


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THESIS

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE REVISED MANPOWER POLICIES
IN THE NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES

by

Stein Wilhelm Weber

December 1983

Thesis Advisor:

Roger D. Evered

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Possible criteria for promotion are analyzed and the benefits and disadvantages of the notion of real competency are discussed.

The thesis suggests that the revision may contribute to changes in the adaptation of career officers to the military organization if a major portion of the officers take the opportunity early in their career to select a permanent residency and become less mobile.

The new regulations will probably relieve much of the dissatisfaction among career officer provided that the services do not have to use excessive temporary duty assignments in order to get important billets filled.

As a result of the study, several areas of concern with regard to the implementation of the revised policies are identified and subsequent policy actions are recommended.

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An Assessment of the Revised Manpower Policies
in the Norwegian Armed Forces

by

Stein Wilhelm Weber
Captain, The Royal Norwegian Air Force
Norwegian Naval Academy, 1978

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of

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from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 1983

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Revised manpower policies will be implemented 1 November 1984 in the Norwegian Armed Forces. The basis for promotion and rotation of officers and the structure of the military education are to be changed service-wide.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. GENERAL

Effective allocation and use of necessary manpower resources have become a challenge for all organizational executives and managers and continue to be stimulating topic for organization theorists and researchers.

Military organizations are facing increasing pressure from a complex environment, in which rapid technological developments take place, and different sets of values emerge among the workforce. The unique position of a military organization, in which the sacrifice of life is the ultimate request of the personnel, means that special attention must be paid to questions related to manpower policies.

Understanding of human behavior in large organizations and an appreciation of how the different elements of a complex system like the military are interrelated are essential in order to successfully plan and implement major changes. Both on the macro level and the micro level of organization behavior, there are important aspects to be considered by the military managers as far as resource allocation is concerned.

B. BACKGROUND

The evolution in the Norwegian society since the World War II has made worker participation in the organizational decision-making process and the ability to control one's working conditions an important aspect of the workforce.

The implementation of the Labor Environment Act¹ approved by the Storting² in 1978, has put various constraints on the employers as far as disposition of the personnel is concerned. The bill ensures the right to worker influence in the decision-making process, and it is considered to be a milestone in the process of increased worker democracy. This bill has in general been made applicable for the career officer corps as well.

During the last decades, the Norwegian armed forces have been facing increasing problems with too many officers leaving the services before retirement age³ and thereby causing difficulties in filling necessary billets with qualified personnel. At the same time, dissatisfaction with the rotation system and the promotion regulations, and a perception of inadequate compensation have emerged among officers. These issues have become important topics for

¹Arbeidsmiljøloven

²The Norwegian Parliament (Will be used throughout the text).

³Retirement age for military officers is 60 years, as compared to 65-70 years for other government employees.



the military labor unions, which has a major role in the context of civilian-military relations.

After a six year study initiated by the Ministry of Defense in 1977, the Storting approved in June 1983 a revision of the current manpower policies in the armed forces for the officer corps. The new regulation will be implemented 1 November 1984 and will change the basis for the rotation system and the criteria for promotion. They will impact the structure of the military education and provide an equal opportunity program for career officers' advancement. The current regulations were established in 1966 and have been adjusted and changed several times, but always part by part, without any revision of the total set of regulations.

It is thought that the revised policy will accommodate the military personnel better by establishing a combined mandatory rotation system with an application system, whereby the officers in the first part of their careers will be transferred at the services' discretion, whereas in the last part of their career, the officers themselves decide if they are to be transferred. However, any promotion in the last period requires that the officers apply for positions designated with higher rank in competition with other eligible officer.

The revised policy will formalize an improved equal opportunity program, with the intention that the best qualified officer shall be promoted, regardless of his or her background in formal education.

For the time being, the officer corps is divided in two categories, with different promotion criteria and career possibilities, based on the level of civilian and military education. The revised policies introduce standard promotion to the O-3 officer grade [Ref. Appendix A] for all career officers.

C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

The objective of this thesis is to review the possible effect of the revised manpower policies in the armed forces, and to stimulate the interest for behavior research in military organizations.

D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This thesis will analyze the revised manpower policies based on contemporary theories in behavior sciences and organization development.

The primary question is:

What is the potential impact of the revised policies on the individual officer and on the military organization's ability to achieve its goals?

Subsidiary research questions are:

1. What underlying assumptions are made about human behavior in organizations?
2. To what extent are they valid in accordance to contemporary organization theories (in specific with the regard to motivation and performance)?
3. Will the revised personnel regulations be likely to cause new problems,, or to emphasize latent conflicts within the armed forces?
4. Is resistance to the approved policy change anticipated and what can be done to overcome it?

E. LIMITATIONS

The revised policies will be implemented 1 November 1984 and empirical data are available only for the current policies. The analysis and evaluation in the thesis are based on several organizational models and research from revelant studies.

The predictions are made with the assumption that no changes will take place in the other components of the manpower, neither the civilians nor the conscripts, and that the current defense concept will be sustained.

F. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The thesis has been conducted as a case study. Information has been gathered through archival research, (mainly originally documentation from Stortinget, the Ministry of

Defense, the Services and military labor unions), and by literature review.

The quotations in the text from source documents in Norwegian are unofficial translations and the author's responsibility. The actual references to these documents are given with their original titles and with explanatory comments in parentheses.

II. THE CURRENT MANPOWER POLICIES

It would be beyond the scope of this thesis to present a complete description of the current manpower policies⁴. This chapter will consequently examine the current policies with emphasis on the promotion and rotation systems.

After presentation of the original policies as they were implemented in 1966, several major changes that have occurred since then will be addressed.

A. HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT

The current manpower policies were approved by the Storting 13 June 1966 [Ref. 1] after several years of planning and discussion. The policies were implemented 1 December 1966 and were perceived to give the officers better career possibilities and to accommodate the service better in their effort of effective manpower utilization.

As far as this thesis is concerned, the following two features of the current policies are of special interest:

1. The introduction of an extended rotation system⁵,
- and 2. The definition of the promotion criteria.

The first feature meant that officers would be transferred in accordance with the military's need, whether he

⁴Den nye Befalsordningen (BO) for Forsvaret

⁵Det utvidete beordringssystem.

was willing or not. The second feature was the creation of fixed percentages within each rank that would determine the number of officers to be promoted to next-higher level after a certain period of time. These elements and other aspects of the current manpower policies are described more in detail in the subsequent section.

During the 1970's the Storting made several changes to the regulations that were given in 1966, partly as a result of pressure from military unions, which had given high visibility to increasing dissatisfaction among certain groups of officers. These changes were mainly concerned with the promotion system and the structure of the career officer corps.

B. DESCRIPTION OF THE CURRENT POLICIES

The policies address the manpower structure of the armed forces as far as military personnel is concerned. The set of regulations that was implemented makes provisions for the way the officer corps shall be recruited and educated, how the manpower resources shall be administered and how the personnel shall be promoted.

1. Definitions

The officer corps is categorized in several ways, by function, by military education and by type of commitment to the military organization (i.e. worker-employer relationship), to mention the major ones.

According to their primary function in the organization, officers are categorized in three groups as shown in Table I.

Based on the nature of the officers' commitment to the service, they can be classified as career officers or as contracted officers. Table II summarizes the main differences between the two officer categories.

Based on the level of military education, each career officer belongs to one of four career categories (I to IV) that were established. More on this topic will follow in the subsequent subsections.

TABLE I

Primary Duty Category

Category of Officer	Primary function
Line Activity:	Planning and execution of military operations
Technical support:	Planning and execution of technical support
Administrative support:	Planning and execution of administrative support

TABLE II

Characterisitics of Career vs Contracted Officers

Characteristics	Career Officer	Contracted Officer
Committment:	Commissioned for service until retirement	On contract for a certain period of time, normally 1 to 3, max 6 years.
Ability to leave the organization:	After 3 months notification, provided that payback duty is done.	Bonus contract: after contract. No-bonus contract: after 1 month notification.
Ranks:	0-1 and higher	NCO, 0-1 to 0-4
% of officers in total force:	75.5%	24.5%

2. The Structure of Military Education

The military education that is provided by each service is given on three different levels. Each level qualified for entry to the career officer corps but gave the personnel different career possibilities. The three levels of military education are:

First level: Officer Candidate/NCO-school

Second level: Advanced officer training

Third level: Postgraduate education

For all military education on the first level the prerequisite is 9 years compulsory schooling. But the high level of general education among the younger generation and

the increased competition have made today's portion of those with university entrance examination high.

On the second level there are two alternatives of advanced officer training.

-The Officer School/Advanced Level and

-The Military Academies.

Both alternatives require completion of a military school on the first level. For candidates to the academies, a university entrance exam is also required.

The third level of military education consists of staff colleges and special courses, some mandatory and others not, both within the country as well as abroad. Attendance at the staff colleges are mandatory for all officers from the academies, but other selected officers attend in a limited number.

The regulations of 1966 did not allow women to attend the military schools, and this situation stayed unchanged until June 1977 when women became eligible to attend some of the military schools. Today, most of the military officer education⁶ in Norway is given on a non-discriminatory basis and women have got many opportunities for military service.

However, the legislators have decided that women are not eligible to serve in combattant functions, and certain

⁶Women are not subject to conscription but will from 1984 be able to participate as "volunteer conscripts."

schools and training are therefore still not open for women. The possibility of women serving in combat positions in the near future is not unfamiliar to the Chief of Defense. In a recent interview [Ref. 2: p.3] he said:

"I have no fundamental objections to accepting women in combat positions in the Armed Forces. They would perform several tasks-will rather say most of them-as well as men."

But since there is no military need for the time being for women serving in combatant positions, the Chief of Defense did not find it necessary to make an initiative for such changes.

The major part of the officer corps is educated within the military educational system. But for certain personnel categories, civil engineers as an example, the services use civilian schools and universities when necessary.

3. Promotion and Career Possibilities

When implemented, the current regulations established a system of promotion founded on two basic considerations: 1) promotions to a higher rank should not be linked to an assignment to a higher position, and 2) a standardized promotion pattern was desired.

All career officers belong to a certain career category, which is determined by the person's level of

military education or equivalent civilian education.

Table III shows the different career categories that were established.

TABLE III

Career Categories

Category	Service	Type of personnel
Career Category I:	All Services	Military academy graduates, and personnel with equiv. civilian education.
Career Category II:	Army and Air Force	Officers graduated from Officer School/Advanced level.
Career Category III:	Army and Air Force	Officers graduated from Officer Candidate/NCO-school.
Career Category IV:	Naval Forces	Officer graduated from Naval School for Branch Officers.

The career category determines the possibilities for promotion and subcategories within the services define with whom the officer will be evaluated when considered for promotion.

The previous promotion system, before the current manpower policies were introduced in 1966, had required the officers to apply for certain positions in order to be promoted. But from 1966 and up today, promotions for all ranks up to and included the O-5 officer grade have been determined by aggregate evaluations of officers in the

different career categories. The predetermined percentages for each rank has been used and there has been no immediate link to assignment in a higher position.

This system was not made applicable for personnel with the rank Colonel/Captain (O-6) and above, which continually have been promoted on a case by case basis, which by definition, does not belong to any career category.

The promotion procedure is as follows: Each year, certain officers are eligible for promotion, based on the number of years in service in the specific rank. For each career category there is a fixed percentage that can be promoted within each rank. Personnel with equivalent education and work experience are evaluated together. Among those eligible, and within the applicable percentages, the best qualified officers are promoted and then able to fill positions with higher rank. Table IV shows the predetermined percentages for each category that determine the officer's advancement opportunities.

TABLE IV

Promotion Opportunities in % of lower rank

Officer Ranks	Career Categories			
	I	II	III	IV
0-5:	60%	25-30%	*	25-30%
0-4:	100%	20%	*	25%
0-3:	100%	65%	Not to exceed 55% for both ranks	55%
0-2:	100%	100%		80%
0-1:	100%	100%	*	*
NCO:	*	*	100%	100%

* = Not applicable

There was a window of opportunity of three years in which an officer could be promoted. First, the officer was to be evaluated after a certain number of years in current rank. In addition, the regulations gave provisions for promotion 1 year sooner if the person had outstanding performance. Secondly, the officer if not promoted when his peers were evaluated, was entitled to an extra chance the year after, with the next group to be evaluated. As a consequence, an officer could be evaluated on up to three separate occasions, if not promoted the first or second time.

Those officers left over the third time, were not eligible for promotion later on. As result, these officers continued in their current rank until they left the organization, either by retirement or pre-retirement discharge. This system created the notation of "by-passed officers;" a notation that was seen as a contributing factor to dissatisfaction and low motivation. Intuitively, it seems likely that if the possibilities for promotions are explicitly not present from a given point in time, no matter what the person's performance may be, then some incentives to work harder will be gone.

4. Allocation of Personnel Resources

The principle behind the concept of an extended rotation system that has been practiced the last 17 years is that an officer is subject to assignments in new positions and to new duty station at the service's discretion. To the extent that it is compatible with the service's perceived needs, due considerations can be taken to what assignments and duty stations the individual officer wants.

It is the responsibility of each service head to manage the available officer resource. This allocation is done centrally by the head staff, and little authority is delegated to the local commanders in determining the assignments. However, as far as career categories III and IV are concerned, the unit commander has the authority to implement

internal assignments for this category within their primary function.

Inherent in the rotation system is the services' responsibility for the officer's career by providing qualifying assignments in a timely manner based on standard career patterns. However, the individual officer can influence the assignments to a certain degree by submitting designated forms for assignment wishes. An officer has also the right to have an ordered assignment postponed for one year (i.e. extension of the existing assignment until the new one is implemented). This right can be exercised on two separate occasions during the career, but not twice for the same assignment. The postponement rule is not applicable to temporary assignments.

Rotation of officers is generally done once a year during the month of August. Although there is no formal application to be submitted for new assignments or duty tours, the officer is entitled to give a statement of willingness to be transferred.

Duty tours are usually given as either temporary (i.e. six to twelve months) or permanent assignments. The duration of a normal duty tour differs within the range from one to five years and is given with a minimum and a maximum limit. As an example, a three to five years assignment

would mean that the next assignment can be expected after three years and before five years.

The administration of the rotation cycle can be divided in the following phases:

Planning Phase: The anticipated need for personnel next year is analyzed and a complete list of vacant positions to be filled is made. The phase is terminated by distributing the documentation that contains the announcement and specification of possible vacant billets.

Information Gathering Phase: Officers are given the opportunity to express their willingness to new assignments and duty tours by submitting written statements of their priorities for next rotation. The services also ask for up-to-date information about marital status, dependents under 18 years of age and medical/social factors that may be of importance to the staff when considering the assignments.

Preliminary Consideration Phase: The requirements for personnel are evaluated against the opinions of the active-duty officers and the prognosis of new officers from military schools. Prioritizing and case by case evaluation are performed, together with consultation with certain major command if deemed necessary. Preliminary orders are given.

Final Consideration Phase: After the preliminary orders are given, there is a stand-off period when requests for reconsideration are received and evaluated. Changes in the services' requirements also take place from time to time. The final orders are given when the revised requirements and officers' requests for reconsideration are evaluated.

Appeal Phase: If not content with the assignment given, an officer can appeal the decision to the Assignment Board. When the board has given its decision, the officer's final options are: 1) accept the assignment, 2) use the right to have the assignment postponed for one year (if not already used twice) and 3) leave the organization.

C. EXPERIENCES WITH THE CURRENT POLICIES

The services have experienced problems in the area of keeping the manpower up on a desired level. Losses in the career officer corps come from two different sources: 1) retirement, which is known and administered by the services, and 2) pre-retirement, which is random and not controllable by the military organization, but hopefully influenced by the manpower policies and working conditions.

1. Areas of Concern

The age structure of the officer corps has not been what the military has desired, i.e. a homogenous work force that would facilitate the military's need for upward

mobility of qualified personnel. With the predetermined percentages for standard promotion within the career categories, an excess number of officers have been promoted as far as the functional need is concerned. The large increase in the officer corps after World War II has created a tidal wave of retirement during the 1980's, and the services have emphasized the importance of an adequate relation between the organizational need for higher ranks and the promotion system.

Losses due to pre-retirement discharges have been noticeable for many personnel categories. The remedy has been to increase the capacity of the military schools in order to make up for these losses, but it turns out to be an expensive way to produce the necessary personnel.

2. Dissatisfaction Among Officers

The career officers have expressed their dissatisfaction with too frequent rotations and unsatisfactory conditions on many duty stations, especially the availability for military housing, work possibilities for the spouses and education for the children have been major issues.

The military has no legal obligations to provide military housing to an officer and the dependents. If government housing is available, the officer is charged a nominal fee for renting the apartment. Monetary

compensation is usually not given when military housing is not available.⁷ According to the Minister of Defense, approximately 60% of the existing military housing is 20-30 years old and below today's desired standard [Ref. 3], and it not possible to have enough available housing to meet the demand at any time at every duty station. There is however an effort to improve the conditions by building new apartments and remodeling old units, especially on duty stations where it is difficult to attract personnel.

The number of women having a career outside the home has increased in general, and the number of two-career families in the military (i.e. where at least one person is a military officer) has accordingly increased. This situation constitutes an obstacle to the way the rotation process has been viewed by the services. An assignment of an officer not only means relocation of the family, but also that the spouse has to leave a career and try to find work at the new duty station. Unfortunately, this evolution can be considered to have become a win-lose situation for a two-career family in the military, because the relocation usually means an advancement for the officer (i.e. winning), while the consequences for the spouse is having to up (at least temporarily) a career (i.e. losing).

⁷The regulations provide for compensation of extra expenses due to having the family living at the old duty station only if the officer cannot find civilian housing in vicinity of the new duty station.

3. Survey Results

An extensive survey by the Ministry of Defense in 1975 provided valuable background information as to what the officers' opinions and attitudes were in these matters [Ref. 4: p.3]. Major findings relevant to these were officers' general dissatisfaction with regard to the extended rotation system and its implications for family relocation and two-career possibility, and the fact that many officers contemplate the idea of leaving the organization to find other work.

In a more recent, but smaller study conducted in 1983 [Ref. 5: p.3], the same pattern was found. 61% of the surveyed officers agreed that they found the rotation system personally burdensome, and 59% were dissatisfied with the current standard of military housing. Approximately half of those surveyed contemplated the idea of finding another work. When the percentages are broken down by rank for this last question, an important difference becomes clear: It turned out that for junior officer (O-1 and O-2) the percentage was 75% and significantly higher than for other officers.

Differences within an organization's manpower levels have been among the consistent findings in opinion research, and personnel express usually more satisfaction the higher in the hierarchy they are situated.

D. CHANGES ALREADY MADE TO THE REGULATIONS

As a consequence of this experience, several changes have already been implemented in the manpower policies, some with a lot of controversy.

The window of opportunity has been made unlimited. All officers above the minimum required years of service in a specific rank are eligible for promotion and are included in each year's evaluation [Ref. 6]. The undesirable concept of by-passed officers was thereby eliminated and a formal possibility to promotion late in an officer's career was established.

The number of career categories has been reduced to two and advanced officer training has become a requirement for entering the career officer corps. Military education from the first level is sufficient to become a contracted officer as before. The reason for eliminating career category III and IV was to decrease the formal differences among the military workforce and to improve the officer corps in the future.

Military personnel previously belonging to career categories III and IV have been transferred to category II [Ref. 7] and given officer ranks (sgt, Vicesgt and Staffsgt to 1Lt, Lt and Cpt according to various numbers of years in service). The rationale behind this change was the perceived lack of social esteem and low status by part of the

NCO-corps, combined with the effort to create a more homogeneous officer corps. Promotion and career possibilities today are as previously shown in Table IV.

III. THE REVISED MANPOWER POLICIES

In this chapter, the revised manpower policies⁸ will be examined. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the presentation will not be exhaustive or complete. Emphasis is given to highlight the differences between the two sets of regulations as far as promotion and rotation are concerned.

A. POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS

First, the administrative and political process that has taken place in order to plan this change will be addressed, and then intentions behind the revision will be discussed.

1. The Decision-Making Process

The Ministry of Defense initiated the revisioning process 17 June 1977 by commissioning a special "Task Force"⁹ to manage the different activities throughout all services. Its mandate was to analyze the military manpower requirements and to make recommendations concerning changes in manpower policies of the officer corps. The task force has during its work been in contact with the services and the military unions.

⁸Den reviderte Befalsordning.

⁹Styringsgruppen (SG).

The report and recommendations [Ref. 8] were submitted 30 June 1981 to the Ministry of Defense, which held meetings with the military labor unions and asked the parties for comments and suggestions. As indicated before, the final decision in this matter was political and had to be taken by the Parliament. When the Cabinet had approved the Ministry's proposal 25 March 1983, the bill was sent to the Storting and is passed 31 July 1983.

2. Intentions Behind the Revision

The driving force behind the change in military manpower policy can be explained by reference to the internal problems facing the services with large pre-retirement losses, the unions activity for changes in the regulations and a political desire to implement certain principles in the manpower policies.

The Ministry of Defense has stated the following intentions [Ref. 4: p.37] when proposing the recommendations that now are approved.

1. The new system had to be at least as good as the current system, all things considered.

2. The revised programs had to meet the requirements of the military organization and to the maximum extent possible, meet the people's need as well.

3. The new policies had to be simple and not need major changes in the near future.

4. It was considered important to find a solution that would not restrict the officers to career categories as today. Emphasis should be on the totality of a person's competency, including formal education, experience and personal skills.

5. The military should follow up on the general social and economic improvements that have taken place in the society.

However, it is also explicitly stated by the Ministry that it would be a revision of current policies and not an introduction of complete new set of regulations.

B. MILITARY EDUCATION

Being the component that has significant impact on the main structure of the officer corps, military education was the natural starting point in order to obtain the desired result with regard to equal opportunities for higher education and promotion.

1. Functional Requirements

The primary reason for military education system is obviously to provide the organization with necessary officers with required training to fill vacant position, both peacetime as well mobilization requirements. Another reason however, and maybe equally important today is the personnel's need for learning and challenging career possibilities. To support the volunteer officer corps the services have to

compete with other government agencies as well as the civilian community for qualified manpower. Attractive education opportunities are valuable assets in this respect.

However, good reputation of military education may also have the side effect of creating competition from potential employers for the graduated officers and has turned out to facilitate leaving the organization before retirement. Certain payback periods have been used to insure some reasonable duty obligations for officers that are given military education and certain civilian education paid for by the services.

Through the military schools the candidates achieve formal competency and a foundation for personal growth, as well as a potential for useful and interesting experience as a career officer. Through the completed study it has been determined that the services need personnel with education on three levels within each duty specialty category.

2. Restructuring

A principle that will be introduced with the revised policies is that any graduate from one level in the military policies is that any graduate from one level in the military education system is eligible to compete for entry on the next level [Ref. 4: p.51-51]. Today, in contrast, only those graduates from first level that have passed the

university entrance examination are eligible for military academy, even though performance may be outstanding.

Military schools on the first level will consist of one year theoretical education and one year duty period with On-The-Job-Training included. The requirement for entry has been increased to 12 years schooling, of which the last three years' subsequently must be appropriate to the desired military training.

Advanced officer training will be restructured to sequential two-part academy instead of today's two separate schools with no interconnections. Academy part I and II will replace the current two alternatives of advanced officer training. Part I will be of two years duration, providing one year of general officer training and one year specializing in one of the three categories, line activity, administration and technical support. Part II of the Academy will also be of two years duration and may be taken by part I graduates (until 29 years of age) or directly following the first year of part II. This last possibility will be the equivalent to today's three years academy.

The staff colleges will be divided in two parts also, but the total duration will still be one year, as today. Part I of the staff college will be required for academy II graduates early in their career, Capt/LT (O-3) and open for other officers according to services' need. Attendance

at part II will be based on applications and those eligible are Major/LCDR (0-4) having completed staff college.I.

C. PROMOTION CRITERIA

All career officers will be promoted to the 0-3 officer grade, which will be the normal or standard level of promotion in the services. The existing career category classification will thereby be deleted and for promotions to the 0-4 officer grade and above all officers are eligible to compete.

However, the time it takes for an officer to reach this standard promotion level is determined by the individual's

TABLE V

Promotion Criteria under Rotation Based on Orders

Rank	First Level: NCO-school	Second Level: Academy I	Third level: Academy II
0-3:	10 years as 0-2	7 years as 0-2	4 years as 0-2
0-2:	5 years as 0-1	4 years as 0-1	Upon graduation
0-1:	1 year as E-6	Upon graduation	*
Sgt	Upon graduation	*	*

* = not applicable

educational background and differs from 4 years to 16 years. Table V shows the different requirements for promotion up to the standard level during the ordering system, and how

this is determined by the level of military education the officer has.

D. CHANGES IN THE ASSIGNMENT POLICIES

The existing rotation system has caused a lot of criticism from officers complaining about frequent transfers and assignments to places where they do not want to go, and at times that are not suitable. In theory, the rotation system is in effect until retirement, but this has been modified by the way it has been practiced. A general rule has been that elderly officers (50 years and more) if possible, should not be transferred to duty stations and positions they have not requested [Ref. 4: p.12].

The revised policies introduces the concept of a combination of two rotation criteria, orders and applications, closely related to the changes being made in the promotion criteria. When officers belong to the rotation system based on orders, the responsibility for providing qualifying positions and broad experience rests with the services. Consequently, promotion should be standardized and based on predetermined criteria, i.e. years in service.

1. Assignments Based on Orders

The services do have the need for a personnel management system that reduces the degree of uncertainty and enhances the planning potential of resource allocation. It is necessary that such a system also enables the

organization to adjust the allocation of manpower resources with great flexibility.

The reason for relocating officers regularly is not only to fill certain functions, but also to give them necessary experience and qualifications for other positions. This continuous process of experience gathering and socialization within the organization is a strong driving force behind the management of military personnel and the basis for promotions to higher command positions.

Early in the officer's career, he or she will be managed pretty much the way it is done today, at the service's discretion and with no formal application. The officers will belong to this ordering system until they transition to an application system in the last part of their career.

2. Application Assignments

The change will be felt in the last part of the career, where an application system will be in effect. During this period all officers with the rank of O-4 and higher will be responsible for any advancement and have the freedom to choose whether or not to be assigned, transferred and promoted. If they decide to continue in a certain position for the rest of their career, they may do so as long as the services can manage without using their authority to override the application system.

Any promotion in this part of the officer's career is determined by how well he or she can compete for the position designated with higher ranks. It will be up to the individual to make the relevant trade-offs between the pro's and con's with regard to promotion and future possibilities compared to the current situation.

3. Transition Criteria

There are two independent criteria that determine when an officer is to make the transition from the ordering system to the application system. It takes place when the officer either 1) is promoted to Maj/LCDR (O-4), or 2) completes the required years of service after reaching the standard level of promotion (i.e. Cpt/Lt (O-3)) whichever happens first. Table VI shows the predetermined number of

TABLE VI

Transition to the application system

Educational level	Number of years required
Officer Candidate/ NCO-school:	2 years as O-3
Academy Part I:	4 years as O-3
Academy Part II:	8 years as O-3

years required for transition to the application system if the officer does not advance beyond the O-3 officer grade.

Since the introduction of the application system for rotations was primarily a move to improve the social conditions of the officer corps, it was decided to assure a transition at least within approx the same time for all personnel. However, officers that advance beyond the standard level will automatically belong to the application system regardless of age, since there are no further promotion possibilities without competing for vacant billets.

4. Modifications and Exceptions

Obviously an unrestricted application system would probably not be possible to practice in order to achieve the military organization's manpower requirements. Therefore, the services have been given the authority to override the application system on several occasions.

In order to ensure that the personnel in lower ranks get the opportunity to have qualifying experience, certain positions have to be designated as temporary billets with a limitation of 5 years for one person.

Officers that might be become unfit for certain jobs, either due to medical problems, security reasons etc., can be transferred regardless of what program they belong to.

Likewise, officers in designated temporary billets that have not successfully achieved transfer by application can be reassigned by the services.

IV. ANALYSIS

This chapter will examine the possible consequences of the revised manpower policies with regard to the objectives of a military organization and their impact on the officers' motivation and satisfaction.

A. AN OVERVIEW

This section will discuss important characteristics in general of a military organization and briefly outline the specific background of the Norwegian Armed Forces with regard to political, strategic and demographic issues.

1. Characteristics of a Military Organization

Organizational behavior can be described by motivation theory, leadership and role theory, but they all have to take into consideration the special characteristics of a military organization. Intuitively, many people feel that characteristics like bureaucratic and authoritarian are related to military organizations. But in fact, hierarchical organizational structure, specialization and detailed regulations, which are some of the characteristics of a bureaucracy, are not unique to military organization, and can be found in any organization in varying degree.

The significant differences between military and non-military organizations have been expressed in several

ways, usually related to the mission and features of the personnel structure. As Lang has put it, the mission of a military organization can be described as "the management of violence" [Ref. 9: p.7]. According to him the military bureaucracy must be interpreted in terms of its ultimate mission of victory in battle, which makes it different from civilian organizations. The overall objective of the Norwegian armed forces is to preserve the national independence and security through deterrence. In order to do so, they must be able to promptly deter, limit or fight down various kinds of violations, and to offer the strongest possible resistance against every form of attack on the country.

Another important aspect is the extremely infrequent demand for the military organizations to perform their ultimate mission. Use of military power is usually a last resort in solving an international problem when other options like political and diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions and negotiations have failed or not perceived adequate. Many problems are caused by this disparity when maintaining a combat ready organization during long periods or relative inactivity.

All other professionals in the society are doing what they are trained to do and can test their skills and improve their training based on real life experience.

Soldiers and officers are educated, trained and exercised to meet combat requirements and wartime conditions, but at the same time with a hope that their skills never will be used. Some people feel that exercises and operational activities in peacetime are close enough to what they will be doing in case of war. But when the uncertainty danger and reality of war is considered, this is likely to turn out to be a misconception.

Great emphasis is put on authority and chains of command, as a consequence of the nature of the task and the conditions in a combat environment. The rank structure is another unique characteristic of a military organization. In addition to the hierarchy given by positions in the organization pyramid, the military has a structure or ranks imposed on its uniformed personnel. This structure does not necessarily follow the positional hierarchy, which means that officers, strictly ranked by seniority, have to function in structure of superiority as well.

Normally this does not create problems, but when the NCO-corps was terminated and transferred to officer ranks, additional problems arose. Many Lt/LTJG (O-2) that had been in charge of a unit with senior NCO's, found themselves in the position of being senior to a Cpt/LT (O-3) in the context of the work relationship, but still junior as far as rank was concerned. The conditions that were agreed upon

preceding this change were that the new ranks would not alter the NCO's functional role, but many officers felt that this situation raised serious questions about the importance of the rank structure being in line with the organization's need.

The military organization is not homogenous, and two distinct different suborganizations must be acknowledged: Combat units and non-combat units [Ref. 10]. This dichotomy is important to consider since their mission and means differ from each other. The same distinction is given by the concept of operational units and logistics/support units. These two subgroups in the organization have distinct characteristics and provide the personnel with quite different working environment, as summarized in Table VII.

The combat units have as their goal to perform the actual military operations while the logistic units have to provide the means thereto. With the exceptions of Norway's participation in the United Nations peacekeeping forces.¹⁰ the country's Armed Forces have not had any combat experience since World War II. This fortunate situation has not eliminated the importance of having an operational availability and a capable organization to meet combat

¹⁰ Norwegian United Nations troops have taken part in UN missions in Korea, Gaza, Congo and Lebanon. Observers have been assigned to duties in the Middle-East, Kashmire and in Yemen.

TABLE VII

Characteristics of Combat vs Non-Combat Units

Combat Units	Non-Combat Units
To plan for and to use coercive force	To provide (plan, develop, produce, purchase, distribute) resources for support of combat units.
Standard units with uniformed military personnel.	Non-standardized units with military and civilian personnel.
Authoritarian leadership style.	A variety of leadership practices.

requirements. But these requirements have been challenged by peacetime political, economical and administrative requirements. It is possible that during the process of maintaining the core mission of military and at the same time satisfy political pressure and internal power struggles, that short term trade-offs have been taken that are not beneficial in the long run.

New regulations and major changes have often been implemented in the armed forces by emphasizing comparisons with other government programs and the development in the society as a whole. The unique position of the services has not always been addressed properly, especially the impact of peacetime arrangements on the operational availability and combat readiness. Even though some

regulations only are applicable in peacetime and will be deleted in war, it is possible that they will be internalized and make it more difficult to achieve a rapid transition in a contingency situation.

The importance of protecting the credibility of the armed forces has been an area of concern for military experts in all cultures. To illustrate how the problem was perceived by another culture than our own, the following text is quoted from Sun Tzu [Ref. 11], the great military expert of ancient China (500 B.C.):

"Now there are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army:.... When ignorant of military affairs, to participate in their administration. This causes the officers to be perplexed. When ignorant of command problems, to share in the exercise of responsibilities. This causes doubts in the minds of the officers."

The question is not about political control and public supervision, which is both necessary and desirable, since the military profession exists to serve the state. But what kind of trade-off between peacetime and wartime requirements provides a defense that the country "needs," whether the criterion for evaluation is what is either best, sufficient, optimal, acceptable or minimum in order to achieve the national goals.

2. National Security and Defense Concept

The solutions sought by Norway to her security problems have been significantly influenced by the country's geographic and strategic position, as well as the experience from World War II. Strong defense posture and NATO-membership have contributed to a peaceful postwar period in Norway. Basic assumptions underlying the defense policy are still the ability of NATO to keep superiority over the sea lines of communications and an effective Swedish defense.

Being one of Europe's smallest countries in terms of population (and sparsely settled in the northern areas), but still the third largest European NATO country in terms of territory (with an extremely long coast line of 21.000 km), creates somewhat unique problems in achieving the objectives of preserving the country's freedom and security. The northern regions¹¹ of Norway represent approx 40% of the total territory and are considered to be the most exposed and vulnerable regions of the country, due to their strategic importance and the perceived military threat. Even though the southern regions are most important in terms of resources, oil drilling and related activities included,

¹¹ Finnmark, Troms and Nordland counties.

this assessment and subsequent defense priority is sustained, according to the Minister of Defense [Ref. 12] in January 1983:

"During the last 30 years we have been able to emphasize the defense of our most vulnerable region, North Norway. Several factors indicate that we should continue this priority..... All things considered, the conclusion will still be that northern Norway should be given priority."

However, only 12% of the country's population of 4.1 million lives in these regions. With the country's limited resources, allocation of military manpower based on all-volunteer force and standing forces is not realistic. It is necessary that the military defense concept is based on conscription, mobilization and a stable career officer corps.

Not only are there substantial implications for the defense planning, but also standing forces in peacetime have been and will be determined by this priority. According to the Chief of Defense: [Ref. 13; p.12]

"The northern regions of Norway shall be given military priority. The implication that the capability to resist an attack on the entire country as a part of an attack on Western Europe, has to be given lower priority."

Consequently, the services have to deal with a situation far from ideal as far as where the manpower is available and where this manpower is needed, is concerned.

They have to maintain a major part of their standing forces in northern part of Norway, based primarily on personnel from other parts of the country.

A different manpower structure with respect to geographical recruiting would relieve some of these problems. Reference is made to the Army's positive experience with increased basic military training offered in Finnmark, according to Col Bergerson [Ref. 14: p.10]. Active recruiting policy to attract personnel from regions where the military has problems filling the billets has obviously a potential benefit, but can not solve the fundamental problem. The benefits are to a certain degree counterbalanced by the fact that most of the military schools are in other regions.

The question of increased emphasis on local recruiting is related to the notion of a homebase for career officers; a duty station that the officer could designate as his or her final destination point in the rotation process. However, this previous suggestion to alleviate the problems caused by the rotation system has lost most of its relevance since the revision will implement an application system that is supposed to take care of these problems.

This political and military reality (population and defense priority, has been the foundation for the current manpower policies and must continue to be the basis for

revelant solutions to the increasing problems in the allocation of military manpower.

B. NEED FOR CHANGE

What are the problems that the revised manpower policies are supposed to solve? Whenever analyzing planned changes and their consequences to an organization, it is necessary to examine what the changes were supposed to accomplish and who the major actors in the change process are. Knowing the reasons behind a decision and the actors involved help in understanding the new system and can be used as guidelines in interpretation in areas with ambiguity or areas not covered.

1. Perceived Problems

There is no explicit objective statement in the official documentation, but between the lines of the stated intentions, the following symptoms/problems can be identified:

1. Pre-retirement of officers is too high,
2. Officers are dissatisfied and resist the rotation system,
3. Classification in career categories is rigid and limits many officers in their career,
4. The Quality of Work Life movement has gained momentum in the military organization,
5. Undesired results have been experienced from previous adjustment to the manpower policies.

Obviously, manpower policy is only one (internal) element that impacts the organizational health (i.e. ability to adapt to changes in the environment and goal achievement with due consideration to human resources). Important factors outside the military and beyond its control have significant influence on these matters.

Changes in working conditions (physical as well as managerial) in the industry and public sector have become a visible reference point for many people related to the military (officers and politicians). Autonomy, participation in the decision-making process and ability to determine or influence one's own job and work place are common needs for organizational members and has been a major issue in the movement of improving the quality of work life. Worker democracy and participative management are more and more accepted and implemented in our society. With the close relationship between the military and the civilian life in our country, changes in society tend to be an influencing environmental factor that the military organization has to adapt to.

Due to the unique aspect of a military organization not all changes suggested are applicable to the services, provided that the military's goal remains unchanged. The military organization can either fight pressure from the environment or accept it, or come up with alternative

solutions that can satisfy the environment and still be acceptable to the military.

Suggestions to introduce a labor union among the conscripts have been rejected by all services, since it is perceived that such a development would be detrimental to the organization. This illustrates a situation where the military was successful in fighting pressure from the environment, even highly visible political forces. But there are also several examples of situations in which decisions based predominantly on political consideration have been imposed on the services; major materiel acquisitions, to mention one. Few people question the fundamental principle of political control and regulation, but many feel that the possible gains by such decisions must explicitly be compared to disadvantages to the services.

2. Actors in the Change Process

The phrase, "the organization needs a change," is often used, but is always comes down to people feeling a need for change and initiating such changes. Several people, individuals and/or interest groups, have interests at stake when there are forces driving for changes in manpower policies in an organization. As alluded to in previous chapters, different players were involved in the process fo revising current policies.

For the purpose of this analysis, the players are as follows: 1) officers 2) the services 3) the Ministry of Defense 4) military labor unions 5) the political environment. This is a good example of the notion that people do the same thing (i.e. working to change the manpower policies) for quite different reasons.

The group that felt the need for change first and most intensely was probably the officers and their dependents, since they were the subject being relocated every 2-5 years. The possibilities for assignments considered unattractive (as far as place and time are concerned) may differ from service to service and also within different duty categories (operational, technical and admin). The common denominator has nevertheless been the growing dissatisfaction with a system perceived to put too much strain and burden on the officer and the family compared to the benefits provided and lost opportunities elsewhere.

The services experienced several problems in rotating personnel to places they were needed and by losing career officers in greater numbers than planned. In addition, the pressure from labor unions to improve the conditions for officers in the areas of rotation and promotion was increasing. These factors contributed to the services' position that a change was needed.

Labor unions are an accepted vehicle for putting forward needs and requirements for military career personnel¹² in the Norwegian armed forces. Since the military labor unions represent different groups of officers they have different objectives and special interests, although they do have goals in common. Some of these areas in which there are major differences in opinions according to the unions' comments to the proposed changes, are: 1) The standardized promotion level, Cpt/LT (O-3), 2) Restructuring of the military academies, and 3) The concept of real competency as the basis for evaluation for promotion. Even though there are strong differences in attitudes towards the new regulations, the Ministry of Defense found that the parties have reached the point where nothing more would be gained through continuing discussions.¹³ It decided to put the matter for the parliament since all parties did agree that the change was needed and better than current regulations [Ref. 4: p.6].

¹² Conscripts are not allowed to unionize. They have a separate ombudsman system within the services in which issues concerning economic compensation, dress and leave regulation etc are discussed with both military and political authorities.

¹³ Changes in manpower policies as far as promotion and rotation regulations are concerned are not an issue open to negotiations between the government and unions. However, this governmental prerogative was conducted with opportunities for all parties to give their opinions.

The political environment has obviously decisive impact on the military organization, since the armed forces are controlled politically through a civilian Minister of Defense who is a cabinet member, while the Chief of Defense is the top career officer in charge of military defense, whose command structure is based on service integration. This important feature promotes trust and confidence among the public and can help explain the strong and consistent support by the population toward military defense through the last decades.

C. EMPLOYMENT RELATION

A general trend in our society is that new value systems have emerged and challenged both tradition and authority. There is a growing concern about arbitrary treatment from managers and a reaction to traditionally accepted organizational structures and policies. The emphasis is on the individual's right to influence his or her life and working conditions.

The status of the officer corps has changed the last three decades, at least according to attitudes among some of the military personnel themselves. When the NCO-corps was incorporated in the officer corps in 1975, one of the main arguments was the perceived lack of social status of being a NCO throughout one's career in the military.

First, some theoretical constructs will be discussed with regard to differences in the relationship between the organization and its member. To better understand changes that have taken place in the society, and the impact of these trends on the military organization, it is useful to elaborate on the relationship between an organizational member, the work being done and the organization this person belongs to. Second, the impact of the revised regulations for the manpower structure in the services will be addressed with emphasis on difference in personnel adaptation.

1. Selection of Employer

Theoretically, there exists several different kinds of relationship between people, their work and the organization they belong to. One can choose specific work or a specific organization in order to: (1) to serve the organization (i.e. to adapt a set of values higher than one's self-interest), (2) to gain individual reward or fulfill self-interest, or (3) because one feels a special responsibility to the task or job itself.

On this basis, the following differentiation [Ref. 15: p.2] between three types of manpower relationship can be made: 1) a calling, 2) a profession, and 3) an occupation. This classification is relevant to the discussion of the differences in what motivates people in work settings.

A calling is characterized by an emphasis on the institutional values and objectives. The members accept the sacrifice of individual self-interest in favor of complete dedication to the required role in the organization. This sacrifice is being highly evaluated by the rest of the society and this compensates the lack of monetary reward for the members. The following well-known phrase expresses the essential aspect of this kind of relationship:

"Ask not what the country can do for you-ask what you can do for your country." [Ref. 16]

Examples of organizations where calling is more or less the fundamental relationship between a member and the organization itself are the Salvation Army, monasteries and the Peace Corps.

A profession is tied to certain skills and expertise achieved after long and formal training and experience. It is characterized by the emphasis on improving professional skills and career achievement. The task itself is regarded to be something special and has overall importance. The workers feel a great responsibility towards their profession. Examples of professions, which have their own code of ethics regardless of organizational membership, are physicians and psychiatrists.

An occupation is a relationship that has emerged in our industrialized society where labor is subject to buying

and selling like any other commodity. The market, i.e. the demand and supply for labor, is supposed to establish the fair and reasonable price (monetary reward) for certain skills. In this setting, the self-interest is the high priority item, and not the organization's objectives, nor the task itself.

The new attitude towards one's job and the organization to which one belongs in general is well captured by the following excerpt from Alvin Toffler [Ref. 17: p.149] when he says:

"Thus we find the emergence of a new kind of organization man—a man who, despite his many affiliations, remains basically uncommitted to any organization. He is willing to employ his skills and creative energies to solve problems with equipment provided by the organization, and within temporary groups established by it. But he does so only so long as the problems interest him. He is committed to his own career, his own self-fulfillment."

These different finds of relationships between the worker-the organization-the task are clearly idealized. Since such ideals seldom exist in the real world, usually different combinations of these three relationships will be found. However, the above terms are useful when explaining and predicting the impact of changes in labor relations as far as motivation is concerned.

How can the military manpower fit this classification? The concept of a citizen soldier is traditionally related

to the system of conscription and mobilization, and the characteristics of a calling would be desirable from the organization's point of view. The majority of the soldiers find the required 12-or-15-month service acceptable, but the demands for social and economical improvements are showing some influence of non-calling considerations, which in many cases also help to reduce dissatisfaction and problems that are easily caused by this temporary duty.

The officer corps has maintained a high standard and required long training and diversified experience among its members. Military science is:

"an area in which specialized competence acquired by professional training and expertise is necessary for decision and action." [Ref. 18: p.37]

The concept of a profession is a reasonable one for the officers, although increasingly challenged by the occupational aspects of the work.

The characteristics of calling (patriotism) and professionalism (military expertise) have been dominant in the officer corps after World War II, but have certainly been challenged by occupational aspects. There is no indication that this trend is going to change in the near future and the services have to realize that for many people the military is in a competitive position in relation to

other employing organizations that have significantly more flexibility in the way they compensate and motivate their members.

There are however some differences in attitudes among the younger generation and the elder cohorts of the workforce. Research seems to indicate that postmaterialistic values are more likely among young people than those that have been in the work force for a while. Among the republics of six West European countries surveyed by Ronald Inglehart older groups- quite overwhelmingly- gave top priority to economic and physical security, while the younger age groups were far likelier to emphasize postmaterialist values [Ref. 19: p.256]. Self-realization and opportunities to get a challenging job seem to be more important to these people compared to a secure job. The question is whether this change if the bad economic situation continues. Officers' dissatisfaction with the rotation system and monetary compensation seems to fit these general findings.

Other factors important in this context are the officer's overall commitment to the organization and the job, as well as the opportunities offered outside the military community. In addition to potential careers outside, external factors include the officer corps' status in the society as a whole. Obviously there have been changes in status of the military and the officer corps, as can be seen

by increasing numbers of conscientious objectors¹⁴ to military service, media coverage of sensitive military issues and the fact that the senior NCO's felt they lacked social status as a group.

However, other factors indicate that military defense still has strong support among the public as shown by independent polls about military defense and NATO-membership. Recent surveys [Ref. 20: p.11] found that 87% of those questioned felt that Norway should have a military defense. 82% was willing to fight for the country if necessary, which is a very high figure, even in an international¹⁵ context.

The number of young people seeking military education is also very high and the services have usually no problem in selecting qualified cadets to their schools. How much of this is due to commitment to military service relative to how much is caused by the difficulties in the labor market is still an unanswered question. There is reason to say that the problem is not to recruit career officers but to keep career officers in service once they have gained

¹⁴ According to Norwegian Law, a conscript has the right to be excepted from compulsory military service if there exist grounds to assume that he cannot do such service in any form without coming into conflict with his serious conviction. If such right is granted, the person has an obligation to do non-military community service instead.

¹⁵ A total of 12 countries were surveyed and other scores to this particular questions were: Sweden=77%, USA=71%, Germany=35%, Italy=28% and Japan=22%.

adequate training and experience making them suitable for a career in the industry and public sector.

As a pertinent example of this situation is the conditions concerning military pilots, which have become a significant problem due to opportunities as commercial pilots with pay and benefits that the military cannot match. According to the Inspector General for the Air Force:

[Ref. 13: p.19]

"The trend in recent years has shown that near 100% of career military pilots leave the service after the payback period is over."

The fact that there is only one institution for pilot training in the country has resulted in an unusual situation where the Air Force in fact provides pilots for its own use and for the commercial airlines as well. This major contribution to the civilian community and national economy is a valuable Public Relation asset, but in terms of internal manpower allocation this situation creates difficulties and has significant impact on the operational availability of one of the "arrows" in the country's defense.

2. Organizational Adaptation

Another aspect of organization behavior is how people adapt or adjust to an organization once they have decided to enter or remain in it. The way members identify

themselves with an organization has significant impact on the overall performance of the organization. Alvin Gouldner has, through research in this area, categorized the nature of adaptation by identifying two social roles that tend to emerge in organizational settings [Ref. 21]. The two roles, cosmopolitans and locals, are extremes of a continuum and based on three independent variables: loyalty to the employing organization, degree of professionalism and the members' reference group. Table VIII shows the two roles and their characteristics.

TABLE VIII

Social Roles in the Organization

Role	Characteristics
Cosmopolitians:	1) Low on loyalty to the employing organization, 2) High on commitment to professionalism, 3) Likely to use an outer reference group.
Locals:	1) High on loyalty to the employing organization, 2) Low on commitment to professionalism, 3) Likely to use an inner reference group.

With reference to the officer corps, the autonomous local units correspond to Gouldner's notion of employing organization, and the inner reference group to the group of

people that work there. The majority of the career officers are only temporary at a specific duty station, in contrast to the civilians in the organization, who tend to be less mobile.

This model suggests that career officers, since their relationship with a certain local unit is only temporary and since they are relocated on a regular basis, tend to be towards the cosmopolitan role than the local. They are committed to the service and the officer profession and likely to use colleagues in the officer corps as their reference group which they feel it is important to be recognized by.

This characterization of career officers is made relative to the civilians in the services. Most of them... stay with a local unit for a longer period of time than the officers, and they usually have their permanent residency in the area. It can be expected that civilians are more motivated by local conditions and that they are more towards the local role than the cosmopolitan, with high loyalty to the organization they work in and with tendency to use other people in this organization as their reference group.

There are of course differences within each category and deviations can be explained with reference to certain subgroups in each major category. Younger officers have experience from less number of duty stations than

senior officers and may have a more local orientation. Some of the civilians who work in the military are spouses to officers and therefore have changed employing organization more often than other civilians. These people may adapt a less local role in the organization than their colleagues. Officers in combat units may have different adaptation than officers in non-combat units due to differences in the work environment.

However, the notion of cosmopolitan versus local orientation is useful to explain how officers adapt to the services, and to point out some differences with regard to other members of the military organization. Lack of empirical data makes it difficult to express conclusive assessment of organizational adaptation among career officers.

The revised manpower policies, especially the earlier transition to an application system where officer have the opportunity to settle down with a given rank and position, may change the patterns of organizational adaptation. Even with sufficient competition for higher positions, it is possible that many of the officers will in the future be less mobile than today. When staying with a local unit for an extended period, it is likely that these officers become more locally oriented than if they had changed work environment regularly.

Such a development would be an advantage to the local unit, since they often suffer from too frequent rotation of military personnel, which contributes to deficiencies in the unit's "corporate memory." The costs to the organization due to frequent changes is difficult to quantify, but there is no doubt that much of the problems related to lack of continuity in the corporated memory is taken care of by the civilians in the organization.

There is however another factor that has to be considered in this regard. Many of today's difficulties related to changes in resource allocation are caused by forces for local optimalization against optimalization for the military organization as a whole. In order to increase the total effectiveness of the services, it may be rational policy to integrate certain units, reorganize command structure etc. but this means that somebody (officers and/or units) will lose power and get their tasks reduced. In addition, the service may feel pressure from local communities as well if such communities are affected by the proposed changes. Local orientation in this case will work against a cosmopolitan view.

Local orientation is necessary for all organizational members, officers included, in order to do the assigned job well. It is equally important to be able to have a cosmopolitan orientation when the situation calls

for it. The change in manpower policies might be beneficial for local units that will get more continuity by less frequent rotation. It may in the long run increase problems with implementation of service wide rationalization efforts.

If the assumption made by the task force [Ref.4: p.57] that no significant change in the numbers of transfers of officers will take place turns out to be correct, the consequences are more uncertain.

D. MOTIVATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR

The reason for modelling human behavior in general and in organizational context specifically, is to be able to understand something that happened (the past), and thereby manipulate the situation (today) and to predict what will happen (in the future).

The question of explaining human behavior has been approached in several ways: 1) from an individual perspective, 2) from a group perspective and 3) from a system perspective. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to make an exhaustive presentation of this body of knowledge, and reference is made to Warner Burke pertinent resume [Ref. 22]. The models and theories that the author has found useful in his research will be discussed in the subsequent subsections.

1. Theoretical Framework

Early motivation theory has been approached in several ways and Charles Handy [Ref. 23: p.24-25] has

provided the following classifications: 1) satisfaction theories, in which a satisfied worker will be a productive worker, 2) incentive theories, in which a worker is assumed to work in order to obtain certain rewards (money), 3) intrinsic theories, that suggests that man will work best when given a job that he or she sees as worthwhile.

There is little research that supports the satisfaction theories proposing that increased productivity will follow increased satisfaction. However, it is likely that a satisfied member tends to stay in the same organization. The economic model of a man implies that people will work harder when such behavior is related to obtaining certain desired rewards, mostly monetary rewards. The incentive theories are considered most appropriate for people in a situation like an owner or manager of smaller business type organizations.

As far as intrinsic models are concerned, Maslow's hierarchy of needs is probably one of the best known explanations of the driving forces in human behavior. Maslow describes the human needs through a five-level hierarchy of needs [Ref. 24], in which a next-higher level need will not be experienced until the previous level(s) have been satisfied. Table IX, adapted from W. Warner Burke [Ref. 22] shows the relationship between the different levels of needs and corresponding goals. This model assumes that

people progress through all levels of needs on a continuous basis and that the lowest level of unsatisfied needs will be the dominating motivating force.

TABLE IX

Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs

Level of Need	Goals
Need for self-actualization:	Autonomy on the job, opportunity to determine criteria for job and effectiveness
Need for ego and status:	Title, office space and location, promotion
Social needs:	Being part of work team, accepted and belonging to social groups
Security and safety needs:	Seniority, salary, fringe benefits
Physiological (basic) needs:	Clean and safe working conditions, necessary living standard

Hertzberg, which also is a representative of behavior scientist explaining human behavior from an individual perspective, differs from Maslow with respect to the continuous progress through the hierarchy. Hertzberg's two-factor theory [Ref. 25] proposes that only higher-order needs (Maslow's self-actualization and esteem levels) provide motivation (motivators), and that lower-order needs (Maslow's physiological and security levels) simply reduce dissatisfaction (hygiene factors). This distinct difference in the

nature of human needs has important implications for managers, since meeting lower-order needs according to this model, can only avoid or reduce dissatisfaction, not motivate the organization members.

The hygiene factors according to Herzberg have also another important aspect; the escalating effect. The effect of improvements in the hygiene factors seems to last a limited period of time unless repeated or reinforced. What has been given in pay increases and better physical conditions seems to create expectations of more improvement. Hygiene factors are necessary conditions for successful motivation, and answer the question "Why work here?," in contrast to the question "Why work harder?," which is answered by the motivators.

A model that is especially useful in organizational context is McClelland's theory of motivation [Ref. 26]. He grouped human needs in three categories and explained behavior in terms of different need profiles. Table X shows the three needs; affiliation, achievement and power, and the corresponding motivating factors.

These three needs are influenced by the person's position in the organization. Junior officers are likely to score higher on achievement and lower on power than senior officers, whereas senior officers can be expected to put more emphasis on power and less on achievement. Junior

TABLE X

McClelland's Theory of Motivation

Needs	Goals
Need for affiliation:	Social belonging and group maintenance, Seeking human relations.
Need for achievement:	Desire to perform individually, to do a good job, feed-back seeking.
Need for power:	To influence others, be a leader/in charge, to do things through others, seeking information.

officers' job are to perform individually, while senior officers are in a position that requires that they have to rely on others to actually do much of what they are responsible for, since they simple cannot do everything themselves. This does not necessarily mean that the needs change, but that a person may be able to satisfy needs differently when in a higher position in the hierarchy. A senior officer may get the need for achievement satisfied outside the organization, through personal involvement in charity organizations, community service and similar activities.

The need for achievement has been an extensive research topic, and some of the major elements of the achievement motives have been found to be: 1) work

orientation, 2) mastery and 3) competition, according to Janet Spence's work [Ref. 27]. Her research showed strong correlation between successfully organizational members and work orientation and mastery, but surprisingly not with competitive attitude.

It is appropriate at this point to address an alternative approach to traditional motivation theories. Some researchers feel that traditional theories do not adequately explain the complex interrelation between people, their behavior and the situation in which this takes place.

Organizational behavior was first explained with reference to the individual's different attributes; typical forms of behavior was found to correlate with certain personality traits. These personality theories had their basis in psychology and focused on the individual, not the environment.

On the other hand, the situation theories emphasized the importance of what context the behavior took place. They found it more useful to explain organizational behavior by taking into account the situational aspect, which consequently made people viewed as rather passive and reactive to external stimuli.

Both schools of thought have drawn criticism from interactional psychology [Ref. 28], whose approach is to synthesize both ways of thinking by analyzing the person

and the situation as a whole. The interactionist perspective has been presented [Ref. 29] as follows:

"It is my argument that both the trait and the situationist positions are inaccurate and misleading and that a position stressing the interaction of the person and the situation is both conceptually satisfying and empirically warranted."

This theory states that the two elements cannot be separated, and that people are both reactive and proactive.

"Situations are as much a function of the person as the person's behavior is a function of the situation."

What characterizes people according to interactional psychology is their ability to locate themselves in environments that corresponds to their behavioral preferences. The implication is that a situation has to be viewed, not as an objective reality but dependent on the individual and how he or she perceives it.

2. Monetary Compensation in the Military

Career officers are paid a fixed monthly salary determined by the government paygrades. In addition to this basic pay, there are extra allowance for uniform expenses and a general compensation for conditions related to military career. Officers are entitled to a variety of extra allowances and/or compensations when assigned to extra duty and performing certain tasks (duty officers, parachute jumps, flight crew members, exercises, etc.).

Some of these allowances are fixed amounts and some variable according to the individual's paygrade. Naval officers are given certain tax reduction in their pay when on sea duty.

Basic pay is directly linked to the individual officer's rank. At first, it seems fair and reasonable that a senior officer has higher pay than those his or her junior. But on the other hand personnel with extraordinary duties and burden should be adequately compensated, which in certain cases mean that a junior officer may earn more than the senior officers.

Career officer's economical conditions are subject to negotiations between the government and the military labor unions. There are basically 3 ways to obtain a pay increase for the officer corps: 1) To increase the existing amount of Norwegian "Kroner" in specific paygrades, 2) To designate a higher paygrade to certain ranks, and 3) To reduce the number of years required for promotion (in a system with standardized promotion level). All 3 approaches have been used with success as far as improving the officers' salaries and keeping up with comparable billets in other government agencies.

Pay is normally accepted as a hygiene factor since it is not related to a person's performance. According to

the two-factor theory insufficient pay will cause dissatisfaction, but increased pay will not cause increased motivation.

In contrast, rank is a sign of successful accomplishment and a status symbol. Promotions and the opportunities for promotion will make people motivated, not because of the value as a status symbol, but because of the opportunities for self-realization and personal achievement. Since these two different kinds of needs are directly linked, and since the goal is to increase the economical conditions, there is a tendency that rank becomes more a hygiene factor.

Difficulties in the national economy have made government spending an important issue in the political discussion and emphasized the military's need to compete with other government programs and agencies for budget "kroner." There is pressure on the services to improve efficiency within existing budgetary limits and to implement a strict priority on their activity. When the "Labor Environment Act" was passed, the impact was unknown quantitatively (i.e. what the result would be in terms of money), but the qualitative impact was clear; the manpower resource would be more expensive than it used to be.

Faced with the need to save money, regulations provide for compensation to officers due to extra duty and

exercises to be given as extra leave instead of monetary compensation. This obviously reduces the amount of budget "kroner" spent on pay, but on the other hand this reduces the available manpower and thereby lowers the level of activity. What may have seem to some people a rational way to facilitate the implementation of the "Labor Environment Act," turns out create a significant problem for the local commanders responsible for achieving their given goals.

Recently this extensive use of extra leave as compensation for extra duty has caused dissatisfaction among career officers as well, on the grounds that the individual officer wants to work and that fewer people have to cope with the workload. This point of view has been put forward by union representatives and supported by several commanders feeling the problems first hand [Ref. 30].

3. Military Rank Structure and Promotion

The implications can be serious if personnel expect and anticipate promotions to negotiable issues like travel allowance, because if the expectations are not met, the possibility for dissatisfaction is great. The indirect way of improving the conditions, through earlier promotion contributes obviously to unhealthy inflation in the organization's rank structure. The direct link between pay and

rank may therefore not be desirable from a motivational point of view.

The alternative would be to separate pay from rank such that negotiations about the economical conditions would not have any impact on the rank structure. The functional need for different ranks would be determined based on and in accordance with the services structure. The personnel's paygrades could however be more diversified within each rank to accommodate the requirements for reasonable pay increases. The level of retirement benefits is partly dependent on the salary at the time of retirement, and it is not unlikely that such considerations have been present in some cases of pay increase and promotions. By separating pay and rank the military would be more flexible with regard to monetary compensation and facilitate a functional rank structure.

Standard promotion to the O-3 officer grade has been viewed as a breakthrough for equality and an elimination of a major reason for dissatisfaction. This point of view seems to not take into consideration the fact that success is only meaningful if there is a chance for failure, as well as a failure is only recognizable if there was a chance for success. Any standard promotion level system will push the level for successful promotion up to the next

grade above the standard level, and not necessarily make the personnel more satisfied with the status of their rank.

In a study of the American soldier that looked at the relationship between the rate of promotion and people's satisfaction with the promotion system, Stouffer found [Ref. 23: p.38] that personnel in units with the highest rates of promotion were most dissatisfied with the system. Units with the lowest rate of promotion, had the most satisfied personnel with respect to the promotion system. These findings do not support the idea that high promotion rates correlate with high satisfaction with the promotion system. Rather they suggest that if promotions are relative difficult to achieve, the value of such promotion to the personnel is relative higher. The relevance of these findings to the situation in the Norwegian Armed Forces may be a topic for discussion, but there is not intuitive reason for discarding the study's result.

There is no doubt that the system with standard promotion to the O-3 officer grade will produce too many officer on that level with respect to the functional need in the services. This is already an area of concern today due to the integration of former NCO corps with the officer corps as well as the policy of negotiating pay increases indirectly through upgrading billets to higher rank designation. The new manpower policies will not solve these

issues even though it was mentioned as one of the intentions behind the revision.

TABLE XI

Alternative Promotion Opportunities

Recommended by	Three levels of military education		
	Officer Candidate	Academy Part I	Academy Part II
Task Force:	0-2	0-3	0-4
Chief of Defense:	0-3	0-3	0-3
Military Unions:	0-2 0-3	0-3 0-3	0-4 0-3
Ministry of Defense:	0-3	0-3	0-3

The Task Force recommended differentiated promotion levels (see Table XI) that would not have cause an over-production as mentioned above. It is somewhat surprising that the argumentation for changing this to what the Ministry of Defense finally proposed, apart from the unions, came from the military itself. The Chief of Defense found that consideration of the recruiting implications and social and status requirements should override what the services saw as functional requirements in this matter [Ref. 4].

There is not unanimous support for his position among the services as the following statement [Ref. 31 Appendix B] indicates:

"The Army Staff will once more emphasize that it disagrees with the Chief of Defense's view...regarding standard promotion level to captain for officers graduated from Officer Candidate/NCO-school."

There are also quite different positions among the military unions with respect to this standard level of promotion; ranging from support to disagreement with the Chief of Defense's view. The Ministry in its evaluation of this issue decided to follow the recommendation from the Chief of Defense. But it also gave an indirect sort of "disclaimer" [Ref. 4: p.46] by stating that:

"(The military has experienced) undesired consequences of a promotion system that produces more officers in higher ranks than there is functional need for. The Ministry's opinion is that one should now try to avoid solutions that one knows will create such difficulties... However, the Ministry appreciates the concern of the Chief of Defense with regard to recruiting and social consequences of differential promotion levels."

E. PERFORMANCE AND QUALIFICATIONS

A system for evaluation of the organization's members performance is an important element of its structure. According to Ilgen and Feldman [Ref. 32] such a system is a necessity in the long run:

"No organization can function well in the long run without some means of distinguishing between good and poor performance by its members. Even if the standard of goodness is arbitrary,...at some point a distinction between satisfactory and unsatisfactory performance must be made."

This section will analyse the reason behind a performance evaluation system in the services. Problems in the evaluation process will be addressed and finally the concept of qualification and competency will be discussed.

1. Why Performance Evaluation

Performance evaluation is in general driven by two major factors: 1) pressure from within the organization itself i.e. those levels concerned with organizational design, control, reward etc. and 2) pressure from the individual level i.e. need for feedback about how the effort put in is evaluated. These two functions, controlling and coaching, are done simultaneously in the services by the annual fitness report. However, some officers are more concerned than others to give feedback and willing to spend time coaching subordinates, due to differences in leadership styles and personal skills.

Behavior scientists are divided on the question of whether the control aspect and the coaching aspect of performance appraisals should be linked together or separated in the organization. Arguments against a direct linkage between these two functions emphasize that the intentions of giving feedback is to provide the individual with objective, descriptive and non-normative information about the person's performance in order to enable him or her to improve personal skills. It is necessary that the feedback

is given in a non-threatening environment if the information is going to be useful to the individual; but if the appraisal also is used by the organization to determine reward, sanctions, payment and promotion, this tends to draw attention away from the coaching aspect and the performance evaluation becomes more like a test where the person is graded.

On the other hand, if rewards are linked to the appraisal, it may simplify the individual feedback and through high visibility clarify what the organization wants from its members. Even if the control and coach aspect formally are separated, people do expect that there is some interrelation between good feedback and rewards and negative feedback and sanctions. On this background, some behavior scientists feel that performance appraisals must deal with both functions openly and avoid any informal link between the two.

2. Performance Evaluation in the Armed Forces

Officers are normally given a formal performance evaluation, the fitness report, annually by their immediate superior. These evaluations are endorsed by the next-higher officer in the chain of command and the documents are filed in the officers' personal files. The fitness report is one of several factors considered when an officer is evaluated

for promotion, and it is often given significant weight by the promotion boards.

The fitness reports are given by one officer, and subjectively is not only unavoidable but desired. When the regulations refer to the required objectivity of the reports, it must be understood as a requirement for the evaluation to be based on facts and actually observed behavior of the appraisee. There is no provision for appealing a fitness report once given, unless it contains or is based on facts that later are confirmed to be not true.

If the services wanted objectivity in a broader sense, the ratings in the fitness reports had to be decided by more than one officer (team-evaluation). This could be achieved by using a group of officers that have been in close contact with the appraisee, for instance his or hers immediate superior and colleagues.

The services find it more appropriate to use the one-to-one approach, where the appraisee's immediate superior alone makes the evaluation with a separate evaluation/endorsement from the appraiser's immediate superior as a checkpoint. The reason for this is that the relevant elements of the person's behavior under consideration (working capacity, loyalty, leadership quality, initiation and personal skills), are within the context of military leadership and chain of command.

Even though there is no direct relationship between the performance appraisal system and the pay system, in a long term perspective future pay increases are strongly influenced by the fitness reports through the possibilities for promotion.

3. Problems in the Evaluation Process

Since fitness reports are of major importance as far as promotion evaluation is concerned, it is necessary to be aware of the potential conflicts and sources of errors inherent in the evaluation process. In order to better understand the appraisal process, it is useful to identify its three basic components as : 1) the appraiser, 2) the appraisee and 3) the organizational context in which the evaluation takes place.

Besides the already mentioned conflict between serving a control function and a coaching function, several other conditions influence the quality of the evaluations. The availability of accurate data about the appraisee is of course essential, but not necessarily present. Reasons for a limited basis of background information may be the nature of the senior officer's work, frequent temporary duty, other responsibilities etc. Distortion occurs when what the appraiser perceives and believes to be true about a person's behavior, it is not in accordance with the behavior that in fact takes place.

Inflation in the ratings is another common problem in performance evaluation systems and limits the appraisers' freedom to use the entire rating scale. This phenomenon is caused by two factors. First, the development of norms as far as what constitutes acceptable performance rating, i.e. expectations among the appraisees that takes place after a evaluation system has been in use for some time. Second, there may be a desire among the appraisers to be in charge of good performers since this implies that their department is run well. It is no doubt that subjective ratings like the fitness report system are far more likely to get inflated than an objective rating system.

The problem is amplified by the fact that not all appraisers inflate their ratings to the same extent. Two officers with equal background and similar performance may get quite different fitness reports depending of who does the evaluation. It is an open question to which degree consistent high-rated fitness reports from single appraisers some times are actually deflated by the promotion board members, when comparing with other reports given by more moderate appraisers.

Manipulating the evaluations can be done by deliberately giving low ratings in the beginning in order to achieve the "proper" progress on the ratings over a period of time. Important information can be withheld, and such manipulating

has taken place, although not frequently, in order to "protect" officers with problems related to alcohol abuse.

Another source of error may be the lack of confirmation or another point of view from the appraiser's superior. This happens when this superior uses non-committing phrases like "Seen" or "Passed" instead of more descriptive language. The value of such paper drill checkpoints are of course negligible.

The phenomenon of inflation, distortion and manipulation is well known in all services and many attempts have been taken to get the appraisers to be more "objective" and sophisticated in their ratings. As an illustration of this point, reference is made to the Air Force memorandum the last three years to all units [Ref. 33] about the necessity of "objective" performance evaluations, of which the following excerpt from this year's memorandum is quoted:

"It is necessary that fitness reports become as objective and moderate as possible. It is equally important to include positive as well as negative information.... emphasize that an entry shall be made in the fitness report if there has been reasons for finding fault with an officer's conduct related to alcohol (substances)."

Even though there are considerable uncertainty about the validity of fitness report ratings as measurement of individual behavior and performance, it is difficult to find another system that is free from these kinds of problems. Performance evaluation will always tend to be subjective

and the importance for the services is to improve the evaluation skills among career officers. Making appraisers aware of potential sources of errors and discussion of illustrative cases could be accomplished in an extensive short course.

The importance of fitness reports will probably not be reduced when the services implement the system of promotion based on application. During the system of rotation based on orders, the services have the responsibility for giving the career officers challenging jobs with adequate variety in order to be qualified for standard promotion. Under the application system it is likely that officers will get more differences in career patterns than before. It is the individual officer's responsibility to obtain necessary variety and useful experience for future promotions in competition with others. But the system will also make it possible for officers to pursue personal interests to a greater degree. It would not be a surprise if the fitness reports turn out to be more important when determining the officer's qualification, since there will be less of standard career patterns.

4. Qualifications as Criteria for Promotion

The criteria for promotion above the standard norm (0-3) will be the officer's qualifications, in a broad sense of the word. The revised policies identify three important

elements of the notion of qualification: 1) Formal qualification (formal education and training), 2) Experience, and 3) personal skills. All these elements combined constitute the officer's "real Competency." The Ministry of Defense has clearly stated that formal education shall be given considerable weight and that it shall be rewarded, but it has also emphasized that knowledge gained through experience is valuable and will qualify officers for promotion.

The important question that is not addressed however, is how these three elements are interrelated. It is clear that concept of "real competency" (Q) is a function of education (E1); experience (E2) and personal skills (S), to use the mathematical notation, ref equation 4.1 What is not known, is the nature of this function. Is the concept of

$$Q = f(E1, E2, S) \quad (\text{eqn 4.1})$$

competency to be construed to mean the sum of these three elements, see equation 4.2? With this kind of model, the implication is that there are full substitutability between

$$Q = E1 + E2 + S \quad (\text{eqn 4.2})$$

formal education, experience and personal skills. What is lacking in one area can be outweighed by another, such that a given level of qualifications can be reached through either one of the three properties. If the concept is viewed as a

product of the elements, ref equation 4.3, the implication is that every element is needed and that lack of formal

$$Q = (E1) \times (E2) \times (S) \quad (\text{eqn 4.3})$$

education cannot be replaced by increased experience or vice versa. Without personal skills, neither education nor experience is valuable according to this model.

Realizing that the relationship between independent variables of the qualification function is difficult to define, it is however useful to keep these two alternate points of view in mind when discussing the problems. The product approach to a person's qualifications is probably the more realistic of the two, since this model contains the possibility of different combinations of education and experience giving the same "real competency," as well as the multiplying effect among the variables.

One of the difficulties of evaluating past performance is to decide to what extent the individual has gained personal learning from it. In order for a successful experience to be useful for an individual, he or she has to be able to draw conclusions about why things went as they did.

"A set of experience, no matter how successful, does not necessarily give learning, unless the lessons are conceptualized." [Ref. 23: p.269]

This indicates that less successful experience if conceptualized, can provide more personal learning than a successful one that is not conceptualized. Failure and mistakes in a next lower position may in fact have contributed more to an officer's personal learning and thereby his or her qualifications for doing a good job in a higher position, than a successful experience that is not understood.

If the military does not distinguish between mistakes versus misfortune, and between success due to competence versus success by fortune, a passive (even negative) approach to the mission may emerge among the personnel. A risk-precluding behavior and a tendency to cover up errors are detrimental to the organization as well as the individual's performance level.

A limitation in the previous models is the fact that only data from the past is included in the measured qualifications. Equally important in our society is the potential for growth that an individual has. Without evaluating the future benefits and growth potential, the evaluation is limited to an instrument for appraisal of past performance. Using such evaluation to determine promotion may be inadequate and even cause future problems.

When promotion is used only as a reward for good performance, the basis for promotion is performance in a job below rather than performance potential with respect to the

vacant billet. Laurence Peter has captured one aspect of promotions in hierarchies where such criterion is used in his popular "Peter Principle" [Ref. 34] that says:

"In a hierarchy, every employee tends to rise to his level of incompetence."

Incompetence has perhaps more significant impact in the armed forces than in other organizations, due to the unique nature of an officer's responsibilities.

A model for measuring competence has to consider this element of future potential (F) in order to avoid the

$$Q = (E1) \times (E2) \times (S) \times (F) \quad (\text{eqn 4.4})$$

effect of the "Peter Principle." This implies that a fourth element needs to be included in the equation, ref equation 4.4.

There is another aspect of competency that has to be addressed. Qualifications implies qualifications with regard to something. In the case of promotion of officers, qualifications can be evaluated with regard to a specific job that the officers have applied for. This is the equivalent to the procedure for hiring civilians in the government, the services included. But qualifications can also be evaluated with respect to overall qualifications for a long-term career in the organization.

The criteria for promotion according to the Ministry of Defense [Ref. 4: p.47] will be:

"(Competition for vacant position will be) based on the competence requirements that are stated in the billet description."

The situation is somewhat different for military personnel versus civilian employees in the military. An officer, during military education and assignments, is trained to be able to fill any position within the applicable specialty in his or her duty category. When officers are promoted, they are promoted to a certain rank, not a specific job. For reason of comparison, it can be mentioned that the task of the selection boards in US Navy is to:

"...recommend for promotion those eligible officers who, in the board's opinion, have the most potential for future naval service in the next higher grade."

It is interesting to notice that no reference is made to past performance or formal education. Naturally these are relevant factors in evaluating the potential for future service, but by tasking the selection boards as the US Navy does, the emphasis is on the future, not the past.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Will the revised policies ease the symptoms, solve the problems or cause new difficulties? Due to differences in opinion among members in the officer corps and the fact that the effects of the revised policies when implemented depend on the current rank and assignment of the individual officer, all three possibilities will probably come true for different groups of people.

A. ARMED FORCES AND THE SOCIETY

In addition to the general characteristics of a bureaucracy, a military organization has some unique features that must be taken into consideration when analyzing changes in its structure and processes. In a peacetime environment, which the last three decades, there is no demand for the military's ultimate mission. As a consequence, social and political requirements towards the military organization may discount some of the effects that are essential to operational availability and combat readiness. Military commanders and the services have to meet this challenge by realistic consequence analysis and make sure that any decision involves an informed trade-off on the part of the policy-makers.

The demographics of the country, as well as the political and military perception of the threat and subsequent priority of the defense resources show that there is an important discrepancy between where the manpower is needed and where it is available. Any allocation of personnel in the Armed Forces has to meet the military requirements and take sufficient consideration to the people involved.

Internal and external pressure throughout the 1970's made it clear that changes in the services' rotation policy for career officers were due. Several interest groups were active in the initial phase of the change process in order to get special issues accepted as "problem areas" or "areas of concern" by politicians. In a complex political and administrative society like ours, this kind of influence is usually a very important source of power, since bureaucratic resources are spent on problems and not what is going well.

Emphasis has been put on several parts of the regulations and include termination of the life long rotation system, equal opportunities for promotion and military education and improving the economic conditions for career officers.

B. ROTATION SYSTEMS

An assignment system based on orders will provide a useful management tool provided that the personnel belonging to such a system accept its conditions and not fight it. If

the ordering system is perceived to be unfair, too burdensome, unnecessary or arbitrary, then the system will be met with resistance (overt and covert) when people try to avoid the undesired consequences.

An application system is obviously most people oriented and it gives the officers opportunity to make decisions themselves regarding career and permanent residency within the preferences of each family.

However, an application system assumes that there are some sort of equilibrium in billet vacancies and interested officers in order to function as intended. If such stability does not exist, additional actions are necessary to ensure that the organization's requirements are met. A successful implementation of an application system is dependent on sufficient compensation (hygiene factors) or attractive rewards (incentives). Without such supporting programs it is likely that an application system will become saturated fairly rapidly, with reference to the attractive duty stations and billets.

1. Rotation of Younger Officers

It is reasonable to sustain a rotation system based on orders for the major portion of the younger members of the officer corps for several reasons. The number of people involved indicate that this is the most effective way to provide the organization with required training of officers

and at the same time fill the positions. During payback periods it is reasonable to have the services decide and plan where they want to use the personnel that have been given certain education or training.

For junior officers, the short term consequences will be negligible as far as rotation is concerned. They and their families will still be subject to relocation at the services' discretion, with small opportunities to settle down, which was one of the major reasons for dissatisfaction among the personnel. Knowing that the situation will change (assumption is to the better) in 10 years or so, may make a difference when the officers contemplate the idea of leaving the service, and it may not. Whether or not it will make a difference depends on the individual's preferences and the actual family situation.

2. Application System

For mid-level officers the consequences of the an earlier transition to the application system will be more self-determination over their life situations. Consequently, dissatisfaction will probably decrease since officers can more or less decide if and when they want to be transferred and promoted.

But the system will only work if sufficient numbers of qualified officers apply for these positions, and if this does not happen, the services have to implement temporary

duty assignments. For personnel that have expected to not be transferred but nevertheless are given such temporary duty, the dissatisfaction may be even worse than before. The situation for senior officers stays unchanged since they already belong to an application system.

The new manpower regulations can in some respect be considered to formalize what has been practiced for several years, as far as rotation is concerned, since since O-4 and O-5's already have been given special consideration. The concept of a combination of a system with rotation based on orders and a system based on application is not new, even though some of the official documentation seems to emphasize this "new" alternative to allocate military manpower. A similar combination is in effect today, since officers of rank O-6 and above do not belong to the rotation system.

The real change is that the time for transition to this application system has been significantly dropped downwards, i.e. earlier in the officers' career. Since all the revised policies going are not finished yet, and since there is a great amount of uncertainty about the way this policy change will affect the services' actual assignments (i.e. to what extent temporary duty will be imposed etc), the final consequences will not be known for a long time.

3. Officers' Adaptation and Orientation

It is suggested in this thesis that career officers in general are relatively more cosmopolitan oriented than other parts of the manpower in the military, mainly because they change duty stations frequently and are subject to centralized administration. If it turns out that a major part of the officers do take the opportunity which the application system will give them: to settle down earlier and become less mobile, one possible consequence is a movement towards more local orientation among the officers.

Each duty station viewed independently will benefit from more continuity in the military billets and reduced loss in corporate memory. If local orientation would increase, the possibility for difficulties in implementing centralized reorganizations and rationalization efforts may consequently also be higher.

C. RANK STRUCTURE AND MONETARY REWARD

Since rank is directly connected with pay, officers are likely to perceive rank and promotion the same way as pay; it is necessary that they are present to some extent in order to avoid dissatisfaction. But they do not provide satisfaction alone in the long run.

Rank structure is one of the significant characteristics of a military organization and imposed on the services due to the organization's special mission. Today's system has

not solved, and the revised system of pay and promotion will not solve, problems the services are faced with when the rank structure is not in accordance with the functional need.

The revised manpower policies will not change today's pay structure as far as its tie with the rank structure is concerned. Transforming ranks from a functional superstructure imposed on the military organization to an administrative pay classification system will inevitably cause undesirable consequences in the long run. Meeting the needs for pay increases and rewarding performance through promotion will cause a continuous inflation of the military ranks.

One of the assumptions underlying the revised policy is that promotion is desirable and that there will be sufficient interest in and competition for billets designated with the ranks from O-4 and up. The policy in fact relies on this assumption only to certain degree, since the services are given the authority to use Temporary Duty Assignments if necessary. If it would not be possible to fill required positions with qualified applicants, the military must be prepared to use this authority and to relieve any subsequent increase in dissatisfaction among the officers.

To what extent officers will apply for promotion is not a sufficient factor when estimating how easy it will be for the services to fill vacant positions. The interest for promotion through certain billets may turn out to be quite

high, while at the same time quite low for billets that are considered unattractive. If the personnel expect the revised policies to improve the conditions which preliminary surveys indicate, the effect of the services having to use temporary assignments of 2 years (with 2 years extension) will be serious dissatisfaction. The revision has risen expectations that will amplify today's dissatisfaction if not fulfilled. The new system is in fact not freedom from a rotation system, but freedom to apply for billets as long as it is acceptable to the services.

The implication is that even if the organization provides good opportunities for growth and self-realization i.e. motivation, the members in the organization may well be dissatisfied due to perceived lack of hygiene factors. What factors his or her individual trade-off between level of dissatisfaction that is acceptable in relation to opportunity for growth.

D. QUALIFICATIONS AND COMPETENCY

With the revised policies, equal opportunities for all officers for advancement, regardless of any career categories that previously were based on formal military education, are introduced. With the change in manpower policies, an officer's overall qualifications and fitness for promotion are determined by the person's real competence, which include formal education, experience and personal skills.

It is beneficial to the military organization that it is now formally acknowledged that officers can gain knowledge and expertise through schools and experience, and that the importance of personnel skills is appreciated. The possibilities for advancement based on real competency will be an important motivational factor, which will satisfy the need for equal opportunities among career officers. By using real competency in promotion selection, rigid classifications that in many cases did not facilitate exploration of potential personnel resources, will be eliminated.

There are several possible interpretations of real competency when applied in reality. Without any clarification of the criterion for promotion, officers will rely on future practice of selection boards to find out what exactly the services require from them. The political advantage of such an ambiguity is that people are more likely to agree to it because there is room for different opinions. An officer's qualifications for a certain position measure his or her ability to do the work successfully. That depends on the person's knowledge, learned either through schools or experience, and personal skills.

E. SUMMARY

The revision of manpower policies for military career officers is an important step for the services towards

alleviating growing dissatisfaction and improving working conditions for military personnel.

If successfully implemented, the revised policies will achieve the first of these two goals to some extent, but the military will still be faced with competition from civilian organizations having greater flexibility in their incentive and reward programs.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to keep career officers in duty as well as to attract new personnel to the corps, the military must achieve two goals simultaneously: reduce (eliminate if possible) dissatisfaction and keep (increase if possible) current level of motivational factors.

The revised policies, if successfully implemented, will achieve the first of these goals to some extent, but may at the same time change motivational aspects to the worse.

To avoid resistance to change and to ensure an effective implementation of the revised manpower policies, the following sections address major areas of concern and recommended actions.

A. RANK STRUCTURE AND ADVANCEMENT

The importance of a functional rank structure is fundamental in the armed forces and must consequently be given priority. The value of the individual officer of a rank equal to the standard promotion level is questionable.

Economic compensation to officers should be separated from the formal rank structure, which is supposed to perform another function than symbolizing the officers' level of salary.

The military depends almost solely on internal advancement by which vacant billets in the hierarchy are filled

with personnel from the same or lower levels. In order to obtain maximum organizational effectiveness it is important to select those officers for promotion that have the best potential for future service.

Past performance can be a good indicator of future performance, as well as formal education, but should not be the formal criterion for promotion. The aspect of rewarding performance in the organization seems necessary to many people, but the difficulties and problems of using promotion only as a reward for past performance must be appreciated.

B. CLARIFICATION OF REAL COMPETENCY

Uncertainty about what the organization will require from its members in the future, as far as advancement is concerned, is detrimental to an effective qualification process of the personnel. Officers spend a large part of their career preparing for duty and positions on higher levels in the organization. If promotion criteria are ambiguous or undefined, it is difficult to obtain the "best" background and it creates uncertainty about future advancement.

The introduction of real competency can be an important step away from a bureaucratic/administrative selection procedure in which rigid requirements of formal education and approved career patterns are predominant features. Instead of a rigid requirement system, real competency can be applied with more flexibility and sensitivity to changing

conditions. But so far the concept seems to lack a needed clear definition as to what the interactions between formal education, experience and personal skills are. To wait and see what the concept in reality would mean, based on the selection boards' interpretations over a period of time, is not desirable and should be avoided.

C. IMPROVING APPRAISAL SKILLS

In addition to documentation of formal competency and duty experiences, information needed in the selection process includes the annual fitness reports. The credibility of this performance evaluation has to be regained and officers responsible for such appraisals should be given training opportunities for improving their evaluation skills. Concentration on rating errors only is not sufficient to achieve this objective. And any training program should focus on the entire evaluation process, with emphasis on how to collect valid information about the subordinate's performance and in what way such information is memorized.

Revision of the entire evaluation program should be given high priority. It would be beneficial to involve the officer corps directly and through their unions in designing a viable evaluation program that would provide the information needed by the services as well as provide personnel with constructive feedback.

D. FUTURE RESEARCH AREAS

Research programs should be implemented in all services in order to obtain empirical data concerning officers attitudes and behavior in military organizations. This will enable the services to monitor the effects of the revised manpower policies and to react quickly to correct any undesired consequences.

Data gathering from officers that pre-retire should be done on a routine basis. Termination interviews and-or questionnaires would be effective tools in collecting information about the reasons why these officers leave the services before retirement age.

There is for the time being an excess of applicants for most of the military schools. Selection of candidates is based predominantly on a person's formal education, which may not necessarily be equivalent to this person's potential for future military service.

More research is needed in at least two areas: 1) local recruiting and 2) information procedures.

The potential for savings in manpower costs by changes in the geographical distribution of officer candidates should be investigated. An assessment of the implications of relocating more of the military schools (alternatively, decentralize the education in smaller classes) to northern regions should be made.

The other field for further research is how expectations to and information about a military career is related to pre-retirement. If officer candidates with little or insufficient knowledge about issues like rotation system and the impact of family relocations have greater frequency of pre-retirement, then it may be beneficial to evaluate the contents of current recruiting policies. Possible gains by introducing some formalized information procedures should be assessed.

E. IMPLEMENTATION

Expectations have been raised by the fact that revised manpower policies will be implemented next year. With increased expectations potential dissatisfaction is also higher than before if the new system does not meet these expectations. It is essential that this source of energy is used to secure a successful implementation of the new regulations and that the economical compensation package that is supposed to go along with this revision is not lost on the way.

APPENDIX A

MILITARY RANK STRUCTURE

When referring to military ranks in several tables in the thesis, the author decided to use the US paygrade classification as a matter of convenience as well as to avoid any ambiguity that might occur when translating Norwegian ranks to English.

The insignia of the military ranks differ in the two countries, and any comparison between ranks has to be done on the basis of the total rank structure.

Table XII shows the military rank structure in USA and Norway and what a certain level in one country corresponds to in the other country.

TABLE XII

Rank Equivalency

UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES			NORWEGAIN ARMED FORCES	
Pay- Grade	USA USAF	USN	Army and Air Force	Naval Forces
0-10	Gen	Adm	Gen	Adm
0-9	LtGen	ViceAdm	GenLt	ViseAdm
0-8	MajGen	RearAdm	GenMaj	KontAdm
0-7	BrigGen	Commodore	Ob I (*)	Komm I (*)
0-6	Colonel	Captain	OB II	Komm II
0-5	LtCol	CDR	Oblt	KomKapt
0-4	Maj	LCDR	Major	OrlKpt
0-3	Cpt	LT	Kpt	Kptlt
0-2	Lt	LTJG	Lt	Lt
0-1	SubLt	Ensign	Fenr	Fenr
E-10 to E-7			Not applicable	
E-6	Sgt		Sjt	Kvm
E-5 to E-1			Conscripts	

(*)

OB I and Kom I are senior colonel and captain ranks and not formally one-star generals for the time being.

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