

INTERROGATION of HOSHINO - EXCERPTS

28 January 1946, page 12

- Q. What was the question about the extraterritorial rights that you referred to back a little while ago?
- A. This extraterritorial right was enjoyed by almost all nations at one time, including the Japanese. Following the influx of Japanese colonists into Manchukuo it was realized that the freedom of taxation enjoyed by them would create inequality and an unfair state of affairs for the Chinese. And it was deemed necessary that this extraterritoriality should be abolished to equalize the situation. In the railway zone both Chinese and Japanese were not subject to taxation and this also was a situation that had to be remedied.
- Q. You conducted the negotiations with the head of the Army, General UEDA, yourself, did you?
- A. I was one of those who conferred with General UEDA.
- Q. And who were the others?
- A. Mr. OHASHI, Vice Foreign Minister, was another who conferred with General UEDA.
- Q. And you and the Vice Foreign Minister, Mr. OHASHI, suggested a plan for working this out, did you? If so, what was the plan?
- A. This was not exactly a plan, but a recommendation to be forwarded to the Japanese Government that steps be taken for the abolition of extraterritoriality in the railway zone.
- Q. What action did they take on that recommendation? That is the Japanese Government.
- A. Late in 1936 or early in 1937 as a result of the Japan-Manchukuo Treaty, the desired result was obtained.

Page 13

- Q. Was it necessary to take up with the head of the Kwantung Army all bond issues which were issued by Manchukuo? I am limiting it to this period of 1932 to 1936.
- A. It was not necessary to refer such matters to the Kwantung Army, but support was usually requested from this source.
- Q. Were there any cases that you remember over the period of 1932 to 1934 in which the Army, or the head of the Kwantung Army refused to give support?
- A. No.

In 1935 bonds to the value of 140,000,000 yen were issued for the purchase of the North Manchuria Railway from the Soviet Government, at which time I came to Japan several times in connection with the flotation of these bonds.

- Q. And did you get the approval of the Kwantung Army in that case, too?
- A. It was not necessary for me to obtain the approval of the Kwantung Army. Rather than approval, it was the moral support as stated previously.

28 January 1946, page 14

- Q. Did the Bureau take any action towards interesting people in making investments in Manchukuo during this period 1932 to 1936? I mean did they take any action towards interesting people in developing industry in Manchukuo?
- A. Great efforts were made to sell shares of newly established companies amongst the population in Manchukuo.
- Q. Was it your department so far as the Manchukuo government was concerned that had charge of that during the period 1932 to 1936?
- A. This department was mainly concerned in a sort of sales campaign to have these shares held by as many people as possible.

31 January 1946, page 17

- Q. [From Pros. Ex. No. 453-A, page 12. What was the reason that the Kwantung Army made any objection to the Zaibatsu making investments in Manchukuo?
- A. The army in general did not oppose the Zaibatsu but there existed such an atmosphere among the Kwantung officers. The Kwantung officers believed that since the Zaibatsu monopolized industry in Japan such should not happen to the industries in Manchukuo. Therefore, the opposition on the part of the army.]
- Q. How did you feel about it, Mr. Hoshino?
- A. Since I did not believe that the Zaibatsu monopolized industry in Japan I felt that anyone could go into Manchukuo and make investments in industry.

Page 19

- Q. Did the Chinese incident come as a surprise to you?
- A. It was a surprise to me.

4 February 1946, page 3

- Q. Was General HONJO in Manchuria when you went there?
- A. Yes.
- Q. State what conversations you had with him about the Manchurian incident in September 1931?
- A. I have never talked with General HONJO concerning the Manchurian incident.
- Q. Did you ever talk with General ITAGAKI?
- A. I have never talked with General ITAGAKI concerning the Manchurian incident.

7 February 1946, page 18

- Q. Did you become a member of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association?
- A. Well not in any particular sense but as a member of the Cabinet. I was an advisor of the society. All the Cabinet Ministers were.
- Q. You were an officer of that association?
- A. No.
- Q. Were you on the Board of Directors or any permanent committee?
- A. Yes, I was a member of the committee. I was called upon to become a member of a committee to study health matters after my resignation. It was for the study of tuberculosis.

Def. Doc. No. 606-A-1

7 February 1946, page 18 (continued)

- Q. So that is all you did with that association?  
A. Yes, that is all.

Page 19

- Q. In the spring of 1940, did MATSUOKA go to Germany and Italy?

A. Yes.

- Q. And what was the result of his trip to Germany?

A. I had resigned when MATSUOKA came back so I didn't hear - I don't know the details or the secret details. But the most important result of the trip as a whole was the Russo-Japanese Treaty of Non-Aggression.

- Q. And that was signed about the middle of April?

A. Yes.

- Q. And was it considered at the Cabinet meeting at which you were present?

A. No, I didn't attend such a Cabinet meeting. I had already resigned in April and since I was traveling during March I did not attend any of the Cabinet meetings.

26 February 1946, page 5

- Q. Now, Mr. Hoshino, you stated that you were president of the Planning Board until April 1941. What did you do after that?

A. For half a year thereafter I was doing no special job. I was visiting various parts of the country.

- Q. And what were the visits? Of a business or of a pleasure nature?

A. It was mostly private trips, except at one time I did make a speech in regard to certain Chuchiku savings. I had been in Manchuria for a number of years and therefore I made this trip to see the condition of the country.

- Q. What was the reason for the collapse of the Third Konoye Cabinet, Mr. Hoshino?

A. I did not know at that time the reason for I had been out on many trips since between August and October, however, afterward I did hear that the Konoye Cabinet collapsed because there was internal friction.

page 6

- Q. How did you happen to become Secretary of the Cabinet, Mr. Hoshino?

A. There was no special reason except that I had been requested to become the Cabinet Secretary on the 17th by Tojo. At that time I had already purchased a ticket in anticipation of going to Korea.

- Q. You and General TOJO were old friends, were you not, Mr. Hoshino?

A. I would not say exactly old friends, however, Tojo was in Manchuria for about two years at the time I was and that is how I came to know him and also when Tojo was the Minister of War and I was on the Cabinet Planning Board.

Def. Doc. No. 606-A-1

26 February 1946, page 6 (continued)

- Q. Who appointed you as president of the Cabinet Planning Board originally?  
A. Prince Konoye.

page 7

- Q. Did you, as Secretary, attend all of the meetings of the Cabinet, Mr. Hoshino?  
A. I did not attend as a Cabinet member, however, I did sit in on the meetings. There also were two other persons that sat in on this conference. The legislative and the intelligence members sat in on these conferences.
- Q. As Secretary of the Cabinet Board, did you have a vote on any of the questions presented there?  
A. No, no rights for a vote.

7 February 1946, page 16

- Q. Did you keep notes of the Cabinet meetings during TOJO's regime?  
A. No.
- Q. Did anybody else in the Cabinet keep any notes, or minutes, or memorandum?  
A. No, the president of the Information Bureau gave whatever information there was to the newspapers.

26 February 1946, page 8

- Q. /From Pros. Ex. No. 2225, page 15. I am advised, Mr. Hoshino, that you were the closest man in the Cabinet to General TOJO. How about that?  
A. As the Chief Secretary, I was the closest to TOJO, however, I can not say that I was the closest advisor.
- Q. I am advised that you also were a strong supporter of TOJO's war policy. Is that not correct?  
A. I have not been asked of any advice by TOJO previous to the war, nor have I given any. I have just carried out instructions as a secretary.

7 February, 1946, page 26

- Q. Did the Prime Minister say anything? /At Imperial Conference of 1 December 1941/  
A. He explained the situation as it was.  
Q. What did he explain? A. I don't remember exactly what was said.  
Q. What was it in substance?  
A. Roughly that if the negotiations did not succeed during the beginning of December, there would be war.

11 February 1946, page 14

- Q. Were you present at this Imperial Conference?  
A. Yes, I was but not as a member.

Def. Doc. No. 606-A-1

7 February 1946, page 28

- Q. Did you make any suggestions? [At Privy Council meeting of 8 December 1941]
- A. I was not permitted to express anything.

11 February 1946, page 13

- Q. Was the Chief of the Information Board present at the meeting of the Privy Council?
- A. I believe he was present though I cannot say definitely that he was. As the Chief of the Cabinet Information Board and myself as well are not members we would not have to attend the meetings except those that pertained to our duties so that possibly he may have attended this. If they were all ministers it would be compulsory, more or less, to attend these meetings, but as these people are merely in line of duty only and not as a member I would not be able to say definitely that they were.