




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
MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATION AND FREE TRADE;

THE STATE AND PROSPECTS OF

ENGLISH COMMERCE IN THE EAST,

THE NEW ADMINISTRATION OF GREECE,

ITS REVENUE AND NATIONAL POSSESSIONS.



LONDON:

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1833.

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TO HIS MOST GRACIOUS MAJESTY

WILLIAM THE FOURTH.

SIRE,

It is with equal pride and satisfaction that I avail myself of your Majesty's most gracious permission to dedicate this volume to your Majesty.

I am rejoiced not only at this opportunity of rendering a subject's homage to his Sovereign, but also of bearing testimony to the enlightened and philanthropic interest of the Monarch of England, in the regeneration and welfare of the country to which it refers.

I am,

Sire,

Your Majesty's most devoted,

obliged, and humble servant,

DAVID URQUHART.

London, May 20, 1833.



ADVERTISEMENT.

THE lingering adhesion of the parts of Turkey to each other, is far more surprising and less easily accounted for, than the dismemberment of that empire.

The destruction of the Janissaries dissolved its internal bond of union, relieved it from the pressure that had brought it so low, but threw off entirely the weight which had steadied so long the jarring elements of which it is composed.

Rebellion has been successful, habits of resistance have been formed, the hands of the government have been weakened, its authority insulted, and it may be truly said at this moment, the political organization is in a state of paralysis; authority, under whatever name it is exercised, whether of the Sultan or Mehemet Ali, is only a form; and this vast body lies with life in each articulation, without corresponding sympathies, without a ruling mind, or the powers of common action.

But even still more alarming than its internal state, are its foreign relations. Its political weakness and

administrative corruption would render it a miserable antagonist in the field of diplomacy, with the most trifling European state; yet, its position implicates its interest with those of all the great states of Europe, or at least of four out of five. One has for its chief end, to create anarchy in Turkey; one, that order and tranquillity should be maintained, but under the most despotic form of government; the third endeavours in vain to conciliate a general system of support with a particular scheme of dismemberment; and the fourth, which alone has a direct and philanthropic interest in preserving its integrity and in reforming its abuses, unfortunately, by the very absence of a specific and interested object, is either unprepared, or interferes when too late.

It is the deep conviction, that the future condition of Turkey hangs at this moment on foreign policy, and that to this country will belong, as the event will decide, the honour or the reproach, nay, more, the profit or the loss, of her preservation or her destruction, that induces the writer of the following pages, at so critical a moment, to publish his opinions on the elements of re-organization which Turkey possesses.

It is not merely the circumstances of the last few years, that have led Europe to look forward to the dissolution of the Turkish empire as an approaching and certain event. For a hundred and fifty years the same event has been as confidently anticipated; may not this historic conviction year by year, disproved in practice, yet perpetuated by education and

habit, be the offspring of a false estimate of the operation of institutions in every respect dissimilar to ours; of which we cannot easily judge as a whole, and of which the exceptions are more likely to strike us than the rule? The writer thinks that the explanation of the permanency of the Mussulman power is to be found in a principle of non-interference in the local administrations of the countries ruled. The effects of this non-interference have made themselves felt in various ways, which it will be the object of the following pages to point out. He cannot offer any more solid testimony of the sincerity with which he entertains these opinions, than the liability to criticism he incurs at a moment when facts outstrip arguments, and when the next post may bring their practical confutation, if they are unfounded. Several months ago it was sufficiently evident, that unless the career of Ibrahim Pasha were arrested, an occasion would be found or made for an interference fatal to Turkey; that catastrophe is still impending, and the belief that the backwardness of England, at such a moment, can only originate in the doubt of the possibility of maintaining a power which has no elements of organization within itself—has led to the present publication.

The moral legislation of Turkey, even if the preservation of that empire were beyond the support of political influence, is of principal importance in calculating the new combinations that may arise from its ruin, and in judging of the states that have been and that may be detached from it.

The higher portions of the administration of Turkey have been minutely described, and its errors and vices have been a thousand times repeated. That portion of it which the present volume is intended to describe, has hitherto been unfortunately neglected, and consists of the popular and elementary parts, through the intervention of which the revenue is collected; whence two principles of vast practical importance have sprung—perfect freedom of industry and commerce, by the placing of taxation directly on property; and a rural municipal organization, which, called into existence and maintained in activity for financial purposes, had been the means of dispensing justice, of mitigating oppression, and of replacing patriotism by local affections and common sympathies. The daily increasing attention which is given in this country to similar questions, may give more importance to the existence of such institutions, and to the operation of such principles in Turkey, than they would have excited even a short time back.

Finally, the writer has endeavoured to make the application of these principles to the state of Greece, by pointing out the form of administration which, in accordance with her previous state and experience, ought to be adopted for that country.

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MUNICIPALITIES

OF

TURKEY.

CHAPTER I.

THE unfavourable aspect of the Turkish empire at this moment, and the triumphant progress of Ibrahim Pasha through its finest provinces, but too plausibly and too conclusively, as far as they extend, establish that the government retains no influence over its provinces, and that the provinces contain within themselves no elements of internal and independent organization; but this conclusion holds good in those provinces only where the agricultural population is Turkish; namely, Asiatic Turkey; those provinces have hitherto been held in subjection by the superior energy and warlike disposition of European Turkey, and their conquest by Ibrahim Pasha is an additional proof of the weakness of the Porte, but is no accession to Mehemet Ali's power, unless the authority of the Porte itself is finally subverted by the indirect effects of his rebellion. The institutions which I propose to examine are those of the Hellenic and Slavonic races, inhabiting European Turkey.

In 1831, after visiting Albania and the greater portion of European Turkey, during the struggle be-

tween the Porte and the Albanians, I returned to England with very little hope of seeing the country tranquillized, or the Turkish rule prolonged; but a few months afterwards, returning to that country, I visited almost every portion of it, and was perfectly amazed at the incredible change that had taken place. It was then that I set myself seriously to inquire how the misfortunes of Turkey might be remedied; how the sultan could attach to himself the Greek and Raya population, the proofs of which attachment met me at every turn. It was then that I clearly saw the value of the elementary municipal institutions, and the facilities for political reorganization which they afforded.

This was a brilliant epoch in the history of Turkey; may it not prove the flicker of an expiring light! But for the hopes with which the state of the country, after the subjugation of the Albanians, and the energies that led to that event, inspired me, I should never have deemed the national and local institutions, which I shall endeavour to describe, of sufficient importance to merit attention, at a moment when results are to be considered, and events alone are to be dealt with.

After the Persian war; after the long and exhausting struggle with Greece, and the all but fatal blow of her independence; after being laid prostrate before the Russians at Adrianople—the humbled and unfortunate administration of the Sultan had to make head against domestic enemies of a more formidable character than ever yet had threatened the throne of the successors of the Califs.* The Servians had ob-

* The dangers of this critical moment were never appreciated in

tained independence, the Bosnians scorned all intercourse with the Sublime Porte, and the whole of Albania was under arms. Albania, on which Turkey had depended for the reduction of Greece, now that Greece was triumphant, turned its arms against the Porte, was supported by the warlike inhabitants of the mountain ranges of Roumelie, and was at that period joined in hatred to the Sultan, and to the new administration, by the Ráya Greeks, both agricultural and armed, the first forming the mass of the population of Turkey in Europe, the latter composing a body, powerful by its numbers and its strong positions, and commanding the whole of the passes that surrounded Thessaly and Macedonia. Though the Albanians dreaded the Nizzam, the Rayas had not yet felt the good effects of the system, and had therefore no reason to look more favourably than heretofore on the Porte, which has so long to them been an object of terror and of hatred.

Europe; few persons in Europe are sufficiently well acquainted with Turkey to see in the revolt of Albania, with Greece and Servia independent on either side, any thing more alarming than in a revolt of Zebecs or Metualis. The importance of Albania is strikingly illustrated by the events of the Egyptian rebellion. The regulars of Ibrahim positively owed the character which enabled him to push his daring invasion through Asia Minor, to being resisted by the hordes of Hussein Pasha. What had the sultan to oppose to him? Only the as yet scarcely subdued Albanians. True, they did not muster more than 6000 men in the army of the grand vizir, but they were its nucleus and its strength. If the rash impetuosity of the grand vizir gave the victory unto the hands of the retiring Ibrahim, still is it not the fault of the Albanians if Ibrahim was not expelled from Anatoly. The whole dependence of the empire was on the Albanians.

The military strength of Turkey in Europe; the Albanians, the industrious population; the Rayas; the Greek Armatoles, and the Turkish proprietors, were therefore at this moment all opposed to the new administration. The conservative party were opposed to the Sultan on account of his reforms, the others would not support him unless he granted further reforms; but their opinions were far from being decided or their objects fixed, because they were not certain of the future intentions of the government, because they had no earnest of the effectiveness of that organization which the other party so much dreaded. The Christians had enabled the Sultan to triumph over Ali Pasha, but ten years of subsequent anarchy had given them abundant reason to regret the election they had then made. At the moment to which I allude, had another Ali Pasha existed in Albania, I am convinced that every class of the population, every portion of Turkey in Europe, would eagerly have submitted to his authority. Thus the moral strength of the nation remained for the moment neutralized, dreading on the one hand, the anarchy of the Albanians, and doubting on the other, the intentions of the government. The decision taken in this crisis by the Sultan, to break through old routine and prejudice, to declare equal rights to Raya and Musulman, and the election of the talented individual who has pacified Roumelie, subjugated Albania, attached the Raya population to the cause of the Sultan,—saved the empire, or preserved to the Porte the allegiance of those provinces, by granting to them a portion of the demanded reform which the Sultan is supposed in Europe to be forcing on his people.

The grand vizir, a man of strong and original mind, and unconnected with the intrigues of the Porte, was alone capable of carrying such a reform into execution; he was invested with all civil and military authority in Turkey in Europe, without limitation of power or time. Never had such authority been entrusted to a Turkish satrap; never had there been greater occasion for the interposition of a dictator's arm, and certainly the choice could not have fallen on an abler man. From Adrianople he advanced, in the early part of 1830, westward, into the heart of the disaffected country. With a handful of troops he had to rescue from the Albanians the territory they held, and were fast depopulating; he had to overawe the growing disaffection of the Turks, and, above all, he had to conciliate the Greeks, who were assembling in numerous and armed bodies, exasperated on one hand, by the oppression under which they laboured, and encouraged on the other, by the example of independent Greece. He clearly understood that the campaign he was undertaking was an administrative rather than a military one, and that his success depended rather on the friends he could conciliate to his master by his policy, than the enemies he could subdue by his arms. As far as I could judge from his own opinions, from the opinions of his favourites, and from his first measures in reorganizing the province of Monastir, his plan was as follows:—*

* I mention here only the financial and administrative reforms; but there are others of a moral nature, perhaps equally important, which in the commencement of this year (1832) I observed with no less gratification than surprise in passing through Turkey in Europe.

1st, To substitute for all exactions, legal and illegal, a property tax, to be assessed by their own municipal authorities, on land, houses, shops, and yokes of oxen. The amount was greatly to exceed the sum formerly paid to government, but on this consideration they were relieved from the robbery of all classes of government officers, and from the grievous oppression of forced labour, and conack, that is, furnishing officers, soldiers, and Turks in general, with lodging

The Greeks were allowed to wear turbans, yellow slippers, and generally any dress and any colours they chose. This may appear a mere trifle, but it is far from being so. The marks of distinction between Greek or Christian and Turk, are dress, name, and mode of salutation; the most important, however, is dress; every one must have felt this who for a day has worn the two costumes in Turkey. When these distinctions are no longer matters of right and law, they will fall into disuse; nor would they be considered, as heretofore, even if preserved, badges of oppression or slavery. The two people will, I doubt not, in time amalgamate, if nothing interferes from without to disturb the progress commenced; with the acuteness of the climate (I know not what word to employ to designate the peculiar intelligence of these races) they even themselves anticipate this event. I recollect a Vlach saying to me at Monastir—"If the grand vizir lives ten years longer we shall sup with the Turks in Lent, and they will dine with us in Ramazan." At the time to which I allude, in approaching Constantinople, I met several deputies returning with firmans for the erection of churches. The difficulties thrown in the way of the building and repairing of churches by the Turks are well known, as also the heart-burnings thereby caused to the Greeks. Now, not only was permission freely granted, but the grand vizir himself subscribed 80,000 piastres towards the erection of one at Monastir, which was erected of solid stone masonry, in an incredibly short period, the whole Greek population contributing labour as well as money, and was completed by the end of 1831. The Turks asked the Greeks, "Why they had not added four minarets to it." How much meaning lies in this taunt!

and board; all servants of the government were henceforward to be paid by the treasury, and were to provide for themselves; and all expenses on government account to be defrayed by government. I am not prepared to say to what extent this arrangement would improve the revenue, or relieve the people throughout Roumelie, but I am not, I think, beyond the mark when I say, that with one season of tranquillity the revenues might be quadrupled, and yet the people remain the most lightly taxed of Europe.

2nd. The Greek capitani, the Albanian derven-agas guards of the mountains, and no better than banditti themselves, and the Turkish pashas, beys, ayans, musselims; vaivodes, agas, zabitis, with their train of chaoushes, cavashes, gramatiki, Jew and Armenian brokers and sarafs, were to be swept away, to be replaced by a military police, composed of regular officers, as military commandants, and by treasurers, whose only duty would be to receive the taxes collected by the municipal officers. I must entreat the most particular attention to this all-important consideration, which is the key both to the present state and future prospects of Turkey, that in sweeping away these functionaries, you burst asunder no ties, you destroy no institutions, you injure no interests, you leave no blank to be filled up. There is centralisation of power in Turkey, but not of administration. The population administers itself—has recourse to Turkish law or authority in no case, except through violence; each community apportions its own burdens, collects its own taxes, and whether these taxes are paid into the hands of a provincial collector, or extorted by swarms of locust functionaries, makes

not the slightest difference in the relations in which the provinces stand to the Porte, though it makes the difference of prosperity or misery to the people—of strength or weakness to the government. Instead of these swarms of functionaries, the passes and principal villages were to be occupied by small detachments of regular troops, having fixed pay, and restrained from demanding a single para from the inhabitants, who were themselves to collect their own taxes, and pay them to the chief collector of the province. The Pashas were also to be paid, by the administration, a regular salary, and placed on the footing of the prefects of France, such as those prefects were before their functions extended beyond civil and correctional police. In fact, the functions of the executive would have been restricted to the maintenance of police; no difficult matter in a country possessing the ample means of employment, and the frugal and industrious habits of Turkey. Here moral sanction renders even constables and sheriff's officers unnecessary; a man cited before a judge is compelled by opinion* even to hasten to attend. The Rayas sub-

* The Turkish word, which we would render in English, opinion, *chatir*, is most expressive and comprehensive; it signifies, in its first intention, memory, but expresses also favour, good-will, and character; the employment of this word in a sense equivalent to our vague term opinion, shows the great respect paid to opinion. On political questions no complications of interests confuse public opinion; so that with respect either to individual character or public acts, opinion may be expressed with more or less boldness, but it is decided and universal. They say, "I will do this on account of *my* opinion," not on account of the opinion of others,*—thus marking a necessary connexion between conduct and character. The Greeks have adopted the word, and have combined it both in

mit their disputes and differences to their priests, whose decisions are not the less final because destitute of legal validity. In the communities the reciprocity of responsibility gives public opinion the right of censorship—a right which is most despotically exercised. Crimes are unheard of, save amongst those whose office is the preservation of order; and the most remarkable industry and frugality, I will not say characterize the body of the nation, but form the essential features of each individual disposition.*

This plan for the reorganization of the administration, so admirably simple, so practicable, so advantageous to the government and to the people, is now placed beyond all danger as to its ultimate success, by the overthrow in the provinces of the bodies interested in the continuance of misrule; it may be more or less retarded by the intrigues of the Porte itself, or by the failure of the organization of the new troops, on which it depends.

The class of men interested in the old system are now, as a faction at least, annihilated; the chief organization expired with the Janissaries, the subjugation of

sound and sense with their own soft and poetic χάρις, by the transposition of the P and T in the oblique cases. The ancients used it precisely in the same sense; τῶν Μεσσηνίων χάριτι.—Thucyd. b. iii. c. 95; would be expressed in Romaic, διὰ τὸ χαρίτι τῶν Μεσσηνίων.

* Turkey is so full of contradictions that it is utterly impossible to come to one single decision without neglecting contradictory facts. Lest the truth of the above observation should be contradicted by partial experience, I must observe, that the population I allude to is that of the agricultural rayas of Roumelie, excepting some of the duller Slavonic tribes to the north, the Armatōles to the south, and the generality of those who wear pistols in their belts. *

the Albanians, and their conversion, which sooner or later must happen, into regular soldiers, will strengthen the bands of the Porte, whose most dangerous enemy Albania has been for the last few years, because most essential to its support. As to the new troops, their discipline and subordination is certainly superior to what could reasonably be expected from them, and they seem to have realized the hopes of their founders in the situations in which they have hitherto been placed.* I speak not in a military point of view, but with regard to the more important considerations of the maintenance of order, and the organization of a Mussulman party opposed to Janissaries and Albanians, and dependent on the executive, which itself must now become directly or indirectly dependent on general prosperity and public opinion for its pecuniary resources, and consequently for its army.†

* In the two actions at Perlipe, and at the Dervends, between that place and Kiupreli, the conduct of these troops surpassed every expectation, and gave them a pride in their uniform, and an esprit de corps, which will greatly assist their organization, and which are an earnest of future success. The Sadrazem was driven by despair to seek these two engagements, in which between five and six thousands of the hitherto despised Nizzam completely routed and dispersed, with very trifling loss, between twenty and thirty thousand, of not only the most warlike troops of the empire, but of those who had made a monopoly of military service, and who exist by that service alone, as their barren mountains would not supply in a year the consumption of three months, for their own population.

† “A state is prosperous when justice is administered impartially, and when the police is good. (One of our great law authorities has said, the whole fabric of government was only a frame for the twelve judges.) A king cannot administer justice without soldiers; soldiers cannot be procured without money; money can only be procured if the country flourishes; it can only flourish by good

The crimes of the Janissaries gave the sultan the power to destroy them—so the crimes of the Albanians enabled the grand vizir, with very inadequate military means, to break the strength and humble the pride of these haughty mountaineers; but through what agency, save the zealous co-operation of the mass of the people, which by acts expressed the public opinion that had not yet found a tongue—the Greeks, by their ready and voluntary contributions of money and provisions, as well as by their arms, enabled the grand vizir to beat the Albanians, Selectar Poda, and the Pasha of Scodra. The Turkish proprietors had been taught by misfortune, that their interests were indissolubly connected with those of the cultivators of their lands. The Greeks,* gaining strength and confidence by the schisms and disasters of the Turks, by the weakness of the government, from which the veil of mysterious power had now been rent, had actively contributed to the establishment of the sultan's authority, and naturally claimed the consideration and influence due to a body who alone possessed, in their wealth and industry, the means of supporting a government which their arms† had partly caused to triumph.

government, and consequently a king can only reign by justice.”
—*The Principles of Wisdom concerning the Art of Government*; by Ak. Thessar. Translation of Garcia de Tassy.

* Of course it will be understood that these are the Raya Greeks, or the subjects of the Porte. In speaking of the inhabitants of independent Greece I have either used the epithet “free,” or given them the name they assume—“Hellenes.”

† At the last decisive action of the Dervends, between Perlipe and Kiupreli, a daring exploit of three hundred Christians from

.. All the causes of a nation's destruction are in active operation in Turkey. Year after year, for a couple of centuries, have devastation and scenes of bloodshed and desolation succeeded to each other, and year after year has been anticipated the approaching extinction of European commerce and the immediate exhaustion of every source of wealth; yet Turkey still exists, nay, furnishes food for fresh destruction; her commerce with Europe continues to move, nay, is hourly increasing. Whence are to be deduced effects so little analogous with the apparent causes? 1st, From the absence of many of the evils that accompany the conditional despotism of European governments, and 2dly, from the existence of a municipal organization.

The oppression of Turkey is direct and apparent, but so is taxation. The people know the full extent of their wrongs, and also the causes whence they flow, and the remedies of which they are susceptible. Their political intelligence and acuteness, indeed, strongly contrasts with the ignorance and indifference on administrative questions of the people of Europe; only so much is abstracted from their pockets as goes into those of their masters; tyranny is severe and irresistible, but it is neither constant nor systematic; there are neither privileged classes* nor privileged

Chimara turned the fate of the day in favour of the grand vizir, and preserved for a while the Ottoman Empire. Mehemet Reschid promised them whatever boon they chose to ask for this signal service. Their noble request was, that a Greek village, close by Kiupreli, should be spared in the sack of the town.

* It will be objected to this, that the so called privileges of the Turks themselves are the most crying abuse, and the distinctive

interests; they know no vexations of spies, police agents, informers, censors, tax-gatherers, (internal,) custom-house officers, or the other innumerable means employed to disguise taxation, by governments less frankly despotic than Turkey. On the other hand, they join fraternally to support their common lot and common burdens; and the close and intimate union of men and interests, created by direct taxation, and strengthened by the moral sanction of municipal institutions, enables them to support, and even to gain strength in supporting, a pressure which otherwise must have annihilated them long ago.

feature of Turkey; but the Turks have been the governing body, as such were distinct from the mass of the population engaged in industrious pursuits, agriculture, and commerce, and were the agents of the oppression, as an antidote to which, I mention this freedom of industry and equality of rights among the oppressed. The oppression of the Turks is not privilege, it is open and direct robbery; besides it was not the government that circumscribed rights and privileges within the pale of certain interests, or the inheritances of certain families; the excluded were excluded of their own free will, and by their adherence to the creed of their fathers. No doubt this reflection often gave them encouragement and strength in moments of suffering and temptation, and fortified the moral feeling in which it originated. The weaker spirits found refuge in Islamism from the wrongs they could not bear; the bolder, freedom from the yoke they could not brook; and the national character maintained its uniformity of passive resistance to oppression, and secret contempt for its oppressors.

CHAPTER II.

THE elevation of the Greeks to political importance in the Turkish empire; the facilities for reorganization which the country possesses; the moral character and industry of the population; the preservation of their distinctive features and creeds, and the preservation of the Turkish empire itself, seem to me to be all of them effects of the local municipal institutions. This opinion has been very deliberately and cautiously adopted, it was not pre-conceived, or taken up even with a knowledge of the existence of similar institutions throughout the greater portion of the east, it was the result of observation in detail under varying circumstances and at different periods; and as the subject acquired importance in my own eyes, my scepticism increased with my astonishment, that causes so active and universal should have so completely escaped observation.

When I first observed the effects of this local organization, and the financial system depending on it, I thought I had discovered the secret of the permanency of the Turkish empire, in effects which had accidentally grown out of its own anarchy and oppression, as necessary, though accidental compensations, which ever accompany permanent wrong, to

prevent it from exhausting and destroying the substance on which it feeds: but it was with no less gratification than surprise, that I found these institutions, and that financial system, not only known and appreciated by enlightened Mussulmans, but even venerated as the fundamental principles of Arabic legislation, and handed down as the constitutional and traditional doctrines of Islamism; but above all was I struck with their importance, when I saw Turks, who had visited Europe, return to their own country, detesting more than ever the practical abuses of their own government, but attached more than ever to these its fundamental principles.

In every branch of science in which Europe desired to be instructed, Arabia became her mistress; but there were other questions in which interests, not arguments, prevailed; in these, no instructions were sought; and we remain up to this day ignorantly sceptical of the existence of such a science among the Arabs, as that of government. Yet in this, as in the other sciences, Arabia brought her principles to the test of experiment,* and reared and consolidated the most stupendous fabric of government that the world has ever beheld.

I have observed, in support of the importance of municipal institutions, that enlightened Mussulmans, who have visited Europe, return more than ever

* The Arab philosophers were men who combined with an acuteness and activity of mind that has never been surpassed, all the knowledge that industry could attain. They were superior to the Greeks by combining logic and metaphysics with experimental philosophy.—*Turner's History of England during the Middle Ages.*

attached to the principles of Arabic legislation. It may be interesting to know, whether or not the condemnation here implied of our system springs from prejudice. If their objections arose from prejudice, practice and customs would be the objects of their aversion; but no, it is to our principles they object—to our principles of finance and of commercial legislation. Freedom of commerce and of industry, is not, indeed, with them an object of independent inquiry; it is a consequence which flows from, and which never can be separated from, direct taxation. I do not mean freedom of commerce, while taxed for revenue, from prohibitions and protecting and discriminating duties, but that freedom which facilitates the exchange of commodities with the view of enhancing the value of land and property from which their revenue is drawn; not admitting the burdening of the exchange of commodities for the sake of revenue, because they hold direct taxation to be the least onerous, the easiest and the cheapest mode of collecting it. These principles have been preserved in practice, not by the solicitude, but by the absoluteness of eastern governments, which have always been too strong to require to disguise their imposts; and therefore the evils of indirect taxation, fluctuations, gluts, over-trading, bankruptcies, fictitious wealth, unwholesome industry, excessive prices of the necessaries of life, pauperism, a blood-stained code for the punishment of factitious crimes, which never have existed in Turkey, are arguments for the direct and Arabic system which a Mussulman is only made acquainted with by visiting Europe.

The connexion between this and the municipal institutions is, that direct taxation can only be beneficially applied by means of municipal institutions.

By the term municipal, I mean to designate the administration which the inhabitants of any village, burg, or section, of the country establish for the management of their local affairs, as distinguished from, and independent of, the political government. The Turks destroyed the administration, institutions, customs, and ranks, that existed under the eastern empire; but imposed on their tributaries neither new administrative forms, nor their own civil code, which was their religious text. So independent of the Mussulman code were the institutions the rayas adopted, that wherever the country has flourished, it has been severed from all political connexion with the Porte. I might even go further and say, that prosperity is invariably the consequence of the *neglect* of the central administration; but such a consideration as this is most effective when presented in the simplest manner.

I will not attempt to trace these bodies to the free states and village republics of ancient times; but I must observe, that though the external forms of the two systems were perfectly similar, the principle was wholly different. The ancient cities or villages, whether *αὐτοκράτορες* or *αὐτονόμοι*, were insulated and independent bodies of masters and slaves. These communities are composed of individuals who, whatever is their political state, are among themselves perfectly equal. But still this inquiry affords some interesting coincidences with the administrative maxims and practice of antiquity; the municipal offi-

cers are now commonly elected in the churches, the *ἐκκλησιάι*, the distinctive appellation of the ancient popular assembly. The administration is confided to two classes of men; representatives, administering the public interests, and priests, judges in private matters. Were not these, as clearly as we can make them out, the characters of the double deputies composing the Amphictyonic council? * The cities of ancient Greece, as now, were independent, yet uniform; their relations with the leagues or commanding states, which might stand for general governments, resemble those of the Greeks with the Turkish government at the present day, and were more or less of a diplomatic character. But a more extraordinary coincidence than all these is to be found between a federal community of villages in Macedonia, which I shall have to describe, and the Amphictyonic body itself, especially when that body was presided by the representative of the king of Macedon, the prototype of the sultan. The council of this community, under the superintendence of a commissioner from Constantinople, was composed of the two classes of deputies corresponding with the Pylagori and Hieromnemons; the same principle of representation is apparent in both bodies, convened to take, in common, measures on questions which had been previously discussed in each community. † The

* The resemblance in every point is complete. There were several pylagori; there was but one hieromnemon. There were several demogerontes; only one papas. The pylagori were popularly elected; the hieromnemon chosen by lot. The primates are popularly elected; the papas by purchase. †

† Eschines, in his oration against Chésiphon, mentions, on his return with other deputies from the Amphictyonic assembly, that they

members were not legislators assembled for deliberation, but ministers for conference. The same unanimity was required in their decisions; and, strange to say, the modern federation was composed, like the ancient, of twelve distinct bodies. But this inquiry, however curious or interesting, is foreign to my present object—the investigation of the political elements of Turkey, in as far as that investigation may prove of utility, by explaining the means which exist for the regeneration of that most important country.

The rayas owe these institutions to the Turkish dominion. Under the weak and despicable eastern empire, the mass of the people was reduced to the lowest state of moral and political depravity. A corrupt aristocracy, a tyrannical and innumerable clergy, the oppression of perverted law, the exactions of a despicable government, and still more, its monopolies, its fiscality, its armies of tax and custom collectors, left the degraded people neither rights nor institutions, neither chance of amelioration nor hope of redress. It is therefore not to be wondered at, if they fled from the tax-gatherer to the barbarians, or if, at a later period, they were glad to exchange both the precarious sway of these conflicting tribes, and even the more fell dominion of their own weak empire, for the powerful protection of the Ottoman dominion, whose rule must have been, indeed, a happy change

rendered an account of their mission, first to the senate, then to the people; and having presented their reports, and deposited the decrees that had been passed, the senate and the people unanimously approved of all they had done, and ratified their acts.

for the Greeks, when it was sought by the persecuted of Europe, and became the refuge of the Jews of Spain, and of the Protestants of Hungary.

The establishment of the Turkish dominion swept away all privileges, all monopolies; but it swept away too, all disabilities; if it destroyed pre-eminence of caste, it destroyed invidious exclusions. It reformed the corrupt and overgrown hierarchy, abolished oppressive influences, and reduced the nation to a state of perfect equality, by depriving it of all rights and distinctions, so that in industry alone this hitherto effeminate people were reduced to seek merit and distinction, as well as the means of existence; and industry, though oppressed by anarchy in Turkey, has never been repressed by law.

Against the resistance or rebellion of such a people, the Turkish government needed no measures of precaution. As a conquering power, it knew its own force and the weakness of its subjects; and in exacting from them what may be more properly termed tribute than revenue, occult, or disguised modes of taxation, would have been superfluous. Each district was required to furnish a fixed sum, and to the Greeks themselves was left the care of distributing the burthens and collecting the amount. This sum was not fixed arbitrarily, however arbitrarily it may have been subsequently exacted; and though contempt for the Greeks, and national indolence, may alone have been sufficient motives for leaving the Greeks to their own government, yet the strict justice that seems to have dictated the first assessments of all species of taxes and property, may lead us to infer, that the legislative doctrines of the Arabs, and

the nomade habits of the Turks, essentially contributed to the establishment of that simple form of administration—direct taxation under the management of municipal institutions, which would seem, judging by the experience to Turkey, to have the property of rendering a people indestructible.*

* The political state of the Mahometan possessions in India most satisfactorily support the opinions I here venture to express respecting the state of Turkey; indeed Turkey and India are countries which mutually elucidate each other, and enable us, even by a comparison of their differences, to understand and appreciate a social and political condition so perfectly antithetical to that of Europe. Colonel Briggs, in his work on the land-tax of India, expresses himself as follows on the subject in question:—

“ It has been already shown that each Hindoo village had its distinct municipality, and that over a certain number of villages, or district, was an hereditary chief and accountant, both possessing great local influence and authority, and certain territorial domains or estates. The Mahomedans early saw the policy of not disturbing an institution so complete, and they availed themselves of the local influence of these officers to reconcile their subjects to their rule. * * * From the existence of these local Hindoo chiefs at the end of six centuries in all countries conquered by the Mahomedans, it is fair to conclude that they were cherished, and maintained with great attention as the key-stone of their civil government. While the administration of the police, and the collection of the revenues, were left in the hands of these local chiefs, every part of the new territory was retained under military occupation by an officer of rank, and a considerable body of Mahomedan soldiers. * * * * In examining the details of Mahomedan history, which has been minute in recording the rise and progress of all these kingdoms, we nowhere discover any attempt to alter the system originally adopted. The ministers, the nobles, and the military chiefs, all bear Mahomedan names and titles, but no account is given of the Hindoo institutions being subverted, or Mahomedan officers being employed in the minor details of the civil administration.

“ It would appear from this that the Moslems, so far from imposing

Under an oppression, which has been considered in Europe as degrading as it is lawless, the condition of the rayas seems gradually to have improved. The Greeks, when a sovereign people, had entirely lost the spirit of enterprise and of commerce; as slaves, they have recovered that spirit, and have carried commercial enterprise to a degree of prosperity, scarcely paralleled under equally unfavourable circumstances in the history of the most commercial nations. Under the eastern empire, neglected literature had taken refuge in the libraries of Constantinople and the cloisters of Athos, now every village of ancient and modern Greece has its schools. Instead of the good qualities of the people being lost by the oppression they have suffered, oppression has purified and renewed the national character; I speak, of course, of the character of the mass of the nation, not of the censals and courtiers of Smyrna, the dragomans of Constantinople, the primates of the commercial towns, or, in general, of those whose industry was rendered chicane, by their coming in individual contact with Turks or Europeans.*

their own laws upon their subjects, treated the customs of the latter with the utmost respect; and that they did so because experience taught them that their own interests were advanced by a line of policy so prudent."

* It would indeed be a herculean task to refute or to notice all the absurdities that have been disseminated respecting Greece, and the character of the people. I should have deemed the common notion of the Greek character having degenerated under the Turkish yoke, a prejudice in complete contradiction with the facts of the case, and totally unworthy of notice, had I not found it repeated in Mr. Gordon's work on the Greek Revolution. It is painful to disagree with such an authority. I extract the passage to which I allude :

The collection of tribute was the origin, and has ever continued to be the bond and end, of the municipal bodies, and led to their uniform establishment throughout the country, wherever it submitted unconditionally. The same could not be said of districts that had made terms; for there some chief would retain his authority—some former system of administration would linger—the annihilation of privileges must prepare the soil for the equal layers of this political structure, which is therefore not to be expected, and as we shall presently see, is not to be found, in districts where resistance had been successfully prolonged. In those districts which had unconditionally submitted, the inhabitants were compelled to select from their own body the fittest persons for filling the office of assessors, collectors, and cashiers; and as under the common yoke there was no privileged order that had influence enough to restrict these offices to itself, so was there no degraded class that would suffer itself

“ Those who are best acquainted with the Greeks, cannot fail to remark the numerous and striking features of resemblance that connect them with their ancestors. They have the same ingenious and active bent of mind, joined to a thirst of knowledge and improvement, the same emulation in their pursuits, love of novelty and adventure, vanity and loquacity, restless ambition and subtlety. The Grecian character was, however, so long tried in the furnace of misfortune, that the sterling metal had nearly evaporated, and little but dross remained; having obliterated whatever was laudable in the institutions of their forefathers, their recent masters had taught them only evil.” Perhaps had the metaphor been more correct the application would have been more just. I should have thought that the furnace would have thrown off the lighter and incongruous particles, and have left the metal free—that the love of novelty—the vanity and restlessness would have escaped, leaving behind activity of mind, and thirst of knowledge, and improvement.

to be excluded from an equal voice in their common concerns; the absence of exclusiveness and restriction left no grounds for strife, and prevented the necessity of defining the rights of suffrage, or of regulating the forms of election. There were no discordant interests to be consulted, because the Turkish system of direct taxation prevents what we consider opposing interests from being in the slightest degree placed in opposition to each other; so that the only question at issue was, the personal merit and character of the individuals to be chosen. Public opinion was at once manifested through the public voice, and elections in which every individual was equally interested, were generally, after a year's reflection, concluded in a few minutes, without agitation, and without formality.

The extreme simplicity of this system affords no detail to which attention can be called, or on which it can be fixed. Little would the passing stranger, seeing this unpretending ceremony hurried over in the church after the service, or under the village tree, think it possible to ascribe to the occult, but all-pervading influence of these elections, and the social condition and moral character which depend upon them, consequences so vast and important. The elders, thus elected, hold their offices for a year; but the same want of formality observable in the election, is also to be found in their functions, and in their term of office. The same individuals may remain in office for years, or even for life, without re-election; but if they lose public confidence, no returning day of election is waited for—they are immediately ejected, and successors appointed to them, and this very faci-

lity of resuming the trust has the effect of prolonging the term of office.

Their functions are numerous and important; the principal are these:--The apportioning the tax imposed upon the whole community, to each individual according to his property. They have therefore to be most accurately acquainted with the amount of the property of the whole community, and of the property of each member of it; they must ascertain each man's means of livelihood, his profits, and his industry. It is their duty, by timely counsel, admonition, or reproof, to prevent the negligence, inactivity, or misfortunes of any individual, from adding to the burthens of the rest. They assess and collect the poll-tax,* house tax,† and land-tax, and many others, which, in their mode of collection and repartition, vary in almost every village, but which always depend on a scale of property. They manage the municipal funds, collected for the compensation of houses in which Turks have lodged, for the supplying of provender and provisions to troops, cavashes, or Turks, passing through the place; for the defraying of all expenses connected with the local administration, such as presents to governors, and to messengers

* The poll tax is farmed throughout Turkey by Carachji; but in many districts, and in all those where the municipal principle is active, the communities redeem themselves, by general valuation, for a certain term of years. This is called kissim, or fixed commutation, and the amount is raised by an increase of the assessed property tax.

† This is termed capniatico, literally "fumage." This is the hearth tax which has proved so obnoxious, as every assessed tax, at every period of our history, has proved in England; the natural consequence of assessors and collectors not being municipal officers.

bringing orders, expenses of envoys sent to different parts, and bribes for deliverance from forced labour, or from other illegal impositions. The funds for these purposes, which often amount to as much, or even more, than the government taxes,* are apportioned, when the accounts are made up, according to the estimate of property they have made for the distribution of government taxes.

There is scarcely a community of Turkey which is free from debt; an average of twenty villages in different parts of the country, gives me two pounds for each house. These debts have been contracted by the urgent necessities of the communities, who often, if they could not provide a supper for their unwelcome guests, would have had their houses burnt. The money was never procured at less than twenty per cent. The lenders were bankers of the pasha's, who thus monopolized the produce of the districts, or they were Turks, possessed of capital, which they advantageously employed in farming branches of the revenue, or in loans to Greeks—their quality of Mussulmans giving them facilities for enforcing payment, securing to them the protection of the governors, and enabling

* If governors received a regular salary, the troops regular pay, and if the Greeks were permitted to pay their contribution at the chief place of each province, the cause and pretence for the collection of this heavy tax would immediately disappear. The facilities this administration presents for reorganization are as numerous as its abuses, and meet one in every detail. In the district of Argyro Castro 2066 Greek houses paid a house tax of 11,000 piastres. The grand vizir proposed to them to allow them to pay the tax directly by their own elders to his treasurer, and asked them what sum they would advance him for that permission. The sum fixed and paid in 1831 by the registers, which I inspected, was 46,000!

them, besides the large interest for their money, to exact services of all kinds from the villages indebted to them. The management of these debts is, of course, a most intricate business, and perhaps the most difficult duty of the elders, on whose responsibility they are contracted, and who, when their troublesome and powerful creditors proceed to extremities, are the first to suffer in property and in person. The financial affairs of the communities are comprised under these three heads:—assessment, and collection of government taxes; collection, management, and disbursement of municipal taxes; and contracting and managing of municipal loans—all which were entirely confined to the elders.

Their civil functions are by no means so easily defined. They distribute lands left uncultivated, or which are left without an heir. In transactions between merchants and members of the communities for cheese, butter, wool, cotton, or any other produce, the contract is legalized by the signature of one or more of the elders, who thus become caution for their townsmen.* Purchases are only legal when wit-

* It is a principle of Arabic finance that the tax on each species of produce be demanded after its collection; but this principle is often violated. To favour the bankers, the people are often required to pay their taxes before the harvest, before the time of shearing, and to demand the tax on flocks before lambing time. (our Saxon Lammas). Since bankers have become securities to the Porte for the tribute of the provinces, they are the real proprietors of Turkey. The peasant is thus obliged to raise money at any price, and the banker furnishes him, on the payment of an exorbitant interest, until harvest time, and on condition of receiving his produce at from two to six per cent. below the current price. The perversion of this most admirable principle shows its superiority over our indirect system, *which anticipates production*. The banker,

nessed by them.* Together with the priests, they decide on all disputes, settle disputed water courses and successions, and maintain a species of government, which tends rather to prevent than to repress disorder, by exercising a paternal or patriarchal control over each individual of the community.

The union of all these powers, in the hands of the elders, leads to no abuse, while public opinion acts immediately and directly on the functionaries, and by merely postponing the day of entering the payment, realizes a large profit, depresses the value of the produce, restricts the market, and keeps the peasant in debt and in beggary, and subtracts, unperceived, a large portion from the prey of the pasha. This system has introduced the practice, now become general, of advancing money to the peasants two or three months before the harvest, on account of the produce of the land. The peasants not only engage to supply, at the stipulated price, the produce for which they have received the advanced sums, but bind themselves to furnish none of their produce to any other merchant. The existence of such a system, not to say its universality, proves the general honesty of the people. Never does it occur that the receipt of the money is denied, the payment resisted, or the produce of the contracting party sold to another, although they might by doing so obtain its full value. Yet these contracts are only verbal, or, if written and signed, they are signed only by the elders. A shepherd in the mountains once refused to sell me an oke of cheese for any price, because he had promised *all* his cheese to a certain merchant: afterwards he made me a present of it: when I gave him a bakshish, he said, "Recollect this is not in payment of the cheese."

* We find a similar custom among the Anglo Saxons. In Athelston's Laws, it is enacted that all purchases should be witnessed by the gerefas in the Folc-Gemot, otherwise they were not legal if the value exceeded twenty pennies. See Wilkin's Anglo-Saxon Laws. And among the Hindoos, "The most important testimony in cases brought before the Punchayet, was sought for in the register books of the Curnum, (second municipal officer of the Hindoo villages,) as no matter of barter or exchange could take place without his cognizance, and he was supposed to record all such transactions."—*Gleig's History of the B. E. in India, Vol. I. p. 36.*

while these owe their election solely to character, and their tenure of office to public confidence. The acceptance, as well as the conferring of the trust, elevates the character of both parties. The ambition of obtaining so honourable a distinction extends its effects to the whole community, while the equal right of conferring it leaves no individual the irritation of exclusion, no motive for exception to the general feelings, or for opposition to the common interests. The equal distribution of taxation, and the immutability* of the common burthens, made them look on private possessions as common gain, and on individual poverty and negligence as common misfortunes.

Thus were these communities linked together by the strongest ties of interest, opinion, and mutual responsibility: each man was a guarantee for his neighbour's obligations, a security for his person, and consequently a censor on his condition and morals. Man did not lose his individuality, for the character of the individual extended to the mass, while the prosperity of the whole, under the direct system of taxation, benefited each individual. They rejoiced in each other's prosperity, bewailed each other's misfortunes; they reprov'd the idle, lest he should be a charge to the rest; they watched the fugitive, lest his debts should be thrown on the community; they repressed the robber, not to suffer in his stead; and were happy when the submissive were

* It is also a maxim of the Arabs, that the expenditure of the state be adjusted to the legal and fixed revenue, not that the revenue should be accommodated to the expenditure; but at intervals new assessments were made.

not punished for the rebellious, and when the living had not to pay for the dead.

This forced guarantee-ship resembles the voluntary associations of the Anglo-Saxons, termed *gild-šcipes*, in which the members were bound to protect each other, and were rendered by law responsible for each other. In the distribution of the were, or price of blood, in the territorial arrangements of tythings, when the members of each community were bound by the law of frankpledge for each others obedience to justice, we may trace the principle of responsibility, and consequently of control exercised by every body, whether a family, or an association, or a community, over its members. Where the gild paid a portion of the penalty incurred by a member, it would carefully scrutinize character before admission, and watch it afterwards.* If men paid also a portion of the penalties that might be incurred by their relatives under a code by which every crime had its fixed price, they had a right to exercise censorship over those relatives; and if the community was bound for its members, every man had an interest to watch over his neighbour's conduct. What coincidence can be more striking than this guarantee-ship of man for man, and how irresistible must have been its effect on national character !

* In Russia there are companies of free labourers termed *artels*. The *artel* elects a chief, and takes his name. The numbers run from 20 to 60. When a candidate offers himself for admission, his character is enquired into, and he is only admitted on its proving good, and on his furnishing caution to some specified amount; the *artel* then becomes responsible for losses occasioned and theft committed by him. Their character is deservedly high.

CHAPTER III.

AMONGST the functions of the elders, I have not enumerated the office of arbitrator or judge, for those more particularly belong to the priest. At Constantinople the chiefs of the different religions are rendered responsible for their followers, and are invested with civil authority over them. In the provinces, the bishop is judge of the Christians: by his berat his judgment is final in matters of marriage and divorce.* In secular matters they are guided by the Pandects.†

* Though the Turks do not recognize any judicial authority save that of the Mussulman *cadi*, imperial firmans, granted to several districts, expressly forbid all interference with decisions which have been given by any arbitrators whatever, chosen by mutual consent of the parties.

† The Koran and the *Sooni*, though they are the established law throughout Turkey, are not the law in operation among the *rayas*, unless when they put themselves within its sphere by transactions with Turks, which involves obligations and duties, and these are very few, as Mussulmans and *rayas* cannot be mutually trustees, guardians, &c. The Turkish law necessarily interferes only in cases of public violence; such precisely was the state of the law in India under the Mahometans, where the interference of the Mussulman courts was only in the case of civil and correctional police, or where the interest of Hindoos and Mussulmans were complicated. It is the British administration which has given the Mussulman code the force of law.

In the small communities, to the consideration of which I wish strictly to confine myself, the priest is the judge in matters which are not of sufficient importance to be carried before the bishop. The priest is consequently an important personage, is associated with the elders in their miniature administrations, and deserves particular notice.

The priest differs in scarcely any respect from the other members of the community; the authority of the office depends greatly on the merit of the man; he receives but a small fee for certain religious ceremonies, and for marriages, burials, and baptisms. He cultivates his ground with his own hands, or follows some mechanical art; he is, or may be, a married man, and is bound to no interest of caste, or system opposed to the interest of his community. He purchases his ordination. This, however little it might be supposed so at first sight, is no disparagement to his worthiness. In a country where a whole community is exercising a constant and severe censorship on each man's conduct, the possession of wealth is a proof of industry, activity, frugality, and intelligence; and the means of purchasing ordination, if it proves any thing, would less prove corruption in the system, than character and capacity in the individual. I wish I could say as much for the higher orders of the hierarchy, who owe their nomination to purchase; but whenever you ascend in Turkey you come in contact with the corrupting influence of the Turkish government.

The municipal officers consist then of elders—administrators elected by the freest suffrage; and of priests—arbitrators, bound to no system, indebted to

no favour ; not indeed elected by the people, but liable to be rejected if they are found to be, or if they are thought to be, unworthy.

The municipal officers are generally, indeed I may say almost universally, either the wealthiest, or among the wealthiest, inhabitants of the place. Solon's maxims of conferring the magistracies on the rich, by the election of the poor, was here a practice, but not a law ; had it been a law, probably the practice would long ere now have disappeared, or at least have ceased to be beneficial. Happily, the Turks never allowed their good intentions to be expressed by legislative enactments. The firmans, which breathe the greatest benevolence, confine themselves to indicating wrongs or injuries, or taxes, which are not to be inflicted on the rayas.

The elders are faithful stewards, and intelligent administrators. They stand between poverty and want, between weakness and oppression, and are beloved as common fathers. Exceptions to this rule, which I am far from pretending to deny, my own inquiries would make me suppose few in number, (I allude exclusively to the country villages,) and in such cases the exception is more easily remarked than the rule. Evil is so much more readily observed and recorded than good ; men are so much more inclined to speak of injuries than of benefits ; the unfortunate are so prone to suspicion, — that the praises I have heard bestowed by the peasants on their elders have, I freely confess, weighed more with me than the accusations I have heard sometimes urged against them.

I have never seen any thing in the social institu-

tions of any country capable of giving an idea of the strict coincidence of character and unity of action which these communities receive from their mode of government. The character of the individual is merged in that of the race which, adapting itself to the necessities and obligations it has to meet, concentrates itself, repels all foreign admixture, and while it presents the external characters of tameness and submission, provides for every exaction with active industry and self-denying frugality.*

* I shall presently point out the remarkable resemblance between the municipalities of India, and those of Arabia and Turkey; but I cannot resist anticipating that comparison by extracting from Mr. Greig's History of British India, as descriptive of the Hindoo national character, which he ascribes solely to the municipal institutions. It must be borne in mind, however, that he speaks of a people destitute of literature, of any political power or prospects, of the right of property, depressed by caste and superstition, and among whom the municipalities exist now only in form and name.

“Under these simple, we had almost said patriarchal arrangements, the natives of Hindoostan seem to have lived from the earliest, down, comparatively speaking, to late times—if not free from the troubles and annoyances to which men in all conditions of society are more or less subject, still in the full enjoyment, each individual, of his property, and of a very considerable share of personal liberty.

“Leave him in possession of the farm, which his forefathers owned, and preserve entire the institutions to which he had from infancy been accustomed, and the simple Hindoo would give himself no concern whatever as to the intrigues and cabals which took place at the capital. Dynasties might displace one another; revolutions might recur; and the persons of his sovereigns might change every day; but so long as his own little society remained undisturbed, all other contingencies were to him subjects scarcely of speculation. To this, indeed, more than to any other cause, is to be ascribed the facility with which one conqueror after another has overrun different parts of India; which submitted, not so much because its inhabitants were wanting in courage, as because to the great majority among them

These institutions alone, under such varying circumstances, could have preserved to the Greeks their astonishing uniformity of character, language, and it signified nothing by whom the reins of the supreme government were held. A third consequence of the village system has been one which men will naturally regard as advantageous or the reverse, according to the opinions which they hold, touching certain abstract points into which it is not necessary to enter here. Perhaps there are not to be found on the face of the earth, a race of human beings whose attachment to their native place, will bear a comparison with that of the Hindoos. There are no privations which the Hindoo will hesitate to bear, rather than voluntarily abandon the spot where he was born; and if continued oppression drive him forth, he will return to it again after long years of exile with fresh fondness. No doubt, this excessive partiality to place, is not without its effect in producing the extreme submissiveness of character, which belongs to the native of India. The consequence of all this has been to create among the Hindoos, a marked peculiarity of national character, into which neither the lapse of ages, nor an intimate communication with other tribes, have succeeded in introducing any material innovation."

In every line of this eloquent picture of the Hindoos, may be traced their resemblance to the raya, but that resemblance unfortunately does not rest here. The Turkish code *not enforced* absolutely on the raya of Turkey, *is enforced* on the Hindoo! The commercial policy of the Company has had, but to a far greater extent, the precise effect of the influence of the Armenian sarafs in Turkey, that of keeping the peasant in debt, and deteriorating the value of the produce of the soil. Perhaps even the Turks encamped in Europe, and the English quartered in Asia, may not appear to the natives very dissimilar. The contemptuous manner with which a Turk receives and treats the most venerable raya is sufficiently known to be a chief cause of the hatred against them, whilst the old Turkish canon prescribes a very different etiquette. "The foolish pride of the English, absolutely leads them to set at nought the injunctions of their own government. The Tusceldars, for instance, ought, by an order in council, to have chairs offered them in the presence of their European superiors, &c."—See *Heber's Journal*, vol. ii. p. 372.

Once hunting with a Turkish Bey, he pointed out to me a Greek,

creed, and produced such invariable submission to the Turkish dominion, when the oppressors, infinitely outnumbered by the oppressed, were so frequently exposed to be cut off in detail, had the more daring arms not been restrained by the opinion and the responsibility of the communities to which they belonged. Men, penned in this extraordinary manner over the face of a country, attached to their pens by affection no less than by the vigilance of their comrades, and the impossibility of their being received into stranger flocks, were not likely to give inconvenience to their masters. Before I understood the secret workings of the system, I have often been exceedingly surprised to see a single Turk exercising the most exasperating tyranny over a village, in the midst of which, all alone, he smoked his pipe in perfect indifference, without an attempt being made upon his person, and without a single individual's endeavouring to fly from his exactions, or resist his violence.* The difficulty was explained when I knew

whom he was much attached to for his skill in horse flesh. I found the man a classical scholar, which was surprising, as he was old. I was glad to express to his master my satisfaction and surprise. The old huntsman, with a reproachful look said to me afterwards, " You have spoilt my favour ; my master is fond of hunting but not of study." Bishop Heber, after interesting us in the personal history and literary acquirements of the Raya of Tanjore, observes, " He is much respected by the English officers in his neighbourhood, as a good judge of a horse and a cool shot at a tiger!"

III

* This must not be taken as descriptive of the general state of the country ; in no part of Europe have I seen the peasantry in the enjoyment of so much comfort as I have often observed among the rayas of Roumelie ; and here I allude to the state of the southern districts during the Greek revolution.

that every individual was surety for his neighbour, that exactions were defrayed from the common stock, and that all the inhabitants of the village were at once watched and watching, and gaolers to themselves. It happens when, as they say, "oppression has reached the bone," that a village disperses entirely in a night, and next morning not a soul is found to suffer for the fugitives.*

It is not in Turkey alone that Greeks are to be found; emigrations of them have taken place at various periods to other countries, both in considerable numbers and in small bodies. They are to be found

* When I was travelling in Chaldidice of Macedonia, in the autumn of 1830, two of the privileged villages, formerly members of a sort of federal community, dispersed in this way during the night. The inhabitants, before they resolve on such a step, must be driven to despair. If they are caught, they are beaten, pillaged, thrown into prison, or reduced, not to a nominal but to real slavery, and where they can find refuge, the other communities fear to receive them; for if discovered, not only the obligations they may have to their own communities are exacted from those who secrete them, but the very suspicion subjects the village suspected of secreting fugitives, to vexatious visitations from cavashes, who are not guests easy to support, and who "sit" till they have obtained their object, or till they have eaten up the fowls and lambs, and drunk all the raki of the villages.

No hindrance is put to the departure of any man, who leaves relatives or property as security for his re-appearance. Those who cannot procure personal bail, are only allowed to emigrate on obtaining security for the payment, by the masters whom they go to serve, of a yearly sum to the community, towards the karatch, if the village poll-tax is paid by composition, and towards other burdens according to the arrangements made with the elders; if they retain property from which profit accrues, not otherwise, those not possessed of property, where the karatch is not levied by composition, may depart freely.

in Tartary, in the steppes of the Kouban, in the Crimea, in Transylvania, in Hungary, in Sardinia and Corsica, Apulia and Sicily. The period of their separation from the parent-stock has seldom been so remote as its subjugation by the Turks. Yet, almost universally in these settlements the Greek character has lost its distinguishing features, above all, its activity and intelligence. Their language has become often unintelligible; they have generally renounced the tenets of the Greek church, and they seem morally and intellectually far below the level of the rayas of Turkey. Yet these settlements are in civilized countries, whose governments relieve the ignorant peasant from all responsibility, from all trouble or fatigue in the collection of his taxes, and the administration of his affairs. It is the tax-gatherer and police-officer that have effaced the type of nationality—it is the absence of the humanizing and instructive experience of the institutions I have been describing, that has exposed them to the corruption of their grammar and their creed. Have these colonists suffered more for that creed which they have abandoned, than the rayas of Turkey for that which they have preserved? Is the hatred of a Greek less for the faith of Rome than for that of Mecca? Are the worldly advantages of proselytism greater in Italy than in Turkey? In Italy the advantage is negative; escape from the persecution of the prevailing bigotry. In Turkey it is translation from the class of oppressed to that of oppressor—it is elevation from the state of serf to that of noble. Without these allurements the Greeks of Italy have become Catholics; and with them all the

Greeks of Turkey remain Christians. Even the criminals at the stake will scorn to purchase, not life alone, but life and favour, by a change of name.*

It is not the influence of the priesthood, or even of religion, that produces this firm adherence to their creed; it is respect for the opinions of the little community, over which the strong affections of each individual are spread. It is not devotion to a heartless religion of ceremonies and witchcraft that inspires, and has inspired, a whole nation, for centuries, with a martyr's endurance of persecution, and a stoic's contempt for worldly allurements; it is the moral authority—it is the support of fellowship and friendship, that results from the close pressure of man and man, and the strong linking of interests, and opinions, and affections, under the municipal bond; so that the good opinion of the fraternity in which each has been brought up is to every man more than faith or law.†

* Christians and Turks are distinguished by their names as well as their costume; and inferior sort of proselytism is admitted in Turkey by merely taking a Turkish name, without the performance of any ceremony.

† This moral bond is the only law of the Turkish raya—not merely in civil cases, but also in criminal, or at least in the prevention of crimes; punishment confounds the guilty and the innocent; it therefore loses its preventative terrors. Since the revolution the Greek race has suffered cruelly, but not so the other tribes. I never heard of a Jew being executed. A late traveller observes, he never heard of a Bulgarian being executed: nor have I. There are no prisons overflowing with debtors, vagrants and felons; indeed, prisons can scarcely be said to exist. Where punishment does take place, its indiscriminateness takes from it all the shame, and even gives it the character of martyrdom; so much so, that the axe is engraved as a proud distinction on the tomb of a decapitated man. The follow-

Certainly the most striking feature of Turkey is the adherence of the various populations of rayas, who are oppressed merely on account of religion, to their particular creeds; they have remained for ages unamalgamated with the ruling class, and are at the present day in nearly the same position as at the period of their subjugation. The difficulty of accounting for such a state has accredited the supposition that some conservative principle in the Turkish government keeps all things stationary. But the facts will neither bear the construction, nor the explanation gratuitously invented, to account for the supposed difficulty.

ing correct description of the bagnio of Constantinople will show the mild spirit of the Turkish code, and will support my position, that public law and penal codes have nothing to do with the morality of the Turkish raya. "Nothing could exceed my surprise, I may say disappointment, for I had strung my nerves for a trial on going into the bagnio, to find it by no means a horrible place, but a very quiet, orderly conducted prison. The galley slaves of Toulon, I positively assert, are one hundred times worse off than the inmates of the bagnio. The only point of resemblance is in their food, equally bad in each, consisting of a kind of hog-wash, sufficiently nutritious to keep the bones covered: in all other respects they differ. The galley slaves are chained in gangs—the bagnioes in pairs. The former must sleep on boards, the latter may sleep on beds. In Toulon dock-yard no horses or steam are employed in order that the culprits may have the harder work. In Constantinople arsenal the number of sailors on pay, whether the fleet be on commission or not, is so great, that the convicts have scarcely any thing to do. The former have not the advantage of religion—within the precincts of the bagnio are a mosque, a Greek church, and a synagogue. In Toulon, there are four or five thousand galley slaves—in the bagnio the number rarely amounts to one hundred! for a city containing about half a million of souls, and the chief rogues of the empire."

—*Slade's Travels in Turkey*, vol. i. p. 105.

The Jews and gipseys have remained stationary in Europe as well as in Turkey; the other populations that have undergone little or no change are the Greeks, the Armenians, the Servians, and a portion of the Bulgarians. The populations that have been amalgamated with the Turks are the majority of the Albanians, a third of the Bosniacs, and a portion of the other Slavonic tribes.

The municipal system is common to the Greeks, Armenians, and that portion of the Bulgarians who are still Christians. The Albanians and the Slavonians have not possessed these institutions, but have ever been subject to odjacks and knezes, military chiefs.

The portion of the Bulgarians that have conformed to Islamism occupied the mountainous and remoter parts of the country.* The portion that maintained their creed was that inhabiting the plains of Mace-

* There are two principal tribes of Bulgarian Mahometans. The Tulcmans, who occupy the mountainous regions of Rhodope, above Jenidge and Cavalla, and the Pomac, whose range extends northward to the Danube, and the borders of Servia. These Mussulmans preserve their Bulgarian language, national manners, and industry. They are exceedingly jealous of the Turks, and never suffer an armed force to penetrate into their mountains. They have the reputation of brave soldiers, and excellent horsemen; but they are not compelled, like the Albanians, by the sterility of their mountains, to seek their bread by military service. I have received hospitality from them, and a finer set of men I have never seen. They have zealously entered the new organization, though as yet they have furnished but inconsiderable numbers. The grand vizir, in his colossal schemes of military organization, reckoned on disciplining forty or fifty thousand of them. These Mussulmans are perfectly distinct from the Juruks, Coniars and Evladi Fatihans, who are Turks.

donia, Epirus, Bulgaria, and Thrace, in the vicinity of Monastir, Salonik, Joannina, Nyssa, Sofia, Philippolis, Adrianople, and Constantinople itself, and consequently subject to overwhelming power and unceasing oppression; but amongst them the communal system originated, as I have above described, in the total inability to resist the Turkish sway—in the annihilation of military power and native aristocracy, so that they were left no motive but character in the selection of stewards for the collection of their taxes and the management of their affairs. In the stronger positions, which longer resisted the Turkish arms, little military chiefs maintained their ground and authority; the strong concentration of interest and opinion of the communal system was not organized, and when obliged to submit, the chiefs bargained for exclusive privileges; their capricious favour, not the fixed opinion of the community, became therefore the rule of right, and the spring of action; so that, notwithstanding the immunity from persecution and oppression afforded them by their remoteness and their mountains, they conformed to the dominant creed, as I have heard it stated by themselves, to avoid the invidious poll-tax, and evidently with the view of favouring the ambition of their leaders, who thus obtained access to the military career, with chances of advancement and plunder in the camp, and authority at home.

Amongst the Albanians, Ghegs, Bosnians, and Slavons, to the north and west, the same facility of conversion is observable, precisely in proportion to the strength of the country, and the lightness of oppression. Amongst these races, men, instead of co-

alescing, seem to fly each other; no villages are to be seen huddled together, but insulated *sois* or races have perched their little towers of defence among the rocks, and scattered them over the mountains. The Merdites alone enjoy a species of autonomy; also do they retain their creed. In fact, through all the modifications of climate, position, and race, the original creed co-exists with the autonomic institutions; and in the absence of these Islamism is found. The next to impregnable fortresses of Colonias, Dibre, &c., where military chiefs held their ground, have readily admitted the supremacy of the crescent; the plains of Thrace, devoured by locusts of functionaries, trodden down by the unceasing passage of fanatic hordes, where distinctions among the tributaries were swept away, still cling to the cross.*

* I believe the case is much stronger than I have here put it. The first conversions to Islamism, took place among the tribes who have longest persevered in their creed, while those that have subsequently conformed, resisted it at first with a spirit of patriotism and chivalry as well as of fanaticism. The descendants of the warriors of Scander Beg and of the defenders of Scodra, are now Musselmans; while many of the predecessors of the humble raya, and even of the submissive monks, both now unflinching Christians, readily embraced Mahometanism at its first appearance. But the Christian writers have generally disguised and concealed the fact. "In genus mortalium turba et ipsorum qui in religiosis claustris degunt ad Mahometanismum delabitur."—*Vivaldus ap. Reland Præfet.*

CHAPTER IV.

IN the cities, however, the municipalities show themselves under a different aspect. The primates are looked upon as worse than the Turkish governors, and the system itself serves only to add Greek ingenuity to Turkish despotism. The rich and powerful intrigue for the office of primate; the Turks interfere with the nomination; amongst the body of the people a deep feeling and sense of wrong and oppression is kept ever alive by the constant agitation of the matter, and every large community is split into numberless factions, at enmity with each other.

This contrast between the towns and villages, between the character of the urban and rural Greeks, I have observed with painful anxiety; nor did it seem to me possible to resist the conclusion, that the municipal organization was inapplicable to large communities. It was not till after these pages were written, that I learnt from a Mussulman, lately holding a high diplomatic situation in this country, that this supposed inapplicability to large communities was wholly without foundation; because city taxation is not direct. Caratch, which is farmed—customs, droits—reunis, or duties on the entrance of articles of consumption at the gates, and

taxes on sales and shops, raised by government agents, replace the direct tribute. I have already shown that the utility and bond of the municipalities was the assessment and collection of the revenue; the perversion of those bodies, when they had no such functions to perform, no such responsibility to support, is a corroboration of the maxim I had laid down when I thought the state of the larger cities militated against, instead of supporting, my opinion.

I come now to the consideration of their effect on portions of the country that have been for a while neglected by the Turkish government, or which, under the protection of Mahometan religious institutions, have been subtracted from the control of the civil authorities, and abandoned to their own management. Here we have effects at once tangible and apparent, which bring into evidence the influences which escape observation in the mass of the nation. Unlike the old commercial towns, the recently created communities are objects of investigation at once interesting and gratifying, with no complications of interests and circumstances to mislead the judgment. The causes of their rise may be traced most satisfactorily to their social constitution, and can be attributed to nothing else; and in their decline, when they have declined, may be distinguished the excellence of the municipal form of administration by the evils that have immediately followed its corruption.

Whenever the most unpromising spot has been neglected, it has made rapid progress; in ascertaining how far each has been emancipated, we have grounds for calculating the progress it has made. Those por-

tions of Turkey that have acquired wealth, strength, and celebrity, have sprung up thus at a distance from, and uncontrolled by the Turkish authority; even, as in the middle ages, the municipal cities and republics burst forth in some remote corner, or on hitherto neglected shores, into splendid contrast with the surrounding barbarism; but as the great powers extended their limits, these states were drawn within the sphere of political centralization, or they were diverted by the slippery circumstances of the times, from commercial and manufacturing to political purposes: still their rise, as their fall, bears testimony to the simple but energetic organization under which they flourished, and to which alone their prosperity can be attributed. Do the antecedent pages of history—does the map of the Mediterranean, indicate any peculiarly happy combinations that could promise to Amalphi, Montpellier, Barcelona, Ancona,—places which had no power to make themselves respected—no anterior connexion or habits of business, which are not in the passage of commerce—not blessed with local fertility, or celebrated for manufactures,—the prosperity that dazzles by its rise, but has not instructed by its decay; tenantless structures, princely relics of departed wealth, record, in their eloquent stillness, the perils of commercial legislation.

Ambelakia is the name of a spot overlooking the vale of Tempe, whose history is the most perfect and striking illustration of the operation of similar causes in Turkey. This extraordinary association, after a brilliant existence of twenty years, was dissolved in consequence of complicated legal proceedings, which it had no competent court to decide,

and in which the ruling body was an interested party. For several years, at an enormous expense, they carried the proceedings from court to court, having no natural tribunal—mendicating decisions, and rejecting them when obtained. The municipal body, which was also the commercial firm, closed its doors to popular election and its books to public inspection; but there was neither prescription nor charters to screen and support its injustice. A recasting of the society took place, but at that period the failure of the Vienna bank, where their funds were deposited, the evil effects of the protracted litigation, and much more than these, the revolution in commerce that English cotton yarn was beginning to effect, conspired with political troubles for its ruin. Ambelakia nevertheless remains an example of what can be effected in Turkey, not by a reform of government principles, but only by the subtraction of a piece of ground from its immediate practical abuses.

This was perhaps the spot, amid all the rich recollections of Thessaly, which I visited with the greatest interest; its commerce, its activity, and its population have disappeared, but its palaces still overlook the Peneus and the Vale of Tempe, to surprise the traveller, and to convince him of the reality of a story which appears almost fabulous. I extract from Beaujourn's "Tableau du Commerce de la Grèce," the details he has preserved respecting it, in as far as they were confirmed to me by the information I obtained on the spot.

“ Ambelakia, by its activity, appears rather a borough of Holland than a village of Turkey. This

village spreads, by its industry, movement, and life, over the surrounding country, and gives birth to an immense commerce, which unites Germany to Greece by a thousand threads. Its population has trebled in fifteen years, and amounts at present (1798) to four thousand, who live in their manufactories like swarms of bees in their hives. In this village are unknown both the vices and cares engendered by idleness; the hearts of the Ambelakiots are pure and their faces serene; the slavery which blasts the plains watered by the Peneus, and stretching at their feet, has never ascended the sides of Pelion; (Ossa;) and they govern themselves, like their ancestors, by their protoyeros, (primates, elders,) and their own magistrates. Twice the Mussulmen of Larissa attempted to scale their rocks, and twice were they repulsed by hands which dropped the shuttle to seize the musket.

“Every arm, even those of the children, is employed in the factories; whilst the men dye the cotton, the women prepare and spin it. There are twenty-four factories, in which yearly two thousand, five hundred bales of cotton yarn, of one hundred okes each, were dyed (6138 cwts.) This yarn found its way into Germany, and was disposed of at Buda, Vienna, Leipsic, Dresden, Anspach, and Bareuth. The Ambelakiot merchants had houses of their own in all these places. These houses belonged to distinct associations at Ambelakia. The competition thus established, reduced very considerably the common profits; they proposed therefore to unite themselves under one central commercial administration.*

* This competition was of a peculiar character; these houses were agents of one factory, and the competition between the agents did

Twenty years ago this plan was suggested, and in a year afterwards it was carried into execution. The lowest shares in this joint-stock company were five thousand piastres, (between 600*l.* and 700*l.*) and the highest were restricted to twenty thousand, that the capitalists might not swallow up all the profits. The workmen subscribed their little profits, and uniting in societies, purchased single shares; and besides their capital, their labour was reckoned in the general amount; they received their share of the profits accordingly, and abundance was soon spread through the whole community. The dividends were at first restricted to ten per cent. and the surplus profit was applied to the augmenting of the capital; which in two years was raised from 600,000 to 1,000,000 piastres (120,000*l.*)

“ Three directors, under an assumed firm, managed the affairs of the company; but the signature was also confided to three associates at Vienna, whence the returns were made. These two firms of Ambe-lakia and Vienna had their correspondents at Peste, Trieste, Leipsic, Salonique, Constantinople, and Smyrna, to receive their own staple, effect the returns, and to extend the market for the cotton yarn of Greece. An important part of their trust was to circulate the funds realized, from hand to hand, and

not allow the produce of the factory its fair advantages against other factories. The factories had a common administration at home, and it sent its goods to market at its own expense and risk—combining the profits of merchant, broker, and manufacturer; as it was carried on by an association of capital and labour which equalized the profits so much that the poorest could wait for a return, to reap the benefits of the speculation as well as receive the wages of his labour.

from place to place, according to their own circumstances, necessities, and the rates of exchange."

Thus the company secured to itself both the profits of the speculation and the profit of the banker, which was exceedingly increased by the command and choice which these two capacities gave of time, market, and speculation. When the exchange was favourable, they remitted specie; when unfavourable, they remitted goods; or they speculated on Salonique, Constantinople, or Smyrna, by purchase of bills, or by the transmission of German goods, according to the fluctuations and demands of the different markets, which their extensive relations put them immediately in possession of, and the rapid turning of so large a capital gave them always the means of profiting by.

"Never was a society established upon such economical principles, and never were fewer hands employed for the transaction of such a mass of business. To concentrate all the profits at Ambelakia, the correspondents were all Ambelakiots; and to divide the profits more equally amongst them, they were obliged to return to Ambelakia after three years' service, and they had then to serve one year at home to imbibe afresh the mercantile principles of the company.

"The greatest harmony long reigned in the association; the directors were disinterested, the correspondents zealous, and the workmen docile and laborious. The company's profits increased every day on a capital which had rapidly become immense; each investment realized a profit of from sixty to one hundred per cent.; all which was distributed, in just

proportions, to capitalists and workmen, according to capital and industry. The shares had increased ten-fold."

The disturbances and distresses which succeeded to this period of unrivalled prosperity, are attributed by Beaujour, with that provoking vagueness that substitutes epithets for causes, to the "surabondance de richesse," to "assemblées tumultueuses," to the workmen's quitting the shuttle for the pen, to the exactions of the rich, and to the insubordination of the inferior, but still wealthy orders. I believe the causes of their disunion, with all the evils that ensued, and the subsequent ruin of Ambelakia, to have been,—first, the too great extension of the municipal body, its consequent loss of activity and controul, and the evasion of responsibility by the managers;—and secondly, the absence of judicial authority, to settle in their origin disputes and litigated interests, which in the absence of law could only be decided by the violence of faction. That the exclusion of the workmen from a due influence in the administration, and share in the profits, was the real cause of the breaking up of the commercial association, is established by the fact of the workmen separating themselves, immediately afterwards, into as many small societies as there were associations of workmen possessed of shares in the joint stock. As I have already stated, a litigated question, depending on the violation of one of their bye-laws, separated the whole community into two factions. The question at issue was at length very unsatisfactorily terminated at Vienna, after ruining the harmony of the community, and occasioning to both parties enormous losses.

Ambelakia for ten years has been deserted: its commerce has been altogether extinguished: but it would be very unjust to attribute its fall to its internal troubles; these, and its losses, might soon have been repaired, had their industry not been outstripped by that of Manchester. They are very indignant at the phantoms of tumult, luxury, and corruption, which Beaujours has conjured up to account for an event so evidently attributable to the causes above adduced. The common disasters of Turkey have reduced, within that period, to a state of as complete desolation the other flourishing townships of Magnesia, Pelion, Ossa, and Olympus. Even on the opposite heights of Olympus, across the Vale of Tempe, Rapsani, from a thousand wealthy houses, which ten years ago it possessed, is now, without being guilty of either luxury or tumult, reduced to ten widowed hearths.

To give a just idea of the prosperity of Ambelakia, it would be necessary to describe the poverty and depression of the surrounding country, because it is by the contrast alone, of the state from which it had emerged, and the evils it had escaped, that the energies and institutions which caused its prosperity can be duly appreciated. Here were to be seen springing again, "grand and liberal ideas, on a soil devoted for twenty centuries to slavery; here the ancient Greek character arose, in its early energy, amidst the torrents and caverns of Pelion, (Ossa;) and, to say all in a word, here were all the talents and virtues of ancient Greece, born again in a corner of modern Turkey."

Had an old commercial emporium, had a conveniently situated sea-port, or a provincial chief town,

possessing capital, connexions, and influence, extended thus rapidly its commerce and prosperity, it would have been cited, and justly so, as a proof of the good administration which ruled it. What then shall we say of the administration that has thus elevated an unknown, a weak, and insignificant hamlet, that has not a single field in its vicinity, that had no local industry, that had no commercial connexion, no advantage of position, was in the vicinity of no manufacturing movement, was on the track of no transit commerce, was not situated either on a navigable river or on the sea, had no harbour even in its vicinity, and was accessible by no road save a goat's path among precipices? With all these local disadvantages, it possessed no local advantage whatever over the thousand other villages of Thessaly; neither did its industry receive an impulse from new discoveries, or secrets of chemistry, or combination of mechanical powers. It supplied industrious Germany, not by the perfection of its jennies, but by the industry of its spindle and distaff. It taught Montpellier the art of dyeing, not from experimental chairs, but because dyeing was with it a domestic and culinary operation, subject to daily observation in every kitchen; and by the simplicity and honesty, not the science of its system, it reads a lesson to commercial associations, and holds up an example unparalleled in the commercial history of Europe, of a joint stock and labour company, ably and economically and successfully administered, in which the interests of industry and capital were long equally represented. Yet the system of administration with which all this is connected, is common to the thousand hamlets of

Thessaly that have not emerged from their insignificance; but Ambelakia for twenty years was left alone. In this short sentence lies the secret of its prosperity, and the promise of the regeneration both of Turkey and Greece.

The marine of Greece has been for ten years the object of so much inquiry, that I need not enter into any detail respecting it. Those who have gone along with me in tracing the progress of these various communities to their municipal institutions, will see the agency of similar causes in the six hundred vessels, of three hundred tons and upwards, which the maritime communities of Galaxidi, Missolonghi, Cranidi, Spezzia, Hydra, Psara, Cassos, Santorin, &c. possessed,—all spots out of the way of man and of commerce; while all the great emporiums of trade in the Levant together did not possess a dozen native Greek vessels of the same class. They will even, perhaps, find in these institutions the explanation of the origin and spring of prosperity and activity, which have so generally been considered unintelligible and inexplicable.

Amongst these communities, the principle of association was carried from their rocks on board their vessels. The ship's company were all owners in the vessel, or sharers in the cargo; labour and capital were equally calculated, and one common interest guided the whole body.* The moral controul, which

* Wherever the same system of co-partnership has existed, the same surprising energy, enterprize, and intelligence have been the result. It is indeed with amazement, mingled with scepticism, that we trace the commercial grandeur of the republics of Italy; but that scepticism may disappear, when we perceive in them the same

was the enlivening spirit of the municipalities, followed them in their speculations afloat; a proof of which may be found in this, that their money, and other transactions, were carried on only by verbal agreement and simple entries. Bonds, and even receipts, were unknown, yet they had, like the Ambelakiots, neither judge nor law of established authority. What is more singular still is, that a bankruptcy did

principle, at least in their earliest days, which we see in active operation, and producing the same wonderful results, at the present moment. The maritime islands of Greece are not solitary witnesses; the whale-men of Nantucket, inhabiting an island too, with a municipal government, and carrying afloat the subdivisions of interests, as the Greeks have done, have extorted the following tribute from the eloquence of Burke, who observed them from a distance, but saw not the internal springs by which they are put in motion:—“Look at the manner in which this New England people carry on the whale fishery. While we follow them among the trembling mountains of ice, and behold them penetrating into the deepest frozen recesses of Hudson’s and Davis’ Straits; while we are looking for them beneath the Arctic circle, we hear that they have pierced into the opposite region of polar cold—that they are at the antipodes, and engaged under the frozen serpent of the South. Falkland Island, which seemed too remote and too romantic an object for the grasp of national ambition, is but a stage and resting-place for their victorious industry. Nor is the equinoxial heat more discouraging to them than the accumulated winter of both poles. We learn, that while some of them draw the line, or strike the harpoon, on the coast of Africa, others run the longitude, and pursue their gigantic game along the coasts of Brazil. No sea but what is vexed with their fisheries—no climate that is not witness to their toils. Neither the perseverance of Holland, nor the activity of France, nor the dexterous and firm sagacity of English enterprise, ever carried this most perilous mode of hardy industry to the extent to which it has been pursued by this recent people—a people who are still in the gristle, and not hardened into manhood.”—*Burke’s Speech on American affairs.* 1774.

not, I believe, once occur before the breaking out of the revolution. The Hydriots have obtained, and merited too, the character of turbulence, yet have we looked narrowly at the causes of their turbulence, have we made allowance for the difficulties of their situation, have we appreciated the qualities they possess? Our idea of insubordination implies the existence of a government; but in Greece no government ever existed, save the demoralizing and anti-national sway of Capo d'Istrias; during which, though their means of existence were cut off, these turbulent islanders maintained peace among themselves; and though they were the focus of the opposition, they conducted that opposition with moderation, restrained the violence of their ruder associates, and sought to influence the government only by creating and directing public opinion.

I am not advocating the cause of the Hydriots, but showing how far the influence of the municipal institutions can extend: it suffices for my object to point to the prosperity of the islands before the revolution, and the dispositions of the people before the circumstances of the revolution disturbed all previous calculations. I will refer to the remarks of an intelligent observer of the Levant, for a just and spirited description of their character, before it was steeled and perverted by the war of extermination in which the naval islands played so important a part. "The Hydriot sailors are sedate, well dressed, well bred, shrewdly informed, and speculative. They seem to form a class in the orders of mankind which has no existence amongst us. By their voyages they acquire a liberality of idea which we expect only among gentlemen,

while in their domestic circumstances their conduct is suitable to their station.”* They were a class of men differing from the classes into which our population is divided, but they perfectly resembled those who live under like institutions, and who have slipped from Turkish anarchy without falling under European custom-houses. They had, too, one advantage over their compatriots, that of seeing the towns and manners of many men. One custom prevalent among this tribe of Albanians, for the Hydriots are Albanians, not Greeks, and few of the women can even speak Greek, is so expressive of the family and social affections that are such distinguishing characteristics of men living under municipal institutions, that I cannot refrain from mentioning it. Brothers make up portions for their sisters, and get husbands for them before they think of marrying themselves.†

The southern portion of Pelion stretches into a rocky and barren promontory, which turning to the west, encircles two thirds of the Gulf of Volo, and terminates in the headland of Trichery. This promontory and the mountain at its base are occupied by

* Galt. p. 379.

† In some parts of Scotland a feeling of the same kind exists, and is sometimes acted on, but is far from producing a practice to be compared with that of Hydra. Yet this custom is not to be traced among the rude people who have colonized Hydra; we are not accustomed to attribute in England to the speculations of commerce, to increase of wealth and prosperity, the simple and moral feeling which would introduce such a custom among sailors, while it was unknown to the shepherds and husbandmen from whom those sailors were derived. This is one of those facts which meet us at every step at Turkey, which are as much in contradiction with many of our current notions as are the political state and commercial policy of the two countries.

twenty-four Greek townships, which have been devastated during the revolution; but they have recovered themselves a little, and appeared to me the most smiling portion of Roumelie. Dodwell * describes them as the most rich and flourishing of the raya communities. Miletius, who was a native of one of them, has given, in his Geography, minute statistics of this little province. They possessed a most important traffic in silk and woollen capotes, with which last article they supplied the whole of the Levant. At the period of their sack by the Turks, they had even a professor of chemistry and experimental philosophy, and some of the Turkish booty consisted of galvanic troughs and electrical machines. The cause of all this prosperity and improvement will, of course, be anticipated in their emancipation from Turkish anarchy. They were either chasia or vacuf, that is, by the influence of the seraglio, or the authority of the royal mosques, their original terms of capitulation were protected, they were subtracted from the sway of the provincial authorities, and were governed by their

* " This delightful spot (M. Pelion) exhibits, in all their rich mixture of foliage and diversity of form, the luxuriantly spreading platanus, the majestically robust chesnut, the waving poplar, the aspiring cypress, which are happily intermingled with the vine, pomegranate, almond, and fig. Here the weary may repose, and those who hunger and thirst may be satisfied. Nor is the ear left without its portion of delight. The nightingale and other birds are heard even in the most frequented streets, and plenty, security, and content, are every where diffused.

" Pelion is adorned with about four-and-twenty large and wealthy villages, some of which merit rather the appellation of cities, inhabited by Greeks of strong and athletic forms, who are sufficiently brave and numerous to despise their neighbours the Turks."

municipal officers, and a bostangi sent from Constantinople. But here this remote influence interfered with the municipal institutions; the system of the two classes of burghs was different; the elders, relying on connexion with the Turks, resisted public responsibility, and the burgh in which the Turk resided sought to domineer over the rest; consequently their political happiness was not unalloyed, but their wealth and prosperity were, notwithstanding, truly astonishing.

Amongst these villages I observed a most interesting fact—Turks and Christians on terms of perfect equality and good will. The village community is far removed from the line of communication, strangers never pass through it, so that slumbering animosities are not awakened; there is one law for all, the same contributions for all; they do not pay distinct poll, and land, and property taxes, but one tax on property, and they compound for the poll tax of the whole community, so that the Turks pay their share just as the Christians. The industry, prosperity, and information of both populations is perfectly similar, and religion, though a difference, is not a distinction.

Chalcidice, which although not a portion of Greece proper, played so important a part in her ancient history, and has left so many illustrations of the colonial policy, diplomacy, and foreign relations of Athens and Sparta, has in later times merited attention for administrative combinations of a most remarkable nature.

This district owed its emancipation most probably to the obligation imposed upon it, of working the mines which it contains, and remitting a stipulated portion to Constantinople. Belon, who visited it in 1568, and who has left us so minute a description of

the manner of working the mines and of its state at that period, makes no mention of such institutions as those which existed at a subsequent period, and details a different distribution of the proceeds of the mines than that which co-existed with those institutions. When he visited them, private speculators extracted the ore, refined and coined the metal, and sent it in that state to Constantinople. The state must have received a certain per centage, for he mentions the sum of from eighteen to thirty thousand ducats monthly, received by government as its portion. The collection of this large revenue, from between five and six hundred furnaces scattered over the mountains, must have required a considerable number of agents, whose office presented great temptations and little controul. By the relaxation of the energy of the Porte, this mode of collection must have become inefficient, and the fisc, awakened by the sensible decrease of revenue, no doubt bethought itself of some expedient for correcting the abuse, and adopted that one which would naturally present itself to an arbitrary power, of compelling the neighbouring villages to take and work the mines, and to pay a certain portion of the profits, or a certain rent.

I am the more confirmed in this supposition, by the progress of the legislation of the mines under the Roman Empire. First, the government received a tax on the produce; as the severity of controul became weaker, the treasury was more and more defrauded; it had then recourse to farming the mines, but as corruption and weakness of the state increased, the next step, before their final abandonment, was the compelling the wretched inhabitants of the neigh-

houring villages to undertake the working of them, which gave rise, under the lower empire, to the class of peasants denominated “adscripti glebæ et metallis.”*

It would be very interesting positively to ascertain the manner of the establishment of this little federation. Supposing it to have originated as I have just said, it proves the simplicity with which administration can be carried on, when physical force cannot be employed to rectify legislative errors, and when men apply the same common sense to government that they do to their private affairs. It is both curious and instructing, to see the raya population of a Turkish province, sitting down to discuss and to

* The condition of these serfs bears a close resemblance to the state of the raya. They were not slaves, but their labour was compulsory. They were not fixed to the soil, but if they fled they were brought back, unless they could guarantee to the community their share of the common burdens. Their right of property in their lands was unquestioned, as was the right to dispose of them, but on condition of their obligations being undertaken by the purchasers. They were allowed to regulate among themselves their time and services to meet the additional burdens imposed on them in consequence of their possession of the mines, but the fixed imposts were unmercifully levied, without regard to the productiveness of the mines or the decrease of the inhabitants.—See the *Codex Theodosianus de Metallis*, lib. vi. § 9, et lib. xv. passim.

I have already stated, that when I was in the mining districts, subsequently to the devastation by Aboull Abut, identical causes, and the common responsibility of the inhabitants, led, in one night, to the total dispersion of two villages. Under the empire similar scenes were witnessed; the oppression increasing in proportion to the wretchedness of the people, bodies of miners simultaneously abandoned their homes. Under Valens, the miners of Dacia, who must have formed a considerable body, deserted to the Goths.—*Ann.* xxxi. l. 567.

decide on what form of administration they should adopt. The constitution they formed would have done honour, not to the people, but to the learned of any country of Europe. From the reasons above stated, from the education of the municipal institutions, and from the facts of the case, I believe that this federation was carefully entered into, that it was negotiated and bargained for with the Porte; and that its liberties were solemnly guaranteed by a firman, which, for the consideration of a stipulated sum, granted them immunity from all legal and illegal exactions, regulations, services, &c., defined the limits of their authority, and constituted them a corporate body. Such firmans were perfectly in accordance with the principles of the Turkish government, which recognized in its agents no controul over any man or body of men who were not criminal and who had paid their taxes; and then the criminal is punished, or ought to be, by the decision of the *cadi*, and not by decision of the pasha; and for non-payment, property is attachable, but neither person, nor lands, nor implements.

The sultan, finding the revenues of the mines rapidly diminishing under the system of which Belon has left us the description, has doubtless offered to the *rayas* of the surrounding villages the mines to work, on the condition of paying to the imperial mint a certain quantity of metal. As all the workmen, and probably many of the capitalists belonged to the villages, the proposition held out advantages both to the villages and to the treasury. The treasury, of course, fixed its demand far above the sum it was wont to receive,

and the mining districts were relieved from the profits, exactions, and interference of the government agents; and then they could equally apportion their burthens by the efficient and economical controul of their municipal institutions. On accepting this charge, they naturally had to alter the system of working the mines, as the tribute to be paid to government was the ore extracted, so that the contribution of each individual towards the communal burthens, became compulsory (*angaria*) labour for the extracting of that ore. So under the Roman empire, on a similar change of the administration of the mines, forced labour, on account of the community, came to be substituted for hired labour, on account of capitalists. The mining communities would represent to government the necessity of joining with them the whole of the surrounding villages for the undertaking of so extensive a concern, and the supporting of so great a responsibility. The conditions, no doubt after consideration and debate, appear to be settled thus:—the district to pay a certain weight of silver, which, at a later period, amounted to five hundred and fifty pounds, and twelve principal boroughs to form an administration of their own, having subordinate to them three hundred and sixty villages.*

The miniature constitution which they then formed, is equally unique in its character, though it is just

* There were two federations in Chalcidice known by the names of Chasia and Mademo-Choria. In what respect they differed, whether or not they were subject to the same government, I cannot recollect. Having been carried off by bandits in the vicinity of the ancient Sane, the notes I had made on the spot were lost.

such a one as any body of rayas in Turkey would have adopted, had occasion presented itself for exercising its judgment in such matters.

Their treaty with the Porte bound them to obedience to the madem emins, the only Turkish authority, and, indeed, the only Turk that could reside in their district, in matters of civil and correctional police, but stipulated entire emancipation from all interference with their internal administration. The payment of the stipulated quantity of metal discharged them from all other government imposts, and from spahilic, (contribution to the military chiefs,) and for their caratch or poll-tax, the community compounded with the collector of the pachalic; but the district and the Turkish governor were rendered independent both of the pacha and mekkiaméh (judiciary) of Salonique. As for their internal administration, that of each village was, of course, the municipal system prevailing throughout the country. The general representative system, adopted in the mining districts, was perhaps an imitation of the monastic administration of Mount Athos. A central committee was formed of deputies from the twelve boroughs. Each subject of discussion was debated by the different municipalities separately; if the whole committee did not agree, the members returned again to the municipal bodies, to re-argue the question, as it was necessary for them to be unanimous* upon every

* It was curious to observe, at the election of members of the assembly of Argos, how deeply implanted in the minds of the Greeks was the principle of the members being mandatories of their constituents. The vote of the members was looked on as the vote of the dis-

measure. To secure this unanimity, no decision was considered valid without the seal of the committee; and that seal was formed of twelve co-partments, one

trict. It is true, Capodistrias sought to convert this feeling into a tool for party purposes; but it never originated in his suggestions. The fears of the people were aroused by the most insidious means,—their virtues and their vices were alike worked on; they were led to suspect treachery from their members, and a coalition of the primates and capetani against the central government, so that they drew up, in some places, the conditions according to which they empowered the members to vote, and exacted the most solemn promises for the observance of these conditions; in other places, *declared they would ratify* no decision in opposition to their instructions; and in some cases even threatened to burn the houses of their deputies, and hang them themselves, if they betrayed their trust. Does not this forcibly recall the deputies carrying their instructions to the Amphictyonic Assembly; making their report on their return; depositing copies of the acts; accounting for their votes; and requiring, to make these valid, ratifications of the *γερονσία* and the *ἐκκλησία* of the constituent city?

When Capodistrias' violation of the principles of the constitution had raised a loud and universal cry for the maintenance of the constitution, and afterwards for a national assembly, these words were not mere shibboleths of faction or terms borrowed from Europe. Two answers were given to the president, which, even if invented, prove the feeling and the intelligence of the people on these points. The president asked an illiterate Greek why he had signed a petition for the maintenance of the constitution, and what he meant by the words. The peasant answered with ready indignation, "The covenant, which teaches us our duty to you, and you, your duty to us!" Not long before the termination of his unhappy career, the president went into Maina, where disaffection was strongest, to attempt to pacify them. At a meeting with some of the chiefs, he protested that he was willing to adhere to the acts of the Congress of Argos, but they persisted in demanding the convocation of a national congress. He petulantly asked what use there could be in a national congress if he adhered to the decrees of the last: one of them replied, "When Moses having received the law from God, broke that law, he had to appear before God again, and to receive anew the laws he had

of which was entrusted to each municipality. These portions had to be united before the seal could be used. What I have so often repeated respecting the effect of direct taxation, will sufficiently show that there was nothing unreasonable in the requiring perfect unanimity in all their decisions, so long as the municipal officers were freely elected, and subject to public responsibility. The unanimity required in the decisions of the committee is conclusive as to the purity of election, without which such unanimity could never have existed, as to have allowed the seal to be used at all.*

Each of the twelve boroughs had a certain number of the villages attached to it, and these corporations were represented in the boroughs on which they depended. But here, as elsewhere, the absence of all formality in the operation of the system, the absence of all familiarity with names and principles, the absence of all idea of rights and prerogatives in the people, render such investigations exceedingly difficult and obscure.

The mining association, whatever were the principles of its administration, might be supposed to be indebted for its prosperity solely to the speculation for which alone it was primarily established. It was bound to pay a very heavy sum to government, as rent for mines, which it was not likely could ever be

broken. You, who are neither our conqueror nor our hereditary chief, possess your power by the constitution you received from the people, you have broken that constitution—you must come to the people again to have it restored to you.”

* Amongst the islands it was customary to have the common seal formed of as many co-partments as there were burghs in the island.

worked with advantage, under the management of a committee of little farmers. The speculation turned out a most unfortunate one. For several years previous to the revolution, the mines had ceased to be worked at all; yet so chary were they of the institutions granted them for the working those mines, that no supplications were made to Constantinople to be relieved from its conditions, but Spanish dollars were yearly bought and melted down, and sent to Constantinople, as if just extracted from the mines; they asked no exception on account of their poverty, claimed no remission on account of their exhaustion, but anxiously contributed the required amount in the wonted form, to check all inquiry, and to take away all pretence for annulling a contract which, as a speculation, had been so unfortunate, but which had been so inestimable in granting them the free exercise of their own municipal institutions, which gave them in unshackled industry, and in the surface of their exuberant soil, greater treasures than in its hidden veins.

The only remaining point of inquiry and comparison between the races possessing or not possessing municipal institutions, is their increase or decrease of population. The absence of all statistical documents renders this inquiry very difficult, and the results uncertain; any such calculation of the rayas could only be formed on the caratch at which the provinces have been rated; and even if we were possessed of these data, the problem would be nearly as far from solution. As a fixed number of papers is always issued, and that number, 1,600,000, gives a raya population of about 6,000,000 as the calculation

of some former period, but of the year and details I am ignorant; I will not therefore attempt any thing like calculation on the subject, but offer a few considerations tending to prove a great diminution in the Turkish population. The Albanians are a people so completely distinct from the others, that I do not intend to enter into any detail respecting them. The Bulgarians have been subject to the influence of both systems, by their division into the two religions; I shall, therefore, confine myself to the consideration of the Mussulman Turk, and Christian Greek races.

The numbers of Turks which at different times passed into Europe, the numbers of the soldiers settled in the conquered provinces, leave us no room to doubt that the Turkish settlements, at the period of the final subjugation of the eastern empire, were very considerable; their population enjoying ease and wealth by the labour of the Christian population, might be expected rapidly to increase; it was besides augmented by proselytism. The ranks of the Janisaries were swelled by the tax which long existed of every fifth Christian male child; and the harems were filled with Greek women, whose fruitfulness was so much abstracted from the Greek population: yet the Turks have dwindled away.* There is a class of agricultural Turks, who cultivate their ground, and live completely distinct and separate from the Christians; but in other parts of the country I do not think the Turks amount to one-tenth of

* It must not be forgotten that the depopulation of the country, traced by the ruins of villages, applies exclusively to Turkish villages—the vestiges remaining are minarets of mosques and Turkish burying-grounds.

the Greek population, if to so much. The only means we have of getting at the Turkish fixed population is by the military fiefs, established at the conquest. It is impossible to say what number of souls ought to be allowed to each fief; but as there were in all Roumelie 1,075* of the first, and 8,194 of the second class; if we allow 100 persons to each of the first, and 50 † to each of the last, we shall obtain a total of 507,300 Turks of both sexes, independent of the tribes that were subsequently converted, and of those who followed the early conquerors, and were settled before or after the fall of Constantinople, and who, as agriculturists, occupied distinct districts of the country. It seems certainly impossible to rate below 500,000 the Turkish population attached to the military fiefs throughout the country; and if this calculation is as low as can be made for the whole country, there can be no objection to applying the same rule to ascertain the minimum of the Turkish population, established in any single district at the period of the conquest, and this will give us some grounds of comparison between the former and present Turkish population; of course it must be borne in mind that the calculation we make of the former number is the lowest that can be taken.

Negropont contains 12 Ziamets and 188 Tima-

* The numbers are taken from Ricaut, who had means of access to the public offices at Constantinople.

† For every 3000 aspers of revenue, or one kiliteli, (sword,) one horseman was to be furnished. The Timars were under 20,000 aspers, and the Ziamets above that sum; thus the first might have to furnish seven horsemen, and the latter thirty, or even more.—See *d'Ohsson*, vol. vii. p. 373.

riots ; which would give, calculating as above, 10,600. At the breaking out of the Greek war it was about 7,000, including Albanians,—the Greeks 36,000. In Carleli a similar calculation would give us 6,950. At the Greek revolution they did not exceed 2,000,* natives and Albanians,—the Greeks were 22,000. Yet these provinces were out of the way of wars, and little liable to be drained by military service.

Of the political system of Turkey, the Turks reaped all the benefits, the rayas endured all the suffering, evils, and wrongs ; yet how different, even in this question of population, has been the progress of the two people ! The deplorable state of Roumelie, during the last struggles of the eastern empire, has been recorded by the Byzantine writers ; and the disorder and misery thus recorded exceed, if it is possible, those of recent date. Phranza's account of the then Christian Albanians is certainly not exceeded by the history of the ravages they lately were guilty of. I have seen Joannina distracted by internal faction and feuds, and encircled by four contending hordes ; but still saw nothing to equal the horrors recorded by Barlettius, &c. which seem to have been for centuries every day occurrences. Our oldest travellers and

* In consequence of the confusion of the limits of the different districts, it is exceedingly difficult to make totals from such statistical materials as can be obtained. The Greek commission gave the following numbers for the districts which composed, I imagine, the Turkish sandjag of Carleli :—Vochos, Turks, 1,500 ; Greeks, 4,500 ; Xeromeros, Vonizza, Valthos, no Turks, and 18,000 Greeks ; making a total of 22,000 Greeks, and 1,500 Turks. Col. Leake calculated the Turks at 3,000 ; and without any knowledge of either of these calculations, I had estimated them at 350 fires.

writers, Verantius (1553); Belon, at the end of the sixteenth century; Brown, in 1669; Rycaut, &c., describe similar scenes, which their successors repeat, with never omitted predictions of the approaching and immediate dissolution of the Turkish empire. Thus, at the period of the conquest, the country was frightfully depopulated; its depopulation has struck every observer from that period, up to the present hour; every observer has seen, besides, numbers of the Greeks destroyed; numbers of them have been forced as children, or as women, to contribute to the numbers of the dominant faith; besides this, provinces have been swept off wholesale. How often has the Morea been left a waste! yet through all these trials and losses the Greeks exist, and exist, at least, in as great numbers as at the period of their subjugation,* while their masters have dwindled, notwithstanding all the means taken to augment their numbers. What does this say for the municipal system?

I have already mentioned the corrupt aspect of the municipalities in the large cities and sea-port towns, where they come under the observation of Europeans; but I think I have also accounted for the difference by the difference of the functions they have to perform.† They apparently justify all the

* The laborious and accurate researches of Col. Leake between the years 1805 and 1810, led him to suppose that the Greek population was decidedly increasing.

† The corporations in towns have been repeatedly noticed by travellers, especially the *esnafs* of Constantinople, and the division of the trades into classes with deacons, as described in the subjoined extract. The peculiar and characteristic feature of the constitutions I am describing, and which have so generally escaped observation, is their being rural and agricultural. "At Caïro, and in all the other cities of the east, every trade has a head, who is entrusted with au-

odium that the most prejudiced are disposed to throw on the Greek character. It must be recollected, however, that the Europeans who inhabit the scales of the Levant—to say nothing of the Franks, or native descendants of Europeans—are not the fittest men for observing or judging in matters so foreign to their ideas and avocations. Their interests are so diametrically opposed to that of the Greeks, that it is impossible for them to be impartial; and interest and prejudice both agree in observing and exaggerating the evil that is but too obtrusive, and in overlooking the good which, unless sought, is not to be found, and which, indeed, can be appreciated only by comparison. It is from this class of men that travellers receive their first, and almost universally their only, impressions.

But it is not only among the Franks or Europeans visiting the East, that we find contempt for these institutions, or ignorance of their existence. The Greeks themselves, even under the direct influence of their most beneficial operation, have hitherto had no just conception of their effect on themselves, or of their value or importance, compared with the economy of more civilized administrations. The peasant clings to them by the pressure of his necessities, for

thority over them, knows every individual of the body to which he belongs, and is in some measure answerable for them to government. Those heads of trades preserve order among the artizans, who are a numerous body. Even the women of the town, and thieves, have each a head in the same manner; not that chief or robber is a profession licensed by law, but the head is appointed to facilitate the recovery of stolen goods. At Tripoli, in Barbary, the black slaves choose a chief, who is acknowledged by the regency, and this is a means by which the revolt or elopement of those slaves is prevented.”—*Niebuhr's Travels in Arabia*, vol. i. ch. 4.

the mitigation of impending penalties or of immediate wrongs ; but they are associated in his mind with the tyranny of the Turkish government. Little does he dream that equality of burthens, freedom of opinion, an equal voice in communal matters, the election with the payment of the village schoolmaster, the right of rejecting the parochial priest, all which he looks upon as portions of his existence and his wrongs, would, amongst civilized nations, be called by such terms as privileges and rights, and that they are benefits which no nation in Europe possesses, and towards which they are groping only in the dark.

Question a raya about his municipal institutions, he will not understand what you mean ; nay, he will describe to you the state of his village, of his own family and affairs, without giving you reason to suppose the existence of any species of local administration whatever, unless he has a complaint to make. I have elsewhere said, that the political intelligence of the rayas was remarkable, because they could immediately trace evils to their sources, and oppression to its authors ; it seems a contradiction now to say, that they have no just comprehension of institutions of such vital importance ; but this apparent contradiction is, perhaps, referable to the contrast between the political instruction of the mass of the people under direct and indirect taxation. With us, men are more conversant with principles than with details, with names than with things—names are necessary for the press, for society, and they often cloy curiosity, which, but for them, would apply itself to facts. Facts, by our complications, are of difficult access, and the reference of effects to causes too fatiguing for common

attention. A labourer in England cannot be expected to calculate, in the price of a pound of tea and sugar; how much he contributes to the support of government, how much he pays for the collection of custom, how much to the East India proprietor, how much to the Jamaica planter, and how much to the grocer, who has advanced the capital, &c.; consequently, he cannot trace to their sources the influences that affect him, and if he complains, it is of wrongs for which he himself can suggest no remedy. A labourer in Turkey has no such complications to unravel; he knows perfectly who takes his money, and can judge of the justice or injustice of its appropriation.

But the *raya* has never been taught principles by political discussion; he has no conception of benefits flowing from these institutions, operating through the moral character impressed by them on the community;* indeed I have only been enabled to describe them by substituting contrasts for details, and by pointing out the evil they prevent, rather than the good they produce. Their mission is, to repel disturbing principles, not to create rights, which word can only apply to nations emancipating themselves from feudal villanage, for right is an exemption from disqualification. In Turkey there are no disqualifications which affect the operation of these institutions; therefore, though they have a perfect comprehension of the word wrong, they have none whatever of rights:

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* La raison la nécessité et des besoins réels furent les seules législateurs qui les dictèrent; la raison des particuliers qui n'étoit point encore différente de la raison publique, avoit été la seule et l'unique loi.—*Recherches sur le Despotisme Oriental. Londres. 1762, p. 78.*

they have not even such a term, and would translate ours *δικαίωμα*, act of justice. It is not then to be wondered at, that the *raya* should observe and investigate wrongs which are positive and material, while he is blind to negative and relative advantages, which even we can only appreciate and describe by contrast.

Thus neglected and unknown, this system, combining interests and opinions, never exciting attention or courting observation, was gradually preparing the people for a change; but still so firmly controlled the movement it created, that no bolder spirit could break through the common bond of prejudice or submission; opinion, as in most other societies, did not divide itself into movement and resistance, and thus a common observer would have supposed it stationary, because it was free from fluctuations, while for that very reason its progress was more certain, because it created no alarm, and suffered from no reaction. This explains how the revolution of Greece appeared an impossibility to those who had observed the Greeks previously, and judged by appearances.

But a very few days subsequent to the elevation of the white cross of Constantine, as a recovered national emblem, an assembly was held of free Greeks. Throughout the revolution, an intelligent attachment has ever manifested itself for a representative form of government. To what can this national conviction, or rather feeling, be referred, save to the remote influences of the municipal system; and to what else the peaceable industry of the people, under such demoralizing and disturbing causes, to which Count Bulgari (under the dictation of Capodistrias) thus bore testimony in a despatch to Count Nesselrode? "It

is a remarkable phenomenon, to see a whole people, after seven years of war and anarchy, resume the peaceable habits of labour and submission to the laws,* without being constrained by any force whatever. The tranquillity that reigns in insular and continental Greece, the security of the roads, the absence of disorder and crime, so common to a people liberating itself from the double yoke of tyranny and revolution, prove to demonstration that Greece is worthy of the good government of which it can already appreciate the benefits.”†

The difficulties America had to contend with in her first elections; the troubles and disorders which the exercise of the new prerogative gave rise to in France, would lead us to anticipate in such a country as Greece difficulties and disorders of the most serious nature. Far from this, the right of suffrage, the mode of election, never became even subjects of discussion; they were not spoken of, they were not heard of; and yet it is notorious that, in the three first national assemblies, before the arrival of Capodistrias, the best men that were to be found were returned; and though their decisions were of little avail, at least they expressed a liberality of sentiment and opinion that is quite astonishing, and leaves us to wonder whence it was derived.‡ Can this representative

* Capodistrias had, at this period, governed the country for ten months, and the orders, rescripts, ordinances, circulars, proclamations, administrative letters and decisions, having force of law, exceeded ten thousand!!

† “ Poros, Dec. 22, 1828.”

‡ For instance, the immediate and unanimous abolition of slavery,

tactic, if I may so call it, be referred to any thing save the self-government in which they had been before exercised? I should think not; and even if the facts and observations I have already offered were to go for nothing, the immediate adoption by freed Greece of the representative form of government, without difficulty, or even discussion, would prove, that in Turkey elements of political regeneration exist, which, overlooked before they were called into action, have been misinterpreted in their operation, and are unfortunately not even at present understood by the Greeks themselves, in whose minds old institutions and practice are connected with past tyranny; and who, in their anxiety to imitate Europe, have hitherto overlooked or despised their own municipalities, which Europe may well envy.

We have now traced these institutions in the character of the people; we have shown how they have preserved the raya population among whom they prevailed, and perpetuated uniformity of creed, doctrines, and opinions, of language, disposition, and character; while they have kept them distinct from all other races that live under the same general government, and while other races, less oppressed, but less strongly knit together, have been swallowed

the liberation of captives without ransom—where did they learn this? Did the Turks, who are supposed to have tutored them in all their faults, teach them this? Was it the example of Europe, and her speculative slavery, that taught these emancipated rayas to abolish the slavery of their enemies by a public decree, when scarcely one of the members of the assembly had not some connexion of blood or interest with slaves retained by the Turks? This is one of the most remarkable features of the revolution.

up by Islamism: we have seen how the activity they called forth, furnished resources to the Turkish empire, and how the submission they inculcated and produced, allowed that supremacy so long to exist: we have then followed them in the powerful impulse they gave to communities under different circumstances; engaged in commerce, manufactures, and agriculture, relieved from all other jurisdiction than their own: we have seen an unknown village of Pelion conducting vast commercial speculations on the Elbe, the Danube, the Rhine—the barren rocks of Magnesia furnishing the fertile but enslaved plains of Thessaly with fruit and vegetables in their season: we have seen remote and unfrequented rocks, sprinkled over the Egean and Ionian seas, rising to the possession of a marine and a commercial prosperity, next to miraculous; and all, independent of any political institution whatever, and under no other influence save that of the municipal system, which is common to the rest of the fertile land and heavenly climate, whose neglected spots have displayed examples of such unparalleled prosperity. What would that country then become if left to itself? If the disregarded seeds, fallen among stones and briers, have produced sixty and a hundred fold, what harvest might be expected from the deep soil, if allowed to bring forth the seed slumbering in its breast?

CHAPTER V.

FINANCES OF TURKEY.

“**I ADMIRE**—I am filled with astonishment at the individual instruction and intelligence spread through every class of the population—at the perfection of your industry, at your useful works and scientific inventions, at the discipline of your troops, at the subordination of your civil officers, and at the strict execution of your laws ; but—cannot you raise your revenue without embarrassing your commerce ?”

This was the question of an intelligent Tunisian, late envoy from that state to France, disposed enthusiastically to admire the progress of Europe in every branch of science, though unable to conceive the advantages of our indirect taxation ; yet doubting the advantages of the Turkish system, obscured as it is by every species of misrule, when he saw nations in every other respect so superior to his own, universally and strongly wedded to an opposite plan. The same question has been asked by a portion of a nation across the Atlantic. An intelligent people, whose ideas of government are derived from Europe, are dissatisfied with their administration, only on

that point which is opposed to the only practice of Turkey which an intelligent Turk admires and clings to.* The practice of Turkey then, whilst a very material feature in her internal administration, is interesting, as, I may almost say, a new fact bearing on, perhaps, the most important political question which agitates practically, even when not avowedly, the whole of Europe.

A superficial glance at the governments of Europe shows an administration constantly employed in adjusting burthens, in shifting them from one shoulder to another, exciting discontent and resistance even by its most impartial measures; a people ever dissatisfied with, and impatient of, taxation, but less impatient of the weight of the burthens than of the mode of imposition; and a penal code, the major part of which little coincides with public opinion, containing a numerous catalogue of punishments for crimes created by fiscal measures.

Is it therefore surprising that this complicated and embarrassing legislation, this individual resistance of each separate interest, which becomes general resistance on the part of the people, and the infliction of severe punishments for crimes, which are infractions of no moral law, (I allude merely to direct and tangible effects of the system,) appear to those whose experience is confined to Europe alone, unfortunate, but

* In South America other views seem gaining ground, as appears from a decree of the president of Guatemala, abolishing the prohibition of Spanish trade, with this preamble:— " "

" Considering that restrictions on trade are directly prejudicial to the public revenue, and to trade itself, and deprive the whole nation of advancement in agriculture and industry, &c." *Nov. 24, 1832.*

necessary conditions of the existence of a government? No one would deny that the efficiency of a government would be immensely increased, its character elevated, the resistance, opposition, and discontent of the people prevented, and that the penal code, losing half its cruelty, would gain double efficacy, by not placing morality and law in opposition—if the revenue were raised without legislative interference with commerce.

Considering the immense difficulties, the temptations, the dangers, that surround a government that interferes with the exchange of industry, under the pretence either of raising a revenue, or of increasing internal prosperity, one might suppose that it is impossible for any very extensive dominion to exist, under such a system: and history will not disprove the supposition; for no great empire that the world has ever seen, the Assyrian, Babylonian, that of Cyrus, of Alexander, or of Charlemagne, of the Romans, or the Saracens, raised its revenue except by direct taxation; and why had the last, and not the least, of conquerors less hold on the countries he overran? At least, it is a singular coincidence, that the first of the great conquerors who has laid his hand on commerce, not as a common spoliator, but in the fatal character of a legislator, should have outlived the empire he had created.*

* “ *The Berlin decree could not fail to cause a re-action against the emperor’s fortune, by raising up whole nations against him. The hurling of twenty kings from their thrones would have excited less hatred than this contempt for the wants of nations. This profound ignorance of the maxims of political economy caused general privation and misery, which, in their turn, created general hostility. It*

But ancient history nowhere shows us any thing to be compared to the fiscal regulations of modern Europe. In the early periods of the commerce of the Mediterranean, violence and bloodshed were the proverbial concomitants of commercial enterprise. Hercules, not Hermes, was the titular divinity of the Phœnician colonists. There we do find traces of commercial legislation apparently resembling that of Europe; but fortunately, their commercial prohibitions were never mixed up with questions of finance. We see the Carthaginians drowning merchants who approached an interdicted port, or punishing with death tributaries, who dared to sow a species of pulse, which was an export of Carthage;* but we find nowhere any trace of a so-termed protecting duty. As far back as history can reach, among civilized and uncivilized nations, under theocracies, monarchies, or republics—men, land, and capital, in money or houses, or in other tangible objects, have always been directly taxed. Amid all the varied experience that centuries, and thousands of tribes of men afford, the principle of raising the revenue was invariably the same, the difference consisting merely in the mode,

is necessary to have witnessed, as I have, the numberless vexations and miseries created by the unfortunate ‘*continental system*,’ to understand the mischief its author did to Europe, and how much that mischief contributed to Buonaparte’s fall.”—*Bourrienne’s Memoirs of Napoleon*, p. 364.

* A species of pulse is at present sold, *toasted*, all over the East—may not this be a relic of a protective measure of Carthage? The *Bosmium*, a species of pulse, was an important export of Carthage, and lest it should be cultivated elsewhere, it was toasted before exportation.—See *Arist. de Mirab. and notes to the Imperial Quarto*, Paris edition of *Strabo*, xv. 8.

the season of collection, the objects, or the classes more or less severely taxed.

Commerce, at times, is found entirely free from all imposts whatever; at other times it has been exposed to arbitrary impositions and tolls. Amongst the Greeks, the Romans, and the Mussulmans, it has not contributed to the revenue of the state; but it has been lightly taxed for municipal purposes, the tax being levied for the repairing of roads and harbours, and, indeed, generally applied to that purpose. No people has ever approached the Mussulmans in the establishment of communications, bridges, roads, and public works of all descriptions; they were the first of nations to introduce regular posts, by these communications were kept up with the greatest rapidity between the remotest parts of their Indian dominions. They were essentially a commercial people, whose commerce extended from the Indian Archipelago to the Atlantic; their great works for the benefit of transport might have therefore entitled them to press heavily on commerce, yet from an examination of their finances in all countries, in ancient and in modern times—in Spain, in the Mogul empire before its fall, in India, in Turkey itself, in Greece—it would appear that the uncertain revenue (indirect taxes) never exceeded ten per cent. of the whole revenue.*

* In the governments of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, when the two branches of revenue were separated in 1789 and 1790, the indirect taxes did not amount even to four per cent., the total jumma was Sa. Rs. 2, 65, 45, 811, the sayer, or variable revenue from customs, and excise, transport duty, &c. were 10, 67, 111.—*Harrington's Land Revenue, Introd.* vol. ii.

The mixed system of commercial restriction and revenue collection which has covered Europe with custom-houses, though it may be regarded as the offspring of the feudal system, is yet only a posthumous child. William, the great founder of feudalism in England, raised his enormous revenue, which some calculate as equal to ten millions sterling of our present money, without one indirect tax. It was the Scotch wars of Edward I., that first led to the imposition of three-pence per pound on commerce, and then English navigation extended from the Baltic to the Adriatic. Under Edward III., the poundage was raised to the rates common to the rest of Europe, that was sixpence in the pound, or $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.; but the destruction or the perversion of the municipal principle,* rendered direct taxation so galling to the people, when they began to enjoy a little political freedom, and so dangerous to the government, that the indirect mode acquired favour in the eyes of both.

That system has now so deeply rooted itself amongst

* The insurrection of Wat Tyler in particular was a sudden outbreak of popular indignation at a direct tax; not at its amount nor its pressure, not at the inequality of its repartition, nor at the inexpediency of its appropriation, but at the disgusting and outrageous conduct of the government agents for its collection, which of course would have been entirely avoided if the municipal bodies had been the organs of taxation. The tax in question was a poll-tax—a tax now fallen into strange disuse and discredit, but once an important branch of revenue. It was equally graduated, and spared neither noble nor placemen. The highest on the scale paid 265 times as much as the lowest. Dukes, 6*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.*; earls and countesses, 4*l.*; barons, cannerets, and baronesses, and knights, 2*l.*; bachelors, esquires, and their widows, 1*l.*; judges, 5*l.*; sergeants, 2*l.*; the mayor of London, 4*l.*; aldermen and other mayors, 2*l.*; merchants, 13*s.* 4*d.*; tradesmen, according to their property, from 6*s.* to 6*d.*—*Plac. Parl.* iii. p. 57.

us, so overspread us with its chill and blighting shadow, that even our vision is intercepted ; and while we look with proud satisfaction on all the discoveries and the progress that has illustrated modern Europe, we seem not to perceive, that in every quarter of the globe, and in all ages, a financial system has existed the very reverse of ours ; we look upon a revenue raised directly as an anomaly and an exception, whereas the indirectly-raised revenues of modern Europe are exceptions in the experience of the world.*

Attaching the importance I do to the direct system in the individual case of Turkey, I have been led into these observations, with the view of showing that that system is no hazardous experiment, that it is no deviation from ancestral wisdom or concession to modern theorists, and that it is neither the rude expedient of a barbarous people, nor the mere caprice of an Oriental despot.

Looking at the financial organization of Turkey on paper, nothing can appear more complicated or unin-

* It is curious to observe, how completely puzzled our early administrators in India appear to have been with the system they found prevailing there. Commissioners for settling the land revenue in 1785, thus express themselves : " In forming conclusions on this subject, and indeed, in all our reasonings concerning the revenue of Bengal, we cannot too carefully avoid the comparison between the customs and institutions that prevail in this country, and those which are established amongst a people more free and refined," because amongst us, " the invention is exhausted in discovering other objects, (than land,) and modes of taxation, (than the direct,) which shall raise a revenue in a manner imperceptible to those who actually pay it, and where it is rather the policy to conceal than to lighten the burden." Afterwards they admit that, " To the neglect of these ancient institutions *may, perhaps, partly* be ascribed most of the evils and abuses that have crept into the revenue."

telligible. The immense finance bureau at Constantinople, where, in twenty-five sections and eleven sub-sections, from seven to nine hundred clerks and officers are in constant occupation, might impress one with an idea, that a whole life-time would not suffice to obtain a general knowledge of the economy of such an institution, or of the workings of such a system; yet in practice nothing can be more simple.

Since the reign of Mahommed the Second, the collection of the revenue has been by farm, (*iltizam*), which are put up to auction and sold to the highest bidder. The system has undergone multifarious modifications and changes, the farms have been increased, diminished, and subdivided, new branches of revenue have been introduced, and old ones newly appropriated; and all these modifications have applied to the subdivisions of the revenue, both generally and territorially. In some districts, certain of the *iltizam* are farmed, as a matter of course, yearly by the pasha—in others there are farmers for life; in some districts, there are distinct farmers for the different branches, in others the whole taxes are at once compounded for; but all these distinctions vanish in practice, which resolves itself, as I have already said, into a sum of so much, demanded from each district or village, which the peasants are allowed to collect as they please: the mode may therefore vary in each village, but the object in all, is to adjust taxation to property.

Taxation may be reduced to these five heads.

Ist. Poll-tax, divided into three classes, *ala*, *evsât*, *edna*, under Soleyman the Second, (or First, according to the Turkish historians) and fixed at ten, six and

three leonines, or piasters, on adult males not professing the Mahomedan religion. The number of papers yearly issued is 1,600,000; but many districts compound for a certain number, and then the amount is added to the general property assessment.

2nd. Land-tax, one tenth of the produce, or by assessment; the tenth is either paid to government or affected to military fiefs; a portion of these applied to the support of the governors, the remainder to the body of spahis; 450,000 men are thus calculated to be supported. The tributary lands are farmed at from one third to one half of the net produce.

3rd. Nouzouli and avarisi, assessed taxes in towns where the population is not agricultural.

4th. Customs, three per cent. on foreign commerce, export and import; internal transport duties at gates of towns and bridges.

5th. Excise upon gunpowder, snuff, wine, and duties on various articles of late introduction, chiefly established to meet the expenses of the new organization under Selim the Third. I omit those branches of revenue which are not of universal application.

The local and municipal expenses, independent of arbitrary exactions, amount, at the very lowest, to three times the sum received by the government; and I have no doubt the people would be benefited if the government were to quadruple its demands, allowing the municipal authorities the entire management of the finances.

But the Turkish government has deviated from the Arab type which Mahomet adopted, and which, as the fundamental principle of the financial system of Islamism, deserves particular notice, no less than

for its beautiful simplicity and comprehensiveness. Among the Arabs this system was so deeply implanted, that the Wahab chief revived it, and it had remained in operation in Algiers from its first settlement to its capture by the French.*

On lands watered by the heavens, one tenth.

On lands watered by irrigation, one tenth to one fifth. †

On lands watered from wells, one fortieth.

On the capital of merchants, one fortieth.

* The history of the first settlement of Algiers is curious. The expelled Moors from Spain, possessed by the desire alone of wreaking vengeance on their inhuman persecutors, scattered themselves along the Barbary coasts, and formed little detached piratical establishments. One body larger than the rest was directing its course to the eastward, when they were met by a naval commander of the Saracens, named Suleyman, who persuaded them to settle at Algiers, which would give them a country inland, and the means also of gratifying their hatred against the Spaniards. This man became their chief, and a deed was drawn up, bearing his signet and that of the chiefs of the Moors, termed *agde imaun*, or act of faith, which stipulated the pay of the dey and his troops. This amount of taxation is precisely that in the text, with the addition of a tax on sheep and camels; and that this public treasury, the *beit ul mahl*, should be under the entire control of the municipal body. The dey's treasury was independent of it, and received the produce of piracy; but the *beit ul mahl* was a legitimate mercantile bank, and at the same time a chancery treasury. The enormous sums found in it by the French, show how faithfully it must have been guarded. The act of the French which excited the greatest discontent, was a tax on wool, in direct violation of the *agde imaun*. "Why," said the Algerines, "not double the tax on sheep, and not tax the same article twice?" But such reasoning seemed folly to Europeans! and to quell the commotion several men were shot, *pour civiliser les autres*. I have been assured, by natives, that the *agde imaun* was among the documents transported to Paris.

† The fertility of irrigated lands is much greater than that of the

But Mahomet forbade any property tax to be exacted from those who did not possess two hundred dinars.

But it is in the mode of raising the revenue that the Turkish government has chiefly departed from the practice of Arabia. It is assessed and collected at present by humble and oppressed municipalities, created by local necessities, that have neither honour before the government nor existence in the eye of the law—and however beneficial in their silent and modest operation—however universally spread over the face of European Turkey, without combined action, and affording each other no mutual assistance or support. The municipalities of Arabia were of a very different character. The ayans (eyes) were formerly a council of municipal officers, whose principal function as such must have been the collecting of the revenue. The alteration of the financial system rendered the institution void by the introduction of farmers of revenue, who, being independent of the powerful Turkish municipality, made use of the subdivided Greek municipality as a useful instrument, from which they had nothing to apprehend. Still a shadow does remain of the

lands watered by rain, the cultivation less expensive, and the produce generally more valuable. These lands are most commonly assessed, sometimes as high as one fifth of the produce. Omer, when he settled the contribution of the sovad, or irrigable and rich plains along the Euphrates and surrounding Cufa and the future site of Bagdad, introduced the plan of assessment in money, which seems to have been fixed with great justice and precision. The sovad contained 36,000,000 djeribs, (which, by the bye, Mr. Silvestre de Sacy renders “arpens,”) vineyard ground paid ten dirhems, date eight, sugar-cane six, wheat four, barley two. The two last were probably inferior soils, or land not irrigable.

ancient body, in the divan attached to, though seldom consulted by, each local governor. "This council," says d'Ohsson, "is chosen by the district and confirmed by the Porte. They are termed ayans, and may be esteemed municipal officers. In most places this municipal has become an hereditary office; but when those notables have consideration in the country, they can control the pashas, and oppose their acts of oppression."*

As all prudent reform in Turkey must reduce itself to a restoration of the ancient rule originally derived from, and lately revived in all its ancient purity in, Arabia itself, it may not be uninteresting to point out the financial organization of the Wahab reformer; which is an example to the sultan, and which is exactly the plan which he has shown an inclination to adopt, and which perhaps ere now would have been adopted, had time been allowed him.

In each district an assessment was made by the municipal chiefs. The government collector made his rounds once a year; he was accompanied by two delegates of the province—one to draw up the assessment, the other to collect the money, when the collection of the district was completed. The government share—I believe the half—was paid to the collector on acquittance, and the remainder was paid to the clerk of the *beit ul mahl*, for municipal expenditure. The tribute could not be exacted before the first spring month, when the camels and sheep have produced their young; and it was not to be delayed beyond that period.

The *beit ul mahl* is a most interesting institution.

* Vol. vii. p. 286.

Every city, or even burgh of consideration, has one; it is a bank, in which is placed the money raised for provincial and municipal purposes; here also private property is deposited—money, or security for property, subject to legislation, and portions of widows and orphans; the whole under the control of the municipal council. The objects of expenditure are the construction and repairing of roads, fountains, bridges, the relief of the indigent, and food for poor travellers; and private money is sometimes lent to merchants on proper security. The municipal council thus hold the strings of the public purse and of public credit, and resemble little houses of the commons; but they have only to vote supplies, the ways and means giving the government no trouble. They have no direct control over the total of the revenue, but they control its collection, and have the local expenditure completely in their hands.

In the Turkish provinces these higher municipal councils still exist in form, being stripped of both these functions. The *beit ul mahl* exists only in name; it has become a chancery bank, having lost its municipal character.

In the collection of the revenue, the *Hidayeth*, or law digests, prescribe, in case of non-payment, neither imprisonment, nor distraint of lands or tenements. They admit of seizure of goods alone; and even every kind of goods were not liable to be seized—implements of husbandry, for instance. Suleyman excepted also bee-hives, in imitation of Justinian. This is a striking resemblance with the practice of Rome, and a necessary consequence of the system common to both empires, of raising revenue by direct taxes, and through

the agency of municipal bodies. The practice of Rome is so illustrative of that of the Arabs, that I cannot refrain from comparing them. The Roman revenue was raised by a poll-tax, (*in capita*,) a property tax, (*ex censu*,) a tithe on land, and a duty on the transport of goods (*portorium*). Turks and Romans only interfered with commerce, with the view of *lowering the price of corn*. The impost on transport amongst the Mussulmans was levied ostensibly for the repair of roads, bridges, and harbours; and though Livy, our only guide in the financial history of Rome, is provokingly concise, yet I think we may confidently infer* that there also the *vectigalia* were applied to municipal purposes, the principal of which were the repair of roads, bridges, &c.

General assessments were made at intervals, the sum of each district was fixed by these, and the collection and distribution then left to municipal officers. The necessity of harsh proceedings against defaulters was thus prevented, because each "bears his burden according to his proportion of the sum assessed on the place of his abode, and of his property, to the goods of the other families, so that the strong may help out

* For instance, "Censoribus deindeulantibus ut pecuniæ summa, sibi, qua in opera publica uterentur adtribueretur; vectigal annuum decretum est.—*Livy*, xl. 46.

The censors were *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, the municipal magistrates of Rome. They examined into private property, inquired into its employment, fixed the assessment, contracted for and superintended the paving of streets, the construction of roads and bridges, &c. The senate votes the *vectigalia* for their expenditure, which expenditure is strictly municipal; public expenses were defrayed from the public treasury; the *vectigalia*, therefore, *did not enter the public treasury*.

the weak.”* Therefore the Roman, as the Mussulman, law admits of no imprisonment for non-payment, “for the taxes regard men only for their goods, and they are of themselves a burden sufficient without this hardship, which, through this indiscretion of the persons who might have this power in their hands, might be a means to fill all the prisons in the kingdom.” For the like reason the Roman law for the non-payment of personal or real tax, admits distraint of goods or fruits, but not of tenements or land. Nay more, collectors are “not to seize or distraint things necessary for food or raiment, for the culture of the land, or the exercise of trade or profession.”†

Under such humane laws, and, above all, with this popular control over the collection, it was natural that direct taxes should be as much preferred as they have been detested amongst us; and even where the advantages of this mode of collection do not exist, whenever the people come materially to perceive the difference between the real pressure of direct and indirect taxes, the former are preferred. The aversion in France for the *droits-réunis* is notorious, and

* Domat. Public Law. Pub. Reo. tit. v. sect. 3.

† Id. id. sec. viii.

“*Servos aratores, boves aratores aut instrumentum aratorum pignoris causa de possessionibus non abstrahant.*”

L. 7. C. quæ res. pig., &c.

A French ordonnance, following the spirit of the Roman law, provides, “That there shall be left to the person on whom distress is made, one cow, three ewes, or two she-goats, to help to maintain them; a bed to lie on, and a suit of clothes to wear.”

Ord. of 1687, tit. xxxiii. sect. 14.

not long ago, as a boon to the bourgeoisie of Vienna, one half of the tax on articles of consumption was remitted, and replaced by an assessed tax on houses. In Turkey the feeling of hostility to indirect taxes is uncompromising and universal, not in consequence, certainly, of greater political intelligence than is to be found among the people of Europe, but because their system is relieved from embarrassing complication, and effects follow close their causes. Amongst the Romans the same feeling may be inferred from their practice; but of its existence, positive as well as negative proofs exist. A tax on articles of consumption introduced into the city, formed, with a poll-tax, the earliest resources of the Roman state. After the expulsion of the Tarquins, when the senate, in the war with Porsenna, doubted the fidelity of the people, this tax, the portorium, was remitted, as a gratification to the plebs, yet, as a tax on articles of consumption, all classes were equally subject to it. Subsequently in the war with the Veii, when it was found necessary to pay the troops, and consequently to increase the expenditure, this tax was not reimposed, because the loyalty of the people was still doubtful, but a property tax was established, and cheerfully submitted to.

Judging by the recent experience of Europe, it seems most strange and inexplicable how powerful governments, during so many centuries, should have kept clear of the perplexities and embarrassments on financial questions, into which the governments of modern Europe have so lamentably fallen. From these errors they have been preserved by the follow-

lowing considerations, which are important in their application to the present state and prospects of Turkey.

A government raising its revenue by a direct property tax, has no motive or pretext, for the favouring of any class of producers, to introduce privileges or monopolies.

It has no motive or pretext, for the favouring of any class of consumers, to distribute unequally the burdens of the state.

It has no motive or pretext, for the protection of its revenue, or for facilitating the collection, to introduce restrictions or prohibitions, or generally to legislate in financial matters, so as to interfere with commerce.

No interests have grown up under such restrictions and protections, to perplex government with new demands, to overawe it by powerful combinations, or to corrupt it by occult influences.

Taxation falling on the amount of property, the government has a direct and sensible interest in the general prosperity; and there is no organized body of collectors to whisper in its ear new modes of taxation, or measures of increased severity.

The general effects of the system on the nation are, that taxation takes from the people only the sum that government receives, consequently that it does not indirectly augment prices. That it fall on wealth realized, not on the means of production. That, consequently, it falls equally on all, and gives a constant interest to the rich and powerful to control expenditure. But there are two remote effects of the system that particularly struck me in Turkey; the first, that taxation, by not anticipating profit, left every field of

industry open—employed no capital uselessly in mere transfers, required no fictitious credit, prevented fluctuations, ensured regular supplies, diminished the chances of loss, excluded gambling profits, and rendered commerce a simple and unmodified transfer or transport of goods. The second, that by falling on property realized, and not on the necessities of the producer, and by not increasing the price of articles of consumption which the poorest must purchase while he labours,—labour itself is raised, and the means of accumulation spread through the whole mass of the community. The consequence of which is, that there is no pauperism in Turkey. This is so remarkable a fact, that I must offer some observations upon it.

Nothing can better illustrate the effect of our system, or consequently show more clearly the relief the Turkish system affords to those classes who amongst us would become paupers, than the poor-laws themselves. They are instituted with the view of compensating for the unequal pressure of taxation, and for the increase of price of the necessaries of life, created by interference with commerce; but of the sum raised for this purpose, two thirds are absorbed by the very system they are intended to counteract; for the corn, tea, sugar, &c. on which they are expended, could be procured for one third their cost if the world were our market, so that taxes raised to counteract taxation are again taxed 66 per cent. One third of the mere operative's labour purchases his articles of consumption, and the two thirds are absorbed by the indirect effects of customs and excise, though the govern-

ment receives but a very trifling portion of that amount.

Under such circumstances accumulation is hopeless; the working classes, living from hand to mouth, become desperate when wages sink, and improvident when they rise. Labour is rendered dependent; they have no provision to enable them to work on their own account, or to associate; old age and sickness are unprovided against; the chances of seasons and warfare in the remotest part of the globe, or, more fatal still, the fluctuations to which our system renders us unceasingly subject, may throw them at an hour's notice out of work, and by the same reason out of bread.

Compared with indirect, direct taxation operates as a loan advanced to each individual, for the prosecution of his industry and enterprise. The advance of a very trifling sum often enables a man to realize talents, industry, opportunities, and even capital, which otherwise would have lain dormant:—a small sum, opportunely furnished, may enable the borrower to discharge a large debt. Now, if government were itself, on the principle of the Scotch banks, to which Scotland owes so much of its characteristic industry, to advance sums to any district, graduated to the humblest wants of the industrious; and were it able to exert a moral influence over the persons benefiting by these advances, such as the Scotch banks exercise, or such as the municipal system exercises, why should not that district make as rapid strides as Ambelakia, or the commercial communities and republics of the middle ages? A new class of men, workmen pos-

sessed of more or less capital would arise; the moral sanction and controul on which the advances would be made, would necessarily raise their character, or exclude them from the benefits of the community; and the government, which by advancing those sums to correct the proscription of independent industry by indirect taxation, and to counteract the tendency of that system to lower the moral character while it curtails the profits of the industrious, would increase national wealth, give additional employment for labour, would augment the indirect revenue, and while it received its own capital, would at the same time, in the interest, make the profit of the bank. But if these loans amount only to the sums necessary to meet the demands made by government antecedent to production, and even to purchase,* then is it not clear that the reserving of these demands until the profit has been realized is tantamount to the advance of this fructifying sum?

The weight of taxation, when direct, if not carried too far, has a tendency to spur rather than to curb exertion. The least increase of the pressure of indirect taxation may throw thousands of those who live from hand to mouth out of work or out of bread. Direct taxation diminishes capital, but indirect taxation diminishes labour. The hardest conditions of the one system are activity and parsimony, while the necessities of the other are want of employment and of bread. Therefore are no idlers to be found in the fields of Turkey; therefore is the condition of pauper-

* The duty on every article is paid months, and even years, previous to consumption.

ism unknown; that is to say, no class of men exists who must starve or be supported by charity, because they cannot find work.

Compare this condition with that of any country afflicted with the indirect system; but recollect, in the comparison, that every institution, every application of the power of mechanism, every discovery in science, all the intellectual and moral nationality, which place such countries as France or England on the high position among nations which they occupy, have no existence in Turkey; no solicitude is there manifested for the welfare of the poor, no benevolent societies, no allotments of land, no poor laws provide for the indigent, no equal representations of interests in a central legislation watches over them; no press is there to spread light, to expose wrongs, to communicate improvements; no tribunals, no jury, no law;—but withal no pauperism. To appreciate at its just value the advantages of the Turkish system, we must, as a term of comparison, find some nation whose central administration is as despicable as that of Turkey, and which follows at the same time the European administrative centralization and financial system. I will not trust to my own recollections to draw the parallel between Turkey and Spain, but I will quote from Mr. Inglis a description of a Castilian village, and then ask the traveller in the most wretched portion of Turkey, to match from that country one hundredth part of its misery.

“I saw between two and three hundred persons, and amongst these there was not one whose rags half covered his nakedness. Men and women were like bundles of ill-assorted shreds and patches, of about

a hundred hues and sizes; and, as for the children, I saw some entirely naked, and many that might as well have been without their tattered coverings. I threw a few biscuits amongst the children, and the eagerness with which they fought for and devoured them, reminded me rather of young wolves than of human beings. The badness of the pavement and the steepness of the street made it necessary for the diligence to go slowly, and I profited by the delay to look into one or two of the miserable abodes of these wretched beings. I found a perfect union between the dweller and his dwelling. I could not see one article of furniture—no table, no chair; a few large stones supplied the place of the latter; for the former there was no occasion, and something resembling a mattress was the bed of the family. Leaving this village, I noticed two stone pillars and a wooden pale across, indicating that the proprietor possesses the power of life and death within his own domain.”*

I can affirm that I have been for months travelling in the interior of Roumelie, during which I have no recollection of having been pursued for charity. I have often put up at the houses of the poorer rayas, and been contented with their fare. I have daily entered several of their huts. I have been unceasingly inquiring into their condition, and therefore have been brought into contact with the poorest and most ignorant, yet I never have entered a hut without a carpet and a cushion being spread for my accommodation; not a single instance remains on my recollection of nakedness being exposed from want of covering; and the humblest peasant would discourse

* Vol. i. p. 56.

sensibly on subjects with which experience had made him acquainted, and often on subjects which appeared far beyond his sphere, with the address and manner which in Europe is only to be found among gentlemen!

Attempt to trace to their sources the misery and degradation of the people of Spain—you will always find them in laws and privileges. Is it too much to assume, that the comparative ease and intelligence, and the unparalleled industry and frugality of the poorest classes in Turkey—in a word, that the absence of pauperism is owing to the absence of * legislative interference with the prices of commodities or the exchange of industry. The profits of the Turkish peasant are all his own, if he can evade the robbery of the government agent. If he stood alone when he saw the fruits of his labours wrested from him, his hands might fall by his side, his energies might fail; but he is supported by the fellowship of his community, as well as by his constantly renewed prospects of gain. Thus the raya population labours and hopes, even when it does not realize. With efforts unceasing as those of Tantalus, it rolls its burden towards the still rising summit. Though accumulation is seldom to be seen, production goes on unceasingly. †

* It will of course be understood that I do not mean civil or penal codes.

† The very apprehension of representing the rayas in too favourable a light, has perhaps led me to depress the whole body to the level of those to the south, who have been exposed for now twelve years to unceasing devastation. The Sclavonic populations to the north can scarcely be said to have suffered from war, consequently their condition is far superior to that of their Greek co-religionists. I am glad to be able to add to my own testimony that of Mr. Slade :

Is it the wrongs the Spanish peasant endures, is it the fertility of his soil, the mildness of his climate, the fewness of his wants, that renders him callous and degraded, and limits his aspirations to winter, sunshine, and summer shade? Has the Turkish peasant fewer wrongs to bear, a less fertile soil, or indulgent climate? Whence, then, the signal difference between them, save in the fundamental differences of system, which I have been endeavouring to point out?

If, then, Turkey exists at this moment, if she contains in her breast the elements of re-organization, if the states that spring from her possess legislative, tactical and administrative experience and instruction, if her commerce is free, and her government without debt—it is only in consequence of her direct taxation, which has called forth the municipal organization, and has precluded the necessity of custom-house exactions.

“Hitherto they (Bulgarians) had lived tranquil, and never till 1829 formed one of the jarring elements of the Ottoman empire. Hence their superior condition, visible in their flourishing towns and abundant fields; witness Ternovo, &c., all thickly peopled, wealthy, and possessing manufactories, &c. I could not hear in any place of a Bulgarian having been executed; the circumstance was time out of mind.

“No peasantry in the whole world are so well off; the lowest Bulgarian has abundance of every thing; meat, poultry, eggs, milk, rice, cheese, wine, bread, good clothing, a warm dwelling, and a horse to ride. I wish that in every country a traveller could pass from one end to the other, and find a good supper and a warm fire in every cottage, as he can in European Turkey.”—Vol. ii. p. 97.

CHAPTER V.

PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION.

How have the pashas maintained their authority over the provinces? How has the Porte maintained its authority over the pashas? These are the questions which I shall endeavour to answer.

The first is soon disposed of. The Janissaries, or local military oligarchy, were balanced by the Albanians, or Magreybeens, or other martial tribes; the disunion and rivalry and opposed interests of these tribes, secured the supremacy of the pashas, while they all united as Mussulmans to subject the Christians to their rule, and, as the arm-bearing caste, to oppress the Fellah.

On the conflicting interests of these tribes not only depended the authority of the pashas, but even of the Porte itself. The Albanians have ever been the right arm of the executive, and the enemies of the Janissaries: twice have armies of Janissaries been pushed in vain against Scadra, the northern Albanian capital. Albanians extirpated the Mamelukes, the

Janissaries of Egypt; and the memorable revolution, which placed the present sultan, in spite of the Janissaries, on the throne, the Albanians left their mountains to effect, and planted their barracks on the heights of Daoud Pasha, in the astonished eyes of Constantinople.

The Albanian is the very opposite of the Janissary in all things, save the common lawlessness of the retainers of a pasha; his home is at a distance from the metropolis, he was called from it to enter the service of the Porte, and he depended on that service; duly paid, he is devoted to those whose bread he eats; he is not fanatic, he is brave. The Arnaut alone has vindicated the honour of Turkey, on the Bog, the Pruth, and the Danube, and though the authority of the Porte has at no period been established throughout Albania, until the close of 1831, yet these mountain nurseries of iron men were not able to support their matured vigour, and the champions of Turkey were controlled in their native fastnesses by the surrounding bands of Christian Armatotes, whom it has always been the policy of the Porte to foster until the tughia were extorted by an Albanian, old Ali of Tebelene, when, unhappily but inevitably, the former policy was entirely subverted.

The destruction of the Janissaries renders it no longer necessary to flatter the passions of the Albanians, who are now compelled to submit to that discipline and subordination which are become the conditions of military service; they have been bred to arms and to danger, they have been hardened by privations and humbled by reverses; arms is their only career,

and the sultan's pay the only means of subsistence that is left them. Here then the most important change is effected in the administration; the pasha, even supposing him inclined, as much as formerly, to pillage, and as certain of impunity, is no longer under the necessity of sanctioning the pillage, and fomenting the intrigues of his subordinates, to maintain his authority both over the province and over them.

I now come to the second question, how the Porte ensures the subordination of the pashas? Turkey, though an empire, is not a nation; the regions submitted to its sway are peopled by tribes and nations, differing in race, religion, language, and even colour. It is not easily to be understood how viceroys of provinces, or rather kingdoms, exercising absolute authority, maintaining large military establishments, while the government has not even what would be called a standing army, should tamely submit to be deposed or reappointed year by year, and that revolt should have been a rare occurrence. Now the difficulty of accounting for the submission of the pashas, on which has immediately rested, on the one hand, the permanency of the empire, and on the other, the misery of the raya, is not diminished by the consideration which meets us, *in limine*, that the agents of government were subject to oppression, in their turn, and to a precariousness of tenure of life and property, which no other Mussulman, indeed no other subjects of the Porte, felt in any comparable degree. The pashas were elevated by no regular system; they were not an organized body, supporting each other; their services secured them no reversionary rewards or honours:

their downfall might be, and generally was, more rapid than their rise. The chamal, or porter, to-day, might be pasha to-morrow, and the next eve might see him restored to his former avocations. So far, indeed, from the service being an honour or an advantage, that hitherto respectable men shunned it, for the sake of their character no less than of their peace and security; and for the wealthy to be exempted from the necessity of accepting service, has been a rare and valued privilege. How then has obedience been enforced among a body of men entrusted with such unlimited powers, and so independent of all restraint of force, of interest, or opinion? It is not one cause alone which has produced or can account for so anomalous a state of society; but I think to one in particular rather than to any other, both by its immediate and remote influence, this state of things is to be attributed, and this lies in the financial system.

Until the reign of Manommed II, as already stated, the administration of the finances was wholly independent of the civil governors, and until the reign of Murad III, the military fiefs, where they were not held by spahis, were principally in the possession of Sandgac beys, who governed Livas, or small provinces, and were appointed for life. The two branches of the financial system were altered by the above-named sultans—the first converted the different branches of revenue into farms, the latter introduced or generalized the system of pashas yearly appointed. In process of corruption and disorganization, the pashas came nominally in many cases, and really in all, to possess at once the farm of the tribute, of the poll-tax,

or customs, or national domains, or all these together, with the civil and military command of the province, and, as may be supposed, took the administration of justice out of the hands of the *cadi*. The precariousness of the office of *pasha* prevented men of property from aspiring to it while the *Porte* required security for the tribute due by him who farmed the revenue; the *pasha* had therefore to give security before he could be installed, but generally being without the requisite personal property, or personal credit, and his office itself, on which the whole chance of repayment lay, being of the most precarious nature, it was necessary for him to bind himself in the most solemn manner, and to grant the most advantageous conditions to the capitalist who would engage to answer for him. Here we come to the secret and carefully concealed spring which puts in motion the whole machinery of the Turkish administration.

The Armenians have been and still are the richest and most commercial people of the empire: by their wealth they are the surest guarantees the *Porte* could obtain: by their knowledge of the Turkish, by their intimate acquaintance with all commercial dealings, and by their condition of *raya*, they offer to the *pashas* every quality that can recommend them as active and able men of business, as bankers of solidity, and as docile creditors. The revenues being often collected in kind, their capacity of merchant, united to that of bankers, makes them doubly useful, and gives them opportunities of rapidly acquiring wealth. The sultan views their prosperity with no unfriendly eye, as their wealth, like that of the *pashas*, is not squandered by extravagant habits, or expended

in rebellious enterprises, but remains carefully hoarded in their strong-boxes till some pretence, or some necessity, brings it into the miri.

Considerable capital being required for carrying on this branch of business, the number of the sarafs is, I believe, under eighty, nearly the number of the pashas ; and as, by their refusal to become guarantee, they can reduce any Turkish governor to the condition of a private individual, they, in fact, farm out the provinces at their pleasure and for their profit ; they have even of late carried their authority so far, that no banker will consent to become the saraf of a pasha—raised, as I may say, to that rank by one of their body, without a note of hand from his former banker, declaring that all his demands have been satisfied.

Supposing the sum to be received by the government is 500,000 piastres, it is to be paid in four instalments ; but the banker receives a note of hand from the pasha for the whole sum, together with the douceurs of office immediately on his being named, which begins to bear interest from that day, of, at the very lowest, two per cent. per month. The pasha has then to be furnished with arms, shawls, pipes, horses, &c. from the merchants : the banker has ten per cent. commission upon those articles. The money to be paid at two, four, and six months ; but he receives an immediate receipt for the sum in full, bearing interest as the other. Shortly after the pasha arrives in his province, there is a present to the banker, of from a tenth to one-fifth of the value of the revenue, as his profits on the operation, and a present to his clerk, of the divers produce of the province. But if

the banker understands from his clerk that the pasha is amassing money, he sends him unexpectedly an intimation to this effect: "There have unfortunately been complaints made against your highness, but by my interests I have silenced them. There is a sacrifice of 10,000 piastres, which you will pass to my account." This sacrifice may be real, but it may also be fictitious. It might be supposed, that when any of these pashas become sadrazem, they would avenge the robberies they had suffered; but, no; the Armenians have, from their wealth, connexion, and party feeling, sufficient influence, even to contribute to the nomination of the grand vizir himself; and the Turks in office look upon their extortion as necessary evils, which are the making of their own fortunes. The vizir, too, has another interest in sparing his banker, for he obtains the remission of his own debts in consideration of his support, in compensating extortions from the other pashas. The utmost extent of their fortunes may be a million sterling: it is rapidly made from the moment they acquire respectability enough to become surety for the pasha; but it does not go on augmenting without checks from time to time.*

The confidential agent, who accompanies the

* They run no risk now of having their heads cut off; but their property is by no means sure. When a cabal, or want of money, or more than ordinary rapacity, occasions a banker to be singled out as the victim, he is seized in his country-house, and hurried over to the Asia side, under sentence of banishment. There he is allowed to remain several days; his friends and dependents busy themselves in providing what may be necessary for him, and, strange to say, his papers remain, as his strong box, untouched; negotiations then commence, and he agrees tacitly with the government as to the sums his coffers are to contain when seized; if the sacrifice is deemed

pasha to his province, is generally a relative of the saraf; all money transactions pass through his hands; and the agiotage and commission are very considerable. This agent receives the revenue of the province, for which his principal has become responsible, and traffics in its produce, which he manages to obtain at a reduced price, as tribute by exaction, &c. Thus, to every pasha a steward is attached, like a sucking fish to a shark, from whom, let him writhe as he likes, he cannot get rid—who watches his movements, commands his resources, and urging him ever to acts of violence and extortion, leaves him only a portion of the plunder. The pasha cannot throw him off, because his office depends on the guaranteeship, and he cannot possibly induce him to plot against the Porte, because the bulk of the Armenian's fortune, and the principal of the firm are at Constantinople, where also his family is retained as hostages, and whence on no pretence they are suffered to depart.

The principal evil of this system is this—the sarafs naturally wish to conceal from the pashas the amount of their profits, which they most effectually do, by obtaining the order for collecting the revenue before harvest time. By anticipating the time of payment the bankers receive two and half per cent. interest per month on the money, which the peasant is obliged to borrow; depress the market after harvest by the necessity in which the peasant is placed of realizing, as the condition of the loan; bargain with the villages

sufficient and loyal, he returns to Constantinople, and goes on as if nothing had happened.

for the exclusion of all other competitors for their produce, and even for a reduction of the price below that of the thus depressed market. On a small scale, the effects of our indirect system are realized, the imitation originating in similar causes—the pretence of taxation for the benefit of monopolists, and the imposition of ruinous burdens for the sake of disguising a small profit.

It is then by means of this body of bankers, jobbers, and speculators, that Turkey secures the exact payment of her revenue, and surrounds her governors with a financial thralldom and espionage, through which the boldest arms have never succeeded in breaking; while at the same time the pashas are driven to such excesses of extortion, that enmity is placed between the province and its governor; and let him amass treasure, levy troops, and put on the show of power and strength, he has no hold on his office, because the very means he has necessarily taken to maintain his authority have made him the object of hatred.

Here we have three bodies particularly interested in the continuance of misrule—the adherents of the pashas, the pashas themselves, and the Armenian bankers; the first we have disposed of, the second are the creatures of a breath, puppets, the wires of which are held by the sultan, the bankers, and the troops; the office was dreaded, but the individual was nothing: no sooner will circumstances allow the military organization to have so far proceeded as to afford men to supply the place of the irregular retainers of the pashas, than the whole system will be swept away. But, it may be thought that so powerful

and united a body as the bankers would strenuously oppose such a change. I can apprehend no such resistance: the security that would accompany the change would increase the value of capital, open new and vast fields to industry and enterprise, capital would be scarce for useful purposes, and be eagerly withdrawn from such precarious investments; and even if fortunes are not to be so rapidly realized by purely commercial pursuits, they are not liable to sudden ruin, nor are their possessors exposed to political intrigue and powerful vengeance. The bankers have no power of their own, they have no distinct influence; they have hitherto been necessary, as a link in a ponderous chain, and that bond once broken, they are wholly deprived of all political importance; and their capital and their habits ensure them better rewards in the honourable and beneficial career of industry, than they could have reaped from the successful hazards of political gambling.

To destroy this influence of the Armenians, which grinds the peasantry, puts hatred between the pasha and his province, degrades the character of the public service, and excludes from it character, honour, and honesty, it is only necessary to collect the revenue without the intervention of the pasha; the municipalities, without any new experiment, afford the ready means. To restrain the rapaciousness of the government agents, they must be rendered by system responsible; to ensure the obedience of the chief, he must be part of a system, and his authority over his subordinates must rest on that system; but no controul or responsibility can make men honest, who have not the means of honourable existence in their sphere

of life, therefore they must receive regular pay ; in one word, they must be disciplined troops. It matters little for the moment whether they can handle a musket or not, but they must be subordinate to their superiors, and responsible for their actions. This, then, is what is required of the sultau ; and strange as it may sound to English ears, a standing army is more necessary as a bulwark to the civil liberties of Turkey than to her national independence.

The perversion of mind from which remotely sprung all the afflictions of Turkey, was pride. It required the most complete prostration of national haughtiness to enable her to emerge from her former torpor, and radically to cure her political disorganization. That gangrenous limb, the Janissaries, had first to be rescinded. The operation has been followed by an accumulation of the most alarming symptoms, indicative of a crisis which must either exhaust the malady or destroy the patient. Habits and old institutions and opinions were broken up ; secret intrigue was added to open revolt ; their fleet annihilated by their friends, their armies scattered by their foes ; the Muscovites, in the second capital of the empire, and the Arnaouts in open revolt ; and while the eye of the startled Turk turned from one object of alarm to another, it saw the balta of the sultan hanging by a hair over his head ; Osmanli pride was laid in the dust, and the mantle of blind confidence was rudely torn from their weakness, their nakedness, and their errors. The government is inexperienced, to apply to it the mildest epithet, and may be rash : the raya population have so much political power and importance as to be able to disturb the progress of their own

political amelioration. The personal character of the sultan, then, is most important, at this moment, as in the paralyzation of all power, the man, even more than the sultan, remains the sole bond of the empire. The attachment of the rayas to him can alone secure a *general union advantageous to their progress, necessary to their independence*, and to the consolidation of a power essential to higher political combinations, and which, I verily believe, more calculated, by its fundamental principles and its national habits, to ensure the prosperity of the various tribes of its population, than any practical combination at the present moment arising out of its overthrow.

When Mahmoud assumed the reins of government, the political horizon of Turkey was completely darkened and confused; but unexpectedly, cloud after cloud was dispelled, the Mamelukes were destroyed, the Afghans chastised, Viddin, Bagdad, submitted to his authority, the Wahabs were punished, the pilgrimages were resumed, and the keys of the holy city laid at his feet. The opinion gradually established itself—"Mahmoud is fortunate"—the first of qualities in an eastern hero. In pursuance of his policy of extirpating the dere beys, he had recourse to various arts to circumvent them, which were signally successful. The mass of the nation, which generally rejoiced in the punishment of its oppressors, saw the destruction of the dere beys, with no less gratification than amazement, and universally exclaimed, "The sultan has a head." But the most tragic scene of a reign spent in ceaseless executions—the extirpation of the Janissaries—fell like a thunderbolt on the nation. Their sultan appeared in the

character of an avenging angel: with the most extraordinary good fortune seemed combined in him the utmost fertility of resources, sternness of purpose, and sanguinariness of disposition: so far his character was only calculated to strike terror; but when the ruthless executioner was seen entering the cot of the peasant, inquiring into his condition, asking for plans for its amelioration, subscribing for the erection of schools and churches, (or at least, reported to have done so,) is it to be wondered at that he became the object of the idolatry of the Greek and Christian population,* or that the measures which he adopted for thoroughly breaking the pride of the Turks, gained him the confidence and attachment of the rayas—much more important than the applause either of the stubborn Turk or of his European judges.

He has effected three things, which have each been the principal objects of every sultan since Mahomet the Fourth; the destruction of the Janissaries, the extirpation of the dere beys, and the subjugation of Albania, which had not admitted the supremacy of the Porte, even in its days of conquest. The man, under whose auspices such events have taken place,

* To this being the fact, I can bear the most uncompromising testimony; from the year 1827 to 1830, I do not recollect ever hearing a Greek peasant speak of the Turks, when he could get an opportunity of addressing me privately, but to express his hatred, contempt, or horror. In 1832, I passed through Lower and Higher Albania, the district of Monastir, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Servia, &c. and seldom (especially towards the west and the north) have I found a Christian peasant speak of the sultan or the grand vizir without saying, "May God take ten years from our lives to add to his!" but the good had only commenced to appear when foreign intrigue; and not less culpable apathy, let loose the Egyptian revolt on devoted Turkey.

is no ordinary character, even though they have been brought about by the change of circumstances, rather than by his combinations; it is no small praise, considering his bringing up; that he has changed with circumstances, and profited by their change.

The monarch's character is as yet beyond the reach of accurate scrutiny; but he has shown himself as opposite to himself as the most dissimilar individuals. In his first measures he appeared cunning and artful, then relentlessly cruel: he was politic with the Albanians, and benevolent to the Greeks. His actions individually appear the result of passion; and taken as a whole, they seem to indicate a mind to which the means are nothing, and the end all: determined, to stubbornness, but capricious through ignorance; not insensible to generous impulses and views; entirely free from prejudices, as to government and etiquette;—and whether he perceives or not that the tendency of his policy is to deprive himself and his successors of even the shadow of arbitrary power, whether he views such a consummation with fear or hope—his efforts have been unceasingly directed to destroying the dangerous and precarious props of Turkish despotism.

In common with most Europeans, I at one time believed that the sultan had entirely mistaken his way, if his object was the regeneration of his country. I thought that the destruction of the powerful chiefs, who individually could protect their dependents from lawless and promiscuous oppression, was exposing the people to irredeemable anarchy. This opinion was founded on the fact, that the peasants abandoned their free lands to become labourers on the chiflicks

of powerful Turks ; but on better acquaintance with the country, and with the opinions of the *people themselves*, I perceived that this preference was of very recent date—that it had been occasioned by the anarchy of the last twelve years—which anarchy was created by the power and insubordination of chiefs and tribes, who set the authority of the government at defiance ; these being reduced, the influence of the municipal organization would be again restored.

If, indeed, the re-organization of Turkey depended on the skill, the intelligence, and the honesty of any central administration, the case would be hopeless. Shameless venality, unblushing ignorance, inveterate corruption and favouritism, are its characteristics, without a shadow of patriotism or a spark of honour. What power could be safely intrusted—what reforming measures be confided to the puppets of Armenian sarafs, to the tools of seraglio favourites? Public opinion too, most thoroughly rejects them, will no longer be ruled by them. There is not a man of ordinary sense who, being asked where the cause of the misgovernment of Turkey is to be found, will not instantly answer, “ In the power of the pashas, and the military chiefs.”

A great deal has been said in Europe about the insults the sultan has offered to the prejudices of his people. Without any intention of defending generally his sumptuary and uniform regulations, I am far from thinking that they have been in all respects injudicious, and I certainly think that they have excited more attention than they deserve.

What, after all, are the prejudices he has offended? I speak not of the Asiatics, but of the European

Turks, who have hitherto ruled the empire. There the Turkish Mussulmans are in very small numbers, and the others have never adopted the Mussulman costume. On the first introduction of the new costumes and style, it was to be expected that the most powerful opposition would have been raised—yet the point has been carried. The infringement of rights hatches and matures in silence future resistance; but if men once submit to have their prejudices insulted, and their habits changed, no future resistance is to be feared; indeed, they themselves become the ready instruments for inflicting the like change upon others. So it was with the costume of the Nizzam: a party was marked by a visible sign, which bound them together, which detached them from their antecedent history, which placed them in dependence on their chief, and barred all relapse. Another important effect of the costume was, that it prepared them to admit similarity of dress with the rayas; and a most important consideration this is, though it is clear that such an effect was never anticipated by the sultan, or he never would have attempted to enforce the uniform on the mountain tribes, where the case is wholly different, and where the attempt was even ridiculous. Amongst them their costume is national, not religious. Mussulman and Christian wore it alike. It was well to humble the pride of the Osmanli, whose haughtiness had been the cause of the independence of both Greece and Servia; but it was madness to irritate the Arnout and the Bosniac, who, as they were used, could support or overturn the empire, whose nationality had to be excited, not repressed, and whose costume had never been made by themselves an

object of invidious and galling distinction from their fellow subjects. Thus the question of costume is simplified, by being subdivided; where it was judicious, it has been enforced, where injudicious, it has been successfully resisted; and such, I trust, will be the result of future innovations.

Great and numerous as the losses of Turkey have been, they are not altogether without compensation. The overweening pride, confidence, and stationariness of the Turk, has been dispelled. The hopes of the raya in his own government have been raised, and aversion for the protection once eagerly sought, takes away the fuel from intrigue. The prostration of Turkey lay in the misuse of her resources; restricted to Roumelie and Anatolia, what empire on the face of the globe is equal in territorial resources and importance to hers? And the experience of the last years has opened her eyes to the advantages she possesses, to the abuses she fostered, and to the necessity of a change. The Greek revolution taught her that a raya was a man—the battle of Navarino that a character in Europe is worth having—the Russian war made her doubt the height of the Balkans and the depth of the Danube—the Albanian insurrection, that the strength of the government now rested on the affections of the people. The march of Ibrahim Pasha has confirmed all former lessons—deepened all former humiliation—showed her that justice must quickly be done, if her dominion was to endure, and wiped clear away the lingering idea of being so necessary to the balance of European power, that she would receive support from England and Austria in her last extremity.

“ Among the Turks and Arab settlers,” says Burkhardt, “ the feelings of patriotism are wholly extinct. The Turkish empire is too extensive, and composed of too many different nations and heterogeneous parts; for a spirit of patriotism to be diffused among its members. A few provinces, inhabited by particular races, are distinguished, however, by their patriotic sentiments; but the Arnaout feels for his own province, not for the empire at large. In Egypt and Syria I can venture to affirm, with perhaps an exception of the Lebanon mountains, that patriotism is extinct.” But the wonder rather is, that this mass should so long have held together, not that it should be destitute of patriotism now. But though patriotism, in our senses of the word, is wanting, local attachments, and the common bonds of race, religion, and language, supply its place. On these attachments, local administrations are engrafted. The Arnaout, the Georgian, the Bedouin, the Druze, the Maronite, whose attachments are local, are, or have been, in fact, independent, and have entered the public service only on stipulated conditions: those populations, also the Armenians, the Catholics, the Greeks, the Jews, who are scattered over the face of the empire, have, as we have already seen, their local, and sometimes even a central government, maintaining a certain independence, by the practice and favour of the Porte. The Greeks at Constantinople have their patriarch; so have the Armenians and Armenian Catholics; the Jews are subordinate to the Hacham bachi. The Turkish authority even grants to these dignitaries civil power. But in the East, as in Europe, there is a strong tendency to nationalization

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by race and language. That tendency, fostered by the policy of the Porte, may, in its reorganization, strengthen, instead of overthrowing; its authority. Nor, if reduced to its ancient standard, can I conceive an administration more happily adapted to conciliate such various interests, by leaving them to adjust themselves, while it represses convulsions and useless struggles, and avoids all the danger attendant on experiment and change. Still her condition at this moment is most alarming; because the events of her Asiatic may disturb her European dominions. But Turkey cannot remain stationary: Greece and Egypt have entered a career of competition with her replete with great and important consequences.

On the chances of reorganization of the Turkish empire, I have but one concluding but very important remark to make. A man who would be considered in Europe perfectly ignorant, may be in Turkey, if he is only honest, an able and excellent administrator, because he has no general questions to grapple with, no party opinions to follow—no letter of the law to consult, because not only is he never called on to decide on and interfere in questions of administration and finance, but his power is only honestly exercised when he prevents interference with the natural self-adjustment of interests. Therefore is it that Europeans form a false estimate, by an erroneous standard, of the administrative capacity of Turks, and add to the real dangers which surround Turkey, others gratuitously suggested by their European prejudices.

If a European thinks, with a minister of France, that the whole art of government resides in fixing a tariff, and “in reconciling the liberty which commerce

requires with the prohibitions which manufactures require,"* he will set down the Turk as incapable, who looks on such science as childish nonsense. Others, perhaps, will consider this untutored conviction as a happy protection against proficiency in a science only to be acquired by deplorable experience. The same is to be observed in every other department of government. A Turkish reformer requires no instruction in fund or bank monopolies—none in bankruptcy laws—none in the mysteries of conveyancing—none in corporate rights; there are no laws of entail or of primogeniture to be discussed or amended. In fact, there are no systematic evils; the reformer requires but honesty and firmness of purpose. Taking, in all things, the law as it is, he has to restore, or rather to fix, the currency—to separate the judiciary from the civil authority—to reduce the pashas to their real functions of prefects of police; he has to organize the army—and there all reforms ought to cease. Above all things, religiously abstaining from legislating for the municipalities or the rayas. If the municipalities be found afterwards capable of forming higher representative combinations, the structure will be reared in its own good time, and on the sound foundation that already exists. That consummation will be little helped even by judicious forcing, and may be retarded by injudicious interference.

* Speech of M. Thiers to the Chamber of Agriculture, Commerce, &c. Feb. 1833.

CHAPTER VII.

COMMERCIAL RESOURCES OF TURKEY.

THE responsibility of individuals for other individuals, so admirable a principle of our ancient institutions, when the controul accompanied the responsibility, when extended to nations, soured at their source the benevolent springs of hospitality—made the stranger be looked on as a hostage, and commerce as a prey; and has bequeathed to our international relations of the present day, restrictions and laws that neutralize fertility of soil, advantage of climate, and facilities of communication,—that place barriers more impassable than deserts between neighbouring nations, and fill our harbours with fiscal intricacies more fatal to commerce than shoals or reefs. Thus has an anti-social and misanthropic spirit been instilled into our commercial system, little in harmony with the enlightenment and urbanity which characterise the individuals or nations on whom the system operates, and by whom it is enforced.

Sacred hospitality in the East gave man,—whatever was his country, his position, his wealth, or his poverty,—the means of placing himself within the pale of men's affections, and of claiming from their common

sympathies protection against oppression. No doubt our own ancestors long preserved their early and nomade reverence for their guest;* but when feudalism had divided men into proprietors and property, hospitality was erased alike from the catalogue of duties and of national characteristics. Subsequently the common bond and influence of Christianity, foreign pilgrimage, and the common fanaticism of the crusades, tempered with bigotry, the harshness of barbarism: still alien was a term of reproach; fines were capriciously laid upon them, their persons were taxed like bales of goods, their property was retained by bargain, not by right, their inheritance, at their death, was seized of lawful right by the crown; a right which has not been very long extinguished, and in the expressive language of the time, it might be said, "that no man could sin against them." Storms were prayed for as we now pray for rain, and pious thanksgivings were offered up by learned prelates for the wrecks which God's bounty sent them. What can be expected from the commercial legislation which originated in such a period, save the perpetuation in practice of the effects of antipathies, which have long since yielded to juster notions? †

* But in our Anglo-Saxon law the purposes of law are completely perverted with regard to hospitality; instead of the written law confirming the right which the natural law gave to the host to protect his guest from violence, the host was made responsible for the debts, the crimes, the penalties, and actions of the guest, who had received hospitality for two or three days. Such laws were^{!!!} not calculated to encourage hospitality.— See *Wilkins, Leg. Sax.* p. 9, 12—18.

† It was the habit of depredation that made every traveller an object of legal suspicion at this period. From the peril of the roads, want of communication, the poverty of the middling and lower

In the East, the preservation of that primary right produced and produces the very contrary effects. The merchant was not denied the rights of the guest, nor the merchandise those of the merchant, and if a powerful chief plundered a stranger, his host became his avenger. Throughout the vast dominions of the Turks and the Saracens, during the centuries that that dominion has existed, under all the vicissitudes to which these dynasties and kingdoms have been subjected, amidst ruined manufactories and wasted fields, we find the exchange of commodities the only right respected, hospitality the only obligation observed.

In the letters addressed to the princes of the interior of Africa in the king's name, in the view of establishing commercial relations with these countries, and of obtaining security for merchandise and protection for merchants, peculiar stress is laid on the trader's character of guest. Freedom of commerce is claimed from "barbarous" princes by the sovereign of England, on the plea of the sanctity of hospitality!

Europeans very generally believe that the trifling per centage exacted on commerce in Turkey, and the absence of such restrictions as European nations have placed on the exchange of commodities, are concessions extorted by the strength of Europe from the weakness of Turkey, or advantages gained by the

classes, and the violence and rapacity of the barons and knights, travelling for the purposes of traffic, was very rare. Hence few men left their towns or burghs but for pillage or revenge; and *this occasioned that jealous mistrust of the law which operated so long to discourage even mercantile journees.*—*Turner's History of the Anglo-Saxons*, vol. iii. p. 117.

skill of European diplomatists from the ignorance of Turkish administrators. Now, even those who are partisans of the European indirect system, and who consequently think that the Turks are injuring themselves by their freedom of commerce, must, on a moment's reflection, perceive, that if the Turks have adopted this system against their interests, it has not been by the overreaching of diplomatists, or by the threat of violence; for the stipulations regulating the present custom-house system, to which alone a consul or minister appeals, when they are violated, were established in the days of Turkey's vigour and power, and equally favourable conditions were granted to the weakest state, and to the most powerful monarchy. In fact, she regarded not who came to buy or sell, but her own interests in buying and selling; and while powerful and haughty enough to treat with contumely the representative of the first prince of Christendom, she granted hospitality, with his national laws, with the exercise of his creed, and a free market, to the humblest merchant of the most insignificant state.

How much the sanctity of hospitality has influenced the commercial legislation of Turkey, may be inferred from a species of declaration of commercial principles which has been published in the official organ of the Turkish government. After contrasting the commercial freedom of Turkey with the restrictions of Europe, and the constancy both of supply and price, compared with the fluctuation produced by the European system, it proceeds thus: "It has often been repeated that the Turks are encamped in Europe: it is certainly not their treatment of strangers that has given rise to this idea of precarious occupancy;

the hospitality they offer their guests is not that of the tent, nor is it that of the laws; for the Mussulman code, in its double civil and religious character, is inapplicable to those professing another religion; but they have done more, they have granted to the stranger the safeguard of his own laws, exercised by functionaries of his own nation. In this privilege, so vast in benefits and in consequences, shines forth the admirable spirit of true and lofty hospitality.

“In Turkey, and there alone, does hospitality present itself, great, noble, and worthy of its honourable name; not the shelter of a stormy day, but that hospitality which, elevating itself from a simple movement of humanity to the dignity of a political reception, combines the future with the present. When the stranger has placed his foot on the land of the sultan, he is saluted guest (*mussafir!*) To the children of the west, who have confided themselves to the care of the Mussulman, hospitality has been granted, with these two companions, civil liberty, according to the laws, commercial liberty, according to the laws of nature and of reason.”*

It is perhaps necessary to offer some proof of the fact which I have assumed as one of public notoriety, that commerce is free in Turkey; travellers, with one or two exceptions, have said very little that bears on the question. Liberty of commerce is often implied, but almost never expressed; the bearings of the question is examined by none, and the principle universally overlooked. One of the few books † that have been written by a commercial man, commends

* *Moniteur Ottoman*, Sept. 1832.

† *Macgill's Tunis*.

the superior intelligence of the custom-house regulations of Tunis, and points out that port as an example to the rest of Turkey—and why? will it be believed—because Tunis had a tariff! because it imposed higher duties!*

Mr. Thornton, who says most on this subject, tells us, that no restrictions are laid on commerce, save on the exportation of corn and some other provisions, (little more than nominal,) but that the wretched policy of the Turks in other respects, renders the freedom of trade comparatively of little importance. Here, if we have no exposition, at least we have an admission of the fact. But the wretchedness of the administration in other respects, instead of making freedom of commerce unimportant, makes that freedom of the most vital importance; but it seems as if detractors and sycophants of the Turks alike had united to render the system they were describing unintelligible, by hurried generalisations, and wholesale flattery, or abuse. I turn with satisfaction to the interesting document above cited, for the Turkish view of their principles and policy, and for the effects which their system has on markets and industry, which I need make no apology for quoting at length. “It is re-

* It is hopeless to look for justice being done to Turkey on this point, when such expressions as the following are found even in Mr. Maculloch's Dictionary of Commerce: “A regulation more at variance with every principle of sound policy is not to be found in the commercial legislation of either Turkey or Spain.” P. 317.

Mr. M. is speaking of our timber duties. With all her misgovernment, Turkey at least may proudly disclaim, on every point, all resemblance with the commercial legislation, if it must be so called, of England.

cognized throughout Europe, that it would be useful to the great majority, to substitute for the system of prohibitions, that of liberty, which theoretical men advocate; the difficulty is, to find means to separate the future from the past without violent rupture. Hence the difficulties of government in satisfying all the exigencies of agriculture, industry, and commerce, driven in a circle where every measure in favour of one acts immediately in an inverse sense on the other. The endeavour is vain to establish, between so many crossing interests, a factitious equilibrium which absolute liberty of exchange alone can give.

“ Thus one of the most important questions which occupies the meditation of statesmen in Europe, is to discover how the palings which pen commerce up in narrow spaces, may be thrown down without shocks that might endanger public order.

“ Good sense, tolerancę, and hospitality, have long ago done for the Ottoman empire what the other states of Europe are endeavouring to effect by more or less happy political combinations. Since the throne of the sultans has been elevated at Constantinople, commercial prohibitions have been unknown; they opened all the ports of their empire to the commerce, to the manufactures, to the territorial produce of the occident, or, to say better, of the whole world. Liberty of commerce has reigned here without limits, as large, as extended, as it was possible to be. Never has the divan dreamed, under any pretext of national interest, or even of reciprocity, of restricting that faculty, which has been exercised, and is to this day, in the most unlimited sense, by all the nations

who wish to furnish a portion of the consumption of this vast empire, and to share in the produce of its territory.

“Here every object of exchange is admitted and circulates, without meeting other obstacle than the payment of an infinitely small portion of the value to the custom-house. The chimera of a balance of trade never entered into heads sensible enough not to dream of calculating whether there was most profit in buying or selling. Thus the markets of Turkey, supplied from all countries, refusing no objects which mercantile spirit puts in circulation, and imposing no charge on the vessels that transport them, are seldom or never the scenes of those disordered movements, occasioned by the sudden deficiency of such or such merchandize, which exorbitantly raising prices, are the scourges of the lower orders, by unsettling their habits, and by inflicting privations. From the system of restrictions and prohibitions arise those devouring tides and ebbs which sweep away in a day the labour of years, and convert commerce into a career of alarms and perpetual dangers. In Turkey, where this system does not exist, these disastrous effects are unknown.

“The extreme moderation of the duties is the complement of this regime of commercial liberty; and in no portion of the globe are the officers charged with the collection of more confiding facility for the valuations, and of so decidedly conciliatory a spirit in every transaction regarding commerce.”

“Away with the supposition that these facilities, granted to strangers, are concessions extorted from weakness! The dates of the contracts termed capitulations

lations, which establish the rights actually enjoyed by foreign merchants, recall periods at which the Musulman power was altogether predominant in Europe. The first capitulation which France obtained was in 1535, from Soliman the Canonist (the Magnificent.)

“The dispositions of these contracts have become antiquated, the fundamental principles remain. Thus, three hundred years ago, the sultans, by an act of munificence and of reason, anticipated the most ardent desires of civilized Europe, and proclaimed unlimited freedom of commerce.”

Here are both argument and authority, at once a declaration of the principles of the Turkish government, a pledge of its future conduct, a specimen of the doctrines it wishes to inculcate, and of the use it makes of the press. In Europe we arrive at the knowledge of the advantage of free trade, by feeling the peculiar evils attached to the prohibition or taxation of each article in detail; still our inquiries are met, and our complaints arrested, by the overwhelming necessity of raising revenue, and the visible misery attending every change; each pressure, just or unjust, raises an equal outcry, every change an equal opposition. Now in Turkey freedom of commerce is not a principle taught by lamentable experience, and put in practice at the cost of much temporary loss and suffering; it is not the result of reasoning on facts collected by persevering industry; it is not the effect of opinions widely spread by public discussion;—it is a result and consequence of direct taxation. Thus, without knowing or suspecting the perils they have avoided, revenue is emancipated from all such necessities, government from such em-

barrassment and opposition, the nation from such excitement, and industry and commerce from all restriction. The revenue depending on national accumulation, must instantly feel the effects of any interference with industry; and though the government extracts the utmost it can, its own interest prevents it from exacting in such a manner as to interfere with production. Now whatever credit I am disposed to give the Arabs for sound views on these questions, I cannot suppose any similar ideas in the Turkish government; and if freedom of commerce has continued to exist up to the present day, I can only attribute its preservation to the visible decrease of direct revenue that must have instantly followed any experiment of indirect taxation.

In speaking of the Turkish finances, I have endeavoured to show the superior economy of their plan, and the ease it affords the nation, compared with the burdens laid upon it; this of course leads to a degree of commercial prosperity, which otherwise would not exist: but there is a still more important consequence flowing from this system, that of rendering commerce an operation perfectly simple and intelligible; it has no fluctuations to fear, save from the reaction of Europe; no fictitious credit is created; the consumer and producer coming almost into contact with each other, are not both rendered dependent on powerful interests and enormous capitals, that have grown up between them, and in opposition to them, employed laboriously and precariously in effecting transfers, in running risks, in overcoming gratuitous difficulties and obstacles, the effects of which are, on the one hand, greatly to augment prices, and on the other, to

accumulate wealth in the hands of a few. Freedom of exchange prevents sudden acquisition, as sudden loss, in the way of trade; none are excluded from some means of independent livelihood; competition diminishes the difficulties, expenses, and consequently the profits of commercial operations; and the price of each article is as equally raised by the labour expended in its transport and commercial exchange in the East, as it is with us, by the labour expended in its manufacture.

It is thus that, notwithstanding the robberies and violence of legal and illegal bandits, the commerce of the East, without exchanges or post offices, canals or railroads, insurances or credit; unprotected by courts at home, or consuls abroad; unprotected by a legislative body, where all interests are duly represented,—extends its gigantic operations from Mount Atlas to the Yellow Sea; from the Blue Mountains amid the deserts of Africa, to the Baikal in the wastes of Tartary; and by the slow and noiseless step of the camel, maintains the communications, exchanges the produce, and supplies the wants of three fourths of the globe.

It is impossible to witness the arrival of the many-tongued caravan, at its resting-place for the night, and see, unladen and piled up together, the bales from such distant places,—to glance over their very wrappers, and the strange marks and characters which they bear,—without being amazed at so eloquent a contradiction of our preconceived notions of indiscriminate despotism and universal insecurity of the East. But while we observe the avidity with which our goods are sought, the preference now transferred from Indian to Birmingham muslins, from Golconda,

to Glasgow chintzes, from Damascus to Sheffield steel, from Cashmere shawls to English broad cloth ; and while, at the same time, the energies of their commercial spirit are brought thus substantially before us ; it is, indeed, impossible not to regret that a gulf of separation should have so long divided the East and the West, and equally impossible not to indulge in the hope and anticipation of a vastly extended traffic with the East, and of all the blessings which follow fast and welling in the wake of commerce.

The effects still apparent of early nomade habits, the erection of pilgrimages into a religious obligation, hospitality still every where a duty, and often a privilege, readily account for the respect in which commerce is held ; nor is the sacredness of its character, and its connexion with religion extraordinary, when the periodical arrival of caravans immediately relieved the wants, and took off the superfluous produce of a country where external commerce stagnated during the rest of the year.* The caravan was then hailed

* The greater extent of coast and facility of sea carriage will partly, though, perhaps, not fully account for the absence of caravans in the West. The principal obstacles lay in the spirit which feudalism introduced into international law. I have known but of one experiment of the kind made in the west, in America ; but it was soon disturbed by the inveterate antipathy to free exchange, which, transported across the Atlantic, has been planted in that virgin soil, in strange and withering combination with civil and religious liberty.

The Mexican government being unable to protect or occupy the Texas, granted a large tract of that splendid province to American settlers, who became subjects of the Mexican republic—this opened to Mexico the prospect of many and important advantages ; the confirmation, by occupation, of its right to the province, the protection of its frontier from the Indians, the augmentation of its population and

with rapture, the beneficent effects of commerce were put in the strongest evidence, and came home to each individual.

Religious feelings have anticipated laws and supplied their place, in rendering sacred that which is useful. The great temples of Apollo were the banks of Hellas and Ionia—the several games were the fairs of Greece—and lands, by consecration to the temples, were secured to their owners, as in Turkey at this day. In the East, hadgis and fakirs were merchants; their religious character protected their merchandize;* the pilgrimages became mighty fairs: nor did the influence of the connexion rest here; commerce preserved its sacred character, even when entirely distinct from religion. The penitence, or piety of a

territorial resources, and, above all, the formation of a population towards the United States, possessing the characteristic energy of its population, and eminently capable of resisting its encroachments. For the supply of their wants, and the disposal of their produce, the settlers found it convenient to establish a yearly caravan with Louisville. A barbarous Turkish administration would have thought that the province could best understand its own wants; but the Mexican government had not emancipated itself from the prejudices of Europe. The sequel may easily be anticipated—prohibition of the caravan, contempt of the settlers for orders that could not be enforced, measures to prevent further settlements, and animosity deeply implanted, which, of course, will end in the loss of the province to Mexico.

* “Murlah is an excellent township, inhabited by a community of charuns, who are carriers by profession, though poets by birth. The alliance is a curious one, and might appear incongruous. It was the sanctity of their office that converted our bardais (bards) into bringarris (carriers), for their persons being sacred, the immunity extended to their goods, and saved them from all imposts, so that in process of time they became the free traders of Rajpootana.”—*Col. Tod's Annals of Rajasthan*, vol. i. p. 621.

devout Turk, displays itself in building a bridge or a causeway, in constructing a fountain, or planting a tree beside it, to shade the traveller or merchant ; but this feeling is particularly striking in the erection of stores for the purposes of commerce exclusively. The Turk, who builds his own habitation of lath and plaster, erects a Han of solid stone, with spacious courts, and iron gates, to protect commerce from the too frequent casualties of insurrection and fire. "They are for all men, of whatever quality, condition, or religion ; there the poorest may have room, and the richest have no more."*

The convulsions and anarchy of the East have, of course, pressed most fatally on commerce at times ; but the return of comparative order, or tranquillity, has always been accompanied by a return to freedom of commerce : at times it has been entirely relieved from all exactions whatever. It has, however, generally been subject to tolls and péage, more particularly when merely transit.

The extreme simplicity of commerce, from the absence of all legislation on the subject, is visible in the establishment of a merchant : no books, save one of common entry, are kept ; no credits (I do not allude to the scales of the Levant) are given ; no bills discounted ; no bonds, nor even receipts ; the transactions are all for ready money ; no fictitious capital is created ; no risk, or loss from bankruptcy,† to

* Wheeler.

† When people in Europe hear of such things as no bankruptcies, in a country where law can hardly be said to exist, while, notwithstanding all our legislation on the subject, bankruptcy with us forms so large a portion of mercantile risks, they either doubt the fact, or

incur. A merchant, whose capital may exceed twenty thousand pounds, will, very possibly, be without a clerk; and a small box, which he places on his carpet, and leans his elbow on, encloses, at once, his bank and counting house.

The merchant who travels by caravan, has really few risks to encounter, and but trifling expenses. He lodges without expense, and in full security, in a Han; he is never alarmed by the dangers of fluctuations of price; he has nothing to fear from the ignorance or dishonesty of an agent or broker; he brings his goods, or his money, to be exchanged for the article he wants; sees, and examines it before he buys; he has not the precarious chance of realizing a large fortune, but he has the certainty of reaping the reward of his industry. With very small capital speculations can be undertaken. A merchant can commence traffic without corporate rights or previous connexion; intelligence, industry, perseverance, and frugality, are the qualifications he requires, and however small may be his profits, if his expenses are still smaller, he considers himself on the road to wealth. Their "habits are therefore not frugal, but

account for it by supposing, that the commerce is insignificant. But to bear out the wisdom of the Turkish plan, and to show its applicability to every state of society, an example is furnished by the commercial city which is second only to London, and which has abandoned all legislation whatever for bankruptcy. The result has been rapid, beyond all calculation, and shows how intimately connected crimes are with legislation. In the city, and state of New York, the bankruptcies were—

In 1829	"	3,507
1830	"	3,126
1831	"	1,644
1832	"	432

penurious." It may be said of them, as Sir W. Temple said of the merchants of Antwerp of his day, "They furnish infinite luxury, which they never practice, and traffic in pleasures which they never taste."

The perfect simplicity of barter and the absence of mystery, risks, and fluctuations, have spread the spirit of commerce throughout the whole mass of the population; a boy of twelve years of age may have as much consideration, as a merchant, as a man of forty.* There is no portion of the population living by the exercise of the liberal professions, none exist by speculating in government securities; there are no annuitants receiving a fixed per centage on capital, or following avocations, which enable them to maintain themselves independently of agricultural or commercial pursuits; every man must put his hands or his capital to some useful purpose, hence is the whole population constantly occupied in some speculation, some matter of interest or profit. If you see a Turk meditating in a corner, it is on some speculation, the purchase of a revenue farm, or the propriety of a loan at sixty per cent.; if you see pen or paper in his hand, it is making or checking an account; if

* No inconsiderable portion of the commercial acuteness, and the family attachment, of the Easterns generally, may be attributed to their early application to business, and to the early part they take in the domestic concerns of the family. The schools among the Greek peasantry instruct the children, for a couple of hours at most, in the intervals of labour; but do not, like ours, fix them on benches for eight hours or more, taxed with probably useless studies, to the ruin of their mental energies and their bodily development; to us, therefore, the children in the East never having been made children of, look like little men.

there is a disturbance in the street, it is a disputed barter; whether in the streets or in-doors, whether in a coffee-house, a serai, or a bazaar; whatever the rank, nation, language, of the persons around you, traffic, barter, gain, are the prevailing impulses; grusch, para, florin, lira, asper, amidst the Babel of tongues, are the universally intelligible sounds.

The vast variety of coins, their extreme subdivisions, the constant change of relative value, the differences of value in neighbouring pashalics, the minuteness of calculations of interest and agio, render all classes wonderfully expert in arithmetic.

The immunities which commerce and merchants enjoy, are unfortunately not extended to other avocations; the cultivator of the soil is ever a helpless prey to injustice and oppression. The government agents have to suffer in their turn from the cruelty and rapacity of which they themselves have been guilty; and the manufacturer has to bear his full share of the common insecurity; he is fixed to the spot, and cannot escape the grasp of the local governor. The raw material monopolized by a bey or ayan, may be forced upon him at a higher price than he could purchase it himself, and perhaps of inferior quality; fines may be imposed on him, he may be taken for forced labour, or troops may be quartered on his workshop.*

* Nothing can show more strongly the capabilities and resources, which the East neglects or misuses, than such facts as the following:—"The city of Isfahan has more than doubled its inhabitants, and quadrupled its manufactures of rich silk and brocade, during the twenty years that Haji Ibrahim has been governor."—*Sir John Malcolm's Sketches of Persia*, vol. ii. p. 184.

However much the consequences of tyranny in the East are to be deplored, it cannot fail to encourage our anticipations of future regeneration, by means of our own commercial connexion with it, when we see that the discouragement of manufactures, will add the necessity of the people to the other inducements, to obtain, through respected commerce, the produce of our looms, and prevent the impositions of those fatal restrictions, which in Europe have so powerfully arrested the development of human energy and the increase of national wealth. If it is an immediate advantage to those who are unmolested in their industry, to Turks themselves, to exchange their superfluous produce, when they can, for our manufactures, how much more important is it for the peasant of the interior, to obtain thus unobserved a supply, and to dispose of his produce in return.

Hitherto, in its vast ramifications, the circulation of commerce has been maintained by the very insecurity of the government and by the greater consideration granted to this than to its sister blessings, agriculture and manufacture. In the thousands of leagues from east to west over which it extends, between latitudes nearly parallel, and climates not very dissimilar, if not all, at least many of the objects of commerce might have been produced in many other localities besides those to which they have been confined, and whence they have at present to be exported. It is thus, probably, that Tunis has remained so long in possession exclusively of the manufacture of red caps, Cashmere of shawls; that Mussulepatam has remained peculiarly celebrated for chintzes, Bagdat for brocades, Ispahan for velvets, Herat for carpets, Bo-

chara for camelets and felts, Galconda, Guzerat, Mussul and Dacca, for muslins; ebony has continued to be brought from Cochin China, aloes from Chiamsi, benzoin and camphor from Sumatra and Java.* It is on this that our hopes of commercial prosperity must rest, that notwithstanding eastern despotism, the means of exchanging commodities are open. It is established, that our cottons and muslins, calicoes, chintzes, &c., are, if not better, infinitely cheaper than those of the East. Taste is gradually directing itself to our manufactures, and money less expended than formerly on furs, jewels, Persian and Damascus blades, amber mouth-pieces and shawls. We may calculate, at no remote period, if, indeed, political troubles are arrested, of supplying the necessaries as well as the luxuries of the whole of the eastern population, whose attention will thus be exclusively directed to agriculture, and the furnishing of raw produce; when we can take from them their produce in return for our wares, or find them the means of exchanging it. These changed circumstances are beginning to produce their effects. Persia, which lately drew raw silk from Turkey for its manufactures, now has commenced to import wrought silk from England; and the current of precious metals, which a few years ago carried yearly 5,000,000*l.* towards the east, is now

* This is a general rule with a whole host of exceptions. Silk in India, tobacco all over the East, tobacc at Siraz, Sea Island cotton in Egypt. Ali Pasha attempted to transport the culture of the rose from Eski Serai to Castoria; his prototype Zalim of Kotah, attempted also to naturalize the Cashmere at Kotah; it has partially succeeded at Delhi; a colony of Damascus reproduces its steel at Mushed, &c.

drawn backwards by the spinning mules and power looms of England., "

It is not in looking on the miracles of machinery, or the accumulation of wealth at home, that a just idea can be formed of the greatness of England, or of the influence she exercises on the fate of millions of men with whom she has no visible connexion. Take some remote village of Turkey, and trace there the effects of England's machinery. This village grows corn and tobacco and cotton; it has vines and flocks; it has enough of the necessaries of life for subsistence, and cotton, and wool, and hides, for clothing; and grows no more except the portion required by government, which, if the population is Turkish, is very small. This village, then, employs one half, say, of its labour in agriculture, and one half in manufacturing its cotton into cloths, its wool into carpets, its hides into zarouchia, while fields lie uncultivated around it. It is removed from the road, not to be subject to the passage of troops, and so placed as to be hidden from the observation of travellers. Its inhabitants have no inducement to accumulate wealth, or to gain information; they are led to form no new desires, to feel no wants by intercourse or traffic with the surrounding country, because they find weaving their own cotton cheaper and less laborious than raising an additional supply of corn to exchange for the cotton cloth of their neighbours, who have no better machinery or greater expertness than themselves. But reduce prices so as to make it their interest to purchase—present the goods and the means of exchange, the whole scene instantly changes; communications are opened, connexions established,

desires created, energies raised, and progress commences. Commerce naturally, in every case, has this effect, but how important is that effect, where the objects of it are the clothing of the mass of the nation? The manufacture of cotton is the principal in-door occupation of the greater portion of the East—of above sixty millions of men, with whom our future commerce will probably be carried on through the scales of the Levant—of men who are applying their labour to manufacture the cotton, and wool, and silk, that clothe them, while their fields lie uncultivated—under a climate producing all those articles which at present give the highest remuneration for labour. Throughout these vast and varied regions, these resources have lain dormant, as in the Turkish village; because hitherto the first object of necessity was not furnished to them cheap enough to induce them to forego its manufacture, and turn their attention to cultivation. How important, then, is it to establish the fact, that our cottons are at a sufficiently low price to induce them to forego the home manufacture! It is superfluous to follow out the vast consequences thence to be deduced; but it may not be unimportant to remark, that perhaps a few pence diminution of price and charges in a pound sterling, may open or close the door of the market of a village, and for the same reason of a quarter of the globe, to our manufactures.

The village which was insulated before, now seeks to connect itself with the lines of communication with the principal marts; cultivation extends, wealth accumulates, instruction follows, desire for new objects increases, produce is raised, England's looms

have called this prosperity into existence, but she herself imposes restrictions on the only return the Turkish peasant can make, and therefore cripples his ability to purchase. From the year 1827 to 1830, our exports have increased from 531,704*l.* to 1,139,616*l.* ;* but there is no corresponding increase in our returns. England, like a large haberdashery and hardware store, displays to the longing eyes of the peasantry of the world, calicoes, long cloths, ginghams, zebras, scissors and razors; but if the merchant will not use the peasant's produce—nay, will not allow him to leave it, until exchanged, at his warehouse, the peasant, without money or credit, must wish in vain, and return home empty-handed.

To appreciate the effect of our restrictions on commerce—to form some appropriate calculation of the wonderful power this country does exercise, and which she may increase, if she chooses, to an incalculable extent—it is, I think, absolutely necessary to have practically examined, to have seen with one's eyes, to have felt with one's hands, the material and palpable contrast of their and our powers of production. Wandering through a village fair in the centre of Roumelie,

* Of these sums cottons formed in the first year £464,873, and in the last £1,037,160. Yet notwithstanding this rapidly increasing importation of our wove cottons, the demand for twist, to mix with home-spun cotton yarn or silk, has advanced as rapidly. While this fact confirms our superiority, even in the most elementary portion of the manufacture, it proves that our present supply has, comparatively speaking, little affected the home manufacture, and leaves us to infer the vastness of the demand which we shall soon have to meet. From 1828 to 1831, the exportation of cotton yarn to Turkey has been as follows: £10,834.—£39,920.—£95,355.—£105,615. However, the year 1828 is far below the general average.

I have observed this circulation at its extreme point, effecting its return, and changing its form with its direction, without the confusing medium of exchanges, custom-houses, protections, drawbacks—without any uncertainty as to the conclusions to be drawn from them, or doubts as to their accuracy. I could not then help comparing commerce to a circulation like that of the human frame, animating the habitable globe; which, expelled from England as the heart, is hurried along through the larger vessels; then dispersing itself, by the minutest channels, over the whole body, repairs exhaustion, supplies force, adjusts the substance to the functions, the powers to the necessities; and extending ever further and further its growth, and augmenting its strength, endows the whole with motion and with life. The power of the heart could have driven forth a much larger quantity of blood, but for the congestion of the returning fluids in the receiving veins. The cause of this congestion appeared only in examining the heart itself; the passages through which the blood was expelled were in their natural flexible and active state; the vessels by which the returning fluid was poured in, were infected with the most strange diseases—one was contracted so as to allow the life blood to pass but drop by drop—one was ossified into lifeless insensibility—one was afflicted by vast aneurisms, where masses of the agile fluid remained in complete stagnation—others were entirely closed, and the blood had to force open new and circuitous passages, or even to burst through the natural and legitimate channels. But the strangest part of the history is that this complication of diseases is not brought on

by natural and unavoidable causes, but by this, that the individual to whom this heart belongs, having a burden to bear, lays the weight of that burden on his palpitating breast, instead of casting it on his brawny shoulders.*

It has been remarked, that the price of labour in Turkey, in proportion to the price of corn, is higher than in any country in Europe. The cause of this very surprising fact has been found by some in the great number of feast-days; the peasant requiring to gain, during his days of labour, the means of sup-

* It would seem that in commercial legislation wrong was ever ready to answer wrong, but that liberality is doomed never to meet with its reward, or freedom with reciprocity. It is particularly from those countries which unrestrictedly admit our manufactures, that our shipping find no return cargo. To this the Brazils; the Philippine Islands, &c. bear testimony, as well as Turkey. In restrictions on commerce, it may be difficult to point out one in its sphere more absurd than another; the following, therefore, does not merit special condemnation. The return cargoes from Turkey, except the fruit ships, are exceedingly light; therefore heavy goods might be taken in even by laden ships, without loss of freight. Milo abounds in admirable mill-stones, which, I believe, answer better than the French burr for the hard wheat of the Black Sea, so much preferred in the Levant to the soft, though not so in England, for want of proper stones. These stones, of full dimensions, might be shipped at Milo for five or six pounds the pair. But will they answer here? Masters of merchantmen are not millers, to be able to judge; but even if a pair were bought on trial, they would be met with a duty of £11. 8s. The French burrs pay but £3. 16s. the 100, and the stones made from them cost £35.

An extensive shipment of gingham for Manilla was lately (end of 1832) ordered from England; the order was subsequently transferred to Rouen, notwithstanding the inferiority of the French article, *because the custom-house engaged itself to grant either franc entry or diminished duties for the return cargo!*

port for the days of idleness. But, do the saints' days of Spain enhance in that country the value of man's labour? The fact is, that the price of labour is high, because labour is exceedingly productive, and more productive than in any other country of Europe, *mutatis mutandis*, because commerce and industry are wholly unshackled; but that very freedom of commerce renders industry unproductive, when applied to the manufacture of goods, that commerce can furnish at a cheaper rate; and hence, throughout Turkey, all manufacturers have lately suffered a ruinous fall in wages, which has affected wages generally; but as the great mass of production is the result of domestic industry, filling the intervals of other work, the consequence of that fall of wages has not transferred to us, as yet, more than a small portion of the supply of the country.

However, the agricultural population, when fully employed, have little time to spare for manufactures. The women employ a great portion of their time in grinding corn with the hand-mill, and in carrying water. The universal taste for embroidery consumes a large portion—and the labour attendant on the cultivation of tobacco, which falls to the women's share—the tending of silk-worms—the picking and sorting of cotton, &c. are employments far more profitable than spinning or weaving: during periods of anarchy, agriculture is arrested; they then find some resource in domestic manufacture; but when tranquillity is restored, domestic manufacture becomes excessively expensive.

The profits have been reduced to one-half, and sometimes to one-third, by the introduction of Eng-

lish cottons, which, though they have reduced the home price, and arrested the export of cotton-yarn from Turkey, have not yet supplanted the home manufacture in any visible degree; for, until tranquillity has allowed agriculture to revive, the people must go on working merely for bread, and reducing their price, in a struggle of hopeless competition. The industry, however, of the women and children is most remarkable; in every interval of labour, tending the cattle, carrying water, the spindle and distaff, as in the days of Xerxes, is never out of their hands. The children are as assiduously at work, from the moment their little fingers can turn the spindle. About Ambelakia, the former focus of the cotton-yarn trade, the peasantry has suffered dreadfully from this, though formerly the women could earn as much in-doors, as their husbands in the field; at present, their daily profit (1831) does not exceed twenty paras, if realized, for often they cannot dispose of the yarn when spun.*

	piastres.	paras.
* Five okes of uncleaned cotton, at seventeen paras .	2	5
Labour of a woman for two days, (seven farthings per day)	0	35
Carding, by vibrations of a cat-gut	0	10
Spinning, a woman's unremitting labour for a week	5	30
Loss of cotton, exceeding an oke of uncleaned cotton .	0	20

Value of one oke of cotton-yarn Prs. 9 00

Here a woman's labour makes but 2*d.* per day, while field-labour, according to the season of the year, ranges from 4*d.* to 6*d.*; and at this rate, the pound of coarse cotton-yarn cost in spinning 5*d.*

One oke of this thread weaves into forty pikes, † seven-eighths wide, (thirty-two yards, twenty-one inches wide,) worth twenty piastres, and is the work of one man for three days. This leaves the weaver about 10*d.* per day, and shows that we have not yet

† Pike three quarters of a yard.

Under such unfavourable prospects, manufacture, there can be no doubt, as soon as anarchy ceases, will give no longer employment to any portion of the population, if it can be supplied cheap enough from Europe; and if the produce of the country can be taken in exchange. It is impossible to ascertain, with any approximation to correctness, either the quantity of labour expended at present in supplying the demand, or the increase of exchangeable commodities, which the brightening prospects of the country may call forth. The following calculation will at least prove the importance of this branch of commerce.

In the southern provinces, the poorest family requires twenty okes of uncleaned cotton, and ten of wool for its yearly consumption, and the manufacture of these occupies one third of their in-door labour. The twenty okes of uncleaned cotton will be reduced to four of manufactured, or eleven pounds; of this eight pounds will consist of such stuff as they would willingly purchase if they had the means. Handkerchiefs, shirting, long-cloth, coarse cotton stuffs, napkins, and clothing in general. It must be recollected that this

brought our coarse cottons into the same competition with theirs, as we have our yarn. Their own yarn being unequal, heavy in weaving, and liable to break, the weavers prefer much the English yarn. When they weave entirely with it, from one oke, which costs them twenty piastres, they weave seventy pikes, which sell for fifty-two and a half piastres, or thirty paras per pike; but the peasants prefer half and half,—the warp (*stimoni*) of English yarn, which is less liable to break, and allows the shuttle to run more freely—the woof (*yfani*) of home spun, which gives the stuff more body. The country people are content to pay for this, as much as for the cloth, entirely wove of English yarn, of which the cost price is one fifth higher. This then is the article we ought to imitate.

is the very poorest class. Two pounds, then, for each individual will certainly be far below the mark ; but this would give us, taking the population at twelve millions, 24,000,000 pounds of manufactured cotton, for European Turkey and Greece. The coarse cotton cloth which they require averages, as above stated, seventy pikes, at thirty paras per oke, or rather more than five shillings per pound—at least one fourth more than the value of such stuff in England, which makes £5,000,000. This embraces only the coarse and heavy stuffs, used by the peasantry, and which do not figure at all in our first exports. These consisted of jaconets, tangibs, calicos, lappets, dimmities, gingham, imitation shawls, handkerchiefs, and chintzes. The Americans were the first to turn their attention to the coarse unbleached cotton stuffs. Plain goods now form one half of our assortments ; but, as I have above remarked, although our handkerchiefs and imitation shawls are commonly to be seen throughout the villages, and at the country fairs, we can scarcely be said to have entered on the branch to which our future commerce will be chiefly indebted. Native manufactories for the former articles have nearly ceased to work ; of six hundred looms, for muslins, at Scutari, that were busily employed in 1812, forty only remained in 1821 : in 1812 there were two thousand weaving establishments at Tburnovo, in 1830 there were only two hundred. |||

The change of taste among the Turks has conspired, with other circumstances, to give our manufactures a favour which we could not reasonably have expected. We are still far from rivalling in fineness

the muslins and chintzes of the East ; our red is generally inferior to theirs, and formerly they would look neither at our cottons nor our hardware. Cheapness, substance, and material value, are now more attended to, and turbans and belts are in part thrown aside ; still the consumption of eastern articles is immense, and the intricacy of their circulation throughout the country is quite surprising. I subjoin a list of the caravans which used to arrive in the course of the year at Aleppo, with the principal objects brought by each, from which it will be observed what a large portion of fine cottons form the internal commerce.*

* Caravans to Aleppo bring from Bassora and Bagdad—

1. Pearls, cottons, shawls, Indian drugs, perfumes, porcelain ; from China, matts ; from Arabia, camels.
2. From Moussul and Merdin—cotton-yarn and cotton stuffs, galls.
3. Diarbekir—Indians, died cotton and cotton stuffs, red cotton, thread, Morocco leather, goat's wool, galls.
4. Marach—timber, furs, goat's hair.
5. Orfa—white cotton, and cotton stuffs, Morocco leather, goats' hair.
6. Antab—white cotton stuffs, wrought Morocco leather.
7. Killis—cotton stuffs, and cotton wool and yarn, silk, galls, oil.
8. Idlib and Riha—5,000 quintals of soap, oil.
9. Van Teflis and Kars—chiefly furs.
10. Erzerum and Livas—furs, goat's hair, wax, gum ammoniac.
11. Guzun—linens, felt.
12. Tocat—silk, fur, anise, copper.*

* Numerous convoys of camels usually transported the copper. These were not unfrequently taken for forced labour. The copper was deposited in a caravanserai, and the camel drivers would return, and continue the transport. Copper not being perishable, was more subject to be interrupted in this way than any other merchandise, but an instance of the copper so stopped (often for many months) having been lost or stolen, was unknown.

Of eleven caravans, arriving in opposite directions, the principal merchandize is cotton goods, and these in transit. An experienced Algerine merchant, calculated, ten years ago, the value of muslins consumed in Turkey and in Africa at £10,000,000. annually—a sum apparently incredible. This individual, convinced of the advantages of a direct trade between England and the Barbary coast, which had previously been carried on through Leghorn, Genoa, and Gibraltar, but with very little spirit,* came to Eng-

13. Trebizonde—cotton stuffs, and lint.
14. Malatic—cotton stuffs, dried fruits.
15. Latakia—silk, Mokka coffee, rice, and Egyptian produce.
16. Constantinople—cotton and woollen stuffs of Germany, printed muslins, wrought amber, and fur.
17. Broussa—silk, satin, and velvet sofa covers.
18. Smýrna—European cotton and woollen stuffs, hardware, horlogerie, &c.
19. Tripoli of Syria—silk.
20. Damascus—Mokka coffee, soap, silk, produce of Damascus looms, cotton yarn of India, dried fruit.
21. Mecca—coffee, scented woods, pearls, ambergris, drugs of Arabia and India.

* “*From the circumstance of there being no direct trade from this country with Tripoli, or, I believe, with any of the ports of Barbary, English goods (the demand for which is daily increasing, amongst a population of not less than five millions, within six hundred miles of the coast) are sold at enormous prices, although frequently of the very worst description. Arab or Moor merchants, who alone have hitherto ventured into the interior, are encouraged and treated with great liberality. After a residence of less than nine years, several of them are known to have returned with fortunes of 15 and 20,000 dollars, which might probably have been doubled by more intelligent traders, as the commodities, chiefly European, are purchased at a full advance on the European price of 250 per cent.*”—*Denham's Narrative*, p. 329. *Articles in demand, cottons, silks, arms, hardware, &c.*

land, and speculated at once to the amount of £250,000. Political causes put an end to this opening traffic; but then it was his opinion, that England had only herself and her consular system to blame, if she did not supply the whole of central and maritime Africa.

CHAPTER VIII.

A VERY important question is—what nations are able to compete with us—the quality and price of their goods, their means of exchange, and facilities of transport.

I have mentioned the coarse stuffs of the Americans; but it is abundantly evident, that if we can undersell the Americans in their own markets, they cannot cope with us in the markets of Turkey, unless by means of our restrictions on returns. There is little doubt that, had the company continued to exist, it would have transferred from us to them the cotton trade, as it did the colonial, at a time when their flag was not recognized, when they had neither consuls nor commercial establishments, and when the seas were covered with our pendants, and Sicily and Italy were occupied by our troops. The erection of Malta into a free port gave the native merchants an English market, beyond the control of the company, rendered their monopoly void,^m and led to its quiet and voluntary extinction; but as America takes fruit and silk, and a considerable quantity of opium,*

* When the commercial monopoly of the East India Company ceases, this traffic will probably cease. The Indian opium, at pre-

for her China trade, she can advantageously dispose of some cotton in return.

Our principal rival in Turkey in Europe is Austria, or rather Germany, which has hitherto carried on immense traffic in this quarter. The fair of Leipsic supplies a great proportion of mixed goods, and we have lately seen even Persians carrying gold thither, for American furs. The iron of Stiria has a well-deserved celebrity; the linens of Lusatia and Saxony are unrivalled; the cottons of Bohemia are good, and adapted to the wants and tastes of the country; and the light cloths of Belgium are in the highest esteem throughout Turkey. Brass, wrought and gilt, is supplied by Vienna, glass by Bohemia, porcelain by Vienna and Saxony. The proximity of the two countries, long-established connexions, and the facilities afforded to the Greek merchants, of making up their assortments in person, foster a traffic, naturally immense, and which Austria directs her utmost attention to encourage, according to her commercial lights.

Mr. Beaujour enters into elaborate calculations to prove that the manufactures of France were cheaper and better than those of Germany, and knows not how to account for their being almost entirely supplanted by those of the latter country; he does not seem to have felt that European governments have uniformly sacrificed the interests of their commerce to the gains and privileges of their merchants, and the

sent so much preferred to that of Turkey, will, when reduced in price, exclude the latter from the China market. Yet the Turkey opium is calculated by Thompson to contain three times as much morphia as that of India.

dignity of their consuls. He himself, in two lines, explains the cause of the prosperity of German commerce. “Germany has a factory and a consul at Salonica; *but as its commerce with Turkey is free, the Greeks have taken possession of it, and the consul and factory have little to do.*”*

Yet, notwithstanding the concurrence of so many favourable circumstances, the commerce of Austria has, for twenty years, been on the decline; and must decline further, in the number at least of articles, when direct and habitual communications are established with England, from the operation of two sets of causes:—first, the obstacles which the change of circumstances, and the regulations of Austria, have raised to this traffic; and secondly, the superiority of the English manufactures.

These obstacles apply not to the introduction of Austrian goods, but to the effecting of returns. These returns consisted of red cotton yarn from Ambelakia, cotton wool from Serres, which once supplied all the manufactures of Germany; tobacco from Jenidje, hides and swine from Servia, silk, dyes, wool, and other articles not worth enumerating. But formerly, the exports of Turkey to Germany greatly exceeded the imports. These were, at the close of the last century, for Roumelie £80,000, and the exports £200,000; the difference was paid in the produce of the mines of Hungary and Transylvania, coined expressly for the Turkish market. But now cotton yarn, instead of being exported, is imported into Turkey; the cotton wool, for the German manufactures, now comes from Egypt, by Trieste; Turkish tobacco is

* Tableau du Commerce de la Grece, Lettre xviii.

prohibited, for the encouragement of Hungarian tobacco; Germany seeks a vent for her increasing production of wool: hides and swine are heavily taxed—and a return, in specie, involves the loss, either, apparent in the exchange, or non-apparent in the increased price of the imported goods, of all the difference between the monetary and real value of the Turkish coin. If Turkey exported, from some other point, value to Germany or to Europe, that balanced the imports here, or elsewhere, this loss would be avoided, because, by bill, value would be exchanged for value, in either country, without having recourse to the forced denomination of the sultan's coin; but as the currency is managed at present, the effect on commerce is incalculably detrimental; and so obstinately does the government adhere to its system, that each Vienna post, once a fortnight, exports a million of piastres, in order to pay for goods, or to answer bills simultaneously drawn; and imports sequins, to coin into piastres, of a constantly lowering standard.

It is curious that while Europe, of all articles circulated by commerce, has consented to allow free ingress and egress to the precious metals alone, Turkey has subjected these alone to legislative restriction; * the cause of the deviation, in both cases, from the common practice in this single instance, was, perhaps, the idea of intrinsic value of the precious

* Our treaties with Turkey particularly stipulate free export and import of ducats and sequins, nor does Turkey place any obstacle in the way of their introduction or extraction; but she does to their circulation, even as merchandize.

An Arab commentator on Makrizi, quoted in M. de Sacy's *Chrestomathie Arabe*, observes, that "legislative interference with the

metals. It is to be hoped, that Turkey will soon put them on the footing of other merchandize; and may it not also be hoped, that Europe, seeing the increased prosperity that the freedom of these objects of exchange has produced, will raise all other objects equally—receiving their value from labour, and their price from demand—to the same state of independence.

But the crowning obstacle in the way of German commerce is the quarantine. Austria takes great credit to herself for the vast expense she incurs, and for the loss her commerce suffers in being the bulwark of Europe against the infection of Turkey. One single fact will show the hollowness of her philanthropic pretensions. Her southern boundary is the Save to Belgrade, and the Danube to Orsova; the great difficulty of interrupting the communications across these rivers, every where abounding in monoxyls, or little boats of hollowed trees, must be very apparent; and if she wished to prevent, or if she really feared contact, she would hold out no inducements to smuggling, thereby to endanger the whole of Europe, and render nugatory her sanitary cordons, and the heavy expense and losses they occasion; or if she runs the risk of smuggling, it will, of course, be supposed it is for the protection of some important branch of revenue: no such thing—a paltry gabelle on salt has established the nightly intercommunication of the tribes on the opposite banks. The fact is, that the Slavonic

currency, so as to elevate or depreciate^u its value, is hurtful to the subjects and to commerce, and involves it in great and ruinous evils; this has caused the slaughter of vizirs and great men, foments domestic troubles, and excites civil war.” This is prophetic of the actual crisis.

military colonists, settled by Maria Theresa on the borders of Hungary and Transylvania, to overawe the Hungarians and separate them from the Turks, no less than to defend the empire, are the key-stones of Austria's military organization; and she endeavours to prevent regular commercial or other connexions, being formed between them and the Servians. The infection she dreads, is the liberal ideas of the subjects of Turkey, and through them the influence of Russia, which, in this quarter, is a propagandist!

To all these causes, which are more than sufficient to account for the decline of German commerce, must be added this—that on her very frontiers she can be undersold in many articles by English goods, after supporting charges of sea and land carriage, to the amount of from fifteen to twenty-five per cent. This I have ascertained on the spot, by a careful calculation of expenses.

The difference between having goods to return in exchange for goods received, or effecting the return by gold or bills, is just the difference between single and double profits; but besides this difference, the combined operation lightens the expenses on each, by dividing them; therefore, a country having nothing to give in exchange for goods she receives, pays higher for these goods than if the same machinery had a double office, and profited by a counter operation; but Turkey not having as yet saleable produce to give in exchange, is obliged to pay in a coin depressed by legislative means. The penalties of death and excommunication maintain a false and nominal value; inferior coins are forced into circulation at higher denominations; foreign coin is excluded from

the currency ; and when, after completing the circle currency generally describes, it returns to the coffers of the government, reduced to its real value, it is succeeded by a new coinage still further debased. Thus a sovereign, which might be coined (1831) into one hundred and ten piastres in gold, or twenty shillings, which might be coined into three hundred piastres of silver, if silver it can be called, can only be exchanged for seventy-five piastres. Commerce suffers not less from this serious loss than from the consequent uncertainty. No man can calculate on the state in which the exchange will be, when the orders he may be disposed under actual circumstances to give are transmitted to him ; but this obstacle is independent of the commercial question ; neither is it founded on maxims of the government or prejudices of the people ; it is in direct opposition to all these : nor is there any rational motive for its continuance. Indeed, the evil is arrived at such a pitch, and foreign governments have become so sensible to it, that an alteration must speedily take place.

Guarded round, as every state of Europe is, by custom-house regulations, the existence of entire freedom of commerce on any portion of its soil, is a point which, at the present moment, yields in urgency to no higher political consideration. While the "continental system" prevailed, through Turkey, our merchandize found a passage—at the present moment our commerce may be said to be excluded from all the countries to which the Blackⁿ Sea gives access. The coasts of Abazia and Georgia are hermetically sealed to us ; the only good harbour to the north is shut to all merchantmen ; our vessels are next to pro-

hibited at the mouths of the Danube, and we have no depôt within reach.

Odessa, though a free port, is but a commercial goal, of which Russia holds the keys; but when that city had ten versts around it included within the barriers, smuggling was conducted on such an extensive scale, that large seizures of contraband goods, made even at Moscow, were traced to Odessa: the freedom of the port had only existed three years, when the government, indignant at the abuse of the privileges with which it had been exclusively endowed, revoked them. In so short a period the distribution of contraband goods, in such large quantities over so considerable an extent of country, proves to demonstration, that an immense traffic would be carried on with southern Russia, were it not for her custom-house regulations, and proves also the inability of her protective measures to exclude foreign commerce where a depôt is at hand. No doubt the venality of the agents must have contributed more to its introduction, than the enterprise of the smuggler, considering that the open frontier did not exceed eighteen or twenty versts. To the abolishment of the privileges of Odessa,* the merchants, however, opposed

* When the merchants remonstrated against the subversion of the privileges of Odessa, they did not deny that extensive smuggling had taken place, and in proportion to the facility of obtaining goods, but they denied all participation in it. They urged that it was the government's business to consider the risks of contraband trade, before it allowed a depôt to be formed on its coasts, and before it induced merchants to break up their establishments elsewhere. If any additional proof were required of the impracticability of Russia's enforcing her tariff, it would be found in the rigour adopted in 1823

the most uncompromising and universal determination of abandoning the cherished city, and in 1823, a compromise took place, and the barriers of the free ports were contracted to the extremities of the leading streets. Since that period, the duties have been doubled, and those of the north-east coast, raised by one sweeping measure, in January 1832, to 80 per cent.

At that period Russia could not interfere with the commerce of Wallachia and Moldavia;* now she has wrested from Turkey the delta at the mouth of the Danube, so that every entrance to that river is within her grasp, and though she has not nominally

towards Odessa, in the multiplication of barriers, guards, and forms, and the reduction of the limits of the free town to the narrowest bounds, while, at the same time, the inducements held out to smuggling were increased by the augmentation of duties, and by the excessive increase of prohibitions. In 1819, the prohibited articles were three; by the tariff of 1822, they were increased to two hundred and ninety-one! in 1831, the imposts on the produce of our looms, which she admits, were doubled; in 1832, in her tributary states between the Black Sea and the Caspian, these imposts have been augmented between six and seven fold! It is to be remarked, that the contraband trade, which spread itself throughout the empire, (when it had a depôt at hand,) had not the encouragement of these restrictions and high duties.

* The commerce of the provinces has hitherto been crippled in various ways; misgovernment and violence at home, the restrictions on the navigation of the Euxine, and the dangers created by these restrictions; and the mistaken policy of Constantinople, which, in these exclusively Christian provinces, deviated from her Mussulman rule and legislated for commerce, to render them the granaries of Constantinople. All exportation, (save of wool, yellow berries, and hare skins,) was forbidden, except to Constantinople.

imposed restrictions or duties on vessels entering, no less than eight visits of captains of armed Russian vessels have been inflicted on vessels under the English flag, before reaching Galatz, with detention and presents to each. Compared, then, with 1822 and 1823 at the present moment, the rewards offered to the smuggler are tripled, and her means of restriction not increased in her own country, and would be wholly ineffective in the provinces to the south, as in the countries to the east, if a depôt of English wares were placed within their reach. Such an establishment would indeed be most injurious to her projects for demoralizing the Cossack, Tartar, Georgian, Circassian,* and Wallachian populations, and to her supremacy on its present unhappy conditions in these regions.

The imports of the provinces exceed at present £300,000, two thirds in cottons and colonial produce, which England does supply, or ought, by the cheapness and other advantages, to supply. These are imported by our colonial vessels (Ionian and Maltese) into Galatz, or overland from Leipsic.

By an experiment lately made, a saving equal to that which I have stated in speaking of Roumelie, has been established by direct importation from England; the same goods may be furnished 20 per cent. lower than

* Some years ago, before the Russian influence had extended so far as at present, the cabinet of St. Petersburg formed the project of anticipating its conquests by commercial connexions with these populations: the experiment was conducted altogether *à la Russe*; a commercial commandant was named for New Russia, independent of the civil and military governors; having under his command a flotilla, independent of the naval commander on the station!

if purchased at Leipsic ; and the tallow and hides of the provinces have been sent to London, and promise at least to hold their ground against those of Russia. There, therefore, can be little doubt, that Russia, in pursuing her regular system, has two additional inducements to cripple the trade of the provinces. First, to prevent the introduction of articles which may be smuggled into her territory ; secondly, to arrest the exports of raw materials which compete with her own produce.

But there is still behind a stronger motive for sealing up the Danube. That river is the natural artery of Europe : if its navigation were open, the territorial riches of Hungary would be poured by it into the general commercial circulation, and almost every article which is exported from Russia at present, exclusively, would descend that river, and its tributary streams, the Save, the Drave, the Theisse, the Drin, the Morava, the Alt, and the Pruth, not only to the ruin of Russian export and transit commerce, but to the increase of the internal prosperity and political importance of the countries on her southern frontier.*

* These are principally Hungary and Galicia. The immense impulse that would be given to Hungary cannot be mistaken. The riches, the variety of her territory, are perhaps unrivalled ; but placed in the centre of Europe, she is destitute of an outlet. Undeveloped as her powers are at present, she was with difficulty restrained from rising to support Poland. The prosperity of Hungary, then, would prove the most powerful bar to the extension, in that direction, of the Russian dominion. The progress of Galicia, being a Polish province, it is most essential to Russia to arrest. She can never bear the sight of a Slavonic people flourishing under German dominion ; and, as Poles, she may be supposed to entertain respecting them peculiar views. Yet, all things considered, Galicia may

The necessity of Wallachia to Austria would become more absolute, and her commercial interests, with those of England, would combine with their political purpose and with Turkey, in making a firm and uncompromising stand against further encroachments; there would be no disguising the visible and direct importance to the three empires, which every foot of territory would now in their quarter require.

The navigation of the Danube has hitherto been impeded by rocks at Orsova, which proved an insuperable obstacle to the enormous flat-bottomed barges; but that these rocks present any insurmountable difficulty, has been completely disproved by an experiment of the enterprising and patriotic Count Shahini, who built a vessel of considerable tonnage above Semlin, and navigated her in safety to Constantinople. The practical obstacle to the formation of a company for clearing, at this point, the bed of the river, has been the inefficiency of Hungarian law in protecting joint stock interests, and the Hungarians resist the slightest change in their institutions; but the rapidly increasing commercial enterprise and information of that country will soon remove these obstacles. The merchants of Buda have already formed an

be reckoned the most advanced province of all Poland: to the exuberant fertility of the southern and eastern provinces, it unites as forward a moral state as is to be found in the western. Though the nobles may sigh for the Russian dominion, the serf is in a far better condition than heretofore; and German influence must improve the cultivation of the soil. The debouché of this province would be by the Pruth and the Danube. The present enlightened viceroy of Galicia, the arch-duke Ferdinand d'Este, has turned his mind particularly to the opening of the Danube.

association for the effecting of this grand work, and the navigation of the Danube is now regarded as the most important of national questions. A steam-boat has been established; extensive coal measures, equal to the best in England, have been discovered and worked at a very trifling expense, on the banks of the river itself, at Orsova, and also at Edenburg; so that in all probability the navigation of this majestic stream will soon be extended to the Euxine. Under such circumstances, the possession of its mouth by Russia becomes a question of first-rate importance; and it cannot be doubted, that she will employ every means to close it, if not to all commerce, at least to the commerce of the nation she very gratuitously assumes to be her rival.*

Russia has excluded, by ukase, merchantmen from Sevastopol, the only good harbour of her possessions on the Euxine: her duties and regulations at Odessa arrest commercial enterprise and communication. Commerce will soon be excluded from the mouths of the Danube. How can Austrian and English commerce, which in this case have one object, be brought to break through the Russian system? How can Austrian produce force its way out? How can English manufactures find their way in?

The Hungarian merchants have been dreaming (for I am afraid to use a more positive term) of re-opening the ancient mouth of the Danube from

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* Russia's condescension to republican America proves, that next to arresting all commercial connexion between the countries she has marked for her own, and other nations, she has at heart the substitution of any other commerce to that of England.



MOUTHS OF THE DANUBE
Illustrative
of
The Projected Canal.

Rissovata, to Kustendge on the Black Sea, where a cut of less than thirty miles would save a circumnavigation of above two hundred and fifty, as may be seen from the annexed plan, would avoid the Russian posts and gun-boats, and the batteries of Brailow and Ismail, would shorten by nearly one hundred and fifty miles the subsequent voyage to Constantinople, and become in proportion to its length the most important canal in the world.

It is chiefly for the transport of merchandise coming from or going to the Leipsic fairs, that steam navigation has been worth establishing as far as Belgrade; but if the difficulties at Orsova were removed by this river and by steam, the whole of the East would communicate with the German fairs. The Persian, the Anatolian, the African merchandise, if even not allowed to pass the mouths of the river, and until a canal sooner or later unites the Danube and the Euxine, would follow the stream to the point nearest Enos, Rodosto, and Constantinople, that is, to Nicopoli, at the confluence of the Alt, near which point two of the largest fairs are now established; but if English wares can penetrate in sufficient abundance into the provinces—and that they will so penetrate there can be little doubt—their route will be through this same place; it has local importance enough to attract speculation, it is in the immediate vicinity of Ternova and Semendria, large and industrious Bulgarian towns; it is at four or five days' distance only from Philipopolis, by the easiest passage of the Balcan, in the centre of Wallachia and Bulgaria, on the division of the road from Constantinople to Jassy and to Hermanstadt; and when the course of

the Danube is cleared, it will, it must become the central point of union, and of the meeting of German and English commerce, which are not only allied by the hostility of Russia, but which are so by direct impulse of their natural energies, and also by the difference of the branches in which they excel. It would indeed be folly in us to impede the sale of our cottons in the vain endeavours to beat their woollens; and in them, it would be equally absurd to jeopardy and curtail the export of their beautiful linens, glass, and porcelaine, corn, wine, and hides, by endeavouring to exclude us from a market for our muslins, tin, and cutlery. The world is yet wide enough for our industry as well as our numbers, when such fields as the East are open to its conquests, is it not pitiable to see England and Austria—or Austria, at least—losing such vantage ground to both, by fruitless jealousy? Here, in the vicinity of Ternova, is the geographical point at which their interests meet, where they will adjust themselves, and where they ought to strengthen themselves for a joint and vigorous assault on the barriers of Russia, which may happily force that government no longer to abuse the vast power of doing good which she possesses.

If we succeed in opening a direct commercial intercourse between England and Roumelie, depôts of our merchandise will be formed at Serres, Adrianople, and Philipopolis. The provinces are at present principally supplied from the fair, of Leipsic, as European Turkey is; the transfer of this demand from that market to England, for such articles as England can supply cheapest, will, in the provinces, depend on the same causes as in European Turkey—the su-

periority and cheapness of our wares, the facility of making returns, and the lowering of charges. If depôts are established in the above-mentioned cities, and if there they are to be procured from one-third to one-fifth cheaper than at Leipsic and Frankfort on Oder, the provinces will supply themselves of course from these depôts in preference to Leipsic. Across the provinces to the Russian frontier, the charges of transport would not exceed, at the very outside, one penny per pound, or two per cent. on the very heaviest and coarsest goods. Their subsequent course will depend on circumstances: they are met by an extensive and ill-guarded frontier, a disorganized and corrupt custom-house establishment, excessive duties, numerous prohibitions, and vexatious regulations; while the Jews, established in every important town, travelling from fair to fair, with perfect knowledge of the country, and of the means of corruption, would form a ready organized body of smugglers.

If it has been matter of congratulation at home that the facilities of smuggling into our own country applied "a wholesome corrective" to our commercial arbitrariness, it surely must be gratifying to perceive that the same corrective is in process of application to this colossal empire. We do not extend our commercial relations, or form depôts by government proclamation, or for political views, but for private interests, over which the government has no authority. If, then, these connexions and depôts are remotely the means of engaging Russia in an internal struggle, of weakening her authority at home, and her power abroad, or even, as it is not unlikely, of ultimately detaching from her her southern provinces;—these

results, though foreseen by us, are still caused by herself, and our more immediate and direct interests would, on the contrary, rejoice in her averting these consequences by a complete change of her commercial system.

I have already stated, that England may undersell Austria on her Turkish frontier; what is more, she has done so. I have seen among the Illirian colonists, English cotton handkerchiefs, smuggled from Belgrade. This might be a solitary instance; but then it must be recollected, that our goods are selling at a very high rate at present, and consequently at a great disadvantage, though the English manufacturer gains not a farthing by the additional charges, and loses the increased consumption these charges arrest. The cost price of our goods is daily diminishing, both by the improvement of our machinery and the gradual abolishment of fiscal restriction and legislation, while the cost price of the articles with which we have to compete seems nearly stationary, and a disposition exists to increase, rather than to abolish, protective measures.* Should the Prussian commercial system be adopted in Germany, prices would be increased at least to the amount of the additional charges imposed on English goods. The effects of this in the market of Turkey would be the immediate substitution of the English wares, daily decreasing

* English goods, to reach Leipsic by the direct road from Antwerp, have to pass six double lines of custom-house cordons, and from Bremen or Hamburg eight. Well might Schiller, seated at Weimar, say,

Der König sperrt die Brücken und die Strassen.

in price, for German wares, which are already dearer and inferior, and which would be, under the assumed hypothesis, raised in price, or lowered in quality; but, if even one Glasgow handkerchief is worth smuggling into Hungary at present, what would be the result of the positive change in the position of the two nations, with the immense relative difference that would follow?

But, even should Austria give a formal consent to the Prussian system, it can never for a moment be supposed that she will join heartily in that scheme. When obliged to conform to the mandates of Napoleon, she winked at the introduction of English and colonial goods along her southern and eastern frontiers. Even sea-coasts are difficult enough to guard, but what possibility is there of guarding an inland frontier, when the neighbouring countries know neither custom-house nor police regulations: the enterprize is hopeless. Austria, by submitting to the Prussian system, will suffer prices to be raised generally, and smuggling to be encouraged in every direction, for the benefit of the silk and cotton manufactures of Prussia, which she can procure cheaper elsewhere, while her own iron, glass, porcelaine, &c. require no legislative countervailing encouragement, and command the market where her connexions extend; these markets being about to be reduced by the Prussian plan, which, by restricting importation, must re-act on exportation. So uncompromisingly are the interests of Austria opposed to the system, that nothing but political considerations could induce her to stand by Prussia. She sacrifices the vast, the material interests of her territory and position, to ap-

prehensions which are only not ridiculous by the enervating mode of defence she has adopted. Austria, by her custom-house system, is ever kept in alarm and therefore in danger; a constant irritation prevails at home, and a constant apprehension of France and Russia from without; yet, no country in Europe could so easily pass from indirect to direct taxation; with her position and resources, what an empire might she not by this simple change become! She would no longer have to fear France or revolution, and she would return with interest to Russia the secret shafts from which she has been so long suffering; in all these points her interests coincide with those of England, and of that coincidence we can force her to become sensible—we will drive her to co-operate with us, as a measure of self-defence, because, in the dilemma in which the Prussian system places her, she must make a decided option, and take part either with us, or against us. That her election cannot, for any permanency, be against us, the commercial facilities of European Turkey are our guarantee.

But it may be questioned how far we ought to sanction a traffic, which, by breaking through the precautionary regulations of quarantine, might expose Europe to the devastations of the plague. To this I would answer, Europe, at this moment, is as much exposed as she possibly can be. Austria, indeed, stops travellers and merchants for ten days; she exposes legitimately entered goods from ten to forty days; she opens and fumigates letters and dispatches, if for foreign governments; but though she imposes such regulations on travellers from a distance, who require to have their passports throughout regularly

countersigned, she cannot impose them on the border population. The very quarantine itself is an inducement to illegal intercourse. Every night do boats cross the Danube and the Save ; and if so clumsy an article as salt is habitually smuggled, what security is there against the introduction of the plague ; or what possibility is there of enforcing the exclusion of cottons or other goods, when the decrease of their price in Roumelie, or their increase of price in Hungary, or both these causes united, offer larger profits for smuggling these portable commodities ? The borders of Hungary cannot possibly be guarded against foreign goods, if these are to be obtained at a low price in Turkey, there is no possibility of guarding the extensive frontier to which the organization of the Austrian Douanes does not extend—the terminal rivers and mountains of Sclavonia, Hungary, Transylvania, and Bucovina. Such is the freedom of the Hungarians' internal locomotion, that unless, on crossing the frontier, or on entering a fortified town, they can wander about without a passport. I have traversed that country with bauer or peasant horses, instead of post-horses, avoiding the public roads, on which peasant horses are not suffered to transport travellers, yet saved both time and money. Entering a village in the middle of the night, the crack of the driver's whip would waken half-a-dozen peasants, who would rush out offering their teams. No efficiency of the custom-house agents could control such a people under the present system ; and a change of system, to render its efficiency greater, would bring Hungary into a state of insurrection. Even at present they question the legality of the custom-house regu-

lations, consider them partially unjust to Hungary, and innovations on their ancient and guaranteed institutions.

It would require greater local and commercial information than mine to point out all the importance of European Turkey; but I think even what I have said will show what political power and commercial advantages we may draw from her free trade system, which gives us not only an open and direct door to her own territories, and to eastern countries, but also a back entry, though an unceremonious one, to Europe itself. How important is it not only to support, but to renovate and strengthen this power: and, again, what more advantageous ally can we find for our diplomatic exertions than commerce itself? Let extensive depôts of English wares be established on the Danube and at Trebizondé, and Turkey will find in them better support than in fleets or armies.

CHAPTER IX.

THE quantity and the quality of our imports from Turkey have greatly depended on our own duties. On raw materials the duty has already been reduced ; silk comes in at a nominal duty, wool and cotton at a low one ; the excessive duties upon drugs have been somewhat reduced, not to benefit commerce, but to prevent adulteration ; and there, perhaps, could be little objection to a great reduction in the duties on ingredients for dyeing and tanning, with other raw materials, which are at present not imported at all, or, comparatively speaking, in small quantities : shumac, for instance, galls, valonea, fustic, madder,* yellow

* The Turkish madder, notwithstanding the absence of all care in its preparation, even at present divides our consumption with that of Germany, where it is treated with the utmost care, and whence it is sent, not in bulky and soiled roots, but prepared in cases. It is evident that a little care, added to the advantages of Turkey's climate, and of a sun that precludes the injurious effects of kiln drying, would improve the quality of the exported Turkish madder, and probably improve our dye. It is well known, that from the eastern shores of the Adriatic Gulph, to the western shores of the Yellow Sea, the inferiority of our red to the eastern red is an obstacle to the sale of our gingham and coloured cottons.

berries, &c.* A reduction of duties on these articles would naturally lead to attention in the cultivation and collection, would open for us a new market, lower the price, and improve the quality.†

Turkey's mineral resources are enormous, and are immediately available; that is to say, when the finance bureau and the system of farmers and pashas is abolished. The sultan has for some time been turning his attention to this subject;‡ but this, like

* The Persian are esteemed, I believe, two hundred per cent. in the market above those of Turkey, yet the Turkish yellow is as brilliant as the Persian. I have heard the dyers at Tournovo declare, that their own was surpassed by no other; but it was not the berries which grew wild on the mountains, and are sold under the name of Turkish, that they used; but berries gathered from plants cultivated by themselves. Yellow and red are the colours in which we generally fail: indeed certain stuffs for the East have to be sent across France to Zurich, for the purpose of being dyed these two colours.

† Compared with other duties, the imports on these articles are very low. It is inconceivable how, for the miserable revenue they give, we ever should have subjected these essential ingredients to any tax whatever; but however trifling such sums as 1s. 6d. per cwt. may look in the custom-house books, they are not so trifling when calculated as an ad valorem duty, to which our custom-house agents have so great an aversion; and when the ad valorem duty is calculated on the price in bond, or on the cost price, then these small sums swell in consideration. By this estimation, galls, valonea, and madder, pay ten per cent., shumac twelve, and yellow berries forty. I have seen these berries selling in the interior at 5s. the cwt., and they are charged the same duty as the Persian, which sells here for 4*l.*

‡ The sultan at one time took a personal interest in the working of the mines. I visited, at his desire, the supposed coal measures of Thrace, (Lignite,) which was anxiously hoped would be available for the steam engines. In consequence of his attention to the subject, and to excite his curiosity still further, I presented to him a little set of specimens of the rocks, &c. of Thrace. Some of

his agricultural and manufacturing schemes, have hitherto been sacrificed to the interests or caprice of favourites. There were formerly eighty-two mines worked; at present, I believe, that those of Gumush Hané, near Trebizonde, and of Ergani and Geopan, in the pashalic of Diarbekir, are alone in lingering activity. In modern Turkey, the riches of the hidden veins have been as fatal to the cultivation of the soil as under Pytheas or Cræsus, so that the neighbourhood of most of the richest mines have been converted into wildernesses.

The copper mines of Cuné, whose produce receives the designation of Tocat, Trebizonde, and Diarbekir, from the places where it is wrought, or where it receives a second smelting, and whence it is exported to Persia, to India, or shipped for Constantinople, the shores of the Black Sea, &c., is perhaps the richest copper mine in the world; the hills seem one mass of carbonate of copper. The administration too is better than that of the other mines, having long been in the hands of Armenians, who allow private speculators to extract and smelt the ore, fixing the price at which it is taken, so that if the price is not remunerating, of course the speculation is not

his attendants deeming such vulgar looking stones unworthy of the august presence, threw them away; but the sultan sent diligently to have the lost specimens replaced; orders were sent to all the mines, to have specimens forwarded to Constantinople; and on leaving that city in 1830, it was promised me faithfully, by the then favourite, that specimens should be sent for analysis to England. As may be expected, I have never heard of them since; for whatever may be the disposition of the sultan himself, little can be expected with such atours.

undertaken. The late Mr. Escalon, than whose name there is no higher authority on eastern commerce, calculated the yearly produce, twenty years ago, at nearly one-third of the produce and importation of England,* and his estimate was not deemed exaggerated by the secretary of the Armenian farmers. By Belon's account of the mines of Calcidity, their produce in the sixteenth century must have been between one and two millions of ducats. But the whole country is full of metallic riches, as the geological structure of European Turkey at least clearly indicates. The iron of Simacove is perhaps inferior to no iron in the world, and is even at present extracted in large quantities. Two very pretty pieces of brass ordnance in the arsenal of Vienna were cast by Czerni George, during his precarious and guerrilla warfare, from copper ore in Servia, which was smelted by a German miner he had kidnapped during the night.

In raw materials an improvement in the resources of Turkey offers to us the most brilliant prospects. A considerable quantity of the finer wool of upper

	Okes.
* Consumed in the Arsenal of Constantinople . . .	800,000
Exported from Trebizonde to Varna . . .	200,000
_____ to Russia . . .	200,000
Commerce of Constantinople and Smyrna . . .	120,000
_____ by Aleppo and Diarbekir to Syria . . .	100,000
Refined at Diarbekir, by Bussora, for India, . . .	
China, &c.	600,000
Consumption in Asia Minor and Persia . . .	1,000,000
	<hr/>
Okes	3,020,000

At 40 okes to the cwt. 3,775 tons.

Dalmatia passes into Austria, and is mixed with that of Saxony; and the same breed of sheep pastures over the mountains of Roumelie; their mode of life, constant exposure to the air, repeated crossing, and migrations, have maintained the quality of the fleece, though the carcass has suffered; but the complete carelessness in shearing, and the filthiness of the wool, discredit it far below its real value.

I have only to quote Egypt, to show what may be done with respect to cotton. The sea-island seed was introduced in 1818 or 1819, and Egyptian cotton* now fetches the second price in the English market. Egypt formerly imported cotton from Thessaly and Macedonia, countries which have ever been celebrated for their aptitude to this produce, and where immense tracts of rich and irrigable land lie unemployed, and which may be supposed even more favourable than Egypt to its culture. Egyptian flax has beaten that of Russia in the markets of Italy, and sells at a higher price.

The exportation of silk to this country has hitherto been considerable; but being wound in the coarsest manner, and in long hanks, it has only been used for heavy goods. I am not aware of the different varieties of worms that exist in Turkey—such information is with difficulty obtained; but I have seen and examined worms, which appeared to me to differ in nothing from the large common worm of France. I have seen others smaller, which struck me as being the small species so much esteemed by Dandolo; but I could obtain no accurate information on the

* The exports were, in 1821, 60 bags, in 1822, 50,000, in 1823, 120,000, and in 1824, 140,000.

relative consumption of leaves and production of silk. However, both from the examination by manufacturers of specimens in this country, and the opinion of French growers and Italian reelers, I have little hesitation in saying that the quality of the silk of Turkey generally, and of Roumelie, (which is only reckoned second or third rate,) is fully equal to the finest of Piedmont or of the mountainous parts of France. The temperature and exposure is very similar to that of the best silk countries of the north of Italy; but there are no snow-crowned Alps, to send late chills to retard the vegetation of the mulberries, or even to blight them. The mulberry of Turkey is that which experience has taught France to prefer—the wild white mulberry.

Even in Europe the injurious effect on silk of separating the interests of grower and reeler, have been abundantly felt. In India the Company's monopoly, had it been of silk, would perhaps have been comparatively but of little injury, compared with its monopoly of cocoons; so that, though the silk was reeled certainly on a far superior plan to that which the Hindoos employed, the result has been the deteriorating of the silk of that country from the ancient standard, and the apparently ungrounded conviction on the minds of some of the Company's highest and oldest servants, that its staple is inferior to that of Italy. In Turkey the peasant has hitherto reeled his silk in the rude manner of the country; but several hundred Piedmontese reeling machines have been established by Italians at Salonica, and by this time probably some thousand reelers have been instructed. There is little or no difficulty in learning, and the

advance of price must infallibly spread the method throughout a country where the people are at once so intelligent and have so clear a perception of profit. The expense of the machines is small; the method in no ways differs from their own, save in additional care; the diameter of the reel is smaller—the water is allowed to change itself more freely, and therefore requires more fuel; but less heat is lost—the temperature requires more attention, so that the resinous matter may be softened, but not that the silk become brittle; the threads have to be twisted round and round each other in passing out of the caldron, so that the fibres, before the resinous matter cools, may receive a rounded and compact form, and there is more refuse. In recompense for this very trifling additional labour, in 1830 the silk reeled in this way sold at Salonique for 110 piastres per oke, whilst the other sold at 60 piastres, about six shillings, per lb. If the silk thus reeled has not yet become an article of importance in commerce, it is not certainly from the inferiority of the quality, but from the political circumstances of the country.

In this branch of industry, which may one day rival or surpass the prosperity of its junior, cotton, the reduction of the high price of the raw material is of the most urgent necessity, not less for the removal of actual distress than for the realizing of the prospects it holds out. It is the capabilities of Turkey of supplying that raw material at so low a price, and of so excellent a quality, that gives to Turkish commerce, as far as regards the supply of England, its chief importance.

As the manufacture of silk goes on increasing, if

the demand for the raw material continues to anticipate the supply, the price will be maintained at a much higher rate, than if, in the same progression, the abundance of the supply had facilitated the manufacture. While the debouchés of this our new export extend to almost every mart of the world, the supply on which we depend is at present very limited. The silk of Turkey, from the mode of reeling, has hitherto been unavailable for the more important branches of the manufacture; her improved produce may therefore be considered a new article; and in consequence of the reduction of price* of this new supply, the price of silk will be everywhere lowered.

Struggling, as England and France now are, for supremacy in this branch of manufacture, we cannot be indifferent to the fact, that in three years France will have doubled her supply; † while that of Italy, on which we at present almost entirely depend for the finer qualities, increases but at a very slow rate. The fall in the price will probably be confined to the limits of France, and made available to the sole benefits of her own manufactures; but if she maintains her exclusive system, while we can raise up a new source of supply in Turkey, the additional interests involved in the growing of mulberries in France will, on each reduction of the price of silk

* The cost price of silk has generally been considered far below its market value. I have endeavoured to make a calculation of its cost price in Turkey. See Appendix.

† It was calculated that in 1835 the quantity of silk would be doubled by the coming to maturity of the mulberry trees planted in the ten or fifteen preceding years.

abroad, call for restrictions on the importations into France. The advantage of price which would have belonged exclusively to France, will not only be lost to her, but gained exclusively to England, unless France chooses to sacrifice her wretched anti-commercial system, which paralyses the commerce of Europe, by rendering almost impervious to its influence the country which naturally would be its focus.

It is not by the present exportation that the produce of Turkey can be ascertained; far less the quantity rendered disposable by the substitution of our cottons, and prospectively of our silks, for their home and domestic manufacture. As a return for our wares, they must principally direct their attention to this object. It has been the resource of the wretched peasantry during the last twelve years of anarchy. It required no sowing or reaping in the field—no cattle, implements, or seed. When the silk was obtained, it was easily transported, easily secreted, ran few risks, and was always saleable. “Silk,” the peasants used to say, “has been yellow gold to us.” The home consumption used formerly to be immense: there was no individual who did not wear some article of silk; in the furniture of the poorest peasant, the yellow threads of their coarse woollen carpets would be of silk, to give them brilliancy; the embroidery of men’s and women’s dresses, belts of the peasantry, the inner garments, and partly the shirting of the whole population, above the condition of the labourer, were of silk. Taste has now changed; cloths, shaloons, and every variety of cottons, will supplant silks, until we can supply them with improved and cheapened silk, and mixed manufactures adapted to their taste.

During the last twelve years the mulberry trees have suffered much, but they are recovering; the villages have been ruined, so that the peasant is often obliged to lay up his winter store, to lodge his family, and accommodate some of his most favoured cattle in what was his former granary; they have not had, therefore, space necessary for rearing silk-worms. But a few months tranquillity have a most miraculous effect in Turkey. Laying all these considerations together, I think we may fairly anticipate a no less important supply of raw materials from Turkey than a demand for our manufactured goods. Even in the present state of transition of the silk trade, our silks have commenced forcing their way even beyond the eastern limits of Turkey. No words or arguments of mine can add weight to these considerations. In cotton, silk, and hardware, our goods undersell the domestic manufacture—can bear the charges of transport, and yet command every native market; and throughout these extended regions no restrictions force men to prefer the bad article to the good, or the dear to the cheap.

Active traffic with Turkey, and the carrying on of that traffic by native merchants, or by Europeans acquainted with the country, instead of the medium which has been so long employed, of commission-houses, brokers, and anticipating monopolisers of the harvests and produce, would not only increase the export of these articles which are in present demand, but create new demands, by giving value to objects comparatively useless, or by converting them to new purposes.*

* The mohair, the manufacture of which, in the East itself, seems

Our factories formerly resembled military establishments in a hostile country, where the national banner waved in proud defiance to the local authorities, and the consul considered himself the depository of the power of his synonyme of Rome. The European merchant possessed exclusive privileges which rendered him obnoxious to the native merchant; but he was denied the rights of citizenship; he could hold no lands, aspire to no office; he had therefore no stake or interest in the country, and moreover he had no acquaintance with the traffic by which he lived, for his transactions were carried on exclusively through the medium of native brokers and agents.

The dissolution of the company has changed this system. Our policy is now directed to the extension of our commerce, not to the favouring of our merchants. The intermediaries of our traffic must be men acquainted with the language and with the country, possessing information and connexion, travelling from fair to fair, supplying themselves, if possible, directly from England, and, above all, emancipated from the intermeddling of consuls, and from the necessity of their invidious protection.

It cannot be advantageous for English vessels to go

to have been one of the most important branches of the commerce of Venice, has hitherto been, comparatively speaking, an insignificant one to us; the reason was, the inequality of the bales of yarn; because the producer and consumer were separated by so many intermediaries, that not only care and labour were not compensated by an additional price, but the producer in Anatoly had probably never the means of knowing what the manufacturer in England required. Now that it is imported unspun, its long-lost value may reappear.

picking up cargoes at out-ports, or scattering their shipments along the coasts; so that the coast or caravan trade, as it is called, must devolve upon the Greeks. The demand, the supply, and interchange of commodities at the numerous scales of this extensive sea coast, though exceedingly great, is too minutely subdivided for the hire and tonnage of our ships, and the capacity and temper of our masters and supercargoes; but the light Greek vessels, whose ship's company may be considered an association of traders,* barter our manufactures and colonial produce for the varied goods of the country, carry to the entre-

* That eminently active mercantile spirit which so much surprises us in nations deprived of all the advantages and facilities that European nations possess, seems ever combined with a minute subdivision of profit and loss, by which the interest of each individual restricted in amount is extended to the whole operation. This has inspired the Greeks with their truly admirable mercantile genius, they applied to commerce the rule they had adopted of self-government. The whale men of Nantucket, the most daring adventurers that the history of commercial navigation records, are organized in precisely the same manner as the Hydriots. The principle of self-government must have been carried afloat by the adventurers of the commercial republics and states, for we find the merchants on board electing their consul, and separating the judiciary functions from the office of captain—a refinement of which I have met no second example. The Genoese owners give their sailors an interest in the vessels, so that not only are wages reduced, habits of morality engendered, but vessels so navigated are insured for one half the ordinary premium, or even less, and the loss by avarie, (particular average) which falls so heavy on insurers of the Mediterranean, is never incurred by more than one in the Hundred of these vessels. But the Chinese carry the subdivision farthest. If 150 individuals are owners of a junk, each knows the particular part that is his property—the vessel is partitioned off, and each does what he likes, with his own co-partment.

pots what is required for our market, and spread the remainder according to the demand. By their acuteness, activity, and strong competition, charges are lowered, and commerce is pushed and multiplied.

The entire prospects of our Turkey trade rest, in fact, on these two points, the emancipation of commerce from the Levant Company, and the emancipation of Greece from the Turkish sway. The Greeks, on sea and on land, will be busily employed in spreading our wares over Turkey, and the shores of the Levant and Black Sea; they will retain all the inimitable qualities they before possessed, their mercantile connexion, frugal habits, laborious industry, and local knowledge; the elevation of their political character will relieve them from the oppression they formerly suffered, will give them credit and consideration among Europeans, and, joined to these advantages, the connexions which they are hourly increasing and consolidating in Europe, will supply the link so long wanting between the commerce of the eastern and western worlds.

It would be indeed miraculous, if, under so wretched an administration as that of Turkey, her system of free trade had been preserved in its original purity. Direct and indirect abuses have grown upon it, but it is rather their fewness than their number that is surprising. First, there is the depreciation of the currency, or rather the monopoly of the precious metals, into which the Turkish currency system resolves itself. Secondly, the illegal influence of the local governments, or of persons connected with them, on the markets for the territorial produce, which I have endeavoured to explain when treating of the sub-

ject it more particularly regards—the administration of the provinces; and, thirdly, increased duties and monopolies introduced of late years.

The Turks maintain, that if you impose duties on commerce you should lay them equally, as a principle of justice, on exports and imports; indeed, that a state should rather burden the exports than the imports, to make the pressure fall on the foreign consumer: so that imposts might be levied on any particular article in proportion to the advantages the country possessed in producing it. The profit would thus be drawn from territorial or local advantages, without burdening the industry of the natives, or restricting foreign commerce, were the duty graduated so as to allow the taxed article to command the foreign market, the nation making a clear gain in the ordinary way of mercantile profit. These were the principles on which the Turkish government acted, or to say more truly, were the pretended principles put forward in support of the late essays at monopolizing silk and opium. It was further argued, that the foreign merchant, the Jew, and Greek broker, the Armenian saraf, the Turkish aga, taking advantage of the necessity of the cultivator, monopolized the produce of the country at a ruinous rate for the peasant, and making large profits themselves, vilified the produce of Turkey in foreign markets. Why, said the advocates of the monopoly, should we allow these locusts to eat up the verdure of the land, make great gains for small service, lower the value of our produce, and disable the raya from paying his contribution to government? These arguments, which I am inclined to consider perfectly sound, as far as they went, unfortunately led

to decisions which overstepped the conclusions they warranted, and the remedies they suggested: a new class of evils, succeeded, or rather aggravated, those already complained of, with this unhappy difference, that the government now was interested in the abuse. These articles were henceforward to be sold by the peasant only to government agents, at a fixed low price, and government was to make the best of the market, hoping thereby to realize all the profit of the intermediaries, and to elevate the price of the commodities; but under the wretched administration of Turkey, there was no chance of inflicting this ruinous system on the country. It had required all the material power, the matured organization and intellectual superiority of England, to inflict a similar one on the Hindoo, and all the individual energy of the despotism of Mohamet Ali to introduce the like, it is to be hoped only for a season, into Egypt. The result of these measures, without entering into their operation, has been disgust of the peasantry, clamour of the former intermediaries, remonstrances of the foreign merchants and their representatives, decline of commerce, and ultimately, though the effects still in part remain, the disgrace of the favourite, to whose advantage they had principally conduced. May this lesson not prove uninstrucive!

When the monopoly of silk was abandoned, the government imposed a duty of nearly ten per cent. on exportation; but the want of custom-house cordons and officers, made it necessary for the sake of collection, to force all the silk to pass through ports where the custom-house was more efficiently organized, and more under the control of govern-

ment. The resistance this measure will infallibly create, and the paralyzation of this branch of commerce, must bring its repeal.

But sincerely do I hope that the arguments used in advocating the monopoly will not be neglected in consequence of the failure of that measure, injudicious in itself, and totally inapplicable to Turkey—which is certainly not in a state to organize a custom-house system, or to add an army of smugglers to its other ills—and that a clear perception of the effects of the present system will lead the government rather to put an end to its abuses than to share in them. A government raising its revenue by direct taxation, has so all powerful an interest in the prosperity of the state—a despotic government is so completely above the influence of castes, or corporations, that it is to be presumed that when it experiences the practical evils of any measure, it will change its policy, now that the oligarchy, that so long interposed itself between the interests of sovereign and nation, has been swept away; and that, time and circumstances permitting, an administration will be organized dependent on the sovereign, and representing his interests when exercising his authority.

Thus it would appear that the obstacles which in Turkey oppose the improvement of her territorial resources, and the increase of her commerce, arise neither from system nor privilege, but from abuses, engendered by the anarchy of the country and the weakness of the government. These obstacles can only be removed by strengthening the hands of the government, by acquiring influence over its councils, and by exercising that influence judiciously. Turkey

is now daily in the schools of experimental administration—she is assuming a place at the council table of Europe: she places herself under the tutelage of England; it is incumbent on England carefully to distinguish the good from the evil dispositions of her charge, to encourage the first as sedulously as to repress the last, and, above all, not to neglect example when enforcing precepts. This consideration leads me to contrast the reception we give her produce with the reception she gives ours.

In Turkey the simplicity of commerce renders every interference perceptible to the senses of every person connected with it. There is nothing to prevent one and the same merchant from purchasing an assortment of German haberdashery at Leipsic, and carrying it to Tocat, in the centre of Asia Minor, there to exchange it for copper; he may exchange his copper for tombac at Shiraz; his tombac for English lace and gingham at Bombay; and with these he may embark for the Philippine Islands. The same individual, with a venture of Chinese ware, may arrive at Astrachan, and thence return with furs to Constantinople: mercantile journies such as this have been not uncommon; and on this system all internal traffic is conducted. The result is, that each person engaged in it has a practical and precise acquaintance with all the wants and capacities of all the countries with which he traffics. There is nothing ever gave me so high an opinion of the commercial capacities of the eastern merchants, as seeing them open packages of European wares, and with the most astonishing rapidity and tact assort them in portable bales, for mule or camel, according to the required proportions,

and the shades of taste of the different countries for which they were destined ; but this practical information makes them immediately perceive any interference with traffic ; and above all, the interest of commerce is one and undivided, because the same individual being interested in the purchase, in the sale, and in the transport, the interminable complications and struggling interests of Europe are at once swept away. While, therefore, the commerce of the East is a clear and intelligible object of inquiry and calculation, the commerce of Europe is quite the reverse ; we cannot see or calculate either the evils we suffer, or the advantages we have ; and when legislation falls on these troubled waters, temptations and ignorance increase in exact proportion with the power of mischief.

We argue, that if duties are only imposed for revenue, commerce is free ; and that if an equal duty is imposed on the same produce, free competition is opened to all nations in our market. The conclusion thence drawn is, that nothing farther is desirable for the increase of our commercial prosperity, than relieving commerce from prohibitions and protecting and discriminating duties. As the interest of these pages, if they have any, depends entirely on the exposition of a practicable system, and commercial experience in all things the very reverse of our own, I cannot better show the wide discrepancy that exists between the free-trade notions of political economists and the practical free-trade of the East, than by conducting the merchant, whose perambulations through Asia we have been tracing, into England, and setting him to carry on his traffic here by the same

rule of substantial and palpable exchange of value for value.

Suppose him, then, preparing for his journey to England: he looks over a list of goods in request in England, and fixes on silk; he looks over some samples from England, and their prices; he sees that there is some reeled in the Piedmontese manner in Turkey, equal to silk bearing the highest price in England; he makes his venture in this. His silk warehoused in London, he inquires where the silk manufacturers are, and wishes to proceed thither to sell his goods; but he soon finds himself entangled in a web of routine, habits, prejudices, conflicting interests, and interested misrepresentations: he is instructed in the mysteries of the subdivision of labour; he finds that brokers and speculators possess the threads of communication, and in a hundred ways thwart all his attempts at free agency; he is informed that no Turkey silk, such as his, is esteemed in the market, that only the coarse has been in demand for ribbons, &c.; indeed, that instead of his silk fetching a higher price than the country-reeled, he would be very lucky if he got even that price. The poor distracted and alarmed man concludes a disadvantageous bargain. He goes down to the manufacturing districts to select goods for the Turkey market. While making his assortments of cotton, for which every facility is afforded him, in which he is as much delighted by the intelligence and frankness of the manufacturers, as he was shocked with the selfishness of the brokers, he is naturally led to speak of his unfortunate speculation in silk: he exhibits some specimens—the manufacturers are struck with them, admire them, declare them

equal to any thing from Italy; and on tracing the after-circulation of his own silk, he finds that, as Piedmontese, it had realized a high price. He now begins to doubt the advantages of the principle of division of labour in mercantile concerns, however applicable to manufactures, and wonders much how English industry can flourish under such a system. However, the purchases he has made in cottons bring him back to Turkey with an equal capital to that with which he left it. On the value, say £5000, he pays to the Turkish government as duty, (or for permission to dispose of his wares,) £150; after all charges, he makes twenty-five per cent. or £1250, and determines to return to England again. He had seen tobacco of inferior quality selling at enormous prices; he determines then to invest his original capital in tobacco, and to reserve his profits for expenses; resolved this time not to abandon his profits to middle men, but to carry samples of his tobacco to the retail dealers, or to dispose of it at the public market, as in Turkey. He arrives in the docks with £5000 value: the same value of English goods had been charged in Turkey £150; he is now informed that he cannot dispose of his tobacco, unless he first pays £30,000 to the customs. He has the mortification of seeing his tobacco bought from him at six-pence in bond, charged three shillings duty, and therefore costing the broker or speculator but three-shillings and six-pence, and selling in the shops of London at ten, twelve, and sixteen shillings. Is it to be expected that this man will spare our commercial system in comparing it with that of Turkey? Can the Turkish government be expected to listen, even with patience, to our disinterested sug-

gestions of moderation and amelioration, when, for equal value to be disposed of in English and Turkish markets, on the same terms, and with equal facilities, requires the employment of £5,150 for the disposal of the English value, and £35,000 for the disposal of the Turkish. In other words, for £100 of English manufactures, Turkey exacts £3, and for £100 of Turkish produce, England exacts £600. This is not, it will be understood, the method any merchant would pursue, still it is the course that commerce has to follow. These obstacles, which render it impossible for the same merchant to complete the exchange as in Turkey, are of course overcome, but certainly at a considerable sacrifice. My object is merely to show in the strongest contrast the operation of the two systems.*

It is not, therefore, the profoundness of instruction or science, but the simplicity of the question as it appears before them, that will prevent the Turks, who look up to us for instruction on all other subjects, from imitating our example in this? What would Turkey be if this withering system were added to her ills? It requires centuries of antecedent error, and consequent prejudice, before men can be brought to debate the items of a tariff with the serious conviction

* I asked a tobacconist, "Why his craft did not, when every body was petitioning for the reduction of some particular duty, petition for a reduction of the tax on tobacco?" "We would rather petition for its permanency," he answered me: "when some time ago a reduction of the duty was talked of, those engaged in the tobacco trade were very much alarmed; for if the duty were much reduced, the cost price of the article is so little, that any body with £10 capital would set up a shop. The profits would be reduced to nothing, and our capital would be unproductive."

on their minds that they are balancing accounts between two nations. When a Turk perceives that we impose six hundred per cent., while Turkey only imposes three per cent., he thinks that he has no right to complain if we do not, since the first and great injury is inflicted on ourselves, in the augmented price of the merchandize to our own people ; but this example will not induce him (unless from dishonest motives) to desire his government to retaliate on Turkey, the evil which the custom and excise system inflicts on England. They wish to buy the best article at the cheapest rate, and they meet with contempt and ridicule all arguments opposed to this practical rule ; so much the reverse, that the more enlightened portion of the Turkish proprietors anxiously anticipate a vastly increased importation of manufactured goods ; so that not only manufacturing establishments may be broken up, and the hands and capital applied to agriculture, but that the peasantry may be enabled to purchase their necessaries at a sufficiently low rate, to turn their labour from manufacturing them, to increasing their harvests and improving their produce ; anticipating, on the one hand, amelioration of the articles of consumption, and on the other, increase of the means of purchase ; both results equally conducing, in their opinion, to individual happiness and national wealth and prosperity.

An example will, perhaps, best show the style of reasoning of Turks, and the degree of their lights on commercial subjects. After the "subjugation of the Albanians, the grand vizir's attention was anxiously devoted to ameliorate the commercial relations of the country : the first and most important point was, the

establishment of one standard of currency; for besides the monopoly of the mint, the provincial governments were in the habit of speculating in coin, and of issuing their mandates to elevate or depress the currency, according to the season of paying their troops, or receiving contributions: the fixation of a common standard, even that of Constantinople, was an inestimable benefit. This, with security of communication and internal tranquillity, was all that commerce required; but with the idea which naturally predominates in a Turk's mind, at this moment however suppressed, of the superiority of our institutions, and pressed by the necessities of his situation, burdens were laid in various ways on exchange, light taxes were converted into heavy duties, new taxes were imposed, licences were now to be purchased for the retail of wine and brandy, as formerly for gunpowder and snuff, and even a pair of slippers could not be purchased without a stamp and fee. I mention this to show that the freedom of traffic in Turkey does not proceed from theoretical views of the directors of affairs, but from the resistance of the body of the people, originating in a clear perception of their own interests, felt and seen through no distorting medium. Therefore, whatever anxiety one must naturally feel for the course adopted by the Turkish administration at a moment so important to their future destinies, I do not think that indirect taxation is to be apprehended: it is too antithetical to the habits, the feelings, and the prejudices of the people: it may be enforced for a while by the respect which has hitherto been paid to taxation; but that respect will speedily vanish, and instead of the defrauder of

the revenue being the object of censure and contempt, the smuggler would become the hero of popular enthusiasm, and would be put on a par with the cleft. The numerous creeks, and vast extent of iron-bound coasts, the proximity of Greece, the light mystico, and the frequent calms of these seas, render it next to impossible to impose any duties that would give smuggling a remunerating profit. Many of the Turks of property, indeed all of them, have capital invested in commerce, lent to Greeks, or lent to villages, which are only enabled to repay capital and interest by the disposal of their own produce, and the purchase of necessaries at the lowest rate: all these considerations militate not only against the policy, but also against the practicability of imposing on Turkey fiscal restraints; and, as a last resort, should the government, by its organized troops, endeavour to force this system on the nation, the inevitable consequence seems to me, the throwing off successively, by each province, the authority of the Porte, which at this moment holds its supremacy by no other lien than opinion. After all, the duties I allude to would be regarded as insignificant in Europe: the importance lies in the precedent.

About the period to which I am referring, the commencement of 1832, I visited the equally neglected and important position of Durazzo. I found there, as governor, one of the most intelligent Turks, and one of the most amiable men, I have ever met with. I have known him both as a public and private man, and believe him to be thoroughly honest, which for a Turk in office may appear an impossibility. Indeed he was so disgusted with office, that he had

requested, and soon after obtained, permission to retire to his own chiflicks. I have referred to these events only for the purpose of relating the substance of a conversation I had with this Turk on the commerce of Durazzo. He had never heard of the splendour and importance of Dyracchium under the Romans or Venetians; he did not know that for a season the whole commerce of the eastern and western world had passed through its gates; but nevertheless he could appreciate the advantages the position offered for present and future traffic. "If," said he, "any thing could induce me to remain in a situation where my conscience and duty are ever at war, and to support the infection of these marshes, it would be the certainty I feel of making Drus (Durazzo) one of the principal ports of Turkey. Along our western shore, which looks on Europe, we have not a single safe or convenient harbour; so that the peasantry, through all these districts, have to supply themselves from Monastir with goods, brought sometimes sixty days' mule carriage, from Leipsic, Constantinople, and Salonica. Durazzo only requires a mole to be run out from the horn of the at present exposed bay, to give shelter to large vessels within, and afford them, at the same time, the immense advantage of a mole for lading, which no port in Turkey, save Constantinople, possesses. This place is, besides, the centre of all communication by land; and from twenty to thirty hours, in all directions, the roads are level, and might be easily rendered passable for waggons. I would undertake to drain the marshes, make three roads for that distance, and construct the mole, if I were allowed for five years to retain the customs of

the now unfrequented port, and the produce of the scarcely productive salt pans."

"But," I observed, "if your government pursues the course it has commenced to adopt respecting commerce, the mole, if built, would not be much frequented. By your treaties with us, three per cent. is all you have a right to exact for the entry of foreign merchandize; and in this very port you exact at present five per cent., at Valona seven and a half: you impose monopolies on various articles: wine, &c. is sold by licence. I hear of three piastres per oke on wool from Scutari." "Very true!" said the bey; "all that is consequent on the circumstances of the moment, which are truly perplexing. Last year you saw me despairing of the fate of Turkey, yet anxiously taking part in the public service: this year you see me hoping much, yet declining her service: the reason is, that then I despaired of the people having energy enough to rid themselves of the Albanians; and as for the poor sultan, I knew he could do nothing for us. But now we have bridled the Albanians, I have no fear for the future prospects of Turkey, however bad the road may be at first. You speak of our being restricted to a duty of three per cent. on foreign merchandise: I say that that is robbery; because our harbours are filled up, our moles ruined, for the support of which alone that per centage is claimed. It is the part of a wise government to favour and facilitate commerce by every possible means, as that alone gives value to^u our possessions, and turns our harvests into treasures; but if a government so wretched as ours has been, neither affords it a shelter from the storm, a landing place

from the waves, nor a road across the country, it certainly ought not, in addition, to burden it with charges, which are a profit of one, and a loss of nine."

There was a shipment at the time proceeding of most wretched tobacco, for the supply of the Austrian monopoly of Italy, which, as I have before mentioned, was furnished at the rate of rather more than one half-penny per pound. It is delivered damp, ill made up, and in the worst possible state; it heats on the passage very often, and has then to be thrown overboard. I was expressing my surprise, that when the peasants were at the trouble of sowing, reaping, and transporting tobacco for so small a sum, they did not expend upon it the additional labour necessary for drying and packing it, which would more than double the value of the article. The bey answered, (and to this answer I beg particular attention,) "The care and labour required to cultivate and prepare tobacco well are very great; and how can these wretched peasants expend that labour upon it, when they have to grind their corn, and manufacture their clothing, with the rudest machinery? When they have plenty of land, they profit by seasonable rains, and make the best of their cattle by sowing a great deal; but want of subsequent care renders the very increase of quantity injurious to them."—"Would it not therefore be more advantageous for them to buy foreign manufactured goods?"—"To be sure it would, when they can get them cheap enough; and that is precisely why the establishment of a mole for shipping here would bring so much advantage to the whole country."—"And would the trivial reduction of price which the traffic direct by Durazzo would effect, pro-

duce such a difference to the peasant?"—"A feather turns the scale. A few paras more or less in the price of the pike will make the difference of purchasing or of manufacturing at home." In fine, he was decidedly of opinion, that if England manufactured for the tastes of the people; if her goods were supplied to the markets of Turkey, at the lowest charges, and by the directest channels; and if the Turkish government intelligently busied itself in repairing and constructing roads, so as to diminish inland charges, and facilitate the transport of the more cumbersome returns, England would have the entire supplying of Turkey, and Turkey would be benefited as much as if one fourth were added to her population.

CHAPTER X.

THE consular system is the last but not the least important part of this inquiry ; but this is a question enveloped with perplexities which are perfectly inevitable where respected individuals fill invidious offices, where the censure applied to the system may attach to the person, or when the censure which the conduct of one man has raised, may fall on the body to which he belongs.

I will as much as possible relieve myself from the difficulties of forming, and the still greater of expressing, an opinion on the subject, by stating, that from my own observation, I know of no blame attaching to any portion of the institution : I have never heard a European merchant complain of positive injury or injustice inflicted on him. As a traveller, I have scarcely ever arrived in a scale where a consul, of whatever nation, resided, without owing him obligations of every description. In such places I have seen with their eyes—the information I have obtained has been through them. All the assistance a stranger requires, I have received at their hands. I was, in fact, dependent on them ; because, where a consul re-

sided, I never have been on confidential terms with Turks. The remarks I have to make on the subject are, therefore, not the result of personal observation of the working of the present system, but of an examination of the objects and conditions of the institution itself, and of the opinion the Turks entertain respecting it. Indeed my object throughout, is as much to explain the opinions of the Turks, as their maxims and practice of commercial policy and internal administration.

Consuls in Turkey and in Europe are placed in extremely different positions ; in the west, they are of the utmost assistance to merchants, without the possibility of their being injurious or obnoxious either to them or to the local authorities ; they act as guides and instructors in the various intricacies and difficulties which the merchant, master, supercargo, &c., has to encounter ; they act as counsel if he is cited before the local tribunals ; as arbitrators in questions arising between master and merchants of his nation ; and above all, they have to see that a ship's papers are in order, that she may not incur risk of seizure or detention, that no contraband goods are taken on board or landed, " in order to prevent the consequent hazard of confiscation or detention of ships, and imprisonment of the masters and mariners."* In the discharge of all these important duties, the consul is guided and bound down both by law and routine ; he is continually under the eye of men as well or better

* Beawes *Lex Merc.* vol. ii. p. 32, which see, with Chitty on *Commercial Law* ; for consular duties *not* applicable to a state of commerce emancipated from customs and legislation.

informed on mercantile law and practice than himself; and any neglect of so much of his duty as would entail loss on any person by its omission, any positive violence or wrong offered to the country where he resides, would be immediately followed by dismissal. But these duties almost entirely vanish under a system of free trade, (in the Turkish sense.) There is nothing to fear from neglect of formalities; there is neither detention, imprisonment, loss, or confiscation, to be apprehended from attempts at smuggling, or the unwitting introduction of contraband articles. The consul's duties are confined to the administering of justice to the individuals of his nation, and to preventing the local authorities from interfering with them. But while the consul is relieved from those duties which render the consular establishment of value in Europe, he is removed far from the controul that renders the consul's duties in Europe obligatory. At those scales where there are European merchants, their court is a civil and commercial judicatory, and they are under the controul of European opinion or diplomatic authority; but these scales are only three, Constantinople, Smyrna, and Alexandria. In other places where are we to find Europeans requiring any such protection? On the whole coasts of Barbary, the number of native English merchants is one; on the coasts of European Turkey, one; in the interior of European Turkey, one; on the coasts of the Black Sea, one. The first of these has been for years appealing against the consul at the scale where he resides; the second has only been established three years; the third has not been two years established; the fourth is the consul himself, at Trebizonde, who,

under the new era of eastern commerce, has been sent to endeavour to open and establish communications through that important outlet, with Armenia, the interior of Asia Minor, and Persia.

Excepting, then, the important and necessary consular establishments of the three cities above-mentioned, what can be expected from men who are influenced by no routine of advancement, from whom no qualifications are required, who are subject to no real controul, who are armed with most dangerous power, and who have no duties to perform?

The special immunities Turkey has so long been in the habit of granting to foreigners, not only in their civil, but in their commercial capacity, rendered it necessary for the native trader, in order to compete in any degree with the foreigner, to share in his privileges. This advantage was only to be obtained through the protection of foreign agents. A traffic in protections was long carried on by our dragomans, consuls, and vice-counsels, as discreditable to the individuals engaged in it, as advantageous to the Turks.

The first symptoms of the reformation which Turkey will yet owe to Greece, appeared in the granting of berats or protections by the Turkish government to its commercial subjects, putting the holders on the same footing as the foreign merchant; they were accompanied by a permission to wear articles of costume forbidden to the rayas, and with a small firman containing similar privileges, which the holder of the berat could send to his correspondent. The sale of protections became less lucrative—it was abandoned; the liberated native merchant trafficked with the free

port of Malta; the monopoly of the Levant company became less profitable; its bye-laws retained their oppressiveness, and had lost their exclusiveness; the charter was resigned; reduction of charges, enterprise, activity, local knowledge, and parsimonious habits, gave the native merchants an immense superiority; commerce circulated more rapidly and through new channels, and the class of men who before humbly attended a consul's levee, have now possessed themselves of the traffic which the formerly privileged class have lost. The feeling of the Frank merchants and population, and consequently of the consuls, towards the Greeks, may be easily imagined.*

The Greeks at the sea ports and those engaged in petty traffic with Europeans, have earned, most deservedly, a character of accomplished roguery and chicane. This, then, with the change in their own prospects and position, has engendered the most venomous hatred in the breasts of the Franks against the Greeks, which is returned with interest; not

* It was not our functionaries alone that made the mistake of considering English commerce identified with English merchants, and consequently of supposing the interest of the Greeks in direct hostility with those of the English. The Russian agents, fortunately for us, were of the same opinion, and this idea went no inconsiderable length in procuring for the Greek merchants and the Greek *flag*, the protection so sedulously afforded them by the Russian consuls. I think I have been able to trace this motive in more instances than one, and once had a direct and indiscreet avowal of it. It is curious to see the Russian policy benefiting England against her will; but it is a proud testimony of the just and philanthropic grounds on which our foreign influence now happily rests, when interested opposition, however acute, is frustrated, not by counter intrigue, but by the common interests of men.

to the benefit of our commerce which has passed into the hands of men every way calculated to extend its sphere, but who are, generally speaking, despised, and perhaps oppressed by our consuls, in a country where they are subject to arbitrary power, and the consul is armed with sometimes unlimited authority.

On the vast extent of the northern shores of Africa, they are only regarded in the light of commissaries for the provisioning of Gibraltar and Malta, and throughout the rest of Turkey, except putting the stewards of men-of-war in the way to find meat and vegetables, there is positively no definable function which their best endeavours could invent; they can render no service to English merchants they never see; or to commerce, except statistical and commercial information which they have never furnished.

Under the influence of the system, the class called Franks has grown up. This class not only prevents communications between the Turks and Europeans, but perpetuates old antipathies, misrepresents the one to the other, disqualifying Europeans from judging of Turks or rayas, by instilling their own prejudices, and debasing Europeans in the eyes of Turks, by our apparent identity with them. It might be supposed that where Europeans reside, there would be the greatest intercourse with the Turks—it is just the reverse; if you wish to know the natives or to be on friendly terms with them, go to some place where a Frank population has not made Europeans objects of contempt.

As Turkey neither requires reciprocity for the freedom of trade she allows, nor corresponding im-

munities and rights for her subjects in our territories, for those she grants to British subjects in hers, it is very clear that that freedom of commerce, and those immunities and rights, are granted and maintained of her own free will, and by reason of self-imposed obligations, and although restored, when violated, on the representations of our diplomatic or commercial agents, her own rule of right, not any compulsory power residing in them, is the ground of her decision.

That once moral, now traditional and political rule, as I have already endeavoured to show, has originated, first in the tangible evidence this financial simplicity affords of the injury inflicted on national industry and production, by burdening imposts; and secondly, in the sacredness of hospitality. But when the consul becomes the natural protector and host of the stranger, and the consul, by whatever cause, is at variance with the natives, a line of separation is drawn, which leaves the stranger without the individual advantages and protection of Turkish hospitality. I feel fully convinced, that, but for the indirect and scarcely definable effects of the system, English merchants, choosing to be content with the small profits and frugal habits of the native traders, and certainly such are not wanting, would ere now have spread our wares all over the East, with greater facilities than the native merchants; they would have enjoyed the commercial advantages which Turkey affords, without distinction, to all; their national character protecting them from much of the violence to which the rayas are subject. I have, during the most disturbed times, travelled through countries deemed impassable, with the most

perfect security—without apprehension, and often without precaution—always receiving at their hands sedulous attentions and hospitality, excepting always where a Frank population existed; for there it is not only not customary, but sometimes even against law, (as at Constantinople,) for Europeans to reside with Mussulmans. It has more than once occurred to me to be asked by Turks, why, when we travelled to spend money, we did not travel to make money? * It is a known fact that America supplanted us in the colonial trade, when she had not a single commercial agent, and when her flag was not even recognized.

This parasitical Frank population, the offspring of consular authority and prerogative, by education and habits are separated from Europeans. The effect of the exercise of the authority by which they exist, places them always in opposition, sometimes and not rarely in enmity, with the natives and masters of the country. The goodwill, which is the basis of all communication, is interrupted, and those friendly relations are never commenced, which through individuals unite nations. Of all these negative but most deplorable evils, the consular system is perhaps the innocent cause; but it has also wrongs of commission chargeable upon it; and these consist in the abuses to which the nominations of vice-consuls have given rise—the intermeddling of consuls with commerce, and, above all other things, their intermeddling in the

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* I have seen an Italian and a German attending the fairs of Upper Albania, dressed in the European manner, who even in that lawless country, had never suffered in person or property for their boldness.

administrative, judiciary, and political, affairs of the country.

It is scarcely worth while to allude to the motley crew of Jews, Armenians, Greeks, and Franks, who have been our vice-consuls, further than to remark, that the transfer of our commerce to so great an extent from the hands of European to that of Greek merchants, relieves us from any further pretence of exposing our flag to insult, in confiding its guardianship to such unworthy hands. There was indeed little pretence before, as far as traffic was concerned, but there was always some pretext sought by a consul to increase in any way his patronage, and that pretext captains of men-of-war never failed to give, by complaining that they had entered such or such a bay, and no consul had come out to them. Yet these little personages would talk to one another just as the consuls—call Europeans “our subjects,” “*nostri soggetti* ;” and the two, or three, or four Franks, or protected rayas of any scale, the “nation.”*

* In one of the islands of the Cyclades, illustrated by Anastasius in a remarkably precise manner, though its ingenious author was never known to have visited it. The transgressions of some French pigs on an English garden, that is, of pigs belonging to the French vice-consul on the garden of the English vice-consul, gave rise to diplomatic negotiations, which lasted for several days, and disturbed the repose of the factious community, which, already split into English and French parties, had broken heads and noses about Napoleon and the Duke of Wellington; and had now all their animosity re-awakened by the impudence of the French pigs. The pigs had been pounded by the English vice-consul, the French vice-consul had demanded their release, through the channel of his cancelliere, in full uniform. The English vice-consul fully admitted that the most friendly relations subsisted between the two governments, but declared—and this was the point on which public opinion

In the Levant the consuls being the only judicial authority, the question of permission to trade rests on very different grounds than it does in Europe. Where there is no British merchant, the objections will not hold; but what then would be the use of the consul, except where, as in the case of Trebizonde, an intelligent merchant is sent under the denomination of consul, to extend our commerce? When a consul is engaged in traffic, his interest and his duty are constantly placed in opposition; his interests lead him to restrict, not to extend—to conceal, not to communicate. The information he possesses, the intelligence he receives, is strictly confined to himself; and thus that which really is the chief end of his mission is entirely frustrated. Whenever his interests clash with those of other merchants, of masters, ship-owners, brokers, underwriters, supercargoes, his official authority must be liable at least to the suspicion of partiality; and instead of an independent magistrate, he becomes an interested party. He is subject to the contingencies of bankruptcy, and may embarrass our political relations by the improper defence of his property and commercial and agricultural operations.

was divided—"that he could recognize no character of nationality in the pigs, seeing they did not wear the tri-colour cockade."

It might seem scarcely possible to treat the subject gravely without having seen the influence and the advantage we squander by this means. "Our vice-consuls, especially, brought dishonour on our name and disgrace on our flag. It has been torn down in Cyprus within the last eighteen months; the consul's house has been plundered at Rhodes; in Sidon the flag has been trampled under foot; in Tyre the agent has been imprisoned, and the interpreter flogged. In Acre the dragoman is still in a dungeon, &c."—*Madden's Travels*, vol. i. p. 156.

To this injurious intermeddling with commerce must be added their interference with the administration of justice* and of police—their not unfrequent political intrigues—the power they possess of misrepresentation—of injuring pashas with their own government, which is ever ready to seize a pretext for fines and punishments—of embroiling the authorities of sea-ports with the captains of our men-of-war—and of making (such things have been) even their presence and friendly visits the means of intimidation.

Possessed of these powers, they are subject to no efficient, to no real responsibility or controul; and their dignity leads them into as many errors as their interest. The self-importance and pretensions of a Levant consul have indeed become as proverbial among Europeans as their rapacity and corruptibility

* “To the perpetrator of every crime, not even excepting murder, the roof of the English consul affords a sanctuary.”—*Denham's Travels in Central Africa, Introduction.*

This is said in proof of the proud influence of England. Is it strange, under such circumstances, that our flag becomes a hostile emblem, and that pashas and governors use every effort to stop all commercial dealing with us? An anecdote immediately follows, illustrative, not, as it is intended, of the utility of our interference, but of the good feelings of the people which we abuse. A “poor wretch,” pursued by the guard, fortunately meets the nurse and child of an Englishman. “The condemned wretch, with wonderful presence of mind, snatched up the child in his arms, and boldly halted before his pursuers. The talisman was sufficiently powerful—the emblem of innocence befriended the guilty, and the culprit walked on uninterrupted, triumphantly claiming the protection of the English flag.” This very flag having been hauled down several times in one year after *written* declarations of war. See on this head Lord Collingwood's correspondence.

unfortunately are among the Turks. But it must be recollected that the demerits of one individual efface the merits of twenty.

Turkey is a nation which, from the very precariousness of her position, it is peculiarly necessary for us to conciliate, not by that servile pandering to her passions, and obsequious charity for her crimes, by which some nations have degraded in her eyes the European character; but by the urbanity a nation, as an individual, owes to itself, by the firmness it owes to an unfortunate and erring, but confiding friend. We have an immense stake in Turkey, and that stake is opinion. Exasperate her, all your prospects vanish; you have no means of reprisal if she seriously intends to injure you; and you throw her into a dependence on others equally injurious to you and revolting to her. Insults innumerable have been offered to our flag and to our minor agents; yet Turkey has no intention of affronting us. In every individual instance, I have no doubt, the wrongs we could officially prove to have been on the side of the Turks. But was it not in our power to conciliate their favour and esteem? Is it not so whenever we choose to take the proper means? When cannon balls are sent into governor's divans—when the British flag is hauled down at a moment's notice—when even declarations of war are fulminated by subordinate agents, can it be matter of surprise that our consular system has sowed the seeds of animosity, has perpetuated old prejudices, and thwarted the discriminating confidence, which would fain select England from the nations of Europe as pattern and protector?

But arguments on this point are not worth testimony; the justice or injustice of the opinion of the Turks matters little; it is the opinion itself which is important: that opinion is as unfavourable as it possibly can be to our consular establishments.

The only guarantee for a consul's integrity, in his dealings with the natives and the local authorities, when removed from the observation of the ambassador and of Europeans, must be his personal character. In no situation is the selection of the individual more important, for this is the very root and fibre of our commercial growth, and in none are there less inducements held out to make the situations worth the acceptance of such men as are fitted for rendering their offices the means of collecting useful materials, and of exercising a wholesome influence over the country—men capable of pointing out improvements beneficial to the country, zealous in the extension of enlightenment, so as to secure respect at once by their usefulness and their intellectual superiority. For this, some proficiency is requisite in scientific pursuits, some instruction in public economy, the means of ready communication by language, and, above all, zeal, that supplies deficiencies and overcomes obstacles. The Turks, as other men, judge of the unknown by the known; the man that can give them a useful hint in the cultivation of a farm, will be considered a sure guide in other matters. Shaken prejudices, belied maxims, disturbed routine, have yielded to the expedient and the useful. A European travelling at present in Turkey, and willing to satisfy their inquisitiveness, would, night after night, or wherever he rested, be incessantly questioned—on

forms of government, on courts of justice, commerce, on the press, the improvement and application of machinery, organization of troops, and on agriculture. How often has it occurred to myself to lament my inability to satisfy their wishes, when this request, often repeated, has been made to me: "Tell us something useful, by which we may recollect that a European has been amongst us."

The altered state of the Levant trade relieves us from all further pretext of having discreditable agents at the out-ports; and if consuls were less absorbed in private concerns and the registration of fees, a smaller number of efficient men would suffice; if, indeed, fit men can be found willing to sacrifice themselves to perpetual imprisonment in a Levant scale, so long as not a chance of advancement in their own line is held out to them, or of elevation to a higher grade.

In conclusion, Turkey is a country having three thousand miles of coast still remaining, and a territory of five hundred thousand square miles, under the happiest climate, possessed of the richest soil, raising every variety of produce, having unrivalled facilities of transport, abounding in forests and mines, opening innumerable communications with countries further to the east, with all which our traffic is carried on in English bottoms, where labour is cheap, where industry is unshackled, and commerce is free, where our goods command every market, where government and consumers alike desire their introduction. But all the advantages that may accrue to us from so favourable a state of things, is contingent on her internal tranquillity and political re-organization.

Here is a field for diplomatic action of the noblest and most philanthropic character, where our interests are so much at stake as to call forth our most strenuous exertions, and where that interest is so reciprocal as to involve no selfish motives, and to introduce no invidious distinctions.

CHAPTER XI.

PRESENT RELATIONS OF TURKEY WITH RUSSIA,
AUSTRIA, AND FRANCE.

THE political state of Turkey is brought to a crisis, which if favourable will, I believe, be the means of her speedy regeneration ; and if unfavourable, of her speedy dissolution : the long and industrious, and hitherto eminently successful labours of Russia, are therefore on the point of being crowned with complete success, or of being entirely frustrated. Open aggression has been carried as far as practicable, and, when stopped, she has claimed merit for moderation. The treaty of Adrianople was, at the time, supposed a blow which Turkey could never recover : it was immediately, however, followed by the astonishing event of the subjugation of Albania ; tranquillity was restored to Roumelie ; and the raya population, for the first time since Turkey was an empire, began to look with affection on the Porte ; the organization of troops commenced, and Russia must have anticipated the possibility of Turkey's becoming, with a little leisure, now at the twelfth hour, a commercial and a military power. The sympathies of the raya population, on whom Russia's hopes of agitation depended,

were evidently escaping from her ; her former allies, the Bulgarians, who had been carried into Russia, were escaping back to Turkey ; the Servians, independent through her means, evincing a no equivocal preference to the Porte ; the Armenians of Erzerum bewailed her protection and interference ; and even Greece avowed no less indignation at her policy than disgust at the specimens she had had of her people. The occupation of Adrianople, and the sight of her troops, had obliterated the oppression of the Turkish government ; wantonly burned villages and forced contributions, had dissipated the hopes fostered, at a great expense of money, of missionary labours, and of the intrigue of years. A splendid opportunity of pursuing her object under a new form, if not made, was eagerly seized, on the rebellion of Mehemet Ali ; and, as may be expected, every thing will be staked on this throw. The ability, and the number of her agents ; her commanding political position, and her money scattered with a lavish hand, have placed the councils of Turkey at her disposal : the venality and corruption of the Turkish governments are sufficiently notorious ;—all these influences will now be simultaneously and unremittingly put in operation to bring about the necessity for an intervention, and to reduce the sultan to such a state of difficulty and exhaustion, as to implore himself the support of Russia—and reconciliation with Ibrahim will be by every means prevented—and, above all, every effort will be used to prevent the sultan from adopting the only true and politic course that remains open to him—a *call on the Christian population of Roumelie*.

The effect of the intervention, when brought about, is but too evident the degradation of the character and authority of the sultan, who will hold his office at the pleasure of Russia; the absolute controul of the administration, the arrestation of the organization of the country, the insulting of the prejudices of the Turks, the injuring of the interests of all, the opprobrium of which would fall on the sultan; in fact, Nicholas would exercise, as protector, an authority he never could enjoy as conqueror, he would be as absolute at Constantinople as at Moscow, with no apprehension of re-action; and the celebrated scheme so lately hazarded in the St. Petersburg Gazette, which indicated Mount Taurus as the future and visionary limits between Russia and Egypt, would be, in fact, to the letter realized.

The particular bearings of the policy of Russia may be better appreciated by considering it in connexion with that of Austria and France.

The views of Austria, though hitherto very equivocal as regards the welfare of Turkey, have been opposed throughout to Russia; her minister, by not the most honourable means, (a forged correspondence between the Hetærists and the Carbonari,) succeeded in obtaining from Alexander an anathema against the revolution of Greece, which she volunteered her services to suppress, from the double dread of free institutions and Russian influence; but this offer the Turks, with hitherto unappreciated dignity, rejected. She sees with the greatest alarm an independent state under the sovereignty of Turkey, on her Illyrian frontier; she has incessantly urged the Porte to measures, the result of which would have been, to have

left it without any hold on the affections of its Christian subjects. Her object has been to preserve the Porte as a condescending and powerless neighbour, and as an oppressed people, affording an example of misrule and submission to her own subjects—strong enough to resist Russia, but weak enough to be dependent on Austria. This struggle pervades their general policy: it is maintained in their diplomacy at Constantinople; it is extended to the disputed soil of Wallachia. But Russia has various means of weakening the hands and distracting the councils of Austria. Galicia is reminded, that her orders are delivered in German; Servia is flattered by emissaries of a higher order; there Russia speaks of civil liberty, as well as of national independence; and, as lately in Greece, patriots, and men of letters, do not consider themselves disgraced by her service. As an indication of her policy in that quarter, she sends a press to Belgrade, to publish newspapers in Servian—the *language of the military colonists of Hungary*, who are not left in ignorance of the Russian creeds being the same as that for which they have been so long persecuted by Austria. Thus while these two governments, with the exception of Turkish policy, appear generally to agree, none ever maintained so obstinate a struggle, and on so many points—the inveteracy of which is only equalled by its secrecy; but they fight on very different grounds: Russia is an unwieldy, but a solid mass of nationality; Austria is a theory and a system—a government without a nation. If the energies required to maintain internal tranquillity were set free, Austrian influence would, at the very least, counterbalance that of Russia in Turkey.

Russia, therefore, gives her occupation at home; and were she to direct her shafts blindfold, Austria would present a vulnerable part; for though the people under the sway of Austria are generally in easy and comfortable circumstances, and in a state of gradual, but steady progression, and though they might cheerfully submit to her general supremacy, which secures internal and external tranquillity; yet her sectarian zeal—whilst a considerable portion of her subjects, and, indeed, all her eastern subjects, profess a different creed—her police and custom-house severity, and the hostile position which in consequence of these the government habitually assumes, create a general discontent and irritation, the more dangerous from being smothered. Thus the existence of Austria is one of continual alarms—her sensibilities are put to torture at the sight of a newspaper, at the sound of a national air, at the odour of contraband tobacco;* and while in the western provinces she is startled at a tri-colour cockade, in the eastern she shudders at the sight of a Muscovite button. The only interests that brought these governments into apparent concord, save the mutual wish to conceal and disguise from foreign powers their secret animosities, were common antipathy to the principles of France, and the common necessity of keeping down their Polish provinces; both these motives have now lost their force: the cock of France has become domesticated, and Austria, an empire of equilibrium, would be startled from her propriety, no less by the prepon-

* The Hungarian tobacco is prepared in a way that gives the smoke a peculiar smell, so that the custom-house officers can detect, in passing along the street, any person smoking foreign tobacco.

derance of Russian legitimacy, than by that of French republicanism. The other object, the keeping in subjection the provinces of Poland, has vanished with the nationality of Poland; that event has severed the bond of positive political necessity, which united Russia to Prussia and to Austria, so that this latter government may be considered disposed, with the self-denial both as to favourite principles and envied possessions, which the earnestness of the crisis demands, to support Turkey to the very utmost of her power.

The Russian scheme is to satisfy Austria with the provinces to the south of the Save, as far as the Egean Sea, if she pleases; but Austria may have little taste for such subjects; and Wallachia, now increasing in importance more than ever to Austria, by the approaching opening of the navigation of the Danube, becomes for the same reason no less necessary now to the maintenance of the actual commercial prosperity of Russia, than it has always been to the furtherance of her political objects.

The policy of France, from her continental position, must be to meet and combat Russia, openly and uncompromisingly, whenever a field of contest is open to the two powers; nor do I think we shall be far wrong in assuming this to be the ruling impulse of her policy in the East, as elsewhere, and of her earnestness in supporting the Porte.

That political influence and commercial advantages are only to be acquired by fleets and armies, by occupation and intimidation, seems to have been the principle which France, naturally enough perhaps, has acted on in her eastern relations. It is needless to retrace, but

not useless to bear in mind, the old historic longing of France for Egypt, and the importance she has ever attached to the possession of that country as the means of injuring the English dominion in India. When Greece made an offer of itself to England, it was rendered a matter of public notoriety that the influence of England was paramount in the Levant to the exclusion, both in Turkey and Greece, of every other. France was placed under the necessity of forming some counterbalancing Levant connexion. It cannot be doubtful to what quarter she would turn her eyes—Egypt, the spot of her predilections, the theatre of the glory of Napoleon, the arena fertilized by the blood of France, the darling objects of so many statesmen, the focus of so many schemes, was free from foreign connexion, was united under a powerful, an ambitious, and a half independent prince, who was glad to accept the patronage France was eager to bestow. But however alluring the project, I am far from attributing to the French cabinet the preconcerted design of such a connexion as that which I suppose I must now say *lately* existed between France and Mehemet Ali. But one step may have led to another; the cabinet may have found itself committed by the acts of its agent—even its agents may have had their own views, and the admiral, the prime mover in the whole affair, may have received many coloured instructions. How that connexion may have been brought about, or by whose means, is very unimportant now.* The destruction of the Turkish

* Those in the French cabinet who considered England the “natural” enemy of France, must, no doubt, have been exceedingly

fleet, the entanglement of England and France in the treaty of 6th July, and the internal events of Turkey, opened to Russia new prospects of aggrandizement. France, seeing the accessions Russia received in the north, bethought herself of balancing them by placing herself in a similar position in the south. Leaving Austria and England to dispute the European provinces of Turkey and Asia with the Muscovite, she turned towards her Egyptian friend; her eyes wandered along the coast of Barbary, and ventured even to trace long vistas in central Africa. The insulting conduct of a French consul produced an eagerly seized insult in return, (for still had a portion of the cabinet to drag the remainder by such artifices into its views,) and, with an external display of moderation, cutting indignities were secretly cast on a not very enduring spirit, that of Husein Pasha, dey of Algiers: the result was, the waving of the standard of France on that important fortress, which gave her a *tête de pont* across the Mediterranean. Here was a basis for future

alarmed at the unequivocal declaration of Greece in favour of English protection, a declaration which (though it might not have been an object with the cabinet itself) both French money and French efforts were employed to prevent. As diplomatists still are men, it is not a supposition very unnatural that those who were interested in these plans, on their complete failure should have looked on the progress of the Greek revolution with no friendly eye, and that they should have sought to gratify private pique in advancing what perhaps they fancied a national object, and which opened, too, to themselves a chance of rapid advancement. All these objects would be realized by adopting this maxim, "that the influence of England over Greece could only be counteracted by the possession of that country by Mehemet Ali, who would, with such a possession, be dependent, both for it and for Egypt, on the good-will of France."

operations, and, had she used the opportunity well, of new triumphs for humanity. From this point she could support Mehemet Ali in subjugating the regencies on the coast; that is to say, make use of his military and other means, and Mussulman authority, to establish a power, from Suez to Algiers, dependent on France, and held in constant check by the weakness of Egypt on the side of Syria and Arabia, by its resting on the French citadel to the west, by its being exposed along the coast to the maritime power of France, and by the schism of the two Mussulman powers.

That France had a hand in exciting Mehemet Ali to direct revolt, is an idea not for a moment to be entertained; but it can scarcely admit a shadow of doubt that, but for France, Mehemet Ali never would have revolted. But when the crisis came, Russia stepped in, took advantage of all that France had done, pointed out Syria, not Barbary, to the ambition of Mehemet Ali, and at this moment how must that crafty power smile at France's alarm at her own handy work! how must she be amused at Admiral Roussin's officious and ludicrously confident guarantee for Mehemet Ali! She, who holds all the threads in her hands, and plays the puppets, may well afford to be magnanimous, and to promise disinterestedly to retire when the French guarantee is fulfilled.* The interest of France was, that

* This was written on the receipt of the news that Admiral Roussin had arrived, arrested Ibrahim, and expelled the Russians. It was written with the view of pointing out either the error Admiral R. had committed, or the miscalculation France had made; and consequently to show that the negotiations were not in the least advanced, and that France had torn away the veil from her secret

Mehemet Ali should be independent of Turkey so far only as to be dependent on her, so that her influence might predominate in Egypt, and that her possession of Algiers might be utilized; but Mehemet Ali, whatever might have been his promises or engagements to France, must have been fully aware that he never could come to an open rupture with the Porte without possessing himself of Syria; he must have known that no influence of France, that no efforts she could make, even were she inclined uncompromisingly to support him, could protect him against the clouds of enemies with which the sultan could cover his desert frontiers, and the secret conspiracies that would be formed against him, to say nothing of direct invasion, unless he could extend his power to Mount Taurus, and thereby intercept all communication between Arabia and the Porte, while he himself possessed Acre and Syria.

The possession of these countries, and of this frontier, of course falsifies the calculations of France, and deprives her of all advantage from her former connexion with Egypt. Mehemet Ali no longer requires her assistance; nay, he has escaped from her tutelage; extending the basis of his power, and in a different direction, he can stand alone, or form those new connexions which his new position require, and which may be, as, perhaps, they are, the most opposite to the interests of France, the most contradictory of all her anticipations, and with which she may have tamely

intrigues, at a moment when she thought them matured and successful; but, in fact, only to show that she had been completely duped. My anticipations were speedily realized, and so completely, as to give me nothing to alter in the text.

to put up, or suffer even worse results. If France, either with a view of supporting the Porte, or of bringing back Egypt to a state of dependence on herself, throws obstacles in the way of the cession to Mehemet Ali of the frontier absolutely necessary to his existence, she postpones indefinitely the termination of a fearful crisis, and perhaps leads to further accession to Mehemet Ali's power, or to a partition of the Asiatic provinces of the empire between him and Russia. The sudden and confident interference of Admiral Roussin establishes two points; the first the connexion between France and Mehemet Ali, and the conviction consequently that he could not oppose the unequivocal wishes of France; and the second, that Mehemet Ali had outwitted France, who could not, up to the period of Admiral Roussin's orders being delivered to him, have been aware of the completely altered position in which Mehemet Ali stood when he had occupied Acre and Mount Taurus. It must be exceedingly mortifying to France, at this moment, to find, as I am fully convinced she does, all her plans rendered abortive, and the fruits of her labours transferred to Russia, for, of course, it is Mehemet Ali's interest now, not indeed to seek the protection of Russia, but to concert measures with her for the weakening of the authority of the sultan, and for the dismemberment both of Turkey and of Persia.*

This failure of the schemes of France, this failure

* The offer of a Persian army to support the sultan, and the late strengthening of friendly relations between these powers, show that Persia, amid her more instant dangers, and her internal disorders, feels her weakness on the side of Arabia, and apprehends the coming storm.

of her plans of separate negotiation, fortunately bring her in her eastern relations to unreserved concurrence in the policy of England, and to that intimate union of interest and of measures necessary to the peace of Europe and the interests of humanity." But what can be said of the foresight or forethought of a cabinet which prepared, in the end, to risk so much for the support of the Turkish government, and, possessed of all this secret information and influence, has allowed matters to proceed to such a point—the Porte to be put in jeopardy, and Egypt to be lost to the objects France had in view, while in the earlier stages of the business she might so easily have moulded circumstances to her will, by leading both to negotiate, by withdrawing from Mehemet Ali, in case of obstinacy, the support he in so many ways received from France, or by urging on the Porte the supporting of Acre, and the defending of Taurus, or by sending Admiral Roussin just one year sooner.

If the question was merely whether Ibrahim or Mehemet should be chief of the Turkish empire, we should have to grapple with comparatively few of the difficulties which surround it at present. That empire was too extended and too diversified in race, language, religion, and interests, to have been held together by the ablest European administration—it has been held together by a weak and profligate administration, which, however, allowed to opinion, to industry, to commerce, to prejudice and habits, a freedom and equality which have been very imperfectly felt in Europe; and it was steadied by a local military oligarchy, depending in each province on its general connexion for support against local resistance. That

oligarchy being destroyed—that portions of the empire and particular races should throw off their allegiance—that nations should like to be governed by men who speak their language and profess their creed—that local resistance should oppose the unjust mandates of the general authority, even when that authority is recognized,—are consequences to be anticipated and provided for; but if the government of the Porte could be remodelled, the provinces would be interested in supporting it for common and general political purposes, and even for the protection of their sectional independence.

The affections and attachment of the tributary states wait on the Porte whenever that government is reduced to the helplessness of being just. The awe imbibed by the rayas with their first milk, the magic of the name, the habit of command and submission, give the Turkish government advantages which, if properly used, are immense. Would a Servian submit to a Greek? would a Greek admit the supremacy of a son of the Scythian race? Would either submit themselves to an Albanian or a Bosniac, or either of these recognize any authority in one of their former rayas? But all cheerfully support the Porte, if it gives a field of exercise to those who bear arms, and ensures tranquillity and non-interference to those who cultivate the soil, or who struggle in the busy arena of industry and commerce. I feel convinced that the people feel this practically, though they cannot find words or mouths to express now what, if the Porte were subverted, bloodshed, and anarchy, and invasion, would cause to ring even in our *distant* ears.

Since the new order of things commenced in Rou-

melie, the time has been short, experience slippery, and facts few ; yet we have enough to show the temper of the people. The Bulgarians were raised into open revolt by the approach of the Russians. These men were humble unarmed rayas, the Servians were armed and strong, long in connexion with Russia ; they could have supported her with 25,000 excellent troops—they did not stir—they were in the enjoyment of some rights and wore arms—on the insurrection of Albania, they offered their assistance to the Porte, which was refused through a remaining jealousy of a Christian's, even though a tributary's, co-operation. The Bosniacs, who formerly had been employed against the insurgent Servians, expected to find the Servians now their allies : but no—by the very insurrection of Servia she was now interested in supporting the paramount authority of the Porte, by which her liberties were secured. Servia remained tranquil during the struggle, because her services were refused, but the Milosh maintained an armed and imposing attitude, which greatly contributed to the success of the grand vizir.

On the advance of Ibrahim the disaffected of the Albanians—indeed the mass of the Albanians—wished to seize the opportunity of recommencing their plunder of the Christians. But these Christians, within the last two years, had become a new people, the number of armed men greatly increased, were united, and reposing themselves on the authority of the Porte—acted, in fact, in the sultan's name, which formerly was the watchword of the Albanians ; so that though the country was drained of troops, the Albanians did not dare to move, lest a rising of the Christians should take place against them. In this dilemma, they tam-

pered with the most turbulent of the free Greeks, proposed an insurrection against the Porte, &c., and had their proposals rejected! This requires no comment. Greece once settled, has, in all respects, interests identical with the Porte, and I have no doubt will be bound to it by the strongest ties.

But, besides all other inducements, the very position of Constantinople gives all the surrounding states an interest in supporting the possessor of that fastness, emporium, and metropolis. This is no uncertain or ephemeral motive—it is a consequence of at once the geographical structure of the country, and of the hostile presence of northern masses, which are now such as they were three thousand years ago. “Though the Byzantines,” says Polybius, “are possessed of the first and best advantages of this happy position, yet, since through their means we are enabled to obtain many things which are of the greatest use to us, it seems natural that they should be regarded by the Greeks as common benefactors and receive not only favour and acknowledgments, but assistance likewise, to repel all attempts that may be made against them by their northern neighbours.”*

For the restoration of its authority, the Porte has not yet been allowed one moment's time. The peace of Adrianople was almost immediately followed by the formidable league of the Albanian beys. The right arm of the empire was raised against it. The sultan called on his Greek subjects; the struggle was severe, but the triumph was complete: and when Europe thought Turkey trampled in the dust, her power from the Adriatic to the Euxine, among the

* Book iv. c. 5.

Albanians, the Bosniacs, and the independent Serbians, was for a moment thoroughly established, as it never had been established in the days of Murad II. or Suleyman. In Anatoly all power was in abeyance; the authority of the Porte was only nominal; it was ready to submit to the first rebel who could establish a police, but that required a disciplined army. The grand vizir, even during his fearful struggle with the Albanians, was hastening the organization of troops for the conquest of Anatoly, as it might be called, and for the reduction of Mehemet Ali. "The old fox," he observed, "has seized the moment well; had he given me another year, I would have made Egypt like a shaved chin."

The troops, half disciplined, of the grand vizir, did not exceed twenty thousand; the Bosniacs, the disaffected Albanians, were to be restrained, the passes of the mountains, the fortresses, had to be garrisoned, the governors had to be supplied with troops—so that his disposable force never exceeded six thousand men; with these, his victories were obtained. The recruits he made during the contest supplied the losses, and no more; and the same numbers only accompanied him into Asia, and these alone supported him in his lamentably rash attack on the retreating Ibrahim, in which most of them sealed their devotion with their blood. On such slender chances do the destinies of Turkey now hang.

Greece has become independent because her people fought. Mehemet Ali's revolt is that of a pasha, in which the people are not interested. The people, dissatisfied with the misgovernment under which the empire has so long groaned, detests every where its

immediate rulers—attack the sultan in Anatoly—he is powerless; attack Mehemet Ali in Egypt—he is still more so; but the attacking party must have a disciplined army, must not excite against itself the very antipathy that gives it power. In a country, naturally so strong, amongst a population of armed men, what would Ibrahim's army be if it excited the animosity of the inhabitants?

If, as I have stated, the tendency of the change in the administration of Turkey, is to nationalize, by race, language, and strong geographical lines, the different populations which lately composed that empire, whilst for common and internal advantage the supremacy of the Porte would still be anxiously maintained, as the late conduct of Servia clearly shows, how is this proposition illustrated, it will be asked, by the revolt of Ibrahim, and his success? A disciplined army was confessedly necessary to restore any form or authority of government in Asia; Ibrahim had that army: he has stepped in to take advantage of the crisis before the Porte had an army for that purpose, and while its hands were full: might not then Ibrahim supplant Mahmoud, and things remain as they are? No, for three principal reasons—first, though he may establish himself in Syria and Egypt, it is very unlikely he will establish his authority in Asia Minor, over a race different from his, speaking another language, and haughtily scorning the Arab race: his easy conquest proves one thing among others, that it may be reconquered with the like facility. The second, that in Europe the authority of the sultan may cease, that Constantinople may fall, and its population be cringing at Ibrahim's feet; but the

mountains and mountaineers of Roumelie will then scorn alike Ibrahim and Mahmoud, and all government will be subverted. The Albanians might intrigue with Mehemet Ali at Alexandria, but not with Ibrahim at Broussa. These warlike tribes, lately reduced to submission, may break out again into partial insurrection, but their object will only be the pillage of the Christians. The Christians, now raised in importance, may resist them; but neither the first nor the last would submit like the Anatolians, whose subdivisions are merely territorial, and who have always been ruled by the superior energies of the European and Arabian portions of the empire. And what would be the result of Ibrahim's nominal possession of Turkish Anatoly, while a *Turkish* power and a Turkish sultan held Roumelie? The third, and conclusive reason is, that his attempt at supplanting the sultan would inevitably lead to the placing the sultan under Russian tutelage, whence all the consequences, disastrous alike to Turkey, Mehemet Ali, our commercial and political interests, already indicated, would flow. Let the sultan be kept independent of the Russians, then Mehemet Ali forms in Syria and Egypt a cordial union with Russia; let him be driven to this step—so much the better, of course, for Russia, but so much the worse for Mehemet Ali. If he gives lieu to this, Russia, after having made Mehemet Ali outwit France, will outwit him.

In Syria the Arabic is the language of the people; the populations are of different races and creeds. Maronites, Metualis, Druzes, &c., independent mountaineers, who might be glad of a field for military service—who would rejoice in the prostration of the

Turkish power—they would submit to a chief, who, maintaining the balance between the rival tribes and races, would be still dependent on their general port. In fact, these populations, with the Arabs, Calmucs, and Afgahns, the mountains and deserts stretching to the east, point out a clear delimitation between the Turkish and the Arabic languages. Ibrahim, when at St. Jean d’Acre, was asked, if victorious, how far he would advance? “As far,” he replied, “as I can make myself understood in Arabic.”

It is impossible to anticipate the results of the influence of Russia: the crisis, for the moment, is delayed, but unless fair and honorable lists are secured, it must be fatal when it comes. But Russia too is treading on a smothered volcano. When Captain Pym threatened to fire on the Russians if they molested the Greeks, what did the Russians do? They sunk the Greek vessels. The English captain could have sunk the Russians—there was our weakness; we took no precaution, and our subsequent interference could not retrieve the error or repair the loss. Let Russia be allowed to extend her protection to the Porte, because we may combine, at an hour’s notice with Austria, and occupy the Black Sea and the provinces—and Russia will have equal reason to thank our confidence in our strength at Constantinople as at Poros. Her object is anarchy in Turkey, and violent measures on our part, when unseasonable, only advance her ultimate ends.

CHAPTER XII.

POLICY AND PROSPECTS OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION OF GREECE.

It is not only to the European stranger that Greece presents a confused and inexplicable mass of discordant principles and interests ; it does so even to the diligent observer, who has made Greece alone, and under the influence of the revolution, his study. He sees a people, who loathe the memory of the past, who repudiate all their former institutions, and who call for the political institutions of England and America, being besides individually of industrious habits and docile dispositions. Yet, whenever those institutions are brought in detail to operate upon them, dissatisfaction, resistance, clamour, are instantly produced. What, then, is to be done with this fickle race—what form, what maxims of government are fitted for them, what measures will conciliate them, what powers coerce them? Such have been the perplexing considerations that have been incessantly forcing themselves on those interested in the solution of the question: such are the difficulties that will meet the new administration, and supposing it honest and sincere in its endeavours to settle the country,

its position is one of imminent danger to itself—its first measures, and its system, of the deepest importance to Greece and to Europe.

The men who surround king Otho, however high their standing, or enlarged their views, have been brought up in, and may be supposed attached to, a system of administration wholly opposed to that in which the Greeks have been educated, to which they are accustomed and unconsciously attached. The new administration cannot be supposed to have either practical or theoretical acquaintance with that system; they will be perplexed and discouraged with the first aspect of the country: it is to be feared they will see things through a false medium; and they carry with them two treacherous supporters, money enough to make them worth deceiving, and troops enough to suggest the idea of compulsion.

The principal object of the foregoing pages has been to develop the principles and practice of the antecedent political condition of the Greeks, to distinguish the good from the bad of their former institutions, to mark the contrast these present with those of Europe. Whether my views are correct or not, it will be allowed that this investigation can alone throw light on their present state, can explain their mixed aversion and attachment to their former administration, their longing for, and resistance to, the administrative maxims of Europe. Pursuing the inquiry to its practical application, I shall now endeavour to point out what portion of their former organization they might profitably retain, and what they might profitably imitate from Europe.

I have seen, on two occasions, two portions of the

Greek population under apparently very dissimilar circumstances, but really under very similar ones—passing from a state of the most miserable oppression, to one of contentment and happiness; in the one case, through the instrumentality of the grand vizir; in the other, of Count Capodistrias. The grand vizir subdued the Albanians, and relieved the rayas from the oppression of the local governors; the circumstances that accompanied the arrival of Capodistrias in Greece, freed Greece from the Arabs, and his assumption of the reins of government relieved her from the devastations of the military chiefs. The peasantry were equally devoted to the one and the other. The same expressions of enthusiastic gratitude, the same earnest prayers which I have heard uttered by the Greek peasant for Capodistrias in 1829, I have heard echoed by the Greek raya in 1831 for the grand vizir; and now, in his captivity, I doubt not, he has the prayers of tens of thousands of the Greeks of Roumelie. Did the tears of the peasant follow the pall of Capodistrias? Whence this strange contrast?

The reforms of the grand vizir I have already mentioned; the changes which produced such happy and instantaneous effects, reduced themselves to this—the municipalities were left to themselves. Let us now turn to the organization of Capodistrias. The people were already relieved from the galling sumptuary prohibitions and restrictions imposed by the Turks; his presence at once relieved them from the military despots; but the municipalities were deprived of all participation in the collection of the revenue. Heavy export and import duties were imposed and re-exacted at every port, on internal, as well as ex-

ternal traffic: commerce and navigation were burdened not only with duties often proscriptive, but with regulations most capricious and vexatious. Still condemning and deploring the general maxims which Capodistrias thought fit to adopt, I cannot help admitting, that his administration, even such as it was, conferred very important benefits on the agricultural population, in relieving them from the anarchy that had previously prevailed, and his personal conduct allowing it to have been as partial, arbitrary, and anti-national, as his most virulent enemies endeavour to represent it, could never have alone excited the national antipathy of which he became the object; the blame was laid on him, and against individual measures, or persons, was directed the expression of the *malaise* produced by the system of centralization imported from Europe.

On the other hand, that Capodistrias, whatever were his secret and collateral views, should have intentionally legislated for Greece in such a manner as to put his own authority in so hazardous a predicament, is a supposition not to be seriously entertained; any European administrator, inexperienced in eastern legislation, with the most undoubted honesty of purpose, would probably have committed the same fundamental error * which involved him in a struggle

* The following incident might give colour to the suspicion that he went to Greece with a perfect acquaintance with the municipal organization, and a pre-determination to destroy it. Being questioned by Prince C —, ex-minister of Russia, as to the causes to which I attributed the failure of Capodistrias in Greece, I was proceeding to detail some of the reasons given in the text, placing in the first rank of errors the destruction of the existing municipalities,

with the nation, which he might have conducted more nobly, which they might have ended less vengefully.

Capodistrias judged of the Greeks by the Europeans; he was imbued with Russian ideas of administration, as well as of authority; he had no notion of a revenue raised by any other means than by ordinances and by custom-houses; yet the Greeks, who had never known any of these, anxiously desired that their institutions should be assimilated to those of Europe. By their ignorance of political maxims and principles, Capodistrias was beguiled into the idea that he had no prejudices, and no experience of theirs to respect, and that the nation was a ball of wax,

and as the most fatal of his omissions, the non-creation of municipalities, which would have prevented all his own faults, and all the national opposition. "That was precisely," observed the Prince, "the policy he ought to have pursued; and I recollect perfectly a conversation I had with him on this very subject, one or two years before his nomination as president. I remarked to him, that the municipalities of Turkey afforded the ready, the cheap, the easy, and efficient means of organizing Greece. Capodistrias made me one of the long answers in which he was so expert, with the view of effacing this conviction from my mind. I do not recollect now what it was he did say; but the impression made upon me at the time was, *qu'il battoit la campagne.*"

Does not this throw light on the diplomacy of Russia? My informant could not know any thing of the municipalities of Turkey, or of the means of organizing Greece, except through the information possessed by the foreign bureau at St. Petersburg. Nothing, indeed, save this high intellectuality of her diplomacy could preserve the connexion and combine the functions of so inert and heterogeneous a mass. Had her object been to organize Greece, how straightly would she have marched towards it! If the contrary, how efficacious is her opposition; and how easily could she detect Capodistrias, had he aimed at consolidating there his own power!

ready to receive whatever form his plastic hand chose to give it; hence the folios of organic statutes and of ordinances; hence the impositions of customs and duties; but as there were no elements from which a regular custom-house establishment could be organized, his only resource was farmers of revenue. Here was forced upon him, as it were, the ready means of bribery;* and the people finding themselves subject to a financial despotism, more intolerable, as I really believe it to have been, than that of the Turks, instead of combining to force on the president a recurrence to the old financial system, attacked with virulence this or that abuse, this or that favourite. In these re-actions, the president, who unfortunately entered into every detail himself, saw nothing but insults put on his authority, indignities offered to his person—the passions of the individual complicated a very simple question—rendered despicable an important struggle; and the real point at

* How far Capodistrias looked to the letting of revenue farms as means of corruption, may be gathered from the dependence in which the farmers were placed. It was enacted, that the government might, of its own spontaneous movement, seize the property of any individual owing money, or who might come afterwards to owe money to the government, on the mere pretence that he might not be able to pay his debt when due—obligations of the government to him were not to be reckoned—the property seized to be valued by arbitrators (whether in part, or in whole, appointed by government, I have forgotten). *The property to be put up to auction at this valuation, within five days of the seizure, and if not bought, to be offered for five successive days, at a reduction each day of five per cent. ; at this last reduction, the government to take it.* Was ever law like this? Who but a devoted creature of the president could venture to be a farmer?

issue has been quite lost sight of, in its deplorable consequences of foreign and domestic violence and intrigue. Will the present government profit by this experience? I fear not, because its pre-conceived notions, its ignorance of eastern habits, and its western prejudices, will lead it into the fatal error of comparing the popular resistance against Capodistrias—to popular commotions in Germany, for instance: the difference is great, and it lies in a nutshell; these are attempts to destroy—those to maintain existing institutions.

But if the new administration makes proper use of the experience of Capodistrias, it may derive from it not only important lessons, but valuable assistance. The errors to be avoided are his custom-house and police system, the letting the revenue to farmers, and his mania for legislating among a people not only unaccustomed, but perfectly hostile to such restraints. Public approbation (which, too readily bestowed, might seriously mislead,) will now cautiously be given to a European government, by reason of the experience which the nation has acquired. It had suffered from Turkish barbarism, from domestic anarchy; Capodistrias brought it acquainted with the tyranny of law. Thus political intelligence has been increased, and while they have been rendered more capable of detecting the errors of government, they have been taught, by a succession of every species of misfortune, to prize tranquillity.

Capodistrias organized a central administration; the bureaucracy was corrupt, ridiculously extensive; still, however, it was not without merit, and its remnants may be of service. The overwhelming claims

which would be poured in on the new government, may be met by the inquiries and examinations of accounts instituted under Capodistrias—the most important and only valuable financial service he rendered. When the decisions then taken are adopted by the new authority, it will incur, even if they are unpopular, but a small portion of the blame; and if it reduces the large balances allowed to the special partisans of the late president, no one will gainsay the reduction; in the meantime, it is relieved from the necessity of bestowing all its attention, and staking its popularity on so embarrassing an investigation.

If the government wishes to be powerful, it will destroy the power of the capitani and primates—not, indeed, destroy what they have not; but it must not be seduced into granting them power. The governor of a province ought not to be a native of that province—and no condition should be placed to the election to any office, so as to restrict it to those families who have rendered the office of primate hereditary; neither, of course, should they be excluded from the offices which public confidence would bestow upon them: but they can only be made faithful to the prince, by being watched by the people.

It is the people alone who will heartily support King Otho; but only on the condition of his preserving to them their local municipalities, and protecting them against the encroachments of the upstart aristocracy. May the good genius of Greece impress this truth on the minds of his counsellors!

A great deal has been said about forcing a monarchy on a people whose aspirations were for a republican government. A few Europeans, or a few

Greeks, educated in Europe, have given rise to the supposition. I can confidently affirm, that the mass of Greeks never entertained such an idea; their aspirations were to be included in the European family, and not only as a bond of that union, and to put an end to internal broils, but also as a national honour, they sought to be governed by a prince belonging to some royal house—true, that feeling grew under the fostering hope that Leopold would have been the man. It has been said, and truly said, that the habits, the dispositions, and the topography of Greece, were essentially republican; but it is the republicanism of village autonomies, too weak to stand alone, and requiring the support of a central authority. In Europe, the evils that hatch revolution, spring almost always from laws and regulations promulgated in the prince's name, and enforced by his authority; against him, therefore, popular vengeance, when aroused, is directed; and in the minds of many enlightened men, the evils of centralization are laid to the account of monarchy. But under the Mussulman system, the local ruler, or ayan, is the oppressor; and the central government only interferes to wreak its vengeance on the petty despot, and really never does become the instrument of direct wrong to the raya. How, then, should the Greek peasant, accustomed to respect, and to hold in veneration the authority of the Turkish sultan, be indisposed to submit to a Christian king? How should a people who only dread, who have only suffered from the usurped and abused authority of delegates, wish to see political power shared among these very men who interfered with their local administrations? If

Otho fails to conciliate the affections of the Greeks, it will not be in consequence of his title; indeed, so glâd will they be of boasting of a European prince to the Turks, and of possessing one central point of authority and administration among themselves, that much will be borne with, much will be forgiven, save and except always, interferences with the municipalities, or the presence of a tax-gatherer.

The account I have given of the administrative reforms, which conciliated the affections of the Greeks to the Turkish authority, will, of itself, explain the measures the new administration has to adopt, which are as follows:—provincial governors; a judiciary establishment adopting the pandects of Justinian already in use; the apportioning the revenue by district, according to a general cadastre, and leaving its assessment and collection entirely to the municipal bodies, as also all local administration, the making of roads, building of bridges, churches, schools, appointment of priests, schoolmasters. The municipalities are the very rudiments of representation, and the primates of a certain number of communities, or of a certain district, might choose deputies to assemble as a provincial council.* The executive will receive

* In the Turkish districts the villages were united municipally, or for financial purposes, by threes or fours, into nahies; these were united judicially into cazas, under a cadi; these were again united civilly into livas, under a candjac-bey. The British villages (trefs) were united by fours for jurisdiction; twelve of these, or fifty trefs, formed a commot, and two of these a cantred. In Spain and Portugal, where the municipalities were a twofold inheritance, from the customs of the Moors and the law of the Romans, and where they displayed greater vigour in the days of their prosperity than in any other portion of Europe, since there, they retained their

the surplus revenue of the provinces after the local expenses are defrayed, without charges or trouble in collecting; its functions will be restricted to maintaining order and general police, the appointing of provincial governors, the organization of troops, and the creation of a little marine, the care of the fortresses, foreign commerce, and foreign relations; but by judicious suggestions, without any assumption of authority, it may be the means of introducing improved cultivation and irrigation, normal schools, an administration of the forests, an extension of communications, the repair and creation of ports and harbours, &c.; it will, indeed, be all powerful for good.

The expenditure would thus be reduced to a mere trifle. In the naval and military departments some expense would be necessary, not in the number of men to be kept on foot or vessels afloat,* but in

essentially agricultural character,—we find the same sub-divisions of municipal districts. The smallest village of Portugal had its municipality, and though there was no general system, each municipal district had a council, representing it.

* Capodistrias presented the naval and military accounts to the congress at Argos, from his arrival up to the end of June 1829. The items were as follows:

Irregulars *	£ 155,396
Regulars †	23,898

* The calculation in this department was erroneous, and the publication of this sum caused an insurrection, as the soldiers declared the third of it had never reached *them*. The establishment then exceeded 10,000 men.

† Consisting of

Infantry, 3 battalions of 300 effective men.
 Artillery, 1 do. do.
 Cavalry, 2 squadrons 100 do.
 and 84 Officers.

elementary schools for officers, and in preparing materials and arsenals. The passes of Macronoros, of Caracos, of Patragic, Tragouvouno, and Œeta, require some fortification, as also the point of Anactorium, and the north-west extremity of the Negropont. These and the principal fortresses* have to be kept up. The clergy are supported by certain fees and voluntary contributions. The monasteries possess considerable property: one of the first acts of the revolution was to prohibit all persons from taking the vows, so that the monks have dwindled away. Capodistrias had appropriated some of the monastic possessions to the support of schools, and the general feeling is that they should be so applied. The judiciary establishment may be maintained at a very trifling cost, and the government has no further expenses save la Maison du Roi. If it adopts the municipal principle, it embarrasses itself with no custom-house officers or tax-gatherers whatever, and it

Brought over	£179,294
Fortresses	4,274
Navy	29,858
Central School	1,030
Office expenses	453
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Total for seventeen months	£214,909
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Or say per annum	£150,000
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Under Capodistrias the War department absorbed three-fifths of the revenue—accounted for. ^{'''}

* In the Morea, Palamide, Napoli de Malvosia, Acrocorintho, Navarino, Modon, and castle of Morea. In Roumelie, castle of Roumelie, Vouizza, Zeitouni, and Negropont. Lepanto, Coron, Patrass, Athens, &c. are of no importance as fortifications.

will be relieved from all concern in local affairs. It has little to do with foreign powers—nothing with foreign commerce, save to leave it to itself; and for its military and civil, its judiciary and central administration, a quarter of a million yearly seems amply sufficient.

The monarchy of Greece must rest on these three principles—municipal institutions, direct taxation, and perfect freedom of commerce: and yet these are not three but one principle, under a three-fold character; each as a principle leading to the other two as consequences, and indivisible in their utility and their operation.

If the revenue of Greece is to be raised indirectly, a custom-house system and a preventive service must be organized. I need hardly enter into detail, to show the utter impracticability of barricading the coasts of such a country—serrated with gulfs, bays, and creeks, intersected with mountain ranges; frequent calms at sea, when the light mysticos, with their sweeps, will defy pursuit—with the neighbourhood of Candia, the Ionian Islands, and Turkey, the example of her free trade, and the convenient vicinity of islands which have been piratical, and now would become smuggling stations. There are other considerations which must be urged against the custom-house plan, namely, the utility to herself of leaving her commerce and navigation entirely unshackled; the necessity of doing so, if she wishes to realize the high commercial destinies that the habits of her population and her admirable position point out as hers. But I must confess that I trust more to the practical impossibility of enforcing the injurious system, than

to the arguments that might be adduced in favour of the other. But supposing that by overwhelming military power, and at an enormous expense, she could establish custom-house cordons, what would be the consequence? 1st. The increase of expenditure; 2d. The decrease of her commerce; 3d. The resistance to government which indirect taxation must produce, but in tenfold force in Greece, where they have been for centuries accustomed to buy the produce of all parts of the world at the lowest price. The indirect system will then not disguise taxation, while it misplaces the burdens and doubles the necessities of the state, and will cause universal irritation, without obtaining the support of interests and prejudices grown up under its influence. 4th. Law will cease to be respected. Opinion has hitherto stood in place of law; and law, to be enforced and respected, must now coincide with opinion. prostitute the law to financial purposes—create new crimes, and visit them with the penalties scarcely awarded to the worst injuries inflicted on society, and law and opinion will be brought into direct collision. This is a momentous consideration for a prince who goes to govern a people, as it is supposed in Europe, of pirates and bandits, with four thousand German bayonets. In practice and in principle so numerous are the objections to the European commercial system, so great are the temptations to interference, for men carrying thither European notions of administration, who will be at first environed with respect, and kneeled to with submission, that I cannot see how he can escape falling into serious errors; and so difficult is it for the self-love of such a government to retrace any false step, that,

without great faith in prophecy, I will only give Greece five years to find its way back to the Turkish dominion, if the indirect system of taxation is attempted.

Supposing it granted that the revenue is not to be raised from commerce, you must lay it on land and property; but if the difficulties of organizing a custom-house system is great, they will be greater in organizing a body of collectors, who will have to assess as well as collect: the expense would be ruinous; the extortion they would be guilty of would fall on the government, and a struggle be commenced, which it is all-important to crush in the very bud. Will the government, then, have recourse to farmers of revenue? I trust it will be deterred from that measure by the example of Capodistrias. How then can its revenue be raised, without injustice, without involving the government in continual struggles, and rendering it obnoxious to the accusation of partiality and injustice, and with the least possible expense? I answer, by the municipal bodies. They have been disorganized in Greece, trampled on and perverted; but if the government carefully abstains from all legislation on the subject—imposes the tribute, and arbitrarily demands its payments—I again repeat, without giving any instructions as to the mode of collection, things will find their level, the municipalities will revive, by the same cause that originally produced them. Legislation on the subject might seriously injure, and could not improve them; and on their restoration, I feel the deepest conviction that the prosperity, nay, the independent existence

of Greece and the authority of her young sovereign depend.*

Again: to settle Greece permanently, her people must have an interest and a voice in her administration. Is it to the capitani and primates that that authority is to be extended? Most certainly not. There is little difference in the political intelligence of the hind and of his master, and the whole mass of the people must feel the independence it, and it alone, has struggled for. It cannot act on the central government: give it a voice in the municipalities—let its in-

* The expulsion of Don Pedro from the Brazils, when rightly read, is a lesson and a warning to King Otho. Don John, previous to his emigration to America in 1807, applied to M. Sarmento, one of the most eminent lawyers of Portugal, for counsel on the line of policy he ought to adopt on arriving in the Brazils; the answer was short and comprehensive—"that he should throw himself entirely on the municipalities for the administration of the country, and trust to them for providing for the expenses incurred by the exigencies of the times, and the removal of the royal family." Don John feared this might appear too great a concession to popular opinion. Money was necessary; he could only raise it by ordinances: to stifle discontent, he had to grant and create pensions and places—to overawe it, to increase the army. The result has been public debt, and enmity placed between the house of Braganza and the people that received it with open arms. The shouts of loyalty of 1807 became invocations of a republic in 1817, and in 1821 the country was ready to break into open revolution on the first news of the insurrectionary movements in Portugal; and now Don Pedro, after granting a constitution, is an outcast, because Don John thought that allowing the municipalities to manage their own affairs would curtail the intrigues of his favourites. The above advice, as the opinion here expressed of its neglect on the fortunes of Don Pedro, "I give on the authority of M. Sarmento (Fils), late Portuguese minister, and equally distinguished as a jurisconsult, patriot, and diplomatist.

fluence be felt on the local administration—direct the public attention to the erection of schools, the construction of bridges, &c.—give it the election of all its officers, the revision and controul of expenditure, the fixation of assessments—let it organize as it chooses its forms, its elections, its courts; let the government only see that the chiefs do not interfere, and the care and wisdom of the government will be repaid by the most unbounded devotion, and supported by the jealous control the municipalities will exercise, over the only class of men who have hitherto profited by anarchy, and who alone can have any wish for its recurrence.

Thus, then, the impossibility of guarding the coasts, makes it necessary to raise the revenue by direct taxation, which can only be advantageously done by municipal bodies. But the ease of raising the revenue directly, renders it unnecessary to burden commerce. The advantages of leaving commerce unshackled, points out taxation on property; the expense of collecting points out the municipalities: thus are the three principles inseparably connected, without superfluity, without deficiency, forming a complete administrative system, to be wholly rejected or unpromisingly adopted.*

* Besides, there are the public possessions and the national lands, for which see Appendix. The disposal of these lands is a momentous question, and deeply should I regret to see the European proprietary system introduced. The government has money at its disposal, let these rich lands be located, like the *Chefalo-Choria* of Turkey—let it advance small loans, even exacting large interest—and then let these public lands be assessed higher than the private property.

But I have been arguing the question as if the new administration could do with Greece in all things as it thought fit, without consulting the wishes of the people, or the opinions of the European governments, on whose guaranteeship it rests. I have been merely pointing out the policy it must adopt to secure a despotic existence, without reference to national habits, prejudices, opinion, or influence. But Otho is not a feudal sovereign; he has no hereditary right or prescriptive prerogative—no historic family associations or influential connexion; the name of king is guarded round by no conservative recollections, nor is his throne encircled by victorious legions. Are the measures, then, which would be imperative on a conqueror, to be neglected by an elected sovereign? And what are those measures? Experimental essays, or exotic institutions? No: the preservation of administrative institutions, which might almost be called domestic—which have formed the habits of the nation and the character of the individual, and which cannot be denied without a dangerous attempt at altering not only the political character of the country, but the moral character of the man.

The municipalities of Greece may be looked on as little republics, which are the objects of more than republican attachment with the people, but which are destitute of republican turbulence. To these institutions their habits, experience, and affections are at-

Capodistrias exacted three-tenths of the produce from the public lands and one from the private. But the tribute must of course be commuted for a fixed money assessment.

tached, with all the energy of mountaineers. Even Napoleon, in his thorough disregard for the moral part of man, respected the affections of the only system in Europe to be compared with that of Greece, the small republics of Switzerland; and in the undeviating uniformity of his gigantic organization, allowed them to stand the only exception; he would “not interfere with the traditional customs of the small republics which had been the cradle of Swiss liberty, and which constituted the principal title of Switzerland to the sympathy of Europe.” Could he have used other words in speaking of Greece? But more extraordinary, and almost prophetic, are the words which follow: “Destroy those free primitive commonwealths, and you become a mere common people, with no claim for escaping the whirlpool of European politics.*

It has ever been objected to Greece that she is destitute of patriotism, that she has no talisman of Fatherland. Whence then her revolution? She may be destitute of that patriotism which thrills at a country's geographical name, but she replaces it by the most devoted attachment to locality and to race; (το γένος,) destroy that local attachment and interest, by centralising the administration, you replace it by no sudden creation of national patriotism; but leave undisturbed the local administrations, and these

* It must be observed, that these were not arguments against annihilating Swiss independence, or for annexing these commonwealths to the empire, but against subjecting them to the common rule of election for local magistrates and representatives in the centralized republic at Berne.

local affections will soon ascend with political power from the part to the whole.

The Hellenic monarchy will be a federation, not a unit of which the smaller bodies politic are the fractions, but a multiple of which these are the integers; these, while to a certain degree they may be strangers to each other, and separate in jurisdiction, will be equally submissive to and equally dependent on the central authority.*

But there is still a very important question to be examined—the obligations of Greece to Europe. The debt of gratitude she owes can only be repaid by prudent legislation, by raising her political resources, and preparing herself for supporting vigorously the Porte; with whom, I feel confident in saying, her interests in every point most strikingly coincide, and to whose institutions hers, if judiciously framed, will be very much assimilated—if that power cannot be renovated, she must be fit to supply its place. But there is a point of more immediate and direct importance than these ulterior political views, to settle between Greece and Europe, and England in particular. To what rate of customs is our commerce to be subjected? If to the Turkish three per cent., this alone decides the whole financial system of Greece. That Greece will be allowed to concoct a tariff, while our most persevering efforts are directed to the introduction of free trade, wherever it does not exist, and amongst our rivals, does not seem at all likely

* Such are nearly the expressions used by Mr. Palgrave, in describing the Teutonic Monarchies.—*Rise and Progress of the Commonwealth*, p. 63.

We must not allow her to extinguish all her own commercial prospects, nor can we resign the all-important free-trade system which Turkey entitled us to, to a new power, of which we ourselves have been the principal architects. What were the stipulations which we made with the new republics that once belonged to Spain, whose struggles we had not countenanced, whose independence we had neither fought for nor guaranteed, and with whose internal administration we had never interfered? Our treaties with them stipulate that “the subjects of his Britannic Majesty shall on no account or pretext whatever be disturbed or molested in the peaceful possession or exercise of whatever rights, privileges, and immunities they have at any time enjoyed.”* Now, though we have submitted to the tariff of Mexico, as we did to that of Spain, Greece cannot pretend to substitute her tariff for that of Turkey. The perfect freedom of commerce†—the right to which in Greece we inherit from Turkey, is one of those immunities which we can resign on no account or pretext whatever; it is a golden privilege which we never can abandon.

Now that Greece has assumed a definite and substantial form, she can afford to discard the sympathies and the classical associations that have contributed so much to her importance. It is no longer her soil, her costume, her language, and her ruins, that interest; it is not even the emancipation of the clusters of the Egean or the mountains of Peloponessus, that

* Treaty with Mexico, Dec. 26, 1826.

† The nominal three per cent. is but equivalent to light port dues, the anchorage under 8*d.* per vessel!

is the reward of one of the most noble and disinterested of diplomatic achievements: it is the political regeneration of the East that we have commenced—it is the emancipation of eastern commerce that we have effected. Greece owes herself to the furtherance of these two grand and philanthropic objects.

The political independence of the Greeks will elevate the raya of Turkey, and force the reorganization of that country. The light craft of Greece will frequent every creek of the Levant and the Euxine; her merchants, combining local experience and information with European connexion and knowledge, and endowed now with political independence, will spread themselves over the whole surface of Turkey—supply their wants, excite their taste, take off their surplus produce, and, increasing their prosperity, augment their demands. Greece will become one great mart, where the manufactures of England will be distributed to the surrounding districts of Europe, Asia, and Africa, and to which the returns from these countries will be directed: she will be one free port, to link together the commerce of the East and of the West.*

This mission seems particularly reserved to the

* It was little to be expected that commerce should even have begun as yet to put forth its feelers in Greece, considering the constant state of agitation the country has been in. Even during the rule of Capodistrias little progress was to be expected, since he took every means of spreading the idea of insecurity in Greece, and even went so far as to menace with unexpressed anger, foreign merchants disposed to settle in the country! yet in 1831 ships of all nations, entered and cleared at the single port of ruined Patras, amounted to 938. Tonnage 53,951.

Greek race; by conquest of arms they had almost succeeded two thousand years ago—by arts, about one thousand years ago, they had subdued the victorious Saracens, and the philosopher of that age, might have confidently looked forward, from the union of Arabic legislation and Greek science, to the extinction of the corresponding barbarism, that in their consequences have so long kept distinct and separate Europe from Asia, and have made the one to the other as if it were an empty space on the earth's surface. The torrent from Tartary; and the dull inertness of the Turkish despotism, has retarded, during this long period, the progress of instruction in the precocious East, from corresponding with that of the West. But now, under very different circumstances, the twice almost achieved conquest of Greece bids fair to be realized—not by arms, not by science, but by the first benefactor, the first instructor of men and nations—commerce. The views of Alexander and his policy appear to to have been directed to cementing by commerce the conquest of his arms. That most wonderful man seems alone among the great of antiquity, to have based political combinations on the wants and interests of men. The founding of Alexandria—the eagle glance which embraced all the commercial advantages of the position of Troas, his statistical researches, and the exploration of the rivers and coasts of India, are mere indications of profound conceptions, that found no interpreter. His main object of uniting Europe and Asia, may be clearly seen by one of many magnificent projects found after his death on his tablets, and which has unhappily been the only one preserved, namely, to build several new cities in

Asia to people with Europeans, and in Europe to people with Asiatics; "that by intermarriages and exchanges of good offices, the inhabitants of these two great continents might be gradually united by similar opinions and attached by mutual affections.*

This grand design presents itself now no longer in records of antiquity, not in dim and distant prospect, to be reached over the ruins of fixed habits, prejudices, and institutions. The cynic despotism of the descendants of the hordes, who, from the Caspian to the Isthmus of Suez, barred the road to India, is now broken up; on every side, from Georgia to Morocco, new principles are in action, while Europe is in a situation to take advantage of the changed circumstances, possessing intelligence united with power, such as no previous epoch has ever known; wise enough to understand that her power over these tribes and nations must not rest on violence and conquest, but on the exchange of mutual advantages, and fortunately possessing in her vast manufacturing resources, the means of cementing that union, and of establishing that power by the indissoluble bonds of mutual interests.

How deeply is it to be regretted, that traffic's fertilizing course between India and our own country, should have been so long uselessly driven through the Atlantic and the Indian ocean. Let us hope that the change of circumstances at home and in the East, will bring back that intercourse to its more direct and natural route; no measure could so essentially contribute to the political reorganization of the intervening countries, of which commercial prosperity is

* Diod. Sec. lib. xviii. c. 4.

a consequence. The communication through the Red Sea seems on the point of being put to the test of practice, and an enterprising and distinguished officer has lately explored the course of the Euphrates, from the point nearest to Scanderoon to the Persian Gulf. Under these circumstances, of what importance is it to us to have a free port such as Greece, in such a position, and such a body of carriers, merchants, and pedlars, as the Greeks? The list of the countries which have acquired the taste for our manufactures, and which are only prevented from being amply supplied with them by the high charges of commerce, or the absence of merchants, or the restrictions of their own governments, and which are more or less within reach of Greece, and of the competition and dexterity of her merchants, is more éloquent than arguments, and needs to be supported by none. Morocco and the Barbary coast, Central Africa, Egypt, the Bedouin and Magrybeen Arabs; Syria, Damascus, Bagdad, the whole of Asia Minor, Diarbekir, Persia, Georgia, Circassia, the Kouban, Southern Russia, and through it a great portion of the empire; Bessarabia, Galicia, Moldavia, Wallachia, Bulgaria, Servia, Bosnia, Albania, &c., and Hungary. To lend her aid to these objects and to benefit herself in their furtherance, Greece must possess, as a necessary qualification, unlimited freedom of commerce.

But the fabric of her own future greatness, and her importance to us, is a visionary dream, unless a foundation fit for its support be now laid; and deeply does it interest us to examine the soundness of the materials and the skill of the workmen; if they com-

mit errors, the blame and the loss will equally and deservedly fall upon us.

Greece has to be delivered from military despotism, from the arrogance of an upstart oligarchy, from their oppression and their factions; she has to be relieved from Capodistrias' broken shackles of customs and police. The power of the chiefs can only be broken, the affection of the people only conciliated, the errors of Capodistrias only obliterated, by the restoration of the municipalities. The only system approved by practice and experience, that is sufficiently economical for the finances of Greece, that is sufficiently simple for her inexperienced administration, that is sufficiently acceptable to the nation, for the weakness of that administration to enforce:—the only system that can allow her commercial capabilities to develop themselves, that can reconcile and excite without confounding the local and parcelled affections and interests of the Greeks; and, in fine, the only system which, by simplifying the central government and strengthening the local interests can arrest the demoralizing progress of northern intrigue, is that which is summed up in municipalities, direct taxation, and freedom of commerce.

Here is the broad and Arab foundation which must be religiously respected; on this you may rear the higher political combinations, which in Europe have preceded the foundation. We have built downwards; hence the struggle of interest which Greece, with moderate prudence, may entirely escape. Having seen the Greeks as patriots, and as bandits, as pirates, and soldiers—having seen them eat the bread of industry, of chicane, and of violence—having visited every

portion of ancient or modern Greece, from the borders of Pannonia, Dacia, and Illyria, to the southern shores of Crete, I may be entitled, as far at least as experience goes, to hazard one concluding opinion, which is, that the Greeks are the easiest people in the world to lead and the most difficult to drive; that amidst all their sectional varieties, two main springs are ever in action—the desire of instruction and the love of gain.

APPENDIX.

No. I.

Estimate of cost price of silk in Turkey, made in a village of Chalcidice, in 1831. See page 181.

Twenty large mulberry trees produced 6000 okes of leaves—from these 75 okes of cocoons were obtained, which were reeled into six okes of silk. I cannot vouch for the exact weight of the leaves, or the cocoons, but I can answer for twenty trees having produced 15 lbs. of coarse silk. The trees were planted in a row, on a high bank of a rivulet, in a beautiful exposure, looking on the Toronaic Gulph. They did not injure the crop of the surrounding soil, but had they occupied the soil exclusively, they would have taken up one stremma, or one third of an acal. They were some of the finest mulberries I have ever seen, of the white variety, wild, having a mixture of round and deeply serrated leaves. The leaves were gathered by cutting the yearly shoots close to the crown of the stem, five feet from the ground, which preserves the leaves better, and allows the worms to feed in a more cleanly manner, and gives them more air than when the leaves are stripped off. The partial outlay of money amounted to 15s., of which 11 was a tax on the trees, and the produce was sold in the market of Salonica, at 60 piastres the oke, or 4*l.* 18*s.* for the 15 lbs. The labour of the family supplied the rest; but calculating that labour at the wages they might

have received if hired, and adding to that the profit on the trees, or, better still, on the land they occupy, we may come to the real price at which silk can be produced were the country relieved from violence, illegal taxation, and the mercantile monopolies of the jews and bankers.

	Cost of production. Piastrs.
Two men's hire for a month, at 1 piastre per day, for gathering leaves, and attending worms	60
Hire for a fileuse, 15 days, 15 piastrs; attendant girl 10 prs.; hire of reel and caldron, 15 prs.; transport of fuel for reeling, 5 prs.; other attendance, expenses, risks, &c.; 15 piastrs, in all	60
Rent of one stremma (equal to 4l. per acre)	100
Tax of government, two piastrs per tree	40
	<hr style="width: 100px; margin-left: auto; margin-right: 0;"/> 260
	<hr style="width: 100px; margin-left: auto; margin-right: 0;"/>
	About 4s. per lb.

This silk sold at 60 piastrs an oke, or 6s. a pound, while a small quantity that was reeled in the Piedmontese manner, was selling for 110 piastrs an oke, or 11s. 6d. per lb.; yet the additional expense of reeling and loss in the Piedmontese manner could not exceed 1s. 6d. per lb. The expense of the machine 27s.

The calculation I have made of labour will appear exceedingly low, but it was the price at the time amongst the villagers. At Salonica for good work-people it was double, but this refers only to the reeling, which does not cost above 6d. a pound. In France it costs 2s. 1d. The priceⁿ of labour will, no doubt, rise with the demand, but this is a labour that the women can perform, and fills up the intervals of

other work, and the objections to cottage education, which are so strong in France, do not hold in Turkey.

In this calculation I have allowed a liberal remunerating price, and a price which the producer never at present obtains; for when the banker has not forestalled the produce, the governor often forces it from the peasant at an arbitrarily fixed price. I have seen it myself, though this is an extreme case, taken at one-third of the calculation I have made.

There is a local tax of from one-sixth to one-third of the produce, and a duty of seven piastres and a half per teffee on exportation, which, if maintained, render nugatory all attempts at opening this new and important branch of commerce. Supposing these impositions withdrawn, the expenses that would be incurred to bring the silk into the English market would be as follows:—

	£	s.	d.
Cost of production as above, per lb.	0	4	0
Additional expense of reeling in the Piedmontese manner, if introduced throughout the country	0	1	6
Average expense of transport	0	0	2½
Brokerage, commission, four prs. per teffee	0	0	3
Warehousing, packing, and cases, portorage, shipping, &c.	0	0	3
Freight, insurance, and selling charges in England	0	0	3½
On this the government has already received, in the form of a tax on the mulberry trees, 10d. but supposing it to exact 10 per cent. export duty	0	0	6
<hr/>			
So that if it removes the causes of individual monopolies, and abstains from illegal exactions, the silk of Turkey may be disposed of, reeled in the Piedmontese manner, in the London market, at per lb.	£0	7	0
The same silk selling at present at 22s.	<hr/>		

No. II.

Population of European Turkey. See page 150.

I have stated, in round numbers, the population of European Turkey and Greece, at twelve millions. As guesses on this subject are so exceedingly vague and contradictory, (varying from seven to twenty-two millions,) I should hardly have thought it worth while giving any reasons for fixing on the above, had not Mr. Gordon, reckoned it at eight millions.

Although the destruction of life and property since 1812, by plague and warfare, has been frightful in the southern regions, and within the sphere of the influence of the Greek revolution, it is not so in the northern regions, and even in those districts which have most suffered, the depopulation and devastation is often greater in appearance than in reality. In such times men avoid observation, villages are displaced from the tracts frequented by troops, and cultivation flies the public routes; but it has often occurred to me, when looking in despair around for a village to pass the night, and being able to discover none, that a peasant finding me to be a Frank, would lead me to one hard by, screened by the brow of a hill, or nestled in the bottom of a vale, and without a patch of cultivated ground visible from the road.

The northern populations, however, can scarcely be said to have suffered from war. They are almost wholly of Slavonic origin, and occupy an immense tract of country, extending east and west from the Adriatic to the Euxine, and from the 41st degree of latitude to the south, to the Danube, and the Save to the north. This territory is very little known to Europeans, who rarely traverse it, and then only in two directions, and its population and fertility is estimated by the barren and trodden-down extremity of Thrace. Yet many portions of this region which, comprises above 120,000 square miles, struck me as being more populous than France.*

Previous to the last Russian war, the Porte entertained the most extravagant notions as to the population of the country. It trusted to its old registers, or admitted unscrupulously the swollen estimates of the different bouluç bashis, beys, and pashas, who, by lengthening their muster-rolls endeavoured to increase their own importance. But the passage of the Balkans has quickened their sight, and awakened energy with apprehension, statistical details have been demanded throughout the whole country, and these can easily be collected from the municipalities. The governors and pashas of late appointment can all read and write, and seem to have taken up statistics with

* In the Supplement to the Enc. Brit. in the Modern Traveller, &c., it is out of the question to look for any approximation to accuracy in their calculations; for the very delimitations of districts are laid down with less accuracy than those of the kingdoms of central Africa.

spirit. I can bear testimony to the readiness with which they have communicated to me all the information they themselves possessed; we may, therefore, soon expect to be in possession of official returns.

The grand vizir proposed organizing 300,000 men, drafted from the Mussulman population, taking one man from fifteen souls, which would give a Mussulman population of 4,500,000. Now throughout the country, the Mussulman population never exceeds one-third of the Christian. The following classification, by race and language, I think preferable to uncertain territorial subdivision, or to ranging them under the indefinite heads of Christians and Turks:—

Osmanlis—Turkish race and language, all Mussulmen	700,000*
Greeks—Hellenic race and language, all Christians	2,050,000†
Albanians—Skipertar race and language, two-thirds Mussulmans	1,600,000

* That portion of European Turkey which now forms Greece contained most Osmanlis; but supposing the Osmanlis scattered, equally over the whole country, if there were 35,000 in Greece, in European Turkey (eight times as large) there would have been 280,000 Osmanlis; and this is certainly above the mark. Besides these, there are the Turkish Juruks and Coniars, Turkish cultivators around Olympus, and in Macedonia; and the Turkish population of Constantinople, Adrianople, Salonica, and Philipopolis.

† Free Greeks	870,000
Candia, Samas, Rhodes, Scio, Mitylene, &c.	280,000
Thessaly, the Pindus range, and Lower Epirus	400,000
Macedonia	300,000
Constantinople, Thrace, &c.	200,000
	<hr/>
	2,050,000

Slavonic race and dialects—one-third Mussulmans, (Bosaniacs, Tulemans, Pomac); two-thirds Christians of the Greek church (Servians, Bulgarians); of the Latin (Mirdites Croatsians) occupying the tract to the north of 41°	6,000,000
Vlachi Greek church	600,000
Other races—gypsies (200,000); Jews (250,000); Armenians (100,000); Franks, &c., (50,000)	600,000
	<hr/>
	11,550,000
Wallachia and Moldavia	1,500,000
	<hr/>
	13,050,000

No. III.—Page 253.

National possessions, population, and revenue of Greece.

Without venturing to vouch for the exactitude of the subjoined tables, I think I may safely say that they are more accurate than any thing that has been yet published on the subject. They are based on the labours of the statistical commission instituted by Capodistrias. The coincidence of my own confined inquiries, with their results, lead me to place considerable confidence in them, which is still further increased by their agreeing, on some points, to an extent truly astonishing, with the results obtained by Col. Leake, who, between the years 1805 and 1810, with his characteristic research and exactitude, framed tables of the population of the Morea and of conti-

nenal Greece, which he has had the kindness to communicate to me. For the Morea the totals are as follows: for the nineteen capitals of Valayetis, or towns inhabited partly by Christians and Turks, the Greeks were 155,000; the village and exclusively agricultural population, 185,000; Osmanlis, 26,500; Laliotes—Mussulman—Albanians, 10,000; in all—Greeks 340,000, Mussulmans 36,500.

In continental Greece the difficulty of ascertaining the limits of districts make the details vary when the totals agree. Thus, although the items of Col. Leake's tables for western Greece vary considerably from the annexed tables, the totals agree, with the difference of 900—the one being 116,900; the other 116,000.

Attica does not at present, or did not before the revolution, contain more than one twentieth of its ancient population; Egina not the hundredth part of the very slaves assigned to it by Aristotle. Argolis must have contained ten times its present population; and those districts, of whose ancient population we can form any estimate, may at least be reckoned ten times as populous as they are at present. The mountainous districts, however, do not follow the same rule; their population having been much smaller, in proportion, than it is at present; the rich lands being occupied by the Turks, the Greeks have been driven for support and defence to the mountains.

In Table D, in calculating the actual population of the Greek states, I have first deducted 62,810 Mussulmans; 58,000 for the loss of the Morea, and 42,700 for the loss of continental Greece—in all 163,510, from the population in 1820. Certainly a large de-

duction. The official census for 1829, gave for the Morea and the islands 550,000, but the population was then very fluctuating.

In the Morea the rapidity with which its population increased, after each devastation, is wonderful. In 1717, on its final subjugation, it was calculated to contain 400,000 souls; in 1756 a dreadful plague swept off half the population; in 1770 the expedition of Orloff subjected that province to ten years of continuous devastation and bloodshed; and after the extermination of the Arnauts, the depopulated country was again, in 1781, visited by pestilence. Before this scourge was inflicted, the population was estimated below 200,000, yet thirty years afterwards the Christians amounted to 340,000; in 1820 they were 458,000; and in 1829, after the eight years of revolution, there were in the Morea 330,000, and 60,000 refugees in adjacent islands.

From table E it will appear that the legal revenue of the countries and islands constituting the Greek state amounted to 6,678,797, (£446,253;) a sum certainly ample for the expenditure at present. Customs and excise form but six per cent. of this sum, (£31,666,) or two per cent. of the gross amount of revenue and exaction, and ought to be abandoned altogether. At this moment I should think, that, with prospective security, Greece may be considered as recovered from the revolution; especially when it is borne in mind that she is delivered from 63,000 Mussulmans, who either lived on the industry of the Greeks, or occupied the richest land.

Table F is an approximate calculation of the national possessions. The value placed opposite

each item is rather introduced to convey more concisely by figures than could be expressed by words, an idea of their general and relative importance. These sums are calculated on a purchase of three years, at the price at which private sales have been effected between the years 1829 and 1830, inclusive. During this period some kinds of property have quadrupled in price. If this property were offered at once for sale, of course it would not fetch a price even approaching these estimates; but, nevertheless, this is a capital which the government may let out at high interest: it has ready money; it may advance small loans to the peasantry; it may establish banks for that purpose in each district, as was proposed to Capodistrias. But if such banks are established, let them be according to the Arab model of the Beit-ul-mahl, for public as well as private property, under the management of the municipal council. An act such as this can, however, only emanate from men with sufficient decision and confidence in their own judgment to step boldly beyond the narrow prejudices and selfish views of their subordinates. Confidence is reciprocal: let the government mark its trust in the people by so beneficial an act as this, and that trust will be returned to it a hundred fold; not only would the revenue be augmented by the rapid improvement of agriculture, but contentment and a universal interest in good government would be spread through the whole community. Sincerely do I hope that the new administration will instantly apply the funds it has received, in this only way in which its utility can be unequivocal, instead of frigidly hoarding it up, like the talent of the unprofitable servant.

The value of land will rise rapidly in Greece, and if this calculation of £12,000,000 is at all near the mark at present, it will be trebled in three or four years of tranquillity. Under the Turks, money for agricultural purposes was borrowed at twenty per cent., yet the cultivator had to endure arbitrary exactions: he had no roads, no waggons, no wheelbarrows—no idea of rotation of crops—no manure—no spade—no harrow, and may hardly be said to have had a plough. Under so many disadvantages—with no expedients for abridging labour, no knowledge by which the produce might be rendered more abundant and more valuable, if the cultivator could afford to pay twenty per cent. interest, what will not the value of land become, when, by experience and instruction, improved agriculture is introduced, with European modes of reducing the expense of cultivation; and when, if the government is wise, the order and point of honour of Europe are engrafted on the simplicity of the Turkish financial, judiciary, and proprietary system?

The internal debts of Greece were settled at 200,000,000 of piasters, besides 20,000,000 borrowed by Capodistrias. The piastre being then seventy-five to the pound, and two and a half to the Greek phoenix; so that to the original debt in England is to be added £2,933,333; and the new loan, £2,400,000, which ought to be immediately taken up and appropriated as above. The debt will thus amount in all to about seven millions sterling. This may appear an enormous sum for Greece, but with economy in the administration, prudence in the settlement of the public lands, and, above all, by the

emancipation of Greece from all legislation affecting the industry of man, the exchange or transport of merchandise or produce, or the self-adjustment of interests—she possesses means far more than sufficient to meet all her obligations.

To face Table A.—p. 279.

The arable, vineyard, and garden land in the opposite Table are calculated per stremma, or one third of an acre; the olives by the number of trees; the contributions in piastres, then fifteen to the pound.

TABLE A.

DISTRICT.	POPULATION.		POSSESSIONS.						CONTRIBUTIONS.					
	Greek.	Turkish.	ARABLE.		VINES.		GARDENS.		OLIVES.		Charatch at 6 pra. per adult male.	Tithe on corn and oil.	Assessed tax on houses.	Total.
			Greek.	Turkish.	Greek.	Turkish.	Greek.	Turkish.	Greek.	Turkish.				
EASTERN GREECE.														
Eubœa	36,000	7,000	300,000	400,000	26,470	4,333	500	270	309,550	91,100	50,000	900,000	410,000	660,000
Attica	20,600	1,650	149,500	170,000	5,790	627	630	790	172,450	4,500	20,000	170,000	395,000	525,000
Bœotia	15,000	560	10,000	172,200	16,550	50	70	320	7,000		10,000	100,000	146,000	236,000
Lebadia	25,750	800	366,300	95,550	19,550	100	320	150	19,550		20,000	120,000	200,000	340,000
Talanti	7,000	450	71,700	77,000	2,230	200	20	20	14,000	720	5,000	50,000	75,000	130,000
Tourcochori	1,450	100	20,000	28,400	250						21,500	20,000	29,500	71,000
Boudounitza	3,500	230	24,000	28,000	1,550	30		20	800	120	3,300	40,000	82,500	126,000
Salona	18,250	1,070	41,750	8,100	6,500	680			40,550	38,960	18,000	45,000	76,000	139,000
Lidoriki	10,000	500	70,000	10,000	2,000						12,000	1,500	22,000	35,500
Malandrino	3,000	1,150	30,000	6,000	3,000	140	200	300			1,500	1,500	12,000	15,000
Patrajic	16,000	1,090	130,000	71,000	9,280		740	80	16,000	2,000	15,000	3,000	48,000	66,000
Zeitouni	19,250	1,000	112,000	50,000	11,970						15,000	70,000	121,000	206,000
	175,800	15,600	1,325,250	1,116,250	105,140	6,160	2,480	1,950	579,900	137,400	191,500	761,000	1,617,000	2,569,500
WESTERN GREECE.														
Agrafa	15,000	300	72,000		15,000				4,000	6,000	8,300	2,700		8,300
Carpenisi	4,000	1,500	28,400	24,600	1,000						800	2,370		3,500
Crabbari	4,350		54,000	2,100	1,170						1,200	3,222		3,570
Apokouron	8,050	300	10,080	1,400	90						2,405	3,222		8,327
Missolonghi	15,500	560	162,800	71,320	17,000	100			120,000	3,200	4,000	16,500	1,200	21,700
Blochos	4,500	1,500	46,100	75,000	20,000	50			4,000		1,000	4,900	1,000	6,900
Xeromeros	7,000		160,200	3,000	10,000						1,800	7,500	2,000	11,300
Vonizza	4,000		100,000	200	300						800	3,200	1,000	5,000
Valtos	7,000		91,000	1,500							1,800	5,400	2,000	9,200
Aspropotamos	13,000		28,000								3,000	7,500		10,500
Venetikon	34,500		150,000	25,000	23,700						35,000	120,000	3,000	158,000
	116,900	4,460	902,580	204,120	88,260	150			128,000	9,200	60,105	173,292	12,900	246,297

TABLE B.
POPULATION OF THE ISLANDS IN 1830.

NORTHERN SPORADES.		Tinos	28,000
Skiathos	1,500	Myconi	5,500
Skopelos	7,000	CENTRAL CYCLADES.	
Skyros	2,500	Naxos	13,000
Heliodromia	300	Paros and Antiparos	7,200
WESTERN SPORADES.		Ios	5,000
Hydra	16,000	Sycenos	600
Spezzia	8,000	Polycandros	1,000
Egina	3,500	Milos	5,000
Salamina	4,000	Kemelos	1,000
Poros	7,000	Syfnos	6,000
NORTHERN CYCLADES.		Amorgos	3,500
Syra	4,500	SOUTHERN CYCLADES.	
Xerofos	2,000	Santorini	47,000
Thermia	4,500	Anafi	700
Zea	5,000	Astypalaia	3,000
Andros	16,000	Psariot refugees	8,700
			<hr/> 218,000

TABLE C.
POPULATION OF THE MOREA IN 1820.

District.	Greek.	Turkish.
Corinth and Dervenochori	38,000	2,000
Vostizza	10,000	300
Calavrita	40,000	450
Patras	30,000	3,500
Gastonna and Lala	40,000	5,000
Fanani	13,000	2,500
Arcadia	26,000	3,000
Navarino	3,000	1,000
Modon	6,000	2,500
Coron	9,000	1,000
Calamata	12,000	50
Androutsa and Nisi	15,000	750
Mikromani	2,000	
Leondari	13,000	1,500
Caritena	40,000	200
Tripolitza	25,000	7,000
Mistra	60,000	6,000
Monembasia	8,000	1,500
Agios Petros	10,000	
Argos	18,000	1,000
Napoli	10,000	500
Maina	30,000	
Total	<hr/> 458,000	<hr/> 42,750

TABLE D.

PRESENT POPULATION OF THE GREEK STATES.

Islands &c.	218,000
Eastern Greece	150,000
Western Greece	100,000
Morea	400,000
	<hr/>
	868,000

TABLE E.

STATEMENT OF THE VALUE OF THE NATIONAL DOMAINS OF GREECE.

Morea.	Stremmata.		
Pasture and Forest	6,000,000 @	3 Piastres, Ψ st.	18,000,000
Corn Land . .	6,000,000 @	50	300,000,000
Irrigable Land .	500,000 @	1,000	500,000,000
Currant Land .	1,500 @	3,000	4,500,000
Vineyards .	6,000 @	1,000	6,000,000
Olive Trees .	100,000 @	50	5,000,000
Fruit Trees .	20,000 @	20	400,000
Mills	400 @	5,000	2,000,000

Continental Greece, excepting Eubœa and Attica, in which provinces the Turks retain the right of selling their lands.

Pasture and Forest		3,000,000
Arable Land . .	750,000 @ 50 piastres Ψ st.	37,500,000
Vineyards and gardens	3,000 @ 1,000	3,000,000
Olive Trees . .	150,000 @ 50	7,500,000
Mills		600,000

887,500,000
£11,833,333 7s.

TABLE F.

REVENUE OF GREECE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION.

1. POLL TAX.	
	Piastres.
Eastern Greece	191,500
Western Greece	60,105
Morea	463,000
Islands	200,000
	914,605
2. TITHE.	
Eastern Greece	761,000
Western Greece	173,292
Morea	2,500,000
	3,434,292
3. ASSESSED TAXES.	
Eastern Greece	1,607,000
Western Greece	12,900
Islands	250,000
	1,869,900
4. CUSTOMS AND EXCISE.	
Morea—Excise on Wine	150,000
Export duties on cur-	} 325,000
rants, silk, wool, &c.	
Import—coffee, &c.	
	475,000
Paid to the Porte	Total 6,693,797
<i>Raised for local purposes, without the sanction of the Porte, but by order of the local authorities' approximate calculation.</i>	
For the Morea	10,000,000
For Continental Greece	2,000,000
	12,000,000
Approximate calculation of the Total Revenue of the Provinces, comprised in independent Greece previous to the Revolution.	
	Piastres 18,693,797
At 15 piastres per pound sterling £1,246,260	

COMPARISON
OF
...
THE MODE OF RAISING THE REVENUE
IN
TURKEY, ROME, ENGLAND, &c.

It has too long been a habit in Europe to regard Mahometanism purely as a religion, without considering that a political was involved with the religious question, and that the religious sanction was often not unprofitably applied to public ends. It is not even by the code of Islamism that the political structure and powers of that system are to be estimated, because the Koran was accompanied by traditions which were the political institutions of Arabia, preserved from time immemorial, admirably simple and powerfully efficient; "and so well adapted, so natural, and so simple, that every nation not reduced to slavery, if thrown at large on the wide desert, might be expected to adopt the same."* But fortunately juster notions are beginning to prevail; the religious is now separated from the political ques-

* Burkhardt. Notes on the Bedouines, p. 214.

tion ;* Arabic literature is gradually unrolling itself to our eyes, and from many points, new and steady, and increasing lights are thrown on the character, history, and institutions of eastern nations.

The beauty and energy of the Arabic institutions lie in their simplicity, and looking at them in their original purity, the extent of the Mussulman dominion ceases to surprise ; for while in arms and in religion a free field was open to the daring or the devotion of each individual, the government, if venal, had no temptation—if ignorant, was under no necessity of committing errors. The same principles have been so deeply engrafted on the habits of the Arabs, that in our own day they have reappeared for a moment, in political combination, under the Wahab chief, when, fortunately, such an observer as Burkhardt was near to record the event.

Greece has revived, as her symbolic Phoenix, from cold ashes ; but the light of Arabia has never ceased to burn, and to shine ; though, like the lamp of the eastern sepulchre, its ray has long been cheerless, and its heat unfelt. The approaching regeneration of the Arabs, and the revival of her spirit and her literature, will lead, let us hope, to the restoration of her ancient principles, supported by the useful instruction of Europe.

I have been particularly struck by the apparent identity of the administrative maxims to which I refer, with those of an empire, which in extent and permanency of dominion, is only to be compared to that of Islamism—an empire, too, in whose institutions all Europe is interested ; for the political, legal, and mu-

* See especially *Mahometanism unveiled*, by the Rev. M. Foster.

nicipal resemblance of her various states, is derived from Rome, their common ancestor.

The municipal institution being only active and efficient when it is cleared of all formality, and unshackled by legislation—when it subdivides itself, and extends its ramifications to the remotest hamlet and the meanest lane—is to be found in history, not recorded, but indicated. Roman law, when adopted by the nations of Europe, carefully defines the obligations and the exemptions of municipal officers, but scarcely notices the mode of election, or only incidentally refers to the usage of the place.* But it is not to the practice of Rome herself, to the laws of her municipia under the republic, or to her law under the empire, become public law of Europe, that I wish to compare the administrative maxims of Turkey; but to her practice, in the early days of her virtue and vigour, and to the system she introduced in the countries she subdued. *

Like Turkey, Rome divided its conquests into military governments; whither a yearly military governor, a yearly judicial officer, and receiver of tribute, were sent from the chief seat of government. The tenth of all lands, the rent of the public domains, and a poll-tax, were the resources of the revenue in both empires; and both left the tributaries to collect it themselves—to remit the sum due to the public treasury, according to a general assessment, free of

* This is a point deserving particular notice and inquiry, but which is not called for in a mere incidental notice of the municipalities of Rome. Suffice it for the present to say, that in the larger towns (for the Roman municipalities were urban, not rural,) smaller bodies in each district elected deputies, who elected the superior municipal officers; the votes of two-thirds of those present at both assemblies being requisite to make the election valid.

all charges—taxing themselves in addition for the local expenditure; the central government supporting only the military and judicial establishments, leaving all other matters to the tributaries, without even forcing on them their own code of civil law, or any forms of public or municipal administration.* Neither ever attempted to raise their revenue from commerce; they neither of them ever attempted to protect or encourage it, or to legislate for it.† A moderate transport duty was enacted, but which was only intended for the repair of roads and bridges. It was the same for goods entering by land or sea, and was one and the same for home or foreign productions. After the Roman supremacy was established in the Mediterranean, the duty did not exceed three per cent. The Mussulman tariff is five per cent. for tributaries, four for Mussulman, and three per cent. for foreigners,‡ favoured in the character, so sacred among the easterns, of guests.

Here are general features of most striking resemblance—freedom of commerce, taxation on property,

* The provincials applied, on contested points, to the prætors, when judgment was pronounced, not according to any one original code given to the provinces, but according to equity. These appeals were voluntarily made from municipal arbitration to the supreme authority, as now sometimes happens in Turkey.

† Usury laws are a common exception. Salt has always been a fertile subject of agitation in Roman history, yet the Roman law prohibits monopolies, and Makrizi informs us that Mahomet in his last moments congratulated himself on not having interfered in any way with the weights, measures, currency, and exchange of any nation.

‡ As all goods are imported by foreigners, or subjects sharing their privileges, the tax practically amounts to three per cent., very liberally estimated.

popularly and gratuitously collected revenue, and an immense territory, submitting to a corrupt and despotic military aristocracy. The municipal system is wholly incompatible with centralization of the administrative and financial functions, but necessarily dependent on centralized political and military power. Universal dominion was not, with such principles of public economy, the vain dream it naturally appears to us, if the Roman emperors, or the Mussulman califs, could have been kept within the bounds of moderation and justice. This system, by preventing legislative interference, prevents both errors and reactions; and the parts of the state eagerly supported the general authority which maintained general peace, internal tranquillity, and acted as a moderator and judge, above partiality, and above envy.* It brought justice to each man's door, gave financial influence to each individual, but left no field for political struggles. And besides all these advantages, taxation falling on property—industry and exchange, production and commerce, were left entirely free. If such were the general rule, however obscured by exceptions, was it surprising to see Rome mistress of the world, or the dominions of the califs extending from the Pillars of Hercules almost to the wall of China?

* Such as our dominion in India, by its superior form, is so eminently calculated to become; if, while it maintained a general political and military supremacy, such as that of Rome, it adopted the Roman maxim, of not only not interfering itself, but of putting an end to the tyranny of little native aristocracies; or if it adopted this maxim not only of common law but of kingly authority—"Quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur."—*Summons to Parliament, 23 Edw. 1.*

The annexation of Macedonia to the empire affords perhaps the most clearly recorded example of the Roman policy, and most satisfactorily establishes this coincidence of the principle of the two empires, and the equal effect of both dominions of destroying domestic tyranny, and of leaving to the mass of the vanquished nations so much interest in their own administration as to attach them to their yoke, and so much control over the handling of their revenue as to deprive that yoke of much of its severity.

Paullus* declares to the Macedonians that they were free; the cities retaining their former lands, using their own laws, and electing annual magistrates; that they should pay one-half the direct taxes (*tributaria*) which they had paid to their kings; that the kingdom was to be divided into four provinces, and in the chief place of each province councils were to be held, magistrates elected, and the tribute collected: the importation of salt was forbidden, and the customs and excise (*vectigal*) should be reduced one half. To these concessions was appended (in violation of the general practice of Rome) the not very comprehensible but most galling prohibition of commerce between the different provinces, or the right of possessing lands or houses beyond the limits of the province to which each man belonged, which was compared by the Macedonians to tearing asunder the members of a body, mutually necessary to each other's existence. The Romans destroyed every chance of old prejudices and combinations influencing these elections, or investing their former chiefs or their hereditary nobles with the new municipal offices, for

* Livy, b. xlv. c. 29.

all the chief men of Macedonia, and all their children above fifteen years of age, were ordered to repair to Italy under pain of death. The people, who at first looked on this measure with alarm; received it as a guarantee of their independence: for these men were accustomed to abject servility to their kings and haughty imperiousness to their inferiors; were educated in the habits of princely expenditure; and while some possessed overgrown fortunes, others were without the legitimate means of supplying their expenditure; "they had therefore no disposition to citizenship, and could endure neither the superiority of laws nor the equality of rights."* Here I think is sufficient proof, that however different the motives and the character of the two people might be, the principles of both administrations were the same. Coincidences of detail are, however, not wanting, if they were required to complete the picture, but there are only two ways of raising revenue, by direct or by indirect means. The complications and intricacies of the indirect system, are of course without limits, as without fixed rule; the direct system must ever resolve itself into a calculation of property, and therefore the financial system of all nations raising their revenue directly, must be very nearly the same. But fortunately it is not merely by analogy that we can establish the antipathy of Rome to interference with the native bodies in the collection of the revenue; the senate in the most formal manner has recorded its opinions and its policy on that point. By the decree which incorporates Macedonia with the empire, the Macedonians are relieved from the obligation of

* C. 32.

working the mines, because these could not be rendered productive, unless let to a farmer of revenue; (publicanus;) "for where there is a publicanus, there either public right is void, or there is no liberty for the allies."* It is also expressly stipulated, that no native can be a publicanus. The Roman quæstor received the tribute, but did not go about collecting it. How then was it collected, save by some of the annually elected magistrates mentioned in the decree of the senate? †

There a source of revenue is abandoned, rather than have recourse to a means considered so unjustifiable. The assigning of such a motive, even if simulated, proves to demonstration the paramount importance which the Republic attached to raising its direct taxes through the municipal bodies; for it is clear, that the additional expense of collection could be no reason for resigning the tax altogether; the motive must have been the political attachment with which they saw this system inspired the conquered states, and the opportunities thus withdrawn from the provincial executive, of exciting discontent by unproductive financial oppression.

The next point of inquiry is, how far these institutions maintained themselves under the military governments, when these came to be absolute and

* Livy, xlv. 18.

† But on this point not a shadow of doubt can remain. The Roman law can leave none, as the assessment and collection of revenue are put forward as the very end and source of the institution; even in the use of the word allies instead of subjects, may be traced the strong resemblance between the administration the Romans adopted in their subject states, and our subsidiary system of India.—See *Domat. Pub. L. Pub. Rev.* Tit. 5, Sec. xij.

uncontrolled. It may perhaps be assumed, and it has by respectable authors been assumed, that the state of Turkey presents to-day an image of the anarchy of the Roman provinces under the declining empire. I am however inclined to think, that notwithstanding this apparent resemblance, the conditions of the two empires are essentially different, and will lead to opposite results.

The impossibility of admixture of the classes separated by the strong demarcation of religion, maintained compact and round the supremacy of the Turks, and prevented any permanent connexion of interest between the privileged and oppressed classes, so as to form mixed interests which could restrict to themselves the municipal offices and convert these bodies into close corporations. Thus has the municipal system in Turkey retained to this day its form and vigour, and needs but to be relieved from external pressure, to produce the same effects all over the country, as it has done in those spots which we have already noticed.

The reverse of this became the state of the Roman provinces under the declining empire; the line of demarcation between governors and governed became obliterated; a portion of the people itself became interested in misgovernment, and the executive assumed the important and all-pervading functions of the municipalities—the honourable and honorary municipal assessor and collector were replaced by the mercenary officers of an irresponsible authority. Direct taxation is a sharp weapon, effective for good or evil according to the skilfulness with which it is used; when collected by responsible and popularly

elected magistrates, burdens are adjusted to property, "for which alone men are taxed,"* but when assessed and collected by a hired tax-gatherer, or by government agents, it may become, and I may say always has been, the most intolerable of all tyrannies.

In this comparison I purposely omit the burden of the laws, which lay so heavy on the Roman provinces—the factions, and the hundred ills which complicated the state of the decaying empire, because I think all these, with national weakness, foreign conquest, with the warring interests of the political body, are but remote consequences of the substitution of tax-gatherers for municipal collectors.

It was by the pollution of the source, that the whole collected stream of financial and administrative power became corrupted; irresponsibility created abuse, abuse was maintained by violence, wrong engendered hatred, and the barbarians, feebly combated by the degenerate armies, were invited by the oppressed provincials to efface internal feuds and invidious distinctions, which their own divisions rendered both implacable and irremediable; so that Goths and Vandals were received as saviours, and owed their conquest to the Roman tax-gatherer rather than to their own arms. †

* Maxim of Roman law, as well as of Adam Smith.

† "In all the cities, municipia, and villages, there are as many tyrants as there are officers of the government. Public burdens are made the means of private plunder—none are safe from the devastations of these depopulating robbers. The burdens, though severe, would be more tolerable if borne by all equally and in common, but they are partially imposed and arbitrarily levied. They who do not fly to the barbarians become barbarians themselves. In this state is a large portion of Spain and no small portion of Gaul.

In Turkey we see provinces escaped from servitude, coalescing, combining, governing themselves.* Turkey found her European subjects in the most degraded condition; they have gained under her wing the power of unlocking her talon's grasp. Give

Roman oppression makes all men no longer Romans. By what other causes do men become bagande, (outlaws,) but by our iniquities—by the dishonesty of our judges, by the proscriptions and rapine of those who convert the public exactions into emoluments for themselves—who make the appointed taxations the means of their plunder?—they fly to the public foe to avoid the tax-gatherer.”—From *Salvian*, an ecclesiastic of Marseilles, published in the *Mag. Bib. Patoum*, vol. v.

Mr. Turner, who makes considerable use of this author in his history of the Anglo-Saxons, observes, that this description of the evils of the Roman provinces recalls the oppression of the Turkish empire. But it is difficult to conceive how, under similar military anarchies, the evils of the two dominions could be more dissimilar. In Turkey, the taxation is not unequal—it is not a source of emolument except to the governing class. There is no tyranny of law, and to crown all, there are no tax-gatherers.

* *Servia*, released from Turkish oppression, is quietly organizing itself, unheeded in its happy obscurity. It is remarkable that this independent people have not the Scriptures translated into their language, though they have printed newspapers, and though the Code Napoleon has been translated into Servian. A translation of the Scriptures was offered to the Bible Society; the question was referred to the Greek Patriarch, who naturally threw obstacles in the way of such a publication, on the grounds that the ancient Illyrian was the Church language of Servia. Thus, while the Society is translating the Bible for the islands of the Pacific, it has refused to accept a translation offered to it* into the vernacular tongue of between four and five millions of civilized beings in the centre of Europe.

* By Dr. Vyk, known to English literature by Dr. Bowring's translation of Servian popular poetry

Turkey herself but moderate time and a fair field, and I see nothing in her political constitution to make us despair of a great and a happy, and, I may add, a speedy change; but without some exertion she cannot have the requisite time, and far less fair and honourable lists.

Throughout India the municipal system exists, but only in name, as a reproach to the intelligence of this country, which, exhausting ingenuity in forming boards and committees, and in establishing checks and controls, neglected the solid and national foundation which the Mussulman dominion had left. Yet no form of administration could have more happily combined with the subsidiary system, and when we took the whole management into our hands, this sure and easy method was essential to a government whose head was on the opposite side of the globe, and which consequently was ever subject to errors of omission and commission, of interest, of ignorance, and of delay. But not content with neglecting this means of simplifying our administration, and of securing our supremacy—of attaching the natives to us, and elevating their character; we subverted that venerable structure, by violating the only hitherto unviolated right, that of property. We have forced the Mussulman laws on our Indian subjects; but that law recognizes most solemnly the right of the occupier of the soil to the property of the soil. The word *rent* is of fatal import in our eastern possessions; and perhaps the confounding of it with tribute was the original cause of a series of errors, where there was no interest to mislead the higher eastern functionaries, who seem, on the contrary, to

have been actuated by the most disinterested and benevolent motives. The feudalism of the East bearing to that of the West the closest resemblance in its higher combinations, is wholly different in its character and effects. The feudal lord acquired the soil, and with it its cultivators, as a possession; in the East, *the right of the lord extended only to a portion of the produce*. In its superior form, and on paper, the Zemindary system, even in its varieties, its anomalies, and exceptions, bears the closest resemblance to the Turkish financial administration; in operation they are wholly different. The foregoing pages will have explained the fundamental, unobtrusive, and unrecorded causes which constitute the difference. In the folios on the revenue of India, the village system is but at times obscurely indicated; some of the older reports speak of it with a mixture of surprise and incredulity; it is only very lately that it has become a subject of enlightened inquiry. Attempts have been even made to restore its efficiency, by the revival of the Panchayet. But it is to be regretted that the character of the native municipalities should have been staked on such an experiment: the election of their magistrates is withdrawn—the experience and habits of administration, in assessing and collecting the revenue; is suppressed, and the right of property is recalled from the demoralized Hindoo. Under such circumstances, can five men, selected arbitrarily from, or even elected by, the community, be objects of public confidence as judicial authorities? and on the failure of such a scheme, which displays, with the best intention, little ac-

quaintance with the moral working of the institution, is the system itself to be condemned?

But it is not surprising that the village system is neglected in India, where it has lost all its nerve, vigour, and utility, when we see it neglected in Turkey, where it is raising divers populations to independence, and where it is the agent, and the only agent, for the collection of the revenue. D'Ohsson thus sums up the provincial administration of Turkey: "In the whole empire, Egypt excepted, the organization of the administrative authorities is sufficiently uniform. Beside the governor, who unites the civil and military authority, is placed a magistrate, entrusted with the administration of justice. The tributaries are placed under the authority of officers of police, soubachis, and they have chiefs of their own, cadja baschis, whose authority is restricted to the distribution (repartition) of the imposts and taxes laid on the cantons." Vol. vii. p. 283.

In this voluminous work, no less remarkable for its elaborate details than for its surprising accuracy, this is the only mention made of the means used for the all-important object of the distribution and collection of the revenue of this colossal empire!

In ancient India, as in Turkey, "to facilitate the regular payment of the revenues, the states were divided into districts, each containing within itself a greater or less number of villages or parishes. Every one of these divisions and subdivisions again, however small, presented the semblance of a regularly constituted republic; nor, in the general organization of the one was there any important feature of dis-

agreement with those discoverable in the other. Thus the smallest village appears in its municipalities but as an epitome of the largest capital, whilst each and both are in this respect but copies of the district to which they belong.*

The evidence taken before the many committees on East Indian affairs, affords numerous proofs, in their still remaining forms, of the identity of the ancient system with that of Turkey. The most important point in the inquiry is how the municipal officers were elected; the present practice of institutions which have lost all utility and importance, and are scarcely more than traditionary, is of little weight; and as well might we attempt to prove that corporations in England were anciently close and self-elected bodies, because they are so at present, as that the polail, the carnum, the headman of the craft, or the little mayor of the village in India, were originally, according to the present practice, hereditary officers, or named by the agents of the supreme government.

But in India this system existed antecedently to the Mussulman conquest, and it is still to be found in Ceylon. Colonel Colebrooke, one of the Commissioners, for Ceylon, where the enlarged mind of Sir A. Johnstone has sowed the first seeds of the future improvement of the native population, has ventured to suggest rules for the regulation of the native system; but he enters, unfortunately, into no detail either respecting the organization or the effect of the system, further than to say, that in the southern districts the headmen are chosen, and are sometimes hereditary; and that in the northern provinces "the headmen of

* History of British India, vol. i. p. 29. •

castes and villages are commonly appointed on the nomination of the inhabitants. There is, however, no established form of election, a deputation of the villages making a return to the magistrate of the candidate chosen by them."

I am led particularly to notice these able Reports, which contain most valuable information and important suggestions, for the purpose of pointing out the dangers of interference with the elemental institution which beset the most liberal and benevolent men, who have not yet got rid of their early European political notions; my meaning will be explained by the following extract from Colonel Colebrooke's first Report; containing his suggestions for remodelling the village system. I have put in italics the portions which an illiterate Turkish raya might point out as superfluous or objectionable, and, in his untutored notions, ridiculous; and these portions embrace every single suggestion for interference with her national practice:—

“From the peculiar constitution of the village communities, composed, as they often are, of people belonging to particular castes, their ancient usages may be preserved; and it would be satisfactory to them if the appointment of the headman of each village community, or parish, should be made on the nomination of the inhabitants who are proprietors of land or houses. *The qualification for the office of village headman should be the possession of property in the village to a certain amount, and where a vacancy occurs, the government agent, or his assistant in the district, should collect the votes, and the appointment should be made in conformity to the wishes of the majority.* In the district of Jaffna, where

the headmen are thus nominated, the elections have been made without regularity or form; *it will, therefore, be necessary to define the qualification of electors, and to regulate the mode in which the votes are to be taken; also to provide that in cases where corruption has been practised, the nomination should be set aside, and the person disqualified from holding the office. The office of headman of a village should be subject to renewal every three years.*"

The provisions against corruption would certainly be necessary if the other portions of the proposed plan were adopted. The richest man might obtain office, and retain it for life, under the original system, in which office was a trust, from which the steward might be removed, the very instant he forfeited the character which had procured his election, without the remotest idea of corruption ever being entertained, (in fact, the notion is perfectly European;) but restrict election to any class of men, prolong office for three years, and, of course, your useless interference with the native system will make exotic laws absolutely necessary.

To raise the character of the people in India, as in Turkey, you must not hamper these bodies with regulations and laws—they must be left to their own judgment. In the administration of district and local affairs, trust and confidence must be reposed in them, and they must be made the means of collecting the tribute without intermeddling pashas or zemendars.

The predominating character of the Hindoo municipalities was rural, originating in the cultivator's proprietorship in the soil, and in the direct system of taxation, which system, indeed, seems to have been universal throughout the world, with the exception of

China and of modern Europe. I find but one instance of an urban corporation, which is beautifully illustrative of the advantages of such a form of administration, and of its applicability to every state and stage of society. It forms the link between the agricultural municipalities of the east and the commercial corporations of the west.

“Jhalra-palun is the only town,” says Colonel Tod, “possessing the germs of civil liberty in the power of framing their own municipal regulations. This is the more remarkable, as the immunities of their commercial charter were granted under the most despotic ruler of India. Opposite the house of the chief magistrate, on a pillar of stone, is the charter of rights of the city. Its simplicity will excite a smile, but the philosopher may trace in it the first rudiments of that commercial greatness which made the free cities of Europe the instruments of general liberty.

“The greatest boon of all was his leaving the administration of justice, as well of national police, in the hands of the municipal authorities. The members of the council are selected according to the general sense entertained of their fitness. In twenty years the population has become 25,000.

“The only officers of government are the commandant and the collector of imposts; and so jealous are they of the least interference on his part, that a fine would be inflicted on any individual who, by delaying his contributions, furnished a pretext for interference.”—vol. ii. p. 731.

Each craft, to the very lowest and least respectable, had its deacons or consuls, and these formed the central municipal council.

The efficiency and even the existence of municipal organization depend, as I have often repeated, on its connexion with direct taxation. It is superfluous to say that America is quite as far as Europe from this species of, I will not say freedom, for that is a relative term, but good government. Where taxes are direct, it is the natural and visible claim and right of each village to inquire into the amount of their own local share of burthens, and to scrutinize into its collection. When the revenue arises from invisible and disguised taxation, established by the central administration, and collected under its sole authority, though suffrage be as free as air, not one step is made towards community of interests. In the one case, when accounts are honestly settled, all politics are at an end, and the greater the responsibility the greater the necessity of its being honestly redeemed; in the other, the greater the extent of suffrage the more indeed may the people be delighted with the exercise of power, but more extended will become the conflict between interests contradistinguished by the unequal pressure on rich and poor, which duties on articles of consumption must necessarily produce, and by the partial—and even if impartial, unavoidable—inequality of revenue raised by a tariff. The majority of any class of the community, or of any section of the country, losing the means which direct taxation gives of controlling government in the detail of its revenue, if opposed by a bare majority in the central administration, has no resource save throwing itself, like South Carolina, on its “*sovereign resistance*.”

Because America is a popular government, and because the municipal system, as far as it has yet been

carried, is based on public opinion, in the most unlimited sense, it by no means follows that the principles of the two systems are the same; indeed, as far as they affect the character of the individual man, they seem the very opposite of each other; tariff republicanism detaches the interests and therefore the affections of man from man—the common burdens of direct taxation, the common control of municipal representation, whatever be the superior form of government, in each community, binds together the interests, and consequently the affections, of all its members.

For a modern term of comparison with the municipalities of Turkey, we must naturally turn to Switzerland. An article in the 17th number of the Foreign Review on the Republics of Switzerland, thus describes their government:—

“The landsgemeinde, or general assembly of all the citizens, constitutes the supreme power, and consists of from four to eight thousand men. They make and abrogate laws, appoint magistrates, fix expenditure, provide supplies, and examine accounts, appoint deputies to the federal diet, and give them instructions. The executive consists of the Landsrath, composed of a president, deputy, and a councillor from each commune. It appears that the nominations to offices are, in ordinary times, under the influence of a few wealthy families in each canton, and that the magistrates, except when the duration of office is fixed, may be considered as remaining in place for life, unless they render themselves obnoxious to the people, for the power of the landsgemeinde, slumbering at intervals, is then roused, and proves irresistible.”

In this seems to reside the difference between the republican and the municipal principle. In a republic the tenure of office is carefully limited to increase the chances of power and place among the competitors for office, or to balance the influence of struggling factions. Under the municipal system, office must be regarded as a stewardship ; the highest qualifications would be required in the steward, and election falls, as reputation does, on the individual most distinguished for wealth, talent, and character ; in this case, the public who elect such an individual would desire to secure his services for the longest period, as these services never can become dangerous or remiss when, as in the case just quoted, and in the municipalities of Turkey, the trust can be resumed as easily as conferred.

But there is one canton (the Grisons) whose organization is perfectly identical with the municipalities of Turkey, where small communes are merged in greater ones, where no general assemblies are held. This canton is, therefore, entirely free from the risks of popular violence, and, I should think, far more effectually secured than the democratic ones, against interested legislation. In this canton the population is divided "into small communities." (It might be thought that I am repeating what I have said of the Turkish municipalities or of the Amphyctionic bodies, but I quote from the above-mentioned article ;) "each is known to each, and every man's character is open to common scrutiny, and the people are strongly attached to their institutions, as they have repeatedly proved, at the cost of their lives, during the last forty years. This state is composed of small

municipalities, having each its own council and magistrates, which sends deputies to a great council, exercising the higher legislative powers. The laws, however, which emanate from the great council, must be submitted to the approbation of the communal assemblies. It may be said that these states constitute confederations in miniature, similar to that of Switzerland, of which they form a part."

When, in 1830-31, popular reaction spread through the whole of Switzerland, and overturned or remodelled every one of the remaining sixteen cantons, the six democratic cantons not only partook not in the general ferment, but looked on the popular movement with particular mistrust and aversion. The conservative principle of America has been remarked as something strange, but if conservativeness is attachment to things as they are, it can nowhere be more strongly pronounced than where the great majority are attached to their political institutions. Therefore, at this crisis, the democratic cantons displayed the utmost conservativeness. At the diet of Lucerne each of the cantons, by its deputies, expressed its opinion on the late events: The feelings of the six cantons present a strange contrast with the others—strongly mistrustful and cautious, such as in our experience, limited as yet in forms of government, would be supposed to proceed from some close corporate body, or select vestry, not from a council elected by the universal suffrage of every male who has completed his eighteenth year, and who has been at school.

The expression of the deputy of the Grisons is remarkable. He congratulates the remodelled cantons upon *their closer approximation to the constitution*

of the Grisons. Such an expression, at a moment of general reconciliation, oblivion of the past, and hopes for the future, could never have been used, unless it coincided with the general feeling, and proceeded from an enlightened attachment to the form of administration that seemed to have worked so well. I need not repeat that that form is the nearest approach Switzerland affords to the Turkish municipalities.

The democratic cantons allow to the people the uncontrolled right of electing deputies to the federal council, of choosing the members of the executive, legislative, and judicial bodies, either in their general or their communal assemblies, and the right of a ratification is reserved to them in their public assembly. This organization is democracy in its purest form, and, true to its spirit and name, gives to the majority of the assembled multitude, at intervals, the exercise of unlimited power.* The municipal system, without allowing power to be tasted by the people, renders public opinion omnipotent; a succession of checks are not violently, at stated seasons, but always in unobserved and active operation; the utility of local measures, the character of their communal administrators, are objects of daily consideration; opinion is too powerful to resolve itself into party; too practical and domestic to assume the forms of the authority it in reality exercises; every individual feels not a periodical authority, but a constant interest in every circumstance affecting the community; and if he is kept at a distance from office or authority, it is not by the barrier of prescription or of formality, but by the interval which his own respect for worth

and character leaves between his magistrate and himself.

But the late existence of municipalities in another state of Europe, where least of all we should think of looking for popular or rational institutions, is an administrative curiosity not to be overlooked—the state I allude to is the Papal territory.

Count Tournon, formerly prefect of Rome, has published a most instructive and interesting account of these states, in which we are made acquainted with details of their internal administration prior to the occupation by the French, previously little known by the thousands of travellers that lounge about the ruins of the former mistress of the world.

“The system of municipal administration,” observes Tournon, “will surprise those who imagine that in the Papal states every thing is left to the will or caprice of the government,” and it certainly is a “most remarkable institution under a despotic government.” Each town and village had a municipal council, composed of from forty-eight to eighteen members, selected in equal proportions from the notables, citizens, and farmers, appointed for life; the vacancies being filled up as they occurred, all local measures, improvements, roads, came under their cognizance; they made up the budget, under the approval of the Pope’s delegate; they fixed the assessment and audited the accounts; appointed and paid the subordinate municipal officers, police, and schoolmasters, and also the apothecary and surgeon, who received fixed salaries, and were obliged to attend the poor gratis.

The gonfalonieri and six elders were the municipal magistrates, who were yearly chosen by the governor

of the province from a triple list presented to him by the council. These communal or municipal administrations, were under the superintendence of a congregation entitled of good government, (*del buon governo*;) a most significant distinction, independent of the government, but composed of cardinals and prelates, and presided by a cardinal prefect; and it often supported the communes, or municipalities, against the arbitrariness of the government agents, and even of the government itself.

Fortunately the same author affords us a vivid picture of the activity these institutions spread through the communities, when not counteracted by irresistible political or physical causes.

“ In the hilly region all is life, bustle, and prosperity; the ground is covered successively by various productions, a multitude of trees spread their cool shade, the dwellings of the cultivators, scattered along the gentle slopes, appear in the centre of gardens and orchards; various branches of manufactures, paper mills, iron works, employ part of the population.”

With respect to equality of taxation, he says, “ On examining the papal finances, we were struck by the fact of the equal distribution of the public taxation, of which the clergy and the nobles have always borne their share, in proportion to their properties, like the commonest villager—exemptions and privileges, which in other countries have engendered so much hostility against these classes, have been for ages unknown to papal Rome.”

This equal distribution of taxation can only refer to taxation falling on property.

This is again supported by the statement of the

revenue of the states south of the Appeneines. In 1808, of a total of 3,576,000 scudi, customs form an item of 318,000, or less than 10 per cent.

But this system was unfortunately swallowed up in the general centralization of the French empire, which with unsparing hand overthrew both good and bad.

Many reasons conspired to preserve for a long time the municipal organization in Spain and Portugal. There the Roman law had been engrafted on the Saracenic institutions; there also the customs of our Gothic ancestors had never been frozen into feudalism. The municipalities may be traced by indubitable signs in the early history of the Peninsula, simple, unassuming, and passing the rural and agricultural characters. But unfortunately Spain and Portugal did not escape "the whirlpool of European politics." What metaphor can more truly characterise a centralized administration?

In France, at this very moment, the experiment is about to be made. The question there rests on peculiar grounds. There alone, and for the first time, will the municipal organization be arrived at, as an *a priori* and theoretical question. Turgot, Necker, &c. have placed the discussion on high argumentative grounds, but I think they are far from anticipating all the positive good that that system can effect, and look to it only as a preventive for the errors of legislators, and the violence of functionaries; but although it seems impossible for France long to go on without a single provincial institution, to attach men to their soil, yet I cannot look forward to any system efficient in its simplicity, as the municipal organization must be, emanating from the minutest interest and

large theories that strive in the central administration of France.

To trace these bodies in our ancient history, and among the historical and legal antiquities of not only the Teutonic, but the Tartar, Sclavonic, Celt, and other tribes, becomes a most interesting research when one has observed their living vigour, and their practical connexion with so many important administrative questions. The coincidences assume, as instances are multiplied, the most perfect order, and in proportion to their vigour invariably is prosperity and contentment to be found; they are sufficiently independent of higher political combinations to exist under absolute monarchies, republics, and theocracies, solacing the oppressed, restraining the turbulent, not changing indeed the political condition of man, but subject to those conditions, elevating his character, increasing his sympathies, and husbanding his resources—bestowing some cherished rights on the victims of Eastern despotism, or of papal tyranny, and tutoring the Bedouin of the desert, and the free mountaineer of Switzerland into enjoying their freedom without licentiousness, and their power without turbulence.

While this volume has been passing through the press, the possibility of a revision of our financial system has become a prominent subject of public inquiry, and leads me to add some further observations on the connexion of our ancient system with that of Turkey, and their actual contrast.

I feel convinced that the information which a few leading questions would elicit from any intelligent Turkish *raya*, would be more important for the practical understanding of the subject than volumes of mere argument, for this reason—that although it is under specific heads of taxation that the Turkish government fixes the general amount of revenue, and regulates the proportion of each district: yet each district, nay, each village, has full liberty to settle according to its best judgment, and to alter as often as it thinks fit the mode and object of assessment; and not only is their attention unremittingly devoted to ascertaining the best means of adjusting taxation to property, but also to the means of relieving property from direct burdens, by appropriating to the revenue profits arising from any particular or exclusive commercial or agricultural advantage possessed by the community.* Whilst, therefore, taxation appears to us a dry, exclusive, and technical study, it is amongst them a domestic question, subject to daily experience,

* At *Ambelakia* taxes were defrayed from the profits of the commercial firm. So, in the state of New York, some successful speculations, undertaken by the community, with municipal funds, has almost entirely relieved the state from contributions for local expenditure.

discussion, and experiment; and this information is spread through the whole population, who apply to the inquiry the same interested anxiety and practical intelligence, which make men generally succeed in the management of their private affairs.

By the opportunities I have had of observing this system in operation, I am inclined to think, that a property tax, abandoned thus to the public judgment of each locality, is an impost, the equality of which is even exceeded by its facility of collection. It may be supposed that such a tax would require an enormous force for its collection; but in practice it does not appear so. First, freedom of exchange increases the resources whence revenue is drawn; secondly, municipal collection engages the most influential men in the assessment and collection, and therefore public opinion enforces it; if indeed we look at home, we may see that the full force and utmost rigour of the law is required at present, for enforcing the payment of the small portion of direct revenue that is superadded to our customs, excise; and in America, force, and even the threat of arms, are necessary to enforce, even for their small revenue, the collection of customs; so much so, that their practice is fast treading on the heels of the opinion that has been slowly making its way amongst them, that "direct taxation on property, assessed and collected by elective officers, is the only impost worthy of a free people."*

Yet, notwithstanding the antithesis of England at this moment to Turkey, with respect to the objects of taxation, and the mode of collection, there was a time when the principles of both were identical; and with-

* Maclure's Opinions on various Subjects, vol. i. p. 429.

out going back to the British or the Anglo-Saxon periods, we shall find the municipal system united with freedom of commerce and direct taxation, in the original constitution and practice of the present burghs and cities of England.

The term feudal has of late been, perhaps, improperly applied to the political state of Tartars, Rajpoots, and other eastern populations, because our ideas of feudalism have reference chiefly to the tenure of land, and to the laws which have grown out of that proprietary system. Now, in the East, the political structure, which it has been the fashion to compare with that of our Norman ancestors, never affected the tenure of land. The resemblance, it is true, is perfect in the higher portions, but the basis is wholly different. The knight, under either system, held for military services of his lord, the mediate lord of the suzerain. Reliefs, fines, feudal incidents, and feudal habits, may be traced in each; but the difference lay in this, that our knight, or lord, was absolute owner or possessor of the land, whether his tenure was by the year, by will, for life, or in succession. In the East the military fief was not understood possession of the soil, but of one-tenth of the fruit of the soil; for which consideration, the knight, or lord (spahi,) was not only held to perform military service, but also *to protect the cultivators*. Such, moreover, is the principle in Turkey at present; indeed, it is considered as binding a duty to protect the peasant who pays spahilic, as to acquit the debt contracted to the merchant. It is singular to find preserved in Turkey the record of the useful and the expedient on which alone this, as all other customs, has been ori-

ginally established. The cultivator there has ever retained the indefeasible right of property, which was as uncontrollably his, according to the allegoric terms of their law, as that of the blade of grass to the earth from which it springs. For the understanding of the institutions, the history, the abuses, and the practicable remedies, applicable to Turkey, or to India, it is necessary to be duly impressed with this principle, consecrated alike by its antiquity, its justice, and utility.

The land seems in all countries to have directly borne the weight of taxation, until the feudal tenure distinguished agriculture from commerce; and uniting landed interests with military service, those interested in agriculture, who, under all other systems, were the oppressed and plundered portion of the community, became the plunderers of the rest.

During the first stage of feudalism, however, the land bore exclusively all burdens of the state, under the charge of the *trinoda necessitas*, and as service of the various holders. The second stage of our national progress may be marked by the necessity for the assessment of the money-commutation for service, of assembling, under the Norman dynasty, Parliaments, which were the revival of our Anglo-Saxon Witenagemot, the grand representation of the rural municipalities.

These had originally been composed of small landed proprietors, and the classification and subdivision was strictly territorial and numerical, as that of Turkey, or Hindostan. Not so the municipalities that sprung from feudalism, which are perpetuated in the existing burghs, and which were so completely

contradistinguished from their predecessors, as to be especially exempted from suit at the county and hundred courts, which were the remnants of the municipal district councils of the Anglo-Saxons.

The military leaders being landed proprietors; except when at open variance, would generally abstain from indiscriminate plunder of the cultivators of each other's soil; it is not likely that they would show equal favour to traders. But for their particular advantage we find them in every district granting charters to burghs, to protect traders from the tolls, dues, fees, and customs, which had succeeded to indiscriminate plunder. These charters were not, however, granted gratuitously, but freedom of commerce was purchased by tribute; that is to say, instead of the indirect taxes which they formerly paid, the burgh system established a property tax. Not only the most unequivocal and reciprocal advantage was requisite to lead to the establishment of these burghs throughout the whole country, but also was it necessary that that advantage should be apparent to all; so it was—and so it would be to us now, if the customs exacted at our frontier were exacted on the confines of each county.

The indirect taxes of the burghs were replaced by fee-farms, or fixed commutation; and the borough elected, or (to use a word, the sense of which our prejudices have not perverted) chose a bailiff to hold this farm, or levy this tax; just as in Greece, when Capodistrias converted the tithes into farms, many of the districts proposed to purchase the farms for the community, which Capodistrias prevented, by subjecting the former to so fearful a responsibility, that

no one, except his own immediate supporters, would venture on taking them.

When the general assessment of the nation was settled, the tallage, or property tax of the burghs, was permanently fixed at one-half more than that of the barons; and it "was collected and rated most commonly by the inhabitants (*I suppose*) among themselves."* The absence of detail on the mode of collection, joined with the fact of direct tribute being collected, and a general assessment being fixed, can scarcely leave a doubt of the existence of the municipal organization in these burghs in all its purity, as its purity must be in exact proportion, first, to its utility—and what can be greater than the adjustment and collection of taxes? and secondly, to the absence of legislation, which never can increase its efficiency, may hamper its free-will, and is a presumptive proof of its having been interfered with. Thus, these urban municipalities were perfectly identical with those of Turkey and the East in their individual character; but with this general and important difference—that they were unconnected with the soil on which they were placed. Composed of men who had broken their bonds, who lived by their ingenuity and were instructed by traffic and by travel, and who, therefore, depended on their superior dexterity and knowledge for their independent existence, these burghs soon shot far a-head of their age and country on the tide of civilization; and indeed no period of the history of man can afford instances of grander political results, if these are to be estimated by general wealth, prosperity, and content-

* Brady's Treatise on English Burghs, p. 82.

ment. Little harmonizing, however, with the general government in which they were included, their prosperity was not of long duration, and did not survive the freedom—or, if I might so say, the simple common sense of the municipal organization, when that had been perverted either by republican violence, or by military despotism. The cousin and historian of a German emperor, speaking of the commercial municipalities of Italy, expresses himself thus:—“They are so much attached to liberty, that they prefer the office of consul* to riches. To repress pride, the consuls are chosen from all classes promiscuously; and to check ambition, the election is annual; hence they excel in wealth and power all cities in the world.”† In England, the line of demarcation between the burghs and the rest of the country, seems not to have been so strongly drawn as on the continent; the soccage tenure, which had survived the introduction of feudalism, gave the burghers some interest in the soil; hence, perhaps, is it that they never came to the possession of such astonishing wealth and power as many across the Channel; hence also, perhaps, were feelings of independence communicated to the whole nation, which at that time, with the exception of the Peninsula, have no parallel in any other European state.

* The consuls were the deacons of the crafts who formed the municipal council; even the scaffingers had their consuls; the merchants, in a fleet or vessel, or at a foreign port, elected a chief or consul; this latter officer, not called to sit in the council, has alone retained the functions and the name of the ancient municipal deacons.

† *Otho de Gest. Fred.* p. 426.

Such was the constitution of our ancient burghs, when, by foreign war, the increased expenses of the state rendered it necessary to assemble the chiefs of the burghs to persuade them to increase their rates. The great landed proprietors answered for themselves, the clergy for themselves; but how did these municipalities intervene? Each sent burgesses to Parliament to represent it, charged with instructions and with certain delegated powers, on the authority of which they made engagements for their community.* And so much more essential was this entrusted authority than their individual vote, that Edward the First, in one of his summonses to Parliament, cautions them not to come to the assembly without the requisite powers; so that “*pro defectu potestatis hujusmodi negotium infectum non remaneat.*”

I need but refer to what I have said, pp. 17, 18, respecting the principle of representation in the Turkish municipalities, to bear out this coincidence between them and our English boroughs; and to p. 65, for the similarity of the powers entrusted to

* The election of the member of parliament by the corporation, the municipal character of the member of parliament, the necessity of express powers for voting taxes, may be traced in charters from Doomsday Book, and the summonses of Edward I., published by Dr. Brady:—“Aldermanni et burgenses dicti burghi—habeant et haberunt auctoritatem, potestatem et facultatem, elegendi et nominandi unum discretum virum, fore BURGENSEM Parliamenti nostri,” &c.—P. 40.

“Plenam et sufficientem potestatem pro se et communitate habeant (milites et langeuses) ad faciendum *tunc* quod de *communi concilio* ordinabitur in præmissis.”—P. 54.

Again:—“Cum plena potestate pro se et communitate ad consulendum et consentiendum pro se et communitati illa.”

our early members for the boroughs, and the députies to the national assembly in Greece ; but this principle, common to the whole community there, was restricted amongst us to the weakest portion of it ; and it is to this want of uniformity, that perhaps the introduction of indirect taxation, through the perversion of the municipal spirit amongst us, is to be attributed.

One more point of resemblance I have yet to point out. Under the Mussulman system, when objections were made to taxes, it was always as, of course, to the amount, not to the mode ; and when taxes were augmented, it was by adding one fortieth or two fortieths : so in our early parliaments they discussed whether they should give one fiftieth or half a fiftieth ; and when parliaments began to lay imposts on commerce, it was, in the same way, so many pence in the pound.

At first the taxes imposed were all direct—tallage, hidage, land-tax, hearth-tax, poll-tax, poll-tax on sheep ; and under Henry IV. an income-tax on annuities, pensions, &c. : the clergy at that time taxing their possessions and benefices in convocation. The first tax on commerce was imposed under Edward I. ; it was subsequently increased ; and under Henry V. customs, excise, &c. had so much increased, that of a revenue of 55,000*l.* of money of that day, they formed 10,000*l.* At present, of a revenue of 50,000,000*l.*, they amount to 45,000,000*l.* !

The local burdens on commerce had led, by mutual consent of the payers and receivers, to the substitution of fee-farms and tallage, to tolls péage, stallage, lastage, and all other duties and customs whatever which affected commerce ; and for the purpose of

local and individual protection against these indirect imports, the burghs, by individual exceptions, became the means of emancipating the whole commerce of the kingdom. At the present moment the burden of taxation having, not as formerly in part, but nearly in totality, slipped from land and capital, on the exchange of the produce of the land and capital, or on commerce, it seems natural that the same mutual interests would lead us, as formerly, to return to the original standard; but formerly the full bearings of the question came within the field of view of each individual. At present this is not the case; and the operation of the gigantic whole is concealed from the close observer by the immediate detail.

The history of the city of London furnishes a fair illustration of the relative intelligence of our ancestors and ourselves on these matters: the first exercise of power of the extended constituency was to pledge their members to the repeal of the assessed taxes, their principal reasons for which were the inequality of their pressure, their vexatious nature, and the depressed state of trade. While repudiating the assessed taxes, they invoked a property tax, not perceiving that assessed taxes are a species of property tax.* The inequality of pressure and inquisitorial nature are objections to the mode of collection, not to the tax. The depressed state of trade which incapacitated them from supporting the burdens of the state, would have been an argument with people more practically acquainted with taxation for emancipating trade from its burdens: and instead of

* By property tax I mean tax on property in general, as distinguished from tax on exchange.

their earliest and most strenuous efforts being directed to effecting this, they were exerted for the suppression of the *only* tax which increases the public revenue by the whole amount (minus collection) that is paid by the people.

But if we turn back to the opinions of the citizens of London a few hundred years ago, we shall find very different views then prevailing; nor do we then find the community divided by conflicting opinions.

The privileges of the burghs or cities were, as I have already stated, unlimited freedom of commerce, and its entire emancipation from fees, dues, or customs, in consideration for which immunities, a property-tax was raised by them;* but in so convulsed a history as ours, we must not expect to find the peaceful burghers in constant possession of their rights. We find under Edward III., the citizens of London complaining, just as at the present day, of burdens heavier than they could bear, and of their inability to support, under such circumstances, the weight of taxation. Their opinions on the subject have been recorded in a petition † of the whole body to the king in council, in which they expose their sufferings and suggest measures of relief. It sets forth, that the citizens of London “ have nothing to live on save their industry and franchise, (free trade,) upon which franchise the said city was founded, and by reason of which franchise, they were wont to travel by land and sea, in various

* That no doubt may remain on this point, I quote the words of Dr. Brady. “ A free burgh, or city, was only a town of free trading, without paying tolls, passage, and free from fines, &c. ; and a free burgess was no other than a man that exercised free trade.”—*Treatise on Burghs*, p. 100.

† *Ibid.* p. 107.

countries for their profit; by which travel, they used to bring divers merchandise, to the great common profit of the whole realm of England, to the great aid and sustenance of the said city, sustenance and increase of the navy (shipping) of the said land." But their franchises or freedom of trade having been encroached on in various ways, "they pray that the king would please to have regard and take notice, that the said city was founded on such franchises, *without which they could not maintain the city, nor bear the taxes and other burdens as they were wont to do;*" and they conclude with this remarkable prayer, worthy of being written in letters of gold, "that all such grants and confirmations of franchises may be made to all other burghs and cities of the realm."*

* "That foreign commerce is eminently conducive to the wealth and prosperity of a country, &c.

"That freedom from restraint is calculated to give the utmost extension to foreign trade, and the best direction to the industry and capital of the country.

"That unfortunately a policy the very reverse of this, has been adopted and acted on by the government of this and every other country.

"That in thus declaring as your petitioners do, their conviction of the impolicy and injustice of the restrictive system, and in desiring every practicable relaxation of it, they have in view only such parts of it as are not connected, or only subordinately so, with the public revenue. As long as the necessity for the present amount of revenue subsists, your petitioners cannot expect so important a branch of it as the customs, to be given up or diminished, unless some substitute less objectionable be found."—*Petition to Parliament of the Merchants of the City of London, presented May 8, 1820.*

This petition, remarkable as the harbinger of sounder views among mercantile men, is still but a meagre comment on the equally concise and conclusive observations of the petition in the text.

The arguments here used by the trading citizens of London at that period, are just such as might be urged in any agricultural village of Turkey against the late attempts at introducing new customs there — that it would render them unable to pay their taxes and their debts.

The practicability or impracticability of introducing a property tax into England, is an application of the present question perfectly irrelevant to the subject matter: not so the opinions that may be entertained on that head, because having founded in a great measure my hope of regeneration of Turkey on her corporations and her property tax, my conclusions will, of course, appear unwarranted and unsound to those who attach to those terms, the meaning which the recent history of England would suggest. In common justice to my subject, I must disclaim such an interpretation; the property and income-tax in England were not substituted for customs and excise, but superimposed on these when stretched to the extremest point; so that instead of being a relief from high prices and high wages, the pressure of the one system was added to the inequality of the other. And, besides this, the collection was through government agents, which would render the slightest and the justest tax obnoxious, and which succeeded in fixing the most odious character on this in itself overwhelming burden.

Still I am far from denying, that under certain unhappy conditions, indirect taxation may have a tendency to extort popular liberties from despotic governments. Direct taxation, when municipally collected, places enormous power in the hands of the general

government; but when in the fulness of its irresponsibility, the government proceeds to interfere with the collection, direct taxation, which had cemented under the first condition the politic body, under the second loses all its parts and breaks it in p̄ces. But no despotism can carry indirect taxation to this extreme point, because the indirect mode seems entirely the offspring of a struggle of powerful interests, which cannot co-exist with despotic authority. No despotism would ever for a moment dream of introducing so ridiculously cumbersome a mode of collection. And then, when this system is carried too far, the smuggler steps in to redress impolitic laws, and acquires in their violation a spirit of daring adventure, which has at times contributed both to civil liberty and to national independence. I conceive, therefore, that there is no paradox in saying, that the taxation of property is the sole cause of the permanency of that empire, while the property taxation of England was the worst and most obnoxious that could be devised; not from any difference in the applicability of the tax to the two countries, but from the difference in its application; because, besides the question of municipal and government collection, it must be borne in mind, that a property-tax can only be negatively beneficial in emancipating industry and exchange; if the property-tax is superimposed on those burdens, or if it does not form the whole revenue, that negative but all-important advantage is sacrificed.

It requires but to look at the powers which it is necessary to grant to the commissioners for taxes, to be convinced of the unpopularity in this country of direct taxation—of that very species of taxation, which

called the burgh system into existence, and for which the citizens of London have so unequivocally marked their affection, by the prayer of the above quoted petition. But how was this tax collected at that period? in the burghs by elected bailiffs, in the counties general collectors were appointed for four or five counties, and took with them the elected sheriffs of each. But the corruption of the municipal system, led gradually to the extension of the power of the collectors, and direct taxation in their hands led to continual disturbances and insurrections. The resistance by which they were so often met, might be proved by the necessity of conferring upon them authority to deal in the most summary manner both with men's persons and their property; and the collectors have been clothed with power, extra-magisterial and extra-judiciary, even when their office was so odious, that it was found necessary to place them without the pale of citizenship.†

† The collectors, even under the despotic governments of France, Spain, &c., while they retained the

* In the several acts of parliament for land-taxes, power is given "to the collectors thereof, in case of non payment, to levy by distress and sale of goods and chattels, or distraint upon the messuages, lands, and tenements."

"If any person or persons shall neglect or refuse to pay their assessment by the space of ten days after the demand, any two of the commissioners are hereby authorized to commit such person or persons (except a peer or peeress of Great Britain) to the common goal, there to remain without bail or mainprize, until payment is made of the money assessed and the charges of bringing in the same."

† I allude to the act disqualifying collectors to vote for members of parliament.

Roman municipal law, were men individually known and respected,* as their yearly election proves, and supported in their functions by common interests and public opinion, required not to be backed by the severity of legal penalties. And as I have already stated, when and where the municipal organization existed, we find the laws of the most confiding mildness with respect to taxation and to debt; while the person was free from arrest, neither lands, nor tenements, tools, implements, or necessary clothing, could be distrained. Yet these were the laws of absolute, arbitrary, and despotic governments. In England, on the contrary, our laws, whether good or bad, have emanated neither from arbitrary will, nor from despotic authority. Whence then their singular and revolting severity? Whence this strange contrast of a mild code emanating from a despotism, and a cruel and unmerciful code emanating from a free and representative government? The compact and self-^{limiting} mechanism of the municipal organization was put in motion by the slightest impulse—the extensive, cumbersome, and ill-adjusted machinery of centralized collection, could only be moved by violent and dangerous efforts.

It is a very prevailing opinion in this country, that high prices are a consequence of heavy burdens, and that the expenses of living are dearer in this

* A particular distinction is drawn between the collector of customs and excise, who farmed his office, and the collector of personal and real taxes, or property-tax, who was elective; respecting the first the Pandects say, "quante audacie, quante temeritatis sint publicanorum functiones, nemo est qui nesciat"—L. 12, ff. de Publ. Actig. et Comm; respecting the second, "exigendi tributum munus, sicut inordinata munera non habetur." 17 sect. 7 ff. ad municip.

country than in any other part of the world, in consequence of the demands of the state. To this opinion Turkey gives a practical contradiction. In Greece, before the revolution, the Turks, or the Turkish government, absorbed two-thirds of the profits of the country, and I dare say I shall not be contradicted in supposing, that the Greek peasant had to bear six times as heavy burdens as the English artizan, and did support this burden without the necessity of poor houses, because his labour was never employed but when it was productive—because he could dispose of his produce in the best market he could find—because he had the world open for his supply, and could purchase the produce of every portion of the globe, at the lowest price at which commerce could furnish it.

* In Turkey the simplicity of the system, permits one at once to see how much taxes really amount to, but it is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain their amount (as paid) in England. However, to arrive at some approximate comparison, I have taken the family's expenditure for necessaries, amounting to £150 per annum, and calculating the price of each article at the price in the country where it is to be procured cheapest; as bread at Dantzic, tea and sugar at Gibraltar, and I have found the market value of the articles which cost £150 to be £50, the two-thirds additional price, created by indirect taxation benefited the government to the extent of £16, or less than one-sixth of what it cost the purchasers, the remainder being absorbed by the reaction of tax on tax, and price on price, and by the necessity thus created of additional mercantile expenses, risks, per centage and profits. But supposing that violence in Turkey, as laws in England, absorb two-thirds of the profits of the mere operative, there is still this difference in favour of the Turkish raya, which saves him from the condition of pauperism, that these two-thirds are taken from his actual realized profit, and not anticipated on the price of his food.

But if the question of price is important as regards our internal relations, what does it not become when applied to our external commerce? America, France, Germany, have the advantage against us of lower prices. We have it in our power, not only to deprive them of that advantage, but to render England the cheapest country on the face of the earth. What nation then could compete with us; what fiscal barriers attempt to exclude our cheapened produce; what limits be placed to our prosperity, or our commerce? Our competitors would become our tributaries, to their own advantage as well as ours; every market of the globe would be supplied with those manufactures in which we excel; and it would not, I trust, under these altered circumstances, be too much to anticipate, that every field which the sun looks on, and that is fattened by the sweat of man, would in some degree have its productiveness increased in furnishing the means to purchase the produce of the looms of England.

A native of the Barbary coast, devotedly attached to the Arabic principles of taxation and free trade, during the agitation of the reform bill, was in the greatest anxiety for fear of its miscarriage. Being questioned as to his particular interest in the measure, he made this remarkable reply: "All your discontent arises from your taxing foreign commerce, which is the surplus and regulator of your internal commerce. This oppresses you in a hundred ways, which you feel without seeing, but which are quite new to those who have been brought up under a stationary system. Reform is a change; if it is lost to a stationary—if gained you will expect

benefit from it; but you will never obtain any till you knock down your custom-houses, and make people contribute to the state as they do to the support of their families: that is, by the *profits* of their industry or capital. You ask me what benefit the measure that leads to this result can be to me? Only this, that I look to the increased activity of your commerce as the means of civilizing Africa." I have faith in the prophecy of this enlightened Mussulman, and believe its application universal.

THE END.

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