

10 October 1947

ITAGAKI

Itagaki - Cross

Page SHIRATORI should be rescinded as actions overstepping their limits. He did not recall if Hitler on April 28, 1939 replied to Roosevelt's request that Hitler and Mussolini give a 10-year guarantee of peace.

30497 \* Asked if shortly before 28 April 1939, he sent instructions to OSHIMA to announce the positive attitude of Japan before Hitler's speech, he stated that he could not directly send instructions to the ambassador. Asked what means OSHIMA and SHIRATORI used to influence the policy of an all-out military alliance, he stated there could never be a case of the government being influenced by an ambassador and he did not know any means used by the two to influence it. Asked if OSHIMA and SHIRATORI threatened to resign, he stated that ARITA had never told him about that. He had never heard if a request from OSHIMA and SHIRATORI for their recall was placed before the Five-Ministers on 25 April.

30498 \* Asked if their recall was considered such a serious question that it might influence peace and order within the nation, he stated there was nothing of this kind in his recollection. Asked if it was the government's view that it would be better to be satisfied with the results of the negotiations than to risk the recall of the ambassadors, he stated there was no question of recall. It was not the case that the government statement was made in this matter to the German and Italian ambassadors because of the opposition of OSHIMA and SHIRATORI to the will of the government.

30499 \* He knew that the statement was conveyed to the German and Italian ambassadors. Before that the Foreign Minister had presented a proposal and with regard to it various discussions were held. This course was not taken for the purpose of ignoring the two ambassadors but rather to support them.



Page 30500 \* The attention of the Court was called to exhibit 503.

30501 The accused was asked if it was not true that soon after ARITA delivered the HIRANUMA declaration to the German and Italian ambassadors he received a wire from USAMI in Berlin that Gauss had submitted a proposed draft and inquired whether it would meet with Japan's approval. \* He replied that he had some recollection, but had completely forgotten the contents. It was not a fact that in consequence of the proposed draft, ARITA investigated its origin and concluded it was submitted to the German Foreign Office through Japanese Army attaches. The accused had no recollection that even a few days after the delivery of the HIRANUMA Declaration, a wire was received from OSHIMA advising that Ribbentrop had made an inquiry to the effect that if Germany went to war and if there was no military aid from Japan, if it would be permissible to recognize Japan as being in a state of war, to which OSHIMA replied in the affirmative.

30502 \* He did not recall that OSHIMA answered Ribbentrop that in the event of war between a contracting nation and another, Japan would be considered in a state of war although there might not be military support. The witness was asked if HIRANUMA supported his opinion in this matter, but he stated that did not refresh his memory.

30503 \* He did not know if the Premier reported to the Throne that Japan would not participate in war, or if ARITA threatened to resign because of the opinions of HIRANUMA and the accused. \* He did not know if the Gauss draft of the alliance was discussed at the Five Ministers' Conference of 9 May. Asked if the Navy Minister contended that before making a decision it was necessary to receive a reply to the HIRANUMA Declaration and that HIRANUMA contended this was unnecessary because OSHIMA had already replied "yes", the accused stated such a thing did not come up for discussion.

30505 \* The accused was asked if it was not true that OSHIMA's reply to Ribbentrop was considered at the conference of 20 May, and that ARITA again advocated the annulment of the reply, while HIRANUMA took the position it was sufficient. He stated that he recalled a conference on that date, but didn't recall such a matter being discussed.



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He was asked if there were not various conferences between the army and navy from 13 May to 20 May, 1939, resulting in a compromise agreement and a new proposal to be made reserving Japan's right to have a conference before participating in a European war. He stated he didn't recall the contents of the Gauss draft, and such a discussion was not held.

It was not true that on 20 May, 1939, he sent YACHIJI to Ambassador Ott with a written declaration that the army was working for signing of the pact secretly and simultaneously with the signing of the German-Italian pact to give the pact a tripartite character.

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\* Asked if this compromise plan was approved at a Five Ministers' Conference on 20 May and reported to the Emperor, he replied that he recalled a conference on that date, but didn't recall if its results were reported to the Emperor. The accused was asked if it was a fact that the Army contended that ARITA's report to Berlin of the decision of 20 May was erroneous in that it failed to stipulate automatic entrance into war against England and France, but made participation dependent on the situation. He stated that the discussion on 20 May was circumscribed to matters contained in the HIRANUMA message of 5 May.

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\* When asked if he recalled that the Gauss draft was amended on May 20, forwarded to OSHIMA and SHIRATORI for presentation to Germany and Italy, and if OSHIMA and SHIRATORI refused to deliver it, the accused stated that he didn't recall any discussions based upon the Gauss draft. It was not true that he and HIRANUMA continued efforts in behalf of the army plan for automatic entrance into war.

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at  
\* When asked if it was a fact that the conference of 5 June, the army and navy found a basis for agreement, thus clarifying the problem of strengthening the anti-Comintern Pact, he stated that on that date the course of negotiations were concluded and the last instructions sent out. The accused was asked if in this agreement it was understood that in the event of war between Germany and Italy and England and France, Japan would participate but with a reservation that she should choose the time to enter, he stated that the contents were quite different from the question of that day. There were two points on which the Germans did not agree. This was with respect to the attached clause. One of the two points was to submit to the Germans that Japan was unable to give effective assistance in connection with armed assistance to third powers in East Asia, outside the Soviet.



NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD  
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\* The second question was the method of making a diplomatic explanation. The treaty was directed toward the activities of the Third International, and there was some talk whether to present this matter to the Germans.

He didn't recall conferring with the Emperor prior to 7 July 1939, regarding sending TERAUCHI to the Nazi Party conference in Germany, or telling the Emperor it was necessary to send TERAUCHI to strengthen the pact and that the Emperor replied he did not think it good. It was not true that at such a conference the Emperor charged that at the conference of Supreme War Councilors the accused reported falsely that the Foreign Minister was in favor of a military alliance and that the Emperor told the accused that this was very insolent.

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\* He didn't recall the conversation with KONOYE prior to 23 July, 1939, in which he asked KONOYE if it was possible to change the Emperor's mind, and KONOYE replied that it was difficult. When asked if the alliance was discussed at a meeting of the Big Three on 3 August, he stated he had no recollection that such a meeting was held, and he didn't recall any action taken.

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When asked if the army opposed the agreement with Britain regarding the Tientsin question on the ground it would hurt chances for a military alliance, \* he stated that negotiations were held with Britain to bring about a meeting of minds. \* When the accused was reminded that he made no reference with regard to the tri-Partite Pact in his affidavit in connection with Anglo-Japanese talks, he stated that the latter conversations and the Pact question were entirely separate matters. The army did not oppose the Anglo-Japanese understanding. With respect to it, the matter was transferred to Tokyo and laid in the hands of diplomats, and at these conversations representatives from the spot attended and cooperated.

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He did not urge a Five Ministers' Conference prior to 3 August 1939, at which he was willing to push an all-out military alliance at the risk of a cabinet crisis. \* When asked if at the conference of 8 August 1939, the army's contention was presented that a change of the situation necessitated an all-out alliance, he replied it was not a question of presenting a contention. It was not true that the army presented such views, although there might have been such a view in existence.

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\* The Army's position was that it must observe the conference decision of 5 June. At that conference, the accused told his conferees that he, as a State Minister, would abide by the decision, and he expressed the desire that a Pact be concluded through a German compromise within the scope of that decision.

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It was not the army's contention that if Germany refused to agree to a pre-arranged Plan, an all-out alliance should be concluded. \* The accused was asked if he recalled that HIRANUMA asked him what he thought about the army contention, and he replied that he was both a State and War Minister, and that he approved the Pre-arranged Plan as a State Minister, but as an army representative he favored the military alliance. He stated that this was not the case. When asked if the plan was discussed at a conference of 8 August, he stated that they consulted in accordance with the Pre-arranged Plan of June 5.

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\* He had no recollection that in the discussion following the conference of 8 August if YONAI answered the army contention that failure to conclude an all-out alliance would mean isolation. It was also not true that HIRANUMA asked him at this conference if the main point of the army proposal meant hindering the plan, to which he replied that it did.

He was asked if it was true that due to the wide gap between the Foreign Minister proposal and that of the army it was considered inadvisable to convene the conference on the 22nd of August, but instead on the 25th. He stated that on 22 August, they received the report of the non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet, so it was only natural there was no more need to discuss the Tri-Partite Pact.

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\* The postponement was not due to the wide gap between the Foreign Minister's proposal and the views of the army.

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\* When asked if the matter of the recall of OSHIMA and SHIRATORI was again considered, it was suggested that the problem of recall be solved by sending the Premier to confer with Hitler and Mussolini, he stated he could not understand how this question could arise. His opinion was that on the 25th, inasmuch as the non-Aggression Pact was concluded, this was in violation of the Anti-Comintern Pact as far as Japan was concerned. They probably arrived at a decision to protest to Germany. \* There was a suggestion to send the Premier to see Mussolini and Hitler, but this existed on a lower level and was not placed on the conference agenda and had no connection with the question

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of recalling the two ambassadors. When asked if the Cabinet was ready to resign at this point but army circles desired that responsibility be diverted from the army, he stated the Cabinet was not ready to resign.

30519 When asked if before the question of sending the Premier was settled and before the gap was closed between the Foreign Ministry and Army proposals, if word was received of the non-Aggression Pact, he stated that this \* question arose before the conclusion of the Pact. There was no question about the Foreign Ministry's or the Premier and the army's plan. The question was only studied at a very low level, and did not mature to the place where it could be placed before the conference. He agreed that word was received of the non-Aggression Pact before the question of sending the Premier to Europe was settled and before the gap was closed between the Foreign Ministry and Army proposals.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. MATTICE.

30520 \* The HIRANUMA Cabinet was formed on 5 January,  
30521 instead of the 4th. \* With respect to the Imperial audience of 21 July, 1938 in which something was said about a difference between the reports of the Foreign Office and his own, he informed the Emperor that he would investigate it, and he did so, reporting the matter to KONOYE, who relayed it to the Foreign Minister. KONOYE ascertained that his report to the Throne was not mistaken, and KONOYE reported to the Emperor, and later the original plan of the accused was again submitted and received Imperial sanction.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. LEVIN,  
Counsel for SUZUKI.

30523 \* The accused stated that YANAGAWA, Heisuke, was Director General of the China Affairs Board, and not the accused SUZUKI.

EXAMINATION BY THE TRIBUNAL.

30524 \*When asked if, at the outbreak of the Mukden Incident, special orders were given to army units at Changchun, Antung and Fushun, the accused stated that the orders were supposed to have been issued by the Kwantung Army commander. The accused was then in Mukden, and heard of this matter later.



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The Changchun Troops were to be concentrated in the Mukden area, but this plan was changed and they were ordered to remain in Changchun. There were no direct orders given to the troops in Fushun. The commander of the 2nd Battalion in Mukden urgently wired the Fushun garrison commander, asking him to come to Mukden immediately. With respect to the Antung unit, he had no recollection.

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When asked if he approved, the accused stated that at the time of the order's issuance he was in Port Arthur and was not directly connected. Asked if he could explain how fighting broke out at night in those three places, he stated \* that based on reports received much later, the garrison commander in Changchun was to have come to Mukden, but was ordered to remain in Changchun, and advised he might be ordered to advance to Mukden later. Because of the need to protect the SMR and Japanese in the zone, the brigade commander, on his own initiative, opened an attack.

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When asked if he could explain why fighting broke out at all four points almost at the same time that night, he stated that the time of opening hostile action was different at different places. Hostilities commenced in Changchun on the 19th, around noon. There was no action at Fushun. \* The Chinese troops at Huanfongcheng were disarmed, on September 19, after the telegraphic order had been sent by Headquarters at Port Arthur.



~~found~~ used  
CHANGKUFENG INCIDENT

(28 July 1938 entry)

During the Changkufeng Incident in July 1938 your co-defendant Hideki TOJO was your vice-minister, was he not?

Was it not a fact that based on intelligence reports received, the Japanese naval and army high command believed at the time that there were no indications that Russia was preparing for war against Japan?

Was it not also a fact that the Kwantung Army had this following estimate of the situation: first, that the Soviet forces must be compelled to withdraw from Changkufeng, and for this the use of force will be necessary. And second, even if Japan would resort to the use of force, Russia would not enlarge the incident because it was observed that Russia was not furthering her military preparations or increasing her mobilization and there was dissension between the Red Army and the OGPU?

In view of those observations and considerations, the Kwantung Army Headquarters persistently urged the use of force to the General Staff Headquarters, (did it not?) *absolutely not the case*

Is it not a fact that you and the Chief of the General Staff fully agreed with the report and recommendation of the Kwantung Army, both of you sought an imperial audience on the 21st for the purpose of obtaining the sanction of the Emperor to the use of force.

Were you not told by the Emperor through his Chief Aide-de-Camp that if your intention of seeing him was to obtain sanction for the use of force, then you need not come? *no*



In spite of that message, did not you and the Chief of the General Staff still insist on requesting an audience?

Is it not true that during the audience you were severely reprimanded by the Emperor for telling a deliberate falsehood?

And did not the falsehood consist of assuring the Emperor that the Foreign and Navy Ministers had agreed with you on the policy of using force in Changkufeng?

Is it not true that the Emperor felt deceived because the Foreign Minister and the Navy Minister had previously expressed to the Emperor their opinions in favor of troop distribution but were absolutely opposed to the use of force?

Is it not true that with an excited countenance the Emperor said to you: "The actions of the Army in the past have been abominable. Speaking of the Loukiaotou case in the Manchukuo Incident and the Marco Polo Bridge at the beginning of the China Incident, there was absolutely no obedience to central orders. There were infrequent instances when the methods used have been arbitrary and sneaky, which is altogether improper as my army. I feel it is abominable in various ways. Nothing like that must happen this time." ?

The Emperor admonished you, did he not, that "hereafter you may not move one soldier without my command" ?

Was not the reprimand so strong that you were humiliated, and in the office of the Chief Secretary of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal you said with tears in your voice that, "I can never look into the Emperor's face again. I would definitely like to resign." ?



Did not the Premier persuade you to withdraw your resignation, placating you that it would look bad if you resigned, that the Emperor did not lack confidence in the Army and it was just that he became suspicious every time such an incident occurred?

*Not asked*



Foundation Fund

Front of Envelope

Your Excellency <sup>Lord of Privy Seal</sup> ~~Home Minister~~  
YUASA Kunahoi

Detailed Report of the Council in the  
Imperial Presence.

Back

ARITA, Hachiro.

Strictly Confidential

Detailed Report of the Council in the presence of the Emperor, regarding  
the Essential Points for Adjusting the Relations between Japan and China.

Held at the Imperial Study in the Palace, November 30, 1938.

Attendants: His Imperial Highness the Chief of the Army General Staff,  
the Chief of the Naval General Staff, President of the Privy Council HIRANUMA,  
the Premier, the Foreign Minister /T.N. presumably in error for Home Minister/  
the Minister of Finance, the War Minister, the Navy Minister, the Foreign  
Minister and the Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff.

The Premier proceeded before the Imperial Presence at 10:30 A.M. and re-  
ported that he would be in charge of presiding over the Council today by  
order of His Majesty, and on returning to his seat he stated that the bill  
should be explained by the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister read  
the bill.

Regarding the bill, the Premier asked the opinions of His Imperial High-  
ness the Chief of the General Staff and the President of the Privy Council  
HIRANUMA. At his request, the President of the Privy Council gave his  
opinion as per annexed document. In regard to the Supreme Command Affairs,  
the Vice-Chief of the General Staff, acting for the Chief of the General  
Staff, replied and in regard to the general political affairs, the Foreign  
Minister, the Minister of Finance and the Home Minister gave their respective  
replies. In conclusion the Premier reported to His Majesty that the bill  
was passed.

The Emperor withdrew to the Inner Palace.  
The Council was adjourned at about 11:50.



East Asiatic Order. I think the substance is, as a whole, appropriate.

This draft is not bad in its object, but I cannot help thinking that it will not be totally devoid of obstacles when putting it into practice. It is needless to say that we ought to endeavor to accomplish the contemplated aims by removing all the obstacles.

Looking over the subjects contained in this draft, the majority require the conclusion of agreements with the new regime that will be set up in China in the future, and there are not a few that will seriously affect the interests of the Third Powers. Therefore, though we are prepared in general, it should be borne in mind that it will become necessary to use our discretion by taking the opinions of the New Regime into consideration and by considering the relations with the Third Powers.

I think there are some premises which need to be considered in the carrying out of the subject enumerated in this draft. The first is the public peace measures in China. Even inside of the areas occupied by our forces, there are still found the activities of parts of the Communist forces and the regular forces and of the native bandits. Unless we suppress them or make them pledge allegiance to us all our measures, especially the economic measures may not become able to be pushed. So, as a prerequisite, I cannot help ardently wishing for the immediate restoration of the public peace. The second is the winning over of the confidence of the people in China. If we fail to win the hearts of the people, none of the measures can last long even though they may succeed for the time being. It is therefore of urgent necessity to devise measures whereby our benevolent spirit may be realized by the Chinese people at large. When it becomes evident that they can lead their lives tranquilly in the areas occupied by our forces, the people at large will be certain to pledge allegiance to us. And, if the people at large should submit to us, the anti-Japanese propaganda of the intelligentsia class will become futile. The third is to pay deep consideration to the establishment of the New Chinese regime. I think that it is better that the establishment of the New Regime should be based, as regards formality, as a spontaneous measure on the part of the Chinese. But, in reality, it will have to depend on the guidance and assistance of our Government. Our Government, in the course of the guidance and assistance thereof, should administer matters through stern but kindly justice, and while on the one hand, the Chinese people, by acknowledging our sincerity, must be led to rise up with inspiration, they must, on the other hand, be led to realize that they cannot turn against us. If they suspect or look down upon us, success cannot be achieved. The authorities concerned must be prepared not to commit a single error in this respect.

I shall not venture to express my opinion concerning each subject as follows:

#### No. I The Basic Matters

What we enumerated as the basic matters are all reasonable.



No. IV The Matters concerning the Principle of Economic Cooperation.

All the matters enumerated under this paragraph are reasonable. But, I think that while they are reasonable there will be obstacles in their being carried out. The greatest obstacle, I think, lies in the relations with the Third Powers.

The Japan-Manchukuo-China cooperation excites Third Powers not a little. There is the danger of suspicion arising that the forming of an economic bloc conjointly by Japan, Manchukuo and China is a preamble to driving the Third Powers out of China economically. To clear this suspicion, it is needless to say, is quite necessary. However, the economic cooperation among the three countries is not of such a nature that it will not affect the rights and interests of the Third Powers. In other words, as is shown in the last page of this draft, it is natural that the economic activities and the rights and interests of the Third Powers in China will become restricted automatically. This result is an inevitability for the establishment of New Eastern Asia, and any Powers, once they recognize the position of our country, should tolerate it as a matter of course. Our country, by revealing the facts and reasons, must endeavor to emphasize the reason of this inevitability, and to make the Third Powers reflect on the matter. If the Third Powers, notwithstanding this, should fail to recognize our sincerity and should unduly adopt retaliatory measures, we must possess measures for dealing with them resolutely. On considering matters from the present world conditions, it is evident that no Third Power would venture to oppose us immediately by military operations. But a change in the situation is unavoidable. There is no vouchsafing that trouble may not arise some day, coupled with other causes. It is necessary, needless to say, to already adopt counter-measures now in order to be prepared for same. As for economic retaliation, there is the danger of same coming immediately. It is an important matter for diplomacy to adopt measures so that such a phenomenon shall not occur. At the same time, I cannot help feeling it urgent to study how to encounter it in the event of such an occurrence. In this respect, I ardently wish the authorities concerned to prepare themselves thoroughly.

The foregoing represents the substance of my opinion concerning the matters enumerated in the outline. Besides these, I wish to say word about the problem of domestic administration in connection with the foregoing. Indeed, no one can fail to keenly feel the extremely costly sacrifice made by our country in this incident. The national funds that have been disbursed amount to a colossal sum. The officers and men who have been sent to the foreign lands have been faithful to the Emperor and the country by sacrificing their lives, and the people at the home front have loyally served their country by enduring all hardships.

Among the people of our country it is not unlikely that some may not, by considering the costly sacrifice, expect matters even beyond the ones specified in the Outline, and might possibly, out of dissatisfaction, engage in riotous conduct by going beyond the normal course of



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Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Ryoichi Takao, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Inner-Court Document Section, Board of Chamberlains, Imperial Household Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 13 pages, dated Nov. 30, 1938 and described as follows: Imperial Conference of November 30, 1938. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number of citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Inner-Court Document Section, Board of Chamberlains, Imperial Household Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
25th day of September, 1947.

/sgd/ Ryoichi Takao (seal)  
Official Signature

Witness: /sgd/ M. Kuroda

Chief of the Inner-Court  
Document Section  
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Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
25th day of Sept., 1947

/sgd/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAME

Witness: /sgd/ Edward P. Monaghan

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity



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I, Ryoichi Takao, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Inner Court Document Section, Board of Chamberlains, Imperial Household Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of five pages, dated Nov. 30, 1938, and described as follows: Imperial Conference of November 30, 1938. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Inner-Court Document Section, Board of Chamberlains, Imperial Household Office.

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*Foundation Laid* Page 11

Council in the Imperial Presence  
The Imperial Conference of November 30, 1938

In accordance with the transition of the Sino-Japanese Incident (the new situation after the captures of Hankow and Canton), the Konoye Cabinet, in order to decide on the future policy toward China, decided to ask the Emperor to convoke a council in the Imperial presence equivalent to the council in the Imperial presence held on January 11 of this year.

Previous to this, in the cabinet meeting held in the afternoon of the 28th of this month, the fundamental policy for the adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations in regard to the establishment of the New Order in East Asia which was for some time being prepared in the Five Ministers' Conference was discussed and decided. From 9:00 A.M. of the 29th an extraordinary session of the Advisory Council was held in the Prime Minister's official residence and matters decided by yesterday's Cabinet meeting were discussed and approved. At 2:55 P.M. of the same day, Prime Minister Konoye took the original bill to the Imperial Palace and from 3:30 to 4:39 privately reported and explained it to the Emperor. On that occasion, the Prime Minister expressed his opinion that he would like to have this Council in the Imperial presence managed in the same way as the Council in the Imperial presence of January 11. Therefore, he asked me to investigate the situation at the time of the council of January 11. This /council/ differs only in the following respects:

When the Prime Minister was received in audience by the Emperor on the 29th, the Prime Minister himself asked the Emperor's permission to allow him to assume the position as chairman of the Council. This matter had been decided after a discussion with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal in the Imperial Palace. (On the previous occasion, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal reported privately to the Emperor that the Prime Minister would be the chairman and on the day of the meeting of the council/ Imperial permission was again obtained.)

November 30 (Wednesday)

At 10:35 A.M., the Emperor appeared from the inner chamber.

The Prime Minister went before his Imperial presence and said, "With your approval, I shall take charge of the duty of expediting the proceedings." Remaining in that position, he faced the floor and announced, "The Council will now come to order." He then returned to his seat and in a standing position, he said to the effect that he had requested the Emperor to convoke the Council in the Imperial presence because a policy had been established to cope with the change in the situation which had taken place since the Council in the Imperial presence of January 11, that he would like to hear their opinions on the original bill and that the Foreign Minister would explain the original bill. He then sat down.



Next, the Foreign Minister rose and explained the original bill (actually, he read it). Then the Prime Minister rose and said that since he had been notified that both Their Highnesses, the Chiefs of the Army General Staff and the Navy General Staff and President of the Privy Council Hiranuma would like to express their opinions, he would like to have them express their opinions in order. His Highness, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, however, was absent because of illness. Therefore, His Highness, the Chief of the Army General Staff, rose and expressed the opinions of both Chiefs of the General Staffs at one time. During this time, the Vice-Chief of the Naval General Staff stood at his seat.

Next, President of the Privy Council Hiranuma rose and made the introductory remark that although this speech would not take the form of a question, since he entertained some desires he would add them in his speech. He said that it would be very satisfactory if he could receive answers to them. He then expressed his opinion in an interrogatory nature on eight articles. The Prime Minister rose and answered that he was generally of the same opinion and said that since they would serve as reference, he had listened attentively. He further stated that he would have each responsible Minister give a detailed explanation. His Highness, the Chief of the Army General Staff, rose and said that he would have the Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff give an explanation. Then the Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff, the Foreign Minister, the Finance Minister and the Home Minister each stood by his respective seat and respectively gave his explanation.

With this, since there were no other speakers, the Prime Minister rose and announced that if there were no other speeches, he would consider that the original bill had been approved. He then went before the Emperor and reported to him that the meeting was over. At 11:52 A.M. the Emperor entered the Inner chamber. Then His Highness, the Chief of the Army General Staff, immediately after signing his name on the original bill, retired. And each Minister also retired after signing his name.

(Additional remark: It is reported that on the afternoon of November 29 Foreign Minister Arita visited President of the Privy Council Hiranuma and explained the contents of the subject under discussion.)

The Emperor

Chief of the Army General Staff  
 President of the Privy Council  
 Home Affairs Minister  
 War Minister  
 Acting Chief of the Naval  
 General Staff  
 (Vice-Chief of the Naval  
 General Staff)

Prime Minister  
 Naval Minister  
 Finance Minister  
 Foreign Affairs Minister  
 Vice Chief of the Army General  
 Staff



IPS DOC. NO. 3090 B

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Signed at Tokyo on this  
25th day of Sept. 1947.

/sgd/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAME

Witness: /sgd/ Edward P. Monaghan

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity



*Gaudin Land*

Policy for the Adjustment of the  
New Relations Between Japan and China

Decided by the Council in the  
Presence of the Emperor

30 November 1938

Japan, Manchukuo and China, prompted by the ideal of establishing a new order in East Asia, have banded themselves together as good neighbors to one another and made it their common purpose to be the axis powers for maintaining peace in the Orient. The fundamental items for this purpose are as follows:

1. The general cooperation of Japan, Manchukuo and China, based on the keynote of reciprocity, especially the establishment of the principles of neighborly friendship, joint defense against communism, and economic cooperation.

2. The establishment of a strongly united zone in North China and Meng-Chiang (T.N. Inner Mongolia) from the point of view of national defense and economics (especially developing and utilizing of natural resources).

In addition to the preceding item, the establishment of a special position pertaining to military and political affairs in Meng-Chiang for anti-Comintern purposes.

3. The establishment of a strongly united Japanese and Chinese economic zone in the area of the lower reaches of the Yangtze River.

4. The establishment of a special position in specified islands off the coast of South China.

Concrete details in this regard will be decided in accordance with the principles appearing in the attached sheets.

ATTACHED SHEETS:

The Principles for the Adjustment of the  
New Relations between Japan and China.

I. Items regarding the principle of neighborly friendship:-----

Japan, Manchukuo and China shall mutually respect their natural characters, harmoniously maintain peace in the Orient, and take appropriate measures to promote the mutual aid and friendly intercourse between them in every field in order to bring about satisfactory results of neighborly friendship.



1. China shall recognize the Empire of Manchukuo; Japan and Manchukuo shall respect the territory and sovereignty of China, and Japan, Manchukuo and China shall restore new diplomatic relations.

2. With regard to politics, diplomacy, education, propaganda, trade, etc., Japan, Manchukuo and China shall remove all measures and causes that would demolish mutual friendly relations, and those measures shall be prohibited in the future.

3. Japan, Manchukuo and China shall conduct diplomatic relations on the basis of mutual cooperation, and will not take, in relations with a third power, any action that would hinder this cooperation.

4. Japan, Manchukuo and China shall cooperate in uniting, creating and developing their civilization.

5. The administrative formula of new China shall be based on a principle in conformity with "cooperation among separate regimes."

Meng-Chiang shall be a highly organized self-governing area against Communism.

Shanghai, Tsingtao and Amoy shall be special administrative areas respectively based on the policy already decided.

6. Japan shall dispatch a few advisers to the new Central Government and assist its new establishment. Especially, Japan shall dispatch advisers to the organs in the zones where the two countries are to be strongly united, and in other specified areas.

7. When the friendly relations among Japan, Manchukuo and China take shape, Japan shall consider gradually returning the concessions and giving up extraterritorial rights.

## II Items regarding the principle of joint defense:

Japan, Manchukuo and China shall maintain joint defense against Communism, and at the same time shall cooperate in maintaining the common public peace and welfare.

1. Japan, Manchukuo and China shall root out Communistic elements and organizations in their own territories respectively and at the same time shall cooperate in concerted action on information, propaganda, etc., concerning Communism.

2. Japan and China shall cooperate in carrying out defense against Communism.



In order to carry it out, Japan shall dispatch the necessary troops to be stationed in the important places of North China and Meng-Chiang.

3. In particular, Japan and China shall conclude a military alliance for defense against Communism.

4. Japanese troops, excepting those described in the second clause, shall be withdrawn as quickly as possible in accordance with the improvement of general and local conditions. But as a guarantee, those troops stationed in North China, Nanking, Shanghai and the Delta Zone of Hangchow shall continue to stay until the public peace is secured. In order to maintain common public peace and welfare a number of ships shall be stationed at specified positions along the banks of the Yangtze River and at specified islands on the coast of South China, including the positions related to these places. Furthermore, the navigation and anchorage of ships in the Yangtze River or along the Chinese Coast shall be unrestricted.

5. For cooperation in maintaining the public peace, as provided for in the preceding clause, China shall have an obligation to give financial cooperation to Japan for the stationing of Japanese troops and ships.

6. Japan shall generally reserve the right of strategic requisition and of supervision of railroads, aviation, communication and important harbors and waterways existing in the areas where Japanese troops are stationed.

7. China shall improve and readjust its police force and army, and at the same time, the soldiers and military equipment in the areas where Japanese troops are stationed shall for the time being be reduced to the minimum necessary for public peace and national defense.

As regards the establishment of the Chinese army and police force, Japan shall cooperate by dispatching advisers, supplying arms, etc.

### III. Items regarding the principles of economic coalition:

In order to effectuate mutual aid, coalition and joint defense, Japan, Manchukuo and China, in regards to industry, economy, etc., shall have as their aim the spirit of collaboration and reciprocity according to the principle of mutually supplementing each other's needs and keeping balance.



1. With regard to the exploitation of resources, customs duty, trade, aviation, transportation, communication, meteorology and surveys, Japan, Manchukuo and China shall conclude an agreement necessary for realizing the aims above-mentioned and embodying the fundamental principles shown in the following clauses.

2. With regard to the exploitation and utilization of the resources in North China and Meng-Chiang, the most important policy shall be the exploitation of resources that are lacking in Japan and Manchukuo, especially underground resources. From the standpoint of joint defense and economic union, China will provide special facilities for this. In other regions also, China shall, from the standpoint of economic union, provide the necessary facilities for the exploitation of specific resources.

3. With regard to general industry, Japan shall strictly respect the enterprises on the part of China, and shall offer aid necessary for their development.

Regarding agriculture, Japan shall aid its improvement and contribute to the stability of the Chinese people. At the same time Japan shall promote the cultivation of the resources of raw materials necessary for Japan.

4. Japan shall give China the aid necessary for the establishment of its financial and economic policies.

5. With regard to trade, Japan, Manchukuo and China shall adopt reasonable customs duties and customs systems so that the general commerce among them may be promoted, and at the same time the supply and demand of materials among Japan, Manchukuo and China, especially North China, may be facilitated and rationalized.

6. With regard to the development of transportation, communications, meteorology and surveys in China, Japan shall give aid or cooperation as required.


The development of aviation in the whole of China, the railroads in North China (including the Lu-Hai line), the important marine transportation between Japan and China and China coastal transportation, the water transportation on the Yangtze River and the communications in North China and the lower reaches of the Yangtze River shall be stressed in the traffic cooperation between Japan and China.

7. Japan and China, working together, shall establish a new Shanghai.



Supplementary Notes

1. China shall compensate Japanese subjects for their loss of rights and interests in China since the outbreak of the Incident.
2. Due to the consolidation of economic cooperation among Japan, Manchukuo and China, it is natural that the economic activities or interests of third Powers in China will be restricted accordingly; but that above-mentioned consolidation shall mainly be limited to the spheres within the need of national defense and national existence. The cooperation shall not unreasonably exclude nor restrict the economic activities and interests of third Powers beyond the aims stated above.





DEFENSE WITNESSES - ITAGAKI

DOC. NO.	NAME OF WITNESS	ATTORNEY	REPORT RECD.	EXAM. ATTORNEY
1830	AYABE, KITSUJU			
2580	FURUNO, INOSUKE			
2040	HAZEYAMA, TETSUO			
2039	IHARA, JUNJIRO			
2042	KOKUBU, SHINICHIRO			
1979	OKADA, YOSHIMASA			
2554	OZAWA, KAISAKU			
2512	UESUGI, MOTOYUKI			
2471	YAMAWAKI, MASATAKA			
1977	SAWADA, SHIGERU			
2036	SHIMAMOTO, MASAICHI (SHOICHI)			
2597	MADOKORO, SHINTARO			
2606	KAGESA, SADAOKI			
2555	ITAGAKI, SEISHIRO			
2615	TAKAYAMA, HIKOICHI			
2038	Saito			
2037	Sakayama			

add  
here



CHANGKUFENG INCIDENT

(28 July 1938 entry)

Make 5 copies send down to me  
Sutton

During the Changkufeng Incident in July 1938 your co-defendant Hideki TOJO was your vice-minister, was he not?

Was it not a fact that based on intelligence reports received, the Japanese naval and army high command believed at the time that there were no indications that Russia was preparing for war against Japan?

Was it not also a fact that the Kwantung Army had this following estimate of the situation: first, that the Soviet forces must be compelled to withdraw from Changkufeng, and for this the use of force will be necessary. And second, even if Japan would resort to the use of force, Russia would not enlarge the incident because it was observed that Russia was not furthering her military preparations or increasing her mobilization and there was dissension between the Red Army and the OGPU?

In view of those observations and considerations, the Kwantung Army Headquarters persistently urged the use of force to the General Staff Headquarters, did it not?

*Is it not a fact that* as you and the Chief of the General Staff fully agreed with the report and recommendation of the Kwantung Army, both of you sought an imperial audience on the 21st for the purpose of obtaining the sanction of the Emperor to the use of force, did you not?

Were you not told by the Emperor through his Chief Aide-de-Camp that if your intention of seeing him was to obtain sanction for the use of force, then you need not come?



*did not*

~~Nevertheless~~, in spite of that message, you and the Chief of the General Staff still insisted on requesting an audience?

Is it not true that during the audience you were severely reprimanded by the Emperor for telling a deliberate falsehood?

*and did not*  
That the falsehood consisted in assuring the Emperor that the Foreign and Navy Ministers had agreed with you on the policy of using force in Changkufeng?

Is it not true that the Emperor felt deceived because the Foreign Minister and the Navy Minister had previously expressed to the Emperor their opinions in favor of troop distribution but were absolutely opposed to the use of force?

Is it not true that with an excited countenance the Emperor said to you: "The actions of the Army in the past have been abominable. Speaking of the Loukiasotou case in the Manchukuo Incident and the Marco Polo Bridge at the beginning of the China Incident, there was absolutely no obedience to central orders. There were infrequent instances when the methods used have been arbitrary and sneaky, which is altogether improper as my army. I feel it is abominable in various ways. Nothing like that must happen this time." ?

The Emperor admonished you, did he not, that "hereafter you may not move one soldier without my command"?

Was not the reprimand so strong that you were humiliated, and in the office of the Chief Secretary of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal you said with tears in your voice that "I can never look into the Emperor's face again. I would definitely like to resign."



Did not the Premier persuade you ~~to~~<sup>to</sup> withdraw ~~your~~ your resignation,  
placating you that it would look bad if you resigned, that the Emperor  
did not lack confidence in the Army and it was just that he became  
suspicious every time such an incident occurred?



MEMORANDUM ON CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ITAGAKI

CHANGKUFENG INCIDENT:

ITAGAKI reprimanded for the first time by Emperor, was about to resign; Kwantung Army urged use of force as it believed Russia was not prepared for war.

1. MATSUDAIRA, Chief Secretary of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, told HARADA that accompanied by the Chief of Staff, Prince KAN-IN and the Minister of War he went to the Palace. (p 2189, 28 July 1938 entry, SAIONJI-HARADA Memoirs)
2. The Emperor, thinking that the War Minister had come again to request a sanction concerning the use of force in the negotiation of the problem of the Soviet-Manchukuo border and also thinking that it would cast a reflection on their prestige if they met him and do not succeed in obtaining his sanction, transmitted the following through the Chief Aide-de-Camp: "If you are coming by any chance to obtain the sanction for use of force, I have no such idea in mind. If you are coming for that, you don't have to come." (p 2189-90)
3. In spite of this message the Chief of the General Staff and the War Minister said: "We would still like to request an audience." The request was granted. (p 2190)
4. Just as the Emperor had thought, the War Minister appealed for permission to use force. (2190)
5. The Emperor said: "Have the Ministers who are concerned been contacted?" (2190)
6. The Minister replied: "Both the Foreign and Navy Minister have agreed." (2190)
7. Previously, both the Foreign Minister and the Navy Minister had expressed their opinions in favor of troop distribution but they were absolutely against the use of force. The Emperor had already known this and when the War Minister had answered "Both Ministers have consented", the Emperor felt as if he was deceived. (2190)
8. In an excited countenance the Emperor said: "The actions of the Army in the past have been abominable. Speaking of the Liukiaotou case in the Manchukou Incident and the doings at Marco Polo Bridge at the beginning of the China Incident, there was absolutely no obedience to central orders. There are infrequent instances when the methods used have been

*Changku Feng*

*Ready*



arbitrary and sneaky which is altogether improper as my Army. I feel it is abominable in various ways. Nothing like that must happen this time. (2190)

44 9. He admonished the War Minister: "Hereafter you may not move one soldier without my command." (2189)

10. The admonition was in such a strong tone that the War Minister retreated very humiliated. (2190-1)

✓ 11. When the War Minister came back he said: "I can never look into the Emperor's face again. I would definitely like to resign." The Chief of the General Staff also expressed desire to resign. (2191)

12. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the Premier interceded. (2191)

13. The Premier called the War Minister and told him: "It would be distressing to have you resign now. In the first place, if you say the Emperor has no confidence in you, there is no reason whatsoever for him to have approved you as War Minister recently.....also he does not lack confidence in the Army. It was just that he becomes suspicious when such incident occurs. He spoke critically about that point and he probably meant for you to be careful hereafter." (2191)

✓ 14. On the 22nd, however, the War Minister still persisted in urging the use of force. Navy Vice Minister YAMAMOTO said that when the War, Navy and Foreign Ministers met, the War Minister attempted to secure their consent on the use of force. (2192)

15. The Navy and Foreign Minister replied: "We are opposed to that. We cannot agree to that." (2192)

16. The War Minister immediately left his seat and clasping his head he mumbled "How troublesome!" and went out. (2193)

17. From Captain TAKAGI of the Navy HARADA received a letter which said: "The strength of the Soviet forces on the spot where the Soviet-Manchukou Incident occurred, was approximately 200. The Korean Army dispatched a battalion to cope with it. (p 2194)

18. ("There are no indications that the Soviet Union is preparing for war. (2194)

19. The two conclusions on this situation as made by the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army are:



A - The Soviet forces must be compelled to withdraw from Changkufeng. For this the use of force will be necessary.

B - Even if we resort to the use of force, Russia will not enlarge the Incident. (2194)

20. The reasons for this are:

A - We do not see any aggravation of the situation such as their furthering of military preparations or increase in mobilization.

B - At present, there is dissension between the Red Army and the O.G.P.U. (2194)

21. "From these observations, the Kwantung Army Headquarters persistently urged the use of force to the General Staff Headquarters. (2194)

22. "Because of this, the War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff sought an Imperial audience on the 21st." (2194)

.....



IFS Document No.

EXCERPTS FROM SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS, COVERING  
THE 28 JULY 1938 ENTRY, ON PAGES 2189-94 THEREOF

Page 2189

When I met MATSUDAIRA, he said: "Accompanied by Chief of Staff Prince KAN-IN and the Minister of War, I proceeded to the Palace since they desired to make an appeal. The Emperor, thinking that the War Minister had come again to request his sanction concerning the use of force in the negotiation of the problem of the Soviet-Manchukuo border and also thinking that it would cast a reflection on their prestige if they meet him and do not succeed in obtaining his sanction, transmitted the following through the Chief Aide-de-Camp with his deep and sympathetic feeling: 'If you are coming by any chance to obtain my sanction for use of force, I have no such

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idea in mind. If you are coming for that, you don't have to come.' In spite of this message, the Chief of the General Staff and the War Minister said: 'We would still like to request an audience.' So, at 11:00 a.m. the Emperor consented: 'If that is so, have them come.' The Emperor awaited their appearance, but they made the Emperor wait more than an hour after they had arrived at the Palace. The Chief Aide-de-Camp maintained contact between them and finally, close to noon, they were received in audience. Just as the Emperor had thought, the War Minister appealed for the request to use force. The Emperor said: 'Have Ministers who are concerned been contacted?' The War Minister replied: 'Both the Foreign and Navy Ministers have agreed.' Previously, both the Foreign Minister and the Navy Minister had expressed their opinions in favor of troop distribution, but they were absolutely against the use of force. The Emperor had already known this and when the War Minister had answered: 'Both Ministers have consented,' the Emperor felt as if he was deceived and with an excited countenance he said: 'The actions of the Army in the past have been abominable. Speaking of the Liutiaokou case in the Manchukuo Incident and the doings at the Marco Polo Bridge at the beginning of this incident, there was absolutely no obedience to central orders. There are infrequent instances when the methods used have been arbitrary and sneaky which is altogether improper as my army. I feel that it is abominable in various ways. Nothing like that must happen this time ....' And to the War Minister, he admonished: 'Hereafter, you may not move one soldier without my command.' He came out in such a strong tone that the

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War Minister retreated very humiliated. When the War Minister came back, he said: 'I can never look into the Emperor's face again. I would definitely like to resign.' The Chief of the General Staff said: 'With things as they



are, I cannot assume the responsibility of assistance to the Emperor as the senior in the Army. I would like to resign.' The Chief Aide-de-Camp, in great concern, thought he might get the Emperor to speak in a mellow tone. Since the inclination to intercede did exist, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal thought that it would not do to have him fail in something in which he was unaccustomed, even if there was sincerity behind it. He said: 'Either I or the Premier will handle that.' Reassured that it would be better, I left everything up to the Premier."

"The Premier appeared before the Emperor and asked about the whole situation. The Emperor seemed to be thinking of it as comparatively simple and said: 'Please urge both the War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff to stay in office.' The Premier called the War Minister and told him: 'It would be disturbing to have you resign now. In the first place, if you say that the Emperor has no confidence in you, there is no reason whatsoever for him to have approved you as War Minister recently. There is absolutely no reason to say he lacks confidence in you when you just recently became the War Minister by the Emperor's command. Also, he does not lack confidence in the Army. It was just that he becomes suspicious every time such an incident occurs. He spoke critically about that point and he probably meant for you to be careful hereafter.' At any rate, the War Minister left his future course up to the Premier. The Premier

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put an end to the Chief Aide-de-Camp's maneuverings and everything was concluded without mishap, but from the lower bracket could be heard: 'UGAKI lied,' and 'How insulting.' At the General Staff Headquarters, especially, it was said that they were quite indignant and the circumstance had been aggravated."

When I met KIDO later that day, he said: "Why didn't the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal act in concert with the Premier and do something? It is disturbing to have the Emperor taking such pointed actions." However, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal had not taken up or mentioned the Liutiaokou or the Marco Polo Bridge Incidents to the Emperor. It was something which the Emperor had said on the spur of the moment without any preparations, and thus, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal had nothing whatsoever to do with it at that time. I do not think it unreasonable that there was misunderstanding between the War Minister and the Foreign Minister UGAKI; that is, for the War Minister thinking that the Foreign Minister had not clearly and absolutely stated his opposition. However, when the Foreign Minister had met the War Minister, he had probably said: "I am in agreement with threatening Russia to the extent of disturbing troops, but you must not use military force," or he may have said: "If it's just up to that point, you can do it." It may be supposed that the War Minister was given this impression because the Foreign Minister had been a former army man and may have been thinking about as such.

On the 22nd, I met Navy Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO at the Navy Minister's official residence and heard that when the War, Navy, and Foreign Ministers had met and



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the War Minister had attempted to secure their consents on the use of force, both the Navy and Foreign Ministers had said: "We are opposed to that. We cannot agree to that." The War Minister had immediately left his seat and clasping his head he mumbled: "How troublesome," and went out. Therefore, the Navy knows that it is a clear fact that the Navy Minister had expressed his opposition. I surmised that later when the War and Foreign Ministers had met, that what I had mentioned before could have taken place.

When I met KIDO, he said: "I intend to speak with KONOYE leisurely tomorrow at Karuizawa. If the Army says that we will have to fight with Russia, then I will recommend KONOYE to resign resolutely. The Premier was also of that determination."

When I met Finance Minister IHEDA, he greatly admired the Emperor's actions and was very grateful for it.

On the 25th, I went to Gotemba and reported the circumstances since the last visit. I said: "The General Staff Headquarters group is clamorous, saying this and that, on the Emperor's not having confidence in the Army as such." The Prince replied with a laugh: "Just whose General Staff Headquarters and Army is it? Whether he has or hasn't any confidence in them; aren't they the Emperor's? It would be very grand if it can be safely concluded without mentioning the use of force."

I departed, and on the 26th, when I met KIDO who had just returned from Karuizawa, he said: "The newspapers had written up whether or not a minister without portfolio would be assigned to the job just as if KONOYE

Page 2194

had uttered it, but we did not speak of it at all. We discussed whether we would cope with it as a war situation, that is, what we would do in case the Army does not comply." I received a letter from Capt. TAKAGI of the Navy and it said: "The strength of the Soviet forces at the spot where the Soviet-Manchukuo border incident occurred was approximately 200. The Korean Army despatched a battalion to cope with them. There are no indications that the Soviet Union is preparing for war. The two conclusions on the situation as made by the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army are: A) The Soviet forces must be compelled to withdraw from Chankufeng. For this, the use of force will be necessary. B) Even if we resort to the use of force, Russia will not enlarge the incident. The reasons for this are: a) We do not see any aggravation of the situation, such as their furthering of military preparations of increase in mobilization. b) At present there is dissension between the Red Army and the OGPU. From these observations, the Kwantung Army Headquarters persistently urged the use of force to the General Staff Headquarters. Because of this, the War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff sought an Imperial audience on the 21st." The criticism of the Navy was: "They (Army) are saying this without taking into consideration the Soviet air force or their submarines. However, this is not very good."



NOMONHAN INCIDENT

1. In Item "G" on page 40 of your affidavit you state that after deliberation with the Supreme Command and with the consent of the Cabinet, you endeavored to bring about a speedy settlement of the Nomonhan Affair. Is it not a fact that you did not seek the approval or the advice of the Five Ministers Conference or the Cabinet until after the Nomonhan conflict had neared its conclusion?
2. When you finally took the matter up with the Cabinet did not Admiral YOHAI state that it was a very distasteful situation to start the incident without mentioning it and then bring up the problem after the Army had bungled it?

(NOTE: These questions are based on page 2,650.)

*John H. ...*  
*1/20/50*



THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE OF NOVEMBER 30, 1938

1. In paragraph "H" on page 36 of your affidavit you state that the policy of adjusting the new relations between Japan and China was decided upon by the Imperial Council on the 30th of November, 1938. Were you present at this Imperial Conference?
2. Did this conference take place after the capture of Hankow and Canton?
3. Did the Foreign Minister read a draft of the policy for the adjustment of the new relations between Japan and China?
4. I hand you IPS Document 2178-C, entitled "Policy for the Adjustment of the New Relations between Japan and China decided by the Council in the Presence of the Emperor," dated 30 November, 1938. Does this document contain the decision of the Council and is there attached to the decision the original bill which was read by the Foreign Minister?
5. I offer in evidence IPS Document 2178-C.
6. I desire to read on page 1, Item 4; on page 2, Items 1, 5, 6 and 7; on page 4, Items 1, 2 and 3; and on page 5, Item 2.
7. General ITAGAKI, Item 4 of the Decision is that a special position shall be established in specified islands off the coast of South China. Does this refer to the Hainan, Spratley and Parcelles Islands?
8. In Item 5 on page 2 of this Exhibit it is provided that Shanghai, Tsingtao and Amoy shall be special administrative areas based on the policy already decided. What was the policy that had been decided in regard to these three areas?
9. You state in your affidavit that the policy of adjusting the new relations between Japan and China was discussed at a Five Ministers Conference on 25 November, 1938. Is it not true that action was also taken on this matter at a Cabinet meeting?

*Do not translate*

(When it becomes apparent that you are not reading the entire document, defense counsel may call on you to read the entire speech, in which event I think you should accede to the request and make the statement that in the interests of saving time and confusion you will read the entire speech in view of the insistence of defense counsel.)



*g. - a i e t*

10. Was not the report made at the Imperial Conference first approved at a Cabinet meeting?

11. Did Prime Minister KONOYE state at the Imperial Conference that he had been notified that HIRANUMA, President of the Privy Council, desired to express at the Imperial Conference his opinion on the original bill?

*Do not translate but write this in English in Jp text*

12. (If the witness denies this, then state as follows:)

*Translate* → I hand you IPS Document 3090-B, which purports to be the Minutes of the Council in the Imperial Presence of November 30, 1938. Will you examine this document and state whether or not your name is signed to it as War Minister?

*Do not translate* (If the answer is "yes," then offer the document in evidence. Then read to the witness the second sentence beginning at the top of page 2, beginning with the words, "Then the Prime Minister rose...")

13. At this conference did HIRANUMA, President of the Privy Council, give his opinion in a speech to which the Foreign Minister made a reply?

14. I hand you IPS Document 3090-G, which purports to be a detailed report of the Council in the Imperial Presence, marked "Strictly Confidential," directed to YUASA, Kunahel, <sup>(Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal)</sup> Home Minister, and signed by ARITA, Hachiro. Will you examine this document and state whether or not it contains the substance of opinions expressed by HIRANUMA and the gist of the Foreign Minister's reply made at this Imperial Conference?

*Do not translate*

15. (The purpose of the foregoing question is to get the witness to identify the document, and if he satisfactorily identifies it in his answer, then state as follows:)

*Translate* → I introduce in evidence IPS Document 3090-G.

*Do not translate*

16. (I think you should read the marked portions of HIRANUMA's speech appearing in IPS Document 3090-G. The marked portions include on page 3, first and second paragraphs, the 1st sentence of the 3rd paragraph and the last part of the 3rd paragraph beginning with the words, "The third is to pay..."; page 4, the entire page beginning with the words, "Clause 5," with the exception of the short paragraph beginning with the word, "Shanghai..."; page 5, the 1st two paragraphs.)



17. Was a copy of this detailed report made by the Foreign Minister, or a similar report, distributed to you?

*do not translate* → 18. (If the previous question is answered in the affirmative, ask the following question:)

Was it the practice to distribute such reports to all the members of the Cabinet?



MATTERS DECIDED UPON AT THE FIVE MINISTERS' CONFERENCE  
AS OF OCTOBER 31, 1938

## THE 1ST SECTION OF THE EAST ASIA BUREAU

CONTENTS

- No. 1      The Future Policy for Guiding the China Incident.
- No. 2      The Measures to be Taken in Case of Surrender of the Present Central Government of China.
- No. 3      Measures to be Taken in Case the Present Central Government of China Does Not Surrender.
- No. 4      Strategy Toward China in Conformity with the Current Situation
- No. 5      The Policy to Guide the Establishment of a New Central Government of China. (Attached Sheet) The Outline for the Internal Guidance of the Chinese Government.
- No. 6      The Emergency Financial Measures for Central China. (Attached Sheet) The Outline of Dealing with the Emergency Financial Measures for Central China.
- No. 7      Diplomatic Policy Toward Britain for the Time Being.
- No. 8      Attitude Toward the Proposals of the British and the German Ambassador for Peace Mediation.
- No. 9      Plan for Studying the Japanese-German-Italian anti-Comintern Pact.
- No. 10,     Procedure Taken in Connection with the Settlement of the Chang Ku-feng Incident.
- No. 11     Corrections.
- No. 12     The Special Commission on Chinese Affairs.
- No. 13     Commentary on the Special Commission on Chinese Affairs.
- No. 14     Regarding the Solution of the Outstanding British Question.
- No. 15     Outline for the Establishment of the Joint Committee.
- No. 16     Concerning the Setting Up of a Committee for Liaison with the Conference of the Five Ministers.



NO. 1 - THE FUTURE POLICY FOR GUIDING THE CHINA INCIDENT  
(Decided 24 June 1938)

1. We must concentrate our national power and direct it to the immediate settlement of the China Incident. All the policies at home and abroad shall be directed in conformity with the assumption that the object of the war shall generally be attained within this year.
2. There is no objection to accepting friendly mediation by third Powers, depending upon its conditions.

NO. 2 - THE MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN THE CASE OF SURRENDER  
OF THE PRESENT CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA  
(Decided 8 July 1938)

1. The Policy

In case of surrender of the Central Government of China, Japan will regard it as one of the regimes and treat it according to the "Must be made to join the newly established Central Government of China" policy decided upon by the Imperial Conference.

2. The Outline

- I Japan shall firmly adhere to the decided policy for the solution of the Incident and shall not try to adjust the general relations between Japan and China in negotiation with the present Central Government of China.
- II In case the present Central Government of China surrenders and accepts the third condition, stated later, it shall either be considered as a friendly regime and will be permitted to join the newly established Central Government, or be made to establish another new central government in cooperation with various existing pro-Japanese regimes.

The merger with the newly established Central Government, or the establishment of a new central government shall be undertaken chiefly by the Chinese, the internal assistance to be given by Japan.

3. Conditions for the recognition of the  
Surrender of the Present Central Government of China

- I The merger with or taking part in the establishment of the new Central Government of China.
- II The change of title as well as the reorganization of the former National Government following the above mentioned measure.
- III The abolition of anti-Japanese, pro-Communist policy and the adoption of pro-Japanese-Manchukuo and anti-Communist policy.
- IV Retiring from public life of CHIANG Kai-shek.



#### 4. Suspension of Hostilities

The suspension of hostilities shall not be taken up unless we have satisfied ourselves with the facts of surrender of the present Central Government of China.

However, in the case of negotiating the cessation of hostilities, the conditions shall be considered separately.

### NO. 3 - THE MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN THE CASE WHERE THE PRESENT CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA DOES NOT SURRENDER

(Decided 8 July 1938)

#### 1. The Policy

Japan shall control her national power more rigidly than ever before, and her whole strength in home administration, foreign relations, financial tactics and propaganda shall be concentrated upon bringing about the destruction or surrender of the present Central Government of China. At the same time, the various administrative measures necessary for a long term warfare shall be intensified in order to actually realize the wartime condition spiritually and materially.

#### 2. The Outline

##### I Measures to be taken before occupying strategic points.

(1) We must direct positive war operations without break, with the aim to occupy strategic points for controlling the general situation of China so as to cause the self-destruction of the present Central Government of China and their abandonment of fighting spirit, because of their repeated defeats and especially the loss of their midland.

(2) In accordance with the development of war operations, the pro-Japanese and anti-Comintern influences should be fostered through strengthening tactics upon administration, finance, foreign relations and thoughts. It should be aimed to break up the interior of the anti-Japanese influence and to bring about an atmosphere desirous for peace as well as the ruin of its financial and economic basis, so that the present Central Government of China might split and collapse, or at least be reduced to a mere local regime at the earliest possible time.

The above mentioned policies shall be carried out not only by Japan herself but also by guidance of the various pro-Japanese regimes of China and others in the background.

(3) The various pro-Japanese regimes shall be enlarged and strengthened. They shall be also incorporated into one regime as early as possible. We should make it really worthy of the name of a Central Chinese Government so that it may be inevitably recognized at home and abroad as the new government de facto which will replace the present Central Government of China.



The recognition of the new Central Government of China by Japan depends solely upon the situation, but it must be done as soon as possible when the new Central Government has been completed in substance.

(4) While we will highly respect the rights and interests of the third powers, and avoid troubles with them, we should adopt powerful and straightforward measures to settle the Incident so that they may actually understand our policies toward China. Then they will be compelled to support our attitude in order to protect and increase their vested rights and interests, and consequently the present Central Government of China will be isolated.

II The measures to be taken after occupying the strategic points.

In case the present Central Government of China should not surrender even after we occupy the strategic points, we should not be impatient so as to resort to force to settle the Incident, but make efforts to enlarge and strengthen the new Central Government, and at the same time should attempt the downfall of the present Central Government of China chiefly by tactics, increasing pressure upon it by political, economic and ideological measures.

III The way for the practice of the above shall be planned and decided upon separately.

No. 4 - STRATEGY TOWARD CHINE IN CONFORMITY WITH THE  
CURRENT SITUATION  
(Decided 8 July 1938)

1. The Policy

In order to break down the present Central Chinese Government and bring about CHIANG Kai-shek's fall from power, simultaneously with the destruction of the enemy's fighting power, the plans now being put into effect shall be strengthened, and the essentials for this purpose are as follows:

Method of Execution:

I By engaging persons of the first rank in China, we pave the way for the establishment of a new strong administrative power concurrently with the weakening of the fighting spirit of the Chinese people.

II By expediting the conciliation and submission of the irregular forces, we plan to disrupt and weaken the fighting power of the enemy.

III By utilizing and controlling the authoritative anti-CHIANG Kai-shek elements, we shall establish in our enemy's midst an anti-CHIANG Kai-shek, anti-Comintern and anti-war government.



IV By promoting the Mohammedans movement we shall create an anti-Comintern zone operated by Mohammedans themselves in the northwestern region.  
(amended on 22 July)

V By confiscating Chinese funds abroad etc., we shall cause the present Central Chinese Government to destroy themselves financially.

VI We shall spread the necessary under-cover propaganda to make easier the execution of all the above measures.

Note: Investigations in respect of Item V above are still in progress.

NO. 5 - THE GUIDING POLICY FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF  
THE NEW CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA.  
(Decided 15 July 1938)

1. The Policy

I The new Central Government of China shall not be confined to the mere party concerned, on the part of China, in settling the Incident, but shall be made the government of China, so that Japan and China will sweep away all the frictions in their past relationships and establish the foundation of a friendly relationship between them from a broad-minded viewpoint.

II Though the establishment of the new Central Government of China shall be undertaken mainly by the Chinese, it shall be internally assisted by Japan. The principle of the collaboration of individual local governments shall be adopted to their government form.

2. The Plan for the Establishment

I A Joint Commission shall be established as soon as possible through the cooperation between the Provisional Government and the Restoration Government, to be joined later by the Mongolian and Hsiang-Kiang Joint Commission. Then we should guide this regime so as to grow into a real central government by gradually absorbing various other influences or collaborating with them.

II The new Central Government shall not be established until after the fall of Hankow, with the CHIANG Kai-shek regime reduced to a mere local government or until the reformation of the present Central Government is brought about by CHIANG Kai-shek's retirement from public office.

III In case the split or reformation in the CHIANG Kai-shek regime does not take place even after the fall of Hankow, we should establish a new central government by putting existing governments together.

IV In case the CHIANG Kai-shek regime is broken up or reformed, and should a pro-Japanese government turn up, we would make it a factor of the central government system and proceed to set up a central government.



V It is expected that the date for our recognition of the new Central Government would be when the reformed (split) government as in Par. I could take charge of the suspension of hostilities, or when the united government as in Par. III has grown to be a central government of real efficiency.

VI Adjustment of the relations between Japan and China in connection with our control of the establishment of the new Central Government of China, shall be done on the following basis, and its concrete matters shall be decided separately.

(1) Basic matters to be adjusted and agreed upon for setting up the new relations between Japan and China shall be generally as follows:

(A) Utilization and development of natural resources in North China.

(B) The recognition of the highly cooperative zones by Japan and China in North China and the lower Yangtze River. The establishment of a special position against the Soviet Union in Mongolian-Hsing-Kiang area. The establishment of a special position on the various islands along the coast of South China.

(C) The establishment of the general policy for the collaboration among Japan, Manchukuo and China based upon reciprocity, particularly on neighborly friendship and goodwill, anti-Comintern and joint-defense and economic cooperation. In order to attain the above objectives, Japan will give internal guidance during a certain period.

(2) The basis for the internal guidance is given on attached sheet No. 1, captioned as "The General Plan for the Internal Guidance of the Government of China."

### 3. The Organization and the Function of the Joint Commission

I. The organization of the Joint Commission by the Provisional and the Restoration Governments and the Mongolian-Hsing-Kiang Joint Commission (to be called "The Joint Commission" hereafter) shall be roughly as follows:



- (1) The Joint Commission shall be of a plain committee system, having the representatives of the Provisional and the Restoration Governments and the Mongolian-Hsing-Kiang Joint Commission as its members, located in Peking for the time being.
- (2) For the most part, the boundary of each local regime shall be left as they are at present for the time being.
- (3) Each of the local regimes as North China, Central China and Mongolian-Hsing-Kiang shall be to a high grade self-governing adaptable to its special local characteristics.
- (4) The limits of the authorities to be given to the Joint Commission and the local regimes shall be studied separately, based upon the principle in the preceding paragraph. Transportation, communication, postal service, finance, customs, national tax, administration over salt, and plans for thought and education, which are common to all governments, shall be administered by the local regimes under the necessary supervision by the Joint Commission.
- (5) The maintenance of public peace and order shall be placed under the charge of the local governments, subject to the control of the Joint Commission.
- (6) Regarding the diplomatic affairs, the Joint Commission shall be authorized to look after the common matters while the local questions shall be dealt with by the respective local regimes.

(Attached Sheet)

#### The General Plan for Internal Guidance of the Chinese Government.

Japan's internal guidance of the Chinese Government is directed to contribute to settle the present Incident, to promote the cooperation between the Japanese and the Chinese, to establish inseparable friendly relations between Japan and Manchukuo, and at the same time to contribute to our national defense policy.

For this purpose, we should save the present situation from the current anti-Japanese sentiments even if by force. Also, we should win the hearts of the people by improving their economic conditions, establish the guiding principle through restoring Oriental culture, and with mercy and dignity stimulate the whole Han race to voluntarily cooperate with us.

#### Outline

##### I Military Affairs

- (1) We will urge the surrender of the Chinese Army, conciliate them, and bring them under control. We will strive to make them support



the new government by promoting their anti-CHIANG Kai-shok and anti-Communist consciousness, and making as many Chinese troops as possible cooperate with the Japanese Army for destruction of the anti-Japanese and pro-Communist Army, and thus guide the racial conflict toward an ideological opposition.

(2) The necessary Japanese troops will be stationed at ports, railways, waterways, etc., in the occupied areas which are strategic for communication, as well as at the locations of important resources; and in remote districts armed Chinese troops will be organized to ensure the preservation of peace. The numerical strength of the troops will be decided in accordance with the actual local situation.

(3) We will conclude an anti-Communist Military Alliance and gradually reorganize the Chinese Army to place it under the direction of the Japanese Army. When the circumstances permit, we will reduce our military strength to the minimum necessary for our national defense.

## II Administration and Foreign Relations.

(1) Under the confederated commission or the new Central Government, local governments will be organized in North China, Central China, Mongolia and Hsing-Kiang, etc. to suit the peculiar characters of each regime. We will give them wide powers of self-government, and have them govern themselves separately and cooperate with each other.

(2) The officials below the level of the key officials in the various governments shall be Chinese, but according to necessity a few Japanese advisers will be placed in important positions or Japanese officials will be employed so as to facilitate the internal guidance.

(3) The local governments shall make efforts to overthrow and destroy the anti-Japanese and pro-Communist Government and especially scheme to conciliate the anti-CHIANG Kai-shok and anti-Communist elements, so as to aggravate their internal troubles.

(4) As to the foreign relations, the local governments shall, in general, follow our foreign policy and conclude an anti-Comintern Pact.

## III Economy, Communication and Relief

(1) The development of the economy and communication will contribute to the establishment of the national defense of Japan, Manchukuo and China, and satisfy the development of the economy of the three countries and the welfare of its people. Japan especially will materially hold the necessary transportation. In North China the demand for national defense shall be the first consideration, and in Central and South China the interests of the people will be particularly considered.



(2) We shall carry out the development of economy following the principle of ministering to each other's wants among Japan, Manchukuo and China and advance energetically for the accomplishment of the three countries' economic sphere. However, we shall respect the rights and interests, already obtained by the third countries, and not interfere with their participation in the economic development.

(3) Railway, water transport, aviation and communication will be materially placed under Japan's power, and satisfy the accomplishment of military activities and contribute to the welfare of the people.

(4) We shall tempt the existing plutocrats with profit and have them cooperate with the local governments.

(5) /T.N. The whole text is crossed out./ Marginal Remarks: "Eliminated 22/7."

(6) We will promote agriculture, start river conservancy and civil engineering, and thus improve the living of the common people. Especially during the Incident, we will make it our emergency duty to smoothen, for the time being, the distribution of food and then carry out the necessary relief work with emphasis on the reconstruction /of China/.

#### IV Culture, Religion and Education.

(1) We will respect the culture proper to the Han race, especially that common to Japan and China, revise the spiritual civilization thoroughly prohibit anti-Japanese speeches and promote Sino-Japanese cooperation.

(2) We will establish the principle on which the realization of the Sino-Japanese cooperation is to be based, in order to enable the local governments to carry out their policies, and strengthen and promote the organization of the people's various associations so as to make them hot-beds for this principle.

(3) We will reject absolutely the Communist Party. The National Party shall amend the "three-people principle" so as to make it adaptable gradually to the policy of the new government.

(4) As to religion, we will grant the freedom of belief as long as it does not disturb the promotion of the Japanese-Manchukuo-Chinese cooperation.

(5) We will conciliate scholars and protect them and encourage Confucianism.

(6) We will promote practical science so as to expedite the industrial development.



NO.6 - EMERGENCY MEASURES FOR FINANCE OF CENTRAL CHINA  
(Decision July 5, 1938)

(1) In view of the big importance of adjusting the relations with the third countries in order to make them give up their assistance to CHIANG Kai-shek, the government is ready to remove the restrictions on commercial and financial activities of foreign banks as well as foreign trading companies in the occupied districts of Central China. However, as the problem of free navigation on the Yangtze River has a great political influence on various aspects, the despatched authorities shall dispose of this problem after reporting it to the superior officials in case they touch this problem in the course of the negotiation.

(2) In view of the present drop in the value of the Chinese legal currency we will provide against its collapse by promptly establishing a bank which is practically independent from politics and will be authorized to issue new bank notes, with the object of promoting the commerce of Central China under the above mentioned preparations and cooperation of the third powers, especially Britain. When asking for the above mentioned cooperation of the third countries, we will persuade the British banks first, and if necessary, the British Government. According to circumstances, we may consider promoting it by inducing Germany and Italy. However, we will make it our policy that Japan has no fear in establishing the foundation for her development in Central China and maintain her leading position in the Central Chinese finance.

(3) We will persuade the Chinese banks and trading companies with the purport indicated in the preceding article.

REMARKS: This matter is to be carried out in accordance with the outline of the disposition mentioned on the attached sheet.

(Attached Sheet)

Outline of the Disposition of the Emergency  
Measures for Finance of Central China.  
(Decision July 5, 1938)

1. The Policy

When we actually take these financial measures we must be very careful so that they may cause neither the interference of the third countries nor bring troubles on the peace problem. We shall keep persistently our independent attitude and arrange the time and method of negotiations to our advantage.

2. Outline

(1) In conformity with the principle of the emergency financial measures of Central China, the government will immediately proceed to establish the concrete plan for the financial machinery of Central China under the collaboration between the authorities at home and at the actual places.

This concrete plan shall be elastic enough to be adaptable to the outcome of the negotiation.



(2) We will regard this negotiation merely as a matter of finance and will set about it, attaching importance to unofficial negotiations between our financial authorities and those of the third countries at the actual places. However, at an opportune time, we will commence gradually the negotiation between the governments. As to the time of transferring the negotiation to the Central /Government/ in accordance with the necessity, it depends on another decision or direction by the Central /Government/. Providing for the above, the Central /Government/ makes practical preparations beforehand for disposal of this matter. For this purpose, the parties concerned at home and at the actual place should be brought into close contact in order to remove the shortcomings due to the loose control. The commercial problem concerned with this negotiation shall be very prudently dealt with not to produce an unilateral result.

(3) At this negotiation we will make efforts to first change the atmosphere of the business circles of the countries concerned at the actual places favorable to us so that their home countries (Britain, USA and others) may rightly recognize the situation. At the same time our financial circles should be guided appropriately not to make speeches unfavorable to us for this negotiation.

(4) The main object of this negotiation is Britain, but we must take every possible positive means such as to make use of USA, Germany, Italy and others as steps in the negotiation.

(5) Along with the diplomatic maneuvers against the third countries mentioned in the preceding article, we will endeavor to make the third countries change their attitude toward CHIANG Kai-shok, and try to break up the CHING Government and absorb the Chinese financial circle.

(6) It is of course necessary to take every care to keep this negotiation secret. All necessary preparations should be made for this negotiation, and there must be no failure or miscarriage in the course of the negotiation.

NO. 7 DIPLOMATIC POLICY TOWARD BRITAIN FOR THE TIME BEING

(Decided July 8, 1938)

1. In order to cause Britain to give up her policy of aiding CHIANG, it is necessary to make her understand through facts the just attitude of the Empire.
2. As for the matters pending up to the present, we will investigate them concretely and settle same rapidly one after another according to the above mentioned plan.

NO. 8 ATTITUDE TOWARD PROPOSALS OF THE BRITISH AND THE GERMAN AMPASSADOR FOR PEACE MEDIATION

(Decided July 12, 1938)

British Ambassador:

To first decline in a roundabout way, but not sever the connection. "Because sincerity is not recognized, we will contemplate for a while."



German Ambassador:

To first hear what he says.

NO. 9 - PLAN FOR STUDYING THE JAPANESE-GERMAN-  
ITALIAN ANTI-COMINTERN PACT  
(Decided July 19, 1938)

To study with the policy of strengthening the Japanese-German-Italian Anti-Comintern Pact.

NO. 10 - PROCEDURE TAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH  
THE SETTLEMENT OF THE CHANG KU-FENG INCIDENT  
(Decided July 22, 1938)

Have made preparations for emergencies.

The use of the prepared military power is to be carried out by the Imperial Order after negotiation among the authorities concerned.

NO. 11 - CORRECTIONS  
(Decided July 22, 1938)

1. To erase "to plan for the fall of Fa-pi" in Par. 5 in "The Strategy Toward China in Conformity with the Current Situation."
2. To erase Par. 5 regarding economy, communication and relief of No. 3 of the inner guidance principles for the Chinese political power in the separate paper of the Policy to Guide the Establishment of a New Central Government of China, and change Par. 6 to Par. 5.

NO. 12 - SPECIAL COMMISSION ON CHINESE AFFAIRS.  
(Decided July 26, 1938)

(1) The Special Commission for China belongs to the Five Ministers' Council and is an executive organ exclusively for working out important strategems against China and establishing the new Chinese Central Government in accordance with the decision of the Council.

(2) Every organ at the actual places concerned with the above mentioned business is directed by the Special Commission for China in connection with the said business.

(3) The Army and Navy Ministers will be in charge of the liaison between the Special Commission for China and the Imperial Headquarters.

NO. 13 - COMMENTARY ON THE SPECIAL COMMISSION  
ON CHINESE AFFAIRS  
(Decided July 29, 1938)

- (1) Composition of the Special Commission for China in Par. 1



The Commission is understood as an organ under the leadership of DOIHARA, TSUDA and BANZAI.

(2) The important strategems against China in Par. 1 are understood as political and economic strategies which are not directly connected with military operations.

(3) Interpretation of Par. 2.

It is understood that the Supreme Command organ is not included in the local organs. However, if there is the necessity of adjusting a certain strategem of the Supreme Command organ with that of the Commission, both will be adjusted through their channels of subordination as mentioned in Par. 3.

NO. 14 - REGARDING SETTLEMENT OF THE PENDING  
MATTERS TOWARD BRITAIN  
(Decided August 19, 1938)

Matters regarding the settlement of the matters pending with England decided on July 8, are to be negotiated and decided by three central ministries: the places affected are to be given instructions; and they are to be carried out promptly. To attain this a meeting of the secretaries of the three ministries is to be held immediately.

NO. 15 - OUTLINE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A  
JOINT COMMITTEE  
(Decided September 9, 1938)  
CONTENTS

- I. The Policy.
- II. Outline for the Establishment of the Joint Committee.
- III. The Organization and the Powers of the Joint Committee.
- IV. Outline for Guidance of the Joint Committee.

I. The Policy

To establish a Joint Committee in accordance with the Policy to Guide the Establishment of the New Central Government of China agreed upon at the Conference of the Five Ministers', 15 July 1938 (Showa 13/.

II Outline for the Establishment of the Joint Committee

1. The establishment of the Joint Committee is to be carried out mainly by China, but is to be unofficially assisted by the Japanese Government. Assistance shall be offered to China after due approval by the Central Government of a locally framed plan for the guidance in the establishment of the Joint Committee.

2. When the Japanese Government's concrete plan concerning the guidance of the establishment of the Joint Committee is completed, with the assistance of the administrative guidance organs of North China and of Central China, a Preparatory Committee meeting shall be opened in Dairon which shall make the various preparations for setting up a Federal Committee.



3. The Joint Committee shall be held in Peiping, based on the preparations made by the Preparatory Committee.

### III The Organization and Powers of the Joint Committee

Basis for Chinese assistance in setting up a Federal Committee is roughly as follows:

1. The Joint Committee is to have jurisdiction over matters concerning the political affairs common to the Provisional Government and the Restoration Government, and is to facilitate the establishment of a new Central Government.

2. The organization of the Joint Committee shall be generally as follows:

- (1) The Joint Committee is to be located in Peiping for the time being.
- (2) The Provisional Government and the Restoration Government shall each send three members to the Joint Committee; one member of each of these groups to be permanently appointed standing members. In case the Mongolia-Sing-Kiang Committee participates, it shall send two members to the Joint Committee.
- (3) Senior committeemen shall be selected from among the members.
- (4) The standing committee shall consist of the senior committeemen and of the standing committeemen.
- (5) An office (Jimukyoku) is to be set up in the Joint Committee, with one director (Jimukyoku Socho) (temporary appointment) and several personnel.
- (6) The Senior Committee shall have jurisdiction over the committee and shall manage its affairs.
- (7) Committee meetings are to be held at any time, and are to be proposed when the Senior Committee and both governments consider them necessary.
- (8) When the committee is not in session, the standing committee shall take charge of joint business for the committee.
- (9) The debates of the committee and the standing committee cannot be decided without the approval of all members of the standing committee.
- (10) The office director (Jimukyoku Socho) controls the office staff and manages affairs concerning the Joint Committee, under orders from the Senior Committee.
- (11) Each government bears part of the expense necessary to the Joint Committee.



3. The powers of the Joint Committee shall be as follows:

- (1) The committee is to confer concerning such matters as unofficial control of railways, communications, postal services, finance, maritime customs, consolidated tax, salt business, education, thought control, etc., of both the Provisional and the Restoration Governments.
- (2) Matters decided by the Joint Committee or Governments Committee shall be executed by either the Joint Committee or by the Governments, depending on the nature of the matter. Matters executed by either of the governments shall be reported to the Joint Committee.

#### IV. Outline for Guidance of the Joint Committee

(1) The North China and Central China administrative control organs are to be closely linked with the Special Committee for China in guiding the Joint Committee. Accordingly, as the occasion demands, the heads of the above mentioned administrative control organs shall open Liaison Meetings.

(2) The North China Administrative Control Organ shall be responsible for control of guiding the affairs of the Joint Committee and its office.

(3) The Joint Committee and both the Provisional and newly established governments shall be guided in such a way as to get consent previously from the Administrative Control Organ of that place for such things as opening Joint Committee meetings, introducing bills, and carrying out decisions.

(4) The central authority must previously approve the important matters concerning the guidance of the Joint Committee and of its office (Jimukyoku).

NO. 16 - CONCERNING THE SETTING UP OF A COMMITTEE FOR  
LIAISON WITH THE CONFERENCE ON THE FIVE MINISTERS  
(Decided October 7, 1938 /Showa 13/)

#### I. Object of setting it up:

The committee for liaison with the Conference of the Five Ministers (temporary appointment) is established in order to accelerate the performance of matters agreed upon by the Conference of the Five Ministers in connection with disposal of the situation in China, and, in case of necessity, in order to study and investigate measures to be discussed by the Conference of the Five Ministers.

#### II. Organization:

This committee is a secret committee belonging to the Conference of the Five Ministers and is organized as follows:



Members: Chief of East Asia Bureau, Foreign Office  
The Chief of the First East Asia Section  
Chief of Finance Bureau, Finance Ministry.  
Chief of Foreign Affairs Section  
Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry  
Chief of Military Affairs Section  
Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry  
Chief of First Naval Section.

Secretaries: The Chief of the First East Asia Section, Foreign Office.  
Chief of Foreign Affairs Section, Finance Ministry.  
Chief of Military Affairs Section, War Ministry.  
The Chief of the First Naval Affairs Section, Navy Ministry.

III. Function:

(1) This committee is to manage affairs according to the object of establishment under the above-mentioned Article I.

(2) This committee, therefore, is to determine the outline of concrete execution of acceleration of the performance of matters decided by the Conference of the Five Ministers, and to transfer them to each government office concerned.

(3) The agenda of the Conference of the Five Ministers agreed upon by this Committee is to be introduced to the Conference of the Five Ministers by the chairman of Conference of the Five Ministers.

(4) When some of the affairs controlled by the Third Committee need to be presented to the Conference of the Five Ministers, they are to be introduced through this Committee from the Third Committee.

(5) This committee is to be abolished when (Tai Shi In) China Affairs Board is established.



Ex 3319

IPS Doc. No. 644-D Item 41

Military Affairs Section  
Nov. 18 Finished (Seal - MAEUDA)

(Seal -  
Toyoichi  
HIRAI)

(One copy is kept in this  
section  
Competent officer in charge-ITO  
Oct 19 - Military Affairs  
Section  
(SECRET) (Military Affairs)

Received by War Ministry

Hiku Man Mitsu Uke No. 984

KWAN-KO-KEI No. 152

(Stamped)  
War Ministry  
Shows

10 Oct 23  
1935  
Ministerial Secretariat

Matters in relation to the 1934 statement  
of accounts of the Manchurian Railroad  
Administration Office

October 12, 1935

(Seal  
UMEBARA)

(Stamped)  
War Ministry  
1935 Oct. 18  
No. 475  
Military Affairs Section

By Juzo NISHIO  
Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG Army

(Seal of Chief of  
Staff of the  
KWANTUNG ARMY)

Addressed to:

Mikio FURUSO/ T.N. or FURUSHO/ the Vice Minister of War.

Please note that the statement of accounts for 1934 (From April 1, 1934  
to March 31, 1935) for the railroads (including harbors and water transporta-  
tion under mandatory administration) has been approved.

P.S. The statement of accounts and three related tables are annexed  
herewith.

Did the meeting of 24 June 1938 decide the following policy:  
a note Policy

Requested Judge  
my 3 times to  
ask this He  
kept  
referring





Parent Doc. Serial Serial No. 4 3318 2404/1000  
IPS DOC. NO. 1242-C → 4 3318A

Page 1.

TOP SECRET - Received by War Ministry/ RIKUMAN MITSU JU NO. 1106 (seals)

KAN SAKU REI NO. 731  
ORDERS OF THE KWANTUNG ARMY

Issued by Kwantung Army Headquarters  
at Hsinking, Nov. 16 - 6:30 p.m.  
1935

1. In view of the subsequent situation in North China, the Army intends to gather part of its air force outside Shanhaikwan.

2. The commander of the Air Forces shall order scout planes, fighters, heavy bombers, each forming two squadrons and commanded by regiment commanders to advance between Shanhaikwan, Suichung and Chinchou by the twentieth of ~~January~~ <sup>November</sup> and to make preparations for marching towards Peiping-Tientsin Area.

3. The Railway Line Sector Commanders of the Kwantung Army shall dispose railway transportation service in order to facilitate the transference of the said air squadrons.

4. I am in Hsinking.

Commander of the Kwantung Army  
General MINAMI

Method of transmission - Telephone to the F.M. sector and afterwards printed matters to be sent.

Addressees: - The Army Units, Organic Units in general, War Minister, Chief of the General Staff, the Tientsin Army.

/Page 48/

(Seals)



*Postal document 3317 on identification*  
→ 3317A

Item 93  
/Page 93/

Inspected  
Received War Ministry/ RIKUMAN-MITSU Receipt No. 1077  
Finished Nov. 27

Vice Minister: Finished  
/Military Affairs/: Finished (seals)

/Secret/ Adjutant: /USHIJIMA/

Identical Text to Army General Staff  
Headquarters No.

Deciphering of Telegram  
Despatched: 5:00 pm) November 12, 1935  
Received: 8:40 pm)

Addressed to: The War Minister-Sender: The Commander of the KWANTUNG Army

KWANTUNG STAFF I TELEGRAM 763

According to the object described in separate telegram, KWANTUNG-STAFF I TELEGRAM 762, we decided to concentrate a part of the forces outside the Great Wall in order to suitably cooperate with the China Garrison Army in case of need and issued orders at noon today, the 12th, to take the following measures:

The 1st Independent Infantry Regiment, one light tank company of the Third Tank Battalion one battalion of the 9th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment and the 1st Independent Engineer Company shall be placed under the command of the Commander of the First Mixed Brigade and shall be made to concentrate the forces near SHANHAIKWAN by November 15th so as to be prepared for advancing into North China. However, as to advancing to the south of SHANHAIKWAN, same shall depend on Army orders.

(End)



1.  
Itagaki

ITAGAKI became War Minister

1. On page 28 of your Affid., "Considering my career and my ideas, KONOYE thought I was the best man for the post". How did he know your ideas when you were away from Japan for almost a year?
2. Did some one tell him your ideas?
3. Did some one recommend you to KONOYE?
4. Was it not ISHIHARA?
5. Was this ISHIHARA the same ISHIHARA who was your colleague in Kwantung Army at the outbreak of the Mukden incident?
6. When you assumed the office as War Minister, who was the Vice War Minister? TOJO?
7. When was TOJO appointed as Vice War Minister? Was it not just a week or so before you became War Minister?
8. Was it not a fact that the outgoing War Minister SUGIYAMA consented to your becoming War Minister on condition that TOJO should be appointed Vice Minister first?



2

Itagaki

(I) QUESTIONS ON p. 28, 29, 30, 31-32.

1. In parag. 2 on page 2 of your Affid. "I knew that Premier KONOYE'S intentions coincided with my idea, namely, the withdrawal of the entire Japanese forces and the peaceful settlement of the Japan-China conflict". As the War Minister, were you aware of the policies of the Japanese Government as laid down before you became such?
2. Were you aware of the decision of the Imperial Conference on 11 Jan 1938?
3. Did ~~not~~ that Imperial Conference decided that the first course was settlement through negotiation and the second course was the complete defeat of China and the establishment of ~~a new Government~~ with which Japan would make peace?
4. Were you aware that on 15 Jan 1938, it was decided to adopt the second course?
5. Were you aware that as a result the KONOYE declaration was issued on 16 Jan 1938?
6. ~~Was~~ the decisions, declarations and policies of the Japanese Government already decided, did they not still stand when you became War Minister?
7. In the last parag. on page 29, you stated that the policy you decided upon as War Minister was to alter peace terms with China and to accomplish a peace settlement quickly. Was this policy a policy you conceived yourself before you became the War Minister?
8. Why did not you adhere to your own policy?
9. on p. 30, you stated that the peace terms offered to China should not be so exacting as the ones proposed through Trautmann, was this also your own policy and not the policy thereupon decided by the Japanese Government?



3

Itagaki

10. Did not you attempt to resign, if your own policy was at variance with that of the Government?

If your policy was identical with the Government, didn't you make an effort to carry it out?

11. After you became War Minister, did you firmly adhere to your policy of localization and non-expansion as far as military operations were concerned?

( Ans. "Operations are within the jurisdiction of Supreme Command", then confront him with 2785 "talk with Ugaki", ITAGAKI asked UGAKI to consent to the attack upon Canton in South China in Sept 1938)

(Ans. "occupy certain key points to offset menace of Russia", then ask him Why not alter your peace terms and settle with China quickly?)

(Ans. "to bear China in order to bring about peace", then ask him Was that what you called peaceful settlement? How much you had to occupy ~~xxxxxx~~ <sup>areas</sup> in China before you would talk on peace? Was that what you called localization?)

12. But at the same time, you were prepared to fight for ten years?

(Exh. 2197)

13. Was your policy endorsed by the Five Ministers' Conference?

Was your policy identical with the decisions of the Five Ministers' Conference?

14. ~~What~~ What was the aim and the function of the 5 Ministers' conference?

"To discuss the War situation following the last Imperial Conference of 11 Jan 1938? (Exh. 2197, interview with Domei, 26 June 1938)

15. Then you had a very important position in that Conference?

16. Then your policy must have been identical with the decisions of that Conference?



4

Itagaki

17. After you became War Minister, were there a number of 5 Ministers' Conferences?
18. Did/ you attend all the 5 Ministers' Conferences in Summer 1938?
19. Were there many important decisions at these Conferences?
20. I ask the witness be shown IPS DOC 2570-B.
21. Please look at the contents and tell the Tribunal whether this document contain the decisions of 5 Ministers' Conferences.
22. I tender in evidence IPS DOC 2570-B



5

Itagaki

IN CASE ITAGAKI REFUSES TO IDENTIFY 2570-B

1. Follow the decisions of that Document.
2. Incorporate the substances of various decisions in the questions.
3. Ask him if that was not the decision of the 5 Ministers' conference on that date so and so.
4. Ask him exhaustively, thus laid a very good foundation for rebuttal.

~~XXXXXX~~



Stagaki

II. INTRODUCE 2570-B, 5 MINISTERS CONFERENCE DECISIONS, JULY-OCT 1938

- 1. Read No. 2 -- make the Chinese Government join the existing new regimes.
- 2. Harbord Ques. -- was this your peace conditions to China? and you think that they were not as exacting as the terms through Trautmann?
- 3. Read No. 3 -- occupy strategic points.
- 4. Ques. -- how would you reconcile this decision with your policy of localization?
- 5. Read No. 4 -- Mohomedans in northwest China.
- 6. Ques. -- So you were also interested in the domestic political situation of China?
- 7. Read No. 5 -- guide the new Central Government.
- 8. Ques. -- so you were still following the decisions of the 15 Jan 1938 to make peace with a new Central Government which was going to be established?
- 9. Read No. 7 -- make British stop aiding Chiang.
- 10. Harbord Ques. -- so you were still following the decisions of 15 Jan 1938 to defeat Chiang?
- 11. Read No. 8 -- put off British and German mediation.
- 12. Ques. -- How would you reconcile this decision with your contention that you favored an early settlement with China?
- 13. Read No. 10 -- prepared force against Russia.
- 14. Ques. (reference questions from Mr. Tavenner)
- 15. Read No. 12 -- Special Commission on China
- 16. Read No. 13 -- DOHIMARA in that Commission.



7

Itagaki

IV. AFTER DEALING WITH 2570-B, concentrate on DOHIHARA

1. Now DOHIHARA was sent to China. who sent him? By the decision of the 5 Ministers' conference?
2. Who recommended him? you as the War Minister?
3. ~~what~~ what was his mission to China?
4. To work on Wu and Tang?
5. Were Wu and Tang in retirement?
6. Was DOHIHARA's mission in accordance with the policy to defeat Chiang and establish new central Government?
7. Why was DOHIHARA picked up to undertake such a Mission?
8. Was he not at that time a Division Commander?
9. Was it not because you knew DOHIHARA very well? and you knew that he was an expert in setting up new Government?
10. Let me refresh your memory, was it not the same DOHIHARA who became Mayor of Mukden after the Manchurian Incident?
11. Was it not the same DOHIHARA who went to Tientsin in 1931 to talk with Henry Pu Yi?
12. Was it not the same DOHIHARA who went to North China in 1935 to explain the attitude of the Kwantung Army with regard to North China autonomy?
13. Was it not the same DOHIHARA who went to sign the ~~xxx~~ so-called DOHIHARA Ching Agreement when you were Vice Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army?
14. Was it not the same DOHIHARA who went to meet Prince Teh in Inner Mongolia in 1935?
15. And now, when you became the War Minister, DOHIHARA, a division Commander, <sup>in</sup> was again sent to China to contact the Chinese retirement?



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Itazaki

IV. INTRODUCE 1005-(1) and 2178-g

16. Was ~~there~~ the Special Commission on China a secret organ? Was the organ ever made public?
17. When DOHIMARA went to China, he was constantly under the direction of the War Ministry and the Army General Staff, was it not true?
18. Was it not true that DOHIMARA maintained a secret organization in China wither known as DOHIMARA Kikan or "TA-KE Kikan?"
19. Because of the nature of DOHIMARA's mission, did he need large funds?
20. Do you know the so-called Anti-Commintern National Salvation League in China?
21. Do you know that it was financed by Japan?
22. To refresh your memory, I suggest to you that it was financed by Japan by the decision of the KO-A-IN, the China Affairs Board, of which you were a member as the War Minister.
23. May the witness be shown IPS DOC 1005-(1)
24. (press him further)
25. Now, when DOHIMARA was working on ~~that~~ WU pei-fu, did you also finance the project?
26. I suggest to you that the WU project was financed ~~as~~ in the same manner as the National Salvation League.
27. May the witness be shown IPS DOC 2178, Item g in it?
28. (press him further)
29. Was it not true that DOHIMARA's work on WU did not succeed?
30. In the spring of 1939, when DOHIMARA failed to get WU, and KAGESA succeeded to get WANG, then DOHIMARA was ordered to come back to Japan?
31. The DOHIMARA KIKAN was taken over by KAGESA?
32. DOHIMARA's TA-KE Kikan was incorporated into KAGESA's U-ME Kikan?



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Stagaki

VI. INTRODUCE 2570-A, 5 MINISTERS CONFERENCE

1. Now let us come back to the 5 Ministers' conference. Did it in August 1938 decide upon some propaganda plan?
2. Was it not decided that every citizen should be made to understand the true intention of the Japanese Government with regard to the Holy War with China?
3. Was it not decided that every minister should be responsible to carry out such propaganda?
4. Was it not decided that civilian organizations should be made to do the same?
5. May the witness <sup>be</sup> shown IPS DOC 2570-A.
6. Was that the decision and you were one of the 5 Ministers?
7. Was ~~not~~ it in line with your interview with Dome a month ~~earlier~~ earlier that the war with China might go on for another 10 years and you asked for public support? (Exh. 2197)



VII. QUESTIONS ON P. 32 and THEREAFTER  
INTRODUCE 2178-A and 2178-B

1. Now, let us come back to your Affid. On p. 33 in the last parag. you stated that Japan had refrained from establishing military Government. Not even for a short while? Not even once?
2. Was this statement true with regard to Hankow and Canton in South China?
3. Was it true with regard to Hainan Island in the south sea Area?
- ~~4. Did you set up a certain administration in Hankow and Canton, wherein the political affairs in these two districts were administered by Japanese?~~
4. Did you set up a certain administration in Hankow and Canton, wherein the political affairs in these two districts were administered by Japanese?
5. Was it a fact that although these administrations did not bear the name of military administration, yet there were the so-called political Guidance Agency?
6. Was it not true that the 5 Ministers Conference decided that the political guidance agency should take up the internatl guidance of these administrations?
7. Was such a part of the work or assignment of the Speical Commission on China?
8. May the witness <sup>be</sup> shown IPS DOC 2178-A and 2178-B.
9. Read 2178-A and 2178-B.
10. Did you see in the last paragraph, the Special Commission on China was mentioned?
11. Was it the work of DOHIMARA, HENSAI and TSUDA?



11

*Hagaki*

VIII. CHINA AFFAIRS BOARD, BASED ON 674-C

1. Now at the same time when you established such administrations in Hankow and Canton, you were also prepared to set up an organ to be in charge of all the affairs in occupied China?
2. Base the following questions on the suggested list of questions by Mr. Laverge.



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Itayaki

X. X. Now, after the establishment of the China Affairs Board, as you stated on page 34 of your affidavit, you stated that the intervention of the Army in administration matters were held to the minimum.

1. The intervention of the Army in administration matters was quite extensive, was it true?
2. Even after the establishment of the China Affairs Board, there ~~was~~ were still some, was it not true?
3. Do you know as a matter of fact that after the establishment of China Affairs Board, the Army still tightened its control on Chinese provincial and local governments?
4. Do you know that the Liaison Office of the China Affairs Board in China still had to obtain the understanding of the local army there before they could do anything?
5. Do you know that such was actually reported by Councillor Horinchi at Peiping to Foreign Minister ARITA on March 4, 1939?
6. Had Foreign Minister ARITA ever reported this or mentioned this to the 5 Ministers' conference?



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Itagaki

(IX)(X) AND (X) AND (XI)

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE OF NOV. 30th, 1938 AND  
INTRODUCE 2178-C and 3090-C

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

1. Now after all these 5 Ministers Conferences and the Fall of Hankow and Canton in November 1938 and the establishment of the administrations there, do you recall that there was an IMPERIAL CONFERENCE?
2. Was this Imperial Conference held on Nov. 30th, 1938?
3. Was this Imperial Conference held the first one after the Imperial Conference of Jan 11th, 1938?
4. Did you as the War Minister attend the Conference?
5. As a matter of fact, that Imperial Conference decided on many important points? was it not true?
6. I suggest to you that the Imperial Conference decided on the separate rule of China, that is, there should be separate regimes for North China and Inner Mongolia? There should be a special zone of economic cooperation between Japan and China in the lower reaches of Yangtze, including Nanking and Shanghai? That if China accepted all these demands, as a guarantee, Japan would still station troops in China? And the Army stationing there should have the right of requisition?
7. May the witness be shown IPS DOC 2178-C.
8. Read 2178-C
9. Now, at the same Conference which you attended, do you recall that HIRANUMA made a speech?
10. May the witness be shown IPS DOC 3090-C.
11. Did you agree with his idea of New Order in East Asia?



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Itagaki

XII. WANG'S FLIGHT FROM CHUNGKING PRE-ARRANGED

1. Now the Imperial Conference decided on these conditions of settlement with China. Do you have any hope that these conditions would be accepted by Chungking?
2. On the basis of the decisions of the Imperial Conference, you were still working on the establishment of a new Central Government in China, was that true?
3. You as War Minister dispatched KAGESA to work on WANG for him to head the new Central Government, was that true?
4. Do you recall that as early as December 12th, you already knew that WANG was going to escape from Chungking around the 18th?
5. You did not? But KIDO already knew and recorded in his diary?
6. Did not KAGESA report such to you?
7. KAGESA testified that this was a pre-arranged plan between Japan and Wang?
8. KAGESA said you dispatched him to work on WANG?
9. At that time, near the end of the year 1938, Premier KONOYE wanted very much to resign, and you went to him and KIDO and advised him to remain, saying that WANG was going to escape from Chungking, was that not true?
10. But KONOYE did resign in Jan 1939. You were asked to ~~remain~~ remain as the War Minister. The Army presented through you certain conditions to Premier HIRANUMA before you agreed to ~~remain~~ remain War Minister, was that not true? (IPS DOC 3171-A, and B already introduced against YAMAWAKI)



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Itagaki

INSERT THE FOLLOWING TO THE PRECEDING PAGE

1. Was the KOMBE's statement of 22 Dec 1938 a pre-arranged plan with WANG who was going to escape from Chungking around the same time?
2. Let me refresh your memory by reading from R.P. 24041. KANEHA testified

\*\*\*\*\*



Hogohi: Present Eton

Kido

6-18-38 Called Kido.  
re: How to effect a speedy settlement of  
the China Incident. Kido said.  
Kronya cabinet engaged with the aim of  
bringing about a prompt settlement of the China  
incident. His personal opinion - China must  
must be speedily settled. Naturally I agreed  
with him -

8-2-38 Cabinet meeting  
when policy of  
Chen Kuang incident discussed. Present  
Kido present - 2 points decided.  
(1) Localization - a speedy settlement -  
(2) France with + diplomatic relations to speed  
settlement - any would cooperate the it as  
method of crisis claimed by H. S. P.



Warren <sup>2lagodi</sup> <sup>Quint</sup> <sup>Enam</sup>  
for Heronimus

Jan 1939 with " cabinet formed

Heronimus asked me to remain in the cabinet.  
1-5-39. H. sd <sup>finally</sup> took new cabinet  
to effect a speedy settlement of the China incident.

He was now joining the previous cabinet.

H. sd nothing <sup>new</sup> strengthening the Tri-  
Partite Pact. but would defer this  
after forming the cabinet. I reported  
this to 3 chiefs conference. (of army)  
I was induced to remain in office as de-  
pute.

sent the milk, ~~Yonawoki~~ to carry in  
acceptance. This is all my conversation with  
Heronimus.

re: Yonawoki (last Monday)

re: paper outlining 7 conditions, his acceptance.  
as War notes - I do not know anything about that



Osaka

~~Stogohi~~

negotiation

re: negotiat<sup>n</sup> } <sup>via</sup> Partito <sup>all'idea</sup> -  
cos. aff. re. Stolun tratt.

I did not send a telegram to  
Osaka in Berlin - never.

Ex 2230 ~~10-28~~ 5.28.39 ex. document.

says we must <sup>restrain</sup> ~~restrain~~ <sup>from my</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>action of</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>telegram</sup>  
asking him to ~~restrain~~ <sup>restrain</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>action of</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>telegram</sup>

~~write~~. making an arista -  
the army is determined <sup>to</sup> ~~to~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>at</sup>  
the cost of the fall of the cabinet.

Denies in toto - I have never sent  
him a telegram.



She? is raised by a member of  
Court as to the  
Extent to which a document  
admitted - one accused may  
be used against all.

---

that the Prosecution then this notes  
these acts relate only to

Japanese admiral. Reys

if we decided that document  
was ev. ... minor who objected to  
it we would have given a  
wrong decision - not objected to by  
other accused + admitted - then seen  
the court not yet takes objections.



*Sutton*

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Ex. 3316

Def. Doc. 2555

EXHIBIT # \_\_\_\_\_

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: ITAGAKI, Seishiro

Having first duly sworn en oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.



*objection*  
*Itagaki's statement except pp 1-27-28*



INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST  
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- v -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT OF ITAGAKI, Seishiro

I. DURING THE PERIOD AS STAFF OFFICER OF THE  
KWANTUNG ARMY (1st May, 1929 - 30th July, 1932)

1. I was appointed staff officer of the Kwantung Army (Army Colonel) on 1st May, 1929, the 4th Year of Showa, and held that post until 30 July 1932, the 7th Year of Showa. The Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army at the time of my above appointment was Lieut. Gen. Eitaro Hata. At the time of the Manchurian Incident the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army was Lieut. Gen. HONJO, Shigeru and the Chief of Staff was Major-General Miyake, Mitsuji.

My duties were to receive orders from the Chief of Staff and to maintain contact between Staff officers and manage the staff office, and also attend to liaison business of the army.

As for the duties and privileges of the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, the Chief of Staff and Staff officers, they are ruled in the Regulations of the Kwantung Army Headquarters (Court Exhibit No. 1415).

2. General situation in Manchuria before the Manchurian Incident, as follows:

(a) In China, since 1925, a movement for the recovery of alleged lost national rights had been started and anti-Japanese actions became increasingly active. In Manchuria also there occurred violations of Japan's rights and interests. In June, 1928, the 3rd Year of Showa, CHANG Tsuo-lin was killed by a bomb and CHANG Hsueh-liang succeeded him. In the same year the CHANG Hsueh-liang regime affiliated with the Nanking Government, changed the Manchurian colour, adopted the "blue sky and white sun" ensign & letting influences of the Chinese Nationalist Party penetrate into Manchuria.



The anti-Japanese movement there was organized under the direction of the Kuomintang and government offices and it became very active and intense. The Japanese rights in Manchuria were infringed and the Japanese nationals were squeezed in the belt-like strip along the South Manchurian Railway. The extreme pressure against the Korean immigrants, violence and oppression of the Japanese and obstruction to communication, etc. were intensified and increased in number. In spite of the earnest and sincere cooperative policy of Foreign Minister Shidehara, no prospect for relaxation of the anti-Japanese activities in China was in sight, and the situation was continuously aggravated. Just before the outbreak of the Incident, several hundred questions were pending.

(b) On the other hand, in the military field, CHANG Hsueh-liang, since taking office as the Vice Commander of the Kuomintang Army in the Fall of 1928, planned to strengthen and reorganize the army under his control, and he increased the strength of the standing army to two hundred odd thousand, enlarged the scale of the Mukden Arsenal, equipped the army with such modern arms as tanks and airplanes and strengthened the system of discipline. Thus he endeavoured to raise both the quality and the quantity of his army, and as a result, as compared with the Kwantung Army at that time, not only in its strength but in its equipment, his army was far superior to it.

Since then the anti-Japanese sentiments gradually influencing the Chinese Troops, they assumed a contemptuous attitude toward the Japanese troops, boasting of the superiority of the Chinese Army and the abundance of their experiences of actual fighting through engaging in yearly internal wars, and the anti-Japanese sentiments of the officers and men became very vigorous.

*Language* → Thus the danger of collision between the Japanese & Chinese armies came to be felt and the situation became very *critical*.



Moreover, the disposition of the Chinese troops was changed so as to encircle our garrison areas along the South Manchurian Railways and the Kwantung troops which had been placed dispersedly, fell into a situation extremely dangerous from the military point of view. That is to say, that while no more than ten odd thousand Kwantung troops, with the inferior equipment and formation, had been stationed dispersedly, still on peace time footing, in the area almost one thousand kilometers<sup>long</sup>, along the South Manchurian Railway, they came to be placed under siege by the large force of two hundred<sup>thousand</sup>/odd Chinese troops, equipped with superior arms, burning with anti-Japanese sentiments, and assuming a most provocative attitude.

23. With the anti-Japanese situation increasingly aggravated and the Chinese troops aflame with anti-Japanese sentiments, a danger of collision between the Japanese and Chinese armies had thus been gradually fermented. The solution of the situation seemed extremely difficult unless either the Japanese or Chinese would concede or compromise, because the situation between Japan and China at that time was the collision between the conflicting demands, the recovery of China's alleged lost rights and the maintenance of our rights and interests. But the Chinese had no intention at all to compromise and the situation was that anti-Japanism by force of arms would be inevitable. If we were to avoid it, there was no solution for us except to abandon all the special rights and interest we had in political, economic and military fields generally. However such a thing as the wholesale abandonment of our rights and interests was not only what our government could not undertake but also what the national public opinion would not permit. Therefore, as for the Kwantung Army, they tried hard to avoid friction with the Chinese, sought all means of appeasement, admonished our officers and men to be patient and cautious, prohibiting any rash acts.



However, on the other hand, they were under the necessity to working out an emergency counter-measure in case of collision between the Japanese and Chinese troops, which might happen by positive military actions on the part of the Chinese. The Kwantung Army, in order to deal with the pressing situation desired to increase its strength, change the disposition of its troops, and replete its equipment, but this desire was not approved by the central authorities of the army. Therefore, the Kwantung Army mapped out a plan with the then existing strength and equipment, without getting assistance from the central authorities since the previous year. They established a plan of operations that in case of collision between the Chinese and the Japanese troops, the Kwantung Army would concentrate its main forces in the vicinity of Mukden and deliver a heavy blow to the nucleus of the Chinese forces in Mukden, and thus by sealing the fate of the enemy, would settle the matter within a short period. They decided to make preparations necessary for education, training, communication, transportation and other things, in accordance with the above plan, and to make up for the shortcomings of the fighting power by utilizing the material for military operations, which could be found in Manchuria, to the best possible advantage.

an Mukden plan

①

1767A-1

guns at Mukden

Paragraph

implicitly

It was a part of that plan that they set two heavy guns in the premises of the Mukden Independent Garrison Barracks in Mukden. These guns were those which became needless as the result of scaling down of the fortifications at Port Arthur, and were appropriated. <sup>rather reducing the strength of</sup> It was a natural step to make up the shortage of the fighting power, and it was in order not to stimulate the Chinese in the peace time that they concealed the setting up of those guns. Commander-in-Chief Honjo, who had taken the post and arrived in August 1931, actually witnessed repeated occurrences of incidents due to the intensification of anti-



Japanese feeling, especially such serious cases as killing Captain NAKAMURA, Wanpaoshan Incident, and disturbances staged against the troops guarding railways in various places and on their practice maneuvers, read out the mounting tension of the situation. Then he strictly warned the officers and enlisted men against any rash act, but at the same time instructed them to the execution of their duties positively and decidedly once emergency arose.

4. I was accompanying Commander-in-Chief Honjo on his informal inspection trips of the troops under his command, and finished the trips with the inspection of the troops located at Liaoyan on 18 September, 1931 (6th Year of Showa). On the same day Commander-in-Chief Honjo was informed by the Chief of Staff Miyake, that Major General Tategawa, the Chief of the First Department of the General Staff Office, was coming to Mukden; and Miyake requested him to send either ISHIWARA or me, staff officers, to Mukden to meet the Major General. Assuming that the matter would probably be in connection with the terms of negotiation on the case of NAKAMURA, Shintaro, Commander-in Chief Honjo ordered me to go to Mukden. Accordingly, I went to Mukden from Liaoyan. Toward evening that day, Major General TATEKAWA arrived, and I greeted and dined with him. The Major General, saying that having left Tokyo in a hurry he missed the special train and was unable to take sufficient rest in the crowded coach, and he was worn out. Since he was scheduled to stay there for a few days, he did not incline to mention his business immediately, except a few words to the effect that the superiors were worrying about the careless and unscrupulous conduct of the young officers. I answered that there was no need of worrying if it was the business, and remarked that I would hear him at leisure the next day, because he seemed tired out. Then we closed the talk, and I took leave to return to my billet.

*Mukden Incident*

*Longway*

*Longway*

*My business to suggest... why did he not go fully into it*

*who remained in post without that day*

*He got back after staying 7 or 8 days of rest*



*Language deleted*

5. On my way to the billet after taking leave of Major General TATEGAWA, as I was concerned with the case of NAKAMURA, Shintaro, I went to the Special Service

*what he*

Section of Mukden in order to get further information about it, but as there was no further news I chatted for a while with the staffs. Just as I was going to return to my billet there was a telephone from the garrison troops, calling the Special Service Section and re-

*what staff at what hour of the night*

② ③

ported the case of blasting up the railway line at Liu Chiaokou. By several following contacts by telephone, I understood that just after 10:00 P.M. Chinese troops blasted the rail line of the South Manchurian Railway at the western side of Peitaying, north of Mukden, and the

*and damaged track*

*1767A-3*

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1767A2*

patrolling scouts of the company of Hushihtai received shots from the enemy lying in ambush. Upon receiving the information the company of Hushihtai hurriedly went to their rescue, collided and engaged in a battle with Chinese troops. Although they had occupied a corner of Peitaying in spite of the enemy's resistance, with the enemy increasing machine guns and infantry guns, the company was hard pressed. From the report of the railway guard it was clear that the incident was not a mere infringement upon rights and interests in the shape of blasting the railway, but a planned challenge of the Chinese Regular Army against the Japanese Army; and it was judged that the Seventh Brigade of Peitaying was in action against us. Therefore, I keenly felt the risk was so close that if we hesitated a moment the leased territories attached to the South Manchurian Railway and the Japanese troops would be encircled and attacked by the Chinese Army in Mukden.

At that moment Lieutenant Colonel SHIMAMOTO and Colonel HIRATA sent the word to the Commander-in-Chief and others through the Special Service Section of Mukden.



SHIMAMOTO, the Second Battalion Commander of the Independent Infantry Garrison, stated that he would immediately go to rescue with all his troops the Hushihtai Company, which was in a desperate battle at a corner of Peitaying, and HIRATA, the 29th Regimental Commander, who had been informed of the situation, declared that he, as the Commander of the Garrison made up his mind to cooperate with SHIMAMOTO's Battalion by attacking the Mukden Wall with all the power under his command.

In the capacity of a Staff officer/<sup>who</sup> happened to be present there, I accepted their determinations and took steps to report to the Commander-in-Chief that the Independence Garrison would fight it out with the enemy at Peitaying and the 29th Regiment against the enemy within Mukden. The reason why I accepted was:

(i) the determination of the above commanders were absolutely necessary, in the line with the plan of operations of the army in case of emergency, not only for the self-defense of the troops in Mukden, but also for the benefit of the activities of the main force of the army;

(ii) I thought it was necessary to give these Commanders assurance in taking actions according to their determinations by my acknowledgment, since I as a staff officer was fully conversant with the intentions of the Commander-in-Chief previously.

When I reported the details of the above steps to the Commander-in-Chief Honjo as the headquarters of the Kwantung Army moved to Mukden on 19 September, he approved the steps as they completely coincided with his intentions.

6. On the night of 18th September we informed the Consulate-General of Mukden by telephone of the outbreak of the incident and of the actions taken by the army, and asking Consul MORISHIMA to come up to the Special Service office we explained the circumstances in detail and asked for his cooperation.



I also talked about the matter with Consul-General HAYASHI several times by telephone. Consul-General HAYASHI said that, as Japan and China had not yet formally entered the war, and as the Chinese, through consultant CHAO, Hsin-po, had announced their adoption of the principle of non-resistance he hoped that the army would arrange the matter so it could be dealt with through diplomatic agents, putting an end to the military actions on the part of Japan at that time. In reply to his assertion, I explained the following in detail and asked his reconsideration. That is to say, the incident this time was different from those of the predecessors, because the regular army of the Chinese had challenged the Japanese army; the fighting between the Chinese and the Japanese was already under way, and it was impossible for the present to separate them.

~~Language~~  
 I said that I  
 would follow  
 your advice if  
 circumstances permitted  
 I explained the  
 following in detail

Anyway, unless the present military actions would be settled it was practically impossible to place the case to the diplomatic negotiations. Though the Chinese were saying that the Chinese were completely abiding by the principle of non-resistance, according to the report from the frontier, they were attacking at Hushihtai, causing dead and injured. I could not imagine that CHAO Hsin-po would be able to arrange a cease-fire agreement on his own responsibility, because he was a mere civil official, having no influence in military affairs. Particularly what had to be considered was that it could not be known whether it might not prove to be the enemy's habitual trick in order that they might rearrange the situation by gaining time, making the actions of the Japanese army delayed and relaxed. I told him we had to be careful, that the condition was of such a grave nature that it permitted no hesitation. I, also, pointed out that the realization of Consul-General HAYASHI's contention was practically impossible in the light of then actual situations.



The battle around Mukden terminated on the 19th September. However, as all the Chinese functionaries who were holding important posts of the city administration had fled, the police, communications, and the banking services all came to a standstill. All the citizens closed their doors and the city became utterly chaotic. The convicts came out of the prison and ran rampant on the streets. Thus the situation became so bad that we could not leave it that way even for a moment, in the interests of public safety. In view of the above circumstances, and also to cope with the earnest desire of the citizens, the army commander Honjo, for the purpose of maintaining public safety, promulgated immediately an emergency municipal administration and appointed Colonel DOHIHARA as the temporary Mayor. The Kwantung Army had no intention of instituting a military administration. They did not admit any other soldier than Colonel DOHIHARA to take part in the administration and apart from a few Japanese advisors, the greater part of the functionaries were Chinese nationals. Thus its purpose was to maintain the public peace as a temporary measure with the arrangement that whenever a qualified Chinese was available the power of administration should immediately be transferred to him.

Colonel DOHIHARA served only one month as temporary Mayor, and on the 20th October Mr. CHAO Hsin-po became Mayor and almost all of the advisors were removed..

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Lay Garrison on

(3) 1767 A-5 - 3rd Haijishi 4 Shidiban 21 Sept 31

... list of administration in Mukden.  
Names of officers

(4) ... - 1767 A-22 13 Oct 31  
only few



8. Commander-in-Chief Honjo had been too cautious to disclose any of his political opinions during the course of the hostilities of the Manchurian Incident.

However, when the independence declaration of each province of Manchuria as well as of some influential persons therein created a general tendency throughout Manchuria that the establishment of a new state was inevitable, he made public, at the end of October 1931 at Kwantung Army Headquarters, the following important statement:

In view of the fact that the Sino-Japanese conflict which had existed before the Manchurian Incident led itself to the present regrettable all out clash between the two countries, we must make certain that an unfortunate incident of this nature should never happen again. In order to do so, we must devise measures with which to settle the incident to the complete satisfaction of both countries. The first step toward materialization of this measure would be to pay high regard to the expressed desire of the whole Manchurian people.

The anti-Japanese movement which had been conducted before the present incident contributed to creating among the Chinese people an anti-Japanese sentiment, which finally developed into a bitter feeling of enmity.

This feeling seems to have been eliminated now, but we must go a step further to completely wipe it out from their mind by enhancing the spirit of racial harmony to such extent that the people of both countries feel no racial discrimination among them.

So long as Japan maintains her special rights and interests in Manchuria, it cannot help causing a sense of unequality and a sense of being oppressed among the Manchurian people, no matter how legally right the Japan's rights and interests, from the viewpoint of international law, may be.

April  
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Therefore, Japan should voluntarily give up her rights and interests there, renounce her special right of extraterritoriality and should return Port Arthur and Dairen to Manchuria, if, by doing so, the relations between the two countries can attain such standard as where the interests of both countries become identical and where the sense of racial discrimination no longer exists.

Since the Japanese and the Manchurian people are the elements constituting the state of Manchuria, based on the equal footing without racial discrimination, Japanese should abandon all of their superior complex and the sense of special rights over that area. They must realize that they stand on an equal footing with the Manchurian people in constituting this new state whether as government officials or civilians. I suggest that those who serve the new country as government officials should have such determination as to naturalize themselves to that country.

Maladministration of Chang Hsuehliang was the cause of hatred, not only of the governmental authorities of Japan and Manchuria, but also of all of the thirty million Manchurian populace. Chang Hsuehliang's failure with the Manchurian people lay in his adoption of sole party policy. One thing Manchuria should be most careful about in the future is to respect the will of the people by rejecting the return of Chang Hsuehliang and his party.

Restoration of imperial regime in Manchuria would be an act of anachronism, furthermore, it is apt to give birth to an evil cause which will deprive Manchuria forever of her possible opportunity of harmonizing with China in the future. Even if Mr. Henry Pu Yi were to become the head of the new state in compliance with the request of thirty million Manchurian people, there must be a clear distinction between his assumption as head of the state and the restoration of imperial regime.



Independence of the new state is the result of a movement of a race freeing itself from the nation to which it belonged, and so it is not in any way violating any treaty. Those influential Manchurian people of the present should be fully responsible to the people of Manchuria.

It is feared that the independence of a new state may overshadow the path to cooperation between China and Japan, but at the same time, it is possible that the new state, by administering good rule, can work as a tie for China-Japan collaboration in the future, and we must hope that this should be the case with the coming new state.

What everything depends upon is good administration and the welfare of the people. The misgoverning in the past, administered by the former military clique should of course be improved. First of all, the heavy extortion of tax should either be abolished or alleviated. All laws purporting to be anti-Japanese should immediately be abolished.

The Kwantung Army should be indifferent to all political affairs of Manchuria. It should leave all the administrative matters of the new state to the independent and autonomous regime of the Manchurian people, and should solely limit its action, as its guiding principle, to assisting the maintenance of law and order. However, the national defense should be a problem for the joint strength of Japan and the new state, and, for the time being, the Kwantung Army should appoint itself to this task.

The Kwantung Army must convince, and gain absolute confidence of the Manchurian people as being their friend. So far, the Japanese government gave us those prohibitive instructions only, such as prohibiting us from participating in political and administrative matters, or instructing us to avoid restoration of Imperial regime, and no definite indication as to the future policy of the Kwantung Army has been shown by them.



We presume it is only natural under the circumstances. What we should do at this juncture is, while devoting our undivided attention to our primary duty as an army, we must make close observation upon the future relation between Manchuria and Japan in order to be able to report the true aspect of the situation to the central government, and, at the same time, should be determined not to interfere with their political movement which is intended to represent the unanimous desire of thirty million Manchurian people of immediately saving the present situation of turmoil. While we should not be reluctant in giving assistance within our power to the Manchurian people whenever asked for it, we must not force ourselves upon them.

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9. I had been taking every opportunity to talk with the Chinese leading authorities and powerful civilians to ascertain their views, so that I could report them to the Military Commander.

I learned that among those personages there prevailed, as a common sentiment, a strong feeling of



animosity against CHANG Hsue-Liang, a dislike of the Koumintang politics, and, consequently, the observance of the principle of the "Hokyo Anmin" (the border security and the peace for people), that is to say, ardent desire for independence of Manchuria. Mr. LO Chen-yu, the authoritative person of the faction of the Restoration, came from Lushun (Port Arthur) to see me at the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army, at Mukden, on the 23rd September, immediately after the incident. <sup>occurred on 16/9/31</sup> He told me then that the faction for the Restoration wished to call the Emperor HSUAN Tung to Manchuria. He then went to see HSI Chia in Kirin where he met CHANG Hai-peng at Taonan, and came back again to Mukden on the 26th September. He then told me that at Kirin, CHANG Hai-peng who was preparing for the independent movement was desirous of welcoming the Emperor HSUAN Tung to Kirin, and of the firm decision of General CHANG Hai-peng for independence and his intention to support the Emperor HSUAN Tung. Mr. YU Chung-han had an interview with army commander Honjo on the 3rd, November, and suggested to him the necessity of establishing a new state on the basis of his cherished principle of the "Border security and the peace for the people." Within a short time after the incident, in many provinces and districts, independence was declared. At that time we got information to the effect that the movements of establishing an independent state were gradually growing among the principal political leaders in various districts, since the general tendency in the provinces of Mukden, Kirin and Heilungkiang had been settled, by the entry of the Japanese army into Tsitsihar in the middle of November of the 6th Year of Showa (1931). So I successively interviewed, by order of the army commander, during the period from the latter part of November to the middle of December, the political leaders of the various districts who were the supporters of independence.



Among them: Mr. CHANG, Ching-hui at Harbin  
Mr. MA Chan-shan at Hailun  
Messrs HSI Chia and HSEH Chieh-shih at Kirin  
Messrs TSANG Shih-i and YUAN Chin-kin at Mukden

I thus met with the leaders of independent states and heard their opinions about the problem of establishing a new State. They were, without exception, against the return of the CHANG Hsueh-liang regime to Manchuria, and they did not want the Nanking Government in Manchuria, as they hated the politics of the Kuomintang. Their common and earnest desire was to take active steps to establish an independent state, on the basis of the principle of "border security and the peace for people". They earnestly and frankly told me that, for the construction of a new state, the support of Japan was absolutely necessary, that for the time being the defense must be assumed by Japan, and that the new state required general modern knowledges for which they would depend upon Japanese aid, and that in order to realize the fruit of cooperation, the Japanese and Chinese should stand on equal footing. There were some differences of opinion among them about the question of its polity and sovereignty. Such well known personages of the Restoration faction as HSE Chia, Governor of the Province of Kirin; and HSEH Chieh-shih, both of the Kirin faction, strongly advocated calling in Mr. PU YI as the sovereign, after making Manchuria an independent state, rather than persistently sticking to a mere theory of restoration itself, TSANG Shih-i, Governor of the province of Mukden, and YUANG Chin-kai, both of the Mukden faction, were strongly opposed to the maladministration of CHANG Hsueh-liang, and though they were advocators of the principle of the "border security and the peace for the people", they did not agree to the monarchical restoration. They desired an independent state with a republican regime. As to the sovereign, however, they were of the opinion that they would agree to install Mr. PU YI as the President, rather than

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Prior action  
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from this movement  
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6  
Pressure by army  
High on ground  
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8  
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Pulled into  
subject to  
enter Harbin  
Kwang  
15-  
declared independence  
joined with the  
of the movement



to decide the ruler by election. MA Chan-shan of the Province of Heilunghiang was not the Governor or the Province at that time, but he was a man of real worth possessing his own troops. It was said that regarding the question of establishing a new state he would yield entirely to the opinion of CHANG Ching-hui who, having almost the same view with the men of Mukden faction, was against the Restoration, but was in favour of an independent state in the republican system. All the Mongolian princes were of the same opinion as the Kirin faction. Accordingly, the authoritative persons of the Mukden and Kirin factions were in the position to dominate the general trend of the affairs as to the questions of polity and sovereignty.

It was clear that all the political leaders of the various districts unanimously agreed on the formation of an independent State. This was mainly due, I found out, to the peculiar geographical and historical position of the "East Four Provinces", and especially to the fact that the "East Four Provinces" had heretofore often declared themselves independent, and that by the Japanese declaration of non-occupation of Manchuria the unsatisfied political leaders who were indignant with CHANG Hsueh-liang over his maladministration, came to the surface of the political scene, and moved by political aspiration desired to eternally solidify their position, rejecting the CHANG's return to Manchuria. I made a detailed report to the Military Commander Honjo about the matters above related.

(2) I, having been called by telegram from the Central authority and comprehending the designs of the army commander Honjo, left Mukden for Tokyo on the 4th day of January 7th Year of Showa (1932). Presenting myself at the Military Headquarters and War Ministry, I made reports as follows:



*Report to War Minister  
11 Jan 1933*

(i) That the general tendency of Manchuria was toward an independent State. After having assiduously sounded the prominent authoritative persons and men of real worth in the outside of official circle, I could affirm that they were all earnestly advocating the creation of an independent State, and that the general public, too, were against, not only the return of CHANG Hsueh-liang's regime to Manchuria, but also against the advance of Kuomintang Government to Manchuria. *+ Lightly attracted by the theory*

*Fargway*

(ii) That the Kwantung Army was entirely absorbed in the maintenance of the public peace, and that it placed no limit on the political desires of the native people;

(iii) That if the matter should go as it was, an independent State would undoubtedly be formed, so that the Japanese Government should be well prepared to meet the situation;

(iv) That the Commander Honjo was of the opinion that there remained no other way than to adopt the theory of an independent State, in view of the general trend of the situation at that time."

Then the War Minister ARAKI told me that though the Government policy was not decided yet, as the new cabinet had just been constructed, his principle was to observe the actual situation on the spot, but as to the issue of the independence of the State he did not interfere one way or the other. During my stay in Tokyo I explained in detail the new conditions in Manchuria and the Central authorities well understood regarding the actual situation.

Coming back to Mukden, I submitted my report to the Commander Honjo, concerning the above liaison affair with the Central authorities.



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10. By order of Commander Honjo I had an interview with Mr. PU YI in Port Arthur on January 29, 1932 (7th Year of Showa). An enthusiastic desire for the creation of an independent State had become extremely strong among the powerful as well as the general public of Manchuria at that time and the tendency of forming such a new State, apart from the Restoration movement reached its high pitch with the probability of having Mr. PU YI, the ex-Emperor of HSUAN Tung who has a close connection with Manchuria, as the sovereign of the new State.

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So Commander Honjo ordered me to meet officially with Mr. PU YI and ascertain his intention regarding this matter. I first gave Mr. PU YI a general information concerning the establishing a new state, and then asked his opinion about it. Mr. PU YI was already aware of the trend in Manchuria for the establishment of a new State through the information he had obtained from various sources. He declared that it was of great necessity to establish a new independent State in Manchuria, seceding from China, and to have a good administration for the sake of the 30,000,000 inhabitants there, in close cooperation with Japan. He also stated that he had the intention to accept the sovereignty of the new State. He also insisted upon the Restoration and the conversation lasted for several hours. The main reasons were as follows:

- (1) The courteous treatments and conditions afforded to the CHING Family did not abolish the title of "Emperor". So he was still an Emperor. Consequently, he could not accept any post which did not carry this title;
- (2) The cultural level of the people of Manchuria being low, the Imperial Rule was necessary;
- (3) As to the system of the Imperial Rule, a general cabinet had to be established, in



subordination to a political organ under the direct control of the Emperor who shall decide himself all the state affairs.

I wondered whether the real intention of Mr. PU YI was to decline to accept the sovereignty of a new state if the State was not formed according to the principle of the Monarchial Restoration, or whether he would accept the offer to be the head of a new state any way. However, as the interview lasted pretty long already, I took my leave, and in another room I met CHENG Chui, the son of CHENG Hsiao-hsu, whom I asked if Mr. PU YI had an idea to refuse to become the head of a new State. He was very much astonished at that and said that could not be so; on the contrary he thoroughly understood the present day political situation, and was ready to accept the offer to become the head of a new State. He further explained to me that, though he did not know the true meaning of Mr. PU YI's talk to me, he thought that it must have been, perhaps, a simple expression of his desire before accepting the office. Then I asked him if I could construe the attitude of Mr. PU YI, as meaning he would agree to become the head of the new State, and if I could make report to Commander Honjo to that effect. He said "Yes". Then I left Port Authur for Mukden, and submitted my report to the Commander Honjo.

The object of my interviews with Mr. PU YI was not to persuade him to become the head of the new State, but merely to learn his intention. I had absolutely no notion whatever or acted in such a way as to coerce or intimidate Mr. PU YI, or to cause his advisor CHENG Chui to make Mr. PU YI agree to become head of the new State.

Later on, on the 21st of February LO Chen-yu and



his son came to see me at the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army, saying that they were sent by the Emperor PU YI. They said that the Emperor was still contending for the Imperial Rule of the new State. However, at that time the North-East Administration Committee had already issued, on the 18th of February, the Declaration of Independence, and decided on the 19th that they should establish republican State and that Mr. PU YI, the ex-Emperor HSUAN Tung be requested to accept the administratorship.

Feb

We, therefore, considered that this move of LO Chen-yu was due to the lack of adequate knowledge on the part of Mr. PU YI of the atmosphere of the North-East Administration Committee. So we saw the necessity of directly communicating to Mr. PU YI the actual situation of the North-East Administration Committee, and by order of Commander Honjo I took the night train that day for Port Arthur. On the next day, the 22nd, I met Mr. PU YI and conveyed to him that information. Mr. PU YI understood the circumstances, was already acquainted with the decision taken by the North-East Administration Committee, and expressed his approval. Mr. PU YI, who had insisted, at our first interview, on February 29, on the Imperial Rule for the new State as his doctrine, and who later indicated to us through his chief retainer LO Chen-yu, that his intention was unaltered, gladly adopted, nevertheless, the decision of the North-East Administration Committee, immediately upon being explained the details of that decision. He also gladly accepted the decision of the North-East Administration Committee in regard to the title of the State, the national flag, the site of Metropolis and the name of era. In the midst of our talk I had a telephone call from the Commander Honjo and reported the progress of our interview to him.



The incident of the 18th September was a pure accident and I definitely state that the Kwantung Army did not plan it. As to the establishment of Manchukuo and the installation of Mr. PU YI, I state they were carried out by the naturally created enthusiasm of the native people, and there was no so-called puppet state or puppet administrator created by the schemes or threats of the Japanese Government, or of the Kwantung Army.

The allegation by the prosecution that I and a few other staff officers schemed and acted arbitrarily without following the desires of the Commander-in-Chief, General Honjo, is a fabrication and as far as I am concerned, I affirm, there is not an iota of truth in it.