

NOTE:

DOCUMENT #1379

Photostat: Memo of conference between Ribbentrop and Jap Ambassador Sato in presence of Kurusu and Stahmer.

The Photostatic copy and other papers herein enclosed are Nurnberg Document and are not to be removed from the vault.

The IPS document also in this file may be charged out.

    NURNBERG DOCUMENT



UNCLASSIFIED

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE**  
**WASHINGTON**



**DEPARTMENTAL RECORDS BRANCH, T.A.G.O.**

UNCLASSIFIED



MEMORANDUM On the conversation between the Foreign Minister of the Reich and the Japanese Ambassador, SATO, in the presence of Ambassador KURUSU and Consul General STAEMER, 8 July 1940.

After a word of thanks for the hospitality shown by the German Government and congratulations on the victory of Germany over France, Ambassador SATO declared that just as in Europe the new order would now be brought about by Germany, Japan on her part had been exerting herself for three years to establish a new order in the Far East and in the South Seas. In these parallel efforts a very close cooperation between Germany and Japan seems to have been in operation. For three years Japan had been holding the attention of the English, the French, and the American Governments and thereby in a certain sense rendered Germany's task in the establishment of the new order in Europe easier. In this manner the Governments of both countries could mutually support each other.

As far as Soviet Russia was concerned, Japan was under the existing circumstances obliged to seek to maintain good neighborly relations with Russia, just as Germany was also obliged to maintain good relations with Russia. In this respect also Japan and Germany could cooperate.

About America, Ambassador SATO stated that Japan has drawn the attention of that country to herself since the beginning of the Chinese war and that she tied up the American fleet in the Pacific Ocean. It is Japan's opinion that America must not overstep her zone consisting of North and South America and must not intervene in European or Far Eastern matters. The pursuit of this principle is also in the mutual interest of both countries. Ambassador SATO closed his remarks by stressing anew the common interests of Germany and Japan and the necessity of their cooperation. This cooperation must also encompass economic matters.

In regard to China, Ambassador SATO added that Japan is at present putting forth strong endeavors to finish the Chinese war, which has lasted now for three years, in order to gain free hands. In this connection he pointed out that public opinion in Japan has become extraordinarily nervous in respect to Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies.



The REICHER FOREIGN MINISTER noted with satisfaction Japan's wish to cooperate with Germany in all fields. He believed that German-Japanese cooperation in itself represented nothing new. He himself had been one of those who years ago had furthered this cooperation with KURUSU's predecessor, General OSEIMA, and it had already borne fruit for both parties. Germany had made noteworthy use of it in her fight for equal rights, whilst Japan had doubtless drawn considerable advantages throughout the whole period of her struggle for China down to the present day from the existence of a strong Germany. Without the existence of a re-strengthened Germany, Japan could not have been able to penetrate as deeply into English and other spheres of interest in East Asia as it has actually happened. The natural interest of both powers in cooperation arises from these facts.

Plans for a very close cooperation between Japan, Germany and Italy had already been taken into consideration some time before. They miscarried because - as appeared again from the latest speeches of Japanese statesmen - Japan was not interested in European concerns.

As a result of Germany's victory over France, a great revision in all factors of foreign policy would follow. He personally believed that in the future, further possibilities for friendly cooperation with Japan would exist in the framework of the New Order in Europe now taking shape. At the present moment he would say nothing of the details of the form which this cooperation was to take, as he was acquainted with the German intentions but not with Japan's political aims. He therefore asked SATO for a further explanation of the principles of the political line which Japan proposed to pursue. He would be especially interested to hear from the Japanese side what was their thought of cooperation with Germany, whether only in the economic sphere or in which other way.

Ambassador SATO replied that it was comprehensible that for outsiders the Japanese Policy had been difficult to understand. For nine years, that is, since the outbreak of the Manchurian conflict, Japan had been trying to orient her policy in a set direction, but had time and again subsequently been forced to moderate this new orientation somewhat. In regard to the new order in the Far East, for Japan it is above all a question of permitting a new China to arise with which it could have friendly relations. The solidarity between this new China and Japan would guarantee peace in the Far East. In order to achieve this aim, Japan had for several



years been fighting obstinately against the so-called regime from Washington which finds expression in the treaties of 1921, especially in the Nine Power Pact. This Washington regime did not give China and Japan but the Anglo-Saxons the predominance in the Far East. Japan did not, however, by any means wish to eliminate the foreigners from the Far East. Quite the contrary. It also wishes to concede an appropriate place to economic cooperation with Germany in China.

In its relations with America Japan must of course be very careful.

To the question of the FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE REICH as to what in reality then was the basic reason for the difficulties between Japan and America, SATO answered that this cause lay in the struggle of Japan against the system of the Nine Power Treaty. In this Japan was not fighting against the fundamental principles of this treaty. Politically, it was quite prepared to respect the independence of China. Economically it was likewise in agreement with the so-called principle of the Open Door. It did, however, wish to exchange roles and itself be the host while the other nations would be only guests in East Asia.

When the question by the Foreign Minister of the Reich concerning the deeper reasons for the difficulties which Japan was having with America was interpolated anew, SATO answered that the causes of friction with America lay less in the economic than in the humanitarian sphere. American sympathies were with China. America felt that she was in a way the protector of this country and wanted to extend her police power in the Pacific Ocean with the help of her superiority at sea. Under these circumstances Japan was at pains to end the war with China soon. SATO declared that he personally, perhaps in a certain sense in opposition to the Japanese military authorities, did not believe that Japan could march to Chungking. It was, therefore, necessary to seek a solution of the Chinese question on some other than on a military basis. For this reason Japan had supported the government of Wang Ching wei and was prepared to conclude a generous agreement with it. Japan absolutely did not wish to meddle in Chinese affairs or force anything upon the Chinese, but on the contrary was prepared to negotiate with Wang Ching wei on the basis of equality. If the Chinese were sensible, a result would doubtless be achieved, under which China would not lose face. In this case America would also perhaps gradually change its attitude and be more



friendly toward Japan. America's economic interests in China were not large, but just this fact alone did not absolutely tend to help clarify the situation. In view of the considerable economic interests of England in this area, an agreement could much more easily be made with her than with the Americans, who take an entirely different view of things.

At the conjecture of the Foreign Minister of the Reich that perhaps America was uneasy about the rising power of Japan and her ever more powerful fleet, and that the differences of opinion with that country were based on the fact that America, who up to now had been ruling alone in the Pacific Ocean, now found herself in the position of being forced to share this rule with Japan, SATO answered in the affirmative and added that the efforts of Japan in particular to achieve naval parity with America, and the fact that Japan was keeping the new additions to her fleet a secret had especially aroused ill feeling in America. For this reason, in particular after the entry of Stimson into the Government, Japan had to be very careful in regard to America in order not to provoke this country into making severe measures against Japan. To be sure, America had already abrogated the commercial treaty, but an export embargo against Japan had not yet been instituted. Because of the supply of petroleum and iron, the Japanese were still exceedingly dependent on America.

The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER replied that he had always held the view that a strong policy also promotes the economy. It would always fare worse as a result of the formulation of a weaker policy. Germany has her own experiences in this sphere. At the time when she was politically weak and the governments at the time maintained that one had to give way for economic reasons, Germany had, in the end, obtained no economic advantages for her conciliatory behavior. Now Germany is strong and her trade is flourishing. She gets all she needs supplied from other lands in addition to all the economic alleviations such as credits and the like.

Even a few months ago Germany had been considered as an encircled country. But now England is as completely encircled as no other land in world history. In gold, which has streamed in such great amounts to America, Germany is no more interested. The German Reich in its thousand years existence would never again build anything on gold. In Germany gold has been dethroned and other countries would



be bound to follow this example. Now, when England is so menaced, the stores of gold had been transported from there to the United States, so that about 85-90% of all the world's gold might be found there. The result of that is that the United States at the end of the war will be choked by gold and goods and would be glad to sell to other lands, for example Japan, under favorable conditions everything that those lands needed.

Germany, economically, is as good as completely independent. Many things, which were previously imported are produced by herself or else she has found a substitute for them. After the war the European economic sphere will be completely independent. That does not mean that Germany no more desires any world trade. Quite the opposite! However this new world trade must run on the basis of the independence of the participating economic spheres and the exchange of surplus. The old world trade rested on the possibility, always, possessed by England, of blockading other countries and cutting off their raw material supplies. In the New World Order Japan in East Asia, Russia in Asia, Germany and Italy in Europe would have the power of decision and also in Africa would Germany and Italy particularly, perhaps with some other interested party, exercise predominance.

The Foreign Minister of the Reich then came to speak on the attitude of the South American countries. The South American states, which Roosevelt tried to link economically with North America, appeared to know that after the war the United States would not be able to import the South American raw products and already turned towards Europe in order to insure the export of their goods after the war. But whoever wishes to trade with Europe, must in the future turn towards Germany.

SATO replied that he, not being an economist, could not express any opinion on economic questions. If, however, the exchange of goods rested no longer on the gold basis, then one could not very well turn back to a free exchange of goods with the rejection of commercial arrangements with foreign bills of exchange and other trade barriers.

As far as the United States are concerned, Japan was, possibly, not impressed by the economic pressure as much as by the American fleet and had to be careful for that reason. Besides, the United States would not be able to remain neutral in the European conflict once she came into a conflict with Japan.



The Reich Foreign Minister admitted that the Japanese situation was difficult and that Japan had to orient her policy according to the opportunities of the situation. He stated moreover, regarding the gold question that it was not a question of Germany not possessing any gold, but that German economy would never again be dependent on gold, i.e., on international speculation.

As regards Russia, the Reich Foreign Minister referred to the efforts which he had made for some years past to influence Ambassador OSHEMA in the direction of an understanding between Japan and Russia. Germany concluded a lasting agreement with Russia and the interests of both countries were very clearly outlined by one another. He welcomed the efforts which Japan had also made, in the previous months, to come to an understanding for her part with Russia.

In conclusion, SATO put up one more question which he himself said was a little indiscreet. What does Germany think the future shape of Europe will be?

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the German Government was only busying itself with one question at the moment, namely how is the war to be carried on and how is it to be brought to a victorious conclusion. For that reason he could not yet say much about the political future. The only thing that is certain is that the still remaining enemy of Germany - England - will be defeated.

Berlin, 9 July 1940.

Signed      SCHMIDT  
                  Envoy



I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U. S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

W. P. CUMMING

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946

G. H. GARDE

G. H. GARDE

Lt. Colonel AGD

Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U. S.)



AFFIDAVIT

I, Paul O. Schmidt, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That from 1923 to the collapse of the German Reich in May 1945, I was Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office, and as such was personally present and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at all important Foreign Office and other conferences between German Government leaders and representatives of foreign governments.

2. That in addition to being Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office as aforesaid, I was also after the year 1939 the Head of the Secretariat General of the German Foreign Office and that my latest government rank was that of a Minister in the German Foreign Office.

3. That while acting as interpreter and/or secretary at such meetings above referred to, it was my official duty to and I did take notes concerning the conversations that took place, and at the conclusion of each such meeting, I prepared from such notes a complete and detailed record of what was said and transpired at such meetings.

4. That the records prepared by me became the official German Government records of what was said and transpired at such meetings. That one copy of the record was filed with the Ministers Office Section of the German Foreign Office, which office acted in the capacity of secretary to said Foreign Office. That another copy of the record of each of such meetings was filed with the Private Secretariat of the German Foreign Minister. That a third copy of the record of each of such meetings was retained by me.

5. That said meetings, concerning which I made a record as aforesaid, were of historical importance and that such records were also prepared by me for the express purpose of maintaining and preserving a record of such meetings for historical purposes.

6. That the document attached hereto is a true and correct photostatic copy of the original record, prepared personally by me in the manner herein set forth and concerning a conference held on July 8th 1940 between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Japanese ambassador Sato in the presence of the ambassador K u r u s u and the Consul-General S t a h m e r.

7. That I personally attended and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at the conference last above mentioned and that the record prepared by me, and of which the attached document is a photostatic copy, is a true and accurate account of what was said and transpired at said conferences.

8. That I have been advised and am aware of the fact that the herein affidavit and the document attached hereto may be used in connection with the prosecution of Japanese War Criminals and make this affidavit freely and voluntarily and with knowledge of the above facts.

Dr. Paul O. Schmidt  
PAUL C. SCHMIDT

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Nurnberg, Germany this third day  
of May 1946

Smith W. Brookhart, Jr.,  
Lt Colonel IGD O-508524



MEMORANDUM On the conversation between the Foreign Minister of the Reich and the Japanese Ambassador, SATO, in the presence of Ambassador KURUSU and Consul General STAMER, 8 July 1940.

After a word of thanks for the hospitality shown by the German Government and congratulations on the victory of Germany over France, Ambassador SATO declared that just as in Europe the new order would now be brought about by Germany, Japan on her part had been exerting herself for three years to establish a new order in the Far East and in the South Seas. In these parallel efforts a very close cooperation between Germany and Japan seems to have been in operation. For three years Japan had been holding the attention of the English, the French, and the American Governments and thereby in a certain sense rendered Germany's task in the establishment of the new order in Europe easier. In this manner the Governments of both countries could mutually support each other.

As far as Soviet Russia was concerned, Japan was under the existing circumstances obliged to seek to maintain good neighborly relations with Russia, just as Germany was also obliged to maintain good relations with Russia. In this respect also Japan and Germany could cooperate.

About America, Ambassador SATO stated that Japan has drawn the attention of that country to herself since the beginning of the Chinese war and that she tied up the American fleet in the Pacific Ocean. It is Japan's opinion that America must not overstep her zone consisting of North and South America and must not intervene in European or Far Eastern matters. The pursuit of this principle is also in the mutual interest of both countries. Ambassador SATO closed his remarks by stressing anew the common interests of Germany and Japan and the necessity of their cooperation. This cooperation must also encompass economic matters.

In regard to China, Ambassador SATO added that Japan is at present putting forth strong endeavors to finish the Chinese war, which has lasted now for three years, in order to gain free hands. In this connection he pointed out that public opinion in Japan has become extraordinarily nervous in respect to Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies.



The REICE FOREIGN MINISTER noted with satisfaction Japan's wish to cooperate with Germany in all fields. He believed that German-Japanese cooperation in itself represented nothing new. He himself had been one of those who years ago had furthered this cooperation with KURUSU's predecessor, General OSHIMA, and it had already borne fruit for both parties. Germany had made noteworthy use of it in her fight for equal rights, whilst Japan had doubtless drawn considerable advantages throughout the whole period of her struggle for China down to the present day from the existence of a strong Germany. Without the existence of a re-strengthened Germany, Japan could not have been able to penetrate as deeply into English and other spheres of interest in East Asia as it has actually happened. The natural interest of both powers in cooperation arises from these facts.

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Ambassador SATO replied that it was comprehensible that for outsiders the Japanese Policy had been difficult to understand. For nine years, that is, since the outbreak of the Manchurian conflict, Japan had been trying to orient her policy in a set direction, but had time and again subsequently been forced to moderate this new orientation somewhat. In regard to the new order in the Far East, for Japan it is above all a question of permitting a new China to arise with which it could have friendly relations. The solidarity between this new China and Japan would guarantee peace in the Far East. In order to achieve this aim, Japan had for several



years been fighting obstinately against the so-called regime from Washington which finds expression in the treaties of 1921, especially in the Nine Power Pact. This Washington regime did not give China and Japan but the Anglo-Saxons the predominance in the Far East. Japan did not, however, by any means wish to eliminate the foreigners from the Far East. Quite the contrary. It also wishes to concede an appropriate place to economic cooperation with Germany in China.

In its relations with America Japan must of course be very careful.

To the question of the FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE REICH as to what in reality then was the basic reason for the difficulties between Japan and America, SATO answered that this cause lay in the struggle of Japan against the system of the Nine Power Treaty. In this Japan was not fighting against the fundamental principles of this treaty. Politically, it was quite prepared to respect the independence of China. Economically it was likewise in agreement with the so-called principle of the Open Door. It did, however, wish to exchange roles and itself be the host while the other nations would be only guests in East Asia.

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Berlin, 9 July 1940.

Signed      SCHMIDT  
                  Envoy



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1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U. S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

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W. P. CUMMING

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946

G. H. GARDE

G. H. GARDE

Lt. Colonel AGD

Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U. S.)



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Dr. Paul O. Schmidt  
PAUL O. SCHMIDT

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Nurnberg, Germany this third day  
of May 1946

Smith W. Brookhart, Jr.,  
Lt Colonel IGD O-508524



No TR

27 August 46

The following has been  
extracted from this file for  
presentation in evidence.  
(Mr. Hyde).

Items: 1379

Frames: 46434 - 46443

W A Wagner



*Not  
checked*

## MEMORANDUM

## Concerning

the conversation between the Foreign Minister of the Reich and the Japanese Ambassador, SATO, in the presence of Ambassador KURUSU and General Consul STAHRER, 8 July 1940.

After a word of thanks for the hospitality shown by the German Government and congratulations on the victory of Germany over France, Ambassador Sato declared that just as in Europe the new order would now be brought about by Germany, Japan on her part had been exerting herself for three years to establish a new order in the Far East and in the South Seas regions. In these parallel efforts a very close cooperation between Germany and Japan seems to have been in operation. For three years Japan had been holding the attention of the English, the French, and the American Governments and thereby in a certain sense rendered Germany's task in the establishment of the new order in Europe easier. In this manner the Governments of both countries could mutually support each other.

As far as Soviet Russia was concerned, Japan was under the existing circumstances obliged to seek to maintain good neighborly relations with Russia, just as Germany was also obliged to maintain good relations with Russia. In this respect also Japan and Germany could cooperate.

About America, Ambassador SATO stated that Japan has drawn the attention of that country to herself since the beginning of the Chinese war and that she tied up the American fleet in the Pacific Ocean. It is Japan's opinion that America must not overstep her zone consisting of North and South America and must not intervene in European or Far Eastern matters. The pursuit of this principle is also in the mutual interest of both countries. Ambassador SATO closed his remarks by stressing anew the common interests of Germany and Japan and the necessity of their cooperation. This cooperation must also encompass economic matters.

In regard to China, Ambassador SATO added that Japan is at present putting forth strong endeavours to finish the Chinese war, which has lasted now for three years, in order to have free hands. In this connection he pointed out that public opinion in Japan has become extraordinarily nervous in respect to Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies.

The Foreign Minister noted with satisfaction Japan's wish to cooperate with Germany in all fields. He believed that German-Japanese cooperation in itself represented nothing new. He himself had been one of those who



years ago had furthered this cooperation with KURUSU's predecessor, General OSHIMA, and it had already borne fruit for both parties. Germany had made noteworthy use of it in her fight for equal rights, whilst Japan had doubtless drawn considerable advantages throughout the whole period of her struggle for China down to the present day from the existence of a strong Germany. Without the existence of a re-strengthened Germany, Japan would not have been able to penetrate as deeply into English and other spheres of interest in East Asia as actually happened. The natural interest of both powers in cooperation arises from these facts.

Plans for a very close cooperation between Japan, Germany and Italy had already been taken into consideration some time before. They miscarried because - as appeared again from the latest speeches of Japanese statesmen - Japan was not interested in European concerns.

As a result of Germany's victory over France there followed a great revision in all factors of foreign policy. He personally believed that in the future, further possibilities for friendly cooperation with Japan would exist in the framework of the New Order in Europe now taking shape. At the present moment he would say nothing of the details of the form which this cooperation was to take, as he was acquainted with the German intentions but not with Japan's political aims. He therefore asked SATO for a further explanation of the principles of the political line which Japan proposed to pursue. He would be especially interested to hear from the Japanese side what was their thought of cooperation with Germany, whether only in the economic sphere or in any other way.

Ambassador Sato replied that it was comprehensible that for outsiders the Japanese Policy was difficult to understand. For nine years, that is, since the outbreak of the Manchurian conflict, Japan had been trying to orient her policy in one direction, but had time and again subsequently been forced to moderate this new orientation somewhat. In regard to the new order in the Far East, for Japan it is above all a question of permitting a new China to arise with which it could have friendly relations. The solidarity between this new China and Japan would guarantee peace in the Far East. In order to achieve this aim, Japan had for several years been fighting obstinately against the so-called rule from Washington which finds expression in the treaties of 1921, especially in the Nine Power Pact. This Washington regime did not give China and Japan but the Anglo-Saxons the predominance in the Far East. Japan did not, however, by any means wish to eliminate the foreigners from the Far East. Quite the contrary! It also wished to concede an appropriate place to economic cooperation with Germany in China.

In its relations with America Japan must of course be very careful.



To the question of the Foreign Minister of the Reich as to what in reality then was the basic reason for the difficulties between Japan and America, Sato answered that this cause lay in the struggle of Japan against the system of the Nine Power Treaty. In this Japan was not fighting against the fundamental principles of this treaty. Politically, it was quite prepared to respect the independence of China. Economically it was likewise in agreement with the so-called principle of the Open Door. It did, however, wish to exchange roles and itself be the host while the other nations would be only guests in Eastern Asia.

When the question by the Foreign Minister of the Reich concerning the basic reasons for the difficulties which Japan was having with America was interpolated anew, Sato answered that the causes of friction with America lay less in the economic than in the humanitarian sphere. American sympathies were with China. America felt that she was in a way the protector of this country and wanted to extend her police power in the Pacific Ocean with the help of her superiority at sea. Under these circumstances Japan was at pains to end the war with China soon. Sato declared that he personally, perhaps in a certain sense in opposition to the Japanese military authorities, did not believe that Japan could march to Chungking. It was, therefore, necessary to seek a solution of the Chinese question on some other than on a military basis. For this reason Japan had supported the government of Wang Ching Wei and was prepared to make a comprehensive agreement with it. Japan absolutely did not wish to meddle in Chinese affairs or force anything upon the Chinese, but on the contrary was prepared to negotiate with Wang Ching Wei on the basis of equality. If the Chinese were sensible, a result would doubtless be achieved, under which China would not lose face. In this case America would also perhaps gradually change its attitude and be more friendly toward Japan. America's economic interests in China were not large, but just this fact alone did not absolutely tend to help clarify the situation. In view of the considerable economic interests of England in this area, an agreement could much more easily be made with her than with the Americans, who took an entirely different view of things.

At the conjecture of the Foreign Minister of the Reich that perhaps America was uneasy about the rising power of Japan and her ever more powerful fleet, and that the differences of opinion with that country were based on the fact that America, who up to now had been ruling alone in the Pacific Ocean, now found herself in the position of being forced to share this rule with Japan, Sato answered in the affirmative and added that the efforts of Japan in particular to achieve naval parity with America, and the fact that Japan was keeping everything in regard to the new additions to her fleet a secret had especially aroused ill feeling in America. For this reason, in particular after the entry of Stimson into the Government, Japan had to be



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very careful in regard to America in order not to provoke this country into taking severe measures against Japan. To be sure, America had already abrogated the commercial treaty, but an export embargo against Japan had not yet been instituted. As regards the supply of petroleum and iron, the Japanese were still exceedingly dependent on America.

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that he had always held the view that a strong policy also promoted domestic economy. It would always fare worse as a result of the formulation of a weaker policy. Germany had her own experiences in this sphere. At a time when she was politically weak and the governments at the time maintained that one had to give way for economic reasons, Germany had, in the end, obtained no economic advantages for her conciliatory behavior. Now Germany is strong and her trade is flourishing. She gets all she needs supplied from other lands in addition to all the economic relief such as credits and the like.

Even a few months ago Germany had been considered as an encircled country. But now England is as completely encircled as no other land in world history. In gold, which has streamed in such great amounts to America, Germany is no more interested. The German Reich in its thousand years existence would never again build on gold. In Germany gold has been dethroned and other countries would be bound to follow this example. Now, when England is so menaced, the stores of gold had been transported from there to the United States, so that about 85-90% of all the world's gold might be found there. The result of that is that the United States at the end of the war would be swamped with gold and goods and would be glad to sell to other lands, for example Japan, under favorable conditions everything that those lands needed.

Germany, economically, is as good as completely independent. Many things, which were previously imported are produced by herself or else she has found a substitute for them. After the war the European economic sphere will be completely independent. That does not mean that Germany no more desires any world trade. Quite the opposite! However this new world trade must run on the basis of the independence of the participating economic spheres and the exchange of surplus. The Old World's trade rested on the possibility, always, possessed by England, of blockading other countries and cutting off their raw material supplies. In the New World Order would Japan in East Asia, Russia in Asia, Germany and Italy in Europe have the power of decision and also in Africa would Germany and Italy particularly, perhaps with some other interested party, exercise predominance. The Foreign Minister then came to speak on the attitude of the South American countries. The South American states, which Roosevelt tried to link economically with North America, appeared to know that after the war the United States would not be



able to import the South American raw products and already turned towards Europe in order to insure the export of their goods after the war. But whoever wishes to trade with Europe, must in the future turn towards Germany.

SATO replied that he, not being an economist, could not express any opinion on economic questions. If, however, the exchange of goods rested no longer on the gold basis, then one could not very well turn back to a free exchange of goods with the rejection of commercial arrangements with bills of exchange and other trade barriers.

As far as the United States are concerned, Japan was, possibly, not impressed by the economic pressure as much as by the American fleet and had to be careful for that reason. Besides, the United States would not be able to remain neutral in the European conflict once she came into a conflict with Japan.

The Foreign Minister admitted that the Japanese situation was difficult and that Japan had to accommodate her policy and the actualities of the situation. He stated moreover, regarding the gold question that it was not a question of Germany not possessing any gold, but that German economy would never again be dependent on gold, i.e., on international speculation.

As regards Russia, the Foreign Minister referred to the efforts which he and Ambassador OSHIMA had made in moves for an understanding between Japan and Russia. Germany concluded a lasting agreement with Russia and the interests of both countries were very clearly outlined by one another. He welcomed the efforts which Japan had made, in the previous months, to come to an understanding for her part also with Russia.

In conclusion, SATO put up one more question which he himself said was a little indiscreet. What does Germany think the future shape of Europe will be?

The Foreign Minister replied that the German Government was only busying itself with one question at the moment, namely how is the war to be carried on and how is it to be brought to a victorious conclusion. For that reason he could not yet say much about the political future. The only thing that is certain is that the still remaining enemy of Germany - England - must be defeated.

Berlin, 9 July 1940.

Signed SCHMIDT  
Envoy



INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1379

Date 22 May 1946

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This document, containing frame numbers 46444 to 46459 incl, is in its first 5 pages identical with the second part of Item 2 of IPS Doc 1379.

The following pages deal with German and Italian military and diplomatic plans in various parts of Europe and North Africa and especially with the situation in the Mediterranean Sea.

No reference is made to Japan.

Analyst: Utter

Doc. No.



Nr. 15/40 ✓

Aufzeichnung

über

die Unterredung zwischen dem Führer und dem Grafen Ciano in Anwesenheit des Reichsaußenministers, der Botschafter von Mackensen und Alfieri und des Staatsministers Meißner, am 7. Juli 1940.

Nach einigen herzlichen Begrüßungsworten an Graf Ciano kam der Führer auf den Grund seiner Anwesenheit in Berlin zu sprechen. Erstens sei er in die Reichshauptstadt gekommen, um durch seinen Einzug eine Demonstration zu veranstalten, die der Welt die Einstellung des deutschen Volkes klar vor Augen führe. Denn im Gegensatz zu den englischen Rundfunkmeldungen sei dieses Volk nicht etwa zermürbt und gebrochen, sondern es befinde sich, wie der gestrige Tag wieder erneut gezeigt habe, absolut auf der Höhe. Zweitens diene sein Aufenthalt in Berlin der Überlegung der nunmehr zu unternehmenden Schritte und der Überprüfung der Lage zusammen mit den militärischen Sachverständigen.

Unter Umständen würde er (der Führer) noch eine Demonstration machen, um bei Fortführung des Krieges - er glaube, daß dies die einzigste <sup>in Frage kommende</sup> / Möglichkeit sei, ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ - eine psychologische Wirkung im eigenen Volk und eine propagandistisch zersetzende Wirkung beim englischen Volk zu erzielen. In der jüngsten Vergangenheit

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wäre gerade die praktische Auswirkung von Propagandamaßnahmen klar zu Tage getreten, denn die deutsche Propaganda habe in Frankreich unzweifelhaft wichtige Ergebnisse erzielt, und so würde es vielleicht auch jetzt gelingen, durch einen geschickten Appell an das englische Volk die englische Regierung weiter in England zu isolieren. Denn die Stimmung in England sei derartig, daß die Regierung jetzt schon zu Maßnahmen gegen die Pazifisten und Kriegsverweigerer gezwungen sei. Ein Krieg bestehe ja nicht aus einer einzigen Aktion, sondern aus einer Unzahl von verschiedenen Elementen und Operationen, und es komme darauf an, Imponderabilien zu schaffen und auszunutzen, von denen vielleicht jedes einzelne nicht ausschlaggebend sei, die jedoch in ihrer Gesamtwirkung die Erreichung des gewünschten Endresultats erheblich erleichtern können.

So sei es z.B. sehr gut gewesen, daß der Duce und er (der Führer) nicht auf der Auslieferung der französischen Flotte bestanden hätten. Die französische Flotte hätte man dann doch nie bekommen. Aber jetzt habe man durch diese kluge Handhabung der Flottenfrage England und Frankreich zu <sup>gegenseitige</sup> Feinden gemacht. Dies erleichtere die Situation besonders auch für Italien bedeutend und verbessere die Lage im westlichen Mittelmeer sowie die Stellung der Achsenmächte gegenüber Franco.

Der Führer gab seiner Befriedigung darüber Ausdruck, daß die Art der Formulierung der italienischen Waffenstillstandsbedingungen mit dazu beigetragen habe, die jetzige günstige Lage Frankreich gegenüber herbeizuführen. Die Tatsache, daß, obwohl in London eine französische Scheinregierung bestünde,



auf französischem Territorium eine französische Regierung unter Pétain bestehe, der sich auch die französischen Kolonien angeschlossen hätten, sei zweifellos für Italien und Deutschland von großem Vorteil. Die Lage des norditalienischen Industriegebiets sei dadurch erheblich erleichtert. Von Flugzeugträgern aus könnten die Engländer auf die Dauer Norditalien nicht länger angreifen, und wenn auch nächtliche Luftangriffe keinen bedeutenden Sachschaden anrichten, so beunruhigen sie doch die Bevölkerung und wirkten sich, wie Deutschland aus eigener Erfahrung wisse, ungünstig auf die Kriegsproduktion aus, sodaß das Aufhören solcher Angriffe eine große Entlastung darstelle.

Der Führer teilte dann dem Grafen Ciano mit, daß Deutschland demnächst über die Waffenstillstandskommission in Wiesbaden an die Franzosen die Forderung stellen würde, je einen Flugplatz östlich und westlich von Spanisch-Marokko mit französischem Bodenpersonal für die deutsche Luftwaffe bereitzustellen. Falls der Kampf zwischen Frankreich und England weiter gehen sollte, würde Deutschland dort Geschwader stationieren und in diesen Kampf miteingreifen. Diese Aktion würde jedoch unterbleiben, wenn die englisch-französischen Kampfhandlungen wieder abebbten.

Im übrigen sei Deutschland dabei, eine Umorganisation seiner Streitkräfte vorzunehmen, den Aufmarsch seiner Luftwaffe gegen England zu vollenden und die Reorganisation seiner Panzer- und Mot. Verbände durchzuführen. Mit den militärischen Sachverständigen würde der Umfang der gegen England zu führenden Operationen geklärt, denn es sei klar, daß wenn der Schlag gegen Großbritannien geführt würde, die



Operationen sich über weite Räume erstrecken müßten.

Es gäbe von Deutschland aus gesehen drei Kriegsschauplätze. 1.) Das Gebiet um England, das durch die Front von Drontheim-Stavanger bis zur Girondemündung erfaßt sei. 2.) Das Mittelmeer und 3.) das Kampffeld der U-Boote, die die von Süden und Westen nach England gelangenden Zufuhren zu unterbinden hätten, wobei die Überlegungen bezüglich der Kriegsschauplätze in Ostafrika und im Mittelmeer Italiens Angelegenheit seien. Der Führer beabsichtige, zunächst eine geschlossene Auffassung über die Fortführung der Operationen herbeizuführen, und würde dann den Duce davon in Kenntnis setzen. Nötigenfalls könnte sich ein erneuter persönlicher Meinungsaustausch am Brenner anschließen.

Von den näher liegenden Problemen sei die Durchführung des Waffenstillstandes, dessen Bedingungen <sup>zwischen</sup> ja/Deutschland und Italien abgestimmt worden seien, völlig klar. Die Auswertung dieser Bedingungen müsse so erfolgen, daß Deutschland und Italien in ihren Interessensgebieten die von ihnen gewünschten Ziele erreichten. Für Deutschland stünde diese Auswertung vor allen Dingen unter dem Motto der Fortsetzung der Operationen gegen England. Grundsätzlich müßten sich jedoch Italien und Deutschland vollständig klar darüber sein, daß Frankreich sich jetzt als unglückliches und unschuldiges Opfer britischer Verführungskünste aufspiele. Tatsächlich lägen aber die Dinge nicht so. Wenn Frankreich heute <sup>dann</sup> in der Lage wäre, so würde es sofort über Deutschland und Italien herfallen und diese Länder vernichten. Der Konflikt zwischen England und Frankreich gäbe keine Veranlassung dazu, die von Frankreich ausgehende Gefahr zu unterschätzen oder zu



verkennen. Ebenso wie es ein ewiges England mit einer bestimmten politischen Tendenz gäbe, gäbe es auch ein ewiges Frankreich mit einer genau so bestimmten achsenfeindlichen Einstellung. Der Führer bat den Grafen Ciano, dem Duce zu erklären, daß, wenn auch die deutsche Presse jetzt scheinbar für Frankreich Stellung nähme, dies nicht die geringste Abweichung von der Frankreich gegenüber zu verfolgenden Linie bedeute. Frankreich sei absolut als Feind zu behandeln, und die Weisung, die der Führer der deutschen Presse wegen einer mildereren Behandlung dieses Landes habe zugehen lassen, sei reine Taktik.

Graf Ciano erwiderte, daß Italien genau der gleichen Ansicht in Bezug auf Frankreich sei. Dieses Land spiele jetzt in geradezu klassischer Weise Theater und behaupte, es sei in eine von England gestellte Falle hineingeraten. Es wäre gefährlich, Frankreich etwa auf die deutsch-italienische Seite hinübergleiten zu lassen. Die Franzosen würden dann im geeigneten Augenblick darauf hinweisen, daß ja auch sie an der Seite Italiens und Deutschlands gegen England gekämpft hätten, und würden versuchen, dadurch leichtere Friedensbedingungen zu erzielen. Der Duce sei über diese Möglichkeit etwas beunruhigt und stehe auf dem Standpunkt, daß Frankreich zwar ein geschlagener Feind, aber immer doch noch ein Feind der Achsenmächte sei und als solcher behandelt werden müsse. Die Vorteile einer Trennung Frankreichs von England habe Italien durchaus erkannt und aus diesem Grunde bescheidene Waffenstillstandsbedingungen aufgestellt. Wenn man aber mit Frankreich Frieden schliesse, so müsse man diesem



Lande die politischen Kosten des Krieges hundertprozentig auferlegen. Was die eigentlichen Kriegskosten anbetraf, so stehe der Duce auf dem Standpunkt, daß es auf diese Geldangelegenheiten nicht so sehr ankomme und man Frankreich wohl eine Kriegsentschädigung auferlegen solle, jedoch in keinem wucherischen Ausmaße.

Anschließend warf Graf Ciano die Frage eines Separatfriedens mit Frankreich auf. Ein solcher Friede würde die Trennung zwischen Frankreich und England noch stärker hervortreten lassen.

Der Führer äußerte in dieser Hinsicht Bedenken. Wenn im jetzigen Augenblick mit der französischen Regierung ein Friedensvertrag abgeschlossen würde, so müßte in diesem Vertrag auch das Kolonialproblem gelöst werden, was z.B. die Rückgabe Kameruns an Deutschland bedeuten würde. Es sei durchaus möglich, daß die Engländer dann diese Gebiete besetzen würden. Vielleicht würden sie auch in Marokko einmarschieren. Solange Gibraltar in englischer Hand sei, könne die italienische Flotte nicht in den Atlantischen Ozean auslaufen, und die deutsche Flotte sei zu klein, um auf so großen Entfernungen wirkungsvolle Operationen durchzuführen. Man müsse heutzutage den Engländern alles zutrauen und so läge eine Besetzung des Gebiets westlich und östlich von Spanisch-Marokko durchaus im Bereich der Möglichkeiten.

Wenn der Krieg gegen England weiterginge, müsse Deutschland außerdem unter allen Umständen die Westküste Frankreichs in der Hand behalten. Auch das sei ein Hinderungsgrund für den Abschluß eines Separatfriedens mit Frankreich. Denn Frankreich würde natürlich seine Westküste



wieder zurückverlangen. Außerdem stelle die Besetzung des Streifens an der französischen Westküste die Verbindung mit Spanien sicher. Wenn der Krieg gegen England weiter gehe, so sei auch mit Rücksicht auf eventuelle amerikanische Unternehmungen das Bestehen von guten Beziehungen und Verbindungen zu Spanien ein Mindestfordernis. Es bestehe die Möglichkeit, daß England oder vielleicht auch Amerika zu gegebener Zeit versuchen würden, in Portugal Fuß zu fassen. Für diesen Fall sei das Eingreifen Spaniens von größter Wichtigkeit. Da aber die Spanier auf ihre Zufuhr von Betriebsstoffen, Kohle, Waffen und Munition auf das Ausland angewiesen seien, so habe sich Deutschland eine wichtige Eisenbahn und Straße durch Frankreich nach Spanien gesichert und seine Besetzung auf einen Streifen von 20 km östlich dieser Bahn ausgedehnt.

Ein Angriff auf Gibraltar, den man in Deutschland schon sehr überlegt habe, sei nur mit Hilfe Spaniens durchzuführen. Wenn England aus Gibraltar vertrieben werden sollte, so könne dies nur durch einen Angriff von der Landseite durch die Spanier selbst geschehen, denen man zur Unterstützung gewisse Spezialwaffen dafür zur Verfügung stellen könne. Von der See und von der Luft aus sei Gibraltar nicht zu erobern. Bei langer Dauer des Krieges müsse auch die italienische Flotte die Möglichkeit haben, ungehindert das Mittelmeer zu verlassen, ganz abgesehen von der wirtschaftlichen Bedeutung Gibraltars für die Zufuhren von Übersee.

Graf Ciano stimmte den Ausführungen des Führers über die psychologische Aktion zur Erzielung propagandistischer und zersetzender Wirkung beim Feinde zu. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit spreche dafür, daß der Krieg weiter gehen würde. Die



Chancen seien für Italien und Deutschland günstig. Der Duce stehe auf dem Standpunkt, daß man den Endschlag gegen Großbritannien jetzt führen solle, um dieses Land zu Boden zu schlagen. Er habe gewisse militärische Unternehmungen im Mittelmeer und in Afrika vor und lege/außerdem Wert darauf, bei dem direkten Schlag, den Deutschland gegen England führen würde, mit italienischen Land- und Luftstreitkräften beteiligt zu sein. Zu diesem Zweck habe Italien bereits 10 Divisionen und bis zu 30 Luftgeschwader ~~vorgesehen~~ bereit gestellt. Der Duce bitte dringend darum, daß man den italienischen Truppen die Ehre erweise, sie an der Seite der deutschen Wehrmacht bei dieser Unternehmung gegen England mitkämpfen zu lassen.

Der Führer erwiderte, daß die Frage der nächsten militärischen Unternehmung deutscherseits noch weiter geprüft und er dem Duce das Ergebnis mitteilen würde.

Bezüglich der italienischerseits geplanten Aktionen führte Graf Ciano folgendes aus: Es seien Vorbereitungen für einen Marsch auf Kairo mit dem Ziel, Ägypten und vor allen Dingen den Suezkanal in italienische Hand zu bringen, im Gange. Durch den Tod Balbos sei zwar eine gewisse Verzögerung eingetreten, aber der Spezialist des Wüstenkampfes Graziani würde als Nachfolger Balbos die Vorbereitungen energisch weiter betreiben. Der Angriff auf Ägypten sei ein schwieriges, viel Mut erforderndes Unternehmen. Allein der Marsch durch die Wüste auf eine Entfernung von 600 km biete in Bezug auf die Wasserversorgung der Expeditionsarmee von 80-100 000 Mann erhebliche Schwierigkeiten. Die Wasserversorgung solle durch Destillierung des Meerwassers und auf



den Luftwege sichergestellt werden.

Ein weiteres Element der Unsicherheit liege in der Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Seeschlacht zwischen der italienischen und der englischen Flotte. Am 8. Juli seien zwölf Transporter von Italien nach Italienisch-Nordafrika in Marsch gesetzt worden. Zu ihrem Schutz würde sich die gesamte italienische Flotte vier Tage lang außerhalb ihrer Häfen im Mittelmeer befinden. Bei der gut organisierten Luftbeobachtung der Engländer von Malta aus sei ein Flottenzusammenstoß wahrscheinlich. Churchill habe in seiner letzten Rede gesagt, es würde der italienischen Flotte noch Gelegenheit gegeben werden, ihre Stärke mit der der Engländer zu messen. Jetzt würden es wahrscheinlich die Italiener sein, die den Engländern diese Gelegenheit gäben.

Der Führer warf hier ein, daß Churchill auch gesagt habe, die englische Armee brenne darauf, in Feindberührung mit der deutschen Armee zu kommen. Diese Berührung mit der deutschen Armee hätten die Engländer ja zur Genüge gehabt, und wenn sie nicht fortgelaufen wären, so bestünde sie noch.

Graf Ciano bemerkte dazu, daß, anstatt zu sagen, die englische Armee brenne auf Ägypten, man besser sagen würde, sie sei angebrannt. - Zum Angriff/zurückkehrend, bemerkte er, daß dieser zwischen dem 20. und 30. Juli stattfinden würde. Es sei natürlich schwierig, genaue Voraussagen über den Verlauf der Dinge zu machen. Zweifellos würden die Engländer, die in Ägypten starke Verbände stehen hätten und aus Palästina noch weitere Truppen heranziehen könnten, starken Widerstand leisten. Italien müsse das Spiel mutig aufnehmen. Es sei zur Herstellung seiner Verbindung mit Abessinien



und der Sicherung des Nachschubs dahin gezwungen, bis zum Suezkanal vorzustoßen.

Der Führer fügte hier ein, daß wenn Italien ein Interesse daran hätte, den Suezkanal mit Minen zu verseuchen solange er noch in englischen Händen wäre, Deutschland dazu Fernbomber zur Verfügung stellen könnte, die jedoch auf italienischen Basen in Lybien oder auf der Insel Rhodos zwischenlanden müßten und von dort aus ihre Unternehmungen gegen den Suezkanal durchführen würden. Natürlich müßten diese Minen, wenn Italien den Suezkanal erobert hätte, wieder geräumt werden. Auch dafür würde Deutschland das dazu nötige Material zur Verfügung stellen.

Graf Ciano kam dann auf die Haltung gewisser Mittelmeerländer im gegenwärtigen Konflikt zu sprechen. Italien sei mit Griechenland sehr unzufrieden, da es die englische Flotte derartig unterstütze, daß sich diese in griechischen Häfen fast wie im Heimatlande vorkäme. Außerdem verriete Griechenland italienische Unterseeboote, die in seinen Gewässern auftauchten, an die Engländer, sodaß dadurch sowie durch die im Mittelmeer an und für sich wegen der Klarheit des Wassers ungünstigen Operationsbedingungen für U-Boote italienischerseits bereits erhebliche Verluste eingetreten seien. Italien hätte in kurzer Zeit vier große U-Boote verloren. Ciano habe zwei sehr energische Schritte bei den Griechen unternommen. Das erste Mal durch seinen Kabinettschef, da er selbst noch im Kriegsgebiet weilte. Das zweite Mal habe er selbst mit dem griechischen Gesandten gesprochen und ihm erklärt, daß wenn wieder etwas Derartiges vorkäme, nicht der italienische Außenminister, sondern



ein italienischer Admiral die Angelegenheit direkt bereinigen würde. Die Griechen hätten natürlich alles abgeleugnet, aber ihre Haltung sei doch äußerst fragwürdig. Eine Gefahr sähe Italien auch darin, daß Churchill in seiner letzten Rede erklärt habe, England würde die nötigen Maßnahmen treffen, um sich die absolute Herrschaft im Mittelmeer zu sichern. Es sei nicht ausgeschlossen, daß darunter die Besetzung gewisser griechischer Inseln, wie Korfu und andere, durch die Engländer zu verstehen sei. Falls Korfu besetzt und zu einer englischen Seeflugbasis ausgestaltet würde, wäre das norditalienische Industriegebiet wieder durch die viermotorigen englischen Flugboote gefährdet. Deshalb hielt es Italien für angebracht, selbst zur Besetzung der griechischen Inseln im Jonischen Meer, vor allen Dingen aber Korfus und der anschließenden Inseln, zu schreiten, <sup>deren</sup> Griechenland warte mit Ungeduld auf den Augenblick, wo es von England vergewaltigt würde.

Der Führer wies in diesem Zusammenhang auf die äußerst interessanten Dokumente hin, die Deutschland über alle diese Fragen gefunden hätte und die dem Duce zugehen würden.

Graf Ciano sprach darauf von Jugoslawien. Italien hätte jetzt Beweise für die Unaufrichtigkeit der Politik dieses Landes in Händen. Jedenfalls sei Prinzregent Paul ein Sklave Englands. Das jugoslawische Volk sei in seiner Haltung unsicher, auf alle Fälle aber nicht deutsch- oder italienfreundlich. Neuerdings trüge Jugoslawien pro-russische Gefühle zur Schau. Es täte dies aber weniger Rußlands wegen als aus einer Anti-Achseneinstellung heraus. Bisher habe zwar auch Italien auf dem Standpunkt gestanden, daß der



Balkan möglichst unberührt gelassen werden sollte. Jetzt aber glaube der Duce, daß man in ungefähr einem Monat die jugoslawische Frage liquidieren müsse. Es sei für Italien eine einzigartige Gelegenheit, denn nach dem Waffenstillstand mit Frankreich hätte es nur noch eine <sup>Land</sup> Grenze zu verteidigen. Italien sei nun einmal am Adriatischen Meer sehr stark interessiert, während Rumänien und das Schwarze Meer mehr zum deutschen Interessengebiet gehören. Italien halte den Augenblick für gekommen, den Umfang des jugoslawischen Staates, einer typischen Versailler Schöpfung anti-italienischer Tendenz, zu beschneiden.

Der Führer erwiderte, daß in diesem Zusammenhang die Frage entscheidend sei, ob es dem Duce und Italien gleichgültig wäre, welches Land <sup>die Dardanellen</sup> ~~den Bosporus~~ und Konstantinopel besetzt hielte. Wenn Italien Jugoslavien angreife, so würde Ungarn sofort über Rumänien herfallen, da Ungarn ja dann nichts mehr von seinem jugoslawischen Nachbarn zu fürchten hätte. Bei einem Angriff Ungarns auf Rumänien würden aber zweifellos auch die Russen wieder lebendig werden, die Donau überschreiten und die Verbindung mit Bulgarien aufsuchen. Das Königshaus in Bulgarien sitze nicht sehr fest, und außerdem besitze dieses Land eine starke kommunistische und panslawische <sup>vis</sup> Bewegung. So würden die Russen sicherlich auf ihr altes historisches Byzanz, die Dardanellen und Konstantinopel vorrücken. Es frage sich nun, wie Italien dazu stehe. Deutschland habe seinerseits bisher auf Ungarn im Sinne der Beruhigung eingewirkt und diesem Lande erklärt, daß über eine gewisse Grenze hinaus deutscherseits keine Verpflichtungen oder Garantien Ungarn gegenüber übernommen



werden könnten. Es sei dies geschehen, um das Entstehen eines größeren Konflikts zu verhindern. Die vom Grafen Ciano angeschnittenen Fragen seien überhaupt keine Probleme, wenn erst einmal England gebrochen sei oder mit England Friede herrsche. Solange aber der Konflikt mit England nicht erfolgreich beendet sei, könnten durch einen Konflikt auf dem Balkan schwierige Probleme entstehen. Es könnte vielleicht sogar so weit kommen, daß England und Rußland unter dem Eindruck dieser Ereignisse eine Gemeinsamkeit ihrer Interessen entdeckten.

Graf Ciano warf hier ein, daß überhaupt die russische Haltung unklar wäre und dem Duce zu allerhand Besorgnissen Anlaß zu geben schiene.

Der Führer führte dann weiter aus, daß Deutschland an Rumänien hauptsächlich wegen der Petroleumbezüge interessiert sei. Zwar sei nach der Erledigung Frankreichs die Lage in dieser Hinsicht nicht mehr so schwierig, und der Petroleumverbrauch sei gefallen. Trotzdem würde für Deutschland doch ein Schaden entstehen, wenn etwa der Krieg über Rumänien dahinbrausen sollte und in der Folge die Petroleumquellen entweder den Besitzer wechseln oder zerstört würden. Immerhin beziehe Deutschland noch 140 000 Tonnen Petroleum pro Monat aus Rumänien, und auch Italien sei wohl ähnlich interessiert.

Graf Ciano erwiderte, daß Italien seinen Petroleumbedarf fast ausschließlich in Rumänien decke, und nahm im übrigen von den Bedenken des Führers mit dem Bemerkenswerten Kenntnis, daß er sie sofort an den Duce weiterleiten würde. Er gab durch seine weiteren Ausführungen zu verstehen, daß er



sich den Gedankengängen des Führers voll und ganz anschliesse und daß er sicher sei, daß auch der Duce diese Haltung einnehmen werde. Persönlich glaube er, daß man die jugoslawische Angelegenheit »vertagen« könne bis zu dem Augenblick, in dem der Krieg mit England erledigt sei. Worauf es jetzt ankomme, sei die Feststellung, daß Jugoslawien kein achsenfreundliches Land sei, daß es keinen Anspruch darauf erheben könne, in dem nach Beendigung des Krieges erstehenden neuen Europa in seiner jetzigen Gestalt und seiner jetzigen Einstellung zu figurieren und daß die jugoslawische Frage gelöst werden müsse, wenn der Führer, der ja das ganze Spiel in Händen habe, den Augenblick für gekommen halte.

Der Führer wies auf die klare Abgrenzung der Interessengebiete zwischen dem Reich und Italien hin. Das Mittelmeer und die Adria hätten von jeher zum historischen Interessengebiet der Italischen Halbinsel gehört, und Deutschland erkenne dies vollkommen an. Über die Schaukelpolitik Jugoslawiens besäße Deutschland Dokumente, die dem Duce zugänglich gemacht werden würden. Prinzregent Paul gehöre als Mitglied des englischen Mutterkönigshauses und seiner ganzen Einstellung nach nach Westeuropa, und seine Haltung sei auch durch die Dokumente belegt. Das jugoslawische Problem müsse im italienischen Sinne gelöst werden, wenn die Stunde dazu gekommen sei. Der Führer wies erneut auf die ungarischen Bestrebungen hin und warf die Frage auf, ob nicht auch Ungarn die Hoffnung habe, mit Rußland gemeinsam Rumänien anzugreifen, denn allein würden es die Ungarn wahrscheinlich nicht wagen.

Der R A M unterstrich in diesem Zusammenhang die in



letzter Zeit stärker gewordenen Verbindungen zwischen Moskau und Budapest.

Abschließend fügte der Führer zu dem Problem Jugoslawien noch hinzu, daß wenn etwa auf dem Balkan der Krieg von selbst losbrechen sollte, der Duce natürlich sofort eingreifen könne und daß eine derartige Intervention dann auch durchaus im Interesse Deutschlands läge.

Als letzten Punkt wurde noch einmal die ungarische Frage behandelt.

Graf Ciano berichtete, daß die Ungarn täglich mehrmal in den Palazzo Chigi kämen und bei ihrer augenscheinlichen Vorliebe für Karten ihm die verschiedenartigsten Kartendokumente unterbreitet hätten.

Der R A M erinnerte in diesem Zusammenhang an die etwas eigenartige Haltung Ungarns bei Regelung der slowakischen Frage. Auch damals sei<sup>en</sup> von Ministerpräsident Daranyi der im übrigen, wie auch der Führer unterstrich, ein absoluter England- und Frankreich-Freund gewesen sei, Karten vorgelegt worden. Aber als nachher in Wien der Schiedspruch gefällt werden sollte, hätten die Ungarn wieder andere Wünsche gehabt, und Daranyi hätte sich gegenüber Italien, das doch damals der große Vorkämpfer der ungarischen Wünsche gewesen sei, in Wien so undankbar benommen, daß er vom R A M zurechtgewiesen werden mußte, als er nämlich erklärte, daß das Münchner Abkommen vielleicht sehr gut sei, daß aber die für die ungarischen Belange vorgesehene Frist von drei Monaten viel zu lange wäre.

Zum Schluß wurde noch die Frage erwogen, ob ein Zusammentreffen Cianos mit Telecki und Csaky in Berlin



wünschenswert wäre. Als Graf Ciano dies bejahte, wurde beschlossen, die ungarischen Delegierten zum Donnerstag nach Berlin einzuladen, damit dann eventuell eine Besprechung zu dritt stattfinden könnte.

Nach einer Dauer von 1 3/4 Stunden fand die Unterredung ihren Abschluß.

Berlin, den 8. Juli 1940.

gez. Schmidt

Gesandter.



AFFIDAVIT

I, Paul O. Schmidt, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That from 1923 to the collapse of the German Reich in May 1945, I was Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office, and as such was personally present and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at all important Foreign Office and other conferences between German Government leaders and representatives of foreign governments.

2. That in addition to being Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office as aforesaid, I was also after the year 1939 the Head of the Secretariat General of the German Foreign Office and that my latest government rank was that of a Minister in the German Foreign Office.

3. That while acting as interpreter and/or secretary at such meetings above referred to, it was my official duty to and I did take notes concerning the conversations that took place, and at the conclusion of each such meeting, I prepared from such notes a complete and detailed record of what was said and transpired at such meetings.

4. That the records prepared by me became the official German Government records of what was said and transpired at such meetings. That one copy of the record was filed with the Ministers Office Section of the German Foreign Office, which office acted in the capacity of secretary to said Foreign Office. That another copy of the record of each of such meetings was filed with the Private Secretariat of the German Foreign Minister. That a third copy of the record of each of such meetings was retained by me.

5. That said meetings, concerning which I made a record as aforesaid, were of historical importance and that such records were also prepared by me for the express purpose of maintaining and preserving a record of such meetings for historical purposes.

6. That the document attached hereto is a true and correct photostatic copy of the original record, prepared personally by me in the manner herein set forth and concerning a conference held on July 7th 1940 between Hitler and Count Ciano in the presence of the Foreign Minister Ambassadors von Mackensen and Alfieri and State Minister Meissner.

7. That I personally attended and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at the conference last above mentioned and that the record prepared by me, and of which the attached document is a photostatic copy, is a true and accurate account of what was said and transpired at said conference.

8. That I have been advised and am aware of the fact that the herein affidavit and the document attached hereto may be used in connection with the prosecution of Japanese War Criminals and make this affidavit freely and voluntarily and with knowledge of the above facts.

*Dr. Paul O. Schmidt*  
PAUL O. SCHMIDT

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Nurnburg, Germany, this  
third day of May 1946.

*Smith W. Brookhart, Jr.*  
SMITH W. BROOKHART, JR.,  
IGD.

0-508524



Ham 18/40

( Aufzeichnung  
über

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die Unterredung zwischen dem Reichsaußenminister  
und dem japanischen Botschafter S a t o in Anwesenheit  
des Botschafters Kurusu und des Generalkonsuls Stahmer,  
am 8. Juli 1940.

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11

Nach einem Dankeswort für die durch die Deutsche  
Regierung gewährte Gastfreundschaft und einem Glückwunsch  
zu dem Sieg Deutschlands über Frankreich erklärte Botschaf-  
ter Sato, daß genau so wie nun in Europa durch Deutschland  
die neue Ordnung entstehen würde, sich Japan seinerseits  
seit drei Jahren bemühe, im Fernen Osten und in der Südsee  
eine neue Ordnung aufzurichten. Durch diesen Parallelismus  
scheine eine sehr enge Zusammenarbeit zwischen Deutschland  
und Japan durchaus gegeben. Seit drei Jahren hätte Japan  
die Aufmerksamkeit der englischen, französischen und ameri-  
kanischen Regierungen auf sich gelenkt und damit in einer  
gewissen Weise auch Deutschlands Aufgabe der Errichtung  
einer neuen Ordnung in Europa erleichtert. Auf diese Weise  
könnten sich die Regierungen beider Länder gegenseitig  
unterstützen.

Was Sowjetrußland anbeträfe, so sei Japan unter den  
obwaltenden Umständen gezwungen, gutnachbarliche Beziehungen  
mit Rußland zu suchen, genau so wie auch Deutschland ge-  
zwungen sei, gute Beziehungen zu Rußland zu unterhalten.  
Auch in dieser Hinsicht könnten Japan und Deutschland  
zusammenarbeiten.

45604



Von Amerika sagte Botschafter Sato, daß Japan seit Beginn des chinesischen Krieges die Aufmerksamkeit dieses Landes auf sich gezogen und die amerikanische Flotte im Stillen Ozean gebunden habe. Japan sei der Ansicht, daß Amerika aus seiner Zone, die Nord- und Südamerika umfasse, nicht heraustreten und sich in europäische oder fernöstliche Angelegenheiten <sup>nicht</sup> einmischen dürfe. Die Verfolgung dieses Prinzips liege ebenfalls im gemeinsamen Interesse beider Länder. Botschafter Sato schloß seine Bemerkungen mit einer erneuten Betonung der gemeinschaftlichen Interessen Deutschlands und Japans und der Notwendigkeit ihrer Zusammenarbeit. Diese Zusammenarbeit müsse sich auch auf wirtschaftliche Dinge erstrecken.

Bezüglich Chinas fügte Botschafter Sato noch hinzu, daß Japan im Augenblick große Anstrengungen mache, <sup>den chinesischen</sup> diesen Krieg, der nunmehr drei Jahre gedauert habe, zu beenden, um die Hände frei zu bekommen. Er wies dabei auch darauf hin, daß die öffentliche Meinung in Japan in Bezug auf Indochina und Niederländisch-Indien außerordentlich nervös geworden sei.

Der R A M nahm mit Befriedigung von dem Wunsch Japans Kenntnis, auf allen Gebieten mit Deutschland zusammen zu arbeiten. Er glaube, daß die deutsch-japanische Zusammenarbeit an sich nichts Neues darstelle. Er selbst sei <sup>einer der</sup> ~~unter den~~jenigen gewesen, die bereits vor Jahren mit dem <sup>Vorgänger</sup> ~~Nachfolger~~ Kurusus, der General Okuma, diese Zusammenarbeit gefördert hätten, die auch bereits für beide Teilnehmer ihre Früchte getragen hätte. Deutschland hätte



- 3 -

daraus merkliche <sup>Ruthen</sup> Vorteile in seinem Kampf um die Gleichberechtigung <sup>gehabt</sup> gezogen, während Japan aus der Existenz eines starken Deutschlands zweifellos in der ganzen Zeit seines Kampfes um China bis auf den heutigen Tag erhebliche Vorteile <sup>haben</sup> genossen hätte. Ohne das Vorhandensein eines wiedererstarkten Deutschlands hätte Japan nicht so tief in englische und sonstige Interessensphären in Ostasien eindringen können, wie dies tatsächlich geschehen sei. Daraus ergäbe sich das natürliche Interesse beider Mächte an einer Zusammenarbeit.

Früher schon wären Pläne zu einer sehr engen Zusammenarbeit zwischen Japan, Deutschland und Italien in Aussicht genommen <sup>gewesen</sup> worden. Sie seien gescheitert, weil sich - wie dies auch wieder aus den letzten Reden japanischer Staatsmänner hervorgehe - Japan an europäischen Belangen desinteressiere.

Durch den deutschen Sieg über Frankreich würde eine große Revision aller außenpolitischen Faktoren erfolgen. Er persönlich glaube, daß auch in Zukunft im Rahmen der nunmehr erfolgenden Neuordnung in Europa weiterhin Möglichkeiten für eine freundschaftliche Zusammenarbeit mit Japan beständen. Wie sich diese Zusammenarbeit im einzelnen gestalten solle, vermöge er im Augenblick ~~zum~~ nicht zu sagen, da er über die deutschen Absichten, nicht aber über die japanischen politischen Ziele unterrichtet sei. Deshalb bäte er gäto um weitere Aufklärung über die grundsätzliche politische Linie, die Japan zu verfolgen gedächte, und ~~seine zukünftigen Ziele~~. Insbesondere würde es ihn interessieren, von japanischer Seite zu hören, wie man sich dort

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die Zusammenarbeit mit Deutschland dächte, ob etwa nur auf wirtschaftlichem Gebiet oder auf welche Weise sonst.

See Doc. 11

Botschafter Sato erwiderte, es sei verständlich, daß für Außenstehende die japanische Politik schwer zu verstehen gewesen sei. Seit neun Jahren, d.h. seit dem Ausbruch des Mandschurischen Konflikts, habe Japan sich bemüht, seine Politik in einer bestimmten Richtung zu orientieren, sei aber immer wieder in der Folge gezwungen gewesen, diese Neuorientierung etwas abzumildern. Es hand<sup>sich</sup>l bei der Neuordnung im Fernen Osten für Japan vor allem darum, ein neues China erstehen zu lassen, mit dem es freundschaftliche Beziehungen unterhalten könne. Die Solidarität zwischen diesem neuen China und Japan solle die Ruhe im Fernen Osten sichern. Um dieses Ziel zu erreichen, kämpfte Japan ~~und China~~ seit einigen Jahren hartnäckig gegen das sogenannte Régime von Washington, das seinen Ausdruck in den Verträgen von 1921, insbesondere im Neunmächte-Vertrag, finde. Dieses Washingtoner Régime gebe nicht China und Japan, sondern den Anglo-Sachsen im Fernen Osten das Übergewicht. Japan wolle <sup>jedoch</sup> dabei keinesfalls die Ausländer aus dem Fernen Osten ausschalten. Im Gegenteil! Auch der wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit mit Deutschland wolle es in China durchaus den entsprechenden Platz einräumen.

In seinen Beziehungen zu Amerika müsse Japan allerdings sehr vorsichtig sein.

Auf eine Frage des RAM, was denn in Wirklichkeit der tiefere Grund für die Schwierigkeiten zwischen Japan und Amerika sei, erwiderte Sato, daß dieser Grund in dem Kampf Japans gegen das System des Neunmächte-Vertrages liege.

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Dabei kämpfe Japan nicht gegen die Grundsätze dieses Vertrages. Es sei politisch durchaus bereit, die Unabhängigkeit Chinas zu respektieren. Es sei wirtschaftlich mit dem sogenannten Prinzip der offenen Tür ebenfalls einverstanden. Es wolle aber die Rollen umkehren und selbst der Gastgeber sein, während die übrigen Völker nur Gäste in Ostasien sein könnten.

Auf eine <sup>erwarte</sup> Zwischenfrage des B. A. M. nach den <sup>(tiefen Gründen der)</sup> Schwierigkeiten, die Japan mit Amerika hätte, erwiderte Sato, daß die Reibungspunkte mit Amerika weniger auf wirtschaftlichem als auf <sup>humanitärem</sup> weltanschaulichem Gebiet lägen. Die amerikanischen Sympathien gehörten China. Amerika fühle sich gewissermaßen als Protektor dieses Landes und wolle die Polizeigewalt im Stillen Ozean mit Hilfe seiner Überlegenheit zur See weiter durchführen. Unter diesen Umständen sei Japan bemüht, den Krieg mit China bald zu beenden. Sato erklärte, daß er persönlich vielleicht in einem gewissen Gegensatz zu den japanischen Militärs nicht glaube, daß Japan bis nach Tschunking marschieren könne. Es sei deshalb notwendig, eine Lösung der chinesischen Frage auf anderem als auf militärischen Wege zu suchen. Aus diesem Grunde habe Japan die Regierung Wang-Tsching-Wei unterstützt und sei bereit, mit ihr ein sehr großzügiges Abkommen zu treffen. Japan wolle sich durchaus nicht in chinesische Angelegenheiten einmischen oder den Chinesen etwas aufzwingen, sondern sei bereit, mit Wang-Tsching-Wei auf dem Fuße der Gleichberechtigung zu verhandeln. Wenn die Chinesen vernünftig wären, so würde sich auch zweifellos ein Ergebnis erzielen lassen, bei dem China nicht an Gesicht verliere. In diesem Falle



würde vielleicht auch Amerika allmählich seine Einstellung ändern und sich Japan gegenüber freundlicher verhalten. Amerikas wirtschaftliche Interessen in China seien nicht groß, aber gerade dies trage durchaus nicht zur Erleichterung der Lage bei. Mit England könne man sich angesichts seiner erheblichen wirtschaftlichen Interessen in diesem Raum viel leichter einigen, als mit den Amerikanern, die die Dinge von einem ganz anderen Gesichtswinkel ansähen.

Auf die vom R A M geäußerte Vermutung, daß vielleicht Amerika durch die aufsteigende Macht Japans und seine immer stärker werdende Flotte beunruhigt sei und die Meinungs-, verschiedenheiten mit diesem Lande auf der Tatsache beruhten, daß Amerika, das bisher im Stillen Ozean allein herrschte, sich gezwungen sähe, diese Herrschaft nur mit Japan zu teilen, erwiderte Sato bejahend und fügte hinzu, daß besonders die japanischen Bezühungen, die Flottenparität mit Amerika zu erreichen und die Geheimhaltung seiner Flottenbauten in Amerika außerordentlich stark verstimm<sup>hätten</sup>t. Deshalb müßte Japan besonders nach dem Eintritt Stimson in die Regierung sehr vorsichtig Amerika gegenüber sein, um dieses Land nicht zu scharfen Maßnahmen gegen Japan zu veranlassen. Zwar hätte Amerika bereits den Handelsvertrag gekündigt, aber die Ausfuhrsperrre sei gegen Japan noch nicht ausgesprochen worden. Wegen ihrer Petroleum- und Eiserversorgung seien die Japaner jedoch von Amerika außerordentlich abhängig.

Der R A M erwiderte, er habe stets auf dem Standpunkt gestanden, daß bei einer starken Politik auch die Wirtschaft gut fahre. Bei einer weniger starken Politik ginge es der Wirtschaft auch stets schlechter. Deutschland habe auf diese



Gebiet seine eigenen Erfahrungen. In der Zeit, als es politisch schwach war und die damaligen Regierungen behaupteten, man müsse aus wirtschaftlichen Gründen nachgeben, hätte Deutschland für sein Entgegenkommen letzten Endes doch keine wirtschaftlichen Vorteile erzielt. / Jetzt sei Deutschland stark und damit blühe auch sein Handel. Es erhalte von den anderen Ländern alles geliefert, was es brauche, nebst sämtlichen wirtschaftlichen Erleichterungen, wie Kredite und dergleichen.

Noch vor wenigen Monaten hätte man Deutschland für ein eingekreistes Land gehalten. Jetzt aber sei England so völlig eingekreist, wie noch nie ein Land in der Weltgeschichte. Am Gold, das in so großen Mengen nach Amerika hineingeströmt sei, wäre Deutschland nicht mehr interessiert. Das Deutsche Reich würde in seiner tausendjährigen Existenz niemals wieder etwas auf dem Gold aufbauen. In Deutschland sei das Gold entthront, und die anderen Länder würden diesem Beispiel folgen müssen. Jetzt, wo England so bedrängt sei, wären auch noch von dort die Goldvorräte nach den Vereinigten Staaten verschifft worden, sodaß sich dort ungefähr 85-90 % des gesamten Goldbestandes der Welt befänden. Die Folge davon wäre, daß die Vereinigten Staaten am Ende des Krieges in Gold und Waren ersticken und froh <sup>sein würden</sup> wären, an andere Länder, wie z.B. Japan, unter den günstigsten Bedingungen alles zu verkaufen, was diese Länder benötigten.

( Deutschland sei wirtschaftlich so gut wie völlig unabhängig. Viele Dinge, die früher eingeführt wurden, stelle es selbst her oder habe Ersatz dafür gefunden. Nach dem Kriege



würde der europäische Wirtschaftsraum seinerseits völlig unabhängig sein. Dies bedeute nicht, daß Deutschland keinen Welthandel mehr wollte. Im Gegenteil! Aber dieser neue Welthandel müßte sich auf der Grundlage der Unabhängigkeit der daran beteiligten Wirtschaftsräume und des Austausches der Überschüsse abspielen. Der alte Welthandel hätte auf der für England jederzeit bestehenden Möglichkeit beruht, andere Länder zu blockieren und von ihren Rohstoffbezügen abzuschneiden. Bei der neuen Weltordnung würde Japan in Ostasien, Rußland in Asien, Deutschland und Italien in Europa zu bestimmen haben, und auch in Afrika würden ausschließlich Deutschland und Italien, vielleicht mit einigen anderen Interessenten, die Herrschaft ausüben.)

Der R A M kam dann auf die Haltung der südamerikanischen Länder zu sprechen. Die südamerikanischen Staaten, die Roosevelt wirtschaftlich an Nordamerika zu binden versuchte, schienen zu wissen, daß nach dem Krieg die Vereinigten Staaten für südamerikanische Rohprodukte nicht aufnahmefähig sein würden und wendeten sich daher schon jetzt nach Europa, um den Absatz ihrer Waren nach dem Kriege zu sichern. Wer aber mit Europa Handel treiben wolle, müsse sich in Zukunft an Deutschland wenden.

Sato erwiderte, daß er als Nichtwirtschaftler keine Meinung über wirtschaftliche Fragen aussprechen könne. Wenn aber der Warenaustausch nicht mehr auf der Goldbasis beruhe, würde man doch wohl nicht zu einem freien Warenaustausch unter Ausschluß der Devisenbewirtschaftung und anderer Handelshemmnisse zurückkehren können.

Bezüglich der Vereinigten Staaten sei Japan vielleicht



nicht so sehr durch den wirtschaftlichen Druck als durch die amerikanische Flotte beeindruckt und müsse deshalb vorsichtig sein. Außerdem würden die Vereinigten Staaten, wenn sie mit Japan in einen Konflikt gerieten, auch in dem europäischen Konflikt nicht mehr neutral bleiben können.

Der R A M gab zu, daß die japanische Lage schwierig sei und daß Japan seine Politik nach der Gegebenheit der Lage einrichten müsse. Er stellte im übrigen zur Goldfrage fest, daß Deutschland nicht etwa kein Gold mehr besitzen würde, sondern nur die deutsche Wirtschaft nie wieder vom Gold, d.h. von der internationalen Spekulation, abhängig machen würde.

(Bezüglich Rußlands wies der R A M auf die Bemühungen hin, die er seit Jahren bei dem Botschafter Oshima in der Richtung eines Ausgleichs zwischen Japan und Rußland unternommen habe. Deutschland habe einen dauernden Ausgleich mit Rußland getroffen, und die Interessen beider Länder seien sehr klar voneinander abgegrenzt worden. Er begrüße die Bemühungen, die Japan in den letzten Monaten gemacht habe, um auch seinerseits zu einem Ausgleich mit Rußland zu kommen.)

Zum Schluß stellte Sato noch eine Frage, die er selber als etwas indiskret bezeichnete. Wie stelle sich Deutschland die zukünftige Gestalt Europas vor?

Der R A M erwiderte, daß die deutsche Regierung sich im Augenblick nur mit einer Frage beschäftige, nämlich, wie sie den Krieg fortsetzen und siegreich beenden könne.



- 10 -

Daher könne er noch nicht viel über die politische  
Zukunft sagen. Sicher sei nur, daß der noch übrig bleibende  
Feind Deutschlands - England - geschlagen werden würde.

Berlin, den 9. Juli 1940.

gez. Schmidt

Gesandter.

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Nr. 15/40 ✓

### Aufzeichnung

über

die Unterredung zwischen dem Führer und dem Grafen  
Ciano in Anwesenheit des Reichsaußenministers, der  
Botschafter von Mackensen und Alfieri und des  
Staatsministers Meißner, am 7. Juli 1940.

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Nach einigen herzlichen Begrüßungsworten an Graf  
Ciano kam der Führer auf den Grund seiner Anwesenheit in  
Berlin zu sprechen. Erstens sei er in die Reichshauptstadt  
gekommen, um durch seinen Einzug eine Demonstration zu  
veranstalten, die der Welt die Einstellung des deutschen  
Volkes klar vor Augen führe. Denn im Gegensatz zu den  
englischen Rundfunkmeldungen sei dieses Volk nicht etwa  
zermürbt und gebrochen, sondern es befinde sich, wie der  
gestrige Tag wieder erneut gezeigt habe, absolut auf der  
Höhe. Zweitens diene sein Aufenthalt in Berlin der Über-  
legung der nunmehr zu unternehmenden Schritte und der  
Überprüfung der Lage zusammen mit den militärischen Sach-  
verständigen.

Unter Umständen würde er (der Führer) noch eine  
Demonstration machen, um bei Fortführung des Krieges - er  
glaube, daß dies die einzige in Frage kommende / Möglichkeit sei, ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~  
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ - eine psychologische Wirkung im eigenen  
Volk und eine propagandistisch zersetzende Wirkung beim  
englischen Volk zu erzielen. In der jüngsten Vergangenheit

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wäre gerade die praktische Auswirkung von Propagandamaßnahmen klar zu Tage getreten, denn die deutsche Propaganda habe in Frankreich unzweifelhaft wichtige Ergebnisse erzielt, und so würde es vielleicht auch jetzt gelingen, durch einen geschickten Appell an das englische Volk die englische Regierung weiter in England zu isolieren. Denn die Stimmung in England sei derartig, daß die Regierung jetzt schon zu Maßnahmen gegen die Pazifisten und Kriegsverweigerer gezwungen sei. Ein Krieg bestehe ja nicht aus einer einzigen Aktion, sondern aus einer Anzahl von verschiedenen Elementen und Operationen, und es komme darauf an, Imponderabilien zu schaffen und auszunutzen, von denen vielleicht jedes einzelne nicht ausschlaggebend sei, die jedoch in ihrer Gesamtwirkung die Erreichung des gewünschten Endresultats erheblich erleichtern können.

So sei es z.B. sehr gut gewesen, daß der Duce und er (der Führer) nicht auf der Auslieferung der französischen Flotte bestanden hätten. Die französische Flotte hätte man dann doch nie bekommen. Aber jetzt habe man durch diese kluge Handhabung der Flottenfrage England und Frankreich <sup>gegenseitiger</sup> zu Feinden gemacht. Dies erleichtere die Situation besonders auch für Italien bedeutend und verbessere die Lage im westlichen Mittelmeer sowie die Stellung der Achsenmächte gegenüber Franco.

Der Führer gab seiner Befriedigung darüber Ausdruck, daß die Art der Formulierung der italienischen Waffenstillstandsbedingungen mit dazu beigetragen habe, die jetzige günstige Lage Frankreich gegenüber herbeizuführen. Die Tatsache, daß, obwohl in London eine französische Scheinregierung bestünde,



auf französischem Territorium eine französische Regierung unter Pétain bestehe, der sich auch die französischen Kolonien angeschlossen hätten, sei zweifellos für Italien und Deutschland von großem Vorteil. Die Lage des norditalienischen Industriegebiets sei dadurch erheblich erleichtert. Von Flugzeugträgern aus könnten die Engländer auf die Dauer Norditalien nicht länger angreifen, und wenn auch nächtliche Luftangriffe keinen bedeutenden Sachschaden anrichten, so beunruhigen sie doch die Bevölkerung und wirken sich, wie Deutschland aus eigener Erfahrung wisse, ungünstig auf die Kriegsproduktion aus, sodaß das Aufhören solcher Angriffe eine große Entlastung darstelle.

Der Führer teilte dann dem Grafen Ciano mit, daß Deutschland demnächst über die Waffenstillstandskommission in Wiesbaden an die Franzosen die Forderung stellen würde, je einen Flugplatz östlich und westlich von Spanisch-Marokko mit französischem Bodenpersonal für die deutsche Luftwaffe bereitzustellen. Falls der Kampf zwischen Frankreich und England weiter gehen sollte, würde Deutschland dort Geschwader stationieren und in diesen Kampf miteingreifen. Diese Aktion würde jedoch unterbleiben, wenn die englisch-französischen Kampfhandlungen wieder abebten.

Im übrigen sei Deutschland dabei, eine Umorganisation seiner Streitkräfte vorzunehmen, den Aufmarsch seiner Luftwaffe gegen England zu vollenden und die Reorganisation seiner Panzer- und Mot. Verbände durchzuführen. Mit den militärischen Sachverständigen würde der Umfang der gegen England zu führenden Operationen geklärt, denn es sei klar, daß wenn der Schlag gegen Großbritannien geführt würde, die

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Operationen sich über weite Räume erstrecken müßten.

Es gäbe von Deutschland aus gesehen drei Kriegsschauplätze. 1.) Das Gebiet um England, das durch die Front von Drontheim-Stavanger bis zur Girondemündung erfaßt sei. 2.) Das Mittelmeer und 3.) das Kampffeld der U-Boote, die die von Süden und Westen nach England gelangenden Zufuhren zu unterbinden hätten, wobei die Überlegungen bezüglich der Kriegsschauplätze in Ostafrika und im Mittelmeer Italiens Angelegenheit seien. Der Führer beabsichtige, zunächst eine geschlossene Auffassung über die Fortführung der Operationen herbeizuführen, und würde dann den Duce davon in Kenntnis setzen. Nötigenfalls könnte sich ein erneuter persönlicher Meinungsaustausch am Brenner anschließen.

Von den näher liegenden Problemen sei die Durchführung des Waffenstillstandes, dessen Bedingungen <sup>zwischen</sup> ja/Deutschland und Italien abgestimmt worden seien, völlig klar. Die Auswertung dieser Bedingungen müsse so erfolgen, daß Deutschland und Italien in ihren Interessensgebieten die von ihnen gewünschten Ziele erreichten. Für Deutschland stünde diese Auswertung vor allen Dingen unter dem Motto der Fortsetzung der Operationen gegen England. Grundsätzlich müßten sich jedoch Italien und Deutschland vollständig klar darüber sein, daß Frankreich sich jetzt als unglückliches und unschuldiges Opfer britischer Verführungskünste aufspiele. Tatsächlich lägen aber die Dinge nicht so. Wenn Frankreich heute <sup>dann</sup> in der Lage wäre, so würde es sofort über Deutschland und Italien herfallen und diese Länder vernichten. Der Konflikt zwischen England und Frankreich gäbe keine Veranlassung dazu, die von Frankreich ausgehende Gefahr zu unterschätzen oder zu



verkennen. Ebenso wie es ein ewiges England mit einer bestimmten politischen Tendenz gäbe, gäbe es auch ein ewiges Frankreich mit einer genau so bestimmten achsenfeindlichen Einstellung. Der Führer bat den Grafen Ciano, dem Duce zu erklären, daß, wenn auch die deutsche Presse jetzt scheinbar für Frankreich Stellung nähme, dies nicht die geringste Abweichung von der Frankreich gegenüber zu verfolgenden Linie bedeute. Frankreich sei absolut als Feind zu behandeln, und die Weisung, die der Führer der deutschen Presse wegen einer mildereren Behandlung dieses Landes habe zu erlassen, sei reine Taktik.

Graf Ciano erwiderte, daß Italien genau der gleichen Ansicht in Bezug auf Frankreich sei. Dieses Land spiele jetzt in geradezu klassischer Weise Theater und behaupte, es sei in eine von England gestellte Falle hineingeraten. Es wäre gefährlich, Frankreich etwa auf die deutsch-italienische Seite hinübergleiten zu lassen. Die Franzosen würden dann im geeigneten Augenblick darauf hinweisen, daß ja auch sie an der Seite Italiens und Deutschlands gegen England gekämpft hätten, und würden versuchen, dadurch leichtere Friedensbedingungen zu erzielen. Der Duce sei über diese Möglichkeit etwas beunruhigt und stehe auf dem Standpunkt, daß Frankreich zwar ein geschlagener Feind, aber immer doch noch ein Feind der Achsenmächte sei und als solcher behandelt werden müsse. Die Vorteile einer Trennung Frankreichs von England habe Italien durchaus erkannt und aus diesem Grunde bescheidene Waffenstillstandsbedingungen aufgestellt. Wenn man aber mit Frankreich Frieden schließe, so müsse man diesem



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MEMORANDUM On the conversation between the Foreign Minister of the Reich and the Japanese Ambassador, SATO, in the presence of Ambassador KURUSU and Consul General STAEMER, 8 July 1940.

After a word of thanks for the hospitality shown by the German Government and congratulations on the victory of Germany over France, Ambassador SATO declared that just as in Europe the new order would now be brought about by Germany, Japan on her part had been exerting herself for three years to establish a new order in the Far East and in the South Seas. In these parallel efforts a very close cooperation between Germany and Japan seems to have been in operation. For three years Japan had been holding the attention of the English, the French, and the American Governments and thereby in a certain sense rendered Germany's task in the establishment of the new order in Europe easier. In this manner the Governments of both countries could mutually support each other.

As far as Soviet Russia was concerned, Japan was under the existing circumstances obliged to seek to maintain good neighborly relations with Russia, just as Germany was also obliged to maintain good relations with Russia. In this respect also Japan and Germany could cooperate.

About America, Ambassador SATO stated that Japan has drawn the attention of that country to herself since the beginning of the Chinese war and that she tied up the American fleet in the Pacific Ocean. It is Japan's opinion that America must not overstep her zone consisting of North and South America and must not intervene in European or Far Eastern matters. The pursuit of this principle is also in the mutual interest of both countries. Ambassador SATO closed his remarks by stressing anew the common interests of Germany and Japan and the necessity of their cooperation. This cooperation must also encompass economic matters.

In regard to China, Ambassador SATO added that Japan is at present putting forth strong endeavors to finish the Chinese war, which has lasted now for three years, in order to gain free hands. In this connection he pointed out that public opinion in Japan has become extraordinarily nervous in respect to Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies.

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The REICHER FOREIGN MINISTER noted with satisfaction Japan's wish to cooperate with Germany in all fields. He believed that German-Japanese cooperation in itself represented nothing new. He himself had been one of those who years ago had furthered this cooperation with KURUSU's predecessor, General OSEIMA, and it had already borne fruit for both parties. Germany had made noteworthy use of it in her fight for equal rights, whilst Japan had doubtless drawn considerable advantages throughout the whole period of her struggle for China down to the present day from the existence of a strong Germany. Without the existence of a re-strengthened Germany, Japan could not have been able to penetrate as deeply into English and other spheres of interest in East Asia as it has actually happened. The natural interest of both powers in cooperation arises from these facts.

Plans for a very close cooperation between Japan, Germany and Italy had already been taken into consideration some time before. They miscarried because - as appeared again from the latest speeches of Japanese statesmen - Japan was not interested in European concerns.

As a result of Germany's victory over France, a great revision in all factors of foreign policy would follow. He personally believed that in the future, further possibilities for friendly cooperation with Japan would exist in the framework of the New Order in Europe now taking shape. At the present moment he would say nothing of the details of the form which this cooperation was to take, as he was acquainted with the German intentions but not with Japan's political aims. He therefore asked SATO for a further explanation of the principles of the political line which Japan proposed to pursue. He would be especially interested to hear from the Japanese side what was their thought of cooperation with Germany, whether only in the economic sphere or in which other way.

Ambassador SATO replied that it was comprehensible that for outsiders the Japanese Policy had been difficult to understand. For nine years, that is, since the outbreak of the Manchurian conflict, Japan had been trying to orient her policy in a set direction, but had time and again subsequently been forced to moderate this new orientation somewhat. In regard to the new order in the Far East, for Japan it is above all a question of permitting a new China to arise with which it could have friendly relations. The solidarity between this new China and Japan would guarantee peace in the Far East. In order to achieve this aim, Japan had for several



years been fighting obstinately against the so-called regime from Washington which finds expression in the treaties of 1921, especially in the Nine Power Pact. This Washington regime did not give China and Japan but the Anglo-Saxons the predominance in the Far East. Japan did not, however, by any means wish to eliminate the foreigners from the Far East. Quite the contrary. It also wishes to concede an appropriate place to economic cooperation with Germany in China.

In its relations with America Japan must of course be very careful.

To the question of the FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE REICH as to what in reality then was the basic reason for the difficulties between Japan and America, SATO answered that this cause lay in the struggle of Japan against the system of the Nine Power Treaty. In this Japan was not fighting against the fundamental principles of this treaty. Politically, it was quite prepared to respect the independence of China. Economically it was likewise in agreement with the so-called principle of the Open Door. It did, however, wish to exchange roles and itself be the host while the other nations would be only guests in East Asia.

When the question by the Foreign Minister of the Reich concerning the deeper reasons for the difficulties which Japan was having with America was interpolated anew, SATO answered that the causes of friction with America lay less in the economic than in the humanitarian sphere. American sympathies were with China. America felt that she was in a way the protector of this country and wanted to extend her police power in the Pacific Ocean with the help of her superiority at sea. Under these circumstances Japan was at pains to end the war with China soon. SATO declared that he personally, perhaps in a certain sense in opposition to the Japanese military authorities, did not believe that Japan could march to Chungking. It was, therefore, necessary to seek a solution of the Chinese question on some other than on a military basis. For this reason Japan had supported the government of Wang Ching Wei and was prepared to conclude a generous agreement with it. Japan absolutely did not wish to meddle in Chinese affairs or force anything upon the Chinese, but on the contrary was prepared to negotiate with Wang Ching Wei on the basis of equality. If the Chinese were sensible, a result would doubtless be achieved, under which China would not lose face. In this case America would also perhaps gradually change its attitude and be more



friendly toward Japan. America's economic interests in China were not large, but just this fact alone did not absolutely tend to help clarify the situation. In view of the considerable economic interests of England in this area, an agreement could much more easily be made with her than with the Americans, who take an entirely different view of things.

At the conjecture of the Foreign Minister of the Reich that perhaps America was uneasy about the rising power of Japan and her ever more powerful fleet, and that the differences of opinion with that country were based on the fact that America, who up to now had been ruling alone in the Pacific Ocean, now found herself in the position of being forced to share this rule with Japan, SAITO answered in the affirmative and added that the efforts of Japan in particular to achieve naval parity with America, and the fact that Japan was keeping the new additions to her fleet a secret had especially aroused ill feeling in America. For this reason, in particular after the entry of Stimson into the Government, Japan had to be very careful in regard to America in order not to provoke this country into making severe measures against Japan. To be sure, America had already abrogated the commercial treaty, but an export embargo against Japan had not yet been instituted. Because of the supply of petroleum and iron, the Japanese were still exceedingly dependent on America.

The REICH FOREIGN MINISTER replied that he had always held the view that a strong policy also promotes the economy. It would always fare worse as a result of the formulation of a weaker policy. Germany has her own experiences in this sphere. At the time when she was politically weak and the governments at the time maintained that one had to give way for economic reasons, Germany had, in the end, obtained no economic advantages for her conciliatory behavior. Now Germany is strong and her trade is flourishing. She gets all she needs supplied from other lands in addition to all the economic alleviations such as credits and the like.

Even a few months ago Germany had been considered as an encircled country. But now England is as completely encircled as no other land in world history. In gold, which has streamed in such great amounts to America, Germany is no more interested. The German Reich in its thousand years existence would never again build anything on gold. In Germany gold has been dethroned and other countries would



be bound to follow this example. Now, when England is so menaced, the stores of gold had been transported from there to the United States, so that about 85-90% of all the world's gold might be found there. The result of that is that the United States at the end of the war will be choked by gold and goods and would be glad to sell to other lands, for example Japan, under favorable conditions everything that those lands needed.

Germany, economically, is as good as completely independent. Many things, which were previously imported are produced by herself or else she has found a substitute for them. After the war the European economic sphere will be completely independent. That does not mean that Germany no more desires any world trade. Quite the opposite! However this new world trade must run on the basis of the independence of the participating economic spheres and the exchange of surplus. The old world trade rested on the possibility, always, possessed by England, of blockading other countries and cutting off their raw material supplies. In the New World Order Japan in East Asia, Russia in Asia, Germany and Italy in Europe would have the power of decision and also in Africa would Germany and Italy particularly, perhaps with some other interested party, exercise predominance.

The Foreign Minister of the Reich then came to speak on the attitude of the South American countries. The South American states, which Roosevelt tried to link economically with North America, appeared to know that after the war the United States would not be able to import the South American raw products and already turned towards Europe in order to insure the export of their goods after the war. But whoever wishes to trade with Europe, must in the future turn towards Germany.

SATO replied that he, not being an economist, could not express any opinion on economic questions. If, however, the exchange of goods rested no longer on the gold basis, then one could not very well turn back to a free exchange of goods with the rejection of commercial arrangements with foreign bills of exchange and other trade barriers.

As far as the United States are concerned, Japan was, possibly, not impressed by the economic pressure as much as by the American fleet and had to be careful for that reason. Besides, the United States would not be able to remain neutral in the European conflict once she came into a conflict with Japan.



The Reich Foreign Minister admitted that the Japanese situation was difficult and that Japan had to orient her policy according to the opportunities of the situation. He stated moreover, regarding the gold question that it was not a question of Germany not possessing any gold, but that German economy would never again be dependent on gold, i.e., on international speculation.

As regards Russia, the Reich Foreign Minister referred to the efforts which he had made for some years past to influence Ambassador OSHIMA in the direction of an understanding between Japan and Russia. Germany concluded a lasting agreement with Russia and the interests of both countries were very clearly outlined by one another. He welcomed the efforts which Japan had also made, in the previous months, to come to an understanding for her part with Russia.

In conclusion, SATO put up one more question which he himself said was a little indiscreet. What does Germany think the future shape of Europe will be?

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the German Government was only busying itself with one question at the moment, namely how is the war to be carried on and how is it to be brought to a victorious conclusion. For that reason he could not yet say much about the political future. The only thing that is certain is that the still remaining enemy of Germany - England - will be defeated.

Berlin, 9 July 1940.

Signed      SCHMIDT  
                  Envoy



I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U. S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

W. P. CUMMING

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946

G. H. GARDE

G. H. GARDE

Lt. Colonel AGD

Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U. S.)



AFFIDAVIT

I, Paul O. Schmidt, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That from 1923 to the collapse of the German Reich in May 1945, I was Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office, and as such was personally present and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at all important Foreign Office and other conferences between German Government leaders and representatives of foreign governments.

2. That in addition to being Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office as aforesaid, I was also after the year 1939 the Head of the Secretariat General of the German Foreign Office and that my latest government rank was that of a Minister in the German Foreign Office.

3. That while acting as interpreter and/or secretary at such meetings above referred to, it was my official duty to and I did take notes concerning the conversations that took place, and at the conclusion of each such meeting, I prepared from such notes a complete and detailed record of what was said and transpired at such meetings.

4. That the records prepared by me became the official German Government records of what was said and transpired at such meetings. That one copy of the record was filed with the Ministers Office Section of the German Foreign Office, which office acted in the capacity of secretary to said Foreign Office. That another copy of the record of each of such meetings was filed with the Private Secretariat of the German Foreign Minister. That a third copy of the record of each of such meetings was retained by me.

5. That said meetings, concerning which I made a record as aforesaid, were of historical importance and that such records were also prepared by me for the express purpose of maintaining and preserving a record of such meetings for historical purposes.

6. That the document attached hereto is a true and correct photostatic copy of the original record, prepared personally by me in the manner herein set forth and concerning a conference held on July 8th 1940 between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Japanese ambassador Sato in the presence of the ambassador K u r u s u and the Consul-General S t a h m e r.

7. That I personally attended and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at the conference last above mentioned and that the record prepared by me, and of which the attached document is a photostatic copy, is a true and accurate account of what was said and transpired at said conferences.

8. That I have been advised and am aware of the fact that the herein affidavit and the document attached hereto may be used in connection with the prosecution of Japanese War Criminals and make this affidavit freely and voluntarily and with knowledge of the above facts.

Dr. Paul O. Schmidt  
PAUL O. SCHMIDT

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Nurnberg, Germany this third day  
of May 1946

Smith W. Brookhart, Jr.,  
Lt Colonel IGD O-508524



來栖大使及ビスターマー總領事立會ヒノ下ニ於ケル一九四〇年  
 (昭和十五年)七月八日ノ獨逸外務大臣ト佐藤日本大使トノ會  
 談ニ關スル覺書

「獨逸政府ニ依ツテ示サレタ欲待ニ對スル感謝ト  
 獨逸ノ對佛戰勝ニ對スル祝詞トヲ一言述ベタ後  
 ニ、佐藤大使ハ、今ヤ獨逸ニ依リ歐羅巴ニ新秩序  
 ガ出現セントシテキルノト同様ニ、日本ノ方デハ  
 三年間極東ト南洋方面ニ新秩序ヲ建設シヤウト努  
 カシテ來タ、ト言明シタ。之等平行的ナ努力ヲス  
 ル場合ニ、日獨間ノ提携ハ非常ニ緊密ニ行ハレテ  
 來タ様ニ思ハレル。三年此方日本ハ、英。佛。米  
 三ヶ國政府ノ注意ヲ惹キ付ケ、其レニ依ツテ或ル  
 意味デハ、獨逸ノ歐羅巴ニ於ケル新秩序建設課題  
 ヲ容易ニシテ來タ。斯ノ様ニ兩國政府ハ互ニ扶ケ  
 合フ事ガ出來タノデアアル。

「ソビエツトロシヤニ關スル限り、日本ハ、現状  
 下ニ於テハ、露西亞トノ友好的隣邦關係ヲ保ツ様  
 努力セザルヲ得ナイノデアアル。之ハ獨逸ガ又露西  
 亞トノ友好關係ヲ保タザルヲ得ナイノト同様デア  
 ル。此ノ點デモ亦日獨兩國ハ協力出來ルノデアアル。  
 「米國ニ關シテハ、佐藤大使ハ、日本ハ支那事變  
 ノ初カラ米國ノ注意ヲ惹キ付ケテ來テ

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ヲ太平洋ニ釘付ケニシタ、ト述ベタ。日本ノ考デハ、米國ハ北米及ビ南米ヲ含ム亞米利加ノ地域ヲ踏ミ越エテハナラズ、又歐羅巴或ハ極東ノ事件ニ介入シテハナラナイト云フノデアツタ。此ノ原則ノ追求モ亦兩國相互ノ利益トナル事デアアル。佐藤大使ハ、言ヲ終ヘルニ當リ、改メテ日獨共通ノ利害關係ト日獨提携ノ必要トヲ力説シタ。此ノ提携ハ又經濟的ナ事柄ヲモ包含セネバナラヌ。

「支那ニ關シテハ、佐藤大使ハ、現在日本ハ自由ナ行動ガ取レル様ニト、最早三年間モ續イテキル支那戰爭ヲ了ヘヨウト懸命ノ努力ヲシテキルト附ケ加ヘタ。是ニ關聯シテ、佐藤大使ハ、日本ノ輿論ガ、印度支那及ビ蘭領印度ニ關シテ非常ニ銳敏ニナツテ來テキルコトヲ指摘シタ。

「外務大臣ハ凡ユル分野ニ於テ獨逸ト協力シ度イト云フ日本ノ欲望ハ誠ニ満足トスル處デアルト承知シタ。彼ハ日獨間ノ提携ハソレ自体新ナモノヲ表スモノデナイト信ジテキタ。彼自身來朝大使ノ前任者ノ大島將軍ト、數年前此ノ提携ヲ促進シタ人達ノ中ノ一人デアリ、ソシテ其ノ成果ハ既に兩者ニ舉ツテキタノデアアル。獨逸ハ、平等ナル權利ヲ要求スル其ノ職ヒニ、ソレヲ著シク利用シ、一方日本ハ、支那事變中ズツト今日ニ至ル迄、獨逸ト云フ強力ナ存在ガアツタ爲ニ、非常ナ利益ヲ



得たデアラウト云フ事ハ疑フ事ハ出来ナイ。若シモ再兵獨逸ノ存在ガナカツタナラバ、日本ハ現ニ行ツタ程深ク東亞ニ於テ英國ヤ其ノ他ノ(國ノ)權益區域ニ立入ル事ハ出来ナカツタデアラウ。斯様ナ事實カラ、協力スル二國ノ利害關係ガ生ジテ來ルノハ當然ノ事デアル。

「日獨伊ガ非常ニ緊密ニ協力シヨウト云フ案ハ既ニ前カラ考ヘラレテキタ。此ノ案ハ、日本ノ政治家ノ最近ノ演説ニモ再ビ現ハレテモキル如ク、日本ガ歐羅巴ノ事件ニ關心ヲ持タナカツタ爲ニ失敗シタノデアル。

「獨逸ノ對佛戰勝ノ結果、全テノ外交政策ノ要因ニ大ナル變革ヲ生ジタ。彼自身トシテハ、將來ニ於テモ亦シテ行ハレテキル歐羅巴新秩序ノ範圍内ニ於テ日本ト友好提携ノ可能性ガ更ニ存在スルト信ジテキル。彼ハ、獨逸ノ意向ハ知ツテキタガ、日本ノ政治目的ハ知ラサレテキナイノデ、此ノ提携ガ個々ニ於テ如何ニ形成サレルカニ就テハ何モ言ハレナイ。ソレ故、彼ハ佐藤大使ニ、日本ガ進マント考ヘテキル基本的政治的動向ヲモツト説明シテ呉レル様ニ要請シタ。彼ハ、日本ガ對獨提携ニ就テ、ソレガ單ニ經濟的分野ニ於ケルトシテモ、其ハ其ノ如何ナル方法デモ、如何ナル考ヘヲ持ツテキルカラ、日本側カラ聞ク事ハ彼ニ特ニ興味ヲ感ゼシメタ。



「佐藤大使ハ、日本ノ政策ガ局外者ニトツテ理解シ難イモノデアツタト云フ事ハ明瞭ナ事デアルト答ヘタ。九年來即チ滿洲事變勃發以來、日本ハ其ノ政策ヲ一定方向ニ確定シヨウト努力シテ來タガ、併シ其ノ後幾度モ此ノ新方向確定ヲ從ツテ幾分加減セザルヲ得ナクナツタ。極東ノ新秩序ニ關シテハ、日本ニシテ見レバ先ヅ第一ニ、日本ガ友好的關係ニ入ル事ガ出來ル様ナ新支那ヲ與スト云フ問題ナノデアアル。此ノ新支那ト日本間ノ團結ハ極東ノ平和ヲ保障スルコトトナラウ。此ノ目的ヲ達成スル爲ニ、數年間日本ハ一九二一年ノ諸條約、特ニ九ヶ國條約ニ表ハレテキル、所謂華盛頓體制ト頑強ニ戰ツテ來タ。此ノワシントン制ハ、日本ヤ中國ニデハナシニ、アングロサクソンニ、極東ニ於テ有利ナ地位ヲ與ヘテキル。併シ乍ラ、日本ハ決シテ極東カラ外國人ヲ追ヒ出スモノデハナイ。全然逆デアアル。日本ハ亦中國ニ於テ獨逸トノ經濟的提携ノ爲ニモ適當ナ場所ヲ讓歩スルツモリデアツタ。

勿論、日本ハ日米關係ニハ、深甚ナル注意ヲ拂ハネバナラヌ。」

「獨逸外務大臣ガ、ソレデハ實際日米間難點ノヨリ深キ理由ハ何デアアルカト問ヒタルニ對シテ、佐



1379-5

藤大使ハ、其ノ原因ハ日本ノ對九ヶ國條約組織ト  
ノ鬭争ニ在ルト答ヘタ。此ノ點ニ關シテモ、日本  
ハ此ノ條約ノ基本的原則ニ對シテ戰ツテキルノデ  
ハナイ。政治的ニハ、日本ハ中國ノ獨立ヲ尊重ス  
ル用意ガ充分アル。經濟的ニモ、日本ハ同様ニ所  
謂門戶開放ノ原則ニ贊成デアアル。併シ日本ハ、東  
亞ニ於テ逆ノ役割ヲ演ジ而モ彼自身主人デアアルニ  
對シ、他ノ諸國ハ東亞ノ單ナルオ客デアリ得ル。」

X X X

一九四〇年七月九日

於 伯 林

ミニミット使節(署名)



## 口 供 誓

余パウウル・オ・シユミツトハ正式ニ宣誓ヲ行ヒタル上次ノ如ク供述ス

一 一九二三年ヨリ一九四五年五月獨逸帝國ノ崩潰迄余ハ獨逸外務省ニ於ケル主席通譯官トシテ有リ、其ノ資格ヲ以テ自ラニ且通譯官トシテ出席シ又ハ凡ベテノ重要ナル外務省並ビニ獨逸政府首領及外國政府使臣トノ會議ニ對シ秘書官トシテ勤メタル事

ニ 既述セル如ク獨逸外務省ノ主席通譯官タルニ加ヘテ一九三九年後獨逸外務省官房長トナリ余ノ悉ク最近ニ於ケル職名ハ獨逸外務省公使タリシ事

三 上述セシ斯カル會合ニ通譯官又ハ秘書官トシテ行使シテ居タ間、取り交サレタ會話ニ關スル筆記ヲ取ル事ガ余ノ任務デアリ斯カル會合ノ結束ニ於テ余ハ斯ル會合ニ於テ話サレ起リシコトニ關スル完全ニシテ詳細ナル記録ヲカカル筆記ヨリ調整シタル事

四 余ノ調整セル各記録ハ斯カル會合ニヨリ話サレ起リシ事ノ獨逸政府公式ノ記録トナレリ  
記録ノ一通ハ既述ノ外務省ノ秘書的職能ヲ行使シ居レル獨逸外務省官房綴リトナリ、他ノ一通ハ獨



外務大臣個人秘書ノ備へ付ケトナリ更ニ各會合ノ記録ハ一通ハ余ニヨリ保留サレタリ

三 余ノ作成セシ既ニ申シ述ベシ記録ニ關係ヲ有スル會合ハ歴史的重要性ヲ有シ居リシ事並ビニ斯カル記録ハ各歴史的諸目的ノ爲ニ斯カル會合ノ記録ヲ維持シ且保存ニ明確ヲ期スル爲本官ニヨリ調整セラレタルモノナリ

六 此處ニ附帶シ有ル文書ハ原記録ノ眞實ニシテ確實ナル寫シニシテ本官ニヨリ此處ニ説明セシ如キ方法ヲ以テ個人的ニ調整セラレタル來栖大使並ビニスタマー總領事出席ノ下ニ獨逸帝國外務大臣ト日本佐藤大使間ニ一九四〇年七月八日舉行セラレタ會議ニ關スル者ナリ

七 本官ハ個人的ニ如上ノ會合ニ通譯官トシテ尙且秘書官トシテ勸メタル、會合デ有リシ事竝ビニ直接複寫寫眞ニヨル其ノ附帶書類ハ既述ノ會議ニヨリ話サレ起リタル眞實ニシテ正確ナル記録ナル事

八 本官ハ該口供書並ビニ附帶書類ガ日本戰爭犯罪人ノ起訴ニ關シ使用サルルデ有ラウ事實ヲ注意サレ確知シ居リシ事

並ビニ本口供書ハ上述セル諸事實ニ關スル智識ニ差ズキ自由ニ且自發的ニ作成セシ事



1379-3

パウル・オ・シュミット 署名

Dr. Paul O. Schmidt

獨逸ニユールンベルグニ於テ本官ノ面前ニヨリ

Nurdrurg Bernang

九四六年五月三日記名且宣誓セル者ナリ。

スミス・ダブリュ・ブルクハート・JR

陸軍中佐

IGD

總監局

〇一五〇八五二四



供 述 書

余、W. W. P. Cumming カミングハ正ニ宣誓シテ次ノ諸項ヲ  
證言ス

一 余ハ合衆國國務省附、同國獨逸關係事項政治顧問  
間部員タル事、及右ニ據リ余ハ（合衆國）獨逸  
軍政部代表ノ一員タルコト、且如上表明セル資  
格ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸柏林所在、柏林文書本部ニ  
於ル鹵獲獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫、原本ノ  
占有、保管、管理ニ任シアル事。

二 上述獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合  
國遠征軍最高司令部ノ指揮下ニ在ル軍隊ニヨリ  
テ鹵獲取得セラレ、其確保ノ下ニ、初メ獨逸國  
マールブルグニ於テ該軍隊ニヨリテ軍文書本部  
ニ蒐集セラレ、後該聯合軍擔任官ヨリ上述セル  
ノ柏林ノ文書本部ニ移管セラレタルモノナル事

三 余ハ一九四五年八月十五日、獨逸マールブルグ  
ニ於テ、上述文書本部擔當ヲ命セラレタル事。  
是ニ仍リテ該鹵獲獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫原  
本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ駐在當時、初メテ  
余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ歸シ、爾來引續キ余ノ  
占有、保管、管理ノ下ニアル事



四 余ノ此供述書ノ添附セラル、所ノ文書ハ上述ノ  
獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫トシテ、鹵獲セラ  
レ、余ノ占有、保管ニ歸シ、且余ノ管理ノ下ニ  
置カレタル、獨逸外務省文書原本ノ、眞正精確  
ナル直接復寫寫眞ノ謄本タル事

五 茲ニ添附セラレタル直接復寫寫眞謄本ノ文書原  
本ハ、余ノ保管、留保ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ  
點檢圖覽ニ資スル如クナシアリ、爲ニ該原本ヲ  
流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫眞謄本ヲ提  
供シ且ツ之ガ證明ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユー・ピー・カミング

(W. P. Cumming)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且ニ  
宣誓ス

中佐 ジー・エツテ・ガード

G. H. Garde

高級副官事務取扱

Lt. Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部



## MEMORANDUM

## Concerning

the conversation between the Foreign Minister of the Reich and the Japanese Ambassador, SATO, in the presence of Ambassador KURUSU and General Consul STAHRER, 8 July 1940.

After a word of thanks for the hospitality shown by the German Government and congratulations on the victory of Germany over France, Ambassador Sato declared that just as in Europe the new order would now be brought about by Germany, Japan on her part had been exerting herself for three years to establish a new order in the Far East and in the South Seas regions. In these parallel efforts a very close cooperation between Germany and Japan seems to have been in operation. For three years Japan had been holding the attention of the English, the French, and the American Governments and thereby in a certain sense rendered Germany's task in the establishment of the new order in Europe easier. In this manner the Governments of both countries could mutually support each other.

As far as Soviet Russia was concerned, Japan was under the existing circumstances obliged to seek to maintain good neighborly relations with Russia, just as Germany was also obliged to maintain good relations with Russia. In this respect also Japan and Germany could cooperate.

About America, Ambassador SATO stated that Japan has drawn the attention of that country to herself since the beginning of the Chinese war and that she tied up the American fleet in the Pacific Ocean. It is Japan's opinion that America must not overstep her zone consisting of North and South America and must not intervene in European or Far Eastern matters. The pursuit of this principle is also in the mutual interest of both countries. Ambassador SATO closed his remarks by stressing anew the common interests of Germany and Japan and the necessity of their cooperation. This cooperation must also encompass economic matters.

In regard to China, Ambassador SATO added that Japan is at present putting forth strong endeavours to finish the Chinese war, which has lasted now for three years, in order to have free hands. In this connection he pointed out that public opinion in Japan has become extraordinarily nervous in respect to Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies.

The Foreign Minister noted with satisfaction Japan's wish to cooperate with Germany in all fields. He believed that German-Japanese cooperation in itself represented nothing new. He himself had been one of those who

Gain

Reich



years ago had furthered this cooperation with KURUSU's predecessor, General OSHIMA, and it had already borne fruit for both parties. Germany had made noteworthy use of it in her fight for equal rights, whilst Japan had doubtless drawn considerable advantages throughout the whole period of her struggle for China down to the present day from the existence of a strong Germany. Without the existence of a re-strengthened Germany, Japan would not have been able to penetrate as deeply into English and other spheres of interest in East Asia as actually happened. The natural interest of both powers in cooperation arises from these facts.

it has

Plans for a very close cooperation between Japan, Germany and Italy had already been taken into consideration some time before. They miscarried because - as appeared again from the latest speeches of Japanese statesmen - Japan was not interested in European concerns.

would follow

As a result of Germany's victory over France there followed a great revision in all factors of foreign policy. He personally believed that in the future, further possibilities for friendly cooperation with Japan would exist in the framework of the New Order in Europe now taking shape. At the present moment he would say nothing of the details of the form which this cooperation was to take, as he was acquainted with the German intentions but not with Japan's political aims. He therefore asked SATO for a further explanation of the principles of the political line which Japan proposed to pursue. He would be especially interested to hear from the Japanese side what was their thought of cooperation with Germany, whether only in the economic sphere or in any other way.

which

Ambassador Sato replied that it was comprehensible that for outsiders the Japanese Policy was difficult to understand. For nine years, that is, since the outbreak of the Manchurian conflict, Japan had been trying to orient her policy in one direction, but had time and again subsequently been forced to moderate this new orientation somewhat. In regard to the new order in the Far East, for Japan it is above all a question of permitting a new China to arise with which it could have friendly relations. The solidarity between this new China and Japan would guarantee peace in the Far East. In order to achieve this aim, Japan had for several years been fighting obstinately against the so-called ~~rule~~ from Washington which finds expression in the treaties of 1921, especially in the Nine Power Pact. This Washington regime did not give China and Japan but the Anglo-Saxons the predominance in the Far East. Japan did not, however, by any means wish to eliminate the foreigners from the Far East. Quite the contrary! It also wished to concede an appropriate place to economic cooperation with Germany in China.

had been a set

regime

In its relations with America Japan must of course be very careful.



To the question of the Foreign Minister of the Reich as to what in reality then was the basic reason for the difficulties between Japan and America, Sato answered that this cause lay in the struggle of Japan against the system of the Nine Power Treaty. In this Japan was not fighting against the fundamental principles of this treaty. Politically, it was quite prepared to respect the independence of China. Economically it was likewise in agreement with the so-called principle of the Open Door. It did, however, wish to exchange roles and itself be the host while the other nations would be only guests in Eastern Asia.

*deeper*  
*generous*  
When the question by the Foreign Minister of the Reich concerning the basic reasons for the difficulties which Japan was having with America was interpolated anew, Sato answered that the causes of friction with America lay less in the economic than in the humanitarian sphere. American sympathies were with China. America felt that she was in a way the protector of this country and wanted to extend her police power in the Pacific Ocean with the help of her superiority at sea. Under these circumstances Japan was at pains to end the war with China soon. Sato declared that he personally, perhaps in a certain sense in opposition to the Japanese military authorities, did not believe that Japan could march to Chungking. It was, therefore, necessary to seek a solution of the Chinese question on some other than on a military basis. For this reason Japan had supported the government of Wang Ching Wei and was prepared to <sup>conclude</sup> make a comprehensive agreement with it. Japan absolutely did not wish to meddle in Chinese affairs or force anything upon the Chinese, but on the contrary was prepared to negotiate with Wang Ching Wei on the basis of equality. If the Chinese were sensible, a result would doubtless be achieved, under which China would not lose face. In this case America would also perhaps gradually change its attitude and be more friendly toward Japan. America's economic interests in China were not large, but just this fact alone did not absolutely tend to help clarify the situation. In view of the considerable economic interests of England in this area, an agreement could much more easily be made with her than with the Americans, who <sup>take</sup> took an entirely different view of things.

At the conjecture of the Foreign Minister of the Reich that perhaps America was uneasy about the rising power of Japan and her ever more powerful fleet, and that the differences of opinion with that country were based on the fact that America, who up to now had been ruling alone in the Pacific Ocean, now found herself in the position of being forced to share this rule with Japan, Sato answered in the affirmative and added that the efforts of Japan in particular to achieve naval parity with America, and the fact that Japan was keeping ~~everything~~ <sup>in regard to</sup> the new additions to her fleet a secret had especially aroused ill feeling in America. For this reason, in particular after the entry of Stimson into the Government, Japan had to be



Because of

very careful in regard to America in order not to provoke this country into taking severe measures against Japan. To be sure, America had already abrogated the commercial treaty, but an export embargo against Japan had not yet been instituted. ~~As regards~~ the supply of petroleum and iron, the Japanese were still exceedingly dependent on America.

has

alleviations

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that he had always held the view that a strong policy also promoted ~~domestic~~<sup>the</sup> economy. It would always fare worse as a result of the formulation of a weaker policy. Germany had her own experiences in this sphere. At ~~a~~<sup>the</sup> time when she was politically weak and the governments at the time maintained that one had to give way for economic reasons, Germany had, in the end, obtained no economic advantages for her conciliatory behavior. Now Germany is strong and her trade is flourishing. She gets all she needs supplied from other lands in addition to all the economic ~~relief~~ such as credits and the like.

anything

will checked by

Even a few months ago Germany had been considered as an encircled country. But now England is as completely encircled as no other land ~~is~~<sup>IN</sup> world history. In gold, which has streamed in such great amounts to America, Germany is no more interested. The German Reich in its thousand years existence would never again build on gold. In Germany gold has been dethroned and other countries would be bound to follow this example. Now, when England is so menaced, the stores of gold had been transported from there to the United States, so that about 85-90% of all the world's gold might be found there. The result of that is that the United States at the end of the war would be swamped with gold and goods and would be glad to sell to other lands, <sup>as</sup> for example Japan, under favorable conditions, everything that those lands needed.

world-trade

of the Reich

Germany, economically, is as good as completely independent. Many things, which were previously imported are produced by herself or else she has found a substitute for them. After the war the European economic sphere will be completely independent. That does not mean that Germany no more desires any world trade. Quite the opposite! However this new world trade must run on the basis of the independence of the participating economic spheres and the exchange of surplus. The ~~Old World's trade~~ rested on the possibility, always, possessed by England, of blockading other countries and cutting off their raw material supplies. In the New World Order would Japan in East Asia, Russia in Asia, Germany and Italy in Europe <sup>have</sup> the power of decision and also in Africa would Germany and Italy particularly, perhaps with some other interested party, exercise predominance. <sup>¶</sup> The Foreign Minister then came to speak on the attitude of the South American countries. The South American states, which Roosevelt tried to link economically with North America, appeared to know that after the war the United States would not be

¶ - new paragraph



able to import the South American raw products and already turned towards Europe in order to insure the export of their goods after the war. But whoever wishes to trade with Europe, must in the future turn towards Germany.

SATO replied that he, not being an economist, could not express any opinion on economic questions. If, however, the exchange of goods rested no longer on the gold basis, then one could not very well turn back to a free exchange of goods with the rejection of commercial arrangements with bills of exchange and other trade barriers.

foreign

As far as the United States are concerned, Japan was, possibly, not impressed by the economic pressure as much as by the American fleet and had to be careful for that reason. Besides, the United States would not be able to remain neutral in the European conflict once she came into a conflict with Japan.

Reich

according to opportunities

account

The Foreign Minister admitted that the Japanese situation was difficult and that Japan had to accommodate her policy and the actualities of the situation. He stated moreover, regarding the gold question that it was not a question of Germany not possessing any gold, but that German economy would never again be dependent on gold, i.e., on international speculation.

Reich

to influence in the direction of defined

As regards Russia, the Foreign Minister referred to the efforts which he and Ambassador OSHIMA had made in moves for an understanding between Japan and Russia. Germany concluded a lasting agreement with Russia and the interests of both countries were very clearly outlined by one another. He welcomed the efforts which Japan had made, in the previous months, to come to an understanding for her part also with Russia.

for some years past

In conclusion, SATO put up one more question which he himself said was a little indiscreet. What does Germany think the future shape of Europe will be?

Reich

The Foreign Minister replied that the German Government was only busying itself with one question at the moment, namely how is the war to be carried on and how is it to be brought to a victorious conclusion. For that reason he could not yet say much about the political future. The only thing that is certain is that the still remaining enemy of Germany - England - ~~must~~ will be defeated.

Berlin, 9 July 1940.

Signed SCHMIDT  
Ambassador



1379

Memorandum

concerning  
the conversation between the Foreign Minister of the Reich and  
the Japanese Ambassador, SATO, in the presence of  
Ambassador KURUSU and General General STAMMER, 8 July 1940.

Page 1. of German text translated in Document 11.  
(Copy Doc 11 to "co-operate". Then continue page 1, Analysis to Doc 1379 "about America..."  
to p. 2. "Dutch East Indies")

Page 2. as far as end of Paragraph 2 translated in  
Document No. 1379. It then continues -

The Foreign Minister noted with satisfaction  
JAPAN's wish to co-operate with GERMANY in all  
fields. He believed that German-Japanese co-operation  
in itself represented nothing new. He himself had  
been one of those who years ago had furthered  
this co-operation with KURUSU's predecessor, GENERAL  
OSHIMA, and it had already borne fruit for  
both parties. GERMANY had made noteworthy use of  
it in her fight for equal rights, whilst JAPAN  
had doubtless shown considerable advantages throughout  
the whole period of her struggle for CHINA down to  
the present day from the existence of a strong GERMANY.



Without the existence of a re-strengthened GERMANY, JAPAN would not have been able to penetrate as deeply into English and other spheres of interest in EAST ASIA as actually happened. ~~These~~ <sup>These</sup> ~~are~~ <sup>are</sup> the natural interest of both powers in co-operation arises from these facts.

Plans for a very close co-operation between JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY had already been taken into consideration some time before. They miscarried because - as appeared again from the latest speeches of Japanese statesmen - JAPAN was not interested in European concerns.

As a result of GERMANY's ~~conquest~~ <sup>victory</sup> over FRANCE there followed a great revision in all factors of foreign policy. He personally believed that in the future, further possibilities for friendly co-operation with JAPAN would exist in the framework of the New Order in EUROPE now taking shape. At the present moment he would say nothing of the details of the form which this co-operation was to take, as he was acquainted with the German intentions but not with JAPAN's political aims. He therefore asked SATO for a further explanation of the principles of the political line which JAPAN proposed to pursue. He would



be especially interested to hear from the Japanese side what was their thought of co-operation with GERMANY, whether only in the economic sphere or in any other way.

(Continue on p 2 of Doc 11 starting with top 'Ambassador Sato -' <sup>last par.</sup> to bottom of p. 4 'on America'. Pages 4, 5 and 6 of the German text are translated in Document 11. It continues thus -

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that he had always held the view that a strong policy also promoted domestic economy. It would always fare worse as a result of the formulation of a weaker policy. GERMANY had her own experiences in this sphere. At a time when she was politically weak and the governments at the time maintained that one had to give way for economic reasons, GERMANY has <sup>in the end</sup> ~~not~~ obtained no economic advantages for her conciliatory behaviour. Now GERMANY is strong and her trade is flourishing. She gets all she needs supplied from other lands in addition to all the economic relief such as credits and the like ~~of~~ <sup>through</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>Even</sup> ~~in~~ a few months ~~ago~~ <sup>before</sup> Germany had been considered as an encircled country. But now England is as completely encircled as no other



land in <sup>world</sup> history. In gold, which has streamed in such great amounts to AMERICA, GERMANY is no more interested. The German Reich in its thousand years existence would never again build on gold. In Germany gold has been dethroned and other countries would be bound to follow this example. Now, when ENGLAND is so menaced, ~~might~~ the stores of gold ~~yet to be~~ had been transported from there to the UNITED STATES, so that about 85-90% of all the world's gold might be found there. The result of that is that the UNITED STATES at the end of the war would be swamped with gold and goods and would be glad to sell to other lands, for example JAPAN, under favorable conditions everything that those lands needed.

GERMANY, economically, is as



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good as completely independent. Many things, which were previously imported are produced ~~by~~ <sup>by himself</sup> or else she ~~has~~ <sup>has found</sup> a substitute ~~for~~ for them. After the war the European economic sphere ~~will~~ will be completely independent. That does not mean that GERMANY no more desires any world trade quite the opposite! However the new world trade must run on the basis of the independence of the <sup>participating</sup> ~~interested~~ economic <sup>spheres</sup> ~~spheres~~ and the exchange of ~~their~~ surplus. The old world's trade rested on the possibility, always possessed by ENGLAND, of blockading other countries and cutting off their raw material supplies. ~~In~~ In the New World order would JAPAN in East Asia, RUSSIA in Asia, GERMANY and ITALY in Europe have the power of decision; and also in Africa would GERMANY and ITALY



particularly, perhaps with some other interested party, exercise ~~the former~~ ~~control~~ predominance.

The Foreign Minister then came to speak on the attitude of the South American countries. The South American states, which ROOSEVELT tried to link economically with North America appeared to know that after the war the UNITED STATES would not be ~~able~~ <sup>able to support</sup> ~~the~~ the South American raw products and ~~had~~ already turned towards Europe in order to ensure the export of their goods after the war. But whoever wishes to trade with Europe, must in the future turn towards GERMANY

SATO replied that he, not being an economist, could not <sup>express</sup> ~~give~~ any opinion on economic questions. If, however, the



exchange of goods rested no longer on the gold basis, then one could not very well turn back to a free exchange of goods with the rejection of commercial arrangements, with bills of exchange and other trade barriers. ~~As for~~ <sup>and</sup> as the United States are concerned, Japan was, possibly, not impressed by the economic pressure as much as by the American fleet and had to be careful for that reason. Besides, the United States would not be able to remain neutral in the European conflict once she came into a conflict with Japan.

The Foreign Minister admitted that the Japanese situation was difficult and that Japan had to accommodate her policy to the actualities of the situation.



stated

He ~~stuck to the decision~~, moreover, regarding the gold question that it was not a question of Germany not possessing any gold, but that German economy would never again be dependent on gold, <sup>i.e.,</sup> ~~comely~~ on international speculation.

As regards Russia the Foreign Minister referred to the efforts which he and Ambassador OSHIMA had made in moves for an understanding between JAPAN and RUSSIA. GERMANY concluded a lasting agreement with RUSSIA and the interests of both countries were very clearly outlined by one another. He welcomed the efforts which Japan had made, in the previous months, to come to an understanding for her part also with RUSSIA.

In conclusion, SATO put up one more question which he himself



said was a little indiscreet. What does GERMANY think the future shape of Europe will be?

The Foreign Minister replied that the German Government was only busying itself with one question at the moment, namely how is the war to be carried on and how is it to be brought to a victorious conclusion. For that reason he could not yet say much about the political future. The only thing that is certain is ~~Only rest assured~~ that the still remaining enemy of GERMANY — ENGLAND — ~~will~~ <sup>must</sup> be defeated.

BERLIN 9 July 1940.

Signed SCHMIDT.

Envoij.



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WB

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 1379

Date: 10 April 1946

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PERSONS IMPLICATED: STÄHLER; OSHIMA, Hiroshi; SATO

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"In regard to China, Ambassador SATO added that Japan is at present putting forth strong endeavours to finish the Chinese war, which has lasted now for three years, in order to have free hands. In this connection he pointed out that public opinion in Japan has become extraordinarily nervous in respect to Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies."

The Foreign Minister noted with satisfaction Japan's wish to cooperate with Germany in all fields. He always advocated this cooperation which has already borne fruits for both parties. "Without the existence of a Germany which has become strong again, Japan would not have been able to penetrate as deeply into English and other spheres of interest in East Asia as it actually happened." Plans for a very close cooperation between Japan, Germany and Italy had been taken into consideration sometime ago. They did not materialize because Japan lacked interest in European matters. As to the form of this cooperation, he declared himself unable to give any explanations, since he was not sufficiently informed about Japanese political aims. He asked for such information and adds that "he would be especially interested to hear from Japanese side how they thought about cooperation with Germany, whether only in the sphere of economies or in which way besides this." Ambassador SATO replied that Japan has endeavored to orient her policy in a definite direction, but has always been forced to mitigate this new orientation somewhat. "In the new order in the Far East Japan is first of all interested in the creation of a new China, with which she could have friendly relations. The solidarity between this new China, and Japan should secure order in the Far East. In order to achieve this aim, Japan fought for years stubbornly against the so-called regime of Washington, which finds its expression in the treaties of 1921, and especially in the Nine-Power Treaty. This Washington regime gives preponderance in the Far East, not to China and Japan, but to the Anglo-Saxons. However, it is not Japan's intention to exclude foreigners from the Far East; quite to the contrary, Japan also wishes to give a proper position to the economic cooperation with Germany in China. In her relations to America, Japan has to be cautious indeed."



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"Questioned by the Foreign Minister for the real and deeper reason of the difficulties between Japan and America, SATO answered that this reason is the fight of Japan against the system of the Nine-Power Treaty. Japan does not fight against the principle of this treaty. Politically, she is quite ready to respect the independence of China. Economically, she also agrees to a so-called principle of the open door. However, she wants to turn the table and be the host while the other nations could only be guests in East Asia.

"In replying to a second question of the Foreign Minister for the deeper reasons of the difficulties between Japan and America SATO states that the points of friction with America are less in the economic than in the humanitarian fields. America's sympathies are with China. America feels that she is, so to speak, the protector of that country and wants to police the Pacific Ocean further by means of her naval superiority. Under these circumstances Japan endeavors to finish the war with China soon. SATO declared that he personally did not believe that Japan could march to Chungking. In this his opinion differs to a certain degree from the Japanese military. Therefore, it is necessary to find a solution of the Chinese question not in a military way, but in a different manner. For this reason Japan aided the Wang Ching-wei government and is ready to make a very generous agreement with it. Japan does not wish to interfere with Chinese matters or to force something upon the Chinese, but is ready to negotiate with Wang Ching-wei on the basis of equality. If the Chinese are reasonable it will be possible to achieve a result which allows China not to lose face. In this case America would also little by little change her attitude and act more friendly towards Japan . . ."

"The Foreign Minister expressed the supposition that maybe America is disturbed by the increasing power of Japan and by her increasingly strong fleet and that the divergences of opinion with that country may be based on the fact that America which so far had ruled the Pacific Ocean alone now is forced to share this rule with Japan. To this SATO replied in the affirmative and added that particularly the Japanese endeavors to obtain a naval parity with America and the fact that the new naval constructions had been kept secret had put America in a very bad temper. Therefore, Japan has to be very careful towards America, especially after Stimson entered the Cabinet, so as not to provoke that country to strong measures against Japan. America has already canceled the trade treaty, but has not yet declared the embargo against Japan. Japan is extremely dependent on America because of the petroleum and iron supply."

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