

I N D I A :
ITS GOVERNMENT
UNDER A BUREAUCRACY.

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“Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto.”—TER.

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P R E F A C E.

FREQUENT intercourse with men possessing great experience in the administration of Indian affairs, induced me to give my earnest attention to the investigation of the subject, and has eventually led me to lay the result of my inquiries before the public. My principal authorities have been :—

- Report of Select Committee of the House of Commons, in 1848, on the growth of Cotton in India.
- Report of Expenditure on Public Works for 10 years, printed by order of the House of Commons, in 1851.
- Report of Select Committee of the House of Commons on Indian Territories in June, 1852.
- Report of the Bombay Cotton Committee, in 1847.
- Letters on the Cotton and Commerce of Western India, reprinted from the "Times."
- Files of the "Friend of India," for 1850-51-52.
- Files of the "Bombay Times."
- Reports, Books and Pamphlets on Scinde.
- Mill and Wilson's History of India.
- Briggs' Land-tax in India.
- Kaye's Affghanistan.
- Campbell's Modern India.
- Chapman's Cotton and Commerce of India.
- Royle's Culture of Cotton in India.
- Shore's Indian Notes.
- Grant's Bombay Cotton and Indian Railways.
- Lecture on Cotton, delivered at the Society of Arts, before H.R.H. Prince Albert, by the President of the Chamber of Commerce at Manchester.

Letters on the Renewal of the East India Company's Charter,
 by Lieut.-General Briggs, published in the "Indian News."
 Remarks on the Affairs of India, by J. Sullivan, Esq.
 Debates in the Court of Proprietors in 1848-49:
 Sundry Pamphlets: and various authorities referred to in the
 text.

Besides the above, I have been indebted to Indian friends for an immense deal of information, advice and active assistance, without which I could not have composed this work.

I am prepared to see a portion of the English press contrast my warmth of expression in the following pages, with the cooler tone of certain petitioners from a particular Presidency. However, any one, who attentively considers the grievances I have pointed out, will see that a body of merchants residing in the capital of a Presidency, were not the men who suffered most from them, and did not even feel some of them at all. Moreover, during nearly three years that I have been occupied with the subject, I have seen no prospect of support until quite lately, but on the contrary, a very clear prospect of great political parties uniting to oppose any reform in our Indian administration. Under such circumstances, although it might have shewn more philosophy to describe the abuses of the present system and its national danger with indifference, it was perhaps natural for a man who loved his country, to feel and speak more warmly.

I N D I A.

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.

REASONS FOR WRITING—EFFECTS PRODUCED ON THE PUBLIC BY OFFICIAL SECRECY AND MISREPRESENTATION.

DID the public ever hear of an absentee landlord neglecting his estate, and consigning it to middle-men, which ensured rack-renting, poverty, crime, and disaffection, among his tenantry, and ended by ruining himself? Does the public know that its neglect of India has had the same distressing effects, and is likely to have the same fatal end? I am sure few people are aware of the real nature of our Indian Administration: and it is high time that somebody should let the country know the truth about it; although I should never have ventured to attempt such a task, if my entreaties could have prevailed on men of ability and experience to tell the public as much as they told me. This is the reason, and the only one, for my writing this book; that I could not get better men to

speak out with that uncompromising plainness of tone which this crisis of the Charter requires; and though the case will lose much from my manner of telling it, I hope the public will recollect that a man may be a blundering stupid witness, whose evidence is nevertheless material to the trial of a cause; and I hope that to the readers of this book, the importance of its facts will compensate for its defects of style. I have omitted many details, and some entire subjects; for a mere abstract of the reforms needed in India, from a single Indian journal, for the last two years, would alone fill one or two volumes; and the journals do not contain every thing; therefore I have been forced to limit my choice of materials, and confine myself to illustrating one single point, viz. the necessity of making the Home Government of India trustworthy and responsible.

It is the fashion with those who criticise this Home Government, to add, in the very same breath with which they point out its abuses, a set of routine compliments to its motives. As I have not complied with this fashion,—as I have, on the contrary, expressed, without reserve, my unfavourable opinion of the Home Government,—I must explain to the reader that it is no want of charity which impelled me to do this. Charity is a discriminating virtue: not one which treats the good and the bad alike: the charity that allowed a robber and murderer to escape, would be a denial of charity to the honest portion of society who suffered from his crimes: and it is not charity

that allows a body of public men to wear a mask which enables them to perpetuate the misgovernment of millions of our fellow-creatures, it is a pusillanimous want of charity for the masses who are suffering because we allow these men to wear a mask. Therefore, I have done what I could to strip off the drapery of "good intentions" that shrouds the rotten system of the Home Government, and to shew how "private suits do putrify the public good." I have done this from pity for the natives of India, and from alarm for the safety of England. And why is it that the public have known so little, and been deceived so much, about the Home Government? There are two reasons for it, which are, a system of secrecy, and a system of mystification. The first of these, the system of secrecy, is alone sufficient to account for what Lord William Bentinck characterized as "the shameful apathy and indifference of Great Britain to the concerns of India." It did not occur to his Lordship that it was hardly fair to accuse the public of "shameful apathy and indifference," when the truth could not reach them. Yet, how stands the case? I am one of the public; I was indifferent while I knew little of the subject; but now let the reader look at my seventh or eighth chapters, and say whether they betoken "shameful apathy and indifference?" And my case is the case of every one of the public; they cannot, without the accident of private information, get at the truth; without knowing it, how can they be otherwise than indifferent? and while those who can, will not speak out, is it the indifference

of the public which is "shameful," or the system of secrecy which keeps the truth from them?

The state of British opinion on Indian affairs was admirably described by an article in the Times of Dec. 4, 1851, as being one of listless "security," *confounding the absence of anxiety with freedom from danger*, and this is entirely due to the suppression of information by the authorities. Now as the system of secrecy has been denied it is worth remarking that it has been affirmed by a late member of the Bombay Government, in the evidence of last session; by a late high functionary of the Madras Government, in an article of the "Calcutta Review," quoted in my chapter on Public Works; by a member of the Bengal Government in a report quoted in the same chapter; by other official men, and by "the Friend of India;" which praises the Company's Government whenever it can, and is often said to be a Government paper, for which reason I will give some extracts from it on this point.

May 21, 1851, the *Friend* answered the above-mentioned denial that information was withheld from the public; by printing a letter, refusing such information, even for a period anterior to the year 1820, signed by the very same functionary who assured the House of Commons a few days afterwards, that the system of secrecy was quite a mistake;—and the *Friend* added, "the Government of India is a government of secrecy in a stronger sense than any other Government now in existence. The first principle at

“ the India House is to conceal every thing—every thing past, present, or future—from the public, that it has the power of withholding.”

July 17, 1851, the *Friend* says, “ it is the perpetual aim of the Court of Directors to throw a veil of profound secrecy around all their counsels and measures ;” adding, that any disclosure by any of the functionaries of the State is “ severely resented and condemned in no measured terms,” and giving a description of the consequences for which my own experience has furnished an exact parallel: “ the whole public service in India trembles at the idea of being detected in conveying any intelligence to the press, however interesting to the public, and however beneficial to the public service. We have scores of letters from officers of high official distinction, who have given us valuable and important facts, but always with the strictest injunction that their names might in no case be permitted to transpire.”

Sept. 30, 1852, the *Friend* says, that “ the great principle of mystery which pervades all the thoughts, feelings, and actions of public men in India, has its origin in Leadenhall Street.” It adds, “ Every thing of which a public servant may become cognizant through his official position, however trivial or insignificant, is a secret :” and again, “ The extraordinary anxiety which the Court manifests to keep every public transaction, and every official document as under a seal of confession, and its determination to visit with condign punishment any allusion which may be made

“ to them, indicates no desire to promote the interests
“ of the community, and is simply an exhibition of
“ that morbid fondness for secrecy which belongs to
“ all corporations.”

And this is the real state of the case : the Government of India is a government of secrecy in a stronger sense than any other Government now in existence ; the footprint on the sand was not more alarming to Robinson Crusoe than a trace of inquiry into the mysteries of their administration is to the Authorities of India, and of course while a despotic Government maintains this “ system of secrecy,” its servants who can, will not speak out, and as an inevitable consequence, the public, who cannot get at the truth, become “ apathetic and indifferent to the concerns of India.” And this is not all: besides the system of secrecy, there is a system of mystification, of eternally deceiving the public, by flattering pictures of the condition of the natives ; which is of as old a date as that irresponsible government which I denounce as the bane of India. The historian Mill continually adverts to this practice. He remarks, that it is always the interest of the Minister of the day “ to prevent inspection ; to lull “ suspicion asleep ; to ward off inquiry ; to inspire a “ blind confidence ; to praise incessantly the management of affairs in India ; and by the irresistible force “ of his influence, make other men praise it :” and he adds, that by the interest of the Minister, “ complaint “ is extinguished, and the voice of praise raised in its “ stead”—and all parties in turn get committed to

this system by the changes of ministry. On one occasion, after noticing a rebuke administered to the Indian Authorities by the House of Commons for this system of deception, the historian says they only followed the beaten common track of misrepresentation which the instruments of Government are seldom without a motive to tread; and farther on, “nothing is more remarkable than the propensity of all sorts of persons connected with the Indian Government, to infer from any thing and every thing, the *flourishing state of the country.*” On another occasion, he notices “the unintermitting concert of praises, sung from year to year, upon the Indian Government, and upon the increasing happiness of the Indian people, while they were all the while sinking into deeper poverty and wretchedness.” Elsewhere he points out the ease with which the results of Indian administration can be misrepresented in this country, and warns the public that they are by no means sufficiently on their guard against the deception. Now I have endeavoured to shew in my seventh chapter, what were the effects of this deception, in the passing of the last three Charters; and in my fifth and sixth chapters, to shew the way in which it is going on now; and when I consider that it is employed to resist the strongest conceivable claims on our justice; to say nothing of our humanity; and to perpetuate the “nightmare oppression lying heavy on many million hearts” in India; this system of mystification appears to me perfectly shocking!—it seems to call for a judgment on the nation that employs

it. It is written: "The Lord shall root out all deceitful lips: and the tongue that speaketh proud things; which have said, With our tongue will we prevail: we are they that ought to speak, who is lord over us?—Now for the comfortless troubles' sake of the needy; and because of the deep sighing of the poor; —I will up, saith the Lord, and will help every one from him that swelleth against him. . . ."

Aye, reader! there are many signs and warnings in India at this moment, and if the present system is allowed to go on, it will soon expose our empire to a greater peril than it has ever yet encountered.

On reading the list of official appointments in the present Ministry, I contemplated for an instant the altering or even suppressing this work, which was then in the press. On second thoughts, however, I determined to publish it as it was, because my quarrel is not so much with particular men as with a particular system—a system which makes all who are drawn into its vortex either the accomplices, the dupes, or the tools of mis-government. And until the Ministry announce some intention of changing such a system, it would be at least premature to relax in my efforts to obtain justice for India from any confidence inspired by names alone.

CHAPTER II.

THE THEORY IN CANNON ROW.

ON the second of April in the present year, the Prime Minister told the House of Lords, that "in the Board of Control, practically speaking, the whole administration of the affairs of India rests." This was the truth; and a truth whose incalculably important consequences are not appreciated by the people of this country. However, those who have an interest in keeping things as they are, and preventing any change in the actual system of Government, were exceedingly disconcerted by Lord Derby's plain speaking, and have been labouring ever since to persuade the public not to believe the truths disclosed by him. For this purpose the old fable of a double Government and a balance of power has been repeated to the world by every channel of publicity which official influence could command; and it has been asserted with the utmost confidence, that the control of the finances and the management of administrative details is in the hands of the Court of Directors. Let us see then whether there is anything to corroborate Lord Derby's statement? The Chairman of the Court of Directors

stated in his place in Parliament, on the 19th of April last, that all letters and despatches come to the Directors, and that when they have come to a resolution on the business in hand, they send their despatch to the Board of Control, "who either approve or disapprove of it;" but that the Directors have a right to call upon the Board to give their reasons for their alterations of it, if the Board think it their duty to insist upon them. We learn from this that the Board of Control can "disapprove and alter" the government of the Court of Directors: but it appears to me, that if the Board has the power to alter the spirit and letter of the Directors' despatches, and uses such a power, the Directors are no more independent of the President of the Board of Control, than the clerks of the Foreign, Colonial, and War Offices, are independent of the Secretaries for those departments; and that the Directors must perform much the same functions as the head clerks of Government offices. Moreover, the statement of the Chairman, that all letters and despatches come to the Directors, is inconsistent with the following evidence from still better authority. In the Committee on Official Salaries, which sat last year, the President of the Board of Control was asked— "Do you correspond with the Governor-general of India, and other high functionaries, the Governors of Madras and Bombay, directly, without the intervention of the Chairman of the India House?" Answer—"Of course I do, privately." Here then I submit are strong grounds for presuming that Lord

Derby told the simple truth when he informed the House of Lords, that "in the Board of Control, practically speaking, the whole administration of the affairs of India rests." But, besides this presumptive evidence, the letter of the law clearly gives the Board the power of conducting the whole administration, by investing it with "full power and authority to superintend, direct, and control all acts, operations, and concerns of the said Company, which in any wise relate to or concern the Government, *or revenues*, of the said territories . . .;" again, by prohibiting the Directors "from issuing any orders, instructions, despatches, official letters, or communications whatever, relating to India, or to the Government thereof, until the same shall have been sanctioned by the Board . . .;" and further, by compelling the Directors either to prepare instructions and orders, upon any subject whatever, at fourteen days' notice from the Board, or else to transmit the orders of the Board on the subject to India; which gives the power of initiative to the Board whenever it likes to use it. Moreover, it was distinctly admitted by the creators of the Board, that they had transferred to it the whole power of administration. Mr. Pitt said, "there was no one step that could have been taken previous to the passing of the Act of 1784, by the Court of Directors, that the Board of Control had not now a right to take by virtue of the power and authority vested in it by that Act." Mr. Dundas said, "Without *the whole powers of Government* the Board of

“Control would be a nugatory institution.” Lord Grenville, one of its first members, said, “The whole authority of the Government was actually committed to the Board; and the carrying on the Government in the name of the Company was only what the Company had done themselves, in the case of Indian princes whose rule they had superseded.” Finally, a former President of the Board of Control said, in 1833, “In that Board for the last fifty years has the real effective Government of India resided.” I think this is sufficient evidence that Lord Derby’s statement in the House of Lords was not a misrepresentation, and that the real state of the case was correctly defined by the historian Mill, who says, “The real, sole governing power in India is the Board of Control; and it only makes use of the Court of Directors as an instrument, as a subordinate officer for the management of details, and the preparation of business for the cognizance of the superior power.”

If this definition be correct, it is evident that the power of the Directors must depend entirely upon the degree to which the Board allows them to manage the business of detail, and such a power manifestly corresponds to that of the head clerks in Government offices. In fact, the only distinction I can perceive between the functions of Directors and those of Government clerks, is in the privilege of the former to protest in writing against the measures of the Board; but if it be true, as I have heard and believe, that the Directors’ protests are treated with very little ceremony, and

habitually disregarded by the Board ; and because these protests cannot exercise the slightest influence on the Parliament or the public, from whom they are concealed, I do not see that such a distinction makes any real difference between the power of the Directors and that of the head clerks of the Treasury, or Colonial Office. But the reader may say, supposing that the Directors are no more than clerks of the Board of Control, what is the harm of it ? The harm is this : it may happen, as it does at this moment, that a President and two Secretaries who are new to the affairs of India, and have none of them ever set foot in the country, are invested with the secret, irresponsible despotism over an empire as large as the whole of Europe, comprised of different nations who are frequently high-spirited and warlike races, and containing within it such an abundance of inflammable materials as to have induced the writers and statesmen who have had most experience, and are the highest authorities on the subject, to declare unanimously, that without a knowledge of the institutions, habits, feelings, and prejudices of the natives of India, their European masters are always liable to make mistakes which may produce a conflagration, and place the empire in peril. For instance, let it be supposed that an ignorant President of the Board of Control decides on some measure which is a climax of iniquity and impolicy ; a Director, saturated with information on the subject, writes a protest against it, clearly exposing by the light of his experience the characteristic bearings of

the question, and exhibiting the series of evils which must ensue from the adoption of the Board's measure; of course, if the President were responsible to Parliament, he would be forced to think twice before he acted in defiance of such a protest as this; but as it is, considering the Director as no better than a clerk, he tosses the protest into a wilderness of records, and pursues his plan without modification;—let it be supposed that an Affghan war is the consequence, the conclusions of the Director are verified to the letter, until, after the sacrifice of a British army and a frightful waste of human life and treasure, it turns out that the Board's measure has been as impolitic as it was iniquitous, and has converted a host of neighbouring nations who were previously disposed to be friends into implacable enemies, while it has robbed one or more generations of our native fellow-subjects of the local expenditure and attention to their social progress which was due to them from British justice, and has saddled themselves and their posterity with a crushing burthen of debt.

When all this is the natural consequence of investing an ignorant Minister with the secret irresponsible despotism over a vast empire, can the reader ask what is the harm of a system which exposes us every day to a recurrence of dangers, similar in kind to the above, while they may be next time infinitely greater in degree? Surely, if Lord Derby's statement was correct that, "in the Board of Control, practically speaking, the whole administration of the affairs of India

“rests,” and if the Board must exercise “*the whole powers of government*,” it will be prudent to provide for the responsibility of this depository of supreme power. But besides the proofs already furnished of the truth of Lord Derby’s description, it has been entirely confirmed since by the evidence of Lord Ellenborough. His Lordship said that, “the President of the Board of Control can now over-rule the Directors;” that, “they can do no more than express an opinion;” and that “they have in fact, no authority.” He said that, with a Court of Directors at one end of the system, and a President of the Board of Control, with a large body of intelligent clerks, at the other, he could not say how the government was conducted; but added, “I know that when I was at the Board of Control, I conducted the government, there is no doubt about that.” So then the power is in the hands of the President of the Board of Control; and if he does not know how to use it, he may ask his ignorant secretaries and intelligent clerks; and we shall see presently what these gentlemen make of the irresponsible despotism of India.

CHAPTER III.

THE PRACTICE IN LEADENHALL STREET.

THE body in which supreme power originally resided, and which still gives its name to the Government, is the East India Company; that is, the Court of Proprietors. As the description of this body given by Lord Derby in his speech of April 2nd, was very clear and correct, I will again quote his words. “ With “ that Act of 1833, the Court of Proprietors ceased to “ have any control or interest whatever in the affairs “ of India. The whole business of the Court of Pro- “ prietors at this moment consists in receiving the “ dividends upon their stock, and in electing the mem- “ bers of the Court of Directors. Further than that “ they have no function whatever to perform. It is “ true they may meet and discuss together, but with “ regard to the legislation of India, any decision or “ vote of the whole Court of Proprietors need not ex- “ ercise the slightest influence over the conduct of the “ government.” As this statement was literally true, and the Court of Proprietors has long been notoriously and entirely subservient to the Court of Directors, I will at once pass on to the description of this Corporation. The Court of Directors consists of twenty-four members, whose qualification is the possession of £1000.

stock ; but as one-fourth of this body go out of office every four years, and must remain out for twelve months, the permanent number of Directors is really thirty, of whom twenty-four form the Court, while six remain a year out of office until it is their turn to be re-elected. This re-election is a matter of course, because since the Directors prefer to hold their places for life, and always support their former colleagues on a re-election, the entirely subservient constituency go on electing them for life, and in many instances long after they are unfit to attend to the affairs of India. This Court has, with a few reservations the nominal and generally the substantial power of making the Home appointments in the Indian Civil Service. The composition of this Corporation is at present exceedingly defective, for although there are some warm and enlightened friends of India among the Directors, such men are always of necessity a very small minority in the Court. The reasons for this are, firstly, that the disgusting incidents of a canvass for the Direction, deter almost all the distinguished servants of Government, who return from India, from being candidates for the office, although frequently in the prime of their faculties, and capable of doing many years hard work in this country ; secondly, that the value of the patronage draws many men into the Direction, and keeps them in it, who are from various causes unfit for its duties, such as bankers, merchants, and directors of companies, whose business in the Indian government is simply the distribution of patronage, and a certain

number of worn-out old men, who are incapable of managing, and some even of understanding the business they are supposed to transact. This Court forms annually three Committees, besides the secret Committee consisting of the Chairman, Deputy-Chairman, and senior member of the Court. The Chairs hold the same rank *ex officio* in the three Committees, which are, 1. political and military; 2. finance and home; 3. revenue, judicial, and legislative. It may be as well to explain here what the business is which is transacted by the Court.

It must be remembered that England governs an Empire in India, as large as the whole of Europe, inhabited by as many different races, and containing provinces as extensive as European kingdoms, and as densely peopled: for instance, the population of the Bengal Presidency, is larger than that of France, the population of the Agra Presidency larger than that of Great Britain, and so on; and as the business of this Empire is referred down to minute details to the Home Government, so that nothing should escape its supervision, it is difficult to give the reader an idea of the vast mass of correspondence which comes home to England from India. When the reader considers, that many despatches are accompanied by such a mass of documents as "cannot be even examined without considerable labour and time—that they amount to 2, 3, 4, 5, and occasionally 20,000 pages," he may conceive the tons of papers which the Home Government is supposed to go through. In Lord Broughton's evidence before the Official Salaries Com-

mittee, he stated that with one single despatch 45,000 pages of "collections" were sent. The first great evil of this system is, that the administration of India is clogged and impeded in a most mischievous degree, —in a degree which reduces to despair the most zealous and able of the Company's servants, and after all a good deal of business is unavoidably slurred over, and either pretended to be done, or not done at all. I saw the same thing happen in France during the reign of the late King Louis Philippe. The abuse of centralization had drawn the mass of administrative details to Paris, and of course the business of the country was ruinously delayed, and either badly done, or left undone. While the Prefects would not take responsibility on themselves, because they were likely to be reprimanded, and have their measures reversed by a central Government (or rather by its irresponsible clerks!) which could not possibly understand the grounds of their decisions half so well as themselves, the supreme Government by its bureaucratic, "paper-assier" spirit, and passion for governing in details, left the country in fact either without an administration or with a wretchedly bad one. This was one main cause of the revolution of 1848 in France, and St. Simon points out in his memoirs that a similar weakness of Louis XIV. for governing in details, was a main cause of the ruin of France under his reign. One of the wisest acts of the present Ruler of France has been to restore specifically the mass of the local

administration to the Prefects, investing them with real power and proportionate responsibility, and depriving the Paris bureaucracy of its authority.

A similar reform is now most urgently required in our Indian administration, for the second great evil of referring such a mass of details to the Home Government is that it throws the real power into the hands of an irresponsible Bureaucracy. This is the class which Burke denounced as "the creatures of the desk, and the creatures of favour," and which he described in the following passage:—"The tribe of vulgar politicians are the lowest of our species. There is no trade so vile and mechanical as government in their hands. Virtue is not their habit. They are out of themselves in any course of conduct recommended only by conscience and glory. A large, liberal, and prospective view of the interest of States, passes with them for romance; and the principles that recommend it, for the wanderings of a disordered imagination. The calculators compute them out of their senses. The jesters and buffoons shame them out of everything grand and elevated. Littleness in object and in means, to them appears soundness and sobriety." Now, on examining into the details of the measures pursued in India, we shall find that they bear the stamp of the "vulgar politicians" described by Burke, and the reader will not wonder at the extraordinary mal-administration described in the following chapters, if he bears it in mind that "the creatures of the desk and the

creatures of favour," are really governing India, and the Home Government is at bottom a Bureaucracy.

But such is the fact: from the sheer physical impossibility of an Indian Minister or Director examining the shiploads of business referred from India, even if they were disposed to do so, it is necessary to maintain a large establishment of clerks to do the work for them, with departments at the India House and Board of Control, corresponding to the departments of the Government abroad, and entailing an expense of £160,000 a-year on the people of India, while the result of the system is to throw the real work of preparing the despatches into the hands of the clerks at the India House, and that of altering them into the hands of the clerks at the Board of Control. The reader will see this from the mode of transacting the business. When a despatch arrives from India, it is referred in the first instance to the Examiner's department to which it belongs, after which the Chairs confer with the official in charge of that department, and settle with him the tenor of a reply, and transmit a draft of this reply to the Indian Minister, in what is technically called "P. C.;" that is to say, "previous communication."

Now it is evident that, partly from the annual rotation in the functions of the Directors, and every fourth year in the men themselves, and principally from the mass of the business the Chairs must, in this preliminary stage of P. C. depend mainly on the clerks who are permanently in office, for information, advice, and

assistance. Nay, such is this dependence, that even in a discussion in the Court of Proprietors, after previous notice, it is pitiable to see the Chairman referring to a secretary who sits by his side, and keeps on whispering, and prompting, and stopping him, as if he were a mere puppet; and probably the Minister at the other end of the system is in the same predicament. However, in this stage of "P. C." if there is a difference of opinion on the draft, it is discussed, and almost invariably settled in friendly communication between the Minister and the Chairs. Finally, the draft is returned by the Minister either adopted or altered; and then it is submitted to the Committee of Directors superintending the department to which it belongs, with all the papers bearing on the case, to be considered, and discussed, and adopted or altered; and afterwards it is exposed to the same process in the aggregate Court, and then goes, for the first time as an official communication, to the Minister. Now, Messrs. Melville and Shepherd are delighted with the success of this system of "previous communication," in bringing about an agreement between the Minister and the Chairs,—in facilitating business, and saving time. No doubt it does all this, but how does it do it? by stripping the Directors' Committees of all their importance and usefulness! for when once the draft is settled, what chance have the dissentient members of any Committee of resisting the Minister, the Chairs, their majority in the aggregate Court, and the bureaucracy? —All they can do is to complain to their friends in

private, and to record a protest, which is of no earthly use, except to shew that it is in vain for them to prove to demonstration that the Government is going wrong, when once the irresponsible bureaucracy has decided its course. I ask if this is not an intolerable abuse? Is it not evident that this "previous communication" system is reversing the first intention, and the whole scope and purpose of the Directors' official existence? Is it not plain that if the opinion of the Directors is to be of any use to the Minister at all, it should go to him, not *after* his mind is made up by the opinion of "intelligent clerks," not *after* he has decided on the matter in hand, but *before*? Does it not stand to reason that if it be worth while for Indian business to go through a Committee and an aggregate Court of Directors, who are presumed to sift it thoroughly, and express a deliberate opinion upon it, all this should be done before the first communication goes to the Minister, and not after "intelligent clerks" on both sides have superficially examined and decided the question? It is not that the Directors should govern: the Indian Minister must of course govern; *as he does now*; and as every Minister ought to do in his department; but he should receive the Directors' deliberate counsel before he makes up his mind, and not after; he should be bound, *as he is now*, to state his reasons in writing, if he disapproved of the policy advised by the Directors; and instead of the "previous communication," there should be an "after communication" with the Chairs, in case of a difference of opinion and

the Minister's adhering to his own views. The Directors would thus be some check upon the Indian Minister, particularly if they were the efficient and experienced body that they ought to be; at least they would be an invaluable Council to him, for the only real check that can be imposed upon him is parliamentary responsibility, for which I have proposed a very simple plan in my seventh chapter. As it is now, the Court of Directors are a mere cloak for the "irresponsible despotism" of the Minister; and they are a source of injury to India and danger to England, by the grasping spirit of the majority of their members for patronage. Before I touch on this point I must remark, that there is on the face of it something wrong in a system by which, as it is said, "the Directors are paid in patronage"—that "their salaries are only £300 a-year, because they are paid in patronage." We ought to cut down a mischievous bureaucracy, and save enough by the reduction to give the Directors competent salaries, like all other public servants, and so get rid of the very improper phrase now employed, that "the Directors are paid in patronage." Why, in this matter-of-fact country, such language naturally puts it into the heads of Directors that their patronage may be used in a way that will pay them—pay well too!—and it is notorious that the managers of banks and companies who take so much trouble to get into the Direction, are "wise in their generation." Under the present system there are two fatal consequences of the Directors being "paid in patronage:"—1st, it

enslaves the Directors to the Indian Minister, by their fear that if they oppose him he may use his parliamentary omnipotence to strip them of their patronage ; 2ndly, it gives the majority of the Court an insatiable spirit of grasping ; of grasping territory, and grasping all the valuable Indian appointments for their European nominees, in spite of the emphatic condemnation of this system by our greatest Indian statesmen, which passion of the Directors is doing incalculable mischief in India, and makes our Government hated by the educated classes of the natives. It is therefore indispensable to reform the present abuses in the composition of this Court—to exclude the superannuated old men, by opening the elections on the annual retirement of one-fourth of the members—to exclude those who belong to any other profession or occupation, and who only enter the Direction to use their patronage for the interest of their private banks and companies—and to abolish a canvass, which costs about £4000, and often extends over a period of seven years, so as to make a Director's personal experience of Indian administration seven years in arrear of its actual state when he is elected—to abolish this canvass, which deters nearly all the fittest men, the most efficient and experienced in Indian affairs, from becoming candidates for the Direction, by adopting the plan suggested by Colonel Sykes ; and finally, to provide expressly that a certain number of the Directors shall have served upwards of twelve years in India.

I will conclude this part of my subject by a notice

of the present value and mode of distributing the patronage. When the number of appointments for the year is ascertained, the whole are divided into 28 equal parts, of which two are allotted to the Chairman and Deputy Chairman, two to the President of the Board of Control, and one to each of the Directors. Taking the average of seventeen years since the Charter of 1833, there have been sent out about 28 writers, and as many assistant surgeons, and chaplains or other officers, independent of from 250 to 300 cadets annually, affording to each Director a patronage which, if sold at the rate of a cadetship actually proved to be purchased in 1849 at £1,050, and a writership at £3000, the annual value of a single share of patronage would not fall short of £14,000 or £15,000, and that of the Chairs and the Indian Minister from £28,000 to £30,000 per annum. Besides his patronage as above, the President of the Board of Control directs the expenditure to any extent of "secret service" money, which as such is not accounted for on the books, and has on some occasions exceeded £100,000 in one year. How differently do we deal with the poor ryot's money and our own! The Secretary for Foreign Affairs is only permitted to disburse as much as £10,000 in one year, and is obliged at the end of it to swear that whatever has been expended was absolutely necessary for the public service. Here then is the great bribe of patronage! appointments of the value of nearly £400,000 per annum, distributed every year, and year after year, among the upper

classes of this country, and in which hardly any respectable English family is not directly or indirectly interested! This is indeed heavy odds thrown into the scale against justice to India; for it would be shutting my eyes to the light of day to pretend not to see the proofs all round me of the influence of this patronage in recruiting adherents to the present system of Government, and suppressing evidence against its abuses. However, though I will not attempt to deny that to reform the abuses of the present Government, especially of the Court of Directors, would gradually and greatly reduce this patronage, for, as a rule, all the Directors of ripe Indian experience, who have lived in the interior, and known the natives well, and seen the foundations on which our empire rests, all these men are as strongly opposed to the grasping system as I am, and as much convinced of its iniquity and impolicy, and to give them a preponderance in the Court would at once begin to cut down the patronage; still, I shall endeavour to shew that the abuses which best serve our private interests are directly contrary to the national interest—that “private suits do putrefy the public good”—and that the present system is not only ruining and degrading the natives of India, but is bringing our empire into a more critical situation every day. And besides the dangers I shall point out hereafter, there are one or two which I will briefly notice here. The “free press” is beginning to do its work in India—the Parsee merchants, the Zemindars, the native heads

of castes, are beginning to feel their power, to combine, and to ask for redress of grievances; some of them are violent, and these do not alarm me; but some are remarkably temperate, and I confess that, knowing the strength of their case, of which I will endeavour to give the reader an idea in the following chapters, I fear the men who begin so temperately, and have reason entirely on their side. So the Americans began, and we all know how it ended. Let not these moderate claims be neglected, when, as I will shew, there is matter enough to swell them into an avalanche. Let not the incipient opposition of the natives be despised because it is feeble now. No doubt we can now accept or reject the opportunity of doing justice to India; but it may be doubted whether, if we reject it, we shall ever have the opportunity again. When Julian marched against Persia, he remarked of the Goths, "*Hostes quærere se meliores;*" in less than fifteen years, says Gibbon, these Goths had overthrown the Roman Empire.

CHAPTER IV.

THE RYOTWAR SYSTEM.

THE reader must not suppose, as we too practical Englishmen are apt to do, that the theory on which men act is of little consequence provided they mean to do their duty. While our neighbours the French, have shewn too little attention to facts in forming theories, we frequently run into the other extreme, and pay too little attention to theory; which is sometimes as fatal an error. We shall see the importance of acting on a correct theory if we reflect that, crime is the act itself, and not the intention; and to make the crime consist in the intention is that pestilent heresy of the Jesuits denounced in the "*Lettres Provinciales*;" and of which I can say from personal observation, that the same doctrines of making the crime consist in the intention are still demoralising large portions of continental society; utterly confounding their notions of right and wrong; and leaving them no fixed moral principles. To shew the importance of an error in theory, it has been admitted by one of the historians who sympathised most deeply with the afflictions of his fellow-creatures, that the crusaders who followed Simon de Montfort, were probably not

worse than other men ; only they *had a mistaken idea of their duties* ; and the massacre of the Albigenses was the consequence. I have said this much about the duty of forming correct theories ; because while the conclusions of this and my 6th chapter will be that we have for many years allowed a bureaucratic Government to act on vicious principles of taxation in India, principles which our common sense at once repudiates when we think of applying them to ourselves, and which have caused extreme pain and injury to our native fellow-subjects, it really seems to me a very weak set-off against all the people of India have suffered, to say that our intentions were good.

I have now to shew the consequences to Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, of the Government's adopting a wrong theory with regard to its proprietary right to the land in India ; and to examine whether there is any justification for the assertion of this theory to the present day.

As the true theory has long since been proved and acted upon successfully in the North-west Provinces, and has been entirely confirmed since by our experience of the Punjaub, and our observation of the practice in native states, I shall refer the reader to a valuable and delightful work on "Modern India," by Mr. Campbell, giving a very clear and graphic description of his experience of the working of this theory in the above province .

I will now state the wrong theory of the land-tax, quoting one or two modern authorities for it, and point

out the mischief it has done in Madras and Bombay, reserving a notice of Bengal for another chapter. The first great authority who asserted that the rent of land in India belonged to the Government, was, I am sorry to say, that amiable man Lord Cornwallis. Forty years afterwards Mr. Mill repeated this doctrine to the Commons Committee of 1831, adding that “ a country wherein *the whole rent* is paid to the State, is in a “ most happy condition, seeing that such rent would “ suffice for all the wants of the Government, and the “ people would then be untaxed.” When pressed upon the means of collecting the Indian land revenue, so that no more than the “ rent” should be taken, he admitted that this would be a difficulty for any European collector; with an imperfect knowledge of the natives, their language, and circumstances; with a swarm of ill-paid and corrupt servants; with perhaps 10,000 square miles of country to look after, and 150,000 tenants to settle with individually; but he had no doubt *means would be found of limiting the demand to the rent*, “ and then the prosperity of the “ country will be as fully secured as it can be,” (poor country!)—He continued: “ if the land-tax “ were limited *to the rent only*, then the revenue “ system of India is the best in the world”—finally, “ as soon as that point is attained when *the rent of “ land* will be adequate to all the exigencies of the Government, then all the other taxes may be abolished, “ and India will be a country *wholly untaxed*.” Mr. Mangles, a Director, and also a Director of that New

Zealand Company of which we have heard a good deal lately, reiterated the above doctrine to the Commons' Committee of 1848, assuring them that the claim of the Government in India to that which constitutes "rent," in other parts of the world, was perfectly legitimate, and therefore this was the very best system of taxation in the world, because so far as the rent sufficed, the people were *wholly untaxed*. So another witness, Mr. Sullivan, told this Committee that the land revenue system was "an excellent system and of great advantage to the country, inasmuch as what goes into the pockets of individuals in this country, goes there into the coffers of the State, and the country is *pro tanto exempt from taxation*." Now, as I will shew that the Government never had any more right to touch the "rent" in India, than they have in England, I should like to know how gentlemen in the House of Commons would like it themselves, if a Government, backed by an overwhelming army, undertook to *wholly untax* the people of this country, by simply taking the rent of land? It might be urged, as in the case of the massacre of the Albigenes, that men were no worse perhaps than their contemporaries, if their error was one of mere theory; but when I can shew that the fatal consequences of applying the ryotwar theory were distinctly proved *before* it was definitively adopted by the Indian Government; that, after the long practice of this theory in one Presidency had shewn its dreadful effects in confiscating the capital of the people, it was deli-

berately applied to another Presidency ; that to this day its evils are not redressed, although the true theory has long been established by historians, and adopted with success in some of our own provinces, then I do say that the Bureaucracy have been guilty of a degree of oppression towards the natives of India which would make it a national sin for us to prorogue their irresponsible despotism for another twenty years. However, the theory having once been adopted that the rent of land belonged to the Government, the great bait of the ryotwar system, or annual settlement with individual cultivators, was what was called its "discovery of concealed cultivation ;" and consequent increase of revenue, for, of course, it began with raising the revenue by confiscating the property of the landlords, though as such a system was "cutting open the hen that laid the golden eggs," by destroying the capitalists of the country, the ryotwar system always ended, as a rule, by swamping the whole population in one dead level of pauperism. There was another mistake made by the originators of the ryotwar settlements, which was to assume that all who were designated "ryots" belonged to the same class ; the fact is, that the word in its primitive sense only means subject, and it is applicable alike to a landlord or a tenant—as well to the proprietor of five thousand acres, as to the tenant-at-will of one. In the districts of Madras, where this system was first applied, the Government officers adopted the rates of assessment of preceding native Governments, which were from 45 to 50 per cent of

the gross produce ; but these rates had been paid under the native or village system, and it did not occur to the English collectors that the people *could not possibly have paid such rates*, at least not without being ruined as we ruined them, unless there had been something more than met the eye in the system, which made the real very different from the seeming burthen, and made the *nominal* taxation often more than double its actual amount ! However, under the native system the land was held by a very peculiar tenure, not then understood by the English, which has certainly prevailed all over India, and is at this day in full operation in the native States, as well as in *our* north-west provinces and *our* Punjaub, and in short wherever we have not ignorantly destroyed it. It was this : the whole landed property of the village was divided into a certain number of shares, which might be again subdivided in families, but were always kept distinct for municipal purposes, and the owners of these shares were the only real landed proprietors in the village, the only ones responsible for the Government tax, the rest of the inhabitants being lease-holders, tenants-at-will, &c. under them.

Now, although the introducers of ryotwar settlements were ignorant of the above facts, they ought to have known, that the native Governments which immediately preceded us, that such men as Hyder Ali, had taken all the revenue the people could pay ; short of paying their capital ; therefore, when they found that, after measuring and classing every field, and assessing

the individual cultivators of it at 45 or 50 per cent of the gross produce, it produced a great increase of revenue, they ought to have felt that there must be some mistake in their principles. Instead of this, the great triumph of ryotwar collectors for many years was, to find out what they called "concealed cultivation." Nevertheless, when this system was established, its operation in ruining the cultivators was so rapid, that years before it was definitively adopted by the Home Government, its most famous advocates had discovered its evils, not from theory, but from practice. Colonel Read, its originator, had declared that "it involved the necessity of ousting all between the Government and the cultivator." Colonel Monro had declared that, unless the assessment were reduced from 25 to 33 per cent, the land would go out of cultivation.

Finally, the Madras Board of Revenue had recorded the following strong opinion against ryotwar settlements :—"Ignorant of the true resources of the newly-acquired countries, as of the precise nature of their landed tenures, we find a small band of foreign conquerors no sooner obtaining possession of a vast extent of territory, peopled by various nations differing from each other in language, customs, and habits, than they attempt what would be termed an Herculean task, or rather a visionary project, even in the most civilized countries of Europe, of which every statistical information is possessed, and of which the Government and people are one, viz. to

“ *fix a land-rent*—not on each province, district, or
 “ country, nor on each estate or farm, but on *every*
 “ *separate field* in their dominions. In pursuit of this
 “ supposed improvement, we find them unintentionally
 “ dissolving the ancient tie which united the republic
 “ of each Hindoo village, and, by a kind of agrarian
 “ law, newly assessing and parcelling out the lands
 “ which from time immemorial had belonged to the
 “ village community collectively, not only among the
 “ individual members of the privileged order, but even
 “ among the inferior tenantry ; we observe them igno-
 “ rantly denying, and by their denial abolishing *private*
 “ *property in the land* ; professing to limit their de-
 “ mand on each field, and, in fact, by establishing for
 “ such limit an unattainable maximum, *assessing the*
 “ *ryot at discretion* ; and, like the Mussulman Govern-
 “ ment which preceded them (Hyder Ali), binding the
 “ cultivator by force to the plough ; compelling him
 “ to till land acknowledged to be over assessed ; drag-
 “ ging him back if he absconded ; deferring their
 “ demand upon him until his crop came to maturity ;
 “ then taking from him all that could be obtained,
 “ and leaving to him nothing but his bullocks and
 “ seed-grain ; nay, perhaps, obliged to supply him
 “ even with these, in order to enable him to resume
 “ his melancholy task of toiling for others.”

Such was a literally true description of the practice
 of this ryotwar theory ; and it was *after* having offi-
 cially received all the above representations, that, in
 1812, the Home Government definitively adopted this

system of assessing "every separate field" in the Madras Presidency "at an unattainable maximum," and settling annually with the individual cultivators. The ruinous effects of such a system may be conceived, and one of them was, that the revenue began at length to decrease till it fell to *considerably below what it was* when Colonel Monro proposed his reductions; and this, I believe, more than anything else at length convinced the Home Government of the absolute necessity of making some change in such a system—and, accordingly, Sir Thomas Monro was allowed to carry out, as Governor of Madras, in 1827, the reductions of from 25 to 33 per cent in the assessment which he had recommended so many years before. I say the reader may conceive what the people of Madras must have suffered during this interval! and he will perhaps remember "the unintermitting concert of praises sung "from year to year upon the Indian Government, and "the increasing happiness of the Indian people, all "the while they were sinking into deeper poverty and "wretchedness." As the same mystification goes on at this day, I should think with greater intensity than ever, and it will go on as long as the existing system of Home Government is tolerated, I will now quote some extracts from Mr. Campbell's book, to shew the present operation of the ryotwar system in Madras. "I must therefore describe a ryotwar settlement, or "rather absence of settlement, as it exists at Madras. "For the distinguishing feature of the ryotwar system "is simply that no settlement is concluded at all, but "the revenue is made the most of from year to year,

“ without settlement . . . ” “ The assessment is rather
“ fieldwar than ryotwar. The Government deals
“ directly, not only with each ryot, but with each field.
“ Instead of assessing each village it assesses each
“ plot of ground. A field is not, in India, a large
“ piece of land fenced and hedged, but a minute por-
“ tion, suited to the minute tenantry, divided from the
“ rest by a little gathering together of the earth about
“ six inches high. Fencing is not common, and in a
“ dry flat plain containing thousands of such fields
“ side by side, it may be supposed that boundaries are
“ only permanent when the fields belong to different
“ owners on the spot, with different interests. More-
“ over instead of assessing at a fixed sum for a series
“ of years, there is fixed on each *field* a maximum
“ rent to be paid for good seasons and good crops ;
“ and it is undertaken, not as an incidental indulgence,
“ but as an essential part of the system,” that this rent
shall be annually reduced when necessary. “ To effect
“ then the commutation of the share of grain into
“ money rates, all the land was surveyed according to
“ the native mode of measurement . . . there were no
“ maps.”

No ! and it has been recently stated publicly, by
a former member of the Madras Government, that
not a single district in the Presidency possesses a
scientific or accurate survey ; and in most, either no
survey has ever been made, or it was known to have
been hastily and carelessly donè, and to have been
extensively tampered with afterwards.

But to return to Mr. Campbell, “ for the manage-

“ment of the village, the headman and accountant are
“made altogether Government servants, paid by
“Government;” and “for the prevention of fraud on
“the part of these functionaries, reliance is placed on
“*informers*. Fifty per cent of the assessment is
“allowed as a reward to any informer of concealed
“cultivation, &c., and it is stated that there are in
“almost every village dismissed accountants desirous
“of being re-employed, and unemployed servants who
“wish to bring themselves to notice, whose services as
“*informers* can be relied on.” Before the rains the
native collector makes “a statement preparatory to
“settlement. But this is by no means *the* settlement.
“When the crops are nearly ripe, the collector goes
“out into the district to look at them, and make his
“annual settlement. The village accountant makes
“out a statement, shewing the cultivation of each ryot,
“his crops and circumstances, the number of his cattle,
“sheep, and children . . . At this time, all who think
“they should not pay full rent, apply for reduction.
“All these cases are settled, and *then only* does the
“collector make up his annual settlement, grant formal
“leases, and take formal engagements for the crop,
“which by this time is *past*, and generally *paid for*.
“The settlement is not made up till *after* the crop is
“ripe, in fact generally does not reach the collector’s
“office till *after* most of the money has already got
“there, and after making all the remissions and re-
“ductions of the season from the standard assessment.”
Yet this settlement is appealed to by the Bureaucracy

at home as a proof of the regularity with which the assessment is collected in ryotwar districts!—Mr. Campbell goes on: “ that the result of the ryotwar “ system in Madras is most unfavourable all parties “ seem to admit. The Madras men to whom I have “ talked candidly admit that at the present moment “ the state of things is most unsatisfactory—that the “ people are wretchedly poor, the land of little value— “ that the difficulty is to get people to cultivate it on “ any terms—and that the cultivation is kept up by “ forcing, by Government advances, &c. &c. And, “ indeed, no one who has any experience of these mat- “ ters can wonder that it should be so. The idea of “ the British Government undertaking to perform the “ duties of immediate landlord throughout a great “ country, discarding all the assistance of the system “ which we found, the self-contained communities, and “ dealing singly with each wretched cultivator, is, to “ one who knows the trouble and difficulty of manag- “ ing in this way but two or three villages, quite “ absurd. All experience, as well as all reason, is “ against it. Any indigo planter who has a village or “ two could tell the weary work, the coaxing and bar- “ gaining, and the management, the favourable leases “ given to some cultivators, the bad debts left by “ others, the thousand and one details of managing a “ village on this system; and the idea of one man so “ managing a couple of thousand villages is perfectly “ monstrous. . . . Only imagine one collector dealing “ directly with 150,000 tenants, not one of whom has

“ a lease, but each pays *according as he cultivates and*
 “ *gets a crop, and with reference to his cattle, sheep,*
 “ *and children, and each of whom gets a reduction if*
 “ *he can make out a sufficiently good case . . . it is*
 “ *generally agreed that the abuses of the whole*
 “ *system, and especially that of remission, is something*
 “ *frightful; and that the opportunities of extortion,*
 “ *peculation, chicanery, and intrigue of all kinds are*
 “ *unbounded; while the reliance of the Madras col-*
 “ *lector on informers by no means mends the matter.”*
 This, reader, is the “ *excellent revenue system! of*
 “ *great advantage to India, inasmuch as what goes into*
 “ *the pockets of individuals in this country goes there*
 “ *into the coffers of the State, and the country is pro-*
 “ *tanto exempt from taxation!*” Now from such excel-
 lent revenue systems, may the Lord deliver us! I have
 said that the true theory was established at last; but
 it was not a new theory—correct views had been held
 by individuals even before Lord Cornwallis’s “Per-
 petual Settlement,” and had been proclaimed by
 authority before the adoption of the ryotwar system in
 Madras. But it was reserved for one eminent man
 to collect into a focus all the scattered proofs which
 existed of the real nature of the Indian land-tax, and
 to establish the true theory on a basis which has never
 since been shaken, by a book published in 1830. This
 author, Lieut.-General Briggs, after having been the
 confidential assistant of Mr. Elphinstone, in all the
 difficulties of the second Mahratta war, was employed
 at its close to settle large districts of the Peishwa’s

country, which gave him an unusual insight into the details of native administration; he afterwards enjoyed opportunities of extending and maturing his observations as Resident at various Native Courts, and during a mission to Persia, and he brought to his task not merely the resources of a first-rate Oriental scholar, but the experience of a practised administrator and the caution of a diplomatist. The method pursued in his work was to travel bit by bit, over the whole surface of India, illustrating the true theory by an immense mass of historical testimony, Native and European; which no writer has ever attempted to answer. I have not space to go into the details of this work, but the sum of its proofs was as follows:—1st. That the integrity of private property in land had been recognised in every village in India. 2nd. That Government had no right whatever to the land, but only to a share in its produce, that is to a tax, which did not affect the proprietary rights any more than the land-tax affects our rights in England. 3rd. That the Government share or tax was so *defined and limited* both by Hindoo and Mahommedan law, that Government had no title or precedent (except revolutionary ones) for taxing the people at discretion, and no more right to claim the property of the land and take its “rent,” than a tithe-owner has to claim another man’s estate because it pays him tithe. 4th. That the Native institutions themselves, afforded a broad basis for our administration, and the only one on which we could establish a durable empire. A series of articles by the

same author, adding new proofs of the correctness of the above views, have recently been published in the "*Indian News*" journal, Nos. 227 to 233. The above work produced a strong impression on the mind of one of the most illustrious politicians of that day, Lord Wm. Bentinck, who at length saw, happily for some of the natives, that the land in India was held in exactly the same conditions as those on which a man possesses a house, or a horse, or a dog, or land, or any other property in England, namely, that the Government might assess it to pay a settled tax, and attach to sell it if the tax was not paid; but that this tax was no more "*rent*" in India than it is in England. The fact is that *tax* and *rent* are two things different in their nature, and acted upon inversely by given circumstances; for instance, *rent*, or the annual premium paid for the use of land, increases per head with the increase of population—*tax*, or the annual contribution to the expenses of the State, as a rule diminishes per head with the increase of population; and in this way the taxes of England have been very much lightened per head in the last half century. But to return to Lord Wm. Bentinck; this enlightened and sincere friend of the natives, when Governor-General of India, took the first opportunity of embodying the recommendations of the above work in a series of regulations, which he sent to General Briggs, then Resident at Nagpore, for correction, and which were the foundation of the North Western Settlements. I must refer the reader to Mr. Campbell's book for the

details, but the principle of these settlements was to ascertain and define first, the extent, nature, and value of the lands, and the rights of their owners, and then, securing the rights of these owners, to settle the tax on a moderate assessment for a term of thirty years, liable to a fixed decennial increase if a certain quantity of fresh land is brought into cultivation, at the same time carefully preserving the native institutions, that is to say *the village system, working through that*, and collecting the tax from the representatives of the different villages. And now, what does the reader think of the Government forcing its Madras system upon Bombay, not only in spite of Mr. Elphinstone's strong opposition, but in spite of his strongly expressed opinion in favour of the village system (for he anticipated long before the conclusions of Lord Wm. Bentinck), and let the reader think of the Government doing this about the time when it was compelled to avow the ruinous consequences of the "excellent revenue system," in Madras! However, such was the case; and although Mr. Elphinstone's great name enabled him to resist ryotwar settlements as long as he was Governor, the doom of the ryots was sealed when he went home, and the "excellent revenue system" was soon after introduced in Bombay. Of course this method of "wholly untaxing" the people by taking their rent, soon reduced them to a state of pauperism in Bombay, as it had done in Madras, and not until they were so reduced, did the Government agree to any reduction in the assessment.

A revision of the assessment is now going on in Bombay, but has only yet gone over the southern portion of the Presidency, and it is stated in the *Friend of India*, of October 21, 1852, that before this revision, “no ryot ever knew one year what he might have to pay the next, and whatever he paid, or whatever exertions he might be induced to make, he still found an unaccountable amount of arrears hanging over his head. There were no rich landholders to stand between him and the Government, no capitalist to bear the first pressure of a bad season, but he just scrambled on from year to year, and took to flight when the grievance became too great to bear. The collection was in fact, based upon the same principle as that which to this day governs taxation in Egypt, viz.: to take from the peasant everything that can be squeezed out of him and then to make a merit of remitting the remainder.” With regard to “rich landholders” and “capitalists,” I have alluded to the progressive destruction of the native aristocracy in my sixth chapter; and the ruin of the country gentlemen and principal farmers by our over assessment is noticed in Mr. Giberne’s evidence before the Commons’ Committee of 1848; also in a letter dated 1849, from a gentleman high in the Company’s service, quoted by Mr. Bright, in the House of Commons, saying “*many of the best families in the provinces who were rich and well to do when we came into Guzerat, in 1807, have now scarcely clothes to their backs, &c. &c.*” I will conclude this chapter by exposing the stupid fallacy,

worthy of a bureaucratic Government, which assumes that a land-tax is the best of all taxes, and the Indian revenue must depend upon it. In the first place it cannot depend upon it, for it is notorious that the Government cannot tax the land any more, and the Indian finances are now in a state of the most dangerous embarrassment from the insufficiency of the revenue. In the second place, a land tax is not the best of all taxes, not only because Adam Smith and others have shewn that a money tax on land must soon become unequal, but because it is a direct tax on produce, which is always the form of taxation least productive to the Government and most oppressive to the people. To say that it is "best" to raise three-fourths of the revenue by a direct tax on produce in India, while we only raise one-fifth of the revenue by direct taxation in England, is a gross and glaring contradiction. Yet, conceive our adopting the "best" principle and attempting to raise three-fourths of our own revenue by a direct tax on the land? Why, the Customs alone pay above twenty-two millions of our net revenue! so that the system is evidently absurd in our own case, or that of any other civilized nation, which a Bureaucracy calls best in India; though it is really quite as absurd there as anywhere else—and it has led to the cruel over-assessment of the people, and the perpetual grasping of the Government for more direct revenue, by confiscating Native States and the landed properties of the Native aristocracy, without saving the Indian finances after all from falling into a situation of extreme peril.

How different is this result from that obtained by a Native Government which encouraged the commerce of its subjects. General Briggs has shewn that one of the wealthiest Native States, before our time, that of Malabar, had no land-tax at all, and had a very large revenue without one. Yet the Bureaucracy, as I will endeavour to shew in my 6th chapter, have done everything to destroy, and nothing to help the commerce of the natives. I am reminded by the subject of this chapter, of one of the effects which would ensue, if commerce was possible, to the natives of India. It is notorious that they have a passion for wearing gold ornaments, and to such a degree, that these used to be a sort of criterion of their family wealth; and it is stated in a pamphlet by a late member of the Bombay Government, and has been confirmed to me by several old Indians, that under the operation of the "excellent revenue system," which ground them down, till it was reported by a Revenue Commissioner before the late revision of the assessment, that "the straits "to which the cultivators were reduced, were not "merely those of the most coarse and homely fare, "but he believed the far greater proportion could not "afford for themselves one daily plentiful meal, of any "sort of grain, throughout the year:"—under this process, of course, their gold ornaments and every atom of gold has disappeared from among them. Now, the consequence of a considerable reduction of the assessment in the South of Bombay has been to cause a vast increase of cultivation and a glut of pro-

duce, which absolutely rots in the interior for want of a market, and brings back the old difficulty of finding money to meet the assessment. Yet if commerce was possible to these people, and I will endeavour to shew in my 6th chapter that it is impossible, not only could they sell their produce but they would get back all their family treasures, and absorb millions upon millions of the gold which is pouring in from Australia, &c.

However, it is hopeless to ask the Home Government to encourage the commerce of the natives. It is impossible for any man to judge of the unfitness of a Bureaucracy to comprehend the interests or conduct the affairs of a great empire, without having had to deal with the Home Government of India. Burke's description of the statesmanship of a Bureaucracy is not in the least exaggerated: "there is no trade so vile and mechanical as Government in their hands. A large, liberal, and prospective view of the interests of states, passes with them for romance; and the principles that recommend it, for the wanderings of a disordered imagination. Little-ness in object and in means to them appears soundness and sobriety." It is in vain to ask such a class as this for any enlightened measures of Government. It is in vain to prove to them, year after year, that such a return of part of the taxes in public works, as is the undoubted right of the people who have been "wholly untaxed" by taking their "rent," that this would produce an increase in

the Indian revenues, of which no man could foresee the end—that it would re-establish the finances ; relieve the cultivators ; restore the capital we have exhausted ; and replace the trade we have destroyed. All such appeals, either in private or in the Court of Proprietors, are rejected as a romance, and resented as an intrusion.

“ I’ll have my bond ; I will not hear thee speak ;
 “ I’ll not be made a soft and dull-eyed fool,
 “ To shake the head, relent, and sigh, and yield
 “ To Christian intercessors. Follow not ;
 “ I’ll have no speaking ; I will have my bond.”

So they will indeed ! they are now goading on the Bombay Government to seize the Enams in that Presidency ; they have taken away many of these estates which had been in the same families for centuries ; and as I shew in my 6th chapter, they are in a course of confiscating the territories of Native Princes, whose dynasties date certainly from 2000 years back, and whose ancestors resisted Alexander the Great.

To bring these things home to the reader, let me suggest a parallel case in England, to what we do in India. Our “ great Duke,” and our only one, has just passed away from amongst us. I leave his services to the record of history and the praises of posterity ; my business is only with a certain estate given to the Duke and his heirs by the nation, to reward those services. Now I propose to my countrymen, to shew our national gratitude, by pauperising

the present Duke and Duchess of Wellington; and to shew our honour and good faith by confiscating Strathfieldsaye. Is the reader shocked at such an idea? but it does not shock our Indian Government in the least. Does the reader think the present Duke's title to his property is something sacred? but so is a native gentleman's title to his Enam. Does the reader think the confiscation of Strathfieldsaye would be a very meagre addition to our revenue, after all? but we see in India that a number of estates taken in this way, do something. Can the reader still hesitate? has he yet another scruple? will he say that no empire can be durable which is not just? why then, in God's name, let him help to stop the injustice of our Indian Government!

CHAPTER V.

THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM.

IT was one of the greatest evils of the Ryotwar settlements, that they subverted the indigenous municipal institutions of the country. These institutions had formed the basis of every successive empire in India for ages ; and they were so rooted in the hearts of the people, that when allowed to retain their cherished privilege of local self-government, they were comparatively indifferent to the title, or creed, or nationality of their rulers, and indisposed to political combination, because they enjoyed a simple and satisfactory administration of civil and criminal law. However, the English, who first acquired territory in the most disorganized part of India, and were then entirely ignorant of the systematic structure of native society—the English rashly assumed that an ancient, long-civilized people, possessing the elaborate mechanism of old governments, suited to their manners and domestic circumstances, grown into a second nature by custom, and to this day working admirably under good rulers—that such a people were a race of barbarians who had never known what justice was until we came among them, and that the best thing we could do for

them was to upset all their institutions as fast as we could, and among others their judicial system, and give them instead a copy of our legal models at home. Models, be it remembered, against which we have been inveighing for at least a century and a half, and which have at length become so odious that we have radically changed a great part of them, and may possibly condemn still more. But even if the technical system of English law had worked well at home, it would have been the grossest political empiricism to force it on a people so different from ourselves as every Oriental people are ; and considering that it did not work well, even at home, the reader may conceive the irreparable mischief it has done in India. It is lamentable to contemplate the pictures given us of its demoralization of the natives ; and the more so, because this demoralization is progressive, so that the worst results are found in our oldest possessions. There was some excuse for the Government which introduced this system of "artificial technicalities," in its profound ignorance of every native institution, including those rational methods of dispensing justice peculiar to the country. But nothing can excuse the Government of the present day for maintaining such an abuse ; nothing can even account for such mal-administration, except the fact, that the Home Government is an irresponsible Bureaucracy. What makes this disregard of the rights of the natives (their right to be well governed) more flagrant in the present instance, is the fact that ample information has long since been supplied to the Government of the evils of its own judicial system and the

merits of the native one. Indeed this last has been retained, and is working with complete success in the latest of our territorial acquisitions; for somehow or other we always know how to give the native good government, when we have strong motives for doing so: as in the Punjaub, where it is our interest to conciliate a martial people, newly brought under our sway; and in Mysore, where it is our interest to reconcile them to the prospect of absorption. But, says Mr. Campbell, the Punjaub "having had the benefit of our previous experience, the best systems have been introduced." This is no excuse for the Government, but an aggravation of its injustice. Equity would require that the unfortunate people at whose expense our experience has been gained, should be among the first to benefit by it. For it has cost our old provinces dear, this experience! We have experimented upon their population, as if in animâ vili, while we were finding out what were "the best systems;" and now we have found them out, we do not give these unfortunate people the benefit of them. However, I object to the word "introduced" in the above sentence. Mr. Campbell's partiality for the Civil Service leads him to speak of our successful administration of the Punjaub, as if the Civil Service had invented a revenue and judicial system which we have only adopted, and which is some centuries older than our empire in India. Long before we knew anything of India, the fabric of native society had been characterized by some peculiar and excellent institutions, viz., by a municipal organi-

zation, providing a most efficient police for the administration of criminal law, while the civil law was worked by a simple process of arbitration, which either prevented litigation, or else ensured prompt and substantial justice to the litigants. It may be worth while to add some details on the subject of these institutions.

The village was the germ of the whole political system of native States. The constitution of a village was the model of that of a town consisting of more than one parish ; and so on, till the village became a city ; each branch of the municipality increasing as the community enlarged, until the single smith or carpenter of the village was represented by the guild of his trade in the city ; and in every case the freeholders forming a corporation which managed the municipal revenues and police, and was the organ through which the Government transacted its business with the people. As a rule, all over India, there were three classes of ryots or cultivators in every village : 1st, the freeholders or proprietors of the soil ; 2nd, a class like copyholders, who rented of the first, but could not sell nor be turned out of their holdings while they performed their engagements ; 3rd, a class of tenants-at-will ; the mechanics, police, &c., were paid partly by tax-free lands, and partly by a fixed portion of the produce of each field. Of the above, the landlord class alone was responsible to the Government for the taxes, which were assessed on each member of this body by its elective council, and the surplus

rent, after paying Government dues and municipal expenses, was divided among the freeholders, in proportion to their share, large or small, of the property : but there was nothing like "communism" in this division, except the sort of communism we have in many parishes in England, viz., a freeholder's right of pasturage on the village common, where there happened to be such a thing. The two most useful functionaries in this municipality were the head-man and the record-keeper ; both generally hereditary officers, but requiring the confirmation of Government. The head-man was the village magistrate, tax-gatherer, coroner, &c., and had a limited civil and criminal jurisdiction, though in the village council, he was simply "primus inter pares." The record-keeper was quite as important an officer as the first, for nowhere in the world were the records kept with more accuracy and statistical detail than in India. The village books contained a register of every field, with dimensions, names of owners, crops sown, &c., with every particular of the possession or alienation of real property by sale, heritage, or transfer, and as the sale of land was one of the most formal processes in all the native institutions, and every circumstance of the transaction was recorded, it was comparatively easy to ascertain the truth in cases of disputed right. Finally, the village chief and record-keeper were represented by corresponding functionaries at the head of each native district or county, who thus connected the local with the general administration, and were the

organs of communication between the Government and the people. For instance, in the imposition of any new tax, the native Governments always took care to obtain first the assent of the local authorities; stimulating their self-interest on such occasions, and profiting by their influence over the people. Whereas, our Government has sometimes goaded the natives into open resistance, by making them feel that they were neither represented nor consulted in its arbitrary imposition of new taxes. It was the county chiefs spoken of above, whom Lord Cornwallis mistook for great land-owners; though they were really only great tax-gatherers; and to whom he transferred the landed property of their districts by his Perpetual Settlement.

But certain conditions were exacted from these municipalities under the native system in return for the privilege of self-government. Each community was responsible for a due performance of its police duties, under heavy penalties; as were formerly the "Hundreds," in England. They were bound to produce or trace the perpetrators of robberies or outrages committed within their limits, or else to make good the amount lost, or submit to a fine imposed by the Government: and partly owing to this responsibility, partly to the peculiar fitness for their employment of the Aborigines who fulfilled the Police duties, there was no part of the municipal institutions of an Indian village more perfect than its police system. Marvellous stories are related of the sagacity of this native police, who have been known to trace

criminals from one county to another, sometimes for weeks together, until they succeeded in apprehending them, and wherever we have destroyed the native institutions and disorganised this force, a great increase of crime has been the consequence. Bengal is a melancholy case in point; and I must continually direct the reader's attention to the fact that wherever we have upset the native institutions, and put inventions of our own in their place, it has produced a great and progressive increase of crime. But it was in the administration of civil law that the merits of the native system were most conspicuous. The Judges were appointed by the King, and sat as his representatives, and the central courts in the capital, and local courts in the districts, corresponded to the old European model: with this difference, that as there were no set of functionaries in the Native Courts, as attorneys and special pleaders, whose livelihood depended on their practice, the Indian judges had a motive for suppressing litigation, and they maintained a system of arbitration, comparatively inexpensive to the litigants, greatly facilitated by the exact and minute record of real property, and scarcely ever leading to appeals to a higher Court.

It is worth while to add a sketch of the forms in Native Civil Courts; as they are still existing and working to admiration, wherever we have not destroyed the native institutions and introduced our system of "artificial technicalities." After the plaintiff's petition is received by the judge, he must

attend when it is read in court, to answer any interrogatories the judge chooses to put to him. The defendant is then summoned and required to answer in writing, and it is the duty of the judge, at this stage of the proceedings, to endeavour to effect an arrangement or compromise, and obtain from the parties mutual releases; in which case, this first process is final. Failing in this, the judge proposes to them an arbitration of friends, generally accepted when the parties are dealing fairly with one another—and then the forms of a regular trial are enforced by an officer of the court, who has power to compel the attendance of witnesses, the production of papers, &c.; the award is made a rule of Court, and this second process is final too. When one or both parties refuse this method, they are required to give securities, the one to prosecute, the other to defend the case. The Court then summons a number of individuals of the same profession or rank as the parties, out of whom a certain number are selected, any of whom the plaintiff or defendant has a right to challenge; the Court deciding on the validity of objection. The parties are then required to sign an instrument agreeing to submit their cause to this jury, and pay a certain fine to Government if they appeal against the decision (this meaning appeal costs), and after the hearing of the cause, before the decree is passed, they are required to sign an affirmation of the fairness of the proceedings. An officer of the Court attends to regulate the forms, as in the Arbitration Courts, and

in this way several suits may be conducted simultaneously in the same Court. When the decree is given, the judge awards their costs to jurors, witnesses, &c., and decides who is to pay them. In the event of an appeal, the appellant must enter into recognizances to pay the expences, but an appeal beyond the district seems to be unheard of, and this simple mode of dispensing justice, minus English law and attorneys and special pleaders, is to this day completely successful. It is not that lawyers do not exist in Native States, but that the Court alone can summon them, if it requires their advice or assistance; the parties cannot hire them under the native system, as they do under our system, to defeat the ends of justice.

Such then is the native judicial administration as it still exists in many parts of India, and did exist everywhere; and so well did it work, that Mr. Elphinstone can only account for "the flourishing state of the Mahratta country," in spite of the obvious defects in its Government, by attributing it to the judicial part of the native institutions. And now, in lieu of this simple and rational mode of dispensing justice, we have given the natives an obscure, complicated, pedantic system of English law, full of "artificial technicalities," which disable the candidates for justice from any longer pleading their own cause, and force them to have recourse to a swarm of attorneys and special pleaders, that is of *professional rogues*, according to Mr. Campbell, to conduct their cases, by which means we have taught an ingenious people to refine upon the quibbles

and fictions of English lawyers, and become such adepts in the science, that the course of justice, civil as well as criminal, is utterly confounded in a maze of artifice and fraud, and the natives, both high and low, are becoming more and more demoralized, as they become more dexterous in applying all the "sharp practice" of English law.

I had copied a series of extracts from "Modern India" to illustrate all this, but I now find their volume so great, that I cannot possibly insert them; although Mr. Campbell's description is full of graphic details, of which I cannot give the effect in a condensed statement. I must, therefore, recommend the reader to buy the book, as the outline of its revelations, which is all I can find room for, will not give a sufficient idea of the injury which our judicial system is doing to the natives. This author says that some men go out from Haileybury, who are not, and never can be, fit for the duties of the Civil Service; that in the course of promotion, men are changed from one department to another with a totally different set of duties at every step—frequently posted to different parts of the country where they do not understand the language of the people; and that they only hold the same office on an average for two or three years without interruption, which gives little opportunity for acquiring the local knowledge necessary for administrative duties. As the rule, promotion goes by seniority, and so the most indifferent officers attain a certain rank in time, and the higher appointments are

sometimes long blocked up by elderly men, never brilliant and now inefficient, worn out in body, mind, or temper, yet who cannot or will not retire.

When a collector is old enough, he is made a judge—and to this step there is almost no exception if it is wished for. “It seems to be considered, that if at this time of life a man is fit for anything at all, he is fit for a judge; and if he is fit for nothing, better make him a judge and get rid of him; for once in that office, he has no *claim* to farther promotion by mere seniority alone.” Altogether, it happens that few above mediocrity remain to be judges, and of those who do, many are disappointed men; and in both divisions of the Bengal Presidency they are promoted to be judges late in life, with no previous experience whatever of the principal portion of their duties, civil justice.

These judges are nervous, captious, and timid; disposed to overstrain forms and exaggerate technicalities, and to rush into the extreme of legal niceties and quibbles; they are unwilling to convict on reasonable evidence—some, unable to make up their minds, and thinking acquittal the safest course—some, considering themselves charged with the interests of the prisoner as opposed to the magistrate, and seeking for every argument for acquittal, substantial or technical; and finally, they are prone to feel that their consequence depends upon actively interfering with and checking the magistrates, and to give prisoners the benefit of every doubt on their minds, reasonable or unreasonable, rather than face the responsibility of convicting them. “Trans-

“ferred to the superintendence of a large judicial
“machinery, after having spent the best of their years
“and energies in other employments, it is hardly to
“be expected that they would well perform so diffi-
“cult a task.” Such being the judges, let us see what
are the laws.

The criminal law is a patchwork, made up of pieces engrafted at all times and seasons on a groundwork of native codes, nearly covered and obliterated; in fact, by practice and continual emendations, there has grown up a system of our own; and the Sudder Court, composed of the judges described above, are in the habit of issuing authoritative “constructions” of regulations and points of practice: but successive judges pretty often vary their constructions. In the civil law the Government has scarcely interfered at all in the laws regulating property; but precedents and “constructions” have swelled out into a large and complicated legal system, quite undigested and unarranged, and the judges of one day are constantly altering the constructions of their predecessors. Such then being the judges, and such the laws, and the police being inefficient, except in the Punjaub, where “the wholesome ancient system is more exactly adhered to,” let us see how the system works, and first in criminal law? It appears that the magistrate has greater facilities for eliciting the truth than the judge; by questioning the witnesses, whose evidence is all taken down in writing, and ascertaining that they understand what is recorded, and the author

hardly ever knew evidence to be at all perverted where the parties, the magistrate, and the witnesses all spoke and understood the same language. Moreover, in the new territories there is a habit of confessing among the people; though this is exchanged for a habit of denial in the clearest cases when they find out the many judicial chances of escape under our system. Altogether in new territories, an efficient and experienced official can very well get at the truth in most cases; but there is a great deterioration in the course of time, from which the author infers that lying and perjury are quite as much due to our judicial institutions as to the people. It appears that the judge prefers deliberate statements as the best legal evidence; while the magistrate can to some extent ascertain the character and history of the witnesses, and does a good deal towards weighing them properly. But still experienced criminals, and especially the professional attorneys about the Courts do much to baffle him, witnesses are sent up well crammed and cautioned to tell a connected story, and not to tell too much; and when the case after a long interval goes to the judge, the evidence is worth literally nothing. All the witnesses are thoroughly well up in a thrice-told tale. Nothing is to be made of strings of such witnesses directly contradicting one another. The judge can get little more out of them. To him a witness is a witness, and he knows nothing else about him. "The civil courts are the great schools for perjury, and in our older possessions false witnesses for criminal

“ trials can easily be procured from thence.” At the trial one of the magistrate’s clerks does the mechanical duties of a prosecutor, and nothing more. The prisoner may produce any number of fresh witnesses he pleases, and has a right to counsel ; although there is none for the prosecution, and “ the professional advocates are the most unscrupulous of men.” Finally, though the form of a jury is preserved, the judge generally puts into the box some of the pleaders, and such people about the Court, intimates to them very broadly his opinion, they always agree with him, and there is no more trouble. Under this system there is a great increase of crime ; most marked in our oldest possessions ; and “ the Dacoits have now got the better of the laws.” It would be very odd if it were otherwise !

Now let us see what is the system in civil law. When the plaint is lodged, which is generally long, rambling, circumstantial, exceedingly exaggerated, and full of irrelevant matter, a notice is served on the defendant, or stuck up in the village where he is supposed to reside, requiring him to file an answer in a certain number of days. If he does so, the plaintiff is called upon for a replication, the defendant for a rejoinder, and so on, each paper containing all kinds of assertions, accusations, and technical objections, and refusing to admit the plainest facts. This being completed, issue is supposed to be joined, that is to say, the judge has before him a mass of the most prodigious contradictions which unscrupulous subtilty can deliberately prepare in writing, and great quantities of irrelevant

matter, and then he appoints a day for trial. Issues of law and fact are all joined at the same time. In the trial the judge is not permitted himself to make any effort towards the discovery of the truth. Every thing is left entirely to the management of the parties and their professional advisers, who avail themselves of every weapon, fair and unfair. Perjury, forgery, and fraud, are altogether rampant in the civil courts; in fact the whole system is one of highly perfected fencing with such weapons. The parties marshal up their own prepared witnesses, produce their own documents, and apply for reference to particular records. The judge would not on any account refer to the records of his own or the collector's office, except on special application from one of the parties. He scrupulously restricts himself to the *worst* evidence, and having heard that, he decides as he best may. If either party commit any error of form, it is fatal to his cause. If the defendant does not appear in the manner required, the decree goes against him by default, and the first he hears of it is in the seizure of his lands and goods, after which he has no legal remedy. In execution of decrees personal property is distrained, &c. Against the possessor of landed rights the process is exceedingly simple. They are at once sold by auction without reserve to the highest bidder in satisfaction of the decree; or if certain rights are decreed, they are at once made over by precept addressed to the collector, who must implicitly obey, however inequitable he may know the decision to be, and however inconsistent with the rights

of others. Such then is the system of civil law, and the worst of it is, we have succeeded in giving the natives a taste for this system of "artificial technicalities," which thrives amazingly; and as most people are frequently involved in litigation in some shape or other, the whole country is demoralized by it, and the lowest villagers are becoming up to many "dodges" of the law. Finally, our author says, "the judicial oath as it is used, does not in the very least affect the evidence. And yet this is not because the religious sanction of an oath is unknown to the people. On the contrary it *was* nowhere stronger, and this is another of the changes caused by our system. In a new country I found that a solemn oath' was astonishingly binding, not gabbled out lightly as an every day matter in the courts of justice, but taken on rare occasions, after the fashion of the people themselves. But such binding oaths do not exist in our older provinces. The judicial oath is much too common-place an affair to carry weight, and the people seeing perjury practised with impunity, become used to it. The longer we possess any province the more common and grave does perjury become."

Such then are our judges, and laws, and administration of what is called civil and criminal justice in India. And the maintenance of this demoralizing system is the more iniquitous that Government is aware of the evil, and conscious of the remedy. That remedy has been applied in the Punjab, and the reason for adopting it is thus stated by Mr. Campbell. "After a long

“ trial of the working of the old courts, it may be sup-
“ posed that the Government was little inclined to
“ extend their operation, and the system was so radi-
“ cally vicious that there was no amending it except by
“ altogether sweeping it away and commencing *de*
“ *novo*.” He then gives the details of the Punjaub
administration which the reader will find is the same
native system described in the beginning of this
chapter. The remedy then, and the only one, is to
return to that local self-government, and simple mode
of administering justice, indigenious to the country,
and congenial to the manners of its inhabitants. A
remarkable instance of the success of returning to
native principles is given by the historian, Professor
Wilson, where he relates how a Bengal magistrate suc-
ceeded in putting down gang robbery in the district of
Burdwan. He says, “ the instruments employed were
“ the neglected and under-valued institutions of the
“ country, animated by skilful superintendence and
“ encouragement. The landowners and head-men of
“ the villages and of various trades, were called upon
“ to enter into engagements for the performance of
“ those duties, which it was personally explained to
“ them they were expected to fulfil, and the village
“ watchmen were punished for neglect or connivance,
“ and rewarded for courage and good conduct. At-
“ tempts to deprive them of their service lands were
“ sedulously resisted, and the villagers were encou-
“ raged to give them more liberal subsistence. In
“ this instance it was unequivocally shewn that the

“ co-operation of the people was to be had, and that
“ when had it was efficacious. Notwithstanding this
“ evidence of the feasibility of a different system, no
“ attempt was made to act upon it on a more exten-
“ sive scale.” No ! instead of that, in spite of every
evidence, and warning, and remonstrance from the most
competent authorities, the Government has deliberately
gone on breaking up the native system all over the
country, except in the North-west Provinces and the
Punjaub, and yet, owing partly, to the short date of
our Empire in the greater part of India, and partly,
to the extraordinary tenacity with which the people
cling to the most characteristic parts of their social
structure, although we have subverted the fabric, we
have nowhere succeeded in destroying the elements of
their institutions. The utter destruction of a village,
says Sir John Malcolm, and dispersion of its inha-
bitants for hundreds of miles, and for thirty years at a
time, cannot prevent its instant re-establishment when
force is withdrawn. At that signal the people at once
reappear, the lost records are recovered, every field is
recognized and claimed, the hereditary village officers,
even when infants, are reinstated, and the little muni-
cipality resumes its place and reasserts its nature.
The village institutions, he says elsewhere, will after
the scenes they have survived, be indestructible, unless
the strong hand of power breaks up establishments
which have for ages formed the basis of all Indian
Governments. Yet this is what the strong hand of
English power continues to do in our old provinces ;

to break up establishments which ensured the natives a good administration of civil and criminal law, and to maintain the shocking abuse of justice exposed by Mr. Campbell. For I ask the reader whether such a judicial system as this author describes be not an offence to God and man? It seems contrived on purpose, not merely to render person and property insecure, and to stop the means of encouraging every kind of industry, but to force, as in a hot-bed, every evil tendency of the native mind; to paralyse confidence between man and man; and to deprave a whole people as much as it is possible for laws to deprave them. And after the abuses of this judicial system have been notorious for about half a century, especially since the Commons' Committee Report of 1810, can Parliament pretend to believe that the bureaucratic Government which has maintained them, has done its duty to the people of India? Can Parliament venture to prolong the secret, irresponsible despotism of such a Government, for another twenty years?

CHAPTER VI.

FINANCE AND PUBLIC WORKS.

SOME of the most sagacious of princes, such as Diocletian and Queen Elizabeth, have complained that it was next to impossible for even a wise and good Ruler to find out the truth, when it was the interest of his ministers to combine together to deceive their sovereign. Never was this more strikingly exemplified than by the mystification of England with regard to the condition of the natives of India, by the bureaucratic Government to which England commits her authority over them. Never was it more true that, "what flatters the sovereign generally forms the misery of the people;" as we shall see when I examine what those "blessings of the British Rule," which England imagines she confers upon India, really are? The most curious thing is, that although the imposture of the day is invariably exposed afterwards, the exposure never seems to reach the mass of the people of this country, but the next grand deception of the Indian Government is just as successful as any former one. This reminds me of the following remarks of Machiavelli on the Borgia Pope: "So simple are men, and so prone to obey any impulse from without, that who-

“ ever is willing to deceive them will always find those
“ who are willing to be deceived. Alexander the 6th
“ never did any thing else than deceive men, nor
“ thought of any thing else, and none ever asserted
“ more confidently, or swore to promises better and
“ kept them less, than he did, nevertheless his decep-
“ tions always succeeded to a wish, because he under-
“ stood that part of the business of life thoroughly.”
And this is the only part of the business of life which
the Bureaucracy seems to understand ; however, if the
reader has the patience to go through this chapter, I
will shew him that unless we entirely and immediately
change our system, and relieve India from the incubus
of a bureaucratic Government, our affairs in that coun-
try cannot be saved from utter ruin : indeed it will be
no easy matter to save them now ! As the Home
Authorities always treat the question of public works
as one of finance, I will take a leaf out of their book,
and consider the subject in a financial point of view.
What is it that now renders the state of the Indian
finances dangerous and unsafe, and far more so than
they were in 1842, when Sir Robert Peel strongly
expressed his alarm about them ? It is the steady
increase of debt ; the almost invariable deficit ; the non-
increase, the decrease in some instances, of the taxpay-
ing power of the people ; coupled with the unhealthy
symptom of an unnatural weakness in this taxpaying
power, and the confession of the Indian Government
after it has tried taxes on everything susceptible of an
impost, that it cannot carry taxation any further. Is

not such a condition of the finances of a great empire enough to alarm any foreseeing statesman? One source of revenue has indeed increased, and just in time to save us from adding several millions more to the debt, but as this source of revenue is one which forms no test of the general ability of the people to pay taxes, although it now contributes about one-eighth of the net receipt of the Indian Exchequer, it adds to the danger of our situation, that this duty on opium is liable to great fluctuations, and might any day be immediately and finally extinguished (one-eighth of the net revenue!) by an act of common sense on the part of the Chinese Government; viz. by its permitting the cultivation of the poppy at home. Surely, when the reader considers the actual embarrassment of the Indian finances, the yearly peril of losing one-eighth of the net revenue, and the confessed inability of the Government to impose more taxes, he must feel how deeply our own interests are involved in placing the finances of India on a sounder footing; for as the case stands, although it would ruin England to lose her empire in India, it is threatening our own finances with ruin to be obliged to keep it. The most startling point to English eyes is the small taxpaying power of the people. A comparison with our own happier land will shew the significance of this fact. In England the people pay on an average £2. per head of population annually in taxes; yet so far from the industry of the country's being crushed by such a burthen, the people never were so prosperous before; in case of war they could evidently

raise a much larger sum for the service of the State, and in peace the yield of the taxes increases with such regularity that a Chancellor of the Exchequer may calculate on a surplus of about two millions sterling every year. In India the people pay only *5s 4d* per head, and deducting the opium monopoly and about half a million of tribute from foreign States, the natives literally pay only *4s 5d* per head of population annually in taxes; and yet by its own admission the Government cannot raise any larger sum in case of an emergency, and so far from the yield of the Indian taxes regularly increasing and affording a surplus nearly four times as large as that of England, in proportion to the number of the people, the Indian revenue would be actual declining at this moment without an increase of territory which brings a corresponding increase of charges. Is it not clear that there must be something radically wrong, something completely rotten in such a state of things as this? The people are described by Mr. Campbell and others, as being full of industrial energy, and "well fitted to accumulate capital." Why then are they so wretchedly poor? What has become and does now become of their productive capital? For it is evidently stationary at an unnaturally low ebb, if it be not even diminishing. Aye! we must ask it sooner or later, and the longer we delay the greater becomes our own danger, what has become of the productive capital of India? I am sorry to say the question opens a dark page of English history, for it is impossible to investigate this subject

without recognising the effect of foreign mal-administration in draining away the capital of the natives of India. Independent of the illegitimate gains of the last century, of the enormous sums of money abstracted from the country in the good old times, when it was possible for a young Englishman to go out with nothing at all, and return at the age of thirty-four with a fortune of a million sterling (vide the histories of Clive, Paul Benfield, and scores of obscure "Nabobs"), independent of the savings of English officials, who monopolize the most lucrative employments in the State, and go home, of course, when they have realized a fortune—independent of the "resumptions" of landed estates and the gradual extinction of the Native Princes who spend their incomes in the country, to make room for more English officials, in other words, to provide more patronage for the Home Government, independent of all this, there is a regular drain in hard cash every year of about three millions sterling from India, for claims in England designated "the Home Charges."

Now, it has been said by the historian, Professor Wilson, that the transfer of surplus revenue to England is "an exhausting drain upon the resources of the country, the issue of which is replaced by no reflux "it is an extraction of the life-blood from the veins of national industry, which no subsequent introduction "of nourishment is furnished to restore;" and some such effects must result from the annual transfer of so large a proportion of the produce of Indian taxes to

England. To bring the case home to our own feelings, let us conceive ourselves to be subjugated and obliged to ship off annually, without one farthing of return, the same proportion of our taxes, which would be more than eight millions sterling, to some foreign country; to see besides, foreigners occupying all the valuable appointments in our public service, and going home with their fortunes, and our great landed estates in a course of gradual "resumption" by the Government; how would our productive capital stand such a drain and such a system as this? Should we not, at least, expect when we remitted our eight millions, to have a good administration in return for our money? We might be sure our foreign masters would keep the peace in the country for their own sakes, but should we not expect them to do something for ours? particularly if they prided themselves on being a very Christian people, much superior in morality to ourselves? Should we not expect then to have an equitable revenue system, and a salutary administration of justice, and above all, considering our heavy tribute, to have our means of production encouraged and assisted? or at the very least, that our foreign rulers would not crush us to the earth by throwing cruel and wanton obstructions in the way of our industry? Well, modest as these expectations may seem, they have all been disappointed by the Government of an English Bureaucracy in India!

I have shewn what sort of revenue and judicial systems have been vouchsafed to the natives, and

will now shew what has been done for their trade. But first, in order to appreciate the obstacles which have mocked the hopes of the natives and doomed their industry and skill and the natural blessings of their soil to the curse of unfruitfulness, it is necessary to understand clearly that trade is the instrument of production. This point is so important, that I must be excused for dwelling upon it a little.

The reason that trade, in other words, commerce, (*commutatio mercium*) or exchange, is the instrument of production, is this: exchange permits that *division of labour* which alone gives value to labour, by enabling different men to obtain articles of utility or luxury, which they perhaps could not produce at all, or could only produce with great difficulty and loss of time—in return for other things which, from their education or genius, or soil or climate, they can produce with ease. Until, therefore, commerce or exchange is introduced into a country, and as long as everybody is obliged to produce and manufacture everything he requires for his own consumption, men remain of necessity in a state of barbarism and extreme poverty, from which they can only emerge in proportion to the division of labour effected by their progress in commerce. And in the state of barbarism or non-exchange, men are inclined to be idle because they can get no reward for being industrious; but when commerce or exchange introduces the division of labour, and gives a value to labour, by offering men what they covet in exchange for their own productions,

then the idleness of the savage is gradually transformed into the industry of civilized man. It has, therefore, been laid down as an axiom that "facility of exchange is the vivifying principle, the very soul of industry."

But, when it is clearly understood that exchange or commerce is the instrument of production, it becomes evident that whatever in any country renders this instrument too expensive to be used, is so far mortal to that country's industry, and that in any country where goods cannot be brought to market without an enormous waste of time and money in carrying them hundreds of miles over "mere tracks," then, in the same degree that the want of roads in such a country deprives the people of the instrument of production, viz. commerce or exchange, to the same extent it must forbid progress; it must ensure poverty; it must stop industry, and prevent the division of labour; it must neutralize God's blessing on the soil, and tend to keep the inhabitants barbarians and paupers. In applying this conclusion to India, I must remind the reader that as trade is the instrument of production, every unnecessary obstacle to the trade of the natives, which the Government has either thrown in their way or else neglected to remove in fulfilment of its acknowledged duty, has been so much positive repression of their means of production, and so much destruction of their capital. Yet I undertake to prove that the Government has inflicted both these injuries on the people of India; it has at one time thrown the

most ruinous obstacles in the way of their trade, and at another time declined to remove obstacles when admitting that it was its duty to do so: nay, incredible as it may appear, it has even prevented others from doing so. And the consequence is, that at this day the trade of India is but a miserable fraction of what it ought to be, and the pauperized natives cannot afford to pay taxes enough to keep the finances in safety, to the danger and discredit of England. As an example of this, it is worth noticing that the total estimated receipts from the land and sea customs of India for 1850-51, are only one million nine hundred odd thousand pounds (including six hundred odd thousand pounds for salt which, since the reduction of duty, is fast underselling and superseding the Government manufacture, and annihilating the revenue from the salt monopoly.) Now, here is a great fact! the customs of a mighty empire, abounding in noble rivers and fine harbours; possessing thousands of miles of coast; and rich in natural products; in cotton, tobacco, coffee, tea, silk, sugar, sandal-wood, linseed, flax, rice, tallow, wool, nutmeg, cinnamon, pepper, indigo, and a vast number of grains and fruits; and containing a naturally intelligent and industrious population, larger than that of all Europe, once indeed containing hundreds of thousands of merchants, manufacturers, and country gentlemen in the interior of the country, whom we have ruined,—the total customs of such an Empire only yield £1,974,556! (And at the same time it is said that England is

paying twenty millions sterling a-year more than necessary for supplies which she could obtain at a cheaper rate from India). I know it is asserted in answer to the above "great fact," that no considerable increase in the customs revenue of India is possible, for the following reasons—that, the native is contented with a little rice for his food, and scanty clothing for his dress, and his *few wants* do not dispose him to profit by the advantages of commerce. I should not answer such drivelling as this, if I had not observed that no mystification is too gross to be imposed on unthinking people with regard to the natives of India; as, however, everything must be answered, I will remark—1stly, That if the native were so easily *contented*, he would be different from all the rest of the human race. 2ndly, That the assertion is contradicted by our experience; for whenever the natives in our employment, or in private occupations, gain more than the mass of the people, they immediately indulge in better food, better clothing, finery of all sorts, equipages, if they can, and vying with one another in ostentatious entertainments, which are rather astonishing in a people of *few wants*; in short, they go on like the rest of the world. 3rdly, I believe that the passions of vanity and sensuality are much more common to men, I say nothing about women, than the passion of avarice, which is always the vice of the smaller number, and the Indians might be reproached for extravagance on high feasts and holidays, but not for avarice. Perhaps I may as well give one example,

out of many, to shew that the *few wants* of the natives are all moonshine.

The scene of the following occurrence, cited by Mr. Chapman, was a district inhabited by the most uncivilized tribe in India. Mr. Fenwick says :—“ Our speculations in the country threw in a circulation of about one lac of rupees (£10,000) yearly ; the effect of this on the condition, appearance, and comfort of the Ghonds was remarkable within the first year, and continued to improve. Those who were seen with a piece of cloth scarce covering their nakedness, were hardly to be recognized with decent ‘ dhatu,’ good ‘ dooputas,’ &c. Some even carried this so far as to rival the gayest of the civilized who came there with us. The Zemindars and others were glad to buy, when they could afford it, chintz handkerchiefs, or a piece of red broad-cloth. Penknives, pocket-knives, and scissors, became much in demand. The men led the way, but the women soon began to fancy a ‘ sarree’ and a ‘ chowlee’ would not display their charms to less advantage.”

From this it appears that among uncivilized people men are vainer than women (how civilization alters us !) and that the natives are ready enough to profit when they can by the advantages of commerce. In fact, India has been famous for her commerce all through history, till the reign of a Bureaucracy, and the traces of former wealth, and even luxury, are visible all over the country. After all, this is an old story that the commerce of India is not susceptible of in-

crease. When it was proposed to throw open the monopoly of the Indian trade in 1813, the organs of the Bureaucracy vehemently asserted, among other pleasant things, to wit, that the destruction of the monopoly would "subvert our Indian Empire," "sacrifice the happiness of the natives," and "imminently endanger the British Constitution!" Besides these cheerful views, they insisted upon it that the experience of two centuries had proved that the Indian trade *could not increase*. Well, the export of the Company was then about one million sterling, and Parliament faced the above terrors so far as to allow private traders to compete with the Company.

In 1832, the export had risen to nearly four millions, and the Company's share of it had dwindled to £149,193! On this Parliament took another step in advance, and suspended the Company's right to trade, when, without visibly "endangering the British Constitution," the export rose rapidly to six millions and a half, about which average it has stopped for the last ten years, shewing that a new limit has been reached, where we are again told that the Indian trade *cannot increase*.

However, having gone so far, I may as well mention what the new limit is, and after explaining it, I shall, although very nervous at the idea of "imminently endangering the British Constitution," I shall venture to propose the removal of an obstacle which prevents the expansion of Indian trade to about eight times its present amount. Mr. Chapman has shewn

it to be a general statistical law that the consumption of our manufactures by the various civilized countries of the world, is in the proportion of our facilities of communication with the localities where those manufactures are consumed. Thus the consumption of our cotton manufactures by the British West Indies is of the value of about 14*s* per head of the population per annum; by Chili 9*s* 3*d*; by Brazil 6*s* 5*d*; by Cuba 6*s* 2*d*; by Peru 5*s* 7*d*; by Central America 10*d*; by India about 9*d*; and by Mexico, a country as roadless as India, and not possessing natural advantages corresponding to the navigable rivers of Bengal, by Mexico 8*d* per head per annum. Moreover, Mr. Chapman has shewn that even of this small average for India, the natives supplied through Bombay only take one-half, because they want the means of communication, which, to some extent, nature has afforded to Bengal and Agra by their rivers.

The unavoidable inference from the above is that our Indian trade is at present limited to the coasts and shores of one or two rivers, in that great Empire, and that we can hardly be said to have a trade with the interior, owing to want of means of transit and of tolerable communications, all over India, and in every one of the Presidencies, not excepting Bengal and Agra, as I will shew by and by. This, then, the want of roads, the want of *cheap carriage*, this is the new limit to the trade of India—this is the only reason why it *cannot increase*, and why a people described by Mr. Campbell as industrious and intelligent, and whose

“native capitalists eagerly embark in all kinds of enterprises,” and why they are “contented with a little rice for their food,” &c. &c. &c.; because it is at present physically impossible for them to avail themselves of commerce for want of means of transit.

I may as well notice here the obligations of the Government with respect to public works in India. I have already observed that common humanity should induce us to encourage and assist the means of production among a people from whom we drain so large a proportion of their capital, and I have shewn how the want of roads in any country tends to keep its inhabitants barbarians and paupers.

I must now remark that in India, where not only the princes but the native aristocracy, who used from religious motives to be most liberal in executing public works, are fast disappearing under the influence of our dominion, in India as in China, it has been the immemorial usage for the State to construct many indispensable public works for the people. In India it is recognized as an historical fact that part of the revenue is received by the Government as trustee for the people, to be disbursed in public works; and not only was this duty inculcated in the institutes of Tamerlane, and discharged by all good Mogul and Hindoo Sovereigns, so that the country is covered with the ruins of works executed by them, but its obligation to fulfil this duty has all along been admitted by the British Government in theory, though not reduced to practice. Nevertheless, one of the

witnesses who most distinctly admitted this obligation before the Committee of 1848, offered some excuses for the neglect of public works by the Government, and I must now shew what they are worth. Mr. Mangles stated, that the means of constructing roads, &c. could not be raised as in England by local taxation; and added on the prompting of Sir James Hogg, that “with reference to the indisposition of the natives to “anything that is new, tolls could not well be levied “on roads and canals as a means of reimbursement.” Well, supposing they could not, the Government has always been repaid indirectly for any such work, by the “magical effect,” as Mr. Williamson Ramsay called it, of a new road in creating wealth in India. I will give one of the instances cited to the above Committee by General Briggs, of the effect of opening a new ghaut on the Comptah road: “incomplete as “the road was, the traffic of the port of Comptah “during three years had increased from £160,000 to “£400,000, and the customs had also increased from “£4,662 to £18,015, within the same period.” But why could not tolls be levied? Mr. Mangles said, “the Indian strenuously resists any effort at new “taxation;” and cited the resistance of Bareilly to a police tax to prove the fact. Now Mr. Mangles ought to have known that the sedition of Bareilly was caused by the brutal tyranny of a low overbearing native, who was placed at the head of the police by the British authorities, and empowered to introduce a law which should supersede the old self-government of the city;

although this ruffian had notoriously been guilty of many acts of oppression and extortion, and was at that very time a public defaulter himself who for four years had set the collector at defiance. And when Mr. Mangles said that similar measures of the Government were "always resisted à l'outrance," he ought to have known that the very same measure which was resisted at Bareilly was adopted without the slightest resistance in Bengal (as in other places), because there the Government conformed to the custom of the country, and introduced the measure through the agency of the natural chiefs and representatives of the people; and it is worth remarking that the effect of this Government measure of substituting its own police for the old local and municipal police, has been the almost utter privation of protection and safety to person, property, or honour, throughout Bengal. It is not the case therefore that Government cannot impose new taxes if it introduces them according to the custom of the country, and allows the people to feel that their representatives have been consulted previously; the only real difficulty is to conceive any tax that would be new in India! for everything has been taxed already, down to shops and implements, down to such things as fishermen's nets, workmen's tools, and barber's utensils! and this odious tax is still levied in Madras. It is no doubt true that public works cannot now be constructed by local taxation in most parts of India, because the Government has drained the people of their capital by its vicious revenue system, and

deprived them of the power of voluntary effort for a while. But if public works were constructed they could be maintained by local taxation; which is now doing and has done a good deal in India. For instance, the Indian press has for some time past noticed the fact of large towns such as Kurrachee, Surat, Mussoorie, Shahjehanpore, several others under the Agra Government, and Lahore, Broach, Belgaum, Poonah, &c., coming forward one after another to avail themselves of enactments permitting them to levy local rates for sanitary and municipal purposes. Again, when Lieut.-General Briggs was administering the province of Candeish, he actually began making roads at a time when the ryots were better off by purely voluntary local contributions; and I have known the same thing done elsewhere. Another gentleman who had succeeded his father as a landowner in India, told the Committee in 1848, with reference to the co-operation of the natives in making roads, "you can do any thing with them if you only reason with them and shew them you mean it for their benefit, and not for a fresh subject of taxation." He added that local taxation might be resorted to for the maintenance of roads and bridges, and instanced a case where he had made a road and established a ferry, assigning the toll of the ferry to the maintenance of the road; but subsequently the Government had doubled the toll on the ferry, and refused to give anything for the repairs of the road: and he said that in his experience a very large fund raised from the tolls on ferries in Malabar,

was appropriated as surplus revenue (contrary to an express law), and not applied to the making or repairing of roads. The same complaint is made to this day in Madras, and I find a similar statement in the *Friend of India*, for 1852, to the effect that the tolls on the rivers in Bengal, which are, it says, "a heavy burthen on the commerce of the country," and are levied nominally to facilitate the navigation of the rivers, are really assigned to the credit of the State, and form a *bonâ fide* item of the public revenue. With regard to the natural disposition of the natives to contribute to public works, it is worth noticing that the Indian journals in the different Presidencies regularly publish an annual list of the public works constructed by private individuals among the natives; and one opulent Parsee merchant of Bombay has actually spent in this way, on roads, bridges, tanks, wells, caravanserais, schools, hospitals, religious edifices, &c., the enormous sum of £130,000 sterling. On a former occasion, March, 1850, in noticing the fact that the anxiety of a rich native to build some public work was often frustrated by the want of a small addition to the sum he could devote to it, and in vainly recommending the Government to encourage this spirit by making up the deficiency, *The Friend* quotes the following passage from Colonel Sleeman: "The respectable merchants lay out their accumulated wealth in the formation of those works which shall secure for them from generation to generation, the blessing of the people of the towns in which they have resided and those of the country around."

But to return to Mr. Mangles, I have shewn that this gentleman was under a mistake when he stated that the natives “ resist à l’outrance ” every attempt to impose a new tax ; but when he added that “ owing to their “ indisposition to anything that is new, tolls cannot “ well be levied,” he made a very considerable mistake indeed for an old Secretary of the Board of Revenue and an East India Director. In the first place tolls on the roads, under the name of transit duties, but real *bonâ fide* tolls, have existed from time immemorial in India, and we have always levied such tolls. In the second place, tolls on the ferries were established by the Ferry Act of 1819, which provided that the surplus profits, after paying the expenses of the ferry, should be applied to the making and repairing of roads, bridges, &c. &c., and I have shewn how the Government violates this law. In the third place, tolls on the public roads, passed by local Acts, have been in operation in the Bombay Presidency for more than a quarter of a century, and the following result of experience will shew whether tolls cannot be looked to as a means of reimbursement. The Government have made in all Western India but one bit of bridged and macadamized road into the interior, 72 miles long, and this is a road made for purely military objects, and leading not to any great mart for commerce, but to the garrison town at Poonah. Nevertheless, one toll on this road which yielded in the first year £400, now yields regularly about £4000 per annum, and on the strength of such a receipt a Company was formed at Bombay for the

purpose of making roads in the interior as a private speculation, if the Government would allow them to levy tolls, whose amount it was to fix itself; which offer, with the characteristic jealousy of a bureaucratic despotism, the Government refused! But the most unaccountable mistake of Mr. Mangles was in asserting that our transit duties were such duties as had always existed in Native States. This renders it necessary for me to re-establish the facts of the case, not merely to prove that the Native transit duties were simply tolls, but to shew that the Government has done all it could to destroy the trade of India, and we are bound to make the natives all the reparation we can for such injuries. The only authority I will refer to is Mr. Trevelyan's Report, mentioned in terms of praise by Mr. Mangles. This report says, that as the transit duties came to us, they were merely tolls on quantities, paid by instalments, according to the distance travelled, just like English turnpike tolls; so light that no one thought of evading them, and requiring no forms or permits, so that every one could come up to the toll-bar without fear; and though different kinds of articles might sometimes be charged at different rates, the utmost the turnpike-man could do was to ask a slight additional toll, and on its payment let them proceed, without search or detention under any circumstances. The Report thus describes what the Government made of these duties; after having in its own phrase "consolidated" them, that is, taken for their standard the

whole amount of tolls levied on goods going the greatest distance (so that a Kensington gardener bringing a few potatoes to London, would have to pay as much as if he took them from Land's End to Edinburgh) Government enacted that the toll was not to be levied at the toll-bar, but only at the Custom-houses. At these Custom-houses, which were comparatively few in number, and frequently a hundred miles off, the tolls were to be paid and permits granted for the transport of goods, when the Collector was at home to sign them; though as this functionary was often away on what he considered much more important business, and the clerks required feeing to hurry them, and there were legions of applicants, permits were not always to be had under several days—(so that the Kensington gardener would have to go and wait a few days at Birmingham for a permit to bring his potatoes to London).—“That such should be the “state of our Customs regulations,” says Mr. Trevelyan, “is a remarkable historical fact which “will not easily be credited by the next generation.” After the permits were granted, at the rate of 10 per cent for metals, and 5 to 10 per cent for other articles, with 5 per cent extra for what were supposed to be the principal towns, and 15 per cent *more on Indian than English* piece goods, and 10 per cent *more on Indian than English* metals; after the permits were granted, and the goods reached their destination, nothing more was required than to send

to the nearest Custom-house and take out "divided permits" for their distribution. "This," says Mr. Trevelyan, "is a fact worthy of being recorded for the information of posterity. If we were to encourage swamps, or accumulate mountains between the different districts of our country, we could not paralyse their industry so effectually as we are doing by this scheme of finance." However, when once the permits were obtained, the goods were as free as air, and the men at the toll-bars, happily named "Chokeys," had nothing more to do with them than simply to ascertain their exact identity, that they were neither more, nor less, nor other, nor superior in value to, nor packed in a different way from, the goods specified in the permits; to search them if they had a doubt on one of these points; to confiscate them if they could prove any difference; but if they merely thought so, "which they can always do," says the Report, only to detain them till they could or would write to the collector perhaps a hundred miles off, in a roadless country, and get instructions on the subject. "If," says Mr. Trevelyan, "it were desired to depress the productive power of Indian industry to the greatest possible extent, could any scheme be devised for the purpose more effectual than this? Although we have now ocular demonstration of its existence, yet when it has once been abolished, the world will find it difficult to believe that such a system could have been tolerated by us *for the better part of a century.*" Remember that, reader, *for the better part of a century!*

But as these men at the Chokeys evidently had the power to choke the whole trade of the country, what sort of men did the Government provide for the purpose? Wonderful to relate! although they had in fact no salary, for their pay, less than that of many workmen, was entirely swallowed up by the necessary expenses of their office in stationery, &c.; although there never was a service, says the Report, in such a state of utter degradation; although these functionaries were universally hated and despised, they could not accept their places without forfeiting all pretensions to character, and their name was synonymous with that of rogue; yet their post commanded a high saleable price, and a place in the Customs was looked upon as a certain fortune. Forced, according to the Report, to get their living by extortion, their brutal tyranny and insults to women were almost certain of impunity; the merchant would not complain, for he dreaded nothing so much as their simply doing their duty, and acting up to the letter of the law, by which they could at any time stop the trade of the country; and the Native travellers and pilgrims, though loud enough in private complaint, could not afford the time and money necessary to go back to the spot and identify and prosecute a culprit. The consequence was that the trade, the very existence of the people, could only be maintained by an universal system of fraud and smuggling; the rich were obliged to carry on their business in collusion with the chokeymen; the poor were their daily victims; and thus, by the agency

of these scoundrels, supported by the range of patrols, did the Government "convert the whole surface of the country into one chokey," and a monstrous system of universal excise subjected the industrious part of the community to the most cruel penalties.

"The truly barbarous and destructive state of things "above described," says Mr. Trevelyan, "had no "existence under the Native system;" and he reiterates that "it will appear almost incredible in another "age that a system which belongs only to times of "barbarism should have been deliberately established "and obstinately persevered in by us." And while the Reporter insists again and again on the "utterly barbarous" and trade-destroying effects of this system, he is quite as much shocked by its "pernicious effect on the national morals." He says, "this system may be said to be productive of universal crime,"—"it is a great moral pest,"—and he explains how it corrupts the whole body of the people. Here I cannot help exclaiming, shall we for ever be content to listen to "the annual concert of praises, sung from year to year, upon the Indian Government, and the increasing happiness of the Indian people, when they are all the while sinking into deeper poverty and wretchedness?" shall we for ever be satisfied with the solemn plausibilities of *public* despatches and Haileybury addresses, when it invariably turns out afterwards that the natives have been cruelly oppressed? Will the English heart never beat for India, a country that has con-

tributed so largely to our wealth and greatness, and to which a generous people owe so much protection, and kindness, and justice?

To resume: Mr. Mangles took credit to the Government for having abolished the transit duties, "in consequence of Mr. Trevelyan's Report." I find as usual that Mr. Mangles was under a mistake. In the first place, unless such a true friend of the natives as Lord William Bentinck, backed by a high reputation, and a strong political connexion at home, had ventured to call for this Report, the transit duties might have gone on to this day. In the second place, it was not the Report but the public scandal, and the weekly reprobation by the Indian journals of this "curse of the country;" it was, as the *Friend of India* has said, the constant and reiterated remonstrances of the press which at length forced the reluctant Government to repeal these duties. The reader may judge by the dates: the Report was dated January 1st, 1834, and these duties were not abolished for two years afterwards in Bengal, four years afterwards in Bombay, and ten years afterwards in Madras, where there was actually greater oppression than I have described, ten years after such a Report as Mr. Trevelyan's! Moreover, judging from the habitual insensibility of the Bureaucracy to the welfare of the natives, shewn by protracted over-assessments and other things, I believe it was not merely the public scandal in the press which caused the abolition of the transit duties, but the

argument of their assailants, that, owing to the efforts of trade to escape from such trammels, and the multiplication of chokeymen to prevent it, and its destruction of other sources of revenue, the system was ending by entailing a loss of money on the Government. And now is it not shocking to feel the proved impossibility of getting any such grievance as this redressed by Parliament? This is proved by experience to be the present state of the case. The only chance of the natives to get any bad system altered is that the Bureaucracy may themselves think at length that they are losing money by it; but it always requires years to get any change made in the strongest cases: and mean while, until after the change, the public in this country are kept entirely in the dark as to the existence of the grievance, and mystified as usual; and it is hopeless to complain to the House of Commons. In that House, any accusation against the Indian Government, though backed by as much presumptive evidence as is required for any grand jury presentment, is sure to be voted a bore and treated as a calumny. It is sufficient for one or two official men to get up and cite every occasion on which the Government has done right, omitting to mention the long previous pressure from without which forced it to leave off doing wrong; then to admit that there may be some trifles in which the Indian administration is not quite perfect yet, though with regard to the particular grievance complained of, "all the stories "about that are without foundation;" and, with re-

gard to the other trifles, really Government is going ahead as fast as it can, and doing everything to make everybody happy and comfortable ; and on this sort of routine explanation, the few Members who are left, just enough to make a House, these few decide that the official is right and the complainant is wrong, and get rid of the subject with a precipitation which shews that India is the bugbear of Members of Parliament.

I appeal to the debate of June, 1850, for proof of what I say : considering the excessive and all but insuperable difficulty of finding out anything about maladministration in India, considering that no information can be procured except from such unwilling witnesses as the servants and dependents of Government itself, it was evident, on the occasion I refer to, that where so much was proved, in spite of every difficulty, the accusation could be fully proved if a fair trial were allowed, and yet the House at once refused a fair trial. And what is the consequence ? That as the Bureaucracy feel that no amount of injury to the natives, and no degree of danger to the interests of England will induce Parliament to interfere, “it takes “ years of private reports, and then years of public “ notoriety and scandal, to get any grievance re- “ dressed in India.” Such has been the case in instances of the most cruel over-assessment, of the non-employment of the natives, of the judicial system, the transit duties, and various other things, and so it promises to be in the case of public works.

I will pause here to mark the progress of my argument. I began by shewing why the natives might expect to have their means of production encouraged and assisted by their foreign rulers, and why, exchange being the instrument of production, they might expect that our Government would do everything to help their trade, and nothing to repress their industry, and prevent the accumulation of their capital when it had to support the annual drain to England. Nevertheless, I undertook to shew that because the Government had thrown some obstacles in the way of their trade, and not done its duty in removing others, the capital of India had been lost, its commerce wasted away, its finances involved, and its people broken in spirit and in fortunes. I have therefore shewn, first, what the Government has done to destroy the commerce of India by transit duties, "deliberately established and obstinately persevered in, for the better part of a century," and only recently and reluctantly abolished; and I will now shew what injuries the Government has inflicted by not making roads, &c.

It may be as well to begin by giving an example, as the illustration, not the measure, of this injury in the history of a particular branch of commerce, because the reader will then understand better what an oppression this bureaucratic Government is to the producers of India, and because there is no question in which it is more necessary to expose the mystifications of the Home authorities than the one of Indian cotton. I will notice in passing the magnitude of our national interest in this

question. Our cotton manufacture now employs one-eighth of the population of the United Kingdom, and contributes one-fourth of the whole national revenue, or more than twelve millions sterling per annum. And such a manufacture is now dangerously limited to one foreign source of supply, and exposed under immense and increasing competition, to the risk of a short crop in the one country of supply, from which cause a loss of eleven millions sterling was suffered by our manufacturers in 1850, besides the curtailing of employment and falling off of consumption on such occasions. Moreover, the monopoly of supply by America not only raises the price, but, from the possibility of war, slave emancipation, &c. exposes us to the risk of a cotton famine in some unlucky year; and, after what I have stated above, the reader may imagine the awful, the possibly fatal, effects of such a catastrophe in England,—and all this while India might, though she could not do it at a moment's notice, send us plenty of cotton, and is only prevented from doing so by mal-administration. Now to put a stop to the trick of doubling back from one exploded argument to another, by which the organs of the Bureaucracy have made the debate endless, I will here recapitulate and answer categorically the different excuses made by the Government advocates for the scanty supply of Indian cotton; at the same time I will cite good authorities to shew what a supply of cotton India might send to this country, and to shew that the sole cause of her not doing so is the neglect of its acknowledged duties by the Government.

The latest excuse turns on freight. It is said that the reason why Indian cotton cannot compete with American, is the greater distance and excess of freight from India. An eminent politician told me, on official authority, that "the fact was, freight had more to do with the question than anything else; and the reduction of a halfpenny a pound or so in the freight would make all the difference." Now admitting, for the sake of argument, that a halfpenny a pound would make all the difference, I should like to know, considering that the freight from India is always less, and often much less than a halfpenny a pound, whether our men-of-war are to be employed in importing the cotton, or what other means we have of reducing the cost of freight to less than nothing? Besides, when politicians believe that the reduction of a halfpenny a pound would make all the difference, what do they think of the fact that the Bombay Cotton Committee, composed of Government officers as well as merchants, estimated the loss arising from the present defective mode of inland transit, caused by the want of roads and bridges, as an addition to the cost of Indian cotton of a penny a pound? Do they not think that if the reduction of a halfpenny a pound *in freight* would make all the difference, the reduction of a penny a pound *in carriage* would have pretty nearly as good an effect? Not that I dislike the idea of reducing the cost of freight to less than nothing, but I cannot recommend it till I know how it can be done; meanwhile, as I do know how the cost of carriage can

be enormously reduced, I confine myself to recommending the construction of roads, bridges, canals, quays, &c. &c.

I have one final difficulty about making a difference of a halfpenny a pound in freight between India and America. There lies before me a report from a large importing house, dated Sept. 27th, 1852, on the average rates of freight on cotton for the preceding twelve months, from India and America, and these rates are as follows :—

Bombay— $\frac{1}{3}\frac{1}{2}$ nds of a penny per lb.

New Orleans— $\frac{1}{3}\frac{3}{4}$ nds of a penny per lb.

I now come to the excuse of “residence.” The Government organs have repeatedly asserted that it was the fault of the merchants themselves that the trade in Indian cotton did not progress satisfactorily, because they would not establish resident agents in the cotton districts. In a book published last year on “the Culture of Cotton in India,” by a Leadenhall-street authority, this step of establishing residents is more than ever recommended as being the *sine quâ non* of success in the Indian cotton trade. Now, I might answer that it is “the nuisance of our civil courts, and “the revenue system we have established,” and the difficulty of making out a title in the present defective state of our laws, which, according to the *Friend of India* for July 29, 1852, most effectually prevent any European from embarking his capital in land. However, let us see what the merchants have said themselves, when thus charged, in fact, with incapacity or

ill-will by the Government for not establishing residents. Their answer has been, that they have tried it on several occasions, and found it did not pay. This ought to be conclusive, for it narrows the debate to a matter of fact, and one would think that to such a fact there could be no reply. Nevertheless, the Government does attempt to answer and disprove this fact, by entering the market itself as a purchaser, and making speculations in cotton, which are proclaimed with great triumph in the book above-mentioned, to persuade the public of this country that it would pay to establish residents, and not only pay, but yield a profit of something like 50 per cent. Now, it may seem very good-natured of the Government to go out of its way and engage in commercial transactions, on purpose to teach the Bombay merchants their business; the more good-natured, because by so doing the Government violates a stringent provision of the law, and incurs a penalty which would be very serious, if it were not understood that its responsibility to Parliament is only a fiction of the law: for the law prohibits any commercial transactions by the Company's Government, on the penalty of forfeiting the charter. However, the good-nature of a Bureaucracy is not a thing to trust to; and there is something which Lord Bacon calls "the turning of the cat in the pan" at the bottom of it, which I must now explain. The reader, then, who admires the pains taken by the Government to teach the Bombay merchants the necessity of establishing residents in the cotton districts, the innocent reader will be surprised

to hear that this necessity was first proclaimed by the merchants themselves, and urged by them in a letter from the Bombay Chamber of Commerce to the Government eleven years ago, which not only explained the importance of this step to the success of the cotton trade, pointing out the great benefits which had resulted from the residence of Europeans in the interior of Ceylon, but clearly described those obstacles to its adoption which it was in the power of Government to remove, which it was its duty to remove, and which nevertheless remain in full force to this day. One of these obstacles was that want of roads, &c., which I shall presently notice. Another arose from Government regulations, framed apparently on purpose to prevent the residence of Europeans in the interior, on the pretence of controlling them. For although it is supposed in England that Europeans may now freely settle everywhere in the interior of India, nothing can be more contrary to the fact; but the real state of the case, as it remains to this day, is explained in the above letter, from which it appears that Europeans can only settle in the cotton districts by permission of the Government, on a short lease, and under the liability of *being any day turned out of the country at once by a Government officer, and having their property confiscated, without any judicial appeal being allowed!* It is on such security as this that men of business are recommended to invest their capital in expensive establishments, which would require the certainty of a long term of possession to offer the prospect of paying.

From the date, then, of this letter, for eleven years at least, the Government has been aware of insurmountable obstacles to the residence of Europeans in the cotton-districts, which it might, at any time, but will not, remove. The Government is also aware that it conveys no real information about the profits or loss of agency, by the assertion that its functionaries, already in the districts, maintained there at charges and risks which are an "unknown quantity," and possessing an influence and other advantages which no mercantile agent could ever enjoy—that these functionaries occasionally make successful speculations in a few hundred bales of cotton. Why, then, does the Government go on boasting of speculations which prove nothing, and inculcating the advantage of establishing residents, as if there were no difficulty in the matter, except that of teaching the merchants their own interest? For this reason—such language is not meant for the merchants who thoroughly despise its hypocrisy, but it is meant for the public of this country; yes, the people of England must be systematically deceived and "mystified," as usual, in order that, instead of seeing in the want of European residents in the interior, another proof of bureaucratic mal-administration, they may actually pity the Government which prevents such residence, for its want of support by the merchants, and blame the merchants who have fruitlessly attempted residence under the existing obstacles, for their incapacity or ill-will—such are the artifices required to defend a bad cause!

A new attempt is now being made by Messrs. Ritchie and Stuart to establish a resident in Candeish, towards the Berar valley, where Mr. Fenwick failed a few years before, for want of means of transport. It remains to be seen whether this attempt will be persevered in as long as Mr. Fenwick's was; meanwhile the successive market reports of Messrs. Ritchie and Stuart will shew the gradual results of their experience.

The first dated July, 1851, asserts that, "*progress* (they print the word in italics), "*progress* is wholly "out of the question until we have improved means of "transport from the interior." The second, dated December, 1851, says, "We have repeatedly before "remarked upon the want of good roads as being the "fatal bar to any material increase of trade in other "parts of the Bombay Presidency (*other* applies to "Scinde), and nowhere else in the world, probably, "would this want of means of transit, to, from, and "within regions of great natural resources be tolerated. "We have but one made road worthy of the name, "that through Candeish to Agra, and even it is in some "parts almost impassable for laden carts, yet from this "road branch off those bullock tracks by which the "bulk of the produce of the fertile valley of Berar finds "its way to Bombay, and our own province of "Candeish yields a gross revenue of nearly a quarter "million sterling, of which so small a pittance is "allowed for outlay on roads, that it has been insuf- "ficient even to keep in repair those fair-weather tracks "which have from time to time been made."

The last report, dated June 25, 1852, says, "Another season has elapsed without anything whatever having been attempted towards the improvement of our means of communication with the interior. No previous season has shewn more palpably how seriously the want of roads impedes the trade of the country. Berar, for instance, has produced this year the finest cotton crop we have seen for many years, if ever; the quality of much of it is superior to the best Broach, and the cultivation of such cotton can be almost indefinitely increased in that province; but to what purpose, so long as it cannot be conveyed to the coast where alone it can be converted into money. A large portion of the crop is still in the districts, and will not reach Bombay until November, and, therefore, much of it, in fact, will not be dispatched until the following crop is being picked, owing to the difficulties of transport over the wretched bullock-tracks, which alone are available for two-thirds to three-fourths of the journey to Bombay. Even the high-road, which serves for the remainder of the distance, is in many parts in a disgraceful state, and in a very interesting report by Captain Wingate, Revenue Survey Commissioner, just printed by the Government, that officer describes it as the frightful and thoroughly execrable road from the Thul Ghaut through the Concan."

I now pass from the excuse of residence, to that of assessment. The Government organs say, firstly, That over-assessment can no more prevent the cultivation of

cotton than that of grain—the ryot will naturally grow what pays him best. Yes, but we know practically that wherever cultivators are reduced to the verge of pauperism, they always prefer to grow the most prolific vegetable food; potatoes in Ireland; rice in China; coarse grain in India; and the injury done by over-assessment has been to prevent the improvement of cultivation in the whole course and series of production; not in cotton alone, but in every crop requiring labour and capital.

Secondly, It is said that Government is revising the assessment. Aye, did anybody ever hear of an abuse in India without hearing this sort of excuse for it? They come down from Charter to Charter, the old abuses, ryotwar, judicial, zemindary, public works, &c. &c., and yet Government is always doing something to reform them. The “intelligent clerks” in Cannon-row and Leadenhall-street, continue to be in the act of reforming a notorious abuse, and yet the natives continue to be its victims from one generation to another—such is the rule of a Bureaucracy! It appears now by the following extract from the market report last quoted, that this revision of the assessment is not even commenced this summer in the largest, richest, and most productive portion of the Bombay Presidency, and Mr. Campbell does not scruple to insinuate, p. 374, that the delay is intentional, and arises from the desire to keep the revenue screwed up to its present amount. Here are the words of Messrs. Ritchie and Stuart’s circular: “This Report of Captain

“ Wingate, to which we allude, has reference to a
“ contemplated survey and re-assessment of the Pro-
“ vince of Candeish, which is contiguous to Berar.
“ The vast importance of this measure will be judged
“ of from the following statistics which we extract
“ from the Report, and which will probably not be
“ deemed out of place here, nor fail to be of interest,
“ as shewing how truly our trade with the interior
“ may be said to be yet in its infancy. The whole
“ province of Candeish contains 12,078 square miles,
“ of which it is intimated that the arable portion is
“ 9772. Of this *arable* area 1413 square miles are
“ cultivated, and 8359 are lying waste. The popula-
“ tion of the whole province was 785,991, according
“ to a census taken in 1851. The number of villages
“ in the whole province is 3837, of which 1079 are
“ now uninhabited. The soil of Candeish is stated to
“ be superior in fertility to, and yields heavier crops
“ than that of the Deccan and southern Mahratta
“ country. Although so much of the country now lies
“ in waste, the traces of a former industry are to be
“ seen in the mango and tamarind trees, and the many
“ ruined wells which are still to be met with in the
“ neighbourhood of almost every village. Of the five-
“ sixths of the arable land, the five millions of square
“ acres now lying waste, Captain Wingate farther re-
“ marks, nearly the whole is comparatively fertile, and
“ suitable to the growth of exportable products, such
“ as cotton, oil-seeds,” &c.

I have two more points to notice before I quit this

subject of assessment. In the ryotwar districts it is usual for the native money-lenders to make advances to the pauperized ryots (at usurious rates which no European could ask), and the necessity of the ryots is thus asserted by the Report of the Cotton Committee of 1848. "They are indebted to the money-lender or "banker of the village, for the means wherewith to "procure the seed, and to carry on even the most im- "perfect cultivation. They give him security for these "loans on the growing crops, which at maturity "they frequently dispose of to him, at prices re- "gulated rather by his will, than by the standard "of an open market. It is asserted that the rate of "interest paid by these unfortunate ryots is often forty "or fifty per cent." Besides these loans, it is customary for the Government to advance a part of the expense of cultivation, and whenever it makes such an advance, it secures repayment, not by exacting an exorbitant interest, but by a summary process of recovery, which works well in practice, and insures it against any serious loss. Under these circumstances, the merchants who wish to promote the cotton cultivation, and can only do so by making advances to the cultivators, have asked the Government to give them the benefit of the summary process as being the only legitimate means, according to its own experience, of avoiding heavy losses; and the Government, which professes such a desire to see residents in the cotton districts, the Government has refused their request.

Again, not only have the poor cultivators had to

suffer from over-assessment, never revised in any district until the population were reduced to pauperism, but up to within a few months they have suffered from the oppressive mode of collecting the land-tax. They were obliged to deposit the cotton-seed when picked, in damp pits, from six to ten feet deep, where it remained without protection, exposed to the night-dews, dust, &c., until the revenue was settled, and then it was taken out of the pit so much deteriorated in colour, strength, and cleanliness, that no process could repair the mischief. This pernicious practice, as the merchants called it, has been persisted in by a Government professing anxiety to promote the Indian cotton-trade, until the very eve of the Charter discussions, shewing that the fear of Parliamentary responsibility is the only motive which can force the Government to do its duty.

The last excuse I have to notice is that Government is now, and has long been, conducting experiments with a view to improve and extend the cotton cultivation of India. On this I must observe that, one experiment the Government has not tried, viz. the one which produced the desired effect in America. For Mr. Chapman has shewn that only thirty years ago American cotton was as dirty and deficient in staple as Indian cotton is now, and that it was the ordinary inducements of free commercial interchange, which stimulated the American cultivator into increasing the supply, and improving the quality of his cotton, to what we see it now; because no Government de-

stroyed his capital by claiming the rent of land, and ruined his commerce by "transit duties." If, therefore, while the Bureaucracy was depriving the ryot of any interest in extending and improving cultivation by rack-renting him, and leaving him roadless, without the means of freely exchanging his produce with foreigners, if at this very time it had really expected to effect supernaturally by "the exotic attempts of a few Government officers," that development of the cotton trade which was effected naturally in a rival country, by the stimulus of free interchange acting on self-interest, then the very insanity of such an expectation would save it from a serious answer. However, it is not the folly but the hypocrisy of the above excuse, which I have to expose, and my answer to it will be very short.

The author of the book on "the culture of cotton in India," although he gives us hundreds of pages about these Government experiments, admits that they "have never had any permanent effect in improving the cotton from India." He also admits that the trade in Indian cotton is a "question of price;" that it is capable of indefinite extension; and that its great evils arise from its not being a regular trade, but a small irregular demand upon the China and home markets for dirty cotton. These facts are admitted by the Government apologist himself; well then, because the Government continues to use means, its experiments, which are certain not to produce the desired effect, and refuses to use means, making roads, bridges,

ports, and piers, which in *a question of price* are certain to produce the desired effect, therefore I say the Government is doing nothing really to promote the cotton trade, but is continuing its experiments, with the usual object of mystifying the public of this country, to divert attention from the mischief it has done to the cotton trade of India by leaving the ryots without the means of that commerce or exchange which is the instrument of production. And while the necessity of giving the cultivators means of transport has been urged on the Government for the last thirty years without effect, it is worth noticing, with particular reference to the cotton trade, some of the representations made by various parties during the present Charter, and first by the Asiatic Society.

One of the original objects of the Asiatic Society was to discover and develop the vegetable, mineral, and other resources of India; and the Society's "Agricultural Committee" had the advantage at starting of possessing a very active secretary, intent on progress, who procured sundry excellent papers for his Committee, describing the valuable products of the soil and the difficulty of turning them to account for want of roads. At this time, 1837, the Committee published Mr. Ashburner's letter on the carriage of cotton on bullock's backs from Berar: a paper which for powers of graphic description has never been surpassed, and has inspired all succeeding writers and speakers on the subject. At the same period the Committee proclaimed that if the Government would

only make roads, it might expect to see the export of cotton alone, to say nothing of other articles of commerce; swelling at the rate of 100,000 bales per annum, and probably soon amounting to a million of bales, while the effect on the salt trade was certain to be equally great. Unfortunately, this Agricultural Committee, which was beginning to know so much, and what was a still greater offence, to tell the public so much about India, alarmed the jealousy of a bureaucratic Despotism, which determined to silence it at any price. The first thing was to find or make a good place for the secretary, and stop his mouth; and accordingly this votary of progress one morning took his colleagues by surprise (of whom one or two never spoke to him afterwards), by announcing his promotion to a government appointment.

After this blow the Agricultural Committee withered away under the frowns of Government, and the Asiatic Society found it expedient to confine itself to the most harmless antiquarian researches for the future. It is hardly necessary to add that as Government did not make the roads, the export of cotton did not swell at the rate of 100,000 bales per annum, as the Committee had anticipated; but, instead of this, the average export to England and China of the last seven years, as compared with that of the preceding seven years, has only increased 25,620 bales, and the average export from Berar has positively diminished. This result is indeed grievous: this single fact is enough to shew the consequences of neglecting public

works in India. But I cannot help being rather amused to see the quondam secretary of the Agricultural Committee, now translated into the honourable Botanist of the Hon. Company, publish a book on the eve of the Charter discussions, to inform us that “roads *however bad* can form no impediment to cotton cultivation in Western India, because the country is everywhere near rivers or the sea.” Why, as it was said by a correspondent of the “Times,” this must make the credulous reader shudder to think of the sums of money wasted on roads in this country, considering that we are almost everywhere nearer to rivers or the sea than they are in the country spoken of by Dr. Royle, with the extra advantage of having *our rivers navigable*. Yet we have in England and Wales 36 canals and 4000 miles of railway and 20,000 miles of paved streets and turnpike roads, and 95,000 miles of cross roads, against 72 miles of ‘real road,’ and 400 miles of unstoned and unbridged clay roads, in a much greater extent of Western India! However I think the credulous reader may take courage; I think if we broke up our roads, and obliged our farmers and manufacturers to transport their produce on pack-bullocks over ‘mere tracks’ only passable a few months in the year, that we should not be better off than we are now; if the public thinks differently, it can easily petition the Legislature to destroy our roads, and place the population of these isles in the advantageous position of the Hindoos!”

And now that I have gone through the stock excuses of the Bureaucracy, under the several heads of freight, residence, assessment, and experiments, I ask whether any of these furnish an answer to the following facts? In the year 1837 a memorial was sent home to Government from the merchants in Bombay, certifying that ruinous and intolerable expenses were entailed on every sort of commerce, specifically including the cotton trade, by the want of roads, bridges, &c. &c. This was backed by a strong appeal from the Governor, then Sir Robert Grant, and it is worth remarking that every eminent Governor of Bombay has tried his utmost to get something done for its communications. From the year 1837 to the present time similar complaints have been reiterated by the merchants, of which I need only remind the reader of two examples, the Trade Reports I have already quoted, and the memorial to the Governor-General in 1850, stating that many valuable articles were often left to perish on the fields, and others enhanced in price 200 per cent owing to the miserably inadequate communications through the country. Again, in the year 1838, the Home Authorities, *i. e.* the President of the Board of Control, and the Company of Directors, distinctly admitted the necessity of making the roads, bridges, ports, and piers, prayed for by a deputation of cotton manufacturers from Manchester, and emphatically promised that they should forthwith be constructed. Finally, in the year 1848 the Cotton Committee of the House of Commons report

that the witnesses, with scarcely an exception, “concur in describing the means of internal communication throughout India, as totally inadequate for the requirements of commerce.” The Committee add, “Produce from the interior being frequently transported hundreds of miles on the backs of bullocks, great damage thereby arises to merchandize, and particularly to cotton.” Government, therefore, has long been aware that the great obstacle to the cotton trade of Western India, was the want of means of transport, and has long ago promised to remove that obstacle. Now then, I have before me a detailed report of the state of the roads throughout the Bombay Presidency in the year 1851. I shall not repeat the details because a series of letters addressed to “*The Times*” in 1850-51, rather understating than overstating the case, have already made the public familiar with the facts, therefore it will be sufficient for me to state generally the sum of this Report which is as follows:—Except the road to Poonah, of 72 miles in length, still very imperfect in some respects, and constructed before the present Charter, except this, there have not been made up to the present time, twenty miles of stoned and bridged road in any part of the Bombay Presidency; there are no made roads in Guzerat; no piers or jetties at the cotton ports; not one good and complete line of communication with the interior all down the country from north to south; not one of the clay roads, the fair weather roads, which *do not deserve the name of roads*

according to Colonel Grant of the Bombay engineers, not one of these even which is properly drained and bridged, and is not, as Captain Wingate says, "thoroughly execrable," for a considerable part of its course; and in short the Government has not fulfilled its promises to supply that want of roads, &c., which is to its knowledge the great obstacle to commerce in this Presidency; it has prevented speculators from doing so; it has left the Natives without tolerable means of transport to this day; and the country will require the construction of about a thousand miles of "real road," in Colonel Grant's phrase, before the cotton trade of India can even be said to have had a chance of success.

And now I must remind the reader, that I promised to give this example of the cotton trade as an illustration, not a measure, of the injury inflicted on the natives by neglecting the communications of the country. Perhaps after all the most lamentable instance of the effect of a want of roads is exhibited in the periodical local famines to which the Government leaves the people exposed, and by which as Mr. Chapman says, the agricultural population are so totally ruined and thrown into the hands of the money-lenders that they have, roughly speaking, to begin the world afresh every ten or twelve years. Let the reader imagine one of these cases cited to the Committee of 1848, when grain was selling at 6s. to 8s. a quarter in Candeish, and 64s. to 70s. in Poonah, where the people were dying in the streets of famine,

without the possibility of getting supplies from Candish, because the clay roads are impracticable in the rains: and let the reader remember that the same famine might happen again next year!

“ O, we have ta'en
 “ Too little care of this! take physic, pomp;
 “ Expose thyself to feel what wretches feel;”

I often hear people talk of the liberality of the Court of Directors; and many instances of this liberality to their servants and friends, and relations, or connexions, have come to my knowledge: a liberality visible in hard cash, and paid for with the ryot's money. But I confess I should like to see some exercise of this liberality to save these poor people from dying of famines. What with over-assessing them, and destroying their aristocracy, merchants, and manufacturers, we have reduced them to a low ebb; and the liberality of the Court of Directors would be well employed in saving them from local famines. Before the passing of the last Charter, the Court of Directors were accused of regularly securing the vote and interest of one or two powerful politicians by their “liberality,” to prepare for the Charter discussion. I know not how far a late Governor-General of India may have been the unconscious object of a manœuvre of this sort, but when I saw a pension of £5000 a year for life so readily granted to him, for having been present at a battle where he was not Commander-

in-Chief, while the destitution of the poor ryots who supply the means of this liberality excites no corresponding sympathy, I fear such a system will end fatally. It reminds me of the prodigality of the French Court, in spite of the distress of the people, before the great revolution in France; and when I hear in society of "the liberality of the Court of Directors," I remember the famous phrase "la Reine est si bonne!" What a comment on their liberality are these local famines, to which so many of the former aristocracy of the country fall victims. Conceive one father of a family, who "was rich and well to do when we came into the province, but has now scarcely clothes to his back," with his crying children round him, perhaps, reader, of an age and form so like your own, perishing of a local famine! Conceive the stony gaze on vacancy, the tearless, terrible despair of that man, when he feels that the children must die; and thinks of the government of the stranger that has done this! Conceive his boys suppressing their torments to spare their father's heart, and his witnessing the death-struggle of all the beings he has loved, one after another, before he is starved himself! Would I could believe that Providence holds us guiltless of these things, and that we may allow a Bureaucracy to misgovern India, with impunity! But I cannot think it—I am speaking of no imaginary inhabitants of another planet, but of our native fellow-subjects, to whom we owe so much of our

wealth and greatness, and to whom we owe protection by all our claims to a higher civilization and a purer morality.

Yet Bombay is not the only Presidency where the Government thinks it sufficient to give up a one-hundredth, or some years a two-hundredth part of the revenue to "public works;" an item which includes a variety of civil buildings, and improvements in the immediate neighbourhood of European stations, and of no service whatever to the commerce of the interior. I will now cite the case of Madras, and then of Bengal and Agra, to shew that every part of our old territory is suffering from this criminal neglect of the communications — criminal, because so deeply injurious to the Natives; so great a dereliction of our duty towards them; and so evidently the cause of financial embarrassment in India, and the consequent peril of England. The system pursued with regard to public works in Madras is clearly explained in an article of the *Calcutta Review*, for December, 1851. The writer shews that while a large part of the Madras revenue is derived from irrigated lands, the constant outlay necessary to keep such works of irrigation in repair, was originally provided for under the Native Princes, by a special assessment distinct from the land revenue, called "tank fees." He shews that these repairs being as much an essential condition of receiving the revenue as the ryot's expenses of cultivation, it is no more reasonable to have absorbed this special assessment into the land revenue, and to put down these repairs as expenditure from revenue on public works, than it

would be to put down the ryot's gross produce as revenue, and call his expenses for seed, manure, labour, &c. expenditure out of revenue. He also shews that such works, which are never undertaken except as a pecuniary speculation, certain to return an usurious interest for the money expended of from thirty to fifty per cent; that such works are not to be placed in the same category as public works, like roads and bridges, which benefit the public without being of the same direct advantage to their authors; particularly because such works of irrigation do not diminish but rather increase the necessity for roads, while at the same time they create an abundant capital for their formation. The writer therefore excludes from the table of nine years' expenditure on public works, published by one of the Directors, the expenses of irrigation works, and proves that on all the rest, roads, bridges, ports, piers, ferries, canals, embankments, &c. &c. there has only been expended about the half of one per cent of the revenue annually, during the said term of nine years. He then notices the results of thus starving the most indispensable public works of the Presidency, and I will quote one of his examples in his own words.

“The Cuddapah collectorate is a large district
“measuring 13,000 square miles, nearly twice the
“size of the whole of Wales. A large part of the
“surface of this district is cotton soil, very productive,
“but the worst of all materials for roads: other parts
“are wild and mountainous. It does not appear that
“any considerable outlay has ever been made on the

“ roads of this extensive tract during the last half
“ century that it has been under British rule, though,
“ during that period, fully fourteen millions sterling
“ have been drawn from it in direct revenue. The
“ consequences may be supposed. Roads cannot be
“ said to exist; in the cotton soil a little rain makes
“ the tracks impassable, and everywhere carts, when
“ used at all, are only able to carry half the load,
“ and to travel half the distance in a day, that they
“ could on a made road. Nor is this all: the road
“ from this extensive district to the Presidency is in
“ no better state. It is, in short, proverbially bad,
“ even among Madras roads, and there is one part of
“ it which is literally used by the Military Board as a
“ trial ground to test the powers of new gun-carriages,
“ which are pronounced safe if they pass this severe
“ ordeal! Cuddapah is a rich and productive tract;
“ its indigo is celebrated, and it is one of the finest
“ cotton-fields in South India, but it is needless to say
“ that its prosperity is dreadfully impeded and kept
“ down by the disgraceful state of its internal roads,
“ and of its communication with the natural outlet for
“ its produce.” The writer adds, that the zealous and
active are impatient and indignant to see the enterprise
and industry of the natives repressed by the wretched
and disgraceful intercommunications of the country;
but he says that the Madras authorities, from the
Governor down to the collectors and engineers, are
most unwilling to propose any improvement to the
Supreme Government (which is forced to obey orders

from a Bureaucracy at home), because such proposals are always received with disfavour, and almost always refused; and this has since been confirmed by the evidence of Lord Elphinstone, late Governor of Madras, before the Committee of last Session. The writer gives an instance of such a refusal, which shews the spirit of bureaucratic administration. "Colonel Arthur Cotton, that able and zealous engineer officer, was very anxious that the noble means of inland water communication, afforded by the Godavery River, should be no longer neglected; and having satisfied himself by local inquiries that there was reasonable ground for believing that the river might be navigated by steam for nearly 400 miles from the sea, and into the very heart of the valley of Berar, the finest cotton country in India, he applied to the Madras Government for a small grant of money to enable him personally to explore the river in a small steamer, which he had himself constructed for the Gadavery Anicut, and to clear away slight impediments. The Madras Government solicited the sanction of the Indian Government to devote a sum not exceeding £1000 to that very important object, but this application was refused." The object was to open an inland navigation 400 miles in length, and thus to effect a communication between a vast cotton-field and the Manchester manufacturers, and to give the grain-producing districts in the delta of the Godavery access to the vast markets for food which would be created by the extended culture of cotton in Berar. I

have before me a letter from a Madras engineer on this subject, in which he says that "*cheap carriage* is "the grand desideratum for India," and that "the navigation of the Godavery would open up a vast field for commercial enterprise, that whole tract having been almost hermetically sealed hitherto." He adds, that "for Berar cotton to be conveyed 300 miles by land to Bombay, when it can be brought down at one-tenth of that expense by the river, to a safe port on this side, in a few days, is a disgrace to Englishmen." The letter concludes by saying that "*nothing but the continual pressure of public opinion in England* will ensure anything being effected in India." I hope this public opinion will not be appealed to in vain!

I will give one more example from the Government Blue Book of 1851, to shew the contrast between the situation of the people in a well-managed native state and that of the inhabitants of one of our Madras districts which suffered the longest from over-assessment. "The roads in this district (of Bellary) are in a wretched state. Excellent roads, feasible not only for the common country carts, but for spring carriages, have been made in many directions throughout the Mysore country, which borders for a distance of about 200 miles on the south boundary of Bellary, but there are *no corresponding roads to meet them* in that district, and consequently not only the town of Bellary, but the whole district is cut off from the advantages which are offered by

“ an open and easy communication with the Mysore territories.” However, an excuse is given for starving the public works of Madras, which is characteristic of a Bureaucracy, viz., that the Presidency does not pay its expenses. On this plea it has been the constant practice to press retrenchment and economy on this unfortunate Presidency, and to refuse it the means of improvement. On this plea the transit duties were retained, and other most injurious taxes are still retained. On this plea the Madras Collector has an amount of work thrown upon him, from the size of the districts, which it is physically impossible for him to perform, so that he is compelled to neglect parts of it. On this plea no revenue survey is granted to Madras, although in every district of the Presidency either no survey has ever been made, or it is known to have been hastily and carelessly done, and extensively tampered with afterwards; and it is admitted that an accurate survey is the only possible basis of an equitable assessment, particularly with the minute holdings under the Ryotwar system. And after all, the reviewer proves that this excuse of the Presidency’s not paying its expenses is only supported by a juggle in the accounts, by which Madras is charged with the military expenditure for countries whose revenues are paid to Bengal. The same excuse is made for starving the public works of Bombay, and supported in the same way, by “ cooking” the accounts, and debiting this Presidency with many heavy expenses, which have nothing on earth to do with it. And it is by such

contemptible tricks as this that the Bureaucracy defend their destructive policy towards the population of these two Presidencies; they begin by destroying the commerce and prosperity of the natives on a false plea of their not paying their expenses, and then point to their pauperized condition as a ground for refusing every improvement that would enable them to pay a higher revenue. This is adding insult to injury. But let us go deeper into this; not only because the excuse of a Presidency's not paying its expenses is the strongest possible admission of the misgovernment of that Presidency, but because this excuse is, in fact, applied to the whole of India; and when the Bureaucracy say they have not money for public works and other reforms in India, they do but say in other words that India does not pay its expenses. I will therefore quote an extract on this point from the letter of a Madras engineer; a letter hastily written, and not meant for publication, but which I like all the better for it. I think the writer's natural expression, coming from the heart, will go to the heart, more than any deliberate statement would do; but the reader shall judge for himself: here is the extract. " Lord * * *
" speaks of the Court not having been able to provide
" money for public works, while they were struggling
" for existence in India, although they could for wars
" which they were compelled to carry on at all risks.
" But this begs the whole question, which is, were
" they, by neglecting the public works, enabled to carry
" on their wars, or were they so miserably poor and

“ swamped in their means because they neglected the
“ public works? They are two very different things,
“ the carrying on new and extensive improvements,
“ and the keeping old works in repair. We will first
“ take up the latter. To say they could not find money
“ for *them* is nonsense. The works themselves pro-
“ vided money from year to year, and if the repairs
“ were not executed the works did not yield their pro-
“ per returns. Now, Tanjore was the only district in
“ this Presidency where the works were kept in tho-
“ rough repair. To give you some idea of the extent
“ to which this neglect was carried, the large irrigation
“ works in this district were never cleared out for
“ thirty or forty years, by which an entire district was
“ half ruined. My predecessor cleared out one mile
“ at a cost of 7000 rupees (£700), and the revenue of
“ the Talook (county) rose immediately from 70,000
“ rupees to much above a lac (£7000 to £10,000).
“ Probably 500 rupees a-year (£50) would have kept
“ the channels clear; and for want of this, 30,000 or
“ 40,000 rupees a-year were lost (£3000 or £4000).
“ This has been the state of things. In 1827, I found a
“ channel that entered two Talooks filled up six feet,
“ so that when it ought to have had eight feet of water
“ in it, it had only two. The revenue had fallen from
“ three or four lacs to one lac: when it was cleared
“ out, the revenue rose in two or three years about one
“ and a half lac of rupees. One or two thousand ru-
“ pees would have kept this clear. Thousands of
“ works are at this moment out of repair, the repairs

“ of which would not have cost one year’s increase of
“ revenue, though they have been neglected so many
“ years. This has been the state of things: what
“ nonsense it is to talk of their not being able to find
“ money. But their own acts answer the question.
“ All buildings are kept in repair. How could they
“ find money for this? And how did they find money
“ for Tanjore? About 40,000 rupees a-year were
“ spent in keeping up the works. Where did the
“ money come from? Of course, from the district
“ itself. If they had not spent the 40,000 rupees,
“ they would have lost two or three lacs; but farther,
“ they spent steadily in Tanjore about 40,000 rupees
“ in improvements, by which, on an average, they just
“ about obtained a permanent increase of revenue of
“ 40,000 rupees per annum. Thus no outlay at all
“ was required for keeping these works in repair, nor
“ even for a constant course of improvement. *Why*
“ *should not this have been done in every district?*
“ The fact is, that the Company were without money
“ for their wars, because they neglected to keep
“ in repair the old works upon which the revenue
“ depended. But they might and ought to have
“ gone much further than this; for without a very
“ large expenditure at once, a system of improvement
“ might have been kept up, as in Tanjore, that would
“ have steadily yielded from 50 to 100 per cent. To
“ confound such a proceeding with the outlay of a vast
“ capital, which, after a few years, will return 5 per
“ cent, and then say the Company could not spend

“ money for public works, is merely throwing dust
“ in their own and other people’s eyes. But this
“ is not the strongest point of the case. They did
“ not take the least pains to prevent famine. To
“ say nothing of the death of a quarter of a million
“ of people in Guntoor, the Public Works Committee,
“ in their Report, calculate that the loss in money
“ by the Guntoor famine was 216 lacs, more than two
“ millions sterling. If they could find money to supply
“ these losses they could have found a hundredth part
“ of the sum to prevent them. But now with respect to
“ works of actual improvement of considerable extent.
“ These works have much more than paid their own
“ way ; not a rupee has been taken from the general
“ treasury, but on the contrary seven lacs paid into it.
“ A schedule of various new works executed of late
“ years has just been printed, the average return from
“ which has been 50 per cent, *counting from the first*
“ *execution* of the works, though of course in the first
“ year or two their full effects were not developed, and
“ this in direct revenue. Of course the indirect re-
“ venues are increased also ; and the increase of private
“ property far exceeds that gained by Government.
“ But just look at this case, the saleable value of land
“ in Tanjore has increased much more than a million
“ sterling since the Anicuts were built—the land is
“ now saleable at about 50 rupees an acre. The land
“ in this delta has as yet been unsaleable; it is much
“ richer than that of Tanjore, much better supplied
“ with water by its river, and has a fine safe port, so

“ that when our works are in full operation, and the
 “ population has filled up, which it will do with great
 “ rapidity, the lands ought to be worth at least 60
 “ rupees an acre, or seven millions sterling for the whole
 “ irrigated tract : this will give you some idea of what
 “ public works are here. Let us take another case,
 “ viz. transit. On the western road from Madras, say
 “ for sixty miles before the roads divide, there is now
 “ a traffic of about 500 tons a day, I believe 180,000
 “ a year, it costs 30,000 rupees a mile, or about 18
 “ lacs a year. This might be carried on a canal for one
 “ lac, here are 17 lacs a year lost in 60 miles of transit,
 “ and *this is going on throughout the Presidency!* Is
 “ it surprising that on such a system of managing the
 “ country, the people are poor, and the Government
 “ poor ; how could it be otherwise ? I am certain that
 “ if 50 lacs a year had been spent in public works here,
 “ there would have been all along an immense addi-
 “ tional increase of revenue, and the country would by
 “ this time have been a complete contrast to what it
 “ now is. Lord * * * thinks it would be better not to
 “ blame the Government ; how can we possibly point
 “ out how improvement can be made without proving
 “ that there has been neglect before ? If such immense
 “ sums can be obtained, there must have been some
 “ stupid, merciless system before.” (Remember that,
 reader ! that phrase is written by one of the most dis-
 tinguished men in India.) “ What inconceivable folly
 “ it is to shut our eyes to facts, and not to take advan-
 “ tage of discovery, because if we do, it would imply

“ that those who went before us committed blunders.
“ The discovery of gold in California and Sydney
“ proves strange blindness in those who had been
“ living so many years in those localities, but that does
“ not prevent men digging it up now. The mine
“ which exists in this country will bear competition
“ with those gold discoveries. An expenditure of thirty
“ or forty thousand pounds in Tanjore, besides the enor-
“ mous increase in direct revenue, has added much
“ more than a million sterling to the property of the
“ Province. If a man who could earn £30. a year in
“ other ways, went to the diggings and there obtained
“ gold to the value of £900. a year, the world would
“ ring with it—yet it would not equal the profits in
“ Tanjore; and here they promise very far to exceed
“ that. Lord * * * wonders at my vehemence about
“ public works; is he really so humble a man as to
“ think no better of himself than to suppose he could
“ stand unmoved in a district where 250,000 people
“ had perished miserably of famine, through the neg-
“ lect of our Government, and see it exposed every year
“ to a similar occurrence?” (Remember that, reader!)
“ If his Lordship had been living in the midst of the
“ district at the time, like one of our civilians, and had
“ had every morning to clear the neighbourhood of his
“ house of hundreds of dead bodies of poor creatures
“ who had struggled to get near the European in hopes
“ that there perhaps they might find food, he would
“ have realised things beyond what he has seen in his
“ ****shire park . . .”

I think the above letter requires no comments of mine, therefore I will now pass on to the Provinces of Bengal and Agra. These Provinces enjoy some real and some apparent advantages which we must reduce to their true value in order to estimate the degree in which the Government has fulfilled its duty towards them. Their first and real advantage is in their navigable rivers, which form a great natural highway to the interior of northern India, and permit the residence of Europeans on the line of the Ganges, &c. because the river navigation affords our indigo planters and sugar manufacturers a means of transit and communication which is not available to residents in Bombay and Madras. Their second advantage is that in the settlement of the North-west Provinces a sum of one per cent on the land revenue was set apart for the improvement of the district roads, independent of the Government expenditure on the trunk lines; and in the perpetual settlement of Bengal, the Zemindars were bound, it was allowed for in their rent, to keep in repair the roads on their respective properties. This advantage in the case of Agra is no doubt real; under the excellent Government of Agra, assisted by Native management and co-operation, this fund and other local funds are turned to the utmost account in improving the means of transit; but in the case of Bengal the advantage is rather apparent than real, because the Government does not enforce the obligation of the Zemindars who neglect their duty. The last apparent advantage of these Provinces is in the fund arising

from the surplus of ferry and river tolls, which is by law destined to the improvement of the local communications. But I have shewn that up to this time the fund in question has been appropriated to the general Treasury in Madras; contrary to the law, and according to the *Friend of India* for July 31, 1851, an accumulation of ferry tolls amounting to eight lacs of rupees was at one swoop so appropriated in Bengal, contrary to the law, and according to the same journal for August 28, 1851, an amount of river tolls has been so appropriated in Bengal, between the years 1824 and 1850, equal to Rs. 37,35,000 (£373,500), contrary to the law; and according to the same journal for April 22, 1852, these river tolls, which are it says "a heavy burthen on the commerce of the country," are still so appropriated, in direct violation of the law—therefore the advantage of the above fund is apparent and not real. But now after enumerating these advantages, I must explain that they do not satisfy the pressing wants of the people. The reader has only to glance at the map of these immense territories to see that the existence of a few navigable rivers does not dispense with the necessity of constructing roads, bridges, &c. &c., all over the country, to give the natives facility of transit for their commerce. I will therefore give some evidence of the extent to which the Government has neglected its duty towards them. Mr. Bird, late Governor of Agra, told the House of Commons' Committee last session, "the observation of travellers through Agra and Bengal, would be,—how very little has been done by the Government

“ of India for the improvement of the country.” This gentleman is called by the author of “ *Modern India*,” a great man, and it is a sufficient eulogy of his service, to say that, in the technical phrase “ he made the North-West Provinces ;” it is therefore important to find him speaking of the little done for the improvement of the country in the style that Shore did twenty years ago. Again, the *Friend of India*, of April 24, 1851, says, “ one of the most serious “ charges brought against the administration of the “ Company in India, has always been the neglect of “ all public works, and the disadvantageous contrast “ which it exhibits, not only to the civilized Govern- “ ments of Europe and America, but also to its less “ enlightened predecessors the Mahommedans. It is “ impossible for any man to travel through the two “ provinces of Bengal and Behar, which have been “ longest in our possession, and which have yielded “ the largest amount of revenue, without a painful “ feeling that the charge is not without foundation. “ The appearance they present after more than ninety “ years of occupancy, is that of *the neglected estate “ of a spendthrift landlord*. For one good road which “ we have constructed, we have *allowed twenty others “ to disappear*. We have erected one magnificent “ city, and every other city of note has been allowed “ to go to ruin. With the exception of the trunk “ road, and the public edifices in Calcutta, there is “ nothing throughout these provinces, to shew that “ they have been for nearly a century under the Go-

“vernment of the same people who have rendered
“their own country a theatre of wonders.” In June,
1851, speaking of the above trunk road, the *Friend*
says, “we have but one road in Bengal.” In March
of the same year, 1851, the *Asiatic and Colonial*
Register, says, “that in Bengal the public officers
“are obliged to travel in palanquins owing to the im-
“passable state of the district roads, and the want
“of bridges, and take twice the time they need do
“if they could use horses and carriages.” In July,
1851, the *Friend* says, alluding to a new Toll Act, “But
“where are the roads in Bengal? we have but
“two which deserve the name: the grand trunk road
“to Benares and the road to Juggaureth, which is said
“to be a good one.” The *Friend* had previously pub-
lished in April, 1851, a description of the above
“trunk road,” by an Agra traveller, stating that
in many places there was no metalling (stone) at all,
and the carriage had to creep along at the rate of
about two miles an hour; and there were three miles of
heavy sand at the Soane, requiring four pairs of bul-
locks to drag the carriage through; that the ferry
was equally bad and caused great delay; and that
most of the metalling was brickdust or inferior stone,
which made a difference of two or three miles an hour
in the rate of palanquin bearers, as compared with a
first-class Agra road. Again, in July, 1852, The
Friend inserts the following paragraph respecting this
“trunk road.” “The *Delhi Gazette* warns intending
‘travellers against attempting the road between Cal-

“cutta and Benares, at the present season. A passenger by the Transit Company’s carriages was recently thirteen days on the road, and was compelled to walk for nearly sixty miles, as the mud was too deep for the carriage to move. Another gentleman was obliged to return to Benares after having reached the Kurumnassa, having discovered that about six feet of loose earth had been heaped upon the road in order to raise its level. Near Calcutta, the road is in a similar condition.” Are such things possible! Bengal and Behar, with but one good road, and “intending travellers warned” that they will have to walk sixty miles upon it, because carriages stick in the mud!

It is difficult to help smiling at such a climax: yet we must recollect that this system of administration is no laughing matter for the unfortunate natives; it is death to them. However, I have now before me a Report printed last year by order of the House of Commons of the public works executed in India during a period of ten years. The details of these works are only given from Bengal to Agra, (the others would have been a still worse exposure), but these occupy the first 145 pages of the Report. I have given in Appendix A, an abstract of this expenditure in Bengal and Agra, prepared by a careful analysis of the above details, and will now notice its result, prefacing this notice by a few remarks on two of the items, viz. : works of irrigation and embankments. The first, as I have shewn in the case of Madras, literally pay their way as they go, and

always yield an usurious interest, and are therefore not to be placed in the same category as works like roads, bridges, canals, &c. which directly benefit the people, and only indirectly the revenue. Of the second, I must remind the reader that, not only is the Government constrained to keep up those embankments by its own engagements at the time of the Perpetual Settlement, but the Government would lose its revenue if it allowed the country to be inundated, and the expense of maintaining the embankments stands on exactly the same ground as the "tank fees" in Madras; it is just as much an essential condition of receiving the revenue as the ryot's expense of cultivation, and it ought no more to have been absorbed into the revenue, and then called expenditure out of revenue on public works, than the ryot's gross produce ought to be put down as revenue, and his expenses called expenditure out of revenue. It appears then by the abstract in Appendix A, that of the gross revenue or whole amount of taxes levied on the people of Bengal and Agra, the average annual expenditure for ten years, on roads and bridges, has been less than three-quarters of one cent; that is less than £110,219 for two provinces larger than England and France put together, and containing a larger population than that of these two kingdoms, and the expenditure on works of irrigation and embankments during the same period has been much less than a half of one per cent. Now could any thing I said be a stronger proof of the cruel and criminal neglect of the

people than these simple facts from the Government's own Blue Book? Could any thing illustrate more forcibly "the stupid and merciless system" of a Bureaucracy?—"Is it surprising," in the words of the *Madras Engineer*, "that under such a system of managing the country, the people are poor, and the Government poor, how could it be otherwise?" But when we entrust the Government of India to a class of politicians, of whom Burke said most truly, that "a large, liberal, and prospective view of the interests of States passes with them for romance; and the principles that recommend it for the wanderings of a disordered imagination;" is it not to be expected that they should govern exactly as they have done? Is it not natural that such a class should think it the highest art of finance, to do what would be considered absurd in any other civilized country, to raise nearly the whole of the net revenue by direct taxation on produce, and to grasp direct revenue as much as they could, and wherever they could reach it, without an idea beyond this? And of course this drain of direct revenue has fallen upon and ruined every class in their turn—the country gentlemen and farmers have felt it in over-assessment—the merchants and manufacturers, and inland towns felt it in the transit duties. Mr. Trevelyan says that many towns were deserted by the trade and manufactures carried on within their walls, and the inhabitants left as paupers who had previously been industrious workmen; and Shore mentions the failure of between fifty and sixty bankers and wholesale mer-

chants in his experience in one city alone; and this went on throughout the country. At present the only class who can yield any more direct revenue are the Native Princes and the territorial aristocracy, and accordingly the drain is falling upon them, as I shew in my next chapter. Of course this system has pauperized the country, for it would pauperize any country: it is cutting down the tree to get at its fruits. Yet it is still the sole resource of the Bureaucracy. The only hope expressed in the last despatch of raising the surplus revenue of the Punjaub from 18 lacs to 30, is by reducing the expenditure of public works in the Punjaub to the same extent. And so they go on, the only plan for the future is the plan of the past, viz. to drain every thing in and lay nothing out, and this hopeful system has at length brought our Indian finances to the very edge of ruin. It is in vain to tell such a Government as this that the want of public works keeps India poor; that the want of communication deprives the natives of the possibility of commerce or exchange to an incalculable extent; that it forbids progress; it paralyzes industry; it stops the division of labour; it neutralizes God's blessings on the soil; and tends to keep the inhabitants barbarians and paupers. It is in vain to tell them that the elevation of the human species follows the track of every great highway we lead into the interior of India. All this passes with a Bureaucracy for romance: "littleness in object and in means, to them appears soundness and sobriety."

In conclusion, I shall not surprise the reader by saying that I have not the slightest confidence in what the *Friend of India* sneeringly calls, "the new vigour of the Government in sight of the Charter discussions." I believe the "new vigour" exactly corresponds to the new responsibility which called it forth, and will only last as long as the cause which produced it. As soon as the Parliamentary responsibility is again comfortably shelved for another twenty years, the new vigour will disappear with it. But I must discriminate here between works undertaken by the new vigour for the English and for the natives. The Government has recently sanctioned three railways and an electric telegraph. Now I have no doubt the latter will be finished, and that speedily, because, independent of the calculation that the users of it will pay its expenses, every man can understand the immense additional strength which the telegraph will give us in India, and our English interest in the matter is so clear to English politicians, that even a bureaucratic administration would not dare to trifle with it. But it is very different in the case of railways. Unfortunately English politicians do not see our English interest in Indian public works, nor feel the ryot's strong necessity for them. There is nothing therefore to ensure the railways being finished, or the want of other communications being supplied—(for two or three railways will not suffice for the wants of India, any more than it would do for England to have a railway from Liverpool to Birmingham, and another from London to

Southampton, and no roads beside.) It appears that the shareholders in Indian railways take the matter very easily as long as they regularly receive their dividends on the money paid up, and as these dividends come out of the pockets of the ryots, who have no voice in the matter, and literally go for nothing in the decision, if once the Charter is settled, and the present bureaucratic Government safe again for another twenty years, there may be money enough spent in dividends on railways always making and never made, to have paid for good roads all over India. In fact, the system will be pursued with railways which has been pursued with other ways; and I must explain to the reader that the published "sanction" for any work in India, is frequently a pure mystification, and does not in the least mean that the work will be made, unless it suits the Government to spend the money.

The Government has various modes of privately stopping the execution of a work that is publicly "sanctioned." One is to write confidentially to the local authorities that the expenditure is "in the present state of the finances, inadvisable." Another is to require further explanation, and so hang up the work just as many years as the Government pleases, pending interminable references to England—the announcement of a reference to England, says Mr. Campbell, "is often regarded as an indefinite postponement." A third mode is to take care in sanctioning a work, that it shall be impossible to execute it, by keeping the district without engineers. And here

I must digress for a moment to remark that in every Presidency in India, the corps of engineers is utterly inadequate to the exigencies of the country, not merely too few to execute new works, but even to keep in repair the old ones.

The *Friend of India*, of February 6th, 1851, after making exactly the same complaint as Shore did twenty years before, that infantry officers, magistrates, and collectors, were constantly called upon to perform the functions of civil engineers, mentions a case where a wealthy native had subscribed a large sum for re-building a bridge, when it fell some years before, and yet, though ample funds were provided for the work, the bridge had not been re-built, and the country had been deprived of the benefit of it, because no engineer could be spared to make it. I repeat, therefore, that the "new vigour" and the public "sanction" of railways, or any other works, gives me no confidence whatever in the Government. I am convinced that the same men, in the same places, will, if they can, pursue the same system in the future as in the past. I have seen that the promises which necessity forces the Indian Government to make, necessity alone will force it to keep.

As I have explained in my 2nd and 7th chapters the remedies which I propose for these grievances, I will not go over the same ground here, except to notice one point. I may be asked, what, if the Bureaucracy is cut down, and power, and responsibility given to the local authorities, what is to ensure their

competency to direct the local administration? for instance, such a Presidency might be named where the only business the Governor is fit for, is to travel about and take care of his health; while his Council are men who have risen by seniority alone, and are remarkable, not for ability, but for the want of it; and supposing 5 per cent of the land revenues were allotted to public works in this Presidency, what is to ensure the money being well laid out? I answer that if the worst comes to the worst, the Local Authorities are always more competent than the Home Authorities, but there is never any reason for having an incompetent local administration, except the private interest of the Bureaucracy. It is always easy enough to make the local Government efficient if there is the will to do it. It is perfectly easy to break through the rule of seniority for the higher appointments, as recommended in Mr. Willoughby's evidence. The only difficulty is that it is not the interest of the "intelligent clerks" to do this, for the more inefficient a local Government can be made, the greater is the power of the Bureaucracy at home. And it is because I have invariably found, in studying the details of local administration, that all the reforms required in India would be a necessary consequence of the reform at Home, that I have struck at the root of the evil, and devoted this book to advocating a change in the Bureaucratic system at Home. Meanwhile, as the case now stands, the Indian Government are imposing a heavy tribute on the ryots, and refusing them the

public works which would enable them to bear the burthen—they are forcing them to make bricks without straw. And so completely does the system of secrecy and the system of mystification keep the English public ignorant of and indifferent to these things, that India might as well contain nothing but cattle besides our functionaries there, for all that its population is talked of or thought of by the majority of my countrymen. Even in the reports of the dinners given by the East India Company to officials going to or returning from the country, the reader will be surprised and perhaps shocked, to find that amid the chorus of praises bestowed on the East India services, and the mutual compliments of Directors and Members of Parliament on the great success of Indian administration, and the great men formed by it, amid all the self-laudation and congratulation, scarcely a word, and sometimes not a word, is said about the natives. And thus it is that every Indian grievance is “out of sight out of mind,” and the compliments go on in England, and the complaints in India, from generation to generation.

I have often wondered how it is that those who are so conspicuously active among us in the interests of religion, never turn their attention to India. How is it they never inquire whether, as a nation, we are doing our duty to India? and whether their zeal could not obtain for its vast population that legislative justice which would confer the most solid blessings on a one-eighth part of the whole human family? It seems to me that Christian charity would not be unworthily

employed in such a work as this. However, I know not if my feeble voice can reach my countrymen, but if it can, I tell them plainly that the Bureaucratic Government to which they have entrusted the irresponsible despotism of India, has not secured the happiness of the natives in their person, honour, property, or moral sentiments. It has not acted on what ought to be the principle of every Government, viz., to serve the people, and root the sovereign in their interests and affections. Instead of this, it has acted on a system of distrust, and exclusion, and exhaustion, like that of a bad tenant who feels that his lease will soon expire, and scourges the land to get all he can off his farm before he is forced to quit. And at length the consequence of a policy which has hitherto only been fatal to the millions of our fellow-subjects in India are coming home to our own door. The public have no idea of the imminence of the danger. It has always been officially asserted that peace would soon return, and the finances would suffice for a time of peace, though they could not defray the charges of war. Even had this last assertion been true, those who are acquainted with the private motives which influence our policy on this subject, and acquainted with the tone of the public press on both sides of India, these know that too many of the servants of the state have an interest in going to war, for this promissory note of peace drawn by an irresponsible Government to be any solid security for the future. And at this very time, although the public have been most unjustifiably kept

without official information of the causes of the present Burmese war, which will add its quota of millions to the debt of India, my private intelligence leaves me not a shadow of doubt that there was no more necessity for our going to war with the Burmese than for our going to war annually with the Americans. But while it is not true, that the finances would suffice for a period of peace without an illicit revenue which is in the nature of a gambling speculation, I refer the reader to a statement given at Appendix B of this book shewing that the permanent sources of Indian revenue, which are at present unequal to the charge of the debt, exhibit no increase corresponding to the progress of the debt, but in the case of the customs duties, a decline in the tax-paying power of the people; while on the other hand the regular increase of the debt under the present system of Government is inevitable, and it has only been met hitherto by a gambling resource. In fact, we are staking the credit and apparently the existence of our Indian empire on such a precarious source of revenue as opium-smuggling. And yet according to the last *Friend of India* (Nor. 25th 1852) the Chinese cabinet must soon *be forced by the necessity of circumstances* to change their policy of prohibiting the use of this drug, which, according to the same authority, will annihilate a financial resource amounting to one-fifth of the gross revenues of the British empire in India! Now I cannot tell how this financial prospect will affect others, for there are those who will not believe in the reality

of an earthquake until they are buried under its ruins, but I feel bound to say what it signifies to me as plain as figures can speak. It signifies that we are going on, the blind leading the blind, to a hideous gulf of bankruptcy in India. It means that we are allowing a Bureaucracy to steer the vessel of State to certain shipwreck. And when I think of "the creatures of the desk and the creatures of favour" who are doing this — when I remember what Burke says of them* — I begin to fear lest the old proverb should come true in India, that "Providence raises up great men to found an empire, but employs the lowest of our species to destroy one."

* "The tribe of vulgar politicians are the lowest of our species."

CHAPTER VII.

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM.

IT is a common saying, and has grown into an article of popular faith, that, "after all, India is much better governed than the colonies,"—and I have heard so much from my youth upward of mal-administration in the colonies, that I had always taken the above proposition for granted, and supposed it to be a truism which admitted of no dispute. When however, after investigating the details of Indian administration, the old saying again accidentally strikes my ear, I am suddenly astonished to find so little foundation for it that I am puzzled to conceive how such a mistake could have arisen. After pondering over this phenomenon, I believe the real explanation of it to be that every grievance of the colonies finds loud and eloquent utterance in England, and even within the walls of Parliament, whereas the grievances of India have no voice among us; and the absence of complaint from the latter country is taken to signify the absence of grounds for complaint. This is a sufficiently curious illusion, for if the degree of complaint were evidence of the degree of mal-administration, then England would be about the worst governed country in the

world, and incomparably worse governed than the Papal States; for no complaints are audible from the Roman territory, whatever men are suffering there: the smoke of the sacrifice rises dumbly. But because there is in England, in one year, a thousand times more complaint of the Government than is heard from India during the lapse of a twenty years' Charter, let not the reader too hastily conclude that men do not suffer in India. It is a great mistake, said Sismondi, in speaking of the modern history of Italy, it is a great mistake to suppose that the times about which history is silent are the least calamitous to mankind. All calamities are not historical; they require a certain dignity, a certain evident connexion with politics and individuals, in which all the world can see the chain of causes and effects, before they attract sufficient notice to be recorded in history. But calamities may afflict a nation, not the less real because from their social nature silent, by which a whole people may feel themselves, as men more than as citizens, degraded, demoralized, disgraced in their own eyes, ruined in their fortunes, and deprived of hope so long as to lose the power of voluntary effort, and all this without the connexion between politics and their condition being evident to the world, or any dramatic effect of public interest attracting notice to their inward bleeding wounds.

I shall endeavour to shew the reader that this has been the case in India, notwithstanding the absence of complaint, but I look in vain for anything

like this in the colonies. The Crown has never inflicted on the colonies such a ryotwar system, or perpetual settlement, or judicial system, or such transit duties, as we have forced upon India, and there are perhaps worse calamities behind. I do not mean to deny that grievances exist in the colonies, only they are not equal to those of India, and they receive a very different degree of attention in England. For instance, I will take the greatest colonial complaint of the day, the transportation of convicts. No doubt this evil is real enough, but I must observe that it is a thing of yesterday compared to many Indian griefs, and that the system of transportation has in its time been of essential service to the colonies, and even now it appears, by the *Globe* of November the 2nd, that a portion of the colonists petition for its continuance, as the only mode of supplying the labour market; at any rate the system is old, and the opposition to it comparatively new, and yet from the time that the colonists declare strongly against it they find men of first-rate abilities to urge their complaint, the press, no part of which is gagged as in the case of India, by the threat of withdrawing the large income yielded by the Leadenhall Street advertisements, the press warmly espouses their cause, and every unprejudiced man would admit that their representative in the House of Commons, Sir William Molesworth, is listened to with the utmost respect by the House and the country—that he is virtually a much higher authority on the subject than any official man—and that from the date of his speech

on the 21st of May, 1852, the system of transportation was certainly doomed, and the only question was, how much more odium and disgrace the Colonial Office would incur in a hopeless resistance to its inevitable abandonment. How different is the case of the natives of India! Out of the House the public appears to be indifferent to their fate; and in the House the great authority on the subject is sure to be some official man who may be said to hold a general retainer to oppose the interest of the natives on every occasion, because his own position and influence depend on his maintaining that vicious system of Indian administration which requires his "sharp practice" to defend it, whereas a good system would employ an advocate of a higher character. I may be referred to the efforts of Mr. Bright in 1848 and 1850, and of Lord Jocelyn in 1851, to shew that the natives are not altogether abandoned in the House of Commons. I must answer that the Ministry would have refused Mr. Bright his Committee in 1848, but for the powerful interference of Sir Robert Peel. Alas for India! that great man was beginning to feel an unusual interest in Indian affairs at the time of his death, and, had his life been spared, the prospects of the natives would have been very different from what they are now. However, in 1850, Mr. Bright was cheaply defeated by an official denial of several notorious facts; and if Lord Jocelyn fared better last Session, it was because a mass of new evidence, backed by official reports of which the substance had transpired, and by the public conviction

and degradation of Ali Moorad, had rendered it impossible for the Home Government any longer to burke the case, as they did burke it for years in the Court of Proprietors.—Vide Appendix C. I repeat therefore that, in spite of the isolated, though generous efforts of Mr. Bright and Lord Jocelyn, there is no regular advocate for the natives in the House of Commons, as there is and always has been for the colonists; but the only permanent representative of India in that House, is some official advocate against the natives. There is, then, almost no complaint; but does this prove there are no grievances? I will endeavour to answer this question. The more I study the subject the more I feel a growing conviction that the natives were happier, not merely under their good princes, but happier under the average of their native sovereigns, than they have been under an English Bureaucracy. In discussing this point, we have always hitherto had the advantage of being the judges in our own cause; therefore, because we first acquired power in India during a revolutionary period, we have assumed that the normal condition of Indian Governments was a chronic state of revolution; and we have assumed that the mass of the people must have been miserable, because we can prove that many of their native sovereigns were warlike, bigoted, &c. But we must recollect that India is as large as the whole of Europe; and suppose we were to apply the same ingenious process of crimination to Europe

that we do to India,* -- suppose we were to reckon up the wars and acts of oppression of European princes, as we do for the native princes, down to the end of the 18th century, and calculate the amount of bloodshed and human misery caused by their ambition and selfish indifference to the fate of the masses,—suppose we were to rake out of a few centuries of history, for Europe as we do for India, all the deliberate cruelties inflicted on mankind by religious fanaticism,—finally, suppose we were to see what the memoir-writers of the time say of the condition of the great bulk of the people in Europe, down to the period of the French Revolution? If we were to do this with any good faith, we should begin to find it impossible to cast the first stone at India. We should begin to admit that if there had been wars, if there had been bigotry, if there had been misgovernment in India, there had been such things elsewhere. But there had been many compensations in India; there had been long-established Governments, and great masses of contented subjects; the Mahomedan conquerors of India had settled in the country, and identified themselves with the interests and sympathies of its inhabitants; they had, as the rule, respected the customs, and religion, and private landed property of the people, and any infraction of the rule was condemned by their own historians as it would be by Europeans; they had preserved the municipal insti-

* Vide Gulliver's defence of "his dear country" to the king of the Brobdignags.

tutions, and arbitration system, and excellent police, which gave the people the best security for person and property at the least cost; they never burthened the country with a *national debt*, and had spent great sums out of the taxes for the people, on public works and grants for education, and had not attempted to destroy that native aristocracy, whose capital was the support of the labourers, manufacturers, and merchants of India: finally, they had not treated the people as an inferior race of beings; they had maintained a free social intercourse with them; they had not confined them to such low ill-paid offices as they could not fill themselves; they had frequently left the most important share of the civil offices of State in their hands, and had allowed them to rise daily from among the lower orders to all ranks of civil and military employment, which "kept up the spirit of the people," said Mr. Elphinstone. In short, the Mahommedans did not, by dividing the community into two distinct bodies of privileged foreigners and native serfs, systematically degrade a whole people. In a long course of time, and among a hundred millions of men, they had oppressed many; but they had left hope to all; they had thrown open to all their subjects the prizes of honest ambition, and allowed every man of talent, industry and courage to aspire to titles of honour or political power, or high military commands, with corresponding grants of land.

Very different from this has been the government of the English conquerors of India. We have kept the peace in the country for our own sakes, and this has

of course, to a certain extent, increased cultivation and commerce, because the instinctive efforts of men to better their condition will always ensure the material progress of any people, until they reach the point where misgovernment sets a limit to progress. But this benefit of keeping the peace in India is the only one our rule has conferred on the natives, to make up for the loss of all the compensations mentioned above; and if I shew this to be the case—if against one benefit is to be set our systematic impoverishment and degradation of a whole people, what will after ages say of our passion for aggrandisement in India? Will it be sufficient to have changed the mode of extortion, to have substituted the dry-rot of English Bureaucracy for the violence of Roman proconsuls, to prevent posterity from condemning with one voice our selfish policy in India? I deeply feel that it will not: I feel painfully that, although for a while the system may deceive or corrupt contemporary opinion, and triumph over such feeble protests as mine, its triumph will one day be appealed against in a higher court of opinion, and be reversed by the judgment of history; and in that day the verdict of the whole civilised world will be given against England, and the curse of many nations will fall upon her, for her selfish treatment of India.

However, the passion for aggrandisement above-mentioned is both excused and denied. It is excused on the ground that our territorial extension in India cannot be helped; that it is “in the natural course of things.” Why, of course it is, so long as we take

every precaution in constituting the Home Government to ensure its grasping tendency. We now make a Home Government which must theoretically know and care little about the natives, and covet any immediate increase of revenue and patronage. But suppose we made the Home Government on a totally different theory; suppose its very constitution ensured its knowing and caring a good deal about the natives, and proportionably less for patronage, and caring more for the ultimate than immediate increase of revenue, more for its real than its apparent value; if we did this, it would then be as much "in the natural course of things" for the Government not to be grasping, as it now is for it to be so.

Again, the passion for aggrandisement is denied, and it is said that our wars in India were defensive wars, by way of disproving the fact. Defensive wars! why the least scrupulous of European conquerors, Louis the XIVth, Napoleon . . . all, have found the same cloak for their ambition, and called their wars defensive measures with the same assurance; so that, with the Scinde and Affghanistan wars fresh in the reader's memory, this exploded old State fiction is not worth answering, as it is not wars alone, that prove this passion for aggrandisement. The reader must recollect that it is not by conquest from enemies, but by cessions extorted from friends, from our unfortunate allies, that a great part of our territory has always been, and continues to be, obtained. The amount of territory taken by Lord Wellesley in time of peace was

prodigious, and at the present day, with profound internal peace, the process of absorbing the native States is going on steadily, not at the expense of enemies but of friends. It is no security to the native Princes to have treaties with us, or to recall times when their alliance was hailed by us as a signal good fortune in a critical period. On some we impose contingents, which keep them in bondage, ruin their finances, force them to oppress their subjects, and end by furnishing us an excuse for interference and annexation. In the case of others, we coolly set aside the lawful succession at their deaths, turn the heirs adrift, and seize on their inheritance. In the same spirit we are confiscating the estates of the landed aristocracy, and it is believed that, what with resumptions of enams and rent-free lands and lapses of jagheers, we have since 1819 appropriated landed property of the value of three millions sterling of annual revenue. And why, for what purpose, is this incessant aggrandisement? Is it to give the natives "the blessings of the British Rule?" Let us see what these blessings have been? Istly, In Bengal, by one of the most sweeping confiscations the world ever saw, we transferred the whole landed property of the community to a body of taxgatherers; but under such conditions that this body of newly invented landlords were ruined almost to a man, and sold up by our Collectors, and their estates transferred to new men, within ten or twelve years; and in making the new landlords, we promised legislative protection to their tenants, yet we have left them from

that day to this at the mercy of the Zemindars, and only the other day it was said by the *Friend of India*, Sept. 16th, 1852 :—“ A whole century will scarcely “ be sufficient to remedy the evils of that Perpetual “ Settlement, and we have not yet begun the task. “ Under its baneful influence a population of more than “ twenty millions have been reduced to a state of such “ utter wretchedness of condition and such abjectness “ of feeling as it would be difficult to parallel in any “ other country.” 2ndly, In Madras, by another sweeping confiscation, perhaps without a precedent in history, we assumed that the Government was the owner of all property in land, and that in the words of Government, we should “ avoid all material evil if “ the surplus produce was in all cases made the “ utmost extent of our demand;” this being the landlord’s rent, and leaving to the cultivator only a bare sufficiency for his own subsistence; and this surplus produce being demanded from the ryots, not as a corn-rent but as a money-rent, and being assessed and collected in districts averaging 7000 square miles, and 150,000 individual tenants, by one or two Europeans, assisted by *informers*, with notoriously incorrect surveys. 3rdly, When this Ryotwar system had ruined Madras, we forced it upon Bombay, in spite of Mr. Elphinstone’s opposition, and nowhere did we at any time lower our assessments until the agriculturists were beggared, and we retain the system to this day. 4thly, We established and maintained for the better part of a century, transit duties, which broke the

manufacturers, decayed the towns, and demoralised the people of India, and left it a matter of wonder that any trade could be carried on at all. 5thly, We destroyed those municipal institutions which had, according to Mr. Elphinstone, “preserved the people of India through all their revolutions, and conduced in a high degree to their happiness, and to the enjoyment of a great portion of freedom and independence.” We destroyed these, and with them the excellent arbitration system and native police which gave the people full security for person and property at the least possible cost; and we set up instead, an exotic system of English law, which has so utterly deprived the people of security, besides corrupting their morals, that in our civil courts, “which give every opening for fraud, perjury, and forgery,” all the most important interests of the country have been rapidly converted and transferred, and no man’s estate is safe, and in our criminal courts nothing but his most singular ill-luck can bring an accomplished criminal to justice, and even within a circle of 60 or 70 miles round our capital city of Calcutta, no man of property can retire to rest without danger of being the victim of Dacoits before morning. 6thly, We levied great taxes on the people, and drained away one-seventh of their net-revenue to England, at the same time burthening them with a load of *national debt* for the first time in their history; and yet, in spite of their admitted rights and necessities, we gave them back next to nothing in public

works ; never anything for education, unless forced by pressure from without, and the vigorous initiative of private individuals, and then as little as possible ; and in most districts beyond comparison less for roads, bridges, tanks, &c. than has been given by wealthy native merchants and country gentlemen. 7thly, We have long been systematically destroying the native aristocracy, who furnished consumers for the articles of commerce and luxury, who stimulated the production of the labourers, the manufacturers, and the merchants, who were the patrons of art, the promoters of agricultural improvement, the co-operators in public works, and the only class who could enable us to carry out any comprehensive amelioration of native society ; and we are extinguishing the native States, of which the effect is, according to Sir Thomas Munro, “ in place of raising to debase the whole people,” and according to the Duke of Wellington, “ to degrade and beggar the natives, making them all enemies ;” and meanwhile, our threat of absorption hanging over their heads, deprives both Princes and aristocracy of any inducement to improve their country. 8thly, We regard the natives rather as vassals and servants than as the ancient owners and masters of the country ; we have as little as possible of social intercourse with them, and although we allow them to do above 97 per cent of the work of administration, we monopolize the credit and emoluments of it, and keep every high office for ourselves. The establishment of our Rule in any part of India at once shuts the door

on the honest and laudable ambition of the natives ; all prospect of enjoying those honours and distinctions, and lucrative situations of trust and power, which reconcile men to the oppressions of arbitrary rulers in native States, is thenceforward cut off ; we divide the community into a government of foreign officials on the one hand, and a nation of serfs on the other ; of foreigners, constantly shifting their quarters, having no permanent connexion with the country, and always looking forward to the day when they shall return to England with a fortune, and of serfs, who are the natives of the land, linked and identified with its interests and sympathies, and many of whom are regarded as little better than menial servants, who might have been governors of provinces but for us ; all of whom are confined to such low, ill-paid offices, as we cannot fill ourselves : for instance, in the military profession, the veteran native officer is as much below the rawest European ensign as that ensign is below his commander-in-chief ; and in the civil administration, every appointment of real dignity and emolument is reserved for a covenanted European service ; and therefore did Lord William Bentinck say, after having done all that has yet been done for elevating the natives, that our system was the reverse of the Mahommedan policy, that our policy was “ cold, selfish, and unfeeling—the iron hand of power on the one side, monopoly and exclusion on the other.” And therefore do we hear of robberies and oppressions in Oude and Hyderabad, and yet the people do not fly to us, because hope is

with them, and the future is not a blank ; instead of flying into our territory, they go from it ; often in flocks ; come into it they never do ; only the other day some important works on the Kistnah were stopped because the people of the country fled, *en masse*, into the Nizam's dominions. And why do they prefer to live under "effete" native Governments? because they do not feel themselves degraded as they do under us, for it is not the arbitrary power of a national sovereign, but subjugation to a foreign one that destroys national power and extinguishes national spirit, and with this the mainspring of whatever is laudable both in public and private life—but we make them feel the rule of the stranger to their heart's core ; we set a barrier of privilege between the natives and their foreign masters ; the lowest European officer in a black or red coat, is above every native gentleman, though the latter may be the descendant of a line of princes, and is often a man of the most chivalrous feelings and the highest accomplishments ; nevertheless, we treat them as an inferior race of beings, and we are making them so ; our monopoly of every high office, from generation to generation, is systematically degrading the people of India ; the deterioration of native character under our rule is manifest to every one ; and Sir Thomas Munro went so far as to say : " it would be more desirable that we should be expelled from the country altogether, than that the result of our system of Government should be such an abasement of a whole people." Here are samples of " the blessings of the British Rule !"

I have not the skill to state the case in eloquent language, and cannot express what I feel about it, but a man of imagination who pleaded this cause would often bring tears into his reader's eyes; however, I do beseech the reader to consider this series of facts, told in the plainest, simplest manner, and to say whether such "*blessings*" can justify our passion for aggrandizement in India? And I have not done: I have yet to describe the means and the end of gratifying this passion; because, considering that our bureaucratic, irresponsible Government of India, has lately shewn that it would no longer respect the clearest rights and treaties when it could find a pretext for grasping a little more revenue and patronage; and considering that Malcolm, Elphinstone, Metcalfe, Russell, Munro, the Duke of Wellington, and most of our great Indian statesmen, have emphatically condemned the absorption of the native States, and that our unfortunate allies, above 250 native Princes, in the presence of an overwhelming army, with no tribunal before which they can carry their complaints, and placed as a class out of the pale of the law, that they have now confiscation always hanging over their heads, I must explain the outrageous breach of faith involved in our absorption of native States, and shew what the Duke meant when he said it "degraded and beggared the natives and made them all enemies." The means now employed by the Government to absorb the native States are to deny the right of adoption. Probably the reader is aware that adoption is one of the most

solemn duties of religion in India, in the case of failure of sons: which continually happens in the reigning families. By this ceremony the adopted son becomes as much an heir as an heir of the body, and Mr. Holt Mackenzie has proved beyond dispute that there is no foundation for drawing a distinction between succession to private property and succession to political power, in the force and effect of adoption, but the adopted son acquires all and every one of the rights of a legitimate heir of the body. Of course this right of adoption is the dearest privilege of the native Princes, and the most necessary to them, as their States would soon fall into our hands without it; and this right has been given to the people of India in express words, by an early Act of Parliament, and has been formally asserted by Governors-General, as Lords Amherst, Metcalfe and Auckland, and asserted by the law officers of the Government and the courts of Bengal over and over again, and has been admitted by us for many years in the succession of native States, without any requiring of previous notice, or any reserve or qualification whatsoever, in a great number of precedents. Nevertheless, the Government has at length decided, with the object, avowed without disguise, of getting more revenue, that, as the paramount power in India, succeeding to the authority of the Emperor of Delhi, its sanction to an act of adoption is necessary, and it is entitled to withhold this sanction; and accordingly it has within the last few years set aside three adoptions, and confiscated the native states of Sattarah, Colabah, and Mandavie,

although, in each of these three cases, there were collateral blood relations and heirs of the deceased prince, after the adopted son.

Now, I will first say a few words about the Emperor of Delhi, and put him out of the way; for he has no more to do with the question than the man in the moon. When the poor Emperor came into our hands, as Scindiah's prisoner, blinded twenty years before, did we restore him to his empire? Certainly not! Did he then give us a grant of his paramount power in India? if so, how came we to make treaties with his feudatories as independent Princes? The fact is, as all the world knows, our paramount power was won, and is kept, by the sword. And such are the "blessings of the British rule," that we are obliged to remain armed to the teeth to keep it; and we had better not forget that we keep it by the sword of a native army, which has a strong personal interest in the right of adoption.

I now come to the question of the sanction. Undoubtedly, where there is a dispute or doubt as to the succession, the sanction of the paramount power is necessary; because the paramount power is entitled and bound to keep the peace in India, and to prevent any violation of rights, or outrage on the feelings of the people, which may endanger the public safety; and in a disputed or doubtful case of succession, its sanction is necessary, to prove that an adoption is legal and regular, and to award the succession to the rightful claimant. But this sanction of the paramount

power is a judicial sanction ; it is the same thing as the Lord Chancellor's decision on a will ; and when the sanction of the paramount power is required or requested in allied States, not subject or belonging to it, but connected with it by treaties, its duty is to find out the heir, and to give the succession to the heir, not to seize on the inheritance itself, in defiance of all the heirs. It was as much an act of robbery for us to appropriate the principalities of Sattarah, Calabah, and Mandavie, in defiance of all the heirs, as it would be for the Lord Chancellor to pocket a legacy, because it was being litigated in his court. We are improving upon a precedent set by Caligula, in our violation of the right of adoption. When Caligula was invited to a nuptial feast, he carried away his friend's wife : when the British Resident is invited to the death-bed of a native Prince, he turns his friend's widow and orphan out of doors, and confiscates their inheritance. And they do not take these things so quietly in the country as we do here. We hear of the absorption of a native State, and go about our business, and think no more of the matter ; like a ship's crew, who duly note in the log, " run down a vessel in the night : all hands lost ;" then pursue their voyage and forget it. But these things lodge and rankle in men's minds in India, where too many of our troops are interested in this question of adoption ; and, as I said before, the free press is doing its work.

I am convinced that the Government will some day regret the system that is making so many enemies.

It will some day absorb a native State too many, and feel a pang like one who has put a fruit into his mouth, with a hornet in it. We must not expect the Rajpūt Princes to lie still like oysters, waiting to be dredged. They are, and ever were, a high-spirited, martial race, prompt to appeal to the sword, and just the men to say, in a fit of exasperation, "better an end with fear than fear without an end." Meanwhile, the natives have a stereotyped expression for us, which gives us a false confidence. We tread on ice, and forget the current of passion flowing beneath, which imperils our footing. The natives seem what they know we expect them to appear, and we do not see their real feelings: we know not how hot the stove may be under its polished surface. For the fire is not out; we are obliged to keep it up by our native army, which may blaze into a conflagration, and burn the empire. There may be some Procida, matchless in diplomatic art and tenacity of purpose, who will travel for years to knit enemies against us; who will mine the ground under our feet, and lay the train of combustibles: there may be some outrage, which will suddenly raise a cry, terrible as that which broke forth when the bells of Monreale were sounding to vespers, a cry of "Death to the Englishmen:" there may be some conspiracy, of which, as at Vellore, we have not even a suspicion, until the native regiments open their fire on our barracks: and, as a merchant who is obliged to throw all his treasure overboard to save the ship, a storm may arise in India which will cost us more to maintain our power, than

all we have gained, or can ever hope to gain, by our confiscations.

Nor does the injury stop with the families of the Princes. Native States support a numerous class of civil and military functionaries, who cannot find employment under us; besides the holders of jagheers, enams, &c. who know that their property is doomed when they fall under our rule. And in a State like the last absorbed, in place of thirty or forty natives exercising the civil administration of affairs, with salaries of from 100 to 200 rupees a month, which they spend in the country, we substitute one or two Europeans, receiving from 2000 to 3000 rupees a month, and remitting the bulk of their salaries to England. Moreover, the bread of almost every man in and about the capital of a native State depends on the expenditure of the native Government; and not only many thousands of natives directly dependent upon it, but the manufacturers and shopkeepers dependent upon them, are nearly all ruined by our absorption; and their distress reacts on the cultivators of the soil. This is why the Duke said that absorption "degrades and beggars the natives, and makes them all enemies." Similar results follow, in proportion, from the resumption of the landed estates of the aristocracy. Shore says, "to bring the subject home to an English heart and mind, let us turn our thoughts to our native land, and compare the effects produced by individual example and influence there, with what might have been the case here. Let us represent to ourselves

“ an English country gentleman, overlooking his estate,
“ promoting the improvement of agriculture, superin-
“ tending the roads and public buildings, and sub-
“ scribing to the local charities. As a neighbour,
“ opening his house, and by his hospitality affording
“ the means of social intercourse to his neighbours ; all
“ the different members of his family contributing their
“ share to the general good. Contrast the picture
“ with the state of things in India. The upper classes
“ of the natives, who used to occupy the above situ-
“ ations, ruined, and their places supplied by fo-
“ reigners, who keep aloof from the people, and
“ whose ultimate object is to return to England with a
“ fortune.” He adds, “ As to the number of respect-
“ able people who have suffered, let any one leave the
“ English stations, few and far between, and go into
“ the country towns and villages, and there see the
“ innumerable houses which not many years ago were
“ in good repair, and inhabited by men who lived in
“ the style of gentlemen, keeping up establishments of
“ servants, horses, elephants, and equipages, but which
“ are now all falling to decay, while their owners or
“ their descendants are dwelling in mud huts, with
“ little more than the merest necessaries of life.” And
let the reader recollect that the destruction of the native
aristocracy is still going on with unremitting vigour,
as one of the “ blessings of the British rule.”

How can we reconcile it to our conscience or our
reason to treat the natives in this manner? It was a
beautiful fiction of the Greeks, that Ulysses could no

longer feign madness when his child was thrown before his plough; but we have allowed a Bureaucracy to plough over India till the "iron has entered into the soul" of her people, when we did not seem to be mad at all.

However, I believe there is a secret cause why the English public feel so little sympathy for the natives, which is entirely founded on a misunderstanding, and on ignorance of the native character. Lord Ellenborough said last session, that "no intelligent people would submit to our Government;" and though he alone would dare to say it, I am quite satisfied in my own mind that many think it, and that my countrymen in their hearts despise the natives of India, because they do submit to our Government. Nevertheless, this submission does not argue cowardice in those who submit. We enforce submission by an overwhelming mercenary army; and as long as that army is faithful, submission is a matter of necessity; but although, under such circumstances they submit to our Government, there is not a race on the face of the earth who possess more personal courage than the men of India; and the fact is not altered by their subjection to us, because the bravest people in the world may be subjugated by foreigners when they are divided against themselves, which was the case with the natives of India when we founded our empire there. And not only were they divided, but for half a century before an opening was given for our supremacy; the great powers of the country had been shattered by wars, which may be called wars

of giants, from the magnitude of their operations. In the last great battle, in 1798, which decided the contest between the Mahrattas and Rajpùts, the forces brought into the field by the latter were 125,000 strong, and by the former 111,000 strong; large bodies of the troops on both sides being armed and disciplined in the European fashion; and I will quote the description of a charge of cavalry in this action, taken from the mouth of an eye-witness, Colonel Skinner, to shew the gallantry of the men:—"We now saw Chevalier " Dudennaig's brigade or division, which was on the " left, charged by the Rahtórs. He received them " nobly, but was cut to pieces by them. Out of 8000 " men he had not 200 left. The Rahtórs, more than " ten thousand in number, were seen approaching from " a distance; the tramp of their immense and compact " body, rising like thunder over the roar of the battle. " They came on first at a slow hand-canter, which " increased in speed as they advanced. The well- " served guns of the brigade showered grape upon " their dense mass, cutting down hundreds at each " discharge; but this had no effect in arresting their " progress. On they came, like a whirlwind, tramp- " ling over 1500 of their own body, destroyed by the " cannon of the brigade. Neither the murderous vol- " leys from the muskets, nor the serried hedge of " bayonets, could check or shake them; they poured " like a torrent on and over the brigade, and rode it " fairly down, leaving scarcely a vestige of it remain- " ing, as if the sheer weight of the mass had ground

“ it to pieces.” Again, we are accustomed to consider the battle of Waterloo one of the most sanguinary that ever was fought, yet our loss in some Indian battles has been about double the loss at Waterloo. The proportion of killed and wounded at Waterloo was one to six ; that of Assaye was just double, one to three, and several have been near it ; and the loss in the Sutlej battles, in 1846, was much more severe than that of Waterloo, being in the proportion of one to five. I could add many other proofs of the personal bravery of the natives ; but it has always been conspicuous : so I will merely remind the reader of the brilliant native armies of Clive, Lawrence, and Coote, which carved out our way to empire. And yet those armies, unrivalled for valour and loyalty, were officered by native gentlemen, with only one or two Europeans to a brigade ; and this was our original system in India, until the thirst for patronage, as usual, surmounted every other consideration, and substituted European for native officers.

Of late years sheer financial necessity has forced us to return to some extent to the old system, which is copied in our “ irregular corps ;” and the admirable state of efficiency and discipline of these “ irregular corps ” shews that we can employ the natives when we choose in situations of trust and power, and that it answers perfectly to do so. To return to my subject, I think I have said enough to shew that we should do very wrong to refuse our sympathy to the natives from a doubt of their courage ; and they have many other

qualities which entitle them to our warm and kind consideration. I have noticed in the chapter on public works, their disposition to found benevolent institutions, and they are remarkable for a degree of charity in private life which renders the poor independent of public relief in India. "Their large family circles," says Mr. Campbell, "assist and support one another to an admirable extent. Families generally live together as on the Continent, and the young men who go out to service return, and remit money most dutifully to their families." The native merchants are particularly distinguished for their honourable mode of doing business, as well as for their enterprise; and Englishmen who have resided in native States bear witness to the simplicity and straightforward manner of the agricultural classes both in their dealings with them and amongst each other. It is only when they are corrupted by external influences, by a demoralising judicial system, or oppressive taxation, that art and cunning are substituted for candour, as the only protection against the hand of injustice and power; and I will add that those who have had much intercourse with the natives, in a commercial, political, or military character, almost invariably speak of them in very high terms; it is only among such judicial functionaries as have centered their observations on the most vicious classes of native society, and have overlooked the rest, that their detractors are to be found. Finally, it has been said by one of the most experienced members of the Indian service, that, "for the transaction

“ of business, whether in accounts, diplomatic correspondence, or the conduct of judicial, magisterial, or financial affairs, the natives are seldom surpassed. They are, on the whole, an intelligent, tractable, and loyal people, not defective in energy when there is a motive for exertion, and eminently calculated to promote the arts of civil life.” And now I have done. I have shewn that although there may be more complaint of the Government of England in one year, than we hear of the Government of India during two or three Charters, yet there has been suffering, not loud but deep, in the latter country ; its cup of grief has filled silently to the brim, aye, it has filled to running over, though no man complained of it in England. The unfortunate natives have had their rights of property confiscated ; their claims on our justice and humanity trampled under foot ; their manufacturers, towns, and agriculturists beggared ; their excellent institutions broken up ; their judicial security taken away ; their morality corrupted ; their patrons systematically destroyed ; and even their religious customs violated, by what are conventionally called the “ blessings of the British rule.” These great results at once strike the eye of any man who goes seriously into the question of our Indian administration ; like the tombs by the side of the road at the entrance of ancient cities, these monuments of the power of a Bureaucracy are the first things we see, and in them lie buried the hopes of India. And as abuses were maintained in the provinces of the Roman

Republic, because the patricians who retired from their magistracy were shielded by the senate, so is the Indian Government regularly shielded by Parliament. And at this day it is an understood thing that the Legislature intends to seal the misery of India, by leasing her out for another twenty years to the present irresponsible Home Government, which will again be exhorted to *govern paternally*, just as Isaac Walton exhorts his angler, in hooking a worm, "to handle him as if he loved him." The Parliament would not dare openly and directly to oppress India, yet it votes a Bureaucracy full power to do so. I cannot help warning my countrymen that if they stand by, and look quietly on, while this political martyrdom is once more consummated, their consenting to the deed will leave a heavy debt of vengeance against them, not only on earth but in heaven; it will provoke that retributive justice, which frequently allows an individual to escape, but never, never fails to overtake a nation. Let them weigh this well before they say, On our heads and on our children's be it! It is true, that we have an overwhelming mercenary army, and the word is passed, no danger above the horizon; but some may be coming; and in history we are always wise after the event, and when it is too late, when the bolt has fallen, and the penalty has been paid, then for the first time do politicians see why a Government based on injustice and bad faith could not stand; and what innumerable consequences of its own wrong-doing were all the while undermining its power. God forbid that we should be wise too late in India!

I have one more word to say in conclusion. Never, since the world began, was so great an opportunity of doing good, offered to a great nation, as that which Providence now offers to us in India. England is the sovereign arbiter and empress of that glorious land, with its 150 millions of "intelligent, tractable, and loyal" people, and she might throw herself on the fallen empire, as Elisha did on the Shunammite's child, "and put his mouth upon his mouth, and his eyes upon his eyes, and his hands upon his hands,"—so might England stretch herself on the prostrate Empire, and warm and quicken its torpid body, and breathe new life into India. She might raise the natives, and watch their progress, moral and material, as a mother watches her child, and loves it the better for the anxieties it has cost her; she might behold from year to year, the blessings she conferred, and feel the tie strengthening which attached her to India; she might have the answer of a good conscience, and the esteem of the whole civilized world. Oh, my countrymen! may Heaven itself soften your hearts, and awaken your sympathy for this interesting people; may it teach you not to reject your fated opportunity, nor again throw such a pearl as India, before an irresponsible Bureaucracy.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE SYSTEM OF PARLIAMENTARY LEGISLATION FOR INDIA.

DEAN SWIFT said, in reprobating the neglect of education in his day, that it was a common remark in families who had wealth enough to afford to have their sons good for nothing, “why should my son be a scholar, when it is not intended he should live by his learning?” He added, that by the same rule another man might say, “why should my son be honest, temperate, just, or charitable, when he does not mean to depend on any of these qualities for a maintenance!” And by the same rule the House of Commons actually do say, “why should one of the Ministry be compelled to prove the success of his department, when the Ministry does not depend on Indian affairs for its existence?” This is true enough, and the fate of an English Ministry now depends on matters of Home administration, and on Home questions, and parties, and politics, quite independent of the affairs of India. But I will shew that this state of things is eminently unsafe and unconstitutional, and from the time when, seventy years ago, a mere legislative oversight threw India out of the list of English political questions, it has been the

cause of shameful abuses in India ever since, it is the cause of perilous mal-administration at the present time, it has led to an almost incredible neglect of the subject by the House of Commons, and after all there is not in the whole range of our national interests any one more vital to the national life than our tenure of dominion in the East.

It is wonderful that my countrymen do not see the palpable contradiction of leaving India out of the list of their political questions. Why, there is not one of them of more importance to us! Is not our preservation of India an integral part of the Imperial policy? Is it not necessary to our commerce that India should be prosperous, and to our safety that it should not be disaffected? Would not a violation of religion and the rights of property, which lit a flame of insurrection in the Rajpootanah and sent over three-fourths of our Bengal seapoys to the enemy, instantly paralyze the right arm of England? Would not even a financial crisis in India shake the British Empire to its foundation? But let the reader imagine the same mistake being made in the case of England, that was made in the case of India. Let him conceive a Minister, "with a majority behind," coming down and telling the House that, "the Ways and Means were an exceedingly awkward subject; there always had been a good deal of debating and ministerial risk about it, and there always would be; therefore it would make things pleasant if the House would vote that for twenty years there should be no more Budgets; and the House should

interfere with any thing else it liked except with taxation; and if the Ministry in office, twenty years afterwards, preferred to revive the Budget, it might." Suppose such a measure had been passed in England 70 years ago, and the army had been strong enough to keep the people down, what would our commerce and rights of property have been worth now? What would have become of our municipal institutions? how much judicial reform should we have had? would there not have been an annual deficit in our finances by this time, instead of the surplus? Yet this is substantially the very same measure which was passed for India 70 years ago, and which of course removed her in a very short time from the list of our political questions, and rendered her Government so thoroughly irresponsible, that it now threatens to be the ruin of both countries. And after all, this was a mere oversight of the Legislature, and it shews how blind men are to the future, even the wisest of them, that although in those days the public mind was absorbed by Indian questions, and there was a most able and bitter opposition, eager to find any handle for an attack on the Minister, and headed by such men as Fox and Burke, not one of them foresaw an incidental and indirect consequence of Mr. Pitt's bill, which has had more effect than any direct provision, and has imperceptibly and silently produced a complete revolution in Parliamentary legislation for India, and thrown a subject which used to excite intense interest in the Parliament and the nation, out of the list of our

political questions. The point was this: as long as the Indian budget was presented to Parliament by parties indifferent to, and sometimes hostile to the Minister, and always viewed with distrust by the House of Commons, these parties were obliged to give not merely a simple publication of accounts but a periodical exposure of Indian affairs, with detailed information on all subjects connected with our Indian policy, and this kept the Members of Parliament well informed upon the question, and enabled them to discuss it, or rather ensured their discussing it, from year to year. And of course this constant supply of information was incomparably more necessary in the case of India than in any English question, not only because all kinds of political intelligence are freely published in England, which are concealed in India, but because the mere distance of the people of India from English politicians shews them to us in a point of view so remote that we are too often disposed to *see them as if they were not*, and to neglect complaints uttered so far off that they cannot reach our ears. However, from the time when the Indian budget became the Minister's budget, as he naturally did not feel inclined to provoke Parliamentary inspection of his administration, and as everybody had overlooked the necessity of making an express provision to meet the case, the periodical supply of information came to an end with the state of things which had led to it, and the consequence was that in a very few years Members of Parliament ceased to be well informed

upon the subject or competent to discuss it, and so India imperceptibly fell out of the list of our political questions, and its Government became irresponsible; and irresponsible it will remain, until the Minister is compelled to give Parliament once more a detailed annual exposure of Indian affairs. From the time when India ceased in this manner to be a political question, the neglect of it by Parliament has been something so incredible, that unless when I relate it, I could appeal to history at every step, I should not expect to be believed; and the description of it will be a lesson to Members of Parliament that they are as helpless as children in Indian affairs when they do not receive regular periodical information about them. At the time of the passing of the Charter in 1794, the House of Commons little thought that the recent "measure for the relief of the Zemindars," the "Perpetual Settlement" would effect a complete social revolution, and a sweeping confiscation of property in the doomed provinces of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa; nor could they imagine that while Mr. Dundas was giving them a glowing description of Indian prosperity, the despatches of the Governor-General contained a minute and shocking picture of the sufferings of the people, from the vices of the Government! But at this period, from the causes above mentioned, India was already ceasing, and had almost ceased to be an English political question, and as, in Mr. Mill's words, "Ministerial influence in Parliament can always get "ministerial praises received as articles of belief,

“ without any real grounds for it.” Mr. Dundas literally managed to persuade the nation that the financial state of India was a subject not merely of rejoicing and triumph, but even of astonishment, as affording a surplus revenue! A few years more threw a new and terrible light on the condition of our native fellow-subjects. The surplus revenue had turned out, as Indian surplus revenue *invariably* does, a complete bubble, and it gradually transpired in England that our unhappy provinces in India had been a scene of fiscal tyranny, of crime, and of suffering, unexampled in any civilized country since the decay of the Roman empire. Forced at length to investigate, the House of Commons in 1810, not only corroborated the above charges, but accused the Indian Government of continual misrepresentation; “ whether the Zemindar or the ryot were the sufferer, the Government always found something to commend.” Meanwhile, as if to balance the calamities of our northern Provinces, a new revenue system called ryotwar was introduced in the south, viz. a settlement with individual cultivators on the basis of assuming 50 per cent of the produce, *in money*, as the due of the Government! After some years experience of this system its originator had discovered that “ its radical defect “ was our over-assessment, which augments the public “ and reduces the private property in the soil to such a “ degree as to involve the necessity of ousting all be- “ tween the Government and the cultivator.” This was indeed a *radical defect*; it was simply the confiscation

of all the landlord's property in the soil by foreign conquerors! Moreover, the Madras Board of Revenue had accused the inventors of this system of "ignorantly denying, and by their denial abolishing private property in land," and though "professing to limit their demand on each field, in fact by establishing for such limit an unattainable maximum, assessing the ryot at discretion." Finally, the ablest administrator of the ryotwar system, Sir Thomas Munro, had declared that unless the assessment were reduced from 25 to 33 per cent, the land would go out of cultivation. Nevertheless, in spite of all this, the Government had but recently enforced the adoption of this ryotwar system, without any reduction of the assessment, when, under such circumstances, the House of Commons was once more called upon solemnly to judge the Indian Government, and to confirm or alter a system which had produced so much pain and ruin, and threatened to produce so much more. I pass over judicial and other grievances for the present, but with the above facts recorded on official authority, the House of Commons discussed the renewal of the Charter in 1813. Surely it was then at length time to do something for the natives; time to amend a despotic Government evidently well adapted for conquest and aggrandisement, but for nothing else; time to revive the periodical statement of Indian affairs, which used to draw public attention to them almost every year; time to adopt the plan recommended so long before by Warren Hastings, and

again urged by the Marquis of Wellesley, to ascertain and define the rights of property of every description in land, and make such definitions the basis of adjudication. But no! it is painful to record the transaction. The natives of India were treated like so many cattle. Their interests, their feelings, their hopes, and their fears, were alike forgotten. The only thing the House of Commons was well informed about was certain private, pecuniary, English interests. The battle of the Charter was fought over the heads of the natives, by parties eager for their trade, but too eager to give a thought to the myriads of human beings who yielded its profit. The leaders in the House of Commons, that is, ministers intent on securing Parliamentary support, Directors and merchants, greedy for private interests, at length struck their bargain, and having done the best they could for themselves, and professed much concern for the natives, they agreed on a fresh twenty years lease of India, to the old irresponsible Government. And now the "radical defect" was allowed to have full swing—the House of Commons had decided that a system which "ousted all between the government and the cultivator," and "assessed the ryot at an unattainable maximum," might be applied with impunity to the natives of India, and the ryotwar system fell with crushing effect on our southern provinces. The miserable inhabitants of Madras endured this oppression until the year 1827, when Sir Thomas Munro carried out, as Governor, the reductions he had recommended

in 1807. And this relief was only obtained at last by the efforts of Sir Thomas Munro and other private individuals, and the pressure of public opinion, not by any act of the House of Commons, which never interfered to protect the natives, nor manifested the slightest sympathy with their sufferings, though it had reserved to itself full power to superintend and control the Indian Government. In the year 1833, the necessity for renewing the Charter once more brought the whole question of Indian administration under the consideration of the House of Commons. There had now been half a century's experience of irresponsible Government in India, and again the House of Commons had the opportunity of altering or confirming the normal system of confiscation which had consigned Bengal to ruin in 1793, Madras in 1813, and which was beginning to crush Bombay in 1833. Moreover, there was now abundant information, which might have been accessible to the House of Commons, of the sufferings and claims of the natives in other respects. The frightful evils of the judicial system had been incessantly recorded by official authority for nearly forty years—the necessity of constructing public works had been loudly proclaimed—the transit duties, now completing the ruin of the manufacturers and towns of India, had been denounced as “the curse of the country”—the attempt to conduct all affairs by European agency, and exclude the natives from every office which it was possible to offer to an Englishman, had been confessed a notorious failure—

the destruction of the native municipal institutions had been admitted to be subversive of the security of person and property among the people—the inhumanity and impolicy of destroying the native territorial aristocracy had been strikingly exposed by Sir John Malcolm and others—the identical recommendation of Warren Hastings and the Marquis of Wellesley, which I have already mentioned, had now been endorsed by the great name of Lord Hastings; and finally the most fatal instance of the operation of “the revenue screw” that ever was known in India, the famous Bundelkund case, was going on at this very time,—and what did the House of Commons do? They met the judicial evils by the mockery of an additional member of Council at Calcutta; they met the necessity of appointing the natives to high office, strongly insisted on by such men as Malcolm, Elphinstone, and Munro, by the mockery of declaring their eligibility, and leaving it to the Directors to carry out this eligibility, who of course treated it with utter contempt. In fact, they shewed as before, that the only matters on which they were really well-informed were certain private, pecuniary, English interests. There was still a rag of the Company’s trade to be fought for, and this fight the House of Commons understood and sympathised with, but beyond this they shewed that they did not look upon their responsibility in legislating for so many millions of our native fellow subjects as being really serious, that they were ready to vote anything that suited the Ministry of the

day in Indian affairs, and that they performed this duty of deciding questions on which the welfare of India was to depend for another twenty years, "not merely with indifference to, but with feelings of impatience and disgust at," the whole subject. Of course, under such circumstances, not one of the above grievances was redressed, or even discussed in earnest. As wretched mariners who approach the harbour-light, only to be driven out to sea again by the storm, the unfortunate natives only witnessed a renewal of the Charter to have all their hopes disappointed, and India was again consigned to an irresponsible Government for another twenty years, to undergo all the mal-administration I have described, and a great deal more than I have described. And this "not mere indifference to, but rather feeling of impatience and disgust at," everything which concerns the natives of India, is still the prevailing sentiment in the House of Commons. It is still the case that, as Mr. Macaulay has told us, an inquiry into a row at Covent Garden would ensure fuller benches in the House than the most important subject connected with India. The debate of June, 1850, was one signal instance of it, and I will now give another. There never was a more "wicked war" and a more wholly unjustifiable measure than our invasion of Afghanistan; it is difficult to reckon the number of millions which it has added, immediately and by its consequences, to the debt of India, and it was plunged into in spite of the most energetic remonstrances and warnings, and explanations of its

impolicy, by all those who were competent to offer an opinion on the matter. Nevertheless, Parliament hardly made a pretence of calling to account the irresponsible Minister who said "I did it," and who coolly avowed many years afterwards that it was "a folly if not a crime," and the presentation of a Blue-book, which Captain Kaye has since gibbeted as the grossest specimen of "official lying" that ever insulted a country, at once satisfied the House of Commons.

Now, as this case only came out by accident, we are left to wonder how many millions have been added to the debt of India, by the "follies if not crimes" of our irresponsible Ministers, which have not come out? and, what is still more important, *how many will be added hereafter?* For every irresponsible Minister knows he has nothing to fear from Parliament; and as the ultimate burthen of every "folly if not a crime" falls on the back of the miserable ryots, nobody cares and nobody complains to any purpose in England. However, there is a time for all things, and this system of abuse has had its day, and though I would rather urge reform on higher grounds than those of mere self-interest, I must remark that in such a state of the finances and resources of India as those described in my sixth chapter, something must be done, and done at once, if we mean to avert a catastrophe. For there is reason to believe that the financial state of our Indian empire is really much worse than the studiously mystified and maimed financial report of the Blue-book enables us to prove; but even

from the imperfect data furnished by the Blue-book, any one may see that a crisis is at length approaching, and that our present system of Indian administration must be leading to some fearful tragedy.

I will therefore remind the reader of a few of the most urgent wants of the present system for which I have explained the necessity in this book. 1stly, The condensation of that immense mass of detailed correspondence now transmitted to England, which renders it impossible for Indian Ministers or Directors to read the reports, and thereby reduces the Home Government under the power of a Bureaucracy. And well do the Bureaucracy understand their interest in this matter, for, as Mr. Campbell informs us, page 216, the Governor-General made one or two attempts to condense and arrange the shiploads of papers now sent home from India, and such measures were at once reversed and disallowed by the Home Government. 2ndly, A system of accounts not "made up in a way to deceive the public," to use the words of the Friend of India, by putting down *different* receipts and charges in separate Presidencies under *the same* heads; by omitting the detail of receipts and charges, so that it is impossible to find out the cause of their rise or decline and their ultimate prospects; and in the ways noticed at page 124 and Appendix C. 3rdly, The concession of that administrative power to the local Governments which they alone are competent to exercise, and for the judicious use of which they will be responsible, and depriving them of that political power

for which the Supreme Government will be found a more disinterested depository. At present we do the very reverse of this ; we allow a political power to the local Governments which enables them to involve us in a Coorg war, a Khutputt case at Baroda, &c., and we refuse them sufficient administrative power to make a ghaut or a pier. 4thly, The settlement of the land tax on the principles of the North-western Provinces. 5thly, The expenditure by the local Government of 5 per cent of the land revenue on public works. 6thly, Legal reform, and the restoration of the *indigenous* local self-government of our Indian fellow subjects, and their popular representation to a considerable extent, through their ' head-men ' of villages, towns, and counties. 7thly, A just and generous policy towards the Indian princes and aristocracy, and a fair share of official power and emoluments for the natives.

I have therefore proposed to reform those evident abuses in the Home Government to which I trace all the evils of India, by cutting down the Bureaucracy, purifying the Court of Directors, and making the Indian Minister responsible to Parliament. Less than this will not do ; but this is merely a practical reform of proved abuses ; it is no theoretic innovation ; it is no construction of a " model Government " on abstract principles. Indeed, I have not the least idea that the old grievances of India can be cured in a day by any model Government, nor if I could get the same parliamentary representation for India that existed 70 years

ago, should I expect to see any inveterate grievance immediately redressed. For instance, supposing my plan were adopted, and the Minister were compelled to give a full annual communication of Indian affairs, then the way would probably be this: some friend of India would go to a Member of Parliament and say, "When the Minister makes his statement, see what he says on a particular subject, and then ask him such and such questions, or state such and such facts." Well, the Member of Parliament would play his part, and the official man, having had due notice, would make a most satisfactory reply, and the House, who were beginning to feel uncomfortable, would be glad to see the complaint so effectually disposed of. However, next Session the complaint would reappear, with a complete exposure of any official fraud and sophistry by which it had been met the year before, with a larger array of facts in its support, with more Members knowing the circumstances of the case, with the advantage perhaps of having appealed to the press in the interval, and it appears by one of my authorities that the *Times* has shewn its readiness to open its columns to any well authenticated case of Indian grievance, and let any one imagine this going on, not for one or two, but for five, or six, or seven years, with a heavier weight of proof thrown into the discussion every year, and the ripple gradually widening and circling round the public, and then say whether it is not probable that, under such circumstances, an Indian grievance would be redressed in a few years? But let me re-

mind the reader that it would be a new life for India to have the chance of getting a grievance redressed in a few years! Under the present system every evil principle of administration is allowed to work itself fairly out, and exhaust all the poison in its nature, before there is any change, so that when at last necessity enforces a change, the mischief done is irreparable. And meanwhile, it is utterly useless to appeal to the Bureaucracy, for the atmosphere of office seems to harden their hearts and render their minds callous to impressions from without, till it changes their very nature; as certain springs have the property of petrifying bits of wood that fall into their water. I emphatically repeat that no reform is more urgently required than this one of giving *by word of mouth* a periodical supply of information on all subjects connected with our Eastern policy to the House of Commons. Let the Minister be compelled to give an account of his stewardship, to give a detailed statement of Indian affairs once a year, and Members of Parliament would again become competent to discuss the subject; and again they would discuss it, again the Government would become responsible, and the grievances of the natives would be redressed, simply because men were informed of them. I will appeal to human nature and to our every day experience for proof of what I say. Why have I written this book, why have I spoken warmly (perhaps too warmly, but my heart has burned within me to see the injury to India and the peril to England), why have I taken so much trouble

about this question? because I was informed of the facts, and other men were not. And in moral qualities I have always observed that the mass of mankind were exactly like myself, neither better nor worse. I have always seen that any gross outrage on common sense and justice, particularly against their own interests, shocked other men just as it did me, when they found it out. And though it may please certain novelists to describe us as purely selfish beings, that is not a true portrait of human nature; there is a divine spark at the bottom of every man's heart which will leap into life when it is properly appealed to; and it is appealed to, every day, among us, in private and in public, in the press and the Parliament, and in no country is it more prompt to answer the appeal.

What is the difference between a Member of Parliament who shews "not merely indifference to, but feelings of impatience and disgust at," the performance of a sacred duty to India, and myself? It is that he has not information and I have. Give him information and he will be as warm for justice to India as I am, for our nature is exactly the same. But some people can trust nothing to human nature; they prefer to invent model Governments to do the work of human nature; it is like the Romans building such expensive aqueducts, because they never thought of water finding its own level. And look at our daily experience. What is the Parliament, and the press, and the system which draws such a degree of popular reverence and attachment to our institutions, as ensured sweet calm

in England, when a hurricane raged over the rest of Europe? Aye! it made our isle a charmed spot where the demon of revolutions could not set his foot; and it procures a visible respect for the law in this nation which astonished the foreigners who visited our Exhibition, more than anything else they saw. What is all this but a system of representation? of representing to the Legislature the wants, and wishes, and claims, and grievances of the people? of informing the Legislature what they feel, and suffer, and hope from its sympathy, or expect from its justice? And why is this system so loved by the people, and so universally admired and envied by foreigners? because it gives the people a guarantee that they shall be governed by equal laws, and that their grievances shall be redressed. Not that it prevents grievances! no system ever did, or could, or ever will do so.

But now see the cruel injustice we are doing to India! We do not find it too much for ourselves to have a Parliament sitting for months every year, to correct and extend our legislation and suit it to our social changes; to have besides the most perfect representation of all our complaints and desires in the press which it is possible to conceive; and with all this to watch vigilantly the responsibility of every depositary of power amongst us, as our only security against official tyranny, neglect, incompetency, and plunder; and, after all, we prove many serious grievances, and the reader of the public journals for the last year alone is familiar with much deserved

blame of every department of our Administration, of the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, the Horse Guards, the Admiralty, the Customs, &c. Can we then affect to believe that a sham inquiry once in 20 years, with almost total neglect in the interval, is sufficient to redress the grievances of India? Can we pretend to think that the despotic administration of 150 millions of men, conducted at a distance of many thousand miles away from us, by a few hundred foreigners, having little intercourse with the natives and no permanent stake in their country, and directed by irresponsible Home Authorities, who betray the utmost anxiety to conceal the truth from the public, can we pretend to think that such an Administration has done or is doing justice to the people of India, without being checked by a particle of anything like political representation? Would not any man who had studied history or human nature, divine all the injury and injustice to the natives which I have described, from merely knowing the conditions of our irresponsible Indian Government? Let the reader conceive any one English question, parliamentary reform, legal reform, free trade, any one of them, being turned over to the Ministry of the day and their successors for 20 years, to give or withhold, at their pleasure, without hearing one word of explanation, or remonstrance, or information of our interest in the matter, and our sufferings for want of a legislative remedy. Would not this seem monstrous in our own case? Why then do we unscrupulously apply it to

India? Why do we treat, not one, but all, of her vital questions and dearest interests in a manner which seems monstrous when applied to ourselves? Oh, my countrymen! do not continue this inhuman system. Do not consign India to an irresponsible Government for another 20 years, and coldly tell her "abi in pace," as the Inquisition used to say in sending its victims back to the torture, when you know it must lead to cruel neglect and mal-administration.

The Indian Government was originally responsible to Parliament, and it is only by an unheard-of abuse, repugnant alike to our principles, and customs, and institutions, and to all our English notions of what is right, that this Government has become irresponsible. Do not permit such an abuse to go on, particularly because England is exposed to great and increasing peril while the Indian Government is allowed to be irresponsible. I shall be met, I know, by the old argument that the Legislature cannot make any change because Indian reformers do not agree among themselves upon what ought to be done. But is this argument really serious? Why men must have remained savages ever since the creation of the world, if nothing had ever been done till all men were agreed upon what ought to be done. The argument is as much as to say there shall be no progress until a condition is complied with, which is notoriously impossible. Besides, I apprehend that it is not merely the function of legislators to redress grievances, but their duty to find out the means of doing so. There is not the same obligation on a private

person who proves the grievance ; he is only one of the patients ; a legislator is the state physician ; and if it is not the business of Members of Parliament to know and apply the proper cure for political grievances, then what is their business ? Conceive the doctor of a consumptive hospital telling his patients, “ My poor friends, one of you thinks one thing would be good for his case, and another fancies something else, now I know how to cure your disease, because it is my profession to understand it, and therefore do I hold the honorable appointment of your medical man, nevertheless as your own opinions about your treatment differ, I beg you will excuse me from giving you any prescription at all.” Should we not think that a doctor who held this language had gone out of his mind ? Yet it is just the same thing for our legislators to say they cannot make any change because Indian reformers do not agree about what ought to be done. After all, if Indian reformers do not agree about the remedy, they all agree about the great abuse of the Indian Government, viz. : its want of parliamentary responsibility. Every independent writer on India for the last fifty years, has emphatically denounced this abuse, and therefore it is the duty of the legislature to find a remedy for it. If Members of Parliament cannot fulfil this duty, they are not fit for the dignified positions they occupy ; if they will not fulfil it, their refusal will lead to fatal results in India, long before another Charter is over. This is the opinion of every eminent man of long experience in that country,

whom I have had the honour to know, and it is worth the serious consideration of the British public.

And now I have done what I could to assist a righteous cause, and in this crisis of the Charter, when the future destiny of England is depending upon her choice of a policy towards her Eastern Empire, I expect that you too, reader, will do your duty—and may the Almighty Disposer of events, who has hitherto signally protected and blessed us – and has he not blessed us? are not the signs of his favour visible on every side? is it not written on our Houses of Parliament, and our Protestant churches? on the glories of our literature, and arts, and sciences? on the triumphs of our industry and invention? on the very look of the people, on all that meets the eye of an Englishman? and is it not an ungrateful return for his bounty to abuse that power over a hundred and fifty millions of our fellow creatures which he has given us in the East? may it not provoke him to punish an ungrateful race, and to cut off the inheritance of his blessings from the sons of those who turn his benefits against him? Yet now, while the fate of two Empires is trembling in the balance, even now may His mercy once more lighten upon us, and may He inspire the Great Council of the nation to frame such a legislative measure, as shall give justice to India; and thereby secure the safety and honour of England!

APPENDIX A.

Abstract of the expenditure on public works in Bengal and the North-West Provinces, for the ten years ending 1848-49, as contained in the Blue Book printed by order of the House of Commons, August 1, 1851.

Classification of Works.	Expenditure in the N.W. Provinces.	Expenditure in Bengal.	Total Expenditure.
On constructing, improving, and repairing roads	995857	7416659	8412516
Ditto, ditto, bridges	339076	696914	1035990
Total for roads and bridges	1334933	8113573	* 9448506
On canals and embankments, and works of irrigation	4758394	433895	† 5192289
Total for roads, bridges, canals, embankments, and works of irrigation	6093327	8547468	‡ 14640795
On repairs and construction of civil buildings	632635	3329425	3962060
Total expenditure by amount stated in the Blue Book	6725962	11876893	18602855

Mean of annual gross revenue for the ten years, &c., rupees, 14,69,58,709, or £14,695,870.

Mean of annual net revenue for the ten years, &c., rupees, 11,87,82,243, or £11,878,224.

* Mean of expenditure on roads and bridges for the ten years, &c., rupees, 9,44,850 or £94,485—showing that less than three quarters of one per cent of the gross revenue, that is, less than £110,218, was expended on roads and bridges.

† Mean of expenditure on canals, embankments, and works of irrigation, for the ten years, &c., rupees, 5,19,228, or £51,922—showing that less than the half of one per cent of the gross revenue, that is, less than £73,479, was expended on canals, embankments, and works of irrigation.

‡ Mean of expenditure on roads, bridges, canals, embankments, and works of irrigation, for the ten years, &c., rupees, 14,64,079, or 146,407—showing that less than one and a quarter per cent of the net revenue, or less than £148,477, was expended altogether on public works other than civil buildings.

With the above statement before him, let the reader remember the proofs given in the Madras Engineer's letter, that public works in India produce more wealth both to the Government and the people than any gold mine has been known to produce.

APPENDIX B.

LAND REVENUE.

It is difficult to draw any conclusion as to the resources of the people from the produce of the land tax, as the receipts are continually swelled by lapses and resumptions, which augment the temporary revenue by weeding out the capitalists among the landowners; and by annexations, which are often not a gain but a loss to the general treasury; for instance, p. 468, par. 65, 66, states that Sattarah, recently annexed, is a loss to the finances of the state, though a gain to the land revenue of nearly 20 lacs! It requires therefore a knowledge of the particular items of this branch of revenue to draw any certain conclusion from it, and these particulars are not given in any public document. I will however state some general results and add a few comments upon them.

Bengal—the four years ending 1849-50, in comparison with the four years ending 1845-6, exhibit an average annual falling off in the last four years of Rs. 3,47,616.

Agra—(old territory, excluding the Sutlej annexations.) The four years ending 1849-50, in comparison with the four years ending 1845-6, exhibit an average annual falling-off in the last four years of Rs. 3,25,163.

Bombay—the four years ending 1849-50, in comparison with the four years ending 1845-6, exhibit an average annual falling off* in the last four years of Rs. 1,47,265.

Madras—the four years ending 1849-50, in comparison with the four years ending 1845-6, exhibit an annual increase† in the last four years of Rs. 24,21,306.

* I have deducted the increased revenue charges, p. 451, par. 11, because the Blue-book misstates the case as to the *increase* of these revenue charges. The fact is that "costs of collection" have been put down in the receipts of the Bombay land revenue of late years, which were not previously included in them. It is another proof of the want of detailed items of receipts and charges.

† The Blue-book states, p. 453. par. 16, that a portion of this increase is a set off against a loss of 28 lacs, by the repeal of the "transit duties;" which must be the case as these duties were far more inquisitorial and destructive of industry in Madras than any where else. However, on making application to the India House, to know the particulars of the Madras increase, I received information that the greater part of it was due to lapses and resumptions, quite independent of the ordinary land revenue of the Presidency. It is therefore impossible to arrive at any certain financial conclusion from the published accounts of the land-tax, and it will require full particulars of the receipts and charges to shew the prospects of the Indian Exchequer, and the real condition of the people.

SALT REVENUE.

The Blue-Book states, p. 454, 456, par. 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, that owing to the large importation of salt since the reduction of the duty, the receipts of the Government salt monopoly are rapidly declining, and it estimates the average annual decreased receipt* at 23 lacs in Bengal, 2 lacs in Madras, and 2 lacs in Bombay.

CUSTOMS REVENUE.

These receipts exhibit a falling off at one Presidency, from the abolition of the transit duties, and a still larger increase in others from the progressive importation of salt, but with a most unsatisfactory result on the whole which will require some comments.

Bengal—the four years ending 1849-50, in comparison with the four years ending 1845-6, exhibit an average annual increase in the last four years of Rs. 12,34,153.

Agra—the four years ending 1849-50, in comparison with the four years ending 1845-6, exhibit an average annual increase in the last four years of Rs. 10,90,532.

Madras—the four years ending 1849-50, in comparison with the four years ending 1845-6, exhibit an average annual falling off in the last four years of Rs. 18,34,695.

Bombay—the four years ending 1849-50, in comparison with the four years ending 1845-6, exhibit an average annual falling off in the last four years of Rs. 6,95,586.

The total falling off on the receipts of above Presidencies, is Rs. 2,05,596.

I cannot but regard this result as a very bad symptom, and the index of a decline in the tax-paying powers of the people; for the annually increasing item of salt forms considerably more than half of the customs receipts of Bengal, and four-fifths of those of Agra, therefore, excepting the salt, I infer from the above result a decided and marked decline in the commerce of the Natives in other articles; and this conclusion is strongly confirmed by the following view, of the exports and imports.

* The cheapening of this necessary of life is indispensable to the health of the people, whatever loss it may be to the Government; and even now, the Natives, who live far more on vegetable diet than Europeans do, suffer severely in the interior of the country from the high price of salt.

IMPORTS.

Comparative statement of the value of merchandize imported into the Presidencies of British India, from the United Kingdom and other countries, from the four years ending 1845-6 and 1849-50.

		From the United Kingdom. Rs.	From other countries. Rs.
Bengal, } Madras, } Bombay, }	Average annual value during the four years ending 1845-6.	25,13,15,728	10,13,13,728
Bengal, } Madras, } Bombay, }	Average annual value during the four years ending 1849-50.	25,30,17,240	10,83,72,503

shewing a falling off in the value of the imports from the United Kingdom during the last four years of Rs. 82,98,488, and an increase of those of other countries of Rs. 70,58,775.

EXPORTS.

Comparative statement of the value of merchandize exported from the Presidencies of British India, to the United Kingdom and other countries, for the four years ending 1845-6 and 1849-50.

		To the United Kingdom. Rs.	To other countries. Rs.
Bengal, } Madras, } Bombay, }	Average annual value during the four years ending 1845-6.	27,48,06,571	36,94,35,307
Bengal, } Madras, } Bombay, }	Average annual value during the four years ending 1849-50.	25,41,39,431	36,65,46,925

shewing a falling off in the value of the exports to the United Kingdom during the last four years of Rs. 2,06,67,140, and a falling off in those to other countries of Rs. 28,88,382.

In this state of the resources of the Government and the people, the debt goes on increasing, and the cause of debt, *viz.* territorial aggrandisement goes on *pari passu*. Mr. Campbell published a book last year stating, p. 148, that we had "at last reached the limit of and become supreme in *all* India. We have the whole country in our power to do as we will with, and we have a natural line of circumvallation "dividing it from the rest of the world." Hardly was the

book published before the Government began a Burmese war—a war for which I can only conceive two even rational motives, that is, either the pressure of those private interests which seek for employment and promotion; or else the old policy of statesmen, as old as the time of Pericles, of plunging into a war to hide the embarrassment of their accounts by war charges. If this last motive be the true one, the Burmese war will be a dear way of passing the Indian accounts, for it is likely to prove quite as expensive as the last war which in two years added thirteen millions and a half to the debt,* and it will end as usual by annexation, and leave us with the certainty of future hostilities, aggrandisement and debt on a new and very exposed frontier, where we have already sown the seeds of another war by our differences with Siam in 1850. The same system is pursued on the other side of India. Before the Affghanistan war the highest authorities opposed it;† but in vain. Before the Caubul disaster it was pointed out, not only privately to the ministry, but to the nation,‡ that we possessed an impregnable frontier on the north-west, in the line from Loodianah to the sea; but in vain. The system prevailed, the line was passed, gradually Scinde, the Sutlej territories, and the Punjaub were annexed, and thus since 1839, about sixteen millions and a half were added to the debt,§ about 100,000 men to the standing army,|| with a corresponding increase in the export of stores,¶ the dead weight at home and abroad,** the charges for the navy, &c.;†† and at the present day the Indian Press cries out, that the Governor-General can only be waiting for the conclusion of the Burmese war, to commence offensive operations against the Affghans. Under these circumstances, I derive no consolation from the argument I often hear, that the debt of India is little more than two years income, and good management would soon raise the revenues of the country so enormously that the debt would cease to be formidable. Let me suggest to the reader a parallel case in private life. Suppose a particular individual was on the road to ruin, and

* Blue Book, 1852, p. 485, par 102.

† Kaye's Affghanistan, vol. 1, p. 363.

‡ Article in the Indian News of Oct. 1841, on "the North Western dilemma;" *vide* Appendix D.

§ Blue Book, p. 485, par. 106.

|| *Ib.* 408, 409.

¶ *Ib.* 273, 279.

** *Ib.* 479, 433, 480, par 94, (I find no account in the Blue Book of the pensions to superannuated Native soldiers.)

†† *Ib.* p. 429, 783, 474 to 477.

all advice, information, and remonstrance were thrown away upon him, although his failure would involve the reader's fortune. Would it console the reader to be told that if this individual only understood his business, and would manage it prudently, he need not become bankrupt? I am inclined to think not: yet it is precisely the same case with the irresponsible administration of India. The permanent resources of the empire are wholly unable to meet the charge of the present debt, and yet the Government does not develop the country's means of production, but trusts to a merely gambling illicit source of income, for one-fifth of its gross revenue; in spite of the great probability of seeing it suddenly cut off. At the same time as the Government gets credit because England is the real security for Indian loans, it make up any deficit by borrowing more capital, and perseveres in that policy of aggrandisement, which causes a progressive increase of the debt. Of course, I cannot tell how long such a system may go on, but any body can tell how it must end.

APPENDIX C.

It happens by an exception to the rule, that the conqueror of Scinde has fallen out with the Court of Directors, and without noticing the cause of their quarrel, the revenge of the Bureaucracy is something so peculiar and so characteristic of the class, that I must direct public attention to it.

Because Sir Charles Napier is a foe, every charge incurred by annexing Scinde is brought prominently forward, and I think with exaggeration, and the financial result of his annexation is exhibited as a heavy annual excess of charge on the Indian revenue. Because Lords Hardinge and Dalhousie are friends, the bulk of the charges incurred by their annexations, are literally altogether suppressed, the receipts are put prominently forward, and the financial result of annexing the Punjaub is exhibited as a surplus. For instance, p. 467, the following six items, Military charges; Extraordinary military charges; Ditto war charges; Commissariat charges; Extraordinary military charges; Arrears of Commissariat, &c. are credited against Scinde, since the date of annexation, amounting in round numbers to the sum of three millions sterling. On the opposite page not one of these items is inserted in the Punjaub accounts, and so completely is every

charge for the Punjaub force suppressed, that we could not even trace its existence without ransacking the Blue Book, till we find a "distribution return," p. 410, which lets out that, besides local and irregular corps, there are 34,000 regular troops in the Punjaub, including 5,765 Europeans. Again, p. 448, Scinde is accused of having added heavily to the debt, which is proved, p. 446, by the increase of the interest of the debt contemporary with the annexation of Scinde. But by the same rule, when I find at p. 479, an enormous increase of the interest of the debt contemporary with the annexations of Lords Hardinge and Dalhousie, I feel bound to accuse these annexations of having been a much greater annual excess of charge on the Indian revenues than the annexation of Sir Charles Napier, notwithstanding that "things are made pleasant" for Lord Dalhousie at p. 466, by proving the Punjaub a *surplus*!

The above is an average specimen of the honesty of Indian Blue Books, and unless the public agree with Hudibras that,

" Surely the pleasure is as great
" In being cheated as to cheat,"

I hope they will not tolerate the system of mystification any longer.

APPENDIX D.

I ADD an extract from the "Indian News" of 1841, to shew how our national interests have been, and ever will be, sacrificed to private motives for war and aggrandisement, under an irresponsible Government of India :—

" THE NORTH-WESTERN DILEMMA.

"The present is a fitting opportunity to lay before our readers as complete a view of the question relating to the North-Western Frontier of India as our space permits. A new Ministry is in power, and a Ministry opposed from the first to the policy of the old. Our Indian finances are in a state of absolute ruin, and the government trying, in desperation, to outbid the merchants for those funds which in the hands of the latter are the life-blood of commerce. All our projects, have been accomplished; all our enemies beaten; Dost Mahomed is down—Shah Soojah is up; and yet at every step of our advance, we have departed further and fur-

ther from that security which was our ulterior object, and for which we have scattered treasure as if it had been dust, and shed blood as if it had been water.

“It is possible some of our readers may be unacquainted with the nature of the frontier we have of late years been so busily occupied in extending, or rather forsaking : and if so, our repeated declaration that the Indus is the natural boundary of our dominion in that quarter may have given rise to some misapprehension. The Indus is our boundary only as the outermost ditch may be called the boundary of a fortress ; and even in that sense it is less important for defence than as affording a means for the conveyance of troops. Within the line of the Indus is *Maroost’hali*, or the Region of Death, a vast wilderness of sand, resembling the Libyan desert, both in its general aspect of desolation and in its oases. From Hyderabad, as far north as Ooch, in looking eastward from the river, the visible horizon is a bulwark of sand, frequently two hundred feet high, guarding the valley of the Indus like the wall of a fortress. Beyond this western boundary the desert stretches hundreds of miles to the east, till it is walled in by the Aravulli, a chain of mountains extending from Delhi almost to the sea. On the north, it meets the valley of the Sutlege, and on the south is lost in the Runn, or great salt marsh of Cutch. ‘Instead of the ancient Roman simile,’ says Colonel Tod, ‘which likened Africa to the leopard’s hide, reckoning the spots thereon as the oases, I would compare the Indian desert to that of the tiger, of which its long dark stripes would indicate the expansive belts of sand elevated upon a plain only less sandy.’ Mr. Elphinstone describes the northern part of the desert as consisting principally of hills and valleys of loose and heavy sand. ‘The hills were exactly like those which are sometimes formed by the wind on the sea-shore, but far exceeding them in height, which were from twenty to a hundred feet. They are said to shift their position and alter their shapes, according as they are affected by the wind, and in summer the passage is rendered dangerous by the clouds of moving sand.’ In the journey of this accurate observer from Delhi to Cabool, he found a hundred miles of the desert before reaching Bahawalpoor absolutely destitute of inhabitants, water, or vegetation. The actual distance, besides, was increased by their being obliged to wind round the sand hills ; while the path was so narrow as not to admit of two camels going abreast, and if an animal stepped on one side, it sunk above the knees as in snow.

“The wells found here and there in the desert, but frequently from fifty to a hundred miles apart, are so deep (sometimes five hundred feet) that, as Colonel Tod remarks, ‘with a large kafila many might die before the thirst of all could be slaked.’ This illustrates the fearful description given by Ferishta of the sufferings of the Emperor Hemayoon. ‘The country through which they fled being an entire desert of sand, the Moghuls were in the utmost distress for water: some ran mad; others dropped down dead. For three whole days there was no water; on the fourth day they came to a well which was so deep that a drum was beaten to give notice to the men driving the bullocks that the bucket had reached the top; but the unhappy followers were so impatient for drink, that as soon as the first bucket appeared, several threw themselves upon it, before it had quite reached the surface, and several fell in.’—*Briggs’ Ferishta*, vol. ii. Hunger is of course a scourge of these desolate regions only second to thirst. The visitations of the *Bookha Mata*, the ‘famished mother,’ form the staple of the native legends from the earliest time; and the traditions of the oases forming some of the Rajhpoot states, point to a famine which occurred in the eleventh century, and lasted twelve years. At the present day a partial visitation is calculated upon every third year; and one year out of seven is always a year of actual famine.

“But even the Aravulli mountains, which bound the desert on the east, are not our last rampart, for, beyond these, the Rajhpoot princes, our feudal vassals, form the advanced guard of British India. Such is the frontier—consisting of the Indus, the desert, the Aravulli and Rajahsthan, which we now voluntarily overstep; a frontier which, taking its whole length from the Himalaya to the sea, is singularly small for so vast an empire, but which is diminished to about *thirty miles* by coincidences of nature as marvellous as the folly which disregards them. Abandoning this actual frontier of thirty miles, at Loodiana—the north-western gate of British India—and not *permitted* to pass through the Punjab, we descend the Sutlege from Ferozepore, place in our rear the Region of Death and our other natural defences, and plunge into the western desert of the Indus, in order to force the Bolan pass into Afghanistan, and chase the wild Beloochees through their barren and interminable wastes. We have thus pushed our frontier—which may now be said to be at Herat, and Kirman in Persia—600 miles beyond its natural and safe position; we have extended its only vulnerable part from thirty

miles to at least seven hundred ; we have quitted the centre of our resources in money, food and men ; and have not only placed between us and them an almost impassable desert, but have scattered our forces over a wide, poor, and scantily peopled region. Finally, we are teaching, day by day, the science of war to these barbarian enemies ; and the rising generation of a host of tribes, occupying a breadth of country from Herat to the Indian Ocean, is growing up in horror and detestation of our very name.

“ Such is our present position ; and one would suppose that we must have been driven into it by some extraordinary force of circumstances, too sudden for human policy to avert, and too mighty for human power to withstand. But in vain we look back to the beginning of this fatal end ; we can trace no cause but individual will. Dost Mahomed was then the popular chief of his wild domain, and seeking to recover a portion of the territory he had lost. We refused him our assistance ; and because he would not bind himself to reject the assistance of others, then our actual allies, we commenced this extraordinary war. But we were not satisfied with dragging Dost Mahomed from his mountain throne ; it was necessary to put into it a man who, within the last twenty years, had been twice driven from it by the people, and who was an object of contempt or hatred to the whole country. We thus commenced the war as auxiliaries of Shah Soojah ; and with no other ostensible object than that of replacing a refractory prince by one whose interest, or gratitude, would bind him to our service.

“ But, setting aside the question of tyranny and injustice, by what right did the perpetrators of this outrage upon the law of nations squander in so wild a manner the blood and treasure of England ? They well knew that one tithe of even the then probable cost of the expedition would have bought the petty mountain chief, body and soul. They well knew that the salary of a diplomatist of common intelligence at Cabool, (*unless they chose to take his reports through the medium of ignorance, stupidity or treachery*) would have been a considerable part of the entire outlay. They well knew in short—to come to the point—or they ought to have well known, that it would not have cost a hundred thousand pounds to secure the hearty co-operation of Dost Mahomed. What is the co-operation we *have* secured ? That of a king who is kept in his throne by a hedge of British bayonets, and who would not continue to reign for a week if these were withdrawn ; and that of a peo-

ple whom we have succeeded, after infinite labour and expense, in pervading with one universal sentiment towards us of horror and aversion. Ask the Brahoes and the Ghiljees for their co-operation! As well might the French demand the friendship of the Arabs in Algiers; although we believe in our conscience—and we make the avowal with shame and disgust—that our invasion of Affghanistan is far less justifiable either on moral or political grounds than that of our neighbours on the northern coast of Africa.

“But hitherto we have only touched upon the ostensible cause of this unfortunate expedition: the real cause is the dread of Russian influence being established on the borders of our empire, with a view to an invasion of India. This is the consideration which has induced us to convert into implacable enemies the whole continent from Herat to the ocean, and, by the slaughter of certain chiefs, to kindle a blood-feud with their tribes, which according to the customs of the people is inextinguishable! But before this dreaded influence could affect us through Affghanistan, Persia must have become one of the provinces of Russia; and towards Persia, therefore, we should have directed our energies, instead of misusing them in Affghanistan. There, as in the other case, it must be evident to the meanest intellect, diplomacy, and not the sword, should have been our weapon,—but what was the conduct we pursued? On the one hand our ambassador, by his foolish and obstinate arrogance, made a personal enemy of the Shah, and thus to all intents and purposes laid down his office; and on the other, we threatened the incensed monarch with our armies from the Affghan mountains, and captured one of his islands in the Persian Gulf. The effect of this “little war”—(little in every meaning of the word)—was of course to aggravate, not remove the evil; and the result of the whole is, that the Persian forces are now commanded by Russian instead of English officers, and that the Shah, being left no alternative by British wisdom, has placed himself voluntarily and deliberately within the hug of the Bear.

“There is nothing, in our opinion, more unaccountable in the moral history of mankind than the dread of Russia entertained by the late Government of Great Britain. There is in reality no country in Europe, or out of it, so entirely at our mercy as Russia. An English fleet in the Baltic, a cargo of Birmingham arms in the Euxine—or the mere threat of these—would at once settle any question which could possibly arise between the two countries. Without a navy worthy of the

name, and yet vulnerable in two vital points by a naval power ; with Georgia and Circassia in arms, as if for the special protection of the East ; with an impoverished treasury, a discontented nobility, and a peasantry dragged in chains to the recruiting depôt,—Russia is absolutely helpless.

“ We come at length to the question, what is to be done ? —and on this point we derive great hope from the fact that the present Ministry, so far from being pledged to the policy of the last, are pledged against it. We have left a good frontier for a bad one ; we have made enemies instead of friends ; we have thrust Persia from our own arms into those of Russia. We must *retrace our steps* ; and if Ministers suppose us to be

“ Stepp’d in so far, that, should we wade no more,
Returning were as tedious as go o’er,”

we will tell them that we may wade till doomsday in our present course without ever reaching the shore. Let us go on as we do now, and the chronic war we wage beyond our frontier is without end, and our false position with regard to Affghanistan and Persia without hope or help.”

THE END.

ARE WE BOUND BY OUR TREATIES?

A LETTER

TO THE

RIGHT HON. THE EARL OF ABERDEEN,

ON THE

CONFISCATION OF BERAR.

LONDON:

WM. H. ALLEN AND Co.

7, LEADENHALL STREET.

1854.

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COX (BROS.) AND WYMAN, GREAT QUEEN STREET,
LINCOLN'S-INN FIELDS.

A LETTER,

&c.

UPTON, SLOUGH, 18th March, 1854.

MY LORD,

I am aware that it must be exceedingly inconvenient to your lordship to have your attention diverted, even for a moment, at this eventful crisis, from European affairs, but if I should be able to prove to your lordship that, just as we are entering upon a war in order to repel an aggression upon the territory of one of our European allies, we are perpetrating a still more flagrant aggression upon the territory of an Asiatic ally, I shall not have been guilty of an impertinent intrusion.

At the conclusion of the Mahratta War, in 1818, we became the head of a great confederation of native states. We entered into treaties with between two and three hundred native princes and chiefs of Hindostan, to whom we pledged "perpetual friendship and alliance," and whose terri-

ories are solemnly guaranteed to them, "their heirs, and successors."

As by those treaties we were bound to support the rightful heir, it became necessary to ascertain who that heir was, and in 1825, in recognising the adopted son of the Rajah of Kotah, as heir to that principality, we admitted the right of all Hindoo sovereigns to perpetuate their sovereignties, in the following terms:—

"The prince of Kotah must be considered to possess the right, in common with all other Hindoos, of adopting a son and successor in conformity with the rules of the Shasters, unless precedent and State usage can be pleaded which distinctly bar the exercise of that right in the instance under consideration." *

In 1837, in acknowledging the adopted son of the Rajah of Oorcha as his successor, the British Government thus reiterated their recognition of this right:—

"Hindoo sovereigns have a right to adopt to the exclusion of collateral heirs, and the British Government is bound to acknowledge the adoption, provided it is regular and not in violation of Hindoo law." †

* Parliamentary Papers, 15th February, 1850, p. 153.

† Id. p. 141.

In 1841, in conformity with the principle here laid down, the British Government intimated to the sovereign princes of India its wish that those who had no issue should name their successors during their lifetime.*

In 1841, an attempt having been made to question the right of the Rajah of Oorcha to name a successor, upon the plea that he would not have been permitted to exercise such a right under the Moghul emperors, the Governor-General of India, Lord Auckland, thus dealt with it:—

“I have referred to the treaty with the Rajah of Oorcha, concluded on the 23rd of December, 1812; it is designated as one of friendship and alliance—the territory which from ancient times has descended to the Rajah by inheritance, and is now in his possession, being guaranteed to him, his heirs, and successors: upon words so distinct and positive as these, I hold it to be impossible to raise a question. I am of opinion, therefore, that the Rajah of Oorcha must be regarded as one of those sovereign rulers, who, under the very proper rule laid down by Sir Charles Metcalfe in 1837, is entitled to make any adoption at his own discretion, which the British Government is bound to acknowledge, provided that such adoption be regular, and not in violation of Hindoo law.” †

* Parliamentary Papers, 15th February, 1850, p. 187.

† Id. p. 146.

And upon a similar occasion his lordship thus formally renounced all right to deal with the native states of India, by virtue of powers which had been claimed for us as successors to the Emperor of Delhi:—

“I would at once put aside any prerogatives claimed and exercised by the former Emperor of Delhi, or any supposed rights which it has been thought might be assumed by us, because they were habitually enforced by those sovereigns who have at different times held supreme rule in the various provinces of their empire. I would look only at the spirit and terms of the treaties or engagements which have been formed with the several states of India, and bring forward no other demand than such as in reference to those engagements may be indisputably consistent with good faith.” *

Here we have, firstly, a distinct recognition of the right inherent in Hindoo rulers to name their successors, and of the obligation which the British Government is under to recognise the choice, provided it be made in conformity with the law.

Secondly, a distinct disclaimer of any right on the part of the British Government to deal with native states by virtue of prerogatives which it may assume as successors of the Moghul emperors.

* Parliamentary Papers, 15th February, 1850, p. 188.

Thirdly, a formal admission that the words in our treaties with native states, which pledge us to perpetual friendship and alliance to princes and their heirs and successors, guarantee to such princes their right to adopt heirs in the event of a failure of issue of their own body, and are “too distinct and positive” to admit of any other interpretation.

These principles thus formally laid down by Lord Auckland and his predecessors, having been adopted by the Court of Directors, and ratified by the Board of Control, were uniformly acted upon for more than twenty years—viz., from 1826 to 1847—during which time fifteen native sovereignties were continued by adoption, with our express recognition.

In 1848 these same authorities — completely ignoring their own recorded principles, and the acts done under them—without any reason whatever assigned for the change, denied that Hindoo sovereign princes had a right to adopt their successors; that there was any obligation upon the British Government to recognise such adoptions: they claimed for the British Government the right to deal with native sovereigns as it asserted the Moghul emperors would have dealt with them. ‘They resolved, that “heirs and successors in our treaties could have no other meaning than ‘heirs male of the body;’” and, by virtue of this new code, they have recently seized upon the principality of Berar, embracing an area of 76,432 miles, with a population of 4,650,000

souls, and a revenue of half a million sterling, upon the plea that the deceased sovereign of that state having died without heirs of his body it had become an escheat to the British Government.

That is, having by an act of power set aside those who claim to be heirs, the British Government put in a claim to the inheritance as successors to the Emperors of Delhi, and forcibly took possession of the principality.

It is to this recent aggression that I desire to draw your lordship's attention; because, although that aggression has been perpetrated by the Local Government, the act awaits the ratification of Her Majesty's Government. The question that I now bring before your lordship is not one that requires Indian experience for its solution; it is a simple question respecting the construction of treaties and the observance of national faith. It is one, therefore, which your lordship's official habits and experience specially qualify you to understand, and which is with more propriety submitted to you, as the head of Her Majesty's Government, than to the minister of the Indian Department.

The ancestor of the late Rajah of Berar had established his independence as a sovereign prince before we appeared upon the political stage of India; and, as such, we negotiated with him upon a footing of perfect equality. In 1816 we entered into a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with

him, and in 1817 the principality was placed at the mercy of the British Government by a breach of that treaty, and by the reiterated treachery of its ruler—the Rajah Appa Sahib. We were then at liberty to have dealt with it as we pleased. We might, without any imputation on our justice or moderation, have annexed it to our dominions, or we might have partitioned it amongst our allies, or, having determined as we did to restore it to the next heir, we might have made it a life-grant, or have limited the succession to the Rajah's natural heirs, giving ourselves a reversionary interest in it on the failure of such heirs. All these alternatives were within our choice, but we deliberately rejected them; and, retaining such portion of the territory as suited us, we restored the remainder to the Rajah Ragojee Bhonsla, then a minor.

In 1826, on his attaining his majority, we concluded “a treaty of perpetual friendship and alliance” with him, the preamble of which runs thus:—

“Treaty of perpetual friendship and alliance between the honourable the East India Company and his highness Maha Rajah Ragojee Bhonsla, *his heirs and successors*,” and the 5th article is thus worded:

Article V. “The late Rajah Moodajee Bhonsla, commonly called Appa Sahib, agreed to cede the Honourable Company certain territories for the payment of the expenses of the permanent military

force maintained by the British Government in his Highness's territories, and in lieu of the subsidy of 750,000 rupees formerly paid by the said Rajah, and of the contingent he was bound to maintain by the former treaty. These territories, as detailed in the schedule annexed to this treaty, shall remain for ever under the dominion of the Honourable Company. His Highness Maha Rajah Ragojee Bhonsla hereby renounces all claims and pretensions to the territories aforesaid, and all connection with the Chiefs and Zemindars or other inhabitants of them. The British Government, on its part, hereby guarantees the rest of the dominions of the Nagpore state, to Maha Rajah Ragojee Bhonsla, *his heirs and successors.*"

Your lordship will see that here there is a mutual guarantee: the Rajah on his part cedes a certain portion of his dominions to the British Government *for ever*, and that Government guarantees the rest of his dominions to him his heirs and successors. We were bound therefore, in fulfilment of this pledge, immediately upon the death of the late Rajah, to have ascertained who his rightful heir was, and to have acknowledged him as such; but in direct violation of this pledge, we immediately seized upon the territory as an escheat. Now I would ask your lordship by what law it is, Asiatic or European, that one sovereign state escheats to another

sovereign state? Berar was not a fief of the British Government, not a Jagheer held of a superior, but a sovereign state, so that even if the late Rajah had died without any trace of heirs we should have had no right to appropriate the territory. Our right to do so would consist entirely of our might, and this we have formally acknowledged in the following words :—

“Those who are sovereign princes in their own right, of the Hindoo religion, have by Hindoo law a right to adopt to the exclusion of collateral heirs, or of the supposed reversionary right of the paramount power, the latter in fact, in such cases, having no real existence except in the case of absolute want of heirs, and even then the right is only assumed by virtue of power, for it would probably be more consistent with right that the people of the state so situated should elect a sovereign for themselves.” * This was our own dictum, and upon this we have acted, in more than one instance, recognising a sovereign elected by the people themselves, when the throne had become vacant by the absolute failure of heirs.†

But there was not, in fact, the slightest pretext for assuming that the Rajah of Berar had died without heirs. He died without issue of his own body, but in the prime of life; and therefore, in the

* Parliamentary Papers, 15th February, 1850, p. 141.

† Id. p. 168-172.

hope that he might have such issue, had failed to adopt an heir. But the right to adopt, under such circumstances, by Hindoo law and state usage, devolved upon his widow. This is a right which we have repeatedly recognised. We did so in 1826, when the widow of Dimlet Rea Scindiah adopted a successor; again, in 1836, when the widow of Junkojee Scindia exercised a similar privilege.* In 1834, in the case of the widow of the Rajah of Dhoa; and in 1841, in the case of the widow of the Rajah of Kishanghur.† All these were adoptions made by widows of deceased princes, without the previous sanction of their husbands, and recognised by us as valid. The widow of the Rajah of Berar had the same right, and if she had declined to exercise it, the inheritance under the treaty belonged to the next heirs by blood, or by descent from the original stock of the family; and even if the whole race had become extinct, it would, according to our own acknowledgment, have been more consistent with right, that the people should have elected a sovereign for themselves, than that the British Government should claim the territory as an escheat.

The process indeed by which we make an escheat is a very simple one. It is by ignoring the pretensions of all those who claim to be heirs. We thus seized upon the principality of Sattara, refusing to

* Parliamentary Papers, 15th February, 1850, p. 110-114.

† Id. p. 172-183.

acknowledge the adopted son of the last Rajah as an heir, and refusing at the same time to give even a hearing to those, who, in the opinion of our own officers, could have substantiated their claims as heirs before any impartial tribunal. And we have now seized upon the principality of Berar upon the plea, that as the last Rajah had failed to adopt a son, his inheritance had devolved upon us, although there may be heirs who, if we would hear them, could prove their rights as heirs, both under the Hindoo law, and under our express guarantee.

We seize upon one principality refusing to acknowledge an adopted son as an heir; and we seize upon another because there is no adopted son to acknowledge. It is thus that the British Government plays fast and loose with its most solemn engagements when its helpless allies, the princes of India, are the parties concerned, whilst it is scrupulously observant of similar engagements with all its European allies.

We have, within the last twenty years, by this creditable process possessed ourselves of 100,000 square miles of territory, yielding a revenue of about a million sterling, and this by virtue of prerogatives which we assume to belong to us as successors to the Emperors of Delhi, prerogatives which in better days we had formally disclaimed. Not only have we usurped these prerogatives, but we claim a right under them to deal with our friends as the Moghul

emperors dealt with their enemies. Those despotic potentates reduced the sovereign states of Hindostan to vassalage, and refused to give them even the title of sovereigns. But we were linked to these sovereigns, whose possessions we have confiscated, by treaties of perpetual friendship, by which we acknowledged their sovereign rights, and guaranteed their possessions to them, their heirs, and successors.

Now, when your lordship recollects that the adoption of an heir in failure of blood heirs is with a Hindoo prince or peasant not a matter of choice, but of religious obligation, you will see that when we enter into a treaty with a Hindoo prince, "his heirs and successors," we know that, except by some extraordinary accident, he never can want heirs and successors, even if all his blood relations should have become extinct. Heirs and successors, therefore, in our Indian treaties, are synonymous with perpetual cession. We renounce all claim to what we give or guarantee *for ever*, and the other contracting party renounces all claim to what he cedes *for ever*. That these are convertible terms may be proved by reference to all our treaties: the terms used are sometimes a cession to the British Government in perpetual sovereignty, their heirs and successors,—sometimes a cession by the British Government to a prince, his heirs, and successors, in perpetual sovereignty,—sometimes the words are "to him and his heirs for ever"—some-

times to him “in perpetuity;” for example, in 1801 the Nabob of Oude ceded a portion of his dominions to the British Government “in perpetual sovereignty;” in 1816 the British Government ceded a portion of territory to the Nabob of Oude, his heirs, and successors, in perpetual sovereignty, in satisfaction of a debt which the British Government owed that prince of a million sterling. Will your lordship permit me to remind you that our empire in India is made up of territory thus ceded to us “in perpetual sovereignty,” under treaties with native princes. It is now contended that whilst the cessions thus made to us are ours for ever, so that on no pretence can they be reclaimed, the cessions made *by* us, and the guarantees given by us in perpetuity, may be redeemed, and our obligations cease and determine, not when it has *been proved*, but whenever we may choose to pronounce that a native prince has died without heirs, and that the British Government, as successors of the Emperors of Delhi, is then at liberty to seize upon his possessions as an escheat.

This novel doctrine, viz., that the obligation of our treaties with the princes of India, their heirs and successors, ceases whenever these princes may die without *heirs male of* their body, will appear to be more monstrous, when it is recollected that whenever in our treaties we wish to limit succession to such heirs, we do so in express terms.

We did so in our treaty with the Rao of Cutch in 1818, with the Holkar Chief in 1844, and with the the Rajah of Cashmere, Gholab Singh, in 1846.

It is by this arbitrary process, viz., by setting aside without a hearing those who claim to be heirs, and then seizing upon their inheritance as escheats, that we have already obtained possession of four Indian principalities, viz., Colaba, Mandavee, Sattara, and Berar. The last seizure now waits for the ratification of the Home Government. To leave out all considerations of justice, would it be politic at any time to sanction such flagrant aggressions? Is it prudent at this moment to give our enemies an opportunity of casting these things in our teeth?

Your lordship, at the meeting of Parliament, declared that we were precluded by treaties from entering the Dardanelles until war had actually been declared between Russia and Turkey. But to what purpose is this scrupulous observance of our treaties with European powers, if we break them by wholesale with our helpless Asiatic allies?

“Our connection with the state of Colaba,” said the late Mr. Tucker, one of the most experienced and able men that ever sat in the Court of Directors, “rests upon the foundation of a formal treaty freely contracted; and while a vestige of the family of Augria remains, it belongs of right to them.

“It is assumed that the principality has lapsed

to the paramount state by reason of the failure of legitimate heirs, but I deny that a failure has taken place, for the right of adoption still exists, and I contend also that illegitimate descendants are not excluded from succession, even under our own Government.

“Whether the case before us be considered to involve a question of international law—assuming Colaba to be an independent state—or a question of inheritance, viewing it as a mere dependency, it is clear that these are no grounds for the interference of the British Government.

“The native princes and chiefs of India will see, in the fate of Colaba, their own future destiny; their fidelity and attachment cannot be relied upon while they have such cause for distrust and alarm; and, although they may be overawed and kept down by an irresistible military power, the occasion may arise when their hostility might become dangerous. The feelings of our Indian subjects are not to be trifled with; and it is not wise or safe to depart from that conciliatory conduct and to efface from their minds those impressions of our justice, wisdom, and good faith, which have hitherto constituted our bond of union with the people of India.” I may venture, indeed, to assert that there is not now a single chief in India, or any man of rank and consideration—a few Hindoo capitalists excepted—who would not draw his sword against us on the first favourable

opportunity, and who is not, at this moment, anxious to drive us out of the country.*

These opinions of Mr. Tucker are the opinions of all our most eminent Indian statesmen; all agree in thinking that the absorption of the native states by the British Government would be the greatest misfortune that could happen to India. The case of Colaba is, *mutato nomine*, the case of Berar; and all that is asked on behalf of those who claim to be heirs is, that they may have a hearing before the British Government finally confiscates the principality upon the pretext that no such heirs exist. It may surprise your lordship that it should be necessary to make such a petition to a British Government; but the fact is, that whilst that Government is precluded from touching the property or the persons of the meanest of its subjects but by process of law, it may at its pleasure, and with perfect impunity, seize upon the possessions of the helpless princes of India, its allies, because those princes, not being British subjects, or resident within British territory, are placed beyond the protection of the law.

“I would sacrifice every political consideration ten times over,” said the late Great Duke, when holding high command in India, “rather than sanction the slightest infraction upon British good faith.” If your lordship is of the same mind, you will not refuse

* Memorials of Indian Government, p. 258—477.

the reasonable request which I have preferred. Between two and three hundred native princes and chiefs await your decision with trembling anxiety ; for on it depends the fate of their heirs, and the fortunes of their families—whether they shall be princes, as their ancestors were, or pensioners first, and beggars afterwards.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most faithful and obedient

J. SULLIVAN.

ARE WE BOUND BY OUR TREATIES?

A P L E A

FOR THE

PRINCES OF INDIA.

BY

JOHN SULLIVAN, ESQ.

“I would sacrifice Gwalior, or every frontier of India ten times over, in
“order to preserve our character for scrupulous good faith.”

Duke of Wellington's Dispatches, p. 157.

LONDON:

EFFINGHAM WILSON, CORNHILL.

1853.

A PLEA FOR THE PRINCES OF INDIA.

It was in the indignant language which I have taken for a motto, that our illustrious Duke rebuked his noble brother when he found that he was disposed to tamper with the public faith. He was the same in the early as in the latter part of his career—an inflexible adherent to principle. He set his face as a flint against all attempts that were made to lure him from the plain path of rectitude. When he had still fame and fortune to win, he laboured with as much anxiety to ward off that war with the Mahrattas, in which he laid the foundation of his greatness, as if he had already attained to both. He insisted upon it, that the treaty, which he had concluded with the Mahratta powers, should be construed in the sense in which he knew that they had understood it. The very hint of an intention to violate a public engagement threw him off his equilibrium—“I am disgusted beyond measure,” he says, “with the whole concern; and I would give a large sum to have nothing to do with the treaties of peace, and if I could now get rid of

“all anxiety on the subject. All parties were delighted with the peace, but the demon of ambition appears now to have pervaded all; and each endeavours by framing constructions, to gain as much as he can—I declare that I am dispirited and disgusted with this transaction, beyond measure.”* He acted, indeed, upon the homely maxim, that “honesty is the best policy.” “What,” he said again, “brought me successfully through the last campaign—but strict adherence to British good faith—and what success could I hope for in any future operations if I were to tarnish that faith.”

This great man, “though dead yet speaketh”—and it is for the British public and the British Parliament now to determine whether that voice, which spurned the acquisition of even a single inch of ground by twisting the meaning of a treaty—shall be heard, or whether we shall follow the inspirations of those who are seeking to acquire principalities by trampling upon treaties by wholesale. A decree has gone forth from the Government of India, to confiscate for our own benefit, as opportunities may offer, the territories of the Princes of India who are allied to us by solemn treaties, and we are at this moment employed in copying the blackest page in Louis Napoleon’s black book. His plea for confiscating the property of the

* Selections from Dispatches, p. 159—161.

Orleans family was, that they held it in defiance of the fundamental laws of the French monarchy ; our plea is our power ; and as he tempted the Army and the Church to acquiesce in his spoliations, by promising them a share of the plunder ; so an appeal is made to our cupidity, by asserting, that if we seize upon the territories and revenues of our allies, we shall be the richest power that has ever existed in India, and our subjects, the lightest taxed. We have now only one-half of the revenues, it is said, and we are in debt and difficulties, let us take the remainder, and we shall have an overflowing treasury.

Our case is this. When, early in the eighteenth century, the Moghul Empire was broken up, there was a general rush made at the fragments ; each Provincial Governor seized upon his province, and made it a kingdom—so that when we first appeared upon the political stage, we found that Empire already divided into several large independent states,* with a multitude of inferior states, more or less dependent upon them, and all recognizing the Emperor of Delhi as their nominal head. The battle of Plassy, and the subsequent grant of the Dewany of Bengal, by Shah Aulum, gave us a place amongst those sovereigns ; and the successful results of our various contests with them conferred

* 1. The Nizam ; 2. The Mahratta Confederacy ; 3. Mysore ; 4. Oude ; 5. Bengal ; 6. the Rajpoot States.

upon us all the rights of conquerors. We availed ourselves of those rights, we dictated our terms to the vanquished, we took such portions of their territory as suited us, leaving them the remainder; we then entered into fresh relations with them, treating with them upon a footing of perfect equality—as independent Sovereign States—and those treaties embraced their heirs and successors. In this way we dealt with those who had been our enemies—but there is a mass of Princes and Chiefs who have always been our friends, and to them we are bound by treaties of perpetual amity and protection.

Up to a comparatively late period those treaties were scrupulously observed; we recognised their heirs—whether heirs natural, heirs adopted, or heirs collateral; and in the failure of heirs, we professed ourselves ready to recognize those who might be called to the Sovereignty by the general voice of the people, upon the avowed principle, that it was inconsistent with the general policy of the British Government to interfere with the internal administration of the states in alliance with it. It was in 1841 that we first put in a claim to determine whether the territory of Holkar; whose ancestor had raised himself to the status of a Sovereign Prince before we had attained to that rank in Hindostan—and whom we had recognized as such by several treaties—would escheat to the British Government, from failure of heirs natural, or

whether those who claimed to be heirs, *adoptive or collateral*, should be recognized as heirs.

The manifestation of a strong feeling on the part of the people on behalf of their national sovereignty, and some misunderstanding on the part of the diplomatic agent employed in the negotiations, baffled us in our attempt to introduce what was designated as an "important line of policy"—the principal feature of which was the reduction, under the threat of forfeiture, of the state of Holkar from the rank of independent sovereignty into that of vassalage, with a view to our eventual succession to the domain. The right of the nearest of blood to succeed was admitted, and he still enjoys his inheritance.*

But the smaller principalities of Colaba, Mundayee, and Sattara, were not so fortunate; the new "line of policy" was followed with respect to them. Upon a failure of heirs of the body, we incorporated them with our territory as escheats to the "Lord Paramount," and in pursuance of the same policy, and by virtue of the same pretensions, we have commenced upon an extirpation of a race of Princes, who have had root in the soil of Hindostan for more than 1800 years—the Princes of a people (the Rajpoots) whose heroic achievements in defence of their fatherland have never been exceeded—a people who struggled successfully for

* See Parliamentary Papers, A.D. 1850, No. 50, p. 9 to 104.

their independence for 500 years—who were reduced to a dependence, rather nominal than real, under the early Moghul Emperors—who were the main instruments in raising that Empire to its greatness—whose possessions have been preserved to them by all the dynasties that have preceded ours, and the integrity of whose possessions we have guaranteed by the most solemn treaties. Our pretensions, however, by no means stop here; we claim the right of seizing upon any state that may have been founded upon conquest, provided that we have the might to do so. We have, it is said, the better title, if we have only the “stronger sword.” The Ameers of Scinde “had no other right to their territory than that of the sword, and we having the better sword, were perfectly justified in appropriating it if we chose, without reference to our particular quarrel with them.”*

As Lords Paramount of Hindostan, we claim then a reversionary right to all the territory within the Indus, and we shall be perfectly justified, it is

* “Now the Beloochee Chiefs had no other right to the territory than that of the sword, and we having the better sword, were perfectly justified in taking it from them, if we chose, without reference to the particular quarrel between Sir Charles (Napier) and the Chiefs: we have seen how, and with what obligations, we acquired our present territory; and have also noted, the origin of the Native States, and judge how far they have any right better than that of those *who may conquer and succeed them*.”—Campbell’s *Modern India*, pp. 138—148.

said, in taking all the countries between the Yellow Sea and the Black Sea from their original conquerors, provided we are able to do so. . And yet, seriously putting forth these pretensions, we reproach the Americans with their razzia upon Mexico, the Russians with their aggressions upon Circassia, and the French with their conquest of Algeria!

Is it politic in the présent state of the world to put this "*tu quoque*" into the mouth of those powers, and to give them a warrant for taxing us not only with inordinate ambition, but with a wholesale breach of treaties, for they know, though we may choose to forget it, that, (for example,) we had solemnly bound ourselves by treaty not even to covet an inch of the dominions of those Ameers of Scinde, which it is now contended—we had a right at any time to take from them by virtue of our superior strength. Is it not time, then, to ask "Are we bound by our treaties?"

It is in the first instance by ignoring those treaties, and all the acts done for a series of years under these treaties—then by confounding Sovereign States, with their vassals—Suzerains, with their feudatories, in a common mass, that we assume a title to deal at our pleasure with the possessions of the Princes in alliance with us, as Lords Paramount of Hindostan. We claim to have succeeded to all the prerogatives of the Mogul Emperors; but we forget, in the first place, that those Emperors reduced the princes whom they conquered, from sovereignty

to vassalage—that they recognized no sovereignty but their own—that the vanquished Rajpoot Princes, for example, made a surrender of their kingdoms to the Emperor, receiving them back with a grant upon each lapse, thereby acknowledging him as their Lord Paramount; and we forget that we have stripped ourselves of all such arbitrary prerogatives by treaties, in which we have strictly, and minutely defined and limited our own rights, and the rights of those with whom we have treated—that we have formally recognized, and treated with these Princes as independent Sovereigns—have formally by the same treaties, disclaimed all right to interfere with their territories, and have pledged ourselves to defend them from all enemies. But, in the face of those treaties, we now claim a right of appropriating the territories so guaranteed, to our own use, whenever we may determine, that the Sovereign Princes our allies, have died without heirs.

When a question of this kind, or any question relating to India, is proposed for our consideration, it behoves us to examine it under a fivefold aspect.

Firstly, Is it just ?

Secondly, Will it improve the character of the people? or will it deteriorate that character ?

Thirdly, Will it conciliate their affections? or will it alienate them ?

Fourthly, Will it consolidate our power, or will it weaken it ?

Fifthly, Will it enrich, or will it impoverish us ?

Now, if strong presumptive proof can be adduced

that the confiscation of the Native States will add to, rather than diminish our burdens, there is hope, that upon purely financial considerations, we may be induced not to violate the national faith, by laying violent hands on the possessions of those whom we are solemnly pledged to protect and to uphold.

Is there then any real ground for believing that we should be richer if we possessed all the territory and all the revenues of India, than we are now, with one-half of it? We have, within the last ten years, extinguished three Native States, viz.: Scinde, Lahore, and Sattara—and our financial account stands with them thus:

	Rupees
Estimated Surplus of the Punjab	14,00,000
Deficiency in Scinde	<u>20,00,000</u>
Ditto, Sattara	<u>3,00,000</u>
Net loss by acquisition	9,00,000*

But this by no means tells the whole story. The Rajah of Lahore was by treaty bound to pay us a tribute of twenty lacs per annum; and the Ameers of Scinde a tribute of three lacs—so that instead of receiving twenty-three lacs, net revenue, from those states, we are actually paying nine lacs for their support, exclusive of the military charges,

* See Appendix to Commons' Report, p. 467.

which, on Scinde alone, are estimated at twenty lacs.*

It may be argued, that whether for profit or loss, we had no alternative but to take Scinde and the Punjab, and that for the security of our empire we must bear whatever burden they bring upon us—but no such reason could be assigned for seizing upon Sattara, or can be assigned for the seizure of the principalities, which remain in possession of their owners. Revenue was the main object of our appropriation of Sattara—and Sattara already entails a charge upon the general revenues of India. “We certainly were not prepared to find that the “annexation of Sattara would entail a charge upon “the general revenues of India”—say, the authorities.† We have been chanting the same dirge for nearly a century—great expectations from every acquisition of territory, and corresponding disappointment—all proceeding from the same cause—viz. that our charges invariably grow faster than our receipts; and the same cause is in sensible operation in the Punjab at this moment—for while it is estimated that there will be an increase of revenue of fourteen lacs of rupees, there is an estimated increase of charge of thirty-eight lacs.‡ Lord

* See Appendix to Commons' Report, p. 468.

† Ibid.

‡ Punjab	1849-50	1851-52, Estimated
Revenue . . .	1,16,08,950	1,30,05,000
Charges . . .	44,02,559	96,22,000
Net excess of Charge		38,14,441

Hardinge was deterred from annexing the Punjab after its first conquest, from an apprehension that it would not pay. If we were to trust to popular books, we should say, that his Lordship's fears were vain indeed, for we are assured in them, that "our new acquisitions" show a surplus of £1,190,633,* but unfortunately, we must fall back for authentic information upon the official accounts. They reveal to us a considerable and a growing deficiency, and books and accounts join in telling us the same story—viz. "that whereas the whole expenses in India, exclusive of the debt, were formerly 66 per cent—they are now 76 per cent on the revenues."†

It is pretty clear, therefore, that we shall not be the richer for robbing our helpless allies of their possessions; and if the opinions of the Duke, and of those who were associated with him in the public service in India, Munro, Elphinstone, and Malcolm are to be trusted, their extinction will gradually undermine our strength.‡ Will it ameliorate the condition of the people, conciliate their affections, or improve their character? If England was to be conquered by Russia to-morrow, if the estates of all its proprietors were to be confiscated, if stipendiary agents were to be placed in charge of them, if the rents were to be remitted to the public treasury, if all offices, civil and military, were filled with Russians,

* Campbell's *Modern India*, p. 439.

† *Ibid.*

‡ See Appendix A.

and no Englishman allowed to hold any post higher than that of judge of a county court, would such a revolution better us materially or morally? would it rivet us in attachment to our conquerors? “*Mutato nomine;*” this is precisely the process that is followed when we confiscate a native state. The representative of the ancient proprietor is provided for by a pension, which is sometimes permanent, at others temporary, all who belonged to him, or who were dependent upon him, are suddenly reduced to beggary; and a large portion of the rents and revenues which went to support the ancient aristocracy of the country are transferred to the pockets of our own countrymen.

It is only by trampling upon the chartered, as well as upon the natural and hereditary rights of the Princes of India that we can extinguish the native states. None but purely English readers need to be informed that, the adoption of a son, in failure of heirs of his body, is not only the privilege, but the religious duty of every Hindoo; no Hindoo, therefore, except by accident or by criminal neglect, can die without heirs. It is by this practice of adoption that the Rajpoot states have been perpetuated from a remote period up to the present moment. It has “secured their political existence, while successive “dynasties of Affghans and Moguls, during 800 “years, have left but the wreck of splendid names, “a Rajpoot prince never dies—he disappears to be “regenerated, ‘*Le Roi est mort—vive le Roi,*’ is

“a phrase the precise value of which is there well understood. Neither the Crown nor the greater fiefs are ever without heirs; adoption is the preservative of names and titles; the great fiefs of Rajpootana can never become extinct.”*

No attempt was ever made by us to trench upon the “indestructible principle” by which native states are perpetuated until in 1841, when upon the prospect of the death of Jungajee Scindiah, the Sovereign of Gwalior, the Governor-General, indicated an intention to interfere in the succession—as he actually did interfere in the succession to the Holkar Sovereignty in 1844, upon the assumption that the adoption of a successor by the reigning Prince, or by his widow, required the confirmation of the British Government.

Such a pretension had never before been advanced, neither had the right of a Sovereign Prince to adopt a successor to his territory been questioned.

In 1825, the question of the rights of succession in native states came formally before the British Government in India, in the shape of a question as to whether the Sovereign Princes of these states had a right—not to adopt an heir, for that right had never been brought into doubt; but whether they had a right to adopt, to the prejudice of a collateral heir—and this question was agitated because as that

* Tod's Annals of Rajpootan, Vol. I. p. 190.

Government was bound by treaty to support the rightful heir—it was absolutely necessary that they should ascertain who the rightful heir was.

The question was accordingly submitted to a tribunal of *Pundits*, and they having pronounced that the adoption of a son was valid against the claims of collateral heirs—the British Government came to a formal resolution, that “Sovereign Princes in their own right have, by Hindoo law, a right to adopt, in failure of heirs male of the body, to the exclusion of collateral heirs; and that the British Government is bound to acknowledge the adoption, provided that it be regular, and not in violation of the Hindoo law;” and in accordance with their resolution—no less than fifteen instances of succession by adoption were recognized by the British Government between the years 1826 and 1848, seven of which were made by reigning princes, seven by the widows or mothers of deceased princes, and one by election of the leading chiefs of the Principality, in accordance with an opinion of the late Lord Metcalfe, that when there is a “total failure of heirs, it is probably more consistent with right that the people should elect a Sovereign for themselves, than that the Principality should lapse to the Paramount State; that State, in fact, having no right in such case, but what it assumes in virtue of its power.”

These independent rights of succession had been exercised with our concurrence, by Sovereigns of

all classes, not merely by those whom we acknowledge to be “absolute and despotic monarchs”—such as Scindiah—but by those also, who, though absolute rulers in their own dominions, stand in a relation of political dependence upon us; acknowledging our supremacy by treaty, and in token of this supremacy, paying us tribute. So far was the British Government from having pretended, up to a late period, to question these rights, that we find it expressing a wish “that all the Sovereign Princes of the country, who had no issue, should name their successors during their lifetime;”* and as a practice recognizing the succession “which should appear to be most agreeable to the Prince and to the people, or to the latter, on the demise of the former,”† although quite aware that the recognition of the ruler *de facto* implied a total renunciation of all reversionary right on their part of succession under any contingency. The British Government ruled at the same time—that whether those who were not Sovereign Princes had a right to name a successor, must depend upon the nature of our engagements with them.

These proceedings, extending over a period of near thirty years, originated with the Government abroad—were approved by the Court of Directors, and confirmed by the Board of Control. On a

* See Par. Pa. A.D. 1850, No. 50, p. 185.

† Ibid. p. 125.

sudden all these authorities turned round upon themselves, and authoritatively declared, that there were no independent Sovereigns in India—that all the Princes of India were feudatories of the British Government—that upon the failure of lineal heirs, their principalities lapsed to the British Government, as the “Paramount State,” and they proceeded to act upon this new dictum by seizing upon the principalities of Mundavee, Colaba, and Sattara.

No new light had broken in upon the subject—no fresh fact had occurred to make their former decision questionable; they arrived at their new judgment by simply ignoring their former one, and all the acts and proceedings arising out of it: and, at the same time, by ignoring the treaties by which they had solemnly guaranteed the territories of those Princes to their descendants in perpetuity.

In 1825 the Government of India had, as we have seen, formally recognized the right of “Sovereign Princes, in their own right, and professing the Hindoo religion to adopt a son, to the exclusion of collateral heirs, as of the supposed reversionary right of the Paramount power;” and in 1849 they determined that the Rajah of Sattara, who was a Hindoo Prince, *de jurè* and *de facto* by birth—and a Sovereign actually reigning, had no right to adopt—and with a treaty under their eyes, in which we had ceded the territory of Sattara to the Rajah, “his heirs, and successors, in perpetual sovereignty,”

they declared that they were “under no pledge “direct or constructive”* to continue the territory to his heirs and successors—and annexed it to their own dominions.

This was done with the usual exuberant profession of a wish to act in the matter “with the purest “integrity, and in the most scrupulous observance “of good faith. If even a shadow of doubt can “be shewn, the claim should,” it is said, “at once “be abandoned.”

At the moment that the British Government was making this ostentatious profession of their determination to abandon their claim, if a doubt could be cast upon its justice, they had under their eyes a reasoned opinion of Sir George Clerk, the Governor of Bombay, that they had no right whatever to the territory—that the British Government had ceded it in perpetuity to the Rajah of Sattara, his heirs and successors, and that it belonged, therefore, clearly to his heirs; they had at the same time before them a declaration from the political agent Mr. Frere, that there were those who would be able, and who were ready, to establish their rights as heirs under the treaty before any court of justice. They were entreated to allow these claimants to be heard—they were urged to refer to Mr. Elphinstone, who had made the treaty, and to Captain Grant Duff, who had been engaged officially in explaining it to the

* See Par. Pa. A.D. 1849, No. 83, p. 9.

first Rajah, for information as to the meaning of the terms used in it, if any doubt could be entertained of their meaning. "But to me," said Sir George Clerk, "they appear to be remarkably distinct and "perspicuous." That Government, however, who were so anxious to act with unspotted integrity, and scrupulous good-faith—turned their backs upon these appeals to their justice—they refused to hear the claimants—they declined to refer to the negociators of the treaty—they seized upon the territory; and the authorities at home—in a despatch of a dozen lines, in which there is not the slightest reference to the right—solemnly and repeatedly recognized by themselves—of a Hindoo Sovereign to adopt an heir, and only a passing allusion to the treaty, by which they had ceded it to him and his heirs for ever, sanctioned the confiscation for their own benefit of a principality which yielded a revenue of near £200,000. a-year.

If this had been a transaction between individuals—if a powerful man had laid claim to the property of his weaker neighbour, professing at the same time loudly his determination to relinquish it if a doubt should be breathed of its justice, and if, upon proof being tendered that the claim was altogether unfounded, he had proceeded to enforce it, we should not scruple to brand the individual so acting as a hypocrite, as well as a tyrant. The hypocrisy is not the less, or the tyranny a jot abated, because they are shared amongst many.

Are we then bound by our Treaties? This will appear to be a pertinent question, when it is known that there are between two and three hundred native states in India, great and small—independent states, and dependent states—sovereignties and feudatories whose territories embrace an area of upwards of 700,000 square miles, with a population of more than 50 millions of souls, and a revenue of ten millions sterling, all of whom are destined to gradual extinction, simply by virtue of our power, and in contempt of a mass of treaties, by which we have pledged ourselves to maintain them as native states.

For example, we are at this moment employed in extirpating the little principality of Kerowlee, one of the Rajpoot states, which has been rooted in the soil of Hindostan for centuries; which was an independent state in the time of the Mogul Emperors, a state to which we are pledged by a solemn treaty, the first article of which runs thus:—

“There shall be perpetual friendship, alliance, and unity of interest between the British Government on the one hand, and the Rajah of Kerowlee and his descendants on the other:”* and by way of fulfilling this engagement of “perpetual friendship” to his descendants, we have determined—the last Prince having died without heirs of his own body—that his race is extinct, that he has no descendants, although there is an heir by adoption, who, according to the laws of the country, stands in the place

* See Treaty, dated 9 November, 1817.

of an heir by blood—an adoption made by virtue of a right inherent in a Hindoo Prince, as recognized repeatedly by ourselves, and which was recognized in this very state of Kerowlee no longer ago than the year 1848, when the Rajah having died with an entire failure of male heirs; the family adopted a son, who was acknowledged by us as his successor.*

Setting aside by violence the rights of this adopted son—setting aside the rights of collateral heirs—setting aside our own dictum by which we have declared it to be “more consistent with the “right that the people should elect a Sovereign in “failure of heirs natural and adopted,” than that the state should lapse to us, as the Paramount Power—abrogating the treaty by which we pledged “perpetual friendship to the Rajah of Kerowlee and “his *descendants*”—and by which we acknowledged the Rajah to be absolute ruler of his own dominions, and covenanted that “the British jurisdiction should “not be introduced therein.” We now claim to be heirs to the lapsed territory, by virtue of certain powers, which we claim as successors to the Emperor of Delhi.†

* See Par. Pa. A. D. 1850, No. 50, p. 209.

† As these sheets are passing through the press, I learn that the Court of Directors, by a majority, have determined to withdraw the claim put forth by the Government in India to the territory of Kerowlee. But whether the decision of that Government shall override the decision of the nominal Governors of India, will depend upon the fiat of the real Governors, the Board of Control.

A similar claim to override the inherent rights of the Native Princes, and to abrogate our treaties with them, was thus summarily brushed away in 1842, by the then Governor-General, Lord Auckland. "In viewing this question,"* said his Lordship, "I would at once put aside any reference to the prerogatives claimed and exercised by the Emperor of Delhi, or of any *supposed rights* which it has been thought might be assumed by us, because they were habitually enforced by those Sovereigns, or by others, who have at different times held supreme rule within the various provinces of the Empire. I would look only to the terms and spirit of the treaties or engagements which we have formed with the several states of India—and bring forward no other demand than such as, in reference to those engagements, may be indisputably consistent with good faith." And Lord Auckland was as good as his word—for when an insidious attempt† was made soon afterwards to rob the Rajah of Oorcha of his rights as an independent Sovereign, on the ground, that under the Mogul Emperors, the Rajah would not have been permitted to nominate an heir to his possessions without the sanction of the superior power. He thus dealt with it.‡ "I cannot for a moment admit the doctrine that, because the view of policy

* The right of the widow of the Rajah of Kishengurh to adopt a son without authority from her deceased husband.—Par. Pa. p. 183.

† Par. Pa. p. 144.

‡ P. 146.

“ upon which we may have formed engagements
 “ with Native Princes may have been by circum-
 “ stances materially altered, we are not to act
 “ scrupulously up to the terms and spirit of those
 “ engagements. I have referred to our treaty with
 “ the Rajah of Oorcha, concluded on the 23rd of
 “ December, 1812, and I find that its preamble
 “ commences in these words : The Rajah of Oorcha
 “ is one of the Chiefs of Bundelcund, by whom,
 “ and his ancestors, his present possessions have
 “ been held in successive generations during a long
 “ course of years, without paying tribute or ac-
 “ knowledging vassalage to any other power. And
 “ the treaty formed with the Rajah is designated as
 “ one of friendship and alliance: the territory
 “ which from ancient times has descended to the
 “ Rajah by inheritance, and is now in his possession,
 “ being guaranteed to the said Rajah and *to his heirs*
 “ *and successors, upon words so distinct and positive*
 “ *as these, I hold it to be impossible to raise a ques-*
 “ *tion,* and I am of opinion, therefore, that the
 “ Rajah of Oorcha must be regarded as one of
 “ those Sovereign rulers who, according to the very
 “ proper rule laid down in the letter of Sir Charles
 “ Metcalfe of 28th October, 1837, is entitled to
 “ make an adoption in his own discretion, which the
 “ British Government is bound to acknowledge,
 “ provided that such adoption be regular and not
 “ in violation of Hindoo Law.”

Here we have the Governor-General, Lord Auck-
 land's judgment in the case—Prerogative *versus*

Treaty. He does not admit, that we have inherited any rights from the Emperor of Delhi, but he says, that treaties override our "supposed rights." He is as stiff as to the obligations of treaties, as was the Duke—and like that illustrious man, was determined to be guided entirely by their obvious meaning. Is it not marvellous that the Governor-General of this day, backed by the authorities at home, who had concurred in Lord Auckland's judgment, should now determine, that we are warranted by virtue of those supposed rights, and in the face of our treaties, to possess ourselves of all the Native States of India, whenever their occupants may die without natural heirs? Treaties couched in terms as distinct and unquestionable as that upon which Lord Auckland grounded his decision—treaties which guarantee those states to the reigning Princes, their heirs and successors?

But, though the authorities of to-day, at home and abroad, are of one mind as to our right to despoil the Princes of their estates, they are as wide as the poles asunder on the grounds upon which they rest that right. One section of the Court of Directors, asserts* that no dependent principality can pass to an adopted heir without the consent of the Paramount Power—another section admits, that sovereigns in the ordinary acceptation of the term, although dependent—the Rajpoot States, for instance—"are unquestionably competent to adopt "successors to their royal rights,"† whilst the

* P.P. p. 9.

† P.P. p. 145.

Governor-General of the day, in the face of the recognition of his predecessors, denies that there are any Sovereign States at all “in their own right,”* although, in the very paper in which this assertion is made, he says—the question for him to determine is, “whether the State of Sattara “shall be *continued as an independent State*,” Lord Hastings, the creator of that state, having placed it “on the same footing of independence as that of “our other allies.”

It is in this way that the most sacred rights are trifled with. The parties thus agreeing as to their right to spoil, but disagreeing as to the ground of their right, have only to read the treaties to be satisfied that the “status” of the Prince has nothing to do with our obligations—that we are bound by those treaties to a perpetual guarantee to the “heirs and successors” of him with whom we made the treaty—be they princes or be they peasants.

But even if no such treaties existed, we should have no right to touch those Principalities—we did not create them, neither did the Emperor of Delhi—they had been called into existence for centuries before the Mussulman touched the soil of Hindostan. Upon the downfall of the Mogul Empire, they recovered their original independence; it was as independent Sovereigns that we first treated with them, and it was as Hindoo Sovereigns, in their own right—and not by virtue of our treaties—that we

* See Par. Pa. A.D. 1849, No. 83, p. 80.

recognized their right to name successors to their sovereignties.

The Mogul Emperors early in the sixteenth century conquered the Rajpoot states, and reduced them to the condition of vassals—as vassals they made a nominal surrender of their kingdoms to the Emperor—receiving them back, with a grant (sumnud), which was renewed on each lessee, thereby acknowledging him as their Lord Paramount.* But we have never conquered the Rajpoot States—they have never been our enemies—we have been linked in close amity with them ever since the connexion began, and we are pledged that this friendship shall continue from generation to generation. We now claim the right, however, to deal with our friends, as the Mogul Emperors dealt with their enemies. If we have derived any rights at all from those potentates—they are plenary rights—we have a right not only to refuse to recognize adopted heirs, but we have a right to insist that upon every lapse, the heir by blood shall receive investiture from us as the Lord Paramount. We have as good a right to refuse the investiture of an heir by blood as we have to refuse the recognition of an heir by adoption—but although the Mogul Emperors, by *conquest* had the right to do both, they never exercised that right. The incontestable proof being the existence of those States at this day—an existence which has been perpetuated by

* Tod's Annals of Rajhastan, vol. 1.

the practice of adoption ; the failure of heirs by blood being a common occurrence in Hindoo dynasties.

It is avowedly with an intention of extinguishing those dynasties—dynasties which have existed, perhaps, from the time of Alexander—dynasties which were spared by all the Mussulman Sovereigns—that the humane, enlightened, and Conservative British Government is now employed. It is the settled purpose of that Government to extirpate the ancient aristocracy from the land—an aristocracy in comparison of which, in point of antiquity, every family in England is modern ; and as, by the laws of equal inheritance, there can be no permanent accumulation of landed property in the hands of individuals—to reduce India to a State—in which the Governor-General shall represent the Sovereign, the English officials, the aristocracy, and a hundred millions of people, be reduced to the condition of the “lower orders.” The object of this fearful revolution is avowedly, money, and this object is to be attained by trampling upon treaties which, as Lord Auckland, said, “speak a language which cannot be mistaken.”

It is by virtue of treaties and grants from the Native powers, that the British hold all their possessions in the East. Is it worthy of a great Government—is it consistent with common honesty, is it politic to put one interpretation upon treaties, by which we receive territory, and another inter-

pretation upon treaties, by which we cede territory, when precisely the same terms are used in both ?

The terms in which the Native Princes cede territory to us, is cession to “the East India Company, their heirs, and successors in perpetual sovereignty.” We dictate these terms to the Native powers as the strongest which language will furnish, to convey a complete and unalterable alienation of territory from them to us. The grantors know, and we know, that when a conveyance in these terms has once passed, the territory is ours for ever—and that the original owners can on no pretence reclaim it. For example, in 1801, the Nabob of Oude ceded “in perpetual sovereignty “to the East India Company” those provinces which form the largest portion of the Government of Agra. In 1813 we ceded to the Nabob of Oude, “his heirs and successors in perpetual sovereignty,” in consideration of a million sterling paid in hard cash—certain districts which we had conquered from the Rajah of Nepaul. In 1818 we ceded “in perpetual sovereignty to the Rajah of Sattara, his “heirs and successors,” certain districts specified in a schedule in 1839. We renewed this treaty in precisely the same terms, and in 1848 we ruled that “perpetual sovereignty” had no meaning—that “heirs and successors” meant only heirs by blood—and that by the law and custom of India we had a right to the territory as an escheat, upon the failure of such heirs. By the same dictum, we

may seize upon the territory which we sold to the Nabob of Oude for a consideration infinitely above its value—should he die without heirs of his own blood, for the only title he has to that territory, is our treaty, by which we cede that territory to him, his heirs, and successors.

Is this, again we may ask, worthy of a great Government—is it honest—is it politic? If the French were to trick territory in Algeria out of an Arab Sheik, after this fashion, what should we say to them? and what a lesson we are teaching to our Native Allies. It happens, that in the treaty by which the Nabob of Oude ceded half his dominions to us in 1801, no mention is made of “heirs and “successors”—the cession is confined to the East India Company. Now, that Company may die to-morrow—and if the Nabob, borrowing a leaf out of our book, was to demand the restoration of the territory upon the plea that his cession had been to the East India Company only, what answer could we give him? But the Mussulman Prince would scorn such an evasion. He knows, that when he ceded the territory in perpetuity, he had done with it for ever, and had made it the absolute property of that Company.

When the Queen desires to limit a peerage to “heirs male of the body,” does she employ the terms “heirs and successors?”* When we wish,

* Parl. Papers, A.D. 1850, No. 50.

in our treaties with the native Princes to limit succession in the same way, do we employ these terms? No: there was under the eyes of the Indian authorities when they came to this decision a treaty which they had recently concluded with Ghoolab Sing, the Rajah of Cashmere, in which, in order to limit the succession, they cede certain territory to him, and the "heirs male of his body"—there was before them, also, a correspondence* in which the Governor-General, with a view to cut off the right of adoption in the family of Holkar, had attempted to introduce a clause into a new treaty, which he wished to force upon that State, in which the future succession was expressly to be limited to "heirs male of the body." It is only when we are bent upon seizing the territory of a weak neighbour that we force a sense upon the terms "heirs and successors." Moreover, in order to facilitate our designs upon the possessions of our allies, we have advanced another monstrous doctrine—viz., that a treaty made with a native Prince in his own language, and explained to him in his own language, is to be construed in our language, of which he is entirely ignorant.† For example, in the treaty with the Rajah of Kerowlee, whose principality we are now seeking to confis-

* If "heirs and successors" means "heirs of the body," what terms are we to use if we wish to make a grant which is to extend beyond "such heirs?"

† Par. Papers, p. 1. March, 1849, p. 65, 72, 82.

cate, the English terms employed are the “Rajah of Kerowlee and his descendants;” in the English sense, “descendants” were those who descend from the body only; but the corresponding term in the native language embraces, with reference to the universal practice amongst Hindoos, those who may be descendants by adoption, as well as heirs by blood—not that the Rajah’s right of adoption depends upon the wording of our treaty. As a Sovereign Prince who had “held his possessions for successive generations, during a long course of years,” for centuries before we had territorial power in India, the Rajah, by our own formal recognition, had an inherent right to adopt a descendant, and our treaty with him is only an additional guarantee of that right.

And, as if to pour contempt upon all rights, the Court of Directors, in the first instance, and the Board of Control afterwards, actually sanction the strange assertion made by the Government abroad—made with a view to fortify our attack upon the principality of Sattara—that the usurping Minister of the Rajah of Sattara was the Suzerain of his own Sovereign—that as that Rajah would not have been permitted to adopt a son without the sanction of his Lord Paramount, the Peishwa—so we, as the successors of that Lord Paramount, had a right to refuse our sanction to his adoption. “This power, it is said,* “the British Government possesses by

* Par. Papers, p. 1, March, 1849, p. 71—81.

“ virtue of its authority, as the Sovereign State over
 “ Sattara, a position which it holds *equally* as suc-
 “ cessor of the Emperors of Delhi, and as the suc-
 “ cessors by conquest of the *Peishwas, the virtual*
 “ *Sovereigns of the Rajahs of Sattara,*” This was
 presuming with a vengeance upon the ignorance of
 Englishmen in the affairs of India; for every person
 of ordinary information in those affairs knows that
 the Peishwas, from the moment of their usur-
 pation, up to the latest period of their existence,
 recognized the Rajahs of Sattara as their Sovereigns.

Every one ordinarily instructed in those affairs
 knows, also, that the Emperors of Delhi recognized
 no Sovereignities in Hindostan but their own—that
 they refused the “royal title” to those who retained
 their independence as well as to those whom they had
 conquered; that they called them all Jagheerdars,
 Zemindars, and, in many instances, that they
 annexed the territories of the vanquished to their
 own dominions. It is freely admitted that as “con-
 querors of their conquerors,” we had full power to
 deal with our enemies as they did with their’s; we
 might, for example, have confiscated the whole
 territory of the Mahratta powers, after our successful
 contests with them in 1803 and in 1817, or we might
 have reduced Scindiah, Holkar, and the Rajah of
 Berar to the status of vassals, limiting their rights
 of succession as we pleased. But it pleased us to
 do otherwise, to maintain them as Sovereign

Princes—to treat with them as Sovereign Princes—and to bind ourselves to them, their heirs and successors by solemn treaties. We now claim a right not only of voiding our treaties with those who were once our enemies as “bad bargains,” but to trample upon the inherent rights, and to set aside treaties with those who have always been our bosom friends.

Not content with acquiring fresh territory by these means, we have already violated in one instance, and are seeking to violate in others our treaties with those whose territories we have long since taken. For example, in 1800, we extorted from the Nabob of Surat, who had been our faithful ally for nearly half a century, his territory, upon condition that we should pay to “him and to his heirs and successors” a specified portion of the revenues in perpetuity. Although the most solemn pledge was given by the gentleman* who negotiated the treaty on the part of the British Government, that that Government gave by its treaty “a security for an honourable provision to himself, his family, and descendants, from generation to generation, greater than they had ever yet had—that that Government had by that instrument become bound in perpetuity to the support of the Nabob and his family.” Yet, upon the death of the heir of this Nabob, without sons, the British Government

* See Par. Papers, No. 27, presented to the House of Commons, relating to East India affairs.

stopped payment, upon the plea that “heirs and successors in the treaty,” meant “heirs male” only, and that they were not bound to continue the provision to heirs female—viz. to the grand-daughter of the Prince with whom we had made the treaty.

What an example of “British faith” is this: We extorted the surrender of his inheritance from a friend, upon condition of paying a fixed annuity to his descendants from generation to generation; and at the second generation, we determined that a grand-daughter is not a descendant, refused to continue the payment, and reduced her to beggary, and this under a treaty which professes to have been made in order to strengthen and confirm a long existing friendship between the parties.

At every turn the question presents itself: ‘Are we bound by our treaties?’ and it becomes the more pressing as we are now urged to deal with other princely families, to whom we are bound by treaties, as we have done with the family of Surat.*

All these treaties are founded upon a *quid pro quo*—either for services rendered, or for territory surrendered, as examples: In 1802, we extorted from the infant Nabob of Arcot, his territory, upon con-

* Extract from treaty with Surat.

“Article I. The friendship subsisting between the Hon. East India Company and the Nabob of Surat, is hereby strengthened and confirmed.”

dition of paying to him and to his heirs, a fixed portion of its revenues, and a certain sum for the support of the families of his ancestors. It was under the shelter of the name of one of these ancestors, that we fought our battles with the French, and established our ascendancy in the Carnatic. And that ancestor was formally recognized as Sovereign of the Carnatic, by English and French, at the Peace of Paris in 1763. We now call the existing Prince "the descendant of a deputy Governor, established by ourselves"—and think it very hard that we have to pay him out of his *own* territory four times "as much as the Prince Consort of the United Kingdom."*

Mir Jaffier was our confederate against the infamous Suraja Dowlah, the Nabob of Bengal. In conformity with our engagements, we placed him upon the vacant Musnud after the battle of Plassy, and when we assumed charge of the territory, we stipulated by treaty to pay to him and his heirs a fixed sum out of the revenues, and this is now called, "an absurdly large pension to the descendants of Mir Jaffier, a temporary governor created by us."

In 1802 we seized upon the little principality of Tanjore, which had been for a century and a half in the family of the Rajah, binding ourselves by treaty to pay him a certain portion of its revenues; this is

* Campbell's Modern India, p. 154.

now said to be : “ an allowance to the descendants
“ of a petty military chief.”

Upon the conquest of Mysore in 1799, in order to facilitate the settlement of the country, we became guarantees to a treaty, by which the Rajah of Mysore bound himself to pay a certain sum in perpetuity for the support of the families of Hyder and Tippoo. We have since taken possession of Mysore, and are therefore become principals as well as guarantees to the treaty. This however is called “ an allowance to the descendants of an upstart
“ usurper, our bitterest enemy, who fought to the
“ last, and with whom no terms were made.”

This mention of Hyder Ali as an upstart usurper, in contradistinction, it is supposed, to the ancient and legitimate rule of the East India Company over India, brings with it some awkward recollections, for no fact is better established in history than this, viz. that Hyder’s “ bitter enmity” to us arose out of our breach of our solemn engagements with him, a breach which was as ungrateful as it was gross. In 1769 he dictated a treaty to us, at the gates of Madras, when he had us at his mercy, by which we engaged to assist him with a certain force whenever and by whomsoever he should be attacked. In 1773 he claimed the stipulated aid ; we evaded the demand ; he repeated it, and such was his anxiety to make his engagements with us a reality, that he offered to bribe us into a performance of these by

grants of money and territory ; and it was not until he had exhausted every effort to prevail upon us to fulfil the treaty that he denounced us as incorrigibly faithless ; threw himself into the arms of the French, and descended into the Carnatic with fire and sword.

The war which followed this invasion, was the parent of those which gave us the supremacy in India ; and now that Hyder's bitter enmity against us is sought to be made a pretext for robbing his descendants of what we have engaged to pay them, it is fitting, we should be reminded that we drove him who was anxious to be our friend, and who, in the judgment of those* who were competent to form an opinion, would have been a faithful ally, into hostility, because we refused to fulfil the obligations of a formal treaty. It was this contempt of treaties that induced Hyder to draw the sword against us ; and is not he, who wantonly provokes an aggression, as guilty as the aggressor ?

The name of the King of Delhi stands at the head of our pension list, and appended to it is this remark : “ the only pension, for the amount of “ which there is reasonable ground ; ” we may well say so, indeed, when we call to mind our dealings with the King of Delhi. To the uninstructed in these dealings, it must have appeared unaccountable, that the King Shah Aulum, when he was at the

* See Wilks' History of Mysore, vol. ii. chap. xxi. for an account of these transactions.

very lowest ebb of his fortunes, blind, aged, decrepit, a prisoner, steeped in poverty and misery, should have received the brilliant overtures which were made to him by Lord Wellesley in 1803, with something of mistrust. He was then an important political card, and Lord Wellesley offered him a munificent provision for himself and family, and a treatment in every respect corresponding to his rank and dignity, if he would throw himself upon the protection of the British Government. "Per-
 "haps they will forget their promises," was the significant remark which he made, when signifying his determination to accept the invitation. The poor old man carried his mind back half a century, when *they* had indeed forgotten their promises, by depriving him in the first instance of his territory, and afterwards of his revenue, his only means of support, both of which we had solemnly guaranteed to him by two separate treaties, in return for his munificent grant to us of an empire, which Clive said, would make the East India Company the richest corporation in the world.* The poor King was soon to have proof that there was ground for his mistrust; Lord Wellesley had promised to settle upon him and his descendants a territory round the city of Delhi, as a Crown domain, but before this cession could be made, he had

* The historians, Messrs. Mill and Thornton, agree in repro-
 bating these transactions.

ceased to be of any political importance; Lord Wellesley's successors, therefore, putting their own interpretation upon their predecessor's engagement, determined that it would be fulfilled by granting the King a stipend in money, very inferior in amount to what the domain would have produced; and not content with turning a deaf ear to the entreaties of his successors, that the obligation should be fulfilled in the sense in which the King was made to understand it,—the Government in India has more than once attempted to trench upon these limited rights.

But not content with withholding payment for territory which we have already taken from our allies, upon promise of payment, we now threaten to take what we have been paid for not taking. After having gradually increased our demands upon the Nabob of Oude for subsidy from twenty-five lacs of rupees to seventy-six lacs—after having extorted* from him in nine years thirty-four lacs per annum more than he was bound by treaty to pay us—after having saddled him with an enormous

* It appeared that during the nine years preceding 1787, the Nabob had paid to the Company, under different titles, at the rate of eighty-four lacs per annum, though by the treaty of 1775 he had bound himself to pay 31,21,000, and by that of 1781, 34,20,000. In other words, "unjustifiable extortions to the amount of thirty-four lacs per annum had been practised on that dependent Prince." Mill's History of India, vol. v. p. 316.

establishment,* and drained his territory of specie, we in 1801 coerced him into the surrender of more than one half of his dominions, in commutation of *all* demands upon him for “imperial purposes,” guaranteeing to him and to his posterity the remaining half. But in utter forgetfulness of that final bargain, we wheedled him out of more than two millions and a half sterling in 1815, and of another million and a half in 1825, when our own treasury was exhausted, and our credit at the lowest ebb.† These were called loans, and were repaid in a

* “The numbers, influence, and enormous amount of the salaries, pensions and emoluments of the Company’s service, civil and military, in the Vizier’s service, have become an intolerable burthen upon the revenue and authority of his Excellency, and exposed us to the envy and resentment of the whole country, by excluding the native servants and adherents of the Vizier from the rewards of their services and attachment.” Warren Hastings’ Life, vol. ii.

† “The Treasuries of the three Presidencies,” said Governor-General Lord Hastings, upon this occasion, “were in so unfurnished a condition, that the insufficiency of funds in them to meet any unusual charges—and many menaced us—excited considerable uneasiness. At that period the low credit of the bonds which had at different times been issued as the securities for monies borrowed, made eventual recurrence to a loan seriously discouraging in contemplation.”

“Luckily I was on such frank terms with the Nabob Vizier as that I could frankly explain to him my circumstances * * * * so that the Honourable Company was accommodated with above two and a half millions sterling, on my simple receipt.” Par. Pa. 1832. Public, p. 42.

manner that was little advantageous to the lender.* And it is this Prince, whose territory we have appropriated, and whose revenues have been poured with such unexampled profusion into our Exchequer, in times of need, that we now threaten with extinction because he “contributes nothing to the “expenses of the State.”

Are we then bound by our treaties? Yes—if there is advantage in keeping them. No—if there is advantage in breaking them. This is, in fact, our language. The opinion is pretty unanimous, that the misgovernment of the territories of Oude and Hydrabad, of which we hear so much, is owing to a system under which there is a pageant king, and a British resident, who is described by a Governor-General, † as more “than king;” as “clothed with a degree “of state equal to that of royalty itself, as acting “the part rather of a schoolmaster and dictator “than of the minister of a friendly power,” ex-

* “Of the two millions which his father had left, the king had lent one to Lord Hastings to carry on the Nepal war. For this he was to receive interest, but unfortunately for him, he accepted instead of all payment a grant of fresh territory under the Himalaya mountains, which is entirely unproductive, being either savage wilderness, or occupied by a race of mountaineers who pay no taxes without being compelled, and whom he has not the means of compelling” “He lent the British Government all the money that would have enabled him to ease the people of their burdens.”—Bishop Heber’s Travels, p. 81—87.

† Lord W. Bentinck, Minute, July 30, 1830.

exercising a jurisdiction “which is totally incompatible with the royal dignity and authority.” It was thought by the same Governor-General that it “would be for the comfort of the sovereign, for the advantage of good government, and for the real interests of both,” that the sovereign should be relieved from this “more than king;” but would not this be an infraction of the treaty was the question which occurred, and which overruled the proposed reform. But how easy to modify or cancel a treaty when both the parties agree to it; agree, that it is productive of nothing but mischief? “Had it not been for our connexion with Oude, although misrule might have attained as great a height, it would not have been of equal duration. It is the British Government which, by a systematic suppression of all attempts at resistance, has prolonged to the present time a state of disorganization, which can no where attain permanence, except where the shortsightedness and rapacity of a semi-barbarous Government, is armed with the military strength of a civilized one.”* We shall not scruple, when the opportunity offers, of seizing upon the territories of this prince in gross violation of our treaty, but we “strain at the gnat,” when it is proposed

* Despatch of Court of Directors to Government of India, 1st October, 1828. P. P. 1832, p. 468.

to modify that treaty so as to relieve the sovereign from the thraldom in which he is held, and the people from the oppression under which they labour.

It has been remarked by the historian, Mr. Mill,* that “several remarkable instances stand in our history of a sort of epidemical frenzy in abusing our enemies, that scarcely was Tippoo ever spoken of but under the description of a hideous monster, disfigured by almost every vice which renders human nature, in the exercise of power, an object of dread and abhorrence.” This wholesale defamation of the native princes is one of the engines we make use of for undermining their power, and of this we have a notable instance in the passage which follows.

“If, however, we turn our eyes to the present Mohammedan Kingdoms of India, and examine the character of the Princes and the condition of the people subject to their sway, we may fairly draw a parallel between ancient and modern times, under circumstances and relations nearly similar. We behold Kings even of our own creation sunk in sloth and debauchery, and emulating the vices of a Caligula† or a Com-

* History of India, vol. v. p. 457.

† When we bring impartial witnesses into the box, they give rather a different character of those so called “Caligulas and Commodi.”—See Appendix B.

“ modus. Under such rulers we cannot wonder
 “ that the fountains of justices are corrupted ; that
 “ the state revenues are never collected without
 “ violence and outrage ; that villages are burnt,
 “ and their inhabitants mutilated or sold into
 “ slavery ; that the officials, so far from affording
 “ protection, are themselves the chief robbers and
 “ usurpers ; that parasites and eunuchs revel in the
 “ spoil of plundered provinces, and that the poor
 “ find no redress against the oppressor’s wrong and
 “ proud man’s contumely. When we witness these
 “ scenes under our eyes, where the supremacy of
 “ the British Government, the benefit of its ex-
 “ ample, and the dread of its interference might
 “ be expected to operate as a check upon the pro-
 “ gress of misrule, can we be surprised that former
 “ Princes, when free from such restraints, should
 “ have studied still less to preserve the people com-
 “ mitted to their charge in wealth, peace, and
 “ prosperity.”* These are the words of the gen-
 tleman who stands at the Governor-General’s
 right hand, his political secretary and adviser.
 Can we wonder that that functionary, new to India,
 and immersed from the moment of his arrival in
 wars, and all that belong to wars, should receive
 this declamation for Gospel, and that his language

* Biographical Index to the Historians of Mohammedan India,
 by H. M. Elliot, Esq., Foreign Secretary to the Government of
 India.

should be, “away with such fellows from the face of the earth; let us pull down these Kings from the thrones we have given them; let us extinguish the Native States, that we may give good Government to the people.” It is so much easier, and so much pleasanter to receive this description of native rule as undoubted truth than to test it, that most Englishmen will take it for granted that the native rulers whom we now seek to uproot, are “Kings of our own creation,” and that we are dealing only justly in resuming gifts which have been so grossly abused. Not one in one hundred will take the trouble to inquire whether this character of the native sovereigns who preceded the kings of our creation, is warranted by authentic history, or whether it is directly opposed to it.* And as these princes cannot be heard in their own defence, it seems only just to inform the English reader that there are no Mahomedan Kings in India of our creation—that those here referred to were firmly established as Sovereign Princes long before we appeared upon the stage—that we restored two of the ancient princes of the country to the possessions of their ancestors, only to pull them down again at the first favourable moment†—that those whom we are now seeking to subvert were rooted as princes

* For the character of native sovereigns, and the state of India under their rule, see Appendix B.

† The Rajahs of Mysore and Sattara.

in the soil of Hindoostan when our ancestors were in the woods. We may also, with great propriety, on behalf of those Sovereigns who are the subjects of this “frenzy of abuse,” ask Englishmen to turn over the first pages of our own history in India, and judge for themselves whether anything is to be found in Mahommedan or Hindoo history more discreditable than the recital which follows:—

“The English,” says the historian of India, “were the first to draw the sword (in India) and from no higher inducement than the promise of a trifling settlement upon the Coromandel Coast. It was Shajee (a pretender to the throne of Tanjore) that first craved the assistance of the English; and it was after having corresponded for years with Pertaub Sing as King of Tanjore—after having offered him the friendship of the English nation, and after having courted his assistance against the French—that the English rulers now, without so much as a pretence of any provocation, and without the allegation of any other motive than the advantage of possessing Devicottah, despatched an army to dethrone him.” Our Governor’s letters to Pertaub Sing “were full of friendly professions;” we made two unsuccessful attacks on the place, when Pertaub Sing ceded it, with a territory round it, and we, on our “part, not only renounced the support of him for whom we had pretended to fight, as the true and lawful king, but agreed to secure his person, in order that he

“ might give no further molestation to Pertaub
 “ Sing. It is even asserted, that but for the hu-
 “ manity of Boscawen (our Admiral) the Shahjee
 “ would have been delivered into the hands of Per-
 “ taub Sing. He found means to make his escape
 “ from the English, who imprisoned his uncle, and
 “ kept him in confinement for nine years, till he
 “ was released by the French when they took Fort
 “ St. David in 1758.”*

It was probably a recollection of this precious morsel of history, amongst other such doings, that led Clive to declare, when he determined to apply to the Emperor Shah Aulum for the grant of the Dewanee of Bengal, that “ the Princes of India
 “ must conclude our views to be boundless ; they
 “ have seen such instances of our ambition, that
 “ they cannot suppose us capable of moderation.”
 “ I can only say,” he writes upon another occasion,
 “ that such a scene of anarchy, corruption, and ex-
 “ tortion, was never seen or heard of in any country
 “ but Bengal ; the three provinces of Bengal, Ba-
 “ har, and Orissa, producing a revenue of £3,000,000
 “ sterling, have been under the absolute manage-
 “ ment of the Company’s servants, ever since Meer
 “ Jaffier’s restoration to the Soohabship ; and they
 “ have, both civil and military, exacted and levied
 “ contributions from every man of power and con-

* See Dr. Wilson’s edition of Mill’s History. Dr. Wilson makes no comment upon this narrative ; we may regard it therefore as unimpeachable.

“sequence, from the Nabob down to the lowest
 “Zemindar. The trade has been carried on by
 “free merchants, acting as Gomantahs, to the Com-
 “pany’s servants, who, under the sanction of their
 “names, have committed actions, which make the
 “name of the English stink in the nostrils of a
 “Gentoo and a Mussulman, and the Company’s
 “servants have interfered with the revenues of the
 “Nabob, turned out and put in the officers of the
 “Government at their pleasure, and made every
 “one pay for their preferment.”

These were the “examples” which the British Government set to the Native Governments, when it entered upon the political stage of India. Had things mended in the space of twenty years? Warren Hastings’ account of our doings in Oude has been already recited. Hear him again upon our general conduct towards the Native Princes.

“I fear that our encroaching spirit, and the inso-
 “lence with which it has been exerted, has caused
 “our alliance to be as much dreaded by all the
 “powers of Hindostan, as our arms. Our encroach-
 “ing spirit, and the uncontrolled and even pro-
 “tected licentiousness of individuals have done
 “more injury to our national reputation, than our
 “arms and the credit of our strength have raised it.
 “Every power in India dreads a connexion with us,
 “which they see attended with such mortifying
 “humiliations, to those who have availed them-
 “selves of it.”

If such things do not occur now, it is because they have been made highly penal, and because we pay handsomely to prevent "bribery, corruption, and extortion." But were there not events in the Affghan war which should make every Englishman blush, and were not our doings in Scinde, as exposed only the other day by Lord Jocelyn in his place in the House of Commons, as foul as anything that ever was done by a native Government, and blacker still, when we consider them as the deeds of a Christian Government, and done in the middle of the 19th century;—deeds "known not "only in Scinde, but throughout Central Asia, not "confined to Mahomedan Asia; Central Africa "re-echoes this story of violence and wrong."*

These and many other such passages in our Indian history would be thrown in our teeth by the Native Princes, if they could be heard, and in answer to our confident boastings, that our territorial greatness has been thrust upon us, and that we have never been guilty of an aggressive war; they would point to the language of Clive and Hastings, and to the Affghan and Scinde wars.

Those founders of our empire—we may remark in passing—knew nothing of that "moderation," of which we hear so much at the present day, as the characteristic of our Indian rule. Events may have compelled us to enter upon wars, although no fact is better established in history than that the parent

* Lord Jocelyn's Speech, p. 23.

of the wars, which gave us supremacy over India, originated in our own gross breach of faith,* but events have not compelled us to despoil our friends, neither is acquisition of territory the necessary consequence of a just war.

It was not from motives of moderation, but from a carefully weighed policy, that Clive was induced to restore the Nabob of Oude to his dominions after the victory gained at Culpee in 1765. It was from the same motives that Lord Cornwallis was led to take only half of Tippoo's dominions and a ransom of three millions sterling, when he might have taken the whole, in 1792.

Was it "moderation" in Lord Wellesley when he took what remained of Tippoo's territory in 1799;† when he took what suited him of the territory of the Peishwah of Scindiah, and of the Rajah of Berar in 1803; or when he took all

* "But of what avail were treaties: of the treaty of 1769, they, the English, have broken every article." Hyder might have been rendered in the early part of his career, a firm and efficient ally of the English Government, and a clear view of his own interests would probably have rendered him faithful, if treated with fidelity. Hyder had just ground to complain of the English Government.

"He (Hyder) spoke very openly and without reserve, and said, "that the Europeans had broken their several engagements and "promises, but that, nevertheless, he was willing to live at peace." Wilks' History of Mysore, vol. ii. p. 125—375.

† Part was given to the Nizam, and part to the Rajah of Mysore, but all eventually fell into our hands.

the territory of some, and half the territory of others of his " friends and allies ?" We have it upon the authority of the great Duke, that the " demon of ambition " had got amongst the British authorities on that occasion, Lord Hastings most justly punished the foul perfidy of the Peishwah when he confiscated the whole of his dominions after the war of 1817, and most justly dethroned his ally, the Rajah of Berar, taking only a portion of his territory, and of the territory of Holkar ; and as he would have been warranted in taking the whole, we may say that he used his victory with moderation.

We took from the King of Burmah all the territory that we wanted, and made him pay as much as it was possible to extract from him.

We charged the Rajah of Mysore with misgovernment, and took possession of all his territory.

We came into collision with the Rajah of Coorg, and took all his territory.

We were turned out of Affghanistan in a hurry, and had no opportunity of acquiring territory.

We drove the Ameers of Scinde into hostilities, and punished them by taking all their territory.

It was from motives, political and financial, that we only took a portion of the Sikh territory in 1846 ; we took the whole in 1849, and in so doing did we not violate the most sacred obligations ? It is in the order of Providence that sons should suffer for the sins of their parents, wards for the misdoings of

their guardians ; and Dhuleep Sing, the infant Rajah of Lahore, fell under that general law when his guardians waged war with the British Government in 1845. But this is perhaps the first instance on record in which a guardian has visited his own misdeeds upon his ward. The British Government was the self-constituted guardian of the Rajah, and the regent of his kingdom ; a rebellion was provoked by the agents of the guardian, it was acknowledged by the guardian to be a rebellion against the government of his ward, and the guardian punished that ward by confiscating his dominions and his diamonds to his own use !

Do we find any proof of this alleged moderation and good faith, in the fact that in order to cover a demand of forty lacs which we had upon our ally the Nizam for subsidy, we took from him territory of the value of sixty lacs ? that having made a subsidiary treaty with him in 1800, by which we engaged to furnish him with* so many men for so much money, we in 1818, of our own *proprio motu*, turned that engagement into a “controlling treaty,” in order to furnish ourselves with a pretext for diminishing the stipulated number of men ; saddling him at the same time with the permanent maintenance of another body of troops, which he was bound by treaty to produce only in war, and now threatening him with confiscation of territory, because he has failed in the payment of this con-

* P.P. Pol. Appendix, 1832, p. 132.

tingent? Or do we find it in the fact, that having gradually raised our demands for subsidy upon our ally the Nabob of Oude from fifty to seventy lacs, we commuted our demands for territory estimated at the value of 135 lacs. The threatened annihilation of both those Princes, upon the ground that they contribute nothing to the public exchequer, makes it necessary that our previous dealings should be known—that we should know also the significant and melancholy fact, that the decline of both those states is to be dated from the moment that we became closely connected with them.* Do we then find any proof of this moderation in our proclaimed determination to seize upon all the territory that still remains in the hands of our allies? We assume to have a right to do this as the Lord Paramount of India; but the duty of a Lord Paramount is to protect, and we assume this title with a view to destroy. We are bound by treaties to “protect” the states, which we are now employed in annihilating.

We have seen that the Governor-General Lord Auckland solemnly decided that our treaties override our assumed prerogatives, and that the words, “heirs and successors,” in those treaties, cannot, by straining language to the utmost, be made to mean only “heirs by blood,” but that they give the parties with whom the treaties are made a clear right to adopt a successor; and now, as the warrant for our meditated spoliation, the Governor-

* P.P. Pol. Report, 1832, p. 107, and Appendix, p. 174.

General of the present day rules, that prerogatives over-ride treaties, that “heirs and successors” mean only heirs by blood, “and that the parties interested in the treaties have no right to adopt a successor;” nay, it is even proposed to regulate the rights of succession to Hindoo sovereignties by the English law of real property. “The proprietor of an entailed estate cannot,” it is said,* “adopt an heir “to the exclusion of the next in succession,” and therefore we have a right to seize upon sovereignties which were in existence as sovereignties long before the first Mussulman invasion of India, whenever the Sovereign may die without male heirs, as standing next in succession to an entailed estate.

And yet, if any one shall venture to say, that this is trifling with the most solemn obligations, or, borrowing the language of Clive and Hastings, shall venture to assert that we have given such proofs of ambition, that the princes of India cannot suppose us capable of moderation,—he is liable to be set down either as a hired advocate, or a man of dis-tempered mind. Nevertheless, as those against whom this aggression is meditated are not to be heard in their own defence—as the characters of all Native rulers and of all Native governments are systematically assailed, in order to reconcile the public mind to the meditated spoliation—it behoves those who love fair dealing to look back into history, in order to ascertain whether our pretensions

* Campbell's Modern India, p. 170.

to exemplary moderation and stubborn good faith rest upon any solid foundation: whether, rather, that be not true which has been asserted of us by high authority,* that we have “sometimes contracted engagements as if they were never to be fulfilled, and sometimes fulfilled them as if they had never been contracted”

We must remember that our own story is told by a hundred pens, and by a thousand tongues. A Resident complains that a Native State is misgoverned, and we displace the Native Governor without stopping to inquire whether the misgovernment has been produced by him or by a system under which there is one who, as Lord W. Bentinck tells us, is “more than King”—who is at once the King’s dictator and schoolmaster. Nay, if any one over whom we have power should venture to lift up his voice in the behalf of these Princes, and should dare to question the justice of our proceedings, his punishment is prompt and signal. Of this we have a striking example in the case of Captain Cunningham, who was dismissed from his political office ostensibly, because in writing his interesting History of the Sikhs, he had made use of the public records which were in his charge, but really because he had used these records—with permission as he thought—in support of his opinion, that we had done our best to provoke the Sikhs to

* The late Sir H. Russell. See P.P. Pol. Appendix, p. 139.

attack us, and that according to the law of nations they had a fair pretext for war. Unhappily, the voices which are raised in the Court of Directors on behalf of the Native Princes of India are not heard; because it is thought to be for the benefit of that great country that its ostensible governors should carry on their proceedings with closed doors—not only that there should be a secret department, in which a Minister of the Crown may rule a great empire in a mask—but that all the departments of the Government should be shrouded in secrecy.

Occasionally, however, through the medium of Parliamentary returns, their opinions ooze out; and it is satisfactory to find a section of the Directors echoing the opinions, long since given, by Clive and Warren Hastings, of Munro and Malcolm, Elphinstone and Metcalfe, against the policy of bringing the whole of India under our direct sway.

But there is another party deeply interested in this question, and that is the people of our own territory. The proposed annexation of the Native States is said to be that India may be the richest empire in the world, and its people the most lightly taxed; but we have seen, from the examples of Scinde, Sattara, and the Punjab, that while Revenue is the professed object, debt is the sure consequence of these spoliations; and it is upon the people of India that this debt falls. It is the British Govern-

ment which has entailed upon the people of India a national debt—the interest upon which, amounting to nearly two and a half millions per annum, presses so heavily upon our finances, as to make it necessary for us to fasten upon the people many most objectionable taxes, and prevents us from expending what we ought upon public works.* It is questionable, indeed, whether we have ever gained a shilling by exchanging tribute for territory. The Nabob of Oude, for instance, was bound to pay us a tribute of seventy-six lacs of rupees per annum, and in lieu of it we took a territory of the value of one hundred and thirty-five lacs.

By the papers, which were laid before Parliament in 1832, it appeared that in twenty years from the date of the cession, the revenue of that territory had declined at the rate of a lac of rupees a year, and we learn from the papers which have been recently produced, that the land revenue of the North West Provinces, which are made up of these cessions from Oude and conquests from Scindiah, is actually on the decline.† But the mere outturn of the revenue, by no means shews the real result. When we take territory, the European element is employed, in its administration,

* The little Rajpoot state of Mewar, which we are watching for an opportunity to absorb, spent more than a million sterling upon one work, the magnificent lake of Rajimunder, a larger sum than we spend for all India in a course of years.

† Appendix to report from Commons' Committee, p. 450.

and it is not only the high salaries which we pay to European agents, but the pensions, furloughs, allowances, &c. which they fall back upon, that eats up our finances. Of this we have a striking proof, in the fact, that the charge for pensions, &c. has increased within the last twenty years, from £400,000 to £600,000 per annum.

To say therefore that we take our neighbour's territory in order to lessen the taxation of our own subjects, is the greatest of delusions. All the native states, which we propose to extinguish, already contribute to the general defence of the empire, either in men or money.* If our real object is revenue we shall be sure to obtain it by increasing our demands upon them, for they will strain every nerve to satisfy those demands, rather than afford us a pretext for depriving them of their possessions.

We have now, it is said, "reached the natural limits of India, and have nothing to hope or fear from advance of our frontier. If we manage well and keep out of debt we are in no immediate danger of bankruptcy."† Hardly was the ink dry on this passage, than we managed to plunge into a new war, which, while it will carry our frontier nobody knows where, will assuredly add immensely to our debt, and if experience is to be our guide,

* Amount of Tribute . . . 1,06,54,891 rupees
 Military Resources . . . 398,918 men
 Contingent Forces . . . 36,311 „
 Campbell's Modern India, p. 417-18.

the easy remedy, by which it is proposed to relieve us, viz. the appropriation of the revenue of the native states—our allies—will assuredly aggravate the disease. “By incorporating Sattara with our “possessions, we shall increase the revenue of our “state,” said the Governor-General, in 1848. “We “certainly were not prepared to find that the annexation of Sattara would prove a drain upon the “general revenues of India,” says the Court of Directors in 1852. But unfortunately, whatever the effect of these appropriations may be upon the public treasury, it is invariably beneficial to a multitude of private exchequers. Whether Scinde, Sattara, or the Punjab, entail a deficit or produce a surplus, the allowances of those who administer them are punctually paid, and pensions are provided for them, whenever they choose to retire. Our private interests then are in conflict with the public interest; it is our interest as individuals to extend our dominions, even over rocks and deserts, it is our public interest to take no territory that will not yield us a clear net revenue.

Is it matter of wonder then that we should look with an “eye of covetousness” upon the state of Oude, which embraces 25,000 square miles of the finest territory in India, or upon the state of Hyderabad, which is four times as large; that public servants in India should paint the sovereigns of those states in dark colours, and in order to make all native rule odious, that English readers should be led to

believe, that even the great Acbar and his immediate successors were no better than Caligulas and Commodi ?

It is not, however, only for purposes of revenue, but that we may give the people the benefit of our institutions, that we propose to extend British rule over the Native States.* The people, if we were to consult them, might perhaps tell us that they preferred the native government even of a Caligula, with its risks and prizes, to our theoretically good government, with its securities and its blanks ; theoretically good, for its practical working is thus graphically described by a weighty authority :—

“ We seem to have accomplished a revolution in
 “ the state of society, which has by some unexpected
 “ fatality proved detrimental to general morals, and
 “ by no means conducive to the convenience of our
 “ Government. Since the first establishment of a
 “ Zilla Court in the year 1780, and from the regular
 “ organization of them in the year 1793, a new

* I cannot conceive it possible for any one to dispute the policy of taking advantage of every just opportunity which presents itself for consolidating the territories that already belong to us, by taking possession of states which may lapse in the midst of them ; for thus getting rid of these petty intervening principalities, which may be made a means of annoyance, but which can never, I venture to think, be a source of strength, for adding to the resources of the public treasury, and for *extending the uniform application of our system of government to those whose best interests we sincerely believe will be promoted thereby.*—*P.P., March 1850, p. 80.*

“ progeny has grown up under our hand, and the
 “ principal features which shew themselves in a
 “ generation thus formed beneath the shade of our
 “ regulations, are a spirit of litigation which our
 “ judicial establishments cannot meet, and a morality
 “ certainly much deteriorated.

“ If in the system, or the practical execution of
 “ it, we should be found to have relaxed many ties
 “ of moral or religious restraint on the conduct of
 “ individuals—to have destroyed the influence of
 “ former institutions, without substituting any check
 “ in their place—to have given loose to the most
 “ froward passions of human nature, and dissolved
 “ the wholesome controul of public opinion and
 “ private censure, we shall be forced to ac-
 “ knowledge that our regulations have been pro-
 “ ductive of a state of things which imperiously
 “ calls on us to provide an immediate remedy for
 “ so serious a mischief.”*

This is not the language of a jaundiced witness, but of a Governor-General,† pronouncing *ex cathedra* a reluctant judgment upon the effect of our institutions. Such as they were then, such they are now; and the people of the Native States, upon whom we wish to impose them, may join in the aspiration of a subject of the King of Oude, who, when asked by Bishop Heber whether he wished

* Parliamentary Papers, East India Affairs, p. 157.

† Lord Hastings.

to become a subject of the British Government, exclaimed, "Of all misfortunes, keep me from that." So fearful indeed were all the Native States of having the yoke of "our institutions" imposed upon them, that their exemption from it was made an express stipulation in all our treaties.

In its determination to confiscate all the Native States when an opportunity offers, the Conservative British Government has entered upon a revolutionary course, unexampled, perhaps, in history. With the ancient Native sovereignties* will fall all that remains of territorial and official aristocracy in India, and the whole native population will, by degrees, be reduced to a dead level, and the effect of the wholesale breach of treaties by which this melancholy change is to be effected, will there-

* "The Rana of Mewar still possesses nearly the same extent of territory which his ancestors held when the conqueror of Ghuzni first crossed the blue waters of the Indus to invade India, while the other families now ruling in the north-west of Rajahstan, are the relics of ancient dynasties driven from their pristine seats of power, or their junior branches who have erected their own fortunes; this circumstance adds to the dignity of the Ranas, and is the cause of the homage they receive, notwithstanding the diminution of their power. Though we cannot give the Princes of Mewar an ancestor in the Persian Nawrashan, nor assert so confidently, as Sir T. Roe, his claims to descent from the celebrated Poirus, the opponent of Alexander, we can carry him into regions of antiquity more remote than the Persian, and which would satisfy the most fastidious in respect of ancestry. Tod's Annals of Rajhistan, vol. i. p. 212.

fore be to impoverish and to degrade the people, and to alienate their affections from British rule.

We propose, indeed, to take every thing and to give nothing. “The native governments,” said Sir Thomas Munro,* “had a class of richer gentry, “composed of Jagheardars and Emendars, and of “all the higher civil and military offices. These, “with the principal merchants and ryots, formed “a large body, wealthy, or at least easy in their “circumstances. The Jagheers and Enams of one “prince were often resumed by another, and the civil “and military officers were liable to frequent removal; “but as they were replaced by others, and as new “Jagheers and new Enams were replaced by others, “and as new Jagheers and Enams were granted to “new claimants, these changes had the effect of “continually throwing into the country a supply of “men, whose wealth enabled them to encourage “its cultivation and manufactures. These advan- “tages have almost entirely ceased under our go- “vernment. All the civil and military offices of “any importance are now held by Europeans, “whose savings go to their own country, and the “Jagheers and Enams which are resumed, or which “lapse to government only in a very small degree.” And yet while pursuing a system, the tendency of which is to lower the character of a whole people, we profess to be extremely anxious to improve that

* Life, volume iii.

character by education. "Our present system of government," says the same sagacious observer,* "by excluding all natives from power, and trust, and emolument, is much more effectual in depressing than all our laws and school books can do in elevating their character. We are working against our own designs, and we can expect to make no progress while we work with a feeble instrument to improve, and a powerful one to deteriorate."

"No conceit more wild and absurd than this was ever engendered in the darkest ages; for what is in every age and every country the great stimulus to the pursuit of knowledge, but the prospect of fame, or wealth, or power, or what is even the use of great attainments, if they are not to be devoted to their noblest purpose, the service of the community, by employing those who possess them, according to their respective qualifications in the various duties of the public administration of the country. How can we expect that the Hindoos will be eager in the pursuit of science unless they have the same inducements as in other countries? If superior acquirements do not open the road to distinction, it is idle to suppose that the Hindoo would lose his time in seeking them; and even if he did so, his proficiency, under the doctrine of exclusion from

“ office, would serve no other purpose than to shew
 “ him more clearly the fallen state of himself and
 “ his countrymen. He would not study what he
 “ knew could be of no ultimate benefit to himself,
 “ he would learn only those things which were in
 “ demand, and which were likely to be useful
 “ to him; namely, writing and accounts. There
 “ might be some exceptions, but they would
 “ be few; some few natives living at the principal
 “ settlements, and passing much of their time among
 “ Europeans, might either from a real love of lite-
 “ rature, from vanity, or some other cause, study
 “ their books; and if they made some progress, it
 “ would be greatly exaggerated, and would be
 “ hailed as the dawn of the great day of light
 “ and science about to be spread all over India.
 “ But there always has been, and always will be a
 “ few such men among the natives, without making
 “ any change in the body of the people. Our books
 “ alone will do little or nothing; dry simple litera-
 “ ture will never improve the character of a nation.
 “ To produce this effect, it must open the road to
 “ wealth, and honour, and public employment.
 “ Without the prospect of such reward, no attain-
 “ ments in science will ever raise the character of a
 “ people.”

In the quarter of a century which has elapsed
 since this passage was written we have been steadily
 at work in narrowing this road to “wealth and
 honour,” and we are now employed in blocking it

up altogether. Not content with proclaiming our intention to exclude them from every high office in our own territory, till they are "christianised and civilized;" not content with confiscating the Jagheers and Emans which have been granted to natives by former Governments, we have now marked whole sovereignties for our prey, and this that we may open fresh fields of employment for our own countrymen. Five native states have fallen within the last ten years. If we put on one side of the account what the natives have gained by the few offices that have been lately opened to them, with what they have lost by the extermination of these states, we shall find the net loss to be immense, and what the native loses the Englishman gains. Upon the extermination of a native state, the Englishman takes the place of the sovereign, under the name of Commissioner; three or four of his associates displace as many dozen of the native official aristocracy; while some hundreds of our troops take the place of the many thousands that every native chief supports. The little court disappears—trade languishes—the capital decays—the people are impoverished—the Englishman flourishes, and acts like a sponge, drawing up riches from the banks of the Ganges, and squeezing them down upon the banks of the Thames.

Whether this system is to go on—whether our proclaimed intention of absorbing all the native states is to be carried out—whether the aggressive

policy of the present ruler of India, and of those in the Court of Directors who support him, is to be sustained—or whether the conservative policy which has been so strongly recommended by all eminent Indian statesmen, headed by the great Duke, and advocated by another party in the Court, is to be re-established, depends entirely upon the new President of the Board of Control, who, for the benefit of India, is called, like the majority of his immediate predecessors, to exercise despotic authority over that great empire, with a total unpreparedness for such a high function.*

Before he decides upon this important question, therefore, it may be as well to call his attention to another important phasis of it.

Aurunzebe undermined the foundations of the Mogul empire by attacking the religion of the great mass of his subjects. Next to attacks upon his religion, the Hindoo is most sensitive to attacks upon his ancestral rights; and in refusing to recognise the right of a Hindoo prince to adopt a successor, in order that his inheritance may lapse to us, we are striking a deadly blow at both, and striking that blow in the most offensive manner; viz., by declaring that those who have been sovereign princes

* Seven Presidents of the Board of Control in ten years; five of whom had never given a thought to India, until they were called to the chair. What an irresistible argument for the appointment of a permanent Council to check and advise the man who is intrusted with such enormous power.

from a remote age—who have been recognised as such by all dynasties, and specially by ourselves in our treaties—are only our vassals, and that we have a right to deal with them as such. We first degrade, in order that we may have a right to injure them.

Can we thus insult a high-spirited people with impunity? The disunion amongst the princes and classes of India has always been a source of our strength; but by the blow which we are now aiming at their rights and at their independence, we are offering Hindoos and Mussulmen, Mahrattas and Rajpoots, encouragement to combine against us. Whether the Rajpoot states shall be a tower of defence, or a source of imminent danger, depends entirely upon the way with which we deal with the question, “Are we bound by our treaties?”

It has been remarked by the highest authority* in everything that respects these states, that “danger both external and internal is inseparably connected with Rajpootana; and according to the policy we pursue towards this cluster of petty sovereignties, will its amount be increased or diminished. If the spirit of the treaties be upheld, it is no exaggeration to say that, within a few years of prosperity, we could oppose to any enemy upon this one only vulnerable frontier at

* Colonel Tod, P.P. 1832, Appendix, p. 80.

“ least 50,000 Rajpoots, headed by their respective
 “ princes, who would die in our defence. This is
 “ asserted from a thorough knowledge of their cha-
 “ racter and history. The Rajpoots want no change ;
 “ they only desire the recognition and inviolability
 “ of their independence ; but we must bear in
 “ mind that mere parchment obligations are good
 “ for little in the hour of danger. It is for others
 “ to decide whether they will sap the foundation of
 “ rule by a passive indifference to the feelings of
 “ race ; or whether, by acts of kindness, generosity,
 “ and politic forbearance, they will ensure the ex-
 “ ertion of all their moral and physical energies in
 “ one common cause with us.”

Shall we then make fast friends of this high-
 spirited and warlike race, by upholding our treaties,
 and respecting their independence, or shall we make
 them our deadly enemies, by violating both ? And
 in weighing this question, we must remember that in
 order to keep India at all, we are obliged to hold it
 by a strong military grasp ; that our chief military
 instrument is the sepoy ; and that a very large
 portion of the Bengal and Bombay armies are Raj-
 poots, whose feelings of clanship are as strong as
 those of Highlanders, and who still retain a lively
 recollection of the ancient grandeur of their race.
 If we sap the foundation of our rule by acts of in-
 justice to the Rajpoot princes, we shall surely awake
 a sympathy for them in the hearts of a large part
 of the native army ; and the greatest of Indian au-

thorities has told us what the consequence will be, whenever our native army is roused to a sense of its own strength.* Wages are rapidly rising; and the time may come when we may find it difficult, pay what we will, to provide the 50,000 Europeans who are required for the service of India, and to them we could alone look for the preservation of our power—if the native army should at any time be induced to hesitate in its allegiance. But as the Mogul Empire was easily overturned when once the Hindoo mind was alienated from its rulers, so ours would soon fall if we were to endeavour to govern by physical force alone, that force being a foreign army. For the natives, whatever we may think, “are not held in subjection by any opinion that we “are wiser or better than they are, or that we “govern them better than they would be governed “by one of their own colour and religion. Our “strength consists not in any mysterious or unseen “force, but in an organised government and a well “officered army.” Alienate the affections of the army and our empire totters to its fall.

But no such catastrophe is to be apprehended if the British public and the British Parliament should say yes, to the question which has been propounded, “Are we bound by our treaties?” Fortunately no reading of Blue-books, no particular Indian knowledge is necessary to enable them

* See Appendix.

thoroughly to understand it. Its merits lie in a small compass, and may be stated thus.

It is the religious duty of Hindoo princes to adopt an heir, in failure of heirs of their own body. Hindoo dynasties have been perpetuated from generation to generation, through a long course of ages by the exercise of this right.

This right was formally recognised by the British Government in 1825, and recognised fifteen successive times between the years 1825 and 1848.

An attempt was made in 1841 to question it, which was nipt in the bud, as we have seen by the Governor-General Lord Auckland, who declared the right to be "unquestionable," and that no rights which we might assume as successors of the Mogul Emperors, could void our treaties; and in 1841, the British Government intimated its wish "that all the sovereign princes of India who had no issue should name their successors during their lifetime."

This is the case of the sovereign princes of India, so far as it rests upon their inherent rights.

With all these princes we have entered into treaties—the language of these treaties varies but little, with some it runs thus—"There shall be perpetual friendship, alliance, and amity of interests between the two States from generation to generation."*

* Treaty with the Rajah of Kerowlee, 9th Nov. 1818.

Or thus, “ There shall be perpetual friendship, alliance, and unity of interest between the British Government on the one hand and Moha Rao Omed Sing, and his heirs and successors on the other.”

When the British Government cedes territory, or when territory is ceded to it, the language of the treaties is a cession in “ perpetual Sovereignty.” As examples : By treaty concluded between the British Government, the Peishwah, and the Nizam, on the 28th April, 1804, the province of Cuttack is ceded “ in perpetual sovereignty to the East India Company.”

The territory to the westward of the river Windah, is ceded to the Nizam “ in perpetual sovereignty.”

The fort and city and territory of Ahmednugur is ceded to the Peishwah “ in perpetual sovereignty.”

The territory within the Doab is ceded to the Company “ in perpetual sovereignty.”

By a treaty concluded with the Rajah of Sattara in 1819, the British Government ceded certain districts to the Rajah of Sattara, “ his heirs and successors in perpetual sovereignty.”

Now if Her Majesty wished to create a title which should never die, or if Parliament intended to confer a grant in perpetuity—what more appropriate, or what more comprehensive terms for the accomplishment of the objects could be used than

“ heirs and successors,” “ descendants from generation to generation in perpetuity;” and strong and unmistakeable as such terms would be in an English grant, they are, if possible, stronger when the grant is made to an Indian Prince, whose duty it is to adopt an heir, if he has none of his body, and who can never therefore, except from his own default, want for heirs.

Shall we, then, agree with the present Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie, and say that in a treaty with an Indian prince, the terms, “ heirs and successors,” must be taken in their ordinary sense, as limiting the grant to “ heirs male of the body ? ” or shall we agree with his predecessor, Lord Auckland, and say, that the words must be taken in their ordinary sense, and that by no strain of language can this be made to mean merely “ heirs male of the body ? ”

We shall certainly agree with both the Noble Lords that the words must be “ read in their ordinary sense, in the sense in which they are employed in *other treaties between states*.”* “ Upon words so distinct and positive as these (heirs and successors),” said Lord Auckland, in commenting upon our treaty with the Rajah of Oomba, “ I hold it to be impossible to raise a question.” The sense in which one Noble Lord read them, was, that they went beyond “ heirs male of the body ; ” and they gave the Rajah an understood right to adopt a suc-

* P. P. March 1, p. 82.

cessor ; by the other Noble Lord, that they limited the succession to heirs male of the body, and debarred him from the right of adoption. If the ordinary reading of " heirs and successors, in treaties with other states," be as Lord Dalhousie says it is, " heirs male of the body," then the treaties made by other states with her Majesty's ancestors are no longer binding ; then are the treaties made by her Majesty's ancestors with the sovereigns of Spain no longer in force, for heirs female, according to this interpretation, do not come within the category of heirs and successors.

Will the British Parliament and the British public, then, permit the Government of India thus to torture the plain language of treaties, and to insult our common sense, in order that they may, as opportunity offers, rob the princes of India of their rights, and of their kingdoms ?

It is " only in this way we are told that we can " hope gradually to extinguish the native states " which consume so large a portion of the revenue " of the country."* With the view to the accomplishment of this object, shall the Indian Government be permitted to say that when they *receive* territory in perpetuity from an Indian prince ; the cession is in reality what it is in name—a cession—for ever ; and that when that government *grants* a territory in perpetuity to a native prince, his heirs and successors, the grant shall cease at our plea-

* Campbell's Modern India, p. 170.

sure; that when we, by treaty, guarantee the territory of a native prince to himself, from generation to generation, we are loosed from our engagement whenever a prince may die without heirs male of his body?

Three hundred princes and chiefs, to whom we have dictated our treaties, wait with trembling anxiety an answer to this question. They want to know whether their posterity are to be what their ancestors have been, Princes; or whether, under the "benign" British Government, they are to become pensioners first, and beggars afterwards. Is that "benign" government, which boasts so much of its conservative principles, to be permitted to revolutionize Hindoostan, after this fashion to root out of the land all the princes and all that remains of its ancient aristocracy—an aristocracy that, with few exceptions, has existed from time out of mind?

If the British Parliament and the British public should say "such things shall not be," there is a still more pinching question behind—will they order what has been already taken unjustly to be restored?

In 1839 we dethroned the first Rajah of Sattara, upon the strength of evidence which we would not permit him to see.

In 1843 we seized upon a large territory from the Ameers of Scinde, upon the strength of certain letters, which we would not permit them to see.

In the years 1845 and 1848 we took up our trea-

ties with the second Rajah of Sattara, with the Chiefs of Cabala and of Mandavie, and determined that a cession in perpetuity and guarantees to heirs and successors meant only pledges to "heirs male of the body," and, while professing an earnest desire to do no injustice, sternly refused to hear those who it was said could, if heard, have sustained their rights against us in any court of justice.

And, lastly, having driven the officers of our ward, the infant Rajah of Lahore, into rebellion, when the country was under our uncontrolled rule, as regent and guardian, we punished our ward by the confiscation of his territory to our own use! Shall we then hold fast these possessions, or shall we imitate one bright example that our Indian annals afford us, and restore what we ought never to have taken. In 1782 we were the means of depriving a Rajah of Tanjore of his rights; many years afterwards we discovered our error, and in redressing it used the following noble language:—

"Adverting to the right of the Company to interfere originally with respect to the succession of Tanjore, it is observed, that the same right called upon them, under existing circumstances, to review the whole subject; and that if it should appear that the decision of Government had been procured by imposition and intrigue, by which the legal heir had been deprived of his rights, a declaration to that effect, followed by his restitu-

“ tion, would be more honourable to British justice,
 “ and more calculated to promote our political
 “ character and interests than to suffer the con-
 “ tinuance of an imposition obtained at our hands
 “ by sinister and undue means. It would manifest
 “ to the world that the principle of British justice
 “ is ever true to itself, and that if those intrusted
 “ with its administration should be betrayed into
 “ error (an event not impossible even from the in-
 “ tegrity of their own minds), when truth shall
 “ have made its way, the hour of retribution must
 “ come, and the honour of the British name be
 “ completely vindicated.”

We have seen that these ill-gotten possessions
 entail a heavy loss upon our Exchequer; that
 instead of receiving aid from them, our own subjects
 are taxed to make good their deficits. It may be
 convenient for us to say, that we can never recede
 with safety, however unjustly we may have ad-
 vanced; but it is not true. We recede when it
 suits us, as we did in 1806, when, having got into
 what was considered at the time an awkward posi-
 tion, we abandoned it, tore up our treaties without
 the least scruple, and left our friends at the mercy
 of their enemies.

If then, with these facts before us, and upon
 full proof of the injustice that has been done, we
 should refuse to follow the example that has been
 adduced, and redress it, the verdict against us must
 be, that in matters oriental this nation has no con-

science, and that it is not a follower of him who said—

“ I would sacrifice Gwallior, and every frontier
“ of India ten times over, rather than violate British
“ good faith.”

APPENDIX A.

Letter addressed to the Most Noble the Marquis of Dalhousie, Governor-General of India, &c., on the sovereign Rights of the Princes of India, in 1850.

MY LORD,—In your Lordship's minute of the 30th August, 1848, in which you assign your reasons for refusing to recognise the adopted son of Appa Sahib, late Rajah of Sattara, as his successor in that principality, you assert it "to be established as a general rule, beyond cavil or doubt, that while adoption by a prince of any individual is valid so far as to constitute him heir to the adopter's private possessions, it is of no power or effect whatever in constituting him heir to the principality, or to sovereign rights, until the adoption so made has received the sanction of the sovereign power, with whom it rests to give or to refuse it." And your Lordship states, that it was exclusively from the papers then before you—that is, upon the minutes of the members of the Bombay Government—that you came to that conclusion.

Now, the principle thus announced by your Lordship is of the highest importance, not merely because it constitutes the foundation of your resolution regarding the unhappy Sattara dynasty, but far more, because, if maintained, it will necessarily lead you to a similar decision as to the numerous principalities of central India—a decision, I confidently assert, utterly at variance with justice and good faith, fatal to the moral strength of the British name, rendering the most solemn treaties of the East India Company a snare and a mockery, and justifying, if it do not occasion, among many millions of a brave and warlike people, a feeling wholly destructive of all security for the peace, not to say the existence, of our Indian empire. You adopted this principle, while yet new to Indian affairs, exclusively on the authority of those on whose judgment you might then not unnaturally rely, but of whose qualifications to advise the supreme Government in such a case,

you now doubtless are more accurately informed, since it seems probable that the immediate pressure of current business, that admitted no delay, may have prevented that careful research into the subject which you would otherwise have directed. But, above all, since your Lordship can no longer be ignorant, that the rule which you consider to be established beyond "all cavil or doubt," is in direct conflict with the deliberate and often-reiterated judgment of your predecessors, I feel that, humble as I am, I need offer no apology for thus publicly calling upon you carefully and candidly to revise the conclusion which you have so unhappily and (with all respect I must say it) incautiously adopted.

I make this call with the more confidence, because in the minute to which I have referred, while grievously mistaking the real merits of the question before you, you nevertheless announced the wholesome general principle, that "the British Government is bound in duty as well as policy to act on every occasion of acquiring territory or revenue, with the purest integrity and with the most scrupulous observance of good faith, and that where even a shadow of doubt can be shewn, the claim should at once be abandoned;" and I will not insult you by questioning for a moment the good faith in which this avowal was made, however much I may feel astonished that it should find a place in such a document, and however strongly it may evince, that the fairest intentions and the highest talents may fail to secure their possessor from being guilty of gross injustice when combined with despotic power. But, accepting this declaration in its plain and simple meaning, and utterly rejecting the notion that it can be a mere cover for designs of violence and spoliation, I entreat your Lordship to observe that the papers which have lately been printed by order of the House of Commons, demonstrate, in the clearest manner, that the rule which your predecessors pronounced to have been established "beyond all cavil or doubt," and upon which they repeatedly acted, was, that *every* Sovereign Prince in India has an inherent right to adopt a successor to his sovereign rights, and that the British Government is as much bound to recognise such right, as a judge is bound to enforce the law, without any, the slightest pretence to the power of arbitrarily withholding the right which it confers upon

those who sue for its protection. You will accordingly find that, in conformity with this rule, your predecessors, Lord Amherst, Lords W. Bentinck, Auckland, and Metcalfe, recognised, between the years 1826 and 1846, seven adoptions made by reigning Sovereign Princes, and seven made either by the widows or mothers of deceased princes. Furthermore, in one instance, where there was an entire failure of heirs, a succession made by election of the chiefs and people of the State, was instantly recognised, in accordance with a rule which had been laid down by Lord Metcalfe in October, 1837, and adopted by the Government of India of that day, viz., "That where there is a total failure of heirs, it is probably more consistent with right that the people should elect a Sovereign, than that the principality should lapse to the Paramount state, that state, in fact, having no rights in such a case but what it assumes by virtue of its power."

The same papers will shew your Lordship that all pretensions to deal with the Native Princes and Chiefs of India, by virtue of certain powers which your Lordship, in your judgment upon the Sattara adoption, assumed to have devolved upon the British Government, as successors of the emperors of Delhi, had been formally abandoned by your predecessors, and that it had been ruled by them, with the sanction of the Home Authorities, that in all our dealings with these princes, "we are to look only to the terms and spirit of our treaties and engagements which we have formed with them, and bring forward no other demand than such as in reference to those engagements may be indisputably consistent with good faith." And that when a question arose as to the sense in which the words "heirs and successors" should be interpreted in our treaty with the Rajah of Orcha, Lord Auckland at once determined it to mean "heirs by adoption," as well as "heirs natural," observing, that "upon words so distinct and positive, it was impossible to raise a question." Thus construing that treaty, and all other treaties similarly worded, in the teeth of the construction which your Lordship put upon the same words in the treaty with Sattara, where you determined that the words "heirs and successors must be read in their ordinary sense, in the sense in which they are employed in other treaties between states, that is, as meaning only 'heirs natural.'" The same

papers will shew your Lordship the serious error into which you fell, in assuming that the Rajah of Sattara had "obtained larger powers in respect of adoption than are enjoyed by old established states," the right which he claimed being precisely the same that had been invariably recognized to all other Sovereign Princes, viz., the right to adopt a successor to his royal rights, in failure of heirs of his body—a right which, strange to say, is unequivocally admitted in the papers which authorized you to confiscate the principality of Sattara, upon the ground that the Rajah had no such right: "for," says the minute which bears the signature of a majority of the Court of Directors, by whose vote that measure was carried, "it is freely admitted that if the Rajah were created a sovereign in the ordinary acceptation of the term, he was unquestionably competent to adopt a successor to his royal rights, as well as an heir to his private estate." The conclusion, I leave it to your Lordship to draw, seeing that you have unequivocally admitted that the late Rajah was such a sovereign as is contemplated in that paper; for in the very first paragraph of your Lordship's minute you designated him, with great truth and propriety, as an independent Sovereign. Recurring, then, to your Lordship's frank avowal, that no claim to territory or revenue ought to be enforced, of which the validity is doubtful, I venture to ask your Lordship, whether, with the proof now before you, that your confiscation of the principality of Sattara was in the teeth of the law and custom of India, as laid down and repeatedly acted upon by your predecessors, in accordance, I believe, with the judgment of every officer entitled to pronounce an opinion on the subject—amongst them, that distinguished man, Mr. M. Elphinstone, who framed the original treaty with the Rajah.—I venture, I say, humbly, but firmly to ask, whether your Lordship can honestly maintain that territory and revenue so acquired can be retained, consistently with that "pure integrity, and scrupulous good faith," which you say should characterise all the dealings of the British Government with the Princes of India?

I have the honour to be,

With great respect,

Your Lordship's most obedient servant,

JOHN SULLIVAN.

ON THE IMPOLICY OF SUBVERTING THE NATIVE
STATES OF INDIA.

The Duke of Wellington.

“ In my opinion, the extension of our territory and influence has been greater than our means. Besides, we have added to the number and description of our enemies, by depriving of employment those who heretofore found it in the service of Tippoo and of the Nizam. Wherever we spread ourselves, particularly if we aggrandize ourselves at the expense of the Mahrattas, we increase this evil ; we throw out of employment and means of subsistence all who have hitherto managed the revenue, commanded, or served, in the armies, or have plundered the country. These people become additional enemies, at the same time that by the extension of our territory, our means of supporting our government and of defending ourselves are proportionally decreased.” *

Sir Thomas Munro.

“ Even if all India could be brought under the British dominion, it is very questionable whether such a change, either as it regards the natives or ourselves, ought to be desired. One effect of such a conquest would be that the Indian army, having no longer any warlike neighbours to combat, would gradually lose its military habits and discipline, and that the native troops would have leisure to feel their own strength, and for want of other employment to turn it against their European masters. But even if we could be secured against every internal commotion, and could retain the country quietly in subjection, I doubt much *if the condition of the people would be better than under their native Princes*. The strength of the British government enables it to put down every rebellion, to repel every foreign invasion, and to give to its subjects a degree of protection which those of no native power enjoy. Its laws and institutions also afford them a security from domestic oppression unknown in those states ; but these advantages are dearly bought. They are purchased by the sacrifice of

* Life of Sir Thomas Munro, vol. 1. p 266.

independence, of national character, and of whatever renders a people respectable. The natives of the British provinces may, without fear, pursue their different occupations, as traders, meerassadars, or husbandmen, and enjoy the fruits of their labour in tranquillity; but none of them can aspire to anything beyond this mere animal state of thriving in peace: none of them can look forward to any share in the legislation, or civil, or military government of their country. It is from men who either hold, or who are eligible, to public office, that natives take their character; where no such men exist, there can be no energy in any other class of the community. The effect of this state of things is observable in all the British provinces, whose inhabitants are certainly the most *abject race* in India. No elevation of character can be expected among men, who, in the military line, cannot attain to any rank above that of Subahdar (captain), where they are as much below an (English) Ensign as an Ensign is below the Commander-in-Chief; and who in the civil line can hope for nothing beyond some petty, judicial, or revenue office, in which they may by corrupt means make up for their slender salary. The consequence, therefore, of the conquest of India by the British arms would be, in place of raising, *to debase the whole people*. There is, perhaps, no example of any conquest, in which the natives have been so completely excluded from all share of the government of their country as British India. Among all the disorders of the native States, the field is open for every man to raise himself, and hence among them, there is a spirit of emulation, of restless enterprise, and independence, far preferable to the servility of our Indian subjects. The existence of independent native States is also useful in drawing off the turbulent and disaffected among our native troops.*

Sir John Malcolm.

“I am decidedly of opinion that the tranquillity, not to say *the security of our vast Oriental possessions is involved in the preservation of the native principalities which are dependent upon us for protection*. These are also so obviously at our mercy, so entirely within our grasp,

* Life of Sir Thomas Munro, vol. II. p. 465.

that besides the other and great benefits which we derive from those alliances, their co-existence with our rule is of itself a *source of political strength, the value of which will never be known till it is lost.* They shew the possibility of a native state subsisting even in the heart of our own territories, and their condition mitigates in some degree the bad effects of that too general impression, that our sovereignty is incompatible with the maintenance of native Princes and Chiefs. I shall not stop in this place to examine into the truth or otherwise of the notion, that we have sought occasion to reduce our allies to the condition of stipendiaries, after having made use of them to serve our own purposes. It is in many cases untrue, and in all exaggerated; but it is very general, and forms one of the most leading, most plausible, and most popular grounds of combination against our power. This I have had ample opportunities of knowing to be a fact; and I am further convinced, that though our revenue may increase, *the permanence of our power will be hazarded in proportion as the territories of native Princes and Chiefs fall under our direct rule.* Considering as I do, from all my experience, that it is our policy to maintain as long as we can all Native States now existing, and through them, and by other means to support and maintain native Chiefs and an Aristocracy throughout the empire of India; I do think *that every means should be used to avert* what I should consider as one of the greatest calamities, in a political point of view, that could arise to our empire, viz. the whole of India becoming subject to our direct rule. There are now none of the latter who can venture to contend against us in the field. They are incapable from their actual condition of any dangerous combinations with each other, and they absorb many elements of sedition and rebellion. It is further to be observed on this part of the subject, that, that the respect which the natives give to men of high birth, with claims upon their allegiance, contributes greatly to the preservation of the general peace. Such afford an example to their countrymen of submission to the rule of foreigners—they check the rise of those bold military adventurers, with which India has, and ever will abound, but who will never have the field widely opened to their enterprizes, until our impolicy has annihilated, or suffered to die of their own act, those high Princes and

Chiefs, who, though diminished in power, have still the hereditary attachment and obedience of millions of those classes, who are from habits and courage alike suited to maintain, or to disturb, the public peace.”

“ Our relations with the Government of Mysore, are of that delicate texture which must make them require constant attention. The smallest departure from any of these fundamental principles upon which they are grounded, will infallibly lead to their ultimate dissolution ; but while they are respected, this connexion will form the *bulwark of our strength in the South of India*, and it may, in the course of events, be a consideration of policy to *increase, instead of diminishing, the limits of a state which*, while it affords us resources fully equal to the same extent of our own dominions, is exempt from some of the objections of rule to which these are subject, and particularly to that popular and in some degree true, one, of not giving sufficient employment to the different classes of military inhabitants.”

Mr. Elphinstone.

“ It appears to me (said Mr. Elphinstone) to be our interest as well as our duty, to use every means to preserve the allied governments ; it is also our interest to keep up the number of independent powers : their territories afford a refuge to all those whose habits of war, intrigue, or depredation, make them incapable of remaining quiet in ours ; and the contrast of our Government has a favourable effect on our subjects, who, while they feel the evils they are actually exposed to, are apt to forget the greater ones from which they have been delivered. If the existence of independent powers gives occasional employment to our armies, it is far from being a disadvantage.”

Sir Henry Russell.

“ The danger that we have most to dread in India lies entirely at home. A well conducted rebellion of our native subjects, or an extensive disaffection of our native troops, is the event by which our power is most likely to be shaken ; and the sphere of this danger is necessarily enlarged by every enlargement of our territory. The increase of our subjects, and still more of our native troops, is an increase

not of our strength but of our weakness ; between them and us there never can be community of feeling. We must always continue foreigners ; and the object of that jealousy and dislike, which a foreign rule never ceases to excite.”*

General Walker.

“ To the imbecile and powerless state to which we have reduced the native Governments we must ascribe all the disorders that have lately disturbed the country. The first effect of their unsuccessful contests with us was the necessary discharge of a great part of their armies, who no longer finding regular pay and subsistence, and having arms in their hands have been obliged to maintain themselves by robbery and violence. The same thing would have happened in Europe after the defeat and dispersion of the French armies, had not the spirit of licentiousness and rapine been restrained by the presence of the forces which the allies have kept on foot. By reducing the native powers to this weak and degraded state, we have deprived them of the ability, and perhaps of the inclination, of crushing disturbances, which they may think more hurtful to us than to themselves. They may hope from anarchy and insurrection to recover their losses.

“ In this mixture of authority and dependence, it would be in vain to look for any solid or sincere alliance. They all feel a yoke which they would be glad to embrace any favourable opportunity of throwing off. *The sentiment of hostility is deeply rooted, and must remain so long as the causes exist that produced it.* Those who are bound to us apparently by the strongest ties of confederacy feel that the treaties concluded with us have not been between independent states, but between a sovereign and his vassals.

“ They perceive in signing these treaties they have consigned themselves to a state of degrading dependence. The moment, therefore, that any power appears which affords a promise of being able to cope with ours they will instantly range themselves on its side. It is certain that we shall never have to contend with such a power. France, we may be well aware, is viewing our predominance in the East Indies with an eye of perpetual jealousy ; and though she may be at present too busy, or too weak, to make any

* Letters to Mr. Villiers, Appendix to Political Report, 1832.

great exertion for the recovery of her former influence, she will certainly avail herself of the first moment of leisure to accomplish that favourite object. It is in vain to hope that we can long exclude her from India. China, Siam, Ava, Persia, and Arabia are open to her enterprise and her ambition. In time and repose she will find ships. Her former passions will regain their influence. But is there no other enemy to dread besides France? May not the policy of Russia be again directed towards India? The barbarous nations that intervene would rather be disposed to augment her power than to oppose her progress. The ambition of Persia may be excited to invade this rich prize, and constant danger must be apprehended from the warlike hordes which extend from Tartary to this frontier.

“It has been by this route that every invader has entered India, from the time of Alexander down to that of Nader Shah. Instead of a weak and mercenary government in this direction, *the security of India would require an independent and powerful state.*”

APPENDIX B.

No. 1.

Sketch of the State of India under its Native Sovereigns, from Mr. M. Elphinstone's History of India.

The Hindoos of the age of Menu, who were contemporary with the age of Homer, were in advance of the Greeks of that age; their institutions were less rude, their conduct to their enemies more humane, their general learning much more considerable, and in the knowledge of the being and the nature of God, they were already in possession of a light which was but faintly perceived even by the loftiest intellects of the best days of Athens.

Their cloths in fineness of texture have never yet been approached in any other country; the brilliancy and permanency of their dyes have not yet been equalled in Europe; manufactures in silk were known to them at a

very early period, and gold and silver brocade were the favourite, perhaps the original manufactures of India. They had a good system of agriculture, and were familiar with the use of the drill plough, and practised a rotation of crops.

Their works for irrigation are upon a great scale; they have reservoirs of vast extent and magnificent embankments, both in respect to elevation and solidity, some of which form lakes many miles in circumference, and water great tracks of country. In the earliest times they had a thriving commerce, and the abundance of articles proves that there was an open trade between the different parts of India. There was considerable traffic also between the coast of Coromandel and the Eastern Inlands in the first century after Christ.

“The historians of Java give a distinct account of a numerous body of Hindoos from that coast who civilized the inhabitants of that island.” The proofs of this immigration are to be found in the numerous and magnificent Hindoo remains which still exist in Java, and in the language used for historical, and religious, and practical compositions which is a dialect of Sanskrit. Java, indeed, at the end of the fourth century was found almost peopled by Hindoos, who sailed from Ganges to Ceylon, and from Ceylon to Java, and from Java to China, in ships manned by crews who professed the Brahminical religion. All the descriptions of the parts of India which were visited by the Greeks give the idea of a country teeming with population, and enjoying the highest degree of prosperity. There were 1500 cities between the *Hydaspe* and the *Hyphasis*, while the numerous commercial cities and ports of trade, mentioned in the “*Periplus*” attest the progress of the Hindoos in a department which more than any other shews the advanced condition of a nation. The soldiers who opposed Alexander were in constant pay during war and peace; their bravery is always spoken of by the Greeks, as superior to that of any other nations with whom they had contended in Asia; their policy was excellent; justice was cheaply and speedily administered mainly through the instrumentality of Punchayets or Juries, and their system of finance rested upon the solid basis of the right of the Government to a portion of the produce of the soil. Their chariots were drawn in war by horses, on

a march by oxen. *Strabo* makes mention of royal roads and milestones. Wheel carriages appear to have been in use in the times of Menu.

From the earliest Hindoo times, indeed to the decline of the Mogul empire, the great roads were objects of much attention to the Government: and we learn from the "*Periplus*" that large quantities of goods were brought down in carts from *Teigora and Plethora*, two cities of great extent, situated on the Godavery, to the coast about about 300 years before Christ. A large part of India was under the sceptre of a Prince named Asoca, the extent of whose dominions is proved by the remote points at which his boundary columns are erected, and the same monuments bear testimony to the civilized character of his government, since they contain orders for establishing hospitals and dispensaries throughout his empire, as well as for planting trees, and digging wells along the public high-ways.* Vicramaditya, a contemporary of the first Cæsar, was the powerful sovereign of a civilized and populous country half a century before the commencement of the Christian era.

The Hindu, as well as the Mahomedan writers, who describe the conquest of India in the 11th century, dwell in terms of the highest admiration on the extent and magnificence of Kanoj, the capital of a kingdom of that name, which included the territory of modern Oude. In the 4th century nearly the whole of India was brought, and remained for a short period under the Mussulman rule. It is described by "Iba Batula," the Mahomedan traveller, as a most flourishing empire, its capital Delhi, with its walls and mosques, "as without an equal on earth." One of its sovereigns, Firoz Toghlok, was the projector of that magnificent canal which united the Jumna with the rivers of the Punjaub, a work that has been partially, and it is to be hoped, will be completely restored by the British Government. Fifty dams across rivers to promote irrigation; forty mosques, thirty colleges, one hundred caravansaries, thirty reservoirs, a hundred hospitals, a hundred public baths, and a hundred and fifty bridges, besides many other edifices for pleasure and ornament, were the fruits of the long and prosperous reign of this able and munificent Prince.

* Elphinstone, vol. 1. p. 393-4.

He moreover fixed the revenues in such a manner as to leave little discretion to the Government agents, and gave publicity and precision to the demands of the State, and established an admirable and well-regulated horse and foot post from the frontiers to the capital.

Historians and travellers, Mahomedan and Christians, unite in bearing testimony to the prosperous condition of India during the 13th, 14th, and 15th centuries.

The historian of Firoz Shah, who wrote in 1351, expatiates on the happy state of the ryots, upon the goodness of their homes and furniture. His reign, though not brilliant in other respects, was distinguished for the enlightened spirit of his regulations, and the extent and utility of his public works. He limited the number of capital punishments, and put a stop to the use of torture and the practice of mutilation, which last prohibition was the more meritorious, as it was at variance with the Mahomedan law.*

Mido de Conti, who travelled in India about 1420, speaks highly of what he saw in Guzerat, and found the banks of the Ganges covered with towns amidst most beautiful gardens and orchards. He passed four famous cities before he reached Nurrazen, which he describes as a powerful place, filled with gold, silver, and precious stones.

These accounts are corroborated by two Mussulmen, who travelled in the first part of the 16th century. The former describes Cambay as a remarkably well built city, in a beautiful and fertile country, filled with merchants of all nations, and with artizans and manufactures like those of Flanders.

In the early part of the 16th century, the Moguls appeared on the scene; and Baber, the first of the sovereigns of that dynasty, although disliking his adopted country, speaks of Hindostan as a rich and noble region, abounding in gold and silver, of its swarming population, and the innumerable workmen that were to be found in every trade and profession. Nor was this prosperity confined to the territories under Mussulman rule. The Hindoo kingdom of Bijanagar, the principalities of Malabar and Madura, were in an equally flourishing condition.

We have the testimony of Sir Thomas Roe, of Tavernier, and of Pietro Valli, that there was rather an increase than

* Elphinstone, vol. ii. p. 71.

a diminution of the wealth, prosperity, and good government of India during the reigns of Acbar, Jehangár, Shah Jehán, and the principal part of the reign of Aurungzebe.

It owed much of this prosperity to the personal characters of its rulers. There were many most distinguished men both amongst the Patán and the Mogul dynasties—amongst them Kutt-u-deen, in the 13th century, the most powerful monarch of the former race, was generally beloved for the frankness and generosity of his disposition, and left a permanent reputation as a just and virtuous ruler. And in the same century reigned the Sultána Regia, who was endowed, says the historian Ferishtah, with every princely virtue. She evinced all the qualities of a just and able sovereign, and those who scrutinised her actions most severely could find no fault in her, except that she was a woman. Jelal-u-deen, of the house of Khilii, who reigned in the year 1288, was celebrated for his clemency, magnanimity, and love of literature; and his nephew, Ala-u-din, for his military talents.

Baber, the first sovereign of the Mogul dynasty, was a frank kind-hearted man, who devoted himself to the improvement of his adopted country. Besides the business of his kingdom, he was constantly employed in forming aqueducts, reservoirs, as well as in introducing new fruits, and other productions of remote countries. His successor, Humáyun, was free from vices and violent passions, and more inclined to ease than ambition. He bore the sad reverses of his fortune with a cheerfulness that approached to magnanimity.

The author of these reverses was "Sher Khan," who wrested the empire from him. He is said to have been a prince of consummate prudence and ability. He was the author of many benevolent measures, which he carried out with signal wisdom, and notwithstanding his short reign, and his constant activity in the field, he brought his territories into the highest order, and introduced many improvements into his civil government, the most important of which was the survey and fixed assessment upon the land. He made a high road, planted with rows of trees for shade extending for four months' journey from Bengal to the Western Rhotas near the Indus, with caravansaries at every stage, and wells at every mile and a half, and provisions

for the poor at every caravansary, with servants to attend travellers. His second son, "Jelab Khan," was a man of known abilities, distinguished as a soldier and an improver.

The heroic courage, energy, and talent of Hemu, the Hindoo minister of his worthless successor, Mahomed Sha, are celebrated in Oriental history.

It is almost superfluous to dwell upon the character of the celebrated Acbar, who was equally great in the cabinet and in the field, and renowned for his toleration, liberality, clemency, courage, temperance, industry, and largeness of mind. He perfected the financial reforms which had been commenced in those provinces by Shir Shah. He abolished many vexatious taxes, and his instructions to his revenue officers shewed his anxiety for a liberal administration, and for the ease and comfort of his subjects.

The Italian traveller, Pietro del Valle, who wrote in the last year of the reign of Jehanger, Acbar's son, A.D. 1623, bears this testimony to the character of that prince, and to the condition of the people under his rule:—"Generally all live much after a genteel way, and they do it securely; as well, because the king does not prosecute his subjects with false accusations nor deprive them of anything when he sees them live splendidly and with the appearance of riches (as is often done in other Mahomedan countries), as because the Indians are inclined to those vanities."

But the reign of Shah Jehan, the grandson of Acbar, was the most prosperous ever known in India. His own dominions enjoyed almost uninterrupted tranquillity and good government; and although Sir Thomas Roe was struck with astonishment at the profusion of wealth which was displayed when he visited the emperor in his camp in 1615, in which at least two acres were covered with silk, gold carpets and hangings, as rich as velvet embossed with gold and precious stones could make them, yet we have the testimony of Tavernier that he who caused the celebrated peacock throne to be constructed, who, at the festival of his accession, scattered amongst the bystanders money and precious things equal to his own weight, "reigned not so much as a king over his subjects, but rather as a father over his family." His vigilance over his internal government was unremitting, and for order and arrangement of his territory and the good administration of every department of the state, no prince that ever reigned

in India could be compared to Shah Jehan. The whole of his civil and military arrangements presented an astonishing picture of magnificence and good order, where unwieldy numbers were managed without disturbance, and economy was attended to in the midst of profusion.

All his vast undertakings were managed with so much economy, that after defraying the expenses of his great expeditions to Candahar, his wars in Balk, and other heavy charges, and maintaining a regular army of 200,000 horse, Shah Jehan left a treasure, which some reckoned at near six, others at twenty-four millions in coin, besides his vast accumulations in wrought gold and silver, and in jewels.

His treatment of his people was beneficent and paternal, and his liberal sentiments towards those around him, cannot be better shewn than by the confidence which he so generously reposed in his sons.

So stable was the foundation upon which this prosperity rested that the empire continued to be in a flourishing condition for a large portion of the long, intolerant, and oppressive reign of Aurungzebe, and notwithstanding the misgovernment which followed in the next thirty years, under a series of weak and wicked princes, and the commotions which attended the breaking up of the empire, the enormous wealth which Nadir Shah was enabled to carry away with him when he quitted Delhi in 1739, is proof that the country was still in a comparatively prosperous condition.

Of the character of the Hindoo sovereigns who were the contemporaries of the Mussulman emperors in the 14th and 15th centuries we know nothing; but we know that their territories had attained to a pitch of power and splendour which had not been surpassed by their ancestors. We know also that the principal administrators of the Mussulman dynasties, with rare exceptions, were Hindoos—that they were entrusted with the command of armies, and with the regulation of the finances. The “robber” Sevajee, who entered upon the scene in the latter part of the 16th century, and who shook the Mogul empire to its foundations, during the reign of Aurungzebe, was an able statesman, as well as a skilful general. His civil government was regular, and he was vigorous in exacting from his provincial and his village officers obedience to the

rules which he laid down for the protection of the people. His enemies bear witness to his anxiety to mitigate the evils of war by humane regulations, which were strictly enforced. Altogether this "robber hero" left a character which has never since been equalled, or even approached, by any of his countrymen. Amongst many distinguished Princes of the Bahman dynasty, who ruled the Deccan during the 15th and 16th centuries, Mulik Amber was conspicuous. With the assistance of his Hindoo Ministers, he introduced great and systematic reforms into his dominions, and converted an arbitrary demand upon the land into a fixed assessment. So intimate indeed were the relations between the two races in those times, that both Moguls and Patans intermarried with Hindoos. The armies of Hindoo Princes were sometimes commanded by Mussulmen, and Mussulmen armies by Hindoos; and such were their notions of mutual toleration, that we find the Hindoo Rajah of Bijanayger in the 15th century building a mosque for his Mussulman subjects. The effort made by the intolerant bigotry of Aurungzebe to separate the races, and to reduce the Hindoo again to a state of a conquered and infidel people, was a main cause of the downfall of the empire. During the reigns of his predecessors, the Hindoo Princes, although conquered, had been permitted to retain their hereditary jurisdiction, and were not interfered with in the ordinary course of their administration. They served the empire, therefore, with a zealous attachment, which made them to be considered as the props of the monarchy. His order to exclude them from office, and his revival of the poll-tax upon infidels, and other encroachments upon their rights, alienated their affections, and made them in their hearts zealous patrons of the Mahrattas.

Nadir Shah finally quitted Hindostan in 1739; and in 1756 Clive won the battle of Plassey, which virtually made us masters of the richest and most populous division of the empire. Of the flourishing state of Bengal and Behar, of the northern circars, and of that part of country round Madras, called the "Jagheer," when those possessions fell into our hands, we have unimpeachable evidence.*

* Elphinstone's History of India, vol. II.

On the State of Bengal under its Native Sovereigns.

Those who think most favourably of Lord Cornwallis's system, see in the increased population, cultivation, and internal commerce, what has certainly occurred — which they deny could have been experienced under the former regulations of the government; they even deny the possibility of such effects being produced under what is understood to have been either the Mahomedan or the Hindoo system of government.

To so unfounded a prejudice, it might be sufficient to oppose the evidence of public works of ornament and use abounding throughout India, some of which recall the stupendous works of the ancient world, and could have been effected only under tranquil and prosperous governments, but on this point I am happy to be supported in the opinion of Mr. Hamilton, formerly Sanscrit Professor, whose knowledge of the history and literature of India give particular weight to his opinion.

“I hope,” says that gentleman, “that I shall not appear inconsistent if I state my conviction that at the time of the Mahomedan invasion, Hindostan had reached a higher degree of order, riches, and population, than it has since attained.” I beg it may not be imagined that I in any degree entertain the opinion that Bengal was misgoverned until the English obtained possession of it. The high state of prosperity in which they found it would, to every unprejudiced mind, sufficiently repel so gross a calumny. For my own part, I not only agree with Mr. Hamilton in regard to the effects which have been produced under former governments, but perhaps go farther than he does, in thinking the system under which those effects were produced to be still the system best adapted to the genius and condition of the people, and that our deviations from it have been attended with inconveniences to the government, and evils to the people, which go far to countervail any good to either, that can be ascribed exclusively to the change.”—*Mr. Davis, for many years in high office in Bengal, and a Director.*

State of Mysore, and of the adjoining Territory, under Tippoo Sultaun, A.D. 1790.

“ When a person, travelling through a strange country, finds it well cultivated, populous, with industrious inhabitants, cities newly founded, commerce extending, towns increasing, and every thing flourishing, so as to indicate happiness, he will naturally conclude it to be under a form of government congenial to the minds of the people. This is a picture of Tippoo’s country, and this is our conclusion respecting its government. It has fallen to our lot to tarry some time in Tippoo’s dominions, and to travel through them as much, if not more, than any other officer in the field during the war; and we have reason to suppose his subjects to be as happy as those of any other sovereign: for we do not recollect of any complaints or murmurings among them; although, had causes existed, no time would have been more favourable for their utterance, because the enemies of Tippoo were in power, and would have been gratified by any aspersion of his character. The inhabitants of the conquered countries submitted with apparent resignation to the direction of their conquerors, but by no means as if relieved from an oppressive yoke in their former government; on the contrary, no sooner did an opportunity offer than they scouted their new masters, and gladly returned to their loyalty again.”* Whether from the operation of the system established by Hyder, from the principles which Tippoo adopted for his own conduct, or from his dominions having suffered little by invasion for many years, or from the effect of these several causes united, his country was found everywhere full of inhabitants, and apparently cultivated to the utmost extent of which the soil was capable, while the discipline and fidelity of his troops in the field, until their last overthrow, were testimonies, equally strong, of the excellent regulations which existed in his army. His government, though strict and arbitrary, was the despotism of a strict and able sovereign, who nourishes, not oppresses, the subjects who are to be the means of his future aggrandisement; and his cruelties were, in general, inflicted only on those whom he considered as his enemies.”†

* Moore’s Narrative of the War with Tippoo Sultaun, p. 201.

† Dirom’s Narrative, p. 249.

No. 4.

State of Peishwal's Territory, A. D. 1803.

“It has not happened to me ever to see countries better cultivated and more abounding in all produce of the soil, as well as in commercial wealth, than the southern Mahratta districts, when I accompanied the present Duke of Wellington to that country in the year 1803. I particularly here allude to those large tracts near the borders of the Kistnah. Poonah, the capital of the Peishwah, was a very wealthy and thriving commercial town, and there was as much cultivation in the Deccan as it was possible an arid and unfruitful country could admit.”—Sir John Malcolm (*vide* evidence, Common's Committee, p. 41).

No. 5.

State of Malwa.

“With respect to Malwa, I saw it in a state of ruin, caused by the occupancy, for a period of more than half a century, of that fine country by the Mahratta armies, the Pindarries, and, indeed, the assembled predatory hordes of all India. Yet, even at that period, I was perfectly surprised at the difference that exists between a distant view of such countries, and a nearer examination of their actual condition. I had ample means afforded to me, as the person appointed to occupy that territory, and to conduct its civil, military, and political administration, to learn all that the records of Government could teach, and to obtain from other sources full information of this country; and I certainly entered upon my duties with the complete conviction that commerce would be unknown, and that credit could not exist in a province which had long possessed, from its position, the transit trade between the rich provinces of western India and the whole of the north-west provinces of Hindostan, as well as the more eastern ones of Saugur and Bundlecund. I found, to my surprise, that in correspondence with the first commercial and monied men of Rajpootana, Bundlecund, and Hindostan, as well as with those of Goozerat, dealings in money to a large amount had continually taken place at Oogain and other cities, where soucars or bankers of character and credit were in a flourishing state, and that goods to a great amount had not only continually passed through the province, but that the insurance offices which exist through

all parts of India, and include the principal monied men, had never stopped their operations, though premiums rose, at a period of danger, to a high amount. The native Governments of Malwa, when tranquillity was established through our arms, wanted nothing but that which the attachment of the natives of India to their native soil soon supplied them with, a return of the inhabitants. And I do not believe that in that country the introduction of our direct rule could have contributed more, nor indeed so much, to the prosperity of the commercial and agricultural interests, as the re-establishment of the efficient rule of its former princes and chiefs, who, though protected from attack, are quite free in their internal administration from our interference. With respect to the southern Mahratta districts, of whose prosperity I have before spoken, if I refer, as I must, to their condition before the last few years of Bajee Row's misrule, I do not think that either their commercial or agricultural interests are likely to be improved under our rule, except in that greatest of blessings, exemption from wars which, while under our protection, they equally enjoy; and I must unhesitatingly state, that the provinces belonging to the family of 'Putwurden,' and some other chiefs on the banks of the Kistna, present a greater agricultural and commercial prosperity than almost any I know in India. I refer this to their system of administration which, though there may be at periods exactions, is, on the whole, mild and paternal; to the knowledge, and almost devotion of the Hindoos to all agricultural pursuits; to their better understanding, or, at least, better practice than us in many parts of the administration, particularly in raising towns and villages to prosperity from the encouragement given to monied men and to the introduction of capital; and, above all, to Jagheerdars (Kandornos) residing on their estates, and these provinces being administered by men of rank, who live and die on the soil, and are usually succeeded in office by their sons or near relatives. If these men exact money at times in an arbitrary manner, all their expenditure, as well as all they receive, is limited to their own provinces; but, above all causes which promote prosperity, is the invariable support given to the village and other native institutions, and to the employment, far beyond what our system admits, of all classes of the population."—Sir John Malcolm,

State of Rampore (Rohilcund) under Native Rule.

“ In passing through the Rampore territory, we could not fail to notice the high state of cultivation to which it has attained, when compared with the surrounding country; scarcely a spot of land is neglected: and although the season was by no means favourable, the whole district seems to be covered with an abundant harvest. As we have no reason to conclude from the description we had received of the present Regent, that this state of prosperity had been produced by any personal exertions on his part, we were solicitous to trace its source, and to discover whether, in the nature of the tenures, the mode of arrangement or otherwise, there were any peculiar circumstances which it might be useful for us to advert to in the course of executing the duty entrusted to us. The management of the Nawaub Fyz-oolah Khan is celebrated throughout the country. It was the management of an enlightened and liberal landlord, who devoted his time and attention, and employed his own capital in promoting the prosperity of his country. When works of magnitude were required which could not be accomplished by the efforts of the individual, the means of undertaking them were supplied by his bounty. Watercourses were constructed, the rivulets were sometimes made to overflow and fertilize the adjacent districts, and the paternal care of a popular chief was constantly exerted to afford protection to his subjects, to stimulate their exertions, to direct their labours to useful objects, and to promote by every means the success of the undertaking.”

“ If the comparison for the same territory be made between the management of the Rohillas and that of our own government, *it is painful to think that the balance of advantage is clearly in favour of the former.* After seven years possession of the country, it appears by the report that the revenue has increased only by two lacs of rupees, or £20,000. The papers laid before Parliament shew that in twenty years which have since elapsed, the collective revenues of Rohilcund, and the other districts forming the

ceded provinces of Oude, had actually declined £200,000 per annum."

"We could not fail, however, to observe the singular difference which the application of greater capital and greater industry is capable of producing in the state of contiguous lands. While the surrounding country seemed to have been visited by a desolating calamity, the lands of the Rajahs Diaram and Bugwaut Sing, under every disadvantage of season, were covered with crops produced by a better husbandry or by greater labour." It should here be explained, that the neighbouring lands alluded to in the report consisted of *British territory, already five years in our occupation.*"*

No. 7.

State of Holkar's territory under the Government of Allia Bae.

"The success of Allia Bae in the internal administration of her dominions was altogether wonderful. * * * The undisturbed internal tranquillity of the country was even more remarkable than its exemption from foreign attack. This was equally produced by her manner of treating the peaceable as well as the more turbulent and predatory classes; she was indulgent to the former, and although strict and severe, just and considerate towards the latter. . . . The fond object of her life was to promote the prosperity of all around her; she rejoiced, we are told, when she saw bankers, merchants, farmers, and cultivators rise to affluence, and so far from deeming their increased wealth a ground of exaction, she considered it a legitimate claim of increased favour and protection . . . There would be no end to a minute detail of the measures of her internal policy. It is sufficient to observe she has become by general suffrage the model of good government in Malwa. . . . She built several forts, and at that of Jaum constructed a road with great labour and cost over the Vindhya range, where it is almost perpendicular. . . . Among the princes of her own nation it would have been looked upon as sacrilege to have become her enemy, or indeed not to have defended her against any hostile

* Appendix to Political Report, 1832, pp. 36, 37.

attempt. She was considered by all in the same light. The Nizam of the Deccan and Tippoo Sultan held her in the same respect as the Peishwah, and Mahomedans joined with the Hindoos in prayer for her long life and prosperity.

“In the most sober view that can be taken of her character, she certainly appears within her limited sphere to have been one of the purest and most exemplary rulers that ever existed, and she affords a striking example of the practical benefit a mind may receive from preferring worldly duties under a deep sense of responsibility to its Creator.”*

No. 8.

State of Bhurtpore under its Native Sovereigns.

“The country, though still bare of wood, has more scattered trees than we had seen for many days back; and notwithstanding that the soil is sandy, and only irrigated from wells, it is one of the best cultivated and watered tracts which I have seen in India. The crops of corn now on the ground were really beautiful; that of cotton, though gone by, shewed marks of having been a very good one. What is a sure proof of wealth, I saw several sugar mills, and large pieces of ground where the cane had just been cleared; and, contrary to the usual habits of India, where the cultivators keep as far as they can from the highway, to avoid the various molestations to which they are exposed from thieves and travellers, there was often a narrow pathway winding through the green wheat and mustard crops, and even this was crossed continually by the channels which conveyed water to the furrows.

“The population did not seem great; but the villages which we saw were apparently in good condition and repair, and the whole afforded so pleasing a picture of industry, and was so much superior to anything which I have been led to expect in Rajpootana, or *which I had seen in the Company's territories* since leaving the southern parts of Rohilcund, that I was led to suppose that either the Rajah of Bhurtpore was an extremely exemplary and

* Malcolm's History of Central India, vol. 1. pp. 176, 195.

parental governor, or that the system of management adopted in the British provinces was in some way or other less favourable to the improvement and happiness of the country than that of some of the native states.”*

No. 9.

State of Oude.

“ We set out at half-past three, and for some time lost our way, there being no road than such tracks as are seen across ploughed fields in England, the whole country being cultivated, though not enclosed, and much intersected by small ravines and nullahs.

I was pleased, and surprised, after all I had heard of Oude, to find the country so completely under the plough, since were the oppression as great, as is sometimes stated, I cannot think that we should witness so considerable a population, and so much industry, yet that sufficient anarchy and misrule exist, the events of yesterday afforded sufficient reason for supposing.

“ We found invariable civility, and good natured people backing their carts and elephants to make room for us, and displaying, on the whole, a far greater spirit of hospitality and accommodation than ten foreigners would have met with in London.

“ The present king is fond of literary and philosophical pursuits.

“ Saadat Ali, himself a man of talent and acquirements, fond of business, and well qualified for it ; but, in his latter days, unhappily addicted to drunkenness, left him a country, with six millions of people, a fertile soil, a most compact position, and upwards of two millions of ready money in the treasury, with a well regulated system of finance, a peasantry tolerably well contented, no army to maintain, except for police or parade, and every thing likely to produce an auspicious reign.

“ I can bear witness certainly to the truth of the king’s statement, that his territories are really in a far better state of cultivation than I had expected to find them. From Lucknow to Sandee, where I am now writing, the country is as populous and well cultivated as most of the Com-

* Bishop Heber’s Journal, vol. II. p. 361.

pany's provinces. I cannot, therefore, but suspect that the misfortunes and anarchy of ()ude are somewhat overrated." —P. 89.

"He was fond of study, and in all points of oriental philology and philosophy, is really reckoned a learned man, besides having a strong taste in its mechanics and chemistry.

"Like our James I., he is said to be naturally just and kind hearted; and with all those who have access to him he is extremely popular. No single act of violence and oppression has ever been ascribed to him, or supposed to be perpetrated with his knowledge; and his errors have been a want of economy in his expenses, a want of accessibility to his subjects, a blind confidence in favourites, and, as will be seen, an unfortunate, though not very unnatural, attachment to different points of etiquette and prerogative."* He is described by Lord Hastings as a sovereign admirable for uprightness, humanity, and mild elevation.

No. 10.

State of Sattara under the Rajah Poutaub Sing.

"We have been highly gratified by the information, from time to time, transmitted to us by our Government on the subject of your Highness's exemplary fulfilment of the duties of that elevated situation, in which it has pleased Providence to place you.

"A course of conduct so suitable to your Highness's exalted station, and so well calculated to promote the prosperity of your dominions, and the happiness of your people, as that which you have wisely and uniformly pursued, while it reflects the highest honour on your own character, has imparted to our minds the feelings of unqualified satisfaction and pleasure. The liberality, also, which you have displayed in executing, at your own cost, various public works of great utility, and which has so greatly raised your reputation in the eyes of the princes and people of India, gives you an additional claim to our approbation, respect, and applause.

* Bishop Heber's Journal, vol. II pp. 77-79.

“Impressed with these sentiments, the Court of Directors of the East India Company have unanimously resolved to transmit to you a sword, which will be presented to you through the Government of Bombay, and which we trust you will receive with satisfaction, as a token of their high esteem and regard.*

No. 11.

State of Bengal after Twenty Years British rule.

Extract from Lord Cornwallis' Minute, 2nd August, 1789.

“I am sorry to be obliged to say, that the agriculture and internal commerce have for many years been gradually declining, and that at present, excepting the class of Shrufts and Bunyans, who reside almost entirely in great towns, the inhabitants of these provinces were advancing hastily to a general state of poverty and wretchedness.”†

No. 12.

Present Condition of the Agricultural Population of Bengal.

“No one has ever attempted to contradict the fact that the condition of the Bengal peasantry is almost as wretched and degraded as it is possible to conceive, living in the most miserable hovels, scarcely fit for a dog kennel, covered with tattered rags, and unable, in too many instances, to procure more than a single meal a day for himself and family. The Bengal ryot knows nothing of the most ordinary comforts of life. We speak without exaggeration when we affirm, that if the real condition of those who raise the harvest, which yields between three and four millions a year, was fully known it would make the ears of one who heard thereof tingle.”—*Friend of India*, April 1, 1852.

* Letter of the Court of Directors, Par. Pa. A.D. 1843, No. 569, p. 1268.

† Mill, vol. v. p. 473.

APPENDIX C.

*Sir Thomas Munro on the Consequences of Disaffection
in the Native Army.*

“ They (the sepoy) will learn to compare their own low allowances and humble rank with those of their European Officers—to examine the ground on which the wide difference rests—to estimate their own strength and resources, and to believe that it is their duty to shake off a foreign yoke, and to secure for themselves the honours and emoluments which their country yields.

“ Their assemblage in garrisons and cantonments will render it easy for them to consult together regarding their plans; they will have no difficulty in finding leaders qualified to direct them; their patience, their habits of discipline, and their experience in war, will hold out the fairest prospects of success; they will be stimulated by the love of power and independence, and by ambition and avarice, to carry their designs into execution. The attempt, no doubt, would be dangerous, but when the contest is for so rich a stake, they would not be deterred from the danger. They might fail in their first attempt, but even their failure would not, as under a national government, confirm our power, but shake it to its very foundation.

“ In such a contest we are not to expect any aid from the people. The native army would be joined by all that numerous and active class of men formerly belonging to the revenue and police departments, who are now unemployed, and by many now in office, who look for higher situations; and by means of these men they would easily render themselves masters of the open country, and of its revenue: the great mass of the people would remain quiet.

“ The merchants and shopkeepers, from having found facilities given to trade which they never before experienced might wish us success, but they would do more. The heads of villages, who have at their disposal the most warlike part of the inhabitants, would be more likely to join their countrymen than to support our cause. They

have, it is true, when under their native rulers, often shewn a strong desire to be transferred to our dominion, but this feeling arose from temporary causes. The immediate pressure of a weak and rapacious government, and the hope of bettering themselves by a change. But they have now tried our government, and found that, though they are protected in their persons and their property, they have lost many of the emoluments which they derived from a lax revenue system under their native chiefs, and also much of their former authority and consideration among the inhabitants, by the establishment of our judicial courts and European Magistrates and Collectors. The hope of regaining their former rank and influence would, therefore, render a great part of them well disposed to form any plan for our overthrow. We delude ourselves if we believe that gratitude for the protection they have received, or attachment to our mild government, would induce any considerable body of the people to side with us in a struggle with the native army.”*

* Life, vol. II. p. 32.

THE END.

ERRORS IN INDIA

AND AT HOME.

BY

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M.DCCC.LIII.

ERRORS IN INDIA AND AT HOME.

As public attention has been recently called to Indian affairs, and as the East India Company's Charter expires next year, it is hoped that the Legislature will not come to a conclusion by giving a renewal without fully ascertaining the numerous complaints of the native population. The people of Madras for years have had strong reason to complain, and the system observed there by the Local Government is not of such a nature to afford assistance when redress is sought for wrongs forming the groundwork of their complaints.

If application is made to the Local Government for relief, it is met with a refusal, leaving the natives with reasonable impressions that they must quietly submit to excessive burthens, as well as defects in the jurisprudence of their country attended with inefficiency, expense, and delay in the administration of justice, retarding their general prosperity, as if they were beings of inferior intellect, and had no right to call in question the actions of functionaries whose duties are to frame laws, so that the whole machinery of legislation may produce satisfaction not only

amongst natives, but to every European domiciled in India.

The Government of India have too long held an irresponsible power, and whatever good intentions one Board of Directors and a President of Board of Control possess for the welfare and happiness of the native community, and however desirous they may be to disseminate benefits for all, a succeeding Directory and President, from want of capability and experience in Indian policy, can frustrate the plans which the former intended to carry out in effecting a wholesome and sound discipline productive of general good government. The superiority of the power possessed by the Board of Control, Directory, and Local Government (that is to say of seizing territories, deposing native sovereigns in secret, and of oppressing the native population) is sufficient reason to induce the public to call for an extensive inquiry, assisted by those who can speak accurately upon the circumstances which cause the discontent prevailing in India.

When the Company monopolized the whole commerce, and excluded others in this country to trade, arguments were found to support and secure this unfair privilege, and it was only by slow degrees that any progress was made for general enterprise. The defenders of this monopoly contended that competition would enhance the price of goods in one place, and reduce them in another, that profit would be entirely destroyed, ruin and bankruptcy take place, and the holders

of East India Stock have little prospect of obtaining their dividends for investment of capital.

The supporters of these arguments were slow in improvement, and could never see the reason of men who were to them in penetration *a century in advance*. With the aid of these opinions the Company continued to enjoy the whole trade. It was from these opinions that the first Lord Clive was in a short time enabled to accumulate vast wealth, and obtain a peerage. It was these opinions that assisted Warren Hastings in designs, that caused him to be impeached in the names of the Commons of England, and it was some of the OPPONENTS to these opinions that made the English public better acquainted with the iniquitous proceedings carried on for years in India, to make human nature shudder at the thought. Successive experience proved the fallacy of these notions, and gradually lessened the restrictions, until at last the trade was thrown open, when to the astonishment of a few who were *old and obstinate*, it was discovered that the price of goods were not enhanced in one place and reduced in another, that the entire profit was not destroyed, that few traders to India were to be found conspicuously in the Bankruptcy or Insolvent Courts, and that the holders of East India Stock could lie down on their pillows without the fear of becoming paupers, or ending their days in a workhouse.

Competition, therefore, has not proved so disastrous in effect to either natives or Europeans, and as the East India Company and *others* have in

error supported the opposition to competition, let us consider whether they have by other *errors* been opposed to the prosperity and happiness of the native population, and whether it is right that the natives, particularly those at Madras, have not been by them sufficiently oppressed to prevent an incentive to exertion, and to destroy their energies in a way that precludes them from evincing the skill, industry, and talent, which would raise them from the torpid condition, and which report (since the Company gained an ascendancy) has alleged to be their characteristic.

THE RYOTS.

In inquiring into facts let us commence with the condition of the Ryots. The Ryots are the cultivators of the soil, and are compelled to pay what is called a water fee, levied by the Government for the repair of tanks to preserve the means of irrigation. To this water fee there is no *complaint*. But when the tanks have for years fallen into decay, and rendered useless, it is natural to expect that strong murmurs will exist when the Ryots find that the money paid as a water fee is not applied to the purpose for which it is collected, and that they are compelled to do nearly all the repairs at a further expense, that is to say, independent of the tax the Ryots are forced to *make these repairs out of their own pockets within a small amount of the cost of putting the tanks in use.*

When the means of irrigation are obstructed, as invariably occurs when the floods of the Monsoon

rains choke and fill up the channels with sand, the Ryots are forced to leave their habitations, and travel many miles to clear out the channels, without receiving any emolument. Upon their indicating an appearance of a refusal to go, a heavy fine is inflicted, and notwithstanding the payment of the fine, they are then compelled to proceed to the distance and perform the work, though they have to pay for additional labour at home in consequence of their absence. The Tehsildars who conduct this business are invested with magisterial authority, and at their pleasure take the Ryots from place to place, far distant from their farms, using them with great severity, until the poor Ryots submissively succumb to their dogmatical commands.*

The lands cultivated by irrigation are frequently of little or no profit to the Ryots from the imperfect manner the tanks are put in repair; and if there is a failure of crops little sympathy from the Local Government is excited, and the Collector is not permitted to allow a remission unless he is satisfied the produce is fallen in the average to the amount of 10 per cent.; and in addition to their losses and extra expense they have to supply

* Mr. Elphinstone, in his *History of India*, speaking of the great Achar, says, "It is almost superfluous to dwell upon the character of the celebrated Achar, who was equally great in the cabinet and in the field, and renowned for his toleration, liberality, clemency, courage, temperance, industry, and largeness of mind. He perfected the financial reforms which had been commenced in those provinces by Shir Shah. He abolished many vexatious taxes, and his instructions to his revenue officers showed his anxiety for a liberal administration, and for the ease and comfort of his subjects."

at their own cost the collector's establishment with provisions during the whole time occupied in the settlement of this portion of the revenue.

Thus the Ryots, who are instruments in producing food for the population, and without their labour a famine would ensue, are taxed and oppressed. They are fearful of complaining, from the consciousness of being punished by those who would not put the proper interpretation on their sentiments. In case the Ryot cannot produce witnesses to confirm his complaint he is tenacious of exposing his grievance, being aware no credence will be placed in his testimony, and if witnesses are brought forward they are in fear of being charged with conspiracy against the Tehsildar. In the event of a Ryot appealing to the Board of Revenue, the complaint is sent to the collector, who frequently, without weighing every circumstance, decides in favour of the Government official, to the additional injury of the Ryot.

That the public may have some idea of the cruelty practised upon these poor Ryots it is better to use the language of a petition lately presented in the House of Lords from the Madras Native Association and other native inhabitants of the Presidency of Madras :—

“ That in order to possess your Honourable
 “ House with some idea of the cruelties under
 “ which the Ryotwar system can be, and actually
 “ is, exercised by the Government servants, your
 “ petitioners will quote an instance occurring in
 “ the year 1851, when certain Ryots in the Zillah

“ or collectorate of Guntoor, unable to obtain
 “ redress from the collector, the Commissioner,
 “ and the Board of Revenue, presented a petition
 “ to the Governor in Council to the following
 “ effect—‘That at the dittum settlement of the
 “ previous year, on their refusal to accept the
 “ dittum offered to them by the Tehsildars of six
 “ different Talooks, because it included lands that
 “ had been relinquished, and others which were
 “ not liable to assessment, and because the lands
 “ bearing assessment were then re-measured with
 “ new ropes, shorter by one cubit of the legal
 “ measure; some of them were compelled by im-
 “ prisonment and corporal punishment of various
 “ kinds to put their names to the dittums: and
 “ when others ran away from their Talooks to
 “ avoid the like treatment, the Curnums of the
 “ villages forged the names (of those who had
 “ absconded) to the dittums that were assigned to
 “ them; they who remained complained to the
 “ collector, who said the dittums should not be
 “ altered, and refused redress: and when the
 “ Jummabundy came round, on their refusal to
 “ pay the excess of the assessment the houses of
 “ the Ryots were stripped of their roofs: their
 “ ploughs, ploughing cattle, grain, seed, and
 “ forage for their grazing cattle, were seized by
 “ attachment and sold by auction. The houses of
 “ others were broken into and plundered by the
 “ Peons, who were paid batta (or extra wages)
 “ from the proceeds of the sales: their herd cattle
 “ were not permitted to graze, and their families

“ prohibited from taking water from the tanks
“ and wells for domestic purposes. Their petition
“ to the Governor in Council was transmitted to
“ the collector in the usual way, when that officer
“ applied for two years’ leave of absence; and
“ there the matter rests to this day; and although
“ your petitioners confine themselves to a recent
“ and single example, they do not scruple to
“ assert that, in a greater or less degree, these
“ practices are prevalent throughout every di-
“ vision of the Presidency.’ ”

Before the Government possessed this over-
whelming power great attention was paid to the
construction of reservoirs and channels for the
purpose of irrigation. But now it is different,
and in consequence of the reservoirs not being
kept in proper repair, and many of them suffered
to fall into decay, the agriculture of the Presi-
dency is impaired, and the Ryots brought to ruin
by the neglect. Besides the annual waterfee
levy (expressly collected for these repairs), a sepa-
rate charge is made in the land assessment for the
use of water. Yet with these sums annually paid,
how is it that the natives are obliged to complain
of the scarcity? It has been estimated that the
construction of new reservoirs where they are
required for an increased cultivation, will give a
return from 50 to 70 per cent. on the capital laid
out. If this estimate is correct there must be an
error in judgment by not employing capital to
advantage. Captain A. Cotton, in a report re-
cently published, speaking of the province of Tan-

jore, whose fertility has often acquired for it the name of "the Granary of Madras," states that the annual expenditure for repairs, and other purposes connected with irrigation, amounts to no more than about two per cent. upon the gross produce, and that in a moderate season enough water is lost to provide grain for about two millions and a half of people.

When the natives are so heavily oppressed—denied redress from the power that by degrees encroached upon their territory, and with the knowledge that their former Rulers took especial care to provide for their wants—when they perceive the decay taking place in their country, not by their own acts but by those who have extinguished the power of their sovereigns,* is it so strange to find that lassitude and *idleness* prevail—not so much accelerated by the climate as by wringing from them the produce of their industry and discouraging their efforts to the detriment of their minds, and the ruin of their offspring! They despair of relief, unless people of influence in England, who, with no self-interest in view, will take their case in hand, and procure for them the redress they anxiously seek to obtain. Enough

* The historian of Firoz Shah, who wrote in 1351, expatiates on the happy state of the Ryots, upon the goodness of their homes and furniture. His reign, though not brilliant in other respects, was distinguished for the enlightened spirit of his regulations, and the extent and utility of his public works. He limited the number of capital punishments, and put a stop to the use of torture and the practice of mutilation, which last prohibition was the more meritorious, as it was at variance with the Mahomedan law.—*Elphinstone*, vol. ii. p. 71.

is shown by their petition that their grievances are not frivolous, and that they are injured, oppressed, and cruelly treated. They have shown no unruly disposition; the Local Government have had no difficulty in governing them, as they always evince a spirit of submission to entitle them to consideration.

THE SALT DUTY.

We will now come to the monopoly in the article of salt, a source of revenue introduced by the Company. The manufacturer under former governments only paid a trifling duty, but under the British the right of manufacture was farmed, or rented by persons on terms which enabled them to sell it to the dealers and factors at 35 rupees per garce. In the year 1806, Government took the whole control of the Salt Department, and immediately doubled the price, charging 70 instead of 35 rupees per garce. In 1844, it was raised to 180 rupees.

When this last alteration took place a material difference in the consumption was found, so much so that the collectors perceived there would be little or no demand at all if a reduction of duty did not immediately take place; and it was resolved to fix it at 120 rupees per garce, which is the present price. The native is not at liberty to manufacture salt to the extent of his means. It depends entirely upon the Board of Revenue to determine whether the manufacture of the salt every year is necessary, and orders are sent to the collectors

in whose districts the salt is manufactured to settle the quantity. The native is not allowed to manufacture any for his own consumption.

According to the census taken in 1851 the population of Madras was taken at 22,301,697, and the revenue for one year, 1849–50, for salt, was 4,645,946 rupees, and the selling price being at 120 rupees per garce, the quantity consumed did not exceed 38,716 garces, or enough to supply the wants of 6,882,844 individuals.

Now let us take the average population, including the inhabitants of Mysore, Travancore, and Coorg. The last-named province less than twenty years ago being in possession of the unfortunate and ill-treated Rajah who at this time is in England, and to whose daughter her Majesty stood sponsor at Buckingham Palace, when the young Princess was baptized in the Christian faith. In taking the population of these places consider it as follows :—

Inhabitants of Madras	22,301,697
Mysore, Travancore, and Coorg	4,000,000
	<hr/>
	26,301,697
Deduct for Infants who do not require salt	6,000,000
	<hr/>
	20,301,697
Deduct number of persons supplied with salt...	6,882,844
	<hr/>
	13,418,853

It is here seen that 13,418,853 out of the above populations are not using the article, but if a reduction of duty occurs, so that it may come within reach of the multitude, it is fair to conceive that three-thirds of these populations would

be consumers, and the Company's revenue not deteriorated, independently of giving employment to additional persons, as well as the increased work distributed by the manufacturers, dealers, and factors. Much mendicancy would be prevented by the reduction, and as it is often remarked that "idleness is the root of all evil," a preventive of crime to a certain extent might be established. The natives are not so ignorant as to require a whole remission. They know for their general weal that to support a Government, from whom they expect to have salutary laws, it is imperative for the community to aid and assist a power in accomplishing a beneficial system of legislation.

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

Upon turning attention to the administration of justice in the Company's law courts at Madras, we find men sitting on the Bench who possess neither learning nor talents for their office, and who never had an opportunity to acquire even the elements of the theory or practice of the law. Yet these men are permitted to adjudicate in matters of vital importance both in the civil and criminal departments. It frequently happens that the appointment of a judgeship is given to an individual who never has been educated for the legal profession; and in 1850 one of the Company's collectors was made a Judge of the Zillah Court of Combaconum, one of the Courts of general resort for suitors. Yet this gentleman,

who had occupied a great portion of his time in acquiring knowledge for the duties of a collectorship, fills a post which none but a barrister of experience and talent should occupy. Now without the slightest detraction to this gentleman's ability, it must be assumed that from his former avocations it is not likely that he can administer the law so as to entitle his decisions to be looked upon as sound; and however anxious he may be of doing justice to the suitors, he cannot expect counsel or attorneys to place confidence in his skill. Another instance of this kind happened in the same year, when the Local Government appointed a Judge who had never performed a day's duty as a judicial officer, notwithstanding the appointment is to preside at a Court of Appeal in the extensive district of Coimbatore, and confers upon the office an unlimited jurisdiction. It is unnecessary to say that the power delegated to the latter office requires the most profound legal knowledge, and if the Judge who received this appointment can by *INSTINCT* make himself master of all the abstruseness of a profession which takes years for the most acute and comprehensive mind to acquire, he is perfectly able to sustain with *greatness* his judicial office; and the Company may congratulate themselves in having something more *wonderful—more astonishing*—than her Majesty or any of our preceding monarchs were ever able to obtain for the Courts at Westminster, though the judges of those courts are ornaments to their profession, and shed lustre upon the tri-

bunals over which they preside. If this Judge, appointed by the Company, is so fortunate as to acquire in a *moment* the power, knowledge, and skill, requisite to preside at a Court of Appeal, it will be useless for our Queen's Ministers to draw their attention to the bar at Westminster Hall or Lincoln's Inn for adequate lawyers to sit on our judicial bench at home, when they have an opportunity of sending to the *Board of Excise*, and selecting from the commissioners a judge *competent* to sit in our courts to adjudicate upon the difficult and intricate questions of law which are continually submitted to the English Judges for judgment.

Another complaint is the defective education of the Vakeels, who act as pleaders and advocates in the Sudder Courts, and who are generally extremely illiterate—not having gone through the legal training necessary for an advocate. They are a class of men different from the Pundits, Mooftes, and Mahomedan law doctors; the latter class being men of learning, and whose attention is exclusively devoted to the study of their profession. The natives think, and with reason, that the Vakeels should undergo a regular examination, and be duly licensed with a certificate verifying their fitness before they should be allowed to appear professionally in the courts. The Vakeels sometimes have been suspected of provoking litigation by inducing their clients to believe an action was maintainable when there was not the slightest prospect of success;

and from evidence lately given before a Committee of the House of Lords, on Indian affairs, there are grounds to suspect that some Vakeels are not very scrupulous about the interest of their clients; for it was represented before that Committee to be a common practice to send money to Vakeels for the purpose of bribing the officials of the Courts.

Another case of hardship to suitors, is the immense delay in the Courts. It is not uncommon for causes to be laying over for seven or eight years before they can be tried, and when proceedings are first commenced, a suitor to secure success, is often prepared with a complete chain of evidence, but in consequence of the long interval existing before trial the link is completely broken, arising from death, documents lost, witnesses not being in the country, and other incidental causes.

To prove the delay in litigation, a few cases are here selected from "Decisions of the Sudder Adawlut," published by that Court, embracing the last half-year of 1849.

Date of Proceedings of Sudder Adawlut	Nature of Decision.	Year of Original Suit.	Time occupied.
July 2, 1849.	Special Appeal Suit decided	1840	9 years.
" "	Suit remanded to Civil Court.....	1845	4 "
" "	Ditto ditto	1843	6 "
" "	Ditto ditto	1846	3 "
Aug. 20, 1849.	Suit remanded to original Court	1846	3 "
" "	Suit remanded to Civil Court ...	1847	2 "
" 23 "	Decrees of Lower Court reversed	1841	8 "
Oct. 22 "	Suit remanded to Civil Court.....	1846	3 "
Nov. 12 "	Ditto ditto	1845	4 "
Dec. 24 "	Decrees of Courts below reversed after two remands in 1840 and 1844.....	Uncertain	15 "

As many salutary legal reforms have within the last few years been effected at home, it is not surprising the natives are anxious to have a speedy reform in the Courts of Justice in India, and to know that law may be administered quickly and at a small expense. The stamp duty upon law proceedings is heavy in the extreme and ought to be abolished. It is useless to establish courts for the poor if they are obliged to pay a heavy tax, that on many occasions prevents them from obtaining claims which a dishonest opulent debtor may threaten to oppose by litigation. To exemplify the effect the stamp duties upon law proceedings have upon the poorer classes in India, it is better to be acquainted with the precise words of the Petition referring to this preposterous tax which are as follows:—

“ That in suits, whether in Courts of the first
 “ instance or in Appeal, every paper presented to
 “ the Court the power of attorney to the Vakeel,
 “ the pleadings, the exhibits of whatever kind,
 “ must be on stamped paper of a certain value,
 “ varying in an ascending scale, with the juris-
 “ diction of the Courts from four annas (sixpence)
 “ to four rupees (eight shillings) per sheet of
 “ thirty lines, independently of an institution fee
 “ payable in every Court, through which a suit
 “ may be carried, according to the following
 “ scale:—

“ In suits for sums not exceeding	16 rupees ..	1 rupee
“ Above 16 rupees and not exceeding	32 „ ...	2 rupees
“ From 32 to	64 „ ...	4 „
“ „ 64 to	150 „ ...	8 „
“ „ 150 to	300 „ ...	16 „

"	"	300 to	800 rupees ...	32 rupees
"	"	800 to	1600 " ...	50 "
"	"	1600 to	3000 " ...	100 "
"	"	3000 to	5000 " ...	150 "
"	"	5000 to	10000 " ...	250 "
"	"	10000 to	15000 " ...	350 "
"	"	15000 to	25000 " ...	500 "
"	"	25000 to	50000 " ...	750 "
"	"	50000 to	100000 " ...	1000 "

" Above 100,000 the stamp is 2,000 rupees, and
 " this fee is to be the stamp on the first sheet of
 " the plaint or petition of appeal; and all further
 " sheets to complete the pleading must have each
 " a stamp, varying according to the Court of
 " Jurisdiction from four annas to four rupees."

These heavy stamp duties must necessarily have prevented the recovery of many millions of rupees, and have created in the minds of the poorer class a species of distrust opposed to the mutual confidence indispensable to industry, and in producing comfort under their humble roofs. The natives have a right to complain. They have been oppressed too long—their condition has been brought to too low an ebb from the length of time their sufferings have been concealed from Europe—and it is essential that measures should be adopted to extricate them from such severe burthens. The gates of justice are closed in India with great strength, and it is incumbent on them, for their own preservation, to unite and effect an opening, to obtain a proper and cheap administration of law. In the Company's Courts in India there are no juries, with the exception of the Queen's Courts, and then juries are only allowed in

criminal matters. Why is this so? Should not the natives possess a privilege of judging upon circumstances submitted as evidence in the various causes brought into those Courts, and not have the province of a jury exclusively confined (as it is now) to criminal matters in the Queen's Courts. If juries are permitted to discover the truth by dissecting evidence that is brought forward in a prosecution, it is clear that plaintiffs and defendants in the Civil Courts should have the same opportunity to establish facts as a prosecutor and prisoner. By not having trial by jury in civil cases, the natives to a very large extent are deprived of a bulwark between their liberties and the undue powers of the Local Government.

CARNATIC STIPENDIARIES.

The next complaint proceeds from the indignance of the Madras population at the Company's treatment towards the Royal Family of the Carnatic, and which is increased on beholding the decayed vestiges of their former splendour, that is nevertheless perceptible and not quite effaced by the hand of time. They know that their Royal Family have been deprived of their Jaghires without a cause, and that in lieu of those Jaghires stipends were granted. The natives also know that in many cases the stipend paid per year for a Jaghire is not a tenth part of its annual worth;*

* See Pamphlet entitled "*Statement of the East India Company's Conduct towards the Carnatic Stipendiaries*," page 23.—Saunders and Stanford, 6, Charing Cross.

and when they reflect on the manner in which many of the Nabobs of Arcot have been treated by the sinister and flimsy pretences of the Company, a blush of shame is raised at the remembrance. A native naturally thinks that if he is taxed and oppressed, the descendants of their former Nabobs should have received some compassion—some act of justice from the *present participators of the royal grants*, so unjustly taken, and which were held (before the Treaty of 1801) by the possessors as hereditary gifts from their Nabobs, who assigned them to their ancestors as absolute property, to descend for ever from generation to generation. Lord Cornwallis, when he was party to the Carnatic Treaty of 1792, knew that these Jaghires* were fee-simples; that they were not life grants, but absolute ones to the donees and to the heritage of their heirs; that they were gifts by Sovereigns in consideration of the merits of individuals, who afterwards held them as absolute property, and neither a Sovereign or his successors could cancel or revoke the grants. The act of seizing the Jaghires proved that the Company paid very little regard to the spirit of treaties, and from subsequent conduct towards the Princes of India, they do not even take the trouble to quibble on the language of a Treaty that possesses a tendency to the disadvantage of their Government, but act in total defiance and opposition both to spirit and construction.

The Government of India have appointed secret

* Jaghires are freeholds.

commissions of inquiry in the conduct of sovereigns, and seldom given them a fair opportunity of disproving the evidence. Upon *exparte* charges they are taken by surprise and dethroned. The accused has no knowledge of the evidence until it is too late. Power of defence is withheld, and the truth seldom elicited by those acting in the commission.* Treaties are useful to them for a time, but in after times not always convenient; hence the common-sense language of treaties is sometimes perverted.

In the Treaty of 1801, which gave the Company the whole ruling power of the Carnatic, two separate explanatory articles were affixed, and the first is as follows :—

“ Whereas, it is stipulated by the 5th article of
 “ the treaty, that the sum to be appropriated to
 “ the support of the dignity of His Highness the
 “ Nabob Azeem Ud Dowlah shall be calculated at
 “ one-fifth part of the net revenues of the Car-
 “ natic, and whereas the improvement of the said
 “ revenue, which, under Providence, may be ex-
 “ pected to arise from the effects of the present
 “ arrangement, may render the said fifth part
 “ greater than will be necessary for the purposes
 “ intended by the contracting parties, it is hereby
 “ explained, for the better understanding of the
 “ 5th article of the Treaty, that whenever the
 “ whole net revenue of the Carnatic, including
 “ the sums to be deducted according to the 6th

* See Rujuo Bapojee's Letter of the 26th July, 1852, to the President of the Board of Control.

“ article of the Treaty, shall exceed the sum of
 “ 25 lakhs of star pagodas, then in that case the
 “ fifth part of such surplus shall be applied to the
 “ repair of fortifications, to the establishment of a
 “ separate fund for the eventual exigencies of war,
 “ or to the military defence of the Carnatic, in
 “ such manner as may be determined by the Go-
 “ vernor in Council of Fort St. George, after the
 “ previous communication to his Highness the
 “ Nabob Azeem Ud Dowlah.”

Perhaps it will not be impertinent for some Member of the House of Commons to enquire if information can be given as to when, where, and how many communications have been made according to this article with respect to repairs of fortifications; and for the military defence of the Carnatic, and how much money has been expended for those purposes. Now, as the Carnatic has not been at war since 1799, there must be a considerable surplus of revenue in the hands of the Company to be so applied; and, as the article refers to the 5th and 6th articles in the Treaty, they are here given for the readers to be acquainted with their purport.

ARTICLE V.

“ It is hereby stipulated and agreed that one-
 “ fifth part of the net revenues of the Carnatic
 “ shall be annually allotted for the maintenance
 “ and support of the said Nabob and of his own
 “ immediate family, including the Mahal of his
 “ late Highness Ameer Ul Omrah. The said fifth
 “ part shall be paid by the Company in monthly

“ instalments of 12,000 star pagodas; and what-
 “ ever balance of the said fifth part may remain
 “ due at the expiration of each year shall be
 “ liquidated upon the settlement of accounts; and
 “ the said fifth part shall be at the free disposal of
 “ the said Nabob, consistently with the principles
 “ of the said alliance.”

ARTICLE VI.

“ The fifth part of the revenues stated in the
 “ preceding article shall be calculated and deter-
 “ mined in the following manner, *viz.*: all charges
 “ of every description incurred in the collection
 “ of the revenues, the amount of the Jaghire
 “ Lands, stated in the 9th article of the Treaty of
 “ 1787 at star pagodas 213,421 and the sum of
 “ pagodas 621,105, appropriated to the liquidation
 “ of the debts of the late Mahomed Ali, in the first
 “ instance be deducted from the revenues of the
 “ Carnatic, and after the deduction of those three
 “ items shall have been made, one-fifth of the
 “ remaining net revenue, including the Poligar
 “ Peishcush, which shall always be calculated at
 “ the sum of star pagodas 264,701-20-26, accord-
 “ ing to the Treaty of 1792, shall be allotted for
 “ the maintenance of the said Nabob, and for the
 “ support of his Highness’s dignity.”

In the yearly statement of the Carnatic re-
 venues, ending in July, 1825, of which the Nabob
 has one-fifth, the account stands thus:—

	Rüp.	An.	Pic.
“ Net collections	11,101,764	7	6
“ Deductions, according to first expla- natory article affixed to Treaty	2,351,764	7	6
	8,750,000	0	0”

Twenty-five lakhs of pagodas amount to 8,750,000 rupees, therefore there was a surplus in that year of 2,351,764 rupees—the fifth part to be applied to a fund for fortifications and military expenditure appertaining ONLY to the Carnatic. The Members of the House of Commons have a right to ask for some explanation with regard to this matter—not merely confining themselves to the year 1825, as there are other years wherein the surplus is greater.* Should the surplus in every year since 1801 have been more than 2,351,764 rupees, an immense sum must be in the Company's Treasury for this purpose; but suppose it always to be at that sum, the fifth part would be 470,352 rupees per annum; and that amount taken yearly for fifty-one years, would produce in their exchequer 23,987,952 rupees, even if not a single rupee had ever been lent at interest. *There are in this country persons who ought to be examined upon the subject of this fund.*

In Madras the Company, until the year 1843, had a Bank, where money was lent at six per cent.; and if there were many borrowers of large sums, the interest of the fifth part of this surplus would produce upwards of £2800 per annum. Another question will be necessary to ask the President of the Board of Control, and that is the sum fixed for the Poligar Peishcush, always, according to the 6th article of the Treaty of 1801, to be calculated at star pagodas 264,701-20-26, and whether

* The year ending in July, 1823, the surplus was 3,154,858 rupees.

the present Nabob of the Carnatic receives a fifth of that amount? The time has now arrived when the House of Commons are in a position to demand an answer to interrogatories which can and may be put with fairness; and it is hoped that the Members will not receive evasive replies.

It is questionable whether the natives of India are so happy under the rule of the respective Local Governments as they would have been under their native Princes, or if there was not the extraordinary power given to the Board of Control to exercise its functions so much in *secret*.

European travellers, upwards of two centuries ago, spoke of the comfort and happiness of the people; and Mr. Elphinstone, in his *History of India*, speaking of Shah Jehan, the grandson of the great Acbar, says: "His own dominions enjoyed almost uninterrupted tranquility and good government; and although Sir Thomas Roe was struck with astonishment at the profusion of wealth which was displayed when he visited the Emperor in his camp, in 1615, in which at least two acres were covered with silk, gold carpets, and hangings, as rich as velvet embossed with gold and precious stones could make them, yet we have the testimony of Tavernier, that he who caused the celebrated peacock throne to be constructed, who at the festival of his accession scattered amongst the bystanders money and precious things equal to his whole weight, reigned not so much as a king over his subjects, but rather as a father of his own family."

Facts are established to prove that distress and misery have been prevalent in India (since the Company by Treaties acquired so much power) to render it necessary that an alteration in the system of government should soon take place ; and whenever it occurs it may be the means of having proper constructions put upon Treaties,* and that we shall not be reproached with treachery, or have it said that we entrap parties to enter into treaties for our own aggrandizement, and take property belonging to others with the knowledge that the rightful owners are suffering

* Mr. Sullivan, in his pamphlet entitled *A Plea for the Princes of India*, very forcibly states, " That it is by virtue of Treaties and Grants from the native Princes that the British hold all their possessions in the East. Is it worthy of a great Government—is it consistent with common honesty—is it politic—to put one interpretation upon Treaties by which we receive territory, and another interpretation upon Treaties by which we cede territory, when precisely the same terms are used in both ? The terms in which the native Princes cede territory to us, is cession to the East India Company, their heirs and successors in perpetual sovereignty. We dictate these terms to the native powers as the strongest which language will furnish, to convey a complete and unalterable alienation of territory from them to us. The granters know, and we know, that when a conveyance in these terms has once passed, the territory is ours for ever, and that the original owners can in no pretence re-claim it. For example—in 1801 the Nabob of Oude ceded in perpetual sovereignty to the East India Company those provinces which form the largest portion of the Government of Agra. In 1813 we ceded to the Nabob of Oude, ' his heirs and successors in perpetual sovereignty,' in consideration of a million sterling paid in hard cash, certain districts which he had conquered from the Rajah of Nepaul. In 1818 we ceded in perpetual sovereignty to the Rajah of Sattara, his heirs and successors, certain districts specified in a schedule in 1839. We renewed this Treaty in precisely the same terms, and in 1848 we ruled that ' perpetual sovereignty' had no meaning, that heirs and successors meant only heirs by blood, and that by the law and custom of India we had a right to the territory as an escheat upon the failure of such heirs."

privations from the loss, as in the case of the Jaghiredars at the time the Company took their property without ever consulting them, and paying *as an equivalent* inadequate stipends, which the Company now desire to take away entirely, although it was stipulated by the 1801 Treaty that a suitable provision for the family of the late Nabobs "should be made chargeable on the "revenues of the Carnatic," and which revenues are increased between TWO AND THREE MILLIONS OF RUPEES by the produce of the seized Jaghires.

Sometimes, when application is made to the Company for redress a deaf ear is turned, perhaps on the omission of a trifling circumstance, not at first presenting itself to the mind of the applicant; but when a further memorial is submitted, embodying all facts and circumstances, so much so that a complete case is made out, "that not a hinge nor loop can hang a doubt on," the answer generally received is through the Company's Secretary, Mr. Melville, stating that the Court, meaning the Board of Directors, cannot *open* the question: and this was the case last January, when a memorial was sent on behalf of the distressed family of the ex-Rajah of Sattara, relative to the restoration of certain private property claimed on behalf of his son. This memorial was forwarded to the Court of Directors last December, with a polite letter from Mr. Hume, Mr. Sullivan, Alderman Salomons, and other gentlemen, who, being perfectly satisfied with the truth of its contents, out of commiseration and sympathy interested themselves for the family.

Such conduct as this is undoubtedly an error that deserves strong censure, it being an anomaly to justice and quite in contradiction to the practice observed in our law courts, for there it is a rule that if either plaintiff or defendant are unsuccessful in an action they are at liberty to move for a new trial, and the rule is made absolute if the court is furnished with facts upon affidavits, showing a probability of setting aside the verdict already returned. As well might a judge say from the bench to a counsel (upon application being made for a new trial), thus a question having once been tried, the Court would not listen to any motion, though law as well as merits are with the applicant: or a Member of the House of Commons could with the same reason be called to order in moving to repeal a statute that did not operate for the benefit of the people.

It is therefore clear that errors have been committed by the Government in India not to be palliated by even their most strenuous advocates, and if the numerous oppressions are allowed to be proved (which is easily done), by granting proper inquiry, the native population will be satisfied. It is the public's prerogative to ascertain the many abuses existing in India, and when convinced to devise means for suppressing them, in order that the poor Ryot may be raised from the degrading humiliation he at present suffers; that the humane may acknowledge by their acts that they have been ignorant until recently of his unhappy state, and that they are taking quick

steps to alleviate his wretchedness produced by a system of government disfigured by ERRORS.

Let the native population have the confidence that the Legislature intends to inquire into and mitigate the evils productive of their complaints—that attention will be paid to relieve them of the heavy duties which prevents many obtaining the necessaries of life—that a better administration of justice will take place—and that the various sovereigns and deserving members of the families of their former Rulers will have reason to think that the English public have sympathy, and are anxious to correct errors brought to their sight, and compel the power committing those errors to make atonement.

GLOSSARY.

- Anna*—Three-halfpence English Money.
- Batta*—Money paid to an Officer who is in possession of Property under a Distress for Rent, Taxes, &c. &c.
- Choultrie*—A covered Building for the accomodation of Travellers.
- Cutchery*—Public Office where the Rents are paid, and other Business respecting the Revenue is transacted.
- Curnums*—Village Accountants.
- Dittum*—Agreement to take Land. Settlement.
- Garce*—Three Thousand Two Hundred measures of Salt.
- Jaghiredar*—The holder of a Jaghire.
- Jummabundy*—A written Schedule of the whole of an Assessment.
- Pagoda*—Seven Shillings English Money.
- Peishcush*—A Tribute.
- Peons*—Police Officers.
- Poligar*—A Military Chieftain, Head of a District.
- Rupee*—Two shillings English Money.
- Ryot*—Cultivator of Soil, Farmer, Tenant of a House or Land.
- Sheristardar*—A Head Native Officer in the Law Courts, also the Head Officer of the Collector's Cutchery.
- Talook*—A small District.
- Tehsildar*—A Native Collector of a Talook.
- Vakeel*—An Envoy, Special Pleader, Advocate, an Attorney.

INDIA AND ITS FUTURE;

OR,

AN ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES.

BY

A RETIRED BENGAL CIVILIAN,

AUTHOR OF "A GLANCE AT THE EAST."

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A FEW WORDS ADDRESSED TO THE READER.

THE Author feels much diffidence in placing this small pamphlet concerning affairs in India before the public; he is well aware that he has discharged a duty which he felt was imperative on him, in a very imperfect manner, and he is also perfectly conscious that many may take exceptions to his various proposals to remedy past errors. A considerable Indian experience leads him to believe that there is nothing very impracticable in what he has advanced, and that a system such as he advocates, however faulty, which, while tolerating religious freedom, is calculated to encourage settlers, promote works of irrigation and railways, improve our monetary system, reduce our expenditure, remove all shackles from commerce, bring the governors and governed into closer contact, make every one responsible from the highest to lowest for their acts, place our army on a greatly superior footing, reorganise our police,

do away with a great deal of litigation, simplify the forms of justice and the complexities of law, and remove the double or quadruple Government and their monopolies, will go far not only to vastly improve our position in British India, but to lead the natives eventually to bless our advent among them, and give an impetus to European trade, while simultaneously opening out new marts for our goods and new fields for our enterprise, such as we have hitherto had no conception of.

INDIA AND ITS FUTURE.

CHAPTER I.

AT a period so momentous, when the Houses of the Legislature are about to re-assemble, to investigate into the causes of the great Mutiny in India, and to determine what course shall be pursued in the future government of that immense Empire, it becomes a paramount duty in all who have had experience in the troubled districts, to endeavour to place before those in whose hands the remedy rests for evils resulting from misunderstanding and misgovernment, such facts as may be known to them, so that it may not be said at any future period that no one raised a warning voice; for there cannot be a doubt that, if the errors of the past be persisted in, they will inevitably lead to a repetition of the fearful scenes that are still fresh before our eyes, and to a revolution which, from being more consolidated, must be still more disastrous in its effects, and more difficult to deal with. It is a most curious result of nearly all investigations made into the conduct of public men, even where there can be no doubt of gross mismanagement, that no one is ever rendered subject to blame; the fault being invariably placed in the system, or in some other inapproachable position, and the person in fault escapes scot-free. However faulty the system may be, or however perseveringly erroneous practices have been followed up, the system, and not the ignominious who persisted in it, is reproached; and so we shall see to be the case with affairs in India, gross as has been the misrule

there. Thus, if among our Indian Potentates A did wrong, B was equally foolish, thinking A to be a clever fellow, and followed in the same path; C and D did likewise; E and F thought all must be right, as A B C and D had set the example; and so, instead of any one of the responsible parties taking the trouble to consider whether he was acting rightly or not, he simply contented himself with thinking that his predecessors having done such and such things, he could not be far wrong in doing likewise; and thus nothing has been done to abolish old customs and rules, as erroneous in themselves as injurious to our Indian Empire. It may be useful to consider some of the more obvious of our errors in the East. The first of these clearly arises from misgovernment in England. It is only by reversing the position of things that we can clearly understand this: thus, let us imagine that a fearful Chartist conspiracy had taken place in England; that the Houses of Parliament were in India; and that we had to communicate with India ere proper measures could be taken to put it down,—the stupid anomaly would be at once apparent, and the disastrous consequences of having to communicate and obtain relief *viâ* India would become clearly visible. Let us carry out this similitude a little further, and imagine that every law enacted for England had to make a voyage to and from India before it could be brought to bear. Could such a state of things be for one moment tolerated? What Englishman would submit to it? Now, let us reflect, are we not doing exactly the same by India, only in a still more cumbrous and ridiculous way? It would seem a matter of common sense in the despatch of every day's business, that, were an English merchant to require transactions to be carried on with Russia, Germany, or France, he would employ some one in his counting-house that could speak Russian, German, or French, and select persons who, by their residence and experience in those countries, could at least give him some assurance that they were competent to undertake the responsibility of the duties entrusted to them. But such a trifling matter as the government of poor insignificant India obviously does not require much consideration; and whether the Board of Control or the Court of Directors know anything or nothing of

the language, people, or country of that trifling territory consigned to their care, evidently matters not. Let us, however, again reverse the state of things, and suppose that the people of England had to complain to certain great people in India constituting Boards and Courts, learned in Hindostanee, but ignorant of the English language, of the character of the people, and of the nature and resources of the country, could such a state of things be allowed to exist for one day?

Again: were the people of England informed that their rulers in India consisted of some twenty people, not one of whom were in any way individually responsible for their acts, would they not open their wondering eyes? It could never be believed by them, that a nation professing to rule on the principles of equity and justice would allow the existence of an irresponsible Government. To carry on our example of an Indian rule existing over England, what would be the surprise of the English if they were to see Governor-General Nawab Shumsh-ood-deen Bahadoor arrive from India to rule England with all his Indian notions, and unable to speak a word of English to any one; full of novel ideas of what he intended to do to set things to rights, and improve this benighted country after his own model, all derived from the depths of his own brain, or from hearsay and miscellaneous reading? Great—and deservedly so—would be their indignation against a people who would thus venture to trifle with, under the pretence of governing, them. If such, indeed, be the case, and the above be not a misrepresentation of our rule in the East, the sooner a reform be established there in these particulars the better. Representatives of the British nation! the subject before you is not one of light moment. Let not old and established customs weigh with you, if you find them opposed to common-sense; allow the truth to prevail; do not imagine that a Government so erroneously conducted under your auspices on this side of the water, is free from blame for the military revolution now taking place on the other side of it, and never rest till you see a Government established to rule India, founded on such principles, that if *you* had to be under its influences and orders, you could yourselves heartily approve of it. Do

not be led away with arguments tending to prove the mildness of our Eastern rule, and be induced to suppose that nothing else is requisite, and that, therefore, neither error of commission nor omission exists. Let the new order of things be an improvement on the mistakes of the past, and, as far as practicable, unimpeachable. It is with this view the suggestions contained in the following pages are placed before you, not with the remotest idea that the best-devised system possible has been traced out in them, but with some hope, that, as emanating from the result of many years' residence and practical experience obtained by the Author in the North-western Provinces of India and Bengal, in magisterial and revenue employ, they may be deemed in some measure to bear a guarantee that they are not offered in utter ignorance of the subjects treated of, or from a mere spirit of speculative imagination, and may thus possibly be rendered the means of assisting in preventing those who have not had a fair opportunity of ascertaining facts from being led away by the warmth of political debate.

CHAPTER II.

DELHI AS IT WAS, AND OTHER INTRODUCTORY MATTER.

READER! imagine a city situated on the banks of the beautiful river Jumna, bounded by it on one side, and surrounded by a somewhat modernised, crenellated wall and ditch on the other three (the entire circuit of which is about seven or eight miles), filled with superb mosques, with their glittering domes; a noble palace, the residence of the ancient Moguls; some fine gardens, and splendid native mansions, occasionally bounded by squalid huts; a few very fine streets, with innumerable small and dirty ones leading into them; a great many bazaars, in which are sold almost every description of article that can be imagined; a gigantic magazine, and a splendid arsenal; and you will have some slight idea of what the general appearance of Delhi was. It was a city that, to the eyes of the natives of

India, especially of Mussulmen, was equivalent to what London is to an Englishman, Paris to a Frenchman, or Moscow to a Russian. The palace at Delhi, and the Jumma Musjid there, are as well or better known to the Easterns, as St. James's, the Tuileries, or the Kremlin to Europeans. The language of Delhi is considered quite as refined, with comparison with the *patois* of the rest of India, as the Court language of London or Paris as regards the dialects of Yorkshire or Cornwall. Delhi conveys to the native mind the concentration of all that is elegant, *recherché*, and beautiful, in language, manners, luxuries, or dress. It is supposed by them to *contain everything* (to use their own phrase), except it be their fathers and mothers; whether the imagination revel on valuable gems, beautiful shawls, elaborately-worked guns, finely-bound and illuminated books, superb horses, splendid vehicles, grand houses, handsome men, or beautiful women. Say you want anything, and ask where it is to be procured; the answer is sure to be (whether probable or improbable, and though you may be a thousand miles off), "Oh! it can be had at Delhi!" Delhi is a complete cynosure in the eye of the Hindostanee: many of their most learned men of the Mahommedan religion, as well as numbers of the wealthiest of the Hindoo persuasion, live there; it is filled with the ancient Mogul-nobility of India, and its palace alone contained between 3000 or 4000 Süllätäens, or descendants of former, as well as of the present Emperor of Delhi. No wonder, then, that the natives generally looked up to Delhi as something very extraordinary and that (smarting from being held in subjection by a nation deemed by them infidels), the Mahommedans especially considered this splendid city their own, and prayed night and day for the restoration of their power. No wonder that the disaffected to our rule have swarmed there; no wonder that all the mutincers have looked forward to it as their rallying point, and have strained every nerve to reach it; no wonder that Delhi always has been the hot-bed of conspiracy, and been filled with the seeds of revolution: the real cause for wonder is, that, with such chances placed before them, and such opportunities at hand, the smouldering fire has not long ago burst

forth ; that with a large fortified town, having the advantage of an extensive river-front, by which men and supplies of every description can be poured into it, and of such extent as to render it impossible properly to surround it ; with an enormous magazine of military stores left quite at their mercy, and unprotected save by their own people ; the disaffected have not long since availed themselves of all that our rulers have, in their utter ignorance of India, stupidly, foolhardily, and unsuspectingly, been for years placing at their disposal.

Is it possible, that any one conversant with the Bengal side of India could ever have ignored all these facts ; and that, at this moment, there should be any man found bold enough to assert that our rulers there knew nothing of the true position of affairs ? that they were not fully aware of the actual state of Delhi, and have been now, at the eleventh hour, taken by surprise ? that they were like moles, grubbing about in the dark, and knew no more of the storm likely to burst over them, than that sable animal knows at what time it is probable that his hole will be dug up ! when they have, beyond all question, for years run the risks and braved the chances which have now been taken advantage of, placed Delhi in the hands of the insurgents, the Mogul Emperor on our throne (however temporarily), and shaken our power in the East to its very foundations ? No Governor could say that he was ignorant that many of our fortresses and principal magazines have been for years either wholly, or nearly so, in the charge of native troops ; it is a great mercy, and through the providence of an over-ruling Power alone, that the fortress of Delhi only, and not those of Allahabad, &c. also, were not in the possession of the mutineers. What, then, may be asked, would have been our position ? A hundred thousand British soldiers would, in that case, have hardly hoped to regain the country, considering the length of time likely to be occupied in reducing each fort, and the effects of climate on the European constitution, added to the chances of war—for we are not now contending against the ignorant natives of former years, but against our own disciplined troops, who are quite as good at fighting behind walls, and in constructing them, as the Russians were at Sebastopol. There is

no option between conceding either that our Indian rulers have been grossly ignorant of India, and were taken aback by the storm, or that they were rash and foolhardy enough to brave it, and place themselves in a position to feel its dire effects, almost to the destruction of our empire in the East; and, in either case, were totally unfit to hold the high office entrusted to them. What, then, are we to do with India? What *has been done* with it, is gradually becoming apparent; we have been trying the foolish experiment of attempting to rule some 200,000 millions with a few hundred civil and a few thousand military officers, without giving to those delegated to that responsible task the power necessary to assert their authority. We have been steadily pursuing the fatal course of elevating to an equality with our own position in the East the native, whose mind, from his birth, is imbued with immorality, and whose soul is steeped in a lie. We have vainly imagined, that the mere routine of education can eradicate the force of that tuition which is derived from a mother's lap, which the native imbibes with his mother's milk, which surrounds him like a mantle at every step, from his cradle through life. We have placed the person, with whom we should be very sorry to associate in private, on the same judicial bench with ourselves; informed the natives of India, that justice from men whom they know would sell them for a song is equivalent to that administered by Englishmen; and that a native, because possessed of the outward form of humanity, is just as good as an European. On the other hand, the European officers have had their hands tied to the greatest possible extent, and every act of theirs looked upon with the utmost possible suspicion. We boldly assert, that many more Englishmen would be punished and hanged in England under similar proofs than natives in India, owing to written evidence alone (which is often erroneous) being relied on by the final Court, and the complex forms required to be gone through. The numerous statements called for from civil servants are so onerous, that hours and hours of their most valuable time are periodically wasted in their preparation; and this with a view only to satisfy the superior authorities as to the trustworthiness or otherwise of their subordinates. Everything is reduced to the

fixed standard of rule; and no one is trusted, even to the extent of an hair's breadth. This order of things has not been arrived at in one day, but is the result of a false system, steadily pursued by those high officials who were too blind to see that the result must eventually be a total want of respect for, and, consequently, a complete undermining of, the authority of both services, civil and military. Is it not obvious, that if you take away from an officer his power of flogging, admit the most frivolous appeals against his orders, and curtail his authority, he is rendered incapable of commanding the respect of the unruly spirits in his regiment? There can be no question as to one point, viz. that neither civil nor military officers should be entertained for service in India without the exercise of the greatest caution, nor should those who are subsequently found to be unfit or unworthy, be promoted to posts of responsibility; but, after due trial, once placed there, once in office, they ought to be and must be trusted and upheld, and not surrounded by trammels which are fatal to that respect, and I may add fear, which forms the basis of all subordination in the native mind. An honest purpose, a determined will, and a tight hand, with proper support in a conscientious discharge of his duties, form the requisites for all officers employed in the East, to whatever service they may belong.

The misfortune of our position there is, that our governors generally commence their career in utter ignorance of the native feelings and the native character. They go out from England filled with all sorts of philanthropical notions, imagine that they see civilized and enlightened Old England, only with a black face, before them, and legislate accordingly. It never occurs to them to imagine, for one moment, what the impression formed on the native minds by their own religion is, and what the sort of moral degradation in which they are born, steeped, and live. They forget that those they rule over do not either mix or associate with them, and that they are as distinct from each other as any two contraries can be. And we have witnessed the result? No good can arise from attaching blame to any particular individual; the whole system of government is rotten to its core: the Civil Courts especially,

not from any want of benevolence, far from it, for so mild a system of government never existed; but from carrying a misplaced philanthropy to a great and most dangerous excess: precisely as if a child seeing a tiger with a sleek skin in a cage should, in its simplicity and ignorance, open the cage door, and say, "Poor thing! why should it not have its liberty? why keep it in confinement?" and go and caress it as a pet. The result would in the latter case be obvious. We now perceive that our pet lambs were in reality only tigers of the most ferocious species, and that there was nothing diabolical, nothing of the most savage and cruel nature, that has escaped their malignity in the hideous massacres they perpetrated among our unfortunate countrymen, when once they had them in their power. It may well be asked, Shall we revert to that false order of things which had prepared the way for this hecatomb of our slaughtered brethren? Great must be the fool who would go out as the servant of the East Indian Government, unless vast and radical changes are made on the restoration of something like order. That the time has arrived for introducing a complete revolution in, and greatly simplifying our system of Indian Government, cannot be doubted. In all Governments no authority should be delegated to any, from the highest to the lowest, without immediate responsibility. The great evil attending all Companies is, that the responsibility is so divided among numbers, that virtually there is none left; and it is on this account we find that Companies do acts collectively that each member would, if he did them in his individual capacity, be ashamed of. As to those who have ruled India, it is sufficient that the slaughter of our infants, the violation of our women, the mutilation and massacre of our men, and the hellish contrivances to torture all who fell into the hands of these demons in the shape of men, must be an everlasting reproach to them for their misgovernment, and determination not to take advice in due season of people competent to give it. The following extract, among numerous others, from the "Bombay Telegraph," throws some light on the character of the Hindostanee nation:—"On the evening

of this engagement the column encamped outside the walls of Cawnpore, and on the morning of the 17th our soldiers entered the city. Accustomed as they had been to scenes of slaughter, the spectacle that met their eyes nearly petrified them with horror. They marched straight to a place where they were told 175 women and children were confined, but on their arrival they found that they had come too late! They only found the clothes of the poor victims strewn over the blood-stained ground. The scene of this horrible catastrophe was a paved court-yard, and one of the Highlanders in writing to a contemporary says, 'there were two inches of blood upon the pavement, and from the report that we got from the residents of the place it appears that after we had beaten the enemy, the evening previous, the Sepoys and Sowars entered the place where the unhappy victims were, killed all ladies, and threw the children alive, as well as the ladies' dead bodies, into a well in the compound. I saw it, and it was an awful sight. It appears, from the bodies we saw, that the women were stripped of their clothes before they were murdered.' 'A feeling more terrible than vengeance arises in the heart at reading this, and even the most reverent shudder when they think that Omnipotence could have deemed such a terrible ordeal necessary. The history of the world affords no parallel to the terrible massacres which during the last few months have desolated the land. Neither age, sex, nor condition has been spared. Children have been compelled to eat the quivering flesh of their murdered parents, after which they were literally torn asunder by the laughing fiends who surrounded them. Men in many instances have been mutilated, and, before being absolutely killed, have had to gaze upon the last dishonour of their wives and daughters previous to being put to death. But really we cannot describe the brutalities that have been committed; they pass the boundaries of human belief, and to dwell upon them shakes reason upon its throne." A people so devoid of all natural and moral feeling, and who have acted so basely, deserve no promises respecting religion, for, as regards this, it is obvious they have none deserving the name in any true sense; for even

savages know that the slaughter and violation of inoffensive women and children forms no part of any religion. If we give any promise of this sort it will be a grave error, and must end in evil.

If we ever hope to re-establish our honour, our name, and our prestige in India, Delhi, Cawnpore, and other places where our women and children have been dishonoured, must cease to exist, save on the page of history. Not one stone should be left on another. What must be the outraged feelings of Englishmen to find themselves called upon, at some short period hence, to administer justice where such foul crimes have been perpetrated? Shall we leave those accursed cities standing as perpetual records of our shame? If there be but one grain or spark of feeling in the heart of Englishmen, Delhi, and other similar places, must be made to resemble Babylon, and become the dwelling of the beasts of the desert; their precincts should be reserved as places for the execution of these barbarous miscreants and rebels, who should be buried there with every circumstance of ignominy that could render that burial dishonourable and degrading. As for Delhi, in a more healthy locality in its neighbourhood, let another city be founded, commanded by a strong Fort, and call it Victoriapoor (or the *city* of Victoria), in honour of her Majesty. Let Delhi and other cities be made, to all time, examples of what shall befall that city which shall dare in future to raise the standard of rebellion among us. This should be our first work. The ruins of Delhi would yield plenty of material for a new and much more splendid city, which might be erected on either bank of the Jumna, and connected in the middle by a stone bridge. We could then regulate the size of the streets and squares, and the magnitude, architecture, and quality of the buildings and bazaars, &c., to our own wishes. Each person who had suffered by loss in the old city, who was *known to be a good man*, should have a spot made over to him in the new one. This accomplished, those who have been faithful to us in the struggle should be immediately rewarded with honours and titles, together with the lands, houses, and possessions of the re-

bellious. The army should forthwith be reorganized, and nothing left to chance. It is clear that, for some time to come, a large European force must be retained in India; an European force alone, however, is obviously unsuited to carry out the entire duties hitherto performed by natives. Each corps should be officered to the full extent of our English regiments of the line, or rather in excess. Caste should especially be set aside, and an understanding on enlistment should clearly be established, that as regards military duties, caste, or religion, was to have no existence. This, of course, would not refer to their private devotions. Flogging should be reintroduced, and the commanding and other officers have increased authority. The Europeans of each regiment should always be kept together at a central head-quarter's station, and the natives sent about to do detached duty in the surrounding neighbourhood. Each company of natives should have officers selected from among its own men; the existing faithful Sepoys should be promoted, and be divided into companies, one of each being attached to each new regiment, and as they died, or were pensioned off, cease to be replaced, except by new companies of Sikhs, Goorkhas, or low-caste men: by this means our army might be reorganized, much reduced in size, and rendered much more effective, for each corps would be as well officered, and almost equal in quality of material, to a British regiment. No possibility for combination should again be permitted. At each station there should be a proper cantonment and buildings for the troops, &c., constructed; in the first place by the Government, and then kept in repair by the occupants. One of the main causes that gave strength to the present outbreak was, that no Sepoy had a home, and but very few their families with them. They had no one to care for; their relatives were far off, and safe. There can be no hold on people so situated; no Sepoy had any one to care for but himself, and when they went off, it was either to join others or to go to a distance to their homes. If the men at Delhi and Meerut had been incumbered with wives and daughters, however disaffected they might have been, they would not have ventured on the cruelties practised

on our poor helpless women and children, as they would have feared, even though without good reason, a retaliation on their own.

The Sepoys, pampered, and fed, and upheld by a Government too ignorant and too presumptuous to listen to any remonstrance, suggestion, or advice—their cases, however trivial, the first always to be attended to on the Civil List before all other claimants, however pressing *their* suits might be—did not require much to persuade them to believe what they already felt; viz. that they were the true masters; and that it was because we could not do without them, that we listened to all their foibles: they thus became, in process of time, fit and proper tools for the originators of a conspiracy to operate on. The patience with which these conspirators bided their time, and the effectual and secret manner in which they have done their work, should be a dear-bought warning to us, that *the Asiatic is never to be trusted*. It has been proposed to have regiments of Sheeahs, and others of Soonees, to prevent concert. Alas! are we still ignorant, that where the slaughter of the *infidel* has to be accomplished, diversity of sects vanish? If Christendom were to be attacked by the Mahomedan powers, Protestants, and the followers of the Pope, would soon unite in one great cause, and the minor points concerning differences of creed be, *for the time*, forgotten. To *extirpate* the *infidel* is an article of the Mahomedan faith; and this is equally binding on both Sheeahs and Soonees. This set aside, they would fight among themselves like cat and dog. It would, indeed, be a fatal error to entertain entire Mahomedan regiments of any sect. The enlistment of native regiments has not hitherto been properly conducted; each aspirant for such employment should, in the first instance, be made to apply to the magistrate of his district, who would then ascertain his whereabouts, his character, caste, and relationship, in short, his entire history. This having been recorded on the spot, he could then proceed to the officer in command at the station where he proposed enlisting, with his certificate signed by the magistrate; and that officer would, if he considered him a proper person, enlist him. His certificate should be registered on the books of the corps, and no further trouble would be necessary.

At present, when a man presents himself to be enlisted, he comes from a distance, such that for all practical purposes it is as far off as if he had dropped from the clouds; thus he may be a Choomar, or a low-caste man by birth, and call himself a Brahmin or Rajpoot; he may be at home a scamp and a thief; but when presenting himself as a recruit, he appears as an honest man, and there is no possibility of detecting him, or finding out who he is, or anything about him: for, unless the recruit is sent to be identified on the spot—a very roundabout business at long distances—he may very readily call himself what he pleases. It is often found out that Sepoys tell great falsehoods about themselves; but the discovery is generally made too late, *i. e.* after the man has proved himself unworthy of his calling. By enlisting none but those identified by the magistrate, each man must become a known and marked man. A copy of each regimental register should be always sent to head-quarters, to prevent the possibility of its being lost; so that each soldier enlisted might be made to feel that his subsequent apprehension must be certain, should he prove a deserter or an offender.

As regards the number of regiments to be raised, in the event of the village police, which amounts to nearly 200,000 men, being reorganised, remodelled, and incorporated into the regular police body—and these so far drilled as to be able to act, to a certain degree, in concert in cases of emergency for local purposes—the regular army, if properly constituted, need not be large, as, in case of external invasion, both Hindoos and Mahommedans would prefer our known mild and gentle rule to that of fresh conquerors, knowing the plunder that is always committed by an hostile army, and the almost complete certainty of being worse off under foreigners who were unknown to them than under ourselves. Of foreign invasion there is but little fear, though we must always be prepared for the worst. It must never be forgotten that the Mahommedan and Christian are, as it were, born enemies: the reason is obvious; they think us infidels; we think them so: the propagation of their respective faiths is the creed of both, though the former believe that the sword is the chief and most proper agent.

Next to the Christians, the Mahommedans are, as a body, the most intelligent class, and have, from being widely spread, a stake in the empires of the world. They are fanatics to the last degree ; and once subjugated by persons of another faith, become as unruly as a Christian would if placed under the Mahommedan yoke. They, *as a race*, are never to be trusted, though there are many trustworthy and excellent men among them : let this be a warning for the future against an evil day. The Asiatic Mahommedan ever resembles the tiger about to make his spring ; however sleek his coat may be, his teeth still exist, and only bide their time to come into play. As long as it serves their end they will pay homage to Christians, and be subservient to them ; but it is only to gain their great end of eventual supremacy in both worldly and religious matters. Such a chance in India, at all events, should never be allowed them. Let all classes, both Hindoo and Mahommedan, be once thoroughly and *practically convinced*, that any attempt at rebellion will only recoil fearfully on their own heads, without even a chance of their success, and they will gradually cease to agitate the question. Have the foolhardiness to again form your army on the same general basis as at present, and however much you may alter your internal regulations, you will, sooner or later, have the same fatal results. In the judicial administration, the amazing quantity of written evidence hitherto taken down ought at once to be dispensed with ; thus a short abstract of each case in the vernacular, with the order passed, written in English by the presiding officer, attached to the plaintiff's petition, is an ample record for all criminal cases within the cognizance of the magistrate and his subordinates. In cases requiring committal, greater detail, together with written evidence, would be requisite. The collector and magistrate should also be unshackled, and his power of nominating and dismissing all his subordinates, from the Tehseeldars and Thannahdars downwards unrestricted ; his orders should, in this respect, be *final*, and without possibility of appeal. All Mooktyars, or native pleaders, should forthwith be dispensed with in criminal matters.

It ought never to be lost sight of that, to all intents and

purposes, the greater part of the Bengal Presidency will, after it has been reconquered and restored to order, be, by the very nature of things, placed on a different footing from what it was when we originally became possessors of the country ; and we shall no longer be bound towards the people by the strict letter of former pledges regarding their religion ; and it is for this reason obvious, that now no promises should be made to them on this score, otherwise we shall be re-committing our original errors. To interfere wilfully with a man's faith, and try and force his creed, is one thing ; and to give a solemn pledge that no measure shall for any time to come be passed interfering with a religious prejudice or an ancient legend, let the future state of the country, or the private feeling of individuals in a more enlightened time, be what they may, is another. Such pledges, once given, the Government become tied hand and foot. Religious toleration is, undoubtedly, the correct system to be adopted by all Governments ; but for any rulers of a country to bind themselves on any subject by a law resembling that of the Medes and Persians, which (however inapplicable time and circumstances may render it) "altereth not," is simply ridiculous ; and the fact of making such concessions, in itself shows a weakness in the tenure of the ruling power, the exhibition of which to the governed is much to be deprecated.

CHAPTER III.

THE NECESSITY OF HAVING A HOME GOVERNMENT AND ITS NATURE CONSIDERED.

WE may well consider, in the first place, what should be the constitution of the Indian Government in England. All that is required is obviously a channel to communicate to the English Government the acts performed by the local administration in India. To attempt to govern India in England, or to control the acts of the local functionaries by references and appeals to

England, is not only most injudicious, but cruelly injurious : it is injurious to the people, by causing great delays (often to the perversion of justice) ; it is injurious to the rulers, by lessening their prestige and local authority. The people are thereby taught that there is another power superior to the local one, to *which* they will naturally turn, as they have hitherto done, as the real authority ; and in proportion as they do so, behold with less respect those placed immediately in contact with them. The fearful events of the past prove that we must strengthen the hands of our Indian officials to the utmost : there must be no more appealing to this country ; the Indian Government must be all powerful to legislate, and be constituted in itself the final Court of Appeal. This being the case, there will no longer be any necessity for having either a Board of Control or a Court of Directors, but only that one of her Majesty's Ministers should be appointed "*Indian Minister,*" to *supervise, not control,* the affairs of India, aided by a sufficient number of experienced secretaries and clerks for each department. The Ministers and the Houses of Parliament will then, through his annual reports, become the controlling authority, exactly as they now listen to the Lord Chancellor's budget, or the statements of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and control them. One judicial, one financial, one foreign, and one military secretary, with two clerks for each department, would be ample for the Home Office of India. These should all consist of gentlemen who had served out there, and of whose individual experience and competency in his own department there could be no question, after due inquiry had been made as to the qualifications of each while in India. Need I add, that the Minister selected to hold an office so highly responsible ought also, if possible, to have served in India ? The salary for the Minister for Indian Affairs might be fixed at 4000*l.*, that of each secretary at 2000*l.*, and of each clerk at 500*l.* a-year. Thus the expenses of the establishment in England for India would be as follows :—

1 Minister	£4,000
4 Secretaries	8,000
8 Clerks	4,000
Total	£16,000

The East India House should be sold, as the present office of the Board of Control could easily afford one room for the Minister and four rooms for his four secretaries and their eight clerks; thus five rooms would be ample for the despatch of business: and for holding such records as were deemed necessary to be preserved, one or two more rooms could be set apart. It would be more convenient to retain the present office of the Board of Control than the East India House; and the latter being in the heart of the City would doubtless, if let, realise enough annually to cover the expenses of the Home Office of the Indian Government.

CHAPTER IV.

WHAT SORT OF MAN THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA OUGHT TO BE.

THE Governor-General of India ought not only to be a practical man, but also one whose life and energies having been spent in India, and one who, having distinguished himself above his peers, has proved himself worthy of so high an office; such a man, for example, as Sir John Lawrence, whose skill, patience, energy, local experience, honesty, rectitude of purpose, and commanding talents, have saved India at her time of dire need and severe trial, would be worthily rewarded by being selected to fill a post which he has proved himself so well fitted for. It would indeed be lamentable for a ministry to say, "It is true, Lawrence was one of those who saved India, but that is a secondary consideration; it suits us best to send out a Peer, who, from his influential position in and out of the House, would increase our political power." What a cruel farce! The poor Lord is, perhaps, first-rate at committee work—knows something of railways—may have been in the army, and may possibly also have an extended connexion and influence: but, is India

to be sacrificed to such considerations? Is a person utterly ignorant of the Eastern languages, and whose knowledge of India and of the natives is most probably confined to seeing the bespangled, and many of them pseudo-Nawabs, who come over to England, to be sent out to be the puppet of, and be dictated to, by a council composed of gentlemen whose experience is not uncommonly confined to Calcutta and its precincts? Forbid it, Common Sense! forbid it, Houses of the British Parliament! You would all hesitate to make a Bishop Chancellor of the Exchequer, or a Lord Chancellor a Bishop. You would not make a Judge of an Admiral, nor ask a Judge to command your fleets. You would not make the Attorney-General take the command of your forces, nor ask the Commander-in-Chief to become Attorney-General. But why multiply examples? you would never be guilty of such anomalies! Why, then, commit a far more serious error in the nomination of the person appointed to rule India? Suppose, then, that you have selected as your Governor-General a man long experienced in Eastern service; one of his first and chief duties should be that of personally supervising the Local Governments, which can only be accomplished by his travelling over the country, and for which he should be provided accordingly. Instead of giving him a salary of 30,000*l.* for knowing nothing, and being an incapable incubus for years to come, let his salary be 18,000*l.* per annum,—an ample sum in itself,—for having at least some pretensions to efficiency. He should have a movable staff, consisting of a private secretary, on 1000*l.* per annum; two aides-de-camp, on 500*l.* each; a secretary for the judicial and revenue departments, another for the foreign, a third for the home, and a fourth for the military department, each on salaries of 5000*l.* per annum. Each department should comprise six clerks; thus: a head clerk, on 500*l.*, a second, on 400*l.*, a third, on 300*l.*, and the remaining three, each on 200*l.* per annum; making an aggregate sum of 1800*l.* for each secretariat; or the total expense to the state of the Governor-General, including his movable staff and native office, should not exceed 59,200*l.* per annum.

Thus:—

Salary of Governor-General	£18,000
Ditto of Private Secretary	1,000
Ditto of 2 Aides-de-Camp on 500 <i>l.</i> each	1,000
Ditto of 4 Secretaries on 5000 <i>l.</i> each	20,000
Ditto of 6 Clerks for each Department as above detailed	<u>7,200</u>
Total	£47,200
Add establishment of 4 native offices, at 500 <i>l.</i> each office*	2,000
Add for entertaining, including all travelling charges for his and his secretaries' offices	<u>10,000</u>
Grand total	<u>£59,200</u>

An *experienced Governor-General*, travelling with his staff from one Presidency to another, does not require the aid of a Council. The practical knowledge of his Secretaries, themselves selected for their superior local knowledge, and therefore the best advisers each in his own department, is sufficient for all purposes; and you will by this means have a Governor-General having some personal responsibility: but trammel him with a Council residing in Calcutta, and he at once loses three-fourths of his utility. The only case that could ever occur for the possible necessity of such a Council would be, where it was requisite to declare war against a foreign power; and in this case the advice of the four Secretaries of State, together with that of the Commander-in-Chief, would, in these days of rapid and telegraphic communication to Europe, be sufficient. It is now scarcely necessary to imagine the occurrence of such a contingency; but should such a case ever happen, this arrangement would amply provide for it. There need not be any Law Commission. The existence of this body is a notable scheme for wasting the public money, and transferring the responsibility of legislation from a puppet government to irresponsible parties. The official pretender once removed, and an efficient practical man there, it would be a hard case if, aided by his Secretaries, after receiving the reports of the local Governors, and all the

* Detail of native office for each Secretary—

A Serishtadar, or head officer	£200
A second ditto	100
Four Writers on 50 <i>l.</i> each	<u>200</u>
Total	£500

detailed reports furnished by experienced local officers, the new Governor-General could not legislate to some purpose; especially when, by moving to the spot with his whole office, he could see and judge for himself. Local circumstances and local usages and customs would require special legislation, which he could, by this means, readily and speedily accomplish.

CHAPTER V.

THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATION.

WHILE having a Governor-General whose duty it would be to visit all the Presidencies, it would be necessary to have, as now, local experienced Governors, each being selected from among those who had had long experience in the country, and from that Presidency in which he had previously had the management of affairs, and not merely chosen from favoritism, to be transferred from one Presidency to another at a distance, where he had no local knowledge. The Governor's salary should be 6000*l.* a-year, and he should have three secretaries under him, one for the judicial, another for the revenue, and a third for the miscellaneous department. Each of these should have salaries of 4000*l.* with three clerks in each department on salaries each of 400*l.*, 300*l.*, and 200*l.*; making in all, including that of the Governor, an annual expenditure of 4900*l.* Besides these there would be a staff, consisting of a private secretary on 800*l.* and an aid-de-camp on 500*l.* Each secretary should also have a *native* establishment, as follows:—

1 Serishtadar on . . .	£200
1 second ditto on . . .	100
4 Writers on 50 <i>l.</i> each . . .	200
Total . . .	£500

The three secretariats would each have a native establishment, comprising 1500*l.* per annum. Thus:—

Salary of the Lieutenant-Governor	£6,000
Ditto of 3 Secretaries, on 4000 <i>l.</i> each	12,000
Ditto of 9 Clerks for offices of ditto, as above	2,700
Ditto of 1 Private Secretary	800
Ditto of 1 Aid-de-camp	500
Ditto of native establishment for all 3 Secretaries	1,500
Total	<u>£23,500</u>
Add for Governor's travelling, including all charges for his own and Secretaries' establishments, and for entertaining	£5,000
Total	<u>£28,500</u>

Under this arrangement, there would be no necessity for an Accountant's or Civil Auditor's Office; each Secretary would look after the accounts and expenditure of his respective department, and each head of a division after those of his subordinate districts; and the business of all these, and all other subordinate offices, being simplified, complicated statements being reduced to something within rational bounds, there would be no difficulty in the rapid disposal of public business. Further: by the alteration in the present faulty system of administration, the Sudder Courts, that is, the Sudder Board of Revenue, and the Sudder Judicial Courts, could be abolished; they are now only clogs to expedition and justice, and add nothing to the efficiency of the details of Government. The existence of these offices involves long detailed correspondence, and acts as a sort of irresponsible, round-about, middle agency between the head of the Government and the local subordinates. The correspondence has to travel hundreds of miles to and from these circuitous channels ere it can reach head-quarters, the delays thus incurred being often ruinous to the parties whose cases are to be disposed of. The judicial farce of the Sudder or head Judicial Court trying people for their lives and heinous crimes on mere written evidence, in the absence of prosecutor, witnesses, and defendant, by merely perusing the documentary evidence prepared by the lower Courts, would thus also be done away with, and a sounder principle established for the administration of justice. The office, as well as name of *Commissioner*, should also be abolished, as a further incubus and waste of time in the despatch of business, and the administration be divided between the district executives and the immediate head of Government,

aided by his secretaries. This could easily be done as follows. Let each Presidency be divided into six divisions, and each division into four subdivisions; each of the former having the following offices :—

A Judge and Collector, uniting the powers at present vested in a Commissioner of Revenue and Judge of the Sudder Courts, as well as that of Accountant and Civil Auditor, but only in his own district	£3,500
4 Deputy Civil Judges and Collectors, each in charge of a sub-division, with full powers of magistrate, on salaries of 2000 <i>l.</i> each	8,000
16 Assistants (8 having special powers), 4 on salaries of 1000 <i>l.</i> each, 4 on salaries of 600 <i>l.</i> each, and 8 on salaries of 400 <i>l.</i> each	9,600
	<u>£21,100</u>

OFFICE FOR EACH JUDGE AND COLLECTOR.

English Department.

6 Clerks to Collector and Judge's Office :—	
1 on 400 <i>l.</i> , 1 on 300 <i>l.</i> , 1 on 200 <i>l.</i> , 1 on 150 <i>l.</i> , 1 on 100 <i>l.</i> ,* 1 on 50 <i>l.</i> *	£1,200

Native Omla or Office.

1 Treasurer on 100 <i>l.</i> , 1 Deputy-Treasurer, 50 <i>l.</i> , 1 Serishtadar, or head officer, 150 <i>l.</i> , 1 Deputy ditto, 100 <i>l.</i> , 5 Writers on 25 <i>l.</i> each, and 5 ditto on 15 <i>l.</i> each	600
	<u>£1,800</u>

OFFICES FOR EACH DEPUTY DITTO.

English Department.

3 Clerks—1 on 200 <i>l.</i> , 1 on 100 <i>l.</i> ,* and 1 on 50 <i>l.</i> *	£350
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Native Omla.

The same as above for Judge and Collector	600
	<u>£950</u>

OFFICE FOR EACH ASSISTANT DITTO.

English Department.

1 Clerk on	£100
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Native Omla.

3 Writers—1 on 50 <i>l.</i> , 2 on 25 <i>l.</i> each	100
	<u>£200</u>

ABSTRACT OF THE ABOVE.

Establishment of Judge and Collector, and covenanted Officers	£21,100
Office to Judge and Collector	1,800
Office of 4 Deputy ditto	3,800
Office for 16 Assistants	3,200
Total	<u>£29,900</u>

* Many of the clerks in India are either Eurasians or Bengalees, born there, for whom such salaries would be ample.

The Deputy Civil Judge and Magistrate would have charge of a subdivision, which should comprise 4 Tehseeldarees, 8 Thannahs, and 16 outposts. Thus each Tehseeldaree would comprise 2 Thannahs and four outposts. There would be no separation of police and revenue functions; but from the Tehseeldar down to the lowest peon the officers should belong to the conjoint office: in short, be both revenue collectors and police officers. The establishment for each subdivision would be as follows:—

4 Tehseeldars*—2 on 200 <i>l.</i> each and 2 on 150 <i>l.</i> each	£700
8 Thannahdars†—4 on 100 <i>l.</i> and 4 on 60 <i>l.</i> each	640
16 outpost Jemadars—4 on 20 <i>l.</i> and 12 on 15 <i>l.</i> each	260
8 Jemadars‡ at Thannahs on 25 <i>l.</i> each	200
60 Policemen at each Thannah, or 480 at the 8 Thannahs—100 on 5 <i>l.</i> 200 on 4 <i>l.</i> , and 180 on 3 <i>l.</i> each	1,840
4 Policemen at each outpost, or 64 Policemen at 16 outposts—20 on 5 <i>l.</i> 44 on 4 <i>l.</i> each	276
Total cost of one sub-division	<u>£3,916</u>

For all the 4 sub-divisions of one division, the total cost would be . . . £15,664

The total expenditure for all 6 divisions, or one Presidency, would be . . . £93,984

The Judge and Collector should constitute the final appellate authority for his division in all matters, both Civil and Criminal. He should be the active Supervisor of the whole district; his four deputies, with their sixteen assistants, being the executives. He should make his circuit from subdivision to subdivision, and dispose of business not by mere routine of visitation, but as his presence might happen to be most required in any part of his division. He should supervise and audit the accounts of all his subordinates, and perform, in his own person, what is now done in a most cumbrous way by the offices of Accountant and Civil Auditor. He should, finally, try and dispose of (without reference or appeal) all heinous cases of crimes, and take up cases in appeal from his subordinates, whether revenue, civil, or criminal, within certain defined limits. He would, by this means, have an entire knowledge of his division, and of the characters as well as of the proceedings of his subordi-

* Tehseeldars are collectors of revenue, and are generally natives or Eurasians.

† Thannahdars are native head police officers.

‡ Jemadars are subordinate native police officers.

nates, and his communications would then be made direct to the Governor of his Presidency, through the Secretary of the department which related to the business to be disposed of. There should be seven Presidencies, as nearly equally divided as possible, as follows: viz. Calcutta, Oude, Agra, Lahore, Scinde, Bombay, and Madras.

The cost of each Presidency being	£93,984
That of the whole 7 would amount to	657,888
To which we must add the cost of the Governor-General and his offices, viz.	59,200
Which will give a total Indian administrative civil expenditure, amounting to	£717,088

If from 29,133,050*l.*, that is, taking the revenue of India for the year 1854-55, as a standard, we deduct the above proposed expenditure of 717,088*l.*, 2,035,915*l.*, the interest of the debt, and 16,000*l.*, the proposed expenditure of the Home Office, we shall have a balance of 26,364,047*l.* to meet the expenses incumbent on the Army, Navy, Political Departments, and Public Works, which could easily be done, on the handsomest scale, and still leave a broad margin to pay off debts and loans, &c.

CHAPTER VI.

FREE TRADE, AND THE ABOLITION OF THE SALT AND OPIUM MONOPOLIES.

ALL duties and customs are burdensome to the people of a country. It is astonishing the difference in the happiness and in the prosperity of a people, where they are relieved from trifling burdens on each article of import or export. A free port becomes speedily prosperous; in India, especially, all such taxes are collected with great difficulty, and give such opportunities to the native executives to pilfer and annoy traders and others, that the trifling gain to the revenue is not to be placed in comparison with the expense of keeping up the large establishments required both for collecting the duties and preventing smuggling, to say nothing of the real injury done to trade

in a thousand different ways. All Customs Duties, whether derived from inland or port dues, should be done away with. India should be free to the trade of the world.

The English merchant and the English settler should receive every encouragement, and the foreign trader meet with no repulse. India is large enough for all: her markets could supply the world, and take in the manufactures of every country without any fear of a surfeit. With the abolition of Customs Duties would also follow that of the Salt and Opium monopolies: the former, a most iniquitous one; the latter, to say the least of it, most injudicious. In lieu of the latter the following arrangement could be made. Any parties wishing to grow the poppy and trade in opium, might be allowed to do so by a direct license from a Collector of a district,—a bond to be entered into by the party under heavy penalties that he cultivated so many, and no more, acres in the district, the statistics of which should be entered in the bond,—and for which license he would have to pay a large sum, proportionate to the extent of land so cultivated. The amount would be determined by reference to the known capability of one acre for producing a certain quantity of opium, so that without any monopoly, without any establishments for preparing opium for the markets, without any opium sales, and large storehouses, and without giving any umbrage on the part of Government to the trader, a much larger revenue could be realized without trouble or extra expense by the present collectors of the land-tax. A year or two's notice by proclamation would be ample to introduce this change.

CHAPTER VII.

REGARDING SOME OF THE DUTIES OF THE CIVIL SERVICE.

It may appear to some, from what has been above written, that no provision has been made in this scheme for the performance of those duties now disposed of by Mooniffs, Sudder Aumeens, and principal Sudder Aumeens. Need I say that all this paraphernalia is simply part and parcel of a system, having

in its aim to introduce a complicated and intricate code of laws, with all its attendant evils, amongst the natives of India, and to encourage litigation to the utmost? The fact is, that a most faulty system of registration of property now leads to the institution of hundreds of suits that would otherwise never exist, and the absurd plan of causing large fees to be paid prior to registration, involves the matter in still greater difficulties, and prevents the poor man from registering. It should be rendered compulsory to register every bond, and each transfer of property, of whatever nature. The registry should be effected through a local functionary, such as a Tehseeldar, and be free of all fees and expenses. The judges, and their subordinates, could easily dispose of all the civil suits that would be likely to occur under a good system of registration. All registered cases, that could possibly be so advantageously disposed of, should be referred to that ancient native tribunal the "Punchayet," *i. e.* to arbitration; and cases not registered should be immediately non-suited. The trial by Punchayet is always deemed final, and would involve no further trouble or appeal, and would, at the same time, be more consonant to native ideas. By enforcing its observance, the perpetual litigation, which now renders such numbers of subordinate courts necessary, and the people paupers, by being compelled (for want of some simpler process) to resort to them, would be got rid of. Our courts now afford a ready method for the rich to oppress the poor, and might still find advocates among the former class. The poor, also, by resorting to a curious process termed "suing as paupers," (which they do generally where there is a family feud, and are backed by others,) are enabled, without having any real or solid basis for their suits, to bring the wealthy to ruin. It is no wonder that on the whole the natives hate our civil administration. It was, and, we believe, still is, a common custom in the district of Backergunge, for great numbers of cases involving civil suits to be disposed of before the magistrate, the native arguing that it is a better and shorter method to involve an opponent in a false case before a magistrate, where he would most probably, (whatever the result of the complaint,) be de-

tained just at sowing or at harvest time, and thus be nearly ruined; for this end each landed proprietor would have dozens of his tenantry drilled by a native pleader into the proper method of giving suitable answers in courts to completely fictitious cases, that might be brought forward suddenly, on the spur of the moment. In the district of Chittagong they argued differently, the notion there being that as it was no satisfaction to the person aggrieved to have the aggressor imprisoned for having committed a breach of the peace after all the expense and vexations attendant on bringing him to justice, it was, therefore, the better plan to involve him in a civil suit, and ruin him, if possible, by litigation; criminal proceedings were therefore few, and civil ones abundant. There can be little doubt that, from simplifying the judicial processes, the Punjab is much better administered than the Bengal Presidency.

There are other reasons why the present system should be altered. We must never again (at least not till India becomes a greatly altered country) fall into the error of placing the natives on the bench, or, in other words, on a par with ourselves. Let the past be a warning for the future. As regards justice to be awarded to Europeans in India, except it be in the towns of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, the less that is heard of English law and lawyers the better. Under the competitive system for the civil service, it can never be contended that the best man has not been sent out. The *ablest men being there*, it is right that *they*, and no *others*, should administer justice: they are fully as well able to decide upon rights and wrongs between man and man up the country, as their brethren in Calcutta; there must no longer be those anomalies taking place of cases occurring a thousand miles off, being sent down the country in order to be decided in Calcutta. If Europeans wish to settle in India, let them do so, and give them every encouragement; but they must thereby become amenable to the laws of the country, the same as if they went to reside in Russia, France, or America.

That there should be a legislative enactment strictly applicable to the cases of Europeans we fully admit; this should

be prepared with much care and deliberation ; but the law once promulgated, all classes of Europeans should be made amenable to its administration by the local authorities. It must be the paramount duty of the British Legislature to take care that those who go to the East to administer justice, should be properly educated for the purpose ; so that it may never be objected, that though the men sent passed the best examinations, still they were not properly instructed in the Civil Code prepared for European residents in India.

It will, doubtless, be asked, what, in the case of such changes occurring, is to become of all the European and Eurasian uncovenanted service, attached to the Customs, Opium Departments, &c. &c.? The reply is simple. On the abolition of those departments, the greater number must be absorbed into the regular service, by being made Tehseeldars and Thanahdars, and writers in the offices, according to their qualifications, superseding the natives. Those who are aged should be pensioned off ; and those who cannot be retained have a bonus given to them of six months' or more salary, and their names registered as first to fill such vacancies as they were suited for, as they occurred. By this means a highly efficient body of trustworthy Christians would be thrown into the civil administration. This rule should also be observed,—that should, among the natives, two candidates for office offer themselves, of equal eligibility as regards qualifications, the preference should invariably be given to the Christian, and thus add to our stability of rule.

CHAPTER VIII.

FINANCE.

INDIA is a country of such extent, and of such amazing resources, that its land revenue may be deemed but a small part of what it is capable of eventually producing ; it should be the duty of the Legislature to open out those resources, by the introduction of European capital. The Government has an

undoubted lien on that part of the soil which yields revenue, and can always sell its right to those disposed to purchase; thus, a native landed proprietor having 1000 acres sells it, subject to the land-tax, to an European, who, being anxious to redeem this tax, should always be at liberty to do so, by paying a fine equivalent to say thirty years of the revenue or rental due to Government: the present laws not admitting of this, should at once be altered. Should the person so having redeemed his land-tax wish to cultivate opium, tobacco, or any drug that the Government thought proper to lay an impost upon, he would come under the same rules as others doing so, as the only thing redeemed by him would be the usual land-tax. Capitalists anxious to speculate in cotton and sugar plantations would thus have every opportunity of so doing unrestrained. The Himalaya, and other ranges, abound in copper, iron, and other mines; these should be let out to proper companies. The raw materials for nearly every manufacture abound in the hills, forests, and plains, and might be similarly farmed to different companies. As the mountain ranges abound in splendid culturable valleys, English settlers there should be encouraged. Our Indian army could easily be recruited from these sources; and if it were made known to the men serving in the army, that a small farm in the mountains would be given to each on being pensioned, there would be no lack of volunteers. Compensation having been given by Government to the Hill Rajahs, the land should be divided into counties; proper localities fixed on for towns, and sites traced out for houses and public buildings: these sites would soon be bought up by settlers, the hill colonies in India flourish, the English in India would assuredly avail themselves of this chance, and finally settle in the land made by long years of residence and association the land of their adoption, when they found that schools and masters made education in the hills cheaper and as efficient as in England, and send their families there, instead of undergoing that separation from them which untoward circumstances and small finances often make nearly perpetual. We cannot see why the hill towns should not rise and flourish as fast as the great American or Australian ones have done: and commencing with a small nu-

cleus, a few years find them expanding into immense cities. Here would be a grand refuge in time of trouble (the occurrence of which God forbid), and hence could our troops be poured down upon the plains. The hills (our natural Indian boundary), being in our own occupation, and peopled by our own colonies, foreign invasion could be set at defiance, and large marts established, by which our home manufactures would be sent into the heart of Asia, as well as Thibet, Tartary, and the frontiers of China, and thus we should get all the benefits of a return trade; the English merchant could travel rapidly by rail through the torrid plains of India, and find himself, after enriching others, by depositing his goods at the various marts *en route*, a rich and happy man, enjoying the gorgeous scenery and cool climate of those magnificent mountains, which are the envy as well as glory of the world.

There are other methods by which a revenue, if necessary, could be raised. Thus, each Bunya's shop might be licensed according to its size. The Bunya comprises in one and the same person a corn-factor and general dealer in groceries, tobacco, and most of the common articles of consumption. The tax need not be onerous, and would not be felt much by either customer or shopkeeper, as the amount of the tax would be distributed by him over all the articles sold, and would bring in a large revenue, easily to be realised by the local native revenue collectors. Another tax might be levied on tobacco, on the same principle as that advocated for the opium; *i. e.* by granting licenses to persons wishing to grow it, under heavy security bonds—the extent of land placed under tobacco cultivation being specified. Thus opium and tobacco, two most deleterious drugs and articles of luxury, might be taxed, while salt and other necessaries were free. Another source of profitable taxation is from the licenses granted for the sale of spirits; these ought to be manufactured at the head-quarters of each division by licensed distillers, and the produce sold by them to the retail dealers, at a fixed royalty per gallon. The retail dealers would also, as now, have certain districts farmed out to them, and the *abkaree*, as it is termed, of other drugs, as *bhāng*, *chūrrūs*, *gānjā*, &c. would be similarly farmed out.

Besides this, there is another means of realising a large revenue, that would simultaneously confer a great benefit. Cowrees, or shells, have hitherto formed part of the coin of India, and the traffic in them is lucrative, and confined, comparatively speaking, to only a few traders. These cowrees, though useful as representing a very small fraction of a rupee, and, consequently, admitting of many very small purchases being made, are still the cause of great vexation and annoyance, owing to their being bought up by local capitalists and money-dealers, and being sold out by them at an exorbitant price at particular seasons, as at marriage and other festivals, when their use for various purposes becomes almost imperative. Their value also fluctuates exceedingly, so that the poor are always at the mercy of the cowree-dealer or jobber. The substitution of cowrees for coin should be at once abolished, as a most mischievous practice, and a metallic coinage of inferior value issued to take their place. Thus a half-pie piece, of copper, of the same diameter and half the thickness of a pie, and also a quarter pie, of nearly its size and thickness, could be coined, formed of an alloy of zinc and copper, or brass; a piece the value of an eighth of a pie could further be struck of the same metal, by reducing the thickness in proportion to the value, and retaining the same diameter. The following table will show the relative value of the proposed new coinage to one rupee, which may, for ordinary calculation, be assumed to be worth two shillings:—

1 rupee	= 16 annas	} Copper.
1 anna	= 4 pice	
1 pice	= 3 pies	
1 pie	= 2 half-pies	} Brass.
1 half pie	= 2 quarter-pie	
1 quarter pie	= 2 eighths of a pie	

Thus one rupee would be equivalent to 2 shillings, or to 16 annas, or 64 pice, or 192 pies, or 384 half pies, or 768 quarter pies, or 1536 eighths of a pie, which last subdivision would be sufficiently minute for all practical purposes, and the smallest purchase, and, while doing away with all necessity for the present cowree system, be the means of yielding the Go-

vernment a very large revenue in their issue of coinage. The system now adopted in England of having receipt stamps for sums beyond a certain amount is a good one, and might be safely adopted in India. The stamps on which suits are required to be brought are too high in value, and should be reduced; and there should no longer be any permission to stamp documents, after being once drawn up, unless it can be proved that the stamps at the head Treasury were exhausted at the time when application was made, and that the stamp required to be affixed was applied for prior to drawing up the document. Such a case could hardly occur under a properly regulated system. The Government loans are a subject requiring great consideration. There can be no doubt that every effort should be made to diminish their amount. The bad faith of the Government, in suddenly issuing promissory notes at higher rates of interest, without rendering composition on account of loans bearing lower rates of interest, so materially depreciate the value of the latter, that a continuance of such a system must end in causing the Government future difficulties in borrowing money; for who can tell whether Government necessity may not cause another loan, bearing a still higher rate of interest than that now given, to be raised? It should be an invariable rule never to issue promissory notes, bearing higher rates of interest, till the holders of other notes bearing less interest have had the prior option of converting the whole of it into the more valuable security, by paying at least one half in paper and the other in cash. Again—all loans should be raised at the lowest possible rate of interest; and if cash is to be had in England, on the Continent, or in America, cheaper than in India, the Government should raise the loan there. There can be no doubt that the Imperial Government could negotiate a loan on small interest, which would enable them to pay off all the present loans, as the time for the payment of each fell due, and also to purchase up much of the promissory notes as they came into the market, owing to its being much depreciated; large quantities could thus be bought up at a profit, and even at par it would be worth while to go on purchasing up and destroying the paper: thus, in reality, by a simple

method, getting rid of the loan before the time agreed on. Those willing to sell would do so, while those anxious to hold on would keep their paper. The first thing to be done is to raise a large loan, and to settle India in the most complete and efficient manner, whether by having forts and public buildings built, or railways and other works of general utility constructed. It is unnecessary to enter into the consideration of other methods of realising a revenue, such as the Post-office, stamps, &c.; enough has been said to show that the resources of India, if properly availed of, are abundant.

CHAPTER IX.

PILOT SYSTEM AND OTHER GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS.

WITH the free ports there should be free pilots. It is, however, the duty of all Governments to take care that no incompetent person should be permitted to pilot a ship; examinations of all candidates should be instituted, and a fixed scale of examinations established by law for piloting Government vessels, similar to the arrangements made for conveying goods by railways. Thus, also, it is incumbent on the Government to have Colleges in various convenient situations, where surgery, medicine, engineering, surveying, chemistry, mining, geology, navigation, astronomy, and other sciences could be taught free. The buildings should be Government ones, and the professors salaried Government servants. Every one desirous of entering who could pass a certain preliminary examination should be allowed to do so, and have a free education in the English language, in the department which he chose to select. Certificates from these Colleges would be the student's passport to employment by Government, without the production of which no one should be entertained. A great deal has been said about the language to be taught, and many have been the advocates for teaching Hindoos through the medium of the Persian character, which is as unknown to them, save by intro-

duction through conquest, as the English character. If our intention was to give up India, I would then advocate translating a few books into Persian and Hindostanee; but as our ideas of retention are pretty strong at present, and we desire a real and permanent improvement, it is a much simpler as well as better process for the natives (the young especially) to learn the English language and its literature than to commence bungling over imperfect translations of a few books, the great mass of scientific literature still remaining a sealed book to them, as the learner could not avail himself of it, save by acquiring English.

CHAPTER X.

WHAT SHOULD BE THE TENOR OF THE FIRST PROCLAMATION * ISSUED ON THE RESTORATION OF ORDER.

WHEN that Empire which has been nearly lost to us by various causes, shall be again firmly in our possession by force of arms, and due retributive justice administered, a proclamation to the following effect should be issued:—

“ Her Majesty, Queen Victoria, having seen with grief the rebellious spirit shown by her army and subjects, in various parts of India, and the wicked attempts made by people of high rank, (who should have known better than to involve themselves and their more ignorant countrymen in the horrors of a civil war, which could only result in destruction to themselves and the misguided people led on by them,) to subvert order, and also the cruel manner in which her European subjects, men, women, and children, without respect to sex or age, have been ruthlessly and barbarously murdered, under the false pretext of religion, has, with a view to the restoration of order and confidence, in conjunction with the Houses of Parliament, resolved to take the Government of India into her own hands, and to be crowned Empress of India; and the Governor-General for the time being there shall be her representative. She therefore proclaims to all her subjects, that it is her intention that Delhi, Cawnpore, Hansi,

and other places where humanity has disgraced itself, shall be raised to the ground, as a memorial and warning to others of the consequences of rebellion. The religions of all classes shall be respected, and each shall be at liberty to use that form of worship most in accordance with his own conscience. This, however, it is clearly to be understood, shall have no reference whatever to the law of the land, which, having in its view solely the good of the entire community, will, so long as that good is concerned, not respect any peculiar religious observances, which individual sectarians imagine may interfere with their tenets. Further, to prevent any more misapprehension as regards the law of inheritance, any one not having children shall be at liberty to adopt a person to succeed him. This, however, shall not be held applicable to political succession: thus a Nawab or Rajah possessed of territory, not having an heir male, shall not be able to appoint a successor to his Raj, or to that political authority which appertains to the government of his country, and to the regalia, whatever they may be, though he may do so as regards his private personal estate, the rule over the territory lapsing to the Crown. In the affairs strictly appertaining to Government, respect for caste shall no longer hold a place. Thus all applicants for office shall, if qualified, be deemed eligible, whatever their rank or denomination. The Government of India, however, being a Christian one, and therefore one of toleration, does not, and never did, desire forcible conversion; nevertheless, it will not permit that religion of which it is the representative to be held in disrespect by any of its subjects: preference will therefore be given in all appointments, where parties are equally qualified, to the Christian applicant. Furthermore, it shall not be competent to any one to disinherit any member, male or female, of his family, merely on the ground of change of religion, in any case where by law the party so changing his other religious opinions would have had legal title, had he or she remained in the ancestral faith. In like manner it shall be competent to all widows, of whatever creed or caste, to marry again, without losing their right to such property as they would otherwise have been able to lay claim to. The Government of each Presidency will be

reconstructed, to meet the exigencies of the State. A Court shall be appointed with powers to try and to punish all persons, without appeal, except Sepoys, who have been concerned in the late rebellion. The latter shall be tried and punished by courts-martial. These courts shall sit till all the rebels have been apprehended, tried, and their cases disposed of; and it shall be their duty to search for and hunt them out from wherever they shall have taken refuge or concealed themselves; and all persons harbouring such men shall render themselves liable to severe penalties.”

A Proclamation of this tenor would soon restore order to India, and clear away all misapprehensions, and the issue of it should not be delayed.

CHAPTER XI.

ON THE REORGANIZATION OF THE INDIAN ARMY.

MUCH has been said and written on this subject: the following is the outline of a scheme that might be found to answer practically. Each regiment should be composed of 500 Europeans, the remaining five companies being natives. Of these, one company should be Sikhs, one Goorkhas, one Mëhtërs and Choomars, one Mahommedans—half of the latter, or fifty, being Sheeahs, and the other fifty Soonees, and one Brahmins; and in addition to these, one company of European artillery and one company of European cavalry attached to each corps. The natives should all be entertained on the understanding that caste had nothing to do with service, and that they should one and all perform every duty they were called upon to do. Local service should be set aside;—a man once enlisted should be engaged to the world’s end, if his services were called for. The Europeans should be always kept at the head-quarters of the district, the natives performing outpost-duties. Corps should not be triennially marched about, at an enormous

expense, from one end of India to another; but be changed to a neighbouring station if necessary every third year. In each division a strong fort should be erected, and be garrisoned by the Europeans only, the munitions of war being placed entirely under their control. The artillery should be entirely European, and the preparation of the shells and caps also form a part of their duty. Each Presidency need not have more than six regiments for civil purposes, one to be located in each division, the Europeans being at the fort, at the headquarters of the division, the natives distributed among the four sub-divisions, according as their services were found to be necessary. At the seat of each Government there should be four European regiments—two of infantry, one of cavalry, and one artillery, as a corps of reserve to march on any given point, and from which the corps distributed over the country could be recruited. Thus, there being seven subordinate Presidencies, and ten corps at each, the army of India in times of peace would consist of 70,000 men. If, in addition to this, we allow 30,000 Europeans of all arms to be distributed, in bodies of 10,000, at the seaports of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, we shall not only have the means of recruiting the various Presidencies, but have corps of reserve for all cases of need, ready to march on any given point where their presence might be required. By this means an army of 100,000 men, of whom 58,000 would be Europeans, and the remaining 42,000 trustworthy natives, added to an enormous and well regulated Police force, would be infinitely more efficient than the 300,000 men hitherto employed by us, chiefly to fight against ourselves. An army so organised would be safe from internal revolt, and from the nature of its construction could be much more speedily recruited from the natives than the old army was, and the expenses attending it be much less.

CHAPTER XII.

EDUCATION AND RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION.

It being the undoubted duty of each person to educate his own children, the burden of doing this should not be thrown upon the State; but each village should pay a per-centage (as now paid for making roads) for education also, in proportion to the land revenue assessed, for the support of village schools. The masters should be selected by the local authorities, and be placed under their management, under proper rules. For instruction in the English language, missionaries should be sent out, and half their expenses paid by Government. These should have charge of all schools where English was taught, and where the Bible would be read and explained. A certain knowledge of English should, after a certain determined period, be made a *sine quâ non* to Government employ; those, therefore, anxious to be so employed, would most probably resort to these schools: this would show the natives, that while the Government did not force any one's religious creed, it was resolved that the Christian religion should not be placed below the level of all others, and should at least command respect. This is a point that the British Legislature should especially insist on; and it would place the missionaries in a position where they would at least be respected; though, from various causes, they might fail to make proselytes; and it could not then be thrown in the teeth of the Government that they held veneration for their own religion cheaper than their lust for rule at all costs. The dominant power has always the power to select its own *employées*, and ought to exercise it, and of this no one has any right to complain. It would be a part of the duty of the missionaries, as a paid clergy, to perform the services at those stations where there were no military chaplains. Another great object would thus be attained, that there would be no missionaries so paid who were not thoroughly educated and ordained, and their qualifications for the appointment would be thoroughly considered ere they

received Government salaries. A spirit of competition to attain the necessary standard, by a knowledge of the native languages, would thus be engendered, and the missionary character thus be vastly improved. It must be obvious to those who have resided long in India, that sound education must, to a certain extent, precede conversion. The good seed must be sown in virgin soil; and though it may sprout in the rocky and weather-beaten soil of infidel pollution, still the young, uncorrupted, and pure spirit of both sexes is the true soil on which to commence operations. Female schools should also be similarly instituted, under certain rules; and the wives of missionaries, or others who were proved fit, be similarly employed in the work of education. Colleges, such as those at Agra, Roorkee, Calcutta, and elsewhere, should be free to all classes, and be supported entirely by Government.

CHAPTER XIII.

PUBLIC WORKS.

ALL works, especially such as promote irrigation, locomotion, telegraphic communication, &c., should be carried on with the utmost vigour, and encouragement be held out by Government to companies; along with this, the beds of rivers should be kept clean and navigable, the various harbours made safe, and forts should be constructed. The first class of these may be considered remunerative, the latter not so. It has been too much the custom to look to profit before constructing public works, and this without any consideration as to the effects on the people: thus the erection of toll-gates along the grand trunk-road had for its immediate result the stopping of two thirds of the traffic, the poor man preferring to make a considerable circuit rather than pay the toll. The buildings for offices, jails, bridges along district roads, should never form part of the department of Public Works, but be placed under

the charge of the local civil officers, with efficient persons sent as Superintendants from the Government Engineering College at Roorkee, or other similar institutions.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY OFFICERS IN CIVIL AND POLITICAL DEPARTMENTS.

THE impolicy of removing officers from their corps for years for staff and civil employ is so obvious, that it is unnecessary to dilate upon it. The question, however, may be asked, Is the army to be shut out for ever from all chance of other benefit? or is an officer who is a good linguist, or a good engineer, or who has done the State good service in the field or elsewhere, not to meet with his reward, and the State be debarred from the use of his services? Men so qualified should certainly be employed for service, but only under the following condition,—that they *ceased to belong to the army*, and that their places were filled up on their removal. *The healthy and efficient state of the army ought not to be sacrificed to anything.* If it be deemed proper to reward great talent and extraordinary exertions, let it be done either by a money payment of some kind, or else, if the ability of the officer is so remarkable as to qualify him for something superior to the army, it is decidedly wrong that he should return to it after a series of years, when by long absence, and employment in a different sphere, he has become unfitted to undertake military duties, and when his prolonged absence must have rendered him an utter stranger to his men and subordinate officers. On no pretext whatever should an officer quit his corps, unless it is for good. A reward in money, conferred by an increase of salary, to be further enhanced by an honorary title, will be found to be the best method of remuneration, as by it the best men will still remain in their corps, and thus render them more efficient.

CHAPTER XV.

THE VILLAGE POLICE.

THE village police in Bengal and the North-west Provinces do not number less, on a rough calculation, than 200,000 men. They are in excess, and do not form a part, of the regular district police, and are now paid by the Zemeendars, and form as inefficient a set of rabble as ever were beheld. These men should be appointed and paid by the Government, and not by the land-owners; and the land now held by them in lieu of payment for services from the land-holders be again made over to the Zemeendars, who should be required to pay the equivalent, in cash, direct into the Government treasuries, as a part of the land revenue. These men, if properly organised, would yield a force amounting to not less than 100,000 men in each Presidency, who should then be incorporated as part of the police, and formed into a sort of movable constabulary, on the plan of the Irish system. This would give a force of about 16,000 men to each division. The seven Presidencies would by this means possess about 500,000 efficient policemen, who, when organised, would form a large force, capable of doing great local service. They would cost the State nothing, as they are now paid by the Zemeendars, and would still be paid by them, only through the channel of Government. They would then cease to be perpetually local, and could be transferred to other divisions, away from their homes, and all that local influence, resulting from their being both nominated and paid by the Zemeendars, which prevents their being of any real use at present, be got rid of.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE CAUSES OF THE MUTINY.

WITHOUT here entering at length into the details of the causes of the mutiny, the Houses of Parliament would do well to

make inquiry into the following matters, viz. : What changes have within the last dozen years been made in the rules regarding Sepoys' pensions, and for granting them leave of absence ? Also, into the reasons for the abolition of flogging among native corps, when it was retained in the European ones ? Why caste was almost worshipped in the choice and management of the Sepoy ? Why the authority of commanding officers was curtailed to the utmost possible limits, and the Sepoy allowed to set his commanding officer at defiance, by the facility with which he was permitted to appeal from his decisions ? Why cartridges were allowed to be greased with fat at all, and, so greased, to be issued to any part of an army to which it was pollution to use ? Why all the forts and strongholds containing all our magazines have been placed, almost exclusively, in the keeping of native corps ? and why, throughout India, the natives have been placed on a par with Europeans in civil employ ? If the replies to these, and many more similar questions that might be asked, are not satisfactory, it will be obvious that the Government of India has been confided to wrong hands ; that misrule, and misapprehension of the true position of things in India, has long occurred to a most awful and reprehensible extent, and that it must be the duty of the Imperial Parliament to recall all those persons sent out from England, who, from want of proper local experience, are positively unfit to carry on their official duties there, and never again to make similar mistakes. There can be no doubt that for years past the Mahommedans, who hate us, have been trying to undermine our rule, by speaking of us as Kaffirs, *i. e.* infidels, as dirty and unclean, and as unable to legislate ourselves, as our laws were founded with due regard for the tenets of their Koran, &c. The mine has been well, though almost imperceptibly, prepared through a long course of time. The annexation of Oude, &c., which affected hundreds of wealthy people, both Mahommedan and Hindoo, holding high and lucrative posts, not only hurried the crisis, but caused matters to proceed to a much greater length than it could otherwise have done.

The people there did not and do not want us, any more than

the inhabitants of the wilds of America want the Americans, to govern them. The method of annexation, also (*viz.* as brought about by Lord Dalhousie's sending 20,000 men into the country surreptitiously), was looked upon by them, and by many independent native chieftains, as an act of treachery to a faithful ally; and as they imagined that the same might happen to them next, it is no wonder that some of them have joined the insurgents. It is well enough to talk about the observance of the letter of treaties; it should be remembered that if we permit that letter, or the interpretation of it, to be broken, and to remain so for a long course of years, we give our sanction to the breach, and become responsible for it; and that natives, generally, are not so disposed to look with a lawyer's eye to the letter of an engagement: they cannot so readily see why a Mahomedan Oriental king should not have a seraglio, as his ancestors had before him, filled to his heart's content; and if satisfied to receive a quarter, or a third of his revenue, instead of the whole of it, why he should not be permitted to do so in peace. If it was certain, as asserted, that the misrule in Oude was so great as to call for immediate occupation on our part, why resort to a secret-expedition? Would not the nation instead of opposing have gladly risen to join us with open arms? If it is true that the nation at large did not want us, it will explain why a large army was secretly collected, and the country suddenly pounced down upon and seized by force. However, it must not be supposed that the forcible seizure of the Oude territory is now any longer an argument for its restoration, after all the rebellion and treachery of the King and the inhabitants. However strong the position of the King of Oude might have been in pleading for his kingdom, in the first instance, all that has now passed away; and to yield a single inch of territory where such atrocities have been committed, and where the country has been now reconquered by the shedding of so much precious blood, would indeed show extreme pusillanimity. Those who annexed Oude have much to answer for, in the terrible character the mutiny has gradually assumed, and for the torrents of innocent blood shed.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE NATURE OF THE SUBJECTS IN WHICH COMPETITORS SHOULD BE EXAMINED, IN ORDER TO BE ADMITTED TO THE CIVIL SERVICE IN INDIA, CONSIDERED.

It is a serious mistake to require men, whose entire lives are to be dedicated to a peculiar service, to enter it by passing examinations in subjects which will never be of any future use to them. The following is a list of subjects that would be important for every one to be well versed in:—

1. Facility in English composition.
2. A good knowledge of Hindostanee, as a general language, and also of the language of the particular parts of India the young civilian is to be posted in.
3. A thorough acquaintance with the codes he will have to administer, the elements of English law, and the histories of England and British India.
4. A fair knowledge of mathematics.
5. A fair knowledge of mensuration and surveying.
6. Geology.
7. Chemistry.
8. General history.
9. Modern languages.
10. Classics.

The five first headings of subjects should be deemed essentials, without which no appointment should be conferred, whether by competition or otherwise. The five last should be added, if possible.

CHAPTER XVIII.

As great efforts will doubtless be made by those incongruous and double-ruling bodies termed, as if in jest, the Court of Directors, and the Board of Control, to preserve their power, a few words regarding their fitness to rule may not be irrelevant. We may in the first place ask, Is it true that under their joint direction and control India has been brought to its present

pitiable condition? If so, their ignorance in government is obvious, and go they ought, at once, to make room for another and better *régime*. Is it true that many important affairs of India are at a stand-still, while thousands of miles of ocean have to be traversed and retraversed, and while the Board and Court are corresponding with the Local Governments concerning matters that not above one in ten of their number have any practical experience of, or know anything about? If this be true, we must have a new system. The whole subject does not admit of two words of argument; the best intentions of the Board and Court have ended, as all good intentions do, not founded on practical knowledge; just as if some good ignorant man were to try and regulate a steam-engine with the best of good wishes, and after exerting extraordinary strength, succeed in blowing up himself and others together with him. Competition for all services once thrown open, there would be an end to all dangerous patronage. The only patronage reserved by the Crown should consist in having an opportunity of conferring some reward on faithful servants, military and civil, by giving their sons appointments; but a good safety-valve may be here applied, by making it necessary for the nominee to be examined in subjects similar to those now passed in under the competitive system, no nominee being permitted to proceed to India till he shall have passed an examination, as good, at least in point of acquirements, as that passed by the lowest grade now admitted under competition. The defence entered into by the Court of Directors is now before the public, and its details will be, doubtless, fully gone into by Parliament. The object of the Author is not so much with the past as with the future. The Court may prove that others govern as ignorantly as themselves; they may prove that they have done their best; but the true interests of India ought not, and must not, be sacrificed to any personal considerations. The millions that inhabit that land are entitled to the best form of Government the British Legislature can confer upon it, irrespective of the passing interest of Proprietors of East India Stock, and their representatives the Court of Directors.

THE
PRESENT AND FUTURE
OF
INDIA
UNDER BRITISH RULE.

BY
HENRY RICHARD.

"THERE is one great question to which we should look in all our arrangements—what is to be their final results on the character of the people? Is it to be raised or is it to be lowered? Are we to be satisfied with merely securing our power and protecting the inhabitants, leaving them to sink gradually in character lower than at present, or are we to endeavour to raise their character, and to render them worthy of filling higher situations in the management of their country, and of devising plans for its improvement? It ought, undoubtedly, to be our aim to raise the minds of the natives, and to take care that whenever our connexion with India might cease, it did not appear that the only fruit of our dominion there had been to leave the people more abject and less able to govern themselves than we found them."—*Sir Thomas Munro.*

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INTRODUCTION.

THE writer, or rather compiler, of this pamphlet, can claim credit for little more than a somewhat laborious diligence in searching for materials, and an honest determination to use them, when found, for the simple elucidation of the truth. There are, he conceives, two fatal errors on the subject of India, into which the people of this country are at this moment in danger of falling. The one is to conclude that when some change has been effected in the administrative machinery at home, all that is necessary for the well-being and prosperity of that country has been accomplished, and so subside back again into that culpable apathy in which they have been so long content to dwell, in regard to this great question, and from which they were so suddenly and so terribly awakened, nine or ten months ago. Nothing is more to be deprecated than this. Far better have no India Bill at all, than have the very best that human wit can devise, if its effect should be to lull the British public in a false dream of security, as though by passing such a measure they had acquitted themselves of all responsibility, and done all that need be done for the good government of India. In point of fact, we shall have done nothing, except, at most, prepare a better means for effecting those great reforms so urgently demanded, *in India itself*, and which never can or will be effected, if the public vigilance at home is relaxed.

The other danger to which we are exposed is, that we should allow ourselves to be persuaded by those who are drawing *couleur de rose* pictures of the state of things in India. It might have been supposed that the appalling outbreak we have just witnessed would have sufficed to convince the most incredulous, that there was "something rotten in the state" of our Indian Empire. But elaborate efforts are made to allay all suspicion of that kind, and to preclude all inquiry, by confident assertions of the perfect justice, wisdom, and beneficence of our rule in the East. The draughts made upon our credulity by this class of persons are prodigious. These are some of the things we are expected to believe:—That though we have in the space of a century, acquired in India, by conquest and annexation, a territory as large as the whole of Europe excepting the Russian dominions, this has been done without any violation of the principles of right, or at least with only such slight venial errors, in some of the early stages of our course

there, as are completely lost in the blaze of glory with which we have enveloped our character, by our virtues and achievements.—That the people of India, so far from resenting this usurpation of their possessions and rights by a nation who are aliens from them in race, language, and religion, in fact like it very much, and are penetrated with profound gratitude to us for taking the cares of government off their hands, and possessing ourselves of all offices of trust, emolument, and dignity throughout the land, to the permanent exclusion of them and their children.—That, nevertheless, it is necessary to inflict the most severe and sanguinary vengeance upon the natives, in order to establish “the *prestige* of the British name,” and to deter them from any attempt to throw off that foreign yoke under which they live in such universal happiness and contentment.—That the recent revolt, though in no respect whatever connected with military grievances, but with such as were religious and national, was, for all that, a purely military mutiny, in which the inhabitants generally took no share, and with which they did not at all sympathize.—That the alarm felt by the sepoys of a design intended against their religion, by the distribution among them of the unclean cartridges, was either a pretext or, if sincere, was utterly undeserving of toleration or respect from enlightened Christians, seeing that their scruples rested upon religious notions that are false and ridiculous; and it is absurd to suppose that Hindoos and Mohammedans have any rights of conscience which *we* are bound to regard.—That, so far from there being anything seriously wrong in our administration of affairs in that country to account for the late convulsion, “the Government of India has been not only one of the purest in intention, but one of the most beneficent in act, ever known among mankind.”*

No doubt such self-flatteries, which are now plentifully uttered by men skilled in preparing “sweet, sweet poison for the age’s tooth,” are more pleasant than the stern and unpalatable truth. But the writer of this pamphlet believes that these assumptions are untrue, and that those who are content to act as if they were true, are trying to build our dominions in India on falsehood and rottenness. Feeling convinced that that is not a safe foundation on which to build, he has endeavoured, in the following pages, to do what little lay in his power to save his countrymen from committing so fatal a mistake.

* Petition of the East India Company.

THE

CONDITION OF INDIA UNDER BRITISH RULE.

“THE English rule, with all its short-comings, has been an infinite blessing to India. The country is more prosperous, and the people better protected and happier, than under their native princes; and the recent outbreak is in no respect whatever the result of oppression, injustice, or mal-government on the part of the British authorities.”—Such and such like are the phrases which we find constantly on the lips of men in these days. Are they true? Well, true or not, it is impossible not to feel that nine in ten of those who use them rest their assertions, not upon any definite acquaintance with facts, but upon mere assumption and hearsay. Of the thousands who are now repeating, with unhesitating confidence, such expressions as the above, how few are there who know anything distinct or accurate as to the actual condition of the 150 millions of human souls, over whom we assume the right to exercise sway? And fewer still are those who have any clear conception whatever of the state of India prior to British occupation. If nothing more were involved in this ignorant and dogged opinionativeness than individual error, it might be left without correction; for it is not a very pleasant thing to expose a popular delusion which at once soothes the conscience and flatters the vanity of those who hold it. But as it is wholly impossible, either to understand the present terrible calamity that has come upon us in India, or to make any wise practical provision for the future, if, wrapping ourselves in a dream of self-adulation, we are content to repeat, parrot-like, certain smooth phrases without knowledge or reflection, we propose to lay before our readers a number of facts, derived from unquestionable authority, which they will find, we think, to harmonize ill with the complacent assumptions to which we have referred.

“The only plea of extenuation, [for our usurpations in India,] that I have ever heard even attempted,” says Mr. Robberds of Liverpool, in his admirable sermon on the Fast-day, “is, that the natives, after all, have been less badly governed than they would have been by their own rulers. Even if this plea can be substantiated, it is a poor boast for a powerful, enlightened, civilized, Christian people, that they have effected, possibly, some little improvement in the condition of a vast continent, their unprincipled seizure of which they were at least bound to atone for by a wise and noble rule. But can even this miserable plea be sustained?”*

* “The question is not whether the Government of India was better than in the former times of bloody-minded tyrants and ferocious conquerors, but whether we as a Christian people had done all that we might and ought to have done; whether we acted as unselfishly as we ought to have acted; whether we gave to the nations the full benefit of Christian example, and whether we set before them a pattern of moderation and truth and justice and mercy. . . . I feel bound to say our conduct has been, in many respects, the reverse of the conduct which a Christian people ought to feel pride in pursuing. I am bound to admit that for the last twenty-five years during which I myself have taken part in public affairs, I have observed grievous instances of policy in respect of our Indian Empire, —measures undertaken without a shade of justice, and a perfect scandal to English history; and no page of that history has fouler blots upon it than that which refers to our Eastern policy.”—*Mr. Gladstone's Speech at Chester, October 12th, 1857.*

Let us first premise that we have not the least inclination to deny or undervalue whatever good has been actually accomplished by our means in India. We gladly acknowledge that the Indian Government is entitled to praise for having abolished slavery and the Suttee, and checked infanticide, thuggism, and the once-prevalent practice of self-immolation. Considerable progress has also been made for the last few years, in improving roads and tanks, and works of irrigation. But in how tardy and utterly inadequate a manner this has been done, up to within a very recent period, may be inferred from the astounding admission of Mr. Ross Mangles, the present Chairman of the East India Company, before the Cotton Committee of 1848, to the effect, that while they had derived during the preceding fourteen years a revenue of £300,000,000 from India, the entire sum spent during the same period on "roads and works of irrigation, and other public works," amounted only to about £1,400,000! We need not say that we regard the exertions of the missionary body in India as having been most praiseworthy, and to a great extent beneficial, if not in making a large number of genuine Christian converts, at least in loosening the hold of the ancient superstitions of the country upon thousands of minds, and thereby preparing them for the reception hereafter of a purer faith. But we have the strongest possible conviction, that the presence of the British power in India, so far from having aided the missionary work, has in many ways greatly obstructed and retarded it.

But let it be remembered that the allegation we have undertaken to dispute is, not that *some* good has resulted from British occupation of India, but that our rule there has been on the whole (as so many good people quiet their consciences by asserting) "a great blessing to the people of India."

Is this so as a matter-of-fact? We shall best answer the question by descending to particulars, and inquiring what *class* of the population of India has profited by our presence or is grateful for our rule? We gladly admit that there is a small mercantile and artizan class, residing principally in the capitals of the great Presidencies, who have prospered greatly by means of English commerce and enterprise. "There are districts," says Mr. Theobald, "contiguous to our great outport, reached by its ever-increasing demand, and where, consequently, increased production must have brought great comparative content to their population."* These, however, form but an infinitesimal portion of the 150,000,000 of people, who are brought, more or less, under British sway in India. And our position is that, with small exceptions in certain limited localities, it is very doubtful whether the whole of this vast population, of every class, has not been reduced to a more degraded and miserable condition than they occupied before we took possession of India.

I.—LOOK AT THE POSITION OF THE NATIVE PRINCES.

It is estimated that since our occupation of India we have deposed and disinherited at least 200 native princes. And this has been done in many instances without any ground, and hardly any pretext, but our own cupidity or convenience. We have systematically pursued a

* Indian Tracts, No 1, by W. Theobald, Esq., p. 5.

practice of intermeddling, which has reduced the ruling powers into the condition of mere puppets in their own dominions, and have then employed the confusion consequent on such a state of things, as the reason for their dethronement and deposition. The Indian Government appoints political agents, called Residents, who take up their abode at the courts of the royal victims, and by degrees so completely usurp all authority as to leave the prince over whom they domineer no power to do or to order anything without their consent. He cannot move in any direction, whether of foreign alliance or internal reform, without being checkmated, and hectorred and harried by this arrogant and officious busybody. ✓ Lord William Bentinck describes this official as "more than king," as "clothed with a degree of state equal to that of royalty itself," as "acting the part rather of a schoolmaster and dictator than of the minister of a friendly power," and as exercising a jurisdiction "which is totally incompatible with the royal dignity and authority."* To the same effect is the declaration of Mr. Mead, in his recent work :—"The sovereigns of what are called independent States live in a state of abject dependence upon the will of the British agency at their various courts. The whole functions of government are, in most cases, exercised by the Resident in fact, if not in appearance; and the titular monarch sighs in vain for the personal freedom enjoyed by his subjects."† The natural consequence is, that, being thus consigned to a state of utter impotence, with only the outward show, but next to none of the reality of power, the unfortunate prince, forbidden the opportunity of active occupation in the legitimate sphere of his own duties as a sovereign, abandons himself to such frivolous and sensual enjoyments as he can pursue unmolested within the precincts of his own palace. ✓ And then the very misgovernment and disorder produced by our own means, are put forward as pretexts for confiscating his kingdom; while the Resident, who is there, be it observed, under the guise of being the representative of a friendly power, avails himself of the authority he has usurped, to act the spy and informer over his victim, to collect all manner of accusations against him from his own subjects, in order to justify the spoliation that is contemplated. ✓ This is precisely the course that was pursued in regard to Oude. The unhappy king, in his petition to the House of Commons, thus describes the conduct of Colonel Sleeman, the last resident at his court :—

"From an early period after his appointment, he commenced a course of conduct highly derogatory to the dignity of the sovereign of Oude, calculated to give personal offence to the king, and to his minister, to degrade his Majesty in the eyes of his people, and to make his government unpopular and contemptible. In the face of solemn engagements not to interfere with the due course of justice, Colonel Sleeman, in effect, erected the British residency into a supreme court of appeal from the decision of his Majesty's judges, and took upon himself, in some instances, to interfere with the decision of the Moojtahid-ool-Usser, or Mahomedan High Court of Justice. Without any proper warranty, and in contravention of all the treaties between the British Government and Oude, Colonel Sleeman, at great cost, and at the expense of the King and the Government of Oude, made a tour of three months, or thereabouts, in the provinces of Oude, in the course of which he engaged himself in collecting complaints, and in consequence applications and petitions were sent in to him by the king's people, for redress of grievances or pretended grievances. He received disputes and claims which

* A Plea for the Princes of India, p. 42.

† The Sepoy Revolt, p. 202.

had been judicially decided for twenty or even thirty years previously. He descended to decided personalities to annoy the king and other members of the Royal family, and by these and other unwarrantable and vexatious proceedings, he threw the Government of Oude into a state of confusion, prevented the due administration of justice, rendered the collection of the revenue of the State difficult, and in some cases impossible, and thereby unhinged the whole social and political system of the State, to whose rulers he was bound by treaty to give his best advice and counsel, with a view to the establishment of order and good government.”*

It is very curious to find Mr. J. P. Grant, one of Lord Dalhousie's councillors, who advised the annexation of Oude on the ground of the incompetency of the king, acknowledging, quite naively, that under the system of *surveillance* and meddling which we had forced upon him it was utterly impossible that he or any other man *could* be an efficient ruler. “It seems to me,” he says, “as hopeless a task to rear hearts-of-oak in a dark cellar, as to bring up, *under a foreign protectorate*, a capable ruler in the palace of such a dependency as Oude.”† And yet the absence of that capability to rule, which by our own admission we had rendered inevitable, is employed as a pretext for confiscating his kingdom.

But while alleged malgovernment on the part of native States is deemed a sufficient justification of our rapacity, good government, even when fully acknowledged by ourselves, is found to be no protection against it. We may take as an illustration the case of Sattara. No charge of misgovernment was ever pretended to be alleged against the rulers of this state. “The Sattara State,” we are told, “was prosperous and well-doing; its princes were prudent and economical; they spent their revenues beneficially on roads, bridges, and other public works: nor did they overspend themselves; for they had always large cash balances both in their private and public treasuries. Their administration drew down the applause of residents, of the Bombay Government, of the supreme Government, of the Court of Directors, of the Board of Control; it produced them laudatory and flattering epistles, and procured for them complimentary presents of jewelled swords and model field-pieces. Better still, their rule was blessed with the contentment and the prosperity of their subjects; and ‘unquestionably,’ said Sir George Clerk in 1848, ‘a Native Government conducted as that of Sattara has been, is a source of strength to the British Government.’”‡

In like manner Mr. Henry St. George Tucker, who long occupied an influential position in the Court of Directors, said, “There are persons who fancy that landed possessions in India cannot be successfully administered by native agency. In disproof of this notion I would point to the Ramapoor Jagheer, in Rohilcund, which was a perfect garden when I saw it long ago, and which still remains, I believe, in a state of the highest agricultural prosperity. Nay, I would point to the principality of Sattara, which appears to have been most successfully administered, both by the ex-Rajah, Purtab Sing, and his brother and successor, the late Rajah Appah Sahib, *who have done more for the improvement of the country than our Government can pretend to have done in any part of its territory.*” Why, then, it may be asked, was this state confiscated? Here are Lord Dalhousie's reasons, in his own words:—“The territories lie in

* Dacoitee in Excelsis, pp. 14-15.

† Oude Blue Book, p. 209.

‡ The Native States of India, p. 36.

the very heart of our own possessions. They are interposed between the two military stations in the Presidency of Bombay, and are at least calculated in the hands of an independent sovereign to form an obstacle to safe communication and combined military movement. *The district is fertile and the revenues productive.* The population, accustomed for some time to regular and peaceful governments" (under their native princes, be it remarked!) "are tranquil themselves, and prepared for the regular government our possession of the territory would give." Here we perceive there is a perfectly unblushing avowal that we seized these territories *because* they were fertile, productive, well-governed, and conveniently situated for our purpose. And how did we deal with the unhappy Prince whom we dispossessed? Besides the revenue derived from his kingdom, he had large private property; and he was promised that "all property belonging to him, *bonâ fide* private and not appertaining to the State, would on his peaceable submission not be interfered with." He did submit: but what followed? "Relying on this promise he allowed 1,200 attached friends and dependents to follow him into exile and confinement at Benares. But from the hour he left Sattara until the day of his death, not one rupee was the Rajah permitted to receive from this guaranteed source. Everything he left behind—jaghires, villages, houses, farms, gardens, jewels, money, clothes—all were confiscated. In consequence the Prince was obliged to submit to great personal discomfort and deep humiliation: he continued through the remnant of his days to be hampered and embarrassed by debts and liabilities; and at last he died deeply involved, leaving his wife, his adopted son, and five hundred followers, in the greatest poverty." * And how did the subjects of this Prince like the change? The answer is at hand. When the opportunity came they conspired and revolted against our rule; and the following extract from the *Bombay Times*, describing the execution of one of the ringleaders in Sattara, speaks trumpet-tongued as to the popularity of our rule:—"The preliminaries of striking off the fetters, reading the death warrant, &c., being gone through, the prisoner in a bold fearless manner mounted the drop, and during the process of adjusting the noose and pinioning, he, in a loud, firm voice, addressed the crowds in the following words:—"Listen all! *As the English people hurled the Rajah from his throne, in like manner do you drive them out of the country.* This is murder. I am illegally condemned, and have not been condemned by judge or jury. This example is made to frighten you; but be not alarmed. Sons of Brahmins, Mahrattas, and Mussulmans, revolt! Sons of Christians, look to yourselves!" Well then, we presume, it will be admitted that these deposed and despoiled native princes are not the class who have been benefited by our rule.†

* India Wrongs without a Remedy, pp. 16, 17.

† As a rule, though by no means without individual exceptions, the official Anglo-Indians, as well as the class in this country from which they are drawn, are always ready to declare, in the most earnest manner, their conviction of the perfect wisdom and justice of every annexation made by the Honourable Company. There is, however, nothing miraculous in this. In the Oude Blue Book there is a despatch from Lord Dalhousie to Major-General Outram, Chief Commissioner of Oude, which throws a flood of light upon the source of these strong convictions. It contains a simple enumeration of the offices which the Commissioner is empowered to create for the administration of the annexed territory, to be, of course, occupied chiefly, if not altogether, by our dear countrymen.

The Chief Commissioner is to retain the salary and allowances which have hitherto appertained to the office of president at Lucknow. There are also to be

A Judicial Commissioner, at..... £4200 per annum.

II.—THE ARISTOCRACY OF INDIA.

Let us next look to the class immediately below them,—what may be called the *native official aristocracy*, who administer political affairs under the native governments. How do they fare under “the blessings of British rule?” It is impossible, indeed, to think of the miserable condition to which we have reduced the ancient, royal, and aristocratic families of India, without a mingled feeling of pity and indignation. Not content with having despoiled them of their dignities and possessions, we have sought every opportunity—shuffling, on the meanest pretexts, out of the payment of those allowances which we bound ourselves by treaties to pay them, as some compensation for their loss of rank and power—to consign them to absolute beggary and degradation. Mr. Mead, speaking of the family and adherents of the Great Mogul, of the house of Tippo Sahib, and of the late Nabob of the Carnatic, thus describes the deplorable state to which they have been reduced by our cruel and dishonest treatment:—

“During the half-century that we have had control over the destinies of the members of the three great families alluded to, whilst we have been steadily encroaching on the fund set apart originally for their maintenance, we have done nothing whatever in the way of training their children, or affording them the opportunities of employment. There is no opening for them in the army, except as private soldiers; no room for them on the bench, except they mingle with the mass of witnesses that haunt our courts, and are content to crawl upwards, all dirt and servility. Without land they cannot live by agriculture; and without capital they cannot embark in trade. Not a year passes over which does not make large additions to the stock of misery and discontent, in the shape of disinherited heirs, who have licked the dust in vain for the chance of being allowed to retain the estate or the pension enjoyed by their fathers.”*

Mr. Norton, an eminent member of the bar at Madras, in his work recently published, says:—“We have destroyed the only remaining stages for the ambitious to play their parts on; we have reduced the families of sovereigns to the miserable condition of pensioners; we have thrown their descendants and dependents by thousands penniless upon the world; we have frittered away the native nobility and gentry; the classes destined to rise from their ruin have not yet emerged from obscurity; the mercantile class, though important in point of wealth, are numerically scanty; the great body of the people consist of ryots and revenue servants, or, as one

A Financial Commissioner, at	£4200	per annum.
4 Commissioners of Divisions, at	£3800	”
12 Deputy-Commissioners, with salaries varying from £1800 to £1000	£1000	”
18 Assistant Commissioners, with salaries varying from £840 to £600	£600	”
18 Extra Assistants, of whom		
3 are to receive	£720	”
6 are to receive	£480	”
9 are to receive	£380	”

“It is impossible,” continues the despatch, “at present, with the number and the limits of districts unknown and undefined, to determine the numerical strength of the Commission; but the Governor-General in Council, adverting to the known area and the supposed revenue of the province, as compared with those of the districts ceded to the British Government in 1801, and now forming part of the North-West Provinces, is inclined to think that *four* Commissioners of Divisions, *twelve* Deputy Commissioners of Districts, *eighteen* Assistant Commissioners, and *eighteen* Extra Assistants, will suffice in the *first instance*. Besides these,” &c.—Why! here are 54 excellent reasons, varying in clearness and force from £4200 to £300 a year, why Oude should have been annexed. Need we wonder, therefore, that the righteousness of this measure is as clear as the noon-day to our countrymen in India? *

* The Sepoy Revolt, p. 220.

of the Madras civilians designated them in the Torture Report, 'the oppressors and the oppressed,' and every act of 'annexation' and 'consolidation' has only added to our embarrassed poverty and weakness." * Here is another emphatic testimony on the same point, from a very able and excellent man, Mr. John Sullivan:—"Five native States have fallen within the last ten years. If we put on one side of the account what the natives have gained by the few offices that have been lately opened to them, with what they have lost by the extermination of these States, we shall find the net loss to be immense; and what the native loses, the Englishman gains. Upon the extermination of a native State an Englishman takes the place of the sovereign, under the name of Commissioner; three or four of his associates displace as many dozen of the native official aristocracy, while some hundreds of our troops take the place of the many thousands that every native chief supports. The little court disappears—trade languishes—the capital decays—the people are impoverished—the Englishman flourishes and acts like a sponge, drawing up riches from the banks of the Ganges, and squeezing them down upon the banks of the Thames. Nor is this all. Native princes and their courts not only encourage native trade and native arts, but under them, and because of their very weakness, public opinion flourishes; all that constitutes the life of a people is strengthened, and, though the government may occasionally be oppressive, heavier far is the yoke of our institutions."

III.—THE NATIVE GENTRY AND LANDOWNERS.

We come next to the class of *native gentry and landowners*. What is their condition under British rule? Is it such as to indicate that we have conferred any advantages upon them, and thereby secured their loyalty and attachment to our power? So far otherwise, that by our system of resumption, and by the oppressive exactions we make on the land, they are actually and rapidly disappearing. Take, for instance, the testimony of Mr. Giberne, long engaged in the Company's service. He was examined by the Commons Committee on Cotton Cultivation in 1848, and stated that he was at one time employed as collector of revenue in Guzerat; but that after an absence of fourteen years he returned to it as judge, in 1840. Everywhere, he says, he remarked deterioration among all classes. "I did not see," he goes on to observe, "so many of the more wealthy classes of the natives. The aristocracy, when we first had the country, used to have their gay carts, horses and attendants, and a great deal of finery about them; and there seemed to be now an absence of all that. . . . The Ryots all complained that they had had money once, but they had none now." † And in a private letter, dated 1849, written by "a gentleman high in the Company's service," the decay of Guzerat is thus described:—"Many of the best families in the provinces, who were rich and well to do when we came into Guzerat, in 1807, have now scarcely clothes to their backs. . . . Our demands in money on the Talookdars are more than three times what they originally paid, without one single advantage gained on their parts. Parties, from whom they have been compelled to borrow at ruinous rates of interest, enforce their demands by attachment of their lands and villages; thus they sink deeper and deeper in debt, without

* The Rebellion in India: How to prevent another. By John Bruce Norton, p. 80.

† Minutes of Evidence.

the chance of extricating themselves. What then must become of their rising families?''*

The Hon. Mr. Shore himself, long a resident in India, draws a picture of the condition to which the native gentry have been reduced under our rule, which one would think must affect with some feeling of compassion and remorse the heart even of an East Indian Director.

"To bring the subject home to an English heart and mind, let us turn our thoughts to our native land, and compare the effects produced by individual example and influences there with what might have been the case here. Let us represent to ourselves an English country gentleman overlooking his estate, promoting the improvement of agriculture, superintending the roads and public buildings, and subscribing to the local charities; as a neighbour, opening his house, and by his hospitality affording the means of social intercourse to his neighbours—all the different members of his family contributing their share to the general good. Contrast this picture with the state of things in India. The upper classes of the natives, who used to occupy the above situations, ruined, and their places supplied by foreigners, who keep aloof from the people, and whose ultimate object is to return to England with a fortune. . . . As to the number of respectable people who have suffered, let any one leave the English stations—few and far between—and go into the country towns and villages, and there see the innumerable houses which not many years ago were in good repair, and inhabited by men who lived in the style of gentlemen, keeping up establishments of servants, horses, elephants and equipages, but which are now all falling to decay, while their owners, or their descendants, are dwelling in mud huts, with little more than the merest necessaries of life."†

It is true this was written a good many years ago; but has the system which produced these results been changed? So far otherwise that it has been carried on with even augmented vigour since Mr. Shore uttered his protest, and is tending rapidly in many parts of India to the absolute annihilation of the native gentry.

There are various means adopted to effect this ruin of the native land-owners in India. First comes the method adopted by the Government of collecting its revenue.

"The payment of the land revenue," says Mr. Wilson, "is made in four instalments, annually. After the sun-setting of a certain specified date, the instalment cannot be received. If a sixpence is short in the amount, the whole of the defaulter's property is put up to auction, and by the chances of an oversight, the neglect or wilfulness of an employé, or, what is more frequent, the intrigues of the functionaries in office, a family living in the highest opulence is suddenly crushed into the dust; and in its fall are swept away all rights, titles, securities, and pecuniary claims of any kind whatsoever; for the sale of an estate for Government revenue revokes all liabilities upon the whole or any part of it. The farmer's lease and the usurer's bond are henceforward waste paper."‡

Then comes the system of "resumption," previously referred to.

In the *Edinburgh Review* just published, it is thus described: "One of the expedients to which the Revenue Boards have been driven, is that of "resumption," a system by which the Government challenges the titles of those holding lands free of rent-charges, harassing them with legal proceedings, taking advantage of every technical defect under its own regulations and its own courts, and frequently succeeding in selling-up Zemindars at a

* The Government of India since 1834, pp. 14, 15.

† Notes on Indian Affairs, by the Hon. Frederick John Shore, vol. i. p. 138.

‡ Letter to John Bright, Esq., M.P., on the India Question, by James Wilson, Esq., twenty-five years resident in Bengal.

nominal price, the agents of the Company being the only purchasers. It is certain that many gross abuses of this kind have occurred.* The reviewer speaks of the Government "taking advantage of defects" in its own regulations and courts. But the petition of some of the aggrieved parties presented to the Court of Directors in 1853, makes it perfectly clear that this system of wholesale plunder of land, has been carried on directly in defiance, of both the letter and spirit of its own regulations.†

Of the extent to which these processes of spoliation are carried, some idea may be formed from the following facts. In Madras the Government has constituted itself the sole land-owner. This was done, partly, by over-assessing the land till the owner was ruined and unable to pay the tax, and then letting the land to any one else who chose to occupy it, thereby confiscating his property in it;‡ and, partly, by abrogating all the jaghire lands, that is, lands originally granted by the crown on condition of military service, very much as under the feudal institutions of Europe. Sometimes they did this on a principle of pretended commutation, that is, the Company taking the jaghires into their own hands, and granting pensions in lieu of them. As the lands were virtually freeholds, the pensions *ought*, of course, to have been hereditary and permanent. But after the arrangement had been made the Government declared that the pensions were only an annuity for the lives of the existing incumbents. The consequence was that the descendants of these people were reduced to the lowest state of degradation and poverty. Mr. Mead, in his very able volume, speaking on this point, says:—

"In Bengal and Madras, the work of retrenchment is well nigh over, but in Bombay at this moment, a commission is sitting, which has been in existence since 1843, charged to inquire into the validity of all titles to free land held in hereditary occupation. The total claims in the Southern Mahratta country, up to the date of a parliamentary return issued on the 28th of August last, amounted to upwards of 108,000, and less than 7,000 decisions had been given in the last 14 years. This leaves more than 100,000 claims standing over, which at the same rate will be settled in the year of our Lord 2058. The gain in revenues from the resumptons is £15,846 per annum at present, and a further sum of £27,000 after the lapse of one, two, or three lives. The cost of the survey was perhaps £100,000 in cash, but how much in good will and loyalty?"§

IV.—THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITION OF THE HIGHER CLASSES IN INDIA.

So much as to the material condition of the landed and other gentry. But how about their social and political status? Is that improved or deteriorated by our occupancy of India? Mr. Mounstuart Elphinstone—and a higher authority on all Indian matters it would be impossible to adduce—thus speaks of the free access to political power open to the people under the native governments:—"Notwithstanding the distinctions of caste, there is no country where men rise with more ease from the lowest rank to the highest. The first Nabob of Oude was a petty merchant; the first Peishwar was a village accountant; the ancestors of Holkar were goatherds; and those of Scindiah slaves. All these and many other instances

* Edinburgh Review for January, 1858, p. 16

† Petition of the British Indian Association to the Court of Directors on Resumptons illegally made—*passim*.

‡ See Appendix to the Torture Report, C, No. 13; also Dykes on Salem, pp. 444, 455.

§ The Sepoy Revolt, p. 221.

took place within the last century. Promotion from among the common people to all the ranks of civil and military employment short of sovereignty, are of daily occurrence under native states, and this keeps up the spirit of the people, and in that respect partially supplies the place of popular institutions. The free intercourse of different ranks also keeps up a sort of circulation and diffusion of such knowledge and such sentiments as exist in society. Under us, on the contrary, the community is divided into two perfectly distinct and definite bodies, of which the one is torpid and inactive, while all the power seems concentrated in the other."

To the same effect is the testimony of Lord William Bentinck, who declared that even the Mussulman conquerors of India displayed more consideration for the people they conquered than we do. "In many respects," he says, "the Mahomedans surpassed our rule; they settled in the countries they conquered,—the interests and sympathies of the conquerors and conquered became identified. Our policy, on the contrary, has been the reverse of this,—cold, selfish and unfeeling. The iron-hand of power on the one side; monopoly and exclusion on the other."*

And what is the effect which this state of things produces on the character of the people, and on their feelings towards ourselves? Mr. Gleig, in his admirable pamphlet just re-published, says:—"All the classes above the mere cultivators see in the English Government a power which, however evenly it may profess to hold the scales between man and man, entertains no sympathy for them or for the traditions of their ancestry. They may acquire fortunes by trade, they may build ships and obtain the honour of knighthood; and whatever they earn by honest industry they feel that they will be permitted to keep: but all beyond this is a blank; and they are fully alive to its dreariness. There are no such avenues to advancement open to them as stirred the ambition and stimulated the exertions of their forefathers. They cannot attain in the civil service of the state to a station more elevated than that of an ill-paid rural magistrate, or a clerk in one of the public offices. Even the status of a practising attorney in the Courts of Law seems to be denied to them; though the decision of the judge who settled the question was evidently delivered under a painful sense of its iniquity. And as to the army, we shall have occasion presently to explain that it offers no prizes for which it would be worth the while of a native gentlemen to strive. Now, people so circumstanced cannot be loyal in any sense of the term. They may submit to their fate with more or less resignation, either because they see no chance of escape from it, or through the influence of that fatalism which enters largely into the faith of all the religionists of the East. But it is impossible they can nourish the slightest feeling of love for the government which thus grinds them down, far less be prepared to make sacrifices of any kind in defence of it. Nor do they. By the native gentry of India—and it is a great mistake to suppose that India has not its gentry of ancient lineage and proud reminiscences—the rule of the English is regarded not only without favour, but with settled detestation. There is not one among them all but would rejoice to see it overthrown to-morrow."† It is important to observe that the above was written four years ago, when most people in this country laughed to scorn the very idea of any serious peril threatening our Indian Empire.

* Remarks on the Affairs of India, by John Sullivan, p. 49.

† India and its Army. By the Rev. G. R. Gleig, Chaplain-General to Her Majesty's ces, pp. 3, 4.

Still more emphatic, if possible, is the declaration on this point of Sir Thomas Munro, one of the most sagacious and eminent of our Indian statesmen, of whom Mr. Canning said that "Europe never produced a more accomplished statesman :"—

"The main evil of our system is the degraded state in which we hold the natives. We suppose them to be superstitious, ignorant, prone to falsehood, and corrupt. In our well-meaning zeal for their welfare, we shudder at the idea of committing to men so depraved any share in the administration of their own country. We exclude them from every situation of trust and emolument; we confine them to the lowest offices, with scarcely a bare subsistence; and even these are left in their hands from necessity, because Europeans are utterly incapable of filling them. We treat them as an inferior race of beings. Men who, under a native government, might have held the first dignities of the State, who but for us might have been governors of provinces, are regarded as little better than menial servants, are often no better paid, and scarcely permitted to sit in our presence. We reduce them to this abject state, and then look upon them with disdain as men unworthy of high station. Under most of the Mahomedan princes of India the Hindoos were eligible to all the civil offices of government, and they frequently possessed a more important share in them than their conquerors."

And what are his opinions as to the moral effect of our rule upon the national character? The following are his words :—

"But even if we could be secured against every internal commotion, and could retain the country quietly in subjection, I doubt much *if the condition of the people would be better than under their native princes*. The strength of the British Government enables it to put down every rebellion, to repel every foreign invasion, and to give to its subjects a degree of protection which those of no native power enjoy. Its laws and institutions also afford them a security from domestic oppression unknown in those states; but these advantages are dearly bought, *they are purchased by the sacrifice of independence, of national character, and of whatever renders a people respectable*. The natives of the British provinces may, without fear, pursue their different occupations, as traders, meerassadars, or husbandmen, and enjoy the fruits of their labour in tranquillity; but none of them can aspire to anything beyond this mere animal state of thriving in peace; none of them can look forward to any share in the legislation, or civil or military government of their country. It is from men who either hold or who are eligible to public office that natives take their character: where no such men exist there can be no energy in any other class of the community. The effect of this state of things is observable in all the British provinces, *whose inhabitants are certainly the most abject race in India*. No elevation of character can be expected among men who, in the military line, cannot attain to any rank above that of subahdar (captain), where they are as much below an (English) ensign as an ensign is below the Commander-in-Chief; and who in the civil line can hope for nothing beyond some petty judicial or revenue office, in which they may by corrupt means make up for their slender salary. The consequence, therefore, of the conquest of India by the British arms would be, in place of raising, *to debase the whole people*. There is, perhaps, no example of any conquest in which the natives have been so completely excluded from all share of the government of their country as British India. Among all the disorders of the native states, the field is open for every man to raise himself; and hence, among them, there is a spirit of emulation, of restless enterprise, and independence, far preferable to the servility of our Indian subjects."*

In reference, indeed, to this tendency of our system of government gradually to destroy both the upper and middle classes in India; even

* See the same sentiments still more strongly expressed in the *Life of Munro*, vol. iii., pp. 360-2, 384.

Colonel Sykes, though now a great man with the Board of Directors, was obliged thus to express himself in 1849 :—

“ I state honestly and sincerely my conviction, that it is most dangerous, with reference to our power and even financial prosperity in India, by our constant appropriations and resumptions of enams and rent-free lands to lead the people at large to fear that *we are really only anxious to make a government of officials on the one hand, and a nation of serfs on the other.*”

V.—THE CONDITION OF THE RYOTS, OR CULTIVATORS OF THE SOIL.

But we shall probably be told, that however unfriendly our rule may be to the higher classes, the great bulk of the people—the peasants, the cultivators of the soil—have been immensely benefited. Let us see, then, how far *this* is true. In what respect have they been benefited ?

And let us take as our example the province of Bengal, where the present mutiny has broken out. What was its condition before it came into British possession ? Listen to the language of Lord Macaulay. “ In spite of the Mussulman despot and of the Mahratta freebooters, Bengal was known through the East as the garden of Eden—as the rich kingdom. Its population multiplied exceedingly ; distant provinces were nourished from its overflowing granaries, and the noble ladies of London and Paris were clothed in the delicate produce of its looms.” Again, Stewart, in his “ History of Bengal,” says : “ By the prudent administration of a system of sound policy and humanity, the rich province of Decca was cultivated in every part, and abounded in everything requisite for the comfort and gratification of its inhabitants. Justice was administered with impartiality, and the conduct of its administrators, Gholab Aly Khan and Jeswunt Roy, gained great credit to their principal, Sanferaz Khan. Jeswunt Roy had been educated under the Nawul Aly Khan, whose example he emulated in purity, integrity, and in indefatigable attention to business ; and in framing his arrangements for the government of the province he studied to render them conducive to the general ease and happiness of the people ; he abolished all monopolies, and the imposts which had been laid upon grain.”* Such was the manner in which our predecessors ruled that beautiful land, and such was the condition of the inhabitants under their rule. Now, on the other hand, we have a series of testimonies as to what the condition of Bengal has been since it came into our possession, extending from the time of Clive to that of Canning, to which we earnestly entreat the reader’s attention. In less than ten years after that province had become subject to British rule, the state of things is thus described by Lord Macaulay :—“ Every ship from Bengal had for some time brought alarming tidings. The internal misgovernment of this province had reached such a pitch that it could go no further. . . . During the five years which followed the departure of Clive from Bengal, the misgovernment of the English was carried to a point such as seemed hardly compatible with the very existence of society. . . . Enormous fortunes were rapidly accumulated at Calcutta, while thirty millions of human beings were reduced to the extremity of wretchedness.”† Let us now descend a little on the stream of time, and come down to a somewhat later period. Twenty years after this, and about thirty years after we had come into possession, we find Lord Cornwallis, then Governor-General, thus describing the state of matters in Bengal. “ I am sorry to be obliged to say that agriculture and commerce

* Stewart’s History of Bengal, p. 30.

† Macaulay’s Essays, vol ii., pp. 113–114.

have for many years been gradually declining; and that at present, excepting the class of shoofs and banyans, who reside almost entirely in great towns, the inhabitants of these provinces were advancing hastily to a general state of poverty and wretchedness. In this description I must even include almost every zemindar in the Company's territories; which, though it may have been partly occasioned by their own indolence and extravagance, I am afraid must also be in a great measure attributed to the defects of our former system of mismanagement."* If we come down lower still we shall find no signs of improvement. Thirty or forty years later than the time to which Lord Cornwallis refers, we find another Governor-General, Lord Hastings, thus describing the state of matters in Bengal:—"The present state of landed property in Bengal may be brought under review, as connected with the judicial administration, since it appears to have originated more from the practical operations of legal decisions than from the fiscal regulations of this government. The powers which have been assumed by the auction purchasers, and probably by the original proprietors also, under the cover of summary suits, and the still more summary process of ejectment, have completely destroyed every shadow of a right in the tenants, and reduced a happy and comparatively rich peasantry to the lowest stage of indigence and penury."† But we may be told that this was comparatively a long time ago, and that since then there has been great improvement in the condition of things in Bengal. Let us see. Lord Cornwallis, whose words we have just read, introduced into that province what is called the Zemindary system of landed tenure, under the name of the perpetual settlement, a system which Mr. Dickinson has justly described in a few comprehensive words, as "one of the most sweeping confiscations the world ever saw, by which we transferred the whole landed property of the community to a body of tax-gatherers."‡ And what has been the effect of this stroke of British statesmanship? The *Friend of India*, under date of September 16th, 1852, thus speaks of it:—"A whole century will scarcely be sufficient to remedy the evils of that perpetual settlement, and we have not yet begun the task. Under its baneful influence a population of more than twenty millions have been reduced to a state of such utter wretchedness of condition, and such abjectness of feeling, as it would be difficult to parallel in any other country." The *Friend of India*, let it be remembered, was always considered as a sort of semi-official paper, its editor Mr. Marshman, being well-known to be in close relations with the government. He is, therefore, a witness not likely to be unduly severe on anything pertaining to Indian rule. We will, give another passage from the same journal of April, 1852:—

"No one has ever attempted to contradict the fact that the condition of the Bengal peasantry is almost as wretched and degraded as it is possible to conceive, living in the most miserable hovel, scarcely fit for a dog-kennel, covered with tattered rags, and unable, in too many instances, to procure more than a single meal a day for himself and family. The Bengal ryot knows nothing of the most ordinary comforts of life. We speak without exaggeration when we affirm that if the real condition of those who raise the harvest, which yields between three and four millions a-year, was fully known, it would make the ears of every one who heard thereof to tingle."

* Parliamentary Papers. "East India Affairs." p. 157.

† The State of Government of India under its Native Rulers, by John Sullivan, p. 24.

‡ The Government of India under a Bureaucracy, p. 169.

Will it be said that, after all, this is only the assertion of an anonymous newspaper writer? Well, that shall not serve the objector, for we have at hand a series of testimonies from men of the highest character, intimately acquainted with India. And, first, we call Ramohun Roy, that remarkable native gentleman and scholar, who, writing in 1831, says:—

“Under both systems (the zemindary system of Bengal and the ryotwary system of Madras) the condition of the cultivators is very miserable; in the one they are placed at the mercy of the zemindars’ avarice and ambition, in the other they are subjected to the extortions and intrigues of the surveyors and other government revenue officers. According to the best of my recollection and belief their condition has not been improving in any degree. In short, such is the melancholy condition of the agricultural labourers, that it always gives me the greatest pain to allude to it.”

In 1834, the Hon. Mr. Shore, son of the late Lord Teignmouth, writing on the same subject, speaks of—

“The gradual impoverishment of the country, by a system of taxation and extortion, unparalleled in the annals of any country. The ruin of the old aristocracy, and of all the respectable landholders, which has been systematically effected, in order to increase the government revenue. At the present moment no one connected with the land feels a day’s security in his possessions; the poverty of the people is almost beyond belief; and this, joined to the almost entire disorganisation of native society, is causing a rapid increase of crime. The simple and natural inducements here, as in every other part of the world, must of course be, first, security of property; secondly, a certainty of reaping the benefits of any trouble or expense incurred. The encouragement given has been to raise the land-tax as high as possible, and appropriate the whole amount to government, with the exception of a bare sufficiency for the cultivators to exist upon, and to enable them to carry on their next year’s agriculture.”

The following are the words of Mr. Saville Marriot, one of the most respectable and honourable men that ever returned from India to this country:—

“In elucidation of the position that this country [India] is verging to the lowest ebb of pauperism, I would adduce a fact pregnant with consideration of the most serious importance, namely, that of late years a large portion of the public revenue has been paid by encroachment upon the capital of the country, small though that capital is in itself. I allude to the property of the peasantry, which consists of personal ornaments of the precious metals and jewels, convertible, as occasions require to profitable purposes, and accommodations in agricultural pursuits, most frequently in the shape of pawn, till the object has been obtained. I feel certain that an examination would establish that a considerable share of this and other property, even to cattle and household utensils, has been for ever alienated from its proprietors to make good the public revenue. In addition to this lamentable evidence of poverty, is another of equal force, to be seen in all parts of the country, in the numerous individuals of the above class of the community wandering about for the employment of hirelings, which they are glad to obtain even for the most scanty pittance. In short, almost everything forces the conviction, that we have before us a narrowing progress to utter pauperism.”†

Again, the same gentleman writes, in another part of his work, republished by him during the present year:—

“You will readily perceive that my opinions are the result rather of practical experience than deductions drawn from scientific views; and if I should, in

* Mr. Marriot was a colleague and friend of Mountstuart Elphinstone, who used to say that the only pleasure he ever derived from his government was when he sometimes got an opportunity of reducing the assessment.

† India: the Duty and Interest of England to inquire into its state. By Saville Marriot, pp. 13-14.

appearance or even in reality, express myself with a somewhat unmeasured warmth, I feel assured I shall find excuse with you, under the consideration that, from a very long and intimate connexion, my claim may be deemed to amount to almost denizenship with this interesting people. *For many years past I have, in common with many others, painfully witnessed their decline; and more especially that part of the community which has emphatically been styled "the sinews of the state"—the peasantry of India.* It is not a single, but a combination of causes, which has produced this result."

Mr. Francis Horseley Robinson, a gentleman long resident in India, in a pamphlet published by him in 1853, adverting to some of the measures of reform which he thought necessary in our Indian dominions, says :—

"Fixity of tenure, within its proper limitations, which are well-known in the North-west provinces, should be extended to every part of our possessions, especially to Bengal, where the opposite principle of rack-renting has been allowed full play, where, in consequence, the ryot is worse off than in the days of Clive, and where this most valuable class of men have been completely shut out from the benefits of our rule, which to them has as yet been an unmixed evil."*

It is well known that the *Calcutta Review* occupies the highest place in the periodical literature of India. Many of the most eminent men, both as scholars and statesmen, in that country have enriched its pages with their contributions. The following are the terms in which that publication describes the condition of the ryots (the peasants) of Bengal,—that is, of about thirty millions of people, who enjoy "the blessings of British rule." In a country, it says,—

"So bountifully intersected by noble rivers, fed by tributary streams and rivulets, which spread perennial verdure and luxuriance over fields and plains, and, constituting links of communication, stimulate and promote the alacrity and bustle of traffic,—there is to be found a community leading a life such as to call forth sympathy and commiseration. The community we allude to is that of the Bengal ryot. The name is familiar here as one expressive of an ignorant, degraded and oppressed race.

"To whatever part of Bengal we may go, the ryot will be found to live all his days on rice, and to go covered with a slight cotton cloth. The profits which he makes are consumed in some way or other. The demands upon him are almost endless, and he must meet them one by one. This prevents the creation of capital, and prolongs the longevity of the Mahajani (or usurious money-lending) system. The districts of Bengal are noted for fertility and exuberance of crops; and if the ryots could enjoy freedom and security, the country would exhibit a cheering spectacle. But their present condition is miserable, and appears to rouse no fellow-feeling, no sympathy, in those by whom they are surrounded."

The same periodical, again writing in 1853, reiterates its assertions in language, if possible, yet more emphatic :—

"There can be no doubt upon the mind of any unprejudiced person, that the wealth of this country is fast visibly declining, and that the temporal circumstances of the poor are wretched in the extreme, and this decline is especially marked in its most fatal results upon the industry of the country and the condition of the peasantry."

After enumerating various causes for this state of things, the reviewer proceeds :—

"These combinations of causes, working for many years, have brought one of

* What Good may come out of the India Bill, p. 44.

the richest countries of the world into the extremest state of poverty, which finds a kind of relief in the devastations of periodic famines.

To all this let us add the testimony of the Protestant Missionaries of Bengal, in their petition to Parliament :—

“ Your Petitioners believe that a strict and searching inquiry into the state of the rural population of Bengal would lead your Honourable House to the conclusion, that they commonly live in a state of poverty and wretchedness, produced chiefly by the present system of landed tenures, and the extortions of the Zemindars, aggravated by the inefficiency and the cruelties of the peace officers, who are paid by the chowkedarry tax or by Government.” Again, they say, that many recent circumstances “ have deepened their conviction, that the social condition of the people of Bengal is deplorable in the extreme,” and “ that they feel themselves bound to declare, that they view with alarm as well as sorrow the continuance of the evils which they have so long deplored, and the effects of which are seen in the demoralization and sufferings of the people ; and that they believe that measures of relief can with safety be delayed no longer, as from the information they have acquired they fear that the discontent of the rural population is daily increasing, and that a bitter feeling of hatred towards their rulers is being engendered in their minds.”*

It will be seen that nearly all these testimonies as to the condition of the cultivators of the soil—the great bulk, in fact, of the natives of India,—relate especially to Bengal. We have selected that presidency as an illustration, because, first, it is that which has been longest under our rule ; secondly, it is the seat of the supreme government ; thirdly, it has been the principal scene of the recent outbreak ; and fourthly, it is avowedly considered by far the best governed and most flourishing of our old possessions in India. According to universal admission, in Bombay, and especially in Madras, where the ryotwarry system is in full vogue, the peasantry are in a still more deplorable plight. On this point let it suffice to cite the following extract from the report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1848 :—

“ It appears from the testimony of almost every witness that the condition of the cultivating population of India is one of extreme poverty ; and this is stated to be the case in every part of the country to which the evidence with regard to cotton cultivation specially refers. This observation applies to the western and southern provinces of India, including the presidency of Bombay, and portions of Madras, regarding which the knowledge of the witnesses examined is much more definite and extensive than of the presidency of Bengal, which latter yields but a very trifling supply of cotton for exportation, in comparison with the other parts of India. Whether under the ryotwarry system at Madras, or under the village system that prevails extensively in the west, the great mass of the cultivators are almost wholly without capital, or any of those means which capital alone can furnish, by which industry may be improved and extended. *They are in reality a class of cultivators in the most abject condition.*”†

Now we venture to say, that no parade of general statistics as to the increased productiveness of the country in taxation and revenue, in imports and exports, will serve to countervail this overwhelming mass of evidence as to the actual condition of the people of India under British rule ; even if the comparison made between the yield of India in those respects now and twenty or five-and-twenty years ago did not rest on an altogether unfair foundation, seeing that at the two periods compared, the extent of country known as British India was widely different.‡

* Appendix to the Seventh Report on Public Petitions, pp. 60-64.

† Report from the Select Committee on the Growth of Cotton in India, pp. 5, 6.

‡ See Appendix A.

THE MORAL CONDITION OF THE NATIVES UNDER BRITISH RULE.

There is one other aspect of this question of still greater importance, if possible, than any yet mentioned, as a criterion of our rule in India, and that is: *What has been the effect of our presence and influence there on the moral character and condition of the people?* It is most painful to be obliged to say so, but we fear it is impossible to deny that the effect has been, in some important respects at least, greatly to deteriorate and degrade them. How, indeed, can it be otherwise, when the whole tendency of our system of government has been to reduce the natives to such a state of social and political servility as is wholly inconsistent with the retention of that feeling of self-respect which is the very basis of all manly virtue. This tendency, as will be seen by a previous citation, was observed and strongly bewailed by Sir Thomas Munro. "The main evil of the system," he says, "is the degraded state in which we hold the natives The effect is observable in all the British provinces, *whose inhabitants are certainly the most abject race in India.*"

But apart from this general tendency of our rule to degrade the population, there are certain of our regulations and practices that directly operate to their moral deterioration. On two points especially, it would seem we have helped to deprave the national character, namely, their truthfulness and their sobriety. There appears to be no doubt that the judicial system we have introduced is an actual premium upon lying, litigation, and perjury. The Right Honourable Mr. H. Mackenzie, in his official minute, says:—

"We are everywhere met by people complaining of the authorities set over them, and the authorities complaining of the people. The longer we have had the district, the more apparently do lying and litigation prevail, the more are morals vitiated, the more are rights involved in doubt, the more are the foundations of society shaken, the more has the work of civil government become a hopeless thankless trial, unsatisfactory as to its immediate results, hopeless as to its future effects."^{*}

No less emphatic on this point is the testimony of Mr. George Campbell, whose work, entitled "Modern India," is as far as possible from being pervaded by a puritanical morality, and who is, moreover, a zealous apologist of the East India Company. But on this point he is obliged to admit, that though the natives of India, like all oppressed races, are no doubt naturally addicted to such vices, yet when they come under our rule, "there is a great deterioration in course of time, and hence I infer that the lying and perjury so much complained of are quite as much due to our judicial institutions as to the people The civil courts are the great schools for perjury, and *in our older possessions* false witnesses for criminal cases can easily be obtained from thence." Further on, the same writer says:—

"Practically, I must at once say, that the judicial oath, as it is used, does not in the very least affect the evidence. . . . And yet this is not because the religious sanction of an oath is unknown to the people; on the contrary, it was nowhere stronger; and this is another of the changes caused by our system. In a new country, among the Jats of the North, I found that a solemn oath was astonishingly binding. . . . But such binding oaths do not exist in our older provinces. The judicial oath is much too common-place an affair to carry weight, and the people, seeing perjury practised with impunity, become

^{*} Minute of Mr. Holt Mackenzie, Oct. 1, 1830.

used to it. The longer we possess any province the more common and grave does perjury become, and the more difficult to deal with.*

In regard to the other point,—the influence of our presence in India on the sobriety of the people,—the evidence is, indeed, overwhelming. Warren Hastings, being summoned to give evidence on India before a Committee of the House of Commons in 1813, many years after his celebrated trial, speaking of the natives, says “that sobriety is not a general but a universal trait of their character. Their temperance is demonstrated in the simplicity of their food, and their total abstinence from spirituous liquors and other substances of intoxication.” But what is the case now? The Hon. Mr. Shore, a gentleman who filled successively the situations of collector of the revenue, of judge, and then of political commissioner in India, says:—

“Drunkenness and the use of intoxicating drinks have increased in an extraordinary degree under the English rule. I have heard men declare that, thirty or forty years ago, even in Calcutta, a drunken native was a perfect rarity. Now they may be seen in numbers, lying drunk about the streets of that city, and more or less in every town in the interior, and not unfrequently in the villages also. *What is the cause of this? Simply that in order to raise the revenue, almost every collector is trying to increase the number of his liquor, spirit, and drug shops; to establish them in every hole and corner of his district, and to promote drunkenness to the utmost; often giving under-hand, summary, and illegal assistance to the proprietors of shops, to enable them to recover money for liquor sold upon credit. And for this, provided the revenue increase, they receive the approbation of Government. . . . It has been observed as a general truth, that the more connexion the natives have had with the English, the more immoral, and the worse characters in every respect, they become.*”†

Both the cultivation of opium and the manufacture of arrack is expressly the work of the Government of India, for purposes of revenue. And the former, apart from the infinite mischiefs to which it gives rise in our relations with China, involving gross and habitual violation of our treaties with that country, converting our merchants into little else than smugglers and pirates, excluding from the Chinese market articles of legitimate and honourable commerce, and keeping up ceaseless irritation between us and the Chinese authorities—apart from all these evils, the cultivation of this pestilent drug is pregnant with injuries material and moral to our own subjects in India. There are great oppressions practised upon the people, in those parts where it is grown, by the *compulsory* cultivation of the poppy to which they are driven by the Government. Still worse, however, are the moral results. On this point we cite the following observations from Major-General Alexander's pamphlet:—

“But a still greater evil than the oppression of the natives, is the rapid demoralization of the vast population of India from the growing habit of opium-eating. Even the Hindoos, said to be the most temperate people in the world, have caught the mania. . . . In a written communication received from Mr. A. Sym, dated the 13th of March, 1840, he states:—The health and morals of the people suffer from the production of opium. Wherever opium is grown, it is eaten; this is one of the worst features of the opium question. We are demoralizing our own subjects in India, one-half of the murders, rapes, and affrays have their origin in opium-eating.”‡

More disgraceful, yet, if possible, is the system by which the Govern-

* Modern India and Its Government, pp. 484-6.

† Notes on Indian Affairs, vol. ii., p. 353.

‡ The Rise and Progress of British Opium Smuggling, by Major-General Alexander, p. 18.

ment of India, merely for purposes of revenue, forces the consumption of arrack upon the people. It is manufactured by the Government, and every stimulus is given to the multiplication of licensed vendors, so as to seduce the natives to the utmost possible extent to get drunk for the profit of the State. The following extract from the Madras Native Petition, ought to bring the burning blush of shame to our cheeks, when we remember that it is the complaint of heathen Hindoos against a professedly Christian Government :—

“The liquor, generally known by the name of arrack is made at the Government distilleries, and thence supplied to licensed vendors to the number of one hundred and fifty; by whom it is sold in small quantities in every direction. In the interior, the manufacture and sale of the article is committed to contractors or farmers, who compete for the privilege annually at public auction; the sales realizing on the average £250,000 a year; and as the sale price is extremely low, the quantity consumed and the number of consumers is immense. Drunkenness, with all its miseries, is consequently common throughout the land; and its baneful effects are a full counterpoise for whatever real or imaginary benefits have been derived by the lower orders of India from her connexion with Great Britain. Your Petitioners have not memorialized Government in order to obtain the repression of this evil, not only because memorials to the Bombay authorities have totally failed, but because the amount of revenue thus derived from native demoralization is too great for your Petitioners to indulge the slightest hope of procuring even a diminution of so profitable a vice; forbidden by Hindu and Mahommedan law, and comparatively unknown before the ascendancy of European dominion.”*

On the same subject, the Bengal Missionaries complain in their petition, that “the abkaree system for the regulation of the sale of wines, spirits and drugs, has, in practical operation, tended to foster among a people whose highest commendation was temperance, a ruinous taste for ardent spirits and destructive drugs, by the efforts made to establish new licensed depots for them, in the places where the use of such things was little, or was not at all, known before.” Still stronger is the declaration of a most estimable clergyman of the Church of England, the Rev. Archdeacon Jeffries, who, after an experience of thirty years in India, used these startling words at a public meeting in London :—

“A large portion of native Christians were spread over Madras; and in consequence of the numerous cases of intemperance among them, the name of *Christian* was synonymous with that of *drunkard*; and when the Hindoos called a man a Christian, they for the most part meant that he was a drunkard. So among the converts of the Church Missionary Society and of the American Board of Missions, many had fallen through strong drink; for when once the natives broke *caste* and became Christians, they were no longer restrained from the use of strong drinks, and they became far worse than if they had never embraced Christianity. For one really converted Christian as the fruit of missionary labour—for one person ‘born again of the Holy Spirit,’ and made ‘a new creature in Jesus Christ’—for one such person, the drinking practices of the English had made *one thousand drunkards!* That was a sad thought; but it was the solemn truth. *If the English were driven out of India to-morrow, the chief trace of their having been there would be the number of drunkards they left behind.*”

So again, in regard to the Principality of Coorg, whose Rajah was deposed and his territories annexed by the Indian Government, four-and-twenty years ago, we find in the work of an American Missionary, lately published, a mournful description of the state of the country since it came

* Petition to Parliament from the Madras Native Association, p. 18.

into British possession. It must be premised that Mr. Mœgling, the Missionary in question, entirely approves the act of annexation, and does his best to blacken the character of the unfortunate Rajah whose property we confiscated. And yet these are the terms which he employs:—

“Little or nothing has been done for the education of the people. Nothing has been attempted systematically to raise them in intelligence and character; on the contrary it is a common complaint that three evils—drunkenness, sexual licentiousness and lying, have greatly increased during the Company’s reign. In former days the native rulers suppressed drunkenness by summary and violent means; now the Government draws a large revenue from the sale of intoxicating liquors. Prostitutes were formerly turned out of the country, and Coorg men severely punished and degraded for intercourse with low-caste women; now, the wicked and shameless do as they please. In past times the Rajah would now and then cut off a man’s tongue or his head for having spoken a falsehood; in these days the man who lies most impudently and swears most fearlessly, often gains the cause; when lies do not succeed, bribes do.”*

We will add only one more testimony on this melancholy subject. It is that of Captain Westmacott, who has traversed India from one end to the other:—

“It is greatly to be deplored,” he says, “that in places the longest under our rule, there is the largest amount of depravity and crime. My travels in India have fallen little short of 8000 miles, and extended to nearly all the cities of importance in Northern, Western, and Central India. I have no hesitation in affirming, that in the Hindoo and Mussulman cities, removed from European intercourse, there is much less depravity than either in Calcutta, Madras, or Bombay, where Europeans chiefly congregate.”†

But perhaps it may be said, that however undeniable and lamentable are the facts we have adduced as to the condition of the various classes of natives under our rule, the evils specified are not the *result* of our rule, but exist in spite of it. We cannot admit this exculpation. On the contrary, we believe it can be distinctly shown that a large proportion at least, of the evils complained of spring directly from the measures of government we have pursued there. It will suffice to refer to a few of these.

SYSTEM OF LANDED TENURE.

1. Look, first, at the operation of the system of landed tenure we have adopted. It may be truly admitted that those systems have been adopted with no unfair intention. On the contrary, we believe that the men who established them,—Lord Cornwallis and Sir Thomas Munro, and others,—were actuated by the best motives. But the utter failure of their plans only proves how incompetent we, a handful of foreigners, were to govern a country with whose institutions and customs, and the character of its people, we were so wholly unacquainted as the arrangements we made in respect to the land prove us to have been. There are cases where sheer ignorance, when combined with presumption, leads to consequences as mischievous as positive and wilful tyranny. And this is one of them. No man who has at all looked into the case can doubt that the rapid extermination of the landed gentry, as well as the poverty and wretchedness of the ryot, are traceable in a main degree to the zemindary and ryotwarry systems of landed tenure which have been introduced, together with the abominable practice of “resumption,” by which the government has absorbed by arbitrary spoliation so many private estates.

* Coorg Memoirs, p. 28. Quoted in Coorg and its Rajahs, p. 135.

† Quoted in George Thompson’s Lectures on India, p. 12.

NEGLECT OF PUBLIC WORKS.

2. Look, again, at the crying neglect—until within the last few years, —of all works for the material development of the country. Surely if we find a population in a state of deplorable misery, and find at the same time that all the measures most imperatively necessary for the cultivation of the soil, and for the conveyance of its produce for purposes of commerce, are systematically disregarded by the only power that can execute them, no man will doubt that these two things are connected together in the relation of cause and effect. Now it is a shameful fact,—but there is abounding evidence to prove that it is a fact,—that the Indian Government, while drawing an enormous revenue from the country, have not only not constructed such public works and roads themselves, but have suffered those which had been constructed by former rulers to fall into ruin in almost every part of India. How, indeed, could it be otherwise? Their revenues have been constantly expended upon wars of conquest and annexation, in gratifying that insane lust for territory, which has induced them to spread their nominal authority so ludicrously beyond their capacity either of occupation or government.

The native petition of Madras, to which we have previously referred, draws a melancholy picture of the neglect of public works and its consequences. They state that the reservoirs and channels for purposes of irrigation, upon which not merely the fertility of the soil, but the practicability of its cultivation, is dependent, “are of the remotest antiquity, and were in former times exceedingly numerous; but at the present moment not more than four-fifths of those still existing are kept in repair, while others have altogether disappeared, although causing a decline in the agriculture of the presidency, equally hurtful to the ryot and the revenue;” that although “an impost is annually levied for their repair,” the roads are so bad that even that from Madras to Calcutta, called the Great North Road, “a few miles from Madras is not distinguishable from paddy fields; and *piece goods have to be brought on the heads of coolies from Nellore, 110 miles distant, and situated on this very road;*” that in other parts of the country things are of course still worse, that “the district of Cuddapah, measuring 13,000 square miles, has nothing that deserves the name of a road,” but mere “tracks impassable after a little rain.” The Petition then refers to the monstrous demand made by the Government that the wretched ryots should construct the roads. We cite that passage at length:—“That the unwillingness of the Company and the local government to expend money on the construction of roads requisite for the interchange of traffic from province to province, and from the interior to the shipping ports along the coast, would be incredible if it were not a notorious and substantiable fact; and it is still worse that they should pretend the ryots ought to make them at their own expense; for, pressed down as they are by a heavy load of taxes, which renders them too poor to purchase Company’s salt for their miserable food of boiled rice and vegetables, the latter too frequently wild herbs, the spontaneous produce of the uncultivated earth,—unable to supply themselves with clothes beyond a piece of coarse cotton fabric worth two shillings, once in a twelvemonth,—it is impossible for them to find the means or time for road-making gratis, even if they possessed the skill requisite for the purpose; and your Petitioners submit that it is the bounden duty

of the State which reduces them to their miserable condition, and keeps them in it from charter to charter, to spend a far larger portion of the revenues upon the improvement of the country whence they are derived from than it does at present. *It can find money to carry on wars for self-aggrandizement, to allow immoderate salaries to its Civil Service, to pension off the whole of its members on five hundred pounds a-year, each, and to pay interest at 10 per cent. to the proprietors of East India Stock—all from the labour of the ryot; and when he requires roads by which he might find the means of bettering his condition, and that of the revenue, he is told that he must make them for himself.*"* Or, if this native testimony be disputed, there are plenty of others to the same effect. The *Friend of India*, of April 24, 1851, says:—

"One of the most serious charges brought against the administration of the Company in India has always been the neglect of public works, and the disadvantageous contrast which it exhibits, not only to the civilized Governments of Europe and America, but also to its less enlightened predecessors the *Mahomedans*. It is impossible for any man to travel through the two provinces of Bengal and Behar, which have been longest in our possession, and which have yielded the largest amount of revenue, without a painful feeling that the charge is not without foundation. The appearance they present after more than ninety years of occupancy, is that of the neglected state of a spendthrift landlord. *For one good road we have constructed, we have allowed twenty others to disappear.* We have erected one magnificent city, and every other city of note has been allowed to go to ruin. With the exception of the Trunk Road, and the public edifices in Calcutta, there is nothing throughout these provinces to show that they have been for nearly a century under the government of the same people who have rendered their own country a theatre of wonders."†

Mr. Norton, in his work on Madras, published in 1854, says:—"It is clear that the old works of irrigation are not kept in a sufficient state of repair. . . . and the result is, *so large a space of land is not now cultivated as formerly*, and it is reckoned that in the twelve chief irrigation districts [of Madras] there are 1,262,906 acres of land, with an assessment of 4,754,802 rupees, *once irrigated and cultivated, now lying waste.*"‡ The same writer says, that Mr. Dykes, in his work on *Salem*, informs us that there are in that district alone, at the present time, 8,864 wells, 218 dams, 164 small channels, and 1,017 small tanks, of which no use whatever is made.

Lieutenant Tyrrell writes as follows—"Regarding the present state of the country, it is deplorable to one who compares this old country with England, or any country on the Continent, particularly when he comes to examine it attentively, and finds that *there are tracts of ground formerly cultivated lying waste, and overgrown with dense jungles; that broken tanks are met with constantly; and villages, formerly large and flourishing, are now perfectly deserted.*"

A correspondent of one of the Indian journals who was travelling in the interior, says:—

"In travelling over the country the villages, especially away from military or civil stations, appear to have greatly deteriorated from their former condition. Tanks, wells, caravansaries, and temples, which bespeak a superior attention to all the appliances of life, are rapidly crumbling to pieces, without being replaced;

* Petition to Parliament from the Native Madras Association, pp. 21, 22.

† The Government of India under a Bureaucracy, p. 92.

‡ Norton's Madras, p. 30.

and the private houses of the village ryots, of any respectable size or appearance, are all of old construction. . . . Many villages are almost entirely shut in and concealed by high dense masses of prickly pear, which must themselves generate malaria, and prevent its dispersion from the town or village. It is lamentable to see a collection of hovels at places where the remains give evidence of former prosperity; and it is no pleasant task to write on the subject; but good will not be effected unless evil be exposed and forced on public notice. Something must be done to revive the expiring trade and energies of the country, if we would redeem our high promises to it as governors and Christians, and prevent the ryots suffering a degradation almost to the condition of beasts which perish. Educational or charitable efforts near the seat of government have no general effect, for you cannot teach or enlighten a starving people. But improve their condition generally, and the desire for knowledge and superior comfort and appliances will infallibly accompany the means of obtaining them."

And even so late as April, 1855, no less an authority than Colonel Cotton, the chief engineer of the Madras Government, says:—"Imagine a portion of England without a mile of made road, canal, or railway, without a bridge, and wholly impracticable to anything but a man on foot, or an animal, and not even to them for several months in the year; and then suppose this tract of land to be cut off from the ocean by from 100 to 500 miles of country, and an idea will be formed of the state of the people of India."*

SYSTEM OF JUSTICE AND POLICE.

3. As another illustration of the extent to which the misery of the people is attributable to bad Government, let us now turn to the question as to *the protection of life and property, and the administration of justice under British rule in India*. No one will dispute that this is as effectual a test of good government as can be found,—whether the great mass of the people are protected in life and property, and can obtain certain, speedy, and cheap justice. And unless men of the highest position and character in that country have grossly and wilfully belied themselves, it may be safely affirmed that there is no part of the world that will less satisfactorily respond to this test than British India. And let us first take the testimony of the Protestant Missionaries of Bengal. Mr. Kinnaird, in calling attention to the Petition which he presented to the House of Commons from that body, thus describes them:—"Of no one party, but connected with various Christian denominations, conversant with the every day lives of the people, unconnected with the Government and civil service, gentlemen of British birth and liberal education, with English ideas of justice: what one body in India is so calculated as they, to take a just view of the social condition of the people?" We have a copy of that Petition now before us. And what does it say? "Your Petitioners greatly fear that it will be found, on inquiry, that *in many districts of Bengal neither life nor property is secure*; that gang-roberies of the most daring character are perpetrated annually in great numbers, with impunity, and that there are constant scenes of violence and contention respecting disputed boundaries between the owners of landed estates." Another Petition, presented to Parliament in 1853, signed by 1800 Christian inhabitants of Bengal, thus speaks:—"The police of the lower provinces totally fails as respects the prevention of crimes, apprehen-

* Quoted in Ludlow's "British India," vol. ii., p. 814.

sion of offenders, and protection of life and property; but it is become an engine of oppression and a great cause of the corruption of the people;" that "torture is believed to be extensively practised on persons under accusation;" and that "all the evil passions are brought into play," &c. But we come now to a still higher authority, that of the Hon. F. J. Halliday, Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, who wrote an elaborate Minute "On the state of the Police and of Criminal Justice in the Lower Provinces of Bengal," a copy of which is now before us. This document is not the less worthy of attention because the authorities at the India House did their utmost to prevent its seeing the light. But what does Mr. Halliday say?—That "for a long series of years complaints have been handed down from administration to administration, regarding the badness of the Mofussil police under the government of Bengal, and as yet very little has been done to improve it;" that "throughout the length and breadth of the country the strong prey almost universally upon the weak, and power is too commonly valued only as it can be turned into money;" that "it is a lamentable but unquestionable fact, that the rural police, its position, character, and stability as a public institution, have in the lower provinces deteriorated during the last twenty years;" that "the criminal judicatories certainly do not command the confidence of the people;" that "whether right or wrong, the general native opinion is certainly that the administration of criminal justice is little better than a lottery, in which, however, the best chances are with the criminal; and this is also very much the opinion of the European Mofussil community;"* &c., &c. Is any more testimony required on this point? If so, we have it at hand in abundance. "A long resident in India," quoted by Mr. Kinnaid in his published speech, says:—"The police is not the worst in the world, only because, in the proper acceptation of the term, there is no police at all, but a *system of organised chicanery and oppression.*" Dr. Cheevers, a writer, also quoted at large by Mr. Kinnaid, says:—"No man in his senses will resort to a court of law in Bengal. The result is only sure to that side which can lie with most assurance, and bribe with the longest purse. What with delay, the inefficiency of the magistrates and judges, the unblushing corruption which prevails from the highest to the lowest officials, the civil servant only excepted, justice is the scarcest of all commodities in Bengal. There is no doubt of it. In every part of Bengal which I have visited, I never met with but one opinion about it. From Burdwan in the north-west to Chittagong in the far south-east, the testimony of all classes of people is uniform: all agree that *the Courts of the Company are nests of corruption, perjury, and injustice.*"† If any additional evidence were required on this point, we can produce that of one whose authority on such a question no one will impugn—the Lord Chief Justice of England. On the presentation of a petition from the natives of Madras to the House of Lords in 1853, the Duke of Argyll complained of the strong language employed by the petitioners in stating their grievances, on which Lord Campbell said:—

"He had sat for many sessions on the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The appeals which had come before the Committee from the Sudder

* Minute of the Honorable F. J. Halliday, pp. 1, 11-13.

† Bengal: its Landed Tenure and System of Police, by the Hon. A. Kinnaid, pp. 22-26.

Adawlut,* which was the highest court in India, had impressed him with the highest idea of the legal attainments and great experience of the judges of that court But whenever the proceedings of the inferior courts had come before the Committee, he had been compelled to feel that the gentlemen who occupied the bench in those courts were wholly uninformed of the principles on which justice should be administered. In this country a long course of experience—twenty years at least—was considered necessary to qualify a man for a judge; but in India a young man dispatched from the College of Haileybury, with at best a very imperfect acquaintance with the languages of India, was at once made a judge. He had not even the advantage of only acting in that capacity—for one day he was a judge of civil cases, the next a collector of revenue, and the next a police magistrate. He (Lord Campbell) had no doubt those young men went out with the best intentions—he believed indeed they were ingenuous youths, but that they possessed none of the qualifications of judges, and the consequence was that their decisions were often entirely opposed to every principle of justice. The noble Duke who had spoken in the course of the debate, had, he thought, been somewhat prudish in his criticisms upon the phrases which had been used by the natives of India in describing their grievances; it was not reasonable to expect them to be very mealy-mouthed; *and for himself, as far as regarded the administration of justice in the inferior courts, he thought no language could be too extravagant in describing its enormities.*†

There is, no doubt, one way of disposing of this immense mass of evidence, and a very summary and convenient way it is—if only it were safe. And that is to affect a lofty air of patriotic indignation, and without making the smallest attempt to disprove the facts or impugn the testimonies we have adduced, to brand as “un-English” those who drag them to the light. For that is the cant phrase which it is the fashion in these days, in lieu of reason and justice, to fling at the heads of all men who are not willing to connive at every act of wrong committed in the name of our country. We trust, however, the good sense of the English public, will be proof against that spurious patriotism which would try to divert them from honestly inquiring into a subject involving the fate of 150 millions of human beings, as well as the stability of our empire in the East, by such contemptible clap-trap appeals to their prejudices and passions. We trust, they will turn round upon these utterers of bombastic flattery, and say to them, “It is all very well to go off into general declamation about ‘English honour’ and ‘greatness,’ and all that. *But are these things so, or are they not?* Can you disprove the facts alleged; can you show the falsehood of the testimonies cited? Here we have what seems to be an enormous mass of evidence from men of all classes and conditions, intimately conversant with India, and whose characters for veracity appears, unless you can prove the contrary, to be unimpeachable. These witnesses include Governors-General, Governors of Provinces, Members of Council, Commanders-in-Chief, Judges, Magistrates, Civil and Military Officers in the service of the Company, Missionaries, Merchants, Journalists, Travellers, and are we to believe that these men have conspired to lie for no purpose but to slander their country? Are there no men who respect ‘the honour of England’ but you? And is there no way by which men can testify their care for that honour, except by flattering the vices of their country or of those who represent it in distant lands, by defending in our own case the same policy that we

* It is obvious that the Lord Chief Justice made a verbal mistake in saying the “Sudder Adawlut;” he was really referring to the Queen’s Judges, and meant to say, the “Supreme Court.”

† Hansard, vol. cxxiv., p. 647.

vehemently execrate and denounce in the case of others, and thus do all that lies in our power to hurry our country into courses of aggression, violence and injustice, which, if there be a God in heaven, cannot be either honourable or safe to any nation or individual. If things be in India as is alleged, we insist upon their being sternly enquired into and remedied, and by so doing we believe we shall best testify how highly we respect our country's honour and greatness."

OUR FUTURE POLICY IN INDIA.

WHAT is to be the future policy of England in relation to India is the question that must now anxiously engage the attention of every man jealous for the honour of his country, and interested in the happiness of his kind. In approaching this question, we must assume that the revolt will subside, and that order and peace will be restored throughout the whole of that vast peninsula. But that being assumed, we ask—How do we propose to deal hereafter with this great dependency of the British Empire? In entering upon this discussion, we beg to assure our readers that we have no intention whatever to present them with a plan for the future government of India. Heaven forbid that we should be guilty of such presumption! *That* is a task that will tax to the uttermost whatever of wisdom, experience, or statesmanship, is to be found among our legislators—a task that, we confess, appears to us beset with difficulties so numerous and appalling as almost to inspire despair. So far as we know, from such acquaintance with the past as we have been able to gain, there is nothing to be found in all the records of history at all analogous to the relation subsisting between this country and its great Indian Empire. Instances enough there are, of course, of conquerors overrunning a foreign land, taking possession of its soil, and reducing its inhabitants to a state of social and political subjection. But, in such cases, the conqueror has been usually accompanied or followed by colonists of his own race, who have settled down permanently in the new acquisition, become naturalised to the soil, and, to a certain extent, amalgamated with the people. But the peculiarity in our case seems to be this,—that nature and providence appear to have placed an obstacle in the way of our ever colonizing India, in the proper sense of that term, because the English constitution refuses to acclimatize in that country. So far as past experience enables us to judge, it would appear that over large portions, at least, of our territories in India, though adults going out from this country may with care and prudence live for years, the climate is found fatal to the children of British parents. So that, unless perpetually replenished by fresh importations from this country, the probability is, that the race would completely die away in the course of three or four generations. This peculiarity necessitates that Englishmen must be always comparatively few, and always foreigners, in India.* Such being the case, you have to govern a

* "Those who have not been in Bengal are not aware of the effects which its climate has upon the European's constitution. . . . His generation, even supposing him to be married to a European woman, dwindles and falls off to such a degree, that the third generation from the original settler, is but little removed in manners and disposition, from the old inhabitants of the country; and, therefore, except by a constant drain from the mother country, the full benefits of this colonization cannot be expected."—*Duke of Wellington's Supplementary Despatches*, vol. i. p. 36.

country removed from you at a distance of 15,000 miles—a country extending over an area of nearly a million square miles, and with a population of 150 millions of souls. These people are, moreover, aliens from us in race, language, and religion; in their ideas of government and morality; and separated from us by social institutions, habits, and manners that will constitute, for a long time at least, an insurmountable wall of partition between them and us. And this is not all; for when we come to analyse this immense mass of human beings, we find that, so far from being homogeneous among themselves, they are divided again into numerous diversities of race and creed, and language and customs. This is the people for whom we have to devise a system of government which shall develop the resources of the country without enslaving its inhabitants—a system which must not so affront their principles and habits as to excite hostility, or so compromise our own as to debase ourselves and provoke their contempt—a system which shall maintain our ascendancy without involving their degradation—which shall transplant the forms of Western civilization into a moral soil, differing in almost every conceivable respect from our own—and a system, finally, which must differ wholly from the one we have attempted hitherto, and which, after an experiment of a hundred years, has proved to be in almost every respect a comparative if not an utter failure.* Whether this is practicable, we do not presume to say; but we are devoutly thankful that the responsibility of discovering the way to do it does not rest upon our intellect or conscience. Our object, however, is not to deal with the politics, but with the morals, of this great question, and to lay down certain principles, which not only the requirements of natural justice and Christian morality, but the experience of the past, seem to point out as indispensable to be observed and practised if there is to be any chance of our retaining our Indian Empire at all.

I.—NO MORE CONQUEST AND ANNEXATION.

And, first, we remark that there ought to be an end, once for all, and once for ever, to that system of annexation and conquest so insanely and iniquitously pursued in India. The avidity for land, the insatiable earth-hunger with which we of the Anglo-Saxon race are afflicted, seems to be really a moral disease. Look round, for a moment, at the present extent of our enormous colonial possessions in all parts of the world. In North America, in South America, in the East Indies, in the West Indies, in Australia, in New Zealand, in Southern Africa, in Western Africa, we have unbounded wastes of territory unoccupied and uncultivated, affording ample scope for the English race to expand and develop itself for a thousand years to come. And yet the cry is constantly "Give, give," like the daughter of the horse-leech. In regard to India there is less excuse for the indulgence of this greed for territory than in any part of the world. If we look, for instance, to North America, or Australasia, we find in them a plausible justification of our encroachments, in the fact that those great countries are very sparsely populated, and only by tribes of wandering and degraded savages. We utterly deny our right to seize

* "Whatever were the causes of the outbreak, you may search the records of history far and wide, before you come across an instance of so vexatious and extraordinary a failure on the part of a governing power in the administration of its political trust."—*Mr. Gladstone's Speech at Chester.*

the land, even of these poor savages, without ample and *bonâ fide* compensation. Still, in those regions there are unquestionably immense tracts of country not brought under culture, or made subservient to the purposes of human subsistence and comfort. But India is already thickly peopled by an ingenious and industrious race, who had attained to a high state of civilization (though not of our type), and an extraordinary proficiency in works, both of industry and art, many centuries before our forefathers had emerged from barbarism.*

And yet this is the country, the possession of which we have grasped with an eagerness and haste which have defied prudence as well as justice. Not content with having secured free access for purposes of commerce and Christianization to every part of the peninsula—not content with having obtained command over almost the whole line of its immense sea-board—not content, even, with having acquired the ownership of the three great Presidencies, the proper rule and management of which would have afforded ample occupation to all our energies and resources for ages to come—not content with all this, we have gone on with insatiate cupidity adding estates, principalities, provinces, and kingdoms to our territories, until our nominal possessions have reached an extent so enormous, as to render it impossible that we should govern them efficiently. To give some idea of the rate at which this work has been carried on of late years, let us take the case of our last Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie. He occupied that post for just eight years. Here is an enumeration of some, though far from all, his exploits of that nature within that brief space:—He annexed the Punjab, with an area of 78,000 square miles and a population of 7,000,000; he annexed Berar, with an area of 80,000 square miles and a population of 4,000,000; he annexed Pegu, with an area of 20,000 square miles and a population of 1,500,000; and he annexed the kingdom of Oude, with an area of 24,000 square miles and a population of 3,500,000. “Without including,” says *The Examiner*, “some minor annexations, such as Sattara and Jahnsi, the noble lord has thus added to our Indian dominions countries equal to twice the extent of the three United Kingdoms, with a population exceeding in number all the inhabitants together of Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and the two Scandinavian kingdoms.”

And let it be specially observed, that this policy has been pursued directly in the teeth of the opinions pronounced by almost every man who has attained any distinction as an Indian statesman. The Duke of Wellington, Sir Thomas Munro, Sir John Malcolm, Sir Charles Metcalfe, Sir Henry Russell, Mountstuart Elphinstone, General Briggs, Mr. Shepherd, Mr. St. George Tucker, and Lord Ellenborough, have all protested against this

* Sir Thomas Munro, when examined before a Committee of the House of Commons, said:—“With regard to civilization I do not exactly understand what is meant by the civilization of the Hindoos. In the higher branches of science, in the knowledge of the theory and practice of good government, and in an education which, by banishing prejudices and superstition, opens the mind to receive instruction of every kind, they are much inferior to Europeans. But, if a good system of agriculture, unrivalled manufacturing skill, a capacity to produce whatever can contribute to convenience and luxury, schools established in every village for teaching reading, writing, and arithmetic; the general practice of hospitality and charity amongst each other; and, above all, a treatment of the female sex full of confidence, respect, and delicacy, are among the signs which denote a civilized people, then the Hindoos are not inferior to the nations of Europe; and if civilization is to become an article of trade between the two countries, I am convinced that this country will gain by the import cargo.”

system, as pregnant with danger to ourselves, and with degradation to the people of India. We can only cite, very briefly, a few testimonies from this great cloud of witnesses. Many years ago, the Duke of Wellington wrote,—“In my opinion, the extension of our territory and influence has been greater than our means.” The words of Sir Thomas Munro have already been cited, to the effect that the advantages of protection for life and property derived by those of the inhabitants of India whom we have already subdued “are purchased by the sacrifice of independence, of national character, and of whatever renders a people respectable;” so that, in his opinion, “*the consequences of the conquest of India by British arms would be, in place of raising, to debase the whole people.*” Sir John Malcolm says:—“I am convinced that, though our revenue may increase, the permanence of our power will be hazarded in proportion as the native princes and chiefs fall under our direct rule. Considering, as I do, from all my experience, that it is now our policy to maintain as long as we can all native states now existing, and through them and by other means to support and maintain native chiefs and an aristocracy throughout the empire of India, *I do think that every means should be used to avert what I should consider as one of the greatest calamities, in a political point of view, that could arise to our empire—viz., the whole of India becoming subject to our direct rule*” Sir Henry Russell says:—“The danger that we have most to dread in India lies entirely at home. A well-conducted rebellion of our native subjects, or an extensive disaffection of our native troops, is the event by which our power is most likely to be shaken; and the sphere of this danger is necessarily enlarged by every enlargement of our territory. The increase of our subjects, and still more of our native troops, is an increase, not of our strength, but our weakness.”

Those who may wish to see more of these authorities, as well as those we have cited in brief, given *in extenso*, are referred to the very able work of Mr. J. B. Norton, entitled “The Rebellion in India: How to prevent Another,” pp. 81–92.

We may appeal against this system of annexation, not only to the authority of great names, but to the still more emphatic testimony of facts. In every respect it has proved a failure. There can be no doubt that one of the main objects kept in view by those who have pushed forward this process of wholesale absorption has been to improve the revenue of the Indian Government. But, so far from attaining that end, it is found that, just in proportion as they annex territory, do their finances become more deranged, and their deficits more formidable. Lord Dalhousie, indeed, in the Minute which he issued on quitting his office, attempted to show that his enormous spoliations had been profitable to his masters. And he did this in a very summary way, by stating the amount of additional revenue derived from the annexed states, but omitting all account of the additional charges they involved. But Sir Erskine Perry, in a speech delivered in the House of Commons in April, 1856, proved beyond all question, from official documents laid before Parliament, that the charges immensely exceeded the receipts. He takes as his example the principal annexations of Scinde, Sattara, the Punjaub, and Nagpore, omitting Pegu, because the returns had not been laid before the House, and Oude had only just been annexed. And what is the result? On comparing the revenues with *the civil charges*

only of these four states, he shows that there is a net deficit of £278,026. "But," he continues, "it is to take a very inadequate view of the value of annexation, if we do not consider the cost of military occupation and defence, whatever that may be." This is nowhere given in the accounts, and some hardy annexationists are bold enough to assert that there is no such item—in fact, that a mere extension of our frontier or territories only requires fresh cantonments for our troops, but no additional force. Inexorable figures, however, tell a different tale. Here is a comparison of the military charges of 1837–8, or the year before the Affghan war, with the year 1852, when the war charges only figure for the small sum of £67,293.

MILITARY CHARGES.

1837–8, the year before the Affghan War ...	£6,725,957
1852,	9,742,776

Increase of permanent Military Charges £3,016,819

So may robbery ever prosper!

But if the system fails thus financially, how does it answer as respects the security of our rule in India? Let the present state of things in that country answer. To what has the success of the mutiny, in a military point of view, been ascribed? To the necessity the government was under to send so much of its European force to garrison its new conquests in the Punjab, Scinde and Pegu. And where has the rebellion raged most fiercely? In Oude and Sattara, the scenes of our last unrighteous acquisitions. On the other hand, who have proved most faithful to us in this crisis? Those native princes whose territories we had *not* annexed: Holkar, Scindiah, the Nizam, and the Rajahs of Rajpootana. Indeed, it may be safely affirmed, that if these had not proved faithful,—if they had given the signal for general insurrection, no power on earth could have saved our empire in India. Or if, as some of the disciples of Lord Dalhousie's school had actually counselled, we had annexed their territories as we did those of the King of Oude, can any man doubt that we should have had the same mortal struggle in every one of them as we have now in Oude? And does not all this speak trumpet-tongued in condemnation of that unprincipled policy?

But we may be told, and are constantly told, that this system of annexation is inevitable,—that we are impelled onward by an irresistible destiny against which it is vain to contend. We wholly deny the truth of this immoral and impious doctrine. We maintain, as regards communities, no less than individuals, that they are never placed under *necessity to commit crime*, except such as arises from the indulgence of their own evil passions. We earnestly intreat our countrymen to fling from them this wicked plea as they would the suggestions of the devil. It is a plea that undermines the very principle, nay the very possibility of anything like international morality; for if every sovereign or every state is allowed to plead in justification of their aggressions and robberies upon their neighbours' rights and possessions this convenient excuse of an inevitable destiny, the whole world must be at once converted into a den of thieves. Indeed, it is high time that this abominable doctrine should be resisted and denounced. It is already made the pretext for all sorts of political iniquities.

Napoleon pleaded it in defence of his career of conquest and blood: he was only following "the star" of his destiny. The supporters of the slave-trade and slavery employ it in vindication of their practices: it is "the destiny" of the children of Ham to be in servitude to the white race. The American fillibusters urge it triumphantly as their "right divine" to become pirates and freebooters: they are only fulfilling "the destiny" of the Anglo-Saxon race on that Western Continent. And, certainly, we do not see why a Palmer, or a Rush, or a Redpath, may not use it as an apology for their crimes as plausibly as the East India Company or the British Government may for theirs.*

And, in point of fact, when we come to examine the actual historical cases to which the doctrine is applied, we find that there is not even a shadow of foundation for this attempt to evade our moral responsibilities. Will anybody tell us what "inevitable necessity" obliged Lord Auckland to invade Affghanistan, lying many hundreds of miles beyond our frontier, and that at the very time when its ruler had not only been guilty of no offence, but was earnestly anxious for our alliance and friendship? Where was the "necessity" which compelled us, after recognizing the Ameers of Scinde as independent princes, and treating with them as such, to obtain from the poor puppet Shah Soojah, whom we attempted to force upon the Affghans as their king, a cession of his pretended rights of sovereignty over these very Ameers, and then deal with them as rebellious vassals, and compel them to enter into treaties with us which it was impossible for them to fulfil? What "necessity," except the necessity which leads a fool to act according to his folly, was laid upon Commodore Lambert, to make the insolence of two of his subordinate officers to the governor of Rangoon a pretext for beginning war against the Burmese empire, which ended in an annexation of one-third of its entire territories? Can any mortal man show what "necessity," save that which arose from the impulses of his own ambitious and utterly unscrupulous nature, obliged Lord Dalhousie to annex Nagpore, or Sattara, or Oude, when their princes were not only at peace with us, but were our faithful and attached allies? Away, then, with this nefarious plea! It is a plea suitable enough to the characters and pursuits of Thugs, and pirates and swindlers, but utterly dishonourable to a civilized and Christian nation.

II.—NOT GOVERNMENT BY THE SWORD.

Another principle that both justice and experience seem loudly to teach is this:—that we must relinquish the attempt to govern India by the sword. This has hitherto been avowedly and even boastingly the principle of our rule. "We have gained India by the sword, and we shall keep it by the sword," has been the axiom laid down with a tone of vaunt and defiance. Fashionable as it may be now to pour unmeasured execration on the Sepoys, our readers need not very severely tax their memories to bring up before their minds a very different manner of regarding and characterising them. They were wont to be spoken of in terms of high admiration and eulogy, as our "brave," "faithful," "loyal," native

* If we may believe Milton, this is precisely the plea which the "Father of Lies" himself employs in self-justification:—

"So spake the fiend, and with necessity,
The tyrant's plea, excused his devilish deeds."

army, who, when trained by British discipline, and led by British officers, were equal to the accomplishment of any task, and constituted the right arm of our power in India. But we believe that, even apart from the perils of mutiny, to which our authorities in India were so blind, the existence of the enormous military force which we have maintained in India has been in every respect a curse and a calamity to that country. It has exhausted its resources by an expenditure amounting of late years to *twelve millions and a half* annually. It has presented a strong temptation to the Government to undertake acts of aggression and plunder, by placing at their disposal, ever ready for use, and even imperatively calling for use, this mighty instrument for mischief. It has diverted their attention, as well as their means, from works of internal improvement and general good government, by teaching them to rely for stability and success upon the strong arm of brute force, instead of such measures as would tend to conciliate the affections and the loyalty of the people. No more conclusive evidence of this need be required than is afforded by comparing the prodigious sums expended on the army, with the miserable dribblets doled out for public works. And yet, despite the deplorable result of this experiment of ruling by the sword in times past, there are many who still insist upon laying down the same brute axiom as the cornerstone of our policy in India. But how is it to be carried out? It seems pretty clear that we dare not for the future entrust the safety of our Indian Empire to the care of a native army. *Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?* What then is to be done? Why, the darling idea of governing 150 millions of people by terror and violence must on no account be relinquished: we must therefore be prepared to keep up a European force of 50,000, 80,000, or 100,000 men. Indeed, if the sword is to be the foundation of our rule, even the last-mentioned number will be found scanty enough, and in our judgment far too scanty, for the work they have to do.*

But let us look for a moment at what is involved in this proposal. Is it possible, and, if possible, is it desirable or safe? Mr. Ludlow, in his admirable work recently published, entitled "British India: Its Races and History," adverting to this idea, says:—

"As far as I can judge, from careful enquiry amongst those competent, it is simply idle to talk of holding India permanently by an army of 100,000 Englishmen, as we hear sometimes. Do those who talk so largely know or recollect that every European soldier costs £100 by the time he is landed in India?—that his tenure of life when there is precisely that of a Cuban slave? that every European regiment has to renew itself in seven years? Then 50,000 Europeans only represent a dead loss of human capital of more than £700,000 a-year, over and above pay and other current expenses. What would it be, if the European had the duties thrown upon him which are now thrown upon the Sepoy?—if he had to march and do all his work habitually in hot weather? I have asked; and the answer of such an Indian officer has been, 'His life would not be worth two years' purchase.

* In a remarkable pamphlet lately published by a native gentleman, entitled "Thoughts of a Native of Northern India on the Rebellion," we find the following:—"If the Government are determined to irritate the people and turn every hand and heart desperately against them, I do not think that even 300,000 European soldiers will ever be able to keep India *quiet*; though 50,000 of them are quite sufficient to turn it into a perfect desert."

Neither would India stand such a drain of gold, nor England of blood, as would be required for such a purpose."^{*}

To the same effect are the statements made in an article recently published in the *Edinburgh Review*, and evidently written in the interest of the Government. "Europeans," we are told, "serving in India annually lose 10 per cent. by death, while natives lose only 1½ per cent. . . . To maintain in India a British army of 50,000 men, the country must be prepared to raise 15,000 men per annum, to supply the loss of life and provide for the necessary reliefs."[†] And, of course, if we maintain an army of 100,000, we must provide annually 30,000 men for supplies and reliefs. That is, we should be obliged every ten years to send from among the young and vigorous manhood of our population 300,000 men out to India, to perish by climate and the hardships of the service, at the rate already indicated. Does anybody believe that this is within the limit of possibility?

But if it were, there is another fatal objection in the expense. Everybody knows that even before this outbreak, and in a time of so-called peace, the Indian finances were in a most unsatisfactory condition, with an annual and annually-increasing deficit. The power of taxation from all sources seems to have reached its utmost limit. The only chance of making India more productive, is by laying money out largely in such public works as are indispensable to the development of its material and commercial resources. But how is this to be done, if the utmost farthing of revenue that you can wring from the people, is to be expended in the support of enormous military forces for the purposes of menace and repression?

But there is another objection of a still more formidable nature, to which we earnestly bespeak the attention of our countrymen. Suppose we *could* maintain a British army of 100,000 men in India, and that it were at the disposal of the government of the day, or of the Horse Guards, what security should we have for our liberties at home? For this huge body of mercenaries would be in addition to our own regular standing army at home, to increase which greatly, we have no doubt, strenuous attempts will be made by the war party. With the great and daily-increasing facilities of communication with and transport to and from India, now possessed, is it a mere fantastic fear, or a real and terrible possibility, that at a period of great political excitement, which may yet arise in the history of our country, such as preceded the passing of the Reform Bill, or the Repeal of the Corn Laws, a Minister intent upon resisting and repressing the popular will, may summon in a few weeks 25,000 or 50,000 Indian troops to his aid? Are we resolutely to shut our eyes to the lessons of history on this subject? How were the liberties of Rome destroyed? Precisely in this way. The extent of her conquests compelled her to maintain immense armies in her remote provinces; and these, when summoned back, became the willing instruments of tyranny at home. "The decline of Rome," says Gibbon, "was the natural and inevitable effect of immoderate greatness. Prosperity ripened the principle of decay; the causes of destruction multiplied with the extent of conquest; and as soon as time or accident had removed the artificial supports, the stupendous fabric yielded to the pressure of its own weight. The story of its ruin is simple and obvious; and instead of inquiring *why* the Roman Empire was

^{*} British India: Its Races and History, vol. ii., p. 232.

[†] Edinburgh Review, p. 37.

destroyed, we should rather be surprised that it had subsisted so long. *The victorious legions, who in distant wars acquired the vices of strangers and mercenaries, first oppressed the freedom of the republic, and afterwards violated the majesty of the purple.*" But, much more recently, and much nearer home, we have had a warning example, which it would be the height of infatuation to overlook. There can be but one sentiment, and that of deep execration, in this country, at the atrocious and dastardly attempt lately made upon the life of the Emperor of the French. But, amid all our horror and indignation of that crime, we must not forget that the state of things in that country is such, that no friend of freedom can look upon it without bitter regret. Every trace of liberty has vanished. The noblest minds of France are either in exile, or so fettered, gagged, and humiliated, that they dare not give any utterance to their thoughts. And by what means has a country of thirty-six millions of souls, certainly among the most intelligent and civilized on the face of the earth, been brought to this condition of abject political servitude? What was the instrument in their enslavement and degradation? We entreat our readers to mark this answer—*The Army of Algeria*. It will be found that this is strictly correct. The officers who were the ready implements for suppressing every trace of liberal institutions in France—your Bugeauds, and St. Arnauds, &c.,—were men who had been trained in that school of African conquest. The men who had fleshed their swords upon the Arabs were equally ready, when occasion came, to strangle the liberties of their own country, and to sweep the streets and boulevards of Paris with their dastardly and deadly fusillades. And with such beacon lights burning before us, shall we quietly see an Indian army of 50,000, 80,000, or 100,000 men put into the hands of our rulers?

III.—JUST TREATMENT OF THE NATIVES.

But there is a third principle which we would lay down for our Indian rule, and which necessarily follows from the last: namely, that we must treat the natives with justice, conciliation, and kindness. This is our answer to the question which we have no doubt the worshippers of brute-force as an instrument of government will put to us on reading what we have just said:—"If we are not to govern India by the sword, how are we to retain possession of it?" We say, then, that you never can retain possession of it by the sword. The only way you can do so is by so ruling the people in righteousness and mercy as to give them an interest in the permanence of British supremacy, and to this end it is indispensable that we should associate them with ourselves in the government of the country. What has been hitherto the course we have pursued in this respect? For many years the natives were totally excluded from all offices of emolument and trust. When Lord William Bentinck was Governor-General, he made some efforts to break down this British *caste*, as arrogant and offensive as anything to be found in Hindoo caste. But even now the distribution of the honours and advantages of office is monstrously unfair as regards the natives.* And still worse is the *animus* displayed towards them in this respect, the mean, grudging, jealous spirit with which the privileges of power are guarded against them. We will give one illustration of this. In the

* See Appendix B.

Company's Charter Act of 1833, Parliament inserted the following clause:—"That no natives of said territories, nor any natural born subject of His Majesty resident therein, shall, by reason only of his religion, place of birth, descent, colour, or any of them, be disabled from holding any place, office, or employment under the said Company." Loud were the self-gratulations over our own virtue and liberality which this clause called forth at the time. But mark the result: Mr. Cameron, a gentleman long and intimately acquainted with India, writing in 1853, just as the Company were applying for another renewal of their charter, says:—"The statute of 1833 made the natives of India eligible to all offices under the Company. *But during the twenty years that have elapsed, not one of the natives has been appointed to any office, except such as they were eligible to before the statute.*" One special case may be mentioned, which shows the *animus* of those in authority. A young native of the name of Chukkerbutty, relying, we presume, upon the reality of the above provision in the charter of 1833, came over to this country—at what a sacrifice and expense may be readily conceived—to complete his education as a medical man. He passed through his examinations with the highest credit, and had testimonials of the most satisfactory nature from his teachers, so that there was no shadow of doubt of his qualification. So disciplined and prepared he applied for admission into the Company's service as assistant-surgeon. But the Directors, one and all, refused to nominate him, for no other reason whatever, but that he had the misfortune to have a dark skin and to have been born in India.

In adopting this course, and treating the natives as a conquered and inferior race, on no account to be admitted to political and official equality with ourselves, we are not only violating the dictates of justice and of Christian morality, but we are disregarding all that the experience of the past has taught to be wise policy with a view to permanent success. It is, perhaps, barely conceivable, that we may by mere dint of superior cunning and brute force maintain our supremacy in India, not by elevating the natives to our own level, but by crushing and keeping them down under our feet. But if we are ambitious of impregnating India with our own civilization and faith, and of erecting there the noblest monument to our own glory, by the formation of its teeming millions of souls, into an intelligent, virtuous, and progressive community, we must—or all history and experience are liars—admit them to the rights and privileges of citizenship which we claim for ourselves.

"By all means it is to be procured," says Lord Bacon, "that the trunk of Nebuchadnezzar's tree of monarchy be great enough to bear the branches and the boughs; that is, that the natural subjects of the crown or state should bear a sufficient proportion to the strange subjects they govern; therefore all states that are liberal of naturalization towards strangers are fit for empire, for to think that a handful of people can, with the greatest courage and policy in the world, embrace too large extent of dominion, it may hold for a time, but it will fail suddenly. The Spartans were a nice people in point of naturalization, whereby, while they kept their compass, they stood firm; but when they did spread, and their boughs were become too great for their stems, they became a windfall upon the sudden. Never any state was in this point so open to receive strangers into their body as were the Romans, therefore it sorted with them accordingly, for they grew

to the greatest monarchy. Their manner was to grant naturalization, (which they called "jus civitatis,") and to grant it in the highest degree, that is, not only "jus commercii, jus connubii, jus hereditatis;" but also "jus suffragii," and "jus honorum," and this not to singular persons alone, but likewise to whole families, yea, to cities, and sometimes to nations. Add to this, their custom of plantation of colonies, whereby the Roman plant was removed into the soil of other nations, and putting both constitutions together, you will say that it was not the Romans that spread upon the world, but it was the world that spread upon the Romans, and that was the sure way of greatness."*

It is sometimes pretended by the upholders of the present system of exclusiveness, first, that the natives are incompetent for occupying offices of trust and power, and secondly, that they are quite content with the arrangement under which all such offices are given to their foreign conquerors, while they are permitted to live in peace under their protection. In refutation of these assertions, we cite the following authorities:—

Sir E. Perry, formerly Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, at Bombay, and President of the Board of Education, in a speech delivered in the Town Hall, Bombay, said—

"All the civil business in the Company's courts is, in the first stage, conducted, generally speaking, by native judges. They are what the French would call judges of the first instance, and, from their decisions, appeals lie to European judges, from whose judgments again an appeal lies to the Sudder Adawlut. It naturally follows that, on these latter appeals, a close comparison is made between the decisions of native and European functionaries. Now I learn from the judges of the Sudder Adawlut, that it was publicly stated in open court, by two leading members of the Bombay bar, that, with a few distinguished exceptions, the decisions of the native judges were, in every respect, superior to those of the Europeans."

Mr. Norton, in his work on the "Administration of Justice in Southern India," makes a similar comparison, which redounds to the credit of the native bench in the Southern Presidency. He says:—

"I will coincide in the opinion that it was wise and just to give the natives a larger share than heretofore in the administration of public justice, and believe that, on the whole, the measure has worked well. It would be inexpedient to recede from that measure; indeed, I hope to see the day when educated natives shall be admitted to a far wider extent in all departments of the public service. My own conviction, arrived at by a careful perusal of the Sudder Reports, is, that the native judges, as a body, are more capable of weighing testimony, and far more often arrive at reasonable conclusions, than the English gentlemen, who are placed immediately above them."

Colonel Sleeman, an able, zealous, and impartial officer in the service of the British Indian Government, speaking of the effect already produced by increasing native agency, says, from his own experience and observation:—

"The consequence is a degree of integrity in public officers never before known in India, and rarely to be found in any other country. In the province where I now write, which consists of six districts, there are twenty-two native judicial officers, moonsiffs, Sudder ameens, and the principal Sudder ameen; and in the whole province I have never heard a suspicion breathed against any one of them, nor do I believe that the integrity of one of them is at this time suspected. The only one suspected within the two-and-a-half years that I have been in the province, was, I grieve to say, a Christian, and he has been removed from office, to the great satisfaction of the people, and is never to be

* "Of the True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates."

employed again. Arrian, in speaking of the class of supervisors in *India*, says :—‘ They may not be guilty of falsehood ; and, indeed, none of the Indians were ever guilty of that crime.’ I believe that as little falsehood is spoken by the people of India in their village communities, as in any part of the world with an equal area and population. It is in our courts of justice where falsehood prevail most ; and the longer they have been anywhere established, the greater the degree of falsehood that prevails in them. Those entrusted with the administration of a newly-acquired territory are surprised to find the disposition among both principals and witnesses in cases to tell the plain and simple truth.”

In a pamphlet published and extensively circulated in England in 1848, by an intelligent native named Shahamut Aly, now in the service of the Indian Government, it is said :—

“ It has been often asserted by partial writers, that the natives are happier under the present rule than they were under their former rulers ; such a conclusion is the result partly of ignorance and partly of misconception. Are the natives happier because they have been thrown out of employments of trust ; because they have been deprived of all offices of honour as well as of their hereditary lands ; because, by the exaltation of their masters, they have been degraded and despised ? Considering their privations, the natives have not any adequate cause to be happy, and a moment’s reflection will convince any thinking mind of the truth of this remark.”

Sir John Malcolm, late Governor of Bombay, in his able work on the Government of India, says :—

“ We must not conceal from ourselves the causes which have combined to exclude the natives from any share in the administration of India. It is an overweening sense of our own superiority, a love of power, and an alarm, which I deem groundless, that as their interests are advanced, those of European agents will be deteriorated. But if I am right in believing, as I conscientiously do, that unless they are treated with more confidence, elevated to more distinction, and admitted to higher employment, we cannot hope to preserve for any long period our dominions in this country, no feelings of considerations should be allowed to oppose their gradual progress in every civil function and employ. By raising the most active and eminent of the natives of India in their own estimation, and that of others, we shall reconcile them, and, through them, the population at large, to a government which, daring to confide in its own justice and wisdom, casts off the common narrow and depressing rules of foreign conquerors.”

Colonel Walker has remarked :—

“ The most prominent feature in the civil government of the Company, is the almost entire exclusion of native agency. The offices held by natives are only those of the lowest description, such as could not be the object of ambition to the European. To natives of rank and education, no temptation is held out which can induce them to engage in the service of the Company ; a very little consideration will be sufficient to show that no circumstance tends more strongly than this to impair the efficiency of our Indian administration, and even to render its duration precarious. The admission of natives to offices of power and profit is the only mode by which they can be effectually conciliated ; it is vain to expect that men will ever be satisfied with merely having their property secured, while the paths of honourable ambition are shut against them.”*

But it is not merely as regards admission to office that our conduct towards the natives requires amendment. Our whole treatment of them

* These, and a variety of other testimonies to the same effect, are cited in a very able pamphlet “ On the Civil Administration of the Bombay Presidency,” by Nowrizjee Burdoonjee, Translator and Interpreter to Her Majesty’s Supreme Court.

must be altered. It is not very easy to get at the truth on this matter. The Anglo-Indian community are almost all infected with that pride of race and pretension of conquest, which induce them to treat the natives with arrogance and contempt; they are little disposed therefore to "peach" against each other. But facts nevertheless do creep out, and facts which go far to explain the desperate and deadly hatred which the late revolt has proved to exist in the breast of the natives towards their British masters. We cite a few testimonials on this subject, to which we bespeak the attention of our readers. Captain Harvey in his work, entitled "Ten Years in India," says that "young officers, on first commencing their military career, talk about those horrible black nigger sepoys;" "look down upon them as brute beasts;" "make use of opprobrious language towards them." "Where is the Englishman," he adds, "who would tamely submit to be dealt with as the natives of India often are? The very brutes that perish are not so treated. . . . Our good folks in England know not of the goings on in India. To maltreat a native is considered a meritorious act; and the younger branches of the service think it very fine to curse and swear at them, to kick and buffet them."*

Mr. Ludlow, in his work previously referred to, says:—"A relative of mine wrote to me from India only the other day, that he had known an European officer who kept an orderly for the sole purpose of thrashing his native servants; that another was recently tried for beating his orderly because he did not thrash his servants hard enough. Another relative of mine," he continues, "an officer in a Bombay regiment, wrote lately, in terms of just disgust, at the conduct of the young officers of his corps towards their native servants; maltreating them, leaving their wages unpaid for a twelvemonth; and yet some of these men were so faithful, that they would pawn their own clothes to procure grain for their master's horses."†

Sir Charles Napier's correspondence abounds with similar allusions. "If I know anything," he says, "of good manners, nothing could be worse than those of Englishmen in India towards natives of all ranks. I speak of the manners of the military of both armies." On one occasion he refused officers a passage in his merchant-steamers on the Indus, knowing "that they would go on board, occupy all the room, treat his rich merchants and supercargoes with insolence, and very probably drink, and thrash the people."‡

Mr. Bayard Taylor, a respectable American traveller, though admiring greatly our empire in India, is obliged to say on this subject:—"There is one feature of English society in India, however, which I cannot notice without feeling disgusted and indignant. I allude to the contemptuous manner in which the natives, even those of the best and most intelligent classes, are almost invariably spoken of and treated. Social equality, except in some rare instances, is utterly out of the question. The tone adopted towards the lower classes is one of lordly arrogance; towards the rich and enlightened one of condescension and patronage. I have heard the term "niggers" applied to the whole race by those high in office; with the lower order of the English it is the designation in

* Ten Years in India, vol. ii., pp. 35, 36.

† British India and Its Races, vol. ii., p. 357.

‡ Life of Sir C. Napier, vol. iii., p. 408.

general use. And this, too, towards those of our own Caucasian blood, where there is no instinct of race to excuse their unjust prejudice. Why is it that the virtue of Exeter Hall and Stafford House can tolerate this fact without a blush, and yet condemn with pharisaic zeal the social inequality of the negro and white races in America?*

In the very last account of life in India, published within a few weeks, containing the experience of two young ladies only just returned from that country, we find the same thing continually coming out, and all the more strikingly, because it comes out quite incidentally, without any consciousness of its being other than entirely a matter of course. Thus we read of a lady addressing an Indian servant as "You donkey;" of gentlemen keeping a large store of boots and other miscellaneous articles beside their beds for the purpose of pitching at the head of their "punkah man;" of a young officer who "had never paid his men anything since they had entered his service." The conduct of a gentleman who occupied the post of magistrate at Meerut, and who is represented as a remarkably good-humoured pleasant man, is thus described:—"In his judicial capacity he, of course, was at liberty to inflict personal chastisement on his servants, which he occasionally did, and after sounds of a general scrimmage in his room, he would emerge looking heated and languid from his exertion, when he would remark with great simplicity, that his fool of a bearer would hand him an unbecoming waistcoat; for which dire offence he had been compelled to shy all the moveables in the room at his (the bearer's) head." So again, the young ladies speaking of their brother's feelings towards the natives, say, "Keith had a most absurd horror of a native's coming near him; he declared he could detect the copperish smell of the colouring matter in their skins the instant they entered the room, and he would much sooner be touched by a toad than by one of their clammy hands."

And yet this very work contains many testimonies to the gentleness, affection, and fidelity of these native servants. "It was delightful," we are told, "to see the native servants amusing the little English children; their patience seems inexhaustible. Thoroughly childish in their ideas, they easily suit their play to their little companions' intellect; and I have watched them by the hour unweariedly amusing a cross little thing, imitating a tiger or elephant, walking on hands and knees about the floor with the little charge mounted on their back, and inventing endless games. They are never tired or put out of temper, but seem really to enjoy it; and certainly the child repays their care with an affection I have never seen evinced to an English servant." And when the young ladies' brother was laid up with dangerous illness we are told that "Keith's bearer sat day and night at the door of the room, and never seemed absent an instant from his post, always watchful and attentive."†

We will produce only one other witness on this point,—Mr. Francis Horsley Robinson, a highly respectable gentleman, who resided long in India. In the pamphlet already quoted, he says, adverting to the contempt with which the natives of all grades are treated by our countrymen: "The existence of this feeling [of contempt] towards them is known to the natives and rankles in their hearts. It is shown by

* "A Visit to India, China, and Japan, in the Year 1853," by Bayard Taylor, p. 273.

† "The Timely Retreat," pp. 149, 152, 189, 217.

their careful avoidance of the society of Englishmen. Formerly they were frequent visitors at the houses of the officers of Government, and their constant companions in field sports; now they never approach them but when compelled by the demands of business or self-interest. Nor is this aversion at all extraordinary; for it is difficult to convey to the people of England an adequate notion of the harshness and rudeness with which even the highest people in India are treated. Nothing seems more to astonish those few natives of India who visit England, than the civility with which they find themselves received, especially in the higher classes."* Now, we say confidently, that if we are to retain India, or to retain it to any purpose but that of reducing 150 millions of people to the most abject humiliation, all this must be changed. We must learn "to do justly, and love mercy, and walk humbly with our God." The plea urged by the Anglo-Indians, for excluding natives from office, and for assuming this lordly air of superiority toward them, is the necessity of maintaining the *prestige* of Englishmen. But if our *prestige* can be maintained only by the degradation of 150 millions of people, we say let it fall. On this point we cite with pleasure the noble language of Sir Charles Metcalfe, when a similar selfish plea was urged against a plan which he proposed for the elevation of the natives.

"There may be those who would argue that it is injudicious to establish a system which, by exciting a free and independent character, may possibly lead, at a future period, to dangerous consequences But supposing the remote possibility of these evil consequences, that would not be a sufficient reason for withholding any advantage from our subjects. Similar objections have been made against our attempting to promote the education of our native subjects; but how unworthy it would be of a liberal government to give weight to such objections. The world is governed by an irresistible Power, which giveth and taketh away dominion; and vain would be the impotent prudence of men against the operation of its almighty influence. All that rulers can do is to merit dominion by promoting the happiness of those under them. If we perform our duty in this respect, the gratitude of India and the admiration of the world will accompany our name throughout all ages, whatever may be the revolutions of futurity; but if we withhold blessings from our subjects, from a selfish apprehension of possible danger at a remote period, we shall merit that reverse which time has possibly in store for us, and shall fall with the mingled hatred and contempt, the hisses and execrations of mankind." †

IV. FAIR ADJUSTMENT OF THE RELIGIOUS QUESTION.

There is another principle on which we must strenuously insist, namely, that what is called the religious question should be dealt with, not according to the dictates of national or sectarian pride, but according to the principles—and it would be impossible to have a truer guide—of justice and charity which Christianity itself inculcates. There are not two opinions now as to the shameful and scandalous policy formerly pursued on this subject by the East India Company—the policy which, under the influence of the

* "What Good may come out of the India Bill," pp. 21, 22.

† "Life of Metcalfe," vol. i., p. 369.

most sordid and selfish motives, warned off the messengers of peace and mercy from their Eastern dominions, as if they had been plague-stricken men, while it extended ostentatious patronage to the degrading Hindoo superstitions. That, however, has been to a great extent, if not altogether, remedied. So far as any remnant of that system still exists, let it be abolished with all possible speed. But even in doing that, we must not allow our zeal to outrun our honesty. The principal charge, we believe, in this respect made against the Indian Government is, that it pays out of its revenues certain tributes to the support of heathen temples—a most objectionable and unseemly arrangement. But if these tributes are in the nature of a commutation for lands and other property belonging to those temples, which our Government has appropriated, we have no right to plead our conscience in bar of payment, if we retain the original endowments. No professions of zeal or sanctity can prevent such acts from being robbery, and it is impossible to believe that they should be acceptable in His sight, who “hateth robbery for a burnt offering.” Nor should we even attempt by such legal juggling, as unhappily has too often sufficed in India, to trick the natives out of their estates, to evade our obligations in this matter. If our Christian convictions forbid (as they ought to forbid) our seeming to patronize heathen worship by contributing to its support, let us honestly restore the lands or endowments, of whatever nature, which we have resumed on the understanding, when such resumptions were made, of granting an equivalent in some other form.

The danger, now, as it appears to us, on this religious question, lies in a direction opposite to that into which the rulers of India formerly fell; that is, in a disposition to undertake the work of promoting or patronising Christianity by the authority of Government. No good can possibly come out of that. If there be one fact that stands out clearly amid the confused and contradictory reasons assigned for the recent mutiny, it is this—that the Sepoys were really alarmed at the supposed intention of the Government to beguile or coerce them by means of the unclean cartridges to abandon their religion.* It is admitted, also, by most of the missionaries, that one of the most formidable obstacles in the way of their gaining access to the people’s confidence, is the impression they have, which it is almost impossible to remove, that they (the Missionaries) are the agents of the Government. “The missionary,” says Mr. Clarkson, “is viewed by many with peculiar prejudice, arising from an idea that he is an agent of the Government, commissioned to destroy the people’s faith.”† It is obvious, then, that nothing could be more fatal than any attempt to propagate or even to favour Christianity by the authority of the State. There is one way, indeed, in which the Indian authorities, and the Anglo-Indian community generally, could do much to facilitate the progress of the gospel; that is, by acting, both in their personal and official capacity, in a manner more in harmony with its spirit and precepts. For our part we have the strongest conviction that no effectual progress will be made in the conversion of the natives, so long as our whole system of policy is such as to give the loud lie to the most vital principles of the religion we profess. How can we hope to convert them to a religion of peace, while they see us incen-

* This point is brought out with great clearness and force, by an analysis of the official documents, in Mr. Crawshaw’s pamphlet, “The Immediate Cause of the Indian Mutiny.”

† “India and the Gospel,” p. 164.

santly engaged in sanguinary and often aggressive wars, which manure the soil of India with the richest blood of her own sons? How convert them to a religion which pretends to inculcate the observance of strict right between man and man, even to the extent of doing unto others only what we would they should do unto us, while they see us annexing their kingdoms, confiscating their estates, wresting from them by fraud or force their most sacred rights and possessions, and grinding them to the earth by extortionate taxation? How convert them to a religion of equality and brotherhood while our whole demeanour betrays a pride of race as arrogant, exclusive and tyrannical, as their own most offensive forms of caste? How convert them to a religion of forgiveness and mercy, while our lips breathe nothing but the fiercest rancour and revenge, hardly to be satiated by any amount of torture or blood? No, no! We may raise funds in abundance; we may make our missionary machinery as perfect as we please; we may have bishops as plenty as blackberries over the whole extent of the peninsula; but it is utterly out of the question that we can make the people believe a religion, which by our conduct we loudly proclaim, that we do not believe ourselves. "Another considerable obstacle," said one of the speakers at the Missionary Conference in Calcutta, in 1855, "is, that we appear in the eyes of the natives as of the same race as the conquerors of their country. The natives hold us, as Europeans, to blame for all that they dislike in the administration of the Government. 'Talk of your goodwill,' said a Talookdar the other day, 'did not your countrymen pass the resumption laws, and take away the lands that our pious ancestors had consecrated to religious purposes?'"* To the same effect is the testimony of Mr. Hume, an American missionary who wrote some years ago:—"This country was conquered at an immense expense of treasure and blood; the government still retain it by the power of the sword; and the effect is most unhappy on the minds of the natives, who regard the missionary as the representative and teacher of a religion which lends its sanction to war, nor seeks to restrain its professors from the rage of conquest and the lust of gain."

The Rev. F. Schurr, of the Church Mission, also read a paper at the Calcutta Conference, in which he remarks:—

"The bad example of many Europeans, their desecration of the Lord's-day, their incontinence, and their severity or brutality, embitter the minds of the natives against all Europeans. Ryots judge of all Europeans from the planters who come to this country merely for gain, and, after making a fortune, leave it again with no sympathy for, and no more interest in it. . . . Not unfrequently have I been reproached, by those who knew me not, with being paid by the Company, and preaching the gospel only because I was paid for it. This is also thrown into the teeth of the native preachers whom we employ. . . . It thus comes to pass, that the natives have but an indifferent regard for the religion of Europeans, and *I have sometimes heard natives say they did not wish to go to that heaven in which such and such a planter would be.*† The ryots generally

* "Proceedings of a General Conference of Bengal Protestant Missionaries," p. 40.

† This reminds one of the story related by Las Casas of the Cuban chief doomed to death by the Spaniards for resisting their seizure of his country. When Hatuey was fastened to the stake, a Franciscan friar, labouring to convert him, promised him immediate admission into the joys of heaven, if he would embrace the Christian faith. "Are there any Spaniards," says he, after some pause, "in that region of bliss which you describe?" "Yes," replied the monk, "but such only as are worthy and good." "The best of them," returned the indignant cacique, "have neither worth nor goodness. I will not go to a place where I may meet with that accursed race."

believe that the Christian religion consists in having no caste, *i. e.* no self-respect in eating beef, and drinking freely, and in trampling upon the social, political and religious rights of the niggers."

Nor, certainly, will it mend the matter should the natives find that the missionaries and their supporters in this country, instead of denouncing the iniquities perpetrated by our countrymen in India, are conniving at them by a studious silence, or through a profane abuse of the doctrine of Providence, in which they make God directly a partaker in men's sins, are ready to become the open apologists and defenders of the most flagrant acts of usurpation and plunder. Will anybody believe, for instance, that it would incline the inhabitants of Oude to listen with a favourable ear to the voice of Christian truth, if from the same lips that uttered it, they heard the annexation of their country and the confiscation of their estates declared to be a wise and righteous measure, because it afforded him (the preacher) a better opportunity for assailing their religion and promulgating his own? We feel a respect so sincere and profound for the promoters and agents of the Missionary enterprise, that it is with inexpressible regret we have observed this disposition on the part of some of them to wink at our national misdeeds in the East, or even to vindicate them as a means of promoting Christianity. But Christianity *cannot* be promoted by robbery and wrong. We would venture with the utmost deference to remind these gentlemen, that the missionaries who have been most honoured and successful in their work, and have won for themselves and their cause the homage and veneration of mankind, have always been men who have stood forth as the protectors of the heathen races among whom they laboured, against the wrongs and oppressions even of their own countrymen. For, unhappily, the history of the intercourse of so-called civilized and Christian nations with heathen races is ever a history of oppression and wrong, and the missionaries of the gospel have always had to choose whether they would side with the oppressors or the oppressed. The truest and noblest of them have never hesitated between their patriotism and their Christianity, but have boldly resisted and exposed the iniquities of their own countrymen. So did Las Casas and Father Mola with the Spaniards at Hispaniola. So did Nobrega and Vieyra with the Portuguese in Brazil. So did Eliot and Brainerd in respect to the North American Indians. So did Dr. Philip and Mr. Read as regards the treatment of the Hottentots and Kaffirs in South Africa. So did Smith, "the martyr of Demerara," and Knibb and Burchel, the true heroes of Negro emancipation, as respects the slaves in the West Indies. So did John Williams in reference to the conduct of our reprobate countrymen towards the inhabitants of the South Sea Islands. And so—all honour to them for the act—did the Bengal Missionaries in their admirable petition to Parliament on the wrongs and sufferings of the natives of India under British rule.

But why should the friends of missions show themselves eager to throw the shield of a religious sanction over flagrant acts of political immorality from which the conscience, even of what are called men of the world, revolt? Why should they bring their great cause into dishonour by winking at unjust wars, aggressions on native rights, and open breaches of treaty, under the plea that such proceedings open a way for the gospel? And why should any of them, by the use of language that is, to say the least, equivocal, seem to demand from the Government measures of coercion or patronage against

the native superstitions and in favour of Christianity, which implies an utter misapprehension of the nature, and a total distrust of the power, of their own religion? We may be quite certain of this,—that if Christianity is to triumph in India, in the only manner in which its triumphs can be genuine and lasting,—that is, by winning the homage of willing hearts,—it must be, not *because* it is, but *in spite of* its being, the religion of the conquerors.

We have indicated thus some of the *principles* which we conceive ought to be observed in dealing with India. But the *measures* required are many.

The systems of landed tenure in India, prolific as they are of oppression and impoverishment to the people, urgently require revision and change. The administration of justice, in respect to which Lord Campbell has declared, in a passage already cited, that “No language could be too extravagant to describe its enormities,” ought to be dealt with in a bold, comprehensive, generous spirit. The system of organized corruption, plunder, and torture, which now exists under the name of Police, must be taken in hand promptly and vigorously. Some means of raising revenue should be found from other sources than the misery of the people, like the salt tax; or their industry, like the tax on implements of labour; or their vices, like that from the sale of opium and arrack. The measures so imperatively demanded for developing the material resources of the country, such as works of irrigation, roads and canals, must be entered upon, not in the grudging, half-hearted, parsimonious spirit hitherto displayed by the Indian Government, but with something of the eagerness, energy, and liberal profusion which we have bestowed upon nothing in India but the prosecution of war, and the annexation of territory. It surely is time to try whether the spade, the mattock and the plough, will not produce results more satisfactory and profitable than the sword. Cotton and sugar, and other articles of legitimate and honourable commerce, should be substituted for opium, the traffic in which is accursed of God and man, cruelly oppressive as it is to the native cultivator, most precarious as a source of revenue, every way infamous as regards the Chinese, whether Government or people, and morally (unless, indeed, morals are to be for ever banished from the domain of international affairs, and we are to proclaim ourselves practically political Atheists), a stain upon our character and a sting in our conscience, as a people. Some method also should be discovered of doing justice as between the Indian Government and native states, princes and rajahs. Nothing can be more monstrous than the present system. When any dispute arises between these two parties, the Government appoints one or two of its own servants to inquire and adjudicate between itself and its opponent, and upon their bare *ex parte* report does not scruple to pronounce and execute the most sweeping judgments of deposal, forfeiture of inheritance, and wholesale confiscation, for its own profit always, and very often for the direct personal aggrandisement of those who had to investigate and decide. Hitherto such wrongs as these have been wholly without remedy; for when disrowned princes and other natives of India have appealed in person or otherwise to the authorities at home, they have been met with the miserable mockery of a reference to the Indian authorities by whom they had been wronged. “India,” says an able writer, in the current number of the *Westminster Review*, “needs a High Court, supreme arbiter in international Indian

questions, over the Indian Government, just as our Courts of Law are over our executive. Every prince of India, and the British Government, should be liable to be sued, and be able to sue, in this court; and, except by verdict of the court, the Government should have no more power to touch a prince's inheritance than our executive to touch a baron's estate."

Above all, we think that the friends of India Reform should insist upon the appointment of an Imperial Commission, to go out to India itself as soon as the rebellion is suppressed, to inquire into the actual condition of the country, and of the people; a commission composed of men of the highest character and qualifications, and most especially and emphatically not under the influence, direct or indirect, of the East India Company. This is absolutely indispensable as the basis of intelligent legislative action—not, indeed, as regards the constitution of the government at home, in respect to which we can judge here as well, if not better, than in India; but as regards the measures necessary to develop the resources, to rectify the wrongs, and to promote the well-being and prosperity of India itself. The absence of authoritative information, such as would be supplied by the evidence of such a commission, has been always a formidable difficulty in the way of those who have laboured in Parliament for the benefit of India. For their statement of the abuses and grievances of which they were complaining, have been always met by counter-statements on the part of the representatives of the East India Company, put forth with such a show of authority, and sustained by such an array of official documents and returns, picked and cooked for the occasion, that however far were the complainants from being convinced, they were at least, for the nonce, effectually silenced and discouraged. A notable illustration of this is afforded by the question of torture in Madras. When the existence of such a practice was asserted in the House of Commons, forthwith Director after Director got up, swelling with indignation and surprise, real or affected, and denied the fact in the most positive and peremptory terms. But since then the Commission of Inquiry, appointed by Lord Harris, has proved by superabundant evidence, not only that torture was practised by Government officials, but that it was practised habitually, universally, and in a perfectly notorious manner. More than that, Mr. Malcolm Lewin has proved that the existence of this practice might, nay must, have been known to the authorities both in India and in England. This he does, by the simple process of re-printing a Report, addressed by himself as Judge of Circuit, to the Madras Government in 1840, in which he declares, on evidence that had come before him as Judge, that the use of torture, by the police in our employ, was "as regular and habitual as any other part of their duties."*

So is it constantly as respects the general condition of India. Specific allegations of misrule are encountered by elaborate general pictures, drawn in the brightest colours, of marvellous progress and universal prosperity and contentment. An array of statistics about revenue and public works, and imports and exports, is marshalled before the bewildered eyes of the Legislature and the country, in such confident fashion as to leave on their minds only an impression of the stupendous audacity of those who can dare to challenge the perfection of a system productive of such results, and the monstrous ingratitude of the people in India that could repine at an rebel against

* "Torture in Madras," by Malcolm Lewin, p. 10.

so paradisaical a rule. How these representations are estimated in India, however, is perfectly well known to those conversant with the India press. Mr. Macleod Wylie, in a very able pamphlet, recently published, referring to these Leadenhall Street boasts issued in 1853, at the last renewal of the Charter, says :—"The superiority of India to any colony in prosperity and in the nature and in the beneficence of her Government, was a matter of boast. It was said that there were expensive and noble public works, and that there were large cash balances in the various treasuries ; and there were members in the House of Commons to rebuke any suspicions or doubts of the paternal influence of the British Government, or of the contentment of the population. We who lived here might be surprised at this, if we knew of there being only one road worth the name in Bengal ; if we had reason to believe the stories about torture which were denied at home ; if we knew that, except in the case of the Ganges Canal and the works in the Punjab, the extensive public works prior to 1854 were simply repairs of jails, court-houses and public offices ; if we suspected that the large balances, declared to be in the hand of Government, were unsubstantial ; if we knew that the money that was wanted in India was kept at home to an extent far beyond any probable want, by the home authorities ; and if we looked round in vain for an energy, earnestness, and public spirit, corresponding with that which was rapidly elevating our native land."

" We in Bengal, and our fellow-subjects in Madras, know well that all is *not* peace, contentment, and prosperity. We know how the work of education was extolled, when, in fact, it reached only a few thousands of the upper classes, pampered them with an effeminate feast of trifling literature, and turned them into a race of selfish, noisy, disaffected infidels. We know that poverty, like an armed man, has been stealing over the fertile territory, alike of Madras and Bengal ; we know here of rent-laws and sale-laws, which probably constitute the most oppressive fiscal laws in the statute-book of any nation ; we know of unprotected tenures, and of cultivators *en masse* in the power of landlords, who, without restraint, can tax them at their pleasure, and who, by law, are authorized 'to compel their attendance.' We know of this oppressive system, and of the energies of the people wasting under it ; and we know that between 1824 and 1852 no attempt had been made to relieve the evil. We believe that the cultivators have been sinking lower in temporal circumstances, and in mental depression. We know that Bengal was practically ungoverned. We know, too, that while public works, and in particular railways, were proposed in 1830, nothing was done till 1850. . . . We know as to Calcutta, the great reservoir of Indian trade, that it had, and has still, only one inadequate canal for the access of all its hundreds of thousands of tons of land produce. We know that great portions of the country in that year of 1852 were as little known and as little accessible as the island of Ceylon.*"

* "The Commerce, Resources, and Prospects of India," by Macleod Wylie, Esq., pp. 3-5.

APPENDIX.

A.

As an illustration of the use that may be made of general statistics to blink the truth, we may take the speech delivered by Sir James Hogg in 1853, on the debate connected with the renewal of the Company's Charter. The orator, we are told, had "produced a picture which had told powerfully on the House," by contrasting the statistics of one period of our Indian rule with those of another. Among other results brought out by that process was an enormous increase of revenue. But when Mr. Blackett—a name which every friend of India Reform must pronounce with sorrow—came to analyze Sir James' statement, it was far from sustaining that impression of the general prosperity of our Indian dominions which it was meant to produce. We subjoin an extract from Mr. Blackett's able and acute speech:—

"Taking the two terms of 1833-34 and 1849-50, the accounts of the latter term being more convenient for reference, and more intelligibly and fully given than those of 1850-51, he found that the total net produce of the revenues of India in the first case was £13,765,425, and in the second case, £19,576,089, showing very nearly an increase of £6,000,000, or, in exact numbers, of £5,871,664. This increase was made up of £2,581,000 from opium; of £710,000 upon salt; of £101,845 upon tribute money, which could not be calculated upon as an ordinary branch of revenue; of £100,000 upon stamp duties; and of £2,445,000 upon land revenue. From this there must be deducted a falling off in the Customs duties amounting to £120,000. Would the House believe that the cost of collecting the £19,576,089 amounted to the enormous sum of £5,810,664, being 25 per cent on the net total? The hon. baronet (Sir J. Hogg) admitted the unsatisfactory state of the opium question; and, with regard to the small increase on stamps, what did Mr. Prinsep say on the subject of this tax? He stated that it was a tax on exhibits, petitions and witnesses—a tax on law proceedings—and that it was wholly of European origin, nothing of the kind having existed under any native government. After opium the main article of increase was that of land revenue, and was that the result of improved management, or did it arise merely from confiscations and an increase of territory—an extension in the area of taxation? Upon the answer to that question the whole merit of such an increase depended, as showing the excellence of the present system of Indian administration. Mr. Prinsep stated that not less than £1,500,000 of that sum arose from fresh territory, and that £500,000 more was the result of resumptions or confiscations in Bengal alone. Then, looking into the accounts, they found £211,367 under the head of tribute—from Nagpore, £80,000; from Rajpootana, £127,999; and from Cutch, £23,368—in addition to the £101,000 he had just quoted under this head; and the result of all this stood thus:—Total increase in land revenue £2,445,720; of which new states contributed £1,500,000, resumptions in Bengal made up another £500,000, and tribute money from the states he had mentioned £211,367; making altogether a total of £2,211,000. This left little more than £200,000 out of the £5,000,000 or £6,000,000 increased revenue which could be set down as the results of good management and improvements, including the unexplained and indefinite items for resumptions elsewhere than in Bengal, and without, as the hon. member for Manchester (Mr. Bright) suggested, making any allowance for the enormous increase of population."

B.

To give an idea of how offices are distributed, as between the natives and their British conquerors, or, at least, how they were distributed up to 1853, we subjoin an extract from the pamphlet already referred to, "On the Civil Administration of the Bombay Presidency, by Nowrozjee Furdoonjee," a native gentleman in the service of the British Government at Bombay, published in 1853:—

"All the situations superior in importance and profit in all the presidencies belong to, and are held exclusively by, the covenanted servants. No native has ever held a single

situation which belonged to the covenanted service. I subjoin a list of the covenanted situations of the Bombay Presidency, from the Almanac of last year, showing the *monthly* salaries of each office in Company's rupees :—

	R.	A. P.		R.	A. P.
2 Members of Council, each	5333	5 4	12 Second assistant collectors to	550	0 0
1 Chief Secretary, including house-rent	3833	5 4	7 Third ditto	400	0 0
2 Secretaries, Government, each	2916	10 8	2 Judges and session judges	2333	5 4
Deputy or Persian secretary and Oriental translator	1500	0 0	1 Judge and session judge of Surat, and agent to the Governor	2333	5 4
Private secretary to Governor	1500	0 0	Judge and session judge of Poona, and agent for the sirdars	2800	0 4
Secretary in the military and naval department	2500	0 0	Joint judge and session judge of Ahmednuggur	1400	0 0
4 Judges of the Sudder Dewanee and Foujdaree Adawlut, each	3500	0 0	2 Senior assistant judges and session judges	1200	0 0
Registrar of the Sudder Adawlut	2000	0 0	8 Assistant-judges, Sudder station	700	0 0
Accountant-general	3407	6 6	President at Buroda	3000	0 0
Deputy accountant-general	2074	1 2	Assistant ditto	750	0 0
Civil Auditor and mint master	3333	5 4	Resident in the Persian Gulf	2400	0 0
Deputy auditor and mint master	1250	0 0	Assistant ditto	700	0 0
Sub-treasurer, general paymaster, and superintendent of stamps	2500	0 0	Commissioner at Sattara, political agent in Kattywar	2000	0 0
Postmaster-general	2000	0 0	Political agent in Cutch	2022	0 4
Senior magistrate of police	2500	0 0	Assistant ditto	700	0 0
Collector of customs and opium agent	3000	0 0	2 Political agents in Rewakantuta and Molee Kantha	1200	0 0
Deputy ditto ditto	1400	0 0	Ditto at Aden	2000	0 0
Collector of Continental customs and salt excise	2333	5 4	Agent of Colaba	1400	0 0
Deputy ditto ditto	1000	0 0	British agent at Muscat	800	0 0
2 Revenue Commissioners	3500	0 0	Assistant master and secretary to the mint committee	1500	0 0
10 Collectors and magistrates	2333	5 4	Superintendent of roads and tanks, &c.	1218	0 0
1 Collector of Belgaum, and political agent S. M. country	2533	5 4	2 Political superintendents of Sawant, Waree, and Kolapore, each	1400	0 0
Assistant political agent ditto	700	0 0	4 Bheel agents—from	600	0 0
Collector Rutnagherry	1916	10 8	To	800	0 0
Sub-collector of Nassick	1400	0 0	Superintendent of revenue survey	1000	0 0
Enam Commissioner in the Southern Mahratta country	1000	0 0			
12 First assistant collectors from	700	0 0			
To	800	0 0			

“ Contrast these long lists of appointments, in *Bombay alone*, very much superior in importance and profit, with the situations held by natives *throughout the whole of British India*. I annex a list of the latter, which is formed by the East India House authorities, and published in the Appendix to the Reports of the Commons' Committee, page 343 :—

	I receives £1560	per annum.
8	840 to £960	”
12	720 to 840	”
68	600 to 720	”
69	480 to 600	”
58	360 to 480	”
277	240 to 360	”
1173	120 to 240	”
1147	24 to 120	”

INDIA DEBATE.

SPEECH

OF

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL,

DELIVERED

IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS,

MAY 14, 1858,

IN OPPOSITION TO MR. CARDWELL'S MOTION.

(Reprinted from the "TIMES")

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S P E E C H

OF

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

In the House of Commons,

MAY 14, 1858.

THE SOLICITOR-GENERAL rose and said,—I was at a loss, Sir, when I first read the resolution which the right hon. gentleman opposite has put into your hands, to understand whether its object was to defend, however indirectly, the policy of Lord Canning; or to promote those military operations in India the opposition to which the right hon. gentleman seems to think the conduct of the Government is calculated to prolong; or, lastly, to facilitate those operations in this country against the Treasury bench, the opposition to which the right hon. gentleman thinks has already been prolonged too much. (Loud cheers.) I confess that, after listening to the speech of the right hon. gentleman, I have come to the conclusion that it is neither the first nor the second of the objects to which I have adverted that he desires to carry into effect. (Renewed cheers.) The third object which I have mentioned is one, indeed, which is perfectly legitimate, and the furtherance of it I am ready to admit has fallen into no unskilful hands. The right hon. gentleman must, however, bear in mind that even in an assault upon a Ministry there are rules of strife which call upon

you boldly and manfully to state and to prove your case (hear, hear), and from those rules, as I think I shall be able to show the House, the right hon gentleman has widely departed. (Hear.) I must ask the House to observe that the resolution of the right hon. gentleman constitutes what is called a complex proposition. It must be resolved into its parts, and those parts are three. The right hon. gentleman in the first place asks the House to pass no opinion upon the policy of the proclamation which was issued by Lord Canning. (Hear, hear.) In the second place he seeks to censure the Government for having expressed an opinion upon that proclamation; and in the third place to condemn their conduct for having, as he alleges, published the despatch in which their adverse opinion was conveyed. Now, I maintain that if the House accepts the first part of this complex proposition, and avoids expressing any opinion as to the policy of Lord Canning's proclamation, it is impossible it can approach the consideration of that censure which the right hon. gentleman wishes it to pronounce. (Cheers.) It is impossible, with any degree of justice, to come to a decision upon the expediency of the condemnation unless you take into account the merits of that which is condemned. (Renewed cheers.) I therefore accept the terms in which the resolution of the right hon. gentleman is couched as a proof of the weakness of his case (hear, hear, hear). He is afraid to challenge the verdict of the House of Commons upon the policy of the proclamation. (Loud cheers.) I decline, however, to accept the form of the resolution, where it narrows and limits the issue which we are to try—I decline, at the instance of the right hon. gentleman, to look at an act of the Government and to shut my eyes to the occurrences by which that act has been produced. (Hear, hear.) I am quite

prepared to meet the right hon. gentleman in any discussion which he may feel disposed to raise as to the conduct of the Government, but in doing so I claim the right of taking into consideration the justice and the policy of the proclamation of Lord Canning. (Cheers.) Now, Sir, a judgment derived from that proclamation may be formed by having recourse to a very trite dilemma. It is either right or it is wrong. If it be right—if the principles which it enunciates are principles just and politic, the Government, beyond all doubt, was wrong in censuring it at all, and still more wrong in making that censure public. But if, upon the other hand, the principles which are embodied in that proclamation are neither consistent with justice nor in conformity with sound policy, then I challenge the right hon. gentleman to show upon what grounds he calls upon the House to censure the condemnation of that which in itself is contrary to justice? (Cheers.) Now, let me ask to whom was this proclamation intended to be addressed? Not to the Sepoys of India. (Hear, hear.) They were mutineers in the strictest sense of the word. They had eaten our bread and received our pay. They were our sworn subjects, bound to us by every tie of allegiance and fidelity. They threw off that allegiance and rebelled. To their rebellion they added treachery, murder, cold-blooded and deliberate cruelty. They were—or, at all events, many of them were—persons whose hands were stained by crimes of the deepest dye. Under these circumstances their lives and property were sacrificed by their crimes. But it was not to them, but to the King and people of Oude, this proclamation of Lord Canning was addressed. (Cheers.) What says Mr. Edmonstone, the secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Oude? He says, “The proclamation is addressed to the chiefs and inhabitants of Oude, and not to mutineers.” (Hear, hear.) But what was this kingdom of Oude? Our relations with it were

relations of conquest, and not of allegiance. (Hear, hear.) I know it has been said that Oude had voluntarily become incorporated with our dominions—that its people had willingly come into our allegiance—and that the hostilities in Oude were rebellion and not war. Sir, these assertions I deny; and my denial is capable of easy proof. I do not now desire to enter into the merits of the question of the annexation of that kingdom. That is a question which never has been, and in all probability never will be discussed in this House as fully as it might deserve. In speaking of the subject, I will only say that the strongest feeling with which I always rise from the perusal of the papers connected with it, and I have read them more than once, is, that history may be as lenient to us in regard to that transaction as we have been to ourselves. (Cheers). But, without opening up that large question, I shall take only those facts about which there can be no dispute. In the year 1856 the treaty which the East India Company asserted was the treaty regulating our relations with the King of Oude, was a treaty made in 1801—contained a clause guaranteeing to the Vizier, his heirs and successors, the possession of their territories, together with the free exercise of their authority within their dominions. In the year 1856, however, the East India Company considered that the kingdom of Oude was misgoverned, and contended that misgovernment conferred upon them the right to annex that territory to our possessions in India. How did they carry that right into effect? Substantially by means of conquest. A commissioner was sent to Oude. A body of British troops crossed the Ganges. A treaty was presented to the King, which he refused to sign, and he was consequently dethroned, his palace taken, his property sold, and his Ministers either made prisoners or held to bail. I do not ask whether all this was justified or not. I will assume that it was justified. But I still

confidently ask whether the case of Oude was one of voluntary submission or of simple conquest? (Hear, hear.) My answer to the question is, that our relations with Oude were relations of conquest. (Hear, hear.) All that was done there was done under protest, and that protest continued until the Sepoy revolt broke out. The people of Oude, taking advantage of that rebellion, made war against England; bloody, I admit, crime stained, unrelenting war; but still war. (Hear.) By the valour of our troops, poured into the country—by the skill and energy of our Commander-in-chief—and, I cheerfully and gratefully add, by the skill and energy of Lord Canning—by the heroism, almost unparalleled, of small handfuls of men—aye, and women—who had to hold their position in the country until our troops arrived—we have achieved a decisive, and, I trust, a lasting victory. (Hear, hear.) But, now that we are victorious, let me ask what is the policy which, as victors, we ought to pursue? I am prepared to declare what that policy should be upon the broad grounds of justice; but first let me examine the question upon the narrower grounds of prudence and self-interest. Do you mean to hold Oude? If so, how do you propose to effect that object? Is it by the aid of a standing army? (Cheers.) You may achieve your end in that way, but its attainment will cost you dear. (Cheers.) Do you desire the willing and cheerful submission of the people of Oude? How can you procure that submission? (Hear.) Is it not an important element in the question to gain the good will of the landowners of that country? (Hear, hear.) A child could answer that question. (Cheers.) Which of two things do you do, let me ask—provoke hostility, or do you bring about submission by taking from them that which they hold dearer than their lives? (Cheers.) Let us go a step further. Do you desire to put down the mutiny of the Sepoys? Of course you do. Then it follows

naturally that you must also desire to prevent the Sepoys from taking refuge and obtaining support in neighbouring States. Where is it most likely that they would obtain that support which would enable them again to make head against us? In the kingdom of Oude. If we have the people of Oude in our favour, they will assist us in beating down and delivering up those Sepoys who may take refuge in their country; but if you alienate the feelings of that people, the consequence is easy to foresee. You will throw them into the arms of the Sepoys; they will combine with the Sepoys, and you will have in that distant and separate territory to crush and to subdue, not merely the natives of the territory, but also the Sepoys, who will certainly assemble there. (Hear, hear.) Therefore I say, upon the lowest ground of self-interest and policy, it is for the advantage of this country to conciliate the affections of the people of Oude. But I desire to rest the case on broader grounds than these. Whatever other nations may do, England ought not to retrograde from those laws of war which civilisation has introduced. (Cheers.) How, then, upon the principles of justice and the practice of civilised nations, which this country is bound to observe, ought we to treat the property of a conquered people? My proposition is this—you make war with Kings and Governments, but not with individuals. (Hear, hear.) If, in the course of war, individuals commit crimes, they put themselves beyond the pale of that rule; but, except as to such cases, every individual is entitled to protection for his life and property from the victorious nation. (Hear, hear.) You might as well confiscate the lives of the conquered as their property. (Loud cheers.) Well, are there authorities or precedents upon this point? I am almost ashamed to ask the House to listen to the opinion of authorities upon a question so elementary. But let me read to you what the greatest civilian of the last century—Vattel—says. The Swiss civilian says:—

“But if the entire State be conquered, if the nation be subdued, in what manner can the victor treat it without transgressing the bounds of justice? What are his rights over the conquered country? Some have dared to advance this monstrous principle, that the conqueror is absolute master of his conquest—that he may dispose of it as his property—that he may treat it as he pleases, according to the common expression of treating a State as a conquered country; and hence they derive one of the sources of despotic government. But, disregarding such writers, who reduce men to the state of transferable goods or beasts of burden, who deliver them up as the property or patrimony of another man, let us argue on the principles countenanced by reason and conformable to humanity.”

Those are the words of a writer 100 years ago. I will now quote you the opinion of a distinguished writer of modern times. Dr. Wheaton says :—

“In ancient times, both the movable and immovable property of the vanquished passed to the conqueror. Such was the Roman law of war, often asserted with unrelenting severity, and such was the fate of the Roman provinces subdued by the northern barbarians on the decline and fall of the Western Empire. A large portion, from one to two thirds, of the lands belonging to the vanquished provincials was confiscated and partitioned among their conquerors. The last example in Europe of such a conquest was that of England by William of Normandy. (Hear.) Since that period, among the civilised nations of Christendom, conquest, even when confirmed by a treaty of peace, has been followed by no general or partial transmutation of landed property. (Hear, hear.) The property belonging to the Government of the vanquished nation passes to the victorious state, which also takes the place of the former Sovereign in respect to the eminent domain. In other respects private rights are unaffected by conquest.”

(Hear.) Sir, this is a question upon which the practice and views of other countries are also worthy of our attention. The House is aware that, in the United States, questions affecting the law of nations frequently come before the Supreme Court, and that Court is one from which we derive the most valuable information concerning national and international law. That court, then, has said this :—

“The modern usage of nations, which has become law, would be violated, that sense of justice and of right which is acknowledged and felt by the whole civilised world would be outraged, if private property should be generally confiscated and private rights annulled. The people

change their allegiance ; their relation to their ancient sovereign is dissolved ; but their relations to each other and their rights of property remain undisturbed."

The hon. and learned member for Cork has given us his views upon this subject. He has told us that, whatever might be the principle, we had precedents, and precedents, too, in relation to India, from which Lord Canning had not departed. I deny that position, and I think I will soon justify my denial. The hon. and learned member read us a proclamation of Lord Dalhousie. What did that proclamation state ? Lord Dalhousie said, " If you, the zemindars and landowners, come in and submit to the new Government your rights to all your lands shall be protected." (Hear, hear.) Sir, if Lord Canning had said this, I should have found no fault with his proclamation. (Cheers.) But, says the hon. and learned gentleman, Sir C. Napier did not follow that rule. Now, we have a history of what was done by Sir C. Napier, and what does his brother say :—

"While his cannon still resounded on the banks of the Indus, he had made known that all persons, whether of high or low degree, were confirmed from the time, and would be so permanently, according to their behaviour" (ironical cheers from the Opposition)—would be confirmed in what ? "In the employments they held under the Ameers (cheers and laughter) ; and that all the rights and possessions would"—there is no behaviour here—"be safe from confiscation, save those of the people who, contrary to the faith of nations, had assailed the residency."

Well, but, says the hon. and learned member, at all events the people of Oude were not entitled to the rights of war and conquest. Those rights were out of the question for them. They were rebels ; they were mutineers ; and any man connected with the Government of this country or of India who should hint that they were anything but rebels and mutineers is false to his country and a traitor to the interests of Great Britain. Now, whom would the hon. and learned member accept as a judge of the condition of the people of

Oude? Will he take the Directors of the East India Company? Certainly they have not combined to state the case of the people of Oude more favourably for that people than was absolutely necessary, but there has been placed upon the table of the House to-night, and will be in the hands of members to-morrow, a despatch from the Court of Directors to the Governor-General, dated the 5th of this month, from which I will read two paragraphs which contain the views of the Court of Directors as to the position of the people of Oude. Let the House remember that the hon. and learned member for Cork says the people of Oude are rebels—it is not fair war they are waging, but it is mutiny and rebellion. Now, what says the Court of Directors? “In dealing with the people of Oude you will doubtless be moved by special considerations of justice and of policy. Throughout the recent contest we have ever regarded such of the inhabitants of that country as, not being Sepoys or pensioners of our own army, have been in arms against us, as an exceptional class. (Hear, hear.) They cannot be considered as traitors nor even as rebels (hear, hear), for they have not pledged their fidelity to us, and they had scarcely become our subjects. (Loud cheers.) Many, by the introduction of a new system of Government, had necessarily been deprived of the maintenance which they had lately enjoyed, and others feared that the speedy loss of their means of subsistence would follow from the same cause.” That was treason when Lord Ellenborough suggested it. (Cheers.) “It was natural that such persons should avail themselves of the opportunity presented by the distracted state of the country to strike a blow for the restoration of that native rule under which the permitted disorganisation of the country had been so long to them a source of unlawful profit.” (Hear, hear.) When an excuse was made for the rising in arms of the people of Oude in a

despatch it is attacked by this resolution, and we are told it was a betrayal of the interests of the country; but what is it when the Court of Directors speaks of it? (Hear, hear.) “Neither the disbanded soldiers of the late native Government nor the great talookdars and other retainers were under any obligation of fidelity to our Government for benefits conferred upon them. (Hear, hear.) You would be justified therefore in dealing with them as you would with a foreign enemy (hear, hear), and in ceasing to consider them objects of punishment after they have once laid down their arms.” (Hear, hear.) That is one paragraph of the despatch. I am fearful of wearying the house (loud cheers); but there is another paragraph which I would wish to read:—

“Of these arms they must be for ever deprived. You will doubtless, in prosecution of this object, address yourself in the first instance to the case of the great talookdars, who so successfully defied the late Government, and many of whom, with large bodies of armed men, appear to have aided the efforts of the mutinous soldiery of the Bengal army. The destruction of the fortified strongholds of these powerful landowners, the forfeiture of their remaining guns, the disarming and disbanding of their followers, will be among your first works. But while you are depriving this influential and once dangerous class of people of their power of openly resisting your authority, you will, we have no doubt, exert yourselves by every possible means to reconcile them to British rule, and encourage them, by liberal arrangements made in accordance with ancient usages (hear, hear), to become industrious agriculturists, and to employ in the cultivation of the soil the men who, as armed retainers, have so long wasted the substance of their masters and desolated the land. We believe that these landholders may be taught that their holdings will be more profitable to them under a strong Government, capable of maintaining the peace of the country, and severely punishing agrarian outrages, than under one which perpetually invites by its weakness the ruinous arbitration of the sword.”

I say that that is a statesmanlike and manly despatch. It meets the case fairly, and it tells the truth. These men in Oude were not rebels, and it would be injustice to deal with them as rebels. The Court of Directors say, provided only

they lay down their arms and become peaceable subjects, the holding of their lands shall not be disturbed. I put it to the House to say which is the truer description, which is the wiser and the juster policy. (Cheers.) I have heard it asked what could Lord Canning have done. Could he say to men who were in arms that he would preserve to them intact their rights of property? I say, No. He should have said what Lord Dalhousie said,—“If you lay down your arms, and become peaceable subjects, promising allegiance to our rule, it is not with you we have made war, and you are safe.” And if the proclamation had been couched in language of that kind, I venture to think no Government could have objected to it. But the hon. and learned gentleman the member for Cork county, who seconded this motion, has suggested a theory with regard to this proclamation which I cannot pass over. He says it is altogether a mistake to suppose that this proclamation is addressed to the people of Oude, or that it interferes with what we call the rights of property. It is, in truth, he says, merely dealing with high and abstruse feudal and baronial rights, which have been a great curse to the country. But suppose it were true that the proclamation only meddled with “feudal and baronial rights,” I want to know from the right hon. gentleman what difference he makes between a feudal right and any other species of right (hear, hear, hear). He may think it an injurious thing to the country; but if it is a right of property, owned by the people of the country, high or low, I desire to know whether he can justify confiscation of that as distinguished from the confiscation of any other kind of property. (Cheers.) The supposition, however, that this proclamation meddles only with “feudal and baronial rights,” is entirely without foundation. There is no shadow of a pretence for such a theory. To whom is it addressed? Is it to the talookdars and chiefs

alone? On the contrary, it is addressed to the landowners of Oude. Moreover, what is to be confiscated? Why, "the proprietary right in the soil of the province." But what is "the proprietary right in the soil?" Why, sir, it is the right of property in the soil. (Cheers.) It includes the right of the tenant, of the farmer, of the middleman, and of the owner of the land. It includes all; the whole is confiscated; and I challenge the right hon. gentleman to point out one single word in this proclamation which spares to any man, except the six persons mentioned in it, any sort of right or any sort of property. (Cheers.) Well, Sir, I now come to that part of the motion which censures the condemnation by the Government of the policy of this proclamation. What are the facts as to this? There comes home the draught of a proclamation which Lord Canning said he was about to issue as soon as the troops were in possession of Lucknow. It comes home without the modifying clause in it to which reference has been made, and it comes home without explanation. It was accompanied, so far as the Board of Control was concerned, with nothing but a letter from the Secretary to the Government of India at Calcutta to the Chief Commissioner of Oude. Let us consider for a moment what are the functions of the Home Government with regard to India. It has been said during the debate that the Government has paralysed the arm of the Governor-General. The Governor-General sends important information to the Government at home on a question of great interest. Is the Home Government to pronounce an opinion on that question, or is it not? (Cheers.) If the Home Government is to give no opinion, the right hon. gentleman may be right; but if the Government is to give an opinion, I say, I, for one, should have been ashamed to be connected with any Government which allowed a single mail to pass after a proclamation of this kind had been received without writing to

the Governor-General, and stating explicitly and distinctly their views in regard to the policy contained in it. (Cheers.) This was a question on which not a moment was to be lost. There was no time for any sensitive shrinking from wounding the feelings of the Governor-General. (Hear, hear.) I respect Lord Canning as much as any man in this House. Lord Canning is one whose kind and considerate nature, and whose upright and simple mind are such, that no person who has, however distantly, been an observer of them, can have any other feelings towards him than those of profound respect and considerable admiration (hear, hear). But in a question on which the fate of India hangs, all these merely personal feelings must be put aside (cheers). This is a part of the case with which the right hon. gentleman has not grappled. Was the proclamation right, or was it wrong? If the proclamation was right, the censure was wrong; and if the proclamation was wrong, the censure was right. I care not who the Governor-General was, or what his past services may have been. I say here was a case in which a specific act was proposed to the Home Government; it was their duty to express an opinion upon that act. They have expressed an opinion upon it, and I think they have expressed it rightly (hear). I come now to the third and the smallest part of the resolution—namely, the publication of the despatch. On that part of the case my views shall be shortly and distinctly stated. I hold that it was the duty of any Government—the proclamation having been published and become known in England—to express, in some form or other, their views of the policy contained in that proclamation, whether it was right or whether it was wrong (hear, hear). I repeat, it was wholly impossible for any Government—the proclamation having once been made public—to refuse to declare the views they entertained in respect to the policy propounded in it. (Cheers.) This was not a question of foreign negotiation or diplomatic corre-

spondence, in which a Minister might say it would be inconsistent with the public advantage to reveal the different stages of a transaction which was still pending. This was a transaction completed and done (hear, hear). The proclamation was out, the House of Commons was assembled, the Ministers were in their places, and were called on to say, aye or no—"Do you approve of the policy contained in that proclamation, or do you not?" (Hear, hear.) The right hon. gentleman is mistaken in some of the facts which he has stated to the House—inadvertently, no doubt, but unfortunately for the argument he has endeavoured to sustain. He has stated, for example, that the right hon. gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer disapproved wholly of the policy of Lord Canning. Now, my right hon. friend never said anything of the kind. (Cheers.) The hon. member for Birmingham put this question to the Government—"A proclamation has been issued confiscating the property of the kingdom of Oude; does the Government approve that proclamation or not?" My right hon. friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer said in reply, the Government disapproves of the confiscation of the property of Oude—that is to say, of the policy indicated in the proclamation of Lord Canning—"in every sense." (Cheers.) I hope I may say on behalf of the Government that they disapprove of that confiscation still "in every sense." (Cheers.) There are only two senses in which it can be approved or disapproved, and these are the sense of justice and the sense of expediency (hear, hear). In both of these senses my right hon. friend stated that he disapproved that part of Lord Canning's policy, and that alone (hear). In both of these senses the Government disapprove his policy, and I trust the House will affirm their decision (hear, hear). But the right hon. gentleman opposite says that in addition to the answer of the Chancellor of the Exchequer there is the publication of the

despatch, and that notwithstanding the resignation of Lord Ellenborough the whole Government is responsible for that act (hear, hear). Now, what are the facts with reference to the publication of the letter? The noble earl (Lord Ellenborough), with that frankness and high honour that are not the least characteristics of his nature, declared in the House of Lords what the facts were. The noble earl in the other House and the Secretary of the Board of Control, by his directions in this House, promised in his place to lay on the table of the House of Commons the despatch sent to Lord Canning in consequence of the proclamation. In the other House, another noble earl, a personal friend of Lord Canning, with eager, although, perhaps, justifiable haste, almost the moment after the promise was made, applied to the noble earl (Lord Ellenborough) for a copy of the despatch, and the noble earl, yielding to the entreaty addressed to him, consented to do so. The noble earl, at the same time, with a regard to fair dealing and impartiality—of which, I trust, this House will not disapprove—thought it his duty also to send a copy of the despatch to the member of this house who had put the question on the subject to my right hon. friend, with the view of giving to him the same advantage and facility for considering the dispatch that he had given to the noble lord in another place (hear, hear). Observe, that was done before any one of the members of the Government was consulted on the subject. (Hear, hear.)

These two copies of the despatch were thus, in point of fact, made public. (Hear, hear.) They were in possession of individuals not bound to secrecy, and the moment the despatch came into their hands they became to all intents and purposes public. (Hear, hear.) The noble earl, therefore was literally and strictly accurate when he said that the publication of the despatch was his act, and that no

other member of the Government was a party to it. (Hear, hear.) In other respects the right hon. gentleman who introduced this motion has not been quite correct. The right hon. gentleman, reproducing an old joke of my right hon. friend near me, which though a good one, is not in point at the present moment, asked if this was "a Government of limited liability," and proceeded to advert to what was done in the case of the Government of Lord Aberdeen. He said a member of Lord Aberdeen's Government resigned, but that notwithstanding this my right hon. friend the present Chancellor of the Exchequer said his resignation ought not to shelter the other members of the Government from responsibility. (Hear.) But is there the slightest resemblance or analogy between the present case and that which occurred in Lord Aberdeen's Government? (Hear, hear.) I do not desire to enter into the merits of that question; but I may observe that it had reference to a policy of years or months in matters in which every member of the Government was responsible for the policy pursued. Of course, when any member of the Government was loaded with the responsibility of that policy, it was in vain to say that when one member retired the whole responsibility incurred by the others was wiped away. (Hear, hear.) It was not a case in which the responsibility could be thrown upon one member of the Government only (hear, hear). But the present is the instance of a single and specific act, and the noble earl avows that on him lies the whole responsibility (hear, hear). He has said, "Alone I did it;" and the publication of the despatch being exclusively and solely his act, that noble earl considered it was for him to tender to Her Majesty his resignation, in order that the great merits of this case might be considered apart from the petty questions that have arisen out of that publication (hear). But then, the right hon. gentleman says, at all events I find the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the head of the Government contradicting each other, because the Chancellor of the Exchequer said in this House yesterday that the Cabinet had they known of Lord Ellen-

borough's intended resignation, would have pressed him not to resign ; while Lord Derby, in another House, said he felt bound to accept the noble earl's resignation. But is this the true state of the case ? What Lord Derby said was, that Lord Ellenborough sent in his resignation to Her Majesty before he communicated his intention of resigning to his colleagues, and it was in vain, after he had done so—after his resignation was in the hands of Her Majesty—for his colleagues to discuss the question whether they would accept or decline that resignation (hear, hear). Why, the object of Lord Ellenborough was to prevent that very question being considered. If he had said to his colleagues, I desire to resign my office, as a matter of course they would have said, We decline to accept your resignation, and whatever responsibility you have incurred we will without hesitation share it with you (hear, hear). But when his resignation was in the hands of Her Majesty it was irrevocable ; and it was in order that it might be irrevocable that Lord Ellenborough placed it in Her Majesty's hands before communicating with his colleagues. Therefore, looking at all the circumstances of the case, the House will see that the statement of Lord Derby and my right hon. friend on this subject were precisely and on all points alike. (Hear, hear.) But at all events, says the right hon. gentleman, your course ought to have been different with regard to Lord Canning. You ought, says the right hon. gentleman, to have recalled him ; and the hon. member for Cork says, You should have either recalled him, or written him a despatch, requesting him to mitigate the severity of the proclamation in practice, and not addressed him in the terms which have been employed. Now, if the hon. gentleman would be good enough to go over the despatch he will find that the very thing he has suggested has been done, and that Lord Canning was recommended in the despatch to mitigate in practice the severity of his proclamation (hear). Then, as to the recall of Lord Canning, there were manifest reasons why that course could not have been taken, even if the Government had desired it. Had the

fall of Lucknow been delayed, the despatch would probably have reached Lord Canning in time to prevent the proclamation being issued at all; but there was every reason to believe that Lord Canning would on reflection and advice have seen good grounds of himself to modify the proclamation before it was published; and in point of fact a modification was, we believe, introduced into the proclamation before it was published. (Hear, hear.) I ask the House whether it was not a reasonable and proper ground of hope on the part of the Government in this country that with such men around Lord Canning as Sir J. Lawrence, Sir J. Outram, General Mansfield, and others who might be named—men well acquainted with Oude—he would have been induced to take the view which the Government hold on the subject, and would have been induced to reconsider the question of the proclamation? (Hear, hear.) But then the right hon. gentleman says, “Why did you not wait for an explanation?” and the hon. and learned gentleman asks the same question. They say, “Why were you so precipitate? Why did you not suppose that after a proclamation of this kind an explanation would be forthcoming?” Well, Sir, I think there is one circumstance, and one only, which might have led to some delay and postponement of the despatch sent out to Lord Canning. If Lord Canning had sent home to the President of the Board of Control a statement that if an explanation had not come with the proclamation, an explanation might shortly be expected (cheers), the publication, and probably the writing of that despatch, might well have been delayed. And I now approach a part of this subject which has, I own, filled me with painful surprise. We have had all the facts of the case from the right hon. gentleman the member for Northampton, and I must say that if there is one man in this House of whom Lord Canning has reason to complain (loud and continued cheering), it is the colleague and friend of Lord Canning, the right hon. gentleman the member for Northampton. (Continued cheers.) What was the statement that Lord Canning made to that right hon. gentle-

man? I believe I remember the words. The right hon. gentleman told us that Lord Canning sent him a letter, in which he said, "I am about to issue a proclamation to the landholders of Oude. I am anxious to send home a full explanation, but I have been so occupied that I have hitherto been unable to do so." Now, that implied that such an explanation would come by the next mail. What was the meaning of this passage? It was very short, but very significant. It meant, "I am about to issue a proclamation, which will be sent home in draught, and sent to you. You are the President of the Board of Control. It is a proclamation requiring explanation. I have an explanation to give. I wished to give it by this mail, but give me credit—trust me—put confidence in me—and consider me as one who has got an explanation to give." (Cheers.) The right hon. gentleman did not himself imagine—he cannot to this moment imagine—he wonders that any one should imagine—he does not believe that any one does imagine (a laugh) that these words of Lord Canning were, or could by any artifice be shewn to be, of the slightest importance (cheers and laughter), or that they ought to be made known to the head of the Government of India. But he did think them of sufficient importance to consult the noble lord the member for Tiverton (cheers), and he and the noble lord met in conclave on this despatch. Two ex-Ministers of England received a despatch from the Governor-General of India adverting to a State proclamation. They considered the statements that he made in that letter. The right hon. gentleman says he consulted the noble lord. [Mr. V. Smith: "I never said any such thing."] I am very sorry if I have misrepresented the right hon. gentleman. I thought he said he consulted the noble lord, but at all events, he said he showed or read the letter to the noble lord (Palmerston). Now I want to know for what purpose he showed it to the noble lord (cheers). It could not be from its importance, because the right hon. gentleman said it was of no importance (continued cheering). I hope the right

hon. gentleman will tell us during the course of this debate what his motive was for showing it to the noble lord (hear, hear). At present we have this singular fact, that the right hon. gentleman received a letter—a private letter, if you will, but addressed to those eyes that the draught of the proclamation was also addressed to—which the right hon. gentleman considered of so much importance that he showed it to the late Prime Minister, but which was not of sufficient importance to be shown to the President of the Board of Control (cheers). Now, Sir, I must say a word on the theory of private letters. As regards the heads of all the Government departments of the State, they must no doubt receive a great number of private letters from the colonies, from our dependencies, and our legations abroad from those with whom they are on intimate terms. These letters are not to be displayed to clerks, and they may be to a great extent private and confidential communications. If a letter of this kind contains a passage really relating to private affairs, it is not incumbent on the Minister who may have resigned office to hand it over to his successor, but it is incumbent upon him to extract from such a letter anything relating to public affairs which had been addressed to that Minister on the supposition that he continued to be the Minister (cheers). Whatever the right hon. gentleman and the noble lord arranged, it virtually comes to this, that they intercepted that letter. (Loud cheers). Well, Sir, what may be the observation of Lord Canning upon this matter I don't know, but if I were in his position, I think I should be inclined to say, "I had a friend, as I thought, one who was formerly my colleague—he was president of a department with which I held the closest relation—I wrote to him a private letter, and sent him by the same mail one of the most important State papers that I had ever penned. I was so occupied that I could not send him an explanation at the time, but in my private letter, written to him because I thought he was the Minister still, I said an explanation would come and might be looked for—and my friend and late colleague put that letter in

“ his pocket—he dissevered the proclamation from the
 “ explanation, and allowed day after day and week after
 “ week to elapse and the Government to think that no
 “ explanation would be given, and a dispatch was written
 “ to me by the Government which grieved and pained me,
 “ and for all this I have to thank my friend.” Loud cheers).
 Sir, I have gone through the charges against the Govern-
 ment; they are reduced to the charge of writing and the
 charge of publishing the despatch. The charge for publish-
 ing it has fallen to the ground. The charge for writing it
 depends upon the higher and broader question of the
 policy of the proclamation. On this question, Sir, the right
 hon. gentleman and myself are at direct and positive
 issue. He appeals to the House to be silent—I appeal to
 you not to be silent (cheers). I appeal to you on behalf
 of your dearest interests in India—aye, and also at home.
 I appeal to you on behalf of 5,000,000 of men—a nation
 misguided, misgoverned, semi-barbarous, if you will, but still
 men, with like passions and feelings, perceptions and pre-
 judices as yourselves. I appeal to you on behalf of humanity
 and justice. I make that appeal to the British House
 of Commons, to which an appeal on behalf of humanity
 and justice has never been made and made in vain (cheers).
 Don't let this go forth as a matter of doubt. Don't treat this
 as a matter to be slurred over by a captious and catching
 motion, prepared by a cabal (great cheering), to em-
 barrass and displace a Ministry (continued cheering). Tell
 it out by your vote, and tell it, in terms neither vague nor indis-
 tinct, to the people of India that the war we wage is the
 war of nations, and not of freebooters (cheers)—that
 England knows how to make war and how to conquer,
 but that she also knows how to treat those who are con-
 quered—and that she offers to those who submit to her
 arms that protection for their lives and property which will
 be the best earnest to them of the mildness of the
 rule which the fate of battles has assigned them.
 (Cheers.) Sir, if ever there was a time at which it
 was necessary that our policy with regard to India

should be clear and distinct, it is the present. We are upon the point of transferring the government of India from the Company to the Queen. In the course of the discussions in this House upon the subject of our past government of that country some confessions have been made which you may rely on it have not escaped the attention of the people of India. There was a confession made by the right hon. gentleman, the member for Radnor, which I heard, I must say, with respectful amazement. (Cheers.) The right hon. gentleman the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Minister of the Crown who was advocating the Bill introduced into Parliament to transfer the government of India to the Queen, was speaking of the past government of that country. It is true he was speaking of the government prior to the year 1784, but at a time when not the most insignificant of our acquisitions in India were made. The right hon. gentleman (Sir G. C. Lewis) said :—

“I do most confidently maintain that no civilised Government ever existed on the face of this earth which was more corrupt, more perfidious, and more rapacious than the Government of the East India Company from the years 1765 to 1784.”

Sir, in this sentiment I, for one, do not concur. But, at all events, let there be no mistake with respect to our future Government of India. Let us not be ashamed to tell the people of India that we offer them mercy and justice, and not spoliation; that we seek from them submission and allegiance, and not plunder; and that no faction and no intrigue will tempt the House of Commons, even for a moment, to leave it open to suspicion that the dynasty we are about to introduce into India is a dynasty of reckless, ruthless, indiscriminate confiscation. (Loud and continued cheers, which for a few moments prevented the next speaker obtaining a hearing.)

BRIEF OBSERVATIONS,
ADDRESSED TO THE GENERAL READER,
ON THE
BASIS OF THE REORGANIZATION
OF
OUR POWER IN INDIA.

BY
AN OLD RESIDENT IN INDIA.

London:
R. C. LE PAGE & Co.,
1, WHITEFRIARS STREET, FLEET STREET.
1858.

N O T E.

The following observations were written at the time when the news first reached this country of the relief of Lucknow by Sir Colin Campbell, and were addressed to an influential London journal, but failed to receive admission into its columns; the writer is therefore induced to offer them to the public in their present form.

BRIEF OBSERVATIONS,

&c.

Now that the two great centres of the Indian Mutiny, Delhi and Lucknow, are in our possession, and no further serious disaster can be anticipated, the time is fitting for the consideration of the relations that shall henceforth exist between Great Britain and her Indian dependency. To this end, too much thought cannot be given to the consideration of the basis upon which the reorganization of the government and control of India should be established, and it appears to me, notwithstanding the able discussions and valuable information that have appeared upon the subject since the outbreak, that the fundamental principle upon which it should rest has scarcely been sufficiently analysed.

The character lately displayed by the Indian population presents such a marked and unfavorable contrast to the previously existing impression of it in the public mind, that, with the exception of the comparative few who are practically acquainted with India and its people, and

a further small proportion who are in a position from their own enquiries and connections to arrive at accurate ideas, the great mass of the public must in its estimate of the people, and what is desirable for them and the country, be embarrassed by a confliction of opinion difficult to reconcile.

In considering how to benefit an individual or a people, we should have an accurate knowledge of the character and tendencies of each, and to obtain this we must have recourse to their antecedents or history; hitherto this practical evidence has been lost sight of, not only by the public, but by those whose duties essentially required them to possess and act upon it; but, contrary to this common-sense course of procedure, the public mind has indulged itself in a sentimental hallucination—similar to a romantic girl, in her idea of shepherds in Arcadia—and has invested the mild native of India with qualities as remote from the dry truth as the young lady's shepherd.

One prominent idea in the public mind is the extent of population under our sway in India, and the rights which attach to such an immense aggregate of people; this idea naturally results from our national perception of what is just, deduced from our own social system, but, applied to an Asiatic people from an English point of view, it is altogether unsound and impracticable; the people of India have no idea beyond a despotism, and if under this system of government life and property be secure, and the laws impartially administered, it is to them the attainment of a height, beyond which their ideas, or those of their best writers or legislators, have

never soared. Under the government and control of Great Britain the people of India will be in a safer and happier position than that of any other Asiatic people, and under the safeguard of the national character and the press, India will possess guarantees for just government that but few civilised nations can lay claim to.

The fundamental element in the question of re-organization appears to me to be the absolute and irremediable mental inferiority of the native of India compared with the Anglo-European, an inferiority I believe to be so fixed and decided, that no intimate union can ever result between them.

To elucidate this question of inferiority, I may refer to the general records of Asiatic or Indian history, which shews the people to have been at a remote period as far advanced in civilization as they are at this moment, and looking to the result, the rational conclusion is that their perceptions have not and will not henceforward enable them from their own efforts to attain a higher standard than they have done. Notwithstanding our connection with and control of them for a century, throughout which period they have been exempt from the vicious example of massacre and cruelty so frequent in their previous history, and accustomed under our rule to see life and property respected, and to have brought within their observation and practical experience the purer refinements of our civilization, the late outbreak goes to prove that they are true to their instincts, and that in their mental organization they are and ever will be incapable of rising

by their own efforts to a higher standard than their history has hitherto exhibited. It may be said of a people, as of an individual, that the child is father to the man, and that the qualities which are developed in the course of maturity, are likely to hold to the end, and, looking to the qualities chiefly developed in the course of Indian history, I fear there is nothing in it upon which we can found a hope for the future.

It has been said that the outbreak was simply confined to the military, and that the people themselves took no part in it; in this view I do not concur,—no doubt there is a mixture of truth in the statement, and that a large proportion of the population were not actively connected with the Mutiny, but I am convinced, from my experience of the native, that the general feeling was more hostile than favourable to us, and this not from any act or violation of their prejudices on our part, but resulting simply and naturally from the difference of mental temperament, habits, and colour between us and them, in which there are no affinities. But supposing it to be the case that the Mutiny was confined to the native army only, the conclusion, I think, is equally unfavourable to the people, seeing that they remained passive observers of the atrocities perpetrated; in either way they are in a false position, and prove the absence of those qualities essential to a fair standard of national character: the mutiny afforded them a hopeful opportunity for achieving their independence, and had they seized it the act would have gone far to justify and prove them worthy of it, but they were wanting in the needful qualities; on the other hand, what is to be inferred

from their remaining passive? certainly no love for us; they exhibited no active feeling of sympathy towards us, but remained quiet observers of the struggle, exhibiting in themselves no favourable or honourable impulse—no sympathies for the torments of women and children—no appreciation of the energy and high qualities of the few brave, struggling with such overwhelming numbers. This was the general feature, but it must not be overlooked that there were many individual instances of sympathy and help displayed by the natives towards us, and they would have been demons without redemption had such not occurred; in the worst examples of human nature some better traits are always to be found; but, on the other hand, these kindly examples are counterbalanced by numberless cases of the foulest treachery.

If we look to the prominent impulses or characteristics developed in the late outbreak, we find no general element of good; two feelings were in operation, one active and the other passive. In the ordinary operation of popular or national feeling there is generally combined with it, in a greater or less degree, a proportion of worthy motives and impulses; but we look in vain for these in the late disturbances in India: among the active, the prominent impulses have been the very worst violences of our nature, without one redeeming trait; and, in the use they made of their advantages in discipline, arms, ammunition, and position, their efforts have exhibited the lowest mental standard, their mental activity having been chiefly displayed in the skill and ingenuity they could exercise in torture: on the other

hand, the quiet or passive have been equally deficient in the exhibition of any quality that can entitle them to respect; wanting in patriotism and humanity, without a single aspiration beyond the feeling of self, they waited the issue, content to abide it, and to come under the authority of the victor, whether it resulted in the sway of a Christian, or was inaugurated by the lust and bloodshed of the Sepoy and the Mahomedan. The qualities thus developed, taken with all the antecedents of the people, should carry conviction to our mind that they are wanting in those mental essentials that would fit them to be placed on the same level as the European; and, admitting this to be the case, we come to the consideration of what should be their position under the re-establishment of our power.

These remarks are made in no feeling of hostility or prejudice against the natives; on the contrary, I estimate them, in certain respects, very favourably: our experience of them, until the late outbreak, showed them to be peaceable, tolerant, and industrious, temperate, and obedient. The world, I think, affords no parallel of a country of the same extent, population, and wealth, being so easily governed, and where the controlling government has less to fear from the population, as long as its functions are exercised with a firm hand, and in a just spirit; the late evils are clearly traceable to our own acts in an undue reliance on the natives. The late rising resulted from no real or, as I think, even imaginary grievance; with such an unreflecting people no grievance is grievance enough, and the will is never wanting to seize any actual or apparent

advantage that may present itself, and this was furnished to them to the fullest extent in the form of solid and substantial power; all the other causes or motives that have been assigned, such as the greased cartridge, proselytism, &c., were merely the result and growth of this power, and served as watchwords to combine and launch it against our rule. The prevailing impulses of the native are the love and fear of mere physical or absolute power, and under the influence of either he runs to extremes, both of which we have now realized, and it is seen that he is wanting in the perception of the duties and rights of either position, whether governing or governed; under the one he is brutal and irrational, while under the other he bends and yields implicitly as the reed to the wind.

In these remarks I am anxious to bring under consideration the basis upon which it is necessary to proceed to reorganize the government of India, and to do this effectually it is important to examine well the materials we have to deal with, and endeavour to apply each to its most practical functions. It is now generally recognized that the social condition, government and institutions of a people are as much the result of their inherent character, as of the circumstances which surround them, and whatever the general character be that is formed or developed, such it ever remains, despite of example or teaching; looking, therefore, to the prominent characteristics of the two races that have to be brought into connection and united under one government, it will be evident that great deliberation and clear practical perception is necessary to grapple with the

subject, and lay down a system that shall afford the best security for its sound and permanent working. The prominent characteristic of the Anglo-European is an accurate perception of what is just and equitable, both as regards his own and the rights of others, with mental and physical energy necessary to give practical effect to this high quality, resulting, as we see, in the freedom and permanence of his social condition; on the other hand, the prominent characteristic of the Asiatic is of a directly opposite tendency, and exhibited in an undue feeling of self, and an imperfect perception of his own and the rights of others. Under this inherent and fundamental characteristic, he alternates, as his latest and antecedent history has shewn, between tyrant and slave; in the one condition he develops everything that is abhorrent to our nature, but in the other he displays qualities of the utmost value and usefulness. If this analysis of the characteristics of the two races be correct, there will be no difficulty in assigning to each his relative position; the Anglo-European, with his higher mental perception, his sense of equity and energy of character, must and ought to represent and embody in a definite and comprehensive form, the power and authority of the government; and the Asiatic, under a like necessity or instinct, must as naturally fall under subjection to him. This is the position which they intuitively assume towards each other when left to themselves, and it is in this position that the respective better qualities of each combine to develop the best practical results. The late outbreak is, to my perception, more definitely traceable to a departure from this state of things, than to

any other cause. For a hundred years the natives yielded ready allegiance to our rule, and would have continued to do so, so long as we held them in hand, and properly estimated what was due to ourselves as well as to them, but adverse influences were allowed to operate, arising out of the nature of the government and the influence of uninformed opinion at home.

I look upon it that we are all more or less chargeable with the evil of the late calamitous mutiny, and in tracing its course, we are led to reflect upon the heavy responsibility of those who, by their neglect, are answerable for it; and, heavily as this responsibility may appear to fall upon the East India Company, I think it will be found, when dispassionately considered, that it falls with equal weight both upon the supreme government and the nation. The control and surveillance claimed and exercised by the supreme government over the action of the East India Company fixes it with its full proportion of responsibility, and it is further answerable for the manner in which it has exercised its more direct and administrative functions—I allude more particularly to its appointments of Commanders-in-Chief; for these errors of administration in connection with interests of such magnitude the nation is deeply liable as an unquestioning and consenting party, while the East India Company are equally chargeable in exercising their high functions in the spirit of monopolists, in looking only to their special interests, and neglecting those of the nation and of the country entrusted to their charge, and the independent Anglo-European residents are alike culpable for a lax fulfilment of their

duties of citizenship, in having failed in any well-directed attempts to enlighten their government or countrymen upon the practical evils that were in existence, and which they were well cognisant of, and must have seen and felt operated so injuriously to their own and the general interest. Under this state of things the East India Company, acting in the spirit of its organization, and looking only to its own immediate and special interests, instinctively avoided any real identification of the national interest or of the interests of its countrymen in India, unconnected with its services; its tendency lay entirely towards the natives, in dealing with whom it had no vigour of mind or will to contend with, and it was under this anti-national feeling that it handed its whole power over to the charge of the native, and also directed its efforts to the introduction of a system of legislation, calculated in its operation to reverse the true relative position of the European and native. This tendency of the East India Company was in a serious degree assisted by public opinion in England, which in the activity it displayed was exhibited in an ignorance of the true circumstances and character of the country and people; under this mistaken phase of popular opinion in England it fell in with the interests or views of the East India Company to adopt what was supposed to be an enlightened and liberal policy towards the natives, which resulted in their admission from one position to another, until a principle of eligibility had been recognized and established, under which the native mind was familiarized with ideas of rights and claims having no definite limit, and to which, until thus incul-

cated by the policy of government, he had never for a moment considered himself or thought of laying claim to. This inconsistent and suicidal policy has produced its natural results, and must now force us to the election of a definite principle upon which to base our future government of India ; the effect of the late policy was to reverse our position from that of conquerors, looking to a permanent hold of the country, to that of temporary guardianship, preparatory to an early renunciation of control, for no other result could naturally follow in its material effect or in its influence upon the native mind.

The European population in India, including all classes connected with or independent of the government, is estimated at 150,000, and the result of the late struggle has shewn that, even this small number, had it had fair play, and been judiciously organized and compacted, the chances are that no rising would have occurred, or, if the attempt were made, that it would have been promptly suppressed, but, under the prevailing policy, the European element was well nigh swamped. If it were possible to look forward, within any reasonable period, to a time when we might safely retire and leave India to its own government and well-being, I would willingly give my adhesion to such a policy, believing that it would be, on moral and material grounds, the best course we could pursue ; but I look upon this as Utopian—the connection must be maintained ; instead, therefore, of lowering and diluting, or, to speak more correctly, dissolving our small number into the great dark mass of its population, our true policy will be to elevate and keep it intact, as a standard for the

one hundred and eighty millions to work up to. Our national character is sound and true to itself, under all circumstances of position, whether of climate or distance, and with its inherent tendencies to what is free and just, the dark race, whose evident destiny it is to come under the subjection of the white, can no where for their welfare be in safer or better hands.

In these observations it will be seen that I have not ventured to offer any remarks or opinion upon the many important questions that must come under consideration in adjusting or re-organizing our rule in India: my object is simply to urge attention to what I conceive to be at the bottom of the whole question, being satisfied that, if we go to work upon a right and sound foundation, any errors that may occur in carrying out the details or superstructure will be of minor importance, and admit of easy removal or correction.

AN OLD RESIDENT IN INDIA.

INDIAN PATRONAGE.

OUTLINE OF A SCHEME

FOR THE

DISTRIBUTION OF INDIAN PATRONAGE.

BY

W.

LONDON:

BOSWORTH AND HARRISON, 215 REGENT STREET.

1858.

LONDON
PRINTED BY SPOTTISWOODE AND CO.
NEW-STREET SQUARE.

At the period when the writer of the following remarks first attempted to solve, by a simple expedient, the difficult problem of Indian Patronage, prevalent opinion pointed to the entire abolition of the East India Company, and the substitution of a Crown Administration under a sole responsible Minister. His suggestions were consequently based on the popular assumption of the moment. Since they were written, public rumour has much modified the supposed tendency of Indian Reforms. On these topics the writer ventures no opinion. He, nevertheless, conceives that under any Government, the principle of his scheme may serve the purposes intended, by securing India from the abuse of irresponsible patronage, and Indian Statesmen from the annoyance of unjust attacks and imputations.

The return moved for by Colonel Sykes, on Friday, the 5th instant, will, in a certain measure, exemplify one portion of the writer's propositions.

IV.

LONDON :

February 8, 1858.

INDIAN PATRONAGE.

THE question of Patronage is considered one of the most difficult connected with the abolition of the double government of India.

Before entering into the subject, it will be necessary to recapitulate the different branches into which the Indian Service is divided: —

1st. The Home Staff.

2nd. The Covenanted Civil Service in India, consisting of between 800 and 900 officers, and of about 300 military men employed in civil duties.

3rd. The Uncovenanted Service, composed of about 1900, besides numerous minor officials.

4th. The Military Service.

5th. The Navy and Pilot Service.

6th. Chaplaincies.

In these are comprised appointments to the Staff of the army, law officers, assay masters of the Mint, and Masters-attendant at the Presidencies, at present in the gift of the Board of Directors.

The Crown, at present, has the patronage of judge-ships in the Supreme Court, of bishoprics, and commands-in-chief. Members of Supreme Council are nominated by Directors. Governorships are in the joint gifts of the Crown and the Court.

The first appointments to the Civil Service have

already been opened to public competition. The chief patronage, therefore, accruing to the new Minister, as regards first nominations, will be confined to cadetships, amounting in number, annually, to about 286. Of these appointments about one-fourteenth has hitherto been in the gift of the President of the Board of Control.

The reasons urged against the exercise of patronage by the new Minister are twofold:—

First. The possibility of undue regard to political consideration or private friendship.

Second. The possible imputation of such motives.

The same arguments are also brought forward against the patronage of the Governor-General in matters of promotion; it being argued that on the dissolution of the Company, and consequent exemption from restraint, he may be subject to the same influences as a Minister at home.

On the other hand, it is urged that the absence of a certain control over patronage will much weaken the power of a responsible Minister over his department; while the introduction of the competitive system, in primary appointments to the army, strikes at the very root and principle of military discipline and organisation.

Some plan must therefore be devised by which the patronage may be kept within the hands of the Minister, subject in such a manner to the control of Parliament as to prevent abuse of power on the one hand, or the harassment of unjust accusations on the other.

In the first place, it is proposed to reserve to the Minister absolutely all such patronage as is at present within his gift, in addition to the appoint-

ments in his office.* These should be considered private patronage as much within his own disposal as patronage appertaining to any other Minister of the Crown.

The remaining patronage should be designated "Public Patronage." The distribution should be conducted through a department in the new Indian office, and subjected to public revision as much as any other public official function.

This department should consist of a Secretary or Superintendent, with the necessary staff. Its action should be as follows :—

With regard to the cadetships.

After the reservation of one-fourteenth, cadetships shall be considered as publicly given when conferred in the following manner :—

1st. To sons of deserving officers.

2ndly. To public schools.

3rdly. To such young men as shall be duly recommended.

A Secretary of State, or other Indian Minister, shall be bound not to have private correspondence of any kind on the subject of such public appointments. He shall be bound to place on record, in the Patronage Department, all correspondence relating to this subject, and also to accept the recommendation of respectable persons known to himself to whatever party they may belong. In the third category, it may be matter for consideration whether the competitive test may not be safely applied in a limited form.

At the commencement of each year, a paper shall

* The diminution of correspondence consequent on the amalgamation of the Board of Control with the India House would entail a considerable reduction in the two staffs.

be laid before Parliament much in the form of the returns of pensions granted on the Civil List. This document shall contain a list of all cadets appointed in the Patronage Department, with the reasons for their appointments, the names of those recommending them, and the number and nature of the certificates to their qualifications. All papers thus referred to shall be liable to be called for by the Houses of Parliament. In order to explain more fully this proposition, a paper is annexed, showing the form in which it is proposed yearly to submit this public patronage to Parliamentary revision.

It will be readily observed that the large number and the public character of certificates required for any direct donation, would prevent their being lightly given. By this means it would be beyond the power of a Minister to dispense his patronage in an improper manner, while sufficient discretion would be left for the allotment of each vacancy to the most deserving candidate.

With respect to the promotions in India and the higher patronage in the gift of the Crown, a modification of the same system may be pursued.

In the evidence given by Mr. Shepherd before the Committee of 1852, he states that from the minuteness of the despatches, "it is quite impossible that an inefficient public servant, an indolent collector, or a careless judge, can avoid exposure and censure by the Court."

In another portion of the Report, it is stated that a record is kept at the India House of the merits and demerits of every public servant.

The supervision of this record should form part of the duties of the Patronage Department. Registers

should be kept of the individual services, the special recommendations, and the omissions of every Civil servant. Every promotion made in India should be subject to the ratification of the Home Government, — a ratification, of course, never withheld except for some flagrant offence. Every session a synoptical register should be submitted to Parliament, containing every promotion, with the former or special Services of the promoted. A Table is also annexed for clearer elucidation of this project.

The Indian Service have already intimated a wish for the establishment of a department of this nature. Indian servants would apply to it with confidence, assured that their claims would be taken into consideration apart from any but public influences, while none but those with well-founded complaints would venture to bring forward their grievances in the face of a register where their shortcomings were not overlooked.

The same process that would enable a government to revise the proceedings of the Governor-General, would serve as a guide in the nomination to the high posts reserved within their own gift. The office of a Member of Supreme Council is not one to which a Minister would or could appoint any individual notoriously incompetent.

Although seniority is but a poor test of qualification, a certain minimum period of service might be affixed to each grade as an indispensable preliminary to promotion.

The naval and the clerical services might be disposed of in a similar manner. The vacancies in the first of these two services are few in number. The supply of chaplains might with advantage be entrusted to bishops and universities.

TABLE I.
CADETSHIPS.

Name.	Age.	Father's Name and Profession.	By whom recommended.	Moral Certificates.	Physical Certificate.	Remarks.
John Havelock	18	Gen. Sir H. H.	Secretary of State.	Rev. J. Jones, Master of —, Rev. H. Thomson, Rector of —.	John Richards, Surgeon. —, Indian Surgeon.	Father, a general officer, died at Lucknow, &c. Speaks French and German.
Wm. Morgan	17	W. Morgan, Solicitor, Barnstaple.	Sir J. Parkinson, Mr. Spooner, Dean of Bristol.	Master of Barnstaple School, —, M.P. for Barnstaple.	—	Elected by competition over two candidates. Speaks French and German; prize for mathematics and engineering.
Arthur Dawson	19	R. Dawson, M.P. for —.	Head Master of Winchester.	—, and Under Masters.	—	Appointment given to the best practical mathematician of the 6th form.
James Murphy	18	Barrister and literary man.	Sir H. Keating, Sir F. Theisiger, Mr. Justice Wills, Mr. Thackeray, Lord Macaulay, Mr. Headlam.	Principal of King's College.	—	Given in consequence of the young man's great proficiency in Eastern languages, and of very high testimonials received from competent and responsible persons.
Edward Johnson	17	Collector, at —.	Gov. of Agra, Sir J. Hogg.	Head Master of Harrow.	—	Given on the certificate of two responsible persons, and as a reward for the services of his father.

TABLE II.
PROMOTIONS IN CIVIL SERVICE.

Name.	Former Services.	Nature of Promotion.	Special Services.	Length of Service.	When promoted.	When confirmed.	Remarks.
Peter Brown.	Deputy collector at ———	Opium Board.	Reported favorably by Lord Auckland and Lord Ellenborough.	24	Aug. 2, 1858.	Jan. 3, 1859.	Author of ———
Col. Jackson.	Political Agent at ———	Resident at Hyderabad.	Military ser-vice.	22			C. B. and two medals.

LONDON:
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NEW-STREET SQUARE.

SPEECH.

SPEECH

ON

LEGISLATION & POLICY FOR INDIA,

DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS,

ON THE

SECOND READING OF THE INDIA BILL,

June 24th, 1858.

BY

JOHN BRIGHT, ESQ., M.P.

LONDON:

EDWARD STANFORD, 6, CHARING CROSS.

1858.

Price One Shilling.

S P E E C H.

Mr. BRIGHT—I do not rise for the purpose of opposing the second reading of this Bill. On the contrary, if any hon. member thinks proper to divide the House upon it, I shall vote with the noble lord. I must say, however, that there are many clauses in the Bill to which I entertain serious objections. Some of them will, I hope, be amended as the Bill passes through Committee; but if that is not the case I can only hope that, as the Bill of 1853 is abandoned in 1858, within the next five years the House of Commons will take some further steps with regard to this question, with a view of simplifying the government of India as carried on in England. I wish to take this opportunity of making some observations upon the general question of Indian government, which it might have been out of place to have made during the discussion of the various resolutions which have been agreed to by the House. I think it must have struck every hon. member that, while two Governments have proposed great changes with regard to the government of India, no good case has really been made out for such changes in the speeches of the noble lord and the right hon. gentleman by whom the two India Bills have

been introduced. ("Hear, hear.") That opinion, I know, will meet with a response from two or three hon. gentlemen on this (the Opposition) side of the House. (Hear, hear.) It occurred to me when the noble lord at the head of the late Government introduced his Bill—and I made the observation when the present Chancellor of the Exchequer brought forward his measure—that if the House knew no more of the question than they learned from the speeches of the Ministers, they could not form any clear notion why it was proposed to overthrow the East India Company. The hon. member for Guildford (Mr. Mangles) has expressed a similar opinion several times during the progress of these discussions. The right hon. member for Carlisle has also said that the East India Company was being dealt with in the manner in which animals intended for sacrifice were treated in Eastern countries, and in ancient times,—they were decked with garlands when they were led out for immolation. That is true; but it does not therefore follow that the House is not quite right in the course it is taking. It must be clear that the moment the House of Commons met this session, there was only one course which the then Government could adopt with reference to this question. A feeling existed throughout the country—I believe I may say it was universal—that for a long time past the government of India had not been a good government; that grave errors—if not grievous crimes—had been committed in that country. (Hear, hear.) I think the conscience of the nation had been touched on this question, and they came

by a leap, as it were—by an irrepressible instinct—to the conclusion that the East India Company must be abolished, and that another and, as the nation hoped, a better government should be established for that country. There was a general impression, arising from past discussion in Parliament, that the industry of the people of India had been grievously neglected; that there was great reason for complaint with respect to the administration of justice; and that, with regard to the wars entered into by the Indian Government, there was much of which the people of England had reason to be ashamed. (Hear, hear.) It has been said by some that these faults are to be attributed to the Board of Control; but I have never defended the Board of Control. I believe everything the East India Company has said of the Board of Control—to its discredit (a laugh), and I believe that everything the Board of Control has said to the discredit of the East India Company is perfectly true. (Cheers and laughter.) There was also a general impression that the expenditure of the East India Government was excessive, and that it had been proved before more than one Committee that the taxes imposed upon the people of India were onerous to the last degree. These subjects were discussed in 1853, at which time, in my opinion, the change now proposed ought to have been effected. Subsequently, the calamitous events of 1857 and 1858 occurred, and the nation came at once to the conclusion—a conclusion which I think no disinterested person could resist—that it was impossible that India and its vast population could any longer be retained under the form of government

which has existed up to this period. If then, a change was inevitable, the question was, how it should be accomplished, and what should be done. I think it is quite clear that the course the noble lord has pursued is right—namely, that of insisting that during this present session, and without delay, the foundation of all reform in the government of India should be commenced at home; because we cannot take a single step with regard to any real and permanent improvement in the Indian government, until we have reformed what I may call the basis of that government, by changes to be effected in this country. What, then, is the change which is proposed, and which ought to be made? For my own part, in considering these questions, I cannot altogether approve the Bill now before the House. What we want with regard to the government of India is that which in common conversation is called “a little more daylight.” We want more simplicity and more responsibility. (Hear, hear.) I objected to the scheme originally proposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, because it did not provide these requisites. That scheme so closely resembled the system we were about to overthrow that I could not bring myself to regard it favourably. In considering the subject before Parliament met, I asked myself this question:—“Suppose there had never been an East India Company or any such corporation,—suppose India had been conquered by the forces of the Crown, commanded by Generals acting under the authority of the Crown,—how should we then have proposed to govern distant dominions of vast extent, and

with a population that could scarcely be counted?" I believe such a system of government as has hitherto existed would never have been established; and if such a system had not existed, I am convinced that no Ministry would have proposed the plan now submitted to the House. I think the government would have been placed in the hands of a Secretary of State, with his secretaries, clerks, and staff of officers, or of a small Board, so small as to prevent responsibility from being diffused and divided, if not actually destroyed. I suspect that the only reason why the country or Parliament can be disposed to approve the large Council now proposed is that they have seen something like a Council heretofore—formerly of 24, and subsequently of 18 members; and I believe there is something like timidity on the part of the House, and probably on the part of the Government, which hinders them from making so great a change as I have suggested to the simple plan which would probably have existed had no such body as the East India Company ever been established. I am willing to admit candidly, that if the government of India at home should be so greatly simplified, it will be necessary that very important changes should be made in the government in India. (Hear, hear.) I agree with the noble lord (Stanley) that the representatives of the Crown in India must have power as well as responsibility; that they should be enabled to deal with emergencies (hear, hear), and to settle the hundred or the thousand questions that must arise among 100,000,000 of people, without sending 10,000 miles to this country

to ask questions which ought to be settled at once by some competent authority on the spot. (Hear, hear.) There are two modes of governing India, and the hon. member for Leominster (Mr. Willoughby), who has been a very distinguished servant of the East India Company, has publicly expressed his views upon this question. I have been very much struck with a note attached to the published report of his speech, referring to the multifarious duties discharged by the Directors of the East India Company. That note states that

“A despatch may be received containing 60, or 100, or 200 cases; and the despatch, in itself voluminous, is rendered more so by collections attached to it, containing copies of all former correspondence on the subject or subjects, and of all letters written thereon by various local officers, and all papers relating thereto. There has, not long since, been in the Revenue Department a despatch with 16,263 pages of collections. In 1845 there was one in the same department with 46,000 pages, and it was stated that Mr. Canning some years since in the House of Commons mentioned a military despatch to which were attached 13,511 pages of collections.”

The hon. gentleman did not say in his speech that anybody at the India House ever read all these things. (Hear.) It is quite clear that if the Directors were to pretend to go through a waggon-load of documents coming to Leadenhall Street every year it must be only a pretence, and if they want to persuade the House that they give attention to only one-tenth part of these papers they must think the House more credulous than it is

in matters of this kind. (Cheers.) That is one mode of governing India. It is the mode which has been adopted, and the mode which has failed. If we are to have the details settled here, I am perfectly certain we can have no good government in India. (Hear, hear.) I have alluded on a former occasion to a matter which occurred in a committee upstairs. A gentleman, who was examined, stated that he had undertaken to brew a wholesome beer and quite as good as that exported for the supply of the troops, somewhere in the Presidency of Madras, for one-sixth of the price paid by Government for that exported to India from England; that the experiment was completely successful; that the memorandum or record with regard to it was sent home, no doubt forming part of the thousands of pages to which reference has been made; and that it was buried in the heap in which it came; because for years nothing was heard of a proposition which would have saved the Government a very large amount annually, and opened a new industry to the population and capital of India. (Hear, hear.) I believe this system of government is one of delay and disappointment—one, actually, of impossibility—one which can by no means form a complete theory of government as held by any persons in the House (hear); and that the other, the simpler system, which I wish the House to undertake, would be one of action, progress, and results, with regard to India, such as we have never yet seen, and never can see, until there is a complete simplification of the Indian government in this country. (Hear, hear.) I come now to the question—

and it is for this question that I have wished principally to address the House—if at any time we obtain the simplicity which I contend for with regard to the government at home, what changes will it be desirable to make in the government in India? And I would make one observation at this point, that in all the statements and arguments which I hope to use, I beg the House to believe that I use them with the greatest possible deference, with the feeling that this is a question upon which no man is at all entitled to dogmatize, that it is a vast question which we all look at as one we are scarcely capable of handling and determining. (Cheers.) I submit my views to the House because I have considered the subject more or less for many years, and I believe I am actuated by the simple and honest desire of contributing something to the information and knowledge of Parliament with regard to its duty upon this great question. (Cheers.) What is it we have to complain of in India? What is it that the people of India, if they spoke by my mouth, have to complain of? They would tell the House that, as a rule, throughout almost all the presidencies, and throughout those presidencies most which had been longest under British rule, the cultivators of the soil, the great body of the population of India, are in a condition of great impoverishment, of great dejection, and of great suffering. (Hear, hear.) I have, on former occasions, quoted to the House the report of a committee which I obtained 10 years ago, upon which sat several members of the Court of Directors, and they all agreed to report as much as I

have now stated to the House—the report being confined chiefly to the presidencies of Bombay and Madras. If I were now submitting the case of the population of India, I would say that the taxes of India are more onerous and oppressive than the taxes of any other country in the world. I think I could demonstrate that proposition to the House. I would show that industry is neglected by the Government to a greater extent probably than is the case in any other country in the world which has been for any length of time under what is termed a civilized and Christian Government. (Hear, hear.) I should be able to show from the notes and memoranda of eminent men in India, of the Governor of Bengal, Mr. Halliday, for example, that there is not and never has been in any country pretending to be civilized, a condition of things to be compared with that which exists under the police administration of the province of Bengal. (Hear, hear.) With regard to the courts of justice, I may say the same thing. I could quote passages from books, written in favour of the Company with all the bias which the strongest friends of the Company could have, in which the writers declare that precisely in proportion as English courts of justice have extended, have perjury and all the evils which perjury introduced into the administration of justice prevailed throughout the presidencies of India. (Hear.) With regard to public works, if I were speaking for the natives of India, I would state this fact, that in a single English county, there are more roads—more travelable roads—than are to be found in the whole of

India; and I would say also that the single city of Manchester, in the supply of its inhabitants with the single article of water, has spent a larger sum of money than the East India Company had spent in the 14 years from 1834 to 1848 in public works of every kind throughout the whole of its vast dominions. (Cheers.) I would say that the real activity of the Indian Government has been an activity of conquest and annexation (hear)—of conquest and annexation which, after a time, has led to a fearful catastrophe which has enforced on the House an attention to the question of India, which but for that catastrophe I fear the House would not have given it. (Cheers.) If there were another charge to be made against the past Government of India it would be with regard to the state of its finances. Where was there a bad Government whose finances were in good order? Where was there a really good Government whose finances were in bad order? Is there a better test in the long run of the condition of a people and the merits of a Government than the state of the finances? And yet not in our own time, but going back through all the pages of *Mill* or of any other history of India, we find the normal condition of the finances of India has been that of deficit and bankruptcy. I maintain that if that be so, the Government is a bad Government. It has cost more to govern India than the Government has been able to extract from the population of India. The Government has not been scrupulous as to the amount of taxes or the mode in which they have been levied; but still, to carry on the government of India according

to the system which has heretofore prevailed, more has been required than the Government has been able to extract by any system of taxation known to them from the population over which they have ruled. It has cost more than £30,000,000 a-year to govern India, and the gross revenue being somewhere about £30,000,000, and there being a deficit, the deficit has had to be made up by loans. The Government has obtained all they could from the population. It is not enough, and they have had to borrow from the population and from Europeans at a high rate of interest, to make up the sum which has been found to be necessary. They have a debt of £60,000,000, and it is continually increasing. They always have a loan open, and while their debt is increasing their credit has been falling, because they have not treated their creditors very honourably on one or two occasions, and chiefly, of course, on account of the calamities which have recently happened in India. There is one point with regard to taxation which I wish to explain to the House, and I hope that, in the reforms to which the noble lord is looking forward, it will not be overlooked. I have said that the gross revenue is £30,000,000. Exclusive of the opium revenue, which is not, strictly speaking, and hardly at all, a tax upon the people, I set down the taxation of the country at something like £25,000,000. Hon. gentlemen must not compare £25,000,000 taxation in India with £60,000,000 taxation in England. They must bear in mind that in India they could have 12 days' labour of a man for the same sum in silver or gold which they had

to pay for one day's labour of a man in England; that if, for example, these £25,000,000 were expended in purchasing labour, that sum would purchase 12 times as much in India as in England—that is to say, that the £25,000,000 would purchase as many days' labour in India as £300,000,000 would purchase in England. [An Hon. Member.—How much is the labour worth?] That is precisely what I am coming to. If the labour of a man is only worth 2*d.* a-day, they could not expect as much revenue from him as if it were 2*s.* a-day. That is just the point to which I wish the hon. gentleman would turn his attention. We have in England a population which, for the sake of argument, I will call 30,000,000. We have in India a population of 150,000,000. Therefore, the population of India is five times as great as the population of England. We raise £60,000,000 taxation in England. We raise in India, arguing by the value of labour, taxation equivalent to £300,000,000 which is five times the English revenue. Some one may probably say therefore, that the taxation in India and in England appears to be about the same, and no great injury is done. But it must be borne in mind that in England we have an incalculable power of steam, of machinery, of modes of transit, roads, canals, railways, and everything which capital and human invention can bring to help the industry of the people, while in India there is nothing of the kind. (Hear, hear.) In India there is scarcely a decent road, the rivers are not bridged, there are comparatively no steam engines, and none of those aids

to industry that meet us at every step in Great Britain and Ireland. Suppose steam engines, machinery, and modes of transit abolished in England, how much revenue would the Chancellor of the Exchequer obtain from the people of England? Instead of £60,000,000 a-year, would he get £10,000,000? I doubt it very much. If the House will follow out the argument, they will come to the conclusion that the taxes of the people of India are oppressive to the last degree, and that the Government which has thus taxed them, can be tolerated no longer, and must be put an end to at once and for ever. I wish to say something about the manner in which these great expenses are incurred. The extravagance of the East India Government is notorious to all. I believe there never was any other service under the sun paid at so high a rate as the exclusive civil service of the East India Company. Clergymen and missionaries can be got to go out to India for a moderate sum—private soldiers and officers of the army go out for a moderate remuneration—merchants are content to live in the cities of India for a percentage or profit not greatly exceeding the ordinary profits of commerce. But the civil service, because it is bound up with those who were raised by it, and who dispense the patronage of India, receive a rate of payment which would be incredible, if we did not know it to be true, and which, knowing it to be true, we must admit to be monstrous. The East Indian Government scatters salaries about at Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Agra, Lahore, and half a dozen other cities, which are up to the mark of those

of the Prime Minister and Secretaries of State in this country. These salaries are framed upon the theory that India is a mine of inexhaustible wealth, although no one has found it to be so but the members of the civil service of the East India Company. (Hear, hear.) The policy of the Government is at the bottom of the constant deficit. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has twice recently declared that expenditure depends upon policy. That is as true in India as in England, and it is the policy that has been pursued there which renders the revenue liable to this constantly recurring deficit. I have come to the conclusion, which many hon. members probably share with me, that the edifice we have reared in India is too vast. There are few men now, and least of all those connected with the East India Company, who, looking back to the policy that has been pursued, will not be willing to admit that it has not been judicious but hazardous—that territories have been annexed that had better have been left independent, and that wars have been undertaken which were as needless as they were altogether unjustifiable. (Hear.) The immense empire that has been conquered, is too vast for management, its base is in decay, and during the last 12 months it has appeared to be tottering to its fall. Who or what is the instrument—the Cabinet, the Government, or the person—by whom this evil policy is carried on? The greatest officer in India is the Governor-General. He is the ruler of about one-fifth, certainly more than one-sixth, of the human race. The Emperors of France and Russia are but the governors of provinces compared with the power, the dignity, and the

high estate of the Governor-General of India. Now, over this officer almost no real control is exercised. If I were to appeal to the two hon. gentlemen who have frequently addressed the House during these debates (Colonel Sykes and Mr. Willoughby), they would probably admit that the Governor-General of India is an officer of such high position that scarcely any control can be exercised over him, either in India or in England. Take the case of the Marquis of Dalhousie for example. I am not about to make an attack upon him, for the occasion is too solemn for personal controversies. But the annexation of Sattara, of the Punjab, of Nagpore, and of Oude, occurred under his rule. (Hear.) I will not go into the case of Sattara, but one of its princes, and one of the most magnanimous princes that India ever produced, suffered and died most unjustly in exile, either through the mistakes or the crimes of the Government of India. This, however, was not done under the government of Lord Dalhousie. As to the annexation of Nagpore, the House has never heard anything about it to this hour. There has been no message from the Crown, or statement of the Government relative to that annexation. Hon. members have indeed heard from India that the dresses and wardrobes of the ladies of its Court have been exposed to sale, like a bankrupt's stock, in the haberdashers' shops of Calcutta—a thing likely to incense and horrify the people of India who witnessed it. Take, again, the case of the Burmese war. The Governor-General entered into it, and annexed the province of Pegue, and to this day there has been no treaty with the

King of Burmah. If that case had been brought before the House, it is impossible that the war with Burmah could have been entered upon. I do not believe that there is one man in England who, knowing the facts, would say that this war was just or necessary in any sense. (Hear, hear.) The Governor-General has an army of 300,000 men under his command; he is a long way from home; he is highly connected with the governing classes at home. There are certain reasons that make war palatable to large classes in India, and he is so powerful that he enters into these great military operations almost uncontrolled by the opinion of the Parliament and people of England. He may commit any amount of blunders, or crimes against the moral law, and he will still come home loaded with dignities and in the enjoyment of pensions. Does it not become the power and character of this House to examine narrowly the origin of the misfortunes and disgraces of the grave catastrophe which has just occurred? The place of the Governor-General is too high—his power is too great—and I believe that this particular office and officer are very much responsible—of course under the Government at home—for the misfortunes that have taken place. Only think of a Governor-General of India writing to an Indian prince, the ruler over many millions of men in the heart of India—“Remember, you are but as the dust under my feet.” Passages like these are left out of despatches when laid on the table of the House of Commons. It would not do for the Parliament, or the Crown, or the people of England to know that their officer addressed language

like this to a native prince. (Hear, hear.) The fact is, that a Governor-General of India, unless he be such a man as is not found more than once in a century, is very liable to have his head turned, and to form ambitious views, which are mainly to be gratified by successful wars, and the annexation of province after province during the period of his rule. The services are always ready to help him in these plans. I am not sure that the President of the Board of Control could not give evidence on this subject, for I have heard something of what happened when the noble lord was in India. When the Burmese war broke out, the noble lord could no doubt tell the House that, without inquiring into the quarrel or its causes, the press of India, which was devoted to the services, and the services themselves, united in universal approbation of the course taken by the Governor-General. Justice to Pegue and Burmah, and the taxes to be raised for the support of the war, were forgotten, and nothing but visions of more territory and more patronage floated before the eyes of the official English in India. I contend that the power of the Governor-General is too great, and the office too high to be held by the subject of any Power whatsoever, and especially by any subject of the Queen of England. I should propose, if I were in a position to offer a scheme in the shape of a Bill to the House, as an indispensable preliminary to the sound government of India in future, such as would be creditable to Parliament and advantageous to the people of India, that the office of Governor-General should be abolished. (Hear, hear.) Perhaps some gentlemen

may think this a very unreasonable proposition. Many people thought it unreasonable in 1853 when it was proposed to abolish the East India Company; but now Parliament and the country believe it to be highly reasonable and proper (hear, hear); and I am not sure that I could not bring before the House reasons to convince them that the abolition of the office of Governor-General is one of the most sensible and one of the most Conservative proposals ever brought forward in connexion with the government of India. (Hear, hear.) I believe the duties of the Governor-General are far greater than any human being can adequately fulfil. He has a power omnipotent to crush anything that is good. If he so wish, he can overbear and overrule whatever is proposed for the welfare of India; while, as to doing anything that is good, I could show that with regard to the vast countries over which he rules, he is really almost powerless to effect anything that those countries require. (Hear, hear.) The hon. gentleman behind me (Colonel Sykes) has told us there are 20 nations in India, and that there are 20 languages. Has it ever happened before that any one man governed 20 nations, speaking 20 different languages, and bound them up together in one great and compact empire. [An hon. member here made an observation.] My hon. friend mentions a great Parthian monarch. No doubt, there have been men strong in arm and in head, and of stern resolution, who have kept great empires together during their lives; but as soon as they went the way of all flesh, and descended, like the meanest of their subjects, to the tomb, the provinces they had

ruled were divided into several States, and their great empires vanished. (Hear, hear.) I might ask the noble lord below me (Lord J. Russell), and the noble lord the member for Tiverton (the noble lord the member for King's Lynn has not as yet experience on this point), whether, when they came to appoint a Governor-General of India, they did not find it one of the most serious and difficult duties they could be called on to perform? (Hear, hear.) I do not know at this moment, and I never have known, a man competent to govern India (hear, hear); and if any man says he is competent, he sets himself up at a much higher value than those who are acquainted with him are likely to do. (A laugh.) Let the House look at the making of the laws for 20 nations, speaking 20 languages. Look at the regulations of the police for 20 nations, speaking 20 languages. (Hear, hear.) Look at the question of public works as it affects 20 nations, speaking 20 languages, where there is no municipal power and no combinations of any kind, such as facilitate the construction of public works in this country. (Hear, hear.) Inevitably all those duties that devolve on every good Government must be neglected by the Governor-General of India, however wise, capable, and honest he may be in the performance of his duties, because the duties laid upon him are such as no man now living, or who ever lived, can or could properly sustain. (Hear, hear.) It may be asked, what I would substitute for the Governor-Generalship of India. Now, I do not propose to abolish the office of Governor-General of India this session. I am not proposing any clause in the

Bill, and if I were to propose one to carry out the idea I have expressed, I might be answered by the argument that a great part of the population of India was in a state of anarchy, and that it would be most inconvenient, if not dangerous, to abolish the office of Governor-General at such a time. (Hear, hear.) I do not mean to propose such a thing now, but I take this opportunity of stating my views, in the hope that when we come to 1863, we may perhaps be able to consider the question more in the light in which I am endeavouring to present it to the House. (Hear, hear.) I would propose that, instead of having a Governor-General and an Indian empire, we should have neither the one nor the other. (Hear, hear.) I would propose that we should have presidencies, and not an empire. (Hear, hear.) If I were a Minister—which the House will admit is a bold figure of speech (a laugh)—and if the House were to agree with me—which is also an essential point—I would propose to have at least five presidencies in India, and I would have the governments of those presidencies perfectly equal in rank and in salary. The capitals of those presidencies would probably be Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Agra, and Lahore. I will take the presidency of Madras as an illustration. Madras has a population of some 20,000,000. We all know its position on the map, and that it has the advantage of being more compact, geographically speaking, than the other presidencies. It has a Governor and a Council. I would give to it a Governor and a Council still, but would confine all their duties to the Presidency of Madras, and I would treat it

just as if Madras was the only portion of India connected with this country. I would have its finance, its taxation, its justice, and its police departments, as well as its public works and military departments, precisely the same as if it were a State having no connexion with any other part of India, and recognized only as a dependency of this country. (Hear.) I would propose that the government of every presidency should correspond with the Secretary for India in England, and that there should be telegraphic communication between all the presidencies in India, as I hope before long to see a telegraphic communication between the office of the noble lord (Lord Stanley) and every presidency over which he presides. (Hear, hear.) I shall no doubt be told that there are insuperable difficulties in the way of such an arrangement, and I shall be sure to hear of the military difficulty. Now, I do not profess to be an authority on military affairs, but I know that military men have often made great mistakes. I would have the army divided, each presidency having its own army, just as now, care being taken to have them kept distinct; and I see no danger of any confusion or misunderstanding, when an emergency arose, in having them all brought together to carry out the views of the Government. There is one question which it is important to bear in mind, and that is with regard to the Councils in India. I think every Governor of a presidency should have an assistant council, but differently constituted from what they now are. I would have an open council. The noble lord, the member for

London, used some expressions the other night which I interpreted to mean that it was necessary to maintain in all its exclusiveness the system of the civil service in India. In that I entirely differ from the noble lord. [Lord J. Russell here indicated dissent.] The noble lord corrects me in that statement, and therefore I must have been mistaken. What we want is to make the Governments of the Presidencies Governments for the people of the Presidencies; not Governments for the civil servants of the Crown, but for the non-official mercantile classes from England who settle there, and for the 20,000,000 or 30,000,000 of natives in each presidency. (Hear, hear.) I should propose to do that which has been done with great advantage in Ceylon. I have received a letter from an officer who has been in the service of the East India Company, and who told me a fact which has gratified me very much. He says:—

“At a public dinner at Colombo, in 1835, to the Governor, Sir Wilmot Horton, at which I was present, the best speech of the evening was made by a native nobleman of Candy, and a member of Council. It was remarkable for its appropriate expression, its sound sense, and the deliberation and ease that marked the utterance of his feelings. There was no repetition or useless phraseology or flattery, and it was admitted by all who heard him to be the soundest and neatest speech of the night.”

This was at Ceylon. It is not, of course, always the best man who can make the best speech; but if what I have read could be said of a native of Ceylon, it could

be said of thousands in India. We need not go beyond the walls of this house, to find a head bronzed by an Indian sun, equal to the ablest heads of those who adorn its benches. (Hear, hear.) And in every part of India we all know that it would be an insult to the people of India to say that it is not the same. There are thousands of persons in India who are competent to take any position to which the Government may choose to advance them. (Hear, hear.) If the governor of each presidency were to have in his council some of the officials of his Government, some of the non-official Europeans resident in the presidency, and two or three at least of the intelligent natives of the presidency in whom the people would have some confidence, you would have begun that which will be of inestimable value hereafter—you would have begun to unite the government with the governed; and unless you do that, no government will be safe, and any hurricane may overturn it or throw it into confusion. (Hear.) Now, suppose the Governor-General gone, the Presidencies established, the Governors equal in rank and dignity, and their Councils constituted in the manner I have indicated, is it not reasonable to suppose that the delay which has hitherto been one of the greatest curses of your Indian government would be almost altogether avoided? Instead of a Governor-General living in Calcutta or at Simla, never travelling over the whole of the country, and knowing very little about it, and that little only through other official eyes, is it not reasonable to suppose that the action of the Government would be more direct in all its duties, and

in every department of its service, than has been the case under the system which has existed until now? Your administration of the law, marked by so much disgrace, could never have lasted so long as it has done, if the governors of your presidencies had been independent governors. So with regard to matters of police, education, public works, and everything that can stimulate industry, and so with regard to your system of taxation. You would have in every presidency a constant rivalry for good. (Cheers.) The Governor of Madras, when his term of office expired, would be delighted to show that the people of that presidency were contented, that the whole presidency was advancing in civilization, that roads and all manner of useful public works were extending, that industry was becoming more and more a habit of the people, and that the exports and imports were constantly increasing. The Governors of Bombay and the rest of the presidencies would be animated by the same spirit, and so you would have all over India, as I have said, a rivalry for good; you would have placed a check on that malignant spirit of ambition which has worked so much evil (hear, hear)—you would have no governor so great that you could not control him, or who might make war when he pleased; war and annexation would be greatly checked, if not entirely prevented; and I do in my conscience believe you would have laid the foundation for a better and more permanent form of government for India than has ever obtained since it came under the rule of England. (Cheers.) But how

long does England propose to govern India? (Hear, hear.) Nobody answers that question, and nobody can answer it. Be it 50, or 100 years, or 500 years, does any man with the smallest glimmering of common sense believe that that great country, with its 20 different nations, and its 20 languages, can ever be bound up and consolidated into one compact and enduring empire? I believe such a thing to be utterly impossible. We must fail in the attempt if ever we make it, and we are bound to look into the future with reference to that point. The presidency of Madras, for instance, having its own government, would, in 50 years, become one compact State, and every part of the presidency would look to the city of Madras as its capital, and to the Government of Madras as its ruling power. If that were to go on for a century or more, they would have their five or six Presidencies of India built up into so many compact States; and if at any future period the sovereignty of England should be withdrawn, we should leave so many presidencies built up and firmly compacted together, each able to support its own independence and its own government, and we should be able to say we had not left the country a prey to that anarchy and discord which I believe to be inevitable if we insist on holding those vast territories with the idea of building them up into one great empire. But I am obliged to admit that mere machinery is not sufficient in this case, either with respect to my own scheme, or to that of the noble lord (Lord Stanley). We want something else than mere clerks, stationery, despatches, and so forth. We want, what I

shall designate as a new feeling in England, and an entirely new policy in India. (Cheers.) We must in future have India governed, not for a handful of Englishmen (cheers), not for that civil service whose praises are so constantly sounded in this House. You may govern India, if you like, for the good of England, but the good of England must come through the channel of the good of India. (Hear, hear.) There are but two modes of gaining anything by our connexion with India. The one is by plundering the people of India, and the other by trading with them. I prefer to do it by trading with them; but in order that England may become rich by trading with India, India itself must become rich (hear, hear), and India can only become rich through the honest administration of justice, and through entire security for life and property. Now, as to this new policy, I will tell the House what I think the Prime Minister should do. He ought, I think, always to choose for his President of the Board of Control, or his Secretary of State for India, a man who cannot be excelled by any other man in his Cabinet, or in his party, for capacity, for honesty, for attention to his duties, and for knowledge adapted to the particular office to which he is appointed. If any Prime Minister appoint an inefficient man to such an office he will be a traitor to the Throne of England. (Cheers.) That officer, appointed for the qualities I have just indicated, should, with equal scrupulousness and conscientiousness make the appointments, whether of the Governor-General, or, should that office be abolished, of the Governors of the Presidencies of India. Those

appointments should not be rewards for old men simply because such men have done good service when in their prime, nor should they be rewards for mere party service (hear, hear), but they should be appointments given under a feeling that interests of the very highest moment, connected with this country, depend on those great offices in India being properly filled up. The same principles should run throughout the whole system of government, for unless there be a very high degree of virtue in all these appointments, and unless our great object be to govern India well, and to exalt the name of England in the eyes of the whole native population, all that we have recourse to in the way of machinery will be of very little use indeed. I admit that this is a great work; I admit also that the further I go into the consideration of this question the more I feel that it is too large for me to grapple with, and that every step we take in it should be taken as if we were men walking in the dark. We have, however, certain great principles to guide us, and by their light we may make steps in advance, if not fast, at any rate, sure. But we start from an unfortunate position. We start from a platform of conquest by force of arms extending over a hundred years. There is nothing in the world worse than the sort of foundation from which we start. The greatest genius who has shed lustre on the literature of this country has said, "There is no sure foundation set on blood;" and it may be our unhappy fate, in regard to India, to demonstrate the truth of that saying. We are always subjugators, and we must be viewed with hatred and suspicion. I say we must

look at the thing as it is if we are to see our exact position, what our duty is, and what chance there is of our retaining India and of governing it for the advantage of its people. Our difficulties have been enormously increased by the revolt. The people of India have only seen England in its worst form in that country. They have seen it in its military power, its exclusive civil service, and in the supremacy of a handful of foreigners. When natives of India come to this country they are delighted with England and Englishmen. They find themselves treated with a kindness, a consideration, a respect, to which they are wholly strangers in their own country, and they cannot understand how it is that men who are so just, so attentive to them here, sometimes, indeed too often, appear to them in a different character in India. (Hear, hear.) I remember that the Hon. F. Shaw, who wrote some 30 years since, stated, in his able and instructive book, that even in his time the conduct of the English in India towards the natives was less agreeable, less kindly, less just than it had been in former years; and in 1853, before the committee, presided over by the hon. member for Huntingdon, evidence was given that the feeling between the rulers and the ruled in India was becoming every year less like what could be desired. It was only the other day there appeared in a letter of *The Times* correspondent an anecdote which illustrates what I am saying, and which I feel it necessary to read to the House. Mr. Russell, of *The Times*, says,—

“ I went off to breakfast in a small mosque, which

has been turned into a *salle à manger* by some officers stationed here, and I confess I should have eaten with more satisfaction had I not seen as I entered the enclosure of the mosque a native badly wounded, on a charpoy, by which was sitting a woman in deep affliction. The explanation given of this scene was, that ‘—— [the name of the Englishman was left blank (hear),] had been licking two of his bearers (or servants), and had nearly murdered them.’ This was one of the servants, and, without knowing or caring to know the causes of such chastisement, I cannot but express my disgust at the severity—to call it by no harsher name—of some of our fellow-countrymen towards their domestics.” The reading of that paragraph gave me extreme pain. People may fancy that this does not matter much, but I say it matters very much. (Hear, hear.) Under any system of government you will have Englishmen scattered all over India, and conduct like that I have just read, in any district, must create ill-feeling towards England, to your rule, to your supremacy; and when that feeling has become sufficiently extensive any little accident may give fire to the train, and you may have calamities more or less serious, such as we have had during the last twelve months. (Hear, hear.) You must change all this if you mean to keep India. (Hear, hear.) I do not now make any comment upon the mode in which this country has been put into possession of India. I accept that possession as a fact. There we are; we do not know how to leave it, and therefore let us see if we know how to govern it. (Hear, hear.) It is a problem such as,

perhaps, no other nation has had to solve. Let us see whether there is enough of intelligence and virtue in England to solve the difficulty. In the first place, then, I say, let us abandon all that system of calumny against the natives of India which has lately prevailed. (Hear, hear.) Had that people not been docile, the most governable race in the world, how could you have maintained your power for 100 years? (Hear, hear.) Are they not industrious, are they not intelligent, are they not—upon the evidence of the most distinguished men the Indian service ever produced—endowed with many qualities which make them respected by all Englishmen who mix with them? I have heard that from many men of the widest experience, and have read the same in the works of some of the best writers upon India. Then, let us not have these constant calumnies against such a people. Even now, there are men who go about the country speaking as if such things had never been contradicted, and talking of mutilations and atrocities committed in India. (Hear, hear.) The less we say about atrocities the better. (Hear, hear.) Great political tumults are, I fear, never brought about or carried on without grievous acts on both sides deeply to be regretted. At least, we are in the position of invaders and conquerors—they are in the position of the invaded and the conquered. Whether I were a native of India, or of England, or of any other country, I would not the less assert the great distinction between their position and ours in that country; and I would not permit any man in my presence, without rebuke, to indulge in the calumnies and expressions of

contempt which I have recently heard poured forth without measure upon the whole population of India. (Hear, hear.) There is one other point to which I wish to address myself before I sit down, and in touching upon it I address myself especially to the noble lord and his colleagues in the Government. If I had the responsibility of administering the affairs of India there are certain things I would do. I would immediately after this Bill passes issue a proclamation in India which should reach every subject of the British Crown in that country, and be heard of in the territories of every Indian Prince or Rajah. I would offer a general amnesty. (Hear, hear.) It is all very well to talk of issuing an amnesty to all who have done nothing; but who is there that has done nothing in such a state of affairs as has prevailed during the past twelve months? If you pursue your vengeance until you have rooted out and destroyed every one of those soldiers who have revolted, when will your labour cease? (Hear, hear.) If you are to punish every non-military native of India who has given a piece of bread or a cup of water to a revolted trooper, how many natives will escape your punishment and your vengeance? I would have a general amnesty, which should be put forth as the first great act done directly by the Queen of England in the exercise of sovereign power over the territories of India. In this proclamation I would promise to the natives of India a security for their property as complete as we have here at home, and I would put an end to all those mischievous and irritating inquiries which have been going on for years in many parts of India as to the title to landed

estates (hear, hear), by which you tell the people of that country that unless each man can show an unimpeachable title to his property for 90 years you will dispossess him. What would be the state of things here if such a regulation were adopted? (Hear, hear.) I would also proclaim to the people of India that we would hold sacred that right of adoption which has prevailed for centuries in that country. (Hear, hear.) It was only the other day that I had laid before me the case of a native prince who has been most faithful to England during these latter trials. When he came to the throne at ten years of age he was made to sign a document, by which he agreed that, if he had no children, his territories should be at the disposal of the British Government, or what is called the paramount power. He has been married; he has had one son and two or three daughters, but within the last few weeks his only son has died. There is grief in the palace, and there is consternation among the people, for the fact of this agreement, entered into by the boy of ten years old, is well known to all the inhabitants of the country. Representations have already been made to this country in the hope that the Government will cancel that agreement, and allow the people of that State to know that the right of adoption would not be taken from their prince in case he should have no other son. Let the Government do that, and there is not a corner of India into which that intelligence would not penetrate with the rapidity of lightning. (Hear, hear.) And would not that calm the anxieties of many of those independent princes and rajahs who are only afraid that when these troubles

are over the English Government will re-commence that system of annexation out of which I believe all these troubles have arisen? (Hear, hear.) I would tell them also in that proclamation that, while the people of England hold that their own, the Christian, religion is true and the best for mankind, yet that it is consistent with that religion that they who profess it should hold inviolable the rights of conscience and the rights of religion in others. (Hear, hear.) I would show that, whatever violent, over zealous, and fanatical men may have said in this country, the Parliament of England, the Ministers of the Queen, and the Queen herself are resolved that upon this point no kind of wrong shall be done to the millions who profess the religions held to be true in India. (Hear, hear.) I would do another thing. I would establish a Court of Appeal, the judges of which should be judges of the highest character in India, for the settlement of those many disputes which have arisen between the Government of India and its subjects, some native and some European. I would not suffer these questions to come upon the floor of this House. I would not forbid them by statute, but I would establish a court which should render it unnecessary for any man in India to cross the ocean to seek for that justice which he would then be able to get in his own country without corruption or secret bargain. (Hear.) Then I would carry out the proposition which the noble lord has made to-night, and which the right hon. gentleman (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) made when he introduced his Bill, that a commission should be issued to enquire

into the question of finance. I would have other commissions, one for each presidency, and I would tell the people of India that there should be a searching inquiry into their grievances, and that it was the interest and the will of the Queen of England that those grievances should be redressed. Now, perhaps I may be told that I am proposing strange things, quite out of the ordinary routine of Government. I admit it. We are in a position that necessitates something out of the ordinary routine. (Hear, hear.) There are positions and times in the history of every country, as in the lives of individuals, when courage and action are absolute salvation; and now, the Crown of England, acting by the advice of the responsible Ministers, must, in my opinion, have recourse to a great and unusual measure, in order to allay the anxieties which prevail throughout the whole of India. The people of India do not like us, but they scarcely know where to turn if we left them. They are sheep literally without a shepherd. They are people whom you have subdued, and who have the highest and strongest claims upon you—claims which you cannot forget—claims which, if you do not act upon, you may rely upon it that,—if there be a judgment for nations, as I believe there is, as for individuals,—our children at no distant generation must pay the penalty which we have purchased by neglecting our duty to the populations of India. (Hear, hear.) I have now stated my views and opinions on this question, not at all in a manner, I feel, equal to the question itself. I have felt the difficulty in thinking of it, I feel the difficulty in speaking of it (hear, hear), for

there is far more in it and about it than any man, however much he may be accustomed to think upon political questions, and to discuss them, can comprise at all within the compass of a speech of ordinary length. I have described the measures which I would at once adopt for the purpose of soothing the agitation which now disturbs and menaces every part of India, and of inviting the submission of those who are now in arms against you. Now I believe—I speak in the most perfect honesty—I believe that the announcement of these measures would avail more in restoring tranquillity than the presence of an additional army (cheers), and I believe that their full and honest adoption would enable you to retain your power in India. I have sketched the form of government which I would establish in India and at home, with the view of securing perfect responsibility and an enlightened administration. I admit that these things can only be obtained in degree, but I believe that a government such as that which I have sketched would be free from most of the errors and the vices that have marked and marred your past career in India. I have given much study to this great and solemn question. I entreat the House to study it, not only now, during the passing of this Bill, but after the session is over, and till we meet again next year, when in all probability there must be further legislation upon this great subject (hear); for I believe that upon this question depends very much, for good or for evil, the future of this country of which we are citizens, and which we all regard and love so much. You have had enough of

military reputation on Eastern fields; you have gathered large harvests of that commodity, be it valuable or be it worthless. I invite you to something better, and higher, and holier than that; I invite you to a glory not "fanned by conquest's crimson wing," but based upon the solid and lasting benefits which I believe the Parliament of England can, if it will, confer upon the countless populations of India. (Loud cheers.)

THE END.

INDIAN REFORM BILLS;

OR,

LEGISLATION FOR INDIA, FROM 1766 TO 1858.

ALSO,

AN ARGUMENT

FOR A

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN INDIA,

IN A

LETTER TO THE RIGHT HON. B. DISRAELI, M.P.,

CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, &c.

TO WHICH IS ADDED AN APPENDIX ON THE PRESENT STATE
AND COMMERCIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE INDIAN MARKET.

BY WILLIAM STOKES,

MANCHESTER.

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—
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INDIAN REFORM BILLS;

OR,

LEGISLATION FOR INDIA, FROM 1766 TO 1858.

No. I.

INTRODUCTORY.*

Sir,

As the question of Indian Reform is one of increasing importance and interest, I beg, with your permission, to present in outline a succinct history of the subject, bringing it down to the measures now before the country.

So early as the year 1766, now nearly a century ago, the affairs of the East India Company came under the direct notice of the ministers of the Crown. Prior to that date, they were practically regarded as matters of private trade, exclusively under the control of a body of chartered merchants.

When Lord Clive returned to India in 1765, he was invested with full powers from the Company at home to act as Commander-in-Chief, President, and Governor, of Bengal. There was also an unlimited power lodged in a select committee, consisting of his lordship and four other gentlemen, to act and determine for themselves on all subjects affecting the interests of the Company, irrespective entirely of the Bengal Council, except so far as they might think proper, at any time, to consult with that body. This select committee was responsible to none

* As four of these letters have already appeared in that able and influential journal, *The Manchester Examiner and Times*, their early epistolary form has been retained.

but the Company at home, and as, on numerous occasions, prompt action appeared to be imperative, and the central authority at London was too remote to admit of consultation, this committee became almost of necessity, an irresponsible, if not a despotic body.

With all its imperfections, however, this select committee accomplished one good thing in a complete exposure of the corruption and venality of the Company's servants in India. "Fortunes," said Lord Clive, "of £100,000 have been obtained in two years; and individuals, very young in the service, are returning home with a million and a half." In this contagious atmosphere Clive himself did not escape perfectly free from pollution, or with hands unaffected with the golden itch. Lord Macaulay, after stating his hard money at a quarter of a million, besides his Indian estate, valued by Clive himself at £27,000 a year, adds,—“We may safely affirm that no Englishman who started with nothing, has ever in any line of life, created such a fortune at the early age of thirty-four.” The noble historian further states, on unimpeachable evidence, that “enormous fortunes were thus rapidly accumulated at Calcutta, while thirty millions of human beings were reduced to the extremity of wretchedness. They had been accustomed to live under tyranny, but never under tyranny like this. They found the little finger of the Company thicker than the loins of Surajah Dowlah.”

These exposures, more than any other single cause, directed public attention to the government, or more correctly, to the misgovernment of the Company, and eventually drew down upon them the disapprobation, tacitly implied in the interference of Parliament. It was justly felt to be a national dishonour that so many millions of mankind should be subject to robbery and oppression, by a company of traders bearing the English name.

But the immediate causes of Parliamentary interference were the unseemly contentions at home between the directors of the Company and the proprietors of India Stock. The astounding wealth of so many of their own servants naturally enough created an eager appetite among the proprietary to share in the common spoil. They considered the dole of 6 per cent per annum much too small a proportion of gains that appeared to

them to be of unparalleled magnitude ; and, as a consequence, they demanded 8 if not 10 per cent in return for their investments. The directors resisted this demand on the general ground, chiefly, that it would be inexpedient, and possibly dangerous, to raise the dividends to an amount that could not be permanently maintained. The effect of this refusal was a flood of recrimination, with charges of venality and threats of exposure such as had never been witnessed in this country before. The community at large was agitated throughout with the violence of the contention, and the journals of the day teemed with "the sound and fury" of Leadenhall-street. It was then that the ministry interfered, by a significant note from the First Lord of the Treasury (the Duke of Grafton), dated September, 1766, and addressed to the General Court of Proprietors, stating "That as the affairs of the East India Company had been mentioned in Parliament last session, it was very probable they might be taken into consideration again ; therefore, from the regard they had for the welfare of the Company, and that they might have time to prepare their papers for that occasion, they informed them that the Parliament would meet some time in November." From this period the Company ceased to be regarded as a body of private traders, Governmental interference having stamped it with a national character, which it retains to the present day.

In the following November, and early in the session, a Parliamentary committee was appointed "to look into the state and condition of the Company." This committee proceeded with great vigour to the discharge of its duties, and ordered that the Company's Charter, their treaties with the native princes, the state of their revenues in Bengal, Bahar, Orixia, &c., their naval, military, and other expenditure, with all business correspondence with their agents, should be laid before the House. There was a refreshing boldness about this committee, and the energy and decision with which it went about the work of Indian Reform have seldom been equalled in the annals of Parliament. During the discussions that followed, "the right of the Company to their territorial acquisitions was called in question ; it was argued that they had no right by their Charter to any conquest ; that such

possessions in the hands of a trading corporation were improper and dangerous, &c." The issue of this inquiry was the adoption, in June, 1767, of a temporary agreement with the Company for two years. In the interim, a message from the ministry, which was read at the General Court, recommending the Company not to augment their dividend until their affairs had been further considered, having proved ineffectual, two bills, regulating the government and dividends of the Company, were carried through Parliament in spite of a strong opposition. On the expiration of the Company's Charter in 1769, it was renewed by Parliament for five years, on the basis of an arrangement, which secured to the Company, on the one hand, a greater control over their dividends; and on the other, the large annual payment of £400,000 to the Government, as the price of their continued privileges. With the exception of an abortive attempt in 1771, to obtain a bill for more effectually enabling the Company to raise a military force for the protection of their Indian territories, and the sending out some commissioners to India to act as supervisors, but who were unfortunately lost on the passage, their affairs remained unchanged until 1772. In that year, a select committee of thirty-one members was appointed by the House of Commons to inquire into the state of the Company's affairs. The reasons assigned for the appointment of this committee were the following:—"The present precarious situation of affairs in India; the late distresses of the natives, and the depopulation of the country; the oppressive and arbitrary conduct of the Company's servants; the great decrease of the Bengal revenues, as well as enormous and unnecessary expenses; the immense importance of preserving and well governing those countries, and that this could not be done without a full inquiry into their state, in order to the establishing of a permanent form of justice and government."

The appointment of this committee was the indirect consequence of an implied commendation in the speech from the throne, for an inquiry into the state of the Company's affairs. A motion for leave to bring in a bill to regulate the Company's servants and concerns in India having been made by the deputy-chairman of the Company, but dropped after the

second reading; the House decided on an inquiry before legislating, and appointed this committee as the result. The members were chosen by ballot; the inquiry instituted was a most comprehensive one; the committee sat through the whole summer; and the reports which it published "excited a general indignation," by exposing, in true colours, the misrule of the Company and its servants. In the session of November of the same year (1772), this committee, after a ministerial attempt to supersede it by a *secret* one of thirteen members, received a re-appointment with full powers, and a special instruction to consider with great care "the measure of sending out a commission of supervision to any part of our territories in the East Indies." The *secret* committee to which the ministry had given birth, also continued its existence, and pursued its course independently of the larger and more important one.

Upon the opening of Parliament in 1773, the embarrassed affairs of the Company came once more before the House, in the shape of an application for a loan. On that occasion the Premier, Lord North, who was also Chancellor of the Exchequer, gave utterance to a memorable opinion, which, though the subject of universal remark at the time, has been too much overlooked in all subsequent debates upon India. He "not only called in question the Company's claim of exclusive right to its territorial possessions, but insisted upon a prior right in the State; from whence he inferred the justice and legality of its interposing its authority in all cases in that Company's affairs! He observed, that this doctrine was not peculiar to himself; and that several persons of great knowledge in the laws had declared it as their opinion, 'that such territorial possessions as the subjects of any State shall acquire by conquest, are virtually the property of the State, and not of those individuals who acquire them.'" After fierce debates, this doctrine of the minister was virtually incorporated in a formal resolution and carried by the House. It ran thus,—“That it is the opinion of this House, it will be more beneficial to the public, and the East India Company, to *let* the territorial acquisitions remain in the possession of the Company for a limited time, not exceeding the term of six years, to commence from the agreement between the public and the

Company." Against this, and other repressive resolutions of Parliament, the Company petitioned in the strongest terms, which led to the continuance of the debates to a tiresome length, and finally to the passing of a bill, by large majorities in both Houses, that virtually transferred the jurisdiction of the Company to the control and government of the British Parliament. This measure has ever been appealed to as a standing precedent for all subsequent legislation in reference to India. It superseded to all intents and purposes the independence of the Company; and though it fell far short of the obvious necessity of the case, it demonstrated to the world that the true government of India was vested in the Parliament of England. The manner in which this great trust has been discharged, will be stated in my next communication, when examining the antecedents and provisions of the celebrated India Bills of Charles James Fox.

Manchester.

WILLIAM STORRS.*

No. II.

BILLS OF CHARLES JAMES FOX, &c.

Sir,

The ministerial bill of 1773 was remarkable for nothing so much as that of being the legal recognition of the transfer of the East India Company's affairs to the control of Parliament. It was by no means what would be called in these days a *sweeping* measure. It provided that the directors should be elected for four years and no longer; six of them to be chosen annually. The electors were to be at least twelve months' holders of stock; and the qualification, instead of being £500 worth of stock as before, was raised to £1,000. It confined the Mayor's Court at Calcutta to small mercantile causes, and established a new one in its stead, consisting of a chief justice and three puisne judges, each of them to be appointed by the Crown; and it assigned to the Bengal Presidency a superiority over the other presidencies of India.

Comparatively mild as this measure now appears, yet it "excited a very general alarm," and was contested and opposed, clause by clause, sentence by sentence, and almost word by word. Long, weary, and fierce debates sprang out of it; counsel were heard against it in both Houses of Parliament; and after more than a month's continual agitation in the Commons, and upwards of a week's stern debate in the Lords, to the exclusion in both of all other business, it was carried in the Commons by 181 to 21, and in the Lords, including proxies, by 74 to 17. An earnest protest against it was, however, entered on the journals of the Lords, and signed by thirteen peers, whose main objection appears to have been the sanctity of private property, in which light they regarded the Indian territories.

During the preparation and progress of this bill, the select committee continued its inquiries with unexampled diligence and impartiality. It subjected Lord Clive and several other civil and military officers, who had held high station in India, to rigorous and frequent examinations. And after a most searching investigation, the report was brought up by the chairman (General Smith), containing "charges of the blackest dye, of rapacity, treachery, and cruelty, against those who were principally concerned in the deposal and death of Surajah Dowlah, the signing of a fictitious treaty with one of his agents, the establishment of Meer Jaffier, the terms obtained from him upon that occasion, &c., &c." After the expression of regret by the chairman at the disagreeable necessity he was under of laying such a report before the House, he proposed resolutions affirming the right of the State to territories obtained by conquest or treaty with princes, and condemned as illegal the appropriation of acquisitions so made to the private emolument of officials. These resolutions were agreed to by the House. But their proposer would have gone farther, and declared "that he would prosecute the subject with the utmost vigour, and that restitution to the public was the great object of his pursuit." This was evidently aimed against Lord Clive, as the chief sinner of the Company, and he, with his guilty gains, escaped but with the skin of his teeth. The Premier, Lord North, voted for his condemnation; the Attorney-General, who afterwards became Lord Thurlow,

did the same; and nothing but the fear of the possible consequences of such a *retrospective* precedent, saved him from the disgrace of having to surrender his vast fortune to the demands of the inexorable justice of the British House of Commons. As an emollient after this terrible probe, the House adopted a resolution to the effect that he had, notwithstanding, rendered service to the State.

On several subsequent occasions, for instance in 1779, 1780, and 1781, bills were passed temporarily investing the Indian territories in the East India Company; but the very fact of the temporary character of these measures proves the unsettled and unsatisfactory state of the whole Indian question. Its condition was one of perpetual annoyance to the country, and of debate, contention, and trouble, in Parliament. It was evident, beyond all doubt, that whatever ability the Company possessed to conquer, it had none whatever to *govern*. Of animal courage there was a superabundance; but as this quality added no particle to administrative talent, the government of India presented a huge mockery, while the millions of its inhabitants became the helpless prey of successive flocks of greedy adventurers, who appeared to study but how to plunder on the largest and most rapid scale.

At length the nation was fairly aroused, and in 1782 the question of the future government of India was taken up in Parliament with an earnest determination worthy of the occasion. In April of that year, the Lord-Advocate of Scotland, Mr. Henry Dundas, who had been chairman of the secret committee, moved that its reports should be referred to a committee of the whole House. On that occasion he spoke for nearly three hours, and presented in his able address a most comprehensive view of the British rule in India. He stated the causes of the deplorable calamities there to be "the engaging in military operations by the Company's servants with a view to conquest,—their corrupt interference in the quarrels of the native princes,—their frequent breaches of faith and disregard to treaties,—their speculation and scandalous oppression of the natives,—and the proved inability of the directors at home to control their servants abroad, and their ready connivance at the grossest misconduct, provided it secured gain to the Company."

These grave charges he supported by a multitude of facts that had been placed in evidence before the committee; and among others, he adduced the disgraceful one that implicated the Company's servants in the black design of the Nabob of Arcot on the flourishing kingdom of Tanjore; to accomplish which, evidence had been given to show that he had formed a scheme for bribing a majority of the British House of Commons by the sum of seven hundred thousand pounds!

Mr. Dundas being warmly supported by Mr. Burke, Mr. Fox, and other eminent members of the House, submitted appropriate resolutions, which were agreed to, and leave was given to bring in a bill founded upon them. The consideration of this bill, and the long defence by counsel of Sir Thomas Rumbold, whom amongst others it accused of high crimes and misdemeanours, wore away the session of 1782; and when, late in the session of 1783, the subject was renewed, the members dropped away one after another, until, for want of further interest in the question, the bill fell to the ground. Thus, a measure that had occupied the close attention of an earnest committee for months, and which affected the welfare, to some extent, of millions of mankind, was allowed to become an abortion. Corruption triumphed, and honest men went home to mourn.

But the question itself did not prove an abortion; for, in the following session of November, 1783, the new Foreign Secretary, Charles James Fox, applied his master-mind to the subject, in his two celebrated bills for reform in India: the one for vesting the affairs of the Company in certain commissioners, and the other for the better government of their Indian territories and possessions. In these two bills he handled the subject with the grasp of a statesman, and the strength of a giant; and placed it before the House with a lucidity and comprehensiveness that did honour to his unrivalled ability. The first bill provided that whatever had been hitherto vested in the directors, or General Court of Proprietors, should be vested in seven directors (named) for the space of four years. These directors, in the first instance, to be nominated by Parliament. The commerce of the Company, it directed should be under the management of nine assistant-directors, who were to be proprietors of India Stock to

the amount of £2,000, and should act under the above seven directors. All vacancies in the office of the directors were to be filled up by His Majesty; but vacancies among the assistant-directors to be supplied by a majority of the proprietors at an open election. The assistant-directors to be removable by five directors, who should enter their reasons on their journals; and both classes of officials were to be removable by His Majesty, on an address from either House of Parliament. The remainder consisted of details, and directed that once in six months the directors should lay an exact statement of the mercantile affairs of the Company before both the General Court of Proprietors and the Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, to be laid by the latter before the Parliament. It also specially provided for the speedy punishment of the Company's servants who should be convicted of wrong towards a native prince, and for rendering full justice to the injured party.

The second bill prohibited the invasion of any territory in India, or any alliance for such a purpose. It abolished all monopolies in India, and secured an estate of inheritance to the native landholder. It directed that the native princes should not be molested in the enjoyment of their rights, and provided for the punishment of offences committed in their territories. It prohibited the Company's servants from all interference with their revenues, to acquire mortgages, or to have pecuniary transactions with them. It secured the right of succession according to native laws. It disqualified the agents of any protected prince, or servants of the Company, from sitting in the House of Commons, and for a certain time after quitting the same; and it directed that all offences against this act might be prosecuted in the courts of India, or in the Court of King's Bench.

The broad justice and marked superiority of these celebrated measures will be pointed out in my next communication, by contrasting them with the more successful India bill of William Pitt.

Manchester.

WILLIAM STOKES.

No. III.

THE BILLS OF FOX AND PITT EXAMINED AND COMPARED.

Sir,

While the bill of 1773 did little more than recognise the right of Parliament to interfere in Indian affairs, the bolder measures of Fox gave to that right a practical application. The one asserted a theory, but the other aimed to reduce that theory into practical law. The former resembled the first step of childhood, but the latter the stately tread of the full-grown man.

It was utterly impossible for the mind of Fox to float upon the surface of things. He was born to dive, and his native element was the profound. He habitually grappled with first principles; and whether his question was that of Indian Reform, or a French Revolution, he detected its conditions and character with greater accuracy and completeness than any other statesman of his day.

Of this rare ability his two Indian bills are splendid illustrations. He saw at a glance the disorders of the whole case, and, with admirable skill, he proceeded to apply an appropriate remedy. There were three parties to be consulted in any attempt at Indian Reform,—the natives, the Company, and the Parliament. The natives had been robbed and oppressed,—the Company had become both venal and despotic,—and the Parliament had been systematically ignored. For the first, Fox demanded protection and justice,—for the second he created a responsible administration,—and for the third he claimed a direct legislative control. The only defect, if, considering the period, it deserves to be so denominated, was the omission of the element of Indian representation. But this ought not to be charged upon Fox as a shortcoming by those who, after the lapse of nearly eighty years, are equally willing to question the debt, or to postpone the payment.

The most prominent feature of these bills, and the most important, was that of making the government of India directly responsible to the British Parliament. This appears in the three following particulars:—First, by vesting the nomination of the seven chief directors in the House of Commons, and not in the

Company or in the Crown ; and as the term of office was but for four years, this nomination would have been renewed at the close of every such period. Secondly, by rendering both the directors and assistant-directors removable by an address to the monarch from either House of Parliament, and this arrangement would have corrected any error that the proprietary, as well as others, might have made in their election, and exercised a healthy check upon the actions of a body whose purity and wisdom were both alike open to improvement. Thirdly, by making it obligatory that a statement of the mercantile affairs of the Company should, once in every six months, be laid before the Commissioners of the Treasury, to be laid by them before the House. By these salutary provisions the Parliament would have become paramount in the government of India, and as the detail of that government must have received its tone and character from the presiding body, direct responsibility would have extended eventually to the most menial of the Company's servants, both at home and in India. And this one great principle, connected with the subordinate but important provisions of these wise measures, would have gone far to cure the wrongs of injured Hindostan ; but, unfortunately for that country and for our own, intrigue and corruption proved too strong for even Charles James Fox, and, as the consequence, justice for India was (if I may be pardoned for the comparison) crucified between two thieves.

These bills were supported by the most distinguished talent in Parliament. The debates upon them probed society to its fundamental principles, during which it was successfully argued that no chartered trading corporation could claim to supersede the imprescriptible rights of mankind, and that the law of recognised States was prior and superior to the prerogative of any company of merchants. But to take issue on tangible points, the advocates of these bills laid down two propositions in their defence, and in support of which they adduced arguments and proofs of an overwhelming character:—First, that the abuses alleged were of enormous magnitude and extent, and highly dangerous in their consequences ; and, secondly, that they were habitual, and, without an entire change of system, utterly incurable. In support of these propositions, the deranged state of the

Company's finances,—their extravagant and unprovoked wars,—their utter faithlessness,—their betrayal each in his turn of every prince without exception with whom they had formed any connection in India, the invasion of their rights, the disorders and rapacity of the military,—the ruthless desire for gain,—and their repeated violation of the most solemn engagements with foreign princes, were, with other equally grave charges, insisted on with all the force of argument, earnestness, and truth, that a feeling of justice for the oppressed could inspire. But grave as these charges were, the utter febleness of the reply served only to deepen the conviction that they were sadly too true. The opposition having failed to make the slightest impression, the first bill was finally carried on December 8th, 1783, by 208 against 102.

Within three days of this, Court intrigue began its work among the peers, and the King (George III.) declared to Lord Temple “that he should deem those who should vote for it (Fox's bill) not only not his friends, but his enemies;” and he gave his lordship full authority to put this into stronger language if he could. Consequently, just one week after the bill had passed the Commons by so large a majority, peers who had given in their proxies in its favour suddenly withdrew them, and other noble lords went over to the Court side of the House in considerable numbers. On a question of adjournment, the ministers were left in a minority of 79 to 87; but the Commons, aware of this scandalous backdoor influence, met on the same day, and carried a strong resolution in favour of the bill, by 158 against 80. Notwithstanding this bold defiance of the Court by the Commons, the assembled peers, true to their servile antecedents, threw out the bill on the second reading, on the 17th instant, by a majority of 95 to 76.

A peremptory and a not very courteous dismissal of the ministry followed as the immediate consequence, and after some coquetry with Lord Temple, the King appointed William Pitt as Premier.

It would be more curious than useful to inquire into the causes of the sudden and unbending opposition of George III. to the India Bill of Charles James Fox; yet no one can have studied the character of that sovereign without being convinced that he was not friendly to Parliament, or, in other words, to

responsible government. His ideas were essentially German, and as he was not remarkable for large capacity, it was quite in harmony with his contracted views to be jealous of the popular prerogative. When, therefore, it was whispered in his ear that Fox's bill would place the control of the Company's affairs in the hands of parliament, and not in his own, he indulged in that pitiable infirmity of little minds, by becoming jealous of a power over which he was not allowed to be the dictator.

The weak-minded, but misled monarch, obtained a compliant agent in William Pitt, who, early in 1784, brought in an Indian Bill, framed in accordance with the narrow wish of his royal master, in which the King was allowed to be everything, and the Parliament just nothing at all. By this act, commissioners were to be appointed by His Majesty from the members of his Privy Council, who were to superintend or control all acts relating to the civil or military government, or revenues, &c., of the East India Company. They were to have access to all papers, despatches, letters, orders, &c., relating to the government of India, whether issued or received by the directors. These also, before being issued, the board had power to alter or amend, but were to assign their reasons for their alterations. Should the board exceed its jurisdiction, the directors had their remedy by a petition to His Majesty in council. It vested the nomination of Commander-in-Chief in His Majesty, and gave him the power also to remove the Governor-General, Presidents, and members of the Indian Councils, giving to the directors power to nominate to these vacancies, subject, however, to the approbation of His Majesty. And it made the royal pleasure final, when once given, to any particular act. This bill, which laid the foundation for the famous "Board of Control," is almost the reverse of that of Mr. Fox in one most essential particular, namely, that of responsibility to Parliament. In truth, for anything this bill shows to the contrary, there might have been no such thing as a British House of Commons in existence. The royal prerogative is pushed almost offensively forward, but the House and its authority are quietly but completely ignored.

Yet this bill has been the basis of British legislation for India for more than seventy years; and with what success those can

best tell who have surveyed that country through other than the coloured glasses of the East India Company. On the 23rd of January, 1784, the bill was rejected by 222 against 214; and the Parliament shortly afterwards being dissolved, no fewer than 160 of the supporters of Mr. Fox lost their seats at the ensuing elections. The new Parliament assembled in May, and in June Mr. Pitt introduced an Indian bill, based chiefly upon the above, that had been previously rejected, with one considerable addition, which gave to the Board of Control the power, in certain cases, of transmitting their own orders to India without their being subject to the revision of the Court of Directors. The mischievous consequences of this subtle clause in the bill it would be difficult, if not impossible, to describe. But so blind was that Parliament to results, that it passed the bill towards the end of June, 1784, by the large majority of 271 to 66.

In my next letter, which will close the series, the subsequent course of Indian legislation will be reviewed, and the resolutions of the present ministry examined. As it is expedient to wait the issue of their reception by Parliament, a little delay will be occasioned.

Manchester.

WILLIAM STOKES.

No. IV.

FROM THE BILL OF WILLIAM PITT, TO 1858.

Sir,

The dissolution of Parliament which issued in securing for Mr. Pitt his formidable majority in the Commons, was all the more remarkable by following so shortly after the royal assurance that no dissolution should take place. In reply to an address from the Commons, His Majesty, on December 24th, 1783, stated distinctly in a message which was read from the chair,—“And I assure you I shall not interrupt your meeting by any exercise of my prerogative, either by prorogation or dissolution.” Confiding in this assurance, the House met again on January 12th, 1784, and proceeded to its duties with no abatement what-

ever of its former vigour and fidelity. Mr. Pitt moved for leave to introduce his bill on the 14th; the second reading, on which he was defeated, took place on the 23rd; and then followed a contest wholly unprecedented in the annals of Parliamentary warfare, whether for obstinacy on the one side, or a dignified forbearance on the other, at the close of which His Majesty, on the 25th of March, dissolved his "faithful Commons," and proceeded to a new election.

A more independent House of Parliament than the one so unceremoniously dismissed, never assembled. In plain truth, its independence proved its overthrow, for the King never forgave it for passing the two bold resolutions in favour of peace with America; and it was natural for him to entertain no affection for a House that had ventured to consult the rights of humanity in defiance of the prerogatives of the Crown. The support given to the India bills of Mr. Fox amounted, in his estimation, to a repetition of the offence, and the dissolution of such a House followed as the only apparent means of protecting the royal prerogative against a second invasion. And right well that dissolution answered its intended purpose, for there was not an "independent" borough, a corporation rookery, or a portly official (from a bishop to a common bailiff) throughout the land, but responded in defence of "chartered rights," at whatever cost to sacred justice or to common sense. "Should Parliament succeed," said they, "in the wild project of Indian Reform, then farewell to all the 'chartered' emoluments throughout the kingdom." The consequences were the downfall of Fox, a truckling Commons, and an indefinite postponement of justice for India,

On the assembling of the new Parliament, in May, they were counselled in the speech from the throne to deal tenderly with the affairs of the East India Company, and to consider the effect which any measure might have upon the Constitution and our dearest interests at home; a caution which, it may be remarked, was not thrown away upon the docile Commons.

But in the face of this caution, Mr. Burke, in a speech of surpassing eloquence and power, boldly moved an address to His Majesty, containing a frightful array of charges against the Company, and which laid at their door a mass of the blackest

crimes. To these grave accusations no reply was even attempted, and the submissive House contented itself by rejecting the motion without a division.

Two years after the passing of Mr. Pitt's bill, another important measure was carried through both Houses, by numerous majorities. Its principal object was to enlarge the powers of the Governor-General, which it did most effectually. It vested in him the nomination to the vacant seats in the Council; it united in him the offices of Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief of the forces; and it authorised him to decide upon every measure, *whether his Council agreed with him or not*. In effect, it made him the despotic ruler of the millions in India, and placed their grievances beyond redress except at the option of one individual.

In 1788, a bill, purporting to determine the powers of the Board of Control, passed both Houses by considerable majorities. It should be observed that within one year of the establishment of that board, its irresponsible character began to appear in a rejection of the orders of the Court of Directors, respecting the debts of the Nabob of Arcot, and in the substitution of others of its own. The above bill, though in appearance but little more than a declaratory one, yet, in effect, it bound the Court of Directors to the chariot wheels of that arbitrary board, and virtually made them responsible for measures about which they were never consulted. In the strong language of the peers' protest, it was an act "fruitful of formidable mischief proper to itself, friendly to corrupt intrigue and cabal, hostile to all good government, and especially abhorrent from the principles of our popular Constitution."

Excepting the protracted trial of Warren Hastings, nothing of importance respecting India took place in Parliament for several subsequent years, unless the introduction of the annual Indian budget may be entitled to this rank. But as the financial affairs of the Company form no direct part of the present question, it would be out of place to introduce them here. They require a rigid examination in order to determine how far "our Indian Empire" has improved or injured the resources of Great Britain; and it is possible that on some future occasion this duty may be

attempted. At present, however, it is plainly foreign to our purpose.

With few and slight exceptions, whatever merits the name of Indian Reform has been confined, since 1788, to the renewal of the Company's Charter, at the successive periods of 1793, 1813, 1833, and 1853; and a brief review of the legislation on these different occasions will exhibit just how much or how little has been accomplished for the improvement of the millions in our Eastern Empire.

On the renewal of the Charter in 1793, the only considerable change was the one that empowered His Majesty to nominate to the Board of Control other than members of his Privy Council. Prior to this privy councillors alone were eligible to seats at that board. With the slightest possible modifications, the bill continued the trading monopoly of the Company; and Mr. Fox, who scrutinised it closely, charged upon the measure that "it had a concealed meaning, and grasped at the whole Indian patronage without any responsibility." That there was at least one solid ground for this heavy charge, is but to say that the bill perpetuated the Board of Control; for to no power upon the earth or under the earth has that board ever been practically responsible, nor without a total change of constitution could it ever possess that robust virtue.

With the expansion of the commercial system of Great Britain, the trading monopoly of the East India Company became the subject of increasing national complaint. In 1802, Sir W. Pulteney moved for a committee on the subject, with a view to the destruction of that monopoly, and the giving free scope to the mercantile activity of the country at large. His motion was lost, but the subject was agitated with so much success, that when the period approached for the renewal of the Charter in 1813, the manufacturing and commercial classes poured their petitions into the House in sufficient numbers to compel a change. This commercial change was the only one of any consequence that marked the renewal of the Charter in 1813. It threw open the Indian trade to the whole country, leaving the ghost of monopoly to the haunts of the Company in the China and tea trade. This change was an evident boon to the commercial

interests of Great Britain, but the renewal of the Charter marked the commencement of another epoch in which nothing was contemplated for the direct improvement of the conquered millions in India.

The Charter was once more renewed in 1833, when the remaining monopoly of the China and tea trade was brought to a close, and the commercial enterprise of Great Britain permitted free scope in the Eastern seas. The surrender of the trade appears to have been the understood condition of the ministry for continuing to the Company the political government of India for another twenty years. At this period a fourth presidency was created in India, and commissioners, with unlimited powers, to be nominated by His Majesty, were appointed to superintend the China trade. Beyond these comparatively subordinate matters, nothing of consequence signalised the commencement of another epoch of legislation for India.

The renewal of the Charter in 1853, presented another splendid opportunity for the exercise of legislative wisdom by the British Parliament. More was naturally expected on this occasion than on any former one, partly on account of the rapid advances made in commercial knowledge and sound political science, but chiefly that, since the last renewal in 1833, a reformed House of Commons had enjoyed ample opportunity for preparing to do justice to India. The bill, however, proved itself a dwarf in comparison with that of Fox, seventy years before; and thoughtful men were startled at the astounding fact, that an advanced age afforded no proof whatever of advanced political wisdom. The bill continued the double government, with a slight improvement of its constitution; but left the existing relations between the Board of Control and the directors untouched; it reduced the scope for private patronage, and provided a pecuniary compensation for its loss; it opened Haileybury College to public competition; formed two new presidencies in India; and placed Bengal under a Lieutenant-Governor. It legislated for the conquerors of India, but it made no provision whatever for the happiness of the nearly two hundred millions who waited for justice at the hands of a Christian Government. It was as fine a specimen of political selfishness as a boastful but unsound civilisation ever supplied.

From this rapid review of Indian Reform Bills, it is most evident that *direct* responsibility in the government of India has not even been attempted since the days of Mr. Fox, nor has one minister of state ventured to imitate his example in prohibiting aggressions upon the native princes. The consequence of this feeble, trifling, pettifogging policy has been, to convert the practical government of India into a huge military despotism, with aggression as the rule, and the solid welfare of the people as the exception. Notwithstanding occasional local ameliorations where some benevolent official has risen above the trammels of the system, the working every-day government of India has assumed the appearance of a prolonged experiment on human endurance, as if its purpose were to solve the problem, how much wrong can be inflicted before a whole people will rebel. This may appear a startling statement now, but an impartial posterity will pronounce the verdict true.

I had hoped to examine the Indian measures now before the country, but regard for your space forbids. Nor is it absolutely necessary; for, though the third resolution of Mr Disraeli is a nearer approach to responsible office than the bill of Lord Palmerston, or any other modern measure has attempted, yet the working machinery will remain, with*but slight exceptions, in much the same state as it has been for more than half a century, and a military despotism will continue to be the rule in India.* For the direct representation of the millions in that fine, but ill-governed country, no kind of provision is made or promised, and until this is seriously intended, it will be a delusion to talk of "Indian Reform Bills."

Thanking you most sincerely for granting me so much of your valuable space,—I remain, yours, &c.,

Manchester.

WILLIAM STOKES.

* "It is a huge error to call the administration of Indian affairs a civil government. It has always been a military government, though generally conducted by men who had no knowledge whatever of military principles. A civil government means a constitutional administration, sustained by the representatives of the people governed; and no government wanting this characteristic can be termed anything but a military rule, whether it be presided over by one or more individuals, one or more boards, councils, courts, conclaves, or commissions, and whether the gentlemen so presiding be clothed in black, blue, or scarlet."—*Lieut.-Col. J. P. Kennedy, "Finances, &c., of India,"* page 14.

THE FUTURE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA;
OR,
A REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN INDIA.

"It seemed to him, however, that the time had come when it would be expedient to put an end to that which was, in fact, the most irrational government now existing in the civilized world."

Lord Ellenborough: Debate in the Lords, June 13th, 1853.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE BENJAMIN DISRAELI, M.P.,
CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, &c., &c.

Sir,

When the interests of nearly two hundred millions of mankind are at stake, an advocate may be excused for being bold. He who on such a subject can content himself with the commonplace sentimentalism of the day, is not the man to undertake the cause of distant races who have never yet been fully heard on their own behalf. The period for tame apologies has long since past, and nothing remains but that we pursue our plans for the future government of India with the honest sincerity of men who understand the responsibilities of the office they have voluntarily assumed.

A supreme Providence has placed within the reach of your distinguished position, the opportunity of advancing the solid welfare of India beyond whatever has been attempted by your illustrious predecessors. The experience of more than seventy years of equivocal conquest, chequered by unequivocal disaster, should not be lost upon those who now possess the seats of power; and it will degrade the boasted intelligence of the second half of the nineteenth century if we do nothing more than imitate the expedients of William Pitt, or even fail to improve upon the bolder measures of Charles James Fox.

But what does India now require? Or, what distinctive principle ought to characterise our legislation for the future government of that magnificent country? It is now too late to agitate the question, what right have we to India? What better claim have we to those vast possessions, than Russia can produce for her Poland, or Austria for subjugated and injured Hungary? India is now upon our hands, and wisdom, sound policy, and humanity, unite to inquire not so much how it came there, as in what becoming manner we, the friends of liberty, the advocates of constitutional government, the pledged stewards of the Christian faith, shall regulate it in the future?*

The past history of British rule in India, is but the history of a dark military despotism, with a systematic neglect of internal improvement on the one hand, and a perpetual craving after more territory on the other. From the days of Clive to those of Dalhousie and Canning, 'annexation' has occupied ten times more thought and exhausted a hundred times more treasure, than the material welfare of the millions already under our sway. And the cause of this can be easily assigned. Military rule has no affinity with 'the ploughshare,' or 'the pruning-hook,' the loom, the factory, or the busy mart of commerce. It lives upon the 'brilliant' or the 'glorious,' and so long as government resides practically in the soldier, so long will 'annexation' be the first, and the solid happiness of the people but the second, consideration in the government of India. †

And this military power must continue to be the rule in that ill-fated land, until checked, subdued, or superceded, by the sounder and more healthy principle of constitutional representation. To you it must be well known that the two only principles employed in the political government of the world, are might and right,—the one the rule of despotism, the other that of justice;

* "All these circumstances are not, I confess, very favourable to the idea of our attempting to govern India at all. But there we are;—and we must do the best we can in our situation."

Edmund Burke: Speech on Mr. Fox's Bill.

† The above charges are true, notwithstanding that Slavery and the Suttee have been abolished, and Self-immolation, Infanticide, and Thuggism, considerably reduced, if not prevented. When we remember how long public opinion had to struggle before anything was gained on most of these points, it leaves the rule itself untouched by a frank admission that some of these, at least, are exceptions.

the former the weapon of oppression, the latter the instrument of liberty wherever found among mankind. The type of mere might is the soldier,—but that of right is the independent representative of a free people. The natural sphere of the one is conquest and bloodshed, but that of the other the advocacy of human welfare. The glory of the one is victory, but the glory of the other is to secure the solid happiness of free born men. Which, Sir, is the nobler office, and which the nobler aim, of the two?

These two principles are as essentially antagonistic in their nature as they are diversified in action, and opposed in their respective results. Consequently, they perpetually struggle for mastery, and where might prevails over right, or where the soldier is held of more account than the civilian, brute force takes undisputed possession of the throne, and a military despotism gives law to the entire community. It is so in Russia, in Austria, and in a country still nearer our own shores,—and it is equally so in India. Hence, among them all (including India) a sound constitutional representation has no existence whatever, and the loudest groans of the millions whose united industry supports the State, are seldom or never heard amidst the clamorous “glory” of armed oppressors.

The frightful effects of this military domination in India, are now looking us full in the face, but the startling reality has hitherto failed to teach the wisdom indispensable to measures worthy of the name of Indian Reform. The bill of Lord Palmerston was far better adapted to increase, than to cure the evils of the Indian Government. In the compendium given of that bill in the *Daily News*, it is easy to be seen that the military element was to be increased rather than diminished, and that the functions of the civil government were to be discharged by the soldier. The paragraph states that “The European portion of the Indian army is to be greatly augmented, and placed directly and exclusively under the Crown. All regulations and orders regarding it will emanate from, and all patronage will be exercised through, the medium of the Horse Guards. *The native army will be confined to the charge of the local government in India.*”

From this statement it is plain beyond question that "the native army" would have been paramount in "the local government of India." In other words, the actual civil government of that country would have been administered under the guardianship, if not by the hands, of the native soldier, and, as a consequence, the military element would have remained supreme.

It would have relieved our anxieties to have discovered that your own "Resolutions" contemplated a higher principle of government than the bill of your unfortunate predecessor in the career of Indian Reform. But here we are met with a cold disappointment, for not to allude to your first bill, which "saw the light and died," your resolutions afford slight evidence of an advance upon the bill of Lord Palmerston in favour of the most important particular connected with a just government for India. The only approach to direct responsibility is contained in your third resolution; but even that amounts to little more than already binds the President of the Board of Control, and will be found like his "responsibility," to begin and end in an empty name.* Between any given Parliamentary Sessions, or with a "House" no more alive to Indian interests than modern "Houses" have been, your "responsible" Secretary will not be responsible at all.

But were your "Resolutions" more exact than they are in enforcing responsibility, they would even then fall far short of the necessity of the case. India requires a responsible government *on the spot*, and not in London only. Should the administration prove itself both honest and vigorous, yet the centre of authority is evidently too distant from the actual executive to be of any practical avail in checking official corruption or neglect. To be responsible to somebody 13,000 or 14,000 miles distant, will be a poor restraint upon cupidity amidst the *golden* temptations at Calcutta or Lahore. When, as in the later age of the Roman Empire, provinces are too remote to feel the checks of the central authority, office itself becomes a bait and a snare to its frail possessor, by making fidelity contingent on personal

* "The President of the Board of Control was, in fact, the indisputable and arbitrary, though still *irresponsible* chief of all Indian departments, both here and in India. His will was absolute, and his orders must be obeyed by every Indian authority."—*Lieut.-Col. T. P. Kennedy: Finances, &c., of India*, page 14.

virtue. You propose a responsible Secretary in St. Stephen's, but your resolutions make no provision for a responsible Executive in India. All the shifts and evasions that have cursed the past, and converted that executive into a by-word and a terror throughout the plains of Hindostan, will remain as rife under the new regime of your resolutions as in the days when Burke, Sheridan, and Fox, thundered forth their anathemas upon the corruptions of the Indian Government.

But it would be wrong to lay the blame at the door either of your resolutions or that of the bill of Lord Palmerston. The fault is much deeper than the one or the other, being found in the superficial political principles of the age, of which statesmen themselves can seldom do more than give the reflection. We practically forget that in national governments responsibility and representation can never exist apart, and that we seek in vain for the one where we fail to supply the other. This has been the capital defect in every attempt hitherto made in favour of Indian Reform from 1773 down to the present year; but less so in Mr. Fox's bill than in any other. For while it has been the aim of the best friends of India to secure for it a responsible government, they have unfortunately, but invariably, overlooked the sole condition of success in an *Indian Representation*. Not looking deep enough into the principles of sound and substantial government, they remained unacquainted with the connection between the two, and they failed, consequently, to accomplish the one because they equally failed to recognise the other. Upon this fatal rock every Indian Reform Bill has sooner or later become a wreck or proved a failure; and while successive administrations have honestly laboured to supply the supposed defects of their predecessors, not one has yet been bold enough to recommend an *Indian Representation* as the sole condition of a solid government there. Consequently, to this hour, legislation for India has been nothing better than a piece of political patchwork,—a mere expedient, just to meet the exigencies of the passing day.

I beg, therefore, with all deference, to submit to your notice a few obvious reasons in favour of A REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN INDIA.

1st. *It is only simple justice that the natives should have a direct share in their own government.*

A government in which the people themselves have no direct share, must be of necessity both despotic and unjust. It is despotic, because no accredited obligation binds it to consult any other will than its own; and it is unjust, because it monopolises a public right without the consent of those to whom that right belongs. In practice such a government regards the people in the light of private property, to be disposed of or *managed* according to its own caprice. Their labour, capital, and possessions, are treated as so many parts of its own estate. They can be dealt with as cattle, and, *where submissive enough*, sold off the farm as so much spare stock. Taxes may be wrung, or capital extracted, or services demanded from them, at the bidding of the ruling power without permission sought, or accountability acknowledged. They are born to be ruled, and are expected to be thankful for even the rod of the ruler.

Such, but in a milder degree, is the Indian Government. In taxation, *the people have no voice*; in the laws that bind them, *the people have no voice*; in official appointments, *the people have no voice*; in the great questions of war and peace, which are to thousands among them matters of life and death, still *they have no voice*. They are a conquered race, and their doom is to bow to the will of the foreign conqueror. This is the condition of 180 millions of British subjects, and *this is British rule in India*. But is it just? Deny a people a voice in their own government, and they are robbed of the dearest prerogatives of man. Is it surprising that such a people should sometimes turn desperate and struggle to throw off the yoke?*

2nd. *As a matter of sound policy and a means of conciliation a Representative Government in India should be determined on forthwith.*

A people who have spontaneously undertaken to rule another people six times as numerous as themselves, and at a distance of

* To this it may be objected that the people of India never had any other than a despotic government. Granted. And they were never long together without rebellions. The plain truth is that despotic government, by whatever hands administered, inevitably engenders rebellion. It did this when their rulers were *natives*. Can we wonder that it does the same when the despot is a foreigner; and, at the same time, a professed advocate of liberal institutions?

half the globe, must rely for the perpetuity of their government much more upon the affections than on the fears of so vast a multitude. The sword may subdue them, but the sword alone can never *govern* them. Good government must evermore imply consent between the rulers and the ruled, and, where this is not the case, the subjugated millions will incessantly be on the watch for opportunities to terminate the rule they hate. But convince the people that your government is just,—that the rulers are disinterested, kind, and honourable,—that they seek the lasting good of the governed and not their own advantage, and they will gradually become reconciled to even a foreign rule that fulfils these conditions of legitimate authority. But let the conquerors appeal to fear rather than to affection, let them employ their soldiers or other agents of mere brute force, to extort the gains of honest industry, for enlargement of empire, annexation, or the aggrandisement of wealth, or place, or power, then no favourable opportunity will be lost in throwing off the yoke, and no means will be left untried to rend to atoms the rule of injustice.

This spirit of conciliation is especially important in the case of Great Britain and India. For is it not sufficiently humiliating to an ancient people to be laid prostrate at the feet of a race who, compared with themselves, are mere upstarts? That venerable age has been doomed to bend to the adolescence of a strange and far distant nation, and one, moreover, whom they never injured, insulted, or attacked? Surely the most common sentiments of humanity will admit that their subjugation is enough, that to degrade as well as to conquer is sheer cruelty, and, by reducing them to the condition of slaves, stamps on the government that degrades them the character of an unfeeling tyranny.

If so, what can be more politic or conciliatory than to award to the conquered millions an equality of rights with ourselves, and a full share in our civil immunities? If they discover that they are equally represented in our common government,—that whatever has raised our national character is also extended to them,—and that they are not treated as an alien or as an inferior race,—it will mitigate on the one hand the severity of conquest,

and attach them on the other to a government that can be both impartial and just.

3rd. *A Representative Government in India would consolidate our Empire there, by removing all just causes of complaint.*

The consolidation and not the increase of Empire is the dictate of political wisdom, and the requirement of national duty. Of all evils war is the most hateful, and of all guilt among nations that of conquest by the sword is the greatest. But, as the past can never be recalled, nor the stain of blood effaced, the only approach to a compensation admitted by the case is to confirm the conquest by raising the conquered to an equal share in the government with ourselves. We cannot call back again to life the dethroned and injured sovereign, whose wrongs have sunk him to an early grave,—we cannot restore the parent to the child, or the son to the broken-hearted father;—they are gone, and an account of the deed will be rendered at another bar! But we can confer on the injured community the honour of being a part of our own constitution, and so far make amends for the loss of their independence. And when they feel that we admit them to a common interest,—that we are resolved to break down all invidious distinctions,—and that, henceforth, they will form a recognised part of a great nation, whose laws are equal, and whose government is just;—then it will at once be perceived that their own good is promoted in the same proportion with that of the State with which they have become incorporated. From that moment obedience will go hand in hand with their own prosperity, and when once the impartial conduct of a government has raised the allegiance of a people to this sound and healthy point, disaffection will perish, and rebellion become a total impossibility.

To secure this allegiance of the heart among the numerous provinces of India should be the determined study of our statesmen, and the one great end of our legislation for its teeming millions. But what on earth can be a surer way to succeed than to give them a government which, in its leading principles, shall identify them as subjects, with our own?

4th. *The people of India are capable of working a Representative Government.*

Upon this point the greatest possible errors prevail. By numbers among us the inhabitants of India are regarded as an inferior people, utterly unable to conduct their own affairs; and by larger numbers still it is believed that whatever they possess in the shape of civilisation and material improvement, have been the result of British conquest. The general impression consequently is, that they owe us a debt of gratitude for having conquered them, which no amount of submissive servitude will ever repay.

It is time that these misconceptions were removed, and it is an imperative duty binding on whoever may possess the means, to dissipate the delusion without any delay. As a humble contribution towards this object, the following observations are presented, in the hope that sounder views upon the subject may yet prevail.

1st. The early civilisation of India is beyond all dispute. Dr. Robertson, the historian, in describing the march of Alexander the Great, now more than two thousand years ago, remarks, "No country he had hitherto visited was so populous and well cultivated, or abounded in so many valuable productions of nature and of art, as that part of India through which he had led his army. But when he was informed in every place, and probably with exaggerated description, how much the Indus was inferior to the Ganges, and how far all that he had hitherto beheld was surpassed in the happy regions through which that great river flows, it is not wonderful that his eagerness to view and take possession of them should have prompted him to assemble his soldiers, and to propose that they should resume their march towards that quarter, where wealth, dominion, and fame awaited them." "Many facts have been transmitted to us, which, if they are examined with proper attention, clearly demonstrate that the natives of India were not only more early civilised, *but had made greater progress in civilisation than any other people.*"* Abbe Raynal bears a similar testimony in the following words, "They (the Indians) were acquainted with laws, civil government, and arts, while the rest of the earth was desert and savage. Wise and beneficial institutions preserved these

* *Disquisition on India*, pp. 5, 51.

people from corruption, whose only care was to enjoy the benefits of the soil and of the climate. If from time to time their morals were tainted in some of these states, the empire was immediately subverted; and when Alexander entered these regions, he found very few kings and many free cities."*

2nd. They were a civilised people when the British and other Europeans took possession of their territories. Colonel Dow, who was in India at the time of Lord Clive, says of Bengal, "We appeal to the testimony of those who marched through Bengal after the death of Surage-ul-Dowlah, that at that time it was one of the richest, most populous, and best cultivated kingdoms in the world. The great men and merchants were wallowing in wealth and luxury,—the inferior tenants and the manufacturers were blest with plenty, content, and ease."† The excellent Bishop Heber follows up this testimony at a later period. He remarks, "But to say that the Hindoos or Mussulmans are deficient in any essential feature of a civilised people, is an assertion which I can scarcely suppose to be made by any who have lived with them. Their manners are at least as pleasing and courteous as those in the corresponding stations of life among ourselves; their houses are larger, and, according to their wants and climate, to the full as convenient as ours; their architecture is at least as elegant. * * * Nor is it true that in the mechanic arts they are inferior to the general run of European nations. * * * Their goldsmiths and weavers produce as beautiful fabrics as our own. * * * The ships built by native artists at Bombay are notoriously as good as any which sail from London or Liverpool. The carriages and gigs which they supply at Calcutta are as handsome, though not as durable, as those of Long Acre."‡

* Vol. 2, Book IV., page 90.

† Vol. 3, Preface lxviii. and lxxix.—To these the evidence of Mr. Burke may also be added. He says of them, that they were "a people for ages civilised and cultivated by all the arts of polished life, whilst we were yet in the woods."—*Works*, vol. 1, page 277.

‡ Bishop Heber, in 1824, *vide Journal*, vol. 3, pp. 351, 2.—To the above may be added the evidence of Sir Thomas Munro, as given before a committee of the House of Commons. In the latter part of it he says, "And if civilisation is to become an article of trade between the two countries, I am convinced that this country will gain by the import cargo."

3rd. The natives of India have been declared by competent authorities to be fully capable of taking part in the functions of government. It might be fairly inferred from the proofs given of their early and modern civilisation, that they are equal to all the claims of civil society. In all nations, *mind* to conceive precedes the skill to execute, whatever is supplied to the public, whether for use or embellishment. And if *we* give proof of the fitness to govern by the amount of intellectual power found among us as a people, who will be so bold as to deny to the inhabitants of India the presence of the same power, though possibly in a less elevated degree? "The large number of native gentlemen," says Mr. Capper (page 268), "who ably and honestly fill judicial and magisterial subordinate situations,—subordinate in emoluments, though the very reverse in duties,—testify to the abundance of native talent." One of the most experienced members of the Indian service states, that "for the transaction of business, whether in accounts, diplomatic correspondence, or the conduct of judicial, magisterial, or financial affairs, the natives are seldom surpassed. They are, on the whole, an intelligent, tractable, and loyal people, not deficient in energy when there is a motive for exertion, and eminently calculated to promote the arts of civil life." Bishop Heber, in a charge delivered to his clergy at Calcutta, in 1824, says of this people, "I have found in India, a race, of gentle and temperate habits, *with a natural talent and acuteness beyond the ordinary level of mankind.*" Horace H. Wilson, M.A., who was for many years connected with the Calcutta Mint, and who had abundant opportunity for acquainting himself with the people, says of them,— "Taking an active part in the education of the natives, both in their own and in English literature, I had many opportunities of witnessing the native character developing itself in boyhood, and in youth, and the object was one of profound interest. There can be little doubt that the native mind outstrips in early years the intellect of the Europeans, and, generally speaking, boys are much more quick in apprehension, and earnest in application, than those of our own schools; they are also more amiable, more easily controlled, more readily encouraged, more anxious to deserve the approbation of their masters and exami-

ners." And he concludes by remarking, "that the natives of India are an estimable and amiable people, who deserve and will requite with attachment and improvement the kindness and justice which they have a right to demand from the strangers who rule over them." To the above may be added the conclusive evidence of the Right Honourable Sir Alexander Johnston, before the Indian Committee of the House of Commons, in 1832. He stated it as his opinion that "The best policy which Great Britain can pursue in order to retain her possessions in India, is to raise the moral and political character of the natives, to give them a share *in every department of the State*, to introduce amongst them the arts, sciences, and literature of Europe, and to secure to them, by a legislative act, a free constitution of government adapted to the situation of the country and the manners of the people." With this view he proposed—

"1st. That a general system of education, founded upon this policy, be established for the benefit of the natives in every part of the British territories in India.

"2nd. That the natives be declared eligible to all judicial, revenue, and civil offices whatever.

"3rd. That all laws by which the natives are to be governed be, before they are adopted as law, *publicly discussed and sanctioned by local assemblies or councils, in which the interest of every class of natives shall be adequately represented by natives of their own class.*" With this the testimony of the late Sir Henry Russell agrees, when he says, "Neither we nor our subjects would have any reason to complain if we could govern India as well as it was governed by Acbar."

The united evidence of these unimpeachable authorities will be sufficient to convince all reasonable men that the people of India are capable of taking a much higher part in the government of their own country than they have been permitted to enjoy under our military rule. But if other proof were required, it could be supplied without difficulty from, if possible, a still more important quarter. For the Hindoo municipal system has, for ages, partaken of a representative character, differently applied to our own, we admit, but embodying the principle of representation in a form of self-government that might be copied

to advantage by many a prouder people. "Under this simple form of government, the inhabitants of the country have lived from time immemorial. The boundaries of the villages have been seldom altered; and though the villages themselves have been sometimes injured, and even desolated by war, famine, and disease, the same name, the same limits, the same interests, and even the same families, have continued for ages. The inhabitants give themselves no trouble about the breaking up and division of kingdoms." (Fifth report, commit. 1810, p. 85. Quoted in Mill.) "These villages appear to have been not only a sort of small republic, but to have enjoyed to a great degree the community of goods."* According to Mr. Elphinstone, these institutions have "preserved the people of India through all their revolutions, and conduced in a high degree to their happiness, and to the enjoyment of a great portion of freedom and independence" Mr. Dickinson, in his excellent work on Indian Reform, furnishes a condensed view of this pristine system. He says, "The constitution of a village was the model of that of a town consisting of more than one parish; and so on, till the village became a city, each branch of the municipality increasing as the community enlarged, until the single smith or carpenter of the village was represented by the guild of his trade in the city; and in every case the freeholders forming a corporation, which managed the municipal revenues and police, and was the organ through which the Government transacted its business with the people."† That in these municipalities the principle of representation was understood and practised, is beyond all doubt, for without it they could not have existed. A municipality is a representative government on a small scale, and there are not proofs wanting that the elective principle has frequently been applied in India to affairs of national concernment. Colonel Sykes is reported to have said, in a recent speech, that "At Basali, the present Allahabad, two thousand years ago, the citizens elected their own magistrates, and under the ancient Hindoo system in India, remnants of

* Mill's History of British India. Vol. 1, pp. 218-19.

† The Government of India under a Bureaucracy. By J. Dickinson. See also Capper's Three Presidencies, p. 273.

which still existed, every village was a little republic in itself. Political storms swept over the country, but did not touch those little republics, which had lasted to the present day. Several of the largest principalities at this moment elected their own princes."*

On various occasions, the ability of the natives of India to conduct their own affairs has been exhibited in a most commanding manner. The following among others may be taken as a specimen. In the year 1853, a public meeting of the *native* inhabitants of Bombay was held on the 21st of May, to petition Parliament for a redress of grievances, and especially to represent the injustice under which they suffered in consequence of their systematic exclusion from all places of trust and responsibility in their own country. It was attended by 1,500 natives, who elected a native chairman, and the various resolutions were spoken to by natives alone. The meeting and the speeches would have done honour to the British House of Commons, both with regard to oratorical ability and the broad views taken of the subject by the various speakers. No impartial man, after perusing those addresses, would doubt for a moment the full ability of such a people to share the duties and responsibilities of a representative government. And is not that form of government working admirably among the Ceylonese? Or are they at all superior in natural ability to their neighbours on the Indian continent? If then it succeeds with the one, why withhold it from the other? That it is succeeding in Ceylon, the arrival by the last Indian mail will abundantly prove. The *Ceylon Overland Observer*, of April 15, 1858, after describing at some length the great increase of trade that followed upon the breaking up of the Company's monopoly, goes on to remark, "Now India contains 180,000,000 of inhabitants against (at the outside) 1,800,000 in Ceylon—that is, India numbers 100 producers and consumers for every one in Ceylon. What India may become, under the influence of European enterprise, it is impossible to foresee, because India is not only, like Ceylon, rich in agricul-

* Quoted in the *Free Press*, March 24, 1858.

† Ceylon has been in our possession but 43 years—and Bengal nearly 100. The one flourishes beyond expectation, and the other is in open rebellion. Such is the difference between liberty and despotism.

tural wealth, but, unlike and superior to Ceylon, teeming with mineral riches—coal and iron, and limestone and clays. This only we know, that if India exported and imported at the same rate per head of the population as Ceylon, we should have an import trade valued at £310,000,000, and exports worth £258,000,000; making a total of £568,000,000” Well might Mr. Layard exclaim, in his recent speech on his return from India, “You must open your Council not only to a European, but to an Indian element. You have already done it on a small scale in Ceylon. You have planters raised from six to 600; you have a council founded upon liberal and civilised principles, where Indians, even Buddhists, and almost native half-castes, are represented. The experiment has been most successful. That experiment you must try in India.”*

Yes, we repeat his emphatic words, “**THAT EXPERIMENT YOU MUST TRY IN INDIA,**” unless you intend to debase the native character to the condition of utter helplessness. But rather than this should ever be, we would affirm in the strong but appropriate language of Sir Thomas Munro, that “it would be more desirable that we should be expelled from the country altogether, than that the result of our system of government should be such an abasement of a whole people.”

5th. It is not honourable to the English character and nation, that we, who boast of constitutional freedom and representative institutions, have hitherto made no attempt to establish them in India.

With much apparent concern we deplore the spread of absolutism in Poland, Hungary, and Italy. We exclaim over it, “wherever that system extends all representative government disappears, and liberty expires. Hapless Poland! Unfortunate Hungary! Miserable Italy! Had you fallen under our sway how different would have been your fate! We would have trained you to the exercise of self-government,—created among you a sound representative system,—and have shown you the way to the solid liberty which we ourselves enjoy. But other hands have

* Representative institutions have also been introduced, on a comparatively small scale, among the Africans on the Gold Coast, and in Liberia, where they are producing the most favourable results. Are the inhabitants of India less worthy of them or less able to appreciate their excellence than the race of Ham?

seized you, and we can only weep for a calamity that we could not prevent!" Are we sincere? With the condition of India before our eyes, have we the smallest show of reason to point at Russia, or Austria, and exclaim, 'there go the oppressors of mankind?' What more have we done in India? It will be time enough to blame the northern despots when we have set them a better example.

If the tremendous charge of Edmund Burke partakes of exaggeration, at least it should not be forgotten. It contained too much of substantial truth when first uttered, and if repeated it would not very far exceed the requirements of truth now. With impassioned eloquence he then declared that "were we to be driven out of India this day, nothing would remain to tell that it had been possessed, during the inglorious period of our dominion, by anything better than the ouran-outang, or the tiger." Allowing to this burning sarcasm some degree of colouring, yet were we to be driven out of India to-morrow, a faithful historian might record with the strictest accuracy that "the British conquered India. They extended their sway from the Himalayas to the sea, and from the Indus to the Brahmapoetra. But after long years of uncontested possession, they left behind them no trace of their own liberty, no institution that told of their own constitutional freedom, and no proof in city, town, or village, that they were the great champions of representative government. They found the people the prey of despotism and they left them so, the only difference being that the first despotism was native, and from sheer necessity administered in most instances with a paternal mildness; but their own was that of the sword, and administered with slight exceptions by the soldier. They professed a great love of constitutional freedom at home, but in India they erected no representative tribunal before which the natives might tell the tale of their own griefs. In Europe they boasted that they were staunch friends of independent self-government, but after nearly a century of rule in Hindostan, they left behind them no trace of the freedom for which they clamoured at home, and nothing to indicate that free-born Englishmen had ever trod the soil!"

But, this verdict would be both just and disgraceful; but while

I write, the disgrace in all its foulness brands the fair fame of our national liberty.

It is but fair to expect of an advocate of representative government in India, that, at least, he should be prepared to suggest the mode of commencing such a work, or to answer the question, in what manner should such a Government make its first appearance? To this inquiry various replies might easily be given, but no reliable plan could be proposed until a special commission, appointed by Parliament, shall have made due examination upon the spot. The constituencies, the number and qualification of the representatives, with the nature and best distribution of the franchise, would form proper points of investigation by such commissioners. But the examination must be made *in India, and not in England*, and the commissioners should be right men, *not Indian officials*; but either independent members of Parliament, who possess the public confidence, or such gentlemen who, though not members, are known to be qualified for the upright discharge of so momentous a trust. Were such a commission to be appointed forthwith, a sufficient amount of sound and appropriate information might be collected, and reported to the House of Commons and the country, in ample time for the inauguration of a Representative Government in India, commencing with the year 1860. This, Sir, is not a vision nor a hazard speculation, but such as a commission of earnest, right-hearted men, would easily convert into a fact. And nothing within the range of possible government would more directly tend to tranquillise India than to assure its population that such a purpose was seriously entertained by the British Cabinet.

In the meantime, and partly to express nothing more than an individual opinion, but chiefly with a view, if possible, of raising the whole question, the following may not be thought undeserving of a careful consideration. Two things are affirmed of this plan, namely, that it is both practicable and safe; but, beyond these, nothing is presumed. Until a Parliamentary commission shall have made a proper investigation in India, every proposal on the subject can claim to be nothing better than matter of opinion or bare conjecture, and as such to be taken for just its worth.

The Governor-General, it is conceded, will continue to be the representative of the British Government, appointed by the Crown, and subject to recall but by the Crown, or at the instance of Parliament. The powers hitherto exercised by the Indian Council, with that officer at its head, shall be, from a certain period to be specified hereafter, transferred to the Governor-General, with a representative council of eighteen members; nine of them to be natives of India, and nine of them Englishmen. In all cases of an equal division in the council, the Governor-General to have the power of giving a casting vote. The members of the council to be elected by the inhabitants of the following places, and in some such proportion as thus stated:—

Calcutta,	2	natives,	and	2	Englishmen...	4	members.
Madras,	2	"		2	"	...4	"
Bombay,	2	"		2	"	...4	"
Benares,	1	native,	and	1	Englishman...	2	"
Delhi,	1	"		1	"	...2	"
Lahore,	1	"		1	"	...2	"

Total members of the council, 18.

The above places are suggested on account of their political and commercial importance, or their local position. These representatives to be elected for three years,—and to assemble at Calcutta (unless otherwise appointed by the Governor-General) at least twice in the year, for the consideration and despatch of all business connected with the government of India. The qualification and remuneration of the members to be determined upon hereafter, but the English candidates should be required to give proof that they have resided in India for a period of not less than five years. Civilians *alone* to be eligible for the representation.

The qualification of the electors should be a full year's residence at least, and a rental no higher than shall be found necessary as a test of adequate intelligence. This, as a standard of qualification, can be determined but by a careful examination upon the spot, and may by possibility require to submit to local modifications. But if it shall be objected that the native population are too debased or too ignorant to exercise the franchise

in any form, then the objection as good as concedes the truth of the charge that the British rule in India has not elevated the people but the reverse. If this objection should be seriously urged, no better reason could be assigned for terminating such a government without a moment's delay. But if the charge is not true, then the people of India are qualified to possess and exercise the franchise.

But Indian Reform will require even more than a representative government. From a remote age the people have had their municipalities, and wherever these remain and are not interfered with by their conquerors, the local affairs of the community are much better administered than they would be by any adaptation of a central government. This system must be restored if the reform is to be complete, and district self-government entrusted once more to the care of the municipal authorities. They will then take charge, in their several districts, of education, the support of the poor, all sanitary measures, the construction of roads and bridges, and the opening of canals for the irrigation of the country. These and other such works, being so intimately connected with the every-day life and comfort of a whole people, may be safely entrusted to the supervision of these local corporations; and the satisfaction which such a proof of confidence would produce among the Indian population, would have the happiest effect in reconciling them to the British Government. And if to these salutary measures we add the opening of all public offices and employment, in every department, to the competition alike of native and English talent, with the *abolition of torture** for any purpose whatever,—Indian Reform, as far as government is concerned, will then be complete, at least for the present. Posterity, with-

* That torture which, in some instances, is *perfectly infamous*, continues to be practised in various parts of the British possessions in India, is beyond all doubt. The missionaries complain of it in their petition presented to the Commons on Feb. 20, 1857. In Mr. Freeman's "Reply to the Memorandum of the East India Company," at pages 82, 83, he quotes a part of the speech of Mr. Kennay, an "extensive indigo planter, silk grower, and landowner, of Jessore," which that gentleman delivered at a meeting in the Town Hall, Calcutta, in February, 1857. In that quotation, the speaker describes a case which occurred in his own village. The victim was "a poor widow woman living in the neighbourhood," and it is not too much to say of the torture, that it was horrible beyond description. A civilised (to say nothing of *Christian*) government who permit such a system to be employed in their name, deserve the execration of all mankind.

out a doubt, will improve upon the heritage of their fathers, by a bolder class of measures in the hands of more enlightened men.

Conciliation has now become both a duty and a necessity. The noble despatch of Lord Ellenborough was a manly effort in the right direction, by requiring that official prerogative should give place to mercy. But "delays are dangerous," and national guilt increases with the shedding of human blood. Crime and war never part company, as the sacking of Delhi, and the pillage of Lucknow abundantly testify. And if the public statement of the present Premier is to be accepted as correct, this unhappy contest will spread sorrow among hundreds of families at home, while its destructive consequences will be prolonged irritation and revolt in India. On the opening of Parliament in February last, the Earl of Derby declared in his speech during the debate, that "the wear and tear of that army (the Indian) would require at least 18,000 men a year to supply the deficiencies, and he did not think they were raising recruits enough at a sufficient rate to meet that demand." Sir, are we to part with our youth at this fearful rate to perish in that distant Golgotha? Are we to witness the havoc made among the families of the poor, to supply "at least" 18,000 men year by year to this Indian slaughter-house? Every sentiment of the British bosom repudiates the thought, and unites with the stern requirements of the Christian faith to supplicate conciliation for India.

By the exercise of your great influence in favour of this just and merciful course, the noble satisfaction of a ruler in the primitive times will be your certain reward. You may never see the eye of sparkling gratitude as it shall read your name among the sultry plains of Hindostan, nor hear the rude accents in which the swarthy millions there shall pronounce their blessings on your deeds. But having advocated their equal rights as British subjects, and broken for them the oppressor's yoke, you may well imagine the scene where, if present, every applauding association would tend to overcome the restraints of personal modesty, and to compel the admission, "When the ear heard me, then it blessed me; and when the eye saw me, it gave witness to me; because I delivered the poor that cried, and the

fatherless, and him that had none to help him. The blessing of him that was ready to perish came upon me, and I caused the widow's heart to sing for joy.....I was eyes to the blind, and feet was I to the lame. I was a father to the poor: *and the cause which I knew not I searched out.*"—(Job, xxix., 11-16.)

But, sir, this duty is not optional. It is not given to us in so momentous a matter to do as we please. The solemn obligation to deliver the oppressed is laid upon us by a higher than human power, and woe unto the man that shall prove unfaithful to the charge! The voice of warning, issuing from the throne of the universe, proclaims in tones of supreme authority both our duty and responsibility. "IF THOU FORBEAR TO DELIVER THEM THAT ARE DRAWN UNTO DEATH, AND THOSE THAT ARE READY TO BE SLAIN; IF THOU SAYEST, BEHOLD, WE KNEW IT NOT; DOETH NOT HE THAT PONDERETH THE HEART CONSIDER IT? AND HE THAT KEEPETH THY SOUL, DOETH NOT HE KNOW IT? AND SHALL NOT HE RENDER TO EVERY MAN ACCORDING TO HIS WORKS?"—(Proverbs, xxiv., 11-12.)

I remain, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

WILLIAM STOKES.

Manchester, June 10th, 1858.

APPENDIX.

THE PRESENT STATE, AND COMMERCIAL IMPORTANCE, OF THE INDIAN MARKET.

Adam Smith, among his valuable comments on the "Sources of Public Revenue" (Wealth of Nations, book 5, chap. 2) remarks, with his usual force and accuracy, of the East India Company, that "If the trading spirit of the East India Company renders them very bad sovereigns, the spirit of sovereignty seems to have rendered them equally bad traders." Their entire history proves that they have been both, and a multitude of facts might be quoted in support of the truth of Dr. Smith's description.

That they have been "very bad sovereigns," let the present state of Bengal, as contrasted with its condition when they took possession, be adduced in proof; for, unless we are prepared to deny all the acknowledged maxims of government, the state of a whole people must be regarded as a true test of the merits of their rulers. Lord Macaulay, in his well-known review of the Life of Lord Clive, gives the following glowing description of its former prosperity. "In spite of the Mussulman despot, and of the Mahratta freebooter, Bengal was known through the East as the Garden of Eden—as the rich kingdom. Its population multiplied exceedingly; distant provinces were nourished from the overflowing of its granaries; and the noble ladies of London and Paris were clothed in the delicate produce of its looms." This account of the high prosperity of Bengal in the time of Clive, is fully sustained by Colonel Dow, whose testimony as an eye-witness is quoted on a former page.

But what is the present condition of that fine, yet miserable province? Mr. Marshman, than whom a more competent witness could not be desired, describes modern Bengal, in the *Friend of India*, of April 1st, 1852, in the following melancholy strain:—"No one has ever attempted to contradict the fact, that the condition of the Bengal peasantry is almost as wretched and degraded as it is possible to conceive, living in the most miserable hovels, scarcely fit for a dog-kennel, covered with tattered rags, and unable, in too many instances, to procure more than a single meal a day for himself and family. The Bengal ryot knows nothing of the most ordinary comforts of life. We speak without exaggeration when we affirm, that if the real condition of those who raise the harvest, which yields between three and four millions a year, was fully known, it would make the ears of one who heard thereof tingle." This deplorable account of a British province, containing a population much more numerous than that of the United Kingdom of England, Ireland, and Scotland, is too sadly confirmed by other unimpeachable authorities. The missionaries, in their petition forwarded to the British Parliament early in 1852, state "That your petitioners believe that a strict and searching inquiry into the state of the rural population of Bengal would lead your honourable House to the conclusion that they commonly live in a state of poverty and wretchedness." And just prior to the close of the administration of the Marquis of Dalhousie, they addressed his lordship on the subject of the perilous and degraded condition of Bengal. In the course of that address they say, "We have reason to believe that a spirit of sullen discontent prevails even now among the rural population, from an impression that Government is indifferent to their sufferings. The zemindary system may be

convenient as a fiscal measure; but, on the other hand, the experience of sixty years proves that it tends to demoralise and pauperise the peasantry, and to reduce this fair and fertile land to a condition similar to that under which Ireland suffered so grievously and so long." Montgomery Martin, quoting from the "Humane officer appointed by the Directing Government in England, and the Supreme Government of India," states that "We find an area of 44,207 square miles, or 28,292,480 acres, presenting a picture of unvarying misery. Mud huts that exclude neither 'sun, wind, or rain;' some dwelling in caves—others in bee-hive hovels, and all in filth and poverty!" Well may he subsequently exclaim, "Why the tenants of the African Kraal or Indian wigwam have a paradise compared to the position of a people who luxuriate in the proud distinction of British subjects!" After an examination of such testimony as this, and it might be easily increased, we cease to wonder at the indignant language of Mr. Gladstone, who, in his speech at Chester, delivered a few months ago, affirmed that, "You may search the records of history, far and wide, before you come across an instance of so vexatious and extraordinary a failure on the part of a governing power in the administration of its political trust." This, then, is the nature of British rule in India! This the condition of a province covering altogether a surface in square miles of three times the extent of the United Kingdom! Under *heathen* rulers it was, according to our noble and most eloquent historian, "As the Garden of Eden—as the rich kingdom," but under a *Christian* government, it is, more or less, "a picture of unvarying misery!" I not the evidence complete that, as Adam Smith affirmed, the East India Company have proved themselves "very bad sovereigns?"

But if the Company have been "very bad sovereigns," they have proved themselves "equally bad traders." As a general maxim, it is universally true that freedom and commerce flourish together, the genial spirit of the one giving strength, enterprise, and activity to the other. And, on the contrary, if despotism and monopoly are found on any given spot, it will follow inevitably that, notwithstanding the presence of the finest market in the world, and the necessities of a teeming population, the paralysing spirit of the selfish government will spread languor or death over the whole scene, by making the needy consumer too poor to purchase. This has been notoriously the case with the Company, for in their own "Memorandum" (page 29), which they have specially prepared and published in their own defence, they state that, up to 1835, their imports were but £4,261,106, of which, it appears from the trade tables of that period, £3,192,692 were exports from the British market. At that time, the population of their Indian territories could not have been less than 100 millions; consequently, they purchased of British goods at the rate of 7½-7d. per head per annum! In the same year our exports to the United States, which then contained a population of about 14,000,000, amounted to £10,568,455, which was at the rate of 15s. 1d. per head of the whole community. Had India purchased in the same proportion, our exports to that country alone would have been £75,000,000, instead of the diminutive sum of much less than four millions sterling. Does the reader ask, why this vast difference? It may be safely replied, that among other causes the chief one will be found in the fact that the government of the American was that of a representative freedom, but the government of the Indian was in the soldier, and the sword.

Notwithstanding the vaunt of the "Memorandum" (page 29), that since 1835 the imports have risen "upwards of 227 per cent," our commercial relations with India

are not worthy of mention, when we remember the unparalleled extent of the market. The question is not, as the Company would fain have it put, how much have they increased? But, after sole possession for so long a period, is the amount purchased at all indicative of a prosperous population? And, if otherwise, then comes the question, why are they not prosperous? If we discover that in every other part of the world we can find a better market, why is it that in our largest, most populous, and most boasted colonial possession, we, who call ourselves its owners and proprietors, and who frown upon whatever wears the face of competition, find there about *the worst market in the universe*? "Whilst Chili, and the States of Rio de la Plata, take of our goods to the value of 13s. 7d. for each individual; and Cuba, Hayti, Brazil, and other countries, consume for each inhabitant 7s. 3d. annually; British India takes but 1s. for every inhabitant. Millions upon millions of Hindoos live and die unpossessed of the smallest fragment, the veriest shred of any British manufactures. What can the miserable ryot spare for Manchester prints, Glasgow cloths, or Birmingham ware, out of the pittance of 6d. per week, the proceeds of his heavy toil?" (Capper's Three Presidencies, page 391.) Another competent authority states, that among the customers for our *cotton manufactures alone*, India stands equally low. He gives the amount per head of purchase in the following descending scale—British West Indies, 14s.; Chili, 9s. 3d.; Brazil, 6s. 5d.; Cuba, 6s. 2d.; Peru, 5s. 7d.; Central America, 10d.; and India about 9d. per head.

The comparative consumption of British produce in several of our principal colonies in the year 1855, as shown by the returns of the Board of Trade, and quoted by Lieutenant-Colonel Kennedy in his excellent pamphlet, will be best understood by the following arrangement—

NAMES OF COUNTRIES.	POPULATION.	CONSUMPTION PER HEAD.
Van Diemen's Land	68,609	£8 19 10
New Zealand	28,683	8 13 3
New South Wales.....	251,315	7 13 5
Hong Kong	55,715	6 19 8
South Australia.....	92,545	6 14 4
Western Australia	11,976	6 2 3
Channel Islands.....	90,739	5 3 1
Malta	131,401	4 15 3
Newfoundland and Labrador ...	96,864	3 18 8
Sierra Leone	44,501	3 6 2
British Guiana	127,695	3 6 0
Cape of Good Hope, and Natal	224,827	2 5 9
New Brunswick.....	193,800	1 18 2
West Indian Islands.....	721,578	1 14 1
Nova Scotia and Cape Breton...	276,117	1 18 0
Mauritius	192,503	1 11 5
Prince Edward's Island	71,284	1 2 0
Ionian Islands	241,493	0 17 6
Canada.....	1,842,265	0 16 5
Gold Coast	151,346	0 14 8
Heligoland	2,215	0 4 6
Ceylon.....	1,710,124	0 3 6
EAST INDIES	171,317,156	0 1 2

A comparison with such of our customers as are not colonists, but independent States, will be equally humiliating to our East Indian market, and once more exhibit it as among the poorest in the world. This will appear from the following statement:—

NAMES OF COUNTRIES.	CONSUMPTION PER HEAD.
Chili	£1 1 0
Peru.....	0 14 11
United States of America	0 12 4
Brazil	0 10 11
Belgium	0 7 10
Holland ..	0 7 4
Portugal and her Colonies	0 5 9
Turkish Dominions	0 3 7
France and her Colonies	0 3 4
Spain and her Colonies.....	0 3 2
EAST INDIES	0 1 2

Men of the North; of Manchester,—merchant princes and manufacturers of Lancashire, Yorkshire, and Cheshire,—how long shall our finest colonial possession remain a scene of desolation? How long shall “*our Eastern Empire*” be but a byword or a scorn throughout the commercial world? You have the power in your own hands to initiate a thorough change, and when once that power is brought to bear aright upon the Legislature, a bright day will speedily dawn upon India. But not upon India alone will that day dawn, for the mills, the looms, the factories, throughout these thronging districts of industry, will receive new life from the impetus, and not a factory hand or a mechanic but will be better for the change. With an improved government in India, a cotton market of almost unlimited capability would spring into active existence, and for ever remove the fluctuations and frequent forebodings inseparable from dependence on one chief but uncertain source of supply. “I can state positively,” says Mr. Freeman, in his spirited reply to the Company’s Memorandum, page 51, “That this Presidency (Bengal) is susceptible of producing the *best kinds* of American cotton, if good seed be sown; indeed, last year (1857), a gentleman who has bestowed great attention to the subject, brought to England a small bale of beautiful cotton, grown in the vicinity of Calcutta. He submitted it to the brokers and manufacturers of Manchester, who valued it at 8d. to 8½d. per lb., giving a very favourable report upon it. I have in my possession a small muster of that cotton.”

All competent judges bear a similar testimony, but they as uniformly declare that the market languishes, and cotton is not grown to any considerable extent for the want of proper means of conveyance to the coast; in other words, because the Indian Government has grossly neglected its duty. With the finest country upon earth for their patrimony, and a soil of unequalled productiveness, yet the Indians are among the poorest people under the sun. And is this surprising, so long as the following statement describes a fact? “But all this time,” says Mr. Freeman, page 42, “there is no road from Calcutta to Dacca—the Manchester of Bengal—150 miles from Calcutta, in the midst of a densely-populated and highly-cultivated country. Nor yet is a road to be found to the great commercial manufacturing town of Moorshedabad, not 100 miles from Calcutta, seated in the very heart of the silk districts, indigo plantations, and factories, and possessing a population of 300,000 souls. Nor does Moorshedabad either possess any water communication for nearly

eight months in the year." He states that one of the finest roads in the world is to the *Governor-General's country seat at Barrackpore*, and that "there may be smaller roads round the civil stations, but they are merely to afford the civil servants a drive in their carriages and buggies." Convenience and pleasure are consulted beyond all doubt, but commerce, upon which the comfort and subsistence of millions are dependent, is left by Indian officials to take care of itself!

It remains to be seen how much longer this indifference to the commercial prosperity of both India and England is to continue. To create producers of cotton in India will be to enlarge, in an equal proportion, the export market there. The very same people whom we encourage to raise the crop, will be the millions to purchase the manufactured article. And, if the British people will but set their heart on promoting the industry, by improving the government, of India, they will eventually command the largest market in the world, and thus become, if they choose, independent of every other. Consequently, the manufacturing millions of Lancashire and the North have a deep and vital interest in the question of Indian Reform. By neglecting it they have hitherto assisted to convert a market of immense value into one of beggars, where we might have had customers, and of paupers instead of producers contributing to our national wealth. India contains the materials for a commercial prosperity greater than England has ever yet known; and without waiting for Premiers and Cabinets, the men of the North would but undertake their own work, it would not require many years to prove once more, that when duty is faithfully discharged, "HEAVEN HELPS THOSE THAT HELP THEMSELVES."