


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
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THE NEW EUROPE

By the Same Author

NATIONALITY
AND
THE WAR
WITH COLOURED MAPS

The argument of this book is that the problem of nationality is the underlying cause of the present war, and the chief obstacle to the establishment of permanent peace in the future. The Author tries to work out what national feeling is, and by what means it can be satisfied.

Times.—" It is interesting, well written, well constructed . . . its suggested programmes have an air of diplomatic authority and a finishing touch of realism is given to them by the many excellent maps."

Athenæum.—" A most able and courageous attempt to think out what the reconstruction of the map on the basis of nationality would really mean. . . . The whole work forms a careful study in historical and political geography; well conceived, well thought out, and well and sometimes eloquently written."

THE NEW EUROPE

SOME
ESSAYS IN RECONSTRUCTION

BY
ARNOLD TOYNBEE

Author of
"NATIONALITY AND THE WAR"



WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
THE EARL OF CROMER
G.C.B., O.M.

LONDON AND TORONTO
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1916

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PREFACE

THE essays collected in this small volume are really the complement to a larger book on "Nationality and the War." The first effect of the war was to drive one's thoughts back upon the interminable tangle of concrete problems out of which it had arisen. One extricated them laboriously in a series, and presented them hopefully for solution. That was the first phase, and I am glad that I made a book of it before it passed; for one might not have had the heart to set to work on it at this later stage of the tragedy, when the evil against which Europe is struggling stands revealed in all its strength and depth. At the present time one's thoughts are momentarily impatient of minute and problematical revisions of the map, and turn rather to the subjective forces—theories and desires, prejudices and ideals—which have made Europe the tragic compound of good and evil she has been in the past, and which are likely to make or mar her definitely in the immediate future. In the essays printed here I have tried to analyse some of these forces and test their quality for true metal or dross. But I could never have defined them clearly to

myself if I had not discovered them gradually, in surveying the whole complex of their actual manifestations; so that this book is a natural successor to the other, and was begun, in fact, within a month of the other's publication.

The first six of the essays it contains appeared serially in issues of the *Nation*, from May to September 1915, and I have to thank the editor for his kind permission to allow their reappearance in the present form, as well as my publisher, Mr. J. M. Dent, for the promptitude with which he has given the permission effect.

The seventh essay on the "Ukraine" has been added as a sort of skeleton at the feast, to remind my readers and myself that all the concrete problems are lying remorselessly in wait, and that if we do not direct our theories and abstractions to their solution, we had better not have abstracted or theorised at all.

A. J. TOYNBEE.

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INTRODUCTION¹

BY THE

RIGHT HON. THE EARL OF CROMER, G.C.B., O.M.

EVERY European will probably agree that at the close of the present war there ought to be, and, indeed, that there must be, some reconstruction of the map of Europe. And every democratic European will also certainly agree that the basis of that reconstruction must be sought in the more ample recognition of the principle of Nationality. The real difficulty, however, consists, not in the enunciation of the principle, but in finding some method by which practical effect may be given to it. Mr. Toynbee has now republished six thoughtful little essays, originally contributed to the *Nation*, in which he deals with this question. It cannot honestly be said that Mr. Toynbee elicits any new facts, or that he adduces any arguments with which politicians, who have considered this subject, may not be held to be fairly familiar. Nevertheless, his essays stimulate political thought. They afford a very useful *vade-mecum* of the principles which should be borne in mind, and, perhaps still more, of those which should be abjured, in treating the question of reconstruction. Moreover, Mr. Toynbee's writings are in no degree marred by the

¹ This appreciation of Mr. Toynbee's book appeared first as a review in *The Spectator* (London, 4th March, 1916), and we are indebted to the Editor's courtesy, as well as to Lord Cromer's, for permission to reprint it as an Introduction to this Edition.—
THE PUBLISHERS.

defect very commonly present in those of the school of political thinkers to which he presumably belongs. He does not inveigh against the obstructiveness of officials, the narrow-mindedness of critics, or the wickedness of Imperialists, who are at times credited with entertaining Chauvinistic intentions and opinions of which they are generally quite guiltless. On the contrary, he looks the facts fairly in the face, and expresses himself with commendable judgment and moderation. He recognises, for instance, that "only a few peoples have grown up to Nationality in the whole course of history, and that the great majority of living populations are undoubtedly unripe for it." In making this admission, he inferentially accords his approval, not, indeed, to all Imperial policy, but at all events to the main doctrine on which the justification of British Imperialism, as at present practised, rests. Neither, save to a limited extent, can Mr. Toynbee be charged with adopting the course which often renders the outpourings of political theorists the despair of practical politicians. The latter complain, and occasionally with much reason, that the former are in the habit of leaving off at the precise point where they might profitably begin; in other words, that they enunciate principles, which not unfrequently command universal assent, but make no suggestions as to how practical effect can be given to them. Mr. Toynbee, however, in discussing the often conflicting claims of Nationality and economic interests, indicates a natural and very reasonable basis of conciliation. It is to be found in the adoption of a commercial policy based on the principle of the "open door." In dealing with the question of Federation he is less explicit, and certainly less convincing.

Obviously, the first thing to do, as a preliminary to discussing the question of Nationality, is to obtain some clear idea as to what is meant by a "nation." Many eminent political writers have dealt with this question. When the scholar Casaubon was taken to the great hall of the Sorbonne and was told by his guide that on that spot discussions had been going on for several centuries, he asked: "Qu'a-t-on décidé?" An equally pertinent question may be asked in the present instance without its being possible to elicit an absolutely satisfactory reply. It is, indeed, no easy matter to explain in epigrammatic form an idea so complex as that of Nationality. *Definitio est negatio*. It is easier to state what a nation is not than to define what it is. It is certain, for instance, that community of race, religion, and language does not, in itself, suffice to create a common and binding national sentiment. The experience of the world testifies to the accuracy of this statement. To cite a single instance, the inhabitants of Spanish South America were all bound together by close racial and religious ties. They were at one time united in the achievement of a common object—the severance of their connection with the Old World. Yet, when once that object had been attained, far from uniting, they engaged for a period of many years in a series of internecine struggles with each other. Failing, however, the adoption of any comprehensive description which will not err on the side of embracing either too much or too little, Mr. Toynbee's definition may very reasonably be accepted as sufficient for all practical purposes. Nationality, he says, must involve a "will to co-operate." It is at least true to assert that, where that will is conspicuous by its absence, no Nationality

can, in the proper sense of the term, be said to exist. On the other hand, the definition does not afford any useful clue to a practical settlement in the difficult but not uncommon case of a heterogeneous community which contains a large and powerful minority who are unwilling to co-operate.

Mr. Toynbee has no difficulty in proving to demonstration that the German ideas on this subject are not only diametrically opposed to the principle which he advocates, but that they are so wholly incapable of any rational defence that it is amazing that they should have been advanced by people who pride themselves on their high intellectual attainments. We now know more of German aims and intentions than was the case before the cannon on the Belgian frontier awoke a slumbering Europe from its ill-timed lethargy. We know, moreover, that the German policy of the day is no mushroom-growth which has suddenly sprung into existence at the bidding of a few swashbuckling Generals of the Bernhardi type. Long before their voices were heard, eminent German Professors had boasted that the "whole essence of humanity" was concentrated in the German race, and Hegel, whose sinister and fallacious philosophy struck its roots deep into the minds of his countrymen, has pleaded that all history goes to prove that at various epochs the people who most of all represented what he called "the world-spirit" must dominate over all others. Of course, he held that, alone of all the inhabitants of the globe, the Germans possessed that spirit. All who did not possess it were *rechtlos* (devoid of rights). More recently, the German programme has been authoritatively explained, with a precision which leaves nothing to be desired, by

Professor Ostwald, who, in 1914, undertook a mission to Stockholm in order to convert the Swedes to German views. He divulged to them "Germany's great secret." It was that the Germans had "discovered the fact of organisation." Germany's ambition, therefore, is to "organise Europe," and it cannot be doubted that, when the task of organising the Old World has been accomplished, the intention is to take the New World in hand. In fact, as other Germans have stated the case, a decadent world can only be saved from complete ruin by a sustained and ruthless process of Germanisation. Another Professor (Franz von Liszt) has been even more explicit, and has furnished a greater degree of detailed information than Professor Ostwald. It is essential, he thinks, to found a Central European Confederation under the hegemony of Germany in order to "check the two menacing world-Powers of Great Britain and Russia."

It has, however, been found convenient to mask the arrogant lust for conquest and world-dominion with which Germany is manifestly inspired by throwing over it a transparent veil of pseudo-nationalist principle to hide its crude brutality. The pleas for the extension of the Fatherland vary greatly. They are adapted to the special circumstances of each State. They are largely based on appeals to the history of a remote past, and, as Mr. Toynbee very truly remarks, "we may almost take it as an axiom that whenever a cause invokes historical sentiment on its behalf, that cause is bankrupt of arguments reasonably applicable to the actual situation." Belgium and Burgundy are claimed for Germany "because the Mediæval Empire called them its own." As well might King George V. put in

a claim to Normandy based on the pretensions of his Plantagenet predecessors. Posen, Schleswig, and also—as a supplementary argument—Belgium ought to belong to Germany by reason of their proximity. “They are necessary complements to the frontiers of the Fatherland.” Flemings and Alsations must be swept into the net because they speak a Teutonic language. Thus, “patriotic German atlases fetter to the ‘Fatherland’ masses of Dutchmen, Belgians, Frenchmen, Italians, and Swiss, who are unshakably devoted to their own nationality.” Little attention need be paid to all this sophistry, which, indeed, is scarcely capable of deceiving a child. This aspect of the subject is, however, purely negative. The refutation of the German case, though dialectically a matter of extreme simplicity, does not show what a nation is. It merely indicates what it is not.

The “will to co-operate” may be produced by other causes than those which tend to create national sentiment. It may, as in the case of the Hapsburg Monarchy, be due to geographical necessity and economic interests. The idea of a “natural frontier” is so far reasonable that, for instance, Trieste, though an Italian town, is an absolutely necessary outlet for the trade of the non-Italian inhabitants of Central Europe. Fiume stands in the same relation to Hungary. How, therefore, are the conflicting claims of Nationality and economic evolution to be harmonised? Not, assuredly, as Mr. Norman Angell seems to suggest, by looking solely to the economic and ignoring the nationalist factor in the situation, but rather by reconstructing Europe on the very reasonable principle advocated by Mr. Toynbee—namely, that of allowing an “economic right of way”

to inland States. It has been applied with success in the case of Antwerp, whose trade was allowed free access to the sea through Dutch territory. Mr. Toynbee cites further cases in point. The principle, which is one of great value and importance, is capable of extension.

In dealing with another aspect of the application of the Nationalist principle, Mr. Toynbee's views, though, it may be, academically sound, can scarcely be considered very practical. He admits that many peoples are "unripe" for self-government. Hence, the policy of *laissez-faire* is impossible. Such peoples must, at all events for a time, be dominated by others. On the other hand, there is a certain potentiality of nation-making in every homogeneous community. To destroy a fully developed nation is, Mr. Toynbee thinks, "murder." To strangle a community which may some day become a nation is "infanticide." What, therefore, is the solution? Mr. Toynbee finds it in Federation, and he points to the example of the United States to justify his proposal. It is, indeed, a fact that, when North America achieved its independence, there was a moment when it seemed probable that the thirteen sovereign States on the Atlantic seaboard might fly asunder. But the "will to co-operate" existed, and Federation ensued. "This concept of a 'Federal Territory' has been the United States' greatest contribution to political thought." It is, however, more than doubtful whether it will be possible to apply a similar principle elsewhere. Mr. Toynbee appears to forget that, in America, Federation was immensely facilitated by the proximity to each other of the different units who federated. Amongst the component parts of the British Empire the "will to co-operate" exists in a

very high degree. Why, therefore, has complete federation not yet taken place, and why does the realisation of the idea still present such formidable difficulties? Obviously, because the several units of the Empire are widely scattered. As to India, Egypt, and other similar territories, it is clear that the differences between their inhabitants and those of North America are so profound that no analogy based on the precedent of the United States is of much value. In these cases, all that is possible is to continue the policy which has already been adopted; that is to say, to do nothing calculated to arrest the growth of nascent and legitimate national aspirations, to govern well and wisely, and to watch the further development of events.

THE NEW EUROPE

I

TWO IDEALS OF NATIONALITY

THIS war, and the diplomatic struggles which preceded it, have pressed the question of nationality upon the attention of all Europe. Some nations have been almost obsessed by it, others have been less conscious of its presence in their thoughts; but each, whether consciously or unconsciously, has been formulating its own version of the idea, and there is no more striking proof of national individuality than the extreme divergence between the lines they have followed.

In his book on "Imperial Germany" the ex-Chancellor von Bülow treats the Polish territories of Prussia as a compensation to Germany, however meagre, for those appanages of the Medieval Empire which are irretrievably lost to her; and any one who turns the pages of the "Alldeutscher Atlas," published by the nationalistic "Alldeutscher Verband,"

will see this vanished frontier encircling the Low Countries, Eastern France, and Northern Italy in its ruthless course, far in advance of the line which marks the actual domain of the German language.

Clearly the argument appeals to the German mind, and yet no English publicist would have thought of it. Not even the most "Jingo" Atlas of the British Empire would mark out the territories held by Henry II. or Henry V. in France; the most uncompromising Unionist would not discover in their loss a warrant for the mildest measures of denationalization in Ireland. In fact, we do not think of nationality statistically—in terms of square miles or human units, any of which can be balanced, and if necessary bartered against any other. For us, nationality is the spiritual experience and self-expression of a human society. Our nation's existence—its internal cohesion, and its external independence of other groups—is something that we take for granted. We learn the history of its making at school, but the events have no more than an academic interest. It all happened so long ago. Even Great Britain is more than two centuries old. Five centuries have passed since the last Welsh

principality was absorbed in England or the last Norse Lord of the Isles forfeited his sovereignty to the Scottish Crown. More than a millennium lies between us and the Heptarchy. Those long-transcended phases have no practical bearing on our actual national life, and we look upon the population that leads this life and the territory in which it leads it, as essentially stable or indeed eternal factors in our nationhood. The increase of either by external accretions or their diminishment by mechanical amputation, are not possibilities which occur to our minds, for both ideas are equally incompatible with our subjective point of view. A national democracy is a living organism, and it can no more multiply or decrease the parts of which it is composed than a man can add a cubit to his stature or survive decapitation.

Even in the sphere of political organization, this is self-evident truth; if we think of those less concrete manifestations of social life in which the sense of nationality finds still greater sustenance—such spheres as Literature, Art, and Religion—any other standpoint becomes an absurdity. If an Alsatian prefers to read and write French poetry rather than German, there is no “compensation” to be got out

of compelling a Polish child to speak German in his elementary school. Yet the exponents of German nationality apparently commit themselves to this absurdity, and this is the more strange inasmuch as their national life is so intensely active on the higher spiritual plane. Few nations have produced such a golden chain of poets, philosophers, and musicians as Germany has maintained during the last two centuries, and few nations have known how to draw such deep inspiration as Germany from their great men. If Germany were merely wicked, if she deliberately set herself to stamp out in other nations the divine spark which she recognizes and worships in herself, we should feel her psychology more intelligible. But she has absolutely omitted from her reckoning the immanence of this spiritual force in groups alien to herself—in Alsatians and Poles and Belgians—and has compromised her fortunes by her miscalculations. Such blindness calls for diagnosis.

The present war is clearly reacting in a different way upon the Germans and upon ourselves. Neutral visitors returned from Berlin impress on us the exaltation of our enemies, national enthusiasm; but if we discount the moral they preach, their narra-

tives rather suggest a feverish self-consciousness. The Germans do not, like ourselves, take their national existence for granted; for though in the sphere of art and intellect their nationality is possibly more strongly grown than ours, in the political sphere it is a thing of yesterday. No more than a generation separates them from their "Heptarchy." The wars which ended "Kleinstaaterei" were fought by the fathers of the men who are fighting now. Their political nationhood is still a new and precarious structure. It may be dissolved again into its elements or it may be preserved; on the other hand, it may be immensely enlarged by fresh acquisitions. They conceive of it, not as an inward principle of life, but as a resultant in the play of external forces.

This attitude will explain itself if we glance at the process by which German unity was attained. The decisive factor was not the will of the nation, but the mutual relations of dynasties. So long as the dynasties respected each other's vested interests, unity was deferred; as soon as the Prussian dynasty found the strength and courage to settle scores with its competitors, unity was accomplished. The Germans of Prussia and Bavaria might have re-

mained politically sundered for an indefinite period, had not Bismarck exerted the Prussian machine in their favour; because neither the machinery nor its manipulator was completely equal to the task, the Germans of Austria have had to mope in outer darkness to this day. No wonder the Germans do not take the national entity for granted, that they regard their national territory and national population not as fixed but as something fluid and pliable like clay in the hands of the potter.

There is nothing peculiar in the means by which Germany was welded together. All the national democracies of Europe have emerged originally from the same phase. In those half-forgotten stages of our history our ancestors, too, were passive material in the hands of Norman, Angevin, and Tudor kings, and much Bismarckian work went to our creation. The "Prussian" standpoint we are combating is only disastrous because it is an anachronism. Five centuries ago it was the most constructive political force in Europe.

In that epoch (which has already faded from the memory of most modern nations) Europeans did not possess the security, not to speak of the capacity, for governing themselves. Their primary need was

to be governed, and that government was the best which imposed itself upon them most energetically and guided them with the firmest hand. The politics of this vanished Europe did not consist in the internal evolution of individual groups, but in the struggle for existence between dynasties, which strove with each other for territories and populations as the common men strove for cattle and fields. Land and people were, in fact, the property of the king; they passed like property from the weaker to the stronger, and that was actually the condition most favourable for their development. Little inconvenience is involved in the transfer from one master to another, if you cannot in any case be master of yourself, and in general the subject stands to gain by changing his king. The ordeal of battle is a fair test of a despotism's efficiency, and the victorious dynast proves upon the head of the vanquished his own title to survive. The most successfully consolidated medieval realms became, indeed, the chrysalis from which sprang the most forward modern democracies. William the Conqueror erected the essential framework within which English Parliamentary Government grew up; Louis XI. constructed the arena for the French Revolution.

Thus the old dispensation enabled the nations to "find themselves," and thereby transformed so profoundly the political life of Europe that it rendered itself for ever obsolete. The dynastic code was wholly inapplicable to the new national organism, and with the necessary revolt of children against their parents the growing democracies spurned it under foot and dismissed it from their mind. The new dispensation meant, above all, a radical change of emphasis. The dynast's ambitions appealed less and less to the democracy, as it discovered for itself more and more objects which never came within the dynast's view. The elder nations of Europe have kept their faces inflexibly fixed towards the future; Germany has committed the sin of Lot's wife, and has been mastered by the hypnotism of the past.

Political unity was so ardently desired by her and withheld from her so long that the process of unification, when it came, made an ineffaceable impression on her. Instead of discarding the Prussian machinery as soon as it had fulfilled its appointed function, she deified it; she worshipped the scythe instead of garnering the ears. That is why Prussianism is the only dynastic system in Europe which has not dug

its own grave, why the Hohenzollerns have not terminated their career by giving political being to Germany, but have gained in this creature of their hands a fanatical convert to their own traditional point of view.

To us the state has come to stand for "Co-operation"; to the German it still stands for "Power." "Liberty? Self-government?" the Pan-German impatiently exclaims. "Not in these obsolete catchwords, but in the concrete principle of nationality does our inspiration lie"; and he does not realize that he is propounding a contradiction in terms. Nationality is just that inward will to cooperate which he abjures; but, like the medieval despot, he regards human society as so much passive material to be bound or loosed, herded together or torn asunder, by arbitrary, irresistible decree, and the claims inscribed on his banner are those for which conquerors have always gone forth to war. Nationality is legal title; therefore Belgium and Burgundy must be German because the Medieval Empire called them its own. Nationality is geographical cohesion; therefore Belgium, Posen, and Schleswig must be German, because they are necessary complements to the frontiers of the Fatherland. Nationality is

language; therefore Fleming and Alsatian must be German, because they speak a Teutonic tongue. For such principles the French, Polish, Danish, and Belgian nations must be maimed or even dismembered, and the supreme political achievement of Europe, the right of freely constituted human groups to work out their own salvation, must be trampled brutally under foot. This ideal of nationality is a menace to our civilization.

II

HISTORICAL SENTIMENT

NATIONALITY is a "will to co-operate," and a nation is a group of men bound together by the immanence of this impulse in each individual. This was the conclusion we reached in our first essay on German and British national ideals, and we believe that no more specific definition will cover all the phenomena. Yet if we must be content to leave the sphere and purpose of national co-operation thus uncertain, we may at least inquire more closely who are the individuals that co-operate, what combination of wills it is that endows the national group with that terrific spiritual force which is convulsing Europe at this moment.

The word "nation" suggests primarily a concrete aggregate of people habitually in touch with one another, capable any day of reading the same poetry or the same newspaper, of celebrating the same festival, of having the same referendum put to them, or of electing the same political representative. We

think of Nationality, in fact, as the will of the living members of the community; only on second thoughts do we realize that this contemporary generation, which monopolizes with such assurance the visible scene, is but the fleeting incarnation of a force infinitely vaster than itself.

It is the will bequeathed by the past that gives its incalculable momentum to the will of the present. Like a church, a nation is strong in its cloud of unseen witnesses, and the world turns to their testimony when it would pass judgment on the living generation or speculate on what the future may bring forth.

We shall admit, then, without hesitation, that in the life of a nation, just as in that of an individual, past experience conditions to an overwhelming degree each present moment as it comes and goes, and that the absence of tradition and, still more, a positive break with the past, are always symptoms of weakness and defect in the ideals of the contemporary generation. But there is a class of argument, very commonly employed in "World-Politics," which goes far beyond this inference. Instead of merely requiring for the present the sanction of the past, people often set past and present over against

each other, and justify by an appeal to history the most ruthless attempts to obstruct, combat, and crush the actual will of great bodies of living men.

The notable contest between the Papacy and the Italian nation in the nineteenth century was fought out on this issue. The inhabitants of the Papal States had become conscious of their nationality. In an overwhelming majority they willed to be united politically with the other Italians beyond the Papal frontiers; spiritually they were already absorbed in the Italian nation, and not merely their will, but the will of this larger society was in question. Political unity was the supreme desire of the nation as a whole, and the Pope was thwarting the aspirations of the whole nation, and not only those of his own subjects, when he forcibly hindered the latter from entering the national state.

The Papal answer to this was “*si argumentum requiris, circumspice.*” “Look at the monuments of the Eternal City, the temples of Imperial Rome, the churches of Papal Rome, and think of the tradition embodied in these imperishable works of men’s hands. Twice Rome has stretched her sceptre over the world, and endowed it with an international state and an international religion. She has pos-

essed herself of mankind's allegiance, and thereby become herself their common possession. She is eternal and infinite; she belongs to no single tribe or generation. How then can these transitory dwellers on her hills, this insignificant section of mankind that inhabits the narrow peninsula on which she is planted, how can they claim to dispose of her as their own? If the claims of Italian nationality and the claims of Rome are mutually exclusive, who can doubt which ought to prevail? "

The Italian Risorgimento did indeed conclude a very long and wonderful chapter in Rome's history. When the Italian troops marched through the Porta Pia in 1870, Gregorovius, the chronicler of the medieval Papacy, broke off his diary. A scholar of alien birth, he entered more than any living man into the past of Rome as opposed to her present, and for him the Rome in which he had sojourned for a life-time was dead. Yet no one would seriously claim that to save Gregorovius' historical sentiment millions of Italians ought to have been baulked of their political aspirations, although he obviously voiced the past with far greater single-mindedness than the Papal Government.

The past, after all, is dead. It cannot speak for itself, and if it is to assert itself against the present, it needs a spokesman in the present to be its advocate. But how are we to be sure that this champion is not really grinding his own axe? Gregorovius was as nearly disinterested as a partisan can be, but what of the protagonist, the Papacy? The Papal apologists who mobilized Rome's past glory on their behalf stood primarily for a tenaciously living vested interest, the Temporal Power, a current political system which gave office, influence, and honour to a ring of clerical monopolists. In a secondary degree they stood for a nobler, but no less finite and contemporary corporation, the Roman Catholic Church.

Between the Italian nation and the Papal bureaucracy there could be no co-ordination. They were two mutually incompatible political forces, and if the case of each were pleaded on its own merits, there could be no question which ought to go to the wall. The Papacy deliberately appealed to history in order to disguise a sinister political interest under a mask of idealism, and so enable it to encounter the genuinely idealistic movement of the Risorgimento on its own ground. As for Napoleon III. and the

Hapsburg Government, which both supported, when it suited them, the Ultramontane plea, they were simply playing the common, sordid game of international politics, and scheming to hinder the birth of a consolidated national power on their flanks, which would inevitably circumscribe the sphere of either's influence.

With examples like these before us, we may almost take it as an axiom that whenever a cause invokes historical sentiment on its behalf, that cause is bankrupt of arguments reasonably applicable to the actual situation. European nationalism is prolific of such appeals at this moment, and in almost every instance we can spy the cloven hoof.

The Turks cannot part with Adrianople, because the tombs of their Sultans are there; but they did not discover that this was one of the holy places of Islam till the Bulgars were on the point of making good their claim to the city on cogent geographical grounds. The Magyars have a passion for the "Crown of St. Stephen." The territory bequeathed to the nation by the national hero must remain for ever "one and indivisible." "So be it," we retort: "let Hungary be inviolate. But why base her boundaries on a title-deed nine centuries old?" And

then we learn that the Saint's prestige has to stem the aspirations of more than half the population, who are non-Magyar in nationality, and are justifiably eager to violate the unity of his antiquated realm.

The most reckless dealers in historical sentiment are the Germans. Why have they been so anxious latterly to proclaim Modern Germany the heir of the Medieval Empire, which Goethe regarded as a melancholy comedy, and Bismarck as a dangerous memory prejudicial to the prestige of the Prussian state? Because the boundary of that empire, unearthed from the dead past and blazoned across the page of patriotic German atlases, fetters to the "Fatherland" masses of Dutchmen, Belgians, Frenchmen, Italians, and Swiss, who are unshakably devoted to their own nationality, and could not plausibly be torn from the political community of their unalterable choice by any pretext drawn from the contemporary situation.

The absurdity of such a claim is revealed by the ease with which it can be reversed, for since Belgium and Germany are both of them living nations, sprung from the same decayed empire of the Middle Ages, Belgium has on this count just as good or as bad a

claim in logic to annex Germany as Germany to annex Belgium.

But Germany's most potent sentimental claim to Belgium is not derived from the Holy Roman Empire. Historical titles essentially depend upon prescription, yet prescriptive rights of this kind can be acquired by an "intensive process." "Belgium cannot be given up," Herr Dernburg argued to the American public, "because of the untold blood and treasure spent by the German people in its acquisition." Thousands of German soldiers slain on Belgian soil and buried beneath it in one short season, cast a German lien upon the land as valid as century-long claims of ordinary "legal" reversion.

This argument surpasses all. If men gain titles for their nation by dying for it, have not the Belgians, who died to save their nationality, created a historical claim more compelling than the Germans who died merely to destroy a nationality not their own? Or, again, if heroic deeds yield a harvest of political advantage, surely foul deeds bring a corresponding forfeit in their train; and if this be so, the public crimes recorded in the report of Lord Bryce's Committee not only cancel any German claims to Bel-

gium whatsoever, but impugn Germany's own right to untrammelled national liberty hereafter.

Here we see historical sentiment at its worst. It can hypnotize a whole nation into calling evil good. We must strip the glamour remorselessly from this deadly hallucination, and display the German claim to Belgium for what it is—a determination to hold by brute force what was won by brute force, and by nothing else.

III

POLITICS AND ECONOMICS

ANY one who glances through a historical atlas will be struck by an extraordinary simplification in its closing pages. The political map of medieval Europe is like a fantastic mosaic, in which innumerable tiny states have been dovetailed together with capricious complexity. In the contemporary map this patchwork has sorted itself out, and the colours lie side by side in broad, continuous masses. The new boundary-lines give so strong an impression of being dictated on some consistent, rational principle, that we ask ourselves what sudden spirit of order can have brooded over the chaos.

The common answer is "Nationality." In the development of national consciousness, we find just such an organizing principle at work, and there is no doubt that the gradual growth of the French nation and the more violent national consolidation of Italy and Germany are actually the forces which have remodelled the map in Western Europe. If

we look further east, however, we shall see that nationality is not the only factor in the process.

Austria-Hungary, for example, is as compact in outline as Italy or France, and more compact than Germany, yet her geographical coherence is not due to any settled "will to co-operate" on the part of her population. Eleven nationalities have gone to her making. All of them set their own national future above the interest of the Monarchy as a whole. Seven of them are fragments of larger national masses that extend beyond the frontier. And three of these,¹ at least, are attracted so violently towards an external centre of gravity that they are undisguisedly eager to disrupt the Monarchy in order to achieve their own national unity. Austria-Hungary survives in spite of the national principle, and the secret of its vitality is the less purposeful and more mechanical force of economics.

A state must always have the means of satisfying its economic needs, and these have been complicated by the industrial revolution to an extraordinary degree. The medieval community demanded little beyond corn, cattle, and timber, which were ubiquitous, and could all be produced by the most limited

¹ The Italians, Roumans, and Serbs.

section of the European area in sufficient quantity for its inhabitants. The modern community requires seams of coal and veins of metal, raw materials to transform by its minerals' agency, ports by which these raw materials may reach its factories from abroad and the finished products travel to foreign markets, and easy internal communications to link port, mine, industrial centre, and agricultural country-side as the nervous system links the different members of the human organism. Although there is only one state now where there were a hundred before, yet under such economic conditions the kingdom of Italy is really less self-sufficient than the superseded Duchy of Parma, and the united German Empire as cramped as Mecklenburg and Hesse were in the days of particularism.

This economic evolution explains the consolidation of the Hapsburg Monarchy. The Hungarian section of the complex is its agricultural hinterland. The Austrian half provides the minerals and industry. Italian Fiume and Trieste offer the necessary ports, and the railway-routes which link these outlets with the interior are bound to traverse the Slavonic provinces between the Adriatic and the Drave. These several regions, so antagonistic in national feeling,

are profoundly complementary to one another in the economic sphere.

Modern Austria-Hungary, then, owes its existence conspicuously to the industrial revolution; but we can discern the same force at work in developments which we commonly ascribe to the principle of nationality alone. The Prussian Zollverein was an important contributory cause in the creation of the Prussianized German Empire, and the abolition of internal customs-barriers coincided with the achievement of national self-government in Revolutionary France.

There are thus two separate organizing principles at work on the map of modern Europe, Nationality and Economics, and they are fundamentally different in their character. In the political form of co-operation, the individuals combine for a common object, which is at once the direct gain of each, and yet transcends his individual life so completely that its attainment often demands—and obtains from him—the entire sacrifice of his personal welfare.⁴ In the economic relation, on the other hand, one individual serves another's purposes on condition that the other does the like for him. For his own personal advantage, each works for ends which are neither

personal to himself nor common to all. The economic nexus is not co-operation, but an exchange of services. Both forces are indeed centripetal, and neither is essentially stronger than the other—either may vary in strength to an infinite degree. But here their agreement ends, for they differ from one another altogether in psychological quality.

Nationality and Economics, then, are incommensurate factors, but do they actually produce incompatible results? Are there irremediable cross-divisions between the groupings created by each, or do they tend in general to coincide?

It is probably true, in the first place, that in any national group there is always an economic nexus between the component individuals. But though economic inter-dependence may be an essential strand in the national bond, it is very seldom the dominant element, for the simple reason that most living European nations attained self-consciousness before the industrial revolution gave rise to economic organization on the modern scale. The national "will to co-operate" is principally derived from other factors—language, religion, and strong government—and the web of modern economics has woven itself independently of this older articulation, with

new seams and sutures of its own; so that in some cases the claims of Economics and Nationality have even become mutually exclusive, and a population has to make the hard choice between the two. During the nineteenth century the Poles subject to Russia built up a flourishing industry within the Imperial tariff wall, which gave them an overwhelming preference in the unlimited markets of the Empire's agricultural hinterland. In their repeated efforts during the same period to sever their connection with Russia and place themselves outside her frontier, they were deliberately cutting away the roots of their economic prosperity. Alsace, again, if this war enables her to realize her national aspirations by reunion with France, must snap all the economic links that bind her to the rest of the Rhine-basin, and perhaps jeopardize the industrial development she has shared with the German Empire during the last forty years.

Such local clashes, however, might possibly have been dismissed as insignificant exceptions, had not the two forces which have created nineteenth-century Europe by their interplay, destroyed their own work by their tragic discord. Just when the industrial revolution had woven the whole world

into its web, and triumphantly "internationalized" the economic sphere of human life, the spirit of nationality has proved its essential particularism by spurring rival states into a world-wide war.

If we are to prevent the recurrence of this disaster, we must read its significance aright. During the first half of last century we discovered the strength of nationality, and took it for the supreme constructive force in human society. After 1871, when the problems of nationality had been palliated or postponed, we fell under the hypnotism of economics so completely that Mr. Norman Angell came to represent this in turn as the sole creative factor, and if he did not forget the existence of nationality, at least denied its significance, with the implication that since trade had become international, mankind must be ripe for the internationalization of its politics as well. The disaster of 1914 should teach us at last that economics and nationality are both fundamental, irreducible factors, that neither can be explained theoretically in terms of the other nor distorted in practice into conformity with the other's results. In the agony of this war we are indeed unlikely to repeat Mr. Angell's mistake and envisage our politics through economic spectacles, but there is all the more

danger of backsliding in the opposite direction. The recrudescence of nationality is the direct cause of the war, and it will give fresh impetus, in the ultimate resettlement, to the antithesis of "Norman Angellism"—the doctrine of "Natural Frontiers."

IV

NATURAL FRONTIERS AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS OF WAY

WHEN the King of Bavaria declared the other day that this war would secure South Germany a direct access to the sea, he provoked the full rigour of the Imperial censorship. Yet the mutilated report of his speech produced a sensation in the German press, and precipitated a stormy debate in the Prussian Landtag, for it put into words at last a deeply ingrained sentiment for a "Natural Frontier."

This doctrine of "Natural Frontiers" is of old standing, and it has not been held in Germany alone. It was first formulated by Revolutionary France, and it had tacitly governed the foreign policy of the French crown for a century before. It starts from the phenomenon of a self-conscious nation, united in itself, and distinguished from the rest of mankind by the identical "will to co-operate" which inspires all its members. Such a society is "natural," and the division of the earth's surface which it occupies

ought to be "natural," too. It ought, in other words, to be a self-sufficient economic unit, marked off from other countries by well-defined physical boundaries; and if the nation does not possess such boundaries already, it has a divine right to extend its territory till it attains them. The economic articulation of the world must be forced into the national mould.

This dogma enshrines all that is evil in the national principle. Instead of fostering the internationalism of modern economics, it deliberately rends the seamless web in pieces. Instead of being content with the essential pluralism of nationality, it renders inevitable the struggle for existence between nation and nation, a "*corruptio optimi*" which national pluralism need never otherwise entail.

It is obvious, in fact, that one nation can only win its "natural frontiers" at the expense of another, and that only war can determine which of the two is to go to the wall. France fixed her "natural frontier" against Germany at the Rhine, and fought for two centuries to secure it. In 1871 Germany fixed hers against France at the Vosges, and now in 1915 she is proclaiming its extension through Verdun to Calais: "Germany must stretch to the Channel

ports." There is no measure in all this, no term to the strife; for the only true criterion of nationality is the deliberate, declared will of the populations concerned, and if once we abandon that, all demarcation between nations becomes arbitrary. "Natural Frontiers" are, in fact, the most artificial that can be drawn, and are simply a euphemism for the momentary conquests of brute force.

This is the bed of Procrustes on which the nations of Europe have racked one another in succession for centuries. The present war, like the wars before it, is an attempt to retain recalcitrant victims under the torments, and to impose the torture on others previously immune.

Germany declares (and this is true, so far as it goes) that she made this war to save Austria-Hungary from dissolution. Yet the structure of the Hapsburg Monarchy, which has extorted our admiration for its economic interdependence and geographical compactness, is an illustration of the doctrine in its most extreme form. It exists in order to provide "natural frontiers" for a privileged minority of Austrian Germans and Magyars, and thwarts to this end the aspirations of nine nations or fragments

of nations which compose the subject majority of the population.

Germany again declares, quite truly, that the occupation of Belgium was an incidental move in her plan of campaign; but in the meantime, German public opinion has discovered, and Dr. Dernburg has informed the American press, that "Belgium cannot be given up." The justification urged by this apologist, apart from the "untold sacrifice of blood and treasure" alluded to before, is that "Belgium commands the main outlet of western German trade, and is the *natural* frontage (vorderland) of the Empire." In other words, the nationality of seven million Belgians, with a few million Frenchmen thrown in, is to be trampled out of existence in order to give the German race a "natural frontier" towards the Channel, as well as towards the Adriatic.

But is there reason in all this? Is it really true that one nation cannot satisfy its economic needs without reducing so many others to political helotage? The paradox was expressed with unconscious piquancy in a German cartoon, which represented the Hansa Towns (three complacent matrons) approaching Antwerp (a distressed damsel) with words of

comfort: "Now you will *speak German*, and be one of us." But is conversion by the sword really an essential condition for the exchange of economic services? Dr. Dernburg himself admits that "these considerations could be disregarded if the natural commercial relation of Belgium to Germany were considered in a just and workable form"; and a simpler and less disastrous solution can surely be found in the principle of the "open door."

This principle is already operative in the case of Antwerp itself. Dr. Dernburg covets the port because "it offers to German trade the only outlet to an open sea," yet this outlet is the estuary of the Scheldt, which flows between Dutch banks, and is itself included in Dutch territorial waters. Antwerp has obtained this outlet, not by annexing the strip of Holland to the north of her, but by receiving a right of way through it from the Dutch nation. Why, then, need Germany annex Belgium in order to secure her outlet across Belgium to Antwerp?

Dr. Dernburg will reply that the free navigation of a channel is easy to regulate, but that Germany communicates with Antwerp by lines of railway across a land frontier. Short of a zollverein, her access must remain precarious, for, by raising a

prohibitive tariff wall, Belgium might block it at any moment. So she might; but is it conceivable that she should do so? Not if there is any weight in a claim and a threat advanced by Germany in this regard.

Germany claims that Antwerp morally belongs to her already, because the chief commercial houses in the city are German, and because the prosperity of the port depends not on the local trade of Belgium, but on the "through traffic" carried on by these firms between the German hinterland and the open sea. This does not look as if Germany's economic transit had been incommoded by Belgian tariffs during the period when Belgium was inviolate and Germany was building up her industry.

Then Germany threatens that if she is ejected from Antwerp she will boycott it hereafter, and transfer her custom to Rotterdam. This implies that the "vorderland" is really dependent on the "hinterland," and that all the time Belgium has been economically at Germany's mercy, rather than Germany at Belgium's. In fact, the economic interplay of "hinterland" and "vorderland" is not essentially penalized by the interposition of a political frontier, even if the administrative boundary

is accentuated by a customs-barrier. For confirmation of this, we can point to the relations between Portuguese East Africa and our own Empire.

Rhodesia, for instance, was originally explored and colonized from the south. Yet the first railway built in the country ran due eastward across the Portuguese frontier, to terminate in the foreign port of Beira; and even when Bulawayo was finally linked by an "all-red" line to the British port of Cape Town, the Beira route survived the new railway's competition, in spite of high freightages and Portuguese customs-dues.

The negotiations which preceded the formation of the South African Union have a still closer bearing on the case. The Transvaal, like Rhodesia and Germany, was barred out by geography from the sea, and several alien ports had been in competition for her traffic. But for six years before the Union was proposed, she had enjoyed a zollverein with Cape Colony and Natal, which gave her the same unhampered access to Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, and Durban as Germany would obtain to Antwerp by the annexation of Belgium. The Act of Union promised to confirm this privilege for ever; yet on the eve of its conclusion, the Transvaal signed a

treaty with Portugal guaranteeing that 50 per cent. of all trade with the Rand should pass through the Portuguese custom-house at Lorenço Marques. Thus almost the last deed of the Transvaal as a separate community was to safeguard her commerce with a foreign port across an international frontier against her commerce with ports which were to count in future as her own.

These examples prove that political frontiers and economic rights of way can exist simultaneously in an effective form. They by no means rule each other out, and another instance will show that they may actually be made conditional upon one another. When the status of Macedonia was settled in 1913, Serbia allowed Greece to annex the littoral on condition that she received a right of way across it to a free port at Salonika, while Greece allowed Serbia to annex the hinterland in exchange for a free passage to Belgrade. Partition of the territory and partnership in the railway were complementary elements in this settlement.

Such precedents as these should be supremely valuable in the European settlement which will follow this war. In spite of Dr. Dernburg, Germany must promote her trade through Antwerp after the

war, as she did so successfully before it, without robbing the Belgians of their national existence. Austria-Hungary, again, must forfeit her imposing compactness, or even, like European Turkey, disappear from the political map altogether, while the economic nexus between her former components continues unimpaired. Trieste, for example, when she realizes her national destiny by union with Italy, must remain a free port for the commerce of Prague, Vienna, and Munich. The consolidation of the Southern Slavs into an independent national state must be extorted from the Magyars, yet the latter must not be deprived of their economic outlet to the Adriatic seaboard. If we are to reconstruct Europe on the enduring basis of national will, we must be prepared to complicate the political map once more, and we can only do so by substituting for the pernicious doctrine of "Natural Frontiers" the more rational principle of "Economic Rights of Way."

V

CULTURE AND THE MOTHER TONGUE

As a record of achievement, the Bible Society has printed a text from St. John in four hundred and thirty-two different languages. The total number of mutually unintelligible idioms that are or have once been spoken on this earth must indeed run to many thousands—in parts of Central Africa each village speaks its own, and grandsons can barely make themselves understood to their grandfathers—and yet this little pamphlet was a remarkable *tour de force*. Of those few hundred dialects many had never been put into writing before, while some were actually inexpressible in any existing script, and owed the first codification of their phonetic system to the ingenious missionary.

Written languages are undoubtedly the exception. Even in Europe we were startled a few years ago by a dispute between Young Turks and Albanians as to whether the latter should employ the Arabic or the Latin alphabet for the teaching of their hitherto

unwritten tongue in their not yet existent primary schools. And even where a script exists, it seldom serves more than the transitory needs of every-day life. Only in the rarest cases does it become the medium for a higher spiritual activity than the current administration of the community and the current business of its individuals, by enshrining a literature which preserves the tradition of the past and enriches with its cumulative force the life of the present. When this happens, the written language has become the vehicle of what the Germans called "Culture."

"Culture-Languages" are the fairest fruits and the most fertile seeds of human civilization. They only arise in the bosom of highly developed, fully self-conscious societies, and once arisen they spread far and wide among populations in a more rudimentary phase. Both their rarity and their expansive power are illustrated by the fact that all the scripts of all the languages written in the world to-day can be traced back to less than half-a-dozen originals; and it would probably be true to say that the majority of those people in the world to whom the conception of culture has meant anything have always associated it with some foreign tongue.

There is no grievance or injustice in this. For, although the originators of culture have generally been conquerors, force has been the least important factor in their achievement. Backward peoples accept and cherish alien culture, not because it is imposed upon them, but because it is a pearl of great price, which they can neither dispense with nor provide for themselves. Often the conqueror accepts it from the conquered. *Græcia capta ferum victorem cepit*, and the Latin language in its turn dominated Western Europe for a millennium after the Roman Empire had passed away, when Virgil, the Vulgate, and Justinian won wider territories for their culture than the legions whose cantonments lay desolate on the Danube and the Rhine. Even the East has falsified Mohammed's precept. The Arabic speech and script owe their extension far less to the Arab's sword than to the religious and literary value of the prophet's Koran, which won homage from the Turk, and opened the way to new worlds in Central Asia and Africa, where the Arab himself had never penetrated. Indeed, the triumph of a "culture language" over idioms less richly endowed seems almost independent of volition. When Indians of diverse dialect meet to protest against British

domination, the discussion tends to slip into the English tongue, because this is the common channel through which all of them have derived the ideas of democracy and self-government which they wish to communicate to one another and to assert against the nation that originally introduced them.

Thus, the culture of an alien language is accepted by less civilized populations even more passively than the strong government of a conquering dynasty. But it is instructive to pursue the parallel further. We argued before that strong government is a transitory, though essential, phase of political development. Its function is to be the chrysalis of democracy, and it is too fruitful a force to hold its own against its offspring. So it is with a dominant language. It is natural that it should be accepted as a medium of culture by uncultured populations of other speech; but it is equally inevitable that the leaven should sooner or later transform the lump. The receptive population will either abandon its mother-tongue altogether and be absorbed linguistically as well as culturally in the dominant society; or else, if it possesses more vitality, it will educate its mother-tongue to perform the functions of the foreign idiom, and dispense with the latter as soon

as it has fashioned for itself a new vehicle of culture out of the former. The Romans pillaged the literary monuments of Hellenism to build up a native Latin culture of their own. The Latin tongue in turn supplied culture to the Teutonic peoples of Northern Europe till they were ripe to translate the Vulgate into their native languages, and fashion their several versions into foundation-stones for so many national literatures.

This crisis in the history of a language, when it becomes a conscious instrument of culture, is precisely parallel to the crisis in the political history of a society when it repudiates the government of an external authority and consciously co-operates to organize its own social life. Both phenomena are acts of will. Just as the Italian nation was created politically by the will to throw off the autocracy of Hapsburg, Papacy, and Bourbon, so the national culture of Italy came into being when Dante, six centuries before, rejected the Latin hexameter for his mother-tongue, and when all others that spoke the same chose to regard the "Commedia" as their supreme ensample of humane literature. If "Culture" means participation in the heritage of humanity, "National Culture" means the conscious will to

enjoy and increase this heritage through the medium of some particular language.

It follows that a national culture, whenever it manifests itself, is as elemental a force as a national democracy, and that to fight against it is to fight against God. No alien culture may dispute its title. Even the culture from which it drew its original inspiration must vanish like smoke before it. (The Roman Church exerted all its prestige in vain to stifle the new doctrines preached in the vulgar tongues of Europe.) Still less can a language once chosen as a national vehicle yield place to another which has asserted its individuality under the same circumstances and moulded itself on the same models.

The national languages which have replaced Latin in Western Europe have, on the whole, conformed to this law of their growth, and developed peacefully side by side. Where a minority has abandoned its mother-tongue, it has done so without pressure, as the Irish have exchanged Erse for English in their national literature. Where a minority has clung to its native speech, it has been allowed to retain it, as Welsh has been retained in parts of Wales as an instrument for poetry and primary education.

Only the more lately emancipated languages of Central and Eastern Europe have become committed to a disastrous struggle for existence.

In Hungary, for instance, Latin remained the official medium of the Diet until 1848. But instead of allowing the six languages native to different parts of the country to share on an equality the status from which Latin had been deposed, the Magyars have been striving ever since the year of revolution to secure for their own tongue the monopoly, and more than the monopoly, which Latin had originally enjoyed, and to banish the other five not only from Parliamentary debates, but from the law-courts, the press, the universities, and even the secondary schools. This persecution, which is as unsuccessful as it is indefensible, has occupied the whole political energy of the population, the oppressors as well as the oppressed, and brought the real development of culture in Hungary to a standstill.

Germany's treatment of the Polish language in Posen, the Danish in Schleswig, and the French in the "Reichsland" is too notorious for comment, but it is infinitely more significant than "Magyarization" in Hungary, because it is based on a general theory, and is an earnest of the methods by which

Germany proposes to put that theory into practice as widely as her power avails. Germany has proclaimed her national culture a "world-culture," as different in kind from the culture of her neighbours as Hellenism was from the barbarism of Thrace, or Roman culture from the untutored ways of Illyrian and Gaul. No other national cultures have any rights against it, and if Germany emerges from the present war with the hegemony of Europe, the *régime* now enforced in her border provinces will ruthlessly be extended over vaster areas. "All else may perish, and humanity will be the gainer, so long as Germanism increases, multiplies, and inherits the earth."

This monstrous German delusion of a universal culture-language arises from a radical misinterpretation of "World-History." Because comparatively few languages have ever become vehicles of culture, and because these few have always won homage from uncultured peoples of alien mother-speech, the Germans attribute to the "Culture-Language" a mystic quality which differentiates it *in toto*, like the speech of Olympus, from the uninspired idioms of mortal men. Herein they greatly err. Culture is not, and never can be, an inherent quality peculiar

to a particular language. It is the heritage of the whole human race, cherished, enriched, and transmitted by one generation to another, from one corner to the other of the earth. Human languages are the vessels in which culture resides. No language has been a "culture-language" from the beginning, and none is incapable of becoming such in the end. Some may be called to be vessels of honour, and some of dishonour, but all are simply vessels, and nothing less or more. The German theory preposterously reverses the process of human development. As culture grows, it really takes into its service an increasing variety of tongues; and the phase of evolution called "Nationality" is characterized by the simultaneous propagation of culture through diverse languages flourishing side by side, just as in the political sphere it implies a pluralism of self-governing societies.

Does this give us that objective criterion for demarcating one nation against another which history and geography fail to provide?¹ Can we say that, where this plurality of culture-languages exists, all those who speak each language constitute a single nation in their totality? The definition

¹ See first and third chapters.

would sound plausible, did we not find the Germans falling back on it as their second line of defence. At moments when they contemplate the possibility of defeat, they admit that they have failed to Germanize their French- and Polish-speaking borderers, and that the Germanization of all Europe is an extravagant phantasy. "But whatever happens," they say, "we will not yield a foot of German soil. All who speak the language of Kant and Goethe shall remain heirs to the inheritance with which Kant and Goethe have endowed their tongue. German Alsace shall never be abandoned, and German Flanders shall for ever be retained within the national fold."

The faultiness of this last desperate German claim to domination lies in its persistent neglect of the subjective factor. The mere possession of a mother-tongue does not impart a national culture, as the German is the first to insist; else all mankind would be cultured, from the German himself down to the clicking Kaffir. What creates a national culture is the consecration of a native tongue to enshrine humanity's spiritual inheritance, and this consecration is essentially an effort of will. Now, when a group of people performs this act of volition, it is just as possible for them to choose another group's

language to be the vehicle for their culture as it is for them to choose political co-operation with people the other side of a geographical barrier. The Albanians of Epirus, for example, raised themselves from barbarism by welcoming to their churches, and later to their primary schools, the alien language of the Greeks, and when the other Albanians summoned them, two years ago, to enter the new "national" state and found a new culture in their common mother-tongue, they vindicated their self-chosen Hellenism by an appeal to arms.

So it is with Alsace or Flanders, and Germany has been a loser on both accounts. For not only have the Poles refused obstinately to imbibe culture through any medium except their own Slavonic patois, but the Alsatians have been so wrong-headed as to renounce the mother-tongue they share with Kant and Goethe, and turn for culture to Latin France. The cause of their choice is not difficult to discover. While the speakers of German east of the Rhine were doing homage to the intellectual circle at Weimar, the Alsatians were living the great life of the French Revolution, and receiving their first political ideals and their first public education from the disciples of Rousseau and Voltaire,

The coldness of the Flemings towards Germanism is even more excusable. The German argument lays siege to them with military methodicality. "The Flemings," it submits, "inherit the same Low-German variety of mother-tongue as the populations of Mecklenburg, Pomerania, and East Prussia. But these easterly Low-Germans on the Baltic have accepted the High-German speech as their culture-language, and become the very core of the consolidated German nation. What defence, then, can the westerly Low-Germans in Flanders offer for holding themselves offensively aloof? "

The Fleming's single and sufficient answer is that his soul has never responded to the message of Goethe or Luther—for it was the religious and literary appeal of Luther's Bible, and no philological formula of relation between Low and High-German vowel-systems, which fused the elements of modern Germany into one. But the dominant factor in Flemish national consciousness has been the rejection of Protestantism for a passionate loyalty to the Roman Church in an environment of heretics and unbelievers. The Germans will judge better whether the Flemings are destined to Germanization, if they will read Flemish history. Exactly a century

ago, the Congress of Vienna yoked Flanders with Holland, where an identical Low-German dialect was not merely spoken but had been developed into a culture-language of the first rank. Yet the Dutch Calvinistic tradition¹ was so antipathetic to the Fleming that he fortified himself against Dutch culture with the foreign culture of his French-speaking neighbours, hazarded an armed revolution within fifteen years to break the Dutch political connection, and did not begin to build up an independent literature of his own in the Dutch-Flemish tongue till twenty years after his political independence from Holland was assured; while to this day he maintains his political co-operation with the French-speaking Walloons, and, for all his Flemish patriotism, allows their language to pass current with his own in his administration, his law-courts, and his schools. Is such a man a promising convert to Germanism? Are bayonets likely to teach him that High-German *ablauts* are the medium through which he is destined to partake of culture in this twentieth century?

¹ The Dutch have remained proof against High-German culture for the same reason as the Flemings: they have never taken their religion from Luther's Bible. Calvinism was as alien to Lutheranism as was the Counter-Reformation.

No; it is the Germans who have much to learn. They must be taught that no objective criterion, however fundamental, can settle people's culture, any more than their political allegiance, against the evidence of their own declared will.

VI

ANARCHY AND INTERNATIONALISM

IN previous chapters we have reviewed various aspects and conditions of Nationality—Language and Culture, Tradition and Environment—and defined the common principle underlying all the phenomena as a “present will to co-operate in a political organization.” We discussed the interaction of this human will with the inanimate mechanism of economics, the other great creative factor in social life, and concluded that these two forces were not irreconcilable. And having thus identified Nationality with Democracy, and distinguished it from the economic nexus, we suggested that if the principle were faithfully translated into practice up to the limits of possibility, it would solve most of the European problems at issue in this war, and would offer the foundations for a new Europe economically knit into a whole, perhaps, but differentiated politically into a number of independent,

self-sufficing, self-developing groups, capable of living in harmony side by side.

From this standpoint, Nationality presents itself as the natural regimen of Europe, but that is equivalent to admitting that it is a very advanced phase of human development. Is it attainable by all mankind? we ask; and when we reflect that the "will to co-operate" presupposes a highly developed "social self-consciousness," we realize that only a few peoples have grown up to Nationality in the whole course of history, and that the great majority of living populations are undoubtedly unripe for it.

We are thus left in face of an imperative question. In a world where honour and power, culture and wealth, are the fruits of Nationality and the monopoly of the few that have attained it, what is to be the relation between these few chosen nations of the earth and the remainder of its inhabitants whose evolution has still left them sitting in various degrees of outer darkness?

The simplest answer deprecates any relation at all. "Your nation," its advocates argue, "is *ex hypothesi* a complete organism, a self-contained group, and once it has come into existence, self-development is its sufficient task. So far from

meddling beyond its own limits, it should scrupulously leave populations more rudimentary than itself to work out their salvation as freely as it has worked out its own."

There is a profound truth in this argument, for the essence of Nationality is an independent spark of social will in the national group, and if a nation cannot kindle its own flame it can never be kindled for it by proxy. But though one people cannot derive its social inspiration from contact with another, there is an economic bond which potentially unites them all—nation with nation and tribe with tribe—and which weaves itself only the more strongly between communities, the further they are apart in the scale of social evolution.

Would-be nations must "find their own souls," but they can be vastly stimulated in the quest by economic intercourse with maturer neighbours, and it may be that without this stimulus they cannot achieve the miracle at all. At any rate, Western Europe found the first instruments of self-civilization in the wares of Carthage and Rome, just as the products of Europe to-day are affecting Basuto, Afghan, and Chinaman, and this craving for the inventions of civilization is ineradicable in the

barbarian. Even if he consents to forego the harmless and constructive sewing-machine and steam-plough, he will stake life and all that he has to smuggle into his possession the anarchic rifle. But if the barbarian is economically attracted by civilization, the civilized man on his part is drawn no less powerfully towards the barbarian. He would not take the initiative of peddling his goods in the wilderness, did he not covet so intensely the wilderness's surplus of raw material—its rubber and timber, its hidden minerals, its unsown crops. He has as much to gain as to give and more, and the interchange of services thus set up is in itself as natural as it is advantageous to both parties. To the barbarian it offers the material foundation for a national development. For a civilized nation it satisfies that necessity of every living organism—the need in some form or another to grow and expand.

The economic nexus is thus proven inevitable, but granting this we grant all, for relations can never be confined to the purely economic sphere. Economic intercourse implies a social medium and a political sanction, and since international economics proceed from the initiative and conform to the system of the most civilized parties to them, they now require

everywhere the social and political standard of the national democratic type of state to sustain them. But this standard is entirely beyond the attainment of societies which have not reached the national stage. The phase of organization that precedes "national self-government" makes strong government its ideal, and arbitrary government its practice; and a state of this calibre is quite unable to cope with an economic development initiated from without on a modern scale. It is too weak to keep foreign economic interests under proper control, and too weak also to give them proper protection either against its own functionaries, its own subjects, or any third party. The situation rapidly grows too complex for its incompetent handling, and the simultaneous existence in the same area of barbaric government and civilized economic conditions is invariably transitory. For proof, one need only recall the fate of Egypt in 1882, of Persia in 1907, and of Morocco in 1911, and watch what is happening to Turkey and China during the present convulsions.

These examples are in fact concrete answers in the very opposite sense to our first. Reasonably despairing of "*Laissez-Faire*," their authors have

recurred to the radical solution of partition, and the upholders of the policy can make out as plausible a case as their opponents. "It has proved impossible," they maintain, "to let these paralytic states alone, and the only alternative is to put an end to their existence. They lack the will, and therefore the right, to live. The only living thing in them is the new economic activity imported from abroad. Why should this economic reality be jeopardized by the conservation of a political sham? In equity it has a superior claim, and this claim can only be met by partitioning the country, in spheres of influence, among the foreign interests established there."

There is some crude common-sense in this attitude, and yet it virtually assumes that a population without national consciousness has no better rights than any other livestock as against a fully-developed nation, and practically revives the doctrine of slavery in a corporate form. "A nation," it implies, "is the only political organism that has a corporate soul." But this is certainly less just than the other theory, and surely no more true. In the previous chapter we discussed the phenomenon of "Culture," and concluded that it was not an

inherent attribute of particular languages, but a blossom which any human idiom may put forth. We can unhesitatingly apply our conclusion to the whole phenomenon of Nationality, and lay down that so far from being a divinely implanted characteristic of particular populations, it is a phase of social evolution which every people on the earth may sometime attain, and which all, we hope, will eventually transcend. If this is so, it is as great a crime to debar the most rudimentary community from its potential development as it is to destroy an actually developed nation in the full current of its life. If the one act is murder, then the other is infanticide.

The policy of "Partition" is thus morally indefensible, but, beside that, it is a failure even from the practical point of view of its upholders. "*Laissez-Faire*," they assert, "flings open the gates of anarchy. Partition brings order, if only the order and tranquillity of death." But here they err, for partition never wholly quenches the spark of life. The exploiters are blind to this, because to them the victim-country is subordinate to their own imported economic enterprise, and they cannot realize that for the victim their economic services are merely an incidental, though necessary, factor in his national

evolution. Yet this becomes apparent as soon as the partition is accomplished. The material well-being which alien strong government brings because it is strong, combines with the moral revolt it provokes because it is alien, to react like a tonic on the victim-population's common consciousness and common will. Partition has almost always brought to birth a vehement, almost pathological nationalism, which will not rest till it has avenged and nullified the criminal subversion of the *status quo*, even though it squanders the whole vitality of oppressors and oppressed in an indeterminate struggle. Partition, in fact, seems to palliate anarchy in the barbaric victim for the moment, at the price of envenoming it mortally for the future; but its worst feature is that it makes the guilty nations pay for their offence by introducing a new and incalculable anarchy into their normally stable international relations with one another. Nations compete in the commercial spirit of private firms or of individual speculators for the economic profits of virgin, barbaric areas, and in this atmosphere of rancorous bargaining they ultimately demarcate their "spheres of influence." Naturally, the result of this haphazard rivalry is as unsatisfactory to them as it is to their common

victim himself; and naturally, too, being sovereign states and not social individuals, they settle their grievances not in court but on the battlefield. The dismemberment of the carrion inevitably drives the vulture nations into international war, and even if all the national problems of Europe had been settled by mutual agreement, the perfected and harmonised national States would still have torn each other to pieces for the spoils of Turkey, China, Morocco, and all the other partitionable areas which are the real objects of contention in the present conflict.

Thus "*Laissez-Faire*" is impossible, "Partition" disastrous, and we are left in face of a dilemma which exposes us to the recurrent catastrophe of war. But we cannot resign ourselves without thought to such a quandary. A clue to the future is often visible in the past, and the international problem of the European Powers may find a solution in the federal experience of the United States.

When Great Britain recognized the independence of her American colonies, she left thirteen sovereign states on the Atlantic seaboard, related to one another by no bond but their common derivation from the country whose allegiance they had re-

puated in the war, and the military co-operation to which they had severally lent themselves for this limited end. They had no tradition to draw them together, no uniformity of economic environment or social evolution, while between each and all of them there were the most formidable conflicts of territorial interest. Their boundaries might be definite enough along the narrow strip of effectively occupied littoral, but each had been endowed by its charter of foundation with a zone of hinterland extending quite indefinitely across the continent to a presumable termination on the Pacific coast; and these unreclaimed state domains, many hundredfold greater in area than the settled territory of each state, and stored with incalculable natural resources, overlapped and intersected one another in reckless contradiction. Here was plenteous occasion for internecine strife. The material gains that would accrue to each state by the complete vindication of its western claims might have seemed worth purchasing at any cost; and if the North American commonwealths had followed the colonial tradition of Europe, or anticipated the spirit of the Spanish-American republics, they would each have pushed forward their own settlers, their own military roads, their

own fortresses, into the disputed regions, and fought such bitter and such indecisive wars for their possession, that the opening up of the West, instead of creating a new English-speaking world, would have exhausted the vitality of the Anglo-Saxon race on the American Continent, and perhaps even have shaken its hold on the districts it already occupied at the moment of asserting its independence from the British Crown.

But the liberated states did not take advantage of their freedom to plunge into this disastrous course. They submitted their individual sovereignty to a federal organ, and invested this authority with real responsibility and real power, by a mutual agreement to resign in its favour all individual claims upon territories in the West. In these vast regions, unreclaimed and unappropriated, the Federal Government assumed the office of a common trustee for all the states in the Union. It regulated without partiality the influx of settlers from every state and from the outside world. It protected the natives against the tide of migration. It provided security for the more complex economic interests—railways and mines, ranches and cotton plantations—that followed the pioneer. And it organized for

all these elements a political administration at a phase when they were far too inchoate to provide it for themselves. Thus it developed each territory in the interests of no individual state, but of the Union as a whole, and it did not "exploit" the nascent community, even in the common interest of this privileged ring of original members. The federal tutelage was essentially transitory, and as soon as a territory had given proof that the "will and capacity to co-operate" had really arisen among its inhabitants, the Federal administrators tactfully retired, the territory organized itself as a self-governing commonwealth, and the new state was admitted to full membership in the Union.

This concept of a "Federal Territory" has been the United States' greatest contribution to political thought, and the secret of their own political prosperity. It made possible their marvellous expansion in the nineteenth century, and exempted the growing West from being riven asunder by the Civil War. It is valuable for the realism with which it takes simultaneous account of the ephemeral fact of inequality and the eternal process of growth; and for the current problems of China, Persia, and the Ottoman Empire, there is no more fruitful precedent.

If the problem of inorganic territories on the North American Continent could be solved only by a Federal Union among the organic states, the same problem, in its world-wide extent, demands the uncompromising abandonment of both " Partition " and " *Laissez-faire*," and the establishment on the part of Sovereign National States of some concrete, permanent, and all-representative organ of international authority over the more backward countries that have still to " find themselves."

VII

THE UKRAINE—A PROBLEM IN NATIONALITY

MANY neglected nationalities have won recognition through the war, but the case of the Ukrainians is surely the strangest of all. A nation of thirty millions, and we had never heard its name! To be told that Ukrainians are the same as Ruthenes hardly enlightens our ignorance. Only the equation with "Little Russians" appears to explain their obscurity. Then they are not really a nation after all, but a variety of Russian, speaking, doubtless, a dialect of the Russian language?

But this facile explanation is precisely the inference we are meant to draw from the name "Little Russian." That is why it has been invented by the "Muscovites"—we must be careful of our terms, for the true Ukrainian would never call the man of Moscow or Petrograd a "Russian," nor even a "Great Russian"; he claims the Russian name for himself. But titles may pass. The issue is more seriously joined on the philological question. Is the speech

of the Ukraine an independent language? "It is," says the Ukrainian. "It differs from the speech of Moscow at least as much as the Polish language does." "No," answers the Muscovite. "It is a dialect, one peasant patois among the many that have differentiated themselves in the vast regions occupied by the Russian people one and indivisible, without prejudice to the political indivisibility of the nation or to the unity of the literary language in which all Russians find their natural medium of expression."

This is no academic debate. It is waged on the field of practical politics. Many ordinances have been launched from Petrograd against the Ukrainian dialect or language (call it which you will), culminating in the Ukase of 1876, which forbade the publication within the limits of the Empire of any printed matter in this tongue that was not of a purely antiquarian nature, and subjected even such to official censorship. "The Ukrainian language," declared Valuyef, the Minister of the Interior, a dozen years before, "never has existed, does not exist, and must not exist." But the Minister protested too much. Edicts are not framed against an hallucination.

Thus in the linguistic sphere the Imperial Govern-

ment seems to have given evidence against itself in favour of Ukrainian individuality—for it is really the individuality of a nation that is in dispute. Yet language is only one factor in nationality. It cannot constitute a nation by itself without the concurrence of history; and we must ask what the Ukraine is, and how its people have developed in the past, before we can pass final judgment upon their claims at the present.

The "Ukraine" means simply the "borderland"—between North and South, forest and steppe—and it stretches from West to East in a mighty zone all the way from the Carpathians to the Volga—a zone distinguished as much by its soil as by its history; for this is the famous country of the "Black Earth," the new corn-land of the Empire, where agriculture, railways and population are growing at a rate that rivals the development of the American "Middle West."

Here was the focus of the earliest, as well as the most modern, phase of Russian life, the holy city of Kieff, placed at the point where the Dnieper gathers up all its tributaries and issues from the forest into the steppe. The state was founded in the tenth century by Swedish wanderers from the

Baltic who made their way down stream; and its culture came up the river from Constantinople across the Black Sea. But the people of Kieff were Slavs like their Northern neighbours in the forest, and they developed their Scandinavian government and Byzantine religion into a Slavonic civilization with a new individuality of its own.

Yet the geographical character of the "Borderland," which opened it to cultural influences from every side, exposed it at the same time to the shock of conflicting races. In the thirteenth century Kieff was destroyed by the Tatars of the steppe, and Ukrainian nationality had to find a retreat among the Carpathian foothills in the principality of Halitch (Galicia). Galicia, again, fell within a century under the dominion of the Poles, who stamped its nobility and middle class with the impress of Western Europe, and cajoled its Orthodox Church, by tolerance of the native ritual and discipline, into acknowledging the suzerainty of Rome. As the Polish Empire decayed in the seventeenth century, the Ukraine once more shook itself free. The borderland nurtured a race of borderers, the Cossacks, who established an independent military republic on an island in the Dnieper, and championed the Ukrainian

peasants against Tatar and Pole. But the renascent nation was swallowed up by a new power from the North. The Slavs of the forest had escaped the hurricanes that devastated the Ukraine. Moscow became the nucleus of a North-Russian kingdom, and Peter the Great reorganized it into a powerful Empire. Partly by conquest and partly by voluntary compact, the Government at Petrograd obtained the lion's share of the Polish inheritance, and at the final partition of 1795 the greater part of the Ukraine found itself, after a century and a half of precarious liberty, included definitely within the Imperial frontiers. Out of the thirty million or so of Ukrainians that exist to-day, upwards of twenty-five million are subject, in virtue of that settlement, to the Tsar.

The settlement might well have been a solution. Ukrainian and Muscovite were linked by the strongest ties—common Slavdom, community in the Orthodox Faith, even an original community of political tradition, for before the Tatars came, the Ukrainian princes of Kieff had borne sway in the forest as well as on the border. Even though the two peoples were not one nation already, their union under the Romanoff Dynasty gave them the same opportunity

for coalescing into one that union under the Stewarts gave to the English and the Scotch. But unfortunately Peter had adopted the political system of Europe when it was in a rather sinister phase — the phase of absolutism, centralization, uniformity under coercion. The bureaucracy at Petrograd could not let well alone. It took its new Ukrainian subjects in hand, and without regard to the conditions on which the Cossack Republic had placed itself under the Imperial sovereignty, it proceeded, as we have seen, to persecute the Ukrainians' language. Of course it only accentuated the individuality it was impatient to efface. The strongest stimulant of nationality is repression, and the tension has grown so acute between Ukrainian and Muscovite, that now coalescence on any terms is probably out of the question. Each will assert his separate individuality till the end of history.

This mistaken policy of Petrograd has given peculiar importance to the small minority of the Ukrainian nation (less than 4,000,000 at the present day) which the Partitions brought under the sovereignty of Austria. If Petrograd had succeeded in welding its Russian and Ukrainian subjects into one, the Austrian Ukraine would have become a

Russian "Irredenta." Under Austrian rule the Ukrainians were still brigaded with their hereditary enemies the Poles in the composite province of Galicia, and though the Viennese government was willing enough to play off the Ukrainian peasant against the Polish noble, it was compelled to purchase the support of the Polish group in the Reichsrath by abandoning the Ukrainians politically to Polish exploitation. In fact the problem of running Pole and Ukrainian in double harness seemed *a priori* insoluble, and would naturally have ended in the embitterment of both. Vienna had far poorer cards than Petrograd in its hands. Yet the general standard of political liberty is so essentially higher in Austria than in the Russian Empire, that in spite of the domineering Pole, the Ukrainian under Austrian government found himself infinitely better off than his fellow-countryman across the frontier. Here as a matter of course he might print and read what he liked in his national language — daily newspapers as well as peasant ballads; he would find official documents triplicated in his own tongue in addition to the versions in Polish and German; and if he went to law, he had the right to have his case conducted in his native speech, even if it travelled

all the way up to the supreme court at Vienna. In fact, his national individuality was here respected in all essentials; and thus it is that so far from becoming a Russian "Irredenta," Eastern Galicia has been turned by Austrian statesmanship into an Ukrainian "Piedmont." The "Uniate" ecclesiastical system, originally imposed by Catholic craving for uniformity, has transformed itself into a national church, and these Uniate Ukrainians under Austrian auspices have found the distinctive name of "Ruthenes" for their distinctive nationality. For however much the Government at Petrograd may contest the particularism of its own Ukrainians, it is unquestionable that these Ukrainians across the Austrian frontier are in no sense Russians, either in concrete fact or in inward allegiance. The "Moskalophil" party in Galicia was never a vital force, and it has sunk to a dwindling, conservative remnant. The majority of Austrian Ukrainians see eye to eye with the Pan-Germans, hope for the redemption of their nationality through the dismemberment of the Russian Empire, and contemplate an independent Ukrainian state, extended, under the patronage of the Central Powers, as far as Kieff and Odessa.

Kieff and Odessa divorced from Russia! Russia excluded from the Black Sea! Of course the scheme is impracticable. Such an assertion of their national individuality would bring anything but advantage to the Ukrainians themselves. The Ukraine and the rest of Russia are geographically inseparable, economically interdependent, racially and culturally interlaced. To part them is impossible, and would remain so even if the Allies were beaten to the earth. This is no solution; and yet the policy of Petrograd leaves the problem insoluble too. There is the same fantastic impracticality about the régime of "Russification," which Petrograd has applied to the Ukrainian "Piedmont" with reckless rigour during her occupation of Eastern Galicia in the course of the present war. Neither programme is practicable in its entirety. The Ukraine can never obtain entire political independence from Muscovy, and the Muscovite can never entirely stamp out Ukrainian nationality or assimilate entirely the whole Ukrainian race. A settlement can only be reached through a compromise under which each party shall secure its real needs at the price of waiving its extremer claims. Russia must have her geographical unity, the Ukraine her national rights; and to com-

pass these essentials the fantasies of Russification on the one hand, and of independence on the other, are no exorbitant sacrifice.

Let the Ukraine be reunited at last by the transfer of Eastern Galicia from Austria to Russia after the war; but let the condition be that all the national rights, which the Ukrainians of Galicia enjoy under Austrian rule, shall not only be perpetuated to themselves, but extended equally to their fellow-countrymen in all the Ukrainian provinces already incorporated in the Russian Empire.

If this is accomplished it will profit the cause for which the Allies are at war. It will deflect a nation of thirty millions from its present orientation towards the Teutonic Powers—an asset which the latter have known how to exploit in their bid for European ascendancy; it will cure one of the worst disharmonies that retard the organic development of our partner Russia; and it will fulfil the principles of Liberty and Nationality to which we have jointly pledged our allegiance. If, on the other hand, a solution fails, we (and the rest of Europe with us) shall all in like measure suffer. We shall do well, therefore, to ponder the question of the Ukraine, in view of the coming European settlement; and

this is only one question taken at random out of the legion that will confront us at that fateful moment. If the settlement is to be wisely and justly achieved (and if it is not, the future is unthinkable), it will need the fervent thought and unwearied goodwill, not only of the statesmen in council, but of every citizen of every country in Europe. It will need them without respite until the situation is saved.

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