

The flow chart in Figure 1a is split into a financial component in Figure 1b and into a real component in Figure 1c. The real component indicates the ultimate objective of this spatially oriented unilateral transfer. When a politically unified country is large and is characterized by differentiated regional land fertility as in China, real resources are routinely transferred out of the rich regions, such as Su-chou and Sung-chiang, to the poor regions.⁷

The financial component is merely an institutional arrangement to accommodate the unilateral transfer. Notice that in Figure 1b the flows form a closed circuit, in that at every vertex S, P₁, and P₂, the total inflow of silver equals total outflow. This shows that the unilateral transfer is being carried out with the use of silver

⁷ That the tax burden of Su-chou and Sung-chiang areas was the heaviest in the country has been well known since Ku Yen-wu noted it in his *Jih-chih-lu* (Daily notes), vol. 10. Some authors have tried to clarify the reason for this: see Chou Liang-hsiao, "Ming-tai Su-Sung ti-ch'ü te kuan-t'ien yü chung-fu wen-t'i" (The government land and its relations to the heavy tax burden in the Su-Sung areas in Ming times), *Li-shih yen-chiu* (Historical studies), 10 (Oct. 1957), 63-75; Wu Chi-hua, *Ming-tai she-hui-ching-chi-shih lun-ts'ung* (Studies on socio-economic problems of the Ming period; Taipei, 1970), first two chs. in Part I, pp. 17-73. According to the latter, the tax quota of Su-Sung areas together amounted to 13.68 percent of the countrywide total during the Ming period (p. 45). Since the early Ch'ing tax quota was adopted from that of the later Ming, the situation remained the same. See *Su-chou fu-chih* (The gazetteer of Su-chou prefecture; 1853 ed.), 12: 18b-33b.

as the primary accounting device (for example, silver is the means of payment as well as the standard of value).

A rational pattern of inter-regional resource flows associated with unilateral transfer can be a very complicated phenomenon. In Figure 2a, Sung-chiang transfers $S_3=50$ ounces of silver to Yunnan (P_3) The tax money is being used by the latter to acquire goods produced in localities x and y different from Sung-chiang. These localities will in turn spend the income so generated to acquire commodity shipments from Sung-chiang. The financial component and the real component of this pattern are shown in Figures 2b and 2c. The rational pattern of real resource flow (see Figure 2c) depends upon such factors as the comparative cost of production in various localities as well as the transportation cost between them.

Since the land tax in an agrarian economy is the major form of taxation, a primary criterion to evaluate its efficiency must be whether or not it leads to an optimal spatial pattern of resource utilization. The only way this optimal spatial pattern can be realized is by making use of the market system in which the merchants guided by the price system play a key role. The purpose of Figures 1a and 2a is to portray the operation of such a market system. The economic significance of the commutation practice is as a crucial part of an organizational




Figure 2

Rational pattern of interregional resource flows associated with unilateral transfer

design that leads to efficient patterns of spatial resource allocation associated with interregional unilateral resource transfer. It is conducive to a full utilization of the market system.

A major question we should now raise is the following. Suppose the total tax quota of Sung-chiang is 100 bags of rice or 200 ounces of silver per year. The total payment in silver is 150 ounces; for example, out of

the rice quota of 100 units, 75 units are to be commuted into silver (150 ounces), hence only 25 units of rice must actually be paid in rice. The commutation rate is, therefore, 75 percent. Our empirical data show that in the period from 1656 to 1865 the commutation rates were fairly stable (usually around 50 percent to 49 percent in the case of Su-chou, and 64 to 63 percent in the case of Sung-chiang). What then accounts for the stability of the commutation rate?

Our conjecture is that the non-commuted tax payment (for example, that paid in rice) corresponded to those usages of rice that could be most efficiently handled under government auspices. Typical items included in this category were storage in local official warehouses and the shipment of tributary grain by the government sponsored transport system (*ts'ao-yun*). Traditionally, these shipments were destined to strategically located warehouses serving the needs of the capital city and the garrisons on the frontier. The major characteristic of noncommuted payment in rice was that it required neither a market system nor merchants to achieve its well defined and obvious spatial patterns of allocation. Thus what lies behind the stable commutation rate is the stability of the ratio of "two streams of spatial rice flows"—one most efficiently served by the market system and the other most efficiently served by government means.

The Absorption of Labor Service Levy by the Land Tax

The principle of land taxation in traditional China went through a long process of transformation, or evolution, from the "two-tax" system (*liang-shui-fa*) of the late T'ang dynasty (formally announced in 780 A. D.) to the "single whip" system (*i-t'ao-pien-fa*) of the late Ming dynasty (beginning in the 1520s). In these seven hundred or so years China gradually experienced population pressure and intensive land cultivation, so that land instead of labor gradually took on scarcity value. The emergence of "economic rent" (for example, the emergence of land as a major capital asset in an agrarian economy) and the administrative feasibility of land assessment naturally led to the selection of land (for example, area of cultivation) as the primary object of taxation.⁸

This leading principle of evolution in the tax system manifested itself in the absorption of the labor services levy into the land tax. What emerged finally was a mixed system in which a "tax on labor" was imposed on a "tax on land." Let us first portray this idealized system analytically.

⁸ The abandonment of the earlier system of *tsu-yung-tiao* prevailing in the early T'ang dynasty was due directly to the lack of accurate population statistics, which made it administratively difficult to tax on the basis of population. The continuing emphasis on the compilation of land statistics, however, culminated in the *Yü-lin-t'u-ts'e* (Fish-scale maps and books) in the early Ming.

When the tax on an adult male of b units of rice is added to a tax of R units of rice per unit of land, the total amount of tax per unit of land cultivated by L units of adult males is given by

$$T = R + bL \text{ (e.g., } R=10, b=2 \text{)} \quad (1)$$

This is shown by the straight line AB in Figure 3, where units of adult male (L) are measured on the horizontal axis. This line indicates an idealized situation in which the levy on labor services (bL) is added to the tax on land (R). For example, with $L=2$, the total tax payment of T_2 consists of R units of land tax (*ti-shui*) and $2b$ units of tax on adult males (*ting-yin*).

According to Adam Smith, two basic principles in the design of a tax system are its productivity and administrative feasibility.⁹ As far as productivity is concerned, the idealized system provides for an increasing tax revenue whenever the land is being more intensively cultivated due to population pressure. Obviously, without the labor tax (bL) in equation 1, a fixed land tax per unit of land (R) will clearly be inadequate to maintain the tax yield as a fixed proportion of output and/or economic rent when land is more intensively cultivated.

From the viewpoint of administrative feasibility,

⁹ Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (Modern Library ed.; New York, 1965), pp. 769-78.




Figure 3

The idealized tax line and the realistic tax line

the idealized system encountered a basic difficulty of tax evasion through underreporting of the number of adult males. In Figure 3, after T_2 the realistic tax line is shown by the dotted curve $T'_3T'_4$ with $T'_3 < T_3$ and $T'_4 < T_4$. Moreover, after T'_4 the realistic tax line becomes horizontal, indicating a situation of increasing *ting* without increasing tax (*tzu-sheng jen-ting yung-pu chia-fu*). For example, after point T'_4 , with four or more adult males cultivating land the actual payment remains three *ting*. Hereafter the tax payment of $R + 3b$ will be paid regardless

the intensity of cultivation.

While such a practice must have been prevalent towards the end of the Ming dynasty, the Ch'ing ruler made all this official. The K'ang-hsi emperor (1662-1722), under the guise of a benevolent ruler, took a decisive action in 1712 to freeze the tax quota of *ting* at the level of 1711 and finally eliminated the possibility of increasing tax revenue from this source altogether.¹⁰ Soon after this decree was issued, a fixed *ting* tax quota (called *ch'ang-o*) was officially adopted at different times for different localities and allotted to the land tax to form the historical tax base (in our example, $R+3b$ at the point T'_4 in Figure 3).¹¹ This historical tax base could not be changed except in minor ways.¹²

In summary, the premodern Chinese land tax system went through a process of transformation during the course of more than seven hundred years. What began with a tax on people in the *tsu-yung-tiao* system in early T'ang times gave way under population and admi-

¹⁰ The decree is recorded in *Ch'ing Sheng-tsu shih-lu* (The veritable record of K'ang-hsi period, 1662-1722), 249:14b-16a.

¹¹ This process began in 1716 and finished in 1745. See *Ch'in-ting ta-Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li* (Precedents of the collected statutes of the Ch'ing dynasty; Chia-ch'ing ed.; 1801), 123:11b-16b.

¹² In a given locality the tax quota could be changed if some parts of the cultivated land became wasteland due to natural calamities; if newly reclaimed land became subject to tax; or if the administrative unit boundary were changed.

nistrative pressures to a fixed tax quota on land symbolized as the "single whip." This principle of taxation was combined with a commutation practice to enhance the efficiency of unilateral transfer in a spatially integrated agrarian economy. These briefly sketched features will serve as background for our analysis below.¹³

III. A Theoretical Analysis of the Land Tax Burden

The twin features of the Ch'ing land tax system—the fixed tax quota on land and the fixed commutation rate—which were adopted in the early days of that dynasty had given the tax system an unexpected and undesirable property of rigid inflexibility which finally resulted in inadequate government revenue. It is clear that with a relatively constant amount of land and a fixed tax quota, revenue could not keep pace with the expansion of agricultural output as population increased.

¹³ Our brief sketch of the historical outline of the land tax system is a familiar story recognized by traditional historical analysis. The essential message conveyed by historians is threefold: 1) unreliability, especially underestimation, of the *ting* data as a measurement of adult males; 2) from a long-run historical perspective, the tax base in traditional China had finally shifted from a tax on people to a tax on land; 3) the land tax system using land area as its base was rather inflexible and hence a basic cause of corruption. See Ping-ti Ho, *Studies on the Population of China, 1368-1953* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), ch. 2; Yeh-chien Wang, *Land Taxation in Imperial China*, chs. 2-3.

Moreover, the difficulty was compounded because the fixed quota system, operated under the fixed commutation rate, led automatically to a lightening of the tax burden in terms of rice when the price of rice rose. In this section we propose to investigate the above issue analytically by introducing in succession the concepts of tax quota and tax payment pattern, the commutation price, the degree of tax burden, and the commutation rate. The theoretical analysis of this section will be statistically implemented in the next.

Tax Quota and Tax Payment Pattern

Let the tax payment in rice be R and the tax payment in silver be S . Suppose the tax quota in rice is Q and that the market price of rice in silver is p . Then the alternative pattern of tax payment which fulfills the quota is given by

$$pQ = pR + S \quad (2)$$

In Figure 4, let R (S) be measured on the horizontal (vertical) axis. The quota in rice is represented by the distance OQ on the horizontal axis. The term pQ (quota in silver) is represented by the distance OM on the vertical axis. The alternative patterns of tax payment satisfying equation 2 are represented by the points on the straight line QM . Every point on this tax patten line is equivalent in value to the tax quota in rice (OQ) or in silver (OM).

When the quota in rice (OQ) is fixed, any change

in the price of rice (p) will lead to a shift of the tax payment line. The straight lines QM' and QM'' represent the system of tax payment lines with the same quota. A higher line in this system indicates a higher price of rice (that is, larger p). Thus at points A, A_1 , and A_2 , with the same tax payment in rice (OB), the tax payment in silver is larger as the price increases ($AB < A_1B < A_2B$)

Commutation Price

The alternative tax pattern lines (QM , QM' , QM'') portray an idealized situation in which the rate of converting rice into silver for tax payment purposes reflects the market price of rice. Those who were responsible for the design of the tax system were obviously aware of the fact that if the commutation price were fixed (that is, if the line QM remained unchanged) and failed to reflect the fluctuating market price, the taxpayers would gain at the expense of the government treasury when the market price of rice increased (for example, $A_1B < A_2B$). The opposite was true when the price of rice fell (for example, $AB < A_1B$). For this reason the central government stipulated an administrative procedure that enabled the commutation price to be changed but that also required the local officials to "memorialize" the central government for

price was very difficult to administer because of a technical consideration. The price of rice can fluctuate for various reasons, such as seasonal, secular, and more violent change due to crop failure. Without very elaborate statistical techniques, it is virtually impossible to make frequent adjustment of the commutation price.

Suppose the government announces a commutation price of rice (r) according to which a portion of tax quota in rice is to be commuted into silver. Then the alternative pattern of tax payment is given by

$$rQ = rR + S \quad (3)$$

In Figure 4, suppose the tax pattern line according to the market price is QM . In case the commutation price is lower than the market price ($r < p$), then the tax pattern line corresponding to r is represented by a straight line such as QM' which is lower than QM . Conversely, the straight line QM'' represents the case in which the commutation price is higher than the market price ($r > p$).

Analysis of the Tax Burden

Let us analyze the impact on the tax burden when the commutation price is less than the market price.

Suppose A is a typical point on the tax pattern line QM' determined by the commutation price. We can draw a straight dotted line AC parallel to QM , the tax pattern line determined by the market price. Let AC intersect the horizontal axis at C . Since OB represents

tax payment in rice, and since AB units of tax payment in silver have an exchange value of BC units of rice, the total tax payment in rice is OC, which falls short of the quota ($OC < OQ$). The distance $CQ = \alpha$ represents the amount of the reduction of the tax burden.

Notice that the magnitude of the reduction of tax burden is determined by two factors, namely, the actual amount of tax payment in rice OB and the gap between the market price and the commutation price ($p-r$). Thus if the government insists that a larger amount of rice OB' be paid ($OB' > OB$), the tax payment point is A' . In this case, the value of tax payment in rice is OC' , hence the reduction of tax burden α' becomes smaller ($\alpha' < \alpha$).

Suppose the government makes an upward adjustment of the commutation price. Now the tax pattern line is QA'' . Because of the narrowing of the price gap ($p-r$), the reduction of the tax burden is again smaller ($\alpha' < \alpha$). Furthermore, when the commutation price is higher than the market price, the tax payment line QM'' is higher than the line QM. At the tax payment point A_2 , there is now an increase of tax burden to the amount of α'' .

In order to measure the degree of actual tax burden we can express the amount of the tax burden as a fraction of the tax quota. For example, at point A the degree of the tax burden is

$$u = OC/OQ \quad (4)$$

When $u < 1$, the the tax burden is less than the quota. For example, if $u = .8$ then the taxpayers only have to pay 80 percent of the quota.

Commutation Rate

When the commutation price is less than the market price ($r < p$), the actual tax burden becomes lighter when the taxpayers have the privilege of making more tax payments in silver. Let us denote the extent, or degree, of this privilege by v ; that is, v is payment in silver expressed as a fraction of the tax quota in silver computed at the commutation price. Thus at point A in Figure 4,

$$v = AB/OM, (=BQ/OQ) \quad (5)$$

This ratio v is the commutation rate, which was fairly stable through time for reasons already discussed. There is a logical relation between this rate and the degree of tax burden u :

$$a. u = 1 - vg \text{ where} \quad (6)$$

$$b. g = (p - r) / p$$

In equation 6b, g is the degree of price gap, or the price gap $(p - r)$ as a fraction of the market price (p) . Equation 6a states that the tax burden is lighter when v is larger (that is, when the commutation rate is high) and/or when g is large (that is, when the degree of price gap is large). Notice that when the commutation price is less than the market price ($r < p$), u is a

positive fraction because both v and g are positive fractions.¹⁵

These equations provide the framework for empirical study. We shall now explain the nature of the statistical data used in this study.

IV. Identification of Parameters

The empirical implementation of our theory is based on the data of Su-chou and Sung-chiang prefectures for more than two hundred years (1656-1865) covering most of the Ch'ing dynasty. This two-hundred-year period was selected so that the land tax burden could be investigated in a long-term historical perspective. These prefectures were chosen for two reasons: they are quantitatively important, as together their payments accounted for more than 10 percent of the total land tax of the country;¹⁶ and the statistical data needed for our study—tax quota Q , tax payment in rice R and in silver S , and the market price p —are available for these prefectures.

For any given date the quadruplet numbers (Q, R, S, p) constitute the primary data needed for our study. When they are available, we can in turn identify the

¹⁵ As diagrammatic proof of this result, we have
 $p = OM/OQ$, $r = OM'/OQ$ hence
 $g = (p-r)/p = (MM'/OQ)/(OM/OQ) = MM'/OM = 1 - OM'/OM =$
 $1 - AB/A$, $B = 1 - BC/BQ$.
 On the other hand
 $v = AB/OM' = BQ/OQ$, then
 $vg = (1 - BC/BQ)(BQ/OQ) = BQ/OQ - BC/OQ = CQ/OQ$; therefore
 $u = 1 - vg = 1 - CQ/OQ = OC/OQ$.

¹⁶ See n. 7.

four indicators (r, g, v, u), for we have

a. commutation price $r = \frac{S}{Q-R}$ by(3); (7)

b. price gap as a fraction of market price $g = \frac{p-r}{p}$ by(6b);

c. commutation rate $v = \frac{AB}{OM} = \frac{S}{rQ} \left(= \frac{Q-R}{Q} \right)$ by(5);

d. degree of tax burden $u = 1 - vg$ by(6a)

In addition to these indicators we also need to verify the hypothesis that the tax quota (Q) per acre of land was relatively constant. As we have shown in Figure 3, after the point T'_4 a historical tax base (or quota) is fixed once and for all. To verify this hypothesis we need the additional primary data of acreage of land (A), based on which we can compute the tax quota per unit of land:

$$q = Q/A \quad (8)$$

The values of p, r, g, v, u, q "identified" in this way for the Su-chou and Sung-chiang prefectures are summarized in Table 1 for the indicated benchmark years.¹⁷ The primary data sources and the procedure we have used to calculate these parameters are explained in the appendix.

¹⁷ In the language of econometrics, what we have shown in this section is the "identification" of the six parameters that are essential for our analysis. "Identification" is to infer the values of the parameters from their observable magnitudes (in our model, $A, Q, R, S,$ and p) under the assumption that the observable magnitudes are indeed produced in a system that can be described by the model structure.

V. Empirical Analysis of Tax Burden

The time series for the six indicators of Table 1 are shown in the three panels of Figure 5.¹⁸ The top

Table 1
Parameters for Tax Burden Analysis

<i>Su-chou</i>						
<i>year</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>g</i>	<i>v</i>	<i>u</i>	<i>q</i>
1656-1710	.80	.885	-.106	.497	1.053	.288
1725-1726	1.27	.889	.300	.488	.854	.304
1738-1750	1.45	.741	.498	.492	.760	.303
1830	3.70	.707	.808	.495	.600	.265
1865	2.50	1.124	.550	.492	.730	.163
<i>Sung-chiang</i>						
<i>year</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>g</i>	<i>v</i>	<i>u</i>	<i>q</i>
1656-1662	.80	.820	-.025	.644	1.016	.289
1775	1.70	.581	.658	.633	.585	.298
1795	2.75	.610	.778	.639	.509	.298
1810	3.50	.627	.820	.628	.485	.290
1875	2.50	1.130	.548	.563	.692	.179

p: the market price

r: the commutation price

g: the price gap

v: the commutation rate

u: the degree of tax burden

q: the tax quota per unit of land

Source: See Appendix.

panel contains the time series *u*, *v*, and *g* needed to implement equation 6a ($u=1-vg$) for the analysis of

¹⁸ The years for which we have data are indicated by the rows of Table 1. Values for other years in Figure 5 are derived by interpolation.




Figure 5

Trends of degree of tax burden and other indicators

Source: Table 1.

the degree of tax burden. The tax quota per unit of land (q) is shown in the middle panel; the market price (p) and the commutation price (r) are shown in the lower panel.

Note that the time series for each indicator for both prefectures are shown in the same panel of Figure 5. Thus there are altogether six pairs of time series for the six indicators. It should be stressed that the patterns of time trend for the two prefectures are quite similar for every pair. This similarity not only facilitates our discussion but, more importantly, it indicates that the same set of socio-economic forces was in fact operating in these key taxpaying districts of south China.¹⁹ The similarity between the two prefectures thus lends credibility to our theory.

Prior to 1865 the tax burden per *mou* (1 *mou* = 16 acre) remained practically stable. On the average it was about .3 *shih* (1 *shih* = 103 litres), which was about one seventh of the yield of rice per *mou*.²⁰ After

¹⁹ The similarity of time patterns exhibited for the two prefectures can in most cases be supported by that of the smaller administrative units, namely, the counties of the two prefectures.

²⁰ The yield of rice per *mou* in these prefectures was approximately 2 *shih* during the Ch'ing dynasty. In the late seventeenth century, according to Ch'i Fu, an able male could cultivate 12-13 *mou* of rice paddy; the annual output from that amount of good land was about 30 *shih* and from poor land about 20 *shih*. See Ho Ch'ang-ling comp., *Huang-ch'ao ching-shih wen-pien* (Essays on statecraft during the Ch'ing dynasty; 1827), 26:20a. In the nineteenth century according to Tseng Kuo-fan, the yield per *mou* was from 1.5 to 2 *shih*. See *Huang-ch'ao cheng-tien lei-tsu'an* (Classified documents of the Ch'ing dynasty; Taipei, 1969), 8:4a. And according to Lin Tse-hsü, in the south during the normal years the yield per *mou* was 5 *shih* of unhusked rice, which equaled 2.5 *shih* of husked rice (*ibid.*, 1:9b). During the Ch'ing period, only one crop of rice, was produced annually in Kiangsu province. See *Su-chou fu-chih* (1883 ed.), 12:33b.

1865, owing to the tax reduction movement carried out during 1864-1865, the tax quota per *mou* was reduced to about .2 *shih* in the two prefectures.²¹ This verifies our hypothesis of a fixed quota per unit of land.

Let us now concentrate on the time patterns of the degree of the tax burden as shown by the u-curves in the top panel of Figure 5. The u-shaped characteristic of these curves immediately reveals that there were two distinct phases marked off by a turning point around 1820-1830. In the first long phase of approximately 160 years (1650-1820) there had been a persistent and uninterrupted decline in the degree of the tax burden. After the turning point this trend was reversed as the degree of the tax burden began to increase consistently over a time span of some 30 or 40 years (1830-1865):

What is most striking is the severity of the decline in the first phase. In the case of Sung-chiang, for instance, the decline over 150 years (1656-1810) was from 1.02 to .48, a drop of more than 50 percent. This means that in terms of rice, the tax collected was less than half of the original quota. Although this loss was partially recovered during the second phase, even in 1875 the loss was more than 30 percent.

The fluctuation and especially the decline of tax

²¹ For the details of this movement, see Hsia Nai, "Tai-p'ing t'ien-kuo ch'ien-hou Ch'ang-chiang ko-sheng chih t'ien-fu wen-ti" (The land tax problem of the Yangtze provinces before and after the Taiping Rebellion), *Ch'ing-hua hsüeh-pao* (The Tsing Hua Journal), 10 (Apr. 1935), 409-74.

revenue in such enormous magnitudes was clearly not anticipated by the original designers of the land tax system. At the beginning of the 1650s, when the Ch'ing ruler inherited the Ming system, the burden of the quota system was fully realized for a while. This can be inferred from the fact that the u-curves begin from points that are very close to, or even slightly higher than, its full amount (that is, $u=1$ shown by a horizontal line). The decline of this tax burden was a cumulative result of imperceptible decreases that "crept in" annually, such as .0036 in the case of Sung-chiang.

Of the two major explanatory variables g (the price gap) and v (the commutation price), it is apparent that it was the former that was mainly responsible for the fluctuation of the degree of the tax burden. This is clearly seen from the equation $u = 1 - vg$ and the inverse u-shaped character of the g -curves which also have turning points in 1810 and 1830, coinciding with those of the u-curves. On the contrary, the dotted v -curves indicate that the commutation rates were very stable—49 percent in the case of Su-chou and 63 percent in the case of Sung-chiang—and thus they were not responsible for the fluctuation of the degree of the tax burden.

It may be observed in passing that the u-curve of Sung-chiang lies consistently below that of Su-chou, indicating that the tax burden of the former was consistently lower. This difference between the two prefect-

ures can be explained mainly by the fact that the commutation rate of Sung-chiang was consistently higher than that of Su-chou. Our conjecture is that Sung-chiang had a higher commutation rate for two reasons. First, the direct government acquisition of rice in Su-chou was higher because it was situated closer to the canal system, which until 1825 was the main route for the shipment of government rice to the north.²² Second, Sung-chiang was more of a cotton growing region than Su-chou, and thus its crop pattern was more conducive to a higher commutation rate.²³ Thus the difference between the two prefectures reflects the difference of their roles in the spatially oriented unilateral resource transfer.

Let us now look at the market price curves and the commutation price curves in the lower panel illustrating the time patterns of the two variables p and r which lie behind the price gap (g). Apparently the inverse u-shaped time pattern of g is explained mainly by the behavior of the market price, as can readily be seen

²² In 1825 T'ao Chu, governor of Kiangsu, proposed to the central government that the shipment of government grain should take the sea route. See *Ch'ing Hsüan-tsung shih-lu* (The veritable record during the Tao-kuang period, 1821-1850), 84:26a-27b; also see *Sung-chiang fu hsü-chih* (1884 ed.), 13:5b-6a. For the details, see Ho Ch'ang-ling, *Chiang-su hai-yün ch'üan-an* (The complete documents of sea transportation from Kiangsu; c. 1830).

²³ Ch'üan Han-sheng, "Ya-p'ien chan-cheng ch'ien Chiang-su te mien-fang-chih-yeh" (The cotton industry in Kiangsu before the Opium War), in the author's *Chung-kuo ching-chi-shih lun-ts'ung* (Studies on Chinese economic history; Hong Kong, 1972), pp. 626-27.

from the fact that the p-curves are also inverse u-shaped with the turning points in 1810 and 1830. In contrast, the r-curves are fairly stable before the turning points and rise slightly after. The increase of the commutation price after 1810 and 1830 therefore contributed somewhat to the narrowing of the price gap (g) and to the increasing degree of the tax burden during the second phase.

The above analysis demonstrates that the enormous fluctuation of the degree of the tax burden in the 160 year period was due mainly to a "monetary" event unforeseen by the original designers of the Ch'ing land tax system. After the rice quota was rigidly fixed, they also adopted an inflexible commutation rate (v) and commutation price (r) for administrative and other reasons, leaving the real impact of the tax burden completely at the mercy of variations of the monetary price level. The variation of the long-run trend of the price level is a monetary phenomenon. Price increased throughout the eighteenth century and up until 1825 because of the export surplus and the increase in the quantity of silver.²⁴ The price level again decreased because of the import surplus and the silver export resulting from the Opium War episode. But whatever the monetary causes

²⁴ Ch'üan Han-sheng, "Mei-chou pai-yin yü shih-pa shih-chi Chung-kuo wu-chia ke-ming te kuan-hsi" (American silver and the price revolution in eighteenth-century China), in *ibid.*, pp. 475-508. Cf. Yeh-chien Wang, "The Secular Trend of Prices during the Ch'ing Period, 1644-1911", *The Journal of the Institute of Chinese Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong*, 5 (1972), 354.

of the fluctuation of the price level might have been, it is clearly an exogenous event unanticipated from the viewpoint of the design of a rational tax system.

VI. Conclusion

It should not be concluded from the above analysis that the time trend for tax burden during the two hundred years was determined solely by an accidental monetary factor. Such a conclusion is unwarranted because it fails to take into consideration adequacy of the government revenue. It is obvious that the adverse effect on revenue of the lowering of tax burden in the first phase must have been at least consistent with overall government policy and hence acceptable.

A basic policy after the founding of the Ch'ing dynasty was to lower taxation for well-known political reasons.²⁵ The pacification of the Three Feudatories (San-fan) and then of Taiwan in 1683 heralded the beginning of a long period known to historians as the age of great prosperity (*sheng-Ch'ing*) which ended with termination of the rule of the emperor Ch'ien-lung in 1795. Peace and prosperity provided a favorable background to realize the political end of lowering the tax burden. A sequence of imperial orders was issued to exempt regular tax payment.²⁶ Thus we see the

²⁵ *Ch'ing Shih-tsu shih-lu* (The veritable record of the Shun-chih period, 1644-1661), 6:9b-10b.

²⁶ In 1725 an amount of 300,000 taels for Su-chou and 150,000 taels for Sung-chiang was reduced permanently. Again, in 1737, a total amount of 200,000 taels for the two prefectures together was reduced. See *Su-chou fu-chih* (1883 ed.), 12:34a-35b, 38b-39a.

lowering of the degree of tax burden (the u-curves in Figure 5) is quite consistent with the overall political objectives. The tax system not only yielded adequate government revenue but was in fact functioning smoothly, as can be seen from the high tax fulfillment rate which prevailed in this period.²⁷

The upward turn of the degree of the tax burden after 1830 happens to coincide with the beginning of the politically much more turbulent period of the nineteenth century. The shortage of government revenue became more acute as the pressure for higher revenues was generated.²⁸ This pressure resulted in the upward turn of the commutation price (r) in 1830 which contributed to narrowing the price gap (g). At the same time, the commutation rate (v) began to drop, especially for Sung-chiang (see the top panel of Figure 5). Both adjustments contributed to an increase in the degree of the

²⁷ Ch'en Ch'i-yuan, *Yung-hsien-chai pi-chi* (Notes of Yung-hsien-chai; rpt.; Taipei, 1960), 6:8a. Also see *Su-chou fu-chih* (1883 ed.), 12:51b-52a; and Pao Shih-ch'en, *An-wu ssu-chung* (Four works of Pao Shih-ch'en; 1846), 25A:30a.

²⁸ In 1780 the stock of silver in the treasury of the Board of Revenue reached 70 million taels, which was the largest amount ever accumulated during the Ch'ing period. See Ho Ch'ang-ling, *Huang-ch'ao ching-shih wen-pien*, 27:29a. But this stock of silver gradually drained out as, in the 1830s, the government began to find it difficult to keep fiscal balance. See Chu Hsieh, *Chung-kuo ts'ai-cheng wen-ti* (The fiscal problems in China; Shanghai, 1934), pp. 70-72.

tax burden.²⁹ Thus, again, we see that the increase in the degree of the tax burden brought about by the price decrease in this period was consistent with government objectives to raise revenue.

The above analysis shows that in both phases of the change of the tax burden the monetary factors operated in a direction consistent with basic government objectives. Such a land tax system was obviously not a rational one, because it had to rely on an unpredictable accidental factor to achieve its function of producing adequate revenue.

Those who advocate a "single tax system" believe that the government should rely exclusively on land tax for revenue because, aside from yielding adequate revenue, it entails minimum disincentive effect and is least disruptive of the market system.³⁰ The administrative efficiency of a flexible land tax system (for example, the assessment of land tax as a percentage of output rather than as a fixed quota) is, however, quite difficult to achieve, especially when the country is very large and characterized by diversified local conditions such as China's. For this reason, after the Taiping

²⁹ After the Taiping Rebellion the tax reduction movement resulted in the decrease of tax quota for the Yangtze provinces. These reductions, however, were in the nature of temporary relief and could not be regarded as evidence contradictory to a trend for higher taxes, as seen from the upswing of the u-curves that started 30 years earlier.

³⁰ For example, see Henry George, *Progress and Poverty* (New York, 1966 rpt.), pp. 413-14.

Rebellion (1850-1864) the increasing government revenue was raised mainly by the very disruptive transit tax (*likin*) and a host of nuisance taxes (*k'o-chuan tsa-shui*). By 1908 the land tax accounted for only 35 percent of the total government revenue, a decline from about 75 percent in 1753.³¹

The transition of an agrarian economy into a modern industrialized society necessarily requires the use of agricultural surplus to finance industrialization. There is well documented evidence that during the Meiji era in Japan this agricultural surplus was transferred to the industrial sector via a reformed and flexible land tax system. In the last two decades of the nineteenth century the land tax accounted for over 80 percent of the government revenue of Japan.³² The Ch'ing government, on the contrary, lacked the farsightedness to launch a resolute drive for industrialization and modernization comparable to that of the Meiji government

³¹ For the history of *likin* see Lo Yu-tung, *Chung-kuo li-chin-shih* (The history of *likin* in China; Shanghai, 1936). Also see Ho Lieh, *Li-chin chih-tu hsin-t'an* (A reinvestigation of *likin*; Tapei, 1972). For a discussion of surcharge on land tax during the last decades of Ch'ing period, see Yeh-chien Wang, *Land Taxation in Imperial China*, pp. 61-66, for changes of tax structure, see p. 80.

³² See Harry T. Oshima, "Meiji Fiscal Policy and Agricultural Progress", in William W. Lockwood, ed., *The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan* (Princeton, 1965), pp. 357-81. Also see Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, "The Role of Agriculture in Modern Japanese Economic Development", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 9 (Oct. 1960), 61-62.

of Japan. A manifestation of that reluctance was the lack of enthusiasm for land tax reform. Thus the tax system was left in a highly chaotic state during the early republican period (1911-1937).

Appendix

In this appendix we describe the primary data source that we have used to compute the values of the parameters summarized in Table 1 in the text. As explained above, this involves the collection of primary data of A (taxable acreage), Q (tax quota in rice), R (tax payment in rice), S (tax payment in silver), and p (the market price of rice) for the Su-chou and Sung-chiang prefectures. Each of these prefectures had a number of smaller administrative units, the counties (*hsien*).

For the primary data of the market price (p) we make use of the data supplied by several contemporary authors.³³ Neglecting the price variation between counties, we assume that a single price prevailed for all the counties in any one prefecture at any moment of time because price differences between counties cannot exceed local transportation cost. Moreover, the prices selected for our two prefectures at different points show a secular trend quite similar to that which has been traced for the Ch'ing period by other authors.³⁴

For the primary data, A, Q, R, S, we make use of the statistical data contained in the prefecture gazetteers (*fu-chih*)

³³ Ch'üan Han-sheng, *Chung-kuo ching-chi-shih lun-ts'ung*, pp. 477-78, 510; Liu I-cheng, "Chiang-su ko-ti ch'ien-liu-pai-nien-chien chih mi-chia" (Price of rice in Kiangsu during a period of 1600 years), *Shih-hsüeh tsa-chih* (Journal of History), 2 (Sept. 1930), 5-8; Hsia Nai, "T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo ch'ien-hou", p. 469.

³⁴ Yeh-chien Wang, "The Secular Trend", p. 362, chart 5.

and the county gazetteers (*hsien-ch'ih*) which are available for most of the counties and for most of the benchmark years.³⁵ The compilers of the local gazetteers often indicated explicitly that they, in turn, obtained their data from the *Fu-i ch'üan-shu* (The complete book of taxation and labor services) which provided the statutory information of taxation for the Ch'ing period. The periodic revision of the latter as reflected in the local gazetteers is the basis for our identification of the time dimension for our data. For example, the "times" shown for the benchmark years 1656-1710, 1725-1726, 1738-1750, 1830, and 1865 in Table 1 indicate the approximate dates *Fu-i ch'üan-shu*. These years were selected because of the availability of all the data (A, Q, R, S) we needed; when only a part of the data was available the year was discarded.³⁶

The taxable acreage (A) represents the total taxable cultivated acreage which included various grades of land generally classified as *t'ien* (rice paddy), *ti* (dry field), *shan* (hilly

³⁵ In 1645, the second year of the Ch'ing dynasty, the government first announced that the tax quota of the Wan-li period (1573-1620) in the late Ming should be adopted. Although we have some data for this year, they are excluded from Table 1 because they are incomplete in their coverage.

³⁶ Thus an interval (for example, 1656-1710) is shown whenever the data revision of the *Fu-i ch'üan-shu* occurred for different counties and different years, or when the data needed were available in different years. It should also be noted that the *Fu-i ch'üan-shu* was also revised in 1775 and 1795. The statistics of the tax quota (Q) for Su-chou prefecture, however, are not available. Although the data of 1818 are available for Su-chou, the calculation of indicators of tax burden reveals them to be the same as those of 1830; thus these data were not used.

land), and *tang* (swampy land).³⁷ For taxation purposes, the land of lower grades was converted to a certain amount of the first grade land; this practice was known as *chun-shou* (allowable for well cultivated land) or *che-shih* (converting to the taxable unit).³⁸ Therefore, the taxable acreage was different from the real spatial area.

The tax quota(Q) represents the tax quota in rice, known in records as *p'ing-mi* ("equalized" quota of rice).³⁹ The local gazetteers pointed out that *p'ing-mi* included the absorption of labor services payment (*ting-yin*) as well as tributary rice and

³⁷ In fact, for each type of land there are subclassifications for the purpose of taxation. For the number of grades of land in the 18 countries of the two prefectures see *Su-chou fu-chih* (1824 ed.), vol. 11 and *Sung-chiang fu-chih* (1817 ed.), vol. 22.

³⁸ For example, see *Sung-chiang fu-chih* (1663 ed.), 7:1b-2a; *Sung-chiang fu-chih* (1817 ed.), 21:40a-43b. According to Wang Chen, land already cultivated is called *shou* (*i-keng yüeh-shou*); see *Nung-shu* (Book on agriculture; rpt. of *Ssu-ku-ch'üan-shu chen-pen*; Taipei), 2;4a. For taxation purposes, *shou* was usually used as an opposite of *huang*, which meant cultivated land that had become wasteland. But the *huang* was not exempted from taxation; instead, its quota was reduced to a certain amount to be borne by the cultivated land. For an explanation of this, see *Chiang-ning fu-chih* (1811 ed.), 14:3a. For example of tax quota of these categories (for example, *shou p'ing-mi* and *huang-p'ing-mi*), see *Su-chou fu-chih* (1824, ed.), 8:17a, 40b.

³⁹ The historical origin of the term *p'ing-mi* is found in records during the 1430s when governor Chou Ch'en initiated a program of tax equalization. His method was to allot equally the amount of rice charged for wastage during the process of transportation, known as *hao-mi* to each original unit of tax quota in rice, known as *cheng-mi*. The total of *hao-mi* and *cheng-mi* was given the name of *p'ing-mi* and became the basic tax quota. This practice was carried on through the Ch'ing dynasty. See Chou Liang-hsiao, "Ming-tai Su-Sung ti-ch'u," p. 70.

its surcharge.⁴⁰ The local gazetteers also made it clear that *p'ing-mi* (the tax quota) was a tax obligation that could be fulfilled either by payment in rice (*pen-se-mi*) or payment in silver (*che-se-yin*)—corresponding to our definition of R and S. This practice of commutation was typically described in the local gazetteers in the following way: “For total taxable obligation of *p'ing-mi* [Q] of so many bushels, the actual collection [that is, *shih-cheng*] consists of *pen-se-mi* [R] in so many bushels and *che-se-yin* [S] in so many taels.”

The primary data and the parameters derived from these data according to our theoretical model for the two prefectures with their counties are listed in a set of four tables. These tables are available in duplicated form upon request to the authors.

Glossary

- An-wu ssu-chung* 安吳四種
Ch'ang-chou 長洲
ch'ang-o 常額
Ch'ang-shou 常熟
Chao-wen 昭文
che-se-yin 折色銀
che-shih 折實
che-yin 折銀
Chen-tse 震澤
Ch'en Ch'i-yuan 陳其元
cheng-mi 正米
Chiang-nan t'ung-chih 江南通志

⁴⁰ The details of allotment can be found in some local gazetteers; for example, *Su-chou fu-chih* (1824 ed.), vol. 11.

Chiang-ning FC 江寧府志

Chiang-su hai-yun ch'uan-an 江蘇海運全案

“Chiang-su ko-ti ch'ien-liu-pai-nien chih mi-chia” 江蘇各地千
六百年間之米價

Chin-shan 金山

Ch'i Fu 蘄輔

Ch'ing Hsüan-tsung shih-lu 清宣宗實錄

Ch'ing-hua hsüeh-pao 清華學報

Ch'ing-p'u 青浦

Ch'ing Shih-tsu shih-lu 清世祖實錄

Ch'ing Sheng-tsu shih-lu 清聖祖實錄

Ch'ing-ting ta-Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li 欽定大清會典事例

Chou Ch'en 周忱

Chou Liang-hsiao 周良霄

Chu Hsieh 朱楔

chun-shou 淮熟

Chung-kuo ching-chi-shih lun-ts'ung 中國經濟史論叢

Chung-kuo li-chin shih 中國厘金史

Chung-kuo ts'ai-cheng wen-ti 中國財政問題

chüan 卷

chün-t'ien 均田

Ch'u'an-sha 川沙

Ch'üan Han-sheng 全漢昇

Feng-hsien 奉賢

fu-chih (FC) 府志

Fu-i ch'üan-shu 賦役全書

hao-mi 耗米

hao-yin 耗銀

Ho Ch'ang-ling 賀長齡

ho-chih 合志

- Ho Lieh 何烈
Hsia Nai 夏鼐
hsien-chih (HC) 縣志
Hsin-yang 新陽
hsü-chih 續志
Hu-pu tse-li 戶部則例
Hua-t'ing 華亭
huang 荒
Huang-ch'ao cheng-tien lei-tsuan 皇朝政典類纂
Huang-ch'ao ching-shih wen-pien 皇朝經世文編
huang-p'ing-mi 荒平米
i-keng-yüeh-shou 已耕曰熟
i-t'iao-pien-fa 一條鞭法
k'o-chüan-tsa-shui 苛捐雜稅
Ku Yen-wu 顧炎武
K'un-shan 崑山
Jih-chih-lu 日知錄
li-chin 厘金
Li-chin shih-tu hsin-t'an 厘金制度新探
Li-shih yen-chiu 歷史研究
liang-shui-fa 兩稅法
Lin Tse-hsü 林則徐
Liu I-cheng 柳詒徵
Lo Yü-tung 羅玉東
Lou-hsion 婁縣
“Mei-chou pai-yin yü shih-pa shih-chi Chung-kuo wu-chia
ke-ming te kuan-hsi” 美洲白銀與十八世紀中國物價革命的關係
Ming-tai she-hui-ching-chi-shih lun-ts'ung 明代社會經濟史
論叢
“Ming-tai Su-Sung ti-ch'ü te kuan-t'ien yü chung-fu wen-ti”

明代蘇松地區的官田與重賦問題

mou 畝

Nan-hui 南滙

Nung-shu 農書

Pao Shih-ch'en 包世臣

pen-se 本色

pen-se-mi 本色米

p'ing-mi 平米

San-fan 三藩

Shang-hai 上海

sheng-Ch'ing 盛清

shih 石

shih-cheng 實徵

Shih-hsüeh tsa-chih 史學雜誌

shou 熟

shou-p'ing-mi 熟平米

Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu chen-pen 四庫全書珍本

Su-chou Fu 蘇州府

Sung-chiang Fu 松江府

T'ai-hu 太湖

“T'ai-ping t'ien-kuo ch'ien-hou Ch'ang-chiang ko-sheng chih

t'ien-fu wen-ti” 太平天國長江各省之田賦問題

t'an-ting-ju-ti 攤丁入地

T'ao Chu 陶澍

ti-shui 地稅

ting 丁

ting-yin 丁銀

t'ien, ti, shan, tang 田地山蕩

tsa-pan-yin 雜辦銀

Tseng Kuo-fan 曾國藩

tsu-yung-tiao 租庸調

ts'ao-yün 漕運

tzu-sheng jen-ting yung-pu chia-fu 滋生人丁永不加賦

wang Chen 王禎

Wu Chi-hua 吳緝華

Wu-chiang 吳江

Wu-hsien 吳縣

“Ya-p'ien chan-cheng ch'ien Chiang-su te mien-fang-shih-yeh” 鴉片戰爭前江蘇的棉紡織業

Yung-hsien-chai pi-chi 庸閒齋筆記

yü-lin t'u-ts'e 魚鱗圖冊

Yüan-ho 元和

太平天國前後長江各省之田賦問題

夏 彙

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引 言

清代咸同之際，中國政府遭遇到一個非常重大的危機。外患方面，有英法聯軍的進師京津，和俄國的侵略東北邊疆。內憂方面，又有太平天國的崛起，波及十餘省。當時政府處境的艱難，幾與九一八事變後的國民政府無異。當時政府的應付國難的辦法，在外交方面，由於實力相差過遠，可以說是完全屈服了。至於內政方面，卻因為軍事和政治雙管齊下，終竟平服了髮亂。清廷也因之延長了四五十年的命運。

清廷解決內亂的政治手段，最重要的是田賦問題。當時太平軍據佔最久的地方，是長江流域的各省，清廷所最關心的，也便是這長江流域的各省。清廷對於這些省份的田賦政策，最重要的不外二種：(一)蠲免匪區錢糧。清廷在咸同年間，

¹ 此類記載，散見於咸同二朝東華錄，以及光緒安徽通志卷八十三，頁二至六，光緒江西通志卷首之五，頁十四至十七，光緒湖南通志卷五十四，頁二十至二十三，民國湖北通志卷四十九，頁三十至三十一。

曾屢頒詔旨，凡被賊竄擾的各州縣，分別輕重，加以全免，減徵，或緩征¹。(二)減輕田賦負擔。前者是僅限於剛被收復的匪區，並且性質是暫時的。至於後者卻是一個廣泛的減賦運動，普及於長江流域六省內不論曾否遭遇匪擾的各地方；並且性質上又是比較永久性的；所以更值得我們的注意。

本篇的目的，便是想探究這減賦運動的原因何在？他的經過情形如何？他的結果又是如何？但在未敘述這些事情以前為明瞭這個運動的背景起見，我要先敘述太平天國以前長江各省的田賦情形。

上篇 太平天國以前的情形

甲 長江各省之浮收勒折及其原因

清代長江各省的田賦，最重要的是漕糧和地丁。漕糧或收本色，或收折色。欽定賦役全書中雖曾規定賦額，但是糧吏仍要作弊浮收。如納本色米，則或就斛面浮收，或竟折扣計算。如折色納銀，則常將米價規定較市價為高，勒令繳納多出數倍的銀兩；甚或更將銀兩改折為錢數，將銀價規定較市價為高，勒令繳納錢文。地丁額徵銀兩，但糧吏勒令繳納錢文，其弊與漕糧徵折色者同。所以人民要負擔溢出正額數倍的田賦。

當時各省州縣，都有此弊。清史稿曾記載着：

乾隆初，州縣徵收錢糧，尚少浮收之弊。其後諸弊叢生。初猶不過就斛面浮收，未幾遂有扣折之法，每石折耗數升，漸增至五折六折，餘米竟收至二斗五升，小民病之²。

長江各省是以富庶著稱的，這種浮收勒折的弊竇自然是要產

² 清史稿，食貨志二頁八。

生的。

江蘇省方面，繳納漕賦時，以七折又八扣計算，即納米一石算爲五斗四升至六斗，有時兩次七折八折後，一石變爲三四五斗，再加以水腳費驗米費等，總須二石五六斗當一石³。折色納銀亦作弊浮收，米價糶二千文時，折價仍要高至八千，十千，至十數千不等⁴。浙江方面，其情形也相差不遠，如杭嘉湖漕糧之交折色者，初收每石已在六千餘文，嗣後遂漸加增；折收一石，照時價約合兩石有奇⁵。安徽方面，「浮收之數，有數倍於正額者，且有私收折價至十數倍者」⁶。江西方面，道光年間，浮收或至二三石以上，勒折或至七八兩之多⁷；咸豐年間，地丁每銀一兩，或收銀一兩五六錢至一兩七八錢不等，或收錢二千四百文至三千一二百文不等；漕米完本色者，每米一石，或收米一石四五斗至一石七八斗不等；漕米完折色者，每米一石或收銀二三兩至四五兩不等，或收錢三四千至六七千不等；至於廣信府，則每石有折洋銀八九兩者⁸。湖北方面，漕米本色除水腳外，每石加米七八斗至石餘不等，折色每石連耗米水腳，收銀四五兩或錢九千十千不等⁹。有些地方，「浮勒至於十倍」，每米一石，折價達十二三千至十五六千文者」¹⁰。湖南方面，地丁正銀一兩，民間有費至數兩者，漕米一石，民間有費至數石者¹¹。可見長江流域六省，都有浮收勒折的事情。

³ 馮桂芬顯志堂藏卷五頁三十六，咸豐三年致許撫部書。

⁴ 吳雲兩巖軒尺牘稿五頁十三。致潘季玉觀察書。

⁵ 左文襄公奏稿初編卷十二頁四。

⁶ 繆荃孫續碑傳集卷二十七頁六。

⁷ 沈文肅公政書卷二頁五十六。

⁸ 光緒重修江西通志卷八十五頁二十一。

⁹ 胡文忠公遺集八十五頁一。

¹⁰ 同上，卷二十三頁三。

¹¹ 駱文忠公奏稿卷八頁十三。

積弊所至，有時浮勒竟達正額十餘倍之鉅，殊足令人驚駭。

浮收勒折，既是當時長江流域各省的一般現象，現在可進一步討究這弊病的根源。糧吏要浮收勒折，其目的無非想從中取利。但是他們所刮削來的民脂民膏，並非全部歸入自己的腰包：他們要拿出一部分來，孝敬上司官吏，又要另拿出一部分去敷衍地紳。糧吏，長官，地紳，三位一體，結合成一個利害相同的大同盟，來壓榨農民的血汗。

糧吏是田賦繳納入官的第一重門戶，浮收勒折的利益，都須先行經過他們的手裏。利益既豐，所以便有許多人鑽營這個位置。道光二年（1832）上諭中說：「州縣官初到省垣，所屬糧房庫房，輒豫行賄賂，求派糧總庫總。既派之後，不得不以錢漕事務，專交承辦。該吏等或將錢漕串票，豫押銀兩，供應揮霍。由是扒夫，斗級，銀匠，匱役，通同一氣，因緣爲奸。勒折浮收，弊端百出。」¹²。糧吏舞弊所獲的收入，據當時江蘇田賦專家馮桂芬說，每辦一次漕糧，以中數言之，門丁漕書可以各得萬金；書夥十數人，共二三萬金；糧差正副三五十人，人二三百金，合共又是一二萬金；糧書二三百人，人一二百金，又是三四萬金¹³。至於舞弊的方法，據馮氏說，除了折扣計算以多爲少外，又有淋尖，捉豬，樣盤米，貼米等名目，此外更有水腳費，花戶費，驗米費，灰印費，篩撮費，廩門費，廩差費等，都是索勒人民的巧法¹⁴。至於胡林翼所舉的捏災枉緩之弊，飛灑詭寄之弊，私收欺侵之弊，則更直接損及國庫了¹⁵。

糧吏除了自取一部分外，還要顧到上下各衙門的官吏。

¹² 劉錦藻，皇朝續文獻通考卷二頁七。

¹³ 顯志堂稿卷五頁三十七。

¹⁴ 同上，頁三十六。

¹⁵ 胡文忠公遺集卷八十五頁十三至十五。

這些由糧吏交納與其他官吏的私費，稱為「陋規」；關於漕糧方面的，則特稱為「漕規」。湖北方面，自糧道以至丞倅尹尉等，都有漕規，大或千餘兩，少亦百數十兩。司道府廳各書吏，均有房費年規等名目，或數百兩，或數十兩。¹⁶ 綜計每縣陋規，多至數十款百餘款，浮費多至數千兩數萬兩不等¹⁷。湖南方面，錢漕陋規，款目繁多，不但民間難以折算，卽州縣亦難逐一清釐，只好一聽戶糧書吏科算徵收¹⁸。安徽方面，稅則本輕，也由於上下官吏需索規費，以致浮收數倍於正額¹⁹。江西方面，我們所知道的更詳細：上司衙門，有門包，有節壽禮，有到任鋪陳供設，有歲時補添器各種雜費，統計每年大缺自三四千金以至八九千金不等，中小缺以次遞減。其次則有文武同寅之漕規，例米，節禮，委員之夫馬程儀，上司胥役之抄牌折夫，以及幕友之束修伙燭，憲幕之漕館乾修，統計每年大缺自三四千金以至六七千金不等，中小差以次遞減。至於戶胥的漕餘，營兵的犒賞，書差的工食，門丁的伙燭，佐貳的年節借貸，犯人的遞解雜需，更是層出不窮，無法計其需數²⁰。江蘇方面，浮收的本原，也是由於本道本府，同寅憲幕，佐貳生監等的一切規費。而糧道衙門舊規，如臨倉領斛各款，名目繁多，都是取給於漕糧²¹。浙江方面，州縣收漕，也是向有陋規，上至道府，中則同寅幕友，下及貳佐生監，無一不取給於漕糧²²。可見陋規是普遍地流行於六省條目既繁，需款自多，故為田賦浮收增高的

¹⁶ 同上，卷三十，頁十四至十五。

¹⁷ 同上，卷二十三，頁三。

¹⁸ 駱文忠公奏稿卷八頁十三。

¹⁹ 續碑傳卷二十七頁六。

²⁰ 王定安求聞齋弟子記卷二十八頁三十六至三十七，又李桓寶寧齋類稿卷十一頁二。

²¹ 江蘇減賦全案卷四頁六。

²² 戴樂浙西減賦紀略頁十九。

重要原因之一。

糧吏與官長狼狽爲奸。長官得了陋規，便假裝痴聵不去干涉糧吏的舞弊；糧吏爲酬答長官的盛意，也很甘願繳納規禮。小百姓是「天高皇帝遠」，無處喊冤。不過，地方上的紳士，看見了未免眼紅，卻要來分肥一些。自己有田地的，稱爲「大戶」或「紳戶」，便要短交田賦；自己沒有田地的，便要包攬小戶的田賦，從輕完納，於中取利。有些更加乾脆，向糧吏硬討規費。官吏怕他們鬧事，不得不唯命是從。然而羊毛終竟是要出在羊身上的，於是剝削小百姓的浮收勒折便要更利害了。這種地紳分肥的事實，在長江各省多曾發生過：

1. 江蘇 富豪之家與稍有勢力者，皆爲大戶。大小戶完糧不平等，如漕糧折色，紳戶每石完錢四千文，生監七八千文，鄉村小戶則須十千文。不惟紳民不一律，即紳與紳，民與民，亦不一律。紳戶最少者一石完不足一石，多者遞增，最多者倍之。民戶弱者約三四石當一石，強者遞減，尤強者不足二石。而紳與民又各有全荒之戶。結果只好「以小戶之浮收，抵大戶之短價」²³。窮民不堪朘削，有與紳戶同姓者，便寄其糧於戶下；紳戶便爲之包完短交，與官爲難²⁴。糧價既不一律，經收者得任意漁利；架點之生監，窺見其弊，遂羣向漕總索漕規。如果不遂其意，則或上控浮收以制之，或搗毀其家以脅之，必歲有常規而後已。這種規費，一名訟米。人數最多之處生監或至三四百名，漕規竟至二三萬，實駭聽聞²⁵。

²³ 李文忠公奏稿卷三頁六十四至六十五，又民國續修太倉州志卷七頁三十六。

²⁴ 李文忠公奏稿卷八頁六十五至六十六。太倉州志卷七頁三十六。

²⁵ 皇朝續文獻通考二頁十三。

2. 浙江 大小戶完糧不均，世家大族，豐收者也能蠲緩，鄉村小戶，被歛者仍或全徵。並且大戶僅完繳正額；小戶更任意誅求；遲至歲滿停收，即須徵折色，每石價至五六千文不等。無非是想「以小戶之浮收，抵大戶之不足」。小戶不得已，多竄入大戶，詭寄糧名，大戶也樂得包攬短交，從中取利。於是「小戶日少，大戶日多」²⁶。

3. 江西 如湖口縣，對於地丁銀不滿三四錢的小戶，另立小錢糧名目，與大戶不一律征收。兵米一項，大戶多係實量本色，小戶係折色。量本色者一斗加六，新米上市時，每一石六斗，不過合制錢三串數百文。折色則額米一石，須折錢六串六百文，故較大戶之量本色者為喫虧²⁷。更有刁紳劣監，包攬完納，名曰包戶。或以折色取於小戶，以本色交於官倉，或取於小戶者價甚重，交於官倉者價甚輕，從中取利²⁸。州縣糧吏為敷衍地紳起見，歲有常規，紳衿則紅圖米，刁生劣監則有棍子米²⁹。

4. 湖北 漕糧小戶交折色，大戶交本色；而且小戶交折色者，如興國及鄂省三十餘有漕州縣，都是以錢折米，未聞以銀折米者。各縣之中，監利每石折至三十六串文，江夏每石折至十二三千文，其餘則每石九千至十八千十九千文。至於大戶，則以本色完納，書吏不敢多取³⁰。於是刁紳劣監，包攬完納，其零取於小戶者重，其整交於官倉者微，民謂之「蝗蟲」。更有挾州縣浮之短，索討規費，否則相率告漕，或聚衆哄倉；州縣糧吏不得不與之分肥，謂之「蝗蟲費」³¹。

²⁶ 浙江減賦全案卷二頁二十三；又見左文襄公奏稿初編卷十八頁四。

²⁷ 曾文正公批牘卷六頁三十九。

²⁸ 李桓寶寧齋類稿卷十一頁二。

²⁹ 求聞齋弟子記卷二十八頁三十七。

³⁰ 胡文忠遺集卷六十頁二十三。

³¹ 同上，卷二十三，頁六至七。

5. 湖南 地方官吏，視錢漕爲利藪。刁衿劣監，便從而挾制他們，每人索數十兩百兩。人數多者，一縣或至數十人，名曰漕口。如果不遂其意，則阻撓鄉戶完納，或赴上司衙門控告，或糾衆闖署毆吏。所以州縣於開徵之時，必先把這班人籠絡住³²。

關於安徽的情形，我尚未找到材料。但是依常理推測，恐也逃不出這通例。

我所以要費了許多篇幅來敘述清代田賦的浮收勒折的情形，是因爲我們在欽定賦役全書，欽定戶部則例等官書中，只能夠看到政府收入的概況，而看不到農民田賦負擔的真相。這些官書中所說的，都是一些裝腔作勢的官話。我們如想知道人民負擔的輕重，必須於額徵錢糧數目以外，增添上這些浮收勒折的數目。這些材料是分散在各書中，除非把這些材料搜集一處比合而觀，決難明瞭當時的真相。

乙 江浙兩省浮賦之重

這裏所說的「浮賦」，是指江蘇省蘇松太鎮常四府一州及浙江省杭嘉湖三府的漕糧額徵。「浮賦」一稱「浮糧」，但與前節中所說的「浮收」，完全不同，不可誤視爲一物。「浮收」是指於額徵數以外多取於民的銀米，劉郁膏所謂「自康熙年間，訂定賦役全書後，耗正並配；此外絲毫顆粒，卽屬浮收」，是也³³。至於「浮賦」，是指江浙兩省上述數府的額徵重徵；因爲賦額很重，幾超過人民納稅力的限度，故亦謂之「浮」。李鴻章云：「漕糧爲惟正之供，而蘇松獨曰『浮糧』，曰『浮賦』，見諸列聖諭旨，及郡縣志，不以

³² 駱文忠公奏稿卷八頁十三。

³³ 江蘇減賦全案第五頁二十一。

爲嫌，是知實有浮多應減之處。」³⁴左宗棠云：「浙江杭嘉湖三屬……徵糧之則，大小不同；即浮額之糧亦多寡不一。」³⁵他們所謂「浮糧」，「浮賦」及「浮額之賦」，都是指規定過重的額徵田賦。

在道光中葉時，林則徐撫蘇，即曾注意到蘇松等屬的重賦。他曾奏陳清廷說：江蘇省蘇松常鎮太四府一州之地，延袤不過五百餘里；但是每年的田賦，地丁漕項額銀二百數十萬兩，漕白正耗米一百五十餘萬，又漕贈行月等米三十餘萬石。比較浙江徵糧，已多一倍；較江西則三倍，較湖廣且十餘倍不止。在米賤之年，一百八九十萬石之米即合銀五百數十萬兩，如果米價少昂，則每年即暗增一二百萬兩而人不覺³⁶。曾國藩於咸豐元年說，這五屬的田，每畝產米自一石五六斗至二石不等。除去佃戶平分之數與抗欠之數，計業主所收，牽算不過八斗；而額徵的錢糧，已在二斗內外；再加以漕斛收兌，及增收幫費，又須去二斗。所以即在豐年，業主每畝亦只獲二斗³⁷。至於浙江杭嘉湖三府漕額之重，也與江蘇蘇松太相等³⁸。丁壽昌說，天下漕糧，以江浙二省爲大宗；而江浙之漕，以蘇松常鎮太杭嘉湖七府一州爲尤重。從前全漕四百餘萬石，而江浙二省，幾及三百萬石，居天下漕糧四分之三。又說：

查例載蘇松糧道所屬四府一州應徵漕白米一百二十餘萬石，每石耗米三斗四斗不等。浙江糧道起運杭嘉湖三府應徵漕白米六十四萬餘石，每石耗米四斗及四斗五升不等。計七府一州之地，開方不過五百餘里，而收漕白正

³⁴ 李文忠公奏稿卷三頁六十一。

³⁵ 浙江減賦全案卷二頁二十四。

³⁶ 李文忠公政書甲集江蘇奏稿卷二頁二十二至二十三。

³⁷ 曾文正公奏稿卷一頁四十。

³⁸ 浙江減賦全案卷二頁二十二。

耗米二百五十餘萬石，較之江西湖南湖北三省浮糧正耗米九十六萬餘石，將及二倍。其應徵漕截輕齊等銀，尚有數十萬兩。賦重若此，民何以堪³⁹。

江蘇浮賦的來源，清初陸世儀曾作有蘇松浮糧考（見桴亭先生遺書中）。李鴻章奏請裁減蘇松太糧賦浮額時，曾撮敘云：

考宋紹熙中朱子行經界法，吳糧每畝五升耳。厥後藉韓侂胄等莊爲官田，又賈似道廣買公田，元代續加官用，明太祖平張士誠，又復入諸豪族田，皆據租籍收糧。宣德中，巡撫周忱，知府況鍾，奏減蘇松糧百萬石，疏中稱蘇府秋糧二百七十餘萬石，內民糧止十五萬餘石，餘皆官糧，二者並未合併，官糧自七斗六升，民糧自五升。嘉靖中，令各州縣畫括境內官民田畝益之，分攤定額。長洲縣官田最多，故額最重；他羣縣官田遞輕。……此蘇松太重賦之源流也⁴⁰。

浙西浮糧的起源，也和蘇松太相同：「始於宋季賈似道之官田，元代因而增之。明初張士誠據姑蘇，兼有嘉湖諸郡，明祖平張士誠遂用其租籍收糧。已而又括官田之糧，均之民田，逐遞加增，民困獨甚。」⁴¹由於這一段歷史，我們可以知道江浙兩省的重賦，並不是以土地生產力肥腴與否的自然法則爲標準，乃是由於歷史上的偶然事故，被政府當局硬加上去的。所以，雖以江浙的富庶，對於這遠踰常例的重賦，仍要稱爲「浮糧」，或「浮賦」。

丙 道咸之間已有減賦之必要

³⁹ 同上卷二頁一至二。

⁴⁰ 李文忠公奏稿卷三頁五十六。

⁴¹ 浙江減賦全案卷二頁二十二。

道咸之間，是太平天國事變的前夜，長江流域各省尚未被兵燹，但是已有減賦的必要。這一種必要，在政府官吏行動及人民行動兩方面，都可以看得出來。為明瞭道咸之交何以會發生這種必要的原因起見，讓我們先來討究咸同以前所以能仍舊貫而不改的原因何在？

前面已敘過長江流域六省的田賦之重，尤其是太湖流域的農民；因為「浮糧」的關係，負擔更重。但是從滿清入關直至道光年間，二百年內，並未見有熱烈的要求改更賦制的運動。推究其原因，不外二點。第一是經濟方面的原因。清室自康熙至嘉慶之間，政局安定，罕有兵禍，而長江流域各國，土地肥沃；尤其是江浙兩省富庶甲於天下。故田賦負擔雖覺稍重，農民尚能勉強忍受。同治二年（1863）戶部議覆江浙減漕時，即曾云：「我朝平定江南，深仁厚澤，淪浹民心，二百年，承平相繼，賦則雖重，民力尚足供支。」⁴² 潘祖蔭，郭嵩燾，李鴻章奏陳江蘇時，也都說：自雍正以迄道光，承平百餘年海內殷富。蘇松為繁富之區，有商賄之饒，即使迫於催科，民猶可賣絲羅穀以納賦。故乾隆中年以來，辦全住者數十年⁴³。左宗棠陳奏浙江情形，亦云：「至乾隆嘉慶年間，家給人足，曾歷辦全漕。」⁴⁴ 世值太平，物力滋豐，這是咸同以前的賦制所以能仍舊貫而不改的第一個原因。

第二是政治方面的原因。順治時八旗軍隊攻取江南，揚州十日，嘉定三屠，充分表現出他們的勇猛和殘酷。這一種慘酷的印象，「淪浹民心」使漢人穀鯁待命而不敢反抗。滿清政府既握有這優越的軍事集團，民間即偶有暴動，也極易

⁴² 同上卷二頁七。

⁴³ 江蘇減賦全案卷二頁一，又卷四頁二，又李文忠公奏稿卷三頁五十六至五十七。

⁴⁴ 浙江減賦全案卷二頁二十三。

平定。更加以康熙初年的江南奏銷案，將欠糧的紳士褫革枷責，凡萬餘人。比紳衿低一級的小民，更是不敢欠賦，只好喘着氣來負擔這沉重的田賦。並且滿清初期的漢人是反抗失敗後的暫時屈服；到了雍乾以後，人民已經守法成習，幾不知道前代曾反抗的一會事。但是清廷仍要時刻提防着，壓力一鬆，反動便要起來。所以政權鞏固，兵力充足，是咸同以前的清廷能向人民抽取重賦的第二個原因。

但是到了道光年間，上面所說的兩個條件，都已發生動搖了。先就經濟方面而論，人民已沒有照額完賦的能力。這可以由王慶雲的直省地丁表中看出來⁴⁵：

省別	額徵(以兩為單位)	實徵(道光二十一年)	實徵(道光二十二年)	實徵(道光二十五年)	實徵(道光二十九年)
江蘇	3,625,814	3,563,686	2,531,320	2,891,023	1,879,614
浙江	2,808,718	1,887,046	2,160,861	2,320,222	1,608,401
安徽	1,809,563	1,877,285	1,798,800	1,797,332	1,630,191
江西	2,249,330	2,292,360	全完	2,237,133	2,163,282
湖北	1,144,208	528,486	640,765	743,203	334,179
湖南	912,643	871,377	885,631	899,864	825,748
合計	12,550,276	11,020,240	10,266,707	10,888,777	8,441,415

可見道光晚年，人民已無力完繳；甚至於實徵之數，僅達額徵三分之二。六省都有欠交，而以江浙及湖北三省為尤甚。至於漕糧，其情形也與地丁相同，在道咸之際，已經無力完交。現在以當時佔全國漕糧四分之三的江浙二省來做例子。江蘇方面，全漕一百六十萬，自道光中葉後，積漸減損。道光十一年（1831）以後十年間，共數一千三百餘萬，內除官墊民欠，得正額之七八成；道光二十一年（1841）以後十年，共數九百餘萬，內除官墊民欠，得正額之五六成；咸豐元年

⁴⁵ 王慶雲，石渠餘紀卷三頁三十七至三十九。

(1851)以後十年，共數七百餘萬，內除官墊民欠，得正額之四成而已⁴⁶。浙江方面，杭嘉湖三屬，乾嘉間辦全在時，共米一百一十餘萬石。而道光年間及咸豐初年，則每屆皆不過七八十萬石及五六十萬石而已⁴⁷。

我們現在要問：爲什麼到了道咸之交，長江流域的納賦能力驟減。我以爲重要的原因，不外下列三點：

1. 水利失修，農田生產力退減。清代自乾隆末年，任用和珅，吏治腐敗，競尚貪婪。地方官多僅知搜括民財，對於水利，罕加注意。因之水患頻仍，農田常遭淹沒，釀成災歉，故田賦收入遂減。王慶雲說：

考聖祖高宗兩朝，以普免輪免錢糧，爲國家大恩澤。……仁宗之世，無普免而多災蠲。嘉慶六年永定滄沱交溢，畿輔被災者，百餘州縣；而頻東南兩河，爲患尤劇，蠲免之數，莫得而詳⁴⁸。

長江流域六省中拖欠錢糧最多的江浙鄂三省，都是受有水患的影響。江蘇自道光三年（1823）以來，歲無上稔，十一年（1831）又經大水，民力拮据。林則徐於道光十二年（1833）任蘇撫後，以「江蘇漕賦，出自水田，水治則田資其利，不治則田被其害」，故加意講求水利，頗收實效⁴⁹。林氏去任後，其事又廢，故漕收仍無起色。浙江方面乾嘉間曾歷辦全漕，但自道光三年（1823）及十一年（1831）兩次大水後，民間元氣大傷；賦重之處；未能全賦起運，遂歲報災歉蠲緩頻仍⁵⁰。湖北素稱澤國，全賴長江堤防爲之保障。道光

⁴⁶ 李文忠公奏稿卷三頁五十八。

⁴⁷ 浙江減賦全案卷二頁二十三至二十六；又左文襄公奏稿初編卷十八頁四至四。

⁴⁸ 石渠餘紀卷一頁二十四至二十五。

⁴⁹ 李文忠公政書甲集江蘇奏稿卷二十二至二十三；又卷七頁十五。

⁵⁰ 浙江減賦全案卷二頁二十三。

十一年（1832）夏間江河異漲，凡各州縣堤岸，多被漫缺。民間廬舍，半入水，釀成災荒。其原因是由於「楚省修隄情形，向係夫頭包工承修，祇知利之在己，不顧工程緊要，往往偷減草率，其弊百出」⁵¹。安徽方面，道光十八年程懋采為政使時，曾說：安慶府屬宿松縣，舊有一道康公隄，建自明朝初年，前濱大江，後禦鄱湖，上通湖北黃梅，中接蘄衛，毘連江西德化地方，為三省保障，很是重要。但是歲久失修，以致該地居民，疊被水災，半多遷移不歸⁵²。林則徐於道光十三年（1834）時說：「近年以來，不獨江蘇屢歉，即鄰近各省，亦連被偏菽。」⁵³由於上面所引的記載，知道這些歉荒是與水利失修有關係的。

2. 銀價漲昂，增加人民負擔。道光年間，銀價忽然漲貴。民間的買賣，多是使用錢文。農民出賣農產物所得的，當然都是錢文。但是地丁及漕折，卻是用銀兩計算。農民的收入，縱使能維持原狀，對於這無形增高的賦額，也已難支持。何況更有上段所說的農田生產力退減的事實同時發生呢？以銀兩計算的政府田賦，自然要大減了。關於銀貴的原因及其對當時外交的影響，湯象龍先生的道光時期的銀貴問題（社會科學雜誌一卷三號）中已討論得詳細。我現在專就他所未注意的銀貴對於田賦的影響這方面，稍加敘述。道光十三年（1834），孫蘭枝奏陳地丁漕糧鹽課關稅及民間買賣，皆因錢賤銀昂，以致商民交困。清廷即令疆吏籌議覆奏。當時林則徐覆奏，即謂孫氏之議「自係確有所見」⁵⁴。咸豐元年（1851）曾國藩備陳民間疾苦疏中，說得更為詳細：

⁵¹ 裕靖節公遺書卷九頁一。

⁵² 程懋采心師竹齋章牘存稿卷中頁八至十。

⁵³ 林文忠公政書甲集江蘇奏稿卷二十四。

⁵⁴ 同上卷一頁十五。

(錢糧)收本色者少，收折色者多。即使漕糧或收本色，而幫費必須折銀，地丁必須納銀。小民力田之所得者米也。持米以售錢，則米價苦賤而民怨；持錢以易銀，則銀價苦昂而民怨。東南產米之區，大率石米賣錢三千，自古迄今，不懸遠，昔日兩銀換錢一千，則石米得銀三兩；今上兩銀換錢二千，則石米僅得銀一兩五錢。昔日賣米三斗輸一畝之課而有餘，今日賣米六斗輸一畝之課而不足。望廷自守歲取之常，而小民暗加一倍之賦⁵⁵。

咸豐八年(1858)，駱秉章奏陳湖南籌餉情形，也說：從前銀價，乾嘉年間，每銀一兩，易錢一千文；道光初年，每銀一兩，尚止易錢一千三四百文。自後漸次增長至二千文，近更增至二千三四百文。農民以錢易銀，完納錢漕，暗增一倍有餘之費。咸豐元二三四年(1851-54)錢糧之多民欠，實由於此。迨五年秋後，收成稍稔，每穀一石，僅值錢四百餘文，尚苦無從銷售。農民以穀變錢，以錢變銀，須糶穀五石，始得銀一兩。計有田百畝，可收租穀百石者，非糶穀二十石，不能完納錢漕。農米俱困，羣情洶洶⁵⁶。

都可以看出銀價漲昂對於田賦的影響。

3. 錢漕積弊日深。農田生產力的退減，和田賦徵額以銀貴而暗增，已使農民難以負擔。同時政府官吏收賦的額外浮收，卻仍是有增無減。官吏是田賦繳納入庫的第一道門戶，有時農民只好先應付官吏的浮收，對於正額田賦，反而短交緩繳。胡林翼說，湖北省的漕糧，弊竇太深，「數十萬之正

⁵⁵ 曾文正公奏稿卷一頁四十至四十一。

⁵⁶ 駱文忠公奏稿卷八頁十三至十四。

額，徵收不滿一半，數十年之積弊，浮勒至於十倍。」⁵⁷道光十九年（1839）時，有人奏江蘇浙江近年浮收之弊，日甚一日⁵⁸。道光二十三年（1843），耆英謂：今之牧令，不理民事，不問疾苦，動輒與民爲難。卽如催科之術，則以幫費，捐款爲名，假手書役，任意浮收；以致蘇松一帶，竟有以所得不敷完納錢糧，棄田不顧者⁵⁹。田賦的重賦，竟使農民寧願棄田不顧，這一種的局面如何能持久呢？（本篇首節所述的長江各省之浮收勒折，大都是道咸時的情形，可與本段互相參照）。

此外尙有下列三點，也可以注意。（這三點是羅爾綱先生提出的，字句方面，也都依照羅先生的原文。特此注明，並對羅先生表示謝意。）

1. 農產品的低賤 如包世臣銀荒小補說吳嘉賓擬上銀錢並用議，馮桂芬用錢不廢銀議，曾國藩備陳民間疾苦疏等，都記有很重要的農產品低賤的記載。倘據包世臣的記載說，當日穀價每石只售錢六百文，合之米價約一千二百文左右。以與乾隆嘉慶時代米價三千文相較（據洪亮吉記載），實跌落一倍有奇。但我們還不曾算到那時候錢銀價格的比較，乾嘉時代銀每兩換不到千錢，而這時候已換到二千文以上，則這時候必須賣米五石才可以抵從前一石之數。這一次穀賤傷農的悲劇，實較我們今日更重。

2. 耕地面積的縮小 耕地面積的日漸縮小，是由於生產力的衰退。按嘉慶十七年全國田地總數爲七百九十一萬五千二百五十一頃有奇，到道光十三年減至七百三十七萬五千一百二十九頃有奇（據石渠餘紀及參清代通史）。在二十一年

⁵⁷ 胡文忠公遺集卷二十三頁三。

⁵⁸ 皇朝續文獻通考卷二頁十九。

⁵⁹ 史科旬刊第三十五期地二百九十一頁。

間，竟減少了五十餘萬頃。據此可以看出當日農業的生產力是怎樣的衰退了。

3. 家庭手工業的動搖。道光時代，西洋新興的棉布棉紗大量的輸入中國，壓倒了中國土布的市場，使中國的家庭手工業起了動搖，在中國的記載中很少看見。有一個道光十四年曾居位廣東的外人在他的往事的迴憶上，給我們保留了一段重要的史料道：「廣東的織工舉行了真正的威挾，要求停止棉紗的輸入。他們的要求，說是棉紗輸入的增加，剝奪了其妻子們績棉紡紗所得的利益。他們為給予其所提出要求的實力，曾聲明如果在他們的織機上碰到英國的棉紗，則馬上要焚毀。」〔李一塵太平天國革命史引Peter Amber 的 *China: an Outline of its Government, Laws and Policy*〕。

經濟方面的情形，既使農民難以負擔當時的田賦，同時在政治方面，清室的政權又發生動搖；人民看穿政府實力的薄弱，對於這無力負擔的重賦，便敢於起來反抗了。滿清八旗勁旅，入關以後，漸失雄風。經過了白蓮教之亂及鴉片戰爭二役後，官兵腐敗的情形，遂為舉世所知。道光末葉，魏源記載嘉慶時白蓮教之亂勦平後，以散遣鄉勇激變，復勞師二年，「數百賊當數千賊剿，數萬兵當數百兵用」⁶⁰，可見官兵的腐敗。同時人民卻很自信他們自己所組織的鄉勇民團，以為遠勝官兵。嚴如煜的鄉兵行有云：「昨到興安城，糧船如魚鱗，又見守營卒，個個衣履新，殺賊要鄉勇，受賞偏說冊無名。」⁶¹ 鴉片戰爭中的情形亦然，人民嘲罵奕山奕經等將官的怯懦，而歌頌廣州平英團，廈門民團等的英勇⁶²。在

⁶⁰ 聖武記卷十頁二十八。

⁶¹ 同上頁四十二。

⁶² 散見江上蹇叟中西紀事，苟塘居士防海紀略等書中。這些書中的記載，多得諸傳聞故常失實。但正可表示當時人民心目中民團的英武與官兵的無力。

人民的心目中，官兵既然這樣無用，而對於自己的民團，又是這樣自信，所以他們對於清室的政權，便加藐視。清室統治力的減弱，實是促成田賦問題嚴重化的另一個重要原因。

由於經濟政治兩方面情況，都已生變化，所以便在太平軍亂起以前，長江流域各省，也已有減賦的必要。當時少數賢明的長官，對於人民的無力完糧，頗加體恤。道光十三年（1833），清廷諭旨責備江蘇等省年年緩征地漕，碍及國計。蘇撫林則徐覆奏，說民間的困苦顛連，有非諸言所能盡者。小民口食無資，而欲強其完納，即追呼敲撲，法令亦有時而窮。觀此景象，時時恐滋事端。所以請求朝廷暫紓追迫，謂「多寬一分追呼，即多培一分元氣。」⁶³ 林氏已見到對於田賦有稍寬追呼以培元氣的必要。我們再看，從嘉慶二十二年起至道光十年止，江蘇兩屬因裁遞緩銀四百八十四萬九千二百三十五兩零，米豆麥穀一百三十九萬五千三百九石零，為數頗鉅⁶⁴。這實由於當時賦重民窮，無力支持，但減額難邀部准，故以緩徵作為暗減之術。又湖南通志云：「道光三十年（1850），（駱秉章）任湖南巡撫，清釐長沙善化湘潭各縣漕糧浮收勒折積弊，民為立德政碑。」⁶⁵ 這一段記載之後，又敘述咸豐二年（1852）太平軍入湘後，駱氏清釐漕政以裕餉源，似乎駱氏於道光末年初抵湘時，便即清釐過田賦一次。由於這些官吏的舉動，我們可以看出當時已有減賦的必要。

但是賢明的官長，終究僅佔少數；便是這極少數的賢明長官，也不能久於其位，人存政舉，人亡政息。但是人民卻已不能再忍受重賦的負擔，同時又輕視政府的統治力，於是

⁶³ 林文忠公政書甲集江蘇奏稿卷二頁二十四至二十五。

⁶⁴ 同上卷六頁十七。

⁶⁵ 湖南通志卷百另七頁二十二。

遂頻而鬧漕的案件發生。尤其是太平軍揭竿而起的幾年，長江流域各省雖暫時尚未入太平軍手中，但鬧漕抗糧的事件，是愈來愈多了。道光二十四年(1844)陳岱霖奏請嚴革徵漕積弊疏，便已提到湖北崇陽湖南耒陽等地方滋事之案，謂「揆其致釁之由，多緣徵漕而起」，州縣官任意浮收，無所顧忌，遂致輿情不服，匪徒乘之，少則聚聚拒捕，大則戕官撲城，比年以來，層見叠出⁶⁶。咸豐元年(1851)，曾國藩疏陳民間疾苦，也提到湖廣之來陽崇陽江西之貴浮撫州等四件抗糧案，謂「此四案者，雖閭閻不無刁悍之風，亦由銀價之倍增官吏之浮收，差役之濫刑，真有日不聊生之勢。」⁶⁷左宗棠陳奏浙江情形，說「竭小民終歲之力，徒爲吏胥中飽衿棍分肥之資，所以嘉湖各屬，時有鬧漕之案也。」⁶⁸到了太平軍勢力漸向長江流域進展的時候，形勢更爲危急。安徽方面，馬新貽於咸豐二年十一月初履建平縣任。當時粵氛已及湖北各路，人心惶惶。建平鄰近各邑士民，方糾衆鬧漕。建民挾書吏前隙，糾衆入城，毀糧房書吏宅。幸賴馬新貽處置得宜，始得無事⁶⁹。江蘇方面，也因太平軍內犯，民心稍動。咸豐二年(1822)，蘇屬江震二邑佃戶，齊心不還租；糧戶亦大半不納賦，官皆無如之何。松江府形勢尤爲岌岌，青浦縣首倡，聚衆拒捕毆官；南匯倉寓，爲民所火，官僅以身免；華亭錢漕家丁下鄉，鄉民積薪繞船四週，令縣差舉火，頃刻而燼，灰流無縱。次年，上海又有拆毀公廠事⁷⁰。湖北方面，咸豐三年黃州廣濟人民抗糧戕官，衆至萬人⁷¹可見當

⁶⁶ 皇朝經世文編卷三十九頁十。

⁶⁷ 曾正文公奏稿卷一頁四十一。

⁶⁸ 左文襄公奏稿初編卷十二頁四。

⁶⁹ 馬端敏公年譜頁八。

⁷⁰ 顯志堂稿卷五頁三十三。

⁷¹ 左文襄公年譜卷一頁三十三。

時抗糧鬧漕的案件，在長江流域六省內皆曾發生過。他的主要原因是銀價昂貴及官吏日弊。太平軍佔據長江流域後，與官兵互相廝殺，農田生產力幾完全被毀。太平天國以前的情形，既已有這樣不可終日之勢，兵燹之後，更是不能不減賦了。所以長江各督撫在平定太平天國時，同時要實行普遍的減賦運動。

下篇 平定太平天國時的減賦運動

甲 減賦的原因

太平軍的勢力侵入長江流域後，東南財賦之區，備受蹂躪；上文所述及的農民納賦能力及清室統治權力二者的減退，更達到可驚的程度。減賦這件事情，成爲箭在弦上，不得不發。當時促成這減賦運動的原因，最重要的有下列各項：

1. 兵燹後農田生產力破壞，政府不能竭澤而漁。經過了太平天國之亂，民間當然非常窮困，這本是用不着贅述。我現在所要指出的，是當是主持減賦運動的幾個人心的心目中，也已經覺到民間的彫敝；換言之，當時民間兵燹後的窮困是曾給重要官長以深刻的印象，使他們覺到減賦的必要。湖南方面，駱秉章謂軍興以來地方叠遭蹂躪，民情極爲彫敝⁷²。湖北方面，胡林翼說，兵燹餘生，脂膏已竭，不堪剝削⁷³。江西方面，曾國藩謂江西地方，蹂躪太廣，賊過之處，搜括太甚，即減價收課，尚恐艱於完納⁷⁴。至於安徽浙江江蘇三省，收復最晚，所受的損失也最大。同治三年（

⁷² 駱文忠公奏稿卷五頁三十一。

⁷³ 胡文忠公遺集卷二十三頁一至四。

⁷⁴ 曾文正公書札卷十六頁三十五。

(1864) 曾國藩云：「安徽全省，賊擾殆遍，創鉅痛深地方雖有已復之名，而田畝多係不耕之土；其尤甚者，或終日不遇行人，百里不見炊煙。」⁷⁵ 浙江方面，馬新貽說，杭嘉湖等府，常數十里無人跡，頽垣敗屋，所在皆然⁷⁶。江蘇方面，李鴻章所陳述的，更為沈痛：

自粵逆竄陷蘇常，焚灼殺掠之慘，遠接宋建炎四年庚戌金兀朮故事，蓋七百有三十年，無此大劫。臣親歷新復各州縣，向時著名市鎮，全成焦土。……復之松太如此，未復之蘇常可知。而欲責以數倍他處之重賦。向來暴斂橫征之吏所謂敲骨吸髓者，至此而亦無骨可敲無髓可吸⁷⁷。

民間生產力已被破壞到「無骨可敲，無髓可吸」的地步，所以減賦運動便應運而生了。

2. 減輕人民負擔，以圖收拾人心。太平天國與前代一般民亂不同，他是有一個號召人民的經濟政策，宣稱將來要依照每家人口多寡分田，「務使天下共享天父上主皇上帝大福，有田同耕，有飯同食，有錢同使，無處不均匀，無人不能飽暖也。」⁷⁸ 除頒：布天朝田畝制度以鼓吹共產主義外，又宣傳將來普免三年錢糧以引誘人民。且所過之處，以攫得衣物，散給貧者。這些政策，頗生效力，人民被誘，以致「賊至爭迎之，官軍至皆罷市」⁷⁹。當時官方的糧吏，仍有浮收勒折這一類的事情，所以時常惹起民變。清史稿敘述咸同之間的情形，謂「時東南財富之區，半遭蹂躪；未被兵州縣，

⁷⁵ 曾文正公奏稿卷二十一頁七十七。

⁷⁶ 馬端敏公年譜頁四十七。

⁷⁷ 李文忠公奏稿卷三頁五十八。

⁷⁸ 太平天國史料第一集，天朝畝田制度，頁二。

⁷⁹ 洪楊類纂史略卷十頁六又卷十一頁二十八。

又苦貪吏浮收勒折，民怨沸騰，聚衆戕官之事屢起」⁸⁰。眼光遠大的政治家，便知道欲平定太平天國，必須政治與軍事同時進行。胡林翼克復武昌後，奏陳湖北善後辦法，即云：「吏治之與兵事，固始終相因者也。」⁸¹當時官吏請求減賦，罕有言及太平天國政策之足以誘民，這是由於有所忌諱，不敢明言。但是看他們時常提起減賦以收拾民心，使未收復者拔身來歸，已收復者流亡返里，則其意仍甚明顯。廷臣中丁壽昌請求裁減江浙漕額，以爲如能實行，則江浙之民，必感激涕零，「已收復者亟思減賦，未收復者率衆歸誠；大兵所到，自有破竹之勢，東南可指麾而定。」⁸²潘祖蔭說；自軍興以來，民遭蹂躪，轉徙流離。此時縱使薄賦輕徭，「且恐有綴耕而歎者」；況迫以急徵暴斂，民力已瘁，必致釀變。不若因時制宜，酌減賦額。使携離之衆，返諸畝畝之中，則「弭變者甚大」⁸³，同時長江各省的督撫，也都有這一種的認識。曾國藩，李鴻章會奏減賦之利，謂尙陷賊中的人民，一聞減賦之令，必當感激涕零，「他日軍毫所指，弩矢驅之更舊，壺漿之意益誠，未始非固結招來之一法。」⁸⁴胡林翼謂湖北的人民，「兵至爲民，賊來從逆。」⁸⁵故以爲「禦賊之法，先結民心，救亂之略，先保民命」⁸⁶。駱秉章謂湖南方面，因爲州縣浮收及銀價翔貴，以致「農末俱困，羣情洶洶」；後來將各州縣錢漕宿弊大加剔釐，以減輕人民田賦，於是「各屬田價漸增，農安畝畝，無復盼盼

⁸⁰ 清史稿，食貨志二，頁八。

⁸¹ 汪士鐸胡文忠公撫鄂記卷一頁二至三。

⁸² 浙江減賦全案卷二頁二至三，又江蘇減賦全案卷二頁五至六。

⁸³ 江蘇減賦內案卷二頁二至三。

⁸⁴ 同上，卷二頁十三至廿三；李文忠奏稿卷三頁六十一。

⁸⁵ 胡文忠撫鄂記卷二頁十三。

⁸⁶ 同上卷四頁二十二。

意」⁸⁷。可見他們都以爲欲平定漕事，必須收拾民心；而收拾民心的要着，在於減輕田賦。

3.軍需緊急，減賦令人民踴躍樂輸。在平定太平天國的時期中，人民既以兵燹關係，無力完納，政府又以收拾民心的關係，不敢過分強迫；但是軍事方面需款甚殷對於佔財政收入大宗的田賦，又不能放鬆。唯一的辦法，只有減賦，使人民感戴恩德，踴躍樂輸。籌備軍需的要着，是使人民從速繳納賦程，以濟燃眉之急，至於總收入的稍減與否，倒在其次。所以當時長江各督撫毅然減賦，便是看到這一點。駱秉章自述他籌畫湖南軍餉所以略收實效者，除添設釐金外，實由於「釐別錢糧宿弊以卹農」使「輸將較前踴躍」⁸⁸。胡林翼在湖北刪減漕糧，其用意在於使「民間所省甚多，輸將甚易」⁸⁹。曾國藩因江西所受蹂躪太廣，征收斷不能踴躍，故以爲「計惟有減價徵收，一新百姓之耳目，或可迅速徵解，稍濟眉急」⁹⁰。安徽北部十縣開徵時，廷旨謂「誠能取之而不爲虐，小民諒必，鼓舞輸將」⁹¹。李鴻章請求裁減江蘇賦額謂人民見政府於經費匱乏之時，尙有此度越尋常之舉，必定「感生望外踴躍輸將」⁹²。左宗棠謂朝廷如能恩准減免杭嘉湖三府浮賦，則「行見率土騰歡，定必輸將恐後」⁹³。他們都認爲減賦一舉，不僅以紓民困，並且也是充裕國庫的良法。

4.釐金制度已成立，政府減賦，不虞收入驟減。清廷平

87 駱文忠公奏稿卷八頁十四至十五。

88 同上卷八頁十二。

89 胡文忠公遺集卷三十頁十五。

90 曾文公正書札卷十六頁三十五。

91 皇朝續文獻通考卷四頁四。

92 李文忠公奏稿卷三頁六十。

93 浙江減賦全案卷二頁三十五。

亂時所需的軍費，亂平後復興事業所需的經費，都要增加政府的支出。即使不減田賦，對於這膨大的支出額，已難應付；何況一行減賦，更要減少政府的總收入呢！如果沒有別項新添的大宗收入，則減賦政策，仍難實行。恰巧當時添設釐金制度，使政府收入增加；所以減賦一舉，遂易施行。咸豐以前的國家歲入總數，除開國初年外，常在四千萬兩上下，而地丁一項，約佔全數三分之二⁹⁴。到了咸同時候，添設釐金，單就釐金收入而言，同治八年收入總數，約在一千萬兩以上⁹⁵而長江各省的實行減賦，都在創辦釐金制度之後，如下表所列：

省 別	釐金創辦年月 ⁹⁶	減賦實行年月 ⁹⁷
江 蘇	咸豐三年九月	同治四年
湖 南	咸豐五年四月	咸豐五年十月
江 西	咸豐五月八月	咸豐十一年
湖 北	咸豐五年十一月	咸豐七年
安 徽	咸豐七年	同治三年
浙 江	同治三年	同治四年

可見二者之間，頗有關係。釐金和田賦都出在人民的身上，但是當時政府對於田賦肯加裁減，對於釐金卻要添設，我們要問何故會發生這種矛盾的舉動呢？我以為這是由於田賦是直接稅，人民易於感覺到它的負擔；釐金是間接稅，雖然它的負擔最後依舊由商人轉移與一般人民，但是不易看出來。所以當時政府使用這遮眼法來欺騙人民。但是在表面

⁹⁴ 羅玉東釐金制度及其起源頁五，中國近代經濟史研究集刊一卷一期。

⁹⁵ 同上，頁二十六。

⁹⁶ 同上，頁二十三至二十四間的附表四。

⁹⁷ 見本篇以下敘述減賦之經過各節。

上，他們卻抬出中國歷來傳襲的重農輕商的學說，謂添設釐金，裁減田賦，便是這學說的實行。當時主持減賦運動的幾個重要人物，有這種言論。駱秉章說：四民之中，惟農最苦，獲利最薄，而錢漕一切，均於農田取之。商賈挾貨營運，懋遷有無，獲利爲饒無力作之苦，而又免徵收之稅。故應依照重農輕商的「往訓」，除減輕田賦外，更添釐金，取商人之贏以佐圖計⁹⁸。胡林翼也說：農尤根本，商猶枝葉；寬其意於錢，糧所以培本計而致厚於農民；嚴其法於釐金，所以開財源而致力於兵事⁹⁹。李鴻章謂當時田畝盡荒，錢糧難徵；正項既不足以養兵，必須釐金濟餉。與其病農，莫如病商，猶得古人重本抑末之義¹⁰⁰。他們似乎不知道釐金的負擔，商人可以轉嫁與農民。不知道他們是真個不知道呢？抑或是假裝痴聾？不過，我們可以斷言釐金制度的創設對於減賦運動頗有幫助，因爲他解決了減賦後的財政困難問題。

由於上述四項的原因，我們可以知道何以在當時要發生這個普遍的減賦運動。歷史上許多比較重要的運動，都是有當時的時勢做他們的背景；這減賦運動也不能逃出例外。

乙 減賦之性質

在未分述各省減賦的經過以前，我想先行總括的敘述當時減賦的一般性質。在上篇中曾說到當時田賦的積弊，由於浮收勒折過高，而江浙二省，又受了糧額過重之苦。所以治標的辦法，不外下列二種。

1. 裁減浮收，僅酌留州縣辦公費。裁減浮收的理想辦法，是除了欽定賦額之外，一文不准多取。但是在事實上，

⁹⁸ 駱文忠公奏稿卷八頁十五。

⁹⁹ 胡文忠公遺集卷六十頁六。

¹⁰⁰ 李文忠朋僚函稿六頁三十七。

這是辦不到的。當時的州縣；廉俸無多，賴錢漕陋規爲津貼；若盡革陋規，則辦公無資，其不肖者將以此藉口，別開巧取之端，廉謹者將無所措其手足，惟有襍被而走耳¹⁰¹。所以當時長江各省，雖痛裁浮收，減定地丁漕糧折錢的價格，以抒民困；但減定後的實徵田賦，仍較賦額稍高，即由於其中須要酌提州縣辦公之費。如湖南減賦湘潭一縣，地丁每兩加四錢，漕米照部議章程每石納一兩三錢外，加納銀四錢，作縣費用¹⁰²。胡林翼於湖北漕糧，改收折色，按其向年浮收之數，痛加剛減，有較前減半者，有減過半並減去三四倍者。但也只是刪減浮收，不是革除淨盡，如荆門直隸州每石折價，由六千八百文減爲四千八百文，包括耗米，水腳，串票，雜費在內¹⁰³。江西的辦法，酌定每地丁一兩，另提銀一錢六分，每漕米一石，提銀二錢七分，以應各州縣每年實在需用之公費等之需¹⁰⁴。安徽方面，釐定章程，也是「除解部定價外，酌留羨餘，以濟公用」¹⁰⁵。江蘇方面，酌定折價，「祇期足敷辦公，不准逾額浮收」¹⁰⁶。浙江減漕，於正漕之外，酌留運費，以爲州縣辦漕之費用¹⁰⁷。主持減賦府策的是督撫大員，但是政策的實用仍賴州縣小官；所以對於州縣的辦公費，不得不酌留一些，以示體恤。不過他們對於州縣的辦公費，也曾大加裁減，其他額外浮收，概加革除，所以減徵的結果，替人民所省下來的錢，爲數頗爲可觀。

2. 減定浙江重賦的浮額。裁減浮收一事，僅損及下級官吏的私費，並不會減少國家的歲入。左宗棠云：「利國仍在

¹⁰¹ 駱文忠公奏稿卷八頁十三至十四；又左襄公年譜卷三頁十九。

¹⁰² 駱文忠公年譜上卷頁四十四至四十五。

¹⁰³ 胡文忠公遺集卷二十五頁一至六。

¹⁰⁴ 江西通志卷八十五頁二十二。

¹⁰⁵ 續碑傳集卷二十七頁六。

¹⁰⁶ 江蘇減賦全案卷二頁四十三至四十六。

¹⁰⁷ 浙江減賦全案卷二頁二十四。

利民，中丞（駱秉章）減漕一事，即其明驗。捐丁書之入以益國，而於民又甚便，何不可為。」¹⁰⁸所以不會遭受中央財政當局的反對。至於減少賦額一事，便不相同，是要損及國庫的收入。李鴻章曾奏請裁減地丁及漕項，遭受廷旨訓斥，謂「老成經國之謀，竊恐不宜出此」¹⁰⁹。所以只有江浙兩省的漕糧浮額，得到裁減的恩典。松蘇太三屬按原額減去三分之一，杭嘉湖減去三十分之八，常鎮減去十分之一。

上面的兩個辦法，都是治標的辦法。減定賦額如不同時裁減浮收，則奸胥蠹吏將在額外浮收中剝削人民。便是裁減浮收，如果不同時設法杜絕浮收的根源，則減徵仍不能持久。浮收勒折的根源，在上篇中已經提到，不外糧吏的舞弊自肥，上下各衙門的陋規，及大戶地紳的分肥。當時主持減賦運動的各督撫，使用下列二策，以杜絕弊端：

1. 嚴禁上官陋規及蠹吏舞弊。「浮收」是州縣收賦時所取於民的浮於賦額的數目，「陋規」是州縣收糧官吏所奉贈於上下各衙門的私費。「陋規」所需的錢，便出自「浮收」。所以欲禁浮收，必先革陋規。駱秉章於湖南「通飭有漕州縣，裁汰漕規，冀稍紓民困」¹¹⁰。胡林翼在湖北減賦時，以為「欲禁浮收，當必先革冗費」¹¹¹。所以將所有道府漕規及上下各衙門一切房費差費，概行革除，以「清弊之源」¹¹²。曾國藩在江西嚴定章程，「禁斷一切浮收規費」，以紓民困¹¹³。喬松年主持安徽減賦也是將「陋規盡數刪除」¹¹⁴。左

¹⁰⁸ 左文襄公年譜卷二頁十二至十四。

¹⁰⁹ 江蘇減賦全案卷二頁三十一至三十二。

¹¹⁰ 駱文公年譜上卷頁四十三。

¹¹¹ 胡文忠公遺集卷二十三頁七。

¹¹² 同上卷二十五頁一。

¹¹³ 曾文正公奏稿卷十四頁五十三。

¹¹⁴ 續碑傳集卷二十七頁六。

宗棠在浙江主持減賦，除了「減正額」及「減浮收」之外，還要「裁陋規」，「庶弊竇清而漕政因之而肅」¹¹⁵。李鴻章在江蘇也將「向來徵漕一切陋規」，核實裁減，祇期勉敷辦公之用¹¹⁶。他們所以要嚴禁陋規，是因為像曾國藩所說的，「能為州縣寬得一分，則州縣之取民者亦自少一分」¹¹⁷。這一舉，在直接方面是減輕州縣官吏的負擔，在間接方面，實在便是減輕人民的負擔。至於蠹吏奸胥的舞弊自肥，也嚴加禁絕。駱秉章在湖南嚴飭各州縣釐剔錢漕宿弊，嚴禁吏胥擾索把持¹¹⁸。胡林翼也告誡縣令，說湖北錢索積弊，皆由書包杭，需索日增煩重；斷不可再假手猾吏奸胥，致滋弊端¹¹⁹。胡氏又將由單串票，樣米，號錢等吏胥所需索的浮費，概行革除¹²⁰。左宗棠在浙江，也將向來加尖，加價，勒折諸弊，概行裁革¹²¹。上官的規費也已取消了，所以對於糧吏的舞弊，更非嚴加取締不可。

2. 廢除大小戶名目。地紳所以能够在田賦中分肥自利，一部分要歸因於官吏自己的不肯守法。同治四年的上諭中曾說：「總緣州縣官違例浮收，地方紳衿，得以挾持短長，包完短交，流弊界出。」¹²²現在官吏方面既已大加整頓，這些地紳便無可藉口了。州縣官吏對於地紳的索討規費，現在可以嚴辭拒絕，不怕他們到上司去告漕。但是如果大小戶名目依舊存在；二者待遇不同，如漕糧方面，大戶交本色，小戶交折色；則大戶常佔便宜，（詳情見上篇甲節「地紳的分肥」

¹¹⁵ 浙江減賦全案卷二頁二十五。

¹¹⁶ 江蘇減賦全案卷二頁六十至六十四。

¹¹⁷ 曾文正公書札卷二十三頁三十四。

¹¹⁸ 駱文忠公奏稿卷八頁十四。

¹¹⁹ 胡文忠公遺集卷六十一頁二十三。

¹²⁰ 同上卷二十五頁一。

¹²¹ 浙江減賦全案卷二頁二十四。

¹²² 江蘇減賦全案卷一頁五至六。

一項中)。這不但有違公平的原則，並且使官吏由於大戶的短交，不得不向馴良的小戶「任意抑勒，以為挹彼茲此之計」¹²³。根本違背減賦運動的原意。所以當時主持減賦運動的人，都竭力設法廢除大小戶的分別，以杜弊端。漕糧方面，一律徵收本色，或一律改徵折色；地丁方面，銀兩折錢文的價格，也一律規定，不復優待大戶，以求公允。如湖北於咸豐七年（1857）減賦時，奏定一例改折，大戶小戶，是紳是民，較若畫一¹²⁴。李鴻章在江蘇也辦理均賦，廢除大小戶之分¹²⁵。江西酌定章程，將包戶名目，嚴行禁革，無論紳庶應完銀米，一律照章折納，不許稍有低昂¹²⁶。浙江方面，漕糧概完本色，紳民一律徵收，不凡再有大小名目¹²⁷。至於地丁漕項等以銀折錢者，也都不准再有大小戶之分¹²⁸。

這兩項都是減賦運動的副產物，但是都很重要，值得特別提出來敘述。第一：因為這兩項都是所謂「澄清弊端」的辦法。假使不能實行這兩項，那麼州縣官吏一方面要奉獻陋規給上下各衙門，一方面又要彌補大戶的短交，叫他們不浮收勒折，決不可能。所以這兩項都是裁減浮收的先決條件。第二：因為這兩項辦法，很與財政學原理相合。刪除陋規及中飽，相當於亞當斯密（Adam Smith）租稅四大原則中的「節省原則」（Principle of Economy）；廢除大小戶之分，相當於「公平原則」（Principle of Equality）。賦稅的徵收方法，應該使人民所繳納的數額，與國庫所實收的數額，愈相近愈佳。換言之，即竭力設法節省徵收過程中所消耗的費用

¹²³ 同上。

¹²⁴ 胡文忠公遺集卷六十頁二十三。

¹²⁵ 江蘇減賦全案卷二頁二十二至二十三。

¹²⁶ 寶字齋類稿卷十一頁四。

¹²⁷ 浙江減賦全案卷二頁二十四；又馬端敏奏稿卷二頁十三至十五。

¹²⁸ 左文襄公奏稿初編卷十四頁十一；又卷十五；又馬端敏公奏稿卷一頁四十四至四十一。

；至於不正當的中飽，更應加以刪除。丁日昌等稟覆江西減賦辦法時，曾說欲一新積弊，必須「取中飽之資，分其半而歸之於公，分其半而歸之於民」¹²⁹。便是這個道理。至於在納稅人的負擔一方面，則應使之公平。大小戶的分別待遇，對於納稅能力較優的大戶反使之負擔較輕，便是違反這原則的。所以這次主持減賦運動的人，都力圖均賦，冀得一「均平畫一之道」。他們抱了相似的目的，根據相似的經驗，所以想出相似的辦法；不但他們自己間互相符合，並且暗合於西洋學者所得的原則。

丙 減賦的經過

當時長江各省的減賦運動，是與各省肅清太平軍的時日相關聯的。太平軍的肅清，以湖南為最早，湖北江西次之，安徽又次之，浙江江蘇最後。各省減賦運動的發生之先後，也是依這個次序。現在便按照這個次序，分別敘述各省減賦的經過。本節所注重的是各省個別的特殊性，與上二節敘述他們的共同性質不同。

1. 湖南

咸豐四年（1854）七月中，湖南官軍克復岳州，湖南境內的太平軍已一律肅清了。但是民間因為錢漕問題，羣情洶洶，須設法綏靖；並且對於尚在匪區的鄰省，須設法協濟軍餉。次年駱秉章便採用減賦辦法，一方面減輕人民負擔，以收拾人心；一方面又可使人民踴躍輸將，以裕軍餉；可以說是一舉兩得。

主持這件事的重要人物，自然是湖南巡撫駱秉章。但是在駱氏背後指使一切的幕客左宗棠，卻是更重要的人物。他的兒子左孝同在先考事略中說：

¹²⁹ 求闕齋弟子記卷二十八頁三十四。

府君佐駱文忠公。其時腹地土寇遽起，又須徵應鄰省接兵餉械。湖南一貧弱之區，支五省兵事，羽檄交馳，兵餉兩絀。籌餉以抽釐減漕爲大端，尤瘁盡心力。減漕事發端湘潭周君煥南。其時排衆議以定章程，府君實主之焉¹³⁰。

胡林翼當時也說：「駱（秉章）之辦事，全在左卿。」¹³¹可見在湖南減賦運動中左宗棠地位的重要。

湖南減賦始於咸豐五年（1855）。據駱秉章自訂年譜中說，當時穀價錢價很賤，而納賦須以銀兩計算，故欠賦遂多。湘潭是著名大缺，每年可以收錢糧四五萬兩；但是咸豐四年；止收四千餘兩。五年已交七月，未見徵納。駱氏很是憂慮，「因通飭有漕州縣，裁汰漕規，冀稍紓民困。」但是這個辦法仍嫌不够，非再進一步不可。恰巧這時候有湘潭舉人周煥南等，赴藩司遞呈，要求核定征收錢糧章程。十月，又赴撫院遞呈，地丁自願每兩加四錢，漕米折色照部章每石納一兩三錢，加納銀一兩三錢助軍需，又加錢四錢作縣費用，其他浮收一概廢革。駱氏便「批獎好義急公，准其照自定章程完納，限本年內將四五年錢糧掃數全完，不準帶欠」。後來長沙，善化，寧鄉，益陽，衡陽，衡山，等縣錢糧較重者，都呈請照湘潭章程，也都遭批准。這樣一來，結果很是完滿；到十二月中，湘潭縣已報收錢糧十萬有另；其他批准減漕的州，也都紛紛報解¹³²。

減賦雖始於五年，但是直到八年（1858）始行入奏。這是由於駱氏的慎重，以爲一切新制度「規模甫定，仍須隨時察看損益，以期周妥；一經奏定，則後此難於更改，轉多窒

¹³⁰ 左文襄公年譜卷二頁十二至十四。

¹³¹ 胡文忠公遺書卷六十一頁十。

¹³² 駱文忠公年譜上卷頁四十二至四十三。

礙也」¹³³。到了咸豐八年四月，減賦事已大致辦妥，於是在滙陳湖南籌餉情形摺中，與創辦釐金一事，合併入告。（湖南抽釐，亦始於咸豐五年）。駱氏在這一摺中，先敘民間艱於完賦的原因，以爲實由於州縣官吏的浮收，刁衿劣監的索勒，及銀價的翔貴。然後申述自己減賦的辦法，一方面「許地方士紳條陳積弊，具呈自擬款目，以爲徵收之準；察其官民相安者准之，未協者駁之，俟其適中而復准之」；一方面更「嚴飭各州縣，將錢漕宿弊，大加釐剔，諭以事理，曉以利害；嚴禁史胥衿棍，擾索把持」。結果頗不差，不但財政方面，徵收有起色；並且在政治方面，農困獲甦，安於畝畝，無復蠢然思動的心思了¹³⁴。

湖南減賦的總數；已不可考。駱秉章的幾個奏摺中，都沒有提到；而且各縣都依據當地情形而定，並不一律。我現在根據駱氏自訂年譜中所述的湘潭情形，加以類推，作一個大概的估計。湖南舊章，地丁每兩加五錢，漕米折色，每石收銀六兩¹³⁵。按湖南賦額，地丁歲入九十一萬餘兩¹³⁶；加五錢併入，則爲一百十六萬餘兩；漕米正耗合計三萬餘石¹³⁷，折色爲八十萬餘兩；二者合計二百十六萬餘兩。湘潭減賦，地丁每兩五錢將浮收減去一錢，漕米折色，每石減去三兩。照此推算，則地丁浮收減去九萬餘兩，漕米折色減去四十萬餘兩，合計近五十萬兩，約當全額二百十六萬餘兩的四分之一。湘潭一縣，錢糧較重，所減的分數也許較大，或許不能爲準，但是大致當相差不遠。

¹³³ 駱文忠公奏稿六頁三十七。

¹³⁴ 同上卷八頁十二至十五。

¹³⁵ 駱文忠公年譜上卷頁四十三。

¹³⁶ 石渠餘紀卷三頁三十七至三十九；保道光間額徵。

¹³⁷ 同治欽定戶部則例卷十九頁三至五；又頁十二至十五；保道光二十五年額徵之數。

湖南減賦一舉，開當時長江各省的先聲；不久，他省便相率仿行了。左宗棠說：湖南核減漕糧，所定章程，最爲允協；「嗣後湖北，江西，仿照行之，官民稱便。」¹³⁸但是湖北江西兩省的辦法，都與湖南的稍有不同。湖南的洞漕，雖由巡撫衙門先示之意，但仍由各屬牧金與該縣紳民定議，稟明撫藩兩署立案，然後上奏，故「較之湖北先後奏定者，更可垂久」¹³⁹。但是湖北辦法，尙大體仿照湖南，對於各縣漕糧折價，依當地情形而定，並不求畫一。至於江西減賦後，各縣折價，一律相同，不許參差，雖覺整齊，但更難垂久。左宗棠批評他們說：

減徵一節，最爲當今急務。各處情形不同，不能一律，亦自然之理。湖南所以勝於湖北，湖北所以勝於江西者，同一減徵而施爲自別也。若概定一章則巨履小履同價，苦樂不均，事必難成，成亦不久耳¹⁴⁰。

曾國藩對於自己在江西所行的辦法，也覺不滿意，謂「其錯處在定價太少，告示又太畫一，將來皆非可久之道」¹⁴¹。後來江浙兩省裁減浮收，也都採取湖南的辦法。可見湖南的減賦，不但發動最早，並且辦法是最妥。

2. 湖北

咸豐六年（1856）十一月，官軍克復武昌，逐漸肅清長江兩岸，乃謀善後辦法¹⁴²。次年，胡林翼便仿照湖南的辦法，實行減賦。自七年三月，興起此議，六月中始行查辦，至九月下旬，乃酌定章程，通飭遵遵¹⁴³。

¹³⁸ 左文襄公奏稿初編卷十二頁四。

¹³⁹ 曾文正公批牘卷六頁三十六至三十七，又曾文正公書札卷二十八頁十九。

¹⁴⁰ 左文襄公年譜卷三頁十九。

¹⁴¹ 曾文正公書札卷二十八頁四十六。

¹⁴² 胡文忠遺書卷十四頁九。

¹⁴³ 同上，卷三十頁十六。

湖南減賦的主要目的，在於籌餉；湖北的主要目的，卻在收拾民心。這是一方面由於湖北是長江上游的門戶，軍事上必爭的地方；咸豐六年的收復武昌，已是第三次的收復，所以不得不亟謀收拾民心，以鞏固防務。一方面也由於當時湖北的人民思叛之心，較他處為尤甚。張德堅說：「蚩蚩之民，竟為賦賣，甚至賊至爭迎之，官軍至皆罷市；此等悖惑情形，比比皆然，而以湖北為尤甚。」¹⁴⁴胡林翼也說湖北方面，吏惰民驕，官仇民而民亦仇官，「恐湖北之民揭竿而起者，不必粵匪之再至，而將盜弄潢池矣。」¹⁴⁵所以更不得不講究撫馭的方法。胡氏收拾民心的方法之一，便是這減賦運動。

咸豐七年(1857)十月，胡林翼奏陳鄂省尚有應辦事件疏，謂湖北錢漕積弊甚深，浮動太過，致失民心，「小民窮困，流亡逋逃，或敢於抗糧，或甘於從賊」，因之主張裁汰陋規浮費¹⁴⁶。同時在奏陳革除漕務積弊並減定漕章密疏中，又敘述湖北田賦浮收之重，而歸因於官吏陋規，紳衿包納及索陋規等各種冗費，因之結論云：「欲禁浮收，當必先革冗費。」¹⁴⁷但是胡氏雖已上奏，實則當時減賦辦法尚在試行中。胡氏敢於事先入奏者，或由於看見湖南已辦有相當成效自信頗有把握。

是年十二月，胡氏又陳奏減賦的具體辦法，謂一方面將所有漕規及上下各衙門一切房費差費，概行革除以清漕弊之源；一方面將漕糧一律改征折色，按其向年浮收的數目，痛加刪減，所有由單串票，樣米，號錢，一切浮費，概行禁

¹⁴⁴ 洪楊類纂史略卷十頁六。

¹⁴⁵ 胡文忠公遺集卷十四頁四。

¹⁴⁶ 同上卷二十三頁二至四。

¹⁴⁷ 同上，頁四至八。

革，以清漕弊之流。據云裁減浮收的結果，「統計有漕州縣民間共刪減錢一百四十餘萬千文。」¹⁴⁸

次年（八年）六月，胡氏陳奏漕務章程辦有成效疏中，敘述核定裁減數目的方法；先由各地紳民，稟呈核減數目，乃細加體察，「核其向日浮收之數及地方之肥瘠，產米之多寡，米價錢價之低昂高下，以明定折價之等差。」如果所議的數目已適中的，便加批准；為數尚過多的，則更加以痛減¹⁴⁹。可見他的辦法，即係仿行湖南的辦法。胡氏又敘述州縣冗費，一概加以裁革。自糧道至丞倅尹尉等官的漕規，司道府廳各書吏的房費年規，州縣書差的飯食紙張等費，以及荊倉綠營各浮費，共刪除銀約二十餘萬兩¹⁵⁰。可衣上下各衙門陋規的衆多；是以欲減浮收，必先革陋規。現在將各縣裁減浮收的數字，作成「湖北減漕表」以為參考。

湖北減漕表

縣別	漕糧每石向來收數	減賦後每石折色收數	本縣漕額	全縣裁減總數
江夏	8,000 文至 13,000 文	6,500 文	7,550 石	30,200,000 文
武昌	5,400	4,400	14,993	14,993,000
咸寧	7,600	5,500	6,330	13,293,000
嘉魚	15,000	5,500	2,849	27,065,500
蒲圻	5,860	5,000	9,750	8,385,000
崇陽	6,000	4,000	5,164	10,328,000
通城	6,000	4,000	6,720	13,440,000
興國	6,400	4,100	18,119	41,673,700
大冶	14,000	5,000	6,562	59,058,000
通山	5,000	4,800	959	191,800

¹⁴⁸ 同上卷二十五頁一至六。

¹⁴⁹ 同上卷三十，頁十至十一。

¹⁵⁰ 同上卷三十頁十四至十五。

漢陽	8,000	5,000	9,568	28,704,000
漢川	9,000	4,200	2,333	11,198,400
黃陂	10,000	5,800	11,113	46,674,600
孝感	12,000	5,800	7,565	46,903,000
沔陽	12,000	4,000	12,778	102,304,000
黃岡	9,600	4,500	25,656	130,845,600
黃梅	6,800	4,500	2,893	6,653,900
蘄州	7,960	4,500	18,900	65,394,000
羅田	9,600	4,500	6,943	35,409,300
蘄水	9,600	4,500	30,832	157,243,200
廣濟	7,000	4,500	13,969	34,922,600
潛江	7,500	5,000	4,854	12,135,000
天門	9,600	5,000	11,233	51,671,800
安陸	9,000	5,600	2,086	7,092,400
雲夢	9,700	5,800	1,713	6,680,700
應城	9,000	5,800	3,151	10,083,200
隨州	12,000	6,500	2,272	23,496,000
應山	9,000	6,500	3,089	7,722,000
江陵	16,000	5,000	14,352	157,883,000
公安	7,500	5,000	4,300	10,750,000
石首	10,000	5,000	2,791	13,955,000
監利	20,000	5,000	7,137	107,055,000
松滋	7,500	4,500	2,019	6,057,000
荊門	7,500 文	4,800 文	16,858	45,518,600
合計	——	——	297,412 石	1,645,980,800 文

附註一：漕糧每石向來收數及減折後收數二項，係根據胡文忠公遺集卷三十一頁十一至十二。

附註二：各縣漕額一項，係根據民國重修湖北通志卷四十六頁二十三至三十九，乃合併南漕正耗米計算；惟作本表時，截去石以下的零數，且未列入夏口當陽二州縣之漕額，故合計總數，較湖北通志所載者稍少。

附註三：各縣裁減總數一項，係根據前三項算而得者；其合計全省總數為百六十四萬千文，較胡氏所報告的一百四十餘萬千文為多。這是由於未減賦前，每石折價，大戶可受優待；而本表則將大小戶等視，故所得減額總數，較實在減數稍多。

減定以後，胡林翼便認真施行。咸豐七年十月批漢陽府詳請漕折章程札中，即云：「折色數目，經此次痛加核減之後，如敢加增一文，定即分別特參究治，決不稍寬。」¹⁵¹是年十二月，即請旨革提違章增收的荊門知州方某¹⁵²，懲一以儆百，以後便罕有違章增收的事了。胡氏曾報告云：「現在各屬俱已奉行，民情極為歡悅，完納俱形踴躍，……為數十年來所未有。」¹⁵³可見成效頗宏。

3. 江西

咸豐十一年（1861）九月間，曾國藩克服江西各縣，「全省肅清」¹⁵⁴。便仿照兩湖的先例，舉行減賦。他的目的，一方面是想培養民力，另一方面是想使人民踴躍輸將，以裕兵餉¹⁵⁵。但是籌餉的動機，似乎比較更為有力，所以初次實行時，頗為急遽殊多未妥；至次年（同治元年）乃不得加以改訂。

咸豐十一年（1861）秋，李桓以糧道署理布政使，曾國藩便以減賦的事情委托他去辦理。李桓所酌定的辦法是地丁正耗減定為二千四百文，漕糧每石減定為三千文，所有州縣辦公等費，一概在內¹⁵⁶。曾國藩便加採納，於九月初六日，將李桓所擬就的扎稿及告示稿寄與巡撫毓科，請其會印後發交司道檄屬下州縣張貼。前後送去了漕減價告示萬張，可見其對於宣傳的努力¹⁵⁷。江西減賦的特點，是各縣折價，一律平等。如廣信府向來浮收至十四千者，亦與他屬向收三千餘

¹⁵¹ 同上，卷八十五頁一至二。

¹⁵² 同上卷二十五頁一至三。

¹⁵³ 同上卷三頁十六。

¹⁵⁴ 曾文正公奏稿卷十四頁三十。

¹⁵⁵ 同上卷十四頁五十三。

¹⁵⁶ 寶字齋類稿卷六十一頁二十七至三十七。

¹⁵⁷ 曾文正公書札卷十六頁三十三，又頁三十五，又頁四十，又頁四十三。（原書不注明發函月日，現根據其手書日記填寫，以下各函仿此）。

者，一體減為三千文¹⁵⁸。但是當時兵餉非常支絀，故李桓後來又提議將廣信漕糧折價，加收若干。曾國藩初頗為所動，但以告示已發出徧貼各處，只好待第二年再圖補救¹⁵⁹。

同治元年（1863），沈葆楨繼任為江西巡撫，遂與曾氏再定江西減各永遠章程。先是，咸豐十一年前署江西廬陵縣知縣丁日昌曾稟陳江省丁漕利弊情形，曾國藩便令他與其他縣令詳議章程，開具簡明清摺，「呈候核奪」¹⁶⁰。是年（同治元年）正月，丁日昌等便覆稟，主張剔除中飽，痛裁浮收，將廣信府屬各縣漕糧折價，統減至五千五百文以至六千文，即減去十分之五；其餘各府：收數，則自二千六百文起，至三千八百文止。計廣信一府，核減浮收十餘萬串；其餘各府，以前一二年收數計之，雖屬無幾依咸豐初年收數計之，核減總在一百餘萬串以外。但州縣辦漕時，須繳交上下各衙門規費，為數頗鉅，非明令裁革不可。又科試兵差，上司新任等供應的需用，為數亦鉅；應該另行指定專款，以免州縣向田賦浮收中設法。此外州縣攤捐，亦應豁免，俾輕州縣負擔，間接即以利民。以上三點如果都能够辦到，則弊源既澄，弊流自清。以歸於公者計之，實數增六十餘萬；以還於民者計之，浮數減一百餘萬¹⁶¹。同年四月，李桓（其時已正式就任江西布政使），請曾，沈上奏嚴定減賦章程詳敘述江西近年丁漕情形，謂一切積弊，均與湖北相等。欲清積弊，必先停攤捐，裁陋規，以清其源；然後刪減丁漕數目，以節其流。其理論與丁日昌等稟文，大致相同。最後提出具體的減賦辦法三條。據他的估計，如能實行新章，每年可為

¹⁵⁸ 江蘇減賦全案卷三頁十一引及曾國藩書信申語。

¹⁵⁹ 寶字齋類稿卷六十二頁九；曾文正公書札，卷十七頁二；及頁十二復左季高書；又同卷頁三及頁十二復李補堂書。

¹⁶⁰ 曾文正公批牘，卷六，頁三十六。

¹⁶¹ 求闕齋弟子記，卷二十八，頁三十四至三十八。

民間節省銀一百萬餘兩，爲軍餉共籌銀三十餘萬兩¹⁶²。

曾國藩將江西丁漕減征永章，細加審閱；又與沈葆楨，左宗棠，李桓等反覆諮商，同治元年（1862）五月二十二日始行核定¹⁶³。曾氏的辦法，是將李桓所議的章程，稍加更動，而大體相同。(一)地丁一項，准如李氏所請，每正耗銀一兩一錢，實收庫平銀一兩五錢；(二)南昌等十府漕米，每石折價，減爲一兩九錢，較李氏所定者更多減一錢；(三)廣信府屬七縣，每漕一石，折收銀三兩，較李氏所定者，更多減去一兩，而且三兩之中，有五錢是軍需費，將來軍務完竣後，可以減去。曾氏並云：擬仿照湖南辦法，由督撫會銜扎飭各屬出示曉諭，令各縣官紳自行酌議，稟省立案¹⁶⁴，後來依照曾氏所定的辦法實行。這辦法中將廣信與他府參差定價，不像咸豐十一年時一律減爲三千文；又飭各屬縣令與該處紳民定議赴省立案，這二點是受左宗棠的影響¹⁶⁵。將廣信府的四兩減爲三兩，又一律專收銀而不收錢，這二點是受沈葆楨的影響¹⁶⁶。至於豁免攤捐一事，則於是年七月出奏，請求將江西各州縣應攤各款共未完銀二百十五萬餘兩，概行豁免，「俾閭閻無科勒之苦，州縣無賠累之虞。」¹⁶⁷這個肅清弊源的請求，於七月廿四日邀受清廷的允許¹⁶⁸。

同治元年(1862)江西減賦的辦法仍與咸豐十一年相同，

¹⁶² 寶字齋類稿卷十一，頁一至十二。

¹⁶³ 曾文正年譜頁十三至十四謂五月初五核定，二十日出示。此據曾氏手書日記。

¹⁶⁴ 曾文正公批牘卷六頁三十六至三十七。

¹⁶⁵ 曾文正公書札卷八頁二十二；又卷二十八頁十九（兩函係同治元年：四五月所寫的）。

¹⁶⁶ 求闕齋弟子記卷二十八頁三十九；又曾文正公書札卷十九頁二，覆沈中丞書。

¹⁶⁷ 曾文正公奏稿卷十六頁四十三至四十六。

¹⁶⁸ 王先謙同治朝東華續錄卷十一頁十七；又江西通志卷首之四，頁二十五。

他的缺點是全省各縣折價一律。廣信漕折雖曾略高；但是在年九月中，便以當地人民的反對，也只好改爲一律¹⁶⁹。這種辦法雖是整齊好看，但難實行完善。後來曾氏便懊恨道：「江西減輕浮收一案，十一年定爲三千一石，元年定爲一兩九錢，其錯處在定價太少，告示又太畫一，將來皆非可久之道。」¹⁷⁰又專收銀而不收錢一層，也因為銀價後來跌落，州縣頗以爲苦，只得於同治三年又復收錢三千之舊，以「州縣過於窮窘，未有不殃及百姓者也」¹⁷¹，所以曾國藩於同治元年雖已陳奏云：「臣與撫臣沈葆楨現方設法減征，容俟妥議章程，另案會奏」；但是後來未能辦妥，遲延幾年，未能入告。直到同治四年孫長紱護理江撫，始行奏定。孫氏事前曾與曾國藩商酌¹⁷²。是年八月間，遂奏聞江省減賦章程。奏摺中先述未減賦時浮收之重，耗費之多；再敘述曾，沈減裁浮收，刪除耗費的辦法，謂「約計丁漕兩項，每年核減浮收銀數，不下百萬有奇」。最後說：「自（同治）元年定章以來，試行數載，一切俱有成規。」¹⁷³八月二十一日清廷下諭批准¹⁷⁴。

根據孫長紱的奏摺，江西每年額徵，計起運地丁銀一百五十五萬餘兩，漕米七十六萬餘兩。當時米價每石約值銀二兩餘。丁漕二者合計，不過三百餘萬兩；但是所減浮收，竟達百餘萬兩之鉅，可見減賦一舉，對於人民生計，關係極大。

¹⁶⁹ 曾文正公書札，卷二十，頁十。

¹⁷⁰ 同上，卷二十八，頁四十六。

¹⁷¹ 同上，卷二十三，頁三十；又求闕齋弟子記卷二十八頁四十三至四十四。

¹⁷² 曾文正公書札卷二十九頁三十五至三十六。

¹⁷³ 江西通志卷八十五頁二十一至二十三。

¹⁷⁴ 清史稿本紀二十一，頁二十五。按原書作八月癸酉，但是月無癸酉日，據江四通志為知癸丑之誤。

4. 安徽

咸豐十一年(1861)八月，曾國藩克復安慶，因為兵亂之後，冊檔全失，故由善後局擬定「抵徵」法，以代正賦¹⁷⁵。至同治三年，安徽軍事大定，「皖南北兩岸肅清」¹⁷⁶。是年始廢止「抵徵」，開辦丁漕；同時乘機減定折價，以紓民困。這件事雖係曾國藩主持；但上奏時，是由皖撫喬松年出面；酌議章程時，則有藩臺馬新貽臬臺何璟，參與其事。

同治二年(1864)五月，清廷批諭喬松年籌議皖北開徵丁漕摺，令釐定章程，嚴飭各州縣痛裁浮費，以培養百姓元氣¹⁷⁷。時喬氏以勦捻督師於壽州，所以將釐定章程的事，交給藩臬二司去辦理，不久，安徽藩司馬新貽等，將安徽漕糧暫征折色章程及酌定所價數目，詳稟江督曾國藩。九月初八日，曾氏遂批定此案¹⁷⁸。詳文中的擬議：(一)漕米每石除部價一兩三錢外，另加一兩二錢，為司庫提存之款；(二)廢止陋規攤捐之費以輕州縣負擔；又另加丁漕餘資，以為州縣辦公費用，各縣並不一律；(三)折色徵銀後，再改折錢文多寡，各縣亦不一律，如懷寧桐城為每石(?)四千八百文，太湖四千四百文，合肥六千六百文；無為，舒城，廬江七千文，巢縣，六安七千二百文，英山，霍山，九千文。曾國藩的批示，以為所定仍嫌過高，故再加減低；除部價外，司庫加提及州縣餘資二項，合計每石可再減七八百文；因之各縣規定收錢數目，亦應減低，仿照湖北之例，極多不過六千五百，大例總在五千元以內¹⁷⁹。曾氏所說的「每石可減錢七八百文」，

¹⁷⁵ 曾文正奏稿卷二十一，頁四十八；批牘卷五頁六至八。

¹⁷⁶ 曾文正公奏稿卷二十一頁四十五。

¹⁷⁷ 同治朝東華續錄奏三十四，頁五十八；又皇朝續文獻通考卷四頁四。

¹⁷⁸ 曾文正公手書日記同治三年八月廿九日至九月初八日各條。年譜卷九頁三十八，謂係初十日所核定，蓋誤。

¹⁷⁹ 曾文正公批牘卷五頁十九至二十一。

是指其改定數目與馬新貽等原議數目的差數，並不是與完全未減賦前的原來收數相比較。安徽全省額徵漕糧正耗米二十八萬四千餘石¹⁸⁰，曾氏所減的總數，已比馬氏等原議的減數，多減了二十餘萬串錢了。至於比未減賦前的原來浮收數，其相差實不止此數，我在下一段中另有估計。

減定以後，由喬松年會同江督曾國藩漕督吳棠奏報清廷。奏摺中先述暫徵折色的理由，謂運道中阻，本年尚不能運輸，且兵燹以後，民力未紓，應大加核減，以示體恤。實行的辦法(一)解部定價，規定為稔米每石折銀一兩三錢，粟米每石一兩二錢；(二)至於折收漕價，(即折成錢數，取之於民的實在數目，包括司庫加提及州縣餘資等款)，視原折價多寡，定以七折六折，體察民力，以易完為斷¹⁸¹。而將陋規盡數刪除¹⁸²。取之於民的實徵錢數，據安徽通志所載，同治三年議定懷寧等州縣應徵熟田漕米，每石折收錢四千至六千五百文不等；四年議定定遠，霍邱，天長三縣，應徵漕米每石折收錢各六千文；六年議定宣城等州縣應徵每石折收錢五千至六千五百文等不等¹⁸³。與曾國藩批示中所說的「最多者不過六千五百文，大例總在五千元以內」一語相合。假使我們以五千元為減賦後每石折價的平均數，又根據喬松年的奏摺，以此數為原折價的七折或六折；則安徽全省漕米未減賦以前的原折價的總數，為二百五十三萬餘文或二百九十六萬餘千文；減賦後為民間省錢百十一萬餘千文，或百五十四萬餘千文；取其中數，則所省者約達一百二三十萬千文。

同治四年(1865)正月，曾國藩致函馬新貽(其時馬氏

¹⁸⁰ 光緒安徽通志卷七十七頁一。

¹⁸¹ 同上。卷六十九，頁十五；又卷七十六頁十八。

¹⁸² 續碑傳集卷二十七頁六。

¹⁸³ 光緒安徽通志卷六十九頁十六。

已由皖藩升任浙撫），詢問浙江減漕章程已辦定者幾府？其立法較安徽新章異同如何¹⁸⁴？可見安徽減漕新章的議定，是在浙江之前。可惜關於安徽方面的史料不多，不能作詳細的敘述。

5. 浙江

浙江減賦的發動，雖在江蘇之後；但是他的奏定，卻在江蘇之前，所以我現在先述浙江的減賦經過。

同治二年（1863）四月二十日潘祖蔭奏請減賦，僅限於江蘇。至四月二十三日，丁壽昌奏請減賦，始兼及浙江。丁氏的奏摺中，先申述減賦的理由：（一）為收拾已叛的民心起見，實有減賦的必要；（二）並且從前時常蠲免及拖欠，徒有重賦之名，並無收稅之實；故減賦有益於民生，無損於國課。然後提出他的建議，將蘇松常鎮太杭嘉湖七府一州之地，按照各州縣應徵漕糧白糧舊額，永減三分之一。令該省督撫統兵大員，多刻謄黃，徧加曉諭，以便收宣傳的效果¹⁸⁵。六月初三日上諭，著曾李酌減蘇松等屬漕額，著左宗棠酌減杭嘉湖三屬漕額¹⁸⁶。十二月，左氏覆奏，謂杭嘉湖三府都未克復，故未能查辦。又云：浙東各屬地丁南米，浮收弊端也未能免，應該同樣加以核減；因將已減定的溫州一府定章奏聞。奏上即遭批准¹⁸⁷。於是裁減浮收一舉，便先進行了。

同治二年（1863）十二月的奏摺中，左宗棠已奏明溫州一府減定浮收的數目。次年又奏定覈減紹興府及寧波府的錢糧浮收¹⁸⁸。左宗棠赴閩剿匪後，蔣益豐馬新貽繼之，於同治

¹⁸⁴ 曾文公正書札卷二十四，頁二十八。

¹⁸⁵ 浙江減賦全案卷二頁一至三；又江蘇減賦全案卷二頁四至七。

¹⁸⁶ 浙江減賦全案卷二頁九；江蘇減賦全案卷一頁三；同治朝東華續錄卷二十三頁四十八。

¹⁸⁷ 左文襄公奏稿初編卷十二頁四至六；又同治朝東華續錄卷二十九頁三十七。

¹⁸⁸ 左文襄公奏稿初編卷十四頁十一；又卷十五頁四；同治朝東華續錄卷三十三頁二十九，又卷三十六頁三十。

四年中，先後奏准覈減嘉、杭、湖、金、衢、嚴、處，七屬浮收。（嘉杭湖三屬，僅奏及浮收錢）¹⁸⁹。是年九月馬新貽又奏裁杭嘉湖三府漕南浮收米四十八萬六千九百另六石，其中以裁革海運津貼一項，所省最多，計裁減津貼米三十餘萬石，而其他浮收米則僅裁減十八萬餘石¹⁹⁰。浙江十一府中，只有臺州一府，尙未辦妥，據馬氏云：「臺州府屬各縣，地本瘠苦，糧額亦少，有無浮收應行核減之處，現在嚴催詳辦。」¹⁹¹後來便不再見提及；但是糧額本少，即有所減，亦必爲數無幾。現在將上面各奏摺中所述的浙江十府覈減浮收錢糧數目，列表於下：

府 別	共減去浮收錢數（單位千文）	共減去浮收米數（單位石）
溫 州	40,500	300
紹 興	221,420	361
寧 波	104,870	867
嘉 興	255,638	285,387
杭 州	69,215	64,653
湖 州	205,501	136,866
金 華	156,161	521
衢 州	103,929	65
嚴 州	61,986	—
處 州	6,833	125
總 計	1,826,053	489,045

附註：此外尚有處州府屬減去浮收銀洋八千二百五十四元，未曾列入表中。

當時減定浮收的章程，據各奏摺中所述，凡分三點：（一）正額照常徵解（惟杭嘉湖漕米徵額，依諭旨酌減）；（二）一切

¹⁸⁹ 皇朝續文獻通考卷九十六頁十三至十四；馬端敏奏稿卷一頁三至六；又頁四十至四十一；同治朝東華續錄卷四十三頁四十八；又卷四十七頁五十九，又頁六十一。

¹⁹⁰ 浙西減漕紀略頁十三至十四；又浙江減賦全案卷十頁二十四至二十六。

¹⁹¹ 馬端敏公奏稿，卷一頁四十至四十一，同治四年閏五月初六日奏摺。

陋規，概行禁革；又痛裁浮收，僅酌留平餘爲辦公費；(三)嚴禁大小戶的分別。這些規程與裁減浮收相輔而行，所以能獲得良好的結果。

浙江除了裁減浮收之外，又減定杭嘉湖漕糧正額。同治三年(1864)八月，湖州克復，浙江全省一律肅清。左宗棠遂於省城設立清賦總局。十月間，清賦局報告會議減賦大概情形詳請具奏¹⁹²。左宗棠便根據這詳文覆奏核減杭嘉湖漕糧大概情形。奏摺中先陳述歷來徵收漕糧積弊之深，然後提出辦法四項即減正額，減浮收，籌運費，裁陋規。減正額的辦法是(一)依原來科則分田畝爲上中下三等賦則，按科則的重輕分別核減；(二)至於核減的總數，擬於原來額徵總數中，減去三分之一¹⁹³。戶部覆奏謂統減三分之一，未免過多，應改爲三十分中減去八分。同治四年(1865)四月清廷諭知杭江督撫，令照部議辦理¹⁹⁴。其時左宗棠已統兵赴閩，浙事由馬新貽主持。閏五月中，馬氏會同左宗棠陳奏酌定浙漕應徵分數。奏摺中擬定(一)浙江額徵漕白改漕正耗行月等米一百萬四百石零，照部議三十分之八爲率，共應減米二十六萬餘石；(二)各科則分成量減，原額重者減數多，額輕者減數少，以求均平；故於上中下三則之中，再分五等，如上則之一斗六升至一斗九升，酌減十分之三；上則之一斗一升至一斗五升，酌減十分中之二分五；中則之九升至一斗，酌減十分之二；中則之六升至八升，酌減十分中之一分五；六升以下之下則，

¹⁹² 浙江減賦全案卷二頁十六至二十一。

¹⁹³ 浙江減賦全案卷二頁二十二至二十七；又左文襄公奏稿初編卷十八頁四至五。

¹⁹⁴ 浙江減賦全案卷二頁二十八至三十二；又同治朝東華續錄卷四十五頁二十六。

¹⁹⁵ 浙江減賦全案卷二頁三十二至三十九；又馬端敏公奏稿卷一頁三十四至三十七。

統減十分之一¹⁹⁵。同治四年五月十一日上諭批准令浙省督撫卽「刊刻騰黃，編行曉諭」¹⁹⁶。浙江減賦的事情，遂告一段落。現在將杭嘉湖三屬各縣減徵漕額數及其對於原額的百分率，做成「浙江裁減漕額表」，以供參考。所減的米數，合

浙江裁減漕額表

地 名	原 徵 本 色 米 數	減 徵 米 數	減 徵 百 分 率
仁 和	石 53,038·0747	石 9,470·9534	17·856
錢 塘	22,400·2531	2,894·5192	12·921
海 寧	53,387·4273	9,247·4978	17·321
富 陽	6,946·7126	677·9870	9·731
餘 杭	11,653·9584	1,281·8165	10·998
臨 安	6,796·8794	1,031·1315	15·170
新 城	4,169·8263	577·5315	13·850
於 潛	3,029·9448	327·3976	10·821
昌 化	2,142·9125	226·1535	10·553
杭州府合計	163,565·9896	25,735·4880	15·800
嘉 興	101,344·0280	28,351·4885	27·970
秀 水	85,922·3860	28,593·2472	33·277
嘉 善	97,701·4404	34,405·8576	35·215
海 鮮	54,657·9749	12,187·7828	22·298
平 湖	56,923·1700	16,542·9974	29·061
石 門	51,742·7807	14,941·1466	28·875
桐 鄉	43,984·3210	10,393·7809	23·630
嘉興府合計	492,276·1010	145,416·3010	29·500
安 吉	8,541·7154	845·3811	9·897
歸 安	98,118·3738	31,369·3850	31·970
烏 程	114,515·8809	38,960·6064	34·022
長 興	54,945·2664	7,803·2171	14·201
德 清	56,132·4914	15,042·9835	26·799
武 康	12,313·0120	1,592·2699	12·931
湖州府合計	344,576·7399	95,613·8430	27·700
三 府 合 計	石 1,000,418·8305	石 266,765·6320	26·666

附註：此表數字，係根據浙江減賦全案卷七至卷九，各屬除減實徵冊。

¹⁹⁶ 浙江減賦全案卷二頁三十九；又同治朝東華續錄卷四十七頁五十九。

原額百分之二十六即十分之八，計減米二十六萬餘石。前面已述及浙江全省所減的浮收米達四十九萬石，減浮收錢達一百八十二萬餘串。可見就數量而言，浙江所減漕糧正額，遠不及裁減浮收之鉅；換句話說，裁減浮收纔是這一次減賦運動的主要部分。

6. 江蘇

江蘇的減賦，注重裁減漕糧浮額。由於廷臣，疆吏和地紳三方面的努力，這運動纔得告成。廷臣方面，同治二年（1863）四月，潘祖蔭，丁壽昌二人，先後交章請減江浙漕賦。丁氏的奏摺，已述於上節中，茲不復贅。潘氏的奏請，是限於江蘇省蘇松等五屬的浮賦。奏摺中先述減賦的必要：（一）人民方面，舊賦本屬過重，近經兵燹，更非減賦不足以紓民困；（二）政府方面，減賦以示恩，不但可以弭變；且賦輕易輸，可裕國課。最後提出辦法，請旨飭江省督撫妥議章程，務使糧無溢額，趕奏定，一面刊刻謄黃，宣布中外¹⁹⁷。疆吏方面，也不約而同的奏請減賦；並且有地紳在背後極力慫恿。先是同治二年（1863）正月，署松江府方傳書稟告督撫，謂蘇松太賦重為天下冠，方今兵燹餘生，懇請督撫奏請朝廷減賦¹⁹⁸。當時督撫頗加嘉許，謂俟軍事粗定，再行會疏具奏，並令委議覆詳¹⁹⁹。二月初一日，糧道郭嵩燾借潘曾璋往訪紳士吳雲；吳氏便勸告郭氏裁減江南浮糧重賦。越日，吳雲又作一書致潘曾璋，詳述勒折浮收的病民，蘇松重賦的由來，及今日亂後實行減賦的便利²⁰⁰。恰巧當時蘇紳馮桂芬正在李鴻章的幕府中。馮氏是研究田賦的專家，自云：

¹⁹⁷ 江蘇減賦全案卷二頁一至三。

¹⁹⁸ 同上，卷五，頁二十四至二十六。

¹⁹⁹ 同上，卷三頁一至二，又卷五頁二十六；又曾文正批牘卷五頁九。

²⁰⁰ 兩粵軒尺牘卷五頁十一至十六。

「三十年來官中一事一言涉及漕賦者，必求其詳手錄之。」李鴻章間接的看到吳雲的信，便加採納，將這事付託馮郭二人去辦。馮氏代郭嵩燾草一詳文，呈請督撫具奏請求減賦；又繼為李鴻章起草疏稿。但這奏疏遲遲未發；經吳雲極力催促，謂事不可緩；乃以五月十一日上奏²⁰¹。奏未上以前，曾李二人曾書函往返商榷，其初都主張俟蘇城克復後再行騰章乞恩，但後來也都說事不可緩，當由於受了吳雲勸說的影響²⁰²。這奏摺與郭嵩燾的詳文，都是馮桂芬起草的，所以內容大致相同²⁰³。奏摺中先述蘇松太浮糧的過重及其起源；繼述自明以來徵賦的實況，大部逋欠準折，有名無實，現今兵燹之後，更無力完賦；再申述減賦的利益，既可充裕國課，又可收拾民心；又舉清初裁減賦的實例；最後提出辦法，要求朝廷允許減定蘇松太三屬糧額，折衷定數，期與舊額本輕的常鎮二屬，通融核計，仍得每年起運九十萬石至百萬石之間，著為定額²⁰⁴。按常鎮二屬歲運五十餘萬石，故減定後的蘇松太新額，將僅餘五十萬左右。

曾李會銜的奏摺抵京後，當天便有上諭，令二人督飭司道設局，分別查明各州縣情形，折衷議減²⁰⁵。清廷又將曾李原摺，交戶部議。戶部將這摺與四月間潘丁二摺，合併核議，於六月初覆奏對於曾李原擬的辦法，加以修正：（一）蘇松太可以量減三分之一，不必如曾李所奏，由原額百二十一萬石減為五十萬左右，驟減去十分之六；（二）常鎮二府漕額雖稍

²⁰¹ 兩巽軒尺牘卷五頁十六至十七；又顯志堂稿卷四頁六頁八。發摺日期，顯志堂稿誤作為十二日。

²⁰² 李文忠公明傑函稿卷三頁二十七；又頁三十；又頁三十三；曾文正公書札卷三十一頁四十二；又頁四十五（覆郭書）；又卷二十二頁六。

²⁰³ 郭氏詳文，見江蘇減賦全案卷四頁一至六。

²⁰⁴ 江蘇減賦全案卷二頁十三至二十；李文忠公奏稿卷三頁五十六至六十三，顯志堂卷八頁二至十。

²⁰⁵ 同治朝東華續錄卷二十二，頁四十三至四十四；江蘇減賦全案卷一頁一至二。

輕，亦應量加體恤，不必如原議絕不減少²⁰⁶。奏上後，清廷即降諭令曾李依照戶部所奏辦理；並令將各州縣減額結果，分晰開列奏聞，以便覆核批准²⁰⁷。

曾李接到上諭後，便轉飭江蘇藩臺劉郇膏設立減賦局，辦理此事。時郭嵩燾已調粵，江蘇減賦的事情，完全由劉郇膏主持。不幸，劉氏對於減賦的意見，與馮桂芬不同；二人都堅執己議，斷斷爭執²⁰⁸。又加以軍事尚未結果，不能以全力進行此事，所以遷延二年餘，至同治四年始行奏定。

劉馮爭執的時候，李鴻章也曾參加意見，但後來便將此事完全交與曾氏定奪²⁰⁹。曾國藩與李劉馮等往返函商，最後折衷劉馮二人的意見，各有取捨，並加進自己的見解：(一)常鎮二府，不可不減漕米；反對劉氏的提議請朝廷收回成命。(二)蘇松太減漕應墨守部議三分減一之率，反對馮氏的請求再減。(三)馮氏曾主張合併百餘科則為九則；曾氏雖未曾明白表示意見，但觀後來的奏摺，知道也採用劉氏的意見，仍舊不減。(四)漕米核減的辦法，與劉馮的意見都不同；馮劉都主張遞減，僅細節上不同；曾氏初主輕則與重則依率同減，反對分別待遇；但後來讓步，允許蘇松太各科則分別遞減，惟常鎮二府仍普減十分之一。(五)馮劉二人都主乘機奏請并減地丁及漕項（錢糧）；曾氏初頗反對；但後來也加允許，惟主張五郡普減十分之二，與劉氏的提議普減十分之一，及馮氏的

²⁰⁶ 江蘇減賦全案，卷二頁八至十二。

²⁰⁷ 同上卷一頁三至四；同治朝東續錄卷二十三頁四十八至四十九。

²⁰⁸ 二人的意見，分見於顧志堂稿卷五頁七至十九；頁四十八至四十九；江蘇減賦全案卷五頁一至十八，卷四頁七至十一，劉氏稟文。又顧志堂稿卷四頁九。記述此次爭執頗詳。

²⁰⁹ 李文忠朋僚函稿卷四頁二十六；卷五頁一；頁八；頁十一至十二；頁五十五；卷六頁四；頁四至五；頁九至十。

提議蘇松太六折，常鎮九折，都不相同²¹⁰。

曾氏既將大概辦法決定後，便使劉郇膏擬具疏稿。曾李再經一度諮商疏稿文字後，便於同治四年（1895）五月會銜上奏²¹¹。這奏摺先述接諭准減漕額後設局籌商的經過，次申述要求併減錢糧的理由，謂錢糧的情形與漕糧相同，自應援例一體請卹，故請求將五府額徵錢糧銀兩，普減十分之二。最後又將糧裁減辦法奏明，謂（一）蘇松太三屬按則分別遞減毋庸併減五升以下的輕則，總數則依部議三分減一的數目；（二）常鎮二屬，一律普減，各照部議十分減一²¹²。清廷交戶部覈議。後來戶部覆奏，對於漕額裁減辦法，准其所請；對於要求併減錢糧一節，駁斥不許，謂最好仿浙江辦法，對於錢糧，不減定額而裁浮收²¹³。六月二十五日上諭，着曾李依照戶部所議辦理²¹⁴。蘇紳馮桂芬，潘曾瑋等主張上疏再請，但是劉郇膏李鴻章以為再請無益²¹⁵。減賦之案遂定，專減漕糧而不減錢糧（指地丁及漕項，略稱地漕）。

同治四年（1865）九月，李鴻章劉郇膏奏擬蘇松等屬減漕章程，並將派減米數清單與章程一併呈上²¹⁶。十月，劉氏更將減賦案內原額及派減科則表冊呈上²¹⁷。十一月初五日上

²¹⁰ 曾文正公書札卷二十三頁三十至三十一，卷二十四頁十九，頁二十，頁二十九至三十批牘卷五頁十八，頁十四至十五；江蘇減賦全案卷三頁十一至十六，卷四頁九，頁十一至十二；卷五頁十八。

²¹¹ 李文忠公朋僚函稿卷六頁二十，頁二十二；曾文正公書札卷二十四，頁三十三頁三十四；江蘇減賦全案卷三頁十七，卷五頁二十一至二十三。

²¹² 江蘇減賦全案卷二頁二十四至二十八；李文忠公奏稿卷八頁六十至六十四。

²¹³ 江蘇減賦全案卷二頁二十九至三十二。

²¹⁴ 江蘇減賦全案卷一頁五頁六；同治朝東華續錄卷四十八頁八。

²¹⁵ 顯志稿卷四頁九至十；李文忠公朋僚函稿卷六頁三十六，致曾劉二書。

²¹⁶ 卷摺見江蘇減賦全案卷二頁三十三至三十五；章程見同書同卷頁三十五至四十三。

²¹⁷ 奏摺見江蘇減賦全案卷二頁四十七至四十八；表冊見同書卷六頁至八。

諭准照該省督所請辦理，並着其即行，刊刻騰黃，徧加曉諭²¹⁸。江蘇減漕的事情，便告了一段落。

李劉所奏的章程，重要的有下列三項(一)常鎮二屬，科則較輕，不分輕重，一律普減十分之一；(二)蘇松太三屬，分別輕重，依下列「新舊科則表」，按則遞減，由舊則減為較輕的新則；(三)蘇松太三屬有沿海瘠區，地既瘠薄，且不種稻，應酌加減數，以示公允，但與按則遞減者通牽合算，減數仍不超過原額三分之一。

蘇松太三屬新舊科則表 (以升為單位)

原來各科則	減徵後新科則	原來各科則	減徵後新科則
20以上	統減為11	7.73—6.66	7—6(遞減)
19.65—16.26	11—10(遞減)	6.60—5.15	6—5(遞減)
15.72—10.47	10—9(遞減)	5.13—5.03	5—4.99(遞減)
10.40—9.28	9—8(遞減)	5以下(4.97以下)	不減
9.21—7.80	8—7(遞減)		

附註：此表係根據江蘇減賦全案卷二頁三十五至三十七又卷六江蘇田糧新舊科表。

依據上面所說章程中三條原則，以觀江蘇減漕的結果，實如下表所列：

常	鎮	原額	570,715.6341
		減去米數	57,071.5635
二	屬	適合原額十分之一	
		原額	1,458,459.0917
蘇	松	減去按則遞減米	470,784.5567

²¹⁸ 江蘇減賦全案卷一頁八至九；又同治朝東華續錄卷五十三頁一。

太 三 屬		又賦去沿海各州優減米	15,270·4170
		計共減去米數	486,045·9737
		適合原額三分之一	
五 合	屬 計	原額 共減米數	石 2,029,174·7258

附註：此表係根據江蘇減賦全案卷二頁四十七，及卷七頁一至三。

現在更就五屬的州別，更作一表，以明當時江蘇減賦的情形；茲列表於下：

府 別	原額 (石為單位)	派減米數(石為單位)	減徵後仍徵米數
蘇 州	石 877,564·9538	石 326,632·3420	石 550,932·6118
松 江	427,461·3970	116,544·6382	310,916·7578
太 倉	153,432·7439	42,877·9955	110,554·7484
常 州	355,980·5627	35,598·0563	320,382·5064
鎮 江	214,735·0714	21,473·5071	193,261·5643
合 計	2,029,174·7258	543,126·5371	1,486,048·1887

附註：此表係根據江蘇減賦全案卷七頁一頁四，頁四十八，頁六十五，頁七十五，頁七十八。其原額係道光十年賦額。

常鎮二府各縣，皆係按賦額普減十分之一，不必再為之作圖表。蘇松太三屬是按則分別遞減，各縣田畝科則不同，故各縣所減的分數也各不相同；現在做成「江蘇裁減漕額表」以供參考。

江蘇裁減漕額表

地 名	原徵本色漕米數	減 徵 米 數	減徵百分率
長 洲	石 115,087·9622	石 49,593·1429	43·0
元 和	109,832·5765	47,891·3498	43·6
吳 縣	73,843·3103	27,647·9845	37·4
吳 江	103,820·0338	41,594·0156	40·0
震 澤	113,537·6708	46,015·3510	40·5
常 熟	108,690·2420	31,216·8332	28·7
昭 文	87,537·1114	23,557·5729	26·5
崑 山	80,528·2488	28,358·9571	35·2
新 陽	81,334·2118	29,898·1273	36·7
太 湖	3,353·5862	859·0077	25·6
蘇州府合計	877,564·9538	326,632·3420	37·2
華 亭	55,070·8230	16,009·9236	29·0
奉 賢	48,358·3441	12,860·7920	26·5
婁 縣	59,408·3733	21,882·8687	36·8
金 山	48,953·6639	16,513·5165	33·7
上 海	64,445·8126	14,878·5607	23·1
南 匯	64,759·3209	11,186·4161	17·2
青 浦	76,246·7828	21,524·3127	28·2
川 沙	10,218·2734	1,688·2459	16·5
松江府合計	427,461·3940	116,544·6362	27·3
太 倉	61,001·2916	21,513·2002	35·2
鎮 洋	60,291·5341	21,364·7953	35·4
嘉 定	17,224·9137	(完係五升以下科則，照常不減)	0
寶 山	14,915·0045	(同上)	0
太倉州合計	153,432·7439	42,877·9955	27·9
三 屬 合計	石 1,458,459·0917	石 486,054·9737	33·3

附註：此表數字，係根據江蘇減賦全案卷七頁二至七十三。減徵米數一項包括境內按則遞減米數及沿海冊區優賦米數。

上面所說的是專指裁減正額而言；至於裁減賦收，卻另外分別進行。同治二年五月曾李奏請蘇松太裁減時，便附片

陳奏江蘇漕糧積弊，謂：「蘇松漕糧核減後，必以革除大小戶名目為清釐浮收之原，以裁減陋規為禁止浮收之委。」²¹⁹同治四年奏請兼減地漕正額時，又於附片中陳奏裁革錢漕積弊，謂同治二年秋間，即曾加以清釐，錢漕都酌定折價，大小戶一律徵收，又將浮收大加刪減，但以「此時米貴銀賤，不能遽為定衡，應俟減賦定案，再行妥議章程，另行奏明立案」²²⁰。六月上諭，駁斥裁減地漕正額，但令核實刪減浮收，並令迅速籌辦妥議具奏²²¹。李鴻章於九月中奏擬減漕章程時遂同時，另摺奏陳裁減收約數，謂裁減地漕銀兩浮收，除酌留辦公經費外，其餘悉行裁減，如照額全完之年，所減銀數總在六七十萬上下²²²。同日，又奏陳裁除海運津貼，謂此項津貼，即從前的浮收，業經籌款補抵銀七十餘萬兩，與前項所裁革陋規銀數合計，則「蘇省一年之間，如辦理全漕之時，取於民者，共可免一百四五十萬兩之數」²²³。同治五年六月李鴻章奏陳江蘇減漕未盡事宜，謂折色收漕，每石折價年內以四千五百文為率，年外以五千文為率，計蘇松太常四屬共減浮收漕折錢（包括海運津貼及陋規）一百六十七萬餘串，（詳見下表（甲）項）徵收地漕各款，條銀每兩折價以二千文為率，計減去浮收條銀折價錢四十萬餘串。（按李氏所奏二項合計共達二百萬串以上，以當時市價每銀一兩合錢千三百文左右計之，則合銀一百五十餘萬兩，與同治四年所奏者相差不遠）。又謂本色收漕，每石餘耗三斗為率，不准多取，計蘇松太常四屬，共減去浮收米三十七萬餘石，（

²¹⁹ 江蘇減賦全案卷二頁二十二至二十三；又李文忠公奏稿卷三頁六十四至六十五。

²²⁰ 李文忠公奏稿卷八頁六十五至六十六。

²²¹ 江蘇減賦全案卷一頁五至六。

²²² 同上，卷二頁四十五。

²²³ 同上，卷二，頁六十至六十三。

詳見下表(乙)項)²²⁴。茲將李氏所入奏漕米項下所減浮收錢米，列表於下(鎮江一府，以當時尚未減定，故未列入)：

地 別	(甲)減去浮收錢(以串為單位)	(乙)減去浮收米(以石為單位)
蘇 州	753,500	192,800
松 江	505,700	108,800
常 州	215,200	73,000
鎮 江	201,600	—
合 計	1,676,000	374,600

附註：此表根據李文忠公奏稿卷十頁三十一至三十二。

除蘇松等五屬外，江甯府也曾實行減賦；因為他是與蘇松等處分開辦理的，所以我現在也將他提出來放在這裏另行敘述。清代江蘇的行政組織，江甯府及江北各屬是與蘇松等五屬分開的。關於田賦等事情，前者是由江甯布政使及江安糧儲道管理；後者是由江蘇布政使及蘇松糧儲道管理的。太平天國的亂事，江甯府屬所受的蹂躪最甚。同治三年(1864)收復金陵後，以兵燹後賦冊散失無考，故曾國藩奏仿皖章，權辦「抵徵」。同治十三年(1874)，始正式開徵丁漕。是年及次年，該省督撫數次入奏，請仿蘇屬的例，酌減賦額，都遭部臣詰駁，至多僅准暫減二年而已²²⁵。光緒三年，江督沈葆楨據布政使孫衣言之請，於六月二十八日入奏，請照同治二年恩免蘇松浮糧的舊例，將江甯府屬上元，江寧，句容，六合，江浦等五縣額徵漕糧等米，一律減免十分之三。就當時啓徵熟田而計，應徵原額漕糧等米九萬二千九百九十五石有奇，共請減三分米二萬七千八百九十八石有奇。將來繼墾

²²⁵ 續纂江甯府志卷二頁一至六。

²²⁴ 李文忠公奏稿卷十頁三十一至三十二。

熟田，亦照此科徵，不再加重²²⁵。七月十五日上諭批准²²⁷。至於高郵溧水二縣，以向完折色，故未受裁減三成的優待；但二縣向有虛糧，因為其地有田地數萬畝遭湖水坍沒，而賦額被加攤入全縣的田賦中。光緒四年（1878）三月，沈葆楨奏請豁免高郵虛糧，計豁銀九千二百餘兩，米二百四十餘石。光緒六年（1880）九月劉坤一奏請豁免溧水虛糧，計七萬餘畝，所豁免的賦額亦當在五六千兩左右²²⁸。

江蘇省江寧蘇州等六屬合計，所減賦糧正額，達五十七萬石以上，所減浮收米三十七萬餘石浮收錢二百萬餘串，實為長江各省之冠。這是由於太平天國亂前，江蘇最為富庶，賦稅最重；太平天國的亂事，又以江蘇所受的蹂躪為最甚；故減賦也最鉅。

丁 減賦的結果

長江流域各省的減賦經過，上面已經分別敘述過了。現在試將他們合併起來一看，看他們減賦總數是多少，換言之，即減輕了人民負擔多少。根據上面各節所述的數目，六省裁減漕額及浮收等項合計銀一百五十萬餘兩，錢六百四十萬餘串，米一百七十萬餘石。同治三四年時，江浙米價每石約值銀二兩五錢；每銀一兩約值錢一千三百餘文²²⁹。假使我們以這市價為估計的標準，將上面的總數化成以銀兩為單位，則共達一千另七十五萬餘兩。這估計是不準確的，因為各地的市價不同，即同一地方的市價，也依時漲落；這估計不過給我們以一個大概的印象，使我們知道他數量的鉅大而

²²⁶ 同上卷二頁六至八；又沈文肅公政書卷七頁十七頁二十。

²²⁷ 續纂江寧府志卷二頁八又光緒朝東華續錄卷十七頁八，惟東華續錄中誤以謂所減者限於本年漕糧。

²²⁸ 續纂江寧府志卷二頁八至十。

²²⁹ 李文忠公奏稿九卷八，及江蘇減賦全案卷二頁三十二。

已。這個數量已經够驚人了，但是我們要知道當時每兩銀的購買力，是抵得上今日的三倍²³⁰。我們更可以看得出這一舉意義的重大！人民驟然釋去重負，辛勤貯蓄，便逐漸恢復太平天國亂前的舊狀。同治一朝是被稱為「同治中興」的，這減賦運動所替人民省下來的汗血錢，便是這「中興」的經濟基礎之一。因為有了這減賦運動，於是農村的復興，更加迅速，然後纔有這「中興」的局面。不過，政府雖替人民省了這許多錢，國庫的收入，卻並不受大影響。所裁減的都是些官吏的中飽，僅江浙減額八十萬石，約合銀百餘萬兩而已。

這次減賦運動所注意的是裁減浮收，但是裁減浮收這件事，不是一紙命令便能生效的。這不僅要賴州縣官吏的束身自愛，並且要靠地方高級長官的嚴厲監視。減賦運動初次實施時，地方大員，如駱、胡、曾、左、李等，都是很能幹的政治家，並且大亂初平，州縣官吏也小心奉行減賦命令。但是即在當時，曾國藩即有「減額賦，則為百世不利之典；減浮收，則無十年不敝之法」數語²³¹。果然，那些官吏，不久便故態復萌了。加以太平戰役之後，捐官（實缺官）成為一大弊政，地方政治，尤為腐敗，減賦之惠便難實現了，（此點係胡適之先生指出）同治六年（1867）清廷以御史崔穆之請，特下諭禁止州縣浮收漕糧，謂浮收之弊，例禁雖嚴，而不肖官吏，仍敢視若具文，誅求無厭，殊堪痛恨²³²。同治九年及十二年（1873），胡家玉數次奏請裁革江西浮收²³³。光

²³⁰ 楊端六等編六十五年來中國國際貿易統計頁三第三表，中國批發物價指數表，謂以民國二年為一〇〇，則同治十三年為六五，而民國十七年則為一五二，即今日物價比同治間漲高約三倍。

²³¹ 曾文正公書札卷二十八頁四十六。

²³² 皇朝掌故彙編卷九頁四十六至四十七；又同治朝東華續錄卷六十四頁十四。

²³³ 光緒江西通志卷首之四，頁三十八至三十九；又卷八十五頁二十五；皇朝續文獻通考卷四頁二十四；同治朝東華續錄卷九十六頁十二。

緒四年（1878）御史歐陽雲又奏請革除江西徵收丁漕陋規，清廷令巡撫劉秉璋查覆，劉氏覆奏有云：「節壽兩項陋規，同治元年奏明革除之後，迄今或違。」²³⁴可見舊有的弊病仍復發生了。光緒十年（1884），御史屠仁守奏請除湖北徵收錢糧冗費，謂湖北錢糧積弊，自咸豐年間革除冗費，奏定章程，近年夙弊漸滋，任意浮收²³⁵。光緒十一年（1885）十二月，戶部條陳整頓錢糧，謂賦稅虧額，財既不在國，又不在民，大率為貪官墨吏所侵蝕，請飭各省督撫藩司，認真釐剔。詔從其請。但是這時已沒有咸豐年間主持減賦運動的那班人物，所以並未能認真實行。清史稿中說：「終清之世，諸弊卒未能盡革也。」²³⁶

不但州縣浮收的積弊；至同治末年後，復行發生；並且連輸納國庫的田賦正額，至光緒時以財政困難，也增加了不少。清史稿中說：

（光緒）二十年中日之戰，賠兵費二萬萬；二十六年拳匪肇禍，復賠各國兵費四萬五千萬。其後練新軍，興教育，創巡警，需款尤多，大都就地自籌。四川因解賠款而按糧津貼捐輸之外，又有賠款新捐。兩江，閩浙，湖北，河南，陝西，新疆，於丁漕例徵外，曰賠款捐，曰規復費捐，曰規復差徭，曰加收耗羨。名稱雖殊，實與加賦無大異也²³⁷。

自太平天國亂後，至是二三十年，休養生息，民力逐漸恢復；但是這時候州縣浮收與賦額附加，也都逐漸加重，人

²³⁴ 皇朝常故彙編內編至九頁四十九至五十三。

²³⁵ 同上卷九頁五十三至五十四；又光緒大清會典事例卷一百七十二，光緒十年上諭。

²³⁶ 皇朝經濟文編卷三十九頁至四；光緒朝東華續錄卷七十四頁六；清史稿，食貨志二頁十。

²³⁷ 清史稿，食貨志二頁十。

民負擔困難，漸覺不安。美人麻斯 (H. B. Morse) 解釋清室傾覆的原因，曾經說：

中國自庚子事變以後，中央政府為償付賠款，向地方政府提款頗多。地方官吏為彌補庫款及充塞私囊起見遂增重舊賦，添徵新稅。人民甚為不滿，怨恨政府，故盜賊橫行，叛亂時起。孫中山及康有為即利用這種憤懣的民情，加以煽動，以進行其革命及維新的事業²³⁸。

他的話並不是完無理由的。田賦是一種直接稅，所以他的增加，最易使人民感覺到切膚之痛。清室的傾覆，與減賦運動成績的消滅，並不是毫無關係，由此可以看得出來這減賦運動在晚清史中所佔地位的重要了。

餘 論

這一次減賦運動最可使我們注意的，是他們注重在裁減浮收，刪除中飽。所以雖替人民省了很多的錢，而國庫的損失很微。前人對於這廣被長江流域各省的減賦運動，罕加注意；即有述及者，也僅注意江浙的減漕而已。對於這運動在晚清史上的地位，更遭忽視。這實是不應該的。不過，這次減賦運動有一個缺點，便是不與減租同時進行。長江流域是盛行佃農制的，減賦而不減租，得益者僅限於自耕農及地主而已，與佃農無涉。最高的成績，不過如荀悅所說的「今漢人或百一而稅，可謂鮮矣；然豪強人占田踰侈，其賦大半；官收百一之稅，而入輸豪強大半之賦」。 (東漢會要) 這次減賦運動後，似乎僅江蘇實行過減租。馮桂芬在江蘇減賦記中說：「減賦既定，僉謂租以供賦，減賦自宜減租。是秋，議定每畝一石以內正數減為九七折，一石外零數五折，仍不

²³⁸ Morse: International Relations of Chinese Empire vol. III. p. 410.

得逾一石二斗，是爲減賦之終事云。」²³⁹其他各省，似乎都沒有實行過，這不能不說是一件憾事。

年來減輕田賦附加的呼聲很高。今日中國的形勢，實有點與咸同之交相似，既有外患，又有內亂。共產黨的組織，雖比原始暴動式的太平軍嚴密得許多，然而二者的口號，都是土地公有。這時候行政院提出廢除苛捐雜稅的口號，自無足怪。國民政府對於匪區田賦的處理原則，分爲全免減徵，緩徵三種²⁴⁰。這與咸同年間蠲免匪區錢糧的辦法相同。至於行政院電令江西省政府轉飭各縣調查各地苛捐雜稅名目數額，原電云：「必廢苛捐雜稅而後可言復興農村，先須詳確調查，而後可言廢除。」²⁴¹便近於咸同間的減賦運動了。最近的趨勢，是將減輕田賦的計劃，推及各省，不限於赤氛最盛的江西；並且他的辦法，也是注重剔除中飽，並非減少政府收入。最近於五月二十一日在南京開幕的全國財政會議，據云：「此會注重於減輕田賦附加，廢除苛捐雜稅；至於如何抵補，財部以爲應整理良稅，平均負擔，剔除中飽，調節支出，限制濫花；因真正苛捐雜稅，政府收入實在不多，雖裁去一大堆，減少收入之數甚微，故抵補無須愁慮。」²⁴²近年來許多田賦附加，巧立名目，什麼自治畝捐，公安捐，公益捐……名目非不冠冕堂皇，但實際上在有些地方一點事情也沒有辦，都歸官吏與地紳乾沒了去，實與清代州縣錢糧浮收無異。可見現今國民政府所欲行的減賦政策，其動機與辦法都與咸同間的減賦運動無異。

不過咸同年間減賦運動所以能够實行，是由於胡曾左這

²³⁹ 顯志堂稿卷四頁十二。

²⁴⁰ 參與國聯東案調查委員會概要卷下，關於在中國之共產主義之說帖頁五十七。

²⁴¹ 天津益世報二十二年十一月四日。

²⁴² 天津大公報二十三年五月二十日。

一班大臣，肯下決心去做。後來的失敗，是由於繼起無人，人存政舉，人亡政息。現在國民政府是否已下極大決心去實行減賦，這是一個問題。縱使中央已下極大決心，而今日地方政府，大半佔據一方，不肯悉聽中央命令，能否實行，仍是一個問題。並且時間方面已經過了七十多年之久，環境已起了許多變化。咸同時代所未曾有過的困難，現今已產生了。田賦附加中有許多是近於浮收，可以核減，但是有許多卻是建設上所不能省的，須另外代為設法。地方行政經費的膨脹，是中國現代化過程中所不能免的。這些新增的地方支出，是否要攤派於田賦中。假若將田賦附加取消了，將設何法以抵補地方支出的不足？又國際資本主義的侵入，一面使洋米洋麥等加入中國糧食市場，以與中國農民出產品競爭，壓低農產品的價格，一面又輸入廉價的工業品，破壞農家附帶的中工業。再加以國內天災人禍的流行，因而釀成了農村經濟的破產。咸同時代因為國際資本主義尚未深入中國農村，所以只要國內安定，休養生息，便足以恢復元氣。但是今日的形勢已不同了。政府將以何法來抵制國際資本主義的侵入；以何法來增加農民的生產力，以便恢復農民的納賦能力？共產黨是一個國際的組織，其宣傳的力量，遠勝於當年的太平軍；在有些地方，這個信仰已深入人心。現在政府的減賦政策，是否能滿足那些農民的希求？政府將以何法宣傳自己的政策，以與共產黨政策對抗？這些都是由於新環境所喚起的新困難，殊值得我們慎重考慮。

此外，上面所提到的咸同時代減賦不減租的缺點，也有加以考慮的必要。自民國元年以來，二十餘年間，我國的佃農數量逐漸增加，由百分之二十八增至百分之三十二；自耕農反形減少，由百分之四十九，降為百分之四十五²⁴³。這是

²⁴³ 民國二十三年申報年鑑頁八三一至八三二。

由於農村破產，自耕農只好賣去土地，降為佃農。佃農數量既然增加，則救濟農民的政策，決不能不顧到佃農。減賦的利益，僅及於自耕農及地主。所以將來政府實行減賦時，應同時設法減輕佃農的田租。一九二七年北伐成功後，僅浙江曾行過二五減租；其他各省未見仿行；正可於減輕田賦時乘機一同舉行。

釐金制度之起源及其理論

羅玉東

本文原發表於中國近代經濟史研究集刊第一卷第一期，民國二十一年。

一 釐金制度之起源

緒 言

「釐金制度，乃我國近代財政上之一種特制，自創行以至於廢止，歷時凡七十有七年（自咸豐三年至民國十九年，即 1853-1930）。其補助我國以往之財政，自屬爲功不小，然其困商病民，阻碍工商業之發展，爲害亦殊不淺。」今此制雖廢，然其流毒仍未消滅，蓋今之統稅及雜捐，亦即變相之釐金，其與釐金相異之點，不過制度有繁簡之別而已。故就其存在言，釐金已成廢制，就其影響言，則其餘毒仍足以影響國計民生。今研究此制，雖屬整理近代財政歷史之工作，然於來日稅制之改革，亦未嘗無足資借鑑之處。茲篇所欲述者，乃釐金制度之起源，及維護此制之理論。茲於未述其起源經過之先，請述其產生之原因。

* 作者按：本文分兩部，前部中表格由三至七皆係雷君輯釋前在本所研究所製，惟經作者稍加增改，附此聲明並謝雷君。

釐金制度產生之原因

釐金制度產生之原因，可就兩方面追求之，一就清代稅制組織方面，一就清代財政狀況方面。由前一方面，可以知其產生之遠因，及其後來由臨時抽捐變為國家經常正稅之原因何在。由後一方面，可以知其必然產生於咸豐朝之原因。但此兩方面之關係極為密切，非綜合觀之，不足以窺全豹，故今當先述此兩方面之關係，然後再分論之。

清代財政之主要歲收，在咸豐以前，共有四項，即(一)地丁，(二)錢漕，(三)關稅，(四)鹽課是也¹。此外尚有雜賦，惟收數甚微，不甚重要。國家歲收總數，除開國初年外，常在四千萬兩上下，而地丁一項約佔全部收入三分之二²。故在咸豐以前，清廷每年歲費，可謂大部仰給於地丁。此為咸豐以前清代財政上之一特徵。另一特徵，即歲入有常，不能驟增。蓋四項主要收入中，不獨約佔全部歲入三分之二之田賦有定額，即其他三項稅收亦有定額³。前者以永不加賦之限制，歲入僅有短收之時（如遇災害，常蠲免或緩征田賦），絕無溢收之可能，即其餘三項稅收雖有徵收溢額之時，然為數亦不能大。歲入有常，不能驟增，此在承平無事之時，固可無慮，況以前各朝歲入，且常浮於出。⁴但一旦遇大事，如災害或軍事，須驟然增加歲出，則將如何應付。今姑置災害不論，單以軍事言，清朝自開國以至道光，其間無一朝不興軍事。換言之，即無一朝不驟增歲出。然以前各朝皆能措置裕如，不聞有加稅之舉。細考其應付之法，不外有二：一即平時貯積歲餘，一即臨時開捐輸款。今當分別言之。

¹ 同治六年十二月初十日戶部統籌財用源流摺見故宮博物院文獻館檔案。

² 王慶雲：石渠餘記，卷三。

³ 閱清文獻通考及戶部則例。

⁴ 閱表第一所列歷朝庫藏之數。

清初財政，異常貧乏，順治八、九年間歲入額賦僅一千四百八十餘萬兩，而歲出之數反常超於歲入⁵，終順治之世，歲入皆不敷出⁶。自康熙以後，各朝對於財政，皆有整頓方策⁷。故以後各朝，雖亦有用兵之時，但皆能於承平期間，從事積蓄，以備不虞。茲將道光以前，歷朝戶部庫存銀數列表如下，以觀節用積蓄補助財政之功效。

表一 道光以前歷朝戶部庫存銀數表

康熙四十六年(1707)	50,000,000餘兩 (1)
六十一年(1722)	8,000,000餘兩 (2)
雍正年間	60,000,000餘兩 (2)
乾隆初年	24,000,000兩餘 (2)
四十五年(1780)	70,000,000兩 (2)
五十四年(1789)	60,000,000餘兩 (1)
嘉慶十九年 (1814)	12,400,000兩 (3)
道光三十年 (1850)	8,000,000餘兩 (4)

(1)石渠餘記；卷三記會計。

(2)阿桂論增兵籌餉疏（乾隆四十六年），見賀長齡所輯皇朝經世文編，卷二十六。

(3)英和疏（嘉慶十九年）同上。

(4)孫鼎臣所撰壽塘芻論，見蒼莖全集。

就上表觀之，可以略知清代各朝財政蓄積之情形。可見以前各朝雖更迭用兵，而能不關稅源，即足以應付裕如者，

⁵ 張玉書：紀順治年間錢糧數目；賀長齡：皇朝經世文編正編，卷二十九。

⁶ 石渠餘記；卷三，記會計。

⁷ 參閱各帝聖訓中關於理財之政績。

實受庫藏豐富之賜。

庫藏而外，捐輸一事，亦為清代財政補苴之術，惟不如庫藏之重要耳。康熙，雍正，乾隆各朝之捐輸統計，雖不可得，但以其時開時輟之情形觀之，可知其時財政尚未至於十分仰賴此項收入。嘉慶以後，情形遂稍異。蓋因庫藏日見短絀，而歲出反屢見加增，加之中間無節用積蓄之機會，故欲彌補歲費之不足，遂不能不取給於捐輸。是以自嘉慶初年以至道光末年，捐輸則未停開。嘉慶一朝，因受河溢之患及教匪之亂，國家財政已受重創。降至道光，事變愈多，初年有回疆河決之患，中葉復遇鴉片之戰，秦豫二年之旱災以及東南六省之水患，前後共耗數千萬兩。此項耗費多在經常歲費之外，僅以庫藏彌補，已感窮蹙，況道光二十一年庫案發生，復失銀九百餘萬兩⁸。其時財政因窮已極，自不能不轉而仰賴捐輸之補助。僅以道光一朝之捐監而言，總計三十年間所收銀數凡三千三百八十餘萬兩⁹。而解部之數共一千八百一十三萬五千餘兩，約佔全數百分之五十二，軍需與賑卹之用款尚不在此數內¹⁰。且自道光四年始，各省捐銀收入湊足五萬兩，即行解部（以前為十萬兩）¹¹，可見其時財政需用此款之緊急。惟其時財政雖見迫蹙，但亦未至年年入不敷出之景況。且道光末年歲入常有盈餘¹²。故至最後一年部庫尚能積存八百餘萬兩。

以上所述，乃咸豐以前清代稅制與財政之相互關係，換言之，則清代稅制影響財政之狀況。今將進而分述此二者與

⁸ 石渠餘記：卷三。

⁹ 見湯象龍道光朝捐監之統計，社會科學雜誌，第三卷，第四期。

¹⁰ 同上四四〇——四四一頁。

¹¹ 同上四四一頁。

¹² 據石渠餘記：卷三所列道光二十五年至二十九年直省歲餘表觀之，其時每歲可餘一百數十萬至二百餘萬。

釐金制度產生之關係。茲先就財政方面而言。

洪楊之亂，起於道光三十年，其時部庫尚存銀八百餘萬兩，及兩廣用兵，履頒內帑，協濟軍需，不及三年，已用去五百餘萬兩¹³。軍興三年之後，糜餉已達二千九百六十三萬餘兩，至咸豐三年六月，部存正項待支銀僅二十二萬七千餘兩¹⁴。「部庫之款，原以各省爲來源」，乃軍興以後，失地數省而外，各省「地丁多不足額，稅課竟存虛名。」¹⁵此時財政之困難，可謂開前朝未有之先例。蓋以前各朝用兵，從未有失地如咸豐朝者，故縱使庫藏不豐，歲入未減，軍需猶有來源。今則庫藏既竭，而歲入又缺額甚巨，能賴以補助財政者，惟捐輸一項耳。故自咸豐元年十月起，清廷即履申諭令，推廣勸捐。計自咸豐二年二月起訖三年正月止，一年所得之數凡五百餘萬兩¹⁶。爲數雖有增加，然以之彌補其時財政之缺額，仍有少不濟用，緩不應急之勢。且勸捐係由富人自動捐資，年年皆於一定之區域內勸行之，爲時若久，則未有不失效者，故終必另籌善策。由此可見釐金制度之產生於咸豐朝，實非出於偶然也。

以上專就咸豐初年財政狀況方面言釐金產生之原因，今再就稅制之面觀之。

釐金制度之產生，在常人視之，多以爲清廷籌餉無源，始出此臨時之策。但若深究其實，則知清代稅政之不完備，實有以促成之也。所謂不完備者，即稅源有限，不能驟增收入以應急需。一國財政，歲出激增，固爲非常之事，不能預爲之備，本不足責，但歲入短絀，乃財政上常見之事，爲政

¹³ 據孫鼎臣存塘芻論所記咸豐二年七月部庫存銀僅三百餘萬兩。

¹⁴ 咸豐三年六月上諭咸豐朝東華錄卷二十四。

¹⁵ 同上。

¹⁶ 咸豐三年正月二十六日大學士管理戶部事祁雋藻等奏見故宮博物院文獻館檔案。

者固不能不預計及之。故一國稅制之組織，必有少數稅項可以臨時增其收入，以爲挹彼注此之用。清代歲入大部仰賴於永不能增稅額之田賦，已有時見短絀之虞，而其他三項主要稅收中，又僅有鹽課一項，可以臨時提高稅額，增加收入。然加增一次，爲數不多，固亦難收挹注之效。庫藏與捐輸雖爲財政補苴之術，然其效用在能積之有年，取之有間，若連年取用，又不積蓄，則庫罄源竭，其用亦失。咸豐以前，庫藏豐而開捐疏，加之歲出雖增，而歲入尚難同時驟減，故前朝財政雖遇困難，亦能安然度過。至咸豐初年則情形大異，補苴二策，一失其用，一將無效，欲濟方增未減之軍需，舍增稅源而外，實無救濟之術。至於何以獨籌出一徵商之制，則不能不一細考清代徵商稅制之組織。今述咸豐以前清代之徵商制度，以觀其與釐金制度產生之關係。

按我國商稅之意義，僅指關市之征而言¹⁷。爲義甚狹，而不包括鹽鐵茶課。其徵收之法，共分二項。一爲通過稅，如清代以前之鈔關關稅，及清代鈔關而外之釐金是也。一爲貿易稅，如漢之算緡錢，唐之除陌錢，宋之經制錢¹⁸，清之落地稅及坐釐是也。此二者合而爲商稅，然有時商稅之名僅用以代表貿易稅。

我國徵商之制，起源甚早。周禮有廛布歛布之徵（同治三年郭嵩燾詳陳釐捐源流利弊一疏謂以杜子春註意推之，廛布當如清之坐釐，歛布當如清之行釐）¹⁹。漢唐以後，各朝皆有征商之法²⁰。制度雖最繁簡之別，但無一朝不徵收之。清以異族統治中國，欲得人心，對於人民自不能不特施恩惠，故除永不加賦外，對於一切稅課，皆務從輕。清稅制中徵商

¹⁷ 馬氏文獻通考征權考。

¹⁸ 閱各史食貨志。

¹⁹ 原疏載皇朝經濟文編五十五卷。

²⁰ 參閱各史食貨志。

之稅多包括於雜賦內，雜賦中如牙帖稅，當稅，落地稅，及牲畜稅皆為徵收商人貿易之稅，惟關稅一項為通過稅。此外尚有所謂商稅者，此稅之性質，無明文規定。據皇朝文獻通考所載乾隆元年甘肅布政使徐柏奏疏所云，則商稅不獨包括落地稅，且為後來釐金分類之根據。該疏內云：「查甘肅稅課，除牙帖等項外，有商畜二稅，內有過稅，坐稅之分。過稅係販往別地貨物，應納過路之稅，坐稅係置買別地貨物，到店發賣，即為落地稅」²¹ 按此則落地稅應為商稅之一種，惟戶部則例則分別載之，不知原因何在。此稅之細目，無從考核。據會典事例及戶部則例所載，則凡斗稅，木稅，竹稅，海稅，河稅等皆屬之。徵此稅之省分共有十二，即直隸，江蘇，安徽，江西，福建，湖北，湖南，山西，陝西，甘肅，廣東，雲南是也。稅額則一省自數千兩（如甘肅）至數萬兩（如陝西）不等²²。合計清代全國（內地十八省及奉天吉林黑龍江三地）徵收商人貿易之稅，即落地稅，商稅及雜稅三者之總合，為數不過八十四萬三千六百餘兩²³。較之宋代天禧末年（宋真宗年號）徵商歲入至八百四萬貫²⁴，可謂少矣。況此數乃法定之稅額，事實上能否收足此數，尚是疑問。且前朝徵商，凡貨皆稅²⁵。甚至有課稅及於民間衣履穀菽雞魚蔬果柴炭瓷器之類者²⁶，而清代則不然（指咸豐以前而言）。貨物之徵收落地稅者為數並不甚繁²⁷。故在釐金未行之前，清代徵商，可謂甚輕。惟以其甚輕，故釐金制度乃得乘間而起，而維護釐金之徵商理論，乃得應時而生。此

²¹ 皇朝文獻通考征榷考二。

²² 見戶部則例關稅四（同治四年校刊本）。

²³ 據會典事例所載各省稅額合計而得此數。

²⁴ 宋史食貨志下八。

²⁵ 參閱各史食貨志。

²⁶ 宋史食貨志下八。

²⁷ 詳數無處可考，讀者可參閱戶部則例及會典事例。

即釐金制度之產生與咸豐以前徵商稅制之關係。咸豐以前之商稅，可謂極不重要。然商稅為國家一大稅源，任何國家皆不能舍此稅源而不用。且商稅收入，多富於伸縮性，國家歲費出入之平衡常賴其維持，故在稅政中，商稅之地位頗為重要。以往各朝（如宋明）在開國之初，多因在創業期內，不欲重斂民財，皆不注重此稅，然一至末世，歲用加增，收入如常，則未有不賴擴充商稅以維持財政者²⁸。清代情形亦正如是。釐金初行時，本以其為一臨時之策，清廷亦允事定即裁，乃事後遷延不裁，竟默認為國家正稅之一，蓋因其後歲費逐漸加增，歲入不加，不能舍商稅之源而不用也。

釐金以前未施行之商稅

清之徵商既輕，故在洪楊之亂未起以前，即有人請「徵收商稅（狹義的）以裕國課」，道光二十三年宗室禧恩²⁹奏請徵收商稅³⁰，其理由即「在昔有關市之徵，今關有徵而市無徵。富商大賈，坐擁豐資，操其奇贏，以攫厚利，竟無應輸之課，殊不足以昭平允。即如當舖一行，其資本自數千兩至數萬兩不等，就其利之最輕者論之，千金之本，可得百金之利，萬金之本，可得千金之利。而其歲輸帖稅，不過數金……以視夫服田力穡之農民，輸什一之賦者，勞逸迥殊，苦樂不均。他如銀號，錢局，糧棧，布莊，綢緞，百貨之商，亦復類是」。故彼提議對各城鎮之坐商，按什一之制，抽一種如現在之營業稅。其辦法係按資本之大小，及歲入餘利之多寡，而課之。即「有資本銀在一千兩以上者，計其餘利，歲可得銀百兩，……按什一之制，每年徵課銀十兩，資

²⁸ 參閱宋明史食貨志。

²⁹ 禧恩在道光六年曾為戶部尚書，十八年為崇文門監督兼署戶部尚書，此時為理藩院侍郎并署盛京將軍。

³⁰ 故宮博物院文獻館檔案，道光二十三年六月十三日硃批禧恩摺。

本多者以次遞加。其原有行帖³¹即不再徵帖稅，以免重複。若資本在一千兩以下者，所得餘利，僅足養贍自家，擬請免其徵課，其原有行帖，仍照舊徵收帖稅。」至於不用重本而取厚利，或用重本而獲微利之商，則僅按其歲得餘利之多寡而徵收之，不按本銀徵課。據禧恩估計，此稅收入歲可得銀數百萬兩。彼以為採行此稅，「既不失夫政體，亦未累及閭閻，而於修備大有裨益。」惟疏上未行其議。原道光時代，尚有一滿人名那斯洪阿者，曾奏請按舊例推廣舖稅於全國。其原疏為「條陳國用事宜」，載皇朝道咸同光奏議³²第二十六卷，惟其人其年，皆無記載可考，故不知其奏疏是否成於禧恩之先。彼所謂按舊例，即按京師舖稅之例，上戶徵銀五兩，中戶二兩五及新疆下戶亦不免稅之例，每戶酌徵銀一兩。以全國直隸州廳州縣合計約一千五百二十餘處，「從少計算，每州縣以八九百戶均勻，應有一百三十餘萬戶……以三分之一歸上則，應有四十三萬餘戶，照京城舖稅上則，每歲可徵銀二百十餘萬兩。以三分之一歸中則，亦應有四十三萬餘戶，照戶部京城舖稅二兩五錢之例，每歲可得銀一百七萬餘兩。」以三分之一歸下則，亦應有四十三萬餘戶，每戶酌徵銀一兩「可徵銀四十三萬餘兩，三者合計，歲可徵銀三百六十餘萬兩。」

至咸豐三年正月十一日，復有一人名布泰彥者³³，上書請行商稅（按此在釐金未行之前，釐金係於是年秋冬始創行³⁴，惟布泰彥請行此稅之目的異於禧恩。前者在裨益脩備，而後者則在實際補充軍餉。布之請暫征賈稅一摺，由戶

³¹ 按行帖即開舖應領之執照，如今之營業牌照。

³² 秀水王廷熙及王樹敏編輯皇朝道咸同光奏議。

³³ 時為伊犁參贊大臣，參閱清史列傳卷五十四。

³⁴ 咸豐四年上諭，東華錄咸豐朝卷三十三，第三十五葉，或會典事例，戶部門釐稅項。

部議覆「定每月上戶征銀二錢，中戶征銀一錢，先由京城試行。」³⁵ 戶部以爲「征數甚輕，不致有累買民」，而當時翰林院侍讀德瑛則以爲過輕，應行增加。其理由頗充足，且於稅之歸宿(incidence of tax)，別具深見。今引其言如下³⁶：

伏見部臣議覆布泰彥奏請暫征賈稅一摺……因思國家征額，自以愈輕，愈便於民。但此舉原以軍餉緊急，所籌他款，非緩不應急，卽少不濟用。惟賈稅既多且速，故特議及此。若所定稅價過輕，是徒博征歛虛名，仍於軍餉無濟。如定價太重，不免苦累買民。然加以細究，賈民並無實累。何也？賈稅銀原非出自己資，不過微增物價，卽以所入倍償所出，且有餘焉。在四民購買物料，亦不過多費數文，況用舍聽便，精粗多寡聽便。其省費在人，並無一定。在四民多費無幾，而於軍餉，則寬備有餘，是寓捐輸於無跡之中也。或曰稅重，則物價亦增，恐四民坐受其困，不知稅價雖輕，而市儈亦未必不增貨價。使在上居其虛名，在下獲其厚利，又何取焉。夫物價抬昂，則貨銷必滯，銷滯則利息不廣，買戶慮此，可無任意抬價之患矣。

德瑛知稅價不能盡轉嫁(shifting)於物價，卽使轉嫁一部，人民購物，尚有選擇取舍之餘地，不致人人受累，故彼提議增稅加價，以利軍餉。彼以爲上中下之買商每月征銀一二兩，斷不致於受病累。依彼估計，若按部議稅價徵收，則每月外省(僅有六省可靠)及京師所徵之賈稅，爲數不過五萬餘兩。「爲數甚少，斷難濟大軍之用。待萬不得已，勢必議增稅銀，或別創名目，另立征科。」與其使將來小民謂朝廷令出無常，「羣相觀望易致支延」，何若此時增加稅價，

³⁵ 見故宮博物院文獻館檔案咸豐三年二月十二日德瑛摺。

³⁶ 同上。

防之於先。

德瑛此摺無殊批「著戶部議奏」之字，大約即擱置未議，即戶部據布泰彥之摺已議定之賈稅，亦未實行。其議而未行之原因何在，以無檔案參考未敢斷言。今僅能據同治四年校刊之戶部則例及會典事例中無此稅名，而斷其未在京城施行。戶部則例及會典事例所載京城舖稅，初訂於康熙三年「（大宛二縣上等行店舖，照當稅例，每年徵銀五兩）」³⁷，再訂於康熙十五年（京城上等行舖每年徵稅銀五兩，中等行舖，每年徵銀二兩五錢）³⁸，乃京城一種特稅，外省無之³⁹。禧恩擬議之商稅異於此稅者，即後者為一種有定額之舖捐（或稅），而前者為一種無定額之營業稅⁴⁰。此舖稅亦與布泰彥所提議之賈稅不同，即前者係按年徵收，而後者，係按月徵收。然布泰彥之賈稅，是否係於舖稅之外再課賈商一次，則以原摺已失，無法考證（禧恩之商稅，則非重徵，可於以上引文中見之）。

釐金制度被採行之原因

按釐金未行之前，兩次請行商稅，皆未成功。釐金亦為額外徵商之稅，何以獨見採行。欲究其故，不能不於清廷之治術中求之，前文已言，清以異族統治中國，對於人民不能不特施恩惠。恩惠之最易入民心者，莫如薄賦歛。清聖祖對於此事，異常努力⁴¹。彼雖僅垂一承不加賦之祖法，然而薄

³⁷ 大清會典事例雜賦項。

³⁸ 同上。

³⁹ 僅直隸天津沿涿有舖稅，惟載於田賦例內，此外喀什噶爾，伊犁，喀喇沙爾，阿克蘇臺，烏里蘇臺，科布多處有此稅，見那斯洪阿條陳國用事宜疏，皇朝道咸同光奏議卷二十六，參閱皇朝文獻通考亦可。

⁴⁰ 按歲利與資本之多寡取稅，祇能有稅，平而無定額。

⁴¹ 康熙年間曾停官史新俸數年，然猶豁免省田賦一年或兩年以博寬大之名其為收服人心而發，可謂無疑義，參閱清文獻通考。

賦歛，不累民之爲政原則已寓其中，咸豐以前之清帝皆恪守祖法，不敢妄行加增民負。道光一朝，雖有鴉片賠款，然其時財政，尚能支持，故未聞有加稅之舉。及至咸豐三年，軍興已逾三載，餉源仍賴舊有之課稅及庫藏。不足之數則於勸捐中籌之，亦未敢言加稅課。前朝之不敢增加民負，一則不敢違祖訓，一則猶有補苴之術。洎自咸豐，失地數省，經常歲入已感不足，而開支則大增不已，庫藏既盡，而勸捐亦有告竭之勢，但仍不敢輕言加稅，是則非僅恪守祖宗之治術而已，蓋亦畏民之怨叛也。咸豐三年二月請增買稅之所以未行之原因，未始非慮增民怨。但何以翌年又准行釐金。是則以釐金輕而買稅重也。否則試問坐釐與買稅非皆出於買商乎，何以請之於三年，則不准行，請之於四年則准行。蓋釐金創行時所抽之數僅千分之十二，較之買稅，輕微多矣。且釐金創行於三年秋冬，奏報於四年春間。試辦已有成效，而未招民怨，則清廷亦何樂而不允其暫行，爲軍餉關一財源。此即三年二月請行商稅未見允准，而翌年厘金獨見採行之原因。

釐金制度創辦之經過

洪楊之亂，起於道光末年。至咸豐元年洪秀全即在永安建立太平天國。咸豐三年，更由湖南進取武漢，武漢既下，即沿江東下，奠都金陵，兼踞鎮江揚州各城。當時清廷爲防堵太平天國再進，由各省調集大軍，屯駐大江南北，爲數不下數十餘萬，需餉甚多，而當時財政之困窮情形，如上文所述，斷難作充分之接濟。時副都御史雷以誠以刑部侍郎在揚州幫軍務，兼保東路⁴²。因練勇需餉，奏請於裏下河設局勸捐。（三年夏間）其勸捐之方法，稍與以前不同，即預請戶部頒發部照千餘紙，隨捐隨給執照，不如以前之遲報給獎，

⁴² 參閱雷以誠傳清史列傳卷五十二。

故其成績較他處爲佳。但勸捐究非長久之計，故彼又籌出一法，卽抽釐是也。雷氏既思得此法，卽於咸豐三年九月委員至附近揚州城之仙女鎮，邵伯，宜陵等鎮，勸諭米行，捐釐助餉。至四年三月行奏報，並請於蘇省各府州縣，亦仿行勸辦。今引其疏中之大要如下⁴³：

竊自粵匪竄擾以來，地已十省，時及四年。各處添兵，卽各處需餉，兼之鹽引停運，關稅難征，地丁錢糧復間因兵荒而蠲免緩征，國家經費有常，入少出多，勢必日形支絀，而逆匪蔓延，又不知何時平定。有餉無兵，尚可招募，有兵無餉，更難支持。上年夏間奏請於裏下河設局勸捐，藉練壯勇，保守東路，一經開導，無不踴躍。蓋紳身家念重，痛癢相關，故臣之勸捐，視各處較易，然皆不逼曉以大義，動以忠愛之良，非別有抑勒把持之術也。特爲時已久，精力已竭，誠恐未能源源接濟。臣晝夜思維，求其無損於民，有益於餉，並可經久而便民者，則莫如商賈捐釐一法。因裏下河百產之區，米多價賤，曾飭委員於附近揚州城之仙女鎮，邵伯，宜陵，張網溝各鎮，略仿前總督林則徐一文愿之法，勸諭米行，捐釐助餉，每米一石捐錢五十文，計一升僅捐半文，於民生毫無關礙，而聚之則多。計自去歲九月至今，祇此數鎮，米行幾捐至二萬貫。既不擾民，又不累商，數月以來，商民相安，如同無事。…臣因此法商民兩便，且細水長流，源遠不竭，於軍需實有裨益，是以現在復將此法推之裏下河各州縣米行，並各大行鋪戶，一律照捐，大約每百分僅一分，甚有不及一分者，令各州縣會同委員斟酌妥議，稟明出示起捐，其小鋪戶及手藝人等概行蠲免，以示體恤，現在仙女廟各行

⁴³ 雷以誠請推廣釐捐助，餉疏皇朝道咸同光奏議卷三十七。

舖戶均已議妥，業於三月初十日起捐，並將該鎮所立章程刊刻刷印，發交各州縣照辦，俟裏下河各處勸齊起捐後，究竟可以收捐若干，自應隨時據實奏聞，如果為數較多，不惟臣營可資守禦，並可協濟琦善軍營之需。夫富家之捐輸有盡，而商賈之轉運無窮，當此帑項拮据之時，若不設法熟籌，必至束手坐困，而取之無方，又恐於民有礙，不得不於藉資民力之中，仍寓勤恤民隱之意，輕而易舉，絕無苦累。惟裏下河特彈丸一隅，乃河臣楊以增勸捐於斯，前漕臣李湘棻勸捐亦於斯，此去彼來，商民幾無所適從。其實臣捐釐之處，僅止揚通兩屬，其大江南北，各府州縣未經勸辦者尚多，如果江蘇督撫及河臣各就防堵地方分委廉明公正之員會同各該府州縣於城市鎮集之各大行舖戶，照所擬捐釐章程，一律勸辦，俟於江南北軍務告竣，再行停止。

在上疏中，可以見雷氏創辦釐金之經過情形。彼分釐金為二種，即活釐與板釐是也。活釐亦名行釐，板釐亦名坐釐，前者為通過稅，抽之於行商，後者為貿易稅，抽之於坐賈。彼所定之稅率，按原則而言，乃以從價為標準，即值百抽一，然在事實上，因抽釐之貨物多為日用品及必需品，此項物品之數量多而價值少變遷，為省手續起見，故有一大部分貨物，皆改為從量抽釐。僅一部價值稍高之物品仍按價抽釐。茲將雷以誠勸諭捐釐助餉章程列如表二⁴⁴。

表二所列稅率，各卡一律遵行。貨物徵收釐捐一次後，各卡即須放行無阻，不得重徵。

雷以誠奏報之摺既上，旋於三月癸亥得諭云⁴⁵：

⁴⁴ 該表根據咸豐四年十一月十九日硃批勝保奏報，見故宮博物院文獻館檔案。

⁴⁵ 咸豐朝奏華錄卷三十三。

表二 雷以誠勸諭捐釐助餉稅率表

(一)從量稅率表

貨物種類	課釐單位	課釐錢數
米，小麥，黃豆，黑豆，菜子	每擔	50
紅豆，碗豆，蠶豆	每擔	30
稻穀，高糧，蕎麥，大麥，雜糧	每擔	25
芝麻，鷄鴨	每擔	80
青定	每擔	20
木災	每擔	20
烟葉	每擔	80
本地豆餅	每擔	12
外來大豆餅（各照稟定捐數收納）		
烟筋	每擔	40
水烟	每大箱，每小箱	36, 240
桐油，香油	每簍，小簍	160, 80
豆油，菜子油	每簍，小簍	120, 60
上等燒酒	每罈	30
紹興酒	每罈	60
百花酒	每罈	40
高糧酒	每簍	120
錢鏰（二百斤以下免捐）	每千	5
壯豬（小豬酌減）	每口	50
棉花	碑亭大布包	200
棉花	桂花條布包	100
棉花	和利蒲包	50
估衣	大包	1600
估衣	中包	1200
估衣	小包	800
棗	每包	100
大布	每疋	6
小布	每疋	3

(二)從價稅率表

貨物種類	每千文課釐	貨物種類	每千文課釐
紙	12文	綢緞	12文
夏布	12文	毡皮貨	12文
木牌	12文	鍋碗	12文
藥材	12文	漆	12文
茶葉	12文	糖	12文
雜貨	12文	鹹	12文
蘇貨	12文	海味	12文
洋貨	12文	其他	12文
京貨	12文		

諭雷以誠試行捐釐助餉，業有成效，請推廣照辦以裕軍儲並開列章程呈覽一摺。粵逆竄擾以來，需餉浩繁，勢不能不借資民力，歷經各路統兵大臣及直省督撫奏請設局捐輸，均已允行。茲據雷以誠所奏捐釐章程，係於勸諭捐輸之中，設法變通，以冀衆擎易舉，據稱裏下河一帶辦有成效，其餘各州縣情形，想復不甚相遠，著怡良（兩江總督），許乃釗（江蘇巡撫），楊以增（江南河道總督兼漕運總督）各就南北地方情形，妥速商酌，若事屬可行，即督飭所屬勸諭紳董籌辦，其有應行變通之處，亦須一心斟酌，總期於事有濟，亦不致滋擾累，方為妥善。

自此諭出後，釐金制度即由一地方之籌餉方法漸變而為全國之籌餉方法。至是年四月，雷以誠又在泰州設公局抽釐助餉，其章程仍照仙女廟章程斟酌規定。因泰州團練局，已有對米，豆，麥，每擔抽釐十八文，稻穀十三文之辦法，故酌量減低稅率。茲將其章程列為表三於後。

表三 泰州城鄉各行捐舖釐助餉稅率表*

(咸豐四年五月初一起施行)

行 鋪 類 別	課 釐 單 位	課 釐 錢 數
米	每擔	20
稻，穀，豆，麥，雜糧	每擔	10
米（出江者）	每擔	30
稻穀各項（出江者）	每擔	15
銀錢業	每銀一兩	4
	每洋一元	3
油行（照油杠頭脚帳）	每擔	40
酒行（照收數）	每擔	24
槽房（照生意多寡）	每百文	1
各雜行	每百文	1

* 據咸豐四年十一月十九日硃批勝保奏，見文獻館檔案。

釐金創辦之時，雖曾設局總理其事，但經手稅收，卻非完全假手胥吏，行釐雖係由官卡派員抽收，但局務仍由紳董襄辦，至於坐釐，則多由捐局指派某商號或某數商號經收某一行之釐捐（如某茶莊經收各茶莊應繳之釐捐），按泰州公局之章程，即「各雜行抽釐錢文由各行生意較大之鋪逐日收齊登摺，按五日齊摺赴公所繳錢。」由所派董稽查所有收繳。此即下文勝保所云「商捐商辦」是也。

釐金創辦之經過，已如上述今進而述其普行時之概要。

釐金制度普行時之概要

釐金創辦後之成績深為當時一般將兵者所注意，因其時中央財政困難，無法充分接濟各軍，各軍將領多不得不自行

籌餉，釐金既爲餉源，故皆思仿行。雷氏僅行其制於蘇省各地，至咸豐四年十一月，以內閣大學士兼禮部尚書在蘇省幫辦軍務之勝保遂較雷以誠更進一層，奏請推行釐金於各省。勝保於是月十一日片奏中云⁴⁶：

伏查雷以誠前在泰州，仙女廟等處勸諭商販抽釐助餉，頗著成效，每月所入捐資，數萬串不等。閱開載章程，哀多益寡，既非苛歛，經權達變，無病於民。行於用兵之省可助軍餉，推行於各省，更多利益。況商捐商辦，弊混難生，利中取釐，無傷於本。雖江南水陸交衝，商賈輻輳，因鎮江爲賊所踞，道途梗阻，商船繞道而行，泰州，仙女廟等處遂成積聚之區，辦理較易，北路坐商多而行商少，然糧米油炭布棉雜貨等物，往來商販，隨處皆有，因地制宜，未嘗不可仿照而行。由少聚多，其利甚薄，…可否請旨飭下各路統兵大臣會同本省隣省各督撫同地方官及公正紳董仿照雷以誠及泰州公局勸諭章程悉心籌辦，官爲督勸，商爲經理，不經胥吏之手，自無侵漏之虞。用兵省分，就近隨收隨解，他省亦暫存藩庫，爲撥濟各路軍餉之需。

戶部議覆，對於勝保之樂觀態度，未能完全贊同。其奏疏云⁴⁷：

臣等公同商酌，將雷以誠抽釐條款，逐加核算，不過百分取一，當此軍需支絀之時，積少成多，未始非補助之一法。惟雷以誠在泰州，仙女廟二處勸諭抽釐，係屬水陸交衝，商賈輻輳，辦理或易爲力，北路坐商多而行商少，…如果辦理得宜，原屬衆擎易舉，設或措施不當，卽爲衆怨所歸。勝保但慮地方官畏難苟安，巧爲推卸

⁴⁶ 見皇朝經濟文編卷五十五所載戶部遵議勝保一摺。

⁴⁷ 同註46。

(勝保片奏中有此語) ，臣等轉慮藉端滋擾，從而取盈。應請旨飭下各省督撫專委道府大員督同州縣揀派公正紳董各就地方情形，妥爲籌度，…所有用兵省分酌量抽釐之處，應由各該督撫籌議具奏。…所收錢文，悉數解充兵餉，亦不准地方擅自挪移，啓影射侵漁之弊。

各省接戶部之咨後，湖南省仿行最先，於咸豐五年四月由湖南巡撫駱秉章奏辦，設立釐金總局於長沙，委鹽法道裕麟總理局務，本地紳士爲襄辦。抽釐則仿照欽差勝保奏准之仙女廟章程辦理。初辦僅抽貨釐，六年三月，始另設專局，續辦鹽茶釐金。咸豐五年八月，以兵部侍郎在江西督辦軍務之曾國藩亦奏請在江西試辦釐金，協濟軍餉。是年十一月湖北巡撫胡林翼亦仿行於湖北，十二月，四川總督黃宗漢創辦鹽釐於川省。咸豐六年，烏魯木齊（新疆）與奉天亦續辦，七年，吉林，安徽，福建，三省亦相繼仿行。七年六月勝保復上一疏，請飭各省普律抽釐。該疏云⁴⁸：

先是江楚督撫臣奏請捐釐，當初原屬試行，現經辦理有年，已著成效，各該省一切軍需，未必不賴以補苴。臣以一隅小試，不過補救於目前，一律舉行，始普美利於天下。查抽釐之法，計貨物之多寡，以定所抽數目，即本諸周禮市廛之微意，而與時增損之。豈可行於殘破之區，轉不可行於完善之地。…現在中外臣工籌議生財之法，亦已無微不至，即經臣思維再四，籌及他端，非迹涉更張，即緩不濟急。…捐輸一款，行之既久，羅掘將空，且被賊省分地丁關稅鹽課正項，業已虛懸，祇靠捐輸，以補不足，亦非救時長策。…抽釐出自各商，合衆人之資，散而出者有限，萃而入者無窮，事簡效速，無

⁴⁸ 見皇朝經濟文編卷五十五戶部建議勝保奏請各省普律抽釐疏。

過於此。…應請旨飭下直隸，山東，山西，四川，陝西，甘肅，雲貴，兩廣各督撫照楚省章程，概行辦理。

戶部議覆云：「伏查軍興以來，餉需浩繁，部撥之銀，已及六千五百餘萬，大都出自地丁錢糧鹽關稅課。」至於抽釐一款，祇緣各路軍營，餉需不繼，始由地方試辦，暫濟軍需，實亦目前補苴之一法。「應請旨飭下各該督撫體察情形，慎選廉明之吏，於水陸交衝地方，妥籌酌辦。」⁴⁹

此議一定，不數年，釐金制度即幾乎遍行於全國，茲將各省創辦釐金制度之年月及創辦人名，列如表四⁵⁰。

表四 各省釐金創辦年月及人名表

省 名	創 辦 年 月	創 辦 人 名
江蘇	咸豐三年九月(2)	刑部侍郎幫辦軍務 雷以誠(2)
湖南 (12)	咸豐五年四月(8)	湖 南 巡 撫 駱秉章(8)
江西	咸豐五年八月(1)	兵部侍郎督辦軍務 曾國藩(6)
湖北 (12)	咸豐五年十一月(3)	湖 北 巡 撫 胡林翼(3)
四川 (13)	咸豐五年十二月(10)	四 川 總 督 黃宗漢(6)
奉天	咸豐六年(1)	奉 天 將 軍 慶 祺(1)
烏魯木齊	咸豐六年(2)	烏魯木齊都統 樂 斌(17)
吉林	咸豐七年(9)	吉 林 將 軍 景 淳(9)
安徽	咸豐七年(5)	欽 差 大 臣 勝 保(5)
福建	咸豐七年(1)	閩浙總督福建巡撫 王 懿 德(1)
直隸	咸豐八年(1)	欽 差 大 臣 僧格林沁(1)
陝西	咸豐八年六月(1)	陝 西 巡 撫 曾望顏(1)
河南	咸豐八年三月初六(1)	河 南 差 撫 英 桂(1)

⁴⁹ 同註48。

⁵⁰ 該表係根據釐金報告檔案財政說明書及志書編輯而成。

甘肅 (14)	咸豐八年三月中旬(1)	陝 甘 總 督 樂 斌(1)
廣東	咸豐八年四月廿日(1)	廣 東 巡 撫 勞 崇 光(1)
廣西	咸豐八年十月(1)	兩 廣 總 督 勞 崇 光(1)
山東	咸豐八年十一月(3)	大 饑 寺 卿 專 辦 三 省 勦 捻 匪 事 袁 甲 三(3)
山西		山 西 巡 撫 英 桂(1)
貴州	咸豐十年(4)	貴 州 巡 撫 海 映(4)
浙江	同治三年四月(1)	浙 江 巡 撫 左 宗 棠(1)
雲南 (15)	同治十三年(11)	
黑龍江	光緒十四年(4)	黑 龍 江 將 軍(4)

- (1) 根據清代各省釐金報告檔案，茲依次列舉各摺於下：
- 江西 同治九年七月廿七日硃批劉坤一奏摺
 - 奉天 咸豐七年五月八日硃批將軍慶祺承志等摺
 - 福建 咸豐七年十二月十日硃批閩浙總督王德榜福建巡撫慶瑞等摺
 - 直隸 咸豐八年九月卅日硃批僧格林沁奏摺
 - 陝西 咸豐八年十一月十一日硃批陝西巡撫曹望顏摺
 - 河南 咸豐八年三月十日硃批河南巡撫英桂摺
 - 甘肅 咸豐八年五月廿一日硃批次甘總督樂斌摺
 - 廣東 咸豐十年閏三月卅日硃批兩廣總督及廣東巡撫勞崇光摺
 - 廣西 同治三年十月一日硃批張凱嵩摺
 - 山西 同治元年八月廿六日硃批山西巡撫英桂摺
 - 浙江 同治十二年七月廿六日硃批浙江巡撫楊昌濬摺
- (2) 光緒會典事例卷二百四十一
- (3) 皇朝掌故彙編內編卷十五
- (4) 各省財政說明書
- (5) 皇朝經濟文編卷五十五
- (6) 咸豐朝東華錄
- (7) 清文宗皇帝聖訓
- (8) 駱秉章保舉鹽茶釐金兩局出力官紳摺，駱文忠奏稿卷八。
- (9) 吉林通志卷四十四，征權。
- (10) 清鹽法志，四川，卷二百六十一，徵權門。
- (11) 清鹽法志，雲南志，徵權門。
- (12) 按賈士毅著民國財政史誤謂「胡文忠設局於湘左文襄仿行於鄂」晏才傑著租稅論亦誤謂「左文襄效法於湖南」因為湘撫駱秉章及鄂撫胡林翼於咸豐五年先後仿辦釐金時左宗棠尚未膺要職，迨咸豐十年清廷始以之襄辦軍務給四品京堂，翌年冬始升任浙江巡撫。
- (13) 咸豐五年所創辦者為鹽釐咸豐九年始由署理川督曹望顏及崇定等創

辦貨釐（見同治三年七月十四日四川總督駱秉章摺）

(14) 按周宗著中國財政論誤載為咸豐四年，甘肅財政說明書誤載為同治五年。

(15) 同治十三年所辦為鹽釐，貨釐是否同時創辦，尚待考證。

各省仿行釐金時，據云皆係仿照雷以誠奏定之章程辦理，但以各省之交通及商務情形各有相異之處，故結果各省辦理釐務之情形亦大不相同。第一，釐金局卡之分配，各省有疏密之別。第二，抽釐貨物之種類，各省有繁簡之異。第三，抽釐之稅率，各省有輕重之差。茲將各項分析，列如表五⁵¹。

第一：各省釐金局卡之分配 各省釐金局卡之分配乃按照各該省之交通及商業情形而定。大約靠水路通商之省分，或與鄰省交通路多之省分，其局卡之分配多較他省為密。茲將各省在創辦時期內設立之局卡列表如下⁵²：

表五 各省創辦釐金時局卡所在地點表

省 分	設 立 局 卡 地 點
江蘇	揚州仙女鎮，郡伯鎮，宜陵鎮，張網溝鎮，泰州城，裏下河一帶，(2)上海(3)
湖南	長沙，湘潭，常德，益揚，沅陰，瀏陽，安化，湘鄉，攸縣，衡州，衡山，邵陽，新化，武岡，津市，浦市，洪江(5)
江西	南康，涂家埠，廣信，河口鎮，南昌(4)，二套口，湖口(1)
湖北	沙市，平善壩，樊城，老河口，沙洋，新隄，蔡店，樊口，武穴(3)
四川	夔府，重慶，叙府，瀘州，富順，健為，榮縣，樂山，(3)射洪，資州，簡州，錦州(6)
奉天	盛京及各縣城(1)
吉林	省城及其他各城(7)
福建	福州，廈門，涵江，南門，銅山，寧德，浦城，崇安，光澤上杭(4)
陝西	虢縣鎮，寧條梁，略陽，寧羌州，陽平關，白水縣，紫陽縣，潼關，龍駒寨，大慶關，華陰縣，三河口(1)
山東	烟臺，鐵門關，龍口，石島，金口，塔埠頭，濰口鎮，滑口鎮，聊城，張秋鎮，(1)登，萊，青三府屬(4)

⁵¹ 同註50。

⁵² 見第五表，該表中所列局卡皆為征收機關並不包括稽查偷漏繞越之小卡。

河南	陝州，南關，會興鎮，孟縣及其沿河(1)
甘肅	省城，靖遠縣(1)
廣東	蘆苞，佛山鎮，後歷汎，韶州，東西關廠，四會大小河(1)
廣西	桂林，平樂，梧州，鬱林，潯州，柳州，慶遠，南寧，泗城，百邑(2)
直隸	津郡，寧河縣屬海口一帶，北塘，蘆臺，張家口，山海關(1)
山西	槐樹舖，茅津渡，礮口鎮，忻口鎮，欄車鎮，東陽關，風陵渡(1)
安徽	鹽河，華陽，運漕，大通，屯溪，灣沚，定埠，六安，三河尖，五河(2)
貴州	仁懷，慶兒井，松坎，龔灘，黎平，託口，流塘，龍溪口(4)
浙江	省城嘉興，湖州，衢州，及東西各郡(1)
烏魯木齊	吐魯蕃(2)

- (1) 各省鑿金報告檔案以其數繁，茲不詳舉
- (2) 光緒大清會典事例
- (3) 皇朝掌故彙編內編卷十五中所載關於鑿金之奏請
- (4) 各省財政說明書
- (5) 湖南通志卷五十九，食貨五，榷稅
- (6) 清鹽法志，四川，卷二百六十一，徵榷門
- (7) 光緒吉林通志，卷四十四，征榷

第二：各省抽釐貨物之種類 雷以誠創辦釐金時，僅抽米糧釐金，稍後即抽其他食料，布疋，茶，酒，烟，油，糖，紙等日用品之釐金，於是百貨釐金之名稱遂成立。以後各省仿行，即以抽收百貨釐金奏聞，不再如雷以誠以抽釐細則奏報朝廷，故今日所存之檔案中無各省抽釐細則。抽釐貨物除鹽茶及洋土藥以其量多，得另行標出外，其他各物俱以百貨一辭概括之，故當初貨物之種類究有多少此時實無法得知，茲僅能就大端列表如下（表六）：

第三：各省抽釐稅率 雷以誠在仙女鎮，秦州城所定之稅率，可謂以後各省釐金稅率之始祖，但各省商務之繁茂情形頗有差異，故各省所定之稅率，自始即不一致，時代愈後，愈見紛歧。茲因材料不完全之故，各省初辦釐金時之稅

率，現在可得而知者僅有十五省。其中抽釐最高者為值百抽三，如湖南省，最低者為值千抽四點五(.45%)，如陝西省，惟多數省分皆為值百抽二，讀者可參讀表七。

表六 各省最初試辦抽釐貨物類別表*

省 別	貨 物 類 別
江蘇，湖北，江西，浙江，陝西，河南	百貨
四川，廣東，廣西，貴州	百貨 鹽
湖南安徽	百貨 茶 鹽
直隸	百貨 茶 馬
奉天，吉林，黑龍江	百貨 糧
山東	百貨 糧 洋藥
福建	百貨 茶 洋藥
山西	百貨 藥料
雲南	百貨 土藥
甘肅	水烟 鹽
烏木魯齊	棉花

*此表係根據各省釐金報告檔案及各省財政說明書製成

表七 各省初辦釐金稅率表
(一)貨釐表

省別	價 值 單 位	抽 釐 數 目	百 分 率
江蘇	1,000文	12文(2)	1.2
湖南	1,000文	20或30文(4)	2或3
湖北	1,000文	20文(3)	2
奉天	東錢100,000文	1,000文(5)	1

江西	1,000文	20文(6)	2
	銀1兩	2分	2
陝西	1,000,000文	4,500文(1)	.45
	1,000兩	4.5兩	.45
四川			約2(7)
安徽			約2(6)
山東			2(6)
河南			1.25(6)
廣東			約1(3)
廣西			約2(9)
浙江			1(6)
直隸			.5至1(1)

- (1) 各省釐金報告檔案
- (2) 見上文
- (3) 胡林翼遵旨查覆沙市釐金情形疏，胡文忠公全集
- (4) 駱秉章保舉鹽茶釐金兩局出力官捐紳，駱文忠公奏稿
- (5) 大清會典事例
- (6) 各省財政說明書
- (7) 清鹽法志，四川志，征榷門
- (8) 郭嵩焘詳陳釐捐源流利弊疏，皇朝經濟文編卷五十五
- (9) 清鹽法志，兩廣志，征榷門

(二) 鹽釐表

省 別	課 釐 單 位	抽 釐 數 目
湖南	每大包	錢七百文(1)
四川	引鹽每斤	銀一釐(2)
	零星小販每斤	錢四文
廣東	正引每包	銀二錢(3)
	積引融引每包	銀四錢
廣西	銷梧州者每斤	銀四釐(3)
	銷平樂者每斤	銀二釐五毫
甘肅	每百斤	銀八文(4)

表七所列皆爲行釐，此外尚有坐釐，惟辦坐釐之省分不多，且有開辦不久即廢止者，故無法列表。今所知者，即湖北省之坐釐稅率，該省以行戶發賣零星貨物，「若估計抽釐，殊形繁瑣，因就鋪面之大小，銷貨之多寡，每月分別酌提釐錢三四十千一二千不等。」⁵³ 奉天吉林創辦釐金時，皆注重坐釐，在奉天名鋪稅釐，於咸豐七年開辦⁵⁴。惟其稅率今不得而知，殊爲可惜。

至於各省設局辦理釐金之情形，大致無甚差異，即皆採用官紳商合辦之法。行釐皆由官家主辦，紳士襄辦，坐釐由官主辦，由商經收⁵⁵。初辦時期皆是如此，後改由官辦，容將來再述。

關於初辦時（即咸豐朝）各省釐金之收支報告，今就檢查檔案所得，僅有六省，即山西，河南，山東，陝西，廣東，福建是也。其他各省之收入數目，雖可間接查得如湖北每年釐金入數目，可據同治二年上諭，知其約在一百三四十萬⁵⁶，但難認爲確數。茲將咸豐三年至十一年上述六省之釐金收支報告列爲第八表於後。

以上六省釐金之開支，除河南一省之款係解布政使司外，其餘五省之款俱解充各軍餉需，惟福建省自九年起每年支銀二萬五千二百兩爲緝捕經費，隨正項開支報銷。

茲爲補充上表起見，再將同治八年各省釐金收支數目列爲第九表該表中省分共計十二（其他省分報告缺），收入在二百萬以上者爲江蘇省，在一百萬以上者爲江西與福建，在五十萬以上者爲廣東，廣西，與湖北三省，其餘各省收入皆

⁵³ 胡林翼並覆沙市釐金情形疏，胡文忠公全集。

⁵⁴ 咸豐七年四月二十八日承志等奏，文獻館檔案。

⁵⁵ 參閱上文釐金制度創辦經過一疏，毛鴻賓湖南釐金辦有成效請仍照舊章疏，皇朝經濟文編卷五十五。

⁵⁶ 清文宗皇帝聖訓。

未超過廿萬⁵⁷。

該表十二省收入之總數，銀爲八百六十八萬五千七百零九兩，錢爲二百零三萬零九百四十二千，若將其他數省之收入加進，爲數當在千萬以上，由此可見釐金收入之重要，及其影響財政之能力。

二 釐金制度的理論

大凡一制度之得以存在，常有一種理論與之相伴。苟非出於制度之先，爲之奠基礎，則必產生於其後，爲之作後盾。否則弊端一生，攻擊一來，則該制度將失其立足之地，而難存在矣。

察釐金制度之起源，本不過爲一臨時籌餉之策。創行之初，卽生弊端，如擾民私飽等弊⁵⁸。清廷亦以其爲萬不得已之舉，而非長久之策⁵⁹。然而數年之間，仿行幾遍於全國⁶⁰。其故何在。清廷財政困難，需款孔急，而同時又不易另尋新源，固爲其普行之主要原因。然仿行者所闡發之理論，亦未始非爲促現其普行之一動力，蓋反對者對釐金弊端之攻訐，朝廷對民情之顧慮，皆有待理論爲之掃除也。

按雷以誠創辦釐金之時，並未創理論以爲其根據。彼曾於其咸豐四年三月奏請推廣捐釐助餉一疏中言：「古人云，逐末者多則廛以抑之。捐釐之法，亦古人微末之微意而變通行之。」。然此不過爲奏牘中作者陳述其建議時應備之一種理由而已，頗難視爲釐金產生之根據。況此種理由，引用於此，亦與事實不符，蓋創行釐金之本意，卽在歛財濟餉，何

⁵⁷ 請讀者注意各省釐金開辦年份，開辦較早之年份此時已過初辦時期。

⁵⁸ 參閱大清會典事例釐稅類中禁例一項，並胡文忠公全集關於釐金之文件。

⁵⁹ 參閱大清會典事例釐稅類。

⁶⁰ 參閱前文第四表。

表八 咸豐三年至十一年各省省釐金收支數目表
(單位以兩計)

省別 款目 年份	福			建			廣			東			河			南		
	收	(1) 入	除	實	存	收	入	開	除	實	存	收	入	開	除	實	存	
三	8,713		3,534		5,179													
四	14,097		2,995		16,282													
五	52,102		35,716		32,663													
六	160,716		5,968		187,416													
七	240,092		155,561		271,947													
八	269,269		256,873		284,343							60,400		57,451			2,949	
九	528,953		448,885		364,411		513,600		513,600	0		121,149		113,457			10,641	
十	797,263		672,897		488,782					0		91,742		99,287			3,086	
十一年	871,384		571,120		789,046		474,626		474,626			51,567		40,665			13,988	
省別	山			西			山			東			陝			西		
款目	收	入	除	實	存	收	入	開	除	實	存	收	入	開	除	實	存	
三																		
四																		
五																		
六																		
七																		
八																		
九	177,823		176,311		3,368(2)													
十	154,324		159,208		7,418		40,169(3)		35,970		4,199						39,175	
十一年					2,534		31,232		30,963		4,463		283,559		305,209		77,525	

(1) 福建省之收入增加甚速，其原因在稅項逐年加多，咸豐三年至六年僅有茶稅一項，七年即增洋藥釐金，八年增雜貨釐金，九年增茶葉釐金，十年增洋藥釐稅，十一年增茶葉釐稅。

(2) 內有 2,538 兩係由十年辦公經費項下省出之款。

(3) 是年收入尚有錢 4,447 串，俱撥用。

表九 同治八年各省釐金收數支目表*

(銀以兩為單位，錢以千為單位)

項 省 目 別	上年存數		收 入		開 除		本 年 實 存	
	銀	錢	銀 數	錢 數	銀 數	錢 數	銀 數	錢 數
(1) 江蘇			2,567,722	364,782	2,447,396	249,980	120,326	123,802
福建	181,831		1,939,271		2,035,408		85,694	
江西			1,153,925		1,153,920			
廣東	6,855		973,101		975,839		4,117	
廣西			734,836		734,836			
湖北			615,532	1,532,715	615,072	1,532,715	460	
陝西	25,952		196,457		222,409			
山西			148,417		148,417			
安徽			139,105	130,730	139,105	130,730		
山東			90,158		60,000		30,158	
河南	70,548		76,622		69,934		77,236	
(2) 甘肅			50,563	2,615				

* 根據各省釐金報告檔案

(1) 江蘇是年收入尚有銀洋9,635元，存而未用

(2) 甘肅是年報告係合前後數年合報，開支數目總報一次：故此年無開支數目

嘗有絲毫抑末之意。雷氏之策劃釐金，實以其極利於籌餉也。蓋此法既於「商民兩便」，而且「細水長流，源遠不竭」。兼之釐金「出自買客」而買客「斷不因一二文之細，爭價值之低昂，所謂征於無形而民不覺者也」。⁶¹ 簡言之，即釐金制度創行之初，僅以籌餉缺源為號召，並理論之根據。迨至駱秉章仿行於湖南，胡林翼仿行於江西（咸豐五年），勝保奏請各省普律抽釐時（咸豐七年），始闡發一種

⁶¹ 雷以誠請推廣捐釐助餉疏，皇朝道咸同光奏議卷三十七。

理論爲之作後盾。其理論爲何，卽征商是也。今述之如下：

第一期釐金制度之理論

按釐金一事，其制度並非首創。宋朝之商稅已有過稅，住稅之別⁶²。清之商稅，亦有坐稅過稅之名。其事之屬於首創者，卽應徵收釐金之貨品甚繁。是以當創行之初，清廷卽視其爲不得已之舉，而僅令其行於用兵之區。推其用意，蓋以用兵之區，民已厭亂，急於求安，使其多納一稅，以爲安生之代價，未必至於出怨言，若驟行於完善之區，則難保商民不生怨望也。故創行於一隅之時，雖無理論作根據，僅以籌餉缺源爲理由，亦足以取信於朝廷及人民。至於推行於數省之後，弊端叢生之時，卽不能不藉征商之理論以服人心。此釐金理論之所由產生也。

釐金創始於咸豐三年，批准於四年。四年十一月勝保曾奏請推廣勸諭抽釐。至咸豐五年，卽由胡林翼，曾國藩，駱秉章等相繼仿行於湖南，江西，湖北三省。咸豐七年始由勝保奏准各省普律抽釐。勝保及駱胡二人，對於釐金，皆各有其說。三人之說雖有深淺之不同，然其說中之大前題則無大異。三人皆以爲清廷徵商之課較輕於農，釐金爲徵商之政，取於商者微，而利於國者大，故可行之於各地，而無病於商民。但既謂無損於商民，則自然於稅之歸宿，不能不有所討論，以證明無害於商民之說無誤。此駱胡二人所以各有一租稅歸宿論。今先述勝保之論，然後再及駱胡。

咸豐四年十一月十九日，勝保曾片奏推廣勸諭商販抽釐助餉，並錄呈雷以誠泰州仙女廟等處抽釐章程。於是片中，勝保僅云釐金之利，在「哀多益寡，旣非苛歛，經權達變，無病於民。」咸豐七年六月二十三日勝保上一摺，奏請各省

⁶² 按宋史食貨志云：行者庸貨，謂之過稅，居者市鬻，謂之住稅……。

普律抽釐⁶³。該摺僅以爲抽釐乃「本諸周禮市廛之微意而與時增損之，」未言何以應重征商人之理。迨是摺上後，復上一片奏，申論其普律抽釐之主張，於是始有徵商之論。茲摘其片奏於後⁶⁴：

伏思我朝取民有制，自來征農之法，地丁錢糧，款多數巨。征商之法，除鹽課關稅之外，一無所取，是征商本少於征農……查關稅係按本抽分，所取較重，抽釐係核商本之多寡，但抽釐捐與關稅仍相表裏……以征商之有餘補征農之不足，裒多益寡，稱物平施，裕國而不害民，洵爲目前接濟軍餉第一良法……。

勝保之論，止於征商，至於何以無害於民則未嘗申論。

戶部根據六月二十三日之摺議奏，僅就事實認爲可行，對於征商之論，亦未嘗論及⁶⁵。

至於駱氏之論，見於咸豐八年四月廿三日瀝陳湖南籌餉情形一摺⁶⁶其言曰：

抽釐之舉，臣於試辦伊始，亦深懷疑慮，恐其奉行不善，適以擾民。惟念重農輕商，載諸往訓。今四民之中，惟農最苦，而錢漕一切，均於農田取之。商賈挾質營運，懋遷有無，獲利爲饒，無力作之苦，而又免徵收之稅。當茲多事之秋，稍取其贏，以佐國計，其亦何辭。況釐金之爲數至微，百貨長落隨時，本無一定之價。以至徵之數，附諸無定之價，官取諸商，商取諸貨，貨價取諸時。如果經理得宜，亦復何慮擾累……。按之駱氏，釐金稅價，可以轉嫁於貨價。故雖取之於

⁶³ 皇朝經濟文編所載戶部遵議勝保奏請各省普律抽釐一摺。

⁶⁴ 見咸豐七年七月二十六日硃批勝保片。

⁶⁵ 戶部之疏見皇朝經濟文編卷三十三。

⁶⁶ 駱文忠公奏稿卷八。

商，而商不受累。然貨價又取於何人？駱氏曰取於時，取於時之意何在，則以駱氏未嘗申論，未敢妄斷。今姑就經濟原理而略釋時與貨價及稅價三者之關係，藉以闡明駱氏斯言之病何在。按時乃確定貨價增減之一要因，百貨之漲落常為時所控制，詳言之，即為某時間之供求所控制。此時與貨價之關係。稅價之能否轉嫁於貨價，常視貨價之漲落為轉移，漲則商人易於轉嫁，落則價較貨難。此貨與稅價之關係。時控制貨價之漲落，而貨價之漲落又影響稅價之轉移，此三者之相互關係。今所欲問者，即稅價之負擔為誰，時乎，商乎，抑民乎？凡稍知經濟原理者，皆知其非出自商人，即出自人民。所謂時者，僅能以控制貨價漲落之力，而移稅價之負擔於民，或商，不能代商民負擔稅價也。換言之，即貨價因時上漲時，商人易轉嫁稅價，而使消費者間接償付稅價。貨價因時下落時（如跌至與成本相等或成本以下時），商人常不易轉嫁稅價，而僅能自負之。時與貨價及稅價之關係，如斯而已。今駱氏謂釐金取諸貨價，「貨價取諸時」語極含混，其意若謂貨價（其中有時即寓稅價）由時負擔，而與商民無涉，是豈可能耶？依駱氏之推論，實不能得釐稅之歸宿，不得其歸宿，而遽謂不虞擾累，似亦未可。

若胡林翼之說，則反於是，而立論又較深一層矣。胡氏之言曰⁶⁷：

抽釐助餉，為朝廷不得已之政，此固官民所鑒矣……當思釐多一文，即貨貴一文。於百姓則增其價值，於商賈究何損絲毫……。

又云：

其滴滴歸根處，仍是百姓食貴耳。商賈之計，究無所損。

⁶⁷ 翁宜洮道等稟陳沙市客幫公懇變抽釐章程批，胡文忠公全集，撫鄂批札。

按之胡氏，抽釐並非無害，惟與他害相較，尚屬輕微，其言曰：「搜括之政，儒者不尚。然軍政係億萬生靈之命，軍餉係水陸三萬餘兵勇（此就湖北一省而言）之命。兩害相形，則取其輕，兩利相形，則取其重。與其饑軍而誤地方，無若取商賈之利，以援大局。」

釐金歸根處既在民食，則抽釐豈非大害於民生乎？胡氏以為「民間若能節用，少取則百姓生計尚不甚礙……至於賤人所食，惰農所寶，則雖多取而不為虐……。」⁶⁸

細釋胡氏之言，則知其所論者實深合於西洋近代之租稅論。彼知釐金稅價必轉嫁於貨價，而貨價則出之於民。故謂釐多一文，即貨貴一文。至彼謂「民間若能節用，少取則百姓生計尚不甚礙」，蓋已深知抽釐及於民間之生活必需品，若在上不少取，在下不節用，則百姓生計艱難矣。至於「賤人所食」，與「惰農所寶」，皆近於奢侈品矣，故彼謂「雖多取之而不為虐」。凡此皆為近代論租稅原則者所重視，而彼於其時已論及之，不可謂無深見矣。若清代辦釐金之人，多能具同一之深見，則釐金之為害，或不致如後來之酷烈。

以上所述，可謂第一期之理論，即自仿行至議裁之一期間之理論（約自咸豐五年至同治三年）。第二期理論始於同治三年議裁釐金之後。第一期與第二期之理論，並無多異，惟第一期之理論在證明釐金制度非聚斂之政，而第二期之理論則專事維護釐金制度。

第二期之理論

同治三年金陵克復後，左都御史全慶於七月奏軍務草定，各省厘局，請酌量裁撤⁶⁹。七月初十，上諭着戶部議

⁶⁸ 賤人所食係指土膏而言，其時湖北已抽收由川入鄂土膏之釐金。

⁶⁹ 見皇朝政典類纂卷八十九。

奏，戶部如何議覆，以無摺可考，不得而知。是年八月官文（時爲湖廣總督）奏請留釐稅辦善後，待三五年後通裁，據八月廿五日之上諭云⁷⁰：

官文奏請將各省釐金留作善後之費，除直隸，山東，山西，河南，陝甘，雲貴，廣西，貿運艱遠，釐金不多，無濟於事，軍務告竣，即可議撤外，其餘若江皖，蘇杭，福建，兩湖，四川，廣東等省釐金，雖軍旅歲事，止宜嚴禁重科，萬不可驟議裁撤，請緩至三五年後，軍事大定，再議裁除，……所有兩湖釐金即着官文擇其扼要處所抽收豐旺者，照常抽收。

此事發生後，郭嵩燾即與毛鴻賓合上一疏詳陳釐捐源流利弊⁷¹。其上此摺之原因，即因「近見金陵克復以後，言事者動請停止釐金，或請酌量裁撤卡局，……」而「現在江南巨寇雖已蕩平，餘匪尙數十萬人，麇聚江西閩粵之交，籌兵籌餉，勢處萬難」。故上疏詳陳釐金利弊，以冀朝廷中止停輸之言，勿塞軍餉之源。郭氏此疏，可謂咸豐以來回維釐金之巨文，今當詳細列述之。

郭氏論釐金起源之言曰：

釐金之制，蓋緣始周官之屨布歛布。以杜子春註意推之，屨布者，當如今之坐釐，歛布者，當如今之行釐。而自周以前，商賈之征數倍於農民。後世水陸鈔關，額設極少，稅課亦極輕。此非徒以卹商也，王者節宣天地之宜，田賦所入，以之制國用而有餘。商賈散無恒居，盈虛無定勢，官中易緣爲姦，故常弛其征以便民。軍興用繁，則百稅並舉。遠古以來，國用之需，無不取給於

⁷⁰ 此諭見文獻館檔案。

⁷¹ 載皇朝經濟文編卷五十五，或閱皇朝掌故彙編內卷十五。

百姓……四民中惟農商二者為有常業，不取之商，即取之農。農民務本而生計微，商民逐末而利源厚，輕重之宜，亦易知也。今之釐金，與漢之算緡，唐之除官錢，宋之經制頭子錢，名異而實同。漢唐之世，所謂算緡諸法者，皆取之商釐之本錢……其餘百貨，更加以稅。史冊所紀，今煩法密，所以括民財者甚至。

其言釐金制度之優點則曰：

今之釐金，……不限以科則，不拘以程式，一依唐臣劉晏之法，引用士人，因地制宜，猶得任人不任法之意……所謂不限以科則者，何也。譬如上海釐金抽收之法異於江北，安徽異於江西……貨行之通滯，商情之順逆，惟其所便而不以相強，上海釐金抽收最重，以次推及廣東，不逮十分之一，不能比而同也。甚至一省之貨，此輕而彼重，一廠之設，此疏而彼密。惟無科則而後事事乃稍可以核實，可以便民，所謂不拘以程式者，何也？凡商船經過之通津，有卡廠行釐，貨物囤積之巨鎮，有門市坐釐，其大較也。間有支津汊港，繞越偷漏，則又添設分卡，小鎮毘連大鎮，或至居奇，則又添設分局，皆隨時酌量辦理。一省扼要之區，不過三、四處，辦法亦因而加密，其餘則稍寬其法。設局多者，不過一二十處，或通數縣無一卡局，或小鎮舉辦而大鎮反未及舉辦，推而至於各省，或辦或不辦，或辦之有效，或竟無效，一聽督撫之自為經理，均無一定之程式，強之以必行……自漢以來，理財之裨政，未有優於今日之釐金者也。

彼又言釐金之優點，在於取約而法均。其言曰：

漢法二緡而一算，算者口出錢百二十，二緡一算（按一緡為一千文，每二千出錢百二十文）每錢千取六十，唐

之除百錢，宋之經總制錢，皆千錢取百⁷²。臣鴻賓前在湖南酌定釐捐章程，大率每錢千，令捐一二十，最為輕減，上海蓋將倍焉，廣東則尚不及其半，故曰取約。按貨估值，計錢抽釐，本厚者出多，息微者出少，人各效其力，無倖免者，故曰法均。

其回護釐金之不病商，則曰：

今言者或曰病商。不知周秦之世，天下大利歸於商賈，漢興而加之困辱，誠惡其專利也。歷周至明，士大夫無屑為商賈者，故虐取之而無所惜，本朝稍加以寬典，士大夫多出於其途，商賈之利厚而權亦重，財雄而勢亦豪，捐釐所取，於其歲入之贏餘者，僅百分之一二，以今制準之，漢唐宋明以前，其輕重多寡之數必有有能辦之者。又況完善省分，每以保護商賈為言，其籌辦釐金者大率在於兵燹之後，盜賊出沒之鄉。即如湖北之漢口，湖南之湘潭，其間著名巨賈，半皆藉隸川陝，使釐金稍有病於商，亦豈能強其間關跋涉，轉側兵戈之地，而自投完納毫無避就乎？

總觀郭氏之論，其擁護釐金制度，可謂備至。但細察其論據，亦僅有兩點可信。（一）即釐金為歷代徵商稅制中最輕之稅制。（二）即釐金所取，僅商人歲入贏餘百分之一二，為數甚微，無害於商。至其所舉釐金之優點，如不限以科則，不拘以程式，他人視之，亦可認為弱點，而以之攻擊釐金。蓋惟以不限以科則，不拘以程式，釐金之弊始層見疊出。同治前後各御史奏報釐金弊端，多以嚴定章程為請⁷³。

⁷² 按舊唐書食貨志所載行除陌法時，凡公私給與及買賣，每經宜留五十錢換言之即每千文抽五十文，據宋史食貨志所載，總制錢初收時（紹興五年），每貫收錢二十三文，其後至乾道元年增收時亦僅至每千文收五十六文，郭云千錢取百，想係誤計。

⁷³ 關於此類文件，俟全部厘金檔案整理後，當以另文發表。

可見郭氏所謂利，亦正是他人所謂弊。郭氏此論，博則博矣，惟欠深思耳。釐金不病商，固善矣，其如病民何。而郭氏於病民一端，則無片語及之，誠屬憾事。

光緒七年閏七月初二日，清廷據給事中劉瑞祺奏請，下諭令各省「酌量裁留」釐卡⁷⁴。於是復有一人出而為釐金辯護，其人即河南道監察御史李郁華是也，其疏較簡，然其立論，則較郭氏更深進一層，蓋彼於言釐金不病商外，復言其不累民之故，該摺云⁷⁵：

為釐金分卡，不能裁併，請飭明定章程，清查積弊，以裕餉需……事。臣惟髮逆煽亂，軍需籌餉，以捐輸釐金為大宗。開捐久則流弊滋多，特旨諭停，似見聖謨遠大。乃近日言事諸臣，於各省釐金分卡，動以商民受累為辭，陳請裁撤。不知受累者，釐金之弊，非釐金之累民也。若因弊而欲裁釐金，則各省賦稅，間亦有不肖官吏，苛歛重征，豈亦將議免正供乎？臣謂釐金為古者徵商之政，資於用者無盡，取諸民者甚微。籌餉之方，莫善於此。如謂累商，則因釐增價，商本無虧。如謂累民，則洋藥而外，如玉帛珍錯，貴重之品，能用者即不計及此微費。若貧民日用，則僅鹽布有釐，計口每歲不過匹布稱鹽，亦止制錢二十餘文，雖赤貧之家，尚無慮是……邇來軍興二十餘年，全恃抽釐助餉，奉行既久，商民相安，苟於利國而不病民，則亦第祛其弊而已矣。

李氏論釐金未嘗累民之言，驟然聽之，可謂具理充分，不容駁詰。然如細察清代釐金制下之課稅物類乃奢侈品多於必需品歟，抑必需品多於奢侈品歟？令試覽咸豐四年勝保奏呈御覽之雷以誠勸諭捐釐助餉章程（見上文表二），其中所

⁷⁴ 見文獻館檔案或會典事例釐稅額。

⁷⁵ 見光緒七年十二月二十日硃批李郁華摺。

列應捐釐金之貨物，究以何類爲多。是項章程列物數十，除煙酒綢緞皮貨，可謂奢侈品外，其餘各物非爲日用品（如米麥，豆，油），卽爲必需品（如棉花，大布，估衣，藥材）。而日用品中，食料又佔多數，豈僅鹽布而已。此誠如胡文忠公所云：「其（釐金）滴滴歸根處，仍是百姓食貴耳。」其他姑不細究，今僅以日用之米爲例，試觀人民受累如何之深。據光緒十年正月十八日江西道監察御史光照爲皖省裁免米釐所奏⁷⁶，謂皖省「鳳穎之間，素稱瘠土，中年石米所值，纔制錢數百，而釐卡所收之數幾同之。」依此而言，則人民食米，日日須付倍價，每歲負擔，又豈止「制錢二十餘文」耶？惜今尚無法統計清代人民之生活費用，否則可算出每人每歲對於釐捐之負擔，爲數至於若干，今雖不能詳知其數，然亦敢斷言，李氏之估計，去事實甚遠。

結 論

總觀上述關於釐金之理論，除胡氏之論，可謂觀察詳盡，推斷確實外，其他理論，皆一偏之言也。然可注意者，卽此種一偏之論，未嘗無其影響也。自釐金創行以後，言事者卽不斷以釐金之弊告之朝廷。朝廷深畏累民，亦常以裁撤許民，其所以未斷然行之者，固尙有其他重要原因（以後當另爲文討論），但此種一偏之論，亦未始不足以搖動聽聞，而阻止朝廷裁撤之。釐金之能普行，此種征商之政，無病於民之理論，固與有力。然釐金之能延長生命，未被裁撤者，如郭李二人之一偏之論亦未嘗無助力。故研究釐金制度者，不可不於此種理論，加以注意。

⁷⁶ 見文獻館檔案。

民國以前的賠款是如何償付的？

湯象龍

本文原發表於中國近代經濟史研究集刊第三卷第二期，民國二十四年。

軍費，外債，和賠款為中國近代財政上國家三宗最大的支出，三宗的總數常佔國家歲出三分之二以上，各時期的財政的盛衰和變遷與此有莫大的關係，特別是時代愈近，關係愈不可分離。更有趣的是近百年來的情形，軍費，外債和賠款三宗歲出都有連帶的關係。一旦對外戰爭爆發，政府軍費隨之膨脹，軍費膨脹，外債即隨之，及戰爭結束，賠款又隨之，或因賠款難償，外債又隨之。此種連帶的關係構成中國近代財政史的主要基礎之一。因此在研究近代財政史的人，分析軍費，外債，和賠款是很重要的工作。明瞭了各時期三宗支出的情形和彼此的關係，亦即是明瞭了各時期財政的內容。茲因資料之便利，首先進行賠款的分析，第一個題目便是「民國以前的賠款是何如償付的？」

中國對外賠款的歷史自鴉片戰爭以至民國，適足五十年，在此五十年中，大小賠款約百數十次¹，有因戰爭失敗

¹ 民國以前賠款次數甚多，其中尤以地方教案賠償為最多，就庚子事變時言京畿附近數省發生教案共計 121 起，大部均經地方賠償，在庚子以前發生之教案賠款亦夥。前者可參閱王振聲編「庚子畿疆教案賠款記」，後者可參閱王復夫編「清季外交史料」及程宗裕編「教案奏議彙編」。此外臺灣生番換印銀，朝鮮換印銀亦都可視為賠款。

而成立的，有因教案發生而成立的，有由中央政府償付的，有由地方政府償付的，自研究財政史的立場言，其中要以中央償付的軍事賠款為最重要。此種賠款凡五次；（一）1842年鴉片戰爭賠款二千一百萬元，（二）1860年英法聯軍賠款一千六百萬關平兩，（三）1881年伊犁償款五百萬庫平兩，（四）1895年日本賠款二億三千萬庫平兩，（五）1901年八國聯軍賠款四億五千萬關平兩。此五次賠款的數目是很龐大的，姑不論其當時交涉的經過和政治上的意義，以及合乎正義與否，其在各時期財政上的影響，至為浩大，所以分析各次賠款償付的方法和實況即是明瞭近代財政史的一種重要的步驟。

一 鴉片戰爭賠款是如何償付的？

道光二十二年（1842）鴉片戰爭結束，中英政府於是年七月二十四日（八月二十九日）訂立南京條約，該約規定中國政府應付英國焚燬鴉片償價六百萬元，行商累欠三百萬元，水陸軍費一千二百萬元²，共計二千一百萬元。償付的方法該約第七條規定如次：

道光二十二年（1842）	6,000,000元
道光二十三年（1843）六月	3,000,000元
十二月	3,000,000元
道光二十四年（1844）六月	2,500,000元
十二月	2,500,000元
道光二十五年（1845）六月	2,000,000元
十二月	2,000,000元

全部應於四年中分七次償清，如按期不能兌交，即酌定每百年息五元。這是中國第一次的對外大賠款。

中國於戰敗之後，在規定的期限內，將二千一百萬元的

² 外交部編康，雅，乾，道四朝條約中英江寧條約第四至六款。

鉅數全數償清，按每元以銀七錢計，全部共銀一千四百七十萬兩。第一次應付的款項，大部分從江浙兩省動撥而來³。第二年至第四年償付的賠款除三百萬元由行商歸還，其餘全部則由廣東一省籌撥，而廣東所籌撥的大部又來自粵海關稅收⁴。該關自廣州正式闢為通商口岸後，稅收是激劇的增加，這種增加在當時政府完全為意外的收獲。所以後兩年的有了關稅賠款的抵補，在財政方面不見有何等重大的影響。茲將歷年償付鴉片賠款的數目和來源列如表一。

二 英法聯軍賠款是如何償付的？

咸豐十年九月十一日（1860年10月24日）中英續增條約規定中國政府應付英國賠款八百萬兩，其中二百萬兩為商人補償，六百萬兩為軍費⁵。次日中法續增條約亦規定中國政府應付法國賠款八百萬兩，其中一百萬兩為商人補償，七百萬兩為軍費⁶。總共中國應付英法兩國賠款一千六百萬兩，這是中國對外的第二次最大的賠款。

償付的方法係規定各將賠款分為兩部，一部先付，作為撤兵的條件，一部由關稅陸續扣還。前者應於十年十月十九日在天津各付銀五十萬兩，同月二十日在廣東各付銀三十三萬三千三百三十三兩，各計八十三萬三千三百三十三兩。後者即其餘銀兩均於通商各關所收稅銀總數內分結扣還二成，即，20%，以西曆三個月為一結，自咸豐九年八月十七日至十一月二十日（即十月一日——十二月三十一日）為第一

³ 故宮文獻館印籌辦夷務始末記（以下簡稱始末記）道光朝卷五十九葉四，道光二十二年七月癸亥上諭，葉三十三，同月壬申硃批欽差大臣耆英摺；卷六十，葉四，道光二十二年八月甲申硃批江蘇巡撫程德全摺，葉七，同前日上諭，葉十六，八月丙申硃批耆英摺等。

⁴ 始末記，道光朝，卷六十五，葉二十六，道光二十三年二月己卯日硃批伊里布等摺。

⁵ 外交部編，咸豐條約中英續增條約第三款。

⁶ 同上書，中英續增條約中法續增條約第四款第五款。

表一 歷年償付鴉片戰爭賠款數目及來源*
(單位關平兩)

年 代	款 項 來 源	數 目
第一年	1. 揚州商捐銀抵償	350,000
	2. 江蘇截撥解部軍需	500,000
	3. 江蘇藩司暫借	600,000
	4. 江蘇藩司防堵經費	100,000
	5. 江蘇地丁正耗銀	220,840
	6. 江蘇藩司雜款	79,160
	7. 兩淮運庫存貯部撥軍需	140,000
	8. 蘇州織造挪借	60,000
	9. 浙江借動	800,000
	10. 廣東民捐	1,350,000
	共 計	4,200,000
第二年	1. 勒追行欠商款	2,100,000
	2. 粵藩庫存款及寄存海關之款	1,235,000
	3. 粵運庫動撥銀	51,000
	4. 粵鹽課項下撥補兵餉銀	550,000
	5. 粵海關稅銀	263,000
	共 計	4,200,000
第三年	1. 粵省藩司	3,500,000
第四年	1. 粵海關稅銀	2,800,000
	四年共計	14,700,000

* 本表根據始末記道光朝卷五十九，葉四，道光二十二年七月癸亥上諭，葉三十三，同月壬申硃批欽差大臣者英摺；卷六十，葉四，道光二十二年八月甲申硃批江蘇巡撫程商采摺，葉七，同前日上諭，葉十六，八月丙申硃批者英摺；卷六十五，葉二十五，道光二十三年二月己卯日硃批伊里布等摺。

結。如此陸續扣繳至八百萬兩全部完結為止⁷。兩國同用此償付方法。

中國於約訂之後關於前一部的賠款，在天津償付共一百萬兩由戶部支給，其中四十萬兩由宗人府撥給，六十萬兩由附近省分撥給⁸，在廣東償付各三十三萬三千三百三十三兩由粵海關支給⁹。

關於後一部的賠款，自咸豐十年八月十七日起由各關稅收按結扣還，於六年中全部償清。各關歷年攤還數目列表二。

綜上所述，計中央直接償付一百萬兩，粵海關最早償付七十萬六千七百八十六兩¹⁰，各關扣還一千四百三十二萬九千三百八十兩，三項共計為一千六百零三萬六千一百六十六兩，所多之數或為粵海關沙面工程費抵作賠款多報者。查此次償付賠款與上次不同之點即條約上規定由關稅擔保。關稅為中國近代最大的財源之一，自五口通商以後每年的稅收是逐漸的增加。政府每年扣還稅銀20%，以償賠款，失此得彼，故在財政上，未發生若何重大的影響。惟以後歷次外債賠款由關稅擔保之惡例實肇基於此。

三 伊犁償款是如何償付的？

第三次大賠款便是伊犁償款。光緒七年(1881)俄國將伊

⁷ 外交部編，咸豐條約中英續增條約第三款；中英續增條約中法續增條約第四款，第五款。

⁸ 始末記，咸豐朝，卷六十七，葉五，十年九月甲辰硃批恭親王桂良文祥等摺，同卷，葉十一，同日硃批恭親王等摺。

⁹ 此部分賠款由中國於粵海關稅收項下分次籌撥，計1859年九月交賠款三十一萬三千三百三十三兩，英法兩國修築沙面地基工程費抵賠款十五萬五千零七十八兩；1860年賠款十七萬五千四百六十四兩，沙面工程抵賠款四萬五千零九十六兩；1861年工程抵賠款一萬七千八百一十五兩，共計七十萬六千七百八十六兩，所多之款，其中一部抵作未還賠款。以上資料來源均見粵海關報告。

¹⁰ 同上註。

表二 各關歷年（第一結至第二十二結）扣還英法賠款數目*

（單位海關兩）

年代	江海關	鎮江關	九江關	江漢關	浙海關	閩海關	打狗臺南	粵海關	東海關	津海關	牛莊關	總計
1861	735,651				102,980	408,782		628,407	3,408	35,154		1,914,382
1862	1,326,237	7,814 ²	—	—	69,147	752,478	4,414	479,809	13,631	31,461	13,216	2,698,207
1863	989,239	2,622	146,534	290,598	107,088	773,498	18,559	530,422	38,725	42,408	21,031	2,960,724
1864	701,954	956	218,220	386,277	141,978	778,514	26,054	399,653	56,037	40,300	46,339	2,796,282
1865	741,477	2,149	192,085	331,351	119,831	742,811	51,877	385,976	77,565	101,656	61,746	2,808,524
1866	299,099	830	70,455	104,555	52,363	380,046	5,324	167,770	20,937	41,209	8,763	1,151,261
總計	4,793,567	14,371	627,294	1,112,781	593,387	3,836,129	106,228	2,592,037	210,303	292,188	151,095	14,329,380

* 本表根據單橋各督撫各海關監督報告二百餘件編成，並參見李文忠公全書，奏稿卷十南洋七關交還二成摺。第一結至二十一結止歷年撥還總數，彼此互投俱屬相符。

1. 年份均自上年十一月一日起至本年九月三十日為一年，但1866年概十月一日起至三月三十日半年即包括第二十一、二十二兩結。
2. 鎮江關從第四結扣還起單橋第四至第七結報告開知，此數根據李文忠公全書，奏稿卷十南洋七關交還二成摺補上。
3. 閩海關從第一結扣還起，單橋第一至第三結報告開知，此數根據同上書補入。
4. 牛莊關從開關至第九結報告開知，此數根據同治五年四月二十二日御批通商大臣崇厚奏摺北洋三口歷年交還英法各二成總數摺補入。

犁交還中國，兩國改訂條約第六條規定中國允將俄國自同治10年代守伊犁兵費及俄國商民被害撫卹金共九百萬銀盧布合銀五百萬兩，於兩年內償付清楚。又該約專條規定所有銀兩勻作六次，每四個月交納一次，第一次自換約後四個月交納，末一次在換約後二年期滿交納¹¹。

以上總理衙門奏飭戶部籌議¹²。戶部擬定償付稅款共有三項：一、釐金；二、關稅；三、田賦。附加稅：如按糧津貼。由釐金項下歸還的有江蘇，江西，湖南，福建，廣東，河南，安徽等七省，各省歸還數目不等，這是政府指定以釐金攤還外債賠款最先的例子。茲將各省歸還數目列表如下：

由關稅歸還的則有六關，各關歸還數目亦列表如下：

此外有以按糧津貼歸還的，就目前所知者僅四川於光緒七年償還四萬兩¹³。總計由釐金歸還者五十八萬四千八百七十一兩，稅一百一十二萬兩，其不足之數似均由戶部與各省湊還，詳情待考。

四 日本賠款是如何償付的？

甲午日本賠款是中國第四次最大的賠款。光緒二十一年(1895)三月二十三日馬關係約第四款規定，中國約將庫平銀二億兩交與日本作為賠償軍費¹⁴。同年九月二十二日遼南條約第二款載，中國為酬報交還奉天省南邊地方應付日本庫平銀三千萬兩¹⁵。又馬關係約另約規定駐守威海衛日軍中國每年應付軍費五十萬庫平兩，至賠款全完為止。

¹¹ 外交部編光緒條約，七年中俄訂條約，又清季外交史料卷二十五，使俄曾紀澤奏中俄改訂條約蓋印畫摺。

¹² 清季外交史料卷二十五，總署奏中俄新訂條約請預籌以備開辦摺。

¹³ 東華續錄，光緒朝卷四十六，葉二十，四川總督丁寶楨摺。

¹⁴ 外交部編光緒條約，中日馬關係約第四款。

¹⁵ 同上書，中日遼南條約第二款。

表三 各省釐金攤還伊犁償款數目*

(單位庫平兩)

年	代	江蘇	福建	江西	河南	湖南	安徽	廣東	總計
光緒七年 (1881)		40,000	50,000	30,000	20,000	52,465	41,105	44,478	278,048
八年 (1882)		40,000	100,000	—	20,000	68,200	35,140	43,478	336,823
總計		80,000	150,000	30,000	40,000	120,670	76,245	87,956	584,871

* 本表根據軍機處各省釐局報告二十餘件編成。

表四 各關攤還伊犁償款*

(單位海關兩)

年	代	江海關	九江關	江漢關	浙海關	閩海關	粵海關	總計
1881		170,000	60,000	50,000	—	60,000	160,000	500,000
1882		—	—	90,000	100,000	230,000	—	420,000
1883		—	30,000	60,000	—	110,000	—	200,000
總計		170,000	90,000	200,000	100,000	400,000	160,000	1,120,000

* 本表根據軍機處各省督撫海關監督報告四十餘件編成。

償付的方法，該約規定軍費二億兩分八次交完，第一次五千萬兩於批約後六月內交清，第二次五千萬兩於批約後十二月內交清，其餘分六次交清，自第二年起每年交一次，自第一次交後其餘按 5% 起息，遲早歸還聽便，如三年內全清不起息。遼南兵費三千萬兩則於約定後三月內一次交清。

從上所述，中國政府除威海衛守費外，應於短期中償付二億三千萬兩的鉅款，於第一年中即付一億三千萬兩。如此鉅款，在中國歷史上誠為空前的負擔，就政府平時的財力言，無論如何，舉全年國家所有歲入以付賠款亦感不足。所以當時政府感受絕大的困難。適列強在東亞之侵略極烈，於馬關條約訂立之日，各國爭以款項貸予中國。政府因於數年中與各國成立鉅額的外債，即以外債償還賠款¹⁶。姑不論所借外債性質如何，合算與否，然鉅額的賠款賴是得於三年之內還清。茲將各次外債列舉如下：

1. 1895	俄法借款	400,000,000	佛郎	36 年還清
2. 1896	英德借款	16,000,000	英鎊	36 年還清
3. 1898	英德續款	16,000,000	英鎊	45 年還清

以上三款共計銀三億兩左右，均屬長期借款。中國於俄法借款成立，即將第一期賠款五千萬兩和遼南償費三千萬兩歸還¹⁷，於英德借款成立即將第二期賠款五千萬兩，第三期賠款一千六百六十六萬六千六百六十七兩，威海衛兩年守費及賠款利息等先後歸還¹⁸。及英德續款成立，乃將所餘全部賠款七千二百五十萬兩，（即所餘賠款八千三百三十三萬三千三百三十三兩扣除三年內已交利息及應扣息銀一千零八十三

¹⁶ 民國以前關稅擔保之外債，中國近代經濟史研究集刊第三卷第一期。

¹⁷ 清季外交史料卷一一九龔照璠奏交收日本第一期兵費銀兩事疏摺，同書，同卷，龔照璠奏與日使交收歸還費銀兩摺。

¹⁸ 同上書，卷一一一，總署籌交日本第二次賠費交收清楚摺。又同上書，卷一二二，使英龔照璠奏交收第二期兵費利息等摺。

表五 日本賠款分期償付情形*

年 代	賠款期數	海 關 兩	折 合 英 鎊
光緒二十一年九月 十四 日	第一期賠款	50,000,000	8,225,245
二十二年三月二十六日	第二期賠款	50,000,000	8,225,245
二十二年三月二十六日	第一期利息	3,750,000	616,898
二十三年四月 十七 日	第三期賠款	16,666,666	2,741,749
二十三年四月 十七 日	第二期利息	5,000,000	822,530
二十四年三月 十八 日	第四期賠款	72,500,000	10,926,604
二十四年三月 十八 日	第三期利息	2,083,333	334,495
	共 計	200,000,000	31,892,766
二十一年九月 三十 日	遼南償費	30,000,000	4,935,147
二十一年九月 三十 日	第一年守費	500,000	82,253
二十三年四月 七 日	第二年守費	500,000	82,253
二十四年三月 十八 日	第三年守費	500,000	82,253
	共 計	31,500,000	5,181,806
	總 計	231,500,000	37,074,572

* 本表根據清季外交史料卷一一九龔照璠奏交收日本第一期兵費銀兩事竣摺；同卷龔照璠奏與日使交收歸還費銀兩摺；卷一二一，總署籌交日本第二次賠費交收清楚摺；卷一二二，使英龔照璠奏交收第二期兵費利息等摺；卷一二六，使英羅豐祿奏與日使交收第三期軍費等項事竣摺，又出使張蔭桓奏請訂借八千萬兩償日本兵費片；卷一三一，總署奏日本償款交清收回威海摺。

萬三千三百三十三兩)及第三年威海衛守費歸清¹⁹。償付詳情另分析列如表五。

¹⁹ 同上書，卷一二六，使英羅豐祿奏與日使交收第三期軍費等項事竣摺。又同上書，卷一三一，總署奏日本償款交清收回威海摺。

從上述情形看，中國該直接償付的賠款一轉變而成爲外債的擔負。然此鉅額的外債，中國又將如何應付？以往的外債大部是由關稅擔保的，但關稅的來源有限，三萬萬兩的鉅債勢不能全部仰給於關稅，所以政府不得不求之於新的財源。在英德續款合同中便規定以釐金爲擔保²⁰。中日戰爭以前，中國所負的外債極少²¹，政府的財政是日趨正軌的，自此以後每年須攤還外債二千餘萬兩，換言之，中國每年增加額外歲出二千餘萬兩。近代財政的敗壞不能不以此爲最主要的原因。數十年後中央財政之一蹶不振即自此時起。

五 八國聯軍賠款是如何償付的？

光緒二十七年七月二十五日（1901年9月7日）中國與俄德英法日美意比奧荷西等國訂立和約，允付償款四億五千萬海關兩以爲各國政府人民庚子年匪亂損失的補償。此之謂庚

表六 歷年攤還庚子賠款本利*

年 代	每 年 歸 還 數		每 期 合 計 數	
	海 關 兩	折 合 英 鎊	海 關 兩	折 合 英 金
1902—1910	18,829,500	2,824,425	169,465,500	25,419,825
1911—1914	19,899,300	2,984,859	79,597,200	11,939,436
1915	23,283,300	2,492,495	23,383,300	2,492,465
1916—1931	24,483,800	3,672,570	391,741,800	58,760,000
1932—1940	35,350,150	5,320,523	318,151,350	47,7227,07
總 計			928,238,150	147,335,723

²⁰ 民以前關稅擔保之外債，中國近代經濟史研究集刊第三卷第一期。

²¹ H. B. Morse, International Relations of the Chinese Empire Vol. 3. p. 52.

子賠款。此項賠款由中國發給保票即定期公債券交與各國，以三大財源為擔保，計：（一）關稅擔保借款以外的剩餘及切實值百抽五的增稅，（二）各通商口岸五十里以內的常關稅收，（三）鹽稅擔保借款以外的剩餘。攤還期為三十九年，年息四釐²²。各年應還數目見表六²³：

以上本利將近十萬萬兩，加以日後金價昂貴，實際猶不止此數，其中各國所得之數目以俄為最多，德英法次之，日美意等國又次之，其比例亦列如表七²⁴：

至此，中國每年又須增加支出自一千八百八十二萬九千五百兩至三千五百三十五萬零一百五十兩。中日戰爭以後中國財政之敗壞早為中外專家所公認²⁵。此次賠款各國雖規定以關稅鹽課常稅擔保，但中國自身之出路應如何求得，此中困難當較甲午後情形為尤甚。且在當時國際監視情形之下，中國自行募集公債或由外國保證中國募集公債等類似方法復為各國所反對²⁶。故中國除自身開源節流外，幾無他法。在此無路可走之情形下，政府始決定兩大政策：第一，即政府緊縮，將諸種重要的軍餉抵撥賠款；第二，令各省負責分攤，或開源，或節流，由各省自決，但規定每年呈繳一定數目。關於前者戶部將各省關應解部庫的加放俸餉，加復俸餉，邊防經費，漕折等項一律留作賠款，每年計得三百九十萬零五百兩。關於後者則各省籌劃情形不一。富庶省分多由藩庫運庫道庫三機關分籌，來源為地丁，釐金，鹽斤加價，常稅，捐輸等項。貧瘠省分則由他省代撥，如新疆甘肅等

²² 外交部編光緒條約，各國辛丑和約第六款。

²³ 同上書，同上條約，附件十三。

²⁴ Stanley F. Wright, *The Collection and Disposal of the Maritime and Native Customs Revenue since the Revolution of 1911*, p. 98

²⁵ 清季外交史料，卷一四六，總署與各使會議賠款事宜述略；H. B. Morse, *Relations Vol. 3*, p. 351.

²⁶ Stanley F. Wright, *Customs Revenue* p. 94.

表七 庚子賠款各國所得百分比例

(單位海關兩)

國 別	百分比例	賠款本額	賠款利息	本利總計
俄	28.97136	130,371,120	154,196,630.49	284,567,750.49
德	20.01567	90,070,515	106,531,031.72	196,601,546.72
法	15.75072	70,878,240	83,831,340.74	154,709,580.74
英	11.24901	50,620,545	59,871,522.72	110,492,067.72
日	7.73180	34,793,100	41,151,589.28	75,944,689.28
美	7.31979	32,939,055	38,958,714.88	71,897,769.88
意	5.91489	26,617,005	31,481,301.11	58,098,306.11
比	1.88541	8,484,345	10,034,871.30	18,519,216.30
奧	.88976	4,003,920	4,735,642.16	8,739,562.16
荷	.17380	782,100	925,029.91	1,707,129.91
國際要求	.03326	149,670	177,022.41	326,692.41
西	.03007	135,315	160,044.01	295,359.01
葡	.02050	92,250	109,108.82	201,358.82
瑞典挪威	.01396	62,820	74,300.44	137,120.45
總 計	100.00000	450,000,000	532,238,150.00	982,238,150.00

省。總計各省籌劃款項每年為一千八百八十萬兩，合戶部改撥者共二千二百七十萬兩。再加以一部分關稅，每年湊足數目當在二千五百萬兩左右。茲將各省籌劃數目及戶部改撥各省數目列如第八表，其詳細情形則見附表一。

以上為各省預籌歸還及撥部改抵庚子賠款的情形，中國竭盡全國人民財力，始能應付如此鉅款，其時財政困難於此可見。但各省關實際應付的情形如何，我們可分下列兩方面說：（一）由各省籌還的，（二）由關稅攤還的。由關稅攤

表八 歸還庚子賠款每年各省認籌及戶部改撥各省數目*
(單位海關兩)

省 分	各 省 認 籌 數 目	各 省 關 部 撥 款 項 改 抵 賠 款 數 目
山 東	900,000	93,000
河 南	900,000	368,000
江 蘇	2,500,000	472,500
江 西	1,400,000	766,000
湖 北	1,200,000	474,000
福 建	800,000	190,000
直 隸	800,000	58,000
安 徽	1,000,000	257,000
湖 南	700,000	304,000
廣 西	300,000	—
浙 江	1,400,000	164,000
廣 東	2,000,000	319,000
山 西	900,000	263,000
陝 西	600,000	104,000
貴 州	200,000	—
甘 肅	300,000	—
四 川	2,200,000	68,000
雲 南	300,000	—
新 疆	400,000	—
共 計	18,800,000	3,900,500

* 本表根據附表一

還的計分關餘，增稅，撥部改作賠款與火耗四種。關餘復包括關稅攤還外債餘款及五十里內常稅兩項，增稅為條約規定

5%實際增稅；撥部改作賠款即戶部緊縮的各項軍餉如加放俸餉東北邊防經費及旗兵加餉原應解部現改賠款者，火耗則為各關節省的一半的傾鎔折耗。其中除戶部改撥有一定數目外，其餘均視稅收之多少而定，共計每年自三百餘萬兩至四百餘萬兩。茲列表如下：

表九 關稅歷年攤還庚子賠款總數*
(單位海關兩)

年代	關 餘	5%增稅	加放俸餉	加增東北邊防經費及旗兵加餉	一半傾鎔火耗	總 計
1902	949,982	1,867,805	112,000	171,500	91,116	3,192,403
1903	780,746	1,758,402	148,000	174,000	144,220	3,005,368
1904	1,216,576	1,967,563	128,000	954,000	155,384	4,421,520
1905	1,314,684	1,935,804	128,000	204,000	174,968	3,757,456
1906	925,984	2,754,058	128,000	176,500	184,756	4,169,298
1907	620,000	2,976,496	155,000	174,000	183,487	4,108,983
1908	635,000	2,692,222	165,000	174,000	179,910	3,846,132
1909	628,333	2,671,352	166,000	174,000	173,155	3,812,840
1010	620,000	2,392,196	154,000	174,000	174,643	3,514,839
總計	7,691,320	21,015,898	1,284,000	2,376,000	1,461,639	33,828,839

* 本表根據附表二至六編成。

1. 年份從本年一月一日起至九月三十日止，1903—1910均自上年十月一日起至本年九月三十日為一年。

由各省籌還的則因係額定分擔性質，歷年攤還數目與原定者無甚出入，惟有因時因事之便，各省籌款情形與最初原定之計劃不無臨時變更之處，但款項主要來源仍不外地丁，鹽課，釐金，漕項，常稅，捐，雜稅等項。茲將各省歷年歸

表十 各省歷年攤還庚子賠款數目*
(單位:海關兩)

年份	直隸	隸	山東	河南	江蘇	安徽	江西	湖南	湖北	福建
1902	800,000	993,000	1,268,000	2,752,500	1,257,000	2,136,000	1,004,000	1,612,000	560,000	
1903	800,000	993,000	1,268,000	2,752,500	1,257,000	2,136,000	1,004,000	1,612,000	560,000	
1904	800,000	993,000	1,268,000	2,752,500	1,257,000	2,136,000	1,004,000	1,612,000	560,000	
1905	800,000	993,000	1,268,000	2,752,500	1,257,000	2,136,000	1,004,000	1,612,000	560,000	
1906	800,000	993,000	1,268,000	2,752,500	1,257,000	2,136,000	1,004,000	1,612,000	560,000	
1907	800,000	993,000	1,268,000	2,752,500	1,257,000	2,136,000	1,004,000	1,612,000	560,000	
1908	800,000	993,000	1,268,000	2,752,500	1,257,000	2,136,000	1,004,000	1,612,000	560,000	
1909	800,000	993,000	1,268,000	2,752,500	1,257,000	2,136,000	1,004,000	1,612,000	560,000	
1910	800,000	993,000	1,268,000	2,752,500	1,257,000	2,136,000	1,004,000	1,612,000	560,000	
總計	7,200,000	8,937,000	11,412,000	24,772,500	11,313,000	19,224,000	9,036,000	14,508,000	5,040,000	

- * 本表根據諭旨彙存，閩粵彙編，華制存考等書彙編之關稅統計重覆一律扣除，並因軍艦之數目詳折精確在前者之上。
- 1 此項統計係本省每年認募900,000兩，撥部款項改歸賠款93,000兩，後項中有東海關應解銀15,000兩，不見於軍艦關稅報告仍一併列此以待續考。
 - 2 此項統計係本省每年認募2,400,000兩並撥部款項改歸賠款銀352,500兩共為2,752,500兩之數，此外原報告中包括金陵關100,000兩及關稅撥部改歸賠款之部分一併扣除。
 - 3 此項統計係本省每年認募1,200,000兩漕折銀160,000兩撥部餉項改歸賠款銀252,000兩共銀1,612,000兩，惟第三項撥部餉項內有練兵加餉一項從光緒二十八年十二月起係由滬關每月於增收開稅項下提撥銀10,000兩，年共120,000兩，該項數目不見於軍艦滬關報告，茲仍一併列此。以待續考。
 - 4 此係本省每年認募之數，此外閩海關洋藥釐項下每年撥銀240,000兩因軍艦報告重覆未列入，但本省撥部款項改歸賠款部分無數字可稽，不知是報告闕如，抑該省根本無此項改歸賠款項目，仍待續考。

表十 各省歷年攤還庚子賠款數目 (續)

年份	浙江	廣東	廣西	山西	陝西	四川	貴州	甘肅	新疆	總計
1902	1,364,000	2,231,000	300,000	1,163,000	704,000	2,268,000	200,000	200,000	400,000	21,212,500
1903	1,364,000	2,231,000	250,000	1,163,000	704,000	2,268,000	200,000	200,000	400,000	21,162,500
1904	1,364,000	2,231,000	225,000	1,163,000	704,000	2,268,000	200,000	200,000	400,000	21,137,500
1905	1,364,000	2,231,000	300,000	1,163,000	704,000	2,268,000	200,000	200,000	400,000	21,212,500
1906	1,364,000	2,231,000	300,000	1,163,000	704,000	2,268,000	200,000	200,000	400,000	21,212,500
1907	1,364,000	2,231,000	300,000	1,163,000	704,000	2,268,000	200,000	200,000	400,000	21,212,500
1908	1,364,000	2,231,000	300,000	1,163,000	704,000	2,268,000	200,000	200,000	400,000	21,212,500
1909	1,364,000	2,231,000	300,000	1,163,000	704,000	2,268,000	200,000	200,000	400,000	21,212,500
1910	1,364,000	2,231,000	300,000	1,163,000	704,000	2,268,000	200,000	200,000	400,000	21,212,500
總計	12,276,000	20,079,000	2,575,000	10,467,000	6,336,000	20,412,000	1,800,000	1,800,000	3,600,000	190,787,500

5 此項為本省每年總籌及撥部改歸賠款之總和，此外由杭州關每年撥撥銀180,000兩，因與軍糧重複已扣除。

6 該省從光緒二十九年十月起因無款可解，部准停解五個月至光緒三十年三月照解。

7 本省每年總籌300,000兩，但其中100,000兩係由閩海關每年從屬解餉內改撥，所餘200,000兩則由安徽省代解。

還數目及各省解部改撥部分總計列如第十表（釐金攤還賠款數目另有分析，列為附表於後）。

綜看各省歸還數目除光緒二十九年廣西因無款可解一度停頓外，皆一律照解，合之解部改撥一部分統計每年總數平均為二千一百二十一萬二千五百兩。再合之關稅部分，全國用以攤還庚子賠款之稅銀每年約在二千五百萬兩左右。茲再將全國總表列下。

五次賠款的分析已如上述。前三次除英法賠款開關稅擔保的惡例外，在財政上均無重大影響。惟日本賠款與庚子賠款關係甚鉅。前者在近代財政史上為劃時代的事件，後者為

表十一 各省關歷年攤還庚子賠款總數*

（單位海關兩）

年代 ¹	各省攤還數	各關攤還數	總計
1902	21,212,500	3,192,403	24,404,903
1903	21,162,500	3,005,368	24,167,868
1904	21,137,500	4,421,520	25,559,020
1905	21,212,500	3,757,456	24,969,956
1906	21,212,500	4,169,298	25,381,798
1907	21,212,500	4,108,983	25,321,483
1908	21,212,500	3,846,132	25,058,632
1909	21,212,500	3,812,840	25,025,340
1910	21,212,500	3,514,839	24,727,339
總計	190,787,500	33,828,839	224,616,339

* 本表根據表九、表十編成。

1 各省份從1902—1910均自本年一月一日至十二月三十一日為一年，各關年份1902除係一月一日至九月三十日，1903—1910均自上年十月一日起至本年九月三十日為一年。

促成清季財政總崩潰的主因。

中日戰爭以前，中國的財政是日趨於穩定的，所負的外債不過數十萬兩，同時關稅的增加，釐金的暢旺，每年政府的財政足以維持平衡有餘。海軍的建設，鐵路的修築，船廠的設立，電報電話的敷設都是這時候財政上軌道後的新事業。甲午一役則外債突增至四萬萬兩左右²⁷，平均每年須還債二千餘萬兩，換言之，每年歲出須增加二千餘萬兩。此時賠款的難關雖然避過，但財政的平衡從此長期破壞。以往量入為出的原則與稅源不變的政策無法維繫了，這是近代財政史上一個很大的轉變。

庚子以後，賠款的負擔復增，中國的財政益達於複雜紛亂的局面。以後數年中政府雖搜盡各種稅源以資應付，但因中國究非現代式的國家，政府的理財，國民的經濟能力，與百年前的情形無大改進，而欲一時負起現代式國家的債務，其所感受之困難，殆為必然之事。在此山窮水盡的局面下政府勢非求新的開展不可，光緒末年的財政大改革，即起因於此。

附表一 戶部及各省籌還庚子賠款數目及來源表*
(單位海關兩)

各省款項來源	額數
直隸 本省認籌共計	800,000
津海關常稅	600,000
長蘆	200,000
部撥款項共計	58,000
部撥山海關應解放俸餉	12,000

²⁷ 民國以前海關擔保之外債，中國近代經濟史研究集刊第三卷第一期。

附表一 戶部及各省籌還庚子賠款數目及來源表 (續)

各省款項來源	額	數
部撥山海關應解加復俸餉	6,000	
部撥津海關應解加放俸餉	20,000	
部撥津海關應解加復俸餉	12,000	
部撥本省應解加復俸餉	8,000	
全省共計	858,000	
安徽 本省認籌共計	1,000,000	
鹽斤加價	266,000	
督辦籌議公所布政使等籌措	+	
部撥款項共計	257,000	
部撥本省應解加復俸餉	7,000	
部撥本省應解旗兵加餉	40,000	
部撥本省應解加增邊防經費	30,000	
部撥本省應解舊案漕折	180,000	
全省共計	1,257,000	
湖南 本省認籌共計	700,000	
鹽斤加價	+	
稅契	+	
加抽土藥	+	
部撥款項共計	304,000	
部撥本省應解加復俸餉	8,000	
部撥本省應解旗兵加餉	120,000	
部撥本省應解加增邊防經費	16,000	
部撥本省應解舊案漕折	160,000	
全省共計	1,004,000	

附表一 戶部及各省籌還庚子賠款數目及來源表 (續)

各省款項來源	額數
廣西 本省認籌共計	300,000
司庫正雜項	+
土藥釐稅	+
釐金	+
鹽茶正稅	+
契稅	+
梧州常稅	+
浙江 本省認籌共計	1,400,000
藩庫正雜各款	+
鹽斤加價	+
杭州關	180,000
糧道庫	+
部撥款項共計	164,000
部撥本省應解加放俸餉	100,000
部撥浙江關應解加放俸餉	20,000
部撥本省應解加增邊防經費	32,000
部撥本省應解加復俸餉	12,000
全省共計	1,564,000
廣東 本省認籌共計	2,000,000
鹽斤加價	232,000
煙酒茶糖土藥加釐	+
房捐	+
沙捐	+
新案二成裁兵餘餉	+

附表一 戶部及各省籌還庚子賠款數目及來源表(續)

各省款項來源	額	數
司庫正雜各款		+
部撥款項共計		319,000
部撥本省應解加放俸餉		100,000
部撥粵海關應解加放俸餉		24,000
部撥本省應解加復俸餉		15,000
部撥粵海關應解加復俸餉		40,000
部撥本省應解旗兵加餉		100,000
部撥本省應解加增邊防經費		16,000
部撥粵海關應解加增邊防經費		24,000
全省共計		2,319,000
山西 本省認籌共計		900,000
藩庫		662,000
河東鹽課		180,000
河東攤捐		58,000
部撥款項共計		263,000
部撥本省應解加復俸餉		3,000
部撥本省應解旗兵加餉		240,000
部撥本省應解加增邊防經費		20,000
全省共計		1,163,000
山東 本省認籌共計		900,000
藩庫		300,000
運庫		300,000
道庫		300,000
部撥款項共計		93,000

附表一 戶部及各省籌還庚子賠款數目及來源表 (續)

各省款項來源	額數
部撥東海關應解加放俸餉	20,000
部撥東海關應解加復俸餉	5,000
部撥本省應解加復俸餉	7,000
部撥本省應解加增邊防經費	34,000
部撥本省應解旗兵加餉	27,000
全省共計	993,000
河南 本省認籌共計	900,000
藩庫	500,000
道庫	160,000
蘆鹽加價	240,000
部撥款項共計	368,000
部撥本省應解加復俸餉	8,000
部撥本省應解旗兵加餉	100,000
部撥本省應解舊案漕折	260,000
全省共計	1,268,000
江蘇 本省認籌共計	2,500,000
寧藩司	400,000
蘇藩司	800,000
兩淮運司	230,000
八處鹽斤加價	970,000
金陵關稅	100,000
部撥款項共計	472,500
部撥江海關應解加放俸餉	20,000
部撥鎮江關應解加放俸餉	20,000

附表一 戶部及各省籌還庚子賠款數目及來源表 (續)

各省款項來源	額	數
部撥江海關應解復加俸餉	20,000	
部撥本省應解加復俸餉	22,500	
部撥本省應解旗兵加餉	330,000	
部撥本省應解邊防經費	16,000	
部撥江海關應解邊防經費	20,000	
部撥兩淮鹽款應解邊防經費	24,000	
全省共計	2,972,300	
江西 本省認籌共計	1,400,000	
淮鹽加價	280,000	
浙鹽加價	+	
司庫各款	+	
釐金項下動放	+	
部撥款項共計	766,000	
部撥九江關應解加放俸餉	24,000	
部撥九江關應解加復俸餉	6,000	
部撥本省應解加復俸餉	10,000	
部撥本省應解旗兵加餉	100,000	
部撥本省應解加增邊防經費	26,000	
部撥本省應解舊案漕折	600,000	
全省共計	2,166,000	
湖北 本省認籌共計	1,200,000	
土藥專款	+	
部撥款項共計	474,000	
部撥本省應解加放俸餉	100,000	

附表一 戶部及各省籌還庚子賠款數目及來源表（續）

各省款項來源	額	數
部撥江漢關應解加放俸餉	16,000	
部撥本省應解加復俸餉	16,000	
部撥江漢關應解加復俸餉	10,000	
部撥本省應解旗兵加餉	120,000	
部撥本省應解加增邊防經費	32,000	
部撥江漢關應解加增邊防經費	20,000	
部撥本省應解舊案漕折	160,000	
全省共計	1,674,000	
福建 本省認籌共計	800,000	
司道庫解	560,000	
閩海關藥釐	240,000	
部撥款項共計	190,000	
部撥本省應解加放俸餉	100,000	
部撥閩海關應解加放俸餉	24,000	
部撥本省應解加復俸餉	10,000	
部撥閩海關應解加復俸餉	20,000	
部撥本省應解加增邊防經費	16,000	
部撥閩海關應解加增邊防經費	20,000	
全省共計	990,000	
陝西 本省認籌共計	600,000	
鹽斤加價	+	
本省捐輸	+	
部撥款項共計	104,000	
部撥本省應解加復俸餉	4 000	

附表一 戶部及各省籌還庚子賠款數目及來源表 (續)

各省款項來源	額	數
部撥本省應解旗兵加餉	100,000	
全省共計	704,000	
貴州 本省認籌共計	200,000	
司庫籌撥	+	
善後局撥	+	
糧儲道撥	+	
甘肅 本省認籌共計	300,000	
閩海關由協餉內代解	100,000	
安徽由協餉內代解	200,000	
四川 本省認籌共計	2,200,000	
鹽斤加價	659,036	
司庫新捐肉贖田房稅契捐輸 等款	+	
部撥款項共計	68,000	
部撥本省應解加復俸餉	14,000	
部撥本省應解加增邊防經費	46,000	
部撥差關應解加增邊防經費	8,000	
全省共計	2,268,000	
雲南 本省認籌共計	300,000	
新疆 本省認籌共計	400,000	
兩淮由協餉代解	+	
江蘇由協餉代解	+	
江西由協餉代解	+	
全 國 總 計	22,700,500	

* 本表根據財政部編各省應解京洋賠各款剔除由鹽關項下撥解數目應解總數表暨分省清單，並參考諭摺彙存，關鈔彙編，華制存考等史料編成。

十 各項細數不詳。

附表二 各關歷年關餘歸還庚子賠款數目表*

(單位海關兩)

年 代	鎮江關	金陵關	蕪湖關	江漢關	杭州關	閩海關	東海關	津海關	總 計
1902	—	85,000 ³	—	—	135,000	180,000	—	549,982	949,982
1903	10,000 ²	100,000	—	—	180,000	240,000	—	250,746	780,746
1904	—	100,000	—	200,000	180,000	340,000 ⁴	—	396,573	1,216,573
1905	100,000	100,000	100,000	—	245,000	340,000	100,000	329,684	1,314,684
1906	—	108,333	—	—	165,000	340,000	—	312,651	925,984
1907	—	100,000	—	—	180,000	340,000	—	—	620,000
1908	—	100,000	—	—	195,000	340,000	—	—	635,000
1909	—	108,333	—	—	180,000	340,000	—	—	628,333
1910	—	100,000	—	—	180,000	340,000	—	—	620,000
總 計	110,000	901,667	100,000	200,000	1,640,000	2,800,000	100,000	1,839,636	7,691,302

* 本表根據單據各督撫咨海關監督報告七十餘件並參考論議彙存，及華制存考等史料編成。

1 年份從本年一月一日起至九月三十日止，1903—19010均自上年十月一日起至本年九月三十日為一年。

2 此數係代雲南省整解賠款。

3 內有代雲南省整解賠款銀10,000兩。

4 1904—1910每年內有閩海關由六成洋稅項下撥甘餉抵賠款銀100,000兩。

附表三 各關歷年實際5%增稅歸還庚子賠款數目表*

(單位海關兩)

年代	江海關	蘇州關	鎮江關	金陵關	蕪湖關	九江關	江漢關	岳州關	長沙關	宜昌關	重慶關	杭州關
1902	900,000	2,228	33,636	1,255	—	3,245	61,620	4,380	—	—	—	8,649
1903	600,000	4,420	32,369	1,701	4,060	5,221	38,878	16,556	—	791	—	21,325
1904	900,000	7,006	38,727	1,237	—	4,385	38,830	13,962	—	2,044	—	50,867
1905	900,000	9,473	39,983	1,613	—	24,272	44,255	5,033	—	1,677	—	53,550
1906	900,000	11,470	60,252	2,745	—	4,704	66,369	2,805	134	976	—	32,558
1907	1,381,500	13,166	73,730	9,214	—	6,806	86,248	4,085	921	2,043	2,573	65,696
1908	1,440,000	13,091	47,556	12,525	—	6,335	180,908	18,673	1,476	1,125	4,825	99,731
1909	1,440,000	19,890	52,966	10,294	—	7,000	105,097	14,133	743	990	2,912	59,093
1910	1,440,000	11,242	19,694 ²	7,016	—	6,941	35,154 ³	5,764	1,238	2,337	*	96,074
總計	10,210,500	91,986	398,853	47,600	4,060	68,915	657,359	85,391	4,512	11,986	10,310	487,543

* 本表根據單據各實撫各海關報告九百餘件並參考海關彙存，關鈔彙編，及華制存考等史料編成。
 1 年份從本年一月一日起至九月三十日止。1903—1910均自上年十月一日起至本年九月三十日為一年。
 2 此數為197—198兩結數目共199—200結報告均闕如。
 3 此數為197結一結數共198—200結報告均闕如。
 * 係報告闕如。

附表三 各關歷年實際 5% 增稅歸還庚子賠款數目表 (續)

年代	浙海關	甌海關	閩海關	粵海關	梧州關	南寧關	東海關	津海關	秦王島關	牛莊關	總計
1902	35,255	213	87,900	600,000	20,858		108,566				1,867,805
1903	46,740	182	36,000	600,000	—		50,219				1,758,402
1904	49,710	200	96,000 ⁴	600,000	109,198		55,394				1,967,563
1905	45,646	174	96,000	600,000	51,735		62,393				1,935,804
1906	55,245	239	96,000	600,000	67,641	—	54,218	798,702			2,754,058
1907	61,037	98	96,000	600,000	75,670	64	24,548	473,097			2,976,496
1908	30,790	108	96,000	311,845	74,007	1,673	24,286	327,262			2,692,222
1909	31,145	77	96,000	342,447	64,669	2,411	24,978	298,243	612	97,652	2,671,352
1910	14,037	113	96,000	74,829 ⁵	50,519	4,561	17,205	385,478	2,580	121,394	2,392,196
總計	369,605	1,425	795,900	4,329,12,	514,297	8,709	421,807	2,282,781	3,193	219,046	21,015,898

4 1904—1910每年內有50里內常關稅收60,000兩(即每月5,000兩)應抵賠款者，見於輪捐彙存而不見於檔案海關報
告，願保單獨報告茲一併統計於此因按每均50里內常關稅收應歸海關其他50里內常關稅收皆併入海關報告。

5 粵海關此數祇197結一結數其198—200結報告闕如。

附表四 各關歷年加放俸餉改還庚子賠款數目表*

(單位海關兩)

年 代	江海關	鎮江關	九江關	江漢關	閩海關	粵海關	津海關	牛莊關	總 計
1902	20,000	20,000	24,000	—	24,000	24,000			112,000
1903	20,000	20,000	24,000	16,000	24,000	24,000	20,000	—	148,000
1904	20,000	20,000	24,000	16,000	24,000	24,000	—	—	128,000
1905	20,000	20,000	24,000	16,000	24,000	24,000	—	—	128,000
1906	20,000	20,000	24,000	16,000	24,000	24,000	—	—	128,000
1907	20,000	20,000	24,000	16,000	24,000	24,000	15,000	12,000	155,000
1908	20,000	20,000	24,000	16,000	24,000	24,000	25,000	12,000	165,000
1909	20,000	20,000	24,000	16,000	30,000	24,000	20,000	12,000	166,000
1910	20,000	20,000	24,000	16,000	18,000	24,000	20,000	12,000	154,000
總 計	180,000	180,000	216,000	128,000	216,000	216,000	100,000	48,000	1,284,000

* 本表根據單檔各海關監督報告二百餘件並參考海關摺存，開列彙編，單制存考等史料編成。如單檔有缺者即根據後列各書數目補入。

1 年份從本年一月一日起至九月三十日止。1903—1910均自上年十月一日起至本年九月三十日為一年。

附表五 各關歷年增加增東北邊防經費及旗兵加餉改還庚子賠款數目表*

年 代	江 海 關	鎮 江 關	江 漢 關	閩 海 關	粵 海 關	津 海 關	總 計
1902	50,000	7,500	20,000	20,000	64,000	10,000	171,500
1903	50,000	10,000	20,000	20,000	64,000	10,000	174,000
1904	830,000 ²	10,000	20,000	20,000	64,000	10,000	954,000
1905	80,000	10,000	20,000	20,000	64,000	10,000	204,000
1906	52,500	10,000	20,000	20,000	64,000	10,000	176,000
1907	50,000	10,000	20,000	20,000	64,000	10,000	174,000
1908	50,000	10,000	20,000	20,000	64,000	10,000	174,000
1909	50,000	10,000	20,000	20,000	64,000	10,000	174,000
1910	50,000	10,000	20,000	20,000	64,000	10,000	174,000
總 計	1,262,500	87,500	180,000	180,000	576,000	90,000	2,376,000

* 本表根據軍艦各管轄各海關監督報告二百餘件並參考論謂彙存，閩粵彙編，及華制存考等史料編成。
 1 年份從本年一月一日起至九月三十日止。1903—1910均自上年十月一日起至本年九月三十日為一年。
 2 內有應提武衛軍餉作抵賠款銀780,000兩。

附表六 各關歷年傾鎔火耗一半改還庚子賠款數目表*

(單位海關兩)

年 代 ¹	江海關	蘇州關	鎮江關	金陵關	蕪湖關	九江關	江 漢 關	岳州關	長沙關	沙市關	宜昌關	重慶關	杭州關	浙海關
1902	45,537 ²	382	4,400	828	2,177	4,008	8,552			61	2,058	1,053	662	686
1903	58,394	411	6,937	1,147	6,798	3,836	15,571			155	1,660	2,040	3,229	2,661
1904	67,474	426	7,327	1,412	5,347	4,470	15,447	—	127	106	2,841	2,654	4,276	4,171
1905	63,848	588	6,936	1,229	6,908	4,128	15,478	—	487	100	5,312	3,496	3,804	3,809
1906	72,490	706	7,445	1,210	5,033	4,022	15,279	—	472	85	4,327	3,442	3,485	3,555
1907	63,643	676	7,514	1,522	3,579	4,631	15,561	—	476	88	3,848	2,842	4,021	3,745
1908	54,382	579	7,255	1,250	5,338	4,347	19,146	1,986 ³	1,173	89	5,368	3,779	3,954	4,211
1909	57,222	788	7,015	708	4,603	3,785	16,879	734	1,250	93	3,938	4,071	3,906	3,491
1910	57,706	531	5,986 ³	706	3,447	4,425	18,461 ⁴	173	1,150	72	3,402	3,438	3,889	3,537
總 計	540,696	5,033	60,815	10,052	43,230	37,652	140,374	2,893	5,135	849	32,754	26,815	31,226	29,866

* 本表係根據各關各管換各海關監督報告一千零數十件並參考偷稅彙存，開列彙編，華制存考等史料編成。

1 年份從本年一月一日起至九月三十日止。1903—1910均自上年十月一日起至本年九月三十日為一年。

2 江海關1902—1903並1910年報告開列根據稅務司海關報告該年收入平均補入。

3 此年報告開列如更換稅務司海關報告該年收入平均補入。

4 同(3)註。

5 此數為1902—1908總數。

附表六 各關歷年傾鎔火耗一半改還庚子賠款數目表 (續)

年代	甌海關	粵海關	梧州關	南寧關	鎮南關	蒙自關	思茅關	騰越關	東海關	津海關	秦王島關	牛莊關	總計
1902	377	15,840 ⁶	—		23	874	—	44	3,608 ⁶	—			91,116
1903	468	16,655	5,149		19	932	136	253	4,383	13,386			144,220
1904	353	17,996	3,017		65	1,292	47	314	4,337	11,885			155,384
1905	314	30,432	3,311		77	1,438	42	276	4,693	18,262			174,968
1906	369	33,064	2,818	—	39	1,731	40	235	4,587	20,314	8	—	184,756
1907	308	35,387	3,070	81	48	1,351	42	283	3,373	20,701	189	6,544	183,487
1908	391	34,911	2,831	315	41	1,205	33	291	6,642	15,515	27	7,809	179,910
1909	378	34,775	3,104	422	42	1,066	38	264	3,916	15,197	38	5,432	173,155
1910	388	32,624 ⁷	3,600	559	38 ⁸	1,315	36	276	3,637	19,512	90	5,645	174,643
總計	3,346	251,684	26,900	1,377	392	11,204	416	2,236	36,140	134,772	352	25,430	1,461,639

6 粵海關1902—1904洋藥稅釐報告則知，但1904年內燕缺兩個月零九天，此項洋藥釐大稅數目甚小，未加估計，亦未估計。

7 同(3)註。

8 同(3)註。

9 1902—1910洋藥釐金報告則知根據稅務司海關報告該關收入平均補入。

附表七 各省釐金歷年攤還庚子賠款數目表*

(單位庫平兩)

年 代	江 蘇	山 西	湖 南	總 計
光緒27年 (1901)	6,607	—	—	6,607
28 (1902)	242,925	84,589	16,083	293,597
29 (1903)	246,228	110,153	16,083	372,464
30 (1904)	110,705	98,668	16,083	225,456
31 (1905)	103,168	170,238	16,083	289,489
32 (1906)	103,168	37,073	16,083	156,324
33 (1907)	39,641	119,046	16,083	174,772
34 (1908)	39,641	110,373	15,412	165,423
總 計	892,083	680,140	111,910	1,684,133

* 本表根據單據各省釐金局報告五十餘件編成。

Economic Aspects of Public Works in Imperial China

by

Lien-sheng Yang

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I. Introduction

THIS is the first in a series of four essays on the economic aspects of public works in imperial China.* The period to be covered extends from the unification of China by the Ch'in dynasty in 221 B.C. to the end of the Ch'ing dynasty in 1912. The first lecture will consist of introductory remarks. The other three

* This is the English text of a series of four lectures delivered in French at the Collège de France in March, 1962. My sincere thanks go to Professor M. M. Postan, who first suggested this subject to me in 1956, to Dr. John L. Bishop for editing my original draft in English, to Dr. Donald Holzman for making a preliminary French version, and above all to Professor Paul Demille for all his encouragement and help without which I would not have dared to give and publish these lectures in French. The French version, dedicated to Professor Demiéville with respect and affection, was published by the Collège de France in 1964. For the twenty-four standard histories, I have used the T'ung-wen shu-chü 同文書局 reproduction (1894) of the palace edition (1739).

lectures will deal with the problems of labor, materials and financing, and economic thought in that order. Although I propose to devote my attention mainly to the economic aspects of public works, I shall also make some observations on other aspects, especially their political and religious significance; I may even have occasion to touch upon art and engineering.

Chinese history is full of famous major public works. To give a few examples at random, one may recall the Great Walls along the northern border of China Proper; the Grand Canal that links the Peking area with the lower Yangtse Valley; the numerous palaces and mausoleums in and near the various imperial capitals, such as Ch'ang-an, Lo-yang, Nanking, and Peking; and Buddhist temples with their towering pagodas and impressive grottos containing magnificent sculptures and wall paintings. The list would seem endless if one began to count also relatively less well known constructions.

Public works can be classified in various ways according to their scale or function. An attempt at classification has been made by Karl A. Wittfogel in his volume entitled *Oriental Despotism, A Study of Total Power*, where the following types of construction works are listed (page 42):

I. Hydraulic works

- A. Productive installations (canals, aqueducts, reservoirs, sluices, and dikes for the purpose of irri-

gation)

- B. Protective installations (drainage canals and dikes for flood control)
 - C. Aqueducts providing water
 - D. Navigation canals
- II. Nonhydraulic works
- A. Works of defense and communication
 - 1. Walls and other structures of defense
 - 2. Highways
 - B. Edifices serving the public and personal needs of the secular and religious masters of hydraulic society
 - 1. Palaces and capital cities
 - 2. Tombs
 - 3. Temples

Personally I am rather dubious about the usefulness of the concept of hydraulic society as developed by Wittfogel, but his list of types of public works is convenient and comprehensive enough to serve as a checklist. Perhaps under highways one should add bridges as another major category of works of communication. As will be demonstrated in the following discussions, we can learn quite a few things from the history of the construction and maintenance of bridges in imperial China.

One may ask: since the subject of public works is so large, why not limit oneself to a single dynasty? Why be so ambitious as to take the whole range of imperial China, covering more than twenty-one centuries of history? The objection is already partly answered

in the foreword to my *Studies in Chinese Institutional History*, a collection of nine of my essays that first appeared in the *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*. In the foreword, I said:

Several of the articles are general surveys covering centuries or even millennia of Chinese history. In theory, a broad survey should base itself on detailed studies of various shorter periods, such as the course of major and minor dynasties. But such studies are not always available. Meanwhile, a preliminary account of certain institutions throughout the ages may serve to stimulate investigation. Indeed, the field of Chinese institutional history is like a vast beach after ebb tide. Whatever value these articles may have, they are hardly more than a few pebbles or shells gathered by one beachcomber in the course of a decade. It is hoped that they may encourage and aid fellow scholars to make more valuable findings.

My study of public works in imperial China has not reached its final form. Not all the materials have been gathered, and my interpretations may still fall short of a high degree of sophistication. Nevertheless, I wish to present my few findings with the hope that some of my eminent colleagues will enlighten me with their thoughts and comments, and enable me to pursue this study.

Students of Chinese history naturally expect a study of the economic aspects of public works in imperial China to throw some light on the nature of the Chinese state and society. Certain features in public works may appear quite stable throughout traditional China, wher-

as other features may reveal changes more readily discernible. Modern scholars have for several decades debated the importance of hydraulic works in traditional China and the nature of their influence on the Chinese state and society. The problems involved are by no means simple. When one investigates the role of government in public hydraulic works, one should distinguish the central government from the local government, and further distinguish the various levels of the local government, and further distinguish the various levels of the local government--provincial, prefectural, and district--from one another. When one investigates the role of local leadership, one should be clear about the social station of such local leaders; for instance, whether they were office or degree holders in their home districts or whether they were plain landlords or businessmen. In certain cases, leadership may have come from a Buddhist monk or a Taoist priest, whether sponsored by a monastery or not. One should also take into consideration the different stages of a project, from its initiation or proposal and, if a major project, the permission of the authorities to carry it out to the actual completion of the work. Different sectors of the state and society may be involved in the different stages. Any attempt to generalize without recognizing all these problems must be considered merely sketchy and of limited value.

Before making further comments on hydraulic works, I wish to point out one thing that should be obvious;

namely, that the student of Chinese history should be adequately equipped in philology. Lacking this requirement, the student may become an amateur in Chinese studies but never a sound Sinologist. After all, the major source of Chinese history is still texts, although both archaeological material and oral tradition are important. Textual criticism, a major tool of philology, teaches the student to be extremely careful about the text he uses. Other philological apparatuses help the student to reach a correct understanding of the meaning of a text once it is established. These, I admit, do not constitute Sinology, but they do serve as its foundation. Even veteran scholars can make mistakes if they happen to slacken their attention to philology. A couple of examples may illustrate this point.

Example 1: In Wittfogel's *Oriental Despotism* we find the following paragraph: "The highways of imperial China required an enormous labor force for their construction and a very sizable one for their maintenance. A Han inscription notes that the construction of a certain highway in the years A. D. 63-66 occupied 766,800 men. Of this great number only 2,690 were convicts" (page 39). I have no quarrel with the first statement on the large labor force required for the construction and maintenance of highways in imperial China. The illustration from the Han inscription, however, is very strange. Here perhaps Wittfogel was trying to prove that under the Han dynasty corvée labor was much more important

than convict labor. The text, however, does not prove this contention at all. A reading of the inscription reveals that the figure 766, 800 referred to the total number of man-days worked by the 2, 690 convicts who constituted the total working force. Apparently in this particular case, no armies of corvée labor were involved.¹

Example 2: The *Shih-huo chih* 食貨志 or "Economic Treatise" of the *Ming shih* records that in the reign of Wu-tsung 武宗 (1506-1521) the T'ai-su tien 太素殿 or Throne Hall of Great Plainness was rebuilt. The building was richly decorated and the total cost was given as *erh-ch'ien-yü-wan liang* 二千餘萬兩, over twenty million taels of silver. In his lecture notes on Ming history, the late Meng Sen 孟森 of Peking University remarked that the figure was shockingly large, but accepted it because the same figure also can be found in the *Ming shih kao* 明史稿 or *Draft Ming History*. Meng severely criticized the Ming emperor for his excessive lavishness and for his failure to live up to the name given by his ancestor to this throne hall, namely, Great Plainness.² In a recent annotated translation of the "Economic Treatise" of the *Ming History* by a group of Japanese scholars headed by Wada Sei, we find no comments on this fig-

¹ Wang Ch'ang 王昶 *Chin shih ts'ui pien* 金石萃編 (Ching-hsün-t'ang 經訓堂 ed.), 5, 13a-b. Also see Ch'en Ming-ta 陳明達, article entitled 袁斜道石門及其石刻 in *Wen-wu* 文物 1561.4, 5, pp. 57-61.

² MenSen, *Ming tai shih* 明代史 (1957), p.253.

ure except a reference to the *Shih-lu* or *Veritable Records* of the Ming dynasty.³ It is true that the printed edition of the *Ming Shih-lu* gives the same figure. However, Hsia Hsieh 夏燮 in his *Ming T'ung-chien* 明通鑑 and T'an Ch'ien 談遷 in his *Kuo ch'üeh* 國權 both give the figure as *erh-shih-yü-wan-liang* 二十餘萬兩, over two hundred thousand taels of silver.⁴ Since the statements of Hsia and T'an may have been based on better editions of the *Veritable Records* or some other reliable source, it seems reasonable to assume that the character *ch'ien* 千 was a copyist's error for *shih* 十, the difference between the two characters being a single stroke. The smaller figure certainly is much more in line with other figures of expenditure on the construction or repair of palaces during the Ming dynasty.

To return to the relationship between public works and the nature of the Chinese state and society, we may take as our point of departure a recent article by Denis Twitchett entitled, "Some Remarks on Irrigation under the T'ang." In this illuminating article, Twitchett ably demonstrates the essentially decentralized nature

³ *Minshi shokkashi yakuchu* 明史食貨志譯註 (1957), p. 271. *Ming Wu-tsung shih-lu* 明武宗實錄, 127.6a (in the year 1515). The *Wu-tsung shih-lu* as quoted in *Ku-chin t'u-shu chi-ch'eng*, 'Kao-kung tien 考工典, 44.4a, however, gives *erh-shih-wan liang*.

⁴ *Ming t'ung-chien*, vol. 46, 1959 ed., p. 1718; *Kuo ch'üeh*, vol. 49, 1958 ed., p. 3088. I am indebted to Huang Chang-chien 黃彰健 of the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica, for a discussion on this point and for the reference to the *Kuo ch'üeh*.

of irrigation work during the T'ang period.⁵ He points out the limited role played by the two central government agencies, namely, the Shui-pu 水部 or Department or Section of Waterways and the Tu-shui-chien 都水監 or Directorate of Waterways. He stresses the initiation of projects by local government officials, especially the prefects and magistrates, and the importance of locally organized groups known as the *ch'ü-jen* 渠人 or "workers on the irrigation canals" in the actual carrying out of the work.

In a concluding paragraph, Twitchett writes,

A field of activity such as irrigation, which was virtually left to the individual initiative of such officials, with their strong local ties, and which was subject to no effective central policy or control, can hardly be considered a primary preoccupation of a Total Despotism of the type envisaged by Wittfogel. Water control (leaving aside circumstances of wide scale catastrophe) in T'ang China was merely one of the spheres of activity--the conduct of agriculture was another--over which, since it was essential for the wellbeing of the state that they should function effectively, local officials were supposed to keep a watchful eye. The basic arrangements were made at the sub-bureaucratic level, and the government intervened only when coordination was essential.

This study by Twitchett is based on a careful scru-

⁵ Denis Twitchett, "Some Remarks on Irrigation under the T'ang", *TP*, 48.1-3; 175-194.

tiny of the available sources, including not only the important historical works but also contemporary documents, especially those from the famous site of Tun-huang. His conclusions are supported by studies of other scholars. For instance, Chung-li Chang, in his valuable book *The Chinese Gentry: Studies on Their Role in Nineteenth Century Chinese Society* (1955), devotes a long section to the gentry's role in public works.⁶ This solid study is based on a variety of sources, especially local gazetteers. The following general remarks quoted from his book apply not only to the nineteenth century, but to the Ch'ing dynasty as a whole. "A great deal of the practical management of local affairs was in the hands of the gentry. Numerous examples in local gazetteers show their very frequent activities in such public works as the repairing of roads, the building of bridges, the dredging of rivers, the construction of dikes, and the promotion of irrigation projects" (page 56). "In projects covering a larger area, a number of gentry would pool their resources and their abilities to plan and carry through the work. Members of the upper gentry usually took the lead. Often the provincial officials stepped in to direct or assist in coordinating the work of the various districts concerned. But whether the projects were directed by officials or by gentry, the latter shouldered

⁶ Pages 56-62, 64, 68.

the main burden of the execution" (page 57). "In some gazetteers the officials were credited with the responsibility for large irrigation projects. But where further information is given in attached memorials, reports, or articles, in almost all cases the gentry are described as active participants in the carrying out of these projects" (page 59).

The importance of gentry or other local leadership in public works in prefectures and districts was observed by earlier scholars. Some very interesting remarks were made by the nineteenth-century scholar Shen Yao 沈堯. In his *Lo-fan-lou wen-chi* 落帆樓文集 we find the biographical account of a certain Hsieh Wei 謝維, a wealthy man from Shao-hsing, Chekiang, who was public-spirited enough to rebuild a bridge, T'ai-p'ing ch'iao 太平橋 in his prefecture. Hsieh's grandson went to Peking to take the *chin-shih* examination in 1834, met Shen Yao there, and asked him to write his grandfather's biography. At the end of the biography, Shen made the following remarks: "In the T'ang period, construction works in the prefectures and districts were left at the discretion of the prefects and magistrates. From Sung times on, such works often required a petition to higher authorities. The prefect and magistrate were not allowed to make free use of a penny. When the funds requested were not sufficient, the work tended to be defective. Therefore the heads of the local government began to need help and public-spirited, wealthy

men undertook to assist the government in construction projects.”⁷ Then Shen cited an example in Sung times, based on an article in the collected works of Wang An-shih. The case involved the building and reconstruction of city walls and houses in Hsin-chou in modern Kiangsi after damage by a flood in 1050.⁸ Another example was cited from the Chin dynasty, in which a local wealthy man in Shansi smoothed a rocky road and built a bridge. His biography is found in the collected works of Yao Sui 姚燧 of the Yüan dynasty.⁹ Two more cases from Chin and Yüan times were cited from the collected works of another Yüan author, Yü Chi 虞集. Both involved the repair or construction of bridges by local wealthy men, one in 1135 and the other in 1324.¹⁰ Having noted that this seems to have been the trend in later times, Shen Yao concluded that the wealthy people should sometimes be protected by the government, as provided for in the *Chou li*, because the poor people had to rely upon them.

Shen Yao's generalization on the liberty allowed prefects and magistrates in construction works in T'ang times is an interesting point, although he has overstated the case. According to the T'ang penal code, prefects

⁷ *Lo-fan-lou wen chi*, 7.21b.

⁸ *Lin-ch'uan hsien-sheng wen-chi* 臨川先生文集 (SPTK ed.), 82.9a-10b. The prefect ordered rich people and Buddhist monasteries in his prefecture to contribute toward the rebuilding of city walls.

⁹ Yao Sui, *Mu-an chi* 牧庵集 (SPTK ed.), 22.1a-b.

¹⁰ *Tao-yüan hsüeh-ku lu* 道園學古錄 (SPTK ed.), 9.3a-4b, 9.10b-11a.

and magistrates who failed to repair dikes or construct necessary bridges and ferries were to be punished. Larger construction works, such as the building of the city walls or dikes, however, had to await the approval of the Shang-shu sheng 尚書省 or the Department of State. The T'ang administrative code is not preserved in toto. An article that can be partially reconstructed from the Japanese *Yōrōryō* 養老令 which is believed to be a close copy of the T'ang administrative code, seems to indicate that construction works involving more than five hundred local laborers should also be reported to the central government.¹¹

In general, in the major Chinese dynasties, from Han through T'ang and Sung, one can see a clear tendency toward decrease in the power of the local governments on the prefectural and district level. This has been noted even as early as Sung and Yüan times. With the increasing trend toward centralization, the central government tightened its control also over local finance. From Sung times on, the prefectural and district treasuries rarely had enough funds to carry out construction works on any great scale. As Ku Yen-wu 顧炎武 has observed in his famous *Jih-chih lu* 日知錄: "The reason why all construction works have come to a complete stop nowadays is exactly because the state takes all the revenues from the prefectures and districts

¹¹ Niida Noboru 仁井田陞, *Tōryō shūi* 唐令拾遺 (1933), p. 805.

and has every penny forwarded to the central government, and the local officials and the people are both pressed to exhaustion and thus have no funds for construction."¹² The role of local gentry in building and repairing bridges and ferries in the Ch'ing dynasty is further demonstrated by two tables in Chung-li Chang's *Chinese Gentry*. Tabulation of information drawn from the local gazetteers of one prefecture in Kwangtung and of one district in Kwangsi indicates clearly that in the majority of cases such projects were financed by local gentry.¹³

To come back to Shen Yao, he was not, of course, the first nor the last one to sing the praises of wealthy men and to comment on their role in public works. From Sung times on, with the relaxation of state control over land-ownership on the one hand and the overall growth of the economy on the other, scholars have found occasions to point out the importance of the wealthy in providing capital for public works as well as employment and relief for the poor and jobless. This view failed to become predominant only because traditional thought favored equal distribution rather than amassed wealth.

Having stressed the importance of the local officials, local gentry, and wealthy people, we should now add

¹² *Jih-chih lu chi-shih* 日知錄集釋 (SPPY ed.), 12.17b. Also see his comments on *shui-li* 水利 or water conservation, 12.24a.

¹³ Chung-li Chang, p. 56.

some remarks on the other side of the coin. One must not assume that the imperial government was idle on matters concerning local water conservation projects. The proverb, "t'ien-kao huang-ti yüan" 天高皇帝遠, "Heaven is high and the emperor is far away," is only partially true.¹⁴ An unusually energetic emperor could be very near. A remarkable example was Emperor Hung-wu, founder of the Ming dynasty. His annals tell us that in the last years of his reign he dispatched a number of students of the Imperial Academy to places all over the country to encourage the local people to work on water conservation projects during their spare time from agricultural work. As a result, it was reported in 1395 that altogether a total of over 50,000 projects had been accomplished, including 40,987 on reservoirs and ponds, 4,162 on rivers, and 5,048 on canals, dikes, and banks.¹⁵ Perhaps the students were employed by the Ming

¹⁴ This proverb is traceable to the last years of the Yüan dynasty. According to Sun Ch'eng-tse 孫承澤, *Ch'un-ming meng-yü lu* 春明夢餘錄 (Ku-hsiang-chai 古香齋 ed.), 34.42b-43a, at that time oppressed peasants in eastern Chekiang erected a banner bearing these words:

天高皇帝遠 Heaven is high and the emperor is far away;
民少相公多 Commoners are few but officials [or lords]
numerous.

一日三遍打 Receiving a beating three times a day,
不反待如何 What can one do but to become a rebel?

¹⁵ *Ming T'ai-tsu shih-lu* 明太祖實錄, 234.1b, 243.6a; *Jih-chih lu chi-shih*, 12-27b. The *Che-chiang t'ung-chih* 浙江通志 (1899 ed.), vol. 60, gives the names of over three hundred reservoirs, ponds, and embankments constructed by the imperial order of 1394.

emperor somewhat in the manner of the cadres in a modern Communist regime. Hung-wu also used these students to conduct a sort of national land survey and to compile land registers known by the picturesque name of *Yü-lin t'u-ts'e* 魚鱗圖冊, "Fish-scale registers."¹⁶ Apparently, the emperor commissioned the young intellectuals from the Imperial Academy for these two important tasks because he hoped they would be independent of undesirable influences and thus less easily corrupted.

Finally, I wish to add few remarks on a religious aspect of public works in imperial China. Such projects as the repairing of roads and building of bridges are often referred to as *i-chü* 義舉 to indicate their voluntary nature, or as *shan-chü* 善舉 to imply that they constitute the kind of good deed that leads to reward in the future. This reflects a common belief endorsed by both Buddhism and Taoism. The Indian concept of karma and its assimilation into the Chinese concept of retribution have been discussed by scholars. I have also touched upon the problem in my essay "The Concept of *Pao* as a Basis for Social Relations in Traditional China."¹⁷ Taoism, even in its very early form, the *Wu-tou-mi tao* 五斗米, taught its believers that one could get

¹⁶ Niida Noboru 支那の土地量帳「魚鱗圖冊」の史的研究 in *Tōhō gaku-hō*, 東方學報, Tokyo, 6(1936):157-204.

¹⁷ In *Chinese Thought and Institutions* edited by John K. Fairbank (1957), pp. 291-309; reprinted above.

rid of one's illness by repairing a road for a hundred paces.¹⁸ In the popular religious work *Kung-kuo ko* 功過格, "Grading of Merits and Demerits," by Yüan Piao 袁表 (Yüan Huang) or Yüan Liao-fan 袁了凡 of the seventeenth century, merits and demerits of various kinds are listed and graded for retribution. For instance, an official who opened irrigation canals and strengthened river banks would receive one hundred units of merit. A commoner who successfully initiated the construction of an important bridge or an important road would also receive one hundred units.¹⁹ Here an interesting commentary makes an exception of cases in which the benefactor was motivated by personal profit. I suppose this exception refers to those who collected tolls, not an uncommon practice for privately financed communication projects.

During the period when Buddhism flourished in China, and especially under the T'ang and Sung dynas-

¹⁸ *San-kuo chih* (1739 ed.), Wei 8.22a-23a. Henri Maspero, *Mélanges posthumes sur les religions et l'histoire de la Chine*, II, Le Taoïsme (1950), p. 46.

Of course, similar ideas also existed in the West. For instance, C. T. Flower has observed, "It is significant that hermits are often mentioned as bridge-builders; for they built with the conviction that their work was to the glory of God and the good of their souls." *Public Works in Medieval Law*, II (1923), xix.

¹⁹ *Kung-kuo ko* 功過格 (1806 ed.), 4.38b, 3.33a-b. Also see Sakai Tadao 酒井忠夫, 袁了凡の思想と善書 in *Chūgoku no shakai to shūkyō* 中國の社會と宗教 (ed. by Yamazaki Hiroshi 山崎宏, *Tōyō shigaku ronsō* 東洋史學論叢, II, 355-380) and his 功過格の研究 in *Tōhō shūkyō* 東方宗教, no. 2.

ties, we find many Buddhist monks initiating public projects. Since monks and priests were supposed to be unselfish, it was easy for them to solicit help from officials and the people. Such projects are too numerous to enumerate. Examples can be found in the collected works of Po Chu-i of the T'ang dynasty and Su Shih or Su Tung-p'ò of the Sung dynasty.²⁰

An interesting case was the opening of a waterway through the rocks known as Pa-chieh t'an 八節灘 Rapids in Eight Sections, near Lung Men 龍門 in Loyang. The project was initiated by a monk, Tao-yü 道遇, in 844. Po Chü-i, who had already retired from government service and was living in Loyang, was very glad to contribute family funds to the project. The waterway was completed and the benefits of the work were obvious. This pleased the old poet so much that he composed two poems to commemorate the event. I shall conclude with a rough translation of one of them.

七十三翁旦暮身 An old man of seventy-three expects his
end to come any time.

誓開險路作通津 Yet, I take an oath that a dangerous
waterway shall be chiseled to become
a thoroughfare.

夜舟過此無傾覆 Boats passing here at night shall never
turn over;

朝脛從今免苦辛 People wading across in the morning

²⁰ For instance, see Su Shih 錢塘六井記 in *Ching-chin Tung-p'ò wen-chi shih-lüeh* 經道東坡文集事略, vol. 50.

shall suffer no more misery.
十里叱灘變河漢 Ten miles of Horrible Rapids shall
change to resemble the Milky Way;
八寒陰獄化陽春 The Eightfold Dank Hell shall be trans-
formed into sunny spring.
我身雖沒心常在 Although my body may perish, my spirit
will remain forever,
闢施慈悲與後人 Invisibly extending my compassion to
later generations.²¹

II. Labor

In this discussion of labor questions relating to public works in imperial China, I shall first mention a few major public works in Chinese history to illustrate the type and magnitude of the labor forces involved. Next, I shall go into some detail on certain problems

²¹ *Po Hsiang-shan shih-chi* 白香山詩集 (SPPY ed.), Hou-chi 後集, 17.10b-11.

A later interesting example is the Ch'ang-chiang ch'iao 長江橋 at Wu-chiang 吳江 reconstructed in 1134. According to Chang Tuan-i 張端義, *Kuei-erh chi* 貴耳集 (*Hsüeh-chin t'ao-yüan* 學津討原, 145) 下 26a, the magistrate of Wu-chiang entrusted the task of reconstruction of the bridge to a group of ten monks, each to be responsible for a section. The monks in turn were successful in obtaining help from rich households. At about the same time, under the Sung and early Yuan, Buddhist monks were remarkably active in Ch'uan-chou 泉州 (Zayton) and the surrounding region as builders not only of pagodas and temples, but also of bridges and other works of public utility. As observed by Demieville, such good deeds are recommended in treatises of Hinayana as well as the Mahāyāna disciplines. See G. Ecke and P. Demieville, *The Twin Pagodas of Zayton* (1935), pp. 94-95.

concerning convict and slave labor. This will be followed by a discussion on civilian and military labor, as well as skilled and unskilled labor. I shall conclude with some remarks on female labor. The problem of hired labor will also be touched upon, although it is equally related to financing.

Let us begin with the construction of the imperial capital with its palaces and mausoleums. Under the Ch'in dynasty, the building of the famous A-p'ang Palace and the imperial mausoleum of the First Emperor is said to have involved 700,000 convict laborers.²² In the early years of the Han dynasty, for the construction of the city of Ch'ang-an, 146,000 men and women were drafted from the surrounding region as far as 600 li away in the spring of 192 B. C., and each person worked for thirty days. In the spring of 190 B. C. again 145,000 men and women from the same area were drafted to work for thirty days on the construction. The capital was completed that fall.²³ Under the Sui dynasty, the building of the Eastern Capital, Lo-yang, is reported to have used a labor force of 2,000,000 people every month in 605-606.²⁴

²² *Shih chi*, 6.29b. Edouard Chavannes, *Les Mémoires historiques de Se-ma Ts'ien*, II, 193-194.

²³ *Han shu*, 2.4a-5a. Homer H. Dubs, *The History of the Former Han Dynasty*, 1, 181, 183.

Examples of water control and conservancy projects are instructive. A major reparation of water works on the Yellow River Han Wu-ti in 109 B. C., according to Ssu-ma Ch'ien used several tens of thousands of conscripts (*tsu* 卒).²⁵ Under the Later Han, the building of the dikes separating the Pien River from the Yellow River in A. D. 69-70 employed hundreds of thousands of conscripts.²⁶ Under the Sui dynasty, the digging of the Pien Canal that linked the Yangtze Valley with the Yellow River Valley took the combined labor of over a million men and women. Another canal required a labor force of similar magnitude.²⁷ Under the Mongol dynasty, reparation work on the Yellow River in 1351, according to a contemporary record, the *Chih-cheng Ho-fang chi* 至正河防記, involved 20,000 soldiers and

²⁴ *Sui shu*, 24. 17a. Etienne Balazs, *Le Traité économique du "Soueichou"* (1953), p. 165. One finds additional information on the labor used in this project in the *Ho-nan chih* 河南志 (*Ou-hsiang ling-shih* 藕香零拾 ed.), 3. 14a-b, which is a Yüan work partly preserved in the *Yung-lo ta-tien* 永樂大典. According to this source, the construction of the Kung-ch'eng 宮城 (or Palace City, at the northwestern corner of Loyang) alone required 700,000 *ping-fu* 兵夫 (cf. *chün-fu* 軍夫 below) to work for sixty days. In addition the palaces inside required over 100,000 laborers. For the construction of the Eastern Capital, the T'u-kung chien 土工監 or Supervisor of Construction needed the service of over 800,000 people, plus over 100,000 artisans working with wood, tiles, metal, and stone.

²⁵ *Shih chi*, 29. 4a.

²⁶ *Hou Han shu*, 106. 7a-b.

²⁷ *Sui shu*, 3. 5b, 3. 11b.

150,000 laborers recruited from the people.²⁸

Comparable or even larger labor forces were used for the construction and reparation of the Great Walls for national defense. Under the Ch'in dynasty, General Meng T'ien used 300,000 troops to build the first Great Walls, although the work was in part based on earlier walls and ramifications left from the time of the Warring States.²⁹ A major rebuilding of the Great Walls under the Northern Ch'i used 1,800,000 people in 555, and major repairs under the Sui in 607 required 1,000,000 male adults to work for ten (or twenty) days each.³⁰ The use of 1,800,000 people by the Northern Ch'i and of 2,000,000 people to construct the city of Lo-yang under Sui seem to represent the largest numbers of laborers involved in a single project in imperial China.

In studying the types of labor used in public works in Ch'in and Han times, we should keep in mind the distinction between laborers who were *tsu* 卒, conscripts, and those who were *t'u* 徒, convicts. Conscripts were drafted from among the commoners who were subject to military and labor services, whereas the *t'u* were criminals who had been condemned to penal servitude

²⁸ The *Chih-cheng ho-fang chi* by Ou-yang Hsüan is a remarkable piece of literature, see below p. 42.

²⁹ *Shih chi*, 88.5a-b.

³⁰ *Pei Ch'i shu*, 4.18b, does not specify the length of work in 555. *Sui shu*, 3.11a, says *i-hsün* 一旬 "ten days", for the project in 607, but *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien* 資治通鑑 (SPTK ed.), 180.19b, gives *erh-hsün* 二旬 "twenty days", which seems more likely.

for a period of time ranging from one to five years. This distinction between *tsu* and *t'u* is maintained in the works of specialists such as the late Edouard Chavannes, and Homer H. Dubs, Matin Wilbur, and A. F. P. Hulsewé. In Wilbur's *Slavery in China during the Former Han Dynasty*, and Hulsewé's *Remnants of Han Law*, we find lengthy discussions on the status of convicts and on the different offenses that would incur penal servitude.³¹

Unfortunately, this important distinction is often ignored. For instance, in an outline history of China published in 1958 in Peking, we find in the chapter labeled "High-handed policy" a description of the A-p'ang Palace and the mausoleum at Li Shan, both built under the First Emperor of the Ch'in dynasty. On page 44 we read, "These extravagant structures were built by more than 700,000 convicts," a statement which is in agreement with historical sources. The following page, however, tells about the Ch'in response to the uprising led by Ch'en She in these words, "The Second Emperor of Ch'in was in desperate straits, for most of his troops were away at the frontiers. He immediately amnestied the unfortunate conscripts toiling at his father's grave at the Lishan hills, had them armed and thrown into the battle with Chang Han in command." Here "convicts" is changed to "conscripts" without any

³¹ Wilbur (1943), pp. 80-85; Hulsewé (1955), pp. 128-132.

explanation, as if the terms were interchangeable.

Another example may be cited from a still more recent publication, Burton Watson's two volumes of translations from the *Shih chi* or the *Historical Memoirs* by Ssu-ma Ch'ien. In his translation of the biography of Ch'en She, the words *Li Shan t'u nu-ch'an tzu* 驪山徒奴產子 are translated as conscripts, slaves, and their children from Li Shan, which is quite wrong.³² What is referred to here are the convicts at Li Shan, and sons of slaves presumably from elsewhere in the empire. This kind of ignorance of institutional history is regrettable especially in view of the fact that such solid studies as those by Wilbur and Hulsewé are available.

Under the Han dynasty, people condemned to labor service were known not only as *t'u* but also by the compound *t'u-li* 徒隸, presumably meaning "convict-bondsmen." This latter term occurs rather rarely in Han texts and seems to have been misunderstood even by Dubs and Wilbur. In the annals of Hui-ti, between the two statements cited above about drafting large numbers of men and women to build the capital Ch'angan, it is recorded that in the summer of 192 B. C. 20,000 *t'u-li* were sent from the states of the vassal

³² Burton Watson, *Records of the Grand Historian of China translated from the Shih chi of Ssu-ma Ch'ien*, I (1961), 23, "to free all the conscript laborers, household slaves, and their children at Mount Li."

kings and marquises to build the city wall of Ch'ang-an.³³ In his translation of the *Han shu*, Dubs rendered the term *t'u-li* as "criminals and retainers," a dubious translation. Wilbur has translated the term as "criminals and servitors" (p. 224), also erring in his separation of *t'u* and *li*.³⁴ That *t'u* and *li* here are synonymous can be shown by the Han official title *Ssu-li Hsiao-wei* 司隸校尉, an officer whose duty it was to be in charge of the *t'u-li* or convict-bondsmen from the bureaus of the capital city.³⁵ An equally clear proof is in an imperial decree from Huan-ti in A. D. 147, recorded in the *Hou Han shu*. In this decree, the emperor expressed sympathy for the hardships of the laboring of *t'u-li* and therefore ordered that those *t'u* who had been working on the imperial tomb should have their terms of penal servitude reduced by six months.³⁶ It is obvious that *t'u* and *t'u-li* here were identical.

Another bit of evidence is the term *li-pu* 隸簿 which referred to a kind of labor camp in Han times. The term appears in the biography of the celebrated

³³ *Han shu*, 2.4a.

³⁴ Dubs, p. 181, Wilbur, p. 224. Hulsewé says, "Occasionally we meet the term *t'u li* 徒隸, which may either mean convicts, or official servants, the 'yamen runners' of a later day" (p. 130). I am doubtful about the latter part of his definition.

³⁵ *Han shu*, 19a-13b. According to *Han shu*, 30.14b-15a, the *li* in *li-shu* 隸書 also referred to *t'u-li*.

³⁶ *Hou Han shu*, 7.3a. The compound *t'u-li* is also found in *Kuan tzu* 管子 (SPTK ed.), 24.2a.

literary figure Liu Chen 劉楨 toward the end of the Han dynasty.³⁷ According to the story, when Ts'ao Ts'ao's son, Ts'ao P'ei, took to wife a beautiful ady née Chen, he introduced her to a group of literary guests at a wine party which he was giving. The guests all prostrated themselves with lowered heads when they were saluted by the lady, except for Liu Chen, who dared to look at her directly. This lack of respect so displeased Ts'ao Ts'ao that he ordered Liu Chen to be sent to the *li-pu* for penal servitude. Sometime afterward, when Ts'ao Ts'ao was inspecting the *li-pu*, he encountered Liu Chen sitting erect and grinding stone. Ts'ao ordered him to describe the nature of stone, and Liu Chen reponded with several lines of poetic prose praising the outward variegation and inner (unyielding) rectitude of stone (and obviously also of himself) as characteristics bestowed by nature. Greatly impressed by his talent, Ts'ao Ts'ao pardoned Liu Chen and restored his literary post.

In connection with convict laborers in Han times, I wish to discuss a technical term that has puzzled several scholars. During the early years of this century a considerable number of tomb bricks of Later Han date were found in western Honan. Apparently, they had been used to indicate the burial places of convict laborers who happened to have died in the "factory" or "labor camp." Since these bricks bear inscriptions, their

³⁷ *Wen-shih chuan* 文士傳 quoted in *Shui ching chu* 水經注 (SPPY ed.), 16.9b-10a. Also see *San kuo chih*, Wei 21-5a, commentary.

rubbings have been collected and published by the famous Chinese scholar Lo Chen-yü 羅振玉 in two books including a total of 272 examples. Believing the words of the antique dealers, Lo reported that the bricks were discovered in the district Ling-pao in western Honan.³⁸

The inscriptions on the bricks tend to be brief, as befitting an epitaph for a criminal. They give the name of the deceased convict, his district and commandery or kingdom, the term of convict labor he had been sentenced to (mostly four or five years, some for only two or three years), the date of his death, and the words *ssu* 死 (read *shih* 屍) *tsai tz'u-hsia* 在此下 "his corpses is underneath." In a large number of cases (about one sixth), one also finds the two characters *wu-jen* 無任 either at the beginning or in the middle of the inscription. This term has puzzled many Chinese scholars.

Lo Chen-yü in the preface to one of his two publications correctly established *wu-jen* as a technical term in the Han penal code but admitted that he could not make out its meaning. In 1951, a learned philologist, Chang Cheng-lang 張政烺 commented on these inscriptions in an article on convicts working in government iron mines or iron workshops during the Han period. Basing his argument on a passage in the *Mo Tzu*, he suggested that the term *wu-jen* means *wu-hai k'o jen-shih che* 無害可任使者 "these who are harmless

³⁸ *Heng-nung chung-mu i-wen* 恒農家墓遺文 (1915), and *Heng-nung chuan-lu* 恒農專錄 (in *Hsüeh-t'ang chuan-lu, ts'e* 1) (1918).

and can be employed.”³⁹ Later in another article on Ch'in and Han convicts published in 1958, Chang went deeper into the problem and changed his view. He noted that the term is also found in the *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien*, where a commentary of Hu San-hsing 胡三省 interprets it as “without special skills.” Chang also noted the use of the term in the *Hsing-fa chih* of the *Sui shu*. But apparently he failed to pursue this because he thought Hu San-hsing had already found the answer.⁴⁰

Actually, the term *wu-jen* has been correctly understood by the great legal scholar Shen Chia-pen 沈家本, whose interpretation “sans garants,” without a guarantor, was followed by Balazs in his translation of *Le Traité juridique du “Souei-chou.”*⁴¹ Balazs, however, like Chang Cheng-lang, was overly influenced by Hu San-hsing and translated the related term *wu-jen* 五任 as “cinq tâches,” including “travaux de bois, de métal, de cuir, mélanger les couleurs et modeler la terre glaise” (p. 119). I propose that *wu* 五 here stands for *wu* 伍 a group of five people held in collective responsibility. Here it is used with *jen* to indicate the requirement of a guarantor from such a group or poss-

³⁹ Chang Cheng-lang, 漢代的隸官徒 in *Li-shih chiao-hsüeh* 歷史教學 1:17-22 (1951).

⁴⁰ Chang Cheng-lang, 秦漢刑徒的考古資料, in *Pei-ching ta-hsüeh hsüeh-pao*, *Jen-wen k'o-hsüeh* 北京大學學報, 人文科學, 4:179-183 (1958).

⁴¹ Balazs, *Le Traite juridique du “Souei-chou”* (1954), p. 46.

ibly loosely used to refer to any guarantor. This interpretation is supported by institutional history and fits best in the context. If this interpretation is correct, then in Balazs' translation, "A cette époque, les forcats déportés à une résidence assignée pour faire des travaux forcés étaient chargés de toutes tâches 五任. Ceux sans garant 無任者 portaient des chaînes carrées en forme de boisseau," the words "étaient chargés de toutes les tâches" should be changed to something like "were required to get a guarantor (or guaranty) from his *wu* or five-man group 伍任."

In the issue of the *K'ao-ku t'ung-hsin* 考古通訊 for June 1958, one finds the report of a field investigation of burial grounds for convict labors in Han and Wei times in Lo-yang.⁴² More inscriptions of the same type been found, containing the term *wu-jen* 無任. The author of the report suggested that it means "to deprive of political rights." This fanciful interpretation was immediately corrected in a colophon by the editor, Hsia Nai 夏鼐 a leading archaeologist. Hsia prefers to leave the question open, making no reference to the writings of Chang Cheng-lang, whose second article was probably not yet available.

In this colophon Hsia also advances the interesting theory that the dealers' report that the hundreds of such burial bricks came from Linpao may be unreliable,

⁴² Huang Shih-pin 黃士斌, 漢魏洛陽城刑徒墳場調查記 in *K'ao-ku t'ung-hsin*, 6: 39-44 (1958).

because archaeologists who carried out work there in connection with the construction of the great Yellow River Reservoir in 1955 found no evidence of such burial grounds. He suggests that all such bricks came from Lo-yang, a theory quite reasonable in view of the fact that large numbers of convict laborers were regularly kept at the imperial capital, not only in Han times but also throughout the Six Dynasties. These convicts were by no means limited to iron factories but were used in all kinds of work, manufacturing and construction.

Closely connected with convict labor is the problem of slave labor. Slaves, male and female, were known as *nu* 奴 and *pi* 婢 in Chinese history. As pointed out by Wilbur in his *Slavery in China during the Former Han Dynasty*:

There seem to have been differences as well as similarities between *t'u* and government *nu* or *nu-pi*. There is no evidence that *t'u* were sold, or given away, which is a useful pragmatic test of slave-ownership. An affirmative conclusion cannot be drawn from absence of evidence. Therefore, while it cannot be asseverated that *t'u* were not sold, it cannot be proved that they were. There is plenty of documentary proof, on the other hand, that slaves, including government ones, were sold and given away. Many special pardons of *t'u* were recorded, but very few manumissions of government slaves during the Former Han period. *T'u* were often recruited to fight in China's frontier wars, but government slaves are

not reported to have been. There were a number of revolts of *t'u*, but none reported for government slaves, which strongly suggests a fundamental difference in treatment (pp. 84-85).

There are still other points of differences, including (1) that slaves tended to serve for life whereas convicts were required to serve for only five years or less in Han times and (2) that the position of a slave tended to be hereditary while that of a convict was not. On the first point, one should add that the term *ch'ang-t'u* 長徒 "long-term or permanent convicts," is found in historical texts of the Six Dynasties, but the number of such convicts does not seem to have been very large.

⁴³ In general, convict labor became less and less important from T'ang and Sung times on. Under the Ming and Ch'ing dynasties, it was common for the government to commute penal servitude into a fine. This was in line with the general trend in recent times of employing more and more hired labor.

In the history of imperial China one can find only a small number of cases in which slave labor was used for the construction or maintenance of public works. For the Han period, Wilbur has suggested certain "hypothetical spheres of government slave work." According to his reasoning, "it seems likely that government slaves would have been employed primarily in service

⁴³ For imperial decrees issuing special pardons of *ch'ang-t'u*, see *Sung shu*, 6.15a, *Nan Ch'i shu*, 3.5b, and *Liang shu*, 5.20a.

capacities and in skilled work, though certainly a portion of them, being unskilled or untrustworthy, worked in labor gangs" (p. 227).

In periods after Han, an interesting case of using private slaves for public construction was one in A. D. 371, when the Ch'in 秦 ruler Fu Chien 苻堅 drafted slave-bondsmen (*t'ung-li* 僮隸) owned by kings, marquises, and powerful and rich families to dig a canal through a mountainous region in central Shensi.⁴⁴ This incident, however, should be understood in light of the fact that in the fourth century the government of the Chin 晉 dynasty several times drafted privately owned slaves and retainers to serve as soldiers in times of emergency.⁴⁵

Under the Sui dynasty, Emperor Yang-ti ordered government slaves to guard a dam (*yen* 堰) on the Lo river.⁴⁶ Presumably the number of slaves used for the purpose was not large. Under the T'ang dynasty, the *T'ang lin-tien* 唐六典 provides the rule that in figuring units of work, the labor of three adult male slaves should be counted as equivalent to only that of two free people.⁴⁷ This regulation obviously does not speak very highly for the efficiency of slave labor. Altogether, government and private slaves did

⁴⁴ *Chin shu*, 113.18b.

⁴⁵ Lien-sheng Yang, *Studies in Chinese Institutional History* (1961), p. 129.

⁴⁶ *Ho-nan chih* (*Ou-hsiang ling-shih* ed.), 4.16a.

⁴⁷ *T'ang liu-tien* 唐六典 (Konoe ed.), 6.43a.

not play any significant role in public works, even in these relatively early periods of Chinese history when slaves are supposed to have been fairly numerous.

In contrast, the role played by soldiers in public works is extremely important. Although the primary duty of soldiers should be fighting, it was tempting for the government to employ them also in public works, because soldiers would appear to be idle and wasteful in a time of peace. This was particularly true in those periods of Chinese history when the dynasty had a large standing army.

Here it is perhaps useful to survey briefly the military systems under the various dynasties. In the Han period, male adults were required to render both military and labor services. These two types of services were not always clearly differentiated, and the people who rendered either were all referred to as *tsu* 卒, which Chavannes translated as "soldiers." From the third century on, the government tended to separate the status of soldier from that of civilian. The profession of soldier was often made hereditary and his family was required to register separately as a military household, for example, the *ping-hu* 兵戶 under the Wei-Chin Nan-pei Ch'ao or the *chün-hu* 軍戶 under the Ming dynasty. The famous *fu-ping* 府兵 system of the T'ang dynasty attempted to unite the roles of the farmer and the soldier, but it was effective for a period of only about a hundred years; after that prof-

essional soldiers became more and more important, until they constituted the bulk of the military force under the Sung. Under the alien dynasties or the so-called dynasties of conquest, military service was a privilege as well as a duty. Since the right to bear arms was chiefly reserved for the conquerors, the Chinese played only a secondary role in soldiery at least during the early periods of such a dynasty.

From the above survey, it becomes obvious that during most periods of Chinese history, soldiers represented a large labor force that could hardly escape the attention of the government. As early as the Sankuo period, we find the statesman-general Chu-ko Liang assigning 1200 soldiers to guard and repair the Tu-chiang yen 都江堰, a celebrated irrigation system, in the Ch'eng-tu plain.⁴⁸ The Wei and Chin dynasties also used their soldiers to construct and repair water conservation works. Several examples of this can be found in the *Shuiching chu* 水經注⁴⁹

Military labor became so important under the Sung that the administrative code defined work (*kung* 功) on the basis of *chün-kung* 軍功 or "military labor." If the work was done by hired labor (*ho-ku* 和雇 literally "harmonious hiring"), the work estimate should be reduced by one third. For instance, if three units of military labor were required, two units of hired labor

⁴⁸ *Shui ching chu*, 33.3b.

⁴⁹ *Shui ching chu*, 14.7a-8b.

should be reckoned as the equivalent. This, of course, does not speak for the efficiency of military labor. However, the fact that this rule is quoted in a standard book on architecture, the *Ying-tSao fa-shih* 營造法式 of 1103,⁵⁰ indicates that military labor must have been very common.

Under the Sung dynasty, most of the public works were accomplished with military labor. Soldiers used for these tasks were sometimes called *i-ping* 役兵, literally "corvée soldiers," most of whom were taken from the *hsiang-chün* 廂軍 or local military forces, rather than the *chin-chün* 禁軍, or imperial army.⁵¹ This division of labor between civilians and soldiers freed the common people from both the bulk of military service and most of the labor service. This government policy was praised by contemporary scholars as highly beneficial.

Under the Sung dynasty, units of troops were regularly assigned to special duty in connection with pub-

⁵⁰ *Yin-tSao fa-shih*, 2.46b.

⁵¹ Only rarely were the *chin-chün* used for public works. One such exceptional case was in 984 when the emperor T'ai-tung sent his imperial army to repair dykes along the Yellow River. In a poem commemorating the success of this repairing task, the emperor said, 乃出禁軍為夫使, "Thereupon, soldiers of the imperial army were sent out to perform corvée work." This poem may be found in *Yü-chih Yüan-shih* 御製錄識, 3.31b-32a (Daizōkyō 卷 10). Also see *Sung shih*, 4.18b, 91.5a. According to *Yüan wen lei* 元文類 (*Wan-yu wen-k'u* ed.), p. 595, under the Mongol dynasty, the use of soldiers in public works was common in the area near the capital but rare in the other parts of the country.

lic works; for instance, for emergency repair along the Yellow River. The task of building and repairing city walls was given to soldiers designated as *chuang-ch'eng ping* 壯城兵, "soldiers for a strong walled city." Such groups were assigned in most places where defense was essential, especially on the northern and north-western frontiers, but not in the southern provinces, except in Hung-chou 洪州, that is, modern Nan-ch'ang, Kiangsi.⁵²

The term *chuang-ch'eng* should not be confused with *lao-ch'eng* 牢城, "prison walled-city," the place where convict laborers were kept in Sung times. The miserable life of prisoners there is vividly depicted in the novel *Shui-hu chuan* 水滸傳⁵³ Incidentally, the terms *chuang-ch'eng* and *lao-ch'eng* remind one of the term *ch'eng-tan* 城旦 used in Han times, which according to commentators meant "building the forifications and patrolling them from the break of day," a four-year punishment for criminals.⁵⁴

Under the Ming dynasty, soldiers were expected to share in the construction of public works with laborers drafted from among civil-ians. The standard ratio in the building and repairing of city walls in various

⁵² *Sung hui-yao kao* 宋會要稿 (ts'e 190), *Fang-yü* 方域, 8.7a-8b. *Sung shih*, 189.5a, 7a, 11b, 12b-17a.

⁵³ *Shui-hu chuan*, chap.8; Pearl S. Buck, trans., *All Men Are Brothers* (1933), pp.163-166; J. H. Jackson, trans., *Water Margin* (1937), pp. 103-106.

⁵⁴ Hulsewé, pp. 129-130.

provinces was *chün-san min-ch'i* 軍三民七 that is, 30 percent soldiers and 70 percent civilians. A much higher percentage of military labor was used in the Peking area, because there were always many soldiers stationed at the capital.⁵⁵

It must not be assumed, however, that all soldiers were unskilled laborers. Actually, under the Sung and Ming dynasties, there were *chün-chiang* 軍匠, "military artisans," in contrast with *min-chiang* 民匠, "civilian artisans."⁵⁶ In a Ming text, when one finds the expression *chün-min fu Chiang*, one should not misconstrue it to mean *chün*, "soldiers," *min*, "civilians," *fu*, "drafted laborers," and *chiang*, "artisans," as four separate entities. The expression *chün-min fu* 軍民夫 refers to *chün-fu*, "drafted soldier-laborer," and *min-fu*, "drafted civilian laborer," *chün-min Chiang* refers to *chün-chiang*, "military artisan," and *min-chiang*, "civilian artisan."⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Shan Shih-yüan 旱士元, 明代營造史料 in *Chung-kuo Ying-tsoo Hsüeh-she hui-k'an* 中國營造學社叢刊 4.1 (1933): 116-137, 4.2 (1933): 88-99, 5.1 (1934): 77-84. Another useful reference is Shan Shih-yüan and Wang Pi-wen 王璧文, *Mingtai chien-chu ta-shih nien-piao* 明代建築大事年表 (1937).

⁵⁶ *Ming hui-tien* 明會典 (Wan-li ed.), 189.11b-12a, 42a-43b, 194.19a-20b. *Sung hui-yao kao* (ts'e 156) *Shih-huo* 食貨, 64.25b-26a, says that the officials in Ch'eng-tu found it profitable to use *chün-chiang* to weave fine brocade, a procedure introduced in the last quarter of the eleventh century.

⁵⁷ The term *chün-min Chiang* should not be confused with *chün min Chiang tsao* 軍民匠造, "soldiers, civilians, artisans, and salt-producers," the four major categories of households under the Ming dynasty.

For most periods of Chinese history, artisans were required to register separately and to render a fixed period of service to the government by taking turns and according to the demand for their skill. Under the Ming dynasty, the regulations in public works and manufactures specified that in normal tasks the ratio between skilled and unskilled labor should be one skilled to five unskilled (*i-chiang wu-fu* 一匠五夫) workmen, but in special cases the ratio could be as high as one skilled to three unskilled (*i-chiang san-fu* 一匠三夫).⁵⁸ From about the middle of the Ming period, one also notices a tendency to permit artisans to pay sums of oney to the government authorities instead of serving their turns. This practice was in agreement with the whole trend toward a money economy.

Finally, a few remarks on female labor. Generally speaking, women were used in public works only during the first thousand years of imperial China, and even in this earlier period the tendency seems to have been toward a sparing use of female labor. In the beginning of this discussion, we mentioned the employment of men and women for the construction of the city of Ch'ang'-an in Former Han times and for the digging of canals under Sui Yang-ti. But in the latter case, it was reported that women were used because of the in-

⁵⁸ *Ming hui-tien*, 194.19a; Ho Shih-chin 何士晉, *Kung-pu ch'ang-k'u hsü-chih* 工部廠庫須知 (*Hsüan-lan t'ang ts'ung shu*, *hsü-chi* 玄覽堂叢書, 續集), 4.10a.

sufficient supply of male adults.⁵⁹ With several gigantic projects going on continuously under Yang-ti, the people must have been exhausted. It is no wonder that they said the reign title Ta-yeh 大業 should be made to read Ta-k'u-lai 大苦來, "great sufferings come," by breaking the character *yeh* into two characters.⁶⁰

The trend toward reduction of female labor was unmistakable. Liang Wu-ti in 541 issued an imperial decree to stop the employment of female adults (*nü-ting* 女丁) all over the country.⁶¹ Under the T'ang dynasty, government regulations made the provision that only males should be registered as *ting* 丁 or adults, thus freeing all women from labor service.⁶² Local governments under the T'ang, however, still occasionally used female labor for road repair.⁶³ And females might be drafted to do miscellaneous tasks like cooking for soldiers, as indicated in the famous poem "Shih-hao li" 石壕吏 by Tu Fu.⁶⁴ On the whole, the use of female labor seems to

⁵⁹ *Sui shu*, 24.18a; Balazs, *Le Traite economique du "Souei-chou,"* p. 168.

⁶⁰ *Sui shu*, 22.19a.

⁶¹ *Liang shu*, 3.24b.

⁶² D. C. Twitchett, *Financial Administration under the T'ang Dynasty* (1963), pp. 8, 25-26.

⁶³ In *Tung tien*, 7, a memorial dated 711 points out that it was common for the local authorities to use women to repair roads. In *Ch'uan T'ang shih* 全唐詩, *ts'e* 20, one finds the lines 婦人役州縣, 丁男事征討 by Ch'u Kuang-hsi 儲光義 (1.8a); in *Tung-huang to-so* 敦煌掇瑣 3.144, one finds the lines 婦人因 (read 困) 重役, 男子從征行, both referring to the heavy labor required of women.

⁶⁴ William Hung, *Tu Fu, China's Greatest Poet* (1952), p.141.

have stopped from Sung times on. Perhaps one of the reasons was that the steady increase of population made it unnecessary.

Another factor was the traditional attitude toward a division of labor between male and female. According to the Han penal code, female convicts were not made to render labor service but only to husk grain for the government.⁶⁵ When they were condemned to gather firewood from hills, their punishment could be commuted to a payment of 300 coins per month. In contrast with the regular commutation charge of 2,000 coins per month for a male laborer, this also indicates the assumption of a difference between male and female labor.⁶⁶ According to the T'ang code, female convicts were to do needlework or to husk grain for the government. Female slaves also were recognized as less useful than male slaves: an adult female slave in performing tasks was considered the equivalent of a secondary adult male slave or half an adult freeman; a secondary adult female slave was equivalent to only one third of an adult freeman.⁶⁷

With the emancipation of women in certain modern societies the fairer sex has had to share much of the

⁶⁵ Hulsewé, p. 129.

⁶⁶ Even as late as the Ming dynasty, in the district Wan-p'ing 宛平 of the imperial capital area, the people had to supply a number of female sedan-chair bearers 女轎夫 per year. See Shen Pang 沈榜, *Wan shu tsa-chi* 宛署雜記 (1961), pp. 117, 125.

⁶⁷ *T'ang liu-tien*, 6.43a.

laborious work that was traditionally shouldered only by the male. This is particularly true under totalitarian regimes where it is clearly recognized that woman power added to man power can make the nation more powerful.

III. Materials and Financing

In this survey of questions concerning materials and financing for public works in imperial China, I shall first discuss the major kinds of materials used for construction as well as their sources of supply. Next, I shall make some general observations on the ways and means of financing public works. Finally, the topics of efficiency and corruption will be discussed against the historical background. In these various aspects, of course, one expects to see both continuity of tradition and innovations and changes. I will try to identify some of the forces that may have contributed to the maintenance of an institution and others which may have favored development of new institutions.

Among the materials used in public works, the predominance of wood and earth, especially *pisé* or "stamped earth," is striking. These two materials played such an important role that the standard cliché in Chinese for engaging in major construction is *ta-hsing t'u-wu* 大興土木, "greatly engaged in work of earth and wood." Even the modern discipline of civil engineering is called *t'u-mu kung-ch-eng* 土木工程, literally, "earth

and wood engineering," although the major materials used by modern engineers are steel and cement.

The extraordinary importance of wood in Chinese architecture is reflected in the title of a Northern Sung work, *Mu ching* 木經, which means literally "a canon on wood." Actually the book, no longer extant, was a treatise on architecture in three chapters. It probably served for many years as a handbook for builders until it was replaced by the famous *Ying-tSao fa-shih* 營造法式 of Li Chieh 李誠 in 1103. Demiéville, in his scholarly review of the *Ying-tSao fa-shih*, has a long note on the *Mu ching* and its author, Yü Hao 喻皓. The review, published in 1925,⁶⁸ remains one of the most important contributions made by Western scholars on the history of Chinese architecture. Young students of Sinology will find careful study of this masterpiece rewarding. The importance of the review is attested by the fact that the Chung-kuo ying-tSao hsüeh-she 中國營造學社 the Society for the Research of Chinese Architecture, published in their Bulletin for 1931 not only a Chinese translation of the review but also a reproduction of the complete French text.⁶⁹

Yü Hao, who was said to be the author of the *Mu ching*, was a native of Chekiang. After the conquest of the kingdom of Wu-Yüeh by the Sung, he was bro-

⁶⁸ BEFEO, 1-2 (1925): 213-364.

⁶⁹ *Chung-kuo Ying-tSao Hsüeh-she hui-k'an* 中國營造學社彙刊, 2.2 (1931): 1-36.

ught to the capital to serve in the official capacity of chief architect (*tu-liao chiang* 都料匠). Many stories have been told about his extraordinary talent. One story concerns the pagoda of the K'ai-pao Temple 開寶寺 which he built in the capital, K'ai-feng. According to contemporaries, people at first were puzzled by the fact that the pagoda appeared to lean slightly toward the northwest. When asked why, Yü Hao replied, "The capital area is a flat plain without mountains, and it is exposed to much wind from the northwest. In less than a hundred years, the pagoda will be blown straight."⁷⁰

Yü Hao, reported to have been a vegetarian, was apparently a devout Buddhist. According to tradition, he asked permission to become a monk after the pagoda was completed, but he died only a few months later. As for the book *Mu ching*, it is doubtful whether Yü Hao was its actual author; the learned scholar Shen Kua 沈括 who lived only about a century later, merely said that it was attributed to Yü Hao. Interestingly enough, Shen also reported that in his own time the art of architecture had improved so much that the *Mu ching* had already become somewhat obsolete and he expressed the hope that someone would update and ex-

⁷⁰ On Yü Hao, see also *Chü Hsüan-ying* 瞿宣穎, *Chung-kuo she-hui shih-liao ts'ung-ch'ao* 中國社會史料叢鈔, Chia-chi 甲集, pp. 511-513.

pand the book.⁷¹ As we know, this hope was soon to be realized in Li Chieh's *Ying-tsao fa-shih*.

It is impossible to enumerate the evidence for the reliance on wood in major public works in imperial China. It may suffice to quote the first few lines from the celebrated *A-p'ang Kung fu* 阿房宮賦 by Tu Mu 杜牧 of the T'ang dynasty:⁷²

六王畢 The Six Kingdoms finished,
 四海一 The Four Seas united,
 蜀山兀 The Szechuan mountains bare,
 阿房出 The A-p'ang Palace appeared.

These terse lines effectively underline the extravagant use of timber in the construction of the A-p'ang Palace under the First Emperor of the Ch'in dynasty. In a similar manner, wood was used in major buildings throughout the history of imperial China.

To procure and transport large timbers was extremely costly and created an enormous burden on the people. In imperial China, the responsibility of providing timber for government construction tended to fall on the southwestern provinces, where the mountainous regions were heavily forested. To obtain large timbers there was a perilous task. The workers had to traverse dangerous mountains and rivers, to experience hardships

⁷¹ Hu Tao-ching 胡道靜, *Meng-ch'i pi-t'an chiao-cheng* 夢溪筆談校證 (1956), pp. 570-572. On *Ying-tsao fa-shih*, see also *Wen-wu* 文物 (1962), II, 12-17.

⁷² *Fan-ch'uan wen-chi* 樊川文集 (SPTK ed.), 1. 1a.

and hunger, to risk facing snakes and tigers, to be exposed to a poisonous and pestilential climate, and to be subjected to the abuse and exploitation of officials, clerks, and their own overseers. In the seventeenth century, a sympathetic artist depicted fifteen scenes of such hardships in a series of paintings entitled *An-yun t'u-shuo* 接運圖說 "Procuring and transporting [of timber], illustrated and explained," in the hope that rulers might reduce their demand for wood.⁷³ A sixteenth-century official, Lü K'un 呂坤 in his memorial⁷⁴ quoted a saying of the people in Szechuan: *Ju shan-ch'ien ch'u-shan wu-pai* 入山一千出山五百 "Of one thousand workers entering the mountains [for timber], only five hundred may come out [intact]." According to him, whenever local people of Hupei and Szechuan talked about providing wood for imperial construction, they would sob until they choked.

The search for timber sent people to every possible place in the empire, even to the coastal districts. For instance, the modern province of Chekiang became an important source of timber supply from Sung times on. The famous mountain Yen-tang 鷹蕩, according to the Sung scholar Shen Kua,⁷⁵ was discovered in the eleventh century by people who went there to fell trees for

⁷³ "An-yun t'u-shuo" 接運圖說 quoted in *Ch'un-ming meng-yü lu*, 46. 61b-64a.

⁷⁴ *Ming shih*, 226. 112b

⁷⁵ *Meng-ch'ipi-tan chiao-cheng*, pp. 761-763.

construction of the imperial palace Yü-ch'ing Chao-ying Kung 玉清昭應宮 to honor the so-called *t'ien-shu* 天書 or message from Heaven.⁷⁶ To prove that this famous scenic spot was unknown in earlier times, he points to the fact that the celebrated poet Hsieh Ling-yün 謝靈運 of the fifth century, who served as prefect of the whole area of Yung-chia 永嘉, visited almost all the famous mountains and streams within his prefecture but never mentioned Yen-tang in his poetry. This assertion of Shen Kua has been challenged by later scholars, who cite as proof of early knowledge of the mountain an inscription dated 714, indicating that a temple was built in that year by a T'ang prefect.⁷⁷ Shen's basic point that Yen-tang did not become well known until Sung times, however, was supported by the Southern Sung scholar Hung Mai 洪邁, who wrote a long note⁷⁸ on the construction of this palace and criticized the whole project as one based on ill advice from wicked ministers. His note reads in part:

The work began in the fourth moon of the second year (1009), and the palace was completed in the eleventh moon of the seventh year (1014). The whole building contained 2,610 units. Within twenty years, a heavenly fire destroyed all of them except one throne hall.

⁷⁶ Yang Chung-liang 楊仲良, *T'ung-chien ch'ang-pien chi-shih pen-mo* 通鑑長編紀事本末 (1893 ed.), 18. 1a-13b, 24. 1a-6b.

⁷⁷ *Meng-ch'i pi-t'an chiao-cheng*, pp. 762-763.

⁷⁸ Hung Mai 洪邁, *Jung-chai san-pi* 容齋三筆 (SPTK ed.), 11. 5a.

At that time, this laborous task involved the whole empire. Fortunately, the emperor did not indulge in excessive militarism, sensual pleasures, beautiful imperial gardens, or severe punishment. The common people were willing enough to comply with the imperial order that it did not lead to any rebellion.⁷⁹ Compared with the Ch'in dynasty and the Sui dynasty, our case was far superior. But contemporary observers with insight and virtue still considered it a pity to have had this event in a glorious era. The history of the dynasty records the event to boast about the achievement. But it would have been better to have concealed it.

In addition to native produce, Chinese builders also made use of imported timber. This was particularly true under the Sung dynasty when much fine timber was imported from Japan, notably at the celebrated port of foreign trade Ming-chou 明州 modern Ningpo. The Southern Sung emperor Hsiao-tsung 孝宗 (1163-1189) used Japanese pine wood construct the Ts'ui-han T'ang 翠寒堂 or Hall of Green Chilliness in his Imperial Garden.⁸⁰ In Sung times, the percentage tax on imported timber rendered no small help to the imperial treasury. However, not all timber from Japan was imported as a commodity. In several cases when a Buddhist temple was to be constructed or repaired at a sacred place in Sung China, pious Japanese monks

⁷⁹ Compare the famous rebellion led by Fang La 方臘 in 1120-1121.

⁸⁰ Li Hsin-ch'uan 李心傳, *Chien-yen i-lai ch'ao-yeh tsa-chi* 建炎以來朝野雜記 (*Ts'ung-shu chi-ch'eng* 叢書集成 *ts'e* 836), A. 1. 15.

would send over fine timber as their contribution to the task. Such cases of donation are often recorded in relevant historical works in Japan as examples of meritorious deeds.⁸¹

In contrast with wood, stone had relatively limited use in Chinese architecture. This has been observed by Demiéville. In his review of the *Ying-tSao fa-shih*, on the chapter "Shih-tso chih-tu" 石作制度 or "Regulations on building with stone," he says:

D'après ce chapitre du *Ying tSao fa che*, l'utilisation de la pierre aurait été plus réduite encore sous les Song que sous les Ming et les Ts'ing: Li Kiai ne parle ni de portiques, ni d'encadrements de portes ou de fenêtres, ni de colonnes, ni de pavege en pierre. L'emploi de la brique aurait été de même fort restreint. Sans doute sa *Méthode* est incomplète. Il passe sous silence, par exemple, les stūpas et les *tch'ouang* 幢 en pierre ou en brique, dont bon nombre, élevés sous les Song, sont conservés; ce n'est pourtant point qu'il traite exclusivement de l'architecture civile ou confucianiste, car, dans la section consacrée aux "Petits ouvrages en bois," il donne des prescriptions très détaillées sur la construction des tabernacles bouddhiques et taoiques. Il semble bien, néanmoins, ressortir de son exposé, qu'on ne construisit pas sous les Song des bâtiments entièrement en pierre ou en briques; et l'archéologie corrobore cette conclusion (p. 243).

This, of course, does not mean that stone did not

⁸¹ Mori Katsumi 森克己, *Nisō boeki no kenkyū* 日宋貿易の研究(1948), pp. 271-272.

play any important role in Chinese architecture. As a material for building, stone was used from remote antiquity. For instance, excavations of ancient cities of the Shang dynasty at Anyang have revealed the use of pillar bases made of stone, apparently for a royal palace,⁸² Descriptions of palaces in later times frequently mention the use of stone. A large portion of the stone used for imperial palaces would be procured from nearby mountains and hills if such a supply was available. But it was not uncommon for the emperor to extend his demand to distant areas, thus imposing another heavy burden on the people. For instance, for the construction of the Yü-ch'ing Chao-ying Kung mentioned above, blue stone was procured from Cheng-chou and Tsu-chou 鄭淄之青石 in modern Honan, green stone from Heng-chou 衡州之綠石 in modern Hunan, white stone from Lai-chou 萊州之白石 in modern Shantung, variegated stone from Chiang-chou 絳州之斑石 in modern Shansi, extraordinary stone from Wu-yüeh 吳越之奇石 in modern Kiangsu and Chekiang, and large pebbles (lit., stone eggs) from the Lo River 洛水之石卵, again in modern Honan.⁸³

In public works for water conservation, water control, and transportation, the introduction of stone was also early, especially in dikes, dams, and bridges of

⁸² Shih Chang-ju 石璋如, *Yü-hsü chien-chu i-ts'un* 殷虛建築遺存 (in the series of reports under the title *Hsiao-t'un* 小屯) (1959).

⁸³ *Jung-chai san-pi*, 11.4a-5a.

considerable scale. As pointed out by Demiéville, a trend toward increasing use of stone is noticeable in more recent periods. For instance, under the Yüan dynasty, many bridges at the capital, Peking, were at first built with wood, but from 1297 to 1307 they were replaced by stone bridges.⁸⁴ In gazetteers of Ming and Ch'ing date, one finds numerous records of replacement of wooden bridges by stone bridges, which can perhaps be taken as an indication of economic growth. In the construction of the *hai-t'ang* 海塘 or sea walls built to ward off waves along the coast of Kiangsu and Chekiang, we also notice increasing use of stone, eventually culminating in the elaborate structure called *Yü-lin ta-shih t'ang* 魚鱗大石塘 or "Fishscale great stone walls" in early Ch'ing times.⁸⁵

Still another important kind of material was the brick which was widely used from Han times on, especially from Later Han when people used bricks not only for dwellings of the living but also for those of the dead. Modern archaeologists have excavated numerous Han tombs all over China, many of which have brick chambers serving as a sort of outer coffin. That this brick structure was intended to substitute for the earlier wooden outer chamber is clearly shown in the style of

⁸⁴ *Yüan wen-lei*, p. 407, p. 614. By 1332 there were 89 stone bridges in Peking.

⁸⁵ For instance, see *Liang-Che hai-t'ang t'ung-chih* 兩浙海塘通志 (compiled 1749-1750), 8. 1a-28b, with many illustrations.

the construction. In a later case dated A. D. 296, the words *chuan fu* 磚浮 “brick outer coffin,” have been found stamped on the bricks, *fu* here being synonymous with *kuo* 槨 “wooden outer coffin.”⁸⁶

A major use of bricks was as a facing for the outside and sometimes the inside of earthen city walls. Brick facing for the walls of the imperial capital and major cities can be traced to early periods of imperial China; but curiously enough, it does not seem to have become prevalent as a general practice until Ming or Ch'ing times. For instance, many cities in the coastal provinces of South China had their walls covered with bricks only from the sixteenth century to face the threat of invasions by the so-called Wo-k'ou 倭寇 or Japanese pirates. The present Great Walls in North China were largely built under the Ming dynasty and therefore for the most part are covered with bricks. Incidentally, bricks used for city walls known as *ch'eng-chuan* 城磚 were of particularly large size, and like the *liu-li wa* 琉璃瓦 or colored porcelain tiles, which were a distinct feature of imperial and certain religious buildings in Ming and Ch'ing China, they were not supposed to be used in buildings for the use of officials or commoners. Not only were unauthorized users of these special materials subject to punishment, but even the official who had jurisdiction over them would be

⁸⁶ *Lo-yang Shao-kou Han-mu* 洛陽燒溝漢墓 (1959), p. 8.

punished.⁸⁷

One characteristic of Chinese construction is its effective combination of several kinds of materials, notably stone and wood. An illustration may be cited from the *Meng-ch'i pi-t'an* 夢溪筆談 by the Sung author Shen Kua.⁸⁸

On the Ch'ien-t'ang 錢塘 River, stone dikes were built by the Ch'ien 錢 House [the Wu-yüeh Kingdom of the tenth century]. Outside the dikes were erected several tens of rows of bit timbers called *huang-chu* 混柱 "screen pillars." In the reigns of Pao-yüan 寶元 (1038-1039) and K'angting 康定 (1040), someone proposed that these screen pillars be removed in order to acquire several hundred thousand pieces of excellent timbers. The governor of Hangchow approved of the proposal. But, after these old timbers were brought out of water, they became rotten and useless. Meanwhile, having lost the screening pillars, the stone dikes were hit violently by storms and broken every year. Apparently, in burying these pillars, people in earlier times used them to obstruct the violence of water but not to fight directly against it. This was how the storms of the river were prevented from doing harm.

As a still more striking example of effective combination of materials in water control projects, I wish to call attention to the type of embankment known as *sao* 埽, which was an innovation of the Sung dynasty. Basically, a *sao* was a huge bundle of layers of grass

⁸⁷ *Kung-pu tse-li*, 21. 1a.

⁸⁸ *Meng-ch'i pi-t'an chiao-cheng*, pp. 429-430.

and timber wrapped around earth and stone, tied up and strengthened with ropes made of grass and split bamboo, occasionally with rocks hanging from the bundle to give it additional weight. The whole bundle, resembling a rolled bamboo screen in shape, could measure several *chang* 丈 in height and double that in length when rolled up. The *sao* was used to protect a river bank or to repair a major breach. The preparation and submergence of the bundles required considerable technique and the concerted effort of many workers. Apparently, the *sao* was an unusually effective apparatus in water control and was used throughout the imperial era.

It will perhaps be helpful to recommend a few books which contain detailed information on the *sao*. A very convenient book is the glossary entitled *Chung-kuo ho-kung tz'u-yüan* 中國河工辭源, published in 1936 by the Bureau of Water Conservancy of the National Economic Council in Nanking. This volume contains a whole chapter on the *sao*, pages 122-155, dealing with its nomenclature, construction, and defects. It is authoritative, full of quotations, and well illustrated. The first quotation is a passage from the "Ho-ch'ü chih" 河渠志 or treatise on rivers and canals in the *Sung shih*. It is followed by quotations from two other important works, the *Ho-fang t'ung-i* 河防通議 and the *Chih-cheng Ho-fang chi* 至正河防記, both of the Yüan

dynasty.⁸⁹

The *Ho-fang t'ung-i* or comprehensive treatise on water control, with a preface dated 1321, was edited by Sha K'o-shih 沙克什, a *Semu* 色目 official. It is a handbook on water control based on two editions of an earlier work of the same title, one from the Sung dynasty, and the other from the Chin dynasty. The *Chih-cheng Ho-fang chi* is a historical account written by the celebrated scholar Ou-yang Hsüan 歐陽玄 (1273-1357). Ou-yang regretted that Ssu-ma Ch'ien and Pan Ku in their histories recorded only the general principles involved in water control, leaving out its technological aspects. In his own account of the major repair of the Yellow River in 1351, he decided to make up this deficiency by interviewing Chia Lu, the director of the project, and others as well as by verifying the government documents. His account, with its detailed information and excellent style, has been considered an outstanding piece of writing in the history of hydraulic works in China.

These two books contain numerous interesting bits of information that deserve attention. For instance, from the *Ho-fang t'ung-i*, we learn that the standard ratio of materials used to construct a *sao* embankment was 30 percent timber and 70 percent grass (*Shao san ts'ao ch'i* 梢三草七) and that the total cost of a *sao*, including both labor and material, was 20,000 to 30,000

⁸⁹ *Ho-fang t'ung-i* (*Ts'ung-shu chi-ch'eng*, *ts'e* 1486), pp. 1-34; *Chih-cheng Ho-fang chi* (same), pp. 1-8.

strings of cash. One third of the cost could be saved by a good official; the cost could be doubled if the official in charge was incompetent.

According to Ou-yang Hsüan, for the repair work in 1351, the hydraulic artisans who built the *sao* in the western portion of the project were Tanguts (Hsia-jen 夏人), drafted from Ling-wu 靈武 in modern Shensi, and those who built the *sao* on the eastern portion were Chinese (Han-jen 漢人) drafted from the capital area.⁹⁰ This division of labor is of considerable interest. Commenting on the use materials, Ou-yang quotes the follow remarks of Chia Lu 賈魯 who was undoubtedly an extraordinarily able administrator and engineer: "Although grass is extremely soft, it can pay with water. When grass is crushed by water, dirt is produced. The combined strength of dirt and grass is as heavy as an anchor. But the maintaining and supporting force of the ropes is also remarkable." These words remind one of the wise comment about the very soft conquering the very hard found in the *Tao te ching*.

Moving to the aspect of financing, I should first point out that normally for a public work to be labeled as such, it should at least partly be financed by the state or society as a whole. On the other hand, one should probably not exclude those cases in which certain publicminded individuals shouldered the major fina-

⁹⁰ *Chih-cheng Ho-fang chi*, p. 3.

ncial burden, although these tended to be local works of relatively small size. As I have pointed out above, the increasing number of such local projects indicates an important role played by the gentry in early modern China.

For the most part, major public works were financed either from the treasury of the imperial government or from the emperor's privy purse, the inner treasury. As I have stressed in an earlier study,⁹¹ a distinction between the empire's purse and the emperor's purse was maintained in many periods of Chinese history, beginning in Han times if not earlier. In general, the national treasury paid for public works relating to national defense and water control, although the emperor could offer emergency help from his own purse. Local projects were sometimes financed from funds available to various levels of local government, one major source in Ming and Ch'ing times being the so-called *tsang-fa yin* 贓罰銀 "silver collected as fines."⁹² But the money was more often raised by a joint effort of the local officials, gentry, and people. Those who would directly benefit from the project were expected to assume a greater share of the cost.

For the construction of palaces and temples, the

⁹¹ Yang, *Studies in Chinese Institutional History*, pp. 89-90.

⁹² Also known by the literary terms *shu-chin* 贖金 and *shu-yüan* 贖銀. See *Sung-chiang fu-chih* 松江府志, 16.12b-13b, 26b; E-tu Zen Sun, *Ch'ing Administrative Terms, a translation of the Terminology of the Six Boards with Explanatory Notes* (1961), p. 279

emperor often looked beyond these two purses and tried to collect additional sums from all classes within the empire. For instance, when the usurper Emperor Wang Mang wanted to build the so-called Nine Temples for his own ancestors, he ordered both officials and the people to "contribute voluntarily coins and grain" 以義助錢穀 to help finance the work.⁹³ When the notorious Emperor Ling-ti 靈帝 of the Later Han dynasty wished to raise money to rebuild his palaces that had burned down, he levied a tax of 10 coins per *mou* in A. D. 185 as *hsiu-kung ch'ien* 修宮錢 "palace construction money."⁹⁴ Officials who received promotions and candidates who received appointments were required to promise a contribution, which they could pay after they had arrived at their posts and had a chance to exploit the people. History records that the contribution was earmarked to assist the army and to help finance construction of the palace. Apparently the latter cause was the more important, since the contribution was referred to simply as *hsiu-kung ch'ien*.⁹⁵

Several interesting examples of financing may be cited from the time of Wu Tse-t'ien 武則天, the only female emperor in Chinese history who found her own dynasty. For the huge cave at Lung-men holding a stone statue of the Lushana Buddha 85 *ch'ih* in height,

⁹³ *Han shu*, 99C, 10b.

⁹⁴ *Hou Han shu*, 8, 12b-13a, 108.23b-23b-24a.

⁹⁵ *Hou Han shu*, 87, 9b.

Wu Tse-t'ien as an Empress, in 672, donated 20,000 strings of cash from her own *chih-fen ch'ien* 脂粉錢 or "rouge and powder money."⁹⁶ In 688 a tremendous sum was spent—presumably for the most part from the empire's treasury—for the construction of the Ming-t'ang 明堂, with another building behind it to house a giant dry lacquer statue of over 100 *ch'ih* in height.⁹⁷ After the buildings and the statue were destroyed by fire in 695, the Empress planned a still taller statue to be cast in metal, for which she ordered each Buddhist monk and nun in her empire to donate a coin every day. Before long, as many as 170,000 strings of cash were collected. The project, however, seems to have been abandoned in view of strong admonition from several officials.⁹⁸ Meanwhile, in 694 and 695, a column of copper and iron octagonal in shape and 90 *ch'ih* in height, known as T'ien-shu 天樞 or Heavenly Pivot, was erected in the capital, Loyang, to extol the virtue of Wu Tse-t'ien. The money was raised from foreign merchants and other foreign personnel at the suggestion of a certain Persian by the name of A-lo-han 阿羅憾, that is, Abraham. The model for the monument was designed by an artisan of Indian origin named Mao Po-lo 毛波羅. This Heavenly Pivot, symbolizing the greatness of

⁹⁶ Mizuno Seiichi 水野清一 and Nagahiro Toshio 長廣敏雄, *Ryūmon sekkutsu no kenyū* 龍門石窟の研究 (1941), p. 324.

⁹⁷ C. P. Fitzgerald, *The Empress Wu* (956), pp. 131-135.

⁹⁸ Matsumoto Bunsaburō 松本文三郎, 則天武后の白司馬坂大像に就いて, *Tōhō gakuhō* 東方學報, Kyoto, 5 (1934): 13-49.

the Chou dynasty of Wu Tse-t'ien, was destroyed in 714 after the restoration of the T'ang dynasty.⁹⁹

A word may be added on the types of currency used to finance public works in imperial China. Coins and grain were commonly used in Han times. Later, from the period of disunion on, bolts of silk cloth became a convenient means for payment of large sums. This medium was largely current in T'ang times although coins also resumed their importance. Paper money became very popular in Sung and Yüan times. Under the Sung dynasty, a very interesting way of financing public works was government issuance of blank *tu-tieh* 度牒 or certificates of ordination for monks and nuns, which could then be sold on the market, not necessarily for use by people who wanted to join the clergy.¹⁰⁰ Copper coins and silver ingots were the two common forms of currency in Ming and Ch'ing times. The decline in use of paper currency caused occasional inconvenience in public works because of the reliance on hired labor in this period. Cartloads of coins might have to be transported to the work site in order to pay the wages of hired workers on a government project—a

⁹⁹ Lo Hsiang-lin 羅香林，景教徒阿羅憾等為則天皇后營造頌德天樞考 *Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies*, New Series, 1. 3 (1958): 13-24.

¹⁰⁰ Yüan Chen 袁震，兩宋度牒考，*Chung-kuo she-hui ching-chi shih chi-k'ian* 中國社會經濟史集刊 7. 1 (1944): 42-104, 7. 2 (1946): 1-78; Kenneth Ch'en, "The Sale of Monk Certificates during the Sung Dynasty, a Factor in the Decline of Buddhism in China," *Harvard Theological Review*, 44. 4 (1956): 307-327.

clumsy arrangement indeed. ¹⁰¹ Considerable care was taken that government spending on a major public work would not affect a steady exchange ratio between copper coins and silver ingots. In the Ming period, this ratio was maintained by paying only wages in coins while making most other payments in silver, and also by minting an optimum amount of new coins to offset the additional amount of silver in circulation. ¹⁰²

Lastly, we come to the problem of corruption. Of course, corruption may be found in any bureaucratic state and in any kind of government transaction. The management of funds, materials, and labor in public works, however, offers special opportunities to encourage dishonesty. For instance, in the acceptance and disposal of materials, corruption existed in imperial China to a degree that is almost unbelievable. This was true irrespective of the sources of the material, that is, whether it was obtained from annual tribute (*sui-kung* 歲貢), government monopoly (*chüeh* 權), transit or import tax by percentage (*ch'ou-fen* 抽分), specially designated levy at certain places (*tso-p'ai* 坐派), or purchase

¹⁰¹ This was true in certain places even in the early Republic.

¹⁰² According to *Tung-kuan chi-shih* 冬官紀事 (*T's'ung-shu chi-ch'eng*, *ts'le* 1500), p. 33, the cost for minting 670 *wen* of copper coins was one tael of silver, in 1596. Although the market ratio between copper coins and silver was 450 *wen* for a tael, a favorite ratio of 550 *wen* per tael was set for the payment of daily wages to laborers working on the reconstruction of imperial palaces in that year. Large sums were till paid in silver.

(*ho-mai* 和買 or *mai-pan* 買辦).¹⁰³ According to an interesting book entitled *Kung-pu ch'ang-k'u hsü-chih* 工部廠庫須知 (Essential knowledge concerning storehouses and yards of the Board of Public Works),¹⁰⁴ which gives much firsthand information on the darker side of administration in the Ming period,

materials (*wu-liao* 物料) payable in kind (*pen-se* 本色) were required to be sent to the imperial storehouses. The eunuchs in charge were interested only in their fee, known as *p'u-tien* 鋪墊 or "cushion" money. The officials who were to deliver the materials joined forces with them to fill their own pockets. There were cases in which originally only a commuted payment in cash (*che-se* 折色) was required but a change was made deliberately to payment in kind to allow for a substitution of inferior purchased material. There were cases in which payments in kind were originally required, but the officials hid the fine material to sell for themselves and substituted false material to submit to the storehouse. Again there were cases in which neither a payment in kind nor a payment in money was made but the officials shared the allotted sum with the eunuchs, produced materials originally kept in the storehouse to certify delivery and thus obtained their receipt, and left. This marks the acme of corruption, and the complete failure

¹⁰³ Ch'en Shih-ch'i 陳詩啓, *Ming-tai kuan-shou-kung-yeh te yen-chiu* 明代官手工業的研究 (1958), pp. 107-138.

¹⁰⁴ *Kung-pu ch'ang-k'u hsü-chih*, 1. 17a-b, 2. 49b.

of law.

Bribes were accepted not only by eunuchs. According to the same book, whenever money or materials were received from the Board of Public Works as wages for artisans and labores, or payments for merchants and carters, a 20 percent reduction known as *shih-fei* 使費, "expenditure fee," or *lou-kuei* 陋規, "illicit custom," was made for the expenses of the clerks and runners. In a memorial dated 1615 (or 1614),¹⁰⁵ it was remarked that this had been an established practice and had been mentioned in earlier memorials. Since it seemed impossible to do away with the practice immediately, it was proposed that a 30 percent reduction should be made on the collection of this "expenditure fee" in the first year, another 20 percent reduction be made in the second year, still another 10 percent reduction be made in the third year, and so forth, until the practice was completely eliminated. The "cushion" money for the eunuchs was to be reduced in the same way. It is not clear whether this proposal was actually carried out. Readers who are familiar with the work of Mencius, however, may be amused to recall the story of the person who used to steal one chicken from his neighbors every day and later promised to reform by stealing only one chicken a month and then stop after a year.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ *Kung-pu ch'ang-k'u hsü-chih*, 3. 64a-b.

¹⁰⁶ *Meng-tzu* 6, "T'eng-wen-kung hsia."

Under these circumstances, it would be very difficult for an upright official to maintain his integrity in the Board of Public Works. One exception is found in Ho Sheng-jui 賀盛瑞, a senior secretary (*lang-chung* 郎中) of the Board who in 1596 supervised the rebuilding of two palaces, Ch'ing 乾清 and K'un-ning 坤寧. An account of his work was written by his son Chung-shih 仲軾, entitled *Tung-kuan chi-shih* 冬官紀事 (A record of the Board of Public Works), which also contains several original documents in the form of proposals and memorials.¹⁰⁷ An anecdote concerning his obstruction of a group of timber merchants from Hui-chou Fu 徽州府 is particularly instructive.¹⁰⁸ According to the book, by bribing certain eunuchs, the timber merchants had succeeded in obtaining a special imperial ruling that they be entrusted with the responsibility of procuring timber for the construction of the palaces. Senior Secretary Ho, who had been opposed to the idea of using the services of these merchants, now had to issue them official certificates. Summoning them all to his office he told them that in the certificates he would state that they were not allowed to claim to be procuring *huang-mu* 皇木, "timber for imperial use," or to demand any privilege or special treatment and that no advancement

¹⁰⁷ *Tung-kuan chi-shih*, pp. 1-28. The *Tung-kuan chi-shih* is also known by the title *Liang-kung ting-chien chi* 兩宮鼎建記.

¹⁰⁸ *Tung-kuan chi-shih*, p. 4. Hui-chou merchants were already very active in the Ming period.

of money was to be made on their purchase.¹⁰⁹ Seeing that there would be little profit in the business, the merchants declined the responsibility and went to the eunuchs to take back their bribes (*taotsang* 倒贓). This action greatly displeased the eunuchs and was one of the factors that later led to a humiliating downfall of the honest official.

Corruption in public works reached a shocking degree in the nineteenth century. In his memorial presented to the throne in 1883, the Vice President of the Board of Rites, Pao-t'ing 寶廷, reported his experience in the construction of the imperial mausoleum. Before receiving appointment as a director of the work, he had heard about the tradition of *chi-ch'eng tao-kung* 幾成到工, or what percentage of the funds should actually be applied to the task. In this particular case, the total estimated sum of over 8,500 taels was divided into ten portions, of which one portion was to be shared by the high-ranking ministers who served as directors and another portion was to be shared by the lower supervising officials. This 20 percent was known as *chieh-sheng ch'ien* 節省錢 or "saved money." Thus, in theory only 80 percent of the fund was to be applied to the construction; but in fact the figure was much less, being more than 40 percent.¹¹⁰ Some measures of reform were

¹⁰⁹ *Tung-kuan chi-shih*, p. 4.

¹¹⁰ *Huang-ch'ao cheng-tien lei-tsuán* 皇朝政典類纂, 163, 7b-8b, based on the *tich'ao* 邸鈔.

proposed in this memorial, but it is unlikely that they would have had any real effect.

Still more notorious was the situation in the offices in charge of the repair of two rivers, the Grand Canal and the Yellow River. According to Feng Kuei-fen 馮桂芬, who was a well-informed scholar-official in the nineteenth century, at his time five million taels of silver were earmarked for the annual repair of the two rivers, but the money actually used for the work was no more than 10 to 20 percent of this figure, the rest being all pocketed by people from the viceroy down. Only some virtuous and diligent officials would apply as much as 30 percent of the fund to actual work. Other officials applied less according to their greed. In extreme cases, the official would not release a penny unless there was a serious emergency.¹¹¹

Reviewing the whole range of history of imperial China, one has the impression that corruption became worse in more recent dynasties. For instance, the tremendous wealth amassed by the minister Yen Sung 嚴嵩 of the Ming dynasty¹¹² and the minister Ho Shen 和珅 of the Ch'ing dynasty¹¹³ was probably unprecedented,

¹¹¹ Feng Kuei-fen, *Chiao-pin-lu k'ang-i* 校邠廬抗議 (1884 ed.), A. 4a.

¹¹² See *T'ien-shui ping-shan lu* 天水冰山錄 (*T'sung-shu chi-ch'eng*, ts'e 1502-1504) for a list of confiscated properties of Yen Sung and his son.

¹¹³ *Ch'ing Jen-tsung shih-lu* 清仁宗實錄, 37.49b-50a; Lien-sheng Yang, *Money and Credit in China, a Short History* (1952), pp. 4-5.

and a considerable portion of their fortunes seems to have come from embezzlement and bribery. This tendency is distinct from the increase in corruption that tended to occur toward the end of a dynasty, and requires an interpretation other than the ready-made theory of the dynastic cycle.

Perhaps corruption in terms of money became more conspicuous with economic growth in general and the growth of a money economy in particular. Perhaps people became more acquisitive with increasing opportunities to make money, and in large sums. In any event, economic development from Sung times on is an unmistakable fact. Agricultural products multiplied with new crops and improvement in land utilization.¹¹⁴ Trade, commerce, and industries all developed to a high level. Since this economic growth was coupled with a growth in population, and since reliable figures on the growth are not available, it is difficult to ascertain whether there was any increase of income per capita. Nevertheless, the standard of living in certain areas of the empire seems to have risen; this is evident notably in the enormous consumption of rice, cotton cloth, and chinaware.¹¹⁵ The trend toward a money economy was marked by

¹¹⁴ See discussion on land utilization and food production in Ping-ti Ho, *Studies on the Population of China 1368-1953* (1959), pp. 169-195.

¹¹⁵ For instance, see Ch'üan Han-sheng 全漢昇, 南宋稻米的生產與運銷, *CYYY*, 10 (1948): 404-432; Yen Chung-p'ing 嚴中平, *Chung-kuo mien-yeh chih fa-chan* 中國棉業之發展 (1943), pp. 18-23; Li Chien-nung 李劍農, *Sung Yüan Ming ching-chi shih kao* 宋元明經濟史稿 (1957), pp. 36-58.

two major reforms in the system of taxation, the *Liang-shui fa* 兩稅法 or two-tax system introduced in 780,¹¹⁶ and the *i-t'iao pien fa* 一條鞭法 or single-whip method introduced in the sixteenth century.¹¹⁷ The two-tax system in theory freed the able-bodied adult male from rendering regular labor service to the government, consolidated several kinds of levies, and figured all taxes in terms of coins and grain. The single-whip method consolidated even more items of taxation and put the whole tax system on a silver basis. It is true that these developments cannot be compared to the spectacular economic growth in modern societies. Nevertheless, changes were taking place and probably they inevitably influenced people's thinking. Seeing landlords and businessmen were making good money, bureaucrats were easily tempted to compete, and obviously corruption was a special channel of wealth for them.

Another factor that may have intensified corruption was the imperial bureaucratic government system, with all its red tape and checks and balances. By Ming and Ch'ing times, the bureaucratic machine had become so complicated that the functioning at every joint required constant oiling with silver. Under the Ch'ing dynasty, although the total number of officials was not particularly

¹¹⁶ D. C. Twitchett, *Financial Administration under the T'ang Dynasty*, pp. 39-48.

¹¹⁷ Liang Fang-chung, *The Single-whip Method of Taxation in China* (1956).

large, the government became unusually top-heavy because most high-ranking positions were to be shared by Manchus and Chinese. The increasing despotism in Ming and Ch'ing times also tended to pass the decision-making function upward and leave every major decision to the emperor himself. The bureaucrats and subbureaucrats hardly dared to assume any responsibility. On the other hand, since they occupied the key posts at every turn in the channel, they were always there ready to receive their share of the grease. Thus, in spite of thousands of years of experience, the Chinese imperial bureaucratic system was doomed to fail in the face of the challenge of the modern West. On the other hand, the history of the successes and failures of imperial China should not be simply brushed aside. Some of its experience may still serve as a mirror or useful reference for students in the West where governments in many cases, although essentially modern, also tend to be highly bureaucratic.

IV. Economic Thought

THIS fourth and last essay on public works is labeled "Economic Thought" merely for the sake of convenience. In the realm of thought, it is not always profitable to make a strictly compartmentalized study, because when people think, they do not normally limit themselves to the single area defined by a discipline or a branch of science. I propose to discuss economic tho-

ught against the background of history as a whole, stressing in particular the relationship between economic thought and ideas concerning the functions of government and the roles of different groups in society, and even possible influences of supernatural force. I shall begin with a discussion of the importance of two closely related key concepts, *chün* 均, "equalization," and *ho* 和 "harmonization." Proceeding to their application, I shall discuss some of the attempts made by the Chinese throughout the imperial era to harmonize the economic and noneconomic wants and needs of the rulers and the ruled, to reconcile the conflicting interests of the various groups in society, and to balance the long-term and the short-term views. I shall conclude with some general comment on the results of these attempts, both successes and failures, and their effect on the economic life of the people.

The concept of *chün*, meaning "equitable, equalize, or equalization," was dominant from very ancient times. It is traceable to Confucius himself. In a famous passage in the Analects, ¹¹⁸ he said,

I have heard that rulers of states and chiefs of families are not troubled lest their people should be few, but are troubled lest they should not keep their several places (read "be kept in equalization"); that they are not troubled with fears of poverty, but are troubled

¹¹⁸ *Lun-yü*, Book 16, "Chi-shih"; Legge, p. 308.

with fears of a want of contented repose *among the people in their several places*. For when the people keep their seves, there will be no poverty, when harmony(*ho* 和) prevails, there will be no scarcity of people; and when there is such a *contented* repose, there will be no rebellious upsettings.

It is possible that the text is somewhat garbled; ¹¹⁹ it would be more logical to say: "they are not troubled lest their people should be few, but are troubled lest they should not be peaceful"; and "they are not troubled with fears of poverty, but are troubled with fears of a lack of equalization." Nevertheless, the stress on equalization is unmistakable. This was perhaps natural in the economy of scarcity characteristic of imperial China, in contrast with the economy of abundance found in several countries in the modern West.

Chinese economic history is full of terms using the character *chün*. For instance, the Han dynasty introduced the institution *chün-shu* 均輸, "equalization of transportation," a system which made levies more equitable because the varying costs of transportation were taken into consideration.¹²⁰ In an ancient textbook on mathematics, the *Chiu-chang suan-shu* 九章算術 or

¹¹⁹ This has been pointed out in Yü Yüeh 俞樾 *Ku shu i-i chü-li* 古書疑義舉例 (1954 2d.), p. 78. *Ch'un-ch'iu fan-lu* 春秋繁露, "Tu-chih p'ien" 度制篇 (also known as "T'iao-chün p'ien" 調均篇), gives 不患貧而患不均 (SPTK ed., 8. 1a).

¹²⁰ Nancy Lee Swann, *Food and Money in Ancient China* (1950), pp. 40, 62-65.

“Mathematics in Nine Chapters,” we find questions dealing with *chün-shu su* 均輸粟, “equitably transported grain,” and *chün-shu tsu* 均輸卒, “equitably transported conscripts,” apparently taken from concrete cases of the Han time concerning grain tax and corvée.¹²¹ From the Northern Wei through a great part of the T’ang period, Chinese history witnessed a largescale experiment in government allotment of land to the people known as the *chün-t’ien* 均田 or “equal-field system.” Original government records found in Tun-huang and Turfan indicate that the system did not exist merely on paper but was at least partly but into practice in North China.¹²² The idea of equal allotment of land goes back to the so-called *ching-t’ien* 井田 or “well-field system,” which may have existed in some form in ancient China. The term *chün-t’ien* itself, meaning loosely “equalization of land,” can be traced to Han times.¹²³ In connection with taxation and labor and miscellaneous services, such terms as *chün-shui* 均稅, *chün-i* 均役, and *chün-yao* 均徭 were commonly used from the middle of the T’ang period.¹²⁴ The concept, and sometimes even the term, can also be found in earlier times. These measures of equalization became more important after

¹²¹ *Chiu-chang suan-shu* (SPTK ed.), 6. 1a-9a.

¹²² D. C. Twitchett, *Financial Administration under the T’ang Dynasty*, pp. 1-11.

¹²³ *Han shu* 86. 12b.

¹²⁴ See my article 龍谷大學所藏の西域文書と唐代の均田制, *Shirin* 史林, 5: 28-34 (1962).

the government had abandoned its attempts at direct control of or active interference with private ownership of land and had restricted its control chiefly to the limitation of tax-free privileges on land owned by certain social classes or institutions (as a kind of legal person) like the church or a clan. Leaders of peasant uprisings from Sung times on also occasionally claimed to be aiming at the equalization of wealth between the poor and the rich (*chün p'iu-fu* 均貧富) and sometimes actually carried out measures toward this goal.¹²⁵

The Chinese word *ho* means "harmony, harmonious, harmonize, and harmonization." It is an extremely important concept in music and cooking, but as a term it can be used in all situations concerning human life or natural phenomena. As a matter of fact, it was the key to all rites and rituals. In the Confucian classics,¹²⁶ it is stated more than once "In practicing the rules of propriety, harmony is to be prized." The attainment of harmony was believed to have a mysterious effect, as expressed in *The Doctrine of the Mean*,¹²⁷ "Let the states of equilibrium and harmony exist in perfection, and a happy order will prevail throughout heaven and earth, and all things will be nourished and flourish." Thinkers of the Yin-Yang School in Han times believed

¹²⁵ For instance, the rebellion led by Wang Hsiao-p'o 王小波 and Li Shun 李順 in Szechuan in 993-994.

¹²⁶ *Lun yü*, Book 1, "Hsüeh-erh."

¹²⁷ *Chung yung*, chap. 1; Legge, p. 385.

that "air of harmony would bring about good fortune, and air of discord would cause abnormality,"¹²⁸ 和氣致祥乖氣致異. In a more concrete sense, the saying "Harmonious air, or courtesy, brings wealth," 和氣生財, has been a motto for Chinese merchants for centuries.

Concerning good government, Confucius is reported to have said, "Mildness serves to temper severity, and severity to regulate mildness; it is in this way that administration of government is brought to harmony."¹²⁹ On the defense of a country, Mencius observed that among three key factors, "Opportunities of time *vouchsafed* by Heaven are not equal to advantages of situation *afforded* by the Earth, and advantages of situation afforded by the Earth are not equal to the *union arising* from the accord of Men (*Jen-ho* 人和)."¹³⁰ These sayings have been quoted numerous times in Chinese history.

According to the *Book of Rites*,¹³¹ an ideal condition of the world was known as *Ta-t'ung* 大同, "Great Commonwealth." Here the word *t'ung* is obviously synonymous to *ho* in the sense of harmony, although tradition makes a distinction between *t'ung*, "echoing," and *ho*, "harmony," the former comparable with the uncritical assent of a yes-man, and the latter with the

¹²⁸ *Han shu*, 36. 16a.

¹²⁹ *Tso chuan*, Chao 20.

¹³⁰ *Meng tzu*, 4A, "Kung-sun Ch'ou hsia"; Legge, pp. 203-209.

¹³¹ *Li chi*, "Li Yun."

skillful mixing of ingredients by a master cook or the skillful arrangement of notes by a master musician. In a sense, one may say that the Grand Harmony could be identical with the Grand Unison.

In Chinese economic history, one finds terms like *ho-chia* 和價, "harmonious price"; *ho-ti* 和糶, "harmonious purchase of grain"; *ho-mai* 和買, "harmonious purchase"; *ho-shou* 和售, "harmonious sale"; *ho-shih* 和市, "harmonious marketing"; and *ho-ku* 和雇, "harmonious hiring of labor." All these terms are traceable to the T'ang period, and the first two go back even to the time of the Northern and Southern Dynasties.¹³² The fact that such terms became widely used from T'ang times on, as I have pointed out above, is an indication of the increasing practice of commutation of levies from labor and material to money. It is true that in many cases, the harmonious purchase or hiring was nocompulsory only in name, and the people were often underpaid or even not paid at all.¹³³ Nevertheless, the use of the word *ho* indicated the realization of this basic principle of harmony or at least the willingness to render lip service to it.

¹³² For *ho-chia* see *Nan Ch'i shu*, 3. 12a; for *ho-ti* see *Wei shu*, 110. 1a, *T'ung tien*, 6. 34a, 12. 70c; for *ho-mai* see *Tso chuan*, Chao 16, subcommentary; for *ho-shou* see *Hsin T'ang shu*, 159. 6b; for *ho-shih* see *Hsin T'ang shu*, 167. 2b; for *ho-ku* see *Hsin T'ang shu*, 167. 3b.

¹³³ *Hsin T'ang shu*, 167. 3b; *Sung hui-yao kao* (*ts'e* 162), Shih-huo 70A. 30a.

Before taking up the application of these two closely related concepts, *chün* and *ho*, in public works in imperial China, it is important to note that the Board of Public Works or *Kung-pu* 工部 did not occupy a particularly important position in the central government. Actually, it took the last position among the Six Boards, which were, according to their standard order of importance, the Board of Personnel, the Board of Revenue, the Board of Rites, the Board of War, the Board of Punishments, and the Board of Public Works, or *Li* 吏 *Hu* 戶 *Li* 禮 *Ping* 兵 *sing* 刑 and *Kung* 工. Officials of the three last boards would consider it a promotion to be transferred to a corresponding post in one of the first three.¹³⁴

This was true not only in Ming and Ch'ing times when the *Liu Pu* developed into full-fledged boards or ministries; even in the T'ang period, when the boards were still in their embryonic stage and constituted merely six divisions within the Shang-shu Sheng or Department of State,¹³⁵ the relative importance between the divisions was already well known. For instance, the section *li-pu* 吏部 within the division *li-pu* 吏部 was the hottest (that is, the most important) office, while the *shui-pu* 水部 or "section on water works" within the division

¹³⁴ The Board of Personnel was always the most honored, while the Board of Public Works was nearly always the least important. For instance, see *Hsu t'ung-tien* 續通典 (1901 ed), 26.3b-4a, 27.11a.

¹³⁵ *T'ang liu-tien*, 7.31a-b.

kung-pu 工部 was the coldest (that is, the least important). This situation was utilized as material for a comic act in theatrical performance¹³⁶ in which an actor in the costume of a clerk in the personnel section meets another dressed as a clerk of the water works section. They collide with each other and both fall down. After getting to their feet, they tell the audience that they both feel very sick after the violent collision between the hot and the cold (*leng-jo hsiang chi* 冷熱相激), a phrase commonly used by a physician in his diagnosis. On the government level, a similar division was made of the staff members into *liu-k'o* 六科, "six bureaus," or *liu-fang* 六房, "six chambers," even down to the level of the district or *hsien* 縣 government.¹³⁷ Likewise, the *kung-k'o* or *kung-fang* was normally a cold office.

This tradition becomes more meaningful in the light of the analysis of political functions made by modern political scientists like Harold D. Lasswell. According to his analysis, political means can be classified into four groups, namely practices, symbols, goods and services, and violence.¹³⁸ The Board of Personnel, being the

¹³⁶ Wei Shu 韋述, *Liang-ching hsin chi* 兩京新記 (*Nan-ch'ing cha-chi* 南齊札記 compiled by Ts'ao Yüan-chung 曹元忠, 6a-b). Also in *T'ai-ping kuang-chi* 太平廣記 230.

¹³⁷ T'ung-tsu Ch'ü, *Local Government in China under the Ch'ing* (1962), pp. 38-41.

¹³⁸ Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (1950), and *A Framework for Political Inquiry* (1950).

closest to leadership and decision-making, naturally occupied a paramount position in the government. The Board of Revenue dealt with goods and services. The Board of Rites was primarily concerned with the use of symbols, but its control of the civil service examinations, which were the main channel to officialdom, also contributed to leadership. As has been proudly observed by officials of the Board of Rites, although they themselves were appointed by the prime minister, through their function as examiners they could help pick up future prime ministers.¹³⁹ The Boards of War and Punishments of course specialized in instruments of violence, both for civil control and foreign defense. As for the Board of Public Works, although it contributed to the specialized functions of other departments, it contributed little to leadership. Thus it was perhaps natural for this board to occupy a relatively unimportant position. On the other hand, it is also a matter of considerable significance that public works constituted the major concern of a regular portion of the Chinese bureaucratic government.

A public work could perform various functions. For example, the major function of the walls around a city

¹³⁹ *Hsu t'ung-tien*, 27. 5a-6a. Under the Ming, from about 1465, normally the president of the Board of Rites was to be selected from the officials of the Han-lin Academy and he had a very good chance to become a member of the Nei-ko. The *Hsü t'ung-tien*, 27. 6a, lists seventy-five such Nei-ko members in the period from 1488 to 1644.

was of course defense against enemies, either rebels or foreign invaders. At times, city walls also proved effective against floods. A canal normally would serve the purpose of irrigation or transportation, but the water could also be used to supply power to turn water mills. These functions tended to conflict with each other and often required government interference for reconciliation. For instance, several times under T'ang dynasty, the emperor ordered the destruction of water mills along certain canals to facilitate irrigation.¹⁴⁰ The Grand Canal in T'ang and Sung times, however, was mainly intended to serve the purpose of transportation. Irrigation with its water was permitted only in exceptional cases.¹⁴¹

The imperial palaces served not only concrete purposes as living quarters for the emperor and his harem, as well as halls for court gatherings and audiences, but also performed an important symbolic function in representing the dignity of the sovereign. When the founder of the Han dynasty, Kao-tsu, expressed displeasure at the magnificence of his palace, the Wei-yang kung 未央宮, which had been built under the direction of his chief minister, Hsiao Ho, Ho replied, "The Son of Heaven takes all within the Four Seas as his household. Unless his palaces are magnificent, how can they dem-

¹⁴⁰ *Shen-hsi t'ung-chih*, 39. 64a-65a.

¹⁴¹ *Po-shih Ch'ang-ch'ing chi* 白氏長慶集 (SPTK ed.), 49. 9b-10a.

onstrate his prowess? Moreover, he should not let later generation surpass him.”¹⁴² This explanation satisfied the ruler, whose displeasure may or may not have been genuine.

Like the imperial palaces, imperial ancestral temples and Buddhist and Taoist temples also served as an indication of imperial patronage. As an example of combined Confucian and Buddhist faith, we may cite the pagoda at the Ta Pao-en Ssu 大報恩寺, “The Great Temple to Repay Parental Affection,” built in Nanking from 1413 to 1432 by order of the Yung-lo Emperor to commemorate his parents. The pagoda had nine stories totaling almost 330 *ch'ih* in height. The outer walls were cased with bricks of white porcelain and the eaves covered with green porcelain tiles. It was a famous site for several centuries until it was destroyed in 1854 at the time of the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion. One interesting point about the pagoda is that according to tradition its construction was paid for with funds left from the celebrated expeditions led by the eunuch-admiral Cheng Ho 鄭和.¹⁴³

In connection with the symbolic significance of certain public works, it may be added that even the names *ssu* 寺 for Buddhist temples and *kuan* 觀 or *kung* 宮 for Taoist temples seem to indicate the semi-

¹⁴² *Han shu*, 1B. 12a-b.

¹⁴³ Chang Hui-i 張惠衣, *Chin-ling Ta Pao-en Ssu T'a chih* 金陵大報恩寺塔志 (1937), pp. 9, 24-25, 109, 113-115.

official nature of these religious buildings. The word *ssu* originally meant a government office. Even under the Ch'ing dynasty, there were still such offices as the Ta-li Ssu 大理寺 or "Court of Judicature and Revision," T'ai-ch'ang Ssu 太常寺 or "Court of Sacrificial Worship," Kuang-lu Ssu 光祿寺 or "Court of Banqueting," and Hung-lu Ssu 鴻臚寺 or "Court of State Ceremonial." The words *kuan* and *kung* refer to "an imperial building with a tower on it" and "a palace" respectively. That these terms were allowed to be used for Buddhist and Taoist temples was an indication of imperial patronage. In volume two of his *Science and Civilisation in China*, Joseph Needham suggested that the meaning contained in the character *kuan* "was essentially to observe the flight of birds, no doubt with the object of making predictions from the omens so observed" (page 56). This may have been true in high antiquity. The appearance of Taoist temples known as *kuan*, however, was much later in Chinese history, long after there had been imperial buildings known by the same name. It may be added that the word *kuan* 觀 also means a thing or a place to behold as in the ancient term *ching-kuan* 京觀, "Grand Demonstration," which was a huge tomb to bury enemy corpses en masse as a mark of military prowess.¹⁴⁴

In the construction of public works, political, eco-

¹⁴⁴ *Tso chuan*, Hsüan 12.

nomic, and religious considerations may come into conflict and require reconciliation. This may be illustrated by the old superstition about *ti-mai* 地脈 or “veins of earth.” The “Biography of General Meng T’ien” 蒙恬 in the *Historical Memoirs* records that when the Ch’in imperial court ordered the general to commit suicide, he at first complained greatly about the injustice done to a loyal, meritorious general, who had committed no offense against Heaven, and then, upon second thought, realized that in the construction of the Great Walls for so many miles he must have cut the *ti-mai* or “veins of earth” and thereby committed a major offense. Ssu-ma Ch’ien, being a rationalistic historian, blamed Men T’ien for his abuse of the people’s energy and simply brushed aside his superstition about *ti-mai*.¹⁴⁵

A study of popular faith in later times, however, reveals that this superstition actually lasted for centuries. According to the Taoist work *T’ai-p’ing ching* 太平經,¹⁴⁶ people in Later Han times believed that the digging of wells might hurt the veins of the earth, an offense against the spirit of the earth which could bring misfortune, involving not only those who had the well dug but their neighbors as well. Incidentally, the *T’ai-p’ing ching* also reports that many wells were dug in spite of this belief, a fact confirmed in archaeolog-

¹⁴⁵ *Shih chi*, 88. 5a-b.

¹⁴⁶ *T’ai-p’ing ching* (*Tao tsang* 道藏 *ts’e* 749), 45. 3a, 6b, 7a-8a, 10a.

ical findings by the large number of pottery models of irrigation wells excavated from tombs of Later Han date.¹⁴⁷

Throughout Chinese history, there has been a strong superstition against *tung-t'u* 動土, "disturbing earth," for which an auspicious day was to be chosen if the construction work had to be undertaken.¹⁴⁸ The provincial gazetteers of Shensi compiled in the nineteenth century report that the people there, because of superstition, tended to refrain from digging wells and were only prevailed upon to do so after considerable persuasion and encouragement from provincial and local authorities.¹⁴⁹

In the pseudo-science of geomancy, the term *ti-mai* is often replaced by *lung-mai* 龍脈, "dragon veins," or simply *lung*, "dragon," which constituted a key concept. This term refers to not only mountain ranges, which certainly resemble a dragon, but also their extensions onto or under the plains, which are much more difficult to identify. This can be illustrated in the title of a rather curious manuscript, *P'ing lung jen* 平龍認, literally, "To recognize the dragon on the plains." This

¹⁴⁷ *Lo-yang Shao-kou Han mu*, p.241. According to *Hsin Chung-kuo ti k'ao-ku shou-huo* 新中國的考古收穫 (1961), p.77, many models of irrigation wells found in tombs in Sian, Lo-yang, Ch'ang-sha, and other places can be dated in the middle and later years of Western Han.

¹⁴⁸ Information on such auspicious days is available in a traditional calendar.

¹⁴⁹ *Hsü Shen-hsi t'ung-chih kao* 續陝西通志稿, 57. 3b.

manuscript was discussed by the German scholar Jules Klapproth in 1807 in a paper entitled "Sur les connaissances chimique des Chinois dans le VIII^{me} siècle." Klapproth claimed that the author of the manuscript, a certain Mao-hhoa, may have lived under the T'ang dynasty and written the book in 756; and that in it he seems to reveal some knowledge of the existence of oxygen.¹⁵⁰ So far, neither the manuscript nor its author has been identified by modern scholars. Since the book was most likely a work on geomancy, it is natural for it to refer to the various kinds of *ch'i* 氣, such as *yin-ch'i* 陰氣 and *yang--chi* 陽氣. The identification of *yin-ch'i* with oxygen is farfetched and probably resulted from a miscomprehension. I am afraid that the Chinese geomancers hardly deserve the credit for the discovery of oxygen. Incidentally, the term *lung-mai* is also used in discussions of landscape painting, especially by artists like Wang Hui 王翬 (1632-1717) and Wang Yüan-ch'i 王原祁 (1642-1715).¹⁵¹

To return to our subject, the harmony of *yin* and

¹⁵⁰ Yüan Han-ch'ing 袁翰青, *Chung-kuo hua-hsüeh shih lun-wen chi* 中國化學史論文集 (1956), pp. 221-231. Wang Huan-piao 王煥鑣 *Ming Hsiao-ling chih* 明孝陵志, 63b-66a, contains an interesting discussion toward the end of the Ming dynasty about a superstition that the people digging ponds in Feng-yang 鳳陽 might have disturbed the *lung-mai* leading to the imperial tomb in Nanking and brought misfortune to the dynasty.

¹⁵¹ Wang Yüan-ch'i, *Yü-ch'uang man-pi* 雨窗漫筆 (included in *Hua-hsüeh hsin-yin* 畫學心印 compiled by Ch'in Tsa-yung 秦祖永 2a-3a).

yang, as a great concern of the imperial government, sometimes influenced the time when a major construction was to be undertaken. According to the *Yüeh ling* 月令 or "Monthly ordinances," an important chapter of the *Book of Rites*, no major construction work was to be undertaken in the summer months. The most suitable month to repair city walls 補城郭 was the first month of autumn (the seventh moon), the most suitable month to build city walls 築城郭 was the second month of autumn (the eighth moon), and the most suitable month to patch (that is, to make minor repairs of) city walls 坯城郭 was the first month of winter (the tenth moon).

¹⁵² The choice of these months was in part based on the principle of not interfering with the farmers' work. It also reflected a belief that in order to adjust human action to cosmological forces, certain activities were appropriate only in certain seasons; this belief is evident in the practice of restricting to autumn and winter the sentencing and carrying out of capital punishments. ¹⁵³

For the harmonization of conflicting interests within a country, it seems obvious that government has an important role to play in undertaking major public works. It has been argued by several modern scholars,

¹⁵² *Li chi*, "Yüeh ling".

¹⁵³ Jean Escarra, *Ledroit chinois: conception et évolution, i nstitutions législatives et judiciaires, science et enseignement* (1936), pp. 256-257.

notably Chi Ch'ao-ting and Karl A. Wittfogel,¹⁵⁴ that major hydraulic works in traditional China had to be undertaken by a strong government and that these waterworks in turn tended to strengthen government. In the *Li-shih yen-chiu* 歷史研究 one finds an interesting article on the relationship between government-controlled handicrafts and feudal institutions from Ch'iu and Han to the end of Ming. The authors, Pai Shou-i 白壽彝 and Wang Yü-ch'üan 王毓銓 find the same relationship holds with hydraulic works, but as authorities they refer to only Marx and Engels.¹⁵⁵ In one place, the authors quote an imperial decree dated A. D. 70 in which Ming-ti of the Later Han dynasty admitted that he had found it very difficult to decide upon a major repair work on the Yellow River, because people in the southern and northern parts of the area involved held opposite opinions about it.¹⁵⁶ On the necessity to destroy certain reservoirs, I have translated a memorial by the scholar-statesman Tu Yü 杜預 in A. D. 277,¹⁵⁷ which reads in part: "Such people's personal opinions vary, one and the same thing can be advantageous to some while harmful to others. The military colonies against

¹⁵⁴ Chi Ch'ao-ting, *Key Economic Areas in Chinese History* (1936), K. A. Wittfogel, "The Foundations and Stages of Chinese Economic History", *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, 4 (1935): 26-60.

¹⁵⁵ Pai Shou-i and Wang Yü-ch'üan, 說秦漢到明末官手工業和封建制度的關係 in *Li-shih yen-chiu*, 1954. 5: 63-98.

¹⁵⁶ *Hou Han shu*, 2. 15a-b.

¹⁵⁷ Yang, *Studies in Chinese Institutional History*, p. 177.

the prefectures and districts, the upper classes against the common folk—between them there is no unanimity of opinion. All of them consider only one-sidedly their own profit, but forget the harm to others. This is why, when reasonableness does not fully prevail, there is much trouble in affairs.” Here the need for harmonization and reconciliation is obvious. Thus, in addition to securing labor and materials and financing major public works, the government was expected to provide leadership and organization.

Sometimes, the vested interests were very local and specific in nature. For instance, on the Ch'ien-t'ang River, after the removal of the “screen pillars” mentioned above, there was frequent damage done by the sea waves. According to the *Meng-ch'i pi-t'an*,¹⁵⁸ in the eleventh century there was a proposal to move the dikes back several miles and to construct *yueh-ti* 月堤 or moon-shaped (actually, crescent-shaped) dikes for protection. At first, most of the water-work artisans said that the proposal would be beneficial. Only one old man among them dissented. Later he secretly told the other artisans, “After the transfer of the dikes, there will be no water disaster. But what are you folks to live on?” His fellow workers realized the point and also objected to the project, which later turned out to be actually helpful. Another illustration

¹⁵⁸ *Meng-ch'i pi-t'an chiao-cheng*, pp. 429-430.

may be taken from the Yangtze Gorges in Szechuan. According to the poet Lu Yu 陸游, who traveled through the area by boat in 1170, there had been proposals to remove certain rocks in the river on which many boats had crashed. The people who lived in the neighborhood, however, found it profitable to seize lost property from the wrecked boats and bribed the water-work artisans to say that the rocks were too difficult to remove.¹⁵⁹ Resistance of this nature, however, could easily be overcome by a strong government.

Much more difficult to reconcile was the conflict between long-term and short-term views. Those who were in favor of major public works argued that it was exchanging *i-shih chih lao* 一時之勞 “toil for a time,” for *wan-shih chih li* 萬世之利, “benefit for ten thousand generations.”¹⁶⁰ Thus the construction of the Great Walls and the digging of the Grand Canal were occasionally praised in Chinese history, although it was recognized that the projects were undertaken in an extremely tyrannous way by the notorious despots Ch'in Shih-huang-ti and Sui Yang-ti.¹⁶¹ The majority opinion of Chinese scholars seems to be in agreement with the T'ang writer P'i Jih-hsiu 皮日休; in his *Pien Ho ming* 汴河銘, he admitted that the T'ang dynasty was fortu-

¹⁵⁹ Lu Yu, *Ju Shu chi* 入蜀記 (*Kuang pi-chi* 廣祿笈 ed.), 4. 13b.

¹⁶⁰ *Han shu*, 29. 8b.

¹⁶¹ For instance, see Huang Lin-shu 黃麟書, *Ch'in Huang Ch'ang-ch'eng k'ao ch'u-kao* 秦皇長城考初稿 (1959), pp. 211-262.

nate to have had the difficult task already accomplished under the Sui dynasty, but also advised rulers against abuse of the people's energy.¹⁶² Of course, this kind of conflict exists in every form of investment, for which the justification has to be based on an evaluation of all the factors properly quantified and weighed.

Deriving from the principle of *chün* or equalization, two or three other principles were applied to the construction of public works in imperial China: namely, the principles of sharing the cost according to expected benefit and according to convenience or ability to pay. The former may be illustrated by the sharing of cost of an irrigation project among those whose land was to be irrigated,¹⁶³ or sharing between two districts the building cost of a bridge over a river that marked their boundary.¹⁶⁴ The concept of sharing according to ability to pay may be illustrated by the phrase *yeh-shih tien-li* 業食佃力, "landlords providing food and tenants

¹⁶² P'i Jih-hsiu, *P'i-tzu wen-sou* 皮子文叢 (SPTK ed.), 4. 56a-b. Lu Yu in his *Ju Shu chi*, 1. 11a, also observes that both the Pien Canal and the canal between Ching-k'ou 京口 and Ch'ien-t'ang 錢塘 had been dug by the Sui but proved beneficial for the Sung.

¹⁶³ For interesting details under the Yüan dynasty, see Li Hao-wen 李好文, *Hsing-ch'ü t'u-shuo* 涇渠圖說, 13a-16b (in his *Ch'ang-an chih t'u* 長安志圖 B).

¹⁶⁴ T'ang Chung-yu 唐仲友, 修中津橋記, included in *T'ai-chou fu-chih* 臺州府志 (compiled 1721-22), 16. 17a-18a: in building the bridge Chung-chin ch'iao, five districts shared the cost of labor and materials. This detail is not found in the abridged version of this essay in *Che-chiang t'ung-chih*, vol. 37, or in *Yueh-chai wen-ch'ao* 悅齋文鈔 (Hsü Chin-hua ts'ung-shu 續金華叢書 ed.), 9. 8a-b.

providing labor” for public works construction.¹⁶⁵ These principles are traceable to the early periods of the imperial era, but became more common from Sung times on. The auxiliary principle of convenience may be illustrated by the practice of ordering empty boats or carts to carry stones for public construction. The following is an early example found in the *Wei shu* 魏書:¹⁶⁶ in the reign of Shih-tsung 世宗 (500-515), an imperial prince, Yüan Ch’ang 元萇, served as prefect of Ho-nei 河內; by his order, each empty cart coming out of the capital, Loyang, was required to carry a couple of stones for constructing the foundation of a drawbridge across the Yellow River. A similar example in the Ch’ing period was an order requiring boats of salt merchants from Huai-nan 淮南 to carry stones for the repair of wharfs at certain places in Hupei province.¹⁶⁷

In more recent periods of the imperial era, a clearer understanding of the economic factors involved in public works led to some interesting practices. One was the practice of “work relief” which has been stressed so much in the modern West. In my article entitled “Economic Justification for Spending—An Uncommon Idea in Traditional China, ” published

¹⁶⁵ *Kung-pu tse-li*, 65 la.

¹⁶⁶ *Wei shu*, 14. 6b-7a.

¹⁶⁷ *Hsü Hsing-shu chiu-cihien* 續行水金鑑, compiled by Li Shih-hsü 黎世序 and others (*Kuo-hsüeh chi-pen ts’ung-shu* 國學基本叢書 ed), 153. 3568.

in the *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, vol. 20, which was a festschrift for Serge Elisséeff, I wrote (page 47):

Guide books for famine relief, from Sung times on,¹⁵⁸ as a rule devote a section to “work relief” (known as *i-kung ta-chen* 以工代賑, lit., “substitution of work for relief,” *chi-kung yü-chen* 卽工寓賑, “implication of relief in work,” or simply *kung-chen*, “work relief”) illustrated by such examples as those of Yen-tzu. Fan Chung-yen, and others. The government regulation referred to in the story about Fan probably was that of 1073, making it a rule that grain and funds from the ever-normal granaries should be used in years of famine to launch projects of water conservancy to relieve the poor.¹⁰⁹ Similar measures were adopted in later dynasties. It is interesting to note that the decree of 1073 ordered advanced planning of such projects with the needed labor and cost figured out in detail. Under the Ch’ing dynasty, a decree of 1737 required careful estimates of city walls to be repaired in the various provinces with priority assigned to the different projects so that work relief could be introduced whenever necessary without delay.¹⁷⁰

In an appendix to this article, I mentioned the contrasting expressions *hsien* 羨, “surplus,” and *pu-tsu* 不足 “deficiency,” found in several ancient texts, including

¹⁵⁸ Yang, *Studies in Chinese Institutional History*, pp. 67-69.

¹⁶⁹ *Wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao* 文獻通考 (*Shih-t’ung* 十通 ed.), 26. 254c.

¹⁷⁰ Yang Ching-jen 楊景仁, *Ch’ou-chi pien* 籌濟編 (author’s preface dated 1824) (1883 ed.), 13. 6a-b.

the *Works of Mencius*, the *Kuan tzu*, and the *Yen-t'ieh lun*.¹⁷¹ Linguistically, it is interesting to note that *hsien putsu* is one of the very few paired expressions with an unequal number of characters. The only other two pairs I can find are *hsien pu-hsiao* 賢不肖, "superior and inferior," and *kuo pu-chi* 過不及, "surpassing and not reaching." Of course, all three pairs of expressions leave out the conditions of equality. The concept of *i-hsien pu pu-tsu* 以羨補不足 or "using surplus to make up deficiency," as expressed in the *Works of Mencius*, must have been common in the time of the *Warring States*. From the early period of the imperial era, it seems to have been forgotten or at least obscured, as attested by the corrupted versions of the pair, *ch'ien pu-tsu* 前不足, *san pu-tsu* 散不足, *chü pu-tsu* 聚不足 in the *Yen-t'ieh lun*, and *I pu-tsu* 義不足 in the *Kuan-tzu*, none of which makes good sense in context. Correct readings of the text in these places have been discovered only by modern scholars.¹⁷²

Another important economic measure was *fa-shang sheng-hsi* 發商生息, "to entrust funds to merchants to produce interest," which was particularly common in Ming and Ch'ing times. In my book *Money and Credit in China, a Short History*, I have noted that "As a

¹⁷¹ Yang, *Studies in Chinese Institutional History*, p. 72.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*

rule, the interest was earmarked for a purpose, for instance, as scholarships for students in public schools, for famine relief, or for the maintenance of an orphanage" (page 99). It was also common to entrust such merchants and earmark the interest for the maintenance of local public works, such as the repair of dikes or of a bridge.¹⁷³

In such an institution, the really interesting point is perhaps the indication of the conception of a fund set up for a specific purpose. The development of this conception also has a long history. As early as Sui and T'ang times, one finds already the institutions *kung-hsieh ch'ien* 公廩錢, "office funds," and *kung-hsieh t'iea* 公廩田, "office land," which were government funds or land set aside, the interest or rent from which was to be used to meet general expenses of government offices.¹⁷⁴ From Sung times on, the practice of setting up a fund was applied for various purposes, by no means limited to government expenses. For instance, the famous *i-chuang* 義莊 or "charitable estate" established by the scholar-official Fan Chung-yen 范仲淹 in 1050 was a fund in the form of land the income from which

¹⁷³ Many examples can be found in *Kung-pu tse-li*, vols. 75-79.

¹⁷⁴ Chü Ch'ing-yüan 鞠清遠, *T'ang-tai ts'ai-cheng shih* 唐代財政史 (1940), pp.126-132; Yang, *Money and Credit in China, a Short History*, pp. 95-96.

was to be used for clan welfare.¹⁷⁵ As an institution, the *i-chuang* has been copied by many clans in Chinese history. Similarly, a fund in the form of land or money could be set up for all kinds of public welfare in a locality, including public works.¹⁷⁶

The development of the conception of a fund or a foundation may have been influenced by the Buddhist church. As suggested by Twitchett, the charitable estate of the Fan Clan may have been modeled after the *ch' ang-chu t'ien* 常住田, the permanent endowments in land held by the Buddhist monastic communities.¹⁷⁷ As a matter of fact, the Buddhist church, as a perpetual corporation, contributed significantly to the development of economic institutions in Chinese history. In my article entitled "Buddhist Monasteries and Four Money-raising Institutions in Chinese History," I pointed out that the pawnshop, the mutual financing association, the auction sale, and the sale of lottery tickets all seem to have originated in or had close connections with Buddhist temples or monasteries.¹⁷⁸ In his book *Les aspects économiques de bouddhisme dans la société chinoise de Ve au Xe siècle* (1956), Jacques

¹⁷⁵ Denis Twitchett, "The Fan Clan's Charitable Estate 1050-1760" in *Confucianism in Action*, edited by David S. Nivison and Arthur F. Wright (1959), pp. 97-133; Kondō Hideki 近藤秀樹, 范氏義莊の變遷, *Tōyōshi kenkyū* 東洋史研究, 21. 4 (1963): 461-506.

¹⁷⁶ For instance, see *Kung-pu tse-li*, 75. 1a-4a, 76. 1a-2a.

¹⁷⁷ *Confucianism in Action*, pp. 102-103.

¹⁷⁸ *Studies in Chinese Institutional History*, pp. 198-215.

Gernet has ably demonstrated the importance of the whole subject. To cite a later example, in Sung times one finds people donating a sum of money to a Buddhist temple with the agreement that the annual income from the donated fund was to pay for religious rituals to be performed by monks of the temple for the benefit of a deceased relative of the donors.¹⁷⁹

Another interesting concept was the principle of *pao-ku* 保固, literally "guarantee of strength of work," as applied to public works. An early example is found during the Sung dynasty. According to the *Sunghui-yao kao* 宋會要稿,¹⁸⁰ in the year 1054 it was learned that officials in charge of building government houses in the capital tended to overestimate the cost at the beginning; after they had been given the charge of the construction, they would spend only a small sum and claim credit for having saved public funds. As a result, such houses were usually fragile and did not last long. To correct this abuse, the government introduced the regulation that officials in charge of the construction of public buildings should be held responsible for the durability of the construction for a period of seven years. The regulation governing public works was further elaborated in later dynasties. For example,

¹⁷⁹ Wang Yüeh-chen 汪曰楨, *Nan-hsün chen chih* 南海鎮志 (compiled 1856-58), 25. 22a-25a, 26. 2a-8b; Lu Hsin-yüan 陸心源, *Wu-hsing chin-shih chi* 吳興金石記 (1890 ed.), 11. 6a-17b.

¹⁸⁰ *Sung hui-yao kao* (ts'e 165), Hsing-fa 刑法, 2. 31a. Also see *Yüan tien-chang* 元典章, 58. 1b-2a.

according to the *Kung-pu tse-li* 工部則例 or "Rules and regulations of the Board of Public Work," under the Ch'ing dynasty officials who had charge of the building of earthen city walls were held responsible for twenty years, and of city walls faced with bricks, thirty years.¹⁸¹ Similar rules were laid down for other public works, especially water control projects.¹⁸²

In a sense, these rules made general contractors of the officials in charge of the construction of public works. Thus the upright official, mentioned above, who was reluctant to permit Hui-chou merchants to procure timber for the imperial palaces which he was charged with reconstructing may be compared to a general contractor who refuses to have any dealings with certain notorious subcontractors. This function of Chinese bureaucrats for public works is parallel to the role of Chinese bureaucrats as tax-farmers imperial China, as observed by the distinguished sociologist Max Weber.¹⁸³ Such points are essential for the understanding of the nature of Chinese government and society.

To return to the application of the concept of harmonization and equalization public works, it seems obvious that, if the people understand what benefits they will derive from the construction, and if they are

¹⁸¹ *Kung-pu tse-li*, 6. 2a, 4a.

¹⁸² *Kung-pu tse-li*, 71. 3a-b, 72. 3a-b.

¹⁸³ Max Weber, *The Religion of China, Confucianism and Taoism*, translated and edited by Hans H. Gerth (1951), pp.84-85.

not employed in a slave-driving manner and not squeezed to their last penny, under certain conditions they will willingly contribute their share to public works. Chinese history occasionally records such examples. For instance, according to the biography of the Neo-Confucian official Huang Kan 黃幹 in the *Sung shih*,¹⁸⁴ when he served as Prefect of An-ch'ing Fu 安慶府, it was reported that the Jurchen in the north were preparing for war. Huang requested from the court permission to build city walls for defense but had the work started without waiting for a reply. The city walls were divided into twelve sections. Huang first had a section built under his own supervision to estimate the cost of labor and materials. Then he entrusted certain subordinate officials, scholars, and eminent residents with supervision of the other sections. Five thousand militia were employed for ninety days each, and twenty thousand additional workers provided by the people according to their wealth were employed for ten days each. They were to take turns in their work. In summer months, they were given six days off each month, and two hours off around noontime every day. These days and hours of rest were reduced in the autumn.

Each day, Huang Kan would arise early in the morning, and, seated in his court, he would summon all the officials in charge to give them detailed instruc-

¹⁸⁴ *Sung shih*, 430. 2b-3b. Huang was Chu Hsi's favorite disciple and son-in-law.

tions about the labor forces and materials to be used for the day, about the rotating turns of the militia and civil workers, and the payment of rice and coins. Only after all instructions had been given would he take up his regular administrative and judicial duties. He was also ingenious in his utilization of resources. For instance, since the pestles for pounding earth required iron, Huang borrowed unused iron from the government mint and returned it after the work was completed. In this connection, it is to be remembered that the Sung government circulated both copper and iron coins in the Huai Valley to form a protective belt to prevent copper coins from being smuggled out.¹⁸⁵

After the city walls were built, the people were greatly pleased. It happened to be the time of the Lantern Festival in the middle of the first moon. The people, both young and old, swarmed in the streets for the celebration. An old lady almost a hundred years of age asked her two sons to carry her in a sedan chair; followed by her grandsons, she went to the prefect's office to express her gratitude. When Huang Kan offered her presents, she refused to accept them and remarked, "I have come here to say thanks for all the creatures in the prefecture, and not for any present from you, the prefect!" Appreciating the benefits of the city walls, the people said to one another, "Not to suffer at the

¹⁸⁵ Yang, *Money and Credit in China, a Short History*, p.28.

hands of invaders or from the damage of flood waters—it is the fatherly prefect Huang who has given us our lives.”¹⁸⁶

It has been aptly pointed out by Balazs¹⁸⁷ that most Chinese histories were “written by the bureaucrats and for the bureaucrats.” This, however, does not mean that the Chinese historical records are therefore useless. Even within the limited goal of providing useful historical references, or “a mirror for aid in government,” Chinese historians made it a rule to keep a veritable and reliable record, and in their recording, to report both successes and failures.¹⁸⁸ As a result, modern historians are provided with an abundance of material which, in terms of economic history, enables them to reconstruct not only a fairly clear picture of the public finance, but also some outlines and details of the history of the people’s livelihood. In these four essays on the economic aspects of public works in imperial China, I hope I have demonstrated that an investigation of the Chinese record on a topic of significance can be fruitful.

¹⁸⁶ *Sung shih*, 430. 3b.

¹⁸⁷ E. Balazs, “L’Histoire comme guide de la pratique bureaucratique (les monographies, les encycloédies, les recueils de statuts)” in *Historians of China and Japan*, edited by W. G. Beasley and E. G. Pulleyblank (1961), pp. 78-94.

¹⁸⁸ Charles Gardner, *Chinese Traditional Historiography* (1938), pp. 64-68; L. S. Yang, “The Organization of Chinese Official Historiography: Principles and Methods of the Standard Histories from the T’ang through the Ming Dynasty”, in *Historians of China and Japan*, pp. 49-53; reprinted above.

The Population Statistics of China A.D. 2-1953

by

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The earliest census mentioned in Chinese histories is said to have been taken during the reign of Yu the Great, founder of the Hsia dynasty, which was supposed to have ruled a part of northern China at some uncertain time in remote antiquity, perhaps two thousand years or more before Christ. According to some sources, Yu found the number of the people to be 13,553,923 (or 13,533,935 etc.), while others give this as the number of households and put the population at 39,220,000. It has been suggested that Han dynasty scholars invented these figures along with other details of the Hsia dynasty history.¹

At least by the time of the Chou dynasty (circa 1050-247 B. C.) population censuses and registrations had

¹ On the Chinese population statistics prior to the Han dynasties, see Liu Nan-ming (22), chapter 1. H. Bielenstein (2), p. 126.

become normal instruments of public administration in China. Several censuses ordered by Chou rulers are mentioned in the histories, and it is recorded that during this time a system of permanent population registers was established throughout the Chinese empire. But the few Chou dynasty statistics which are quoted in the histories are hardly more trustworthy than the supposed results of Yu the Great's census. The population enumerated in a census around the beginning of the eleventh century B. C. is recorded sometimes as 13,714,923 (or variants such as 13,704,923 and 17,304,923), sometimes 49,232,151 with 13,714,923 as the number of households. Another census taken about 680 B. C. is said to have shown a population of 11,841,923 or variants of this figure. The repetition of the same digits in all these numbers suggests that they might all have been derived by garbled transcription and varying interpretations from a single parent number.

Statistics which are worth more serious consideration begin in A. D. 2, just before the end of the Western Han dynasty, and continue with some long interruptions until 1953, when the latest census was taken on the mainland of China. During the fifteenth century, under the rule of the Ming dynasty, the statistics came to be recorded annually, and this practice was continued under the Ch'ing dynasty from the mid-seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth century. Two figures relating to the population are found for most dates prior to the Ch'ing period:

numbers of persons and households (“mouths” and “doors”), although in some cases one figure or the other is lacking. The Ch’ing dynasty statistics refer almost exclusively to persons, but, on the other hand, for most years they are recorded by provinces, while the earlier series, with few exceptions, are limited to totals for the whole empire.

The statistics are found in many different kinds of sources, including contemporary and later encyclopædias, histories, geographies, etc., as well as the dynastic archives. For one not specialized in the study of Chinese historical materials, the practical sources are the works of certain modern scholars who have assembled the figures for the whole period since A.D. 2 or for particular dynasties.² Selected figures from the latter works are reproduced in the tables of the present article to show the trends of the statistics during each dynastic period.

Reliability and Scope of the Statistics

These statistics are full of faults which make it obviously impossible to put much confidence in them as

² Liu Nan-ming (22) presents a series from the beginning up to the year 1928. Biot (3) lists most of the figures on record up to the sixteenth century. Abridged series are shown in: Sacharoff (29), Rockhill (28), FitzGerald (12), and Usher (39). The following works contain more detailed compilations and analyses of the statistics for certain periods: Bielenstein (2), Balázs (1), H. Franke (14), Shigeshi, Kato (30), Eichhorn (10a); van der Sprenkel (40), Ho Ping-ti (17), Chen Chang-heng (7); Krotevitch (18), Irene Taeuber and Wang Nai-chi (33), Institute of Economic Research, Academia Sinica (16).

measures either of the exact size of the population at any time or of its changes during any period. Their ups and downs are often patently incredible, and the numbers of persons and households are sometimes inconsistent. Conflicting figures for the same date are found in different sources, and when statistics are given for parts of the country they do not always add to the totals recorded for China as a whole. In many cases it is apparent that the numbers have been corrupted in the course of repeated transcriptions by persons who were not sufficiently careful with figures, and the resulting errors sometimes run into millions. Modern scholars have been able to emend some of the errors by comparing figures for different years and from different sources, checking sums, etc., but other errors certainly remain undetected, and in some cases it is hardly possible to choose between contradictory data. If the figures have any value it is only to show the general form of the long-term trends of China's population through the centuries, and even in this respect they be affected by major biases. Still they deserve more attention than they have received, as the only series of statistics on the population of any country that can be traced back more than a century or two into the past.³

Some historians have held that the early Chinese

³ Figures purporting to represent the population of Japan go back to the seventh century A.D., but they are highly questionable prior to the eighteenth century. See Taeuber (31), chapters 1 and 2.

statistics did not refer to the total population but only to taxpayers or persons who were liable to military service or *corvée* duty.⁴ In fact, it is known that the the statistics of the early Ch'ing dynasty (A. D. 1651-1734), represented some kind of tax-units, and that it was only after 1740 that the Ch'ing government made an effort to register and count the whole population. Also, a Professor Ho Ping-ti has shown,⁵ the Ming dynasty statistics during the fifteenth, sixteenth, and early seventeenth centuries came to be based less and less on population records and more and more on records of conventionally defined tax-paying units which bore little relation to the numbers, either of total population or of individuals in the taxable age-group. The evidence regarding the definitions of the statistics of earlier dynasties is not so clear, but the works of Giles and Bielenstein have made it appear that the figures on record from the first to the fourteenth century were not, as a rule, limited to taxpayers or persons liable to military or *corvée* duty. Before going further, it will be well to review briefly the evidence on this point.

In the first place, a document has been found which contains a fragment of the record of a census or registration in the Western Liang State, dated A. D. 416. The members of each household in the village of Kao-chang, commandery of Tun-huang, in the present

⁴ For instance, Fitzgerald (12).

⁵ (17).

province of Kansu, are listed by name, sex, age, household relationship, and occupation, in a systematic order which is remarkably like that of a modern census. Women, children, and the aged are included. For example, one household is listed as follows:⁶

Pei Pao, a soldier, aged 66
his wife, Yuan, aged 63
their son, Chin, aged 39
Chin's younger brother, Lung, aged 34 (?)
Chin's wife, Chang, aged 36
Lung's wife, Su, aged 22
Chin's son, Yang, aged 2

The numbers of adult males in the household (2), younger adult sons (1), boys (1), females (3), and the total number of persons (7) are also noted. It should be observed that Pao, as a soldier, would presumably have been exempt from taxation and other duties.

This seems to be the only fragment of a census record prior to the fourteenth century which has been found. It was preserved thanks to some Buddhist texts having been written afterwards on the back of the sheet. But from the beginning of the Ming period, fragments are extant from a census, which was ordered to be taken throughout the empire in the year 1370, and these, too, show that women, children, and the aged were enumerated. For example, one household is listed as follows:⁷

⁶ A full translation is given by Giler (15).

⁷ Librarian of Congress (38), p. 159. For another example see Ho Ping-ti (17), p. 6.

Chang Te-ssu, aged 34
 his wife, Sung Ta-niang, aged 26
 their son, A-kou, aged 1
 their daughter, A-sheng, aged 4

Second, for two years of the T'ang dynasty, A. D. 754 and 755, the numbers of taxpaying and tax-free persons and households are recorded along with the usual totals of persons and households, as follows:⁸

	A. D. 754	A. D. 755
Persons — — — —	52,880,488	52,919,309
Taxpayers — — —	7,662,800	8,208,321
Tax-free persons — —	45,218,480	44,700,988
Households — — —	9,069,154	8,914,709
Taxpaying households —	5,301,044	5,349,208
Tax-free households—	3,886,504	3,565,501

The totals of "persons" and "households" are intended, obviously, to be the sums of the taxpaying and tax-free groups, although there are some discrepancies due to errors in transcription. The meaning of the figures for "taxpayers" and "taxpaying households" is uncertain. We are informed that males and females between the ages of 23 and 60 years were required to pay poll-taxes at this time,⁹ but the ratio of taxpayers to total persons in the above tabulation is much too small to represent the expected proportion of this age group in the population.¹⁰ Apparently more than half

⁸ Balázs (1), pp. 14-15.

⁹ Bielenstein (2), p. 130.

¹⁰ The ratio of taxpayers to persons is 14.5% for A. D. 754 and 15.5% for 755, whereas the ratio of persons aged 23 to 60 in a population of high fertility and mortality would normally be somewhere in the neighbourhood of 40%.

the persons of the stated age group either claimed exemption for various reasons or otherwise avoided registration as taxpayers. But it is nevertheless evident that the numbers of "persons" and "households" recorded in these two years were not limited to taxpayers; and since they belong to a consistent series extending from A. D. 705 to 755, it follows that this whole series of T'ang dynasty statistics was not limited to taxpayers. (See Table 2, p. 223.)

Third, the ratios of persons per household derived from the statistics of the various dynasties are generally somewhere near the levels which might be expected if all household members were included in the counts of persons, and these ratios are too high to be plausible on the assumption that only taxpayers were counted. In recent times the average size of Chinese households has apparently been somewhere in the vicinity of six persons or perhaps slightly smaller,¹¹ and this is in line with the averages for other Oriental countries where

¹¹ The incomplete census of 1912 showed an average of 5.5 persons per household in those provinces of China proper which were covered, and a range of provincial averages from 4.5 to 7.6 persons. (See Appendix, Table A.3.) The even less complete census of 1928-1929, in those provinces from which returns were obtained, showed an average of 5.2, and the same figure was deduced by Chen Chang-heng from the 1909-1911 census returns of those provinces for which they were trustworthy in his opinion. The writer has not found a measure of the average size of households in the publications which quote returns of the 1953 census. The censuses of 1909-11, 1912 and 1928-29 almost certainly understated the numbers of infants and women in the households that were enumerated.

the birth rate is high and a fair-sized minority of the population is found in extended households (married sons, daughters-in-law, grandchildren, and other relatives sharing the patriarchal home). The averages obtained from the statistics of the various dynasties (all years for which both numbers of persons and households are recorded) fall within the following ranges:

	Persons per household		
Western Han (A.D. 2)	—	—	4.9
Eastern Han (A.D. 57-156)	—	—	4.9-5.8
Sui (A.D. 606)	—	—	5.2
T'ang (A.D. 705-755)	—	—	5.7-6.0
Sung (A.D. 1006-1223)	—	—	1.4-2.6
Chin (A.D. 1187-1207)	—	—	6.4-6.7
Yuan (A.D. 1290-1292)	—	—	4.5-4.6
Ming (A.D. 1381-1626)	—	—	4.8-7.1

The Sung dynasty statistics are a special case; their interpretation will be discussed in a later section of this article. For the other dynasties, if the statistics of persons are taken to refer only to taxpayers, they imply averages of ten to twenty or even twenty-five persons, including non-taxpayers, to the household, depending on the provisions of the tax laws and the frequency of exemptions and evasions in each period. There seems to be no historical evidence to suggest that the size of households had been so much larger in earlier times than recently. Moreover, in the light of the knowledge that the T'ang dynasty statistics were not limited to taxpayers, the comparison of the averages makes it incredible that the figures for the other dynastic periods (except

the Sung) were so limited.

The conclusion that the statistics were not limited to taxpayers does not mean that they approximated a measure of the total population. On the contrary, there are several reasons for supposing that in general they fell considerably short of the true totals.

In the first place, up to the time of the Ming dynasty, various parts of the territory now included in the eighteen provinces of China proper were outside the Chinese empire. The areas covered will be indicated below, where the statistics of each period are discussed.

Within the borders of the empire the statistics probably did not, as a rule, include "barbarians", as the Chinese called all non-Chinese peoples. During the early dynastic periods the non-Chinese probably accounted for a substantial part of the population in some parts of the country, especially in the south and along the western and northern frontiers. Some of the Chinese also may have been outside the scope of the statistics, such as nobles, slaves, and inmates of monasteries.¹²

Probably more important than the limitations of coverage were omissions of persons who should have been counted. Experience with efforts to enumerate the population in various parts of China during modern

¹² Bielenstein (2), p. 132, gives some reasons for supposing that slaves and inmates of monasteries were included in the statistics, at least during the T'ang dynasty, but the evidence seems to be inconclusive. On exclusions from the Ming and Ch'ing statistics see Ta Chen (8), p. 3 and Liu Nan-ming (22), pp. 37, 46-7.

times has shown a strong tendency to overlook women and girls and a certain reluctance to report male children, either because of superstitious fears or the Chinese aversion to bragging about good fortune, especially to strangers. It is not likely that the early statistics were unaffected by these tendencies. Moreover, men who were liable to taxation, military service, or labour draft had good reason to conceal their presence if they could do so, and it was to the advantage of local officials to report the smallest possible numbers in order to minimize their obligation to remit tax-money to the central government. As Wittfogel and Fêng put it, the statistics refer to the admitted population,¹³ and many scholars have suggested that at times when the burdens of taxation and other duties were relatively heavy, the fraction of the true numbers which was reported would diminish.

The instructions for the census of 1370 provide an example of the horrifying penalties which were prescribed for evasion and falsification of the returns:

“On 12 December 1370, the Board of Revenue was informed by Imperial edict, that although the country is now at peace the Government has no clear knowledge of the population. The provincial authorities are therefore instructed to prepare census blanks in duplicate so that a census can be made of the whole Empire. Every revenue official must give notice to the local officials who in turn

¹³ Wittfogel and Fêng Chia-Sheng (45), p. 53.

are to see that all the people under them present to those officials a written statement (without any falsifications) of the number of persons in their households. Each householder is to be given an official blank with a half-seal on each stub which can be detached from the original. Since the military forces of this region are no longer going out on campaigns they are to be sent to every district and department to make a census of the households and to check the duplicate returns. Those households whose tallies agree will be treated as subjects in good standing; if not, the family will be placed on the list of those liable for military service. If in their search the military come across minor officials who have suppressed the facts, those officials are to be decapitated. Any common people who hide from the census will be punished according to law and will be drafted into the army. Let everyone respect this."¹⁴

The term "census", which is ordinarily used in referring to the Chinese enumerations of the population, is not to be interpreted strictly in the modern, technical sense. Although the details of the methods employed in early times are not known, it can be taken for granted that they never approximated the procedures which are recognized in modern times as indispensable for accurate census-taking. Even with the honest and energetic cooperation of the whole public and all ranks of officials it would have been practically impossible to take a strictly accurate census throughout the whole vast coun-

¹⁴ Librarian of Congress (38), p. 159. Cf. Ho Ping-ti (17), p. 4.

try under the conditions which prevailed until very recent times: archaic means of transportation and communications, no adequate maps, an overwhelmingly illiterate population, and no corps of field workers with the necessary organization and training to assure systematic coverage of every part of the area and all the inhabitants. Actually, it was more a method of permanent population registers than of censuses which was used during the Ch'ing and Ming periods, if not also in earlier times. A record of all households and their members was supposed to be kept in each locality and brought up to date periodically by recording the changes due to births, deaths, and inward and outward movements. To maintain an accurate series of statistics by this method requires even more scrupulous care than the census method, for any laxity in the current recording of population changes will result in cumulative errors in the course of time.

For a number of reasons, then, it is practically certain that the statistics of the early dynasties fell short of accounting for the whole population, or for whatever part of the population they were intended to cover. The degree of understatement cannot be presumed to have been constant, and therefore the statistics do not necessarily provide accurate measures either of the magnitude of the population or its increases and decreases during various periods. It is clear that the deficiencies became very large at certain times

when the central government was weakened to such an extent that it could no longer command the cooperation of the provincial or local authorities, or when the administrative system was disrupted by rebellions, civil wars, epidemics, famines, or natural calamities. At such times the statistics show abrupt decreases which greatly exaggerate whatever population losses actually occurred. In times of prosperity and political unity, when the strength of the central government was growing and the efficiency of administrative organization was improving, the statistics show increases which were probably due only partly to actual population growth.

The same presumption or perennial under-reporting in varying degrees does not apply to the statistics of the Ch'ing dynasty after 1740, when "pao-chia" system was established for annual reports on the numbers of the whole population. By this time the former link between population reports and local tax or *corvée* assessments had been severed, and thus the principal motive for evasion and deliberate understatement was removed. But still no adequate administrative machinery was created for accurate record-keeping and compilation of population statistics; and, as we shall see, the statistics of the Ch'ing dynasty from this time onwards are hardly more reliable than those for earlier periods.

Tests of Credibility and Consistency of the Data

Most of the usual tests of the quality of population statistics cannot be applied to the Chinese historical data for lack of the necessary classifications by sex and age groups and complementary statistics of births and deaths. With the material that is available, only a few simple tests are feasible.

In the first place, statistics for geographical divisions can be used, where they are available, to verify that all parts of the country are represented and that the sum of the figures for component areas agrees at least tolerably well with the total recorded for the country as a whole. The tables of the Appendix reproduce the available statistics for provinces from A. D. 2 to 1578 and a selection of those which are available for more recent years.

Second, figures for different dates can be compared to see whether the changes are credible and consistent with what is known of the history of the period. In particular, increases which exceed a maximum credible rate of population growth in the absence of immigration can be taken as presumptive evidence of defective statistics.

Material for a third test is supplied by the ratios between the numbers of persons and households shown in the statistical records. If the data were accurate, these ratios should be stable; they should increase or decrease only slightly over short periods. Large changes in the course of time and large differences between the ratios for different parts of the country at any time, should

be explainable in terms of the factors which influence the size of households, namely fertility, mortality, migration, and customs relating to household composition. Otherwise errors are to be suspected either in the enumeration of persons or of households, or both. Because of the obstacles to complete recording of household members, wherever the ratio of persons per household appears unduly low, an understatement of the number of persons is to be suspected.

Applications of these tests to the statistics of the various dynastic periods will be discussed below. In addition, comparisons with other statistics found in the ancient Chinese records may possibly give some indication of the plausibility of the population figures, but efforts to test the data by these means have not been very fruitful as yet. Statistics of the area of cultivated land are recorded for many years from the time of the Han dynasty, but these statistics appear to be very unreliable. Amounts of cultivated land per person, computed from these statistics and the recorded population figure show erratic variations which are at least as likely to have been caused by errors in the land statistics as in the population statistics.¹⁵ Historical data on the construction of city walls are also available from a seventeenth-century encyclopædia, which gives the number of city walls built in each province during each histo-

¹⁵ These data were presented and analyzed by D. K. Lieu and Chen Chung-min (21).

rical period since earliest times, and the number still in use in 1644. The author has experimented with the use of these data to estimate the number of cities at various dates between A. D. 2 and 1644, and so to check the plausibility of the population statistics, but the results were inconclusive.¹⁶

Han Dynasty Statistics

The population of China during the Western and Eastern Han dynasties (206 B. C. -A. D. 220) is represented by statistics for ten dates in the period from A. D. 2 to 156. The numbers of persons and households on record for those dates are listed in Table 1.¹⁷ Other censuses must also have been taken during the time of the two Han dynasties, but the results have been lost.

Statistics for geographical divisions of the empire are available for two dates in the Han series: A. D. 2 and 140. Bielenstein has succeeded in mapping the areas for which figures were given, by a painstaking search through the records of ancient place names and their changes in the course of the centuries. Thus he was able to chart the distribution of population in China as of A. D. 2 and 140, and also to estimate the numbers of households and persons within the area of each

¹⁶ For an attempt to derive an estimate of China's population in A. D. 618 from the data on city wall building, see Fitzgerald (11).

¹⁷ The series presented here is the one shown by Bielenstein (2), p. 126. The figures quoted by Biot, Sacharoff, Liu Nan-ming, and others for the same dates differ in some instances, as they were from different sources.

modern province. His estimates for the provinces are reproduced in the Appendix, Tables A. 1 and A. 2.¹⁸

Table 1
China: Recorded Population Statistics, A. D. 2-156

Year (A. D.)	Persons	Households	Persons per Household
2— — — —	a59,594,978	a12,233,062	4.9
57— — — —	21,007,820	4,279,634	4.9
75— — — —	34,125,021	5,860,572	5.8
88— — — —	43,356,367	7,456,784	5.8
105— — — —	53,256,229	9,237,112	5.8
125— — — —	b49,690,789	9,647,838	5.2
140— — — —	c49,150,220	c9,698,630	5.1
144— — — —	49,730,550	9,946,919	5.0
145— — — —	49,524,183	9,937,680	5.0
146— — — —	d47,566,772	9,348,227	5.1
156— — — —	e56,486,856	e10,677,960	5.3

Source: Bielenstein (2), p. 126, where the Chinese sources are cited. The average number of persons per household have been computed by the present author.

a The totals which Bielenstein obtained by adding the statistics for minor administrative divisions were 57,671,400 persons and 12,366,470 households.

b Liu Nan-ming (22) quoted 48,690,789 from a different source.

c See the discussion of the totals which Bielenstein obtained by adding the statistics for minor administrative divisions, p. 219 below.

d Lao Kan (19), p. 86, quotes 61,086,224 for this year.

e In addition to these figures Liu Nan-ming(22)quoted 50,066,856 persons and 16,070,906 households, from a different source.

¹⁸ Bielenstein's charts of population distribution are appended to his article (2), plates II and III. He was kind enough to give his unpublished estimates of provincial totals to the author.

For A. D. 2 there was a sizeable discrepancy between the sums of the figures for local areas (57.7 million persons and 12.4 million households) and the recorded totals for the empire as a whole (59.6 and 12.2 millions). The totals obtained by adding the local figures are probably more reliable.¹⁹ For A. D. 140 an exact check is not possible because statistics were missing for 3 of the 103 commanderies and “vassal kingdoms” which made up the empire. About 1.2 million persons were recorded in these three areas in A. D. 2.²⁰

The totals for both A. D. 2 and 140 included some areas in Manchuria, Korea, Mongolia, Turkestan, and Viet-Nam, in addition to areas within the present boundaries of the 18 provinces of China proper. In A. D. 2 the number of persons recorded in these outlying areas came to a total of about 2.5 millions. On the other hand, the present province of Fukien, in China proper, was

¹⁹ As Bielenstein implied (2), p. 128, the cause of the discrepancy was probably faulty addition at the time when the statistics for the whole empire were originally compiled. It is possible, however, that the original additions were correct and that the discrepancy was caused by subsequent mistakes in copying the figures for local areas. If so the empire totals as originally recorded would, of course, be preferable to the sums of the local figures.

²⁰ The totals of the local statistics for A. D. 140, without the three missing commanderies, were 48 million persons and 9.5 million households, whereas the recorded totals for the empire were 49.2 and 9.7 millions. It is difficult to agree with Bielenstein when he substitutes the totals by addition, instead of the originally recorded totals, without any allowance for the population of the missing commanderies.

outside the empire and not represented by the statistics of either A. D. 2 or 140.

Comparing his population maps for these two years, Bielenstein found that the indicated shifts of population were generally consistent with the record of historical events during the interval.²¹ The north-western border regions (modern Kansu, Shensi, and Shansi Provinces) were largely depopulated, mainly as a result of Hun and Tibetan invasions. Large decreases took place also on the Great Plain of north-central China, especially in Shantung and Honan; Bielenstein interpreted them as the result of flood damage and internal fighting, but it appears that they were in line with a long-term trend (see Tables A. 1 and A. 2). The depopulation of the north was partly offset by increases in the south, especially Kiangsi, Hunan, Kwangtung, and Yunnan, where extensive Chinese colonization took place during this period.

A study of the changes in the recorded population totals for the whole empire reveals that the number of persons must have been greatly understated in A. D. 57. For A. D. 57 the recorded total of 21 millions is 38.6 millions less than the total for A. D. 2 and 13.1 millions less than the total for A. D. 75. If these figures were correct, they would mean that the population increased between the years 57 and 75 at an average annual rate of 27.3 per 1,000, which rivals the present rates of

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 139-142.

growth in those countries where the birth rate is highest and where the death rate has recently been cut very low by applications of modern medical science. It is beyond belief that such a rate of increase could have been achieved in ancient China in the face of the death rates which must have prevailed in the dense agricultural settlements with no adequate protection against infectious diseases. Only immigration on a large scale have brought about a population increase at the rate which the statistics show, and there is no indication of immigration on such a scale having taken place during this or any other period of China's history.

It is quite likely that some decrease of population did take place between A. D. 2 and 57, in view of the calamities which China suffered during this period. In the year 9 a usurper seized the throne, and under his rule the long peace and prosperity of the Western Han empire came quickly to an end. Ten years later a great peasant insurrection broke out, led by the Red Eyebrows Society, and spread death and destruction through the Yellow River Valley. To make matters worse, in a series of catastrophes which began soon after A. D. 2, the Yellow River broke its dykes and set out on a new course across the plain of Shantung, creating what is known as one of the most disastrous floods in Chinese history. In A. D. 23 a successor of the Han line recovered the throne, and the Eastern Han dynasty was founded. The new emperor took up the long task of

bringing the rebels and the river under control; but in the meantime Huns and Tibetans mounted invasions from the north and west, and many decades passed before peace could be restored. It is likely that in the year 57 the empire was not yet under firm enough control to make it possible to carry out a complete census in all the commanderies, and therefore the result of this census was a considerable understatement of the population and an exaggeration of the decrease since A. D. 2.

A question can also be raised about the completeness of enumeration in the census of A. D. 75, since the average annual rate of increase shown by the figures for the years 75 and 88 is also suspiciously high, amounting to 19 per 1,000 population per annum. Is such a rate of increase credible under the conditions which can be assumed to have prevailed in ancient China?

During peaceful years that were relatively free of epidemics, floods, droughts, and other natural disasters, we may assume that the mortality rates were normally such as to yield an expectation of life in the neighbourhood of 30 years or less. This figure is consistent with the life tables for India during the early decades of the twentieth century and with the evidence as to mortality in the Roman Empire derived from the tombstone inscriptions of ages at death. A stable population with such mortality rates and a gross reproduction rate of 3 (which is near the highest level of fertility on record in modern times for countries at a low standard of health) would

have a birth rate near 50, a death rate near 35, and an annual rate of natural increase approximating 15 per 1,000.²² Thus, if the increase shown by the Chinese statistics for any two dates exceeds an average annual rate of about 15 per 1,000, and unless there is evidence of substantial immigration during the interval,²³ there is cause for suspicion that the enumeration at the earlier date was less complete, more narrowly defined, or covered a smaller area than the later enumeration. This criterion is applicable to the statistics of all dynastic periods up to and including the Ch'ing, for there is little reason to suppose that any great progress in the control of infectious diseases was achieved in China until very recent times.

The growth of population indicated by the statistics between A. D. 75 and 88 is moderately in excess of this assumed maximum rate, and therefore some deficiency in the census of the year 75, over and above the extent of deficiency that was normal in the Han dynasty censuses, is to be suspected. The smallest number of persons in that year which would be consistent with the recorded total for A. D. 88 and a rate of increase not exceeding 15 per 1,000 per annum is approximately 36

²² United Nations (36), p. 42.

²³ In general the factor of immigration can be neglected in considering the statistics of China as a whole, for there has been no period in Chinese history when immigration was large enough to have a major effect on the growth of population in the whole country.

millions, or 2 millions more than the recorded number. The corresponding minimum for A. D. 57 is 27 millions, or 6 millions more than the total on record for that year.

If the census of A. D. 75 was defective, it was mainly because of omissions of whole households or whole areas, rather than of individuals within the enumerated households, for the average number of persons per household shown by the statistics of this year was comparatively large. If any of the Han dynasty censuses were much affected by underenumeration of individuals in enumerated households, they would be the censuses of A. D. 2, 57, and 125-156, which showed averages in the low range of 4.9 to 5.3 persons per household, whereas the average for A. D. 75, 88, and 105 was 5.8 persons. To be sure, the statistics show rapid population growth during A. D. 75-105, contrasting with slow growth or decline during A. D. 2-57 and 125-146, and for this reason a somewhat smaller average size of households would be expected during the latter periods. But the ups and downs of the average are too abrupt to be explained by variations of the vital rates.²⁴ Furthermore, the figures for A. D. 156 do not fit this pattern; the statistics show an average of only 5.3 persons per household in that year, although the population appears to have been increasing rapidly since A. D. 146. It is therefore likely that the apparent changes in average size of households were due at least partly to less com-

plete enumeration of household members in the years 2, 57, and 125-156 than in 75, 88, and 105.

Geographical variations in the average numbers of persons per household computed from the local statistics also suggest defects in the figures. Bielenstein's estimates for A. D. 2 (see Table A. 3) show especially small households in the north, with averages ranging from 4.6 down to 4.0 persons in all provinces north of the Yangtze except Honan. In the southern provinces, except Szechwan, the averages are all on the level of 5.2 persons or higher. Between A. D. 2 and 140, if the statistics are to be trusted, the size of households decreased in every southern province except Kweichow and Yunnan, while in the north the averages increased so that in A. D. 140 their level was considerably higher, on the whole, in the north than in the south. The

²⁴ It is true that large variations of the birth rate would produce considerable changes in the average size of households. For instance, if the birth rate dropped suddenly from 40 to 30 per 1,000 and remained at the lower level for fifteen years, other things remaining equal, the average number of children under 15 years of age per household would be reduced by one-fourth at the end of the fifteen-year period, and this reduction would be enough to account for a decrease in the average number of persons per household, for instance, from 5.8 to 5.2. But variations in the rate of population growth in ancient China were almost certainly due as much, and probably more, to changes in the death rate than in the birth rate. An increase or decrease in the death rate would affect the average size of households much less than a corresponding change in the birth rate, as it would probably affect the adult population as well as the children, and so would affect the trend in the number of households as well as the number of household members.

statistics of the T'ang dynasty, A. D. 742, show a further development of this trend. For that year averages of 5.6 persons per household or more are shown by the statistics for all the northern provinces except Kansu, while the averages for the southern provinces, except Kiangsi and Chekiang, now ranged downward from 5.5 to 3.2.²⁵

Bielenstein saw in migration the main explanation of the differences between average sizes of households in different parts of the country and their changes from one census date to another.²⁶ There was an important migration from the north to the south during the Han period, and Bielenstein argued that the migrants were probably drawn chiefly from the poorest classes of the population in the north: households with little or no land, which would have been comparatively small by economic necessity. Thus their departure would have increased the average size of households in the north and reduced it in the south. Further colonization of the south took place during the T'ang dynasty, and Bielenstein took this to explain the further decrease of household size in the south and further increase in the north. He went so far as to use the average number of persons per household as a yardstick of recent migration or to from each area.

Bielenstein's explanation of the behaviour of these

²⁵ The maps appended to Bielenstein's article (2), plates VIII, IX and X show these averages for commanderies in A. D. 2, 140, and 742.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 142 ff.

averages is questionable for several reasons. In the first place, when emigration occurs, unattached young people are likely to be among the first to move out, such as unmarried sons, whose departure would tend to reduce temporarily the average size of households in the areas of emigration. The emigration of young couples might also have this effect in a society where young people commonly share the homes of their parents after marriage, as has been the tradition in China. The hypothesis that emigration would have raised the average size of households in the north is therefore doubtful. So far as the south is concerned, it is plausible enough that immigration on a large scale would have tended to lower the average, but any great reduction on this account would have been only temporary. Within two or three decades, as the immigrants became established and proceeded with the building of their families, the average size of households in the immigration areas would have tended to return to normal, unless the immigration continued on a constantly increasing scale. For instance, in an area of immigration, if the average were 5 persons per household for non-migrants and 3 persons for migrants at the time of their arrival, it would take a doubling of the population by immigration within a decade or two to bring the average for the whole population down from 5 to 4 persons, and then, unless the population continued to double by immigration decade after decade, the average would tend to return to 5.

The number of persons per household would ordinarily be affected more by variations in the birth rate, in infant mortality, and in the frequency of extended households (married children and grandchildren living with the parents) than by migration. It is possible that in the south, where the density of population was relatively low, the birth rate might have been higher, the infant mortality rate lower, and the frequency of extended households might have been greater than in the more crowded north. The larger average size of households in the south in A. D. 2 might possibly be explained in these terms, but the same explanation would not hold for A. D. 140 or 742, when the statistics show larger households in the north than in the south.²⁷ Averages in the neighbourhood of four persons per household or less are hard to reconcile with a birth rate such as must surely have been the rule in ancient China. Such extremely low averages are shown by the statistics for two northern provinces in A. D. 2 and for several southern province in 140 and 742.

All signs point to the conclusion that there was a tendency at each census to omit some members of the enumerated households and that the frequency of omissions varied in different parts of the country, and from one census date to the next. It is therefore possible that

²⁷ Balázs (1), p. 19, noted that the average size of households shown by the T'ang statistics for provinces, ca. A. D. 742, varied directly with the density of population.

accuracy would be improved by discarding the reported numbers of persons and substituting estimates derived from the numbers of households, with the assumption of a constant average size of households near the maximum shown by any of the censuses. The following estimates are obtained by multiplying the recorded numbers of households by 6, after striking out the defective statistics of A. D. 57 and the suspect figures for the year 75:

Year (A. D.)	Millions of persons	
	Empire total	China proper ^a
2 — — —	674	671
88 — — —	45	43
105 — — —	55	53
125 — — —	58	56
140 — — —	58	56
144 — — —	60	58
145 — — —	60	58
146 — — —	56	54
156 — — —	64	62

^a Figures for the years 88-156 estimated by subtracting a constant of 2 millions from the figures for the empire total. This figure of 2 millions appears to be approximately the number which would have been recorded in A. D. 140 in those parts of the empire which were outside the present area of China proper, if returns had been obtained from the areas for which data were missing. The corresponding number recorded in A. D. 2 was 2½ millions according to Bielenstein's estimates.

^b Bielenstein's total of households obtained by adding the figures for the various area has been taken as the basis of the calculation. If the recorded total were used, the estimate would be 1 million lower.

“China proper”, as we use the term in this article refers to the area of the 18 modern provinces listed in Table A. 1 (excluding Manchuria, Mongolia, and other

outlying areas), so far as it was included in the statistics of each period. As already mentioned, Fukien Province was outside the Han empire.

These estimates are by no means the highest that would be plausible. No correction has been made for the omission of entire households, which was almost certainly an important type of deficiency, nor for the non-Chinese population, most of whom were probably excluded from the statistics. The number of households omitted may have been much larger in some years than in others, and consequently the increases and decreases indicated by the estimates might be either exaggerated or understated.

Statistics of the Period of Disunity,

A. D. 221-580

During the three and a half centuries after the disintegration of the Han empire, when China was divided among a varying number of lesser empires and kingdoms, the population is represented in the records by only a few statistics showing numbers of persons and households in various parts of the country at widely scattered dates.²⁸ These statistics in general are almost certainly very incomplete, and they are practically worthless for the reconstruction of population trends.

The weakness which was very likely common to all

²⁸ Bielenstein (2), pp. 126, 145, 154-156, quotes various statistics of this period. See also Liu Nan-ming (22).

the statistics of this period has been brought out by Bielenstein's analysis of the figures of A. D. 464 referring to the Liu Sung State, which occupied a large territory in southern and central China at that time. The number of persons recorded was only 5.3 millions and the number of households 900,000.²⁹ Bielenstein made a map of the numbers of persons recorded in the component areas, which showed that in the region around Nanking, where the capital was located, the size and distribution of the population were about the same as in A. D. 140; but throughout the rest of the territory the recorded numbers were generally few and far between. Bielenstein concluded: "Either the district officials had control only over the areas in the immediate vicinity of their residential towns, or they did not care to carry out a correct census. In both cases this indicates that the government's influence was limited to a small part of the country".³⁰

Sui and T'ang Dynasty Statistics

The population of China as reunited under the Sui

²⁹ These are presumably rounded totals of the figures recorded for local areas. The totals shown in Bielenstein's table (p. 126) and listed by Liu Nan-ming and others are 4,685,501 persons and 906,870 households.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 145. Wan Kuo-ting (41), (translation, pp. 178-9) quotes the Chinese classic, *T'ung k'ao*, to the effect that the population statistics of this period were understated because the tax rates were high. "Banding together" of households in groups of as many as fifty is mentioned as a device that was used to minimize the numbers reported and to escape taxation and *corvées*.

dynasty (A. D. 580-618) is represented in the records by the results of only one census, dated A. D. 606.³¹ During the T'ang dynasty (A. D. 618-905) statistics are on record for 27 dates, as listed in Table 2, but only the numbers recorded at eight dates during the interval A. D. 705-755 can be regarded as possibly approximating the population of the whole country.

If the statistics of the early years of the T'ang dynasty could be believed, it would appear that China suffered a catastrophic depopulation at the end of the Sui dynasty, followed by an increase under the T'ang emperors which made good most of the loss in about a hundred years time. The trend is very similar to that of the Han dynasty statistics between A. D. 2 and 105, and the same reservations are required with regard to probable defects of the data. Again, there is reason to believe that some decrease probably occurred, particularly during the period 618 to 623, when the empire was split into countless petty states fighting among themselves. But the small numbers recorded in A. D. 627, 634-643, 650, and 652 were probably not due so much to actual losses of life as to the effects of political disintegration and consequent failure to get complete returns from all areas.³²

³¹ Bielenstein (2) and Pulleyblank (27) attribute this census to the year 609, but Balázs and others dated it 606.

³² This point is brought out by Balázs (1), p. 17-18. Bielenstein (2), p. 153, argues that the statistics of A. D. 634-643 referred to taxpayers only.

Table 2

China: Recorded Population Statistics, A. D. 606-845.

Year (A. D.)	Persons	Households	Persons per Household
606— — — —	46,019,956	<i>a</i> 8,907,536	5.2
627— — — —	—	3,000,000	—
634-643 — — —	<i>b</i> 12,000,000	2,992,779	4.0
650— — — —	—	3,800,000	—
652— — — —	—	3,850,000	—
705— — — —	37,140,000	6,156,141	6.0
726— — — —	41,419,712	7,069,565	5.9
732— — — —	45,431,265	7,861,236	5.8
734— — — —	46,285,161	8,018,710	5.8
740— — — —	48,143,609	8,412,871	5.7
742— — — —	<i>c</i> 48,909,800	<i>c</i> 8,525,763	5.7
754— — — —	52,880,488	<i>d</i> 9,069,154	5.8
755— — — —	52,919,309	<i>e</i> 8,914,709	5.9
756— — — —	—	<i>f</i> 8,018,710	—
757— — — —	—	<i>f</i> 8,018,710	—
760— — — —	16,990,386	<i>g</i> 2,933,174	5.8
764— — — —	16,900,000	2,900,000	5.8
766-779 — — —	—	1,200,000	—
780— — — —	—	<i>h</i> 3,805,076	—
806-820 — — —	—	2,473,963	—
812— — — —	—	2,440,254	—
812-824 — — —	—	3,944,959	—
825-826 — — —	—	3,978,982	—
827-835 — — —	—	4,357,575	—
839— — — —	—	4,996,752	—
841— — — —	—	2,114,960	—
845— — — —	—	4,955,151	—

Source: Except as noted, from Balázs (1), p. 14, where the Chinese sources are cited.

a Bielenstein (2), p. 160 obtained a total of 9,067,993 by adding the statistics for administrative divisions, excluding those for which the data were missing or confused, and excluding two commanderies in Turkestan. He dated these figures A. D. 609.

b Bielenstein (2), p. 153. Exact date not determined within the period specified. The total of persons is apparently a rounded sum of figures for administrative areas.

c Bielenstein (2), p. 161 obtained totals of 51,500,000 persons and 8,954,301 households by adding the statistics for administrative divisions, excluding those for which the data were missing or confused and excluding three commanderies in Turkestan. In addition to the totals listed, Balázs quoted from another source 45,311,272 persons, and 8,348,395 households, and noted that the total of 8,535,763

households given elsewhere was a misprint.

d From another source Balázs also quoted a total of 9,619,254 households. The figure shown is preferred because it agrees better with the statistics of tax-paying and tax-free households shown on page 211 above and gives an average number of persons per household which fits better into the series.

e Liu Nan-ming (22) quoted 9,919,309 from another source.

f Compare the number recorded for A. D. 734.

g Emended by Balázs from 1,933,174. Statistics refer to only a part of the empire.

h Balázs also quoted another figure of 4,100,000.

Between A. D. 705 and 755 to all appearances the census machinery functioned much more effectively; but after 755 it broke down again. The recorded number of persons dropped from nearly 53 millions in the year 755 to only 17 millions in 760. During this time China was torn by revolts which were suppressed with bloody force, including the notorious rebellion of An Lu-Shan. Many historians have affirmed that 36 million lives were lost as a result of these violent events, but Fitzgerald and others have shown that this is incredible.³³ Even if such a huge loss were conceivable, it would be naive to suppose that an accurate count of the survivors could have been carried out in the midst of the ensuing chaos. Actually, the census of the year 760 fell far short of covering the whole empire; Balázs notes that only 169 commanderies—less than half the total of A. D. 754—are represented in the record. It is unlikely that any of the censuses which were taken from this time to the end of the T'ang dynasty approximated complete coverage.

³³ Fitzgerald (12), pp. 142-44; also (13).

Thus the statistics of A. D. 606 and 705-755 are the only ones in the Sui-T'ang series that are useful for our purpose. The statistics of the two years 606 and 742 deserve special attention as Bielenstein has analyzed these, like the statistics of A. D. 2 and 140, for local areas.

For the year 606, although totals of both persons and households are recorded for the empire as a whole, the local records show only the numbers of households. Bielenstein found that these numbers were reported for all the 190 commanderies which made up the empire at that time, but the total of the local figures was 9,067,993 households instead of the 8,907,536 shown by the record.³⁴ From the fact that numbers of persons for local areas were missing, Bielenstein surmised that only households were enumerated in the Sui census and that the recorded total of 46,019,956 persons was an estimate. He rejected this figure on the ground that it implied too small an average number of persons per household: only 5.2, whereas the averages shown by the T'ang statistics of A. D. 705-755 were in the range of 5.7 to 6.0. He made a set of local population estimates for A. D. 606 based on the recorded numbers of households

³⁴ Bielenstein (2) pp. 160-61. The total obtained by addition does not include two commanderies which were in Turkestan, nor two other commanderies, adjacent to one another, for which the same number of households (2,330) was recorded. Bielenstein thought it improbable that the number of households in these two commanderies was really the same, but he could find no basis for deciding which was in error.

and estimated local averages of persons per household, which yielded a total of about 54 million persons and an average of approximately 6 persons per household for the whole empire.^{35,36} Even if the recorded number of persons was not an estimate but the result of a count, its consistency with the figures for the period 705-755 is questionable unless some historical explanation can be found for a considerable increase in the size of households between A. D. 606 and 705.

When Bielenstein checked the local statistics for the year 742, he found that data for a few commanderies were missing, but their population probably did not amount to more than two or three hundred thousand. Even without these commanderies the sums of the local figures considerably exceeded the recorded totals, the totals by addition being 51.5 million persons and 9.0 million households whereas the recorded figures were 48.9 and 8.5 millions.³⁷

³⁵ The method of estimation is explained *ibid.*, p. 160, and the local population estimates are charted on Plate V, appended to Bielenstein's article.

³⁶ Pulleyblank (27), pp. 172-77, criticized Bielenstein's estimates and made another set which yielded totals of 46,800,000 persons and 9,069,791 households, corresponding to the original average of 5.2 persons per household.

³⁷ Bielenstein (2), p. 161. The unrounded number of households obtained by addition was 8,954,301; Bielenstein gave only the rounded total of persons. Again, the totals by addition do not include three commanderies in Turkestan, nor two other commanderies for which the same number was recorded (9,500 households, numbers of individuals missing). Some estimates and emendations were involved in Bielenstein's calculations.

Comparing his maps of population distribution in A. D. 606 and 742 with each other and with the map for A. D. 140, Bielenstein found that the major changes were generally consistent with historical events. He interpreted the ups and downs of the statistics for the Yellow and Wei River valleys and the regions to the north and west as effects of alternately relaxing tightening pressure of the Huns, Tibetans, and Turks on the frontiers. (See the figures for Hopei, Shansi, Shensi, Kansu, and Szechwan in Tables A. 1 and A. 2.) He also explained the variations in population growth in the south as results of alternating migrations from south to north and north to south, which were related to the retreats and advances of the invaders on the northern and western borders.³⁸

For certain areas, the increases and decreases shown by the statistics are rather startling; but historical evidence might make them appear credible enough. For instance, in the eastern coastal area which corresponds to the modern province of Chekiang, Bielenstein's approximate allocation of the recorded numbers of households shows a sharp drop between A. D. 140 and 606 followed by a ten-fold increase between 606 and 742. On the face of it the trend gives some cause for suspecting a major deficit in the enumeration of A. D. 606 in this area; but Chekiang is known have been gaining rapidly in economic importance during the T'ang period. Similar but less

³⁸ Bielenstein (2), pp. 145-51. See also Balázs (1), pp. 18-19; Pulleyblank (27), pp. 172-177.

extreme variations are shown by the statistics for Kiangsi and Hunan. As already stated, the behaviour of the average numbers of persons per household computed from the local statistics gives reason for suspecting major defects of enumeration in some areas.

In general the scanty evidence as to the quality of the statistics is consistent with the hypothesis that the Sui and T'ang censuses, like those of the Han dynasty, generally understated the numbers of the people, in varying degree from year to year and from area to area within the country.

Assembling the recorded total and Bielenstein's estimate for the number of persons in A. D. 606, Bielenstein's total by addition of the local statistics for A. D. 742, and the totals for other years in the period 705-755, we obtain the following series:³⁹

Year (A. D.)	Millions of perons	
	Empire total	China proper ^a
Sui dynasty:		
606, as recorded	— — — 46	46
606 Bielenstein's estimate	— 54	54
Tang Dynasty:		
705	— — — — 37	37
726	— — — — 41	41
732	— — — — 45	45
742	— — — — 52	51
754	— — — — 53	52
755	— — — — 53	52

^a Estimates obtained by deducting a constant 0.5 million from the empire total before rounding; this being the approximate number of persons recorded in outlying areas of the empire in both A. D. 606 and 742 as indicated by Bielenstein's figures. See Tables. A. 1 and A. 2.

³⁹ Figures for A. D. 734 and 740 are omitted because they cannot be reconciled with Bielenstein's total for A. D. 742 obtained by addition of the local statistics, and criterion of an annual rate of population growth not exceeding 15 per 1,000.

It should be noted that the part of China proper which was included in the Sui and T'ang empires was smaller than the part held by the Han emperors, as it did not include Yunnan and Kweichow. Yunnan was an important loss; more than 2 million persons were recorded there in A. D. 140.⁴⁰ Fukien, on the other hand, was now partly settled by Chinese and included in the Sui and T'ang empires.

Sung and Chin Dynasty Statistics

A gap of 118 years lies between the last statistics of the T'ang dynasty and the beginning of the Sung dynasty series. During the latter part of this interval, after the T'ang dynasty fell, China was again split into several states. The area reunited under the rule of the Sung in A. D. 980 was smaller than the T'ang empire. Yunnan and Kweichow were still not included, and a part of the Yellow River region also escaped the grasp of the Sung. The latter area belonged to the Liao empire, a powerful military state which was formed in the north early in the tenth century, including large parts of Mongolia and Manchuria, part of northern

⁴⁰ According to Bielenstein's estimate the figure for A. D. 2 was about 600,000. Two millions seems a surprisingly large number of Chinese to be found in this remote region during the time of the Eastern Han Dynasty. Lao Kan, "Population and Geography in the two Han Dynasties" (19), (translation, p. 100) holds that this was a conquered non-Chinese population, and that it was located partly in territory now belonging to Burma.

Table 3

China: Recorded Population Statistics, A.D. 996-1103

Year (A. D.)	Persons	House- holds	Pers- ons per hous- ehold	Year (A. D.)	Persons	House- holds	Pers- ons per hous- ehold
996	—	3, 574, 257	—	1064	<i>f</i> 28, 823, 252	12, 489, 481	2. 3
997	—	4, 132, 576	—	1065	<i>f</i> 29, 077, 273	12, 904, 783	2. 3
1006	16, 280, 254	7, 417, 507	2. 2	1066	<i>f</i> 29, 092, 185	12, 917, 221	2. 3
1014	21, 996, 965	9, 055, 729	2. 4	1069	<i>b</i> <i>f</i> 23, 086, 230	<i>b</i> 14, 414, 043	1. 6
1019	19, 471, 556	8, 545, 276	2. 3	1072	<i>b</i> <i>f</i> 21, 867, 852	<i>b</i> 15, 091, 560	1. 4
1020	22, 717, 272	9, 716, 712	2. 3	1075	<i>b</i> <i>f</i> 23, 807, 165	<i>b</i> 15, 684, 129	1. 5
1021	19, 930, 320	8, 677, 677	2. 3	1077	30, 807, 211	14, 245, 270	2. 2
1023	22, 455, 859	9, 898, 121	2. 3	1078	<i>b</i> <i>f</i> 24, 326, 102	<i>b</i> 16, 492, 631	1. 5
1029	26, 054, 238	10, 562, 689	2. 5	1080	<i>g</i> 33, 303, 889	<i>g</i> 14, 852, 684	2. 2
1031	<i>b</i> 18, 936, 066	9, 380, 807	2. 0	1083	<i>b</i> <i>f</i> 24, 969, 300	<i>b</i> 17, 211, 713	1. 5
1034	26, 205, 441	10, 296, 565	2. 5	1086	40, 072, 606	17, 957, 029	2. 2
1042	<i>c</i> 22, 926, 101	10, 307, 640	2. 2	1088	42, 163, 017	18, 289, 375	2. 3
1045	<i>b</i> 21, 654, 163	10, 682, 947	2. 0	1091	41, 492, 311	18, 655, 093	2. 2
1048	<i>b</i> <i>d</i> 21, 730, 064	10, 723, 695	2. 0	1094	42, 566, 243	19, 120, 921	2. 2
1050	<i>b</i> 22, 292, 861	10, 747, 954	2. 1	1097	43, 411, 606	19, 435, 570	2. 2
1053	<i>b</i> 22, 292, 861	10, 792, 705	2. 1	1099	44, 364, 949	19, 715, 555	2. 3
1058	<i>b</i> <i>e</i> 22, 432, 793	10, 825, 580	2. 1	1100	44, 914, 991	19, 960, 812	2. 3
1061	<i>b</i> 22, 683, 112	11, 091, 112	2. 0	1102	<i>h</i> 45, 324, 154	<i>h</i> 20, 264, 307	2. 2
1063	<i>f</i> 26, 421, 651	12, 462, 310	2. 1	1103	45, 981, 845	20, 524, 065	2. 2

Source: Eichhorn (10a), where the Chinese sources are cited. Eichhorn also quoted numbers of households for certain years in the period A.D. 963-979, ranging from about 1,100,000 to 3,800,000 which referred to an expanding fraction of the subsequent Sung Empire; also numbers of persons and households for the years 1108 and 1109, which were shown to have been calculated from an incomplete record of increases since 1103.

a Eichhorn also quoted, from another source, 10,162,689 households.

b Eichhorn believed that these figures did not come from the same lists as the figures for other years.

c Eichhorn also quoted, from another source, 20,524,735 persons and 7,436,018 households.

d Eichhorn also quoted, from another source, 21,836,004 persons.

e Eichhorn also quoted, from another source, 22,442,791 or 23,442,791 persons.

f These figures are designated as numbers of "ting" and are appa-

rently more narrowly defined than the numbers of "k'ou" which are listed under "persons" for other years.

g Quoted by Eichhorn as "*verbesserte Ziffern*". Eichhorn stated that the source listed the corresponding figures for each province, and that totals obtained by addition of the provincial figures were 33,151,989 "k'ou" and 14,525,264 households.

h Eichhorn also quoted, from another source, 43,820,769 persons and 20,019,050 households.

Shansi, and about half of modern Hopeh province, with Peking as one of its two imperial capitals.⁴¹

The population statistics of the Sung dynasty from A.D. 996 to 1103 are reproduced in Table 3. As no statistics for divisions of the Sung empire have been found in the European-language works consulted by the author⁴², the geographical coverage of the totals is unverified. In view of the trend of the totals, it is practically certain that the enumerations of households in A.D. 996, 997 and 1006 were incomplete.

The Sung statistics are unique in that they show very small average numbers of persons per household, ranging in most years from only 2.0 to 2.3 persons. Although it is possible that these incredibly low ratios are due to an exaggeration of the number of households,⁴³ the more probable explanation seems to be that the statistics of

⁴¹ A map of the Liao empire is shown in Wittfogel and Fêng (45), at the end of the volume.

⁴² Eichhorn (10a) refers to a work by Yüan Chen in Chinese, published in Peking in 1957, which contains tables of Sung statistics by provinces.

⁴³ This Was the opinion of Sacharoff.

persons were limited to the male sex.⁴⁴ It is unlikely that even the males were completely enumerated, for when the numbers of persons are multiplied by two to make allowance for the females, the resulting average numbers of persons per household (4.0 to 4.6 for most years) are still too small to be easily credible.

The series of statistics shows numerous irregularities which are probably due in some cases to variations of the definitions and in other cases to defects of coverage. The numbers of persons are more erratic than the numbers of households. On the whole the numbers of households follow a strong upward trend with an average annual increase of nearly 8 per 1,000 over the whole period A. D. 1006-1103 and almost 14 per 1,000 during 1048-1086. Population estimates calculated by multiplying the numbers of households by the assumed average of six persons indicate that the population was about 55 millions at the beginning of the eleventh century and increased to about 120 millions during the next hundred years. This great increase, carrying the population for

⁴⁴ Giles(15), pp.481 ff. argues persuasively that this was so. Krotevich (18), p. 32, states that the Sung statistics of persons referred to "men who were able to work". Ho Ping-ti, "Early-ripening rice in Chinese history" (16), p. 206, footnote, refers to the conclusion of Shigeshi (30) (in Japanese) that the Sung statistics of persons were much too low while the household figures were relatively reliable. On the other hand Eichhorn (10a) held that the number of households was exaggerated and the number of persons understated: he thought that the population of the Sung period could be estimated approximately by increasing the numbers of persons by one-fourth.

the first time high above the mark recorded in A. D. 2, has been interpreted as the result of a long period of peace and outstanding achievements in the economic sphere, including an extensive development of irrigation works and expansion of settlement in the south. Although statistics by provinces are lacking, a large part of the population growth during this period is said to have taken place in the Yangtze valley provinces.⁴⁵

Early in the twelfth century the Jurchen people of Manchuria gained control of the Liao empire and in A. D. 1126 they took the whole Yellow River basin from the Sung, forming an empire which was ruled for the next hundred years by the Chin dynasty, forebears of the Ch'ing (Manchus) who conquered China in the seventeenth century. The Sung retired to the south and continued to rule there until, during the thirteenth century, first the Chin and later the Sung succumbed to the Mongol power. Table 4 shows a selection of the statistics which are on record for the Southern Sung and Chin empires in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

After the partition the Sung statistics continued as before with ratios of about two persons per household while the ratios shown by the Chin dynasty statistics

⁴⁵ Ho Ping-ti (16), p. 206, says that between A. D. 754 and the early twelfth century, the population of the "southern provinces" roughly tripled. The data on city-wall building, however, do not indicate any unusually rapid growth of the number of cities in China as a whole during the Sung period. See Li Chi, (20), Chapter III.

Table 4

China: Recorded Population Statistics, A. D. 1160-1223

Dynasty and year (A. D.)	Persons	Households	Persons per Household
Southern Sung:			
1160 — — —	19,229,008	11,575,733	1.7
1170 — — —	25,971,870	11,847,385	2.2
1180 — — —	27,020,689	12,130,901	2.2
1193 — — —	27,845,085	12,302,873	2.3
1223 — — —	28,320,085	12,670,801	2.2
Chin			
1187 — — —	44,705,086	6,789,449	6.6
1190 — — —	45,447,900	6,939,000	6.5
1195 — — —	48,490,400	7,223,400	6.7

Sources: For Southern Sung, Eichhorn (10a); for Chin, Liu Nan-ming (22). Sacharoff (29) gives almost the same figures as Liu Nan-ming.

exceeded six persons per household. If the true average size of households in the Southern Sung empire is taken as 6 persons, the population of that area at the end of the twelfth century can be estimated at roughly 75 millions and the total for the combined territories of the Sung and Chin comes to almost 125 millions. This is about the same as the estimate for the early years of the twelfth century, prior to the partition; thus a stabilization of population after the rapid growth of the eleventh century is suggested.⁴⁶ The most remarkable feature of these estimates is that a larger total is obtained for southern than for northern China, whereas under the T'ang, Sui, and Han dynasties the statistics showed a

⁴⁶ It should be recalled the Ch'in empire included large areas in Manchuria and Mongolia, outside the boundaries of modern China proper, but the population of the Manchurian and Mongolian portions probably did not exceed 5 millions.

large majority of the population in the north.⁴⁷

Yuan (Mongol) Dynasty Statistics

The Chin empire fell to the Mongol Chingis Khan early in the thirteenth century, and in the year 1280 Kublai Khan also took over the Sung territory and became emperor of all China. The population of China under Mongol rule is represented by the results of five censuses which are listed in Table 5. The population of areas beyond the Great Wall was not included in these figures; the Mongols took censuses in their Central Asian dominions, but the results were recorded separately.⁴⁸

It will be observed that the household statistics of the Mongol period are on a much lower level than those of the Sung and Chin dynasties at the end of the twelfth century, and the numbers of persons recorded in A. D. 1290 and 1291 are only about one-half as large as the estimate for the combined Sung and Chin empires in 1193-1195.

⁴⁷ See Table A.1. The Southern Sung empire comprised approximately the area of the present provinces of Chekiang, Kiangsi, Hupeh, Hunan, Szechwan, Kwangsi, Kwangtung, and Fukien plus substantial parts of Anhui and Kiangsu and smaller portions of Shensi and Kansu. It is a fair estimate that the population recorded in this whole area at the T'ang census of 742 was no more than about 20 millions out of the total of 51 millions for the whole territory of the T'ang dynasty in China proper. A map showing the boundary between the Sung and Ch'in will be found in Sun E-tu Zen and John de Francis, *Chinese Social History...* (1956).

⁴⁸ Sacharoff (29), p. 167. Cf. Franke (14), pp. 128-129. Liu Nan-ming was apparently wrong in saying (p. 32) that Mongolia was included.

Table 5

China: Recorded Population Statistics, A.D. 1290-1330

Year (A. D.)	Persons	Households	Persons per Household
1290 — — —	<i>a</i> 58,834,711	13,196,206	4.5
1291 — — —	<i>b</i> 59,848,964	13,430,322	4.5
1292 — — —	<i>c</i> 53'654,337	<i>c</i> 11,638,281	4.6
1294 — — —	—	14,002,760	—
1330 — — —	—	13,400,699	—

Sources: Franke (14), pp. 128-29; Liu Nan-ming (22), p. 30. Franke and Liu Nan-ming quote the Chinese sources. Franke also quotes a series of statistics for northern China under Mongol rule during A.D. 1235-1275 and a dubious total of 60,491,230 persons dated 1362.

a According to Fitzgerald (12), p. 147, it was recorded that this total did not include "those who had taken refuge in the mountains and rebels still in arms".

b Including 429,118 "wanderers" and 213,148 Buddhist priests. Liu Nan-ming gives the number of persons for this year as 60,277,982.

c Franke suggests that these statistics might have referred only to the agricultural population. Another possibility is that they were limited to southern China.

But if there was actually a decrease of population during this interval, the statistics almost certainly exaggerate it, for there are several kinds of evidence to show that the enumerations during the Mongol period were very incomplete.

In the first place, not all areas of China proper were covered by the Mongol censuses. Sacharoff found statistics for small areas listed in a geography of China under the rule of Kublai Khan and discovered that for many areas no statistics were shown, or only the numbers of households or taxpayers were listed, without the numbers of persons. Yet by adding these figures, Sach-

aroff obtained totals of 59,908,969 persons and 13,689,294 households, which are close to the recorded totals for A. D. 1291.⁴⁹

For the years 1290 and 1291 we have separate numbers of households for northern China and the former Sung empire in southern China:⁵⁰

	A. D. 1290	A. D. 1291
Total — — —	13,196,206	13,430,320
Northern China — —	1,355,406	1,999,444
Southern China — —	11,840,000	11,430,878

For southern China the numbers are not much lower than those which were recorded for the Sung empire in A. D. 1166-1223.⁵¹ But for the north the statistics show an appalling decrease from the 7.2 million households recorded under the Ch'in dynasty in A. D. 1195. A considerable decrease of population in the north might have been caused by the struggle between the Chinese and the Mongol invaders, the conversion of farmland to pasture, and emigration of farmers to the south. Still, the sheer magnitude of the decrease in the north, not balanced by corresponding increase in the south, creates a suspicion that the census in the north was very defective. In any event, the numbers of households

⁴⁹ Sacharoff (29), p. 169. Cf. Liu Nan-ming (22), p. 31.

⁵⁰ Figures quoted by Franke (14), pp. 128-129. The figure attributed to northern China in 1291 referred to "the interior" and the territories of Szechwan and Kuang-huai.

⁵¹ A much smaller number of households was recorded in the Sung empire in the year 1264, but this was probably an understatement, as the power of the Sung had sunk to a low ebb by that time.

recorded for the north in the years 1290 and 1291 are incompatible, and the arrangement of digits in the figure for 1291 is highly suspicious.⁵²

The Mongols apparently adopted a broader definition of "persons" than the Sung employed, but still the averages of 4.5 and 4.6 persons per household derived from the Mongol statistics are substantially lower the averages for the Han, T'ang, Chin, and Ming dynasties. This is another sign of relatively defective census enumeration during the Mongol period.

Ming Dynasty Statistics

The series of statistics begins again in 1381, thirteen years after the Mongols were driven out of China and the Ming dynasty was founded. From the census ordered in 1370, which was mentioned earlier, apparently no totals are found in the record, probably because it proved impossible to carry out the census throughout the empire so shortly after the end of hostilities. Numbers of persons and households for the empire as a whole are recorded for the years 1381, 1391, 1393, annually from 1402 to 1520, and decennially from 1522 to 1620, with some gaps and irregularities. The figures for 1620 are repeated for 1621, 1623, 1625, and 1626, with minor variations, and then the Ming series comes to an end.

⁵² The numbers of households recorded in northern China during the period A.D. 1235-1275, quoted by Franke, were still smaller than the number of the year 1290.

Table 6 shows this series, reproduced from van der Sprenkel's article, "Population Statistics of Ming China" (40). Statistics by provinces are recorded for the years 1381, 1391, 1393, 1491, and 1578, and undated provincial statistics are given in a Ming geography which was issued in 1557; van der Sprenkel has tentatively dated the latter figures about 1540. The provincial statistics will be found in the tables of the Appendix.

The area represented by the statistics from 1391 onward was approximately the same as the eighteen provinces of modern China proper. Statistics for Yunnan were apparently missing in 1381.

The system of population records which was established by the first Ming emperor about 1380 was apparently a system of permanent registers. It was based on a local organization of households throughout the empire. The primary units of the organization were the *chia*, composed in principle of eleven households, and the *li*, made up of ten *chia* plus a variable number of households of widows, widowers, orphans, and others who were exempt from taxation and not assigned to any *chia*. Each year forms were printed from wood blocks and distributed to the householders, who were required to submit "an itemized statement, according to the form, of the persons, occupations, and property of their respective households". The forms were to be collected by the *chia* leaders and forwarded to the *li* chief, who passed them on to the *hsien* office, where they were checked,

Table 6

China: Recorded Population Statistics, A. D. 1381-1626

Year (A. D.)	Persons	Households	Pers- ons per hous- ehold	Year (A. D.)	Persons	Households	Pers- ons per hous- ehold
1381*	a59,873,305	10,654,362	5.6	1443	52,993,882	c9,559,650	5.5
1391*	a56,774,561	10,684,453	5.3	1444	53,655,056	9,549,058	5.6
1393	b60,545,813	b10,642,870	5.7	1445	53,773,934	9,537,454	5.6
1402*	56,301,026	10,626,779	5.3	1446	53,740,321	9,528,443	5.6
1403	c56,598,337	11,415,829	5.0	1447	53,949,787	9,496,265	5.7
1404	50,950,470	9,685,020	5.3	1448	53,534,498	9,530,933	5.6
1405	51,618,500	9,689,260	5.3	1449	53,171,070	9,497,165	5.6
1406	51,524,656	9,687,859	5.3	1450	53,403,954	9,588,234	5.6
1407	51,878,572	9,822,957	5.3	1451	53,433,830	9,504,954	5.6
1408	51,502,077	9,443,876	5.5	1452*	53,507,730	9,540,966	5.6
1409	51,694,769	9,637,261	5.4	1453	53,369,460	9,384,334	5.7
1410	51,795,255	9,605,755	5.4	1454	53,811,196	9,406,347	5.7
1411	51,466,834	9,533,692	5.4	1455	53,807,470	9,405,390	5.7
1412*	d —	d —	—	1457	54,338,476	9,406,288	5.8
1413	50,950,244	9,684,916	5.3	1458	54,205,069	9,469,340	5.7
1414	51,618,248	9,689,052	5.3	1459	53,710,303	9,410,339	5.7
1415	51,524,436	9,687,729	5.3	1460	53,747,400	9,420,033	5.7
1416	c51,878,172	9,822,757	5.3	1461	53,748,160	9,422,323	5.7
1417	51,501,867	9,443,766	5.5	1462*	54,160,634	9,209,966	5.9
1418	51,694,549	9,637,061	5.4	1463	56,370,250	9,385,213	6.0
1419	51,794,935	9,605,553	5.4	1464	60,499,330	9,107,205	6.6
1420	51,446,434	9,533,412	5.4	1465	60,472,540	9,105,960	6.6
1421	51,794,228	9,603,360	5.4	1466	60,653,724	9,202,718	6.6
1422*	52,688,691	9,665,133	5.5	1467	59,929,455	9,111,688	6.6
1423	52,763,178	9,972,115	5.3	1468	61,615,850	9,113,648	6.8
1424	52,468,152	10,066,080	5.2	1469	61,727,584	9,119,888	6.8
1425	52,083,651	9,940,566	5.2	1470	61,819,814	9,119,891	6.8
1426	51,960,119	9,918,649	5.2	1471	61,819,945	9,119,912	6.8
1427	52,070,885	9,909,906	5.3	1472*	61,821,232	9,119,970	6.8
1428	52,144,021	9,916,837	5.3	1473	61,823,480	9,120,161	6.8
1429	53,184,816	9,848,393	5.4	1474	61,852,810	9,120,195	6.8
1430	51,365,851	9,778,419	5.3	1475	61,852,891	9,120,251	6.8
1431	50,565,259	9,705,397	5.2	1476	c61,853, —	9,120,263	6.8
1432*	50,667,805	9,623,294	5.3	1477	61,853,581	9,120,278	6.8
1433	50,628,346	9,635,862	5.3	1478	61,832,198	9,126,272	6.8
1434	50,627,456	9,702,322	5.2	1479	c61,850,132	9,210,690	6.7
1435	50,627,569	9,702,495	5.2	1480	62,456,993	9,127,928	6.8
1436	52,323,998	9,713,407	5.4	1481	62,457,997	9,128,119	6.8
1437	51,790,316	9,623,510	5.4	1482*	62,452,677	9,222,389	6.8
1438	51,841,182	9,704,145	5.3	1483	62,452,806	9,202,389	6.8
1439	51,740,390	9,697,890	5.3	1484	62,885,829	9,205,711	6.8
1440	51,811,758	9,686,707	5.3	1485	62,885,930	9,205,860	6.8
1441	52,056,290	9,667,440	5.4	1486	65,442, —	9,214, —	7.1
1442*	53,949,951	9,552,737	5.6	1487	50,207,134	9,102,630	5.5

Table 6

Continued

Year (A. D.)	Persons	Households	Per- sons per house- hold	Year (A. D.)	Persons	Households	Per- sons per house- hold
1488	50,207,934	9,113,630	5.5	1511	60,406,135	9,152,180	6.6
1489	50,302,769	9,406,393	5.3	1512*	60,590,309	9,181,754	6.6
1490	50,307,843	9,503,890	5.3	1513	63,284,203	9,370,452	6.8
1491	^a 50,503,356	9,807,173	5.1	1514	62,123,324	9,383,552	6.6
1492*	50,506,325	9,901,965	5.1	1515	62,573,730	9,383,148	6.7
1493	—	9,909,561	—	1516	62,573,736	9,380,123	6.7
1494	50,614,196	9,909,725	5.1	1517	62,627,810	9,379,090	6.7
1495	50,608,953	10,100,279	5.0	1518	^c 62,664,295	9,309,182	6.7
1496	50,727,539	10,201,183	5.0	1519	62,695,812	9,379,081	6.7
1497	50,765,186	^c 10,205,358	5.0	1520	60,606,220	9,399,979	6.4
1498	50,805,375	10,304,374	4.9	1522*	61,929,862	9,704,484	6.4
1499	50,827,568	10,306,285	4.9	1532*	61,712,993	9,443,229	6.5
1500	50,858,937	10,402,519	4.9	1542*	63,401,252	9,599,258	6.6
1501	50,895,236	10,405,831	4.9	1552*	63,344,107	9,609,305	6.6
1502*	50,908,672	^c 10,409,788	4.9	1562*	63,654,248	9,638,396	6.6
1503	50,981,289	10,503,874	4.9	1567-	—	—	—
1504	^c 50,105,835	10,508,935	4.8	71	^e 62,537,419	10,003,805	6.2
1505	59,919,822	10,972,974	5.5	1578	^b 60,692,856	^b 10,621,436	5.7
1506	^c 56,802,050	9,151,773	6.2	1602*	56,305,050	10,030,241	5.6
1507	55,906,805	9,144,056	6.1	1620-	—	—	—
1508	59,425,208	9,243,709	6.4	26	^e 51,655,459	9,835,416	5.3
1510	59,499,759	9,144,095	6.5				

Source: Van der Sprenkel (1953), pp. 293-296, where the Chinese sources are cited.

* Years when records were due for major revision.

^a Recorded figures do not agree with totals of statistics by provinces shown by Van der Sprenkel pp. 297,300-305. The following figures are obtained by addition of the provincial statistics:

Year	Authority	Persons	Households
1381	Ming Shih-lu — — —	59,473,305	10,654,362
1391	Ming Shih-lu — — —	56,874,561	10,684,435
	Van der Sprenkel's emendations	—58,474,561	10,684,435
1491	Ming Shih Ti-li-chih — —	55,027,236	9,251,862
1491	Ta-Ming Hui-tien — —	53,281,158	9,113,446
	Van der Sprenke's emendations	—52,281,158	8,913,456

^b Totals obtained by addition of provincial statistics as emended by Van der Sprenkel, pp. 300-305. The following figures are obtained by addition of the unemended statistics:

Year	Authority	Persons	Households
1393	Ming Shih Ti-li-chih — —	60,545,813	9,642,870
	Ta-Ming Hui-tien — —	60,545,812	10,652,869
1578	Ming Shih Ti-li-chih — —	62,791,056	10,621,436
	Ta-Ming Hui-tien — —	60,692,856	10,621,436

c Figures as emended by Van der Sprenkel. The unemended figures are:

Year	Persons	Households
1403 —	66,598,337	11,415,829
1416 —	57,878,172	9,822,757
1443 —	52,993,882	8,559,650
1476 —	16,853, . . 1	9,120,263
1479 —	71,850,132	9,210,690
1497 —	50,765,186	12,005,358
1502 —	50,908,672	14,409,788
1504 —	60,105,835	10,508,935
1505 —	59,919,822	12,972,974
1506 —	46,802,050	9,151,773
1518 —	66,664,295	9,309,182

d Illegible figures in the Chinese sources.

e The same, or nearly identical, figures were repeated each year during this period.

counted, and compared with previous records. If they showed an increase of population, the returns were regarded as satisfactory in that respect; otherwise it was laid down that the local officials should make an investigation. Every tenth year the posts of *li* and *chia* leaders were supposed to rotate, and on this occasion apparently some kind of revision of the records was to be carried out.⁵³

The total number of persons recorded in 1381 was just under 60 millions, or about one-half as large as the

⁵³ Some more details about the household organization and the prescribed method of compiling the statistics are given by van der Sprenkel (40), pp. 308-10.

estimate from the Sung and Chin statistics of A. D. 1193-1195 and about the same as the deficient totals shown by the Mongol censuses of 1290 and 1291. It is reasonable that the population should have decreased considerably during the fourteenth century in view of the incessant fighting and bitter hardships which marked the last phase of Mongol rule, and especially the pandemic of bubonic plague, which seems to have raged no less fiercely in China than it did in Europe about the middle of this century. But Ho Ping-ti has found evidence of important gaps in the early Ming enumerations, especially in the south-western provinces and in parts of Che-kiang and Fukien. He concluded that the population during the late fourteenth century "probably exceeded 65,000,000 to an unknown degree".⁵⁴

During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, as Ho Ping-ti's research has revealed, the quality of the Ming population statistics deteriorated. There was a gradual shift from registration of the whole population to registration of parts, with gross omissions of women and children, increasing concentration on taxable males, growing evasions and manipulations of the registration procedures to avoid or lighten taxes. In view of Professor Ho's findings, no significance can be attached to the trend of the population totals recorded for the Ming empire from the end of the fourteenth century onward. Instead of the erratic fluctuations above and below an

⁵⁴ Ho Ping-ti (17), p. 22.

approximately constant level, shown by the statistics, Professor Ho believed that the true trend was fairly steadily upward throughout the Ming period, but there is little concrete evidence to support this view.

In addition to their weakness due to deterioration of the registration system, the Ming statistics seem to have been corrupted to a remarkable extent by copyists' errors and misprints. Possibly the long, monotonous columns of figures with their insignificant changes had a soporific effect on the clerks who copied and re-copied them. Van der Sprenkel has made a number of emendations of apparent errors of transcription in individual figures, but an inspection of the series raises suspicions of clerical blunders on a grander scale.

It is apparent that the annual figures for the period 1404 to 1411 have been confused with those for 1413 to 1420, as the following arrangement shows:

Year	Persons	Households
1404	— 50,950,470	9,685,020
1405	— 51,618,500	9,689,260
1406	— 51,524,656	9,687,859
1407	— 51,878,572	9,822,957
1408	— 51,502,077	9,443,876
1409	— 51,604,769	9,637,261
1410	— 51,795,255	9,605,755
1411	— 51,446,834	9,533,692
1413	— 50,950,244	9,684,916
1414	— 51,618,248	9,689,052
1415	— 51,524,436	9,687,729
1416	— ^a 51,878,172	9,822,757
1417	— 51,501,867	9,443,766
1418	— 51,694,549	9,637,061
1419	— 51,794,935	9,605,553

1420 — 51,446,434 9,533,412

a Emended by van der Sprekel from 57,878,172

The chart (Fig. 1) shows highly erratic fluctuations in the numbers of persons and households during certain periods. There is a curious discrepancy in timing in the fluctuations of the two series during the period from 1462 to 1506; they would fit together better if the series of household statistics were moved back, or the statistics of persons moved forward, by nineteen years.

At some points it is the incredible constancy of the figures which destroys faith in them. Between 1469 and 1477 the number of households does not increase or decrease in any year by so much as 100 out of the total of more than 9,000,000. It is incredible that such constant numbers could have been obtained by addition of local records throughout the empire.

The statistics for provinces also exhibit incredible features. The 1391 figures for eight provinces (Kwangtung, Chekiang, Hukuang,⁵⁵ Kwangsi, Fukien, Shansi, Shantung, and Kiangsi) are irreconcilable with the 1381 and 1393 figures, as shown in Tables A. 1, A. 2 and A. 3 of the Appendix. The ratios of persons to households computed from the provincial figures for 1491, 1540, and 1578 follow trends which are difficult indeed to accept as real changes in the average size of households. In this respect the statistics of 1381, 1391, and 1393 look

⁵⁵ Hukuang was the name given in Ming times to the province which has since been split to form Hunan and Hupeh.

plausible enough, as the ratios for most provinces range from about 5 to 7 persons per household (Table A. 3). But at later dates the high provincial ratios keep rising higher and the low ones falling lower until, by 1578, the statistics of Shensi-Kansu, Hopeh, Szechwan, and Yunnan yield ratios in the incredibly high range of 10.0 to 11.8 persons per household, while those of Chekiang, Fukien, and Kwangtung have fallen to the incredibly low range of 3.3 to 3.8. Ho Ping-ti says that the high values were brought about by the frequent practice, in certain provinces, of merging households for registration as a device to reduce tax assessments.⁵⁶ Presumably the very low ratios were the result of omission of women, children, and the aged from the records, occurring on a larger scale in Chekiang, Fukien, and Kwangtung than in other provinces.⁵⁷

To sum up, the Ming statistics from the beginning of the fifteenth century onward appear to be worthless

⁵⁶ Ho Ping-ti (17), pp. 14-15.

⁵⁷ Van der Sprenkel (40), pp. 306-308, interpreted the variations as in these ratios as results of migration. He noted a close correspondence between high values of the ratio and large increases in the provincial population as recorded in the statistics. He argued that immigrants moving with relatives already established in the provinces of immigration caused the average size of households to increase. This argument is open to the objection mentioned above in connection with Bielenstein's interpretation of the Han and T'ang dynasty statistics, that an inordinately large amount of immigration would be required to produce, in the manner indicated by van der Sprenkel, such a large increase in the ratio as the statistics for several provinces show and even then the effect would only be temporary.

as indications of population trends. The least untrustworthy figures in the Ming series are apparently those of 1381 and 1393, which showed a total of about 60 million persons, but these were probably affected by an important degree of underregistration. In all likelihood the population of China increased during the period of Ming rule, but the amount of the increase is indeterminate.

Ch'ing (Manchu) Dynasty Statistics:

First Period (1651-1734)

During the last years of the Ming dynasty, in the 1630's and early 1640's, China was torn by numerous revolts and struggles between opposing factions, in which millions of lives are said to have been lost. Drought and famine added to the misery of the people, and it can be taken for granted that at this time a population decrease occurred. In the midst of this chaos, Manchu invaders under the Ch'ing princes entered China. They seized Peking in 1644 and went on to complete their conquest of the Ming empire by 1662. For a time semiautonomous princes were allowed to rule the southern provinces, paying tribute to the Ch'ing court, but in 1674 they revolted, and when the revolt was put down in 1682, all China came directly under the rule of the new dynasty. The Ch'ing regime continued until 1911, when the last emperor abdicated and the republic was declared.




Figure 1

Population statistics of the ming dynasty

The population statistics of the Ch'ing dynasty are divided into two distinct periods. During the first period, 1651-1734, the statistics referred to numbers of registered *ting*, the meaning of which will be considered presently. The second period began in 1740 with the establishment of the *pao-chia* system of population registers. From 1741 statistics of the total population were recorded annually, with a few gaps, until 1851, when the Tai-ping rebellion destroyed the unity of the empire and crippled the statistical system.

The numbers of *ting* recorded for the empire as a whole during the period 1651-1734 are listed in Table 7. Apparently no provincial statistics are on record for this period, although local figures are found in the *hsien* histories. The irregularities in the series of empire totals

Table 7

China: Recorded Statistics, of *ting*, A. D. 1651-1734

Year (A. D.)	Number of <i>ting</i>	Year (A. D.)	Number of <i>ting</i>	Year (A. D.)	Number of <i>ting</i>
1651	10,633,326	1678	16,845,733	1708	21,621,324
1652	14,483,858	1679	16,914,256		
1653	13,916,598			1710	23,311,236
1654	14,057,205	1680	17,094,637	1711	24,621,324
1655	14,033,900	1681	17,235,368		
1656	15,412,776	1682	19,432,753	1713	23,647,679
1657	18,611,996	1683	19,521,361	1714	24,741,546
1658	18,632,881	1684	20,340,655	1715	24,796,087
1659	19,008,913	1685	20,341,738		
		1687	20,349,341	1717	24,932,448
1660	19,087,572			1718	24,971,449
1661	19,037,652			1719	25,020,966
1662	19,203,233	1689	20,363,568		
1663	19,284,378			1720	26,029,949
1664	19,301,624	1692	20,365,873	1721	26,616,209
1665	19,312,118			1722	25,763,502
1666	19,353,132	1694	20,370,654	1723	25,734,854
1667	19,364,881			1724	25,111,953
1668	19,366,227	1696	20,410,382	1726	26,390,899
		1697	^a 20,410,682	1727	26,508,987
1670	19,396,453	1698	^a 20,410,693	1728	26,521,690
1671	19,607,587	1699	20,410,896	1729	26,659,259
1672	19,431,567				
1673	19,393,587	1700	20,410,963	1730	26,332,457
1674	19,246,472	1701	20,411,163	1731	26,302,933
1675	16,075,552	1702	20,411,380	1732	26,364,855
1676	16,037,268	1703	20,411,480	1733	26,348,775
1677	16,216,357	1705	20,412,560	1734	27,355,462

Source: Chen Chang-heng (7), pp. 45*-47*.

^a Figures emended by the author. The figures listed by Chen Chang-heng were 22,410,682 for 1697 and 20,210,693 for 1698.

between 1650 and 1684 are probably due mainly to variations in geographical coverage. Coverage was doubtless incomplete from 1651 to 1656, when the Manchus were pursuing their conquest and tightening their grip on the former Ming dominions. The abrupt drop in the number of *ting* in 1674 was almost certainly due to the revolt in the south which broke out at that time and doubtless caused a default in the reporting of statistics from that part of

the country. By 1684 it seems that returns were again being received from the south, and from that date until 1705 the recorded totals were almost constant. In fact, between 1696 and 1705, as in the case of the Ming series between 1469 and 1477, the numbers change so slightly that it is impossible to regard them as the result of an annual summation of local records. From 1708 to 1734 they follow an irregular but decidedly upward trend.

Historians and demographers attempting to estimate the size of China's population and its increase during the early period of the Ch'ing dynasty have adopted various interpretations of the statistics of *ting*. Some have taken them to represent taxpayers, defined in principle as males between the ages of 16 and 60, and have estimated the population by dividing the statistics by an estimated ratio of this sex-age group to the total, adding allowances for men who were exempt or evaded taxation.⁵⁸ Others have interpreted the statistics as numbers of households and multiplied them by an estimated average number of persons per household, likewise making additions to represent unregistered households.⁵⁹

Chen Chang-heng made two alternative series of population estimates for this period by assuming (a) that "official figures included only males 16-60 years of age, and that such males, after due allowance for those who evaded poll taxes, amounted to only one quarter of actual total population", or (b) that "both taxpayers and

⁵⁸ For example, Liu Nan-ming (22), pp.41-47.

⁵⁹ For example, Willcox (44).

local officials might have tried to report only the irreducible number of population liable to poll taxes, i. e. the heads of families” and that the average number of persons per family was five. To the results of assumption (b), which he considered more likely than (a), he added 10 per cent to allow for the “propertyless class”, who would have been exempt from taxation. Thus he obtained population estimates which ranged, under assumption (a) from 76.2 millions in 1661 to 109.4 millions in 1734, and under assumption (b) from 95.2 millions in 1661 to 136.8 millions in 1734.⁶⁰

Professor Ho Ping-ti, in his study of the statistics recorded in local histories of this period, has discovered some facts which cast grave doubt on the validity of any population estimates derived from these data for the empire as a whole. It appears that in many areas the records of *ting* did not refer directly either to taxpaying individuals or households but to conventionalized fiscal units defined with reference to the amount and quality of land held by the registered households as well as the numbers of their adult male members. In fact, in some localities the numbers of *ting* were recorded in decimals.⁶¹

At best the statistics in Table 7 might give a rough indication of the trend of population growth during the

⁶⁰ Chen Chang-heng (7), pp. 45*-48*. He carried both series of estimates back to 1651, obtaining a total of only 42.5 millions for that date on assumption (a) and 53.2 millions on assumption (b); but these figures are evidently too low because of the incomplete coverage of the statistics for the first years of the series.

⁶¹ Ho ping-ti (17), Chapter II.

second half of the seventeenth century and the first decades of the eighteenth. Their validity for this purpose depends on the assumption, which must be recognized frankly as dubious, that the total numbers of *ting* reported for the whole empire bore a fairly constant ratio to the population. On this assumption the following rates of population growth are obtained:

					Average annual increase per 1,000 population
1657-1671	—	—	—	—	3.7
1682-1703	—	—	—	—	4.1
1708-1734	—	—	—	—	9.0

It was during this period that the connection between registration of the population and taxation was formally severed. The action was taken in the year 1712 by the sagacious and wealthy emperor Ch'ing Shen-chu. He seems to have been concerned not only with the injustice of a system under which the *bona fide* taxpayers had to bear the burden of those who evaded registration, but also with the importance of reliable statistics as a source of information on the economic progress of the empire and the welfare of his subjects. He declared in a speech to the cabinet: "I have examined the census report of the viceroys of the provinces and have found them inaccurate.....During my survey I visited many places.....I learned of the households numbering five to six adults, only one of which paid the poll tax; and of other households of nine or ten adults, only two or three of which were taxed.....The local magistrates and the viceroys of the provinces do not

report the correct figures, for they fear an increase in taxes.....As a matter of fact, I am not interested in increasing taxation, but am anxious to know the size of the population". Accordingly, he decreed, "Hereafter the tax returns of each province are to be in accordance with the tax records for 1711, that year being taken as a fixed base; all those who were untaxed in 1711 are to be exempt from the poll tax". The details of the new regulations were stated in another edict issued in the following year.⁶²

The emperor's action had no apparent effect on the trend of the recorded numbers of *ting* in the empire as a whole. The upward trend which had begun in 1708 went on haltingly for the next 22 years.⁶³ But this separation of registration from tax assessments prepared the way for the reorganization of the system of population records and statistics which marks the beginning of the second period of the Ch'ing dynasty series.

Ch'ing Dynasty Statistics: Second Period (1741-1911)

An imperial decree of 1740 ordered the establishment of a new system whereby statistics of the total popul-

⁶² Quoted by Chen Chungshen (6), p. 125*. Chen noted (p. 126*) that the decrees of 1711 and 1712 were implemented only after a long delay in some parts of the empire; in Szechwan they were not put fully into effect before 1775.

⁶³ From 1712 to 1734, in addition to the statistics of *ting* listed in Table 7, numbers of tax-free persons or tax-free *ting* were also recorded year by year. These numbers increased from about 60,000 in 1712 to 937,000 in 1734. Annual figures are quoted by Parker (25), p. 153.

ation in each part of the empire were to be compiled annually. The system which was put into effect at this time is known as the "*pao-chia*" from the form of the local household organization by which the records were to be kept. The scheme was as follows:

10 households make one *pai*;
10 *pai* make one *chia*;
10 *chia* make one *pao*.

Initially each household was required to keep a tablet hanging by the door with a list of all members of the household; later the tablets were replaced by lists kept in the *pao* and *chia* offices. In principle, the method of keeping the registers and reporting the statistics was apparently much the same as that which was instituted in the early years of the Ming dynasty, and which has been described in an earlier section. The *pao-chia* registration, however, had nothing directly to do with taxation. As before, the officers of the organization at the local level had no special qualifications or training for the registration work, nor were they paid for it, and often they performed their duties in a very perfunctory way, if at all.⁶⁴

Statistics ostensibly compiled from the local *pao-chia* registers are on record annually, with some gaps, from 1741 to 1851, for the empire as a whole and each province. The empire totals are listed in Table 8 and charted in Fig. 2; they include the population of Man-

⁶⁴ The system is described further by Chen Chungshen (6), pp. 126* ff.

churia and apparently also Sinkiang and Taiwan as well as China proper.⁶⁵ Provincial statistics for selected years in this period are reproduced in Table A-1. After 1851, as a result of the Tai-ping rebellion and subsequent disorders, the central government was no longer able to collect statistics from all the provinces.⁶⁶

Dr. Irene Taeuber and Wang Nai-chi have shown that the statistics of this period were not obtained, as a rule, by counting the names on the population registers each year. Instead, it was apparently the custom, once the population figure for a province had been established, to carry it forward with approximately constant, arbitrary increments until the central authorities complained of inaccurate reporting and demanded a revision. Then the level of the series would be suddenly raised, possibly by a very large amount. Other irregularities were created by the occasional failure of certain provinces or *hsien* to submit their reports, causing the level of the totals to drop abruptly and rise again when the missing jurisdictions resumed reporting.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Statistics for Manchuria are listed separately in the provincial tables. According to Usher (39) the recorded totals up to 1882 probably include the population of Sinkiang, which was combined with Kansu province until that date. Taiwan was included with Fukien province. Sacharoff (29), p. 181, says that only the numbers of households were recorded in other outlying parts of the empire.

⁶⁶ Chen Chang-heng (7), pp. 51*-53*, lists the incomplete totals recorded for various years from 1852 to 1873 with the names of the missing provinces.

⁶⁷ Taeuber and Wang Nai-chi (33).

It goes without saying that the statistics produced by such methods are worthless to represent year-to-year change in the population of China or any its provinces. It is possible, however, that the figures might be fairly valid as rough approximations to the magnitude of the population at a given time and the amount of its increase over a long period. Their validity from this point of view would depend, first, on the accuracy with which the initial figure for each province was established; second, on the realism of the conventional annual increments as approximations to a normal rate of population growth for each province; and finally, on the accuracy of the adjustments which were made on certain occasions.

The tabulation of long-range average annual rates of population increase derived from the provincial figures, which are presented in Table 9, gives cause for putting a certain amount of confidence in the statistics as a representation of the major features of population trends in various parts of China during the period from 1749 to 1851 considered as a whole. The comparison of the numbers reported in 1749 with the results of the census in 1953 shows the largest proportionate increases in the south-western and south-central provinces and the smallest increases in the northern and eastern regions. This pattern agrees with expectations based on the known history of agricultural expansion and economic development in these regions of China during the last two centuries. The implication is that the 1749 figures were

Table 8

China: Recorded population totals, A. D. 1741-1851

Year (A. D.)	Population (thousands)	Year (A. D.)	Population (thousands)	Year (A. D.)	Population (thousands)
1741	145,412	1779	275,043	1815	326,575
1742	159,802	1780	<i>a</i> 277,554	1816	328,815
1743	164,454			1817	331,330
1744	166,809	1781	279,816	1818	348,820
1745	169,922	1782	281,823	1819	351,261
1746	171,897	1783	<i>a</i> 284,734	1820	353,578
		1784	286,331		
1749	177,495	1785	288,864	1821	355,540
1750	179,539	1786	291,102	1822	372,458
		1787	292,429	1823	375,153
1751	181,811	1788	294,852	1824	374,601
		1789	297,717	1825	379,886
1753	183,678	1790	301,487		
1754	184,504			1827	383,696
1755	185,613	1791	304,354	1828	386,532
1756	186,616	1792	307,467	1829	390,501
1757	190,348	1793	310,497	1830	394,785
1758	191,673	1794	313,282		
1759	194,792	1795	296,969	1831	395,821
1760	196,838	1796	275,662	1832	397,133
		1797	271,334	1833	398,942
1761	<i>a</i> 198,215	1798	290,983	1834	401,009
1762	200,472	1799	293,288	1835	403,052
1763	204,210	1800	295,237	1836	404,901
1764	205,591			1837	406,984
		1801	297,502	1838	409,039
1766	208,096	1802	299,750	1839	410,851
1767	209,840	1803	302,251	1840	412,815
		1804	304,461		
1769	212,024	1805	332,181	1841	413,457
1770	213,613	1806	335,309	1842	<i>a</i> 416,118
		1807	338,062	1843	417,239
		1808	350,292	1844	419,441
1771	<i>a</i> 214,600	1809	352,900	1845	421,343
1772	216,467	1810	345,717	1846	423,141
1773	218,743			1847	425,106
1774	221,027	1811	358,610	1848	426,929
1775	264,561	1812	<i>a</i> 361,691	1849	428,421
1776	268,238	1813	336,452	1850	429,931
1778	242,966	1814	316,575	1851	431,896

Sources: Krotovich (18); Institute of Economic Research, Academia Sinica (16).

a Different totals are obtained from the statistics by provinces quoted by Sacharoff (29).

not unrelated to the facts of population size and distribution at that time.




Figure 2

Population statistics of the Ch'ing dynasty,
second period (1741-1851)

Furthermore, the same general pattern of provincial variations is repeated in the average annual rates of population growth derived from the statistics for the periods 1749-1776, 1776-1851, and 1851-1953. (The erratic variations in the rates for the two parts of the former period, 1749-1771 and 1771-1776, will be considered presently.) This consistency of pattern implies that the long-range trends of increase in the provincial figures were also related at least loosely to the actual trends of population growth. To be sure, the figures for some provinces do not always fall in line; those for Kweichow, for instance, appear to be erratic. But some

such deviations would be expected even if the statistics were perfectly accurate.

Table 9

China: Average Annual Rates of Population Growth
(per cent) for Provinces, 1749-1953

Province	1749	1749	1771	1749	1776	1851
	1953	1771	1776	1776	1851	1953
Szechwan — — —	1.6	0.9	20.5	4.3	2.4	0.3
Yunnan — — —	1.1	0.6	7.1	1.7	1.2	0.8
Kwangtung — — —	0.8	0.4	16.0	3.1	0.9	0.2
Kwangsi — — —	0.8	1.2	2.4	1.4	0.5	0.9
Kweichow — — —	0.8	0.5	7.6	1.8	0.1	1.0
Hunan — — —	0.7	0.2	10.5	2.0	0.4	0.5
Hupei — — —	0.6	0.6	11.7	2.5	1.1	-0.2
Honan — — —	0.6	1.2	3.6	1.6	0.3	0.6
Hopeh — — —	0.5	0.9	4.2	1.5	0.2	0.6
Shensi — — —	0.4	0.4	2.0	0.7	0.5	0.3
Kiangsu — — —	0.4	0.7	3.5	1.2	0.6	0.1
Shantung — — —	0.3	0.4	-3.7	-0.4	0.6	0.4
Kaingsi — — —	0.3	1.5	7.5	2.6	0.5	-0.4
Chekiang — — —	0.3	1.7	2.5	1.8	0.6	0.3
Shansi — — —	0.2	0.5	3.3	1.0	0.3	-0.1
Anhui — — —	0.2	0.4	3.1	0.9	0.4	-0.2
Fukien — — —	<i>a</i>	0.3	6.5	1.4	0.8	<i>a</i>
Kansu — — —	<i>a</i>	3.9	2.7	3.7	0.0	<i>a</i>

a 1953 figures are not comparable with earlier data as they refer to a smaller territory.

The significance of these comparisons depends on the assumption that the 1953 census figures are independent of the Ch'ing dynasty statistics. Taeuber and Wang have suggested that the 1953 figures for some provinces were based partly on estimates, the origins of which could be traced in part to the population reports of 1850.⁶⁸

The most conspicuous discontinuity in the statistics

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

is found between 1774 and 1775. At that time the figure for the total population of the empire was raised by more than 43 millions in a single year, apparently as a result of a complaint on the part of the emperor that the statistics were inaccurate and did not do justice to the economic progress of the empire. Of this increase Sacharoff wrote, "The population of China in the fortieth year of Chien Lung was overstated by the officials so as to satisfy the vanity of the emperor, and possibly this over-estimated figure, instead of being cancelled, was carried over to the census reports of later periods".⁶⁹ Other scholars have agreed with this indictment and rejected the statistics of 1775 and later years, substituting lower estimates which they thought were more credible.⁷⁰

The huge increase in 1775 does not necessarily mean, however, that the figures were exaggerated at that time, or in any later year. On the contrary, it seems more likely, in the light of all available evidence, that the statistics prior to 1775 were much too low, at least in certain provinces, and that the revision had the effect of bringing the figures in general nearer the truth. This hypothesis is supported by a comparison of the provincial statistics for 1771 and 1776, which are shown in Table A-1. Large increases appear in the figures for all provinces except Shantung, where the population reported

⁶⁹ Sacharoff (29), p. 182.

⁷⁰ Rockhill (28), Chen Chang-heng (7), Liu Nan-ming (22), and Willcox (44).

in 1776 was nearly 5 millions less than in 1771, probably as a result of the White Lotus rebellion which broke out in this province in 1774, and consequent disruption of the administrative organization. In other provinces the recorded increases varied from nearly 8 millions, or 110 per cent, in Kwangtung to less 0.8 millions, or 10 per cent, in Shensi. In addition to Kwangtung, relatively large increases were recorded in several other provinces of south-central and south-western China, including Szechwan, Hupeh, Hunan, Kweichow, and Yunnan. These were provinces of relatively rapid long-range population growth, where the increases recorded between 1749 and 1771 had lagged behind the long-range trend. (See Table 9.). More moderate additions were made between 1771 and 1776 in the figures for the northern and eastern provinces, where the trend of the statistics between 1749 and 1771 was more nearly in line with the long-range trend.

It is not only the jump in 1775 which has led certain scholars to conclude that the statistics from that time until 1851 were generally much exaggerated; they have also been impressed by the seemingly excessive rate of population growth implied in the whole series of statistics from 1741 to 1851. It is generally agreed that population growth was actually fairly rapid, at least during the eighteenth century, which was on the whole an extraordinarily peaceful and prosperous period, not marred by any major wars, internal revolts, or great

natural calamities, until the White Lotus rebellion in Shantung in 1774. But even under these favourable conditions, certain scholars have been unwilling to believe that the population could have increased as much as the statistics indicate. Chen Chang-heng, for instance, discarded the statistics and substituted estimates computed by assuming that the population grew between 1741 and 1795 at an average annual rate of 10 per 1,000, which he thought was the highest plausible rate even for such an exceptionally trouble-free time.⁷¹

The maximum rate of population growth which we have accepted as credible in the statistics of earlier dynasties was 15 per 1,000 per annum, and it does not seem impossible that the population could have increased at this rate under the favorable conditions of the eighteenth century. Such a rate of growth could have been produced, for example, by an average birth rate of 45 and death rate of 30 per 1,000. The comparison of the recorded population totals for the whole empire in 1749 and 1775 implies an average annual increase of 15 per 1,000 during this interval. For the period 1775-1794 the average is 9 per 1,000 and for 1794-1851 it is 7 per 1,000.

One possibility, then, is to accept the totals for 1749 and 1775 as comparable approximations, if not

⁷¹ Chen Chang-heng (7), pp.48*-51*. He observed that the 1741 figure was probably understated, but he used it anyway as his starting point.

accurate measures of the population at these two dates, and to assume that the large increase from 1774 to 1775 was the rectification of a deficiency which had accumulated during the interval 1749-1774. An alternative is to suppose that this deficiency was already present in 1749--in other words, that the population was understated throughout the period from the establishment of the *pao-chia* system up to 1774. If the ratio of 1774 to the 1775 total is taken as an estimate of the degree of understatement in 1749, a corrected figure of 212 millions is obtained for 1749, or 35 millions more than the recorded total. The average rate of population growth for the period 1749-1775 then works out at 9 per 1,000. This alternative appears more plausible than the first possibility mentioned: that the 1749 and 1775 statistics were approximately comparable as recorded.⁷²

At least in the years 1741 to 1748, if not also in 1749, the recorded figures were almost certainly too low. The excessive increases recorded during these years were in all likelihood due to progressive extension of

⁷² Ho ping-ti (17), Chapter III, presents several kinds of evidence to support the conclusion that the population statistics of 1741-1774 were understated, including evidence that *pao-chia* organization was not set up in some remote areas, that the regulations were not followed energetically, that women and children were incompletely registered or omitted altogether in some areas, and that the earlier system of reporting *ting* persisted in some areas. A further indication of underregistration in 1743 and 1753 is found in statistics of households for these dates quoted by Rockhill (28), pp. 307-308, and Chen Chang-heng (7), p. 29*, which show averages of less than 5 persons per household.

the coverage of the new statistical system in the initial phase of its operation.

To sum up the discussion of the second series of Ch'ing dynasty statistics (1741-1851), it is certainly not justified to put any faith in them as exact measures of the size of China's population or its changes from year to year. The evidence does not, however, warrant dismissing them as entirely unrealistic and useless for study of the major features of population history of the period. The figures were probably too low from 1741 to 1774. From 1775 to 1851 it is possible that they exaggerated the size of the population and the rate of growth, but there is actually no evidence that they were biased upward rather than downward. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the population increased greatly during the period from 1741 to 1851 as a whole, and especially during the first half of this period.

The Censuses of 1909-1911, 1912, 1928-1929 and 1953

After 1851, as already mentioned, the tottering Imperial government was no longer able to collect population statistics from all the provinces. The *pao-chia* organization continued in existence and the local records were still maintained more or less half-heartedly, but the system of central collection of statistics broke down.

Many of the provincial authorities went on as before submitting their data to Peking, but the reports from certain provinces became more and more erratic and every year figures for several provinces were missing. During the last half-century of the empire the population of China as a whole was represented only by estimates with wide margins of error, and this state of affairs continued during the time of the republic which replaced the empire in 1911.

In 1909 a census was ordered to be taken throughout the empire, to serve as a basis for elections and the establishment of a constitutional monarchy; but this project was never completed. It was planned as a two-stage enumeration, beginning with a census of households which was to be followed by a census of persons. When the emperor abdicated in 1911, the household statistics had been compiled for most parts of the country, but the numbers of persons had been established only for Hopeh, Chekiang, and Kweichow provinces, parts of Shansi, Kiangsi, and Szechwan, and some area in Manchuria. For some of these areas the data were manifestly incomplete.⁷³

After the republican government came into power, it proceeded in 1912 to attempt a new census. Numbers of persons were obtained from all provinces of China proper except Anhui, Kiangsi, and Kweichow, as well

⁷³ The numbers of persons and households reported in this census are listed by Chen Chang-heng (7) p.25*.

as from Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang, etc. (see Table A-1). It is not certain, however, to what extent the figures for the different areas were the results of actual enumeration or compilation of the registration records, and to what extent they were estimates based on previous data.

The effort to take a census was repeated with less success in 1928 and 1929. This time the government was able to get reports from only eight provinces of China proper, certain parts of Manchuria, and Sinkiang. The figures are listed in Table A-1.

It is doubtful to what extent the enumerations of 1909-11, 1912, and 1928-29 could properly be called censuses. In the large cities, enumerations were carried out under the supervision of the police, but in the rural areas the organization was that of the ancient *pao-chia* system, and it is likely that the data were drawn largely from the defective registers with little or no attempt to verify the actual numbers of the people at the time. Analyses of the results have revealed evidence of important deficiencies in the enumeration of females and there is every reason to suspect that the counts of male children, at least, were also incomplete.⁷⁴

Further enumerations or compilations of registration data were carried out in various provinces from time to time during the 1930's and 1940's, but in no case did

⁷⁴ On the methods of these enumerations see Chen Chungshen (6), and Jaffe (17).

they approximate a complete census of China.⁷⁵

In 1953, for the first time in more than a hundred years, the government of the People's Republic succeeded in taking a census which covered nearly all parts of mainland China. The total number of inhabitants reported (including estimates for a few areas where the enumeration could not be carried out) amounted to 582.6 millions, exceeding by more than 100 millions the figures which had come to be widely accepted as the best estimates of China's population.

It was officially announced that the enumeration had been verified by sample checks in 343 cities with an aggregate population of 53 millions, which showed omissions of 0.23 per cent and duplications of 0.14 per cent. If these were reliable measures of the extent of errors, they would mean that this census was one of the most accurate ever taken anywhere in the world. Actually it may be granted that the count was probably far more accurate than any which had been made previously in China, but a consideration of the methods makes it appear very unlikely that the error was as small as the announced results of the checks would imply.

This enumeration was not strictly a census according to the accepted, modern definition, because it was not done mainly by a house-to-house canvass of all dwelling units. Instead, the method used throughout the greater

⁷⁵ Orleans (24), gives a compilation of statistics for each province throughout the period 1909-1953.

part of the country was apparently that of calling upon the heads of households to come to the local census office and report the required information concerning members of their households. Experience in other countries has shown that this method is likely to yield less accurate results than the standard procedure of house-to-house canvass. It also appears that in many areas the figures were probably derived from existing records, with an indeterminate amount of checking, instead of a new enumeration. The length of time required to complete the project is indicative of the difficulties encountered. Although the reference date was 30 June, 1953, the fieldwork was spread over a period of nearly one year and the majority of the population was not enumerated before the first quarter of 1954. A very high degree of accuracy is not to be expected in these circumstances.⁷⁶

The 1953 census figures are compared in Table 10 with various estimates of the Chinese population made during the 1930's and 1940's by different authorities, on the basis of the 1909-1911, 1912, and 1928-1929 partial census results. If it is taken for granted that the 1953 figures are more reliable than the earlier estimates, the comparison makes it appear that the 1928-1929 estimates,

⁷⁶ On the methodological plan which was drawn up for this census, see Krotevich (18). On the modifications which it was found necessary to introduce in practice, see Taeuber and Orleans (32). On the possibility that the totals reported for certain provinces were estimates derived in part from earlier figures, see Taeuber and Wang (33).

at least, were almost certainly too low. For example, Liu Nan-ming's estimate of 408.5 millions for China proper at this date, compared with the corresponding figure of 518.4 millions for 1953, implies an average annual rate of growth of about 10 per 1,000 during the interval. Although this is perhaps not absolutely incredible, it is difficult to accept in view of the long years of fighting, which must have taken a heavy toll of the population, directly and indirectly, during the 1930's and 1940's. A considerable deficiency in Liu Nan-ming's estimate is much more plausible. Willcox's estimate for 1912 is not quite so difficult to reconcile with the 1953 figures, as it shows an average annual growth during 1912-1953 of 8 per 1,000; but this rate, too, seems rather high in view of the influenza pandemic which intervened in 1918, and the generally poor conditions of health and low level of living of the Chinese peasantry during these times. The 1909-11 estimate is clearly too low to be consistent with the other figures.

Compared with the 1851 statistics, the 1953 data indicate an increase of population in China proper amounting to 101 millions in the course of 102 years. This corresponds to an average annual increase of only 2 per 1,000, which is quite credible in view of the history of this interval, with its many tragic catastrophes.

The comparison of the 1953 and 1851 statistics for provinces (Table 9) also shows a picture which is credible enough on the whole, although questions might be raised




Figure 3

Growth of population in China proper, A. D. 2-1953,
 according to emended series of statistics and estimates

(logarithmic scale)

with regard to the increases and decreases indicated for certain provinces: Kiangsi, for instance. In short, the 1953 figures fit tolerably well into the long historical series of Chinese population statistics, but they

Table 10

China: Comparison of 1953 Census Results with Population Estimates for 1909-1911, 1912 and 1928-1929

Population in millions

	Total China and dependencies	China proper	Outlying areas
1909-11:			
Estimate of Chen Cheng-heng ^a —	374.2	347.9	26.3
1912:			
Estimate of Warren H. Chen ^b —	393.2	370.2	23.0
Estimate of W. F. Willcox ^c —	410.6	397.4	13.2
1928-1929:			
Estimate of Chen Chang-heng ^d —	461.7	—	—
Estimate of Warren H. Chen ^b —	445.0	—	—
Estimate of Liu Nan-ming ^e —	474.8	408.5	66.3
1953 census ^f — — —	582.6	518.4	64.2

^a Quoted by Liu Nan-ming (22), p. 97, together with another, closely similar estimate by Wang Chi-ta. Chen Chang-heng (7), p. 30* also gives another estimate of 386.4 millions for China and dependencies based on the 1909-1911 census, but without a division between China proper and the outlying territories.

^b Chen, Warren H. (10), pp. 56*-60*. The division of his 1912 estimate between China proper and outlying territories has been made by the present author with the data quoted by Chen and the assumptions which he stated.

^c Willcox (44), p. 523. The figures include an estimated correction of 30 millions (Willcox put it in the range of 20 to 30 millions) for underenumeration of females.

^d Chen Chang-heng (7), p. 33*.

^e Liu Nan-ming (22), pp. 113-114.

^f United States, Bureau of the Census (37).

can hardly be reconciled with many of the estimates which were made during the first half of the present century.

Emended Series of Statistics, A. D. 2-1953

Table 11 shows an emended series of population totals, A. D. 2 to 1953, for that part China proper which was within the empire during each historical period. This series is charted in Fig. 3.

Statistics which have been shown to be seriously defective and inconsistent with figures for other years have been discarded in making up this emended series. From the statistics of the Ming dynasty, only the figures for 1381 and 1393 have been retained, for it seems impossible to put any faith in the later statistics of this dynasty, in view of the multiple inconsistencies found in them. Also omitted are the Yuan (Mongol) dynasty statistics and those for certain years in other dynastic series, as well as the numbers of *Ting* for 1651-1734 and the defective censuses of 1909-1911, 1912, and 1928-1929. The emended series is abridged during those periods in which statistics were recorded at short intervals, since the data are clearly not reliable enough to provide useful measures of year-to-year changes.

The numbers shown for A. D. 2, 88-156, 606 and 1014-1103 are estimates derived from the recorded numbers of households with the assumption of a constant average of six persons per household. Such estimates are

probably nearer the truth, especially for the period of the Sung dynasty, than the smaller recorded numbers of persons. Likewise, in the estimated total for the period 1193-1195, the component which represents the population of the Southern Sung empire has been derived by the same assumption from the number of households, while the recorded number of persons has been taken to represent the population of the Chin empire. For the year 1751 an estimate of 30 million omissions has been added to the recorded number of persons; this improves consistency with the figures for 1775 and later years.

The statistics of the Han, Sui and T'ang dynasties have been reduced, as explained above, by the estimated populations of areas outside China proper which were included in the statistics of these periods. Likewise, the Ch'ing dynasty totals, 1751-1851, have been reduced by the numbers reported for Manchuria and by approximate estimates of the populations of Sinkiang and Taiwan. On the other hand, no attempt has been made to add estimates of the population in those areas of modern China proper which were not covered by the statistics of the earlier dynasties, since the basis for such estimates is completely lacking. The deficiency on this account is most important in the case of the Sung dynasty statistics and less important in the Han, Sui, and T'ang statistics.

In making the chart (Fig. 3), some irregularities

in the statistics have been smoothed out and hypothetical trends have been sketched in, as shown by the dotted lines, for those intervals in which partial statistics or historical evidence seemed adequate to indicate at least approximately the form of the population curve. The trend for the early Ch'ing period, 1657-1734, has been sketched with reference to the increases in the statistics of *Ting*.

Although the figures presented in this emended series for the Han, Sui, and especially the Sung dynasty are larger than the recorded numbers, they are by no means the highest estimates which would be defensible. No allowance has been made for the non-Chinese population nor for social classes of the Chinese who were probably excluded from the statistics, and no attempt has been made to correct deficiencies in the counts of households due to oversight, evasion, deliberate underreporting by local officials, or other kinds of malfunctioning of the statistical organization. For reasons which were enumerated earlier, the statistics of all dynastic periods prior to the Ch'ing were almost certainly understated, and the substitution of estimates based on the numbers of households, instead of more defective statistics of individuals, is not likely to be a sufficient correction.

It is likely, for reasons indicated above, that the amount of understatement varied from one date to another, and consequently the increases and decreases of the figures for some periods may be considerably distorted.

Although the emendations have removed the most obviously erratic fluctuations, the series as emended is still likely to exaggerate the population losses during periods of social disorganization and economic adversity as well as the gains in times of prosperity, re-unification, and population growth. The chart of the emended series may therefore be something of a caricature of the variability of China's population trend over the last twenty centuries.

Possibly the weaknesses of the statistics are more fundamental; possibly the major outlines of the long-range trends are distorted beyond recognition. But the examination of the statistics and available information concerning their definitions and methodological basis does not provide sufficient justification for so sweeping a condemnation. Without definite knowledge of such major errors it would be a mistake to ignore these data and what they tentatively imply with regard to the population history not only of China but also of the world as a whole.

Table 11
China Proper: Emended Series of Population
Statistics. A. D. 2-1953

Dynasty and year (A. D.)	Population (million)	Dynasty and year (A. D.)	Population (millions)
Western Han: 2 — —	71	Sung-Chin: 1193-1195 —	123
Eastern Han: 88 — —	43	Ming: 1381 — —	60
105 — —	53	1393 — —	61
125 — —	56	Ch'ing: 1751 — —	207
140 — —	56	1781 — —	270
156 — —	62	1791 — —	294
Sui: 606 — —	54	1811 — —	347
T'ang: 705 — —	37	1821 — —	344
726 — —	41	1831 — —	383
732 — —	45	1841 — —	400
742 — —	51	1851 — —	417
755 — —	52	People's Republic: 1953 — —	518
Sung: 1014 — —	60		
1029 — —	61		
1048 — —	64		
1065 — —	77		
1075 — —	94		
1086 — —	108		
1094 — —	115		
1103 — —	123		

Appendix

Provincial Statistics

Available population statistics for the provinces of China proper from A. D. 2 to 1578 and a selection of the available figures from 1749 to date are reproduced in Tables A-1, A-2, and A-3. Table A-1 shows the recorded number of persons, Table A-2 the number of households, and Table A-3 the ratio

of persons per household. For the Han, Sui, and T'ang dynasties, the figures shown are Professor Bielenstein's estimates. The author is indebted to him for making these figures available and giving permission to publish them.

The division of China proper into provinces has remained approximately the same since the time of the Ming dynasty, although there has been some splitting of provinces and some provincial names have been changed. During the Ming period Hunan was combined with Hupeh under the name of Hukuang, Kiangsu and Anhui were combined under the name of Nanking, and Kansu was a part of Shensi. Kweichow was formed in 1411 from parts of Yunnan, Szechwan, and Hukuang. Under the Ch'ing dynasty Taiwan was included in Fukien, and Kansu included Sinkiang.

During the Han, Sui and T'ang dynasties the administrative divisions were entirely different. Bielenstein's allocation of local statistics for A. D. 2, 140, 606, and 742 to the areas of the modern provinces is necessarily only approximate, but the approximation should be close enough for most analytical purposes, particularly in view of the large errors of other kinds to which the statistics are subject.

Table A-1

China: Numbers of Persons Recorded by Provinces. A. D. 2-1953

Province	Area (square miles)	Thousands of persons					
		A.D. 2	140	742	1381	1391	1393
Total, China proper	1,463,505	55,130	47,265	50,964	59,473	56,875	60,546
Kansu —	241,254	1,518	468	e1,130	} 2,155	} 2,490	} 2,317
Shensi —	72,554	3,344	820	4,229			
Shansi —	60,396	3,415	1,307	3,888	4,030	14,413	4,072
Hopeh —	54,498	6,998	6,657	6,005	b1,893	b1,981	b1,927
Shantung —	56,946	13,700	9,342	7,131	5,197	5,673	5,256

Honan	63,763	12,630	9,864	7,030	1,891	2,107	1,913
Anhui	56,490	4,350	3,233	2,993			
Kiangsu	42,469	2,530	1,722	3,476	10,241	10,162	10,756
Chekiang	39,633		481	4,319			
Kiangsi	63,809	352	1,669	1,586	8,982	8,106	8,982
Hupei	71,958	938	1,013	1,355	i4,593	i4,092	i4,703
Hunan	79,065	561	2,312	1,223			
Szechwan	117,231	3,514	4,797	4,987	i1,465	i1,568	i1,467
Yunnan	162,348	580	2,008	a—	j—	i355	i259
Kweichow	65,715	153	267	a—	k—	k—	k—
Kwangsi	84,530	296	c467	f349	1,463	1,392	1,483
Kwangtung	84,468	251	838	g853	3,172	2,582	3,008
Fukien	46,378	a—	a—	412	3,840	3,293	3,917
Outlying areas	—	2,542	d—	536	—	—	—
Total recorded	—	b57,671	49,150	b51,500	b59,473	b56,875	60,546

Table A-1 continued

Province	Thousands of persons						
	1491	c. a. 1540	1578	1749	1771		
Total, China proper	—	—	53,281	60,216	60,693	n177,089	n213,896
Kansu	—	—	13,912	3,934	4,502	n5,710	n13,216
Shensi	—	—					
Shansi	—	—	4,360	5,084	5,319	9,509	10,626
Hopeh	—	—	3,431	3,413	m4,265	13,933	16,770
Shantung	—	—	6,760	6,760	5,664	24,012	26,000
Honan	—	—	m2,614	5,106	5,194	12,848	16,679
Anhui	—	—	7,984	9,967	10,503	21,568	23,684
Kiangsu	—	—					
Chekiang	—	—	5,306	4,525	5,153	11,877	17,092
Kiangsi	—	—	6,550	7,925	5,859	8,428	11,745
Hupei	—	—	3,782	4,336	4,399	7,527	8,532
Hunan	—	—					
Szechwan	—	—	2,598	2,104	3,102	2,507	3,068
Yunnan	—	—	126	1,433	1,476	1,946	2,208
Kweichow	—	—	259	512	291	3,075	3,458
Kwangsi	—	—	1,676	1,055	1,186	3,688	4,794
Kwangtung	—	—	1,817	1,978	m2,041	6,461	7,068
Fukien	—	—	2,106	2,083	1,739	n7,620	n8,171
Outlying areas	—	—	—	—	—	407	751
Total recorded	—	—	b53,281	60,216	60,693	177,495	b214,647

Table A-1 continued

Province	Thousands of persons					
	1776	1812	1851	1912	1928—29	1953
Total, China proper	n267,399	n360,443	n428,709	—	—	518,405
Kansu — — —	n 15,068	n15,355	n15,440	4,988	—	12,928
Shensi — — —	8,193	10,207	12,010	12,364	11,802	15,881
Shansi — — —	12,503	14,004	15,693	10,082	12,088	14,314
Hopeh — — —	20,567	27,991	23,455	26,658	31,118	41,447
Shantung — — —	21,497	28,959	33,266	30,989	—	48,877
Honan — — —	19,858	23,037	23,928	28,518	—	44,215
Anhui — — —	87,567	34,165	37,631	—	21,715	30,344
Kiangsu — — —	28,808	37,844	44,303	32,283	34,130	47,457
Chekiang — — —	19,365	26,257	30,107	21,440	20,623	22,866
Kiangsi — — —	16,849	23,047	24,516	23,988	—	16,773
Hupeh — — —	14,815	27,370	33,810	29,590	26,696	27,790
Hunan — — —	14,990	18,653	20,648	27,617	31,500	33,227
Szechwan — — —	7,790	21,436	44,752	48,130	—	62,304
Yunnan — — —	3,103	5,561	7,403	9,468	—	17,473
Kweichow — — —	5,003	5,288	5,436	9,526	—	15,037
Kwangsi — — —	5,382	7,314	7,823	—	—	19,561
Kwangtung — — —	14,821	19,174	28,389	—	—	34,770
Fukien — — —	n11,220	n14,779	n20,099	15,849	—	13,143
Outlying areas —	839	1,250	3,187	22,470	21,688	64,199
Total recorded —	268,238	361,693	431,896	353,260	211,361	582,603

Sources: A. D. 2-742-Data supplied to the author by Professor Bielenstein; 1381-1578- Van der Sprenkel (40), pp. 297-305; 1749, 1771, 1776, 1812-Sacharoff (29), p. 193; 1851-Institute of Economic Research, Academia Sinica (16); 1912-1929-Warren H. Chen (10), pp. 56*, 59*-60*; 1953-United States, Bureau of the Census (37).

a Area not included in the empire at this date.

b Total of recorded local figures. The totals recorded for the empire were:

A. D. 2	Thousands		
—	—	—	59,595
742	—	—	48,910
1381	—	—	59,873
1391	—	—	56,775
1491	—	—	50,503

c Incomplete; areas for which statistics were lacking reported a population of roughly 75,000 in A. D. 2.

d Recorded figures are very incomplete.

e Incomplete; areas for which statistics are lacking reported a population of roughly 25,000 in A. D. 140.

f Incomplete; areas for which statistics are lacking reported a

population of less than 25,000 in A. D. 140.

g Incomplete; areas for which statistics are lacking reported a population of roughly 50,000 in A. D. 140.

h Incomplete.

i Including a part of Kweichow.

j No figure on record for this year.

k Kweichow was organized as a province in 1411 from parts of Yunnan, Szechwan, and Hupeh.

l The following emendations were proposed by van der Sprenkel because the recorded figures were out of line with data for other years:

Province	Date	Emended figure (thousands)
Shensi-Kansu	— 1491	2,912
Shansi	— — 1391	4,013
Chekiang	— — 1391	10,662

m Figures from *Ta-ming Hui-tien* (preferred by van der Sprenkel) do not agree with those from *Ming Shih Ti-li-chih*, which are as follows:

Province	Date	Thousands of persons
Hopeh	— — 1578	3,365
Honan	— — 1491	4,360
Kwangtung	— — 1578	5,041

n Totals for China proper apparently include Taiwan (combined in the statistics with Fukien) and Sinkiang (combined with Kansu).

Table A-2

China: Numbers of Households Recorded by Provinces

A. D. 2-1929

Province	Thousands of households					
	A. D. 2	140	606	742	1381	1391
Total, China proper	11,822	9,295	8,987	8,852	10,654	10,684
Kansu — —	383	108	352	c214	} 285	295
Shensi — —	762	172	755	755		
Shansi — —	785	212	867	658	596	593
Hopeh — —	1,612	1,023	1,256	911	c339	c341
Shantung — —	3,092	1,723	1,638	1,054	752	730
Honan — —	2,360	1,985	1,935	1,243	315	330
Anhui — —	954	614	308	467	1,935	1,877

Kiangsu — —	}	553	{	384	386	515	2, 150	2, 282
Chekiang — —				123	73	729		
Kiangsi — —	}	67	{	406	86	259	1, 554	1, 567
Hupeh — —				182	221	450		
Hunan — —	}	99	{	515	54	221	786	739
Szechwan — —				765	1, 175	504		
Yunnan — —	}	82	{	261	a—	a—	c—	76
Kweichow — —				24	32	a—		
Kwangsi — —	}	52	{	c111	152	c109	210	208
Kwangtung — —				48	230	159		
Fukien — —	}	a—	{	a—	12	91	811	817
Outlying areas — —				545	c161	d81		
Total recorded — —		b12, 366		9, 699	b9, 068	b8, 954	10, 654	10, 684

Table A-2 continued

Province	Thousands of households							
	1393	1491	ca. 1540	1578	1912	1928-29		
Total, China proper	10, 643	9, 113	9, 677	10, 620	—	—		
Kansu — —	}	295	307	363	394	{	986	—
Shensi — —							1, 636	2, 103
Shansi — —	}	595	575	590	596	{	2, 100	2, 292
Hopeh — —							c335	395
Shantung — —	}	754	771	771	1, 372	{	5, 653	—
Honan — —							316	g437
Anhui — —	}	1, 903	1, 512	1, 963	2, 069	{	—	3, 830
Kiangsu — —							6, 077	6, 877
Chekiang — —	}	g2, 138	1, 503	b1, 242	1, 542	{	4, 745	4, 647
Kiangsi — —							1, 554	1, 364
Hupeh — —	}	776	505	532	541	{	4, 844	5, 545
Hunan — —							5, 767	6, 455
Szechwan — —	}	216	254	164	263	{	9, 259	—
Yunnan — —							60	16
Kweichow — —	}	f—	43	149	43	{	2, 063	—
Kwangsi — —							211	b460
Kwangtung — —	}	676	467	483	531	{	—	—
Fukien — —							816	506
Outlying areas — —		—	—	—	—		3, 425	3, 567
Total recorded — —		10, 643	b9, 113	9, 677	10, 620		65, 795	40, 761

Sourcess: see Table A-1.

a Area not included in the empire at this date.

b Total or recorded local figures. The totals recorded for the empire were 12,233,000 in A. D. 2, 8,908,000 in 606, 8,526,000 in 742, and 9,807,000 in 1491.

c Incomplete; see notes to Table A-1.

d Incomplete; areas for which statistics are lacking reported a population of roughly 50,000 in A.D. 140.

e No figure on record for this year.

f Kweichow was organized as a province in 1411 from parts of Yunan, Szechwan, and Hupeh.

g Figures from *Ta Ming Hui-tien* (preferred by van der Sprenkel) do not agree with those from *Ming Shih Ti-li-chih*, which are as follows:

Province	Date	Thousands of households
Honan — —	1491	575
Chekiang — —	1393	1,138

h The following emendations were proposed by van der Sprenkel because the recorded figures were out of line with those for other years:

Province	Date	Thousands of households (amended)
Kwangsi — —	1491	260
Chekiang — —	1540	1,542

Table A-3

China: Average Numbers of Persons per Household, by Provinces: A. D. 2-1929 (Computed from Tables A-1 and A-2)

Province	A. D. 2	140	742	1381	1391	1393	1491	ca. 1540	1578	1912	1928 29
Total, China proper	4.7	5.1	5.8	5.6	5.3	5.7	5.8	6.2	5.7	—	—
Kansu	4.0	4.3	5.3	7.6	8.4	7.9	12.7	10.8	11.4	5.1	—
Shensi	4.4	4.8	5.6	6.8	7.4	6.8	7.6	8.6	8.9	7.6	5.6
Shansi	4.4	6.2	5.9	6.8	7.4	6.8	7.6	8.6	8.9	4.8	5.3
Hopeh	4.3	6.5	6.6	5.6	5	5.8	8.7	8.1	10.0	5.3	5.7
Shantung	4.4	5.4	6.8	6.9	7.9	7.0	8.8	8.8	4.1	5.5	—
Honan	5.4	5.0	5.7	6.0	6.4	6.1	6.0	8.7	8.2	6.0	—
Anhui	4.6	5.3	6.4	5.3	5.4	5.7	5.3	5.1	5.1	—	5.7
Kiangsu	4.6	4.5	6.7	5.3	5.4	5.7	5.3	5.1	5.1	5.3	5.0
Chekiang	4.6	3.9	5.9	4.9	3.8	4.9	3.5	3.6	3.3	4.5	4.4
Kiangsi	5.3	4.1	6.1	5.8	5.2	5.8	4.8	5.0	4.4	5.2	—
Hupei	5.2	4.6	5.5	5.8	5.5	6.1	7.5	8.2	8.1	6.1	4.8
Hunan	5.7	4.5	5.5	5.8	5.5	6.1	7.5	8.2	8.1	4.8	4.9
Szechwan	4.6	4.1	4.3	6.8	6.7	6.8	10.2	12.8	11.8	5.2	—
Yunnan	7.1	7.7	—	—	4.7	4.3	7.9	10.7	10.9	5.0	—
Kweichow	6.4	8.3	—	—	—	—	6.0	3.4	6.8	4.6	—
Kwangsi	5.7	4.2	3.2	7.0	6.7	7.0	3.6	5.7	5.4	—	—

Kwangtung	5.2	3.6	4.0	4.5	4.3	4.5	3.9	4.1	3.8	—	—
Fukien	—	—	4.5	4.7	4.0	4.8	4.2	4.1	3.4	5.3	—
Outlying areas	4.7	—	5.3	—	—	—	—	—	—	6.6	6.1
Total recorded	4.7	5.1	5.8	5.6	5.3	5.7	5.8	6.2	5.7	5.4	5.2

a Emendation of the numbers of persons and households, as proposed by van der Sprenkel, would yield the following averages:

Province	Date	Persons per household
Shensi-Kansu	— 1491	9.5
Shansi	— 1391	6.8
Chekiang	— 1391	4.7
	1540	2.9
Kwangsi	— 1491	6.5

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農業部門

1. The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions and activities. It emphasizes the need for transparency and accountability in financial reporting.

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