



**Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive**  
**DSpace Repository**

---

Theses and Dissertations

1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items

---

2006-12

Cost analysis of civilian-sailor substitution  
plan for ashore Aircraft Intermediate  
Maintenance Departments

Scott, Matthew M.

Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School

---

<http://hdl.handle.net/10945/2393>

*Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun*



Calhoun is a project of the Dudley Knox Library at NPS, furthering the precepts and goals of open government and government transparency. All information contained herein has been approved for release by the NPS Public Affairs Officer.

**Dudley Knox Library / Naval Postgraduate School**  
**411 Dyer Road / 1 University Circle**  
**Monterey, California USA 93943**

<http://www.nps.edu/library>



**NAVAL  
POSTGRADUATE  
SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

**THESIS**

**COST ANALYSIS OF CIVILIAN-SAILOR SUBSTITUTION  
PLAN FOR ASHORE AIRCRAFT INTERMEDIATE  
MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENTS**

by

Matthew M. Scott

December 2006

Thesis Advisor:

Lawrence R. Jones

Co-Advisor:

William Gates

**Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.**

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
<b>1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)</b>		<b>2. REPORT DATE</b> December 2006	<b>3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED</b> Master's Thesis	
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b> Cost Analysis of POM09 Civilian-Sailor Substitution Plan for Ashore Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Departments			<b>5. FUNDING NUMBERS</b>	
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b> Matthew M. Scott, LT, USN				
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			<b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b>	
<b>9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> Commander, Naval Air Forces, Code N422E			<b>10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER</b>	
<b>11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b> The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
<b>12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b> Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited			<b>12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE</b> A	
<b>13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)</b> This thesis provides a cost analysis of the plan to civilianize 4355 enlisted billets at ten shore-based Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Departments (AIMDs). Total cost was determined for each UIC, billet, and rating. Active duty costs were compared to Government Service (GS)/Wage Grade (WG) workers and comparisons were calculated across currently funded billets. Specific savings for each AIMD, rating, total projected savings, and an Excel decision support tool are provided to aid the sponsor with decisions about which ratings, groups of ratings, or while UICs to Civ-Sub. A summary of potential sea shore rotation impacts is also included. The analysis revealed a potential personnel cost savings of 14.27%. When administrative and contractual costs are considered, along with the standard deviations inherent in this type of analysis, the overall cost effectiveness of Civ-Sub is negligible. Other effects must be considered, including active duty manpower reductions on host Naval Air Stations, significant shore duty billet reductions, costs above and beyond personnel, and retention. Potential retention effects could eventually affect manning levels at sea and ultimately damage afloat AIMD readiness. The cost savings ashore (assuming there are) from implementing Civ-Sub will not compensate for the inability to maintain aircraft and aircraft components while deployed.				
<b>14. SUBJECT TERMS</b> Civilian substitution, Civ-Sub, outsourcing, AIMDs, cost analysis, A-76, HRCAT, NMPBS, TFMMS			<b>15. NUMBER OF PAGES</b> 113	
			<b>16. PRICE CODE</b>	
<b>17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT</b> Unclassified	<b>18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE</b> Unclassified	<b>19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT</b> Unclassified	<b>20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b> UL	

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

**Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited**

**COST ANALYSIS OF CIVILIAN-SAILOR SUBSTITUTION PLAN FOR  
ASHORE AIRCRAFT INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENTS**

Matthew M. Scott  
Lieutenant, United States Navy  
B.S., Chaminade University of Honolulu, 1995

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  
December 2006**

Author:

Matthew M. Scott

Approved by:

Lawrence R. Jones  
Thesis Advisor

William Gates  
Co-Advisor

Robert Beck, Dean  
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis provides a cost analysis of the plan to civilianize 4355 enlisted billets at ten shore-based Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Departments (AIMDs). Total cost was determined for each UIC, billet, and rating. Active duty costs were compared to Government Service (GS)/Wage Grade (WG) workers and comparisons were calculated across currently funded billets. Specific savings for each AIMD, rating, total projected savings, and an Excel decision support tool are provided to aid the sponsor with decisions about which ratings, groups of ratings, or while UICs to Civ-Sub. A summary of potential sea shore rotation impacts is also included.

The analysis revealed a potential personnel cost savings of 14.27%. When administrative and contractual costs are considered, along with the standard deviations inherent in this type of analysis, the overall cost effectiveness of Civ-Sub is negligible. Other effects must be considered, including active duty manpower reductions on host Naval Air Stations, significant shore duty billet reductions, costs above and beyond personnel, and retention. Potential retention effects could eventually affect manning levels at sea and ultimately damage afloat AIMD readiness. The cost savings ashore (assuming there are) from implementing Civ-Sub will not compensate for the inability to maintain aircraft and aircraft components while deployed.



THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>I.</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>A.</b>	<b>BACKGROUND .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>B.</b>	<b>OBJECTIVES .....</b>	<b>1</b>
	<b>1. Primary Research Questions .....</b>	<b>2</b>
	<b>2. Secondary Research Questions.....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>C.</b>	<b>OVERVIEW .....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>D.</b>	<b>AIRCRAFT INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENTS (AIMD).....</b>	<b>3</b>
	<b>1. Responsibilities.....</b>	<b>3</b>
	<b>2. Functions.....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>E.</b>	<b>CIVILIAN SUBSTITUTION.....</b>	<b>5</b>
	<b>1. Outsourcing for Manpower .....</b>	<b>5</b>
	<b>2. Government Directives.....</b>	<b>6</b>
	<b>3. The Process .....</b>	<b>6</b>
	<b>4. Criticisms .....</b>	<b>8</b>
	<b>5. Issues and Concerns.....</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>F.</b>	<b>COST ASSUMPTIONS.....</b>	<b>13</b>
	<b>1. Base Pay .....</b>	<b>13</b>
	<b>2. Working hours .....</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>G.</b>	<b>SUMMARY .....</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>II.</b>	<b>METHODOLOGY .....</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>A.</b>	<b>OVERVIEW .....</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>B.</b>	<b>TOTAL FORCE MANPOWER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (TFMMS).....</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>C.</b>	<b>NAVY MANPOWER PLANNING AND BUDGETING SYSTEM (NMPBS).....</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>D.</b>	<b>HUMAN RESOURCE COST ANALYSIS TOOL (HRCAT) .....</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>E.</b>	<b>SUMMARY .....</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>III.</b>	<b>ANALYSIS RESULTS .....</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>A.</b>	<b>OVERVIEW .....</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>B.</b>	<b>UIC SUMMARY .....</b>	<b>24</b>
	<b>1. Overall.....</b>	<b>24</b>
	<b>2. Fallon AIMD (44317).....</b>	<b>26</b>
	<b>3. Jacksonville AIMD (44319).....</b>	<b>27</b>
	<b>4. Key West AIMD (44320) .....</b>	<b>27</b>
	<b>5. Lemoore AIMD (44321) .....</b>	<b>27</b>
	<b>6. Norfolk AIMD (44325) .....</b>	<b>28</b>
	<b>7. North Island AIMD (44326).....</b>	<b>28</b>
	<b>8. Oceana AIMD (44327).....</b>	<b>29</b>
	<b>9. Point Mugu AIMD (44328) .....</b>	<b>29</b>
	<b>10. Whidbey Island AIMD (44329).....</b>	<b>30</b>

11.	Mayport AIMD (45459).....	31
C.	<b>RATING SUMMARY .....</b>	<b>31</b>
1.	<b>Overall.....</b>	<b>31</b>
2.	<b>Unauthorized Ratings.....</b>	<b>33</b>
3.	<b>Authorized Ratings .....</b>	<b>33</b>
a.	<i>Aviation Boatswains Mate (ABE/F/H).....</i>	<i>34</i>
b.	<i>Aviation Machinists Mate (AD).....</i>	<i>34</i>
c.	<i>Aviation Electricians Mate (AE) .....</i>	<i>34</i>
d.	<i>Aviation Structural Mechanic (AM) .....</i>	<i>34</i>
e.	<i>Aviation Structural Mechanic – Safety Equipment (AME) ..</i>	<i>34</i>
f.	<i>Aviation Ordnanceman (AO).....</i>	<i>34</i>
g.	<i>Aviation Support Equipment Technician (AS).....</i>	<i>35</i>
h.	<i>Aviation Avionics Technician (AT).....</i>	<i>35</i>
i.	<i>Aviation Warfare Systems Operator (AW).....</i>	<i>35</i>
j.	<i>Aviation Maintenance Administrationman (AZ).....</i>	<i>35</i>
k.	<i>Command Master Chief (CMDCM).....</i>	<i>35</i>
l.	<i>Electronics Technician (ET) .....</i>	<i>36</i>
m.	<i>Fire Control Technician (FC).....</i>	<i>36</i>
n.	<i>Information Technology Specialist .....</i>	<i>36</i>
o.	<i>Machinists Mate (MM) .....</i>	<i>36</i>
p.	<i>Machinery Repairman (MR).....</i>	<i>36</i>
q.	<i>Navy Counselor (NC).....</i>	<i>36</i>
r.	<i>Aircrew Survival Equipmentman (PR) .....</i>	<i>36</i>
s.	<i>Ships Serviceman (SH) .....</i>	<i>37</i>
t.	<i>Store Keeper (SK).....</i>	<i>37</i>
u.	<i>Yeoman (YN).....</i>	<i>37</i>
4.	<b>Sea-Shore Rotation Effects.....</b>	<b>37</b>
a.	<i>Overview .....</i>	<i>37</i>
b.	<i>Summary.....</i>	<i>38</i>
D.	<b>SUMMARY .....</b>	<b>39</b>
IV.	<b>CONCLUSIONS .....</b>	<b>41</b>
A.	<b>SUMMARY .....</b>	<b>41</b>
B.	<b>RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTHER STUDY .....</b>	<b>42</b>
APPENDIX A.	<b>DOD, FY 2006 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST .....</b>	<b>43</b>
APPENDIX B.	<b>DOD, FY 2007 PROCUREMENT PROGRAM .....</b>	<b>45</b>
APPENDIX C.	<b>DOD, FY 2007 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET .....</b>	<b>47</b>
APPENDIX D.	<b>EXHIBIT M-1, FY 2007 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET.....</b>	<b>49</b>
APPENDIX E.	<b>LIST OF MANPOWER CLAIMANT CODES .....</b>	<b>51</b>
APPENDIX F.	<b>UIC OVERALL COSTS .....</b>	<b>53</b>
APPENDIX G.	<b>RATING OVERALL COSTS.....</b>	<b>55</b>
APPENDIX H.	<b>RATING COSTS BY PAYGRADE (AUTHORIZED RATINGS)</b>	<b>57</b>

<b>APPENDIX I.</b>	<b>RATING COSTS BY PAYGRADE (UNAUTHORIZED RATINGS)</b>	<b>61</b>
<b>APPENDIX J.</b>	<b>FALLON</b>	<b>63</b>
<b>APPENDIX K.</b>	<b>JACKSONVILLE</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>APPENDIX L.</b>	<b>KEY WEST</b>	<b>67</b>
<b>APPENDIX M.</b>	<b>LEMOORE</b>	<b>69</b>
<b>APPENDIX N.</b>	<b>NORFOLK</b>	<b>71</b>
<b>APPENDIX O.</b>	<b>NORTH ISLAND</b>	<b>73</b>
<b>APPENDIX P.</b>	<b>OCEANA</b>	<b>75</b>
<b>APPENDIX Q.</b>	<b>POINT MUGU</b>	<b>77</b>
<b>APPENDIX R.</b>	<b>WHIDBEY ISLAND</b>	<b>79</b>
<b>APPENDIX S.</b>	<b>MAYPORT</b>	<b>81</b>
<b>APPENDIX T.</b>	<b>RATING BILLET COUNT BY COMMAND</b>	<b>83</b>
<b>APPENDIX U.</b>	<b>COMMUNITY HEALTH MATRIX</b>	<b>87</b>
	<b>LIST OF REFERENCES</b>	<b>91</b>
	<b>INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST</b>	<b>93</b>

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	I-Level Maintenance Department/Detachment Ashore (From: CNAF INST, 2005) .....	4
Figure 2.	A-76 Outsourcing Process (From: OMB A-76, 2003).....	7
Figure 3.	Manpower Information Systems Structure (From: Department of the Navy).....	18
Figure 4.	NMPBS and Related Databases (From: Department of the Navy, 2005).....	19
Figure 5.	HRCAT Comparison Example (After: Resourceconsultants.com, 2006) .....	22

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Affected AIMDs (From TFMMS, Aug 2006) .....	2
Table 2.	Number of Positions Studied, 1988-1997 (From: CRS, June 2005) .....	9
Table 3.	Resource Sponsors for Requirements Determination (From: Department of the Navy).....	17
Table 4.	Navy Average Length of Service at Promotion and Calculated Average Time in Service at Paygrade (After: About.com, 2006) .....	21



THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

The author would like to acknowledge the following people for their support throughout the writing of this thesis; Lawrence R. Jones, PhD and William Gates, PhD, Naval Postgraduate School; CDR John Smadjek, Mr. Robert Linsteadt, and Mr. James Holland, Commander Naval Air Forces staff; Mr. Mike Mclean, LCDR Rick Payne, and Mr. Gary Grice, Commander Naval Personnel Command staff.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## LIST OF ACRONYMS

AA	Airman Apprentice
ABE	Aviation Boatswains Mate (Launch and Recovery Equipment)
ABF	Aviation Boatswains Mate (Fuels)
ABH	Aviation Boatswains Mate (Aircraft Handling)
AC	Air Traffic Controlman
AD	Aviation Machinists Mate
AE	Aviation Electricians Mate
AFCM	Master Chief Aircraft Maintenceman
AIMD	Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department
AM	Aviation Structural Mechanic
AMD	Activity Manning Document
AME	Aviation Structural Mechanic – Safety Equipment
AN	Airman
AO	Aviation Ordnanceman
AR	Airman Recruit
AS	Aviation Support Equipment Technician
AT	Aviation Avionics Technician
AVCM	Master Chief Avionics Technician
AW	Aviation Warfare Systems Operator
AZ	Aviation Maintenance Administrationman
BAH	Basic Allowance Housing
BM	Boatswains Mate
CHM	Community Health Matrix
Civ-Sub	Civilian Substitution
CM	Construction Mechanic
CMDCM	Command Master Chief
CNAF	Commander, Naval Air Forces
CONUS	Continental United States
CPO	Chief Petty Officer
CRS	Congressional Research Service
CS	Culinary Specialist
DC	Damage Controlman
DOD	Department of Defense
EM	Electricians Mate
EMC	Enlisted Management Community
EN	Engineman
ET	Electronics Technician
FC	Fire Controlman
FMD	Fleet Manning Document
FTE	Full Time Equivalent
FY	Fiscal Year
GAO	Government Accountability Office

GS	Government Service
HRCAT	Human Resource Cost Analysis Tool
IC	Interior Communications Electrician
IMA	Intermediate Maintenance Activity
INST	Instruction
IT	Information Systems Technician
LOS	Length of Service
MA	Master at Arms
MC	Communications Specialist
MM	Machinists Mate
MR	Machinery Repairman
NAVMAC	Navy Manpower Analysis Center
NC	Navy Counselor
NMPBS	Naval Manpower Planning and Budgeting System
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OMD	Organizational Maintenance Department
OS	Operations Specialist
OSD	Office of Secretary of Defense
PC	Postal Clerk
PH	Photographers Mate
POM	Program Objectives Memorandum
PR	Aircrew Survival Equipmentman
PS	Personnel Specialist
QM	Quartermaster
RP	Religious Program Specialist
SA	Seaman Apprentice
SeaOpDet	Sea Operational Detachment
SH	Ship's Serviceman
SK	Storekeeper
SMD	Ships Manning Document
SN	Seaman
SQMD	Squadron Manning Document
SR	Seaman Recruit
SSR	Sea-Shore Rotation
TAD	Temporary Assigned Duty
TFMMS	Total Force Manpower Management System
TIS	Time in Service
UIC	Unit Identification Codes
UT	Utilitiesman
WG	Wage Grade
YN	Yeoman

# **I. INTRODUCTION**

## **A. BACKGROUND**

The Department of Defense (DoD) has been in the business of downsizing for almost 15 years as a result of Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) and the need to satisfy goals outlined in documents such as Joint Vision 2010 and Joint Vision 2020. For FY2006, DoD requested supplemental appropriations of \$67.9 billion to cover the costs of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom (App A). As a result, DoD spending has been and is presently on the rise but the additional dollars are used directly for global war on terror operations while critical infrastructure spending is actually declining. From 2005 to 2007, DoD procurement spending has been reduced from \$94.5B to \$84.1B, operations and maintenance spending from \$21.5 billion to \$20.0 billion and personnel spending from by \$104.5 billion to \$84.8 billion (Apps B-D). The values are in nominal terms, and thus, real dollars expenditures have decreased even more when inflation is accounted for through discounting. The reduction in infrastructure spending requires that officials find less costly ways to support the deployed fighting forces.

## **B. OBJECTIVES**

As a result of efforts to reduce active Navy personnel, Commander, Naval Air Forces, (CNAF) Code N422E was asked by CNAF Code N1 to eliminate 4355 enlisted billets across ten continental United States (CONUS) ashore Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Departments (AIMDs) for POM09. The ten activities and their respective funded enlisted billet numbers as recorded in the Total Force Manpower Management System (TFMMS) are listed in Table 1.

This thesis provides a cost analysis of Sailor versus Government Service (GS) and Worker Grade (WG) billets at the CONUS AIMDs in an attempt to meet the challenge of reducing infrastructure costs while maintaining readiness in an era of reduced resources. Based on the cost data from the Navy Manpower Program and Budget System (NMPBS), this thesis provides costs across all Unit Identification Codes (UICs) and ratings with comparable GS and WG costs from the Human Resources Cost Analysis Tool (HRCAT) program.

<b>Activity Name (TFMMS)</b>	<b>UIC</b>	<b>Common name</b>	<b>Funded Enlisted Billets (FY06)</b>
AIMU FALLON AIMD	44317	Fallon AIMD	133
NAS JAX AIMD	44319	Jacksonville AIMD	498
NAS KW AIMD	44320	Key West AIMD	70
CSFWP DET AIMD	44321	Lemoore AIMD	551
NORFOLK AIMD	44325	Norfolk AIMD	395
CHSMWP AIMD	44326	North Island AIMD	622
NAS OCE AIMD	44327	Oceana AIMD	1171
COMACCLOG DET	44328	Point Mugu AIMD	238
CVWP DET AIMD	44329	Whidbey Island AIMD	480
NS MYPT AIMD	45459	Mayport AIMD	197
Total			4355

Table 1. Affected AIMDs (From TFMMS, Aug 2006)

### **1. Primary Research Questions**

The primary questions addressed in this thesis are:

- (1) What are the total salary and benefit costs for the activities' current enlisted force?
- (2) What are the total salary and benefit costs if GS and WG workers are substituted for the enlisted force?
- (3) What is the total savings across each UIC and each rating?

### **2. Secondary Research Questions**

In answering the primary questions, the following secondary questions are addressed:

- (1) What is the function and responsibility of an AIMD?
- (2) What is Civ-Sub or outsourcing?
- (3) What strategic and operational risks need to be considered?
- (4) How does eliminating 4355 enlisted billets change the sea-shore rotation of the affected ratings?

### **C. OVERVIEW**

Strictly speaking, this thesis is a cost analysis only. However, it is important to recognize that cost in and of itself is not the only consideration when making decisions.

The segments that follow in Chapter I are intended to provide background knowledge of what AIMDs are and do, what civilian substitution is and the government instructions that cover the outsourcing process, criticisms of outsourcing, and other non-cost related issues and concerns that may ultimately affect the civilian-substitution plan decision. Chapter II explains the methodology and tools used to obtain the cost figures and Chapter III provides the detailed cost analysis and a notional analysis of the sea-shore rotation impacts if implemented. Finally, Chapter IV is a summary with recommendations.

#### **D. AIRCRAFT INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENTS (AIMD)**

##### **1. Responsibilities**

An Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA) comprises all departmental or organizational units responsible for providing I-level maintenance support ashore. Normally, an IMA consists of the Aircraft Maintenance Department/Detachment, the Supply Department, and the Weapons Department. The IMA is responsible for performing I-level maintenance functions on the aircraft and aeronautical equipment located at the ship or station supported. (CNAF INST, 2005)

For the purposes of this thesis, only the manpower costs associated with the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department/Detachment enlisted personnel will be considered. The Supply and Weapons Departments do not fall under the purview of CNAF N422E. However, there are supply rated personnel (Store Keepers), weapons personnel (Aviation Ordnancemen), and other ratings such as Yeoman and Machinery Repairmen assigned in small numbers to an AIMD. If the billets are listed in TFMMS as assigned to the AIMD UIC, they are considered as part of this analysis.

The standard I-level Maintenance Department Organization Ashore is shown in Figure 1.






Figure 1. I-Level Maintenance Department/Detachment Ashore (From: CNAF INST, 2005)

Breakdowns beyond the basic divisions are not illustrated because of the variety of branches possible. Activities will be required to establish the necessary branches to meet their individual requirements. Organizational Maintenance Divisions (OMD) are only included in the AIMD when specific authority has been granted to combine them. (CNAF INST, 2005) This analysis includes only I-level technicians and thus any associated OMD's are not considered. The Support Services division can be established if the Maintenance Officer deems necessary, including certain functions such as Individual Material Readiness List personnel, however these personnel do not come from outside the AIMD and are considered as part of the analysis. All divisions shown in Figure 1 can and do contain enlisted personnel with the exception of the Maintenance Officer and Assistant Maintenance Officer.

## **2. Functions**

The Intermediate-level maintenance mission is to enhance and sustain the combat readiness and mission capability of supported activities by providing quality and timely material support at the nearest location with the lowest practical resource expenditure. I-level maintenance consists of on and off equipment material support and may be grouped as follows: (CNAF INST, 2005)

(1) Performance of maintenance on aeronautical components and related SE.

(2) Field Calibration Activities which perform I-level calibration of designated equipment.

(3) Processing aircraft components from stricken aircraft.

(4) Providing technical assistance to supported units.

(5) Incorporation of Technical Directives.

(6) Manufacture of selected aeronautical components, liquids, and gases.

(7) Performance of on-aircraft maintenance when required.

(8) Age Exploration of aircraft and equipment under Reliability Centered Maintenance.

## **E. CIVILIAN SUBSTITUTION**

### **1. Outsourcing for Manpower**

The Navy must be able to deter, fight and win wars. DON must also reduce operating and readiness budgets to finance recapitalization. Unfortunately, defense operations and support costs have not reduced proportionately to the size of the force. (GAO, 1999) The key question then becomes, how do we do both? This same question has been addressed many times over the last sixteen years and the same answer seems to rear its head every time; outsource key positions that organic Navy personnel are not required to perform.

This thesis deals with the substitution of GS and WG workers for enlisted Navy personnel, and Civ-Sub can be accomplished without completing the A-76 process. However, CNAF has made it clear that independent contractor personnel will be

considered for the positions if the billets are categorized as commercial. Thus, a discussion of the A-76 process is salient here.

The following sections are provided as background material on the process of outsourcing. The hope is that those who are considering Civilian Substitution or private outsourcing for Navy manpower will consider the associated non-financial risks as carefully as the financial costs.

## **2. Government Directives**

The Office of Management Budget (OMB) took the first steps to formalize the outsourcing process by creating OMB Circular A-76 in 1966. The *Supplemental Handbook* was issued in 1983 and revised in 1996. The circular and handbook have been subsequently revised and rewritten and the current issue was updated May 29, 2003. OMB A-76 can be considered the government's outsourcing roadmap, describing the process from beginning to end. Unfortunately, OMB A-76 uses non-specific terms to define when and how to outsource. For the AIMDs in question, it is unclear whether the billets described could be classified as "inherently governmental" as required in the A-76 process. (OMB A-76, 2003) The vagueness in definition presents problems for many commands, potentially adding confusion to the decision making process.

## **3. The Process**

The A-76 process, shown in figure 2 below, begins by classifying the activities currently performed by the government as either commercial or inherently governmental. A commercial activity is defined as "a recurring service that could be performed by the private sector and is resourced, performed, and controlled by the agency through performance by government personnel, a contract, or a fee-for-service agreement. A commercial activity is not so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance by government personnel." An inherently governmental activity is "an activity that is so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance by government personnel. These activities require the exercise of substantial discretion in applying government authority and/or making decisions for the government. Inherently governmental activities normally fall into two categories: the exercise of sovereign government authority or the establishment of procedures and processes related to the oversight of monetary transactions or entitlements." All agencies are required to prepare

two annual inventories and categorize for OMB, in an email, all activities performed by government personnel as either commercial or inherently governmental. (OMB A-76, 2003)




Figure 2. A-76 Outsourcing Process (From: OMB A-76, 2003)

After submission, OMB reviews the inventories and consults with the agency regarding the content of both. Once the consultation is complete, the inventories are made available to Congress and the public. OMB then publishes a notice of availability in the *Federal Register*. All activities deemed commercial are eligible to begin the public announcement stage. (OMB A-76, 2003)

The agency makes a formal public announcement at the local level and via FedBizOpps.gov for the activity in competition. The announcement must include the agency information, location, type of competition (streamlined or standard), activity being competed, number of government personnel performing the activity, and important dates. From the public announcement, a Performance Work Statement or solicitation for public review and comment are drafted and posted. The Contracting Officer identifies specifics in the solicitation, such as sealed bid or negotiated procedures, provisions unique to the tender, performance periods, government furnished property, and any other information necessary to successfully complete the activity. (OSD, Share A-76!)

Private sector companies and other public agencies, known as a “public reimbursable source,” may respond to the solicitation. Public reimbursable sources must develop a tender that responds to the requirements of the solicitation and include items such as a quality control plan, phase-in plan, and copies of existing contracts already being performed for other public agencies. All parties submit offers to the Source Selection Authority who evaluates and selects the most appropriate offer to compete with the originating agency’s “in house” offer/present costs. Offers are selected on the basis of many criteria including cost, performance and schedule. (OSD, Share A-76!)

The ten AIMDs considered for conversion to civilian personnel all contain more than the required 65 full time equivalent (FTE) positions. This results in a standard vice streamlined (less than 65 FTEs) competition process. The Contracting Officer is required in a standard competition to ensure that the conversion cost, that is, the cost of changing from government to civilian workers, is the lesser of 10 percent of the new organization’s personnel-related costs or \$10 million over all the performance periods in the solicitation. Since this contract would not have a specific end date, the conversion cost must meet the former criteria. A preliminary decision is provided and an appeals process is begun where the parties can rebut the preliminary finding. After appeals are exhausted, the final decision is made and the conversion to private sector begins. (OSD, Share A-76!)

Clearly, this short summary shows that OMB has defined the outsourcing process very well. OMB is extremely thorough in explaining how to perform a standard or streamlined competition and how to award the contract to a private firm or to a public reimbursable source. Unfortunately, the A-76 process does not identify the risks associated with outsourcing or provide a risk management tool to help the agency consider whether outsourcing has other possible effects. OMB A-76 does not definitively give instruction as to which risks must be considered. Many times the risks associated are difficult or impossible to quantify in dollar terms, and OMB A-76 avoids discussion of these areas completely. These criticisms and concerns are discussed in the following paragraphs.

#### **4. Criticisms**

Within the federal government, OMB A-76 has not been used uniformly. DOD has set the pace as the lead federal agency to use the OMB A-76 policy, yet many other

agencies do not report a single position as available for outsourcing. The table below summarizes the number of federal job positions that were studied from 1988-1997.

Fiscal Year	Total FTEs	DOD FTEs	Civilian Agencies FTEs
1988	17,249	12,000	5,249
1989	8,469	6,100	2,369
1990	9,547	6,989	2,558
1991	2,026	1,243	783
1992	564	496	68
1993	509	441	68
1994	1,691	1,623	68
1995	2,386	2,128	258
1996	5,267	5,241	26
1997	25,255	25,255	0

Table 2. Number of Positions Studied, 1988-1997 (From: CRS, June 2005)

OMB has targeted 158,000 positions that are to be studied for fiscal years 2004-2008; originally the ten AIMDs identified were supposed to be studied for POM08 submission. The study was delayed and, as previously mentioned, is now set for POM09 submission. Every component of DoD has faced a number of challenges trying to meet OMB's A-76 program goals. They include (1) time required to complete the studies, (2) the cost and other resources required to conduct and implement the studies, and (3) the selection and grouping of positions to compete. (GAO, 2003)

Opponents and proponents of the A-76 policy both agree that the process simply takes too long. Smaller, single function agency activities have completed managed competitions in as little as 18 months, but some multi-function studies have taken as long as four years. (CRS, 2005) However, GAO reports that multi-function studies conducted since 1991 average about 30 months. (Ferris, 1999) Unfortunately, this means that just completing an average study would take the entire shore rotation period of an enlisted Sailor!

The GAO report from 2003 states that a greater investment of resources than originally planned is needed to conduct the A-76 studies. The President's 2001 budget

had a wide variety of projected costs, ranging from \$1300 per position studied in the Army to about \$3700 per position in the Navy. (GAO, 2000) The much larger number of studies required to meet OMB's goals in the following out-years could require an even greater dedication of resources across DoD. (GAO, 2003)

Selection and grouping of positions becomes a difficult question when the AIMDs are considered. Are all ten AIMDs and their cumulative 4355 billets competed out as a whole, each AIMD location individually, by specific rating at each location, or by rating across the enterprise? Because the Navy does not know the depth and range of experienced civilian technicians available to fill the enlisted billets, the selection process will become that much more difficult. What if the Navy can fill all the F414 and F404 jet mechanic jobs, but none of the T56? Does that mean AIMD Oceana only becomes partially Civ-Sub but AIMD Lemoore is completely civilianized?

## **5. Issues and Concerns**

There is a long history of civilian and military personnel working side by side. Both contractor and DoD civilians have successfully integrated with active duty and reserve components, performing very well and providing outstanding support. However, the subject of civilian substitution would not be complete without a discussion of the issues and concerns that surround such an implementation. At the AIMD level, GS and WG workers would integrate with the active duty enlisted SeaOpDet personnel and with the active duty command structure (Division Officers, Maintenance Material Control Officer, Production Officer, Assistant Maintenance Officer, and AIMD Officer). In their report, Adedeji and Gasch found many items of concern to deployable commands that are relevant to shore activities as well. These include discipline, lines of authority, fraternization, watch standing, job performance, and exercising of privileges (Adedeji and Gasch, 2000).

Most prevalent among the officer community and mid-senior grade enlisted is the issue of discipline. DoD civilians are expected to perform in a professional, responsible, diligent, and self-disciplined manner. Concerns were documented that an argument might occur between civilian and military personnel, which could lead to disrespect (Adedeji and Gasch, 2000). Disrespect is routinely handled between military members under the auspices of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. If such an encounter

occurred, adequate supervision and contract oversight would have to be in place to ensure that civilian-military chain-of-command relationships are well defined and upheld.

This obviously leads to questions about lines of authority. When military members, such as SeaOpDet, are working side-by-side with civilians, clear lines of authority must be delineated within the contract. Training must also be conducted so that military and civilian workers understand who can give orders to whom and what types of orders are “legal.” Many times Sailors perform duties that are not directly associated with their rating specialties; for example, junior Sailors typically have shop/work center clean up responsibilities. If a senior military person were to order a civilian to perform clean up type duties that are not within the scope of the contract, then the military runs the risk of violating the contract and incurring additional charges, or even a lawsuit.

Fraternization is also an important issue. Military members have very clear guidelines about socialization and personal involvement with other military members. Adequate contract oversight would require provisions that clearly define which military-civilian relationships are considered acceptable and which are not. Just as important, is the consideration of civilian to civilian relationships. In a “normal” office environment, there are few, if any, restrictions on relationships between employees. If that philosophy were in place for the civilian-civilian relationships but not for military-civilian relationships, then good order and discipline will suffer as Sailors recognize the double standard applied.

Another issue to consider is watch standing. Since civilians will not be standing any military watches, there is a concern that reduced active duty manpower will increase the watch standing responsibilities for the remaining active duty personnel. At the extreme, force reductions could create gaps in the watch standing cycles, seriously jeopardizing the security of the facility. Naval Stations and Naval Air Stations with affected AIMDs must complete a review of watch standing requirements and verify that the reduction in personnel will not adversely affect the physical security of the facility.

One aspect of job performance mentioned above with regard to the possibility of contract violations on the part of the military when civilians are ordered to do something



outside the scope of work. Job performance also alludes to the perception that civilians will leave a job undone.

My experience in the yards [shipyards] is that we had to pick up and clean up after the yardbirds [shipyard workers] had supposedly finished. Contracts can't cover every eventuality, and it is my experience that civilians will point out those particular tasks, typically more disagreeable ones, that are not covered. It won't be worth having civilians if they can't be flexible enough to accomplish common-sense tasks that may not be covered in the contract. (Adedeji and Gasch, 2000)

Clearly, accountability in job performance will be required of all members of the command, military and civilian alike. The more difficult issue is the delicate balance between what military members see as their inherent responsibility and what civilian members will see as their contractual responsibility. The line between the two cannot be one open for interpretation, necessitating a clear and detailed contract which could ultimately be very expensive to administer.

Another concern to be addressed when integrating civilian and enlisted personnel is the exercising of privileges. Enlisted personnel are very conscious of how they fit into the chain-of-command structure within an activity and the resultant privileges that accompany the position or rank he/she holds. How civilians fit into this mix is not a minor issue. Adedeji and Gasch noted that most of their respondents "shared that they would be somewhat distressed if civilians had privileges that exceeded their own, particularly if the civilian workforce consisted mostly of entry-level, lower skill workers." (Adedeji and Gasch, 2000) For example, this could be significant if the civilian were a retired Chief Petty Officer hired to fill a E-5 or E-6 job but treated as a CPO by being invited to the CPO mess or "top three" functions, etc. Again, a clear contractual distinction has to be made ensuring the integrity of the chain-of-command and providing relief in the form of redress if such activities create an unbalanced situation between civilian and military members.

Finally, there is an issue of deployability. Although it does not happen frequently, there have been instances when a shore-based I-level Sailor was asked to go to sea on a TAD (Temporary Additional Duty) basis. Typically, this occurs when critical sea duty personnel are incapable of performing their duties (medical injury, pregnancy, legal,

exceptional family member, etc). The respective AIMD commanders usually ask for a volunteer to assume the sea duty Sailors billet for a specific length of time, not to exceed 180 days (to avoid violating TAD policy and create a permanent change of station situation). If this were to occur after civilians had assumed the enlisted shore positions, the afloat AIMD would not have the resource to fill the billet temporarily and afloat readiness would suffer.

## **F. COST ASSUMPTIONS**

### **1. Base Pay**

It is assumed, in many cases, that the military member costs less than their civilian counterpart. For most, this assumption is made because the typical salary for a military member is less than the civilian. For example, base pay for an E-6 with 13 years of service is \$33,350.40, while the GS equivalent is a GS7, step 4 with a base pay of \$37,565.00.

Included in this assumption is that the military member can be worked, theoretically, 24 hours per day, 7 days per week because military compensation is a salary and not based on hours worked. As a salary, there is no additional compensation for overtime as with civilian wages. For the GS7 worker, the base pay is calculated on a 40 hour work week and any time in excess of 40 hours must be paid on an overtime basis.

If a cost savings analysis is conducted that accounts only for base pay differences, the military member clearly wins out. Base pay is lower and no overtime payments are required. However, when drilling down into the compensation package, the analysis finds that total pay and benefits for the military member actually exceed their civilian counterpart. Military pay and benefits include retired pay accrual, housing allowances, subsistence allowances, permanent change of station costs, defense health plan accruals, and employer social security and medicare payments. All of these are not included in the civilian compensation package, and the military members' costs rise well above GS/WG costs.

Additionally, there is no tradeoff between short term and long term costs. It is well known that the active military lifetime benefit stream (primarily retirement payments) is a huge expense for DoD. There are practically zero retirement costs to the

government for civilian workers because their retirement is either provided by the respective employer or through personal deposits (Individual Retirement Accounts, 401K, etc). If the military member did cost less in the short run, then an examination of those costs versus their lifetime benefit stream as a comparison against the GS/WG stream would be appropriate. Because short and long term costs of the military member exceed those of their civilian counterpart, the analysis is not relevant.

## **2. Working Hours**

The Navy standard work week ashore is a 5 day, 40 hour work week and is the key element in the Navy's calculations of manpower requirements. Most importantly, the productive hours are calculated at 33.38/week, which takes into account training time, service hours (cleaning, etc), leave, and holidays. The nature of Navy work, watch, and duty requirements makes it difficult under all circumstances to fix work periods on a daily or weekly basis. Averaging techniques are, therefore, employed to determine the elements that include the various workweeks. As a result, workweeks are not an expression of the maximum weekly hours that may be expended by an individual in any particular week, but rather regulate the average weekly hours that will be expended on a monthly or annual basis. (Department of the Navy, 2002)

Daily workload intensity is a function of operational requirements; as such, the actual day-to-day management of personnel is the responsibility of the CO or AIMD Officer. Under certain circumstances it may become necessary to exceed the standard workweek; however, extending working hours on a routine basis could adversely affect such matters as morale, retention, and safety and is not encouraged as a labor saving or "catch up" methodology.

For civilians, the time "lost" to training, leave, holidays, etc, is calculated as part of their weekly/monthly compensation. Thus, for a GS/WG all 40 hours are calculated as productive time and the analysis here essentially "buys" an extra 6.62 hours from the enlisted salaries. In reality, the enlisted sailor works the extra 6.62 hours/week anyway, so the analysis compares equivalent productive work time.

## **G. SUMMARY**

This chapter has provided the background, objectives, and general information about AIMDs and outsourcing. Included in the discussion has been material which

covered responsibilities, directives, criticisms, and cost assumptions. Chapter II follows with an explanation of the tools and methodology used to perform the analysis.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## II. METHODOLOGY

### A. OVERVIEW

Cost analysis data was compiled from three sources; the Total Force Manpower Management System (TFMMS), the Navy Manpower Planning and Budgeting System (NMPBS), and the Human Resources Cost Analysis Tool (HRCAT). A review of how each tool was utilized follows.

### B. TOTAL FORCE MANPOWER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (TFMMS)

TFMMS is the single authoritative repository for total force manpower requirements, active duty manpower personnel data, Navy Reserve personnel, Navy manpower authorizations, and end strength. TFMMS has the ability to store and retrieve historical, current year, budget year, and out-year manpower data. It also provides access to current manpower data for resource sponsors (Table 3), claimants (App E), and the Navy Manpower Analysis Center (NAVMAC). (Department of the Navy)

<b>Sponsor</b>	<b>Resource</b>
N4 Logistics	People, Naval Stations
N6 Staffs	People
N85 Amphibious	People, Ships
N86 Surface	People, Ships
N87 Subsurface	People, Submarines
N88 CV/CVN	People, Planes, Ships

Table 3. Resource Sponsors for Requirements Determination (From: Department of the Navy)

TFMMS maintains the billet file as well as the Ship/Squadron Manning Documents (SMD/SQMD), Fleet Manning Documents (FMD), and Activity Manning Documents (AMD). There are several requirements documents and information systems that provide data to TFMMS and their interactive relationship is shown in Figure 3.




Figure 3. Manpower Information Systems Structure (From: Department of the Navy)

### C. NAVY MANPOWER PLANNING AND BUDGETING SYSTEM (NMPBS)

NMPBS is a software tool developed for the Commander, Navy Personnel Command, Codes N1 and N10. The program requirement was driven by the desire to develop a total force human capital strategy. Current demands on the human resources department, such as force reductions, highlighted the need for more accurate information with greater flexibility and depth. The desire for specific cost data drove a change from using historical average rates to granular programming which drilled down to each billet and UIC. (Department of the Navy, 2005)

NMPBS joined Human Resource and personnel pay data at the transaction level in real time so that the reports generated are, at most, one month behind. This translates to actual dollar programmatic impact of personnel decisions in real time. Figure 4 provides an illustration of how NMPBS interacts with other databases. (Department of the Navy, 2005)

NMPBS has related human resource data with financial data to provide accurate historical costs with granular detail across a broad variety of personnel, programmatic, and activity variables. It continues to provide real time personnel and strength data. In the future NMPBS will provide long term pricing of every authorized billet in the TFMMS billet file and will allow managers to adjust program pricing to compensate for

changes in strength plan. Billet pricing includes all special and locality pays and incorporates all rules, assumptions, and algorithms (Medicare, retirement set aside, etc). (Department of the Navy, 2005)

NMPBS uses Oracle Portal software to provide the numerous tools available to NMPBS users, including the Oracle Discoverer software, Oracle 11i applications, viewing frequently accessed reports, user documentation and training documents. Discoverer is an outstanding software tool that creates and views the requested reports using the Enterprise Data Warehouse and programming solutions. It performs statistical functions, complex calculations, graphs, and export to Excel with little problem. (Department of the Navy, 2005)




Figure 4. NMPBS and Related Databases (From: Department of the Navy, 2005)



#### **D. HUMAN RESOURCE COST ANALYSIS TOOL (HRCAT)**

HRCAT is a web-based cost analysis tool developed to aid Navy leaders in determining the most cost-effective manpower structure within Navy commands. It provides personnel cost estimates for military, civilian, and contractor personnel. HRCAT does not have complete knowledge of all pay and allowances, particularly at the specific individual level (i.e., is the individual person eligible for certain special pays?). However, for military personnel, HRCAT accounts for paygrade, years of service, occupation (NEC), geographic location, pay, allowances, benefits, recruiting costs, and training costs. The model does allow the user to enter specific pay data when the user has more complete information than the model. If specific data is not presented, then the model runs on best case scenario and projects data for the billet. For civilian personnel, HRCAT accounts for GS or WG, grade, step, occupation, geographic location, pay and fringe benefits, recruiting costs, and training costs. All data provided by HRCAT are in FY05 dollars. (Resourceconsultants.com, 2006)

When entering individual billet data into HRCAT it is required that the user know the individuals' information, such as years of service, NEC or EMC, location, and paygrade. TFMMS generates all the required information except for individual length of service. Since service members rotate from one duty station to another frequently, it was determined that for this analysis the average time in service for each paygrade would be used for input into HRCAT. The average time in service was calculated by retrieving the average years of service at promotion and finding the midpoint between the next promotion. For HRCAT purposes, the years of service are rounded to the next higher or lower whole number. For E-9's who have no further promotion opportunity, 2.7 years time in service was added to the average years of service at promotion. The values input into HRCAT for each paygrades' time in service are displayed in Table 4.

	E-4	E-5	E-6	E-7	E-8	E-9
Average LOS at promotion	3 years	5.2 years	11.3 years	14.4 years	17.1 years	20.3 years
Average TIS for HRCAT calculation	4 years	8 years	13 years	16 years	19 years	23 years

Table 4. Navy Average Length of Service at Promotion and Calculated Average Time in Service at Paygrade (After: About.com, 2006)

A snapshot example of the comparison that HRCAT provides is shown in Figure 5. The example is a First Class (E-6) Aviation Machinist's Mate (AD), with NEC 6403 (Oil Analysis Operator/Evaluator), stationed at AIMD Fallon, Nevada.

Define an occupation profile to generate the billet, Civilian, and Contractor equivalent

Paygrade E-6 YOS 13  
 Location NV - FALLON NAS  
 EMC Aviation Machinist's Mate (A110)  
 NEC 6403:Oil Analysis Operator/Evaluator  
 DESIGNATOR NONE  
 SUBSPECIALLY NONE  
 Duty Type Shore

-----  
 Military

Military Pay Type	Annual	
Base Pay	\$33,350.40	Grade: E-6
Retired Pay Accrual (RPA)	\$9,171.36	YOS: 13 Year(s) of Service.
BAH	\$13,908.00	Locality: NV - FALLON NAS, NV
BAS	\$3,206.16	Dependents (BAH): With Dependents
Miscellaneous	\$1,153.74	EMC: Aviation Mechanical - Aviation Machinist's Mate (A110)
PCS	\$1,543.00	NEC: 6403:Oil Analysis Operator/Evaluator
Special Pay: Other	\$188.00	
DHP Accrual	\$5,364.00	Military Annual (MPN): \$70,435.96
Social Security (Employer)	\$2,067.72	
Medicare (Employer)	\$483.58	Military Annual (Total): \$72,049.41
Recruiting Costs	\$1,613.45	

-----

Contractor		Change Parameters
Contractor Pay Type	Annual	Location: Rest of the U.S.
Base Pay	\$44,634.76	SOC Code: 49-3011
Benefits	\$20,525.47	SOC Title: Aircraft mechanics and service technicians
Overhead/Profit	\$11,158.69	Percentile: 50th Percentile (Median)
		Contractor Annual: \$76,318.92
-----		
Civilian General Schedule (GS)		Change Parameters
GS Pay Type	Annual	Grade: GS7
Base Pay	\$37,565.00	Step: 4
Fringe Benefit Factor	\$10,142.55	Location: Rest of U.S.
Training Costs	\$751.30	Series: 8602: Aircraft Engine Mechanic
Recruiting Costs	\$1,050.00	Civilian(GS) Annual: \$49,508.85
PCS / Relocation Costs	\$0.00	
-----		
Civilian Wage Grade (WG)		Change Parameters
WG Pay Type	Annual	Grade: WG10
Base Pay	\$41,905.34	Step: 2
Fringe Benefit Factor	\$11,314.44	Location: Rest of the U.S.
Training Costs	\$838.11	Civilian(WG) Annual: \$55,107.89
Recruiting Costs	\$1,050.00	
PCS / Relocation Costs	\$0.00	

Figure 5. HRCAT Comparison Example (After: Resourceconsultants.com, 2006)

## E. SUMMARY

This chapter has described the interactive relationship between TFMMS and NMPBS, and the data which can be retrieved from the associated databases. It also described how HRCAT is used to generate comparisons between military and civilian workers with the same skills. Comparisons were generated across all funded billets using the aforementioned tools and methodology. The resulting analysis by UIC and rating follows in Chapter III.

### **III. ANALYSIS RESULTS**

#### **A. OVERVIEW**

The data displayed in appendices F-S under the heading “NMPBS Enlisted Force Cost Data” is the actual enlisted force cost data for fiscal years 2004-2006. The data set was retrieved via NMPBS linked through TFMMS for the exact billet costing. The cost reports were filtered in a manner which provided enlisted force data only and excluded officers, civilians, or contractors that were attached to the command. Costs were retrieved as an aggregate (all ten UICs together), individually aggregated by UIC, and individually by rating and paygrade by UIC. Thus, in appendix F, column FY2005, the total \$239,889,351 enlisted force expenditure in FY05 is a sum of each of the ten UICs, and each UIC can be broken down by enlisted rating as seen in appendices J-S. Individual paygrade data was collected at the UIC level and will be discussed in the UIC analysis area, however, appendices J-S do not break ratings down to the paygrade level because the sample sizes were too small in most cases and the data displayed would be overly detailed and cumbersome. The individual paygrade and rating values are available in the Excel decision support tool provided to CNAF, N422E.

FYs 2004 and 2006 are provided in appendices F-S for reference purposes only. The amounts in all columns are nominal and, as one would expect, costs for each FY increase from FY04-FY06 for all UICs. Annual pay raises, individual longevity pay raises, BAH increases, etc, account for the annual cost increases.

The four right hand columns of appendix F, page 1, and the four right hand columns of appendices G-S are the HRCAT comparison cost data. Raw billet data was pulled from TFMMS which provided, at the UIC level, each rating, paygrade, primary NEC, secondary NEC, billet title, and billet sequence code for all FY authorized billets. The 4355 individual billets were input into HRCAT and comparables were retrieved as seen in Chapter II, Figure 5. When summed at the billet and UIC level, aggregate comparison costs were derived as listed in appendix F under column headings GS, WG, (page 1) and GS/WG (page 2). Appendix F, page 2, has two HRCAT columns which provide combined GS/WG costs across the AIMDs. These combined GS/WG costs are

not provided at the individual command level because the differences in cost from strictly GS to GS/WG combination are very small. The savings column in all appendices is a simple calculation of FY 2005 cost minus HRCAT projection, divided by FY 2005 cost. The savings is expressed as a percentage (positive or negative). FY 2005 is used for comparison because HRCAT provides its values in 2005 nominal terms. As of this writing, HRCAT is being updated to reflect 2006 costs.

The column labeled “TFFMS Auth Billets” in appendices G-S is a direct billet pull from the TFMMS database and reflects total billets authorized in paygrades E-1 through E-9. The billets are listed either aggregately by rating (i.e. “AD”) or individually by rating and paygrade (i.e. “AD1, AD2”) depending on the various appendices and the need to drill down the data.

Appendix G provides NMPBS cost data, number of billets authorized within the rating, and projected costs and savings for each rating across all ten UICs. Appendix H provides cost data, billet numbers, and HRCAT projections for each individual paygrade in an authorized rating across all ten UICs. Appendix I provides cost data, billet numbers, and HRCAT projections for each individual paygrade in an unauthorized rating that have real cost data in NMPBS. Obviously, savings for unauthorized ratings is always 100% when projecting HRCAT comparisons because it is assumed that the command will not have unauthorized ratings onboard after conversion to civilian or contractor maintainers. Appendices J-S are individual UIC summaries by aggregate rating with cost data, billets authorized, and HRCAT projections.

## **B. UIC SUMMARY**

### **1. Overall**

Overall, going strictly GS as a substitute for enlisted seems to have the most promise. The GS comparisons are more favorable than the WG comparisons in every rating and every UIC (Appendices F and G). Only when the top 3 paygrades (E-7 through E-9) are individually broken out does the WG show higher costs savings. Using appendix H, find values for the ratings ATC, ATCS, and AVCM. The cost savings are higher when comparing WG to GS. This is also true of any other E-7 through E-9 rating. Unfortunately, E-7 and above billets are less than 10% of the total considered (311 of

4355 total) and the savings at those levels are quickly overcome by the higher WG costs at the E-1 through E-6 paygrades.

The UIC summary in Appendix F provides an initial indication of the possible success of Civ-Sub across the ten AIMDs. When viewing the “Total” line, it is important to note that the costs reflected for FYs 2004-2006 include unauthorized ratings and paygrades. The savings of 16.83% and 4.57% for GS and WG, respectively, are inflated somewhat by the comparison of HRCAT to the actual costs that include unauthorized ratings and paygrades. Appendix F lists the aggregate unauthorized rating costs from appendix I and the unauthorized paygrade costs from appendix H. The final “Summary” cost is a true indication of the amount the Navy should have paid for the enlisted structure for FY05. Thus, comparing the HRCAT value results in a projected savings of \$33.2 million for GS substitution and \$3.8 million for WG substitution, or 14.27% and 1.63% respectively. If the GS/WG combination is used from appendix F, page 2, the projected savings is \$35.5 million or 15.27%.

As a population, the 4355 billets approach a normal distribution with a mean of \$53,542 per billet and standard deviation of \$3,285 per billet. The HRCAT comparison mean for strictly GS substitution is \$45,813. The probability of achieving the HRCAT value in error with the stated means and standard deviation is 0.93%. Thus, given the large sample size and the distribution of costs, the probability of the GS savings estimate accuracy is 99.07%. The WG mean is \$52,568 and the probability of accuracy is 62%. The combined GS/WG mean is \$45,277 and the probability of accuracy is 99.5%.

Each UIC has a sample size of greater than 30, the smallest being Key West with only 70 billets. The projections for each fall well within the acceptable range from the aggregate mean. Statistically, the probability of expected savings is greatest for Oceana (99.73%), Jacksonville (99.53%), and Mayport (99.54%).

When examining specific UIC expenditure data, it is possible to see when a particular billet has not been utilized. For example, if two MRs (a MR1 and MR2) are authorized but cost data only exists at the MR2 billet then it is easy to understand that no MR1 was onboard or paid for by the command. However, large numbers within a rating make it more difficult to ascertain the exact cause of the expenditure differential from the

mean. A rating could be undermanned or overmanned creating a small difference, or even negative/positive differences between the actual cost and the projected. It is impossible to tell exactly how each rating was manned and the fluctuations due to almost daily personnel transfers create deviations that cannot be answered.

Appendix T provides the authorized manning by command, rating, and paygrade and this can be used as a reference against the actual expenditure data to determine if specific ratings/paygrades have been gapped or are overmanned. This is particularly true if the rating/paygrade has only one authorized billet. For example, Key West has one authorized AECS billet (App T) but the expenditure analysis reveals no AECS line item data. Further examination can help determine if the command has gapped the billet or has possibly filled it with a E-7 or E-9. More specifics on this are provided in the individual command assessments.

## **2. Fallon AIMD (44317)**

Fallon AIMD has 133 authorized billets in ten different ratings (App J). For FY05, Fallon had unauthorized expenditures in the PR rating which comprised 0.61% of total enlisted force cost. Expenditure analysis reveals the AE, AM, AO, AT, and SK ratings had personnel costs in the E-3 and below paygrades with no corresponding authorized billets (App T). The AZ rating had personnel costs in the E-4 and below paygrades with no corresponding authorized billets (App T). The AM2, AOCS, AT1, SK3, and SKCS billets were gapped or undermanned but this was offset by overmanning in the AM3/AMAN, AOC, AT3/ATAN, SKSN, and SKC billets. The AE rating was overmanned at the AE1 and AEAN billets, and although this was somewhat offset by gaps in the AE3 and AE2 billets, the overmanning was significant enough for AEANs to produce higher costs and savings than the mean. Gaps in the AD1, AMCS, AM1, AZ1, SK1, and SK2 billets produced projected cost savings less than the mean. The MR billets were completely gapped, with zero costs, and the MM rating has two authorized billets at the MM2 paygrade, but only MM1 was onboard the command. Overall, the gapped billets lowered personnel costs and kept Fallon's projected savings lower than the mean (1.22% vs 14.27%).

### **3. Jacksonville AIMD (44319)**

Jacksonville AIMD has 498 authorized billets in fifteen different ratings (App K). For FY05, Jacksonville had unauthorized expenditures in the GENDET, AME, and MA ratings which comprised 0.28% of total enlisted force cost. Expenditure analysis reveals the AD, AM, AO, MR, and PR ratings had personnel costs in the E-3 and below paygrades with no corresponding authorized billets (App T). The AE3, AMCS, AOCS, AT3, AZC, AZ3, MR3, PR3, SKCS, and SK3 billets were gapped or undermanned but this was offset by overmanning in the AE2, AM1/AM2, AOC, ATAN, AZCS, AZ2, MRFN, PR2/PRAN, SKC, and SK2 billets. Additional overmanning in the AECS, AE1, AEAN, AO1, AO2, AZ2, PRC, PR1, SK1, YN1, and YN2 billets produced projected savings higher than the mean. The ET and FC expenditures indicate that there was an unauthorized ET1, FC1, and FC2 onboard the command. The AD rating was somewhat overmanned at the AD1/ADC/ADCS billets but severely undermanned at the AD3 billet producing costs and projected savings less than the mean. Overall, the overmanned ratings pushed Jacksonville's costs above the mean/billet and resulted in a higher projected cost savings than the mean (21.51% vs 14.27%).

### **4. Key West AIMD (44320)**

Key West AIMD has 70 authorized billets in ten different ratings (App L). For FY05, Key West had no unauthorized rating expenditures. Expenditure analysis reveals the AE and AM ratings had personnel costs in the E-3 and below paygrades with no corresponding authorized billets (App T). The AM1, AM3, ASC, ASAN, AZC, and YN2 billets were gapped or undermanned but this was offset by overmanning in the AM2, AMAN, ASCS/AS1, AS3, AZ1, and YN3 billets. Additional overmanning in the AD2, AE1, AT1, AT2, AZ2, PR1, and YN1 billets produced projected savings higher than the mean. The SK2 and AO billets were undermanned producing savings lower than the mean. Overall, Key West's actual manning very closely matches authorized billets and the relatively small excess costs resulted in projected cost savings that nearly match the mean (16.63% vs 14.27%).

### **5. Lemoore AIMD (44321)**

Lemoore AIMD has 551 authorized billets in eleven different ratings (App M). For FY05, Lemoore had unauthorized expenditures in the GENDET, AME, EM, RP, and



YN ratings which comprised 0.89% of total enlisted force cost. The expenditure analysis seems to reveal a significant amount use of the “one down” philosophy when detailing to AIMD Lemoore. The AD, AE, AO, AS, AT, AZ, and SK ratings had large personnel costs in the E-4 and below paygrades with no corresponding authorized billets. The AM and PR ratings had personnel costs in the E-3 and below paygrades with no corresponding authorized billets and only limited E-4 billets (App T). The ABF1, AD2, AECS, AOCS, ATC, AT2, PRCS, and PR2 billets were gapped or undermanned but this was offset by overmanning in the ABFC, AD3/ADAN, AEC, AOCS, ATCS, AT3/ATAN, PRC, and PRAN billets. Overall, the undermanned ABCM, AO1/AO2, AZ2, and SK2 ratings pushed Lemoore costs below the mean/billet and resulted in a lower projected cost savings than the mean (10.58% vs 14.27%).

#### **6. Norfolk AIMD (44325)**

Norfolk AIMD has 395 authorized billets in ten different ratings (App N). For FY05, Norfolk had unauthorized expenditures in the GENDET, ABF/H, AC, AME, AO, BM, NC, PS, SH, YN ratings which comprised 7.78% of total enlisted force cost. Norfolk also seems to be a location where the “one down” detailing philosophy was used extensively. The AD, AE, AS, AT, AZ, and SK ratings had large personnel costs in the E-3 and below paygrades with no corresponding authorized billets. The AM and PR ratings had significant personnel costs in the E-4 and below paygrades with no corresponding authorized billets (App T). The AD3, AM2, ASC, ATCS, AZCS, and SKC billets were gapped or undermanned but this was offset by overmanning in the AD3, AM3/AMAN, ASCS, AVCM/ATC, AZCM, and AKCS. Overall, the undermanned AD2 and PR2 ratings and the overmanned AE1, AEAN, AS1, AS3/ASAN, AZ2, AZAN, IT1, and SK3/SKSN ratings pushed Norfolk costs slightly above the mean/billet and resulted in a nominally higher projected cost savings than the mean (19.37% vs 14.27%).

#### **7. North Island AIMD (44326)**

North Island AIMD has 622 authorized billets in ten different ratings (App O). For FY05, North Island had unauthorized expenditures in the GENDET, ABE/F/H, ET, PC, and PS ratings which comprised 2.17% of total enlisted force cost. The AO rating had large personnel costs in the E-4 and below paygrades with no corresponding

authorized billets. The AD, AE, AS, AT, PR, and SK ratings had personnel costs in the E-3 and below paygrades with no corresponding authorized billets and only limited E-4 billets (App T). The AE2, AOCS, AS2, AT2, PR2, and SK2 billets were gapped or undermanned but this was offset by overmanning in the AE3/AEAN, AOCM, AS3/ASAN, AT3, PR1, and SK1 billets. The AD3 rating was severely undermanned with no other paygrade offsets. With the exception of SK1 and SK2, the SK ratings was overmanned in all other paygrades. The MR rating was overmanned at the MRC and MR3 billets. Overall, the overmanned ratings balanced the undermanned rating and North Island costs were slightly above mean/billet and resulted in a slightly higher projected cost savings than the mean (18.53% vs 14.27%).

#### **8. Oceana AIMD (44327)**

Oceana AIMD has 1171 authorized billets in twelve different ratings (App P). For FY05, Oceana had unauthorized expenditures in the GENDET, CS, DC, and YN ratings which comprised 0.42% of total enlisted force cost. The AD, AE, AT, and AZ ratings had personnel costs in the E-3 and below paygrades with limited corresponding authorized billets (App T). The AM3, AO3/AOAN, MR3, PR2, and PR3 billets were gapped or undermanned but this was offset by overmanning in the AMAN, AO2, MRFN, PR1, and PRAN billets. The AEAN, ATAN, AZAN, and SK1/2/3 ratings were overmanned with no other paygrade offsets, creating overspending that translates to higher projected saving within the respective ratings. The AD rating was significantly undermanned at E-5 and below and overmanned at E-6 through E-8. The AS rating was slightly undermanned and the NC rating was manned at 50% (1 of 2 billets). Overall, the overmanned AE, AT, AZ, and SK ratings outweighed the undermanned AD, AS, and NC ratings and influenced the Oceana costs slightly above mean/billet and resulted in a slightly higher projected cost savings than the mean (19.27% vs 14.27%).

#### **9. Point Mugu AIMD (44328)**

Point Mugu AIMD has 238 authorized billets in ten different ratings (App Q). For FY05, Point Mugu had unauthorized expenditures in the GENDET and AME ratings which comprised 0.21% of total enlisted force cost. Expenditure analysis reveals the AE, AM, AS, AT, AZ, and PR ratings had personnel costs in the E-3 and below paygrades with no corresponding authorized billets (App T). The AO and SK ratings had personnel

costs in the E-4 and below paygrades with no corresponding authorized billets (App T). The ADC, AE3, AO2, ASC, AZC, AZ3, PRCS, PR2, and PR3 billets were gapped or undermanned but this was offset by overmanning in the ADCS, AEAN, AO3, AS1/AS2, AZ1, AZ2/AZAN, PRC, PR1, and PRAN billets. The SK rating was undermanned at the SKCS and SK1 billets, but overmanned at the SK3 and SKSN billets. For SK's, total cost and savings are closely approximate the mean, but the over/under-manned billets do align with the "one up, one down" philosophy. The AD3, AMCS/AMC/AM1/AM3, AS3, and ATC/AT2 billets were undermanned with no offset, creating low personnel expenditures. Overall, the undermanned ratings produced costs below mean/billet and resulted in a lower projected cost savings than the mean (7.11% vs 14.27%).

#### **10. Whidbey Island AIMD (44329)**

Whidbey Island AIMD has 480 authorized billets in eleven different ratings (App R). For FY05, Whidbey Island had unauthorized expenditures in the GENDET ratings which comprised 0.13% of total enlisted force cost. Expenditure analysis reveals the AD, AE, AM, AO, AZ, PR, and SK ratings had personnel costs in the E-4 and below paygrades with no corresponding authorized billets (App T). The AS and AT ratings had personnel costs in the E-3 and below paygrades with no corresponding authorized billets (App T). The AE2, AMC, AME1/AME2, AO1, AT2, and PR2 billets were gapped or undermanned but this was offset by overmanning in the AE3/AEAN, AMCS, AME3/AMEAN, AOC, AT3/ATAN, and PR3/PRAN billets. Additional overmanning in the AE1, AMEC, AO2/AO3/AOAN, and PR1 billets produced projected savings higher than the mean. The AD2, AS2, AZ2, and SK2 billets were severely undermanned and this was offset somewhat by the unauthorized personnel in the E-4 and below paygrades, respectively, but not enough to keep each rating from producing projected costs savings less than the mean. The AM1, AM2, AVCM, ATC, and AT1 billets were also slightly undermanned producing projected savings for each rating less than the mean. Overall, the undermanned ratings outweighed the overmanned ratings and produced costs below mean/billet and resulted in a lower projected cost savings than the mean (5.23% vs 14.27%).

## **11. Mayport AIMD (45459)**

Mayport AIMD has 197 authorized billets in thirteen different ratings (App S). For FY05, Mayport had unauthorized expenditures in the GENDET ratings which comprised 0.32% of total enlisted force cost. Expenditure analysis reveals the AD, AO, AZ, and PR ratings had personnel costs in the E-3 and below paygrades with no corresponding authorized billets (App T). The ADCS, AE3, AM3, ATCS, AT3, and AZ3 billets were gapped or undermanned but this was offset by overmanning in the ADC, AEAN, AM2, ATC, AT2/ATAN, and AZ2/AZAN billets. The AD and AS ratings produced projected savings less than the mean because of gaps or undermanning in the AD3 and AS3/ASAN billets, respectively. The AE, AO, AW, MR, and YN ratings produced projected savings higher than the mean because of overmanning in the AE1, AOAN, AW1, MR2, and YNC/YN2 billets. The PR3 billets were severely undermanned and although not technically aligned with “one up, one down” detailing, this cost loss was offset by surplus inventory in the PRC, PR1, PR2, and PRAN billets. The ABH1 billet was completely gapped and this also reduced overall command costs. Overall, the undermanned ratings balanced the overmanned ratings and produced costs nearly matching the mean/billet and resulted in projected cost savings approaching the mean (15.09% vs 14.27%).

### **C. RATING SUMMARY**

#### **1. Overall**

When analyzing the rating data provided in appendices G and H it is important to understand that any rating or paygrade with a sample size of less than 30 cannot be viewed as having a normal distribution of costs. For example, if it is assumed that the costs and comparisons are normal, then savings of 43.5% are expected for the AME rating (App G). Unfortunately, there are instances when ratings and paygrades have been overmanned or undermanned. It is impossible to verify the exact numbers of persons filling the billets authorized during FY05 and even if it were done, it would only provide a snapshot of the data because of personnel transfers and receipts. To be valid, the analysis must compare the individual ratings or paygrades to the average across all 4355 billets. So, for those AMEs, the 43.5% savings is relatively high when compared to the expected savings of 14.27% and common sense would suggest that for FY2005 the

AMEs were overmanned. The closer an individual ratings savings approach the aggregate mean, the higher the confidence level of savings estimate.

In some cases, a rating or paygrade has costs in FYs04-06 but no authorized billets. For example, the BM rating has costs listed in FYs04-06 (App G), but there are no authorized BM billets in any AIMD and thus, the savings represented are 100%. An example of paygrade overspending is in the AD rating. In appendix H, there are costs listed for the ratings ADAN, ADAA, and ADAR but there are no authorized billets for these paygrades in any AIMD. The AD3 rating costs are significantly less than the HRCAT projection, at over -113% and the AD2 rating is also less at over -8% savings. The AD1 rating is too high at 33%. This suggests that the AD3s and AD2s are undermanned and the detailer has used the “one up, one down” philosophy of detailing personnel to fill billets. There are similar instances of this occurring and the reader must carefully examine each paygrade and the associated paygrades to ascertain the true story.

Appendix G provides the optimal resource when attempting to make decisions about which individual ratings might be best to Civ-Sub. The large sample size for almost all authorized ratings (exceptions are AME, CMDCM, ET, FC, IT, AW, MM, NC, SH, and YN) provides excellent comparison data to the overall mean. The ratings with smaller sample sizes have very large deviations from the savings mean. Appendices H and I are best used as drill down tools to understand how the costs in each rating have been distributed across the paygrades. Although appendix H has some paygrades within ratings with sample sizes larger than 30, the nuances of the detailing process (one up, one down) make it difficult to determine if those sample costs are normal.

Some ratings or paygrades, for example ABH1 in appendix H, have a “#DIV/0!” error in the savings columns. This indicates there is an authorized billet and a comparison cost, but no actual cost from NMPBS. For the ABH rating, there are costs associated with the ABH2 billet, but not the ABH1. Again, this suggests that the detailer filled the ABH1 billet with the “one down” philosophy. Comparisons are not made for GS and WG with the “one up, one down” philosophy in mind because the position dictates the paygrade and projecting all 4355 billets one up/one down would be very difficult.

## **2. Unauthorized Ratings**

Every AIMD, with the exception of Key West, has expenditures for unauthorized ratings. Overall, for FYs 04-06 there were expenditures for 19 different ratings (App G and I). Some of the unauthorized ratings “make sense,” that is, it is not surprising to see GENDETS at an AIMD, particularly when several of them have ratings which fall into the AN, SN, and FN basic groups. It is also not surprising to see other related aviation ratings at an AIMD, for example, PRs at AIMD Fallon. However, it is important to provide an explanation for the non-aviation ratings that are seen in appendix I and appendices J-S.

Typically, non-aviation personnel are detailed into an ashore AIMD on a general duty basis because of an inability to perform their duties at another command. This can occur for a variety of reasons, including medical problems (injury, pregnancy, alcohol, etc), legal hold, exceptional family member issues, financial distress, etc. It is particularly prevalent in fleet concentration areas where large numbers of sea duty commands exist and limited shore billets are available. Because these types of transfers are outside the normal detailing window and are of an emergent nature, the detailee usually is required to keep the Sailor in the same geographic area and this also minimizes contingent PCS costs.

When reviewing appendices J-S, only Norfolk and North Island have unauthorized billet expenditures greater than 1% of total enlisted force cost (7.78% and 2.17% respectively). These two facilities are in primary fleet concentration areas on the east and west coast and, with the explanation provided, their higher expenditures are understandable.

## **3. Authorized Ratings**

Most ratings were individually reviewed at the UIC level; however this section is designed to provide a brief overview of each authorized ratings health and position as an aggregate relative to the cost and savings means. When manning levels are reviewed, they are exclusively considered by cost. Thus, an appropriately or correctly manned rating is considered to have cost what it should have relative to the mean, regardless of whether individual paygrades were over/undermanned at the activity; refer to appendix G for the following sections.

**a. Aviation Boatswains Mate (ABE/F/H)**

AB's have 4 total authorized billets located at Lemoore and Mayport. Although Lemoore and Mayport were below projections, unauthorized AB expenditures at Norfolk and North Island caused rating overspending which in turn produced higher than expected projected savings (56.48% vs 16.09%).

**b. Aviation Machinists Mate (AD)**

AD's have 817 authorized billets allocated across every ashore AIMD and are the second largest rating by total end strength. AD's were undermanned at every AIMD except Lemoore and Key West and this resulted in lower than expected projected savings (4.81% vs 16.09%).

**c. Aviation Electricians Mate (AE)**

AE's have 359 authorized billets allocated across every ashore AIMD. AE's were overmanned at every AIMD except North Island and this resulted in higher than expected projected savings (33.68% vs 16.09%).

**d. Aviation Structural Mechanic (AM)**

AM's have 462 authorized billets allocated across every ashore AIMD. AM's were manned appropriately with only Fallon, Point Mugu, and Whidbey being undermanned which resulted in slightly lower than expected projected savings (11.99% vs 16.09%).

**e. Aviation Structural Mechanic – Safety Equipment (AME)**

AME's have 12 authorized billets at Whidbey Island. As noted in the UIC summary, AME's were overmanned and this produced higher than expected projected savings (43.50% vs 16.09%).

**f. Aviation Ordnanceman (AO)**

AO's have 201 authorized billets allocated across every ashore AIMD except Norfolk. AO's were undermanned at Fallon, Key West, and Lemoore and overmanned at Jacksonville, Oceana, North Island, and Mayport. There were unauthorized expenditures at Norfolk. Point Mugu was the only AIMD manned appropriately. As an aggregate, AO costs were slightly above the mean and produced higher than expected projected savings (18.85% vs 16.09%).

***g. Aviation Support Equipment Technician (AS)***

AS's have 597 authorized billets allocated across every ashore AIMD. AS's were manned correctly at Fallon, Jacksonville, Key West, and North Island. Gaps occurred at Lemoore, Oceana, Point Mugu, Whidbey, and Mayport. Norfolk was overmanned. Overall, AS costs were balanced across the AIMDs and resulted in savings projections which closely matched the mean (13.27% vs 16.09%).

***h. Aviation Avionics Technician (AT)***

AT's have 1209 authorized billets allocated across every ashore AIMD and are the largest rating by total end strength. AT's were manned correctly at Fallon, Jacksonville, Lemoore, Norfolk, and Mayport. Key West, North Island, and Oceana were overmanned while Point Mugu and Whidbey were undermanned. As a result of the variance across the AIMDs, AT projected savings almost exactly matched the mean (16.08% vs 16.09%).

***i. Aviation Warfare Systems Operator (AW)***

AW's have 1 billet located at Mayport. AW's were manned correctly, however as paygrade decreases, projected savings increases and without the higher paygrades to offset the calculations as in other ratings, the AW appears to be in error. It is in fact accurate for the single billet. The result of this billet having a sample size of one produced a large difference between the projected savings and the mean (32.37% vs 16.09%).

***j. Aviation Maintenance Administrationman (AZ)***

AZ's have 311 authorized billets allocated across every ashore AIMD. AZ's were manned correctly at Point Mugu and Mayport. Fallon, Lemoore, and Whidbey were undermanned while Jacksonville, Key West, Norfolk, North Island, and Oceana were overmanned. As a result of the balanced variance across the AIMDs, AZ projected savings approach the mean (19.27% vs 16.09%).

***k. Command Master Chief (CMDCM)***

CMDCM's have 2 authorized billets located at Jacksonville and Oceana. CMDCM's were manned correctly and the projected savings approach the mean (17.62% vs 16.09%).



***l. Electronics Technician (ET)***

ET's have 2 authorized billets located at Jacksonville. ET's were overmanned and this in combination with small sample size resulted in excess costs and produced projected savings far in excess of the mean (60.78% vs 16.09%).

***m. Fire Control Technician (FC)***

FC's have 1 authorized billet located at Jacksonville. FC's were overmanned and this in combination with small sample size resulted in excess costs and produced projected savings far in excess of the mean (85.94% vs 16.09%).

***n. Information Technology Specialist***

IT's have 1 billet located at Norfolk. IT's were overmanned and this in combination with small sample size resulted in excess costs and produced projected savings far in excess of the mean (66.05% vs 16.09%).

***o. Machinists Mate (MM)***

MM's have 2 authorized billets located at Fallon. MM's had one billet gapped and this in combination with small sample size resulted in lower cost and produced projected savings much lower than the mean (-21.80% vs 16.09%).

***p. Machinery Repairman (MR)***

MR's have 35 authorized billets allocated across every ashore AIMD except Key West and Point Mugu. MR's were manned correctly at Lemoore, Norfolk, and Oceana. Fallon (3 billets) was completely gapped and Whidbey was also undermanned while Jacksonville, North Island, and Mayport were overmanned. The variance was balanced across the AIMDs that actually had MR manning, however the gaps at Fallon produced projected savings lower than the mean (9.38% VS 16.09%).

***q. Navy Counselor (NC)***

NC's have 3 authorized billets located in Jacksonville and Oceana. NC's were manned correctly at Jacksonville and undermanned at Oceana, however there were unauthorized expenditures at Norfolk also. The unauthorized expenditures produced projected savings much higher than the mean (41.34% vs 16.09%).

***r. Aircrew Survival Equipmentman (PR)***

PR's have 181 authorized billets allocated across every ashore AIMD except Fallon. PR's were manned correctly at Lemoore, Oceana, Point Mugu, and

Mayport. Jacksonville, Key West, North Island, and Whidbey were overmanned while Norfolk was undermanned. Fallon, with no authorized billets, had unauthorized expenditures. Overall, the variance across the AIMDs produced projected savings that closely approach the mean (17.40% vs 16.09%).

*s. Ships Serviceman (SH)*

SH's have 1 authorized billet located at Point Mugu. It was manned correctly and the projected savings approach the mean (12.49% vs 16.09%).

*t. Store Keeper (SK)*

SK's have 148 authorized billets allocated across every ashore AIMD. SK's were manned correctly at Point Mugu and Mayport. Gaps occurred at Key West, Lemoore, Fallon, and Whidbey while Jacksonville, Norfolk, North Island, and Oceana were overmanned. As a result of the balanced variance across the AIMDs, projected savings were close to the mean (13.81% vs 16.09%).

*u. Yeoman (YN)*

YN's have 6 authorized billets located at Jacksonville, Key West, and Mayport. YN's were overmanned at all three authorized AIMDs and there were unauthorized expenditures at Lemoore, Norfolk, and Oceana. The combination of overmanning, unauthorized expenditures, and small sample size produced projected savings well in excess of the mean (63.69% vs 16.09%).

**4. Sea-Shore Rotation Effects**

*a. Overview*

A modified version of the Community Health Matrix (CHM) that the Enlisted Community Managers have built for PR-09 is shown in appendix U. This CHM was a draft at the time of this writing but Commander, Naval Personnel Command analysts expected the final CHM to use the same concepts as shown in appendix U. A brief summary of the contents follows:

Columns A-C show the EMC/rating/rate.

Columns D-E show the FY09 sea and shore billet base, which includes POM-08 changes.

Column F shows the resulting FY09 sea/shore billet ratio, calculated as a ratio of months at sea for 36 months ashore. For instance, 100 sea and 50 shore billets is a ratio of 2:1, or 72:36.

Column G-H shows the Sea-Shore Rotation (SSR) risk level and the number of shore cuts that would move a rate to the next higher risk level. Risk levels are defined as:

Red - Very High Risk

Orange - High Risk

Yellow - Moderate Risk

Green - Low Risk.

The criteria for red for most E5-E7 rates is 60:36, and for most E8-E9 rates it is 54:36 (note: risk levels for E3-E4 rates were not included because they generally do not need billets to support sea/shore rotation).

Column J shows the billet deltas from the proposed Civ-Sub.

Columns K-N shows updated FY09 billet and SSR ratios and the resulting risk levels, after the Civ-Sub deltas are included.

***b. Summary***

The proposed Civ-Subs would have a very negative affect on SSR for a number of rates. The following 10 rates are currently red: ABCM, AME1, AME2, AECS, AOCS, AZCM, AZCS, MR1, MR2, and NC1. Currently, ABE1, ABH1, and AE2 are orange for SSR. After the Civ-Sub, the totals are 22 red and 6 orange (App U). The rates are “color coded” in appendix U in the Risk Level and Rev Risk Level columns.

More importantly, some of the rate billet cuts are so large as to drive SSR too high (see AD2, AM2, AE2, AT2, AS2, PR2, MR2, others). The cuts also would affect Fiscal Year Phasing, that is too great a cut in one year would not be executable from the personnel standpoint. The Enlisted Community Managers would be unable to shed Sailors as fast as the billets are cut. An example of this is AT2 - 610 Civ-Sub cuts

out of 2328 sea/shore billets is 26%, which would be unexecutable unless spread over a number of years.

#### **D. SUMMARY**

This chapter provided an overview of the analytic appendices, specific cost analysis for each UIC and each authorized rating, and a brief explanation of the effects of Civ-Sub on the affected ratings sea-shore rotation. As a whole, the ashore AIMD enterprise can expect 14.27% savings in salary dollars by substituting strictly GS for enlisted Sailors. Minor additional increases in savings can be garnered by including using WG workers as substitutes for the top three enlisted paygrades. Chapter IV concludes this thesis with conclusions and a summary of the analysis, and recommendations for further study.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## IV. CONCLUSIONS

### A. SUMMARY

From a purely personnel cost standpoint, performing the Civ-Sub conversion across all AIMDs saves an average of 14.27%, after accounting for unauthorized paygrade and rating expenditures (App F). This meets OMB A-76 criteria of changing from government to civilian workers by exceeding 10 percent of the new organization's personnel-related costs. However, personnel costs alone do not account for the entirety of the conversion costs. Administrative and contractual costs associated with the new personnel must be calculated and if those approach 4%, the situation now becomes break-even. Of course, if the administrative and contractual costs exceed 4%, it becomes more cost effective to retain the enlisted force. When the potential additional costs are considered along with the standard deviations inherent in this type of calculation, the overall cost effectiveness of Civ-Sub is negligible, at best.

This analysis only considers the annualized cost differences between military and civilian workforces. What is unclear is the effect of Civ-Sub on DoD long term costs. Personnel costs are the single largest expense in the DoD budget and military retirement would certainly be reduced if Civ-Sub were adopted. 4355 billets is a fairly small number of personnel when compared to DoD totals and other personnel decisions must be accounted for in this process, such as new personnel program accessions that might offset or even overcome the proposed AIMD personnel reductions.

From a rating perspective, it appears as though the best avenue would be to Civ-Sub those ratings with the smallest footprint (number of billets). This would serve two distinct purposes; first it creates a trial Civ-Sub that proves it can or cannot work from a manpower standpoint and costs very little if it needs to be abandoned. Second, it allows the ECMs time to develop a plan for reducing the force structure on a large scale basis and to address the associated sea shore issues.

Most importantly, the reduction of the shore billets could cause serious adverse effects on retention if the SSR issues are not resolved. The retention problems would certainly affect manning levels at sea and could ultimately damage afloat AIMD

readiness. The cost savings ashore (assuming there are) from implementing Civ-Sub will not compensate for the inability to maintain aircraft and aircraft components while deployed.

## **B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY**

Whether full or partial Civ-Sub is contemplated, the other considerations addressed herein should be the decisive factors in making Civ-Sub decisions. These issues need further study before important questions can be accurately answered. The following issues are identified as notional areas for further thesis or MBA Project research:

1. Is there sufficient available civilian workforce for each rating and NEC to implement the Civ-Sub?
2. What are the long term cost implications of Civ-Sub?
3. How will the loss of manpower affect the parent Air Station or Naval Station?
4. Will the afloat AIMDs have the resources to “plus-up” manpower when required?
5. Can the ECMs manage the drawdown of shore billets and personnel in a timely manner that will not adversely affect overall cost of the program?
6. If partial Civ-Sub is to be attempted, which commands or ratings within commands are the best candidates?

## APPENDIX A. DOD, FY 2006 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST

### Department of Defense FY 2006 Supplemental Request

	Summary of FY 2006 Supplemental Request by Appropriation (\$M)					Other	Total
	Military Personnel	Operation and Maintenance	Proc. & RDT&E	Military Construction	WCF		
Iraq Freedom Fund (IFF)	-					100.0	100.000
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund						2,197.8	2,197.8
Iraq Security Forces Fund						3,703.0	3,703.0
Military Personnel, Army	6,506.2						6,506.2
Military Personnel, Navy	761.7						761.7
Military Personnel, Marine Corps	834.1						834.1
Military Personnel, Air Force	1,145.4						1,145.4
Reserve Personnel, Army	126.1						126.1
Reserve Personnel, Navy	110.4						110.4
Reserve Personnel, MC	10.3						10.3
Reserve Personnel, Air Force	1.9						1.9
National Guard Personnel, Army	96.0						96.0
National Guard Personnel, Air Force	1.2						1.2
O&M, Army		18,050.3					18,050.3
O&M, Navy		2,793.6					2,793.6
O&M, Marine Corps		1,622.9					1,622.9
O&M, Air Force		6,088.2					6,088.2
O&M, Army Reserve		100.1					100.1
O&M, Navy Reserve		236.5					236.5
O&M, Marine Corps Reserve		55.6					55.6
O&M, Army National Guard		178.6					178.6
O&M, Air Force Reserve		18.6					18.6
O&M, Air National Guard		30.4					30.4
O&M, Defense-Wide		3,559.9					3,559.9
O&M, Inspector Genera		1.1					1.1
Drug Interdiction & Counter-Drug						192.8	192.8
Defense Health Program						1,153.6	1,153.6
Aircraft Procurement, Army			533.2				533.2
Aircraft Procurement, Navy			271.3				271.3
Aircraft Procurement, Air Force			389.9				389.9
Procurement, Marine Corps			2,900.6				2,900.6
Procurement, Defense-Wide			331.4				331.4
Procurement of Ammo, Army			829.6				829.6
Procurement of Ammo, AF			29.0				29.0
Procurement of Ammo, Navy & MC			331.0				331.0
Other Procurement, Army			7,663.7				7,663.7
Other Procurement, Navy			168.0				168.0
Other Procurement, Air Force			1,517.0				1,517.0
Missile Procurement, Army			203.3				203.3
Weapons Procurement, Navy			95.9				95.9
Proc of Weapons & Tracked Combat							
Vehicles, Army			1,133.3				1,133.3
RDT&E, Army			429.0				429.0
RDT&E, Navy			140.0				140.0
RDT&E, Air Force			67.1				67.1
RDT&E, Defense-Wide			145.9				145.9
Defense Working Capital Fund					516.7		516.7
Military Construction, Army				413.4			413.4
Military Construction, Defense-Wide				35.2			35.2
Military Construction, Air Force				36.1			36.1
Total	9,593.3	32,735.8	17,179.2	484.7	516.7	7,347.2	67,856.9

*Source: Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2006 Supplemental Request*



THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## APPENDIX B. DOD, FY 2007 PROCUREMENT PROGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE			
FY 2007 PROCUREMENT PROGRAM			
FEB 2006			
SUMMARY			
(\$ IN MILLIONS)			
APPROPRIATION	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007
AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, ARMY	3,134.7	2,849.8	3,566.5
MISSILE PROCUREMENT, ARMY	1,593.3	1,239.1	1,350.9
PROCUREMENT OF W&TCV, ARMY	4,969.6	2,234.5	2,301.9
PROCUREMENT OF AMMUNITION, ARMY	2,034.2	1,983.6	1,903.1
OTHER PROCUREMENT, ARMY	12,910.4	7,528.3	7,718.6
CHEM AGENTS & MUNITIONS DESTRUCTION, ARMY	1,371.9	1,386.8	
<b>TOTAL DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY</b>	<b>26,014.2</b>	<b>17,222.2</b>	<b>16,841.1</b>
AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, NAVY	9,011.5	9,785.9	10,868.8
WEAPONS PROCUREMENT, NAVY	2,191.1	2,741.2	2,555.0
PROCUREMENT OF AMMO, NAVY & MARINE CORPS	1,023.7	881.5	789.9
SHIPBUILDING & CONVERSION, NAVY	10,373.2	10,595.3	10,578.6
OTHER PROCUREMENT, NAVY	4,862.0	5,486.0	4,967.9
PROCUREMENT, MARINE CORPS	5,030.1	3,035.9	1,273.5
<b>TOTAL DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY</b>	<b>32,491.6</b>	<b>32,525.9</b>	<b>31,033.7</b>
AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE	13,947.0	12,681.5	11,479.8
PROCUREMENT OF AMMUNITION, AIR FORCE	1,312.8	1,003.2	1,072.7
MISSILE PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE	4,332.6	5,118.1	4,204.1
OTHER PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE	16,493.1	14,026.2	15,408.1
<b>TOTAL DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE</b>	<b>36,085.6</b>	<b>32,829.0</b>	<b>32,164.8</b>
PROCUREMENT, DEFENSE-WIDE	3,565.7	2,739.7	2,861.5
NATIONAL GUARD & RESERVE EQUIPMENT	349.9	1,194.0	
DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT PURCHASES	42.6	57.5	18.5
CHEM AGENTS & MUNITIONS DESTRUCTION			1,277.3
<b>TOTAL DEFENSE-WIDE</b>	<b>3,958.1</b>	<b>3,991.1</b>	<b>4,157.2</b>
<b>GRAND TOTAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE</b>	<b>98,549.5</b>	<b>86,568.2</b>	<b>84,196.8</b>

*Source: Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2007 Budget*

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## APPENDIX C. DOD, FY 2007 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET

**Department of Defense  
FY 2007 President's Budget  
Exhibit O-1 Total Obligational Authority  
(Dollars in Thousands)**

<b>Appropriation Summary</b>	<b>FY 2005</b>	<b>FY 2006</b>	<b>FY 2007</b>
<b>Department of the Army</b>			
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, ARMY	60,327,095	45,505,704	24,902,380
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, ARMY RESERVE	2,017,313	2,011,101	2,299,202
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD	4,872,300	4,708,505	4,838,665
<b>Total Department of the Army</b>	<b>67,216,708</b>	<b>52,225,310</b>	<b>32,040,247</b>
<b>Department of the Navy</b>			
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, NAVY	33,892,238	31,769,782	31,330,984
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, MARINE CORPS	6,237,908	5,489,460	3,878,962
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, NAVY RESERVE	1,364,111	1,643,911	1,288,764
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, MARINE CORPS RESERVE	200,637	242,070	211,911
<b>Total Department of the Navy</b>	<b>41,694,894</b>	<b>39,145,223</b>	<b>36,710,621</b>
<b>Department of the Air Force</b>			
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, AIR FORCE	34,494,921	32,617,931	31,342,307
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, AIR FORCE RESERVE	2,262,807	2,475,554	2,723,800
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, AIR NATIONAL GUARD	4,551,700	4,691,532	5,336,017
<b>Total Department of the Air Force</b>	<b>41,309,428</b>	<b>39,785,017</b>	<b>39,402,124</b>
<b>Defense-Wide</b>			
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE, DEFENSE-WIDE	21,534,488	20,870,792	20,075,656

*Source: Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2007 Budget*

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## APPENDIX D. EXHIBIT M-1, FY 2007 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET

### Exhibit M-1 FY 2007 President's Budget

	(DOLLARS IN THOUSANDS)		
MILITARY PERSONNEL, GRAND TOTAL	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007
<b>ACTIVITY 05: PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION TRAVEL</b>			
125 ACCESSION TRAVEL	257,032	387,979	379,682
130 TRAINING TRAVEL	235,973	211,912	234,638
135 OPERATIONAL TRAVEL	786,941	792,835	581,367
140 ROTATIONAL TRAVEL	1,306,417	1,369,749	1,282,823
145 SEPARATION TRAVEL	406,687	437,012	476,669
150 TRAVEL OF ORGANIZED UNITS	71,065	38,276	29,054
155 NON-TEMPORARY STORAGE	63,272	78,961	82,164
160 TEMPORARY LODGING EXPENSE	88,828	78,923	78,881
165 OTHER	6,091	8,477	8,796
<b>TOTAL BUDGET ACTIVITY 05:</b>	<b>3,222,306</b>	<b>3,404,124</b>	<b>3,154,074</b>
<b>ACTIVITY 06: OTHER MILITARY PERSONNEL COSTS</b>			
170 APPREHENSION OF MILITARY DESERTERS	4,645	3,845	3,900
175 INTEREST ON UNIFORMED SERVICES SAVINGS	11,538	1,487	1,402
180 DEATH GRATUITIES	596,032	292,418	15,406
185 UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS	422,597	376,593	323,567
190 SURVIVOR BENEFITS	11,023	7,169	6,640
195 EDUCATION BENEFITS	9,581	9,232	10,134
200 ADOPTION EXPENSES	1,401	1,630	2,037
210 TRANSPORTATION SUBSIDY	16,021	14,115	13,966
215 PARTIAL DISLOCATION ALLOWANCE	7,919	11,575	11,989
216 SGLI EXTRA HAZARD PAYMENTS	126,579	168,341	
217 RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS (ROTC)		144,577	149,772
218 JUNIOR ROTC		64,963	67,904
<b>TOTAL BUDGET ACTIVITY 06:</b>	<b>1,207,336</b>	<b>1,095,945</b>	<b>606,717</b>
220 LESS REIMBURSABLES	(1,021,255)	(968,075)	(1,023,533)
<b>TOTAL DIRECT - ACTIVE</b>	<b>104,518,984</b>	<b>88,481,602</b>	<b>84,872,596</b>

*Source: Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2007 Budget*

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## APPENDIX E. LIST OF MANPOWER CLAIMANT CODES

Manpower Claimant	Code
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Assistant for Field Support (CNO (N09bF))	11
Assistant for Administration, Office of Under Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV (AAUSN))	12
Chief of Naval Research (CNR)	14
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)	15
Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED)	18
Commander, Naval Air Systems Command (COMNAVAIRSYSCOM)	19
Chief of Naval Personnel (CHNAVPERS (PERS 02))	22
Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command (COMNAVSUPSYSCOM)	23
Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (COMNAVSEASYSYSCOM)	24
Commander, Naval Facilities Engineering Command (COMNAVFACENCOM)	25
Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC)	27
Director, Strategic Systems Programs (CM3) (DIRSSP)	30
Commander, Military Sealift Command (COMSC)	33
Commander, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (COMSPAWARSYSCOM)	39
Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT)	60
Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR)	61
Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET)	62
Commander, Naval Computer and Telecommunications Command (COMNAVCOMTELCOM)	63
Commander, Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command (COMNAVMETOCCOM)	65
Commander, Naval Security Group Command (COMNAVSECGRU)	69
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT)	70
Commander, Naval Reserve Force (COMNAVRESFOR)	72
Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command (COMNAVSPECWARCOM)	74

*Source: Department of the Navy, "Manpower, Personnel and Training: A Tutorial"*



THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## APPENDIX F. UIC OVERALL COSTS

	NMPBS Enlisted Force Cost Data (nominal FY \$\$)		
	Fiscal Year		
	2004	2005	2006
UIC Command			
44317 Fallon	\$5,132,365	\$6,438,509	\$6,899,373
44319 Jacksonville	\$26,247,201	\$28,634,688	\$30,651,382
44320 Key West	\$3,196,496	\$3,855,263	\$4,329,227
44321 Lemoore	\$26,641,756	\$29,131,947	\$30,005,683
44325 Norfolk	\$21,264,847	\$24,593,656	\$25,735,187
44326 North Island	\$34,754,097	\$36,026,090	\$37,228,378
44327 Oceana	\$54,669,480	\$64,695,475	\$70,980,504
44328 Pt Mugu	\$10,467,038	\$12,035,801	\$12,730,142
44329 Whidbey Island	\$20,624,781	\$24,009,479	\$27,746,477
45459 Mayport	\$9,855,570	\$10,468,443	\$11,566,271
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$212,853,633</b>	<b>\$239,889,351</b>	<b>\$257,872,623</b>

HRCAT Projected Costs and Savings 2005 \$\$			
GS	Savings	WG	Savings
\$6,321,116	1.82%	\$7,098,829	-10.26%
\$22,412,048	21.73%	\$25,846,284	9.74%
\$3,213,990	16.63%	\$3,682,444	4.48%
\$25,817,210	11.38%	\$29,386,043	-0.87%
\$18,286,873	25.64%	\$20,862,284	15.17%
\$28,713,888	20.30%	\$32,858,860	8.79%
\$52,009,360	19.61%	\$60,681,397	6.20%
\$11,156,542	7.31%	\$12,622,966	-4.88%
\$22,725,290	5.35%	\$25,659,158	-6.87%
\$8,860,401	15.36%	\$10,234,118	2.24%
<b>\$199,516,718</b>	<b>16.83%</b>	<b>\$228,932,385</b>	<b>4.57%</b>

Unauth Rating Expenditures	\$1,765,951	\$2,120,260	\$1,509,931
Unauth Paygrade Expenditures	\$5,278,199	\$5,045,208	\$6,058,596
Unauth Rating & PG %	3.31%	2.99%	2.93%

Summary	\$205,809,483	\$232,723,882	\$250,304,096	\$199,516,718	14.27%	\$228,932,385	1.63%
---------	---------------	---------------	---------------	---------------	--------	---------------	-------

Avg Auth Billet Cost	\$47,258	\$53,438	\$57,475	\$45,813	\$52,568
----------------------	----------	----------	----------	----------	----------

	NMPBS Enlisted Force Cost Data (nominal FY \$\$)			HRCAT Projected Costs and Savings	
	Fiscal Year			2005 \$\$	
	2004	2005	2006	GS/WG	Savings
UIC Command					
44317 Fallon	\$5,132,365	\$6,438,509	\$6,899,373	\$6,205,246	3.62%
44319 Jacksonville	\$26,247,201	\$28,634,688	\$30,651,382	\$22,053,685	22.98%
44320 Key West	\$3,196,496	\$3,855,263	\$4,329,227	\$3,186,837	17.34%
44321 Lemoore	\$26,641,756	\$29,131,947	\$30,005,683	\$25,605,832	12.10%
44325 Norfolk	\$21,264,847	\$24,593,656	\$25,735,187	\$18,053,057	26.59%
44326 North Island	\$34,754,097	\$36,026,090	\$37,228,378	\$28,410,871	21.14%
44327 Oceana	\$54,669,480	\$64,695,475	\$70,980,504	\$51,493,924	20.41%
44328 Pt Mugu	\$10,467,038	\$12,035,801	\$12,730,142	\$10,993,908	8.66%
44329 Whidbey Island	\$20,624,781	\$24,009,479	\$27,746,477	\$22,450,083	6.49%
45459 Mayport	\$9,855,570	\$10,468,443	\$11,566,271	\$8,727,183	16.63%
Total	\$212,853,633	\$239,889,351	\$257,872,623	\$197,180,627	17.80%

Unauth Rating Expenditures	\$1,765,951	\$2,120,260	\$1,509,931
Unauth Paygrade Expenditures	\$5,278,199	\$5,045,208	\$6,058,596
Unauth Rating & PG %	3.31%	2.99%	2.93%

Summary	\$205,809,483	\$232,723,882	\$250,304,096	\$197,180,627	15.27%
---------	---------------	---------------	---------------	---------------	--------

Avg Auth Billet Cost	\$47,258	\$53,438	\$57,475	\$45,277	
----------------------	----------	----------	----------	----------	--

## APPENDIX G. RATING OVERALL COSTS

Rating Group	NMPBS Enlisted Force Cost Data (nominal FY \$\$)			TFMMS Auth Billets	HRCAT Projected Costs and Savings (2005 \$\$)			
	Fiscal Year				GS	Savings	WG	Savings
	2004	2005	2006					
GENDETS (AN, FN, SN)	\$1,015,362	\$1,672,473	\$1,051,746	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
ABE/F/H	\$266,360	\$541,235	\$570,778	4	\$235,532	56.48%	\$223,195	58.76%
AC	\$23,091	\$108,028	\$88,282	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
AD	\$36,744,322	\$39,315,792	\$42,379,766	817	\$37,423,902	4.81%	\$43,055,172	-9.51%
AE	\$21,816,715	\$24,646,850	\$26,158,594	359	\$16,346,339	33.68%	\$18,845,208	23.54%
AM (incl AFCM)	\$24,166,107	\$24,584,635	\$27,146,942	462	\$21,636,873	11.99%	\$24,447,198	0.56%
AME	\$1,050,426	\$1,001,989	\$1,208,834	12	\$566,107	43.50%	\$642,833	35.84%
AO	\$9,221,400	\$11,295,066	\$12,739,327	201	\$9,165,820	18.85%	\$10,555,867	6.54%
AS	\$25,505,303	\$30,745,277	\$36,205,974	597	\$26,664,264	13.27%	\$31,036,346	-0.95%
AT (incl AVCM)	\$59,770,597	\$66,054,023	\$68,020,690	1209	\$55,430,877	16.08%	\$63,467,914	3.92%
AW	\$69,094	\$73,202	\$58,526	1	\$49,509	32.37%	\$55,108	24.72%
AZ	\$14,514,391	\$17,577,178	\$18,141,101	311	\$14,190,385	19.27%	\$16,381,466	6.80%
BM	\$41,118	\$88,599	\$52,680	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
CM	\$35,581	\$0	\$0	0	\$0		\$0	
CMDCM	\$180,492	\$211,224	\$229,553	2	\$174,011	17.62%	\$115,743	45.20%
CS	\$0	\$46,855	\$118,776	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
DC	\$0	\$2,129	\$5,146	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
EM	\$0	\$4,339	\$0	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
EN	\$0	\$0	\$19,438	0	\$0		\$0	
ET	\$142,471	\$216,297	\$108,792	2	\$84,830	60.78%	\$102,173	52.76%
FC	\$119,326	\$285,689	\$181,278	1	\$40,173	85.94%	\$49,719	82.60%
IC	\$0	\$0	\$3,116	0	\$0		\$0	
IT	\$147,889	\$145,831	\$205,358	1	\$49,509	66.05%	\$55,108	62.21%
MA	\$83,789	\$48,833	\$1,930	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
MC	\$0	\$0	\$80,760	0	\$0		\$0	
MM	\$96,731	\$73,329	\$48,419	2	\$89,314	-21.80%	\$104,909	-43.07%
MR	\$1,550,742	\$1,714,284	\$1,852,490	35	\$1,553,482	9.38%	\$1,826,851	-6.57%
NC	\$234,646	\$271,641	\$348,944	3	\$159,341	41.34%	\$168,087	38.12%
OS	\$12,048	\$0	\$0	0	\$0		\$0	
PC	\$1,981	\$46,248	\$4,167	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
PH	\$0	\$0	\$1,101	0	\$0		\$0	
PR	\$8,513,199	\$10,186,122	\$10,629,897	181	\$8,414,058	17.40%	\$9,560,416	6.14%
PS	\$0	\$64,267	\$58,724	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
QM	\$34,066	\$0	\$0	0	\$0		\$0	
RP	\$16,443	\$38,490	\$24,063	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
SH	\$18,121	\$56,573	\$80,091	1	\$49,509	12.49%	\$55,108	2.59%
SK	\$6,423,217	\$8,044,226	\$9,256,178	148	\$6,933,542	13.81%	\$7,874,789	2.11%
UNK	\$467,720	\$0	\$0	0	\$0		\$0	
UT	\$34,752	\$0	\$0	0	\$0		\$0	

YN	\$536,134	\$728,626	\$791,159		6		\$263,827	63.79%	\$311,909	57.19%
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$212,853,633</b>	<b>\$239,889,351</b>	<b>\$257,872,623</b>		<b>4355</b>		<b>\$199,516,718</b>	<b>16.83%</b>	<b>\$228,932,385</b>	<b>4.57%</b>

<b>Auth Ratings Only</b>	<b>\$211,087,682</b>	<b>\$237,769,090</b>	<b>\$256,362,693</b>		<b>4355</b>		<b>\$199,516,718</b>	<b>16.09%</b>	<b>\$228,932,385</b>	<b>3.72%</b>
<b>Unauth Rating Expenditures</b>	<b>\$1,765,951</b>	<b>\$2,120,260</b>	<b>\$1,509,931</b>							
<b>Unauth Rating %</b>	<b>0.83%</b>	<b>0.88%</b>	<b>0.59%</b>							

## APPENDIX H. RATING COSTS BY PAYGRADE (AUTHORIZED RATINGS)

Rate rank	NMPBS Enlisted Force Cost Data (nominal FY \$)			TFMMS Auth Billets	HRCAT Projected Costs and Savings (2005 \$)			
	Fiscal year				GS	Savings	WG	Savings
	2004	2005	2006					
ABCM	\$0	\$0	\$83,098	1	\$87,005	#DIV/0!	\$57,872	#DIV/0!
ABE1	\$32,955	\$70,274	\$70,075	1	\$49,509	29.55%	\$55,108	21.58%
ABE3	0	0	\$2,827	0				
ABEAN	0	\$28,447	\$7,322	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
ABF1	0	\$1,058	\$0	1	\$49,509	4580.27%	\$55,108	5109.57%
ABF3	\$28,779	\$96,537	\$101,015	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
ABFAN	0	\$20,219	\$28,532	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
ABFC	\$89,241	\$91,258	\$42,374	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
ABH1	0	0	\$55,581	1	\$49,509	#DIV/0!	\$55,108	#DIV/0!
ABH2	\$72,215	\$86,295	\$66,983	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
ABH3	0	\$29,415	\$25,006	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
ABHAA	0	\$49,945	\$748	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
ABHAN	\$43,171	\$67,786	\$87,218	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$266,360</b>	<b>\$541,235</b>	<b>\$570,778</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>\$235,532</b>	<b>56.48%</b>	<b>\$223,195</b>	<b>58.76%</b>
AD1	\$10,910,323	\$11,749,586	\$11,846,391	159	\$7,871,907	33.00%	\$8,762,155	25.43%
AD2	\$15,316,319	\$16,446,394	\$17,379,183	398	\$17,773,550	-8.07%	\$20,876,987	-26.94%
AD3	\$3,642,024	\$3,770,818	\$5,137,201	200	\$8,034,624	-113.07%	\$9,943,736	-163.70%
ADAA	\$36,235	\$56,321	\$321,387	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
ADAN	\$2,946,070	\$1,971,025	\$1,847,785	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
ADAR	\$63,107	\$60,341	\$87,750	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
ADC	\$2,738,141	\$4,024,118	\$4,653,715	50	\$3,016,146	25.05%	\$2,893,579	28.09%
ADCS	\$1,092,104	\$1,237,189	\$1,106,353	10	\$727,676	41.18%	\$578,716	53.22%
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$36,744,322</b>	<b>\$39,315,792</b>	<b>\$42,379,766</b>	<b>817</b>	<b>\$37,423,902</b>	<b>4.81%</b>	<b>\$43,055,172</b>	<b>-9.51%</b>
AE1	\$4,608,520	\$5,161,359	\$4,714,526	62	\$3,069,549	40.53%	\$3,416,689	33.80%
AE2	\$8,127,906	\$9,040,030	\$9,882,914	179	\$7,993,632	11.58%	\$9,389,398	-3.86%
AE3	\$3,582,100	\$3,369,706	\$2,773,014	85	\$3,414,715	-1.34%	\$4,226,088	-25.41%
AEAA	\$190,545	\$269,746	\$522,191	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
AEAN	\$3,468,764	\$4,753,825	\$5,949,165	7	\$225,379	95.26%	\$308,372	93.51%
AEAR	\$30,659	\$42,753	\$85,977	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
AEC	\$1,170,415	\$1,538,158	\$1,609,409	20	\$1,206,458	21.56%	\$1,157,432	24.75%
AECS	\$637,807	\$471,271	\$621,398	6	\$436,605	7.36%	\$347,229	26.32%
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$21,816,715</b>	<b>\$24,646,850</b>	<b>\$26,158,594</b>	<b>359</b>	<b>\$16,346,339</b>	<b>33.68%</b>	<b>\$18,845,208</b>	<b>23.54%</b>
AFCM	\$559,634	\$404,906	\$577,207	6	\$522,032	-28.93%	\$347,229	14.24%
AM1	\$5,574,688	\$5,568,853	\$6,603,429	93	\$4,604,323	17.32%	\$5,125,034	7.97%
AM2	\$10,895,469	\$11,076,606	\$11,768,691	241	\$10,762,376	2.84%	\$12,641,592	-14.13%
AM3	\$3,078,709	\$3,410,267	\$3,570,781	79	\$3,173,676	6.94%	\$3,927,776	-15.18%
AMAA	\$65,136	\$65,913	\$68,160	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
AMAN	\$1,747,603	\$1,581,356	\$1,771,163	6	\$193,182	87.78%	\$264,319	83.29%
AMAR	\$24,006	\$56,946	\$15,271	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
AMC	\$1,548,581	\$1,820,292	\$2,087,963	25	\$1,508,073	17.15%	\$1,446,790	20.52%

AMCS	\$672,282	\$599,496	\$684,278		12	\$873,211	-45.66%	\$694,459	-15.84%
Total	\$24,166,107	\$24,584,635	\$27,146,942		462	\$21,636,873	11.99%	\$24,447,198	0.56%
AME1	\$292,838	\$236,344	\$440,350		3	\$148,527	37.16%	\$165,324	30.05%
AME2	\$401,702	\$340,168	\$236,244		8	\$357,257	-5.02%	\$419,638	-23.36%
AME3	\$55,167	\$62,889	\$171,559		0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
AMEAN	\$174,024	\$208,806	\$191,416		0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
AMEC	\$126,694	\$153,782	\$169,266		1	\$60,323	60.77%	\$57,872	62.37%
Total	\$1,050,426	\$1,001,989	\$1,208,834		12	\$566,107	43.50%	\$642,833	35.84%
AO1	\$2,752,104	\$2,885,977	\$2,958,187		47	\$2,326,916	19.37%	\$2,590,071	10.25%
AO2	\$4,200,613	\$5,243,332	\$5,862,843		100	\$4,465,716	14.83%	\$5,245,474	-0.04%
AO3	\$1,108,321	\$1,448,488	\$1,652,968		31	\$1,245,367	14.02%	\$1,541,279	-6.41%
AOAA	0	\$34,923	\$41,741		0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
AOAN	\$365,218	\$661,852	\$1,091,533		11	\$354,168	46.49%	\$484,584	26.78%
AOAR	0	\$34,432	0		0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
AOC	\$682,076	\$760,289	\$783,313		8	\$482,583	36.53%	\$462,973	39.11%
AOCM	0	\$134,984	\$227,727		0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
AOCS	\$113,067	\$90,789	\$121,014		4	\$291,070	-220.60%	\$231,486	-154.97%
Total	\$9,221,400	\$11,295,066	\$12,739,327		201	\$9,165,820	18.85%	\$10,555,867	6.54%
AS1	\$6,475,585	\$7,197,384	\$7,106,122		106	\$5,247,938	27.09%	\$5,841,436	18.84%
AS2	\$9,787,204	\$11,695,348	\$13,685,757		287	\$12,816,605	-9.59%	\$15,054,510	-28.72%
AS3	\$5,309,466	\$7,191,371	\$7,781,521		128	\$5,142,159	28.50%	\$6,363,991	11.51%
ASAA	\$41,516	\$103,056	\$336,505		0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
ASAN	\$1,788,668	\$2,519,668	\$4,897,180		45	\$1,448,867	42.50%	\$1,982,390	21.32%
ASAR	\$56,589	\$8,804	\$6,046		0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
ASC	\$1,313,156	\$1,271,204	\$1,410,098		21	\$1,266,781	0.35%	\$1,215,303	4.40%
ASCM	0	\$19,348	\$77,802		1	\$87,005	-349.69%	\$57,872	-199.11%
ASCS	\$733,118	\$739,094	\$904,942		9	\$654,908	11.39%	\$520,844	29.53%
Total	\$25,505,303	\$30,745,277	\$36,205,974		597	\$26,664,264	13.27%	\$31,036,346	-0.95%
AT1	\$11,910,403	\$12,227,843	\$13,132,500		199	\$9,852,261	19.43%	\$10,966,470	10.32%
AT2	\$22,951,470	\$25,308,310	\$27,258,236		610	\$27,240,868	-7.64%	\$31,997,391	-26.43%
AT3	\$14,118,003	\$14,648,979	\$9,698,561		282	\$11,328,820	22.66%	\$14,020,668	4.29%
ATAA	\$524,014	\$421,844	\$478,395		0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
ATAN	\$5,078,679	\$7,415,096	\$10,728,638		25	\$804,926	89.14%	\$1,101,328	85.15%
ATAR	\$145,421	\$142,087	\$122,575		0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
ATC	\$2,481,102	\$2,960,589	\$3,422,914		59	\$3,559,052	-20.21%	\$3,414,423	-15.33%
ATCS	\$1,455,983	\$1,768,760	\$1,929,988		22	\$1,600,886	9.49%	\$1,273,175	28.02%
AVCM	\$1,105,522	\$1,160,516	\$1,248,883		12	\$1,044,063	10.03%	\$694,459	40.16%
Total	\$59,770,597	\$66,054,023	\$68,020,690		1209	\$55,430,877	16.08%	\$63,467,914	3.92%
AW1	\$69,094	\$73,202	\$58,526		1	\$49,509	32.37%	\$55,108	24.72%
Total	\$69,094	\$73,202	\$58,526		1	\$49,509	32.37%	\$55,108	24.72%
AZ1	\$2,730,498	\$3,133,746	\$3,111,015		55	\$2,722,987	13.11%	\$3,030,934	3.28%
AZ2	\$8,693,643	\$10,432,529	\$9,688,927		184	\$8,216,917	21.24%	\$9,651,672	7.48%
AZ3	\$1,520,154	\$1,831,213	\$2,422,985		54	\$2,169,348	-18.47%	\$2,684,809	-46.61%
AZAA	\$22,053	\$69,521	\$182,275		0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
AZAN	\$473,160	\$1,022,414	\$1,513,426		2	\$64,394	93.70%	\$88,106	91.38%
AZAR	\$16,367	\$7,040	\$66,829		0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
AZC	\$697,839	\$637,525	\$702,436		13	\$784,198	-23.01%	\$752,331	-18.01%
AZCM	\$216,282	\$203,454	\$210,889		1	\$87,005	57.24%	\$57,872	71.56%
AZCS	\$144,395	\$239,736	\$242,318		2	\$145,535	39.29%	\$115,743	51.72%

Total	\$14,514,391	\$17,577,178	\$18,141,101		311		\$14,190,385	19.27%	\$16,381,466	6.80%
CMDCM	\$180,492	\$211,224	\$229,553		2		\$174,011	17.62%	\$115,743	45.20%
Total	\$180,492	\$211,224	\$229,553		2		\$174,011	17.62%	\$115,743	45.20%
ET1	\$65,608	\$98,801	\$27,823		0		\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
ET2	\$28,388	\$70,041	\$80,398		1		\$44,657	36.24%	\$52,455	25.11%
ET3	\$48,475	\$47,454	\$571		1		\$40,173	15.34%	\$49,719	-4.77%
Total	\$142,471	\$216,297	\$108,792		2		\$84,830	60.78%	\$102,173	52.76%
FC1	\$61,700	\$79,478	\$21,806		0		\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
FC2	\$0	\$47,172	\$55,959		0		\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
FC3	\$32,137	\$96,302	\$103,513		1		\$40,173	58.28%	\$49,719	48.37%
FCC	\$24,487	\$62,736	\$0		0		\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
FCSN	\$1,003	\$0	\$0		0		\$0			
Total	\$119,326	\$285,689	\$181,278		1		\$40,173	85.94%	\$49,719	82.60%
IT1	\$112,942	\$145,831	\$130,470		1		\$49,509	66.05%	\$55,108	62.21%
IT2	\$32,068	\$0	\$0		0		\$0			
IT3	\$2,879	\$0	\$35,788		0		\$0			
ITC	\$0	\$0	\$39,100		0		\$0			
Total	\$147,889	\$145,831	\$205,358		1		\$49,509	66.05%	\$55,108	62.21%
MM1	\$96,731	\$73,329	\$37,070		0		\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
MM2	\$0	\$0	\$11,349		2		\$89,314	#DIV/0!	\$104,909	#DIV/0!
Total	\$96,731	\$73,329	\$48,419		2		\$89,314	-21.80%	\$104,909	-43.07%
MR1	\$320,980	\$291,822	\$525,882		8		\$396,071	-35.72%	\$440,863	-51.07%
MR2	\$733,088	\$828,383	\$779,363		18		\$803,829	2.96%	\$944,185	-13.98%
MR3	\$140,119	\$203,644	\$150,689		8		\$321,385	-57.82%	\$397,749	-95.32%
MRC	\$69,987	\$51,539	\$133,147		0		\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
MRFA	\$0	\$7,734	\$2,113		0		\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
MRFN	\$286,568	\$313,713	\$245,404		1		\$32,197	89.74%	\$44,053	85.96%
MRFR	\$0	\$17,451	\$15,892		0		\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
Total	\$1,550,742	\$1,714,284	\$1,852,490		35		\$1,553,482	9.38%	\$1,826,851	-6.57%
NC1	\$158,183	\$207,445	\$267,273		2		\$99,018	52.27%	\$110,216	46.87%
NCC	\$76,463	\$64,196	\$81,671		1		\$60,323	6.03%	\$57,872	9.85%
Total	\$234,646	\$271,641	\$348,944		3		\$159,341	41.34%	\$168,087	38.12%
PR1	\$2,714,735	\$3,385,293	\$3,281,436		42		\$2,079,372	38.58%	\$2,314,531	31.63%
PR2	\$2,592,358	\$3,103,310	\$3,612,960		89		\$3,974,487	-28.07%	\$4,668,472	-50.44%
PR3	\$1,145,746	\$947,787	\$873,463		32		\$1,285,540	-35.64%	\$1,590,998	-67.86%
PRAA	\$63,254	\$171,348	\$206,716		0		\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
PRAN	\$814,776	\$1,340,639	\$1,630,984		4		\$128,788	90.39%	\$176,212	86.86%
PRAR	\$76,909	\$34,781	\$482		0		\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
PRC	\$527,883	\$583,540	\$537,160		7		\$422,260	27.64%	\$405,101	30.58%
PRCM	\$141,207	\$199,046	\$228,220		1		\$87,005	56.29%	\$57,872	70.93%
PRCS	\$436,331	\$420,379	\$258,476		6		\$436,605	-3.86%	\$347,229	17.40%
Total	\$8,513,199	\$10,186,122	\$10,629,897		181		\$8,414,058	17.40%	\$9,560,416	6.14%
SH1	\$7,306	\$56,081	\$55,772		1		\$49,509	11.72%	\$55,108	1.74%
SH2	\$9,465	\$0	\$0		0		\$0		\$0	
SHSN	\$1,350	\$492	\$24,319		0		\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
Total	\$18,121	\$56,573	\$80,091		1		\$49,509	12.49%	\$55,108	2.59%



SK1	\$1,860,308	\$2,062,831	\$2,297,108		34	\$1,683,301	18.40%	\$1,873,668	9.17%
SK2	\$3,044,789	\$3,948,488	\$4,841,235		89	\$3,974,487	-0.66%	\$4,668,472	-18.23%
SK3	\$760,774	\$872,804	\$811,293		14	\$562,424	35.56%	\$696,062	20.25%
SKC	\$544,407	\$773,414	\$835,985		7	\$422,260	45.40%	\$405,101	47.62%
SKCS	\$121,396	\$281,512	\$303,497		4	\$291,070	-3.40%	\$231,486	17.77%
SKSA	0	\$1,411	\$10,261		0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
SKSN	\$91,542	\$101,745	\$156,798		0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
SKSR	0	\$2,020	0		0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$6,423,217</b>	<b>\$8,044,226</b>	<b>\$9,256,178</b>		<b>148</b>	<b>\$6,933,542</b>	<b>13.81%</b>	<b>\$7,874,789</b>	<b>2.11%</b>
YN1	\$194,085	\$308,120	\$306,815		1	\$49,509	83.93%	\$55,108	82.11%
YN2	\$255,752	\$269,495	\$172,142		3	\$133,971	50.29%	\$157,364	41.61%
YN3	\$29,393	\$77,177	\$156,494		2	\$80,346	-4.11%	\$99,437	-28.84%
YNC	\$56,904	\$73,834	\$108,410		0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
YNSN	0	0	\$47,298		0	\$0		\$0	
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$536,134</b>	<b>\$728,626</b>	<b>\$791,159</b>		<b>6</b>	<b>\$263,827</b>	<b>63.79%</b>	<b>\$311,909</b>	<b>57.19%</b>
<b>Auth Ratings Only Total</b>	<b>\$211,087,682</b>	<b>\$237,769,090</b>	<b>\$256,362,693</b>		<b>4355</b>	<b>\$199,516,718</b>	<b>16.09%</b>	<b>\$228,932,385</b>	<b>3.72%</b>
<b>Auth PG</b>	<b>\$205,809,483</b>	<b>\$232,723,882</b>	<b>\$250,304,096</b>		<b>4355</b>	<b>\$199,516,718</b>	<b>14.27%</b>	<b>\$228,932,385</b>	<b>1.63%</b>
<b>Unauth PG Expenditures</b>	<b>\$5,278,199</b>	<b>\$5,045,208</b>	<b>\$6,058,596</b>						
<b>Unauth PG %</b>	<b>2.50%</b>	<b>2.12%</b>	<b>2.36%</b>						

**APPENDIX I. RATING COSTS BY PAYGRADE  
(UNAUTHORIZED RATINGS)**

Rate rank	NMPBS Enlisted Force Cost Data (nominal FY \$\$)			TFMMS Auth Billets	HRCAT Projected Costs and Savings (2005 \$\$)			
	Fiscal year				GS	Savings	WG	Savings
	2004	2005	2006					
AA	\$136,241	\$120,819	\$192,505	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
AN	\$832,172	\$1,423,110	\$764,915	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
AR	\$16,802	\$46,023	\$11,109	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$985,215</b>	<b>\$1,589,953</b>	<b>\$968,529</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>100.00%</b>
AC2	\$10,958	\$7,648	\$13,671	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
AC3	\$12,132	\$100,380	\$74,612	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$23,091</b>	<b>\$108,028</b>	<b>\$88,282</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>100.00%</b>
BM2	\$424	\$0	0	0				
BM3	\$32,888	\$88,599	\$52,680	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
BMCM	\$7,806	0	0	0				
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$41,118</b>	<b>\$88,599</b>	<b>\$52,680</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>100.00%</b>
CMCN	\$35,581	0	0	0				
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$35,581</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>\$0</b>		<b>\$0</b>	
CS3	0	\$46,855	\$118,776	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>\$46,855</b>	<b>\$118,776</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>100.00%</b>
DC3	0	0	\$5,146	0				
DCFA	0	\$2,129	0	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>\$2,129</b>	<b>\$5,146</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>100.00%</b>
EM3	0	\$4,339	0	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>\$4,339</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>100.00%</b>
ENFN	0	0	\$19,438	0				
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>\$19,438</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>\$0</b>		<b>\$0</b>	
FA	0	\$25,678	0	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
FN	0	\$986	0	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>\$26,663</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>100.00%</b>
IC3	0	0	\$3,116	0				
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>\$3,116</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>\$0</b>		<b>\$0</b>	
MA2	\$83,789	\$48,833	\$1,930	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$83,789</b>	<b>\$48,833</b>	<b>\$1,930</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>100.00%</b>
MCC	0	0	\$80,760	0				
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>\$80,760</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>\$0</b>		<b>\$0</b>	
OSSN	\$12,048	0	0	0				

Total	\$12,048	\$0	\$0	0	\$0		\$0	
PCSN	\$1,981	\$46,248	\$4,167			100.00%		100.00%
Total	\$1,981	\$46,248	\$4,167	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
PHC	0	0	\$1,101	0				
Total	\$0	\$0	\$1,101	0	\$0		\$0	
PSSN	0	\$64,267	\$58,724	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
Total	\$0	\$64,267	\$58,724	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
QM3	\$31,385	0	0	0	\$0		\$0	
QMSN	\$2,682	0	0	0	\$0		\$0	
Total	\$34,066	\$0	\$0	0	\$0		\$0	
RPSN	\$16,443	\$38,490	\$24,063			100.00%		100.00%
Total	\$16,443	\$38,490	\$24,063	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
SA	0	0	\$12,320	0	\$0		\$0	
SN	\$30,146	\$55,857	\$70,897	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
Total	\$30,146	\$55,857	\$83,217	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
UNK	\$467,720	\$0	\$0	0	\$0		\$0	
Total	\$467,720	\$0	\$0	0	\$0		\$0	
UTCN	\$34,752	0	0	0	\$0		\$0	
Total	\$34,752	\$0	\$0	0	\$0		\$0	
<b>Unauth Ratings Only</b>	<b>\$1,765,951</b>	<b>\$2,120,260</b>	<b>\$1,509,931</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

## APPENDIX J. FALLON

44317 Fallon	<b>NMPBS Enlisted Force Cost Data (nominal FY \$\$)</b>			<b>TFMMS Auth Billets</b>	<b>HRCAT Projected Costs and Savings (2005 \$\$)</b>			
	Fiscal year				GS	Savings	WG	Savings
	2004	2005	2006					
Rate rank								
GENDETS (AN, FN, SN)	0	0	\$4,867	0				
AD	\$57,437	\$58,887	\$60,959	2	\$94,166	-59.91%	\$107,563	-82.66%
AE	\$795,497	\$987,299	\$1,093,458	15	\$705,298	28.56%	\$802,768	18.69%
AM (incl AFCM)	\$1,241,278	\$1,262,083	\$1,381,472	30	\$1,408,117	-11.57%	\$1,597,659	-26.59%
AO	\$527,863	\$727,126	\$830,148	14	\$658,898	9.38%	\$742,271	-2.08%
AS	\$17,700	\$54,936	\$56,863	1	\$49,509	9.88%	\$55,108	-0.31%
AT (incl AVCM)	\$1,472,330	\$1,545,300	\$1,602,267	26	\$1,311,129	15.15%	\$1,401,354	9.32%
AZ	\$370,639	\$511,431	\$471,409	13	\$595,098	-16.36%	\$689,871	-34.89%
MM	\$96,731	\$73,329	\$48,419	2	\$89,314	-21.80%	\$104,909	-43.07%
MR	\$0	\$0	\$0	3	\$143,675	#DIV/0!	\$162,671	#DIV/0!
PR	\$87,639	\$39,104	\$0	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
SK	\$441,304	\$1,179,013	\$1,349,511	27	\$1,265,913	-7.37%	\$1,434,657	-21.68%
UNK	\$23,948	\$0	\$0	0				
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$5,132,365</b>	<b>\$6,438,509</b>	<b>\$6,899,373</b>	<b>133</b>	<b>\$6,321,116</b>	<b>1.82%</b>	<b>\$7,098,829</b>	<b>-10.26%</b>
<b>Auth Billets Only</b>	<b>\$5,020,779</b>	<b>\$6,399,405</b>	<b>\$6,894,506</b>	<b>133</b>	<b>\$6,321,116</b>	<b>1.22%</b>	<b>\$7,098,829</b>	<b>-10.93%</b>
<b>Unauth Billet Expenditures</b>	<b>\$111,586</b>	<b>\$39,104</b>	<b>\$4,867</b>					
<b>Unauth Billet %</b>	<b>2.17%</b>	<b>0.61%</b>	<b>0.07%</b>					
<b>Avg Auth Billet Cost</b>	<b>\$37,750</b>	<b>\$48,116</b>	<b>\$51,838</b>		<b>\$47,527</b>		<b>\$53,375</b>	

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## APPENDIX K. JACKSONVILLE

44319 Jax	NMPBS Enlisted Force Cost Data (nominal FY \$\$)			TFMMS Auth Billets	HRCAT Projected Costs and Savings (2005 \$\$)			
	Fiscal year				GS	Savings	WG	Savings
	2004	2005	2006					
Rate rank								
GENDETS (AN, FN, SN)	\$8,641	\$2,318	\$82,984	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
AD	\$4,503,864	\$4,330,238	\$5,324,681	89	\$4,075,138	5.89%	\$4,682,705	-8.14%
AE	\$2,981,009	\$3,502,987	\$3,606,172	45	\$2,000,181	42.90%	\$2,326,332	33.59%
AM (incl AFCM)	\$2,214,066	\$2,152,715	\$2,413,517	36	\$1,778,731	17.37%	\$1,917,389	10.93%
AME	\$14,900	\$29,819	\$0	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
AO	\$580,143	\$705,656	\$504,137	9	\$431,128	38.90%	\$477,261	32.37%
AS	\$3,064,430	\$3,547,140	\$3,958,157	73	\$3,151,261	11.16%	\$3,730,062	-5.16%
AT (incl AVCM)	\$8,399,574	\$8,886,919	\$9,336,284	165	\$7,252,682	18.39%	\$8,465,691	4.74%
AZ	\$1,947,298	\$2,229,248	\$2,327,814	38	\$1,679,539	24.66%	\$1,967,882	11.72%
CMDCM	\$76,084	\$110,561	\$114,417	1	\$87,005	21.31%	\$57,872	47.66%
ET	\$126,853	\$188,207	\$99,188	2	\$84,830	54.93%	\$102,173	45.71%
FC	\$119,326	\$285,689	\$181,278	1	\$40,173	85.94%	\$49,719	82.60%
MA	\$39,643	\$48,833	\$1,930	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
MR	\$78,445	\$114,006	\$136,944	2	\$89,682	21.34%	\$104,827	8.05%
NC	\$64,912	\$69,010	\$98,443	1	\$49,509	28.26%	\$55,108	20.14%
PR	\$1,113,595	\$1,310,900	\$1,290,679	20	\$934,274	28.73%	\$1,056,778	19.39%
SK	\$651,304	\$908,292	\$956,715	13	\$623,576	31.35%	\$695,205	23.46%
UNK	\$103,191	\$0	\$0	0				
YN	\$159,922	\$212,150	\$218,043	3	\$134,339	36.68%	\$157,281	25.86%
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$26,247,201</b>	<b>\$28,634,688</b>	<b>\$30,651,382</b>	<b>498</b>	<b>\$22,412,048</b>	<b>21.73%</b>	<b>\$25,846,284</b>	<b>9.74%</b>
<b>Auth Billets Only</b>	<b>\$26,080,826</b>	<b>\$28,553,717</b>	<b>\$30,566,468</b>	<b>498</b>	<b>\$22,412,048</b>	<b>21.51%</b>	<b>\$25,846,284</b>	<b>9.48%</b>
<b>Unauth Billet Expenditures</b>	<b>\$166,375</b>	<b>\$80,971</b>	<b>\$84,914</b>					
<b>Unauth Billet %</b>	<b>0.63%</b>	<b>0.28%</b>	<b>0.28%</b>					
<b>Avg Auth Billet Cost</b>	<b>\$52,371</b>	<b>\$57,337</b>	<b>\$61,378</b>		<b>\$45,004</b>		<b>\$51,900</b>	

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## APPENDIX L. KEY WEST

44320 Key West	NMPBS Enlisted Force Cost Data (nominal FY \$\$)			TFMMS Auth Billets	HRCAT Projected Costs and Savings (2005 \$\$)			
	Fiscal year				GS	Savings	WG	Savings
	2004	2005	2006					
Rate rank								
AD	\$57,959	\$120,352	\$156,222	2	\$94,166	21.76%	\$107,563	10.63%
AE	\$199,281	\$224,990	\$216,928	3	\$154,489	31.34%	\$165,434	26.47%
AM (incl AFCM)	\$557,319	\$597,819	\$768,319	11	\$528,147	11.65%	\$590,323	1.25%
AO	\$59,361	\$97,515	\$85,816	2	\$94,166	3.43%	\$107,563	-10.30%
AS	\$1,267,434	\$1,587,160	\$1,758,112	30	\$1,310,569	17.43%	\$1,533,651	3.37%
AT (incl AVCM)	\$331,570	\$404,288	\$420,209	7	\$322,671	20.19%	\$372,407	7.89%
AZ	\$345,498	\$425,202	\$382,304	7	\$337,969	20.52%	\$377,906	11.12%
PR	\$94,984	\$122,514	\$140,513	2	\$94,166	23.14%	\$107,563	12.20%
SK	\$234,983	\$209,534	\$332,938	5	\$232,989	-11.19%	\$267,580	-27.70%
YN	\$48,106	\$65,889	\$67,866	1	\$44,657	32.22%	\$52,455	20.39%
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$3,196,495</b>	<b>\$3,855,263</b>	<b>\$4,329,227</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>\$3,213,990</b>	<b>16.63%</b>	<b>\$3,682,444</b>	<b>4.48%</b>
<b>Auth Billets Only</b>	<b>\$3,196,495</b>	<b>\$3,855,263</b>	<b>\$4,329,227</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>\$3,213,990</b>	<b>16.63%</b>	<b>\$3,682,444</b>	<b>4.48%</b>
<b>Unauth Billet Expenditures</b>	<b>\$1</b>	<b>\$1</b>	<b>\$1</b>					
<b>Unauth Billet %</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>					
<b>Avg Auth Billet Cost</b>	<b>\$45,664</b>	<b>\$55,075</b>	<b>\$61,846</b>		<b>\$45,914</b>		<b>\$52,606</b>	



THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## APPENDIX M. LEMOORE

44321 Lemoore	<b>NMPBS Enlisted Force Cost Data (nominal FY \$\$)</b>			<b>TFMMS Auth Billets</b>	<b>HRCAT Projected Costs and Savings (2005 \$\$)</b>			
	Fiscal year				GS	Savings	WG	Savings
	2004	2005	2006					
Rate rank								
GENDETS (AN, FN, SN)	\$24,846	\$42,446	\$39,729	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
ABE/F/H	\$122,196	\$162,590	\$198,374	3	\$186,023	-14.41%	\$168,087	-3.38%
AD	\$6,615,884	\$6,957,727	\$6,746,113	129	\$6,034,392	13.27%	\$6,884,284	1.06%
AE	\$2,115,056	\$2,495,961	\$2,418,351	32	\$1,534,877	38.51%	\$1,713,374	31.35%
AM (incl AFCM)	\$3,681,941	\$3,732,055	\$3,698,461	65	\$3,032,295	18.75%	\$3,460,161	7.29%
AME	\$3,942	\$93,301	\$180,065	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
AO	\$2,886,330	\$3,416,078	\$3,688,189	79	\$3,700,057	-8.31%	\$4,218,655	-23.49%
AS	\$1,965,532	\$1,981,285	\$2,342,556	41	\$1,916,754	3.26%	\$2,188,120	-10.44%
AT (incl AVCM)	\$6,253,180	\$6,407,840	\$6,311,617	120	\$5,622,457	12.26%	\$6,398,926	0.14%
AZ	\$1,086,807	\$1,433,603	\$1,550,918	37	\$1,687,387	-17.70%	\$1,956,855	-36.50%
BM	\$7,806	\$0	\$0	0				
EM	\$0	\$4,339	\$0	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
EN	\$0	\$0	\$19,438	0				
MA	\$9,922	\$0	\$0	0				
MC	\$0	\$0	\$80,760	0				
MR	\$347,584	\$274,051	\$217,347	5	\$223,653	18.39%	\$262,191	4.33%
NC	\$507	\$0	\$0	0				
PH	\$0	\$0	\$1,101	0				
PR	\$984,302	\$1,338,594	\$1,448,103	25	\$1,174,385	12.27%	\$1,332,538	0.45%
RP	\$16,443	\$38,490	\$24,063	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
SK	\$487,396	\$672,991	\$956,148	15	\$704,930	-4.75%	\$802,851	-19.30%
UNK	\$7,025	\$0	\$0	0				
YN	\$25,061	\$80,594	\$84,352	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$26,641,760</b>	<b>\$29,131,945</b>	<b>\$30,005,685</b>	<b>551</b>	<b>\$25,817,210</b>	<b>11.38%</b>	<b>\$29,386,043</b>	<b>-0.87%</b>
<b>Auth Billets Only</b>	<b>\$26,546,208</b>	<b>\$28,872,775</b>	<b>\$29,576,177</b>	<b>551</b>	<b>\$25,817,210</b>	<b>10.58%</b>	<b>\$29,386,043</b>	<b>-1.78%</b>
<b>Unauth Billet Expenditures</b>	<b>\$95,552</b>	<b>\$259,170</b>	<b>\$429,508</b>					
<b>Unauth Billet %</b>	<b>0.36%</b>	<b>0.89%</b>	<b>1.43%</b>					
<b>Avg Auth Billet Cost</b>	<b>\$48,178</b>	<b>\$52,401</b>	<b>\$53,677</b>		<b>\$46,855</b>		<b>\$53,332</b>	

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## APPENDIX N. NORFOLK

44325 Norfolk	NMPBS Enlisted Force Cost Data (nominal FY \$\$)			TFMMS Auth Billets	HRCAT Projected Costs and Savings (2005 \$\$)			
	Fiscal year				GS	Savings	WG	Savings
	2004	2005	2006					
Rate rank								
GENDETS (AN, FN, SN)	\$653,541	\$1,015,352	\$383,211	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
ABE/F/H	\$71,949	\$146,709	\$121,417	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
AC	\$23,091	\$108,028	\$88,282	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
AD	\$4,365,122	\$4,240,130	\$5,054,375	95	\$4,325,945	-2.02%	\$4,992,348	-17.74%
AE	\$2,546,355	\$2,948,726	\$3,222,378	45	\$1,978,119	32.92%	\$2,335,286	20.80%
AM (incl AFCM)	\$2,312,683	\$2,278,522	\$2,262,339	41	\$2,007,730	11.88%	\$2,207,024	3.14%
AME	\$61,394	\$84,436	\$62,106	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
AO	\$0	\$212,438	\$117,662	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
AS	\$2,857,116	\$3,484,023	\$4,096,655	49	\$2,312,561	33.62%	\$2,618,315	24.85%
AT (incl AVCM)	\$3,359,329	\$4,291,081	\$4,810,610	77	\$3,580,393	16.56%	\$4,045,814	5.72%
AZ	\$2,122,192	\$2,754,863	\$2,594,436	39	\$1,817,097	34.04%	\$2,069,613	24.87%
BM	\$32,888	\$88,599	\$52,680	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
IC	\$0	\$0	\$3,116	0				
IT	\$112,942	\$145,831	\$67,932	1	49,508.85	66.05%	55,107.89	62.21%
MR	\$192,578	\$250,380	\$280,222	5	\$215,677	13.86%	\$256,525	-2.45%
NC	\$92,764	\$138,436	\$92,860	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
PR	\$1,285,203	\$1,156,726	\$1,191,029	25	\$1,184,464	-2.40%	\$1,335,468	-15.45%
PS	\$0	\$33,920	\$4,795	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
QM	\$31,385	\$0	\$0	0				
SH	\$1,350	\$492	\$0	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
SK	\$1,071,959	\$1,129,610	\$1,114,360	18	\$815,378	27.82%	\$946,783	16.18%
UNK	\$7,867	\$0	\$0	0				
YN	\$63,140	\$85,354	\$114,720	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$21,264,847</b>	<b>\$24,593,656</b>	<b>\$25,735,187</b>	<b>395</b>	<b>\$18,286,873</b>	<b>25.64%</b>	<b>\$20,862,284</b>	<b>15.17%</b>
<b>Auth Billets Only</b>	<b>\$20,225,479</b>	<b>\$22,679,891</b>	<b>\$24,694,336</b>	<b>395</b>	<b>\$18,286,873</b>	<b>19.37%</b>	<b>\$20,862,284</b>	<b>8.01%</b>
<b>Unauth Billet Expenditures</b>	<b>\$1,039,368</b>	<b>\$1,913,765</b>	<b>\$1,040,851</b>					
<b>Unauth Billet %</b>	<b>4.89%</b>	<b>7.78%</b>	<b>4.04%</b>					
<b>Avg Auth Billet Cost</b>	<b>\$51,204</b>	<b>\$57,417</b>	<b>\$62,517</b>		<b>\$46,296</b>		<b>\$52,816</b>	

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## APPENDIX O. NORTH ISLAND

44326 North Island	NMPBS Enlisted Force Cost Data (nominal FY \$\$)			TFMMS Auth Billets	HRCAT Projected Costs and Savings (2005 \$\$)			
	Fiscal year				GS	Savings	WG	Savings
	2004	2005	2006					
Rate rank								
GENDETS (AN, FN, SN)	\$248,584	\$443,597	\$314,613	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
ABE/F/H	\$72,215	\$231,936	\$195,407	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
AD	\$5,431,271	\$5,222,855	\$4,965,394	112	\$5,136,053	1.66%	\$5,886,317	-12.70%
AE	\$3,973,184	\$3,644,191	\$3,541,274	70	\$3,183,740	12.64%	\$3,687,115	-1.18%
AM (incl AFCM)	\$4,749,769	\$4,898,001	\$5,675,827	87	\$4,015,952	18.01%	\$4,586,805	6.35%
AME	\$111,100	\$0	\$0	0				
AO	\$526,844	\$759,617	\$805,228	6	\$293,312	61.39%	\$325,452	57.16%
AS	\$5,715,011	\$5,626,930	\$6,526,054	98	\$4,557,190	19.01%	\$5,201,780	7.56%
AT (incl AVCM)	\$8,818,323	\$9,351,691	\$8,963,314	157	\$7,303,854	21.90%	\$8,309,019	11.15%
AZ	\$2,385,535	\$2,848,532	\$3,028,887	44	\$1,974,186	30.69%	\$2,307,373	19.00%
ET	\$15,618	\$28,090	\$9,604	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
IT	\$34,947	\$0	\$35,788	0				
MA	\$33,497	\$0	\$0	0				
MR	\$194,893	\$195,443	\$221,332	3	\$138,823	28.97%	\$160,017	18.13%
PC	\$1,981	\$46,248	\$4,167	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
PR	\$1,538,262	\$1,685,758	\$1,676,245	28	\$1,316,165	21.92%	\$1,487,305	11.77%
PS	\$0	\$30,347	\$53,929	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
SH	\$0	\$0	\$24,319	0				
SK	\$827,588	\$1,012,857	\$1,186,995	17	\$794,612	21.55%	\$907,677	10.38%
UNK	\$75,476	\$0	\$0	0				
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$34,754,097</b>	<b>\$36,026,090</b>	<b>\$37,228,378</b>	<b>622</b>	<b>\$28,713,888</b>	<b>20.30%</b>	<b>\$32,858,860</b>	<b>8.79%</b>
<b>Auth Billets Only</b>	<b>\$34,160,680</b>	<b>\$35,245,873</b>	<b>\$36,590,551</b>	<b>622</b>	<b>\$28,713,888</b>	<b>18.53%</b>	<b>\$32,858,860</b>	<b>6.77%</b>
<b>Unauth Billet Expenditures</b>	<b>\$593,417</b>	<b>\$780,217</b>	<b>\$637,827</b>					
<b>Unauth Billet %</b>	<b>1.71%</b>	<b>2.17%</b>	<b>1.71%</b>					
<b>Avg Auth Billet Cost</b>	<b>\$54,921</b>	<b>\$56,665</b>	<b>\$58,827</b>		<b>\$46,164</b>		<b>\$52,828</b>	

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## APPENDIX P. OCEANA

44327 Oceana	NMPBS Enlisted Force Cost Data (nominal FY \$\$)			TFMMS Auth Billets	HRCAT Projected Costs and Savings (2005 \$\$)			
	Fiscal year				GS	Savings	WG	Savings
	2004	2005	2006					
Rate rank								
GENDETS (AN, FN, SN)	\$47,886	\$83,295	\$196,807	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
AD	\$9,228,542	\$11,188,785	\$12,573,168	233	\$10,437,898	6.71%	\$12,166,542	-8.74%
AE	\$5,766,770	\$6,697,098	\$6,829,093	84	\$3,764,380	43.79%	\$4,368,916	34.76%
AM (incl AFCM)	\$4,549,260	\$4,598,637	\$4,985,366	90	\$4,023,456	12.51%	\$4,647,329	-1.06%
AO	\$3,672,088	\$4,280,593	\$5,578,236	76	\$3,259,071	23.86%	\$3,868,550	9.63%
AS	\$5,893,535	\$8,555,901	\$10,312,543	176	\$7,546,357	11.80%	\$8,964,978	-4.78%
AT (incl AVCM)	\$18,251,346	\$20,882,484	\$21,523,094	371	\$16,552,232	20.74%	\$19,302,432	7.57%
AZ	\$3,245,901	\$3,951,192	\$3,876,665	63	\$2,893,691	26.76%	\$3,308,711	16.26%
BM	\$424	\$0	\$0	0				
CMDCM	\$104,408	\$100,664	\$115,137	1	87,005.28	13.57%	57,871.58	42.51%
CS	\$0	\$46,855	\$118,776	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
DC	\$0	\$2,129	\$0	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
MA	\$727	\$0	\$0	0				
MR	\$482,739	\$557,321	\$673,364	11	\$469,176	15.82%	\$563,239	-1.06%
NC	\$76,463	\$64,196	\$129,210	2	\$109,832	-71.09%	\$112,979	-75.99%
OS	\$12,048	\$0	\$0	0				
PR	\$1,850,491	\$2,283,531	\$2,488,271	44	\$1,948,390	14.68%	\$2,268,322	0.67%
QM	\$2,682	\$0	\$0	0				
SK	\$1,204,735	\$1,262,622	\$1,476,704	20	\$917,873	27.30%	\$1,051,527	16.72%
UNK	\$209,054	\$0	\$0	0				
YN	\$70,382	\$140,172	\$104,070	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$54,669,480</b>	<b>\$64,695,475</b>	<b>\$70,980,504</b>	<b>1171</b>	<b>\$52,009,360</b>	<b>19.61%</b>	<b>\$60,681,397</b>	<b>6.20%</b>
<b>Auth Billets Only</b>	<b>\$54,326,277</b>	<b>\$64,423,024</b>	<b>\$70,560,851</b>	<b>1171</b>	<b>\$52,009,360</b>	<b>19.27%</b>	<b>\$60,681,397</b>	<b>5.81%</b>
<b>Unauth Billet Expenditures</b>	<b>\$343,203</b>	<b>\$272,451</b>	<b>\$419,653</b>					
<b>Unauth Billet %</b>	<b>0.63%</b>	<b>0.42%</b>	<b>0.59%</b>					
<b>Avg Auth Billet Cost</b>	<b>\$46,393</b>	<b>\$55,015</b>	<b>\$60,257</b>		<b>\$44,414</b>		<b>\$51,820</b>	



THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## APPENDIX Q. POINT MUGU

44328 Pt Mugu	NMPBS Enlisted Force Cost Data (nominal FY \$\$)			TFMMS Auth Billets	HRCAT Projected Costs and Savings (2005 \$\$)			
	Fiscal year				GS	Savings	WG	Savings
	2004	2005	2006					
Rate rank								
GENDETS (AN, FN, SN)	\$0	\$21,157	\$3,244	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
AD	\$2,295,588	\$2,465,958	\$2,327,267	52	\$2,400,532	2.65%	\$2,740,249	-11.12%
AE	\$979,037	\$1,144,228	\$1,299,885	19	\$884,294	22.72%	\$1,012,504	11.51%
AM (incl AFCM)	\$1,408,101	\$1,291,296	\$1,453,714	29	\$1,418,460	-9.85%	\$1,552,970	-20.26%
AME	\$84,636	\$4,023	\$39,410	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
AO	\$269,999	\$217,326	\$205,574	4	\$188,332	13.34%	\$215,125	1.01%
AS	\$1,597,650	\$1,913,348	\$2,314,324	38	\$1,714,147	10.41%	\$1,981,590	-3.57%
AT (incl AVCM)	\$2,144,058	\$2,780,017	\$2,810,937	57	\$2,670,129	3.95%	\$3,029,552	-8.98%
AZ	\$802,897	\$995,855	\$863,560	18	\$845,967	15.05%	\$960,077	3.59%
PR	\$372,451	\$583,812	\$628,488	10	\$485,121	16.90%	\$535,105	8.34%
SH	\$16,771	\$56,081	\$55,772	1	\$49,509	11.72%	\$55,108	1.74%
SK	\$488,186	\$562,699	\$689,958	10	\$500,051	11.13%	\$540,687	3.91%
UNK	\$7,664	\$0	\$0	0				
YN	\$0	\$0	\$38,009	0				
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$10,467,038</b>	<b>\$12,035,801</b>	<b>\$12,730,142</b>	<b>238</b>	<b>\$11,156,542</b>	<b>7.31%</b>	<b>\$12,622,966</b>	<b>-4.88%</b>
<b>Auth Billets Only</b>	<b>\$10,374,738</b>	<b>\$12,010,621</b>	<b>\$12,649,479</b>	<b>238</b>	<b>\$11,156,542</b>	<b>7.11%</b>	<b>\$12,622,966</b>	<b>-5.10%</b>
<b>Unauth Billet Expenditures</b>	<b>\$92,299</b>	<b>\$25,180</b>	<b>\$80,663</b>					
<b>Unauth Billet %</b>	<b>0.88%</b>	<b>0.21%</b>	<b>0.63%</b>					
<b>Avg Auth Billet Cost</b>	<b>\$43,591</b>	<b>\$50,465</b>	<b>\$53,149</b>		<b>\$46,876</b>		<b>\$53,038</b>	

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## APPENDIX R. WHIDBEY ISLAND

44329 Whidbey	<b>NMPBS Enlisted Force Cost Data (nominal FY \$\$)</b>			<b>TFMMS Auth Billets</b>	<b>HRCAT Projected Costs and Savings (2005 \$\$)</b>			
	Fiscal year				GS	Savings	WG	Savings
	2004	2005	2006					
Rate rank								
GENDETS (AN, FN, SN)	\$5,587	\$31,191	\$1,062	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
AD	\$2,912,822	\$3,277,615	\$3,598,152	72	\$3,412,826	-4.13%	\$3,862,195	-17.84%
AE	\$1,299,414	\$1,981,521	\$2,659,924	30	\$1,439,081	27.37%	\$1,608,575	18.82%
AM (incl AFCM)	\$2,064,293	\$2,463,861	\$3,045,621	49	\$2,310,715	6.22%	\$2,621,024	-6.38%
AME	\$774,455	\$790,410	\$927,253	12	\$566,107	28.38%	\$642,833	18.67%
AO	\$491,186	\$648,477	\$705,401	8	\$402,033	38.00%	\$440,974	32.00%
AS	\$2,215,218	\$2,948,243	\$3,541,686	69	\$3,147,836	-6.77%	\$3,640,077	-23.47%
AT (incl AVCM)	\$7,632,588	\$8,127,089	\$9,005,435	166	\$7,989,328	1.70%	\$8,897,712	-9.48%
AZ	\$1,514,909	\$1,681,856	\$2,103,550	37	\$1,701,943	-1.19%	\$1,964,814	-16.82%
CM	\$35,581	\$0	\$0	0				
IT	\$0	\$0	\$62,538	0				
MR	\$190,958	\$192,103	\$208,405	4	\$178,629	7.01%	\$209,819	-9.22%
PR	\$700,599	\$1,101,623	\$1,095,340	16	\$782,549	28.96%	\$863,375	21.63%
SK	\$743,595	\$765,491	\$792,110	17	\$794,244	-3.76%	\$907,760	-18.59%
UNK	\$8,823	\$0	\$0	0				
UT	\$34,752	\$0	\$0	0				
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$20,624,781</b>	<b>\$24,009,479</b>	<b>\$27,746,477</b>	<b>480</b>	<b>\$22,725,290</b>	<b>5.35%</b>	<b>\$25,659,158</b>	<b>-6.87%</b>
<b>Auth Billets Only</b>	<b>\$20,540,038</b>	<b>\$23,978,288</b>	<b>\$27,682,877</b>	<b>480</b>	<b>\$22,725,290</b>	<b>5.23%</b>	<b>\$25,659,158</b>	<b>-7.01%</b>
<b>Unauth Billet Expenditures</b>	<b>\$84,744</b>	<b>\$31,191</b>	<b>\$63,600</b>					
<b>Unauth Billet %</b>	<b>0.41%</b>	<b>0.13%</b>	<b>0.23%</b>					
<b>Avg Auth Billet Cost</b>	<b>\$42,792</b>	<b>\$49,955</b>	<b>\$57,673</b>		<b>\$47,344</b>		<b>\$53,457</b>	

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## APPENDIX S. MAYPORT

45459 Mayport	<b>NMPBS Enlisted Force Cost Data (nominal FY \$\$)</b>			<b>TFMMS Auth Billets</b>	<b>HRCAT Projected Costs and Savings (2005 \$\$)</b>			
	Fiscal year				GS	Savings	WG	Savings
	2004	2005	2006					
Rate rank								
GENDETS (AN, FN, SN)	\$26,277	\$33,117	\$25,229	0	\$0	100.00%	\$0	100.00%
ABE/F/H	\$0	\$0	\$55,581	1	49,508.85		55,107.89	
AD	\$1,275,832	\$1,453,246	\$1,573,435	31	\$1,412,786	2.78%	\$1,625,406	-11.85%
AE	\$1,161,111	\$1,019,847	\$1,271,133	16	\$701,879	31.18%	\$824,905	19.11%
AM (incl AFCM)	\$1,387,394	\$1,309,644	\$1,462,308	24	\$1,113,270	14.99%	\$1,266,514	3.29%
AO	\$207,586	\$230,241	\$218,937	3	\$138,823	39.71%	\$160,017	30.50%
AS	\$911,677	\$1,046,315	\$1,299,021	22	\$958,082	8.43%	\$1,122,664	-7.30%
AT (incl AVCM)	\$3,108,299	\$3,377,313	\$3,236,922	63	\$2,821,518	16.46%	\$3,242,272	4.00%
AW	\$69,094	\$73,202	\$58,526	1	\$49,509	32.37%	\$55,108	24.72%
AZ	\$692,716	\$745,391	\$941,557	15	\$657,508	11.79%	\$778,364	-4.42%
DC	\$0	\$0	\$5,146	0				
IT	\$0	\$0	\$39,100	0				
MR	\$63,545	\$130,981	\$114,875	2	\$94,166	28.11%	\$107,563	17.88%
NC	\$0	\$0	\$28,431	0				
PR	\$485,672	\$563,562	\$671,231	11	\$494,545	12.25%	\$573,962	-1.85%
SK	\$272,168	\$341,118	\$400,739	6	\$283,976	16.75%	\$320,062	6.17%
UNK	\$24,676	\$0	\$0	0				
YN	\$169,523	\$144,466	\$164,100	2	\$84,830	41.28%	\$102,173	29.28%
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$9,855,570</b>	<b>\$10,468,443</b>	<b>\$11,566,271</b>	<b>197</b>	<b>\$8,860,401</b>	<b>15.36%</b>	<b>\$10,234,118</b>	<b>2.24%</b>
<b>Auth Billets Only</b>	<b>\$9,804,617</b>	<b>\$10,435,326</b>	<b>\$11,468,365</b>	<b>197</b>	<b>\$8,860,401</b>	<b>15.09%</b>	<b>\$10,234,118</b>	<b>1.93%</b>
<b>Unauth Billet Expenditures</b>	<b>\$50,953</b>	<b>\$33,117</b>	<b>\$97,906</b>					
<b>Unauth Billet %</b>	<b>0.52%</b>	<b>0.32%</b>	<b>0.85%</b>					
<b>Avg Auth Billet Cost</b>	<b>\$49,770</b>	<b>\$52,971</b>	<b>\$58,215</b>		<b>\$44,977</b>		<b>\$51,950</b>	

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## APPENDIX T. RATING BILLET COUNT BY COMMAND

	Fallon	Jax	KW	Lemoore	Norfolk	NI	Oceana	Pt Mugu	Whidbey	Mayport
ABCM	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
ABE1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
ABF1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
ABH1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
sum	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	1
ADCS	0	1	0	1	1	3	1	1	1	1
ADC	0	7	0	7	6	7	13	5	4	1
AD1	1	21	1	28	17	21	32	9	22	7
AD2	1	29	1	93	44	45	108	21	45	11
AD3	0	31	0	0	27	36	79	16	0	11
sum	2	89	2	129	95	112	233	52	72	31
AECS	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	1	0
AEC	1	4	1	1	1	4	4	1	3	1
AE1	5	6	1	7	6	11	12	6	5	3
AE2	8	15	1	22	21	42	33	10	21	6
AE3	1	17	0	0	17	13	31	2	0	4
AEAN	0	3	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2
sum	15	45	3	32	45	70	84	19	30	16
AFCM	0	2	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0
AMCS	1	2	0	1	1	1	3	1	1	1
AMC	1	2	2	3	4	5	3	2	2	1
AM1	6	9	3	14	9	12	11	10	13	6
AM2	21	11	4	44	26	51	33	9	33	9
AM3	1	10	2	3	0	17	33	6	0	7
AMAN	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0
sum	30	36	11	65	41	87	90	29	49	24
AMEC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
AME1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
AME2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	0
sum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	0
AOCS	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
AOC	0	0	0	3	0	1	3	0	1	0
AO1	3	3	1	20	0	2	9	2	6	1
AO2	8	2	1	55	0	3	26	2	1	2
AO3	2	3	0	0	0	0	26	0	0	0
AOAN	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	0	0	0
sum	14	9	2	79	0	6	76	4	8	3
ASCM	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
ASCS	0	1	1	0	1	2	1	1	1	1



ASC	0	2	1	3	3	5	4	2	1	0
AS1	1	13	5	8	12	16	26	7	13	5
AS2	0	25	12	30	31	68	59	11	45	6
AS3	0	21	5	0	2	7	61	17	9	6
ASAN	0	11	6	0	0	0	24	0	0	4
sum	1	73	30	41	49	98	176	38	69	22
AVCM	1	2	0	1	1	1	2	0	3	1
ATCS	2	2	0	0	3	4	4	1	3	3
ATC	2	8	0	7	5	7	11	5	13	1
AT1	6	25	3	23	11	28	45	13	36	9
AT2	13	46	3	89	31	93	178	29	108	20
AT3	2	65	1	0	26	24	129	9	3	23
ATAN	0	17	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	6
sum	26	165	7	120	77	157	371	57	166	63
AW1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
sum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
AZCM	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
AZCS	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
AZC	0	3	1	1	2	1	2	2	1	0
AZ1	3	5	2	4	7	7	12	5	7	3
AZ2	10	12	4	32	25	27	31	8	29	6
AZ3	0	17	0	0	4	9	15	3	0	6
AZAN	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
sum	13	38	7	37	39	44	63	18	37	15
CMDCM	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
sum	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
ET2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ET3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
sum	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FC3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
sum	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IT1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
sum	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
MM2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
sum	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MR1	2	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1
MR2	1	0	0	3	3	2	4	0	4	1
MR3	0	1	0	1	0	0	6	0	0	0
MRFN	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
sum	3	2	0	5	5	3	11	0	4	2

NCC	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
NC1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
sum	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
PRCM	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
PRCS	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0
PRC	0	1	0	0	1	2	1	0	1	1
PR1	0	5	1	8	5	5	6	4	5	3
PR2	0	7	1	14	18	16	20	3	9	1
PR3	0	6	0	2	0	4	12	2	0	6
PRAN	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0
sum	0	20	2	25	25	28	44	10	16	11
SH1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
sum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
SKCS	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
SKC	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1
SK1	8	4	2	4	1	5	3	2	4	1
SK2	12	7	3	10	14	10	12	6	12	3
SK3	5	1	0	0	2	1	4	0	0	1
sum	27	13	5	15	18	17	20	10	17	6
YN1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
YN2	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
YN3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
sum	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>133</b>	<b>498</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>551</b>	<b>395</b>	<b>622</b>	<b>1171</b>	<b>238</b>	<b>480</b>	<b>197</b>

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## APPENDIX U. COMMUNITY HEALTH MATRIX

EMC	Rating	Rate	FY09 Sea	FY09 Shore	FY09 SSR	Risk Level	Shore Cuts to Next Level	CivSubs	FY09 Sea	Rev FY09 Shore	Revised SSR	Rev Risk Level
A100	AB	9	31	11	101.5	Red	0	-1	31	10	111.6	Red
A101	ABE	6	197	121	58.6	Orange	3	-1	197	120	59.1	Orange
A102	ABF	6	115	84	49.3	Green	11	-1	115	83	49.9	Green
A103	ABH	6	286	180	57.2	Orange	8	-1	286	179	57.5	Orange
A110	AD	8	120	92	47.0	Green	7	-10	120	82	52.7	Orange
A110	AD	7	256	217	42.5	Green	55	-50	256	167	55.2	Yellow
A110	AD	6	612	456	48.3	Green	70	-159	612	297	74.2	Red
A110	AD	5	777	652	42.9	Green	161	-398	777	254	110.1	Red
A110	AD	4	696	327	76.6		0	-200	696	127	197.3	
A120	AF	9	43	54	28.7	Green	24	-6	43	48	32.3	Green
A130	AM	8	106	79	48.3	Yellow	8	-12	106	67	57.0	Red
A130	AM	7	277	234	42.6	Green	59	-25	277	209	47.7	Green
A130	AM	6	770	542	51.1	Green	56	-93	770	449	61.7	Red
A130	AM	5	1034	712	52.3	Green	59	-241	1034	471	79.0	Red
A130	AM	4	1026	359	102.9		0	-79	1026	280	131.9	
A130	AM	3	1466	431	122.5		0	-6	1466	425	124.2	
A131	AME	7	36	45	28.8	Green	22	-1	36	44	29.5	Green
A131	AME	6	158	90	63.2	Red	0	-3	158	87	65.4	Red
A131	AME	5	265	156	61.2	Red	0	-8	265	148	64.5	Red
A200	AE	8	83	44	67.9	Red	0	-5	83	39	76.6	Red
A200	AE	7	185	154	43.2	Green	37	-21	185	133	50.1	Yellow
A200	AE	6	359	333	38.8	Green	106	-62	359	271	47.7	Green
A200	AE	5	735	457	57.9	Orange	16	-179	735	278	95.2	Red
A200	AE	4	509	193	94.9		0	-85	509	108	169.7	
A200	AE	3	743	230	116.3		0	-7	743	223	119.9	
A210	AT	8	138	140	35.5	Green	43	-22	138	118	42.1	Green
A210	AT	7	269	276	35.1	Green	106	-59	269	217	44.6	Green
A210	AT	6	663	646	36.9	Green	227	-199	663	447	53.4	Green
A210	AT	5	1346	982	49.3	Green	132	-610	1346	372	130.3	Red
A210	AT	4	1099	399	99.2		0	-282	1099	117	338.2	
A210	AT	3	1018	258	142.0		0	-25	1018	233	157.3	
A220	AV	9	72	62	41.8	Green		-12	72	50	51.8	Orange

A360	AW	6	254	315	29.0	Green	155	-1	254	314	29.1	Green
A420	AO	8	68	45	54.4	Red	0	-4	68	41	59.7	Red
A420	AO	7	235	167	50.7	Yellow	26	-8	235	159	53.2	Orange
A420	AO	6	692	443	56.2	Yellow	28	-47	692	396	62.9	Red
A420	AO	5	999	668	53.8	Green	37	-100	999	568	63.3	Red
A420	AO	4	1110	239	167.2		0	-31	1110	208	192.1	
A420	AO	3	2657	194	493.1		0	-11	2657	183	522.7	
A430	AS	9	1	6	6.0	Green	5	-1	1	5	7.2	Green
A430	AS	8	22	24	33.0	Green	8	-9	22	15	52.8	Orange
A430	AS	7	50	55	32.7	Green	23	-21	50	34	52.9	Yellow
A430	AS	6	136	200	24.5	Green	114	-106	136	94	52.1	Green
A430	AS	5	285	387	26.5	Green	207	-287	285	100	102.6	Red
A430	AS	4	260	182	51.4		18	-128	260	54	173.3	
A430	AS	3	182	64	102.4		0	-45	182	19	344.8	
A440	AZ	9	11	6	66.0	Red	0	-1	11	5	79.2	Red
A440	AZ	8	40	25	57.6	Red	0	-2	40	23	62.6	Red
A440	AZ	7	105	126	30.0	Green	60	-13	105	113	33.5	Green
A440	AZ	6	202	192	37.9	Green	64	-55	202	137	53.1	Green
A440	AZ	5	691	499	49.9	Green	63	-184	691	315	79.0	Red
A440	AZ	4	244	101	87.0		0	-54	244	47	186.9	
A440	AZ	3	189	93	73.2		0	-2	189	91	74.8	
A450	PR	9	1	5	7.2	Green	4	-1	1	4	9.0	Green
A450	PR	8	8	17	16.9	Green	11	-6	8	11	26.2	Green
A450	PR	7	34	45	27.2	Green	24	-7	34	38	32.2	Green
A450	PR	6	164	160	36.9	Green	56	-42	164	118	50.0	Green
A450	PR	5	277	176	56.7	Yellow	10	-89	277	87	114.6	Red
A450	PR	4	155	91	61.3		0	-32	155	59	94.6	
A450	PR	3	250	83	108.4		0	-4	250	79	113.9	
B130	MMSW	5	499	427	42.1	Green	112	-2	499	425	42.3	Green
B250	MR	6	88	50	63.4	Red	0	-8	88	42	75.4	Red
B250	MR	5	189	54	126.0	Red	0	-18	189	36	189.0	Red
B250	MR	4	48	13	132.9		0	-8	48	5	345.6	
B250	MR	3	64	3	768.0		0	-1	64	2	1152.0	
B310	FC	4	997	14	2563.7		0	-1	997	13	2760.9	
B420	ETSW	5	1049	841	44.9	Green	179	-1	1049	840	45.0	Green
B420	ETSW	4	1701	260	235.5		0	-1	1701	259	236.4	
B460	IT	6	1123	1317	30.7	Green	608	-1	1123	1316	30.7	Green



THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

## LIST OF REFERENCES

About.com, *Enlisted Military Promotion (NCO) Averages*. Calendar year 2001 data referenced from DoD Manpower and Personnel. Online document accessed October 2006 at <http://usmilitary.about.com/od/promotions/l/blenpromrates.htm>

Adedeji, Adebayo M. and Gasch, James L., "Outsourcing Service Functions Afloat: Issues and Concerns With a Military-Civilian Mixed Crew." Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA., May 2000

Commander, Naval Air Forces Instruction, 4790.2J, Subject: The Naval Aviation Maintenance Program, February 1, 2005

Department of Defense, FY 2006 Supplemental Request for Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF), February 2006

Department of Defense, FY 2007 Budget, Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, February 2006

Ferris, Nancy. "Targeting Jobs." *Government Executive*. Washington: National Journal Group, Inc, December 1999

Resourceconsultants.com. *Human Resources Cost Analysis Tool*. July 2006. Online tool accessed October 2006 at <http://personnelcosting.resourceconsultants.com>

United States. Congressional Research Service. *Defense Outsourcing: The OMB Circular A-76 Policy*. CRS RL30392. Washington, DC: GPO, June 2005

United States. Department of the Navy. *Granular Programming and Enterprise Data Warehouse Overall Training Session*. Washington, DC: November 2005. Online module accessed October 2006 at <https://nmpbs.n10.npc.navy.mil/portal/page/portal/NMPBS>

United States. Department of the Navy. *Manpower, Personnel and Training: A Tutorial*. Millington, TN: publishing date unknown. Online module accessed October 2006 at <http://web.nps.navy.mil/~kishore/mpt/requirements.infosystem.tfms.htm>

United States. Department of the Navy. *OPNAVINST 1000.16J Manual of Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures*. Washington, DC: June 2002

United States. Executive Office of the President. *Circular No. A-76*. Washington: Office of Management and Budget, 29 May 2003



United States. General Accounting Office. *DOD Faces Challenges Implementing Its Core Competency Approach and A-76 Competitions*. GAO-03-818. Washington, DC: GPO, July 2003

United States. General Accounting Office. *DOD Competitive Sourcing: Some Progress, but Continuing Challenges Remain in Meeting Reform Goals*. GAO/NSIAD-00-106. Washington, DC: GPO, August 2000

United States. General Accounting Office. *Observations on the Department of Defense's Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Plan*. GAO/NSIAD-99-178R. Washington, DC: GPO, July 1999

United States. Office of the Secretary of Defense. *Share A-76!* October, 2006. Online publication accessed October 2006 at <http://sharea76.fedworx.org/inst/sharea76.nsf>

## INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center  
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, California
3. Commander, Naval Air Forces  
Code N422E  
San Diego, CA
4. Commander, Naval Personnel Command  
Code N122C1C  
Arlington, VA
5. Commander, Naval Personnel Command  
Code N126  
Arlington, VA
6. Commander, Naval Personnel Command  
Code N10  
Arlington, VA
7. Clinton J. Miles  
Commander, Naval Air Forces Pacific Fleet  
Comptroller  
San Diego, CA
8. Lawrence Jones, PhD  
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, CA
9. William Gates, PhD  
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, CA