

INTERROGATION OF  
AIKAWA, YOSHISUKE

7 FEBRUARY 1946.

INTERROGATOR: MR. HORWITZ

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AIKAWA, YOSHISUKE

Date and Time: 7 February 1946, 1015-1200.  
1315-1530.

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : AIKAWA, Yoshisuke  
Solis Horwitz, Interrogator  
Ingeborg Nyden, Stenographer

Unsolicited statement by AIKAWA, Yoshisuke.

When I set up the Giseikai, this organization was not to do any of the actual work itself but was to have subordinate organizations or finance other organization which were to do the actual work. At that time my ideas did not meet with the approval of other business men and there was no belief in my program on the part of my staff. I was very anxious, perhaps over-anxious, to have my idea put into effect. Accordingly I felt that a man who was more likely to get along with both the Army and the Navy and the other civilians who they would need to get the results of the plan would be the best party to have in charge of this program. I knew of such a man, Mr. KOBIYAMA, who had been associated with me in business being the head of the Showa Steel Works, a subsidiary of the Manchurian Heavy Industry Corporation. He had left the Showa Steel Works and had joined the TOSEIKAI, being the head of the iron and steel division in that group which was a bureau of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Mr. KOBIYAMA was well liked by both the Army and the navy, an unusual thing for Japan, and by civilians. He took charge of an informal group known as the Giseikai Keizai Kenkyu Kai where individual studies were made. However, Mr. KOBIYAMA had to leave his chairman ship of this group to undertake the position as Chief of the South Manchurian Railway Corporation, and while these studies did not fully carry out my plan of a miniature economic set up I felt that because the working of such a group had been publicized that I could not drop it. Accordingly I got Mr. NAGASAKI, Eizo, President of one of the oil companies to work with this group. Mr. NAGASAKI, in view of Mr. KOBIYAMA's former position with the group, preferred not to become known as formally attached to the group so that he was more or less the actual director of the group although he did not formally appear on record as being the chairman. He finally reported to me that the individual researches would be useless in view of the fact that they did not take into consideration the essential factor of timing as the basic factor. He felt, as I did, that all instantaneous phenomena in all industries must be caught at one and the same time. However, due to the fact that much of the information

necessary for such a project was kept secret by the Army and Navy I felt that this matter could not be brought about under my organization. In November of 1943, through the intervention of Mr. HOSHINO, I became a Cabinet advisor to the TOJO Cabinet. Premier TOJO, who was a very earnest and direct personality, was interested in individual researches. He was also interested in general in industries increasing both capacity and amount of production. When I joined the advisors it was on the understanding that I would not be working in any particular field but would be more or less a critical observer. However I felt that the general over-all picture was not being planned for and accordingly I proposed to Mr. HOSHINO that the Cabinet set up such an organization as I had tried to set up individually and asked him to submit the idea to Premier TOJO. Whether Mr. HOSHINO was reluctant about the idea or Premier TOJO, I do not know but on several occasions I asked Mr. HOSHINO if the matter had been taken up with Premier TOJO and obtained no satisfactory result. Finally, two weeks before the TOJO Cabinet resigned, the matter was taken up and a partial organization known as Keizai Shisaku Enren Kikan was established. This organization was not in accordance with my idea. It was on too small a scale and was doing preliminary work which the Keisai Kenkyu Kai had already done.

Mr. ROBERT HUNTER and Lt. SIEKER, of the Economic and Scientific Section, attended the interrogation at this time, and at the request of Mr. HUNTER the following questions were asked Mr. AIKAWA by Mr. HORWITZ.

- Q. Mr. AIKAWA, how much money did you expend on the research group?
- A. I do not remember.
- Q. How much are the assets of the Giseikai worth?
- A. 13,500,000 yen.
- Q. You did not touch the principal?
- A. No.
- Q. You spent the income?
- A. Yes. All spent. Donated to the government.
- Q. What did the 13,500,000 yen consist of?
- A. Some cash and stocks. Manchurian stocks small amount, 5,000,000 yen.
- Q. Did they have any Nissan shares?
- A. No I don't think so.
- Q. According to the records there were some Nissan Industries shares?

- A. We had some but I don't remember the exact amount.
- Q. Did it have any Manchurian Industry Development Corporation?
- A. Yes.
- Q. How much?
- A. I don't remember.
- Q. Did it have any shares of any other company?
- A. It did have but I do not remember what they were.
- Q. Did the war do much damage to the Nissan Heavy Industries Corporation?
- A. Hardly any. In the Yokohama plant we had they had some damage.
- Q. What would your estimate be of the damage?
- A. Only one bomb that hit the creek and did some damage although I do not know what later damage was done.
- Q. Did the Giseikai own any Shirokiya Department store shares?
- A. There were two organizations, the Giseikai and the Nissankai, both of which were juridical persons and one of them had the Shirokiya Department Store shares. However I forgot which one had such shares.
- Q. Was the Shirokiya Department store damaged during the war?
- A. There was a great deal of damage there. My office was there, and those burned pamphlets came from there.
- Q. Did Giseikai own  $7\frac{1}{2}\%$  of the stock of the Shirokiya Department store?
- A. I do not remember. I had no personal interest in these financial matters and therefore did not pay much attention to them.
- Q. At the present time does the Giseikai own any shares other than the Nissan Security company shares?
- A. They did own some but I do not remember just what outside of the Manchuria Investment Securities Company. They owned all the voting stock of the Manchuria Investment Securities Company's stock. This had a paid up value of 5 million yen.
- Q. And 20 Japanese life insurance companies owned the non-voting stock?

- A. I do not remember the exact number?
- Q. The total subscription of the life insurance companies amounted to 395 million yen?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Did they transfer the assets or were they going to transfer the assets of the Giseikai to the Nissankai?
- A. We tried to be it was not permitted, but it would take a long time, and they came to the decision to give up the idea and donate it to the government.
- Q. Did you donate it to the government?
- A. I think so. I believe it had been done when I left.
- Q. Who was in charge of the transferring of it to the government?
- A. Mr. KISHIMOTO.
- Q. Did you turn everything over to the government? All the assets?
- A. Yes I thought the Manchurian Investment Security Company shares-- all assets, except a trifle left - but almost all.
- Q. Was the Manchurian Security Investment Company stock turned over to the government?
- A. I was going to but it was frozen. Not allowed to remove that.
- Q. When did you come to Sugamo?
- A. December 17.
- Q. Up to that time, as you recall, everything had been transferred to the government except the Manchurian Investment Company stock and a little bit of the other assets?
- A. Yes. I don't know whether they was completed or finished. Anyhow it was decided before I came over here.
- Q. Did Nissankai have any assets? What was the value of those assets?
- A. That is very intricate.
- Q. Where are the assets of Nissankai? What did you do with those?
- A. They are for public benefit.

- Q. You are planning to continue the Nissankai?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Does Nissankai own two-thirds share of Kobushiki Kaisha Nissan?
- A. I forget. Manchurian Investment owned some of that. The Nissan subsidiaries owned some too.
- Q. That stock was not sold to the public?
- A. No. Private. Not public.
- Q. Is Nissan Fire and Marine Insurance Co. still operating.
- A. Yes.
- Q. Is that still a good investment? Has it been greatly affected by the war?
- A. I do not know.
- Q. Do you think it is still a good investment? Now is it a good investment?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. How about KANTO Industry Company?
- A. No good.
- Q. What was their main business, KANTO Industry?
- A. It used to make shells during the war, under the direction of the Arsenal.
- Q. How about Nissan Life Insurance Company. Is that a good investment?
- A. It is about average.
- Q. Is there a company known as the Japan Real Estate Company?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Is there also a company known as the Japan Security Company?
- A. I don't remember. Maybe a subsidiary company of Manchuria Investment Security Company.
- Q. Is there a company known as the Nippon Land and Security Company?
- A. Yes, there is.

- Q. Is that the same as the Japan Real Estate Company?
- A. I don't know. It probably is the same. Mr. KISHIMOTO could probably clarify this. He knows very well.
- Q. Was Hitachi Engineering Company badly damaged during the war?
- A. A good deal.
- Q. How much?
- A. I don't know but it was a good deal.
- Q. How about Nippon Mining, was that badly damaged by the war?
- A. I don't think so. But mining business was not very well.
- Q. Is Nippon Mining a good investment. Now is it a good company?
- A. It did not become better.
- Q. Is it coal mining?
- A. No coal. Yes, a subsidiary company has coal.
- Q. What are its main mines?
- A. Gold, copper, lead, something like that. All kinds. Copper is predominant. Used to produce about one-third of Japan's production in regard to copper.
- Q. Nippon Transport, was that an airplane company?
- A. No good. Wooden airplanes. Only made the wooden parts, fuselage. They are now making desks or furniture - something like that.
- Q. Is that a good business?
- A. I do not think so.
- Q. Nissan Contractors--what kind of a concern was that?
- A. Civil engineering. Building contractors.
- Q. How big a business was that?
- A. No business.
- Q. What kind of things did they do?

A. I do not know what they are doing. Before they were building subsidiary companies factories. Occasionally they do other things but it was set up as company to take care of subsidiary companies.

Q. Mr. AIKAWA, what do you own personally in these companies?

A. I do not own much, just a bit.

Q. Do you know what you do own?

A. I do not remember.

Q. Do you have a record of what you personally own?

A. Yes, we have record in my home.

Q. Could we obtain that record from your home?

A. Get that from Mr. KISHIMOTO. He will get that information for you.

Q. We want to know what kind of securities you have.

A. I will write a letter to Mr. KISHIMOTO asking that he give information about securities and holdings, and cash.

Recess for lunch at 1200. End of questioning on behalf of Mr. HUNTER.

Interrogation resumed at 1315.

Q. Did you see Gen. ISHIHARA in Manchuria?

A. Some times also saw him in Japan.

Q. Gen. ISHIHARA is the man who told you about setting up an independent country?

A. I think so. I am not sure.

Q. Do you know Gen. DOIHARA?

A. I know him by face. I saw him at banquet or some place like that.

Q. Are you sure you never met him many years ago when you were in Manchuria or China?

A. No.

Q. I am going to show you a letter. I want you to read it and tell me if you remember it?

A. This I don't remember.



- Q. This is a letter addressed to Gen. DOIHARA?
- A. This is a letter of introduction. Yes.
- Q. Did you take this letter to Gen. DOIHARA?
- A. No, no, never.
- Q. Did you go to see Gen. DOIHARA?
- A. I don't remember. I don't see him before.
- Q. When he wrote this letter you didn't go to see him?
- A. Yes.
- Q. You didn't go to China to see him?
- A. Some time I went to China, to Tsintao.
- Q. This letter was written about 1928?
- A. I went once to Tsintao with Mr. OKURA, on the same boat.
- Q. When was that?
- A. That was 6th or 7th year of Taisho, about 1916 or 1918. That was when Oriental Iron and Steel Company was organized.
- Q. Was Gen. DOIHARA there then?
- A. I don't remember.
- Q. Here you have a letter of introduction. This letter says at this time a man who was at the head of Kuhara Mining Company - - - you weren't at the head of the Kuhara Mining Company then. To what does this letter refer?
- A. This letter is different, another one I think. I did not go over there. This refers to YuanSHIKEI. This was many years ago.
- Q. When was this?
- A. That was when I started the Oriental Iron & Steel Company, was organized then by several businessmen in Japan by Baron GO, Seinosuke. May be mistaken about time but that might be a little after the first European war broke, I think. I was running Tobata Foundry Company. We started to build up a big steel plant in Tobata and then there were lots of undertakings about iron and steel at that time because they needed so much steel and there were many plannings there. One

big one is Mr. GO and he asked KUHARA--I wanted Tobata--we wanted to start another large steel business in Tobata, and I referred that to Mr. KUHARA so we can get money out of the Kuhara Mining Company because TOBATA Foundry Company was so small we cannot finance. I asked KUHARA to invest money in Tobata Kuhara Mining Company. That was my idea. At that time the Oriental Iron and Steel Works were planned and they looked around for sites.

Q. Who was planning?

A. Baron GO and his associates. Various business men at that time. They were looking around for sites for areas for the iron and steel to be built up. It is not settled. But we ourselves had a good site for the Tobata. We didn't care to build separately. We thought it was a good thing to merge together.

Q. What did you want to combine?

A. Tobata and Oriental because Oriental was looking around for sites. We have already sites but I could not achieve enough money so I thought it is better to merge with Oriental. So we consulted together and then I became one of the directors of Oriental Steel. It was at that time, I think. It was at that time when I started that steel and iron business we wanted the ores from China so at that time we must consult with Chinese figures.

Q. Did Mr. KUHARA ever send you on a mission to China?

A. Yes, at that time.

Q. That was when?

A. Right after the <sup>World</sup> great/war broke out. 1917.

Q. Was this letter written about that?

A. I don't remember that letter.

Q. Don't you remember whether Mr. KUHARA told you that he was getting a letter of introduction for you?

A. I don't remember at all.

Q. Have you ever seen this letter before?

A. No. Never.

Q. Never saw this letter before?

A. No. Never.

Q. When you went over to China?

- A. I didn't go there at that time.
- Q. Why didn't you go?
- A. I can't go over there. I do not remember the reason but I didn't go.
- Q. You had planned to go but you didn't go?
- A. I didn't go.
- Q. Did you go to China at any other time?
- A. Later.
- Q. When?
- A. That may be before. We saw Mr. Gary in KUHARA's house.
- Q. When did you see Mr. Gary?
- A. That's a story.
- Q. We have a letter written by Baron TANAKA to Gen. DOIHARA telling him you are to come to China and he is to have conferences with you. You say you know nothing at all about this letter?
- A. I don't remember was it DOIHARA or not. Whether or not I took the letter or not. I don't remember now.
- Q. When did you go to China?
- A. I did not go to China. I went just before the Oriental Steel company was organized.
- Q. When?
- A. Right after the war - to Tsintao. That is about, I think, 1917. I may be a year or two off but that is approximately the time.
- Q. Did you go to China at any time during the 1920s?
- A. 1939.
- Q. Didn't you go during 1927 or 1928?
- A. No, never.
- Q. You went in 1917 and after that you never went to China until 1939?
- A. Never.
- Q. Did you go to Manchuria during 1925, 1926, 1928?

A. No. Never. I never went to China, Korea or Manchukuo before 1936 except Tsintao.

Q. And you went there when?

A. That was about 1917. That is different man. They don't show the year. There are two connections. One is Mr. Gary for steel, other Oriental.

Q. Did you go to China in connection with Mr. Gary?

A. No.

Q. In connection with the Oriental Steel Works you did go?

A. No, No. Before that. Before making the merger with Oriental Steel and Iron. I went to China in 1917 to get the necessary iron ore.

Q. Did Mr. KUHARA ever ask you to go to China, or to Manchukuo, or to Korea at any other time?

A. No. That is only case is Mr. Gary's connection.

Q. At what time was Mr. Gary's connection?

A. Anyhow before 1917. It was before 1917.

Q. Mr. KUHARA asked you to go to China at that time?

A. That was Gary's connection.

Q. You didn't go to China?

A. The only time I went there was some time between 1916 and 1918 in order to find ore. There is a Japanese railroad from Tsintao. There is an iron ore mine which is what we wanted to get. So I went there once.

Q. Does this letter refer to that one time?

A. I don't remember. I didn't meet DOIHARA. I don't remember. I went there with government steel works man and Mr. OKURA on the same boat.

Q. You have no remembrance about what this letter is about?

A. Yes. Mr. Yuan SHIKAI must refer to Mr. Gary's question at that time, I think. Later than that the Oriental & Tobacco was going at that time, wanted to have some connection with the ores from there. Maybe that. That must be 1916, 1917, 1918, something like that. Later I never go there.

Q. When was Gen. DOIHARA over there - in 1916 or 1918?

- A. I don't think.
- Q. Why did TANAKA write a letter to DOIHARA over there if he wasn't there?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. When was Col. BANZAI over there?
- A. I never saw him. I don't know Col. BANZAI.
- Q. You don't know why this letter was written?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. This letter is about you. It says you are going over there representing Mr. KUHARA, something very secret and important to talk about. You should remember about this.
- A. Partly I recall. Anyhow it was 191, - never later than that.
- Q. You never left Japan from 1917 to 1936?
- A. Never left Japan. I don't recall ever having left Japan in the years from 1918 to 1936. Never went to Korea, Manchukuo, China during those years. If this letter is later than that it may not be true. There is something wrong. I don't know so there must have been some scheme that I don't know. Must be if it is later than that. I never took such a letter. If it is so I must take that when I went to Tsintao.
- Q. Do you remember taking the letter when you went to Tsintao?
- A. I don't remember.
- Q. At that time DOIHARA was in Tsintao?
- A. I don't remember. Very little I saw him. Whom I met in Tsintao I don't remember.
- Q. In other words, do you think this is a scheme of Mr. KUHARA's with which you didn't go along?
- A. I don't know. If it was after 1917 I had nothing to do with it and I know nothing about it. I didn't go. It is 90% sure that I didn't go.
- Q. What if I told you that Gen. DOIHARA says this letter was written in 1927 - 1928?
- A. At that time I became the president of Nissan that year.

- Q. Did you leave Japan in that year?
- A. No, never.
- Q. Did you see Gen. DOIHARA in that year?
- A. No, I don't remember him. Maybe I met with him when I went to North China and China in 1939. Maybe at that time I met him. I don't remember. During that time I have no remembrance.
- Q. In 1939 Yuan was dead. It couldn't refer to that, could it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. It would have to be written before 1939 since Yuan was dead?
- A. Sure. Must be that. It has a character which is probably that of Yuan, which means it would have to be written before 1939 when I went to North China.
- Q. Could this have been one of Mr. KUHARA's schemes that was planned but he never talked to you about?
- A. If this is 1920 he came from Russia and I took his post. At that time KUHARA went away from the business circles so he joined to Tanaka, I being left to run the business for myself and I had no scheme or prospectus on China at all for that time. I was quite busy reorganizing that company as I talked before to you.
- Q. You didn't go to China for Mr. KUHARA at that time?
- A. No. Not at that time. This letter does not refer to events of 1917 or 1918 when I went to China. It must refer to something else-- it doesn't fit with the 1917 trip. This is to set up business in China. I had no such idea.
- Q. Did Mr. KUHARA talk to you about that?
- A. I don't remember. Nothing at all. This letter couldn't have been written in 1917 and must have been written at a later time. It is therefore an error when it says that I was never in China because I had been in Tsintao, although this may mean that I never made an extensive trip in China. This person EN referred to may be Yuan Shi Kai or it may be some other person.
- Q. This couldn't have been written when you went to Tsintao?
- A. No how. If it was 1929 I was already president but I have no recollection of this at all. I don't know anything about this at all. I can't recall now. I will try and recollect.

Q. You talked with Mr. Gary? What was that about?

A. We talked with Mr. Gary and had to cooperate with him. That was in China, several times. You can get story from Mr. KUHARA. At that time Mr. Gary came over there. I went to America later. I went to America and saw Mr. Gary at his country house. Met and had lots of interviews with him - wanted to cooperate with us in China for the development of China together with mines. That did not materialize. I have no idea of such a letter if it was later than that.

Q. You said this letter couldn't have been written in 1917?

A. This undertaking in China- I have no idea at all. I have no business before KUHARA's time.

Q. Could this letter have been written in 1917? Is it possible or impossible?

A. Impossible.

Q. Let us return to this morning's discussion.

A. Although the plan adopted in the last days of the TOJO Cabinet did not meet my idea I was told by Mr. HOSHINO that I was the person responsible for the plan and that I would have to take the position of leadership, not as a government official but as an advisor. I have never accepted political office. Even though Prince KONOYE had asked me once or twice to become the minister of Industries and Commerce. However, I refused. The newspapers always carried rumors that I was to assume this office but I never did. On this occasion in the TOJO Cabinet I did not have to accept the office because the plan did not materialize due to TOJO's resignation. During the KOISO cabinet the integrated Planning Board came out under the leadership of the Premier. I expected that this would develop into my type of an organization but nothing developed from it. At that time I heard a report that came to me that this time the conditions for putting my plan into effect would be better. That this time timing would be taken into consideration and, moreover, some of the secret data would be obtained, but nothing at all developed from it. In the SUZUKI Cabinet it was too late. My general conclusion was that this type of organization that I had in mind was absolutely necessary for Japan for several reasons. First, I thought that we have to eliminate the attitude of rushing into things blindly and purge such element from our economy. Second, that we would be able to set up an integrated national and well balanced plan, and, third, that we would have a means within the government whereby the military and the government, particularly the military, could see for themselves just where we were going and that industry could not be pressured to produce impossible results, and that the time would come that the higher officers would recognize that they could not continue going on as they have been in the past and would have to stop the

war while Japan still had a chance. During TOJO's time I could not say this. I never told this to TOJO because I believed that things would turn out all right. KOISO was a broad minded man and I thought I might be able to tell it to him but I never got the chance. If the organization which KOISO had set up had worked out along the idea which I had planned for, I would have had the opportunity to prove it to him.

Q. The other day you made a statement that you told certain people that Japan must lose, so will you now please tell us if you recall those people?

A. With the exception of Mr. KISHIMOTO with whom I talked the matter over a great deal, I never came out directly to anyone and said that Japan would lose this war although I felt that this was the situation. It would have been very dangerous for me to do so and I would have been considered as being anti-Japanese and would have been arrested, and, furthermore, my plan which would allow the Army to see what the actual situation was for themselves would have been defeated if I had taken such an open stand. However, while at the beginning, since we did not know what the government potential and the strategy was, we could not tell whether the war would be won or not, yet it was felt that business was caught between the demands of the Army and the Navy and the government. However, after Guadalcanal it became readily apparent to me that the war was going badly and that it would be 99% bad for business. What I could say, however, and did say, was that the pressure of the government upon business to increase its facilities without adequate planning and timing was self-destructive and would ruin the entire possibility. My purpose was to get the plan of timely economic planning adopted so that the Army and Navy and government could see for themselves that we could not proceed especially in view of the fact that we had arrived at the year 1944 when America's industrial potential was expected to be extremely great. Generally, among business men, we used a common expression "Kono mama dewa senso wa kitto makemasu." This can be taken in two meanings. It can be taken in its literal meaning that we will lose the war, and the other meaning is that unless we work harder and improve the situation we will lose this war. This could be said because of its encouraging meaning without getting into trouble. I have used this expression on many occasions and other business men have used it to. Things like this I said to HOSHINO and KISHIMOTO, and to HOSHINO I said even more. I told him without my plan or something like my plan, it would not go well for Japan and I felt that if they adopted my plan they would find out for themselves it would not go all right. I felt that if they adopted my plan that it should be, but without it the harder they worked the greater the loss.

Q. What efforts did you make to get foreign capital to invest in Manchuria?



A. I tried to go over to America about the end of 1937 at the time the Manchurian Industrial Company was organized. At that time I was prepared to go but unfortunately the Panay incident took place and relations were bad with the United States so I had to wait until the disturbance was settled. During that time Mr. MIHO was in Europe and America and we were constantly in touch with each other exchanging information. At the time of the Chinese incident KONOYE's statement had been that there would be no expansion of the incident. We thought that it would be settled soon, especially among economic circles, but the matters did not develop in accordance with Mr. KONOYE's views. Business circles thought that some third party would intermediate and that we would have a chance to stop it and they were hoping that such a chance would come about, and I thought that during such time the settlement of the foreign capital question could be brought about. During the ABE Cabinet, 1939, I tried again to go to America but it was stopped. Perhaps this was due to the foreign office having a personal reason for not giving me a passport, and I therefore did not achieve my desire. In order to stop criticism, although I did not know in which direction to turn because of my inability to go to America, I decided to take a trip to Europe and Mr. YOSHINO took over the business. I had in mind to go to England and America from Europe if the conditions warranted my going. I started out at the end of 1939 in company of Mr. MIHO and Mr. KISHIMOTO. I first went to Moscow and TOJO was Ambassador to Russia at that time.

Q. What did you do in Russia?

A. I met the Foreign Trade Minister MIKOYAN. He was an old acquaintance of Mr. KUHARA. Then I met Mr. MOLOTOV. During my stay in Moscow I saw many things that went on and knowing what is going on there I got pleasure and appreciation out of seeing how well they were working out their plan. I thought that STALIN would make a great business man and was not an ordinary politician. I did not try to get any capital in Russia. Seeing Communism in operation we found it to be quite different from what we had been told it would be. I was strong for their idea of building up heavy industry first for a good development of industry. It was clear that the general prosperity and contentment of the people was growing every year. We found many good points that we felt it was necessary for us to study. From there we left and went to Berlin.

I, SOLIS HORWITZ, certify that on 7 February 1946, personally appeared before me AIKAWA, Yoshisuke; that the interrogation was conducted in the English language between AIKAWA, Yoshisuke and me; that AIKAWA, Yoshisuke gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan

8 February 1946

Solis Horwitz

I, INGEBOG NYDEN, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Ingeborg Nyden