


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THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE:

AN ESSAY

Brown

HAVING IN VIEW THE REVIVAL, CORRECTION,
AND EXCLUSIVE ESTABLISHMENT

OF

Locke's Philosophy.



By B. H. SMART.

LONDON:

LONGMAN, BROWN, GREEN, AND LONGMANS.

1855.

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To MICHAEL FARADAY, Esq.

D.C.L. Oxon: F.R.S.: F.G.S.: M.R.I.:

Fullerian Prof. of Chem.: Knight of the Prussian Order of Merit:

Foreign Associate of the Acad. of Science in the Imperial Inst. of Paris:

&c. &c. &c.

THIS ESSAY,

THOUGH IN A DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

DISTINCT FROM THAT IN WHICH HIS NAME STANDS ILLUSTRIOUS,

YET BEING ATTEMPTED TO BE CARRIED OUT

IN THE INDUCTIVE SPIRIT

WHICH HIS EXAMPLE EMINENTLY RECOMMENDS,

IS,

WITH VIVID RECOLLECTIONS OF EARLY FRIENDSHIP

AND CONTINUED KINDNESS,

AFFECTIONATELY INSCRIBED.

ATHENÆUM, PALL-MALL, LONDON.

September, 1855.

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THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE.

CHAPTER I.

The common persuasion of the way in which language denotes thought—Horne Tooke's failure to correct Locke—Causes which have discredited Locke's Philosophy—Present effects of this discredit.

THAT Language and Thought stand to each other in the relation of sign and thing signified, is a fact beyond question ; but it may be made a question whether the way in which the representation takes place is not universally misconceived. The universal notion is, that language represents thought with a perfect correspondence of part to part, and a correspondence of operations in joining the parts ;

so that if we wish, when thought is expressed, to ascertain the nature and process of what has taken place *within*, we have only to examine the parts and composition of the language *without*.¹ On the presumption of this kind of correspondence have been built all the metaphysical doctrines of ancient and of modern days, all treatises on grammar or structure of speech, all systems of logic, and consequently all systems of rhetoric also. The same kind of correspondence is taken for granted by Locke, who considers that all nouns in a proposition are put forward as signs of ideas that are the mental elements of the proposition, while the other parts of speech

¹ Addison speaks the common opinion when, in Spectator 166, he says, "The world is a copy or transcript of those ideas which are in the mind of the First Being, and those ideas which are in the mind of man are a transcript of the world. To this we may add, that words are the transcript of those ideas which are in the mind of man, and that writing or printing is the transcript of words."

“signify the connection the mind gives to ideas, or to propositions, one with another.”²

But universal, or all but universal as is this notion of the way in which language stands related to thought, it may, as I have said, be questioned; and I mean to show that if Locke had questioned it, he might have reached a foundation for his doctrine that would have placed it out of the reach of contradiction or dispute. A hundred years later, Horne Tooke, one of Locke's most ardent admirers, did question it; but it was by attributing to the instrumentality of language all that Locke ascribes originally to thought. Overpowered by the blaze of light which a view so near the truth cast upon him, he lost all distinctness of vision, and shot, in consequence, as far beyond the truth, as he had left Locke behind it. On the subject of abstraction, for instance, instead of saying that it is carried on, after our early learning, chiefly by the instrumentality of

² Locke's Essay, b. iii., ch. vii., § 1.

words, he says, "there is no such thing as abstraction except in words."³ Again, instead of being content with saying what most people suspect to be true that "all" (foregone) "systems of metaphysics, and controversies concerning it, are founded on the grossest ignorance of words and the nature of speech," he declares that "the very term *metaphysic*, is nonsense."⁴ Instead of pointing out in what way artificial language is instrumental in the conveyance of thought, he asserts that "all which we are accustomed to consider the operations of the mind, are nothing but the operations of language."⁵ And further, after having traced all the parts of speech up to two, namely noun and verb, and shown that the remaining parts are only one or the other of these in disguise, he draws unwarrantable conclusions from the

³ Diversions of Purley, ch. ii. The passage is often repeated.

⁴ Ibid., vol. i. (second edition), ch. ix., p. 399.

⁵ Ibid., ch. iii., p. 51.

fact, and leaves his inquiries unfinished, because he could not establish, what indeed is contrary to truth, that verbs grew out of nouns, and not nouns out of verbs. Thus failing to place Locke's philosophy, as he meant to do, correctly before the world, he left an impression that the philosophy itself was unsound, instead of being deficient simply in mode of development; an impression the more injurious, inasmuch as the continental followers of Locke had already brought, among his countrymen, discredit upon his doctrine, by having made it the ground of a system of materialism. Thus it happened that Locke, who, up to nearly the close of the last century, had been our leaning staff in metaphysics, as much respected by us as Bacon, the reformer of physics, lost almost all the authority he had won; and the effect has been that those doctrines and methods of speculation have come again into activity, which Locke had set himself to oppose.

Now the doctrines which it had been Locke's especial object to subvert, were all those which assigned any other beginning, or any other ground of human knowledge than experience; and which pretended to arm human reason with any other means of prosecuting knowledge than God had given it.⁶ The weight of his authority being removed, up sprung, in Germany, system after system of philosophy, constructed, in the old way, upon hypothesis, in contempt of all demand for experimental evidence; and here in England, where it had been thought dead, though alive among the metaphysicians of Germany, uprose, however failing in pristine vigour, the doctrine of the syllogism as taught by Aristotle and his followers, the schoolmen of the middle ages. Of this last-mentioned revival, Dr. Whately, the present archbishop of Dublin, was the indirect cause, probably without intending the full effect produced. He wrote for the Encyclo-

⁶ Locke's Essay, b. iv., ch. xvii., § 4.

pedia Metropolitana an article on Logic, which he afterwards published separately; a work which, to use concerning it the words of Sir William Hamilton, himself a decided Aristotelian, "conciliated to the declining study a broader interest than its own." This it accomplished by the clearness of its style, by the strong common sense underlying the superstructure, and by its forced connection with Aristotelian logic, while all that is practically good and useful in it, is independent of the foundation on which it pretends to rest, but does not rest. But the public ear was won, and the subject followed up by an article in the Edinburgh Review (No. 115, 1833, Art. IX.), from the learned and powerful pen of the writer just named (Sir William Hamilton); and it is to this essay we may immediately ascribe the revulsion in favour of Aristotelian logic, and against Locke, which, for nearly five-and-twenty years, has been dominant in the academic world, and the portion of our periodic

press which distributes, or which apes its learning.⁷

⁷ That I did not, at the time, under-estimate the likely effect of the article,—that, however conscious of my better cause, I saw it would eclipse for a season both me and my cause,—will be evident from the following passage, which was written six years after the publication of my “Outline of Sematology,” and soon after the article appeared, while I was yet ignorant of the name of the author:—

“Though Oxford is said to be ‘the only British seminary where the study of logic-proper survives,’ yet if the learning expended in the article referred to operates according to its quantity, we may soon expect to see what the reviewer calls logic-proper flourishing in other places than Oxford. ‘A new life’ is said to be ‘suddenly communicated to the expiring study,’ in earnest of which we are presented with an array of new publications on the subject, formidable by their number at least, while the reviewer’s essay, which places them at its head, is still more formidable for its learning,—learning which, being derived not only from Greece and Rome, but from the armouries of scholastic times, threatens, by its bare weight of rusty metal, to crush all opponents who come not in similar panoply. *It would not be a new or singular event if, by such sort of array, truth were overborne for a season.*”—Beginnings of a new School of Metaphysics, Second Essay, p. 19.

Nevertheless, in spite of the efforts which have thus far succeeded in re-establishing Aristotle, and in procuring respect for German metaphysics, our old love for the plain common-sense English philosophy of Locke, seems by many pregnant symptoms to be coming round again.⁸ Nor must it be supposed that the

⁸ Beside articles relative to Locke in several of the reviews, the following works, among others, have appeared, since these pages were first written, all of them tending in the direction of my own efforts :

“On the Study of Language, an Exposition of the Diversions of Purley : by Charles Richardson, LL.D.”

“Letters on the Philosophy of the Human Mind : by Samuel Bailey.”

“Locke’s Writings and Philosophy historically considered : by Edward Tagart, F.S.A., F.L.S.”

“The Senses and the Intellect : by Alexander Bain, A.M.”

Ignored as I have been by the leaders among those who profess to review the literature of the day, and acquaint the world with what is new and true in doctrine, I cannot wonder that the three gentlemen last mentioned should know nothing of me or of my pretensions.

efforts alluded to have been successful in any great degree beyond the limits of the academic world. Ask any Englishman of sound sense and wide information, clear from the trammels of college learning, what he thinks of metaphysics, Greek or German, and the subtilities of mood and figure in logic,—he will say that the one is moonshine, and the other, child's play with words. That this opinion is just, I do not despair of making evident. As a step to it, I shall, in the following chapter, endeavour to show that Locke's purpose is the only legitimate purpose that metaphysics can have; that so far as he failed in it, the failure arose from his inability, notwithstanding all his pains, to keep his teaching clear from the false points of view which all previous teaching had contributed to establish; but that, with regard to Kant's method of pursuing the same purpose,—while Locke's is a failure through the wrong views occurring at times and capable of correction, Kant's is a failure throughout by

being built on a purely hypothetical foundation incapable of proof, and permitting no substitution which would not destroy the entire edifice.

CHAPTER II.

Speculation by hypothesis—Inquiry by induction.

THE philosophers of antiquity had but one way of prosecuting science, though the principle which each carried with him was as various as fancy could make it. Being admitted, the principle assumed was the key to all knowledge; but this principle differed with every sect, and to the number of sects there was no end. The idealists of modern Germany build up systems in the same way, each system different from the last, because each is founded on mere hypothesis incapable of either proof or disproof. Surely it is time that this mode of philosophizing had an end; and it would long since have been at an end, so as to

have saved the world from nearly two centuries of fruitless speculation, if Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding had been as faultless in execution as it was sound in purpose. That purpose was, "to inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge." It is self-evident that such inquiry should precede all other philosophical speculation, in order to stop it when it cannot be of use, and to indicate the ground, when ground there is, for speculating with likely profit. But while Locke's purpose was sound, he very soon takes a fundamentally wrong step in pursuit of it. In endeavouring to get at the beginning of human knowledge, he goes back to the beginning of human existence, and finds it sensitive; that is to say, the babe has sensations as the first condition of his existence. With these sensations, either at first or afterwards, he has knowledge also. Locke's proper inquiry (the proper inquiry of every metaphysician) then was, how does knowledge

become connected with sensation? For sensation is not knowledge: a sensation by itself is nothing more than an effect on the animal frame; that is to say, some nerve or nerves of that frame are acted upon by a foreign substance, the action is diffused to the nerve centres, and sensations follow as the effect of having life that transcends, it may be just transcends, vegetable life. What an unwarrantable assumption, then, lies under Locke's first application of the term *idea*, when he considers the beginning of our knowledge to be those early sensations which reach the brain from the world without; which sensations he calls simple ideas! This first error leads to all his other errors in his doctrine of ideas. For speaking of sensations as simple ideas, he makes them the materials of complex ideas, by which he means all our subsequent knowledge, —all of which is derived from, or rather consists of, so he teaches, those first materials, with the addition to their number of ideas



obtained by reflecting on the inward processes while we accumulate our ideas obtained from without. Locke was not himself a materialist, but it is easy to see that such doctrine tends to materialism; and this accordingly has, in other hands, been its issue, and its cause of failure. This is the *reductio ad absurdum* by which Locke has, for a time, been driven from the ground he was believed to have won; nor can he be reinstated on it but by tracing our knowledge to a higher function of our nature than sensation, however true it is that the higher function would never have been called into activity if sensation had not first been active.

Turning now to Kant, the unintentional father of modern idealism, as Locke is of modern sensationalism, we shall find that, with the same general purpose, namely, to ascertain the origin and the nature of human knowledge, and the source of its certainty when it is certain, he proceeds on a plan entirely different. He begins indeed as Locke begins,

with sensations, and he allows that sensations arise from something that comes from without; but what this something is, he denies that we know, or, in our present state of being, ever can know. Sensations, he teaches, are the crude *matériel*¹ of the world in which we live, which *matériel* is so moulded by the understanding immediately on its reception through the senses, as to exhibit the *phenomena* which we deem external nature, though these phenomena are nothing but the forms which the mind gives to that spiritual something, that *noumenon*, which occasions its activity. The mind, so he teaches, consists of TWENTY elements, of which the first TWO are Space and Time, for these receive the crude *matériel* conveyed by the senses; the eye and the hand conveying it into space, inasmuch as they convey it in coexisting parts; the ear, the tongue, and the nose conveying it into

¹ Kant does not use this word, but it offers itself in the attempt to explain his meaning. †

time, inasmuch as they convey it in successive parts. Thus existing in space and time, it has next to take its varieties of form, and these it obtains from the understanding by virtue of the TWELVE constructive powers or faculties that constitute the Understanding. External nature, then, is nothing but the product of our own activity of thought: what things are in their own nature, we cannot now know; we can but know them as *phenomena*.² Yet Reason is given to us to speculate on things transcending our present experience, and, while it regulates the understanding, it enables us, by virtue of its SIX ideas, completing the twenty elements of mind, to soar above this world where all is contingent and conditioned, and catch a secure,

² Stated in our own way, we, Lockeists, must admit the fact which seems couched under this Kantist dogma. While we are convinced that the things of sense are, for us, related to each other as we perceive them to be, we must admit that by beings otherwise constituted, they may be otherwise perceived.

though not an experimental or demonstrable sight of that world, where all is absolute and unconditioned.

Such is the outline of Kant's doctrine; and we, Lockeists, presume to say of it, that if our teacher began and continued *his* doctrine so as never to get clear of *Matter*, the German philosopher begins and continues *his*, so as scarcely to allow of our seeing anything but *Mind*. We need not wonder therefore that the speculators in Germany who have followed him,—Fichté, Schelling, Hegel, and others,—have sought to establish systems of pure idealism, each agreeably to his own fancy, and have thus accomplished in Kant's case, the *reductio ad absurdum* which the French materialists accomplished in Locke's.

Seeing, then, that these philosophers have equally failed in their one common purpose,—a purpose that must be achieved or human learning will remain imperfect,—namely, that of establishing undeniable *criteria* by which

to test the origin, the nature, and the limits of human knowledge, we have next to ask whether, in both of them, the faulty procedure is irremediable? Now with regard to Kant, his system is a pure hypothesis, of which, if you change one part, you destroy the whole ; moreover, as it contradicts our earliest, our strongest convictions, it is required to contain in itself such inherent force, as to make its way and establish its authenticity without danger of change or question, the moment it becomes intelligible. We have seen that it has not so established itself, but that other hypotheses, like it in character, are continually arising, and seeking to displace it. Locke's theory, on the other hand, is never hypothetical but in the search of facts to confirm the supposition ; as a whole, it appeals to experience, and rises, or seeks to rise to general propositions by the induction of particulars. It does not contradict our early convictions respecting space and time, nor that of the ex-

istence of an outward world unindebted for its forms to the understanding, nor that of the identity of human understanding and human reason; contradictions which stand at the very threshold of Kant's doctrine. Always where it is faulty, it is so by being at variance with itself, and admitting as experimented facts, hypothetical distinctions which are essential only in such philosophy as Kant's. In avoiding the language of such philosophy, his own course would have been clear. He needs not have floundered as he does, in speaking of that unknown, unknowable support or substratum of qualities called *matter*,—he needs not have exposed himself to the objurgation of modern Platonists³ by supposing that *matter*, for aught we know, could be made to think, and that *mind*, for aught we know, may not be immaterial, if, with this persuasion of our necessary ignorance on these points, and

³ *E. g.* of Mr. James Douglas of Cavers, in his volume on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, p. 117.

avoiding the philosophical distinction implied by the terms, he had accepted them simply in their colloquial uses, and considered his subject to be, not the mind abstracted from the body, nor the *body* distinct from the mind, but MAN, as a living, feeling, thinking, reasoning creature. It was also essential to his purpose to avoid the personification as well of the faculties and the furniture of the mind, as of the mind itself; yet no metaphysician more frequently offends by giving, in mode of speech, distinct independent existence to sensation, memory, volition, perception, judgement, reasoning, and to ideas of every kind and variety.

It seems, then, that while Kant's philosophy must stand or fall as it is, that of Locke may be taken up where he has left it, and be corrected in parts till it becomes perfect as a whole. And the truth is, if Locke's continental followers had not seized upon, and carried out to their own conclusions, his pri-

mary assumption, that sensations are the materials out of which all our ideas are formed, both that assumption, and every other faulty statement in his Essay, would in time have been amended by his British followers. Indeed, the corrections are already made, though they have to be collected from different quarters, and sometimes to be carried out and specially applied. Take, for example, Berkeley's Theory of Vision; a theory admitted (with only one exception, to be noticed hereafter) by every philosopher since his time, and we shall have reason to deny the fact which Locke at his first step takes for granted, that sensations enter the mind as simple ideas, and remain there to be formed into complex. Berkeley's theory makes evident this fact, that, with regard to vision at least, the sensations which enter by the appropriate organ, do not make us perceive the things that produce them from without, but only awaken higher functions of our nature, to the activity of which

higher functions the perception is properly ascribable. The fact has only to be generalized by including the other senses, and we reach the truth that a sensation is one thing, and the knowledge we have of it, and have, through it, of a something external, is quite another thing. Berkeley may be made further serviceable to Locke. For subsequently to his "Theory of Vision," he published "A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge," in which he follows out, to its legitimate consequences, the doctrine of all philosophers who start upon the hypothesis of two substances, Mind and Matter, which divide the universe,—the doctrine, namely, that mind cannot become acquainted with matter except by means of its own ideas; the legitimate conclusion from which fact, if it were a fact, is, that the mind never becomes acquainted with anything but its own ideas, and Berkeley, presuming that the fact must be admitted, shows accordingly that we have no proof of

the existence of an external world.⁴ Locke needs not have exposed himself, this second time, to a *reductio ad absurdum*; for, as we have seen, he lays no stress on the Platonic division of the universe, and yet, by his manner of using the term idea, “to express whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is that the mind can be employed about when thinking,”⁵ he renders himself liable, while placed among the materialists by one party, to be set down as an idealist by another. To have done justice to himself, he should have made it clearly understood, that in using the expression *mind of man*, he meant nothing more nor less than man himself as a thinking being; nor should he have ever used the term *idea* but in some one well-defined sense.⁶

⁴ Kant's doctrine adds the external *noumenon* to this doctrine of Berkeley's; but the general similarity of the two doctrines is evident.

⁵ Locke's *Essay*, Introduction.

⁶ Idea, among the old Platonists, means a form of thought, a pure abstraction; in modern definite use,

However, Locke is not left in the strait to which Berkeley reduces him : his followers of the Scottish school, so far as they are his followers from using, like him, the inductive method of inquiry, here come in to his rescue by being the first philosophers to assert, what indeed no one of unfettered common sense ever doubted, that we are cognizant of an external world immediately by our senses, though whether we are originally thus cognizant of it, as brutes certainly are, or become cognizant by virtue of some higher function of our nature, is an inquiry yet to be made.

As to the defect in Locke's mode of procedure which springs out of his ignorance of the true relation that language bears to thought,

it signifies that unreal presentation of some individual thing which remains, when the real presentation to the appropriate sense is absent ; following which use of the substantive, the adjective *ideal* stands opposed to *real*. By Locke the terms are confusedly applied in all possible ways of using them.

this, which has already been alluded to, also remains to be considered hereafter. Horne Tooke, as already said, saw this cause of failure, but misapplied the remedy, because he, as well as Locke, misunderstood the relation. Locke became aware, as he proceeded with his essay, that from having neglected to trace the moulding influence of language on thought, he had been working in the dark; "for," says he, "when I began this discourse on the understanding, and a good while after, I had not the least thought that any consideration of words was at all necessary to it."⁷ All metaphysics, indeed, have been elaborated more or less under the same darkness; nor can this department of learning receive its proper light till language and thought shall be understood in theory to be what they are in common proper practice.

⁷ Essay, iii., ix., § 21.

CHAPTER III.

Intellection, brute and human—Initial steps in the inquiry, how Language denotes Thought.

MAN is a sentient, an intellectual, and an emotive creature; that is to say, he is placed in contact with things that pain or do not pain, that pleasure¹ or do not pleasure him: he becomes cognizant of these things, and speculates on things beyond them: and on becoming thus cognizant, he fears and hopes, grieves and rejoices, hates and loves, as occasions arise from the previously mentioned sources.

¹ This verb is not in elegant use, but it is needed in this place, because there is no other verb which would signify mere sensational pleasure.

But are not brutes of the higher orders capable of all this? Excepting speculation which rises above the things of sense,—by which characteristic even human beings do not all distinguish themselves, and none till early years are passed,—we have full ground for asserting that they *are* capable. In what, then, does the human being essentially differ from the intelligent brute? He has one, and only one external characteristic by which he is clearly divided from all other creatures inhabiting the earth,—the use of rational language. As to his early language, at first instinctive, and then emotional, it identifies in kind and character with that which other creatures use; but, placed in society with his fellows, he inevitably invents or adopts means of communication which no other creature can invent or use. Have we not ground to infer, from this fact, that a human creature's first intellection occurs in some way different from a brute's? Not however his

very first intellection,—that which makes him imbibe his earliest food,—but almost every subsequent intellection. We cannot go back and examine the first acts of human intellection, but we can those of later date; and if we find that they occur with circumstances of a specific character, clearly distinguishing them from brute intellection, we shall be justified in deciding that the early acts likewise differed in the same specific manner, and that human language becomes different from brute language, because early knowledge, in the respective cases, is differently derived.

Now as soon as we are old enough to examine how an act of intellect occurs, that is, an act by which we understand or know something which we did not understand or know before, we shall find that it takes place, and can take place, only by virtue of knowing something else at the same time: that is to say, we come to know B only because we previously knew, or now for the first time know A.

In other words, every act of human intellection consists in becoming aware of a relation not hitherto perceived: but a relation implies things related, of which there must be two, and the relation between these being apprehended, is the new step in knowledge. We may further say that every such act includes a virtual syllogism, of which the two things whose relation is perceived, are the premises, and the knowledge of their relation, the conclusion. Thus, for instance, when I know for the first time that the loadstone attracts iron, it is by virtue of knowledge already existing, that neither of them stands in that relation to other things in which I now perceive that they stand to each other. Thus, again, when from some temporary disorder that affects my vision I believe my friend to stand before me within my reach, and I learn, by putting out my hand, that he is not there, not only do I learn this fact which I did not know before, but I also learn the fact, of which I was equally ignorant,

that my sight is disordered. Let this inquiry concerning our acts of intellection be prosecuted to the utmost amount of instances of every kind, and the result will always be the same, namely, that we cannot know one thing but by knowing another. We may restate the fact thus: not only is it true that I cannot know what it is to be a father, except by knowing what it is to be a son,—that I cannot know what it is to be a cause except by knowing what it is to be an effect, and in both and all cases, *vice versâ*; but it is equally true that I cannot know what is a man except by knowing what is not a man; that I cannot know which of many persons is my friend *John*, except by knowing which of them severally is not *John*; that I cannot know the colour before me to be blue, unless I know some other colour or colours; that I cannot *know* I am now in pain, *feel* the pain though I may and do, unless I know what it is to be free from pain.

If to the statement here made, this be offered as a counter statement, that a dog also knows his master from many others, and every one of these others not to be his master; that he knows when he is in pain and when he is relieved from pain; we answer that he knows each fact irrespective at the moment of the other fact,—knows it instantly and immediately,—in a word instinctively and not rationally, the knowledge going along with the sensation from the very first, and not requiring the contradistinction which, in the first occurrence of a human intellection, is indispensable to its taking place. That the dog has to learn his master, is true; but the delay is only till his instinct becomes sure, and not to gather rational means of knowledge. If it be further objected, with regard to all the common objects of sense, that they seem to be perceived by the human and the brute creature in the same direct manner, we answer that they are so, when, in the human creature, the appro-



priate sensations have become linked to the knowledge which foregone intellections have established; then, but not till then, a sensation produced by something affecting the appropriate organ, no sooner occurs, than the knowledge of the thing so affecting it occurs with it,—occurs as quickly, as immediately as the knowledge of its food occurred to the new-born babe when the nipple was put to its mouth, howbeit that this last was an instinct, while, in their beginning, all our other perceptions were rational, although being once established, they cease to have any difference from the correspondent instinctive perceptions of brutes.

But in order to establish this doctrine of human as having a different beginning from brute intellection, (the babe's first intellection excepted, and perhaps a few others,) we must be able to see in what way our early intellections could link themselves to our sensations;—how, if we first have only sentient existence,

it could become intellectual also. Now, with respect, at least, to one class of our sensations, those which enter by the eye, it is already admitted by all who subscribe to Berkeley's doctrine, that originally and in themselves they are sensations from reflected and refracted light, and nothing more; and that it is by subsequent acts of the understanding that the thing communicating the sensations receives its accredited individuality. One English writer, and only one, since the bishop's time, dissents from his doctrine, namely, Mr. Samuel Bailey of Sheffield. With regard, however, to the Essay which undertakes to show the unsoundness of Berkeley's doctrine, a very able critic² asserts that, "On the whole, neither by his facts nor his arguments has Mr. Bailey thrown any new light on the question, but has left the theory precisely as he found it, subject, as it has always been, to the acknowledged difficulty arising from the motion

² Westminster Review, No. 75, October, 1842.

of young animals" (brute animals), "but otherwise unshaken, and, to all appearance, unshakeable." Now the difficulty here alluded to, is the fact that, with regard to brute animals, a sensation may be, and is, from its very first occurrence, accompanied by such knowledge as the occasion demands; for instance, the sensation on the eye of the new-hatched duck, by which it immediately knows the water.

Under our doctrine, the fact we have just stated is no difficulty; for we extend Berkeley's theory to the human creature only, and deny that it should include brute-vision. Neither to our other senses any more than to the eye, do we suppose knowledge to be originally joined; and we thus keep clear from all that remains of fact or argument by which Mr. Bailey attempts to establish the doctrine of original or immediate perception. We repeat that, as regards the human creature, there is, with his sensations, no perception originally, except of his first food; and the inquiry which

remains, is, how, in his case, do intellections become linked with his sensations, so that the latter are no longer mere sensations, but perceptions?

That the human being should not have the powers of perception earlier than they are needed, is a fair presumption. The babe is so completely tended immediately on its birth, as to require no knowledge of the things around, save the single knowledge of its food. The Creator grants instinct where he denies reason; but granting the latter to man, he gives him little of the former. We must believe that the first human pair had instincts which their progeny have not; it is accordingly said of them that while they had the fruition of good, they had not the knowledge of it; for the rational knowledge of *good* can take place only by the mental presence of the other premise, *evil*; and they were not as Gods, knowing both good and evil, till they misused the only voluntary election which was put into their power.

But if it is true that, in the actual condition of our race, our first existence is purely sentient, how does it become intellectual? It must be by the occurrence of states which at the same time resemble, yet differ from sensations. Two real sensations cannot be distinctly present at once, so as to awaken intellect hitherto dormant; they can but blend so as to be one sensation. If knowledge goes along with such sensation, it must be originally given with it, that is, it must be instinctive. But we are supposing (always with one clear exception) that man's early knowledge is not instinctive any more than his later; that, till his intellect is awakened, he merely *lives*,—lives in successive states of hunger, feeding, and repletion, of sleeping and being awake, of noises of every kind, of the absence of noise or silence, of light and its degrees and refractions, of the privation of light or darkness, of different affections of the skin by the contact of different substances, of affections

by effluvia that pass up the nostrils, of warmth and cold in every different degree,—that he lives in all these varieties of sensation, but, in supposing no instincts joined to these, that, as yet, he knows nothing by them. He has no memory yet : his sensation is now painful, now free from pain ; he cries instinctively in the first case, he ceases instinctively in the second ; but there is no knowledge at the time, and none therefore to survive it. Now it is one and the same thing to say of a creature that it has no knowledge of the pain in which it exists, and to say it is not conscious : the babe, then, is not yet conscious ;³ when memory comes, consciousness will awake ; but memory requires this condition of our being, that while we *really* exist in one state

³ To all who have consciousness, it is one and the same thing to be in pain, and to be conscious of pain. In saying the babe is not conscious of pain, we do not say he is not in pain. A man born blind is in darkness, but he is not, and cannot be, conscious of the darkness.

of sensation, there is revived, at the same time, some past state in which we are conscious that we do not really exist. And it will not be difficult to apprehend how, in the progress of such early existence as we are supposing in the human creature, unreal states at length occur with the real. Suppose a succession of real sensations, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6; 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6; 1, 2, &c., occurring and re-occurring: the nerves which convey the several sensations to their centres, will very soon be so predisposed to the established order, that if one state of the series should not come in its place, the appropriate nerve or nerves will nevertheless be affected in some degree as if it did; but at the same time there will be the real sensation along with it, and the difference between them will not fail to be known if there be a faculty, however dormant hitherto, which, on having presented to it two things at one and the same time, shall be empowered to discern the relation between them; if, we repeat, there be a

faculty appointed to apprehend the relations of things to each other among which we live, always with relation at the same time to the living, sentient, and now intellectual creature whose present abode is among those things.

To exemplify the previous statement, let it be supposed of the series 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, that 5 is a sentient state of cold and hunger in which the lately-born babe exists, which state, during a certain period, has been almost uniformly followed by 6, a sentient state of warmth and suction, which is one state in experience, though language forces us to describe it by reference to two states that might exist separately. We repeat that up to the end of some short period from the birth, the state 6 is supposed to have almost uniformly followed the state 5; so often, that at length when the state 6 does not come in its turn, but the state 5 continues, a state resembling 6 nevertheless supervenes, a state which is not 6 *really*, but—we cannot say what, without borrowing a term of

knowledge which now only dawns on the infant. Yet we may say that, for the first time, two premises are presented at one and the same instant to the hitherto dormant intellect, and the consequence follows in the understood difference of the real from the unreal. The cry of the babe now begins to change its character; to be no longer a merely instinctive unavoidable effect, but, by degrees, to be wilful, indicating the knowledge of what is required; and when the required reality comes, there will very likely come with it a slight grunt of gratification. The sucking pig, it will be said, exhibits these signs of intellectuality much earlier than the sucking babe; and we grant the fact while we deny the intellect in the former to be the same in kind as the power awakened in the babe. The pig has not to wait for premises in order to know that he is cold and hungry, or warm and feeding: to him, the knowledge and the sensation are the same, because, from the first moment of existence, the

one has never occurred without the other ; but it is otherwise with the babe. And because man's knowledge begins otherwise than as the pig's begins, it can go and be increased for ever, limited indeed at present by the limits of its present suggestive occasions, but in capacity unlimited, while the earlier learned of earth's creatures stop where their knowledge begins. As to the first step in knowledge which we suppose the babe to have made, it has but given him consciousness, that is to say, the knowledge that he exists in different sentient states, now painful, now pleasurable, now indifferent ; beyond this, he as yet knows nothing, not even that anything exists beside himself ; and nothing beyond this would he ever learn were he destitute of muscular power to turn his head and move his limbs, and also destitute of eyes and of ears. But through these instruments, suggestive occasions of knowledge will now be in abundance supplied ; and every step gained will be a premise, to which the next suggestive

occasion will add the other premise, and from the two, a new intellection, a fresh conclusion, will spring. The real has been learned because of the unreal: the solid or substantial will make itself known by the experience of resistance, but only because the absence of solidity or the unsubstantial is learned, at the same time through the experience of non-resistance. And thus universally, one thing is never learned but by means of another, the being aware of the relation between the two, and nothing less, or more, or other than being so aware, constituting and being our knowledge in the case. Taking this doctrine with us, let us go on: we have seen but the first steps which the babe makes in knowledge, and these have not yet brought him to the perception of an external world: we mean that there is nothing yet to tell him that the sensation of substantial and unsubstantial proceeds from other cause than his own existence furnishes, sometimes changeable at his will, and sometimes not. In other

words, the consciousness of existence does not yet include the knowledge of what that being is which so exists ; or again, in further words, the babe does not yet know what is himself, because he does not yet know what is not himself. When he puts his finger in his eye, when he knocks his head, his foot, or his arm against a block, he does not at first know, however conscious of the unwelcome change, that himself is partially the cause ; he has not ascertained, even in its very first degree, the extent of his power to produce, or to avoid certain states of his being. Soon, however, in his experiments on the substantial by the chance exertion of his muscular powers, he learns something that he can do, on the usual condition of learning something else at the same time, namely, in this case, something that he cannot do. Further, he learns, by tactual impressions, that there is substance which responds to his touch, inasmuch as he learns at the same time that there is other substance which does

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not respond ; that he can give pain to the one, or avoid giving it pain ; that he cannot give pain to the other, nor always avoid receiving from it pain ; and thus, we may believe, the separation of himself from what is not himself, first dawns on his understanding. Rapidly now does this something,—this huge substantial reality which is not himself,—which variously reflects to that self the rays of light, which as variously affects, on contact with the skin, the nerves it reaches, which sends to the brain the reverberations of the atmosphere,—rapidly now does this immense external something resolve itself into singulars, though no one step in that resolution is, or can be other, than the intellectual act which makes us know one thing because we know another,—which receives a conclusion from premises suggested at one and the same instant to the understanding. As fast however as knowledge is in this way received, it links itself to the sensations that gave occasion to it ; in other words, the sensations are

now perceptions; and these perceptions thus acquired by reason, are thenceforward practically the same in kind and character as the perceptions of brute creatures which are not acquired by reason, but given to them with the gift of life.

We have arrived, then, at this fact, if it will be admitted as fact, that man who comes into the world destitute of instinctive knowledge except of the breast on which he hangs, has everything to learn by virtue of that reason which is the same in its earliest operations as in its latest, and no less necessary, in him, to the first perception of the things of sense, than to the recognition, in after days, of the truths of science, and the deductions of philosophy; that this power is at first dormant; that it is developed by degrees; and that every step in its development includes three things: 1, the thing which becomes for the first time known; 2, the thing apprehended at the same time with it, by virtue of which simultaneous ap-

prehension the knowledge takes place ; 3, and the knowledge itself, which, because it is thus acquired and is not instinctive, can, whenever necessary, be called up and applied to other things than those which first suggested it ; and, we are entitled to add, can be abstracted, and entertained apart from all things whatever.

It is because he gets his knowledge in this way, that the human creature subsequently invents or adopts a language altogether different in kind from that with which nature furnishes him in common with other creatures ; a language not calculated, and not intended to make itself at once intelligible, as a cry or a gesture is intended, but which places means before the hearer from which to collect, rationally, what is intended to be made known. Such artificial language begins by the evolution of a natural word, or of an articulate word naturally used, into artificial parts. A child in his earliest use of a name uses it naturally, that is, as a word which means all he has to

say without any assistance but the tone and gesture that go along with it. Such use is purely emotional, and is the little tyro's first step in rhetoric. If, for instance, he calls out joyously "Papa!" or "Mamma!" it is most likely to signify that papa or mamma is coming; in which use the vocable is not a mere part of speech, a name or noun, but the one word for the one meaning. Sooner or later, however, having some other meaning to convey that regards papa or mamma, the child, in using the word, will be driven to use it logically. For, finding that you do not understand him, he will, for the first time, use it as part of means to an end,—as one of two premises out of which a conclusion shall issue; he will so utter it that you shall be in suspense as to what he intends to convey,—he will put it forward as one of two parts, from which, nevertheless, only a single meaning will flow, and oblige you to wait for the other part before you understand him. Sup-

pose his actual perception to be that *papa* is asleep, but that "Sleep!" as an exclamation has always meant, brother is asleep; yet now, in joining it to the sign *papa*, as this receives a new meaning from the sign *sleep*, so the sign *sleep* receives a new meaning from the sign *papa*, which meaning is one, and to join the signs is to convey it. If it be asked whether the term *papa*, or the term *sleep*, has not an independent meaning, the answer is, yes; but such meaning is metaphysical,—it lies beyond or out of nature, inasmuch as *papa* cannot be perceived or imagined independently of the circumstances belonging to him at some one moment, and *sleep* cannot be perceived or imagined independently of some one sleeping. Moreover, such metaphysical meaning is put forward at one instant, only that it may be taken away at the next. It is taken away by adding the other part of speech; for, of the two signs, each merges its separate meaning in the meaning of the other,

in this way forming the new expression,—the one word with one incomplex indivisible meaning. It is thus that the early practice of logic,—the logic of practical life, not Aristotelian logic,—is evolved from the early practice of rhetoric : grammar has yet to be evolved. Horne Tooke ended his industrious inquiry most lamely through not perceiving this fact. It was not till each of the two abstractions of a word was evolved into further abstractions, and these were again and again evolved, that one of the excessive abstractions was required to assume the function which now distinguishes the grammatical verb,—namely, that of aggregating all the other parts,—of collecting into one conclusion the several syllogistic processes, so that the whole, when completed, shall be but one expression with one meaning.⁴

Let us now, from what has been shown,

⁴ Dr. Charles Richardson, a disciple of Horne Tooke in common with myself, is a much more faithful disciple than I. In his very able little volume published

consider how far the signs which form artificial language, are concerned in fixing and making permanent what have been called metaphysical ideas. I⁵ do not join with those who apply the term *ideas* to these metaphysical

last year (1854) "On the Study of Language, an Exposition of the Diversions of Purley," he not only clearly re-states all Horne Tooke's etymological discoveries, but defends all his metaphysical positions. He does not think, as I do, that our predecessor came to his abrupt end because he had brought himself to a puzzle, but believes that he could have explained the difference between the noun and the verb on his own previously-advanced principles. Accordingly Dr. R., with very many modest apologies, undertakes to do that for the master which he did not do for himself. That my friend and fellow-disciple does not carry me with him, I am obliged to declare, but I wish my reader to judge for himself, assuring him that Dr. R.'s work is well worth his perusal.

⁵ Be it permitted me to state under what difference of feeling I sometimes use "I," and sometimes "We," in writing these chapters,—at least to disclaim editorial arrogance in using the latter. By "we," I mean "we, Lockeists:" the pronoun singular I use when I feel personal responsibility for what I advance.

existences; but let them be so called at present, and the statement will be, that though the understanding originates these ideas, they are preserved for use and for abuse by the signs that stand for them. Their use is, through their signs, to *suggest* thought: they are abused when supposed to be *constitutive* of thought as parts are constitutive of a whole, and when, under such supposition, they are joined mechanically; as, for instance, ideas called subject and predicate by a copula. They correspond,—so long as they are abstract or unapplied to singulars,—to nothing that we know or can know to exist, and we properly use them only when we intend that they shall lose their abstraction. To borrow an illustration from modern science, they are held from natural spontaneous combination only for an instant, that, at the next, they may be lost in the substance they generate. This being their use, all procedure that keeps them abstract in order to reason FROM them,

or that joins them mechanically in order to reason WITH them, is abuse. It is, we repeat, an abuse to reason *from* ideas of this kind, unless we can apply our demonstration, when complete, to things in nature for practical ends; an applicability which, for instance, quite prevents the censure from falling on geometry, the demonstrations of which are from metaphysical ideas of figured space. And it is an abuse to reason *with* ideas of this kind, as is done in using the organ or instrument invented by Aristotle: for then we dispense with the natural, involuntary acts of the understanding, and the real or fancied things that should prompt the acts, and use language with its abstract ideas mechanically joined, as the instrument itself of reasoning.

One remark must be added. While it is insisted that science, in order to be of value, must confine itself to things *knowable*, there is no intention to discountenance belief. When, by merely human powers, and the accumulation

of facts, all that *can* be known *shall* be known, (if such period shall ever be,) there will still remain a boundless region beyond, and in that region Belief will discern much that Reason can have no pretence to see. Why, then, it may be said, not believe what Plato teaches, or Kant, or Fichté, or Schelling, or Hegel? Because, it may be answered, there exists a Book that opens for our belief, views far, far more satisfactory than can be suggested by the most splendid metaphysical system that has existed, or that can exist. To be sure, if any one, in preference to the God that Scripture reveals, chooses to believe in Fichté, who, in one of his lectures, undertook to create God in the next day's lecture, we must leave the chooser to his bent; only let him keep in mind that his choice has no support in science of legitimate foundation;—it is but belief, to say the very best of it.

The fundamental principle which we shall have hereafter more fully to explain, is, that

every constructed form of instituted language however long and complex by which thought is made known, is, when completed, but as one word with one incomplex meaning. Thought is indeed continually changing, but arrest it at any moment, it is one and incomplex. That which led to it, and that which led to its precursor, and so on backward, was at every step only one thought; as the place on which a person now stands is one, although to reach it he had to pass through many places, each of which was one, if for a moment he had rested at it. Nor is the assertion less true, because a thought may, in the progress of its formation, embrace many things; there must be occasions of thought inward or outward: these are distinct from the state of intellect which they produce; and, in speaking of the thought, it is the state of intellect which is meant, and not the suggestive occasions. If, then, when we seek to make thought known, the thought is one and indivisible while the expression we

employ is made up of parts, the cause must be, that not being able to find an expression correspondent in unity to the thought, we are driven to construct an expression, and, as we well know, the construction will at times be extremely long, involved, and intricate. Now the doctrine is, that it is a subsequently felt necessity, not original nature, that leads to this procedure. As with other creatures that communicate with their kind by oral sounds, so with man, it is a natural impulse to signify an actual state of feeling and thought by a single appropriate exclamation:

“ Could I embody and unbosom now
 That which is most within me,—could I wreak
 My thoughts upon expression, and thus throw
 Soul, heart, mind, passions, feelings, strong or weak,
 All that I would have sought, and all I seek,
 Bear, know, feel, and yet breathe—into ONE WORD,
 And that one word were Lightning—I would speak ;
 But as it is, I live and die unheard,
 With a most voiceless thought, sheathing it as a sword.”

Childe Harold, canto iii., 97.

It is a necessity, then, that drives man from this natural mode of communication to the use

of means that nature does not immediately provide. In our previous inquiry we have seen how he is fitted to meet this necessity; and we shall have to follow up the inquiry by another, which will make language its especial subject. But before we reach the chapter having this especial purpose, it will be attempted to confirm the views thus far opened, first, by such a re-statement of the facts⁶ of consciousness as would fit the revived and corrected philosophy of Locke; and, secondly, by a comparison of this re-statement with other modes of statement, in order to reconcile what may admit of reconciliation, and to reject the rest as unwholesome in philosophy.

⁶ A better term than *facts* is desirable, but is not easy to be found. *Phenomena* may seem better, but in classing *perceptions* among phenomena we might seem to admit Kant's doctrine that the things perceived are not realities. In favour of the term *fact*, be it remembered, that though it etymologically signifies a thing *done*, it means derivatively a thing that *is*. Of course, it is in the latter sense we are to understand it in the text.

CHAPTER IV.

The Facts of Consciousness in an Adult.

It is proposed, in this chapter, to show, by examining the facts of consciousness as they are experienced by an adult, that first consciousness, and all knowledge that followed it, must have taken place in the way which the last chapter described. We shall have to go over much of the same ground; but if clearer evidence is gained by repetition, it will not be objected to.

The lowest element of consciousness (and this exists before consciousness itself begins) is sensation. While life continues, there is to every person the sensation of life, not remaining the same in character but continually

changing; otherwise we should not be conscious of life. It is because I am now sensible of pain or uneasiness, now of relief from pain,—because I am now hungry, now thirsty, have now sensations from variety of food, now feel replenished and vigorous, am now overcome by fatigue, am now drowsy, and now, even when asleep, though not conscious of sleeping, that is, aware of being asleep, yet still not unconscious of many of the sensations of my waking hours,—because, when I awake, my ever-changing sensations continue; the painful perhaps intensified, the pleasurable diminished by sudden sickness, or by another step of slow decay—it is because all this, in much greater variety than can be described, is at every instant a part of my consciousness, that I know I am alive.

But we could not know even thus much unless knowledge were given with sensation, which would be instinct, or were added to it by reason. Let us say that human knowledge

is not instinctive, and we shall have to consider how, in our earliest years, it could be derived rationally. While sensations were nothing more nor less than sensations, and instinct went not with them, the change from one to another, however felt, could not be known: the babe existed unconscious of existence. Pain indeed came at times, and forced the instinctive cry from the sentient creature; the pain ceased, and the cry ceased, leaving no memory of the one or of the other; so that, so far as reason could yet be awakened by the changes of sentient existence, existence might as well have been without any change.

Let us, however, examine our adult consciousness a little further, and we shall find there was a point in infant existence at which THOUGHT must have begun, always assuming that the creature in whom it begins, is empowered to think.

Now, even in our adult years, how great a proportion of the sensations which make up

the sum of our animal existence, come and go without bringing with them or leaving behind any knowledge but consciousness ! It may be truly said that we think not of them so long as they do not force us to think. Even our most painful sensations, if they spring from internal disease, are not apt to rouse in us any other thought than consciousness of their presence, and desire of their absence. A man must be a physician, which indeed they say every man, if not a fool, is at fifty, who habitually inquires why he has this or that sensation,—in other words, finds in his sensations occasions of thought and knowledge beyond the simple consciousness of them.

And now, with the belief before us that the human creature receives with life the powers and capacities which are to be developed by appointed occasions, let us see whether the occasion which, in the previous chapter, was assumed to awaken thought for the first time, is not adequate to the effect, and in accord-

ance with similar facts in our adult consciousness.

We supposed the human creature to be born with the instinct to suck its food, and to cry when in pain, but with no other knowledge; under which supposition, we have just seen that while sensation was nothing more nor less than sensation, no such thing as thought, no such thing as rational knowledge, could arise. But after a time states of the animal frame supervened, which had the character of sensations, but were not true sensations, inasmuch as they did not spring from the original, that is, the extrinsic causes. For the nerves of sensation having been set in motion by these real extrinsic things, at times repeated their motion when the things were not present; and the fact insisted upon, was, that as soon as these shadows of sensation occurred in contradistinction to their realities, and no earlier than they occurred, did thought, in its first dim glimmerings, begin.

In the last chapter, we saw how those dim glimmerings cleared by degrees, till the external world was fully known for all the ordinary ends of life; and we must again advert to these facts. But let us previously ask what is properly meant by the terms *thought* and *knowledge* when we employ them in such discussions as the one now in progress.

The term *thought*, like most abstract terms, has an extensive vague meaning, and a restricted precise one. When, on common occasions, we speak of thinking, or of our thoughts, we mean all that exists at the moment in our consciousness; but a very little discrimination separates this aggregate into the things which occasion the thought, and the thought itself. Going back to our presumed beginning of thought, what do we find? One sensation in reality and another in shadow present at the same time: these are the suggestives of the first thought, namely, the thought of existence, —not of one's own existence in contradistinc-

tion to something else existing, for this is another thought that must await other occasions,—but the thought—the dim consciousness of existence simply. The thought having once occurred, remains as knowledge permanently accompanying sensation from whatever cause arising whether real or ideal; and thenceforward, to have a sensation, and to be conscious of the sensation, is the same thing.

In the progress of this consciousness, we saw how another thought was suggested by certain muscular and tactual sensations, which found sometimes resistance with kindred response, sometimes resistance but no response of kindred. That thought was the dim discovery of self, and of something distinct from self; and this remained as knowledge permanently fixed to each of these two sensations, with diffusive effect to others; so that it became impossible, eventually, for any sensation to arise which did not bring with it the recogni-

tion of *ego* and *non-ego*, the self and the not-self.

Thought, then, is the dawn of new knowledge, and knowledge permanently linked to a sensation, is perception. We then cease to call it thought: it remains fixed to the sensation in order to be the occasion of other thought: to make use of the ordinary way of speaking, the things we see, hear, touch, taste, and smell, are the constant occasions of thought, because they are constantly presenting themselves in new relations to each other and to oneself.

And not only are our *perceptions* constantly active in generating thoughts, but our *conceptions* (ideas) also; that is to say, the things which we *have* seen, heard, touched, tasted, and smelled; things which re-appear quite distinctly in point of the knowledge necessary to their existence in consciousness, though the sensations are revived in shadow only, not in reality.

Other facts of adult consciousness remain to be mentioned, but some remarks must first be made on those that have been so far traced.

All our early knowledge is forced upon us ; that is to say, the occasions of our early thoughts are so put in our way that we cannot but have them, and entertain the knowledge which they leave behind. This might have been expected as a provision of the Creator, who gives us no more instinctive knowledge than we absolutely need. But beyond the knowledge required for the merely animal ends of life, we get knowledge only in proportion as we seek it, and we seek it by seeking occasions of new thought, occasions which would not come in our way, if we did not seek them. Hence the fact stated above, a fact too common to be for a moment questioned, that the things which produce knowledge in one individual have no such effect on another ; the explanation of which fact, is, that the one is an active, the other only a



passive thinker. This however must be noted, that no one, let him think actively or passively, can directly will the thought which shall succeed his actual thought; for to do this, would require the thought to be already present to the will; but we can dwell upon or rest in a present thought, till, among the multitude that are in some way associated with it, one recurs, which, by the side of the other, suggests a relation never perceived before, and unlocks, or goes onward to unlock, the truth we are seeking. Such is the process of thought succeeding thought which we are conscious of in study. The process is generically the same, though specifically different, when we are not seeking knowledge: thought, in this case, succeeds thought; that is, familiar perceptions and conceptions arise, differing with the different habits of the individual; and these so present themselves relatively to each other as constantly to generate thoughts, but not such thoughts as are likely to leave any important

accession of knowledge behind. How many a man, before Newton lived, had seen an apple fall from a tree, without being awakened to any other thought, than that it fell because the stalk gave way !

Another remark which may be here inserted, is, that a thought must be what the suggestive occasions make it ; and error, if there is any, will lie with the occasions, not with the thought. Now we can create occasions of thought by assuming knowledge which we have not reached, as the ground of necessary knowledge that will spring from it ; a proceeding tantamount to laying down unproved premises, and resting in the conclusion which they yield. Such is our proceeding whenever we interpret what we do not know by what we do know ; a proceeding than which nothing is more common with all thinkers, both of the idle passive kind, and of those who control and direct their thoughts ; and it is a legitimate proceeding when the included assump-

tions can be, and are, brought to the test of subsequent experiment, but vicious for science, and unwholesome for the regulation of life, when the test is impossible, or is never made.

We may now go on to state, that as intellection or thought is first occasioned by sensation, emotion is first produced by thought. To be rationally conscious of existence is to know good and evil, to fear the one and grieve when it comes, to love the other and rejoice at its approach. These and all other emotions spring as naturally from our thoughts, as our thoughts spring from the things that come before us, really and ideally, in ever-changing relations to each other and to the thinker; nor, to the common thinker, is thought apt to occur at any time without bringing with it some degree and kind of emotion. Exceptions are to be found in the scientific thinker, and in the cold unimaginaive poet, if such a one can be called a poet. In what is called a chain of reasoning to reach a remote truth,

each link of the chain is a purely intellectual thought; and in those efforts of *fancy*, conceits as they are called, which are ingenious but not natural, we often have what is put forward as poetry, but it is poetry engendered without warmth, and kindling none after its birth, except admiring wonder in a tasteless hearer and revulsion in another.

Not distinct from elements of consciousness already spoken of, though arising out of them with a very marked character, is that which claims our next statement,—namely, the Will. It is nothing more nor other than the impulse of desire enforced and circumscribed by the knowledge that what we desire can be compassed. We desire the apple on the tree before us, we raise the arm and grasp it. We wish to clear a doubt that clouds a present thought, and we repel every thought that begins to displace it, till one arises that removes all the dimness from it. What we are conscious of in these and similar cases is, first, a desired

end or purpose, and then an effort that goes along with the purpose, and attains or fails to attain it. To state the fact otherwise, we are, if successful, conscious of causation; getting in this way, the thought which leaves behind it the knowledge, or, in Kantian phrase, the *idea* of causation. The new-born infant has to get this knowledge as he gets all other. He moves his limbs, at first, without purpose, without aim; he cries, but the cry is only instinctive: in a few weeks, however, he moves his arm, he opens and shuts his hand with a purpose, and his cry, from having been instinctive, becomes wilful.

Nor must Memory be spoken of as an element of consciousness distinct from elements already mentioned. The term is liable to some variety of application. We call by this name the dreamy passive state in which past occurrences suggest themselves in the order of their by-gone real existence, or nearly so; for some will have lapsed, namely, the least inte-

resting, by reason of the little pleasure or the little pain which accompanied them when real. We also call by this name that active exertion to call back to consciousness something gone by, which, without the exertion, does not suggest itself. Not, as already observed, that we can directly will any state of desired consciousness; for this would be to have the state already present to the will: but we can force a present state to remain till another arises that places us nearer to the one desired, and so on till the one desired arises. Again, we apply the name memory to the power acquired, by frequent repetition, of going through a series of acts, as soon as we get hold of one link of the chain. In none of these instances does it appear that there is any distinct faculty in operation, but only certain effects of intellection and emotion, suggested sometimes by real sensations, but in immediate union with only the shadows of sensation.

Much in the same way must we explain the

operation of another faculty or supposed faculty, namely, Imagination. This differs from Memory by differing in the emotive cause—the originative excitement of the states of consciousness. Acts of memory are stimulated by the desire of living over again in thought some part or the whole of what we have lived in reality, or by the purpose of doing over again what we have done once or oftener before. Acts of imagination arise under the excitement of a less narrow motive, namely, under some ruling emotive state of a comprehensive character, which summons up ideas of complexion suitable to it, and so marshals and combines them, as to continue the dominant emotion by a series of emotions in unison with it. And let the remark be added that the acts of imagination thus attempted to be described, are very different in their generation and their effect from what were described above as the acts of fancy.¹ Also, let the re-

¹ Our old writers, it is true, often use *fancy* for

mark be added, that the genuine effect of poetry differs from the genuine effect of instrumental music (music without words) in this way, that in poetry, though all the thoughts excited are in harmony with one pervading state of feeling, yet as to the special emotions, these do not come but in consequence of the thoughts, while in music emotions are first generated, and thoughts (in general of a vague character) follow.

Something must now be said about the different degrees of certainty with which we hold our knowledge. We have seen that all rational knowledge is the product of intellection (thought), and that an act of intellection takes place, and can take place, only when two things—things apprehended as two—present themselves in some relation to each other.

what is here called *imagination*; but it is believed that good modern use sanctions the distinction indicated.

Till they come before the intellect in that relation, they are not, as regards that relation, yet known; then, in that relation, they are known. Let us take an example from adult consciousness: say, that a person knows, in other relations, a certain wine, but he does not know it as a promoter of gout: he gets a fit of the gout, but continues to drink the wine: he accidentally ceases to drink it, and the fit relaxes: the relation between the wine and his gout will probably now occur to him for the first time, that is to say, he will *think* the wine is the cause of his gout, but he is not sure: he will, however, be pretty sure, if, on repeated occasions, when he drinks the wine, the gout returns, and relaxes when he ceases to drink it.

Let us now examine this instance, and see what is originally certain in it, what is at first uncertain, how the uncertainty becomes a certainty, and whether the certainty thus attained is not a certainty of a different kind

from the certainty that went along with the act itself of intellection.

One original certainty which is an element in the foregoing instance, is, the abstract relation of cause and effect existing as a part of our knowledge. For that relation once understood, is understood of necessity to be what it is; nor can its certainty be in the least affected by the doubt that accompanies the particular things that stand, or seem to stand, in that relation to each other. Another element of the same kind in the instance before us, is the relation between the wine and the gout now for the first time suggested. This relation abstracted from the suggesting things is as certain an element in our consciousness as the more comprehensive one mentioned above; for, being abstracted, it is not—"this wine is the cause of my gout," which at first I am far from being sure of, but—"this wine is apprehended as being the cause of my gout," which I am quite sure of; and the relation

thus suggested and abstracted, namely, the possible relation between some one wine and some one disease is thenceforward a part of my consciousness, to be brought into activity whenever a new occasion calls for it. In the mean time, experiment either increases or diminishes the certainty that this particular wine is the cause of this my particular disease. After long trial I shall perhaps be sure that it is so : but the strongest certainty thus obtained is different in kind from the other, namely, that which belongs to the abstract relation ; for I know that this latter is of necessity what it is, and cannot be different but by being another relation. And hence it is that when, dismissing all regard to the particular things which suggested the relations,—the things from without which first awaken me to thought,—I take the relations themselves as the beginning of further thought,² the result is pure necessary truth ; such truth, for instance,

² In Kantian phrase, synthetic cognitions *à priori*.

as we attain in the metaphysics of quantity, pure mathematics.

And now, returning once more to the beginning of knowledge, it will be comprehended why that beginning must have been dim or unassured. Awakened consciousness could not indeed but be what it was; but the pleasurable and painful sensations by which we become aware of existence, were required to be frequently repeated before that consciousness could be strong. After some experience, however, the knowledge of existence abstracted itself from its contingent suggestive occasions, thenceforward to be the first element of necessary truth, on which all further knowledge was to be built. The knowledge of existence brought with it the abstract relation of non-existence, without entertaining which, the former cannot be entertained. Then, as we have seen, arose from its suitable suggestive occasions, the dim discovery of self and something distinct from self; a knowledge which

became clearer and clearer as the occasions were repeated, till at length no doubt remained that what came under our hands, or before our eyes, or sent sounds, or effluvia, or flavours to the appropriate organs, were things quite distinct from that self which apprehended them. Still, the certainty so attained was different from necessary certainty, and there are times when it breaks down; that is to say, when what we *think* we see, and feel, and hear, and smell, and taste, turns out to be altogether a delusion, or something very different from what we thought it to be.

Such, then, as was proposed to be shown in the beginning of this chapter, are the facts of consciousness growing up from days of infancy till the human being is adult. Are these all—that is, all in kind, or are there others different in kind? And if these are all, have they been truly described? It is for individual experience to answer the questions—no appeal lies elsewhere. Yet we may ask how others, in-

cluding Locke himself, whose professed disciple we are, have traced and described the same facts, with the view of correcting what in other doctrine shall appear evidently erroneous, of reconciling to ours what will admit of reconciliation, and of proposing the rejection of all else.

CHAPTER V.

The Facts of Consciousness under other modes of view
—What Locke's Philosophy would be, if consistent
with itself.

WE have seen that it is the property of every thought—of every rational intellection—to leave behind it the relation apprehended abstract from the things that suggested it. Thus, to go back to one of our former instances, we no sooner know, by unavoidable experiment, that certain things are solid and heavy in contradistinction to things not solid and heavy, than we have and hold the knowledge in such a way apart—abstract—from the things, as to take under it other things which are brought before us by our constantly-increasing famili-

arity with the world we are placed in. In first entertaining the abstraction, our persuasion that the things really exist in the relation suggested by them, is slight, but it becomes stronger and stronger with every new suggestive occasion. Still, as we have seen, our growing certainty is always distinct in kind from that with which we hold the abstract knowledge: the latter is *necessary* certainty even from the first moment of holding it, because, irrespective of the things which may, or may not stand in the apprehended relation, the relation itself cannot, by any higher function (we have no higher¹) be called in question.

But yielding to the abstraction its claim of necessary certainty, are we to admit (what assuredly cannot be proved if it cannot be disproved), that, irrespective of the things which

¹ Reason and understanding, in *our* doctrine, are the same, as they are the same with all persons but the Kantists.

suggested the abstraction, and beyond the abstraction itself, there exists under the name matter or body, an element fit to enter into a higher system of speculation than Locke's corrected philosophy would be able to recognise? For it is upon elements such as this is, that all other systems of metaphysics are constructed.

Further ; assuming that there is a something that, independently of the things of sense, corresponds to the name *matter* or *body*, which substance does not and cannot think, are we forced to admit, that, irrespective of the creatures of our species, who, we know by experience, can and do think, and irrespective of higher creatures, and of the Creator, whose manner of existence, with whatever firmness we believe in their existence, we cannot now know,—are we forced to admit that, irrespective of these, there is another something which corresponds to the name *mind*, *spirit*, or *soul*? For we here have a second of the elements employed in the construction of all

metaphysics, except what we assert Locke's would be, if made consistent with itself.

Locke's Essay does not start *expressly* on the hypothesis which the terms mind and matter include, and, as already said, he frequently so refers to them, as to prove that he does not intentionally build upon what they are supposed to mean. Yet he does build upon them. Accepting a manner of speaking which was interwoven with philosophy itself, he takes his stand, from the very first, with *matter*, and pursues it till, through the senses, it is transmuted into mind, the things of matter becoming ideas, that is things of mind, the latter being presumed to be just, in proportion to their correspondence with the former. Kant, with full consistency on his side, because the division of the universe into mind and matter is to him essential, takes his stand with *mind*, and deduces from mind the whole world of matter. That part of mind which he distinguishes from the impersonal reason by

calling it the understanding, is furnished beforehand with its recaptivities and its moulds ; these give existence to matter, and add all the phenomenal characteristics by which it is at present known ; while reason standing above the understanding, reposes in the absolute and unconditioned.

The difference between this mode of tracing the facts of consciousness and that which consistently belongs to Locke, is, that the abstract knowledge which the Lockeists follow up from the individual things of sense, is assumed by the Kantists to be pre-existent in the understanding ; as to which pre-existent knowledge, since the individual things of the world receive their forms from it, so from it all true science of the world is derived. Now it cannot be denied that this method quite agrees with that pursued by the pure geometrician. He does not begin, as would the unscientific earth-measurer, by examining and comparing with his eyes and fingers, the points, lines, angles,

circles, and so forth, that come before those senses, but requires you to admit the abstract existence of these figures, and proceeds, from this beginning, to deduce all the truths of his science. Observe, however, that his science would be of no practical value whatever, if points, lines, circles, &c., had not tangible and visible—in short physical—as well as metaphysical existence. There would indeed be the same powerful exercise of the intellect, and the same indubitable conclusions; but after the intellect had been at work and the conclusions attained, the question would arise, where are the things concerning which all this labour has been expended? Now, in the metaphysics of quantity, an answer can be made to the question, but it cannot be made in other metaphysics, and least of all can it be made in Kant's.

On the other hand, in the mode of inquiry which essentially belongs to the school of Locke, we begin by experiment on the things

which our science is eventually to embrace, using hypotheses indeed to assemble our facts, but casting them aside as fast as they appear untenable ; nor do we say that the understanding gives its pre-existing forms to the things we examine, but that these things, pre-existing, suggest relations to the understanding, which relations the understanding thenceforward entertains as knowledge, abstractly from the suggestive occasions. To the statement of the Kantists that the things are contingent but the knowledge absolute, we agree : for the moment it is abstracted from the things that suggested it, it is independent of those things, that is to say, it is necessarily to our apprehension what it is, whether the things do or do not stand in the apprehended relation. Then, as to the plea which the Kantists oppose to this doctrine, that these abstract relations, these *ideas* as they call them, cannot be derived from the contingent things of matter, because the latter are soiled by the doubt which clouds all con-

tingent things, while the former are clear, perfect, absolute, — we answer that we do not consider the abstract relations to be copies, as ideas are copies in our sense of the word idea, but as appropriations which the higher function of our nature, reason, makes of what is suggested, not given to it, by a lower. It may be that this way of accounting for the facts, contains in it an admission of all that the Kantists substantially require,—be it so: there must be something in common to the two schools, or men of science would not be found in both; yet this essential difference remains, that Kant *begins* with the abstractions, and the school of Locke *ascends* to them.

However, before we attempt to trace any further the difference, and the virtual agreement of the two modes of doctrine, it may assist us to take a brief preliminary survey of the strife which the abstract terms, *matter*, *mind*, *ideas*, have, without intermission, ex-

cited in the speculative world from the days of Plato down to our own; for the strife is still raging at least in Germany, and if at a lull in our own country, it is so only from the very reasonable persuasion, that, carried on as it has been hitherto, it is in its very nature interminable.

First, then, in time and in importance,—for we pass by the philosophers who preceded him,—comes the divine Plato. To him we owe the distinct enunciation of the principle that two substances make up the universe, mind and matter, of which MIND is the presiding deity, and the human mind an emanation of the mind Divine. With regard to MATTER, which, like the other substance, is eternal, it existed as a chaos till the forming power of the Almighty mind gave it order and beauty. This was accomplished by virtue of IDEAS, eternal forms of perfect beauty existing in the Divine mind, and which being impressed on matter, the sensible world took

the shape it now bears, rising upward from things which the forms scarcely reached, to those that received their immediate and full impression. Among the latter was Man, as a part of the world of matter. But man, however bound to matter, received from Deity the essential gift of mind, and with it the ideas, the moulding forms that belong to mind. In his mind, however, immersed as it is in matter, these ideas are dim and indistinct, till intellectual and moral exercise diminishes the incrustation, and lays open the beauty of the universe, in contemplating which, the original forms in the Divine mind are seen reflected, and strength is gathered for the corresponding forms in the mind of man.

That these are sublime views, none will deny; but they are poetry, not philosophy. Felt as the former, and accepted as the latter, so great has been their charm, that there is no language of civilized people that does not bear their stamp, so that persons who are not Pla-

tonists in opinion are obliged to platonize in their expressions: nay, further, platonism has, at sundry times, and by sundry teachers, been so mingled with Christianity, that to dissent from the former shocks many a Christian as if it were infidelity in the latter. Be it then observed, in passing, that Plato teaches the immortality of MIND, as consequent on the nature of mind; but Christianity teaches the conditional immortality of MAN, triumphing, by a Saviour, over the grave that cannot hold his relics except as a seed that is to shoot up into new being, having in it the elements of the old, improved, if improved, by its trial-pilgrimage on earth, and rising without its former liability to decay, its former tendency to corruption. Both doctrines are doctrines for belief, quite distinct from science, or what can be known by human investigation: to attach the name of science to the one, and call the other, opinion, is to deceive oneself; both are matters of opinion, liable, it may be, to hold the judge-

ment in doubt between the two, unless on other grounds than human science furnishes, Faith comes in to fix the election of one in preference to the other. It is, indeed, possible to compromise the two, and pin one's faith on that compromise; but this is unfair: If Baal be God, then follow him, but, &c.

But whatever has been, and is now believed concerning the immortality of mind as a part of Plato's doctrine, his theory of ideas was very soon opposed, and this by a philosopher of no less name than Aristotle. The reader must keep in mind Plato's use of the term *idea*, remembering that with him, it implies an original, an *à priori* element of the Divine mind, and as the human mind is an emanation of the Divine, so ideas in the human mind are also *à priori*, that is to say, as regards man, they are innate. Aristotle refused this doctrine concerning ideas in the human mind, and, refusing the doctrine, he rejected the term, admitting under other names the ex-

istence of what we now call ideas, which term was not applied to such existences till times comparatively modern. According to Aristotle, all that is found in the human mind, enters originally through the senses from the world without; a doctrine afterwards embodied in the well-known proposition, *Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu*. This was saying, in other words, that ideas were not *à priori*, or innate, but acquired; so that, on this point, Aristotle and our English philosopher are agreed. But now came a difficulty which has puzzled philosophers from that time to the present, though it is a difficulty that none but philosophers have felt. With regard to ordinary thinkers, there is not, and never has been, a person who doubts his immediate connection with the things of sense among which he is placed,—who believes that he does not directly perceive whatever he sees, hears, touches, tastes, or smells. Not so the philosopher. Since man is both matter and mind,

yet has his true existence only in the latter as a perceiving, judging, reasoning being,—since not matter, but mind, is the self, the ego, the I,—we as philosophers have to explain what on such supposition is a most wonderful fact, the intercommunication of mind and matter, so that the former gets cognizance of the latter. The explanation was various, though every explanation agreed in this, that the outward world is not immediately perceived, but recognised only through the media of existences—ideas—which come between the mind, and the things of the outward world; that is to say, the mind never perceives the things, but only its own ideas. When this doctrine, in Bishop Berkeley's legitimate deduction from it, had produced the absurd conclusion which previous chapters have alluded to, Dr. Reid, the founder of the Scottish school of metaphysics, undertook to contradict it on what he considered the principles of common sense; yet as he left the hypothesis untouched which had rendered

the doctrine necessary, he can but be said to have cut the knot without solving it. Had he declared the simple fact, that *man*, having once gained a knowledge of sensible objects, directly perceives them as often as they come before him, he would have stated what no common sense can deny; but in continuing the doctrine of mind and matter, he leaves the original mystery as he found it. It is the more remarkable that the Scottish school should adopt this platonic division of the universe, when, while it stands in the way of their first fact, it is not of the least use to them afterwards: they do not, as the Germans do, construct systems on its basis, but industriously collect facts by observation in order to reach inductive truths relating to consciousness; a proceeding quite as possible under another name as under that of the Philosophy of the human *Mind*.

But to return to Aristotle:—ideas, according to him, enter the mind as singulars; we

say ideas in our sense of the term ; for though Aristotle repudiated the term, his doctrine did not, on this point, differ from ours. Being received as singulars,—as first existences,—they assemble themselves into species, and these into genera, and so on from proxima to summa genera. All these are existences in the mind, and came, in later times, to be called ideas, just as first existences were so called ; an extension of the term, which, be it remembered, we decline to adopt. Now all these existences, under whatever denomination, are the provision for the first stage of Aristotelian logic, which is limited to what its teachers call the first of the three operations or states of the mind, namely, the simple Apprehension of ideas, using the term *ideas* in its widest application. The next stage is Judgement ; in which so-called second operation of the mind, two ideas are compared, and pronounced to agree or disagree. Then comes the third stage, Reasoning, which takes place

as often as the agreement or disagreement of two ideas cannot be immediately discerned: for then a third idea is introduced with which each of the others is measured: this is accomplished in two propositions, and then in consequence of the admeasurement, we come to a third proposition, which affirms or denies the agreement between the two ideas that were in question. Such was the organon that found its most devoted admirers in the schoolmen, the lights of the dark and middle ages. However, a division occurred at an early period even among them concerning the reality or non-reality of these ideas or existences. Of first existences, that is, ideas of things singular, no one questioned the reality; but when they were collected into a species or a genus, the question arose whether the name used was the sign of an idea,—of a reality existing in the mind,—or whether it was a name and nothing more. For, said the Nominalist, the holder of the latter opinion, though I can be, and am,

conscious of the idea of a particular man, or a particular animal, or a particular creature of any kind, how can I have the idea of a universal man, or a universal animal, or a universal creature of all kinds? Yet in spite of this reasoning, the Realists, the holders of the other opinion, resting in some way on Plato's sense of the term *idea*, predominated in almost all the schools, nor did their opinion lose much ground till the doctrine of the formal syllogism began to sink in estimation. At the end of the last century and beginning of this, no one any longer spoke of realism but as of an opinion gone by; so that when, about this time or a little later, some men of high academical reputation, again, as we have said, took up the doctrine of the formal syllogism, the revival was free from the appendage of realism: judgment and reasoning were indeed still spoken of as resulting from the comparison of *ideas*, but the expression was not interpreted with rigour, nor the terms minor, middle, and

major, declared to be more than mere terms, each having a certain extent of meaning.

Ideas, then, among all who hold that there is nothing in the intellect which was not first in the senses, being given up, except in the meaning to which we have proposed to limit the term, namely, to denote impressions within of things singular without, we shall have to apply to those philosophers who, with Plato, derive ideas from the Deity for any further doctrine under the word. Of course, all who admit the existence of a Creator, must, under any doctrine of ideas, confess that we come by them through the provisions of the Creator; but the philosophers we refer to, Plato in ancient days, and Kant in modern, require more than this admission. Plato, as we have seen, made it a part of his doctrine, that as the mind of man is an emanation of the Divine mind, so does he receive his ideas also from the same eternal source: they are innate or *à priori*, not learned from experience, not

obtained *à posteriori*. Kant takes up unquestioned from Plato the division of the universe into mind and matter; but with regard to man, he does not view him as mind immersed in matter; he is pure mind, though not permitted yet to know the unconditioned or absolute which exists beyond the things of space and time.² As to these, namely Space and Time, which receive from without and mould the something that is poured into them through the senses, they are, as we have already seen, elements of the mind itself,—necessary and permanent *ideas*:—it is that alone which is given from without in order to

² According both to Plato and Kant, man is mind though encumbered with matter: the difference between them is this—in Plato's doctrine, a man is so much matter with mind in it, that is with him in it, while in Kant's doctrine a man is so much mind with matter in him, that is, with it in him. In point of antiquity and general persuasion, Plato's is the superior opinion, but in intrinsic value, Kant's is quite as good—not better; the one is worth as much as the other.

be moulded, that is, for the present, contingent, because it is meant to be transitory. Further; the something so received by space and time, and moulded by these ideas, has (to repeat our former statement) yet to take the varieties of form, in which, during our present existence, it *appears* to us,—in which it becomes *phenomena* to us; for which end, the mind has, essentially and of necessity, its twelve ideas which impress those forms upon it. But, the observation must be repeated, it is only the matter which is conditioned that receives the forms;—the mind which lends its forms is unconditioned. And in raising itself above what is conditioned, which the pure reason can now do only by speculating on its own ideas, it becomes conscious of this its unconditioned essence, conscious of ideas no longer giving form to matter, but absolute: of which absolute ideas, there are six, making up the twenty elements of mind, which are called indifferently either elements or ideas. As to the products

of the twelve ideas or categories, that is to say, the things of matter formed by them, Kant does not call them ideas but notions, reserving the former term for the two receptivities of the mind, for the categories that, out of the matter received, form the notions, and especially and pre-eminently for the six elements of the pure reason.

In this manner, up to the end of the last century, has the strife concerning mind, matter, and ideas, been carried on. And is it now come to a conclusion? As far from it as ever; nor, as it is carried on in Germany, can it ever terminate, because the philosophers there, do not take into any important account the truths which we reach by inductive inquiry, but build up hypothesis after hypothesis to account for our knowledge; which hypotheses can be varied for ever by every change of station that gives a new point of intellectual vision in constructing them. Something more, but not much more, satisfactory has been

accomplished by the French eclectic school under M. Cousin; for Cousin does not clear himself from German prepossessions; while here, in England, the country of Bacon and of Locke, no attempt to regenerate metaphysics, and render it a healthy science is made, or if made, is encouraged. A cause has been assigned for this in the re-action we have alluded to in favour of Aristotle; and an assisting cause may be, the partiality which some of our leading men of science have shown for German modes of propounding general truths, while the utter unsuitableness of such modes of explanation to an English atmosphere, has revolted general readers, and turned them away from every attempt to revive metaphysical inquiry, though on English ground, and with an English purpose. It is unfortunate, too, that the author of a lately-published work, whose talents and reading qualify him to indicate to his countrymen the direction which English metaphysics must take in order

to remain English, has exhibited, throughout his "Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe," a decided bias toward the German mode of speculation. Take, for instance, the following passage in an early part of his work : (Morell's Historical, &c., first edition, vol. i, p. 63.) "The three great and primary elements of all our knowledge, are, first, the idea of our own individual existence ;" (in any *improved* revival of Locke's philosophy, what is here called an *idea*, would be called *knowledge*;) "secondly, the idea" (knowledge) "of nature; and thirdly, the idea of the absolute and eternal as manifested in the pure conceptions of our impersonal reason." Of this passage, which is intended to be fundamental in order to serve as a standard for estimating all the philosophy of which the history treats, the whole spirit is German : the use of the word *idea* is German : it implies a something existing in the mind *à priori* or independently of experience : and



hence the statement of a third element of our knowledge, which third element Locke's philosophy entirely excludes, not by denying the existence of the things, but by denying that we can scientifically know anything about them in our present state of being. Indeed, Kant's six ideas of pure reason, namely, Absolute totality, Absolute limitation, Absolute substance, Absolute cause, Absolute concurrence, Absolute necessity, can have no place in Locke's philosophy except with an addition to absorb the rest, namely absolute incomprehensibility.

That the author from whose work the passage above referred to is quoted, and who, with all his efforts to be impartial, is decidedly biassed in favour of *German* modes of speculation, should find any "Beginnings" to be vague and unsatisfactory which propose to regenerate *English* philosophy, is not at all surprising. Neither is it surprising that the English public, turning with weariness and mistrust from all that takes the name of meta-

physics on account of the constant failure to produce unanimity of view, should extend this aversion and neglect to materials, which, properly worked out, would fix the philosophy begun by Locke on an unassailable basis, and stop all speculation differing in kind and purpose from itself. In the hope, however, that what has hitherto been unfavourable to the restitution of English philosophy is beginning to give way, we now return to our examination of certain parts in Locke's own method of developing his doctrines, for the sake of showing that he is often at variance with his stated purposes, and the truths he seeks to establish.

To begin, then, not with the Essay, but the beginning of human knowledge as set forth in the Essay—in order to go back as far as possible and get at the very first stage of human knowledge, Locke supposes the child may gain some few ideas even in the womb.³

³ Essay, b. ii., ch. ix., § 5.

Such a supposition is quite unnecessary to his ultimate purpose. That he should deem the child, as soon as born, conscious because sentient, is an error not likely to be detected unless pointed out; for all people are liable to think so. But indeed it is a fundamental error in Locke, since it confounds two things which, from the beginning of his essay, ought to have been discriminated—sensation, and intellection. Accordingly, he deems sensations to be ideas, distinguishing them as *simple* ideas, and teaching that out of these, and out of those other simple ideas, as he calls them, namely, thinking, willing, &c., which are obtained “when the mind turns its view inward upon itself,” are formed all its other ideas whatever, which other ideas are therefore, according to him, *complex*, and they are of three sorts, *modes, substances, and relations*; of which three sorts, let *Lie* be an example of the sort of idea he calls a complex mixed mode,⁴ *Swan* be an example of the sort of

⁴ Essay, b. ii., ch. xxii., § 9.

idea he calls a complex substance,⁵ and *Father* be an example of the sort of idea he calls a complex relation :⁶ which three complex ideas are thus, as he says, made up out of simple ideas ;—First, as to the complex idea denoted by *lie*, it is made up of these simple ideas,—Articulate sounds ; Certain ideas in the mind of the speaker ; Those words the signs of those ideas ; Those signs put together by affirmation or negation otherwise than the ideas they stand for are in the mind of the speaker :⁷—Next, as

⁵ Essay, b. ii., ch. xxiii., § 14.

⁶ *Ibid.*, ch. xxviii., § 2.

⁷ I take the opportunity of this ill-appointed example to repeat a former remark, namely, that Locke was too much trammelled by existing methods of explanation to take up such original modes of teaching as his own doctrines required. Nothing is more certain than his strong persuasion of the futility of the formal syllogism ; yet here, in so simple a matter as explaining what is done in telling a lie, he borrows the doctrine of affirmative and negative predication, as if there were something more in it than a mere grammatical difference. Assent and dissent are indeed differences in thought, and one of the circumstances under which

to the complex idea denoted by *swan*, supposing it to be the common English swan, it is made up of the simple ideas, White in colour, Long neck, Red beak, Black legs, Whole feet, Power of swimming, and Power of making a certain kind of noise.—Thirdly, as to the complex idea denoted by *father*, it is made up of the simple ideas, Community of blood, and Origin or beginning.⁸

a lie may be spoken is that of having to say *yes* or *no* to a previous question. But a lie can take place impromptu without such reference, and it can be expressed by a gesture, or a look, or an exclamation, as in crying Wolf! when no wolf is present.—What we Lockeists of the present day have to do, is, to free our great master from his inconsistencies: let us accomplish this, and his philosophy is safe.

⁸ In the last two examples, Locke is thinking of the sense presentation of the individual things, and of the ideas (ideas as we receive the term) which they leave behind. But then he confuses his thought, otherwise clear enough, through his wide, vague interpretation of the word idea, esteeming *swan* and *father*, which are abstractions of the understanding, to be the same

How immature, how confused, how far from the facts, are these statements of Locke! how evidently they tend to mislead us from the ultimate truths he has in view! A sensation is not an idea, nor can sensations, nor can acts of thought, be made up into ideas. A sensation cannot be even the cause of thought while it is real, and while nothing exists but the sensation in the sentient creature. For if a thought is the apprehension of a relation (and what else can it be?), there is need of more than one state of being to suggest relation: one sensation cannot suggest relation by itself; and if, when it ceases, another takes its place without leaving remembrance behind, it is—so far as regards the suggestion of thought—as though the creature existed but in one unchanging sentient state. There is, however, a

things as the idea of an individual swan, and of an individual man, who, among his other accidental circumstances, is a father.

point, and that point we have endeavoured to trace, when sentient existence becomes intellectual also, not by any change of the one into the other, but by the awakening of a higher function of our nature, that very Understanding of which it was Locke's declared purpose to treat. And then, as to his threefold division of complex ideas, we refuse the name *ideas* to what he calls so, and find but one common principle to which all his instances both of simple and complex ideas can be properly referred. (A colour, or a sound, or a taste, which he calls a simple idea, is not apprehended, however present as a sensation, till apprehended relatively to another colour, or sound, or taste, or to what is not a colour, or sound, or taste, and when so apprehended, it is *knowledge* of the colour, of the sound, of the taste, not an idea. The term *idea* will, it is true, be properly used to signify the presentation of the thing to thought when the sense-presentation is away; but Locke's use of the

term is not thus circumscribed. His examples of complex ideas come properly under the same explanation as his simple ideas: *lie*, for instance, is a term standing for my knowledge of what it is to tell a lie, namely, wilfully using signs to declare what is not true; *swan*, is the name I give to a certain bird under the knowledge that to be so called, it must be white in colour, have a long neck, &c. ; and *father* is the name I give to a man under the knowledge that he has a child. In assigning only the last example to the apprehension of a relation between the thing and something else, Locke quite misleads us, unless we correct him. He confines our view to a narrow, trivial application of the term. But whatever shows off something not itself by the force of contradistinction, without which contradistinction we could not know it, stands in relation to that thing; and hence there is relation between lying and telling the truth, between being a swan and being anything not a swan, say a goose for instance,—just as well

as there is relation between being a father and being a son. That the last is a special relation and the others wide and general, is true; but that is all the difference. It is also true that Locke's examples are drawn from things different in kind, but not different in the way he tries to make out. For though some of the things, as colours, tastes, smells, are justly classed as simple sensations, they do not reach the understanding at first in that shape, but as suggestives of the things that produce them, and they have to be *abstracted* from the things in order to be understood as simple sensations. Again, there are other things brought forward among his examples, thinking, willing, &c., which belong to the class of things called mental acts; and these have to be abstracted from the person who performs the acts, in order to be understood simply. Other things among his examples, a lie for instance, are acts of mind manifested by outward acts, and these again have to be abstracted

from the person performing them, in order to be understood simply. As to swan, goose, man, father, &c., they belong, when applied individually, to the things which help to make up the world in which we are placed; these four happen all to be living things; nor is the living thing-called *a father* generically different from the living thing called *a man*, although the name is applied to a man only under the special circumstance of his having a child. The distribution here adopted of the several things in this place and above mentioned, is a distribution on the common and recognised principle, and it is very different from Locke's. His distribution is founded in error, and his whole doctrine of ideas is a delusion.

Dismissing, then, for ever this exploded mode of tracing human knowledge from its beginning to its adult state, what are we, Lockeists, prepared to substitute for that one which our master furnishes? We cannot answer the question but by again going over the ground

we have twice traversed. We begin, as Locke began, with *sensation*, but not to call it, as he did, an idea, or even, by itself, the occasion of an idea, but a state of existence in a succession of such states, in which the human creature has its being immediately on its birth, and in which it continues for a very short time, unconscious of the changes it undergoes. Before *intellection* can begin, states of sentient being must occur, different from those that occur at first, namely those that we have called states of unreal or ideal sensation; and these very soon arise to open the understanding by contrasting with the real. At birth, the human creature, otherwise so ungifted, so helpless, has however one decided instinct; and on the subject of instinct, as the consideration of it must enter into Locke's philosophy when complete, and as there are other instincts that grow in us when the first has served its purpose, we may take occasion here to remark that all our instincts, all our animal impulses, for such they are, we

are bound to place under the control of the higher elements of our nature.

Intellection being awakened in the manner we have seen, sensations are now not only felt but known; in other words, consciousness begins. Now with regard to Intellection, as with regard to Sensation, and also of Emotion, the reader has to bear in mind that the effect is always passive and unavoidable,—it must take place the adequate cause being present. It is in this fact we shall find the element of necessary truth, concerning which so much inquiry has been made; it is here, in the inevitable acts of the understanding, that we rest without a doubt, because any doubt would involve the absurdity of being at the same time the thing doubted, and the thing that doubts it. But if an act of intellection must be right, how, it will be asked, do we come throughout life so abundantly upon error? Because, though an act of intellection can never be other than it is, yet the premises are always liable to be false;

in other words, what is necessarily true exists in the intellection; what is contingent and doubtful exists in the matter submitted to it. Therefore, as was stated in a former chapter, when instead of those data which originally gave activity to the intellect, the data for its further activity are the results of its own acts, namely the relations abstracted — taken apart — from the things which suggested the relations, — we have for the product what is distinctively called *Science*, concerning the truth of which, so long as we continue to keep aloof from the things that suggested the relations, there can be no doubt whatever. But then, it will be naturally asked, what to us now living among the things that suggested the relations, can be the value of such science, if the things do not exist in the relations to each other and to ourselves, in which we understand them to exist? The answer is, that for the truth of all our early knowledge, the premises of which are placed before us, and not sought out or collected by

ourselves, we must depend on the wisdom and beneficence of our Creator: if the things of sense are not in themselves what they are by us understood to be, it is our Creator that misleads us, and we must yield to the illusion. But who believes there is illusion? Who does not think that the outward world is a reality, and not a mere phenomenon, as the doctrine of Kant would make us esteem it? With regard then to our early knowledge, in the acquirement of which we are almost entirely passive, namely both in waiting for premises and receiving conclusions, we may and do count upon it safely for all the ordinary purposes of life, though as our experience enlarges, much of our early knowledge is replaced by riper. That early knowledge being acquired, the process of learning falls under very different conditions from those that went with it at first. When the WILL is evolved,—the Will which gives personality to, and imposes responsibility on the individual,—the Will which grows out of

the third original element of our nature, EMOTION, inasmuch as it begins by being simply wish or desire, but is completed by the intellection of a certain degree of power to accomplish, so that, up to where we are conscious of power, the Will extends, while what exists beyond it, remains in the shape of simple wish or desire,—when the Will is thus evolved, the process of learning, we repeat, comes under conditions very different from those conceded to infancy. We now seek knowledge, or we neglect to seek it; we now interpret what we wish to know by what we know already,—that is to say, we interpret hypothetically what lies beyond our immediate understanding, and then hunt for further facts to confirm or set aside the hypothesis. Throughout this course, which continues to the end of life, we are liable to false conclusions at every step; not however, be it distinctly re-asserted, from any possible error in the natural acts of the understanding, but solely from the false

premises which we place before it; in other words, not because any conclusion can be wrong with reference to its actual premises, but because wrong premises can be assumed, and right premises wilfully or ignorantly overlooked.

Pausing for a moment in this attempt to show how, from his own beginning, we might proceed to reconstruct Locke's philosophy, let us ask whether, so far as we have advanced, we have ground to affirm the non-existence of *à-priori* elements in our knowledge,—whether it is true that there is nothing in the intellect which is not first present to the senses? With regard to this proposition, Leibnitz makes a very pertinent remark,—there is, says he, at least the intellect itself. Nothing can be more certain: but we should choose to state the fact thus. The Creator has given to his creature, man, the power to understand more or less accurately the things among which he is placed; but always so, that if he does not understand

them accurately, the fault lies, not in his want of power to understand, but in his want of opportunity, or industry, or inclination to collect all the matter obtainable outwardly, in order to elicit the truth from within. Now with regard to the fact thus stated, what shall be our doctrine? Shall we say with Kant, that the understanding is provided, *à-priori*, with forms or ideas which it impresses upon matter, and so deduce all truth from within? or shall we say, as Locke's improved philosophy would say, that the world conveys its forms to the understanding, and so deduce all knowledge from without, that is, from experience? We have already answered the idealists who tell us we cannot philosophize thus, because, the forms or ideas which exist in our consciousness,—say, for instance, the figures in pure geometry,—cannot be copied from the individual figures which experience supplies, and which have the same names;—they are not, say they, ideas of those figures in your sense of the word idea:

for all these, namely the real, and the corresponding ideal figures, exist in our knowledge as things contingent and doubtful, because the matter is so in which the forms inhere; but the forms themselves—the ideas in Platonic and in Kantian phrase,—are absolute and necessary; and therefore they must exist independently of experience, that is, *à-priori*, and be impressed upon matter, not received from it. To this reasoning we have answered, that though all our knowledge of outward things must be accompanied by the doubt to which their contingent character subjects them, yet as our knowledge, from the way in which we acquire it, *can* be abstracted, and *is* by means of signs abstracted from the things that suggested it, the knowledge so abstracted is as free from contingency and doubt, as the conscious acts by which it is obtained. Take, for instance, our knowledge of what it is to be a circle. Before we have this knowledge, we are familiar with numberless things in nature,—the sun, the full

moon, the outline of many fruits and flowers, the outline of the vertex of the skull, and so forth; and are familiar at the same time with other things some straight-lined, some unequally curved, some angular, and so forth. Those first-mentioned set of things, in contradistinction to any one set among the latter, appear to the understanding in a certain relation the one set to the other; and this relation can be abstracted from the things, and then it belongs exclusively to the understanding, having left behind all that was contingent, and become an element of necessary truth; though still, as often as we re-apply it to such things, it yields only truth that is contingent, and not necessary; for the circle so called, may not, that we are sure, agree with the conditions which our abstract knowledge of what it is to be a circle, requires. Should the idealist here say, that in admitting the understanding to be capable, *à-priori*, of all that is here described, we virtually admit all he contends for, we join

hands ;⁹ objecting, at the same time, to Kant's mode of explanation, because it makes intricate what would otherwise lie straight before us. Instead of taking man as he is to common apprehension, it turns him wrongside out, as we might turn a shirt to make it seem cleaner. In Kant's philosophy, matter is put almost out of sight, and mind made all in all. This is flattering to our pride, and, it must be confessed that, granting certain first steps, the

⁹ We are most happy that German influence is not so strong in every one of high name and talent that has yielded to it, as to prevent such concessions as the following: "Fundamental ideas may be termed, if any one chooses, results of connate intellectual tendencies."—Vide a Demonstration (*à-priori!*) that all Matter is heavy, by Professor Whewell (1841), inserted in the Transactions of the Cambridge Philosophical Society. Again: "Instead of saying that all our knowledge involves certain fundamental ideas, the sources from which all universal truth is derived,—we may say that there are certain laws of mental activity according to which alone all the real relations of things are apprehended."—Dr. Whewell, 1844, in a Letter to Sir John Herschel, printed for private circulation.

whole holds harmoniously together. Hence, favoured in no small degree by the natural love of what is marvellous when offered instead of plain vulgar truth, its reception in Germany and elsewhere, so far as it is received. But it is constructed in violent opposition to our earliest and strongest convictions, and cannot stand against a philosophy that shall be properly based, and properly carried out, on these convictions.

We mean to say, then, that the doctrine of certain forms or ideas in the understanding, which forms the understanding impresses upon matter, is only part and parcel of Kant's whole inquiry concerning the grounds of truth, and that this inquiry begins at the wrong end, while our English philosophy begins the same inquiry at the right end. In affirming this of Kant's Critic of pure Reason, we do not refer to the order in which he develops his scheme, but to the ideas of pure reason on which he makes the whole to depend. We

have already referred to these so-called ideas, and have to repeat that, in Locke's philosophy, whose purpose is, to ascertain what man *does* know, what he *can* know, and what he CANNOT know, they come, with all similar generalizations and abstractions, into the third division, to be viewed as stumbling-blocks in the way of truth, not as helps to attain it. Kant himself does not pretend that they yield knowledge now, but proposes them as intuitions of God, the Universe, and the Soul,—subjects that, except by intuition, lie, in our present state, beyond us. By Locke, such subjects, as matters of human learning, are rejected altogether. Nor must our reader think, because Locke's philosophy thus recedes from idealistic views, that it is less favourable to the spiritual, by which we mean the religious and moral improvement of our nature. At all events, so far as that improvement is carried on in accordance with the doctrine of what we call revealed religion, it goes hand in hand

with it. In denying, for instance, what has just been denied, the fitness of certain subjects for human inquiry, it carries Scripture with it;—"Canst thou, by searching, find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection? It is high as heaven, what canst thou do? It is deeper than hell, what canst thou know?" Kant, who acknowledges that speculative reason cannot reach thus high and thus low, retains nevertheless the *ideas*, and seeks to give value to *speculative* reason, by adding the doctrine of what he calls *practical* reason. We confess indeed that during the lifetime of him who is the father of modern idealism, the wings lay folded which were nevertheless inherent in it from the birth. But under his successors, those wings were soon expanded to reach the heights and depths of all possible being—(and impossible also, we might venture saying;) to scan, at one glance, the finite and the infinite; to view truth as a whole whose connected parts lie stretched

upon the field of vision ; and among the parts, in due subordination to the rest, the revelations of the Bible interpreted as myths, that they may adjust themselves to the other parts, and harmonize with the great, the all-absorbing whole.

We repeat that Philosophy in the school of Locke, as it takes its beginning from the humblest elements, can never aim at flights like these. But humble as its beginning is, we may hope that when it shall be carried out in its true spirit, and to its true purpose, it will issue in the indication of paths by which we may attain all the knowledge possible to us here, and all the moral improvement of which our nature is capable. With regard to the Bible, it will not build on, or appropriate its doctrines as belonging to human learning, but if the paths it discovers be close and parallel to those which the Bible indicates, it will hardly be denied us to exclaim—So much the better! And indeed, in laying

down as primary facts three states of being in man, Sensation, Intellection, and Emotion; in teaching that he cannot now raise himself out of these, nor make them other than they are; but that he can, by exertion of his personal WILL, which develops itself from the latter two, exert a control over the whole three, so that the senses shall be cared for and governed by the intellect, and the intellect seek knowledge by inquiry within limits where alone it can be found in a wholesome state, and the emotions be partially detached from inferior occasions of excitement, till they strongly respond only to high, and generous, and holy motives,—in teaching all this, which it will teach when its doctrines shall be completed, Locke's philosophy will be able to assert a conformity between the moral training to which it naturally leads, and the righteousness defined by the Sacred Volume.

But in order that Philosophy carried out from Locke's beginning and with Locke's pur-

pose, may stand without a rival, it must remove the delusion which renders possible the construction of such systems as the Germans furnish. This cannot be accomplished by anything which Locke himself has provided, and for assistance in the matter, we must go to another English writer, far inferior indeed to Locke in all that gives a claim to reputation, but worthy of being listened to, because he was the first who saw, however dimly, that delusion in Locke, which, while it was the main cause that Locke's own doctrine is imperfect, completely invalidates all other metaphysics. Both these men had that peculiar sagacity, often observable in commoner men, which sees a truth clearly on general grounds without having reached the particular proofs necessary to make it clear to ordinary understandings. Locke, for instance, was clearly persuaded that the Aristotelian syllogism was built on a delusion. "God," says he, "hath not been so sparing to men to make

them barely two-legged creatures, and left it to Aristotle to make them rational: he hath been more bountiful to mankind than so." He saw there was a juggle somewhere, but he could not put his finger on the spot; and Leibnitz truly says of him that he despised logic (Aristotle's logic) without understanding it. The fact was, that he himself lay under that universal delusion concerning language and thought, which had led to the construction of the formal syllogism, and to indicate where Aristotle was wrong, he must first have been aware of his own error. Then, a century afterwards came Horne Tooke, who, but for his participation in the same universal error, would have detected all that Locke had failed to see. He, too, looking at the vast web which metaphysical philosophy had spun, strongly felt the presence of an undetected error, but he was not able to give it to the day. He says there is no such thing as abstraction, except in words, and that "the

very term metaphysic is nonsense, all the systems of it, and controversies concerning it, being founded on the grossest ignorance of words and the nature of speech." To deliver himself thus, was to miss the truth he was in search of, and yet to have it close to his fingers. If there had been no such power in man as that of abstracting knowledge without using words at first in the operation, words could never have been invented in order to carry on the operation afterwards; and if Tooke had not failed in attempting to remove the ignorance which he complains of concerning words and the nature of speech, he would have found that metaphysic, in a wholesome state, merits a far better name than nonsense.

Thus it happened to both these men to feel that a great fundamental error existed, and yet to fail in pointing it out. Still, I am very clear that if they had not gone before, the discovery would never have been made by him who pretends to have made it. It is to

Locke next after Bacon that we must assign the credit of founding English philosophy. Little credit is due to Horne Tooke, because his work, so far as metaphysics are concerned, is a failure. If I can lay claim to any merit, it is that of having discovered, by the guidance of Locke and Horne Tooke, what nevertheless they themselves had failed to see, though the discovery was essential to the purpose of both. And in saying even thus much, I am quite aware that I shall be deemed to say more than can be true. Is it possible, so it will be thought, that any discovery can be made in the theory of a practice so familiar to us as speech? I must leave it to be judged. One thing I am sure of, that no writer I am acquainted with explains the practice as I do, except Dugald Stewart; and what he says to the same purpose as myself is contained in the following two short passages in his *Philosophical Essays*;¹⁰ passages which I quoted in my

¹⁰ *Phil. Essays*, Part I. Ess. 5. Ch. I.

“Outline of Sematology,” published twenty-five years ago, and again in my “Letter to Dr. Whately,” published in 1852. I quote them again before proceeding to my next chapter:—

“ In reading the enunciation of a proposition, we are apt to fancy that for every word contained in it, there is an idea presented to the understanding; from the combination and comparison of which ideas, results that act of the mind called judgement. So different is all this from fact, that our words, when examined separately, are often as completely insignificant as the letters of which they are composed, deriving their meaning solely from the connection or relation in which they stand to others.”

“ When we listen to a language which admits of such transpositions in the arrangement of words as are familiar to us in Latin, the artificial structure of the discourse suspends, in a great measure, our conjectures about the sense, till, at the close of the period, the verb, in the very instant of its utterance,

unriddles the enigma. Previous to this, the former words and phrases resemble those detached and unmeaning patches of different colours, which compose what opticians call an *anamorphosis*; while the effect of the verb at the end may be compared to that of the mirror, by which the anamorphosis is reformed, and which combines these apparently fortuitous materials into a beautiful portrait or landscape. In instances of this kind, it will generally be found, upon an accurate examination, that the intellectual act, so far as we are able to trace it, is altogether simple, and incapable of analysis; and that the elements into which we flatter ourselves we have resolved it, are nothing more than the grammatical elements of speech;—the logical doctrine about the comparison of ideas, bearing a much closer affinity to the task of a schoolboy in parsing his lesson, than to the researches of philosophers able to form a just conception of the mystery to be explained.”

CHAPTER VI.

The Way in which Language is the Exponent of
Thought—Conclusion.

THE truth, if truth it is, which I oppose to the prevalent persuasion on the subject of language in its relation to thought, may be stated in a single proposition, though it may require a good deal of care to state it clearly, and a good deal of reflection to see, when stated, its distinctness from the notion we receive of language from all our school and college instruction.

No part of speech is properly a word, but only the part of a word, a part completed by what follows, or completing what precedes, yet in such a manner that it expresses no part of the thought which the word will express when

completed: the meaning of this word will be one and indivisible, to assist in conveying which, each part resigns its separate meaning the moment it enters into union with the other parts in order to form the word. For instance, in saying *Men-must-die*, the whole expression is the word that corresponds with the thought,—the parts, *men*, *must*, *die*, are parts of the word, but not parts of the attained meaning: each indeed has a meaning while separate, but the moment it joins the other parts, it merges its separate meaning in the one meaning of the word it helps to form.

This statement requires only to be understood to be at once admitted. But unfortunately, after being understood and admitted, the old notion will return into a pre-occupied mind, and be somehow reasoned into the other. I can deal with young minds, and carry them on successfully on the one principle without confusion from the other: not so when there is the rooted prepossession that the meaning of

any expression made up of parts, is the aggregate of the meanings of those several parts. Dr. Richardson, the gentleman referred to, in a note at page 50, as a disciple of Horne Tooke in common with myself, had read, I believe without objection to the main principle, my *Outline of Sematology*: yet when I say,—“If my theory is true, the words of a sentence understood in their separate capacity, do not constitute the meaning of the whole sentence, (i. e. are not parts of its whole meaning,) and therefore, as parts of a sentence, they are not by themselves significant,”—Dr. Richardson exclaims, “Might not Mr. Smart as well say, that the several numbers which together amount to a total number, do not constitute—are not parts of—that total number; and that the figures representing such several numbers, are not by themselves significant!”¹ Assuredly I might not as well say so; for this would be to contradict the doctrine I seek to establish,

¹ On the Study of Language, p. 52, foot note.

that the meanings of parts of speech are not *constitutive* of the ultimate meaning sought to be made known, but *suggestive* only. The meaning of a phrase or sentence is not the aggregate of the several meanings of the parts which construct it, but the rational consequence. Take any two parts of speech that are fitted to make sense, such as *old* and *men*: each of these has a much larger meaning than the phrase they form; as in French, *vieux* and *hommes* are severally names of very much larger application than the name *vieillards*. The phrase *old men* does not signify the aggregate of the previous meanings of its two parts, but is the merging of each of those meanings in the narrower meaning attained. The fact indeed is, that when parts of speech are joined so as to make sense, what takes place under the addition of part to part outwardly, is not *addition*, but on the contrary is SUBTRACTION. For instance, when to the part of speech *old* we add the part of speech *men*, the

effect is, that *old* suffers a subtraction of its extent of meaning, so far as its meaning is included in *men*; and *men* suffers a subtraction of its extent of meaning, so far as its meaning is included in *old*. The result is, the identification of the two subtractions, yielding the limited out of the two wider meanings, which limited meaning is signified by what is virtually or really a single word, *old-men* or *vieillards*, whose parts are no longer separately significant. And the fact is universal, namely, that as fast as we join parts of speech which agree logically, that is, make sense, we subtract meaning from meaning, till we reach the special meaning we design to convey.

The fact here stated is so evident, so undeniable when once apprehended, that it must at times have forced itself on individual observation. Am I, then, the first to teach, on the incontrovertible principle which this fact discloses, what is our process when we are using language properly in its relation to thought,

and what process is an abuse of it? I admit that it is quite unlikely I should be; and accordingly, when I came forward five-and-twenty years ago, with the pretension of having made a discovery, I was quite prepared for a denial of originality; and a denial soon came. A critic in the following year,² after highly lauding my essay, found its principal fault to be "its pretension to the character of a *new* theory." I expected, and therefore yielded to the rebuke. But from that time to the present I have looked about in vain for some one who had taught, or who teaches language to be what my doctrine makes it. Hence I cannot help thinking that the critic read and judged my essay under prepossessions he was unable to set aside—such prepossessions as led Dr. Richardson to animadvert upon it in the way mentioned above. And I am the more inclined to think thus, because if the critic is,

² Examiner newspaper, March 25, and April 1, 1832.

as I suspect, the same gentleman that has since put forth a very important and much valued work, he has shown that he did not understand my view of language to be essentially different from the common view, by having kept closely to the latter, while laying down the ground materials of his undertaking.

Looking to the difficulty which persons so acute appear to find in keeping one view of the nature of speech distinct from another which is quite different from it, I beg my reader to be on his guard against the same confusion, and to carry the caution with him while he proceeds with me.

I think it expedient to repeat a remark I made at page 47, and to follow it up by a similar example.

Artificial (instituted—rational) language begins by the evolution of an exclamation into artificial parts. An infant, say ten or fifteen months older than his brother who has just fallen asleep by the side of the nurse, toddles

into the adjoining room to make his mother aware of the fact. This he attempts to do by a subdued repeated exclamation that means "Sleep! sleep!" His mother replies "What, nurse asleep?" and his rejoinder is, "Baby! baby!" There is as yet, in these exclamations, no evolution into artificial parts: the one exclamation is indeed intended to explain the other, but it is only by being another exclamation with the same meaning. The approach may however be seen to the time when materials such as these will be joined, in order to convey the one meaning which they now separately signify. And what will be the effect, when, for instance, *Baby's asleep* signifies the same that *baby*, and that *sleep*, signified each by itself? It will be this, that each sign, till it joins the other, is the sign of a certain degree of knowledge which the infant learner has acquired, which knowledge is held abstractly from—independently of—the present fact, the knowledge, namely, of *baby* under

other circumstances, as well as that of being asleep, and of *sleep* under the circumstance of papa, of mamma, of nurse, of the cat, and so forth being the sleeper, as well as of *baby*. And these signs, whose comprehensive power is enlarged to an indeterminate degree by no longer being applicable to a particular occasion except when they restrict each other's meaning,—these signs, and signs like these, will go along with the infant to fix every future accumulation of his knowledge under its proper head—that is, as to the present instance, all that he shall hereafter know of *baby* more than he now knows, and all that he shall see of *sleep* beyond the cases which his present little circle supplies.

And how happens it that the human creature thus breaks through the bondage of instinctive or of emotional language to which, to the end of their existence, all other of earth's creatures are fixed? The cause can but be that which has been insisted on in pre-

vious chapters, that while to other creatures such knowledge as they require is immediately, instinctively given, man is left without knowledge till his reason is opened by occasions appointed for that effect; and reason once awakened, he invents or adopts rational language, not only to communicate, by adequate means, with his fellow rational beings, but to assist the steps of his own understanding. Till his reason is awakened, man's language, his first cry, is like that of other creatures, instinctive. It afterwards becomes emotional, but so does the dog's, whose varieties of cry often betray us into thinking there is more than instinct in them :—

*Irritata canum cùm primùm magna Molossùm
Mollia rieta fremunt, duros nudantia denteis,
Longè alio sonitu rabie distracta minantur ;
Et cùm jam latrant, et vocibus omnia complent.
At catulos blandè cum linguâ lambere tentant,
Aut ubi eos jactant pedibus, morsuque petentes,
Suspensis teneros imitantur dentibus haustus.*

Longè alio pacto gannitu vocis adulant ;
Et cùm deserti baubantur in ædibus, aut cùm
Plorantes fugiunt summisso corpore plagas.

Lucretius, de Rer. Nat., Lib. V., v. 1062.

Even in his emotional language, however, man far transcends all other creatures ; for, with him, emotions swell not, till reason has begun ; and those characteristics of rational feeling, the smile and the tear, though they come soon after the first month, do not, be it observed, come earlier ; the original cry is tearless, and the lips at first relax not, except to receive the food that passes them. With purely emotional language we make, as was said in an earlier page, what may be considered our first step in the practice of rhetoric ; and in evolving an exclamation into artificial parts, we begin the practice of logic. Let it not be supposed, however, that, subsequently, the one art is carried on independently of the other. For though rhetoric in her earliest practice is superseded by a rational

process, she immediately puts in her claims, and follows close on the steps of logic. She accepts the constructed in lieu of the original unconstructed expression; she utters it with the same emotive tone and gesture; and soon begins to find what a useful, what an indispensable ally she has gained. Our infant speaker, who has become a logician by the first or earliest step he takes in the use of rational language, does not therefore cease to be a rhetorician, either now, or ever afterwards, except when language is employed on subjects altogether abstract, and kept designedly apart from the feelings. But grammar, as was also remarked in an earlier page, has yet to be evolved: the artificial verb was not needed while the signs put together to form the expression demanded by the occasion were only two. But the same necessity which drives the infant logician to substitute for his natural exclamation a word constructed of two signs that convey premised meanings, will

afterwards drive him to construct each of these in the same way, and thus, when by this multiplication of parts, the artificial verb becomes necessary in order to collect all the parts mediately or immediately to itself, and imply, as often as may be judged eligible, that so many of the parts, neither more nor fewer, are to be received as *one expression with one meaning*,—then will grammar follow in the train of rhetoric and of logic. We are here admonished of these arts as they come into existence practically; and practice, it needs not be said, is, in all arts, born before theory. When, for the improvement of practice, theory is at length instituted, grammar comes first in order with its laws of construction,—logic next as requiring sense along with construction,—and rhetoric last, as bringing the frame thus put together and thus endowed with rationality, back again to receive the warmth, the life, the feeling, and, consequently, the persuasiveness of natural language.

To confirm these views, I proceed to show, by a few examples, the true and proper analysis of rational speech. As to such an expression as "Forgive!" though borrowed from rational language, it suggests its meaning without premises; and yet an etymologist sees that however this may be its present force, it originally suggested that one meaning by two premises. At present, the speaker in using it, is conscious only of one unconstructed word that at once denotes his one meaning. But possibly he may find it inadequate—he may not be understood as he wishes to be understood, and so he may be driven to construct an expression—thus, "Brother, forgive!" or thus, "Brothers (nominative) forgive:" or thus, "Forgive brother (fratrem):" or thus, "Entreated, forgive:" or thus, "Fully forgive:" or thus, "Try to forgive." Any one of these, or any one of fifty others, might have been his special meaning in using the single word; but since he could not make that special


meaning known by it, he now uses means to suggest what he wishes to be known, and these means are, in each instance, put forward as premises from which the hearer is to collect a conclusion, which conclusion is signified by the two parts joining into one whole, and each losing its abstract meaning in the less abstract meaning which they unite to express. The grammatical character of the structure, which, by imitating subsequent practice when parts of speech were multiplied, is, in every one of the six instances different, affects not the nature of the logical process as here described : this logical process is the same in each, though the sense conveyed is different, and it will continue the same however complicated the grammatical structure may become by making up each of the two parts out of other two parts, and these again out of further two parts, and so on till no more premises are needed to suggest the one meaning. And that this is the nature of, in connection with the structure

of, rational language, and nothing else its nature and its structure, will appear by comparing the ordinary method of parsing which prevails in schools, with the method which I have now to explain. As to the ordinary method, it is adequate only for sentences constructed of no more than two parts of speech, and is therefore adequate to the analysis of the six examples given above, but it is not adequate when the sentence is in the least degree more complicate. Take, for instance, the first period of the Lord's prayer,—“Our Father which art in heaven, hallowed be thy name :” —to begin the analysis with the part of speech *our*, to proceed to the part of speech *Father*, and so on to the last part of speech *name*, is as if we should begin the examination of any work of nature or art, by breaking it up at once into its minutest parts, instead of first surveying the large parts from which it immediately receives its form and character. It is evident, to proper observation, that the period

in question is, until we descend below the first division, a structure precisely the same as the shorter example, "Brother, forgive," consisting of a noun vocative, and a verb imperative. But then, in the more complicated sentence, the noun vocative is itself constructed, being made up of the substantive part *our-father*, and the adjective part *which-art-in-heaven*. Again, the substantive part is also constructed, being made up of the adjective part *our*, (specially called an adjective pronoun,) and the substantive part *Father*; while the adjective, *which-art-in-heaven*, is, in construction, a sentence made up of nominative and verb, the verb being made up of the mere grammatical verb, and of the adverb *in heaven*, and this last being made up of the preposition, and the noun objective to it. So again, the latter great division of the whole period, *hallowed-be-thy-name*, is a sentence the same in construction as "Entreated, forgive:"—this being subdivided yields, for the latter of its

two parts, a sentence, *be-thy-name*, which in construction is a verb imperative with its nominative in the third person; which nominative is made up of the adjective part *thy*, and the substantive part *name*.

The syllogistic process which I assert to take place whenever meaning is received from two parts of speech that are joined in order to express the one meaning, may be thus illustrated to the eye :



Here, on receiving the former part of speech, it is evident that if the hearer rests in its meaning, he understands the speaker to say just the contrary of what he intends to say. The suspension of voice, with other


rhetorical indications, will prevent this, and force the term to be received as a premise only, awaiting the other premise in order to suggest the conclusion. The lines drawn from the two parts of speech may represent this process: the points where they begin are two in number, but these points move down and become one at the angle of junction. And here I claim to make a passing remark on the Aristotelian doctrine of affirmative and negative propositions in the construction of the formal syllogism; which doctrine I assert to be a delusion, so far as it pretends to teach more than a mere grammatical difference. The term negative with regard to the foregoing example, (and the same could be shown of all so-called negative propositions that occur in examples of the formal syllogism,) applies to it only as indicating the effect which *not* produces on the term associated with it: as to the meaning which the terms suggest when their separate meanings have merged into that

one meaning, it is no more negative than the meaning of the equivalent expression "Stay." Assent and dissent have indeed their difference in the mind; but assent can be expressed by a sentence *grammatically* negative, and dissent by one *grammatically* affirmative; for instance, if it is said to me, "You are not an Aristotelian," I can assent by replying, "I am not an Aristotelian," or dissent by saying, "I am an Aristotelian."

In applying to more complicated structures the mode of ocular illustration employed above, I hope I shall be able to show how, by repeated steps, meaning is collected from premises, sometimes by successive steps, sometimes, in a language of different genius, by steps one of which is included in another, or that crosses another, till, at last, having arrived at two premises which collect the meaning of all the preceding, we collect from these two the one final meaning of the whole structure. But, be it observed, that final meaning may

be final only as regards the grammatical structure completed; since this structure may be afterwards used as a premise in connection with another premise exhibited in another similar structure; and both of them may be independent, *grammatically*, of a third structure which shall express a conclusion issuing from the sense which those two have suggested, to which single sense the last adds the limitation, so that the whole three, though distinct grammatically, are, logically, only one expression with one meaning. Such, in point of fact, is the shape in which the formal syllogism presents itself, our explanation of whose effect remains to be stated with more particularity hereafter. In the meantime, I propose to add further illustrations of the informal syllogism exhibited to the eye in the manner of the previous example. Instead of a single syllogism, which the sentence *Go not* presents, let us suppose a sentence whose ultimate meaning is gathered from a series of


Let us now see how the same meaning is collected from the correspondent sentence in a language of different genius :



Here, in receiving the premise *vosmet*, the understanding holds itself in suspense till the other premise shall be supplied. In the mean time, *rebus*, the premise of a second syllogism is presented to the understanding, requiring the same suspense on the same account. Then comes *servate*, the other premise of the first syllogism, yielding with *vosmet* the one meaning *vosmet-servate* : then *secundis*, the other premise of the second syllogism, yielding,

with *rebus*, the one meaning *rebus-secundis*. And now, from the premises *vosmet-servate* and *rebus-secundis*, we get the same one meaning of the Latin sentence that we received from the previous English sentence.


It may be as well to furnish another English and correspondent Latin example, for the sake of showing that in the latter language, different hearers will not always collect the meaning by exactly the same process. The same difference occurs, though not so often, in English :



Here, from the premises *there* and *is*, we

receive the one meaning *there-is* : again, from the premises *a* and *certain-pleasure-in-weeping*, we get the one meaning *a-certain-pleasure-in-weeping* ; but included in this syllogism, are two sub-syllogisms, the first having for its premises *certain* and *pleasure*, which yield the one meaning *certain-pleasure* ; and the second, *in* and *weeping*, which yield the one meaning *in-weeping*. And, lastly, the premises *There-is*, and *a-certain-pleasure-in-weeping*, yield the one meaning of the whole sentence.


The same meaning is collectible from the Latin sentence in the following way :



If we suppose the meaning to be collected

in the manner which the figure indicates, there is no difference between this and the Latin example preceding the last figure. For in receiving the premise *est*, the understanding remains suspended till it gets the other premise; and in the mean time, it receives *quædam*, the premise of a second syllogism requiring a like suspense. Then comes *flere* to complete the first syllogism, and then *voluptas* to complete the second, yielding the premises *Est-flere* and *quædam-voluptas*, out of which we collect the one meaning of the whole.

But the same meaning is collectible from this Latin sentence in the following somewhat different manner :



Here, though in the first part of the procedure, the understanding, as before, holds itself in suspense at the premise *est*, and again at the premise *quædam*, yet in coming to *flere* it continues to hold itself in suspense until *voluptas* completes the syllogism with *quædam*. Then, out of the premises *est* and *quædam-voluptas* we get the one meaning *est-quædam-voluptas*; and lastly, it is from premises a little different, namely *Est-quædam-voluptas* and *flere*, that we get the same one meaning of the whole.

The reader cannot fail to have remarked how tedious, in every one of these instances, is the description of what takes place. This is unavoidable. But, quite unlike the description, the acts of the understanding attempted to be recorded by it, are under-rated in saying they are as lightning,—at least with regard to the hearer or reader who is versed in the language, and in possession of the abstract knowledge, which, before merging into the

other parts of the sentence, or immediately into the sentence itself, the parts of speech severally denote. The schoolboy, indeed, who, in Latin, has to construe the sentence in the ordinary, but unavoidably tedious manner, and to whom the parts of speech, even in English, bring, severally, only a limited degree of that knowledge which will be accumulated under them as his experience increases, finds the process to be one of more or less difficulty ; but to others, it springs in successive flashes out of gradually dissipating darkness, till the last flash reveals in full light the meaning for which all that went before, was intended to prepare.

Language, then, whenever it makes thought known in such a way that the parts which enter into its construction, are separately attended to before receiving the meaning of the construction as a whole, does not stand for thought as a sign stands for the thing signified, *till the structure is complete*. The parts of that structure do not signify parts of the

speaker's thought,—thought has no parts,—but they are means used for recalling knowledge in the hearer, which knowledge losing its abstraction in proportion as the parts join to form new wholes, the parts now united at length indicate that special thought which the speaker desires to convey. Then, and not till then, when the hearer and the speaker have the same thought in common, may it be said with truth that the expression which has been formed is the outward sign of what, with regard to both of them, exists within. But among the causes which have prevented the world from seeing the relation of language to thought in this its true point of view, is the fact, that we do not always collect the meaning of a sentence from its several parts, but, being familiar both with the sentence, and its meaning as a whole, we at once receive from the one structure its one meaning. Who, for instance, has to collect out of the several parts the meaning of the common sentences of com-

mon discourse? Who thinks what *how*, and *do*, and *you*, and *do*, separately mean on hearing the sentence which those parts construct? Who does not understand, as single parts of speech, all the common combinations which serve to connect and carry on construction, such as, *in-consequence-of*, *on-this-account*, *under-these-circumstances*, *at-all-events*, *admitting-the-fact*, and the like? Indeed, we are entitled to say of ordinary common-place speakers, that as they scarcely use constructed language except in forms already existing, so, with them, each thought finds an immediate sign in some familiar sentence; but then, be it observed, the parts which compose the sign have ceased to be separately significant: the sentences so used have been brought back to the condition of original or natural language, that of exclamations,—they have ceased to be logical, by having become purely rhetorical.

The effect above described, as regards the familiar forms of constructed speech, is per-

fectly analogous to what had previously taken place as regards our perceptions, and is productive of a similar error in the doctrine engendered by it. We have seen that every perception at its first occurrence to the human being, was an intellectual act, such as, when words are subsequently instrumental to such an act, we consider a syllogism, informal though it may be. But that act having once taken place—the conclusion of the virtual syllogism having once been received—the knowledge having been repositied apart from its premises,—those premises, as premises, are no longer required; the occurrence of the sensation which entered partially into the proceeding, is sufficient to bring back the knowledge without renewing the act that led to it, and thenceforward the sensation and the thing understood, are one. Thus it is, as stated in former pages, that human perception becomes practically the same as brute perception, and the error engendered by the fact is, that from the

days of Aristotle—we may perhaps say from the days of Adam—to those of Locke and Horne Tooke inclusive, the practical identity of the two cases, has hindered the inquiry concerning the possible difference between them originally. So with regard to language, it cannot, I think, any longer be denied that the first time a child puts two signs together to express his one thought, he substitutes a logical for what, when he used only one sign, was a natural way of trying to make it known; and it cannot, I believe, be any longer imagined that either of the two signs is, separately, significant of his thought, or part of his thought, but that they are premises put forward in order that his one thought may be collected from them as a conclusion. As soon however as they are put together, they *do* stand for his thought, and the expression so formed may become a familiar established expression bringing back the thought every time it is used, without demanding a repetition of the logical

process that went along with it at first. In this way, then, language sometimes is, though it generally is not, related to thought in the same way that, in other matters, a sign is related to the thing signified; and the error of doctrine engendered by the fact is this, that again from the days of Aristotle down to Locke and Horne Tooke inclusive, it has been taken for granted that language is, in all its parts, and at all times, related to thought in that way in which, only under certain circumstances it stands related. Hence it is that the true nature and import, the legitimate use and proper operation of signs which are only *parts* of a word, and, in strictness, not by themselves to be deemed words, remains yet to be taught, or, at least, remains yet to be accepted. When it shall be accepted, it will reconcile Locke and Tooke to themselves and to each other, while it will make evident what both of them saw though they could not prove, and what men of strong sense, untrammelled

by academical learning, are always forward to assert, that Aristotelian Logic is, as I lately said, a puerile juggle with the forms of language, and the metaphysics of ancient Greece and modern Germany, a something which has seeming existence, only through favour of surrounding darkness.

I think it here necessary to re-assert, that what has been called an act of intellection, whenever such an act occurs, is inevitably what it is,—inevitable in the same way that a sensation is inevitable the adequate cause being present,—inevitable as an emotion is inevitable a sufficient cause for it arising. A real and an ideal sensation occurring at one and the same instant, was the cause of the first intellection by which the babe became conscious of existence, and the latter effect was quite as unavoidable as the two former. Just as unavoidable is every subsequent intellection of the human being to the end of life, let premises vary as they may. We are accustomed

indeed, when the process of reasoning, with regard to the choice and assembling of premises, becomes a work of art and prolonged labour, to speak of drawing wrong conclusions; but the expression misleads us if it induces us to believe that the essential act in each step of the reasoning process is a voluntary one, or that it can occur wrongly. With regard to that act itself, irrespective of the preparation made for it, it cannot be other than it is, and, with relation to its actual premises, it cannot be wrong. To understand facts or phenomena *as premises*, is, to understand the conclusion which they necessarily include; to understand a fact or phenomenon *as a conclusion*, is, to understand it in connection with premises that include it. How is it, then, that we ever reach a wrong conclusion? It may be done by using a calculus in the process, and using it wrongly, as we may perform a sum wrongly in arithmetic, and so get a wrong conclusion. But the majority of mankind are not ingenious

enough to substitute an artificial for an all-sufficient natural act,² and when they get wrong conclusions, which no doubt they do in too sufficient abundance, it is not by a non-distribution of a middle, or an illicit process of a major or a minor, but through the wrong premises which their ignorance, their passions, their prejudices, are continually throwing in their way. Even before the intermediation of language, our perceptions may be false because our senses may be diseased, and our conceptions wrong because our fancies may be disordered ; but in every case the act of intellection with regard to its suggestive occasions is right, and wrong only because those are wrong. And

² The formal syllogism is wonderfully fitted to meet the predilections of those gentlemen—

Who love, by geometric scale,
 To take the size of pots of ale,
 Resolve by line and tangent straight
 If bread and butter wants of weight,
 And wisely tell what time of day
 The clock doth strike by algebra.

very often when error is attributed to an act of intellection, no such act has taken place. We are plausibly told that a madman reasons justly from false data, and a fool erroneously from just data. Only the former part of this assertion is correct. The fool reasons justly from such data as his intellect can reach : what, to a higher intellect, appears a false conclusion in the fool's, is, in the latter, not a conclusion, because his intellect has not embraced as premises what the wiser man's intellect does so embrace. In other words, we are justified in calling a fool's characteristic actions or sayings irrational, not because they are wrong effects of a rational proceeding, but because they take place independently of any such proceeding.

And now, I must beg my reader will reconsider by the light which the present chapter is intended to furnish, the history, so often pressed on his attention, of the progress of our human state from unconsciousness up to adult

knowledge. Let him remember how the infant creature was represented to get its earliest dawn of thought; how real sensations are felt, but not understood—not known—till ideal states supervene; how these, in contradistinction to the real, yield the condition under which all thought takes place, namely, the co-existence of things having some relation to each other, of which the intellect is created to be cognizant; how the real and the unreal thus become a part of consciousness even before the outward world is known; how muscular action, resisted and unresisted, gives the next thought; to indicate which thought in terms correspondent to its first dim light, is impossible: it is, like the other, at first only a part of consciousness, the outward world being still unknown; how another thought occurs in this manner,—an event, say feeding by suction, now a conscious reality, takes place and ceases; conscious existence goes on, and the event again takes place; the thought

alluded to being generated by the events which form one premise, and the conscious existence between them, which is the other; this thought or conclusion also being, by its then dimness, far short of any terms that are fitted to meet its riper state; how at length the outward world revealed itself in the dim twilight of the next thought, suggested by solid substance that does not sympathize with the opposing touch, in contradistinction to that which does; the latter being now known as self, the former as the world beyond it; how this discovery acted on the thoughts that had preceded it, by referring the real to the outward world, and to self, existing in, and being a part of it, although that same self, by its consciousness and sensibility, remains isolated in the world it lives in; and further, how the unreal, the creations of which, by the operations of the real on the understanding, were constantly increasing, were referred to self, and experienced, except when the real

was excluded by sleep or other cause, to be essentially a part of that self; a microcosm or little world within, contrasting with the macrocosm or great world without; how likewise that which resisted and that which did not resist muscular power were also now referred to the outward world and known as Space-occupied, and Space-unoccupied; while conscious existence which went between events, was now itself measured by outward duration, and known as Time,—I ask my reader, while he recollects the statement in substance such as this in earlier chapters, whether it is not consistent and correspondent in character with what has been advanced in the present chapter, and corroborative each of the other?

I have further to observe that as thought began by the rising up of the unreal in contradistinction to the real, so it is carried on, and cannot otherwise be carried on, by contrast in particulars of the one world with the other: that is to say, every ordinary thought we have,

suggested as our ordinary thoughts are by what we see, and hear, and touch, and taste, and smell, finds its other indispensable premise in what we *remember* to have seen, heard, touched, tasted, and smelled. The friend whose presence brings with it the delightful thought of all his amiable qualities, brings that thought only by bringing before me the facts of our past intercourse, facts now become ideal :—the song which I listen to with delight, could not afford that delight, if the past notes did not remain in consciousness to combine with the note, the only note, that I really hear :—the object (suppose me to be born blind) which I ascertain by feeling to be a straight line or a curved one, a triangle or a circle, a plane or a solid, a cube or a sphere, could not, unless so small as to be taken into the hand at once, be ascertained to be what it is, unless those parts of the whole which the hand had relinquished, remained in consciousness with the part really touched :—the peach

which I taste, the rose which I smell, and which I recognise, be it supposed, by those senses alone, I could not so recognise if the real flavour and the real odour did not bring with them the ideal flavour and the ideal odour of past occasions. In this manner, then, is the ideal world ever present to consciousness in connection with the real world: and it is even more constantly present; for we can partially shut out the latter by excluding it from some of our senses, but the former remains not only in our waking hours, but, for the most part, and perhaps always, even when we sleep.

Now,—(unless it be a thought of the constantly recurring kind which is already provided with a constructed WORD, to the parts of which we have ceased to give separate attention,)—the process of making a thought known to others must resemble that by which the speaker came to have it himself. He places before them, not his thought—he cannot immediately do that,—nor yet parts of his

thought; for thought has no parts; but he calls up ideas which are common to them and to himself, in order that thought after thought may spring from these, till at length the desired state of intellect is engendered, and his thought is known. Till he comes to the end of his speech, whether its end be the sentence in progress, or require volumes for its development, we are not entitled to rest in the meaning, but must hold it in suspense for the junction of other parts, out of which junction, new meaning will spring, till the intended meaning is at last revealed.³

In the process here attempted to be described, it must be borne in mind, that the ideas which the speaker calls up in order to engender thought, are ideal presentations of real things, or of things, including fancied

³ The Bible is an instance: one part is meant to be taken with another, and the conclusion or spirit of the whole gives it the title of the WORD of GOD,—the one word with one meaning.

things, which are absent from sense; and that such an idea never finds a correspondent sign in an abstract part of speech. While we understand it abstractly, a part of speech denotes knowledge, but not an idea in the only sense of the term which the reader is requested to entertain. The part of speech, man, for instance, does not stand for any man in particular until we so apply it, and of course it does not stand for the idea of a man in our sense of idea, because we cannot have a clear idea of this kind, unless it be accompanied by every circumstance that attaches to a particular. What, then, is it but the sign of the knowledge which we have gathered from particulars, have accumulated under the sign, and now, until we join it to other similar signs, the means by which we hold that knowledge apart from—abstractly from—the particulars that suggested it. Let the fact be re-stated by saying that the noun *man*, in a detached state, does not signify a particular man, or the idea

of a particular man, but includes, or is presumed to include, the knowledge of what it is to be a man. So the noun *circle*, in an unapplied state, does not signify a particular circle, or the idea of one, but the knowledge of what it is to be a circle. Again, the noun *virtue* denotes the knowledge of what it is to be virtuous; and the proper name *John*, however it may be made to stand for my familiar friend under the particular circumstances of the moment as often as I have occasion so to apply it, yet, abstracted from these circumstances, and still remaining the proper name of that familiar friend, it denotes my knowledge of what John is, collected from, yet now apart from, all the circumstances of his life that my intimacy with him has brought before me.

Now with respect to names thus entertained separately from expressions into which, as indicated by their grammatical form, they are meant to enter, three important observations are to be made. The first is, that no such

name can stand for more knowledge in the individual who uses it, than he has acquired ; the second, that he may reason, or pretend to reason, from a name under which he can have no knowledge at all ; the third, that as an abstract name is not intended for meaning by itself, but to make meaning with other parts of speech, so, even when there is knowledge under it, we are not entitled to count upon it as the knowledge of anything existing, unless we can trace it to some singular existing thing or things. We may indeed, without such proof, substitute a hypothetical definition, and build our argument on this ; but then the value of the proceeding will entirely depend on the applicability of the argument, when complete, to matters of fact and practice. Let these three observations be repeated and exemplified.

First, it is evidently impossible that a name should stand for more knowledge in the individual who uses it, than the individual has

acquired. But this is to be remarked, that all knowledge which a name *can* include, is not necessary to its adequacy in coming to conclusions of limited extent. When we say, "a large man could not get through this opening,"—no other knowledge is necessary of what a man is, than that of the ordinary and less ordinary sizes of men. It requires other knowledge under the same name, to conclude that "man is the highest of the Maker's creatures here on earth;" and again, other knowledge to conclude that "man is what his education makes him." It is by continually hearing or reading the same word in different contexts that our knowledge under it, is widened, as well as by experience gathered from the things to which it is applied. How very limited is the knowledge which young persons entertain under innumerable words of very large abstract capacity, needs hardly be observed: for the process by which knowledge is accumulated is only in its beginning with them. And what

is that process but the method which Bacon shows to be the only true process, and which Locke's philosophy undertakes to trace from its beginning?

In the second place, it is possible to reason, or pretend to reason, from a name under which there can be no knowledge at all. We may choose, for instance, to speak of *Rotundo-squareness*; we may call it an idea, an intuition, or anything else that may help to hide its nonsense; and then, only requiring the first step to be given, the absolute concurrence of round and squareness, we may construct a system of which every following step shall be demonstratively consequential. What will be the value of such a proceeding, the reader is left to judge.

In the third place, even when there is knowledge under an abstract name, we are not entitled to count upon it as the knowledge of real existence, unless we can prove that a thing or things exist to which the knowledge

corresponds, or unless, if we define the term hypothetically, we can apply our demonstration with practical effect to real things. That, in pure geometry, there is knowledge under the abstract names a point, a line, an angle, a circle, and so forth, none can deny; but we cannot prove that anything exists in nature rigorously correspondent to our knowledge, although we can and do re-apply the names to the numerous individual things that originally suggested it. Now it is the possibility of this constant re-application of our knowledge to physical things, to things in nature, that renders valuable a demonstration from a thing metaphysical, a thing out of nature. No such re-application is possible when we come to such metaphysical existences as *matter, mind, God, spirit, infinity, eternity, absoluteness*, and the like: we cannot prove by any procedure of human science that these things exist: we can indeed readily indicate a multitude of things to which we apply the common name

of *matter* ; we can point to man as exhibiting in his discourse and actions what we call *mind* ; we can appeal, independently of revelation, to the wisdom and beneficence evident in the design of the universe so far as we experimentally understand it, as a proof inductive that a *God* exists ; we can believe in the existence of other intelligent beings than ourselves although we perceive them not, and call them *spirits* ; we are sure that, relatively to ourselves, many things are endless, are out-enduring, are without dependence or contingency—but only, we repeat, as regards ourselves : for as to infinity, eternity, absoluteness, put forward with pretence to higher knowledge, they are terms that do but hide our inevitable, our necessary ignorance.

We may further observe, to the same purpose, that though many such names as we have referred to, have no correspondence, in their abstract state, with anything that we can prove to exist, yet making sense with other

parts of speech, and so losing some of their abstract meaning, they are valuable elements in the construction of other names. We speak with sufficient intelligibility of “the infinite goodness of God,” of “his absolute perfection,” of “the mind of the Eternal,” of “the human mind,” of “the vast extent of matter” and the like. But when we presume on the apparent entirety of form and meaning of the parts entering into these expressions,—each of which so formed expressions, be it observed, is one expression with one incomplex meaning,—when, resting in the abstract sense of a part of speech detached from the other parts that take that abstract sense away, we attempt to raise science on such foundations as the Infinite, the Absolute or Unconditioned, the Idea of Mind, the Idea of Matter, and the like, each considered abstractly from all singulars existing in the visible, and the invisible but accredited world,—that is to say, abstractly from individual men, abstractly from God,

abstractly from spirits, abstractly from things differing in kind of matter,—when we attempt thus much, it may be confidently said that we are under the dominion of an enormous error engendered by a wrong use of language; and this wrong practice produced by a wrong understanding of the relation in which language stands to thought. Here is the source,—a source quite sufficient it is to produce the evil,—of all the systems which pseudo-philosophy has put forth to divide, bewilder, and misinstruct mankind.

But perhaps these systems would have had little chance against the common sense of mankind, if an organon or instrument of reasoning exactly adapted to them, had not existed from the days of Aristotle to our own. This instrument enables us to reason with parts of speech in their abstract state, so as to dispense with all attention to real things; just as, when we reckon up a sum in arithmetic, we dispense with all regard to the kind of

things numbered. It pretends to be the science of the laws of thought, as if there could be such a science without first rendering thought mischievously artificial,—as if there could be a science of natural thought, any more than a science of natural sensation, and of natural emotion. What formal logic truly is, may be stated in words that amount to its own proposition: it is the science or the art, which, in the use of language, *apprehends* parts of speech abstractly, and keeps them abstract; then *judges*, by two separate acts of comparison, that two of these parts of speech or the abstractions they signify, agree or disagree with a third; and, lastly, by a necessary act of *reason*, concludes that the two parts of speech or abstractions which have been compared with the third, agree or disagree with each other. For instance, let *This* (meaning this bird), *Swan*, and *Goose*, be the three abstractions, or *x*, *y*, *z*;—we compare *swan* with *goose*, *y* with *z*, and *deny* that they

agree by saying, No swan is a goose : we compare *this* with *swan*, *x* with *y*, and *affirm* that they agree by saying, This is a swan : and so we conclude inevitably that *x* is not *z*, that is, that the swan (*this*) is not a goose. The perfection of the art, and its adepts boast of that perfection, is, that it puts signs for things, and makes its conclusions depend on the form of the reasoning, and not on the knowledge of the things concerning which the reasoning takes place. Such, fortunately, is not the logic in use by mankind,—not even by the Aristotelians themselves when they step out of their colleges and mingle with the rest of the world. The logic which all of us use who use language, is an art which also employs language instrumentally in reasoning, but so employs it as ever to lose its abstractions as fast as they answer their end, while it never loses sight of the things, on and from the knowledge of which, the reasoning takes place. In this logic, as in formal logic, the previous

example is also a syllogism, but a syllogism rising out of previous syllogisms, all of which the last syllogism includes, while, throughout the whole process, the knowledge is presupposed of what it is to be a swan, and what it is to be a goose, gathered from familiarity with the things in particular instances. Warranted by this knowledge, we *affirm*—not deny—that No swan is a goose,—a conclusion that, in point of expression, arises out of the two immediate premises *no swan* and *is a goose*, each of these being also conclusions, in point of expression, from subordinate premises. The same knowledge enables us to affirm This is a swan,—a conclusion in point of expression from the premises *this* and *is a swan*, which join, and, as in the previous affirmation, become one in meaning. But we are quite aware, while this proceeding is in hand, so long in description, but in its acts like lightning, that the thought we propose to express is one, however we may be using many parts of speech to

construct a WORD for it. To complete this word—this one expression with one meaning,—we have now only to take all that precedes as the first of the two premises of the syllogism that will collect all the others, and then add the premise which will complete it, namely, It is not a goose, and the work is done,—As no swan is a goose, and this is a swan, it is not a goose. In this manner, we rid logic of the three operations of the mind by installing reason—the informal—the virtual syllogism, in place of simple apprehension or perception, and in place of judgement, while of course we leave her where she has always been understood to reign. In this manner, too, we rid logic of the care of looking after the affirmative or negative quality of propositions, leaving that care entirely to grammar. We also leave to grammar the useful terms *subject* and *predicate*, and, with them, the whole doctrine of predication.⁴ And, dear reader,—for we hope

⁴ Connotative and non-connotative, much lauded

we have made or confirmed you a Lockeist,—along with these, what a precious jargon do we at the same time get rid of,—Distribution and non-distribution of terms ; Undistributed middle ; Illicit process of the major ; Illicit process of the minor ; Mood and figure—Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio, Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroko, Feriso, Bramantip, Camenes, Dimaris, Fesapo, Fresison ; Categoricals, Modals, Constructive form, Destructive form, Ostensive reduction, Illative conversion, &c. &c. &c. ! In listening to all this, well may we, as I wrote many years ago, join with Mons. Jourdain in exclaiming—“ *Voilà des mots qui sont trop rebarbatifs. Cette logique là ne me revient point. Apprenons autre chose qui soit plus jolie.*”

There remains a remark to be made with reference to parts of speech not being nouns or

terms of modern invention, are also at the service of grammar, if grammar wants them : as to logic, they are of no use to it, when we leave Aristotle behind.

verbs infinitive ; which latter are indeed but a sort of nouns. As to a verb personal, it may or may not be a part of speech, since it is sometimes the whole speech,—the one word with the one meaning ; for instance, “ Come ;” “ Go ;” “ Esurio ;” “ Vixit.” Excluding verbs so used, and excluding nouns and verbs infinitive, our present remark is, that all parts of speech bear their inconclusive meaning in their very form, and yet, like nouns, they are signs of knowledge, but often of knowledge so excessively abstract as hardly to be definable. We are conscious, in using them, that they are not without meaning, but we wait for what is to be joined to them to know what that meaning will merge into. If any one says—“ I am employed in—” and stops short, we ask impatiently — “ In what ?” The preposition evidently yields no meaning in which we are satisfied to rest, and the remark holds good of prepositions, conjunctions, adjectives, and adverbs generally, and also of verbs personal, if

only *parts* of speech. In all of them, the grammatical form concurring with the very vague meaning which attends many of them when they stand alone, forces us to insist on a continuation of the structure which is to take their vagueness away. It is only when a part of speech has the form of noun or verb infinitive that we are tempted to rest in its abstract meaning; and where the abstraction is greatest, the temptation is often greatest, seduced, as we are apt to be, by the indefinable and obscure, into an opinion of the profound, the vast, the sublime. What an excessive abstraction we have in the infinitive verb, To be!—it signifies existence apart from anything existing. Does not every one of undeluded common sense perceive, that such a meaning would not for an instant be accepted as of the least value, if the relation of language to thought were justly understood? Seeing the abstraction to be the pure effect of the artificial structure of language, we should understand

the meaning to rest in the word, and be valueless until restricted by, or rather lost in some context. Yet upon this abstraction Hegel has constructed his system of philosophy, which explains the universe and all that therein is,—a wondrous web, woven

Out of fine cobweb, fit for skull
That's empty when the moon is full.

As a conclusion to these chapters, the reader, who was spared a preface, is reminded that the author does not pretend to have re-constructed Locke's philosophy, but only to show how it is to be done. "But if he knows how it should be done, why has he himself not done it?" Alas! he has done too much already to be easily forgiven. How does such a one as he, of small name even now, of no name at all before he took up this subject, dare enter a field appropriated by men who have gained the ear of the reading public, and are interested in keeping it? Is it likely they would

have drawn attention, by any notice of theirs, to a writer, who, while he had youth, and spirits, and time, to accomplish it, might have produced a work important enough to contend with—nay to have overturned—the philosophies, the logics, and the grammars of the day? Instead of assistance in this way, while the generality of periodicals have been content to avoid all aid by keeping a cautious silence, and ignoring the author, one at least among the number has stood between him and the public by designed and decided misrepresentation. In 1837, the periodical alluded to speaks of him as an author “endeavouring to revive the study of metaphysics, which the experience of ages has proved to be barren.” Some twelve years after, the same periodical, carefully avoiding any explanation of the principles of the author’s Logic, charges him with a design to cheat the public by substituting himself for Aristotle: and more lately, with reference to a work in which he tried to get the ear

of the public by couching his principles in a popular form, the same periodical, choosing to consider the book only in its character of Novel, finds it of course a very dull one, and dragging the author from under his disguise of editor, sets him down as "one of a little knot of curious speculators in that mysticism which in our day calls itself metaphysical science." In other quarters, indeed, he has not found such sort of opposition: nay, in stable works of high reputation, he is the subject of laudatory foot-notes; while, to return to periodicals, there is one which, some years back, said of his Essays, that "like all works destined to last and grow in favour, they are written for posterity:"—yes,

"The only way *his* fault to cover,
To hide *his* guilt from every eye,"
To shine, and not offend another,
Nor stir up malice, "is—to die."

THE END.

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