

DEFENSE WITNESSES — KAYA

DOC. NO.	NAME OF WITNESS	ATTORNEY	REPORT RECD.	EXAM. ATTORNEY
2642	KAYA, OKINORO			
2654	" "			
2118	KOBAYASHI, SEIZO			
2617	YAMAMOTO, KUMAICHI			
2482	USAMI, UZUMIRO			
2653	SHIONO, SUEHIKO			
2062	KUBO, KYUJI			
2658	OGAWA, YATARO			
2518	UCHIDA, SHINYA			
2611	ICHIWATARI, SOTARO			
2058	TAMEMOTO, HIRATSU			
2060	GOTO, RYUNOSUKE			
2059	OKAZAKI, KOICHI			
2061	TOYODA, TEIJIRO			
2656	KAWAGOE, TAKEO			
2057	KAMEYAMA, KOICHI			
2655	SAKUMA, KOICHI			
2119	AKASHI, TERUO			
2657	TSUSHIMA, JUICHI			
(REV) 2659	YUKI, TOYOTARO			

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KAYA, Okinori, DIRECT EXAMINATION,
by Mr. Levin.

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* The accused identified exhibit 3337 as his affidavit, and after a correction verified it. * The affidavit stated that the accused was born in 1889, and after graduation from Tokyo Imperial University in 1917 * he entered the Finance Ministry, becoming a civil servant. Subsequently he was a secretary to the Japanese Financial Commissioner in New York City in 1918, and was in the Accounts Bureau in 1920; went to the Geneva Disarmament Conference in 1927 and to the London Naval Conference of 1929, as an attendant to the Plenipotentiary WAKATSUKI. In March, 1930, he became secretary to the Finance Minister and Section Chief of the Accounts Bureau. In November, 1932, he was Chief of the Budget and Settlement Section, and in May 1934 Chief of the Accounts Bureau. He became Chief of the Finance Bureau in May, 1936, and Vice Minister of Finance on 2 February, 1937. He was Minister of Finance from 4 June 1937 to 26 May 1938, when he resigned. In August, 1939, he was appointed President of the North China Development Company, and resigned on 18 October 1941 to become Finance Minister, from which post he resigned on 19 February 1944.

Except for the two years he served as President of the Development Company, his entire career was as an official of the Finance Ministry, devoted to administration. The goal of his endeavor was a healthy national finance. The affidavit stated that the accused had no connection with a rightist, leftist, or military clique, nor was he a member of any political party. For a short period after August, 1934, KAYA joined the IRPAA, but did not know whether it could be called a political party.

In the Ministry, much of his time was spent in the study and evaluation of military and civil budgets, and he constantly tried to slash military budgets and prevent them from increasing. Prevailing conditions made this task difficult, but he believed he succeeded in suppressing their growth.

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* At the Geneva and London Conferences, he exerted himself toward their successful conclusion. His effort to suppress military budgets and to conclude disarmament conferences were due to his superior's instructions and to his personal desire to maintain a healthy finance, lessen the burdens of the people, and increase hopes for peace.

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* As to counts 1 to 5 of the Indictment, to which he was charged, even if the conspiracy and planning of an aggressive war did take place, he was not a party to it and had no connection. As to the Counts from 6 to 38 which he was charged, of those referring to the Manchurian Incident, his record indicated that prior to the Incident and for some time thereafter he was no more than a Section Chief and had no connection with it. From December 1929 to November 1932, he was not even concerned with military budgets, and after those dates he was concerned with military budgets and exerted efforts to reduce them. Demands for military budgets increased greatly after November 1932, and KAYA vehemently opposed the increased demands and fought to keep them down.

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He had no connection with any plan for aggression against FIC or the Soviet. * From 26 May 1938 to 18 October, 1941, he had no connection with the Cabinet nor the Tripartite Pact. He became Finance Minister on 4 June 1937, and knew nothing about the Lukouchiao Incident before its outbreak, nor had the Cabinet any plans in preparation for it. After the Incident, the report was that hostilities broke out due to an illegal attack by the Chinese. The Cabinet decided to regard the Incident as local and to deal with it on the spot. It opposed sending troops from Japan, and if that became inevitable it would be limited to a small number. The sending or increase in troops was due to an army report that continued illegal attacks by Chinese led to massing their forces in the area, so when the army requested an increase to protect Japanese lives and interests the Cabinet could not help but give its assent, * and its motive in doing so was to protect the small Japanese force there.

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He opposed especially sending troops to China for he believed it would spread the Incident. He asked for reconsideration, to no avail, for the other Cabinet members thought it necessary. On every occasion, he tried to limit the budgets required for sending troops. The Cabinet was staunch in its policy to refrain from infringing on third power's rights.

The civil members of the Cabinet were not informed beforehand, nor consulted about battle plans, and they viewed with anxiety the spread of hostilities. The civilian members were not consulted about the Manchurian Incident and received no report about alleged atrocities, nor read anything about them in the press. He did not know such things had been committed.

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* He resigned as Finance Minister in May, 1938, before hostilities spread to Hankow and Canton. His resignation was requested by KONOYE, and he was happy to be relieved.

The arbitrary confiscation of Chinese enterprises, etc., in North China were made by the military for operation purposes, and the Cabinet had no connection. Although the prosecution had charged that when he was Vice Minister of Finance from February to June, 1937, the Five Year Plan for Steel and a Third Plan for North China were adopted, he knew nothing about them, nor did he know about or was he a party to the Army Five Year Plan for Heavy Industries when he was Finance Minister from June 1937 to May 1938.

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* Prior to becoming Finance Minister, financial circles were uncertain, and he felt a difficult responsibility when he assumed the post. The outbreak of the China Incident increased unrest, and during his tenure there was no room for preparing for a future war. The Cabinet had its hands full with the China Incident and did not think about another war.

He was President of the North China Development Company from August 1939 to October, 1941. The Company was established in November 1938, in accordance with laws passed by the Diet, which set out its purpose and object. It aimed for economic cooperation with China, and was not established to infringe upon third powers' economic interests, but desired their participation in the economic development. The Company did not infringe upon Chinese rights, nor made any preparation toward war, nor received Cabinet instructions to that effect. The Company was not permitted to engage in industry, but served as a financial organ, and its activity was confined to investments and loans. It had no power to mobilize material wealth, nor engage in such work. In making loans or investments, the Company was limited by law, and could make them only to utility industries, small manufacturing enterprises, and in the wholesale of coal. It was not concerned with the spinning, tobacco, and milling industries, nor in general trade, agriculture, banking, or insurance.

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* Investments and loans were generally made in Sino-Japanese joint stock companies, and other companies besides the Development Company also made investments. The Company did not exercise a monopoly over investments.

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* It had no arbitrary rights, and no more power than any ordinary company. It aimed to adjust economic activities in North China. It had no control over the economy. Loans and investments were subject to contracts under which the company obtaining financial aid was required to obtain the Company's approval in certain matters to avoid over-investment or unwarranted expansion to bring about a sound economy in North China. The Company had no rights over any industry except those in which it had a financial interest. Even these rights were limited by contract.

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All major acts of the Company were made at the instruction and approval of the China Affairs Board, and it was prohibited from taking any action on its own. The Company's accounts were mostly in the red, and government subsidies were required to pay stockholders dividends, of not more than six per cent per annum. Most of the affiliated companies were either in the red or made little profit. * Japanese stockholders were not given special favors in the payment of dividends.

All funds invested by the Company in North China were raised in Japan, and it received no property or special rights from the North China Political Council, nor was any monopolistic right granted to anyone by the Company, for it had no power to do so. The investments and loans handled were not large, and were small compared to those in Japan and Manchuria.

The Company received no instructions from the government, nor on its own did it attempt to expand the production of the affiliated companies, with 1941 or thereabouts as its goal. While the affiliated companies production increased, the Development Company looked forward towards long-range development. It endeavored toward a solid expansion of the industries it was concerned with, and as an instance, the Tatung Coal Mines was producing ten thousand tons of coal per day when the accused resigned.

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* He thought of plans for the people's welfare, but could not carry them out due to disorder caused by fighting, but he was able to carry out one plan which did help the people. In early 1940 a famine swept the Peiping-Tientsin area, and he was told that importation of twenty million yen of wheat flour was necessary to tide over the crisis, but the North China Political Council and Government of North China did not have necessary foreign funds to buy the flour. The accused negotiated with Japan for twenty million yen to buy the flour. The government was then hard

Page pressed for foreign money, but he managed to obtain the help of the Vice-Minister of Finance OHNO. He next negotiated with the Communications Minister for transporting the flour, and although ship bottoms were short he succeeded in obtaining some and imported considerable amounts of flour into North China.

30648 In 1941 there were rumors that Japanese-U. S. relations were getting worse, * and since he had harbored a sincere hope for the maintenance of peace he felt bad. He did not know anything about the contents of the negotiations nor the policies decided on by the government.

On the night of 17 October 1941, TOJO telephoned the accused to join his Cabinet as Finance Minister. Before replying, he called on TOJO. To his query as to whether TOJO was decided on waging war against the U. S., TOJO replied in the negative, stating he intended to continue the negotiations and exert efforts toward an amicable settlement. The accused then told TOJO that there was a rumor that the Supreme Command and Cabinet did not always cooperate, that unless they reached a closer relationship it would be a stumbling block, and asked TOJO if he intended to do something.

30649 * TOJO replied that he fully understood the deep concern of KAYA and would work toward a closer relationship. KAYA told TOJO that there was a tendency to adopt reform policies. They should forget the ideology and adopt policies in keeping with the needs of the country. To this, TOJO agreed. The accused was quite satisfied with the interview, but left without replying.

30650 The rumor at the time was that the army was especially pronounced in its attitude toward the U. S., and he was relieved to learn that TOJO planned to continue the negotiations. He felt he should join the Cabinet and do what he could, and he consented. Before joining the Cabinet, he had had no relations with TOJO, but had met him only once. * Even after joining, their contacts were solely official.

He did everything in his power to avoid war after joining the Cabinet, realizing his goal should be the successful culmination of the negotiations, but the prevailing circumstances were mostly against settlement and he realized the necessity of working towards the prevention of war even if the negotiations were not settled.

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The first cause for a possible war was the military pressure of Allied powers, and the second was economic pressure. The embargo on vital materials was a blow to Japan, and of all imported materials, oil was the most critical. Without oil, Japan could not maintain national defense. KAYA felt that even if oil imports from the U. S. and NEI should not be renewed due to the negotiations failure, if some other oil source could be found it could prevent war. He therefore suggested a plan for manufacturing synthetic oil and a plan to buy oil from North Karafuto, and if possible buy that territory.

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* He realized the difficulty of his plans, but felt they must do everything possible to avoid war. However, his plans were turned down as impractical. He recalled that of the conditions in the negotiations, he was in favor of equal trade opportunity in all Pacific areas.

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At the Liaison Conference of 1 November 1941, a proposal for immediate war was brought up, but did not meet with favor. For the settlement of the negotiations, the "Ko" and "Otsu" plans were discussed. The conference was unanimous that Japan should give in as much as possible to settle the disputes, but the Supreme Command proposal plunged the conference into extreme difficulty. This proposal was that if by the end of November the negotiations showed no possibility of settlement, they should be ready to decide on war, and with that in mind commencing preparations now was needed. The Supreme Command stated that Japan faced a crisis due to military and economic pressures by the Allies. * If the negotiations remained unsettled and things went along as they were, Japan's defensive power in the western Pacific would decline in comparison with the Allies. They would reach a critical point, and if they were attacked after December or if there was a necessity of waging war in self-defense, Japan would be so weak that the Supreme Command could not accept responsibility for national defense. It stated that they must make up their minds to decide on war before the opportune moment was lost. With that in mind, they should decide on preparing for war.

According to this proposal, the failure of negotiations meant war. Discussions dragged on, but as for the accused it was his desire that they go along as it was, even if negotiations remained unsettled, but there was no way to bring this about. Since the Supreme Command was responsible for defense, it was not possible just to oppose this proposal.

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* To give assent to the proposal meant making the possibility of war that much greater. He was in a difficult position and fully realized what suffering war would mean and they should avoid it if possible. Through experience he knew of the horrors of war. The China Incident had been going on for a long time and the people were feeling its effects. A war with the U. S. would greatly add to their sufferings.

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* The Supreme Command insisted that there was a chance for victory if war began at an opportune time, but the Navy Branch of the Supreme Command predicted that if the war dragged on for over two years its outcome would be uncertain. It was possible that the war might drag on for a long period, and if Japan should lose after a long war she would suffer more than if she had not gone to war at all. For this reason the accused felt he could not then give his assent to the Supreme Command's proposal, and insisted on further consideration, but the Supreme Command replied that the matter called for immediate decision; otherwise, it could not assume responsibility.

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The accused argued against an immediate decision and was allowed to consider the matter for another day. TOGO made the same reservation. Returning home, the accused spent a restless night. A decision on the pending proposal was not a decision to wage war, but it meant it would be highly probable if the negotiations were not settled by the end of November. * He came to the conclusion that regardless of whether the issue was good or bad, circumstances did not permit him to stop it. If he opposed it he would have to resign, and if he resigned the effect would be unfavorable toward settling the negotiations and thus would aggravate the possibility of war.

The next morning TOJO telephoned twice for a reply. The accused believed that further delay would aggravate the issue, so he replied he was not opposed to the proposal, but sincerely hoped for an amicable settlement.

The Hull note of November 26 was a big blow to all. Japan could not accept its terms, and the Foreign Minister explained there was little room for U. S. reconsideration. The question was whether to commence hostilities or drift along with disputes unsettled. The Supreme Command believed that it could not accept responsibility for national defense if hostilities were not begun at once.

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* If the U. S. showed the least compromising attitude there might be a way to continue the negotiations even by altering the "Ko" or "Otsu" plans, but the Hull note indicated settlement was not possible, and a decision to wage war in self defense was inevitable.

Japan was embarking on a perilous war, whether good or bad, and if he resigned the effect to the public would be great, as it would interpret the resignation to mean that financially, Japan was not in a position to fight successfully. When it comes to national defense, public feeling is especially important, and if the people lose confidence it would breed uncertainty and might cause defeat. He was against the war, but could not think of increasing Japan's dangers and felt it his duty to carry out his responsibility.

The decision for war was decided at the Imperial Conference of 1 December, 1941, but the hope for averting war, though dim, was not given up. He obtained at the Liaison Conference the Supreme Command's agreement that * war plans would be cancelled even after the outbreak of skirmishes if the negotiations reached a point where settlement was possible.

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He didn't recall that the reply to the note of November 26 was ever discussed at any Liaison or Cabinet meeting he attended. He thought the matter was competently handled by responsible officials. While the prosecution had charged that a declaration of war was discussed at the Privy Council meeting of 8 December, 1941, such a declaration was discussed, but it was an Imperial Rescript on the declaration of war addressed to the people.

Operation plans were never discussed at liaison or Cabinet meetings. He was not consulted about the Pearl Harbor, or any other attack, nor was he ever informed about such attacks beforehand.

It was his sincere desire to avoid war, and he did everything to do so, but conditions against him were too strong and his assent for war was inevitable, but he firmly believed they were fighting a war in self-defense.

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* As to the attack prior to formal notification in violation of international treaty, he did not know such a plan existed and could not have stopped it. Furthermore, the government had no such plans.

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He had no connection with atrocities and acts in violation of the rules of land warfare. The Supreme Command was an independent organ, and civilian Cabinet members were not informed beforehand or consulted on plans and preparations for battles. Civilian Cabinet members had no power to stop or command a battle, and had no voice in choice of commanders. He, at least, was not even informed of the atrocities, officially or otherwise, and they were not mentioned in the press, nor was he informed about foreign protests, and he was of the impression the war was fairly fought.

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As to the treatment of POWs, he was not informed, nor consulted at Cabinet meetings or elsewhere, nor knew of foreign protests. * He did not even dream of the ill-treatment dealt POWs, nor hear rumors that they were ill-treated, and the press and radio made no mention of it.

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He resigned from the TOJO Cabinet on 19 February, 1944, at TOJO's request. By 1945 it became clear that Japan was facing defeat. The sufferings of the people were extremely painful, and he felt his political responsibility to them. On 11 August, he learned that the government had decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration. Feeling his political responsibility, he made up his mind to resign all marks of honor the Emperor had conferred on him and become a plain citizen. As a private citizen he felt he should do everything he could for the people, * and if circumstances permitted, to do his part to prevent a bad inflation after the war.

DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. BRANNON,
Counsel for OKA and SHIMADA.

The accused stated that by the Supreme Command he meant the General Headquarters, consisting of the Army and Navy General Staff, and he referred to the Chief of Staff and his subordinates, but he did not include the Navy Minister.

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He heard from Chief of the Naval Staff NAGANO at the Liaison Conference of 1 November 1941, that the Navy predicted that a war dragging on for over two years would have an uncertain outcome. He had no recollection of ever hearing at any Liaison Conference he attended, that any member of the Navy advocated an attack without first giving a notice of war.

Page CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. WILEY.

30662 * The accused was asked if between 26 May 1938 and October 18, 1941, he held certain named posts. He stated that with regard to the membership in these various committees he believed he was a member of them, but membership did not mean he was an official of the government. * He resigned from the first KONOYE Cabinet on 26 May, 1938, because he was requested by Premier KONOYE to resign, and he had desired to resign even before that. KONOYE told him that he wanted to carry out a Cabinet reorganization, and that the accused was not on particularly good terms with the military.

The attention of the Court was called to exhibit 841 and 842.

30664 * The accused was handed a document and asked whether he was familiar with it. He stated he had no recollection of having seen it, but the title of it was "Wartime Economic Life", while the book said that he was its author. The editor was his private secretary, and 30665 * he thought it was edited by him on the basis of various speeches and writings that the accused made. He had no clear recollection of having seen the book before, and in the "Editor's Note" in the book it was stated that his private secretary had gathered and edited some of the speeches and talks of the accused, and he assumed that he had reproduced the gist of various talks made by him. 30666 * The date of the publication was September, 1938.

Exhibit 3338-A, the book thus identified by the accused, entitled "Problems on Japanese Economic Power", was a speech given 26 October 1937, entitled "Armed War and the War of Economy". In it, KAYA said that the China Incident was actually a war. Since it was a war, military force was essential and important, but in order to give it full play they should make adequate preparations also in all spheres of thought, diplomacy, finance, and economy, and one of the pre-conditions of victory is to make adequate preparations to get the better of the other party.

30668 * When war commences, the question was how great a war expenditure they could afford. The war funds now ran to a considerable sum. There might be many who doubted whether their resources were sufficient to stand that expenditure. Everybody thinks that the question of how much war expenditure a state can afford is proportional to its economic power.

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KAYA would tell them how much they could stand. During the Russo-Japanese war, a sum of two billions were required over about two years. * There were many ways of estimating economic power, but if he compared the figures to show the general economic situation, they would find that bank accounts in 1903 amounted to 777 million yen. Granting that war expenditures could be defrayed at this rate and that they could stand an expenditure of two billion during the two year Russo-Japanese war, they should come to the conclusion that they could afford at least twenty billions at present. To that extent the economic power of the country had developed.

30670 As to what should be the war-time footing in finance and economy, since it was war, * the first thing to be done was to meet the military demands to finance the industries related to their demands and national defense, and concentrate on goods, funds, and labor in those spheres.

30674 * Exhibit 3338-B, A chapter of the afore-mentioned book, purporting to be a speech of KAYA on 12 April, 1938, entitled "Path to Patriotic Service Through Savings," and sub-titled "Preparations for a Protracted War", stated that in present-day warfare many kinds of arms have been used, and battles are now fought on and under the ground and in the air. Materials needed for war were so numerous that one would be surprised to hear that some things were required, directly or indirectly, for war. As the scope of war had enlarged, the amount of needed materials amounted to a surprisingly large quantity. So in time of peace they must prepare necessary goods so as to be able to supply them in time of war.

30675 * Their brethren, the officers and soldiers of the army, were then fighting in China to bring about true peace and prosperity to the Orient. The most important thing is a preparation for a protracted war so as not to have the army feel the lack of war supplies. The war expenditure of 2500 million yen had been approved by the Diet, and additional expenditures of 4800 million yen were approved also, and amounted to the sum of 7400 million yen. * However, part of the expenditure had come from government bonds, and most would have to depend on the issue of bonds.

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The budget for 1938 would amount to about 80 hundred million yen, and the total of bonds issued would be about 56 hundred million yen.

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An excerpt sub-titled, "Savings for the Purpose of Carrying out the Policy", stated that one year hence they must issue more than 15 hundred million yen of government bonds. Success or failure of war-time policies regarding finance and economy depended solely on whether the bonds would be absorbed satisfactorily.

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* Exhibit 3338-C, an excerpt from the same book, entitled, "Women Behind the Guns", stated that all the world marveled at the glorious results their forces had achieved in the China Incident. These were ascribable to the Emperor's virtues and the loyal forces in the Army and Navy. The people must not be dazzled by these results and take things easy, for the anti-Japanese movement in China, in conjunction with Communist power, was stronger than they imagined.

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In modern warfare they must be victorious not merely in battle, but also in the spiritual, diplomatic, and economic wars, and the economic war was the most important factor bringing war to a successful end. The government therefore had started the National Spirit General Mobilization Movement * and was trying to enhance the nation's spirit, and had reorganized its financial and economic policies to meet war-time requirements. Much attention was being paid to policies to meet the war-time situation so that the soldiers might not lack arms, the people might not be short of necessaries, and that prices might not go up.

The government policies in finance and economics depended on the people's efforts. What is called national economic power decided final victory, and the determination and cooperation of the nation were necessary. The women behind the guns should cooperate.

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* The witness was asked if, in 1938 and 1939, until he became President of the North China Development Company, he continued these talks, speeches, and articles throughout Japan. He stated he conducted addresses and talks to quite an extent to encourage savings. In the spring of 1938 he became chief investigator with regard to adjusting prices, and undertook plans for creating a price structure, and therefore the number of speeches he made decreased. After he became President of the Development Company he had little time to go on lecture trips. In November, 1938, he became temporarily chairman of the Japan-Manchukuo-China Round Table Conference. He made no speeches in connection with this committee.

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* Asked if he recalled on 29 November, 1938, that he introduced the speaker at Hiroshima on a Round Table Conference, he stated that the meeting was not large, and the talks did not amount to what might be called a speech.

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* The accused was handed a document, and he agreed that its title was "Reports on the Japan-Manchukuo-China Economic Round Table Conferences". He acknowledged that in the book there was purported to be a speech given by him. In the book he read that he himself had said on that occasion that the sponsors were pleased that so many people, especially in influential financial circles, were able to attend the meeting.

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* He could not say for sure if this was his speech, but it was possible. He had no doubt about what he had just read, but at this time there was an office known as the Secretariat of the Round Table Conference, which was not under his jurisdiction, and he could not say whether the contents were accurate.

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He agreed that in exhibit 3215, the document which he had been handed, it stated that KAYA was Chairman of the Round Table Conference. * He supposed it was something somebody had written up concerning a greeting he gave, but he could not say whether the greetings were accurately reported. He was Chairman of this particular conference. In regard to the Round Table Conference, the Japan-Manchukuoan Central Society was its main sponsor. The Society asked to borrow his name as Chairman and make greetings, etc., and told him they would not bother him with any details, and therefore he accepted.

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* He did make a greeting, but had nothing to do with the record of the Conference, and could not say whether the book was correctly drawn up. This was the first time he had ever seen exhibit 3215.

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* In Exhibit 3339, a speech by KAYA taken from the book "Reports on Japan-Manchukuo-China Economic Round Table Conference", dated 2 November 1938, KAYA stated that sponsors were honored that so many people, especially those influential in financial circles, * were able to attend the meeting. It was hardly necessary to mention that the aim of the army's attack in the China Incident lay in destroying the Chiang Kai-shek regime which was thoroughly anti-Japanese and pro-communistic and did not understand the position of China and its mission in East Asia. Later they had received joyful reports that Wuchang, Hankow and Canton had been occupied. Now that the Chiang regime had suffered a crippling blow it was a great advance toward achievement of the purpose of the holy war. He was continually lost in admiration of the army's valour and loyalty and labors of its soldiers. It was hardly necessary to say that the holy war's aim was not merely annihilating the Chiang regime, but also the establishment of a new regime friendly to both Japan and Manchukuo so they might hope to rebuild a new China. Furthermore, it consists in establishing a basis of peace in the Orient through a far-reaching plan between Japan, Manchukuo and China. Unless the construction of a new era was completed, it could not be said that the mission of the troops had been completed.

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As long as this completion was not in sight, he thought they could not compensate for the sufferings of those who lost their lives in the war. To establish peace in the Orient there must be a strong national union between the three nations which was more than friendly cooperation. One might say this was the dawn of a new East Asia and its foundation.

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To realize their ideal of being a stabilizing force, they must contrive to establish and expand armaments and economic power. * Strong economic power was the underlying foundation of powerful armaments. It had been keenly realized how greatly armaments depended on economic power, even in normal times. The expansion

Page of economic power was the basis for stabilizing and improving national life and welfare. It was a matter of course that great emphasis in future policies should be on completion and development of the united economic power of the Japan-Manchukuo-China bloc and public opinion was in favor of this. They should devote national energies to long-range economic construction and government and private enterprises would be promoted and diligent people would be able to obtain employment and their life would be stabilized. * A stabilized life did not mean during the construction period, idleness and abundant materials, but it would be a frugal, though healthy, life in which one worked hard, got much and saved much and contributed to the expansion of economic power. A strong Japan would be established to secure peace and the welfare of future generations would be promoted.

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The most important point and the objective of future endeavor was the development of economic power in the three countries. Since the founding of Manchukuo, she had been formulating great plans for finance, economics and the people's welfare, striving for their realization.

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* Japan also had exerted herself to assist her with funds, materials and manpower. That country was making rapid strides in the development of resources, heavy industries, transportation and communication, and in the greatness of her progress was worthy of wonder. These schemes aimed at the united expansion of the national power of Japan and Manchukuo based on the inseparable oneness of both.

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It would be a natural policy for Manchukuo to cooperate closely with the revived new China. In spite of the short existence of the temporary North China Government and the restored Central China Government, they were progressing in constructing a new China which would be friendly to Japan and Manchukuo and oppose communism. * It would not be long before there would be established a new regime uniting all China. The important trend of the new China was toward a united economic power by the three nations. Peace in the Orient was a great ideal that would contribute to world peace and which was important to the realization of national spirit. It meant a great deal

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Page that on this occasion economists from the three nations would engage in a Round Table discussion on plans and policies for unifying economic cooperation. Influential economists from Japan and China and Manchukuo had been invited for the conference. * KAYA believed that to attain this objective, much depended upon their assistance. He had requested their attendance to seek their understanding and hoped they would give full assistance.

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* The accused was asked if this speech was given on 2 November 1938 and he said he believed that was its general gist. He remembered a Round Table Conference at Hiroshima in late November 1938, at which he was present and made a speech.

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Exhibit 3339-A, excerpt from "Reports on the Japan-Manchukuo-China Economic Round Table Conference" given 29 November 1938 at Hiroshima was the speech acknowledged by the accused. * In it he stated that the aim of the present incident was a war for construction and not destruction. Hitherto, China's condition had been like a cancer, and since surgical removal was necessary, Japan had been performing that role. After the operation had been completed, new flesh and new life would appear.

The temporary government of North China, the restoration government of Central China, the Federal Mongolian Commission, and the Peace Preservation Committees in Hankow and Canton had made their appearance and were moving toward unification. They were on the way toward construction of a new East Asia but its basis must be a strong unification and economists must proceed toward welding an economic area.

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KAYA said he was one who believed that the foundation of the people's welfare, as well as cultural and national defense, * must be based in general upon economy. Therefore, the basis must be an economic one which would produce a union of Asia for the Asiatics. The fact that economic representatives from the three countries had been and were holding in various parts of Japan and China economic Round Table Conferences was something history would

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Page not forget. The things discussed were producing successful results.

30701

Mr. Ting, who had come from Manchukuo, was extremely active in his nation's founding, was president of the Manchurian Electrical Company and was a prominent economist. Mr. Chin, from the Mongolian border, who was secretary of Industry in the Federal Mongolian Commission, was an ardent patriot who had labored * in behalf of Mongolian independence. Mr. Chu of Central China, and Mr. Chang of North China, were both influential economists and he hoped that the meeting would be a start toward the overseas expansion of Hiroshima Prefecture, especially toward the development of East Asia.

30702

The accused was asked if those remarks were made at the meeting in Hiroshima late in November 1938, and he replied that he didn't recall that particular speech but he may have made it. Asked if after the Army had acquired certain mines and industries, he, as president of the North China Development Company, operated those mines and industries, he stated they were not in charge of operations. By his statement in the affidavit that the Development Company had no rights over any industry except those in which it had a financial interest, he did not intend to claim that the company * confined operations to those mines and industries in which it had only financial interests.

30703

To companies to which the Development Company had given financial help or was a shareholder or had made a loan, they had certain rights of approval over certain matters which arose from the contracts they had with such companies. The actual operations of the companies to which aid was given were conducted by the companies themselves.

* The accused denied saying in his interrogation of 26 March 1946 that he was president of the Development Company which operated the mines and industries and the basis for the industries were acquired by the army and that he went there to develop them. This was a garbled version. The interrogator had asked him if there were industries in North China which the Army had taken over and he answered yes. He never said the company operated industries, but

Page that the company was formed to further the economic development and advance the interests of both Japan and China.

30704 * The accused stated that he told TOJO that he did not oppose war after the arrival of the Hull note. He was present at the Imperial Conference of 1 December 1941 and did not oppose war with the U.S. * at that time. Asked if he had advance knowledge that hostilities were to open against the U.S. in December, he stated that since war had been decided on, he thought hostilities would open sometime in December. Asked if in his interrogation, he said that he did not know the exact date for commencing hostilities, but believed it was the night before they commenced that he heard about it. He stated that the date was actually neither announced in the Cabinet nor Liaison Conferences. He heard the day before hostilities commenced, or the day before that, but not at a conference. He heard this either at the place where the Liaison Conference was held or at the Premier's official residence, but did not remember whether it was from TOJO, the Navy Minister, or the Chief Cabinet Secretary, but it was one of the three.

30706 * He didn't recall who else heard this. The accused was asked if he did not state in his interrogatory that he believed he heard it from another member of the Cabinet officially but it might have been at the Premier's residence from TOJO, SHIMADA or HOSHINO. The accused stated that it was true he heard it from one of those three, but he had never said as to whether this was official or unofficial.

30707 REDIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. Levin

The accused was asked the circumstances in which he made the speech of 26 October 1937 (Exhibit 3338-A). He stated it was at a meeting of members of the Preparatory Committee and it was a formal function. Since it was that kind of meeting, he stated what was generally known to be the government's policy and the general situation at the time.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
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He didn't remember the exact number who attended but he didn't believe it could be so very large. He did not attend the Tokyo Conference of the Economic Committee.

The address at Hiroshima on 2 November 1938 (Exhibit 3339) was also made before the meeting of the Preparatory Committee in Tokyo.

30708

* Those who attended were comparatively few and he made a very informal speech on a personal basis. The speech at Hiroshima on 29 November 1938 (Exhibit 3339-A) was made in the same spirit.

VII - X

Def. Doc. No. 2660 (Revised)

Exhibit # _____

OPENING STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF
KAYA, Okinori



By: TAKANO, Tsuruo
TANAKA, Yasumichi
FUJIWARA, Kenji

Japanese Counsel

By: Michael Levin

American Counsel

OPENING STATEMENT OF KAYA, Okinori

In this brief opening statement of the defendant Kaya it is necessary to preface what we have to say by pointing out that not only is there a paucity of evidence against him to sustain the charges of the Prosecution under the Indictment; but except for the fact as has been shown, that he held conventional administrative offices during the Konoye and Tojo Cabinets, and performed his duties in a conventional and routine manner, there is nothing in the record to sustain the charges against him. The evidence will show that he entered the Finance Ministry as a young man out of college through competitive civil service examination, and that his entire career was spent in that department of the Government, with the exception of his service as President of the North China Development Company. We believe we are sustained in this statement by the tenuous argument of the Prosecution made on this defendant's motion for dismissal. Without apology, we nevertheless feel that we must meet the issues raised by the Prosecution in a negative way.

In GROUP ONE: CRIMES AGAINST PEACE of the Indictment, the defendant Kaya is charged with all the Counts except those concerning initiation and prosecution of a war of aggression against French Indo-China and Soviet Russia, and the initiation of the Manchurian Incident. The evidence will show that the first position that this accused held, although it cannot be said of any power, was when he became Vice-Minister of Finance in February 1937, followed by his short tenure as Minister of Finance in June 1937, which continued only until May 1938, a period of less than a year, and his evidence will indicate that he conducted his office as an office of state; and that he did not participate in a conspiracy as charged,

and had no connection with one whatever. It is, of course, contended that no conspiracy existed, but if there was one, the evidence will indicate that he was not a party to it. The Prosecution has not tendered any evidence against the defendant Kaya in connection with the attacks against Soviet Russia or French Indo-China nor in connection with the Manchurian Incident. In his personnel record it stated that he was an official of the Finance Ministry but he was out of the Government about a year before the border disputes with Soviet Russia took place as claimed by the Prosecution, and it was about two years after he resigned from the Government that the French Indo-China development took place. When the Tri-Partite Pact was signed he was not a member of the Government and there is of course no evidence to indicate any connection on his part in either the negotiation or the signing of the Pact. For some time prior and after the occurrence of the Manchurian Incident he was a minor official of the Finance Ministry. The evidence will show that when the matter of military budgets came before him for consideration, he exerted, within his limited powers, every effort to slash them and prevent them from increasing.

The Prosecution has charged that he was party to the planning of a huge-scale war of aggression but not only did he have nothing to do with it, (and there is no evidence to indicate that he did) but he knew nothing about the Five Year Plan for Ammunition Industries and Five Year Plan for Heavy Industries said to have been established in May and June of 1938. The Cabinet of which he was a member did not adopt such plans nor did he have anything to do with their adoption nor with putting them in effect.

The evidence will show that what the defendant did in office during the time he became Vice-Minister of Finance in

February, 1937 up to the time he resigned as Finance Minister in May, 1938 was to establish measures to combat the turmoil and uncertainty that were troubling the economy of the country before he assumed his post and which became aggravated on account of the China Incident. But he did try to avoid radical changes. The prevailing tendency at that time was for a strong foreign policy, and at home the abolition of status quo in favor of radical changes. His moderate policy, therefore, was regarded in disfavor and for that reason he was asked to resign his post as Finance Minister. He resigned because of this difference in views.

The evidence will show that the defendant Kaya was President of the North China Development Company from August 1939 to October 1941. He was appointed as its administrative head and acted in that capacity pursuant to law. It will be pointed out that the approval of the Prime Minister was required when either making or revising regulations, increasing capital and the carrying on of the functions of this company. The evidence will show that it was under the direction and supervision of the China Affairs Board and he was not permitted to act on his own initiative.

The evidence will show Mr. Kaya had a strong desire to avoid war long before he became a member of Tojo's Cabinet. He had no connection with the Imperial Conferences of July and September, 1941 nor did he know anything about these conferences. In October, 1941, when Tojo requested him to become the Finance Minister, he did so only after receiving the assurance from Tojo that the new Cabinet would endeavor to maintain peace and would adopt policies to that end.

After joining the Cabinet, the defendant Kaya worked toward the amicable settlement of the Japanese-American negotiations. He endeavored to prevent war even if the negotiations

were not successful. However, the conditions at the time were beyond his power to prevent war. Dissatisfied as he was with the outcome, he did not resign from his post because he could not do so as a loyal citizen of the country. However, he assented to the decision for war because he clearly recognized that the war was inevitable.


Under GROUP TWO of the Indictment, MURDER, the defendant Kaya is charged with Counts 37 to 47. The evidence will show that Mr. Kaya did not plan a war of aggression nor knowingly agreed to it. He was not a party to any plan to open hostilities without first giving notice, nor did he give silent approval to such a plan. He was not a party to any plan to wage battles in breach of laws or land warfare, nor did he give his consent nor silent approval to such acts. The record is replete that the Supreme Command was independent of the Cabinet and therefore a civilian Cabinet officer could have no responsibility in relation to the waging of battles. Civilian members of the Cabinet had no voice in war operations. The attacks on Hankow and Canton took place long after he resigned his post as Finance Minister.

As to GROUP THREE; CONVENTIONAL WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, the defendant is charged with all three counts. However, the treatment of prisoners of war was a matter outside his jurisdiction. He was not informed nor consulted on the matter of illegal treatment of prisoners of war and it was a matter with which he was charged with no responsibility and in the nature of negative presentation we state the Prosecution did not directly or indirectly offer evidence to indicate any responsibility on the part of Mr. Kaya in relation to these counts in the Indictment.

In fine, the evidence to be offered by the accused will show that he is a career public servant; that such duties and functions he performed were either as a member of the Cabinet or in an administrative capacity and not otherwise all of which were performed as a state official essential in carrying out the functions of government.

VII-X

Doc. No. 2660



OPENING STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF
KAYA, OKINORI

By: TAKANO, Tsuruo
TANAKA, Yasumichi
FUJIWARA, Kenji

Japanese Counsel

By: Michael Levin

American Counsel

OPENING STATEMENT OF KAYA, OKINORI

In this brief opening statement of the defendant Kaya it is necessary to preface what we have to say by pointing out that not only is there a paucity of evidence against him to sustain the charges of the Prosecution under the Indictment; but except for the fact as has been shown, that he held conventional administrative offices during the Konoye and Tojo Cabinets, and performed his duties in a conventional and routine manner, there is nothing in the record to sustain the charges against him. The evidence will show that he entered the Finance Ministry as a young man out of college through competitive civil service examination, and that his entire career was spent in that department of the Government, with the exception of his service as President of the North China Development Company, which may be said to have been kindred to his work in the Finance Ministry. We believe we are sustained in this statement by the tenuous argument of the Prosecution made on this defendant's motion for dismissal. Without apology, we nevertheless feel that we must meet the issues raised by the Prosecution in a negative way.

In GROUP ONE: CRIMES AGAINST PEACE of the Indictment, the defendant Kaya is charged with all the Counts except those concerning initiation and prosecution of a war of aggression against French Indo-China and Soviet Russia, and the initiation of the Manchurian Incident. The evidence will show that the first position that this accused held, although it cannot be said of any power, was when he became Vice-Minister of Finance in February 1937, followed by his short tenure as Minister of Finance in June 1937, which continued only until May 1938, a period of less than a year, and his evidence will indicate that he conducted his office as an office of state; and that he did not participate in a conspiracy as charged, and had no connection with one whatever. It is, of course, contended that no con-

spiracy existed, but if there was one, the evidence will indicate that he was not a party to it. The Prosecution has not tendered any evidence against the defendant Kaya in connection with the attacks against Soviet Russia or French Indo-China nor in connection with the Manchurian Incident. In his personnel record it stated that he was an official of the Finance Ministry but he was out of the Government about a year before the border disputes with Soviet Russia took place as claimed by the Prosecution, and it was about two years after he resigned from the Government that the French Indo-China development took place. When the Tri-Partite Pact was signed he was not a member of the Government and there is of course no evidence to indicate any connection on his part in either the negotiation or the signing of the Pact. For some time prior and after the occurrence of the Manchurian Incident he was a minor official of the Finance Ministry. The evidence will show that when the matter of military budgets came before him for consideration, he exerted, within his limited powers, every effort to slash them and prevent them from increasing.

The Prosecution has charged that he was party to the planning of a huge-scale war of aggression but not only did he have nothing to do with it, (and there is no evidence to indicate that he did) but he knew nothing about the Five Year Plan for Ammunition Industries and Five Year Plan for Heavy Industries said to have been established in May and June of 1938. The Cabinet of which he was a member did not adopt such plans nor did he have anything to do with their adoption nor with putting them in effect.

The evidence will show that what the defendant did in office during the time he became Vice-Minister of Finance in February, 1937 up to the time he resigned as Finance Minister in May, 1938 was to establish measures to combat the turmoil

and uncertainty that were troubling the economy of the country before he assumed his post and which became aggravated on account of the China Incident. What steps he took towards controlled economy, he took because such steps he felt would tend to avoid war. But he did try to avoid radical changes. The prevailing tendency at that time was for a strong foreign policy, and at home the abolition of status quo in favor of radical changes. His moderate policy, therefore, was regarded in disfavor and for that reason he was asked to resign his post as Finance Minister. He resigned because of this difference in views.

The evidence will show that the defendant Kaya was President of the North China Development Company from August 1939 to October 1941. Mr. Kaya had nothing to do with the organization of this company nor with the enactment of the law which created it. He was appointed as its administrative head and acted in that capacity pursuant to law. It will be pointed out that the company was under the direct control of the Prime Minister and that the approval of the Prime Minister was required when either making or revising regulations, increasing capital and the carrying on of the functions of this company. The evidence will show that it was under the direction and supervision of the China Affairs Board and he was not permitted to act on his own initiative.

The evidence will show Mr. Kaya had a strong desire to avoid war long before he became a member of Tojo's Cabinet. He had no connection with the Imperial Conferences of July and September, 1941 nor did he know anything about these conferences. In October, 1941, when Tojo requested him to become the Finance Minister, he did so only after receiving the assurance from Tojo that the new Cabinet would endeavor to maintain peace and would adopt policies to that end.

After joining the Cabinet, the defendant Kaya worked toward the amicable settlement of the Japanese-American negotiations. He endeavored to prevent war even if the negotiations were not successful. However, the conditions at the time were beyond his power to prevent war. Dissatisfied as he was with the outcome, he did not resign from his post because he could not do so as a loyal citizen of the country. However, he assented to the decision for war because he clearly recognized that the war was inevitable.

Under GROUP TWO of the Indictment, MURDER, the defendant Kaya is charged with Counts 37 to 47. The evidence will show that Mr. Kaya did not plan a war of aggression nor knowingly agreed to it. He was not a party to any plan to open hostilities without first giving notice, nor did he give silent approval to such a plan. He was not a party to any plan to wage battles in breach of laws or land warfare, nor did he give his consent nor silent approval to such acts. The record is replete that the Supreme Command was independent of the Cabinet and therefore a civilian Cabinet officer could have no responsibility in relation to the waging of war. Civilian members of the Cabinet had no voice in war operations. The attacks on Hankow and Canton took place long after he resigned his post as Finance Minister.

As to GROUP THREE: CONVENTIONAL WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, the defendant is charged with all three counts. However, the treatment of prisoners of war was a matter outside his jurisdiction. He was not informed nor consulted on the matter of illegal treatment of prisoners of war and it was a matter with which he was charged with no responsibility and in the nature of negative presentation we state the Prosecution did not directly or indirectly offer evidence to indicate any responsibility on the part of Mr. Kaya in relation to these counts in the Indictment.

In relation to the matter of military currency concerning which the Prosecution has offered evidence, it appears that in January 1941 the order for the preparation of military currency by the Japanese Army was made on the Finance Ministry at a time when Mr. Kaya was not the Finance Minister and the only evidence offered by the Prosecution is to charge Mr. Kaya with responsibility of establishing the procedure of handling military currency at a time when war seemed imminent but this procedure was already in preparation at the time Mr. Kaya assumed office and it was merely a routine administrative matter.

In fine, the evidence to be offered by the accused will show that he is a career public servant; that such duties and functions he performed were either as a member of the Cabinet or in an administrative capacity and not otherwise all of which were performed as a state official essential in carrying out the functions of government.

Kaya

THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al
 - vs -
 ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Affidavit
 Defendant



Having first duly sworn on oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

(1) - I was born on January 30, 1889, in the city of Hiroshima, Hiroshima Prefecture, coming from a middle class family. After graduating from the First Higher School in 1911, I entered the Political Science Department of the Tokyo Imperial University and graduated in March 1917.

Immediately after graduation I entered the Finance Ministry as an employee. I took and passed the higher civil service examination and thereafter received promotions continuously under the Civil Service.

In September 1918, I was sent to the United States as secretary to the Japanese Financial Commissioner in New York City. In November 1919 I was ordered to Europe and returned to Japan in March 1920 to a post in the Accounts Bureau of the Finance Ministry. In 1927, I was sent to the Geneva Disarmament Conference and in January 1928 was appointed acting secretary to the then Finance Minister Mitsuchi. In November 1929, I was ordered to attend the London Naval Conference as an attendant to the Plenipotentiary. In March 1930 I was appointed secretary to the Finance Minister and Section Chief of the Accounts Bureau. I returned to Japan in May 1930. In November 1932 I was appointed Chief of the Budget and Settlement Section and in May 1934, Chief of the Accounts Bureau. I was appointed Chief of the Finance Bureau in May 1936 and Vice-Minister of Finance on February 2, 1937. On June 4, 1937 I was appointed Minister of Finance, which post I held until May 26, 1938, when I resigned. In August 1939, I was appointed President of the North China Development Company, which post I resigned on October 18, 1941 to become Finance Minister. I resigned as Finance Minister on February 19, 1944.

(2) - As the above mentioned record indicates, except for a period of about two years which I served as President of the North China Development

Company, I devoted my entire career as an official of the Finance Ministry and was wholly occupied with matters of financial administration. The goal of my endeavor was the maintenance of a healthy national finance.

I had no connection whatsoever with the so-called rightist or leftist or military clique, nor was I a member of any political party. For a short period after August 1944, I joined the Imperial Rule Political Assistance Association, an organization composed chiefly of members of both houses of the Diet, but I do not know whether that association could be termed a political party.

In the Finance Ministry, a great part of my time was spent in the study and evaluation of military budgets and other civil budgets, and during this period, I constantly endeavored to slash military budgets and prevent them from increasing. The prevailing conditions at the time made this task extremely difficult, but I believe I succeeded in no small degree in suppressing the growth of military budgets.

I attended the Geneva and London Naval Disarmament Conferences as a member of the Japanese delegations and exerted myself toward the successful culmination of the disarmament treaties.

My effort to suppress the military budgets and successfully conclude the disarmament conferences were due to the instruction of my superior officials and to my personal desire to maintain a healthy national finance and thus lessen the burdens of the people and a strong hope for the maintenance of peace.

(3) - I am charged with Counts 1 to 5 of the Indictment. Even if the conspiracy and planning of war of aggression as mentioned in these Counts did take place I was not party to them and had no connection whatsoever.

I am charged with all the Counts from 6 to 36, except for Counts 18, 23, 25, 26, 33, 35 and 36. Of the Counts I am charged with, with reference to those concerning the Manchurian Incident, I wish to state, as my personal record indicates, that prior to the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident and for sometime thereafter, I was nothing more than A Section

Chief in the Finance Ministry and had no connection with the Incident whatsoever. From December 1929 to November 1932, I was not even concerned with military budgets. Prior to December 1929 and after November 1932, I was concerned with the study and evaluation of military budgets and during this period exerted my efforts toward reducing them. The demands for military budgets increased greatly after November 1932. I vehemently opposed the increased demands and fought to the best of my ability to keep them down.

I wish to state that I had no connection whatsoever with any plan or preparation for an aggression against the French Indo-China or against the Soviet Russia.

During the period from May 26, 1938 to October 18, 1941, I had no connection with the Cabinet nor was I an official of the Japanese Government, and I had no connection whatsoever with the Tri-Partite Pact with Germany and Italy, concluded in 1940.

(4) - I became Minister of Finance on June 4, 1937, I know nothing about Lukouchiao Incident before its outbreak. The Cabinet made no plans or preparation for the Incident. I learned about it for the first time after the outbreak of the Incident and the report was that hostility between the Chinese and the Japanese broke out due to illegal attack by the Chinese. The Cabinet, of which I was a member, decided on a policy to regard the Incident as a local Incident and to settle it on the spot as soon as possible. It was against the sending of troops from Japan, but if that became inevitable to limit the troops to a small number. The sending of troops or the increase in troops was due to the Army report that continued illegal attacks on the part of the Chinese troops and to the massing of their forces in the area so when the Army requested for increase in troops in order to protect the lives and interests of Japanese in that area, the Cabinet could not help but give its assent. The Cabinet's motive in assenting to the requests for sending troops by the Army was to protect

the small Japanese force stationed there in accordance to treaty.

I opposed especially the dispatching of troops to Shanghai for I believed it would spread the Incident wider. I asked for reconsideration, but my request came to no avail, for the other Cabinet members thought the dispatching of troops was necessary in order to protect Japanese interests. However, on every occasion I tried my best to limit the budgets required for the dispatching of troops.

The Cabinet of which I was a member was staunch on its policy to refrain from infringing upon the rights of Third Powers.

(4-b) We, civil members of the Cabinet, were not informed beforehand nor consulted about the various plans for battles. It was with the greatest anxiety that we viewed the spread of the hostilities to a wider and wider area.

Regarding the Nanking attack, we civilian members of the Cabinet, were not consulted about the attack.

We received no report about the alleged acts of atrocity at Nanking and other places, nor read anything about such acts in the press. I did not know that such acts had been committed.

(4-c) I resigned as Finance Minister in May 1938, long before the spread of the hostilities to Hankow in Central China and Canton in Southern China. My resignation was requested by Premier Konoye and I was happy to be relieved for I had been hoping for an opportunity to do so.

(4-d) The arbitrary confiscations of Chinese enterprises, etc., in North China were made by the military for operation purposes and the Japanese Cabinet had no connection with such acts whatsoever.

(4-e) The prosecution has charged that during the period I was Vice-Minister of Finance from February to June 1937, the Five Year Plan for Steel and the Third Plan for North China were adopted by the Japanese Government; however, I know nothing about such plans.

The prosecution has charged that during the period I was Finance Minister from June 1937 to May of the following year, the Army Five Year Plan for Heavy Industries was adopted for preparation of a future war. The Cabinet did not adopt any such plan. I did not know such a plan actually existed or not and I could not have been a party to it.

From the time prior to my becoming Finance Minister, the financial circle of the country was in a state of uncertainty and I felt the difficult responsibility when I assumed the post of Finance Minister. The sudden outbreak of the China Incident only increased the unrest among the economic and financial circles thereby multiplying the burden placed on my shoulders. During the one year I was Finance Minister, there was no room for any preparation for a future war. I was occupied with the difficult task before me and I did not even dream about a preparation for a future war. The Cabinet had its hands full with the China Incident and did not think about going into another war.

(5-a) I was President of the North China Development Company from August 1939 to October 1941 and shall testify chiefly about the Company during the period I was its president.

The North China Development Company was established in November 1938 in conformity to the Law for the Establishment of the North China Development Company and its purpose and object were defined by laws, passed by the Diet. It aimed to bring about economic cooperation between China and Japan for mutual benefit of both countries. It was not established for the purpose of infringing upon the economic interests of third powers. On the contrary, it desired the participation of third power capital in the economic development of North China. The Company did not infringe upon the rights of the Chinese people nor made any preparation with aim toward war, nor received any instruction from the Japan Cabinet to that effect.

(5-b) - The Company was not permitted to engage in any industry. It

served as a financial organ and its activity was confined to making investments and loans. It did not have the power to mobilize the material wealth of North China, nor was it engaged in such work.

In making loans or investments, the Company was limited by law in scope, that is, it was permitted to make investments or loans only in such industries as mining, transportation, communications, electricity, salt manufacturing, in certain small manufacturing enterprises and in the wholesale of coal. It was concerned only with a limited number of companies in the field in which it was permitted to make loans or investments. It was not concerned with the spinning industry, tobacco and milling industries, which were active in North China, nor in general trade, agriculture, banking and insurance business.

Investments and loans were generally made in Sino-Japanese Joint Stock Companies and other Japanese companies besides the North China Development Company also made investments in these companies. The North China Development Company did not exercise a monopoly over the investments.

(5-c) - The Company did not have any arbitrary rights. It had no more power than any other ordinary company. It aimed to adjust the economic activities of North China, but it was not given any power to control the economy of North China. Loans and investments were subject to contracts under which the company obtaining the financial aid was required to obtain the approval of the North China Development Company in certain prescribed matters in order to avoid over-investment or unwarranted expansion and thus endeavored to bring about a sound and orderly development of the economy of North China. The Company had no rights over any industry except those in which it had financial interest and even then, the rights were limited to those prescribed in the contracts.

(5-d) - All major acts of the Company, including the granting of approval to its affiliated companies, were made at the instruction and approval of the China Affairs Board. The Company was prohibited from

taking any action on its own.

(5-e) - The Company's accounts were mostly in the red and subsidies from the Japanese Government were required to pay private stockholders dividends of not more than six (6) percent per annum. Most of the affiliated companies were in the red or made very little profits. In the payment of dividends the Japanese stockholders were not given special favors.

(5-f) - All funds the Company invested in North China were raised in Japan. The Company did not receive any property nor special rights from the North China Political Council, nor did the Company grant any monopolistic right to anyone. It had no power to do so.

The investments and loans handled by the Company were not large. Compared to those in Japan Proper and Manchuria during the same period, they were very small.

(5-g) - The Company did not receive any instructions from the Japanese Government nor on its own free will attempted to expand the production of its affiliated companies with 1941 or thereabout as the goal. While the production of the affiliated companies increased from time to time, the Company looked forward towards long-ranged development of the industries. The Company endeavored toward a solid expansion of the industries it was concerned with. The Tatung Coal Mines, for instance, was expanded on a well-planned program and after my resignation as president of the North China Development Company this coal mine was producing ten thousand tons of coal per day.

(5-h) - I thought of many plans for the welfare of the people in the area, but I was not able to carry out my plans due to disorder caused by the fighting in the area and because Japan was not in a position to help us materially. However, I was able to carry out one plan which did help the people.

In early 1940, the Peiping-Tientsin area was swept by a famine

which threatened the whole area. I was told that importation of twenty million yen worth of wheat flour was necessary to tide over the crisis, but the Government of North China - the North China Political Council - did not have the necessary foreign funds to buy the flour with. I, therefore, negotiated with the Japanese Government for twenty million yen in foreign funds with which to buy the flour. The Japanese Government at that time was hard pressed for foreign money, but I managed to obtain the understanding of the Vice-Minister of Finance Ohno, who promised to extend us as much help as was possible. I next negotiated with the then Minister of Communications Katsu for bottoms to transport the flour. Bottoms, likewise, were short in Japan at that time, but I succeeded in obtaining some and thus succeeded in importing into North China a considerable quantity of flour which helped to tide over the famine.

(6-a) - In the year 1941, rumors to the effect that Japanese-American relations were getting worse with the passing of the days grew in intensity. As I had harbored a sincere hope for the maintenance of peace between Japan and the United States, it made me feel bad to hear such rumors. However, I did not know anything about the contents of the negotiations, nor did I know anything about the policies decided on by the Japanese Government.

(6-b) - On the night of October 17, 1941, Tojo requested me over the telephone to join his Cabinet as Finance Minister. Before giving my reply, I requested for an interview and called on Tojo at the official residence of the War Minister that same night. At the interview, we exchanged conversations to the following purport:

(1) - To my query as to whether he (Tojo) was decided on waging war against the United States, he replied in the negative and stated he intended to continue with the Japanese-American negotiations and exert his efforts toward an amicable settlement.

(2) - I next stated to him that there was rumor to the effect that the Supreme Command and the Cabinet did not always cooperate, that unless these two organs reach a more closer relationship there would be a stumbling block in the negotiations for a successful settlement of the negotiations and asked him whether he intended to do something to close the gap. He replied that he fully understood my deep concern and that he would work toward a more closer relationship.

(3) - I told him there was a tendency to adopt reform policies based on the so-called ideology, that we should forget the ideology and adopt policies in keeping with the time and needs of the country. I asked his opinion on this matter and his reply was he felt the same as I did.

I was quite satisfied with the interview, but I left his residence without giving my reply. The public rumor at that time was that the Army was especially pronounced in its attitude towards the United States and I was greatly relieved to learn that Tojo planned to continue with the negotiations and try to settle the disputes amicably. The second point had an important connection in the maintenance of peace and the third point was an assurance that dangerous policies, both domestic and foreign, were to be avoided. I felt that I should join the Cabinet and do what I could to help steer the State to a peaceful landing. Late that same night Tojo telephoned for my reply so I consented to join his Cabinet.

(6-c) - Before joining the Cabinet, I had no relations with Tojo. If I remember correctly, I met him only once. Even after I joined the Cabinet, our contacts were solely official. We had no social relationship.

(6-d) - After joining the Tojo Cabinet, I did everything within my power to avoid war. I realized the goal of my efforts should be the successful culmination of the negotiations. However, the prevailing circumstances of the time were mostly against the successful settlement of the negotiations and I realized the necessity of working towards the prevention of war even if the negotiations could not reach settlement. There were two causes for a possible war:

The first was the military pressure of the ~~10000~~ Powers and the second was the economic pressure by these powers.

The embargo on vital materials placed on Japan by the Allied Powers was a big blow to Japan. Of all the imported materials, oil was the most critical problem. Japan produced hardly any oil and without imported oil she could not maintain her national defense. I felt that even if the import of oil from the United States and the Dutch East Indies should not be renewed due to the failure of the negotiations, if some other source of oil could be found, it would be a big factor in the prevention of war. I, therefore, suggested a plan for the manufacture of synthetic oil and a plan to buy oil from nearby North Karafuto and if necessary and if possible buy North Karafuto. I fully realized the difficulty of my plans, but I felt we must do everything possible to avoid a war with the United States. My plans, however, were turned down as being impractical.

I also recollect that of the conditions in the negotiations, I was in favor of equal trade opportunity not only in the Western Pacific, but in all the Pacific area.

(6-e) - At the Liaison Conference of November 1, 1941 various important problems were discussed. Proposal to commence war immediately was brought up, but this proposal did not meet with favor. For the settlement of the Japanese-American negotiations, the "Ko" and the

"Otsu" plans were discussed. The conference was unanimous in the opinion that Japan should give in as much as possible in order to settle the disputes. The proposal by the Supreme Command, however, plunged the conference into an extreme difficulty. The proposal of the Supreme Command was: "If by the end of November the negotiations did not show a possibility of a settlement we should be ready to decide on war and with that in mind there is need of commencing preparations now". "Japan faces a crisis" stated the Supreme Command in support of its proposal, "Due to the military and economic pressures by the Allied Powers. If the negotiations remain unsettled and we drift along as we are, the defensive power of Japan in the Western Pacific in comparison with that of the Allied Powers will day by day decline. We will reach a critical point if we go along as we are until after December. If we are then attacked or there arises a necessity of waging a war in self-defense Japan will be so weak by then that the Supreme Command will not be able to accept the responsibility of national defense. We must make up our minds to decide on war before the opportune moment is lost and with that in mind we should decide on a preparation for war."

According to the above proposal, failure of the negotiations meant war. Discussions dragged on until after midnight on such points as whether it was not possible to go on without going to war even if the negotiations remain unsettled and whether or not waging a war meant extreme danger to Japan. As for me, it was my desire to go along as it was without war, even if the negotiations remained unsettled, but there was no way of bringing this about.

The Supreme Command was responsible for national defense and it was not possible to just oppose its proposal. However, to give assent to the proposal meant making the possibility of war that much greater. I was in an extremely difficult position. I fully realized what suffering

war would mean that we should try to avoid it if at all possible.

My first trip to Europe was made a year and several months after the Armistice, of the First World War, but I became fully aware of the horrors of war. The horrors of war were especially visible in the defeated countries, but for the people and the governments of the countries which won the war there was also suffering. I saw the battlefield and the wide devastations and the horrors of war sank into my bones. The China Incident had been going on for a long time and the people were feeling the effect of it. Needless to say, if a war against the United States should break out it would greatly add to the sufferings of the people.

The Supreme Command insisted that there was a chance for victory if war was started at an opportune time, however, the Navy Branch of the Supreme Command had predicted that should the war drag on for over two years the outcome would be uncertain. There was the possibility that the war might drag on for a long period and should Japan lose after a protracted war she would suffer more than if she did not go to war at all, even if the war was a defensive war. For the above reason, I felt I could not then and there give my assent to the Supreme Command's proposal and insisted we should give the matter further consideration. The Supreme Command replied that the matter called for immediate decision, otherwise it could not assume responsibility for national defense. I argued strongly against making an immediate decision and was finally given an opportunity to consider the matter for another day. Togo also made the same reservation.

Returning home from the Liaison Conference, I spent a restless night pondering over the matter. A decision on the pending proposal was not a decision to wage war, but it meant war would be highly probable if the Japanese-American negotiations were not settled by the end of November and I wanted to avoid war if at all possible. Thinking over the matter, however, I came to the conclusion, regardless of whether the issue in

question was good or bad, circumstance did not permit me to stop it. If I opposed it, there was nothing I could do except to resign. I felt that if I resigned, the effect, both at home and abroad, would be unfavorable towards the settlement of the Japanese-American negotiations and thus aggravate the possibility of a war between the United States and Japan. That much was clear.

Next morning Tojo telephoned me twice for my reply, I believed that further delay on my part would only aggravate the pending issue so I replied that I was not opposed to the proposal before the conference yesterday, but sincerely hoped for an amicable settlement of the negotiations.

(6-f) - The Hull Note of November 26 was a big blow to all. Japan could not accept the terms and the Foreign Minister explained there was little room for reconsideration on the part of the United States. The question at issue was whether to commence hostilities or drift along with the disputes unsettled. The Supreme Command was of the opinion that it could not accept responsibility for national defense if hostilities were not commenced at once. If the United States showed the least compromising attitude, there might be a way of continuing the negotiations even by altering the terms of the "Ko" or the "Otsu" plans, but the Hull Note indicated that settlement was not possible. In view of the conditions, a decision to wage war in self-defense was inevitable.

Japan was embarking on a perilous war, whether good or bad. If the Finance Minister had resigned, the effect to the general public would have been extremely great. The public would have interpreted the resignation to mean that financially and economically, Japan was not in a position to fight the war successfully, that the Finance Minister resigned because he felt the burden too great for the nation to bear. When it comes to national finance, the feeling of the people is especially important. If

the people are made to lose confidence it will breed a feeling of uncertainty and thus might become a cause for defeat. I was against the war, but I could not think of increasing the dangers that Japan faced. I felt it my duty to carry out my responsibility.

(6-g) - The decision to wage war was decided at the Imperial Conference of December 1, 1941, but hope that the war might be averted, though dim, was not given up. I pressed and obtained at the Liaison Conference the Supreme Command's agreement that war plans would be cancelled even after the outbreak of skirmishes if the negotiations reached a point where settlement was possible.

(6-h) - I do not recall that the reply to the Hull Note of November 26 was ever discussed at any of the meetings I attended, Liaison or Cabinet. I was of the opinion the matter was competently handled by the responsible officials. The prosecution has charged that a declaration of war was discussed at the Privy Council meeting of December 8, 1941. A declaration of war was discussed at that meeting, but it was an Imperial Rescript on the declaration of war addressed to the Japanese people.

(6-i) - War operation plans were never discussed at the Liaison Conferences or at the Cabinet meetings. I was not consulted about the Pearl Harbor attack or any other attack, nor was I ever informed about such attacks beforehand.

(7a) - I shall next reply to the other counts: 37 to 46, 51, 52, and 53.

It was my sincere desire to avoid war and I did everything in my power to do so, but the conditions against me were too strong. My assent for war was inevitable. However, I firmly believed we were fighting a war in self-defense and for our very existence.

As to the attack prior to formal notification in violation of International Treaty, I did not know such a plan existed and not knowing about it, I could not have stopped it. Furthermore, the Japanese Government did not have such a plan.

As to the acts of atrocity and other acts in violation of the law of land warfare, I had no connection with them whatsoever. In Japan the Supreme Command existed as an independent organ from the Cabinet and we, civilian members of the Cabinet were not informed beforehand or consulted on plans and preparations for battles. Furthermore, we, civilian members of the Cabinet, had no power to command or stop a battle. We had no voice in the choice of commanders of the Army and Navy. I, at least, was not even informed about the acts of atrocity, either officially or otherwise. Nothing about the acts of atrocity was mentioned in the press or radio. I was not even informed about the protests from foreign countries. I was of the impression the war was being fought fairly.

(7-b) - As to the treatment of prisoners of war, I was not informed nor consulted about it either in the Cabinet meetings or elsewhere, nor was I informed about the protests from foreign countries. It was said that in previous wars Japan had accorded good treatment to prisoners of war. Concerning the treatment of prisoners of war during the Pacific War, I was not in a position to even dream that ill-treatment was being accorded the prisoners of war. I did not even hear of rumors that prisoners of war were being ill-treated. The press and radio made no mention of it.

(7-c) - As to Counts 45, 46 and 47, I have touched on them in the China Incident Phase.

(8) - I resigned from the Tojo Cabinet on February 19, 1944 at the request of Premier Tojo. By the year 1945, it became clear that Japan

was facing defeat. The suffering of the people due chiefly to the air raids was extremely painful and I deeply felt my political responsibility to the people. On August 11, I learned that the Government had decided to accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. Feeling deeply my political responsibility to the Emperor and the people, I made up my mind to resign all marks of honor which His Majesty was graciously pleased to confer upon me (the privileges of my former post as a Minister of State specially granted me court rank) order of ~~merits~~, and become a plain citizen and remain in the background in the future. However, as a private citizen, I felt I should do everything I could for the people and if circumstances permitted, do my small part in the prevention of a bad inflation which was sure to follow the war. I felt that we who were concerned with finance should bear the responsibility of maintaining financial stability.

On this 25th day of September 1947

at TOKYO.

DEPONENT: KAYA, OKINORI (seal)

I, TAKANO, TSURUO, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date at TOKYO

WITNESS: TAKANO, TSURUO (Seal)

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

KAYA, OKINORI (Seal)

Kaya

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-- vs --

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Second Affidavit

Defendant



Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

I, KAYA, Okinori, attended practically all the Liaison Conferences up to the decision for war. I attended also all the Liaison Conferences held after the decision for war was made, except when otherwise inconvenienced.

Prior to my time, the Minister of Finance did not attend Liaison Conferences and I have not been told the reason why I, as Finance Minister, who was not a regular member, was asked to attend the meetings. At the time I joined the Cabinet I had exchanged views with the Premier on the efforts to be made to settle the Japanese-American negotiations and on the question of cooperation between the Cabinet and the Supreme Command and I have thought this might have been the reason for my being asked to attend the meetings.

In my recollection, subject matters within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance were never discussed. The decisions of the Liaison Conferences did not control the Cabinet meetings.

- (1) - The Liaison Conference was established for the purpose of enabling the Supreme Command and the Cabinet to get together for discussions. There is no law or Imperial Ordinance specifying its establishment and it had no power of making a decision.
- (2) - Important matters within the jurisdiction of the Cabinet discussed at the Liaison Conference were submitted to the Cabinet meetings for discussion and decision. In such instances the understanding reached at the Liaison Conferences were generally adopted.

- (3) At the Liaison Conferences subject matters coming under the direct jurisdiction of the Premier or matters under the jurisdiction of the Foreign, War and Navy Ministry were generally discussed. Whenever matters coming under the jurisdiction of other Ministers came up, such Ministers were asked to attend the meeting for discussions, or understanding was reached by some other method and when an unanimous agreement was reached the matter was submitted to the Cabinet for decision.
- (4) - At the Cabinet meetings matters submitted by the Minister having jurisdiction or matters which the Minister having jurisdiction approved were generally passed without opposition. There are hardly any cases in which a major change was made. In case a major opposition or a basic change in the subject matter was made, the Minister having jurisdiction or the Minister making the objection had to resign his post. When any opposition to a proposal was expected, it was customary to iron out the difference among the Ministers concerned before the proposal was submitted to the Cabinet meeting. I do not know of any case whereby the decision of the Liaison Conference controlled the Cabinet decision.
- (5) - At that time the Army and the Navy held strong political power and had absolute control over certain matters submitted by them or approved by them. Any opposition by any of the other Ministers did not carry weight.

I wish to point out next that the Liaison Conference was not the Supreme Organ for the prosecution of the war.

Matters such as: When, where and under what method a battle was to be held, transportation and movement of soldiers, commanding officers, etc. that pertained to war strategy were never discussed at the Liaison Conferences, nor was the Conference informed about such matters. They were

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considered secret matters of the Supreme Council. The Conference was not informed about any new implements of war, nor about the total strength of the Army and Navy. The Conference did receive reports on battles, but when I think about them now, there were great discrepancies between the reports and the actual facts. The reports received were generally the same as those reported in the newspapers.

As stated above, the Conference did not discuss matters pertaining to the armed forces, nor received factual reports on battles nor knew how much materials the Army and Navy had in stock.

On this 26th day of September 1947

At TOKYO.

DEPONENT: KAYA, Okinori (Seal)

I, TAKANO, Tsuruo hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness,

On the same date

at TOKYO

WITNESS: TAKANO, Tsuruo (Seal)

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

KAYA, Okinori (Seal)

9 June 1947

DEFENDANT: KAYA, Okinori

TO: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr.
FROM: Wiley and Cole
SUBJECT: Statement of Prosecution's evidence as to
KAYA, Okinori

The Indictment charges the defendant with the following violations:

Group 1 -- Crimes against peace

Counts 1 to 17, inclusive
Counts 19 to 34, inclusive, excepting
Counts 23, 25, 26 and 33

Group 2 -- Murder

Counts 37 to 47, inclusive

Group 3 -- Conventional War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity

Counts 53 to 55, inclusive

The defendant's argument for dismissal:

Mr. Levin, attorney for Kaya, in his motion for dismissal, contends that Kaya as to Counts 1 to 5 inclusive held "purely an administrative office" and that the evidence does not show that he participated in either "planning or executing the conspiracy".

As to the "planning and preparation of a war of aggression" against France, Russia, China and the other countries named in Counts 20, 21, 22, 24 and 27 to 36 inclusive, he contends that the record does not show Kaya "with any participation in connection with the waging of these wars except as a mere incident to the holding office at or about the time specified in Count 28". (July 7, 1937 to Sept. 2, 1945)

As to Group 2 -- Murder. He contends that the evidence "is not sufficient to warrant a conviction" and that "the evidence is abundantly clear that the responsibility for the opening of hostilities was not that of a minister of finance."

As to Group 3 -- War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, he contends that evidence not only is insufficient "but that there is not the slightest evidence in the record to charge any responsibility . . . in connection therewith," that these are all matters pertaining to the military administration.

Reply of Comyns Carr to the motion:

He contends that KAYA was a financial official throughout "holding parliamentary and civil service positions." He was a part of the pernicious system that took government control out of the responsible people and turned it over to the bureaucrats and as such is responsible for the acts the same as any other holder of a parliamentary office.

He then briefly summarizes the various offices held by KAYA and his responsibility in the development of the conspiracy and aggressive war, and that he assented to the final decision to make war at the imperial conference December 1, 1941.

As to the offenses under Group 2 and 3 he contends that KAYA'S responsibility was the same as every member of the cabinet during his two periods of finance minister, that the construction of the Burma-Siam Railroad could not have been carried on without consultation and consent of KAYA. If he was ignorant of outrages throughout the theaters of the Pacific War, which is incredible, it could only have been by deliberate abstinence from using the obvious sources of knowledge which it was his duty to invoke.

For convenience sake, I have put the defendant's activities into four time classifications:

1. Those years prior to his serving as Finance Minister in the First KONOYE Cabinet, starting from the date of Japanese aggression in Manchuria and ending June 4, 1937;

2. His tenure as Finance Minister in the First KONOYE Cabinet, commencing June 4, 1937, and ending May 26th, 1938;

3. The time elapsing between his tenure as Finance Minister in the First KONOYE Cabinet and the starting of his tenure as Finance Minister in the TOJO Cabinet, commencing with May 26, 1938, and ending October 18, 1941.

4. His tenure as Finance Minister in the TOJO Cabinet starting with October 18, 1941 to July 7, 1944, and up to date of surrender.

EVIDENCE CHRONOLOGICALLY ARRANGED
INTRODUCED BY THE PROSECUTION AS TO
KAYA, OKINORI

First Period, up to June 4, 1937: (1st Konoye Cabinet)

<u>Narrative Summary Page</u>	<u>Reference</u>	<u>Transcript Page</u>
116.	Cross-examination of WAKATSUKI showed that KAYA was attached to the Intendant Bureau of the Finance Ministry during WAKATSUKI Cabinet and he cooperated with Financial Reduction Policy of this Cabinet.	1590
162	Cross-examination of OKADA: - in which OKADA stated that in his Cabinet, KAYA, who was then in the Accounting Bureau of the Finance Ministry, faithfully carried out the policy of that Cabinet in reduction of expenditure and military expenses, also economized in State expenditures.	1887
734	Exhibit 90: Responsibilities of Manchuria Affairs Bureau to which KAYA was appointed Councillor on 8 June 1936.	5185- 5188
857	In connection with Anti-Comintern Pact, attention called to fact that KAYA was Councilor of the Cabinet Investigation Bureau, 27 Feb. 1937, and from 4 June 1937 - May 26, 1938 was Finance Minister.	5900- 5904

Second Period, June 4, 1937 to May 26, 1938: (1st Konoye Cabinet)

263	Cross-examination of Ching Teh Chun states that 1st KONOYE Cabinet decided on 11 July 1937 to send larger Army to North China. KAYA was Member of Cabinet and Finance Minister at time of the decision.	2455
363	Exhibit 239: Cabinet decision of 22 October 1937 outlining the establishment of heavy industry in Manchukuo. KAYA was Finance Minister and Member of Cabinet at this time.	

<u>Narrative Summary Page</u>	<u>Reference</u>	<u>Transcript Page</u>
628	Exhibit 323: Telegrams for American Embassy protesting about Nanking situation were shown to YOSHIZAWA, who stated matter had been brought before the Cabinet. KAYA was Finance Minister and member of the Cabinet at this time.	4558
723	Exhibit 453: Interrogation of HOSHINO, in which he stated the plan for the Manchurian Heavy Industrial Co. was started in 1937 and corporation began in 1938 (during KAYA's term as Finance Minister.)	5128
750	Exhibit 460: North China Development Company established for investing in and financing subsidiary companies engaged in reconstruction and development undertaking was set up under law of 30 April 1938 when KAYA was Finance Minister in 1st KONOYE Cabinet.	5261
880	Exhibit 36: Protocol of 6 Nov. 1937 of Japan, Italy and Germany - concluded while KAYA was Finance Minister.	6036
1204	Liebert's testimony refers to promulgation of Electric Power Conduct Law, March 1938 - KAYA Finance Minister at this time.	8274
1208	Liebert's testimony states on 28 March 1938 the Oil Resources Exploitation Law was passed. KAYA was Finance Minister in March 1938.	8289
1217	Liebert's testimony refers to act to promote production of important minerals, 29 March 1938 - when KAYA was Finance Minister.	8325
1233	Liebert's Enactment of National General Mobilization Law in May 1938, mobilizing all factories for war economy not otherwise provided. KAYA was Finance Minister.	8395
1249	Liebert: Formation of North China Development Company to promote economic development in North China, 30 April 1938 (KAYA Finance Minister), later became president of this Company.	8474

<u>Narrative Summary Page</u>	<u>Transcript Page</u>
1265	KAYA authorized expenditures from Extraordinary War Expenditures Accounts. 8542
1268	KAYA, when Finance Minister, was authorized to apply the Temporary Fund Adjustment Law. 8553
1269	KAYA, when Finance Minister, had right to direct adjustment of investment policies in all banks, hence destruction of last vestige of autonomous action in banks was executed - (authority for this: - Imperial Ordinance of 19 Oct. 1940). 8558
1243	Liebert testified that the Reserve Bank of China was incorporated on the 11 of Feb. 1938 and began business on 10 March 1938, with purpose of stabilizing currency, controlling money market and foreign exchange, also authorized to issue and manufacture currency. KAYA was Finance Minister 4 June 1937 to May 1938. 8445
1201	Exhibit 841: The outline of the Five-Year Plan for the Production of War Materials, 23 June 1937, War Office. KAYA was Finance Minister at this time. 8261-8262
1285	Liebert testified in cross-examination that the Five Year Plan of 23 June 1937 was a more complete outline for the production of war materials than was the plan of 29 May 1937. 8648
	Exhibit 2216: During his interrogation ARAKI stated that Finance Minister was in favor of sending armed forces to China under the 1st Konoye Cabinet. KAYA was Finance Minister from June 1937 to May 1938.
3128	Witness Tanaka stated that a Five-Minister conference was held on 20 July 1937 on the policy in North China. HIROTA was Foreign Minister and KAYA was Finance Minister at this time.

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1697	Exhibit 2216: During his interrogation ARAKI stated that Finance Minister was in favor of sending armed forces to China under the 1st Konoye Cabinet. KAYA was Finance Minister from June 1937 to May 1938.	15832
<u>Third Period, May 26, 1938 to Oct. 18, 1941:</u> (Between Cabinet Offices)		
530	GOETTE in direct examination testified concerning an interview with KAYA about the plan of material mobilization in North China, 3 main points were: (1) Supply of war materials to Japan for Sino-Japanese Conflict, (2) Expansion of Japanese armament and (3) Needs of peacetime industry.	3869 - 3874
531	Cross-examination of GOETTE: KAYA gave interview in his capacity of President of the N. China development to which subsidized, loaned money, and invested in business enterprises.	3875 - 3879
748	Exhibit 458: Article from Tokyo Gazette giving details of the work of the N. China Development Company. KAYA was President of this Company from 14 August 1939 to 18 October 1941.	5249 - 5250
748	Exhibit 459: Law concerning the North China Development Company and its establishment.	5250 - 5252
766	Exhibit 470: Japanese interests in various companies including North China Development Company.	5341
880	Exhibit 492: Privy Council meeting attended by KAYA on the conclusion of Protocol between Japan, Italy and Germany.	6033 - 6035
982 991 990	Exhibit 591-598: Documents concerning negotiations toward a Japanese-German Economical Agreement on China during 1938. At this time KAYA was advisor to the Finance Minister (1 July 1938-24 Oct. 1941).	6586 - 6630- 6631

<u>Narrative Summary Page</u>	<u>Transcript Page</u>
1750	Exhibit 1279: KIDO's diary of 19 July 1944, states that KAYA visited him about the monetary policy toward China. 11381
1854	Exhibit 1329: A document of the Foreign Office entitled, "What is the Prospect of the European War," answers the questions set forth in Exhibit 1328, concerning the essentials for national policy which was circulated to the various Ministries concerned. KAYA was Finance Minister at this time. 11928 - 11929
2503	In the spring of 1941 Prince KAYA told TANAKA that the Emperor was much worried about the participation of the Army in politics, and KAYA proposed that the witness (TANAKA) become the chief of the Military Affairs Bureau to stop the military participation in politics. The witness told KAYA that he was not the kind of person to do this and he could not realize the purpose, and had no ambition of becoming chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. He flatly refused the proposal. 15916
<u>Fourth Period, Oct. 18, 1941 to Feb. 1944 (Tojo Cabinet):</u>	
704	Exhibit 439: Charter of the South Manchurian Railway of 7 June 1906 was revised in 1942. When KAYA was Finance Minister to provide for losses to be recompensed by the government in the event that Kwantung Army orders re business affairs caused such losses. 5024
882	Exhibit 496: Renewal of Anti-Comintern Pact with additional satellite participants, 25 Nov. 1941 - KAYA was Finance Minister at this time. 6048
1000	Exhibit 49: Military Agreement between Germany, Japan and Italy, 18 January 1942 - KAYA was Finance Minister. 6681 - 6683

<u>Narrative</u> <u>Summary Page</u>	<u>Transcript</u> <u>Page</u>	
1062	Exhibit 659: Mitani's letter to Laval of 20 Jan. 1943 requesting settlement between F.I.C. and Japan, of payment, whereby F.I.C. provide piastres as against a special Japanese yen currency - KAYA Finance Minister at this time.	7146 - 7147
1085	Exhibit 683: List of members of Kokusaku Kenkyukai Society which includes KAYA.	7400 - 7402
1246	Exhibit 852: #10 Communication re Military Currency in Foreign Denominations. KAYA was Finance Minister during decisions made on latter communications.	8458
1247	Exhibit 853: Document from KAYA, 1 Nov. 1941 disclosing procedure for handling military currency.	8464
1280	Liebert, in cross-examination, stated KAYA issued instructions of 1 Nov. 1941 to Bank of Japan concerning foreign military currency.	8621
1264	Liebert testified that the Industrial Equipment Corporation with Government Capitalization of 400,000,000 yen was formed on 25 Nov. 1941 to equip wartime industry as determined by the Government. KAYA was Finance Minister at this time.	8534
1268	Liebert testified that Minister of Finance supplied the Temporary Fund Adjustments Bureau, which centralized complete authority of Japan's finances in the Bank of Japan.	8553
1552	Exhibit 588: The Exhibit is a document found at the Foreign Ministry giving information as to the national policies agreed on and the decision made at the Imperial Conference of 1941. Japan would adhere to the greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and would continue the move Southward of the China Incident. Japan would continue negotiations with relevant nations for war with	10146

- Britain and U.S. First she would carry out her scheme against FIC and Thailand and secretly arm against the Soviet while continuing diplomatic negotiations with precaution.
Reference: KAYA attended Imperial Conference of Nov. 5 and Dec. 1 1941.
- 1585 Exhibit 1167: Policy for guiding public opinion on British and American Problems agreed by the Cabinet meeting on November 4, 1941, provided that the suppression of reports on the tenseness of diplomatic relations with Britain and the United States shall be eased and the people given hope for the future. News and speeches enabling the enemy to see Japan's war preparations are to be concluded as well as all activities which might incite the public to take action against resident of third powers.
Reference: KAYA was Finance Minister. 10329 -
10331
- 1585 Exhibit 1169: Attended the Imperial Conference of 5 November 1941, where "Measures towards Foreign Countries in Relation to the Principle of Execution of National Policy of the Empire" was decided. 10332
- 1590 Exhibit 1176: General outline for hastening the conclusion of war against the United States, Britain, Netherlands and Chungking, dated November 12, 1941, provided in essence the plan to be adopted toward foreign powers as already set out in Exhibit 1169 pertaining to Imperial Conference on November 5, 1941. 10371
- 1590 Exhibit 878: Measures to be taken toward foreign countries decided at the Council in the presence of the Emperor on November 5th as considered in the Liaison Conference on November 13, 1941, the policy towards various nations is outlined. This is substantially the same as Exhibit 1169 with some addition in respect to China. Although names are not listed KAYA is cited as being a Member of the Cabinet. 10365

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- 1590 Exhibit 1175: Liaison Conference, November 11, 1941, gives the principal reasons alleged for the commencement of hostilities against United States and Britain. Although the names are not listed KAYA is included as being in the Cabinet. 10363
- 1600 Exhibit 1192: Extract from the Tokyo Nichi Nichi, November 29, 1941, showing that the Cabinet on November 28, 1941, approved a plan for establishing a new system in press circles. An Imperial Ordinance creating the New System will be issued under National Mobilization Law aimed at placing newspapers on a wartime basis. Reference: KAYA was a Cabinet Minister. 10437
- 1603 Exhibit 1197-A: Interrogation of NAGANO on March 26, 1946, showing that he had approved attack on Pearl Harbor and the fleets started for Pearl Harbor on November 26th or 27th. On or about November 28th or 29th a Liaison Conference was held which KAYA attended. 10464
- 1605 Exhibit 1201-A: In TOJO's interrogation of February 20, 1946, he stated that the last Liaison Conference before the Imperial Conference was on November 30th. Although the names are not listed KAYA is cited as being a Cabinet Minister and therefore probably attended. 10480 -
10481
- 1605 Exhibit 1202: In a TOJO communication of March 18, 1946, TOJO stated that the Liaison Conference approved the gist of the final note for U.S. and it was then given to the Cabinet. The text of the final note was the responsibility of TOGO. TOJO was head of the Liaison Conference and this Conference approved the time set for delivery of the note by delegating the task to the Foreign Minister and the two Chiefs of Staff. The Foreign Minister knew of the time and day set for the attack as did the President of the Planning Board SUZUKI. The following are cited by TOJO as always being present at the Liaison Conferences: War, Planning Board, Foreign and Finance Ministers. Reference: KAYA was Finance Minister. 10482

1607

Exhibit 1204-A: In TOJO's interrogation of February 19, 1946, TOJO stated that Japan felt that by her final note breaking off diplomatic relations she acquired freedom of action from international treaties and international law. Prior to the attacks the whole matter of treaty responsibility and international law had been considered by TOJO and his Cabinet and this was the grave responsibility of the Foreign Minister. The whole Cabinet attended the Imperial Conference on the 1st or 2nd, which made the decision for war. Japan had been challenged and was acting in self-defense and from the standpoint of international law TOJO felt they were not impeded and this was the opinion of the Cabinet. With respect to time of delivery of the note there were various opinions advanced and argued between the Chiefs of Staff and Foreign Minister. The hour fixed was one that would not interfere with the success of the surprise attack but from the Foreign Minister's point of view the note had to be delivered before the attack. The possibility of victory was intimately related to time.

10493

1610

Exhibit 1207-A: Interrogation of TOGO of March 11, 1946, stating that the final note was written by the Foreign Office but responsibility for its composition rests with participating members of the Liaison Conferences and it was reported to the Cabinet without objection. There was an Imperial Conference on December 1st, there was a decision for war but previous to that Conference the mainpoints of the note were reported to the Cabinet. As to the delivery of the note, instructions were sent previously to Washington stating that it was to be delivered at 1 p.m., December 7th, Washington time, to the Secretary of State. The instructions were sent by the Chief of the Cable Section of the Foreign Office and all members of the Liaison Conference knew of the sending of these instructions.

Reference: KAYA was a member of the Liaison Conference cited by TOGO as thought to be responsible.

10509

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- 1612 Exhibit 1209-A: In TOJO's interrogation of February 8, 1946, he states that those who attended the Imperial Conference on December 1st were himself as President of the Privy Council, all or nearly all Cabinet Ministers, the two Chiefs of Staff, also HOSHINO, MUTO, OKA. KAYA was Finance Minister. 10520
- 1624 Exhibit 1232: Memorandum of conversations between HULL and NOMURA, December 7, 1941, and submitted the document he had been instructed to hand over. HULL asked whether the document was presented under instructions from the Government and NOMURA replied that this was so, whereupon when HULL finished he said that in all his 50 years of service he had never seen a document more crowded with infamous falsehood. At 1:20 p.m., the attack on Pearl Harbor had taken place. At 4 p.m., Washington time, the Japanese Imperial Headquarters announced that war began at dawn that day. KAYA was Finance Minister. 10627 -
10628
- 1631 Exhibit 1240: Imperial Rescript, December 8, 1941, stating that the Emperor hereby declared war on U.S. and British Empire and outlining Japan's policy and decision to fight. The Rescript bears the signature of KAYA. 10686
- 1632 Exhibit 1241: Minutes of the Inquiry Committee of the Privy Council, December 8, 1941, when SHIMADA reported on the starting of the war against U.S. and England. Reference: KAYA was present at the meeting. 10690-
10691
- 1634 Exhibit 1243-A: TOJO'S interrogation of February 7, 1946. He admitted his responsibility for the attack on Pearl Harbor, United States and British possessions, but said the other Cabinet Members were jointly responsible. Reference: KAYA was a Member of the Cabinet. 10706
- 1732 Exhibit 1267: Minutes of the Privy Council of December 10, 1941, pertaining to the proposal made by Japan to Germany and Italy regarding a no separate peace treaty. KAYA was present at this meeting. 11305-
11306

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- 1853 Exhibit 1328: Major terms to be re-examined concerning essentials for the prosecution of national policy, a list of questions drawn up for the liaison conference of October or November 1941 by a department of the Foreign Office and sent to the different Ministries concerned. The Finance Ministry is mentioned in the document and the defendant KAYA was Finance Minister at this time. 11922 - 11924
- 2617 Exhibit 2344: Chart showing composition of Japanese Cabinets from 1928 to 1945 in which the positions held by KAYA are shown.

KAYA, Okinori

Complete personnel record of KAYA as taken from the records of the Personnel Section, Cabinet Secretariat, Diet Building, Tokyo, January 9, 1946:

NOTE: Admitted in evidence as Exhibit 111. Excerpts in record only.

PRESENT DOMICILE: Tokyo-fu

PREVIOUS DOMICILE: Yamaguchi Prefecture

BORN : 30 January 1889

SOCIAL STATUS : Samurai

1908 Mar. Graduated from the Hiroshima Prefectural Middle School

1911 July Graduated from the Political Science Course of the Law College of the Tokyo Imperial University

1917 Apr. 9 Appointed to a position in the Temporary Investigation Bureau of the Finance Ministry; Received 6th Grade salary; Ordered to work in the Finance Section of the Temporary Investigation Bureau of the Finance Ministry

1917 Oct. Passed the Higher Civil Service Examination

1918 July 8 Appointed Financial Secretary (Finance Ministry); Ordered to be stationed in USA (Finance Ministry); Ordered to become accountant of Articles and Goods (Finance Ministry)

1917 Aug 20 Left Japan

1919 Sept. 16 Appointed under official of the Temporary Investigation Bureau of Finance Ministry, and Financial Secretary (Finance Ministry); Received 6th Grade Salary (Finance Ministry); Appointed to duty in the Tax Section, (Finance Ministry); Ordered to return from USA (Finance Ministry)

1919 Nov. 6 Ordered to serve in Europe (Finance Ministry); Released from post of Accountant of Articles and Goods (Finance Ministry)

1920 Mar. 3 Returned from Europe (Finance Ministry)

1920 Mar. 11 Appointed Accountant of Finance Ministry
(Finance Ministry);
Ordered to serve in the Budget and Account
Settlement Section of the Accounts Bureau

1920 Aug. 18 Revision of Higher Civil Service System Salary
(Effective from August) (Cabinet)

1920 July 26 Appointed to serve concurrently in the In-
vestigation Section of the Accounts Bureau
(Finance Ministry)

1920 Nov. 1 Granted ¥120 as a reward for services in the
1915-1920 Incident

1922 June 2 Ordered to serve in the Budget and Account
Settlement Section of the Accounts Bureau
and concurrently in the Investigation
Section (Finance Ministry)

1924 Dec. 20 Ordered to serve in the Accountant Office
(Finance Ministry); Accountant became Secre-
tary by change in official regulations
(Imperial Ordinance No. 326)

1925 Dec. 22 Appointed Secretary of the Building and Repairs
Bureau and concurrently Secretary of the
Finance Ministry;
Assigned to the General Affairs Division of
the Building and Repairs Bureau

1928 Sept. 30 Released from main post and ordered to serve
exclusively as Secretary of the Finance
Ministry (Cabinet);
Granted 3rd Class Salary

1927 Apr. 15 Ordered to attend the Naval Disarmament Con-
ference at Geneva as attendant to the Pleni-
potentiaries (Cabinet)

1927 May 24 Appointed secretary of the council of Commerce
and Industry (Cabinet)

1927 June 6 Appointed to the same post again

1928 Jan. 23 Appointed Acting Private Secretary to the
Finance Minister (Finance Ministry)

- 1929 Nov. 12 Ordered to attend the London Naval Conference as an attendant to the Plenipotentiaries (Cabinet)
- 1930 Feb. 18 Released from post of Acting Secretary to the Finance Minister (Finance Ministry)
- 1930 Mar. 10 Appointed Secretary of the Finance Ministry (Finance Ministry);
Appointed Section Chief in the Accounts Bureau (Finance Ministry)
- 1930 May 21 Appointed Secretary of the State Property Investigation Committee (Cabinet)
- 1930 Oct. 15 Decorated with the 6th Order of Merit with the Sacred Treasure
- 1931 Apr. 17 Appointed Assistant to members of the Preparation Committee for the Readjustment of Administration (This was abolished 21 December 1931). Not reported in the official gazette. (Cabinet)
- 1931 June 22 Appointed secretary of the Special Administration and Financial Council (This was abolished by Imperial Ordinance No. 292 of 1931) (Cabinet)
- 1932 June 4 Appointed government commissioner for matters under the jurisdiction of the Finance Ministry in the 62nd Diet (Cabinet).
- 1932 Nov. 24 Appointed Chief of the Budget and Account Settlement Section of the Accounts Bureau (Finance Ministry)
- 1932 Nov. 30 Appointed Secretary of the Preparation Committee for the Construction of Central Government Buildings (Cabinet)
- 1932 Dec. 5 Appointed Secretary of the Resources Bureau (Cabinet)
- 1932 Dec. 8 Appointed Secretary of the Investigation Committee on the Cultural Works for China (Cabinet)
- 1932 Dec. 24 Appointed government commissioner for matters under the jurisdiction of the Finance Ministry in the 64th Diet (Cabinet)

- 1932 Dec. 28 Appointed Secretary of the Unemployment Counter-Measure Committee (Cabinet)
- 1933 Sept. 25 Appointed Secretary of the Judging Committee on the Valuation of Iron Manufacturing Enterprises (Cabinet)
- 1933 Sept. 25 Appointed as Assistant Committeeman for the Establishment of the Japan Iron Manufacturing Company, Ltd. (Cabinet)
- 1933 Dec. 23 Appointed government commissioner for matters under the jurisdiction of the Finance Ministry at the 65th Diet (Cabinet)
- 1933 Dec. 27 Commissioned Secretary of the Rural Communities Burden Investigation Committee (Cabinet)
- 1934 Apr. 24 Commissioned Secretary of the Rice Production Costs Investigation Committee (Cabinet)
- 1934 Apr. 29 Decorated 4th Order of Merit with Single Ray of the Rising Sun for services 1931-1934 Incident
- 1934 May 21 Appointed Secretary of the Rice Disposal Committee (Cabinet)
- 1934 May 22 Appointed Director of the Accounting Bureau of the Finance Ministry
- 1934 June 1 Appointed Secretary of the Resources Council; Appointed a Councillor of the Resources Bureau (Cabinet); Appointed Secretary of the Education Administration Council.
(This was abolished on 29 Dec 1935 by Imperial Ordinance No. 323 of 1935) (Cabinet)
- 1934 June 6 Appointed member of State Property Investigation Committee (Cabinet); Appointed member of the Preparation Committee for the Construction of Central Government Buildings (Cabinet); Appointed member of the Horse Administration Investigation Committee (Cabinet); Appointed a member of the Rice Control Committee (Cabinet)
- 1934 June 8 Appointed member of the Perpetual Lease Committee (Cabinet); Appointed member of the Investigation Committee on Cultural Works for China (Cabinet); Appointed Secretary of the International Tourists Committee (Cabinet)

- 1934 June 11 Appointed member of the Public Health and Sanitation Investigation Committee (Cabinet); Appointed member of the National Parks Committee (Cabinet)
- 1934 June 15 Appointed member of the Relief Examination Committee (Cabinet); Appointed member of Unemployment Counter-Plan Committee (Cabinet)
- 1934 June 19 Appointed member of the Judging Committee on the Valuation of Iron Manufacturing Enterprises (Cabinet)
- 1934 June 1 Commissioned member of the Rural Communities' Burden Investigation Committee (Abolished 11 Jan 1936) (Cabinet); Commissioned a member of the Rice Production Costs Investigation Committee (Abolished 5 March 1936) (Cabinet)
- 1934 Aug 1 Appointed member of the Public Works Council (Cabinet)
- 1934 Sept. 1 Appointed Secretary of the Rice Counter-Measure Investigation Committee (Abolished by Imperial Ordinance No. 22 of 1936) (Cabinet)
- 1934 Nov. 27 Appointed government commissioner for matters under the jurisdiction of the Finance Ministry in the 66th Diet (Cabinet)
- 1934 Dec. 25 Appointed government commissioner for matters under the jurisdiction of the Finance Ministry in the 67th Diet (Cabinet)
- 1934 Dec. 26 Appointed Secretary of the North-Eastern District Development Investigation Committee (Cabinet)
- 1935 June 1 Appointed member of the Overseas Colonization Committee (Cabinet)
- 1935 June 5 Released from the post of member of the Relief Examination Committee (Cabinet)
- 1935 June 10 Appointed member of the Hokkaido Colonization Plan Investigation Committee (Abolished by Imperial Ordinance No. 23 of 1936) (Cabinet)
- 1935 June 11 Appointed a member of the Relief Examination Committee (Cabinet)

- 1935 July 27 Appointed a member of the Social Insurance Investigation Committee (Cabinet)
- 1935 Sept. 4 Appointed a member of the Government Loans Disposition Committee (Cabinet)
- 1935 Dec. 24 Appointed government commissioner for matters under the jurisdiction of the Finance Ministry in the 68th Diet (Cabinet)
- 1936 Feb. 7 Appointed Secretary of the Preparation Committee for the 2600th Anniversary Celebration (Cabinet)
- 1936 Mar. 26 Appointed reserve member of the Ordinary Civil Service Officials' Limitation Committee (Finance Ministry)
- 1936 Apr. 21 Appointed a temporary member of the Raw Silk Demand Promotion Investigation Committee (Cabinet)
- 1936 May 2 Appointed government commissioner for matters under the jurisdiction of the Finance Ministry in the 69th Diet (Cabinet)
- 1936 May 30 Appointed Director of the Financial Bureau; Promoted to the 2nd class of the higher civil service
- 1936 June 3 Appointed a member of the Postal Life Insurance Reserve Funds Management Committee (Cabinet)
- 1936 June 8 Appointed a Councillor of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau (Cabinet)
- 1936 June 9 Appointed a member of Rice Control Committee (Cabinet)
- 1936 June 10 Appointed a member of the Foreign Exchange Control Committee (Cabinet); Appointed a member of the Foreign Currency Valuation Committee (Cabinet)
- 1936 June 15 Appointed Secretary of the International Tourist Committee (Cabinet)
- 1936 June 16 Appointed reserve member of the Ordinary Civil Service Officials' Limitation Committee (Finance Ministry)

- 1936 June 27 Appointed a Councillor of Social Bureau (Cabinet)
- 1936 July 1 Appointed member of the Committee for Increasing Domestic Production (Cabinet)
- 1936 Dec. 24 Appointed government commissioner for matters under the jurisdiction of the Finance Ministry in the 70th Imperial Diet (Cabinet)
- 1937 Feb. 2 Appointed Vice Minister of Finance;
Appointed Acting Director of the Financial Bureau of Finance Ministry (Finance Ministry)
- 1937 Feb. 4 Released from the position of Acting Director of the Financial Bureau (Finance Ministry)
- 1937 Feb. 12 Appointed member of the Foreign Exchange Control Committee (Cabinet)
- 1937 Feb. 20 Appointed member of the Information Committee (Cabinet);
Appointed member of Committee for Increasing Domestic Production;
Appointed a member of Investigation Committee on the System of Weights and Measures;
Appointed member of the Unfair Bargain Sales Examination Committee;
Appointed member of the Committee on Automobile Manufacturing Enterprises (Cabinet)
- 1937 Feb. 24 Appointed Councillor of the Cabinet Investigation Bureau;
Appointed Councillor of Manchurian Affairs Bureau;
Appointed member of the Central Statistics Committee;
Appointed member of the Resources Council;
Appointed member of the Northeastern District Development Investigation Committee;
Appointed member of the Board of Trustees for the 2600th Anniversary Celebration (Cabinet);
Appointed member of International Tourist Committee (Cabinet)
- 1937 Mar. 1 Appointed member of the Opium Committee (Cabinet)
- 1937 Mar. 5 Decorated with the 3rd Order of Merit with the Sacred Treasure.

- 1937 Mar. 8 Appointed member of the Electricity Committee; Appointed member of the Postal Insurance Reserve Fund Management Committee (Cabinet)
- 1937 Mar. 10 Appointed a member of the Religious System Investigation Committee
- 1937 Mar. 12 Appointed member of the Grand Shrine Facilities Investigation Committee
- 1937 Mar. 22 Appointed member of the Shinto Shrine System Investigation Committee (Cabinet)
- 1937 Mar. 19 Appointed member of the Examination Committee on the Valuation of the Iron Manufacturing Enterprises (Cabinet); Appointed member of Perpetual Lease Committee (Abolished 1937 by Imperial Ordinance No. 185 of 1937) (Cabinet)
- 1937 Mar. 26 Appointed member of the Public Works Council (Cabinet)
- 1937 Apr. 30 Appointed member of the State Property Investigation Committee (Cabinet); Appointed member of Preparation Committee on the Construction of Central Government Offices (Cabinet); Appointed member of the Government Loans Disposition Committee (Cabinet)
- 1937 May 10 Commissioned a special member of the Temporary Price Counter-Plan Committee (Cabinet)
- 1937 May 14 Appointed Councillor of the Investigation Bureau of the Cabinet (Abolished by Imperial Ordinance 192 of 1937) (Cabinet)
- 1937 June 4 Appointed Finance Minister
- 1938 May 26 Resigned from the regular post (Cabinet)
- 1938 July 1 Appointed adviser to the Finance Ministry; Appointed member of the National Savings Encouragement Committee (Cabinet)
- 1938 Sept. 10 Appointed member of the Electric Communications Committee (Cabinet)

- 1938 Dec. 9 Became a member of the House of Peers by Article I, No. 4, of the House of Peers Ordinance
- 1939 Jan. 26 Appointed member of the Tax System Investigation Committee (Cabinet)
- 1939 Mar. 8 Appointed member of Central Price Committee (Cabinet)
- 1939 July 5 Appointed member of the Asia Development Committee (Cabinet)
- 1939 Aug. 14 Appointed President of the North China Development Co., Ltd. (Cabinet)
- 1939 Sept. 6 Appointed member of the National Spiritual General Mobilization Committee (Cabinet)
- 1940 Apr. 1 Appointed member of the Price Counter-Measure Committee (Cabinet)
- 1941 Sept. 30 Appointed member of the Organizing Committee for the East Asia Marine Transportation Co., Ltd. (Cabinet)
- 1941 Oct. 18 Appointed Finance Minister (Cabinet); Relieved of the post of President of the North China Development Co., Ltd. (Cabinet)
- 1941 Oct. 24 Relieved of duty as adviser to the Finance Minister at his request; Relieved of duty as member of National Savings Encouragement Committee at his request (Cabinet)
- 1941 Oct. 31 Relieved of duty as member of the Price Counter-Measure Council (Cabinet)
- 1941 Nov. 4 Resigned from the Organizing Committee for the East Asia Marine Transportation Co., Ltd. (Cabinet)
- 1942 Mar. 17 Appointed chairman of the Organizing Committee for the Southern Regions Development Bank (Cabinet)
- 1942 Mar. 24 Appointed chairman of the Organizing Committee for the Wartime Finance Bank (Cabinet)
- 1942 Apr. 2 Released from the post of chairman of the Organizing Committee for the Southern Regions Development Bank (Cabinet)

1942 Apr. 24 Released from the post of chairman of the Organizing Committee for the Wartime Finance Bank (Cabinet)

1944 Feb. 19 Resigned from the principal post (Cabinet) Specially granted the privileges of his former post (Cabinet)

1944 Mar. 4 Appointed as adviser to the Finance Ministry; Appointed member of the National Savings Encouragement Committee (Cabinet)

1944 Aug. 24 Appointed member of the Customs-Duties Investigating Committee (Cabinet)

1945 Feb. 29 Appointed member of the Wartime Price Council (Cabinet)

1945 May 19 Appointed Financial Adviser to the Finance Ministry (Cabinet)

1945 Aug. 29 Appointed adviser to the Finance Ministry (Cabinet)

1945 Sept. 29 Relieved of the post of adviser to the Finance Ministry

1945 Sept. 28 Resigned from the Customs- Duties Investigation Committee

1945 Sept. 28 Resigned from the National Savings Encouragement Committee

1945 Dec. 3 Resigned from the House of Peers

NOTE: The above personnel record of KAYA appears as Exhibit #111. The Record contains only excerpts of exhibit.

NOTE: Record does not show all appointments to public office and by whom or the character of duties of each appointment.

NOTE: The Record does not show proof as to the meaning of words in brackets, such as (Cabinet) and (Finance Ministry).

KAYA, Okinori

The following is from Document No. 2932 (page 25),
"List of Decorations awarded to Defendants":

Oct. 31, 1931	Decorated with the Imperial Order of the Single Rays of the Rising Sun.	For meritorious services in the signing of the London Naval Treaty.
Dec. 12, 1931	Decorated with the 5th Class Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure.	For meritorious services in connection with the administrative and economic adjustment.
Sept. 1, 1932	Raised to the Fifth Court Rank, Sr. Grade.	For having been in office for the prescribed term after having been raised to the Fifth Court Rank, Jr. Grade.
Apr. 29, 1934	Decorated with the Small Cordon of the 4th Class Imperial Order of the Rising Sun.	For meritorious services in the Incident of the years 1931-1934.
Feb. 15, 1937	Raised to the Fourth Court Rank, Jr. Grade.	For having been in office for the prescribed term after having been raised to the Fifth Court Rank, Sr. Grade.
Mar. 5, 1937	Decorated with the 3rd Class Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure.	In accordance with the established precedence whereby first class officials of CHOKUNIN rank who have been raised to the 4th Class Order may be raised to the 3rd Class Order after having remained in office for 1½ years.
June 15, 1937	Raised to the Third Court Rank, Jr. Grade.	For having been appointed Finance Minister.

- June 28, 1937 Decorated with the 2nd Class Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure. In accordance with the established precedence whereby Ministers who have been raised to the 3rd Class Order may be raised to the 2nd Class Order after having remained in office for four months.
- July 28, 1937 Decorated with the 1st Class Order of Merit of /TN Manchukuo?/ For meritorious services in promoting friendly relations between Japan and Manchukuo.
- June 13, 1938 Raised to the Third Court Rank, Sr. Grade. For having been in office for many years at the time of his retirement.
- July 14, 1943 Decorated with the 1st Class Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure. In accordance with the established precedence whereby Ministers who have been raised to the 2nd Class Order may be raised to the 1st Class Order after having remained in office four years.

SUMMARY OF NUMBER AND ACTIVITIES IN GOVERNMENT APPOINTMENTS

The defendant KAYA was born January 30, 1889. He is a career man who has spent his life from the date of his first government appointment in April of 1917 in government service and activities. He is a graduate in political science, having graduated in July 1911 from the Law College, Imperial University.

His appointments from the various government agencies include not less than 24 from the Finance Ministry; 90 by the various cabinets; one by Imperial Ordinance; two by the Prime Minister; and one for the House of Peers.

The various fields of government activities in which he was engaged include:

1. Finance

Investigation Bureau

Secretary positions and private secretary to
Finance Ministry

Accountant of articles and goods

Section Chief, Accounts Bureau

Study of foreign economics in USA and Europe

Secretary, Tax Section

Accounts Settlement Section

Commissioner for matters under jurisdiction of
the Finance Ministry

Member of Government Loans Commission

Director, Finance Bureau

Member, Foreign Exchange Control and Valuation
Committee

Vice Minister of Finance

Finance Ministry under KONOYE First Cabinet

Advisor to Finance Ministry

Finance Minister under TOJO

Advisor to Finance Ministry

II. Others

Secretary and member, Building and Repairs Bureau
Naval Disarmament Conference, Geneva
Naval Conference, London
Secretary and Council of Commerce and Industry
Committeeman, Investigation State Property
Committeeman, Readjustment of Administration
Secretary to Commission for Construction of Central
Government Buildings
Secretary and Councillor, Resource Bureau
Secretary to Committee on Cultural Works in China
Secretary to Committee of Unemployment
Secretary to Committee, and Committeeman on
Valuation of Iron Manufacturing
Secretary to Rural Burdens Investigating Committee
Secretary and Committeeman, Rice Production Costs
and Rice Control
Secretary to Education Administration Council
Secretary, Perpetual Lease Committee
Secretary, International Tourists Committee
Committeeman on Public Health and Sanitation -
National Parks - Relief
Member of Public Works Council
Secretary and Committeeman, Northeastern Development
Committee
Member, Overseas Colonization Committee
Member, Hokkaido Colonization Plan Committee
Committeeman, Social Insurance
Member of Ordinary Civil Service Committee -
Raw Silk Investigation Committee
Member, Perpetual Life Insurance Committee

Councillor, Manchurian Affairs

Member, Committee for Increasing Domestic
Production

Member of Unfair Bargain Sales - Automobile
Manufacturing Enterprises - Resources Council

Councillor, Cabinet Investigation Bureau,
Manchurian Affairs

Member, Opium Committee - Electricity Committee

Member, Grant Shrines Investigating Committee -
Religious Investigating Committee - Shinto-Shrine
System Investigation Committee

Member of House of Peers

Member of Tax System Investigation Committee -
Central Price Committee

Asia Development Committee

President, North China Development Committee

Member, National Spiritual Development Committee -
General Mobilization Committee - East Asia
Transportation Committee

Mr. Higgins

SUBJECT: Relations between Japan and U. S.

The following information was obtained from the file of KAYA, Okinori, case no. 49.

DETAILS: File 49, serial 14, pp. 3, 4, 5 and 6 relate KAYA's memory of the cabinet sessions just prior to December 7, 1941. He said among other things it was of no use to oppose the wishes of the rest of the cabinet members in agreeing with TOJO's opinion that it was impossible to comply with Hull's note and that war was inevitable. No cabinet member opposed TOJO and by their silence approved his opinion. Later they all approved in writing.

File 49, serial 16, pp. 2, 3. When KAYA asked that no hasty action be taken concerning Hull's note, the military (TOJO or SUGIYAMA) or navy (NAGANO) said "we have no time to think over this problem very long, as time is short" and allowed one day for consideration. Defensive preparations for war were discussed.

On page 4 same file and serial TOJO is quoted as having said at the December 2 Imperial Conference, "Altho we have negotiated with America, Hull's note indicates that we will soon be at war. As a means of self defense we must reconcile ourselves that we will soon be at war."

File 49, serial 34, page 2. KAYA admits that at a liaison he and all of cabinet agreed with the military decision to wage war against the U.S. His excuse for not opposing was that he would have to resign and the cabinet might collapse. He thought that war was inevitable and that it was best to go to war at that time. He says further that if he resigned it would have weakened Japan's position financially, while if he remained there would be confidence in the financial situation and inflation could be avoided.

It was further decided that the means of carrying out the war should be left entirely up to the army and navy departments. In other words they could decide whether to attack the U.S. or await an attack.

Interrogator: Lt. Samuel F. Healey

Briefer: Lt. McEwen

Higgins

KAYA OKINORI

ANALYSIS

of the responsibility of the accused arising out of his official position for the facts stated in Prosecution's phase " Aggression against the USSR.

Official positions
(directly connected with the said phase)

Responsible
for the following facts:

- 1. 10/III 1930-Secretary of the Finance Ministry.
- 2. 30/V - 1936 - Director of the Financial Bureau.
- 3. 8/VI - 1936 - Councillor of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau.
- 4. 2/II - 1937 - Vice Minister of Finance.
- 5. 4/VI 1937 - May 1938.-Finance Minister.
- 6. 5/VII 1939- Member of the Asia: Development committee :
- 7. 6/IX 1939 - Member of the Na-: tional Spiritual General Mobili-: zation Committee. :

- 3. Aggressive intentions of the imperialistic clique of Japan in regard to the USSR. (1928-1945).
Cc.5,17 of the Indictment.
- 5. The seizure of Manchuria and turning it into a military base for an attack on the Soviet Union. Violation of provisions of the Portsmouth Treaty, and of the Peking Convention of 1925. (1931-1945)
C.17 of the Indictment.
- 6. The establishment of the military base for an attack on the USSR in Korea. The violation of the provisions of the Portsmouth Treaty and of the Peking Convention of 1925.
C. 17 of the Indictment.
- 17. Active realization of the aims of conspiracy as regards the Soviet Union during the period of the aggressive war of Germany against the USSR and gross violation of the Neutrality Pact.
- 19. Plans of an aggressive war against the USSR from 1941 to 1944.
C.17 of the Indictment.

8. 18/XI - 1941 - February 1944 -
Finance Minister.

As one of the leaders of the Japanese ruling clique which fact is proved in particular by his having held high government posts in the important field of financing various undertakings is responsible for the general policy of the Japanese government, which found its expression in specific aggressive acts against the U.S.S.R.

4. Plans of a war of aggression against the Soviet Union from 1928 to 1940.

C. 17 of the Indictment.

14. The conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact, which was a military political alliance of aggressors directed against the democratic states and against the USSR, in particular, the results of its enforcement as regards the USSR prior to the conclusion of the Tri-partite pact. (1936-1940)

Cc. 5, 17 of the Indictment.

15. The conclusion of the Tri-partite Pact finally shaping the conspiracy of aggressors against the democratic states, and the USSR in particular.

Cc. 5, 17 of the Indictment.

SYNOPSIS

of the documents presented to the Court containing direct reference to the actions of the accused connecting him with the facts mentioned during prosecution's phase " Japanese Aggression Against the USSR."

DOCUMENTS

1. Affidavit of Yatsugi, Kazuo, Chief of the General Affairs Bureau of the National Policy Investigation Society, the "Kokusaku-Kenkyu-kai", of August 30, 1946. The affidavit shows that the accused Kaya, Okinori being the Minister of Finance of Japan was member of the "Kokusaku-Kenkyu-Kai" Society (which worked out aggressive plans of Japan directed against the democratic nations, and the USSR in particular. See Exhibits NN 679, 680, 682, 684, 685)
(Prosecution document N 2233, exhibit N 673)

2. List of members of the "Kokusaku-Kenkyu-Kai" Society in which, among other members there is the name of Kaya, Okinori.
(Prosecution document N 2302-A, exhibit N 683)

3. Testimony of Yatsugi, Kazuo given before the Court on October 9, 1946, which confirmed his affidavit.
(Page of the Record 7368-7399)

REFERENCE TO THE FOLLOWING FACTS.

3. Aggressive intentions of the imperialistic clique of Japan in regard to the USSR.

(1928-1945).

Mr. Higgin

KAYA

The following are additional references to the Defendant

KAYA:

Not listed
in
transcript

Exhibit 1029: Measures to be taken towards natives of East Asia or Burma - the President of the Racial Committee of the National Policy Research Institute, KOKUSAKU RENKYU KAI, 20 Sep 1940 - KAYA was a member of this Society (See Page 1085 of Narrative Summary for use of members).

Mr Higgins

KAYA, Chinoro

The following is a list of references made to the defendant KAYA in the Narrative Summary of the record:

<u>Page</u>	<u>Reference</u>
	<u>Biography:</u> 29 April 1934 KAYA was decorated for service in 1931-34 Incident. KAYA was appointed member Investigation Committee on Cultural Works for China on 6/8/34. On 1 Jun 1935, KAYA was appointed member Overseas Colonization Committee from 30 May 1936 to 2 Feb 1937. KAYA was Director of the Financial Bureau. On 8 Jun 1936 KAYA was appointed Councilor of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau.
116	Cross-examination of WAKATSUKI showed that KAYA was attached to the Insistent Bureau of the Finance Ministry during WAKATSUKI Cabinet and he cooperated with Financial Reduction Policy of this Cabinet.
162	Cross-examination of OKADA: - in which OKADA stated that in his Cabinet, KAYA, who was then in the Accounting Bureau of the Finance Ministry, faithfully carried out the policy of that Cabinet in reduction of expenditure and military expenses, also economized on State expenditures.
	<u>Biography:</u> 3 June 1936 to 4 Jun 1937, KAYA was Vice-Minister of Finance. 24 Feb 1937 KAYA was appointed Councilor of Cabinet Investigation Bureau of Manchurian Affairs Bureau. 1 Mar 1937 KAYA was appointed Member of Opium Committee 14 May 1937 until abolition. KAYA was Councilor of Investigation Bureau of Cabinet.
*263	Cross-examination of Ching Teh Chun states that 1st KONOYE Cabinet decided on 11 Jul 1937 to send larger Army to North China. KAYA was Member of Cabinet and Finance Minister at time of the decision.

KAYA, Okinori (Con't)

<u>Page</u>	<u>Reference</u>
* 363	Exhibit 239: Cabinet decision of 22 October 1937 outlining the establishment of heavy industry in Manchuria. KAYA was Finance Minister and Member of Cabinet at this time.
530	GOETTE in direct examination testified concerning an interview with KAYA about the plan of material mobilization in North China. 3 main points were: (1) Supply of war materials to Japan for Sino-Japanese Conflict, (2) Expansion of Japanese armament and (3) Needs of pacoties industry.
531	Cross-examination of GOETTE: KAYA gave interview in his capacity of President of the N. China Development to which subsidized, loaned money, and invested in business enterprises.
* 603	Exhibit 323: Telegrams for American Embassy protesting about Nanking situation were shown to YOSHIZAWA, who stated matter had been brought before the Cabinet. KAYA was Finance Minister and member of the Cabinet at this time.
704	Exhibit 439: Charter of the South Manchurian Railway of 7 Jun 1906 was revised in 1942. When KAYA was Finance Minister to provide for losses to be recouped by the government in the event that Kwantung Army orders re business affairs caused such losses.
723	Exhibit 453: Interrogation of HOSHINO, in which he stated the plan for the Manchurian Heavy Industrial Co. was started in 1937 and corporation began in 1938 (during KAYA's term as Finance Minister.)
734	Exhibit 90: Responsibilities of Manchuria Affairs Bureau to which KAYA was appointed Council on 8 June 1936.
740	Exhibit 458: Article from Tokyo Gazette giving details of the work of the N. China Development Company. KAYA was President of this Company from 14 Aug 1939 to 13 Oct 1941.
743	Exhibit 459: Law concerning the North China Development Company and its establishment.

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- 759 Exhibit 460: North China Development Company established for investing in and financing subsidiary companies engaged in reconstruction and development undertaking was set up under law of 30 Apr 1938 when KAYA was Finance Minister in 1st HIRIYU Cabinet.
- 766 Exhibit 470: Japanese interests in various companies including North China Development Company.
- 857 Biography: In connection with Anti-Comintern Pact, attention called to fact that KAYA was Councillor of the Cabinet Investigation Bureau, 27 Feb 1937; and from 4 Jan 1937 - 4 Jan 1938 was Finance Minister.
- 880 Exhibit 492: Privy Council meeting attended by KAYA on the conclusion of Protocol between Japan, Italy and Germany.
- 880 Exhibit 36: Protocol of 6 Nov 1937 of Japan, Italy and Germany - concluded while KAYA was Finance Minister.
- 882 Exhibit 496: Renewal of Anti-Comintern Pact with additional satellite participants, 25 Nov 1941 - KAYA was Finance Minister at this time.
- 982 Exhibit 591-593: Documents concerning negotiations toward a Japanese-German Economic Agreement on China during 1938. At this time KAYA was Advisor to the Finance Minister (1 Jul 1938-24 Oct 1941).
- 991
- 1000 Exhibit 49: Military Agreement between Germany, Japan and Italy, 18 January 1942 - KAYA was Finance Minister.
- 1062 Exhibit 659: Mitani's letter to Laval of 20 Jan 1943 requesting settlement between F.I.C. and Japan of payment, whereby F.I.C. provide piast as against a special Japanese yen currency - KAYA Finance Minister at this time.
- 1085 Exhibit 683: List of members of Keizansai Kenkyukai Society which includes KAYA.
- 1204 Liebert's testimony refers to promulgation of Electric Power Conduct Law, Mar 1938 - KAYA FINANCE MINISTER at this time.
- 1208 Liebert's testimony states on 23 Mar 1938 the Oil Resources Exploitation Law was passed. KAYA was Finance Minister in March 1938.

KAYA, Ginori (Con't)

<u>Page</u>	<u>Reference</u>
1217	Liebert's testimony refers to act to promote production of important minerals, 29 Mar 1 938 - when KAYA was Finance Minister.
1233	Liebert's enactment of National General Mobilization Law in May 1938, mobilizing all factories for war economy not otherwise provided. KAYA was Finance Minister.
1246	Exhibit 852: 10 Communications re Military Currency in Foreign Denominations. KAYA was Finance Minister during decisions made on latter communications.
1247	Exhibit 853: Document from KAYA, 1 Nov 1941 disclosing procedure for handling military currency.
1249	<u>Liebert</u> Formation of North China Development Company to promote economic development in North China, 30 April 1938 (KAYA Finance Minister), later became president of this Company.
1265	KAYA authorized expenditures from Extraordinary War Expenditures Accounts.
1268	KAYA, when Finance Minister was authorized to apply the Temporary Fund Adjustment Law.
1269	KAYA, when Finance Minister, had right to direct adjustment of investment policies in all banks, hence destruction of last vestige of autonomous action in banks was executed - (authority for this: - Imperial Ordinance of 19 Oct 1940).
1280	Liebert in cross-examination stated KAYA issued instructions of 1 Nov 1941 to Bank of Japan concerning foreign military currency.

o Although the defendant held the position stated at the time of decision, it has not been established that he was actually present at this meeting.

Name

Reference

- 1243 Liebert testified that the Reserve Bank of China was incorporated on the 11 of Feb 1938 and began business on the 10 of March 1938, with purpose of stabilizing currency, controlling money market and foreign exchange, also authorized to issue and manufacture currency. HAYA was Finance Minister 4 Jun 1937 to May 1938.
- 1251 Exh. 841: The outline of the Five-Year Plan for the Production of War Materials, 23 Jun 1937. War Office. HAYA was Finance Minister at this time.
- 1264 Liebert testified that the Industrial Equipment Corporation with Government Capitalization of 400,000,000 yen was formed on 25 Nov 1941 to equip wartime industry as determined by the Government. HAYA was finance minister at this time.
- 1268 Liebert testified that Minister of Finance applied the Temporary Fund Adjustments Bureau, which centralized complete authority of Japan's finances in the Bank of Japan.
- 1285 Liebert testified in cross-examination that the Five Year Plan of 23 Jun 1937 was a more complete outline for the production of war materials than was the plan of 29 May 1937.

FILE NO. 49

REPORT BY: R. H. GILLILAND
1st Lt., Inf.

RE: KAYA, Okinori

DATE: 30 April 1946

STATUS : Pending

On 9 January 1946 the records of the Personnel Section, Cabinet Secretariat were examined at the Diet Building, Tokyo.

Complete personnel records of the subject were micro-filmed. Photostatic copies, together with translation, are on file as Exhibit No. 657.

Following is a transcript of the translation:

KAYA, Okinori

PRESENT DOMICILE : Tokyo-fu

PREVIOUS DOMICILE : Yamaguchi Prefecture

BORN : 30 January 1889

SOCIAL STATUS : Samurai

1908 Mar Graduated from the Hiroshima Prefectural Middle School.

1911 Jul Graduated from the Political Science Course of the Law College of the Tokyo Imperial University

1917 Apr 9 Appointed to a position in the Temporary Investigation Bureau of the Finance Ministry (Finance Ministry); Received 6th Grade salary;
Ordered to work in the Finance Section of the Temporary Investigation Bureau of the Finance Ministry.

1917 Oct Passed the Higher Civil Service Examination.

1918 Jul 8 Appointed Financial Secretary (Finance Ministry).
Received 6th Grade Salary (Finance Ministry);
Ordered to be stationed in U.S.A. (Finance Ministry);
Ordered to become Accountant of Articles and Goods (Finance Ministry).

1917 Aug 20 Left Japan.

1919 Sep 16 Appointed under official of the Temporary Investigation Bureau of Finance Ministry, and Financial Secretary (Finance Ministry);
Received 6th grade salary (Finance Ministry);
Appointed to duty in the Tax Section (Finance Ministry);
Ordered to return from U.S.A. (Finance Ministry).

1919 Nov 6 Ordered to serve in Europe (Finance Ministry);
Released from post of Accountant of Articles and Goods (Finance Ministry).

1920 Mar 3 Returned from Europe (Finance Ministry).

1920 Mar 11 Appointed Accountant of Finance Ministry (Finance Ministry);
Received 7th Rank of Higher Civil Service Cabinet;
Received 7th Class Salary (Finance Ministry);
Ordered to serve in the Budget and Account Settlement Section of the Accounts Bureau.

1920 Mar 30 Received the 7th Court Rank, Junior Grade (Cabinet).

1920 Dec 28 Promoted to the 6th Rank of Higher Civil Service (Cabinet).

1920 Aug 18 Revision of Higher Civil Service System Salary (Effective from Aug.) (Cabinet).

- 1920 Dec 28 Received 9th Class Salary (Finance Ministry).
- 1920 Jan 31 Promoted to the 7th Court Rank, Senior Grade.
- 1920 Jun 30 Received 8th Class Salary (Finance Ministry).
- 1920 Jul 26 Appointed to serve concurrently in the Investigation Section of the Accounts Bureau (Finance Ministry).
- 1920 Nov 1 Granted ¥120 as a reward for services in the 1915-1920 Incident.
- 1921 Dec 28 Granted 7th Class Salary (Finance Ministry).
- 1922 Jun 2 Ordered to serve in the Budget and Account Settlement Section of the Accounts Bureau and concurrently in the Investigation Section (Finance Ministry).
- 1922 Dec 28 Promoted to the 5th Class of the Higher Civil Service (Cabinet).
Granted 6th Class Salary (Finance Ministry).
- 1923 Feb 10 Promoted to the 6th Court Rank, Junior Grade.
- 1923 Dec 28 Granted 5th Class Salary (Finance Ministry).
- 1924 Dec 20 Ordered to serve in the Accountant Office (Finance Ministry);
Accountant became Secretary by change in official regulations (Imperial Ordinance No. 326).
- 1925 Jan 17 Promoted to the 4th Class of the Higher Civil Service (Cabinet).
Granted 4th Class Salary (Finance Ministry).
- 1925 Feb 16 Promoted to the 6th Court Rank, Senior Grade.
- 1925 Dec 22 Appointed Secretary of the Building and Repairs Bureau and concurrently Secretary of the Finance Ministry;
Promoted to the 4th Class of the Higher Civil Service (Cabinet);
Granted 2nd Class Salary (Finance Ministry);
Assigned to the General Affairs Division of the Building and Repairs Bureau.
- 1926 Jan 18 Granted 1st Class Salary (Finance Ministry).
- 1926 Jul 12 Awarded a set of silver cups for service in adjusting financial and administrative matters.
- 1928 Sep 30 Released from main post and ordered to serve exclusively as Secretary of the Finance Ministry (Cabinet);
Granted 3rd Class Salary.
- 1927 Apr 15 Ordered to attend the Naval Disarmament Conference at Geneva as attendant to the Plenipotentiaries (Cabinet).
- 1927 May 24 Appointed secretary of the council of Commerce and Industry (Cabinet).
- 1927 Jun 6 Appointed to the same post again.
- 1927 Jul 5 Promoted to the 3rd Class of the Higher Civil Service.
- 1927 Aug 1 Promoted to the 5th Court Rank, Junior Grade.
- 1927 Dec 27 Granted 2nd Class Salary (Finance Ministry).
- 1928 Jan 23 Appointed Acting Private Secretary to the Finance Minister (Finance Ministry).
- 1929 Nov 12 Ordered to attend the London Naval Conference as an attendant to the Plenipotentiaries (Cabinet).

- 1929 Dec 23 Granted 1st Class Salary (Finance Ministry).
- 1930 Feb 18 Released from post of Acting Secretary to the Finance Minister (Finance Ministry).
- 1930 Mar 10 Appointed Secretary of the Finance Ministry (Finance Ministry); Promoted to the 3rd class of the Higher Civil Service (Cabinet); Granted 1st Class Salary; Appointed Section Chief in the Accounts Bureau (Finance Ministry).
- 1930 May 21 Appointed Secretary of the State Property Investigation Committee (Cabinet).
- 1930 Oct 15 Decorated with the 6th Order of Merit with the Sacred Treasure; Appointed Government Commissioner for matters under the jurisdiction of the Finance Ministry in the 59th Diet (Cabinet).
- 1931 Apr 17 Appointed Assistant to members of the Preparation Committee for the Readjustment of Administration (This was abolished 21 December 1931). Not reported in the official gazette (Cabinet).
- 1931 Jun 22 Appointed secretary of the Special Administration and Financial Council (This was abolished by Imperial Ordinance No. 292 of 1931) (Cabinet).
- 1931 Oct 31 Decorated with the Order of Single Ray of the Rising Sun (for services in the Signing of the London Naval Treaty).
- 1931 Dec 12 Decorated with the 5th Order of Merit with the Sacred Treasure as a reward for his services in administrative and financial readjustments.
- 1932 Jun 4 Appointed government commissioner for matters under the jurisdiction of the Finance Ministry in the 62nd Diet (Cabinet).
- 1932 Sep 1 Received the 5th Court Rank, Senior Grade.
- 1932 Nov 24 Appointed Chief of the Budget and Account Settlement Section of the Accounts Bureau (Finance Ministry).
- 1932 Nov 30 Appointed Secretary of the Preparation Committee for the Construction of Central Government Buildings (Cabinet).
- 1932 Dec 5 Appointed Secretary of the Resources Bureau (Cabinet).
- 1932 Dec 8 Appointed Secretary of the Investigation Committee on the Cultural Works for China (Cabinet).
- 1932 Dec 24 Appointed government commissioner for matters under the jurisdiction of the Finance Ministry in the 64th Diet (Cabinet).
- 1932 Dec 28 Appointed Secretary of the Unemployment Counter-Measure Committee (Cabinet).
- 1933 Sep 25 Appointed Secretary of the Judging Committee on the Valuation of Iron Manufacturing Enterprises (Cabinet).
- 1933 Sep 25 Appointed as Assistant Committeeman for the Establishment of the Japan Iron Manufacturing Company, Ltd. (Cabinet).
- 1933 Dec 23 Appointed government commissioner for matters under the jurisdiction of the Finance Ministry at the 65th Diet (Cabinet).
- 1933 Dec 27 Commissioned Secretary of the Rural Communities Burden Investigation Committee (Cabinet).
- 1934 Apr 24 Commissioned Secretary of the Rice Production Costs Investigation Committee (Cabinet).

- 1934 May 21 Appointed Secretary of the Rice Disposal Committee (Cabinet).
- 1934 May 22 Appointed Director of the Accounting Bureau of the Finance Ministry;
Promoted to the 2nd class of the Higher Civil Service (Cabinet).
- 1934 Jun 1 Appointed a Councillor of the Resources Bureau (Cabinet);
Appointed Secretary of the Education Administration Council.
(This was abolished on 29 Dec 1935 by Imperial Ordinance No. 323 of 1935.) (Cabinet);
Appointed Secretary of the Resources Council.
- 1934 Jun 6 Appointed member of State Property Investigation Committee (Cabinet);
Appointed member of the Preparation Committee for the Construction of Central Government Buildings (Cabinet);
Appointed member of the Horse Administration Investigation Committee (Cabinet);
Appointed a member of the Rice Control Committee (Cabinet).
- 1934 Jun 8 Appointed member of the Perpetual Lease Committee (Cabinet);
Appointed member of the Investigation Committee on Cultural Works for China (Cabinet);
Appointed Secretary of the International Tourists Committee (Cabinet).
- 1934 Jun 11 Appointed member of the Public Health and Sanitation Investigation Committee (Cabinet);
Appointed member of the National Parks Committee (Cabinet).
- 1934 Jun 15 Appointed member of the Relief Examination Committee (Cabinet);
Appointed member of Unemployment Counter-Plan Committee (Cabinet).
- 1934 Jun 19 Appointed member of the Judging Committee on the Valuation of Iron Manufacturing Enterprises (Cabinet).
- 1934 Jun 1 Commissioned member of the Rural Communities' Burden Investigation Committee (Abolished 11 Jan 1936) (Cabinet);
Commissioned a member of the Rice Production Costs Investigation Committee (Abolished 5 March 1936) (Cabinet).
- 1934 Aug 1 Appointed member of the Public Works Council (Cabinet).
- 1934 Sep 1 Appointed Secretary of the Rice Counter-Measure Investigation Committee (Abolished by Imperial Ordinance No. 22 of 1936) (Cabinet).
- 1934 Nov 27 Appointed government commissioner for matters under the jurisdiction of the Finance Ministry in the 66th Diet (Cabinet).
- 1934 Dec 25 Appointed government commissioner for matters under the jurisdiction of the Finance Ministry in the 67th Diet (Cabinet).
- 1934 Dec 26 Appointed Secretary of the North-Eastern District Development Investigation Committee (Cabinet).
- 1935 Jun 1 Appointed member of the Overseas Colonization Committee (Cabinet).
- 1935 Jun 5 Released from the post of member of the Relief Examination Committee (Cabinet).
- 1935 Jun 10 Appointed member of the Hokkaido Colonization Plan Investigation Committee (Abolished by Imperial Ordinance No. 23 of 1936.) (Cabinet).
- 1935 Jun 11 Appointed a member of the Relief Examination Committee (Cabinet).
- 1935 Jul 27 Appointed a member of the Social Insurance Investigation Committee (Cabinet).

- 1935 Sep 4 Appointed a member of the Government Loans Disposition Committee (Cabinet).
- 1935 Dec 24 Appointed government commissioner for matters under the jurisdiction of the Finance Ministry in the 68th Diet (Cabinet).
- 1934 Apr 29 Decorated with the 4th Order of Merit with the Single Ray of the Rising Sun for services in the 1931-1934 Incidents (Cabinet).
- 1936 Feb 7 Appointed Secretary of the Preparation Committee for the 2600th Anniversary Celebration (Cabinet).
- 1936 Mar 26 Appointed reserve member of the Ordinary Civil Service Officials' Limitation Committee (Finance Ministry).
- 1936 Apr 21 Appointed a temporary member of the Raw Silk Demand Promotion Investigation Committee (Cabinet).
- 1936 May 2 Appointed government commissioner for matters under the jurisdiction of the Finance Ministry in the 69th Diet (Cabinet).
- 1936 May 30 Appointed Director of the Financial Bureau;
Promoted to the 2nd class of the higher civil service.
- 1936 Jun 3 Appointed a member of the Postal Life Insurance Reserve Funds Management Committee (Cabinet).
- 1936 Jun 8 Appointed a Councillor of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau (Cabinet).
- 1936 Jun 9 Appointed a member of Rice Control Committee (Cabinet).
- 1936 Jun 10 Appointed a member of the Foreign Exchange Control Committee (Cabinet);
Appointed a member of the Foreign Currency Valuation Committee (Cabinet).
- 1936 Jun 15 Appointed Secretary of the International Tourist Committee (Cabinet).
- 1936 Jun 16 Appointed reserve member of the Ordinary Civil Service Officials' Limitation Committee (Finance Ministry).
- 1936 Jun 27 Appointed a Councillor of Social Bureau (Cabinet).
- 1936 Jul 1 Appointed member of the Committee for Increasing Domestic Production (Cabinet).
- 1936 Dec 24 Appointed government commissioner for matters under the jurisdiction of the Finance Ministry in the 70th Imperial Diet (Cabinet).
- 1937 Feb 2 Appointed Vice Minister of Finance;
Promoted to 1st class of the Higher Civil Service (Cabinet);
Appointed Acting Director of the Financial Bureau of Finance Ministry (Finance Ministry).
- 1937 Feb 4 Released from the position of Acting Director of the Financial Bureau (Finance Ministry).
- 1937 Feb 12 Appointed member of the Foreign Exchange Control Committee (Cabinet).
- 1937 Feb 20 Appointed member of the Information Committee (Cabinet);
Appointed member of Committee for Increasing Domestic Production;
Appointed a member of Investigation Committee on the System of Weights and Measures;
Appointed member of the Unfair Bargain Sales Examination Committee;
Appointed member of the Committee on Automobile Manufacturing Enterprises (Cabinet).

- 1937 Feb 15 Promoted to the 4th Court Rank, Junior Grade.
- 1937 Feb 24 Appointed Councillor of the Cabinet Investigation Bureau;
Appointed Councillor of Manchurian Affairs Bureau;
Appointed member of the Central Statistics Committee;
Appointed member of the Resources Council;
Appointed member of the Northeastern District Development Investigation Committee;
Appointed member of the Board of Trustees for the 2600th Anniversary Celebration (Cabinet);
Appointed member of International Tourist Committee (Cabinet).
- 1937 Mar 1 Appointed member of the Opium Committee (Cabinet).
- 1937 Mar 5 Decorated with the 3rd Order of Merit with the Sacred Treasure.
- 1937 Mar 8 Appointed member of the Electricity Committee;
Appointed member of the Postal Insurance Reserve Fund Management Committee (Cabinet).
- 1937 Mar 10 Appointed a member of the Religious System Investigation Committee
- 1937 Mar 12 Appointed member of the Grand Shrine Facilities Investigation Committee.
- 1937 Mar 22 Appointed member of the Shinto Shrine System Investigation Committee (Cabinet).
- 1937 Mar 19 Appointed member of the Examination Committee on the Valuation of the Iron Manufacturing Enterprises (Cabinet);
Appointed member of Perpetual Lease Committee (Abolished 1937 by Imperial Ordinance No. 185 of 1937) (Cabinet).
- 1937 Mar 26 Appointed member of the Public Works Council (Cabinet).
- 1937 Apr 30 Appointed member of the State Property Investigation Committee (Cabinet);
Appointed member of Preparation Committee on the Construction of Central Government Offices (Cabinet);
Appointed member of the Government Loans Disposition Committee (Cabinet).
- 1937 May 10 Commissioned a special member of the Temporary Price Counter-Plan Committee (Cabinet).
- 1937 May 14 Appointed Councillor of the Investigation Bureau of the Cabinet (Abolished by Imperial Ordinance 192 of 1937) (Cabinet).
- 1937 Jun 4 Appointed Finance Minister.
- 1937 Jun 15 Promoted to the Junior Grade of the 3rd Court Rank.
- 1937 Jul 5 Decorated with the 2nd Order of Merit with the Sacred Treasure.
- ~~1937 Jul 28~~
1938 Apr 28 Permitted to receive and wear the 1st Order of Merit with the Pillar of State granted by the Emperor of Manchukuo.
- 1938 May 26 Resigned from the regular post (Cabinet).
- 1938 Jun 13 Promoted one grade in rank by special grace of the Emperor to the Senior Grade of the 3rd Court Rank.
- 1938 Jul 1 Appointed adviser to the Finance Ministry;
Appointed member of the National Savings Encouragement Committee (Cabinet).
- 1938 Sep 10 Appointed member of the Electric Communications Committee (Cabinet)
- 1938 Dec 9 Became a member of the House of Peers by Article I, No. 4, of the House of Peers Ordinance.

- 1939 Jan 26 Appointed member of the Tax System Investigation Committee (Cabinet).
- 1939 Mar 8 Appointed member of Central Price Committee (Cabinet).
- 1939 Jul 5 Appointed member of the Asia Development Committee (Cabinet).
- 1939 Aug 14 Appointed President of the North China Development Co., Ltd. (Cabinet).
- 1939 Sep 6 Appointed member of the National Spiritual General Mobilization Committee (Cabinet).
- 1940 Apr 1 Appointed member of the Price Counter-Measure Committee (Cabinet).
- 1941 Sep 30 Appointed member of the Organizing Committee for the East Asia Marine Transportation Co., Ltd. (Cabinet).
- 1941 Oct 18 Appointed Finance Minister (Cabinet);
Relieved of the post of President of the North China Development Co., Ltd. (Cabinet).
- 1941 Oct 24 Relieved of duty as advisor to the Finance Minister at his request;
Relieved of duty as member of National Savings Encouragement Committee at his request (Cabinet).
- 1941 Oct 31 Relieved of duty as member of the Price Counter-Measure Council (Cabinet).
- 1941 Nov 4 Resigned from the Organizing Committee for the East Asia Marine Transportation Co., Ltd. (Cabinet).
- 1942 Mar 17 Appointed chairman of the Organizing Committee for the Southern Regions Development Bank (Cabinet).
- 1942 Mar 24 Appointed chairman of the Organizing Committee for the War-time Finance Bank (Cabinet).
- 1942 Apr 2 Released from the post of chairman of the Organizing Committee for the Southern Regions Development Bank (Cabinet).
- 1942 Apr 24 Released from the post of chairman of the Organizing Committee for the War-time Finance Bank (Cabinet).
- 1943 Jul 14 Decorated with the First Order of Merit with the Sacred Treasure.
- 1944 Feb 19 Resigned from the principal post (Cabinet);
Specially granted the privileges of his former post (Cabinet).
- 1944 Mar 4 Appointed as adviser to the Finance Ministry;
Appointed member of the National Savings Encouragement Committee (Cabinet).
- 1944 Aug 24 Appointed member of the Customs-Duties Investigating Committee (Cabinet).
- 1945 Feb 29 Appointed member of the War-time Price Council (Cabinet).
- 1945 May 19 Appointed Financial Adviser to the Finance Ministry (Cabinet).
- 1945 Aug 29 Appointed advisor to the Finance Ministry (Cabinet).
- 1945 Sep 29 Relieved of the post of advisor to the Finance Ministry.
- 1945 Sep 28 Resigned from the Customs-Duties Investigation Committee.
- 1945 Sep 28 Resigned from the National Savings Encouragement Committee.
- 1945 Dec 3 Resigned from the House of Peers.