

R. H. Larsh

28 February 1947

MASAKI, Jinzaburo

The idol of the February 26 revolt was born in Saga Ken in 1876, graduated from the Army Staff College in 1898 and reached the grade of full general in 1933. Dismissed from the post of Inspector General of Military Training and appointed to the Military Council in 1935, he voiced his dissatisfaction to Lt. Gen. HIRANO Sukekuro, Commanding General of HOYO fortress, who lost no time in informing his intimate friends MURANAKA and ISOBE.

MASAKI continued to grumble in talks with young officers who came to see him, to whom he remarked that AIZAWA had given his life for the cause and to whom he intimated that further bloodshed would result if AIZAWA's trial and the question of the national constitution were allowed to take their course without opposition. He went so far as to blame the young officers for not taking the proper steps. In January and February 1936 he was in close contact with Lt. Col. MITSUI, Sakichi, to whom he offered to stand as a witness for the AIZAWA defense. He arranged to obtain money for the February 26 agitators from some of his friends. During the February 26 trouble he took the conspirators' side in visits to the Imperial Palace, the Naval General Staff, the War Ministry and the Military Council. When he heard Mrs. KITA's pronouncement, "Only MASAKI the valiant leads the righteous Army!" he interviewed the insurgents with retired General ABE, Nobuyuki, and Lt. Gen. NISHI, Giichi, the new Inspector General of Military Training, and suggested that they leave matters entirely in his hands.

SOURCE: "The Brocade Banner", G-2 compilation of the rise of nationalism in Japan.

R. H. Lorch

MASAKI, Jinzaburo

The idol of the 2-26 revolt was born in Saga Ken in 1876, graduated from the Army Staff College in 1898 and reached the grade of full general in 1933. Dismissed from the post of Inspector General of Military Training and appointed to the Military Council in 1935, he voiced his dissatisfaction to Lt. Gen. HIRANO Sukekuro, Commanding General of HOYO fortress, who lost no time in informing his intimate friends MURANAKA and ISOBEO MASAKI continued to grumble in talks with young officers who came to see him, to whom he remarked that AIZAWA had given his life for the cause and to whom he intimated that further bloodshed would result if AIZAWA's trial and the question of the national constitution were allowed to take their course without opposition. He went so far as to blame the young officers for not taking the proper steps. In January and February 1936 he was in close contact with Lt. Col. MITSUI, Sabichij

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~~FRONT~~

SOURCE: "The Brocade Banner" G-2 compilation of the rise of nationalism in Japan.

MAZAKI, Jinsaburo

Request by: ARAKI, Sadao

Address: Sugamo Prison

He was formerly a general in the Japanese Army

(L)

MAZAKI, Jimbohiro

Request by: Araki, Sadao

Address: Sugamo Prison

He was formerly a general in the Jap Army.

昭和七年四月五日

補臨時軍事參議官

五月十六日

敘從三位

六月十六日

滿洲へ出張被仰付

八月八日

兼補軍事參議官

昭和八年六月十九日

任陸軍大將

補軍事參議官

六月卅日

宮内省御用掛被免

七月七日

資源審議會委員被免

七月廿日

敘勳一等授瑞寶章

昭和九年一月廿三日

免本職

補教育總監兼軍事參議官

昭和十年三月廿六日

第一特命檢閱使被仰付

六月十一日

敘正三位

七月十六日

免本職並兼職

補軍事參議官

内閣

同

同

同

宮内省

内閣

陸軍省

内閣

陸軍省

陸軍省

内閣

昭和九年 四月廿九日 授旭日大綬章 昭和六年乃至九年事變ノ功

昭和十一年 三月十六日 待命被仰付

三月十日 豫備役被仰付

陸軍省
同

内閣

内閣

昭和二年三月五日

任陸軍中將

內閣

四月二日

敘從四位

昭和四年八月廿六日

補第八師團長

陸軍省

昭和四年七月一日

免本職

陸軍省

十一月

補第一師團長

內閣

五月二日

敘正四位

內閣

東京警備司令官陸軍中將

昭和六年八月一日

免本職
林彌三吉著任迄東京警備司令官代理被仰付

陸軍省

補臺灣軍司令官

內閣

昭和七年一月九日

特ニ親任官ノ待遇ヲ賜フ

內閣

補參謀次長

陸軍省

一月十三日

資源審議會委員被仰付

內閣

一月十八日

宮內省御用掛被仰付

宮內省

大正十年七月廿日

免本職補近衛步兵

第一聯隊長

陸軍省

陸軍功績審査委員

要塞建設實行委員軍用自動車調查委員作戰

資材整備會議議員陸軍經理學校高等科學生

試驗委員陸軍經理學校普通科學生試驗委員

予免

陸軍省

大正十一年八月十五日

任陸軍少將

內閣

補步兵第一旅團長

陸軍省

九月十一日

敘正五位

大正十二年八月六日

免本職補陸軍士官學校本科長

陸軍省

大正十四年五月一日

補陸軍士官學校幹事兼同校教授部長

陸軍省

大正十五年三月二日

免本職並兼職補陸軍士官學校長

陸軍省

八月廿六日

敘勳二等授瑞寶章

五月十一日

十一月十日

八月十日

補教育總監第二隊長

參謀下心得ヘシ

兼補陸軍將校生徒試験常置委員王事

外國語學高等試験委員ヲ命ス

任陸軍步兵大佐

大正七年一月十八日

二月廿八日

三月廿九日

六月廿九日

敘從五位

第二特命檢閱使屬員被仰付

敘勳三等授瑞寶章

免本職並兼職 補陸軍省軍務局軍事課長

大正九年八月十日

八月十四日

十月十四日

七月廿日

十一月一日

陸軍功績審査委員ヲ命ス

陸軍技術會議議員被仰付

外國語學高等試験委員ヲ免ス

授旭日中綬章

賜金九三〇圓

大正四年乃至九年戰役ノ功

陸軍省

同

同

同

內閣

陸軍省

陸軍省

陸軍省

同

同

明治四十二年 一月廿八日

任陸軍步兵少佐

四月 廿日

敘從六位

五月十三日

第五第十一第十二師團特命檢閱使屬員被仰付

明治四十四年 五月 一日

免本職軍事研究下シテ獨逸國駐在被仰付

六月十三日

敘勳四等授旭日小綬章

大正元年 八月 十一日

韓國併合記念章授與

大正三年 五月 廿日

敘正六位

六月 六日

獨逸駐在被免

六月 六日

補步兵第四十二聯隊大隊長

十一月十九日

任陸軍步兵中佐

大正

四年 五月廿五日

補步兵第五十三聯隊附

八月 十日

久留米俘虜收容所長被仰付

十一月 七日

免本職

大正

五年十一月十五日

賜金三〇〇圓

久留米俘虜收容所長被免

陸軍省

同

同

陸軍省

內閣

陸軍省

陸軍省

明治卅三年十二月二十日

免本職補士官學校生徒隊附

明治卅四年二月廿八日

敘從七位

明治卅五年八月九日

陸軍大學校へ入學ヲ命ス

同 年十一月十七日

免本職補步兵第四十六聯隊附

同 年十一月三十日

賜一等給

明治卅七年六月廿九日

任陸軍步兵大尉

同 年八月十七日

敘正七位

明治卅九年一月廿二日

步兵第四十六聯隊附被仰付

同 年四月一日

敘功四級授金鷄勳章 卅七八年從軍記章授與

敘勳五等授雙光旭日章

明治四十年十一月三十日

步兵第四十六聯隊附被免陸軍省出仕被仰付

陸軍省軍務局附ヲ命ス

明治四十一年五月廿一日

御用有之韓國へ被差遣

同 年十月十四日

陸軍省出仕被免

補陸軍省軍務局課員

參謀ト心得ヘシ

陸軍省

同上

同上

内閣

陸軍省

同上

同上

同上

履 歷 書

本 籍 佐 賀 縣

真 崎 甚 三 郎

明 治 九 年 十 一 月 廿 七 日 生

明 治 廿 八 年 七 月 廿 六 日 佐 賀 縣 尋 常 中 學 校 卒 業

同 年 八 月 廿 六 日 士 官 候 補 生 ヲ 命 ス

同 年 十 二 月 一 日 步 兵 第 二 十 三 聯 隊 補 充 大 隊 第 六 中 隊 へ 入 隊

明 治 三 十 年 十 一 月 廿 九 日 士 官 學 校 卒 業

同 年 十 二 月 九 日 見 習 士 官 ヲ 命 ス

明 治 卅 一 年 六 月 廿 七 日 任 陸 軍 步 兵 少 尉

同 年 七 月 廿 一 日 補 步 兵 第 四 十 六 聯 隊 附

同 年 七 月 廿 一 日 敘 正 八 位

明 治 卅 二 年 五 月 二 日 免 本 職 補 對 馬 警 備 隊 步 兵 隊 附

同 年 十 月 廿 八 日 廢 職

補 對 馬 警 備 隊 步 兵 大 隊 附

明 治 卅 三 年 十 一 月 廿 一 日 任 陸 軍 步 兵 中 尉

免 本 職 補 步 兵 第 四 十 六 聯 隊 附

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10 Feb 47

MEMORANDUM TO: COMMANDER GARR, LANGUAGE DIVISION, IPS.

FROM : DOUGLAS L. WALDORF, Chief, Investigation Division, IPS.

1. It is requested that translation be made of the attached document which is the official personnel report of General MAZAKI, Jinsaburo. We would appreciate having the furnished material forwarded directly to this Section for typing and proper consideration.

DOUGLAS L. WALDORF,
Chief, Investigation Division,
I.P.S.

12/2
Return to
Investigation
Room 300
A-N

Translated by
J. Iwanaga

Checked by TATSUMI

Buffington

Personal Record

O.K. ✓

MAZAKI, Jinzaburo

Born: 27 November 1876

Permanent domicile: Saga Prefecture

26 July 1895 Graduated from The Saga Middle
School, Saga Prefecture

26 Aug 1895 Appointed Military Cadet

1 Dec 1895 ~~Attached to~~ ^{Joined} ~~the~~ 6th Company of

Replacement Battalion of 23rd

Infantry Regiment

29 Nov 1897 Graduated from The Military

Academy

9 Dec 1897 Appointed Probationary Officer

(2)

27 June 1898	Appointed 2nd Lieutenant, Infantry	Cabinet
	Attached to ^{The} 46th Infantry Regiment	War Ministry
21 July 1898	Honored with the 8th Court Rank, Senior Grade	
2 May 1899	Relieved of main duty and assigned ^{attached} to Infantry Corps of TSUSHIMA Garrison Unit	War Ministry
28 Oct 1899	Relieved of main duty and appointed ^{attached} Attache to the	

(3)

Infantry Battalion of TSUSHIMA

Garrison Unit

War Ministry
~~Same~~

21 Nov 1900 Promoted to 1st Lieutenant,

Infantry

~~Same~~

Relieved of main duty and

attached to The 46th Infantry

Regiment

War Ministry
~~Same~~

20 Dec 1900 Relieved of main duty and
attached

~~appointed~~ Attache to The
Cadets Corps of,

Military Academy

War Ministry
~~Same~~

(4)

28 Feb 1901	Raised to Honored with ^{The} 7th Court- Rank, Junior Grade	
9 Aug 1902	Ordered to enter the Army Staff College	War Ministry same
17 Nov 1902	Relieved of main duty and attached to the 46th Infantry Regiment	War Ministry same
30 Nov 1902	Granted 1st Grade Salary	same
29 June 1904	Promoted to Captain, Infantry	Cabinet
17 Aug 1904	Raised to Honored with ^{The} 7th Court- Rank, Senior Grade	

(51)

22 Jan 1906

Attached to the 46th

Infantry Regiment

War
Ministry

1 Aprⁿ 1906

Decorated with the 4th

Class of Golden Kite

with
Presented, War-Medal for

1904-1905 War

Decorated with the 5th

Order of Merit of Rising Sun

with Double Rays

30 Nov 1907

Relieved ^{of his post in} ~~as attaché~~ to the

46th Infantry Regiment and

(6)

Ordered to ~~work~~ ^{serve in} at The War Ministry War Ministry
~~Same~~

~~Appointed~~ Attached to The Bureau

of Military Affairs of War Ministry War Ministry
~~Same~~

21 May 1908 Ordered to ~~make~~ ^{take on} official trip

to KOREA

War Ministry
~~Same~~

14 Oct 1908 ~~Relieved as attache~~ ^{Detached} ~~from~~ ^{from} the War Ministry

Appointed ~~as~~ ^{officer} Staff of The Bureau

of Military Affairs, War Ministry.

~~Ordered to act~~ ~~Staff Officer~~

28 Jan 1909 Promoted to Major, Infantry

(7)

20 Apr^{il} 1909 Raised to the 6th Court-

Rank, Junior Grade

13 May 1909

~~Appointed~~ Attached to the

Special Inspector for the

5th, 11th and 12th Divisions

1 May 1911

Relieved of main duty and

ordered to stay in Germany

for ^{the study} ~~investigations~~ of military

affairs

War
Ministry

13 June 1911

Decorated with the 4th Class of

Merit of Small Cordon of

Rising Sun for meritorious
service in ^{connection with} the annexation of

KOREA

Korean Annexation

1 Aug 1912 Decorated with Commemoration

Medal for Annexation of KOREA

20 May 1914 Raised to the 6th Court Rank,

Senior Grade

6 June 1914 Relieved ^{from post} ~~from staying~~ in Germany

6 June 1914 Appointed Battalion Commander,

of the 42nd Infantry Regiment ^{War} Ministry

19 Nov 1914 Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, ^{Cabinet}
Infantry

(9)

Assigned to the 53rd Infantry
Regiment

War
Ministry

25 May 1915 Appointed Commander of ^{the PRISONER} OF WAR
~~Prisoners~~ Camp at KURUME

War Ministry
~~Same~~

10 Aug 1915 Relieved of main duty

War Ministry
~~Same~~

7 Nov 1915 ~~Given~~ granted a sum of ¥300.

Decorated with War-Medal

for 1914 - 1915 war

15 Nov 1916 Relieved ^{of} as
PRISONER OF WAR
~~War Prisoners~~ Camp at KURUME

War
Ministry

Appointed ^{staff officer in charge of} Chief of the 2nd

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28 Feb 1918 Raised to the 5th Court -

Rank, Junior Grade

29 March 1918 ~~Attached to~~ Appointed Attache to the

2nd Special Inspector

29 June 1918 Decorated with the 3rd Order

of Merit of Sacred Treasure

10 Aug 1920 Relieved of main ^{DUTY} and OF

additional duties

Appointed Chief of the Military Affairs
~~Administration~~ of the Bureau of Military
AFFAIRS Section, War Ministry

14 Aug 1920 Appointed ~~the~~ member of the Army

(12)

Investigation Committee for

War Merits

War
Ministry

4 Oct-1920 Appointed ~~Member~~ Member of The Army

Technical Council

War Ministry
~~same~~

30 July 1920 Relieved as ^{of the post} Member of The

High Examination Committee

for Foreign Languages

War Ministry
~~same~~

1 Nov 1920 Decorated with The Middle

Cordon of Rising Sun and

Granted ^a ~~the~~ sum of ¥930 for

~~WW~~ meritorious ^{war} service 1915-1920.
~~the~~

(13)

~~was between 1915 and 1929~~

translated by SATO, Seiichi
checked by G. G. wanaga
checked by W. OTSUKA
checked - HIRAYAMA

p. 1.

20 July, 1921	Relieved of main duty and appointed Brig Commander of the First Imperial Guard Infantry Regiment Relieved of duties as a member of the Army Investigation Committee for War Merits, the Executive Committee of the Fortress Construction, the Investigation Committee ^{the} Military Motor ^{Vehicle} , the War Supplies Maintenance Council, and the Examination Committee for the Junior and Junior Students of the Military School of Supplies and Accounts.	War Ministry
15 August, 1922	Promoted to Major-General. Appointed Brig Commander of the First Infantry Brigade.	Cabinet War Ministry
11 Sept, 1922	Raised to the 5th Court Rank, Senior Grade.	
6 August, 1923	Relieved of main duty and appointed Brig Chief of the Regular Course of the Military Academy.	War Ministry
1 May, 1925	Appointed Brig Secretary of the Military Academy and the Chief of the Teaching Section.	War Ministry

2 March 1926	Relieved of main and additional duties,	
	and appointed Mr. Director of the Military Academy	War Ministry
26 August, 1926	Decorated with the 2nd Order of the Sacred Treasure	
5 March, 1927	Promoted to Lieutenant-General	Cabinet
1 April, 1927	Raised to the 4th Court Rank, Junior Grade	
26 August, 1927	Appointed Mr. Commander of the 8th Division	
1 July, 1929	Relieved of main duty.	War Ministry
	Appointed Mr. Commander of the 1st Division	Cabinet
2 May, 1929	Raised to the 4th Court Rank, Senior Grade.	
	Appointed Mr. Acting Commander of the Tokyo Guards until the arrival of Lieutenant-General HAYASHI, Yasabichi, the Commander of the Tokyo Guards.	War Ministry
1 August, 1931	Relieved of main duty	Cabinet
	Appointed Mr. Commander of the Formosan Army.	Cabinet
9 Jan. 1932	Specially accorded the treatment as an official personally appointed by the Emperor.	
	Appointed Mr. Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff.	War Ministry

13 Jan, 1932	Appointed as member of the ^{Natural} Natural Resources Investigation Council.	Cabinet
18 Jan, 1932	Appointed as <u>Commissioner</u> of Imperial Household ₂	Department of the Imperial Household
5 Apr, 1932	Appointed ^{as} the Temporary Supreme War Councillor	Cabinet
16 May, 1932	Raised to the 3rd Court Rank, Junior Grade	
16 June, 1932	Ordered to make an official trip to Manchuria.	Cabinet
8 August, 1932	Concurrently appointed Supreme War Councillor.	Cabinet
19 June, 1933	Promoted to General	Cabinet
	Appointed as Supreme War Councillor.	Cabinet
30 June, 1933	Relieved of duty as <u>Commissioner</u> of Imperial Household.	Department of Imperial Household
7 July, 1933	Relieved of duty as the member of the Natural Resources Investigation Council.	Cabinet
20 July, 1933	Decorated with the the ^{the} Order of the Sacred Treasure, First Class.	
23 Jan, 1934	Relieved of main duty	War Ministry

26 March, 1935	Appointed to Inspector-General of Military Training and a Supreme War Councillor.	Cabinet War Minister
19 June, 1935	Appointed the First Special Military Inspector. Raised to the 3rd Court Rank, Senior Grade.	Cabinet War Minister
16 July, 1935	Relieved of main duty and of additional duties.	Cabinet War Minister
29 April 1934	Appointed to Supreme War Councillor. Decorated with the Grand Order of the Rising Sun for meritorious service in the Incident. from 1931 <u>and</u> 1934.	War Ministry Cabinet
6 March, 1936	Placed on the waiting list.	War Ministry
10 March, 1936	Placed on the reserve list.	War Ministry

MASAKI, Jinsaburo

1876: Born

1895: Military Cadet.

1897: Graduated from Military Academy.

1898: 2nd Lieutenant

1922: Major-General

1927: Lieut-General.

Aug. 1931: Commander of Formosan Army.

Jan. 1932: Vice Chief of Army General Staff whilst Prince Kanin Chief.

April. 1932: Temporary Supreme War Councillor.

June 1933: General and Supreme War Councillor.

Jan. 1934: Inspector-General of Military Training and Supreme War Councillor.

April 1934: Decorated with the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun for meritorious service in the 1931-1934 Incident.

6 Mar. 1936: Placed on the waiting list.

10 " " " " " reserve "

The following exhibits refer to him:-

Exh. 161. Affidavit by Ken INUKAI about the murder of his father, then Prime Minister, by young naval officers in May 1932. At the time Ken INUKAI was Secretary to his father. The affidavit gives an account of the murder and of the antagonism his father had roused amongst the military by his anti-militarist policy and his opposition to the action of the military in Manchuria. Further cause for the opposition of the military to Premier INUKAI was his policy of reducing the army budget. This was opposed by the War Ministry. At that time the War Minister was General ARAKI and the Vice-Chief of the General Staff was General MASAKI.

Exh. 2409 Instructions concerning stratagem dated 5 October, 1932, sent to KAWABE, Japanese Military Attache in the USSR and signed by MASAKI as Assistant Chief of Staff. Essentials of stratagem is divided into war with (1) USSR (2) China (3) USA. The instructions clearly envisage aggressive war.

MASAKI's Case file is No. 60.

▲ summary of its contents is attached.

MASAKI

Former Inspector-General of Military Education 1934-1938

60-5

Chief of Military Affairs Bureau.

Member Supreme War Council 1936.

Statements made by Masaki during interrogation (60-17)

The aim of the inner (TOJO) group was to dominate the army and politics..... In the totalitarian group some wanted to transform Japan on a given plan. They wished to Nazify or to Sovietise the country. I believe that the Manchurian Incident was caused by these totalitarians..... They hoped to precipitate an incident in Japan, but the situation was such that there was no hope at that time, so they thought up the incident in Manchuria. I do not think it was caused by a few plotters.... The chief instigators were ITAGAKI, Hanada, Katakura, OKAWA, Fujita - p/3.

The objective of the totalitarians (in 1935) was the establishment of the totalitarian system in Japan. - p/5.

The special group inside the inner group consisted of Ikeda, Akinaga, MUTO, HASHIMOTO, Akamatsu. p/10.

(Appraisal by interrogator says he should make a good witness - p/12).

(Close associate of KOISO, ARAKI. 60-20).

Supreme War Council member till 1936 - p.3

Vice Chief of Staff at time of Manchuria Incident.

HONJO Commander of Kwantung Army and MINAMI War Minister at the time. p3

I consider HASHIMOTO my enemy - p.4.

My ideas and MINAMI's differ completely - p.6.

Kept track of secret funds whilst Vice-Chief of Staff - p.7.

"I had something to do with setting up Manchuria as an independent state. There was an opinion in the army to take over Manchuria entirely, but I thought that would never clear up the mess, so I offered an advice to the Emperor to set up an independent state and also offered the same advice to Premier Saito at that time". p/8.

"My idea was not to use any Japanese officials in Manchuria" - p.11.

Breakfast Club - p.12.

Persons responsible for Manchurian Inc. - p/13.

Leaders of the Manchurian Incident were ITAGAKI, Ishihara and Hanaya - p.14.

"I felt any occupation of Manchuria by Japan was a violation of the 9 Power Treat - p.15.

Interrogation 60-21

"Whilst I was Vice-Chief of Staff I went to receive the Emperor's permission on different matters and especially recall that I went to get this permission at the time we sent the 14th Div. to Shanghai"... - p.2.

"When I went...he at first said that he could see no reason for sending it. I told him that they were already on the move....and that

if they were not to be used in Shanghai we definitely needed them in Manchuria and he finally reluctantly agreed? - p.2.

"Before I had an audience....I consulted with Prince Kanin and also later immediately took the report of the conversation to the Prince. Also I would have to receive the O.K. of the War Minister before I did anything". p.2.

"No difference between me and ARAKI re strengthening Manchurian garrison". p.3.

"Hashimoto and Nemoto were for a vigorous policy of expansion in Manchuria". p.6.

"The 14th Div. was sent to Shanghai at the end of January or beginning of February 1932 with the Emperor's reluctant approval. It could not be sent without his approval - p.8.

The Emperor (had) felt that with the situation coming back to normal in Shanghai it wasn't necessary to send it there".p/9.

Sent troops three times to Shanghai - p.9.

Matters like the sovereignty of China or the treaties guaranteeing it did not enter into our heads at the time. p.9.

Emperor wanted to know why the Incident was still spreading. I thought if the worst came to the worst I would myself go to the Great Wall and stop the troops. p.10.

F.M.Muto probably died as a result of his extreme endeavours and the trouble he had in trying to stop the Kwantung Army from going any further. p.10

Interrogation 60-24

Q. You had no differences of opinion with ARAKI during the period you were Vice Chief of Staff, did you?

A. We have clashed on small matters but on the whole our ideas were the same. - p.4.

"What Hayashi, Nagata, KOISO and MINAMI thought was entirely different from what ARAKI and I believed. To group us together is like mixing oil and water". p.5.

Interrogation 60-30.

Record of the secret operations of the February 1936 Incident.

Document No. 600.

Received following from "Manchurian Incident Secret Service Funds" in 1932:-

5 July ¥ 10,000
7 " ¥ 290,000
20 Aug. ¥ 10,000

Document No.646.

See Woolworth's memorandum of 20th March, 1946.

60-46

Ueda say the Masaki Group opposed the March and October incidents.

60-51.

May 15th 1932 Incident. "This is an incident in which young naval officers and army officer candidates, together with a few civilians, assassinated Premier Inukai. At first the young army officers and officer

candidates tried to start it, but the army officers, respecting Minister of War ARAKI, observed his instructions and did not participate in it" Statement by Masaki, Dec. 1945. p. 9 (60-52).

"Regarding the disposition of the five officer candidates involved in the incident I worried a lot. Persons in sympathy with me and also those opposing me worked hard in order that these officer candidates would not be expelled from school. I also pitied these men who had been taken in by the plotters but reviewing it from the standpoint of discipline as soldiers I decided to expel them". p.12 (60-52)

Statement by Masaki Dec. 1945.

Re February 26th 1936 Incident.

"The court-martial was held in strict secret. Needless to say no defence counsel was allowed. Judges who tried me were General Isomura, General Matsuki and Legal Officer Ogawa". p.2 (60-53)

"Kido is a member of the Choshu clique and antagonistic to me" p.6. (60-54)

"The Prince (Konoye) had originally intended to restore Masaki, Yanagawa, Obata, etc. to active service, so that other officers who were subjected to undue treatment in the February 26th Incident might be re-instated by the army, and to bring the China Incident to a conclusion by the strength of these officers. Accordingly the Prince hoped that Masaki would support ITAGAKI and co-operate with him for the settlement of the Incident". p.7 (60-54).

"Prince Konoye recommended Baron HIRANUMA as succeeding Prime Minister (Jan. 1939) and hoped that Obata and I would be assigned to important posts by Baron HIRANUMA. p.8 (60-54).

"Prince Saionji and Prince Konoye were contemplating the Araki Cabinet as succeeding Cabinet. Prince Konoye was thinking that, in order to settle the China Incident, Masaki should be given an important post and in order to do it ARAKI should be first nominated Prime Minister and then ARAKI should be caused to appoint Masaki to a suitable post. This plan of Prince Konoye was frustrated by the obstruction of Harada, ABE and KIDO. The Abe Cabinet was formed instead of the ARAKI Cabinet". p.8 (60-52).

"The Prime Minister at the time of the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident was Baron Reijiro Wakatsuki and the War Minister was General Jiro MINAMI. The Cabinet resigned en bloc in December 1931.

It was beyond the ability of General MINAMI and his staff to control the fanatic officers who plotted these incidents or to bring the Manchurian Incident to a satisfactory conclusion. Here the service of General ARAKI and other senior officers close to him became necessary, since their past records were beyond criticism (they were opposed to the Choshu domination, to the corruption of the political parties and to the revolutionary trend of the Army officers) The Army had to make a new start with a clean slate. The new regime in the Army.....fairly succeeded in the settlement of the Manchurian Incident...However...circumstances...led to the downfall of the loyalist regime...The misunderstanding still persists that it was members of the short-lived loyalist regime who plotted...the Manchurian Incident".

pp.6 and 7 (60-57).

The above are statements by Masaki.

Kamkichi Yoshizawa was Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Inukai Cabinet from 14th January to 25th May 1932. Somewhere around the 15-28th February 1932 he attended a meeting at the official residence of the War Minister, at which Masaki was present. Yoshizawa states that all the military were in favour of an early recognition of the independence of

Manchuria and opposed delay in its formation.

Summary of statement by Yoshizawa. (60-59).

The idea of Greater East Asia was spread pretty widely in Japan. Mazaki and Kikuchi were leaders in this thought.

SHIRATORI's Interrogatories, pp 2 and 3, 28 March, 1946.

- (a) The people in the 26 Feb 1936 Incident wanted to make Mazaki Premier. They requested the Emperor to appoint him to head a new government (p. 7, 18 Jan).
- (b) Mazaki was requested, along with ARAKI, by the War Minister (Hayashi) to resign after the Feb 26th Incident (pp 1, 2, Jan. 22).
- (c) MAZAKI had similar ideas on many subjects to those of ARAKI (p 2, Feb. 5th)
ARAKI's interrogatories. (60-59).

Was the controlling figure of the Koda-ha faction within the Japanese Army, just as General ARAKI was.... Was President of the Military Academy prior to 1927... Became acquainted with many young officer candidates, all of whom thought highly of him. During his presidency he imbued in them the mystic spirit of Japan and the ideology of Rakko-Ichiu (p.1.)

HIRANUMA, Kiichiro was Mazaki's intimate associate outside of the army. HIRANUMA was a guiding figure of the Kokuhon-sha (p.1.)

Mazaki was not involved in the March Incident but he was in the October Incident. (p.1.)

Had very great connections with the Manchurian Incident (p.1.)

See page 2 re his connections with the October Incident and re Kodo-ha, and Tosei-ha factions and his connection with former.

See page 3 re connection with establishment of Manchukuo.

Statement by Tanaka about Mazaki (60-61).

Q. While Prince Yanin was Chief of Staff General Mazaki, his Vice-Chief of Staff, actually made most of the decisions, did he not?

A. Yes on the whole I would say that is so -
MINAMI's interrogatories (76-18- p.3)

"Advances made after 1931 were by troops under the command of General Mazaki and General ARAKI. This was when I was War Minister.

MINAMI's interrogatories (76-15-p.11.)

"When I took command of the Kwantung Army it had already fully occupied the land up to the Great Wall and this conquest had been made at the time that the two Generals were in the positions I spoke of".

MINAMI's Interrogatories (76-15-p.13)

The three extracts from MINAMI's interrogatories - (60-63)

Nationalistic organizations sought Army support and the Army did support them with funds and personnel. This had already begun during the Wakatsuki Cabinet. When ARAKI was Minister of War he with Mazaki gave them greater support. Mazaki maintained very close contact with the nationalistic groups.

Interrogatories of HASHIMOTO
(415-3-pp 4, 5, 6 & 7) (60-63).

Masaki belonged to one of the military cliques interested in politics. Following the February 1936 incident there were no groups active publicly, but I believe that the same set-up as before existed.

Men like TOJO and Yamashita succeeded to the leading roles upon the retirement of men like Masaki, ARAKI and Matsui.

Interrogatories of Ando, Kisaburo.
(52-15-pp 3 and 4) (60-64).

See summary of admissions 60-66.

See extracts from KIDO's Diary 60-70.

From 5 July to 20 August 1932 Masaki received from "Manchurian Incident Secret Funds" a total of ¥ 310,000 (Doc. 646)
(60-72)

Masaki was in favour of the expansion of Manchuria and establishing the Manchurian Government.

Interrogatories of Yoshizawa Kenkeshi (494 pp 2 & 3)
60-74.

No disciplinary action was taken against Kwantung Army officers for failure to obey orders.

Interrogatories of Koiso 62-39-pp.2 & 3)

See extracts from KIDO's Diary 60-78.

Masaki and Araki were the leaders of the Kodo-ha faction in the army.

Statement by Professor Kamei, Ken-Ichiro (60-82)

See 60-101 being CIS /G-2's reasoned recommendation that Masaki should be released from internment ~~with~~ ^{without} preference of charges.

See Exhibits 161 and 2409
" Doc No 12 (being Defence Doc 477)

MAZAKI, Jinsaburo

Request by: ARAKI, Sadao

Address: Sugamo Prison

He was formerly a general in the Japanese Army

Read Japan's Military Leaders

Doc No 12

PERSONAL RECORD: MAZAKI, Kinzaburo

Born: 27 November 1876

Permanent domicile: Saga Prefecture

26 July 1895	Graduated from the Saga Middle School, Saga Prefecture.	
27 Aug. 1895	Appointed Military Cadet	
1 Dec. 1895	Joined the 6th Company of Replacement Battalion of 23rd Infantry Regiment.	
29 Nov. 1897	Graduated from the Military Academy.	
9 Dec. 1897	Appointed Probational Officer	
27 June 1898	Appointed 2nd Lieutenant, Infantry	Cabinet
	Attached to the 46th Infantry Regiment	War Ministry
21 July 1898	Honored with the 8th Court Rank, Senior Grade	
2 May 1899	Relieved of main duty and attached to Infantry Corps of TSUSHIMA Garrison Unit.	War Ministry
28 Oct. 1899	Relieved of main duty and attached to the Infantry Battalion of TSUSHIMA Garrison Unit.	War Ministry
21 Nov. 1900	Promoted to 1st Lieutenant, Infantry. Relieved of main duty and attached to the 46th Infantry Regiment.	
20 Dec. 1900	Relieved of main duty and attached to the Cadet Corps of Military Academy.	War Ministry
28 Feb. 1901	Raised to the 7th Court Rank, Junior Grade.	
9 Aug. 1902	Ordered to enter the Army Staff College.	War Ministry
17 Nov. 1902	Relieved of main duty and attached to the 46th Infantry Regiment.	War Ministry
30 Nov. 1902	Granted 1st Grade Salary.	
29 June 1904	Promoted to Captain, Infantry.	Cabinet
17 Aug. 1904	Raised to the 7th Court Rank, Senior Grade.	

MAZAKI, Kinzaburo (cont'd)

22 Jan 1906	Attached to the 46th Infantry Regiment.	War Ministry
1 April 1906	Decorated with the 4th Class of Golden Kite. Presented with war medal for 1904-1905. Decorated with the 5th Order of Merit of Rising Sun with double rays.	
30 Nov 1907	Relieved of his post in the 46th Infantry Regiment and ordered to serve in the War Ministry. Attached to the Bureau of Military Affairs of War Ministry.	War Ministry
21 May 1908	Ordered to take an official trip to Korea.	War Ministry
14 Oct 1908	Detached from the War Ministry. Appointed Staff Officer of the Bureau of Military Affairs, War Ministry.	
28 Jan. 1909	Promoted to Major, Infantry.	
20 Apr. 1909	Raised to the 6th Court Rank, Junior Grade.	
13 May 1909	Attached to the Special Inspector for the 5th, 11th and 12th Divisions.	
1 May 1911	Relieved of main duty and ordered to stay in Germany for the study of military affairs.	War Ministry
13 June 1911	Decorated with the 4th Class of Merit of Small Cordon of Rising Sun for meritorious service in connection with the annexation of Korea.	
1 August 1912	Decorated with Korean Annexation Commemoration Medal.	
20 May 1914	Raised to the 6th Court Rank, Senior Grade.	
6 June 1914	Relieved from post in Germany.	
6 June 1914	Appointed Battalion Commander, 42nd Infantry Regiment.	War Ministry
19 Nov 1914	Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry. Assigned to the 53rd Infantry Regiment.	Cabinet
25 May 1915	Appointed Commander of the Prisoner of War Camp at Kurume.	War Ministry
10 Aug 1915	Relieved of main duty.	War Ministry

MAZAKI, Kinzaburo (cont'd)

7 Nov. 1915	Granted a sum of Y300. Decorated with War Medal for 1914-1915.	
15 Nov. 1916	Relieved as Commander of the Prisoner of War Camp at Kurume.	War Ministry
	Appointed Staff Officer in charge of 2nd Section of the Inspectorate General of Military Training.	War Ministry
	Concurrently appointed Director of the Standing Committee for (entrance) examination of military officer-students.	
	Appointed member of the High Examination Committee for Foreign Languages.	
18 Jan 1918	Promoted to Colonel, Infantry.	Cabinet
28 Feb 1918	Raised to the 5th Court Rank, Junior Grade.	
29 Mar 1918	Attached to the 2nd Special Inspector.	
29 June 1918	Decorated with the 3rd Order of Merit of Sacred Treasure.	
10 Aug 1920	Relieved of main duty and of additional duties. Appointed Chief of the Military Affairs Section of the Bureau of Military Affairs, War Ministry.	
14 Aug 1920	Appointed member of the Army Investigation Committee for War Merits.	War Ministry
4 Oct. 1920	Appointed member of the Army Technical Council.	War Ministry
30 July 1920	Relieved of the post as member of the High Examination Committee for Foreign Languages.	War Ministry
1 Nov. 1920	Decorated with the Middle Cordon of Rising Sun and granted a sum of ¥930 for meritorious war service - 1915-1920.	
20 July 1921	Relieved of main duty and appointed Commander of the First Imperial Guard Infantry Regiment. Relieved of duties as a member of the Army Investigation Committee for War Merits, the Executive Committee of Fortress Construction, the Military Motor Vehicle Investigation Committee, the War Supplies Maintenance Council, and the Examination Committee for the Senior and Junior Students of the Military School of Supplies & Accounts.	War Ministry

MAZAKI, Kinzaburo (cont'd)

15 Aug 1922	Promoted to Major General Appointed Commander of the First Infantry Brigade.	Cabinet War Ministry
11 Sept. 1922	Raised to the 5th Court Rank, Senior Grade.	
6 Aug. 1923	Relieved of main duty and appointed Chief of the Regular Course of the Military Academy.	War Ministry
1 May 1925	Appointed Secretary of the Military Academy and the Chief of the Teaching Section.	War Ministry
2 March 1926	Relieved of main and additional duties and appointed Director of the Military Academy.	War Ministry
26 Aug. 1926	Decorated with the 2nd Order of the Sacred Treasure.	
5 March 1927	Promoted to Lieutenant-General.	Cabinet
1 April 1927	Raised to the 4th Court Rank, Junior Grade.	
26 Aug. 1927	Appointed Commander of the 8th Division.	
1 July 1929	Relieved of main duty.	War Ministry
	Appointed Commander of the 1st Division.	Cabinet
2 May 1929	Raised to the 4th Court Rank, Senior Grade. Appointed Acting Commander of the Tokyo Guards until the arrival of Lieutenant General HAYASHI, Yasakichi, the Commander of the Tokyo Guards.	War Ministry
1 Aug. 1931	Relieved of main duty.	Cabinet
	Appointed <u>Commander of the Formosan Army.</u>	Cabinet
9 Jan. 1932	Specially accorded treatment as an official personally appointed by the Emperor. Appointed Vice Chief of the Army General Staff.	War Ministry
	<i>whilst Prince Kanin Chief</i>	
13 Jan. 1932	Appointed member of the Natural Resources Investigation Council.	Cabinet
18 Jan. 1932	Appointed Imperial Household Commissioner.	Dep't of the Imperial Household.
5 April 1932	Appointed as temporary Supreme War Councillor.	Cabinet

MAZAKI, Kinzaburo (cont'd)

16 May 1932	Raised to the 3rd Court Rank, Junior Grade.	
16 June 1932	Ordered to make an official trip to Manchuria.	Cabinet
8 August 1932	Concurrently appointed <u>Supreme War Councillor.</u>	Cabinet
19 June 1933	Promoted to General.	Cabinet
	<u>Appointed Supreme War Councillor</u>	Cabinet
30 June 1933	Relieved of duty as Imperial Household Commissioner.	Dep't of Imperial Household.
7 July 1933	Relieved of duty as member of Natural Resources Investigation Council.	Cabinet
20 July 1933	Decorated with the Order of the Sacred Treasure, First Class.	
23 Jan. 1934	Relieved of main duty.	War Ministry
	<u>Appointed Inspector-General of Military Training and Supreme War Councillor.</u>	Cabinet
26 March 1935	Appointed the First Special Military Inspector.	War Ministry
1 June 1935	Raised to the 3rd Court Rank, Senior Grade.	
16 July 1935	Relieved of main duty and of additional duties.	War Ministry
	<u>Appointed Supreme War Councillor.</u>	Cabinet
29 Apr. 1934	Decorated with the <u>Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun for meritorious service in the 1931-1934 Incident.</u>	
6 March 1936	Placed on the waiting list.	War Ministry
10 " 1936	Placed on the reserve list.	War Ministry

R. H. Larsh

28 February 1947

MASAKI, Jinzaburo

The idol of the February 26 revolt was born in Saga Ken in 1876, graduated from the Army Staff College in 1898 and reached the grade of full general in 1933. Dismissed from the post of Inspector General of Military Training and appointed to the Military Council in 1935, he voiced his dissatisfaction to Lt. Gen. HIRANO Sukekuro, Commanding General of HOYO fortress, who lost no time in informing his intimate friends MURANAKA and ISOBE.

MASAKI continued to grumble in talks with young officers who came to see him, to whom he remarked that AIZAWA had given his life for the cause and to whom he intimated that further bloodshed would result if AIZAWA's trial and the question of the national constitution were allowed to take their course without opposition. He went so far as to blame the young officers for not taking the proper steps. In January and February 1936 he was in close contact with Lt. Col. MITSUI, Sakichi, to whom he offered to stand as a witness for the AIZAWA defense. He arranged to obtain money for the February 26 agitators from some of his friends. During the February 26 trouble he took the conspirators' side in visits to the Imperial Palace, the Naval General Staff, the War Ministry and the Military Council. When he heard Mrs. KITA's pronouncement, "Only MASAKI the valiant leads the righteous Army!" he interviewed the insurgents with retired General ABE, Nobuyuki, and Lt. Gen. NISHI, Giichi, the new Inspector General of Military Training, and suggested that they leave matters entirely in his hands.

SOURCE: "The Brocade Banner", G-2 compilation of the rise of nationalism in Japan.

MAZAKI, Jinsaburo

<u>DATE</u>	<u>CLASS OF DECORATION</u>	<u>ACHIEVEMENT</u>	<u>RECOMMENDING MINISTRY</u>
29 Apr '34	Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun.	Manchurian Incident	War Ministry
17 Dec. '37	Chingyuan-chang 1st Class (Manchukuo)	Japan and Manchukuo Amity	War Ministry

11 June 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Glanville Brown, British Division, IPS.
FROM: Edward P. Monaghan, Chief, Investigative Division, IPS.
SUBJECT: General MASAKI

1. Pursuant to your memorandum, dated 26 May 1947, there is submitted herewith report made by Lt. Eric W. Fleisher, Investigator, under this date.

Edward P. Monaghan
EDWARD P. MONAGHAN,
Chief, Investigative Division,
IPS.

11 June 1947


MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Glanville Brown
British Division, IPS

FROM: Lt. Eric W. Fleisher, Investigative Division, IPS

SUBJECT: General MASAKI

1. Pursuant to your memorandum, dated 26 May 1947, requesting a document taken from the home of Prince KONOYE that is stated to be a memoir relating to the modern phase of life by General MASAKI, the following information is submitted for your attention.

2. On contacting C.I.S. it was learned that all information available to C.I.S. is contained in the "Saionji-Harada Memoirs". Mr. Horwitz has a copy in his possession.


ERIC W. FLEISHER
1st Lt., Inf.,
Investigator, IPS

MEMORANDUM

TO: Investigative Division

FROM: British Division

SUBJECT: General MASAKI

26th May, 1947.

Reference Case File No. 59, serial 13, being a list of papers and documents removed from the home of Prince Fumimaro Konoye by Major L.H. Barnard on 16 December, 1945 and subsequently turned over to CIS by order of Brig. Gen. Thorpe.

One of these documents is stated to be a memoir relating to the modern phase of life by General Masaki.

Can this be obtained?

H. G. B.

1 May 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Sutton; Mr. Comyns-Carr; Mr. Brown
FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

Information in the form of a Staff Study compiled by G-2 has been included in the Investigative Case Files of the International Prosecution Section and is now available on the following witness.

MAZAKI, Jinsaburo

who has been requested by

ARAKI

E P M

EDWARD P. MONAGHAN
Chief, Investigative Section

19 May 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: **Mr. Sutton; Mr. Comyns-Carr; Mr. Brown**

FROM : **EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Chief,**
Investigative Division, IPS

SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find ~~attached hereto~~ list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT

ARAKI

WITNESS

MAZAKI, Jinzaburo

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

Director of the Kokuhonsha (National Federation Society) for this information see G-2 Staff study under file name HONDA, Kumataro in Investigative Files.

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl
(Described above)

E P M

EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

1 May 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Sutton; Mr. Comyns-Carr; Mr. Brown
FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

Information in the form of a Staff Study compiled by G-2 has been included in the Investigative Case Files of the International Prosecution Section and is now available on the following witness.

MAZAKI, Jinsaburo

who has been requested by

ARAKI

E P M

EDWARD P. MONAGHAN
Chief, Investigative Section

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
September 15, 1947
DEFENSE - ARAKI
MASAKI - Direct

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Page

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF MASAKI, Jinsaburo
BY MR. SUGAWARA

28455 * The witness identified Exhibit 3168 and verified
28456 it. The affidavit stated * that the witness was Vice Chief
of Staff from January 1932 to 19 June 1933, a War Councillor,
Inspector General from January 1934 to 16 July 1934, a War
28457 Councillor again and transferred to the reserve in March
1936. When he became Vice Chief of Staff * the Chief of
Staff was Prince KAN-IN and the War Minister was the ac-
cused ARAKI. When he assumed his post, ARAKI explained
to the witness that the state of affairs was quite alarm-
ing. There had been many internal incidents and relations
with the League were not satisfactory.

The situation in Manchuria had become more aggra-
vated. There was every danger it would develop into a
regular war, and they must leave no stone unturned to
immediately safe the situation.

28458 ARAKI told the witness that when he was appointed
War Minister, the Chinchou District was in a critical con-
dition. Unless they saved it, residents and troops would
be in danger. Diplomatic negotiations were at a stand-
still. The situation was aggravated and the Kwantung
Army was in difficulty. Therefore, the government was
obliged to decide to liquidate * the district for self-
defense and to protect residents. The General Staff
ordered the Kwantung Army to that effect. ARAKI told
the witness that the Liquidation Campaign had just been
finished and he thought there would be no need of further
operations unless the army was challenged. They would
try to cease hostilities within the smallest possible
scope and on principle the government was still dealing
with Chang Hsueh-liang who was still disturbing peace
and order. Therefore the scope of operations was limit-
ed to Chang's sphere of influence. ARAKI told the wit-
ness to bear this in mind and control the army strictly.

When the witness assumed the post as Vice Chief
of Staff, he met INUKAI, who explained political affairs
and made remarks similar to those of ARAKI. He did not
in any way suggest that he intended to petition for an
Imperial Order to withdraw troops from Manchuria and
the witness never heard from any one that Premier INUKAI
had any such intention.

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* The witness reported to the Chief of Staff, Prince KAN-IN, what he had heard from INUKAI and ARAKI and with his approval, conducted matters in accordance with those policies. While doing so, it was decided by the Ministry to send troops to Shanghai which had been requested by the Navy as reinforcements to protect the Japanese there. The witness took every precaution to observe ARAKI's principle so that the troops sent would not exceed the scope of their primary object. Divisional Commander UEDA also followed this principle and tried to settle the situation without bloodshed. The witness remembered UEDA made a proclamation requesting reconsideration by the enemy of their action. Contrary to his expectation, the Chinese increased preparations to fight. There were signs that an overall clash was inevitable.

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* Under such circumstances, further reinforcement was decided on to solve the situation. When the second reinforcement landed at Chillaikou, the 19th Route Army began a retreat and as it was driven beyond the expected line, attack ceased, ending in three days with almost negligible casualties. An agreement was later signed to ensure future safety.

28461

* This agreement gave Japan the right to station troops there, but in view of ARAKI's principle, they decided to evacuate all troops from China and withdrawal was made within a month after signing the agreement. The Jehol and Hulunpeirh campaigns and the task of the Kwantung Army under the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol, and because of constant disturbances around Jehol and in Hulunpeirh, it became necessary for the Japanese and Manchukuo forces to resort to action under the Protocol. It took place after recognition of Manchukuo and as precautions were taken throughout the campaign not to divert from the principle of bringing about law and order the operation was extremely difficult. As to Hulunpeirh, their object was achieved through the good offices of the Soviet and as to Jehol, efforts were made to limit action within the Great Wall. Observance of this policy was sternly requested to the troops at the risk of operational inconveniences. There was an occasion when troops advanced beyond this limit * but they were immediately ordered to return and further action

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Page was stopped. Hostilities were finally settled by the Tangku Agreement.

The witness believed that ARAKI was one who was most seriously worried about the Manchurian Incident. Because of his worry, he made a firm determination to settle it, which finally led to the Tangku Agreement. After the agreement was signed, ARAKI strove to settle the overall situation by adjusting foreign and domestic affairs. ARAKI often told the witness that he was devoting his efforts to letting the people live up to Japan's original teachings, enhancing the Emperor's virtue of benevolence and improving aggravated international relations by realizing the advocated international peace conference.

The natives' wishes for Manchukuo's independence were ardent when the witness was appointed Vice-Chief of Staff. The General Staff did not interfere on principles as it was a political problem. ARAKI assumed the most prudent attitude toward it and he was in accord with the officers.

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* ARAKI also exerted efforts to calm the minds of young officers who were indignant at the current situation and had caused considerable trouble. He did his best to develop their spirit so they might devote attention to their duty. He also let subordinates spare no time in teaching and guiding younger officers. In due course, they showed signs of composure and no army officer was a participant in the May 15th Incident.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. COMYNS CARR

Reference was made to the witness' affidavit where he had said that the natives' wishes for Manchukuo's independence were ardent, that the General Staff did not interfere with it, and that ARAKI assumed the most prudent attitude toward it. When asked if he remembered being interrogated in Sugamo, * the witness stated he did not. He recalled an interrogation in which he had said that he had something to do with setting up Manchuria as an independent state, but the meaning was entirely contrary. In regard to his statement on interrogation that there was an opinion in the Army to take over Manchuria

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Page entirely but he thought they did not clear up the mess, and advised the Emperor and Premier SAITO to set up an independent state, he explained that when he went to Manchuria he found Japanese officials in all quarters. Under such a state of affairs, it would appear as if Japan had occupied Manchuria. Therefore, the witness stated emphatically that under such a situation, Manchuria could not be properly governed and administered. Administration must be left entirely in Manchurian hands. When asked if he had said on interrogation that he felt any occupation of Manchuria by Japan violated the Nine-Power Treaty, he stated * that with regard to treaties he was a complete layman, but he did feel that would be a violation.

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When asked on interrogation if he stated that while Vice-Chief of Staff he went to receive the Emperor's permission to different matters, and especially recalled that he went to get this permission at the time the 14th Division was sent to Shanghai, and that the Emperor said he could see no reason for sending them, the witness stated that the Emperor did not say he saw no reason. The Emperor stated to the effect that it would be all right if it were necessary to send more troops. He made inquiry to that effect. * He had not said that the Emperor felt that with the situation coming back to normal in Shanghai it was not necessary to send the division there. He did not know that before even the Naval party landed in Shanghai the Chinese Mayor had accepted all terms demanded by the Japanese Consul-General. He said it wasn't the case that he said on interrogation that he told the Emperor that they were already on the move and if they were not to be used in Shanghai, they were needed in Manchuria and he finally reluctantly agreed. The witness stated that there was a war going on in Shanghai and it was doubted whether troops were needed there and so they took precautions. Half the troops were at sea and half on the move and they couldn't stop them. It was carried out on the plan that if they went to Shanghai and were not needed there, they should be transferred to Manchuria where they were needed.

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28469 * The witness did not know whether he had said that troops were sent three times to Shanghai, but it was true that they were sent three times. He did not

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say that matters like the sovereignty of China or treaties guaranteeing it did not enter their heads at that time. Troops of the various powers were stationed in North China and Shanghai and at that time ideas pertaining to sovereignty were superficial and they hardly thought about it. When he said it never entered their heads, he did not refer to anyone in particular insofar as diplomatic affairs were concerned. He was following the directions of the government.

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When he said that the question of sovereignty did not enter their heads,* he did not include ARAKI because he of all persons placed great emphasis and importance on international treaties. ARAKI did not tell the witness that this was a breach of them.

With regard to the despatch of forces, ARAKI agreed because it was a cabinet decision. In regard to the statement in his affidavit where he stated that ARAKI's opinion toward the League was quite clear, that he fully explained his opinion at the cabinet meeting and induced the decision that Japan would not withdraw from the League, the witness stated that he was not present at the meeting but he had frequently heard this from ARAKI.

He did not know that the truth was that ARAKI expressed the opposite opinion at the Cabinet meeting. He placed implicit trust in what ARAKI told him but he did not know for himself what took place in the meeting.

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* From Exhibit 2177, the minutes of the third trial of OKAWA, in answer to a question whether MASAKI and ARAKI were involved in the March Incident or the October Incident, the answer was no.

Served 9/9

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

- Against -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.



SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

DEPONENT: MASAKI, Jinsaburo

My name is Jinsaburo MASAKI. I was formerly a General of the Imperial Japanese Army.

I was the Vice-Chief of the General Staff from January 1932 to June 19th 1933, a War Councillor for a short while; the Inspector-General of training from January 1934 to July 16th 1935; a War Councillor again and was then transferred to the first reserve in March 1936.

When I became the Vice-Chief of the General Staff the Chief of the General Staff was H.R.H. the Prince KAN-IN and the War Minister was Lieutenant-General ARAKI Sadao.

When I assumed this post War Minister ARAKI explained to me the internal and external situations of Japan which existed at that time, the gist of which, as far as I remember, was as follows.

"The State of affairs of our country, both internal and external is quite alarming. There have already been many internal incidents and our relation with the League of Nations is far from being satisfactory.

As for Manchuria in spite of the non-expansion policy of the former cabinet, the situation has simply become more aggravated.

As there is every danger that it will develop into a regular war, we must leave no stone unturned in immediate saving of this complicated situation. When I (ARAKI) was appointed Minister of War the CHINCHOU district was in a critical condition. Unless we saved it, our residents and troops would be endangered. The diplomatic negotiations were at a standstill; the situation was aggravated, and the KUANTUNG Army was in a difficulty. The Government, therefore, was obliged to decide to liquidate that district for self-defence and protection of the residents. The General Staff Office ordered the KUANTUNG Army to that effect. The liquidation campaign has just finished. I think there will be no need of further operations unless our Army is challenged. At any rate we will try to cease hostilities within the smallest possible scope. The Government is on principle dealing with Chang Hsuehliang who is still disturbing peace and order. Therefore our scope of operation is limited under any condition within his sphere of influence. Bearing this in mind, please control the Army strictly."

At my appointment, my predecessor told me almost the same thing.

At the time when ^{I met} I assumed the post as the Vice-Chief of the General Staff, Premier INUKAI. While he has explained chiefly our political difficulties that Japan was experiencing at that time, he also made some remarks on the situation which was more or less similar

to that of War Minister ARAKI. The Premier did not in any way suggest that he had any intention of petitioning to the Throne for an Imperial Order, by virtue of which to withdraw all the troops from Manchuria, not did I ever hear from anyone that Premier INUKAI had any such intention.

I reported to H.R.H. the Prince KAN-IN. Chief of General Staff, what I had heard from the Premier and the War Minister respectively, and with his approval, I managed and conducted the matters in accordance with the Government's policies shown to me by War Minister ARAKI. While I was doing so, it was suddenly decided by the Ministry that troops be dispatched immediately to Shanghai which were requested by navy authorities for the purpose of reinforcing the navy and to protect Japanese nationals there.

Bearing in mind what I had heard from the War Minister I took every precaution to observe his principle so that the dispatched troops would not exceed the scope of their primary object. Divisional Commander UEDA (I.N. - Commander of the dispatched troops) also followed closely this principle and endeavoured to settle the situation without resorting to means of bloodshed. I remember he first, made a proclamation requesting reconsideration by the opponent over their action. However, contrary to his expectation, the opponent increased their preparation for fighting and added difficulties. In fact, there were signs that an over all clash between Chinese and Japanese was inevitable.

Under these circumstances, further reinforcement was decided from the point of view of strategic importance with the purpose of solving the situation quickly. When the vanguard of the second reinforcement made their landing at CHIILAIKOU along the YANGTZEKIANG, the 19 Route Army began to retreat, and as it was driven beyond the expected line, attack was ceased. Thus hostilities ended in three days, with almost negligible casualties.

In due course, an agreement was signed to ensure the future safety.

This agreement provided Japan the right of stationing certain part of her troops there, but in view of War Minister ARAKI's principle, which was completely identical to ours, we decided to evacuate all the troops from China and I think the complete withdrawal was made within a month of signing the agreement. JOHOL and HULUNPEIRH campaigns were and the task of the Kwantung Army through the provisions of the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol and because of constant disturbances of law and order in and around Johol chiefly by TANG YULIAN and in HULUNPEIRH chiefly by SU PING WEN, it became necessary for the Japanese and Manchoukuo forces to resort to military action based on the provisions of the Protocol. It took place after the formal recognition of the State of Manchoukuo, and as the precaution was taken throughout the campaign not to divert from the primary principle of bringing about law and order the operation called for extreme difficulties; nevertheless, as to HULUNPEIRH our object was achieved through good offices of the Soviet Union and as to JOHOL efforts were made to limit the action within the line of the Great Wall and observance of this fundamental policy was sternly requested to the troops in the front at the risk of suffering considerable operational inconveniences. There was an occasion when the troops advanced beyond this limit, but they were immediately ordered to return and further action was stopped at that. Then the hostilities were finally settled by the conclusion of Tangku Agreement.

I believe that War Minister ARAKI was one of the persons who were most seriously worried about the Manchurian Incident. Because of this worry, he had made a firm determination to settle it, which finally led to the Tangku Agreement. No sooner had the Agreement been signed than he strove to settle the overall situation of Japan by adjusting foreign as well as domestic affairs.

He often told me in those days that he was devoting his effort toward letting the people live up to the original teachings of Japan, enhancing by so doing the virtue of benevolence of His Majesty the Emperor among the people, and externally, toward improving aggravated international relations by realizing the already advocated International Peace Conference.

The natives' wishes for the Independence of Manchukuo were ardent, when I was appointed the Vice-Chief of the General Staff. The General Staff did not on principle interfere with it as it was a political problem. Minister of War ARAKI assumed the most prudent attitude toward it. He was in accordance with the decision of the Government based on the opinion of the Foreign Office and the real situation. During this time the General Staff was devoting itself to security of peace and order there.

The opinion of War Minister ARAKI toward the League of Nations was quite clear. He fully explained his opinion at the cabinet meeting and induced the meeting to the decision that Japan would not withdraw from the League.

I was under the impression that the War Minister had been prepared with an opinion with which he hoped to persuade the League of Nation. It also seemed to me that the War Minister had had a firm belief of getting the complete understanding of powers over Japan's position if once restoration of law and order in Manchuria were attained which he thought above everything else.

War Minister ARAKI stressed importance on quality than on quantity of troops from the viewpoint of armament. He endeavoured to recover the armament which had fallen behind since World War I up to that of other Powers at the time of the War. He had his own ideal on national defence, which was all based on morality. He was particularly concerned in promoting the character and moral standard of the commissioned officers.

War Minister ARAKI also exerted to calm the mind of young officers who, indignant at the current situation, had already caused considerable troubles. He did his best to develop the immaculate spirit of those officers without being distorted so that they may devote their unshattered attention to their duty. While devoting his whole hearted attention for this purpose, he also let his subordinates spare no time in teaching and guiding the younger officers, and so they began to show the sign of composure in due course, and at the occasion of May 15th Incident, it turned out that no army commissioned officer participated in it.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al)

vs)

ARAKI, Sadao, et al)

AFFIDAVIT



Monthly argument for Araki

 DEPONENT: MASAKI, Jinsaburo

I, MASAKI, Jinsaburo, make oath and say as follows:

I was formerly a General of the Imperial Japanese Army.

I was Vice Chief of the General Staff from January 1932 to June 19, 1933; a War Councillor for a short while; the Inspector General of training from January 1934 to July 16, 1935; a War Councillor again, and was then transferred to the First Reserve in March 1936.

When I became the Vice Chief of the General Staff, the Chief of the General Staff was H.R.H. the Prince KAN-I. and the War Minister was Lieutenant General ARAKI, Sadao.

When I assumed this post, War Minister ARAKI explained to me the internal and external situations of Japan which existed at that time, the gist of which as far as I remember was as follows:

"The state of affairs of our country, both internal and external is quite alarming. There have already been many internal incidents, and our relation with the League of Nations is far from being satisfactory.

As for Manchuria, in spite of the non-expansion policy of the former cabinet, the situation has simply become more aggravated. Unless we do something to stop it now, there is every danger that it will develop into a regular war.

We must leave no stone unturned in the immediate saving of this complicated situation. In view of the extreme seriousness of the condition of Manchuria today, the possible minimum military action may not be unavoidable for the sake of restoring law and order in that district, but the action, if it should take place, must never exceed the scope of self-defense. In other words, since the object of action lies in securing our self-defense by restoring peace and order in Manchuria, the theatre of operation must be limited within the Four Eastern Provinces which are under Chang Hueliang's regime. This is the policy of our cabinet!"

At the time when I assumed the post as Vice Chief of the General Staff, Premier INUKAI, while he has explained chiefly the financial plight and economic difficulties that Japan was experiencing at that time, he also made some remarks on the situation which were more or less similar to that of War Minister ARAKI. The Premier did not in any way suggest that he had any intention of petitioning to the

Throne for an Imperial Order, by virtue of which to withdraw all the troops from Manchuria, nor did I ever hear from anyone that Premier INUKAI had any such intention. It would have been impossible for any one to withdraw the troops in the midst of their operation unless the hostilities showed some sign of settlement.

Furthermore, Premier INUKAI as clever as he was, should have known quite well that His Majesty the Emperor, who was an ardent believer in the Constitution, would have never granted him an Imperial Order related to military operation without first having an advice from the General Staff Headquarters. I cannot altogether imagine that Premier INUKAI should have harbored such an intention.

I reported to H.R.H. the Prince KAN-IN, Chief of the General Staff, what I had heard from the Premier and the War Minister respectively, and with his approval, I managed and conducted the matters in accordance with the line shown to me by War Minister ARAKI. While I was doing so, it was suddenly decided by the Ministry that troops be despatched immediately to Shanghai which were requested by navy authorities for the purpose of reinforcing the navy and to protect Japanese nationals there.

Bearing in mind what I had heard from the War Minister, I took every precaution to observe his principle so that the despatched troops would not exceed the scope of their primary object. Divisional Commander UEDA (T.N. Commander of the despatched troops) also followed closely this principle and endeavored to settle the situation without resorting to means of bloodshed. I remember he first made a proclamation requesting reconsideration by the opponent over their action. However, contrary to his expectation, the opponent increased their preparation for fighting and added to the difficulties. In fact, there were signs that an overall clash between Chinese and Japanese was inevitable. Under these circumstances, further reinforcement was decided from the point of view of strategic importance, but as soon as the advance corps of reinforcement made their first landing, the 19th Route Army began to retreat, and as it was driven beyond the expected line, attack was ceased. Thus hostilities ended in three days, with almost negligible casualties.

In due course, an agreement was signed to ensure the future safety. (I think that in making this agreement, a committee of powers through the good offices of the League of Nations participated.)

This agreement provided Japan the right of stationing certain parts of her troops there, but in view of War Minister ARAKI's principle, which was completely identical to ours, we decided to evacuate all the troops from China and I think the complete withdrawal was made within a month of signing the agreement.

The Jehol campaign was the task of the Kwantung Army through the provisions of the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol and because constant disturbances of law and order in and around Jehol it became necessary for the Japanese and Manchukuo forces to resort to military action based on the provisions of the protocol. It took place after the formal recognition of the State of Manchukuo, and as the precaution was taken throughout the campaign not to divert from the primary

Araki
principle of bringing about law and order the operation called for extreme difficulties. Nevertheless, efforts were made to limit the action within the line of the Great Wall, and observance of this fundamental policy was sternly requested of the troops in the front at the risk of suffering considerable operational inconveniences. There was an occasion when the troops advanced beyond this limit, but they were immediately ordered to return and further action was stopped at that. Then the hostilities were finally settled by the conclusion of the Tangku Agreement.

I believe that War Minister ARAKI was one of the persons who was most seriously worried about the Manchurian Incident. Because of this worry, he had made a firm determination to settle it, which finally led to the Tangku Agreement. No sooner had the Agreement been signed than he strove to settle the overall situation of Japan by adjusting foreign as well as domestic affairs.

He often told me in those days that he was devoting his efforts toward letting the people live up to the original teachings of Japan, enhancing by so doing the virtue of benevolence of His Majesty the Emperor among the people, and externally, toward improving aggravated international relations by realizing the already advocated International Peace Conference.

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I was under the impression that the War Minister had been prepared with an opinion with which he hoped to persuade the League of Nations. It also seemed to me that the War Minister had had a firm belief of getting the complete understanding of powers over Japan's position if once restoration of law and order in Manchuria were attained.

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War Minister ARAKI also exerted efforts to calm the minds of the young officers who, indignant at the current situation, had already caused considerable trouble. He did his best to develop the immaculate spirit of those officers without being distorted so that they might devote their unshattered attention to their duty. While devoting his wholehearted attention to this purpose, he also let his subordinates spare no time in teaching and guiding the younger officers, and so they began to show the sign of composure in due course, and at the occasion of the May 15 Incident, it turned out that no army commissioned officer participated in it.

Def. Doc. # 2134

MASAKI, Jinsaburo

Subscribed and sworn to before the under-signed officer
by the above-named MASAKI, Jinsaburo, at the War Ministry
Building, Tokyo, Japan, on this _____ day of August 1947.

1 May 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Sutton; Mr. Comyns-Carr; Mr. Brown
FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

Information in the form of a Staff Study compiled by G-2 has been included in the Investigative Case Files of the International Prosecution Section and is now available on the following witness.

MAZAKI, Jinsaburo

(JUNSA BORO)

who has been requested by

ARAKI

E P M

EDWARD P. MONAGHAN
Chief, Investigative Section