

Shack (13) pm
follows
Shaffer
A-1

5419

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Senator Ferguson: That was the occasion. So it came from the British to you and you made this recommendation to the President?

Admiral Turner: That a warning be issued?

Senator Ferguson: Yes, that a warning be issued in relation to Thailand. I want to call to your attention the last paragraph. It does not relate to the line that was drawn about the notice. Have you got your copy?

Admiral Turner: I think so.

Senator Ferguson: Have you got it now, Admiral?

Admiral Turner: No, sir, I am afraid not.

(The document was handed to Admiral Turner.)

Admiral Turner: The first one of those three sub-paragraphs Senator, covers United States-British and Dutch territory. Then, because Thailand is not one of the three, that is put in as a separate matter. But it covers the whole thing. It is the entire line.

Senator Ferguson: Let me go up a paragraph:

"After consultation with each other, United States, British and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counteraction against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100° East or south of 10° North, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands."

In other words, they are saying that we had agreed, and you recommended, that in case they moved into Thailand west of 100° East or south of 10° North, that we were to take action.

Now down in the next to the last paragraph you say this:

"In case of a Japanese advance into Thailand" - that is not west of 100° East, but just in Thailand - "Japan be warned by the United States, the British and the Dutch Governments that advance beyond the lines indicated may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint military opposition be undertaken."

Now am I clear in this, that this recommendation has two parts? In the one case you recommend that if they cross this line that you set up, 100° East or south of 10° North, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia or the Loyalty Islands, that action is to be taken, but in case they go into any other part of Thailand you want a notice given, is that correct?

Admiral Turner: That is correct, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: That is correct.

Admiral Turner: But with regard to that second paragraph it says, you see, "after consultation with each other, United States, British and Dutch military authorities in the Far East

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
agreed" on certain things.

Now that was never approved by either the Chief of Staff or Chief of Naval Operations, or anybody in Washington, nor by the British Chiefs of Staff, but that was taken as a basis for this paper here, which was a new thing to fit the exact situation here.

Senator Ferguson: But then when the Ambassador of Britain was asking the United States Secretary of State for an answer to this question he was very desirous of ascertaining what the United States Government would do if the British should resist any Japanese undertaking to establish a base on the Kra Isthmus? That is a specific question.

Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now would not that have been a violation of the thing that you had in mind here, moving across this line 100° West?

Admiral Turner: It certainly would have been a violation if the British had gone in there.

Senator Ferguson: If the British had gone in?

Admiral Turner: Yes. They had a proposition that they wanted to go in. That was opposed. We refused to support it, either the State Department or the military.

Senator Ferguson: You opposed that?

Admiral Turner: Yes, sir, because that would have taken

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

out the whole basis of our non-aggression.

Senator Ferguson: In other words, if they would have gone in first to protect that, that would have been against non-aggression, is that right?

Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: That would have been a violation of the first overt act proposition, would not it?

Admiral Turner: That is correct.

Senator Ferguson: And we were doing everything we could to avoid the first overt act?

Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: In other words, we were watching the Jap ships going in and as soon as they crossed the line that was the overt act on their part?

Admiral Turner: That is right. We wished to define it as that.

Senator Ferguson: That is why we had scouts out and patrols, and so forth, to see whether or not they were going over that line and committing that overt act, is that right?

Admiral Turner: That was way south of any place our people were in. We were over there merely to look and see the size of the forces, and to see how much they could undertake at one time.

Senator Ferguson: You said one of our scouting planes

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 was in trouble over Formosa. When was that?

3 Admiral Turner: That was about the 2nd or 3rd of
4 December, or even a few days before that. Planes had gone
5 up in that general direction and apparently one of our planes
6 had gotten over or close to Formosa, because it got a protest
7 from the Japanese about it.

8 Senator Ferguson: Got a protest?

9 Admiral Turner: Yes.

10 Senator Ferguson: On the 30th of November, 1941, from
11 OPNAV, action: CINCAF, and information CINCPAC, I want to
12 read this to you:

13 "Indications that Japan about to attack points on Kra
14 Isthmus by overseas expedition. In order to ascertain destina-
15 tion this expedition and for security our position in the
16 Philippines desire you cover by air the line Manila Camranh
17 Bay on three days commencing upon receipt this despatch.
18 Instruct planes to observe only. They must not approach so
19 as to appear to be attacking but must defend themselves if
20 attacked."

21 In other words, they were armed, is that true?

22 Admiral Turner: That is correct, they were armed with
23 machine guns and ammunition.

24 Senator Ferguson: "Understand British Air Forces will
25 search arc 180 miles from Tedta Bharu and will move troops

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

to line across Kra Isthmus near Singora. If expedition is approaching Thailand inform MacArthur. British mission here informed."

Now is that the message that was sent out, that the British had asked for here where I read the Commander in Chief Far East has requested the Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet at Manila to undertake air reconnaissance on Hawaii, Manila and Camranh Bay on the same days?

Admiral Turner: Yes, sir, that is the message.

Senator Ferguson: That is the message sent out. Now here is the wording, "Understand British Air Forces will search arc 180 miles from Tedta Bharu and will move troops to line across Kra Isthmus". How do you account for that in line with what you told me before, that that would be an act of aggression by the British?

Admiral Turner: My recollection of the position of Singora is it is just outside the nearest town to the northern border of the British territory, and that they were going to move troops to that northern border.

Senator Ferguson: They were not going to cross the line, in other words?

Admiral Turner: I believe so. I believe that is correct.

Senator Ferguson: Did you believe that the Tanaka memorial was an actual instrument, or did you have any ideas

AL-7

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 on that?

3 Admiral Turner: Well, I do not believe I ever formed
4 any definite opinion as to whether it was authentic or not.
5 I always felt that it expressed generally the Japanese militar-
6 istic viewpoint.

7 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I would like to insert
8 in the record, where I read the statement that the Admiral
9 had made to the Japanese Ambassador, I would like to put into
10 the record the whole statement, because I think it will make
11 better sense in the record and explain what we were talking
12 about.

13 The Vice Chairman: So ordered.

14 Mr. Mitchell: Would you mind identifying that for
15 the reporter by volume, book and page?

16 Senator Ferguson: It is Foreign Relations of the United
17 States-Japan, 1931-1941, Volume II, page 516.

18 (The document referred to is as follows:)
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

(15)

WLC
1

1 The Director of the War Plans Division of the Navy
2 Department (Rear Admiral Turner) to the Chief of Naval
3 Operations (Admiral Stark) . . . (Transmitted to President
4 Roosevelt and to the Secretary of State by Admiral Stark).

5
6
7 Op-12-CTB
8 (SC)EF
9 Serial 083412
10 Memorandum

WASHINGTON, July 21, 1941.

11 1. On July 20, 1941, about 3 P. M., Ambassador Nomura
12 called on me at my residence. After some general conversation,
13 he informed me that on Friday or Saturday (July 18-19, 1941)
14 he had gone to Virginia Hot Springs White Sulphur Springs to
15 call on Mr. Hull, but the latter's physician had not permitted
16 an interview. Subsequently, as I understand, Ambassador
17 Nomura had a conversation with Mr. Welles. Prior to coming
18 to my residence, he had called at Admiral Stark's house, but
19 he had not found him in. He did not say whether he had then
20 tried to get in touch with Admiral Ingersoll; (Rear Admiral
21 Royal E. Ingersoll, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.) I
22 understand the latter was not at home at that hour.

23 2. Ambassador Nomura indicated that he desired to have
24 a conversation with Admiral Stark as soon as convenient; he
25 intended to go to New York the 21st or 22d but will return
shortly. I informed the Ambassador that I would convey his
request to Admiral Stark, and assured him that the latter

WC2

1 would be glad to talk with him.

2 3. The Ambassador then explained at considerable length
3 what he proposed to discuss with Admiral Stark. He said that
4 he is not a professional diplomat, and is occupying his present
5 position because none of the trained diplomats in whom the
6 government had confidence had been willing to accept the
7 Washington Mission; he had demurred for a considerable period,
8 and had accepted the duty only after great insistence by his
9 friends, particularly high ranking naval officers and the more
10 conservative groups of Army officers. He noted that Admiral
11 Toyoda, now Foreign Minister, had been more than insistent that
12 he accept the Mission; it was evident that he felt he had a
13 greater measure of Toyoda's confidence than of Matsuoka's.
14 He stated that he particularly wished to discuss the inter-
15 national situation with Admiral Stark because, if the United
16 States and Japan could not remain at peace, it was obvious that
17 a devastating naval war would ensue.

18 4. Ambassador Nomura stated that for some weeks he had
19 had frequent conferences with Mr. Hull, in an endeavor to
20 seek a formula through which the United States and Japan could
21 remain at peace. He no longer hoped for 100% agreement on all
22 points, but would be content if a partial agreement could be
23 reached which would prevent war between the two countries.
24 Such an agreement would necessarily be informal, since Japan
25 is now committed by treaty to Germany, and this treaty could

WLC3

1 not be denounced at this time. However, he noted that the
2 decision as to when the military clauses of the treaty would
3 come into effect lies entirely in Japan's hands, and that these
4 would be invoked only if Germany were to be the object of
5 aggression by another power. He stated that Japan entered
6 the Axis solely because it seemed to be to Japan's interest
7 to do so. Japan's future acts will be dominated solely by Japan,
8 and not by any other power. Whatever military action Japan
9 takes will be for her own ultimate purposes.

10 5. He then talked at length on the points which Japan
11 considered essential for an agreement between the United States
12 and Japan. The fundamental basis of such an agreement neces-
13 sarily would be that either Power would be free to take such
14 steps as seem to be required by its own responsibility for self
15 defense. He mentioned that, owing to export restrictions against
16 Japan by the United States and the Philippines, and owing to a
17 reduction in shipping tonnage available for trade, Japan's
18 present economic position is bad and steadily getting worse.
19 It is essential that Japan had uninterrupted access to neces-
20 sary raw materials, particularly iron ore and iron products,
21 oil, rubber, cotton and food. There are other important
22 items as well.

23 6. The second point is that the United States is constantly
24 providing greater support to China. If China is left without
25 industrial and military support, it will not be long before the

1 Chungking regime will be unable to continue the present
2 "China Incident"; Japan will then be able to withdraw from
3 the greater part of China. However, Ambassador Nomura noted
4 that the United States is improving the Burma Road, and is supply-
5 ing airplanes and pilots to be sent to Chungking. He under-
6 stands that there are over a hundred American pilots now en
7 route, who have been supplied from the armed forces of the
8 United States. Japan must make some arrangement through
9 which support of this nature will be reduced, rather than
10 increased. The British are also contributing more and more
11 to measures designed to sustain the Chungking regime.

12 7. The third point which the Ambassador mentioned as
13 essential for Japan's security is the more or less permanent
14 stationing of Japanese troops in Inner Mongolia in order to
15 break the connection between Russia and China, and in order
16 to suppress the extensive Chinese Communist elements in that
17 general region. Japan has an agreement with Wang Ching Wei
18 which will permit Japanese forces to remain in Inner Mongolia;
19 how long such measures will continue necessary can not be fore-
20 told. I inferred that, were this agreed to, Japanese troops
21 would be withdrawn from the greater part of China.

22 8. He then informed me that within the next few days
23 Japan expects to occupy French Indo-China. How the occupation
24 would be made he is not informed; presumably, it would be
25 chiefly by an over-land march from Hanoi southward, but on

1 this he is not yet informed. In any case, for the immediate
2 future security of Japan, both against a possible attack from
3 the south and for a better control over the activities of
4 Chungking, this occupation has become essential.

5 9. It was evident that Ambassador Nomura had some appre-
6 hension that the United States would take further action
7 against Japan, either economically or militarily, as soon as
8 Japanese troops were known to be occupying French Indo-China.
9 He anticipates an intensification of the present press campaign
10 against Japan in the United States. It seems, though he did
11 not so state categorically, that Japan contemplates no further
12 move to the south for the time being. He made no mention of
13 possible activity against Siberia.

14 10. Ambassador Nomura indicated that these points were
15 essential to any informal agreements which might be made
16 between the United States and Japan. Rather cautiously he
17 conveyed the impression that were the United States to accept
18 these conditions, any action it might take in the Atlantic
19 would not be a matter of great concern to Japan. The one
20 great point on which agreement might be reached, he again
21 emphasized as the inherent right of self defense.

22 11. The Ambassador set forth all the foregoing without
23 interruption on my part. I informed him that I would present
24 these points to Admiral Stark's attention. However, I desired
25 to point out one important thing to him, speaking solely

1 from a personal viewpoint, and as one naval officer to
2 another, on a certain broad strategic aspect of the situa-
3 tion which I envisaged. I agreed that there would be a
4 decidedly adverse reaction in the United States to Japanese
5 occupation of Indo-China. Entirely aside from matters of
6 policy, it would be evident to him that this move had an import-
7 ant bearing on the strategic position of the United States.

8 12. I pointed out that, speaking from the standpoint of
9 self defense, the greatest danger to the United States in the
10 future lies in the continued military success of Germany. The
11 United States has been able to live in peace because power-
12 ful military nations in Europe have checked each other and
13 prevented a military penetration by any of them in the Western
14 Hemisphere. If Great Britain were to collapse, German mili-
15 tary power might very well be directed against South America,
16 and such moves would cause great difficulties for the United
17 States. So long as the United Kingdom continues to exist
18 as a military and naval power, the problems of the United States
19 as regards its security will not be very great. Therefore,
20 aside from racial and social ideals, it is decidedly against
21 the military interests of the United States to permit the
22 United Kingdom to be overcome by Germany. For this reason any
23 action which the United States could take against Germany is
24 necessarily one of self defense and could never be considered
25 as aggression: Furthermore, anything that affects the future

1 security of the United Kingdom, in any part of the world,
2 also is of interest to the United States from the defensive
3 viewpoint.

4 13. The occupation of Indo-China by Japan is particu-
5 larly important for the defense of the United States since it
6 might threaten the British position in Singapore and the Dutch
7 position in the Netherlands East Indies. Were they to pass out
8 of their present control, a very severe blow would be struck
9 at the integrity of the defense of the British Isles, and
10 these Isles might well then be overcome by the Germans. It
11 can thus be seen what a very close interest, from a military
12 viewpoint, the United States has in sustaining the status quo
13 in the southern portion of the Far East.

14 14. I suggested that Japan really has very little to
15 fear from American, British or Dutch activities in the Far East.
16 It might well be, were these Powers to be displaced, Japan
17 would find Germany facing her in that region, which would put
18 an entirely different complexion on the military situation
19 there.

20 15. Ambassador Nomura stated that, regardless of his own
21 personal opinions in the matter (which were clearly sympathetic
22 to the above point of view) he was bound to support the poli-
23 cies of his government, which at present include collaboration
24 with the Axis.

25 16. The interview then closed after the Ambassador again

reiterated his desire to discuss these matters with Admiral Stark.

R. K. TURNER

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

fols.
copy

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Senator Ferguson: At that time, as I recall it, he was telling you that that they were going into Indochina.

Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And you were attempting to tell him, and I think in no uncertain language, just how you felt about it.

Admiral Turner: It was on that occasion that I became convinced, after discussing the matter with him, that the future diplomatic effort they would make with us would be to keep us out while they attacked Britain and the Netherlands East Indies.

Senator Ferguson: Now, Admiral, did you have, after the conversation that you had, any definite ideas that we were going to get into a war with Japan? Could that have changed your thinking, that conversation?

Admiral Turner: I think that had a very decided effect. My recollection of that conversation is that it was the latter part of June. Now this was, as you have it there, in July, but I remember it as the latter part of June.

Senator Ferguson: This is dated July. It says he was over to Hot Springs to see the Secretary of State and could not see him on the 20th of July, 1941, and he apparently came back to see you.

Admiral Turner: Yes.

Senator Ferguson: Now does that refresh your memory?

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Admiral Turner: Yes, sir. I thought it was June, when I said I might have been influenced in June or July, because that had a very decided influence.

Senator Ferguson: Admiral, I want to call your attention to pages 200 and 202 in Exhibit 1. Do you have Exhibit 1 there?

Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: That is a message intercepted from Berlin, dated November 29, 1941, translated by the Navy on December 1, 1941, in which the Ambassador of Japan was telling VonRibbentrop that he had no official word on the status of the American-Japanese negotiations and that he could make no definite statement, since he was not aware of any concrete intentions of Japan.

Now on the next day, on the 30th -- and I want to call your attention to the fact that they had extended the time from the 25th to the 29th, and you are familiar with those deadlines, are you not?

Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: That on the next day, on pages 204 and 206, another message from Tokyo to Berlin, on just the following day, November 30, 1941, in which the Japanese Government instructed its Ambassador in Germany to tell Hitler and Ribbentrop that American-Japanese negotiations

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

stood ruptured, broken, and that an American-Japanese war "may come quicker than anyone dreams".

Now did those facts mean anything to you? Here on the one day they are telling the Germans they do not know a thing, on the day following the 29th, which was the deadline -- and, by the way, that is exactly the deadline, because there is a message on that in here saying that it was Japanese time -- they tell them that the negotiations are ruptured and that "war may come quicker than anyone dreams".

Did that mean anything to you?

Admiral Turner: The dispatch of the 29th of November is from Berlin, from the Ambassador.

Senator Ferguson: That is right.

Admiral Turner: The dispatch of the 30th is from Tokyo. It is evident that the Berlin Ambassador had not received news as to the intentions of the Government and he was just giving them some double talk on this matter, and then he was instructed in the matter on the 30th.

Senator Ferguson: In other words, he gave them some double talk on the 29th and then they instructed him on the 30th, which was the very day of the deadline, and the troops were going south, that they were ruptured and war may come quicker than anyone thought.

Did not that mean something to your Intelligence brains?

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 If they had evaluated that would not they have found that
3 the Japs were making a move, and that that meant war?

4 Admiral Turner: That was the conclusion I drew from it.

5 Senator Ferguson: You did draw that conclusion from it?

6 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

7 Senator Ferguson: Then I am wondering -- the question
8 that Congressman Murphy asked -- you had sent a message on
9 the 27th, your plans were in flux, and here you had new
10 information which really meant war at that time, why did not
11 you give them more information?

12 Admiral Turner: I do not understand, Senator, what you
13 mean when you say "your plans were in flux".

14 Senator Ferguson: Well, the Congressman read to you,
15 and he will be able to find that part in that report. Do
16 you remember the part where it was a live subject? You
17 read it out of the United States News. I wish you would
18 read that again.

19 Mr. Murphy: "The effectiveness of these plans depended
20 entirely upon advance knowledge that an attack was to be
21 expected within narrow limits of time and the plans were
22 drawn with this as a premise."

23 I was reading from column 1, paragraph 2, page 64 of
24 the full text of the official report, United States News,
25 Naval Court of Inquiry.

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Admiral Turner: These dispatches that you have just referred to of the 29th and 30th of November relate to the over-all picture of war. They added nothing to the warning that we had given on the 27th, just three days before. There was no development here with respect to Hawaii any more than with respect to the Far East.

Senator Ferguson: Now you have a ship movement plan, do you not? Did not you send out on the 30th, did not I read this message that you sent out for the 70 scouting planes when you said one got into trouble over Formosa?

Admiral Turner: Oh, yes.

Senator Ferguson: So you did take action in the Asiatic.

Admiral Turner: At the request of the British, in order to coordinate for three days the scouting that they were doing in those three days, to find out the movement of a definite force some place, that we knew something about.

Senator Ferguson: But here, Admiral, we have many carriers that were out of our sight, out of our hearing, we did not know where they were. We knew at least they were not down in the Kra Peninsula because we had that one sighted, and the British come along and ask us to make a specific reconnaissance at a specific time, which is after the 27th, and we do that and find this fleet going into the Kra

Witness Turner.

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Peninsula, but no specific orders to see if they were taken out to Hawaii. How do you account for that?

Admiral Turner: I account for that by what I said previously, that the commanders in chief had been given a large definite order and giving them specific orders as to how they were going to do it, or the details of how they were going to do it is very bad military command practice.

Hook follows

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 Senator Ferguson: Well, it could not have turned out
3 any worse than it did, could it?

4 Admiral Turner: Not very well.

5 Senator Ferguson: Not very well, but it was the duty
6 of your office, as I understand you to say, to alert any and
7 all naval posts of the Government of the United States in the
8 event that a war involving the United States was imminent.
9 That was your job and duty, was it not?

10 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

11 Senator Ferguson: And when you received this informa-
12 tion after the 27th, you did not so alert Hawaii, did you?

13 Admiral Turner: We had already alerted Hawaii. We
14 reviewed the matter daily. We felt that nothing further
15 was necessary, and I still hold to the same opinion, up
16 to the point where the matter of the 1 p.m. deadline came
17 up, which was very unfortunate.

18 Senator Ferguson: I am not trying to change your
19 opinion. I am just trying to get what the facts were,
20 and what you had in mind at that time.

21 Now, Admiral, when did you first hear there was a
22 pilot message in relation to the 13 parts message?

23 Admiral Turner: I think the same time that I got
24 the 13 parts. I have no recollection of seeing it at any
25 other time.

Shack(17)

hl

AL

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

b2

Senator Ferguson: And at that time you thought that was so important that a new information bulletin should go to Hawaii, is that right?

Admiral Turner: I did not think it important enough without the 14th part to have interceded in the matter.

I knew Admiral Wilkinson knew about it, and Admiral Ingersoll did.

Senator Ferguson: But, Admiral, at that time, you thought that Admiral Kimmel was getting the 13 parts?

Admiral Turner: That is correct, and the 14th part.

Senator Ferguson: And the pilot message as quickly as you did?

Admiral Turner: Well, I do not know about "as quickly." Of course, those things are delayed, and you do not know just how long it is, how long it might be. There might be some of those things that would be delayed somewhat. Something urgent, why, it might be sent, or a dispatch sent "Have you seen such and such series?"

Senator Ferguson: Now, as I understand it, you and Admiral Wilkinson differed on one point, as to whether or not they were going to attack the United States.

Admiral Turner: We differed on that point.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether you and Admiral Kimmel disagreed on that point?

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h3

Admiral Turner: No, sir, I do not. I saw Admiral Kimmel when he was in Washington sometime during the summer and discussed with him and other staff officers, his situation in case of war with Japan.

Senator Ferguson: Admiral, you have mentioned the so-called reply of General Short, a very short message.

Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: You are familiar with the wording of it?

Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And, as I understand it now, all the officers in Washington misunderstood it.

Admiral Turner: All that saw it.

Senator Ferguson: All that saw it. You saw it; General Marshall saw it; General Gerow saw it; General Miles, and who else?

Admiral Turner: Bundy.

Senator Ferguson: Bundy. Who else in your department?

Admiral Turner: I think that Captain Hill, who was my First Assistant, saw it, customarily. There may have been somebody else. I think probably Captain Glover saw it, because I showed him all those things.

Senator Ferguson: The Secretary of War saw it?

Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h4

1
2 Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether the Secretary
3 of the Navy saw it?

4 Admiral Turner: I think not.

5 Senator Ferguson: Now, all you gentlemen not under-
6 standing his message, my question is, how do you account for
7 the fact that none of you can see, at least you do not see,
8 how he could have misunderstood your message?

9 Admiral Turner: If you are comparing the two messages
10 as to clarity and meaning --

11 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

12 Admiral Turner: -- why, then I will say it does not
13 follow that it does not follow that the two points of view
14 are analogous.

15 Senator Ferguson: In other words, your message is
16 perfectly clear?

17 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

18 Senator Ferguson: And his message is fuzzy and cloudy?

19 Admiral Turner: That is correct.
20
21
22
23
24
25

AL
fls

Shack (18) pm
follows
Hook
AL-1

5444

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 Senator Ferguson: That is what you want to tell us?

2 Admiral Turner: Exactly.

3 Senator Ferguson: So that is the reason you can say
4 that reasonable men can differ on his message but reasonable
5 officers would not differ on your message, is that what I
6 understand?
7

8 Admiral Turner: Those words are not my words, Senator.

9 Senator Ferguson: I do not want you to let me put any
10 words in your mouth. What is your answer to that?

11 Admiral Turner: My answer is that the Short Message
12 can be interpreted and was interpreted by a number of persons
13 as applying to a partial situation and did not apply at all
14 to the general situation in which General Short found himself.
15 I have no idea that he meant he was only taking sabotage
16 precautions, in view of the specific orders in the War
17 Department dispatch, which is perfectly clear to do certain
18 things.

19 Senator Ferguson: You had an operational room in the
20 Munitions Building, did you not, a ship board?

21 Admiral Turner: In the Navy Department?

22 Senator Ferguson: In the Navy Department.

23 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: How far was that from your office?

25 Admiral Turner: I had one of strategic movements; there

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 was one of general information and all foreign merchant ship
3 movements in the Office of Naval Intelligence, and I know
4 there was a big one in two rooms, in ship movement, that
5 showed the movements of all our forces and all shipping of
6 the United States and Great Britain.

7 Senator Ferguson: Well, Admiral, you had access to a
8 ship movement board that showed all the ships in Pearl Harbor
9 daily? When a ship went out you could see, if you looked
10 at your board, isn't that true?

11 Admiral Turner: I think not. I do not know whether
12 they kept the information as to whether the ship was in
13 Pearl Harbor or outside of Pearl Harbor. They did keep in-
14 formation showing what ships were in that vicinity.

15 Senator Ferguson: All right. Then after the 27th
16 there were two orders issued to Admiral Kimmel, were there
17 not, sending two carriers in two different deployments, one
18 to Midway and the other to Wake?

19 Admiral Turner: That is correct, they issued those
20 orders.

21 Senator Ferguson: And that would appear on your board?

22 Admiral Turner: I do not know whether that movement
23 would appear or not. Presumably it would. It would not appear
24 on my board.

25 Senator Ferguson: Did not the orders come from your

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

office to do that?

Admiral Turner: No.

Senator Ferguson: Whom did they come from?

Admiral Turner: I beg your pardon. No, I think the orders actually went from Ship Movements to do that. We had an arrangement for them to take those planes out there, and there was some delay, and there was a longer delay out there, due to uncontrollable factors, than we expected.

Larry
follows

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

LaC (last)
fls
Sh k
5:20

hl

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1
2 Senator Ferguson: Now, Admiral, these two movements
3 were after the 27th, were they not?

4 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

5 Senator Ferguson: Now, what effect do you think that
6 had upon the Commanding Officers at Pearl Harbor, after
7 the 27th, the so-called warnings I am talking about, as
8 far as an attack is concerned, at Pearl Harbor, of sending
9 two carriers with planes, taking them from the Pearl Harbor
10 district, as to whether or not there was going to be an
11 attack at Pearl Harbor?

12 Admiral Turner: I think it would have had no effect
13 whatsoever, because we also had to defend these other places,
14 and the attacks would, if they were made on Pearl Harbor,
15 would probably be made on the other places too, which they
16 were, except not by airplanes at Midway.

17 Senator Ferguson: Did I understand you to say sometime
18 in your testimony that we didn't intend to defend Guam?

19 Admiral Turner: Correct. Midway and Wake.

20 Senator Ferguson: Midway and Wake we did intend to
21 defend?

22 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: Did we have an attack on the 7th
24 at Midway and Wake?

25 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h2

1
2 Senator Ferguson: The same day?

3 Admiral Turner: By night, by two destroyers at Midway
4 and, I believe, the next day by destroyers on Wake, and
5 I think on the 7th by airplanes at Wake.

6
7 Senator Ferguson: Now, if we expected an attack on
8 the 27th, up to the 30th, and we were routing our ships,
9 how do you account for sending these two carriers with
10 planes to Wake and Midway, if we actually expected an
11 attack?

12 Admiral Turner: I haven't those dispatches ordering
13 that movement. My impressinn is that the orders from the
14 Department were issued prior to the 27th. However, even
15 so, it was necessary to increase the defenses on those two
16 islands, and we -- I agree that it was proper to go ahead
17 with the plan up until the time it was pretty definite that
18 an attack was imminent and that ships ought not to go out.

19 I call your attention to the fact that, with most of
20 the planes on those two carriers, they left few back at
21 Pearl, and their western position put them actually in quite
22 a good position from which to counterattack from the north
23 on Oahu.

24 Senator Ferguson: Is this true, that left no carriers
25 at Pearl Harbor, so that Admiral Kimmel could take his
battleships out and have air protection if he wanted to take

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h3

1
2 them out?

3 Admiral Turner: That is correct. If he had taken
4 them out, in order to get fighter protection, he would
5 have had to keep pretty close to land.

6
7 Senator Ferguson: Then, when you said this morning
8 that if you had been in his place, you would have taken
9 your planes out when you got the warning message -- let's
10 say he had the orders to take carriers and go to Wake and
11 Midway. That left him without any air support at all for
12 eight or nine battleships that he had and the cruiser.

13 Admiral Turner: That is correct -- No. The cruiser,
14 that is a somewhat different matter. But by moving the
15 eight or nine battleships down to the southeastward, two
16 or three hundred miles, why, they wouldn't need any protec-
17 tion, off down there.

18 Carriers act on the offensive.

19 Senator Ferguson: Did he know which way the attack
20 would come from? You say go south that many miles.

21 Admiral Turner: Southeast.

22 Senator Ferguson: Southeast. How did he know the
23 attack wouldn't come from there?

24 Admiral Turner: The probability of its coming from
25 that direction, Senator, was, I think, extremely small.

Senator Ferguson: But there was a probability from the

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h4

1
2 north in the Vacant Sea.

3 Admiral Turner: That was the much more likely place;
4 that is well recognized.

5 Senator Ferguson: What is the difference between an
6 alert message and a war warning?

7 Admiral Turner: We don't use the term, ordinarily,
8 alert; at least we didn't at that time. The only time we
9 used the term alert in the Navy is referring to, ordinarily
10 to an air attack, and the orders were never issued in those
11 terms anyway. That is, we have conditions of readiness
12 which mean alert, 1, 2, or 3, and various subsequent ones.

13 Senator Ferguson: On the 24th is that an alert, or a
14 war warning?

15 Admiral Turner: Neither. An estimate of the major
16 strategic situation. And it doesn't give and is not intended
17 to give, to put them on the alert, except to start getting
18 ready for it.

19 Senator Ferguson: Now, the War warning message of the
20 27th, I just want to ask you a few questions in relation to
21 that.

22 Do you, in the Navy, in drawing an instrument such as
23 this, when you use specific terms and then have a general
24 term, does it relate to specific terms of the same nature?
25 I am trying to put this in a layman's language and not in a

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h5

1
2 lawyer's language.

3 Admiral Turner: Could you illustrate that, please,
4 Senator?

5 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

6 You say here:

7 "An aggressive move by Japan is expected within the
8 next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops
9 and the organization of Naval task forces indicates an
10 amphibious expedition against either the Philippines" --
11 you expressly name them -- "Thai, Kra Peninsula, or possibly
12 Borneo."

13 You have got three definite places, either the Philip-
14 pines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, and then one possibility,
15 Borneo.

16 Now, doesn't that exclude others?

17 Admiral Turner: It excludes others against which an
18 amphibious expedition will be launched within the next few
19 days.

20 Senator Ferguson: Doesn't the fact that you mention
21 an amphibious expedition reject other kinds of expeditions,
22 because you specify amphibious and do not say anything
23 about the others? Wouldn't an ordinarily prudent naval
24 officer read it that way?

25 Admiral Turner: We said in the dispatch of the 24th

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h6

1
2 that a surprise aggressive movement might be expected in
3 any direction. In this case, the amphibious expedition
4 is the major effort by the Japanese war machine, and it
5 does not mention the many, many other types of activities.

6 For example, it doesn't mention submarines but it is
7 obvious that submarines will go out and raid our trade as
8 they did, and it doesn't mention raids against our trade
9 by surface vessels which we expected. It doesn't mention
10 expansion of the area occupied by Japan in the Mandates,
11 down in the little islands, which is certainly to be expected.

12 Senator Ferguson: Admiral, we had all our merchant
13 ships in convoys and had battleships with them?

14 Admiral Turner: No. I beg your pardon, we did not.

15 Senator Ferguson: We did not?

16 Admiral Turner: No, sir. Many of them were entirely
17 single. There were only one or two convoys. Most of them
18 were alone.

19 Senator Ferguson: You didn't expect Admiral Kimmel
20 to take care of these single ships on the ocean, did you?

21 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir, by covering the patrol areas
22 and general covering operations.

23 Senator Ferguson: But you knew he wasn't doing any of
24 that, if you looked at the ship board you could have told
25 he had the ships still in the Pearl Harbor district. You

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h7

1
2 said you knew he wasn't doing that; is that true?

3 Admiral Turner: I don't know whether he would have
4 made the reports as to the movements of those ships or not.

5 Senator Ferguson: On page 996 of the record of the
6 Navy top secret, I want to read this question and this
7 answer:

8 "Q. This dispatch, Exhibit 15, states 'a surprise
9 aggressive movement in any direction is indicated.'"

10 That is the one of the 24th is it not?

11 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

12 Senator Ferguson: "This language is omitted from the
13 dispatch of 27 November, three days later, wherein there is
14 set out certain Japanese objectives in the Far East. Was
15 this omission from the dispatch of 27 November done inten-
16 tionally?"

17 Here is your answer:

18 "A. I would like to invite attention to the difference
19 between the two dispatches. In the one of the 24th, it
20 says, 'a surprise, aggressive movement in any direction is
21 indicated.' Now, that movement in any direction could be
22 by naval forces, air forces, amphibious forces, or anything
23 else. In this other dispatch, we said 'an amphibious expedi-
24 tion is enroute.' It was moving down the China Sea.

25 "Now, those two are quite different. They don't cover

1 Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h8

2 the same kind of a subject, and they were intended not to
3 cover it. That was information. We knew that the Japanese
4 were on the move in the China Sea. That was a fact. Now
5 the other was deduction as covering generally not only the
6 movement of amphibious forces, but the movement of any
7 forces."

8 Do you stand by that answer now?

9 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir, I do, and also I stand by
10 the answer I gave previously, that all of these dispatches
11 that were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations, certainly
12 as far back as October 16, should be considered as a whole,
13 as forming a single series, and they related to the same
14 subject, and the ground covered in any one is not intended
15 to be the entire ground.

16 Senator Ferguson: All right, but on the 24th, you
17 sent the message.

18 Now, what happens between the 24th and the 27th to
19 send this other message?

20 Admiral Turner: It is getting closer to the deadline
21 of the 29th. We waited as long as possible. We also find
22 out about the final breakdown, practical breakdown of negotia-
23 tions.

24 Senator Ferguson: Then, if we could have drawn here
25 in Washington the conclusions from the 13 parts and the

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h9

1 pilot message that there was another deadline of the de-
2 liverly of that message, that would have made a change so
3 that another message should have been sent?
4

5 Admiral Turner: I agree that a message should have
6 been sent about the one o'clock note.
7

8 Senator Ferguson: Can you account for why you didn't
9 sent it, whose province it was to sent it?

10 Admiral Turner: Because when I first saw it, I was
11 informed that the War Department was already sending it
12 and that Admiral Stark had taken action.

13 Senator Ferguson: Then the delay was in getting the
14 action to you, the message to you?

15 Admiral Turner: I think there was very little delay
16 in getting it to me.

17 Senator Ferguson: Admiral, suppose it is two hours.

18 Admiral Turner: I was in my office from about 11:15.

19 Senator Ferguson: Was your office alerted for war
20 on the 6th and the 7th?

21 Admiral Turner: I had an officer on watch and a steno-
22 grapher in there that day.

23 Senator Ferguson: Was it alerted for war on the 6th
24 and the 7th?

25 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir, it was alerted so far as
anything that we had to do. There was an officer in there

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Ferguson
Mr. Murphy

h10

1 and I could always be gotten.

2
3 Senator Ferguson: Was there anybody there to take ac-
4 tion?

5 Admiral Turner: There were officers there who could
6 get me on the phone at once, and there was an officer there,
7 a duty officer, who could take it up with me, or with the
8 Chief of Naval Operations.

9 Senator Ferguson: Have you ever made an investigation
10 to see why the messages didn't get to you quicker than they
11 did?

12 Admiral Turner: I have not, because I believe that
13 they got to me as fast as they customarily did.

14 Senator Ferguson: That is all. I want to thank the
15 committee for staying on. And if my voice was loud,
16 Admiral, it was because I was hurrying to get through.

17 The Vice Chairman: Thank you, Senator.

18 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman: I have just one concluding
19 question.

20 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Murphy.

21 Mr. Murphy: Admiral, in Exhibit 1, on page 72, in a
22 message from Nomura at Washington to Tokyo on October 16,
23 1941, in subparagraph C, is the following:

24 "It is urgent that a formula be drawn up on the basis
25 of a 50-50 compromise between Tokyo and Washington (Turner

hll

Witness Turner

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 does not think that we are compromising)."

3 Did you at any time leave any inference that you
4 thought there should be a 50-50 compromise with Japan?

5 Admiral Turner: No, I did not.

6 I thought that was the only possible basis for continued
7 negotiations.

8 Mr. Gearhart: Mr. Chairman --

9 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Gearhart.

10 Mr. Gearhart: I would like to make a request. I
11 was wondering if during the interim I would be permitted
12 to inspect all of the original intercepts which bear the
13 date of December 6, regardless of the date upon which they
14 were decoded. I would like to make a comparison.
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Larry (3) pm
follows
Hook
AL-1

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 Mr. Mitchell: What is the request?

2
3 Mr. Gearhart: I wanted to be permitted to inspect all
4 of the original intercepts that bear the date of December 6
5 regardless of when they were decoded that appear in Exhibit
6 i and the first 30 pages of Exhibit 2.

7 Mr. Mitchell: Do you want the photostats or the originals?

8 Mr. Gearhart: The photostats would do but I want all
9 of the markings upon them.

10 Mr. Mitchell: I don't see any reason why we can't get
11 those into your hands.

12 Mr. Gearhart: During the interim.

13 Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

14 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, there is one other
15 question that I want to ask the Admiral.

16 Admiral, I would like to have you look at page 22 of
17 Exhibit 2. That is a message of the 3rd of December 1941
18 and it shows it was translated on the 11th of December.

19 Are you familiar with that message?

20 Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

21 Senator Ferguson: Now, if that message was translated
22 by 1:30 or 2:00 o'clock on the day of the 6th as shown by
23 the record of Admiral Hewitt, and in the Navy Department,
24 on Cramer's desk, in the rough, would that have made any
25 difference in your planning to send notices, and so forth,

Witness Turner

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

so far as Hawaii was concerned?

Admiral Turner: I think I would certainly have taken it up with the Office of Naval Intelligence to find out what had been done about it, to send a check, at least a check message out there to see if they were familiar with that.

Senator Ferguson: That would have meant that there could be an attack on Pearl Harbor and they wanted this information for that purpose?

Admiral Turner: It could be, but it also could easily be what actually occurred at a later time when Japanese submarines made contact with the people on shore and exchanged signals with them both by day and night.

Senator Ferguson: But it was an important message?

Admiral Turner: Quite.

Senator Ferguson: And normally would have come to you?

Admiral Turner: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: That is all.

The Vice Chairman: Admiral Turner, is there any other statement or any further information that you desire to give to this committee on the subject here under investigation?

Admiral Turner: No, sir, there is not.

The Vice Chairman: Is there anything else you think the committee ought to know about this that you are prepared to tell us?

Witness Turner

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

WARD A PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Admiral Turner: No, sir, there is not.

The Vice Chairman: We desire to thank you for your appearance, for the information you have given to the committee, your cooperation at this hearing, and to assure you that we feel that you have endeavored to cooperate fully, and we appreciate the assistance you have given us in the testimony presented.

Admiral Turner: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I thank the members of the committee and counsel for their courtesy and kindness to me in this hearing.

(Witness excused)

The Vice Chairman: The committee wishes the press and all others who have worked with us a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year, and the committee now stands adjourned until December 31st at 10:00 a.m.

(Whereupon, at 5:40 o'clock p.m., a recess was taken until 10:00 o'clock a.m., Monday, December 31st, 1945.)

- - - - -