



COMMANDERS DIGEST

VOL. 14, NO. 22/NOVEMBER 29, 1973

The People's Republic of China



PRC Strategic Forces —pg. 5

PRC: Its People and Progress —pg. 9

President Summarizes

U.S. Policy Toward P.R.C.

President Nixon summarized U.S. policy toward the P.R.C. (People's Republic of China) in his foreign policy report to the Congress of February 9, 1972, from which the following key excerpts are taken.

Referring to the beginning of communication between the United States and the P.R.C., the President said:

"... in February of 1972, after many vicissitudes, many achievements and our separate evolution, the U.S. and China enter this dialogue on a fresh foundation of national equality and mutual respect. We are both turning a new page in our histories.

"... Until 1971 we had little meaningful contact for most of a generation. The People's Republic's critical public statements and interpretations of history are well known to us. We have also made our position clear.

"It serves no purpose to gloss over these sources of division. Neither side pretended during preparations for my journey, and neither will pretend afterwards, that we have solved our basic problems. We can expect our talks to be marked by the directness and candor which best serve leaders whose differences are deep but whose policies are rooted in realism.

"The following considerations shaped this Administration's approach to the Peoples Republic of China.

- "Peace in Asia and peace in the world require that we exchange views, not so much despite our differences as because of them. A clearer grasp of each other's purposes is essential in an age of turmoil and nuclear weapons.

- "It is in America's interest, and the world's interest, that the Peoples Republic of China plays its appropriate role in shaping international arrangements that affect its concerns. Only then will that great nation have a stake in such arrangements; only then will they endure.

- "No one nation should be the sole voice for a bloc of states. We will deal with all countries on the basis of specific issues and external behavior, not abstract theory.

- "Both Chinese and American policies could be much less rigid if we had no need to consider each other permanent enemies. Over the long term there need be no clashes between our fundamental national concerns.

- "China and the United States share many parallel

interests and can do much together to enrich the lives of our peoples. It is no accident that the Chinese and American peoples have such a long history of friendship.

- "Over the longer term, we will see whether two countries—whose histories and cultures are completely different, whose recent isolation has been total, whose ideologies clash, and whose visions of the future collide—can nevertheless move from antagonism to communication and understanding.

- "On January 20, 1969, in my Inaugural Address, I defined our approach toward all potential adversaries:

'After a period of confrontation, we are entering an era of negotiation.

'Let all nations know that during this Administration our lines of communication will be open.

'We seek an open world—open to ideas, open to the exchange of goods and people—a world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry isolation.

'We cannot expect to make everyone our friend, but we can try to make no one our enemy.'

- "When I spoke those lines, I had the Peoples Republic of China very much in mind. It is this attitude that shaped our policy from the outset and led to the July 15, 1971, announcement. It is in this spirit that I go to Peking."

The President has emphasized that the talks at Peking focused on bilateral issues and that no secret understandings or agreements were reached with the P.R.C. on matters relating to third countries. The communique accurately reflects the content of the talks.

The President has further emphasized that the new U.S. dialogue with Peking will not be at the expense of old friends. In his February 9 foreign policy report to the Congress, the President said: "With the Republic of China [Taiwan], we shall maintain our friendship, our diplomatic ties, and our defense commitment. The ultimate relationship between Taiwan and the mainland is not a matter for the United States to decide. A peaceful resolution of this problem by the parties would do much to reduce tension in the Far East. We are not, however, urging either party to follow any particular course."

Dept. of State, Background Notes, People's Republic of China, May 1972.



President Richard Nixon

Agreements Reached

Results of President Nixon's Trip

On July 15, 1971, President Nixon announced his decision to visit the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) on the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai. The President explained that the purpose of the trip would be to seek normalization of relations between the two countries and to undertake an exchange of views on questions of mutual concern. This historic journey took place on February 21 through February 28, 1973.

At the conclusion of the trip, a joint communique, issued in Shanghai, stated that the United States and the People's Republic of China had reached agreement on the following principles:

- International disputes should be settled without the threat or use of force;
- Progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;
- Both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;
- Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to any efforts to establish such hegemony; and

● Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements with the other directed at other countries.

While the P.R.C. stated that the Taiwan question is the crucial problem obstructing the normalization of relations with the U.S., the United States said that it favors a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.

For the future, both sides agreed to:

- Expand exchanges in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism;
- Facilitate the development of bilateral trade; and
- Stay in contact through various channels, including establishment of regular ambassadorial contacts at Paris and the sending of a senior U.S. representative to China from time to time for consultations.



Since the President's visit, several actions in conformity with the communique have taken place:

- A Chinese table tennis team has toured the U.S.;
- Several hundred U.S. citizens have visited the P.R.C.;
- About 40 U.S. businessmen attended the spring Canton Trade Fair;
- Formal negotiations are underway at Paris between United States and Chinese representatives on facilitation of trade and cultural exchanges; and
- High-level talks took place between Dr. Henry Kissinger (then Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and now also Secretary of State) and Premier Chou in June 1972 (and again in November 1973).

Earlier U.S. Actions

In the past few years, the U.S. has taken a number of unilateral steps to demonstrate our intent to construct a new relationship with the P.R.C. In 1969 and 1970, the United States:

MEETING—President Richard Nixon is welcomed to the People's Republic of China by Chairman Mao Tse-tung. The historic meeting took place during the President's trip to the P.R.C. in February 1973.

- Relaxed travel restriction to permit a broad range of Americans to use U.S. passports to travel to the P.R.C.;
- Removed restrictions on noncommercial imports;
- Altered regulations to permit foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms to trade with the P.R.C. in nonstrategic goods; and
- Permitted U.S. oil companies to supply foreign-produced oil to Free World ships carrying nonstrategic cargo to the P.R.C.

After some signs of responsiveness by the P.R.C., the U.S. in 1971 decided further to:

- Eliminate the restriction on the use of U.S. passports for travel to the P.R.C.;



FIRST MEETING—Dr. Henry Kissinger, then Presidential adviser, talks with Yeh Chein-ying, member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, during Kissinger's first secret visit to make arrangements for President Nixon's trip to Peking.

friends; our Defense commitment and ties of friendship to the Republic of China remain intact. We will not take sides in any Sino-Soviet dispute but will seek to improve our relations with both powers.

P.R.C. Attitudes

The P.R.C. is continuing its efforts to expand relations with the U.S. and other governments. It has joined the United Nations (with U.S. support) and now has diplomatic relations with over 70 countries. Peking has also shown increased flexibility about admitting visitors to China. In addition, in December 1971, the PRC released two long-held American prisoners and commuted the sentence of a third. However while generally avoiding issues which would unduly complicate our bilateral relations, Peking continues to attack various American policies which it characterizes as the efforts of a "super-power" to dominate the small and medium-sized nations of the world.

Improved Communications

Following the President's trip, communications between the Governments of the United States and the Peoples Republic of China have improved and contacts between the American and Chinese people have increased.

Dept. of State GIST #6 (rev. 5) dated August 1972.

- Relax currency controls to permit use of dollars by the P.R.C.;
- End restrictions on the provision of fuel by U.S. oil companies to carriers bound for, or leaving, the P.R.C. (provided they are not bound for North Vietnam, North Korea, or Cuba);
- Issue an extensive list of nonstrategic goods that may be exported directly to the P.R.C. under general export license (items not on the list may

be considered for specific licensing); and

- Permit imports from the P.R.C. to enter the United States under a general license.

U.S. Policy

The U.S. seeks normalization of its relations with the P.R.C. We have, however, made it clear that such normalization cannot be at the expense of old

China's Representation in the United Nations

On October 25, 1971, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution calling for the seating of the People's Republic of China and the expulsion of representatives of the Republic of China. While favoring the participation of the P.R.C. in the United Nations, the United States had vigorously opposed expulsion of the Republic of China. The following day former Secretary of State William P. Rogers said:

"Last night's decision to admit the Peoples Republic of China as a member of the United Nations, of course, is consistent with the policy of the United States. President Nixon hopes that this action, which will bring into

the United Nations representatives of more than 700 million people, will result in a reduction of tensions in the Pacific area.

"At the same time, the United States deeply regrets the action taken by the United Nations to deprive the Republic of China of representation in that organization . . .

"The Republic of China, of course, continues to be a respected and valued member of the international community, and the ties between us remain unaffected by the action of the United Nations."



P.R.C. Strategic Forces

By

Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

The People's Republic of China, during the past year, continued to make steady progress in the build-up of its nuclear forces. The production of fissionable materials continues to expand as new facilities come on-line, thus permitting a more rapid increase in the stockpile of nuclear weapons.

As I indicated last year, the P.R.C. has a variety of nuclear weapon delivery systems operational or under development, including both aircraft and missiles.

Last year, I informed Congress that the P.R.C. had developed and tested a Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) and an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), and possibly the latter could be ready for deployment. We now have reason to believe that both of these systems have been operationally deployed. Moreover, a third system, which I referred to last year as a multi-stage longer-range IRBM, may also be nearing operational deployment. This last system might more properly be termed a limited-range Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM); it could reach deep into the Soviet Union, but it could not reach the Continental United States (except for the western part of Alaska).

The P.R.C., however, is also developing a full-range ICBM and this program is moving forward at a slow, but steady, pace. We are still estimating that this missile could reach an Initial Operating Capability (IOC) as early as 1975, but more likely a year later. Its range, carrying a 3 megaton (mt.) warhead, could be about 6,000 nautical miles (nm.), sufficient to reach virtually all major targets in the Continental United States. Inasmuch as an ICBM cannot be tested at

full range within the confines of the P.R.C., we would expect that eventually this new missile will be tested out into the Pacific or the Indian Ocean. If it is so tested, we will know much more about its characteristics than we do now.

In addition to these liquid-fuel missiles, we believe the P.R.C. has also been working for some time on the development of solid-fuel missiles. While we do not as yet have a good basis for estimating an IOC, a solid-fuel MR/IRBM-class missile and/or a solid-fuel Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) would probably not be available for deployment before the mid-1970s. The P.R.C. has one Soviet-type GOLF class diesel-powered missile-launching submarine which it built during the early 1960s, but to our knowledge, it has never been equipped with missiles. If the P.R.C. is indeed developing a solid-fuel SLBM, it is reasonable to assume that this submarine would

be used as the test platform. No other P.R.C. ballistic missile submarines are known to us; however, we cannot preclude the possibility that one or more may be under construction.

P.R.C. Strategic Defensive Forces

The P.R.C. air defense system, notwithstanding the relatively large number of interceptors, is quite limited in capability as compared with that of the Soviet Union. By mid-1973, the P.R.C. is expected to have about 3,400 operational home defense interceptors, but except for a small number of MIG-21s, most of these aircraft are of the older types—MIG-15s, -17s, and -19s. The P.R.C. still has only a few hundred surface-to-air-missile (SAM) launchers deployed, mostly around a few key cities. The rate of deployment is increasing, however, and this force is expected to grow more rapidly in the future than it has in the past few years.



A MIG aircraft is assembled at Shenyang.



Members of the P.R.C. 3d Company (motorized) with their tracked personnel carriers in background.

Threats in Asia

Strategic Capabilities of People's Republic of China

A P.R.C. strategic nuclear threat to the U.S. currently does not exist, but developments are continuing that could affect the nuclear balance. It now seems possible that a strategic missile with a range in excess of 3,000 nm. may be deployed in limited numbers by 1974. This range is sufficient to cover all of the U.S.S.R. and part of Alaska. We do not expect a deployed ICBM capable of reaching the remainder of the U.S. to achieve an Initial Operating Capability until 1975 at the earliest and a full operating capability by the end of the decade.

Despite the prospect of continued improvements in system components, ac-

curacy and warheads, the P.R.C.'s nuclear forces will remain vastly inferior to those of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. during the next 10 years. However, the prestige and psychological influence of its nuclear capability could be valuable in providing leverage for China's political goals in the underdeveloped world and with the two superpowers.

The P.R.C. appears to have given a high priority to the creation of a theater nuclear capability. Currently, this capability rests primarily on China's small but growing fleet of TU-16 Badger medium bombers. These aircraft can operate from numerous airfields in China and

can reach targets up to 1,650 nm. away without refueling when carrying a normal payload.

China is now deploying liquid-fueled Medium Range Ballistic Missile/Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM/IRBM) systems, and solid-fueled versions will probably be introduced during this decade. We expect the P.R.C. to deploy some of their strategic ballistic missiles in hardened silos during the next few years.

These regional nuclear forces are capable of attacking some Soviet targets as well as U.S. and allied forces that are based in the wide area from Japan through Korea and Taiwan to the Philip-

pires and Southeast Asia.

The Chinese army (from 2.5 to 3 million men) continues to be modernized and upgraded. Additional production of armored vehicles indicates plans to increase the armored force and possibly to mechanize some infantry divisions in the next few years.

While its inventory of some 4,000 home defense and tactical aircraft is the third largest in the world, China's equipment is far below the standards of U.S. and Soviet aircraft.

The Peoples Republic of China lags the Soviets in applied aircraft technology by about 10-15 years. However, a native capability in research and design is being developed. China's ground attack fighter force consists of MIG-15 and -17 Fagots and Frescos, a growing number of F-9 fighter bombers—a native-designed aircraft somewhat larger than but resembling the MIG-19 Farmer—and the IL-28 Beagle light bomber. A small number of China's jet bombers are the TU-16 Badger; the remainder are IL-28 Beagles.

Chinese air defense suffers from serious weaknesses due to heavy reliance on outmoded aircraft, a very modest surface-to-air missile force, and limited air surveillance capabilities.

The P.R.C. naval construction program has increased in scope and complexity following the initial setback at the time of the withdrawal of Soviet assistance in 1960. The Chinese continue to base their naval offensive strength on their diesel-powered medium range attack submarines, which they are still producing in significant numbers—including a new class of submarines. The first few units of a new class of destroyers armed with surface-to-surface missiles are now operational and several more are under construction. We continue to conclude that the capability of the P.R.C. to project its ground forces to areas outside its land periphery will remain limited in the near term.

North Korean Threat

After the Soviet Union and the P.R.C., North Korea is the most powerful Com-

TRAINING—Soldiers of the People's Republic of China prepare to fire an artillery piece during training exercises. The Chinese army ranges between 2.5 to 3 million men and is constantly being modernized.



munist nation in Asia. Supplied in large part by the U.S.S.R. and to a lesser extent by the P.R.C., it has continually improved its military forces which are maintained at a high state of combat readiness. Its army of about 370,000 men could engage in initial offensive operations without outside aid. Its air force includes nearly 500 jet fighters—over half of which are older MIG-15 and -17 models—and a significant number of small transport and reconnaissance aircraft. Continued upgrading of the air force, possibly with newer aircraft from the U.S.S.R. and China, can be expected. Naval capabilities remain primarily limited to coastal defense and hit-and-run attacks.

The Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) armed forces, coupled with U.N./U.S. forces, present significant deterrent to North Korean attack. At this time, North Korea does not enjoy overall military superiority, and any sustained, large-scale operations against the R.O.K. would require substantial materiel and manpower support from the U.S.S.R. or the P.R.C.

North Vietnamese Threat

The North Vietnamese threat in Southeast Asia remains formidable. As of early March 1973, there were more than 230,000 North Vietnamese/Viet Cong personnel in the Republic of Vietnam, about 70-90,000 VC/NVA and Khmer Communists in Cambodia, and over 100,000 NVA and Pathet Lao in Laos. These forces were heavily reinforced by both artillery and tanks.

The North Vietnamese Air Force, which began 1972 with more than 240 jet fighters—about one-half of which were MIG-19s or -21s—has lost approximately 95 aircraft, about 75 of which were shot down. North Vietnamese support aircraft include about 100 transports and helicopters. Expected modernization of the fighter force, construction of airfields, and improvements in its early warning/ground-controlled-intercept (EW/GCI) network will give the North Vietnamese Air Force some capability to conduct intercept missions.

In other areas of the world, both the

U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. are continuing their efforts to increase their influence at the expense of the West and of each other. In some cases, each of the Communist rivals overtly supports established governments through economic and military aid and diplomacy. Soviet support to India and P.R.C. support to Pakistan are examples.

Rivalry between the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. has to some extent limited the influence each has been able to gain from these efforts. Their inability to project military power and the forces of nationalism have also been important constraints. However, we see no evidence of a change in the objectives of Communist nations in most developing areas, and the buildup of Soviet naval and air power is impressive in terms of its portent for future attempts to extend influence through military presence as well as political and economic assistance.

Extracted from Secretary of Defense "Posture" Report, Fiscal Year 1974.



This street scene in Shasi is typical of Chinese cities where work is largely done by manpower.

History of P.R.C. and Its People



Red China army unit passes in review as a show of strength during an anniversary of the People's Republic of China.

The People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) is located in eastern Asia. Occupying a landmass of 3,691,502 square miles, it is the third largest country in the world (after the U.S.S.R. and Canada). It shares common borders with North Korea, the U.S.S.R., the Mongolian Peoples Republic, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Burma, Laos, and North Vietnam. The British Crown Colony of Hong Kong and the Portuguese overseas province of Macao are on the P.R.C.'s southern coastline.

Two-thirds of China's area is mountainous or semidesert; only about one-tenth is cultivated. Ninety percent of the people live on one-sixth of the land, primarily in the fertile plains and deltas of the east.

The country lies almost entirely in the temperate zone. Only portions of the southernmost area—the Provinces of Yunnan and Kwangtung and the autonomous region of Kwangsi Chuang—are within the tropical zone. Monsoonal climate is a major influence, with summers hot and humid throughout much of the country and winters dry and unusually cool or cold for the given latitude. The concentration of rain in the summer months frequently results in torrential downpours and is a major cause of the floods which often afflict China.

The P.R.C.'s flag consists of five yellow stars, one large and four small (signifying the five Chinese races), located in the upper left corner of a red field.

The People

Although the Chinese authorities have issued no recent population statistics, the P.R.C. is believed to have between 825 and 875 million people, making it the most populous country in the world. The rate of increase appears to have been about 2-2.5 percent annually except during 1959-61, when it probably was affected by a succession of poor harvests. Government authorities have shown an ambivalent attitude to the growth of an already crowded nation—they endorsed birth control at first, played it down in 1958, and again actively promoted it beginning in 1962. Using a population figure of 850 million, there are about 230 persons per square mile, although the distribution is very uneven. Although the last official figures for the populations of the five largest cities were provided by the P.R.C. in 1957, recent radio broadcasts have given the following figures: Shanghai, 10 million; Peking, 7 million; Tientsin, 4 million; Shenyang, 3 million; and Wuhan, 2.4 million.

By far the largest ethnic division is the Han Chinese—about 94 percent of the total population. The remaining 6 percent (approximately 51 million people) is composed of several non-Chinese groups. They are concentrated mainly along the Chinese frontiers and include Uighurs and Muslims in the northwest, Mongols and Manchus in the north and northeast, Chuangs in the south, and Tibetans in the southwest.

The authorities have discouraged religious practices by mounting propaganda drives during the past 20 years, cutting all direct links with foreign faiths, removing uncooperative clergymen, and closing the most places of worship. Nevertheless, religion is still tolerated within very narrow limits. In pre-Communist China there were substantial numbers of Confucianists, Buddhists, Taoists, and Muslims and smaller numbers of Christians and adherents to tribal religions.

The national language of the P.R.C. is based on the Peking dialect of Mandarin Chinese. Other principal dialects include Cantonese, Shanghai, Fukiense, and Hakka. The non-Chinese groups speak their own languages.

Education

Expanding education to support modernization was an urgent program of the P.R.C. beginning in 1949—one that was facilitated by earlier expansion which had provided a potential cadre of teachers. It is estimated that in 1949 formal education was less than 2 years per capita for the 450 million people aged 7 years and more, with a total student enrollment of 26 million. Enrollments quadrupled in the following 10-year period (to 104 million), raising the years in school to about 3.5 per capita, and then stabilized as the desired enrollment structure was reached. By 1959 primary enrollment was nearly universal, junior secondary enrollment nearly universal in cities and nearby rural

areas, and senior secondary and higher education enrollments quite narrow and restricted. Educational advancement was by examination, with extreme competition for admittance to senior secondary and higher education. While standards suffered in the rapid growth from 1949 to 1959, they were noticeably improved in the 1959-66 period when the average school years reached about 5.5 years per capita. In 1966 there were approximately 116 million students in the P.R.C.

This remarkable social transformation—the surest guarantee yet of China's eventual modernization—brought political problems. A flood of graduates entered the labor market after 1959 and found the cities not expanding or providing the urban and industrial jobs they expected. A growing educated, alienated elite began to form, believing it was better trained and motivated to lead the revolution than the less educated old cadres who had led the guerrilla legions out of the backward rural areas.

The Cultural Revolution was in large part a political effort by the P.R.C. authorities to destroy and reform the cultural "establishment" that was dividing China. They sought an accommodation to youth by purging the top leadership and remolding the middle echelons of the bureaucracy to provide political excitement and opportunities for ambitious, talented youth to enter and advance in the bureaucracy. The result, however, was that the Cultural Revolution served as a mechanism to control youthful revolutionary fervor, to denigrate and politically control professional educators and to reform the educational structure so that it could modernize at the same pace as other sectors of society.

The new educational model, still far from being fully reconstituted, provides for a universal 9-year primary-secondary curriculum for youths 7-15 years of age. The schools no longer will be operated by the central Ministry of Education but will be run and financed by local organizations—in the rural areas, the communes and in the cities, the factories and the "neighborhood" party organizations. Teachers will be paid local wage rates and curriculums and costs will be shaped by local desires and needs. Virtually all secondary school graduates are to go to work at age 16, and candidates for higher education will be selected from those aged 18-25, as nominated by local party secretaries throughout China, on the ba-

sis of work performance and political attitudes. A very few outstanding students are being permitted to enter the universities directly from high school.

This system expands enrollments at lower grades while curtailing enrollments at higher levels, consonant with reduced needs for more highly trained personnel. Competitive examinations are eliminated, reducing the sense of elite status at higher grade levels. The adult literacy rate is estimated to be 40 percent.

History

China is among the oldest of the world's civilizations—but those of the Nile, Tigris-Euphrates, and the Indus Rivers may be older by as much as 2,500 years. The earliest evidence of Chinese civilization is set at about 1500 B.C. China does, however, claim the longest and most enduring cultural continuity, dating to prehistoric times. As with most ancient civilizations, the beginnings of China's civilization are obscure, but under successive dynasties Chinese culture prospered and advanced to a point where achievements in literature, philosophy, art, and craftsmanship were among the highest attained by man.

The advent of Western ideas had profound consequences for traditional China. Weak in the scientific field and untouched by an industrial revolution, China was no match for 19th-century Western expansionism. A series of military and political humiliations at the hands of the West slowly awakened Chinese intellectuals to the need for drastic changes in the traditional society if China were to be preserved as an entity. The process of change in a society structured by more than 3,000 years of civilization has not been an easy one, and China in the 20th century has been rent by political, economic, and intellectual chaos and revolution in its search for accommodation with the modern world.

20th Century

Recognition of the inability of the Mandarin-Confucian system of government to deal either with internal difficulties or foreign encroachments started a great ferment among China's intellectuals. Many liberals hoped to reform the

imperial system; others, like Sun Yat-sen, sought to overthrow it completely and establish a modern republic.

The Manchu Empire (Ching dynasty) was brought down by the revolution touched off on October 10, 1911, and in its place rose the shaky structure of the Republic of China. The new government barely survived the impact of World War I, which Japan used as an excuse to move into Shantung Peninsula and present China with a stringent list of demands. After the death in 1916 of Yuan Shih-kai, the Republic's first president, the unstable government was all but shattered in the warlord era.

In the 1920s a new leader arose—Chiang Kai-shek, a protégé of Sun Yat-sen. Chiang began skillfully pulling together pieces of a fragmented China. The Kuomintang (KMT)—Nationalist Party—was reorganized with the assistance of Soviet advisers. An increasingly uneasy association between the KMT, the Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.), and Soviet advisers continued until 1927. Chiang then drove the Communists out of the KMT and out of the government; he destroyed most of their party organization, virtually paralyzed their ranks throughout China, and drove the survivors into the mountains of central China.

In their historic "Long March" of 1934-35, the Communists, driven out of the mountains by the KMT, retreated to Shensi Province in the northwest. Despite continued hardship they reorganized their forces under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung. The bitter struggle between the



COMMANDERS DIGEST

Vol. 14, No. 22, Nov. 29, 1973

A publication of the Department of Defense to provide official and professional information to commanders and key personnel on matters related to Defense policies, programs and interests, and to create better understanding and teamwork within the Department of Defense.

Published weekly by the American Forces Press Service, 1117 N. 19th St., Arlington, Va. 22209, a unified activity of the Office of Information for the Armed Forces, OASD (M&RA). Reproduction of content is authorized.

Telephone: (202) OXford 4-4912
Autovon 224-4912

SHOCK TROOPS—Shouting and singing, a mass of Communist political shock troops demonstrate shortly after the Chinese Communist army occupied Shumchun.

KMT and the C.C.P. continued even while both sides were engaged in the war against Japan, finally culminating in the Communist defeat of the KMT forces in 1949. Chiang Kai-shek moved his KMT government and elements of the armed forces to the island of Taiwan. On September 21, 1949, the Chinese Communists, at a meeting at Peking, proclaimed the "Peoples Republic of China" and elected Mao Tse-tung Chairman of the new Government.

The Communists took over a country that had been exhausted by nearly a generation of conflict, war, and social upheavals; whose economy had been disrupted and many of whose industrial centers had been damaged or destroyed; and whose people had become disillusioned by inflation and the apparent inability of the government concurrently to solve China's economic problems and meet the political challenge of the Communists. As a result, many Chinese were ready for a change and willing to take a chance with any political organization that gave promise of establishing order and restoring the economy.

The Chinese Communists promised this and much more, including "freedom of thought, speech, publication, assembly, association, correspondence, person, domicile, religious belief, and freedom of processions and demonstration." It was also promised that the Peoples Republic would "in a systematic manner transform the feudal and semifeudal land ownership system into a system of peasant land ownership. It shall protect the economics interests and private property of workers, peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie."

As Communist political control spread over the country, these promises were ignored. Peasants, for instance, were originally granted titles to private plots but subsequently lost them when, from 1952 to 1956, the land was rapidly collectivized. The promised freedoms of thought, speech, publication, and the like fell before such mass political indoctrination campaigns as the "Three and Five Anti"



campaign of the early 1950s and the attack on the intellectuals following the "Hundred Flowers" campaign of 1957. The Cultural Revolution, which began in 1966, represented an even more intensive assault on China's intellectuals.

The Chinese Communist leaders initially proclaimed that it was their objective to transform a weak and traditionally backward China into a militarily strong, modern, industrial state. Economic progress of the Chinese Communists in the years of rehabilitation following 1949 was impressive. They succeeded in curbing inflation, restoring the transportation network, and rebuilding many of the industrial plants destroyed during World War II, although the strains of the Korean War created serious financial difficulties.

The Cultural Revolution

Between 1949 and 1966, the P.R.C. had a typically Communist government, similar to that of the U.S.S.R. The authority of the Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.) Central Committee reached into every phase of Chinese life through an extensive organization extending down to the village and city block. Strong military and security forces supplemented the approximately 18.5 million members of the C.C.P. who, holding key power positions in the state government apparatus and the usual Communist youth, labor,

and women's organizations, formed a tight web of control over the entire country.

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution changed all this. Begun in the spring of 1966, this most massive, pervasive, and disruptive of all Chinese Communist political campaigns was the result of four interacting processes:


- An attempt by Chairman Mao Tse-tung to purge and remold his party bureaucracy, which he felt had degenerated and was leading the country toward Soviet-style "goulash communism;"

- Mao's effort to inspire and test a younger generation that had never experienced war or revolution;

- A power struggle to determine the succession to Mao; and

- Deep-seated and long-standing domestic and foreign policy disputes among the top leadership, many of whom increasingly questioned the applicability of Mao's revolutionary principles to the problems of administering a complex nation-state.

These processes inspired the Cultural Revolution—the major upheaval needed to purge the party, block the growing movement toward liberalism and revisionism, inspire the younger generation, and



China has 25,000 miles of railroads, compared to 370,000 miles in United States.

place the country again squarely on the path to revolution. Initially, attacks were directed against those in arts and letters, party secretaries, and propagandists but were soon broadened to include all spheres of Chinese activity. In the process, the People's Liberation Army became deeply engaged in the struggle to provide civil government and fill the vacuum of power.

In August 1966 the Maoists formed the Red Guards—a youth group which, in its efforts to force revolutionary Maoism on every faction, quickly placed itself outside the disciplines of the C.C.P. and the government. As Red Guard units fought each other throughout China, economic production, communications, and transportation were interrupted. Fortunately for the government, with ideal weather in 1967, China produced a record crop. The leadership urged the Red Guard youth to return to work and school.

By the time the movement began to draw to an apparent close in the summer of 1968, millions of C.C.P. and government officials and ordinary Chinese had come under criticism, and the party structure was virtually shattered. Key political, economic, and military officials had been purged, including among others Liu Shao-ch'i, Chairman of the Peoples Republic, and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Secretary General of the C.C.P. The Minister of

National Defense, Lin Piao, rose during the Cultural Revolution to become Vice Chairman of the party and Mao's designated heir only to fall from power in an apparent purge of top P.R.C. military leaders in late 1971.

Government

The Constitution of the Peoples Republic of China was adopted on September 20, 1954. It provides that the powers of state be shared by the National Peoples Congress, its Standing (Executive) Committee, and the Chairman of the Chinese Peoples Republic. A new constitution may be adopted soon to reflect changes brought about by the Cultural Revolution; for the time being the 1954 Constitution remains theoretically in effect. In fact, however, the formal structure of government constitutes an administrative framework within which the ruling Chinese Communist Party—which is not mentioned specifically in the Constitution—exercises complete control. The real rulers of China are the members of the Standing Committee of the C.C.P., especially the Politburo.

In accordance with Mao Tse-tung's dictum that the government be streamlined and simplified, a number of ministries have been amalgamated and staff levels have been greatly reduced since the end of the Cultural Revolution. There are now

said to be only 28 ministries, offices, or commissions as compared to 90 before the Cultural Revolution. Only some of the government officials have been publicly reinstated, but these same men constitute virtually the whole top staff of the restructured bureaucracy. One objective of the Cultural Revolution was to infuse new blood into the ruling machinery, but the new young officials who have been added to the central bureaucracy seem to have been assigned to lower-level posts.

The P.R.C.'s legal system is a complex structure of indigenous concepts, civil and common law, and Communist theory, which was largely suspended during the Cultural Revolution. The highest judicial organ is the Supreme Peoples Court.

National People's Congress

The National People's Congress (N.P.C.) is constitutionally the P.R.C.'s highest organ of state authority. Its representatives were indirectly elected for a term of four years, with N.P.C. sessions to be convened annually barring "exceptional circumstances." In practice the N.P.C. met rarely in the period leading up to the Cultural Revolution, and when it did meet, its sessions served only to demonstrate mass support for the regime and to give legitimacy to prior decisions of the top leadership. The last session ended in January 1965. The main function of the N.P.C. was to endorse party

decisions on election of the Chairman of the Peoples Republic of China (Chief of State), amendments to the Constitution, and state economic plans. The N.P.C. had the power to elect the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the P.R.C. who were to continue in office until the next N.P.C. convened (4 years). However, the last Chairman was reelected to office in January 1965, and his dismissal was announced by the Central Committee of the C.C.P. in October 1968; the position of Chairman of the P.R.C. is currently vacant.

Executive responsibility is vested in the State Council (cabinet), whose members (Premier, Vice Premiers, and other ministers) were appointed by the Chairman of the P.R.C.

Peking has decided to convene the Fourth National Peoples Congress "at an appropriate time" to replace the existing parliamentary body which has outlived its terms of office. The forthcoming N.P.C. may ratify a new constitution based on a draft which circulated throughout the P.R.C. in the fall of 1970.

Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.)

The highest organ of the Chinese Communist Party is the National Party Congress. The Congress elects a Central Committee which in turn elects a Politburo, as well as the party Chairman and other top party leaders. The Politburo elects the Standing Committee, the most prestigious party body and the one with the final decisionmaking authority.

Theoretically, the C.C.P. Congress is elected every 5 years and holds annual sessions; in practice the Eighth Party Congress met only in 1956 and 1958. The Ninth Party Congress convened in April 1969 and was attended by about 1,500 delegates. It adopted a new party constitution and elected a new Central Committee of 278 members, 19 percent of whom were on the pre-Cultural Revolution Eighth Central Committee.

Provincial Structure

Since the Ninth Congress of the C.C.P. met in April 1969, Peking has begun the careful reconstruction of the party. By August 1971, the reformation of all of the new C.C.P. committees at the provincial level had been reported, and by April 1972 almost all had been reestablished at the municipal and district levels.

The principal governmental organ to emerge throughout the country after the



EDUCATION—A Peking schoolteacher explains a point to one of her students. In 1949 formal education was less than two years per capita for the 450 million Chinese aged seven years or more. Ten years later the average school years reached about 5.5 years per capita.

Cultural Revolution was the Revolutionary Committee. It consists of a coalition of local military figures, old-line party cadres, and representatives of mass organizations in each province and major municipality. The Peoples Liberation Army, which during the Cultural Revolution emerged as the only national institution competent to maintain order and minimum standards of public administration, has dominated almost all of these committees as well as the C.C.P. committees. With the reconstruction of the latter committees in all of the P.R.C.'s provinces, it is likely that the Revolutionary Committees have become less important.

Among the political subdivisions of the P.R.C., which apply to the party as well as to the Government, are the 21 Provinces: Anhwei, Chekiang, Fukien, Heilungkiang, Honan, Hopeh, Hunan, Hupoh, Kiangsi, Kiangsu, Kansu, Kirin, Kwangtung, Kweichow, Liaoning, Shansi, Shantung, Shensi, Szechwan, Tsinghai, and Yunnan. There are also five autonomous regions (Kwangsi Chuang, Inner Mongolia, Ningshi Hui, Sinkiang Uighur, and Tibet) and three centrally-governed municipalities (Peking, Shanghai, and Tientsin).

Economy: First 5-Year Plan

During the "rehabilitation" period of

1949, the P.R.C. organized and restored farm and industrial production and expanded fiscal controls and saving, enabling the inauguration of the First 5-Year Plan (FYP) during 1953-57. In this plan it copied the Soviet model, stressing armaments and heavy industry. According to official Chinese data, net material product (a Soviet concept roughly equivalent to total industrial and agricultural production plus construction, transportation, and trade related to material production) showed an average growth of 9 percent annually, reflecting mainly an 18 percent annual growth in industrial and handicraft output. Despite a reasonably high level of industrial capital construction, most of the new plants were not completed in the period, and industrial growth stemmed primarily from successful efforts to intensify the use of existing plants and raise their productivity.

The planning did not proceed smoothly. The 1953 census and demographic surveys disclosed sharply reduced death rates and a population growth in excess of 2 percent annually, requiring increased attention to farm output. In 1954 the Soviets gave their final refusal of loans and grants to accelerate Chinese development, forcing the P.R.C. in 1955 to collectivize in an effort to increase the mobilization of domestic resources. The initial economic expansion drive in 1956 led to severe dislocations and retrenchment in 1957.

The outline of the second 5-Year Plan (1958-62), announced in the latter half of 1956, continued the goals and priorities of the first plan with a slightly increased emphasis on agriculture. Through 1956 and 1957, Chinese planners studied schemes to translate alleged rural labor surpluses into realized output, including proposals for decentralized administration and rural industrialization.

The 'Great Leap Forward'

The second 5-Year Plan had barely gotten underway in 1958 before economic policy was taken out of the hands of the planners in a politically inspired program termed the "Great Leap Forward." The program proposed to regiment the population of the P.R.C. in huge, semi-military communes where in an egalitarian, austere society the people would work overtime on various productive activities. According to the rationale, a

campaign of "3 years' hard effort" would so raise investment, production, and savings as to secure a rapid-growth economy. The leaders envisaged the sudden availability of a huge surplus labor supply with the problem being one of finding sufficient productive outlets rather than one of its efficient use. Schemes emanated from Peking to the localities for constructing "backyard steel plants," deep plowing, grandiose water conservation projects, and rural industry, while the urban population rose sharply as industries greatly expanded their labor forces. Cost controls and technical constraints were abandoned as restrictive to the growth of labor employment.

By 1959 severe dislocations and strains were evident. However, the central leadership believed the system could be made to work by abandoning overly ambitious schemes and calling for greater common sense, and pressed on. But farm output, which had dropped sharply in 1959, fell further in 1960 under the additional influence of adverse weather. Food rations sank perilously and nutritional deficiency was widespread. Owing to soaring death rates and declining birth rates as a result of these conditions, population growth between 1959 and 1962 was retarded by 20-50 million persons. By mid-1960, the "Great Leap" was abandoned in practice, as the economy had exhausted its resources and was paralyzed by massive imbalances.

Trade and Aid

Since 1960 the P.R.C.'s pattern of trade has shifted from Eastern Europe to non-Communist states in Western Europe and the Pacific. In 1960 some 70 percent of its trade was with the Communist bloc (mainly the U.S.S.R.) and 30 percent with the Free World. By 1965 this ratio had reversed itself, and approximately 80 percent of the P.R.C.'s trade is now with the Free World. A major portion of its purchases from the West during the past several years has consisted of large grain imports (4-6 million tons a year), mainly from Canada and Australia, to supplement domestic food supplies.

In addition to food grains, the P.R.C. imports chemical fertilizer, pesticides, machinery and equipment, and raw materials. Its major exports include raw materials, agricultural products, and manu-

	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971*
Industrial output index (1957 = 100)	183	148	155	188	221	243
Production:						
Coal (mil. met. tons)	240	190	200	250	300	325
Crude Oil "	10	10	11	14	18	23
Electric power (bil. KWH)	47	41	44	50	60	70
Steel (mil. met. tons)	13	10	11.5	14.5	17	21
Trucks (000)	47	34	31	66	75	NA
Cotton cloth (bil. m.)	6	4.8	4.8	6.5	7.5	NA
Grain (mil. met. tons)	205	218	210	212	225	230
GNP (bil. 1969 U.S.\$)	104.3	99.5	96.7	107.3	119.5	125
Foreign Trade (bil. U.S.\$)						
Exports "	4.2	3.9	3.7	3.9	4.3	4.5
Imports "	2.2	1.9	1.9	2	2.1	2.3
Imports "	2	1.9	1.8	1.8	2.2	2.2

* Preliminary estimates subject to revision.

factures including consumer goods, textiles, and goods and services to Hong Kong.

Serious rail and port tie-ups, as well as production and procurement problems caused by the Cultural Revolution, resulted in a 12 percent decline in the P.R.C.'s exports in 1967. At the same time, imports increased, creating the largest balance-of-trade deficit since 1955. In 1968 the P.R.C.'s exports and imports declined slightly, thus producing a slightly more favorable trade balance. In 1969, exports increased; imports remained virtually unchanged. In 1970, exports grew slightly, while imports jumped sharply; in 1971, after the good 1970 harvest, exports rose, while imports remained steady. (Trade totals in the table above are adjusted to account for shipping costs.) Japan, Hong Kong, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and Singapore (in that order) were China's principal trading partners.

Although itself a less-developed country, the P.R.C., for political reasons, has a continuing program of foreign economic aid. In 1971 it displaced the U.S.S.R. as the largest Communist aid donor.

It has extended credits and grants to developing non-Communist countries, with Africa and the Near East being the primary targets. These programs totaled about \$949 million for the period 1956-69; about \$531 million of this amount had been expended through December

31, 1969. In 1969, aid agreements were signed with 10 African countries. Most are minor projects, although the TanZam railway—connecting Lusaka, Zambia, with Dar es Salaam, Tanzania—is the most ambitious aid project ever undertaken by the P.R.C.

In 1970, in the wake of economic recovery and a new bid for world influence, the P.R.C. extended \$711 million in credits to seven countries—Tanzania and Zambia for the TanZam railway (\$404 million), Pakistan (\$200 million), Southern Yemen (\$43 million), Sudan (\$42 million), Ceylon (\$12 million), and Guinea (\$10 million). The aid effort continued in 1971 at a somewhat smaller but still substantial pace.

Additionally, the Chinese have provided military jets, tanks, and artillery to Pakistan and Tanzania.

The P.R.C. gives substantial economic assistance to North Vietnam.

In addition to North Vietnam, major Communist recipients of military assistance have been North Korea and Albania. Generally, they have received infantry weapons and transportation equipment.

Agriculture, Industry, & Mineral Resources

Basically, the P.R.C. is an agricultural economy with an annual per capita income of about \$145. Approximately 90 percent of the land is unsuited for agri-

cultural purposes because of high altitude and other topographic or climatic conditions. Consequently, maximum yield must be obtained from the 10 percent of land that is arable (mainly in the east). Although intensive cultivation techniques already secure high yields of food per acre. China's main hope lies in substantially increasing these yields even further through improved technology. Because virtually all arable land is used for crops, there is very little animal husbandry in the country—except in western and northern regions, such as Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet.

China is the world's largest producer of many important food crops, including rice, sweet potatoes, sorghum, soybeans, millet, barley, peanuts, and tea. Major industrial crops consist of cotton, other fibers, and various oilseeds. The portion of the industrial crop which is exported comprises a principal source of foreign exchange.

An expanding but inadequate manufacturing sector supplies the needs for capital and consumer goods. Major industries are iron and steel, coal, machine building, armaments, and textiles. Shortages exist in the manufacturer of complex machinery and equipment.

The P.R.C. has extensive deposits of iron. Other minerals include bituminous and anthracite coal, tin, tungsten, antimony, salt, and magnetite. Crude oil exists and is refined throughout the country; the supply is adequate to meet the needs of China's expanding economy.

Foreign Relations

The international objectives of the Chinese Communists, like their domestic policies, are in part Chinese-inspired and in part Communist-inspired. These objectives essentially are to safeguard the security of China and ultimately to bring under the P.R.C.'s control all territories that it regards as Chinese. The international Communist objectives are to promote communism in Asia and the world.

The P.R.C.'s leaders have assumed for themselves a major responsibility to press the cause of communism in newly independent countries in Asia, Africa, and

NEWSPAPER—Scarce paper is conserved by posting news in prominent places. "Wall newspapers" provide much of the news in many Communist Chinese cities.

Latin America. They offer their own experience as a pattern for less developed countries to follow in seeking transition from an agricultural to an industrialized state, although this model has undoubtedly been much tarnished by various domestic setbacks.

In 1965 the P.R.C. suffered a series of foreign policy setbacks, and its relations with a number of Afro-Asian countries, particularly Ghana and Indonesia, as well as with Cuba, deteriorated sharply.

The P.R.C.'s international position declined further during the Cultural Revolution. With the Foreign Ministry temporarily in the hands of a new group of militants, the country's diplomacy during the summer of 1967 degenerated into harsh sloganeering, advocating the armed overthrow of the governments of several countries which had been cultivated assiduously only a year before. Red Guard mobs sacked and burned the British Embassy at Peking and humiliated diplomats of other countries. Foreign business-

men and newsmen were harrassed and in some cases arrested and expelled.

By mid-1968 the P.R.C. moved to restore some semblance of order to its foreign relations by resuming more normal relationships with several selected Afro-Asian countries. Despite these efforts, Chinese Communist diplomacy remained far from normal, with the P.R.C. represented at that time in only one capital (Cairo, Egypt) by a diplomat of ambassadorial rank. The rest of its ambassadors were reported at home undergoing "ideological rectification." Since then, however, most of the P.R.C. diplomats have returned to their posts, and in early 1969 the government gradually began sending new ambassadors abroad. The P.R.C. is now involved in a "Peoples Diplomacy" offensive intended to improve its relations with as many countries as possible and to reverse its former self-imposed isolation. Recent recognition of the P.R.C. by a large number of countries constitutes evidence of the success of



this policy. Peking has received a parade of visiting delegations, many of whom have returned home with trade or aid agreements, and the Chinese have reciprocated a number of these visits.

United States

Following the establishment of the Communist regime in China in 1949, the new government immediately demonstrated intense hostility toward the United States and toward Americans who were resident in China. Nevertheless, American diplomats, businessmen, and missionaries remained on the mainland during this period of "wait-and-see." Hope of improving relations was ended, however, by the Korean Conflict, with the P.R.C. verbally supporting the initial attack on the Republic of Korea and ultimately sending in Chinese soldiers in an effort to save the North Korean forces from total defeat by the United Nations forces. To secure the southern flank of the U.N. forces, President Truman ordered the 7th Fleet into the Taiwan Strait, and the United States took a number of economic sanctions against the P.R.C.

The Korean experience and many other manifestations of hostility and rigidity at Peking produced a corresponding antagonism among people in the United States, and there was little opportunity throughout the 1950s to improve relations. However, some efforts were made. In 1954 a series of bilateral conversations were instituted, first between consular officials at Geneva and then in 1955 at the ambassadorial level again at Geneva and later at Warsaw, Poland. On September 10, 1955, the P.R.C. and the United States issued a joint agreed announcement concerning the repatriation of some nationals.

This was the only concrete arrangement reached by the two sides in the talks. If these talks failed to produce important changes in the relations of the two nations, however, they at least served to give both governments a clear understanding of each other's views on questions of mutual interest, reducing the hazard of war by miscalculation. The last talk was held in February 1970.


In recent years the U.S. Government has taken a series of steps to relax ten-

sion between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China. In broad outline, they have had the cumulative effect of eliminating all restrictions on the use of U.S. passports for travel to the P.R.C. beginning in mid-March 1971 and dropping the 20-year embargo on trade by permitting imports from the P.R.C. and authorizing exports on the same basis as to most other Communist countries. By July 1, 1971, about three dozen Americans had traveled to the P.R.C. and indirect U.S.-P.R.C. trade had begun.

On July 15, 1971, the President announced that he had sent his (then) assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Henry Kissinger, to Peking for meetings with Premier Chou En-lai on July 9-11. Dr. Kissinger returned to the United States with an invitation from the Premier for President Nixon to visit.

Another trip to Peking in October by Dr. Kissinger paved the way for the President's historic visit to the P.R.C.

Extracted from Dept. of State Background Notes, People's Republic of China, May 1972.



President and Mrs. Nixon dine with Premier Chou En-lai and other P.R.C. officials.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
Subscription Price: \$4.50 domestic per year; \$1.25 additional for foreign mailing; 10 cents per single copy.
☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 541/432/Z-24

