

Aircraft Action Reports

2-d (57) USS Sangamon

A16-3/0VE26 (RR) U.S.S. SANGAMON (0VE26)  
Serial 044

017018

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L



20 May 1945.

**From:** Commanding Officer.  
**To :** Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.  
**Via :** (1) Commander Task Unit 52.1.3 (Commander Carrier Division TWENTY-TWO).  
(2) Commander Task Group 52.1 (Commander Escort Carrier Force).  
(3) Commander Task Force 51 (Commander Amphibious Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet).  
(4) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

**Subject:** U.S.S. SANGAMON Action Report for the Ryukyus Operation (21 March to 9 May 1945).

**Reference:** (a) Pacific Fleet Confidential letter 1 CL-45, dated 1 January 1945.

**Enclosures:** (A) Ships Battle Damage Report.  
(B) Personnel Suffering Death, Wounds or Injury Requiring Hospitalization; Report of.  
(C) Series of Action pictures taken 4 May 1945.

1. Subject report with enclosures (A), (B) and (C) are submitted in accordance with reference (a).

A. I. MALSTROM.

**cc:**  
Cominch (1) advance copy.  
CincPac (3) advance copies.  
ComAirPac (1) advance copy.  
C.T.U. 52.1.1 (1) copy.

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PART I.  
Brief Summary.  
A.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

This Report covers the period from 21 March, the date of leaving Ulithi for Okinawa, to 9 May, the date of return to Ulithi. All times refer to -9 (Item) unless otherwise indicated. The U.S.S. SANGAMON in company with other elements of 52.1.1 arrived in the operating area on L-7 day and commenced flying aircraft in support of the landings on Kerama Retto. On Love day this ship joined 52.1.3. As part of that unit it flew aircraft in support of the assault on Okinawa. Until its departure from the area on 5 May support and TCAP missions were flown over Okinawa and neutralization strikes, night heckler and intruder missions over Miyako and Ishigaki in the Sakishima Gunto.

On 4 May at 1933 while returning to operating area from Kerama Retto, where it had reprovisioned and rearmed, this ship was struck by a Kamikaze flying a Nick. The plane and bomb load penetrated to the hangar deck amidships. The resulting explosion and fire damaged the ship to such an extent as to make further flight operations impossible without extensive repairs to flight and hangar decks and installations. The ship rejoined 52.1.3 in the operating area on the morning of 5 May and transferred gear and remaining personnel of Commander Carrier Division TWENTY-TWO to U.S.S. SUWANNEE. On orders of Commander Task Unit 52.1.3 in accordance with orders from higher commands, the U.S.S. SANGAMON left formation shortly after dusk that same day and proceeded to Ulithi.

PART II.  
Preliminaries.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

A. U.S.S. SANGAMON (CVE 26) with CVEG 33 embarked, operated from 21 March through 31 March with Task Unit 52.1.1, Support Carrier Unit 1, Rear Admiral C. A. F. SPRAGUE, U.S.N., Commander Carrier Division 26, Commander, in U.S.S. FANSHAW BAY (CVE 70) flagship. Task Unit 52.1.1 consisted of the following additional ships: U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93), U.S.S. LUNGA POINT (CVE 94), U.S.S. NATOMA BAY (CVE 62), U.S.S. SANGAMON (CVE 26), U.S.S. BAGLEY (DD 386), U.S.S. INGRAHAM (DD 694), U.S.S. PATTERSON (DD 392), U.S.S. HART (DD 594), U.S.S. RICHARD S. BULL (DE 693), U.S.S. RICHARD M. ROWELL (DE 403), U.S.S. DENNIS (DE 405), U.S.S. O'FLAHERTY (DE 340), and U.S.S. SEDERSTROM (DE 31).

From April 1 - May 5th, the SANGAMON operated in Task Unit 52.1.3, Support Carrier Unit 3, Rear Admiral W. D. SAMPLE, U.S.N., Commander Carrier Division TWENTY-TWO, Commander in U.S.S. SUWANNEE (CVE 27), flagship. Initially Task Unit 52.1.3 included in addition the following ships: U.S.S. CHENANGO (CVE 28), U.S.S. SANTEE (CVE 29), U.S.S. FULLAM (DD 474), U.S.S. GUEST (DD 472), U.S.S. METCALFE (DD 595), U.S.S. DREXLER (DD 741), U.S.S. MASSEY (DD 778), U.S.S. SEDERSTROM (DE 31), U.S.S. FLEMING (DE 32), U.S.S. TISDALE (DE 33), U.S.S. EISELE (DE 34), U.S.S. JOHN C. BUTLER (DE 339), U.S.S. EDMONDS (DE 406) and U.S.S. BEBAS (DE 10).

B. Departed Ulithi, Caroline Islands 0637 (K) 21 March, 1945 with Task Unit 52.1.1 in accordance with Commander Task Group 52.1 Sortie plan 2-45. Set course direct for the operating area to furnish aircraft for the assault and capture of Okinawa. Enroute to the objective area this ship with other elements of Task Unit 52.1.1 took cruising disposition as the right flank of Task Force 54 (Gunfire and Covering Force) and flew Combat Air Patrol and Anti-Submarine Patrol during the passage. 25 March arrived at the objective area and commenced launching aircraft from an operating area approximately 50 miles South of Okinawa.

C. Own Mission; As a part of Support Carrier Unit One (Rear Admiral C. A. F. SPRAGUE) provide air cover enroute. Furnish direct air support and air observation for the occupation of Kerama Retto prior to Love Day. As a part of Support Carrier Unit Three (Rear Admiral W. D. SAMPLE) on Love Day and thereafter furnished direct air support, strikes, air observers, target combat air patrol and special mission flights for the assault on Okinawa and furnish strikes, intruder and night heckler flights for the neutralization of Miyako and Ishigaki in the Sakishima Gunto.

PART III. Chronological Account of Action. (CONFIDENTIAL)

A. Day to Day Account.

25 March (L-7)

Operating 50 miles South of Okinawa, flying LCAP, air support and special flights. 0544 Commenced launching aircraft. 0828-0916 and 1010-1120 Refueled U.S.S. FLEMING (DE 32). 1230-1315 and 1411-1510 Refueled U.S.S. SEDERSTROM (DE 31). 1651-1701 General Quarters, bogey at 320° (T) 22 miles. 2047 Recovered last flight.

26 March (L-6)

Operating 50 miles Southwest Okinawa, flying LCAP, air support and special flights. 0531 Commenced launching aircraft. 0602 U.S.S. SEDERSTROM (DE 31), U.S.S. LOWERY (DD 770) and U.S.S. FLEMING (DE 32) left formation. 0752 U.S.S. ANZIO (CVE 57), U.S.S. NEWMAN (DE 205), U.S.S. MITCHELL (DE 43) and U.S.S. TABERER (DE 418) joined formation. 0839-0901 General Quarters, bogie in vicinity. 2045 Recovered last flight.

27 March (L-5)

Operating 50 miles Southwest of Okinawa, flying LCAP, air support and special flights. 0330-0400 General Quarters, bogies in vicinity. 0445 Commenced launching aircraft. 0805-0918 Refueled U.S.S. HART (DD 594). 1210-1254 Refueled U.S.S. TAYLOR (DD 468). 1335 F6F crashed barrier, damaging prop and landing gear, fatal injury to O'DELL, Robert L., AMM2c, 630 07 32, V-6, USNR. 2133 Completed recovering last flight.

28 March (L-4)

Operating in an area 50 miles South of Okinawa, flying LCAP, air support and special flights. 0015 Commenced launching aircraft. 0016 F6F (5N) crashed in water off port side, catapult failure, pilot recovered. 1003 O'DELL, Robert L., AMM2c, V-6, USNR. buried at sea. 1050-1102 U.S.S. PATTERSON (DD 392) alongside transferred pilot. 1258-1305 at General Quarters, bogies identified as friendly. 1645 Recovered TBM, port wing damaged by flak. 1930 U.S.S. ANZIO (CVE 57) and screen left formation. 2145 Recovered last flight.

29 March (L-3)

Operating in area 50 miles Southeast and East of Okinawa, flying LCAP, air support and special missions, and making fueling rendezvous. 0333 Commenced launching aircraft. 1030-1255 Alongside U.S.S. COWANESQUE (AO 79) to receive fuel oil and aviation gasoline. 2125 Recovered last flight.

30 March (L-2)

Operating in area 40 miles South of Okinawa, flying LCAP, air support and special missions. 0332 Commenced launching aircraft. 0544 F6F crashed barriers #1 and #2, damaged cowl and prop. 0654 F6F crashed into port catwalk, major damage to engine, prop, port wing. 1645 Recovered last flight. 1905 U.S.S. PATTERSON (DD 392) left formation.

31 March (L-1)

Operating in area 50 miles South of Okinawa, flying LCAP, air support and special missions. 0332 Commenced launching aircraft. 0609 U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93), U.S.S. TAYLOR (DD 468), and U.S.S. ROWELL (DE 403) left formation. 1150-1240 Refueled U.S.S. BULL (DE 693) and U.S.S. OLIVER MITCHELL (DE 43). 1355-1432 refueled U.S.S. KILLEN (DD 593) and U.S.S. M. R. NAWMAN (DE 205). 1605 U.S.S. DENNIS (DE 405) and U.S.S. O'FLAHERTY (DE 340) left formation. 1632 U.S.S. LOWERY (DD 770) joined formation. 1635 U.S.S. EISELE (DE 34) joined formation. 1650 U.S.S. PATTERSON (DD 392) joined formation. 2150 Recovered last flight.

1 April (L-Day)

Operating in area 50 miles South of Okinawa, furnishing CAP, ASP and support to T.F. 51. At 0230 commenced launching aircraft. 0708 detached from T.U. 52.1.1 and assigned to T.U. 52.1.3 proceeded to join that unit accompanied by U.S.S. SEDERSTROM (DE 31), U.S.S. FLEMING (DE 32), U.S.S. TISDALE (DE 33), and U.S.S. EISELE (DE 34). T.U. 52.1.3 Rear Admiral W. D. SAMPLE, U.S.N., Commander Carrier Division TWENTY-TWO, consisted of U.S.S. SUWANNEE (CVE 27) (flagship), U.S.S. CHENANGO (CVE 28), U.S.S. SANTEE (CVE 29), U.S.S. SANGAMON (CVE 26), U.S.S. FULLAM (DD 474), U.S.S. GUEST (DD 472), U.S.S. METCALF (DD 595), U.S.S. DREXLER (DD 741), U.S.S. MASSEY (DD 778), U.S.S. SEDERSTROM (DE 31), U.S.S. FLEMING (DE 32), U.S.S. TISDALE (DE 33), U.S.S. EISELE (DE 34), U.S.S. JOHN C. BUTLER (DE 339), U.S.S. EDMONDS (DE 406) and U.S.S. BUBAS (DE 10). At 1030 U.S.S. DREXLER (DD 741) rejoined formation from rescue mission. At 1506 F6F-5E crashed through barriers 2 and 3, tail hook engaging #9 arresting cable. Pilot uninjured. 1625-1627 U.S.S. HELM (DD 388) transferred four officers from U.S.S. SANGAMON (CVE 26) to U.S.S. BOUGAINVILLE (CVE 100) for temporary duty. At 2038 F6F-5N crashed into #2 barrier. Pilot uninjured. 2107 recovered last flight.

2 April (L/1)

Operating in area 50 miles Southeast of Okinawa, flying LCAP, air support and special missions. 0550 commenced launching aircraft. 1715 unidentified plane reported bearing 255° (T), friendly. 1830 U.S.S. EISELE (DE 34), U.S.S. FLEMING (DE 32), U.S.S. SEDERSTROM (DE 31) left formation for special duty. 1834 to general quarters, unidentified plane bearing 295° (T). 1957 an F6F from U.S.S. CHENANGO (CVE 28) crashed through barriers #1 and #2. Plane a major casualty but no injuries to personnel. Minor damage to another CHENANGO F6F. 2054 another F6F crashed through #1 and #4 barriers wrecking the plane - major damage to 3 TBM's and 3 F6F's, two of which were U.S.S. CHENANGO (CVE 28) planes, no injuries to personnel. All barriers out. Flight operations secured. Two F6F's from this base landed on U.S.S. CHENANGO (CVE 28).

3 April (L/2)

Operating in Area 50 miles South of Okinawa, flying LCAP, air support and special missions. 0505 Commenced launching aircraft. 1230-1239 Jettisoned 2 F6F's, one belonging to U.S.S. CHENANGO (CVE 28), after removing useable parts. 1922 Recovered last flight.

4 April (L/3)

Operating in area 50 miles Southeast of Okinawa, flying LCAP, air support and special missions. 0459 Commenced launching aircraft. 0930-0940 U.S.S. DREXLER (DD 741) alongside to receive equipment and personnel for U.S.S. CHENANGO (CVE 28). 1525-1540 and 1623-1653 Refueled U.S.S. SEDERSTROM (DE 31). 1947 Completed recovering last flight.

5 April (L/4)

Operating in area 40 miles Southeast of Okinawa, flying LCAP, air support and special missions. 0456 Commenced launching aircraft. 0640-0755 Refueled U.S.S. EISELE (DE 34). 1323-1510 Refueled U.S.S. TISDALE (DE 33). 1930 F6F crashed barriers, slight damage to plane, no injury to personnel. 1955 Completed recovering last flight.

6 April (L/5)

Operating in area 60 miles Southeast of Okinawa, flying LCAP, air support and special missions. 0459 Commenced launching aircraft. 0742-0802 U.S.S. LOWRY (DD 770) alongside to receive pilots for transfer to U.S.S. ATTU (CVE 102) to obtain replacements. 1732 Jettisoned U.S.S. CHENANGO (CVE 28) F6F after removing engine and useable parts. 2035 Completed recovering last flight. Two F6F's landed on YONTAN field to remain overnight. One plane slightly damaged.

7 April (L/6)

Operating in area 50 miles South of Okinawa, flying LCAP, air support and special missions. 0500 Commenced launching aircraft. 0834-0840 U.S.S. DREXLER (DD 741) alongside to receive pilot for transfer to U.S.S. SANTEE (CVE 29) for replacement aircraft. 0945-0959 and 1023-1056 Refueled U.S.S. BUTLER (DE 339). 1315 Recovered 4 TBM's replacements from U.S.S. ATTU (CVE 102). 1738 Recovered 2 F6F's from YONTAN. 1943 Completed recovering aircraft.

8 April (L/7)

Operating in area 90 miles East of Sakashima Gunto, flying LCAP, strikes against airfields on Miyako and Ishigaki and special missions. 0415 Commenced launching aircraft. 1337 F6F crashed into port catwalk, minor damage to 20MM gun mounts, no injuries to personnel. 1400 3 F6F's landed aboard U.S.S. CHENANGO (CVE 28). Recovered at 1632. 1933 Completed recovering aircraft.

9 April (L/8)

Operating in area 90 miles East of Sakashima Gunto, flying LCAP, strikes, heckler and intruder missions. 0330 Commenced launching aircraft. 1255 U.S.S. CHENANGO (CVE 28) left formation following barrier crash and fire on flight deck. 1310 Completed recovering 3 F6F's from U.S.S. CHENANGO (CVE 28). 1525 U.S.S. CHENANGO (CVE 28) rejoined formation. 1931 Completed recovering aircraft including one TBM from U.S.S. CHENANGO (CVE 28).



10 April (L/9)

Operating in area 90 miles East of Sakashima Gunto, flying LCAP, strikes, heckler and intruder missions. 0256 Commenced launching aircraft. 0543 Completed launching 3 U.S.S. CHENANGO (CVE 28) F6F's. Two F6F's on morning strike damaged by flak and machine gun fire. 1355-1423 U.S.S. FULLAM (DD 474) transferred Commander Carrier Division TWENTY-TWO personnel from U.S.S. SUWANNEE to this ship. 1715-1735 U.S.S. DREXLER (DD 741) transferred Commander Carrier Division TWENTY-TWO (CTU 52.1.3) and remaining flag personnel to this ship. 1838 Completed recovering aircraft. 2000 U.S.S. SUWANNEE (CVE 27), U.S.S. SEDERSTROM (DE 31), U.S.S. MASSEY (DD 778) and U.S.S. EISELE (DE 34) departed formation on duty assigned.

11 April (L/10)

Operating in area 90 miles Northeast of Sakashima Gunto, flying LCAP, strikes, heckler and intruder missions. 0650 Commenced launching aircraft. 1322 Completed recovering 4 TBM's of U.S.S. CHENANGO (CVE 28). 1506 F6F crashed on deck with major damage to prop, right wing, landing gear, engine, and radar gear, no injuries to personnel. 1835 F6F crashed barriers with minor damage. 2125 Completed recovering aircraft.

12 April (L/11)

Operating in area 150 miles Southeast of Okinawa, flying LCAP and effecting refueling rendezvous. 0130 U.S.S. SUWANNEE (CVE 27), U.S.S. SEDERSTROM (DE 31), U.S.S. MASSEY (DD 778) and U.S.S. EISELE (DE 34) rejoined formation. 0917 Jap plane splashed by LCAP near formation. Sighted burning plane at 18 miles. 0925 Sighted parachute hitting water at 8 miles. 0933 Completed launching 4 TBM's of U.S.S. CHENANGO (CVE 28). 0940 U.S.S. SEDERSTROM (DE 31) left formation to investigate parachute. 0942 U.S.S. TISDALE (DE 33) left formation for scene of Jap plane crash. 0953 U.S.S. SEDERSTROM (DE 31) rejoined formation having recovered empty plane chute. 1110 U.S.S. TISDALE (DE 33) rejoined formation having recovered body of Jap pilot. 1800 Completed recovering aircraft. 1815-2358 Received fuel oil and aviation gasoline from U.S.S. SUAMICO (AO 49). 1830 U.S.S. SANTEE (CVE 29), U.S.S. FLEMING (DE 32), U.S.S. METCALF (DD 595), and U.S.S. TISDALE (DE 33) left formation for Kerama Retto. 2035 U.S.S. EISELE (DE 34) left formation to replace U.S.S. TISDALE (DE 33). 2240 U.S.S. TISDALE (DE 33) rejoined formation.

PART III Continued.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

13 April (L/12)

Operating in area 60 miles Southeast of Okinawa, flying local and target CAP. 1511 Commenced launching aircraft. 0943-1017 U.S.S. FULLAM (DD 474) alongside to receive FLAG personnel for transfer to U.S.S. SUWANNEE (CVE 27). 1041 Recovered 2 F6F's from U.S.S. SANTEE (CVE 29). 1300 Recovered TBM from U.S.S. SUWANNEE (CVE 27). 1430 Launched U.S.S. SUWANNEE (CVE 27) TBM. 2006 Completed recovering aircraft. 2013 U.S.S. CHENANGO (CVE 28), U.S.S. SEDERSTROM (DE 31), U.S.S. GUEST (DD 472), and U.S.S. TISDALE (DE 33) left formation for Kerama Retto.

14 April (L/13)

Operating in area 60 miles South of Okinawa, flying LCAP, air support and special missions. 0302 U.S.S. SANTEE (CVE 29), U.S.S. FLEMING (DE 32), and U.S.S. EISELE (DE 34) rejoined formation. 0529 Commenced launching aircraft including 2 F6F's of U.S.S. SANTEE (CVE 29). 2028 Completed recovering aircraft. 2125 Departed formation with U.S.S. DREXLER (DD 741), U.S.S. EISELE (DE 34) and U.S.S. FLEMING (DE 32) for Kerama Retto.

15 April (L/14)

Proceeding to Kerama Retto to rearm, flying LCAP. 0432 Commenced launching aircraft, 2 F6F to be recovered by U.S.S. SANTEE (CVE 29). 0540 Completed launching 8 F6F's to be recovered by U.S.S. CHENANGO (CVE 28) and one TBM to be recovered by U.S.S. SUWANNEE (CVE 27). 0722 Arrived and anchored, Kerama Retto. 1812 Departed from Kerama Retto. 1959 Completed recovering all aircraft except one TBM which remained aboard U.S.S. SUWANNEE (CVE 27).

16 April (L/15)

Proceeding to rendezvous with Task Unit 52.1.3 and operating in area 50 miles South of Okinawa, flying LCAP, air support and special missions. 0432 Commenced launching aircraft. 0644 Rejoined formation with U.S.S. DREXLER (DD 741), U.S.S. FLEMING (DE 32) and U.S.S. EISELE (DE 34). 0809 Recovered one TBM returning from U.S.S. SUWANNEE (CVE 27). 2031 Completed recovering aircraft. 2100 U.S.S. EISELE (DE 34), U.S.S. SEDERSTROM (DE 31) and U.S.S. TISDALE (DE 33) left formation.

17 April (L/16)

Operating in area 50 miles Southeast of Okinawa, flying LCAP, air support and special missions. 0030 U.S.S. BUTLER (DE 339) joined formation. 0530 Commenced launching aircraft. 0803-1210 U.S.S. MASSEY (DD 778) alongside, except when launching and recovering aircraft, to transfer FLAG personnel and baggage permanently, from U.S.S. SUWANNEE to U.S.S. SANGAMON. 2008 Completed recovering aircraft.

18 April (L/17)

Operating in area 80 miles East of Sakishima Gunto, flying strikes, heckler, intruder and special missions over the islands of Miyako and Ishigaki. 0200 Commenced launching aircraft. 0751-0848 U.S.S. MASSEY (DD 778) alongside to transfer FLAG personnel and gear from U.S.S. SUWANNEE (CVE 27). 1322-1457 U.S.S. MASSEY (DD 778) completed transferring FLAG personnel and gear. U.S.S. SANGAMON now Flagship. 1436-1447 U.S.S. BUTLER (DE 339) alongside to deliver mail. 1935 F6F and pilot reported missing in action with enemy fighters over Ishigaki. 2229 Completed launching last flight.

19 April (L/18)

Operating in area 90 miles East of Sakishima Gunto, flying strikes as before, heckler, intruder and special missions. 0031 Commenced launching aircraft. 0040 Completed recovering last flight of 18 April. 1138-1145 U.S.S. BUTLER (DE 339) alongside to transfer spare parts. 1900 Completed recovering aircraft.

20 April (L/19)

Operating in area 150 miles Southeast of Okinawa, refueling and flying LCAP and special missions. 0525 Commenced launching aircraft. 0537 Left formation to take station in Task Unit 50.18.62. 1132-1435 Alongside U.S.S. TAPPAHANNOCK (AO 43) to refuel. 1500 Resumed station in formation. 1530 Task Unit 50.18.62 left formation.

21 April (L/20)

Operating in area 90 miles East of Sakishima Gunto, flying strikes as before, heckler, intruder and special missions. 0330 Commenced launching aircraft. 1540 Launched TBM with 2 pilots to obtain F6F replacements from U.S.S. SAVO ISLAND (CVE 78). TBM to be recovered by U.S.S. CHENANGO (CVE 28) as replacement. 1735 Completed recovering 2 F6F's replacements from U.S.S. SAVO ISLAND (CVE 78). 1811-1818 U.S.S. FULLAM (DD 474) alongside to return TBM pilot. 1933 - U.S.S. SUWANNEE (CVE 27), U.S.S. MASSEY (DD 778), and U.S.S. EDMONDS (DE 406) departed for Kerama Retto. 2110 F6F damaged by flak crashed barriers, broke #2 and #4 arresting gear cables and damaged prop; no injury to personnel. 2156 completed recovering aircraft.

22 April (L/21)

Operating in area 70 miles East of Sakishima Gunto, flying strikes as before, heckler, intruder and special missions. 0230 Commenced launching aircraft. 1836 TBM crashed barriers, damaging prop, no injuries to personnel. 1927 Passed horned mine close aboard. 1950 U.S.S. JEFFERS (DD 621) exploded mine. 2003 F6F taxied into barrier #1 cutting cable, no damage to plane. 2132 Completed launching last flight.

23 April (L/22)

Operating in area 80 miles East of Sakishima Gunto, flying strikes as before, heckler, intruder and special missions. 0130 Commenced launching aircraft. 0150 Completed recovering last flights of 22 April. 0646 U.S.S. SUWANNEE (CVE 27), U.S.S. EDMONDS (DE 406) and U.S.S. DREXLER (DD 741) rejoined formation. 1955 F6F crashed barriers, major damage to engine and prop, no injury to personnel. 2010 F6F hit by flak reported crashed at sea. Pilot last seen clinging to life raft dropped by TBM. 2030 U.S.S. CHENANGO (CVE 28), U.S.S. GUEST (DD 472) and U.S.S. BUTLER (DE 339) departed for Kerama Retto. 2032 Completed launching last flight. 2044 F6F leaped over barriers and crashed into planes parked forward; 3 F6F's damaged beyond repair and major damage to tail surfaces of two others, no injury to personnel.

PART III Continued.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

24 April (L/23)

Operating in area 80 miles East of Sakishima Gunto, flying strikes as before and special missions. 0028 Completed recovering last flight of 23 April. 0517 Commenced launching aircraft. 0910 Pilot who crashed at sea on 23 April picked up by DUMBO in good condition. 0939-1017 U.S.S. DREXLER (DD 741) alongside to deliver oxygen bottles and receive flag personnel for transfer to U.S.S. SUWANNEE (CVE 27). 1249-1307 U.S.S. JEFFERS (DD 621) alongside to receive pilots to ferry aircraft replacements. 1857 Completed recovering aircraft including 4 F6F's of U.S.S. SUWANNEE (CVE 27). 1919 Departed for Kerama Retto in company with U.S.S. DREXLER (DD 741) and U.S.S. EDMONDS (DE 406).

25 April (L/24)

Proceeding to Kerama Retto to rearm. 0734 Anchored at Kerama Retto. 1746 Departed Kerama Retto in company with U.S.S. DREXLER (DD 741) and U.S.S. EDMONDS (DE 406) to rejoin Task Unit 52.1.3.

26 April (L/25)

Operating in area 90 miles East of Sakishima Gunto with Task Unit 52.1.3, flying strikes as before and special missions. 0349 Commenced launching aircraft. 0435 Rejoined T.U. 52.1.3. 0855 Completed launching 3 F6F's of U.S.S. SUWANNEE (CVE 27). 1916 Completed recovering 4 F6F's replacements. 1020-1058 U.S.S. JEFFERS (DD 621) alongside to transfer flag personnel from U.S.S. SUWANNEE (CVE 27). 1122-1140 U.S.S. JEFFERS (DD 621) alongside to transfer baggage of flag personnel. 1410-1535 Refueled U.S.S. JEFFERS (DD 621). 1830-1839 U.S.S. DREXLER (DD 741) alongside to transfer personnel. 1858 Completed recovering aircraft.

PART III. Continued.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

27 April (L/26)

Operating in area 100 miles East of Sakishima Gunto, flying strikes as before and special missions. 0430 Commenced launching aircraft. 0515 U.S.S. SANTEE (CVE 29) and escorts rejoined formation. 2113 Completed recovering aircraft.

28 April (L/27)

Operating in area 180 miles Southeast of Okinawa, flying LCAP and special missions and refueling. 0505 Sighted tanker group bearing 090°(T) 8 miles. 0507 Left formation to join tanker group. 0613 In formation with tanker group. 1100-1345 Alongside U.S.S. NIOBRARA (AO 72) to receive fuel. 1154-1206 U.S.S. FULLAM (DD 474) alongside to transfer personnel. Rejoined formation. 1502 Commenced launching aircraft. 1908 Completed recovering aircraft. 2150 U.S.S. JEFFERS (DD 621) departed formation.

29 April (L/28)

Operating in area 90 miles East of Sakishima Gunto, flying strikes as before, heckler, intruder and special missions. 0331 Commenced launching aircraft. 1830 TBM reported hit by flak and crashed at sea. Pilot and one crewman rescued by DUMBO. Pilot seriously burned, one crewman missing. 1945 U.S.S. SUWANNEE (CVE 27), U.S.S. GUEST (DD 472), and U.S.S. EDMONDS (DE 406) departed for Kerama Retto. 2107 Completed launching last flight. 2124 Completed recovering aircraft, with the exception of the 2147 flight.

30 April (L/29)

Operating in area 90 miles Southeast of Sakishima Gunto, flying strikes as before, heckler, intruder and special missions. 0029 Commenced launching aircraft. 0035 Completed recovering last flight of 29 April. 0140 U.S.S. DENNIS (DE 405) and U.S.S. RUSSELL (DD 414) joined formation. 0734 Recovered TBM shot up by flak, pilot and one crewman suffering minor shrapnel wounds. 1325-1351 U.S.S. DENNIS (DE 405) alongside to receive pilots for transfer to CTG 50.8 to obtain aircraft replacements. 1637 U.S.S. DENNIS (DE 405) departed formation.

PART III. Continued.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

1830 U.S.S. LANG (DD 399) joined formation. 1902 F6F photographic plane reported shot down by flak. Pilot last seen on reef one mile off Ishigaki. Rescue attempts unsuccessful. 2203 Completed launching last flight. 2219 Completed recovering aircraft.

1 May (L/30)

Operating in area 70 miles East of Sakishima Gunto, flying strikes as before, heckler, intruder and special missions. 0127 Commenced launching aircraft. 0217 Completed recovering last flights of 30 April. 0630 U.S.S. SUWANNEE (CVE 27), U.S.S. GUEST (DD 472) and U.S.S. EDMONDS (DE 406) rejoined formation. 1305 Completed recovering 1 F6F and 3 TBM's replacements. 1940 U.S.S. CHENANGO (CVE 28), U.S.S. DREXLER (DD 741) and U.S.S. MASSEY (DD 778) departed for Kerama Retto. 2116 Completed launching aircraft. 2132 Completed recovering aircraft.

2 May (L/31)

Operating in area 90 miles Southeast of Sakishima Gunto, flying LCAP, strikes as before, heckler, intruder and special missions. 0030 Commenced launching aircraft. 0044 Completed recovering last flight of 1 May. 0800 U.S.S. DENNIS (DE 405) rejoined formation. 0813 Completed Recovering aircraft.

3 May (L/32)

Operating in area 90 miles Southeast of Sakishima Gunto, flying strikes as before and special missions. 0230 U.S.S. CHENANGO (CVE 28), U.S.S. MUSTIN (DD 413) and U.S.S. STACK (DD 406) joined the formation. 0533 Commenced launching aircraft. 0857 recovered TBM shot up by flak, one aircrewman slightly injured. 0910-0957 Refueled U.S.S. GUEST (DD 472). 0911-0948 Refueled U.S.S. EDMONDS (DE 406). 1059-1120 U.S.S. FULLAM (DD 474) alongside to receive flag personnel for transfer to U.S.S. SUWANNEE (CVE 27). 1852 Completed recovering aircraft. 1919 Departed for Kerama Retto in with U.S.S. FULLAM (DD 474) and U.S.S. DENNIS (DE 405).

4 May (L/33)

In company with the U.S.S. DENNIS (DE 405) and U.S.S. FULLAM (DD 474) steamed into Kerama Retto to replenish ammunition and supplies. 0711 Anchored in Berth K99. 0800 Commenced loading ammunition. 0801 set condition I in the gunnery department. 0900-0933 ship went to general quarters due to presence of many unidentified planes in the area. 0933 Set readiness condition III with gunnery department and CIC in condition I. During the remainder of the day supplies and ammunition were taken on board. 1830 The ship got underway and set course southward to rejoin TU 52.1.3. 1850 Set condition I material condition Zebra, CIC having reported a raid of 6-8 planes then 29 miles bearing 200° true. This raid had been originally picked up 68 miles. The weather was ideal from the standpoint of the attacker for cumulus clouds hung heavily about the sky. A Marine Combat Air Patrol of four F4U's from OKINAWA intercepted the raid. They reported sighting five planes, shooting down 4 of them. The fifth plane was tracked into the ship (See CIC interception report). 1902 A Japanese Tony, was sighted, circling left to a position on the port quarter. 1903 ship turned hard left. All ships' guns with those of the U.S.S. DENNIS (DE 405) and U.S.S. FULLAM (DD 474) as well as the U.S.S. SPEARS which happened to be nearby, took the enemy plane under fire. It was hit and crashed at 1905 in a vertical slip about 25 feet off the starboard quarter carrying away the antenna wire there (See Part IV Ordnance for detailed report). There were no losses or injuries. Three men went over the port side as the plane dove. These men were picked up by the U.S.S. SPEARS.

1906 Two night fighters were launched and the ship returned to a southerly course, 170°. They were no sooner airborne than they were vectored out on a bogey, 150° true, 12 miles. They failed to intercept and were ordered back to base. 1925 The U.S.S. FULLAM reported bogey 264°, 12 miles. The ships' SP radar picked up bogey at 265°, 9 miles low on the water. The night fighters were given their vector and altitude. The fighters were seen from the bridge going out through the clouds at approximately 2500 feet. It was then apparent the Jap had closed the ship in a climb. He broke through the clouds at approximately 3 miles on the starboard quarter. He was immediately brought under fire but quickly disappeared in a black cloud astern and at 3000 yards he reappeared headed directly for the ship. He came in fast through well directed gunfire. (See Part IV Ordnance for details). Just before hitting he released a bomb and at 1933 bomb and plane crashed amidships penetrating the flight deck and exploding in the hangar deck space (See photographs - Enclosure (D)). A general and intense fire started on the flight, hangar and fuel decks.



PART III. Continued

(CONFIDENTIAL)

After the ship had been hit bridge communications remained intact long enough to turn the ship out of the wind. At 1940 the Captain ordered all hands except the Navigator, helmsman, and Captain's Orderly off the bridge. At 1955 all communications from the bridge were lost due to electrical wiring being destroyed by the fire on the hangar deck. Numerous personnel were observed jumping overboard. 2005 Steering control was established at Batt II. 2025 The Captain and party abandoned the bridge and established a command post forward on the flight deck. 2200 Fire reported under control. Sixteen planes had been jettisoned port and starboard aft. Much assistance was received from the screening vessels and LCI 13, LCI 61, U.S.S. HUDSON and other unidentified patrol craft. 2333 Underway with U.S.S. FULLAM and U.S.S. DENNIS, screen, to join 52.1.3.

5 May (L/34)

0755 Rejoined Task Unit 52.1.3 and steamed in formation with Task Unit 52.1.3 throughout the day. Transferred baggage and remaining personnel of ComCarDiv 22 to U.S.S. SUWANNEE (CVE 27). 1800 Held burial services for two officers, nine enlisted personnel, identified, and six unidentified. 1905 Left formation with U.S.S. DENNIS and set course for Ulithi.

6 May (L/35)

Enroute to Ulithi. 0800 Position Lat. 22-11.2 N., Long. 130-03.4 E.

7 May (L/36)

Enroute to Ulithi. 0800 Position Lat. 18-18. 4 N. Long. 133-16. N.

8 May (L/37)

Enroute to Ulithi. 0800 Position Lat. 13-37 N. Long. 136-39 E.

9 May (L/38)

Arrived Ulithi anchored at 0907 berth #30.

PART III. Continued

(CONFIDENTIAL)

B. Weather.

21 March 1945 (L-11)  
Sunrise 0647                      Sunset 1850

Underway at 0635. Broken skies throughout the day becoming scattered in the afternoon. Surface winds E'ly to ENE'ly 14-18 knots. Moderate sea with an E'ly swell. Visibility good with average flying conditions.

22 March 1945 (L-10)  
Sunrise 0555                      Sunset 1808

Scattered to broken cumulus throughout the day. Surface winds ENE'ly 21-25 knots. Visibility good. Moderate sea with heavy E to ENE'ly swell. Flying conditions average.

23 March 1945 (L-9)  
Sunrise 0609                      Sunset 1824

Broken lower cumulus with high cirro-stratus becoming scattered in afternoon. Surface winds ENE'ly becoming NE'ly 12-18 knots. Visibility good. Moderate sea with deep E to ENE'ly swell. Flying conditions average to good.

24 March 1945 (L-8)  
Sunrise 0619                      Sunset 1837

Overcast to broken lower cumulus and strato-cumulus. Visibility mostly good. Surface winds NE'ly to NNE'ly 12-16 knots. Moderate sea with N swell. Flying condition average.

25 March 1945 (L-7)  
Sunrise 0632                      Sunset 1845

Average winds NE'ly 14 to 17 knots. Clouds broken to overcast. Visibility better than 12 and not more than 30 miles all day. Sea moderate. Flying conditions good.

26 March 1945 (L-6)  
Sunrise 0628                      Sunset 1844

Average winds NE to E, 15 to 18 knots. Cloud coverage scattered to broken. A few scattered showers. Visibility 12 to 30 miles throughout. Moderate sea and swell. Flying conditions good to average.

27 March 1945 (L-5)

Sunrise 0627                      Sunset 1844

Average winds ESE to SSE, 19 to 16 knots. Sky mostly broken, becoming overcast late in period. Moderate sea and swell. Flying conditions good. Visibility good throughout period.

28 March 1945 (L-4)

Sunrise 0626                      Sunset 1844

Broken clouds becoming overcast in early morning. Surface winds variable, becoming calm late in period. Calm sea throughout period. Flying conditions good.

29 March 1945 (L-3)

Sunrise 0625                      Sunset 1846

Overcast throughout period. Light intermittent rain in morning and early forenoon. Visibility generally good except when reduced by rain. Surface winds E'ly 9 to 11 knots. Calm sea. Flying conditions average to undesirable.

30 March 1945 (L-2)

Sunrise 0625                      Sunset 1846

Occluded front passed between 1330 to 0500 the next morning. Overcast skies with light intermittent rain. Visibility generally good except when reduced to 2 to 4 miles by rain. Surface winds SE'ly becoming ESE'ly. Moderate sea and swell. Flying conditions good to undesirable.

31 March 1945 (L-1)

Sunrise 0625                      Sunset 1846

Broken clouds becoming overcast. Visibility good. Surface winds E'ly 10 to 14 knots. Moderate sea and swell. Flying conditions average.

1 April 1945 (L-Day)

Sunrise 0625                      Sunset 1846

Broken to overcast cumulus clouds. A few widely scattered showers. Ceiling and visibility unrestricted. Surface winds ENE'ly 18 to 25 knots. Moderate SE swell increasing to heavy towards evening. Sea moderate to heavy. Flying conditions average.

2 April 1945 (L/1)  
Sunrise 0625                      Sunset 1846

Overcast stratocumulus type clouds becoming scattered cumulus by evening. Winds at surface moderate ENE'ly. Sea moderate to heavy. Swell from the SE. Visibility good throughout period. Flying conditions undesirable to good.

3 April 1945 (L/2)  
Sunrise 0625                      Sunset 1846

Surface winds ENE'ly 13 to 15 knots. Ceiling and visibility generally unlimited. A light scattered rain shower in early morning. State of sea moderate. Swell from N. Flying conditions good.

4 April 1945 (L/3)  
Sunrise 0619                      Sunset 1849

Scattered cumulus clouds becoming overcast strato cumulus by evening. Visibility good all period. Winds were N'ly 12 to 16 knots. Thin haze becoming thick, aloft. State of sea moderate. Flying conditions average.

5 April 1945 (L/4)  
Sunrise 0618                      Sunset 1848

Overcast skies throughout period with thick haze above cloud layer reducing visibility to 1 mile. Winds N'ly 16 to 21 knots. A light rain shower in early part of period. State of sea slight. Visibility at surface good throughout period. Flying conditions average.

6 April 1945 (L/5)  
Sunrise 0617                      Sunset 1849

Sky completely overcast throughout period. Heavy and fog. Light intermittent rain preceded fog and drizzle in morning. Winds N'ly 13 to 15 knots. Sea slight to moderate. Visibility generally good, except when reduced to 200 yards. By fog and drizzle. Flying condition average to undesirable.

7 April 1945 (L/6)

Sunrise 0616                      Sunset 1849

Sky broken to overcast with middle and low clouds. Winds E'ly 5 to 10 knots. Visibility good throughout period.

8 April 1945 (L/7)

Sunrise 0615                      Sunset 1850

Overcast in morning and early afternoon becoming scattered to a few in late afternoon. Visibility good throughout period. Winds SE'ly 10 to 16 knots. Light rain shower in mid morning period. Sea slight. Flying conditions average.

9 April 1945 (L/8)

Sunrise 0615                      Sunset 1849

Scattered clouds the entire period. Ceiling and visibility unlimited. Winds ESE'ly veering to S'ly 10 to 15 knots. Sea slight. Flying conditions good.

10 April 1945 (L/9)

Sunrise 0614                      Sunset 1850

Scattered low clouds becoming overcast. A moderate cold front passed ship at 1845 local time. A marked wind shift resulting. A SW wind veered rapidly to N. Visibility good except reduced to less than 2000 yards in rain squalls. Moderate N'ly sea and a S'ly swell. Flying conditions average in morning becoming undesirable in afternoon.

11 April 1945 (L/10)

Sunrise 0612                      Sunset 1850

Area under the influence of cold front. Intermittent moderate rain in early morning. Surface winds, N'ly, 20 to 23 knots. Sea moderate. Flying undesirable to average. Visibility poor in early morning becoming good towards noon.

12 April 1945 (L/11)

Sunrise 0611                      Sunset 1851

Scattered clouds. Winds E'ly reducing in velocity later in day. Light sea with a moderate swell from the NE. Visibility good throughout period. Flying conditions good.

13 April 1945 (L/12)

Sunrise 0610                      Sunset 1851

Scattered low and middle clouds. Visibility good throughout period. Average winds ESE'ly 5 to 10 knots. Sea slight. Flying conditions good throughout period.

## PART III. Continued

(CONFIDENTIAL)

14 April 1945 (L/13)  
Sunrise 0609                      Sunset 1852

A few low cumulus type clouds throughout period. Visibility good. Surface winds ENE'ly 8 to 12 knots. Sea slight, swell from the ESE. Flying conditions excellent.

15 April 1945 (L/14)  
Sunrise 0608                      Sunset 1855

A few scattered cumulus type clouds. Visibility good throughout period. Haze aloft, restricting vertical visibility. Surface winds ESE, 4 to 8 knots. Sea calm. Flying conditions good.

16 April 1945 (L/15)  
Sunrise 0608                      Sunset 1852

Scattered cumulus clouds. Visibility above 15 miles except in late evening then restricted to 10 miles by haze. Surface winds E'ly 5 to 7 knots. Sea calm. Flying conditions good.

17 April 1945 (L/16)  
Sunrise 0607                      Sunset 1853

A few scattered cumulus clouds. Visibility good except when reduced from 12 miles to 6 to 8 miles by haze in early morning and late afternoon. Winds at surface ENE'ly, 7 to 9 knots. Sea calm. Flying conditions average.

18 April 1945 (L/17)  
Sunrise 0606                      Sunset 1854

Scattered high and low clouds. Visibility good. Surface winds SE'ly 11 to 14 knots. Sea slight with swell from the SE. Flying conditions good.

19 April 1945 (L/18)  
Sunrise 0605                      Sunset 1854

Mostly clear skies, a few scattered upper and lower clouds. Visibility good. A moderate sea and swell. Surface winds S'ly 15 to 20 knots, veering to SW'ly. Flying conditions good.

20 April 1945 (L/19)  
Sunrise 0604                      Sunset 1855

Broken to overcast skies with rain during passage of cold front. Visibility 4 to 6 miles due to thick haze. Surface wind N'y 15 to 22 knots. Sea moderate with N'y swell. Flying conditions undesirable.

21 April 1945 (L/20)  
Sunrise 0603                      Sunset 1855

Broken to scattered high and low clouds. Visibility generally excellent. Surface winds slowly veering from N to ENE 10 to 15 knots. Sea slight with the swell from ENE. Flying conditions good.

22 April 1945 (L/21)  
Sunrise 0602                      Sunset 1855

Broken to overcast, high middle and low clouds. Winds E'y 9 to 12 knots. Visibility good. Sea slight with a E'y swell. Flying conditions average.

23 April 1945 (L/22)  
Sunrise 0601                      Sunset 1856

Sky coverage broken to overcast with a rain shower in mid-morning. Pre-frontal weather reduced visibility to 4 to 6 miles. Surface winds S'y, 5 to 10 knots. State of the sea slight to calm. Flying conditions undesirable.

24 April 1945 (L/23)  
Sunrise 0600                      Sunset 1856

Overcast skies with passage of warm front. Light intermittent rain and visibility reduced to 4 to 5 miles. Wind moderate veering from E'y to S'y. Sea slight to calm with swell from SE. Flying conditions average to undesirable.

25 April 1945 (L/24)  
Sunrise 0559                      Sunset 1858

Overcast skies all period. Intermittent light rain during early morning and afternoon. Visibility 8 to 12 miles. Surface winds veering from S'y to NNW'y. Sea calm. Flying conditions average.

PART III. Continued

(CONFIDENTIAL)

26 April 1945 (L/25)  
Sunrise 0603                      Sunset 1901

Overcast skies all period. A few light scattered rain showers. Surface wind N'ly, 4 to 7 knots. Sea calm. Flying conditions average, Good to average visibility.

27 April 1945 (L/26)  
Sunrise 0600                      Sunset 1859

Overcast to broken middle and lower clouds. Squally weather in early part of period. Surface winds northeasterly, 8 to 16 knots. Visibility average to good all period. Sea slight. Swell from ENE. Flying conditions average.

28 April 1945 (L/27)  
Sunrise 0548                      Sunset 1847

Scattered high and low clouds. Ceiling and visibility unlimited. Surface winds northeasterly, 15 to 20 knots. Sea moderate. Swell from ENE. Flying conditions average. Light rain shower during morning period.

29 April 1945 (L/28)  
Sunrise 0558                      Sunset 1901

A few scattered cumulus type clouds. Ceiling and visibility unlimited. Surface winds easterly, 15 to 17 knots. Sea moderate. Swell from ESE. Flying conditions average.

30 April 1945 (L/29)  
Sunrise 0558                      Sunset 1901

Scattered cirrus and cumulus type clouds. A rain shower in early morning. Winds ENEasterly, 13 to 15 knots. The sea slight with a easterly swell. Flying conditions good.

1 May 1945 (L/30)  
Sunrise 0557                      Sunset 1901

Broken to scattered high and lower type clouds. Visibility good. Sea slight. Swell from SE. Flying conditions good.



PART III Continued.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

2 May 1945 (L/31)

Sunrise 0557 Sunset 1902.

Overcast throughout period with high, middle and low clouds. Cold front passage at 1700 with winds shifting from S to NNW. Swell also changing from S'ly quadrant to N'ly quadrant. Rain light to moderate and steady, later becoming intermittent. Visibility reduced only during frontal passage. Flying conditions, average to undesirable to bad.

3 May 1945 (L/32)

Sunrise 0556 Sunset 1902.

Low overcast of stratocumulus. Light intermittent rain first half of period. Visibility average. Winds N'ly, N'ly swell. Flying conditions average.

4 May 1945 (L/33)

Sunrise 0555 Sunset 1903.

Anchored in Kerama Retto. Cloudy in early part of period, decreasing to scattered and remaining scattered all period. Cumulus and Alto-Cumulus type clouds. Thick smoke and haze obscured visibility in mid period. Source of phenomenon was produced by Naval smoke craft. High cirrus clouds appeared late in period. Sea all day was calm, while underway it was slight, and the swell from the E. Flying conditions were average to undesirable due to thick smoke and haze.

Standard Observations of 4 May, 1945.

<u>Time</u>	<u>Flying Cond.</u>	<u>State of Sea</u>	<u>Temp.</u>	<u>Dew Pt.</u>	<u>Wind Dir. and Vel.</u>	<u>High Clouds</u>	<u>Low Clouds Amt. Height</u>	<u>Ceil- ing</u>	<u>Vis.</u>	<u>Weather</u>
0800	Good	Calm	76	70	ENE 2	- - -	Cu Few 2500'	Unl.	8	Clear
1200	Good	Calm	73.5	67	NNE 8	Ac Few	Cu 1 3000'	Unl.	8	Scattered
1600	Good	Calm	74	70	E 8	Ac Few	Cu 3 1500'	Unl.	8	Scattered
1800	Good	Very Slight	74	--	E 10	Ci Ac Few	Cu 6 1500'	1500'	8	Broken

## PART III. Continued

(CONFIDENTIAL)

May 5, 1945 (L/34)  
0550                      Sunset 1850

Few to scattered cirrus and alto-cumulus with lower broken cumulus. Visibility good. Moderate sea with a moderate N'ly. Surface winds, estimated, NE 8-12 knots. Flying conditions average.

May 6, 1945 (L/35)  
Sunrise 0520                      Sunset 1845

Broken skies becoming overcast in afternoon with high cirrus-stratus and lower cumulus and strato-cumulus. Surface winds, estimated NE'ly 21-24 knots. Visibility generally good. Light rain shower in evening from broken built up cumulus. Passed through cold front of weak stable wave during night. Average sea and moderate N to NE swell. Flying conditions generally good .

May 7, 1945 (L/36)  
Sunrise 0530                      Sunset 1820

Broken middle and lower scattered clouds during most of day with few high cirrus. Surface winds, estimated, NE to E 10-14 knots. Visibility good. Slight sea with slight NNE'ly to E'ly swell. Light rain shower toward evening. Flying conditions good.

May 8, 1945 (L/37)  
Sunrise 0528                      Sunset 1803

Ship remained under influence of unstable warm air mass. Rain most of the day from overcast skies. Visibility 6 miles except in heavy precipitation when it fell to less than 1 miles. Surface winds E to SE 8-10 knots. Moderate sea with slight E to SE swell. Flying conditions undesirable to average.

May 9, 1945 (L/38)  
Sunrise 0620                      Sunset 1854

Overcast skies with broken middle and lower scattered clouds. Slight rain shower during morning. Slight sea and slight E'ly swell. Flying conditions average. Anchored Ulithi 0903.

A. PERFORMANCE OF OWN ORDNANCE MATERIAL.

1. Detailed Information on Ship's Gunnery.

ANTI-AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT FOR 4 MAY 1945

First Attack

- (1.) Surprise attack: No
- (2.) Method of picking plane up: Radar. Type of set SC
- (a) Lookout spotter who later was first to pick up plane with binoculars: JONES, Edward V., S2c, 251-70-95
- (3.) Range plane was picked up: The raid was picked up at 30 miles initially by radar and designated by bearing to the lookouts who later picked up one of the planes of the raid visually with binoculars at a distance of 11,000 to 12,000 yards coming out of a cloud at the exact designation as reported by C.I.C.
- (4.) Number of planes: One.
- (5.) Type of plane: Japanese fighter identified as a Tony.  
Type of attack: Suicide dive.
- (6.) Speed and altitude: First sighted at below intermediate elevation moving fast to the left; later turned and increased speed in his dive toward the ship.
- (7.) Guns firing: All the port battery 40mm and 20mm guns as well as several guns of Sector One, which were able to bear on the target across the flight deck, and the starboard after 40mm quad mount. Other starboard side guns were fouled by planes spotted aft on the flight deck. These guns were instructed to take over the sector coverage of other mounts and groups firing on the off side where the action occurred.

Size and number: Seven 40mm Twins, two 40mm Quads, and sixteen 20mm guns.

Method of control: Mostly Mark 14 Sight.

Method of spotting: Tracer.

- (8.) The following expenditures are listed by mounts, guns, and groups, with totals shown:

40mm MountsStarboard Battery

Mount 1 - - - 0 rounds  
 Mount 3 - - - 6 rounds  
 Mount 5 - - - 0 rounds  
 Mount 7 - - - 0 rounds  
 Mount 9 - - - 30 rounds  
 Mount 11 - -200 rounds

Port Battery

Mount 2 - - - 16 rounds  
 Mount 4 - - - 92 rounds  
 Mount 6 - - - 56 rounds  
 Mount 8 - - - 45 rounds  
 Mount 10 - - -70 rounds  
 Mount 12 - - 120 rounds

5"/38

Gun 1 - - - - 0 rounds  
 Gun 2 - - - - 0 rounds

20mm GroupsStarboard Battery

Group 0 - Gun 01 - - - 1 round  
 Gun 02 - - - 0 rounds  
 Gun 03 - - - 0 rounds  
 Group 1 - Gun 11 - - -50 rounds  
 Gun 12 - - -50 rounds  
 Gun 13 - - -50 rounds  
 Gun 14 - - - 0 rounds  
 Gun 15 - - - 0 rounds  
 Group 3 - Gun 31 - - -45 rounds  
 Gun 32 - - -45 rounds  
 Gun 33 - - -45 rounds  
 Gun 34 - - - 0 rounds  
 Gun 35 - - -45 rounds

Port Battery

Group 2 - Gun 21 - - 60 rounds  
 Gun 22 - - 60 rounds  
 Gun 23 - - 60 rounds  
 Group 4 - Gun 41 - - -60 rounds  
 Gun 42 - - -60 rounds  
 Gun 43 - - -60 rounds  
 Gun 44 - - -60 rounds  
 Gun 45 - - -60 rounds

Total: 5"/38 - - - - 0 rounds  
 40mm mounts - 645 rounds  
 20mm guns - - 861 rounds

Grand Total 1496 rounds

(9.) Percent service allowance expended:

40mm - - - 1.9%  
 20mm - - - 1.3%  
 5"/38 - - 0.0%

(10.) Approximate time tracking to first shot: Average 15 seconds  
 for all guns able to bear.

(11.) Approximate time of first hits: 5 seconds.

(12.) Approximate time from first shot to last shot: 30 seconds.


(13.) Approximate position angle at open fire: 20 degrees average  
 for all guns firing.

PART IV Continued.

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- (14.) Approximate position angle at cease fire: 25 degrees average for all guns firing.
- (15.) Approximate bearing at first shot: 235 degrees relative.
- (16.) Approximate bearing at last shot: From 060 degrees to 210 degrees relative, depending upon parallax of the guns firing and the operation of the safety cut-out cams. Target was under fire continuously from the first shot until no gun on any part of the battery could bear on the target which crashed in the water close aboard starboard side amidships.
- (17.) Approximate range at first shot: Open fire order given at approximately 8000 yards; first gun commenced firing at approximately 7000 yards, well beyond maximum range of weapons that could bear on target.
- (18.) Approximate range at last shot: Guns were still firing when target crashed in water close aboard on starboard hand.
- (19.) Approximate altitude of bomb release: None. Type bomb: None
- (20.) Approximate range torpedo release: None. Size of torpedo: None
- (21.) Hits on ship: None. Was ship strafed: No. Size gun: None.
- (22.) Number near bomb misses: None. Casualties from near misses: None.
- (23.) Planes shot down: Sure: One. Possible: None. Damage: None.
- (24.) Details of damage to target by gunfire if available: Plane was observed to be trailing black smoke after being taken under fire; later observed to be trailing heavy white smoke as he passed over ship before crashing.
- (25.) Performance of ammunition: Excellent. No jams or hangfires were reported.
- (26.) Pattern size: Large, principally because of poor visibility at this time of evening and loss of precision tracking due to contrasting illumination presented by tracers.
- (27.) No reports of material failures were received and all equipment operated efficiently.

(28.) Sketch:



Second Attack

- (1.) Surprise attack: No.
- (2.) Method of picking plane up: Radar. Type of set: SC and SP  
Plane was picked up by radar at a distance of 12 miles as reported from C.I.C. However, it is believed that this was one plane of a six to eight plane raid which split up after being tally-hoed by combat air patrol being directed by radar pickets in immediate area.
- (a) Plane was seen with binoculars coming out of the clouds going right through a lighted break in the overcast, almost simultaneously by starboard gun control and Sector Three lookouts.
- (3.) Range plane was picked up: Raid was picked up and designated from C.I.C. to lookout control at a distance of 12 miles and closed until seen through binoculars on the starboard quarter at a distance of about 8000 yards. The plane then passed into cloud formation and was later seen coming out of cloud directly astern at a distance of about three thousand yards.
- (4.) Number of planes: One.
- (5.) Type of plane: Fighter-bomber, identified as a Nick by recognition and evidence of plane parts found in the ship.  
Type of attack: Suicide dive-bombing.
- (6.) Speed and altitude: At first visual contact it was intermediate and fast; at second contact it was at about twenty degrees elevation in a glide and coming exceedingly fast.
- (7.) Guns firing: All guns of the 40mm and 20mm battery that could bear fired on the target on the starboard quarter when given the initial commence firing order, and as target became obscured in cloud cover, a check fire cease firing gong was sounded in order to clear up visual cover of the sector. Visibility was so low, because of the period of twilight that tracer illumination would have cause loss of target vision for new open fire designation when target closed to attack again out of clouds. All guns which could bear again reopened fire immediately as soon as target came through cloud directly astern at a low angle.

Size and number: Seven 40mm Twins and two 40mm Quads. Eighteen 20mm guns, or all guns that could bear on the target.

Method of control: Mk.14 Sight was not used for the most part after firing commenced, because of the blinding and obscuring effect of tracer during this period of low visibility.



Method of spotting: Tracer.

(8.) Ammunition expended:

20mm Groups

40mm Mounts

Starboard Battery

Starboard Battery

Mount 1 - - - - 80 rounds  
 Mount 3 - - - - 208 rounds  
 Mount 5 - - - - 200 rounds  
 Mount 7 - - - - 160 rounds  
 Mount 9 - - - - 100 rounds  
 Mount 11 - - - 200 rounds

Group 0 - Gun 01 - - - 0 rounds  
 Gun 02 - - - 0 rounds  
 Gun 03 - - - 0 rounds

Group 1 - Gun 11 - - - 120 rounds  
 Gun 12 - - - 120 rounds  
 Gun 13 - - - 120 rounds  
 Gun 14 - - - 120 rounds  
 Gun 15 - - - 120 rounds

Port Battery

Mount 2 - - - - 0 rounds  
 Mount 4 - - - - 0 rounds  
 Mount 6 - - - - 0 rounds  
 Mount 8 - - - - 8 rounds  
 Mount 10 - - - 6 rounds  
 Mount 12 - - - 100 rounds

Group 3 - Gun 31 - - - 64 rounds  
 Gun 32 - - - 64 rounds  
 Gun 33 - - - 64 rounds  
 Gun 34 - - - 64 rounds  
 Gun 35 - - - 64 rounds

Port Battery

5"/38  
 Gun 1 - - - - 0 rounds  
 Gun 2 - - - - 0 rounds

Group 2 - Gun 21 - - - 45 rounds  
 Gun 22 - - - 45 rounds  
 Gun 23 - - - 45 rounds

Group 4 - Gun 41 - - - 45 rounds  
 Gun 42 - - - 45 rounds  
 Gun 43 - - - 45 rounds  
 Gun 44 - - - 45 rounds  
 Gun 45 - - - 45 rounds

Total: 5"/38 - - - - 0 rounds  
 40mm Mounts - 1062 rounds  
 20mm Guns - - 1280 rounds

(9.) Percent service allowance expended:


40mm - - - - 3.2%  
 20mm - - - - 1.9%  
 5"/38 - - - 0.0%

(10.) Approximate time tracking to first shot: Three seconds on initial open fire. Immediately as the target became unobscured the second time coming out of cloud for suicide attack.

(11.) Approximate time of first hits: One second after commencing fire on second contact.

- (12.) Approximate time from first shot to last shot: Seven seconds during first period of fire, five seconds during last.
- (13.) Approximate position angle at open fire: Average of 20 degrees at both commence firing orders.
- (14.) Approximate position angle at cease fire: Average 20 degrees at first check fire; average 22 degrees at final cease fire.
- (15.) Approximate bearing at first shot: 130 degrees relative at first commence fire; 175 degrees relative at second commence fire.
- (16.) Approximate bearing at last shot: 165 degrees at first check fire; 180 degrees at final shot fired.
- (17.) Approximate range first shot: 7000 yards at first commence fire; 3000 yards at second commence fire.
- (18.) Approximate range at last shot: 5000 yards at check fire; 50 yards at final shot.
- (19.) Approximate altitude of bomb release: 50 feet.  
Type bomb: No information, but believe it to be a 250 KG or bigger.
- (20.) Approximate range torpedo release: None. Size of torpedo: None.
- (21.) Hits on ship: Plane suicide dived into flight deck amidships just after dropping a bomb. Bomb penetrated flight deck at about one third the distance from the after to the forward elevator.  
Was ship strafed: Yes.  
Size gun: 37mm.
- (22.) Number near bomb misses: None. Casualties from near misses: None.
- (23.) Planes shot down: Sure: One. Possible: None. Damage: None.
- (24.) Details of damage to target by gunfire if available: This plane was on fire from engine to engine and dropped part of his wing before crashing on flight deck. Plane was seen to receive hits in forward part at a range of about 600 yards.
- (25.) Performance of ammunition: Excellent.
- (26.) Pattern sizes: Large, due to late twilight and loss of precision tracking resulting from contrasting illumination presented by tracers.
- (27.) No reports of materiel failures were received and all equipment operated efficiently.

(26.) Sketch:



## 2. Performance of Aircraft Bombs, Torpedoes, Mines, Rockets, Ammunition, and other Aircraft Ordnance Material and Equipment.

Ammunition expended during the Okinawa Operation, 21 March to 4 May 1945, by aircraft.

ROCKETS

3.25 inch rocket bodies	-	39
3.25 inch rocket motors	-	1,567
5 inch rocket motors	-	992
5 inch rocket bodies, Mk. 5	-	992
5 inch rocket bodies, Mk. 1	-	1,506
Rocket fuzes, Mk. 149	-	54

NAPALM

Type "C"	-	760 lbs.
E4R1 Igniters		17

BOMBS

500# G.P. AN-M64	-	389
500# SAP AN-M59	-	24
100# G.P. AN-M30	-	1,430
350# ADB AN-M54	-	4

FUZES

AN-Mk. 219	-	374
AN-M 101A2	-	387
AN-M 103A1	-	1,683
AN-M 100A2	-	698
AN-M 115	-	100

PRIMER DETONATORS

M14 non-delay	-	1,417
M14 .1 sec. delay	-	1,191
M14 .01 sec. delay	-	294

AMMUNITION

.50 caliber	-	228,000
.30 caliber	-	13,000

Ammunition lost due to enemy action on the night of 4 May 1945. This ammunition unless otherwise indicated exploded from the heat of the fire or was in planes jettisoned from the flight deck.

ROCKETS

3.25 motors (water soaked)	-	84
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FUZES

AN-M 103A1	-	70
AN-M 100A2	-	55
AN-M 101A2	-	25
AN-M 102A2	-	60
AN-M 230 - Mod. 4	-	20
AN-M 115	-	45
Mk. 149	-	80
E4R1 Igniters W.P.	-	45

AIRCRAFT FLARES

Mk. 6 (Jettisoned during fire)	-	6
--------------------------------	---	---

AMMUNITION

.30 caliber	-	5,000
.50 caliber	-	125,000

Bombs, fuzes and aviation ordnance equipment performed satisfactorily with the following two exceptions:

- (1) E4R1 W.P. igniters failed to work in 25% of drops.
- (2) In some cases explosions were noticed just outside the barrels of the .50 cal. B.A.M. after the guns had heated up as a result of strafing runs. It is thought that the A.P.I. exploded as a result of barrel heat.

#### B. PERFORMANCE OF ENEMY AVIATION ORDNANCE AND EQUIPMENT.

Strafing from enemy aircraft observed by this ship on the second attack, but resulted in no casualties.

Effectiveness of aircraft bombs.

In the view of the damage done (see Damage Report Enclosure "B" there is some question as to the total amount of explosive force carried by the plane. The following is the opinion of the Ship's Aviation Ordnance Officer and a trained Bomb Disposal Officer serving aboard. At least part of the bomb load of the Nick suicide plane that struck this ship was a Japanese Army 250 Kg. (550 pounds) General Purpose High Explosive Bomb. The body of a B-4(a) Army Mechanical Impact Tail Fuze was recovered from the wreckage. So far as is known this fuze fits only the bomb described above. A single elliptical pattern of shrapnel holes on the hangar deck, though rather large more probably than not, indicates that only one bomb exploded there.

In the event there was only one bomb, the explosive used was exceedingly effective if not extremely powerful in view of the extensive explosion damage to the hangar and flight decks.

## C. NARRATED REPORT OF SHIP'S GUNNERY ACTION ON EVENING OF 4 May, 1945.

The Gunnery problems of this action were numerous, but clear cut, which made for quick analysis for immediate designation of orders to the Ship's Batteries. The following narrative, which may, in parts, be a repetition of the foregoing report, will, however, show the general situation from a gunnery standpoint and at the same time present a critical summary.

Three quarters of an hour before the ship weighed anchor from Kerama Retto Harbor there were Bogies reported on the screen on a true bearing southwest. This situation was not surprising since the harbor had been under numerous snooper attacks practically all morning. All guns of the 40mm battery (10 twin and 2 quad 40mm Mounts) were manned all day with partial crews and the gun and lookout crews were again alerted for any possible sort of attack.

The ship weighed anchor at about 1830 and stood out to sea. The gun and lookout crews were being relieved in small groups for supper. By the time the ship was well clear of the Torpedo Nets of the Harbor, the Officer-of-the-Watch in the Combat Intelligence Center ordered the Gun Control and Lookout Circuit Talker to report that there were again a large group of Bogies coming from the southwest, estimated to be a six to eight plane raid moving rapidly on a course directly towards our general position, distance about 50 miles. The Commanding Officer ordered the ship to General Quarters and the gun stations were fully manned and ready within two to three minutes. The Gunnery-Combat Intelligence Center Liaison Officer then took the gunnery control designation circuit and continued to report ranges, bearings and angles of elevation from the SP and SC Radar. We who were in Gun Control were quite apprehensive at this time because we knew that the general situation was far from good as far as conditions for good visual gunnery were concerned. The dusk and sunset period was an ideal time for enemy aircraft attack. The interference of land and cloud cover gave unusual opportunity for fast bombing or suicide raids. The weather was cool with large low hanging cumulus clouds partially shutting off the slanting rays of the sinking sun. The water was clear blue which later turned to a slate grey as twilight closed down. Each billowy cloud formation in the west had tinges of various shades of red and pink, which presented a beautiful scene, but which portended that the gunnery and lookout job would be that much harder.

We had no air coverage at this time from our own planes as we were not yet clear of the harbor sufficiently to turn into the wind and launch them. There were a number of friendly planes in the area and this made our job doubly hard because of the necessity of careful recognition in the twilight period.

Sound power telephone circuits at best are a poor substitute for a good Target Designation System to twelve 40mm Mounts, twenty-one 20mm Mounts and two 5"/38 Mounts. However, Sector Control procedures were carried out extremely well for both gun and lookout coverage.

Gun Control was constantly informed of the closing range and direction of the enemy raid. A report was received that at about thirty miles four of the enemy planes had been shot down by Corsairs of the Combat Air Patrol that had been vectored out by the beach fighter direction station to intercept them. One was reported to have gotten away from them.

Combat Intelligence Center again picked up what was apparently the enemy plane that had not been shot down by the Corsairs at a distance of about 16 miles. The ship was on a southerly heading maneuvering towards the wind for launching of aircraft. This plane was closing the ship's position on a course that would draw it across the port bow.

At the exact bow bearing predicted this plane was seen and recognized as probably enemy and was coming out of the cloud cover drawing left heading for Kerama Retto Harbor. His distance, at first, was about five or six miles and had closed slightly to about 8000 yards when the order to "Commence firing" was given. The hail of bullets and tracer streams opposing his closing course and final dive were so terrific that the whole sky was lighted up (Refer to Enclosure D). In spite of this, his attack was so determined and fast moving that the plane continued its final suicide dive towards the ship in the middle of the pattern of gun fire. Every gun on the ship that could bear was firing at maximum rate at the plane until it crashed dived into the water on the starboard side where it missed the starboard guns by not over 10 feet. Attached photographs show the plane smoking badly. No one was hurt by this near miss. No casualties or failures of equipment were reported, bores were clear and there was an expenditure of 1496 rounds of ammunition at this target. Ammunition performance was excellent with the exception that in spite of repeated hits with A.P. and H.E.I.T. 40 mm ammunition and 20mm slugs the target did not disintegrate. Gun crews showed magnificent morale and determination throughout this attack as evidenced by photograph showing guns firing at the target which had been masked by planes on deck until a fraction of a second before. The general feeling of elation caught everyone cheering on the gun stations.

Immediately the order was given for all guns to return to their firing sector, so as not to be caught napping by any subsequent attack. Every eye and thought was again concentrated on searching the edges of the lowering clouds and the few clear spaces that were left in the west.

This action occurred just about the time of sunset and our thoughts, of course, turned to the possibility of darkness closing down for a more quiet night. The Air Department was again busy getting several planes ready and warmed up for launching. Two were gotten into the air very shortly after that. Careful consideration as to their location over the ship was given so as not to chance shooting in their direction.

Not over 20 minutes after the first action had occurred the Combat Intelligence Center again reported a Bogie at a distance of 12 miles coming out of the west low over the water. This was on our starboard beam. In this direction the sky was dark grey. There were a few clear spaces higher up in the sky off the starboard quarter, toward the northwest, in which the diminishing rays of fading light still were bright.

Our own recently launched aircraft were vectored out to intercept this second plane and everyone saw them as they passed over the ship. They had just gone into a large cloud three miles on our starboard beam when the enemy plane appeared to their right coming out of the same cloud into clear space on the starboard quarter. Again the Combat Intelligence Center reports of plots were exact in their designation from the SP and SC Radar. The order to "commence fire" was immediately given. The tracer streams were blinding to Mark 14 Sight control because of the intensity of automatic fire which resulted in larger than usual pattern. The target went into another very black cloud astern of the ship. We checked fire in order to reorient the battery for a renewed attack and also for purpose of clearing the sectors of tracer streams to be able to see the movement of the target. Sure enough it did not fail our expectations and the plane popped out of the cloud 3000 yards astern in a final dive coming at a rate of over 350 knots. All guns that could bear opened up instantaneously. The target was seen to burst into flames at about 600 yards from the ship. His final crash on the flight deck came just after dropping his bomb. The flame and fury of the percussion was indescribable.

Careful estimation by surviving mount crews and battery officers indicate that approximately 2342 rounds of 20 and 40 mm ammunition were expended without jams or material casualties. There was some confusion in Gun Control produced by men coming down from above. This condition soon corrected itself. Telephone communications were still intact at this point to most stations. Crews were ordered to re-man the guns, train to their sectors, and elevate for further attacks. Those stations that still had personnel prepared to carry on. However, the resulting fires prevented further communications and required abandonment of the majority of the midship stations. Gun Control was then removed to Group Zero for the purpose of at least controlling the undamaged mounts of the forward battery. It was later learned that battery officers maintained similar control of the after mounts and poop deck 40 mm quads.



PART IV Continued.

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The fire discipline was excellent in spite of the Target Designation problems. It is pointed out that this system breaks down with the high noise level inherent with automatic weapon batteries or when aircraft are turning up. Sector Control procedures worked very well so that all targets were taken under fire well beyond maximum ranges. Training procedures have been carried out in accordance with Fleet Gunnery Instructions for reverting control to the respective battery officers at the mounts. In this case the procedure worked perfectly.

Armor Piercing projectiles were used intermittantly with clips of H.E.I.T. but did not deflect or disintegrate this target. The target was identified as a twin engine enemy fighter bomber (Nick) and parts of the plane were found with cast steel armor plate from sections of wing leading edges. It is possible that the plane would possibly have fallen in flames short of the ship if it would have had another 1000 yards to go.

Observation of a total of five separate suicide attacks on this ship since October 20 at Leyte Gulf indicates the very doubtful ability of 40mm and 20mm machine guns knocking down or disintegrating well built armored planes. These guns may deflect attacking planes to near misses, but are relatively ineffective for demolishing them. The 5"/38 caliber battery of this class vessel have proved useless in action to date. Their maximum sight angle settings is 12,000 yards for surface targets and only 14° elevation is available on any bearing for aerial targets. V.T. Fuzed Projectiles were loaded and the guns ready to fire, if given the opportunity, but at no time was this possible because of the targets approach above 14° elevation.

The General Electric Amplidyne Power Drive for the 40mm Mounts is whole heartily endorsed and has proved its value under the worst conditions. One unit continued to operate faultlessly while submerged under three or four feet of water (Refer to Enclosure D). Enclosed photographs shows amplifier panels, wiring, and amplidyne unit badly burned but still functioning.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

PART V. DAMAGE

A. Battle Damage to Own Units

1. To Ship (See copy of Battle Damage Report appended marked Enclosure (A)).

B. Battle Damage to Enemy Units

1. By Surface Ship.

- a. See PART IV page 3 Anti-Aircraft Action Report for 4 May 1945, first attack and page 7 Anti-Aircraft Action Report for 4 May 1945, second attack.

## A. SPECIAL COMMENTS AND INFORMATION.

## Comments on Air Operations, Barriers, Catapults and Plane Handling.

During the period 21 March to 4 May, this ship engaged in extensive night carrier combat operations. In light of the experience gained, ships of this class are deemed to be excellent night carriers.

Air Group THIRTY-THREE came aboard in Pearl Harbor after a rather long training period on the West Coast, and a short but intensive night training period in NACTU (Pac), Barbers' Point. It was equipped with six TBM-3E, sixteen F6F-5E, eight F6F-5N; and one F6F-5P. The Air Group, though lacking in combat experience, performed admirably.

Prior to departure Pearl Harbor, the ship made two short training cruises. Enroute to the forward area, air operations were greatly curtailed because of the necessity of making good the required speed of advance and because of the excessive amount of work necessary to put newly received planes, radio and radar into commission. Routine day patrols were flown enroute to the operating area. During the preliminary phases of the operation, the Air Group was used primarily as a day group, with two or four night fighters in Condition 11 or airborne throughout darkness.

Upon joining up with CarDiv 22, under command of Admiral W. D. Sample, night operations were commenced and rapidly superseded our day operations. Between 24 March and 4 May, 422 night catapult launches and 151 night landings were completed.

Day work consisted in pre-"Love Day" strikes, close support of the ground forces on Okinawa, smoker missions, DDT spraying; propaganda missions, air drop supply missions, anti-submarine patrols and combat air patrols. Night work consisted of dusk and dawn strikes and combat air patrols over Sakishima Gunto, heckler missions from dusk to dawn, and local night combat air patrols.

The TBM-3E is an excellent all-around night aircraft. Indirect red cockpit lighting is, however, neither indirect nor red, and was replaced by the old fluorescent lighting system prior to departure from Pearl Harbor. The instrument panel was modified so that both radar altimeter and sensitive altimeter were on the left side of the board. This move considerably simplified night carrier landings. The F6F-5E and F6F-5N also performed well, but in becoming a fighter-bomber, the F6F has lost considerable of its performance as a fighter. Cylinder head temperatures were consistently higher than was found to be the case with the preceding air group, which was not rocket or radar equipped. Rate of climb and speed both suffered from the additional weight and drag. This is believed to be justified, however, in view of our present air superiority, the advent of other high performance carrier fighters and the adaption of the F4U to carrier operations.

Both the F6F and TBM should be furnished with standardized cockpits. This situation does not now exist, and is seriously inconvenient and uncomfortable to a night carrier air group, as well as difficult to correct during an operation in the case of replacement aircraft.

Pilot equipment has improved considerably. However, we have not as yet seen a goggle-oxygen mask combination with a wide enough field of vision in the vertical plane. Nylon flying suits have proved to be impractical in the latitudes of the current operation.

The ship has numerous minor shortcomings, most of which have been or can be overcome. The most glaring fault lies in the barriers. This ship has two arresting gear wires reeved on each arresting gear unit except for number nine wire which has its own unit. The number nine wire has been caught once - by a plane which had already hit number one barrier. Numbers one and four barriers are double reeved on one unit. The other barriers are singlereeved. If either number one or four barriers are struck, the other is of no value. On one occasion, one and four barriers were the only two left in commission after a barrier crash at night, with planes remaining in the air. An F6F-5N subsequently caught number seven wire and continued to eliminate both remaining barriers plus seven planes. The barrier run-out when suddenly stopped, as is the case when the second barrier is struck, will invariably cause the purchase cable to part. This fault can be overcome by re-reeving the barriers and number nine wire in such fashion that no two barriers are on the same unit.

In one respect, the barriers themselves are improperly designed. In a normal arrested landing, the arresting gear wire is run out in a plane almost parallel to the deck. The flush deck sheaves are designed for this condition, and no difficulty has been encountered with the arresting gear installation. However, the same sheaves are used for the barriers, and have been an endless source of trouble. The barrier cross-deck pendants are considerably above the deck, and when struck by an aircraft, the runout is in both a forward and upward direction. This is especially true when the rotating propeller of the aircraft "picks up" the barrier. As a result of the use of sheaves designed for an entirely different function, barrier crashes almost always break the purchase cable over the lip of the sheave. Two or three hours work are required to pour new fittings, during which time the barriers are out of commission. This ship has reduced, but far from eliminated, this difficulty by constructing a padding composed of two layers of gasoline hose, served with safety wire, about six inches long between the lips of the sheave guard and the end fitting of the purchase cable. This increases the radius of the bend formed in the wire when the crash occurs. The only way, however, to effectively eliminate this problem lies in redesigning the sheave, or canting the present sheave at an angle of about 20° to the horizontal thwartship axis. It has been our experience that three barriers, functioning in succession, and on units identical with the arresting gear, will not absorb a force equal to that absorbed by one arresting gear wire and unit when caught properly by a tail hook.

The two HII catapults have functioned well. On one occasion a double bridle failed at night, resulting in a runaway shot and loss of one F6F-5N. It is believed that this was a result of improper fitting of the bridle to the shuttle, with the result that one bight slipped over the top of the shuttle. Because of the difficulty of inspecting for this situation at night, single bridles were substituted for all subsequent night operations.

In view of the fact that all night launches were by catapult, it became both necessary and desirable to reduce the catapult interval without increasing the danger of deforming or breaking the holdback tension rings during spotting on the catapult. This was accomplished by designing and using an auxiliary holdback hook with a hand release, which engaged the aircraft holdback fitting from below and stopped the plane about two inches short of its final position. After releasing this hook, a second man inserted the regular holdback hook and catapulting was completed. The launching officer used a pair of red lucite wands with three half-inch black stripes, which are believed to be more readily distinguishable than green wands, and have less effect on the pilots night vision.

Spotting on the catapults at night and spotting forward during darkness were materially assisted by the installation of countersunk luminous buttons along the dock edge, on the elevators, and on the catapult approach paths. These buttons are not visible to an aircraft in flight, nor to ships alongside, but are an invaluable aid to night handling of aircraft. Full use was made of the three jeeps and two tractors carried by the ship. Only through their use was the ship able to respot with a flight deck crew never in excess of twenty men. The standard fighter tow bar was used, and a lazy tong tail wheel tow bar was designed for the torpedo planes. As few planes as possible were left on deck at night and sufficient pilots were called to taxi forward for landings.

The training of the air group was exceptionally good, but one or two deficiencies were noted. First, the night fighter pilots were highly trained specialists in intercept work, but had little training in day tactics, escort, and other phases of day work. They were not sufficiently familiar with the APS-4 radar gear of the day fighter to fully exploit its advantages on night heckler missions. Also, the day fighter pilots did not have sufficient training in the use of their radar. Both of the above situations were a direct result of the late delivery of the APS-4 equipped F6F-5E aircraft to the squadron. The torpedo pilots, having had their aircraft during a longer part of the training period, were better trained in the use of radar. Training continued for all pilots during the operation, and considerable progress was made. The only other apparent training deficiency noted was the lack of experience in locating and attacking well disguised installations. All bombing, strafing, and rocket attacks during the training period had been made on clearly defined, artificial targets.

Bombs and fuzes functioned well, though when tail fuzes only were prescribed the percentage of duds increased.

PART VI Continued.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

The newly installed bomb elevator was of inestimable value, but a constant source of trouble, as the installation had not been completed in the Navy Yard. Mark VI flares were used by night hecklers with considerable success, though the pilots had not been trained in their use over land prior to this operation. Napalm was carried in 100 gallon TBM tanks on the fighter wing racks because this tank is more nearly symmetrical and because this method of suspension and release is more dependable. When only one E4RI igniter was used, about 25% duds occurred, in spite of the fact that additional black powder was placed around the annular groove at the end of the igniter. This was eliminated by cutting a hole to receive a second igniter in the upper portion of the after part of the tank. No tail vanes were available for this tank, but reasonable accuracy was achieved. Rockets were very successful during daylight against properly selected targets, but were of doubtful value at night. It was impossible to pick out suitable targets in most cases, and the pilot was blinded temporarily by the flash. It is recommended that shackles capable of carrying 100 lb. G.P. bombs be substituted for the rocket racks on all night fighters.

Coordination of strikes was unusually good, because this group flew mostly early morning, late afternoon, or night strikes, and the torpedo planes were escorted by the fighters with which they had trained. Because of this, this groups' losses to anti-aircraft fire were lower than those of other groups engaged in the same operation. Leadership of the air group was excellent as is evidenced by the results achieved.

It is recommended that the complement of night fighters be increased to ten planes because of the difficulty of night fighter maintenance. Day fighters should be reduced to fourteen, but the pilot complement should remain the same. The TBM complement should be increased to seven planes to allow an operating spare. The photographic fighter should be dropped and all special photographic missions flown by one of the day groups in the division. This proposed breakdown is based on the supposition that the present total complement be retained. A decrease to twenty-six planes would be advantageous from the maintenance standpoint, as wing changes, engine changes, and other similar repairs are slow and difficult when the hangar deck is full. However, thirty-one planes should be carried on departure for the operating area, as higher operational losses may be expected at the outset. Operational losses are, of course, higher at night than by day.

Night operations on the hangar deck were greatly hindered by the overhead lighting system. When the elevators are down, the lights are out. Standing red overhead lights should be added at the first opportunity, to enable the ordnance crew and hangar deck handling crews to work safely and efficiently when the elevators are down.

PART 1

Page 4

PART VI Continued.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

Frequently it was necessary, in spite of all the Task Unit Commander could do, for the Air Department to operate all day and all night. By increasing the complement of the Air Department this could be made practicable. Under the present personnel setup it is almost impossible to continue this double duty for more than two or three days. It should also be borne in mind that operating one plane is often just as difficult or more so than operating a full deckload.

This operation was terminated by a direct hit of a "Nick I" between the elevators, which destroyed all of the ships' aircraft except two night fighters which were airborne, and one fighter on the port catapult which was damaged. The flight and hangar decks and both elevators were damaged to such an extent as to require major repairs if not complete rebuilding.

PART VI.

CONFIDENTIAL

B. Air Operations.

a. Table of Sorties

Daily Total of Sorties (Omitting planes that did not reach target)

Date	Availability			AT TARGET				SHIP								
	Strike Sweeps			Support			CAP		DAD		ASP		Other			
	VF	VF(N)	VT	VF	VF(N)	VT	VF	VT	VF	VF(N)	VT	VF	VT	Remarks		
25 Mar	16	6	6			5			3		Smokers	12		4	2	Special Search
26 "	16	6	6			4			4		TASP	12		8		
27 "	17	6	6			4						13	2	12		
28 "	16	5	5			8						12	2	8		
29 "	16	5	5			3			1		Propaganda	12		8		
30 "	16	5	5		2	7						12		4		
31 "	15	5	5	12	2	5						12		8		
1 Apr	14	5	5	8	2	2			4		Smokers	9		8	2	
									2		DDT					
2 "	13	5	5				16	3			Ferry Hop	12		4		
3 "	12	5	2				4		1		Propaganda	5		2		
4 "	14	3	2				16					4		2		
5 "	14	4	2				16		2		DDT	4		3		
6 "	15	5	2				16		2		DDT	4		2		4: Ferry
7 "	13	5	2	5		3	32		1		Propaganda	8		2		
8 "	14	7	6	17		9						24		2		
9 "	12	7	4	8	4	4						24		2	4	
10 "	12	6	5	17	4	11						20				
11 "	12	7	5	8	4				1		Yonton	12		2		



PART VI.

B. Air Operations.

a. Table of Sorties.

Daily Total of Sorties (Omitting planes that did not reach Target)

Date	Availability			AT TARGET			SHIP			Other					
	VF	VF(N)	VT	Strike	Sweeps	Support	CAP	DAD	ASP						
	VF	VF(N)	VT	VF	VF(N)	VT	VF	VT	Remarks	VF	VF(N)	VT	VF	VT	Remarks
12 Apr	9	7	5												
13 "	9	5	5				8				8				
14 "	10	8	5			3	23		1: Propaganda	16		2	2		
									3: Supply Drop						
									3: TASP						
15 "	9	7	6				3				10				
16 "	7	5	4	8							20		4	4	
17 "	10	8	6	3		11	27								
18 "	11	8	6	8	14	4			1: Mess. Drop						
19 "	8	8	6	20	4	8			1: Photo.						
									1: Mess. Drop						
20 "	8	9	6								8			4	
21 "	10	8	6	12	8	10			2: Mess. Drop						
22 "	9	8	5	16	10	7			1: Mess. Drop						
									1: Sp. Search						
23 "	8	6	5	15	12	11			1: Mess. Drop						
24 "	8	6	5	8		4									
25 "	12	4	4												
26 "	12	4	5	15	4	4			2: Mess. Drop				9		Ferry

PART VI.

CONFIDENTIAL

B. Air Operations.

a. Table of Sorties.

Daily Total of Sorties (~~Outitting~~ planes that did not reach Target)

Date	Availability			AT TARGET			SHIP						
	VF	VF(N)	VT	Strike	Sweeps	Support	CAP	Other	CAP	DAD	ASP	Other	
	VF	VF(N)	VT	VF	VF(N)	VT	VF	VT	VF	VF(N)	VT	VF	VT
27 Apr	9	5	5	16	8	8							
28 "	13	5	5						1	Mess. Drop			
29 "	13	5	5	17	10	9			1	Mess. Drop			
30 "	12	5	4	15	12	7			1	Sp. Search	8	1	Mess. Drop
1 May	12	6	3	16	8	6		6	6	Sp. Search		1	Mess. Drop
												3	Ferry
2 "	13	8	6	8	6								
3 "	13	8	7	12		6						1	Mess. Drop
4 "	12	8	7								2		Landed Yontan airfield, Okinawa.

## PART VI.

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## Special Comments and Information.

## B. 2. Table of Bombs and Rockets dropped at target (Strafing sorties Marked\*)

FLGT.	DATE	OFF	TARGET ATTACKED		SORTIES		BOMBS & ROCKETS		FUSING	
			General	Specific	VF	VT	No.	Type	Nose	Tail
VT-1	:25Mar	:0745	Kerama Ret:	Beach,Cliffs:	5*	8	HVAR	Inst.	.02	Sec.
				Zamami Shima:		22	HVAR	Inst.	.02	Sec.
						50	100 lb. G.P.	Inst.	.1	Sec.
VT-2	:26 "	:0552	Kerama Ret:	Power House:	4*	32	HVAR	Inst.	.02	
						40	100 lb. G.P.	Inst.	.1	
VT-3	:27 "	:0930	Okinawa	Barracks	4*	32	HVAR	Inst.	.02	
						40	100 lb. G.P.	Inst.	.1	
VT-4	:28 "	:0743	Okinawa	AA Posit.	4*	11	HVAR	Inst.	.02	
						23	100 lb. G.P.	Inst.	.1	
				Bridge		6	HVAR	Inst.	.02	
				2 Luggers		4	HVAR	Inst.	.02	
				Seaplane		7	100 lb. G.P.	Inst.	.1	
				Sugar Mill		6	100 lb. G.P.	Inst.	.1	
				Gun Posits.		4	100 lb. G.P.	Inst.	.1	
						8	HVAR	Inst.	.02	
VT-5	:28 "	:1331	Okinawa	Gun Posits.	4*	40	100 lb. G.P.	Inst.	.1	
						31	HVAR	Inst.	.02	
VT-6A	:29 "	:0654	Okinawa	4 So. Towns:	1*	8	Mk. 26	Prop.		
				Gun Posit &		7	HVAR	Inst.	.02	
				Bldg.						
VT-6B	:29 "	:0932	Okinawa	2 StoryBldg:	3*	14	HVAR	Inst.	.02	
				Gun Posit.		16	100 lb. G.P.	Inst.	.1	
						10	HVAR	Inst.	.02	
				Revetment		14	100 lb. G.P.	Inst.	.1	
VF-1	:30 "	:0330	Okinawa	5 Airfields:	2*	12	HVAR	Inst.	.02	
VT-7	:30 "	:0745	Okinawa	Yontan Rev.:	3*	22	HVAR	Inst.	.02	
						30	100 lb. G.P.	Inst.	.1	
VT-8	:30 "	:1335	Okinawa	Oil Tank	4*	6	HVAR	Inst.	.02	
				Gun Posit.		26	HVAR	Inst.	.02	
				Gun Posit.		40	100 lb. G.P.	Inst.	.1	
VF-3	:31 "	:0330	Okinawa	Airfields	2*	10	HVAR	Inst.	.02	
				SupplyTruck:		2	HVAR	Inst.	.02	

## PART VI.

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## Special Comments and Information. (Continued).

## B. 2. Table of Bombs and Rockets dropped at target (Strafing sorties Marked\*)

FLGT.	DATE	OFF	TARGET ATTACKED		SORTIES		BOMBS & ROCKETS		FUSING	
			General	Specific	VF	VT	No.	Type	Nose	Tail
VF-4	31 Mar	1135	Okinawa	Barracks & installations	12*		78	HVAR	Inst.	.02
							20	100 lb. G.P.	Inst.	.1
VT-9	31 "	1325	Okinawa	Airfields area	5*		40	HVAR	Inst.	.02
							45	100 lb. G.P.	Inst.	.1
VF-5	1 Apr	0340	Okinawa	4 Airfields	2*		11	HVAR	Inst.	.02
VT-10	1 "	1205	Okinawa	Nagahama T.	8*	2*	54	HVAR	Inst.	.02
VF-6							8	500 lb. G.P.	Inst.	.1
							20	100 lb. G.P.	Inst.	.1
VT-11	3 "	0550	Okinawa	8 So. Towns		1	10	Mk. 26	Prop.	
VT-12	7 "	0615	Okinawa	2 Small Boats	1*	1*	14	HVAR	Inst.	.02
VF-10							12	100 lb. G.P.	Inst.	.1
				6 So. Towns		1	8	Mk. 26	Prop.	
VT-13	7 "	1205	Ie Shima	Range Finder Station and Gun Posit.	4	2	26	HVAR	Inst.	.02
VF-11				Caves in Cliff			4	100 lb. G.P.	Inst.	.1
				Camouflaged shore area			8	HVAR	Inst.	.02
							4	HVAR	Inst.	.02
							14	100 lb. G.P.	Inst.	.1
VT-14	8 "	0425	Miyako J.	3 Airfields	4*	3*	38	HVAR	Inst.	.02
VF-12							29	100 lb. G.P.	Inst.	.1
				SC Freighter (700T)			10	HVAR	Inst.	.02
							1	100 lb. G.P.	Inst.	.1
VT-15	8 "	0415	Sakishima	Ishigaki	5*	2*	25	HVAR	Inst.	.02
VF-13			Gunto	Airfields			8	100 lb. G.P.	Inst.	.1
VF-14	8 "	1012	Miyako J.	3 Airfields	4*		12	HVAR	Inst.	.02
							4	500 lb. G.P.	Inst.	.1
				Breakwater			4	HVAR	Inst.	.02
VF-15	8 "	0850	Ishigaki	Ishigaki	4*		14	HVAR	Inst.	.02
			Jima	Airfields			3	500 lb. G.P.	Inst.	.1
VT-16	8 "	1210	Ishigaki	Ishigaki		4	32	HVAR	Inst.	.02
			Jima	Airfields			40	100 lb. G.P.	Inst.	.1

## PART VI.

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## Special Comments and Information. (Continued).

## B. 2. Table of Bombs and Rockets dropped at target (Strafing sorties Marked\*)

FLGT.:	DATE	:OFF	TARGET ATTACKED		SORTIES		BOMBS & ROCKETS:		FUSING	
			General	Specific	VF	VT	No.:	Type	Nose	Tail
VF-16:	9 "	:0335:	Sakishama	Miyako and	4*	:	10	HVAR	:	Inst. : .02
---	---	---	Gunto	IshigakiA/F:	---	---	2	500 lb. G.P.	:	Inst. : .1
VT-17:	9 "	:1145:	Ishigaki	Miyako and	8*	4*	47	HVAR	:	Inst. : .02
VF-17:	:	:	Gunto	IshigakiA/F:	:	:	8	500 lb. G.P.	:	Inst. : .1
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	40	100 lb. G.P.	:	Inst. : .1
VF-18:	10 "	:0300:	Sakishima	2 Airfields:	4	:	4	HVAR	:	Inst. : .02
---	---	---	Gunto	---	---	---	3	500 lb. G.P.	:	Inst. : .1
VT-18:	10 "	:0530:	Ishigaki	Miyara A/F	8*	4*	48	HVAR	:	Inst. : .02
VF-19:	:	:	Jima	:	:	:	16	500 lb. G.P.	:	Inst. : .1
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	12	100 lb. G.P.	:	Inst. : .1
VF-20:	10 "	:0930:	Miyako	Hirara A/F	5*	:	8	HVAR	:	Inst. : .02
---	---	---	Jima	---	---	---	4	500 lb. G.P.	:	Inst. : .1
VT-19:	10 "	:0930:	Ishigaki	Miyara A/F	:	4*	15	HVAR	:	Inst. : .02
---	---	---	Jima	---	---	---	8	500 lb. G.P.	:	Inst. : .1
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	16	100 lb. G.P.	:	Inst. : .1
VF-21:	11 "	:0655:	Sakishima	2 Airfields:	4*	:	14	HVAR	:	Inst. : .02
---	---	---	Gunto	---	---	---	4	500 lb. G.P.	:	Inst. : .1
VF-22:	11 "	:0900:	Ishigaki	2 Airfields:	4*	:	15	HVAR	:	Inst. : .02
---	---	---	Jima	---	---	---	4	500 lb. G.P.	:	Inst. : .1
VF-23:	11 "	:1100:	Miyako	2 Airfields:	4*	:	14	HVAR	:	Inst. : .02
---	---	---	Jima	---	---	---	4	500 lb. G.P.	:	Inst. : .1
VT-20:	14 "	:0540:	Okinawa	Gun Emplac.:	:	1*	8	HVAR	:	Inst. : .02
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	10	100 lb. G.P.	:	Inst. : .1
VT-21:	14 "	:1335:	Okinawa	LooseStores:	:	2*	6	HVAR	:	Inst. : .02
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	10	100 lb. G.P.	:	Inst. : .1
---	---	---	---	5 Okinawa	---	---	10	Mk. 26	:	Prop. :
---	---	---	---	towns	---	---	---	---	:	---
VT-22:	14 "	:1530:	Okinawa	LooseStores:	:	1	8	HVAR	:	Inst. : .02
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	10	100 lb. G.P.	:	Inst. : .1
VF-24:	16 "	:0710:	Ie Shima	Military	8*	:	8	Napalm	:	E-4 R-1:
---	---	---	---	bldgs.	---	---	---	---	:	Ignitor:

## PART VI.

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## Special Comments and Information. (Continued).

## B. 2. Table of Bombs and Rockets dropped at target (Strafing sorties Marked\*)

FLGT.	DATE	OFF	TARGET ATTACKED		SORTIES		BOMBS & ROCKETS:		FUSING	
			General	Specific	VF	VT	No.:	Type	Nose	Tail
VT-23:	17Apr	:0330:	Ie Shima	Front line	:	6	:47	: HVAR	: Inst.	: .02
---	---	---	---	area	:	---	:60	: 100 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .1
VT-24:	17 "	:1335:	Ie Shima	DirectSupp.	3*	5	:55	: HVAR	: Inst.	: .02
VF-25:	---	---	---	Ft. lineArea:	---	---	:50	: 100 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .1
VF-26:	18 "	:0200:	Sakishima	5 Airfields:	4*	:	:15	: HVAR	: Inst.	: .02
---	---	---	Gunto	---	---	---	:3	: 500 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .1
VT-25:	18 "	:0400:	Sakishima	Ishigaki	2*	2	:22	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
VF-27:	---	---	Gunto	Airfields	---	---	:4	: 500 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .1
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	:8	: 100 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .1
VT-26:	18 "	:0400:	Miyako	2 Airfields:	2*	2*	:8	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
VF-28:	---	---	Gunto	---	---	---	:6	: 500 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: Inst.
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	:6	: 100 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .1
VF-29:	18 "	:1650:	Miyako	1 Airfield	4	:	:16	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
---	---	---	Jima	---	---	---	:4	: 500 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .1
VF-31:	18 "	:1830:	Sakishima	2 Airfields:	2*	:	:11	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	:2	: 500 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .1
VF-32:	18 "	:2030:	Sakishima	5 Airfields:	2*	:	:12	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	:2	: 500 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .1
VF-33:	18 "	:2230:	Sakishima	3 Airfields:	2*	:	:12	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	:2	: 500 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .1
VF-34:	19 "	:0030:	Sakishima	4 Airfields:	2*	:	:12	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	:2	: 500 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .1
VF-35:	19 "	:0230:	Sakishima	3 Airfields:	2*	:	:12	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	:2	: 500 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .1
VT-27:	19 "	:0435:	Miyako	2 Airfields:	4*	2*	:31	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
VF-36:	---	---	Jima	---	---	---	:9	: 500 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .1
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	:8	: 100 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .1
VT-28:	19 "	:0435:	Sakishima	4 Airfields:	4	2	:33	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
VF-37:	---	---	---	---	---	---	:8	: 500 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .1
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	:8	: 100 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .1

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Special Comments and Information. (Continued).

B. 2. Table of Bombs and Rockets dropped at target (Strafing sorties Marked\*)

FLGT.:	DATE	:OFF	: TARGET ATTACKED		:VF	:VT	:No.:	BOMBS & ROCKETS: Type	: FUSING	
			: General	: Specific					: Nose	: Tail
VF-38:	19Apr	:1430:	Miyako	:Nobara A/F	: 4*	:	: Strafing	:	:	
---	---	---	Jima	---	---	---	: only.	---	---	
VF-39:	21 "	:0330:	Ishigaki	:2 Airfields:	: 2*	: 11	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.:	: .02	
---	---	---	Jima	---	---	: 2	: 500 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.:	: .1	
---	---	---	---	---	---	: 2	: 100 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.:	: .1	
VF-40:	21 "	:0330:	Miyako	:2 Airfields:	: 2*	: 12	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.:	: .02	
---	---	---	Jima	---	---	: 2	: 500 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.:	: .1	
---	---	---	---	---	---	: 2	: 100 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.:	: .1	
VT-29:	21 "	:0530:	Miyako	:2 Airfields:	: 8*	: 6	: 4	: 100 gal Nap.:	:	
VF-41:	---	---	Jima	---	---	: 75	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.:	: .02	
---	---	---	---	---	---	: 16	: 500 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.:	: .1	
---	---	---	---	---	---	: 26	: 100 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.:	: .1	
VT-30:	21 "	:1535:	Miyako	:Nabara A/F	: 4*	: 4*	: 41	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.:	: .02
VF-42:	---	---	Jima	---	---	: 12	: 500 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.:	: .1	
---	---	---	---	---	---	: 19	: 100 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.:	: .1	
VF-43:	21 "	:1725:	Ishigaki	:1 Airfield	: 2*	: 6	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.:	: .02	
---	---	---	Jima	---	---	: 2	: 500 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.:	: .1	
VF-44:	21 "	:1726:	Miyako	:2 Airfields:	: 2*	: 12	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.:	: .02	
---	---	---	Jima	---	---	: 2	: 500 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.:	: .1	
VF-45:	22 "	:0235:	Ishigaki	:3 Airfields:	: 4*	: 13	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.:	: .02	
---	---	---	Jima	---	---	: 8	: 100 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.:	: .1	
VT-31:	22 "	:0400:	Ishigaki	:Hegima A/F	: 8*	: 4*	: 15	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.:	: .02
VF-46:	---	---	Jima	---	---	: 5	: 500 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.:	: .1	
---	---	---	---	---	---	: 27	: 100 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.:	: .1	
VT-32:	22 "	:1630:	Miyako	:Nobara A/F	: 8*	: 4	: 18	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.:	: .02
VF-47:	---	---	Jima	---	---	: 12	: 500 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.:	: .1	
---	---	---	---	---	---	: 16	: 100 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.:	: .1	
VF-48:	22 "	:1725:	Sakishima	:2 Airfields:	: 4	: 16	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.:	: .02	
---	---	---	---	---	---	: 1	: 500 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.:	: .1	
VF-49:	22 "	:2235:	Sakishima	:5 Airfields:	: 2*	: 8	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.:	: .02	
---	---	---	---	---	---	: 2	: 500 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.:	: .1	

## PART VI.

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## Special Comments and Information. (Continued).

## B. 2. Table of Bombs and Rockets Dropped at Target (Strafing sorties Marked\*)

FLGT.:	DATE	OFF	TARGET ATTACKED		SORTIES		BOMBS & ROCKETS:		FUSING	
			General	Specific	VF	VT	No.:	Type	Nose	Tail
VF-50:	23Apr	:0130:	Sakishima	:3 Airfields:	2*	:	4	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
							1	: 500 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .1
							1	: 100 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .1
VF-51:	23 "	:0430:	Ishigaki	:3 Airfields:	4*	:	8	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
			Jima				4	: 500 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .1
							4	: 100 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .01
VT-33:	23 "	:0502:	Miyako	:2 Airfields:	7*	: 5*	30	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
VF-52:			Jima				17	: 500 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .1
							25	: 100 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .01
VT-34:	23 "	:1600:	Ishigaki	:3 Airfields:	8*	: 6	43	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
VF-53:			Jima				5	: 500 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .01
							80	: 100 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .01
VF-54:	23 "	:1700:	Sakishima	:4 Airfields:	4*	:	4	: 500 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .1
							4	: 100 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .01
VF-55:	23 "	:2035:	Sakishima	:4 Airfields:	2*	:	4	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
							3	: 100 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .1
VF-56:	24 "	:	Miyako	:2 Airfields:	7*	:		: Strafing	:	:
			Jima					: only.	:	:
VF-57:	24 "	:0530:	Miyako	:Nabara A/F:	2*	: 4*	48	: 100 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .01
VT-35:			Jima							
VT-36:	26 "	:0359:	Sakishima	:6 Airfields:	4*	: 4*	8	: 500 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .01
VF-58:							16	: 100 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .01
VF-59:	26 "	:0540:	Miyako	:Hirara A/F:	7*	:	10	: 100 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .01
			Jima							
VF-60:	26 "	:1615:	Sakishima	:Ishigaki A/F:	8	:	48	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
							16	: 100 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .01
VT-37:	27 "	:0430:	Sakishima	:4 Airfields:	4*	: 4	20	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
VF-61:							8	: 500 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .01
							24	: 100 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .01
VF-62:	27 "	:0530:	Sakishima	:Shipping &	8*	:	16	: 100 lb. G.P.	: Inst.	: .01
				:Miyara A/F						



PART VI.

Special Comments and Information. (Continued).

B. 2. Table of Bombs and Rockets Dropped at Target (Strafing sorties Marked\*)

FLGT.:	DATE	OFF	TARGET ATTACKED		SORTIES		BOMBS & ROCKETS:		FUSING	
			General	Specific	VF	VT:No.:	Type	Nose	Tail	
VT-38:	27Apr	:1300:	Miyako	:2 Airfields:	7*	4*	:56	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
VF-63:			Jima				: 8	: 500 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .1
							:33	: 100 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .1
VF-64:	27 "	:1730:	Sakishima	:5 Airfields:	4*		:16	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
							: 8	: 100 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .01
VT-39:	29 "	:0330:	Sakishima	:4 Airfields:	4*	4*	:36	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
VF-65:							:11	: 500 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .1
							:16	: 100 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .1
VF-66:	29 "	:0530:	Sakishima	:Heckler	8*		:48	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
				: sweep			: 8	: 500 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .01
							: 8	: 100 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .01
VT-40:	29 "	:1530:	Miyako	:Nabara A/F	8*	5*	:70	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
VF-67:			Jima				:18	: 500 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .1
							:28	: 100 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .1
VF-68:	29 "	:1730:	Miyako	:2 Airfields:	4*		:24	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
			Jima				: 4	: 500 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .1
							: 4	: 100 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .1
VF-69:	29 "	:2100:	Ishigaki &	:4 Airfields:	2*		:12	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
			Miyako				: 2	: 500 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .1
							: 2	: 100 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .1
VF-70:	30	:0030:	Ishigaki &	:4 Airfields:	2*		:12	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
			Miyako				: 2	: 500 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .1
							: 2	: 100 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .1
VT-41:	30 "	:0400:	Ishigaki &	:4 Airfields:	4*	4	:44	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
VF-71:			Miyako				: 9	: 500 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .1
							:19	: 100 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .1
VF-72:	30 "	:0500:	Ishigaki	:Shipping:	8*		:48	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
			Jima	:Ishigaki A/F:			: 8	: 500 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .1
							: 8	: 100 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .1
VT-42:	30 "	:1530:	Ishigaki	:Miyara A/F	6*	3	:57	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
VF-73:			Jima				:12	: 500 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .1
							:18	: 100 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .1

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PART VI.

Special Comments and Information. (Continued).

B. 2. Table of Bombs and Rockets Dropped at Target (Strafing sorties Marked\*)

FLGT.	DATE	OFF	TARGET ATTACKED		SORTIES		BOMBS & ROCKERS:		FUSING	
			General	Specific	VF	VT:No.:	Type	Nose	Tail	
VF-74:	30Apr	:1810:	Sakishima	:4 Airfields:	4*	:	:16	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
							: 4	: 500 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .1
							: 4	: 100 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .1
VF-75:	30 "	:2200:	Ishigaki	:2 Airfields:	2*	:	: 8	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
			Jima				: 2	: 100 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .1
VF-76:	1May	:0130:	Ishigaki	:2 Airfields:	2*	:	: 8	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
			Jima				: 4	: 100 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .1
VT-43:	1 "	:0500:	Ishigaki	:Miyara A/F	8	: 3	: 53	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
VF-77:			Jima				: 6	: 500 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .1
							: 28	: 100 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .1
VT-44:	1 "	:1530:	Miyako	:Nobara A/F	8*	: 3*	: 47	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
VF-78:			Jima				: 14	: 500 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .01
							: 20	: 100 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .01
VF-79:	1 "	:1755:	Ishigaki &	:3 Airfields:	4*	:	:16	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
			Miyako				: 8	: 100 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .1
VF-80:	1 "	:2115:	Miyako	:2 Airfields:	2*	:	: 8	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
			Jima				: 4	: 100 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .1
VF-81:	2 "	:0030:	Miyako	:2 Airfields:	2*	:	: 8	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
			Jima				: 4	: 100 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .1
VT-45:	3 "	:0540:	Miyako	:2 Airfields:	8*	: 6	: 72	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
VF-82:			Jima				: 12	: 500 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .1
							: 40	: 100 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .1
VF-83:	3 "	:1500:	Ishigaki &	:2 Airfields:	4*	:	:16	: AR Mk. 1	: Inst.	: .02
			Miyako				: 8	: 100 lb. G.P.:	: Inst.	: .1

Special Comments and Information.  
B. 3. Own Losses and Rescue Operations.

DATE	TIME OF LAUNCH	TYPE A/C	Circumstances, Place, & Cause of Plane Loss	No. Pilots Lost	No. Air Crew Lost	No. Pilots Saved	No. Air Crew Saved
24 MAR	1815	F6F-5N	At Approx. 2100 while in landing circle, plane hit YE antenna of CVE in the formation. Plane landed in water between carriers. Pilot apparently went down with plane.	1	0	0	0
28 MAR	0016	F6F-5N	Bridle on port catapult broke on launching. Plane dribbled off port bow.	0	0	1	0
18 APR	1645	F6F-5E	Crashed at sea 10 mi. off Ishigaki Jima in combat with enemy plane	1	0	0	0
22 APR	0400	F6F-5E	Presumably crashed at sea before daylight. Cause unknown.	1	0	0	0
23 APR	1600	F6F-5E	Hit with light AA aft of cockpit. Ditched at sea 20 miles East of Ishigaki	0	0	1	0
29 APR	1530	TBM-3E	Hit by 40MM AA starting fire in starboard wing tank. Ditched 2 mi. off Miyako Jima.	0	1	1	1
30 APR	1530	F6F-5P	Plane ditched about 1 mi. off shore, south east coast Ishigaki Jima, after being hit by AA. Pilot was last seen standing on a reef about 1000 yds. due E. of Ohama Town	1	0	0	0

## B. 3. Rescue methods and Facilities Employed

In accordance with current instructions Task Unit Commander was notified and passed information for alerting of Dumbo, Patrol planes and Life Guard Submarine.

- 24 March: Immediate search was instituted by U.S.S. PATTERSON DD of the screen and maintained all night but no trace of pilot was found. Further search was made at daylight and throughout the following morning by 2 Sangamon planes making a radar controlled search of the area, results negative.
- 28 March: Plane crashed close aboard and pilot rescued by DD guard.
- 18 April: Plane crashed while in combat. As soon as combat permitted remaining planes of flight searched area until dark. Dumbo was notified and immediately began search which was continued throughout the following day. Sangamon was removed from area on the 19th which prevented special search, but replacing unit was notified and search was made to and from strikes. All searches negative.
- 22 April: Crash presumably occurred shortly after take-off (0400) as pilot was neither seen nor contacted by radio after being launched. One TBM remained in area and began search as soon as light permitted. Search was also made by Dumbo planes and planes of Task Unit while enroute to and from missions.
- 23 April: Crashed plane was followed down by wingman who dropped raft as did 3 other planes of flight, and radioed position to ship. Dumbo was notified but weather prevented rescue that night. Search made following morning by Dumbo and Sangamon planes, the latter locating the downed pilot approximately 20 miles from original ditching. Dumbo made the rescue.
- 29 April: Sangamon immediately notified of position of crash by planes in the flight. Dumbo rescued the 2 survivors within 50 minutes of the crash despite enemy gunfire throughout the rescue operation. On landing Radioman was apparently knocked unconscious and went down with plane before he could be pulled free. He had jettisoned the escape hatch but remained strapped in his seat.

B. 3. Rescue Methods and Facilities Employed.

30 April: Raft was dropped about 25 feet from pilot by TBM from same flight. Pilot appeared in good condition. The next Sangamon flight passed over position about 10 minutes later and could sight neither pilot or raft. Life guard submarine attempted to get to position but was forced to abandon the mission due to shallow water. Dumbo conducted search for following two days with negative results. Special search was flown by CVEG Commander the same night in an endeavor to drop another raft if pilot was located. The following day a special 6 plane search was made of the area along the coast and seaward to fifty miles north of Ishigaki.

## PART VI.

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## Special Comments and Information.

## B. 4. a. Damage to enemy (Evaluated Conclusion from ACA-1 Reports).

FLIGHT	OFF	LOCATION	ENEMY A/C DESTROYED		ENEMY SHIPPING		
			In Air	Ground	Sunk	Probably Sunk	Damaged
26 Mar.	0535	25-30 N 127-21E	1 Val				
4 Apr.	0500	25-00N 128-40E				2 Luggers	2 Sampans
5 "	1555	25-45N 128-15E	1 Paul				
6 "	1550	25-25N 128-18E	1 Zeke 2 Vals				
7 "	0615	24-59N 127-50E				2-45' Boats	
8 "	0425	24-43N 127-10E				1-700 Ton SC	
10 "	0930	Hirara A/F		1 T/E			
18 "	2030	Ishigaki A/F	1 Nick				
21 "	1725	Hegina A/F		1 Zeke			
22 "	1630	24-00N 126-45E	7 Oscars:	5 S/E 4 T/E			
22 "	1725	24-00N 126-37E	2 Oscars:				

## PART VI.

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## Special Comments and Information.

## B. 4. a. Damage to enemy (Evaluated Conclusion From ACA-1 Reports) Continued.

FLIGHT	OFF	LOCATION	ENEMY A/C DESTROYED		ENEMY SHIPPING		
			In Air	Ground	Sunk	Probably Sunk	Damaged
23 Apr.	1700	24-02N 126-06E				1 SD left beached and burning	
26 "	0350	Ishigaki A/F		1 unidenti- fied			
26 "	0540	Homia Bay					1 Lugger
27 "	0530	Sakishima Gunto					8 Small Boats
29 "	1530	N. Shore Miyako J.					12 60' boats
		3 Mi. NE Hirara					300 ton SCS
30 "	0500	W.Coast Irimote					25 small boats
30 "	2200	Miyako A/F	1 Tony	1 S/E			
1 May	1530	Ikema Harbor				1 50' boat	5 50' boats

PART VI.  
 Special Comments and Information.  
 B. 4(b). Damage to Land Targets.

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FLIGHT	OFF	LOCATION	TARGET	LAND TARGETS	
				DESTROYED	DAMAGED
25 Mar	:0745:	Kerama Retto:	Town Area	: 2 Fuel Dumps	: Many Blds. Seriously damaged.
26 "	:0552:	Kerama Retto:	Power House		: Seriously Damaged
27 "	:0930:	Okinawa	: Barracks area	: Several barracks	: Serious damage to several.
28 "	:0743:	Okinawa	: Gun Positions		: 2 Guns damaged.
			: Sugar Mill		: 2 Rocket hits.
29 "	:0932:	Okinawa	: 2 Story building:		: Seriously damaged.
30 "	:0745:	Okinawa	: Yonton Revetments		: Slight damage to several
	:1335:	Okinawa	: Naha 40' oil tank:	1 Oil tank	
	:0330:	Okinawa	: Supply Truck	1 Truck	
31 "	:1135:	Okinawa	: Barracks 400'x200'		: Seriously damaged.
			: 3 40' gun Posit.		: 8 rocket & 1 bomb hit.
	:1325:	Okinawa	: Buildings Yontan		: 11 rocket & 8 bomb hits
			: Plane revetments		: 8 Bomb hits.
1 Apr	:0340:	Okinawa	: Naha Runways		: slight - 5 rockets
	:1205:	Okinawa	: Town of Nagahama		: Serious, numerous fires started.
7 "	:1205:	Ie Shima	: Shore Installation:	Range Finder Sta.	: Caves in Cliffs.
8 "	:0425:	Miyako Jima	: 3 Airfields	: Fuel Tanks	: Runways cratered.
	:0415:	Sakishima G.	: Ishigaki A/F		: Runways cratered.
	:1012:	Miyako Jima	: 3 Airfields	: Fuel tank & truck:	: Runways cratered.
			: gun positions	: Cave containing	
				: 1 heavy gun.	



PART VI.  
 Special Comments and Information. (Continued).  
 B. 4(b). Damage to Land Targets.

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FLIGHT	OFF	LOCATION	TARGET	LAND TARGETS	
				DESTROYED	DAMAGED
8 Apr	:0850:	Ishigaki A/F:	Barracks	:	:2 Rocket hits.
--	:1210:	Ishigaki A/F:	Landing strip.	--	:Slight damage runways.
9 "	:0335:	Sakishima Gunto	:Barracks, Isigaki A/F:	:	:1 bomb hit.
	:	:	:Runways, Harara A/F:	:	:3 rocket hits.
	:1145:	Ishigaki A/F:	Runways	:	:Cratered.
	:	:	:Gun Positions	:1 Light AA, 4 MG	:
--	--	--	:Buildings	--	:Buldg. Seriously damaged
10 "	:0530:	Ishigaki J.	:Miyara Airstrip	:	:18 bomb hits, 10 rocket hits.
	:0930:	Miyako Jima	:Hirara Airfields	:1 oil storage tank	:Cratered runways.
--	:0935:	Ishigaki J.	:Miyara Airfield	:1 Heavy AA	:Revetments - slight.
11 "	:0900:	Ishigaki J.	:Ishigaki A/F's	:	:Runway cratered.
	:1100:	Miyako Jima	:Storage dump.	:	:Left burning.
--	--	--	:Runway	--	:Cratered
16 "	:0710:	Ie Shima	:Military buldings:	--	:Entire area ablaze.
17 "	:1335:	Ie Shima	:Front Line Support	--	:1 Pillbox - seriously
18 "	:0400:	Miyako Jima	:2 Airfields	--	:Hanger - set afire
19 "	:0435:	Miyako Jima	:2 Airfields	:1 gasoline dump	:runways cratered.
	:0435:	Ishigaki J.	:2 Airfields	:	:runways cratered.
--	:1430:	Miyako Jima	:Radar Station	--	:Set afire.
21 "	:1725:	Ishigaki J.	:Truck	:	:Riddled by strafing
	:0530:	Miyako J. A/F:	Runways, Building:	:	:Burning furiously.
	:1535:	Miyako Jima	:Underground Storage	:	:Burning furiously.

PART VI.  
 Special Comments and Information. (Continued).  
 B. 4(b). Damage to Land Targets.

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FLIGHT	OFF	LOCATION	TARGET	LAND TARGETS	
				DESTROYED	DAMAGED
22 Apr	:0400:	Ishigaki J.	:A/F runways.	:	:27 bomb, 8 rocket hits.
---	:1630:	Miyako Jima	:Runway&Revetments:	: 1 gasoline truck:	:slight to runway.
23 "	:0130:	Sakishima	:Nobara A/F	: 1 dump truck	:
	:	:	:Ishigaki A/F	:	:4 AR in runway.
	:0502:	Miyako Jima	:Nobara runway	: Fuel dump fired	:Runway seriously.
	:	:	:Underground hanger	:	:large fire started.
	:1600:	Ishigaki J.	:A/F runways	:	:Numerous craters
	:	:	:Underground hanger:	:	:Slight damage.
---	:1700:	Ishigaki J.	:Miyara A/F	:Gasoline dump	:7 hits in Taxiway.
24 "	:0520:	Tarana Shima	:Crane	:	:Seriously
26 "	:0350:	Sakishima G.	:Hirara and	:	:Runway slight damage.
---	:	:	:Nobara A/F	:	:
27 "	:1300:	Miyako Jima	:Hirara A/F and	:	:Runways cratered.
---	:	:	:revetments	:	:
29 "	:0330:	Miyako Jima	:Hirara & NobaraA/F:	:	:Slight to runways.
	:0530:	Sakishima	:Revetment area on:	:	:Saturated by 42 rocket
	:	:	:Miyara airfield.	:	: hits.
	:	:	:Revetments NobaraA/F:	:	:Fires 8x500, 8x100.
	:1530:	Nobara A/F	:Revetment area	:	:Large fires started.
	:	:	:Underground hanger:	:	:Large fires started.
---	:1730:	Nobara A/F	:Barracks	:	:Set afire.
30 "	:0500:	Ishigaki A/F	:Revetments	:	:Set afire.
	:1530:	Miyara A/F	:Runways&Revetments:	:	:Runway cratered, 3
	:	:	:	:	:fires started.

## PART VI.

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## Special Comments and Information. (Continued).

## B. 4(b). Damage to Land Targets.

FLIGHT	OFF	LOCATION	TARGET	LAND TARGETS	
				DESTROYED	DAMAGED
30 Apr	:1810:	Ishigaki A/F	:Revetments	:	:Large fires started.
	:	Nobara A/F	:Revetments	:	:Large fires started.
	:2200:	Ishigaki A/F	:Revetments	:	:Large fires started.
1 May	:1530:	Nobara A/F	:Revetments	:2 Revetments	:
	:1755:	Miyara A/F	:Hanger	:	:1 direct hit.
3 "	:0540:	Nobara A/F	:Runways and :revetments	:1 Fuel dump.	:
	:1500:	Ishigaki A/F	:Runways	:	:Runway cratered 8x100 :hits

PART VI. Special Comments and Information.

D. 1. COMBAT INFORMATION CENTER.

a. A complete chronological record of these operations are impossible.

1. During most of the operations, CIC experienced normal air operational routine, which was the tracking of strikes; patrols (both day and night) and "heckler missions." Fortunately, our operating areas were at sufficient distances either southeast or southwest of Okinawa to avoid most of the enemy aircraft heading toward the invasion beaches. We picked up and tracked, however, many "bogey" indications from the north heading for Okinawa. Since we were operating south of that area, these "bogies" had always been picked up and reported before they appeared on our screen. On a few occasions, primarily just after our arrival in the area prior to "L" day, we picked up, tracked and reported "bogies" headed toward the "beaches" from the south and southwest. Such was the case on the afternoon following our arrival in the objective area when we picked up "bogey" indications in the southwest, heading toward Okinawa. Fighters were vectored, sighted "Vals", but were not able to close them. These same "Vals" were later contacted and a number shot down by another group operating east of our position.

On the morning of 26 March, a "bogey" was picked up closing from 280 degrees, 35 miles, altitude 2000 feet. We had just launched four VFN for pre-dawn CAP, which had not as yet joined, and one of them was vectored on the "bogey". At approximately 15 miles west of us, the "bogey" suddenly changed course to 060 degrees (heading for Okinawa) and the VFN's vector was corrected accordingly. The "bogey" faded from our scope for a distance of about ten miles, but VFN was continued on the same heading. A few minutes later, the pilot reported "Contact" and almost immediately "Splashed one Val." The "Splash" occurred at 0618, just as light began to appear in the east. Visibility was reported 500 feet, cloud cover eight tenths, and base of clouds 2500 feet. The rest of the period of operations consisted of investigating many "bogies", most of which were identified as PBM's and TBM's.

PART VI (Continued).

On the morning of 4 May, many "bogies" were tracked heading for Okinawa and Kerama Retto. We were just entering Kerama Retto for the purpose of replenishing bombs and rockets, and had no aircraft airborne. At approximately 1000, "bogies" were picked up in the southwest closing, and a few minutes later "Flash Red" was announced by SOPA. We tracked them without difficulty, reported SP radar altitude determination and an interception was effected by "Beach Control". All "bogey" indications cleared up about fifteen minutes later. We were delayed in departing by the loading of "Lube Oil" and did not get underway until about 1830. During the day, all of our planes had been degassed and as we sortied, both the Air Department and Gunnery Department were completing the stowage of bombs and rockets below decks. At approximately 1845 we were about eight miles south of Kerama Retto and a "bogey" was picked up on the SP radar at 240 degrees, 68 miles. In a few minutes, this "bogey" indication was confirmed by SC-3. The "bogey" appeared to be "six to eight" on a course of 050 degrees, altitude about ten thousand feet. We reported this "bogey" on the Force Inter-Fighter Director net (2096 kcs.), as we had not heard it previously reported. At 240 degrees, 50 miles, CIC reported the "bogies" were definitely closing and requested fighters be launched. We immediately gassed two VFN's and prepared to launch them as soon as possible, and it was planned to launch two more immediately afterwards. At about 200 degrees, 29 miles the ship went to General Quarters and the "bogies" were continually tracked without difficulty into about 220 degrees 25 miles when "friendlies" appeared on our screen headed for an interception. Over the FIFD net, we heard a "Tallyho" reported almost immediately. At the time we were not monitoring the "Beach" FD net as VFH equipment was set on our "Group Frequencies", and we did not hear the Fighters vectored. Following the "Tallyho", a general melee developed which drifted generally eastward, closing on us. We also had what appeared to be "window" at the intercept point, which continued for some little time after. At about 200 degrees 18 miles, we heard a report of "Splash four Vals", and immediately following we had a single "bogey" breaking away from the melee and closing fast. This "bogey" was continuously reported to Gunnery in relative bearing, distance and angle of elevation (from SP) until sighted by lookouts. Fighters were "turning up" on the catapult, when the guns began firing.

PART VI (Continued).

This "bogey" proved to be a "Tony" which was shot down and later crashed off our starboard quarter. A minute or two later, the U.S.S. Fullam (a member of our screen) reported over our "Group" IFD net (116.10 mcs.) a "bogey" closing from 100 degrees, 12 miles. It was immediately picked up on SP, and two VFN were launched at the same time. The "bogey" was tracked in to about four miles, where it changed course to the north. VFN's were vectored north, although they had not joined up, but the "bogey" was opening fast and disappeared at 010 degrees, 12 miles. SP indications were that the "bogey" was very low and the VFN never got close enough for a "Tallyho". The VFN's were ordered to return to the ship, join up and orbit at 2000 feet. About four minutes after this "bogey" disappeared to the north, another "bogey" was picked up at 265 degrees, 9 miles, low but climbing, closing fast. (Whether this "bogey" was the same one that disappeared to the north or another one, has not been established.) VFN's were vectored 270 degrees, "Gate", "Low" and instructed that if they did not sight "bogey" to continue out to 15 miles and orbit. Lookouts have since reported that the "bogey" passed around behind a low hanging, black cloud and our VFN went under the cloud. Visibility was dropping fast, with approaching darkness. This "bogey" was continuously reported to Gunnery and again it was sighted without difficulty. This "bogey" crashed into our flight deck a few minutes later.

All radars went out of commission immediately as well as all TDQ VHF transmitters and RCK receivers. Our ARC-1 radio in CIC, however, was still in operation. We called the U.S.S. Fullam instructed them to take control of our VFN on channel "Guard"; called the planes, told them to switch to "Guard" from 124.02 mcs. (our "Group" primary); checked to see that communications were established, requested the U.S.S. Fullam to keep us advised as to additional "bogies", and then our ARC-1 went out of commission. Stations were maintained in CIC utilizing it to render first aid to men who had been wounded on the catwalk outside CIC. In about ten minutes the compartment began to fill with acrid smoke. Permission was requested to secure, which was granted.

PART VI (Continued).

Before securing CIC, all power switches were turned off and all ventilators and hatches closed in an effort to smother any fires that might start. Heat from the hangar deck fire, however, started small fires in the radar and radio transmitter room, which although immediately extinguished, continued to break out in the area throughout the night. As a result of fires, excessive heat, salt water and acrid smoke all equipment is probably ruined. All radar and radio equipment in the transmitter room is damaged beyond repair. In CIC the SP console may be salvaged but the SC-3 and SC-A receivers appear to be seriously damaged. The VF, VC, VG and VG-1 PPI repeaters appear seriously affected, but extent of damage is not determinable at this time. All plexiglass boards are warped and darkened, all cables are damaged, together with radio remotes, internal communication circuits, etc.

2. Employment and Performance of Radars.

- (a) Our experience in tracking with the SF radar has been excellent. Its narrow beam, altitude determinate and sharpness of return is of great assistance. It must be used, however, in conjunction with other radars of the search type (Sk, SC-2) for aircraft work, and target designation must be intelligently determined, particularly in the case of a "splitting raid." It is not possible to successfully track two raids at different altitudes or changing altitudes. It, further, requires particularly skilled operators as well as a higher degree of intelligence on the part of the operators. Operators should be given thorough training in this type equipment before being assigned to ships where they will have to operate it. We were most fortunate in having a relatively quiet month in the combat area during which our operators could gain experience and improve their technique. It is suggested that operators being assigned to ships operating night fighters have an opportunity of working at least a month with night fighters during training before being assigned to ships.
- (b) The SP radar leaves little to be desired from the standpoint of efficiency, when properly operated and maintained. Ranges on aircraft were as follows: Single aircraft - 45 miles; large single - 60 miles; large groups - 75 miles. Single aircraft "crossing" were picked up and tracked at ranges as great as 95 miles. Large surface contacts were picked up and tracked at distances of 35-40 miles.

PART VI (Continued).

- (c) This ship is not equipped with fire-control radars, the SP was very helpful in getting visual directors on targets. Its sharpness of bearing, more accurate range determination and solving of the angle of elevation were of considerable assistance to gunnery.
  - (e) & (f) Surface search radar (SG-A) was generally used for navigational purposes, except as mentioned in "b".
  - (g) The SP "R" scope proved of great assistance in the determination of size and number of aircraft targets. The results achieved with the SC-3 and SG-A radars were generally as expected. Aircraft ranges on SC-3 averaged about 75 miles. Ranges on surface targets on the SG-A were out to about 20 miles. This represented an increase of about three miles in effective range over previous results, as height of antenna was increased during last yard availability.
3. The SP was used for weather analysis. It was found to be of great use in the discovering and tracking of weather "fronts", as well as determination of their depths.
4. IFF performance was not found to be up to standard in the case of the SP radar. At the present time, our SP installation is equipped with two IFF interrogator bands. One, the "A" band (157-187 mcs.) "Mark III", utilizes BM-1 equipment which is in general use, and the other the "G" band (194-212 mcs.) utilized BO-1 equipment not as yet in general use. The purpose of the latter is to distinguish aircraft of our own ship or group from other friendly indications. The BO-1 equipment is installed with a directional antenna attached to the SP antenna. The BM-1 equipment is equipped with a non-directional antenna and will "trigger" Mark III over 360 degrees.

In operation it was found that the pilots were not sufficiently well acquainted with the use of "G" band IFF ("Canary") for it to be of much practical use. The use of the "A" band with a non-directional antenna in an area of many "friendly" indications where different aircraft at the same range but on different bearings could trigger if off, simply caused confusion. Further, the "A" band (BM-1) proved to have insufficient range when its power was dissipated over 360 degrees.



To remedy some of the above defects, the use of the "G" band (BO-1) equipment was discarded and its directional antenna connected to the "A" band (BM-1) equipment. This afforded directional characteristics for the "A" band IFF and was found to be more useful from an operational standpoint. Full efficiency of the BM-1 equipment could not be realized, however, from an antenna designed for the BO-1 and left something to be desired with respect to range. This makeshift arrangement afforded "A" band IFF response to a distance of 55-60 miles.

It is our suggestion that SP radar installations be equipped with a directional "A" band (Mark III) antenna and that pilots should be more thoroughly instructed in the use of "G" band IFF.

From the standpoint of aircraft IFF failure, PBM's PB4Y's, C54's, C47's and TBM's continued to be an annoyance. During the present operation of two months, there were only six cases of IFF failure in our planes, three involving TBM-3's and three in F6F-5's. Of these failures, five were the result of power supply failures. The other was caused by incorrect switch operation by the aircrewman. In relation to the number of sorties flown this was a satisfactory average.

5. As this was the only ship equipped with SP radar in the division, it became necessary to operate it twenty-four hours a day for extended periods. This made proper maintenance impossible. In spite of it, results were better than can usually be expected. This was primarily due to the fact that one magnetron operated continuously for in excess of 1100 hours. The three preceding tubes had lasted 368 hours, 22 hours and 18 hours. In future operations it is imperative that more time be allocated to routine repairs if optimum operating efficiency is to be expected. The effects of weather in this operating area were particularly severe. At times the effective range was reduced by as much as 50 percent. There also were numerous examples of phantom echos.

6. It is believed that one VHF circuit should be designated in each group for the sole purpose of radar information. In these operations one circuit was used for both radar reporting and IFD. As a result it was many times crowded with IFD instructions and discussion which delayed reports. Fortunately, nothing serious was delayed by this jamming of the circuit. However, it was only by the fortunate fact that a "bogey" turned out to be "friendly" that difficulty was avoided. Some trouble was experienced with the RCK receivers cutting out. This may have been due to the receiver block or the noise suppressor. Up to the time the equipment was destroyed by fire the trouble had not been remedied. It is suggested that two ARC-1 radios be installed in CIC as a standby for the TDQ-RCK or to afford additional channels when needed. Interior communications were satisfactory.

b. Fighter Director.

Enemy tactics displayed in the attack on this ship the fourth of May were: Plane approached very low, climbed quickly to approximately 2500 feet and then dove at maximum speed.

c. This ship is not equipped with radar countermeasures.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

Special Comments and Information.  
D. 2. Communications.

1. COMMUNICATIONS PRIOR TO BATTLE DAMAGE.

a. Cryptographic Channels:

1. There were many despatches originated by Commander Task Force 51 encrypted in strip channels. Most of these despatches were addressed to Task Force 51 as action or information addressees. We considered all these despatches as addressed and treated them so. Many of them were irrelevant to carrier operations. Breaking these despatches tied up personnel who could have been used in other work more efficiently.

Believe calls should be established and transmitted in the heading of strip channels to omit unnecessary breaking by ships not concerned.

b. Circuits:

1. Voice Circuits:

(a) TBS-2 (Air Operational Circuit)

This circuit was very valuable for transmitting air operational traffic while all ships of the unit were in formation.

This circuit could be utilized for urgent "request for repetition" and communication plan should so advise.

Set TBS-2 watch in radio three so radio three communication watch officer can coordinate all communication voice circuits without going into CIC. A TBS-2 remote control box should therefore be installed in radio three.

(b) Local Air Warning (3115 KCS)

Radio frequency plans call for a guard watch by all ships. One ship from each unit setting guard on this circuit with all other ships in the unit maintaining an efficient speaker watch should be sufficient.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

PART VI continued.

Waiting for ship to come within TBS-2 range of unit didn't allow sufficient time to efficiently prepare aircraft for early operations flown by this ship.

2. COMMUNICATIONS AFTER BATTLE DAMAGE.

a. External Communications:

1. Radio Two was knocked out immediately due to shock and all personnel had to abandon this station through the escape hatch due to suffocating smoke and heat.

Radio Three was next to be abandoned as smoke from Intelligence Office and Radar transmitter room was unbearable. The receivers and other equipment in Radio Three were damaged by water.

All equipment in Radio One remained in good condition. However TDE-2 and TBS-3 (Tactical Circuit) went out immediately. TDE-2 went out due to broken feed-through insulator at end of trunk on bridge and broken lead probably caused by shrapnel. TBS-3 went out due to motor generator set failure in radar transmitter room. All power from main generators aft was cut off, caused by destruction of cables. Emergency power from forward generators was substituted. This station finally had to be abandoned due to suffocating smoke.

All VHF equipment except TBS and ARC-1 failed immediately due to shock. Power failure soon caused TBS equipment and ARC-1 to fail. TDQ/RCK's were heavily damaged.

TBS-2 (Air Operational Circuit) probably was in operation longer than TBS-3 but of no value at the time as other ships around us were not equipped. However, due to fire and water this circuit was put out of commission and motor generator set in the YE room was used later to put TBS-3 back in commission. All other equipment in YE room was damaged.

TBY equipment was stowed in radio store room aft of radio two and was destroyed by fire.

Searchlights on signal bridge were non-operational due to power failure. All flags in the bags and the flag bags plus halyards were destroyed by fire.

## 2. Continuous Wave Circuits:

## (a) NPM How Fox:

The reception of this schedule was better than any preceding operation. Operators report good reception at all times.

## (b) Task Force Common (371 kcs)

This circuit was hampered by Japanese broadcasting stations and probably interference caused by atmospheric conditions. The circuit was not dependable for out going or incoming traffic and therefore the most dependable circuit (2032 kcs.) was overloaded. Hours of poorest reception were from 2000 to 0500 local time.

## (c) Expeditionary Force Fox (483 kcs.)

During fueling operations this circuit (Love Fox) could not be intercepted due to distance between transmitting and receiving units. Interference similar to that noticed on Task Force Common was noticed on this circuit.

## (d) Task Group Commanders (2032 kcs.)

Although the traffic was heavy with operational priority and urgent traffic, this was the most dependable tactical circuit.

## (e) Task Group Common (CW)

This circuit was not established for Okinawa operation. Use of a common circuit for escort carrier task group would have been beneficial for following reasons:

1. When units retired to fueling area, Love Fox could not be intercepted. Repetition of missing Love Fox despatches, when necessary, could be requested on common frequency from unit not fueling. The circuit, of course, could be used for request for repetitions of despatches missed on any circuit, but Love Fox was the circuit most concerned in this operation.
2. Ships when leaving unit for rearming area would be in constant contact by CW with Unit Commander. If necessary, and when radio silence did not prevent, air operations for day after rearming could be enciphered and sent to rearming ship.

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PART VI continued.

2. The above damage left the ship with no external communications. The following steps would probably prevent a reoccurrence:
  1. Locate the motor-generator set for the TBS-3 in Radio One with TBS-3 equipment. Take power leads from power panel in Radio One.
  2. Take motor-generator power leads for TBS-2 (Located in YE Room) from panel in passageway between YE Room and Radar Transmitter Room.
  3. Install ARC-1 equipment complete with portable antenna in a watertight steel box at Batt Two. Also install all necessary power leads and motor-generator set plus battery to operate ARC-1 near this position.
  4. Store TBY equipment below main deck level aft available for Batt Two if necessary.
- b. Internal Communications:
  1. Radio One was in communication with CIC and Radio Two until these two stations were abandoned. However, all internal communications failed shortly after plane hit. Therefore bridge and Batt two were isolated from each other.
  2. Consideration should be given to installing sound power system below main deck to parallel present battle sound power system.  
A few Handie Talkies (Army equipment) should be placed about the ship in suitable locations. Aldis Lamps should also be dispersed at several places about the ship.
- c. Restoring Communications following Battle Damage:
  1. Visual communication was the first to be restored by us of an Aldis Lamp from the flight deck.  
Temporary voice communication was restored immediately after the fire by using an ARC-1 set in the only plane left on the ship. A portable gasoline generator was used for power. The plane was located on the forward end of the flight deck. Battle phones were used to effect direct communication between the plane and Batt Two.  
About noon the following day, TBY equipment was obtained from another ship and set up at Batt Two. This was not very satisfactory due to low elevation.  
TDE-2 antenna was repaired and operation of this equipment was restored at 1200 Item 5 May. All radio receivers in Radio One were repaired and operating also by this time.

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PART VI continued.

Required watches were set. The motor-generator unit of the TBS equipment in the YE Room was installed in Radio One to operate TBS-3. Temporary power connection to set extension was installed from Radio One TBS-3 control unit to bridge. Coaxial transmission line was temporarily run from transmitter unit to TBS antenna. Operation of TBS was resumed about 1800 5 May.

Power was restored to signal bridge to operate 12 inch searchlights on 7 May.

D. 7. Medical.

The Medical Department facilities functioned very well during the emergency despite the fact that the Flight Deck Battle Dressing Station was rendered useless by the explosion. The Forward Battle Dressing Station on the second deck seems to be in an ideal location for survival from the standpoint of an air attack. The only contemplated change is to place a Medical Dispersal locker in the passageway of the Admiral's Country, for first aid use in the flag wardroom.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

PART VII  
Personnel Performance and Casualties.

1. Personnel performance. The performance of all personnel was excellent in spite of the darkness, size of the fire and exploding of 50 cal. and 20mm ammunition. The fact that the fire was brought under control within a reasonable time is evidence of the splendid performance of all hands. Due to the location of the fire, communications were severed amidships and effectively separated the bow and stern for sometime. However, the fire was attacked from all quarters quickly and efficiently.
2. The "Report of Ship's Personnel Suffering Death, Wounds or Injuries Requiring Hospitalization" is appended marked Enclosure (C).
3. Two (2) officers, one of whom was a squadron pilot, and 113 enlisted men were absent from the ship on the morning of the 5th. The U.S.S. Dennis furnished this ship a list of names of 66 enlisted men and one officer it had picked up. The U.S.S. Fullam returned an additional eight men to the ship. One enlisted man transferred to the U.S.S. Hudson during the fire and was reported aboard. Approximately fourteen additional men were reported having been picked up. However, for these fourteen no names were furnished. Recapitulation: 11 identified dead; 25 missing.



C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

PART VIII LESSONS , LEARNED, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. General.

The two Kamakaze attacks on the U.S.S. SANGAMON proved nothing new. There is no royal road to the solution. The problem of whether to keep protective fighters in close or not is a difficult one. In these particular cases after the attempted interception was missed by our planes it is doubtful if another fighter group overhead would have interposed itself quickly enough to have stopped the attack and they might have interferred with the gunnery which in the first case definitely prevented the enemy from hitting and in the second case damaged him before he hit. It is too easy to say that the ship has insufficient gun power. Vessels with much larger batteries have in some cases not done so well and others with smaller batteries have shot down more. The only lesson learned on this score is that every effort should be made to increase skill of interception, improve ships gunnery and develop a projectile heavy enough to stop armoured Kamakaze planes. It is recommended that a 60 or 80 millimeter gun be developed with enough penetrating and disruptive power to overcome the armour carried by these planes.

2. Water curtains, hangar deck.

It was proved again that hangar deck water curtains are of no value when they can not be turned on, as is the case when a large bomb explodes in the hangar deck. It is recommended that hangar deck water curtains be controlled by valves outside of the hangar deck space in view of the fact that explosive damage is very likely to make the valves in the hangar deck inoperative. On the other hand there must be means to turn on the curtain in the hangar deck in the event of fire at other times. It is recommended that remote controls from the hangar deck to valves located at the roots of the risers be installed. These to be installed in such a way that no force transmitted from the hangar deck by reach rods can jam the control valve. It is recommended as a temporary expedient that carriers of this class use the root valves to control the water curtain on one side and the hangar deck valves on the other side.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

PART VIII (Continued).

This system will give theoretically only 50% protection should a bomb cut the risers or firemain. In this case it would have been invaluable in reducing the time required to put out the fire on the hangar deck.

3. Engineering.

- (a) At the time of the explosion and at other times when the generators trip out due to overloads or short circuit, it is difficult to maintain enough steam to relight the plant which if not successful means dead fires and losing steam pressure entirely. It is recommended that in addition to the auxiliary steam fuel service pump and the auxiliary steam boiler feed pump, that a steam driven blower be installed. It would then be possible to maintain a full head of steam and save much valuable time in bringing the main plant back into operation.
- (b) Engineering repair parties used all of their fire fighting equipment and needed much more. It is recommended that a larger stock of fire fighting equipment be provided.

4. Internal communications.

- (a) The primary lesson learned regarding communications is how easy it is for an explosion and fire in the hangar deck to completely sever communications fore and aft. In such cases the bridge and I.C. Room are completely isolated from aft. Battle Two, the fireroom, engine room, auxiliary engine room and steering engine room should have complete circuits with all leads as far aft as possible so they would not be cut by any damage forward. In view of the fact that most bomb explosions are on or reach the hangar deck, particularly from the Kamakaze type attack it is recommended that the power leads, ship control lines, etc., be led forward below the hangar deck, preferably below the main deck with proper stuffing boxes installed to maintain watertight integrity.

PART VIII (Continued).

5. Communications.

- (a) The sound power system should be installed below the hangar deck paralleling the battle sound power system. It is possible that a few "Handie Talkies" dispersed in several locations about the ship might be used to establish communications between fore and aft sections of the ship in cases similar to this.
- (b) External communication complete and independent with power both forward and aft is essential. Some such radio equipment as an ARC-1 complete with power should be installed in Battle Two for emergency communications, as many ships and all carriers are equipped to communicate on VHF. TBY equipment should be stowed aft away from main radio in order to be available if the established radio is destroyed.
- (c) Aldis lamps should also be dispersed fore and aft to be available when all normal signal lights are inoperative due to damage to them or their power supply.

6. Air Department.

- (a) The recently instituted practice on the SANGAMON of degassing all planes on the hangar deck at all times and those on the flight deck except the next immediate flight or the standby planes, paid large dividends for the considerable effort required. None of the barrier crashes where planes ended up in the spot caught fire. One particular bad crash caused numerous minor electrical fires but these were extinguished with CO<sub>2</sub>. When the ship was hit there was less than 1800 gallons of gasoline in the planes aboard instead of the 11 or 12 thousand gallons which would have been in them if the tanks had been full. The 1800 gallons could have been reduced had the planes been degassed completely dry. However, this would interfere with operations an unacceptable amount. About 25 gallons were left in each plane for taxiing forward. This gasoline burned but it was a much lesser problem than had the same tanks contained 450 gallons per plane.

PART VIII (Continued).

- (b) The relatively small number of casualties was a direct result of the doctrine of clearing the hangar deck of all personnel as soon as the guns started firing. In this particular case no one was killed on the hangar deck because there was no one there. It is certain that if anyone had been on the hangar deck they would have been killed. This is proven by the fact that men in clipping rooms on both sides of the hangar deck were killed, although they had the protection of the clipping room bulkheads.
- (c) Again it has been proved that fire fighting school is worth all the man days it requires. It is recommended that material such as gasoline, lubricating oil, rubber tires and aviation engines be used in the instruction fires as these materials are a great deal harder to extinguish than fuel oil fires. In fact the only burning material that could not be extinguished was the burning aircraft engines. It is impossible with the equipment at hand to stop the magnesium in the engines from burning once it gets started.

8. Medical Department.

- (a) No pertinent medical problems arose during the operational period prior to the enemy attack.
- (b) The course of penetrating shrapnel after piercing the skin is very uncertain. One man had a wound on his left thigh, lateral surface, below the greater trochanter. The wound could be probed four (4) inches in an upward direction. He had tenderness to pressure over the crest of the left ilium but no other symptoms and signs referable to the abdomen. An X-Ray plate of the abdomen taken in the upright position revealed free gas under both domes of the diaphragm, a metallic foreign body one (1) inch in diameter to the left of the fourth lumbar vertebra, and a fracture of the left ilium and iliac crest. Here then, is a bizarre case of an object penetrating the upper thigh, burrowing upwards through the ilium, and causing intestinal perforation.

PART VIII (Continued).

It is recommended that immediate X-Ray of penetrating wounds of the thighs, buttocks, abdomen, and the trunk to determine the location of the penetrating object and to detect any evidence of intra abdominal damage.

- (c) On questioning men with burned arms and forearms, about half of them admitted having had their sleeves rolled up at the time of the explosion. It is questionable whether the others did have their sleeves down and buttoned since they had been familiarized with the precaution against blast burns and were perhaps reluctant to admit their failure. The large number of men with burned wrists and hands only, who said their sleeves were rolled down, definitely reaffirms the principle that a thin layer of clothing will protect the skin from a flash burn. It is recommended that men in the combat area keep themselves completely clothed, with shirt sleeves downed and buttoned as a protection against flash burns. Although this has been reiterated again and again since the horrible lesson learned at Pearl Harbor it is practically impossible to enforce at all times and in the excitement the men do not remember to roll down their sleeves and button their collars.
- (d) The treatment of burns sustained in this attack was the vaseline gauze pressure dressing method. With this method the original dressings are left undisturbed for a period of ten (10) days unless circumstances arise indicating their removal for clinical investigation. When the dressings were removed on the tenth day one man was found to have a class ring on a burned finger and an identification bracelet around his burned wrist. Questioning the patient revealed that his hand had been dressed by a line officer "helping out" at one of the dressing stations. Fortunately neither object had interfered with the burn healing process but such a situation might have caused serious consequences. It is recommended that burns dressed by non medical department personnel be redressed to detect and correct any improper treatment.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

PART VIII (Continued).

- (c) The Admiral's Country was used as an auxiliary dressing station for first aid treatment of a considerable number of casualties from the forward parts of the ship after the explosion. Supplies had to be obtained from various first aid boxes and a dispersal locker from the port side of Officers' Country. It is recommended that a medical dispersal locker be placed in the alcove in the Admiral's passageway just forward of the wardroom entrance.

8 MAY 1945

Serial 041

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding Officer:  
To : Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.

Subject: Battle Damage Report.

1. The U.S.S. SANGAMON was hit by a twin engine Japanese suicide airplane (believed to be a NICK), at 1933 on 4 May, 1945, ten (10) miles South of Kerama Retto.

2. The plane struck the flight deck at Frame 69 almost exactly amidship, crashing through this 32" x 12" x 3/4" girder, exploding just below this beam. Fragments penetrated the hangar deck into the midship pump room and laundry. Three missiles penetrated the (1") main deck. The blast blew both elevators above the flight deck where they now rest. The forward elevator lying upright, crowned about one (1) foot, with its centerline about 12° from the ship's centerline. The after elevator inverted in flight and fell back diagonally. Its forward starboard corner is now high above the flight deck while its after port corner is suspended in the elevator pit. The whole is supported by the elevator fore and aft marginal beams. This elevator is also crowned along its fore and aft centerline.

3. The following detailed damage was sustained arranged by decks:

(a) ISLAND

equipment is out of commission: All surfaces and equipment scorched. Following

Electric steering  
Gyro repeaters  
Pit log  
Wind director intensity indicator  
Engine order telegraph  
Rudder angle indicator  
Engine revolution indicator  
Revolution order telegraph  
All navigation lights  
Siren and whistle  
Lines to remote PPI  
Hydraulic steering control  
DRT  
Course recorder  
Fathometer  
Loran Equipment  
Rangefinders (2½ and 1 meter)

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(b) FLIGHT DECK

Between the elevators the flight deck is crowned (bulged) with two high points. One high point is in the centerline between frame 73 and 74 which rounds down to the forward expansion joint at frame 77, and aft to the hole. The other high point is about 17 feet to port of the centerline, rounding down forward to the hole, and aft to the elevator edge at frame 61. These points are about 3½ feet high. Athwartship these girders curve down to their normal position on the bents. Planking is, of course, ruined from frames 58 to 81. Arresting gear, barrier gear, gasoline stations and lines within these limits are also ruined. The after starboard jettison ramp, stack, port after end of catwalk and net frame were damaged by assisting vessels during the conflagration. (See other damage from the same cause under appropriate decks).

(c) GALLERY DECK

From frame 82 forward there is no apparent damage other than some evidence of the starboard catapult settling at its after end. Flag stateroom 0210, coding room, main communication station and radio central are pierced by a few shrapnel holes through bulkheads, ventilation ducts, files, and decks. Other equipment is undamaged. Air Plot is slightly burned, CIC burned overhead and all equipment damaged and wiring burned. From frame 79 to 60 on starboard side all gallery deck compartments are both burned and structurally damaged. Gun sponsons and catwalks from frame 69 to 75 starboard are warped and buckled. The transmitter storeroom, finishing room, developing and printing rooms are burned. On the port side between frames 78 and 74 compartments are burned only, while those from frames 74 to 63 are both burned and structurally damaged. Between frames 64 and 73 gun sponsons and catwalks are warped and bent.

Damage by assisting craft. Mount 3(40MM) sponson battered, both flag bags ruined, net baskets at frames 67 and 64 ruined, TCE and TOK antennae destroyed. All on starboard side.



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(d) HANGAR DECK

Blast and fragmentation lies on a line between bents 72 starboard and 68 port. Overhead is arched as outlined under FLIGHT DECK. All roller curtains are blown out completely. Bulkheads from bents 63 to 74 port are bulged outwardly, with fragmentation holes increasing toward bent 67 where shell plating is blown out. A similar condition exists between bents 66 and 73 on the starboard side with plating blown out between bents 70 and 72. The hangar deck varies in amount of sagging between expansion joints up to about 1½ feet. There is some blast damage to bulkheads around staterooms 0114, 0116, the aviation engine shop, and the aviation sheet metal shop. Vital wiring from the bridge and CIC along the upper starboard corner of the hangar and those along the port corner are burned out the entire length. Fire main risers 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 23 and 25 are out of commission. Fire main crossover in midship pumproom is pierced. Sprinkler expansion loop on port after side has fallen. Emergency elevator hatch trusses port have warped and fallen; starboard trusses were also twisted and have been jettisoned. All hoisting gear is badly burned and out of commission.

Damage from assisting craft on this deck consists of piercing the plating on the starboard paravane sponson, a hole in the aviation sheet metal shop at frame 57, another in the plating under the starboard 5" gun sponson. A small dent in the sick bay at frame 52 was also sustained.

(e) MAIN DECK

The main deck proper is undamaged except for three shrapnel holes near the after port corner of the midship pump room trunk. Centerline stanchion at frame 77 is crimped. Wires are burnt on port side of overhead at frame 76. From crew's head and laundry to frame 68 on the starboard side, diagonally across to frame 65 on the port side and forward to CPO head at frame 71 the stanchions are crimped and deck beams are sagged and skewed. Nearly all overhead steam and water line hangars are broken. Within the area outlined, all lines are ruptured or pierced. Laundry machinery is also pierced, though not irreparably. Deck machinery is apparently in normal condition though lack of steam has prevented testing. Fueling equipment is damaged by about 35%.

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(f) GENERAL

All boats damaged. Personnel boat burned.  
Number one and two motor whaleboats shrapnel and blast damage.

All winches, except poop deck, are out of  
commission due to ruptured steam lines, including anchor engine.

Battle Two wiring ruptured to all communications  
and gyro repeaters.

4. The following detailed damage, arranged by departments;  
was sustained:

(a) AIR DEPARTMENT

C.I.C. - Damage to spaces caused by smoke, acrid  
fumes, salt water and extreme heat is impossible to evaluate at  
this time. All sound proofing is damaged, wiring, radio and  
sound power systems are inoperative. DRT, Gyro repeaters, Pit-  
ometer Log, Wind intensity and direction indicators are also  
inoperative. Damage to instruments does not seem severe, but  
power leads are out. All plexiglass boards are warped or darkened  
and will have to be replaced. Sound power and radio selector  
switches are corroded.

Airborne Radar Shop in old Parachute packing room.

1. Ladder from hangar deck to shop missing.
2. All power leads into shop burned up.
3. Undetermined damage to two (2) 800 cycle  
motor alternators. One of motor generators  
looks as though it might be in running order.
4. One DC generator probably burned internally.
5. Hatch blown off its hinges.
6. Insulating material on one bulkhead damaged.
7. Sprinkler system pipe cracked open.
8. Several small leaks in pipe No. R38.
9. Storage shelves on forward bulkhead loose.
10. Sink loosened from bulkhead.
11. Superficial damage to frigidaire unit.
12. Pipe broken on storage tank.
13. Test equipment for APS/4, APS/6A, IFF, Radio  
Altimeter and Radio gear is in doubtful  
condition due to heat and moisture. It is  
suggested that units either be replaced or  
undergo rigorous inspection and testing  
before being placed back into service.

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Subject: Battle Damage Report.

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Radar Battle Damage Report. - The following units are damaged beyond repair.

1. SP Transmitter
2. SP Modulators A and B
3. SP Control Amplifiers
4. SP Amplidyne generators (3)
5. SP Step by step converter
6. BM-1)  
BO-1) IFF Sets  
BL-1)  
BN )
7. SG-A Transmitter receiver main frame.
8. SG-A Control Amplifier.
9. Step by step converter for SG-A and SC-3 radars.
10. SC-2 Transmitter.
11. OBU-3 Echo box for SG-A.
12. LID UHF signal generator.
13. Model OE-5 Weston test set.
14. Pattern No. 844 Precision meter.
15. OBQ-1 Vacuum tube volt, ohm, milliammeter - Hickok.
16. OAP Radar test equipment (wave meter - oscillator.
17. Model OBL-1 Cathode Ray oscillograph (Dumont)
18. Model OZ-1 Vacuum tube testing equipment (Hickok)
19. OAA-2 Wave Meter.
20. SG-A range and train indicator.
21. SC-3 Console.
22. Trigger delay lines (3).

The following units are possibly salvagable:

1. YJ-1 Radar beacon.
2. SP Console.
3. ABK-7 (2 units).
4. VF remote PPI repeater.
5. VG Projection PPI.
6. VG-1 Projection PPI.
7. VC Remote PPI.
8. Mark 8 Mod 2 stable element for SP.

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The following units are salvagable:

1. VD-2 (2 units).
2. SP Antenna.
3. SC-3 Antenna.
4. SG-A Antenna.

Note 1. All cabling, bulkhead installations, and wave guides are destroyed in the Radar Transmitter Room. By bulkhead installations is meant switches, transformers, contactors and junction boxes.

Note 2. The extent of the cabling damage in C.I.C. is greater than appears because most of the cables are terminated in the Radar Transmitter Room or VHF Radio room, in which case they will have to be completely re-run.

Note 3. Smoke, heat and salt water damage to the equipment units in C.I.C. will become worse as time goes on because of corrosion and many of the units which are now salvigable will not be so in a matter of a few days. The interiors of all units are coated with a highly acid, sticky smoke film.

Gasoline System.

1. All stations on Hangar Deck completely destroyed. This includes hose, filters and degaussing pumps.
2. Three (3) stations on Flight Deck completely destroyed, hose, filters and degaussing pumps.

Station #8 (frame 75 port side)  
Station #9 (frame 62 port side)  
Station #10 (frame 66 starboard side)

3. Complete loss of 30 gasoline safety cans, 2000 feet of gasoline hose, eleven (11) hose nozzles.
4. All gasoline piping from pump room (Weather Deck) to Flight deck, including valves, was damaged by intense heat and explosions.

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Subject: Battle Damage Report.  
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Alcohol System.

1. Complete loss of two (2) stations on hangar deck and one station on flight deck.
2. All piping from weather deck to hangar and flight deck destroyed or damaged by heat or explosions.

Arresting Gear.

1. Six (6) Arresting Units (includes all fair lead sheaves, piping, valves, accumulators, etc.) need replacing.
2. Barrier Air Operated Units need replacing. Barrier stanchions damaged by heat need replacing.
3. All arresting gear spares, such as cross-deck pendants, barrier cables, yielding elements, crosshead sheaves and spare grease was ruined by intense heat.
4. Eighteen (18) yielding elements need replacing.

Catapults.

1. Catapults are still in commission.

Lubrication Oil System.

1. Complete loss of two (2) ready service oil stations. All piping from weather deck to hangar deck, including filter and vent lines, destroyed or damaged by fire or explosions.

Motorized Equipment.

1. One (1) Hyster Karry Crane completely destroyed.
2. Three (3) 1/4 ton 4 x 4 command reconnaissance cars (jeeps) completely destroyed by fire.
3. Two (2) Ford Tractors completely destroyed by fire.
4. One (1) Clark Fork Truck damaged excessively by fire. Replacement desired.

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Subject: Battle Damage Report.  
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(b) ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT.

Whistles. - Inoperative due to cables, etc. Should be capable of operation by electric solenoids if electric circuit was all right. Air Whistle inoperative due to ruptured air lines.

Mid-ship Pump Room - Damage excessive, sustained to ventilation system, overhead, steam lines; deck. Damaged firemain. Air compressor, H.P., Cargo lines, Stripper pumps, and Diesel Fire Pump apparently all right, but cannot be sure until actually tested.

Fuel Deck - All steam lines on port side from galley hatch to cut-out valves at forward FD bulkhead ruptured, necessitating complete replacement. All steam smothering and Butterworth lines on starboard side are very badly strained and bent, probably operative but with danger of rupture. Fuel oil lines punctured at starboard header, port side; bunker filling line port side, amidship punctured. Three (3) forward deck winches inoperative by virtue of ruptured steam lines, possibly inoperative because of shrapnel also.

Other Deck Machinery - Poop deck winch operative. Aviation winch and small winch amidship on gasoline deck (weather deck), and anchor winch in operative condition, but incapable of operation because of steam lines. Paravane winches same with possibility of shrapnel damage.

Forward Pump Room Steam Pumps - Inoperative due to ruptured lines on Fuel Deck.

Refrigeration - All photo laboratory equipment needs replacing. One (1) scuttlebutt carried away on hangar deck.

Laundry - Laundry steam lines being checked. Apparently little damage to same. Extent of machinery damage uncertain until power and steam turned on. Dryer has punctured heater.

Hydraulic Steering - Oil lines punctured, temporarily repaired.

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General.

1. All power, light, I.C. and F.C. cables in hangar deck spaces burned or ruptured.
2. All power, lighting, I.C. and F.C. cables on Fuel Deck, on port and starboard catwalks, and Island structure burned out and damaged.
3. Battery charging equipment damaged.
4. Hangar Deck lighting system destroyed.
5. M.C.G. announcing system and speakers damaged.
6. Zonite Fire Alarm System out of commission.
7. Flight Deck lighting control equipment and lighting damaged.
8. Vent fan motors on Fuel Deck and Hangar Deck damaged and burned.
9. Lighting system in Ammunition Ready Service and Clipping Rooms on catwalk burned out.
10. Intercommunication boxes on 19 and 21 M.C. circuits damaged.
11. Three (3) 24" searchlights and four (4) 12" searchlights damaged.
12. Two (2) DeVry motion picture machines and amplifying equipment burned and blast damaged.
13. Casualty power, risers and bulkhead terminals on after starboard side of Hangar Deck Space destroyed.
14. Bracket fans damaged.
15. Power panel #224, Main Deck, frame 72, port side, damaged.
16. Casualty power cable TCOP-42 damaged.
17. Degaussing cable and equipment on A, M, F, and Q coil loops and control circuits damaged.
18. Armeter feeders to Pilot House partially damaged.

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(c) GUNNERY DEPARTMENT

Mount 1 - Ready Service Stowage undamaged.

Mount 2 - Ready Service Room undamaged. No lighting circuit but wiring appears undamaged.

Mount 3 - Structural damage to shell shute and sponson frames. Frames are bent and twisted. Ready Service Room undamaged. No lighting circuit but wiring appears undamaged.

Mount 4 - Ready Service Room undamaged. No lighting circuit. Wiring seems to be undamaged.

Mount 5 - Ready Service Rooms 74-76 completely ruined. Frames and bulkheads warped and twisted. Gun sponson completely ruined. All strengthening members completely twisted.

Mount 6 - Ready Service Room undamaged. No lighting circuit. Wiring seems to be undamaged.

Mount 7 - Ready Service Room undamaged. Electrical circuit out but wiring apparently undamaged.

Mount 8 - Ready Service all right. Electrical circuit out but wiring apparently undamaged.

Mount 9 - Ready Service Room undamaged. Electrical circuit out but wiring apparently undamaged.

Mount 10 - Ready Service all right. Electrical circuit out but wiring apparently undamaged.

Mount 11 - Satisfactory. Gun sponsons satisfactory.

Mount 12 - Satisfactory. Gun sponsons satisfactory.

40MM Ready Service Magazine - (Aft) Magazine 01-12-1 satisfactory. Lighting circuit out. Wiring apparently undamaged. Magazine 01-12-2 small hole in inboard bulkhead. Lighting circuit out. Wiring apparently undamaged.

5"/38 - (Port) Gun sponson apparently satisfactory. Starboard gun sponson frame 20 outside deck level slightly damaged needs repair for watertight integrity.



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5" Ready Service Magazine - Satisfactory.  
Lighting circuit out. Wiring apparently undamaged.

Ship's Armory - Undamaged. (Compartment A-312-A)

Forward Magazine Group - Undamaged. Hoist in running condition. (Compartment A-411-M).

Midship Magazine - Undamaged. Hoist in running condition. (Compartment A-411-M).

After Magazine - Flooded, for period of 36 hours, no lighting circuit but wiring apparently undamaged. Insulation intact but saturated. All switches wet and short circuited on hoist. (Compartment C-301-M, C-302-M, and C-305-M).

Bomb Magazine - All deck insulation wet, one section of bulkhead insulation wet at after side of hoist. Hoist motor drowned. (Compartment A-413-M).

Torpedo Stowage - Undamaged. (Compartment A-414-M)

Rocket Stowage - Undamaged. (Compartment A-315 $\frac{1}{2}$ -M)

Pyrotechnic Locker - Undamaged. (Compartment A-408-M)

Bomb Fuze Locker - Undamaged. (Compartment a-312 $\frac{1}{2}$ -M).

Incendiary Bomb Stowage - Undamaged. (Compartment A-408 $\frac{1}{2}$ -M).

Group "O" - Replace damaged insulation below door inside Group O Ready Service. Electrical circuit is out. Wiring apparently undamaged.

20MM (Starboard) - Frame 58-60 - 20mm Ready Service undamaged. Electrical circuit out but apparently undamaged.

Frame 60-61 - 20mm Ready Service burned out.

Group 1 - All Ready Service Rooms from frame 70-74 completely burned out. Bulkheads and frames twisted. Gun sponsons warped and twisted.

Frame 76-78 - 20mm Ready Service Room completely burned out. Bulkhead twisted and buckled.

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20MM (Port) - Frame 74-76 - 20mm Ready Service Room completely burned out. Insulation and wiring completely bad.

Frame 73-74 - 20mm Ready Service Room completely burned out. Insulation and wiring completely bad.

Frame 72-74 - 20mm Ready Service Room outer and inner bulkheads warped. Frames twisted. Completely burned out. Insulation and wiring completely burned out.

Ready Service Room - Frame 58-60 - Electrical circuit out but apparently undamaged.

Group 2 - Gun Sponson decks warped and out of shape. All group and ready service rooms completely burned out.

Group 4 - Ready Service Room completely burned out. Forward two gun sponson decks warped. Ready Service Room bulkheads either gone or shattered. Outboard bulkhead completely warped.

Mount 5 - Burned out from excessive heat. No temper in metal parts. (Right Gun Mk. 2 Mod. 1, Serial No. 42541) (Left Gun Mk. 1 Mod. 1, Serial No. 32451):

40MM Barrel Mk. 1 Mod. 1, Serial No. 49362 - Burned out.

20MM Guns completely burned out.

Group 1 - Gun 11 - Mk. 4 Ser. No. 32923, Barrel Mk. 4 Ser. No. 51330.

Gun 12 - Mk. 2 Ser. No. 71914, Barrel Mk. 2 Ser. No. 123551.

Gun 13 - Mk. 2 Ser. No. 71747, Barrel Mk. 2 Ser. No. 123561.

Gun 14 - Mk. 4 Ser. No. 52366, Barrel Mk. 4 Mod. 1 Ser. No. 95159.

Gun 15 - Mk. 2 Ser. No. 71756, Barrel Mk. 2 Ser. No. 123562.

Group 3 - Gun 33 - Mk. 2 Ser. No. 71753, Barrel Mk. 4 Mod. 1 Ser. No. 90014

Gun 34 - Mk. 4 Ser. No. 49144, Barrel Mk. 4 Ser. No. 88018.

Group 2 - Gun - Mk. 2 Ser. No. 71748, Barrel Mk. 4 Mod. 1 Ser. No. 91467.

Gun 22 - Mk. 4 Ser. No. 49138, Barrel Mk. 2 Ser. No. 123559.

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Group 4 - Gun 42 - Mk.4 Ser.No. 46808, Barrel  
Mk.4 Mod.1 Ser.No. 302386.

20MM Spare Guns Destroyed - Mk. 4 Ser.No.19840,  
Mk.4 Ser.No. 52389, and Mk. 4 Ser.No. 66153.

20MM Spare Barrels Destroyed - Mk: 2 Ser.No.  
123552; Mk: 2 Ser.No. 123569; Mk. 2 Ser.No. 123556; Mk. 2 Ser.  
No. 123888; Mk. 4 Ser.No. 87889; Mk. 4 Ser.No. 70431; Mk. 4  
Mod. 1 Ser.No. 112086; Mk. 4 Mod. 1 Ser.No. 91450; Mk. 4 Mod. 1  
Ser.No. 95162; Mk. 4 Mod. 1 Ser.No. 22943; Mk. 4 Mod. 1 Ser.No.  
22952; and Mk. 4 Mod. 1 Ser.No. 91193.

6 Complete sets of 40mm spare parts destroyed  
by fire.  
16 Complete sets of 20mm spare parts destroyed  
by fire.  
20MM Magazines - 333 were destroyed or thrown  
overboard.

Group 0 - Electrical circuits demolished.

Gun Sights Mark 14 Mod. 2 All Demolished -  
Gun 11 - Ser.No. 3951; Gun 12 - Ser.No. 15054; Gun 13 - Ser.  
No. 38966; Gun 14 - Ser.No. 35070; Gun 15 - Ser.No. 95724;  
Gun 21 - Ser.No. 16571; Gun 22 - Ser.No. 35330; Gun 23 -  
Ser.No. 14121; Gun 33 - Ser.No. 7758; Gun 34 - Ser.No. 33546;  
Gun 35 - Ser.No. 38959; Gun 41 - Ser. No. 16897; Gun 42 - Ser.  
No. 8393.

Pump Units All Demolished - Gun 11 - Ser.No.  
19450; Gun 12 - Ser.No. 33611; Gun 13 - Ser.No. 21931; Gun 14 -  
Ser.No. 20286; Gun 15 - Ser.No. 62723; Gun 21 - Ser.No. 26043;  
Gun 22 - Ser.No. 7930; Gun 23 - Ser.No. 26459; Gun 33 - Ser.No.  
20846; Gun 34 - Ser.No. 27713; Gun 35 - Ser.No. 19372; Gun 42 -  
Ser.No. 25665

Pump Units Damaged - Gun 41 - Ser.No. 21966.

Mount 5 - Amplidine - (Tr.) - Ser.No. YAH832 -  
Demolished; (Ele.) - Ser.No. YAH836 - Demolished.  
Controller - Ser.No. 1219662 - Demolished.  
Amplifier - Ser.No. 1218423 - Demolished.  
Cooling Pump Motor (R) - Ser.No. 3X4524 -  
Damaged beyond Ship's Force Repair.

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Cooling Pump Motor (L) - Ser.No. 3X40510,  
Damaged beyond Ship's Force Repair.

Firing Motor - Ser.No. 6785999, Damaged beyond  
Ship's Force Repair.

Elevation Drive Mk. 4 - Ser.No. 20300, Damaged  
beyond Ship's Force Repair.

Train Drive Mk. 4 - Ser.No. 20300, Damaged beyond  
Ship's Force Repair.

Mount 6 - Amplidine - (Tr.) Ser.No. ZAF301 -  
Damaged beyond Ship's Force Repair. (Ele.) Ser.No. YAH677 -  
Damaged beyond Ship's Force Repair.

Amplifier - Ser.No. 1219112, Damaged beyond  
Ship's Force Repair.

Controller - Ser.No. 1220237, Damaged beyond  
Ship's Force Repair.

Director 6 - Sight Mk. 4 Ser.No. 13458 Damaged  
beyond Ship's Force Repair

Pump Unit Ser.No. 34390, Damaged beyond Ship's  
Force Repair.

Mount 7 - Elev. Amplifier - Ser.No. 1219119,  
Damaged beyond Ship's Force Repair.

Elev. Controller - Ser.No. 220231, Damaged  
beyond Ship's Force Repair.

Elev. Amplidine - Ser.No. YAF672, Damaged beyond  
Ship's Force Repair.

Mount 8 - Train Power Drive - Mk.4 Mod.0 - Ser.  
No.2564 - Damaged in local control.

Lookout 5 - Seat burned. Needs recovering.

Lookouts 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9 - Fittings to  
hold binoculars missing from stations.

JA (Lookout) Phones Circuit Out of Commission.

Binoculars Missing - Serial Numbers 2145 (L.O.#5),  
13882 (L.O.#6), 15147 (L.O.#7), 26403(L.O.#8). All but L.O.#8  
glasses were believed to have been removed before we were able  
to check on them the morning of 5 May 1945, since fittings  
holding them are also missing.