

...ers would have remained for the joint Indo-
Japanese command to act upon, if exclusive authority over
military forces as to organization, allotment and movement was
vested in the Japanese Army.

181. As Prime Minister, you knew, did you not, of the decision of the Supreme War Leadership Council on 1 February 1945, to place all railways, shipping and communications in French Indo-China under the control of the Japanese Army.
182. Were you familiar with the 6-hour ultimatum given by the Japanese to the Governor-General of Indo-China to bring about the surrender of the agencies mentioned in my previous questions.

THE MARCH AND OCTOBER INCIDENTS OF 1931

1. Do you recall meeting with Gen. UGAKI, Gen. SUGIYAMA, Gen. YAMAWAKI, Masao; Gen. NINOMYA, Col. HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, and Lt. Col. NEMOTO, on or about 13 January 1931 to discuss ways and means of seizing political power in Japan.
2. If answer is no, pass to question 4.
3. If answer is yes, ask the following:
 - (1) Was a decision made at that meeting to take action to achieve the objective.
 - (2) What was the decision.
 - (3) Was OKAWA present at that meeting.
 - (4) Was OKAWA's name mentioned as an appropriate person for the carrying out of the plan.
 - (5) Was any arrangement decided upon whereby your group would work in conjunction with OKAWA to carry out the plan to seize political power in Japan. If so, state what it was.
 - (6) Do you know of any subsequent meetings of this group or representatives of this group to secure the effectuation of the proposed plan to seize political power.
 - (7) If so, when did it take place and who attended and what action was taken.
4. You state that at the beginning of March 1931, OKAWA asked you to arrange an interview for him with War Minister UGAKI, pertaining to a plan he had for the reconstruction of Japan.
5. Was OKAWA's plan related to the plan of the group that met on 13 Jan 1931 to discuss the seizing of political power.
6. Did OKAWA's plan contemplate the overthrow of the Cabinet by bombing the Diet.
7. Were you interested in OKAWA's plan to overthrow the Cabinet in ~~March 1931~~.
8. When OKAWA disclosed his plan to you did you examine the same and were you worried mainly about the sort of measures to be taken.
9. Was your objection to OKAWA's plan to bomb the Diet principally based on the fact that it might require a good many unnecessary victims, and did you tell him that the execution of an improper plan always requires a good many unnecessary victims.
10. Did you believe that OKAWA's plan lacked consistency.
11. Did you show the plan to Col. NAGATA, Tetsuzn, Chief of the Military Affairs Section and request him to examine OKAWA's plan for its consistency.

The March and October
Incidents of 1931 (cont'd)

12. If you were opposed to the adoptability or the execution of OKAWA's plan, why did you desire to have the consistency of the plan determined.
13. As Director of the Military Affairs Bureau at the time OKAWA brought his plan to you, did your duties include the examination of the consistency or the practicability of plan for the bombing of the Diet, or the overthrow of the Cabinet.
14. Was such a plan a proper matter of business to be presented to the War Minister.
15. Was such a plan a proper matter to be considered for consistency or adoptability by subordinates in your Bureau.
16. Was the OKAWA plan to create an incident in March 1931 within the scope of work assigned to you as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau.
- 16a. You knew this at the time, did you?
17. Prior to receiving Col. NAGATA's opinion on OKAWA's plan, did you go to the residence of the War Minister and discuss the OKAWA plan with him.
18. Did you take along with you your original pencil notations outlining the plan.
19. Did you deliver these pencil notations to Gen. UGAKI.
20. Did you tell Gen. UGAKI that you had directed Col. NAGATA to examine the consistency of the OKAWA plan and that you had not yet received Col. NAGATA's answer.
21. How long did your visit with Gen. UGAKI last.
22. Will you state what was said by the War Minister and you on that occasion.
23. Did you discuss any other matters besides OKAWA's plan at that time, pertaining to the overthrow of the Cabinet and if so state fully what was said.
24. Did Gen. UGAKI make a decision at that time as to the consistency or practicability of the plan.
25. Did Gen. UGAKI consider the plan reckless.
26. Why was further attention paid to the plan if Gen. UGAKI considered the plan reckless.
27. Did either or both of you feel that if the plan could be made consistent that it might be adaptable.

The March and October
Incidents of 1931 (cont'd)

28. After your visit with Gen. UGAKI did you permit Col. NAGATA to continue to work on the plan so as to give it consistency.
29. Why did you desire Col. NAGATA to give the plan consistency if you considered the plan not adaptable.
30. Is the purport of your testimony that had the OKAWA plan been consistent and adaptable you would have favored its execution.
31. In connection with the bombs which OKAWA received, you say that you arranged to have OKAWA return them as a result of your intervention with Marquis Tokugawa. Was there any question about OKAWA having the bombs.
32. Prior to your visit to Marquis Tokugawa, did you ask OKAWA to return the bombs.
33. What did you tell OKAWA to do in reference to returning the bombs.
34. Did you request OKAWA to return the bombs in a personal or military capacity.
35. Was OKAWA holding any military position at the time.
36. Was it not an offense for a civilian such as OKAWA to have possession of military property for the purposes these bombs were intended.
37. Was there any military authority on which the bombs could have been recaptured.
38. If so, why was such authority not used.
39. Why was the intervention of Marquis Tokugawa necessary in order to recapture property belonging to the War Department.
40. Did you know Lt. General TATEKAWA.
41. Did you know Maj. Gen. NAGATA, Tetsuzen.
42. Did you know Maj. TANAKA, Kiyoshi.
43. Did you and the last three officers I have mentioned cooperate in OKAWA's plan.
44. Were Lt. Gen. TATEKAWA, NAGATA, Tetsuzen and TANAKA, Kiyoshi, involved in the October Incident in 1931.
45. Were you acquainted with ISOBE, Asaichi and MURANAKA, Koji.
46. Are you familiar with their involvement in the Feb. 1936 revolutionary plot.

The March and October
Incidents of 1931 (cont'd)

47. Do you know whether they were punished for their part in the Feb. 1936 plot.
48. If so, what was the punishment.
49. Are you familiar with a written statement made by ISOBE and MURANAKA in which you are named as a cooperator in the March and October incidents of 1931.
50. If such statement was made, do you admit or deny the truth of that statement.
51. If you deny having a part in the March and October incidents, what motive do you attribute to ISOBE and MURANAKA in the assertion they made that you were a conspirator in the March and October incidents.
52. On KOISO's connection with the March and October incidents, the Prosecution further refers the Tribunal to prosecution evidence in the record, pages 1402; 1406; 1417; 1418; 1605; 1627; 1553; 1558; 1441; 1445; 15560; 15674; 1926.

CONNECTION WITH OUTBREAK OF MANCHURIAN INCIDENT

1. Prior to the Mukden incident did you discuss with Gen. MINAMI the probability of an outbreak of an incident in Manchuria.
2. Who else was present during such discussion.
3. What was decided.
4. Were you selected as the War Department representative, to discuss the matter with the General Staff Office.
5. How long before Sept. 18, 1931, did the conference with Gen. MINAMI and the General Staff Office take place.
6. What was the conclusion reached by you and the General Staff.
7. Did you recommend Maj. Gen. TATEKAWA, as the person to go to Mukden to prevent the outbreak of an incident; or did you mention him as a possible candidate for this assignment.
8. You knew that Gen. TATEKAWA had been accused of, or at least was under suspicion of having planned the March 15 incident.
9. You knew that TATEKAWA was responsible for giving OKAWA the bombs in March in order to effectuate a plan to blow up the Diet.
10. Did you consider TATEKAWA an ideal person to send on a mission to prevent an outbreak of the kind anticipated.
11. If so, why was he selected.
12. Did you know when he left for Manchuria on his mission to prevent the outbreak of the incident.
13. Did he have ample time to get there far in advance of the outbreak of the incident.
14. Did you confer with him before he left, and if so what conversation did you have with him.
15. Was the mission of TATEKAWA in fact merely a scheme to make it appear that you and he desired to prevent an incident, whereas you knew that by circumventing the desires of the General Staff such an incident would take place.
16. Precisely what was TATEKAWA to do in order to prevent the outbreak of an incident.

CHIEF OF STAFF, KWANTUNG ARMY

1. As Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, were you the one who presented to the Commanding General, all matters which required final action by him.
2. Were you advised by all staff officers and agencies of the Kwantung Army concerning their plans, operations and policies.
3. Were such matters coordinated by you and either passed upon finally by you or presented to the Commanding General for his approval.
4. Did you yourself prepare certain plans and policies for the command.
5. In general, were you familiar with all actions planned or taken by the Kwantung Army.
6. Were you acquainted with Gen. TADA, Shun, head of the Counselling Section to the Manchukuoan Military Administration, and did you ever discuss with him the system of advisors over which he had supervision.
7. Did you know of the system of advisors which was in his charge, by means of which Japanese advisors and instructors coordinated matters relating to personnel, finance and munitions with the Manchukuoan Army.
8. Did you know that such advisors and instructors were posted at each Manchukuoan detachment, government office and school and that this system put the Manchukuoan Army under the direct control of the Japanese.
9. Did you know that this system of advisors was extensively used in the conquest of Jehol.
10. Did you know that this system of advisors was a subterfuge or pretense that the Kwantung Army was only furnishing advisors to the Manchukuoans whereas such advisors and military instructors were used to control the life pulse of the Manchukuoan Army.
11. Prior to the time you became Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, and while you were Vice Minister of War, do you recall receiving ¥20,000 from the War Minister in connection with the Manchurian Incident (R 15809).
12. State what was the precise reason for the payment of this money to you.
13. It also appears that you received ¥18,500 (R 15810) while you were Vice Minister of War, for your participation in the Manchurian incident. Will you state the things you did to justify the payment of this sum of money to you.
14. Do you admit that after you became Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army you received, as Chief of Staff, ¥1,970,000 for secret expenditures.

Chief of Staff,
Kwantung Army (cont'd)

15. What was done with the money so received by you.
16. Was any accounting made of the expenditure of this money.
17. To whom in the Kwantung Army were funds, in ordinary military transactions transmitted by the War Ministry.
18. In view of the customary procedure, would the transaction in question, the ¥1,970,000 payment to you, be considered an extraordinary transaction.
19. What was the reason for handling this item out of the regular channels.
20. Do you recall receiving, during your incumbency as Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, an item of ¥3,000,000 from the War Ministry, for the Kwantung Army Service Fund.
21. Who was the real beneficiary of this money, and how was the money used.
22. Were you the Executive of the Special Service Department as well as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army.
23. What were your duties as Executive of the Special Service Department.
24. Did you hold both positions while you were assigned to the Kwantung Army as Chief of Staff.
25. Was Gen. DOIHARA connected with the Special Service Department during the time you were Chief of Staff.
26. Was the Special Service Department in charge of opium traffic in Manchukuo.
27. Do you agree with Gen. MINAMI's statement (R 19976) that one of the reasons for abolishing the Special Service Department may have been that it was running the opium traffic for its own benefit instead of for the Government of Manchukuo.
28. What was meant by the expression "running the opium traffic for its own benefit".
29. Did you, while Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army, recommend to Tokyo a customs policy for Manchukuo.
30. In your proposal respecting customs and tariffs, did you recommend that no other country except Japan be permitted to participate unconditionally in Japanese-Manchukuoan conventional tariffs.
31. Did you recommend special treatment for Japan especially in goods needed for defense.

Chief of Staff,
Kwantung Army (cont'd)

32. What country did you have in mind as a possible aggressor against Japan on 12 Dec. 1932, the date you made your recommendations on such customs and tariff policy.
33. Do you recall the incidents connected with the promulgation of the Manchukuoan constitution on or about Jan. 1934, while you were Chief of Staff.
34. Did you make any recommendations to the Vice War Minister in connection with the proposed terms of the constitution.
35. Do you remember recommending that it should be provided that power should be divided between the Premier and the several department heads.
36. And was your purpose in making such recommendation to ultimately secure control of one or another of the Manchukuoan officials by the Kwantung Army Commander.
37. Was your recommendation to provide divided control carried out.
38. Did you desire Manchukuo to be self-governing and independent.
39. Did you believe that self-government and independence could be achieved by Manchukuo if the Kwantung Army controlled Manchukuoan officials.
40. What function did the Fourth Section in the Kwantung Army exercise in relation to Manchukuoan affairs (R 3992-5).
41. Are you familiar with what was known as the Tuesday meetings at which rescripts, ordinances and enactments were passed upon.
42. Who composed the membership of the Tuesday meetings. (Japanese Director of General Affairs Bureau, Director of Fourth Section, and various Vice Ministers of the Ministries (R 3992-5))
43. As Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army were you familiar with the Japanese-Manchukuo protocol (R 4259) under which the national defense and preservation of law and order of Manchukuo was delegated to Japan.
44. Did you also know that control of existing railways, harbors, waterways and air routes and construction of new routes was given to Japan if she decided that such became necessary from the standpoint of national defense (R 4258).
45. In view of the rights delegated to Japan by Manchukuo, is it your opinion that Manchukuo exercised self-government and had independence.

OVERSEAS MINISTER 7 Apr 1939 to 30 Aug 1939 (HIRANUMA)
and 16 Jan 1940 to 22 July 1940 (YONAI)

1. Do you recall conversing with Ott, the German Ambassador in 1939 on one or more occasions while you were Minister of Overseas Affairs.
2. If so, did you discuss with him Japan's relations with Germany (R 6093).
3. Did you tell him in so many words that Japan was bound to Germany.
4. Do you recall a radio interview on Domei Radio in May 1939 at a time when both you and ITAGAKI spoke, in which interview you urged the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact so that Japan could ~~see the~~ *execute her*
~~international situation from her own standpoint~~ (R 15817). *policy*
5. What did you mean by that.
6. Do you recall that in 1940 while you were Overseas Minister, you requested Ott to find out what Germany's attitude would be to military activity by Japan in Indo-China and parts of the Netherlands Indies. (R 11699)
7. Did you know at the time that French Indo-China and Netherlands were at peace with Japan.
8. Did you know at the time that the Foreign Office of Japan was announcing its view that the status quo as to the Netherlands would be preserved. (R 11671-3; 11685-6)
9. Did you know at the time that economic demands were being made on the Netherlands which would if accepted by the Netherlands, have disturbed the status quo in that region of the Pacific, and would have seriously interfered with the sovereignty of the Netherlands.
10. Did you know that under the Four-Power Treaty of 13 Dec 1921, Japan as a signatory was bound to respect the territorial integrity of the Netherlands (R 11674).
11. Did you attend or did any of your subordinates in the Overseas Ministry attend a conference on 12 and 16 July 1940 of the Army, Navy and Foreign Office authorities, at which Japan's attitude toward the southern regions and Japan's future domination of these areas was discussed (R 11699).
12. Were you advised of such a meeting and did you become familiar with what took place at the meeting. If so, what was meant by domination of the southern regions.
13. Do you recall speaking before various Committees of the House of Representatives in 1940 while you were Overseas Minister.
14. Do you recall a speech made by you before the Budget Committee in Feb 1940 in which you said that Japan had a destiny to advance in all directions; north, south, east and west. (Doc 3030-N)

Overseas Minister 4/7/39-8/30/39 (HIRANUMA)
and 1/16/40-7/22/40 (YONAI) (cont'd)

15. Do you recall a speech made by you before the Committee of Accounts in March 1940, in which you recommended a two-fold policy by Japan, of having both the south and the north as the objective.
16. What did you have in mind as to what included the objective of Japan.
17. Did it also include political domination or control.
18. Did you also desire to reform the religious beliefs of Buddhists, Confucianists and Christians so that they would conform to the spirit and culture of Japan.
19. Did you also urge the spread throughout the world of the spirit represented by the Emperor.
20. And was it your opinion that unless those whom you desired to convert to the Imperial Way were ~~not~~ willing, ~~that~~ force should be used to bring this end about.
21. In effect, was it your opinion that if Japan could extend its power and culture in all directions, Japan would have resources sufficient to carry ~~on~~ on the kind of war she desired to wage.
22. And that was also in effect the object of Japan's desire to establish a great Asian chain of common prosperity.
23. While you were Minister of Overseas Affairs did you promise to pursue the idea of tying down the United States in the Pacific in return for German non-intervention in French Indo-China (R 6175).
24. Did you pursue the idea.
25. And was the meeting of the joint conference of Army, Navy and Foreign Ministries on 12 and 16 July 1940, where future domination of the southern regions was discussed, a part of the idea which you were pursuing.
26. Do you recall discussing with HARADA on or about 9 May 1940 the conclusion of a Tri-Partite Alliance.
27. Do you recall stating to HARADA that such an alliance was necessary in order to conclude the China war and that such an alliance would alleviate the feelings of the men at the front.

PRIME MINISTER 22 July 1944--7 April 1945

1. During your term as Prime Minister did you have anything to do with the action taken to place all military and police forces of French Indo-China, and also all railway, shipping and communications, under the joint command of the Japanese Army.
2. Were you familiar with the 6-hour ultimatum given by the Japanese to the Governor-General of Indo-China to bring about such surrender of sovereign rights. (R 7165)
3. Was such action in your opinion a substantial evidence of what members of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere might expect as proof of Japan's real intention of spreading the Imperial Way to the four corners of the earth.
4. In connection with the promise of future independence of the Netherlands made by you in a speech before the 85th Session of the Diet 7 Sept. 1944, (R 11666) will you explain why such promise was not carried out by you.
5. Was the real reason independence was not granted to the Netherlands during your Premiership, because had it been granted, Japan would have lost control and real power in that country.
6. Were you familiar with the announcement of the Chief of Staff of the Osamu Army Corp made in the same month you made the promise of Dutch Independence, that "there shall be no great alterations in the operation and the business structure of the Military Government" (R 12217).
7. If you knew of this, state whether such statement had your concurrence.
8. If you knew this, will you state what precisely would the Dutch have received, had you given them independence.
9. And explain whether it was intended to return to the Dutch owners, the agricultural enterprises, the sugar industries, the public utilities, the private railways, the gas and power companies and the newspaper plants which had been taken from them and which were under Japanese control (R 12216-17).
10. In reference to your views on the purpose of the Pacific war, will you state whether your fundamental conception of the matter was that the war was a holy war by means of which the United States and Britain would be driven from East Asia. (R 3703, Ex 277)

THE GUIDANCE OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT
OF MANCHOUKUO

(A report on conditions on the
occasion of leaving my post and
handing over to my successor)

August 1, 1934

By Major-General Shun TADA,

Advisor to the Military Government
of Manchoukuo.

Advisor System

IPS Doc. No. 612

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(Copy)

August 1, 1st year of Kangō.

To General HISHIKARI,

Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army.

Re Report on Conditions

On leaving my post, I submit to you my report on the conditions connected with the guidance of the military government of Manchoukuo from the time of the founding of the empire, as you will see in an annexed booklet.

I add further that the annexed booklet is to serve as a document to hand over my duties to my successor.

Shun TADA,

Advisor to the Department of the
Military Government of Manchoukuo.

The Guidance of the Military Government of Manchoukuo

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Chapter One

The Outline of the Guidance of the Military Government
from the Time of the Founding of the Empire.

1. Grasping Control of the Manchoukuan Army

Article 1. Grasping by Force and the Central Control.

I. The Grip on the life pulse of the Manchoukuan Army.

1) At the beginning of the founding of the Empire of Manchoukuo the troops in various places had gradually reverted to the new state forced into submission by the Imperial Army and had been organized into garrisons of various provinces, but they still assumed the aspect of rival warlords and the controlling power of the military government failed to penetrate into them, causing changeable and unsettled conditions.

In order to make them loyal to the new state and put them under the practical control of the Imperial Army either at the time of war or at the time of peace, it was necessary to control them first of all under the Government's rule.

2) In that period we established the great policy of gradual organization and drew up "The Essentials for Organization of the Manchoukuan Army" ('Manshukoku-gun Seibi Yoko'). As the first provisional measure it was necessary to strive for "grasping control of them by force" as well as "putting the soldiers' minds at rest," so we dispatched advisors and military instructors (all of them were renamed advisors afterwards), who were very few in number at that time, to various key points in the whole of Manchoukuo to make them assume the responsibilities of gripping the Manchoukuan Army with the influence of the Imperial Army for a background /i.e. backing/; at the same time, perceiving that we must include in our grasp "money," "people" and "munitions" to control the life pulse of the Manchoukuan Army and put them under the Government's direct control, we exercised, first of all, general control over the fundamental principles regarding accounting, personnel affairs and munitions, and after that we strove for the gradual centralization of matters relating to the above.

II. The Formation of Guidance Networks of the Manchoukuan Army and its Consolidation.

1) The Basic Formation of Guidance Networks.

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Feeling keenly that in order to grasp control of the Manchoukuan Army, it was essential to secure our grasp of the Army by "forming systematic networks" and "cellularizing their veins and branches," we held, first of all, meetings of the advisors and military instructors who were scattered in various districts and were hard to control and unify at first, so as to come to a mutual understanding; at the same time we strove to make them the pivot of control of the Manchoukuan Army and its guidance by impregnating them with guiding spirit; and gradually employing Japanese personnel and making them the veins and branches of the networks, we endeavored to establish the basis of a horizontal network system which had connections in all directions. After that we demanded gradually increased stationing of officers in actual service only to be refused and were obliged to fill up the positions by adding officers on the reserve list to this system.

2) Expansion and Strengthening of the Networks.

However, we were fortunate enough to have the number of officers in actual service doubled in April 1933, and to a certain extent we succeeded in making the networks which covered the whole of Manchoukuo our desired "organic system" with the help of the increased officers on the reserve list.

Thereupon, we renamed all the officers in actual service advisors, changed the status of officers on the reserve list to that of call-in-officers and named them military instructors, and established a consistent connection even among these officers' subordinates. And moreover, we firmly established inner connection among Japanese-Manchoukuan officers who held post in the Manchoukuan forces, Government offices, or schools which had contact with the above-mentioned network system and were under its control, and thus consolidated the guiding networks of Manchoukuo.

II. Guidance in Military Operations Directly Given by the Department of the Military Government.

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1) The Jehol Province Operations and Operations on the Western Boundary by the Manchoukuan Army.

The Jehol Province operations were the greatest operations which had been worked up and directed by the Advisory Section of the Dept. of the Military Government, a force more than 40,000 strong being used and eight million yen being spent for them.

Important as the operations were, I won't dwell upon the subject because it now belongs to the past and I find it too troublesome to do so.

I will only add that the Jehol Province operations carried out by the Manchoukuan Army were presided over by the advisors of the Dept. of the Military Government and the advisors of the general headquarters of the former enemy, from their preparations down to the outset and the guidance after the outset, and that the efforts made by those concerned are worthy of our appreciation.

Further, special attention should be accorded to the western boundary operations (the Tolun operations) which were carried out soon after the Jehol Province operations. As a result of the operations, the garrison of Eastern Chahar (Lt. General Li Shou-hsin is commanding it) as /one of/ the pro-Manchoukuan self-defence forces is now stationed in the vicinity of Tolun and ruling over its neighborhood, and the government office of the governor of the Eastern Chahar Special Autonomous Administrative District is established; this should not be overlooked in conducting movements towards Chahar. And the fact that Li Shou-hsin is concurrently holding the post of commander-in-chief of the garrison in the Province of Hsingan Hsishen (Wu Ku-ting is his acting commander-in-chief) and that the Dept. of the Military Government is expected to defray ¥300,000 annually as the expenses for its maintenance is also worthy of our attention.

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I. The Commencement of the Organization of the Department of Military Government.

1) With the founding of the state Ma Chan-shan was designated as Chief of the Department of Military Government, but he soon turned traitor and ran away.

In the middle of April, Wang Ching-hsiu was appointed to the post of vice-chief of the Department of Military Government and was made to deal with the chief's business on behalf of him. He set about organizing the Department of Military Government.

2) At the outset, the Kwantung Army charged itself with his guidance and Captain of Cavalry KOMITSU, member of the Army Staff, and Intendant-Captain SUMITANI, attached to the Naval Staff, chiefly concerned themselves in the business.

II. Organizing Guidance Organs and Setting up Guidance Network.

1) On April 13th, Advisers to Military Administration, Advisers to Provincial Guards' Headquarters, and Military Instructors were appointed, and they were placed under my supervision.

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I. To Whom the Prerogative of Supreme Command Belongs and Whence it is Put in Action.

The Prerogative of supreme command is to be controlled by the Emperor and the form that will justify the name of Sovereign State is to be adopted, but the original source that will put it in action is under the control of the commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army.

The advisors holding it in their power, the source from where the prerogative of supreme command is put in action is really and practically in the hands of the commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army.

II. The Independence of the Prerogative of Supreme Command and the Particulars of its Realization.

1) The Independence of the Prerogative of Supreme Command.

It was not clear at the outset whether the prerogative of supreme command of Manchoukuo was independent of her state affairs or not; but on the occasion of the enforcement of Imperial (Manchoukuo) rule, it was made clear that it should be independent.

2) The Reasons of the Independence of the Prerogative of Supreme Command.

O Considering that the Kwantung Army has been making its elements penetrate deep into the Manchoukuan Army and has been controlling its /i.e. Manchoukuan Army's/ tendency through these elements, and has been making them /i.e. elements/ grasp the substance of supreme command of the Manchoukuan Army, it may be proper to deal with supreme command of the Manchoukuan Army through the original system which is under the control of the Kwantung Army, not through the Board of General Affairs.

O Moreover, even if we look at the problem in a practical way, it would be idle to attempt to carry out matters belonging to the Supreme Command through civilian officials.

O As to the possibility of revolt by the Manchurian Army, based on the so-called "Impossibility of Independence Opinion," if we come to a situation where it is uncontrollable by the present military advisors' system, we shall not be able to prevent the performance of duties pertaining to the Supreme Command, by Civilian officials.

O And there is the opinion that there is a danger because the permanency of the advisors for the Manchurian Army is uncertain; but the withdrawal of advisors is something unimaginable to those who

consider the permanent rule of Manchukuo. If we realize the fact that from ancient times armed troops can be the destruction of the supreme power just as it can be its mainstay, we shall not be able to loosen our control of a national army composed of a different race. That the advocates are voluntarily thinking of taking steps convenient for revolts, while recognizing the possibility of revolts by the Manchurian Army, is obviously self-contradicting.

O Moreover, there is the opinion that the dispatch of advisors should not be continued when there is no lawful foundation for it. However, from the spirit of the protocol and from the articles of the Military agreement, the dispatch of advisors should be interpreted as having lawful foundations. What is still more, customs can always be taken for lawful foundations.

O Moreover, by its independence we shall give the Manchoukuan Army a nucleus and shall be able greatly to enhance the feeling of a national army. And as long as the Kwangtung Army has the substance of the Supreme Command under its power, there is no danger.

O However, in conclusion, what we should be most careful about is that, if we should make a precedent of a non-independent supreme command in Manchoukuo, it will become a source of calamity for our Imperial Army in the future, although it may be all right for the present.

3) The Developments Leading to the Independence of Supreme Command.

Although there were doubts also within our Army as to the advisability of the independence, negotiations were made with the authorities concerned according to the above mentioned opinion, and it was made independent as a matter of formality.

Chapter Two

The Organs for Guidance of the Manchoukuan Army

Article I

An Outline

Though I have already described the organs for guiding the Manchoukuan Army in the first section of chapter one and also in the third section of chapter two, as I cannot ignore this organization, which in explaining the present situation of the military government of the Manchoukuan Army, could be considered as its basis, I want to add some explanations on some items which I have not described in the above.

I. The Branch Organs of the Imperial Army.

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The existing advisors are not employed by the Manchoukuan Army, nor does their appointment need this Army's sanction, nor is an ex post facto approval of their appointment necessary, they are simply dispatched to the Manchoukuan Army by the Kwantung Army in accordance with a military order; in short, the advisors are organs of the Imperial Army and the systematic networks for controlling the Manchoukuan Army are, in reality, nothing but branch organs of the Imperial Army.

II. The Advisors' Consciousness of their being Members of the Imperial Army.

Though in the Manchoukuan Army, the advisors are in service on the standpoint that they are all officers of the Japanese Imperial Army and burn with the patriotic spirit of those who are at the front to accomplish our national policy. It is certain that they will never place the Manchoukuan Army in opposition to the Japanese Imperial Army.

II. The Advisors Hold Real Power in the Manchoukuan Army.

1) The Manchoukuan leaders who were picked out by the advisors to take post in the Department of the Military Government established by the advisors were naturally under the advisors' perfect control; and besides, as they had never been in service in this kind of government office, they could not do anything without the advisors' guidance. Such being the situation, the Department of the Military Government naturally held perfect control of the advisors.

2) In provinces, chiefs of the Military Intelligence Bureaus being generally appointed as advisors, past circumstances naturally caused them to come in power.

3) At the front line, they /i.e. the Manchoukuan leaders/ realized that they could obtain facilities in connection with the Imperial Army through the advisors and this caused them to make friends with the advisors; the advisors' footing was raised as they /i.e. the Manchoukuan leaders/ thought it wise to rely upon them in matters concerning negotiations with the Dept. of the Military Government; they began to revere and rely upon the advisors after they had known the advisors' ability in matters concerning subjugation; and they also realized that a word from an advisor to the Central Government authorities would concern their position and merit, and this naturally induced them to be ruled by the advisors.

In short, the advisors are now practical rulers of both local and central governments.

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----- In short, what makes the pivot of guidance is practical grasp of the Manchoukuan Army. And for this purpose, it is essential that we should establish control attended with real power with strong and systematic guiding networks and also firmly control soldiers' minds by the spirit of harmony, various measures to be taken and facilities to be established should all be based on the aforesaid.

Now I will dwell upon some concrete problems. I think it necessary to consolidate the relations between the guiding networks and the cells of the Japanese-Manchoukuan officials related to them. And we should pay most attention to the establishment of gendarmerie /Kempai-tai/ and to the reform of training stations; we should exert our utmost in the matters that would affect the inner workings of the human nature of the Manchoukuan people such as personnel affairs, allowances, rewards, and relief; as for various equipment, we should be satisfied by only fulfilling the minimum necessity and aim at the immediate maintenance of public peace and order; but as for the equipment and facilities which will be used by the Imperial Army in wartime, they should be completely equipped from a different point of view.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I.D.C. No.
I.P.S. No. 612 (Supp.)

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Yozo, Miyama hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chef of the Archives and Document Section of 1st Demob. Bureau, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of numerous pages, dated 1 August, 1934, and described as follows: Excerpt (Pages 1, 2, 13, 18, 37, 38, 39, 40, 60 of Report by Major-General T.DA, Shun, entitled "Direction of Manchurian Military Administration."

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): First Demobilization Ministry, Archives and Records Section.

Signed at Tokyo on this
25th day of September, 1947.

/s/ Yozo Miyama (Seal)
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Torakichi Nakamura (Seal) Chef of the Archives and Document S. of 1. Demob. Bureau

Statement of Official Procurement

I, JOHNSON F. MUNROE, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
25th day of September, 1947.

/s/ Johnson F. Munroe
NJE

Witness: /s/ Henry I. Dolan, Jr.

Investigator, IPS.
Official Capacity

Oct. 14, 1947

Memorandum

To: Colonel Rowland Fixel

From: Judge Judson Nyi

Subject: Interrogation of Tomita, Kenji, on secret funds received by KOISO

According to a memorandum from Mr. William E. Edwards dated 19 August 1947, the interrogation of Tomita on 21 April 1947 had revealed that the Kwantung Army had been using secret war funds for the following purposes:

- (1) Substantial sums of secret war funds had been used to bring about the installation of the accused Doihara as Mayor of Mukden;
- (2) Very extensive sums of secret war funds had been employed in bringing about the enthronement of the Manchurian Dynasty (Pu Yi Regime);
- (3) To finance Special Service Organizations;
- (4) To pay for services of spies in Manchuria;
- (5) To procure subordinates to serve under the puppet regime.

Tomita had further brought out corrupt practices and dissipation among the army which were connected with placing Doihara as Mayor.

It happens that all the above mentioned items had close relationship with the activities of Doihara. It is my desire that through the knowledge gained by the interrogation of Tomita, you would be able to put questions to Koiso which will implicate or incriminate Doihara.

Copies to : Judge Hsiang
Mr. Sutton

Received by the War Ministry. RIKU-MAN-MITSU-JU /TN literally, Army-Manchuria, Secret-Receipt/
No. 239 February 29

CHIBA /Seal/

Examined

LIDA /seal/ MIYAWAKI /seal/

: KAN-SEN Dispatch No. 107

: Re: The Sending of the Resolutions of the Information Committee

YANAGAWA

:/seal/ February 19, 1933. Chief of Staff of the
KWANTUNG ARMY.
KOISO, Kuniaki

: Seal of the
: Chief of Staff
: of the KWANTUNG
: Army

Vice-Minister /seal/

: To the Vice Minister of War YANAGAWA, Heisuke

1 Copy

Military /TN Section/
Adminis- /seal/
tration

: We are sending you two copies of the resolutions of the Fourth
: meeting of the Information Committee under separate cover.
: For Reference /TN Marked in Red/

) 1 copy

: Military Administration)

) 1 copy distributed

Press /seal/
Section

Press

SUGATA /Seal/

7

March 8

Completed

Reference

February 15, 1933 :SHIROTA : /seal/
Information : :
Committee :

P. 2

Matters Resolved at the Fourth Meeting of the Information Committee.

Subject No. 1. Re: Movie regulations in Manchuria (Principle of permits
Censorship law)

Subject No. 2. Re: The establishment of an organ newspaper
in the KOREAN language.

Subject No. 3. Re: The essentials of propaganda in connection with
the occupation of JEHOL.

== Essentials for
extending assistance

Previously reported

/T.N. Subject No. 1 and 2, not translated/

"The Essentials of Propaganda in connection with the Occupation of JEHOL"

I. The Policy.

1. The occupation of JEHOL is a natural measure from the standpoint of maintaining the peace and order of MANCHUKUO, especially it should be emphasized as being a just measure to resolutely repulse CHANG HSUEH-LIANG's regular forces who have already invaded JEHOL at present.

The deliberate and unreasonable conclusion that JEHOL is not a part of MANCHURIAN territory should be rejected.

2. We are absolutely not in favor of resorting to force for the occupation of JEHOL outside of MANCHURIAN territory.

If, however, CHANG HSUEH-LIANG's side should adopt the measure of resorting to active force, the havocs of warfare will of necessity become extended also to North CHINA. In such a case, not only would the whole responsibility rest on him, but if any one should instigate or support him, we shall also hold him responsible for collaboration.

We reject such false conclusions as to accuse our occupation of JEHOL as JAPAN's stratagem for advancing into North China or as being designed for an all-out war against CHINA.

3. Against the acts of throwing MANCHUKUO into confusion and disorder by CHANG HSUEN-LIANG and his party, we shall always keep a watch in order to expose the same, also endeavoring to ostracize the existence of the CHANG HSUEN-LIANG Regime at the same time utilizing same for justifying our occupation of JEHOL; we shall also endeavor to make them /T.N. the CHANG HSUEH-LIANG's Regime/ shoulder the responsibility in the case of aggrandizement of the Incident.

4. We shall guide the public opinion so as to make the people acknowledge the necessity and justness of the occupation of JEHOL, and at the same time, also forestall any attempts of rebellious elements in MANCHUKUO who may try to gain power by availing themselves of this chance.

As for JEHOL, we shall promulgate the spirit of establishing the state of MANCHUKUO as well as the true motive of our Army's advancing thereby leading the general sentiment of the people towards eulogizing MANCHUKUO as well as the co-existence and co-prosperity of JAPAN and MANCHUKUO.

DOC NO 620-L

II The Essentials of Execution.

Part 1. The Propaganda for the Period of Preparation (the time prior to the commencement of occupation) special emphasis shall be laid on propaganda to foreign countries and Japan.

1. Overseas Propaganda.

a. Towards Europe and America.

A part of the propaganda organs shall be despatched to Mukden at some opportune time and close contact shall be kept with Tientsin, Shanghai, Tokyo and diplomatic missions overseas. We should exert ourselves towards guiding and manipulating foreign nationals and foreign pressmen.

From the viewpoint of overseas propaganda, we shall apply our energy to the guidance, control and censorship of newspapers and correspondence.

The "Manchurian Daily News" shall be made to give full display, as promptly as possible, of its influence as a result of its reorganization.

b. Towards China proper.

Suitable and timely materials for propaganda shall be broadcast to China proper. CHANG HSUEH-LIANG and the Nanking Regime shall be treated separately, and, to begin with, we shall exert ourselves in paving the way towards the overthrow of CHANG HSUEH-LIANG's Regime.

2. Domestic Propaganda.

a. Towards Manchuria.

We shall bring about hostile feeling against CHANG HSUEH-LIANG's party by exposing and emphasizing their boundless outrages. We shall suppress the rebellious elements who cooperate with CHANG HSUEH-LIANG lest they should become powerful by way of close search as well as intimidatory propaganda. At the same time, we shall exert efforts towards enlightenment propaganda along the line of a political campaign so as to foster the nation's unity.

Besides the completion of an organization for foreign communication censorship, we shall prohibit the underground activities of private wireless in Manchukuo.

We shall endeavor to control and guide the press and news service.

b. Towards Japan.

We shall explain and make the people recognize the necessity and justness of the occupation of JEHOL. We shall endeavor to clear them of suspicions regarding limitless expansion of the situation, thereby accelerating the uplifting of public opinion and the unification of the whole nation's feeling.

Especially we shall make efforts in the control and the guidance of the press and news service.

3. The KWANTUNG Army and the Manchukuo Government shall at a suitable opportunity, make public a statement regarding the seizure of JEHOL.

Part 2. Propaganda During the Occupation.

Emphasis shall be laid on JEHOL Province so as to aid military, strategical, and political measures. Otherwise things shall be done practically the same as the "Essentials of Execution of Propaganda during the Preparatory Period." Especially, the provocative attitude of CHANG HSUEH-LIANG and his party should be watched and exposed, and we must make our efforts so as to fix the responsibility upon CHANG HSUEH-LIANG when the Incident became enlarged.

1. Propaganda in connection with military operations and political measures.

Propaganda in connection with military operations and political measures should be brought in operation under the control of the KWANTUNG Army and when the local political system of MANCHUKUO in JEHOL Province becomes well organized the propaganda organ of MANCHUKUO should take over charge of the propaganda. Prompt communication contact should be established to suppress CHINESE false propaganda.

2. Foreign and domestic propaganda.

Domestic and foreign pressmen wishing to accompany the Army shall be permitted to do so and special facilities shall be accorded them.

Part 3. Propaganda After the Occupation of JEHOL.

After the conquest of JEHOL has been brought to a temporary pause, the focal point of the Japanese and Manchurian propaganda organs shall be diverted towards JEHOL by enlightening the people throughout the whole of JEHOL Province, especially in the districts along the provincial border and help them with the political construction. Pointing out the truth regarding the

founding of MANCHUKUO as well as tyrannical and inhuman behavior of the CHANG HSUEH-LIANG party menacing the peace and order of MANCHUKUO, we shall also foster an Anti-CHANG and Pro-Manchukuo feeling from the SHANHAIKWAN, HSIFENGKOW and KUPEIKO areas (to the areas inside) the Great Wall.

We shall pay the utmost attention to the Bolshevization movement from Outer Mongolia, especially from DOLON and KALGAN and carry out the necessary propaganda.

Part 4. Allotment of duties of, and liaison between, the various organs concerned.

1. The overseas propaganda shall be undertaken chiefly by the Japanese Embassy and the Foreign Office of Manchukuo, and the Headquarters of the KWANTUNG Army shall carry out same through the hands of the military attaches in foreign countries.

2. The propaganda towards China Proper and Japan shall be undertaken chiefly by the Japanese Embassy and the Headquarters of the KWANTUNG Army.

3. The propaganda in Manchuria shall be undertaken chiefly by Manchukuo, the Headquarters of the KWANTUNG Army, the KWANTUNG Government and the South Manchurian Railway.

4. At a suitable opportunity a part of the propaganda organs of the machineries concerned shall be despatched to MUKDEN. Any important propaganda made by the organs must, at once, be communicated reciprocally.

昭和八年

二十四冊内其六

滿密大日記

陸軍省

ヨリノ叔 正等

6204

Doc.

陸軍省 陸密受第三九號

三月十三日

閣宣卷第一之號 録田

官賜

午業

弘報委員會決議書類送附ノ件

川柳

昭和八年三月十九日 関東軍參謀長 十磯 國 昭 印

次官

陸軍次官 柳川平助 殿

第四回弘報委員會決議事項別冊ノ通ニ部送附ス

参考

新聞班

軍事

新子

一部配布済

官田

No. 1

三月八日

結

陸軍

No. 2

Doc. 620L

極秘

參考

第四回弘報委員會決議事項

(項目)

昭和八年二月十五日
弘報委員會

- 議題之一 滿洲之映畫規則之件 (許方主席)
- 議題之二 訪文機關新刊之件 (檢閱法)
- 議題之三 熱河強略之宣傳要領 (補助實施要領)

既報

熱河経略ニ伴フ宣傳要領

一、方針

一、熱河経略ハ滿洲国治安維持上當然ノ處置ニシテ就中
學良正規軍力既ニ熱河省ニ侵入シアル現況ニ於テ斷平之ニ
排撃ヲ加フルハ亦至當ノ措置ナル旨ヲ強調ス

熱河ノ故更ニ滿洲国ノ領域トラスト誣フルカ如キ妄斷ヲ排
撃ス

二、熱河経略ノ実力行便ヲ滿洲国領域外ニ脱逸セシムルカ如
キハ斷シテ好ムサル処ナリ

然リト雖モ學良側ニシテ積極的実力行爲ニ出スルカ如キ場
合ニ於テハ戰果延シ北支ニ及フモ亦己ムヲ得サル所ニシテ此
場合全責任ハ彼ニ在ルミナラス苟モ之ヲ使啖シ又ハ支援スル
者ハ依同ノ責任ヲ負擔スヘキモノナルコトヲ指摘ス

熱河経略ヲ以テ日本北支進出又ハ対支全面的戰爭ノ策謀
ナリト誣フルカ如キ妄斷ヲ排撃ス

三、學良一味ノ滿洲国初亂行爲ニ對シテハ終始之ヲ監視摘發
シ學良政權ノ存在ヲ排撃スルコトニ努ム併セテ熱河経略ノ
安易性ニ利用シ且事件拡大ノ場合其責任彼ニ歸納スル如
ク努ム

四、輿論ヲ指導シ熱河経略ノ必要妥當性ヲ認識セシムルコト
ニテ滿洲国内ニ於テ此様ヲ利用シテ抬頭セムトスル反抗分子
ヲ未然ニ抑制ス

熱河省ニ對シテハ滿洲国建国精神ト自軍出動ノ真意ト
ヲ徹底宣布シ以テ一般民意ヲ滿洲国謳歌ト目滿存存カリ
宋ニ誘導ス

二 實施要領

其一 準備期間（經路開始迄）の宣傳

重兵ヲ對外並對日本宣傳ニ指向ス

一 對外宣傳

イ 對歐米

適時宣傳機關一部ヲ奉天ニ派遣シ且天津上海東京

並在外公館ト連絡ノ密ニス

外人及外人記者團ノ指導操縦ニ努ム

對外宣傳ノ見地ヨリ新報通信ノ指導統制並檢閲ニ努ム

マシキリヤ・デーリー・ニリス改造ニ伴フ威力ヲ可成速ニ發揮セシム

ロ 對支那本土

支那本土ニ對シ適時適切ナル宣傳資料ノ投入ニ努ム

學界ト南京政權トノ分離ヲ取扱ヒ先ツ學界良政叔倒壞

ノ氣運ヲ醸成スルコトニ努ム

二 對內宣傳

イ 對滿洲國

學界一味ノ飽々無事暴虐行為ヲ摘發高調ニ敵意ヲ煽發ス

探索ヲ密ニ威嚇宣傳ト相俟ツテ學界ニ協定スル反抗分子

ノ抬頭ヲ抑制シ併セテ政治工作ニ伴フ教化宣傳ニ努ム國民ノ

結束ヲ促進ス

滿洲國內ニ潜伏スル私設無線ノ活動ヲ防遏スルト共ニ對外通信

ノ檢閲機關ヲ整備ス

新報通信ノ統制指導ニ努ム

對日本

熱河經略之必要妥當性ヲ解說認識セシメ且其態
無制限的擴大ニ對スル疑惑心ヲ一掃スルニ努ム與論
ノ高潮ト國民總意ノ結束トヲ促進ス

特ニ新聞通信ノ統制指導ニ努ム

三適當ナル時機、於テ閩東軍及滿洲國政府ヨリ熱河
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其二 經路間ノ宣傳

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其他ノ概ニ準備期間ノ宣傳實施要領ヲ繼承助長ス
特ニ學界良一派ノ挑戰的態度ヲ監視摘發シ事件擴大ノ
場合其責任ヲ彼ニ歸納スル如ク努ム

一作戰並政治工作ニ伴フ宣傳

作戰並政治工作ニ伴フ宣傳ハ閩東軍統制ノ下ニ實施
シ熱河省ニ於ケル滿洲國地方政治機構整頓スル刻
ヲハ滿洲國側宣傳機關之ヲ繼承ス

迅速ナル通信連絡ヲ圖リ支那側ノ偽宣傳ヲ抑制ス

二對外及對內宣傳

內外新聞通信記者ニシテ從軍ヲ希望スルモノハ之ヲ
許可シ便宜ヲ供與ス

其三 熱河經略後ノ宣傳

熱河經略一段落後ニ於テハ日滿宣傳機關ノ重點ヲ承
德ニ置キ熱河省全圖特ニ省境ニ沿フ地域ノ民衆ヲ啓蒙
シ政治建設ヲ助長シ且山海關、喜峯口、古北口方面ヨリ

關内ニ對シ滿洲建國ノ真相及學子良系ノ暴
 戾非道ナル滿洲國攪亂行爲ヲ摘剔シ以テ
 排張附滿ノ氣運ヲ促進ス
 外蒙特ニ多倫張家口方面ヨリスル赤化運
 動ニ對シ深甚ノ考慮ヲ拂ヒ所要ノ宣傳
 ヲ行フ

其ノ四關係各機關業務ノ分擔並連絡

一 對外宣傳ハ主トシテ日本大使館滿洲國外
 交部之ニ當リ關東軍司令部ハ在外武官
 ヲ通シテ行フ

二 對支那本土及日本ニ對スル宣傳ハ主トシ
 テ日本大使館及關東軍司令部之ニ當ル

三 滿洲ニ於ケル宣傳ハ主トシテ滿洲國關
 東軍司令部、岡東廳、滿鉄之ニ當ル

四 適當ノ時機ニ關係各機關ノ宣傳機因
 ノ一部ヲ奉天ニ派遣ス

各機關ニ於テスル重要ナル宣傳ハ機ヲ失
 セズ相互連絡スルモノトス

↓
The following should be substituted for the second from the last paragraph on Page 12 of brief entitled "ANALYSIS OF DEFENSE OF KOISO, Kuniaki."

The suggestion by Koiso that Hiranuma be the next Premier, at that time, is interesting in that Hiranuma was the first President of Kokuhon-Sha "Foundation of the State Society", which was related to the "Black Dragon" Society, later called "Production Party", in which Koiso was a director, and in which Togo was an advisor, and the avowed purposes of which were "to foster the spirit of nationalizm" and "to exalt the national spirit" (Pros. Ex. 164, R.p. 1636).

*submitted by
Col. Fitch*

17 June 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Colonel R. W. Fixel
FROM: Mr. S. N. Crowe
SUBJECT: Defendant, KOISO

In Document No. 3030 upon which, I believe an analysis sheet has already been distributed, I discovered a statement by Minister KOISO, at that time Minister of Overseas Affairs which is as strong a statement as I believe I have ever seen attributed to any of the defendants. This and other statements of KOISO to the same effect are found on pages 11, 12 and 13 of the analysis sheet on Document No. 3030.

Since I was having certain statements of HATA processed, I included these statements of KOISO in the request for processing. Should you desire the exact translation and the document number of the processed copies, I will forward them to you at your request.

S. N. CROWE

17 June 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. D. N. Sutton
FROM: Mr. S. N. Crowe
SUBJECT: Defendants HATA, KOISO and MUTO

I am having processed certain of the statements of HATA which are analyzed in the analysis of Document No. 3030. In the process I discovered other statements by the Defendants MUTO and KOISO which I thought might be of some value.

I have directed memoranda to the attorneys handling these Defendants, copies of which are herewith enclosed.

S. N. CROWE

2 Incls:
Memo to Mr. P. Lopez
Memo to Col. Fixel

ANALYSIS OF DEFENSE
OF
KOISO, KUNIAKI

~~Mr. Sutton:~~
The attached is a
basis for cross examina-
-tion of Koiso. I tried
to bring out his
connection with im-
portant events and
particularly tried to
impeach the position
Mr. Brooks took on his
motion to desist, which
no doubt will be the
line of defense finally
used. Col. Fixel

Prepared by
Col. Rowland W. Fixel

KOISO, KUNIAKI

1. The Indictment

Group One, Wars of Aggression

Koiso is charged under some but not all of the counts in Group One of the indictment. Specifically, he is charged with conspiring to conduct wars of aggression; dominate the world; violate International Law, treaties and agreements as to China; the U.S.A.; Great Britain; Australia; New Zealand; Canada; India; Philippines; Netherlands; France; Thailand; and the U.S.S.R. He also is charged in Group One with initiating a war of aggression against China, specifically against the Mongolian Peoples Republic, in 1931, in the area of the Khalhin-Gol River; and with waging wars of aggression against China between 1931 and 1945; against the Mongolian Republic and U.S.S.R. in the summer of 1936; and the Philippines; the U.S.A.; Britain; Netherlands and Thailand.

2. Motion to Dismiss Counts Under Group One

Apart from the technical grounds asserted, namely, that the crimes charged are not such as may be considered under 5A of the Charter of the tribunal, the principal grounds of the motion to dismiss may be classified as follows: (a) that Koiso was a just, moderate and moral character, inactive in political groups or factions, and not intimately known by other accused or members of the Government, and that he did not participate

in the March and October incidents; (b) that his duties as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry and as Vice Minister of War, were limited; as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, he merely executed orders of his Commander in Chief, and that while in that position he believed that his duties were to subdue bandits, maintain and restore peace and order; and protect Japanese and Korean residents and property; that at the time of the Manchurian Incident he was not in any Government position of authority or responsibility; that the same applies as to the move for autonomy of the five North China provinces and the incident of the Marco Polo Bridge; that while Minister of Overseas Affairs in the Hiranuma Cabinet in 1939; in the Yonai Cabinet in 1940 and as Prime Minister from July 22, 1944 to April 7, 1945 he did not participate in or have responsibility for military actions as the Cabinet had no authority in such matters.

He claims he opposed Ribbentrop's approach to Japan; took no part in the conclusion of the Japanese-German alliance and in fact opposed the Tri-Partite Pact during his tenure of office as Minister of Overseas Affairs in 1940 while in the Yonai Cabinet. He claims he never attended any Imperial or Liaison conferences or cabinet meetings listed in App. E of the indictment. In general, he says that as Prime Minister he only followed the Imperial Rescript proclaiming that the war was in self defense and he had no knowledge that the war was

illegal. He merely endeavored to save the country, and what he said in the Imperial Diet was what would be expected of any war time Premier.

3. Indictment

Group Two, Murder

Koiso is named as having unlawfully caused or permitted unlawful attacks on Changsha on or about 18 June 1944; Henyang August 1944; Kweilin November 1944; and Mongolia and U.S.S.R. in the summer of 1939 in violation of treaties mentioned in count 2 and resulting in the death of large numbers of civilians and disarmed soldiers or members of armed forces; and he is also charged with participating as a leader, organizer, instigator and accomplice in a conspiracy or plan to procure or permit murder of prisoners of war, members of armed forces and civilians.

4. Indictment

Group Three, Crimes Against Humanity

Koiso is charged with breaches of Laws and customs of War re. labor units for civilian internees and prisoners and that he disregarded his duty to such persons and failed to take adequate steps to secure observance and prevent breaches of laws of war, all between 7 December 1941 and 2 September 1945.

5. Motion to Dismiss All Counts in Group Two and Three

Koiso claims he had no responsibility or connection with the charges in Groups Two and Three as prisoners of war outside

Japan are the responsibility of the Commander in Chief of the Army in the field; that not even a Prime Minister has authority to intervene in those matters; that protests as to treatment of prisoners were transferred by the Foreign Office to Administration Offices of the War Department and that such matters were referred to the respective field commanders, and none of this information was forwarded to the Prime Minister. He furthermore contended that he never was a Minister of War, Chief of the General Staff, or Commander in Chief of any front line army, and was not in the army since July 29, 1938.

6. Summation of Koiso's Defense

Briefly, Koiso takes the position that if any offenses were committed, he should be exonerated because he did not participate in the formulation of the plans for the violations; that he had no authority to carry out such violations; and that whatever he did was to carry out the orders of those in authority, in the belief that such orders were legal and emanated from higher authority.

(a) The facts contradict the assertions of Koiso that he had no active part in the Manchurian and Chinese Incidents.

One has but to examine the record of important military and civil offices held by Koiso from August 1930 to April 1945, excepting the brief interval between 22 July 1940 and 29 May 1942, when he claims he engaged in agriculture in a private capacity, to become assured that Koiso was not the unimportant person he

now seeks to portray himself to have been. In August 1930, he was already a Major General in the Army and prior to his assignment early in 1932 as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, he was in the War Ministry as Vice War Minister and Chief Secretary of the Supreme War Council. During this time he was promoted to Lt. General, and from 29 February 1932 to 8 August 1932 served as Vice War Minister. While Vice War Minister, he was extremely active in the handling of Manchurian military matters on the highest level. It appears in Pros. Ex. 2210 that on July 4, 1932 he, as Vice War Minister, approved for payment to himself, the sum of ¥20,000 from a secret fund in connection with the Manchurian Incident. In the same exhibit, it clearly appears that other Army men were awarded sums of money out of this secret fund for their participation in the Manchurian Incident. The Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army received ¥85,000, the largest amount; Koiso the next largest; the Vice Chief of the General Staff ¥10,000; the Chief of Staff of the Chinese Garrison ¥5,000; the Chief of Staff of the Chosen Army ¥5,000; the M.P. Commandant ¥1,500; and the Chief of Staff of the Formosan Army ¥100. The following year, when Koiso was Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, he received as Chief of Staff ¥1,970,000 from Manchurian Incident Funds, on account of Secret Expenditures. (Pros. Doc. 2922)

It is to be noted that the first item of ¥20,000, when considered in connection with the other items, some trivial in amount, must have been a gift in token of some special services

performed, whereas the item of ¥1,970,000 which Koiso received while Chief of Staff was specified to be for requirements for his "Armies to the end of the current year." (Doc. 2922)

The importance of Koiso in this transaction is apparent when it is considered that the ¥1,970,000 was transmitted to him as Chief of Staff, and not forwarded to the Commanding General of the Kwantung Army or to the Finance Officer, as would ordinarily be done. No doubt the transaction earmarks Koiso as occupying a special position engaged in special secret work for the highest military authority in the War Department, apart from his regular military duties as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army. It is especially to be noted that this large sum was transmitted to him for requirements of "his armies." Therefore, it would be pertinent to inquire whether he was in command of any secret organizations which in reality were "armies," distinct from the Kwantung Army, which was commanded by Gen. Muto, when Koiso was Chief of Staff.

Another fact which nullified Koiso's contention that he was but a subordinate figure in the plans of the War Ministry in 1931 was his participation in the conference called by Gen. Minami on the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident. Koiso was then (September 1931) Director of the Military Affairs Bureau and unless he had authority to participate in and act upon military matters he would not have been called to the breakfast conference of Minami, which was attended only by the War Minister, the Vice War Minister, Koiso and the War Minister's

Private Secretary. (Def. Doc. 989) At that breakfast conference, the War Minister selected Koiso as the man to represent the Ministry of War as Liaison with the General Staff on the Manchurian Incident. It is inconceivable that a person of no consequence and without authority would be participating as he did in affairs considered at that time so important as to call for a meeting of the General Staff and subsequently a report to the Emperor. (P. 5 Minami's affidavit)

But even before this, Koiso was involved in Army politics and schemes of exploiting the Army as an aggressive instrument, as is demonstrated by the March incident of 1931. The March incident was a plan for the masses to express their disapproval of the Diet then in session by means of a mass demonstration and a bombing in the vicinity of the Diet. To do this, as many people as possible were expected to mobilize and to clash with the police. From that point on it was anticipated that the affair would increase to such an extent that metropolitan Tokyo would be thrown into a turmoil and the Army would step in and declare Martial law (Okawa's testimony, Pros. Ex. 2177A, P.18). Okawa, who was the civilian brains of the scheme, had been told by Col. Shigeto, head of the Chinese Section, and Lt. Col. Hashimoto of the Russian Affairs Section, of the General Staff, that the "upper class of the Army was burning with indignation at the Diet and that such a Diet should be crushed." He was requested to see Gen. Ugaki, who was then War Minister, who stated that Japan could never develop "her fate" and "overseas development

with such a Diet." (P. 18 Okawa's testimony, ibid.) At first it was planned to agitate a mass demonstration and to have the Army take positive action when martial law was declared. (P. 20 Okawa's testimony ibid.) Others who gave their opinions were Lt. Gen. Minomiya, who was then Deputy Chief of Staff, and Maj. Gen. Tate-Kawa, who was then Chief of the Second Department. Koiso came to be involved and others joined later (P. 19 Okawa's testimony, ibid.). The same evening of the day Okawa had been to see Gen. Ugaki, Koiso, Minomiya and Sugiyawa saw Ugaki and after that meeting Koiso took charge of everything and told Okawa that "since there would be the danger of being discovered if too many fussed about it," they should "pretend to have suspended it on the surface" and that Okawa "should represent the civilians" and Koiso would "represent the Army." (P. 20 Okawa's testimony, ibid.) It was Gen. Ugaki's intention to dissolve the Diet, set up a new political power and form a Cabinet centering around the Army; have an influential army man as the leader of the Cabinet and adopt a bold policy. (P.20 Okawa's testimony, ibid.)

The sum and substance of the participation of Koiso in the March Incident is that he represented the Army in the treasonous plot to overthrow the Cabinet by means of attempted murder. It is also crystal clear that Koiso represented Ugaki, the War Minister, and that the purpose of the overthrow of the Diet and Cabinet was to put the military in the saddle in the first move for overseas expansion. Although the proposed plot was later suspended, it is indicative of the desire of Koiso for positive action

by a strong government and by the Army in Manchuria. The strength of Koiso is demonstrated not only by his retention in the service, after he sought the overthrow of the Cabinet and Diet by force, but by his subsequent promotions and assignments, eventually gaining for himself the position of Prime Minister.

Although Koiso claims that he recommended non-expansion of the Manchurian incident and such action became a General Staff decision, it is quite apparent from subsequent events that the military authorities, including Koiso, only gave lip service to the plan to control the incident, whereas by their real actions they sanctioned unlimited expansion of the initial outbreak to such an extent that in a very few months all of Manchuria was in Japanese hands. Okawa (Pros. Doc. 1908) revealed that Koiso was one of the conspirators to renovate Japan by setting up a military dictatorship to carry a strong policy in Manchuria. How strong this policy had become less than two months after the Manchurian Incident is exemplified by a telegram dated November 7, 1931 from Consul General Ohashi to Shidehara (Pros. Doc. 1513) in which he said: "In order to execute the Government's North Manchuria policy, we must let the Army have its own way....attack Tsithar, destroy Chinese Army there and put up puppet on the post." Again in a telegram dated November 30, 1931 from Morishima at Mukden to Shidehara, it was said (Pros. Doc. 1513): "The policy of the military in Manchuria is to establish a new regime in the whole of Manchuria and Mongolia and to establish an independent country which will be under our influences. The next step in our mind is

to overthrow the Chinchow regime which is an obstacle in their way. The Japanese Government must establish its fundamental policies in connection with the Army's movement."

To now assert that the authorities in Tokyo, including Koiso, favored non-expansion of the Manchurian Incident is to fly in the face of the actual facts. For instance, although the Chief of the General Staff notified the Commander of the Korean Army not to cross the Yula River, a unanimous decision was made, only a short time after the Mukden Incident, to approve expenditures for the dispatch of the Korean Army to Manchuria. (R. p.1564) Koiso was Director of the Military Affairs Bureau at that time under the Minister of War. The Military Affairs Bureau was concerned with political affairs and was not a part of the General Staff, which had control of operational matters (R. 1588). However, it is fatuous to assert that the Minister of War and the Director of the Bureau of Military Affairs had nothing to say about operational matters, when it affirmatively appears that in the Manchurian Incident the matter of extension or non-extension of the incident was settled by the General Staff after meeting with Koiso, the Liaison Officer for the War Ministry, as above set forth. Such joint action would be especially applicable in the case of any military operations in foreign territory. The Minister of War and the Prime Minister would have to be consulted as was done.

When Koiso was interrogated by Maj. Hummel on March 22, 1946 (Case file #62, serial #5), he stated that when Inukai became Prime Minister the policy in Manchuria had been decided, and such

policy was to extend to the entire Manchuria, and that he was assigned as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, in August 1932, to support three basic policies, namely: (1) the reorganization of peace in Manchuria; (2) development of its transportation and communication; (3) development of its industry, mining and agriculture. That the purposes stated by him were only half truths is shown by the following:

Okada testified: (R.p. 1825)

"After the occupation of Manchuria, the Kwantung Army was the real government there, although a so-called independent government was set up in Manchuria in the early part of 1932, whose independence was supposedly recognized by Japan in September of that year. This government was completely dominated and controlled by the Kwantung Army."

It is of interest that Koiso was Chief Secretary of the Supreme War Council from 21 August 1930 to 29 February 1932, on which date he became Vice War Minister. (R. 1927) In this position he was sitting with the top hierarchy of military chiefs in Japan, and was obliged to be familiar with all of their discussions and decisions. He must have known, as it was common knowledge among the inner circles, that the army was becoming more unyielding than ever in the summer of 1931 and wanted to occupy Manchuria (R.p. 3016). Harada reported this to Kido at a lunch at which Harada, Tagaki, Sakai and Okabe were present, and the War Minister was to take the matter up with the Emperor on July 14 or 15 (R. 1927).

Koiso was also present and representing the Army along with Minami, Kanaya, Sugiyama, Ito, Minomiya, Tate-Kawa and Oki at a

meeting to which the War Ministry had invited officials of the South Manchuria Railway to discuss Manchurian-Mongolian problems. At that meeting Minami stated that the Army had long recognized the necessity of increasing its divisions in Korea and he hoped that the day would come when more divisions would be sent (R.p. 15752, Ex. 2202).

Considering this situation in connection with the March incident and the October incident, in both of which Koiso was involved (R.p.2187), it is ridiculous for Koiso to assert that he had no facilities or means of his own to inquire into affairs of State and was dependent upon announcements of the Japanese Government (R.16428). If ever a man had the means of knowing what was going on it was Koiso, because he was officially occupied for two years as Chief Secretary of the Supreme War Council, (R. 1927) and he even was retained in that position after his treasonable conduct in the March incident. This leads to one conclusion, namely, that the General Staff had as its bible aggression, and publicly sanctioned the participation by its Chief Secretary in any movement to further military aggression.

When Koiso became Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, he received an outline for guiding Manchoukuo from the Vice Minister of War. In brief, Manchoukuo was to be supported and developed as an independent state, adapting herself to Japan's national policy and realizing co-prosperity and harmony between the two countries. The administration was to be backed by the inner leadership of the Kwantung Army and carried out by the Japanese officials of

this leader. However, (and here is the plan Japan established for her subsequent conquests), it must be provided, the Vice War Minister said, that Manchoukuoan officials shall outwardly assume charge of the administration as much as possible while Japanese officials must satisfy themselves by controlling the substance. Then comes the most important part of the instructions. The Japanese should occupy the key positions. (R. 2902, Ex. 230)

So, while Koiso was purportedly sent to Manchuria to reorganize the peace of Manchuria and develop its transportation, communication, mining, agriculture and other industries, his mission in reality was to develop these industries and agencies for the use, the benefit, and under the control of the Japanese.

This is substantiated by the minutes of a Cabinet Conference in Japan (IPS Doc. 1415, R.p. 2823) which show the real interest of Japan in the reorganization and development of Manchuria, as follows:

"We should not make it appear that important government posts of the new State are exclusively filled by Japanese....the new State shall employ authoritative advisers from our country and make them the highest advisers in connection with financial, economic and general political problems.... The new State shall appoint competent Japanese Nationals to the leading posts in the Privy Council, the Central Bank, and other organs of the new State.... As regards the railroads and other means of transportation of the new State, we shall hold real power of management thereof in view of the National defense and economic requirements

of the Empire and the new State." (R. 2826) (Underscoring ours.)

Koiso was an important figure in the consummation of the Army's scheme to extend the sphere of Japan by "positive action." The position he takes in his motion to dismiss the counts under Group One of the Indictment are untenable. He was doing more than subduing bandits, maintaining peace and order, and protecting Japanese and Korean residents and property. He actually was vitalizing the policy which had been decided upon, namely, the extension of Japan's control over the entire Manchuria. (Case file #62, Serial #51)

On the 29th of April 1934, Koiso was decorated by the Emperor for his services in the Manchurian Incident. Palpably such decoration could not have been awarded for the only service he claims to have rendered, namely, to vote to limit the expansion of the incident. It must have been awarded for the ground work and underground work he did prior to the incident, to bring the incident about. Any other conclusion would rebel against reason itself, because in 1934 awards were not given to those who opposed intervention, extension, and conquest of Manchuria.

The real extent of Koiso's contribution to the full conquest not only of Manchuria, but of Jehol and North China, came after his appointment as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, from August 1932 to May 1934. It was in this period that Jehol fell; the battle of Shanahaikwan was begun and key points along the Great Wall fell into Japanese hands. (R. 2269) It was also while he was Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army that Japan attempted

to bring Hopei and Chahar and other parts of North China under its domination. Tanaka testified that there were persistent conspiracies to oust the political power of the Chinese National Government and Japanese militarists and diplomats openly declared that the political structure of North China did not satisfy their wishes, and local authorities were instigated to proclaim autonomy. (R. p. 2701)

(b) Refutation of Koiso's claim that he had no part in the Tri-Partite Pact.

The record indicates that Koiso was the ideological leader in the sphere of racial discrimination and religious persecution. (Pros. Ex. 668). He urgently requested the Japanese Minister of Education to inculcate in Japanese children hatred toward Russians, Americans, and English (Pros. Ex. 668). While Overseas Minister, he initiated the publication by Pu-Yi of a manifesto in 1940 requiring the entire population of Manchuria, regardless of religious convictions, to worship the Japanese goddess Amatorase (Pros. Ex. 668). When he became Minister of Overseas, he supported the anti-Soviet activities of the "Russian Fascist Union" (Pros. Ex. 730). He became a member of the Cabinet (April 7, 1939) shortly after Ambassador Ott reported to Berlin that the Japanese Cabinet is "supposed to have finally decided upon an intensification of the Pact" (Anti Comintern) (Prox. Ex. 500), and was a Cabinet Member on 6 May 1939 when Ott reported to the German State Secretary that, "The War Vice Minister declared that the treaty bound Japan definitely to the Axis powers." (Pros. Ex. 504.)

At the same time, the Japanese Prime Minister was extolling Hitler for his "lofty wisdom," his "iron will" and his efforts in the "noble task" of the reconstruction of his country.

In an interview of Koiso by Domei on May 8, 1939, he made the following statement: "The success of negotiations for the conclusion of a military treaty between the three Axis powers depended on whether Germany and Italy recognize Japan's place in the Far East."

Thereafter, in line with the general pattern woven eventually by the Tri-Partite agreement, Koiso as a Cabinet officer, speaking before a Joint Conference of the Committee of Accounts of the House of Representatives, 75th Session of the Imperial Diet on March 17, 1940, agreed with Fukuda, who recommended a "two-fold policy" of having both South and North as the objective of Japan. Koiso said: "Please note, nevertheless, that as regards the idea of having both North and South as our objective, I am in full accord with Mr. Fukuda's opinion." (Pros. Ex. 2215)

Other overt acts and statements by Koiso in implementation of the negotiations for the Tri-Partite Pact are as follows: (1) while Koiso was Minister of Overseas Affairs, the Foreign Office announced on 1 August, 1940 that Japan had determined to fulfill her idea and mission of establishing a Great Asian chain of common prosperity (Ex. 1297; R.p. 11714); (2) Koiso promised to pursue the idea of tying down the United States in the Pacific in return for non-German intervention in French Indo-China as he felt that an agreement with U.S.S.R.; realization of Japan's colonial

wishes in French Indo-China, and the Netherlands East Indies would make Japan independent of America (Pros. Ex. 523, R.p. 6175. Telegram of Ott of 24 June 1940).

Thus, while he was not a negotiator of the Tri-Partite Pact, he was a behind-the-scenes manipulator and schemer for the eventual execution of such a Pact, which had as its secret objective, aggressive action by the participants to finally accomplish subjection of all nations to the yoke of Germany, Italy and Japan. Koiso in his official position laid some of the groundwork which channeled official opinion to the ultimate conclusion of the Pact. He is in no position to say now that he opposed Ribbentrop's approach to Japan and took no part in the conclusion of the Pact. If he opposed Ribbentrop's "approach", his conduct and words refute such contention. His technical position that he took no part in the conclusion of the Pact may have some force, if by conclusion of the Pact he meant the actual consummation. A broad view of the words "in the conclusion of the Pact" would mean every step taken by all persons in authority, to bring about the Pact, as well as the final consummation thereof. In this sense, and in this view, Koiso did participate in the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact, by his words and acts indicating that he not only favored such an agreement, but aggressively aided in its final consummation. (Case file 62, Serial 4).

(c) Refutation of Koiso's claim that as overseas Minister he had no responsibility for military actions.

The record points to important measures by Koiso in overseas military policies and matters during his incumbency as Overseas Minister in the War Ministry. One of the outstanding matters

definitely aggressive in character was the undeclared war against the U.S.S.R. and the Mongolian Peoples Republic in the Nomonghan Area from May to September 1939. Another, more ideological than otherwise, but indicative of the pattern he was working on to bring about further aggressive war was the opinion expressed several times by Koiso that the Southern Pacific was a "Treasure house" where there was 200 times as much coal, gold, silver, iron and petroleum as in all China and that if Japan had these resources it would not have to suffer from its present plight of not being able to wage a war because of scarcity of resources. (Ex. 2215, R.p. 15820). Also, while Overseas Minister, an interview was held between Itagaki and Koiso on May 8, 1939, regarding the military alliance with Germany and Italy. On May 9, 1939, Koiso as Minister of Colonies, stated that negotiations were being conducted for such an alliance (Pros. Ex. 2214, R.p. 15816).

A change in the Cabinet in July 1940 removed Koiso from office as Overseas Minister and he apparently became a gentleman farmer until 29 May 1942, when he again returned to power in the important position of Governor General of Korea. However, after he had retired as Overseas Minister, he was considered as Chief Delegate by the Liaison Conference held July 27, 1940, in connection with the execution of plans for aggression on the Netherlands East Indies, but was rejected on the ground that he had given an interview to the Press in which he stated in violent terms that the Netherlands regime had always been most oppressive toward the indigenous population of the Indies and therefore it

was concluded that he would not be acceptable as a delegate without at least a public retraction or denial of the statement (R.p. 11796). In this connection, it must be considered that the Overseas Ministry had already, with other interested Japanese high level agencies, determined to "strengthen the diplomatic policy toward the East Indies in order to obtain important materials (R.p. 11795) and had advised the Netherlands that an economic delegation would be sent." (R.p. 11796). Following this preliminary maneuvering, the Dutch Indies were given an ultimatum to "cut off relations with Europe and should quickly take a position as a member of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." (R.p. 11811, draft of demands dated Aug. 1940). And on 25 October 1940 the cat was let out of the bag when Delegate Saito telegraphed Matsuoka, the Foreign Minister (R.p. 11835) as follows: "Have a great number of planes and plain clothes troops enter these areas thereby establishing it to become some sort of strategical base from the point of view of military operations against the Dutch." (R.p. 11836). Thus in sum and substance the plan was to establish strategical bases in the Netherlands, to infiltrate fifth columnists, and then take the country over. Koiso's hand is seen in this aggressive undertaking, and he would have participated in the one-sided negotiations had he not already publicly committed himself in such a manner as to make him unacceptable to the Dutch. He was a willing agent for the propagation, promulgation and completion of the aggression against the Netherlands, despite his retirement as a gentleman farmer for the time being.

(d) Koiso's tenure as Governor General of Korea was part of a plan to wage an aggressive war on the U.S.S.R.

Koiso acted as Governor General of Korea from 29 May 1942 to 22 July 1944. While this position was clearly a civilian position, it was involved in politics as well (R.p. 1632). Korea had become a rear supply base for the Kwantung Army (R.p. 7591-2, Ex. 728), and the Kwantung Army on January 1, 1942 had reached a strength of one million; the number of tanks had doubled and the number of airplanes had tripled in comparison to those of 1937 (Ex. 706). Ott reported to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Germany on July 25, 1941 that a new Army group was being formed in Korea (R.p. 8073). It is noteworthy in this connection to record that Koiso, prior to becoming Governor General of Korea, had been Commander of the Korean Army from 2 December 1935 to 15 July 1938, so he was no novice in that territory. In fact, while he was Military Commander, the Japanese established a military base on Korea for an attack on the U.S.S.R., in violation of the Portsmouth Treaty and the Peking Treaty of 1925. Korea became very important as the supply center for Manchuria. The extent of such preparations is seen by the increase of airfields in Korea from 8 in 1931 to 53 in 1941; the increase of pieces of ordnance from 300 in 1931 to 800 in 1941; the increase of military dumps for divisions from 10 to 15 Divisions in 1931 to 50 Divisions in 1941. (Ex. 728). Thus, both in his military capacity as Commander of the Korean Army for almost three years (1935-1938) and as Military Governor of Korea (1942-1944), Koiso was at top level

in the aggressive actions of Japan whereby her military forces in Manchuria approximated 1,000,000 in strength by January 1, 1942 (Ex. 706). The supply of those forces was the task of those in command at Korea (Ex. 728), and the reason for the presence of such a vast military force in Manchuria was because the North (U.S.S.R.) as well as the South (the Indies and Java and other countries) were the objectives of the policy of Koiso and the top controlling forces in Japan (Ex. 2215).

(e) Koiso cannot relieve himself of his duties in reference to prisoners of war.

During the period from 7 April 1939 to 30 August 1939 and again from 16 January 1940 to 22 July 1940, when Koiso was Overseas Minister in the War Department, and again when he was Premier from 22 July 1944 to 7 April 1945, he had a responsibility in reference to the treatment of prisoners of war. As Overseas Minister it was his direct responsibility to supervise matters of that kind, to determine whether the procedures and policies of the Commander in Chief of the Army in the field were adequate and in conformity to international undertakings and in accordance with the common dictates of humanity. It is recognized that the Commander in the field is generally vested with broad powers, but these are not unlimited, and such powers are always subject to directions by higher authority. In the case of Japan, the Commander in Chief of the forces in the field was subject to directions by the Chief of Staff of the

General Staff, and the Chief of Staff himself was not entirely independent of all controls. Especially would the Chief of Staff be amenable to the powers granted him and to a conscientious compliance with the law. Furthermore, the Chief of Staff, being the top policy making individual for the Army, is guided by his subordinates' views on matters. The Overseas Minister was obliged to know what was going on in connection with the treatment of prisoners of war and if he failed in this duty or neglected to advise the Chief of Staff as to the facts, the Chief of Staff would be within his rights to compel him to secure the information. Therefore, it can be assumed that Koiso knew or should have known of the atrocities committed during the times he served as Overseas Minister.

As to his knowledge of atrocities committed on War prisoners while he was Premier, he is equally culpable, because although he claims he had no authority to intervene in such matters as protests of that kind which were transferred to the War Department, he fails to state that as Premier, the very top Cabinet Officer, it was his duty to the Emperor to know what was going on in all departments of the Government and especially in the War Department in 1944-45, when the Nation was entirely occupied with a world war.

The claim that matters relating to prisoners of war was for the Commander of the forces in the field is completely refuted by the agreements made by the Foreign Minister of Japan on several

occasions in January and February 1942, in communications to the Swiss Government, that Japan would strictly observe the Prisoner of War Convention and also agreements relating to civilian internees. (R.p. 12856, 12857, 12859). The reason why the Foreign Department of a nation is responsible in such matters is because it affects foreign relations and because treaties are involved. Therefore, Koiso must bear his share of responsibility for failing to know what was going on, or if he knew, for failing to take appropriate action to prevent atrocities which were committed on such a wholesale scale that it was notorious within Government circles in Japan and eventually caused the appointment of an investigation.

(f) Koiso as Prime Minister was not the rubber stamp he now claims to have been.

When Tojo and his Cabinet decided to resign on 18 July 1944, a Senior Statesmen's Conference was called to consider who should be Tojo's successor (R.p. 11378). At first Field Marshal Terauchi was agreed upon, but Tojo opposed the idea for two reasons: (a) because the enemy's counter-offensive was at its height and to withdraw Terauchi from the front would be impossible, and (b) to allow the domestic political situation to affect front lines would be bad for morale (R.p. 11380). Therefore, the Emperor decided to appoint Gen. Koiso (R.p. 11379). The latter arrived from Korea and organized the Cabinet under instructions from the Emperor "to observe the text of the Constitution" and "to handle the affairs so as not to irritate the

Soviet in order that the East Asia War might be accomplished" (R.p. 11384). In this direction there is a subtle suggestion that Japan wanted to dispose of its antagonists one at a time.

Shigemitsu remained in the Cabinet as Foreign Minister and became concurrently Minister for Greater East Asia (R.p. 11666). One of the first moves of the new Cabinet, under pressure from local Army authorities, was to revise Japanese policy regarding Netherlands Indies. Koiso, in a speech before the 85th Session of the Diet on 7 September 1944, promised "future" independence to the Netherlands. But no further details were given as to when, or to what extent, such independence would be granted, but it became perfectly clear that this false promise was given to induce the Netherlands people to assist to the utmost in the Japanese effort, by stimulating their Nationalistic feelings. (R.p. 11666).

The real plan in connection with the Southern regions had been promulgated as early as October 4, 1940. Under this policy the Straits Settlement was to be placed under the direct rule of Japan (R.p. 11725). After independence of the Netherlands East Indies, a protective treaty under the name of military alliance would be accomplished, under which she would be made to appoint Japanese economic and military advisors in powerful positions (R.p. 11727). She would be compelled to lease to Japan important places from a military standpoint (R.p. 11727). And, finally, it was planned as follows: "After we have grasped real power in the Dutch East Indies, we must take proper measures

to get hold of real power in other British Territories" (R.p. 11728). This plan was announced time after time along with threats of force, if results could not be obtained otherwise. For instance, on April 16, 1941, the Army and Navy Imperial Headquarters established a policy that it intended "to occupy bases in the southern part of French Indo-China, needed for a military advance into the Netherlands Indies," (R.p. 11753); and in a telegram from the Japanese Secretary of the Embassy at Bangkok to Tokyo on July 4, 1941, he said: "Failure of Japan's economic negotiations with the Netherlands Indies would oblige her to take over the oil resources there by force, since her fleet would otherwise be incapable of action. Prior to this there is to be a Japanese military occupation of Indo-China in order to procure a concentration area and jumping off ports against Netherlands East Indies" (R.p. 11755).

Instead of independence, the Netherlands East Indies and Java in September 1944 were advised by Chief of Staff of the Osamu Army Corps that in regard to the Proclamation of Independence, "there shall be no great alterations in the operation and the business structure of the Military Government." (R.p. 12217).

It is significant that if independence had been granted to the Netherlands and Java, such in fact would have been a mockery and a hollow grant, because all agricultural enterprises of any account had been brought under control of the Japanese; the Western owned sugar industries had been allotted to large Japanese

sugar companies; public utilities had been seized by the Military Administration and operated without compensation and in some cases allotted outright to Japanese companies; a large part of equipment of private railway companies had been shipped to the Burma-Siam Railway; private or semi-government gas and power companies had been taken over by the Military Government or by Japanese companies and Press monopolies had been divided among the large Japanese newspaper concerns. (R.p. 12217 et seq.). In this state of affairs, the Netherlands would receive in effect nothing by a hypothetical return of independence, as such independence would have been in name only, and not in fact, inasmuch as all of the valuable assets of the country had been syphoned off by the Japanese.

But under these facts Koiso did not even carry out his promise, and return the hollow shell to the people of the Netherlands. As late as July 17, 1945, the Supreme War Council of Japan announced that the Independence of the East Indies would be recognized "as soon as possible." (Ex. 1350, R.p. 12121-2)

His union of thought with other Japanese military aggressionists is exemplified by a speech he made as Premier, before the 85th Diet Session in 1944, in which he extolled the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and in an inflammatory manner advocated the destruction of the United States and Great Britain (Pros. Ex. 277, R.p. 3113).

Later, on January 21, 1945, in a speech of Koiso before the 86th Imperial Diet, he emphasized the fact that Japan was "reconstructing East Asia" and that "the ideal of co-existence and

co-prosperity in the joint declaration with Greater East Asia could not be compared" to "the cunning object" of the aggressive war carried on by "Anglo-American greedy ambition to control the world" (Ex. 829-A).

To have him now say that he merely acted under an Imperial Rescript, in the belief that everything done was legal, does not hold water, because he knew or was familiar with the general scheme underlying Japan's conquest of Asia and the South and also her illegal actions against the United States and Britain.

The resignation as Prime Minister of Japan on 4 April 1945 again illustrates that Koiso could not even tell the truth when he finally stepped out of the Premiership. In his own words which are recorded in Kido's Diary (IPS Doc. 1632W (117) (R.p. 11384), the reasons for Koiso's resignation are found (R. 11387) as follows:

"Since we are convinced that at this moment when the situation of the Empire is getting more and more urgent, with changes on both political and war fronts east and west, and when there should exist no discrimination between the battlefield and the home front or between the Supreme Command and the Civil Government, a fundamental change should be made in the organization and character of the Cabinet so that they may cope with the present situation and so that the Cabinet, together with the whole Nation, with renewed resolution may be powerful enough to go straight

forward for the accomplishment of the great task of assisting the Throne. To this end, we have decided to ask permission of the Emperor to tender our resignation and carry out a resignation en bloc."

In a conversation with Kido on April 4, 1945, Koiso stated, off the record, that the present organization and character of the Government was not good; also that his opinion concerning the direction of the war was not availed of; that Japan needed an Imperial Hq. Cabinet or Cabinet which would direct the war; also, in view of the situation in Okinawa, he had been thinking of deciding on this action at about the end of the month (R. 11384-5).

In viewing the military and political career of Koiso, we must conclude that he was an integral part of the military machine, in the highest circles of Japan, which fostered, planned, and aided and carried out the Army's plan to dominate the world. He is almost always in the picture in important positions in Japan; in Manchuria; in China; then in the Southern Pacific. His leaving the Premiership as he did, for reasons not expressed in the formal document of resignation, indicates his desire to wash his hands of an unsavory situation, brought about in part by himself. The record is too full of his affirmative participation in the aggressive acts of the inner Army circles, for years, to permit him to exculpate himself on the theory that he was an unimportant person who only carried out the orders of higher authority.

file

INDICTMENT AND MOTION TO DISMISS
AS TO KOISO, KUNIAKI

Prepared by
Col. Fixel

INDICTMENT AND MOTION TO DISMISS
AS TO KOISO, KUNIAKI

Group One
Conspiracy - Wars of Aggression

- Count 1 - Conspiracy to dominate East Asia, etc.
2 - parts of China.
3 - China by establishing states.
4 - conduct wars of aggression.
5 - dominate the world.
6 - violate International Law, treaties,
agreements as to China.
7 -
8 - the U.S.A.
9 - Great Britain.
10 - Australia.
11 - New Zealand.
12 - Canada.
13 - India.
14 - Philippines.
15 - Netherlands.
16 - France.
17 - Thailand.
18 - U.S.S.R.
18 - Initiated a war of aggression against China Sept 18, '31
26 - Mongolian Peoples Republic
in Area of Khackhin Gol River.
27 - Waged war of aggression against China between Sept 18, '31
and Sept 2, '45.
28 - July 7, '37
and Sept 2, '45.
29 - U.S. between Dec 7, '41
and Sept 2, '45.
30 - Philippines
31 - Britain
32 - Netherlands
34 - Thailand
36 - Mongolian Republic and
U.S.S.R. in summer of 1936.

Group Two
Murder

- Count 37 - KOISO is not named.
38 - " " " "
39 - " " " "
40 - " " " "
41 - " " " "
42 - " " " "
43 - " " " "
44 - Participated as leader, organizer, instigator, or accomplice in common plan or conspiracy to procure or permit murder of prisoners of war, members of armed forces, and civilians.
45 - KOISO is not named.
46 - " " " "
47 - " " " "
48 - Prior to 18 June 1944 caused or permitted unlawful attack on CHANGSHA in violation of Treaty Articles mentioned in Count 2 and unlawfully to slaughter thousands of civilians and disarmed soldiers of Republic of China.
49 - Prior to Aug. 1944 caused or permitted unlawful attack on HENGYANG in violation of treaties mentioned in Count 2, causing slaughter of large numbers of civilians and disarmed soldiers of Republic of China.
50 - Prior to 10 Nov. 1944 caused or permitted attack on KWEILIN in violation of Treaties mentioned in Count 2, causing slaughter of large numbers of civilians and disarmed soldiers of Republic of China.
51 - Ordered, caused, or permitted armed forces of Japan to attack Mongolia and U.S.S.R. in the region of KHALKLIN - Gol River in summer of 1939, unlawfully killing and murdering members of armed forces of Mongolia and U.S.S.R.
52 - KOISO is not named.

Group Three
Crimes against Humanity

- Count 53 - Between 7 Dec. 1941 and 2 Sept. 1945 permitted breaches of the Laws and Customs of War re labor units for prisoners and civilian internees.
- 54 - Between 7 Dec. 1941 and 2 Sept. 1945 permitted the persons named in Count 53 to commit the offenses therein named, in violation of the laws of war.
- 55 - Between 7 Dec. 1941 and 2 Sept. 1945 disregarded his duty to prisoners of war and civilians and failed to take adequate steps to secure observance and prevent breaches of laws of war.

Motion to dismiss Count 1

- a. KOISO had no connection with the crimes charged (16424)
- b. The charge is no crime under Art 5A of the Charter of the Tribunal (16424)
- c. No conspiracy proven (16424)
- d. KOISO was not intimately known by other accused and members of the government (16424)
- e. Was considered by Army faction a neutral (16424)
- f. Was of just, moderate and moral character (16424)
- g. Not a member of Minseito or Seiyukai political parties, or active in any other political group or faction (16424)
- h. The March and October incidents of 1931 were domestic political issues due to corruption of domestic administration and not related to a plan for war (16424)
- i. That KOISO did not participate in the March and October incidents, but caused the firecrackers used in the demonstration to be confiscated (16425)
- j. That KIDO's diary as to the incident is based on hearsay (16425)

Motion to dismiss Counts 2, 18, 27

- a. At time of the Manchurian incident KOISO was not in any government position of authority or responsibility. (16426)
- b. KOISO, as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau under MINAMI, only carried out his duties in conformity to SHIDEHARA policies. (16426)
- c. Record does not show any illegal or criminal activity in KOISO's exercise of the functions and duties of his office. (16426)
- d. KOISO's duties of Chief of Military Affairs Bureau and as Vice Minister of War were very limited. (16427)
- e. As Chief of Kwantung Army, KOISO executed orders of his Commander in Chief, believing that his duties were to subdue bandits, maintain and restore peace and order, protect Japanese and Korean residents and property. (16427)
- f. KOISO had no facilities or means of his own to inquire into affairs of state and was dependent on announcements of the Japanese Government (16428)
- g. Promotions of KOISO were based on length of service and followed as a matter of course. (16429)
- h. Transfer to the retired list was not to permit him to become a member of the General Staff. (16429)
- i. No proof that any of his promotions or changes of position were a reward for any unlawful activity.

Motion to dismiss Counts 3, 6, 28

- a. In relation to the China incident KOISO was not in a position to take part in any move for autonomy of the five North China Provinces. (16429)
- b. Same applies to the time of the Marco-Polo Bridge incident July 7, 1937. (16429)
- c. KOISO was in Korea from Dec. 2, 1935 to July 15, 1938. (16429)
- d. No evidence that he participated in or had any responsibility for military actions during the time he was Minister of Overseas Affairs in the Hiranuma Cabinet, 1939; in the Yonai Cabinet in 1940; and as Prime Ministers July 22, 1944 to Ap 7, 1945. (16430)
- e. Cabinet had no authority as to military action. This was prerogative of Chief of the General Staff. (16430)
- f. No guilty knowledge or malicious intent to conduct or assist in an unlawful act. (16431)

Motion to dismiss Counts 4, 5, 7, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17.

- a. As Minister of Overseas Affairs in the Hiranuma Cabinet in 1939 KOISO opposed Ribbentrop's approach to Japan. (16434)
- b. He took no part in the conclusion of the Japanese-German alliance. (16434)
- c. He resigned as Minister of Overseas Affairs on August 23, 1939. (16434)
- d. On January 16, 1940, KOISO joined the Yonai Cabinet (16434) but opposed the Tri Partite Pact during his tenure of office. (16435)
- e. Dissatisfaction of the Army with this opposition caused the Cabinet to fall 22 July 1940 and KOISO resigned. (16435)
- f. KOISO was not of the Konoye Faction. (16436)
- g. He withdrew from official life after the fall of the Yonai Cabinet and engaged in agriculture as a private citizen for 2 years. (16436)
- h. KOISO did not attend any of the Imperial or liaison conference or Cabinet meetings listed in Appendix E of the indictment. (16437)
- i. The meeting Ott with KOISO is not clear as KOISO at that time had no authority to negotiate or any responsibility in the diplomatic matters relating to the Netherlands proposed by Ott. The latter's telegram to Berlin is inconsistent. (16435-6)

Motion to dismiss Counts 4, 7, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 26,
29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 36.

- a. Exhibit No. 730 tendered by the Soviet Prosecution is inconsistent with KOISO's position as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army from 8 Aug '32 to 5 Mar '34. (16437)
- b. Furthermore the witness who gave the Exhibit was executed in Soviet Russia and unavailable for cross-examination. (16437)
- c. Exhibit 668 is in error in stating KOISO issued instructions for the Education Ministry. (16437)
- d. The witness in Exhibit 668 was also executed. (16438)
- e. The Khalhin-Gol River incident was a local incident and was settled among Japan, Mongolia and Soviet Russia without fighting spreading. (16438)

- f. Furthermore the movement of armed forces outside Japan was under the Army General Staff and not a Cabinet office. (16438)
- g. As Prime Minister 22 July '44 to 7 Ap '45 KOISO endeavored to save the country. (16438)
- h. As Premier he followed the Imperial Rescript proclaiming the war was in self defense in the exercise of sovereignty rights. (16439)
- i. KOISO did not plan, prepare or initiate the war. (16439)
- j. No evidence that KOISO had knowledge that the war was illegal. (16439)
- k. He unavoidably became President of I.R.A.A. which was originally a public organization to carry out the ways of the subject. (16439)
- l. KOISO's administrative speech in the Imperial Diet (Ex. 829) was what would be expected of any war time Premier. (16440)

Motion to dismiss Groups II and III
All Counts

- a. Prosecution failed to establish proof of facts as related to KOISO in these counts.
- b. As armed forces outside Japan did not come under KOISO he had no responsibility or connection with them. (16440-1)
- c. Prisoners of war outside Japan are the responsibility of the Commander in Chief of the Army in the field. (16441)
- d. Not even a Prime Minister has authority to intervene in these matters. (16441)
- e. The Prime Minister has no authority to punish or prevent illegal acts in the Army. (16441)
- f. KOISO never was Minister of War, Chief of the General Staff, or Commander in Chief of any front line armies and was not in army since July 29, '38. (16441)
- g. Protests of foreign countries concerning treatment of prisoners of war were transferred by the Foreign office to Administration offices of the War Ministry. (16441)
- h. Such matters were then referred to the respective field commanders. (16441-2)
- i. None of this information was forwarded to the Prime Minister. (16442)

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23 April 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. David Sutton; and the
Chinese Prosecution Section

FROM : Colonel Rowland W. Fixel

SUBJECT : Application of KOISO, Kuniaki for Subpoena
of Witness Ralph Townsend

1. In the application in subject matter based on paper No. 538, which was disposed of in Paper 600, the Court indefinitely postponed action on the application, awaiting the results and disclosures of interrogatories authorized.

2. It was alleged in the application for subpoena of Mr. Townsend that he is an American and that he "is an instructor of Journalism at Leland Stanford University".

3. Upon inquiry of a friend of mine who is on the faculty of Leland Stanford, I have just been advised that Ralph Townsend is not and was not a Professor or Instructor of Journalism at Stanford University, and that so far as has been ascertained, he was a free lance reporter who was pro-Japanese and tried to get Prof. Graham Stuart, of the Political Science Department at Stanford to write a book on U. S. Foreign Policy with a pro-Japanese and anti-British and anti-Chinese flavor. That such effort was made in 1939 or 1940. It was ascertained that Prof. Stuart declined, so Mr. Townsend wrote such a book himself. The title of the book is "Seeking Foreign Trouble", and I am advised there is but one copy thereof at Stanford which was presented to Stanford by one Ferdinand Hansen. However, Townsend has written other books entitled "Ways that Are Dark" (re China) and "High Cost of Hate" (re Manchuria). The latter was written in 1939. "Seeking Foreign Trouble" is pro-Japanese and German and Anti-Russian, British and French.

4. Hansen, who presented Townsend's book "Seeking Foreign Trouble" to Stanford, wrote "Supreme Sacrifice" in 1936, published by Overseas Pub. Co., 509 Sansome St., San Francisco. No publisher's name appears on Townsend's "Seeking Foreign Trouble".

Rowland W. Fixel
ROWLAND W. FIXEL
Colonel, JAGD

Restricted

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

15 April 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Col. Rowland W. Fixel
FROM : D. N. Sutton
SUBJECT : Brocade Banner

I suggest that you examine the Brocade Banner as you may find some interesting material therein pertaining to KOISO. This publication is available in the document room.

D. N. SUTTON
Assistant Counsel

CC:
Mr. Tavenner

Dear Mr. Sutton

Apr 8/47

re Koiso - Okawa's testimony

Upon further checking I find that Document No 1908 B received Pres. No 2177 A and was received in evidence (R.p. 155-56).

This document contained the testimony of Okawa at Okawa's Third trial in connection with the March 1931 incident, implicating Koiso as asserting that he (Koiso) would handle the matter for the Army.

Since this document is in evidence, my understanding is that although it was not read, it may be referred to.

Therefore you may disregard my note to you in which I stated that the facts were not in evidence.

J. H. H.

Apr 4/47

Dear Mr. Sutton:

In the memo which I gave you on Witness Saito in the Koiso matter I referred in Par VI to Prosecution document 1908 B (Minutes of Third Trial of Okawa) as part of the Summary of Prosecution's evidence.

I find that document 1908 B ~~was~~ not yet ~~been~~ introduced in evidence by the Prosecution and has no exhibit number.

In my opinion it is an important document and must be put in evidence before the case is completed.

My progress report on Saito should be noted in this respect.

Col. Lutz

re: ~~Red Bull~~ ^{see memo of 8, 47}

attach Doc 1908 B

LIST OF PROSECUTION DOCUMENTS IMPLICATING

KOISO, Kuniaki

Prepared by Col. Fixel

Doc. No. 574 - Not yet used
Monthly Magazine "Koa", "Rise of Asia", July to Dec. 1941.

Crimes to which document applies: Instigation of aggressive warfare.

August number, p. 2. "It is Japan's responsibility to set the Asians free from under the yoke of the Western aggressors." P. 66 records proceedings of the 1st Conference of the "Dai Nippon Koa Domei". KOISO, Kuniaki is listed as a promotor or staff member.

Doc. 590 - Exhibit 829A
Speech of Jan. 21, 1945 by Prime Minister Koiso in proceedings of the 86th Imperial Diet.

"The present situation of the war is far from reassuring but I firmly believe that now it is the best opportunity for us to gain a victory, for the enemy's long way of supply is exposed as our attacking target."

"Their Anglo-American greedy ambition to control the world has been disclosed to the sun. In the district of their occupation they already are quarreling on the share of their big game. On the contrary the countries in the East Asia are, under the joint ideal of reconstructing East Asia, exerting their utmost to protect it and to fight it out with their total powers. The ideal of co-existence and co-prosperity in the joint declaration of the Greater East Asia could not be compared with their cunning object of the aggressive war."

Doc. 621 - Exhibit 230
Confidential record concerning Manchurian Affairs, dated Dec 8/23 but should be 1932.
From Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, Koiso, Kuniaki to the Minister of War Yangigawa, Heisuke.

The principles of leading Manchukuo are stated:

1. The administration will be backed by the Commander of the Japanese Kwantung Army.
2. Racial harmony.
3. Economic block between Japan and Manchukuo.
4. Armament shall be aimed at maintaining peace and order.
5. Diplomatically adopt an anti-Chinese principle according to circumstances and same attitude toward Soviet and U. S. A. as toward Japan.
6. Joint defense of Japan and Manchukuo.
7. Not permit political parties. "Let the people follow blindly."
8. Japanese should occupy key positions in the administration.

Doc. 646 - Exhibit 2209
Record dated April 5, 1938 of the transfer of secret funds from the Manchurian Incident Expenditure Account:
To Tojo, Hidek, Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army ...¥ 700,000
To Kitano, Keuzo, Chief of Staff, Chosen Army¥ 20,000
To Umezu, Yoshijiro, Vice Minister of War¥ 77,800
Koiso's name does not appear on the approved sheet.

- Doc. 1375A - Exhibit 642
Secret telegram July 19, 1941, handed by Oshima to German Foreign Minister advising that the Japanese Government has started negotiations with the French Government to secure naval and air bases in Indo-China. "The realization of this plan is the first step for our push to the South."
- Doc. 1513 - Exhibit 700
Telegram Nov. 7, 1931 from OHashi, Consul General in Harbin to Shidehara, Foreign Minister.
 Approves advance to Chichihar. Take advantage of this opportunity to "complete the plan" which they hope to realize. "There is only one way to complete the policy for the control of North Manchuria. There is nothing else to do but install our own puppet in Chichihar after the army attacks", etc.
- Doc. 1661 -
"Black Dragon Society" later called "Production Party" began agitation in 1931 in connection with the Manchurian and Mongolian incidents.
"Foundation of the State Society" was a related organization. Koiso was a director.
 Activities were chiefly directed to combating Bolshevism and exalting the national prestige.
- Doc. 1742 - Prosecution Exhibit 208.
Does not mention Koiso. It is a statement by Chen Fu Pao of atrocities committed in Nanking Dec. 14, 1941, and thereafter.
- Doc. 1753 - Exhibit 694
 The Russo-Japanese Fishing Problems. Japanese GHQ study dated Feb. 9, 1931.
- Doc. 1908B -
Minutes of Third Trial of Okawa, Shumei.
 On P. 20, he mentions Koiso's connection with the March 1931 incident of murder and attempted murder.
 "Then Lt. Gen. Koiso, taking charge of everything, told me that since there would be the danger of being discovered if too many fussed about it, we should pretend to have suspended it on the surface and that I should represent the civilians and he will represent the Army. However, although he went ahead with the plan, Lt. Gen. Koiso decided to suspend it later . . . and that was the end of the March incident."
 The intent was to set up a new political power and form a Cabinet centering around the Army.
- Doc. 2363 - Exhibit 668
Affidavit April 11, 1946 of Grigori M. Sermyonov. A former Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Eastern Frontier Area, a White Guard Army General.
 Page 9 of his affidavit, he said:
"General Koiso was the ideological leader in the sphere of racial discrimination, as well as religious persecution policy. He was Chief of the Kwantung Army headquarters, from 1933 to 1935, and later on Prime Minister of Japan.
"On Koiso's urgent request an instruction of the Japanese Minister of Education found its application in the Japanese schools, that instruction prescribing the teachers as a matter of obligation to inculcate in the Japanese children hatred toward Russians, Americans, and English and to imbue them with the idea of the Japanese being a higher race in comparison with other nationalities. Also it was on Koiso's initiative that in 1940 in Manchuria was published

Pu-Yi's manifesto which prescribed the entire population of Manchuria, regardless of the religious convictions of those or those national groups, to worship the Japanese goddess Amatorase.

"The persecution of Russians became still worse following the beginning of Japan's war against the U. S. A., and Great Britain, when one could see Russians beaten openly by the Japanese in the streets of Harbin and Dairen."

Doc. 2364 - Exhibit 730

Affidavit dated April 11, 1946, of K. V. Rodzaevsky, an anti-Soviet Russian living in Manchuria.

P. 3. "Gen. Koiso, the Japanese Minister of Colonies, who from 1933 to 1935 was Chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarters also told me about the aggression plans of Japan concerning the U. S. S. R. I met Koiso twice during my visits to Tokyo.

"When I first met him in the Ministry of Colonies in March 1939 Koiso promised me his support of the Anti-Soviet activities of the "Russian Fascist Union".

"I met him the second time in October 1939 when I came to Tokyo on an excursion organized by the Kharbin Military Mission. Koiso received me in his flat and in our conversation concerning the relations of Japan with the U. S. S. R. said that Japan strove to drive Soviet Russia from the Pacific Ocean."

Doc 2664 A - Exhibit 661.

Supreme War Leadership Council, Dec. 16.
Measures toward Indo-China to meet the sudden change in the situation. Feb. 1, 1945.

1. "The time for resorting to military measures shall be determined separately." (That is, resort to independent military action).
2. Military and police force of French Indo-China should be placed under the joint command of the Japanese Army.
3. Full cooperation with requests of Japanese Empire.
4. Foregoing to be accepted in six hours.
5. The Japanese Government will report to Germany its "true intentions" as regards the disposition of French Indo-China.
6. Rights and interests of the French people in general shall be treated as leniently as possible.

Doc. 2754 - Exhibit 1344.

Shows that action as in Doc. 2758, was taken because the line had been broken in the Mariannas and the United States was turning to the offensive. It was believed that by granting independence to some of the conquered, unity could be achieved.

Doc. 2758 dated 17 July 1945.

Measures for the Netherlands East Indies Independence data for Foreign Minister's Explanation.

This document refers to deliberations at the Supreme War Supervisory Conference of previous year, and Koiso's statement that the Empire was ready to recognize independence for the East Indies "in order to secure everlasting welfare for her people."

Doc. 2759 - Exhibit 1350
Decision of Supreme War Plans Council July 17, 1945 regarding former Netherlands East Indies as soon as reparations are completed in the principal areas.

The execution of the policy of promoting "race consciousness of the people" and "to make them contribute toward the complete prosecution of the war" and prevent "any hindrance to operations" will be in the army there.

Doc. 2832 - Exhibit 1398.
Deals with murder and rape near Jagua, Bohol, P. I., April and October 1945.

21 April 1945, a retreating Japanese bayoneted and beat a family whose house they looted. One of the children died of his wounds.

17 May 1945, Japanese captured 5 Filipino civilians, tied them and took them away. About a week later their mutilated bodies were found.

Sept. 1945. Two Japanese looted a house in Jagua and shot an eight year old girl.

Oct. 1945. Japanese raided a house in Jagua, wounded the owner and carried away two Filipino women. One was kept until surrender, Feb. 1946, and declared she had been raped by 19 different Japanese whom she identified from among those in custody.

Doc. 2900 - Prosecution Exhibit 2210
This is a draft note addressed to the Chief of Finance Section, Intendance Bureau (Confidential) dated July 4, 1932.

Shows secret expenditures for the Manchurian Incident "be disbursed" as follows:

¥ 20,000 to Koiso Kuniaki, Vice Minister of War.

On this list he received the second largest amount.

¥ 85,000 Hashimoto, Toranosuke, Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army

¥ 10,000 Mazaki, Jinazaburo, Vice Chief of General Staff

¥ 5,000 Kikuchū, Kadonari, Chief of Staff, Chinese Garrison

¥ 5,000 Kodaura, Tomoe, Chief of Staff, Chosen Army

¥ 1,500 Hata, Shiuji, MP Commandant

¥ 100 Shimizu, Kiyu, Chief of Staff of Formosan Army

It seems from the chart attached that Koiso, as Vice Minister had to approve this secret expenditure in which he was a chief beneficiary.

Doc. 2907 - Exhibit 2211
Approval of secret expenditures re Doc. 2900 by Account Section of War Ministry, August 11, 1932.

This Document is the final action. It is secret and is entitled "The Draft of Announcement to the Chief of the Accounts Section in the Intendance Department".

"Deliver secret service funds as follows from the Manchurian Affairs Expenses". There is listed, among others, ¥ 18,500 Koiso Kuniaki, Vice Minister of War.

Doc. 2922

Draft of Instructions to Chief of Intendance Section,
Intendance Bureau - Dec. 27, 1933.

"Disburse from Manchurian Incident Funds, Secret Expenditures
as follows:

To Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army
Koiso, Kuniaki ¥ 1,970,000"

"Secret Expenditure (¥ 1,970,000) as required by your Armies
to the end of the current year have been disbursed from the
Manchurian Incident Funds."

Doc. 2954 - Prosecution Exhibit 2215.

Extract from minutes of Second Joint Conference of Sections I,
II, III, and IV of the Committee of Accounts of the House of
Representatives, 75th Session of the Imperial Diet on March 17,
1940.

Fukuda recommended that Koiso, Minister of State, carry out a
drastic reform in the national policy in such a way as to make
same a two-fold policy; one phase being for defense, and the
other for advance. He said, "the military so far have been
concentrating too much upon the north . . . we must replace this
with what we call the principle of having both South and North
as our objectives."

Koiso: "Please note, nevertheless, that as regards the idea of
having both North and South as our objectives, I am in full accord
with Mr. Fukuda's opinion."

Doc. 4043A - Exhibit 500.

Telegram by Ott to the State Secretary, Berlin, 18 Feb. 1939.

Japanese Cabinet is supposed to have finally decided upon an
intensification of the pact (Anti-Comintern).

Doc. 4043C - Exhibit 504.

Telegram dated 6 May 1939 from Ott to German State Secretary.

"The War Vice Minister declared that the treaty bound Japan
definitely to the Axis power."

Doc. 4043 B & D - Exhibit 503

Telegram dated 4 May 1939 from Prime Minister Miranuma to Reich
Foreign Minister.

"I, for my part, as Japanese Prime Minister, am likewise occupied
with the strengthening of peace and with the maintenance of a new
order in East Asia founded on the principles of justice and
morality.....and today if I have in view the conclusion of an
agreement, to strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact and to make
closer the co-operation between Japan, Germany and Italy, this
does not occur just out of a consideration of the more expediency
(Zweckmassigkeit) of it, but in the hope that in that way we may
contribute to the consolidation of a world peace founded upon
justice and morality in consciousness of our common tasks now
Japan is firmly and steadfastly resolved to stand at the side
of Germany and Italy."

In the forepart of the telegram he refers to Hitler's "lofty
wisdom" and "the iron will" with which he is working at the
noble task" of reconstruction of his country.

Sutton

22 April 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Frank S. Tavenner
FROM: James T. C. Liu
SUBJECT: KOISO's Informal Statements, Sept. 1932

Thanks to the work of the Investigative Division, a copy of the Japanese newspaper published in Manchuria in the year 1932 has been secured, in which the informal statements of the accused KOISO are now located.

Upon the signing of the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol on 15 Sept 1932, KOISO, then Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, in an informal statement, declared that the recognition of Manchukuo was the expression of the true sentiment of the Japanese people, that Manchukuo should work with Japan hand in hand according to the "Japanese spirit" and "Imperial Way or Kingly Way".

Three days later, upon the first anniversary of the Mukden Incident, 18 Sept, KOISO in another reported talk praised the Incident as instrumental in giving birth to the new state which will work with Japan for the renovation of the Oriental Spirit in a Kingly Way.

The above is the gist of the two statements. The newspaper is still in the keeping of the Chinese Division. I will be glad to turn it over to some one you assign

EXTRACTS FROM KIDO'S DIARY

KOISO, General

8.23.40 Proposed appointment as envoy to French Indo-China.