





AN

AUTHENTIC HISTORY

OF THE

649
1575

SECOND WAR

FOR INDEPENDENCE,

COMPRISING

DETAILS OF THE MILITARY AND NAVAL OPERATIONS,
FROM THE COMMENCEMENT TO THE CLOSE OF THE
RECENT WAR; ENRICHED WITH NUMEROUS GEO-
GRAPHICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES.

BY SAMUEL R. BROWN.

*“ Give Fillan’s praise to the wind. Raise high his
praise in mine ear, while he yet shines in war.”*

Ossian.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.



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HISTORY, &c.

MOVEMENTS ON THE NORTHERN FRONTIER, IN 1812.

SOON after the declaration of war, troops began to assemble at Greenbush on the Hudson, directly opposite of Albany. From this depot detachments were marched to different points of the Canadian frontier. A brigade of regulars rendezvoused at Plattsburgh, under the orders of General Bloomfield. Several companies of New York militia were also ordered to this post. Major C. D. Young, commanding a detachment of N. Y. militia at the French Mills, having obtained information that a party of the enemy had landed at the Indian village of St. Regis, determined to make an attempt to surprize and capture them before a reinforcement should arrive to increase their numbers. He ordered his men to be well supplied with two days' rations and a liberal supply of whiskey, and at eleven o'clock at night on the 22d of October, marched silently on a circuitous route through the woods to the execution of his design: At 5 in the morning they had arrived within half a mile of the village, where they halted behind a rise of ground to reconnoiter and refresh the men. The detachment was then divided into three parts, each taking different directions. Captain

Lyon soon engaged the enemy, who surrendered at discretion, after a short and feeble resistance. The result of this little affair was five of the enemy killed and 40 prisoners, one stand of colors, two batteaux and 38 guns. Major Young's force consisted of Captains Lyon's, Higbie's, Tilden's and M'Niel's companies, who entered the village so silently that they were unheard even by the Indian dogs. They returned the same day with the prisoners and captured property, without the loss of a man. In November our troops passed into Canada, but the movement terminated in the mere capture and destruction of an inconsiderable block house, when the army retrograded and went into winter quarters at Plattsburgh.

In September a brigade of N. Y. militia and several independent companies were detached to protect the shipping and military stores at Sackett's Harbor, the whole under the command of Brig. Gen. Dodge.

On the 6th of October, 1812, Commodore Chauncey arrived there as commander of the U. S. naval forces on lakes Ontario, Erie, Huron, Michigan, &c. at which time the only vessel owned by the United States on those waters was the brig Oneida. He immediately purchased all the merchant vessels and fitted them out as gun boats.

On the 8th of November, he sailed from S. Harbor, in pursuit of the enemy with the Oneida and 6 schooners, and having fallen in with the Royal George on the 9th, chased her into the bay of Quinta. In the night he lost sight of her, and the next day chased her into Kingston, and engaged her and the batteries for an hour and an half, until he was compelled to haul off by the violence of the wind. On the 12th he chased the Earl

Moira into Kingston, and captured the transport sloop Elizabeth, with the brother of General Brock on board. On the 12th he took, off Kingston, the schooners Jane and Mary Hart. The blockade of Kingston was continued as long as it was practicable to keep the lake on account of ice, when Commodore Chauncey returned to Sackett's Harbor. On the 26th of November, the ship Madison of 32 guns was launched, having been built in 45 working days. He then proceeded to Erie and purchased all the private vessels on that lake, and made preparations for building the Lawrence and Niagara. From thence he went to New York, made contracts for building on the two lower lakes and sent on carpenters and mechanics to Erie and Sackett's Harbor. The campaign closed on the St. Lawrence without any military movement worthy of notice, if we except the gallant and daring achievement of Capt. Forsyth, who with a small detachment made a descent on the Canada shore, near Gananoque, in which he made several prisoners and captured a considerable quantity of arms, stores, &c.

Forts were erected at the Harbor in the autumn of 1812. The position of Fort Volunteer was calculated to defend the camp from the southeast. The locality of Fort Tompkins commands the approach from northwest to northeast.

EVENTS ON THE NORTHERN FRONTIER IN 1813.

ON the 6th of February Capt. Forsyth, commanding at Ogdensburg, left that village with about 200 volunteers, part from his own and part from Capt. Lytle's companies, together with several patriotic citizens, who accompanied the expedition. The detachment were conveyed in sleighs up the river to Morristown on the American side, where they formed and at 3 o'clock in the morning crossed over to Elizabethtown, surprized the guard, took 52 prisoners, among whom were one major, 3 captains and two lieutenants; also 140 muskets and rifles and a quantity of ammunition. The party, after liberating 16 deserters from prison returned to Ogdensburgh without the loss of a single man.

Shortly after this the British crossed over on the ice from Prescott and commenced an attack upon Ogdensburgh, which they succeeded in taking after a sharp conflict in which they suffered severely. Capt. Forsyth effected his retreat up the river with comparatively a trifling loss in men; but the enemy succeeded in capturing six pieces of cannon and the stores and provisions in depot.*

* *Capt. Forsyth to Colonel Maccomb.*

February 22, 1813.

SIR,

I have only time to inform that the enemy, with a very superior force, succeeded in taking Ogdensburgh this morning about nine o'clock. They had about two

PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN, AS EXEMPLIFIED IN THE FOLLOWING NOTE PRESENTED TO THE CABINET ON THE 8TH FEBRUARY, 1813, BY THE SECRETARY OF WAR, CORRESPONDENCE, &c.

THE enemy's force at Montreal and its dependencies has been stated at 16,000 effectives. It more probably does not exceed 10 or 12,000. The militia part of it may amount to one sixth of the whole. Is it probable that we shall be able to open the campaign on lake Champlain with a force competent to meet and dislodge this army before the 15th of May? I put the question on this date, because it is not to be doubted but that

men to our one, exclusive of Indians. Numbers of the enemy are dead on the field. Not more than twenty of our men killed and wounded; lieutenant Beard is among the latter.

I have made a saving retreat of about eight or nine miles. I could not get all the wounded off.

We have killed two of the enemy to one of ours killed by them. We want ammunition and some provisions sent on to us, also sleighs for the wounded.

If you can send me *three hundred men*, all shall be retaken, and Prescott too, or I will lose my life in the attempt. I shall write you more particularly today.

Yours, with due respect,

BENJAMIN FORSYTH,
Captain rifle regiment, commanding.
Col. Macomb, Sackett's Harbor.

the enemy will then be reinforced, and, of course, that new relations in point of strength will be established between us. Our present regular force on both sides of lake Champlain does not exceed 2,400 men. The addition made to it must necessarily consist of recruits, who, for a time, will not be better than militia; and when we consider that the recruiting service is but beginning, and that we now approach the middle of February, the conclusion is, I think, safe, that we cannot move in this direction and thus early [say 1st of May] with effect.

It then remains to choose between a course of entire inaction because incompetent to the main attack, or one having a secondary but still an important object; such would be the reduction of that part of Upper Canada lying between the town of Prescott, on the St. Lawrence and lake Erie, including the towns of Kingston and York, and the forts George and Erie. On this line of frontier the enemy have,

At Prescott,	-	-	-	-	-	300
At Kingston,	-	-	-	-	-	600
At George and Erie, &c.	-	-	-	-	-	1,200

Making a total (of regular troops) of 2,100

Kingston and Prescott, and the destruction of the British ships at the former, would present the first object; York and the frigates said to be building there, the second; George and Erie the third.

The force to be employed on this service should not be less than 6,000 effective regular troops, because in this first enterprize of a second campaign nothing must, if possible, be left to chance.

The time for giving execution to this plan is clearly indicated by the following facts:

1st. The river St. Lawrence is not open to the purposes of navigation before the 15th of May; and

2d. Lake Ontario is free from all obstruction arising from ice by the 1st day of April.

Under these circumstances we shall have six weeks for the expedition before it be possible for sir George Prevost to give it any disturbance.

Should this outline be approved, the details for the service can be made and expedited in forty eight hours.

Extract of a letter from the Secretary at War to Maj. Gen. Dearborn, dated

War Department, February 10, 1813.

“ I have the president’s orders to communicate to you, as expeditiously as possible, the out line of the campaign which you will immediately institute and pursue against Upper Canada :

“ 1st. 4,000 troops will be assembled at Sackett’s Harbor.

“ 2d. 3,000 will be brought together at Buffalo and its vicinity.

“ 3d. The former of these corps will be embarked and transported under convoy of the fleet to *Kingston*, where they will be landed. *Kingston*, its garrison, and the British ships wintering in the harbor of that place, will be its first object. Its second object will be York, (the capital of Upper Canada,) the stores collected and the two frigates building there. Its third object, forts George and Erie, and their dependencies. In the attainment of this last, there will be a cooperation between the two corps. The composition of these will be as follows :

1st. Bloomfield's brigade	1,434
2d. Chandler's do.	1,044
3d. Philadelphia detachment,	400
4th. Baltimore do.	300
5th. Carlisle do.	200
6th. Greenbush do.	400
7th. Sackett's Harbor do.	250
	<hr/>
	4,030
8th. Several corps at Buffalo under the command of colonel Porter and the recruits belonging thereto,	3,000
	<hr/>
Total,	7,030

“The *time* for executing the enterprise will be governed by the opening of lake Ontario, which usually takes place about the first of April.

“The adjutant general has orders to put the more southern detachments in march as expeditiously as possible. The two brigades on lake Champlain you will move so as to give them full time to reach their place of destination by the 25th of March. The route by Elizabeth will, I think, be the shortest and best. They will be replaced by some new raised regiments from the east.

“You will put into your movements as much privacy as may be compatible with their execution. They may be masked by reports that Sackett's Harbor is in danger, and that the principal effort will be made on the Niagara in cooperation with General Harrison. As the route to Sackett's Harbor and to Niagara is for a considerable distance the same, it may be well to intimate, even in orders, that the latter is the destination of the two brigades now at lake Champlain.” [Extract.]

Albany, February 18, 1813.

SIR,

Your dispatches of the 10th were received last evening. Nothing shall be omitted on my part in endeavoring to carry into effect the expedition proposed.

I fear the very large magazines of provisions on lake Champlain will be unsafe unless a considerable part is removed at some distance from the store, or a considerable force is assembled at Burlington and vicinity by the time the two brigades shall move. Another motive for having a large force on that lake, will be, that of preventing the enemy from sending almost his whole force from Lower Canada to Kingston, as soon as our intentions shall be so far known as to afford satisfactory evidence of our intentions in relation to the conquest of Upper Canada; and unless an imposing force shall menace Lower Canada, the enemy's whole force may be concentrated in Upper Canada, and require as large a force to operate against them as would be necessary to operate towards Montreal. It may be advisable to draw out a body of New Hampshire militia to serve for a short time, in Vermont. You will judge of the expediency of such a measure; but I do not believe that there will be a sufficient body of new raised troops in season for taking the place of the two brigades.

I am, &c.

H. DEARBORN.

Honorable John Armstrong, Secretary of War.

War Department, February 24, 1813.

SIR,

Before I left New York, and till very recently since my arrival here, I was informed, through various channels, that a winter or spring attack upon Kingston was

not practicable, on account of the snow, which generally lays to the depth of two, and sometimes of three feet, over all that northern region during those seasons. Hence it is, that in the plan recently communicated, it was thought safest and best to make the attack by a combination of military and naval means, and to approach our object, not by directly crossing the St. Lawrence on the ice, but by setting out from Sackett's Harbor, in concert with, and under convoy of the fleet. Later information differs from that on which this plan was founded; and the fortunate issue of major Forsyth's last expedition shews, that small enterprises at least, may be successfully executed at the present season. The advice given in your letter of the instant, has a bearing also on the same point and to the same effect. If the enemy be really weak at Kingston and approachable by land and ice, Pike (who will be a brigadier in a day or two) may be put into motion from lake Champlain, by the Chateauge route (in sleighs) and with the *two* brigades, cross the St. Lawrence, where it may be thought best, destroy the armed ships and seize and hold Kingston until you can join him with the other corps destined for the future objects of the expedition; and if pressed by Prevost before such junction can be effected, he may withdraw himself to Sackett's Harbor, or other place of security on our side of the line. This would be much the shorter road to the object, and perhaps the safer one, as the St. Lawrence is now every where well bridged, and offers no obstruction either to attack or retreat. Such a movement will, no doubt, be soon known to Prevost, and cannot but disquiet him. The dilemma it presents, will be serious. Either he must give up his western posts or to save them, he must

carry himself in force, and promptly to Upper Canada. In the latter case, he will be embarrassed for subsistence. His convoys of provisions will be open to our attacks, on a line of nearly one hundred miles, and his position at Montreal much weakened. Another decided advantage will be, to let us into the secret of his real strength. If he be able to make heavy detachments to cover, or to recover Kingston, and to protect his supplies, and after all maintain himself at Montreal and on lake Champlain, he is stronger than I imagined, or than any well authenticated reports make him to be.

With regard to our magazines, my belief is, that we have nothing to fear; because, as stated above, Prevost's attention must be given to the western posts and to our movements against them. He will not dare to advance southwardly while a heavy corps is operating on his flank and menacing his line of communication. But on the other supposition, they [the magazines] may be easily secured; 1st, by taking them to Willsborough; or 2d, to Burlington; or 3d, by a militia call, to protect them where they are. Orders are given for the march of the eastern volunteers, excepting Ulmer's regiment and two companies of axemen, sent to open the route to the Chandiere.

The southern detachments will be much stronger than I had supposed. That from Philadelphia will mount up nearly to 1000 effectives.

With great respect, &c.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

General Dearborn.

Head Quarters, Albany, February 25, 1813.

SIR,

I this day received by express from Colonel Mecom, the inclosed account from Major Forsyth. His known zeal for a small partizan warfare, has induced me to give him repeated caution against such measures, on his part, as would probably produce such retaliating strokes as he would be unable to resist; but I fear my advice has not been as fully attended to as could have been wished. He is an excellent officer, and under suitable circumstances would be of important service.

I have requested the governor to order Gen. Brown out with three or four hundred of such militia as he can soonest assemble, to join Forsyth; and I have ordered Colonel Pike, with four hundred of his command, to proceed in sleighs by what is considered the shortest and best route to the neighborhood of Ogdensburgh, or to Sackett's Harbor. On his arrival at Potsdam, or Canton or Russell, he will be able to communicate with Brown or Forsyth, or both, and act with them, as circumstances may require.

The affair at Ogdensburgh will be a fair excuse for moving troops in that direction; and by this movement it will be ascertained whether the same route will be the best in future: the distance by that route from Plattsburgh to Sackett's Harbor, is but little more than one half of what it would be by the route proposed, and I am assured by a gentleman, whom I can confide in, that there will be no difficulty by that route.

Chauncey has not yet returned from New York. I am satisfied that *if he had arrived as soon as I had expected him, we might have made a stroke at Kingston*

on the ice, but his presence was necessary for having the aid of the seamen and marines.

From a letter received this day from Colonel Porter at Niagara, it appears that the enemy were preparing to strike at Black Rock.

I can give him no assistance.

I am, &c.

II. DEARBORN.

Hon. John Armstrong, secretary of war.

General Dearborn learning that sir George Prevost had passed Montreal with troops on his way to Kingston, left Albany in haste and arrived at Sackett's Harbor in 52 hours, 180 miles distance! He found on his arrival that sir George had already reached Kingston with a force of from six to eight thousand men. As a measure of precaution the neighboring militia were called in, and in a few days 3000 men were in garrison at the Harbor. The ice at this time was good, and a visit from sir George was confidently expected. However, he neglected to seize the favorable moment, and in the course of the month of March two brigades (Pike's and Chandler's) arrived from Plattsburgh in sleighs. Four hundred men followed the General from Albany. Sir George after visiting York and Niagara, relinquished his meditated coup de main against Chauncey's flotilla, and returned to Montreal.

On the 15th of March it was unanimously determined in a council of the principal officers at the Harbor, including Com. Chauncey, that they ought not, under existing circumstances, to make an attempt on Kingston *before the naval force could act.*

After this General Dearborn and Commodore Chauncey decided that it was best first to capture York and

Fort George, while the troops at Buffalo should cross over and carry Forts Erie and Chippewa; then march to Fort George, and after forming a junction with Pike's division, attack Kingston with their whole force.*

* General Dearborn informed the secretary of war (Armstrong) of his intended change of the plan of the campaign, who replied in the following words, under date of March 29 :

“Your despatches of the 11th and 14th instant from Sackett's Harbor, and one of the 22d, from Albany, have been received. The correspondence between you and Major Murray, in relation to an exchange of prisoners, has been referred to the department of state. The alteration in the plan of campaign, so as to make Kingston the last object, instead of making it the first, would appear to be necessary, or at least proper; but the force assigned to the attack of the upper posts, is believed to be too small.

“Accident may prevent a cooperation of the corps at Buffalo. That sent from Sackett's Harbor should have in itself the power of reducing Forts George and Erie, and holding in check the militia who may be sent to support them. The ships can give little aid in the business, except merely in covering the landing. Double the number you propose sending, would not be too many. Various considerations recommended the employment of a large and decisive force, and none, that I can think of, dissuade from it. If our first step in the campaign, and in the quarter from which most is expected, should fail, the disgrace of our arms will be complete. The public will loose all confidence in us, and we shall even cease to have any in ourselves. The party who first opens a campaign, has many advantages over his antagonist, all of which, however, are the result of his being able to carry his whole force against a part of his enemy's. Washington carried his whole force against the Hessians in New Jersey, and beating them, recovered that moral strength, that self conf-

On the 9th of April the keel of the *General Pike* was laid, and she was launched on the 12th of June. In the mean while Commodore Perry with carpenters was sent to Black Rock to expedite the repair and equipment of five vessels at that place. It is worthy of remark that the *General Pike* sailed in 100 days from the time her keel was laid, in spite of the obstacles which retarded the forwarding of her equipment.

In a letter of April 19, the secretary of war concurred in the expediency of the expedition to York, and added, that "we ought to destroy the communication between Kingston and Montreal, by interposing a com-

dence, which he had lost by many preceding disasters. We are now in that state of prostration that he was in after he crossed the Delaware; but, like him, we may soon get on our legs again, if we are able to give some hard blows at the opening of the campaign. In this we cannot fail, provided the force we employ against his western posts be sufficiently heavy. They must stand or fall by their own strength. They are perfectly insulated and out of the reach of reinforcements: send therefore a force that shall overwhelm them—that shall leave nothing to chance. If I had not another motive, I would carry my whole strength, merely that their first service should be a successful one. The good effects of this will be felt throughout the campaign.

"I have hastened to give you these thoughts, under a full conviction of their usefulness; and shall only add, that there is no drawback upon this policy. When the fleet and army are gone, we have nothing at Sackett's Harbor to guard, nor will the place present an object to the enemy.

"How then would it read, that we had lost our object on the Niagara, while we had another brigade at Sackett's Harbor doing nothing?"

petent force between the two, and assailing the former, by a joint operation of military and *naval means*.

“Local circumstances favor this project. A few armed boats on lake St. Francis, stop all intercourse by water; in which case, cannon, military stores and articles of subsistence in *bulk*, cannot be conveyed between Montreal and Kingston.

“From lake Ontario to Ogdensburgh we command the navigation of the St. Lawrence by our armed vessels, and under their protection, our army can be passed over and established on the Canada side at the point deemed most proper for attack.

“On the other supposition, that the British garrison is withdrawn from Kingston to Montreal, the old question of approaching him by lake Champlain, or by the St. Lawrence, recurs, and ought now to be settled, so that there should be no unnecessary pause in our operations at a later and more momentous period of the campaign.

“The circumstances in favor of St. Lawrence route, are these :

“1st. Our force is now upon it.

“2d. It furnishes a conveyance by water the whole distance.

“3d. The enemy is not fortified on the St. Lawrence side, has on it no strong out posts, which must be forced in order to secure our flanks and rear, while engaged in the main attack : and

“4th. By approaching his *flank* (as this route enables you to do) instead of his *front*, we compel him to change his position, in which case, he must do one of four things : either he must occupy the north side of the river and give up the south, or he must occupy the

south side and give up the north, or he must confine himself to the island and give both sides; or lastly, he must occupy both sides, and in this case expose himself to be beaten in detail.

“None of these advantages are to be found in approaching him by the other route. Our troops are not upon it; we cannot move by water; his out posts are fortified, and must be carried by assault; his front is the only assailable point, and that is covered by the St. Lawrence; our attack must be made exactly where he wishes it to be made; all his arrangements and defences are, of course, in full operation, nor is he compelled to disturb them in the smallest degree. In a word, we must fight him on *his* previous dispositions and plans, and not on any of *our own*.”

CAPTURE OF YORK.

THE troops embarked on board of Com. Chauncey's fleet to the number of 1600 on the 22d of April, but owing to adverse winds, did not leave the harbor until the 24th. On the morning of the 27th the fleet arrived off York, and at 8 o'clock commenced landing the troops about three miles westward of the town, and one and a half from the enemy's works.

It was the intention of general Dearborn to have landed at a clear field, (the site of the old French fort Tarento) but was prevented by the unfavorable state of the wind. They were therefore, obliged to land in a wood which was filled with 800 of the enemy, and consisted of regulars, militia and Indians, under the immediate command of general Sheaffe. Our riflemen, under major Forsyth, first landed, under a heavy fire from Indians and other troops. He was supported as promptly as possible with other troops, but the contest was sharp and severe for nearly half an hour. We give the principal incidents of that day, in the words of the commanding general.

“The enemy was repulsed by a far less number than their own, and as soon as general Pike landed with 7 or 800 men, and the remainder of the troops were pushing for the shore, the enemy retreated to their works; and as soon as the whole of the troops had landed and formed on the clear ground intended for the first landing, they advanced through a thick wood to the open

ground near the enemy's works, and after carrying one battery by assault, were moving on in columns towards the main works; when the head of the columns was within about 60 rods of the enemy, a tremendous explosion occurred from a large magazine prepared for the purpose, which discharged such immense quantities of stone as to produce a most unfortunate effect on our troops. I have not yet been able to collect the returns of our killed and wounded, but our loss by the explosion must, I fear, exceed one hundred; and among them I have to lament the loss of the brave and excellent officer brigadier general Pike, who received such a contusion from a large stone as terminated his valuable life within a few hours. His loss will be severely felt. Previous to the explosion the enemy had retired into the town, excepting a party of regular troops, which did not retire early enough to avoid the shock; it is said that upwards of forty of them were destroyed. General Sheaffe moved off with the regular troops and left directions with the commanding officer of the militia to make the best terms he could. In the mean time, all further resistance on the part of the enemy ceased, and the outlines of a capitulation were agreed on. As soon as I was informed of general Pike's being wounded, I went on shore. I had been induced to confide the immediate command of the troops in action to general Pike from a conviction that he fully expected it, and would be much mortified at being deprived of the honor, which he highly appreciated. Every movement was under my view. Our troops behaved with great firmness and deserve much applause, especially those who were first engaged, under circumstances that would have tried the firmness

of veterans. Our loss in the action in the morning and in carrying the first battery, was not great, probably about fifty killed and wounded; among them were a full proportion of officers; and although the enemy had a decided advantage in point of numbers and position at the commencement, their loss was greater than ours, particularly in officers.

It was with the greatest exertion that the small vessels of the fleet could work into the harbor against a gail of wind directly ahead; but as soon as they got in contact with the batteries a tremendous cannonade commenced from 24 and 32 pounders, and was kept up without intermission under a heavy fire from two batteries until the enemy's batteries were carried or blown up by the explosion, which undoubtedly had a powerful effect on the enemy. I am under the greatest obligation to commodore Chauncey for his able and indefatigable exertions in every possible manner that could give facility and effect to the expedition. He is equally estimable for deliberate, sound judgment, bravery and industry. The government could not have made a more fortunate selection for the important trust he holds. Unfortunately, the enemy's armed ship the "Prince Regent" left this place for Kingston four days before we arrived. A large ship on the stocks, and nearly planked up, with a large store of naval stores, were set on fire by the enemy soon after the explosion of the magazine. There are no vessels fit for use in the harbor. A considerable quantity of military stores and provisions remained. We shall not possess the means of transporting the prisoners from this place, and must of course leave them on parole. I hope we shall so far complete the necessary measures at this

place in the course of the day as to be able to sail tomorrow for Niagara, by which rout I send this by a small vessel, with notice to general Lewis of our approach.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

H. DEARBORN.

Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary of War.

In a subsequent letter to the secretary of war, general Dearborn says: You will observe that our loss was very small excepting that produced by the explosion. As nearly as I have been able to ascertain, the loss of the enemy amounted from ninety to one hundred killed, two hundred wounded, and upwards of three hundred prisoners. I have not been able to ascertain precisely the number of the militia put upon their parole. I presume that it could not be less than five hundred. There was an immense depot of naval and military stores. York was the principal depot for Niagara and Detroit; and notwithstanding the immense amount which was destroyed by them, we found more than we could bring off. General Sheaffe's baggage and papers fell into my hands. These papers are a valuable acquisition: I have not had time for a full examination of them. A scalp * was found in the ex-

* The fact that a human Scalp was actually found suspended over the speaker's chair in the government house, is fully corroborated by the subjoined letter of Commodore Chauncey to the secretary of the navy. The scalp was stretched on a hoop of six inches diameter and deeply pointed, and from the length and fineness of the hair, was presumed to have been taken from the head of a woman.

*United States' Ship Madison,
Sackett's Harbor, 4th June, 1813.*

SIR—I have the honor to present you, by the hands

ecutive and legislative chamber, suspended near the speaker's chair, in company with the mace and other emblems of royalty. I intend sending it to you with a correct account of the facts relative to the place and situation in which it was found.

With great respect, &c.

H. DEARBORN.

Great praise is due to General Dearborn for the secrecy and military management with which he conducted the enterprize. The enemy had been induced to believe that Kingston was the point of attack; every stratagem was resorted to, in order to create this impression.

The explosion which proved fatal to the brave Gen. Pike was tremendous; such was the shock that it deafened and amazed every one within reach of the devastating shower of stones which instantly succeeded it. Nevertheless, after he had received his mortal wound, he encouraged his men to push on. They gave three cheers, and advancing to the charge, overcome all before them at the point of the bayonet. General Pike was removed

of Lieutenant Dudley, the British standard taken at York, on the 27th of April last, accompanied by the mace, over which was hung a *human scalp*.

These articles were taken from the parliament house by one of my officers, and presented to me. The scalp I caused to be presented to General Dearborn, who, I believe, still has it in his possession. I also send, by the same gentleman, one of the British flags taken at Fort George on the 27th of May.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully sir, your most obédiant servant,

ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

Honorable William Jones,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington.

from the battle and conveyed on board the *Madison*, where the British colors were sent to him: they were folded up and placed under his head, upon which he said—" *I die contented.*:" he then laid his hand on his breast and immediately expired.

An unusual number of officers for the force engaged were killed and wounded. Fourteen American lieutenants were killed or wounded. Captain Stephen Moore, who led the Baltimore volunteers, lost a leg. Lieutenant Baptiste Irvine * received a bayonet in the shoulder, when in the act of stepping out of a boat the moment it touched the shore.

In the harbor was found the British armed schooner *Duke of Gloucester*, of 14 guns, in ordinary, which was taken to Sackett's Harbor and repaired.

After the death of General Pike, the command (on shore) devolved on Colonel Pierce.

The following general order was issued by General Pike the morning our troops sailed from Sackett's Harbor.

BRIGADE ORDER.

Sackett's Harbor, April 25, 1813.

When the debarkation shall take place on the enemy's shore, Major Forsyth's light troops, formed in four platoons shall be first landed. They will advance a small distance from the shore, and form the chain to cover the landing of the troops. They will not fire, unless they discover the approach of a body of the en-

* Formerly conductor of the *Baltimore Whig*, and at present one of the editors of the *N. Y. Columbian*. He is by birth an Irishman—in sentiment an American—and a political writer of the first order.

emy, but will make *prisoners of all persons* who may be passing, and send them to the general. They will be followed by the regimental platoons of the first brigade, with 2 pieces of Brooks' artillery, one on the right and one on the left flank, covered by their musketry, and the small detachments of riflemen of the 15th and 16th infantry. Then will be landed the three platoons of the reserve of the first brigade, under Major Swan. Then Major Eustis, with his train of artillery, covered by his own musketry. Then Colonel M'Clure's volunteers, in four platoons, followed by the 21st regiment, in six platoons. When the troops shall move in column, either to meet the enemy or take a position, it will be in the following order, viz: 1st, Forsyth's riflemen, with proper front and flank guards; the regiments of the first brigade, with their pieces; then three platoons of reserve; Major Eustis' train of artillery; volunteer corps; 21st regiment: each corps sending out proper flank guards. When the enemy shall be discovered in front, the riflemen will form the chain, and maintain their ground, until they have the signal (the preparative) or receive orders to retire, at which they will retreat with the greatest velocity, and form equally on the two flanks of the regiments of the first brigade, and then renew their fire. The three reserve platoons of this line will form under the orders of Major Swan, one hundred yards in the rear of the colors, ready to support any part which may show an unsteady countenance. Major Eustis and his train will form in the rear of this reserve, ready to act where circumstances may dictate.

The second line will be composed of the 21st infantry, in six platoons, flanked by Col. M'Clure's volun-

teers, equally divided as light troops. The whole under the orders of Col. Ripley.

It is expected that every corps will be mindful of the honor of the *American arms*, and the disgraces which have recently tarnished our arms; and endeavor, by a cool and determined discharge of their duty, to support the one, and wipe off the other. The riflemen in front will maintain their ground at all hazards, until ordered to retire, as will *every corps of the army*. With an assurance of being duly supported, should the commanding General find it prudent to withdraw the front line, he will give orders to retire by the heads of platoons, covered by the riflemen; and the *second line* will advance by the heads of platoons, pass the intervals, and form the line; call in the light troops, and renew the action. But the General may find it proper to bring up the *second line* on one or both flanks, to charge in columns, or perform a variety of manœuvres which it would be impossible to foresee. But as a *general rule*, whatever may be the directions of line at the commencement of the action, the corps will form as before directed. If they advance in line, it may be in parallel eschelons of platoons, or otherwise, as the ground or circumstances may dictate.

No man will load until ordered, except the light troops in front, until within a small distance of the enemy, and then *charge bayonets*, and thus letting the enemy see that we can meet them with their own weapons. Any man *firing, or quitting his post without orders, must be put to instant death*, as an *example* may be *necessary*. Platoon officers will pay the greatest attention to the *coolness* and *aim* of their men in the fire; their *regularity* and *dressing* in the *charge*. The

field officers will watch over the *conduct of the whole*. *Courage and bravery* in the field, do not more distinguish the soldier than humanity after victory; and whatever examples the savage allies of our enemies may have given us, the General confidently hopes; that the blood of an unresisting or yielding enemy, will never stain the weapons of the *soldiers of his column*.

The unoffending citizens of Canada are many of them our own countrymen, and the poor Canadians have been forced into the war. Their property therefore, must be held sacred; and any *soldier* who shall so far neglect the honor of his profession as to be guilty of plundering the inhabitants shall, if convicted, be punished with *death*. But the commanding General assures the troops, that should they capture a large quantity of *public stores*, he will use his best endeavors to procure them a reward from his government.

This order shall be read at the head of each corps and every field officer shall carry a copy, in order that he may at any moment refer to it; and give explanations to his subordinates.

All those found in arms in the enemy's country, shall be treated as enemies; but those who are peaceably following the pursuits of their various vocations, friends, and their property respected.

By order of the Brigadier General,

Z. M. PIKE.

After the capture of York, General Dearborn disembarked the army at Niagara, to afford the troops an opportunity for recovering their healths and spirits, which had become much depressed by the crowded and con-

lined situation in which they had been placed on board the fleet.

The army remained inactive twenty five days. Gen. Dearborn was seriously indisposed. In the mean while preparations were in readiness for making a blow, and considerable reinforcements had arrived.

C. 2

BATTLE OF FORT GEORGE.

ON the 27th of May, at one o'clock in the morning, the whole army embarked on lake Ontario, three miles east from Fort Niagara. It was arranged in six divisions of boats; the first contained the advanced guard, under Col. Scott—this was followed by Colonel Porter with the field train, the brigades of Boyd, Winder and Chandler, and a reserve under Col. Maccomb.

Commodore Chauncey favored the descent by the fire of his small schooners. Captain Perry (now of the Java) volunteered his services to conduct the divisions.

“At nine in the morning, Col. Scott effected his landing in good order, under a heavy discharge of musketry and artillery, about a mile and a quarter from the village of Newark, and the same distance west of the mouth of the Niagara. He formed his line on the beach of the lake, covered by a bank twelve or fifteen feet in height, which served as a parapet against the enemy's fire. This bank was to be scaled against the enemy, who had now drawn up his whole force, 1,500 strong, immediately on its brow. They were soon driven from their ground by the fire of the schooners and a brisk and vigorous charge, but rallied, and took a second position behind a ravine, at a little distance. An action of about twenty minutes ensued, it was short and desperate, and ended in the total rout of the ene-

my at every point. Scott's and Forsyth's commands, supported by Boyd's * and Winder's brigades sustained the brunt of the action."†

"Our batteries succeeded in rendering Fort George unteneable; and when the enemy had been beaten from his position, and found it necessary to reenter it, after firing a few guns, and setting fire to the magazine,‡ which soon exploded; moved off rapidly by different routes. Our light troops pursued them several miles. The troops having been under arms from one o'clock in the morning, were too much exhausted for any further pursuit. The behavior of our troops, both officers and men, entitles them to the highest praise; and the difference in our loss with that of the enemy, when we consider the advantages his positions afforded him, is astonishing. We had seventeen killed and forty five wounded. The enemy had ninety killed and one hundred and sixty wounded, of the regular troops. We have taken one hundred prisoners, exclusive of the wounded. Colonel Meyers of the 49th, was wounded

* During the last five minutes Gen. Boyd landed in the advance guard and a part of his brigade participated in the action.

† This sentence is from the official letter of General Lewis.

‡ But one of the magazines blew up. At the moment of the explosion, the advance under Col. Scott was within 80 paces of the fort. The front gate was instantly forced by our men. Scott was the first to enter, and took with his own hands, the British flag yet waving over the works. At the same time Captains Hindman and Stockton snatched away the matches which had been applied by the retreating garrison to the other magazines.

and taken prisoner. Of ours, only one commissioned officer was killed, Lieutenant Hobart, of the light artillery.*

Another and subsequent statement makes the total British loss 107 killed and 264 prisoners, 175 of whom were wounded.

So precipitate was the flight that they abandoned all the cannon and stores in the fort and left the field of battle covered with arms. The enemy were closely pressed at a distance of five miles up the river, until Scott and Miller were recalled from the pursuit by order of General Lewis.

General Dearborn speaks of the conduct of the officers and men in terms of the warmest approbation. "The animating example set by Col. Scott and General Boyd, deserve particular mention. I am greatly indebted to Colonel Porter of the light artillery, to Maj. Armistead of the 3d regiment of artillery, and Lieut. Totten of the engineer troops, for their judicious and skilful execution in demolishing the enemy's batteries." Captain Roach and Lieut. Swearingen, both of the 23d—Captain Arrowsmith of the 6th—Major King of the 15th, and Captain Steel of the 16th, were the only officers wounded.

Commodore Chauncey contributed by the judicious disposition of his schooners, his full share to the success of the attack. Mr. Trant in the Julia, and Mr. Mix in the Growler, were directed to take a position in the mouth of the river and silence a battery near the light house which from its position commanded the shore where our troops were to land. Mr. Stevens in the On-

* See Gen. Dearborn's official dispatch.

tario, took a position north of the light house, enfiladed the battery and crossed the fire of the Julia and Growler. Lieutenant Brown in the Governor Tompkins, was ordered to take a station near the 2 mile creek, where the enemy had a battery with a heavy gun. Lieut. Pettigrew in the Conquest, took a position so as to rake the same battery. Lt. M'Pherson in the Hamilton, Lt. Smith in the Asp and Mr. Osgood in the Scourge, covered the landing of the troops. All the vessels anchored within musket shot of the shore, and in ten minutes after they opened upon the batteries, they were completely silenced and abandoned. Capt. Perry was present at every point where he could be useful, exposed to showers of musketry.* Commodore Chauncey had himself prepared about 400 seamen, with whom he calculated to land, if the enemy had made a stand.

In the brigade order of the 28th May, applause is bestowed on Colonel Miller for "the steadiness with which he supported the advance party;" on Maj. King who "continued to lead his regiment through the severity of the contest long after having received a painful and debilitating wound;" and on the "intrepid conduct of Capt. Grafton and Lieut. Whiting. The Irish volunteers under Col. M'Clure from New York, and the 16th regiment under Col. Pierce are honorably mentioned.

The battle of Fort George may be justly ranked among the most brilliant feats of arms during the war. The modesty, or indifference to popular applause, of General Dearborn prevented him from speaking with sufficient eclat of this masterly achievement. The tro-

* See Com. Chauncey's official report, May 28, 1813.

phies of the victory were splendid—more than forty pieces of cannon, besides small arms, ammunition and provisions to an immense amount.

The morning after the action, Gen. Lewis' division consisting of Chandler and Winder's brigades, the light artillery, dragoons, light infantry and riflemen, were ordered to march in pursuit of the enemy by way of Queenstown. The commander in chief had entertained a belief that the enemy, after receiving reinforcements from Chippewa, Erie and Kingston, and calling in the neighboring militia, would make a stand at the Beaver Dam, where they had a considerable deposit of provisions; but he was disappointed. The enemy suddenly decamped and continued his retreat on to Burlington heights. General Dearborn upon hearing of this movement, recalled General Lewis with a part of his force for the purpose of attempting to cut off the enemy's retreat at York by the aid of commodore Chauncey's fleet. Unfavorable winds prevented the execution of this measure. Generals Chandler and Winder continued in pursuit of the enemy, who halted about 50 miles from Fort George.

On the 29th, Lieutenant Colonel Preston with about 600 men crossed from Buffalo and took possession of Fort Erie and its dependencies. The enemy spiked the guns of the fort and batteries, blew up the magazines and retreated at his approach.

ATTACK ON SACKETT'S HARBOR.

ON the 29th of May, Sackett's Harbor, garrisoned by about 400 regular troops, principally dragoons under Lieutenant Colonel Backus, the regiment of Albany volunteers under Lieutenant Colonel Mills, and the neighboring militia, the whole under the orders of Brig. Gen. Jacob Brown, was attacked by 1,000 regulars under the immediate command of Sir George Prevost.

Fortunately, Gen. Brown was apprized of the intentions of the enemy on the 28th, and had made suitable preparations to receive them. Anticipating the point of descent, General Brown placed the militia and Albany volunteers, amounting to 500 men, near the waters edge on the peninsula usually called Horse Island. "Lieutenant Backus with the regulars formed the second line, the care of Fort Tompkins was committed to the regular artillerists, and that of the Navy Point to Lieutenant Chauncey." In case the militia and volunteers were driven from their position, Lieut. Col. Backus was ordered to advance and meet the head of the enemy's column, while General Brown was to rally and fall on its flanks. If unable then to resist the enemy's attack, our troops were to throw themselves into the forts and defend themselves to the last extremity, in which case Lieutenant Chauncey was to destroy the stores and retire.

Such, in short, was the plan of defence. A little before sunrise the enemy were seen in 38 large boats making for the shore under cover of their gun boats. General Brown gave orders for his men to reserve the fire until the near approach of the enemy should enable every shot to hit its object. The fire was too soon, but not without effect. Yet the aspect of danger was too terrible for militia, unaccustomed to the music of balls, to withstand. They fled without giving a second fire. General Brown and Lieutenant Colonel Mills made every possible exertion to rally their men, but in vain. The intrepid Mills received at the same instant a canister and musket ball through his body, and fell dead on the first line of defence. Lieutenant Colonel Backus with the regular troops, according to previous arrangement, met the advancing column and with greatly inferior numbers caused it to falter and finally with the aid of about 100 militia and volunteers, who rallied under General Brown and Captain M'Nitt, succeeded in checking its progress and defeating its intentions. The enemy repulsed, retreated under the fire of his ships. After having reembarked, they sent a flag to General Brown requesting attention to the wounded.

The total loss of the Americans in killed, wounded and missing was 158. Lieutenant Colonel Backus, to whose undaunted bravery General Brown chiefly ascribes the success of the day, was mortally wounded near the close of the action.

The British loss in killed and wounded remaining on the ground exceeded ours; besides, many were killed and wounded in their boats by the militia and volunteers while effecting a landing; a number were also carried off the field by the enemy previous to his re-

treat. Among the British officers killed, was Adjutant General Gray, Colonel Moody, and Major Edwards.

Lieutenant Chauncey being falsely told that the battle was lost, unfortunately set fire to the navy barracks and stores, by which means a heavy public loss was unnecessarily sustained. General Brown's official report of this affair pays a becoming homage to the noble conduct of Colonels Mills and Backus, Maj. Swan and Captain M'Nitt.

The chief object of the enemy seems to have been the destruction of the Pike, then on the stocks, and the stores in depot; in which he failed, at the same time sustaining a disgraceful discomfiture.

On the 5th of June Commodore Chauncey sailed from Fort Niagara for Sackett's Harbor, having on board Colonel M'Comb and two hundred men. At this period the British squadron under Sir James Lucas Yeo was decidedly superior in point of guns and tonnage. The command of the lake gave the enemy peculiar advantages. Lieutenant Colonel Ripley with his regiment was also ordered to the defence of Sackett's Harbor. He was directed to land at Oswego.

The indisposition of General Dearborn continued. The inhabitants in the vicinity of Fort George came in in great numbers and received their paroles. A large majority of them were friendly to the United States, and fixed in their hatred against the government of Gt. Britain. The Mohawk Indians were principally quiet for fear of losing their valuable tract of land on Grand River.*

* See Gen. Dearborn's official letter of June 8, 1813.

AFFAIR OF STONEY CREEK.

IN the afternoon of the 5th of June, the advanced guard of Chandler's force, consisting of the light infantry under Captains Hindman and Nicholas, a part of the rifle corps under Captain Lyttle, and a detachment of the 2d dragoons under Captain Selden, arrived at Stony Creek and commenced a sharp skirmish with an enemy's picket, 100 strong, under Col. Williams of the 49th regiment. He retreated and our men pursued till about sun set, when they returned to their proper position in the line of march. The main body, in the mean while, had reached the creek, behind which they took a position for the night. The light infantry and part of the rifle corps on the right of the 25th reg't, formed the right wing. The artillery under Capt's Towson and Leonard, the center, the 5th, 16th, 23d, and some riflemen, the left wing, and the cavalry in the rear. A strong picket guard was posted some distance in front. Also strong flank and rear guards in such manner as to surround the whole encampment with sentinels. The whole number of our troops at this point did not exceed one thousand men. A detachment of 300 men of the 13th and 14th regiments were encamped upon the beach of the lake about three miles distant, to protect the boats expected from Fort George. Our men lay upon their arms without covering. The night was very dark, but fires were kindled which enabled the enemy

to see some parts of our line. Gen. Chandler's account of the action which ensued is in the following words.

“About an hour before day light, on the morning of the 6th, the alarm was given. I was instantly up, and the 25th, which lay near me, was almost as instantly formed, as well as the 5th and 23d, which was on the left, under the immediate eye of General Winder. Owing to the neglect of the front picket, or some other cause, the British officers say, that they were not hailed, or any alarm given, until they were within three hundred yards of our line. The extreme darkness prevented us from seeing or knowing at what point they intended to attack us, until an attack was made on our right. A well directed fire was opened upon them from the 25th and from nearly the whole line. After a few minutes I heard several muskets in our rear, in the direction of the rear guard, and then expected that the enemy had gained our rear by some path unknown by me, and were about to attack us in rear. I instantly ordered Colonel Milton, with the 5th, to form in our rear near the woods, to meet such circumstances as might take place, knowing that I could call him to any other point, if necessary, at any moment. I had observed, that the artillery was not covered, and directed Gen. Winder to cause the 23d to be formed so far to the right, that their right should cover the artillery. At this moment I heard a new burst of fire from the enemy's left on our right, and not able to see any thing which took place, I set out full speed towards the right, to take measures to prevent my right flank from being turned, which I expected was the object of the enemy. I had proceeded but a few yards, before my horse fell under me, by which

fall I received a serious injury. Here was a time when I have no recollection of what passed, but I presume it was not long. As soon as I recovered, I recollected what my object was, and made my way to the right, and gave Major Smith such directions as I thought proper, to prevent his right from being turned by surprise. I was then returning toward the center, and when near the artillery, heard men, who, by their noise, appeared to be in confusion, it being the point at which I expected the 23d to be formed. I expected it was that regiment. I approached them, and as soon as I was near enough, I saw a body of men, who I thought to be the 23d, in rear of the artillery, broken. I hobbled in amongst them, and began to rally them, and directed them to form, but soon found my mistake; it was the British 49th, who had pushed forward to the head of their column and gained the rear of the artillery. I was immediately disarmed and conveyed down the column to its rear. It was not yet day, and the extreme darkness of the night, to which was added the smoke of the fire, put it totally out of our power to see the situation of the enemy. This was all that saved their columns from sure and total destruction, of which some of their officers are aware. After seeing the situation of the column as I passed, I did hope and expect that General Winder, on the first dawn of light, would see their situation, and bring Colonel Milton with the 5th, (who I had still kept in reserve until I could have day light to discern their situation) to attack this column, which, I am sure, he would have done to advantage; but, to my mortification, I soon learned that he had fallen into the same mistake with myself; and by endeavoring to learn what was taking

place in the center, he was also taken, as well as Major Van De Venter. To the extreme darkness of the night, the enemy's knowledge of his intended point of attack, and our not knowing at what point to expect him, must be attributed his partial success, and not to a want of strength or bravery in our troops, who, generally, behaved remarkably well under all the circumstances; and however unfortunate the event, as it relates to myself, I only ask that all circumstances may be taken into consideration, in making up your opinion upon the conduct of General Winder and myself in this affair, which I am sure you will do, and I flatter myself you will see no cause of censure."

Colonel James Burn of the 2d light dragoons, in a letter to General Dearborn, furnishes some additional and interesting particulars. "In a few minutes the fire became general along the whole line, and was nobly returned by the artillery of the center, commanded by Captains Towson and L. Leonard, and again by the troops of the left wing, viz. the 5th, under Lieutenant Colonel Milton, the 23d, commanded by Major Armstrong, and the 16th. The fire continued with little intermission for one hour, during which time the enemy attempted, by frequent charges, to break our line, but without effect, being obliged to give way by the well directed fire of our brave troops."

"The 13th and 14th regiments (which had been detached the preceding evening) were active in making prisoners, and advancing with much order to the field in hope of sharing with the gallant 5th and 25th, 23d and light troops, the glory of another combat. But the unfortunate capture of Brigadier Generals Chandler and Winder, who were taken in the action unknown

to any part of the army, and hurried into the enemy's lines, prevented the future operations from being carried into effect with the promptitude which would assuredly have taken place had either of those officers been present to command.

“ You will be surprised to find our loss so small—that of the enemy exceeds ours much; they lost in killed about sixty, many wounded, and upwards of seventy prisoners, all regulars and principally of the 49th regiment. Several of their officers were killed, wounded and missing. A flag was sent by Colonel Harvey, asking permission to make enquiries for them; also to be allowed to send a surgeon to attend their own wounded, which I readily granted. On the return of day light, I found the command of the army had devolved on me, and being at a loss what steps to pursue in the unpleasant dilemma, occasioned by the capture of our generals; finding the ammunition of many of the troops nearly expended, I had recourse to a council of the field officers present, of whom a majority coincided in opinion with me that we ought to retire to our former position at the Forty Mile Creek, where we could be supplied with ammunition and provisions, and either advance or remain until further orders.

“ Every aid was afforded by the staff. The Assistant Adjutant General Major Johnson, and Brigade Majors Jones and Wartenby, exerted themselves in rendering all the assistance in their power.

“ The army on this occasion, has proved its firmness and bravery, by keeping its position in a night attack, in which the yells of the Indians mingled with the roaring of cannon and musketry, were calculated to intimidate. The enemy charged repeatedly, and so

dark was the night that our army could not distinguish friend from foe ; in one of those they succeeded in carrying off a six pounder, a howitzer and a caisson, to the great mortification of our brave artillery. I presume it was on that occasion also that we lost our generals, who were distinctly heard encouraging our men to fight. The squadron of dragoons remained formed and steady at their post, but could not act on account of the darkness of the night and the thickness of the adjacent woods. Much credit is due to the troops generally, but too much praise cannot be said of the conduct of the 5th and 25th regiments."

On the 6th of June, General Dearborn ordered Gen. Lewis to proceed to the advanced army for the purpose of directing its operations. He found it on the 7th, about ten miles in the rear of the ground on which it had been attacked on the night of the 5th, with its right flank on the lake and its left on the Forty Mile Creek, which skirts a perpendicular mountain of considerable height. At six in the evening the British fleet hove in sight. The troops lay all night on their arms. At day light the enemy appeared abreast of the encampment about a mile from shore. At six they towed in a large schooner which opened a fire on our boats. Archer's and Towson's companies, with five pieces of artillery, were ordered to the bank of the lake to give them a suitable reception. Captain Totten in 30 minutes constructed a temporary furnace for heating shot. Her fire was returned with effect and interest, which soon compelled her to retire. A party of savages appeared on the brow of the mountain ; they were, however, soon dispersed by Lieutenant Eldridge, who gained the summit of the mountain with a party of volunteers.

In the mean while an officer was sent to General Lewis with a flag of truce from Sir J. L. Yeo, advising him, that, "as he was invested by savages in his rear, a fleet in his front, and a powerful army on his flank, it was his duty to surrender his army." General Lewis very properly answered the noble knight that his "message was too ridiculous to merit a reply."

Orders having been received for the army to retire to Fort George, the troops and boats were put in motion for that purpose. Fourteen boats were taken by the enemy. "The Indians and incorporated militia hung on the flanks and rear of our army throughout the march and picked up some stragglers."

On the 10th, General Dearborn in consequence of continued indisposition, resigned the command of the army to General Lewis. At this time the sick were so numerous that the effective force of the army was materially reduced. Several officers resigned in disgust; and the prospect of the campaign, a few weeks before so brilliant, was now obscured and cheerless.

The British Colonels Bishop and Warren, with about 400 men, availing themselves of the absence of the U. States' troops from Fort Erie,* crossed over to Black Rock, burnt the sailor's barracks, dismounted and spiked three 12 pounders, and sent off four cannon and a quantity of whiskey and salt. While the enemy were busied in securing their booty, General P. B. Porter, who had left Black Rock for Buffalo, on the appearance of the enemy, assembled a body of volunteers, a

* Lieutenant Colonel Preston, soon after taking possession, was ordered to join General Dearborn at Fort George.

few regulars and about 40 Indians, returned with his motly force and by a wise disposition and vigorous attack, succeeded after an action of twenty minutes in routing the invaders. They returned in confusion to their boats. Our men crowded upon their heels and with good aim had each several fair shots. Eight of the British were killed on the shore, and 16 made prisoners. Colonel Bishop was mortally wounded. The last boat off lost nearly every man on board. The enemy acknowledged a loss of 104 killed. We had but three killed and five wounded. The Indians behaved admirably well in the action, and shewed no disposition to scalp the dead enemy. After the British killed were collected and covered with boughs preparatory to interment, the Indians approached the spot and evinced their contempt with a gentle but disdainful kick of the foot.

On the evening of the 25th of June, a detachment of 570 men, infantry, artillery, riflemen and cavalry, under Lieut. Colonel Børstler, was ordered to march by the way of Queenstown to the Beaver Dams, distant about 15 miles from Fort George, for the purpose of dispersing a body of the enemy collected there. When within about two miles of the Beaver Dams, our detachment fell into an ambuscade, but soon drove the enemy some distance into the woods and then retired to a clear field and sent an express to Gen. Dearborn for a reinforcement. Lieut. Col. Børstler assured the general that he would defend himself until reinforced. A reinforcement of 300 men marched immediately under Col. Chrystie, but on arriving at Queenstown, Colonel Chrystie received authentic information that Lieutenant Colonel Børstler with his command

had surrendered to the enemy. Colonel Børstler's statement of this disastrous affair differs materially from the British account. He states that he defended himself until his ammunition was nearly exhausted, and that he was summoned by superior numbers. The enemy ascribe their success to the presence of mind of Lieut. Fitz Gibbon, who on reconnoitering Børstler's position and finding him too numerous to oppose with his small force, sent a summons for him to surrender in the name of Major De Haren. A court martial has honorably acquitted Lieut. Colonel Børstler, and have pronounced an opinion that he conducted on that occasion in a "brave, prudent, and officer like manner." Military men will nevertheless reiterate the enquiry of General Dearborn, "why it should have been deemed proper to remain several hours in a position surrounded with woods without risking a decisive action, or effecting a retreat, remains to be accounted for, as well as the project of waiting for a reinforcement from a distance of fifteen or sixteen miles."*

The British account of this affair does not admit that they had any killed. The American detachment lost about 25 killed, besides wounded.

Shortly after the loss of this detachment, General Dearborn received orders to *retire*† from the command

* See General Dearborn's letter to the Secretary of War, June 25, 1813.

† A warm and respectful address was presented to the General on the eve of his departure from Fort George, which fully evinced the regret of the army at the order. It was signed by all the principal officers. He replied, that "Obedience was the first duty of a soldier."

of the 9th military district. General Lewis having previously gone to Sackett's Harbor for the purpose of menacing Kingston, the command of the army at Fort George devolved on General Boyd. Com. Chauncey arrived at Sackett's Harbor the day after the repulse of the enemy in their attempt on that post. General Boyd was instructed to act on the defensive,* while Chauncey remained in port; which continued from the beginning of June to the latter end of July.

On the 30th of July the Secretary of War wrote to General Boyd as follows:

“The restriction put upon you with regard to the enemy, was but commensurate with their command of the lake. So long as they have wings and you had only feet; so long as they could be transported, supplied and reinforced, by water at will, common sense, as well as military principles, put you on the *defensive*. These circumstances changed, the reason of the rule

* The loss of the command of the lake in June, 1813, must be ascribed, in a great measure, to the inactivity of our troops at Fort George. On the 20th of June, General Dearborn wrote from Fort George, “that the enemy will endeavor to keep up such a force at or near the head of the lake, as to prevent any part of our force in this quarter, from joining or proceeding to Sackett's Harbor, for the purpose of attacking Kingston; and such is the state of the roads in this flat country, in consequence of continued rains, as to render any operations against the enemy extremely difficult without the aid of a fleet for the transportation of provisions, ammunition, and other necessary supplies. The whole of these embarrassments have resulted from a temporary loss of the command of the lake. The enemy has availed himself of the advantage, and forwarded reinforcements and supplies.”

changes with them; and it now becomes your business, in concert with the fleet, to harass and destroy the enemy, wherever you can find him. Of the competency of your force there can be no doubt, provided your estimate of him be but tolerably correct. Again, if, (as you say) you can beat him, do it without delay; and remember, that if you beat, you must destroy him. There is no excuse for a general who permits a beaten enemy to escape and rally. These remarks grow out of some recent events in your quarter, and require no explanation. It is the President's wish that you should communicate fully and freely with Brigadier General Williams. It is only by this kind of intercourse that the efforts of all can be united in promoting the public good."

Soon after the capture of Børstler's detachment, the enemy, emboldened by the supineness which reigned in the American camp, approached within a few miles of Fort George, and frequently showed themselves at the out posts. A mixed force of British and Indians attacked two of our pickets on the 8th of July. A small detachment of 39 men was immediately ordered to the support of the pickets. The bravery of Lieutenant Eldridge carried him too far. He penetrated into the woods where the British and Indians were laying in ambush in far superior numbers. His men were mostly soon cut to pieces; no mercy was shown to the wounded. They were horribly mutilated, scalped, their hearts taken out and otherwise disfigured. The gallant Eldridge was among the killed. It is said that British officers, were, on this occasion, painted like the Indians, with streaks of *red* and *green* around their eyes!

The enemy again attacked the pickets on the 17th. After a contest of one hour, occasionally severe, they were dispersed. They exhibited a force of 200 besides Indians. The American loss was trifling—only 3 or 4 being killed, and a few wounded. The loss of the British was comparatively great. Both parties fought with unusual ardor. Capt. Birdsall's riflemen were nearest the enemy in pursuit—and had many fine shots. Capt. Towson was wounded in the hand while voluntarily bearing Col. Scott's orders.

About this time Major Cyrenus Chapin, who had been made prisoner at the Beaver Dams, at the time of Børstler's surrender, arrived at Fort George with two boats, 16 British, and 28 American prisoners; the former of whom were taken in the following daring manner. At Burlington Heights, Major Chapin and 28 of his men were ordered to Kingston in charge of a guard of 16 British soldiers in two boats. When arrived off York, in the afternoon of the first day, the major gave a concerted signal for his men to rise and take the boats—which was instantly and successfully attempted. A British officer in one of the boats attempted to draw his sword; Major Chapin seized him by the neck and threw him on his back; two of the British soldiers drew their bayonets upon the major, who seizing both at the same instant, threw them on top of the officer and held all down together. In the mean while his men had succeeded in disarming the guard. Major Chapin then changed the direction of the boats and arrived safe at Fort George after rowing hard all night.

A few days before this adventure a scouting party was sent out from Ft. George in quest of Captain Ball.

an active and cruel commander of Indians in the British service. When they arrived at the six mile creek, sergeant James Rouse and two dragoons volunteered to go to a house where they suspected that Ball was concealed. They arrived at the house about 9 o'clock in the evening, within half a mile of a British picket. Having entered the house they were told that Ball was not within; sergeant Rouse, however, fired his pistol through a door that he could not break open, upon which Ball opened it and surrendered himself and guard, eight in number, prisoners. They were placed on horses, and carried 18 miles through the enemy's country to Fort George.

After this handsome partizan affair, Rouse was taken prisoner, and complaining to General Vincent of the ill treatment he met with from the Indians, was by him threatened to be sent to Quebec and hanged. Being put in prison, he escaped at the hazard of his life. He and one other American took to the woods and avoiding the settlements, without arms or food, finally reached the shore of Lake Erie below point Abino. Here they seized a British sentinel, with whose aid they crossed the lake and arrived at Buffalo much exhausted.

Commodore Chauncey being reinforced by the new ship Pike, sailed from Sackett's Harbor and arrived off Niagara on the evening of the 27th of July, where he received on board his fleet Colonel Scott with 250 infantry and a company of artillery under Captain Crane, for the purpose of surprising the British at Burlington Heights, where it was understood that they had a considerable deposit of provisions and stores. The fleet sailed for the head of the lake, but being retarded by

light or contrary winds did not come to anchorage before the evening of the 29th, when they found the enemy reinforced and too strongly entrenched for the force under Colonel Scott to hazard an attack. Commodore Chauncey therefore weighed and stood for York, where Colonel Scott landed his troops without opposition, and found several hundred barrels of flour and provisions in the public store houses, five pieces of cannon, eleven boats and a quantity of shot, shells and other stores, all of which were either destroyed or brought away, except a part of the flour which was generously distributed among the poor of the place.

After the return of the fleet to Niagara another expedition was immediately concerted. One thousand men were to embark on board the fleet, under the command of Brigadier General Williams, and to land at the head of the lake. The army at Fort George, under General Boyd, was to move in two columns against the enemy's front, while General Williams assailed his rear and cut off his retreat. But at the very moment when the troops were to have embarked, the enemy's fleet hove in sight. Commodore Chauncey weighed anchor and offered battle. Sir J. L. Yeo having the weather gage, kept at a respectful distance. On the night of the 9th of August, Commodore Chauncey lost two schooners in a gale; and on the succeeding night the Growler and Julia fell into the hands of the enemy. Shortly after these disasters, Com. Chauncey left the head of the lake, which necessarily kept the army at Ft. George on the defensive, and prevented the expedition against the enemy's forces at Burlington Heights. Sir J. L. Yeo went into Kingston and Com. Chauncey to Sackett's Harbor.

A body of volunteers, militia and Indians, having arrived at Fort George, and being impatient to see the enemy, a plan was concerted to cut off one of the British pickets. Accordingly on the morning of the 17th of August, about 300 volunteers and Indians under the command of Major Chapin, supported by 200 regulars, were detached to effect this object. A heavy rain prevented the surprize and capture of the picket; but a smart skirmish ensued which terminated much to the advantage of our detachment. Our Indians captured twelve of the British Indians and four whites; two of our Indians were killed and five wounded. The Indians conducted with great zeal and activity.* Several of their noted chiefs were engaged, among whom was the Farmers Brother, Red Jacket, and Henry O'Bail, (Cornplanter's son) who was educated at Philadelphia. Brigadier General Porter and Major Chapin were very active on this occasion.

At day break on the morning of the 24th, the enemy considerably reinforced from Kingston, attacked all the pickets, which retired pursued by his advanced guards. A skirmish ensued in the village of Newark. A captain of the 49th and several privates were taken. The British left 15 killed on the ground. It was the opinion of General Boyd that they brought their whole force into the field for the purpose of a general attack, but desisted on ascertaining the strength of his position.

* An Indian of the Seneca tribe while in Canada, entered a house and observing an elegant *Parisol made it his own*. After his return home he was seen strutting through the streets of Buffalo with it properly interposed between the rays of the sun and his tawny brow.

On the 20th of August, General Wilkinson arrived at Sackett's Harbor to take command of the central army. The hopes, expectations and good wishes of the nation followed him. His revolutionary services—his achievements under the daring Wayne, and the celerity and secrecy with which he captured the Spanish fort Charlotte at Mobile, inspired general confidence. "The reduction of Kingston by a direct attack or an indirect movement, embraced the primary object of his instructions."*

His means were ample; at least the number of troops at his disposal were superior to those of the enemy. Besides, the latter had a long line of defence assailable almost at every point from Montreal to Fort Erie, which necessarily distracted his attention; harrassed and weakened his forces, and gave decided advantages to the invader.

General Boyd was enclosed on the land sides of his defences at Fort George, by De Rottenburgh's army of inferior numbers. The question of naval superiority on Lake Ontario remained undecided.

General Wilkinson on his arrival at Sackett's Harbor called a council of war, at which were present Generals Lewis, Brown, Swartwout, and Commodore Chauncey, of whom he requested their sentiments on the following points, viz.

1st. To wait, in our present positions, a combat between the rival squadrons for the supremacy on the lake.

2d. To assemble a sufficient force at Fort George to

* See minutes of a council of war, holden at Sackett's Harbor, August 26, 1813, and published in the public papers in May, 1814.

cut up the enemy in that quarter, then to descend to this place, call the division from Champlain, incorporate the whole, and make a direct attack on Kingston.

3d. To concentrate all the troops on the lake in this vicinity, order the division on Champlain to feint upon Montreal, or carry a real attack against it should circumstances warrant, and then with the troops assembled here, to reduce Kingston and proceed against Montreal should the season permit: or

4th. To rendezvous the whole of the troops on the lake in this vicinity; and in cooperation with our squadron, to make a bold feint at Kingston, slip down the St. Lawrence, lock up the enemy in our rear to starve and surrender, or oblige him to follow us without artillery, baggage or provisions—eventually to lay down his arms, to sweep the St. Lawrence of armed craft, and in concert with the division under Major General Hampton to take possession of Montreal.

After duly considering the foregoing propositions, they decided,

1st. It is not necessary to await the result of a conflict between the hostile squadrons, as the operation of the army in the event of the adoption of either of these propositions, will not depend on a cooperation with the fleet, further than to secure the passage of the troops into the St. Lawrence.

2d. The second proposition is rejected, because the object appears to be a partial one, as far as relates to the proposed operation against the division in the vicinity of Fort George. The loss of time also would probably render it too late to carry an attack against Kingston this campaign.

3d. This proposition is also considered a partial op-

eration, and one for which the force on this lake might possibly prove inadequate.

4th. The fourth and last meets the approbation of the council. The object appears feasible—and, if accomplished, the upper country must fall of course; for it is incapable of subsisting the enemy's force for any length of time, and the possession of Montreal will certainly destroy the line of communication between the upper and lower provinces. The feint on Kingston is reserved for future consideration.

Sir J. L. Yeo sailed from Kingston for the head of the lake about the 22d of August. Chauncey followed him on the 30th. General Wilkinson reached Fort George on the 5th of September. The same day the secretary of war arrived at Sackett's Harbor.

There were at this period, 4500 regulars and 1000 militia under General Hampton, at Burlington, (Vt.) This corps crossed lake Champlain and advanced to Odeltown early in September. On the 25th it marched to Chateauga, to hold itself in readiness to act in concert with the central division. In the mean time, Col. Clark was directed by General Hampton to amuse the enemy and divert his attention by a partisan warfare.

Two thousand militia were ordered to assemble at Champion, 25 miles northeast of S. Harbor.

General Lewis commanded at Sackett's Harbor; his force amounted to about 2000 men.

The army at Fort George was about 5000 strong.

Reinforcements of regulars, detached militia and volunteers were on their way to different points of the frontiers.

Sir J. L. Yeo made his appearance off Niagara on the 3d of September. Chauncey at this time occupied

the Harbor. It was not till the 7th that the commodore was favored with a breeze to stand towards the British fleet. For 24 hours the two fleets continued to maneuver within a short distance of each other without firing a shot—The British uniformly on the retreat, and the American in pursuit. Adverse winds, or a mutual disinclination to engage, prevented their coming to blows. On the 17th Chauncey found himself off Sackett's Harbor—having lost track of Sir James; he, however, continued in search of his wily antagonist till the 27th, when he closed with him between Niagara and York. The wind blew a gale from the southeast. Commodore Chauncey in the Pike sustained successfully the brunt of the action. Having shot away the mizzen and main top masts of Sir James' own ship, the latter as usual escaped to the head of the lake and anchored close in shore. Chauncey pursued as far as he thought prudent on account of the gale which threw a prodigious sea on shore. He could readily have taken a brig and schooner which struck as he passed them—but having his eyes fixed on heavier game, he lost the whole. Yet this action appeared to decide the dominion of the lake for the remainder of the year. Chauncey in this engagement had five killed and about 20 wounded. Sir James' ship was much cut up. This action of itself is sufficient to establish a reputation of bravery for Com. Chauncey.

About the 20th of September General Wilkinson received a proposition from Gen. P. B. Porter, Cyrenus Chapin and Joseph M'Clure, requesting, in case of the withdrawal of the regular troops from Fort George, permission to raise by the first of October, a volunteer force of from 1000 to 1200 men exclusive of Indians, to

be furnished with four pieces of field artillery, arms, ammunition, provisions and pay, while in actual service.

At a council of war holden on the 29th of September, at which were present all the general and field officers then at Fort George, General Wilkinson proposed,

1st. Shall this post (Fort George) be strengthened and garrisoned for defence against the British division in its vicinity ? or

2dly. Shall the place be razed and abandoned ?

The council, with the exception of one voice, answered the first question in the negative, and the second in the affirmative.

However, the general was instructed to close with P. B. Porter's propositions, and leave a sufficient number of regulars for the garrison of Fort George and Niagara, in all about eight hundred effectives under Colonel Scott.

The embarkation of the troops commenced on the 26th; but owing to unfavorable winds, it was not until the 30th that it was completed, when the flotilla of batteaux containing the central army, left Fort George for the St. Lawrence. General Wilkinson was detained by necessary arrangements till the 2d of October, when he embarked and arrived at Sackett's Harbor on the 4th of October. "He immediately visited the Secretary of War, in company with Generals Lewis and Brown, and in the presence of these officers remonstrated freely and warmly against making an attack on Kingston—urging the propriety of passing that post and of going directly to Montreal.

"The Secretary of War differed from General Wilkinson in opinion, but thought his objections worthy of consideration, and proposed a meeting on the day following for that purpose.

“ The meeting took place accordingly, when General Wilkinson presented the paper marked No. 1. That marked No. 2, was presented by the Secretary, and the opinion with which it closes was adopted as that which should regulate the movements of the army.”

Opinions of General Wilkinson.

No. 1.

Reasons for attacking Kingston *anterior* to a descent upon Montreal.

1st. We shall capture a garrison of 800 or 1000, and demolish a strong hold of the enemy.

2d. We shall destroy his naval depot and magazines of every species.

3d. We shall by this operation diminish his force, destroy his resources, and place the division at the head of the lake, under De Rottenburg, in great difficulty and distress ; and

4th. We shall destroy every naval resource, and of consequence prevent the building, equipping, and even repairing a single vessel.

Against this attack it may be urged,

1st. That the reduction of the place may cost more time than we can calculate on.

2d. It may encumber us with wounded and sick ; and

3d. It is possible the British squadron may as heretofore elude Commodore Chauncey, and find us before Kingston, or overtake us on the St. Lawrence.

In the first place, from the lateness of the season, the loss of a few days may expose us to the autumnal rains, and jeopardize the chief object of the campaign. In the second place, our own force will be diminished, and our movements retarded ; and

In the third place, the chief object of the campaign, *the capture of Montreal*, will be utterly defeated, and our own army subjected to great difficulties, losses and perils. Submitted to the honorable the Secretary of War.

JA. WILKINSON.

Opinions of the Secretary of War.

No. 2.

1st. The Niagara division will probably arrive here in a day or two.

2d. The weather is yet good, and the lake navigable by scows and boats.

3d. The enemy's main force is in the neighborhood of Fort George, and his fleet at the head of the lake.

4th. The garrison at Kingston does not exceed 800 or 1000 men.

5th. If we effect a landing at M'Pherson's farm, on the eastern side of Kingston, a point may be seized, which will command the town, the forts and the harbor, and within seven hours after the landing is effected, a sufficient battery may be erected and in operation.

6th. Nine and twelve pounders will be sufficient for burning block houses, &c. and may be dragged by men.

7th. The time necessary to reduce the place will not exceed a single day, and of course will not materially interfere, on that account, with our object below.

8th. The loss we may sustain can only be conjectured. Judging from that at Fort George, when the enemy were more numerous, it will be inconsiderable.

9th. The advantages of taking Kingston are two: you sever the enemy's line of communication, and you expel him from his only secure harbor.

The premises assumed under the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th and 5th heads may change, and our conclusions with them. The only safe decision, therefore, is, that if the British fleet shall not escape Commodore Chauncey and get into Kingston harbor; if the garrison of that place be not largely reinforced, and if the weather be such as will allow us to navigate the lake securely, *Kingston* shall be our first object, otherwise, we shall go directly to *Montreal*,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GENERAL WILKINSON AND
THE SECRETARY OF WAR.*

ON the 18th of October Gen. Wilkinson wrote to General Armstrong as follows :

“The diminution of our force by disease and various casualties, and more especially, the uncertainty of the period of our movement against Montreal, render it necessary, in my judgment, that you should revoke the order of march you have given to Maj. Gen. Hampton, and that he should be directed to march for Morrisville, as rapidly as may be consistent with the health of his troops. This proposition is founded on the presumption, that we make the reduction of Kingston and the conquests of the upper provinces the first objects of our operations.”

War Department, October 19, 1813.

SIR—I received your letter of yesterday, and should have answered it more promptly, but that business of the south and west required my immediate attention.

When on the 4th instant you returned from Fort George, we had the prospect of a speedy concentration of our forces at this point; the Niagara division had sailed on the 30th ult. the enemy's principal force occu-

* We think the reader will find in this correspondence a full developement of the causes which produced the failure of the campaign of 1813. The saddle ought to be placed on the right horse.

pied a cantonment between Lakes Erie and Ontario; his fleet was at the head of the lake, and his garrison at Kingston, reduced to *seven* or *eight* hundred men. *Under these circumstances*, it was no doubt wise to decide as we did, that our first attack should be carried against that place; but do these circumstances any longer exist? The expected concentration is but now effected, (18th of October) a reinforcement of 1,500 men has been thrown into Kingston; the British fleet has got into port there, and our force, from disease and other casualties, is according to your statement, diminished and diminishing. To reinstate and augment this, it is now proposed to order General Hampton from his present position at Chataugea, to Morrisville, on the St. Lawrence. These places are distant upwards of one hundred miles. A march of such length at this season of the year, and in the present condition of the roads, loaded as he is with a train of artillery, with the means of subsistence, and with tents and baggage, cannot be performed under fifteen days, to which must be added the time necessary for giving the order, for making the arrangements preliminary to such a movement, and for making also the subsequent one for Morrisville to the mouth of the Gaunanoqui river; all of which would probably protract the moment of junction till the 15th of November.

Admonished as we are by the storms which have assailed us for ten days past, and which have not yet ceased, I cannot but think that a period so late would of itself be fatal to the project.

Other circumstances lead to the same conclusion. Beginning our operations from the mouth of the Gaunanoqui river, we shall have a march of twenty four

miles to Kingston, and through a country covered with woods, destitute of inhabitants, and pervious only by two roads, which, without any interruption from the enemy, are represented as nearly impassable at present. This movement (unlike that originally projected)* cannot be made without the aid of horses, and a less number of these than six hundred,† including the 2d regiment of dragoons, is, I understand, deemed insufficient. Now these must be fed, and their provender drawn from *this place*, as the country between Gravelly Point and Putneyville, affords none, and interposes a swampy desert which shuts us out from the supplies of Rossie and Rayville, &c. An important question arises here, can the necessary forage be obtained from this neighborhood? The quarter master general says "it cannot, that it must be carted from Lowville, (40 miles distant) and transported hence by water." These facts, on your plan, menace our operations against Kingston with a delay, which would probably surround us with all the embarrassments of a Canadian winter, and extinguish every hope of grasping the other, the safer and the greater object below. I call it the safer and greater object, because—

At Montreal, you find the weaker place, and the smaller force to encounter. At Montreal, you meet a fresh, unexhausted, efficient reinforcement of four thousand men. At Montreal, you approach your own resources, and establish between you and them an easy and expeditious intercourse. At Montreal, you occu-

* A descent at M'Pherson's farm, two miles and a half below Kingston.

† Forage for this number was required by the general.

py a point which must be gained in carrying your attacks home to the purpose of the war, and which if seized *now*, will save one campaign. At Montreal, you hold a position which completely severs the enemy's line of operations; which shuts up the Ottawa as well as the St. Lawrence against him, and which, while it restrains all below, withers and perishes all above itself.

These, general, are the thoughts which present themselves, on your proposition, and which I understand as abandoning, for this campaign, the proposed attack on Montreal. I am entirely disposed to listen to all that can be said on the other side of the question, but at present, the reasons assigned, leave me no doubt of the policy of pursuing, promptly and firmly,* the plan already indicated, and which, besides the approbation of the President, has received the sanction of a council of war.

I am, very respectfully,

Sir, your most obedient servant,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major General Wilkinson.

H. Q. Sackett's Harbor, October 19, 1813.

DEAR SIR—I was about to embark for Grenadier Island, when I received your letter of this morning, which I will endeavor to answer; my very feeble condition and the want of time for reflection, disqualify me from doing full justice to my opinions.

You will recollect that in my letter of the 6th of Aug. I proposed to take Kingston, as preliminary to an at-

* This refers to the preceding plan, approved by the President on the 23d July, and communicated to Gen. Wilkinson on the 5th of August.

tack on Montreal; you offered a different opinion in your letter of the 8th, and on my arrival here, I submitted the alternative to a council of war, which decided in favor of your plan, to leave Kingston untouched, and proceed directly against Montreal; but ulterior considerations and *information* have induced me to adhere to my original plan.

Permit me, previous to the discussion of the grounds of my opinion, to submit a few incidental remarks.

It is extremely doubtful what may be the present force of the enemy at Kingston, and very uncertain how much our own force may have been diminished by diseases, and the casualties attending our movements.

From the retreat of Proctor before Gen. Harrison, and the information received from Col. Scott, I think it probable that De Rottenburg, with the effectives of his division, has gone to reinforce Proctor, and that the troops which have descended to Kingston consisted only of the sick of that division.

My idea of recalling General Hampton to reinforce us, was produced by an alarm with respect to the insufficiency of our force, which I found spreading; and the direction which I suggested was founded on your own proposition* of the 13th instant, at which time I understood you to offer the opinion, that the march from Hampton's encampment to Morrisville might be accomplished in six days, and my own opinion is, that by

* What is here called a *proposition* was but a question, *whether the march could be performed in six days?* General W. answered in the negative, and advised that General Hampton should be ordered to go on to Cognawaga.

disembarrassing himself of his artillery and its attirail, perhaps he might be able to make the march in that time, or a few days more.

My reasons for preferring the attack on Kingston to that of Montreal, are these :

By the reduction of that place, we conquer a province, not only of great importance to the enemy, but a valuable acquisition to ourselves ; we capture or destroy four thousand of his best troops ; we put an end to the Indian war, and by the destruction of his naval force, establish our command of the lake, and permit a respectable part of our naval force to be employed elsewhere.

On the contrary, leave Kingston, its garrison, and the British squadron in our rear, and proceed to Montreal, none of those important objects will be gained. The enemy will remain in undisturbed possession of the province, at liberty to exercise his enterprises against this frontier at discretion ; for it is a fact, however opinions may vary, the resources of the province are adequate to the subsistence of his army. His naval superiority on the lake will be reestablished by the opening of the spring, the Indian depredations may be encouraged and continued ; or should he prefer it, he may, on the opening of the campaign, leaving sir James Yeo triumphant on the lake, with a suitable garrison for the protection of Kingston, descend the St. Lawrence with his main force and fall upon our rear, while we shall be engaged in front, admitting we succeed in establishing ourselves at Montreal.

Having passed Kingston, the fortifications at Prescott may present such an obstacle to our further progress, as to compel us to land and reduce it by force ;

an operation which may consume more time than can be spared at this advanced season. I speak conjecturally, but should we surmount every obstacle in descending the river, we shall advance upon Montreal ignorant of the force arrayed against us, and in case of misfortune, having no retreat, the army must surrender at discretion.

I will barely add, that as the winter commences at Montreal by the 20th of November, should we be delayed on the route by any untoward incidents, our embarrassments and perils will be greatly multiplied.

I offer these results of my frail judgment with a conscientious regard to the public good. I am bigotted to no project, and therefore am willing to yield my own judgment to that of others.

Personal considerations would make me prefer a visit to Montreal to the attack of Kingston; but before I abandon this attack, which by my instructions I am ordered to make, it is *necessary to my justification*, that you should by the *authority of the president*, direct the operation of the army under my command, *particularly against Montreal*. With my earnest wishes for the successful issue of whatever may be undertaken, I am, dear sir, with much respect and esteem, truly yours.

JA. WILKINSON.

The honorable John Armstrong, secretary of war.

N. B. All the objections which apply to the landing below Kingston may be obviated *by* landing above it. My sole motive for suggesting the idea of landing below, was to prevent the *garrison's escape*. If there be a deficiency of forage on our part, it is the fault of the quarter master general, who was instructed as early as

August to lay in a supply of 12,000 bushels for the subsistence of the cavalry. JA. WILKINSON.

Hon. J. Armstrong, secretary of war.

War Department, October 20, 1813.

SIR,

I received your letter of yesterday by Major Lee. You appear to have written it under an impression that your instruction of August last made a direct attack upon Kingston unavoidable. A copy of these instructions is before me, and in the last paragraph of them we find a summary of their substance. It is as follows: "After this exposition, it is unnecessary to add, that in conducting the present campaign, you will make *Kings-ton* your principal object, and that you will *choose*, as circumstances may indicate, between a *direct* and *indirect* attack upon that post." Both modes of attack are slightly detailed in these orders, and a preference given to the latter, but without at all infringing your right of choice or in any degree lessening your responsibility. *Nor am I now at liberty to change the ground of these instructions*, since the only effect of this would be, to *substitute my opinion for yours*. The former has not however been withheld; it has been given freely and fully, and is yet unshaken by any consideration present to my mind.

As we are now about to part, it may be proper that I should subjoin to what I have said in favor of a movement on Montreal, a short statement of my objections to a direct attack on Kingston.

1st. If its garrison consists of *four thousand* of the best troops of the enemy (as you suggest) your attack will fail.

2d. If your attack fails, your retreat is impracticable.

3d. Your descent must necessarily be made above or below the town, on the water's edge, and within a short distance of your object. If made *below* the town, your fleet cannot cover it: if made *above* the town, it must be done in presence of the enemy, and within stroke of his fleet, and that he will think the object sufficient to justify the risk cannot be doubted. Besides, an approach on this side, however successful, leaves to the enemy the means of escaping.

4th. The experiment already made of the lake navigation is not encouraging. Though pressed by no other enemy than the weather, the army has not been able to reach Grenadier Island, but in broken order and with considerable loss. On your plan they have eighteen other miles to go on the open lake, and much of this distance under the eye of the British fleet. Is it probable that our *scows* will be able to navigate this remaining distance (at a season and under circumstances so unfavorable) in better order, or with less loss?

These are the best thoughts I can offer, and it only remains to add to them my best wishes for your army and for yourself.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

Major General Wilkinson.

The progress of the army from Fort George and Sackett's Harbor to Grenadier Island was greatly retarded by unfavorable weather, and it was not till the last of October that the rear divisions joined the main body. The British fleet had not dared to show itself since the 28th of September.

General Wilkinson's Journal.

October 21st. Boisterous weather; left Sackett's Harbor; at night arrived off Grenadier Island.

October 22d. Called for a return of the troops on the island; found a large body to be still in the rear, wrecked or stranded; returned in quest of them, and to order from the harbor a supply of winter clothing and shoes for the troops on the island, who were nearly destitute; observed at night, on our way up, many fires on different points of the coast; wind so high could not call at them; reached the harbor at midnight.

October 23d. Orders given for the shipment of the clothing; many stragglers picked up and embarked for Grenadier Island; Colonel Coles arrived with two hundred men of the 12th regiment, and sailed for the same place; the Growler equipped, manned, furnished with a skipper, and sent to Oswego for Colonels Randolph and Scott (who were expected at that place) and as many men as she could carry. We sailed for Grenadier Island; arrived about eight o'clock at night off the island; weather blustering, with frequent rain. All this time the General's illness continued without abatement.

October 24th. Hard rains with heavy gales. Still at anchor off the island.

October 25th. The General landed; and measures were immediately taken to seize every pause of the prevailing storms to slip the flotilla into the St. Lawrence by small detachments. In these deceitful momentary calms we found it impossible to traverse in safety the arm of the lake to Gravelly Point, though distant only nine miles. In the several attempts made, many boats were driven ashore, and much provis-

ion and clothing lost. French Creek nearly opposite the point where the enemy expected we should land to attack Kingston, was made the general rendezvous of the troops, and Brigadier General Brown ordered on to take the chief command. The expedition of the Growler was so far successful, that on the 31st Colonel Randolph, after a perilous voyage, reached Grenadier Island with two hundred and thirty men of the 20th regiment. On the 2d November Commodore Chauncey, by concert, entered the St. Lawrence, fell down nearly to French Creek, and took a position to command the north and south channels. In the evening of 1st of November our vigilant enemy having observed, even amid the storms, our movement and position at French Creek, attacked the detachment at that place under General Brown, about sun set, with a squadron of two brigs and two schooners, with many boats loaded with infantry for landing, should their cannonade make a sufficient impression. Very soon Captain M'Pherson of the light artillery erected a battery of 3 18 pounders, and returned their fire with such spirit and effect, that they fell down to a harbor below, beyond its range. Next morning the attack was renewed and repelled and one of the brigs was with great difficulty towed off by the squadron, which put into Kingston Channel behind Grand Island. We lost two killed and four wounded. The enemy were supposed to have suffered severely, from the evident disabled state of their brig, and the deliberate and well directed fire of the gallant Captain M'Pherson.

November 3d. The rear of the army, with the General more and more sick, sailed for the general rendezvous, where the chief part arrived in the evening. The Gen-

eral was carried on shore and lodged in a tent, his malady increasing in violence.

November 4th. This day was devoted to final arrangements for the sailing of the flotilla. Weather moderating.

November 5th. Charming day. The flotilla got under way, and without accident fell down and landed early in the night below Morrisville. The General suspecting he would be followed by the enemy, as in the morning his course had been discovered by three of their look out gun boats and a gig, and knowing that two of their armed sloopers could jeopardize his movement, gave orders for the flotilla to pass Prescott, then seven miles below him, in the course of the night. But some confusion occurred arising from the novelty of the movement, and the order was countermanded.

November 6th. This morning the health of the General appeared better; he ordered the flotilla to descend to a point within three miles of Prescott; and the day being fine, got into his gig, and proceeded to reconnoiter the place. In the mean time the powder and fixed ammunition were debarked and placed in carts, to be transported by land, under cover of the night, beyond the enemy's batteries. As soon as the General returned, orders were issued for the debarkation of every man (except so many as were necessary to navigate the boats) who were directed to march under cover of the night, to save useless exposure to the enemy's cannon, to a bay two miles below Prescott; and arrangements were made at the same time for the passage of the flotilla by that place, the superintendancy of which devolved upon Brigadier General Brown, the general offi-

cer of the day. About 8 o'clock P. M. we had a heavy fog, that it was believed we could pass the British fortress unobserved, and orders were accordingly given for the army to march, and the flotilla to get under way. The General in his gig proceeded ahead, followed by his passage boat and family; but a sudden change of the atmosphere exposed his passage boat to the garrison of the enemy, and near fifty twenty four pound shot were fired at her without effect, while the column on land, discovered by the gleam of their arms, were assailed with shot and shells without injury. General Brown, on hearing the firing, judiciously halted the flotilla until the moon had set, when it got in motion, but was perceived by the enemy, who opened upon it, and continued their fire from front to rear for the space of three hours; and yet, out of more than three hundred boats, not one was touched, and only one man was killed, and two were wounded; and before 10 next morning the whole of the flotilla (except two vessels) reached the place of rendezvous. About noon this day Colonel King, Adjutant General of the army of General Hampton, arrived and waited on the commander in chief, whom he informed that he had been to Sackett's Harbor with a despatch from General Hampton to the secretary of war; that he had no communication written or verbal, from Major General Hampton to him (the commander in chief,) but that not finding the secretary of war at Sackett's Harbor, he had thought proper, on his return, to call for any communication he (General Wilkinson) might have to make to General Hampton. The General had intended, in the course of this day to send an express to General Hampton, with an order to him to form a junction of his division with the corps de-

scending the St. Lawrence, and availed himself of the opportunity, presented by Colonel King, to send the order.

November 7th. The General having been exposed to the open air all last night, in consequence found himself ill. In passing Prescott, two of our largest vessels loaded with provisions, artillery and ordnance stores, either through cowardice or treachery, had been run into the river near Ogdensburgh, and opposite Prescott. The enemy kept up so constant a cannonade on them, that we found it difficult, and lost half a day, to get them out. We perceived the militia in arms at Johnson, directly opposite us, and several pieces of field artillery in motion. Understanding that the coast below was lined with posts of musketry and artillery at every narrow pass of the river, Colonel Macomb was detached about one o'clock with the elite corps of about 1200 men, to remove these obstructions, and the General got under way about half past three o'clock. Four or five miles below we entered the first rapids of the river, and soon after passing them, two pieces of light artillery, which had not been observed by Colonel Macomb, opened a sharp fire upon the General's passage boat, but without any further effect than cutting away some of the rigging. Lieut. Col. Eustis, with a party of our light gun barges came within shot of the pieces of the enemy, and a cannonade ensued without injury on either side. In the mean time Maj. Forsyth, who was in the rear of the elite of Col. Macomb, landed his riflemen, advanced upon the enemy's guns, and had his fire drawn by a couple of videts, posted in his route, on which their pieces were precipitately carried off. The General came to at dusk about six miles below the town of Hamilton,

where he received a report from Col. Macomb, who had routed a party at a block house about two miles below, and captured an officer.

November 8th. This morning the flotilla fell down to a contraction of the river at a point called "Whitehouse," where the dragoons were assembled to be crossed. Brigadier Gen. Brown was ordered this morning to reinforce Colonel Macomb with his brigade, and to take the command; and the whole day and following night were devoted to transporting the dragoons. About noon this day we received advice that 2 armed schooners and a body of the enemy in batteaux, estimated at 1000 or 1500 men, had descended the river from Kingston and landed at Prescott; that they had immediately sent a flag across the river to Ogdensburgh and demanded the delivery of all public property there, under the penalty of burning the town. Not long after, information was received that the enemy had reembarked at Prescott in their batteaux, and were following us with seven gun boats.

November 9th. This morning very early the enemy menaced our rear, and a slight skirmish took place between our riflemen and a party of their militia and Indians, in which we had one man killed, and the enemy were driven back. The cavalry, with four pieces of light artillery, under the command of Capt. M^rPherson were attached to the command of Brig. Gen. Brown, and he was ordered to march to clear the coast below us as far as a point near the head of the "long saut." The rapidity of the current obliged us to halt the flotilla several hours, to enable Gen. Brown to make good his march in time to cover our movement. During this period the enemy frequently threatened our rear, but

never indicated an intention to make a serious attack. About three o'clock P. M. the flotilla got under way and came to, about five o'clock, at the yellow house, having floated near eleven miles in two hours, where we encamped for the night.

November 10th. This morning the following order was issued:—

“MORNING GENERAL ORDERS.

“*Head Quarters, Tuttle's Bay, Nov. 10, 1813.*

“General Brown will prosecute his march with the troops yesterday under his command, excepting two pieces of artillery and the 2d dragoons, who with all the well men of the other brigades, except a sufficient number to navigate the boats, are to march under the orders of Brig. Gen. Boyd. This precaution is enjoined by regard to the safety of the men in passing the *longue saut*; and as this rapid is long and dangerous, the general earnestly requests the commanding officers of regiments and corps to examine the boats and see them properly fitted, in order to avoid accidents as much as possible. Brigadier general Boyd will take the necessary precaution to prevent the enemy who hangs on our rear from making an advantageous attack and if attacked is to turn about and beat them. The boats are to resume the station assigned them in the original order respecting the flotilla, and for this commanding officers of regiments and brigades will be held responsible. The movement of yesterday was a reproach to the service. The flotilla will come to today at Barnharts, near Crab Island, and two guns from the front will be the signal for landing. In case of an attack in force beyond all expectation, the corps under Brig. Gens. Boyd and Brown are to cooperate with each

other promptly and with decision. The general officer of the day will strictly attend and see that the flotilla puts off and moves in the prescribed order, and will arrest any officer who presumes to deviate therefrom."

Brigadier General Brown marched, and about noon was engaged by a party of the enemy near a block-house on the saut, erected to harrass our flotilla in its descent. About the same time the enemy were observed to be advancing on our rear, and their galley and gun boats hove in sight, approached our flotilla then at shore and began to cannonade it. The slender structure of our gun barges made it impossible for them to resist the long 24 pounder of the enemy's galley; this obliged the General to order two 18 pounders to be run on shore and formed in battery, a single shot from which gave such an alarm to the enemy's vessels that they retired up the river accompanied by their troops. But these slight operations so far wasted the day that our pilots were afraid to enter the saut (a continued rapid of 8 miles) with the flotilla; we therefore fell down within two or three miles of the head of it and came to for the night. By this time the General had become so extremely ill as to be unable to set up, and was confined to his bed in a small birth under the quarter deck of his passage boat.

November 11th. Having heard the firing of the cannon yesterday between Gen. Brown and the enemy, being unapprised of the result, it became necessary that we should hear from him before we committed ourselves to the saut, which allows no retreat, no landing, no turning to the right or left but where the impetuosity of the current impels. About 10 or 11 o'clock, A. M. the commander in chief received advices from Gen. Brown

that he had forced the enemy to retire before him, and had arrived near the foot of the "saut." Orders were immediately given for the flotilla to prepare to sail, and for Gen. Boyd and his command to commence their march, when some firing took place from the gun boats, and a report was brought to the commander in chief that the enemy was advancing in column; on this he ordered Gen. Boyd to attack them, and the flotilla was directed not to leave the shore. But the report was soon after contradicted. A variety of reports respecting their movements and countermovements were after this successively brought before the General, which impressed him with the conviction that the enemy had determined to attack his rear as soon as the flotilla should put off and the troops commence their march; he resolved to anticipate them. He therefore sent Col. Swift of the engineers, with instructions to Brig. Gen. Boyd, who had been directed by the order of the preceding day to take command of the detachment on shore, to form that detachment into three columns, to advance upon the enemy, to endeavor to out flank them, and to take their artillery. Soon after this, the action commenced, and for the numbers engaged was extremely warm and bloody for upwards of two hours, during which time, in open space and fair combat, the raw undisciplined troops of the United States braved, and frequently drove the best troops of the British army. Descriptions of battles have become too subservient to the gratification of personal vanity and the acquisition of popular applause; yet every man who has taken part in a great action must know that there is nothing more difficult than to do justice to the merits of a battle in all its parts, where it is hard to find two officers, unless

fighting side by side, who agree in opinion as to the propriety of measures and the conduct of men. The fortunes of this day were various; sometimes one line, sometimes the other giving way. Unfortunately, during the shiftings of the action, by the death of Lt. Smith, a young officer of the highest promise, the enemy got possession of a field piece, the only trophy they obtained. It is difficult to speak of the precise numbers engaged on either side, because the detachment under Gen. Boyd consisted of an indefinite number of his own, Covington's and Swartwout's brigades, ordered from on board the boats to lighten them, and to save the hazard of the men's lives in descending the saut. Neither Covington nor Swartwout were obliged to have taken part in the action, with this detachment; yet they both entered the field, taking command of that part of it which belonged to their respective brigades, where they exhibited the same courageous conduct which distinguished Gen. Boyd on the field; and to the great loss of the service Brigadier General Covington received a mortal wound when encouraging and leading on his detachment. The numbers engaged on our side could not have exceeded sixteen or seventeen hundred men, while those of the enemy are reckoned, by spectators, at from one to two thousand; but it is probable did not exceed 1,500, consisting, as we are informed of detachments of the 49th, 84th, and 104th, the voltigeurs, and Glengarian regiments.

With respect to the courage displayed by our officers, it would be useless to enter into details, since they all manifested in their respective stations equal intrepidity. The names of the meritorious dead and wounded will be recorded in another place. The firing ceased by com-

mon consent about 4 o'clock P. M. our troops were formed in battallia in front of the enemy, who were also in line, and they separated, the enemy to their camp and we to our boats. The troops being much exhausted it was considered most convenient that they should embark, and that the dragoons with the artillery should proceed by land. The embarkation took place without the smallest molestation from the enemy, and the flotilla made a harbor near the head of the saut, on the opposite shore. The views of the American and British commanders were on this occasion precisely opposite. The first being bound by the instructions of his government and the most solemn obligations of duty to precipitate his descent of the St. Lawrence by every practicable means, and the last by duties equally imperious to retard, and if possible to prevent such descent. If then he found himself victorious on this day, it was certainly in his power to have effected one or the other object; and as he made no attempt to effect either it follows incontestibly that he had no fair ground on which to claim a victory.

November 12th. The flotilla sailed early this morning and passed down the saut without discovering either the boats or troops of the enemy, and arrived in the course of the forenoon, at Barnharts, where the commanding general received a letter from Major General Hampton, by the hands of Colonel Atkinson, his inspector general, which blasted all his hopes and destroyed every prospect of the campaign. A council of war was called upon the receipt of this communication, which was submitted to their consideration, whereupon the council determined that the conduct of Major General Hampton, in refusing to join his division to the

troops descending the St. Lawrence to carry an attack against Montreal, rendered it expedient to leave the left bank of St. Lawrence, and to remove the troops to French Mills, on Salmon river; and on the 13th of November this recommendation was accordingly carried into effect; ample time having been given to the enemy to have tried a second action, if they had dared to run the hazard.

Council of War, holden this 12th day of November, 1813, near Cornwall in Upper Canada.

PRESENT,

MAJOR GENERAL LEWIS, *President.*

BRIGADIER GENERALS BOYD,

BROWN,

SWARTWOUT,

PORTER,

COLS. MACOMB, *com'g Elite of the Army,*

SWIFT, *Chief Eng'r Army of U. S.*

WALBACH, *Adj't General.*

Major General Wilkinson, commander in chief of the army destined for the attack of Montreal, submitted the correspondence between Gen. Hampton and himself--Whereupon he proposes for their consideration and opinion the following questions:—

Question 1st. Major General Hampton having declined to form a junction of his division consisting of about four thousand men, with the corps under the immediate command of Major General Wilkinson, for the attack of the said city of Montreal: Shall the troops now present which after the losses incident to the movement from Sackett's Harbor and the action of yesterday cannot be estimated at more than six thousand men proceed to the said attack? or,

Question 2d. In case this force should be deemed insufficient to carry the said attack into successful execution—What is the alternative in the judgment of the council to be adopted?

The council named in the preceding document met agreeably to order, the two questions were submitted by Major General Lewis.—On the first question the council are unanimously of opinion that in consequence of the statements made by the commander in chief, the attack upon Montreal should be abandoned for the present season.

On the second question the council are unanimously of opinion that the army now near Cornwall should be immediately crossed to the American shore for taking up winter quarters. The French Mills afford in the opinion of the council an eligible situation for winter quarters.

(Signed)

J. B. WALBACH,
Adjutant General,

J. G. SWIFT,
Col. Chief Engineers,
ALEX. MACOMB,

Col. com'g the Elite of the Army,

M. PORTER,
R. SWARTWOUT,

JAC. BROWN,
JNO. P. BOYD,

Brig. Generals,
MORGAN LEWIS,

President.

A true copy from the original,

C. J. NOURSE, *Capt. and A. D. C.*

GEN. BOYD'S ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE AT CHRYSLER'S
FIELD.

H. Q. 3d mil'y district, N. York, April 29, 1815.

The Hon. Secretary at War.

SIR—In justice to myself and the troops I had the honor to lead at the battle of Chrysler's Field, I deem it proper, even at this late hour, to report an impartial statement of that event.

The public has misapprehended my situation and made me undeservedly responsible for events that occurred under the commander in chief, and my reputation may perhaps have suffered for disasters which could not be attributable to me.

At the commencement of the campaign, whilst preparing to leave Fort George, even at Sackett's Harbor, and down to the moment of leaving Grenadier Island, I was kept in ignorance of the pending expedition and of the mode in which it was to be effected. Afterwards, while descending the St. Lawrence, the frequent indisposition of the two Generals often threw the command on me, without the possession of any of those facts relative to the object of our movements or the situation and strength of the enemy, so important for the execution of my duties.

On the 9th inst. General Brown, the elite corps and the dragoons (who had joined us and crossed over) moved by land on the Canada shore, the residue of the army embarked and proceeded by water; the whole rendezvoused at Chrysler's Field at 2 o'clock. Late at night, without having had any direction of the order of landing, or any knowledge of the relative situation of the troops, a verbal order from the commander in chief suddenly informed me, that in consequence of the ex-

treme ill health of himself and Gen. Lewis, both being confined to their boats, the command on shore devolved on me, and that the enemy's gun boats and a body of troops by land were approaching our rear. Arrangements were immediately made for their reception.

Early next morning (10th) conformably to the commander in chief's order, Gen. Brown was detached with a strong portion of the army and directed to pursue his course down the river to dislodge some militia, supposed to be intercepting the route to Cornwall. It was my decided opinion that the army should not be detached. I did not express this to Gen. Wilkinson, for my counsel was seldom or never required.

The rear guard, consisting of parts of the 1st, 2d, and 4th brigades, a squadron of dragoons and two pieces of artillery under the command of Brig. Gen. Boyd, destined to cover the flotilla, was directed to follow as soon as the boats should put off,—“should the enemy hang on the rear, advance, beat him back.” Nothing was left to the discretion of Gen. Boyd. General Wilkinson's health was such as to confine him to his cabin, and I had not seen him for several days. Yet ambitious to be first in the service of his country, he tenaciously held the command.

The column had taken up the line of march and proceeded about two miles, when Col. Bissell, of the 5th regiment was *detached* from the 1st brigade and *ordered* by the commander in chief to reembark and disperse a party of the enemy, supposed to have made a lodgment on one of the islands. Ere this could be executed a videt from Capt. Selden from the rear, reported a column of 1500 of the enemy approaching in that direction. The detachment was immediately brought to the

right about, marched up the river and formed in line of battle.

General Lewis landed and came to the field, viewed our position, gave some directions and returned to his boat. I pushed forward with Capt. Selden's dragoons to reconnoiter the enemy—he opened his artillery, our line advanced, skirmished, and the enemy retired. After a long, harrassing and stormy day, the troops were directed by an order from General Lewis to return and take post for the night, (which was inclemently stormy) so as to cover the flotilla. Late in the evening I waited on General Wilkinson, on board his boat, to report the events of the day; to receive orders for the night, and to *ascertain* who commanded. The General was so indisposed that I was not permitted to see him, and was directed to call on General Lewis, whose boat I boarded and received orders to defend my position and the flotilla. Early the next morning (11th) General Lewis sent an aid ordering us to move down the river. The troops were put in motion—the commander in chief arrested their march. At 10 o'clock the enemy's gun boats turned a point and commenced a cannonade on our boats without any effect on either side. During the fore part of the day a variety of verbal orders were received, but countermanded before executed, occasioned as I understood, by the want of information from Gen. Brown. At 12 o'clock, impatient for some *decisive* or *discretionary* orders, the troops having been nearly 48 hours under arms, exposed to incessant rains, I rode to the bank of the river, requested and obtained a specific order, written by pencil, "that the flotilla would put off in 20 minutes—4 pieces of artillery would be landed to reinforce the rear guard which would follow the

boats—should the enemy harrass the rear, turn and beat him back.” While expecting the signal for moving, report from the rear announced the approach of the enemy in the woods which intersected the fields and were flanking our right. General Swartwout was ordered to disperse them, Gen. Covington to support him. Swartwout dashed into the woods and drove the advance back to the main body—here he was joined by Covington. The enemy had judiciously chosen his ground among deep ravines of an extensive plain beyond the woods, and discharged a heavy and destructive fire on our advance columns. No opposition could check the invincible ardor of our troops. By resolute and repeated charges, the enemy were driven more than a mile, disputing every inch of ground. Colonel Coles, with a detachment of Boyd’s brigade came up, and was immediately directed to turn the enemy’s left flank, which was promptly executed, amidst a shower of musketry and Shrapnell shells. Two pieces of artillery under Captain Irvine now arrived in the field, which had been delayed by a circuitous route; the four other pieces which were landed, reached the field soon after, and had their effect. The squadron of dragoons under Major Woodford, were early in field, but the nature of the ground did not admit of successful charges. The enemy had now been driven under the protection of their gun boats, which supported their right, and enfiladed by their numerous and heavy artillery the field in front, their left rested on the woods, obliquely to the rear supported by light artillery, Indians and incorporated militia. Many of our troops beginning to break, and I vainly endeavored to rally them, it became necessary for the whole to fall back, and reform out of the range

of the enemy's floating batteries, which was executed without inducing him to move from his strong position. At this time a reinforcement of 300 men under Col. Upham, came into the field, whose activity while engaged evinced the benefit that might have been derived from their more early assistance. After the troops were reformed, I received orders to return to the ground near the boats, and to embark. A valuable part of the flotilla and the two principal artillery officers had descended the river and joined General Brown, at Cornwall, during the action, and many of the remaining boats were already in the stream. Had an early and sufficient reinforcement come into the field, as was expected, the result of this day would have been very different. It is evident, throughout, that the commander in chief, acted with a misapprehension of the force and designs of the enemy—when the action began, it is probable he considered his strength inferior to ours, else he would not have retained, in inactivity so large a force in the boats.

The strength of the enemy, according to the calculation of the principal officer engaged, could not have been less than 2500 men, 7 pieces of artillery and 9 gun boats (manned from the fleet): the British prisoners state their strength at 2100. Our force, exclusive of artillery and dragoons, amounted to not more than 1200 men. Though the result of this battle was not so decisive as I could have wished, and as the first part of it promised, yet when it is recollectcd, that the troops had been exposed for four days to incessant fatigue, and inclement storms, from which they had no shelter, that we carried into the field so small a force, that the action commenced unexpectedly and without

artillery, and was sustained with a cool determined valor never surpassed, for more than three hours, and that the enemy were superior in numbers and position, it is hoped that this affair may be justly considered as having added new glory to the American arms. The field was crimsoned with the blood of 339 killed and wounded, whose deaths or scars will immortalize this day. The names of the officers whose bravery and activity characterized this conflict, were reported to the commander in chief. The praise, however, which was so parsimoniously bestowed on this occasion, but ill accords with their deserts. In the account of the enemy, who reported our numbers 7000 men, a greater compliment is implied than could be found in the despatches of the commander in chief.

I would not here again give an useless exhibition of the valor and skill which was displayed by many individuals and corps on this important day. The time for reward has passed by—those who fell must sleep in oblivion, and those who survive conceal their scars, which are seen only with indifference. But I cannot forbear from making one more struggle to rescue the character of this army from unmerited aspersion. If it be not entitled to the praise of their country, let it not meet with undeserved neglect, but receive the common rewards of justice.

With much consideration and respect,

I have the honor to be,

Sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN P. BOYD,

Brig. Gen. commanding.

OFFICIAL.

Names of Commissioned Officers, Killed and Wounded.

KILLED.

- Lieutenant William W. Smith, of the light artillery.
 ——— David Hunter, of the 12th regiment infantry.
 ——— Edward Olmstead, of the 16th, do.

WOUNDED.

- Brig. Gen. Leonard Covington, mortally, (since dead.)
 Major Tolbot Chambers, assistant adjutant general,
 slightly.
 Major Darby Noon, aid de camp to Brigadier General
 Swartwout, slightly.
 Colonel James P. Preston, of the 23d regiment infantry,
 severely, his right thigh fractured.
 Major William Cummings, 8th ditto, severely.
 Captain Edmund Foster, 9th ditto, slightly.
 ——— David S. Townsend, 9th ditto, severely. *Tu-*
ken prisoner.
 ——— Mordecai Myres, 13th ditto, severely.
 ——— John Campbell, 13th ditto, slightly.
 ——— John B. Murdoch, 25th ditto, slightly.
 Lieut. William S. Heaton, 11th ditto, severely.
 ——— John Williams, 13th ditto, slightly.
 ——— John Lynch, 14th ditto, severely. *Taken pris-*
oner.
 ——— Peter Pelham, 21st ditto, severely. *Taken*
prisoner.
 ——— James D. Brown, 25th ditto, slightly.
 ——— Archibald C. Crary, 25th ditto, severely in the
 skirmish the day before the action.

SKETCH OF THE MOVEMENTS OF THE DIVISION UNDER
GENERAL HAMPTON, ON THE CHAMPLAIN FRONTIER.

THE army of General Hampton assembled at Burlington. It was composed for the most part of new recruits. The general concentrated his forces at Cumberland Head about the middle of September. From this point he dropped down the lake and took post at Chazy on the 22d, and put the light corps of the army in motion against the enemy. The troops passed the frontier, surprised a picket. But the drought was found so severe that the general "had some doubts of the practicability of procuring *water* for the troops, horses, and teams." After exhausting the springs and wells of Odeltown, the army fell back to Champlain on the 25th.

It was next decided to approach the St. Lawrence by the Chatauga route, which takes off at Champlain, and which affords at all seasons an abundant supply of water.

The army reached Chatauga on the 26th of September. On the first of October the enemy made an attack upon our out posts, which happened to be defended by Snelling and Wool's corps. The attack was made with Indians and the regulars lay in ambush. Major Snelling attacked them in flank and soon compelled them to retire. Lieutenant Nash of the 33d regiment and a private were killed.

The hostile Indians in considerable numbers continued to lurk about the camp and fire at the sentinels, as as they also had done at Odeltown.

On the 4th of October, General Hampton wrote to the Secretary of War, stating :

“The road to Plattsburgh will be completed to day, and is a perfect *turnpike*. The artillery, consisting of 8 six pounders, 1 twelve, and 1 howitzer, tolerably appointed and found, is arrived. I have but a small stock of provisions on hand, but have the most pointed assurance from Colonel Thomas, the quarter master general, that a supply of sixty days of bread and flour will arrive at once, in the course of three or four days. I have only from forty to fifty rounds of musket cartridges but this convoy will make the supply an *hundred*, and give to the artillery all it requires in reserve. The supply of salted provisions will not exceed a fourth of the proportion of flour ; but we have, and can have, an unlimited supply of good beef cattle. Brigadier General Parker is at Plattsburgh hastening my supplies, and presiding over some arrangements that were thought necessary. I have directed the commencement of a *petty war*, or invasion of the lines, at and near Lake Champlain, by Colonel Clark, who has some volunteers, and Brigadier General Fasset, (our colonel) who has, at my instance called out his brigade of militia. The latter, I understand, turn out but badly, but they will make together, I suppose, from 600 to 1000 men. There has been inculcated by the artifices of the British, a shameful and corrupt neutrality on the lines, for the purpose of gain. I have directed these officers to break the truce.”

Col. Clark, with a militia force and some riflemen

was detached to Missisquoi bay, to surprize a party of the enemy at St. Armand. So secretly was the enterprize conducted that he arrived within fifteen rods of the enemy before they discovered him. The British were drawn up under Maj. Powell, well prepared for an attack from the water, but wholly incapable of defence on the land side. Col. Clark attacked them so unexpectedly and with such spirit, that in ten minutes the whole party surrendered. Our whole force engaged was one hundred and two; the number of prisoners taken was *one hundred and one*—nine killed and fourteen wounded.

On the 16th of October, the Secretary of War apprized General Hampton, of the reinforcements which had arrived at Kingston from the head of the lake, and of the probability of an immediate descent of the St. Lawrence by Gen. Wilkinson. “Under these circumstances,” continues the secretary, “you will approach the mouth of the Chatauga, or other point which shall better favor our junction, and hold the enemy in check.”

On the first of November General Hampton again wrote to General Armstrong, detailing his movement down the Chatauga, and his reasons for retrograding to the Four Corners.

“On the morning of the 21st ultimo the army commenced its movement down the Chatauga, for the purpose of placing itself in a situation which would enable it to fulfil its parts of the proposed combined operations on the St. Lawrence.

“An extensive wood of eleven or twelve miles in front, blocked up with felled timber, and covered by the Indians and light troops of the enemy, was a se-

rious impediment to the arduous task of opening a road for the artillery and stores. Brigadier General Izard with the light troops and one regiment of the line, was detached early in the morning to turn these impediments in flank, and to seize on the more open country below, while the army, preceded by a strong working party, advanced on a more circuitous but practicable route for a road. The measure completely succeeded, and the main body of the army reached the advanced position on the evening of the 22d. The 23d and 24th were employed in completing the road and getting up the artillery and stores.

“I had arranged,” says the general, “at my departure, under the direction of Major Parker, a line of communication as far up the St. Lawrence as Ogdensburgh, for the purpose of hastening to me the earliest notice of the progress of our army down. I had surmounted twenty four miles of the most difficult part of the route, and had in advance of me seven miles of open country, but at the end of that distance commenced a wood of some miles in extent, which had been formed into an entire abatis, and filled by a succession of wooden breast works, the rearmost of which were supplied with ordnance. In front of these defences were placed the Indian force and light corps of the enemy, and in the rear all of his disposable force. As the extent of this force depended upon his sense of danger on the St. Lawrence, it was a cause of regret that all communication from yourself or Major Parker seemed to be at an end. As it was, however, believed that the enemy was hourly adding to his strength in his position, if free from the apprehension of danger from above, an effort was judged necessary to dislodge

him, and if it succeeded, we should be in possession of a position which we could hold as long as any doubts remained of what was passing above, and of the real part to be assigned us.

“Our guides assured us of a shoal and practicable fording place, opposite the lower flank of the enemy’s defences, and that the wood on the opposite side of the river, a distance of seven or eight miles, was practicable for the passage of the troops. Colonel Purdy with the light corps, and a strong body of infantry of the line, was detached at an early hour of the night of the 25th to gain this ford by the morning, and to commence his attack in rear, and that was to be the signal for the army to fall on in front, and it was believed the pass might be carried before the enemy’s distant troops could be brought forward to its support.

“I had returned to my quarters from Purdy’s column about 9 o’clock at night, when I found Mr. Thomas Baldwin, of the quarter master general’s department, who put into my hands an open paper containing instructions to him from the quarter master general, respecting the building of huts for the army in the Chatauga, below the line. This paper sunk my hopes, and raised serious doubts of receiving that efficacious support which had been anticipated. I would have recalled the column, but it was in motion, and the darkness of the night rendered it impracticable. I could only go forward. The army was put in motion on the morning of the 26th, leaving its baggage, &c. on the ground of encampment.

“On advancing near the enemy, it was found that the column on the opposite side was not as far advanced as had been anticipated. The guides had misled

it, and finally failed in finding the ford. We could not communicate with it, but only awaited the attack below. About 2 o'clock the firing commenced, and our troops advanced rapidly to the attack. The enemy's light troops commenced a sharp fire, but Brigadier General Izard advanced with his brigade, drove him every where behind his defences and silenced the fire in his front. This brigade would have pushed forward as far as courage, skill and perseverance could have carried it; but on advancing, it was found that the firing had commenced on the opposite side, and the ford had not been gained.

“The enemy retired behind his defences, but a renewal of his attacks was expected, and the troops remained some time in their position to meet it. The troops on the opposite side were excessively fatigued. The enterprise had failed in its main point, and Colonel Purdy was ordered to withdraw his column to a shoal four or five miles above, and cross over. The day was spent, and General Izard was ordered to withdraw his brigade to a position three miles in the rear, to which place the baggage had been ordered forward.

“The slowness and order with which General Izard retired with his brigade, could but have inspired the enemy with respect. They presumed not to venture a shot at him during his movement; but the unguardedness of some part of Purdy's command exposed him to a rear attack from the Indians, which was repeated after dark, and exposed him to some loss.—These attacks were always repelled, and must have cost the enemy as many lives as we lost.* Our entire loss of killed,

* Sweet consolation, indeed!

wounded and missing, does not exceed fifty. In its new position within three miles of the enemy's post, the army encamped on the night of the 26th, and remained until 12 o'clock of the 28th. All the deserters, of whom there were four, having concurred in the information that sir George Prevost, with three other general officers, had arrived with the whole of his disposable force, and lay in the rear of these defences, and a letter from Major Parker (by express received on the evening of the 26th) having informed me that no movements of our army down the St. Lawrence had been heard of at Ogdensburgh, and for some distance above; the following questions were submitted to the commanding officers of brigades, regiments and corps, and the heads of the general staff, in a council convened for the purpose: "Is it advisable, under existing circumstances, to renew the attack on the enemy's position, and if not, what position is it advisable for the army to take, until it can receive advices of the advance of the grand army down the St. Lawrence?" The opinion of the council was expressed in the following words:

"It is the unanimous opinion of this council, that it is necessary, for the preservation of this army and the fulfilment of the ostensible views of the government, that we immediately return by orderly marches to such a position (Chatauga) as will secure our communications with the United States, either to retire into winter quarters or to be ready to strike below." In pursuance of this opinion the army has returned by slow marches to this place, and now awaits the orders of the government."

COLONEL PURDY'S REPORT OF THE AFFAIR ON THE
CHATAUGA.

“ We commenced the march at sun down, and by sun rise the next morning had gained only six miles! Here we were discovered by the enemy and fired on from the opposite side of the river. During that night we were repeatedly misled by the guides who knew nothing of the country, having never been that way, and at the time we were attacked, they had led us into a thick cedar growth or swamp on the banks of the river and immediately opposite the enemy's position, and knew not how to extricate us. Incredible as it may appear, Gen. Hampton entrusted nearly one half of his army, and those his best troops, to the guidance of men, each of whom repeatedly assured him they were not acquainted with the country, and were not competent to direct such an expedition. At the same time Gen. Hampton told me he had a man by the name of Smith, who had a perfect knowledge of the country, and whom he promised to send me, but which he neglected to do. The defeat of the expedition was the consequence of this neglect of the Major General. About two o'clock while receiving an order from Colonel King, adjutant general, upon the opposite side of the river to march back four miles and then ford the river and join the 2d brigade, the enemy made a furious attack on the column by a great discharge of musketry, accompanied by the yells of the savages. Unfortunately, the word “retreat,” was heard, which for a short time spread confusion among the several corps. A sufficient number, however, remained firm, and the enemy was soon compelled to retire. Towards sun down I sent General Hampton a request that a regiment might be ordered

down to cover my landing on the opposite side of the river; but judge my surprise, on receiving intelligence that he had retreated with the second brigade nearly 3 miles. Thus was I deserted without the smallest guard to cover my landing. To what cause shall it be attributed, that the General ordered a retreat, and that too at a moment when the presence of the second brigade was required, or could be useful, as soon afterwards he declared "he should be willing to compound with the first brigade for 500 men." The wounded had previously been conveyed across on rafts, which made a removal of my brigade to that side absolutely necessary for their protection. An attempt was accordingly made and a floating bridge soon constructed of old logs found on the margin of the river. The enemy discovering our disposition, commenced a firing from the opposite side, and killed several while crossing. Major Snelling with about a hundred men effected a landing and joined the main body. The remainder of my force, exhausted by the excessive exertions of the preceding night, and weary with the fatigues of the day, not having had a moment either for rest or refreshment, were compelled to endure the privation of sleep another night. We retired two or three miles and took a position. At about 12 o'clock, the enemy came up and made an attack upon us, but were soon routed. The men at this time were were formed and lying on the ground they were to occupy in case of an attack, and were ordered to and did immediately rise, seize their arms, and remain under them the residue of the night. An excessively heavy rain prevented the firing both of the enemy and ourselves, except occasionally a single gun from the former. Our troops were ordered not to fire, but

in case of a repetition of attack to charge bayonets; this was accordingly done. The enemy charged several times, and as often were put to flight. It is observable in this place, that so greatly were the men overpowered by fatigue, tho in a situation every way dangerous, and in which they had every reason to believe they should be sallied upon by the enemy every moment, many were unable to conquer their disposition to sleep, and it was not in the power of the officers to keep them awake. It was on the morning of this last attack, that the general expressed his apprehensions for the first brigade, and made the declaration above quoted. The next morning we crossed the river and joined general Hampton; on the 28th the army retreated four miles, and on the 30th and 31st marched back to Chatauga. The troops at the times of the attack were not in a situation to endure further fatigue; and it is an indubitable fact, that many of them were so debilitated they were unable to proceed with the brigade on its march from the place of its last attack, and actually did not reach the main body until the day after the brigade had joined it, and some not even until the army had reached the Four Corners of Chatauga."

HEAD QUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
District No. 9, seven miles above Ogdensburgh,
 November 6, 1813, in the evening.

SIR,

I address you at the special instance of the secretary of war, who, by bad roads, worse weather, and ill health, was diverted from meeting me near this place, and determined to tread back his steps to Washington from Antwerp on the 29th ultimo.

I am destined to and determined on the attack of Montreal, if not prevented by some act of God; and to give security to the enterprize, the division under your command must cooperate with the corps under my immediate orders. The point of rendezvous is the circumstance of greatest interest to the issue of this operation, and the distance which separates us, and my ignorance of the practicability of the direct or devious roads or routes on which you must march, make it necessary that your own judgment should determine that point. To assist you in forming the soundest determination, and to take the most prompt and effectual measures, I can only inform you of my intentions and situation in one or two respects of first importance. I shall pass Prescott to night, because the stage of the season will not allow me three days to take it; shall cross the cavalry at Hambleton, which will not require a day, and shall then press forward and break down every obstruction to the confluence of this river with Grand river, there to cross to the isle Perrot, and with my scows to bridge the narrow inner channel, and thus obtain foothold on Montreal island, at about twenty miles from the city; after which our artillery, bayonets and swords must secure our triumph or provide us honorable graves. Inclosed you have a memorandum of my field and battering train, pretty well found in fixed ammunition, which may enable you to dismiss your own, we are deficient in loose powder and musket cartridges, and therefore hope you may be abundantly found. On the subject of provisions, I wish I could give you as favorable information; our whole stock of bread may be computed at about 15 days, and our meat at 20. In speaking on this subject to the secretary of war, he in-

formed me that ample magazines were laid upon lake Champlain, and therefore I must request you to order forward two or three months supply by the safest route in a direction to the proposed scene of action. I have submitted the state of our provisions to my general officers, who unanimously agree that it should not prevent the progress of the expedition; and they also agree in opinion, that if you are not in force to face the enemy you should meet us at St. Regis, or its vicinity.

I shall expect to hear from, if not see you, at that place or the 9th or 10th instant.

And have the honor to be respectfully, &c.

JAS. WILKINSON.

To Maj. Gen. W. Hampton, &c.

P. S. I was preparing an express which I should have despatched tomorrow, but for the fortunate call of Col. King.

A copy,

JOHN HOOMES, *Aid de camp.*

H. Q. Four Corners, November 8, 1813.

SIR,

I had the honor to receive, at a late hour last evening, by Col. King, your communication of the 6th, and was deeply impressed with the sense of responsibility it imposed of deciding upon the means of our cooperation.

The idea suggested as the opinion of your officers, of effecting the junction at St. Regis, was most pleasing, as being the most immediate, until I came to the disclosure of the amount of your supplies of provision. Col. Atkinson will explain the reasons that would have rendered it impossible for me to have brought more than each man could have carried upon his back; and, when

I reflected that, in throwing myself upon your scanty means, I should be weakening you in the most vulnerable point, I did not hesitate to adopt the opinion, after consulting the general and principal officers, that by throwing myself back on my main depot, where all the means of transportation had gone, and falling upon the enemy's flank, and straining every effort to open a communication from Plattsburgh to Cognawaga, or any other point you may indicate on the St. Lawrence, I should more effectually contribute to your success, than by the junction at St. Regis.

The way is, in many places, blockaded and abatised, and the road impracticable for *wheels* during winter; but, by the employment of pack-horses, if I am not overpowered, I hope to be able to prevent your starving.

I have ascertained and witnessed the plan of the enemy is to burn and consume every thing in our advance.

My troops and other means will be described to you by Col. Atkinson. Besides their rawness, and sickness, they have endured fatigues equal to a winter campaign in the late snows and bad weather, and are sadly dispirited and fallen off; but upon this subject I must refer you to Col. Atkinson.

With these means, what can be accomplished by human exertion, I will attempt, with a mind devoted to the general objects of the campaign.

W. HAMPTON.

To Major General Wilkinson.

A copy, JOHN HOOMES, Aid de camp.

H. Q. Plattsburgh, November 12, 1813.

SIR,

I have the honor to inclose a copy of a letter I have

received from Gen. Wilkinson, and of my reply. The forage at Chatauga had been nearly consumed before the expedition down the river; and in the return of the army, enough only could be found to subsist the horses and teams two or three days. All accounts concurred in the report, that Gen. Wilkinson had not commenced his operations against Kingston, and that no descent down the river was intended. Hence, the necessity for sending off the cavalry, artillery, and provision teams to Plattsburgh for subsistence; and hence also, the impossibility of a junction at St. Regis with more provisions than must have been consumed on the march to that place. Gen. Wilkinson had no spare transportation for us; and the junction would have reduced the stock of provisions to eight or ten days for the whole. The alternative was adopted under the impression of *absolute necessity*.

The army has approached on this route to the road leading to Chazy, a few miles from the lines, where I shall join it to night. I can only repeat what I said in my letter to Gen. Wilkinson, "that what can be accomplished by human exertion, shall be attempted to meet the objects of the campaign." But I should be uncan- did not to own, that many circumstances are unpropitious. The force is dropping off by fatigue and sickness to a most alarming extent. My returns yesterday report the effectives at a little more than half their original state at Chatauga; and, which is more discouraging, the officers, with a few honorable exceptions, are sunk as low as the soldiers, and endure hardship and privation as badly. In a word, since the shew, produced by clothing, movements &c. has worn off, all have assumed their native *rawness*. Fatigue and suffering from the weath-

er have deprived them of that spirit, which constituted my best hopes. What confidence can the best officer (and I have a few surpassed by none) feel under such circumstances! It is painful to hold up to you this picture, but it is but too faithfully drawn.

The quarter master general has been ordered to procure on hire 400 waggons, and I shall attempt to open a communication on the direct route from the town of Champlain. Success, under the circumstances I have mentioned, must depend upon the efforts and force opposed to me. The *demonstration*, however, can but produce a partial good.

On the route I took, the enemy burnt and consumed every thing before him, and this I understand to be his general plan. If the same course precede the advance of Gen. Wilkinson and my feeble force should be foiled, the consequences are much to be dreaded. But the Rubicon is now passed, and all that remains is to push for the capitol.

I have the honor to be, &c.

W. HAMPTON.

Gen. John Armstrong, Secretary of War.

DISASTROUS EVENTS ON THE NIAGARA, AT THE
CLOSE OF 1813.

HAVING followed the movements of the armies of Generals Wilkinson and Hampton until the close of the campaign, it is now necessary to return to Fort George and note the disastrous scenes which were exhibited on the Niagara after the departure of the central army.

Col. Scott who had been left in command of Fort George with 800 regular troops remained in garrison till the 13th of October, when he marched his troops for the mouth of Genesee river, having been relieved by Gen. George M'Clure, with a body of New York militia. Previous to his departure, however, the British army under General Vincent, which had remained inactive in the neighborhood of Fort George for a considerable time, broke up its camp and retreated hastily on Burlington Heights. This retreat was no doubt caused by the news of Proctor's defeat on the Thames. This army had suffered excessively from sickness and desertion. An officer of the 23d (U. S.) regiment assured the writer that 500 deserters came into Fort George in less than three months: and a still greater number would have deserted, but for the British Indians who were dispersed in the woods to pick up and deter

deserters. The sick of this army who reached Kingston in October, in boats, amounted to nearly 1500 men. Upwards of 700 are supposed to have died in camp. To facilitate their retreat, the enemy burnt every thing in store in the vicinity of Fort George—3000 blankets, many hundred stand of arms; also the blankets in the men's packs, and every article of clothing not in actual use.

On the 24th of October, General Harrison arrived at Buffalo by water from Detroit with the greater part of M'Arthur's brigade and the detachment of the U. S. rifle regiment under Col. Smith. He marched immediately to Fort George, and commenced preparations for an expedition against Burlington Heights. The arrival of Harrison at Fort George diffused joy and confidence not only among the militia in service at that post, but among the whole population of the western counties of New York. Already numerous parties of volunteers were on their march to fight under his orders, when Com. Chauncey's fleet arrived at Niagara with orders from the secretary of war, for Gen. Harrison to embark his troops for Sackett's Harbor, at that time menaced with an attack from Kingston. This order left the General no alternative. Thus were *all* the objects of the campaign blasted, and the road paved for disasters on the Niagara frontier. Had Harrison been permitted to have executed his purposes upon the wreck of Vincent's army, no conceivable obstacle could have prevented the accomplishment of his views. Disgust and disappointment soured the popular mind; the troops at Fort George become discontented, and Gen. M'Clure after two abortive excursions towards Stoney Creek, closed his operations by burning the village of

Newark* and recrossing the Niagara. The enemy emboldened by this movement, advanced from his position at Burlington to the banks of the Niagara. Nor did he neglect to profit from the defenceless state of that frontier. They crossed at the Five mile Meadows on the 19th of December. A party under Col. Murry descended the American side of the straight, surprized and captured Fort Niagara, which they found an easy conquest, either from neglect or traitorous designs. Our men were nearly all asleep in their tents; the enemy rushed in and commenced a most horrid slaughter. Such as escaped the fray of the onset retired to the old mess house and fired for some minutes on the enemy. It is said that a want of ammunition compelled them to surrender. Captain Leonard, who had been entrusted with the command of the fort was at his farm in the vicinity of the place. Popular opinion, not always correct, finds no difficulty in attributing the loss of the fort to *treachery* in the commanding officer. A court martial has, however, acquitted him from that charge.†

* Gen. M'Clure, in a letter to the secretary of war, of the date of Dec. 10, 1813, thus exonerates himself from the responsibility of the measures:—

“The village of Newark is now in flames—the few remaining inhabitants in it, having been noticed of our intention, were enabled to remove their property. The houses were generally vacant long before. This step has not been taken *without counsel, and is in conformity with the views of your excellency, disclosed to me in a former communication.*”

† The war department disclaims any agency in the appointment of Leonard to the command of Fort Niagara. General Porter had been designated to command on that frontier.

The gate of the fort was not left *open* as has been reported. The enemy obtained the watchword from the centinels, who were surprized. It was by this means that they entered the fort before the garrison was apprised of their approach. About 80 Americans were bayoneted. Several escaped by leaping the pickets: some, after having received two or three stabs from a bayonet. No mercy was shown to the sick; they were inhumanly slaughtered in their beds. The enemy acknowledged only 5 killed and 3 wounded. With the fort were lost several thousand stand of arms—many valuable pieces of cannon and an immense quantity of ammunition.

“ On the same morning a detachment under Major Bennett, stationed at Lewistown Heights, was attacked by a party of savages; but the Major and his little corps by making a desperate charge, effected their retreat after being nearly surrounded, with the loss of six or eight killed or taken, among whom were two sons of Captain Jones, Indian interpreter for the six nations. The villages of Youngstown, Lewistown, Manchester, and the Tuscarora villages were reduced to ashes; and the inoffensive inhabitants who could not escape, were, without regard to age or sex, inhumanly butchered by savages headed by British officers painted. A British officer who was taken prisoner, avowed that many small children were murdered by the Indians.”* A number of sick soldiers confined to their beds at Lewistown, were bayoneted and the houses burnt over their heads; several dead bodies were left in the streets

* See General M'Clure's official despatch to the secretary of war, dated Dec. 22, 1813.

to be devoured by hogs and dogs. Dr. Molly, who was not attached to the army, but who, from benevolent motives, had gone from Eleven Mile Creek to Lewistown to attend the sick, being a spectator of those horrid scenes, begged his life, informing the enemy that he belonged to no army. He was answered with reproaches and a thrust of a bayonet through his abdomen, which let out a part of his bowels, on which he placed his hand and walked six miles to Fort Niagara and in fifteen minutes expired.*

General M'Clure speaks in terms of the highest praise of the conduct of Major Mallory, who was stationed at Schlosser with about forty Canadian volunteers. He advanced to Lewistown Heights and compelled the advanced guard of the enemy to fall back. He fought the enemy two days and contended every inch of ground to the Tonawanto creek.

General M'Clure had three days previous to the surrender of Niagara, left that post for the purpose of calling out the militia of the neighboring counties *en masse*, and providing for the defence of Buffalo and Black Rock.

After the crossing of the enemy the road from Lewistown to Batavia presented an indescrivable scene of terror and confusion. Mothers without children and children without mothers; the Indian women and children of Tuscarora mixed with the whites, and swelled the terrified groupe of fugitives.

The enemy having desolated the frontier from the lake to the falls, recrossed the straits after leaving a garrison in Fort Niagara, and ascended the river on the

* See Dr. Jones' statement.

British side in quest of blood and plunder. The news of these events having reached Major General Hall of the N. Y. militia, he hastened to Batavia for the purpose of taking measures to protect the frontier and repel the enemy in case of a second invasion. He collected a considerable force from General Wadsworth's brigade in Ontario county. At Batavia he met General M'Clure with the regular troops, under Major Riddle. A corps of 150 infantry under Lt. Col. Lawrence, and a company of cavalry under Captain Marvin, were armed and ordered to join a party of militia collected at Forsyth's, on the Ridge road, 15 miles east of Lewistown. This force when united were to collect the ammunition scattered on the roads and act as circumstances might require; and if practicable to effect a junction with the main force at Buffalo. With the residue of the militia Gen. Hall proceeded to Buffalo, leaving to General M'Clure the organization and direction of such detachments of volunteers as might arrive. Gen. Hall on his arrival at Buffalo found a numerical force of about 2,000 irregulars of various descriptions, artillery, cavalry, infantry and Indians. On the 28th, the General obtained information from a citizen who had escaped from Canada, which left no doubt of the enemy's intentions.

The evening of the 29th of December was dark and gloomy. The enemy nevertheless crossed the Niagara in boats, the foremost of which landed below Conjokaty creek, advanced and took possession of the sailor's battery, near the mouth of that stream. Some firing took place as the enemy reached the shore. Lieut. Boughton who opposed them had a horse shot under him.

A considerable part of the American force was stationed at Black Rock; but the darkness of the night and the uncertainty at what point the enemy intended to make his principal attack, prevented the repulse of the enemy who first landed. Two successive attempts were made to dislodge him, but the militia were soon thrown into confusion. Towards the dawn of day Gen. Hall arrived at Black Rock from Buffalo with a reinforcement; at the same time a fresh division of boats full of British regulars were seen crossing the river and bending their course towards the rear of General Porter's house. General Hall now ascertained the object of the enemy and the disposition of his forces. "Their left wing, composed of about eight hundred regular troops and incorporated militia, and from 150 to 200 Indians disposed below Conjockaty creek. With this force the enemy designed to cover their left, outflank our right and cut off our retreat by the woods. With their center, consisting of about 400 Royal Scots commanded by Col. Gordon, the battle was commenced. The right which was purposely weak, was landed near our main battery, under cover of a high bank, and was merely calculated to divert our attention from the principal attack. Lt. Gen. Drummond commanded the whole. Gen. Rial conducted the attack.

"The enemy's left wing was discovered wheeling upon our right, and was attacked by the Indians under Col. Granger, and the Canadian volunteers under Col. Mallory. Colonel M'Mahan's regiment was stationed at the battery in reserve. The attack was commenced by a fire from our six pounder under Lt. Seely, below Gen. Porter's house and one 24 pounder and two 12 pounders at the battery under Lieut. Farnum of the

21st U. S. infantry, who acted as a volunteer. At the same time the enemy opened a heavy fire from their batteries on the opposite side of the river, of shells, spherical and hot shot and ball."* Such was the order and such the commencement of the battle, if so it deserves to be called. Of two thousand militia under General Hall who ought certainly to have repelled an inferior British force, not more than 600 could be made to face the enemy. This number formed regularly in line and attacked the enemy in their boats, and poured upon them a very destructive fire. After maintaining their ground for half an hour, opposed to veteran and highly disciplined troops, a retreat became necessary, which soon became a flight. Gen. Hall attributes the loss of the action to the defection of the Indians and the cowardly conduct of the reserve and other corps to whom orders had been given to attack the right wing of the enemy, which advanced from Con-jockaty creek. The General estimates the enemy's loss at not less than 200; his own at about 30 killed, 40 wounded and 69 taken prisoners. The principal loss fell upon the fugitive militia who were overtaken in the woods and tomahawked by the British Indians. "Lieutenant Boughton was among the slain. He was a good officer and a valuable citizen. The veteran Blakely and his corps were preeminently distinguished." The General notices the bravery and good conduct of Lt. Seely of the militia; Lieutenants Forman and Frasier of the U. S. infantry; the cavalry under Col. Boughton; the mounted volunteers under Major

* See General Hall's letter to Governor Tompkins.

Warner, and his aids Majors Hosmer and Norton. General Hall, however, admits that it was not in his power to notice all that distinguished themselves.

The enemy, after obtaining possession of the different batteries at Black Rock, pursued his march to Buffalo, which he immediately plundered and burnt. A woman by the name of Lovejoy refused to quit her house, was tomahawked and burnt with her dwelling. The distance from Black Rock to Buffalo is two miles; a considerable part of the road is flanked by woods. Yet the enemy were suffered to advance in column without the least annoyance. Oh! that a Croghan or a Holmes could have been present to have diffused courage and confidence, what a different result might safely have been anticipated. For never did the enemy more expose himself to ambush, defeat and capture, and never were the means at the disposal of the commanding general more ineffectually applied, if we except the campaign of Gen. Hull.

General Hall retired to Eleven Mile Creek, where he rallied about 300 men with whom he afforded protection to the inhabitants. The enemy recrossed the Niagara. Eight pieces of artillery fell into their hands, but the military stores were principally removed by the well timed exertions and zeal of Captain Camp of the quarter masters department.

The enemy burnt two small schooners belonging to Perry's squadron, which had been stranded in October preceding.

Great individual losses were sustained. Many industrious families were reduced to extreme wretchedness, and but for the generous hospitality and active benevolence of their fellow citizens in the interior,

great numbers would have been in danger of perishing by hunger and the rigors of the season. As charity is probably as great a virtue as courage, it will not be improper to record a few laudable instances of beneficence. Joseph Elicott, Governor Tompkins, Stephen Van Rensselaer and Solomon Southwick, of the state of N. York, gave each one hundred dollars.

CAMPAIGN OF 1814; ON THE NORTHERN FRONTIER.

EARLY in February, Gen. Wilkinson evacuated his camp at French Mills. Previous to his leaving it, he masked his intentions by ordering a constant march of troops from Plattsburgh and Chatauga to the French Mills.* This movement induced the traitorous inhabitants on the lines, and the enemy at Cornwall, to believe that the American army meditated an expedition into Canada. During the march of troops to the Mills, the roads from thence to Plattsburgh were filled with the public property.

Thus the general was enabled to send off all the baggage; the torch was applied to the huts, and the boats destroyed. The snow was between three and four feet deep, and the first night after leaving its encampment, the whole army slept upon the snow, without any other covering than the heavens. But the contented soldier, remindful of the cares which poison the felicity of political and civil life, enjoys sweeter repose than the factionist or voluptuary on beds of down.

* A detachment of 200 men under Capt. A. W. Odel, an officer of great promise, (from Ballston, N. Y) was ordered from Chatauga to the Mills. They performed the march in *ten hours*, facing a storm. Thus, in one short day, in the dead of winter, was performed a march that would, in the fall, have brought the armies of Gens. Wilkinson and Hampton together, but for the perverseness of the latter. The *distance* is twenty four miles.

The enemy afterwards crossed the St. Lawrence on a marauding expedition, advanced to Chatauga, but paid dearly for his booty: for they lost from the 89th and 103d regiments about 200 deserters. An American citizen who was a prisoner with the British, persuaded a whole picket to desert with him. Five Indians who pursued were killed by the deserters.

When the news of the enemy's movement reached Gen. Wilkinson at Plattsburgh, himself and most of his officers were at a ball. Yet in half an hour after the arrival of the news, the whole army were in motion; but the British retreated hastily without waiting to measure swords. It is said that they lost several pieces of cannon, by the ice giving way, as they repassed the St. Lawrence.

SECOND VICTORY ON THE THAMES.

TOWARDS the latter part of February, Captain Holmes, with 180 men, consisting of regulars and Michigan rangers, were detached on an expedition from Detroit against Fort Talbot, situated about two days march northeast of Malden. From information obtained on his march, Capt. Holmes abandoned his design upon Fort Talbot, and directed his march upon Delaware upon the Thames. When arrived within fifteen miles of that place he received intelligence that the enemy, 500 strong, were probably within one hour's march of him. Hunger, cold, and disease, had greatly enfeebled his men, sixteen of whom had previously been sent back to Detroit as incapable of duty.

Captain Holmes immediately retreated five miles for the purpose of a good position, which he found upon the western bank of the Twenty Mile Creek. The enemy made his appearance in small numbers upon the opposite heights the next morning about sunrise. He fired a few ineffectual shots and disappeared. Lieut. Knox of the rangers was sent to reconnoiter; he soon returned and reported that the enemy had retreated with great precipitation, leaving his baggage scattered upon the road, and that his trail and files made him out less than 70 men. Mortified at the supposition of having retrograded from this diminutive force, Captain Holmes immediately commenced a pursuit; but he

soon discovered that the enemy's supposed retreat was only a stratagem to draw him from his position, for at the distance of five miles the enemy were met in force, and in the act of preparing for battle. Capt. Holmes resumed his old position and formed in the order of the order of the *hollow square*, to prevent the necessity of evolution, which a part of his force was incompetent to perform; his horses and baggage in the center. The militia and Indians of the enemy commenced the attack, with yells, and *bugles* sounding in various directions. The British regulars charged to within 20 paces of the American line and against a fire that poured death upon their front section; those that followed were much thinned and wounded; the survivors abandoned the charge and attempted to screen themselves in the woods which were not more than 30 paces distant. The enemy's hopes were now upon his ammunition.

Our regulars being uncovered, were ordered to kneel, that the brow of the height might partly conceal them from the enemy's view. The firing was continued on both sides with great vivacity. But as the British regulars charged in column, and our line being extended, they derived but very little shelter from the woods; a common sized tree was found to afford no safety even to an individual, much less to the squads that often stood and breathed their last together. Our militia on the other fronts were protected by logs hastily thrown together, and the enemy not charging, the rifle was aimed at leisure and generally with unerring certainty.

The enemy after a copious bleeding, and finding his numbers constantly diminishing, relinquished the attack and retreated under cover of twilight. Capt. Holmes did not think it prudent to pursue. The Americans

lost but two killed and four wounded, while the enemy lost between 80 and 90 ; among whom were four officers.

Capt. Holmes acknowledges himself much indebted to his regular officers, particularly to Lieutenants Knox, Henry, Jackson and Porter. Ensigns Heard and Morgan, and Capt. Lee of the Michigan-dragoons, distinguished themselves. In the hottest of the fire the soldiers would frequently exclaim, "Huzza for Kentucky!" Sailing master Darling, of the U. S. schr. Somers, served as a volunteer and was very active—another instance that Americans can fight on both elements.

The enemy's wounded and prisoners were treated with great humanity. Though some of our men were marching in their stocking feet, they were not permitted to take even a shoe from the dead.

A convoy of 100 head of cattle intended for Burlington was subsequently taken upon the Thames.

AFFAIR AT LA COLE.

General Wilkinson to the Secretary of War.

Province of Lower Canada,

Odeltown, March 31, 1814.

SIR--We have had an affair with the enemy, in which our troops have given him another test of firmness and valor.

Pursuant to the designs communicated to you in my last, and to accomplish your views if in my power, I entered Canada yesterday morning, and was met by the enemy near this place about 11 o'clock, whom we forced at every point of attack on the route to La Cole, distant from hence one league, and from St. Johns six. We reached the former post about 3 o'clock, and found there a strong corps in possession of a spacious lofty stone mill, of which I had received some information. An eighteen pounder had been ordered forward to effect the destruction of this building, but it broke down, and after being repaired, the only road of approach through a deep forest was reported to be impracticable to a gun of such weight. An opinion prevailed at the same time with the chief engineer, Maj. Totten, founded on intelligence previously received, and several of the best informed officers, that an iron twelve would suffice to make a breach; but after a fair and tedious experiment, at three hundred yards distance only, it was discovered our battery could make no impression.

Brig. Gens. Smith and Bissel covered our guns, and Brig. Gen. Macomb, with a select corps, formed the

reserve. The enemy had been reported, from a source considered strictly confidential, to be two thousand five hundred strong, and his first attack of my right favored the report, from the use he made of Congreve rockets and other indications of deliberate preparation; the corps, therefore, were held in high order to receive his combined attack. Yet believing in the efficacy of our battery, dispositions had been made to intercept the enemy should he evacuate the post, and to give it the utmost effect, we were obliged to take ground near the margin of the field which encompassed the mill. During the cannonade, which was returned with vivacity by the enemy's galleys (I presume) several sorties and desperate charges were made from the mill upon our battery, which were repulsed with incredible coolness by the covering corps, at the expence of some blood and some lives on both sides: it is reported to me that in the last charge a captain of grenadiers and fifteen men fell together, but I cannot vouch for the fact. Finding all our attempts to make a breach unsuccessful, I withdrew the battery, called in my detachments, and having removed our dead and wounded and every thing else, fell back to this place about 6 o'clock.

Where a military corps appears to be universally animated by the same sensibilities, where the only competition is for danger and glory, individual distinctions seem improper, except in extraordinary cases, such as the conduct of the officers who commanded our battery yesterday. Capt. M'Pherson, of the light artillery, (my military secretary) impelled by the noble spirit which marks his whole character, asked permission to take part in the operation of the day with his proper arm; he was indulged, and being first for command

took charge of the pieces which followed the advance and formed our battery, in which he was seconded by Lieuts. Larrabee and Sheldon. On opening his fire he seemed inclined to the opinion he could make an impression on the work, but he soon received a wound under the chin, which he tied up with his handkerchief, and continued at his piece until a second shot, which broke his thigh, brought him to the earth. Larrabee had kept his station until shot through the lungs, and Sheldon kept up the fire until ordered to retire. The conduct of these gentlemen, from the nature of their duties, has been so conspicuously gallant as to attract the admiration of their brethren in arms, and should (I humbly conceive) be distinguished by the executive.

I have sent forward my wounded who can bear the movement to Plattsburgh or Burlington, and those who cannot will be provided for in Champlain.

I would hold this position until I receive further orders, were it not for the difficulty of transporting our provisions and the impossibility to cover the troops; but I shall not retire further than Champlain, which will place us twenty five miles from St. Johns, and forty two from Montreal.

I cannot close this letter without confessing my obligations to my general and field officers, and to my general staff of every grade, for the able and prompt support I received from them. So small an affair does not merit so tedious a detail, but it warrants the remark, that it will produce a degree of self confidence, of reciprocal trust, of harmony and friendly attachments in this corps, highly beneficial to the service. It is a lesson of command to the officers, and of obedience to the soldier, worth a whole year's drill of empty parades.

The returns of killed and wounded have not yet been furnished, but they will not exceed 80 or 90, including a captain and 4 subalterns, and this shall be forwarded to-morrow or next day.

With great respect, &c.

J. WILKINSON.

The honorable Secretary at War.

Lieuts. Green, Parker and Kerr and sergeant Childs, were among the wounded. The commander in chief exposed his person to the hottest of the enemy's fire.

The movement not proving successful, it has been censured as untimed and injudiciously conducted. In a letter to a friend dated April 9, 1814, the General explains his motives in the following words: "That upon hearing of General Brown's march to the westward, and having ascertained that the enemy continued to strengthen his garrison upon Lake Ontario, as late as the 17th of March, on which day upwards of 1000 men passed up by Hamilton, on the St. Lawrence. In combination of other motives equally important, I made the late incursion into Lower Canada, to put the enemy in fear nearer home, and thus effect a diversion in favor of Major General Brown's operations, whether offensive or defensive; and if I am not deceived by a concurrence of information, the movement has had the effect to draw the whole of the enemy's force in Lower Canada to the vicinity of St. John's, including a corps of Glengarians, who were stationed on the St. Lawrence, at Cateau de Las."

UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT OF THE ENEMY TO DESTROY
THE SUPERIOR, BUILDING AT SACKETT'S HARBOR.

ON the night of the 25th of April, two of Com. Chauncey's guard boats fell in with three of the enemy's boats in the bay formed by Black river. Lieut. Dudley, who discovered them, hailed, and was answered "guard boats;" this however, not being satisfactory, he repeated the hail, and was not answered. Finding the strange boats were attempting to cut him off from the shore, he fired upon them; the enemy escaped and the guard boats returned to the fleet. The next day Com. Chauncey caused both shores of Chaumont bay to be examined, to see if the enemy had not secreted himself in some of the small creeks. Nothing, however, was discovered but six barrels of powder, found in the water near the shore where our guard boats fired on them. These barrels were all slung in such a manner that one man could take two across his shoulder and carry them; each barrel had a hole bored in the head of about one inch diameter, with a wooden plug in it. These barrels were evidently fitted for blowing up the Superior then on the stocks, by placing them under the ships bottom, and were thrown overboard for the double purpose of facilitating escape and preventing accident in case of close action.

The discovery of the enemy's intentions in this instance, may prevent future meditated mischief.

The U. S. ship *Superior* was launched at Sackett's Harbor on the morning of the first of May, without accident. She is an uncommon beautiful ship and could mount 64 guns if necessary. She was built in the short space of *eighty* days. The Jones and Jefferson, two brigs of 500 tons and 22 guns each, were built during the same period. All this was done during the most unfavorable part of the season, upon a remote frontier where the wilderness still maintains its empire. What is not American genius and enterprize capable of performing when properly directed ?

ATTACK ON OSWEGO.

OSWEGO Fort* stands on the right bank of the river of the same name, at its entrance into lake Ontario. The site is elevated and the prospect beautiful; but since its delivery to the Americans in 1796, has been suffered to go to decay. When attacked by the enemy on the 6th of May, 1814, there were but five pieces of cannon in the fort, three of which had lost their trunnions.

The enemy made the attack with a force estimated at 2000. Col. Mitchell, who defended the fort, had but 200 effective men. The odds was fearful, but valor and skill supplied the place of numbers, and compelled the enemy to purchase a dear bought victory.

The British made their appearance in 4 large ships, three brigs and a number of gun and other boats. Col. Mitchell, had artfully pitched his spare tents on the village side of the river, thereby inducing the enemy to attack where from appearances, they expected the least resistance.

“ About one o'clock on the 5th, the fleet approached. Fifteen boats, large and crowded with troops, at a given

* This fort was taken by the French, under the celebrated Montcalm, in 1756. It had then a garrison of 1600 men—21 pieces of cannon, 14 mortars, large stores, 2 sloops and 200 boats. It sustained a siege of only 2 days.

signal, moved slowly to the shore. These were preceded by gun boats, sent to rake the woods and cover the landing, while the larger vessels opened a fire upon the fort. As soon as the debarking boats got within range of our shot Capt. Boyle and Lieutenant Legate opened a very successful fire and compelled them twice to retire. They at length returned to their ships, and the whole stood off from shore for better anchorage."* Several of their boats were so perforated that they were abandoned; one of which was 60 feet long, had three sails and could accommodate 150 men. She had received a shot through her bow, and was nearly filled with water.

The troops of the fort lay upon their arms during the night. At day break, on the 6th the fleet again appeared bearing up under easy sail. The heavy ships took position directly against the fort and batteries, and for three hours kept up a heavy fire of grape, &c. Finding that the enemy had effected a landing, Col. Mitchell withdrew his small disposable force to the rear of the fort, and with Capts. Roneyn and Melvin's companies met the advancing British columns, while the other companies attacked their flanks. Lieutenant Pearce of the navy and some seamen joined and fought with their characteristic bravery. Col. Mitchell maintained his ground for 30 minutes, when he retreated. He halted at the distance of 400 yards from the fort.

The enemy landed 600 of De Watteville's regiment, 600 marines, two companies of Glengarians, and 350 seamen. Gen. Drummond commanded the land forces. They burnt the old barracks and evacuated the fort on

* See Col. Mitchell's official statement.

the morning of the 7th. The British, according to their own statement, lost 19 killed and 75 wounded. Our loss was 6 killed and 38 wounded.

Lieutenant Blaney, a young man of great promise, was killed. Captain Boyle and the subalterns Legate, M'Comb, Ansart, King, Robb Carle, M'Clintock and Newkirk, are noticed for conspicuous bravery in the official account.

BRILLIANT AFFAIR AT SANDY CREEK.

ON the 30th of May Major Appling, with 120 riflemen and a small number of Oneida warriors, was detached to protect the cannon and naval stores collected at Oswego, destined for Commodore Chauncey's fleet. They embarked on board a flotilla of boats in charge of Capt. Woolsey of the navy. Arrived at the mouth of Sandy Creek and apprehending an attack from the enemy who were in sight, Major Appling placed his men in ambush in the woods on each side of the creek, a little below where Captain Woolsey's boats were moored, and at a place where the stream was narrow and shoal. He then sent a few militia with orders to make a show of resistance whenever the enemy should attempt to land. The trap was artfully set;—the game was soon caught. The militia retreated on the first fire, pursued by the enemy, who expected an easy conquest of the boats; elated with their supposed triumph over the militia, they advanced up the creek and passed the ambuscade without perceiving it. At a given signal the work of death commenced. A battery of four field pieces opened upon them in front, while the Indians and riflemen attacked them in rear.

The fire of the riflemen and Indians was too severe to be long resisted. In 20 minutes the whole party surrendered. Thirteen of the enemy were killed,—28 wounded and 133 prisoners, together with two heavy

boats and three barges, some of which carried large pieces of ordnance.

Not an American was hurt. The officers under Major Appling were Lieuts. M'Intosh, Calhoun, M'Farland, Armstrong, and Smith, and Ensign Austin, all of whom have distinguished themselves on various occasions.

DEATH OF COLONEL FORSYTH.

THIS courageous and enterprising officer fell in a skirmish near Odeltown on the 28th of June. He had been engaged by General Smith to attempt to draw the enemy into an ambush, by offering him battle and keeping up a retreating fire until his object should be effected. When within a proper distance of the enemy, the Colonel detached a Lieutenant and 18 men to fire on him and draw him into an ambuscade. The plan succeeded. The enemy followed the 18 riflemen to the boundary line, where Col. Forsyth and the residue of his detachment had remained. It is stated in the official account of this affair, that the Colonel had orders to fall still further back, but that instead of complying with his orders, he directed his men to make a stand; and totally regardless of personal danger, he attacked the enemy, exposing his person in full view at the distance of only 16 rods; being in uniform he was soon shot down by two Indians who had concealed themselves in the bushes. His last words were "Rush on my boys," which he expressed immediately on falling. He survived but a few minutes.

Colonel Forsyth was a native of North Carolina, a bachelor and possessed of handsome property. His men, to whom he was always attentive, repaid his care with strict obedience and the warmest attachment.

The following anecdote is given as authentic: On

a reconnoitering excursion near Odeltown, a party of the enemy showed themselves; Colonel Forsyth gave orders to fire, which was immediately done; but observing one of his men to take shelter behind a fence whilst he loaded his piece, the colonel peremptorily commanded the trembling soldier to come and stand behind him, while he performed that part of his duty. It is unnecessary to add that it produced the intended effect.

CAPTURE OF A BRITISH FLOTILLA ON LAKE ONTARIO.

ON the 2d of October, Commodore Chauncey again proceeded in quest of the British fleet. He discovered them steering a course for Niagara, with studding sails, and all sails set, the wind being from the south and westward. The Commodore made all sail in chase, but as soon as his vessels were discovered by the British, they took in studding sails and halued upon the wind to the westward, and made all sail from the Americans. The wind being light all day, little progress was made against the current. By sundown the British were off Twenty Mile Creek, and had got a considerable distance from the Americans. At daylight the British were perceived to be at anchor; but as soon as they saw the American squadron, they weighed and made all sail to the west. The wind was from the south to southwest and squally. The American commodore made all sail in chase, and continued it the whole day. At sun down the British could scarcely be perceived from the masthead of the American vessels.

On the following morning the British fleet were out of sight. Commodore Chauncey then steered for the Ducks, with a view of intercepting the British fleet on its return, should it have gone down the lake. The wind increased to a strong gale from the northward and westward, and continued during the whole day.

Capture of five transports. At 3 o'clock in the afternoon of the 5th of October, seven sail were discovered near the False Ducks. Sail was immediately made in chase by the American commodore, who took them for the British fleet. But in the course of an hour he ascertained them to be sloops and schooners. Signal was made by the commodore for the Sylph and Lady of the Lake to cast off the vessels they had in tow, and chase N. E. Soon after this the British were observed separating on different tacks.

The Governor Tompkins was now cast off by the Pike, and the commodore made all sail in chase with her, having left the American squadron in charge of Captain Crane. At 5 o'clock in the afternoon, the British set fire to one of their gun vessels which did not sail well, after taking out her crew. At sundown, and opposite the real Ducks, the Hamilton, Confidence,* and Mary Ann struck to the Americans. The Sylph soon after captured the Drummond. The Lady Gore ran into the Ducks, but the Sylph being left to watch her, she was captured early the next morning. The only British vessel that escaped, was the Enterprize, a small schooner. The British vessels captured were gun vessels, mounting from one to three guns each. They were transporting troops to Kingston. The number of prisoners amounted to 264, of whom 222 were soldiers. The American fleet, immediately after this affair returned to Sackett's Harbor.

* The Hamilton and Confidence had not long been captured from the Americans, as already related, and had been, in the American service, called the Growler Julia.

OPERATIONS ON THE NIAGARA IN 1814.

AS early as the middle of March, General Brown made a movement with a part of his division, from Sackett's Harbor westwardly, as far as Onondaga, but suddenly retraced his steps.

General Scott arrived at Buffalo in April, collected troops and formed a camp of instruction. A biographer of General Scott informs us, that "in this camp were taught those tactics which gave to our army an accuracy and celerity of movement, which had never been displayed on this continent, either by British or American troops. The French *Tactique* of the battalion and the line was adopted. Without regard to rank all the officers were rigorously drilled by the commanding general in person; these then instructed the rank and file; companies were then formed and subjected to the same process; next battalions, which were also instructed by General Scott in person; and finally, the troops were carried through the evolutions of the brigade and the line, with the same strict attention to science and method. For two months and a half, these exercises were continued from 7 to 9 hours in a day. The effect was astonishing. Four full battalions were brought to advance in brigade line, 1000 paces in quick time, in accurate *allignment*. The same line was made to change front perpendicular, on a central point, in *three minutes and a half*. During this period

of discipline and instruction, the army was perfectly organized; and by the unwearied exertions and example of the commanding general, the strictest routine and discipline was established throughout the whole."

In June, General Brown arrived at Buffalo and assumed the command of the army, which had increased by reinforcements from various parts of the union, to 5,000 men in round numbers.

The passage of Niagara and the capture of Fort Erie was accomplished on the 5d of July without loss. The brigade of General Scott landed nearly a mile below the fort, and that of General Ripley about the same distance above. A battery of long 18's was placed in a position which commanded the fort, and induced the enemy to surrender it, in which were found six pieces of cannon and 157 prisoners under Major Burke.

BATTLE OF CHIPPEWA.

FROM Fort Erie the American army moved immediately upon Chippewa; General Scott's brigade was in the advance and took up a position within $\frac{1}{4}$ ths of a mile of the enemy encamped behind the Chippewa, a deep, still stream which runs into the Niagara, nearly at right angles, three miles above the falls. General Brown arrived with Gen. Ripley's brigade about midnight. Gen. P. B. Porter, with the N. Y. and Pennsylvania volunteers and Seneca warriors arrived about sunrise on the morning of the 5th.

“The battle of Chippewa has been described as one of the most brilliant spectacles that could well be conceived. The day was clear and bright; the sun still high in the heavens. The plain was such as might have been selected for a parade or a tournament; the troops on both sides, though not numerous, admirably disciplined; the Generals leading on their columns in person, the glitter of the arms in the sun, and the precision and exactness of every movement, were all calculated to carry the mind back to ancient story or poetry; to the plains of Latium or of Troy, and all those recollections which fill the imagination with images of personal heroism and romantic valor.”*

The two armies being encamped within cannon shot

* See *Analectic Magazine*.

distance, the morning of the 5th was consumed in skirmishing.

At 4 in the afternoon Gen. Porter commenced a circuitous movement on the left, which he concealed from the enemy until he had nearly reached the Chippewa. He met and drove back the light parties of the enemy, and soon found his progress stopped by their whole column advancing in order of battle; but he engaged them with unshaken resolution.

From the cloud of dust rising, and the heavy firing, General Brown very justly concluded that the entire force of the enemy were in march, and prepared for action, whereupon he immediately ordered Gen. Scott to advance with his brigade and Towson's artillery and meet them on the intervening plain. Gen. Scott advanced with promptitude. In the meanwhile Gen. Porter's command had given way in spite of the personal gallantry and exertions of this distinguished officer. Capt. Harris with his dragoons was directed to stop the fugitives behind the ravine fronting the American camp. General Ripley was ordered to advance with the 21st regiment which formed part of the reserve, pass to the left on the route taken by Porter, skirt the woods so as to keep out of view, and fall upon the rear of the enemy's right flank. This movement was promptly made; but the alacrity with which Scott's brigade marched to combat, and an equal eagerness with which the enemy sought the rencounter, accelerated the action and its results, and prevented the cooperation of the other corps of the army.

“Of the three battalions of infantry composing the first brigade, the first consisted of the 9th and a detachment from the 22d regiment, under command of Major

Leavenworth. The second battalion, or the 11th regiment, was gallantly conducted towards its place, in order of battle, by Colonel Campbell, who being early wounded, was succeeded by Major M'Niel. Maj. Jessup commanded the 25th regiment, or the remaining battalion of the brigade. Of these three excellent officers it would be difficult to say which was the most meritorious, or most conspicuously engaged,**

Major Jessup was detached to the left to turn the enemy's right wing. His command contributed much to the general success of the day; he had a horse shot under him.

The other two battalions with an enlarged interval between them, received the enemy in open plain; that under Major Leavenworth, paraded to the attack; that under Major M'Niel, with its left wing thrown forward to take the enemy in front and flank at the same time. Captain Towson, who commenced the fire before the troops were in order of battle, immediately after advanced to the front of the extreme right with three pieces of artillery, and took post on the river. Majors Leavenworth and M'Niel made prompt dispositions to receive the charge. The fire of the corps, including the artillery, produced a prodigious effect upon the enemy's ranks. That of Major M'Niel was the most effective from the oblique position which his corps judiciously occupied. The enemy's batteries were also admirably served; to the fire of which all our troops were exposed, and that of Major Leavenworth more particularly. This canonade did not prevent the lat-

* See General Scott's report of the battle of Chipewa.

ter from preserving his corps in the most excellent order, at all times prepared, to advance or to fire, to give, or to receive the charge.

At the crisis of the action, "Major Jéssup, commanding the left flank battalion, finding himself pressed in front and in flank, and his men falling fast around him, ordered his battalion to "*Support arms and advance*;" the order was most promptly obeyed amidst the most deadly and destructive fire. He gained a more secure position and returned upon the enemy so galling a discharge as caused them to retire. At this critical juncture, Capt. Towson had silenced the enemy's most effective battery, by blowing up an ammunition waggon, which produced great confusion. Turning next a heavy discharge of cannister upon their infantry, now nearly in contact with our line, advancing to the charge; the enemy could not long sustain this accumulation of fire, they broke and fled to their strong works beyond the Chippewa—as soon as they reached the sloping ground descending towards the Chippewa creek, they broke in confusion and ran to gain the bridge. Our troops pressed upon the fugitives until checked by the guns discharged from the British works.

The American loss was 60 killed, 316 wounded, and 19 missing. Total, 395.*

The British loss according to their own statement,

* Among the wounded was Col. Campbell, 11th infantry, severely, knee fractured, since dead. Captain King, 22d do. severely, wounded in the abdomen. Captain Read, 25th do. badly, flesh wound in the thigh. Captain Harrison, 42d, doing duty in the 9th regt. severely, shot in the shoulder. Lieut. Barron, 11th do.

was 148 killed, 320 wounded and 44 missing—total 514. Five hundred British muskets were picked up the day after the action upon the field of battle.

Major General Riall had in his front line 1,700 men, all regular troops, supported by the 8th regiment, 400 strong. The 100th regiment which was on the left of the British line, commanded by the Marquis of Tweeddale, late aid de camp to Lord Wellington, brought into action 700, and paraded the next day but 264. The other regiments engaged suffered proportionably. General Brown has had in his possession the most unequivocal evidence of these facts.

General Porter's command was never engaged after their first retreat, consequently the whole action was sustained by Scott's brigade, which, including Towson's artillery, consisted of but 1500 men fit for duty—150 were on the different guards and pickets, and therefore not in the action; so that the American force actually engaged did not exceed 1200 men.

To the immortal honor of our arms, therefore, it may be safely affirmed, that 1200 Americans, many of them raw recruits, under the guidance of the intrepid Scott, and equally gallant Leavenworth, M'Niel, Jessup and Towson, defeated in *fair field fight*, 1700 veteran British troops, consisting of the Royal Scots, the Prince Regent's and the King's own, led on and encouraged by the heroic example of Gen. Riall.

Among the officers noticed for bravery and good conduct by Gen. Brown, are General Ripley, from whom he received every assistance that he gave him an oppor-

severely, shot below the knee and bone fractured. Lt. De Witt, 25th do severely. Lieut. Patchin, badly, flesh wound in the thigh. Lt. Briemhall, slightly.

tunity of rendering—General Porter, whose conduct was conspicuously gallant—his own family, consisting of Col. Gardner, Major Jones, and his aids Austin and Spencer, who yield to none in honorable zeal, intelligence and attention to duty—Capt. Biddle of the artillery, who brought a wounded man from the field who had been abandoned by Capt. Treat—Major Camp, deputy quarter master general, for great exertions in procuring means for crossing the Niagara, and Capt. Deliza, of the ordnance department, who rendered every service in his power.

In the report of General Scott many additional officers are named: among these is Capt. Ketchum, who was detached with his company to attack a much superior force, and who gallantly sustained himself in the execution of his orders until relieved by Major Jessup, who marched to his support. Captain Harrison was struck by a cannon ball which shattered and carried away a part of his leg; he nevertheless refused any assistance from the ranks until the enemy should be beaten. "To mention them in order of their rank," says the General, "Majors Jessup, Leavenworth, and M'Neil, and Capt. Towson, deserve, in my humble opinion, every thing which conspicuous skill and gallantry can wish from a grateful country." Major Wood of the engineers and Captain Harris of the dragoons could not be restrained from joining during the action; the latter had a horse shot under him. Captain Crooker particularly distinguished himself in a skirmish on the 4th. Major Hindman, Captains Hull and Ritchie, Lts. Campbell, Randolph, and Smuck are also noticed for their bravery.

The victorious army remained four days near the bat-

The ground, and then took up its line of march for Queenstown. The enemy but feebly opposed the passage of the Chippewa. Gen. Riall with the British forces fell back to the Twelve Mile creek, and threw a part of his troops into Fort George. The American army advanced to within three miles of the lake. Gen. P. B. Porter reconnoitred the fort and offered battle to the enemy, who declined leaving their defences to risk the doubtful issue of a fight, when they were well informed that the main army under General Brown was at hand.

It would appear from the correspondence between General Brown and Com. Chauncey that a prompt co-operation of the fleet with the land forces was expected by the general. Whether he had just grounds for this expectation or not, no aid was afforded, and the reader will, with the documents before him, make his own comments and draw his own inferences.

Copy of a letter from Major General Brown to Commodore Chauncey, dated

H. Q. QUENSTOWN, JULY 18, 1814.

MY DEAR SIR,

I arrived at this place on the 10th, as I assured you, that with the blessing of God I would. All accounts agree that the force of the enemy in Kingston is very light. Meet me on the lake shore north of Ft. George with your fleet, and we will be able, I have no doubt, to settle a plan of operation that will break the power of the enemy in Upper Canada, and that in the course of a short time. At all events, let me hear from you; I have looked for your fleet with the greatest anxiety since the 10th. I do not doubt my

ability to meet the enemy in the field, and to march in any direction over his country, your fleet carrying for me the necessary supplies. We can threaten Forts George and Niagara, and carry Burlington Heights and York, and proceed directly to Kingston and carry that place. For God's sake let me see you; Sir James will not fight, two of his vessels are now in Niagara river.

If you conclude to meet me at the head of the lake, and that immediately, have the goodness to bring the guns and troops that I have ordered from the Harbor. At all events have the politeness to let me know what aid I am to expect from the fleet on Lake Ontario.

There is not a doubt resting in my mind but we have between us the command of sufficient means to conquer Upper Canada within two months, if there is a prompt and zealous cooperation and a vigorous application of these means; now is our time before the enemy can be greatly reinforced.

JACOB BROWN.

Commodore Chauncey.

Copy of a letter from Commodore Chauncey to Major General Brown, dated

U. S. Ship Superior, off Kingston, }
August 10, 1814. }

SIR—Your letter of the 13th ult. was received by me on a sick bed, hardly able to hear it read, and entirely unfit to reply to it. I, however, requested Gen. Gaines to acquaint you with my situation, the probable time of the fleet's sailing, and my views of the extent of its cooperation with the army.

From the tenor of your letter, it would appear that you had calculated upon the cooperation of the fleet.

You cannot surely have forgotten the conversation we held on the subject at Sackett's Harbor, previous to your departure for Niagara. I then professed to feel it my duty as well as inclination, to afford every assistance in my power to the army, and to cooperate with it whenever it could be done without losing sight of this great object, for the attainment of which this fleet has been created, to wit: the capture or destruction of the enemy's fleet. But I then distinctly stated to you, that this was a primary object, and would be first attempted; and that you must not expect the fleet at the head of the lake, unless that of the enemy should induce us to follow him there.

I will not suffer myself to believe that this conversation was misunderstood or has since been forgotten. How then shall I account for the intimation thrown out to the public in your despatch to the Secretary of War, that you expected the fleet to cooperate with you? Was it friendly, or just or honorable, not only to furnish an opening to the public, but thus to assist them, to infer that I have pledged myself to meet you on a particular day, at the head of the lake, for the purpose of cooperation? and in case of disaster to your army, thus to turn their resentment from you, who are alone responsible, upon me, who could not by any possibility have prevented or retarded even your discomfiture? You well know, sir, that the fleet could not have rendered you the least service during your late incursion upon Upper Canada. You have not been able to approach Lake Ontario on any point nearer than Queens-town, and the enemy were then in possession of all the country between that place and the shore of Ontario; and that I could not even communicate with you with-

out making a circuit of 70 or 80 miles. I would ask, of what possible use the fleet would have been to you, either in threatening or invading Fort George, when the shallowness of the water alone would prevent an approach with these ships, within two miles of that fort or Niagara? To pretend that the fleet could render the least assistance in your projected capture of Burlington Heights on your route to Kingston, is still more romantic, for it is well known that the fleet could not approach within 9 miles of those Heights.

That you might find the fleet somewhat of a convenience in the transportation of provisions and stores for the use of the army & an agreeable appendage to attend its marches and counter-marches, I am ready to believe. But, sir, the Secretary of the Navy has honored us with a higher destiny—we are intended to seek and to fight the enemy's fleet. This is the great purpose of the government in creating this fleet; and I shall not be diverted in my efforts to effectuate it by any sinister attempt to render us subordinate to, or an appendage of, the army.

We have one common object in the annoyance, defeat and destruction of the enemy; and I shall always cheerfully unite with any military commander in the promotion of that object.

I am, sir, &c.

I. CHAUNCEY.

Major General Jacob Brown.

While the American army remained in the vicinity of Fort George, the enemy were actively engaged in concentrating their forces. The militia were called out *en masse* from Long Point to the bay of Quinte; in

short the whole population of the Peninsula were in requisition. General Riall had been reinforced with the garrison of Burlington Heights, 300 strong, and the Glengary light infantry from York, 400 strong. The whole regular force in the Peninsula at this period, has been stated at from 10 to 15,000 men.

In a justificatory pamphlet published by a friend of General Ripley, it is said that General Scott was for investing Fort George; that General Ripley made a proposition to march on the night of the 14th of July with his brigade, and Towson's and Biddle's artillery to attack General Riall at revilee, so as to bring him to action, and for Generals Scott and Porter to be kept in supporting distance; and Col. Hindman to bring up the park of artillery of reserve.

The reasons General Ripley assigned for this movement were, 'that if we moved against Ft. George, we could not carry it. To think of storming it, was out of the question; and to invest it, would be perfectly absurd, for we had only our eighteen pounders to besiege a place where by dismantling Niagara, 30 heavy pieces could be brought to bear upon us. That if we invested Fort George, we should waste a few days, which would give the enemy an opportunity to reinforce from Kingston; and if this were allowed them, as we only had an effective force of 26 or 2700 men, our movement must resolve itself into a retrograde one for our own security. But on the other hand, if we attack Riall, and break him down before he could be reinforced, the Peninsula was within our power. This proposition was supported by Gen. Porter, Col. M'Ree and Col. Wood. Colonel Hindman gave no opinion. Generals Brown and Scott, and Col. Gardner were op-

posed to it, and in favor of investing Fort George. The movement was made on Fort George the 16th of July; and on the 23d, without even opening a single trench, the forces retrograded. They fell back to Chippewa the 24th; and on that evening, Gen. Drummond arrived with three fresh battalions from Kingston; several battalions of militia were concentrated, and Gen. Riall with a force of about 3000 strong, moved forward his camp to Lundy's Lane."

In the reconnoissance of Fort George, General John Swift of the N. Y. volunteers, fell by the hand of a British soldier. The general by judicious arrangements, succeeded with a party of volunteers in capturing, without the discharge of a gun, a picket consisting of a corporal and five men, one of whom shot the general through the breast after they had surrendered.

The discharge of the gun aimed at the general drew a patrolling party of the enemy to the spot, 50 or 60 strong. But the general was not to be restrained by a mortal wound; he formed his men and fell exhausted at the very moment he saw the enemy give way. He was borne to camp by his men.

General Swift had served seven years in the revolutionary war. Every energy of his soul was consecrated to his country. His loss excited general regret.

The army remained two days before Fort George, and then retrograded to Queenstown. Gen. Porter's command succeeded in taking several prisoners from the enemy's light troops who hovered about the Heights.

About this time Captain Stone of the N. Y. volunteers was dismissed the service by a peremptory order of General Brown, for an alledged disobedience of or-

ders, in permitting or conniving at the burning of the village of St. Davids, by a part of his command. Capt. Stone declared that he had no agency in the transaction, that his men put fire to the houses when he was not present.

On the 23d of July Gen. Brown received information that the heavy guns which had been previously ordered from Sackett's Harbor, to be employed in the siege of Forts George and Niagara, were blockaded in that port, together with a rifle regiment that had been ordered up with them; and that no prospect then remained of their arriving, he retraced his steps to Chippewa and encamped near the battle ground of the 5th.

BATTLE OF THE CATERACT.

General Brown's Report of this Battle, to the Secretary of War.

SIR--Confined as I was, and have been, since the last engagement with the enemy, I fear that the account I am about to give, may be less full and satisfactory, than under other circumstances it might have been made. I particularly fear, that the conduct of the gallant men it was my good fortune to lead, will not be noticed in a way due to their fame and the honor of our country.

You are already apprized that the army had on the 25th ult. taken a position at Chippewa—About noon of that day, Col. Swift, who was posted at Lewistown, advised me by express, that the enemy appeared in considerable force in Queenstown, and on its heights; that four of the enemy's fleet had arrived during the preceding night, and were then lying near Fort Niagara, and that a number of boats were in view moving up the streight. Within a few minutes after this intelligence had been received, I was further informed by Captain Denmon, of the quarter master's department, that the enemy was landing at Lewistown, and that our baggage and stores at Schlosser, and on their way thither, were in danger of immediate capture. It is proper here to mention, that having received advices as late as the 20th from Gen. Gaines that our fleet was then in port and the Commodore sick, we ceased to look for cooper-

ation from that quarter, and determined to disencumber ourselves of baggage, and march directly for Burlington Heights. To mask this intention, and to draw from Schlosser a small supply of provisions, I fell back upon Chippewa. As this arrangement, under the increased force of the enemy, left much at hazard on our side of the Niagara, and as it appeared by the before stated information, that the enemy was about to avail himself of it, I conceived that the most effectual method of recalling him from this object, was to put myself in motion towards Queenstown. General Scott, with the first brigade, Towson's artillery, and all the dragoons and mounted men, were accordingly put in march on the road leading thither, with orders to report if the enemy appeared, and to call for assistance, if that was necessary. On the General's arrival at the Falls, he learned that the enemy was in force directly in front—a narrow piece of woods alone intercepting his view of them. Waiting only to give this information he advanced upon them. By the time Assistant Adjutant General (Jones) had delivered his message, the action began, and before the remaining part of the division had crossed the Chippewa, it became close and general between the advanced corps. Though Gen. Ripley with the 2d brigade, Major Hindman with the corps of artillery, and Gen. Porter at the head of his command had respectively pressed forward with ardor, it was not less than an hour before they were brought to sustain General Scott, during which time his command most skilfully and gallantly maintained the conflict. Upon my arrival I found that the General had passed the wood and engaged the enemy on the Queenstown road and on the ground to the left of it, with the 9th, 11th, and 22d regiments

and Towson's artillery. The 25th had been thrown to the right to be governed by circumstances. Apprehending that these corps were much exhausted, and knowing that they had suffered severely, I determined to interpose a new line with the advancing troops, and thus disengage General Scott and hold his brigade in reserve. Orders were accordingly given to General Ripley. The enemy's artillery at this moment occupied a hill which gave him great advantages, and was the key of the whole position. It was supported by a line of infantry. To secure the victory, it was necessary to carry this artillery and seize the height. This duty was assigned to Colonel Miller, while, to favor its execution, the 1st regiment under the command of Col. Nicholas, was directed to menace and amuse the infantry. To my great mortification this regiment after a discharge or two, gave way and retreated some distance before it could be rallied, though it is believed the officers of the regiment exerted themselves to shorten this distance. In the mean time, Col. Miller, without regard to this occurrence, advanced steadily and gallantly to his object and carried the height and the cannon. General Ripley brought up the 23d (which had also faltered) to his support and the enemy disappeared from before them. The 1st regiment was now brought into line on the left of the 21st, and the detachments of the 17th and 19th, General Porter occupying, with his command the extreme left. About this time Col. Miller carried the enemy's cannon. The 25th reg't under Maj. Jessup, was engaged in a more obstinate conflict with all that remained to dispute with us the field of battle. The Major, as has been already stated, had been ordered by General Scott, at the commencement of the action, to

take ground to his right. He had succeeded in turning the enemy's left flank—had captured (by a detachment under Capt. Ketchum) General Riall and sundry other officers, and shewed himself again to his own army, in a blaze of fire, which defeated or destroyed a very superior force of the enemy. He was ordered to form on the right of the 2d regiment. The enemy rallying his forces, and as is believed, having received reinforcements, now attempted to drive us from our position and regain his artillery. Our line was unshaken, and the enemy were repulsed. Two other attempts having the same object, had the same issue. Gen. Scott was again engaged in repelling the former of these; and the last I saw of him on the field of battle, he was near the head of his column, and giving to its march a direction that would have placed him on the enemy's right. It was with great pleasure I saw the good order and intrepidity of General Porter's volunteers from the moment of their arrival, but during the last charge of the enemy, those qualities were conspicuous. Stimulated by the examples set them by their gallant leader, by Major Wood of the Pennsylvania corps, by Col. Dobbin of New York, and by their officers generally, they precipitated themselves upon the enemy's line, and made all the prisoners which were taken at this point of the action.

Having been for some time wounded, and being a good deal exhausted by loss of blood, it became my wish to devolve the command on General Scott, and retire from the field; but on enquiry, I had the misfortune to learn, that he was disabled by wounds: I therefore kept my post, and had the satisfaction to see the last effort repulsed. I now consigned the command to Gen. Ripley.

While retiring from the field, I saw and felt that the victory was complete on our part, if proper measures were promptly adopted to secure it. The exhaustion of the men, was however such as made some refreshment necessary. They particularly required water. I myself was extremely sensible of the want of this necessary article. I therefore believed it proper that Gen. Ripley and the troops should return to camp, after bringing off the dead, the wounded and the artillery; and in this I saw no difficulty, as the enemy had entirely ceased to act. Within an hour after my arrival in camp, I was informed that General Ripley had returned without molestation and in good order. I now sent for him and after giving him my reasons for the measure I was about to adopt ordered him to put the troops into the best possible condition; to give to them the necessary refreshments; to take with him the piquets and camp guards, and every other description of force; to put himself on the field of battle as the day dawned, and there to meet and beat the enemy if he again appeared. To this order he made no objection, and I relied upon its execution. It was not executed. I feel most sensibly how inadequate are my powers in speaking of the troops, to do justice either to their merits or to my own sense of them. Under abler direction, they might have done more and better.

From the preceding detail, you have new evidence of the distinguished gallantry of Generals Scott and Porter, of Colonel Miller and Major Jessup.

Of the 1st brigade, the Chief, with his aid de camp Worth, his Major of brigade Smith, and every commander of battallion, were wounded.

The 2d brigade suffered less; but as a brigade, their

conduct entitled them to the applause of their country. After the enemy's strong position had been carried by the 21st, and the detachments of the 17th and 19th, the 1st and 25th assumed a new character. They could not again be shaken or dismayed. Major M'Farland of the latter, fell nobly at the head of his battalion.

Under the command of General Porter, the militia volunteers of Pennsylvania and New York stood undismayed amidst the hottest fire and repulsed the veterans opposed to them. The Canadian volunteers, commanded by Col. Wilson, are reported by General Porter as having merited and received his approbation.

The corps of artillery commanded by Major Hindman behaved with its usual gallantry. Capt. Towson's company, attached to the 1st brigade, was the first and last engaged, and during the whole conflict, maintained that high character which they had previously won by their skill and their valor. Capts. Biddle and Ritchie were both wounded early in the action, but refused to quit the field. The latter declared that he never would leave his piece; and, true to his engagement, fell by its side, covered with wounds.

The staff of the army had its peculiar merit and distinction. Colonel Gardner, adjutant general, though ill, was on horseback and did all in his power; his assistant, Major Jones, was very active and useful. My gallant aids de camp, Austin and Spencer, had many and critical duties to perform, in the discharge of which the latter fell; I shall ever think of this young man with pride and regret; regret that his career has been so short; pride, that he has been so noble and distinguished. The Engineers, Majors M'Ree and Wood, were greatly distinguished on this day, and their

high military talents exerted with great effect; they were much under my eye and near my person, and to their assistance a great deal is fairly to be ascribed. I most earnestly recommend them, as worthy of the highest trust and confidence. The staff of Generals Ripley and Porter discovered great zeal and attention to duty. Lieut. E. B. Randolph of the 20th regiment is entitled to notice, his courage was conspicuous.

I inclose a return of our loss; those noted as missing, may generally be numbered with the dead. The enemy had but little opportunity of making prisoners.

I have the honor to be, sir, &c, &c.

JACOB BROWN.

Hon. J. Armstrong, Sec'y of War.

Report of the killed, wounded and missing of the Left Division of the army commanded by Major General Brown, in the action of the afternoon and night of the 25th July, 1814, at the Falls of Niagara.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, }
FORT ERIE, July 30, 1814. }

General Staff—wounded, 1 major general, 1 aid de camp.

Light dragoons—killed, 1 corporal; wounded, two privates.

Artillery—killed, 1 captain, 1 corporal, 8 privates; wounded, 1 captain, 2 subalterns, 1 sergeant, 2 corporals, 1 musician, 28 privates; missing, 1 private.

First or Brig. Gen. Scott's Brigade.

Brigade staff; wounded, 1 brigadier general, 1 aid de camp, 1 brigade major.

9th infantry; killed, 1 captain, 2 subalterns, 1 ser-

giant, 1 corporal, 11 privates; wounded, 1 major, 1 quartermaster, 1 paymaster, 1 captain, 5 subalterns, 7 sergeants, 5 corporals, 69 privates; missing, 1 subaltern, 1 sergeant major, 2 sergeants, 11 privates.

11th infantry; killed, 1 captain, 2 sergeants, 4 corporals, 2 privates; wounded, 1 major, 1 captain, 5 subalterns, 1 sergeant major, 1 chief musician, 7 sergeants, 3 corporals, 1 musician, 82 privates; missing, 1 subaltern, 2 privates.

22d infantry; killed, 2 sergeants, 1 corporal, 33 privates; wounded, 1 colonel, 2 captains, 4 subalterns, 9 sergeants, 11 corporals, 1 musician, 62 privates; missing, 3 subalterns, 2 sergeants, 12 privates.

25th infantry; killed, 1 captain, 1 subaltern, 26 privates; wounded, 1 major, 1 adjutant, 1 quartermaster, 1 subaltern, 6 sergeants, 6 corporals, 50 privates; missing, 1 sergeant, 2 corporals, 19 privates.

Second or Brig. Gen. Ripley's Brigade.

1st infantry; killed, 11 privates; wounded, 2 subalterns, 18 privates; missing, 1 corporal 1 private.

21st infantry; killed, 1 subaltern, 2 sergeants 1 corporal, 11 privates; wounded, 1 captain, 5 subalterns, 1 sergeant, 53 privates; missing, 19 privates.

23d infantry; killed, 1 major, 2 sergeants, 7 privates; wounded, 1 captain, 6 subalterns, 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, 43 privates; missing, 3 sergeants, 2 corporals, 22 privates.

Brig. Gen. Porter's Command.

Brigade staff; 1 brigade major missing.

Canadian volunteers; killed, 1 private; wounded, 2 privates; missing, 8 privates.

Pennsylvania volunteers; killed, 1 adjutant, 1 ser-

geant, 9 privates ; wounded, 1 major, 1 quartermaster, 1 subaltern, 21 privates ; missing, 1 captain.

New York volunteers ; killed, 1 captain, 1 corporal, 2 privates ; wounded, 1 lieutenant colonel, 1 subaltern, 2 sergeants, 1 corporal, 9 privates ; missing, 1 subaltern.

Grand Total.

Killed, 1 major, 1 adjutant, 5 captains, 4 subalterns, 10 sergeants, 10 corporals, 140 privates. Total 171.

Wounded, 1 major general, 1 brigadier general, 2 aids de camp, 1 brigade major, 1 colonel, 1 lieut. colonel, 4 majors, 1 adjutant, 3 quartermasters, 1 paymaster, 7 captains, 32 subalterns, 1 sergeant major, 1 chief musician, 34 sergeants, 29 corporals, 3 musicians, 449 privates. Total 572.

Missing, 1 brigade major, 1 captain, 6 subalterns, 1 sergeant major, 8 sergeants, 5 corporals, 95 privates. Total, 117.

C. K. GARDNER, *Adj. Gen.*

Officers Killed.

Maj. M'Farland, 23d infantry.
 Capt. Ritchie, corps of artillery.
 Capt. Hull, 9th infantry.
 Capt. Kinney, 25th do.
 Capt. Goodrich, 11th do.
 1st Lieut. Bigelow, 21st do.
 1st Lieut. Turner 9th do.
 2d Lieut. Burghardt, 9th do.
 Ensign Hunter. 25th do.
 Capt. Hooper, N. Y. volunteers.
 Adj. Poe, Penn. volunteers.

Officers Wounded.

Maj. General Brown, severely wounded through the thigh and in the side.

Capt. Spencer, aid to the maj. gen. through the body, supposed to be mortal

Artillery—Capt. Biddle, slightly, shot wound in the neck and arm.

2d Lieut. Campbell, badly, shot through the leg.

2d Lieut. Schmuck, severely.

First Brigade.

Brig. Gen. Scott, severely, shoulder fractured and wounded in the side.

Lt. J. D. Smith, 6th inf'y, brigade major, badly, thro' the leg.

Lt. Worth, 23d infantry, aid de camp, severely, grape shot in the thigh.

9th infantry—Maj. Leavenworth, slightly, contusion in the side.

Capt. W. L. Foster, slightly, in the shoulder.

Lt. and paymaster Fowle, slightly, shot in the foot.

Lt. and qr. master Browning, slightly, in the face.

2d Lt. Fisher, severely, shot in the head and wrist.

3d Lt. Cushman, slightly, in the thigh and shoulder.

Ensign G. Jacobs, severely, shot in the knee.

Ensign J. P. Jacobs, slightly, in the shoulder.

Ensign Blake, slightly, in the knee.

11th infantry—Maj. M'Neil, severely, cannister shot in the knee.

Capt. Briss, badly, shot in the leg.

1st Lieut. Hall, slightly, shot in the thigh.

2d Lt. Cooper, slightly, contusion in the breast.

3d Lt. Stephenson, slightly, in the thigh.

Ensign Bedford, slightly, hurt in the abdomen by a splinter.

Ensign Thompson, (26th, doing duty in the 11th) severely, shot wound in the side.

22d infantry—Col. Brady, severely shot wound in the side and hip.

Capt. Pentland, severely wounded and a prisoner.

Capt. Foulk, severely, shot wound in the side.

1st Lieutenant Culbertson, severely, shot wound in the leg.

1st Lieut. Ferguson, severely, shot in the hand from a cannister.

2d Lt. Armstrong, dangerously, shot wound in the shoulder.

3d Lt. Bean, slightly, shot in the foot.

25th infantry—Major Jessup, severely, shot wounds in the hand and shoulder.

Lieut. and adj. Shaylor, severely, shot wounds in the arm and side.

Lt. and quartermaster M'Glassin, badly, shot wounds in the shoulder.

3d Lieutenant Glafford, severely, shot wounds in the hip.

Second Brigade.

1st infantry—1st Lt. Vasquez, slightly, shot in the thigh, and bayoneted in the leg.

1st Lieut. Bissel, slightly, in the leg.

21st infantry—Captain Burbank, severely, shoulder fractured.

1st Lieut. Cilley, severely, thigh fractured.

2d Lieut. Fisk, (of the 19th attach'd) slightly, in the breast.

Ensign Jones, slightly, flesh wound in the wrist.

Ens'n Camp, 2d rifle regt. (serving with the regt. attach'd) flesh wound in the ankle.

Ensign Thomas, slightly, contusion in the back.

23d infantry—Capt. Odell, severely, shot wound in the arm.

1st Lt. H. Whiting, severely, in the neck.

2d Lt. Ingersol, slightly, in the foot.

2d Lt. Tappan, slightly, in the head.

3d Lt. Abeal, slightly, in the leg.

3d Lt. Deidreich, slightly, in the arm.

3d Lt. Lamb, severely, in the leg.

Brig. Gen. Porter's Command.

New York volunteers—Lt. Col. Dobbin, slightly, shot in the breast.

Lieut. O'Fling, slightly, spent common shot in the shoulder.

Pennsylvania volunteers.—Major Wood, severely, musket shots in the arm and foot, and bruised by his horse being shot and falling on him.

Quartermaster Maclay, severely, musket shots in the head and twice through the leg.

Lt. Dick, severely, shot in the hand.

Brig. Gen. Porter was slightly wounded, but declined being reported.

Officers Missing.

1st Lt. Perry, 9th infantry, a prisoner.

3d Lt. Webster, 11th do. severely shot in the head, and taken prisoner.

Lieuts. Sturgis, Keps and Davidson, 22d infantry, supposed to be killed:

Volunteers—Brig. Maj. Stanton, of N. York, taken prisoner.

Capt. Roberts, of Penn. taken prisoner.

Lt. Hant, of N. York, supposed to be killed.

No battle of the war, perhaps none in the annals of

the world can compare with this in the horror and awful grandeur of its character. If the great battles of Austerlitz, Jena, and Mount St. Jean surpass that of the Cateact in the number of the combatants, and of the slain, it must be recollected that those actions were fought in open day, and by armies forming a line of many leagues extent—that in no instance did the defeated party return three several times to the charge over the dead bodies of their companions; and this in the gloom of night.

Here the conflicting armies closed at the moment the light of day was yielding to the empire of darkness, which gave an indescribable effect to the blaze of the guns, and the terrors of the fight. In no other action ever recorded was the loss in killed and wounded so great, in proportion to the number engaged. Nearly two thirds of the American troops were either killed or wounded. Almost every officer of distinction was wounded. An equal, probably a greater loss, fell on the enemy. What a scene of carnage must the battle ground have presented! No parallel can be found in history, where both parties fought with such determined bravery and suffered such a horrible loss. Of more than 2000 Americans who went into battle, not more than 700 escaped unhurt. The superior numbers of the enemy enabled them to renew the attack until our troops were diminished to about one third of their original number. Yet like a wall of granite they remained immovable amid repeated shocks and surrounding horrors, with their feet inundated with the blood of their enemies, they waded in gore to victory. In the intervals of the charges, darkness veiled the appalling spectacle but their ears were stunned with the cries of the

wounded and dying—while the tremendous force of the cataract shook the astonished earth beneath their feet ; for it is here that nature appears in all the majesty of her power. Never was human firmness put to so severe a trial. Where is the cold hearted ingrate that can withhold his admiration from such intrepid defenders ? Can the Republic tarnish her glory by forgetting the services of the heroes of Niagara ?

The official censure of General Ripley's conduct in not renewing the action on the morning of the 26th of July, which appears in Gen. Brown's statement of the battle has drawn from the officers* friendly to the reputation of Gen. Ripley, a voluminous series of letters and statements in which they not only exonerate him in the most pointed manner, from all blame in the transaction, but ascribe to his prudent foresight, bravery and consummate military skill the salvation of the wreck of the army put in jeopardy of total annihilation by the temerity of General Scott and the injudicious dispositions of General Brown !

In armies, as in courts and politics, there will be courtiers and factions ; and brave men may be allowed to be jealous of military glory, obtained by privations, fatigue and an almost constant exposure of life. The best officers may for once endanger the success of a battle by a premature movement and an erroneous impression as to the force or intentions of his enemy.

* Among the long list of officers who have come forward in defence of Gen. Ripley's military character we observe the names of Gen. Miller, Col's Leavenworth and Hindman, Majors Noon, Foster, Browning, Burbank, Marston, Odell and Romaine, Captains Clark, Perry, M'Donald, &c.

Cæsar was not always victorious. The great Napoleon was fairly foiled in his attempts upon St. Jean d'Acre; and but for the opportune arrival of the immortal Desaix he would have lost the battle of Marengo. Bulow saved Blucher and Wellington at Waterloo. A single ball sometimes decides the fate of battles by prostrating the leader of a charge, the success of which would have determined the victory.

A correspondent friendly to General Ripley describes this memorable battle in these words:—

No battle perhaps in the annals of the world was more obstinately contested or attended with greater or more frightful carnage, according to the number engaged. The scales of victory for many hours were doubtfully suspended; sometimes vibrating on one side and sometimes on the other, alternately promising and threatening to either party, the glory of triumph or the disgrace of defeat, until at length the God of battles and the divinity of fortune, crowned our arms with glorious success. The American soldiers flushed with the pride of recent triumphs over the boasted conquerors of Europe, and animated with the spirit of liberty and a love of glory peculiar to freemen, distinguished themselves by daring achievements, worthy the heroes of a Grecian band or a Roman legion in the proudest days of those republics. They showed to tyrants and to the world how unavailing is the most perfect order of slavish discipline, opposed to the resistless impetuosity of republican valor. They may venture to assert without the imputation of vanity or weakness, that the heights of Bridgewater, and the plains of Chippawa, will remain to the latest posterity, as lasting monuments of human greatness and human glory, as those of Thermopylæ, and

Marathon. Commanders in after ages of our republic will refer to them for the most brilliant examples of patriotic devotion, and heroic achievement, to rekindle the expiring flames of independence, liberty and glory, in the bosoms of their degenerate and disanimated legions. Their bare recital will relume the dying fire of patriotism and valor in their languid souls, and prompt them to a glorious and successful emulation of their fathers.

The number and situation of the enemy was not precisely known upon the day of the engagement, though it afterwards appeared that he was about 4000 strong, and had advanced to the heights of Queenstown. The number of our respective corps was as follows :

The first brigade under General Scott, consisted of about 700 effective men, and the second brigade under General Ripley, amounted to about the same number. The volunteers, under General Porter, did not exceed 500 capable of duty. The number of artillerists and dragoons is not precisely ascertained ; they probably amounted to 200 fit for service, making in the whole a force of 2,500 men, rank and file.

Upon the 25th, about 6 o'clock, P. M. General Scott with the first brigade marched from camp, on the high road to Fort George, without sending in advance any reconnoitering party of light troops to ascertain the position, number, or approach of the enemy, to guard against a surprise or to facilitate a retreat to the main body of the army, if occasion should require. Whether he moved from the order of the commander, or his own inclination, with an expectation of a battle or for parade and drill, was unknown in camp at that time. If he went out to give the enemy battle agreeably to orders, why was not our whole disposable force direct-

ed to accompany or follow him? If the enterprize was only for ostentation, why was he permitted to jeopardize his gallant band and the whole army, exposing himself to be surprised and attacked alone so far from camp by the whole British army? These are things yet involved in impenetrable mystery, which time, the retrospective and prospective expounder of events only can reveal. If the commander in chief ordered the movement of General Scott, he must be deservedly suspected of military incapacity, if he only permitted it, he must be justly considered guilty of notorious imprudence. If General Scott made the movement without orders, he is justly chargeable with rashness, or folly, which we shall see in the progress of events, would inevitably have destroyed the whole army, and blasted the glories of the day if they had not been fortunately retrieved by the superior ability, skill, enterprize and valor of General Ripley. When Gen. Scott had proceeded about two miles from camp, he was attacked by the whole British forces, by a discharge of musketry from their whole line. Upon this signal our camp was alarmed and General Ripley ordered his brigade to be formed. In the mean time the thunder of artillery announced the reality, fury and inequality of the contest, and excited in every bosom the most painful apprehensions for the fate of the first brigade before we could arrive to support them. Orders were soon received from General Brown, through Captain Spencer, his aid, for the second brigade to repair to the scene of action, for the relief of General Scott's corps, whose ranks were now frightfully thinned and reluctantly recoiling from the unequal contest. General Ripley instantly obeyed the order by directing us to march,

and when we had proceeded to within half a mile of the field of battle, he was ordered to form his brigade in line near the skirts of a wood to the right of General Scott's, and advance upon the enemy. But from the difficulty, if not impracticability of proceeding in line, through the woods, he resolved to advance within reach of the foe before he formed. Although this was taking upon himself a high responsibility, yet the order was so absurd that he dared to disobey, and the success attending his after movements seem clearly to justify the measure. Though a scrupulous obedience to the orders of superiors in an army is generally a sacred duty, and a sure pledge of victory, yet the incompetency or mistake of a commander, may sometimes allow and require a partial defection from them. It would have been admissible and even meritorious for the officers of Gen. Hull, at the capture and surrender of Detroit, and seems tolerable and even laudable for Gen. Ripley on this occasion.

In performing the proposed movement of Gen. Ripley, we suffered great annoyance and sustained considerable loss from the constant and destructive fire of the enemy's battery, which was chiefly directed at General Scott's mutilated and almost exhausted corps, which we were about passing to form in line upon their left.

The enemy's artillery was placed upon an eminence and from its destructive effect upon our advancing columns, the general was sensible unless they were taken we should be compelled to retire or be overpowered. He accordingly asked Colonel Miller if he could storm and take them. The intrepid though modest hero replied, "*I can try,*" an answer truly worthy a Leonidas and a Milliadés, and shows the striking difference between real magnanimity and empty daring.

At this time General Scott's corps was about a quarter of a mile in the rear having ceased firing, the volunteer corps under the command of General Porter was not yet marshalled in the field, and our artillerists, and dragoons were not then nor afterwards advantageously engaged in the action, on account of the peculiar situation of the contending armies.

Agreeably to the orders of general Ripley, Colonel Miller formed his regiment directly in front of the batteries and with a quick step advanced to storm and take them, under a tremendous fire which supplied the light of day, and produced most frightful chasms along his line, yet it did not in the least repel, disorder or check the rapid and steady march of the assailants; like the Gallic chief and his brave companions at the bridge of Lodi, or the Spartan chief and his chosen band at the streights of Thermopylæ they had resolved to conquer or to die. In the mean time the 23d regiment was ordered to move in column to the left for the purpose of annoying the enemy in flank. In the execution of this order they were partially repulsed, by a discharge of musketry from the enemy's right wing, but they were soon rallied by their general in person and proceeded to attack the enemy as first directed. By this time the gallant Miller had taken the enemy's batteries consisting of nine pieces of cannon, and after a stubborn and bloody contest, had forced him to abandon his position. The two lines were not more than 20 yards distant from each other, during the transaction. The darkness of night was by turns dispelled and the light of day resumed by the incessant and tremendous fire of the contending armies. During these operations of the

21st regiment, the 23d was attacking the enemy's right wing and compelled it to fall back with the center. Previous to the success of the 23d, the 21st was almost overpowered by superior numbers, but at this trying crisis, was seasonably and happily relieved by the arrival of the 22d, and the enemy was completely driven from the heights. Soon after the three regiments were formed in line forward of the captured batteries, together with 200 men of the 1st regiment, waiting with impatience another charge of the enemy. A considerable interval succeeded, in which General Ripley and General Brown met and conferred together some time. The former requested the latter to give orders and provide means to remove the captured cannon from the field, which seemed to be the principal object of contention, and which we shall see in the course of events, induced several desperate charges of the enemy to retake them. Time and means were then in our power and should have been improved. The superfluous horses of our artillery, and all our volunteer corps might have been employed for the purpose. The first were never engaged in the action, and the last only at the close of the engagement. General Brown, however, disregarded the request at this time, and soon after destroyed the means by ordering the artillery horses to camp. And those trophies so dearly won and expensively defended, finally fell into the hands of the enemy when we returned to our encampment. The exhausted men could not drag them, and if they could they had no ropes for the purpose. However painful or invidious the task may be, of canvassing the conduct of illustrious men in civil or military life, it becomes our duty in recording their actions, for the instruction and advantage of the world.

impartially to state their capacity and incapacity, their virtues and their faults. It serves, like a beacon to the mariner, for future statesmen and commanders to avoid the rocks and quick sands to which they are exposed. Therefore we cannot avoid the expression of our opinion, that General Brown in this affair is chargeable with an unpardonable improvidence, if not with criminal neglect; and that Gen. Ripley, so often but mistakenly blamed in the business should be acquitted of remissness or imprudence. After this interview and conference of the two Generals concerning the removal of the captured artillery, the battle was soon renewed. The 25th regiment of the first brigade under the command of the able and gallant Colonel Jessup joined the second brigade and was formed on the right to flank and annoy the enemy in his after attacks; which disposition was attended with the most brilliant success. They not only distressingly annoyed the enemy, but succeeded in capturing Major General Riall and a greater number of other officers and men, than was taken during the whole conflict.

The peculiar honor of capturing General Riall is due to Captain Ketchum, which justly entitles him to the attention of his government and will inevitably procure him the just confidence and grateful plaudits of his country.

While the line was thus formed upon the eminence, the enemy advanced and made a most violent charge upon our whole force. General Ripley ordered our men to reserve their fire until the enemy approached within reach of our bayonets, and firstly to receive their fire. The advantage of distance and light afforded to take aim, rendered our vollies more certain and

tremendously destructive ; while the enemy, from the lowness of his position in ascending the heights from which he had been driven, and the darkness of his view, generally fired over our heads. This order of the general was promptly obeyed and with the most desired success ; for after a few discharges in this way, the enemy was again routed and compelled to retire. An interval of half an hour ensued, when the enemy again advanced and impetuously attacked our whole line, now extended by General Porter's corps of volunteers upon the left, and three battalions of General Scott's brigade upon the right. The contest was now longer, more stubborn and attended with greater carnage ; but by observing the precautions adopted in the last charge, it terminated in the entire discomfiture and retreat of the enemy. Our right and left were partially repulsed but they were rallied before the engagement ended. A cessation for three quarters of an hour now followed before a renewal of the contest, which, like a conflagration, quenched for a while by scanty showers of water, soon rekindled with more appalling and destructive fury, ruthlessly consuming what its first violence had spared.

During this interval, ancient night resumed her fearful empire and spread her shroud of gloom over the horrors of the carnage covered field, still trembling with the convulsions of the conflict. The terrific silence that prevailed was only interrupted by the agonizing groans of the dying, and the tremendous sound of Niagara's Cataract, stilled for a while by the deadly cannon's more awful roar. The intermitted beams of the pale faced Moon and affrighted stars from behind their passing clouds, by turns exposed to view

the frightful desolation of the scene, crimsoned with the blood and strewed with the mangled bodies of the dead. At length the martial clangor and exulting shouts of the advancing hosts proclaimed the renewal, the doubtful and long contested fight; which, after several impetuous charges and repulses, terminated in the complete discomfiture of the enemy, and a decisive triumph of our arms. After remaining undisputed masters of the field for some time, General Ripley retired to camp with all his forces, in pursuance of the orders of the commander in chief, in perfect order, unpursued or molested by the enemy. Having removed our wounded, we had nothing to regret or to tarnish our glory, but our inability to remove the captured artillery; which, as I before observed, fell into the hands of the enemy after our retirement from the field.

Before the close of the engagement, General Brown and Scott were wounded and retired from the scene of action, which devolved the entire command upon Gen. Ripley. During the whole conflict he displayed an ability, valor, enterprize and zeal worthy a Hannibal or a Cæsar, and proved himself truly deserving supreme command, in any age and any country. He gave his orders with coolness and deliberation, and personally attended to their execution. He constantly rode a few paces in the rear of his line, rallying the routed ranks and cheering them on to combat. He avoided every refuge of protection, every resource of safety; and at all times and on all occasions he courted every place of trial, every post of danger.

By order of General Brown he repaired on the morning of the 26th to meet the enemy and give him battle. But finding them reinforced and in possession of the

battle ground and their artillery, he wisely declined a renewal of the contest which the enemy shewed no disposition to encourage or provoke, and returned again to camp. In this disobedience of orders, which now preserved the army as the other obtained the victory, Gen. Ripley has been severely, though unjustly, blamed. But his conduct in both instances was perfectly accordant to military principles, and is supported by every intelligent officer in the army, and will be approved and commended by his country and posterity, when the dark cloud of falsehood, which has hitherto obscured the transaction, shall be dispelled by the refulgent sun of truth.

Our loss of men and officers had been immense. The first brigade marched into the field on the evening of the 25th with about 800, rank and file, and the second with about the same number. The first returned from the field with not more than two hundred, and the last with not more than four hundred men, which, together with what could be spared of the other corps from the camp and attention of the wounded, amounted perhaps to 900 men. To suppose that this small force, impaired by the hardships of the preceding day, fatigued by a march of three miles to and from camp, and exhausted for the want of sleep, could attack and vanquish an army of more than three thousand men, a great many of whom were reinforcements, the remainder refreshed by rest and sleep, and possessed of the battle ground, and artillery, is really absurd and ridiculous. Such an order could only have proceeded from gross incapability and rash ambition; unwarranted by military principles, unsupported by common discretion. Generals Brown and Scott are justly to be esteemed for their undaunted

bravery in action and honest zeal for their country, but for want of early instruction in military science, and a neglect of those precautions its practice inculcates, rendered them poorly qualified for chief commanders. The blunders they have committed and the neglects of which they have been guilty on that account, must even lessen our opinion of their abilities as generals, and will always greatly detract from their military fame. And although now undeservedly exalted at the expence of men, whose abilities, skill and valor achieved the victory's to which they owe their ephemeral renown; they will yet be reduced to a just standard of estimation by the impartial and enlightened historian, stript of the gaudy plumage with which interested knavery, deluded ignorance and blinded friendship may have clothed them.

The ability, skill and valor of individuals seems sufficiently shown by the preceding relation of events; yet I cannot omit to record the peculiar fate of Ambrose Spencer, aid to Gen. Brown. When war was declared he was a student in Columbia college, a hopeful candidate of science and literary fame. Possessed of a bold and enterprising mind, he could not remain an idle spectator of the dangers that threatened his injured and insulted country. He cheerfully volunteered in her service, and gloriously fell in her defence. Noble youth, with the gallant heroes, who have fought, bled and perished to establish and support our independence, you will live immortalized in fame, until our proudly towering empire shall be no more; or until this far spreading continent, upon which it is established, shall be lost in the final conflagration and ruin of the world.

Such was the carnage among Col. Jessup's officers, that he was obliged to place his standard in the hand of a Sergeant, whose name was Fitch.

While the colors, pierced with about seventy balls, were waving in the hand of this brave fellow, a shower of grape shot coming from the enemy, cut the staff into three pieces. Fitch deliberately gathering up the scattered fragments, turned to Jessup, who was near him, and said with a smile, "Look, Colonel, how they have cut us." In a moment afterwards, a ball passed through his body. But even that was insufficient to move him. Alike powerful in person and resolute in mind, he neither fell nor flinched; but continued to wave his mutilated standard, until, becoming faint with the loss of blood, he was forced to resign it into the hands of another.

Fitch recovered from his wound, and his good conduct being reported to the secretary of war, he was promoted to a second lieutenancy, his commission bearing date from the day on which he had thus distinguished himself.

Colonel Jessup suspecting that his troops had expended nearly all their cartridges, passed along the rear of the line, to make enquiry as to the fact. Several soldiers who lay mortally wounded, some of them actually in the agonies of death, hearing the inquiry, forgot for a moment, in their devotion to their country, both the pain they endured and the approach of death, and called out, each one for himself, "Here are cartridges in my box, take and distribute them among my companions."

A soldier in the line exclaimed to his commander "my musket is shot to pieces."—His comrade, who lay expiring with his wounds at the distance of a few feet, in a voice scarcely audible, "My musket is in excellent order—take and use her."

At a moment of the greatest confusion General Scott rode up to a large body of the British, supposing them to be Americans, and enquired to what corps they belonged; they answered the Glengarians; keep in order, said he, and I will be with you in a few minutes; he then galloped off at full speed. A great number fired upon him when they found their mistake; it was said that he received his wound at this time.

When Major General Riall, who was made prisoner at the battle of Niagara, proffered his sword, in token of submission, to Colonel Jessup, who commanded the capturing party, the generous young American courteously declined accepting it, with a complimentary observation, that he could not deprive of his sword an officer who had worn it with such distinguished honor.

On the following day, when Jessup was setting in his tent smarting under his wounds, Riall entered, and after eulogising his conduct as an officer, thanking him for his magnanimity, and expressing his regret at the injuries he had sustained in battle, begged his acceptance, as a favor to himself, of the same sword which he had refused when he might have claimed it by right of conquest. It is a plain gold hilted sabre, with a blade unadorned by any figures, lettering, or device, but of the finest metal and most exquisite polish.

The following letter addressed to the Secretary of War, fully exculpates Gen. Ripley from all *blame* in this memorable engagement.

Washington City, May, 1815.

Hon. Alex. J. Dallas,

SIR,

My report of the 7th August, created an impression, in relation to General Ripley, which I by no means intended. I did not intend to implicate his courage, his talents, or his zeal.

In that report I stated, that I had given him orders to meet and beat the enemy on the morning of the 26th July. This order was not given until after the command of the army had entirely devolved upon General Ripley; and I am fully convinced, that circumstances afterwards occurred, to satisfy the judgment of General Ripley that the order could not be executed.

Justice to myself, as well as to the army, requires that I should make this statement.

(Signed)

JACOB BROWN.

Generals Brown and Scott were conveyed to Buffalo. The command of the army devolved upon General Ripley, who ascended the Niagara and took a position at Fort Erie, and made every preparation to receive the pursuing enemy, who had repaired his losses with numerous reinforcements, and which compelled our army in its turn, to act on the defensive.

Nothing of moment occurred until the third of August, when the enemy to the number of from 12 to 1500 crossed the Niagara, at about 2 o'clock in the morning. They made the shore a little below Conjockta creek. Major Morgan who had been stationed at Black Rock,

and who had anticipated the enemy's movement, took a position on the upper side of the creek, and threw up a battery of logs. The British landed nine boats full of troops, and at a quarter past four, advanced to attack our riflemen, posted behind their temporary works, calmly awaiting their approach. Our men as a precautionary measure had taken up the bridge. The enemy came on with an advance party to repair the bridge. When within rifle shot distance our troops opened a deadly fire which soon compelled them to falter, and finally to retire. They then formed in the skirt of the woods and kept up the fight at long shot, continually reinforcing from the Canada shore until twenty three boat loads had landed, and then attempted to flank our men by sending a large body up the creek to ford it, when Major Morgan detached Lieuts. Ryan, Smith and Armstrong with about 60 men to oppose them, when they were again repulsed with considerable loss. Being thus foiled in this attempt, the enemy withdrew to Squaw Island and finally to the Canada shore.

Major Morgan had only 240 men to resist the superior numbers of the enemy. He lost but two killed and eight wounded. Captain Hamilton and Lieuts. Wadsworth and M'Intosh were among the latter. He estimates the loss of the British at fifty.

On the 4th of August Brigadier General Gaines arrived from Sackett's Harbor and assumed the command at Fort Erie. General Ripley had previously made the most judicious disposition for defence. General Drummond, with a force estimated at about 5,000 men, remained posted opposite Black Rock, two miles below the American position.

On the 5th General Gaines attempted to draw out the enemy's forces, by sending the rifle corps through the woods, with orders to amuse the enemy's light troops until his strong columns should get in motion, and then to retire slowly to the plain on the American side, where a strong line was posted ready to receive him. Our riflemen met and drove the enemy's light troops into their lines, but could not provoke them to come out again. After remaining nearly two hours in the woods our men returned to camp, having lost five killed and several wounded. Ten British and five Indians were killed.

On the 11th of August the enemy had cautiously approached to within about 1200 yards in the rear of the American works, where they had constructed two batteries and erected a wooden breastwork, which enabled them to annoy our camp without exposing themselves to any danger. In examining their works Capt. Birdsall of the 4th rifle regiment with 160 men beat in two of their strong pickets, with a loss on the part of the British of ten killed. Capt. Birdsall had but one killed and three wounded.

On the 12th Major Morgan, who defeated the enemy on the 3d at Conjockta, fell at the head of his corps while gallantly supporting a detachment of 80 riflemen under Captain Birdsall, who had been sent to cut off a working party of the enemy, engaged in opening an avenue for a battery through the woods. The enemy were driven from their works, but were soon reinforced and an animated contest ensued. The firing continued longer than the major had expected, he advanced to the support of Captain Birdsall. The British proving too strong for our party, the major gave the signal of re-

treat with his bugle, and at the 'same' time received a ball through his head; his men succeeded in conveying his body from the field.

About this time nearly 3000 militia from the western counties of New York arrived at Buffalo, to aid in extricating the gallant survivors of Chippewa and Niagara from their perilous predicament; being now closely invested on the land sides of their defences, and it was not practicable to escape in boats. But deliverance was near; defeat and dismay awaited the foe, as the following official details will show.

*Head Quarters, Left Wing, 2d Division,
Fort Erie, U. C. August , 1814.*

SIR—I have the honor to communicate for the information of the department of war, the particulars of the battle fought at this place on the 15th inst. between the left wing of the 2d division of the army under my command, and the British forces in the peninsula of Upper Canada, commanded by Lieut. Gen. Drummond, which terminated in a signal victory in favor of the United American arms.

Our position on the margin of the lake at the entrance of the Niagara river, being nearly a horizontal plain 12 or 15 feet above the surface of the water, possessing few natural advantages, had been strengthened in front by temporary parapet breastworks, entrenchments and abattis, with two batteries and 6 field pieces. The small unfinished Fort, Erie, with a 24, 18, and 12 pounder, forms the north east, and the Douglass battery, with an 18 and 6 pounder near the edge of the lake, the south east angle of our right. The left is defended by a redoubt battery with six field pieces just thrown up

on a small ridge. Our rear was left open to the lake, bordered by a rocky shore easy of ascent. The battery on the left was defended by Captain Towson; Fort Erie by Captain Williams, with Major Trimble's command of the 15th infantry; the batteries on the front by Capts. Biddle and Fanning; the whole of the artillery commanded by Major Hindman. Parts of the 11th, 9th, and 22d infantry (of the late veteran brigade of Maj. Gen. Scott) were posted on the right under the command of Lieut. Col. Aspinwall. General Ripley's brigade, consisting of the 21st and 23d, defended the left. General Porter's brigade of New York and Pennsylvania volunteers, with our distinguished riflemen, occupied the center.

I have heretofore omitted stating to you, that during the 13th and 14th, the enemy had kept up a brisk cannonade, which was sharply returned from our batteries, without any considerable loss on our part. At 6 P. M. one of their shells lodged in a small magazine in Fort Erie, which was fortunately almost empty. It blew up with an explosion more awful in appearance than injurious in its effects, as it did not disable a man or derange a gun. It occasioned but a momentary cessation of the thunders of the artillery on both sides; it was followed by a loud and joyous shout by the British army, which was instantly returned on our part, and Captain Williams amidst the smoke of the explosion renewed the contest by an animated roar of his heavy cannon.

From the supposed loss of our ammunition, and the consequent depression such an event was likely to produce upon the minds of our men, I felt persuaded that this explosion would lead the enemy to assault, and

made my arrangements accordingly. The annexed paper, No. 1, is a copy of Lieut. Gen. Drummond's order and plan of attack.

The night was dark and the early part of it raining, but the faithful centinel slept not; one third of the troops were up at their posts. At half past 2 o'clock, the right column of the enemy approached, and though enveloped in darkness, black as his designs and principles,* was distinctly heard on our left, and promptly marked by our musketry under Major Wood, and cannon under Captain Towson. Being mounted at the moment, I repaired to the point of attack, where the sheet of fire rolling from Towson's battery, and the musketry of the left wing of the 25th infantry under Major Wood, enabled me to see the enemy's column of about 1500 men approaching on that point; his advance was not checked until it had approached within ten feet of our infantry. A line of loose brush representing an *abattis* only intervened. A column of the enemy attempted to pass round the *abattis* through the water where it was nearly *breast deep*. Apprehending that this point would be carried, I ordered a detachment of riflemen and infantry to its support, but having met with the gallant commander, Major Wood, was assured by him that he could defend his position without reinforcements. At this moment the enemy were repulsed, but instantly renewed the charge, and were again repulsed. My attention was now called to the right, where our batteries and lines were soon lighted

* I several times heard, and many of our officers heard, orders given "to give the damned Yankee rascals no quarters."

by a most brilliant fire of cannon and mukestry ; it announced the approach of the center and left columns of the enemy, under Colonels Drummond and Scott ; the latter was received by the veteran 9th under the command of Captain Foster, and Captains Boughton and Harding's companies of New York and Pennsylvania volunteers, aided by a 6 pounder judiciously posted by Major M'Kee, chief engineer, who was most active and useful at this point ; they were repulsed. That of the center, led by Colonel Drummond, was not long kept in check ; it approached at once every assailable point of the fort, and with scaling ladders ascended the parapet, but was repulsed with dreadful carnage. The assault was twice repeated, and as often checked, but the enemy having moved round in the ditch, covered by the darkness added to the heavy cloud of smoke which had rolled from our cannon and musketry, enveloping surrounding objects, repeated the charge, reascended the ladders ; their pikes, bayonets and spears fell upon our gallant artillerists. The gallant spirits of our favorite Captain Williams and Lieutenants M'Donough and Watmough, with their brave men, were overcome. The two former and several of their men received deadly wounds. Our bastion was lost. Lieutenant M'Donough, being severely wounded, demanded quarter. It was refused by Col. Drummond. The Lieut. then seized a handspike, and nobly defended himself until he was shot down with a pistol by the monster who had refused him quarter, who often reiterated the order, "Give the damn'd Yankees no quarter." This officer, whose bravery, if it had been seasoned with virtue, would have entitled him to the admiration of every soldier—this hardened

murderer soon met his fate. He was shot through the breast while repeating the order "to give no quarter."

The battle now raged with increased fury on the right, but on the left the enemy was repulsed and put to flight. Thence and from the center I ordered reinforcements. They were promptly sent by Brig. Gen. Ripley, and Brigadier General Porter. Capt. Fanning of the corps of artillery, kept up a spirited and destructive fire with his field pieces on the enemy attempting to approach the fort. Major Hindman's gallant efforts, aided by Major Trimble, having failed to drive the enemy from the bastion with the remaining artillerymen and infantry in the fort, Captain Birdsall of the 4th rifle regiment, with a detachment of riflemen, gallantly rushed through the gateway to their assistance, and with some infantry charged the enemy; but was repulsed, and the captain wounded. A detachment from the 11th, 19th and 22d infantry under Captain Foster of the 11th, were introduced over the interior bastion, for the purpose of charging the enemy. Maj. Hall, assistant inspector general, very handsomely tendered his services to the charge. The charge was gallantly made by Capt. Foster and Maj. Hall, but owing to the narrowness of the passage up the bastion, admitting only two or three men abreast, it failed. It was often repeated and as often checked. The enemy's force was, however, much cut to pieces and diminished by our artillery and small arms. At this moment every operation was arrested by the explosion of some cartridges deposited in the end of the stone building adjoining the contested bastion. The explosion was tremendous, it was decisive, the bastion was restored. At this moment Captain Biddle was ordered to have a

field piece posted so as to enfilade the exterior plain and salient glacis. The captain, though not recovered from a severe contusion in the shoulder, received from one of the enemy's shells, promptly took his position and served his piece with vivacity and effect. Captain Fanning's battery likewise played upon them with great effect. The enemy were in a few moments entirely defeated, taken or put to flight, leaving on the field 221 killed, 174 wounded, and 186 prisoners, including 14 officers killed and 7 wounded and prisoners. A large portion are so severely wounded, that they cannot survive; the slightly wounded it is presumed, were carried off.

To Brigadier General Ripley much credit is due for the judicious disposition of the left wing previous to the action, and for the steady disciplined courage manifested by him and his immediate command, and for the promptness with which he complied with my orders for reinforcement during the action. Brigadier General Porter, commanding the New York and Pennsylvania volunteers, manifested a degree of vigilance and judgment in his preparatory arrangements, as well as military skill and courage in action, which proves him to be worthy of the confidence of his country and the brave volunteers who fought under him. Of the volunteers, Captains Boughton and Harding, with their detachments, posted on the right and attached to the line, commanded by Captain E. Foster of the veteran 9th infantry, handsomely contributed to the repulse of the left column of the enemy under Col. Scott.

The judicious preparations and steady conduct of Lieut. Col. Aspinwall, commanding the first brigade, merit approbation.

To Major M'Kee, chief engineer, the greatest credit is due for the excellent arrangement and silkful execution of his plans for fortifying and defending the right and for his correct and seasonable suggestions to regain the bastion. Maj. Wood, of the engineers, also greatly contributed to the previous measures of defence. He had accepted the command of a regiment of infantry, (the 21st,) for which he has often proved himself well qualified, but never so conspicuously as on this occasion.

Towson's battery emitted a constant sheet of fire. Wood's small arms lighted up the space, and repulsed five terrible charges made between the battery and the lake. Brig. Gen. Ripley speaks in high terms of the officers and men engaged, particularly Capts. Marston and Ropes; Lieuts. Riddle (of the 15th, doing duty with the 21st) and Hall; Ensigns Benn, Jones, Cummings and Thomas of the 21st, and Keally and Green of the 19th.

Major Hindman and the whole of the artillery under the command of that excellent officer, displayed a degree of gallantry and good conduct not to be surpassed. The particular situation of Captain Towson and the much lamented Capt. Williams and Lieut. M'Donough, and that of Lieut. Watmough, as already described, with their respective commands, rendered them most conspicuous. The courage and good conduct of Lieut. Zantzinger and Lieut. Childs, is spoken of in the highest terms by Major Hindman and Captain Towson, as also that of Sergeant Major Denhon. Captains Biddle and Fanning, on the center and right of their entrenchments, threw their shot to the right, left and front, and annoyed the Indians and light troops of the enemy.

approaching from the woods. Lieut. Fontaine, in his zeal to meet the enemy, was unfortunately wounded and made prisoner. Lieut. Bird was active and useful, and in fact every individual of the corps did their duty.

The detachment of Scott's gallant brigade, consisting of parts of the 9th, 11th and 22d infantry, did its duty in a manner worthy the high reputation the brigade had acquired at Chippewa and at the falls of the Niagara. The 9th, under the command of Captain Edmund Foster, was actively engaged against the left of the enemy, and with the aid of Lieutenant Douglass' corps of bombardiers, commanding the water battery, and of that of the volunteers under Captains Boughton and Harding, effected their repulse. The good conduct of Lieuts. Childs, Cushman and Foot, and Ensign Blake, deserves commendation.

The officers killed are Captain Williams and Lieut. M'Donough of the artillery; wounded, Lieut. Watmough of the artillery; Ensign Cisna, 19th; Lieut. Bushnell, 21st; Lieuts. Brown and Belknap, 23d; and Capt. Birdsall, 4th rifle regiment, all severely.

Lieut. Fontaine of the artillery, who was taken prisoner, writes from the British camp, that he fortunately fell into the hands of the Indians, who, after taking his money, treated him kindly. It would seem, then, that these savages had not joined in the resolution to give no quarter.

To Major Jones, assistant adjt. gen. and Major Hall, assist. insp. gen; Capt. Harris, of the dragoons, volunteer aid de camp; Lieut. Belton, aid de camp, much credit is due for their constant vigilance and strict attention to every duty previous to the action, and the

steady courage, zeal and activity which they manifested during the action.

The surgeons, Drs. Fuller, 23d, Troubridge, 21st, with their mates; Drs. Gale, of the 33d, and Everitt and Allen, of the 21st, deserve the warmest approbation for their indefatigable exertions and humane attention to the wounded of our army, as well as to the prisoners who fell into their hands.

I have the honor to be, sir,

Your very obedient servant,

E. P. GAINES,

Brig. Gen. Commanding.

The disparity of loss between the assailants and the besieged sufficiently marks the importance of the victory. The enemy admit a loss of 805. Our loss was only 84.

The *cause* of the explosion has never been officially explained. Much difference of opinion exists, but the true cause, we are persuaded, is to be traced to the wadding of the British guns which fell on a quantity of cartridges deposited under the east end of the bastion, and to which accident we unquestionably owe the success of the conflict, and the safety of our gallant little army. For the enemy had in considerable numbers gained the top of the bastion upon which were placed our principal guns and these they had actually turned upon our men. This advantage enabled them to rake the whole extent of the encampment. Besides several desperate but abortive attempts had been made to regain possession of the bastion. It was therefore the *explosion* which cleared it, and saved our troops from the horrors of a general massacre.

The enemy on the bastion were thrown high into the air with their cartouch boxes full of fixed ammunition exploding at every point of elevation, exhibited a spectacle of awful grandeur, never before surpassed. Nearly 200 unfortunate beings were blown into eternity; each of whom described in his course a blazing parabola. No description can reach the tremendous reality of this shocking catastrophe.

Every thing conspired to give to menacing danger the utmost of its appalling influence. The darkness of night; the unknown effect of the explosion; the incipient success of the enemy; his vastly superior numbers; his well known intentions to "give no quarter;" the unsuccessful attempt to regain the bastion, and the impossibility of escape, left nothing in prospective to feed expiring hope. It is in scenes like this that the brave man acquires additional strength from the terrors of surrounding objects. Even the coward, if he resists the onset, forgets the weakness of his nature and electrified by magic sympathy, rises superior to himself. It is in this school of fortitude that heroes are born to distinction; that the long and glorious list of our military and naval commanders have been trained to deeds of noble achievement.

Some of the enemy survived this awful explosion, even after having lost both legs and an arm.

About 1000 British muskets were picked up at the different points of assault the day after the action.

In addition to the officers and corps named in Gen. Gaine's official report, Captain Chunn and his company signalized themselves by sallying out and pursuing a retreating column of the enemy nearly a mile. They made nearly 100 prisoners. Lieutenants Bowman,

and Larned bore conspicuous parts : Lt. Gleason, as usual, was particularly active.

General Ripley commanded on the left flank ; so regular and vivid was the fire on this point that the enemy called it the *Light House*.

Although foiled in this attempt to carry our works, the enemy did not relinquish his views of conquest. The blockade was continued. Severe cannonades were occasionally kept up ; particularly on the 13th and 14th of August, during which time our loss was 9 killed and 36 wounded. Scarcely a day passed without an exchange of several shots. The situation of our troops was distressing, for they were exposed to incessant danger and annoyance. Many valuable lives were lost by the bursting of the enemy's shells in camp, and by their cannon shot, which unfortunately, were but too well aimed.*

On the 28th of August, a shell fell in the room which General Gaines occupied as his head quarters, it struck the floor close by the general's chair and instantly burst. He received a violent contusion in the side which at first was considered mortal ; but from the effects of which he afterwards recovered.

The command of the army again devolved on General Ripley, who retained it only until the 2d of September, when General Brown resumed the command.

Between the 16th and 18th of September, several animated skirmishes were fought, in one of which fell the gallant Colonel Wilcox, the leader of the Canadian

* It is the opinion of our officers who remained with the army during the whole blockade, that we had 300 men, killed or wounded, by the enemy's fire, exclusive of those who fell during the sortie and assault.

Volunteers. He was killed in the act of storming one of the enemy's batteries which he approached sword in hand, at the head of his troops. He gave a noble example of personal courage. His loss was regretted by the whole army.

Two of the enemy's batteries were very formidable, being served with great skill and effect. A third had been completed and was about to open its fire. The militia of the western counties of New York, crossed over to Fort Erie and generously participated in the dangers of the regular troops. Every thing was at length in readiness to resume the offensive, and chastise the enemy for his insolence; about one third of whose force was kept constantly on duty in his numerous works. The remainder, consisting of three brigades of infantry, estimated at 12 or 1500 men each, occupied his main camp, situated in a field surrounded by woods, nearly two miles distant from their batteries and intrenchments.

On the morning of the 17th September the general had matured his plans. By twelve his whole force were paraded in readiness to act according to his directions. General Porter, with the volunteers, riflemen and a few Indians commanded the left wing; he had orders to move from the extreme left of our position, upon the enemy's right, his command was subdivided into three divisions: 200 riflemen and a few Indians under Col. Gibson, formed the advance; followed by two columns moving parallel to, and 30 yards distant from each other; the left column commanded by Lt. Colonel Wood, headed by 400 infantry under Major Brook of the 23d, and followed by 500 volunteers and militia, being parts of Lt. Colonel Dobbin, M'Burney's and Flemming's

regiments, and was intended to attack the batteries. The left column of 500 militia was commanded by Brigadier General Davis, and comprized the commands of Lieut. Colonels Hopkins, Churchill and Crosby and was intended to repel any reinforcement from the enemy's camp; both columns were ordered to cooperate in the same object should circumstances require it, which was the case. Gen. Miller was directed to station his command in the ravine which lies between Fort Erie and the enemy's batteries, by passing them by detachments through the woods; and the 21st under Gen. Ripley, was posted as a corps of reserve between the new bastions of Fort Erie; all under cover and out of the view of the enemy. About half past 3, P. M. the action commenced on the left. At this moment Gen. Brown directed Gen. Miller to pierce the enemy's entrenchments between bastions No. 2 and 3. His orders were promptly and ably executed. Within 30 minutes after the first gun was fired, batteries No. 2 and 3, the enemy's line of entrenchments, and his two block houses were in our possession.* Soon after, battery No. 1 was abandoned by the British. The guns in each were spiked by us, or otherwise destroyed; the magazine of No. 3 was blown up.

General Ripley was ordered to reinforce Gen. Miller with the 21st; but in advancing to his support, inclined to the left, where Major Brooks' command was engaged, with a view of making some necessary enquiries of that officer, and, in the act of doing so, was unfortunately wounded. Nevertheless, Colonel Upham led

* See General Brown's official statement of September 29, 1814.

the 21st to the aid of General Miller, who, however, had previously ordered the troops on the right to fall back. General Brown perceiving this movement sent his staff along the whole line to call in the other corps, which successively, according to their distance, returned to camp.

No one knows better how to appreciate military merit than General Porter. It is thus he speaks of his companions in arms :

After carrying by storm, in the handsomest style, a strong block house, in the rear of the third battery, making its garrison prisoners, destroying the 3 24 pounders and their carriages in the third battery, and blowing up the enemy's magazine, and after cooperating with General Miller in taking the second battery, the gallant leaders of the three divisions all fell nearly at the same time ; Colonel Gibson, at the second battery, and Gen. Davis and Lieut. Col. Wood, in an assault upon the first.

Brig. Gen. Davis, although a militia officer of little experience, conducted on this occasion with all the coolness and bravery of a veteran, and fell while advancing upon the enemy's entrenchments. His loss as a citizen, as well as a soldier, will be severely felt in the patriotic county of Genesee. Col. Gibson fully sustained the high military reputation which he had before so justly acquired. You know how exalted an opinion I have always entertained of Lieut. Col. Wood of the engineers. His conduct on this day was what it uniformly has been, on every similar occasion, an exhibition of military skill, acute judgment, and heroic valor. Of the other regular officers, Lieut. Colonel M'Donald and Major Brooks, senior in command, will

report to you in relation to their respective divisions. Permit me, however, to say of these two officers, that, much as was left to them by the fall of their distinguished leaders, they were able to sustain their parts in the most admirable manner, and they richly deserve the notice of the government.

Of the militia, I regret that the limits of a report will not permit me even to name all of those, who on this occasion established claims to the gratitude of their fellow citizens; much less to particularize individual merit. Lieut. Cols. Hopkins, M'Burney, Churchill and Crosby, and Majors Lee, Marcle, Wilson, Lawrence, Burr, Dunham, Kellogg and Ganson, are entitled to the highest praise for their gallant conduct, their steady and persevering exertions. Lieut. Colonel Dobbin being prevented by severe indisposition, from taking the field, Major Hall, Asst. Ins. Gen. volunteered his services to Join Major Lee in the command of the volunteer regiment: and Maj. Lee and every other officer speaks in the highest terms of the gallant and good conduct of this young officer.

Captain Fleming, who commanded the Indians, was, as he always is, in the front of the battle. There is not a more intrepid soldier in the army. I should be ungrateful, were I to omit the names of Captains Knapp and Hull of the volunteers, and Captain Parker and Lieut. Chatfield of the militia, by whose intrepidity I was, during the action, extricated from the most unpleasant situation. Capts. Richardson, Buel, and Kennedy, Lieuts. Parkhurst and Brown, and Adjts. Dobbin, Bates and Robinson, particularly distinguished themselves. The patriotic conduct of Capt. Elliot with 20 young gentlemen, who volunteered from Batavia,

and of Major Hubbard with 14 men exempted by age from military duty, should not be omitted. They were conspicuous during the action.

You will excuse me, if I seem partial, in speaking of my own family, consisting of my Brigade Major Frazer, my volunteer aid-de camp Riddle, (both 1st Lieutenants in the 15th infantry) Capt. Bigger of the Canadian volunteers, Messrs. Williams and D'Lapierre, volunteer aids for the day, all of whom, except Mr. Williams, were wounded.

Lieuts. Frazier and Riddle were engaged for most of the preceding day with fatigue parties, cutting roads for the advance of the column through the swamp, and falling timber to the rear, and within 150 yards of the enemy's right: which service they executed with so much address as to avoid discovery; and on the succeeding day they conducted the two columns to the attack. Frazer was severely wounded by a musket ball whilst spiking a gun on the second battery. Riddle, after the first battery was carried, descended into the enemy's magazine, and after securing (with the assistance of quarter master Greene, of the volunteers, whose good conduct deserves much praise) a quantity of fixed ammunition, blew up the magazine and suffered severely by the explosion. I must solicit through you, sir, the attention of the general government to these meritorious young men. Capt. Bigger is an excellent officer, and rendered me much assistance, but was dangerously wounded. The other young men are citizens, and deserve much credit for their activity, and for having voluntarily encountered danger. My aid de camp, Major Dox, was confined at Buffalo by sickness.

On the whole, sir, I can say of the regular troops at-

fached to the left column, and of the veteran volunteers of Lieut. Col. Dobbin's regiment, that every man did his duty, and their conduct on this occasion reflects a new luster on their former brilliant achievements. To the militia, the compliment is justly due, and I could pay them no greater one than to say, that they were not surpassed by the heroes of Chippewa and Niagara in steadiness and bravery.

The studied intricacy of the enemy's defences, consisting not only of the breast work connecting their batteries, but of successive lines of entrenchments for a hundred yards in the rear, covering the batteries and enfilading each other, and the whole obstructed by abattis, brush and felled timber, was calculated to produce confusion among the assailants, and led to several contests, at the point of the bayonet. But by our double columns any temporary irregularity in the one was always corrected by the other. Our success would probably have been more complete, but for the rain which unfortunately set in soon after we commenced our march, which rendered the fire of many of our muskets useless, and by obscuring the sun, led to several unlucky mistakes. As an instance of this, a body of 50 prisoners who had surrendered, were ordered to the fort in charge of a subaltern and 14 volunteers; the officer mistaking the direction, conducted them towards the British camp in the route by which we had advanced, and they were retaken with the whole of the guard, excepting the officer and one man who fought their way back. Several of our stragglers were made prisoners by the same mistake. But, sir, notwithstanding these accidents, we have reason to rejoice, at our signal success in inflicting a vastly disproportionate injury on the enemy, and in

wholly defeating all his plans of operations against this army.

I have the honor to be, with very great respect, your obedient servant;

P. B. PORTER, *Brig: Gen.*
Com'g Volunteers and Militia.

The militia, although fresh from their fire sides, during the various rencontres of the day rivalled the regulars in cool, determined bravery. Numerous were the feats of individual heroism. The rustic sons of Cayuga, Seneca, Ontario, Genessee and Niagara, most of whom were ignorant of the manual exercise, faced the Glengarian sharp shooters, often at half pistol shot distance, and with a deadly and certain fire, were more than a match for their experienced enemy. The scene of the action was in the woods, which afforded opportunities for exercising address in the choice of objects. Frequently two hostile columns would approach unperceived to within a few paces of each other, when a most deadly contest would ensue. The sun was obscured by thick clouds; indeed it rained during the greater part of the afternoon. The point of direction was often lost, by corps as well as individuals.

General Miller was at one time several rods in advance of his men; nay, even of his aids. On a sudden he perceived himself almost surrounded by the enemy. By a singular stroke of good fortune he extricated himself from his perilous situation, and regained his command, unhurt by a shower of balls which was aimed at his person.

Maj. Burr who led Col. M'Burney's regiment, decided, by a prompt and judicious movement in the rear of bat-

tery No. 3, the contest at this point. The enemy perceiving himself hemmed in, surrendered at discretion. Advancing still further in the rear of the batteries, in a line parallel thereto, he fell in with a party of the enemy under Lt. Col. Fisher, who on account of the thickness of the brush, had approached unseen to within 4 or 5 rods of our men. This party was immediately put *hors du combat*. Fisher was wounded. One major and 5 other officers and nearly 100 privates were taken prisoners. Battery No. 2, next surrendered; and the major would, with his command, advance still further upon the enemy's camp, but he had not proceeded many rods before his attention was arrested by the appearance of a British force advancing in close column to the relief of their batteries. The numbers and nearness of the enemy would have justified Major Burr in a hasty retreat; but knowing General Davis to be in his rear, he dispatched a sergeant to apprise him of his situation, and immediately formed his line within eight rods of the enemy. But this was scarcely done before his right was all cut down. For a moment his men were disordered, but were quickly rallied. The words "aim low," "break their shins," produced a magical effect, as they were repeated by every soldier in the line. "It is the heroes glory to live in thunder. Danger was forgotten in the love of glory and of country." For five minutes our gallant little band were enveloped in a blaze of lightning produced by the vivacity of their fire. The British regulars became entangled in the brush; they were thrown into confusion, and at intervals were heard swearing as if in mutiny; they wanted open and level ground to deploy upon. The oblique and low fire of our men carried death into the enemy's

ranks. In the height of this combat Major Burr received orders to *retreat*. Instead, however, of obeying the mandate, he exclaimed to his brave troops, "*charge! charge!!*" The order was obeyed with a resistless impetuosity. The enemy fled at all points and in the greatest disorder on his camp. The slaughter was great; in proportion to the number engaged it was immense. It was at this point that the most obstinate fighting took place. It is the opinion of those engaged in that deadly rencontre, that nearly *two hundred* of the enemy fell upon this sanguinary spot. Indeed General Drummond in his official report of the events of the day, particularly notices the obstinacy of the action on this part of the line. It was here that he admits the greatest loss. Of 176 men with which Major Burr marched from the fort only 76 returned unhurt. Of twelve platoon and staff officers, eight were killed, wounded or taken, and three others taken besides, two who returned, were wounded.

Major Burr, receiving no support from the other corps of the army, which in fact had returned at the first order of retreat, and perceiving the enemy attempting to outflank him, determined on a retreat, in which he was closely pressed in rear and exposed to a cross fire from the fresh reinforcements from the British camp.

General Porter has rendered a suitable homage to the valor of his fellow citizens; but the limits of his report would not permit him to notice all the incidents of the action, nor to particularize half the instances of individual bravery. The eloquence of the cannon awakens the brave to feats of courage. It is impossible to do justice to the merits of those brave men. Capt.

Huick, who was wounded, deserves all that can be said in his praise, or a grateful country bestow. Captains Pullock and Case; Lieutenants Clark and Beebe; Adjutant Bates, Paymaster Watkins and quarter master Green, both slightly wounded, merit a grateful and lasting recollection of their services. Although the virtuous dead cannot profit by eulogy, still let the names of Lieutenant Brown and Ensign Blakely live in the history of that day. "Amiable, as citizens; cool and undauntedly brave as soldiers, they died as they lived, patriots and heroes."

A veteran officer speaking of the militia volunteers, renders them the tribute of his admiration in these words: "In the rage of battle they were cool and collected, paying strict attention to every order, as though they had been on parade."

In the course of the action a New York volunteer named Wm. Holmes, from Ontario county, received a musket ball in his mouth which shattered several of his teeth and lodged in his neck, he fell, and his companions supposing him to be mortally wounded, paid no attention to him. After lying some time in a state of insensibility he regained sufficient reason and strength to rise. The scene of the battle had changed and he knew not which course would take him to the fort, but wandering at random he blundered upon a party of the enemy who were also bewildered. Holmes rendered desperate by the anguish of his wounds, instantly levelled his piece at them; upon which they made signs of submission; he went up to them and ordered them to march, which they very readily obeyed. He followed close to their heels. By chance they took the right course to bring them to the fort, when it was proved

that he had *eleven* of De Wateville's corps prisoners. Extraordinary as this relation may appear, it is nevertheless strictly true. General Porter gave Holmes a certificate of the fact. The improbability is at once removed by the rational inference that the party had made up their minds to desert.

The following authentic anecdote, although rather out of place, is only a specimen of the heroic fortitude of the brave men who perished at Fort Erie. When Colonel Wilcox was mortally wounded in storming a battery a few days before the sortie, he said *jocosely* to the next in command, "Tell the general I was fairly hit in front," and expired in a few minutes.

The modesty of General Porter would not permit him to give the particulars of the following adventure; of the truth of which we have received the most indubitable testimony. "In the course of the action, he had occasion to go from the right column of his command to the left. He had proceeded but a short distance in the woods, when he found himself within a few yards of the enemy, who had just emerged from a ditch, and who, discovering probably that our troops were formed in their rear, stood formed in two lines with their arms at rest, apparently hesitating which way to go or how to act. General Porter finding himself within their power, and seeing that the occasion required resolution and decision, instantly left his company and running to them with the greatest boldness, exclaimed, "that's right my brave fellows, surrender and we will take care of you," and coming up to the man on the left, he took his musket out of his hand and threw it on the ground, at the same time pushing him forward towards the fort. In this way he proceeded through the

first line, most of the men voluntarily throwing down their arms and advancing to the fort; when, on a sudden, a soldier, whose musket he was about to take, stepped back and presenting his bayonet to General Porter's breast, demanded *his* surrender. The general seized the musket and was wresting it from him, when he was assaulted by an officer who stood next in the ranks, and three or four soldiers, who, after a short scuffle, brought him to the ground. He however soon recovered his feet, when he found himself surrounded by 15 or 20 men with their guns presented to him, again demanding his surrender. By this time several of our officers were advancing with their men to the scene of action, and General Porter assuming an air of composure and decision, told the enemy that they were surrounded and prisoners; and that if they fired a gun they should all be put to the sword. Without venturing to fire, they still continued to vociferate, "surrender, *you* are my prisoner;" when Lieutenant Silas Chatfield of the Cayuga riflemen, who had got near the spot, ordered his men to fire. This drew their attention from the general, and after a momentary scene of confusion and carnage, the enemy were all either killed or taken prisoners. In this affair Captain Knapp of the New York volunteers was badly wounded by a musket ball in the side, and General Porter in the hand by the cut of a sword."

Lieut. Gen. Drummond broke up his camp on the night of the 21st, and retired to his entrenchments behind the Chippewa. A party of our men came up with the rear of his army at Frenchman's creek. The enemy destroyed a part of their stores, by burning the buildings from which they were employed in removing

them. A considerable quantity of cannon ball, and upwards of 100 stand of arms, were found in their camp.

General Izard, with his brigade, amounting to nearly 4000 men, was now on his march from Plattsburgh, for the purpose of forming a junction with Gen. Brown's army. He reached Sackett's Harbor on the 16th Sept. The advance of this respectable reinforcement to the Niagara frontier, the splendid and decisive result of the sortie of the 17th, the diminished and dispirited state of the enemy's forces in the peninsula, and the physical impracticability of their receiving fresh reinforcements until the succeeding spring, combined to raise public expectation to anxious solicitude. The junction or concert of the two armies was considered as certain; and as the presage to the conquest of U. Canada, including the enemy's naval force on lake Ontario.

But Pandora's fruitful box was not yet exhausted of its evils; a chilling disappointment succeeds to the ardor of hope, and again the most brilliant military prospects are blasted by the absurd dispositions of the war department, the tardiness of Izard, fastidious jealousy, or the date of a commission. At last, Gen. Izard arrives at Batavia—the two generals confer, which results in the speedy departure of Gen. Brown for Sackett's Harbor, and the passage of the Niagara by General Izard, at Black Rock, on the 11th of October.

On the 14th Gen. Izard displayed his force on the Plains of Chippewa. The enemy appeared in force on the 15th; but evinced no disposition to offer battle. The bridge being destroyed, both armies contented themselves with a brisk cannonade across the river, in which the artillery of Towson and Archer nearly si-

lenced that of the enemy. General Izard returned to Black Rock.

On the 18th of October, Brig. Gen. Bissell marched from Gen. Izard's head quarters with 900 men, for the purpose of seizing a quantity of provisions at Lyon's creek. On the morning of the 19th, the detachment was attacked by a select corps of the enemy, 1200 strong. The light infantry under capt. Dorman, and Irvine's riflemen, sustained the whole of the enemy's fire for fifteen minutes, during which time the fifth and fourteenth were formed. The 5th turned the enemy's left flank, while the 14th charged directly in front. These movements were gallantly executed—the enemy were compelled to make a hasty retreat. The enemy's loss in this affair was estimated at nearly 200, while ours amounted to 12 killed and 55 wounded. Captain Allison had a horse shot under him. Colonels Snelling and Pinckney, Majors Barker and Barnard, Captains Dorman and Irvine, and Lieutenants Gassaway, Horriell, Anspach, and Prestman, were the most conspicuous actors on the American side, and were all noticed for bravery and skill by Gen. Bissell.

The army remained in Canada until the 5th of November, when it closed the campaign by blowing up the fortifications at Fort Erie and recrossing the Niagara.

OPERATIONS ON LAKE ONTARIO, IN 1814.

ON the evening of the 12th of May, Sir J. L. Yeo appeared off the mouth of Genesee river. On the 13th the commodore demanded the surrender of the village and in case of refusal threatened to land 1200 regulars and 400 Indians. The alarm occasioned by the appearance of the enemy had reached the interior of Ontario county. Gen. Porter and Col. Hopkins, with a large number of volunteers, hastened to the defence of the place. The enemy contented himself with throwing a great number of rockets, shells, and shot from the size of grape to 68 pounds. He finally withdrew on the morning of the 14th, without daring to land.

About the middle of June, Lieutenant Gregory, was dispatched by com. Chauncey for the purpose of destroying a brigade of boats which were ascending the St. Lawrence. His force consisted only of three gigs, having only their crew and one settie in each boat. On the 19th of June, Lieut. Gregory found he had been discovered by the enemy's look out boats, and that a gun boat had been sent in pursuit which was then close upon him; he instantly formed the bold design of boarding her, which he did, without losing a man. She proved to be a fine gun boat, mounting one 18 pounder, and manned by 18 royal marines--being afterwards closely pursued by a very large gun boat, he was obliged to scuttle his prize.

On the 28th of June this active and enterprising officer succeeded in destroying by stratagem a large schooner on the stocks at Presqu'ile on the north side of lake Ontario. She was a stout, well built vessel, and would probably have been launched in ten days.

On the 7th of August Com. Chauncey chased one of the enemy's vessels ashore near Niagara. She was formerly the Prince Regent, and mounted 14 guns. Being loaded with stores for the garrison of Niagara, the British blew her up.

About the last of September, a gig belonging to the American squadron, with an officer and 4 men, captured near the outlet of the lake, 6 boats, manned with 35 men, all armed, and laden with brandy, crates and dry goods, bound to Kingston, and brought them all to Sackets Harbor. The boats and their cargoes were estimated at \$12,000.

EXPEDITION AGAINST MICHILIMACKINAC.

ABOUT the 5th of July a military and naval expedition sailed from Detroit, under the orders of Col. Croghan and Com. Sinclair, for the double purpose of reducing the garrison of Michilimackinac, and of securing a naval ascendancy on the upper lakes. The fleet first touched at St. Josephs, where troops were landed, and the fort, which had been evacuated, burnt. Major Holmes marched to the Sault de St. Marie, for the purpose of breaking up the enemy's establishment. The agent of the N. W. Company being informed of the approach of our troops, escaped with a part of the merchandize deposited there, though a considerable quantity was concealed in the woods. A valuable vessel was taken at the entrance into lake Superior, but which was lost in an attempt to bring her down over the *sault*.

The expedition next proceeded to Michilimackinac, and a landing of the troops under Colonel Croghan and Major Holmes was effected at some distance from the fort. But in attempting to force his way to the garrison, Col. Croghan found the enemy too strong in numbers and position to accomplish his object. Accordingly after an hour's desperate fighting, he was compelled to order a retreat, which, however, was effected in good order. This affair cost many valuable lives. The intrepid Major Holmes, who had so nobly distinguished him-

self in the preceding spring on the Thames, was among the killed. Capt. Van Horne of the 19th, and Lieut. Jackson of the 24th infantry, both promising young men, fell, mortally wounded, at the head of their respective commands. The small numbers of the troops compared with the strength of the enemy's works and the cloud of Indian allies lurking in the vicinity, determined Colonel Croghan to relinquish further operations against Michilimackinac; at least during that season. No blame has ever been ascribed to Col. Croghan, as every thing was done that bravery, vigilance and skill could accomplish. The American loss was 13 killed, 51 wounded and 2 missing. A few of the wounded fell into the hands of the enemy, who, shocking to record, were butchered by the ferocious savages in British pay. The hearts of these unfortunate men were taken out and eaten at an Indian festival held at the fort, and at which was present Major M'Dowell, the English commander of the place, and his officers!*

Colonel Croghan was fortunate enough to learn that the most eligible line of communication from York to Mackinac, &c. was by lake Simcoe and Nawtawwawsaga river, which empties into lake Huron about 100 miles south east of its head.

The expedition arrived off the mouth of this river on the 13th of August, where the enemy had a block house, and the schooner Nancy, with a very valuable cargo of several hundred barrels of provisions destined to supply the garrison of Mackinac, at anchor in the harbor. The troops were quickly disembarked on the Peninsula formed by the river and lake, for the purpose of fixing a

* See Com. Sinclair's official statement.

camp. A fire was opened upon the block house, but with little effect. At 12 o'clock two howitzers being placed within a few hundred yards, commenced a fire which lasted but a few minutes, when the block house blew up; nearly at the same instant the Nancy was enveloped in flames, by the bursting of a shell, no part of the vessel or cargo was saved. The enemy's garrison escaped into the woods and the expedition returned to Detroit, except gun boats Tygress and Scorpion, who were left on lake Huron to prevent the enemy's small boats throwing supplies into Mackinac. These vessels were unfortunately surprized by the enemy and taken in October following. Com. Sinclair captured, during his cruise on lake Huron, the British schooner Mink, laden with three hundred barrels of flour, the last of their vessels on the upper lakes.

GENERAL M'ARTHUR'S EXPEDITION INTO CANADA.

ON the 22d of October, General M'Arthur with 600 mounted volunteers, 50 rangers and 70 Indians left Detroit on a secret expedition against the enemy. The general justly suspecting the futility of some of the citizens of Detroit, had the address to induce a general belief among the inhabitants of the place, that the object of his movement was the chastisement of the Indians at Sagaunia, on the south side of Lake Huron. To keep up the deception he actually went round Lake St. Clair, by crossing the streight of the same name at Beldone, and all the streams which fall into that lake between Lord Selkirk's settlement and the River Thames. To overcome the natural obstacles in this route, is sufficient to establish his claim to uncommon fortitude and perseverance. Several rivers were crossed by swimming. The general aspect of the country is low and swampy.

General M'Arthur reached the Moravian Towns on the 30th of October. Here he had the good fortune to take a British sergeant who was going to Burlington Heights with the news, that the expedition had passed into Canada. This enabled the general to reach Delaware undiscovered. The rangers were detached on a circuitous route in order to reach the rear of the settlements and guard the different roads, while the main body were engaged in swimming their horses and trans-

porting their baggage on rafts. They were thus enabled to arrive at Oxford, 150 miles from Detroit, before the inhabitants knew that a force was approaching.

The next day, Nov. 5, the detachment proceeded to Burford. A few hours before their arrival the enemy had retreated to Malcom's mills, ten miles distant. It was the general's intention to have crossed Grand river without regarding the force at the mills, and attack Burlington; but on arriving at that river he found it swelled by the rains to such a degree that it was impossible to ford it; he therefore determined to attack and disperse the militia at the mills.

The enemy to the number of between 4 and 500 were found encamped on a commanding ground behind a creek deep and difficult of passage, except at a bridge immediately in their rear. The Ohio troops, with the advance guard of Indians, were thrown over the creek under cover of a thick wood, to oppose the enemy in rear, while the Kentucky troops were to attack in front as soon as the attention of the enemy was engaged by the attack in rear. The whole of the enemy would undoubtedly have been completely surprised and captured, but for the too hasty yell from one of our Indians, which announced the approach of the troops advancing against their rear. They were nevertheless, defeated and dispersed with the loss of 1 captain and 17 privates killed, 9 privates wounded and 111 prisoners; while our loss was only one killed and six wounded.

After this brilliant affair the general pursued his route to Dover and burnt five mills employed in the use of the British army.

The humanity of General M'Arthur, and the discipline he maintained in his corps, disarmed the people

of their prejudice which the conduct of Hull had excited in their minds.

The general was at one time within one day's march of Fort Erie, and was about to move to that point and form a junction with General Izard, at the very moment he learnt that our army had repassed the Niagara. This information induced the general to return to Detroit, where he arrived, without accident, on the 17th of November. The general speaks in terms of admiration at the almost unusual good conduct of his officers and men.

EXPEDITION OF SIR GEO. PREVOST AGAINST PLATTS-
BURGH.

THE withdrawal of nearly 4000 men under Gen. Izard from the Champlain frontier, presented to the governor general of Canada the prospect of an easy conquest of Plattsburgh and the gallant little army of General M'Comb.

Having collected all the disposable force in Lower Canada, Sir George Prevost entered the territory of the United States on the 1st of September, 1814, with a force officially estimated at 14,000 men, the greater part veteran troops who had fought in Spain and France under the banners of Wellington. He first occupied the village of Champlain, where he avowed his intentions, and issued orders and proclamations tending to dissuade the people from their allegiance, and inviting them to furnish his army with provisions. He immediately began to impress the waggons and teams in the vicinity, and loaded them with his heavy baggage and stores.

At this time General M'Comb had not an organized battalion, General Izard having taken the flower of the army to the Niagara frontier. The garrison was composed of the convalescents and the recruits of the new regiments; all in the greatest confusion, as well as the ordnance and stores, and the works in no state of defence.*

* We have followed the text of General M'Comb, with slight variation.

To create an emulation and zeal among the officers and men in completing the works, General M'Comb divided them into detachments and placed them near the several forts; declaring in orders, that each detachment was the garrison of its own works, and bound to defend them to the last extremity. It is thus that an able general knows how to call every physical and moral energy into action.

The enemy advanced cautiously and by short marches; our men worked day and night, so that by the time he made his appearance before the place, every thing was in readiness to receive him.

The principal fort which stands on the right bank of the Saranac, a short distance from the lake, is called Fort Moreau, and to remind the troops of the actions of their brave countrymen, the general called the redoubt on the right Fort Brown, and that on the left Fort Scott. Besides these three works, there were two block houses strongly fortified. The whole number of regular troops amounted to about 1,500 men. The militia were called out en masse. The regiment from Clinton county, under Lieutenant Colonel Miller, were the first to assemble. The brigade of General Wright followed the example. The whole under Gen. Mooers amounted to about 700 men, who advanced on the 4th seven miles on the Beekmantown road to watch the motions of the enemy, and skirmish with him as he advanced; to obstruct the roads by fallen trees, and to break up the bridges.

The inhabitants of the village fled with their families and effects, except a few worthy citizens and some boys who formed themselves into a party & were very useful.

On the lake road at Dead Creek bridge, the general

posted 200 men under Captain Sproul, with orders to *abbatis* the woods, to place obstructions in the road and fortify himself. In advance of this position was Lieut. Col. Appling with 110 riflemen. On the 6th before day light the enemy advanced on both roads. The militia skirmished with his advanced parties, and except a few brave men, they fell back most precipitately in the greatest disorder, notwithstanding the British troops did not deign to fire on them, except by their flanks and advanced patroles. The night previous Major Wood advanced with a detachment of 250 men to support the militia, and set them an example of firmness. Captain Leonard, of the light artillery, was directed to proceed with two pieces to be on the ground before day light, but failed. Major Wood with his party disputed the road with great obstinacy, but the militia could not be prevailed on to stand, although the fields were divided by strong stone walls.

Finding that the enemy's columns had penetrated within a mile of Plattsburgh, the general dispatched his aid de camp, Lieutenant Root, to bring off the detachment at Dead Creek, and to inform Col. Appling that he wished him to fall on the enemy's right flank. The colonel fortunately arrived just in time to save his retreat and to fall in with the head of a column *debauching* from the woods. Here he poured in a most destructive fire from his riflemen at rest, and continued to annoy the column until he formed a junction with Major Wood. The field pieces also did considerable execution. So undaunted, however, was the enemy, that he never deployed in his whole march, always pressing on in column. The whole force of the enemy having approached the Saranac, our troops withdrew

to the south side, disputing every inch of ground as they retired. The enemy's light troops occupied the houses near the bridge and kept up a constant firing from the windows and balconies; but the hot shot from the fort, soon put the buildings in flames, and obliged these sharp shooters to retire. The enemy made constant attempts during the whole day to dislodge our men from the lower bridge, and suffered dearly for his perseverance. An attempt was made to cross the upper bridge, which was handsomely repelled by the militia. The planks were taken off the bridges and piled up in form of breastworks. The rear of the enemy arrived towards night with his heavy artillery and baggage on the lake road, where he was sorely galled by our row gallies. The enemy encamped on the ridge west of the town, occupying an extent of nearly three miles.

From the 6th until the morning of the 11th an almost continued skirmishing was kept up, between the enemy's pickets and the militia on the river; and in the mean time the dreadful note of preparation continually resounding in both armies. Our's was busily employed in strengthening their works; their's in erecting batteries, collecting ladders and bringing up their heavy ordnance. The New York and Vermont volunteers were pouring in from all quarters. General Mooers was directed to keep his force along the Saranac to prevent the enemy's crossing, and to send a strong body into his rear and keep it in continual alarm.

On the morning of the 11th, the British fleet made its appearance round Cumberland Head, and at nine bore down and engaged our flotilla at anchor in the bay off the town. This was the signal for a general attack

by land. At the same instant the British simultaneously opened several batteries and continued throwing bomb shells, shrapnells, balls and congreve rockets until sunset, when the bombardment ceased, the superiority of our fire having silenced all the enemy's batteries. The naval engagement lasted two hours in full view of both armies. Our troops all cheered at the result. Three efforts were made by the enemy to pass the river at the commencement of the cannonade to carry the works by storm, for which purpose he had provided an immense number of scaling ladders.

One attempt was made to cross at the village bridge, and another at the upper bridge, and a third at a ford about three miles from the works. At the two first he was repulsed by the regulars. At the ford by the brave volunteers and militia, where he suffered severely in killed, wounded and prisoners; a considerable body having crossed the stream, compelled the militia to retire before them about a mile and a half, when the resistance become too formidable for them to advance further. They kept always in close column, and the ground being peculiarly favorable it gave the militia a fine opportunity to take sure aim from behind every tree, log or stump. The Vermont volunteers, who hastened to the scene of action, hung on the enemy's flanks and made many prisoners. Had the British remained on the south side 30 minutes longer the whole detachment must have been cut off.

A daring enterprize was executed by Capt. M'Glasin, who was ordered to ford the river and attack a party constructing a battery, within 500 yards of Fort Brown, which he handsomely performed at midnight, with 50 men; drove off the working party consisting

of 150, and defeated a covering party of the number; killing one officer and six men in the charge and wounding many more.

Being repulsed at all points, at dusk the enemy withdrew his artillery from the batteries and raised the siege. At nine, under cover of the night, he sent off all the baggage he could find transports to carry. At two o'clock in the morning the army precipitately retreated, leaving their sick and wounded behind, whom he recommended to the humanity of the American general.

The British camp was found covered with vast quantities of provisions partially destroyed, concealed in holes, buried in the earth and thrown into ponds and creeks. Also an immense quantity of bomb shells, grape shot, muskets, ammunition, flints, &c. &c. entrenching tools of all sorts, tents, marquees, clothing, &c. &c.

A continual fall of rain and a violent storm prevented a general pursuit. The light troops harrassed their rear, captured several baggage waggons and some prisoners.

The total loss of the enemy was upwards of 2,000, about 300 of whom were deserters.

The American loss, from the 6th to the 11th of September, was thirty seven killed, 62 wounded and twenty missing.

NAVAL ACTION ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN.

THIS battle was fought on the 11th of September, 1814, in full view of the American and British armies, in Plattsburgh bay.

The American fleet consisted of the ship *Saratoga* of 16 guns, brig *Eagle*, 20, schooner *Ticonderoga*, 17, *Preble* sloop, 7, and 10 gun boats carrying 16 guns, making in all 86 guns.

The British fleet, under Commodore Downie, comprised the new ship *La Confiance* of 39 guns, brig *Linet* of 16, sloop *Chubb* of 11, sloop *Eagle* of 10, and 13 gun boats carrying 18 guns, which gave the enemy a superiority of *nine* guns.

The British fleet was manned by 1,030 men; the American by 820.

When the enemy made his appearance the American fleet were at anchor in line of battle. He also anchored in line at the distance of 300 yards from Commodore M'Donough's line, with *La Confiance* opposed to the *Saratoga*, his brig to the *Eagle*; his gallies and sloops to the *Ticonderoga* and *Preble* and a division of our gallies; our remaining gallies with the *Saratoga* and *Eagle*.

Commodore M'Donough gives the details of the action in the following words:

“In this situation, the whole force on both sides became engaged, the *Saratoga* suffering much from the

heavy fire of the *Confiance*. I could perceive at the same time, however, that our fire was very destructive to her. The *Ticonderoga*, Lieutenant Commandant Cassin, gallantly sustained her full share of the action. At half past 10 o'clock, the *Eagle*, not being able to bring her guns to bear, cut her cable and anchored in a more eligible position, between my ship and the *Ticonderoga*, where she very much annoyed the enemy, but unfortunately leaving me exposed to a galling fire from the enemy's brig. Our guns on the starboard side being nearly all dismantled or not manageable, a stern anchor was let go, the bow cable cut and the ship wind- ed with a fresh broadside on the enemy's ship, which soon after surrendered. Our broadside was then sprung to bear on the brig, which surrendered in about fifteen minutes after.

“The sloop that was opposed to the *Eagle*, had struck some time before and drifted down the line; the sloop which was with the gallies having struck also. Three of their gallies are said to be sunk, the others pulled off. Our gallies were about obeying, with alac- rity, the signal to follow them, when all the vessels were reported to be in a sinking state; it then became necessary to annul the signal to the gallies, and order their men to the pumps.

“I could only look at the enemy's gallies going off in a shattered condition, for there was not a mast in either squadron that could stand to make a sail on; the lower rigging being nearly shot away, hung down as though it had been just placed over mast heads.

“The *Saratoga* had 55 round shot in her hull; the *Confiance* 105. The enemy's shot passed principally just over our heads, as there was not 20 whole ham-

rocks in the nettings at the close of the action, which lasted without intermission two hours and twenty minutes.

“The absence and sickness of Lt. Reymond Perry, left me without the services of that excellent officer; much ought fairly to be attributed to him for his great care and attention in disciplining the ship’s crew, as her first lieutenant. His place was filled by a gallant young officer, Lieutenant Peter Gamble, who, I regret to inform you, was killed early in the action. Acting Lieutenant Vallette worked the 1st and 2d division of guns with able effect. Sailing Master Brum’s attention to the springs and in the execution of the order to wind the ship, and occasionally at the guns, met with my entire approbation; also Captain Youngs, commanding the acting marines, who took his men to the guns. Mr. Beal, purser, was of great service at the guns, and in carrying my orders throughout the ship with Midshipman Montgomery. Master’s Mate Joshua Justin had command of the 3d division; his conduct during the action was that of a brave and correct officer. Midshipmen Monteath, Graham, Williamson, Platt and Thwing, and acting Midshipman Baldwin, all behaved well, and gave evidence of their making valuable officers.

“The Saratoga was twice set on fire by hot shot from the enemy’s ships.

“I close, sir, this communication with feelings of gratitude for the able support I received from every officer and man attached to the squadron which I had the honor to command.”

According to an official statement of the purser of the Saratoga the killed and wounded of the enemy ex-

ceeded 260. The American loss in killed and wounded amounted to 110. We had but two officers killed; these were Lieutenants Gamble and Stansbury. The British officers killed, were Commodore Downie and three lieutenants.

There was taken on board the enemy's fleet 17,000 pounds of powder, besides fixed ammunition for their ships; between 80 and 90,000 pounds of balls, &c.; 600 muskets; 600 suits of soldiers' clothing, and the winter clothing for the whole of the land army.

In addition to this the enemy sunk eight tons of ball at Chazey, and a vessel laden with various warlike instruments at Isle La Motte, which was raised by the Americans.

MILITARY OPERATIONS ON THE MARITIME FRONTIER
OF THE UNITED STATES.

IN April 1813, Admiral Cockburn entered the Chesapeake with three line of battle ships and several frigates and commenced a predatory warfare against the settlements bordering on the waters of the bay.

The villages of Frenchtown, Fredericktown, and Georgetown were plundered and partially burnt.— No respect was paid to private property. The noble Admiral headed the marauding parties, and assisted in stealing negroes, pigs and poultry. Sharp's and Poplar islands were stript of every living domestic animal; such as were not in a condition for eating, were bayoneted or otherwise destroyed. A Mr. Segourney, the master of a small vessel, was wounded in defending it against three launches. He fell wounded, and his men jumped overboard, when the enemy got on board and finding the colors still flying; knocked out his brains with the but end of a musket.

On the 3d of May, the village of Havre de Grace was laid in ashes, the windows of the church broken in, and the most of the private property carried off, among which was a gig belonging to Com. Rodgers, which the redoubtable leader of the enterprize, Cockburn, appropriated to himself.

On the 22d of June, the enemy were foiled in an attempt upon Crany Island. Three of their brigs were sunk; one of them belonging to Admiral Warren's

ship had 75 men in her, most of whom were drowned; about 50 of the enemy deserted. Lieut. Beatty commanded the Americans.

The British with 2500 men attacked Hampton three days afterwards. The place was defended by 400 Americans, under Major Cratchfield, who made a noble defence; but were finally overpowered and put to flight. It was here that the enemy excelled himself, if possible, in acts of brutal ferocity. Several defenceless women were dishonored—two sick men were stabbed in their beds—one in the arms of his wife: Negroes were encouraged in their rudeness to females; the church was pillaged, and the plate belonging to it taken away. An apprehension of an attack from the militia of the neighboring country caused them to return hastily.

In April, 1814, the enemy made a dash at Pettipaug, (Con.) where they captured and burnt 21 sail of vessels of various tonnage, the value of which was estimated at 150,000 dollars. No resistance was made by the inhabitants.

On the 13th of June they landed at Wareham in Massachusetts, and burnt 5 merchant vessels, and set fire to a *cotton factory*, which the inhabitants saved by extinguishing the flames after the enemy retreated.

Soon after, they entered the harbor of Scituate and burnt 9 small vessels.

Early in August a British 74 gun ship, a sloop of war and an armed brig, arrived off Stonnington, (Con.) and commenced bombarding the town, which lasted the greater part of three days. The enemy attempted to land in their launches, but were driven back. The brig which had approached nearest the shore was hulled and obliged to haul off. The only defence of the place

was two 18 pounders and a 4 pounder, worked by a company of militia under Col. Randall. Six of the militia received slight wounds; a few of the buildings were injured. A prodigious number of rockets, balls and shells were thrown into the town.

On the evening of the 11th of July the British captured the town and garrison of Eastport, in the province of Maine. The fort was defended by six pieces of cannon and 40 men. The enemy's force amounted to 2000 men, transported on board eight ships of war. No defence was made. The vessels in the harbor were confiscated, and the inhabitants allowed four days either to take the oath of allegiance to his Britannic majesty, or to remove from the island. Many of the federalists preferred remaining on that degrading condition. The place contains about 1000 inhabitants, and is situated on an island.

Castine was the next object of attack; the force employed on the expedition against it was too strong for the garrison, who blew up the fort and evacuated the place. The Adams frigate was at that time lying in the mouth of the Penobscot. On the approach of the English fleet, Capt. Morris ascended the river as far as Hambden, where he landed his guns and erected batteries. The enemy, to the number of 2000 pursued. The militia who had assembled for his protection, disgracefully fled. Captain Morris, after a hopeless resistance, spiked his guns, blew up his vessel, and effected his escape through the woods.

The enemy took possession of Belfast and several small places in the District of Maine without opposition, and retained undisturbed possession of them until

after the exchange of the ratification of the treaty of Ghent. Several of the inhabitants were actually flogged like slaves by their new masters.

The continued depredations of the British in the Chesapeake, suggested to our government the necessity of a flotilla on that bay to counteract the enemy's designs. Three or four light schooners and eight barges were armed and manned by 200 men, the command of which was given to Com. Barney, an officer of tried valor and skill.

This flotilla was an object of peculiar attention from the enemy; and frequent attempts were made by him to destroy it, in each of which he was roughly handled, owing to our superior gunnery, and the facility with which it could run into shoal water, creeks, &c.

About the 16th of August great alarm was excited by the arrival of a formidable British naval force in the Chesapeake; on board of which were about 12,000 land troops.

BATTLE OF BLADENSBURGH—CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON CITY.

THE enemy divided his forces—the principal part ascended the Patuxent as high as Benedict, preceded by our flotilla; the residue ascended the Potomac.

The main body of the enemy, headed by Gen. Ross, advanced to Upper Marlborough on the 22d. Com. Barney blew up his flotilla to prevent its falling into their hands, and joined the American army under Gen. Winder. The enemy pushed on to Bladensburgh, compelled our troops to retire, and then advanced to Washington City, which he plundered and conflagrated. The other division of the enemy ascended the Potomac as far as Alexandria, which they plundered.

For a minute and official detail of these events, see Appendix (C.)

We have preferred giving this interesting document in full length, to any other statement, as it is certainly entitled to the highest respect. The committee seem to have been actuated by a sincere desire to condense the mass of testimony into the best form for leading public opinion to a just and unprejudiced result. Col. R. M. Johnson was chairman of the committee.

The total loss of public property at the city and at the navy yard was \$969,171 04. The Argus sloop of war, nearly ready for sea, and the Columbian frigate, on the stocks, and all the public buildings, were destroy-

ed at the navy yard. The printing office of the National Intelligencer was destroyed.

The President, Col. Monroe, and Gen. Armstrong made every possible exertion to defend the District. The *true causes* of the success of the enemy, were the military incompetence of Gen. Winder, who never had the art of inspiring by his presence a martial spirit in his men—who did not sufficiently reconnoiter the enemy's force—harrass him in his march with his light troops, nor obstruct the roads. 2d, the pernicious influence of the Federal Republican newspaper published at Georgetown, which paralyzed by its encomiums on the enemy the exertions of nearly one half the neighboring militia.

3d. The locality of the City of Washington, which left it uncertain what place in Virginia, Maryland, or the District of Columbia, they intended to attack.

After the defeat of Gen. Winder at Bladensburgh, a deputation of the first citizens of Alexandria waited on Admiral Cockburn to make their peace with the conquerer. He promised to respect private property. On the morning of the 27th of August, the division of the enemy's fleet which had ascended the Potomac, consisting of three frigates and a few light vessels, appeared in sight of the place. Captain Dyson, the commander of Fort Washington, blew up the works and retreated without making even a show of defence. This cowardly act left the enemy masters of the river and of Alexandria. The British naval commander, Captain Gordon, demanded, as the price of saving the town, the surrender of the shoppery and merchandize belonging to the place. These conditions were acceded to by the dastardly inhabitants. They were obliged

to assist in raising the vessels which had been sunk, and in putting the merchandize on board. The enemy carried off 14 vessels laden with 16,000 barrels of flour; 800 hogsheads of tobacco, and 150 bales of cotton.

While the enemy were employed in loading their vessels, Captains Porter and Creighton of the United States navy, made a dash into Alexandria on horse back, rode up to a midshipman who was superintending the loading of a boat; Captain Creighton seized him by the cravat, for the purpose of dragging him off, which he probably would have done had not his cravat given way.

Hopes were at first entertained that the time which the enemy consumed in securing their booty, would prevent their descent, by erecting batteries and obstructing the channel. Commodores Perry, Rodgers and Porter were indefatigable in this service, but without the desired success. Twelve of our men were killed at Perry's battery.

ATTACK ON BALTIMORE.

ELATED with recent success, the British general descended the Patuxent and prepared to gather fresh laurels in an attack on Baltimore. The citizens of this patriotic city, knowing themselves to be the peculiar objects of British hatred, had not been unmindful of their own safety; they were prepared to face the approaching storm.

On the 10th of September, intelligence was received that 50 hostile sail were ascending the bay. A part of this formidable expedition touched at North Point, fourteen miles below Baltimore, and disembarked the land forces.

The citizens of Baltimore turned out *en masse*. A part of General Winder's force had repaired to that city in anticipation of an attack; the militia of the vicinity came in. The whole were under the orders of General Smith.

General Stricker took a position at the junction of two roads leading from the city to North Point; his right flanked by Cove Creek, and his left by a marsh. He here awaited the approach of the enemy. A reconnoitering detachment met the enemy's advance, skirmished, and retreated to the line. Between 2 and 3 o'clock, the enemy's whole force came up and commenced battle by some discharges of rockets; and soon after the action became general along the whole line.

General Stricker gallantly maintained his position against a great superiority of numbers, for the space of one hour and twenty minutes, when a regiment on the left gave way, which obliged him to fall back on his reserve. He then formed his brigade, but the enemy having lost their commander in chief, General Ross, did not renew the attack, and the general fell back to the entrenchments near the city. The enemy made some further demonstrations; but finding our troops on the alert at all points, and the entrenchments strong and well manned, silently withdrew his troops in the night. General Smith states the British loss, as nearly as he could ascertain, at between six and seven hundred. General Stricker's brigade lost about 150 killed and wounded.

At the same time the British army was advancing by land their fleet made its approach by water, and commenced a discharge of rockets and bombs as soon as it came in range of Fort M'Henry. The situation of Major Armistead, the commander of the fort, was peculiarly trying; the enemy having taken his position at such a distance as to render offensive operations on his part entirely fruitless; while the bombs and rockets were every moment falling in and about it; the officers and men being at the same time entirely exposed. The vessels, however, had the temerity to approach somewhat nearer. They were as soon compelled to withdraw. During the night, while the land forces of the enemy were retreating, and whilst the bombardment was the most severe, two or three rocket vessels and barges succeeded in getting up the Ferry Branch; but they were soon compelled to retire, by the forts and batteries in that quarter. These forts also destroyed.

one of the barges with all on board. The loss in Fort M'Henry was 4 killed and 24 wounded. The enemy, finding that there was little to be expected from their attack but hard blows, disappeared on the morning of the 11th.

Among the citizens of Baltimore who fell on the 11th, was James Louny Donaldson, a representative in the state legislature, from the city.

The British admiral, Sir Peter Parker, was killed in one of the predatory attempts of the enemy.

Soon after the repulse of the enemy at Baltimore, he withdrew the greater part of his troops and ships of war from the Chesapeake; he however left enough to maraud and harrass the inhabitants contiguous to the bay and its tributary streams. Kent Island was the principal rendezvous of his land troops. The brutality and ferocity of the enemy while on that station, exceeds any recorded of the most barbarous nations. Their expedition up the Rappahannock outstrips previous depredations; for here British rapacity was found ransacking vaults and tombs, and profaning the sanctuary of the dead in quest of plunder.

At Tappahannock they burnt the court house, jail, collector's office, clerks office, a large ware house and destroyed a large amount of private property. In a skirmish they lost 15 men killed and 31 wounded. In another, two of their barges lost almost every man on board, with twelve prisoners and several deserters. Captain Shackelford of the Virginia house of delegates, attacked a large party of the enemy with only 60 men, but was eventually taken prisoner.

CREEK WAR.

THE Muscogees, commonly called the Creeks, inhabit the extensive country between the frontiers of Georgia and the Tombigbee river. They enjoy a most delightful climate, and are an artful and warlike people. Their language is musical and abounds with a great number of remarkable *long* words.

Before the commencement of the late war the number of warriors was estimated at 6,000; the whole population to 26,000 souls. The British have always exercised a preponderating influence over their minds; but in 1812, civil dissension produced great bloodshed in the nation. One party declared themselves against the United States, the enemies of civilization, and the friends of Britain. The other party, headed by the Big Warrior, avowed themselves the friends of the Americans and civilization.

Massacre at Fort Mims.

THIS fort stands on the eastern side of the Alabama, nearly opposite of Fort Stoddert in the Mississippi territory. Major Beasley who commanded the garrison, had frequent warnings of the danger which awaited him, but instead of preparing to ward off the meditated blow, flogged the negroes who informed him of the approach of the Indians. The fort was filled with the inhabitants of the surrounding settlements. The

appearance of the Indians was sudden and unexpected: They had to come through an open field 150 rods wide, yet they were within a few steps of the fort before they were noticed. The gate was open. They rushed immediately into one side of the fort, which was separated from the other by a line of pickets. The women and children took refuge in the houses which were fired by the Indians; and it is said that the Indians, when the buildings were in flames, danced round them with savage delight. A general massacre ensued. One hundred and seven officers and privates, 100 men, women and children, and 100 negroes fell victims to their fury. Only 18 of the whites escaped. This took place in August 1813.

Battle of Tallushatches.

THE alarm and terror excited by the catastrophe of Mims pervaded the whole Mississippi Territory and spread to the borders of Tennessee and Georgia. Ten thousand militia were put in motion to avenge the blood of their fellow citizens.

General Jackson was selected to lead the Tennessee volunteers to victory and vengeance. He rendezvoused at the Ten Islands in the river Coosee. On the 2d of November, he marched in the night with 900 mounted riflemen, to inclose the Indian town of Tallushatches. He disposed his troops so as to encircle the town; he then ordered two companies to advance beyond the circle of alignment, for the purpose of drawing out the enemy from their buildings, which stood in open woodland. The plan succeeded. The Indians began to beat their drums, mingled with the most savage yells. They rushed out and charged with great

fury the reconnoitering party, who gave way as they advanced until they met the troops in the line, which gave them a general fire and then charged. The Indians could not resist the shock. They fell back upon their town, when they made all the resistance that an overpowered force could; they fought as long as one existed. The work was soon over. Our men rushed up to their houses and in a few minutes killed the last warrior. The enemy fought with savage fury and met death with all its horrors, without shrinking or complaining; not one asked to be spared, but fought as long as they could stand or sit. Several squaws and children were unintentionally killed by our men. 186 warriors were counted dead, besides those killed in the woods. Not one escaped to tell the dismal tale. 84 women and children were taken. General Jackson lost 5 killed and 41 wounded, mostly with arrows.

On the 7th, General Jackson received word that the friendly Creeks at Talladega were menaced with an attack from the hostile Creeks. The distance was thirty miles; he marched to their relief in the evening. The next morning at sun rise he was within half a mile of the encampment of the enemy. Here again the general arranged his columns so as to enclose the enemy in a circle. A select corps was pushed forward to bring on the action. The bait took. The enemy met and pursued; but the militia who were to have checked them, faltered, which enabled a part of the Indians to escape. Nevertheless, the combat was very bloody; 290 savage warriors were left dead on the ground, and those who escaped were pursued to the distance of 3 miles. Fifteen whites were killed, the same number wounded.

Battle of Hillabee Towns.

ON the 11th of November, a detachment of the Tennessee army marched into the heart of the Creek nation. They burnt in their progress the villages at Little Opiskee, and at Galenga; they then proceeded to Nitty Chaption, and from thence to the Hillabee Towns. When within six miles of these towns, Gen. White, who led the expedition, dismounted his troops to surround the towns in the night. A little before day light, he commenced the attack; the Indians were completely surprized. The whole were killed or taken. Sixty warriors were slain; the prisoners amounted to 256. Not one of our men received the slightest injury. This feat was performed at the distance of one hundred miles from the main army.

Battle of Autossee.

TOWARDS the close of November, General Floyd with 950 Georgia militia accompanied by 350 friendly Indians, marched into the most flourishing part of the Creek country. He defeated the enemy on Cenlabee Creek, and burnt their town including 400 houses. The dead of the enemy covered the plain; 200 warriors were killed. The American loss was 54 killed and wounded.

Battle of Ecconnachaed.

IN December, General Claiborne with a party of Mississippi volunteers, marched into the Creek country and engaged the Indians at Ecconnachaed, (or holy ground.) Colonel Carson commanded the whites in the battle, and the celebrated Weathersford the sava-

ges. The battle was obstinate; but the combatants were not numerous. Thirty Indians were killed. Their favorite town, which comprized upwards of 200 houses, was laid in ashes. Great quantities of Indian goods were taken.

Battle of Camp Defiance.

ON the 27th of January, General Floyd was attacked in his camp west of Cohahovehie. The Indians attacked at 5 o'clock in the morning. They stole on the centinels and with great impetuosity rushed upon our line. They even advanced to within 30 yards of our artillery, and fought with veteran courage. But the firmness of the men and the influence of the bayonet saved the army. The enemy was at last routed with some loss. General Floyd was dangerously wounded, and many of his troops killed.

Expedition to the head of the Tallapoosee.

ON the 14th of January, General Jackson was reinforced by 800 volunteers; the term of service of his original force had expired, and most of the men had departed for their homes. On the 17th he took up his line of march for the Tallapoosee with 930 men, exclusive of 300 Indians. This expedition had two objects. First, to make a diversion in favor of General Floyd; secondly, to indulge the ardor of his troops, which would attach them to the service.

Nine hundred hostile Indians were known to be assembled near Emuesau. Early in the morning of the 21st of January, while the army was encamped, the Indians attacked the left wing, and continued it vigor-

ously until it was light enough for the troops to charge, when the enemy was routed at every point.

Four hundred men under General Coffee was then detached to burn the indian camp at the bend of the river, which was found too strong to attack. He returned to camp. Half an hour afterwards the Indians again appeared in force and fired on the pickets. General Coffee made a movement to turn their left flank, but his men, from some mistake, did not follow in sufficient numbers; he nevertheless immediately attacked their left flank with only 154 men. The action became general and bloody. A charge decided the struggle. "The effect was immediate and inevitable." Forty five of the savages were found dead. General Coffee was wounded in the body; his aid was killed by his side. The venerable Judge Cocke, at the age of 65, fought with youthful ardor, and saved a fellow soldier by killing his antagonist.

On the 23d, General Jackson commenced his return march, but in passing a defile on the 24th he was again attacked. His previous arrangements had provided for every contingency. Yet, as soon as the word was given to halt and a few guns had been fired, the right and left columns of the rear guard precipitately gave way. This shameful retreat threwed the greater part of the army into confusion. Colonel Carrol rallied a few of the center column who checked the enemy until order was restored. The brunt of the action fell on a small part of the troops. Never was more bravery displayed than on this occasion. The Indians were defeated, but not without considerable bloodshed on both sides.

Battle of Tohopiska.

THE village of Tohopiska, stands in the great bend of the Tallapoosa. It contained 300 houses. The course of the river here describes the figure of a horse shoe, and forms a peninsula, including about 100 acres of land. It was on this point of land that the hostile Creeks had resolved to make their last desperate effort to check the tide of conquest, which threatened a total extinction of their tribe. "Nature furnishes few situations so eligible for defence; and barbarians have never rendered one more secure by art. Across the neck of the bend which leads into it from the north, they had erected a breast work of the greatest compactness and strength, from five to eight feet high and prepared with double port holes, very artfully arranged. An army could not approach it without being exposed to a double and cross fire of the enemy who lay in perfect security behind it."* To defend this position, 1000 desperate Indian warriors had assembled. The river was deep and unfordable.

On the 26th of March General Jackson who had again advanced to the Tallapoosa, encamped within 5 miles of the enemy's lines. On the morning of the 27th he made his arrangements for an attack. General Coffee with the mounted and Indian force crossed the river and surrounded the bend, to prevent the escape of the enemy by swimming or in canoes. With the remainder of the forces the General marched and took a position in front of the thin breast works, and planted his cannon at the distance of eight yards, and immediately opened a brisk fire from his artillery and musket-

* General Jackson.

ry, which continued about two hours, when a company of spies and the Cherokee force crossed over to the peninsula in canoes, set fire to a part of the town and fell on the rear of the enemy as he lay concealed behind his defences. This diversion determined General Jackson to storm the breast work. His men were eager to be led to the charge, and obeyed the order with the greatest enthusiasm; they marched with a quick and firm step in the face of a shower of balls, the blaze of a thousand guns, and infuriate yells of savage desperation. At first the contest was maintained musket to musket, through the port holes, in which many of the enemy's balls were welded to the bayonets of our muskets. The Indians made desperate by their situation, fought like devils. But nothing could withstand the valor of our men; they threw themselves over the works and finished the massacre with the bayonet and the but ends of their muskets. Eight hundred of the enemy were killed upon the Peninsula. Nearly three hundred were shot as they attempted to swim the river. Never was there a more terrible vengeance inflicted upon an enemy. "Among the dead was found their famous prophet Monahell, shot in the mouth by a grape shot, as though heaven designed to chastise his impositions by an appropriate punishment." Three hundred prisoners were taken, all women and children except three. Our loss was 26 whites killed and 107 wounded—18 Cherokees killed and 17 wounded.

This decisive battle terminated the Creek War in the submission of the surviving warriors. Gen. Jackson returned to Tennessee, but was soon appointed a Major General in the service of the United States.

ATTACK ON FORT BOYER.

THIS fort stands on the eastern point forming Mobile bay, and was built by Col. Boyer, by the order of General Wilkinson.

On the 15th of September the British made a combined attack by land and water. The naval force consisted of two ships of 24 and 28 guns, two brigs and three tenders. The land troops were composed of 100 marines under Colonel Nichols, and 300 Indians under Captain Woodbine of the British army. The effective force in the fort amounted to 120 men under Major Lawrence.

The *Hermes* of 28 guns anchored nearest the fort and was set on fire and blew up. Of 170 men, which composed her crew only 20 escaped. The *Charon* lost 85 men. The loss of the other vessels, was not ascertained. Between 4 and 500 hand guns were fired from the fort during the attack. Only 4 Americans were killed.

The flag staff of the fort was shot away, and the flag rehoisted on a sponge staff planted on the parapet, during the hottest of the fire.

ENTRANCE INTO PENSACOLA.

THIS place had long been a principal rendezvous for the Indians and British, much to the prejudice of the United States. In Nov. 1814, General Jackson, indignant at the barefaced violation of the neutrality of the place, determined to enter the place and seize on its defences. On his approach he sent an officer with a flag to the governor, who was fired upon from fort St. George. This outrage produced a resolution in the commander in chief to storm the place, which was defended by British and Spanish troops, and 7 English ships of war in the harbor. Our troops advanced for this purpose, as they were entering the town they were saluted with a shower of ball and grape from a battery and the musketry from the houses and gardens. The Governor met the officers in advance with a flag, begged for mercy and surrendered the town and fort unconditionally. The British blew up the principal fort called the Baruncas, which commands the entrance into the bay. After this General Jackson repaired to New Orleans which was then menaced with an attack from a most formidable naval and military expedition.

On the 12th. of December the British fleet with the expedition on board arrived at ship Island in the bay of St. Louis and about 70 miles N. E. of New Orleans. On the 13th they landed at pass Christienne which communicates with Lake Ponchartrain with 106 barges;

manned by upwards of a thousand men and officers, from the squadron, and proceeded directly in quest of the American flotilla commanded by Lieutenant Jones, which they engaged on the 14th. The American force consisted of 2 light schooners, 5 gunboats carrying 23 guns, manned with 182 men. The sanguinary character of this contest has few parallels. Several of the barges were sunk. Our little force was finally overpowered and taken; not however, until they had killed or disabled nearly 400 of their enemies.* The capture of our flotilla gave the enemy command of the lakes and enabled him to choose his point of attack.

But it was yet doubtful at what point the enemy would strike the contemplated blow, whether he would approach through the lakes, or attempt to ascend the Mississippi by the way of the Balize and fort St. Philip. General Jackson was indefatigable in his preparations to receive him. Large bodies of Tennessee and Kentucky militia were on their way for the defence of the city. The numerous approaches from the side of the lakes were carefully guarded. The eyes of the union were directed to this new theater of war.

The enemy approached the city by the way of the lakes, and on the 23d of December succeeded in reaching the Mississippi six miles below New Orleans, undiscovered by any one disposed to give the intelligence. The artillery and baggage was conveyed in boats up the Bayou and canal which passes from the Levee to Lake Bourgere, and through the farm of Mr. Villere. Had it not been for the fortunate escape of the son of Mr. Villere, they would have reached the city before it was known that they had disembarked at the mouth of the

* See the official account.

bayou. This unexpected appearance of the enemy is not to be attributed to any want of precaution in the commanding General. He had garded all the approaches; a picket had been stationed at the mouth of the bayou, which was completely surprized.

It was about 12 o'clock when the news of their arrival reached the General, who apprehending a double attack by the way of Chef Monteau, left General Carrol's and the militia of the city to guard the canal of Carondelet, and at 5 o'clock marched with 500 men to meet the enemy, at that time about 3000 strong, occupying a line upon the river of half a mile extent, and leisurely employed in cooking their suppers. Commodore Patterson in the Carolina schooner was ordered to drop down the river and open a fire upon their camp, which he executed about half past 7. His fire was the signal for our troops to attack, which they executed with great spirit. General Coffee's brigade rushed into the enemy's camp. Several other corps did the same. The city riflemen penetrated to the enemy's center, were surrounded and fought their way out again bringing off a number of prisoners. One hour after the commencement of the action a thick fog arose which produced some confusion. It became prudent to recall the troops from a murderous conflict of doubtful result. Our men lay on their arms during the night and in the morning took a stronger position two miles nearer the city. General Jackson lost about 100 men killed, wounded and prisoners. The enemy must have suffered severely from the certain aim of the riflemen.*

* A Journal found upon one of the British officers killed in the assault of the 8th of January, mentioned

Colonel Lauderdale of General Coffee's corps fell nobly fighting at the head of his regiment. Cols. Dyer and Gibson of the same corps were wounded.

On the 27th the enemy succeeded in blowing up the Carolina schooner which had become becalmed. The enemy fired her by hot shot from a land battery. The crew escaped by swimming.

The next day the enemy marched up the levee for the purpose of forcing the American lines. At the distance of half a mile he opened upon our works with bombs and rockets. They continued to advance in solid column until they were saluted with a shower of canister and grape, when they fell on their bellies and laid still until it was dark and retired under cover of the night. Their loss on this occasion was about 100.

The *new year* opened by a discharge from the enemy's batteries, the principal fire was on the left near the cypress woods. Twelve Americans were killed; many of the enemy were killed and wounded.

On the second General Jackson ordered a sortie of 400 men, half of them mounted, to go and reconnoiter the enemy's batteries which had fired so briskly on the preceding day. It was found by the sallying party that our fire had dismounted several of their guns, which they had taken off, razed their redoubts and retreated to their first lines.

General Adair from Kentucky arrived with 4000 men and encamped three miles above the city. Considerable inconvenience was experienced for the want of

that they lost on the night of the 23d of Dec. 224 killed and an immense number wounded.

arms in consequence of the continual arrival of the militia.

At this time the enemy received a reinforcement of 6000 men under General Lambert. On the 7th they were disembarked at the bayou Beenvenu. The same evening they dug through the levee to admit the river into the canal, through which they dragged 25 of their boats and thus transported 600 of their men to the opposite side of the river for the purpose of attacking the batteries and a party of Kentucky militia entrusted with their defence. These troops under the command of Col. Thornton, were intended to create a diversion on that side of the river, while the main attack was carried on on the east side,

Accordingly before day light on the morning of the 9th, they moved in silence upon the American entrenchments. Let us first introduce the official account of the various fortunes of the day.

“ *Camp 4 miles below Orleans, 9th January, 1815.*

SIR--During the day of the 6th and 7th, the enemy had been actively employed in making preparations for an attack on my lines. With infinite labor they had succeeded on the night of the 7th in getting their boats across from the lake to the river, by widening and deepening the canal on which they had effected their disembarkation. It had not been in my power to impede these operations by a general attack; added to other reason, the nature of the troops under my command, mostly militia, rendered it too hazardous to attempt extensive *offensive* movements in an open country, against a numerous and well disciplined army. Although my forces, as to number, had been increased by the arrival of the Kentucky division, my strength

had received very little addition; a small portion only of that detachment being provided with arms. Compelled thus to wait the attack of the enemy, I took every measure to repel it when it should be made, and to defeat the object he had in view. General Morgan, with the New Orleans contingent, the Louisiana militia and a strong detachment of the Kentucky troops, occupied an entrenched camp on the opposite side of the river, protected by strong batteries on the bank, erected and superintended by commodore Patterson.

In *my* encampment every thing was ready for action, when, early on the morning of the 8th, the enemy after throwing a heavy shower of bombs and Congreve rockets, advanced their columns on my right and left, to storm my entrenchments. I cannot speak sufficiently in praise of the firmness and deliberation with which my whole line received their approach, *more* could not have been expected from veterans inured to war. For an hour the fire of the small arms was as incessant and severe as can be imagined. The artillery, too, directed by officers who displayed equal skill and courage, did great execution. Yet the columns of the enemy continued to advance with a firmness which reflects upon them the greatest credit. Twice the column which approached me on my left, was repulsed by the troops of Gen. Carrol, those of Gen. Coffee, and a division of the Kentucky militia, and twice they formed again and renewed the assault. At length, however, cut to pieces, they fled in confusion from the field, leaving it covered with their dead and wounded. The loss which the enemy sustained on this occasion, cannot be estimated at less than 1500 in killed, wounded and prisoners. Upwards of three hundred have already been delivered

over for burial; and my men are still engaged in picking them up within my lines and carrying them to the point where the enemy are to receive them. This is in addition to the dead and wounded whom the enemy have been enabled to carry from the field, during and since the action, and to those who have since died of the wounds they received. We have taken about 500 prisoners, upwards of 300 of whom are wounded, and a great part of them mortally. My loss has not exceeded, and I believe has not amounted to ten killed and as many wounded. The entire destruction of the enemy's army was now inevitable, had it not been for an unfortunate occurrence which at this moment took place on the other side of the river. Simultaneously with his advance, upon my lines, he had thrown over in his boats a considerable force to the other side of the river. *These* having landed were hardly enough to advance against the works of Gen. Morgan; and what is strange and difficult to account for, at the very moment when their entire discomfiture was looked for with a confidence approaching to certainty, the Kentucky reinforcements, ingloriously fled, drawing after them, by their example, the remainder of the forces; and thus yielding to the enemy that most fortunate position. The batteries which had rendered me, for many days, the most important service, though bravely defended, were of course now abandoned; not however, until the guns had been spiked.

This unfortunate route had totally changed the aspect of affairs. The enemy now occupied a position from which they might annoy us without hazard, and by means of which they might have been enabled to defeat, in a great measure, the effects of our success on

this side of the river. It became therefore an object of the first consequence to dislodge him as soon as possible. For this object, all the means in my power, which I could with any safety use, were immediately put in preparation. Perhaps, however, it was somewhat owing to another cause that I succeeded beyond my expectations. In negotiating the terms of a temporary suspension of hostilities to enable the enemy to bury their dead and provide for their wounded, I had required certain propositions to be acceded to as a basis; among which this was one, that although hostilities should cease on *this* side the river until 12 o'clock of this day, yet it was not to be understood that they should cease on the *other* side; but that no reinforcements should be sent across by *either* army until the expiration of that day. His excellency Maj. General Lambert begged time to consider of those propositions until 10 o'clock of to day, and in the mean time recrossed his troops. I need not tell you with how much eagerness I immediately regained possession of the position he had thus hastily quitted."

After the signal defeat of the enemy on the 8th, they shewed no disposition to renew the attack. But General Jackson did not long permit them to remain undisturbed; a constant cannonade was kept from all our batteries, and on the night of the 18th of January the enemy silently withdrew to their boats on Lake Borgen. They left on the field 16 pieces of cannon, their equipments and an immense quantity of ball. Seventy of their wounded were mangled to such a degree that it was impossible to remove them. These they recommended to the humanity of the American commander.

The British ships of war which attempted to ascend

the Mississippi, found themselves completely checked at Fort St. Phillip. They bombarded the fort for nine days; during which time they threw about 1000 shells at our works. They withdrew on the 17th of January. This fort has 44 cannon and is considered bomb proof. It was defended by 500 men under the command of the brave Major Overton.

NAVAL OPERATIONS ON THE OCEAN.

Action between the Constitution and Guerriere.

THE Constitution fell in with the Guerriere on the 19th of August, 1812, in Lat. $41^{\circ} 42'$ and Long. $55^{\circ} 48'$. As soon as the Constitution was ready for action, she bore down to bring her adversary to close action immediately; but on coming within gun shot, received a broadside which did no injury. After which the Guerriere kept wearing and manouevring for three quarters of an hour to get a raking position, without success. At 6 P. M. the Constitution being along side, within half pistol shot, she commenced a heavy fire from all her guns, double shotted with round and grape, and so well directed and so warmly kept up, that in 15 minutes the Guerriere's mizen mast went by the board, her main yard in the slings, and her hull rigging and sails very much torn to pieces. The fire was kept up with equal warmth for fifteen minutes longer, when her masts went by the board taking with them every spar except the bowsprit. On seeing this, Captain Hull ceased firing, so that in thirty minutes after he got fairly alongside the Guerriere, she surrendered. She had not a spar standing, and her hull below and above water so shattered that a few more broadsides must have carried her down.

The Constitution had seven men killed and seven wounded.

The *Guerriere* had thirty nine killed and missing, and 61 wounded.

Captain Hull, not deeming it prudent to attempt to take his prize into port, destroyed her.

Fourteen impressed Americans were found on board the *Guerriere*.

The crew of the *Constitution* gave three cheers as they went into action, and requested to be laid close along side of the enemy. "From the smallest boy in the ship to the oldest seamen, not a look of fear was seen." In the heat of the action, a sailor perceiving that the flag at the topmasthead had been shot away, went up and lashed it in such a manner as to render it impossible for shot to take it away without taking the mast with it.

Captain Dacres of the *Guerriere*, gravely ascribes the loss of his ship to the defective state of her masts and the number of American seamen on board, whom he could not permit to fight against their own countrymen, and ordered them below!

Capture of the Allert.

On the 13th of August, 1812, off the Grand Banks, the *Essex* frigate, Captain Porter, fell in with the *Allert* British sloop of war, Captain T. L. P. Laughame, which immediately ran down on the weather quarter of the *Essex*, gave three cheers and commenced the action; and after eight minutes firing struck her colors with seven feet water in her hold and much cut to pieces. The *Essex* did not receive the slightest injury.

This cruise of the *Essex* was most brilliant. She annoyed the enemy's commerce in the West Indies, upon the coast of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, and

after the capture of the Allert had 500 prisoners on board. On her return to port she narrowly escaped capture from a British squadron.

Action between the Wasp and Frolic.

CAPTAIN JONES, of the Wasp, put to sea on the 13th of August, 1812, and five days afterwards fell in with the British sloop of war Frolic, convoying several armed merchantmen. The sea was rough and the weather boistrous. The two sloops approached each other until within about sixty yards, when the Wasp hailed and was instantly answered by a fire of cannon and musketry, which she returned with spirit. In ten minutes her main topmast, gaff and mizen topgallant sail were shot away and fell, entangling the rigging so that her head guns were unmanageable during the heat of the action. "Still she continued a close and constant fire. The sea was so rough that the muzzle of the Wasp's guns were in the water. The Americans therefore, fired as the ship's side was going down, so that their shot went either on the enemy's deck or below it, while the English fired as the vessel rose, and thus her balls chiefly touched the rigging or were thrown away. The Wasp now shot ahead of the Frolic, raked her and then resumed her position on her larboard bow. Her fire was now obviously attended with such success, and that of the Frolic so slackened, that Captain Jones did not wish to board her, lest the roughness of the sea might endanger both vessels; but in the course of a few minutes more, every brace of the Wasp was shot away, and her rigging so much torn to pieces, that he was afraid that his masts, being unsupported would go by the board, and the Frolic be able to escape. He

thought, therefore, the best chance for securing her was to board and decide the contest at once. With this view he wore ship, and running down upon the enemy the vessels struck each other, the Wasp's side rubbing along the Frolic's bow so that her jib boom came in between the main and mizen rigging of the Wasp, directly over the heads of Captain Jones and the first lieutenant, Mr. Biddle, who were at that time standing together near the capstan. The Frolic lay so fair for raking that they decided not to board until they had given a closing broadside. Whilst they were loading for this, so near were the two vessels that the rammers of the Wasp were pushed against the Frolic's sides, and two of her guns went through the bow ports of the Frolic, and swept the whole length of her deck. At this moment Jack Lang, a seaman of the Wasp, a gallant fellow who had been once impressed by a British man of war, jumped on a gun with his cutlass, and was springing on board the Frolic, Captain Jones, wishing to fire again before boarding, called him down, but his impatience could not be restrained, and he was already on the bowsprit of the Frolic; when, on seeing the ardor and enthusiasm of the Wasp's crew, Lieut. Biddle mounted on the hammock cloth to board. At this signal the crew followed, but Lieut. Biddle's feet got entangled in the enemy's bowsprit, and Midshipman Baker, in his ardor to get on board, laying hold of his coat, he fell back on the Wasp's deck. He sprung up, and as the next swell of the sea brought the Frolic nearer he got on her bowsprit, where Lang and another seaman were already. He passed them on the forecastle, and was surprized at seeing not a single man alive on the Frolic's deck, except the seaman at the wheel, and

ree officers. The deck was slippery with blood, and strewn with the bodies of the dead. As he went forward, the captain of the Frolic, with two other officers, who were standing on the quarter deck, threw down their swords and made an inclination of their bodies, denoting that they had surrendered. At this moment the colors were flying, as probably, none of the seamen of the Frolic would dare to go into the rigging for fear of the musketry of the Wasp. Lieut. Biddle jumped into the rigging himself and hauled down the British ensign, and possession was taken of the Frolic in forty three minutes after the first fire. She was in a shocking condition, the birth deck, particularly, was crowded with dead and wounded, and dying; there being but a small proportion of the Frolic's crew escaped. Captain Jones instantly sent on board his surgeon's mate, and all the blankets of the Frolic were brought from the slop room, for the comfort of the wounded. To increase the confusion, both of the Frolic's masts soon fell, covering the dead and every thing on deck, and she lay a comple wreck."

The Wap had 5 men killed and 5 slightly wounded.

The Frolic lost about thirty killed and 45 wounded. She was superior in her armament to the Wasp by exactly four twelve pounders. The number of men is believed to have been about equal.

After the decks were cleared of the dead and the wounded taken care of, Captain Jones ordered Lieut. Biddle to proceed in the Frolic to a southern port, and as there was a suspicious sail to the windward, the Wasp would continue her cruise. The ships then parted. The strange sail unfortunately proved to be a British ship of the line, the Poictiers of 74 guns. It is

hardly necessary to add, that the *Wasp* and her crew were taken, they being in such a shattered state it was next to impossible for them to escape. They were both sent into Bermuda.

Capture of the Macedonian.

ON the 25th of October, 1812, early in the morning, lat. 30, lon. 26, the *United States* discovered the *Macedonian* to windward, and gave chase. The enemy bore down upon her and about 10 o'clock, a distant and partial exchange of shot commenced, when the *Macedonian* having her mizen topmast shot away, bore down for close action. In fifteen minutes afterwards she struck her flag to the *United States*. She was one of the first frigates in the British navy, and commanded by Captain John S. Carden, an able and experienced officer. She lost her mizen mast, fore and main topmasts and main yard, and was much cut up in her hull. Her loss was 36 killed and 68 wounded. The *United States* had four killed and seven wounded; she suffered so little in her hull and rigging that she might continue her cruize, had not Commodore Decatur preferred conveying his prize into port, which he successfully accomplished across a vast extent of ocean swarming with the enemy's cruizers. His reception of Captain Carden on board the *United States* was nobly generous. On presenting his sword, Decatur declined receiving it, saying, "give me your hand, I cannot take the sword from an officer who has defended his ship so gallantly."

Sinking of the Peacock.

In the autumn of 1812, the *Constitution* and *Hornet*

ed in company for a long cruize on the coast of Bra-
zil. At St. Salvador Captain Lawrence challenged the
Bonne Citoyenne which he chased into that port. But
the British commander, Captain Green, declined the
contest, notwithstanding the superior force of his ship.

On the 24th of February, 1813, when cruizing off
Demerara, the Hornet fell in with the British brig Pea-
cock, Captain Peake, a vessel of about equal force.
“The contest commenced within half pistol shot, and
so tremendous was the American’s fire, that in less than
15 minutes the enemy surrendered, and made signals
of distress being in a sinking condition. Her mainmast
shortly after went by the board, and she was left such
an absolute wreck, that notwithstanding every exertion
was made to keep her afloat till the prisoners could be
removed, she sunk with thirteen of her crew, and three
brave American tars, who thus nobly perished in reliev-
ing a conquered foe. The slaughter on board the Pea-
cock was very severe; among the slain was found the
body of her commander, Captain Peake. He was twice
wounded in the course of the action. The last wound
proved fatal. His body was wrapped in the flag of his
vessel, and laid in the cabin to sink with her, a shroud
and a sepulcher worthy so brave a sailor.

“During the battle the British brig L’Espeigle,
mounting 15 two and thirty pound caronades and 2 long
nines, lay at anchor about six miles in shore. Being
apprehensive that she would beat out to the assistance
of her consort, the utmost exertions were made to put
the Hornet in a situation for action, and in about three
hours she was in complete preparation, but the enemy
did not think proper to make an attack.”

The crew of the Peacock, who had lost their clothing

by the sudden sinking of their vessel, were gratuitously supplied each man with two shirts and a blue jacket and trowsers. The British officers on the arrival of Peacock at New York, made a grateful acknowledgment in the public papers, in which they said, "we ceased to consider ourselves prisoners."

Capture of the Java.

On the 29th of December, 1812, in south lat. 13, west lon. 33, about 10 degrees from the coast of Brazil, the Constitution, Captain Bainbridge, fell in with his Britannic majesty's frigate Java, of 49 guns and upwards of 400 men. Some time was spent in manoueuering. At two P. M. the action commenced at grape and canister distance. At 5 minutes past four, the Java's fire was completely silenced. An interval of 15 minutes succeeded without firing on either side, in which Commodore Bainbridge was busy in repairing damages. Perceiving that the flag of the Java was yet flying, the Constitution took a position athwart her bows, and at the very moment that Commodore Bainbridge was about to pour into her a raking broadside, she prudently struck her flag. Every mast and spar was shot out of the Java. She had 60 men killed and 170 wounded. In addition to her own crew, she had upwards of 100 supernumerary officers and seamen, to join the British ships of war in India, among whom was Lieutenant General Hislop appointed governor of Bombay. She had also on board 40 tons of sheet copper destined for the British ships building at Bombay. Several impressed Americans were found on board.

The Constitution had 9 men killed and 25 wounded. Commodore Bainbridge not daring to trust his prize

the port of St. Salvador, and being at too great a distance from the United States to think of taking the Java with him, very properly destroyed her.

Loss of the Argus.

In May, 1813, Captain Allen, of the U. States brig Argus, sailed from this country for France, having on board Mr. Crawford, our minister to the French court. After landing our envoy at L'Orient, he proceeded on a cruize in the British channel, where he captured 21 English vessels, many of which had very valuable cargoes.

On the 14th of August, the Argus fell in with the British brig Pelicon; an action ensued which terminated in the capture of the Argus, which soon became unmanageable and fell an easy conquest to the superior force of the enemy. Captain Allen lost a leg early in the action. The next in command on board the Argus, Lieutenant Watson, received a wound in the head and was carried below; at which time the wheel ropes and rigging of every description were shot away, and the enemy in a raking position. Further resistance, therefore, would have been unavailing.

Captain Allen died the day after the action. He was considered as one of the best officers in the navy. The Argus lost 6 killed and 12 wounded. The English state their loss to have been 8 killed and wounded.

The Pelicon was in every respect a superior vessel to the Argus; she was of 485 tons burden. Her shot in pounds, was 660. The burden of the Argus was 298 tons; her shot in pounds, 402.

Loss of the Chesapeake.

THIS disastrous and memorable engagement was

fought off Boston harbor on the second of June, 1791.

The British frigate Shannon, with a select and mercurious crew, had for several days hovered near the entrance of the port. On seeing the Chesapeake come out, she bore away and was followed by Captain Lawrence. "The vessels manouvered in awful silence, until within pistol shot, when the Shannon opened her fire, and both vessels almost at the same moment poured forth tremendous broadsides. The execution on both sides was terrible, but the fire of the Shannon was peculiarly fatal, not only making great slaughter among the men, but cutting down some of the most valuable officers. The very first shot killed Mr. White, sailing master of the Chesapeake, an excellent officer, whose loss at such a moment was disastrous in the extreme. The fourth lieutenant, Mr. Ballard, received also a mortal wound in this broadside, and at the same moment Captain Lawrence was shot through the leg with a musket ball; he however supported himself on the companion way, and continued to give orders with his usual coolness. About three broadsides was exchanged, which, from the closeness of the ships, were dreadfully destructive. The Chesapeake had three men shot from her helm successively, each taking it as the other fell; this of course produced irregularity in steering, and the consequence was, that her anchor caught in one of the Shannon's after ports. She was thus in a position where her guns could not be brought to bear upon the enemy, while the latter was enabled to fire raking shots from her foremast guns, which swept the upper decks of the Chesapeake, killing or wounding the greater portion of her men. A hand grenade was thrown on the quarter deck, which set fire to some musket cartridges, but did no other damage.

In this state of carnage and exposure, about twenty of the Shannon's men, seeing a favorable opportunity for boarding, without waiting for orders, jumped on the deck of the Chesapeake. Captain Lawrence had scarce time to call his boarders, when he received a second mortal wound from a musket ball, which lodged in his intestines. Lieutenant Cox, who commanded the second division, rushed up to call the boarders, but came just in time to receive his falling commander. He was in the act of carrying him below, when Captain Broke, accompanied by his first lieutenant, and followed by his regular boarders, sprang on board the Chesapeake. The brave Lawrence saw the overwhelming danger; his last words, as he was borne bleeding from the deck, were, "dont surrender the ship."

Embarrassment, confusion and a terrible carnage ensued, and the Chesapeake was finally surrendered by Lieutenant Ludlow. While the cannonade continued, the Chesapeake is said to have had a decided advantage. The Shannon had many shots between wind and water, and was represented to have been in a dangerous situation, when victory declared in her favor.

The Chesapeake had 48 killed and 98 wounded. The loss of the Shannon was, 26 killed and 58 wounded.

Capture of the Boxer.

THE action between the Enterprize and Boxer, was fought on the 5th of September, 1813, off the coast of Maine. The Enterprize had the weathergage. After maneuvering for some time to windward, she hoisted three ensigns and ran down with the intention of closing with her antagonist; when within pistol shot, the crew of the Boxer gave three cheers and commenced

the action by a discharge of her starboard broad-
 which was returned in like manner by the Enterpri-
 The action continued 40 minutes, when the guns of the
 British vessel being silenced, the crew cried for quar-
 ters, saying that their colors being nailed to the mast,
 could not be hauled down. Both vessels were much
 cut up. The Enterprize lost *one* man killed and thir-
 teen wounded. The American and British command-
 ers both fell. Lieutenant Burrows of the Enterprize,
 expired a few hours after the engagement. While ly-
 ing on the deck, previous to the capture of the Boxer,
 he raised his head and desired that his flag might never
 be struck. When the sword of his vanquished enemy
 was presented to him, he clasped his hands and ex-
 claimed, "I die contented." The British loss was not
 precisely known, as their dead were thrown overboard
 during the action. Seventeen wounded were found on-
 board at the time of her surrender.

Glorious Cruize of the Wasp.

THE Wasp, Captain Johnson Blakely, sailed from
 Portsmouth, N. H. on the 18th of May, 1814. On the
 28th of June, in lat. 48°, long. 11°, she fell in with and
 captured, after an action of 19 minutes, his Britannic
 majesty's brig Reindeer, of 19 guns. She was literally
 cut to pieces in a line with her ports. Her loss was 23
 killed and 48 wounded. On board the Wasp, 5 were
 killed and 21 wounded. Captain Blakely, not deem-
 ing it prudent to attempt taking his prize into port, de-
 stroyed her.

After this victory, the Wasp put into port L'Orient in
 France, to repair damages. She sailed again on the
 27th of August, and on the 18th of September, fell in

with the British sloop of war Avon, and compelled her to surrender after an action of 45 minutes. The Avon had 40 killed and 60 wounded. The Wasp had two killed and one wounded. Just at the close of the action three other British ships of war were in sight, which induced Captain Blakely to abandon his prize, which, however, sunk soon after he left her. The Wasp afterwards continued her cruise and made a great number of valuable prizes. Unfortunately, this successful vessel never returned to the U. States. Her fate is involved in uncertainty.

Loss of the Essex.

THIS adventurous vessel was captured at Valparaiso, a Spanish port in the Pacific Ocean, on the 28th of March, 1813. In violation of the neutrality of the port, she was attacked while at anchor within pistol shot of the shore, by the Phoebe frigate and Cherub sloop of war. The action lasted 2 hours and 30 minutes, during which time, the Essex had 58 men killed and 65 wounded. The British state their loss at 5 killed and 10 wounded. For a long time after the Essex had struck, the British continued their fire, in violation of every principle of decency and honor.

Capture of the L'Epervier.

On the 29th of April, in lat. 47°—long. 80°, the United States' brig Peacock, Capt. Warrington, captured the British brig L'Epervier of 18 guns and 128 men, having on board \$120,000 in specie. The L'Epervier had 8 killed and 13 wounded. Not a man of the Peacock was killed, and only two wounded. The Peacock received so little damage that she continued her cruise.

Loss of the President Frigate.

THIS frigate, in which Commodore Rodgers had three times scoured the Ocean, was at last captured, while commanded by Com. Decatur. She was chased by the *Endymion*, *Pomone* and *Tenedos* British frigates, the first of which was completely silenced and thrown out of combat by the superior fire of the *President*. Two fresh frigates coming up, just as the *Endymion* was silenced, a surrender of the ship became indispensable.

Capture of the Cyane and Levant.

ON the evening of the 20th of February, 1815, Capt. Stewart, of the *Constitution*, off the Island of *Medeira*, fell in with his Britannic majesty's ships of war *Cyane* and *Levant*, and after a spirited action of 40 minutes, succeeded in capturing them. The *Cyane* mounted 34 and the *Levant* 21 guns. The two vessels lost 35 killed and 42 wounded. The *Constitution* received but little injury; she had 3 killed and 12 wounded.

Capture of the Penguin.

THE *Hornet* fell in with the *Penguin* off the Island of *Tristian de Cunha* off the coast of *Brazil*, on the 23d of *March*, 1815. The *Penguin* was fitted out for the express purpose of capturing the *Wasp*. But mark the result—in 22 minutes after the action commenced, the *Penguin* struck to the *Hornet*, a vessel greatly inferior to the *Wasp*. The *Hornet* lost one man killed and 11 wounded. The *Penguin* had 17 men killed and 28 wounded.

END OF VOLUME SECOND.

APPENDIX.

(A.)

Copy of a letter from William Eustis, Secretary of War, to the governors of the states, dated war department, April 15, 1812.

I am instructed by the president of the United States to call upon the executives of the different states, to take effectual measures to organize, arm and equip, according to law, and hold in readiness, to march at a moment's warning, their respective proportions of one hundred thousand militia, officers included, by virtue of an act of congress, passed the 10th instant, entitled "an act to authorise a detachment from the militia of the United States."

This, therefore, is to require of your excellency to take effectual measures for having ——— of militia of ———, (being her quota) detached and duly organized in companies, battalions, regiments, brigades and divisions, within the shortest period that circumstances will permit, and as nearly as possible in the following proportions of artillery, cavalry and infantry, viz. one twentieth part of artillery, one twentieth part of cavalry, and the residue infantry.

There will, however, be no objection on the part of the president of the United States, to the admission of a proportion of riflemen, duly organized in distinct corps, and not exceeding one tenth part of the whole quota of the states respectively. Each corps should be properly armed and equipped for actual service.

When the detachment and organization shall have been effected, the respective corps will be exercised under the officers set over them, but will not remain em-

bodied, or be considered as in actual service, until by subsequent orders they shall be directed to take the field.

Your excellency will please to direct that correct muster rolls and inspection returns be made of the several corps, and that copies thereof be transmitted to this department as early as possible.

Copy of a letter from William Eustis, esq. Secretary of War, to the governor of Massachusetts, dated war department, June 12, 1812.

SIR,

I am directed by the president to request your excellency to order into the service of the United States, on the requisition of major general Dearborn, such part of the quota of the militia of Massachusetts, detached conformably to the act of the 10th of April, 1812, as he may deem necessary for the defence of the sea coast.

I am, &c. &c.

NOTE.—A similar letter was addressed to the governors of Connecticut, Rhode Island and New Hampshire.

Copy of a letter from William Eustis, secretary of war, to his excellency Caleb Strong, governor of Massachusetts, dated July 21, 1812.

SIR,

By information received from major general Dearborn, it appears that the detachment from the militia of Massachusetts, for the defence of the maritime frontier, required by him under the authority of the president, by virtue of the act of the 10th of April, 1812, has not been marched to the several stations assigned them.

Inasmuch as longer delay may be followed with distress to a certain portion of our fellow citizens, and with injurious consequences to our country, I am commanded by the president to inform your excellency, that this arrangement of the militia was preparatory to the march of the regular troops to the northern frontier. The exigencies of the service have required, and orders

have accordingly been given, to major general Dearborn, to move the regular troops to that frontier, leaving a sufficient number to man the guns in the garrisons on the seaboard. The execution of this order increases, as your excellency cannot fail to observe, the necessity of hastening the detached militia to their several posts, as assigned by general Dearborn; in which case they will, of course, be considered in the actual service and pay of the United States.

The danger of invasion, which existed at the time of issuing the order of the president, increases, and I am specially directed by the president to urge this consideration to your excellency, as requiring the necessary order to be given for the immediate march of the several detachments, specified by general Dearborn, to their respective posts.

I have the honor to be, &c.

Extract of a letter from John Armstrong, secretary of war, to the governor of Connecticut, dated August 9th, 1813.

Whenever the militia are called out, the contractor or his agent, should be required to supply according to the contract.

Circular letter from John Armstrong, secretary of war, to the governors of the respective states, dated July 4, 1814.

SIR,

The late pacification in Europe, offers to the enemy a large disposable force, both naval and military, and with it the means of giving to the war here, a character of new and increased activity and extent.

Without knowing with certainty, that such will be its application, and still less that any particular point or points will become objects of attack, the president has deemed it advisable, as a measure of precaution, to strengthen ourselves on the line of the Atlantic, and (as the principal means of doing this will be found in militia) to invite the executives of certain states to organize and hold in readiness, for immediate service, a

corps of ninety three thousand five hundred men, under the laws of the 28th Feb. 1795, and the 18th of April, 1814.

The enclosed detail will show your excellency, what, under this requisition, will be the quota of ————. As far as volunteer uniform companies can be found, they will be preferred.

The expediency of regarding (as well in the designations of the militia, as of their place of rendezvous) the points, the importance or exposure of which will be most likely to attract the views of the enemy, need but be suggested.

A report of the organization of your quota, when completed, and of its place or places of rendezvous, will be acceptable.

I have the honor to be, &c.

Extract of a letter from John Armstrong, secretary of war, to Nathaniel Searle, jun. adjutant general of militia, state of Rhode Island, dated July 9, 1814.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 8th instant, accompanied by sundry documents in relation to the defence of the Atlantic frontier of the state of Rhode Island.

The state troops, if considered part of the militia, or as substitutes therefor, will be taken into the service of the United States, as the quota of Rhode Island, under the requisition of the 4th instant, and will be designated for the defence of that state.

Copy of a letter from James Monroe, acting secretary of war, to the chairman of the military committee, dated department of war, December 23, 1812.

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 21st instant, requesting such information as this department may possess, respecting the defects in the organization of the general staff of the army, and in the laws relating to volunteers; and requesting also, the opinion of this department, as to the propriety of augmenting the present military force, and in case of augmentation, of what description of troops it ought to consist.

The committee of each house of congress having called on the department of war for information on the same points, I shall have the honor to make to each committee the same report. The enclosed remarks go to several of the enquiries suggested in your letter, and contain the views of the department on the several subjects to which they relate. The pressure of business has forced me to give them a shape rather informal. A copy of them I have sent this day to the committee of the house of representatives, and hasten to forward a like copy to you.

EXPLANATORY OBSERVATIONS.

To make this war effectual, as to its just objects, so much of the physical force of the country must be brought into activity, as will be adequate. The force exists in an abundant degree, and it is only necessary to call it forth, and make a proper use of it. This force must be employed alike in defensive and offensive operations. The exposed parts of our country claim a primary attention. After providing for their defence, all the remaining force may be employed in offensive operations. I will begin with that part which requires protection.

DEFENCE OF THE COAST.

The whole coast from our northern limits to St. Mary's should be divided into military districts.

Boston, including New Hampshire and Massachusetts, to constitute one.

Newport, including Rhode Island and Connecticut, another.

New York, including the state of New York and Jersey, a third.

Philadelphia, including Pennsylvania and Delaware, a fourth.

Norfolk, including Maryland and Virginia, a fifth.

Charleston, including North and South Carolina, and Georgia, a sixth.

At Boston, and at each of the other posts, let a company of artillery, or more than one, according to circumstances, of the regular army, and a small per-

tion of its infantry, be stationed. Let them be placed under the command of a brigadier, in the following manner, and let him have attached to him an engineer. This force will constitute the nucleus of a little army, to be formed, in case of invasion, of the militia, volunteers, or such other local force, as may be specially organized for the purpose.

This apportionment is intended to give an idea. It would be carried into detail by the executive.

At Boston, including a suitable proportion of artillery, and at Eastport and other ports eastward,	600
At Newport, with a company of artillery,	350
At New York, with a suitable proportion of artillery,	1,000
At Philadelphia, with a company of artillery,	200
Norfolk, with a company of artillery at Annapolis,	300
North Carolina, one company of artillery,	100
Charleston, with a company of artillery,	300

By placing a general officer of the regular army of some experience in command, at each of these stations, charged with the protection of the country to his right and left to a certain extent, suitable provision will be made for the whole. The country will have confidence, and by degrees, a system of defence, suited to any emergency, may be prepared for the whole coast. This may be done, by the local force, with economy, and what is also of great importance, without drawing at any time for greater aid, on the regular force of the nation, which may be employed in offensive operations elsewhere. There should be some flying artillery at each station, ready mounted, and prepared to move in any direction which may be necessary. An engineer will be useful to plan and execute any works which may appear proper for the defence of the principal station, or any within each military district.

It may be said that it is not probable, that the enemy will attempt an invasion of any part of the coast described, with a view to retain it, and less so for the

purpose of desolation. It is nevertheless possible, and being so, provision ought to be made against the danger. An unprotected coast may invite attacks which would not otherwise be thought of. It is believed that the arrangement proposed will be adequate, and that none can be advised, to be so, which would prove more economical.

For Savannah and East Florida, special provision must be made. Whether East Florida is left in possession of Spain, or taken immediate possession of by the United States, in either case it menaces the U. States with danger to their vital interests. While it is held by Spain, it will be used as a British province, for annoying us in every mode in which it may be made instrumental to that end. The ascendancy which the British government has over the Spanish regency, secures to Great Britain that advantage while the war lasts. We find that at present the Creek Indians are excited against us, and an asylum afforded to the slaves of the southern states who seek it there. To guard the United States against the attempts of the British government, in that vulnerable quarter, the province remaining in the hands of the Spanish authorities, a force of about 2000 men will be requisite. It will require no more to hold it, should possession be taken by the United States.

For New Orleans and Natchitoches, including the Mobile and West Florida, about 2,500 men will be necessary. A local force may be organized in that quarter in aid of it, which it is believed will be adequate to any emergency.

The next object is Detroit and Malden, including the protection of the whole of our western frontier. For these, it is believed that 2,000 regular troops, with such aids as may be drawn from the states of Kentucky and Ohio, will be amply sufficient.

The following, then, is the regular force requisite for the defence of those places :

Boston,	-	-	-	-	-	600
Newport, Rhode Island,	-	-	-	-	-	350

New York,	-	-	-	-	-	1000
Philadelphia,	-	-	-	-	-	200
Norfolk,	-	-	-	-	-	300
North Carolina,	-	-	-	-	-	100
Charleston,	-	-	-	-	-	300
Savannah and East Florida,	-	-	-	-	-	2000
New Orleans, Mobile, &c.	-	-	-	-	-	2500
Detroit, Malden, &c.	-	-	-	-	-	2000

9,350

This leaves a force of about twenty six thousand regular troops, consisting of infantry, artillery and cavalry, provided the whole force contemplated by law is raised and kept in the field, to be employed in offensive operations against Niagara, Kingston, Montreal and all the Lower Canada, and likewise against Halifax. This whole force, however, even if raised, cannot be counted on as effective. The difference between the force on the muster rolls, and the effective force in the field, through a campaign, is generally estimated at a deficiency in the latter, of one fourth, with troops who have already seen service. With young troops it may be placed at one third. Take from the nominal force ten thousand, and it would leave about sixteen thousand for these latter purposes.

Will this force be sufficient? This will depend of course on the number of the British force which may be opposed to us. It is believed that the British force at Niagara, and its neighborhood; at Kingston, Montreal, Quebec and Lower Canada, ought to be estimated at twelve thousand regulars and several thousand militia; say in all, sixteen or eighteen thousand, and at Halifax, at three thousand men.

To demolish the British force from Niagara to Quebec, would require, to make things secure, an efficient regular army of twenty thousand men, with an army of reserve of ten thousand. The commander ought to have power to dispose of them as he thought fit. The movement against Niagara and Lower Canada, ought to be in concert and of course under the control of the

same commander, who, alone, could be a competent judge of the suitable time and manner. A corps of reserve is indispensable to guard against casualties, especially with raw troops. Nothing should be left at hazard. The expedition should be of a character to inspire a certainty of success, from which the best consequences would result. Our troops would be more undaunted, and those of the enemy proportionably more dismayed. In the interior, on both sides the effect would be equally salutary; with us, it would aid in filling our ranks with regular troops, and drawing to the field such others as occasion might require: with the enemy the effect would be equally in our favor. It would soon drive from the field the Canadian militia; and by depressing the spirits of the people, interrupt and lessen the supplies of the British army.

If the conquest of Canada should prove to be easy, a part of this force might be directed against Halifax; but for that purpose, a force should be specially provided, to consist of not less than 6000 men. Before this time next year, the honor and interest of the United States require that the British forces be driven into Quebec and Halifax, and taken there, if possible. They must, at all events, be excluded from every foot of territory beyond the reach of their cannon. This may be done, if timely and suitable measures are adopted for the purpose, and they be executed with vigor and skill.

If the government could raise and keep in the field thirty five thousand regular troops, the legal complement of the present establishment, the deficiency to be supplied, even to authorise an expedition against Halifax, would be inconsiderable. Ten thousand men would be amply sufficient; but there is danger of not being able to raise that force and keep it at that standard. The estimate, therefore, of the force to be raised for the next campaign, in addition to the legal complement, should cover any probable deficiency in it as well as the addition which ought to be made to it. My idea is, that provision ought to be made for raising twenty thousand men, in addition to the present establishment.

How shall these men be raised? Shall new regiments be added to the standing army, to constitute a part of it; the volunteer acts to be relied on; or any other expedient adopted?

The first question to be answered is, can more than the force contemplated by the present military establishment be raised in time for the next campaign, and that force be kept in the field by new recruits, to supply losses produced by casualties of war? Will the state of our population, the character and circumstances of the people who compose it, justify a reliance on such a resource alone?

The experiments heretofore made, even under the additional encouragement given by the acts passed the last session of congress, and the excitement produced by the war, though great, forbid it. Abundant and noble proofs of patriotism have been exhibited by our citizens in those quarters where the approach and pressure of the enemy have been most felt. Many thousands have rallied to the standard of their country; but it has been to render voluntary service, and that for short terms. The increase of the regular army has been slow, and the amount raised, compared with the number sought, inconsiderable. Additional encouragement may produce a more important result; but still there is cause to fear that it will not be in a degree called for by the present emergency. If then there is cause to doubt success, that doubt is a sufficient motive for the legislature to act on, and to appeal in aid of the existing resource, to another not likely to fail.

In rejecting a reliance on the regular military establishment alone, for the force necessary to give effect to the next campaign, the alternative is too obvious to be mistaken by any one. The occurrences of the present year designate it in the most satisfactory manner. The additional force must be raised for a short term, under every encouragement to the patriotism of the people which can be given, consistently with the circumstances of the country, and without interfering with enlistments into the old corps. The volunteer acts of the

last session, may be the basis on which this additional force may be raised: but those acts must be radically altered to enable the president to raise the force. Experience has not been less instructive on this very important point. Although whole sections of our country and among them many of our most distinguished and estimable citizens, have risen in arms and volunteered their services, and marched in the ranks, it has not been done under the volunteer acts. Those acts contemplate a beginning at the wrong end, and require too long an engagement to produce the desired effect. They contemplate a movement in no particular quarter, and by no particular person; they require that the people shall take the affair up of their own accord, enrol themselves into companies, and then recommend their officers to the president; and that the president shall not appoint the field officers until a sufficient number of companies are formed to constitute a regiment. Thus it may happen that companies from different states, all strangers to each other, may be thrown into a regiment, and that the officers appointed to command them may be strangers alike to all the company officers and men. They contemplate, an enrolment for three years, with a service only of one; conditions, which, in themselves, could not fail to defeat the object, as they enlist on their side not one motive to action. The patriotic citizen, who really wished to serve his country, would spurn the restraint imposed upon him, of two years of inactivity out of three, and enter the regular army, where he would find active employment for the whole term of his enlistment. And the farmer, the merchant and the artist, willing to make a sacrifice of a certain portion of their time to the urgent calls of their country, would find a check to that impulse, by the obligation they must enter into for so long a term; and by allowing no bounty, no pecuniary inducement, no aid to enable a man to leave home is offered. It is impossible that any such a project should succeed on an extensive scale. The ardent patriotism of a few, in detached circles of our country, may surmount these obstacles; but such examples will be rare.

To give effect to such a measure the president alone should have the appointment of all the officers under the rank of colonel, and it should be made in the following manner: He should first select such prominent men as had merited, and acquired, by a virtuous conduct, the confidence of their fellow citizens, and confer on them, with the advice and consent of the senate the rank of colonel, and then confide to them the selection and recommendation of all their officers, to be approved by the president. These men would go to their homes, look around the country where they were known, and where they knew every one, select the prominent men there, such as enjoyed the esteem and confidence of their fellow citizens, and recommend them, according to their pretensions, as field officers, captains and subalterns under them. Thus the service would be truly voluntary, as every man would act under the officers to whose appointment he had essentially contributed. The several corps would consist of neighbors, friends and brothers; the example would animate to action; generous motives would be excited; patriotism aroused; and the ties of kindred would unite with the love of country and of free government, to call our young men to the field.

The first object is to complete the regular establishment to its legal complement, and to keep it there. The pay of the soldiers has already been raised during the present session of congress; but this, it is feared, will not afford a sufficient inducement to fill the ranks within the requisite time. Let the bounty be raised to the sum of forty dollars to each recruit, and let the officers receive the sum of five dollars per man, for all whom they may recruit. These additional encouragements will, it is presumed, secure the desired success. When filled, how keep the regiments full? The presence of all the officers will be necessary, in that state, for their command, none could be spared to recruit. Different expedients have occurred to supply supernumerary officers for the recruiting business. It has, for example, been proposed to add a certain number of regiments,

from fifteen to twenty, to the present military establishment; but this would be to rely on that establishment alone, which as is presumed, it would be highly improper to do. This plan is farther objectionable, on account of the expence attending it; and likewise, as would create delay in the organization of the corps and appointment of the officers. The same objections are applicable to the addition of a company to each battalion, not to mention others. On much consideration, the following expedient has occurred as most eligible: Let one field officer, a major, be added to each regiment, and a third lieutenant to each company. This will allow a field officer and ten company officers from each regiment, for the recruiting service, which would be sufficient.

The additional force proposed for one year, is intended to supply the probable deficiencies in the present military establishment. This force being to be raised for a short term, and for a special purpose, it is presumed, that much aid may be drawn from that source, and with great despatch, for the purposes of the next campaign. It is possible, also, that it may be done without essentially interfering with enlistments into the old corps, as most of the men who may enter into this, might not be willing to engage in them.

If a lingering war is maintained, the annual disbursements will be enormous. Economy requires that it be brought to a termination with the least possible delay. If a strong army is led to the field, early in the spring, the British power on this continent must sink before it; and when once broken down it will never rise again. The conquest of Canada, will become, in the opinion of all enlightened men, and of the whole British nation, a chimerical attempt. It will, therefore, be abandoned; but if delay takes place, reinforcements may be expected, and the war be prolonged. It is to save the public money, and the lives of our people, and the honor of the nation, that high bounties and premiums, and the most vigorous exertions in other respects are advised. The prolongation of the war, for a single cam-

paign, would exceed these expenditures more than ten fold.

Boston, August 6, 1812.

SIR—I received your letter of the 21st July, when at Northampton, and the next day came to Boston. The people of this state appear to be under no apprehension of an invasion. Several towns indeed on the sea coast, soon after the declaration of war, applied to the governor and council for arms and ammunition, similar to the articles of that kind which had been delivered to them by the state in the last war, and in some instances they were supplied accordingly. But they expressed no desire that any part of the militia should be called out for their defence; and in some cases we were assured such a measure would be disagreeable to them.

You observe in your last letter, that the danger of invasion, which existed at the time of issuing the orders of the president, increases.

It would be difficult to infer from this expression, that in your opinion the danger is very considerable, as the president's orders must have been issued before war was declared, your former letter being dated the 12th of June, and general Dearborn's, who was then at Boston, on the 22d of that month; besides it can hardly be supposed, that if this state had been in great danger of invasion, the troops would have been called from hence to carry on offensive operations in a distant province; however, as it was understood, that the governor of Nova Scotia had, by proclamation, forbid any incursions or depredations upon our territories, and as an opinion generally prevailed, that the governor had no authority to call the militia into actual service, unless one of the exigencies contemplated by the constitution exists, I thought it expedient to call the council together, and having laid before them your letter and those I had received from general Dearborn, I requested their advice on the subject of them.

The council advised, "that they are unable, from a view of the constitution of the United States, and

the letters aforesaid, to perceive that any exigency exists which can render it advisable to comply with the said requisition; but as upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions, the governor and council have authority to require the opinion of the justices of the supreme judicial court, it is advisable to request the opinion of the supreme court upon the following questions, viz.

“1st. Whether the commanders in chief of the militia of the several states have a right to determine whether any of the exigencies contemplated by the constitution of the United States exist, so as to require them to place the militia, or any part of it, in the service of the United States, at the request of the president, to be commanded by him pursuant to acts of congress?”

“2d. Whether, when either of the exigencies exist, authorising the employing the militia in the service of the United States, the militia thus employed can be lawfully commanded by any officer but of the militia, except by the president of the United States?”

I enclose a copy of the answers given by the judges to these questions.

Since the council were called, a person deputed by the towns of Eastport and Robinston, on our eastern boundary, at Passamaquoddy, applied to me, representing that they were under no apprehensions of an invasion by an authorised British force; but that there were many lawless people on the borders from whom they were in danger of predatory incursions; and requesting that they might be furnished with arms and ammunition, and that three companies of militia might be called out for their protection. The council advised that they should be supplied with such arms and ammunition as were necessary for their present defence, which has been ordered. They also advised me to call into the service of the United States three companies of the detached militia, for the purpose above mentioned. I have this day issued an order for calling out three companies of the detached militia, to be marched forthwith to Passamaquoddy, and to be commanded by

a major; two of the companies will be stationed at Eastport, and one company at Robinston, until the president shall otherwise direct.

I have no intention officially to interfere in the measures of the general government, but if the president was fully acquainted with the situation of this state, I think he would have no wish to call our militia into service in the manner proposed by general Dearborn.

It is well known that the enemy will find it difficult to spare troops sufficient for the defence of their own territory, and predatory incursions are not likely to take place in this state, for at every point, except Passamaquoddy, which can present an object to those incursions, the people are too numerous to be attacked by such parties as generally engage in expeditions of that kind.

General Dearborn proposed, that the detached militia should be stationed at only a few of the ports and places on the east; from the rest a part of their militia were to be called away; this circumstance would increase their danger; it would invite the aggressions of the enemy, and diminish their power of resistance.

The whole coast of Cape Cod is exposed as much as any part of the state to depredations; part of the militia must, according to the detailing order, be marched from their homes; and yet no place in the old colony of Plymouth, is assigned to be the rendezvous of any of the detached militia.

Every harbor or port within the state has a compact settlement, and generally, the country around the harbors is populous. The places contemplated in general Dearborn's specifications, as the rendezvous of the detached militia, excepting in one or two instances, contain more of the militia than the portion of the detached militia assigned to them. The militia are well organized, and would undoubtedly prefer to defend their fire sides, in company with their friends, under their own officers, rather than be marched to some distant place, while strangers might be introduced to take their places at home.

In Boston the militia is well disciplined, and could be mustered in an hour upon any signal of an approaching enemy; and in six hours, the neighboring towns would pour in a greater force than any invading enemy will bring against it.

The same remark applies to Salem, Marblehead and Newburyport; places, whose harbors render an invasion next to impossible. In all of them, there are, in addition to the common militia, independent corps of infantry and artillery, well disciplined and equipped, and ready, both in disposition and means, to repair to any place, where invasion may be threatened, and able to repel it; except it should be made by a fleet of heavy ships, against which, nothing, perhaps, but strong fortifications, garrisoned by regular troops, would prove any defence, until the enemy should land; when the entire militia would be prepared to meet them.

Kennebunk is unassailable by any thing but boats, which the numerous armed population is competent to resist. Portland has a militia and independent corps, sufficiently numerous for its defence; and the same is the case with Wiscasset and Castine.

Against predatory incursions, the militia of each place would be able to defend their property, and in a very short time they would be aided, if necessary, by the militia of the surrounding country. In case of a more serious invasion, whole brigades, or divisions, could be collected, seasonably for defence. Indeed, considering the state of the militia in this commonwealth, I think there can be no doubt, that detaching a part of it, and distributing it into small portions, will tend to impair the defensive power.

I have thus freely expressed to you my own sentiments, and, so far as I have heard, they are the sentiments of the best informed men. I am fully disposed to afford all the aid to the measures of the national government, which the constitution requires of me; but I presume it will not be expected or desired, that I should fail in the duty which I owe to the people of this state, who have confided their interests to my care.

I am, sir, with respect, your most obedient and humble servant.

CALEB STRONG.

The Hon. W. Eustis, secretary of war.

To his excellency the governor, and the honorable the council of the commonwealth of Massachusetts: the undersigned, justices of the supreme judicial court, have considered the question proposed by your excellency and honors, for their opinion.

By the constitution of this state, the authority of commanding the militia of the commonwealth is vested exclusively in the governor, who has all the powers incident to the office of commander in chief, and is to exercise them personally, or by subordinate officers, under his command, agreeably to the rules and regulations of the constitution, and the laws of the land.

While the governor of the commonwealth remained in the exercise of these powers, the federal constitution was ratified; by which was vested in the congress a power to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions, and to provide for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively the appointment of the officers.

The federal constitution farther provides, that the president shall be commander in chief of the army of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States.

On the construction of the federal and state constitutions, must depend the answers to the several questions proposed. As the militia of the several states for the three specific purposes of executing the laws of the union, of suppressing insurrections, and repelling invasions, the opinion of the judges is requested, whether the commanders in chief of the militia of the several states have a right to determine whether any of the exigencies aforesaid exist, so as to require them to

place the militia, or any part of it, in the service of the United States, at the request of the president, to be commanded by him, pursuant to acts of congress.

It is the opinion of the undersigned, that this right is vested in the commanders in chief of the militia of the several states.

The federal constitution provides, that whenever either of those exigencies exist, the militia may be employed pursuant to some act of congress, in the service of the United States; but no power is given to the president or to congress to determine that either of the said exigencies do in fact exist. As this power is not delegated to the United States by the federal constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, it is reserved to the states respectively; and from the nature of the power, it must be exercised by those to whom the states have respectively entrusted the chief command of the militia.

It is the duty of these commanders to execute this important trust, agreeably to the laws of their several states respectively without reference to the laws or officers of the United States, in all cases except those especially provided in the federal constitution. They must therefore determine when either of the special cases exist, obliging them to relinquish the execution of this trust, and to render themselves and the militia subject to the president. A different construction, giving to congress the right to determine when these special cases exist, authorising them to call forth the whole of the militia, and take them from the commanders in chief of the several states and subjecting them to the command of the president, would place all the militia, in effect, at the will of congress, and produce a military consolidation of the states, without any constitutional remedy, against the intentions of the people when ratifying the constitution. Indeed, since passing the act of congress of February 28th, 1795, chapter 101, vesting in the president of the U. S. the power of calling forth the militia when the exigencies mentioned in the constitution shall exist, if the president has the power of deter-

mining when those exigencies exist, the militia of the several states is in effect at his command, and subject to his control.

No inconveniences can reasonably be presumed to result from the construction which vests in the commanders in chief of the militia in the several states, the right of determining when the exigencies exist, obliging them to place the militia in the service of the United States. These exigencies are of such a nature that the existence of them can be easily ascertained by, or made known to the commander in chief of militia; and when ascertained, the public interest will produce prompt obedience to the acts of congress.

Another question proposed to the consideration of the judges, is, whether, when either of the exigencies exist, authorizing the employment of the militia in the service of the United States, the militia thus employed can be lawfully commanded by any officer but of the militia, except by the president of the United States?

The federal constitution declares, that the president shall be commander in chief of the army of the United States. He may undoubtedly exercise this command by officers of the army of the United States, by him commissioned according to law. The president is also declared to be the commander in chief of the militia of the several states, when called into the service of the United States. The officers of the militia are to be appointed by the states, and the president may exercise his command of the militia by officers of the militia duly appointed; but we know of no constitutional provision, authorizing any officer of the army of the United States to command the militia, or authorizing any officer of the militia to command the army of the United States. The congress may provide laws for the government of the militia, while in actual service; but to extend this power to the placing them under the command of an officer, not of the militia, except the president, would render nugatory the provision, that the militia are to have officers appointed by the states.

The union of the militia in the actual service of the

United States, with troops of the United States, so far as to form one army, seems to be a case not provided for or contemplated in the constitution. It is, therefore, not within our department to determine on whom the command would devolve, on such an emergency, in the absence of the president. Whether one officer, either of the militia or of the army of the United States, to be settled according to military rank, should command the whole; whether the corps must be commanded by their respective officers, acting in concert, as allied forces; or what other expedient should be adopted, are questions to be answered by others.

The undersigned regret that the distance of the other justices of the supreme judicial court, renders it impracticable to obtain their opinions seasonably upon the questions submitted.

(Signed)

THEOPHILUS PARSONS.
SAMUEL SEWALL.
ISAAC PARKER.

Extract of a letter from general Dearborn, to the secretary of war, dated military district No. 1, head quarters, Boston, July 14, 1814.

SIR—From the exposed and unprotected situation of the military post in this harbor, and the seaboard of this state generally, and the threats and daily depredations of the enemy, I have concluded it my duty to exercise the authority vested in me by the president of the United States, by requesting the governor to order out a detachment of the artillery and infantry.

A copy of my letter to governor Strong, and of his answer, are enclosed.

Copy of a letter from general Dearborn to his excellency Caleb Strong, governor of the state of Massachusetts, dated military district No. 1, head quarters, Boston, July 8, 1814.

SIR—The existing state of alarm on the seaboard of this commonwealth, arising from the daily depredations committed by the enemy on our coast, renders it desirable to afford some additional protection to the citi-

zens generally on the seacoast, and especially to the principal towns and villages; and by virtue of authority derived from the president of the United States, I deem it my duty, at this time, to request that your excellency will be pleased to give the necessary orders for having detached, as early as circumstances will permit, armed and equipped as required by law, one major of artillery, two captains, eight lieutenants, thirteen sergeants, eleven corporals, six musicians, and two hundred privates; and one lieutenant colonel of infantry, two majors, ten captains, thirty subalterns, one adjutant, one quarter master, one paymaster, one serjeant major, one quarter master serjeant, two principal musicians, fifty sergeants, fifty corporals, twenty musicians, and nine hundred privates, to remain in the service of the United States for the term of three months, unless sooner discharged by order of the president of the United States. As it will be necessary to have the artillery and infantry placed at the different posts on the seaboard of this state, it would be desirable that, as far as practicable, they would be detached from the vicinity of the respective ports. The intended distribution of the detachment will be communicated to the adjutant general of the state, previous to his issuing the necessary orders. The proportion of officers, noncommissioned officers, musicians and privates, is in conformity with the present regulations of the department of war, from which I am not authorized to admit of any material deviation.

Copy of a letter from his excellency Caleb Strong, governor of the state of Massachusetts, to general Dearborn, dated Northampton, July 22, 1814.

SIR—This morning I received your letter of the 8th instant. As you propose to communicate to general Brooks your views concerning the particular destination of the militia to be called out for the defence of the towns on the seacoast of this state, I have written him on the subject.

Your suggestion, that the men should be detached, as far as may be, from the vicinity of their respective

homes, I think is perfectly proper, and I have no doubt you will be able to make such arrangements with general Brooks, as will be satisfactory.

Extract of a letter from general Dearborn, to the secretary of war, dated military district no. 1, head quarters, Boston, Sept. 5, 1814.

SIR—Having received such information as is entitled to full credit, that the enemy, with a formidable naval and land force, has arrived in Penobscot Bay and taken possession of Castine; and presuming his force, after forming a place of arms at Castine, will, with such reinforcements as he may receive from Halifax, in addition to the naval force now in Boston Bay, attempt the destruction of the public ships and other public and private property on the seaboard, I have deemed it necessary to request the governors of this state and New Hampshire, to order out for the defence of Boston harbor, Portsmouth, Portland, and that part of the district of Maine between Kennebeck river and Penobscot, five thousand two hundred infantry, and five hundred and fifty artillery, for the term of three months, unless sooner discharged.

Extract of a letter from H. Dearborn, to the secretary of war, dated head quarters, district no. 1, Boston, October 15, 1814.

SIR—In obedience to the direction in your letter of the 27th ult. on the 2d inst. I made a formal requisition on governor Strong for three hundred militia, to guard the Prisoners at Pittsfield, and I enclosed to him a copy of your letter, for the purpose of showing him the necessity of his compliance. Having waited until yesterday morning without any answer from his excellency, I directed one of my aids to call on the adjutant general of the state, to ascertain whether he had received any order for making out the detachment for Pittsfield. The answer was, that no direction had been received from the governor to make such detachment.

Copy of a letter from his excellency Caleb Strong, governor of the state of Massachusetts, to the secretary of war, dated Boston, September 7, 1814.

The troops of the United States which at different periods were stationed on the seacoast of this state, have been afterwards ordered to join the army on the western frontiers, so that very few have remained in the state. We have, therefore, found it necessary, in the course of the last and present year, to call out small bodies of the militia, as guards to the towns most exposed. As the danger has increased, the number of detached militia has been augmented, and I have now issued the enclosed general order, for the protection of Boston, and the towns and property in its neighborhood, and shall immediately issue an order of a similar kind for the security of the district of Maine.

A few weeks since, agreeably to the request of general Dearborn, I detached eleven hundred militia, for three months, for the defence of our seacoast, and placed them under his command, as superintendant of this military district; but such objections and inconveniences have arisen from that measure, that it cannot now be repeated. The militia called out on this occasion, will be placed under the immediate command of a major general of the militia.

I will thank you, sir, to consult with the president and inform me whether the expences thus necessarily incurred for our protection, will be ultimately reimbursed to this state, by the general government; and I shall be particularly obliged if you will favor me with an answer as soon as may be, as the legislature of the state will meet on the 5th of next month.

GENERAL ORDERS.

Commonwealth of Massachusetts,

H. Q. Boston, Sept. 6, 1814.

The war between the United States and Great Britain, having lately become more destructive, in consequence of violations of our territory, by the forces of the enemy, which continue to menace our cities and villages, the shipping in our harbors, and private prop-

erty on shore; his excellency the commander in chief orders the whole of the militia to hold themselves in readiness to march at a moment's warning, with arms, ammunition, and accoutrements, as the laws of the United States, and of this state, require. Every man must likewise be provided with a good knapsack and blanket. Captains of companies must realize it to be one of their most solemn and imperious duties, to see the law respecting arms and equipments efficaciously executed: but the commander in chief relies on the concurring aid of all the general and field officers, in encouraging the company officers in the discharge of their duty. The major generals and commanding officers of divisions, will give the necessary orders for an immediate inspection of their several regiments, by companies. Every instance of deficiency of arms or equipments should be forthwith supplied by the delinquent individual, or by the town to which he may belong, agreeably to the requirements of the militia law.

The officers commanding regiments, battalions and companies of artillery, will pay special attention, at this interesting moment to the state of their field pieces, their carriages and tumbrils; and see that every thing appertaining to them is in the most perfect order for marching, and for action, and particularly that suitable horses are always engaged, and ready at any moment to be attached to their pieces, that they may be moved to any point required, with celerity. All the companies of artillery now to be called into immediate service, besides the requisite supplies of fixed and other ammunition, will be furnished by the quarter master general, with prolonges and bricoles. The legislature of this state, always proud of its militia, has been particularly liberal in its artillery establishment: and the commander in chief promises himself, that emulating the brilliant example of Knox and his heroic associates, in the artillery of the revolution, they will be equally distinguished for their discipline as soldiers, and for their gallantry in the field.

Under possible events, the cavalry of the several div

visions may be in requisition. Every motive, therefore, of love of country, of honor, and sympathy for their fellow citizens who may be suffering the perils of war, will prompt them to maintain the most perfect state of preparation, and to move when called to the scene of action, with all the rapidity of which cavalry is susceptible. The general officers, and the field officers of cavalry, as well as the company officers, will direct their attention to the quality of the horses, and suffer no man to be mounted but upon a horse sound and fit for actual service. A few bad horses may occasion irretrievable disaster.

The commander in chief having thus called the attention of all the officers and soldiers of the militia to the observation of their several duties, at this eventful crisis, the more effectually to meet impending dangers, orders that all the flank companies, whether of light infantry, grenadiers or riflemen, of the 1st and 2d brigades of the 1st division; two companies, viz. the one at Andover, and the other at Haverhill, of the 2d division: all the companies of the 3d division, excepting the two companies at Charlestown; four companies of the 4th division; five companies of the 5th division; eight companies of the 7th division; and two companies of the 9th division, do immediately march to the town of Boston, unless (in the mean time) otherwise directed. Each company will march to its place of destination by itself, without waiting for any other corps.

These companies, when assembled, will be arranged into regiments, or otherwise, as circumstances may dictate; and, with the addition of twelve companies of artillery, will form the elite, or advanced corps of the Massachusetts militia. The field officers to command the regiments, and a general officer to command the whole will hereafter be designated in general orders. The several companies of artillery, to be annexed to the advanced corps, will be furnished by the following divisions, viz. two companies from the 1st brigade, and one company from the 2d brigade of the 3d division; four companies from the 4th division; one company from the

5th division: and four companies from the 7th division.

Besides the above mentioned companies, the commander in chief orders a detachment of sixteen companies of infantry to be immediately made from the fourth division, properly officered, and arranged into two regiments, which will march to Boston with the least possible delay. Major general Matton is charged with the arrangement of the regiments.

From the 9th division the commander in chief orders eight companies of infantry to be detached, properly officered, formed into a regiment and marched to Boston. Major generals Matton and Whiton will assign field officers, for the troops to be detached from their respective divisions; and the commander in chief relies on their experience and zeal to carry this order into the most prompt and energetic effect. As soon as the troops shall commence their march, each maj. general will give notice of it to the adjutant general.

All the troops will be armed, accoutred and equipped, and provided with ammunition, provisions, knapsacks and blankets, as the law requires. The men will be supplied with rations when they arrive at the place of destination, and will receive pay from the time of their being embodied.

The security of the town and harbor of Boston being an object of primary importance, the commander in chief, while he wishes to direct the principal energies of the state to the attainment of this end, is solicitous to render the militia of Boston itself as efficient as possible. With this view he orders the infantry of the third brigade of the 1st division, commanded by brigadier general Welles, to be called out by regiments in rotation, two days successively, for the purpose of improving their discipline, already respectable, and of enabling them to practise the higher duties of the field. This order is committed to brigadier general Welles, whose knowledge in tactics, and animated zeal in the service of his country, must ensure to his exertions the highest effect. The order will be continued in opera-

tion until revoked. The flank companies of this brigade will be reserved for other service.

The troops called into actual service by this order, will serve three months after they arrive at their ultimate rendezvous, unless sooner discharged.

By his excellency's command,
Adjutant General.

Copy of a letter from James Monroe, secretary of war, to his excellency Caleb Strong, governor of Massachusetts, dated September 17, 1814.

SIR—I have had the honor to receive your excellency's letter of the 7th instant.

The attack of the enemy on Baltimore, and probable eventual attack on other places, with the heavy duties incident thereto, pressing on this department, have prevented my answering it at an earlier day.

It may be satisfactory to your excellency for me to explain the views and principles on which this government has acted, in regard to the defence of our eastern frontier.

It was anticipated soon after the commencement of the war, that while it lasted, every part of the union, especially the seaboard, would be exposed to some degree of danger, greater or less, according to the spirit in which the war might be waged. It was the duty of the government to make the best provision against that danger, which might be practicable, and it was proper that the provision should continue while the cause existed.

The arrangement of the United States into military districts, with a certain portion of the regular force, artillery and infantry, under an officer of the regular army, of experience and high rank, in each district, with the power to call for the militia, as circumstances might require, was adopted with a view to afford the best protection to every part, that circumstances would admit.

It was presumed that the establishment of a small force of the kind stated, constituting the first elements of an army, in each district, to be aided by the militia, in

case of an emergency, would be adequate to its defence. Such a force of infantry and artillery might repel small predatory parties, and form a rallying point for the militia at the more exposed and important stations, in case of more formidable invasion. A regular officer of experience, stationed in the district acting under the authority, and pursuing the will of the government, might digest plans for its defence; select proper points for works, and superintend the erection of them: call for supplies of ordnance, for tents and camp equipage; for small arms and other munitions of war; call for the militia and dispose of the whole force. These duties it was believed, could not be performed with equal advantage by the officers of the militia, who, being called into service for short terms, would not have it in their power, however well qualified they might be in other respects, to digest plans, and preserve that chain of connection and system in the whole business, which seemed indispensable. On great consideration this arrangement was deemed the most eligible that could be adopted, under the authority of the United States: indeed no other occurred that could be placed in competition with it. In this mode the national government acts, by its proper organs, over whom it has control, and for whose engagements it is responsible.

The measures which may be adopted by a state government, for the defence of a state, must be considered as its own measures, and not those of the United States. The expences attending them are chargeable to the state, and not to the United States.

Your excellency will perceive, that a different construction would lead into the most important, and it is believed, into the most pernicious consequences. If a state could call out the militia, and subject the United States to the expence of supporting them, at its pleasure, the national authority would cease, as to that important object, and the nation be charged with expences, in the measures producing which the national government had no agency, and over which it could have no control. This, however, though a serious objection

to such a construction, is not most weighty. By taking the defence of the state into its own hands, and out of those of the general government, a policy is introduced, on the tendency of which I forbear to comment. I shall remark, only, that if a close union of the states, and a harmonious cooperation between them and the general government, are at any time necessary for the preservation of their independence, and of those inestimable liberties which were achieved by the valor and blood of our ancestors, the period may be considered as having arrived.

It follows, from this view of the subject, that if the force which has been put into service by your excellency, has been required by major general Dearborn, or received by him, and put under his command, that the expences attending it will be defrayed by the United States. It follows, likewise, as a necessary consequence, that if this force has been called into service, by the authority of the state, independently of major general Dearborn, and not placed under him, as commander of the district, that the state of Massachusetts is chargeable with the expence, and not the United States. Any claim which the state may have to reimbursement, must be judged of hereafter, by the competent authority, on a full view of all the circumstances attending it. It is a question which lies beyond the authority of the executive.

Your excellency will perceive, that this government has no other alternative than to adhere to a system of defence, which was adopted on great consideration, with the best view to the general welfare, or to abandon it, and with it a principle held sacred, thereby shrinking from its duty, at a moment of great peril; weakening the guards deemed necessary for the public safety; and opening the door to other consequences not less dangerous.

By these remarks, it is not intended to convey an idea, that a militia officer, of superior grade, regularly called into service, shall not command an officer of the regular army of inferior grade, when acting together.

No such idea is entertained by the government. The militia are relied on essentially for the defence of the country; in their hands every thing is safe. It is the object of the government to impose on them no burdens which it may be possible to avoid; and to protect them in the discharge of their duties; in the enjoyment of all their rights.

The various points which are attacked and menaced by the enemy, especially in this quarter where they are waging, in considerable force, a predatory and desolating warfare, make it difficult to provide, immediately, for all the necessary expenditures. Any aid which the state of Massachusetts may afford to the United States, to meet those expenditures, will be cheerfully received, and applied to the payment and support of the militia of that state in the service of the United States.

It will be proper that the money thus advanced, should be deposited in some bank in Boston, that the disbursement of it may be made under the authority of the government of the U. States, as in similar cases elsewhere. Credit will be given to the state for such advances, and the amount be considered a loan to the United States.

[A similar letter was written to the governor of Connecticut.]

Sharon, Connecticut, July 2, 1814.

SIR—His excellency governor Griswold has received from major general Henry Dearborn, a letter under date of the 22d of last month, requesting that five companies of the militia of this state, detached conformably to the act of congress of April 10, 1812, may be ordered into the service of the United States, to wit: two companies of artillery, and two companies of infantry, to be placed under the command of the commanding officer at fort Trumbull, near New London, and one company of artillery, to be stationed at the battery, at the entrance of the harbor of New Haven.

Impressed with the deep importance of the requisition, and the serious consideration it involves, his excellency deemed it expedient to convene the council at Hartford, on Monday the 29th ultimo. He has ta-

ken their advice upon this interesting subject, and has formed his own deliberate opinion; but as he is under the necessity of leaving the state, on a journey for the recovery of his health, it becomes my duty, as lieutenant governor, to communicate to you the result.

The assurance contained in the governor's letter of the 17th of June last, in answer to yours of the 12th of the same month, was necessarily given in full confidence that no demand would be made by general Dearborn, but in strict conformity to the constitution and laws of the United States. His excellency regrets to perceive that the present requisition is supported by neither.

The constitution of the United States has ordained that congress may "provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, to suppress insurrections, and repel invasions." Accordingly the acts of congress of February, 1795, and of April, 1812, do provide for calling forth the militia in the exigencies above mentioned.

The governor is not informed of any declaration made by the president of the United States, or of notice by him given, that the militia are required "to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions." or that "the United States are in imminent danger of invasion." As, therefore, none of the contingencies enumerated in the constitution, and recognized by the laws, are known to have taken place, his excellency considers that no portion of the militia of this state, can, under existing circumstances, be withdrawn from his authority.

Farther, if the call had been justified by either of the constitutional exigencies already recited, still in the view of his excellency an insuperable objection presents itself against placing the men under the immediate command of an officer or officers of the army of the United States.

The appointment of the officers of the militia, is, by the constitution, expressly reserved "to the states, respectively." In the event of being called into the ac-

tual service of the United States, in the cases before specified, the laws of the United States provide for their being called forth as militia, furnished with proper officers by the state. And, sir, it will not escape your recollection, that the detachment from the militia of this state, under the act of congress, of the 10th of April last, is regularly organized into a division consisting of brigades, regiments, battalions and companies and supplied, conformably to law, with all the necessary officers. His excellency conceives, then, that an order to detach a number of companies, sufficient for the command of an officer of the United States, cannot, with propriety be executed, unless we were also prepared to admit, that the privates may be separated from their company officers and transferred into the army of the United States; thus leaving the officers of the militia without any command, except in name, and in effect impairing, if not annihilating the militia itself, so sacredly guaranteed by the constitution of the several states.

Under these impressions, the governor has thought proper, by and with the advice of the council, to refuse compliance with the requisition of major general Dearborn.

His excellency is sincerely disposed to comply promptly with all the constitutional requests of the national executive; a disposition which has ever been manifested by the government of this state; and he laments the occasion which thus compels him to yield obedience to the paramount authority of the constitution and laws of the United States. He trusts the general government will speedily provide an adequate force for the security and protection of the seacoast. In the meantime, his excellency has issued the necessary orders to the general officers commanding the militia in that quarter, to be in readiness to repel any invasion which may be attempted upon that portion of the state, and to cooperate with such part of the national forces as shall be employed for the same purpose.

With great respect, &c. JOHN C. SMITH,
The hon. William Eustis, secretary of war.

Extract of a letter from his excellency John Cotton Smith, to the secretary of war, dated New London, June 7, 1813.

I arrived at this place on the 5th instant, and found about six hundred of the militia of this state, stationed on the two sides of the river, who had been assembled under the circumstances mentioned in my letter from Hartford of the 2d inst.

I shall not disband any part of the militia until a communication is received from commodore Decatur; being heartily disposed to assist his views, in affording all possible protection to the squadron and harbor. I will address you again before my departure from this place, and in the mean time, am desirous of receiving the instructions of the president as to the course proper to be pursued.

Extract of a letter from his excellency John Cotton Smith, to the secretary of war, dated New London, June 12, 1813.

On a consultation with commodore Decatur, as proposed in my last, it was concluded to retain the whole of the militia then assembled, until their places could be supplied by two regiments to be drawn from the neighborhood. Orders were issued accordingly.

But on the arrival of the two regiments, information was received that a bombketch had been added to the enemy's squadron, and that preparations were evidently making for an attack. At the instance of commodore Decatur, who knows best his own capacity of meeting the exigency, and on whose opinion, therefore, I must greatly rely, the whole force was directed to remain, excepting such individuals as were under a pressing necessity of returning to their homes. The number of militia now here, is about fifteen hundred, including officers.

Extract of a letter from his excellency John Cotton Smith, to the secretary of war, dated New London, June 16, 1813.

Your favor of the 12th instant is received, and has afforded me much pleasure.

The details in my letter of the 12th instant, I trust will fully justify, in the view of the president, the additional force it was then thought necessary to employ. After closing my dispatches on that day, the hostile fleet got under sail; approached the harbor; fired several shots at the guards; and to all appearance were meditating an attack.

Whether the display of so respectable a body of troops, or some other cause, discouraged them from the attempt, is not known. The enterprize, was for that time, abandoned; and on the 14th two of their ships passed eastward out of the sound.

As soon as information of this diminution of the squadron was received, orders were issued to disband the two regiments which were first brought into the field; and a farther reduction of the troops is this day made, to the number mentioned in your letter.

Extract of a letter from his excellency John Cotton Smith, to the secretary of war, dated state of Connecticut, Sharon, August 1, 1814.

Your letter of the 4th of July reached me on the 16th of the same month.

Although there appears to be no act of congress, expressly authorising a detachment from the militia, for the purpose mentioned in your communication; yet the respect due to a recommendation from the president, having for its object the defence of the country, induced me, without unnecessary delay, to convene the council of the state, and to submit the proposition to their consideration.

That honorable body having advised the executive to detach the number of militia suggested, as the proportion of Connecticut, orders were immediately issued to that effect; and you will be speedily informed, by the proper officer, of their execution.

Copy of a letter from general Cushing, to his excellency governor Smith, dated military district No. 2, head quarters, New London, August 1, 1814.

SIR—I have been notified by the secretary of war, that on the fourth day of July last, a requisition was

made on the executive of the state of Connecticut for a body of militia, to be organized and held in readiness for immediate service; and I am instructed by him, "in case of actual or menaced invasion of the district under my command, to call for a part or the whole of the quotas as assigned to the states of Connecticut and Rhode Island, which shall have been organized and equipped under the aforesaid requisition." But in the performance of this duty, I am charged "to avoid all unnecessary calls; to proportion the calls to the exigency and to have inspected, without delay, all corps entering on service, to the end, that men, who, from any cause, are unfit therefor, be promptly discharged, and that a due proportion, in all cases, be maintained between officers and privates."

It is not deemed necessary to call any part of the quota of Connecticut into the service of the United States at this time; but it is desirable that the draft be made, and the men held in readiness for immediate service, whenever circumstances may indicate an intention on the part of the enemy to invade any part of the state. And I have, therefore, to request your excellency to inform me whether the quota of militia required of this state by the aforesaid requisition, has been, or will be "organized and held in readiness for immediate service?" whether, on my requisition, the whole or any part of the said militia will be ordered into the service of the United States, for the purpose beforementioned? whether my requisition for this purpose must be made to your excellency in the first instance, or to such general and field officers as may have been detailed for this service? and, generally, that your excellency would be pleased to favor me with such information and opinions, in relation to the object and designs of the enemy, and to the defence of this state as you may think proper to communicate.

I have only to add, that as commanding officer of this military district, it will be my constant endeavor to preserve the strictest harmony between the national troops and the militia, and that the rights of the latter,

as secured by the constitution and laws of our country, shall be duly respected by every officer and soldier under my command.

Extracts of a letter from John Cotton Smith, to general Cushing, dated state of Connecticut, Sharon, August 4, 1814.

“I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 1st instant.

“The adjutant general is directed to send you a transcript of the general orders, issued on the 28th ultimo, for organizing and holding in readiness a body of militia, pursuant to a recommendation from the president of the United States. To that document I must refer you for answers to most of your inquiries.

“The militia, whenever their services are required, will expect to march under orders received from their commander in chief; and such orders as the exigency demands, you may rest assured, shall be promptly given.”

GENERAL ORDERS.

State of Connecticut, Hartford, July 28, 1814.

The commander in chief has received a communication from the president of the United States, inviting the executives of certain states to organize and hold in readiness for immediate service, a corps of ninety three thousand, five hundred men, “as a measure of precaution to strengthen ourselves on the line of the Atlantic,” and assigning as the quota of Connecticut, three hundred artillery, and two thousand seven hundred infantry, with a detail of general and staff officers.

The commander in chief having thought proper, by advice of the council, to comply with the recommendation, directs that dispositions be immediately made for carrying the same into effect.

Accordingly, the number of artillery and infantry above mentioned, including the usual regimental officers, will be detached from the militia of the state, excepting from the drafts such as have, either in person or by substitute, performed a tour of duty the present season. Volunteer uniform companies will be accepted. The

whole to be formed into four regiments, and duly officered. Their places of rendezvous as follows, to wit: for the first regiment, Hartford; for the second, New Haven; for the third, Norwich; and for the fourth, Fairfield. One major general and one brigadier general will be detailed, in the usual manner; also one deputy quarter master general; and instead of an assistant adjutant general, (there being no such officer in the militia of this state) there shall be detailed one division inspector.

The troops thus detached are to be completely armed and equipped according to law, and until otherwise directed, will be held in readiness to march at a moment's warning for the purpose of repelling invasions of the enemy, under such orders as they shall receive from the commander in chief.

Notwithstanding this arrangement, it is confidently expected that the whole body of the militia, and every other description of military force, will bear in mind the general orders issued on the 18th of April last, and will stand in complete readiness for the defence of the state, at this unusual period of difficulty and danger.

By order, EBEN. HUNTINGTON, Adj. Gen.

Norwich, August 11, 1814.

SIR—By desire of his excellency governor Smith, I have forwarded a copy of the general order, of the 28th of July, for your information, on some points of enquiry made to him. I am, &c.

EBEN. HUNTINGTON, Adj. Gen.

Brigadier General Cushing.

Copy of a letter from general Cushing to the governor of Connecticut, dated military district No. 2, H. Q. New London, August 10. 1814.

SIR—By major general Williams' communication of this date, your excellency will be fully informed of the state of things in this quarter; and by the enclosed district order, that the militia ordered out by him at my request, are to form a brigade in the service of the U. States, under the command of brigadier general Isham.

Your excellency's communication of the 4th instant, was received this morning, since which general Williams has furnished me with your general order of the 28th of July; but I have heard nothing from the adjutant general on this subject.

It is my opinion that the safety of this state requires that fifteen hundred infantry and two companies of artillery, duly officered, and to be commanded by a brigadier general of this state's quota of ninety three thousand five hundred men, required by the president of the United States "to be organized and held in readiness for immediate service," should be immediately detached from the said quota, and ordered to this place, for the purpose of relieving the militia now on duty here; if circumstances would justify the measure, or to increase our means of defence, in the event of more formidable and vigorous operations on the part of the enemy. And I have the honor to request your excellency to make and place the said detachment under my command. It is desirable that the brigadier general to be detached on this service, should be instructed by your excellency to report himself to me, by letter, immediately, after he shall have been so detached, to inform me of his route to this place, and the probable time of his arrival; and to receive and obey any orders he may receive from me, while on his march.

Copy of adjutant general P. P. Schuyler's orders, dated military district No. 2, head quarters, New London, August 10, 1814.

DISTRICT ORDERS.

The militia of this state, ordered into service yesterday, by major general Williams, at the request of the commanding general of the district, are to be considered in the service of the United States, and will form a brigade, under the command of brigadier general Isham, who will furnish a return, by regiments, to the adjutant general of the district, the soonest possible.

Until the proper returns of general Isham's brigade can be obtained, the contractor will issue provisions on

the requisition of major Goddard, countersigned by the commanding general; and the major will be held responsible for the proper application of all provisions so received, and which must be covered by regular returns, so soon as the strength of the brigade can be ascertained.

By order of the commanding general,
P. P. SCHUYLER, Adj. Gen.

Extract of a letter from brigadier general T. H. Cushing to the secretary of war, dated district No. 2, head quarters, New London, August 12, 1814.—10 o'clock P. M.

By the letter of the 11th instant from governor Smith, of which I enclose a copy, marked H. you will see that he has ordered the militia called for on the 10th; but for the reasons therein stated, claims the right of placing a major general at their head. I shall endeavor to satisfy him that, with the number of militia called for, a major general cannot be received; but if he should persist, how is the difficulty to be got over?

Extract of a letter from John Cotton Smith to general Cushing, dated state of Connecticut, Sharon, August 2, 1814, 9 o'clock, A. M.

Your communication, by express, is this moment received.

Major general Williams is directed to retain the militia, now on duty, until they shall be relieved by the force ordered out, conformably to your request, or unless circumstances shall justify an earlier dismissal.

It is probable the draft for the new detachment is not completed; but brigadier general Lusk, detailed under the orders of the 28th ultimo, is instructed, by the return of the express, to hasten it as fast as possible, and to march without a moment's delay, with the first and third regiments, whose places of rendezvous are Hartford and Norwich. Their numbers will make the complement you require, including artillery.

As the force requested by you, will constitute a majority of the detachment, there is an evident propriety

that it should be commanded by the major general detailed pursuant to the recommendation of the president. He will accordingly be directed to enter the service, as soon as the necessary arrangements will permit. In the mean time, brigadier general Lusk is ordered to report himself to you, agreeably to your desire.

Extract of a letter from brigadier general T. H. Cushing to the secretary of war, dated military district No. 2, head quarters, New London, August 29, 1814.

I deem it proper, at this time, to lay before you a copy of my correspondence with governor Smith, from the 14th to the 28th instant, inclusive. Unwilling to relinquish his project of introducing a major general of militia into the service of the United States, the governor has attempted to prevail on me to accept a command of six hundred men, to be posted at New Haven, under the command of major general Taylor, who, it appears, must be provided for.

I have agreed to accept the men, if properly officered, because it will enable me to discharge an equal number, which must otherwise be marched from this neighborhood; but I have pointedly refused to recognize the major general, or to have the men mustered and supplied, on any other consideration but that of their being subject to my orders.

Extract of a letter from brigadier general Cushing to his excellency John Coitton Smith, governor of the state of Connecticut, dated military district No. 2, head quarters, New London, August 14, 1814.

A copy of your excellency's letter to me of 11th instant, has been transmitted to the secretary of war, and I have the honor to enclose an extract of a letter from him on the subject of the militia drafts, and a copy of the rules referred to in his letter.

In acting on the late requisition of the president, for 3,000 men, to be organized for the service of the United States, I had presumed that your excellency would have pursued the course suggested by that requisition, and formed the state's quota into three regiments of

1,000 men each ; and, under that impression, in my letter of the 10th instant, I did not express the number of privates, noncommissioned and commissioned officers, required. It now appears that a different course has been adopted, and the quota of the state formed into four regiments ; but, although, in point of form, there is considerable difference between the 3,000 men, as organized by your excellency, and the same number, as organized in the army of the United States ; yet as a due proportion between officers and privates will be maintained, and no additional expence incurred, I shall consider the spirit and intention of the rule as having been fully complied with, by the organization which your excellency has been pleased to direct.

Extract of a letter from his excellency John Cotton Smith, governor of the state of Connecticut, to brigadier general Cushing, dated Hartford, August 25, 1814.

As you seem, sir, not to have understood, correctly, the views of this government, with respect to the late detachment, it is fit that I state them to you distinctly.

The communication from the war department, under date of the 4th July last, relative to a detachment from the militia, for the purpose therein mentioned, did not assume the style of a "requisition," and for the obvious reason, that there existed no law to authorize it. The invitation (for such was its purport) was accepted by the executive of this state, from a desire to cooperate in what appeared to the president a proper measure of defence for the Atlantic coast.

The terms of the compliance are contained in the general orders issued on the 28th July, a transcript of which you have received. In organizing the regiment, I conform as nearly as possible to the act of Congress, passed the 8th May, 1792. I am not informed that there is now in operation any other act of the national legislature on that subject. If your instructions from the war department materially interfere with the requirements of this act, it is indeed a subject of regret,

but not of doubt, as to the authority which ought, in such case, to prevail.

I am happy, however, to perceive, that you do not consider the difference as essentially varying the result.

Extract of a letter from brigadier general Cushing, to his excellency John Cotton Smith, governor of the state of Connecticut, dated military district no. 2, H. Q. August 23, 1814.

Your excellency's letter of the 25th instant, was received last evening, and shall be submitted to the secretary of war by the next mail.

Not having the communication from the war department, under date of the 4th July, before me, when my letter to your excellency, of the 14th instant was written, I inadvertantly used the term requisition, when I should have employed that of invitation; and I beg leave to assure your excellency, that it it was done without any intention or desire of giving to the invitation of the president, or the acceptance of your excellency, a different understanding from that originally intended.

Extract of a letter from brigadier general T. H. Cushing to the secretary of war, dated military district no. 2, H. Quarters, New London, September 2, 1814.

I have the honor to enclose a copy of a letter from governor Smith, of the 30th August, with my reply of this date.

It is now pretty evident that the governor and council have determined that their militia shall not be commanded by an officer of the United States; and it is possible an attempt may be made to withdraw the brigade now in service. I am, however, of opinion, that this will not be done before the meeting of the legislature.

Copy of a letter from John Cotton Smith, to brigadier general Cushing, dated Hartford, August 30, 1814.

SIR—Colonel Waid has delivered me your letter of the 28th instant.

In referring you to the views of this government, respecting the detachment lately organized, it was my design not to criticise your language, but to point your attention to the precise condition upon which that detachment was formed. The right of command, you will perceive, is expressly reserved. The detachment thus constituted is accepted; and with a knowledge of the reservation just mentioned, you request a large proportion of the troops for public service. Whatever sentiments, therefore, may be entertained as to the right of the executive of the state to direct its military force, when ordinarily employed in the national service, it surely cannot be questioned in the present instance. If, at your particular desire, brigadier general Lusk was ordered to report himself to you, in the manner suggested in my letter of the 11th inst. I trust it evinces a spirit of accommodation which will be duly appreciated.

I think, sir, you will be satisfied, upon reflection, that you should have requested the major general, when you called for a majority of the detachment; especially if you consider that another brigade of militia was at that time on duty; and from appearances the services of both might become necessary. That a brigadier general of the regular army, with no troops *in the field*, should insist on the command of two entire brigades of militia, whose brigadier generals held senior commissions, would have produced a case which neither precedent nor principle could justify. To avoid so unusual and embarrassing a state of things, it became my duty to order the major general into service. Having been properly detailed, no casual diminution of numbers can affect his right of command.

I enclose you the opinion of the council in relation, as well to this point, as to the employment of a large force at New Haven and Bridgeport. Their opinion is in perfect accordance with my own, and therefore will be carried into effect. The troops destined for these posts will arrive at New Haven on the 8th, and at Bridgeport on the 13th of September next. If no officer

of the United States appears to muster them, that duty will be performed by an officer of the militia, agreeably to the late act of congress. If supplies are withheld by your order, they will be furnished by the proper officers of the state, and charged over to the United States.

It is hoped the services of the third regiment may be dispensed with for the present.

From the harmony with which the service was conducted the last season, under an arrangement not essentially dissimilar, I flatter myself that a temper equally conciliatory will distinguish the present campaign. Whilst I lament that any difference of opinion should exist, as to the particular mode of defending our country at a moment when its dearest interest are in jeopardy, I cannot lose sight of the high duties which I am solemnly bound to discharge.

Extract of the proceedings of the governor and council, at a meeting held at Hartford, on the 24th day of August, A. D. 1814.

His excellency, the governor, laid before the council, a correspondence between him and brigadier general Cushing, in regard to the command of two regiments of the militia of this state, now in service, and requested the advice of the council thereon.

The council, on mature deliberation, cannot doubt the right or expediency, under existing circumstances, of having in service, from this state, a major general, authorized to command such portions of the military force as is, or may be, in service, for its defence.

Extract of a letter from general Cushing to John C. Smith, governor of Connecticut, dated military district no. 2, head quarters, New London, September 2, 1814.

Your excellency's letter of the 30th of August, was received this morning by the southern mail.

Whether I have understood "the views of the government (Connecticut) respecting the detachment lately organized," or not, is, in my estimation, a question of no importance at this time, since, by referring to my

letter of the 10th of August, your excellency will there find the conditions on which the drafted militia, now in service, were asked for, and have been received into the service of the United States. If these conditions do not accord with the "views of this government," it is not for me to assign the motive which induced your excellency to make the detachment; but while I regret that any misunderstanding should exist on this subject, I feel confident that my communications have been too explicit to leave a doubt as to the course authorized and enjoined by the government of the United States.

Extract of a letter from his excellency John Cotton Smith to the secretary of war, dated state of Connecticut, Hartford, September 3, 1814.

In consequence of the exposed and defenceless situation of the town of New Haven and borough of Bridgeport, I have thought proper, by the advice of the council, to order into service 600 men, for the protection of those places.

The general officer of the United States, located at New London, has been advised of this procedure; and has also been required to cause the troops to be duly mustered and supplied.

He admits the propriety of the measure, but, as I understand, refuses to comply with the request, and on grounds which, in my view, are wholly inadmissible.

It is my duty, sir, to inform you of these circumstances, and to express the assurance I feel, that you will order the requisite supplies to be immediately furnished.

Extract of a letter from his excellency John Cotton Smith to the secretary of war, dated state of Connecticut, Hartford, September 14, 1814.

I am informed the agent of the United States, at New London, has refused any further subsistence to the militia now on duty, in that vicinity, upon the unfounded pretext, that they are withdrawn from service by my authority. Unwilling to hazard the safety of those posts, and the national property in the river, by disbanding the troops, I have directed the commissary gen-

eral of the state to provide for them, until the pleasure of the president shall be known.

You will perceive the importance, sir, of apprizing me, whether the agent is to be countenanced in the course he has thought proper to adopt; and also, how far I am to rely on the general government for assistance, in the necessary defence of the state.

[A letter was written to the governor of Connecticut, in reply to these letters to the department of war, to the same effect with that to the governor of Massachusetts, of September 14, 1814.]

Copy of a letter from James Monroe, secretary of war, to his excellency John C. Smith, governor of Connecticut, dated October 17, 1814.

SIR--I have had the honor to receive your excellency's communication of—. The letters mentioned in it had been before received.

The regulations of this department, in conformity to the laws of the United States, having designated commands for different grades of the general officers of the militia—two thousand men for a brigadier general; and general Cushing not having called for more than 2,000 men, at any time; and there not being more than that number of militia in the field, it was thought that the command of them ought not to be committed to a major general of the militia.

The tendency of such an arrangement would be, to take the force assembled for the defence of the military district No. 2, out of the hands of the officer to whom the president had entrusted it. It was on this principle, that my letter to your excellency, of the 17th September was addressed, and with intention to explain the principles on which the arrangements of this government were made for the defence of every part of the United States; which explanation I gave on the belief that it would be satisfactory, and that it was particularly my duty to give it, at this very important crisis of our affairs.

It is, however, distinctly to be understood, that if the

whole quota assigned to Connecticut had been called into service, that it would have been proper to have committed the command to a major general of the militia, who in cases where he and a brigadier general of the army of the United States acted together, would take the command of him.

I have the honor to be, &c.

Copy of a letter from T. H. Cushing, brigadier general, to the secretary of war, dated military district no. 2, H. Q. New London, September 2, 1814.

SIR—The enclosed copies marked A, B, C and D, will show the situation in which I am placed, with respect to the militia in the state of Connecticut, and that it will be impossible for me to repel the attack of the enemy within its limits, not directed against the forts in this harbor, or the very small and inconsiderable battery in the neighborhood of New Haven.

The letter of governor Smith was delivered to me yesterday morning, by the aid of major general Taylor. I enquired whether his general had been ordered into service by the government of the United States, and assured him, if this was the case, I would most cheerfully resign to him, not only the command of the drafted militia, but of this military district. He replied that general Taylor had no such orders; but that he had been ordered by governor Smith to take command of the drafted militia of Connecticut, in the service of the United States, and would immediately assume the command, and issue his orders agreeably to the governor's instructions.

Finding that the usual report of the brigade was not furnished by brigadier general Lusk, I sent for him to inquire the reason for this neglect, and to admonish him of the consequences which would ensue, in the event of his failing to discharge the duties of his station, as an officer in the service of the United States, and as such, not accountable to governor Smith, or any of his militia generals.

The brigadier requested a short time to make up his mind, as to the course he should pursue: and I heard

nothing more from him until two o'clock this day when his answer to my note was received, and the enclosed district order immediately issued.

I understand that general Taylor is making arrangements for the supply of Lusk's brigade, at this place, and its neighborhood; and it will readily occur to you, that the power to call militia into service, vested in me by the president's proclamation, cannot be exercised to any beneficial result since, the moment such militia shall have assembled, in pursuance of my requisition, they will be taken from me by state authorities.

Copy of a letter from his excellency John Cotton Smith, governor of the state of Connecticut, to brigadier general Cushing, dated Hartford, September 9, 1814.

SIR—Conformably to the original arrangement, major general Taylor, now goes to take the command of the militia on duty, at New London and its vicinity.

He will retain or reduce their present number, according to existing circumstances. Upon this and other subjects, connected with the safety of these ports, he is instructed, and will be disposed, to confer with you freely, and to promote, by all means in his power, that concert of operation on which the success of the service must essentially depend.

Copy of a letter from brigadier general Cushing, to brigadier general Lusk, commanding militia, dated Military District, No. 2, Head Quarters, New London, September 12, 1814.

SIR—The usual reports of the brigade of drafted militia under your command, in the service of the United States, was not delivered to the adjutant general of the district yesterday, and report says that you have received, and are acting under the orders of a militia officer, not in the service of the United States.

It has, therefore, become necessary, that you assign a reason, in writing, for withholding your reports, and contradict or admit the fact, of your having received, and are actually executing, the orders of an officer, not in the service of the United States.

Copy of a letter from brigadier general Lusk, to brigadier general Cushing, dated New London, September 12, 1814.

SIR—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of this morning. The following is an extract of the order of his excellency, the captain general, dated the 28th July, 1814.

“The troops thus detached, are to be completely armed and equipped according to law, and, until otherwise directed, will be held in readiness to march at a moment’s warning, for the purpose of repelling invasions of the enemy, under such orders as they shall receive from the commander in chief.”

The following is an extract of a letter of instruction to me, from governor Smith, dated Sharon, 11th August, 1814.

“You will inform general Cushing, by letter, of your state of readiness, and take his directions as to the route and place or places of destination, and to conform to his instructions until the arrival of major general Taylor, who will take the command as soon as his health and the necessary arrangements will permit.”

In addition to the above, major general Taylor issued his orders to me, under date of the 11th September, 1814, directing me to discontinue calling at the office of the commanding general of the district for orders, and to obey no orders, excepting such as shall be issued under the authority of this state.

He has also required of me regularly to make report to him of the forces under my command.

From a perusal of the foregoing extracts, you will readily infer the only answer to your interrogations which I have the power to make.

Copy of district orders, dated Military District. No. 2, Head Quarters, New London, September 12, 1814.

The brigade of drafted militia from the state of Connecticut, having been withdrawn from the service of the United States, by his excellency governor Smith; and brigadier general Lusk, the commanding officer of the said brigade, having refused to receive and obey the or-

ders of the brigadier general commanding this military district, no further supplies, of any description, are to be delivered to him, or his brigade, for and on account of the United States, without an express written order from the brigadier general commanding, or from his superior officers, actually in the service of the United States.

By order of the commanding general.

P. P. SCHUYLER, *Adjutant general.*

Copy of a letter from William Jones, governor of Rhode Island, to the secretary of war, dated Providence, April 22, 1812.

SIR—I have had the honor to receive your letter under date of the 15th instant, requiring me to take effectual measures to detach five hundred of the militia of Rhode Island, and that they be armed and equipped for actual service, within the shortest period that circumstances will permit.

The general assembly of this state will be in session in a few days, when I shall embrace the earliest opportunity to lay the request before them.

Copy of a letter from William Jones to the secretary of war, dated Providence, June 18, 1812.

SIR—Your communication of the 12th instant came to hand by last evening's mail; and in reply, permit me to state, that for the quota of militia required by the act of congress of April 10, 1812, the general assembly of this state, at their session, in May last, ordered a return of our militia made on or before the 4th of July next, and that therefrom a draft of the number required will be made as soon as practicable, and ready for service.

Extract of a letter from William Jones to the secretary of war, dated Providence, August 22, 1812.

I have not been able to obtain an entire return of the men drafted, as this state's quota of militia, alluded to in my last, until the 11th instant. It is now done, and the detachment organized, as per enclosed roll, and will be held in readiness to act, when in my opinion, any of

the exigencies provided for by the constitution, and referred to the by late act of congress under which they are detached, exist agreeably to the opinion and advice of the council of this state, given me on the occasion.

Extract of a letter from his excellency William Jones, governor of the state of Rhode Island, to the president of the United States, dated Providence, June 29, 1814.

The views of the general assembly, the council of war, and myself, will be discovered from the act of the assembly, passed at the late session, a copy of which Mr. Searle will present to you, with whom I request you will make all the necessary arrangements for carrying it into full effect.

He will discuss the subject of his mission fully, and I trust to your satisfaction, so that the state will, by the assistance of the United States, be placed in a posture of defence, at least against the predatory incursions of the enemy.

Extract of a letter from Nathaniel Searle, jun. to the president of the United States, dated Washington City, July 6, 1814.

The views of the general assembly, of the council of war, and of the governor, will be clearly discovered, in relation to this subject from an act of the assembly, passed at their last session, a copy which I beg leave to present.

I beg leave, therefore, in behalf of the state by whose authority I am deputed, to solicit the peculiar attention of the president to her perilous and calamitous situation: to request of him a reimbursement of the expenditures already made, and a prompt provision of a military force for her protection; or that he will furnish, herewith, pecuniary means, by which she can place herself in an attitude of defence.

Extract of a letter from brigadier general T. H. Cushing, to the secretary of war, dated military district no. 2, head quarters, Providence, July 21, 1814.

Your letter of the 11th instant, with enclosures, reached me at this place, on the evening of the 15th.

and on the next morning I had an interview with governor Jones, who is at this time, deliberating with his council, as to the mode of selecting the state's quota of 500 men, which he assures me shall be raised, either by enlistment or draft, in a very few days.

Extract of a letter from his excellency William Jones, governor of the state of Rhode Island, to the secretary of war, dated Providence, August 15, 1814.

Since the arrangement was entered into with you, relative to raising a state corps, rendezvous have been opened in different parts of the state, officers appointed, and the recruiting service progresses in a manner and with a rapidity that promises success.

Should we be disappointed, however, in raising the number proposed by enlistment, the militia will be detached to make up the deficiency, for the defence of the state, according to the invitation of the president of the United States, of the 4th of July last.

Extract of a letter from his excellency William Jones, governor of the state of Rhode Island, to the secretary of war, dated Providence, September 8, 1814.

SIR—I am ready, as I have by letter, and through the adjutant general, colonel Scarle, repeatedly expressed to your department, to call out the militia, and particularly the 500 men ordered out by the president, on the 4th day of July last, as our quota of the 93,500 men; but we are destitute of almost every necessary for the comfort and subsistence of the men, and for making them effective as soldiers. We are without tents, equipage, and provisions, and have a very inadequate supply of cannon, muskets and ammunition. I have attempted to raise a corps of 500 men, to be accepted as substitutes for our quota of militia. In this I have not yet succeeded, having been able to enlist only about 150 men, notwithstanding a bounty was offered by the state. I have also detached four companies of militia for the defence of Newport, who have been called into actual service, one company at a time, and who were agreed to be mustered under the authority of the

United States, as appears by the letter of general Armstrong, dated July 9, 1814. Five companies of militia were also called out by general Stanton of Washington county, to assist in the defence of Stonington, in Connecticut. In the actual state of affairs, the militia must be drafted or detached to make up the 500 men, and it may very probably be necessary to call out a much larger force; but you must be perfectly sensible of the inefficacy of any force, without further supplies of munitions of war.

Copy of a letter from his excellency William Pennington, governor of the state of New Jersey, to the secretary of war, dated Trenton, October 29, 1814.

SIR—I am informed that governor Tompkins, as governor of the state of New York, has taken command of the 3d military district of the United States; this district comprehends the principal part of New Jersey, and between two and three thousand Jersey militia are now in actual service in this district, at Sandy Hook, in the state of New Jersey. It might certainly appear, on first view, novel, at least, that a governor of a state, as such, should have the command of the militia of a neighboring state, within the actual territory of that state. I am far from entertaining a disposition, especially in the present state of our country, to throw the least obstruction in the way of the operations of the general government in any measure of defence which it may think proper to adopt, but I conceive it my duty to enquire as to the fact, and the views of the war department on the subject.

Copy of a letter from James Monroe, secretary of war, to his excellency William Pennington, governor of the state of New Jersey, dated November 22, 1814.

SIR—I have had the honor to receive your excellency's letter of the 29th ultimo, requiring information whether governor Tompkins, as governor of the state of New York, has been appointed commander of the 3d military district, comprehending a part of the state of

New Jersey. Your excellency seems to doubt whether the governor of one state can have the command of the militia of another state, within the limits of the latter; and it is to ascertain the views of the general government on that point, that the enquiry has been made.

The patriotic and national sentiments which you have expressed on this subject, have afforded much satisfaction to the president, who desires that all the information which you have sought, should be fully communicated.

Governor Tompkins has been appointed commander of the military district of the United States, No. 3, by virtue of which his command extends to that part of the state of Jersey, and to such of her militia as have been called into the service of the United States within that limit.

The city of New York being menaced by the enemy with formidable invasion, and the United States not having a regular force sufficient to repel it, a large body of militia were called into their service for the purpose. It was this circumstance which led to the appointment of governor Tompkins to the command of military district, No. 3, he being, in the opinion of the president, well qualified for the trust.

It is a well established principle, that when any portion of the militia are called into the service of the United States, the officers commanding it ought to retain their command, and enter with it into that service; a colonel with his regiment; a brigadier with his brigade; a major general with his division. On the same principle, when several divisions of the militia of any state are called into the service of the United States, the governor of the state may be authorised to take the command of them, he being the highest officer of the militia in the state. In such a case the governor of a state is viewed in his military character only. He becomes, it is true, the military character, by virtue of his office as governor; but every *other* feature of that character is lost in the service of the United States. They relate to his civil functions, in which the state alone is in-

terested. The militia of one state, when called into the service of the United States, may be marched into another state. We have seen the militia of Pennsylvania and Virginia serving in the state of Maryland, and of North Carolina in Virginia, with many other examples of a like kind. In all these instances, the militia officers go with their respective corps, and as such, no discrimination can be made, to the exclusion of the governor of a state commanding the militia of his state. Like other militia officers he may march with the troops of his state into another state, and retain there his command, either as commander of the district, or acting under another governor, to whom the president has already given the command.

Your excellency will find these principles fully illustrated, and more than fully established by an example which took place soon after the adoption of the present constitution. In the year 1794, when president Washington thought it proper, on the certificate of a judge, that an insurrection existed in the western part of Pennsylvania, to order the militia of other states there, to aid the militia of that state in suppressing it, he committed the command of the whole force to the governor of a neighboring state, who commanded the governor of Pennsylvania. The relative rank and command of the governor employed in the service, was settled by the president himself.

In general, it was not desirable to impose on the governors of other states the duty of commanding the militia of their respective states, when called into the service of the United States, where they supercede the officer of the latter, commanding the military district in which such state is, because, as governors, they have other duties to perform which might interfere, if they did not conflict with those incident to such a command. A governor for example, under the influence of local feeling might think the danger more imminent than it really was, and call into the service of the United States a greater force than would be necessary. He might even set on foot expeditions, which the general

government could not approve. It would be improper that the charges incident hereto should be defrayed by the United States. The constitution contemplates the exercise of the national authority, in contra distinction to that of a state, whenever the militia of a state are called into the service of the United States. The call must be made by the president, or by his authority, to be obligatory on the nation. If made by the governor of a state, it is the act of the state, obligatory on it only. These objections, however, to the union of both trusts in the same person, did not apply to the employment of the governor of New York. All the force necessary for the defence of that state, had already been called for by order of this government, and put into the service of the United States, and although the governor is authorised to dismiss a part of the militia, in certain cases, he is instructed not to call out any, without a special sanction from this department.

Your excellency will observe, that the objection to the command of the militia of a state by its governor, when called into the service of the United States, does not apply except to cases in which the command of the military district of the United States is superseded. In every other case, even in those having that effect, under similar circumstances with that under consideration, such active, patriotic service by persons so highly intrusted by their country, will be seen by the president with great interest and satisfaction. Its example could not fail to produce the happiest effect.

I have the honor to be, &c.

(B.)

MILITARY PEACE ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES.

Department of War, May 17th, 1815.

The act of congress of the 3d of March 1815, declares, "That the military peace establishment of the United States shall consist of such proportions of artillery, infantry and riflemen, not exceeding, in the whole, ten thousand men, as the president of the United States shall judge proper; that the corps of engineers, as at present established, be retained; that the president of the United States cause to be arranged the officers, noncommissioned officers, musicians and privates, of the several corps of troops in the service of the United States, in such manner as to form and complete out of the same, the corps authorized by this act; and that he cause the supernumerary officers, noncommissioned officers, musicians and privates, to be discharged from the service of the United States, from and after the first day of May next, or as soon as circumstances may permit."

The president of the United States, having performed the duty which the law assigned to him, has directed that the military peace establishment be announced in general orders; and that the supernumerary officers, noncommissioned officers, musicians and privates, be discharged from the service of the United States, as soon as the circumstances, which are necessary for the payment and discharge of the troops, will permit.

But on this important and interesting occasion, the president of the United States is aware, that he owes to the feelings of the nation, as well as to his own feelings, an expression of the high sense entertained of the services of the American army. Leaving the

ness of private life, the citizens became the soldiers of the United States: the spirit of a genuine patriotism quickly pervaded the military establishment; and the events of the war have conspicuously developed the moral, as well as the physical character of the army, in which every man seems to have deemed himself the chosen champion of his country.

The pacific policy of the American government, the domestic habits of the people, and a long sequestration from the use of arms, will justly account for the want of warlike preparation, for an imperfect state of discipline, and for various other sources of embarrassment, or disaster, which existed at the commencement of hostilities: but to account for the achievements of the American army, in all their splendor, and for its efficient acquirements in every important branch of the military art, during a war of little more than two years continuance; it is necessary to resort to that principle of action, which, in a free country, identifies the citizen with his government; impels each individual to seek the knowledge that is requisite for the performance of his duty; and renders every soldier, in effect, a combatant in his own cause.

The president of the United States anticipated from the career of an army thus constituted, all the glory and the fruits of victory; and it has been his happiness to see a just war terminated by an honorable peace, after such demonstrations of valor, genius, and enterprise, as secure for the land and naval forces of the United States an imperishable renown; for the citizens, the best prospect of an undisturbed enjoyment of their rights; and for the government, the respect and confidence of the world.

To the American army, which has so nobly contributed to these results, the president of the United States presents this public testimonial of approbation and applause, at a moment when many of its gallant officers and men must, unavoidably, be separated from the standard of their country. Under all governments, and especially under all free governments, the restora-

tion of peace has uniformly produced a reduction of the military establishment. The United States disbanded in 1800 the troops which had been raised on account of the differences with France; and the memorable peace of 1783, was followed by a discharge of the illustrious army of the revolution. The frequency, or the necessity, of the occurrence does not, however, deprive it of its interest; and the dispersion of the military-family, at this juncture, under circumstances peculiarly affecting, cannot fail to awaken all the sympathies of the generous and the just.

The difficulty of accomplishing a satisfactory organization of the military peace establishment, has been anxiously felt. The act of congress contemplates a small but an effective force, and, consequently, the honorable men, whose years or infirmities, or wounds, render them incapable of further service in active warfare, are necessarily excluded from the establishment. The act contemplates a reduction of the army from many, to a few regiments; and, consequently, a long list of meritorious officers must, inevitably, be laid aside. But the attempt has been assiduously made to collect authentic information from every source, as a foundation for an impartial judgment on the various claims to attention; and even while a decision is pronounced, the president of the United States desires it may be distinctly understood, that from the designation of the officers who are retained in service, nothing more is to be inferred, than his approbation of the designated individuals, without derogating, in any degree, from the fame and worth of those, whose lot it is to retire.

The American army of the war of 1812 has hitherto successfully emulated the patriotism and the valor of the army of the war of 1776. The closing scene of the example remains alone to be performed. Having established the independence of their country, the revolutionary warriors cheerfully returned to the walks of civil life; many of them became the benefactors and ornaments of society, in the prosecution of the vari-

ous arts and professions; and all of them, as well as the veteran few who survive the lapse of time, have been the objects of grateful recollection, and constant regard. It is for the American army, now dissolved, to pursue the same honorable course, in order to enjoy the same inestimable reward. The hope may be respectfully indulged, that the beneficence of the legislative authority will beam upon suffering merit; an admiring nation will unite the civic with the martial honors, which adorn its heroes; and posterity, in its theme of gratitude, will indiscriminately praise the protectors and the founders of American Independence.

By order of the President of the United States,

A. J. DALLAS,

Acting Secretary of War.

Department of War, April 17, 1815.

GENTLEMEN,

I proceed to state some additional views connected with the execution of the act of Congress fixing the military peace establishment.

I. Corps belonging to the army, which are not expressly retained by the provisions of the act, are to be discharged.

The corps expressly provided for, are

1. The corps of artillery;
2. The regiment of light artillery;
3. The corps of engineers;
4. Regiments of infantry and riflemen.

The corps not provided for, are

1. The regiment of light dragoons;
2. The Canadian volunteers;
3. The sea fencibles.

II. The officers of the general staff employed in the command, discipline and duties of the army, who are not expressly retained by the provisions of the act, are to be discharged.

The officers provided for, are

1. Two major generals, with two aids de camp each;
2. Four brigadier generals, with one aid de camp, each.

3. Four brigade inspectors.
4. Four brigade quarter masters.

The officers not provided for, are

1. All the general officers, except the six above mentioned;
2. All the officers of the adjutant general's department;
3. All the officers of the inspector general's department—four brigade inspectors being substituted;
4. All the officers of the quarter master's department—four brigade quarter masters being substituted;
5. All the officers of the topographical department.

III. Departments which do not form a constituent part of the army are preserved, except so far as the act of Congress by express provision, or necessary implication, introduces an alteration.

1. *The Ordnance Department* is preserved. It is a distinct establishment, with a view to a state of peace, as well as a state of war. It is not affected by any express provision in the act of Congress; and it is an object of the appropriations made for the military peace establishment.

2. *The Purchasing Department* is preserved for similar reasons.

3. *The Pay Department* is preserved, with specific modifications. The act of Congress expressly provides for the appointment of regimental paymasters. The office of district paymaster, and assistant district paymaster, is abolished: but the act of the 18th of April, 1814, which continues in force for one year after the war, is not repealed, nor affected in any other manner, than has been mentioned by the act of the 3d of March, 1815. It is seen, therefore, that the act of the 16th of March, 1802, fixing the military peace-establishment, constituted the office of paymaster of the army, seven paymasters, and two assistants; and that the act of the 18th of April 1814, recognizes the office of paymaster of the army; and in lieu of a monthly compensation, allows the paymaster an annual salary of two thousand dollars, payable quarterly at the treasury. The former

act is of indefinite continuance; and the latter will continue in force until the 17th of February, 1816.—Nor does the act of the 3d of March, 1815, affect the office of deputy paymaster general: the act of the 6th July, 1812, providing that to any army of the United States other than that in which the paymaster of the army shall serve, the President may appoint one deputy paymaster general, to be taken from the line of the army; and each deputy shall have a competent number of assistants.

4. *The office of Judge Advocate* is preserved. The act of the 11th of January, 1812, provides, that there shall be appointed to each division, a judge advocate.—The act of the 3d of March, 1815, neither expressly, nor by necessary implication, repeals that provision.

5. *The Chaplains* are preserved. The act of the 11th January, 1812, provides that there shall be appointed to each brigade, one chaplain. The act of the 3d of March, 1815, neither expressly, nor by necessary implication, repeals that provision.

6. *The Hospital Department* is not preserved. The act of the 3d of March, 1815, provides for regimental surgeons and surgeon's mates, and for such number of hospital surgeons and surgeon's mates, as the service may require, not exceeding five surgeons and fifteen mates, with one steward, and one wardmaster to each hospital. From this specific arrangement, it is necessarily implied, that the physician and surgeon general, the assistant apothecaries general, and all the hospital surgeons and surgeon's mates, garrison surgeons and surgeon's mates, except the above specified number, are to be discharged. The physician and surgeon general, and the apothecary general, were appointed, the better to superintend the hospital and medical establishment of the army of the United States, under the act of the 3d of March, 1813; and the act of the 30th of March, 1814, authorised the president to appoint so many assistant apothecaries as the service might, in his judgment, require. The occasion for the appointments under both acts has ceased; and the act of the 3d of

March, 1815, meant to provide a substitute for the whole department, according to the demands of the peace establishment.

7. *The Military Academy* is preserved. The act of the 3d of March, 1815 provides, that the corps of engineers, as at present established, shall be retained.—By the act of the 16th of March, 1802, ten cadets were assigned to the corps of engineers. By the act of the 29th of April, 1812, the cadets, whether of artillery, cavalry, riflemen, or infantry, were limited to the number of 250, who might be attached, by the president, as students to the military academy, but the act of the 2d of March, 1815, declares, that the regiment of light artillery shall have the same organization as is prescribed by the act passed the 12th of April, 1808; and by that act, two cadets are to be attached to each company. It is therefore, to be considered, that there are 250 cadets attached to the military academy, under the establishment of the act of the 29th of April, 1812, and 20 cadets attached to the regiment of light artillery.

Upon this analysis of the act of Congress for fixing the military peace establishment, the president wishes to receive any information which you think will tend to promote the public service, in reference to the following enquiries.

1. The best arrangements to adopt to the peace establishment—the ordnance department—the purchasing department—the pay department—and the military academy.

2. The arrangements best adapted to render the medical establishment competent to the garrison, as well as to the regimental service.

It is obvious, that considerable difficulty will arise, if the adjutant general's and the quarter master general's departments should be immediately and entirely abolished, and if the garrison surgeons should be immediately discharged. The president is desirous to execute the act of Congress, as far as it is practicable and safe, on the first of May next; but he is disposed to

take the latitude which the act allows, in cases that clearly require a continuance of the offices for the necessary public service. You will be pleased, therefore, to state——

1. Whether, in your judgment, the continuance of the office of adjutant and inspector general is necessary for the public service ?

2. Whether, in your judgment the continuance of any, and which of the offices in the quarter master's department, is necessary for the public service ?

3. Whether, in your judgment, the continuance of any, and which of the offices in the medical department, not expressly provided for by the law, is necessary for the public service ?

I have the honor to be, gentlemen, very respectfully,
your most obedient servant,

A. J. DALLAS,

Acting Secretary of War.

*Major Generals Brown, Jackson, Scott,
Gaines, Macomb and Ripley.*

Department of War, 12th May, 1815.

The acting secretary of war has the honor to submit to the president of the United States the following report:

That the act of congress, entitled "An act fixing the military peace establishment of the United States," passed on the 3d of March, 1815, provided, that after the corps constituting the peace establishment was formed and completed, the supernumerary officers, non-commissioned officers, musicians and privates, should be discharged from the service of the United States, from, and after the first day of May ensuing the date of the act, or as soon as circumstances might permit. But it was soon found impracticable to obtain from all the military districts the information which was requisite to do justice to the army, and to the nation, in reducing the military establishment from a force of thousand men, to a force of ten thousand men, so early as the first day of May. And it is obvious, that circumstances do not even yet permit the entire reduction.

contemplated by congress, with regard to the settlement of the numerous accounts depending in the quartermaster, commissary, and pay departments, and the medical care of the troops at the many military stations to which they must be apportioned.

That having, however, dilligently collected from every proper source of information, the necessary materials for deciding upon the various subjects involved in the execution of the act of congress; and having obtained from the board of general officers convened at Washington, the most valuable assistance, the acting secretary of war respectfully lays the result before the president of the United States, in the form of four general orders to be issued from this department :

No. 1. A general order, announcing the military divisions and departments of the United States; the corps and regiments constituting the military peace establishment; and the distribution and apportionment of the troops.

No. 2. A general order, announcing the army register for the peace establishment, including the officers provisionally retained in service, until circumstances shall permit their discharge.

No. 3. A general order, directing the supernumerary officers, noncommissioned officers, musicians and privates to be paid, and discharging them from the service of the United States on the 15th day of June next, or as soon thereafter as the payment can be completed; provided, 1st, that such officers of every rank, as may be necessary to supply vacancies created by resignations on the first organization of the corps and regiments for the peace establishment, shall be deemed to be in service for that purpose alone; and, 2d, that paymasters, quartermasters, commissaries and other officers, who have been charged with the disbursement of public money, shall be deemed to be in service for the single purpose of rendering their accounts for settlement, within a seasonable time.

No. 4. A general order, requiring the major generals to assume the command of their respective divisions,

and to proceed to form and distribute the corps and regiments for their respective commands, according to the system announced for the military peace establishment.

All which is respectfully submitted.

A. J. DALLAS,

Acting secretary of war.

The president of the United States,

APPROVED, May 15, 1815.

JAMES MADISON.

*Adjutant and Inspector General's Office,
May 17, 1815.*

GENERAL ORDERS.

In pursuance of the act of congress, entitled, "An act fixing the military peace establishment of the United States," approved the 3d of March, 1815, the president of the United States has judged proper that the military peace establishment shall consist of the following proportions of artillery, infantry, and riflemen; the corps of engineers being retained as at present established.

1. Of the corps of artillery, there shall be thirty two companies, or eight battalions, making 3,200 men.
2. Of the light artillery, there shall be ten companies, or one regiment, making 660 men.
3. Of the infantry, there shall be eighty companies, or eight regiments, making 5,440 men.
4. Of the riflemen, there shall be ten companies, or one regiment making 680 men. Total, 9,980.

And the president of the United States has further judged proper, that the United States be divided into two military divisions; and that each military division be subdivided into military departments, as follows:

The division of the north to comprize five military departments, to wit:

No. 1. New York, above the highlands, and Vermont.

No. 2. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut.

No. 3. New York, below the highlands, and that part of New Jersey which furnishes the first division of militia.

No. 4. Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and that part of New Jersey which furnishes the second division of militia.

No. 5. Ohio, and the territories of Michigan and Indiana.

The division of the south, to comprize four military departments, to wit :

No. 6. Virginia, North Carolina, and the District of Columbia.

No. 7. South Carolina and Georgia.

No. 8. Louisiana and the Mississippi territory.

No. 9. Tennessee, Kentucky, and the territories of Missouri and Illinois.

And the president of the United States has further judged proper, that the general distribution of the regiments and corps constituting the military peace establishment, shall be made in the following manner :

To the division of the north—

The second, third, fifth, and sixth regiments of infantry, forming two brigades.

Four battalions of the corps of artillery ; and the regiment of light artillery.

To the division of the south—

The first, fourth, seventh and eighth regiments of infantry, forming two brigades.

Four battalions of the corps of artillery ; and the regiment of riflemen.

And the president of the United States has further judged it proper, that a part of the several regiments and corps constituting the military peace establishment, shall be detailed and apportioned for the following named stations, and that the rest of the regiments and corps shall be disposed of as the major generals commanding divisions may hereafter direct.

In the division of the north—

For the posts and fortresses on the coast of New England,

The regiment of light artillery, ten companies.

Of the corps of artillery, four companies. Total 14.

For the harbor of New York, and its dependencies, of the corps of artillery, four companies.

For fort Mifflin, and its dependencies, of the corps of artillery, two companies.

For fort M·Henry, and its dependencies, of the corps of artillery, two companies.

For Sackett's Harbor, of the corps of artillery, one company.

For Plattsburgh, of the corps of artillery, one company.

For Niagara, of the corps of artillery, one company.

For fort Washington, on the Potomac, of the corps of artillery, one company.

For Detroit, and its dependencies. of infantry, ten companies, of riflemen, four companies. Total, 14.

In the division of the south—

For Norfolk harbor, and its dependencies, of the corps of artillery, three companies.

For forts Johnson and Hampton, N. C. of the corps of artillery, one company.

For Charleston harbor, and its dependencies, of the corps of artillery, four companies.

For Savannah, of the corps of artillery, one company.

For Mobile, of the corps of artillery, one company.

For Plaquemin, of the corps of artillery, one company.

For forts St. Charles, St. John, and Petite Coquile, of the corps of artillery, three companies.

For Natchitoches, of the corps of artillery, one company, of riflemen, two companies. Total, 3 companies.

For St. Louis. and its dependencies, of infantry, ten companies, of riflemen, four companies. Total, 14 companies.

For Chefuncta, of infantry, ten companies.

For the vicinity of Augusta, Geo. of infantry, ten companies.

And the president of the United States has further judged proper, that the noncommissioned officers, musicians and privates, of the several regiments and corps now in the service of the United States, whose term of service has not expired, shall be so arranged as to form and complete out of the same the noncommissioned officers, musicians and privates, constituting the military peace establishment, in the manner following, viz.

To form the regiment of light artillery, brigadier general Porter, there shall be mustered for selection, the light artillery proper, the 15th, 26th, 30th, 31st, 33d, 34th and 45th regiments of infantry.

To form the corps of artillery, there shall be mustered for selection, the corps of artillery proper, the regiment of dragoons, the 41st, 42d, and 43d regiments of infantry.

To form the regiments of infantry in the division of the north, there shall be mustered—

For the 2d regiment of infantry, colonel Brady, the 6th, 16th, 22d, 23d, and 32d regiments of infantry.

For the 3d regiment of infantry, colonel John Miller, the 1st, 17th, 19th, 24th, 28th, and 39th regiments of infantry.

For the 5th regiment of infantry, brigadier general Miller, 4th, 9th, 13th, 21st, 40th and 46th regiments of infantry.

For the 6th regiment of infantry, colonel Atkinson, the 11th, 25th, 27th, 29th, and 37th regiments of infantry.

To form the regiments of infantry and riflemen, in the division of the south—

For the 1st regiment of infantry, brigadier general Bissel, the 2d, 3d, 7th, and 44th regiments of infantry.

For the 4th regiment of infantry, colonel King, the 12th, 14th and 20th regiments of infantry.

For the 7th regiment of infantry, colonel M'Donald, the 8th, 10th, 36th and 38th regiments of infantry.

For the 8th regiment of infantry, colonel Nicholas, the 5th, 18th, and 35th regiments of infantry.

For the rifle regiment, brigadier general Smith, the 1st, 2d, 5d, and 4th rifle regiments.

And the president of the United States has further judged proper, that in addition to the provision for a general staff, which is specifically made by the act of congress, certain officers shall be detained, under the special authority given by the act, until circumstances will permit of their discharge, without material injury to the service: and that the following shall be the general staff:

- Two major generals, with two aids de camp, each.
 - Four brigadier generals, with one aid de camp, each.
 - An adjutant and inspector general, and two adjutant generals, to be provisionally retained.
 - Four brigade inspectors.
 - One quartermaster general and two deputy quartermasters general, to be provisionally retained.
 - Four brigade quartermasters.
 - An apothecary general and two assistant apothecaries, to be provisionally retained.
 - Five hospital surgeons.
 - Fifteen hospital surgeon's mates.
 - Two garrison surgeons, to be provisionally retained.
 - A paymaster of the army.
 - Two deputy paymasters general, and two assistant deputy paymasters, to be provisionally retained.
- The acts of congress establishing the ordnance department, the office of commissary general of purchases, and the military academy, remain in force, as well as certain acts authorizing the appointment of judge advocates and chaplains to the army.
- The organization and arrangements of the military peace establishment, thus made by the president of the United States, are published in general orders for the information and government of the army.
- By order of the secretary of war,

D. PARKER, *Adj. and Insp. Gen.*

ARMY REGISTER.

NAMES.	RANK.	Date of appointment.	Brevet & former commissions.	REMARKS.
Jacob Brown	Major Gen.	24th Jan. 1814.	11th Sept. 1814, maj. gen. brvt.	Div. of the north.
Andrew Jackson	do.	1st May	15th Aug. 1814, maj. gen. brvt.	Div. of the south.
Alexander Macomb	Brig. Gen.	24th Jan. 9th March	25th July, 1814, maj. gen. brvt.	
Edmund P. Gaines	do.	9th March	25th July, 1814, maj. gen. brvt.	
Winfield Scott	do.	9th March	25th July, 1814, maj. gen. brvt.	
Eleazer W. Ripley	do.	15th April	maj. gen. brvt.	
Daniel Parker, adjt. & insp. general	do.	22d Nov. 1814.	brig. gen. brevt.	} prov. retained
Robert Butler, adjutant general	do.	5th March.	colonel do	
Arthur P. Hayne,	do.	12th April.	do	} Div. of south
Robert Swartwout, qr. master general	do.	21st March 1813	brig gen do	} Div. of north
S. Champlain, dep. quar. master general	do.	1st March	major do	} Div. of south
Samuel Brown,	do.	26th March	do	} Div. of north
Four brigade inspectors and four brigade				
qr. masters, to be taken from the line.				

<i>Ordnance Department.</i>		2d July, 1812.	Colonel brevet.
Decius Wadsworth, colonel	captain	18th June	do.
George Bounford, lieutenant	colonel	11th Sept.	do.
John Morton,	captain	4th Dec.	do.
Abraham B. Woolley,	do.	31st Dec.	do.
John H. Margart,	do.	5th Aug. 1813.	do.
James Daliby,	do.	5th Aug.	do.
Thomas L. Campbell,	do.	5th Aug.	do.
Edwin Tyler,	do.	5th Aug.	do.
R. D. Richardson,	do.	5th Aug.	do.
George Talcott, jr.	do.	5th Aug.	do.
J. H. Rees,	do.	16th June 1814.	do.
William Wade,	1st lieutenant	12th Mar. 1813.	1st lieutenant. brevet.
Rufus L. Baker,	do.	12th Mar.	do.
William C. Lyman,	do.	19th Apr.	do.
George Larned,	do.	19th Apr.	do.
Nehemiah Baden,	do.	6th Aug.	do.
Christopher Keiser,	do.	6th Aug.	do.
Thomas L. Hawkins,	do.	6th Aug.	do.
James Baker,	do.	6th Aug.	do.
J. Livingston,	do.	5th Mar.	do.
James Wilson,	2d lieutenant	26th Dec. 1814.	2d lieutenant. brevet.
Ebenezer M'Donald,	do.	do.	do.
R. C. Pomeroy,	do.	do.	do.

Charles F. Morton,	do.	2d Mar. 1815.	do.
Wm. F. Rigal,	3d lieutenant	do.	3d lieut. brevet.
James Simonson,	do.	do.	do.
John Hills,	do.	do.	do.
Simon Willard,	do.	do.	do.
John Symington,	do.	do.	do.
<i>Medical Department.</i>			
Francis Le Baron,	apothecary general	11th June, 1813.	} Prov. retained.
Christopher Backus,	assistant apothecary	12th Aug. 1814.	
James Cutbush,	do.	12th Aug.	
David C. Kerr,	hospital surgeon	30th April 1812.	
Benjamin Waterhouse,	do.	29th June 1813.	
James C. Bronaugh,	do.	15th April 1814.	
Joseph Lovell,	do.	30th June	
Arnold Elzey,	do.	17th May 1815.	
James Stevenson,	hospital surgeon's mate	27th May 1812.	
J. B. Whiteridge.	do.	30th Mar. 1813.	
Edward Purcell,	do.	2d May	
William W. Hazard,	do.	4th May	
William Jones,	do.	2d July	
Joseph Wallace,	do.	15th July	
William Williams,	do.	1st Aug.	
William Stewart,	do.	30th Mar. 1814.	
William Marshall,	do.	30th Mar.	

Joseph Eaton,	do.	15th April	Provisionally retained.
Robert Archer,	do.	13th May	do.
Hugh F. Rose,	do.	21st May	do. Fort Mifflin
James Trimble,	do.	17th July	do. Natchitoches
Thomas Russell,	do.	21st July	do. Norfolk
Donaldson Yates,	do.	16th Aug.	do. Fort Stoddert
Foster Swift,	garrison surgeon	18th Feb. 1814.	do. Fort Osage
James H. M'Culloch,	do.	17th July	do. New York
John F. Heileman,	garrison surgeon's mate	2d June, 1802.	do. New London
Charles Slocum,	do.	25th Mar. 1807.	do. Detroit
Lemuel B. Clark,	do.	4th Jan'y 1808.	do. Vincennes
William T. Davidson,	do.	15th June, 1808.	do.
Jonathan S. Cool,	do.	8th Feb'y 1811.	
Alexander Wolcott,	do.	25th Mar. 1812.	
William Turner,	do.	29th Sept. 1812.	
William M. Scott,	do.	8th April 1814.	
W. C. Lane,	do.	15th Sept.	
<i>Pay Department.</i>			
Robert Brent,	paymaster of the army	1st July 1808.	} Northern division } Prov. retained } Southern division } Prov. retained
Washington Lee,	deputy do. general	13th April 1813.	
Jonathan Bell,	assistant dep. do. general	1st Aug. 1814.	
Ambrose Whitlock,	dep. pay gen. assist. dep. do.	17th May 1815.	

Purchasing Department.
Callender Irvine, com. gen. of purchases
assist. com.

storekeeper
Judge Advocates.

James T. Dent,
Henry Wheaton.

Chaplains.

Military Academy

Sen. officer of eng. superintend. mil. acad.
Jared Mansfield, pro. nat. & exper. phil.
D. B. Douglass, assist. do. do.
Andrew Ellicott, professor mathematics
J. Wright, assist. do.
Alden Partridge, prof. art engineering
William Evelyth, assistant do.
Samuel Walsh, surgeon
Adam Empie, chaplain & prof. ethics
Claudius Beraud, teacher French language
C. E. Zoeller, teacher of drawing
Pere Thomas, sword master

8th Aug. 1812.

Prov. retained

19th July 1813.
6th Aug.

Southern division
Northern division

7th Oct. 1812.

1st Sept. 1813.

1st Sept. 1813.

9th Aug. 1813.

3d Jan. 1815.

CORPS OF ENGINEERS.

*Names and Rank.**Colonel.*

Jos. G. Swift, 31 July, 1812

*Lieutenant Colonel.*Walker K. Armstead,
31 July, 1812*Majors.*

Geo. Bomford, 6 July 1812.

Wm. M^rRee, 31 do. 1812.*Captains.*

Chas. Gratiot 23 Feb. 1808

A. Partridge 23 July 1810

J. G. Totten 31 do. 1812

Saml. Babcock 20 Sept. 1812

Sylv. Thayer 13 Oct. 1813

Wm. Cuthbush 17 Sept. 1814

First Lieutenants.

Ed. De Russey 6 July 1814

Fred^rk Lewis 20 Sept. 1812

Jas. Gasler 17 March 1813

T. W. Maurice 13 Oct. do.

Hipolite Dumas 20 Feb. 1814

D. B. Douglass 17 Sept. do.

Second Lieutenants.

Geo. Trescott 16 Oct. 1813

J. L. Smith 16 do. do.

Horace C. Story 11 Mar. 1814

John Wright 30 do. do.

S. H. Long 12 Dec. 1814

H^y Middleton 2 Mar. 1815.*Brevets & former Com-
missions.*B. gen. 19 Feb. 1814
brevetLt. col. 22 Dec. 1814
brevet

Ord. 18 June 1812

Col. 15 Aug. 1812 brev.
Prof. mil. acad.Lt. col. 11 Sept. 1814
brevet

Maj. 20 Feb. 1814 brev.

Capt. 11 Sept. 1814
brevet

Cap. 17 Sep. 1814 brev.

1st lt. 11 Sept. 1814
brevet1st lt. 17 Sept. 1814
brevet

REGIMENT OF LIGHT ARTILLERY,

Colonel.

Moses Porter 12 March 1812

Lieutenant Colonel.

J. R. Fenwick 2 Dec. 1811

Majors.

Abram Eustis 15 March 1810

B. gen. 10 Sept. 1813
brevetCol. staff & brevet 18th
March 1813

Lt cl 10 Sep 1813 brev.

Captains.

Aw M'Dowell 1 April 1812

Nathan Towson 6 July do.

Saml. D. Harris 3 do.

Arthur W. Thornton 20 Jan.

1813

Gabriel H. Manigault 1 Aug.

1813

Arms Irvine 1 Oct. do.

Fras. Stribling 1 Nov. do.

John S. Peyton 15 Dec. do.

Henry K. Craig 23 do.

John R. Bell 10 Oct. 1814

First Lieutenants.

Wm. F. Hobart 5 April 1813

Geo. W. Hight 10 Aug. do.

G. N. Morris 23 Oct. do.

J. H. Wilkins 3 Dec. do.

John Gates jr. 3 do. do.

Nels. Freeland 21 Feb. 1814

Wm. Lyman 10 June do.

J. T. M'Kanney 31 Aug. do.

S. M. Mackay 10 Oct. do.

Fred. Kinloch 10 do. do.

Second Lieutenants.

G. E. Wells 2 Oct. 1813

E. Lyon 22 do. do.

S. Washburn 13 Dec. do.

H. Stanton 7 March 1814

R. W. Field 17 do. do.

P. Drane 17 do. do.

W. Smith 12 May do.

H. F. Evans 2 June do.

R. F. Massie 31 Aug. do.

W. Wells 10 Oct. do.

Surgeon.

Lewis Dunham 12th Decr. 1814

Surgeon's Mate.

W. H. Livingston, 26th July,

1814

Lt cl brev 15 Aug 1814

Maj brev. 15 Aug. 1814

Maj. staff 9 Sept. 1814

Col. staff 28 Oct. 1814

Maj. staff 27 July 1814

Maj. staff 17 July 1814

Capt staff 12 July 1813

CORPS OF ARTILLERY.

Lieutenant Colonels.

G. E. Mitchell 3 March 1813

James House 3 do.

Wm. Lindsay 12 do.

Wm. Macrea 19 April 1813

Majors.

G. Armistead 3 March 1813

Jas. B. Many 5 May

J. Hindman 26 June

W. H. Overton 21 Feb. 1814

*Captains.*Charles Wollstonecraft 15 Mar.
1805

J. B. Walbach 31 Jan. 1806

Wm. Wilson 3 May 1808

E. Humphreys 9 Jan. 1809

Jas. Reed 12 March 1812

J. B. Crane 6 July

Roger Jones 6 do.

J. H. Boyle 6 do.

A. S. Brooks 6 do.

S. B. Archer 6 do.

J. B. P'on 6 do.

Th. Biddle jr. 6 do.

J. T. B. Romaine 6 do.

Wm. O. Allen 6 do.

Th. Murray 10 Feb. 1813

Wm. Gates 3 March do.

A. C. W. Fanning 13 Mar. do.

G. H. Richards 13 do.

I. Roach jr. 13 April do.

J. F. Heilman 5 May do.

Th. Bennet 20 June do.

A. W. Odell 20 do.

Rt G. Hite 26 June do.

S. Churchill 15 Aug. do.

J. D. Hawell 15 do.

B. K. Pierce 1 Oct. do.

John Biddle 1 do.

Col. bvt 15 May 1814

Lt col bvt 12 Sept 1814

Lt col bvt 15 Aug do.

Major brevet 15 March
1185

Col staff Aug 6 1803

Maj bvt 11 Nov do

Maj brev 13 Nov. do

Lt col bvt 17 Sept 1814

Maj bvt 5 May do.

Maj bvt 11 Sept do

Maj bvt 27 April 1815

Maj bvt 15 Aug 1814

Maj staff 11 Feb 1815

Maj bvt 15 Aug 1814

Maj bvt 25 July 1814

Maj staff 6 Aug 1813

Maj staff 29 Aug do

G. P. Peters 21 Feb. 1814	Maj staff 29 Aug 1813
H. H. Villard 14 July do	
H. J. Blake 1 Sept. do	
Nath'l N. Hall 30 do	Maj staff 25 April 1814
M. P. Lomax 17 Nov. do	Maj staff 3 March do
<i>First Lieutenants.</i>	
Milo Mason 20 Feb. 1812	
C. Van De Venter 12 March 1815	Maj staff 26 Mar 1814
J. L. Tracy 6 July do	
Wm. M. Reed do do	
Harold Smyth do do	Capt brev 11 Sept 1814
Wm. I. Cowan do do	Maj staff 17 Oct do
John Fontane do do	
L. Brown do do	
Luther Scott do do	Capt brev 20 Feb 1815
R. R. Ruffin do do	
J. H. Daring do do	
J. Erving jr. 16 Aug. do	Maj staff April 1811
A. L. Sands 10 Feb. 1813	
Richard A. Zantzinger 13 Mar 1815	Capt brev 13 Aug 1814
T. Randall 13 March do	Capt brev 1 Dec 1814
W. R. Duncan do do	
Chester Root do do	Capt brev 11 Sept do
J. L. Edwards 28 do	
Gus. Loomis 5 May do	Capt staff 19 Ap'l 1813
P. D. Spencer 13 do	Maj staff 17 Oct 1814
J. Mountford 20 do	Capt brev 11 Sept do
F. Whiting 20 June do	
Edwin Sharp 26 do	
G. Dearborn 1 Oct. do	
Felix Ansart 1 do	
Jacob Warley 15 Dec. do	
S. Spotts 22 May 1814	
L. Whiting 14 June 1814	
B. B. White 29 July 1814	
Lewis Morgan 17 Nov. 1814	
W. H. Nicoll 22 do	
John Ruffin 6 Jan. 1815	

Second Lieutenants.

J. W. Kincaid	6 July 1812	
Robert Groode	6 do.	
Francis O. Byrd	6 July 1812	1st lt brvt 20 Feb 1815
J. J. Cromwell	23 Nov. 1812	1st lt brvt 11 Sep 14
J. W. Lent jr.	12 March 1813	at. ord.
Th. Chrystie	18 do.	Maj staff 18 Mar 1813
S. Rockwell	20 March 1813	
C. D. Cooper	16 April 1813	
Rich. Bache	17 April 1813	1st lt brvt 17 April 13
P. I. Nevill	20 do.	
M. S. Massey	13 May 1813	
F. P. Woolsey	20 do.	
Ch. Anthony	20 do.	
W. M'Clintock	20 June 1813	
L. H. Osgood	20 do.	
P. Melendy	29 do.	
E. Kirby	31 July 1813	
R. M. Kirby	1 Oct. 1813	Capt brvt 17 Sept 1814
H. M. Campbell	12 Oct. 1813	do 25 July do
Robert Beall	14 Nov. 1813	
W. I. Sever	31 Dec. 1813	
I. G. Bostwick	13 Feb. 1814	
John A. Dix	8 March 1814	
R. Lyman	11 do.	
Wm. B. Howell	17 do.	
I. L. Gardner	28 do.	
Jas. C. Pickett	19 April 1814	
T. I. Harrison	do.	
I. Watmaugh	do.	1st lt brvt 15 Aug 1814
C. Newkirk	do.	
G. W. Gardiner	1 May 1814	
C. S. Merchant	do.	
Nath'l G. Dana	do.	
John Monroe	do.	
J. S. Allanson	do.	
L. G. De Russy	do.	
Thomas Childs	do.	
Sam'l L. Dana	do.	
Jac. Schmucke	do.	1st lt brvt 25 July 1814

Thos. V. Earle	1 do	
Charles Mellon	1 do	
George H. Britt	1 do	at. ord.
James Hall	1 do	at. ord.
John S. Pierce	1 do	
Allen Lowd	1 do	
G. S. Wilkins	3 do	
James Scallan	19 do	
P. A. Dennis	20 do	
J. Ripley	1 June 1814	
John Grayson	2 do	
D. Turner	21 July 1814	
Isaac E. Craig	do	
C. M. Thruston	do	
H. W. Fitshugh	do	
Jacob Davis	do	
T. T. Stephenson	do	at. ord.
E. Humphrey	do	
S. Whetmore	do	
T. B. Guy	22 do	
D. S. Andrews	do	
N. G. Wilkinson	do	
Joseph Buckley	do	at. ord.
A. C. Towler	30 Sept. 1814	
Robert Call	3 Nov. 1814	
<i>Third Lieutenants.</i>		
R. H. Lee	17 March 1814	1st Lt brvt 17 Sept 1814
Rice L. Stuart	15 July 1814	
W. L. Booth	21 do	
T. J. Baird	do	
J. Parkhurst	do	
R. L. Armstrong	do	
James Badolet	do	
G. W. Gardner	do	
B. S. A. Lowe	do	
Th. R. Broome	do	
Patrick Galt	16 Sept. 1814	
Upton S. Frazer	1 Oct.	
N. G. Pendleton	22 Nov.	
B. H. Rutledge	12 Dec.	

John R. Sloo	2 March 1815
Hen. Griswold	do
James Monroe	do
Robt C. Brent	do
Abr. Wendell	do
G. A. Washington	do
Robert J. Scott	do
Alon Brewer	do
F. N. Berrier	do
George Cooper	do
Henry Smith	do
A. F. Cochrane	do
M. F. Van De Venter	do
Milo Johnson	do
Aaron G. Gano	do
Rt M. Forsyth	do
Thomas W. Lendrum	do
Henry R. Dulany	do

*FIRST INFANTRY.**Colonel.*

Dan Bissel 15 Aug. 12	brig gen brevet 9 March 1814
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Lieutenant Colonel.

George Croghan 21 Feb. 14	brevet 2 August 1813
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Major.

Tho. S. Jesup 6 April 14	col brevet 25 July 1814
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Captains.

Isaac L. Baker 5 April 13	
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Wm. O. Butler 5 do	
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John Jones 29 July 13	
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James Davis 29 do	
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Henry Chotard 9 Oct. 13	
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maj staff 17 Oct 1814

Wm. Laval 15 Feb. 14	
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Antole Peychaud 11 Mar. 14	
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Ferd. L. Amelung 11 March 14	
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Wm. Christian 31 May 14	
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John Read 15 July 14	
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First Lieutenants.

Sam'l Farrow, jr. 1 Aug 13	
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Thos. Daggett 7 Sept 13	
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John C. Kouns 20 Feb 14
 Jn P. Thibault 11 March 14
 Wm. Gibbs do.
 John Tarrant 15 April 14
 Archimedes Donoho 15 April 14
 Tilman Turner 1 May 14
 Rich. K. Call 15 July 14
 Guy Smith 1 Sept 14

Second Lieutenants.

George Watts 1 Aug. 13
 Robert H Briggs 1 do
 Robert L Coomb 4 Aug 1813
 R B Hyde 18 Feb 1814
 Geo W Boyd 9 March 1814
 W Christie 9 do
 Charles Cooper 1 May 1814
 Treuman Cross 1 do
 Samuel Huston 20 May 1814
 Th C. Hindman 20 do

Surgeon.

Edward Scull 8 April 1814

Surgeon's Mates.

W. S. Madison 12 Dec 1812
 Henry Hield 23 April 1814

1st Lt brvt 5 July 1814

SECOND INFANTRY.

Colonel.

Hugh Brady 6 July 1812

Lieutenant Colonel.

Ninian Pinkney 15 April 1814 Col staff Dec 1 1813

Major.

Hen Leavenworth 15 Aug 1813 Col brvt 25 July 1814

Captain.

John Sproul 6 July 1812

Maj brevt 25 July 1814

Stephen W Kearney 1 Ap 1813

Pet B Van Beuren 30 Apr 1813

Abner P Spencer 14 Mar 1814

Hen Shell 21 March 1814

Alex R Thompson 1 May 1814

G D Smith 30 June 1814

Maj brvt 25 July 1814

Richard Goodell, 9 July,	Maj brev. 25 July, 1814
Wm. J. Worth, 19 August,	
Henry Whiting, 1 Sept.	
<i>First Lieutenants.</i>	
Chs. J. Nourse, 7 May, 1812.	Major, staff, 14 Sep.
W. Browning, 15 Oct. 1813.	Capt. brevet, 31 Oct.
Wm. Hoffman, 11 Nov.	
B. A. Boynton, 25 do.	
Owen Ranson, 19 April, 1814.	
John Kirby, 19 May.	
James Young, 30 June.	
Wm. G. Belknap, 19 Aug.	
S. B. Briswold, 1 Sep.	
Walter Bicker, jr. 1 do.	
<i>Second Lieutenants.</i>	
N. N. Robinson, 12 May, 1813.	
James Palmer, 20 Dec.	1st lt. brevet, 5 Aug.
John Wood, 1 May, 1814.	
Jos. Hopkins, 2 do.	
R. M. Harrison, 30 June.	
Th. Chittenden, 10 July.	
Seth Johnson, 20 Aug.	
Joshua Brant, 1 Oct.	
John Clitz, 2 do.	1st lt. brevet, 17 Sept
Stedman V. Wyck, 11 Feb. 1815	
<i>Surgeon.</i>	
Franklin Bache	
<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i>	
W. W. Southall, 20 July, 1813.	
S. Edmonds, 18 April, 1814.	
THIRD INFANTRY.	
<i>Colonel.</i>	
John Miller, 6 July, 1812	Col. staff, 12 Apr 1814
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i>	
Matthew Arbuckle, 9 Mar 1814	
<i>Major.</i>	
Chas. K. Gardner 26 June 1813.	
<i>Captains.</i>	
Wm. Taylor, 6 July, 1812.	col staff 12 April 1814
Wm. J. Adair, do.	

Robert Desha, 6 July, 1813.	Maj. brevet, 4 Aug.
John T. Chunn, do.	Maj. brevet, 15 do.
Wm. Whistler, 31 Dec.	
Geo. Stockton, 20 May, 1813	
Th. L. Butler, do.	
Hez. Bradley, 19 April, 1814.	
Lewis Bissel, 30 June.	
W. M'Donald, 11 Nov.	Maj. brevet, 25 July.
<i>First Lieutenants.</i>	
Jas. Hackley, jr. 13 March 1813	
Th. Mountjoy, do.	
John Garland, 31 do.	
Reasin H. Gist, 30 June.	
Robt. Sturgus, 9 March, 1814.	
Daniel Curtis, 15 April.	
Hen. Conway, 19 do.	
Lawr. Talliaferro, 30 June.	
Yurley F. Thomas, do.	
Collin M'Cloud, 4 Aug.	
<i>Second Lieutenants.</i>	
Asher Phillips, 20 May, 1813.	
Wm. Baylor, 15 Aug.	
Jon. B. Clarke, 9 April, 1814.	
Ed. E. Brooks, 1 May.	
Robert Davis, 30 June.	
Raimy G. Saunders, 14 July.	
Cy Saunders, do.	
Jon. Saunders, do.	
Gab. J. Floyd, 1 Oct.	
Charles Cisna, 12 do.	
<i>Surgeon.</i>	
A. G. Goodlet, 10 Feb. 1812.	
<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i>	
James B. Hill, 6 July, 1812.	
Rich. E. Hall, 11 March, 1814.	

FOURTH INFANTRY.

Colonel.

Wm. King, 21 Feb. 1814.	Col. staff, 18 July 1813
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i>	
Duncan L. Clinch, 4 Aug. 1813.	

Major.

Geo. M. Brook, 1 May, 1814.

Col brevet 17 Sept 1814

Captains.

Jas. Bankhead, 18 June, 1808.

Col. staff, 9 Sept. 1813,
Maj brv 15 Aug. do

Enos Cutler, 3 Sept. 1810.

Maj. staff 18 Mar 1813
brevet 1 May 1814.
Maj brevet 15 May.

James Dinkin, 6 Feb. 1811

A. Cummings, 1 Nov do

T. M. Nelson, 6 July 1812.

John A. Burd, 6 do do

Th. Sangster, 6 do do

A. L. Madison, 6 do

Bernard Peyton, 16 April 1813

Reub. Gilder, 26 June, do

Major brevet, 19 July.
Major brevet, 31 Oct.*First Lieutenants.*

F. S. Belton, 20 Jan. 1813.

John Beckett, 13 Mar do

Wm. F. Pendleton, 30 May, do

Wm. Nelson, 7 June, do

Oth W. Callis, 26 do do

J. M'Gavock, jr. 24 do 1814.

James H. Gale, 29 do do

J. M. Glassell, 12 July, do

Wm. Merrick, 30 Sept. do

E. B. Randolph, 31 Dec do

Major staff, 18 Oct

Second Lieutenants.

H. K. Mullen, 13 May, 1813.

F. H. Lissenhoff. 1 Aug. do

C. Comegys, jr. Nov. do

John Strother, 20 Nov. do

F. L. Dade, 31 Jan. 1814.

Philip Wager, 17 Mar do

J. Shommo, 24 do do

C. Wright, 19 April, do

J. P. Dieterich, 14 June, do

Pat. O'Fling, 11 Feb. 1813.

1st Lt brevet 5 Feb 1814

1st Lt brvt 17 Sept do

Surgeon.

M. C. Buck, 2 July, 1813.

Surgeon's Mates.

W. J. Cocke, 15 April, 1814.

James Bates, 27 do do

*FIFTH INFANTRY.**Colonel.*

James Miller, 9 March, 1814.

Lieutenant Colonel.

Jos. L. Smith, 12 March, 1814.

Major.

J. M'Neal, jr. 15 August do

Captains.

Josiah H. Vose, 6 July, 1812.

S. Burbank, 13 Mar 1813

Geo. Bender, 13 May do

M. Marston, 26 June, do

W. L. Foster, 15 Oct. do

Peter Pelham, 28 Feb. 1814.

J. Fowl, jr. 10 June do

E. Childs, 20 July do

David Perry, 1 Sep. do

James Pratt, 30 do do

First Lieutenants.

H. Whiting, 20 Aug 1811

Eliphalet Ripley, 30 April 1813

I. Plymton, 31 July do

D. Chandler, 15 Oct do

J. Cilly, 7 March 1814

J. Ingersoll, 1 June do

Otis Fisher, 20 July do

Jos. Gleason, 25 do do

J. W. Holding, 31 do do

B. F. Larned, 4 Aug. 1814

Second Lieutenants.

Nathan Clark, 19 May, 1813

Saml. Keeler, 31 Jan. 1814.

Saml. Robinson, 1 May, do

J. Craig, 23 June, do

G. H. Balding, 25 July, do

J. K. Jacobs, 1 Sept. do

G. W. Jacobs, 1 Sept. do

B gen brvt 25 July 1814

Col brevet 25 July do

Maj brevet 4 Aug do

Maj brevet 25 July do

Maj brevet 15 Aug do

Capt brevet 25 July do

Capt brevet 15 July do

Capt brevet 15 Aug do

Capt brevet 25 Aug 1814

Arnold B. Drake, 13 Sept 1814
 P. R. Green, 1 Oct. do
 C. Blake, 31 Oct. do

Surgeon.

Sylvester Day, 13 March 1813

Surgeon's Mates

Elsh. L. Allen, 21 July, do

J. P. Russell, 25 May, 1814.

SIXTH INFANTRY.*Colonel.*

H. Atkinson, 15 April 1814

Lieutenant Colonel.

J. Snelling, 21 February do

Major.

John E. Wool, 13 April 1813

Captains.

Th. Stockton, 10 Sept. 1812

Wm. S. Foster 13 March 1813

John B. Murdoch, 15 April do

John Bliss, 13 May, do

B. Watson, 15 Aug. do

Danl. Ketchum, 30 Sept do

Edwd. White, 14 March 1814

Th. S. Seymour, 25 July do

D. Crawford, 17 Sept do

Newman S. Clarke, 1 Oct do

First Lieutenants.

Wm. Hale, 15 Aug. 1813

Ephraim Shayler 15 do

Geo. M'Chain, 30 Sept. do

Fred'k A. Sawyer, 12 Dec do

J. P. Livingston 19 do

Saml Tappan, 14 June 1814

Alphonso Wetmore, 9 July do

Hen. De Witt, 25 do

Th. Staniford, 2 Sept. do

Delafayette Wilcox 2 Oct do

Second Lieutenants.

Talcott Patchin, 4 March do

Sam'l Holcomb, 1 May do

Th. Tupper, 2 do

Col staff 25 April 1813

Col staff 12 April 1814

Lt col brvt 11 Sept do

Maj brev. 15 April do

Maj brevet 15 July do

Maj bvt 25 July do

Capt staff 28 Ap'l 1813

Maj bvt 25 July 1814

Maj bvt 25 July do

Capt brev 25 July do

Capt brevet 25 July do

Caleb B. Campbell, 2 May do
 Hazen Bedel, 15 June do
 P. Andrews, 2 July do
 H. Webster, 25 do do
 Benj. Fitch, 25 do do
 Jacob Brown, 1 Sept do
 Ezra Dean, 1 Oct. do

Surgeon.

Th. G. Mower, 30 June do

Surgeon's Mates.

Chas. Loring, 20 May, 1813.

Wm. Sterne, 11 March, 1814.

SEVENTH INFANTRY.

Colonel.

Jas. M'Donald 17 Sept. 14

Lieutenant Colonel.

Wm. R. Boote 13 Dec. 13

Major.

Dan'l Appling 15 April 1814

Captains.

John Machesney 10 June 1809

Rd Whartonby 3 May 1810

Zach. Taylor 30 Nov.

W. Chisholm 6 July 1812

Ed. B. Duvall 4 Aug. 1813

Rich. H. Bell 15 do

Geo. Vashon 29 Nov.

J. Robertson 21 Feb. 1814

Elijah Montgomery 1 May

J. S. Allison 25 June

First Lieutenants.

George Birch 1 Nov. 1811

J. H. Mallory 5 May 1813

Wm. Bee jr. 14 Aug. 1813

Wm. Irvine do.

J. J. Clinch 15 do.

John Hays 9 April 1814

S. W. Prestman 1 May

T. Blackstone 15 do

A. Ross 9 June

Col staff Aug 6 1813

Lt col bvt 30 May 1814

and col bvt 11 Sep do

Maj bvt 21 March do

Maj bvt 1 May do

Maj bvt 5 Sept 1812.

J. B. Taylor 1 Aug.
Second Lieutenants.
 G. R. Bridges 24 March 1813
 F. S. Gray 2 May
 J. W. Allston 30 June
 H. L. Oneale 11 July
 R. H. Goodwyn 24 do
 George Brent 1 Aug.
 F. E. Hedges 13 do
 J. Leftwich do
 R. W. Scott 1 Oct.
 Lewis Lawshe do

Surgeon.

Thos. Lawson 21 May 1813
Surgeon's Mates.
 R. C. Walmsey 1 July 1813
 Asahel Hall 19 Sept.

EIGHTH INFANTRY.

Colonel.

R. C. Nicholas 4 Sept. 1814

Lieutenant Colonel.

W. A. Trimble 30 Nov. 1814

Major.

W. Lawrence 19 April 1814

Captains.

J. Dorman 9 Nov. 1811

Daniel Baker 12 March 1812

White Youngs 6 July

C. Larrabee 15 Sept.

W. Davenport 28 do

Willis Foulk 20 June 1813

Mangle M. Quackenbos 7 Jan.

L. Austin 21 April

G. H. Grosvenor do

John Greene 25 Sept.

First Lieutenants.

David Riddle 13 March 1813

A. Goodwyn jr. 13 May

J. Culbertson 1 Oct.

Lt cl bvt 17 Sept 1814

Lt cl bvt 15 do do

Maj bvt 28 June do

Maj bvt 15 April do

Maj bvt 11 Sept do

Maj staff 9 Nov do

Maj bvt 5 July do

Maj bvt 17 Sept do

Chs. B. Hopkins 5 Sept 1814	
Charles Fisler 11 Nov.	
D. Frazer 31 Dec.	Capt bvt 4 July 1814
Th. Wright 17 March 1814	
Wm. Ligon 30 do	
John R. Guy 3 May	
Saml. Brady 1 Oct.	
<i>Second Lieutenants.</i>	
J. B. Stewart 30 April 1813	1st lt brevet
Henry Brown 30 Sept.	
Luther Hand do	
Thomas Hunt 9 March 1814	
Hector Burns 1 April	
Floreat Meline 30 May	
Nath. Young 2 June	
G. R. Horter 13 do	
John Brady 25 Sept.	1st lt bvt 5 Feb 1815
M. Thomas 17 Dec.	
<i>Surgeon.</i>	
P. Woodbury 30 March 1814	
<i>Surgeon's Mates.</i>	
W. Beaumont 2 Dec. 1812	
Clajon Reily 22 March 1813	

RIFLE REGIMENT.

<i>Colonel.</i>	
Th. A. Smith 6 July 1812	Brig gen bvt 24 Jan 1814
<i>Lieutenant Colonel.</i>	
W. S. Hamilton 21 Feb. 1814	
<i>Major.</i>	
Talbot Chambers 21 Feb. do	Lt col bvt 17 Sept do
<i>Captains.</i>	
Willoughby Morgan 6 July 12	Maj bvt 26 June 1813
Joseph Selden 6 do do	Maj bvt 21 Feb 14 lt cl bvt 1 May 1815
Wm. Bradford 6 do do	Maj bvt 20 Aug 1814
Jos. Keane 17 March 1814	
Benj. Birdsall do do	
Jno. O'Fallan do do	Maj bvt 15 Aug do
Hen. V. Swearingen 11 May do	
Edmund Shipp 26 do do	

W. L. Dufphe 12 Aug. 1814
 C. A. Trimble 20 do do

First Lieutenants.

Louis Laval 28 July 1812
 J. Calhoun jr. 24 Jan. 1814
 J. H. Ballard 17 March do
 E. I. Langham do do
 Lewellen Hickman do do
 Stoughton Gantt do do
 J. M^o Gunnegle 28 April do
 David B. Stith 1 Sept. do
 Sam. V. Hamilton 17 do
 Jno. Heddelson 30 do do

Second Lieutenants.

W. Armstrong 24 Jan. do
 W. J. Gordon 17 Mar. do
 Th. Griffith do do
 John Hollingsworth 25 do
 Bennet Riley 15 April do
 W. N. Bryan 25 do do
 W. Markle 29 do do
 James S. Gray 11 May do
 Chs. L. Harrison 26 do do
 Overton W. Crockett 30 Sept do

Surgeon.

Lewis L. Near 17 Mar. do

Surgeon's Mates.

Sam'l P. Hugo 12 Mar. 1812
 V. H. Henning 20 April 1814

By order of the Secretary of War,

DANIEL PARKER,

Adjutant and Inspector General.

Adjt. & Insp. Gen's. Office, }
 May 17, 1815. }

(C.)

TREATY OF PEACE AND AMITY
BETWEEN
HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY
AND
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

His Britannic Majesty and the United States of America, desirous of terminating the war which has unhappily subsisted between the two countries, and of restoring upon principles of perfect reciprocity, peace, friendship, and good understanding between them, have, for that purpose, appointed their respective plenipotentiaries, that is to say : His Britannic Majesty, on his part, has appointed the right honorable James Lord Gambier, late admiral of the white, now admiral of the red squadron of his majesty's fleet, Henry Goulburn, Esq. a member of the Imperial Parliament, and Under Secretary of State, and William Adams, Esquire, Doctor of Civil Laws : And the President of the U. States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, has appointed John Quincy Adams, James A. Bayard, Henry Clay, Jonathan Russel, and Albert Gallatin citizens of the United States, who, after a reciprocal communication of their respective full powers, have agreed upon the following articles :

ARTICLE THE FIRST.

There shall be a firm and universal Peace between His Britannic Majesty and the United States, and between their respective countries, territories, cities, towns, and people, of every degree, without exception of places or persons. All hostilities, both by sea and land, shall cease as soon as this Treaty shall have

been ratified by both parties, as hereinafter mentioned. All territory, places, and possessions whatsoever, taken from either party by the other, during the war, or which may be taken after the signing of this treaty, excepting only the islands hereinafter mentioned, shall be restored without delay, and without causing any destruction, or carrying away any of the artillery or other public property originally captured in the said forts or places, and which shall remain therein upon the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, or any slaves or other private property. And all archives, records, deeds and papers, either of a public nature, or belonging to private persons, which, in the course of the war, may have fallen into the hands of the officers of either party, shall be, as far as may be practicable, forthwith restored to the proper authorities and persons to whom they respectively belong. Such of the Islands in the bay of Passamaquoddy as are claimed by both parties, shall remain in possession of the party in whose occupation they may be at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, until the decision respecting the title to the said islands shall have been made in conformity with the fourth article of this treaty. No disposition made by this treaty, as to such possession of the islands and territories claimed by both parties, shall, in any manner whatever, be construed to affect the right of either.

ARTICLE THE SECOND.

Immediately after the ratifications of this treaty by both parties, as hereinafter mentioned, orders shall be sent to the armies, squadrons, officers, subjects and citizens, of the two powers to cease from all hostilities. And to prevent all causes of complaint which might arise on account of the prizes which may be taken at sea after the said ratifications of this treaty, it is reciprocally agreed, that all vessels and effects which may be taken after the space of twelve days from the said ratifications, upon all parts of the coast of North America, from the latitude of twenty two-degrees north, to the latitude of fifty degrees north, and as far eastward

in the Atlantic ocean, as the thirty sixth degree of west longitude from the meridian of Greenwich, shall be restored on each side: That the time shall be thirty days in all other parts of the Atlantic ocean, north of the equinoctial line or equator, and the same time for the British and Irish channels, for the Gulf of Mexico and all parts of the West Indies: Forty days for the North Seas, for the Baltic, and for all parts of the Mediterranean: Sixty days for the Atlantic ocean south of the equator as far as the latitude of the Cape of Good Hope: Ninety days for every part of the world south of the equator: And one hundred and twenty days for all other parts of the world, without exception.

ARTICLE THE THIRD.

All prisoners of war taken on either side, as well by land as sea, shall be restored as soon as practicable after the ratifications of this treaty, as hereinafter mentioned, on their paying the debts which they may have contracted during their captivity. The two contracting parties respectively engage to discharge, in specie, the advances which may have been made by the other for the sustenance and maintenance of such prisoners.

ARTICLE THE FOURTH.

Whereas it was stipulated in the second article of the treaty of peace, of one thousand seven hundred and eighty three, between his Britannic majesty and the United States of America, that the boundary of the United States should comprehend all islands within twenty leagues of any part of the shores of the U. States and lying between lines to be drawn due east from the points where the aforesaid boundaries, between Nova Scotia on the one point, and East Florida on the other, shall respectively touch the Bay of Fundy, and the Atlantic ocean, excepting such islands as now are, or heretofore have been, within the limits of Nova Scotia; and whereas the several islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy, which is part of the Bay of Fundy, and the island of Grand Menan in the said Bay of Fundy, are

claimed by the U. States as being within their aforesaid boundaries, which said islands are claimed as belonging to his Britannic majesty, as having been at the time of, and previous to, the aforesaid treaty of one thousand seven hundred and eighty three, within the limits of the province of Nova Scotia. In order, therefore, finally to decide upon these claims, it is agreed that they shall be referred to two Commissioners to be appointed in the following manner, viz: one Commissioner shall be appointed by his Britannic majesty, and one by the President of the U. States, by and with the advice and consent of the senate thereof, and the said two Commissioners so appointed shall be sworn impartially to examine and decide upon the said claims according to such evidence as shall be laid before them on the part of his Britannic majesty and of the United States respectively. The said commissioners shall meet at St. Andrews, in the province of New Brunswick, and shall have power to adjourn to such other place or places as they shall think fit. The said commissioners shall, by a declaration or report under their hands and seals, decide to which of the two contracting parties the several islands aforesaid do respectively belong, in conformity with the true intent of the said treaty of peace of one thousand seven hundred and eighty three. And if the said commissioners shall agree in their decision, both parties shall consider such decision as final and conclusive. It is further agreed, that in the event of the two commissioners differing upon all or any of the matters so referred to them, or in the event of both or either of the said commissioners refusing, or declining, or wilfully omitting, to act as such, they shall make jointly or separately, a report or reports as well to the government of his Britannic majesty as to that of the United States, stating in detail the points on which they differ, and the grounds on which their respective opinions have been formed, or the grounds upon which they or either of them, have so refused, declined, or omitted to act. And his Britannic majesty, and the government of the United States hereby agree to refer

the report or reports of the said commissioners, to some friendly sovereign or state, to be then named for that purpose, and who shall be requested to decide on the differences which may be stated in the said report or reports, or upon the report of one commissioner, together with the grounds upon which the other commissioner shall have refused, declined, or omitted to act, as the case may be. And if the commissioner so refusing, declining or omitting to act, shall also wilfully omit to state the grounds upon which he has so done, in such manner that the said statement may be referred to such friendly sovereign or state, together with the report of such other commissioner, then such sovereign or state shall decide *ex parte* upon the said report alone. And his Britannic majesty and the government of the United States engage to consider the decision of some friendly sovereign or state to be final and conclusive on all the matters so referred.

ARTICLE THE FIFTH.

Whereas neither that point of the high lands lying due north from the river St. Croix, and designated in the former treaty of peace between the two powers as the northwest angle of Nova Scotia, now the northwesternmost head of Connecticut river, has yet been ascertained; and whereas that part of the boundary line between the dominion of the two powers which extends from the source of the river St. Croix directly north to the abovementioned northwest angle of Nova Scotia, thence along the said highlands which divide those rivers that empty themselves into the river St. Lawrence from those which fall into the Atlantic ocean to the northwesternmost head of Connecticut river, thence down along the middle of that river to the forty fifth degree of north latitude; thence by a line due west on said latitude until it strikes the river Iroquois or Cataraguy, has not been surveyed; it is agreed, that for these several purposes, two commissioners shall be appointed, sworn, and authorised, to act exactly in the manner directed with respect to those mentioned in the next preceding article, unless otherwise specifi-

ed in the present article. The said commissioners shall meet at St. Andrews, in the province of New Brunswick, and shall have power to adjourn to such other place or places as they shall think fit. The said commissioners shall have power to ascertain and determine the points abovementioned, in conformity with the provision of the said treaty of peace of one thousand seven hundred and eighty three, and shall cause the boundary aforesaid, from the source of the river St. Croix to the river Iroquois or Cataraguy, to be surveyed and marked according to the said provisions. The said commissioners shall make a map of the said boundary, and annex to it a declaration under their hands and seals, certifying it to be a true map of the said boundary, and particularizing the latitude and longitude of the northwest angle of Nova Scotia, of the northwesternmost head of Connecticut river, and of such other points of the said boundary as they may deem proper. And both parties agree to consider such map and declaration as finally and conclusively fixing the said boundary. And in the event of the said two commissioners differing, or both, or, either of them, refusing or declining, or wilfully omitting to act, such reports, declarations, or statements, shall be made by them, or either of them, and such reference to a friendly sovereign or state, shall be made, in all respects as in the latter part of the fourth article is contained, and in as full a manner as if the same was herein repeated.

ARTICLE THE SIXTH.

Whereas by the former treaty of peace that portion of the boundary of the United States from the point where the forty fifth degree of north latitude strikes the river Iroquois or Cataraguy, to the lake Superior, was declared to be "along the middle of said river into lake Ontario, through the middle of said lake until it strikes the communication by water between that lake and lake Erie, thence along the middle of said communication into lake Erie, through the middle of said lake until it arrives at the water communication into lake Huron, thence through the middle of said lake to the water communication between that lake and lake Supe-

rior." And whereas doubts have arisen what was the middle of said river, lakes and water communications, and whether certain islands lying in the same were within the dominions of his Britannic majesty or of the United States. In order, therefore, finally to decide these doubts, they shall be referred to two commissioners, to be appointed, sworn, and authorized to act exactly in the manner directed with respect to those mentioned in the next preceding article, unless otherwise specified in this present article. The said commissioners shall meet, in the first instance, at Albany, in the state of New York, and shall have power to adjourn to such other place or places as they shall think fit. The said commissioners shall, by a report or declaration, under their hands and seals, designate the boundary through the said rivers, lakes, and water communications, and decide to which of the two contracting parties the several islands lying within the said river, lakes, and water communications, do respectively belong, in conformity with the true intent of the said treaty of one thousand seven hundred and eighty three. And both parties agree to consider such designation and decision as final and conclusive. And in the event of the said two commissioners differing, or both, or either of them, refusing, declining, or wilfully omitting to act, such reports, declarations, or statements, shall be made by them, or either of them, and such reference to a friendly sovereign or state shall be made in all respects as in the latter part of the fourth article is contained, and in as full a manner as if the same was herein repeated.

ARTICLE THE SEVENTH.

It is further agreed that the said two last mentioned commissioners, after they shall have executed the duties assigned them in the preceding article, shall be, and they are hereby authorized, upon their oaths impartially to fix and determine, according to the true intent of the said treaty of peace, of one thousand seven hundred and eighty three, that part of the boundary between the dominions of the two powers, which extends from the water communication between lake Huron,

and lake Superior, to the most northwestern point of the lake of the Woods, to decide to which of the two parties the several islands lying in the lakes, water communications, and rivers, forming the said boundary, do respectively belong, in conformity with the true intent of the said treaty of peace, of one thousand seven hundred and eighty three; and to cause such parts of the said boundary, as require it, to be surveyed and marked. The said commissioners shall, by a report or declaration under their hands and seals, designate the boundary aforesaid, state their decision on the points thus referred to them, and particularize the latitude and longitude of the most northwesternmost point of the lake of the Woods, and of such other part of the said boundary as they may deem proper. And both parties agree to consider such designation and decision as final and conclusive. And, in the event of the said two commissioners differing, or both, or either of them refusing, or declining, or wilfully omitting to act, such reports, declarations, or statements, shall be made by them, or either of them, and such reference to a friendly sovereign or state, shall be made in all respects, as in the latter part of the fourth article is contained, and in as full a manner as if the same was herein repeated.

ARTICLE THE EIGHTH.

The several boards of two commissioners mentioned in the four preceding articles, shall respectively have power to appoint a secretary, and to employ such surveyors or other persons as they shall judge necessary: Duplicates of all their respective reports, declarations, statements and decisions, and of their accounts, and of the journal of their proceedings shall be delivered by them to the agents of his Britannic majesty, and to the agents of the United States, who may be respectively appointed and authorized to manage the business on behalf of their respective governments. The said commissioners shall be paid in such manner as shall be agreed between the two contracting parties, such agreement being to be settled at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty. And all other expences.

attending the said commissioners shall be defrayed equally by the two parties. And in the case of death, sickness, resignation or necessary absence, the place of every such commissioner respectively shall be supplied in the same manner as such commissioner was first appointed, and the new commissioner shall take the same oath or affirmation, and do the same duties. It is further agreed between the two contracting parties, that in case any of the islands mentioned in any of the preceding articles, which were in possession of one of the parties prior to the commencement of the present war between the two countries, should, by the decision of any of the boards of commissioners aforesaid, or of the sovereign or state so referred to, as in the four next preceding articles contained, fall within the dominions of the other party, all grants of land made previous to the commencement of the present war by the party having had such possession, shall be valid as if such island or islands, had by such decision or decisions, been adjudged to be within the dominions of the party having such possession.

ARTICLE THE NINTH.

The U. States of America engage to put an end immediately after the ratification of the present treaty to hostilities with all the tribes or nations of Indians, with whom they may be at war at the time of such ratification; and forthwith to restore to such tribes or nations, respectively, all the possessions, rights and privileges, which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in one thousand eight hundred and eleven, previous to such hostilities: *Provided always*, that such tribes or nations shall agree to desist from all hostilities, against the United States of America, their citizens and subjects, upon the ratification of the present treaty being notified to such tribes or nations, and shall so desist accordingly. And his Britannic majesty engages, on his part, to put an end immediately after the ratification of the present treaty, to hostilities with all the tribes or nations of Indians with whom he may be at war at the time of such ratification, and forthwith to restore

to such tribes or nations respectively, all the possessions, rights and privileges, which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to, in one thousand eight hundred and eleven, previous to such hostilities: *Provided always*, that such tribes or nations shall agree to desist from all hostilities against his Britannic majesty, and his subjects, upon the ratification of the present treaty being notified to such tribes or nations, and shall so desist accordingly.

ARTICLE THE TENTH.

Whereas the traffic in slaves is irreconcilable with the principles of humanity and justice, and whereas both his Majesty and the United States are desirous of continuing their efforts to promote its entire abolition, it is hereby agreed that both the contracting parties shall use their best endeavours to accomplish so desirable an object.

ARTICLE THE ELEVENTH.

This treaty, when the same shall have been ratified on both sides, without alteration by either of the contracting parties, and the ratifications mutually exchanged, shall be binding on both parties, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington, in the space of four months from this day, or sooner if practicable.

In faith whereof, we the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty, and have thereunto affixed our seals.

Done, in triplicate, at Ghent, the twenty fourth day of December, one thousand eight hundred and fourteen.

(L. S.)	GAMBIER,
(L. S.)	HENRY GOULBURN,
(L. S.)	WILLIAM ADAMS,
(L. S.)	JOHN QUINCY ADAMS,
(L. S.)	JAMES A. BAYARD,
(L. S.)	HENRY CLAY,
(L. S.)	JONATHAN RUSSEL,
(L. S.)	ALBERT GALLATIN.

Now, therefore, to the end, that the said Treaty of

Peace and Amity may be observed with good faith, on the part of the United States, I James Madison, President as aforesaid, have caused the premises to be made public; and I do hereby enjoin all persons bearing office, civil or military, within the United States, and all other citizens or inhabitants thereof, or being within the same, faithfully to observe and fulfil the said treaty and every clause and article thereof.

In testimony whereof, I have caused the seal of (Seal.) the United States to be affixed to these presents, and signed the same with my hand.

Done at the City of Washington, this eighteenth day of February, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifteen, and of the sovereignty and independence of the United States the thirty ninth.

JAMES MADISON.

By the President,
JAMES MONROE,
Acting Secretary of State.

(D)

A TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP

Between the United States of America and the Tribes of Indians called the Wyandots, Delawares, Shawanosee, Senecas and Miamies.

The said United States of America, by William Henry Harrison, late a major general in the army of the United States, and Lewis Cass, governor of the Michigan territory, duly authorized and appointed commissioners for the purpose, and the said tribes by their head men, chiefs and warriors, assembled at

Greenville in the state of Ohio, have agreed to the following articles, which, when ratified by the president of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, shall be binding upon them and the said tribes.

ARTICLE THE FIRST.

The United States and the Wyandots, Delawares, Shawanœse and Senecas, give peace to the Miami nation of Indians, formerly designated as the Miami Eel River and Weea tribes; they extend this indulgence also to the bands of the Putawatimies, which adhere to the Grand Sachem Tobinipee, and to the Chief Onoxa, the Ottowas of Blanchard's Creek, who have attached themselves to the Shawanœse tribe, and to such of the said tribe as adhere to the Chief called the Wing, in the neighborhood of Detroit, and to the Kickapoos, under the direction of the Chiefs who sign this treaty.

ARTICLE THE SECOND.

The Tribes and Bands abovementioned, engage to give their aid to the United States in prosecuting the war against Gt. Britain, and such of the Indian tribes as still continue hostile; and to make no peace with either without the consent of the United States. The assistance herein stipulated for, is to consist of such a number of their warriors from each tribe, as the president of the United States, or any officer having his authority therefor, may require.

ARTICLE THE THIRD.

The Wyandot tribe, and the Senecas of Sandusky and Stoney Creek, the Delaware and Shawanœse tribes, who have preserved their fidelity to the United States throughout the war, again acknowledge themselves under the protection of the said states, and of no other power whatever; and agree to aid the United States, in the manner stipulated for in the former article, and to make no peace but with the consent of the said states.

ARTICLE THE FOURTH.

In the event of a faithful performance of the condi-

tions of this Treaty, the United States will confirm and establish all the boundaries between their lands and those of the Wyandots, Delawares, Shawanoese and Miamies, as they existed previously to the commencement of the war.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, the said commissioners and the said head men, chiefs and warriors of the before mentioned tribes of Indians have hereunto set their hands and affixed their seals.

Done at Greenville, in the state of Ohio, this twenty second day of July, in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and fourteen, and of the Independence of the United States, the thirtieth ninth.

WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.
LEWIS CASS.

In presence of

James Dill, secretary to the commissioners,
John Johnston, Indian agent,
B. F. Stickney, Indian agent,
James J. Nisbet, associate judge of court of common pleas, Preble county,
Thomas G. Gibson.

Sworn Interpreters.

Antone Boindi, sworn interpreter,
Wm. Walker, sworn interpreter,
William Conner, sworn interpreter,
J. B. Chandonnai, sworn interpreter,
Stephen Reeddeed, sworn interpreter,
James Pettier, sworn interpreter,
Joseph Bertrane, sworn interpreter,
Thos. Ramsay, capt. 1st rifle regt.
John Conner,
John Biddle, col. 1st regt. Ohio militia.

Shawanoese.

Tea-was-koota, or blue jacket, ✕ (L. S.)
Tah-cum-tequah, or cross the water, ✕ (L. S.)

Ottowas.

Wa-tash-ne-wah, or bear's legs, ✕ (L. S.)

Wa-pa-chek, or white fisher, X	(L S)
Foo-ta-gen, or bill, X	(L S)
Augh-qua-nah-quo-se or stump tail bear, X	(L S)
U-co-ke-nuh, or bear king, X	(L S)

Senecas.

Coon-tind-nau, or coffee house, X	(L S)
Tog'uon, X	(L S)
En-dosque-e-runt, or John Harris, X	(L S)
Can-ta-ra-te-roo, X	(L S)

Shawanoese.

Cul-e-we-cus-a, or black hoof, X	(L S)
Tam-e-ne-tha, or butter, X	(L S)
Pi-a-se-ka, or wolf, X	(L S)
Pom-tha, or walker, X	(L S)
Sha-mon-e-the, or snake, X	(L S)
Pom-tha-ta, or turkey flying by, X	(L S)
We-tha-wak-a-sik-a, or yellow water, X	(L S)
Que-la-wa, or sinning, X	(L S)
So-kut-che-mah, or frozen, X	(L S)
Wy-ne-pu-ech-sika, or corn stalk, X	(L S)
Che-oh-sha, or captain Tom, X	(L S)
Qui-tu-æe-poh, or captain Lewis, X	(L S)

Delawares.

Tai-uh-shrah, or Charles, X	(L S)
Ti-un-dra-ka, or John Boliale, X	(L S)
E-lone-ni-a-rah, or shrone sch, X	(L S)
Kick-to-he-nina, or capt. Anderson, X	(L S)
Le-mot-ti-nuck-quis, or James Nantioke, X	(L S)
La-o-pon-nichle, or Bauber, X	(L S)
Jo-on-queake, or John Queake, X	(L S)
Kill-buck, X	(L S)
Neagh-corningd, X	(L S)
Montgomery Montaine, X	(L S)
Capt. Buck, X	(L S)
Hop-hoo-que, or moles, X	(L S)
Capt. White Eyes, X	(L S)
Captain Pipe, X	(L S)
McDaniel, X	(L S)
Captain Snap, X	(L S)

Wyandots.

Tar-he, or crane,	(L S)
Har-ron-yough, or Cherokee boy,	(L S)
Te-ar-rone-au-ose, or between the legs,	(L S)
Men-on-con,	(L S)
Rush-ar-ra, or Stookey,	(L S)
Se-no-shus,	(L S)
Zash-u-on-a, or big arm,	(L S)
Te-an-dut-to-sooh, or punch,	(L S)
Tap-uk-sough, or John Kuks,	(L S)
Ron-oin-ness, or sky come down,	(L S)
Tee-en-doo,	(L S)
Ron-aisis,	(L S)
Omaint-si-ar-nah, or Bowyer,	(L S)

Senecas.

Cun-tah-ten-tah-wa, or big turtle, X	(L S)
Ben-on-negu, or wiping stick, X	(L S)
Co-rach-con-ke, or reflection, or civil John, X	(L S)
Coon-au-ta-nah-roo, X	(L S)
See-is-ta-nee, [black] X	(L S)
Too-ten-an-dee, or Thomas Brane, X	(L S)
Hane-use-wa,	(L S)
Ut-ta-un-tus,	(L S)
Lut-au-quis-on,	(L S)

Miamies.

Peeon, X	L. S.
La-passiere,	L. S.
Ashe-non-quah, X	L. S.
Osage, X	L. S.
Na-te-wee, X	L. S.
Me-she-ke-le-a-ta, or the big man, X	L. S.
Sa-na-mah-hon-ga, or stone eater, X	L. S.
Ne-she-peh-tah, or double tooth, X	L. S.
Me-too-sa-ni-a, or Indian, X	L. S.
Che-qui-a, or poor racoon, X	L. S.
Wa-pe-pe-che-ka, X	L. S.
Chin-go-me-ja-ebeo, or one,	L. S.
Ke-we-se-kong, or circular travelling, X	L. S.
Wa-pa-sa-ba-nah, or white racoon, X	L. S.
Che-ke-me-li-ne, or turtle's brother, X	L. S.

Pacou-de-qua, or crooked, X	L. S.
Che-que-ah, or poor racoon, or little eyes, X	L. S.
Sho-wi-lin-ge-shau, or open hand, X	L. S.
O-ka-we-a, or porcupine, X	L. S.
Shaw-a-noe, X	L. S.
Ua-uan-sa, or young wolf, XX	L. S.
Me-shwa-wa, or wounded, XX	L. S.
San-quee-com-ya, or buffaloe, X	L. S.
Pe-que-a, or George, X	L. S.
Keel-swa, or sun, X	L. S.
Wan-se-a, or white skin, X	L. S.
Wan-se-pe-a, or sun rise, X	L. S.
An-ga-to-ka, or pile of wood, X	L. S.

Potawatamies.

Too-pin-ne-pe, X	L. S.
O-nox-a, or five medals, X	L. S.
Me-te-a, X	L. S.
Con-je, or bear's foot, X	L. S.
Na-nown-se-ca, X	L. S.
Cha-jobbe, or one who sees all over, X	L. S.
Me-shon, X	L. S.
Pe-nosh, X	L. S.
Che-ca-noe, X	L. S.
Nesh-coot-a-na, X	L. S.
Ton-guish, X	L. S.
Ne-baugh-gua, X	L. S.
Ton-guish, or Chippeway, X	L. S.
Wes-nan-e-sa, X	L. S.
Che-chock, or crane, X	L. S.
Ke-poc-ta, X	L. S.
Mac-koe-ta, or crane, X	L. S.
Pa-pe-ket-cha, or flat belly, X	L. S.

Kickapoos.

Kee-too-te, or etter, X	L. S.
Ma-ko-ta-ne-cota, or black tree, X	L. S.
She-she-pa, or duck, X	L. S.
Wa-pe-kon-nia, or white blanket, X	L. S.
A-coo-che, or the man hung, X	L. S.
Che-kas-ka-go-lou, X	L. S.

Now therefore, to the end that the said treaty be ob-

served and performed with good faith on the part of the United States, I have caused the premises to be made public, and I do hereby enjoin and require all persons bearing office, civil or military, within the United States, and all others, citizens or inhabitants thereof, or being within the same, faithfully to observe and fulfil the said treaty, and every clause and article thereof.

In testimony whereof, I have caused the seal of the United States to be affixed to these presents, and signed the same with my hand.

Done at the City of Washington, the twenty first day of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fourteen, and of the independence of the United States the thirty ninth.

JAMES MADISON.

By the President,
JAMES MONROE.

(E.)

CONGRESSIONAL REPORT

*Of the Committee of Investigation on the destruction
of the American Capitol.*

Previous to the 2d July this district formed a part of military district No. 5. Early in June the cabinet assembled for purposes extraneous to the defence of this district. A plan was however suggested by the secre-

tary of the navy relative to its defence, which was adopted. The effective force of district No. 5, was, on the 7th June, 2,154 effectives, stationed at various points. On the 1st July a cabinet council was again convened by the president, from a variety of considerations, and a plan of defence proposed by him, which was adopted. On the 2d July the 10th military district was created, and General Winder appointed to command it. On the 4th of July a requisition of 93,500 men was made. Of this requisition 2,000 effectives from the state of Virginia, 5,000 from Pennsylvania, 6,000 from Maryland, and 2,000 from the District of Columbia, were put at the disposal of Gen. Winder; making a total of 15,000 men, exclusive of the regular force, estimated at 1,000 more. The committee state, that the secretary of war, on the 12th July enclosed to General Winder a circular addressed to the governors of certain states, requiring a body of militia to be organized, equipped and held in readiness for future service, and *authorizes* him to call for a part or a whole of the quota assigned to Maryland; and on the 17th the secretary authorizes him to draw from Virginia her quota of 2,000, from Pennsylvania 5,000, and informed him that the district militia were at his disposal; making 6,000 from Maryland, the estimate of 15,000 men.

In a letter of the 13th of August from Gen. Winder to the secretary of war, he states, that in consequence of the acceptance of the 2d regiment of Gen. Smith's division, and the impracticability and impropriety of taking any portion of the militia from the Eastern Shore of Maryland, and the necessity of leaving the men upon the bay for local defence, instead of 3,000 he would not get as many hundred at Bladensburg. He suggests the propriety of taking the troops, about 1,000, drawn out under the state authority, into the service of the United States, and to call on Pennsylvania for one regiment which would make his militia between 2 and 3,000, besides the 2d regiment from General Smith's division. In answer, the secretary authorizes him to take them into the service of the United States. On

the 27th July, the governor of Maryland, in a letter to the secretary of war, states, that the requisition of the president was complied with, and that the requisition of General Winder for the 3,000 drafts was ordered to embody. On July 30th, General Winder made a requisition on the governor of Maryland, for 3,000 militia, and on the 5th of August the governor informs him that his demand could not be complied with. On the 14th July, Mr. Boileau, secretary of state for Pennsylvania, writes to the secretary of war to the same effect, already mentioned, in relation to the difficulties, &c. resulting from the nonexistence of the militia laws of that state; but relies on the patriotism of the people. On the 14th of July, the deputy adjutant general in answer to the communication from the war department, containing the requisition of the 4th July, states that orders had been issued by the governor of Virginia placing a provisional force of 15,000 in readiness for defence, &c. to be organized for three months only; he also states that the whole militia would be furnished with arms, &c. by Virginia, and on the 18th the secretary of war informs the governor that 2,000 of the Virginia militia, would be placed at the disposition of General Winder.

In relation to General Winder, the committee states, that on the 4th or 5th of July he received notice of his appointment to the 10th military district, and proceeded to Washington, when the secretary of war enumerated the regular force, and shewed him the requisition of the 4th. He then proceeded to explore the 10th military district generally. On the 17th, at Nottingham he was informed that the enemy was ascending the Patuxent, wrote to the secretary, and Gen. West, advising him to collect the militia. The 36th and 38th regiments were ordered to Nottingham, and three companies of city militia were sent to him. On the 18th August, information was received that the enemy's fleet had, on the 17th, been considerably reinforced. Immediately requisitions were made on the governors of Pennsylvania and Maryland. Various officers and

the district militia were ordered out *en masse*. On the 19th General Winder submits several propositions relative to the defence of the City, which the secretary of war informs him had been submitted to the president, and refers him to the navy department in relation to the means in that department. His call on the militia *en masse* is approved, and advises that the cavalry be pushed immediately into the neighborhood of the enemy. On the 20th information was received of the arrival of the enemy at Benedict in force, and the same day Colonel Tilman and Captain Caldwell were dispatched to annoy the enemy, impede his march, and remove and destroy his forage and provisions.

On Sunday morning, the 21st, the troops were mustered, and the articles of war read to them. At 12 o'clock the marines under Captain Miller joined the army; the regulars of the 36th and 38th also joined at the Wood Yard, seven miles in advance, to which the main body of our troops were marched and encamped on Sunday night. Two letters from Colonel Monroe, on the 21st, one stating that he had viewed the enemy near Benedict, enumerated 27 square rigged vessels, some bay craft and barges; the other dated at Nottingham, stating the advance of the enemy upon that place by land and water; and recommending the commanding general to dispatch 500 or 600 men to fall upon the enemy. Colonel Monroe and Colonel Beall both joined the army at night, and gave an account that the enemy had been viewed by them. Colonel Beall calculated that he had seen 4,000, without supposing he had seen all. Colonel Monroe estimated the enemy at about 6,000; Captain Herbert joins with his troops; Colonel Laval had joined with two companies of cavalry on the day previous; the enemy remained at Nottingham, except an advanced detachment about three miles from town. Monday the 22d, early in the morning a light detachment was ordered to meet the enemy, composed of the 36th and 38th, Lieut. Col. Scott, Colonel Lavall's cavalry, and three companies from the brigade of General Smith, under Major Peter;

viz. his own company of artillery, Captain Stull's rifle corps, Captain Davison's light infantry. This detachment marched on the road to Nottingham, about nine o'clock; the remainder of the army marched about one mile in advance to an elevated position; the commanding general with his staff, accompanied by Col. Monroe, proceeded in advance to reconnoiter the march of the enemy. Commodore Barney had joined the army with his flotilla men, besides the marines under Captain Miller; the horse preceded the advance detachment of our forces, met the enemy, and retired before them. This induced the advance corps to take a position to impede the march of the enemy; but the advance detachment was ordered to retrograde and join the main body of the army that had remained some hours in line of battle, expecting the enemy to come that route to the city, but they were disappointed, for he took the road to Upper Marlboro, turning to his right after having come within a few miles of our forces, upon which the commanding general fell back with his whole forces to the battalion old field, about eight miles from Marlboro, and about the same distance from the city of Washington. At this time heavy explosions in the direction of Marlboro announced the destruction of the flotilla under command of Commodore Barney. The enemy arrived at Upper Marlboro about 2 o'clock, and remained there until late next day, to be joined, it is presumed, by the detachment of the enemy which had been sent against the flotilla.

The commanding general proceeded to Marlboro, and found the enemy encamped; several prisoners taken gave information that the enemy would remain in that position until the next day; and, after making observations of the enemy until the close of the day, Gen. Winder returned to the army. Late in the evening of this day the president, with the secretary of war and navy and the attorney general, joined Gen. Winder at the battalion old fields, and remained with him till the evening of the 23d. In the morning the troops were drawn up and reviewed by the president. The most

contradictory reports prevailed as to the movements and force of the enemy and it was doubted in camp whether Annapolis, Fort Washington, with a view to cooperate with his naval forces, or the city of Washington, was his object. As to numbers, rumors vibrated from 4 to 12,000; the best opinion was from 5 to 7,000. Our forces at this time, at the old fields, are variously estimated, with no material difference, at about 5,000 men, in the following corps: about 400 horse under the command of the following officers; Lieut. Col. Laval, Col. Tilghman, Captains Caldwell, Thornton, Herbert, Williams, &c. 400 regular troops, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Scott, viz. 36th, 38th, and Captain Morgan's company of the 12th infantry; 600 marines and flotilla men under Commodore Barney and Captain Miller, with five pieces of heavy artillery, two 18 pounders and three 12 pounders; 1,800 militia and volunteers, General Smith's brigade of Georgetown and city militia, and Maryland militia under Colonel Kramer, of which there were two companies of artillery under Captain Burch and Major Peter, with six 6 pounders each, making an aggregate of 5,200, with 17 pieces of artillery. The enemy was without cavalry, and had two small field pieces and one howitzer, drawn by men; and the whole country well calculated for defence, skirmishing, and to impede the march of an enemy.

The enemy remained at Upper Marlborough till after 12 o'clock; about which time, Gen. Winder again ordered the detachment under Lieut. Col. Scott and Maj. Peter, to advance and meet the enemy if he should be found advancing, or to attack his positions. About this time, 12 o'clock, some prisoners were taken, and from the information given by them and the observations of the videts, General Winder was induced to believe that the enemy intended to remain stationary for the day, which induced him to think of uniting with him the forces at Bladensburg, and despatched orders to Gen. Stansbury, and other corps at Bladensburg to move direct for Upper Marlborough, and proceeded himself

towards Bladensburg, to meet and hurry on the forces to form a junction. When General Winder left the command with General Smith and proceeded towards Bladensburg, with several troops of cavalry, he left orders that the advanced corps should march upon the enemy, and annoy him by all possible means if in march, or, if not, then in his positions; and if he advanced upon Bladensburg, General Smith, with the main body, should fall upon his flank, or be governed by circumstances in other movements.

Captain Caldwell joined the advanced corps at 2 o'clock. P. M. An express brought intelligence that the enemy had left Upper Marlborough; that our advance had met the enemy about six miles in advance of our forces, and after a skirmish, in which Captain Stull's company had about 4 or 5 rounds was compelled to retreat, and that the enemy was advancing. One of the aids of Gen. Smith was despatched for Gen. Winder; the whole army was placed in a favorable attitude for defence, in which position it remained until about sunset, when General Winder, who had arrived some time previous, ordered the army to march to the city of Washington. The enemy was about three miles distant, and remained there that night. Having remained till the going down of the sun, the retreat to the city was induced by several considerations, stated by the commanding general. 1st. To effect a union of his whole forces. 2d. The fear of a night attack, from the superiority of the enemy, and want of discipline in his troops. And, 3d. In a night attack his superiority in artillery could not be used. The march of our army to the city was extremely rapid and precipitate, and orders occasionally given to captains of companies to hurry on the men, who were extremely fatigued and exhausted before the camping ground was reached near the Eastern branch bridge, within the district of Columbia.

General Stansbury had arrived at Bladensburgh on the 22d, and the 5th Baltimore regiment, including the artillery and rifle corps, on the evening of the 23d;

and at 12 o'clock at night, Colonel Monroe, in passing through Bladensburgh to the city of Washington, advised General Stansbury to fall upon the rear of the enemy forthwith, as it was understood that he was in motion for the city. General Stansbury having been ordered to take post at Bladensburgh, did not think he was at liberty to leave it; but, independent of this consideration, the fatigue of the troops under Col. Sterret made it impracticable.

It is here proper to state that on the 22d, the secretary of war in a letter to General Winder, which closes their written communications previous to the 24th, except a short note of that morning, states that he had ordered General Douglass to march with his command to the district without seeking a rendezvous with Gen. Hungerford; that a detachment of the 12th infantry had arrived; that it should be armed, equipped and marched to the Wood Yard; that the Baltimore brigade would arrive at Bladensburgh that day; and suggests the propriety of throwing Barney's seamen and some other troops on the right of Nottingham, a demonstration which would menace the rear of the enemy, and his communication with his shipping, which would, if not stop, much retard his progress. On the morning of the 24th, in a short note to the secretary of war, General Winder says, the information up the river is threatening; Barney or some other force should occupy the batteries at Greenleaf's Point and Navy Yard, and wishes counsel from the government or secretary of war. Upon this note is an endorsement in the handwriting of General Armstrong to this effect; "went to General Winder, saw no necessity for ordering Barney to Greenleaf's Point or Navy Yard, advised the commodore to join the army at Bladensburgh and ordered Miner's regiment to that place.

On the 21st, late at night, Colonel Taylor arrived in the city from the Northern Neck, where he had been charged with orders in relation to Virginia drafts, and reported himself to General Armstrong, who issued the following general order.

*“ War Department, 22d August, 1814.
(12 o'clock.)*

“ GENERAL ORDER.

“ General Douglass will assemble his brigade at Alexandria, and hold it there subject to orders.

“ JOHN ARMSTRONG.”

Colonel Tayloe executed this order, and Tuesday night, the 23d, again reported himself to Gen. Armstrong, who issued the following orders.

“ War Department,

“ GENERAL ORDER.

“ Lieutenant Colonel Minor will repair to Washington with the regiment under his command with the utmost despatch; he will report on his arrival to Colonel Charberry of the 36th regiment, and make a requisition for arms and ammunition.

(Signed)

“ JOHN ARMSTRONG.”

“ War Department, August 23d, 1814.

“ GENERAL ORDER.

“ All the militia now in and marching to Alexandria, besides Col. Minor, will march immediately to Washington; these orders will be communicated by Colonel Tayloe.

“ JOHN ARMSTRONG.”

On the 18th of August, General Van Ness ordered General Young to call out, en masse, the brigade under his command, including the Alexandria militia; the same day two troops of cavalry attached to the brigade were ordered to rendezvous at Bladensburgh; on the 19th at 4 o'clock in the morning, to accompany Colonel Monroe, secretary of state, and to be subject to his order. On the 20th, in the afternoon, General Young's brigade was ordered by General Winder to cross the Potomac, opposite Alexandria, and encamped in the best position and wait further orders, which was effected. The brigade consisting of 454 men, two brass six pounders, and one brass four pounder. On the 22d early, General Young, by orders of General Winder, marched his brigade and took a position on a height

near the head of Piscataway creek, about three miles in the rear of Fort Washington, where the ground was favorable for a small detachment to defend the country against a much greater force, and remained in this position until the morning of the 24th, when several orders were given to him; first, to march towards the eastern branch bridge; second, to cross the Potomac to the Virginia side, &c. This brigade was intended in its dispositions to aid Fort Washington, the town of Alexandria, and to be in a situation to join General Winder.

On the morning of the 24th, General Winder established his head quarters near the eastern branch bridge; detachments of horse were out in various directions as videts and reconnoitering parties, and arrangements made to destroy the Eastern Branch bridge. Colonel George Minor with his regiment of Virginia militia, composed of 600 infantry and 100 cavalry, arrived at the city of Washington in the twilight of the evening of the 23d; he called on the president who referred him to the secretary of war for orders; the secretary informed him that arms could not be had that night, but gave orders to report himself to Colonel Carberry early in the morning, who would furnish him with arms and ammunition, as he was charged with that duty by General Winder. From early in the morning till late in the afternoon, Col. Minor sought Colonel Carberry diligently, but he could not be found. He rode to head quarters and obtained an order from General Winder upon the arsenal for arms, &c. marched to the place with his regiment, and its care he found committed to a young man whose caution in giving out arms, &c. very much delayed the arming and supplying this regiment. An instance is here given when the flints were counted out by the officers of the regiment, to expedite business at this crisis, the young man would count them over before they could be obtained.

Colonel Carberry arrived at this moment, apologized for his absence, and informed Colonel Minor, that he had the evening previous ridden out to his country seat.

Colonel Minor was again delayed some small length of time in having to remain to sign receipts, &c. His men were ordered to Capitol Hill, in the mean time various reports were brought into head quarters as to the movements and intentions of the enemy; the president and heads of departments collected at head quarters, in the following order. The President, next Secretary of State, next the Attorney General, next the Secretary of the Navy, and last the Secretary of War and Treasury together. Colonel Monroe had left head quarters upon a rumor that gained ground, that the enemy was marching upon the city by way of Bladensburg, with a view of joining General Stansbury, advising him of the rumor and to aid him in the formation of a line of battle to meet the enemy. General Stansbury, for reasons given in his report, had marched from his position in advance of Bladensburg, and occupied the ground west of that village on the banks of the Eastern Branch. Here the front line of battle was formed by General Stansbury and his officers, with the aid of Colonel Monroe, on the presumption that Gen. Stansbury's brigade, and the command of Colonel Sterret, including the command of Major Pinkney and Baltimore artillery.

There is a bridge over the Eastern Branch at Bladensburg, and a large turnpike road leading direct to the city of Washington. About 400 yards from this bridge, some small distance to the left of the road, the Baltimore artillery, six pieces of six pounders, occupied a temporary breastwork of earth, well calculated to command the pass over the bridge. Part of the battalion of riflemen, under Major William Pinkney, and one other company, took position on the right of the artillery, partially protected by a fence and brush; and on the left of the battery, leading to the rear of a barn, two companies, from the regiment under Col. Shutz, and the other part of the riflemen from Baltimore. Colonel Ragan was posted in the rear of Major Pinkney, his right resting on the road; Colonel Shutz continuing the line on the left, with a small vacancy in the

center of the two regiments; and Col. Sterret, formed the extreme left flank of the infantry. At this moment, Colonels Beall and Hood entered Bladensburg, with the Maryland militia from Annapolis, crossed the bridge, and took a position on a most commanding height, on the right of the turnpike, about 300 yards from the road, to secure the right flank. In the mean time, (about 11 o'clock) certain intelligence was received at head quarters, that the enemy was in full march towards Bladensburg; which induced Gen. Winder to put in motion his whole force, except a few men and a piece of artillery left at the Eastern Branch bridge to destroy it. The day was hot, and the road dusty, the march was rapid to Bladensburg. The cavalry and mounted men arrived, and were placed on the left flank, and some small distance in its rear. General Winder now arrived, and told Gen. Stansbury and Col. Monroe, that his whole force was marching for Bladensburg, and approved the dispositions which had been made of the troops; at which moment, it had become impracticable, in the opinion of the officers, to make any essential change; for the two armies were now coming to the battle ground, in opposite directions; and the enemy appeared on the opposite heights of Bladensburg, about a mile distant, and halted 15 or 20 minutes. This was about 12 o'clock. The troops from the city were disposed of as they arrived. Capt. Burch, with 3 pieces of artillery, was stationed on the extreme left of the infantry of the line; and a rifle company, armed with muskets, near the battery, to support it. About this time the secretary of war arrived, and in a few minutes after, the president and the attorney general, and proceeded to examine the disposition of the troops. In the mean time, as the enemy advanced into Bladensburg, the officers were forming rapidly the second line. The command of commodore Barney came up in a trot; and formed his men on the right of the main road, in a line with the command under Colonels Beall and Hood, with a considerable vacancy, owing to the ground. The heavy artillery commodore Barney planted in the road;

the three 12 pounders to the right, under Capt. Miller, who commanded the flotilla, men and marines, as infantry, to support the artillery. Lieut. Col. Kramer, with a battalion of Maryland militia, was posted in a wood, in advance of the marines and Colonels Beall and Hood's command. The regiment under command of Col. Magruder, was stationed on the left of commodore Barney, and in a line with him and Col. Beall. The regiment under command of Col. Brent, and Maj. Waring's battalion, and some other small detachments, formed in the left flank of this second line, and in the rear of Major Peter's battery; and Lieut. Col. Scott, with the regulars, was placed in advance of Colonel Magruder, and to the left, forming a line towards Maj. Peter's battery, but in such a manner as not to mask it; other small detachments in various directions.

About half after 12 o'clock, while the second line was thus forming, the enemy approached and the battle commenced: the Baltimore artillery opened a fire and dispersed the enemy's light troops now advancing along the street of the village, who took a temporary cover behind the houses and trees, in loose order, and presented objects only occasionally for the fire of the cannon. The enemy commenced throwing his rockets, and his light troops began to concentrate near the bridge, and to press across it and the river which was fordable above. The battalion of riflemen under Major Pinkney, now united gallantly with the fire from the battery. For some minutes the fire was continued with considerable effect; the enemy's column was not only dispersed while in the streets, but while approaching the bridge they were thrown into some confusion, and the British officers were seen exerting themselves to press the soldiers on. Having now gained the bridge, it was passed rapidly, and as the enemy crossed, flanked, formed the line and advanced steadily on, which compelled the artillery and battalion of riflemen to give way, after which Major Pinkney was severely wounded. He exerted himself to rally his men, and succeeded at a small dis-

place in the rear of his first position, and united with the fifth Baltimore regiment.

It appears from the reports of several officers, Stansbury, Pinkney, Law, Sterret, &c. that the command of General Stansbury was 3 or 400 yards in the rear of the battery, and major Pinkney's riflemen and some other small corps to the left of the battery; of course this small party had to fight with the whole force of the enemy until they retired, and the enemy occupied the ground they left without any considerable resistance, as the enemy marched on without halting after the bridge was passed. Capt. Burch and Col. Sterret were about the same distance, when Col. Sterret was ordered to advance to support the first line. One of the pieces of artillery was abandoned, but spiked previously. The enemy soon took advantage of the trees of an orchard which was occupied or held by the force which had just retreated and kept up a galling fire on part of our line. Capt. Burch's artillery and a small detachment near it now opened a cross fire upon the enemy. Col. Sterret, with the fifth Baltimore regiment, was ordered to advance and made a prompt movement until ordered to halt, as at this moment the rockets assuming a more horizontal direction and passing near the heads of Colonels Schutz and Ragan's regiments, the right gave way, which was followed in a few minutes by a general flight of the two regiments, in defiance of all the exertions of Generals Winder, Stansbury and other officers. Burch's artillery and the 5th regiment remained with firmness: the orchard obstructed their fire; but notwithstanding, the enemy's light troops were for a moment driven back by them; the enemy having gained the right flank of the fifth, which exposed it, Burch's artillery and Col. Sterret, who commanded the fifth, were ordered by Gen. Winder to retreat, with a view of forming at a small distance in the rear; but, instead of retiring in order, the fifth, like the other two regiments under Gen. Stansbury, in a very few minutes were retreating in disorder and confusion notwithstanding the exertions of Colonel Sterret to prevent it. From reports of various officers

Exertions were made to rally the men and to bring them again to battle, which partly succeeded in the first instance, but ultimately, and in a short time, all attempts were vain, and the forces routed; and the first line, together with the horse, were totally routed and retreated in a road which forked in three directions; one branch led by Rock Creek Church, to Tenley Town and Montgomery court house, another led to George Town and a third to the city of Washington. It does not appear that any movement was made or attempted by the cavalry or horsemen, although the enemy to the left were in open and scattered order, as they pursued or pressed upon our lines, and a most fortunate moment presented itself for a charge of cavalry and horsemen.

It may be proper here to observe, that Gen. Winder states his exertions to direct the retreating line to the capitol, with a view of rallying. This intention is corroborated by Col. Sterret; but it appears as if this determination was not generally understood by the officers or men. Col. Kramer, posted on the right of the road and in advance of Commodore Barney, was next drawn from his position after having maintained his ground with considerable injury to the enemy, and retreated upon the command of Cols. Bealls and Hood, on a commanding eminence to the right. After the retreat of the militia under Col. Kramer from his first position, the enemy's column in the road was exposed to an animated discharge from Major Peter's artillery, which continued until they came in contact with Com. Barney; here the enemy met the greatest resistance and sustained the greatest loss, advancing upon our retreating line. When the enemy came in full view, and in a heavy column in the main road, Com. Barney ordered an 18 pounder to be opened upon them, which completely cleared the road, scattered and repulsed the enemy for a moment. In several attempts to rally and advance, the enemy was repulsed, which induced him to flank to the right of our lines in the open field. Here Capt. Miller opened upon him with the three 12 pounders, and the flotilla men acting as infantry with consid-

erable effect. The enemy continued flanking to the right and pressing upon the command of Cols. Beall and Hood, which gave way after three or four rounds of ineffectual fire, at a considerable distance from the enemy, while Col. Beall and officers attempted to rally the men on this high position. The enemy very soon gained the flank and even the rear of the right of the second line. Com. Barney, Capt. Miller and some other officers of his command being wounded, his ammunition waggon having gone off in the disorder, and that which the marines and flotilla men had being exhausted; in this situation a retreat was ordered by Com. Barney, who fell himself into the hands of the enemy.

The second line was not exactly connected, but posted in advantageous positions in connection with and supporting each other. The command of Gen. Smith, including the Georgetown and city militia, still remained in order and firm without any part having given away, as well as the command of Lieut. Col. Scott of the regulars, and some other corps. The enemy's light troops had in the mean time advanced on the left of the road, and had gained a line parallel with Smith's command, and in endeavoring to turn the flank Col. Brent was placed in a position calculated to prevent it, the enemy also advanced, and came within long shot of part of Col. Magruder's command, which opened a partial fire, but without effect; and at this moment and in this situation Gen. Winder ordered the whole of the troops, then stationary, to retreat, which was effected with as much order as the nature of the ground and the occasion would permit; these troops, after retreating 5 or 600 paces, were halted and formed, but were again ordered to retreat by Gen. Winder. Gen. Winder then gave orders to collect and form the troops on the heights west of the turnpike gate, about one mile and a half from the capitol, which order was in part executed, and the forces formed by Gen. Smith and the other officers, when Col. George Minor came up with his regiment of Virginia volunteers, and united his forces with Gen. Smith's command, having been detained, as before stated, in obtain-

ing arms, ammunition, &c. : but while in the act of forming, Gen. Winder gave orders to retire to the capitol, with an expectation of being united with the troops of the first line. Col. Minor was ordered to take a certain position and cover the retreat of all the forces by remaining until all had marched for the capitol. The troops were again halted at the capitol while Gen. Winder was in conference with Col. Monroe and General Armstrong.

The first line and the cavalry, except one troop of Col. Laval's, had taken a route which did not bring them to the capitol; the most of them had proceeded north of the District of Columbia, and others dispersed and returned home, and sought refreshment in the country. The commanding Gen. represented the diminution of his force, the dispersion of a large portion of it, the want of discipline, the great fatigue of the the troops, and believed that it would be impossible to make effectual resistance to the invasion of the city, nor did he think it would be proper to attempt to defend the capitol, the troops being without provisions, and which would leave every other part of the city to the mercy of the enemy, and the prospect of loosing his army. In this consultation the secretaries of state and war, it appears, concurred in their views with Gen. Winder, and advised him to retire and rally the troops upon the heights of Georgetown; this produced an order for the whole forces to retreat from capitol hill through Georgetown. On receiving this order the troops evinced the deepest anguish, and that order which had been previously maintained was destroyed. Gen. Smith in his report uses this language—"when the order for a retreat from capitol hill was received, the troops evinced an anguish beyond the power of language to express." The troops were halted at Tenleytown, and an attempt was made to collect them together, which only partially succeeded. Some returned home; some went in pursuit of refreshments, and those that halted gave themselves up to the uncontrolled feelings which fatigue, exhaustion, privation and disappointment produced. The force

thus collected were marched about five miles up the Potomac, and early in the morning, Thursday the 25th, orders were given to assemble the troops at Montgomery Court house. Gen. Winder seems to have taken this position with a view to collect his forces, and to interpose for the protection of Baltimore, in case the enemy marched upon it as it was anticipated by him. On the 23d, Gen. Winder dispatched an order to the commanding officer at Fort Washington to place patrols on every road leading to the garrison; and upon the event of his being taken in the rear of the fort, to blow it up and retire across the river. On the 26th, the army at Montgomery took up the line of march about ten o'clock towards Baltimore; Gen. Winder proceeded on to Baltimore. On the 27th, Gen. Smith's brigade marched to this district.

The distance from Benedict to the city of Washington, by Bladensburg, is upwards of fifty miles. The enemy was without baggage waggons or means of transportation; his troops much exhausted with fatigue; many compelled to quit the ranks, and extraordinary exertions used to keep others in motion; and as if unable to pursue our forces, remained on the battle ground; the enemy's advance reached this city about 8 o'clock in the evening, the battle having ended about 2 o'clock, or before. The main body of the enemy remained on the heights west of the turnpike gate.

Doctor Catlett, the superintending surgeon, who was admitted to attend upon the wounded, and who passed through the enemy's camps and remained at Bladensburg until the city was evacuated, had the best opportunity of estimating the loss on both sides, as well as a good opportunity to ascertain the number and force of the enemy. His estimate is as follows:

Of the enemy—On capitol hill, 700; turnpike hill, 2000; wounded at Bladensburg, 300; attendants, 300; wounded and attendants in the city of Washington, 60; killed at Bladensburg and the city, 180; total force, 3540. This statement is corroborated by all information in his power, besides his own observations. Mr.

Law estimated the enemy, on his march, at 5000; but from the best information, his estimate would be about 4,500. Col. Monroe, who viewed the enemy on his march, estimated the number at about 6000. Gen. Winder states that the best opinion at the Wood Yard, made the enemy from 5 to 7000. Our forces are variously estimated; and, indeed, from the manner of collecting them, and their dispersion, makes it difficult to ascertain the number with perfect accuracy. Gen. Stansbury represents Col. Ragan's regiment at 550, Col. Shutz's regiment at 700; Col. Beall's and Hood's at 800; Col. Sterret's regiment at 500; Major Pinkney's command, including two companies of artillery, 300; making, 2953. But Gen. Winder estimates Col. Beall, 6 or 700; deduct 100, this leaves 2853. To which add the command of Gen. Smith, and militia that united with him at the Wood yard, Battalion Old fields, the regulars under Lieut. Col. Scott, Barney's command, the cavalry, &c. 3200; making an aggregate number of 6053. Besides this force, several detachments are spoken of by Gen. Winder's officers not known, amounting to several hundred. But as a small detachment was left at the Eastern Branch bridge, others, particularly some of the cavalry, were on detachment, reconnoitring, &c. the number of our forces may be estimated at least 6000, including about 20 pieces of artillery, two 18 pounders, 3 twelves, and the others 6 pounders. Our loss on the field of battle, killed, is estimated, by the superintending surgeon, at 10 or 12, and the wounded, some of whom died, at about 30. Gen. Winder's official report estimates our loss at about 30 killed and 50 wounded.

The probable estimate of British forces on the 24th August: Total 4,500. Killed at Bladensburg and in the city, 180; wounded at both places, 300. American forces, 6,000. Killed, 20; wounded, 40; besides the regiment under Col. Minor, 600 infantry and 100 horse, which met the retreat on the west of the turnpike gate; and Gen. Young's brigade, about 500, which was ordered to remain on the banks of the Potomac, about 12 miles from the city of Washington, until the evening of

the 24th, when he crossed over to Alexandria, and proceeded to Montgomery court house, to join the main army.

The enemy, on the evening of the 25th, made the greatest exertions to leave the city of Washington. They had about 40 indifferent looking horses, 10 or 12 carts and waggons, one ox cart, one coach, and several gigs; these were sent to Bladensburg to move off the wounded; a drove of 60 or 70 cattle preceded this party. Arriving at Bladensburg, the British Surgeon was ordered to select the wounded who could walk; the 40 horses were mounted by those who could ride; the carts and waggons loaded, and upwards of 90 wounded left behind. About 12 o'clock at night, the British army passed through Bladensburg and parties continued until morning, and stragglers until after mid day. The retreat of the enemy to his shipping was precipitate apparently under an alarm and it is supposed that it was known to him that our forces had marched to Montgomery court house.

The hon. Richard Rush, Gen. Stansbury, Major Wm. Pinkney, Dr. Catlett, and Mr. Law, all remark, Gen. Winder was active, and zealous, encouraged the men and exposed himself, and acted as a man of firmness during the engagement, and endeavored to rally, with other officers, the lines as they gave way.

There seems to be a general concurrence of statement, that our forces were much fatigued, and worn down with marching, counter marching, and their strength much exhausted, during their service, by remaining under arms much of the night, as well as the day, by false alarms, and otherwise. Nor does it appear, that it was generally known, among the officers and men of the first line, that the forces from the city were formed behind in the second line, to meet the enemy and support them. This statement is made by Gen. Stansbury, Maj. Wm. Pinkney, and some other officers of the first line.

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