

417  
Partial Ex. 3 p. in all.  
Exh. 1153

2 splits Sr 2501  
A  
Felix Holtz

Interrogation of Hideki Tojo  
11 February 1946, Case File #20, Serial #53, pp. 2-3

- "Q Who presided at the Imperial Conference of December 1st or 2nd, 1941?
- "A I did, as Prime Minister. The others were seated down bothsides of the table in accordance with their court rank.
- "Q Did you state the purpose of the meeting or was it known by them before they came to the meeting?
- "A Of course I explained the purpose of the meeting at the very first. After I had explained the purpose of the meeting, each of the ministers and the two Chiefs of Staff discussed the question from the standpoint of his own responsibilities."



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Exhibit #1209A 2500A

IPS Doc No 2501A - Ex No 1153

2502A -	1123
2502B -	1110A
2503A -	1205A
2504A -	1204A
2505A -	1201A
2506A -	1203A
2507A -	1136A
2508A -	1244A
2509A -	1137A
2510A -	1158A
2511B -	1979A (over)



IPS Doc. No. 2512B - Ex No. 1119A

2513A 1202A

2514B ————— 1980A

2514C ————— 1980B

2514D ————— 1980C

2514E ————— 1980D

2514F ————— 1980E

2515B ————— 1981A

2515C ————— 1981B

~~2515D —————~~

2515E ————— 1981C



Doc. 2501 Evid

Folder 13

(19)



**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE**  
**WASHINGTON**



**DEPARTMENTAL RECORDS BRANCH, T.A.G.O.**



EXHIBIT NO. 1153A

2501A-1

一九四六年二月十一日東條英機ニ對スル訊問ヨリノ拔萃

二一三、四、五頁

問、昭和十六年十二月一日カ二日ノ御前會議ハ誰ガ主宰シマシタカ

答、總理大臣トシテ私ガ致シマシタ。他ノ人々ハ「テーブル」ノ兩側ニ官中席次ニ從ヒ席ヲ占メテ居リマシタ。

問、會議ノ目的ヲ貴方ハ述ベラレタカ、又ハ會議ニ出ル前ニ出席者ニ知ラレテ居リマシタカ。

答、勿論、私ガ最初ニ會議ノ目的ヲ説明シマシタ。コノ説明ノ後各大臣並ニ兩總長ハ各自ノ責任ノ立場カラ問題ヲ論議シマシタ。

X X X

「第四頁」

361

問、昭和十六年十月十七日カ或ハ其頃近衛内閣ガ倒レタ時、貴方ハ米國及ビ他ノ三ヶ國ニ對シ戰爭ヲ宣言シオケンバナシイト感ジマシタ

カ。 FIVE COPIES RETURN TO ROOM 361



答、陸軍大臣トシテ宣時私ハ善戰ノ好機ヲ失フ危険ガアル事ヲ感ジマシタ。而シテ御前會議ハ好都合ナ外交的打歸ヲ待ツニ十月中旬ヲ限度ト決定シテ后リマシタ。

X  
X  
X

「第五頁」

問、昭和十六年十月十七日又ハ其頃近衛内閣ガ例レタノハ陸相タル貴方ガ米國ト戰爭ヲスル方ガ良イト言ツタ事實ニ因ツタノデアリマセンドシタカ。

答、理論的ニハサウデス。近衛ハ日本ガ若シ中國カラ撤兵スルナラバ、外交的解決ハマダ可能ナリト考ヘタ。然シ乍ラ若シ日本軍ガ目的ヲ果ス前ニ撤兵シタナラバ中國人ノ不法行爲ヲソレガコノ事變ヲ惹起シタノダガ、ソレヲ繼續シナイトイフ保障ガナイト陸軍ハ思ヒ、ソノマ、撤兵スル事ガ忍ビラレマセンドシタ。



*Extras*

*Split*  
Exh. 1153-A

*also 2501*

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Exh. 1153-A

Dr 2501

Interrogation of Hideki Tojo  
11 February 1946, Case File #20, Serial #53, pp. 4

"Q Did you feel, at the time the KONOYE Cabinet fell on or about 17 October 1941, that war should be declared against the United States and the other three nations?

"A At that time I felt, as War Minister, that the opportune time for fighting was in danger of being lost and the Imperial Conference had set the middle ten days of October as the limit for waiting for a favorable diplomatic break."



Exh. 1153-A

Doc. 2501

Interrogation of Hideki Tojo  
11 February 1946, Case File #20, Serial #53, pp. 5

- "Q Was it not because of the fact that you, as War Minister, favored war with the United States that the KONOYE Cabinet fell on or about 17 October 1941?
- "A Theoretically, yes. KONOYE thought that a diplomatic solution was still possible if Japan would withdraw troops from China, but the Army felt that there would be no guarantee that the unlawful acts of the Chinese, which had caused the Incident, would not be resumed if the troops were withdrawn before their purpose had been achieved, and the Army could not bear to so withdraw the troops."



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Ephebe # 1153



INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. Nos. 2500-2515, inclusive

25 July 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Records of Interrogations of General TOJO, Hideki

Date: Feb-Mar 46 Original (x) Copy ( ) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Document Division

PERSONS IMPLICATED: TOJO, Hideki

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Preparation for war, Military; Conspiracy for aggressive warfare; Relations with USA.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Interrogations on dates shown below given document numbers as follows:

<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Date</u>
2500	8 Feb 1946	2508	1 Mar 1946
2501	11 Feb 1946	2509	11 Mar 1946
2502	13 Feb 1946	2510	12 Mar 1946
2503	18 Feb 1946	2511	14 Mar 1946
2504	19 Feb 1946	2512	15 Mar 1946
2505	20 Feb 1946	2513	18 Mar 1946
2506	21 Feb 1946	2514	25 Mar 1946
2507	23 Feb 1946	2515	26 Mar 1946

Analyst: W.H. Wagner

Doc. Nos. 2500-2515, incl



Partial Ex.

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2 splits

Exh. 750  
A

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ser. 2501A  
Feb. 11

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