

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: HAZEYAMA Tetsuo

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I was a staff-officer of the 1st section (mainly responsible for giving the operation and training) of the 7th Area Army, from January 29, 1945 to the day of Japan's surrender.

I was a major at the time of Japan's surrender. At present I live in the Depot Affairs Bureau at ONAKA-DAI, Chiba City.

2. The Commander of the 7th Area Army was General DONIHARA, Kenji until April 21, 1945 and General ITAGAKI Seishiro, from that time to the surrender.

3. General ITAGAKI was formally appointed as Commander of the Area Army on April 7, 1945, but as his trip took some days, he took over the duties, as I remember, on 21st, April.



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4. The units which were under the Commander of the 7th Area Army were, in the main, as follows:

16th Army

25th Army

29th Army

37th Army (As of mid-night, May 19, 1945)

Directly attached units:

40th Division

Defense Unit for SHONAN

26th Independent Mixed Brigade

13th Independent Artillery, Regiment

43rd Independent Engineer Regiment

Other small non-combatant units.

The defense area for each of the above Armies was, in the main, as follows:

16th Army Java

25th Army Sumatra

29th Army Malay Peninsula

37th Army Borneo

Areas under direct jurisdiction:

Singapore Island (after June, 1945 Singapore Province was included)

There were some stationed air-units and Communication-units in the defense area of the 7th Area Army, but these units came directly under the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern



Army. These units received instructions from the Commander of the Area Army only with regard to their ground fighting.

The same was true with the naval units.

4.) The Chain of command regarding the units concerned with P.O.W.s was as follows:

POW camps were under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Army, and the local Army Commander (if the area came directly under an Area Army, the Commander of such an Area Army) had control over them in limited matters.

The scope of the authority of army commander, as set forth in the regulation, was limited to supply of provisions and articles, guard duties etc.

The system of administration of POWs was set forth by the P.O.W.s. Administration Bureau in Japan and by the Southern Army.

5. The use of POWs for labor was done in the following manner:

A) POW's were used within the limits fixed by the "Regulations concerning POW's Labor" and the "Regulations concerning the dispatch of POWs. In using POWs for labor the Chiefs of POW camps were consulted regarding the condition of POW's and



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the number of POWs available so as to meet the labor conditions.

B.) In Singapore, POWs were used in construction works. They were healthy prisoners, and they were never used in works directly concerned with fighting.

Moreover with a suggestion of General ITAGAKI to accord better treatment to these prisoners the amount of their food was increased to the level of that given to the Japanese soldiers.

6. The condition of communication in the South and the food condition in the vicinity of Singapore after April, 1945 were roughly as follows:

A) Communications between Japan Proper and Singapore.

Communications by sea were completely cut off. Only a small number of persons made trips by plane. There was no chance to supply munitions from Japan Proper.

B) Communications between Singapore and other places in the South Seas.

a) Singapore area maintained 15,000 tons of ships which were usable. The majority of these ships were used between Singapore and Java and Singapore and Palembang. But these ships could not effectively meet the transportation demand, due to the enemy's interference.

b) Planes were only used for transporting a small number of persons in areas free from the attack of enemy.

c) Singapore-Java

Goods transported amounted to 10,000 tons per month. Of this



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5,000 tons were rice, and the remainder included arms and munitions and troops transferred from areas north of Australia. However, with the increasing difficulty of using larger ships, it was planned to use sailboats with motors and warships in order to utilize the land transportation facilities on Sumatra. These proved to be inadequate in counter-acting the transportation short-comings.

d) Singapore-Palembang (Sumatra)

Goods transported amounted to 5,000 -- 6,000 tons per month. These were mainly fuel and materials. As for food, little amount could be transported from Sumatra, because Sumatra itself was short of food.

e) Singapore-Borneo

As the areas near Borneo were always under the control of the Allied planes, the use of large ships for transportation was impossible. After April we tried several sailboats with motors. Among them, only one boat named "Borneo-maru" was successful as I recall. After June, even these sailboats with motors were unusable. Then we transferred one company of landing boats (about 20 boats) from Java. But these boats also proved to be incapable of transportation. The first boat reached Pontianak just before the time of Japan's surrender. The sailboats with motors that were in Borneo ports were all out of order. None of them reached Singapore. Such being the



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case, most of the goods for Borneo were stored at Singapore.

f) Singapore-French Indo-China

Sailboats with motors were used in transporting rice between these places. But due to motor troubles and the enemy's interference, rice transported was only 1,000 tons per month.

g) Singapore-Siam

Transportation chiefly of rice was carried out by junks and railways. But like in the above cases, it was not effective, the amount of transportation per month being 3,000 tons.

h) Singapore-Burma

After about April, 1944, sea communications were cut off. And railways were damaged at many places. Transportation was practically unavailable.

i) Singapore-Andaman and Nicobar

In about May or June, a convey consisting of three or four ships was sent twice. But these ships were attacked by the Allied Forces and practically wiped out. Only one ship returned, as I remember.

Communications by plane was attempted only a few times by naval planes.

Consequently, the Japanese Army in the above islands suffered greatly from the acute short age of food, but they had no means to correct the situation.



C) Food conditions in the vicinity of Singapore.

To feed the people and the troops stationed in Singapore at least 8,000 tons of rice were required per month. But, as stated above, the transportation of food to Singapore from other places gradually became so difficult that after July or so they could not depend on what was coming from other areas. So it was planned to save the rice they had in store as much as possible, and the rations for the people as well as for the troops were cut down to 2/3 of the normal quantity from around March.

In spite of the above measure, the quantity of rice in store for the civilians and soldiers at the time of Japan's surrender was not enough to last 6 months.

In order to make up for the deficit, a great effort was made to become self-sufficient, but due to the poor productivity of the area, this aim was not accomplished as much as we expected.

The supplies for P.O.W.s inevitably decreased under the above circumstances but every effort were made to give substitutes to P.O.W.s who were also instructed to alleviate the situation by raising vegetables, etc. in the vicinity of their barracks.

Medical supplies, too, were not sent from Japan Proper. So efforts were made to produce such items locally and to



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save them, but refined, critical medicines were lacking.

7. The 37th Army was commanded in the following manner:

The above Army came under the command of the 7th Area Army Commander on 20th, May when the war situations at the Borneo fronts were increasingly becoming difficult.

Communications by air and sea between Singapore and Borneo were almost cut off. Signal communications were also very difficult and wireless contact was barely maintained for about 30 minutes twice a day. This was due to the lack of fuel and electric source in Singapore. When a plane was dispatched from Singapore, we were uncertain whether it could reach the objective. When the plane did reach the objective, its return was questionable because of fuel.

One hour's signal communication a day was not enough even to send or receive urgent operational reports. The exchange of information being thus extremely restricted, all we were able to learn about the Allied Forces was their general situations and it was not an easy matter to find out what was going on in their rear areas.

As the sole means to get a clear picture of this unknown condition in Borneo, Lieutenant-Colonel NAITO Kiyoshi a staff officer, was dispatched by plane to Borneo. The plane in which he flew got lost at sea on July 7th and never returned. Thus the condition in Borneo was never made clear up to the time of Japan's surrender.



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As mentioned in the forgoing paragraphs, it was virtually impossible to ship out materials. As a result what ammunitions and other war supplies we were able to send to Borneo from Singapore constituted only 5 or 6% of the request repeatedly made from Borneo.

As we were in such a predicament as not being able to send even badly needed ammunitions for operational purposes, we never had an opportunity until the day of surrender to send the relief items for P.O.W.'s which arrived in Singapore by the AWA-maru.

(After Japan's surrender these relief items were handed over to the P.O.W.s in Singapore, with their understanding on the circumstances).

The condition of communications, being as stated above we had no alternative but to let the Commander of the 37th Army handle everything concerning his Army. The transfer of the P.O.W.s in Borneo was planned by the above Army before it came under the command of the Area Army, and the Area Army was not in position to find out how it was carried out. And since the Commander of the Area Army was not directly responsible for the handling of these P.O.W.s he had nothing to do in this connection.

On this 26 day of August, 1947

At Tokyo

Deponent: /S/ HAZEYAMA Tetsuo (seal)



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I, SASAGAWA, Tomoharu, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: /S/ SASAGAWA, Tomoharu (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ HAZEYAMA, Tetsuo (seal)