

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent ; SAMEJIMA, Tomoshigo

Born on Apr. 8, 1889
No. 300, Kami-Osaki-cho
2-chome, Shinagawa-ku,
Tokyo.

Having first duly sworn an oath as an attached sheet
and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country
I hereby depose as follows:

On this 18th day of November, 1946

At Tokyo

DEPONENT /s/ SAMEJIMA, Tomoshigo (seal)

I, MUNEMIYA Shinji, hereby certify that the above
statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his
signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: (signed) MUNEMIYA Shinji (seal)

1. I was formerly a Vice Admiral. In December, 1931, when I was a Captain, I was appointed Commander of the SHANGHAI Standing Landing Party. At that time the SHANGHAI Standing Landing Party consisted of about 90 seamen. The Landing Party I commanded was under the command of Rear Admiral SHIOZAWA Koichi, Commander of the 1st Expeditionary Squadron, which was despatched abroad for the purpose of guarding the YANGTZE River Zone and protecting Japanese residents.
2. Since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident anti-Japanese activities or insult to Japan on the part of the Chinese had become particularly intensified; so much so that they threatened to turn into riots. Even rumours were circulated that all the Japanese would be annihilated, and the situation came to assume extremely serious proportions. But the Chinese police force was too feeble to control the situation. The police in the Settlement had run away, so that the life and property of not only the Japanese but also other powers' nationals were exposed to danger, and consequently the Municipality on the afternoon of Jan. 28, 1932 proclaimed martial law. As the result of a consultation among various foreign powers' forces, it was decided that each of them should take a

position in their respective areas allotted to their charge. The landing party under my command was to take its allotted position from 12 o'clock midnight, Jan. 29. At the commencement of its maneuver, I, by my superior Commander's order, admonished all its members, saying, "So long as the Chinese do not open the offensive, our side positively must not attack, "Thus I strictly warned against the unreasonable use of armed strength. Moreover, I ordered my troops "never to trespass over the prescribed line of the allotted area."

However, when our landing party marched out of the gate of its headquarters in order to take its position in the HONKIANG Road area, the party was shot at by Chinese apparently plain-clothes soldiers from a two-storied house on the right hand side at the corner of HASKELL Road.

And soon afterwards when our party was entering the street leading to HONKIANG Road and the Chinese controlled areas in CHAPEI, it suddenly received a "fierce attack" with machine-guns, hand-grenades, etc. from the Chinese Regular forces, causing a large number of casualties.

The landing party, however, in the face of this onslaught, at about 6 a.m. Jan. 29 reached to joint-guard area previously designated and finished its arrangement. But following up their one-sided attack, the Chinese troops still challenged us, and for self-defense, we accepted their challenge, thus eventual hostilities, ensued. Upon

this the Chinese troops fired on us, loading guns on trains and establishing a position on the China Press premises. They also placed their guns along the railroad and attacked us. As the Japanese landing party, which was of numerically inferior strength, was now exposed to imminent danger, an airplane took off from the warship NODORO on the following day, Jan. 30 for the purpose of protecting the land forces and bombed the enemy military positions on the China Press premises in CHAPEI, etc.. Before carrying out the bombing, the Commander had strictly warned the crew members of the said plane against bombing other objects than those military positions. For this reason the said crew members had first visited the Landing Party and investigated the objectives on a map.

When the intended objectives were not clear enough to give them assurance, they repeated their flights several times until they were confident of not making errors. As they expected to be accurate, they paid the greatest possible caution not to hit anything other than military objectives. In particular, the positions of the Chinese side were adjacent to the International Settlement, the persons who were directly in charge of the bombing took utmost pains in preventing bombs from dropping in the Settlement. While the hostilities continued, we fired on the WOOSUNG fortress, but it was because the said fortress

first bombarded the Japanese warcraft anchored there; that is the Japanese side that fired back. It was not the Japanese that opened fire first.

3. At the time the said incident broke out, the whole strength of the Japanese landing party consisted of not more than 17 or 18 hundred troops. It was by no means strong enough to insure protection of the tens of thousands of Japanese residing over a wide spread area. On the contrary, the 19th Route army of the Chinese side was about 34 thousand strong. The British garrison then consisted of about 7 thousand troops and those of the United States and France one thousand each, and that of Italy seemed to be of a small number. Moreover, in SHANGHAI volunteer units of various foreign powers, including Japan, were always organized. A British Colonel on the reserve list was in command of all these units, which consisted of about one thousand volunteers.

After that the Japanese side was gradually reinforced from home sources, and as the result of mutual hostilities having been continued, on May 5 a truce was concluded.

The Japanese had always adhered to a strictly non-aggravation policy, their motto being "local settlement." They originally had no intention of starting combat. The said incident was quite an unforeseen occurrence due to provocation on the part of the Chinese side, so that the Tokyo Headquarters were taken aback, with absolutely no

preparations. Landing parties were immediately organized for reinforcements, but the Navy had no land weapons, so that they were borrowed from the Army. Navy men, however, were not acquainted with the use of these weapons. They also borrowed steel helmets from the Army, but could not borrow enough to be distributed among all of them, so that there were a considerable number who went without helmets. Under such circumstances, the Japanese were in an extremely difficult situation.

It was quite a miracle that the Japanese landing party consisting of such a small number of troops, at the outset of the incident, managed to protect so great a number of residents. If it had previously been known that the Japanese were to fight such powerful Chinese forces as the 19th Route Army, they would have first made preparations, with equipment of efficient weapons, etc. strong enough to match these enemy forces. That they were devoid of any preparations is evidence that the incident was not started by the Japanese with any aggressive intention.

I, then Commander of the Japanese forces, hereby testify that the said incident was not deliberately originated by the Japanese side.

4. The 19th Route Army which engaged in the battle with the Japanese forces was the only army affiliated with the KWANTUNG faction with fighting power. It had been stationed in the vicinity of SHANGHAI in accordance with one of the

compromise conditions adopted at the conciliation conference between the NANKING and KWANTUNG factions, and this Army consisted of three divisions, comprising about 34 thousand troops.

According to information collected by Japanese Government sources at that time, it was due to the complicated internal circumstances in China that the 19th Route Army provoked the Japanese forces into battle. In December, 1932, the KWANTUNG faction took possession of the NANKING Government and General CHIANG Kai-shek was for a time ousted from the Government and was leading a private life in HONAN. On Jan. 22, however, General CHIANG succeeded in re-establishing himself in NANKING, availing himself of the opportunity when the finance and foreign policy of the New Government did not proceed as favourably as was intended. To cope with this situation, SUN Ko and CHEN Yu-jen of the KWANTUNG faction intrigued for the downfall of General CHIANG by utilizing trouble caused with Japan and so they insisted on an immediate waging of war on Japan. But on Jan. 25, their proposal was rejected at an extraordinary session of the Central Party Affairs Standing Committee. Thereupon they tendered their resignations and proceeded to SHANGHAI. There they endeavoured to raise anti-Japanese riots by instigating the masses.

They made the 19th Route Army attack the Japanese forces

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at a most opportune moment when WU Tien-cheng, Mayor of SHANGHAI, dissolved the Anti-Japanese Association, who, thus accepting the Japanese demand, acted in accordance with the instruction from the NANKING Government.

On the other hand, contrary to the wish of the 19th Route Army to remain in the vicinity of SHANGHAI on account of revenue, the NANKING Government desired the withdrawal from SHANGHAI of the 19th Route Army of the KWANTUNG faction. This made the 19th Route Army dissatisfied with the NANKING Government. Thereupon General TSAI Tin-hai, Commander of the 19th Route Army started the said incident pursuant to the KWANTUNG faction's suggestion, himself thinking that if he won the battle, it would heighten his reputation and add to his influence, and if defeated, it would annoy the NANKING Government, which was responsible for China. That the said incident was a struggle with the 19th Route Army, which was a provincial military clique and not with China, can be imagined from the fact that, during this incident, both Japanese warships and those of the Chinese Navy remained anchored side by side outside NANKING harbour on the YANGTZE River, making calls and return-calls.

一、私ハ元海軍中將デアリマス。昭和六年十二月私ノ海軍大佐、時上海常駐ノ陸軍
ノ指揮官ニ任ゼラレマシタ。

當時上海常駐ノ陸軍隊ハ約九百名許リデシタ。私、率キタ陸軍隊ハ第一遣外
艦隊司令官塩澤幸一少將ノ指揮下ニ在リマシタ。右艦隊ハ長江ノ沿岸
警備、居留民保護、爲ニ派遣セラレタキタ艦隊デアリマシタ。

二、滿洲事變勃發以來、上海ニ於ケル中國側ノ排日毎日行爲ガ特ニ激烈ニテ
暴動化ノ徵候ヲ示シ全日本入ヲ殲滅スルトノ流言ナドモ傳ハリ來ツテ形勢カ
極メテ不穩トナツタガ、中國側ノ警察力ハ微弱テ取締リ得ズ、租界内ノ警官ハ
逃亡シ邦人、ミナラズ各國人、生命財産ガ全ク危険ニ瀕シタ、デア工部局ハ昭和
七年一月二十八日午後戒嚴令ヲ發動シ各國軍隊、協議ニヨツテ各受持テ區
域ノ配備ニ就クコトナリ私、率キタ陸軍隊ハ一月二十九日午前零時カラ配備ニ
就クコトナリマシタ。行動開始ニ當リ私ハ司令官ノ命ニ依リ全員ニ「彼ヨリ
攻撃ニ出デザル限リ我ヨリ進ンデ攻撃スベカラズ」ト訓示シ濫リニ武カラ行儀セザル

様嚴ニ警戒シ又「豫定」配備線以上ニ進ムヲ命令シマシタ。

然ルニ我カ陸戦隊ガ虬江路方面、配備ニツク爲本部、門ヲ出テ進ムト「ハスケル」路角右側、ニ階家カラ便衣隊ト覺シヤモノカラ狙撃ヲ受ケ次テ虬江路其、他間北支那側ニ通ズル街路ニ臨ムヤ、不意ニ中國正規軍ヨリ機関銃、手榴彈等、猛烈テ攻撃ヲ受ケ忽チ多数ノ死傷者ヲ出シ、陸戦隊ハ之ヲ排除シテ二十九日午前六時頃所定ノ共同警戒備區域ニ到達シテ配備ニ就クコトヲ得マシタカ引續イテ中國軍ガ挑戦セル爲自衛上之ニ應戦シ遂ニ戦闘トナリマシタ。

戦闘トナルマ中國軍ハ列車ニ砲ヲ積シテ我ヲ砲撃シ或ハ鉄道線路ニ沿ッテ砲ヲ配備シ又高務院書館ニ陣地ヲ構築シテ我ヲ攻撃シ寡勢ノ我カ陸戦隊ハ頗ル危険ニ瀕シタデ軍艦能登呂カラ翌三十一日飛行機ガ出テ陸工部隊援護ノ爲間北高務院書館ヲ敵ノ軍事據点ヲ爆撃シマシタガ、司令官ハ右軍事據点以外ヲ爆撃セザル様宣シク注意サレマシタデ飛行機、搭乗員ハ先ツ陸戦隊ヘ來テ圖上デ目標ヲ調査シ爆撃ニ當リ目標ガ

判然セズ自信ノツケトシ、何度モ飛行ヲ遣リ直シ間違ヒ無キヲ確メテ正確ヲ
期シ苟モ軍事目標以外モヲ爆撃セザル様萬全ヲ注意ヲ拂ヒマシタ。殊ニ
中國ノ側、陣地ガ共同租界ニ近接シテキタ爲メ爆弾、組界ニ落チテイ様當
事者起非常ニ苦心ヲ致シテ居リマシタ。今モ英海軍備ヲ大ニ増シマシタ
又戰爭中吳淞砲台ヲ砲撃シタルガソレハ同砲台カラ先ニ在泊ノ日本ノ艦船ヲ砲
撃シタ爲メ日本側ガ之ニ應酬シタ儀アリマシタ。日本カラ先ニ砲撃シタモソレハ
アリマシタ。被ハラス兵隊モ相當ニマシタ。日本モ非常ニ困難ニシマシタ
三、右事變動發當時、我が陸戰隊、全兵力ハ千七百名ニ過ズ。廣シク範圍ニ亙
ル數萬ノ居留民、保護ニハ極メテ不十分ヲ兵力デアリマシタ。之ニ對シ中國側、
十九路軍ハ約三萬四千ノ兵力デアリマシタ。當時英國、兵力ハ約一萬。米佛各
一千。伊太利、兵力少數、様デシタ。尚上海ニハ日本ヲ含ム各國ノ義勇隊ガ常
時編成シテ英國、豫備陸軍大佐ガ義勇隊、總指揮官デアリマシタ。其、隊
員約一千名アリマシタ。

其ノ後日本カラ順次増兵サレ互ニ戦鬪ノ結果五月五日ニ停戦協定ニテリマシタ
ガ我方ハ終始嚴重ナ不擴大方針ヲ局地解決ヲモットトシテ居リマシタ
日本側テハモトモト戦争ヲ始メル意志ナク中國側ノ挑戦ニヨツテ突發的ニ事件
ハ惹起サレタノデアリマスカラ東京方面デモ全ク無準備テ大マゴツキデアリマシタ
急遽陸戦隊ヲ編成シテ増強シタガ海軍ニハ陸上兵器ガ無クテ陸軍カラ借り
テ来マシタガ其ノ取扱方ヲ知ラズ、又鉄兜、如キモ陸軍カラ借りタガ全部ニ聞
合ハズ之ヲ被ブラヌ兵隊モ相當ニアツタ様ヲ始末テ非常ニ困難ヲシマシタ
事件頭初、少数ノ陸戦隊テ多数ノ居留民ヲ保護シ得タノハ全ク奇蹟デア
アリマシタ、ナル路軍ト言フ有カテ中國兵ニ對抗スルトナレバ之ニ對應スル有カテ
武器ヲド準備シテカカレ可キ苦デアリマス、全ク準備ノ無カリシコトハ日本ガ侵畧
ノ意志ヲ以テ始メテ事件デナイ證左デアリマス
此ノ事件ガ日本側ノ計画的ニ出タモノデアナイコトハ當時ノ指揮官デアツタ私ニ於テ
確言致シマス

四日本軍ト闘テ交ヘタ中國ノ第十九路軍ハ廣東系ノ唯一ノ戦力アル軍隊デアリマシ
テ南京廣東両派妥協會議ノ際妥協條件ノ一トシテ上海附近ニ配置セシメ
モノデ三箇師約三萬四千ノ兵力デアリマシタ。

當時日本官憲ノ蒐集シタ情報ニ據リマスト十九路軍ガ日本軍ニ挑戦シタノハ
中國内部ノ複雑ナ事情ニ因ルモノデアリマス。即廣東派ハ昭和七年十二月南京
政權ヲ掌握シ蔣介石將軍ハ一時下野シテ河南ニ居リマシタガ、新政權ノ戡政
對外策意、如ク進マザルニ乘ジテ一月二十二日再び南京ニ復活シマシタ。之ニ對シ
廣東派ノ孫科、陳友仁氏等ハ對日問題ヲ利用シテ蔣將軍ノ失脚ヲ圖
ラントシテ即時對日開戦ヲ主張シ一月二十五日、南京ニ於ケル臨時中央黨務
常務會議ガ其ノ意見ガ否決セラレタノデ、辭表ヲ提出シテ上海ニ至リ大衆
ヲ使喚シテ對日暴動ヲ行ハシメントシ、上海市長吳鐵城氏ガ日本ノ要求ニ應
ジ南京政府、旨ヲ受ケテ抗日會ヲ解散セルヲ機トシテ第十九路軍ヲシテ
日本軍ヲ攻撃セシメタモノデアリマス。

一面第十九路軍トシテハ收入ノ点ヨリ上海附近ニ在ルコトヲ欲セルニ對シ南京政府
ハ廣東派ノ第十九路軍ヲ上海ヨリ退カシメントテ冀望セル爲メ第十九路軍トシテ
南京政府ニ心好カラスヨコニ於テ第十九路軍長蔡廷階將軍ハ戰ヒ勝テバ自
己ノ名聲ヲ博シテ勢力ヲ増シ、敗レバ中國ノ責任者タル南京政府ヲ困ラス事
ニテレバ廣東派ノ意思ニ從フテ事變ヲ起シタモテアリマス、此ノ事變ガ地方
軍閥タル第十九路軍トシテ戰鬥ガ中國トシテ戰爭ニ非ザルコトハ揚子江ノ南京港外ガ
日本ノ軍艦ト中國海軍ノ軍艦トガ此ノ事變中互ニ相接シテ疑泊シテ訪問
應訪シテカタ一事ニヨツテモ窺ハレマス、

not special

Jap. Doc. No. 647

Subject.

鮫島具重供述書

Defence Counsel *宗宮* Phase *Manchuria*

Certification. is attached to this.
~~will be later completed.~~

Priority *I*

(A) ~~Copy only.~~
~~(The original translation is attached to this.)~~

Translation and copy.
(Translation for reference is not attached to this.)

Jan 30th 1947

J. Wilson

