

pation of Korea was divided north and south of latitude 38 into Soviet and American areas. The continuation of this division after surrender has been unsatisfactory. The movement of persons and goods and the functioning of public services on a nationwide scale has been hampered.

Under our agreement at Moscow, the two military commands are to form a joint Soviet-American Commission to solve immediate economic and administrative problems. They will make recommendations to the Governments of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China for the formation of a Korean provisional democratic government. They will also make proposals to these governments regarding a four-power trusteeship to prepare Korea for its independence within five years.

The joint Soviet-American Commission, working with the Korean provisional democratic government, may find it possible to dispense with a trusteeship. It is our goal to hasten the day when Korea will become an independent member of the society of nations.

In the various agreements and understandings reached in Moscow the interests of China were taken into full account. China is to participate in the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Far Eastern Commission, in the four-power Allied Council in Tokyo, in the formation of a Korean provisional national government, and in any trusteeship for Korea.

But China divided by civil strife will not be able to take its rightful place among its Allies and discharge properly its international responsibilities.

Our policy toward China as recently announced by President Truman was discussed at Moscow. We found our Allies in substantial accord with that policy. The three Governments agreed that the cessation of civil strife and broad participation throughout the National Government of democratic elements are necessary to assure a unified, peaceful, and democratic China under the National Government. The three Governments reaffirmed adherence to the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of China.

Mr. Molotov and I discussed the problem of Soviet and American armed forces in China. The Soviet Union, pursuant to their agreement with the National Government of China, plans to remove its forces from Manchuria by February 1st. We will move our Marines from north China when Japanese troops are disarmed and deported from China or when China is able to complete the task unassisted by us.

The understanding of the three Powers as to policy toward China should assist General Marshall in the mission he has undertaken.

The British and ourselves came to Moscow with a very definite



proposal for the establishment by the United Nations of a commission on atomic energy and related matters based on the Washington declaration of the President of the United States and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and Canada on that subject. At the request of the Soviet Government the discussion of our proposal was placed at the end of our agenda. Our discussions were limited to this proposal. At no time did we discuss any technical or scientific matters, nor were we asked by the Soviet Government about the new weapon. I was happy to find that the Soviet Government feels as we do that this particular weapon is of such a revolutionary nature that we should explore through a United Nations commission methods of international control.

It should be understood that the task of the commission is to inquire into the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy and related matters and to make recommendations. Neither the Security Council nor the commission has authority to bind any government to act on its recommendations.

The four objectives set forth in the proposed resolution establishing the commission are not intended to indicate the order in which they are to be considered. In particular, it was intended and is understood that the matter of safeguards will apply to the recommendations of the commission in relation to every phase of the subject and at every stage. Indeed, at the root of the whole matter lies the problem of providing the necessary safeguards.

Neither we nor any other nation would be expected to share our armament secrets until it was certain that effective safeguards had been developed to insure our mutual protection.

The Soviet Government offered only a few amendments to the proposal submitted by us. These amendments were designed to clarify the relations of the commission to the Security Council. With some revisions we accepted them.

Carefully examined, these amendments will be found to go no further than appropriate to enable the Security Council to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security.

The Security Council can give directions to the commission and restrain publication of reports detrimental to peace and security, but such action can be taken only with the concurrence of all its permanent members. Failure of the Security Council to act cannot block the work of the commission.

The three Governments have invited France, China, and Canada to join with us in submitting the proposed resolution to the Assembly of the United Nations.

The Foreign Ministers reached understanding on all important items placed on our agenda with the exception of Iran. At one time



it looked as if we might agree on a tripartite commission to consider Iranian problems which have been accentuated by the presence of Allied troops in Iran. Unfortunately, we could not agree. I do not wish to minimize the seriousness of the problem. But I am not discouraged. I hope that the exchange of views may lead to further consideration of the grave issues involved and out of such consideration a solution may be found.

There was no subject as to which an agreement was reached that was not covered in the communiqué published Friday, apart from instructions to the representatives of the three Governments to facilitate agreements in the field.

The agreements reached should bring hope to the war-weary people of many lands. They will facilitate the signing of peace treaties which is necessary to permit the withdrawal of troops from occupied territories. Only by the withdrawal of armies of occupation can the people have an opportunity to start on the long road to economic recovery. Only by economic recovery of other countries can we in America hope for the full employment of our labor and our capital in this interdependent world.

We must realize that international conferences are not intended to give individual statesmen the opportunity to achieve diplomatic successes. They are intended to be useful in the adjustment of delicate social and human relations between states with many common interests and many divergent interests.

In international affairs, as in national affairs, conflicting interests can be reconciled only by frank discussion and better understanding. The meeting in Moscow did serve to bring about better understanding. We must not slacken in our efforts. With patience, good will, and tolerance we must strive to build and maintain a just and enduring peace.



# Soviet-Anglo-American Communiqué<sup>1</sup>

December 27, 1945.

**T**HE FOREIGN MINISTERS of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America met in Moscow from December 16 to December 26, 1945, in accordance with the decision of the Crimea Conference, confirmed at the Berlin Conference, that there should be periodic consultation between them. At the meeting of the three Foreign Ministers, discussions took place on an informal and exploratory basis and agreement was reached on the following questions:

JAMES F. BYRNES  
ERNEST BEVIN  
V. MOLOTOV  
*Dec. 27/45*

## REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE UNITED KINGDOM

At the meeting which took place in Moscow from December 16 to December 26, 1945 of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and the United Kingdom, agreement was reached on the following questions:

### 1 Preparation of Peace Treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland

As announced on the 24th of December, 1945, the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States have agreed and have requested the adherence of the Governments of France and China to the following procedure with respect to the preparation of peace treaties:

1. In the drawing up by the Council of Foreign Ministers of treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland,

<sup>1</sup> Released simultaneously in Moscow, London, and Washington.



only members of the Council who are, or under the terms of the Agreement establishing the Council of Foreign Ministers adopted at the Berlin Conference are deemed to be, signatory of the Surrender Terms, will participate, unless and until the Council takes further action under the Agreement to invite other members of the Council to participate on questions directly concerning them. That is to say:

A) the terms of the peace treaty with Italy will be drafted by the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union and France;

B) the terms of the peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary by the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom;

C) the terms of the peace treaty with Finland by the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom.

The Deputies of the Foreign Ministers will immediately resume their work in London on the basis of understandings reached on the questions discussed at the first plenary session of The Council of Foreign Ministers in London.

2. When the preparation of all these drafts has been completed, The Council of Foreign Ministers will convoke a conference for the purpose of considering treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. The conference will consist of the five members of The Council of Foreign Ministers together with all members of the United Nations which actively waged war with substantial military force against European enemy states, namely: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America, China, France, Australia, Belgium, Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Greece, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Union of South Africa, Yugoslavia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The conference will be held not later than May 1, 1946.

3. After the conclusion of the deliberations of the conference and upon consideration of its recommendations the States signatory to the terms of armistice with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland—France being regarded as such for the purposes of the peace treaty with Italy—will draw up final texts of peace treaties.

4. The final texts of the respective peace treaties as so drawn up will be signed by representatives of the States represented at the conference which are at war with the enemy states in question. The texts of the respective peace treaties will then be submitted to the other United Nations which are at war with the enemy states in question.

5. The peace treaties will come into force immediately after they have been ratified by the Allied States signatory to the respective



armistices, France being regarded as such in the case of the peace with Italy. These treaties are subject to ratification by the enemy states in question.

## II

## Far Eastern Commission and Allied Council for Japan

## A. FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

Agreement was reached, with the concurrence of China, for the establishment of a Far Eastern Commission to take the place of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission. The Terms of Reference for the Far Eastern Commission are as follows:

I. *Establishment of the Commission*

A Far Eastern Commission is hereby established composed of the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States, China, France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, and the Philippine Commonwealth.

II. *Functions*

## A. The functions of the Far Eastern Commission shall be:

1. To formulate the policies, principles, and standards in conformity with which the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the Terms of Surrender may be accomplished.
2. To review, on the request of any member, any directive issued to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or any action taken by the Supreme Commander involving policy decisions within the jurisdiction of the Commission.
3. To consider such other matters as may be assigned to it by agreement among the participating Governments reached in accordance with the voting procedure provided for in Article V-2 hereunder.

B. The Commission shall not make recommendations with regard to the conduct of military operations nor with regard to territorial adjustments.

C. The Commission in its activities will proceed from the fact that there has been formed an Allied Council for Japan and will respect existing control machinery in Japan, including the chain of command from the United States Government to the Supreme Commander and the Supreme Commander's command of occupation forces.

III. *Functions of the United States Government*

1. The United States Government shall prepare directives in accordance with policy decisions of the Commission and shall transmit them to the Supreme Commander through the appropriate United



States Government agency. The Supreme Commander shall be charged with the implementation of the directives which express the policy decisions of the Commission.

2. If the Commission decides that any directive or action reviewed in accordance with Article II-A-2 should be modified, its decision shall be regarded as a policy decision.

3. The United States Government may issue interim directives to the Supreme Commander pending action by the Commission whenever urgent matters arise not covered by policies already formulated by the Commission; provided that any directives dealing with fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure or in the regime of control, or dealing with a change in the Japanese Government as a whole will be issued only following consultation and following the attainment of agreement in the Far Eastern Commission.

4. All directives issued shall be filed with the Commission.

#### *IV. Other Methods of Consultation*

The establishment of the Commission shall not preclude the use of other methods of consultation on Far Eastern issues by the participating Governments.

#### *V. Composition*

1. The Far Eastern Commission shall consist of one representative of each of the States party to this agreement. The membership of the Commission may be increased by agreement among the participating Powers as conditions warrant by the addition of representatives of other United Nations in the Far East or having territories therein. The Commission shall provide for full and adequate consultations, as occasion may require, with representatives of the United Nations not members of the Commission in regard to matters before the Commission which are of particular concern to such nations.

2. The Commission may take action by less than unanimous vote provided that action shall have the concurrence of at least a majority of all the representatives including the representatives of the four following Powers: United States, United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China.

#### *VI. Location and Organization*

1. The Far Eastern Commission shall have its headquarters in Washington. It may meet at other places as occasion requires, including Tokyo, if and when it deems it desirable to do so. It may make such arrangements through the Chairman as may be practicable for consultation with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

2. Each representative on the Commission may be accompanied by an appropriate staff comprising both civilian and military representation.



3. The Commission shall organize its secretariat, appoint such committees as may be deemed advisable, and otherwise perfect its organization and procedure.

*VII. Termination*

The Far Eastern Commission shall cease to function when a decision to that effect is taken by the concurrence of at least a majority of all the representatives including the representatives of the four following Powers: United States, United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China. Prior to the termination of its functions the Commission shall transfer to any interim or permanent security organization of which the participating governments are members those functions which may appropriately be transferred.

It was agreed that the Government of the United States on behalf of the four Powers should present the Terms of Reference to the other Governments specified in Article I and invite them to participate in the Commission on the revised basis.

**B. ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN**

The following agreement was also reached, with the concurrence of China, for the establishment of an Allied Council for Japan:

1. There shall be established an Allied Council with its seat in Tokyo under the chairmanship of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (or his Deputy) for the purpose of consulting with and advising the Supreme Commander in regard to the implementation of the Terms of Surrender, the occupation and control of Japan, and of directives supplementary thereto; and for the purpose of exercising the control authority herein granted.

2. The membership of the Allied Council shall consist of the Supreme Commander (or his Deputy) who shall be Chairman and United States member; a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics member; a Chinese member; and a member representing jointly the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and India.

3. Each member shall be entitled to have an appropriate staff consisting of military and civilian advisers.

4. The Allied Council shall meet not less often than once every two weeks.

5. The Supreme Commander shall issue all orders for the implementation of the Terms of Surrender, the occupation and control of Japan, and directives supplementary thereto. In all cases action will be carried out under and through the Supreme Commander who is the sole executive authority for the Allied Powers in Japan. He will consult and advise with the Council in advance of the issuance of orders on matters of substance, the exigencies of the situation permitting. His decisions upon these matters shall be controlling.



6. If, regarding the implementation of policy decisions of the Far Eastern Commission on questions concerning a change in the regime of control, fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure, and a change in the Japanese Government as a whole, a member of the Council disagrees with the Supreme Commander (or his Deputy), the Supreme Commander will withhold the issuance of orders on these questions pending agreement thereon in the Far Eastern Commission.

7. In cases of necessity the Supreme Commander may take decisions concerning the change of individual Ministers of the Japanese Government, or concerning the filling of vacancies created by the resignation of individual cabinet members, after appropriate preliminary consultation with the representatives of the other Allied Powers on the Allied Council.

### III

#### Korea

1. With a view to the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea, there shall be set up a provisional Korean democratic government which shall take all the necessary steps for developing the industry, transport and agriculture of Korea and the national culture of the Korean people.

2. In order to assist the formation of a provisional Korean government and with a view to the preliminary elaboration of the appropriate measures, there shall be established a Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the United States command in southern Korea and the Soviet command in northern Korea. In preparing their proposals the Commission shall consult with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations. The recommendations worked out by the Commission shall be presented for the consideration of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, the United Kingdom and the United States prior to final decision by the two Governments represented on the Joint Commission.

3. It shall be the task of the Joint Commission, with the participation of the provisional Korean democratic government and of the Korean democratic organizations to work out measures also for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea.



The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted, following consultation with the provisional Korean Government for the joint consideration of the Governments of the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and China for the working out of an agreement concerning a four-power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years.

4. For the consideration of urgent problems affecting both southern and northern Korea and for the elaboration of measures establishing permanent coordination in administrative-economic matters between the United States command in southern Korea and the Soviet command in northern Korea, a conference of the representatives of the United States and Soviet commands in Korea shall be convened within a period of two weeks.

#### IV

#### China

The three Foreign Secretaries exchanged views with regard to the situation in China. They were in agreement as to the need for a unified and democratic China under the National Government, for broad participation by democratic elements in all branches of the National Government, and for a cessation of civil strife. They reaffirmed their adherence to the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of China.

Mr. Molotov and Mr. Byrnes had several conversations concerning Soviet and American armed forces in China.

Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet forces had disarmed and deported Japanese troops in Manchuria but that withdrawal of Soviet forces had been postponed until February 1st at the request of the Chinese Government.

Mr. Byrnes pointed out that American forces were in north China at the request of the Chinese Government, and referred also to the primary responsibility of the United States in the implementation of the Terms of Surrender with respect to the disarming and deportation of Japanese troops. He stated that American forces would be withdrawn just as soon as this responsibility was discharged or the Chinese Government was in a position to discharge the responsibility without the assistance of American forces.

The two Foreign Secretaries were in complete accord as to the desirability of withdrawal of Soviet and American forces from China at the earliest practicable moment consistent with the discharge of their obligations and responsibilities.



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V

**Rumania**

The three Governments are prepared to give King Michael the advice for which he has asked in his letter of August 21, 1945, on the broadening of the Rumanian Government. The King should be advised that one member of the National Peasant Party and one member of the Liberal Party should be included in the Government. The Commission referred to below shall satisfy itself that

- (a) they are truly representative members of the groups of the Parties not represented in the Government;
- (b) they are suitable and will work loyally with the Government.

The three Governments take note that the Rumanian Government thus reorganized should declare that free and unfettered elections will be held as soon as possible on the basis of universal and secret ballot. All democratic and anti-fascist parties should have the right to take part in these elections and to put forward candidates. The reorganized Government should give assurances concerning the grant of freedom of the press, speech, religion and association.

A. Y. Vyshinski, Mr. Harriman, and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a Commission to proceed to Bucharest immediately to consult with King Michael and members of the present Government with a view to the execution of the above-mentioned tasks.

As soon as these tasks are accomplished and the required assurances have been received, the Government of Rumania, with which the Soviet Government maintains diplomatic relations, will be recognized by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom.

VI

**Bulgaria**

It is understood by the three Governments that the Soviet Government takes upon itself the mission of giving friendly advice to the Bulgarian Government with regard to the desirability of the inclusion in the Bulgarian Government of the Fatherland Front, now being formed, of an additional two representatives of other democratic groups, who (a) are truly representative of the groups of the parties which are not participating in the Government, and (b) are really suitable and will work loyally with the Government.

As soon as the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom are convinced that this friendly advice has been accepted by the Bulgarian Government and the said additional rep-



representatives have been included in its body, the Government of the United States and the Government of the United Kingdom will recognize the Bulgarian Government, with which the Government of the Soviet Union already has diplomatic relations.

## VII

### The Establishment by the United Nations of a Commission for the Control of Atomic Energy

Discussion of the subject of atomic energy related to the question of the establishment of a commission by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, and the United Kingdom have agreed to recommend, for the consideration of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the establishment by the United Nations of a commission to consider problems arising from the discovery of atomic energy and related matters. They have agreed to invite the other permanent members of the Security Council, France and China, together with Canada, to join with them in assuming the initiative in sponsoring the following resolution at the first session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in January 1946:—

Resolved by the General Assembly of the United Nations to establish a Commission, with the composition and competence set out hereunder, to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy and other related matters.

#### *I. Establishment of the Commission*

A Commission is hereby established by the General Assembly with the terms of reference set out under Section V below.

#### *II. Relations of the Commission with the Organs of the United Nations*

(a) The Commission shall submit its reports and recommendations to the Security Council, and such reports and recommendations shall be made public unless the Security Council, in the interests of peace and security, otherwise directs. In the appropriate cases the Security Council should transmit these Reports to the General Assembly and the members of the United Nations, as well as to the Economic and Social Council and other Organs within the framework of the United Nations.

(b) In view of the Security Council's primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council shall issue directions to the Commission in matters affecting security. On these matters the Commission shall be accountable for its work to the Security Council.



*III. Composition of the Commission*

The Commission shall be composed of one representative from each of those states represented on the Security Council, and Canada when that state is not a member of the Security Council. Each representative on the Commission may have such assistants as he may desire.

*IV. Rules of Procedure*

The Commission shall have whatever staff it may deem necessary, and shall make recommendations for its rules of procedure to the Security Council, which shall approve them as a procedural matter.

*V. Terms of Reference of the Commission*

The Commission shall proceed with the utmost dispatch and inquire into all phases of the problem, and make such recommendations from time to time with respect to them as it finds possible. In particular the Commission shall make specific proposals:

- (a) For extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends;
- (b) For control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes;
- (c) For the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction;
- (d) For effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions.

The work of the Commission should proceed by separate stages, the successful completion of each of which will develop the necessary confidence of the world before the next stage is undertaken.

The Commission shall not infringe upon the responsibilities of any Organ of the United Nations, but should present recommendations for the consideration of those Organs in the performance of their tasks under the terms of the United Nations Charter.

JAMES F. BYRNES  
ERNEST BEVIN  
V. MOLOTOV

*Dec. 27-1/45*



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28 January 1946

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 19

LABOR DEVELOPMENTS IN JAPAN SINCE  
SURRENDER (AUGUST 15 - NOVEMBER 15, 1945)

Note by the Secretary General

The enclosure, a report on Labor Developments in Japan since Surrender (August 15 - November 15, 1945) compiled by the Interim Foreign Economic and Liquidation Service of the United States Department of State, is circulated for the information and use of the members of the Commission.

FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL:

ERLE R. DICKOVER

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LI-9  
UNRESTRICTED

Copy No. 161

STATE DEPARTMENT  
INTERIM FOREIGN ECONOMIC AND LIQUIDATION SERVICE

LABOR DEVELOPMENTS IN JAPAN

SINCE SURRENDER

(August 15 - November 15, 1945)

November 30, 1945



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### INTRODUCTION

The present survey is an attempt to bring together the major items of information relating to Japanese labor which have been received since the surrender of Japan.

The bulk of the information presented herein is derived from the monitored Daily Report prepared by the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service of the Federal Communication Commission (abbreviated in this report as FCC). Except where otherwise noted all dates are for 1945.

A detailed analysis is not possible at this distance, but a certain degree of interpretation has been attempted against a background knowledge of the pre-war Japanese labor movement and labor conditions. Basic information concerning that pre-war movement and the war time changes may be found in LM-1 "Trade Unions and Collective Bargaining in Japan," also issued as a War Department Civil Affairs Guide. It is intended that short supplements to the present study will be issued periodically in the future to keep this survey of labor developments up to date.



## I. Summary

In the three-month period since the surrender of Japan, considerable progress has been made in the application of United States policy towards Japanese labor affairs, and important developments have taken place. Encouraged by the democratization of the legal and governmental structure, Japanese workers' groups on the whole have been showing a degree of activity beyond that which had been generally anticipated. Partly because of the unfavorable economic situation labor efforts have been more intensive in the political rather than in the trade union field. Organizational efforts have also been made by labor elements in related fields resulting in newly formed cultural, legal and unemployed organizations. In general, the old pre-war groups have reemerged, some from prison or obscurity, others from nationalist organizations, and are carrying on the bulk of the labor activity. Despite the changed labels, comparatively few new labor leaders have arisen thus far. Some of the highlights of labor developments since the surrender follow:

1. Labor's Legal Position. In compliance with the directives of Supreme Allied Headquarters, the Japanese government has removed almost all the pre-war repressive anti-labor legislation so that Japanese labor is at present in the best legal position in its history. Noteworthy among the laws whose enforcement has been ended either by repeal or pending repeal are the infamous Peace Preservation Act which made "dangerous thoughts" punishable by death, the Protective Surveillance Law for "Thought Offenses" which sharply limited the personal freedom of past offenders or even mere suspects,



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and those articles of the Public Peace Police Act which enabled the suppression of public meetings. More than 300,000 prisoners, the great majority of whom were arrested for political reasons, have been released, almost all ostensibly by an Imperial Amnesty, but actually as a result of a MacArthur directive. The Special Higher (or "Thought") Police have been disbanded, the bulk of their members are believed to have been discharged, and related civil sections in the Justice and Home Ministries have been abolished. The dread military gendarmerie (Kempei-tai) has shared the fate of the rest of the army. Finally, some positive legislation also is in sight. The newly established Legislative Committee set up in the Welfare Ministry has proposed the passage in the December session of the Diet of the long awaited Labor Union Bill, which is to guarantee the rights of trade unions to organize, bargain collectively and strike. A temporary conciliation service has been set up until the revised version of the Labor Disputes Adjustment Law can be passed.

Several smaller jobs remain to be done, including the repeal of certain legal provisions which have been used to prevent picketing, and making neighborhood associations (tonari-gumi) incapable of being used for repressive purposes. Above all, continuing supervision to ensure the effectuation of the legal reforms will be required.

2. Labor's Economic Position. In contrast, the economic situation in which the workers find themselves is extremely bad. Most desperate is the food situation; without imports, averagedaily per capita caloric consumption for 1946 is estimated at 1427 compared to 1809 in 1945 and 2160 in pre-war years. With the breakdown of the



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food distribution system, the food available to the urban resident will be lower than the theoretical average, perhaps as little as 700 per capita per day. Many cases of starvation are expected. The supply of clothing is so small that rationing has been discontinued and no new clothing can be expected for the ragged population this winter. In addition, the destruction of 2,100,000 dwellings is likely to leave some 5,000,000 persons homeless in the next few months. The sharply curtailed domestic coal production, currently being mined at only a ninth of the 1944 rate, will hit the heating of factory and office buildings hardest, but will also affect home heating. Taken together, inadequate food, clothing, shelter and heating may bring about wide-spread disease in the cities during the forthcoming winter. Unemployment among the industrial labor force is perhaps most reliably estimated at 6,000,000 currently, compared to the previous high of half a million in 1932. Finally, inflation has made considerable headway; from the fragmentary evidence available, the nominal cost of living has risen to fifty times the 1937 level, or about five times the increase in money earnings since that date.

3. Trade Unions and Related Organizations. With the withdrawal of official support, the wartime "labor front" of Industrial Patriotic Societies ("Sampo") has fallen apart. Plans for the revival of the pre-war national trade union federations are under way but await successful cooperation between left and right wing labor leaders on a political level before a united trade union movement is possible. Since the middle of October 1945, however, several local unions have been in process of formation,



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and if membership claims are given credence perhaps as many as 50,000 workers adhere to trade unions at present. Particularly note-worthy are the unions of municipally employed transport workers already organized or to be inaugurated shortly in Tokyo (7000), Kobe (2000), Osaka (7000), Yokohama (2000), Kyoto (3000), and Nagoya (2000), the Metal Workers Union (Kawaguchi Branch about 20,000, Yokohama branch membership unknown), the Tokyo Food Market Employees Union, the Japan Broadcasting Company Employees Union and the several newspaper and news agency employees unions, the latter having formed the first national trade union federation. A number of strikes has occurred. However, the 16000 workers reported to have struck during October and November probably include Korean and Chinese contract laborers who may have taken this form of demonstrating their anti-Japanese sentiments. In addition, the trade union leaders have made the first attempt to organize the unemployed into a war victims relief association.

5. Labor Political Activity. With a surprising burst of energy, labor elements have been active since shortly after the surrender and have held numerous political meetings. The Nippon Socialist Party, consisting of almost all shades of non-Communist labor opinion, and hoping to gain 100 of the 466 Diet seats in the January 1946 elections, has been inaugurated. Fifteen of its members hold seats in the present Diet. Its 25-point program is featured by demands for the nationalization of key industries, a democratic constituent assembly to revise the constitution and basic land reform. In general, four major schools of thought are discernible in the Socialist Party. The left-wing socialists, many of whom have been imprisoned since 1937; the social democrats, who refused to support aggressive nationalism



and the cooperative socialists, who were often prominent members of the government during the war. So far, the social democratic faction appears to control basic party policy.

Communists have not yet had the opportunity to set up a formal political party, since their leaders either have been recently released from prison or are still in Yenan, Red China, waiting to return to Japan. As yet both Communist groups disagree on certain vital issues, such as the retention of the Emperor, and clarification of these issues may prove to be a necessary preliminary to the establishment of a formal Communist Party. In general, the Communist program is very similar to the socialists' "moderation" and "popularization" appear to be their watchwords. Their attempt to form an alliance with the Socialists was temporarily turned down by the latter, but the Communists have announced that they will try again.

Political leadership in all labor political groups has not changed very much; almost all of the present leaders are familiar to students of pre-war Japanese labor politics.

6. Related Groups. Peasant unions and cooperatives are showing signs of revival, with consumer cooperatives apparently destined to receive a good deal more attention than heretofore. Neither movement, however, has proceeded far enough yet to gauge its character or strength.

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## II. Labor's Legal Position

The Japanese labor movement is at least temporarily in the best legal position in its history as a result of American pressure which has brought about the repeal of key repressive laws, the release of several hundred thousand political prisoners, the abolition of certain repressive agencies, including the thought police, and the announced policy of encouraging trade unions. However, the transformation in labor's legal position is not complete and, despite the inadequacy of available data, it appears likely that much detailed follow-up work will be required on the part of Allied Headquarters to ensure a complete and lasting transformation.

A. Repeal of Repressive Legislation. Most of the repressive laws have been abrogated. Certain laws were abolished by the Japanese government without specific directives from Allied Headquarters. In this case fall:

(1) The Factory and Workshop Labor Supervision Ordinance (Juyo Jigyo-jo Romu Kanri-rei) of 1943 which established a system of military ranks and discipline in munitions plants and which was repealed in the first weeks of the Higashi-kuni Cabinet (August-October 1945).

(2) The National Labor Conscription Ordinance (Kokumin Kinro Doin-rei) of 1941 which had become an anomaly in view of the impending widespread unemployment, and which was abrogated on October 11, 1945, about a month after the decision to do so was first announced. Some labor conscripts have not yet been released, however.

(3) The wartime amendments to the Public Peace Police Law (Jian Keisatsu-ho) of 1900, which governed public meetings,



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processions and the like, and which were removed on August 28, 1945, leaving the stringent peace-time regulations temporarily in force.

(4) Other regulations regarding special training of engineers and others for war industries.

In addition, following the September 29, 1945 order of General MacArthur to remove all restrictions on freedom of speech, press and assembly, the Japanese have stopped enforcing the following:

(1) The Peace Preservation Law (Jian Iji-ho) of 1925 and 1941 which punished "dangerous thoughts", such as disavowing the national polity and the private property system, with from 10 years penal servitude to death.

(2) The Protective Surveillance for Thought Offenses Law (Shiso-han Hogo Kansatsu-ho) of 1936, which set up a strict parole system for all ex-offenders and suspects with regard to the Peace Preservation Law.

(3) Articles 3 and 8 of the Public Peace Police Law of 1900 which enabled the breaking up of public meetings by the police.

Still remaining on the law books so far as is known are:

(1) The National Mobilization Act (Kokka Sodoin-ho) of 1938. Articles 4, 6 and 7 of which provide blanket wartime authority for the government to break strikes, fix wages and disband unions. This authority will become inoperative when the termination of the war emergency is declared, but if not repealed could be utilized in future emergencies. 1/

1/ According to the latest information received, the Japanese Cabinet has decided to repeal this law shortly. FCC 12/4 BA-4



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(2) Certain provisions of the Police Crimes and Punishments Ordinance (Keisatsu-han Shobatsu-rei of 1908), in particular paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 1 and Paragraphs 5 and 31 of Article 2, which have been applied in the past to prevent picketing in labor disputes. Their repeal apparently has not yet been seriously considered.

B. Release of Political Prisoners. Despite some initial resistance on this key issue, the Allied demand that political prisoners be released, has finally been complied with. The Higashi-kuni Cabinet stalled for seven weeks (in the course which at least one prisoner, Kiyoshi Miki, died of police brutality) and on October 5, 1945 finally resigned on the issue after an appeal to the Emperor from MacArthur's order had proved ineffectual. The Shidehara Cabinet which succeeded it bowed to the inevitable, but sought to give the appearance that the Emperor's magnanimity was really responsible for this popular move. This was done by interpreting the term "political prisoner" used in the directive, to mean only persons who had been convicted for organizing or belonging to an illegal political party; consequently only about 800 prisoners, mostly Communists, were liberated ostensibly in conformity with MacArthur's order. In contrast some 320,000 prisoners were pardoned by an Imperial Amnesty of October 17, 1945. Although the Japanese authorities pretended that the arrested persons were not really "political" prisoners, the vast majority of them had been arrested on suspicion of blasphemy against the Imperial Household; of rebellion; espionage; violation of the Peace Preservation Public Peace Police, or National Defense Maintenance Laws; desertion or



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evasion of labor and military conscription; inciting to strike; or violation of wartime restrictions on freedom of speech, press and assembly. In addition, more than 600,000 others who had previously been released were restored their civil rights.

C. Abolition of Repressive Agencies. A good start has been made towards the abolition of Japanese government agencies which have repressed labor in the past. In accordance with General MacArthur's order, the Special Higher Police (Tokubetsu Koto Keisatsu) or "Thought Police" were dissolved on October 12, 1945 or shortly thereafter and 4,800 police officials were dismissed. This number would amount to some 6 percent of all policemen (using the figure of 75,443 in 1939) p/. However, since the total number of "thought police" is unknown and since it is not clear whether all of the 4,800 dismissed had been "thought police", it is possible that some of the police specially trained to fight labor and radical movements may still remain in office. The Justice Ministry has gone somewhat further by dissolving, on October 8, 1945, the Fourth (Thought Control) Section of the Police Affairs Bureau, the Thought Section of the Penal Affairs Bureau and the Protective Surveillance and Detention Stations which were used to watch "thought offense" suspects and parolees. The dread Military Gendarmerie (Kempei-tai) which had interested itself in all movements "jeopardizing national defense" has remained, but with the complete demobilization of the army, it will undoubtedly disappear.

However, other agencies persist. The semi-official neighborhood associations (tonari-gumi) which were responsible for reporting

p/ OSS, R&A No. 2758 The Japanese Police System under Allied Occupation, September 1945, Page 30.



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subversive activities to the police continue to operate and apparently wield considerable influence. As late as October 16, 1945, a meeting of the Tokyo neighborhood association heads warned the people that "you will be rigidly punished if you buy cigarettes, chocolate, soap, ....". While it is not expected that the associations will busy themselves with labor matters at present, they remain potentially a powerful deterrent to labor and radical groups. In addition, it is not clear to what extent the various prefectural and metropolitan police organizations, which regard labor disputes primarily from the narrow view-point of police order, legally retain their function of arbitrating labor disputes. Both Home and Welfare Ministers have stated that they will not be so employed, but no revision of the official department functional or organizational regulations (Kansei and bunka kitei, respectively) has been reported and in the absence of such revision, the statements stand as a mere expression of cabinet policy.

Finally the existence in civilian life of the demobilized military gendarmes (some 50,000 to 70,000 in all) and the discharged "thought police", will probably constitute an anti-labor element of no mean dimensions in the population unless special action is taken against them.

D. New Labor Legislation. In the three months since surrender, abrogation of war-time and repressive legislation has been the first order of business and the enactment of new labor legislation has been postponed. However, in response to the demands of the Socialist Party and others as well as to the requirements of the new democratic order, the Welfare Ministry established on October 24, 1945 a Labor



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Legislation Examination Commission to draft new laws and ordinances. <sup>2/</sup>

Measures actually taken by the government have included the removal of maximum wage controls, the hiring of stevedores, secretaries, translators, etc., for the Allied Headquarters, the granting of veterans' preference in vocational training, and the thus far unsuccessful attempt to recruit Japanese to take the place of the departing Korean coal miners. In addition, the first step towards the restoration of pre-war protective labor legislation was taken on November 4, 1945 with the resumption of the prohibition on female labor in the mines to take effect February 1946. The restoration of the remaining protective legislation is anticipated shortly but no information to this effect has yet been received.

The most important pending legislation is a bill which the Welfare Ministry proposes to introduce in the December Diet session and which would grant legal status to trade unions, guarantee the right to strike and presumably outlaw anti-labor practices such as "yellow-dog" hiring.<sup>3/</sup> However, in view of the controversial nature of such a bill, it may not be enacted until after the January 1946 elections. As an interim measure the Welfare Ministry decided on November 31, 1945 to establish informal prefectural conciliation boards to handle labor disputes.<sup>4/</sup> However, the newly appointed Chief of the central conciliation board, Kakichi Kawarada, was formerly Home Minister and a director of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, and has been attacked by liberal newspapers as a collaborator of the militarists and an oppressor of the proletariat.<sup>4a/</sup>

<sup>2/</sup> FCC 10/26/45 BB-1

<sup>3/</sup> FCC 11/15/45 BA-1, 11/26 BB 3-4.

<sup>4/</sup> FCC 11/5/45 BC 2; 11/7 BA 2-3.

<sup>4a/</sup> Cable, Atcheson (Tokyo) to State Department 11/28/45.



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E. General Attitude of the Government towards Labor. In conformity with General MacArthur's directive to encourage labor unions, the Shidehara Cabinet has made it a practice publicly to encourage the organization of labor unions. While it is feared that these official statements may be hypocritical or, at most, refer to quiescent, pro-government or company unions, the sharp contrast of even such an attitude to the hitherto openly hostile attitude of the governmental authorities will undoubtedly encourage labor organization. Also expected to favor labor organizations, particularly on a political level, is the directive of General MacArthur to provide new spirit to all publishers on a non-discriminatory basis and the establishment of a reporting system to enforce this directive.<sup>5/</sup>

5/ FCC 10/29/45 BE-5



### III. Economic Conditions of Japanese Labor

In sharp contrast to their relatively favorable legal position, the economic conditions of Japanese laborers at present are extremely poor. Insufficient data have been received from the theatre to make an exhaustive survey, but several important problems stand out.

A. The Japanese food situation is verging on the desperate, particularly with respect to the urban population. Preliminary estimates made by U. S. government specialists as to the amount of food available in 1946 under present circumstances (i.e. without imports) allow an average of 1427 calories per capita per day, compared to 1809 in 1945 and 2160 in typical pre-war years. <sup>6/</sup> Basic factors in this decline are the poor 1945 rice harvest, estimated at 50,000,000 koku, <sup>7/</sup> at most, or some 20 percent below normal and the uncertainty of food imports. The decline in food available to the non-farming population, of course, is much greater proportionately than the above figures indicate. In recognition of the poor crop and the increased difficulty of enforcing war-time controls, the rice collection quota has been set at 30,000,000 koku for 1945 instead of the 37,000,000 koku quota for 1944, but if the amount retained by the farmers is as great as during war years, and it is generally expected to be much greater, the actual amount collected through government channels will be about 20,000,000 koku.

<sup>6/</sup> Estimates were made tentatively by the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Agriculture Department, and Food and Agriculture Division, Enemy Branch, Interim Foreign Economic and Liquidation Service, Department of State. No allowance was made for imports for 1946.

<sup>7/</sup> 1 koku equals 4.95 bushels.



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It has even been estimated that, lacking consumer goods to be obtained in exchange for their crop, the farmers may retain 4 go of rice<sup>8/</sup> per capita per day, totalling 47,000,000 koku for the year or almost the entire crop. This situation, in a country which normally produced indigenously only about 80% of its caloric requirements and whose ability to import food in the future is questionable, has already resulted in food riots in Hokkaido and Sendai.<sup>9/</sup>

B. The clothing situation is almost as bad. Since 1937, staple fiber and other ersatz materials, which have poor wearing qualities, have been substituted for cotton in clothing. During the war, the separation of Japan from the raw cotton of India, Egypt and the United States and the wool of Australia, had brought about a textile famine. Rationing was started in early 1942 with 100 points permitted each person, but by 1944 the ration had been cut to 40 points. By October 1945 the supply of cloth had fallen so low (less than 4 yards per person) that the Commerce and Industry Ministry abandoned textile rationing altogether and neglected even to issue ration tickets.<sup>10/</sup> For several months to come and certainly for the coming winter, until the textile industry has been rehabilitated and cotton can be imported

<sup>8/</sup> 1 go of rice equals .322 pounds.

<sup>9/</sup> In the Hokkaido riots "thousands" of hungry miners attacked neighboring farm villages and seized foodstores (N. Y. Times, November 17, 1945 p. 3). Reports of scattered deaths from malnutrition have already been partially confirmed by U. S. Civil Affairs Officers (N. Y. Times, November 30, 1945 p. 4) despite the fact that it is only a short time since the harvest.

<sup>10/</sup> FCC, 11/1/45, pp. BE 4-5.



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(assuming sufficient foreign exchange to pay), the already ragged population cannot count on any additional clothing other than the meager military stockpile.

C. Shelter is equally inadequate. According to the Welfare Ministry, 2,100,000 dwellings (or 15 percent of all dwellings in Japan) were destroyed by aerial bombardment, while an additional 600,000 buildings (mostly dwellings) were destroyed by typhoons, earthquakes and other causes during the war. 11/ The great bulk of this damage, of course, occurred in urban areas and particularly affected the working class. Even though many of those whose homes were destroyed can go and have gone to live with their rural relatives, a homeless population of more than 5 million may be expected during the coming winter.

D. Fuel. The production of coal in Japan Proper has fallen from the rate of 60,000,000 tons to an estimated 7,000,000 12/ tons annually, since the surrender as a consequence of the departure of contract Korean coal miners, lack of explosives and other reasons. The effect on the heating of homes however, will not be as severe as in comparable situations in Western Europe because the Japanese customarily heated their residences with charcoal in addition to coal briquettes. Nevertheless, office buildings and factory dormitories, many of which have had their central heating systems torn out, may be expected to be without heat for the coming winter. The lack of sufficient heat, taken together with the inadequate food and shelter for a working class

11/ FCC 11/3/45, pp. BC 1-2

12/ FCC 11/1/45 pp. BE 2,3.



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already weakened by years of wartime privation, may bring about widespread disease.

E. Unemployment. Various Japanese sources have estimated immediate post-war unemployment at from 3,000,000 to 13,000,000.<sup>13/</sup> The latter estimate was maximal and preliminary in nature, and appears to be somewhat exaggerated, assuming among other things (1) an immediate return and demobilization of all armed forces from outside Japan, (2) the inability of agriculture to absorb any additional workers and (3) no expansion of civilian goods industries. The most reliable estimate thus far appears to be that announced by the Commerce and Industry Ministry on November 3, 1945 indicating 6,000,000 unemployed at present.<sup>14/</sup> When it is considered that the entire non-agricultural labor force is estimated at twenty million, half of whom were industrial laborers<sup>15/</sup> in 1944 and that the highest previous unemployment figure in Japan's history was 510,000 in July 1932<sup>16/</sup> it is clear that an unemployment figure of several million is an extremely serious matter.

As in Germany and France, however, the paradox of acute labor shortages in the midst of general unemployment has made its appearance in Japan. Again as in Europe the shortage of coal miners is the worst problem. Among other measures taken to combat

<sup>13/</sup> The 3,000,000 was made by the Aiichiro Fujiyama, president of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry quoted in N. Y. Times, November 18, 1945; the 13,000,000 figure was announced by Domei on September 13, 1945 (FCC 9/15/45 p. BC-1).

<sup>14/</sup> FCC, November 5, 1945, BA 1.

<sup>15/</sup> Including all employed laborers in factories, mines, communications and transport, civil engineering, public utilities and day labor.

<sup>16/</sup> Japan-Manchoukuo Yearbook, 1937, p. 251



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the natural reluctance of the former Japanese miners (replaced during the war by Koreans) to return to the pits after working in less dangerous occupations above ground, the government has offered double rations of rice for miners. 17/

The widespread unemployment will exert very great influence on the character and progress of the post-war Japanese labor movement. In particular, the enormous over-supply on the labor market and the consequent poor bargaining position of the laborer, may be expected to inhibit the organization of trade unions. Another special consequence of the unemployment situation from the viewpoint of a labor movement is the extreme importance attached by the Japanese laborer to dismissal and demobilization allowances and other forms of social insurance, to the point where at present it may even be said to overshadow the question of wages and wage rates.

F. Inflation. Another grave aftermath of the war from the laborer's point of view is the enormous rise in prices, unmatched by the increase in wages. The primary cause of inflation in the past few years, namely the huge military and naval expenditures, will be sharply reduced, but this reduction will be somewhat counter-balanced by new expenditures for bomb damage repair and reconstruction for public welfare and for reparations payments. Furthermore, the pent-up purchasing power in the form of savings, the exhaustion of consumer goods stocks and the breakdown or relaxation of the price control program may be expected to exert



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continuing inflationary pressure.

Using the very rough and inadequate data thus far available in order to obtain an order of magnitude, it may tentatively be concluded that by the beginning of November 1945 prices had risen about four to five times as much as wages since 1937. It was previously estimated that by V-J Day official prices (in most cases price ceilings) had reached two-and one-half times their 1937 level. <sup>18/</sup> By October 31, 1945, according to the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Board, the highest retail black market prices being charged for consumer goods ranged from two times to three hundred times the official price ceiling, and the median of the maximum prices reported was twenty times its official ceiling. Rice was selling on the black market for as much as 700 yen per koku, compared to the official ceiling of 53 yen per koku. <sup>19/</sup>

"Take home pay" has not kept up with the price rise. In July 1945 nominal money earnings of workers were estimated at about double the 1937 level, <sup>20/</sup> but deductions (including "voluntary" deductions brought about by high pressure savings campaigns and compulsory deductions for income taxes and social insurance) were estimated at 40-50%, <sup>21/</sup> so that "take-home pay" was only slightly higher than in 1937. Since July 1945, money earnings have undoubtedly risen sharply for those still employed. Counterbalancing the loss of overtime pay and special wartime bonuses,

<sup>18/</sup> Interim Research and Intelligence Service, State Department, R.&A. Report No. 2451, Control of Inflation in Japan, 1 October 1945, p. 15.

<sup>19/</sup> Cable # CA 54519145.

<sup>20/</sup> Office of Strategic Services R&A Report No. 2454A Control of Wages and Hours in Japan, p. 23.

<sup>21/</sup> Ibid p. 7



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have been the termination of deductions for war bonds and the reduced amounts deducted for savings. Above all, maximum wage controls have been ended. The overall statistical results are unavailable, but if wages for day laborers and carpenters hired for Supreme Allied Headquarters by the Japanese are taken as the only available examples, wages in October 1945 were 15 and 23 yen per day respectively <sup>22/</sup> or only about eleven times the 1.43 and 2.2 yen daily wage respectively of 1937. <sup>23/</sup>

It should be kept in mind that the earnings of workers with relatively fixed wages, such as government employees, including persons working for the Imperial Railways, the post-office, school teachers, policemen, and the like, probably do not show so great an increase. Most of all, the unemployed have no consistent income and their discharge allowances have tended to become progressively devalued by a continuing inflation.

G. Precarious Economic Position of Certain Employers.

Quite aside from the shut-down of plants because of the termination of war contracts or in accordance with allied industrial disarmament policies, a number of employers, principally among the small and medium sized factories, are finding themselves in a precarious financial position. While, on the one hand, some Japanese businessmen are taking advantage of chaotic conditions to sell scarce goods at high prices, other firms find that bomb damage to equipment and stocks, disruption of transportation and loss of raw material imports are making it difficult to continue

<sup>22/</sup> FCC 11/24/45 p. FD-3. The 23 yen figure is made up of 17 yen wage and up to 6 yen winter allowance.

<sup>23/</sup> R & A No. 2454 A, op.cit., p. A 4-5.



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in business. If drastic removal of plant equipment for reparations is carried out, this situation will be aggravated. Laborers in these establishments are finding and will find it impossible to secure wage adjustments without putting the employer out of business. As in the case of the Vienna laborers, certain Japanese workers may be obliged to agree to forego essential wage raises in order to assure themselves of a job.

H. Willingness of Japanese to Work. It should be noted that several reports have been received which cast doubt on the personal initiative of Japanese civilians in facing their severe economic circumstances. One American Civil Affairs Officer complains that instead of building shelters for the oncoming winter or removing rubble, the residents of Tokyo queue up before the movies in great numbers. 24/ The Metropolitan Police Board of Tokyo reported that less than one percent of the 600,000 jobless in the city have applied for work. 25/

The difficulty of obtaining coal miners has been noted above. If the general atmosphere of lethargy indicated by these reports is true, it is very similar to the immediate post-war reaction of the populace of Paris who promenaded aimlessly along the boulevards in the fall of 1944, and is not likely to be conducive to economic revival for some time.

24/ FCC 10/29/45 BE 7.

25/ FCC 11/17/45 BB-1. This is explained in part by the necessity for the workers to spend a good deal of their time scouring the nearby countryside for food.



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#### IV. Trade Unions and Related Organizations

Handicapped by widespread unemployment and economic uncertainty, as well as by unfavorable conditions in the heretofore widely unionized industries the revival of the trade union movement is lagging behind labor political activity. Local unions of transport, newspaper, radio, shipyard, and food marketing employees with a total membership of perhaps 50,000, have sprung up in October and early November, but union reconstruction on the pre-war national basis is still in the planning stage. Although the wartime fascist "labor front" has fallen apart, attempts are being made to retain some of its local organizations, and labor elements are fearful that these local groups may be utilized for anti-labor purposes. Overshadowing all attempts to organize a united federation or front of trade unions is the question of cooperation between radical and conservative labor elements, a matter which is now being put to the test within the new Socialist Party.

A. Curtailment of Unionized Industries and Changes in Labor Force. Among the severest handicaps to the revival of the pre-war trade union organization are the changes in the character of the employed labor force which have been wrought by the war and will be brought about by the nature of the peace terms. On the one hand, certain industries which were highly unionized before the war will be greatly curtailed in the post-war period. Maritime transport and the manufacture of metals and machinery,



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which together accounted for half of all trade union members in 1936,<sup>26/</sup> will be particularly hard hit. In contrast, the light industries and the smaller units of production which were almost unorganized will certainly be emphasized in the post-war economy. The shut-down of plants or concerns which were wholly or partly unionized before the war will prevent the revival of a number of the pre-war local unions, while the old union men may be unemployed, enter agriculture, or be dispersed among plants with no previous organization.

On the other hand, in certain industries which had a modicum of trade union organization, the old union members have been replaced by non-union workers during the war. In particular, many of the old union miners in Kyushu and Hokkaido have left their jobs and have been replaced by Koreans; with the departure of the Koreans, it is not clear how many of the pre-war union miners will return. It is not known to what extent this wartime change in labor force has affected the more highly skilled and traditionally more radical copper miners.

B. Dissolution of the "Labor Front". No official action was taken against the Industrial Patriotic Societies (Sangyo Hokoku-kai or "Sampo"), by either the Higashi-kuni or Shidehara Cabinet, since while comparable to the German Labor Front in many ways, they did not formally constitute a government agency.

<sup>26/</sup> Of the 420,000 union members in 1936, 120,000 were seamen and merchant marine officers, and 90,000 were metal and machinery workers. Civil Affairs Guide, Trade Unions and Collective Bargaining in Japan. LM-1



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However, with the removal of official pressure which made membership compulsory in practice, if not theory, the organization has fallen apart. As early as August 27, Lt. Gen. Teiichi Suzuki, former chief of the Cabinet Planning Board, resigned as the Director of "Sampo" and after more than a month of intermittent discussion, the national federation voted to disband, officially terminating its existence on October 1. Nevertheless, in one or two cities the local associations have reorganized and are continuing their existence. Information is too inadequate at present to tell how closely the revived organizations are connected with management as company unions. The disposition of the funds of the dissolved organizations is also unknown.<sup>27/</sup>

C. New and Revived Trade Unions. With the meeting on October 11 of 120 leaders of the pre-war Zen-Nippon Rodo Sodomei (All Japan General Federation of Labor), Zenkoku Rodo Kumiai Hyogikai (National Council of Labor Unions or "Zenkyo") and Transport Workers Federation, and with the establishment at that meeting of a national organizing committee, plans to reorganize the national labor federations which were dissolved in 1937-1940 appear to be getting under way.<sup>28/</sup> Up until their pre-war dissolution, the conservatives, represented by the Sodomei, and the radicals in the "Zenkyo" had been unable to get together for political reasons, a situation which was aggravated by the conservative fear of being associated with the radicals who were the target of possible hostile

<sup>27/</sup> The Tokyo Industrial Patriotic Association was reorganized as the Tokyo Labor Association on October 20, according to FCC intercepts.

<sup>28/</sup> FCC 10/11 BC9



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government measures. With that fear removed and the close cooperation effected thus far in the new Socialist Party between Komakichi Matsuoka, former Sodomai president, and Kanju Kato, former "Zenkyo" chief, a united national trade union movement is a distinct possibility. The pre-war fascist labor unions, which had been merged into "Sampo" in 1938-40 have shown no signs of revival, nor have the names of their leaders turned up in current labor discussions.

On a local level a handful of trade unions has already been organized. - The reorganization of the Tokyo Transport Workers Union (Tokyo Kotsu Rodo Kumiai), an unaffiliated union supporting the old Social Masses Party, was begun on October 22 under the leadership of Ichiro Kitada, a left-wing socialist. This union, which was dissolved in 1939, had a membership in 1936 of 11,000 workers consisting largely of bus drivers and trolley car operators working on the municipal lines. As a result of air raid damage, however, only 7000 operators remain in Tokyo today. The municipality, in accordance with General MacArthur's order to encourage labor unions, appears ready to accept the union. At the Tokyo Municipal Assembly meeting on October 29 a right wing labor member, Koichi Nakamura, was scheduled to introduce a measure calling for recognition of such a union by the city and for the establishment of collective bargaining rights.<sup>29/</sup>

Following the lead of the Tokyo workers, unions of municipally-employed transport workers were also being organized in the following

<sup>29/</sup> FCC 10/29/45 BE 3-4. The Vice-Speaker of the Assembly is Inajiro Asanuma, a veteran right-wing labor politician.



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cities: Kobe, 2500 workers in late October; Osaka, 7000 workers in November; Yokohama with 2000, Nagoya with 2000 and Kyoto with 3000 scheduled for December. In addition, some 15,000 employees of the Tokyo Express Electric Railway Co. were due to inaugurate a union in December. <sup>30/</sup>

The aggressive activities of the newspaper employees have broader political implications. Employee groups have already been formed by editorial workers at three great Tokyo dailies, the Yomiuri-Hochi, the Mainichi and the Asahi and have demanded that the officials and directors of the papers resign immediately; the first two groups have gone even further by denouncing the officials of their journals as war criminals, and offering to submit supporting evidence to General MacArthur. Preparations for organization are also being made by employees of the Nippon Chubu Shimbun and the Jiji and Kyodo news agencies which have replaced the dissolved Domei. Together with the employees of the Japan Broadcasting Corporation, who held a meeting to organize a union of their own on October 25, the six press employee groups have set up a committee to establish the Japan Federation of Press Employees Unions. <sup>31/</sup> It should be noted that newspaper unionization had been restricted to printers before the war and that the recent activity is the first among editorial workers.

The activities of two other new trade union groups merit attention here. An Association of Tokyo Food Market Employees,

<sup>30/</sup> FCC 11/13/45 BC-1

<sup>31/</sup> FCC 10/27/45 BE-1,2; 10/29, BE-45; 11/1, BC-1.



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established by the workers in the great municipal market, has already presented a position to the Agriculture and Forestry Ministry demanding democratization of the market, improvement in working conditions and increased efficiency in the food-distribution system.<sup>32/</sup> The national Metal Workers Union has been forming branches through the country. In Yokohama the organizing committee has been supporting a strike of some 300 shipyard workers at the Tsurumi Shipbuilding Co.,<sup>33/</sup> and in Kawaguchi City, workers reported over the Tokyo Radio since the surrender. In Kawaguchi City in Saimata Prefecture, 20,000 metal workers are reported to have held an organizing rally.

Since the surrender a number of strikes have taken place. Sangyo Keizai (Industrial Economics) reports that 16,000 workers have gone out on strike in the months of October and November 1934<sup>34a/</sup>, a number which is somewhat above the average before 1937, but by no means represents a serious strike wave.

D. Organization of the Unemployed. In view of the mass unemployment likely to prevail in Japan for the next few years, the organizations of the unemployed will be more significant in some ways than trade unions. Apparently realizing the importance of allying the unemployed groups with the trade union movement and thereby preventing the unemployed from being used by anti-labor groups to smash unions or strikes, certain of the trade union leaders including Ichiro Kitada, the head of the Tokyo Transport Workers Union, and Minoru Takano (both of whom were pre-war associates of the left-wing Socialist Kanju Kato) have established the United Headquarters for Protecting

<sup>32/</sup> FCC 11/2, p. BE-5.

<sup>33/</sup> FCC 10/29, p. BE-4. Strikes of Koreans and Chinese workers for better living conditions has been reported in Hokkaido.

<sup>34/</sup> FCC 11/12 p. BE-1.

<sup>34a/</sup> N.Y. Times, December 16, 1945.



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the Livelihood of the War Afflicted. This association was inaugurated on October 28, 1945, with its headquarters in Tokyo and is now setting up branches in Osaka, Fukuoka and Niigata. At the inaugural meeting, it centered its fire on the officials now handling relief. In addition to demanding their removal, the association called for an increase in the food relief allowance; the use of mansions, barracks, schools, munitions factories and dormitories by the homeless; the distribution of military stocks to war victims, and the release of government lumber for the construction of shelters.<sup>35/</sup>

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<sup>35/</sup> FCC 10/29, BD-1



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V. Labor Political Activity

Since the surrender, labor elements have shown surprising energy in the political field, far surpassing their trade union activity and even the political activity of other, hitherto better organized groups. All efforts are being focused on the forthcoming January 1946 elections. Except for the Communists, all labor elements are now cooperating in the formation of the Japan Socialist Party. The Communists, with some of their leaders still at Yen-an in Red China, have not yet formally organized a party. Relations between the two groups thus far have been cool but not hostile. Proposals for an alliance of the two have been advanced by the Communists, but have been temporarily turned down by the Socialists on the ground that their internal organization had not yet been completed.

The programs of all labor elements are in substantial agreement on major points. They call for the nationalization of key industries, basic land reform and a democratic political system. Two issues are excepted from this general area of agreement. The Communists in Japan, contradicting the line of their Yen-an colleagues, <sup>demand</sup> the desposition of the Emperor and the establishment of a Republic. The Socialists, most of whom prefer to avoid the issue for the present, have taken no official stand, but some of their conservative members are known to be enthusiastic supporters of the monarchy. Differences have also arisen over the land question, where the Socialists generally prefer transformation of tenants into independent yeomen while the Communist group at Yen-an is inclined towards nationalization of the land with private tenants becoming tenants of the state.

Thus far, very few new leaders have arisen. Unlike Germany where the older labor leaders have been killed, almost all the Japanese labor



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leaders, including even most of the Communists, have survived. Again in contrast to the German situation, labor political and trade union activity has been absolutely forbidden only since 1940. In general, however, the really old leaders like Iso Abe and Bunji Suzuki are being replaced in active posts by younger men who were not as well known before the war. In addition, the extreme right wing labor elements and leaders have disappeared from the scene.

A. The Communists.

For the first time in twenty-five years, political activity by the Communists in Japan is no longer outlawed, but as a result of the government's past offensives against them, the Communists are well-scattered and apparently have few supporters at the moment. Their leaders form two distinct groups which have had little mutual contact and which disagree on certain vital issues. These groups are the emigres at Yen-an in Red China, who have been in constant contact with Moscow, and the recently released political prisoners in Japan who have not. The divergence in the views of the two groups appears likely to persist at least until the Yen-an group returns to Japan.

1. The Yen-an Communists. Headed by Susumu Okano<sup>36/</sup> the

<sup>36/</sup> Susumu Okano, whose real name is Tetsuo Nosaka, was born in 1892, graduated from Keio University and attended the London School of Economics in 1918. He was connected with the labor and communist movement in Japan from before 1920 to 1931, when the anti-Communist raids compelled him to flee to Russia. In 1922 he took part in the formation of the Japanese Communist Party. From 1931 to 1943 he remained in Russia, the last eight years serving as Japanese delegate to the Comintern. In the spring of 1943 he arrived at Yen-an by way of North China.



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Japanese Communists in Red China have constituted an organized group since the spring of 1943 when the Japanese People's Emancipation League was established at Yen-an. Their wartime activities have consisted of propaganda to Japanese front line troops fighting the communists and "reeducation" of Japanese prisoners of war, some of whom they have converted to their views, in the Japanese Workers and Peasants School. At the time of surrender, the Japanese People's Emancipation League is believed to have numbered several hundred, all of whom were to be active organizers for the new Communist Party in Japan upon their return.

The latest program of the Yen-an Communists, broadcast on October 24, 1945, and the eight-point program of August 24, 1945 both make no mention of removing the Emperor, and the detailed statement made by Okano in the spring of 1945 declared that the Japanese people were not yet ready to do away with the Imperial system but had to be educated up to it. A synthesis of the August and October platforms with the October plank given in cases of conflict, follows:

- i. Organize a Democratic Alliance (or Popular Front) of all "democratic" elements.
- ii. Carry out the Potsdam Declaration strictly.
- iii. Severely punish war criminals and confiscate their property, prohibiting those who actively supported the war from holding responsible positions in the political, economic and social spheres<sup>37/</sup>
- iv. Release immediately all political prisoners and grant freedom of press, religion and assembly.
- v. Convene a democratic diet to reform the constitution.
- vi. Eliminate all militarist influences, particularly with

<sup>37/</sup> See Appendix C for list of war criminals proposed by Japanese Communists at Yen-an.



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respect to education.

vii. Establish government control of the land, banks, heavy industries, and giant financial combines. (The August platform called for the nationalization of the land, banks, and important industries).

viii. Raise the living standard of the workers and provide effective relief to war victims and the unemployed.<sup>38/</sup>

As the first plank in their program implies, the Yenan Communists are in favor of building a popular front of workers, peasants, intellectuals and small business men which can insure conditions favorable to the propagation of their ideas. As long as they are outside Japan, however, the concrete form which the application of this tactic would take will remain in doubt.

2. The ex-prisoner Communists.

Since their release in early October, this group has been especially active in holding public meetings and processions of various kinds. In all, they are believed to number several hundred<sup>39/</sup> and are under the

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<sup>38/</sup> FCC 8/28, BC 8-10; 10/25, BB 1-2

<sup>39/</sup> The Japanese authorities have released in all some 850 "political prisoners", a term which is apparently defined to mean persons convicted for organizing or joining an illegal political party. (See above Section II B). Since the only active illegal party was the Communist, it is likely that the bulk of these prisoners, or a minimum of several hundred, were Communists. This is confirmed by the claim of their leader Shiga, on November 12, 1945 that his group numbered 600.



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leadership of Yoshio Shiga and Kyuichi Tokuda.<sup>40/</sup> Most of the ex-prisoner Communists were arrested between 1928 and 1933 and have been continuously in jail since then. Prior to their arrest, some of them had worked rather secretly in Japan in organizing the Communist Party itself, but many others had devoted themselves to overt, public movements such as the Labor-Farmer Party (Rodo Nomin-to), the Japan Trade Union Council (Hyogi-kai), the Equality Society (Suiheisha, a group which sought the removal of discrimination against the outcast Eta), and numerous university study groups. The percentage of intellectuals in this group is high and, with a few exceptions, they are all trained political organizers.

In most respects, the ex-prisoner Communists agree with the program of their Yenan colleagues. Points 1 through 4 cited above are repeated verbatim. On economic matters they are somewhat more specific, advocating the immediate abolition of farm rent, the confiscation of farm land owned by non-farmers, the establishment of a compulsory minimum wage system, allotment of the military fund for aiding soldiers out-

<sup>40/</sup> Tokuda, who is now 51 years old, was with Okano, one of the small group who tried to organize the Japanese Communist Party in 1922. He visited Shanghai for several months during 1925, at which time he attended the Far Eastern Comintern Conference and worked with Chinese Communists under Berodin. In 1926 and again in early 1928, he visited Moscow. From 1925 to 1928 he was chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Japanese Communist Party. After several years of organization work in Japan, during which time he became known as a staunch opponent of Trotskyist tendencies, he was arrested in 1928 by Japanese police (Japan Chronicle 5/8/30, p. 489). After 17 years, he was released from Fuchu prison early in October 1945. Shiga was less prominent in Communist activities prior to his arrest. After having graduated from the Tokyo Imperial University in 1925 at the age of 24, he was appointed acting head of the Political Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in late 1927 when the leaders of the party were preparing to go to Moscow, and served until March 1928 when he was arrested. He also was released in early October 1945.



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side the country and a reduction in working hours to relieve unemployment. Like the Yen-an group, they call for government control of important industries and banks. However, on two major issues they disagree, demanding (1) the destruction of the Emperor system and establishment of a republic and (2) the distribution of confiscated farm land to farmers.<sup>41/</sup> Hirohito is classed as a war criminal.<sup>42/</sup>

Their tactics are suited to their numerical weakness. Moderation and popularization are to be their watchwords. At a press conference given on November 8, to illumine the basic party policies, Shiga stated that strikes should be discouraged and that violence should not be resorted to. He disavowed dual unionism and opposition to farmers' organizations but advocated the establishment of worker and peasant councils. Capitalism in general is not to be attacked; rather is the attack to be pressed against "parasitic landowners" and the Zaibatsu (financial clique), while medium and small businessmen will be encouraged. The Young Communist League is to be developed as an extensive "popular" organization, as distinguished from the small and highly disciplined party. Interestingly enough, Shiga objected to special women's organizations, holding that women should participate jointly with men in the various party groups. Finally, the Communists intend to compete wholeheartedly in the January 1946 elections.<sup>43/</sup> The ex-prisoner Communists have categorically denied any ties with Moscow and in view of their long imprisonment and the present difficulties in communications, this is undoubtedly true. Their difference with Yen-an on the Emperor issue and the words

<sup>41/</sup> FCC, 11/26/45, p. BC 3

<sup>42/</sup> Interview with Shiga reported in New York Times, 11/13/45, p. 3.

<sup>43/</sup> FCC, 11/14/45, BA 1-3.



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with which their leader, Shiga, answered the correct description of the Yen-an position in an interview on October 18 are valuable evidence in this regard and are worth quoting:

"There were reports that Japanese Communists at Yen-an were recently advocating Communistic principles under the Imperial Rule and that they are making this the aim of their activities in Japan. I believe that this report is false. There is no reason for comrades in Yen-an to advocate such a thing."<sup>43a/</sup>

It should be pointed out that the sharp contrast between the 1928 international "party line" with which these people were familiar and the 1945 "party line" to which they will be expected to conform, may result in defections from the Communist international movement.

#### B. The Socialists

By far the greatest political activity reported, not only among labor groups, but among all groups in Japan is that carried on by the Socialists. Emerging into the political limelight three weeks after surrender, they have held a score of meetings, culminating in the formal inauguration of the Japan Socialist Party (Nippon Shakai-to) with a central committee of 150 members and a twenty-five point program. In addition they, or certain groups among them, have actively supported such non-political activity as labor unionization, the organization of the war-afflicted, the foundation of a peace society, two cultural leagues, a committee for abrogating oppressive laws and a lawyers federation. Within the Socialist Party, the peasant groups are also well represented, with seven peasant leaders among the twenty top officials of the party.

The Japanese socialists are not a homogeneous group, but consist

<sup>43a/</sup> FCC, 10/20/45, BA-2.



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of four major schools of thought whose views and influence vary greatly, i.e., the left-wing socialists, social democrats, nationalist socialists and cooperative socialists. Thus far they have gotten along surprisingly well together, but internal differences may be expected in the future. At present, the social democrats appear to be in control of basic policy, but the nationalist socialists and the left-wing socialists fill many of the key operational positions.

Leaders of the Socialist Party have stated that they expect to capture 100 to 120 out of the 466 seats in the coming Diet elections of January 1946.

1. Organizational Structure of the Socialist Party.

As yet the new Japan Socialist Party has a rather loose organization. Some 200 representatives of various socialist branches and groups from the prefectures comprised the first convention which inaugurated the party on November 2nd. These representatives are to select approximately fifty of their number to a Central Executive Committee, which in turn will select a smaller group of fifteen to twenty as a Standing Executive Committee. The men of the Standing Executive Committee are to carry on the day-to-day business of the party and propose policies to the Central Executive Committee and the party convention. Basic policies will be set in conjunction with a three-man Board of Advisors, consisting of the same three men who made up the Board of Advisors of the first large-scale proletarian party, the Labor-Farmer Party (Rodo-Nominto) of 1925, namely, Iso Abe, Iwasaburo Takano, and Toyohiko Kagawa.

The administration of party affairs is to be directed by the Standing Executive Committee and its chairman. Most, if not all, of the members of that Committee will each be in charge of a specialized



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department. Thus far, twelve departments have been set up: Information and Propaganda, Education, Investigation, Youth, Women, International, Labor Coordination, Farmers, Associations (possibly cooperatives), Commerce and Industry, Diet, and Election Campaigns. The Central office is to be run by two chief secretaries and two auditors who apparently wield considerable power within the party.<sup>44/</sup>

## 2. Program.

Although the Party was not inaugurated until November 2nd, the Planning Committee drew up a detailed program some two weeks earlier. The platform is aimed at eventually bringing about a socialist democracy, but in the words of the inaugural proclamation, the Party "discards the extreme idea of equality". Key planks in the program are government ownership of heavy industries, banks, trusts and insurance companies; very heavy taxes on wealth, inheritances, and high income; constitutional revision by a democratically elected assembly; and limitation of agricultural rents together with a limited program of land nationalization. No formal mention of the Emperor has been made in their program.<sup>45/</sup> Except for the Emperor issue and the question of land nationalization, the general impression given by this program is the marked agreement on almost all points on which both Communists and Socialists have made statements.

## 3. Divergent Trends within the Party

For the time being, all "socialists" of whatever shades of anti-capitalist political thought except the advocates of military socialism have flocked to the banner of the Socialist Party. While they all favor

<sup>44/</sup> FCC, 11/12/45 BB 3.

<sup>45/</sup> The detailed program may be found in Appendix D.



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democracy, their views on the Emperor and on the extent of the purge within the Japanese administrative structure vary considerably. As evidence of their heterogeneous nature, they include among their number, Diet members who held their seats throughout the war and persons who have just been released from prison.

In general, four major groups are readily discernible: (1) left-wing socialists, whose activities have been banned since December 1937 and many of whose members have been imprisoned at various times; (2) the social democrats, who refused actively to support nationalism and militarism, but who did not oppose them strongly enough to be imprisoned; (3) the nationalist socialists, who in 1939 and 1940 openly broke with internationalist principles and supported the anti-Comintern Pact, the anti-British campaigns and finally the Greater East Asia War and (4) the cooperative socialists, or the followers of the erratic Kagawa.

Despite their serious, and in some case fundamental, differences in political outlook, these divergent groups have cooperated surprisingly well thus far. This is perhaps out of a lack of confidence in their ability to carry on alone. Of the twenty top positions in the party at present, eight are held by nationalist socialists, seven by social democrats, three by left-wing socialists and one by the cooperative group. Together, the social democrats and left-wing socialists can determine general policies, the more so since some of the nationalist socialists, such as Sugiyama, have personal views more akin to the social democrats than to other of the nationalists. Of the six top policy positions, i.e., the advisors, chief secretaries and chairman of the central committee, the social democrats hold four, the nationalist socialists one, and the cooperative socialists one. However, the nationalist socialists hold the



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bulk of the key day-to-day operating jobs with six of the twelve department directorships. Of the remaining six, the left socialists hold three, the social democrats two and one is held by a person whose past history is not sufficiently well known to be classified. In view of their basic differences, splits within the socialist party among these groups are to be expected. The characteristics of each group are given in somewhat more detail below.

a. The Left-Wing Socialists. Briefly, the left-wing socialists, led by Kanju Kato, Ichiro Kitada and Hisao Kuroda,<sup>46/</sup> consist of those who preferred imprisonment to altering their socialist views during the 1930's. They are those survivors of the outlawed radical Labor-Farmer Party (Rodo Nomintō) of 1925-1928 who tried consistently throughout the thirties to organize a new party along the old lines but were repeatedly banned by the authorities. Their greatest measure of success came in the middle thirties when, under the leadership of Kanju Kato, they organized the Proletarian Party (Musanto). This party, supported by the "Zenkyo" trade union council, gained 100,000 votes for

<sup>46/</sup> Kanju Kato, who is the undisputed leader of this group, turned socialist in 1918 as a result of his experience in the Allied intervention expedition in Siberia. After leading the 1920 strike at the Yawata Steelworks, he held important posts in the Nippon Rodo Sodomei (Japan General Federation of Labor) during the twenties as a leader of the left-wing faction. During the thirties, he organized the radical "Zenkyo" trade union council and served in the Diet 1936 - 1937 as representative of the Musan-to (Proletarian Party). He was arrested in December 1937 and released two years later with the understanding that he would keep silent about the war. In November 1944 he was again arrested and sentenced to three years penal servitude but has been liberated since the end of the war. Kitada was elected to the Tokyo Assembly in 1937; at present he is president of the Tokyo Transport Workers Union. Kuroda, who is a peasant leader, represented an Okayama district in the 1937 Diet, and with Kato was the only left-wing socialist elected to the Diet in the late thirties.



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their candidates in the April 1937 election and won two seats in the National Diet. The left-socialists opposed both the Manchurian and Chinese Adventures and in 1935 tried to form a "popular front" sub-rosa with the Communists. With the advent of the China war, these organizations were outlawed and several hundred of their members were arrested.

The relationship of the left socialists with the Communists is not clear. While cooperating sub rosa in the Popular Front Movement in thirties and holding May Day demonstrations as late as 1937, the left-wing socialists thus far appear quite independent of Russian influence and the changing "party line".

Within the Socialist Party the left-wing socialists, while not very numerous, hold three of the thirteen positions on the Standing Executive Committee and are in a position to raise issues which the others might like to forget. Kanju Kato in particular holds a strategic post as head of the Labor Union Coordinating Department of the Party.

b. The social democrats have the longest continuous tradition and date themselves from the first Japanese Social Democratic Party of 1901 through their leader, the octogenarian Iso Abe. During the 'twenties they supplied the bulk of the Sodomei trade union leadership, and after the first Labor-Farmer Party was dissolved in 1925, they organized the Shakai Minshu-to (Social Democratic Party) which amalgamated with other labor groups in 1932 to form the Shakai Taishu-to (Social Masses Party). Although they were gradually forced to the right, their acceptance of the 1937 China Incident stands in sharp contrast to their opposition to the Manchurian adventure in 1931. They have never actively advocated imperialism. In 1939, they prevented an attempt by the nationalist faction of the Social Masses Party to merge



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the party with the fascist Toho-kai (Oriental Society) and opposed the dissolution of the trade unions in favor of the "labor front". In 1940, they were finally expelled from the Social Masses Party and tried to form a new democratic political group but were prevented from doing so by the police.

Iso Abe is considered by them to be their outstanding leader but because of his advanced age, he will not take an active part in the new party. Bunji Suzuki, who led the Sodomei for many years and represented Japanese labor in the I.L.O. conferences repeatedly, is also too old to play an active role, in addition to which he is generally rated unequal to the tasks of a political, as distinct from a trade union leader. More likely to emerge in important positions are Tetsu Katayama (former president of the General Federation of Farmers Unions and Abe's deputy in attempting to form a social democratic political group in 1940), Chosaburo Mizutani of Kyoto (colleague of the left-wing socialists in 1929 - 1931, Social Masses member of the Diet, and member of the short-lived new social democratic group in 1940), and Komakichi Matsuoka (successor to Suzuki as president of the Sodomei). Katayama is now acting head of the Socialist Party in his role of Chief Secretary.

The social democrats, at the moment, direct the basic policies of the socialist party by virtue of their occupation of two of the three advisory board posts, both chief secretaryships and one of the two auditorships. However, their role in the day-to-day functioning of the party appears to be limited by their two department directorships out of twelve.

c. The Nationalist Socialists comprise a mixed group



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ideologically and do not have any particular group unity. They are almost all labor leaders and officials of some years standing who went along with the militarists after 1937. Some actively campaigned against Britain and the U.S. prior to Pearl Harbor, supported the Axis Powers and advocated a union with the fascist Toho-kai party domestically. Of the three most vociferous leaders of this group, Hisashi Aso has died, Kanichiro Kamei has not been heard of since the surrender and Juso Miwa is now active in the Socialist Party. In general, most of the nationalist socialists were narrow trade union or peasant leaders who had inadequate political training and background and who were caught up in the wave of nationalism which swept the country after the inception of the China war. Undoubtedly a concern for their personal respectability, positions or incomes swayed many of them in their decision to support nationalism and desert their former principles. In light of their past records of devotion to labor or peasant organizations, some few of this group, particularly men like Motojiro Sugiyama, who worked closely with the left-wing socialists in the early thirties, may be expected to prove effective pro-democratic advocates in the future.

Several of the nationalist socialist group have held government posts throughout the war and are still in office. For example, Inajiro Asanuma is a member of the Diet and Vice-Speaker of the Tokyo Municipal Assembly. Also in the Diet at present are Jotaro Kawakami, Mitsu Kono, Motojiro Sugiyama, Shoichi Maekawa, Yonosuke Kikuchi, Shoichi Miyake, Rikizo Hirano and Seion Kawamata.

The nationalist socialists have not been recognized in the very top leadership of the Party but by virtue of their department directorships, particularly of the Farmers, Cooperative and Youth Departments,



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will handle a good deal of the important day-to-day party business.

d. The Cooperative Socialists is a term used in this report to designate the small group of prominent men, centered around Toyohiko Kagawa<sup>47/</sup>, and drawn largely from the cooperative movement who favor socialism for its ethical content. Their adherence to socialism and the labor movement is somewhat dubious. With the exception of Kagawa they have had little direct contact with the labor movement, and even Kagawa who led several strikes in the early twenties has not worked actively among laborers since 1925. Most of them, however, have been associated with the agriculture cooperatives and Count Arima<sup>48/</sup> was at one time the head of the cooperative movement. Unlike the other groups in the Socialist Party, these people have generally had high social recognition and been well regarded by past Japanese governments. Among their number are several aristocrats including Prince Tokugawa and Count Arima. It might be added that Tokugawa and Arima have been, at least temporarily, barred from membership in the Socialist Party.

<sup>47/</sup> Kagawa himself considers himself to be a Christian Socialist. After several years of courageous social work in the Kobe slums, carried on at the cost of his health and almost his life, he joined the Socialist Federation in 1920 and became a trade union leader shortly thereafter. His proletarian novels at that time sold more copies than the novels of any other author in Japan. In 1921 he led 30,000 shipyard workers at Kobe in a great strike which lasted six weeks and culminated in the proposal made by Kagawa to set up a workers' soviet in the plants. After the earthquake of 1923 when the Home Minister invited him to help rebuild the Kobe slums his radicalism rapidly faded away. From that time on he devoted himself primarily to the agricultural cooperative movement, much to the relief of the Japanese government.

<sup>48/</sup> Arima was arrested as a war criminal on December 3, 1945.



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After a war-time career as pro-government propagandist,<sup>49/</sup> Kagawa was selected by Premier Prince Higashi-kuni as an advisor, immediately after surrender. In the last few months Kagawa has founded an International Peace Society and a Moral Promotion Society (of which he invited Prince Higashi-kuni to become honorary president). In addition he is one of the leaders of the Japanese Christian movement. At a recent meeting of the Socialist Party he called for "Banzai" for the Emperor, much to the consternation of his colleagues. While he is tolerated at present by the Party because of his long history as a labor leader and "socialist" and has even been honored by his nomination to the Party's advisory board of elders, it is considered likely that he will eventually become involved in some irreconcilable dispute with the more radical party members.

<sup>49/</sup> Among other of his statement since 1937, Kagawa has declared that Japan was not the aggressor in the Sino-Japanese War (Japan Christian Yearbook, 1938), that poverty in the Philippines was due in part to "American-Jewish capitalism" (FCC 10/23/42), that U.S. policy towards India was the blackest page in American history (FCC 10/2/43), that UNCIO was evidence of the inordinate U.S. ambition to dominate the world, and that the U.S. bombing methods were more cruel than Genghis Khan, in contrast to Japan's "careful and thoughtful" methods of bombing Shanghai (FCC 7/28/45, 8/8/45).



VI. Peasant Groups.

Thus far democratic peasant groups have been slow in reorganizing, a situation which has prompted the Japanese government to try to forestall genuine "grass roots" organization with synthetic farmers' associations. As long ago as August 25th the Higashi-kuni Cabinet converted the wartime officially-sponsored Farmers Patriotic Association (Nogyo Hokoku-kai) into a National Farmers Association, an organization which like its predecessor, is to be headed by high government officials and landlords, among them Tadaatsu Ishiguro, former Agriculture and Forestry Minister, and Viscount Gon-ichi Kodaira, vice-president of the government-sponsored compulsory Central Agricultural Society (Chuo Nogyo-kai)<sup>50/</sup>. At the meeting of October 16 the whole question of fundamental land reform was ignored and the "mutual aid principle" was offered as the solution for Japan's agricultural problems, this principle to be supplemented by the increased use of fertilizer, distribution of additional farm implements, repeal of regulations controlling food production and distribution, an increase in cultivated areas, the testing of land for suitability for special crops, and the promotion of small-scale industries as subsidiary occupations for farmers.<sup>51/</sup> Enthusiastic mass support for this government-sponsored organization is considered unlikely.

More than a month after the founding of the National Farmers Association, on October 3, fourteen pre-war peasant leaders met to

<sup>50/</sup> FCC, 8/27, BE11; 8/30, BC2.

<sup>51/</sup> Ibid; FCC, 10/17, BD 2-3



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discuss the revival of the peasant unions along national lines. At that time they advocated fundamental reform of land ownership, abolition of laws prohibiting peasant unions, removal of government influence on farmers associations and solution of the food problem. Of the fourteen leaders, eleven are known to be associated with the new Japan Socialist Party, including one left socialist, two social democrats and eight nationalist socialists.<sup>52/</sup>

The activity of this peasant group, however, like the trade unionists, appear secondary to political organization, particularly of the Japan Socialist Party.

Remaining relatively intact thus far is the Central Agricultural Society (Chuo Nogyo-kai) to which all peasants belong. This organization consists of the No-kai (old technical agricultural societies) and the Sangyo Kumiai (the cooperatives) which were forcibly combined by the government in 1943. Membership in this organization is still compulsory and local leaders are appointed by the government. Recent reports (November 12) indicate grave dissatisfaction on the part of the peasants with this organization and a desire to restore the component associations to their pre-war status, at which time the agricultural cooperatives were quite popular. In fact, several meetings aimed at revising the old cooperatives have already been held (See Section VII). As a result, Supreme Allied Headquarters has ordered<sup>53/</sup> the Japanese government to submit a plan for the reformation of the existing agricultural associations.

<sup>52/</sup> FCC, 10/4, BA-5

<sup>53/</sup> New York Times, 11/14, p. 2.



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VII. Consumer and Other Cooperatives.

Unlike the agricultural cooperatives, which the state supported, the consumer cooperatives in Japan have long been under suspicion as part of the left-wing movement. After 1935, most of the consumer cooperatives who numbered about 100,000 members were suppressed. With the end of the war, however, an attempt has been made to revive the movement and tie it closely with the other cooperatives.

On October 8, the Japan Joint Cooperative Federation (Nippon Kyodo Sangyo Kumiai Domei) consisting of Consumers Cooperatives, Agricultural Cooperatives, Producers Cooperatives and a Women's League, was organized with the formal inauguration date set for November 18. Leaders are Toyohiko Kagawa and Count Rainei Arima, both of whom have long been engaged in cooperative work.<sup>54/</sup> Unlike the pre-war associations which emphasized agricultural marketing and mutual finance, cooperative buying of the necessities of life was stressed. At the meeting of the preparatory committee, the following program was proposed:

1. Guidance is to be offered by the Federation to groups who wish to establish cooperatives.
2. A cooperative school is to be established.
3. A federation newspaper and federation pamphlets are to be published.
4. Research into the cost of living is to be carried on.

<sup>54/</sup> See Section V, for further details on both leaders.







APPENDIX A. Political Affiliation<sup>a/</sup> of Selected Japanese Labor  
Personalities Active since the Surrender

I. Communists

A. Ex-prisoners

Morio Emori  
Jutoku Kuroki  
Shigeo Kamiyama  
Inosuke Makanishi  
Shiro Mitamura<sup>b/</sup>  
Ichizo Matsumoto  
Kenji Miyamoto  
Fumio Sano<sup>b/</sup>  
Manabu (Gaku) Sano<sup>b/</sup>  
Yoshio Shiga  
Kyuichi Tokuda

B. Emigres now at Yenan

Susumu Okano (nee Tetsuo Nosaka)  
Kenzo Yamamoto

II. Socialists

A. Left-wing Socialists

Shizue Ishimoto (Mrs. Kanju Kato)  
Kanju Kato  
Ichiro Kitada  
Hisao Kuroda  
Hideo Namba<sup>c/</sup>  
Hyoie Ouchi  
Zengoro Shimagami  
Shigesaburo (Mosaburo) Suzuki  
Seido (Masamichi) Takatsu

B. Social democrats

Iso Abe  
Tetsu Katayama  
Jiichiro Matsumoto  
Yoshio Matsunaga  
Komakichi Matsuoka  
Chozaburo Mizutani  
Suehiro Nishio



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B. Social democrats (Cont'd)

Ken Okazaki<sup>b/</sup>  
Bunji Suzuki  
Iwasaburo Tanaka  
Minnosuke (Taminosuke) Tsujii  
Manryo Yonekubo

C. Nationalist socialists

Inajiro Asanuma  
Rikizo Hirano  
Ryoji Inoue  
Kanichiro Kamei  
Jotaro Kawakami  
Seion Kawamata  
Yonosuke Kikuchi  
Mitsu Kono  
Shoichi Maekawa  
Jus. Miwa  
Shoichi Miyake  
Kazuo Nagae  
Koichi (Takaichi) Nakamura  
Masaru Nomizo  
Motojiro (Genjir.) Sugiyama  
Yoshi (Ko) Sunaga  
Haruji Tahara  
Seishin (Kiyomi) Taman

D. Cooperative socialists

Rainei (Yoriyasu) Arima  
Chu Funada  
Toxohiko Kagawa  
Tsunejiro Matsuyama  
Shigero Nakajima  
Yoshichika Tokugawa

E. Faction unknown

Hyo Hara  
Toraichi Hara  
Haruki Kitahara  
Seigi Mikami<sup>c/</sup>  
Tsunehiro Miki  
Shozo Oya  
Kenichi Sho  
Shigeo Tsubaki



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III. Others

Yoshi Hijikata (Ex-Commonist, disillusioned  
with Soviet Russia)  
Wataru Kaji (In Chungking, formerly left socialist)  
Ikuo Oyama (In Evanston, Illinois, formerly  
left socialist)

NOTES: a/ Affiliations listed herein are judgments based on pre-war and pre-surrender connections and activities, and may have been changed since. For meaning of categories in case of Socialists see text of this report, Sect. V.

b/ May not be active since surrender.

c/ Political affiliation as noted is somewhat in doubt.



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APPENDIX B. Officials of the Japan Socialist Party and theirPolitical Affiliation

<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Political Affiliation</u>	<u>Economic Group Affiliation</u>
Advisors:	Iso Abe	SD	L
	Toyohiko Kagawa	CS	L-P-C
	Iwasaburo Tanaka	SD	L
Chief Secretaries:	Tetsu Katayama	SD	P
	Jiichiro Matsumoto	SD	-
Auditors:	Manryo Yonekubo	SD	L
	Yoshi Sunaga	NS	P
Central Committee: (with departments they direct)	Inajiro Asanuma, Chief	NS	P
	Chezaburo Mizutani (Information and Propaganda)	SD	-
	Hyo Hara (Investigation)	-	-
	Mitsu Kono (Education)	NS	L
	Koichi Nakamura (Youth)	NS	-
	Hisao Kurada (Women)	LS	P
	Haruji Tahara (International)	NS	-
	Kanju Kato (Labor Union)	LS	L
	Masaru Nomizo (Farmers)	NS	P
	Motojiro Sugiyama (Cooperatives)	NS	P
	Shigesaburo Suzuki (Commerce and Industry)	LS	-
	Suehiro Mishio (Diet)	SD	L
	Rikizo Hirano (Election Campaigns)	NS	P

Recapitulation:

Left-wing socialists (LS)	- 3
Social democrats (SD)	- 7
Nationalist socialists (NS)	- 8
Cooperative socialists (NS)	- 1
Unknown	- 1
<hr/>	<hr/>
Labor unions (L)	- 7
Peasant unions (P)	- 7
Cooperatives (C)	- 1
Unaffiliated or unknown	- 6



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APPENDIX C. List of War Criminals proposed by JapaneseCommunists at Yen-an1. Militarists

Sadao Araki  
 Shigero Honjo  
 Kenji Doihara  
 Hideki Tojo  
 Gen Sugiyama  
 Juichi Terauchi  
 Mitsumasa Yonai  
 Juzo Nishio  
 Heibun Yamashita  
 Katsuzo Yamada  
 (Yasutsugu?) Okamura  
 Shunroku Hata

2. Aristocrats and Elder Statesmen

Prince Fushimi  
 Prince Nashimoto  
 Prince Higashi-Kuni  
 Prince Asaka  
 Fumimaro Kunoye  
 Kiichiro Hiranuma  
 Kasushige Ugaki<sup>a/</sup>  
 Jiro Minami<sup>a/</sup>

3. Industrialists

Seihin Ikeda  
 Ginjiro Fujiwara  
 Kiyoshi Goko  
 Toshinosuke Furuda  
 Chikuhei Nakajima  
 Yoshisuke Aikawa  
 Seibin Okochi

4. Politicians and Bureaucrats

Hachiro Arita	Kazuo Aoki
Yosuke Matsuoka	Sotaro Ishiwata
Mamoru Shigemitsu	Fumio Goto
Toshio Shiratori	Iwane Matsui <sup>a/</sup>
Hiroshi Oshima <sup>a/</sup>	Kingoro Hashimoto <sup>a/</sup>
Teiichi Suzuki <sup>a/</sup>	Ichiro Tokutomi

Source: Yen-an New China News Agency quoting Yen-an Emancipation Daily.

NOTE: Classification given is that of Yen-an Communists. Names marked a/ are military and naval officers not listed under "Militarists".



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19. Establishment of a minimum wage system.
20. Redistribution of agricultural land. (In the light of other Socialist statements this appears to mean the nationalization of the land of non-farming owners and its renting out by the state to tenants)
21. Limitation of agricultural rents. (Other statements indicate a maximum rate of 25 percent)
22. State management of fertilizer and fodder.
23. Establishment of Public Works and Social Insurance Ministries with establishment of a social insurance system, including unemployment, old age, life insurance and educational benefits.
24. Thorough political education for women and prohibition of the sale of women for immoral purposes.
25. Fundamental renovation of the educational system, including extension of the compulsory education period, better pay for scientists and technicians, free contact with world culture, and removal of militarist influence on education.

SOURCE: F.C.C. 10/20/45, BB 2-3, 10/22/45 BA 5/



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APPENDIX D. Program of the Japan Socialist Party (Oct. 1945)

1. Revision of the constitution through a democratically elected assembly.
2. Confiscation of wartime profits.
3. Discontinuance of the disbursement by the Government of compensatory money to wartime munitions factories, and the establishment of some agency to inquire into the wealth of such factories.
4. Discontinuance of the wartime special expenditure fund and an examination of those expenditures.
5. Establishment of a means to check inflation, especially through letting the wealthy classes carry the burden.
6. Levying of a tax on wealth and an increase of taxes on income and inheritance.
7. Readjustment of the national wealth and industrial resources and the establishment of some means to clear national liabilities through passing such a burden to the wealthy classes.
8. Establishment of a new currency system and the stabilization of the currency.
9. Realization of a socially planned economic system and abolition of militaristic and bureaucratic economic control.
10. Establishment of an advisory economic council.
11. Government ownership of heavy industries, such as iron, coal, chemical fertilizers, and electricity.
12. Government ownership of banks, trusts, and insurance companies.
13. Democratization of the management of Government-owned enterprises, such as railroads, post offices, telegraph and telephone systems, and Government-monopolized industries, (e.g. camphor, tobacco).
14. Encouragement of peacetime industries.
15. Immediate establishment of a consumer's association.
16. Increase of staple food rationing and revision of the rationing system.
17. Establishment of a Labor Ministry.
18. Official recognition of labor unions.



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19. Establishment of a minimum wage system.
20. Redistribution of agricultural land. (In the light of other Socialist statements this appears to mean the nationalization of the land of non-farming owners and its renting out by the state to tenants)
21. Limitation of agricultural rents. (Other statements indicate a maximum rate of 25 percent)
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23. Establishment of Public Works and Social Insurance Ministries with establishment of a social insurance system, including unemployment, old age, life insurance and educational benefits.
24. Thorough political education for women and prohibition of the sale of women for immoral purposes.
25. Fundamental renovation of the educational system, including extension of the compulsory education period, better pay for scientists and technicians, free contact with world culture, and removal of militarist influence on education.

SOURCE: F.C.C. 10/20/45, BB 2-3, 10/22/45 BA 5/



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MI-20

29 January 1946

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 20

SUMMARY OF RECENT POLITICAL  
DEVELOPMENTS IN JAPAN

Note by the Secretary

The enclosure, a brief summary of recent political developments in Japan submitted by the United States delegation, is circulated for the information and use of members of the Commission.

FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL:

ERLE R. DICKOVER

MI-20



E N C L O S U R ERECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN JAPAN

Since the surrender of Japan five principal parties, Progressive, Liberal, Social Democratic, Communist, and Japan Cooperative Party, and about 35 minor parties have emerged on the Japanese political scene. It may not be premature to take stock of the present political situation and to examine the roles of the various parties in the present practical and ideological competition for political dominance,

Ideologies. Japan as a defeated nation is groping for a new ideology and a new foundation to replace the shattered one constructed so carefully during the years of military ascendancy. Acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration has committed Japan to democracy, and in spite of the sincere desire on the part of most Japanese to fulfill the terms of the Declaration, it is nevertheless natural that each class of society will try to salvage its own interests or will try to reap advantage from the new situation. Political parties can be expected to represent these particular interests.

One objective of the occupation is a reasonably efficient but orderly development of genuine democratic ideology. It is to be expected that social legislation to this end will receive considerable attention during the next few years, and the labor union and agrarian reform laws may be cited as a beginning of this trend. However, for some time legislation will probably be ahead of the actual political development of the people.

At the present time the main deterrents to speedy and orderly developments toward democracy seem to be economic insecurity, general deterioration of morale, and lack of leadership.



Economic Insecurity may act either as a deterrent to political development, or at a later stage, as a violent revolutionary force. At present the problems of livelihood are on the level of bare existence and absorb the activities of most of the Japanese people. Problems posed by shortages of food and coal and of housing for air raid victims leave little scope for political thought on the part of the as yet politically uneducated Japanese people. The political parties have advocated security of livelihood for the purpose of getting votes rather than for providing a practical basis of workable plans.

Morale. It is not surprising that a nation without experience of defeat should suffer psychological collapse when a war has been lost. Until a new ideology is established, the Japanese people are lost creatures, their old faiths, religions and moral security broken. Disillusioned soldiers turn quickly to black market operations instead of steady constructive toil.

Leadership. The statesmen of pre-1931 days lack the flexibility of mind to meet the new, pressing, and unprecedented problems. Most statesmen who have in recent years held office are either war criminal suspects or have been involved to some degree in war responsibility.

The political parties should in time produce new leaders and should afford the training schools for vigorous young Japanese rising to meet the challenge of the present day. Unfortunately, such time has not yet come nor does there appear to be faith in Japan that it will come soon.

The recent Diet session has revealed apparent inertia, lack of initiative and incapacity on the part of its members. Consequently government in Japan has become increasingly a matter of directives from the Supreme Commander rather than acts initiated by the Japanese Cabinet or Diet. In the present negative political state, the majority of these directives seem to be welcomed by Japan's impotent leaders.



Activities of the Social Democratic Party

The Social Democratic Party is a labor-agrarian party, in many respects the successor of the pre-1940 Social-Mass Party.

A split within the Social Democratic party over the Emperor question was threatened by an open letter published by Ono Shunichi, member of the Central Executive Committee, protesting the action of the Standing Committee on December 14 in supporting the Imperial Institution and rejecting the Communist proposal for a united front. Ono insisted the Standing Committee did not possess the right to decide such an important issue without consultation with members of the party. An open letter signed by the Chairman of the Investigations Section of the Central Executive Standing Committee reproached Ono for having publicly expressed his disagreement with the party policy. The Standing Committee's right to make decisions on all questions was defended and the example of orders in council in Great Britain was cited as a democratic precedent.

The controversy highlighted the discrepancy of view on the vital Imperial issue within the ranks of the Social Democratic party.

According to press reports of December 14, 213 members of the Social Democratic party had notified party headquarters of their intention to run as candidates in the general election. Each candidate must be approved by the Standing Committee after recommendation by the Prefectural Headquarters. In general, the number of party candidates in each constituency will reach one third of the total number of Diet members to be elected. On December 21 the party announced a list of 148 candidates for seats in the House of Representatives. The party stated that the total number of candidates might reach 300. Among the candidates already announced is one woman, the wife of Yamazaki Kenji, present Diet member from Shizuoka Prefecture.



The Social Democratic party has so far received better publicity from the press than the other major parties. For example, the Mainichi, which foresees the bankruptcy of capitalism in Japan, stated on December 14 that while the Progressive and Liberal parties have referred to the necessity for a reform of capitalism they have not, in contrast to the Social Democratic party, proposed the substitution of socialism for capitalism and advocated the nationalization of heavy and other industries. In a statement to the press Katayama Tetsu, Secretary General of the party, said that his party alone was capable of shouldering responsibility in the present situation and that Japan's plight was the result of "capitalistic politics." He stated further that the Social Democratic party would not suffer a disadvantage because its candidates were relatively unknown men, since Japanese voters would attach more importance to parties than to individuals.

On December 27 the Social Democratic party rejected for the third time a proposal for a united front made by the Japanese Communist party. The party informed the Communists that they had already established their own policy for expediting the marketing of farm produce and the securing of essential foodstuffs in close cooperation with farmers unions and they believed the Socialists and Communists should pursue separately their policies for solution of the food problem.

#### Activities of the Progressive Party

The Progressive Party is composed in large measure of former members of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society and the later Great Japan Political Association.

The issuance by SCAP on January 4 of the two directives abolishing certain organizations and disqualifying individuals from public office threw all political parties into sudden confused activity. The Progressive party was deprived of its President and most of its leading officials, and the consensus is that the Progressives cannot continue to exist as a party.



In spite of the threat of disqualification of many of their numbers, Progressive party representatives had previously spoke optimistically to the press regarding their chances in the elections. They had planned to have between 400 and 500 candidates in the field and hoped to win 200 seats.

The Secretary General of the party had announced the slogans of the Progressives to be:

1. Protection and maintenance of the national polity (Imperial Institution);
2. Guarantee of people's livelihood through enforcement of a social welfare policy; and
3. Recovery of international confidence.

On December 26 the party announced the formation of a special policy committee, composed of members of the party representing Tokyo Prefecture in the previous Diet, to investigate the problems of food, coal, transportation and inflation.

In spite of widespread criticism in the press and in the Diet for war responsibility, the Progressives were favored by organization and financial support, and most observers conceded that, unless a directive should be issued by SCAP qualifying eligibility for election, the Progressive party would win the largest number of seats in the elections.

#### Activities of the Liberal Party

The Liberal Party is composed in large part of former members of the Seiyukai and Minseito parties, i.e., professional politicians.

The SCAP decrees of January 4 forced into retirement certain of the Liberal party leaders, although this party suffered a far less severe blow than the Progressive party.

One of the weaknesses of the Liberal party has been its reputation as a one-man party. People referred to it as



"Hatoyama's Party" as frequently as they called it by its rightful name. Hatoyama's record during the war years was clean; he did not associate himself with Tojo's policies nor with the Political Association of Great Japan. Nevertheless, although he is generally conceded to be an able politician with liberal ideas, his recent speeches at political rallies and in the Diet have been uninspired.

The Liberal party had expected to place approximately 250 candidates in the field and hoped to return at least 150 members to the House of Representatives.

The Liberals, like the Progressives, have been emphasizing maintenance of the national polity and the Imperial Institution as the cornerstone of their policy. They have been advocating a daily rice ration of 2.5 go, imports of foodstuffs and unemployment relief. As a solution to unemployment, they have proposed public works projects such as construction of dams, ports and harbors. They have directed special appeals to the commercial classes by advocating free trade, international trade, and aid to small and medium scale industries.

#### Activities of the Communist Party

Estimates of Communist party membership increase at a rapid rate. Shiga Yoshio, party leader, stated on December 2 that the party had enrolled 1200 members. Press reports indicate that on December 12, in an interview by Edgar Snow, he set the party membership at 1700. In an interview on December 20 he said that the party was making steady progress and that evidences of this progress could be found in the trade union movement, the peasant movement and the increasing signs of pro-communist sympathy within the Social Democratic party. The trade union movement, he said was progressing toward the "one big union" idea in which the Communists were cooperating. Two agrarian organizations, the Peasant Committee sponsored by



the Communists and the Peasant Union sponsored by the Social Democrats, were beginning to cooperate and their eventual unification was expected.

The party has recently stated that it will not insist on the abolition of the Imperial institution if the majority of the people favor its retention.

The Communist Youth movement, inaugurated at the time of the party congress in early December, appeals to Japanese youth under the age of 26. It is its principle deliberately to omit from discussion the Emperor system but to work toward the propagation of communism among youth.

The Communist party has stated that 160 members would run for Diet seats and that they hoped to win 60 seats in the next House of Representatives. The party has also indicated its willingness to lend support to "genuine democrats" running on the Social Democratic ticket. On December 27 the Communist party made its third proposal to the Social Democrats regarding a united front based on the solution of the food crisis. The communists proposed close cooperation between the farmers' unions sponsored by the Social Democrats and their own farmers' committees. The Socialists rejected this proposal, replying that the communist-organized committees would be incapable of launching a nationwide campaign and that the farmers' unions would be able to solve the food question without communist aid.

#### Inauguration of the Japan Cooperative Party

On December 18, the day of the dissolution of the Diet, the Japan Cooperative Party was formed by Diet members who had remained independent up to that time. With 26 members in the dissolved House of Representatives, this party became the third strongest in point of view of representation in the past Diet. Party leaders are Kurosawa Torazo, butter manufacturer of Hokkaido long active in the cooperative movement, Funada Nake



(Chu), and Sengoku Kotaro, member of the House of Peers and former Minister of Agriculture and Forestry. The party advocate maintenance of the Imperial institution, establishment of a democratic political system, autonomy for labor, and the reconstruction of industry, economy, and culture on the basis of the cooperative principle. The group is apparently composed of persons who desire social reform but are not prepared to advocate the substitution of socialism for capitalism. At the same time they are not attracted by the platforms or the personalities of the Progressive and Liberal parties. Party leaders claim they originally had no intention of forming a new political party and only did so in response to urgent requests from local groups organized in 12 Prefectures. They assert their present objective to be not political power but political education.

Cooperative Party leaders state that there is considerable sentiment within the Social Democratic Party for a coalition with the Cooperatives following the next election. Some members of the Social Democratic Party would like to amalgamate the two parties and at the same time eliminate the troublesome left wing from the Social Democratic party. The Cooperatives say that they are not at present thinking of amalgamation with any other party.

The party expects to sponsor between 100 and 130 candidates in the coming elections. It is very anxious to have the date of the election postponed in order to give it more time to recruit new members.

The leaders of the Cooperative Party believe that from now on the Progressive and Liberal parties will decline in influence because they have no solid basis of support among the people and are historically associated with the old-line Japanese political parties. The Progressive leaders backed the militarists during the war, and the Liberals were indifferent.

The Cooperative leaders believe that the influence of the Communist party is unimportant. The party may attract the support of students and young intellectuals, but will be unable to create widespread disturbances, primarily because the Japanese



farmers are conservative and look upon the Japanese Communist Party as a destructive rather than constructive force.



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20 February 1946

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 21

U. S. IN JAPAN

Note by the Secretary General

The enclosure taken from Life Magazine of 18 February 1946 entitled "U. S. in Japan" is circulated for the information of the Commission.

NELSON T. JOHNSON  
Secretary General

MI-21



ENCLOSURE

## U. S. IN JAPAN

"At least," say the optimists, "we're doing a good job in Japan. Thank God for MacArthur, wish we had that sort of setup for Germany."

Amen. Our occupation of Japan seems to be remarkably successful to date. But what are our long-range plans for that unhappy country? Will we pull out too soon, thus inviting the Japs (who are good imitators) to repeat the German strategy of 1920-39? Do we know what we want Japan to be like 20 years hence? Do our allies know?

Unlike Germany, Japan has a functioning central government. The occupiers issue orders, they do not execute them. Like a gentle snow, the orders fall from the mimeograph machines of the Central Liaison Office, Tokyo (MacArthur) on the imperial Japanese government (Hirohito). Snow usually looks pretty while it is falling.

WHERE WE ARE SUCCEEDING

Much Western energy is behind this Eastern storm. In the center is the absorbing figure of General MacArthur, commanding both the occupation and the "Son of Heaven." The general is good, so good that he almost lives down his press agents, who apparently have never heard the ancient maxim, "The perfection of art is to conceal art." Although MacArthur plays the tune he does not write all his own music. Many of the orders, and some of the best, have been drawn up in his headquarters. But in Washington the separate and somewhat rival economic and political divisions of the State Department also dream up orders for Japan's government that go to SWINC, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

These orders deal with specific problems. One may grant permission to complete three ships under construction in Kobe. Another bans the quaint Japanese custom of using their daughters as a cash crop for the brothel keepers. When added together, these specific orders comprise what might be with forbearance called policy -- at least short-range policy. As far as it goes it is commendable.

The U.S. can properly take credit for giving a higher degree of freedom to the Japanese schools, press, radio, theater. These directives, while imperfect by Western standards, have sufficiently loosened the fetters to give Jap war leaders a task should they ever try to tighten them again. Some 20 political parties are now campaigning for the March elections. This activity at least gives promise of adding a few more players to the old Japanese governmental game of musical chairs.

One of the most significant of the MacArthur orders came last November: a capital levy up to 70%. Combined with a 100% war-profits tax and a freezing of war indemnity and pension payments, this was aimed at fighting inflation, relaxing the tight fiscal bonds with which the military had tied the poor, while also demonstrating to all classes that war doesn't pay.

In addition to these externally inspired developments, the Japs are doing some things for themselves. Women are voting for the first time. If they can shake off their status as dolls and chattels, Japanese women may become an effective brake on militarism. This is said under the gentlemanly assumption that the female of the species is less deadly than the male, an assumption history and the daily press frequently challenge.



Outright and admitted defeat has cooled off some queer notions of Jap invincibility. They no longer have a basis for considering themselves implements of their gods in forcing their way of life on Asia and the world. Hirohito's Jan. 1 rescript denying his own divinity and the godlike qualities of the Japanese people removes one more occult lever on the Japanese mind. Another salutary change should come shortly when MacArthur adds some Asiatics to his occupation troops. This should demonstrate to the Japanese people that the issue is not just white supremacy.

MacArthur is having his troubles. He is short of competent personnel because Americans won't leave home these days even for a good cause. The ex-members of the Japanese army, which was demobilized with sensational speed, are beginning to lord it over the peasants in remote villages. The food problem is due to become much more acute in the next few months. Much remains to be done. But, all in all, the American occupation of Japan has so far been something to be proud of, and MacArthur deserves the highest credit for it.

#### WHERE WE MAY FAIL

However, the biggest question of all still remains wide open. It is so big that whatever we do in Japan may be useless unless it is answered. The question is, simply, what do we want to see in Asia two decades from now? In answering that we must include provision for the 70,000,000 Japanese jammed on islands that can afford them only a sporadic and doubtful diet of fish and rice. Unless a proper place is provided for them in the economy of the East and of the world, they will starve, and they will not do so in peace.

The ideal answer to their problems and the problem of Asia is fairly clear. It is simply to encourage Japan to produce the textiles, household goods and similar light manufactures which the consumers of the East so bitterly need and which would provide the Japs with the exchange they require for food and raw-material imports. Simultaneously, the ideal answer would be to move Japanese heavy industry to China and other friendly Asiatic lands to achieve more industrial balance.

Such is the patently desirable course, but it is being undertaken with much uncertainty. While it is clearly a world problem, the U.S. partly because it is so proud of the MacArthur occupation, has acted somewhat like a mother hen. The Japs are our chicks. Soon after the Japanese surrender the British, whose interest in the Far East is fully as keen as our own, proposed that a control council be set up for Japan. With the lessons of the Control Council in Germany before our eyes and the growls of General MacArthur's friends in our ears, we demurred. The Russians, who have had their share of trouble with the Japanese and who certainly are not geographically remote from the problem child, also wanted some assurances about occupation, present and future.

So, in an effort to enjoy the best of two worlds -- the unobstructed occupation of Japan by MacArthur and the approval and coresponsibility of the major powers -- a scheme was hit upon, then negotiated by Secretary of State Byrnes. It was to set up a Far Eastern Advisory Commission, comprised of the 11 nations to whom Japan surrendered. This commission has just spent a month in Tokyo catching up on what has been done to date. It is assembling again this week in Washington, where it will be reconstituted given the new name of Far Eastern Commission and will presumably start laying down the line for General MacArthur to follow.



Each of the Big Four nations on the commission has veto power which may prove a serious hazard in practice. However, there are escape clauses and fine print, and the net effect is such that MacArthur can in practice have the last word. Thus the commission deal is fully as much a Yankee trick as it is an expression of British imperialism or Russian boring-from-within.

If the commission can avoid the pitfall of too much wrangling with MacArthur, it may still fall into another; too much wrangling over the spoils of reparations. Under the terms of Potsdam, the members of the commission are to take what is deemed surplus Japanese machinery and apportion it among Japan's victims. It will be a miracle if this grab-bag method results in any sane economic pattern or in a proper industrial balance in the Far East. It hasn't done so in Europe.

#### THE TRUE NEED

Here is the Far Eastern Commission's real opportunity. Let it consign the details of reparations to a subordinate group and concentrate on drafting long-term Allied policy for Japan's future. Some day, of course, this policy should be brought under the Economic and Social Council of UNO. But there is not time to await more machinery. For, while the falling snows of occupation look pretty, the people of Asia are shivering for lack of clothes. Several million spindles and several million hands are idle in Japan, while raw-cotton stocks have dwindled to about five days' supply for available manufacturing capacity.

Still lacking is the master plan as to what industries should have the green light. Given the master plan, the occupiers can bring in the materials to start the manufacturing and thus alleviate the distress, unemployment and inertia now inflicted on all the East. Such is the true need, and it is unwise to let joy in the snowfall obscure the miseries and dangers it temporarily covers.



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25 February 1946

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 22

SUMMARY REPORT ON TRIP TO JAPAN

Note by the Secretary General

1. The enclosures, comprising a summary report on the trip of the Commission to Japan, is circulated for the information and use of members of the Commission.

2. The report is divided into the following sections:

Enclosure A - Itinerary

Enclosure B - Selected Communications En Route

Enclosure C - Press Releases

Enclosure D - Bibliography

Enclosure E - Personnel

NELSON T. JOHNSON  
Secretary General

MI-22



ENCLOSURE "A"ITINERARYI. GENERAL STATEMENT

1. The Commission left Washington on the evening of 26 December 1945, in two special C-54 planes furnished by the Air Transport Command. After a brief stop-over at Hamilton Field, California, the Commission arrived at Hickham Field the evening of December 28, 1945, where it was received by General Lawton, Acting Chief of Staff for Rear Admiral M. F. Schoeffel, representing Admiral Spruance, CINCPAC, General Richardson, Commanding General MidPac, and the members of General Richardson's staff.

The Commission embarked the evening of the same day on the USS MT. MCKINLEY, Commanding Officer Captain Wayne Gamet, and sailed for Japan from Pearl Harbor at 0700 the morning of December 29.

2. After 10 days enroute, the Commission arrived at Yokohama at noon on Wednesday, January 9, 1946, where it was met by Major Gen. W. F. Marquat on behalf of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. After discharging oil in order to adjust trim, the ship proceeded over the bar the following morning and tied up alongside the dock at Shiba-Ura, Tokyo.

3. During the 23 days of its stay in Japan the Commission lived aboard ship and used as headquarters ashore special offices which had been arranged for it in the Dai Ichi Bldg., where GHQ was housed.

4. The Chief Delegates had an initial luncheon and meeting with General MacArthur on Thursday, January 10, a second meeting with General MacArthur in his offices on Tuesday, January 29, and invited him and Mrs. MacArthur for lunch on board the ship on Wednesday, January 30.



5. The bulk of the Commission's activities in Japan consisted of conferences with various sections of the Supreme Commander's General Headquarters. In addition, there were several trips made to various sections of Japan when opportunity was given to inspect local conditions and to confer with local military authorities as well as local Japanese officials.

6. At the conclusion of a special meeting with the Commission on the subject of Hokkaido, Lt. Col. Spillers, Chief, Forestry Division, Natural Resources Section, SCAP, presented the Commission with a carved basswood bear from Hokkaido. The carving had been made by the Ainus, Aborigines of the island, and has become the centerpiece for the Commission's conference table, as a memento of its visit to Japan.

7. The Commission acquired a great many documents in the course of its meetings with the staff sections of SCAP, and these are listed in Enclosure "C". These were distributed to the Commission while in Japan, if received in sufficient quantity, or are on file in the Secretariat, in case of items of which only one copy was received.

8. The Commission made a final visit to the 8th Army Headquarters in Yokohama and to the Naval Command in Yokosuka on Thursday, January 31, prior to embarking on the MT. MCKINLEY the evening of that day. The MT. MCKINLEY sailed from Yokosuka at 0700 on February 1 for Pearl Harbor.

9. After 11 days at sea, the Commission arrived at Pearl Harbor the morning of February 11 and left for San Francisco and Washington from Hickham Field the evening of February 11. The Commission arrived in Washington the morning of February 13.



II. DETAILED ITINERARY.

December 26 - Wednesday - 2100 Lv. Washington via ATC

" 27 - Thursday - 1900 Ar. Hamilton Field, Calif.

" 28 - Friday - 0900 Lv. Hamilton Field, Calif.  
2145 Ar. Hickham Field; Reception by Gen. Lawton and officers of CONGEN MIDPAC staff and Rear Adm. M. F. Schoeffel.  
Dinner at Hickham Field.  
Embark on USS Mt. McKinley

" 29 - Saturday - 0700 Lv. Pearl Harbor for Japan

" 30 - Sunday

January 9 - Wednesday (noon) incl.-  
to  
January 9 - Wednesday (noon) incl.-

At sea aboard USS MT. MCKINLEY.  
1st (J) FEC Meeting held 1-1-46  
2nd (J) FEC Meeting held 1-8-46

Ship's Company addressed from day to day after lunch by the following Commission members: Maj. Gen. McCoy, Sir Carl Berendsen, Sir George Sanson, The Hon. Tomas Confesor, Dr. A. D. A. de Kat Angelino, and Major Charles Boxer.

January 9 - Wednesday - 1200 Arrive Yokohama. Met by Maj. Gen. Marquat on behalf of SCAP. Sightseeing tour of Yokohama.

January 10 - Thursday - 1200 Arrive Tokyo. Luncheon for Chief Delegates with Gen. and Mrs. MacArthur.

1600 3rd (J) FEC Meeting; Gen. Marquat and Col. D. Larr discussed SCAP organization.

January 11 - Friday - 1330 Sightseeing tour of Tokyo.

January 12 - Saturday - AM 4th FEC (J) Meeting; Mr. H. D. Maxwell of Pauley Mission addressed Commission.

PM Factory tour; also, airplane view of Tokyo area.

January 13 - Sunday - Trip to Myanoshita with lunch at Fujia Hotel.

January 14 - Monday - 5th & 6th (J) FEC Meeting, Civil Information and Education Branch, Brig. Gen. Ken R. Dyke, Chief of group, addressed Commission.

" 15 - Tuesday - (AM) 7th (J) FEC Meeting, Civil Intelligence Branch; Brig. Gen. Elliott R. Thorpe, Chief of Section, addressed Commission.

(PM) 8th (J) FEC Meeting, Public Health & Welfare Section; Commission addressed by Col. Crawford F. Sams.



- January - 16 - Wednesday - (AM) 9th (J) FEC Meeting  
Conference on Hokkaido with Lt. Col. A. R. Spillers, Chief Forestry Division, Natural Resources Section, addressing Commission, followed by: Natural Resources Section, Lt. Col. Hubert G. Schenck, Chief of Section, speaker.
- (PM) 10th (J) FEC Meeting - Continuation by Lt. Col. Schenck.
- " 17 - Thursday - (AM) 11th (J) FEC Meeting - Government Section, Speaker Col. Kades, Chief Public Administration Branch, substituting for Chief of Gov't. Sect.
- (PM) 12th (J) FEC Meeting - ESS, Import-Export Division, speaker Mr. Richard May, Chief of Section.
- " 18 - Friday - 13th & 14th (J) FEC Meetings  
ESS, Industrial Section, Major Harry McGurk, Acting Chief, Speaker
- " 19 - Saturday - Depart by train for Nikko and Sendai. Sightseeing in Nikko (PM).
- " 20 - Sunday - Arrive Sendai.
- " 21 - Monday - (AM) 15th (J) FEC Meeting - Military Intelligence Section, Col. P. Coope G-2, Chief of Section, addressed Commission, followed by: Price Control & Rationing Division, ESS, Capt. W. S. Egekvist, Chief of Division, as speaker.
- (PM) 16th (J) FEC Meeting - ESS, Labor Division; Major Wm. Karpinsky Chief of Division.
- " 22 - Tuesday - Open
- " 23 - Wednesday - 17th & 18th (J) FEC Meetings - ESS, Finance Division, Mr. C. F. Thomas, Chief of Division, spoke.
- " 24 - Thursday - (AM) 19th (J) FEC Meeting - Legal & International Prosecutions Section represented by Col. A. C. Carpenter and Mr. C. W. Higgins, respectively
- (PM) 20th (J) FEC Meeting - ESS, Scientific & Technical Div. Brig. John W. O'Brien (Aus. Army), Chief of Section.
- " 25 - Friday - (AM) 21st (J) FEC Meeting - ESS, Anti-Trust Cartels Division Maj. Sidney W. Wheeler, Chief; Zaibatsu Mission, Mr. Corwin D. Edwards, Chief of Mission.
- (PM) Depart by train for Kyoto.
- " 26 - Saturday - Arrive Kyoto; trip to Nara; board train.
- " 27 - Sunday - Arrive Kure; trip to Naval Base and conference with local officials: Hiroshima; board train and arrive at Osaka at 0900. Night spent at new Osaka Hotel.



January - 28 - Monday - Osaka, Kyoto; board train for Tokyo at 1900.

" - 29 - Tuesday - (0800) Arrive Tokyo.  
(1130) MacArthur addresses Chief delegates.

" - 30 - Wednesday - (1300) General and Mrs. MacArthur dine aboard ship with Chief Delegates.

" - 31 - Thursday - (0900) USS MT. MCKINLEY departed for Yokosuka; most of Commission went by car to Yokohama for visit to 8th Army Headquarters and Naval Command at Yokosuka.

February - 1 - Friday - (0700) USS MT. MCKINLEY sails from Yokosuka for Pearl Harbor.

" - 1-10 At sea

" - 11 - Monday - (0700) USS MT. MCKINLEY arrives Pearl Harbor.  
(2100) Leave Hickham field by air for Hamilton Field.

" - 12 - Tuesday - (1200) Arrive Hamilton Field, Calif.  
(2000) Depart Hamilton Field, Calif. via ATC for Washington, D. C.

" - 13 - Wednesday - (1000) Arrive Washington, D. C.



ENCLOSURE "B"SELECTED COMMUNICATIONSI. GENERAL EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE  
COMMISSION AND GENERAL MACARTHUR1 January 1946

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur  
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers  
Supreme Headquarters

New Year's greetings to you from the Far Eastern Commission enroute Japan, with wishes for continued success in the difficult task of occupation and administration which you have conducted so admirably and for which the United Nations, particularly those in the Far East, will be forever deeply indebted.

For the Far Eastern Commission  
Nelson T. Johnson  
Secretary General

3 January 1946

Pass to Secretary General Nelson T. Johnson. Many thanks to the Commission for its cordial message. I am looking forward with anticipation to its arrival in Tokyo.

(Signed) MacArthur

4 January 1946

General of the Army MacArthur  
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers  
Supreme Headquarters, Tokyo

From McCoy, Chairman, FEC

1. Believing it would be helpful to you and your staff in meeting the desires of the Commission for information relating to its work, the Commission forwards herewith the following list of subjects which have been allocated to Committees of the Commission for study and on which it would appreciate information as soon as practical upon arrival.

- a. Social and Economic Problems
- b. Constitutional Reform
- c. War Criminals
- d. Aliens in Japan
- e. Strengthening of Democratic Processes

2. With reference to category a above, Social and Economic Problems, the Commission would especially appreciate detailed information (which is no doubt already available or in preparation) on the following:

- a. Agriculture and Other Forms of Primary Production
- b. Industrial Capacity, Organization and Production
- c. Financial Structure, Japanese Assets and Statistical Position of Japanese Banks
- d. Labor Conditions
- e. Communications and Transportation
- f. Shipbuilding
- g. Present Status of Interest, Assets and Rights of All United Nations and Their Nationals in Japan

3. For your information and as an appendix to this message, the Commission is forwarding its Tentative Long-Term Agenda, which will indicate in a comprehensive way the scope of its interest.



A P P E N D I X(TENTATIVE) LONG-TERM AGENDA FOR THE COMMISSIONFEAC-10/2, November 9, 1945

1. Basic Policies and Objectives in regard to Japan.
2. Social and Economic Problems.
  - (a) Extent and character of Japanese industry, commerce and agriculture necessary for a viable economy in Japan.
  - (b) Measures necessary to establish such an economy.
    - (1) Regulation of Japanese Foreign commerce.
    - (2) Control of agriculture.
    - (3) Control of fishing and aquatic industries.
    - (4) Control of transportation and communication.
    - (5) Control of industry
  - (c) Adjustment of system of land tenure.
  - (d) Ownership and Japanese industry, finance and commerce.
3. Reduction and Control of Japanese War Industry.
  - (a) Armament production.
  - (b) Heavy industry.
  - (c) Aeronautical industry.
  - (d) Merchant shipping.
  - (e) Shipbuilding.
  - (f) Reconversion of other wartime industry to peacetime purposes.
  - (g) Long-range control of rearmament.
  - (h) Control of scientific and industrial research.
4. Restitution and Reparation.
  - (a) Seizure and disposition of Japanese overseas property and investments.
  - (b) Reparations: goods and materials, merchant ships, factory installations, Japanese patents and scientific processes.
  - (c) Use of Japanese labour by Allies.
  - (d) Measures necessary to safeguard the interests of the United Nations and foreign assets in Japan.
  - (e) Restitution of looted property, including objects of historical, cultural and artistic value.
5. Consitutional Reform
  - (a) Emperor
  - (b) Diet
  - (c) Cabinet
  - (d) Local government
  - (e) Political parties
  - (f) Civil liberties
  - (g) Machinery for drafting new constitution



6. War Criminals
7. Aliens in Japan
  - (a) Enemy nationals other than Japanese.
  - (b) Koreans
  - (c) Allied persons desiring repatriation.
  - (d) Allied persons who have collaborated with the Japanese.
  - (e) Neutral nations.
  - (f) Relation of non-Japanese civilians to Japanese authorities.
8. Strengthening of Democratic Processes.
  - (a) Positive policy in the reorientation of the Japanese.
  - (b) Educational system.
  - (c) Control of public information - the press and radio.
  - (d) Workers' and peasants' organizations.
  - (e) Civil liberties.
  - (f) Purging of militarist and totalitarian elements.
  - (g) Dissolution of secret and other undesirable societies.
  - (h) Reform of police system.
  - (i) Improving the status and role of women.
  - (j) State Shinto.
9. Disarmament and Demobilization.
  - (a) Processes of disarming and demobilizing.
  - (b) Disposal of arms.
  - (c) Policing and inspection of disarming.
  - (d) Disposal of Japanese fleet.
  - (e) Disposal of Japanese aircraft, air fields, etc.
  - (f) Employment of discharged Japanese service men.
  - (g) Treatment of Japanese ex-officers.
10. Relief Problems in Japan.
  - (a) Prevention of mass unemployment.
  - (b) Public health.
  - (c) Food.
  - (d) Housing.
  - (e) Repatriation of Japanese from overseas territories.
11. Financial Problems.
12. Organization of Allied Control and Military Government in Japan
13. Conditions under which Japan may be admitted to membership in the United Nations Organization.
14. Other Matters Raised by Member Governments.