

The following documents are excerpts from the Pearl Harbor Report as shown below:

1500-A-2 - Pages 1006 - 1012, Volume 14

1500-Z-1, J-2 - Pages 1000 - 1002, Volume 14

1500-C-2 - Pages 1061 - 1062, Volume 14

1500-B-2 - Pages 1013 - 1018, Volume 14

D. D. 1500-Z-1

Exhibit No. 10 of the Joint Committee On The Investigation Of The Pearl Harbor Attack. - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

Letter dated Jan. 24, 1941, from Secretary of Navy to Secretary of War regarding defenses of Pearl Harbor, and reply by Secretary of War, dated Feb. 7, 1941; letter from Adjutant General to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated Feb. 7, 1941, transmitting the above letters with instructions and receipt therefor.

EXHIBIT NO. 10

Op-12B-9-McC (SC)A7-2(2)/FF1

Serial 09112

Secret

JAN. 24, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This reexamination has been, in part, prompted by the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan, and by reports from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases. If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.

In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major disaster to the fleet or naval base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned above.

The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be:

- (1) Air bombing attack.
- (2) Air torpedo plane attack.
- (3) Sabotage.
- (4) Submarine attack.
- (5) Mining.
- (6) Bombardment by gun fire.

Defense against all but the first two of these dangers appears to have been provided for satisfactorily. The following paragraphs are devoted principally to a discussion of the problems encompassed in (1) and (2) above, the solution of which I consider to be of primary importance.

Both types of air attack are possible. They may be carried out successively, simultaneously, or in combination with any of the other operations enumerated. The maximum probable enemy effort may be put at twelve aircraft squadrons, and the minimum at two. Attacks would be launched from a striking force of carriers and their supporting vessels.

- (2) The counter measures to be considered are:
 - (a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before air attack can be launched;
 - (b) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their objectives;
 - (c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire;
 - (d) Concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke;
 - (e) Protection of vital installations by balloon barrages.

The operations set forth in (a) are largely functions of the Fleet but, quite possibly, might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated without warning prior to a declaration of war.

Pursuit aircraft in large numbers and an effective warning net are required for the operations in (b). It is understood



that only thirty-six Army pursuit aircraft are at present in Oahu, and that, while the organization and equipping of an Anti-Air Information Service supported by modern fire control equipment is in progress, the present system relies wholly on visual observation and sound locators which are only effective up to four miles.

Available Army anti-aircraft batteries appear inadequate if judged by the standards of the war in Europe. There are now in Oahu 26-3" fixed anti-aircraft guns (of which something over half are grouped about Pearl Harbor), 56 mobile 3" guns, and 109 .50 caliber machine guns. The anti-aircraft batteries are manned in part by personnel which is also required to man parts of the sea coast artillery. Should an attack on Oahu combine air attack with a gun bombardment, one or the other countering fires would suffer from lack of men. If the prevailing high ceiling is taken into account the caliber of the anti-aircraft guns might be inadequate against high altitude bombing attack.

By late summer the defenses will be considerably strengthened by additions in guns, planes, and radio locators. It is understood, sixteen additional 3" Mobile, twenty-four 90 mm., and one hundred twenty 37 mm. guns will be on hand; the pursuit aircraft strength is to be expanded to a total of 149; the new radio locators will have an effective range of 100 miles. Although the caliber of the guns will still be small for effective action against high altitude bombers, this augmentation will markedly improve the security of the Fleet. It does not, of course, affect the critical period immediately before us.

(3) The supplementary measures noted in (d) and (e) might be of the greatest value in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Balloon barrages have demonstrated some usefulness in Europe. Smoke from fixed installations on the ground might prove most advantageous.

To meet the needs of the situation, I offer the following proposals:

(1) That the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii.

(2) That the Army give consideration to the questions of balloon barrages, the employment of smoke, and other special devices for improving the defenses of Pearl Harbor.

(3) That local joint plans be drawn for the effective coordination of naval and military aircraft operations, and ship and shore anti-aircraft gun fire, against surprise aircraft raids.

(4) That the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees of joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids against Pearl Harbor.

(5) That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly so long as the present uncertainty continues to exist.

Your concurrence in these proposals and the rapid implementing of the measures to be taken by the Army, which are of the highest importance to the security of the Fleet, will be met with the closest cooperation on the part of the Navy Department.

Sincerely yours,

Secretary of the Navy

The Honorable The SECRETARY OF WAR.
Copies to: CINC, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Com 14
Op-22
Op-30

合衆國第七十九議會に於ける眞珠灣攻撃審査兩院委員會第一回會議證據
書類 第十號

眞珠灣の防備に關し、海軍卿より陸軍卿に宛てたる、昭和一六年一月廿
四日附書翰及之に對する昭和一六年二月七日附陸軍卿よりの返翰。市陸
局高級副官より上記の兩書翰を、訓令及其の受領書を添へ、司令官に移
牒したる昭和一六年二月七日附書翰。

證據書類第十號

O P 1 - 1 2 B : 9 1 M O G (S O) A 7 1 2 (2) F F 1
輯録番號〇九一一二

(機密) 昭和一六年一月廿四日

海軍卿

陸軍卿

拜啓 海軍省並に艦上部隊は眞珠灣に碇泊中の合衆國太平洋艦隊及眞珠
灣海軍根拠地自体の安全性に就き過去數週間に亘り再檢討中でありませ



此の再検討は、一面、對日情勢が愈々重大性を加ふるに鑑み、又根據地に碇泊中の艦隊に對する雷撃機及爆撃機攻撃の有効性に就き報ぜらるる海外よりの情報に依り促進せられたるものであります。若し對日戦争が起るとせば、其の開戦が先づ眞珠灣に於ける艦隊或は根據地の奇襲に始まり得ることとは容易に想像し得る處であります。

余の意見としては、艦隊若くは海軍根據地に對し加へらるべき大災害の固有的可能性は、前述の如き性質の襲撃に備ふる爲、陸海軍の合同動作が一層迅速に運び得る様、出來得る限り速かに、有ゆる手段を講ずる正當な理由となり得ると考へるものであります。

各種の危険を其の重要性と可能性の順位に依り考察すれば左の如くであります。

- (一) 爆撃機の空襲
- (二) 雷撃機の空襲
- (三) 破壊行動
- (四) 潜水艇攻撃

(四) 機雷布設

(五) 砲撃

最初の二つの項以外の危険に對する防備は満足に出來てゐるやうに思はれます。次の數節は主として上記(一)と(二)に包含される問題の討議に傾倒され居るもので、余は之等問題の解決を以て先決要件と考へるものであります。

前記兩様式の空襲は可能であり、之等の空襲は継続的に、同時に、或は又右に掲げたる内の他の作戰と相呼應して實行され得る。敵の出來得る最大限の攻撃力は十二個飛行中隊で、最小限は二個飛行中隊でありませう。攻撃は母艦と、之を援護する各艦の攻撃力によりて開始されるであります。

(一) 反撃手段として考へられるものは

(イ) 空襲開始前に敵母艦及援護艦の所置を捜査發見し之と交戦すること。

(ロ) 敵の航空兵力が彼等の目標に到達する前に其の所在を捜査發見し之と交戦すること

- (イ) 高射砲火に依り親機を撃退すること。
- (ニ) 重要施設を人工煙幕を以て隠蔽すること。
- (ホ) 氣球幕を張りて重要施設を掩護すること。

前記(イ)に掲げたる作戦は主に艦隊の機能に屬するも、之は空襲が宣戦の布告前豫告なしに行はれたる場合には實行出來ないであらう。

(ロ)の作戦には多數の追撃機と有效なる豫防網が必要である。目下オワフ島に於ける陸軍の追撃機の数は僅かに三十六機と知られてゐる。近代式砲火發射設備を以てする防空報導の組織と施設が目下進捗中なるも、現在の方式としては只四哩まで有效なる視力觀察と聽音器とに依存してゐる。

歐洲戦争の水準より判断すれば、使用し得る陸軍高射砲陣地は不充分と思はれる。現在オワフ島には三インチ固定高射砲二十六門（内半数以上は眞珠灣周邊に集中されてゐる）、三インチ移動高射砲五十六門及半インチ口徑機關砲百九門がある。防空陣地人員の一部は、海岸砲兵隊に要する人員中から補充されてゐる。故にオワフ島が空襲と砲撃の合同攻

撃を受けるとすれば、その何れかの對抗射撃は人員欠乏の爲境に陥るであらう。若し又今一般に普及されおる高度上昇を考慮に入れるならば、高射砲の口径は、高度からの爆撃に對して不充分であらう。

此の夏季の末までには、砲、航空機及無線方向探知器の増加に依り、防備は著しく強化されるであらう。即ち移動砲三インチ十六門及九〇ミリ二十四門、三十七ミリ百門が接受されることになつており、追撃機も總數百四十九機にまで増強され、新無線方向探知器は百哩の有効距離を有することにならう。砲の口径は、高度爆撃機に對しては尙小なるに過ぐるも、此の増加は艦隊の安全が著しく保強されるであらう。之は勿論今我等が直面する危機に役立つものではない。

(三)と(二)に掲げられたる補足手段は、眞珠灣の防禦には最大の價值あるものと考へられる。氣球幕は歐洲に於て或る程度の有要性を示した。地上固定施設からの煙幕は最も有利性を立證し得るであらう。現時情勢の必要に應ずる爲余は次の提言を致します。

(一)陸軍は追撃機及防空砲の増加及布哇に於ける空襲警報網の布設に最

高の優先順位を附與すること。

(一) 陸軍は眞珠灣の防備を改善する爲氣球幕、煙幕其他必要なる特殊手段の使用問題を考慮すること。

(二) 航空機の奇襲に對し、陸海軍航空機及船艦及海岸の高射砲火の有効なる協同作戰に關し局地的合同計畫を立てること。

(三) オワフ島に於ける陸海軍部隊は、眞珠灣に對する不意打的空襲に對し、速刻合同動作を取り得る様適宜の程度に於て一致協力すべきこと。

(四) オワフ島に於ける陸海軍部隊をして、不意打的空襲に對する防禦に備へる目的を以て、現時の不要状態が續く限り、少くとも一週一回共同演習を行はしめること。

以上の提言に對する貴下の御贊同、及艦隊の安全保持の爲最も重要である處の陸軍側に於る各種手段の急速なる履行は、海軍省側に於て最も緊密なる協力を以て迎へられるでめりませう。 敬具

Def, Doo 1500-Z-1

寫送付先

合衆國太平洋艦隊司令長官

第十四海軍區司令部

第二十二作戰部

第三十作戰部