

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Commander Davis?

Admiral Bellinger: Very close.

Senator Lucas: Did Commander Davis discuss with you at any time the acceptance of any of these messages that came from the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral Bellinger: No, sir. I do not know that he knew about that.

Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield? I expect to go into the Davis matter and show that he did not know about that either.

Senator Lucas: What were the duties of General Davis?

The Chairman: Commander Davis.

Senator Lucas: I keep getting my Generals and Commanders mixed.

The Chairman: Go ahead. Pardon the interruption.

Senator Lucas: It is perfectly all right, sir.

What were the duties of Commander Davis?

Admiral Bellinger: He was the Aviation Aide on the Staff of Admiral Kimmel and his duties were assigned by Admiral Kimmel.

Senator Lucas: How often did you see him?

Admiral Bellinger: I would say I was in communication with him by telephone or saw him at least, I should say, on the average of every day.

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Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 Senator Lucas: Did he give you any direct orders as
3 to what you should do with respect to the Air Force?

4 Admiral Bellinger: No, sir. He had no authority except
5 by virtue of being on the staff of Admiral Kimmel.

6 Senator Lucas: What he was then was sort of a liaison
7 man, is that it?

8 Admiral Bellinger: He was an Aide to Admiral Kimmel.

9 Senator Lucas: And Admiral Kimmel was the only one
10 who could give you orders as to what to do then?

11 Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

12 Senator Lucas: At no time, as I understand it, during
13 the months of November and October did Admiral Kimmel talk
14 to you about any messages that he might have received from
15 Washington, D. C.?

16 Admiral Bellinger: He did not talk to me about them.

17 Senator Lucas: I call your attention to Exhibit 37.
18 As an example, page 1, the message of April 1, 1941, which
19 was sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel. It says:

20 "PERSONNEL OF YOUR NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE SHOULD
21 BE ADVISED THAT BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT FROM PAST EXPERIENCE
22 SHOWS THE AXIS POWERS OFTEN BEGIN ACTIVITIES IN A PARTICULAR
23 FIELD ON SATURDAYS AND SUNDAYS OR ON NATIONAL HOLIDAYS OF
24 THE COUNTRY CONCERNED, THEY SHOULD TAKE STEPS ON SUCH DAYS
25 TO SEE THAT PROPER WATCHES AND PRECAUTIONS ARE IN EFFECT."

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Are you familiar with that order?

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Admiral Bellinger: No, sir, but I was familiar with the general situation in that respect. As a matter of fact, my Operations Officer wrote an article which was published in the Naval Institute, I think in 1936, which practically duplicated this estimate of the situation in regard to an attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese.

Senator Lucas: Yes.

Admiral Bellinger: So that this was not any news, particularly.

Senator Lucas: I see. It was no news at all? It was merely a reminder of something you already knew?

Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: Now, what was the condition of these planes that were destroyed by the Japanese on December 7 on the Saturday before? Were they in the same places, the same conditions, the same spots?

Admiral Bellinger: No, sir, I don't think so. I can't say for sure but I would be willing to bet they were not in the same places.

Senator Lucas: Were there more planes on hand at that particular time than there were during the other days of the week, on this particular Sunday morning? I presume your operation schedule would show exactly as to the dispersal

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1 of your planes during that week.

2 Admiral Bellinger: I believe there were more, perhaps,
3 on the beach on Saturday than there were on Sunday.

4 Senator Lucas: Why was that? Was that payday?

5 Admiral Bellinger: Well, we had been working pretty
6 strong on the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th, and you have got to do
7 something about easing up on personnel.

8 Senator Lucas: I appreciate that.

9 Admiral Bellinger: But every day was a working day.
10 That was started in my forces about 1 March, or maybe 1 April.

11 Senator Lucas: Well, it is a fact that there were
12 more Naval officers and men at Pearl Harbor on the week-end
13 than at any other time, is it not?

14 Admiral Bellinger: On week days?

15 Senator Lucas: No, on the week-ends, Saturdays and
16 Sundays. That was the custom, wasn't it?

17 Admiral Bellinger: Not necessarily. As far as my
18 outfit was concerned I tried to make a schedule that would
19 hold water utilizing every day as a work day, Saturdays and
20 Sundays the same as Tuesdays or Wednesdays. But there
21 were certain combinations which did make a let-up at times
22 maybe more than others.

23 As I said before, if you look at this schedule you
24 will find on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday there
25

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1 was considerable activity and that was when we were having
2 wing tactics.

3 Senator Lucas: Well, was that the regular operation
4 schedule every week?

5 Admiral Bellinger: No, sir, not every week, but it
6 was in our schedule of employment.

7 Senator Lucas: It shows that you were busy the first
8 part of the week and then over the week-end these fellows
9 were entitled to some rest and recreation.

10 Admiral Bellinger: Yes, but that doesn't follow nec-
11 essarily all the way through.

12 Senator Lucas: Now, where were you when the attack
13 took place?

14 Admiral Bellinger: I was taken sick with what they
15 call acute laryngitis, I believe, a type of flu, on December
16 2, and on December 7, that was to be my first day up.

17 Senator Lucas: I see.

18 Admiral Bellinger: I got up very hurriedly.

19 Senator Lucas: You didn't wait for the doctor to tell you?

20 Admiral Bellinger: No, sir.

21 Senator Lucas: Who was in command while you were away?

22 Admiral Bellinger: I was still in command and in touch
23 every day with my Operation Officer who was my second in
24 command, at that time Commander Ramsey.
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Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Senator Lucas: Were you in the hospital?

Admiral Bellinger: No, sir, I was at home. The first message that I received about the attack was from Commander Ramsey, now Captain, and I would say that it was probably a few seconds before 8:00 o'clock.

Senator Lucas: When did you first see Admiral Kimmel after the attack?

Admiral Bellinger: I talked to him on the telephone the day of the attack, over the telephone. I did not see him until a few days later.

Senator Lucas: When was the last --

Admiral Bellinger: As a matter of fact, I stayed in the office practically all the time.

Senator Lucas: When was the last time you talked to Admiral Kimmel before December 7?

Admiral Bellinger: I don't remember exactly but I think the latter part of November, probably the 26th or 27th.

Senator Lucas: Do you recall what you talked about?

Admiral Bellinger: There was a conference, I remember, in connection with -- whether that was the last time or not I am not sure -- but I know I was over there in a conference with reference to making plans for these planes to be put on Wake and Midway.

Senator Lucas: There was nothing at that time said

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1 about the imminence of war with Japan?

2 Admiral Bellinger: No, not with reference to any war
3 warning or dispatches from Washington in connection with it.

4 Senator Lucas: I direct your attention again to
5 Exhibit 37. Just take a cursory glance at the messages
6 sent by the Chief of Naval Operations, particularly the one
7 of October 16, which says:

8 "THE RESIGNATION OF THE JAPANESE CABINET HAS CREATED
9 A GRAVE SITUATION. IF A NEW CABINET IS FORMED IT WILL
10 PROBABLY BE STRONGLY NATIONALISTIC AND ANTI-AMERICAN. IF
11 THE KONOYE CABINET REMAINS THE EFFECT WILL BE THAT IT WILL
12 OPERATE UNDER A NEW MANDATE WHICH WILL NOT INCLUDE RAPPROCHMENT
13 WITH THE U.S."

14 And so on. Are you familiar with that message?

15 Admiral Bellinger: One minute until I find it. What
16 page is it?

17 Senator Lucas: Page 18. Did you ever see that message?

18 Admiral Bellinger: No, sir, I don't remember seeing
19 that before December 7.

20 Senator Lucas: Have you read it since these hearings
21 started?

22 Admiral Bellinger: Sir?

23 Senator Lucas: Have you read that message since these
24 hearings started?
25

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1 Admiral Bellinger: I think I have seen them all.

2 Senator Lucas: You have seen them all?

3 Admiral Bellinger: I think so. Most of these were
4 shown to me at various investigations on this subject. And,
5 as a matter of fact, I didn't know that there was any message
6 other than one message, the war warning message, until 1944.

7 Senator Lucas: You are familiar with all of these
8 top secret messages that were sent?

9 Admiral Bellinger: No, sir, not familiar.

10 Senator Lucas: You have read them all?

11 Admiral Bellinger: I have read the testimony on a
12 good many of them.

13 Senator Lucas: Directing your attention to the message
14 of November 24, assuming Admiral Kimmel had given you that
15 message, the Admiral has complained bitterly because Washington
16 didn't give him all the information they had, I am wondering
17 what you would have done had Admiral Kimmel given to you
18 the message of November 24. It is found on page 36. That
19 is the message that says a surprise aggressive movement is
20 possible in any direction. What would that message have
21 conveyed to you, if anything? Give us your best judgment
22 on it now, although I appreciate it is hindsight.

23 Admiral Bellinger: Hindsight is one thing and foresight
24 is another. This situation at Pearl Harbor was another. I
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Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1 have been asked that question many times.

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3 Senator Lucas: The reason I ask --

4 Admiral Bellinger: I wish I had seen it. I don't
5 know what I would have done. I would rather have the people
6 who know me think what I would have done. Only God knows
7 what I would have done. I can't make any statement on that.

8 Senator Lucas: Well, the reason I ask the question
9 is that you were in charge of, more or less in charge of
10 the Air Forces there.

11 Admiral Bellinger: Patrol planes only.

12 Senator Lucas: Who had charge of the other planes?

13 Admiral Bellinger: Various commands of the air in the
14 Fleet. For instance, there were utility planes headed by
15 a wing commander. There were Marine planes headed by a
16 colonel. There were carrier planes and organization headed
17 by Admiral Halsey.

18 Senator Lucas: I see.

19 I suppose what you have said about this message would
20 be true about the war warning message, too, of November 27?

21 Admiral Bellinger: If I would have gotten any of
22 these messages I would have made an estimate of the situation,
23 with my knowledge and understanding at the time, and taken
24 action accordingly.

25 Senator Lucas: Do you believe now, Admiral, that you

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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were entitled to receive these messages from Admiral Kimmel in view of the position that you had there as Commander of the Patrol Fleet?

Admiral Bellinger: I think that was Admiral Kimmel's business entirely. I can't answer for that.

Senator Lucas: Well, I was wondering what your position would be. You say that you would have liked to have seen the messages, you would have liked to have had them in your possession. You at least by implication say you would have had more insight into what was going on. I am wondering whether or not you thought it was the duty of Admiral Kimmel to pass this kind of message on to you under the arrangement that you had out there?

Admiral Bellinger: I certainly am not one to say what the Commander in Chief's duty was. I was under him.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Senator Lucas: In other words, whatever he did was all right with you?

Admiral Bellinger: I wouldn't have been full of inhibitions, as I remember. I think that if I saw something that I thought I should have seen at the time, I think I probably would have brought the question up with him.

Senator Lucas: Well, that is what I am trying to ask you about, that is what I am trying to find out, whether or not you think you should have seen any of these messages. I am basing that now, primarily, on the contention that Admiral Kimmel has made in his case before the committee. He complains bitterly because Admiral Stark didn't send him information.

In view of the fact that you were a subordinate of Admiral Kimmel, I am wondering what you think of his failing to send you information, if he did.

Admiral Bellinger: I think your guess is about as good as mine. I can express an opinion. I can say that if he had shown me the messages and the situation did remain as is, why, I would be in a different situation at the present time.

Senator Lucas: Well, I don't know what that situation is, and I am not going to inquire into it.

Mr. Keefe: Will the Senator yield?

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Senator Lucas
Mr. Keefe

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Senator Lucas: Yes.

Mr. Keefe: I want to make just this observation. I think it is quite apparent that Admiral Bellinger at that time was a Commander. Is that true?

Admiral Bellinger: No, sir, a rear admiral.

Mr. Keefe: A real admiral:

Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: But you were serving under the direct orders of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: You were not a member of his staff?

Admiral Bellinger: No, sir; I was a task force commander under him.

Mr. Keefe: You took orders from him?

Admiral Bellinger: Took orders from him, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: That is the way it works in the Navy isn't it, Admiral?

Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: In the line of command?

Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Fellows down below don't usually dispute the higher-ups, do they?

Admiral Bellinger: No, sir. In good team work opinions are expressed back and forth.

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Keefe
Senator Lucas

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Mr. Keefe: We have had some evidence of that before this committee, I think.

That is all.

The Chairman: Are you through, Senator?

Senator Lucas: One other question.

The only reason I raised these questions is that you raise it yourself. In other words, you must have attached some significance to the fact that you never saw any of these papers given to Admiral Kimmel until after the war was on, because you so state.

You state in your statement on page 8:

"I had no knowledge of any of the warning messages emanating from the Navy and War Departments, during October November and December. I never knew of any warning dispatches until a few days after the attack -- on the evening of about December 10, I think it was -- when I was told by one of my officers that he had just heard that there had been a warning dispatch received in the District Naval Intelligence Office, and that the local Intelligence officer of the Naval Air Station knew about it. I immediately sent for that Intelligence officer, and he confirmed this information. Several days after that, when I was working on some papers with Admiral Kimmel, I first saw one of the warning dispatches."

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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In other words, it apparently disturbed you at the time that you hadn't seen any of these messages, and you immediately contacted the District Naval Intelligence Office.

Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir, I did that. I could have recommended to him that we do start patrols.

Senator Lucas: That is right. That is the point I am trying to develop. You did have it within your power to make such a recommendation, that long distance reconnaissance be used. The point that I was hoping you would answer was whether or not if you had all of this information at hand, and had the chance to analyze it, whether or not it might have made a difference with you in respect to the recommendations that at least you might have made?

Admiral Bellinger: There is a possibility.

Senator Lucas: There is a possibility. Was Admiral Kimmel depending upon you for commendations as to whether or not the long distance reconnaissance would be made?

Admiral Bellinger: Not to my knowledge.

Senator Lucas: That is what I wanted to know about. You were concerned about this. You wanted the committee to know that you didn't receive any of these messages after November 27 and before. I was trying to find out why you wanted the committee to know about it.

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Senator Lucas
Mr. Murphy

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Admiral Bellinger: I want everybody to know about it.

Senator Lucas: I see. I think that is all.

The Chairman: Mr. Clark.

Mr. Clark: I have no questions.

The Chairman: Senator George would be next, but he will inquire later.

Mr. Murphy.

The Chair would like to advise that he is advised that if possible without restricting any members' interrogation, that Admiral Bellinger is on an assignment that makes it important that he get away tonight, if possible; but I am just advising the committee of that so we may keep it in mind.

Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy: Admiral Bellinger, there has been handed to the committee a statement on your career with the U. S. Navy covering the time from 1913 on.

I note in the sketch that was given to us that from 1914 on, you had a very active participation in the air activities of the U. S. Navy; that is a fact, is it not?

Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: You were in the first Navy plane that was ever struck by an enemy bullet; isn't that right?

Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Murphy: That was down at Vera Cruz?

Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Then you went to Pensacola, Florida in 1915 and in the following year -- rather, on January 21, you were designated Naval Air Pilot No. 4?

Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Thereafter, in 1915, you participated in the development of the use of the catapult; is that right?

Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Thereafter you piloted flying boat AB-3 and were on the first extended flight of this kind ordered and carried out?

Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: In 1915 you made the American altitude record for a seaplane of 10,000 feet; on 1915 you participated in the first actual instance in the Navy where Navy aircraft spotted actual gun or mortar fire; in 1916 you conducted live bomb dropping tests from a plane, the first test of this nature to be conducted by the Navy; in 1916 you participated in the first instance of spotting, and firing at regular targets at sea by the Navy.

Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: In 1916, you conducted experimental tests with radio set in pontoon type of seaplanes; in 1917 you

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Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 made the first machine gun firing tests ever made in
2 a Navy plane; in 1917 you conducted the first night
3 seaplane flight in which floodlights were employed on
4 the beach for illuminating the water, and that marks
5 the beginning of night flying at Pensacola and of regular
6 night flying instructions in the Navy.

7 Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Murphy: In 1919, you participated in the first
9 trans-Atlantic flight as commanding officer of the NC-1.
10 You made a long overseas flight from Newfoundland to the
11 vicinity of the Azores in May 1919.

12 In other words, on down through the years, were those
13 I have outlined, together with others that follow, you
14 had a very distinguished and outstanding career in the
15 Navy, on which I want to congratulate you at this time.

16 And you were the type of man that was selected by
17 Washington to be sent to Honolulu; that is right, isn't it?

18 Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir, but --

19 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, you were sent there?

20 Admiral Bellinger: I was ordered there.

21 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, after you got to Honolulu,
22 you were also ordered to conduct a survey and to prepare
23 a plan in conjunction with General Martin of the Army Air
24 Corps; that is right too, isn't it?
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Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

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Mr. Murphy: And that plan which you developed, was in effect a chart of exactly what happened at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, with the exception of a few details; that is right, too, isn't it?

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Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

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Mr. Murphy: Now then, you were placed under that plan in charge of certain operations which you did not have the authority to carry out until the means with which to carry it out were made available to you by higher authority; isn't that so?

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Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

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Mr. Murphy: The fact is that throughout this entire critical period, you were never shown any of these dispatches which in an official way showed the development of a tense and critical situation; that is true, isn't it?

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Admiral Bellinger: That is correct.

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Mr. Murphy: When Admiral Kimmel was on the stand I questioned him as to why he had not consulted you who were unquestionably an outstanding air expert, and he said that he consulted his own man, Commander Davis. I would now like to direct your attention to the fact that Commander Davis was called to testify before Admiral Hewitt

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Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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1 and his testimony appears in the record as that of Rear
2 Admiral Arthur C. Davis, commencing at page 96.

3 Mr. Masten: Pardon me? Is that the Hart or the
4 Hewitt report?

5 Mr. Murphy: This is the Hart report. I beg your
6 pardon.

7 And the same Rear Admiral Arthur C. Davis was the
8 air man on the staff of Admiral Kimmel immediately pre-
9 ceding --

10 The Vice Chairman: The Air Aide.

11 Mr. Murphy: Was his Air Aide on the Staff of Admiral
12 Kimmel immediately preceding December 1941.

13 Isn't that right, Admiral?

14 Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Murphy: I would like to go to the testimony in
16 question.

17 Admiral Davis, as I recollect it, did think that there
18 could have been instituted a system of reconnaissance
19 whereby you would use certain planes in the less critical
20 areas and other planes in the more critical areas. Do you
21 know of any such possibility? For reconnaissance purposes?

22 Admiral Bellinger: Actually, on December 7 we used
23 planes of every type and description, some that could only
24 go 200 miles. On the days following December 7, we used
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Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 planes that were made available for the distances that
3 they could go. That was to get information as far out
4 as we could through all the various sectors surrounding
5 Pearl Harbor.

6 Actually, in fact, for prevention of an air raid,
7 the further out you can get information the better. And
8 in order to figure on preventing an air raid in the early
9 morning and having this information, it was considered
10 that the patrol planes should go out between 7 and 8 hundred
11 miles.

12 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, Admiral, you were never
13 confronted with the problem because you weren't taken into
14 the confidence of those in command; isn't that right?

15 Admiral Bellinger: In general, yes, sir.

16 Mr. Murphy: And the best -- excuse me.

17 Admiral Bellinger: I was not asked or shown.

18 Mr. Murphy: The best we can do is to ask you as an
19 air expert to speculate by way of hindsight what you would
20 have done before December 7; that is right too, isn't it?

21 At any rate, you didn't see them, you weren't asked
22 to pass on them; it wasn't your problem directly until
23 you were consulted on them; isn't that true?

24 Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Murphy: Now, I -- excuse me.

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Admiral Bellinger: On December 7.

Mr. Murphy: I say, up to December 7, Admiral.

Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Up to December 7.

Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: The fact is that up to the morning of December 7, you were a man sick in bed and pretty much concerned about improving the health of Admiral Bellinger, I assume. I didn't mean to go into the actual attack itself.

Now, then, on page 97, the question was asked -- you do not have this, Admiral -- page 97, the question was asked of Rear Admiral Davis, who was the Air Aide on Admiral Kimmel's staff:

"Q Admiral, available records indicate that you have knowledge pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that occurred on 7 December, 1941. Please state the facts within your knowledge concerning the attack and the major events leading up thereto. It is especially desired that you cover the following, and a written copy of this question is handed you so that you may refer to it as you testify: -- "

Now, then, the Admiral testified for several paragraphs as to the question itself, and what it was looking for, and

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Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 then appears his answer, the last paragraph on the bottom
2 of page 97 :

3 "A My duty as Fleet Aviation Officer was primarily,
4 if not almost entirely, concerned with technical training
5 and logistics matters. As the case with the Staff as
6 a whole, our primary interest for many months had been
7 the improvement in strength and proficiency of the Pacific
8 Fleet.

9 "As is no doubt well known, it had not been possible,
10 for various reasons, including appropriations, to develop
11 the Fleet to a point which, it is now known, was necessary.
12 However, this fact made it all the more important to con-
13 centrate on all phases of materiel and training.

14 "I, myself, had little to do with considerations of
15 attack possibilities, and I do not recall ever being direct-
16 ly consulted on such matters by the Commander in Chief.
17 Naturally, the subject was frequently discussed among members
18 of the Staff and also by the Commander in Chief with the
19 Staff at times when I was present.

20 "From these discussions, I can definitely state my
21 opinion that it was the Commander in Chief's belief that
22 it was vitally necessary to continue as long as possible
23 with the training and other Fleet improvements, and that
24 going into a defensive status would interfere with this
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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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1 work, so that I am convinced it was his sincere intention
2 to accomplish all that could be done before hostilities
3 began and that he believed there was still time to keep
4 the work going.

5 "As to the imminent possibility of attack, I only
6 occasionally saw or heard of warnings that may have been
7 received by the Commander in Chief. I know that there had
8 been many warnings of varying degrees of seriousness over
9 a number of months, and I had the impression that it was
10 within the Commander in Chief's discretion to determine
11 how far to go in action with regard to such warnings.

12 "I believe his thought throughout was to take pre-
13 cautionary steps within reason but to regard the warnings
14 as all the more reason for concentration on improving the
15 Fleet's readiness.

16 "During the period of strain which finally led up
17 to the events of 7 December, I am certain that the Commander
18 in Chief gave the situation the carefulest possible con-
19 sideration. I have to admit, however, that I was, myself
20 concerned because of information that was available in the
21 press and that I concluded that there must be other informa-
22 tion which had not been shown me that influenced the deci-
23 sion to take no greater precautionary steps than were taken.

24 "As to advice with regard to precautions, I was asked
25

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Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 not so much for an opinion as to whether or not the fullest
2 precautions should be taken, as for information with regard
3 to the practicability of comprehensive searches, and their
4 effect on training. Comprehensive and extensive air
5 searches were practicable, and I so stated. I also stated
6 the fact that this would very definitely interfere with
7 the progress in general in aviation training in the Fleet.

8 "This, as was the case in the Fleet as a whole, was
9 important in view of the training demanded by the rapid
10 expansion that was already beginning to take place.

11 "With respect to the surprise air attack, I naturally
12 expressed the opinion that this was possible and that it
13 could only be prevented by the most extensive searches
14 and efforts to intercept at sea by air and surface
15 vessels.

16 "I did not, however, realize to what a high degree
17 of proficiency Japanese naval aviation had been developed.
18 I do not believe that anybody else in the American Navy
19 had any proper conception of this development either.
20 Certainly I had never seen anything, either officially
21 or unofficially that would lead me to suppose that Japanese
22 naval aviation was so tremendously effective and well-
23 developed as it turned out to be."

24 At that point I would like to ask you, did you in
25

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Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 Hawaii, consider the ability of Yamamoto and his daring?

2 Admiral Bellinger: I was asked the question at one
3 other hearing whether I was fully cognizant of Yamamoto's
4 background. I am not sure whether I was conscious of it
5 before December 7 or after. I think I was.

6 Mr. Murphy: Captain Layton -- Excuse me. Go ahead.

7 Admiral Bellinger: With reference to the ability of
8 the Japanese, which they showed in their attack on December
9 7, it far surpassed my estimate of their ability.

10 Mr. Murphy: There was a book about which Captain
11 Layton testified in the Hart proceedings, and that book
12 seemed to discuss the question of a possible raid on
13 Pearl Harbor and the capabilities of the Japanese. Were
14 you considered and brought into those discussions, or given
15 the benefit of that?

16 Admiral Bellinger: No, sir.

17 Mr. Murphy: I would like to refer now particularly
18 to the testimony of Captain Layton at page 214. At any
19 rate you were not in those discussions about Yamamoto and
20 this book that was published and the discussions about a
21 possible raid on Pearl Harbor?

22 Admiral Bellinger: No, sir.

23 Mr. Murphy: Now, Admiral, there has also been testimony
24 in this record that the north was not the most dangerous
25

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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1 section. As I recall, reading the record of all the hear-
2 ings, there seemed to be almost a unanimous opinion that
3 the north was the most dangerous, and in your statement
4 you so state, do you not?

5 Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

6 Mr. Murphy: Now, you give as the reason for feeling
7 that it was the most dangerous, the wind conditions. Did
8 you also take into consideration the fact that in the north,
9 where they did come from, was the so-called Vacant Sea ?

10 Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Murphy: Did you also --

12 Excuse me. Let me add this, and then you can answer
13 both. Did you also take into consideration the fact that
14 whatever shipping there had been previously in that area,
15 it had been eliminated prior to December 7?

16 Now, will you answer both?

17 Admiral Bellinger: I didn't know that it had been
18 eliminated up there. I am not so sure that it was.

19 Mr. Murphy: Well, there is some testimony to that
20 effect.

21 Admiral Bellinger: The question was where the Japanese
22 were going to come from, and we were not conducting
23 patrols from Palmyra, or Johnston Islands, as a regular
24 proposition, and I presume that the Japanese would have known
25

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h17

1 about it, so there was nothing to stop them from coming
2 from that direction either; but it is a very serious
3 proposition, a vital proposition to a carrier, in connec-
4 tion with the operation of planes.

5 It must head into the wind, and it must get up enough
6 speed to compensate for the wind that is blowing in order to
7 have a sufficient force of wind over the deck. So that
8 the wind controls the direction of movement of the carrier,
9 and I don't believe an attack of the kind that was made
10 on Pearl Harbor where surprise was expected to be the major
11 affair, or where they felt there might be considerable
12 jeopardy would take place in a direction wherein the carrier
13 had to take on her planes after having launched them,
14 heading toward the Island.

15 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, Admiral, had you had any
16 knowledge of the fact that all shipping had been directed
17 to the south through the Torres Strait before December 7?
18

19 Admiral Bellinger: No, sir.

20 Mr. Murphy: That had been done since October, but
21 you didn't know about that, did you?

22 Admiral Bellinger: I am practically sure, I didn't.
23 I don't recall any knowledge of it.

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Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Mr. Murphy: That is another of the dispatches in that
3 period.

4 Now, there was a conference at which time the possibil-
5 ity of an air raid on Oahu or Hawaii was discussed, at which
6 time Captain McMorris made a certain statement. That would
7 be on November 27th or 28th. You were not present at that
8 conference, were you?

9 Admiral Bellinger: No, sir.

10 Mr. Murphy: Admiral, you do believe that there could
11 have been reconnaissance if the command had been issued to
12 have it, isn't that so?

13 Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir. With the planes we had
14 there could have been reconnaissance.

15 Mr. Murphy: I would like to direct your attention in
16 that regard to the testimony of your Chief of Staff at page
17 595 of the record of the Court of Inquiry conducted by of-
18 ficers of the Navy. On page 596:

19 "Q That is a very clear explanation. However,
20 will you please answer the question? We will put the
21 question another way. Were there any planes at Pearl
22 Harbor which could have been used and were not used for
23 distance reconnaissance on the morning of December 7?

24 "A Yes, sir, there were planes that could have
25 been used had such a search been ordered by higher

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1

2 authority.

3

4 "Q How many of these planes were in that category?

5

6 "A For an emergency effort, approximately 60 planes
7 could have been made available in four hours or less.

8

9 "Q Who would have ordered the distance reconnaissance
10 and under whose authority would the directive have
11 been made?

12

13 "A For the full utilization of all aircraft, both
14 Army and Navy, available on Oahu, the orders to us would
15 have come from the Commander, Naval Base Defense Force.

16

17 "Q Who is that?

18

19 "A The Commandant of the 14th Naval District.
20 Orders solely for the Navy planes would probably have
21 come from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

22

23 "Q Did you consider in these plans and orders which
24 you had that the Commander of the Naval Base Defense
25 Force was the one who would have originated the idea of
26 distance reconnaissance and would have directed you or
27 Admiral Bellinger to have sent planes out on this mis-
28 sion?

29

30 "A I would have assumed it would be the duty of
31 any officer higher in the echelon of command above
32 Admiral Bellinger to have taken action on receipt of the
33 information indicating that action was necessary."

34

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Do you agree with those answers of your Chief of Staff?

3

Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

4

5

Mr. Murphy: What was the name of your Chief of Staff at that time, Admiral?

6

7

Admiral Bellinger: He was Commander Ramsey; Logan C. Ramsey.

8

9

Mr. Murphy: Yes. Now I direct your attention to the questions at page 597 of the same record, question 110:

10

11

12

13

"Q You stated that in your opinion there might be or could be an air attack on Oahu. Had you ever thought from what direction the air attack would come or the most probable direction?

14

15

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"A Yes, sir, we had. We had great discussions on it, and in view of the prevailing wind conditions and the presence of outlying islands and other factors, we had decided the northwest sector was the most likely line of approach, and in our drills the squadron in the highest degree of readiness was always ordered to take up that sector from 315 to 00.

21

22

23

24

"Then, if you, with your limited number of planes, had sent out distance reconnaissance, you would have sent them to the northwest sector so as to cover that sector?

25

"For any single day, yes, sir."

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Question 115: "Why did you select that sector?

3

"A "Because we had always decided that was the most likely direction of approach.

4

5

"Q But that sector was not based on the sighting of any Japanese planes?

6

7

"A No, sir, it was in accordance with our estimate and preconceived ideas. We always selected that sector, 315 to 00, as the first sector. The second sector was from 315 to around 270. We placed other sectors in their relative idea of importance."

8

9

10

11

12

I take it you agree with that statement or testimony because it is substantially what you yourself have stated.

13

14

Admiral Bellinger: I do.

15

16

Mr. Murphy: I would now like to refer to page 578 of the same record and the same witness, question 24:

17

18

19

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"Arriving at this estimate, did you consider any particular nation" -- he was speaking of the Martin-Bellinger report -- "did you consider any particular nation, or was this just a generality for any country -- any enemy which might attack without a declaration of war?"

23

24

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"A It was obviously and solely Japan. I use the pre-war phraseology intentionally in trying to get myself into a pre-war frame of mind.

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

"Q Then your conclusion was that if any attack at all were made on Oahu it would be by air and not by some other means?

"A That is correct.

"Q At the time you made this estimate of the situation, did you conclude from the international situation as it existed on that date, that Japan would attack the United States?

"A It is impossible for me to say at this late date, but I do recall having mentioned to Admiral Bellinger, half in earnest and half in pure speculation, that it was my belief that if the Japanese did attack us by an air raid, that the attack would probably come on Christmas Eve or New Year's Day."

Of course, that was just discussion over the table I assume, but the fact is, Admiral, that if you had been at a conference, - and now I am taking you back before December 7th, - and the discussion were to come up as to the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor, would it not have been your opinion at that conference, being an airman, that the most likely danger was air rather than submarine?

Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir, that was my estimate throughout.

Mr. Murphy: In other words, at the conferences that were

1 Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 held Rear Admiral Davis was not voicing too much of an opin-
3 ion or asked for too many opinions and you were not consulted
4 at all, the opinion of those at the conference was that there
5 would be an attack on Hawaii but it would be a mass submarine
6 attack and I take it you would have differed with that. You
7 felt it would come from the air?

8 Admiral Bellinger: The attack most easily for the Japan-
9 ese to make would be a submarine attack and a general submar-
10 ine menace in and around the Pearl Harb or area. If they had
11 contemplated an attack on Pearl Harbor, why, I certainly
12 thought it would be air, an air attack. We suspected sub-
13 marines to be out in the area, in the operating area, for
14 some time. There were many contacts, sound contacts that were
15 investigated but did not conclusively show any definite re-
16 sults, but there was a suspicion that their submarines were
17 about, even before December the 7th.

18 Mr. Murphy: Admiral, were you at any time between the 1st
19 of December and the 7th of December acquainted with the fact
20 that there was some definite uncertainty as to where the
21 Japanese carriers were?

22 Admiral Bellinger: No, sir.

23 Mr. Murphy: So that between November 27th and December
24 7th you yourself or no one under you ordered any change in
25 the status of alert of the planes under your command, isn't

1 Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 that right?

3 Admiral Bellinger: No, sir.

4 Mr. Murphy: You mean it is right?

5 Admiral Bellinger: I mean the schedule was being carried
6 out, to the best of my knowledge, in the activities connected
7 with Fleet tactics that I referred to before. There may have
8 been certain changes so far as readiness was in those squad-
9 rons and connected in that exercise, but not in connection
10 with any security.

11 Mr. Murphy: I would like to now refer, Admiral, to page
12 583 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, question 44, to your Chief
13 of Staff. (Reading)

14 "Q With the combined Navy-Army aircraft that were
15 available for operation between 27 November and 7 December
16 1941, could you have complied with a directive to conduct
17 a long-range reconnaissance through 360 degrees?

18 "A. No. Using the most economical aircraft type
19 of search that we could devise, a single plane going to
20 700 miles would only cover a sector of 8 degrees. There-
21 fore, with 66 planes, only 50 per cent of which could be
22 used continuously from a maintenance and pilot fatigue
23 standpoint, only 264 degrees could be covered daily.
24 360 degrees could be covered only one day, possibly only
25 two days as an emergency measure, but it could not be

Witness Bellinger

Questions by Mr. Murphy

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2 maintained. It would only cover about three-quarters of
3 the circle day in and day out until the exhaustion point
4 from not only of personnel but from the materiel stand-
5 point as well was reached. The exhaustion period would
6 have been reached in materiel before it was reached in
7 personnel. As nearly as I could estimate the situation and
8 in view of our almost total lack of spare parts for the
9 PBV-5 planes, I believe that three weeks of intensive
10 daily searches would have been approximately a 75 per cent
11 reduction in material readiness of the entire outfit
12 and we would have been placing planes out of commission
13 and robbing them for spare parts to keep other planes go-
14 ing. The pilots, I believe, could have kept going ap-
15 proximately a six week period, but at the end of that time
16 they would have all required a protracted rest period."

17 I take it you agree with that?

18 Admiral Bellinger: In general, yes. I think very prob-
19 ably the pilots could not have kept up that long. That is
20 at least a fourteen to a sixteen hour flight. We have on oc-
21 casions, particularly in the Battle of Midway I think, put
22 pilots on patrol covering longer periods of patrol for con-
23 secutive days and any time I know of they were practically
24 on their last legs at the end of it.

25 Mr. Murphy: Admiral, under the plan, the Martin-Bellinger

1 Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 plan, in order for you to have any authority it was necessary
3 for an emergency to arise. That is right, isn't it?

4 Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir. It had to be apparent.

5 Mr. Murphy: Right. It would be rather difficult for you
6 who was to be apprised of the existence of an emergency to
7 recognize the existence of one if you did not have this in-
8 formation, isn't that right?

9 Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, on page 584 the question was
11 asked of your Chief of Staff:

12 "Had you heard anything about an Army condition of
13 readiness designed to prevent sabotage?"

14 "A I had heard indirectly and unofficially of vari-
15 ous rumors of attempted sabotage and counter measures
16 against sabotage, none of which appeared at the time to
17 be of great importance."

18 My question to you is did you know what type of alert
19 the Army was on?

20 Admiral Bellinger: I don't think so. I knew that at
21 some stage of events at that time there was a great deal of
22 thought given to sabotage. I am not sure whether I knew that
23 they were in a sabotage alert or not, but I do know that the
24 subject was a live subject and I had done something about it
25 in my force and various other naval forces were taking action

1 Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 of that kind and whether I knew the Army was actually in it
3 or not I am not sure.

4 Mr. Murphy: Your Chief of Staff, of course, had no more
5 information about these war warning messages than you had, did
6 he?

7 Admiral Bellinger: No, sir. I questioned him on that.

8 Mr. Murphy: You also, I take it, Admiral, had no infor-
9 mation whatsoever to the effect that the Japanese were de-
10 stroying their codes and their systems?

11 Admiral Bellinger: No, sir, I knew nothing of that.

12 Mr. Murphy: Nor any information about the Japanese consul
13 at Honolulu destroying some of his systems or all of them, I
14 take it?

15 Admiral Bellinger: No, sir, I did not know that.

16 Senator Lucas: Will the Congressman yield?

17 Mr. Murphy: Yes.

18 Senator Lucas: With respect to your not knowing the Army
19 was alerted to sabotage, did you have occasion to see on the
20 Saturday before the Sunday morning how the Army planes were
21 lined up on their fields from wing tip to wing tip?

22 Admiral Bellinger: No, sir. I was in bed most of Satur-
23 day.

24 Senator Lucas: Oh, yes, that is right. And you did not
25 receive any information from anyone that the Army was alerted

1 Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 to sabotage?

3 Admiral Bellinger: Not that I can say definitely. I
4 may have known it; I am not sure.

5 Mr. Murphy: Are you through, Senator?

6 Senator Lucas: Yes.

7 Mr. Murphy: I would like also to refer to page 99 of the
8 Hart inquiry, Rear Admiral Davis speaking:

9 "Although I did not feel that I had sufficient in-
10 formation as to the actual situation to undertake to
11 question the Commander-in-Chief's policy as 7 December
12 approached I was concerned about the general situation
13 with respect to our outlying islands. For this reason I
14 stressed the necessity for providing some form of air
15 protection at Wake and Midway, which it would have been
16 too late to attempt after actual emergency had arisen.
17 Action was finally taken in this connection and that is
18 why the attack on 7 December found the ENTERPRISE task
19 force on its way back, having landed Marine fighting
20 planes at Wake, and the LEXINGTON task force on its way
21 to land Marine aircraft at Midway."

22 Now, the question was asked of Admiral Davis, re-
23 ferring to the Martin Bellinger report, a question on page 99:

24 "Did you have that estimate at all in mind during
25 the days which led up to 7 December?"

1 Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 "A I did.

3 "Q But I understand, from your testimony, that you
4 made no particular estimate yourself along that same
5 line, formal or otherwise?

6 "A No, sir, it was not that I made no estimate, or
7 did not consider it; it was rather that this, like all
8 of the other very comprehensive and thorough preparatory
9 plans that were made, was contingent, as to its being
10 placed in effect, on prior decision that the situation
11 justified taking up what might be called a defensive de-
12 ployment. As to whether or not it should, at any given
13 point, have been taken up, I necessarily considered that
14 the Commander-in-Chief's estimate was final.

15 "Q And your advice on the point was not asked?

16 "A No, sir.

17 "Q Did you see the Navy Department's dispatch of
18 27 November, the one which has come to be known as the
19 war warning (indicating Exhibit 8)?

20 "No, sir.

21 "Q You never saw it prior to 7 December?

22 "A No, sir.

23 "Q Admiral, did I understand you correctly earlier
24 in your testimony to say that in your opinion a compre-
25 hensive air search could have been carried on at that time?

1 Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 "A Yes, it could.

3 "Q Would you elaborate on that just a little bit, as
4 to how a 360 degree distant reconnaissance could have been
5 carried on with the material at hand at that time?

6 "A There were not enough planes and pilots to estab-
7 lish and maintain a long-range, 360 degree search indefin-
8 itely, or even for more than a limited time. There were,
9 however, enough to approximate this by using relatively
10 short-range planes in the least dangerous sectors, and by
11 obtaining some assistance from available Army aircraft,
12 so that I think it could have been undertaken, had it been
13 considered essential, on the basis that reinforcements
14 could have arrived before personnel and materiel fatigue
15 set in. Unless reinforcements arrived, it could not have
16 been maintained.

17 "Q You may proceed to the written question given you,
18 passing on to the Army part.

19 "A Prior to 7 December I had relatively little de-
20 tailed information regarding the Army Interceptor Command.
21 I knew approximately the numbers and types and my recollec-
22 tion is that they had about 170 P-36's, P-39's, and
23 P-40's, of which the greater number were P-36's and
24 P-39's. Judged by modern war standards, there were
25 enough air fields to operate them, but not enough to

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 provide adequate dispersal and protection, nor were re-
3 vetments and dispersal runways provided at the various
4 fields."

5 In that connection, Admiral, as I understand your
6 testimony you knew that the Interceptor Command was not pro-
7 perly functioning, or not? Do you recall what your state
8 of mind was before December 7th?

9 Admiral Bellinger: It is my understanding that it was not
10 functioning as a regular agency.

11 Mr. Murphy: You say what?

12 Admiral Bellinger: That it was not functioning as a
13 regular continuous agency.

14 Mr. Murphy: Admiral Kimmel testified that radar would
15 give him coverage, at one time in one hearing, of two hundred
16 miles and in this hearing of one hundred miles. Did you so
17 understand it?

18 Admiral Bellinger: No, sir. I did not expect it to be
19 that effective. As a matter of fact, it was not that effective
20 to the fullest extent several months after December the 7th.

21 Mr. Murphy: Now, in connection with that and in corro-
22 boration of your feeling about it in connection with Admiral
23 Kimmel's testimony, his airman said at page 100:

24 "I did not feel, however, that it was yet ready for
25 full effective employment."

1 Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 That is Admiral Davis speaking.

3 Now, what was your information as to the ability of the
4 Army to participate in or cooperate with you by way of help
5 in the event you called on them? Did you feel the fliers
6 were competent?

7 Admiral Bellinger: From my information from General
8 Martin, he had difficulty in getting enough competent crews,
9 air combat crews to man the planes he had and he was also
10 confronted with a job of training personnel to man B-17's
11 for further transfer to the Philippines. I know of this only
12 because of conversations with General Martin, so that I know
13 that he had problems of that nature which were of consider-
14 able importance.

15 Mr. Murphy: Now I would like to direct your attention
16 to page 44 of the Hart inquiry, to the testimony of Vice
17 Admiral Smith. Question 81:

18 "What do you know about their combat efficiency,
19 particularly as regards personnel?

20 "Well, we didn't have a very high regard for it.
21 That was based upon our observations during Fleet Oper-
22 ations, when their Flying Fortresses would come over at
23 almost smoke-stack level, and showed an utter disregard
24 for possible anti-aircraft fire. In the operations be-
25 tween our planes and theirs, our aviators, possibly

1 Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 prejudice, expressed the opinion that they were not very
3 good."

4 I was wondering if that feeling prevailed so that
5 it would prevent calling on the Army to help in reconnaissance.
6 It certainly did not with you, did it?

7 Admiral Bellinger: I knew that reconnaissance requires
8 special training, it requires training which the Army had not
9 utilized very much because it was not considered part of the
10 job that they were going to do; at least, they had not
11 undertaken it. Therefore, I did not think that the Army could
12 do very much in assisting in long-range reconnaissance. It
13 took some time after December the 7th for them to train their
14 crews sufficiently to be really effective. That was shown
15 up actually after December the 7th, when they did assist in
16 the reconnaissance around Oahu.

17 Mr. Murphy: Did you know, Admiral, that when Kurusu was
18 on his way to the States to participate in the conferences
19 in Washington that his plane landed at Midway?

20 Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Murphy: Did you believe that the plane had really
22 broken down?

23 Admiral Bellinger: I don't know, but I was directed to
24 have two planes to bring him to Oahu in case the Pan-American
25 plane was not made ready in time.

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Murphy: You decided to let him wait there, didn't you? You did not use the planes, did you?

Admiral Bellinger: No, sir. He came finally by Pan-American.

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Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, on his way to America
2 Kurusu's plane appeared apparently to be disabled and did
3 land at Midway for some time, did it not?

4 Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir. I have been told Kurusu
5 was kept in the hotel there, and I have also been told that
6 the Marine guard, every time they moved, went around the
7 building three times.

8 Mr. Murphy: Did you have called to your attention,
9 Admiral, the fact that the Army, on November 5, had a new
10 Operating Procedure Order? Admiral Kimmel apparently did
11 not know of it and I was wondering if you did.

12 Admiral Bellinger: The one with reference to 1, 2
13 and 3 alerts?

14 Mr. Murphy: Yes.

15 Admiral Bellinger: No, sir, I do not think I knew
16 of that, or the details of it. I would not normally know
17 of the details of it, so I do not think I did know of it.

18 Mr. Murphy: For a long time the Army had only one
19 kind of an alert, and then they had three alerts and they
20 sent copies to the Navy?

21 Admiral Bellinger: I do not think they sent me a
22 copy. If I knew about it it was from conversation with
23 General Martin.

24 Mr. Murphy: There has been some testimony here that
25

1 Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 the Japanese knew about the workings of our radars. The
3 fact is that the radar at the Opana Station did detect the
4 Japanese at distances of 132 miles. If the Japanese were
5 aware of our radar functioning that morning, would they
6 have been at a sufficient height in the air for radar to
7 have detected them at 132 miles?

8 Admiral Bellinger: The high altitude bombing planes --
9 and they were I assume between 8 and 10 thousand feet when
10 they made their attack -- probably would have been detected.
11 The torpedo planes, according to my information, assembled
12 at very low altitudes and made their approach at a very
13 low altitude, and they probably would not have been detected
14 that far by radar.

15 Mr. Murphy: I would like to just ask one question.
16 Do we have available any Navy exhibit showing the damage
17 to the ARIZONA? I understood you to say this morning that
18 the damage to the ARIZONA was from torpedoes.

19 Admiral Bellinger: This was the first attack on the
20 ARIZONA, and I assume that there were three torpedoes that
21 hit the ARIZONA, merely from seeing these three planes pass
22 over the ARIZONA.

23 Mr. Murphy: I just wanted to check it.

24 Admiral Bellinger: And immediately afterward a
25 tremendous explosion.

1 Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Mr. Murphy: I just wanted to check with the actual
3 records so we will have it straight. I believe there were
4 some bombs.

5 Admiral Bellinger: There may have been bombs in addi-
6 tion.

7 Mr. Murphy: I do not know. Do you have that, Counsel?

8 Let me ask two other questions, Admiral. You did
9 prepare, did you not, a report, which is in the record as
10 Exhibit No. 120, dated December 19, 1941, a memorandum for
11 information for Admiral Kimmel?

12 Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir, I have it right here.

13 Mr. Murphy: Did you prepare that report then at the
14 request of Admiral Kimmel, as to what occurred on December 7
15 and immediately thereafter?

16 Admiral Bellinger: I am not sure whether it was made
17 at his request or not, but I made it up for him.

18 Mr. Murphy: And that was your judgment, as of that
19 date, as to what actually occurred at that time?

20 Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir, that was the situation
21 as I knew about it on that day.

22 Mr. Murphy: Now, Admiral, in regard to the ARIZONA,
23 the Navy report is that she was hit by one or more aircraft
24 torpedoes and about 8 heavy bombs.

25 I have no other questions.

1 Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Mr. Keefe: We will call them patrol planes, then.

3 Admiral Bellinger: We expected to use them for anything
4 and everything we could.

5 Mr. Keefe: As such you were not a member of the staff
6 of the Commander in Chief, Admiral Kimmel?

7 Admiral Bellinger: I was not a member of his staff.

8 Mr. Keefe: And as such you were not given information
9 as to the so-called warning messages that were sent to
10 Admiral Kimmel from Washington?

11 Admiral Bellinger: I was not given those warnings, no, sir.

12 Mr. Keefe: And you had no information concerning those
13 until after the attack?

14 Admiral Bellinger: Not until after the attack.

15 Mr. Keefe: Am I correct in the assumption that you
16 had sufficient planes at Pearl Harbor on December 7, and
17 prior thereto, for a period of at least a week, to have
18 enabled you to conduct long-range reconnaissance to the
19 north for a period of a week?

20 Admiral Bellinger: I would say "yes" to that question.

21 Mr. Keefe: I understand that you, yourself, as a
22 Task Force Commander, would not put into effect the pro-
23 visions of the Martin-Bellinger plan for long-range re-
24 connaissance without an order from the Commander in Chief,
25 except in case of an emergency. Is that your testimony?

1 Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Admiral Bellinger: That is correct.

(9)
3 Mr. Keefe: Therefore, do I understand your testimony
4 to be that the reason there was no long-range reconnaissance
5 in the sector to the north in the week preceding Pearl Harbor
6 is because you had received no order from the Commander in
7 Chief to effect or carry out such reconnaissance?

8 Admiral Bellinger: That is correct.

9 Mr. Keefe: I understand your testimony also to be --
10 and you may correct me if I am in error -- that as an air
11 man familiar with the situation in Hawaii you were in agree-
12 ment with Admiral Davis that the greatest possibility of
13 a successful air attack lay in an attack coming in from the
14 sector to the north because of the prevailing wind condi-
15 tions, is that right?

16 Admiral Bellinger: That is practically correct, yes, sir.
17 You have got to utilize the conditions as you find them at
18 the time when you make the attack, and the prevailing wind
19 was normally about 65 or 70 degrees coming from that direction.

20 Mr. Keefe: I understand your testimony to be in order
21 to recapture your planes you have to head into the wind.

22 Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Keefe: So if planes were launched down wind --

24 Admiral Bellinger: (Interposing) Into the wind.

25 Mr. Keefe: They were launched into the wind?

1 Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Admiral Bellinger: Into the wind.

3 Mr. Keefe: Now when they leave the carrier they would
4 come down wind, would they not? I am not an air expert,
5 but I have been following your testimony. When they come
6 back on to the carrier they have to land into the wind,
7 is that correct, or am I in error?

8 Admiral Bellinger: They take off and land with the
9 carrier heading into the wind.

10 Mr. Keefe: Then the carrier turns around when they
11 take off to head into the wind?

12 Admiral Bellinger: Yes.

13 Mr. Keefe: If the prevailing wind is down toward Oahu
14 and they are assembled up to the northwest, then when they
15 take off they take off into the wind and circle and come
16 down; is that right?

17 Admiral Bellinger: Yes.

18 Mr. Keefe: So the best opportunity to get away is
19 when the carriers are headed out away from Oahu and the
20 planes can be recaptured by the carrier heading right into
21 the wind?

22 Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Keefe: Is that right?

24 Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Keefe: That is, as I understood, your plan set out

1 Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 in the Martin-Bellinger report. You set that out, did you not?

3 Admiral Bellinger: No, sir, that is not in that report.

4 Mr. Keefe: Well, I got it from some place else. I
5 would not be surprised if I misunderstood what the report
6 might be. At any rate, whether it is in the report or whether
7 it is not, that is a fact, isn't it?

8 Admiral Bellinger: That is a fact, yes, sir.

9 Mr. Keefe: You do not make any complaint today because
10 you were not made aware of the messages that were received
11 by the Commander in Chief, do you, Admiral?

12 Admiral Bellinger: No, sir.

13 Mr. Keefe: My recollection of this war warning message
14 is that at the end an injunction was laid upon the Commander
15 in Chief to distribute it only to certain restricted essential
16 officers. Do you remember that?

17 Admiral Bellinger: No, sir, I think it was left to
18 his own discretion, but I know nothing about that.

19 Mr. Keefe: Isn't that in the record? I have forgotten.

20 Admiral Bellinger: I think you are correct on some
21 messages, but I am not familiar with them enough to answer.

22 Mr. Keefe: I guess that is right. That would be
23 the Army message. That was General Short.

24 Then am I to see this picture from your testimony to
25 the effect that here is a task force commander in command of

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1 patrol planes who isn't given any information at all
2
3 as to what is going on in the international situation and
4 in the relations with Japan except what you got from the
5 newspapers, perhaps, while you were lying sick in bed four
6 or five days before the 7th of December; that no long-distance
7 reconnaissance is ordered at all, some people claiming that
8 that could not be effected because of lack of personnel and
9 lack of planes, but you are of the opinion that if there
10 had been a utilization of the patrol planes that were avail-
11 able it could have been carried on for at least a week.

Admiral Bellinger: I think it could have, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And effectively covered the arc from which
13 you, as an Air Force Commander, at all times believed an air
14 attack on Hawaii would come. Do I so understand it to be
15 your testimony?
16

Admiral Bellinger: It could have covered that parti-
17 cular arc, yes, sir.
18

Mr. Keefe: Narrowing this matter down, if I interpret
19 your testimony correctly -- and if I am in error you can
20 challenge me, Admiral -- the failure to conduct a long-range
21 reconnaissance which was, under the circumstances existant
22 on December 7 at Pearl Harbor, practically the only way in
23 which an attacking force of carriers could be discovered,
24 rested entirely with the Commander in Chief and his staff,
25

1 Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Mr. Keefe
Senator Ferguson

2 and until an order came from the Commander in Chief you
3 would not, as a Task Force Commander, control the planes
4 to effect such reconnaissance, is that correct?

5 Admiral Bellinger: That is correct.

6 Mr. Keefe: That is all.

7 The Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

8 Senator Ferguson: Admiral, did you have a conversa-
9 tion with Admiral Smith in relation to the Kurusu plane
10 at Midway?

11 Admiral Bellinger: I am not sure whether it was Admiral
12 Smith or who it was. I got the message from someone, from
13 the Commander in Chief, Pacific, to have two planes out
14 there in case they were needed.

15 Senator Ferguson: Let me refresh your memory. Admiral
16 Smith was asked this question on page 52 of the Hart Board,
17 No. 147:

18 "This particular dispatch (indicating Exhibit 8) is
19 different from all other warnings received previously in
20 that the words 'war warning' were used. What was your own
21 reaction to those particular words?"

22 He answers this way:

23 "My reaction was we knew that negotiations were still
24 going on; Mr. Kurusu had flown through a few days before;
25 we were in great doubt as to what was happening. Mr.

(10)

1 Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Kurusu's plane broke down in Midway. Admiral Bellinger
3 called up at night and asked permission to fly him on in
4 a PBV, and I said 'No, it may be that the plane was told
5 by the administration to break down. They know more what's
6 going on than we do. Let him stay there.'

7 Did you have a conversation like that with Admiral
8 Smith?

9 Admiral Bellinger: I do not remember that, no, sir.
10 I remember a conversation with reference to Kurusu and with
11 reference to bringing him from Midway to Pearl. I do not
12 remember that any of my organization suggested it in any
13 way.

14 Now in connection with the two planes standing by to
15 bring him, one being an escort plane, as I remember now,
16 they were sent out there to stand by to bring him back.
17 The question was evidently whether to bring him or let him
18 wait for the Pan-American plane which appeared to be about
19 to be fixed.

20 Senator Ferguson: Why were you concerned about bringing
21 him? Why did you want to get him to Washington?

22 Admiral Bellinger: I was not concerned about him at all,
23 except I was told by the Commander in Chief, as I remember
24 now, to furnish these planes to bring him. The question
25 was whether they should sit there waiting for him to make

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 up his mind and wait for the Pan-American, or to bring him
3 right away. I had no reason to get him to Honolulu or any-
4 where.

5 Senator Ferguson: At least you did not fly the PBY?

6 Admiral Bellinger: No, sir.

7 Senator Ferguson: Now you have in your statement here
8 something that I would like to have cleared up. You say:

9 "As pointed out in the Martin-Bellinger estimate, the
10 problem of when to place the Naval Base Defense Air Force
11 in a functioning status resolved itself into one of timing
12 with respect to the current status of our relations with
13 Japan, and required specific information as to the probability
14 of an air attack within rather narrow time limits."

15 Now what do you mean by "rather narrow time limits"?

16 Admiral Bellinger: For instance, the question comes
17 up now could we have covered a sector or could we have
18 covered 360 degrees; "for how long could you cover 360 degrees,
19 and for how long could you cover a sector of about 90 degrees?"
20 The only definite assurance of early information of an
21 air attack is by covering 360 degrees, and --

22 Senator Ferguson: Now take that answer --

23 The Chairman: I do not think he finished his answer,
24 Senator.

25 Senator Ferguson: Did you want to go on?

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1

Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

2

Senator Ferguson: All right.

3

4

Admiral Bellinger: So that if you were going to cover 360 degrees it is going to come down to a question of a very few days. If it is going to come to the question of a sector of 90 degrees even, that is going to cause a reduction in your forces sooner or later.

5

6

7

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9

Senator Ferguson: Isn't it better, in case of an anticipated attack, to use what you have even though you are not able to use the full 360 degrees?

10

11

Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir, that is perfectly true.

12

13

Senator Ferguson: Then why consider the question of 360 degrees when we did not have enough planes for 360 degrees?

14

15

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Admiral Bellinger: In an estimate of the situation you are trying to work this out so as to weigh all the situations. 360 degrees on an island is the only way you can make sure that there is not a force coming in. Actually for months after Pearl Harbor, December 7, we endeavored to have 360 degrees covered from Oahu.

20

21

22

23

Senator Ferguson: Is this the trouble, that we were trying to work from a war plan which said that the absolute way was to cover 360 degrees and if we could not work from the war plan we were not going to work at all?

24

25

Admiral Bellinger: Oh, no, sir, that is not the idea.

(11)

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 The estimate can only figure on a basis of 360 degrees,
3 otherwise where is the attack going to come from? If you
4 do not put the 360 degrees in what are you going to put in?
5 The idea is to stop the raid.

6 Senator Ferguson: Isn't it a question of trying to
7 figure out where he may come from? Isn't that part of your
8 Intelligence system?

9 Admiral Bellinger: That is part of it, and that was
10 the plan as devolved from this estimate later with reference
11 to where we put the first available planes, and if we had
12 no more, why, that was all.

13 Senator Ferguson: Now did you consider in any plan
14 that if you did not have enough planes for 360 degrees --
15 and we were in that condition up to the time we were going
16 to war -- that you would use the planes that you did have?
17 Did we have any war plan on such a basis?

18 Admiral Bellinger: The war plans called for planes
19 to be on Wake, Midway, Palmyra, Johnston, and Oahu.

20 Senator Ferguson: On Oahu?

21 Admiral Bellinger: Yes.

22 Senator Ferguson: Did you have any war plan that
23 called for anything less, on long-distance reconnaissance,
24 than 360 degrees, the entire circle?

25 Admiral Bellinger: Why, certainly. The Operating Plan

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 called for planes as they were available.

2
3 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, did you have a plan that
4 said if war was imminent you would conduct a reconnaissance
5 in the segment north, into the vacant sea?

6 Admiral Bellinger: I am not sure. I haven't a copy
7 of this latest subsidiary plan that was gotten out over my
8 signature. I do not know whether that is available or not.
9 I was discussing the other day with my Operations Officer
10 if he remembered whether or not that northwest sector was
11 put down in that plan as a vital sector. He thought it was.
12 I am not sure. That was a question in our minds anyway,
13 if not definitely on paper.

14 Senator Ferguson: Now isn't this true, that your plan
15 with General Martin covered a 360 reconnaissance?

16 Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

17 Senator Ferguson: And it did not cover any particular
18 segment in case you did not have enough to go on 360 degrees?

19 Admiral Bellinger: Well, that is down in black and
20 white. If you have got something and haven't got enough
21 you will do what you can with what you have got.

22 Senator Ferguson: All right. Did you have a plan to
23 do what you could with what you had?

24 Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir, that is exactly what I
25 read out this morning. The first sector was from north around

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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to west to be covered by the first available planes.

Senator Ferguson: All right. Then I will ask you this: If you did not know where these carriers were, why did not you send your planes up in that direction, with the first planes that you got off the ground, to locate these carriers?

Admiral Bellinger: On December 7?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Admiral Bellinger: That is what was done.

Senator Ferguson: Will you get me the evidence that you sent them up north? You sent one up north.

Admiral Bellinger: It is in my statement this morning, I thought very clearly.

Senator Ferguson: Will you tell us what time you sent them up there, up to the north?

Admiral Bellinger: The three patrol planes 14 P-1, 2 and 3 on early morning security search were assigned a search sector between north and northwest. Those were the first ones available.

Senator Ferguson: What time was that?

Admiral Bellinger: That was about 8:00 o'clock, or 8:05 when they got the message, according to my information.

Senator Ferguson: 8:05, and the attack took place at 7:55.

Admiral Bellinger: Now there is a little hitch in

(12)

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 that.

3 Senator Ferguson: I want to get the hitch out of it.
4 Let us know what happened.

5 Admiral Bellinger: These three planes were assigned
6 this north to northwest sector and proceeded on search.
7 After the first phase of the attack Patrol Wing one reported
8 two planes at Kaneohe available for immediate operation and
9 was directed to send these two planes on a northwesterly
10 sector.

11 Senator Ferguson: That is another search?

12 Admiral Bellinger: That is another besides those three?

13 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

14 Admiral Bellinger: One second. Before these could
15 be dispatched another Japanese attack put them out of
16 commission.

17 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

18 Admiral Bellinger: At about the same time communications
19 between Kaneohe and Pearl were knocked out. Patrol Wing One
20 on own initiative diverted the two planes then on that
21 northerly sector, that is the 1 and 3, to cover a westerly
22 sector because of the loss of the two planes originally
23 detailed.

24 Senator Ferguson: All right.

25 Admiral Bellinger: In an effort to comply with instructions

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Then they violated the war plan that you and Martin had drawn up, because your first one was to be to the north?

Admiral Bellinger: No, sir. They may have violated it but not with the idea of violating, because they were not controlling the plan. They were carrying out orders from the Patrol Wing to headquarters.

Senator Ferguson: But the headquarters policy was to send them in another direction. How do you account for the fact, if this map is correct, of these carriers, six of them, and their task force, as being 200 miles north of Hawaii, if you had these planes and if you did have them sent up there, that you did not see these carriers?

I think from the data we have now they were 200 miles out, that is where they were stationed when their planes took off.

Admiral Bellinger: This diversion of those two planes removed two planes from the sector where the Japanese task force was later determined to be near.

Senator Ferguson: Could I have that answer read?

(The answer was read by the reporter.)

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Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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1 Senator Ferguson: Do I understand that someone at
2 headquarters diverted the two planes and that if they
3 hadn't been diverted, they would have located the task
4 force?

5 Admiral Bellinger: I wouldn't say they would have,
6 but it was in that area.

7 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

8 Admiral Bellinger: Yes.

9 Senator Ferguson: Now, who was the man that diverted
10 those two planes?

11 Admiral Bellinger: The Patrol Wing One organization.

12 Senator Ferguson: What?

13 Admiral Bellinger: Over Kaneohe.

14 Senator Ferguson: What about the one plane that kept
15 going up, how do you account for not seeing those planes
16 going back to the carrier and landing?

17 Admiral Bellinger: They didn't see it go.

18 Senator Ferguson: Well, did you ever see this radar
19 chart, where these planes came down and they caught them
20 at 302, and they came straight down, and we found planes
21 going straight back to the north?

22 Admiral Bellinger: No, sir, I never saw that before.

23 Senator Ferguson: Well -

24 Admiral Bellinger: I would like to elaborate on a
25

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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1 question of this morning, if I may, in connection with
2 this general subject.

3 I understand that my Operations Officer' Captain
4 Ramsey, made a statement that he had telephoned and he
5 thought I had telephoned to the Army on December 7 with
6 reference to the radar detection on those planes going
7 north after they had left.

8 Now, in the plan for the carrying out of this Naval
9 Base Defense Air Force in the event of a raid, there were
10 planes assigned by the Army to follow the carrier planes
11 back with the idea that this radar existed at this time,
12 which it didn't, when this was made out. And so I was
13 interested in trying to find out where these planes went
14 to.

15 Commander Ramsey was also.

16 He says I telephoned over to Army headquarters to
17 find out about it. I don't know whether I did or not. I
18 don't remember doing it now, but I did ask him questions
19 to find out where they went. We did not get information
20 from the radar at that time that planes went north to the
21 carrier.

22 Senator Ferguson: Did you have any communication,
23 any means of communication to the radar station?

24 Admiral Bellinger: Only through the Army.
25

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Only through the Army?

2

Admiral Bellinger: Yes.

3

Senator Ferguson: You had to go through headquarters?

4

Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

5

Senator Ferguson: It turns up that the Army had this chart, and knew about it. How do you account for your not getting it?

7

8

Admiral Bellinger: I don't know.

9

Senator Ferguson: Did you know the radars were not supposed to be working that morning?

10

11

Admiral Bellinger: I was surprised that they were working that morning.

12

13

Senator Ferguson: Why would you be surprised that the radar was working?

14

15

Admiral Bellinger: Because I didn't think they were set up and ready to go.

16

17

Senator Ferguson: Then, as I understand it, you didn't even know that the Island had radar?

18

19

Admiral Bellinger: Oh, I knew that the radar was being installed, we were very interested in that.

20

21

Senator Ferguson: But you didn't know they had actually the radar working?

22

23

Admiral Bellinger: No, I didn't know it was actually working that morning.

24

25

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: At any time did you know it was working before that?

2

3

Admiral Bellinger: I knew that they were establishing their system and the radar had been set up, and the individual radars were working, yes, but the system had to be set up to make it work intelligently, and they were in the process of putting that into effect.

4

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Senator Ferguson: Well, that isn't quite an answer to my question. My question is, did you know prior to the 7th that radar was established on the Island?

9

10

11

Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

12

13

Senator Ferguson: Well, then, why didn't you get in touch with the radar stations to ascertain if they had picked up anything coming in or going out?

14

15

16

Admiral Bellinger: It would have been impossible to have gotten in touch with the radar station. You have got to go through the Army headquarters to get in touch with it.

17

18

19

Senator Ferguson: Well, did you have to call General Short?

20

21

22

Admiral Bellinger: General Martin, General Martin's office.

23

24

Senator Ferguson: Why didn't you call General Martin to find out what he had from his radar? That was one of

25

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Witness Bellinger Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 the greatest instruments we had, wasn't it?

2 Admiral Bellinger: I am not positive I didn't do it.
3 I talked to Martin that day twice. I think I did, as a
4 matter of fact. I am not saying positively I did or not.

5 I could have also gotten that information from the
6 Air Combat, the fighter commander. He had that -- General
7 Davidson was the one that was in charge of the interceptor.

8 Senator Ferguson: Well, we come down to this, that
9 you did not get any news about any radar on the 7th?

10 Admiral Bellinger: No, we did not; at least I did
11 not.

12 Senator Ferguson: You were in command?

13 Admiral Bellinger: I was in command of the long range
14 reconnaissance, and this striking force.

15 Senator Ferguson: Now, part of the duty of the striking
16 force would be to go out and get these carriers?

17 Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir; we wanted to know about
18 that; that was our main effort then.

19 Senator Ferguson: The reconnaissance would be to
20 locate them, so you had the most important force, as far
21 as intercepting this task force was concerned; is that
22 not true?

23 Admiral Bellinger: That is true.

24 Senator Ferguson: You don't remember now that you ever
25

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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1 made any inquiry as to what radar showed?

2 Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield?

3 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

4 Mr. Murphy: If he had asked General Davidson, General
5 Davidson couldn't tell him. He didn't know.

6 Admiral Bellinger: You are trying to get me to say
7 something definite describing my action. I probably did.
8 I don't know. I know I wanted that information. I took
9 it up with my Operations Officer to see if he couldn't
10 get it too. We were both trying to figure how we could
11 get that information.

12 Whether I talked personally, I am not sure. We were
13 trying to get the information.

14 Senator Ferguson: How far would your headquarters be
15 from where this information would be?

16 Admiral Bellinger: About six miles.

17 Senator Ferguson: And the first attack was at 7:55.
18 When was the last one?

19 Admiral Bellinger: It lasted about two hours.

20 Senator Ferguson: About two hours.

21 So you had two hours time there to try to locate
22 where this task force was?

23 Admiral Bellinger: No, sir. If they have got the
24 information coming in there is the question of getting the
25

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h7

1 information. It is two hours then, yes, but the getting
2 of the information is only while the planes are in motion,
3 coming from and going to.

4 Senator Ferguson: Well, is this true, that you had
5 an untrained Navy there as far as getting Intelligence
6 from radar? Is that true, that you didn't know how to use
7 radar, you had it but you didn't know that it was operating
8 and you didn't know whether it was operating that morning?

9 Admiral Bellinger: The radar installations, the whole
10 set-up was an Army project.

11 Senator Ferguson: Then do we come --

12 Admiral Bellinger: The Navy did have radar on some
13 of their ships. As a matter of fact that question has
14 been discussed with reference to the use of that radar,
15 when it could be used, and where it could be used.

16 Senator Ferguson: What was the answer?

17 Admiral Bellinger: There were certain sectors,
18 certain places in Pearl Harbor where it could work.

19 Senator Ferguson: Would it work in the sector here
20 (indicating chart)?

21 Admiral Bellinger: It would have to work in a sector
22 to the south, to the southerd, on account of the hills,
23 et cetera.

24 Senator Ferguson: You are talking about the ship radar?
25

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Admiral Bellinger: Yes.

Senator Ferguson: I am talking about the Army radar.

Admiral Bellinger: What I meant was that the ship radar augmented and could augment Army radar when it was in a place where it could be used.

Senator Ferguson: Now, did the Army have radio to the Navy airplanes and did the Navy airplanes have radio to the Army airplanes?

Admiral Bellinger: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: In other words --

Admiral Bellinger: The communication to the Navy planes was by Navy and the Army planes by the Army, and if the Navy wanted to send information to any Army planes, the information was telephoned over and they sent it.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: Then I understand that if the Communi-
3 cations center had wanted to know, desired to know whether
4 those were Army planes up to the north that morning the Army
5 would have to get in touch with the Army, and if they desired
6 to know whether they were Navy planes they would have to call
7 the Navy?

8 Admiral Bellinger: That is correct.

9 Senator Ferguson: And you could not communicate --

10 Admiral Bellinger: There was no set-up at that time for
11 the control of all planes to keep knowledge of that kind.

12 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, did we have such a system
13 that the planes of the Navy had no communication with the Army
14 radio? Is that where we stand on the 7th?

15 Admiral Bellinger: That is correct.

16 Senator Ferguson: Why was that true? Was that coordin-
17 ation?

18 Admiral Bellinger: That was the situation. The Army did
19 not control Navy and Navy did not control Army.

20 Senator Ferguson: I understand.

21 Admiral Bellinger: And, as a matter of fact, even up
22 until about two months after December the 7th did we work out
23 a situation whereby the Army planes on long-range scouting
24 could be communicated with directly from my headquarters.
25 Now, that had to be worked out and, as I say, it took about

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 two months to to that.

3 Senator Ferguson: All right. Was that due to lack of
4 material and manpower?

5 Admiral Bellinger: That is a difficult thing to say. I
6 would say no, it was not.

7 Senator Ferguson: What was it due to? Because the two
8 departments did not coordinate?

9 Admiral Bellinger: Primarily that, yes, sir.

10 Senator Ferguson: Well, how do you account for the Army
11 and the Navy expecting war and no cooperation to the extent
12 that you could communicate from the ground to both the Army
13 and the Navy planes in each of the Army and Navy set-ups?

14 Admiral Bellinger: Well, that is very easily explained.

15 Senator Ferguson: All right, explain it.

16 Admiral Bellinger: There was one and there was another.
17 One force was working under the Navy Department and one was
18 working under the War Department. They were two separate
19 entities.

20 Senator Ferguson: And do I understand that you thought
21 that war was imminent?

22 Admiral Bellinger: I thought war was coming.

23 Senator Ferguson: Well, how far away?

24 Admiral Bellinger: Well, that was a question which I was
25 very much interested in.

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Well, you were out there on the ground.

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Admiral Bellinger: When I went out there in 1940 I felt that it was coming. It was a question how soon.

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Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, you knew in 1940 that war was coming; it was a question of how soon. Then why didn't you get into a condition so that you would have one command on that small island?

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Admiral Bellinger: I would like to ask you how I was going to do that.

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Senator Ferguson: Then I will ask you. I won't answer you but I will ask you.

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Admiral Bellinger: I brought that subject up, too.

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Senator Ferguson: All right.

Admiral Bellinger: I mean in Oahu.

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Senator Ferguson: Why couldn't it be done? You give me the facts.

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Admiral Bellinger: I think you are in a much better position than I am. I have been watching this.

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Senator Ferguson: It could be done. You did it after Pearl Harbor, didn't you?

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Admiral Bellinger: Unity of command was placed in effect very shortly after Pearl Harbor.

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, could someone of the superiors in Washington in the Army and Navy cause that to be done?

1 Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir, I should think so.

3 Senator Ferguson: There is no doubt about that, is there?

4 Admiral Bellinger: I don't think there is any doubt
5 about it. There might have been some objections raised; I
6 don't know.

7 The Chairman: May I ask there, Senator? Could that have
8 been done in Oahu without referring it to Washington, under
9 what they had as an agreement as to the cooperation between
10 the Army and Navy forces out there?

11 Admiral Bellinger: I don't believe it could have been.

12 The Chairman: You do not?

13 Admiral Bellinger: At least I know I discussed this same
14 subject with Admiral Kimmel.

15 Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield?

16 Senator Ferguson: I want to just --

17 Mr. Murphy: There is evidence in the record that it
18 could be done in Oahu.

19 Admiral Bellinger: It could be?

20 Mr. Murphy: Yes, very definite evidence.

21 Senator Ferguson: I want to read his answer now.

22 Mr. Murphy: There is also evidence that they talked for
23 four or five days on some little island.

24 Senator Ferguson: Were you asked this question:

25 "If a message had been relayed to the Army that an

1 Witness Ballinger

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 enemy submarine had been sunk, would that have placed your
3 air operating plan in effect?"

4 Now, this answer is not clear to me and that is the reason
5 I am going to read it. (Reading)

6 "I doubt it. I think it would have required some
7 higher authority in the Army to place it in effect. Now,
8 in order to amplify that statement, I would like to re-
9 fer to an air raid drill which was planned by the Army
10 subsequent to the joint estimate and orders issued set-
11 ting up the air defense plan. During one night, prior
12 to the operations for the next day, I received a message
13 stating that the Bomber Command was no longer subject
14 to the orders of Commander, Patrol Wing Two. I wondered
15 what was the matter. I finally found out that the Army
16 wanted to revert to the old 'Joint Action' wherein, if
17 the Navy wanted the Army to assist, it was necessary for
18 the Navy command to so request the Army. Therefore, in
19 the early morning, at five o'clock, the Army Bomber Com-
20 mand asked if I was going to request the Army to assist.
21 I informed him that I did not understand that that was
22 necessary in our agreement, that the Commander-in-Chief,
23 Pacific, was the only one to ask the Army to assist. He
24 stated he would like to participate in this drill. I
25 said I would give him the information and he could act as

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 he saw fit, and in accordance with his orders. After
3 that I made an official report of same to the Commander-
4 in-Chief and also the Commander, Naval Base Defense, and
5 also prepared a letter for the Commander, Naval Base De-
6 fense Force, to General Short, trying to straighten this
7 out. In other words, to place the plan for air defense
8 into effect evidently required authorization from higher
9 Army authority for each instance. My letter, just re-
10 ferred to, was designed to correct that situation."

11 Did you ever correct the situation?

12 Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: When was this?

14 Admiral Bellinger: Within limitations. It did not
15 actually bring about a coordination like was necessary or
16 unity of command like was necessary, but we did not have that
17 same situation come up again.

18 Senator Ferguson: When had this happened at five o'clock
19 in the morning that you tried to get this straightened out?
20 Do you know about what month or what part of the month?

21 Admiral Bellinger: It happened about July; July 1941.

22 Senator Ferguson: Now, you told us this morning that
23 your Intelligence officer knew about these war warnings.

24 Admiral Bellinger: No, sir.

25 Senator Ferguson: Whose Intelligence officer?

1 Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 Admiral Bellinger: An Intelligence officer of the Naval
3 Air Station, who was attached to the District but he was on
4 the air station.

5 Senator Ferguson: Didn't you have access to him?

6 Admiral Bellinger: I had access to him by sending for
7 him and he came. He was not under me, not part of my com-
8 mand, no.

9 Senator Ferguson: When did you send for him?

10 Admiral Bellinger: I sent for him when I heard that there
11 was or had been a warning message of some description and he
12 was supposed to have known about it and he was the one that
13 gave information to this officer who was in my command.

14 Senator Ferguson: Well, on the sixth you have told us
15 that there was peace in Hawaii.

16 Admiral Bellinger: Peace with Japan.

17 Senator Ferguson: Yes. Well, between whom was the war
18 going on in Hawaii?

19 Admiral Bellinger: Excuse me.

20 Senator Ferguson: You indicate then that there was war
21 in Hawaii between some other people, not Japan. Who was it
22 between?

23 Admiral Bellinger: I don't know exactly what you mean.

24 Senator Ferguson: Well, I took your answer when you said
25 "peace with Japan" --

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Admiral Bellinger: That is what I meant, what I was referring to. We were at peace with Japan, that is all.

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Senator Ferguson: All right. And you did not anticipate any war that morning?

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Admiral Bellinger: No, sir.

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Senator Ferguson: It was the farthest thing from your mind probably, is that right?

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Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

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Mr. Murphy: He was thinking about his sore throat.

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Senator Ferguson: If you would have had more air fields in Hawaii -- you said something about you did not have space for your planes. Were you crowded for air space?

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Admiral Bellinger: Let me go back to that. The planes that I am speaking about are seaplanes, great big two-motored seaplanes, which come out of the water, come up a concrete ramp and are pulled up a concrete platform and you have got to keep them on that or else you cannot handle them.

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Senator Ferguson: Was the Navy ready for war on the 6th and 7th of December 1941 as far as Hawaii was concerned, -- Pearl Harbor?

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Admiral Bellinger: Ready for war?

22

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

23

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Admiral Bellinger: I would say "No", neither was any other place in the United States.

25

1 Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: And you are definite that in that month,
3 that we were not ready for war in Hawaii?

4 Admiral Bellinger: When I say "ready for war" I mean in
5 every way that they are supposed to be ready. I do not mean
6 just merely the individual but I mean in the overall picture.

7 Senator Ferguson: Did you have enough of equipment?

8 Admiral Bellinger: No, sir.

9 Senator Ferguson: Then as I understand it you were not
10 ready for war.

11 Admiral Bellinger: That is what I said; we were not ready
12 for war.

13 Senator Ferguson: And you did not expect it?

14 Admiral Bellinger: I did not expect it then, no, sir.

15 Senator Ferguson: That is all.

16 Mr. Murphy: May I ask this question?

17 Admiral, we were still getting ready for war a month be-
18 fore and a day before the war ended, weren't we, still get-
19 ting more prepared?

20 Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir, we were.

21 Mr. Murphy: Did you ever see a commander who felt that
22 he had what he would have liked to have to fight the enemy
23 and feel perfectly satisfied, fully satisfied?

24 Admiral Bellinger: No, sir, but there are times that you
25 like to get at the enemy with what you have got.

1 Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 Mr. Murphy: Now, I would like to say this: The question
3 was asked of you why didn't you call the Interceptor Command?
4 The evidence in that regard is that General Short did not
5 have this information at least until the day after, that Ad-
6 miral Kimmel did not know it until at least the day after and
7 if you called General Davidson he would not know and if you
8 had called the Interceptor Command, unless Lieutenant Tyler
9 was there to tell you, you would not be able to find out,
10 either him or McDonald.

11 Senator Lucas: May I ask one question?

12 The Vice Chairman: Were you through, Senator Ferguson?

13 Senator Ferguson: No, I had a question, but go ahead,
14 Senator.

15 Senator Lucas: Admiral Bellinger, what did you under-
16 stand by the war warning message of November the 27th, 1941
17 sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel when Admiral Stark
18 advised Admiral Kimmel to "execute an appropriate defensive
19 deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned
20 in WPL-46?" What does that mean to you? What would that
21 mean to you?

22 Admiral Bellinger: Of course, now it would mean a great
23 deal different than it might have meant then and that is
24 one of those questions that your guess is as good as mine now.

25 Senator Lucas: Well, what did the Navy Department have

1 Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 in mind when they said, "Execute an appropriate defensive
3 deployment?" What did that mean to you as a part of the
4 force out there?

5 Admiral Bellinger: Well, "deployment" means to place un-
6 its.

7 Senator Lucas: What would you do with your planes under
8 that sort of an order?

9 (No response.)

10 Senator Lucas: You don't know?

11 Admiral Bellinger: That is a question, of course, that
12 I could say I might have done anything, I could have done
13 anything, but what does it mean now? I am not an individual
14 that wants to say what I am going to do or what I could
15 have done.

16 Senator Lucas: I understand.

17 Admiral Bellinger: I am perfectly willing to stand on
18 what I do.

19 Senator Lucas: Assuming that you had seen General
20 Marshall's message, which went to Admiral Kimmel, where they
21 directed long-range reconnaissance in his message -- you are
22 familiar with that?

23 Admiral Bellinger: Yes.

24 Senator Lucas: Take Marshall's message and take Stark's
25 message and construe them together. What would you have done

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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with your planes?

Admiral Bellinger: Well, it does say, "Make a reconnaissance." I have forgotten whether it said "long-range" or not.

Senator Lucas: Well, "make a reconnaissance," I think is what it says, "that you deem necessary." "Make such reconnaissance as you deem necessary", I think is the way it reads.

Now, take that message of General Marshall's and take the message of Admiral Stark's, which starts out, "This is a war warning and take appropriate defensive deployment", a combination of the two of them: What would that tell you as a man that had charge of the patrol and long-range planes? Don't you scratch your head too hard over that one.

Admiral Bellinger: Well, I see you are trying to get me to make an answer which --

Senator Lucas: No, if you cannot make an answer I don't want you to.

Admiral Bellinger: (Continuing) -- I don't think I can do. As I say, I am not going to make an answer as to saying what I might have done or what I would have done because this is four years since it happened. As I say, I would like to think I would have taken the appropriate action immediately.

Senator Lucas: Yes. I appreciate that it is a most

1 Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 difficult question for you to answer and the only reason --

3 Admiral Bellinger: I cannot answer it.

4 Senator Lucas: (Continuing) -- that I place that ques-
5 tion before you, sir, is in view of the fact that you re-
6 sired to have before the committee the fact that you did not
7 have any of these messages and I presumed that you would want
8 us to interrogate you just a little bit upon that fact be-
9 cause you told us that you did not see any of these messages
10 and it would give me some indication that you thought some-
11 body should have given them to you, otherwise you would not
12 have told the committee that.

13 Admiral Bellinger: Well, I assumed you would have asked
14 me if I had not told you.

15 Senator Lucas: Well, that may be true.

16 Admiral Bellinger: As a matter of fact, I did not state
17 that in any statement.

18 Senator Lucas: I will not press the question, sir.

19 Mr. Murphy: May I ask one question?

20 The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson has some questions
21 to ask at this time.

22 Senator Ferguson: Admiral, I would like to read to you
23 the last sentence:

24 "You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance
25 and other measures as you deem necessary, but these

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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measures should be carried out so as not, comma, repeat
 not, comma, to alarm the civil population or disclose
 intent."

Would that have made any difference with that in it?

Admiral Bellinger: I think all modifications have a
 bearing on the general thought.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: One or two more questions. You got out a letter on November 19, a revised schedule for remainder of the second quarter fiscal year. Did that carry through December, November and December?

Admiral Bellinger: That was going on in December, yes.

Mr. Murphy : 1941?

Senator Ferguson: That is Exhibit 113-C. Now that would cover November and December?

Admiral Bellinger: That covers a part of November, and December. I believe I am correct in that.

Mr. Murphy: 1941?

Admiral Bellinger: It covers a part of November and December.

The Vice Chairman: What year?

Admiral Bellinger: 1941.

Senator Ferguson: Admiral Kimmel approved that, did he not?

Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: He approved it on November 22, 1941?

Admiral Bellinger: Yes.

Senator Ferguson: Then we have charts in the back of that indicating what you did with certain planes.

Witness Bellinger

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Admiral Bellinger : Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, was there any alteration of that after you had it approved by Admiral Kimmel? Did you make any changes in the schedule?

Admiral Bellinger: Not to my knowledge, no, sir.

Senator Ferguson: There were no changes at all?

Admiral Bellinger: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: That is all I have.

Admiral Bellinger: Except this; to be technically correct, patrol squadron 22 came back on the 5th of December.

Senator Ferguson: But that was under a specific order?

Admiral Bellinger: Yes.

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Murphy has a question.

Mr. Murphy: I was just going to say in conclusion, Admiral, that I am not asking you to place yourself in Admiral Kimmel's position with all of the material he had through the months, but, as I take it, since you were an air officer, and air-minded, if there was a discussion about the possibility of an attack on Hawaii, your mind would have been that it would be from the air and there was danger of the attack coming from the air?

Admiral Bellinger: If there was danger of an attack

Witness Bellinger Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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1 on Hawaii, I would expect it to come from the air.

2 Mr. Murphy: That is right.

3 The Vice Chairman: Does counsel have anything?

4 Mr. Richardson: No.

5 The Vice Chairman: Admiral, do you have any further
6 information that you feel could be of assistance to this
7 committee in considering the question here under consider-
8 ation?

9 Admiral Bellinger: No, sir, I do not think I can
10 add anything more to it.

11 The Vice Chairman: Do you have any other evidence
12 that you desire to present?

13 Admiral Bellinger: No, sir.

14 The Vice Chairman: On behalf of the committee I want
15 to thank you for your appearance, the information you have
16 given the committee, and your apparent desire to be help-
17 ful to us in this inquiry.

18 Admiral Bellinger: Thank you very much. I appreciate
19 the committee's consideration.

20 The Vice Chairman: You may now be excused with the
21 thanks of the committee.

22 Admiral Bellinger: Thank you very much, sir.

23 The Vice Chairman: The committee will now adjourn until
24 ten o'clock in the morning.

25 (Whereupon, at 4:40 p. m., the committee recessed until
10:00 o'clock a.m., the following day, Friday, February 1,
1946.)