

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

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2. Groups and Individuals Expected to Attempt a Split with the President

A. Brazilian Communist Party (PCB)

While the PCB, with a membership of approximately 40,000 in the country and 2,000 in Washington state, has followed a subversive policy to achieve its goals, it has generally been unopposed by major US forces within the country. It has been active in such demonstrations, mass speeches, and highly organized activities such as protests, rallies, and demonstrations critical of the United States in general and of the President in particular.

B. Communist Party of Brazil (CPB)

The CPB is a minority group which has broken with the PCB and advocated violence, along the lines of Fidel Castro's "Guevara Communism," to achieve its goals. While the CPB has relatively few members and does not have organizational capability like the PCB, certain individuals within the party might conceivably attempt some sort of violent action against the President or his entourage.

C. Protest Leagues


The Protest Leagues are Communist-infiltrated para-political groups consisting of rural workers, peasant farmers, and small landowners concentrated mainly in the States of Pernambuco and Parana. A prominent leader, Francisco Salles, while not adhering to Communist Party membership, is definitely a Communist sympathizer and strong advocate of the policies of Fidel Castro and the Soviets. He is a proponent of the violent overthrow of the government through peasant uprisings. Followers of Francisco Salles can be expected to attempt to demonstrate in Rio de Janeiro against the President's visit. A report previously furnished from office indicates that these elements are planning to make a red paint bomb to be thrown at Mrs. Kennedy.

D. Urban and Soviet Air Activities

Urban and Soviet Air Activities can be expected to conduct concerted efforts to create disturbances and incidents designed to mar the success of the Presidential visit.

E. Legal Affairs, Governor of Rio Grande do Sul

Legal Affairs, with special interest, anti-American members of the Senate of Rio, may very possibly take advantage of the President's visit to implore further anti-American measures and actions not only in his own State, but also in Rio de Janeiro.





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2. Security Forces Charges with Protecting the President

A. Federal Service for Intelligence and Counter Intelligence (FSIC)

The FSIC is Brazil's national agency responsible for security and counter-intelligence operations in the country and has been in existence since 1976. It reports directly to the National Security Council and is headed by Colonel General Roger de Lima, a political appointee of President Collor. Colonel Lima reportedly had a heart condition which worsens from the effectiveness as Director of the FSIC. Additionally, Colonel Lima is described as a person who is at all times in the vicinity of President Collor.

[REDACTED]

The FSIC has the capability to provide intelligence coverage of potentially hostile groups and individuals posing a threat to the Presidential party's security and through its access to the highest levels of the Brazilian Government, can insure the availability of necessary armed forces and police personnel to cope with or counter any disturbances.

B. Caribbean State Department of Public Safety (DPS)

The DPS, headed by Police Chief Antonio Martins de Almeida, maintains the main police and security force which will be charged with protecting the President while he is in Rio de Janeiro.


[REDACTED]

Although subject to varying standards, the DPS is not a highly efficient police agency. It is considered capable of providing necessary security measures in connection with the visit. Further information on the DPS will be furnished your office when received from the field.

C. First Army

The First Army is located in Rio de Janeiro and, if the need arises, can be called upon to disperse any unruly mobs or break up violent demonstrations against the President.

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2. Carlos Lacerda, Governor of Pernambuco

Governor Lacerda is pro-American and anti-Communist and can be relied upon to utilize all the forces at his command to insure the President's safety while in Rio.

3. Miscellaneous [redacted]

Through [redacted] police, militia, labor, press, and foreign political skills groups [redacted] in Rio are planning to take appropriate unilateral actions not only to suppress official measures to uncover and counter the plans and activities of hostile groups but also to undertake other actions designed to create a favorable atmosphere for the Presidential visit.

4. General Estimate of Situation

At this time, the general security situation prevailing in the Rio de Janeiro area is satisfactory. It is believed that the local forces - civilian and military - are capable of coping with any hostile demonstrations or attempts at rioting or violence. At the time of the visit of former President Eisenhower to Brazil in 1959, the local forces proved capable of providing the security needed for the protection of the Presidential party while in Rio. At the time of the resignation of President Quadros in August 1961, the local forces again showed their ability to cope with hostile crowds and street demonstrations. The good will generated by the friendly reception of President Dulles on his recent trip to the United States will be a factor in insuring a similar reception for President Kennedy. It is expected that the Brazilian official attitude towards the visit will be highly favorable and that this in turn will contribute towards a similar attitude on the part of the press and the public.





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## 3. Issues Related to Issues of Hostile Activities Towards the Visit

### A. American Communist Party (ACP)

As previously reported to you, the ACP (7,500 members in San Francisco State) has already initiated discussions to consider plans for demonstrating against the Presidential visit. In spite of the fact that the present ACP line advocates peaceful means to achieve its aims, it can be expected to throw its full resources behind an attempt to protest publicly against the visit. The ACP will most assuredly bitterly oppose the trip in the local Communist press, notably in *Party News*, the official San Francisco ACP weekly newspaper, and in *Party Voice*, the rural monthly ACP publication. The Party will undoubtedly attempt to influence key leftist politicians to protest the visit. Party appeals will probably be made to selected nationalist military leaders. The Party will also undoubtedly make full use of its fronts such as pro-Chinese groups, student groups, labor organizations, the Francisco Peace Partisans Movement and the San Francisco State Federation of Women. Perhaps the strongest arm of the ACP in this regard will be the local labor unions under ACP control such as the bank workers union, metallurgical workers union, textile workers union, civil construction workers union, food workers union, and the chemical workers union. Communist elements within the Fronts National de Libertacion (National Liberation Front) can also be expected to undertake some sort of hostile action.

### B. Communist Party of Brazil (CPB) and Trotskyist Movement

As previously explained, the CPB is a far-left Communist Party with a revolutionary program and would be eager to organize and support any demonstration. It would have little to lose by resort to violence which would dramatize Brazilian opposition to the trip. By the same token the Trotskyist Movement can be relied upon to support any and all measures, including resort to violence, to protest against the trip. As the most anti-American groups in the San Francisco area, the CPB and Trotskyists would willingly support violent demonstrations of the type undertaken against former Vice President Nixon during his visit to Venezuela a few years ago. Although both of these groups are small and relatively weak, they might, in connection with certain extreme student elements, try to stage violent, but isolated, demonstrations.

### C. Political Parties

It is possible that demonstrations against the trip will have the support of the Far-left Nationalist Revolution and

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expressed belief elements of such left-of-center parties as the Partido Revolucionario Mexicano and the Partido Insurreccionalista.

4. Security Forces Merged with Protecting the President

A. San Paulo State Department of Public Safety (SE)

1.) The SE will have primary responsibility for protecting the Presidential party, including the Vice President for the two main elements, the San Paulo Police and the State Police (Public Force). The San Paulo Police is perhaps the best equipped and best trained force in Brazil, not least by American standards. It is an inferior organization. The San Paulo Police and Public Force have excellent equipment and manpower available to control any serious street demonstration, and in the event of a large scale rioting, groups of the armed force stationed in San Paulo could be brought into action. In case of a serious outbreak of riots or fighting between an extensive military action, it is assumed that the San Paulo Police of Public Force could contain the riotous element pending its extensive armed reinforcements. A good example of the capability of the San Paulo Police and Public Force to contain a potentially dangerous situation was the San Paulo general strike of 12 December 1964. Within a matter of hours the police and Public Force were alerted and they crushed the strike. The general services provided by the SE and the General Services (Intelligence) of the Armed Forces are generally more of a standard and other administrative organizations. Consequently, if any serious demonstration attempt were being plotted against President Kennedy at any number of his visits, these services normally would not have about 15. If, however, they were tipped off in advance they could arrange for the arrest and detention of the participants. The local security services will advise the area military commander available and, within the limits of their capability as outlined above, will attempt to make the President's visit to San Paulo as safe and secure as possible.

2.) The SE is headed by the Secretary of Public Security for the State of San Paulo, who is directly responsible to Governor Carlos Albert de Carvalho Filho. The present Secretary, Flaminio Lopes de Silva, who will arrive in January 1973, although not initially pro-American, is anti-Communist and can be counted on to render all our support that he can during the President's visit. He will

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b. Public Force (Fuerza Publica) is a military unit composed of about 12,000 officers and men in the state. It is established to preserve order and maintain security and its duties include patrol, traffic, and essential guard duty. It has placed a uniformed unit at the disposal of the law enforcement and defensive action in case of riots, etc. The latter unit can call for aid from the Public Force when needed.

c. Maritime and Aerial Police Division (Division de Policia Maritima y Aerea and Guardia de Retraso) has about 250 police officers and sailors on duty at seaports and airports in the state.

3. Second Army

The commander of the Second Army, which is headquartered in the city of San Paulo, is Lt. General Figueira de Mello. He is anti-Communist and friendly to the United States. The Second Army has about 27,000 men.

4. General Figueira, Governor of Sao Paulo

General Figueira is pro-American and is easily accessible to American officials. Without question he will take a personal interest in insuring that proper security measures are observed during the President's visit.

5. Miscellaneous Security Actions [redacted]

Apart from the official actions to be undertaken by the security services described above, [redacted] Sao Paulo will implement through their own security agencies to monitor, detect and disrupt the plans and activities of hostile individuals and groups. At the same time, they plan to carry out a variety of actions designed to insure a favorable reception of the Presidential visit.

6. General Estimate of Situation

It is not believed that any large-scale demonstrations, resulting in planned or accidental violence, will be organized without the support of the PCB. Beyond question the strongest and best organized subversive organization in the Sao Paulo area. It is not believed at this time that the PCB would encourage violence in any demonstration of this nature, from the Party standpoint, counterproductive to their immediate goals of legitimacy and participation in the national life of the state, and to their long-range objective of creating a brand.



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nationalist movement composed of all anti-imperialist (i.e., anti-United States) elements. Present indications are that the PCB and other subversive elements would support fully all activities harmful to the visit, short of those activities which, by their very violence, would provoke local police forces into repressive countermeasures, would be condemned by the majority of Brazilians, or would be self-defeating in terms of PCB objectives. By and large, it is expected that President Kennedy will receive a spontaneous favorable reception on the part of the Brazilian public in Rio de Janeiro.

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1. General Information

2. Objectives

The purpose of this study is to determine the effectiveness of the proposed system in reducing the number of errors in the data processing system. The study will be conducted over a period of six months, during which time the system will be used in a controlled environment. The results of the study will be reported in a final report.

3. Methodology

The methodology of this study is based on the use of a controlled experiment. The system will be used in a controlled environment, and the results will be compared to the results of a control group. The control group will consist of data processed by the current system. The results of the study will be reported in a final report.

4. Results

The results of the study show that the proposed system is effective in reducing the number of errors in the data processing system. The number of errors was reduced by approximately 20% compared to the control group. The results of the study are presented in the following table:

5. Conclusions

The study has shown that the proposed system is effective in reducing the number of errors in the data processing system. The results of the study are presented in the following table:

6. Recommendations

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Military Agreement to the President... [faded text]

B. Military Policy of the Department

The military policy of the Department... [faded text]

C. United Army

United Army... [faded text]

D. Air Support, Development, and Maintenance

Air Support, Development, and Maintenance... [faded text]

E. Air Support, Development, and Maintenance by the Department

Air Support, Development, and Maintenance by the Department... [faded text]

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Air Support, Development, and Maintenance by the Department... [faded text]

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General Outlook of the Situation

As you have not yet received [redacted] the overall security situation prevailing in Berlin will be described to you as far as it is available. It is probably safe to say, however, that the presence in Berlin of the subversive elements listed above, could pose a definite threat to the continued life of the Provisional Party.

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[Redacted]

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Information as follows: The DCP is responsible for the control, direction, and presentation of all major and important activities in the military in the political and social life of Brazil. The activities, plans, and programs of the Federal District. The following divisions of the DCP will probably be involved in the security operations affecting the President's visit:

- a. The Military Police, consisting of approximately 1,000 men.
- b. The Special Police of the DCP, consisting of approximately 500 selected officers and men. This is a special unit and is used for emergency duty for the President's personal security. It is usually stationed in public places.
- c. The Civil Guard of the DCP, consisting of approximately 2,500 uniformed police officers. This unit is in charge of police, guard, and traffic duty.
- d. The National Police, consisting of approximately 2,500 officers and men.

It is reported that [redacted] established contact with [redacted] and [redacted] prior to the arrival of President [redacted] in [redacted].

[redacted]

Intelligence activities during the [redacted] [redacted]

These will be reported to the [redacted] [redacted]

Special Intelligence Situation

While we have not received [redacted] information as to security risks or possible [redacted] in [redacted] that would affect our [redacted] or [redacted] to [redacted] a serious threat to the President at this time.



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
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