

File copy under Dyoshiguni
 S A T O
 Army Affairs Bureau and Kenryo SATO
 TANAKA (Gen)
 Zavalca #3
 POW ADM #18
 file

The Military Affairs Bureau of the Army Ministry is the backbone of the Army, being responsible for the organization of the Army and the drawing up of budget. In the days of the TOJO Cabinet, this bureau used to hold sway over Japan's internal administration, diplomatic intercourse, administration in occupied territories, and all of the information and propaganda services.

The Composition of the Bureau is as follows:

	(Personnel (Gunji) Division . . . organization of the Army, budget
Military Affairs Bureau	(Military Affairs (Gummu) Division . . . domestic administration, diplomacy, administration in occupied territories
	(Intelligence Department . . . propaganda information

In other words, the Military Affairs Bureau constituted the War Minister's administrative staff, for with TOJO's appointment as Premier, it actually came to control the reins of government in Japan.

It was the Military Affairs Bureau that took the lead in carrying out the plans of the Pacific War.

When the Pacific War broke out, Lt. General Akira MUTO (General YAMASHITA's Chief of Staff in the Philippines towards the end of the war) was the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, and the position of the head of the Military Affairs Division was held by Maj. General Kenryo SATO.

Kenryo SATO, simple-minded but head-strong, was the greatest favorite of TOJO's. SATO adored TOJO as a deity, while TOJO loved to listen to his flattery and adulation, so much so that they became attached to each other as if they were father and son. SATO did not distinguish himself at the Army Staff College, but being gifted with a fluent tongue he used bombastic words, which TOJO liked. Though a good-for-nothing, he won TOJO's favor and succeeded in assuming the high post of the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Army Ministry. In order to rise to higher positions, he shrank from no evil doing.

Army Affairs Bureau & Kenryo SATO

Towards mid-April, 1942, SATO was promoted from the Head of the Military Affairs Division to the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau and, therefore, he was virtually the chief of TOJO's administrative staff.

It was Kenryo SATO, then Head of the Military Affairs Division, who approached Senior Statesmen Hobuyuki IBE and Senjuro H. YASHI in order to make TOJO the Premier.

It was Akira NUTO, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, and Kenryo SATO, Head of the Military Affairs Section, who most ardently advised TOJO to open hostilities in the Pacific.

(As to how matters stood in the Army General Staff Office concerning this, however, I have no idea.)

At the beginning of May, 1942, when TOJO, regardless of the advice from Lieutenant General Mikio KAMIMURA, Chief of War Prisoners Information Bureau, decided and issued an order to ignore the treaty of Geneva and subject the prisoners of war to compulsory labor. It was SATO, Military Affairs Bureau Chief, who, in compliance with his orders, took up the responsibility of drawing up the Imperial ordinance. The Military Affairs Bureau decided on the number of war prisoners' camps and estimated building expenses and so on. It was also this bureau that determined the organization of war prisoners' camps.

Of the participants of the early May conference of Bureau Chiefs, when TOJO decided on the treatment of war prisoners, those who have not yet been sent to Sugamo but are living in the homeland are as follows:

Lieutenant General Terashiro KAMABE (Nagoya)
Lieutenant General Masao YOSHIZUMI (Chief, General
Affairs Department of the First Demobilization
Ministry)
Lieutenant General Harutsugu SUGA (Tokyo)
Surgeon Lieutenant General Yoshihide MIKI (Tokyo)
Lawyer Lieutenant General Fumio OYAMA (Tokyo)

Concerning the whereabouts of the above, the 1st Demobilization Ministry will be able to give the exact information.

As for Mikio KAMIMURA, then Chief of the War Prisoners' Information Bureau, he was assigned to overseas duty soon after the

Army Affairs Bureau & Kenryo SATO

conference, and I have no knowledge of his present whereabouts. The Demobilization Ministry, however, will be able to make it clear.

If one wishes to ascertain the reasons why and how the Japanese Army had come to embark on such a reckless war, it would be difficult to apprehend the actual circumstances unless one inquires not only into the nature and scope of power of the Military Affairs Bureau but also the character and plots of Akira MUTO and Kenryo SATO, the Chiefs of the Military Affairs Bureau at the time, respectively.

In order to make a close study of the Military Affairs Bureau as to its structure and the nature of its function, it would be advisable to summon and interrogate Lieutenant General Masao YOSHIKUNI, who succeeded Kenryo SATO as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau and remained as such till the termination of the war and who is at present the Head of the General Affairs Department in the First Demobilization Ministry.

(Takakichi TANAKA)

444
Tanaka - R -

See Transcript p 2051

Hunaka Ryukichi

See case file - #234

also -

Ats Orosmond - 2767 - 2115

file 234 - 119

" " 193

" " 121

" 343 - 6

" etc

Tanaka, Ryukichi

Partially

rully

1

2

3

4

5

6

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8

9

Case file # 234

~~Handwritten scribbles and crossed-out text~~

Case file → 234 - 121 - Dr's certificate
 # 234 143 - interruption
 → 234 - 119 - A major asylum
 → 234 - 43 - re sub. for Japan
 402 - 1 - election to Axel

ATIS trial - 2767

2115 - esp. by T - a telegram instructions rule

343 - 6 - head of Kenpei list

409 - 57 - re Shigenetsu (family) / as anti-war

432 - 1 - re Taka Lataki Yoshikida

Case file

200 - 12 - re POWs

Case files \rightarrow 234-42 - Cho & Harukata use chief platters 7 3/4 ^{inch}
 206-32 - Rambo, Kuratama - in number book
 1-59 - Togo & description of forest - number book
 234-122 - 2 sets of files
 99-53
 430^{1st} - 2 - answer of Chuy In Ten
 115 - (?) 36
 200 - 6

AT 10 Over land - 2724

99-252 - 21 lbs in Japan & one animal
 209-25 - Ibedu, Saito gave fund to Kito, Ibedu
 272-3
 6-31
 23-46
 225-31
 99-9
 206-20 - 2 accounts of files
 107-19 - gave Kubam 2 million yen
 176-25 - De Sato (Su. of military affairs) & P.O. files
 182-57 - Ohama
 \rightarrow 234-45 - Kido

For additional information see:

IPS File No. 234 - TANAKA, Ryukichi

TANAKA, Ryukichi (Maj. Gen.)

Requested by: KIMURA

Nationality - Japanese

Residence: Tokyo - in custody of the prosecution.

The facts to be proved by this witness are that he was the Chief of Military Affairs Bureau during the time the accused KIMURA was Vice War Minister and the Military Affairs Bureau was the controlling branch of the War Ministry and that matters of policy were decided by the War Minister and the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, and other pertinent facts.

The testimony of this witness is relevant in that it tends to prove that the accused KIMURA took no part in the formulation of policies in the more important matters.

Translated by K. YAMADA
Checked by OGITA

Personal History

Name: TANAKA, Ryukichi

Born: July 9, 1893

Address: SHIMANE Prefecture.

Status: Commoner

30 May 1912	Graduated the regular course of the Central Military Preparatory School.	
31 May 1912	Appointed cadet and assigned to the 23rd Field Artillery Regiment.	War Ministry
6 June 1912	Entered the 23rd Field Artillery Regiment.	
" " "	Given the grade of artillery superior private.	23rd Field Artillery Regiment
1 Aug. 1912	Promoted to artillery corporal.	"
1 Sept. 1912	Promoted to artillery sergeant.	"
1 Dec. 1912	Entered the Military Academy.	
28 May 1914	Graduated the Military Academy.	
3 June 1914	Returned the Mother Unit.	
" " "	Promoted to the grade of sergeant-major and appointed probationary officer.	"
27 Nov. 1914	Passed by the Officer Selection Board in accordance with Article 12 of the Army, Personnel Replacement Regulation.	
25 Dec. 1914	Appointed an Artillery 2nd Lieutenant; Assigned to the 23rd Field Artillery Regiment.	Cabinet War Ministry
1 Mar. 1915	Raised to the Eighth Court Rank Senior Grade.	
29 July 1918	Promoted to Artillery 1st Lieutenant.	Cabinet
30 Sept. 1916	Raised to the Seventh Court Rank, Junior Grade.	

1 Apr. 1919	Relieved of the present position and assigned to the 26th Field Artillery Regiment.	War Ministry
10 Dec. 1919	Ordered to enter the Army Staff College.	" "
17 Mar. 1923	Relieved of the present service and assigned as an acting captain attached to the 26th Field Artillery Regiment.	" "
22 June 1923	Relieved of duties as an acting captain attached to the 26th Field Artillery Regiment; assigned as an acting company commander in the 26th Field Artillery Regiment.	" "
6 Aug. 1923	Promoted to Artillery Captain. Assigned as a Company Commander of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment.	Cabinet
30 Nov. 1923	Raised to the Seventh Court Rank, Senior Grade.	
11 Dec. 1923	Ordered to service with the Army General Staff Headquarters.	War Ministry
9 Apr. 1924	Relieved of the present post and assigned to the 26th Field Artillery Regiment.	" "
14 Oct. 1924	Relieved of the present position and assigned as a member of the Headquarters of General Staff.	" "
25 Nov. 1925	Concurrently assigned as an instructor in the Army Veterinary School.	" "
10 May 1927	Relieved from concurrent position.	
18 July 1927	Decorated with 6th Class Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure.	
26 July 1927	Relieved of the present position and assigned to the Headquarters of the Army General Staff.	" "
28 Dec. 1928	Raised to the Sixth Court Rank, Junior Grade.	
1 Aug. 1929	Promoted to Artillery Major. Assigned as a member of the Headquarters of the Army General Staff.	Cabinet War Ministry
30 Sept. 1929	Concurrently assigned as a military instructor of the Army Staff College.	

25 Oct. 1930	Assigned to the Headquarters of the Army General Staff.	
7 Nov. 1931	Decorated with the 5th Class Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure.	
8 Aug. 1932	Assigned as a Battalion Commander of the 4th Field Artillery Regiment.	
1 Feb. 1934	Raised to the Sixth Court Rank, Senior Grade.	
5 Mar. 1934	Promoted to Artillery Lieutenant Colonel.	Cabinet
	Assigned to the 1st Heavy Field Artillery Regiment.	War Ministry
15 Mar. 1935	Assigned as staff officer of the Kwantung Army.	" "
29 Apr. 1934	Decorated with the Small Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, Fourth Class; for meritorious service in the Incident of the years 1931-1934.	
2 Aug. 1937	Promoted to Artillery Colonel.	Cabinet
1 Sept. 1937	Raised to the Fifth Court Rank, Junior Grade.	
2 Aug. 1937	Relieved as a staff officer of the Kwantung Army; assigned as Commanding Officer of the 25th Ministry Mountain Artillery Regiment.	War Ministry
10 July 1936	Decorated with the Middle Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, Third Class; for meritorious service in the Incident of the years 1931-1934.	
15 Apr. 1939	Appointed as a member of Army Munitions Investigation Commission.	Cabinet
8 Aug. 1939	Ordered to be a judge of the Army General Court Martial.	War Ministry
23 Dec. 1939	Appointed chairman of Military Arts Promotion Committee (T.N. BUDO SHINKO IINKAI)	Cabinet
9 Mar. 1940	Promoted to Major-General.	"
28 Mar. 1940	Relieved as Chairman of Military Arts Promotion Committee (T.N. BUDO SHINKO IINKAI).	"

9 Mar. 1940	Appointed the Chief of Staff of the First Army.	War Ministry
1 Apr. 1940	Raised to the Fifth Court Rank, Senior Grade.	
16 Jan. 1939	Assigned as the Chief of Military Service Section of Military Service Bureau of War Ministry.	" "
5 Aug. 1940	Relieved as a member of Army Munitions Investigation Commission.	Cabinet
24 Dec. 1940	Appointed as a government delegate concerned with matters under the charge of the War Ministry in the 76th Imperial Diet.	"
13 Jan. 1941	Appointed a member of the Investigation Committee of the Horse Administration Section (T.N. Under the Military Service Bureau).	"
17 Jan. 1941	Appointed a member of the Central Air Defense Commission.	
	Appointed a member of the National Language Investigation Committee.	
	Appointed a participant in the Horse Administration Bureau.	"
	Appointed a member of the National Physical Strength Investigation Committee (T.N. KOKUMIN TAIRYOKU SHINGIKAI).	"
4 Feb. 1941	Appointed a participant in the Population Reserved Institute (Discontinued by Imperial Ordinance No. 762 of No. 1, 1942.)	"
20 May 1941	Appointed a member of the Text-book Investigation Committee.	"
	Appointed a member of the Labor Control Committee (Discontinued by the Imperial Ordinance No. 95 of Mar. 10, 1945).	"
12 Dec. 1941	Decorated with the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, Second Class.	
22 Jan. 1942	Appointed a government delegate concerned with matters under the charge of the War Ministry in the 79th Imperial Diet.	"

<p>Mar. 27, 1942 (T.N. The word "March" is not clear in the original text.)</p>	<p>Appointed a participant in the Air Defense Bureau of the Home Ministry.</p>	<p>Cabinet</p>
<p>13 Oct. 1942</p>	<p>Relieved as a member of the Text-book Investiga- tion Committee.</p>	
	<p>Relieved of a member of the National Language Investigation Committee.</p>	
	<p>Relieved as a participant in the Horse Administration Bureau.</p>	
	<p>Relieved as a member of the Horse Administra- tion Investigation.</p>	<p>Cabinet</p>
<p>19 Oct. 1942</p>	<p>Relieved as a participant in the Air Defense Bureau of the Home Ministry.</p>	<p>"</p>
<p>29 Apr. 1940</p>	<p>Given the Imperial Order of the Golden Kite, Third Class; and the Imperial Order of the Double Rays of the Rising Sun, Second Class; for meri- torious service in the China Incident.</p>	
<p>30 Oct. 1943</p>	<p>Army reserve. (T.N. This text is in pencil on the original).</p>	

1 April 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR TANAKA, Ryukichi (KIMURA witness) FILE:

1. TANAKA was not, as stated in the defense application, Chief of Military Affairs Bureau; he was Chief of the Military Discipline Bureau.

2. It is suggested that we better not cross examine TANAKA who as prosecution's witness had already testified favorably for KIMURA. (tsn pp. 14,385-86; 14,388; 14,386-97; 14,398-99; 14,401-03; 14,404-07.)

(Received from Col. Woolworth)

TANAKA, Ryukichi

Request by: SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru

Witness is now in Tokyo, USHIGOME-KU, c/o IPS, Investigation Div.
War Ministry Building.

Document Requested:

Location

Diary of M. M. Litvinov, former commissar
of foreign affairs of the Soviet Union
(from July 1, 1938 to Aug. 31, 1938) ex-
cerpts were introduced as Exhibit No. 754.

I.P.S. War Ministry
Building, Tokyo, Japan.

The relevance of the testimony of these witnesses, all of whom were associated with the accused SHIGEMITSU, in various capacities during the time charged in the indictment, or who have personal knowledge of such events is, in its tendency, to establish that the accused SHIGEMITSU took no part in any of the conspiracies charged to him; and was not in any way connected with the planning, initiating or waging of wars of aggression; and was, furthermore, in no way connected with the commission of any crimes against peace and is not guilty under the indictment or any of its counts.

TANAKA, Ryukichi

The following is an extract from Document No. 2971 (page 98), "List of Decorations awarded to Witnesses called for by the Defendants":

<u>Date</u>	<u>Class of Decoration</u>	<u>Achievement</u>	<u>Recommending Ministry</u>
10 July 1936	Intermediate Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun	Manchurian Incident	War Ministry
29 Apr. 1940	Order of the Compound Light Rising Sun	China Incident	War Ministry
29 Apr. 1940	Military Order of the Golden Kite, 3rd Class	China Incident	War Ministry
27 Nov. 1942	Decorated by Manchukuo Chingyuan-Chang 2nd Class	Japanese-Manchurian Amity	Foreign Ministry

REFERENCES TO KIMURA IN INTERROGATIONS

OF TANAKA, RYUKICHI

Serial 134 - 11 May 1946

Q. What I am interested in finding out about this morning is the people responsible for the employment of prisoners of war in the construction of the Burma-Thailand Railroad. ... (p. 1)

.....
A. In Burma those responsible for gathering workers were KAWABE and KIMURA, both of whom are in Sugamo. KIMURA was Vice Minister of War. ..."
..... (p. 2)

Serial 38A

"The inside story of the September 6 Imperial Conference was known to MUTO and KIMURA." (p. 8)
.....

Serial 57

43

KIMURA, Heitaro, Vice Minister of War, was among those who attended the meeting of the Chiefs of the Military Bureaus in the early part of 1942. (p. 4-5)
.....

Q. "KIMURA, Heitaro, as Vice Minister of War from 1941 to 1943 -- What was his responsibility in regard to decisions on the B-T Railway construction?

A. His responsibility should be the same as that of General DOIHARA.

Q. Why?

A. Because he was commander of the Japanese Army in Burma at that time. At the same time General KAWABA, who preceded KIMURA should be held responsible.

Q. One final question about SATO, Kenryo, what responsibility would he have in regard to decisions on prisoners of war?

A. He should be held responsible for causing Imperial Decree to be issued on the treatment of war prisoners. He drafted the Decree as well as the order concerning the treatment of prisoners of war. In other words, he should be the responsible officer in the construction

of shelters for war prisoners. The responsibility for anything relating to treatment of prisoners should rest on the shoulders of War Minister TOJO, Vice Minister of War KIMURA and Chief of Military Affairs Bureau SATO." (p. 8-9)

A F F I D A V I T

I, Eiji IMAMURA, being duly sworn, in accordance with the method existing in my country, hereby depose as follows:

I am an ex-Lt. Colonel of the Japanese Army. I served in the Service and Discipline Section of the Service and Discipline Bureau from February, 1940 until October, 1943. During that period, Colonel Kyuzo KODAMA was head of the Service and Discipline Section and, until September, 1942, former Major General Ryukichi TANAKA was the Chief of the Service and Discipline Bureau. During part of that period, former Lt. Colonel Akira OTSUKI was on duty in the Military Affairs Bureau.

I remember well that upon Major General Ryukichi TANAKA's return from an absence from the Service and Discipline Bureau during the summer of 1942, he scolded Colonel KODAMA severely, and later I found out it was for having placed in his (TANAKA's) seal on a document brought from the Military Affairs Bureau providing for the punishment of the American fliers who had raided Tokyo in the spring of 1942.

Eiji IMAMURA

I hereby conscientiously swear that I have stated all the truth and have neither concealed nor added anything whatever.

Eiji IMAMURA

The above Affidavit was truly translated into Japanese and read in Japanese by me to the affiant before he signed the same.

Nobuo MAKANISHI

Not requested

TANAKA Ryukichi

Request by: SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru

Witness is now in Tokyo, USHIGOME-KU, 90 I.P.S.
Investigation Div. War Ministry Bldg.

Document requested:

Location

diary of M. M. Litvinov, former
Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the
Soviet Union (from July 14 1938 to
Aug. 31 1938) excerpts were
introduced as exhibit No. 754.

I.P.S. War Ministry
Bldg. Tokyo, Japan.

The relevance of the testimony of these witnesses,
all of whom were associated with the accused
Shigemitsu in various capacities during the
time charged in the indictment, or who have personal
knowledge of such events is, in its tendency, to
establish that the accused Shigemitsu took no
part in any of the conspiracies charged to him, and
was not in any way connected with the planning, initiating
or waging of wars of aggression; and was, furthermore, in no
way connected with the commission of any crimes against
peace and is not guilty under the indictment or any of its
counts.

Translated by K. YAMADA.
Checked by Azita.

Personal History

Name: TANAKA, Ryukichi

Born: July 9, 1893.

SHIMANE - Prefecture.
Commoner.

Date		
May 30, 1912	Graduated the regular course of the Central Military Preparatory School	
May 31, 1912	Appointed the cadet and assigned to the 23rd Field Artillery Regiment.	War Ministry
June 6, 1912	Entered the 23rd Field Artillery Regiment	
Same date	Given the ^{grade} rank of artillery superior private	23rd Field Artillery Regiment

August 1, 1912

Promoted to ~~the rank~~ of artillery
corporal

"

September 1, 1912

Promoted to ~~the rank~~ of artillery
~~sergeant~~ sergeant.

"

December 1, 1912

Entered the Military Academy

May 28, 1914

Graduated the Military Academy

June 3, 1914

Returned the Mother Unit

Same date

Promoted to the ^{grade} ~~rank~~ of ~~master~~ ^{sergeant-}
~~major~~ ~~sergeant~~ and appointed ^{probationary} ~~a probationary~~ Artillery
officer.

23rd Field
Regiment

November 27, 1914

Passed by the Officer Selection Com-
Board in accordance with the
mission by ~~the~~ Article 12 of ^{Army} Military

Personnel Replacement ^{Regulation} Ordinance

December 25, 1914 Appointed ~~to~~ ^{an} Artillery 2nd Lieutenant Cabinet

Assigned to the 23rd Field Artillery ^{War Ministry}

Regiments

March 1, 1915 Raised to the ~~Senior Grade of the~~ Eighth

Court Rank Senior Grade.

July 29, 1918 Promoted to Artillery 1st Lieutenant Cabinet

September 30, 1918 Raised to the ~~Junior Grade of the~~

Seventh Court Rank Junior Grade.

April 1, 1919 Relieved of the present ^{position} ~~service~~ and War

assigned to the 26th Field Artillery, Ministry

~~26th Artillery~~ Regiment.

December 10, 1919	Ordered to enter the ^{Army} Military Staff	War
	College	Ministry
March 17, 1923	Relieved of the present service and	War
	as assigned to an acting captain attached	Ministry
	to the 26th Field Artillery Regiment	
June 22, 1923	Relieved ^{of duties as} of an acting captain attached	War
	to the 26th Field Artillery Regiment;	Ministry
	as assigned to an acting company com-	
	mander ⁱⁿ of the 26th Field Artillery	
	Regiment.	
August 6, 1923	Promoted to Artillery Captain.	Cabinet

	Assigned ^{as a} to Company Commander of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment	
November 30, 1923	Raised to the Senior Grade of the Seventh Court Rank Senior Grade	
December 11, 1923	Ordered to service ^{with} attached to the Army General Staff Headquarters.	War Ministry
April 9, 1924	Relieved of the present ^{post} service and assigned to the 26th Field Artillery Regiment.	War Ministry
October 14, 1924	Relieved of the present ^{position} service and assigned ^{as} to a member of the Head- quarters of General Staff.	War Ministry

November 25, 1925	Concurrently assigned ^{as} to an instructor in ^{Veterinary} of the Army Veterinarian School.	War Ministry
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May 10, 1927	Relieved ^{from} of the concurrent service ^{position.}	"
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July 18, 1927	^{Decorated with (6th class)} Given the decoration of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, Sixth Class.	
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July 26, 1927	Relieved of the present ^{position} service and assigned to the Headquarters of the Army General Staff.	War Ministry
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December 28, 1928	Raised to the Junior Grade of the Sixth Court Rank Junior Grade .	
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August 1, 1929	Promoted to Artillery Major	Cabinet
	Assigned ^{as} to a member of the Headquarters of the Army General Staff	War Ministry
September 30, 1929	Concurrently assigned ^{as} to a military instructor of the Army Staff College.	"
October 25, 1930	Assigned to the Headquarters of the Army General Staff	"
November 7, 1931	^{Decorated with the 5th class} Given the decoration of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, Fifth Class.	
August 8, 1932	Assigned ^{as a Battalion} to an Battalion Commander ^{4th} of the Fourth Field Artillery Regiment	"

February 1, 1934	Raised to the Senior Grade of the Sixth Court Rank Senior Grade.	
March 5, 1934	Promoted to Artillery Lieutenant Colonel.	Cabinet
	Assigned to the 1st Heavy Field Artillery Regiment	War Ministry
March 15, 1935	Assigned ^{as staff officer} to a staff of the Kwantung Army	"
April 29, 1934	Decorated with the Small Cordon) Given the decoration of the Imperial Order of the Small Cordon of the Rising Sun, Fourth Class; ^{for} by the meritorious distinguished service in the of the Incident	

of the years
1931-1934.

August 2, 1937 Promoted to Artillery Colonel. Cabinet

September 1, 1937 Raised to the Junior Grade of the
Fifth Court Rank Junior Grade.

August 2, 1937 Relieved ^{as} of a staff ^{officer} of the Kwan-War
tung Army; assigned ^{as Commanding Officer of} to the 25th Ministry
Mountain ^{Artillery} Regimental Com-
~~mander.~~

July 10, 1936 Decorated with the Middle Cordon of the
~~Given the decoration of the~~ Imperial

Order of the Middle Cordon of the

Rising Sun, Third Class; ^{for} ~~by the~~

^{meritorious} distinguished service ^{in the} ~~of the~~ Incident.

of the years)
 1931-1934.

April 15, 1939	Appointed temporarily ^{as} a member of Army Munitions Investigation Commission.	Cabinet
August 8, 1939	Ordered to be) Appointed a judge of ^{the} Army General War Court Martial	War Ministry
December 23, 1939	Appointed Assistant chairman of Military Promotion Committee. (I.N. BUDŌ Arts Promoting Commission SHINKŌ IINKAI)	Cabinet
March 9, 1940	Promoted to Major-General.	"
March 28, 1940	Relieved of ^{as} Assistant Chairman of Military Arts Promoting Commission (I.N. BUDŌ SHINKŌ IINKAI)	"

March 9, 1940	<p>Appointed Assigned to the Chief of Staff of the First Army.</p>	War Ministry
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April 1, 1940	<p>Raised to the Senior Grade of the Fifth Court Rank Senior Grade</p>	
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January 16, 1939	<p>Assigned ^{as} to the Chief of Military Service Section of Military Service Bureau of War Ministry</p>	War Ministry
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August 5, 1940	<p>Relieved ^{as} of a member of Army Munitions Investigating Commission.</p>	Cabinet
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December 24, 1940	<p>Appointed ^{as} temporarily to a govern- ment delegate ^{concerned with} of the matters under the charge of ^{the} War Ministry</p>	Cabinet
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in the 76th Imperial Diet

January 13, 1941

Appointed ~~temporarily~~ to a member Cabinet
of the Investigation Committee

of the Horse Administration ^{Section.} Investigating
(T.N. Under the Military Service Bureau).
~~Commission.~~

January 17, 1941

Appointed ~~temporarily~~ to a member of
the Central Air Defense Commission.

Appointed ~~temporarily~~ to a member
of the National Language Investigating
Committee
~~Commission.~~

Appointed ~~temporarily~~ to a partici- Cabinet
pant in the Horse Administration
Bureau.

Appointed ~~temporarily~~ to a member Cabinet
of the ^{National} ~~Nation's~~ Physical Strength

Investigating ^{the} Commission
(T.N. KOKUMIN TAIRYOKU SHINGIKAI)

February 4, 1941

Appointed ~~temporarily~~ to a partici- Cabinet.

pant in the Population Research

Institute. (Discontinued by ~~the~~

Imperial Ordinance No. 762 of

November 1, 1942).

May 20, 1941

Appointed ~~temporarily~~ to a member Cabinet

of the Text-book Investigating

Commission

	Appointed temporarily to a member of the Labor Control Commission (Discontinued by the Imperial Ordinance No. 95 of March 10, 1945)	Cabinet
December 12, 1941	^{Decorated} Given the decoration of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, Second Class.	
January 22, 1942	Appointed temporarily to a govern- ^{concerned with} ment delegate of the matters under the charge of ^{the} War Ministry in the ^{the} 79 th Imperial Diet.	Cabinet

<p>March 27, 1942 (T.N. the word "March" is not clear in the original text.)</p>	<p>Appointed temporarily to a participant in the Air Defense Bureau of the Home Ministry</p>	<p>Cabinet</p>
<p>October 13, 1942</p>	<p>Relieved ^{as} of a member of the Text-book Investigating Commission</p>	
	<p>Relieved of a member of the National Language Investigating Commission.</p>	
	<p>Relieved ^{as} of a participant in the Horse Administration Bureau.</p>	
	<p>Relieved ^{as} of a member of the Horse Administration Investigating</p>	<p>Cabinet</p>

~~Committee~~

~~Relieved of a participant in the~~

October 19, 1942

Relieved as a participant in the
Air Defense Bureau of ^{the} Home Mini-
Cabinet
stry.

April 29, 1940

Given the Imperial Order of the
Golden Kite, Third Class; and
the Imperial Order of the
Double Rays of the Rising Sun,
Second Class; ^{for meritorious} ~~by the distinguished~~
service in the China Incident.

October 30, 1943

~~Retired the~~ Army reserve.

(T.N. This text is in pencil on the original)

7 August 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Lopez, Capt. Robinson, Mr. Edwards, Mr. Fihelly,
Mr. Dunigan

FROM: William E. Edwards

SUBJECT: Secret Funds Interrogation Transcripts
Citation(s) re the Defendant(s): **MUTO, TOJO**

A series of interrogations has been conducted in connection with an investigation re alleged abuses and corrupt practices surrounding the uses made of Secret Funds by the Defendants and others, during the last War. The transcripts of such interrogations have been placed on file in the Investigative Division, Room #386.

The information briefly referred to below came to our attention in this manner. Because of your interest in the Defendant(s) it is being cited for your reference.

The essence of the information is as follows:
General TANAKA, Ryukichi, advised that along about March 1941 the accused **MUTO**, as Chief, Military Affairs Bureau, called **TANAKA** (then, Chief, Military Service Section) to his office and stated that it was the desire of the accused **TOJO** to have one **KOBAYASHI, Ichiso**, then Minister of Commerce and Industry, unseated, because of his anti-militarist stand. **TANAKA** states **MUTO** handed him ¥ 3,000 to be turned over to one **KOYAMA, Ryo**, to be used for this purpose.

(See attachment)

The pertinent questions and answers will be found in the transcript of the interrogation of _____
dated _____, at page(s) _____ (of seq).

KOYAMA, Ryo dated 25 March 1947
KOYAMA, Ryo, and TANAKA, Ryukichi, dated 23 April 1947

TANAKA states that pursuant to MUTO's request shortly thereafter he invited KOYAMA to his home and turned over the ¥ 3,000 of secret war funds to KOYAMA to be used in unseating KOBAYASHI.

On 25 March 1947, KOYAMA was interrogated and vigorously denied having received the yen or having agreed to lead the attack against KOBAYASHI according to the TOJO-MUTO request. However, KOYAMA admitted leading an attack against KOBAYASHI on the floor of the Diet because of his supposed stock market manipulations conducted on the strength of official knowledge gained as Commerce and Industry Minister. Thereafter on 23 April 1947, KOYAMA again was interrogated and at that time was confronted by TANAKA, Ryukichi. During this supplemental interrogation, TANAKA's original story was somewhat modified, and the following additional details were brought out:

TANAKA at the time in question, being Chief, Military Service Section, exercised control over the KEMPEI TAI; an investigation had been conducted by the KEMPEI TAI into the activities of KOBAYASHI; MUTO called TANAKA to his office and stated it was TOJO's request that TANAKA appear before the Diet for the purpose of certain questions to be directed to him based on the KEMPEI TAI investigation of KOBAYASHI, such questions were to be directed to TANAKA by KOBAYASHI, according to MUTO. TANAKA suspected something was wrong in that he learned that KOYAMA had in his possession a copy of the KEMPEI TAI report, which was unusual. Moreover, TANAKA's consent to provide KOYAMA with a copy of such report had not been sought.

Therefore, TANAKA states that he went to the office of War Minister TOJO and met with MUTO and Vice Minister ANAMI. TANAKA states that in the presence of MUTO and ANAMI he asked War Minister TOJO if he had given MUTO the orders referred to above. TOJO assertedly replied that it would not have been necessary to bring out the KEMPEI TAI investigation report in order to oust Minister KOBAYASHI; that if he wanted to oust KOBAYASHI, he could personally order his removal. TANAKA states that MUTO then lowered his head in shame in acknowledgement of his untruth. TANAKA added that while still in the presence of TOJO, ANAMI and MUTO he accused MUTO of having uttered a lie, and then TANAKA added that this incident was the beginning of his falling out with MUTO.

TANAKA added that there followed some additional discussion between TOJO, MUTO, ANAMI, and himself and finally ANAMI issued instructions that the results of the KEMPEI TAI investigation should not be brought up in the Diet in that some of the contents thereof would be embarrassing to the Army. Therefore, the order was issued that KOYAMA should refrain from questioning either KOBAYASHI or TANAKA before the Diet. TANAKA therefore contacted KOYAMA and recinded the original instructions to open the matter on the floor of the Diet.

Still during the course of the 23 April interrogation, toward the conclusion thereof and after KOYAMA and TANAKA had been given

an opportunity to discuss the matter at some length off the record, TANAKA modified his original story by stating that sometime after the adjournment of the Diet session in question, NUTO had called TANAKA to his office and requested him to turn over approximately ¥ 3,000 of secret war funds to KOYAMA. Apparently, NUTO desired that this money be handed to KOYAMA as an expression of his embarrassment and regret over having issued the original false instructions in the name of TOJO.

KOYAMA steadfastly denied ever having received the yen from TANAKA. I am inclined to subscribe to the truth of TANAKA's modified version, as related above. Obviously, however, the significance of the situation was greatly discounted through the modified version in that it appears NUTO did not hand over the yen for the purpose of unseating an anti-militarist, but rather for the purposes outlined immediately above. Nevertheless, the incident is illustrative of the promiscuous manner in which secret war funds were used by the conspirators.

Copy to: Mr. Tavenner
Mr. Sutton

WHE/nb

Ref. Doc. 2963
(Umezu)

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

YAMAGUCHI SADAO, et al

- Defendants -

A F F I D A V I T

TANAKA RYŪKICHI



(Umezu)

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

I state chiefly about relations between General Umezu and the Pacific War, as follows:

1. Tokyo never consulted with the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army nor gave him advance information about the plan or decision for starting the Pacific War.

2. Staff Officer of the Kwantung Army Takei told me as follows when he came up to Tokyo on business in November 1941:

"General Umezu, being told that the negotiations with the United States have come to a very critical condition, is in serious anxiety. He is of the opinion that a war with the United States should absolutely be avoided under any conditions."

Though this was only General Umezu's private opinion, and not an expression of official opinion, I learned by this that General Umezu did not favor starting a Pacific war.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Tanaka Ryūichi (seal)

Def. Doc. 2963

On this 8th day of May, 1947

At Tokyo

Deponent: Tanaka Ryūichi

I, Ikeda Sumihisa, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: Ikeda Sumihisa (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION
DOCUMENT DIVISION

17 December 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Joseph B. Keenan

SUBJECT : TANAKA, Ryukichi Testimony on Behalf of TOGO

1. TANAKA, Ryukichi has told the writer that he will testify on behalf of Defendant TOGO. TANAKA claims that he was instrumental in getting TOGO appointed as Foreign Minister since he knew that TOGO favored rapprochement with the United States. He claims that TOGO changed his mind after receipt of the U.S. note of 26 November.

2. TANAKA will probably testify that pressure was put on TOGO by "military circles" to narrow down the time originally allowed between the delivery of the final note and the attack on Pearl Harbor. If so, could he be pinned down to specific individuals within the War Department or General-Staff? If this is done he will probably identify the following younger officers involved:

MUTO, Akira.....	Defendant (Chief, Military Affairs Bureau)
TANAKA, Shin-ichi.....	Prosecution and Defense witness (Chief of 1st Section-Operations-of the General Staff)
TSUJI, Masanobu.....	Chief of Operations Sub-Section of Army General Staff (According to TANAKA, Ryukichi this wartime cannibal along with MUTO and TANAKA, Shin-ichi was the spearhead of the extremely powerful "young officer" group in the Army.)
ITO, Seiichi.....	Navy Vice Chief of Staff (dead)
FUKUTOMI.....	Chief, Operations Section, Navy General Staff

3. Inasmuch as many Japanese believe that the "young officers" were in fact largely responsible for Army policies, I believe there is a value in thus making their activities a matter of record. It will not make TOGO, TOJO, et al any less culpable, but it will shed a little more light on the source of some of the fanatical, aggressive and illegal actions taken.

4. Mr. Lopez, who used TANAKA, Shin-ichi as a witness on pages 16140 - 16173 of the Record, has no objection to the above procedure.

YALE C. MAXON
Chief, Document Division

Def. Doc. 1029 (revised)
(Tōgō)

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

vs.

ARAKI Sadao, et al.

- Defendants -

A F F I D A V I T

TANAKA RYUKICHI

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I came to know Mr Tōgō Shigenori in February 1936 when I was a staff officer in the Kwantung Army. Since then I have frequently had opportunities to talk with him.

2. In July 1935, when I was a staff officer of the Kwantung Army, the Soviet Government informed the Japanese Government that it had no objection to the opening of negotiation for the establishment of a commission for the settlement of disputes on the Soviet-Manchoukuo boundary, but later the progress of the negotiations encountered difficulties on account of the attitude of the Kwantung Army, which insisted that the demarkation of the Soviet-Manchoukuo boundary should first be accomplished before the establishment of such commission, as otherwise the commission would not be able to carry out its task smoothly. Mr Tōgō, then director of the European-Asiatic Bureau, dispatched his section chief Nishi to Hsingking in September 1935 in order to persuade the Kwantung Army, but this ended in no agreement of opinions. At my conversation with Mr Tōgō which took place in Tokyo in February 1936, he referred to this question and said that while the above contention of the Kwantung Army was not unreasonable, it was too much to say that the commission could not function without border demarkation, and he earnestly requested the cooperation of the Kwantung Army for the success of the negotiation, by further stressing that the establishment of such commission would rather accelerate the realization of border demarkation. Thereupon I suggested the idea of establishing simultaneously a commission for the settlement of border disputes and a commission for border demarkation, so that the two commissions could set to work in parallel, to which Mr Tōgō agreed. I also had a talk with Vice-Minister Shigemitsu on this subject and got his consent. On my return to Hsingking I reported the matter to General Itagaki, Vice-Chief of Staff, and next to General Minami, Commander of the Kwantung Army, who both approved of this plan. As a result the Japanese Government began to conduct negotiations with the Soviet Government on this principle.

3. Mr Tōgō became Foreign Minister in the Tōjō Cabinet in October 1941, when I was Director of the Soldiers' Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry. When I saw him in the latter part of October at his official residence immediately after his appointment as Foreign Minister, he told me that he had agreed to enter the Cabinet on condition that General Tōjō would also do his best to bring the Japanese-American negotiations to successful conclusion.

(1)

whom do you mean by the military - wanted that included

4. At the time of the formation of the Tōjō Cabinet, it was generally felt in the War Ministry and the General Staff Office that all the civilian members of the Cabinet were actually under the control of the military. Mr. Tōgō's opinion naturally provoked great disaffection within the military circles when it was revealed that he had declared, at the Liaison Conference held in the first part of November to consider whether hostilities should be opened in case the negotiations ended in failure, that failure of the negotiations would not necessarily mean war, and that the most proper way for Japan to take was to persevere under all difficulties and wait for the opportunity to mature. At that time it was not a rare case that such a state secret was divulged through the General Staff Office to younger officers. A party of radicals in the Army thereupon even maintained that it was an encroachment upon the prerogative of the High Command for a foreign minister to utter such an opinion, and declared threateningly that such a foreign minister should be "disposed of". I recall that I requested Commander Kakamura of the Gendarmerie to protect the person of Mr. Tōgō.

*ant
Togō
(2)*

5. Toward the end of October 1941, I had a talk with Mr. Tōgō at his official residence. On that occasion, the Foreign Minister intimated his intention to resign on the ground that he was strongly against war with the United States. I earnestly requested him to retain his office, pointing out that it would be quite impossible to find another person who would resolutely do his utmost to check the outbreak of war in opposition to the Army; that if such a person as Mr. Matsuoka should be recalled to replace him, it would naturally become more difficult to prevent war; and that, should war unfortunately break out, his remaining in office would become all the more necessary in consideration of the national strength of Japan, so that he might be able to seize the earliest possible opportunity to conclude peace.

6. Toward the end of August 1942, Mr. Tōgō sent me his private secretary, Mr. Usui Tanemasa, to convey his opinion, which was, according to Mr. Usui, that the further existence of the Tōjō Cabinet was against the interest of Japan, as it had gradually begun to commit mistakes in the direction of the war. There was, furthermore, the question of the Greater East Asia Ministry, to the establishment of which he was firmly opposed on the ground that it would violate the fundamental principles of Japanese diplomacy. And he revealed to me, through Mr. Usui, his resolution not to resign alone, but to make persistent efforts to the last eventually to bring the Cabinet to general resignation. I expressed my consent, encouraging him to stand out stoutly for the sake of the country, and promised him that I would also resign together with him in case his efforts should end in failure. By the way, it was because Mr. Tōgō was, then, already under the surveillance of the Mikuni Organ, the secret police of the Army, that he did not see me in person.

Nevertheless, Mr. Tōgō resigned alone. I asked him the reason when I saw him in the middle of September that year. His reply was that, although he for his part had fought all he could, he had eventually been compelled to make up his mind to resign alone upon learning from Navy Minister Shimada who had come to see him that the overthrowing of the Cabinet was practically impossible owing to dissention in Court circles.

7. In the middle of July 1945, I called on Mr. Tōgō at his private residence. He was then Foreign Minister in the Suzuki Cabinet. I asked him if the restoration of peace was

*would Shiwada be included within the
term Naval High Command*

possible. He replied that he was making efforts in that direction though the time was very late. Then, I had again a chance to see him in the middle of November 1945, when he explained in detail the circumstances attending the termination of the war, and revealed that anyway it was greatly to his satisfaction that battles in Japan Proper had been avoided.

8. On the occasion of my interview with Mr. Tōgō in the middle of July 1945, mentioned above, he declared that he had had no means of knowing the exact time and place of the commencement of hostilities beforehand, the matter being an operational secret, though he had often heard the Naval High Command right before the outbreak of the war, mentioning "surprise attack". He also referred again to the fact that, as he had told me in the middle of December 1941, despite the Naval General Staff's having given the commitment to open hostilities a considerable space of time after the Japanese memorandum to the United States should have been served at 1 P.M., 7 December, Washington time, the actual attack on Pearl Harbor was commenced very shortly after 1 P.M., Washington time; and he told me that Vice-Admiral Itō, Vice-Chief of the Naval General Staff, had expressed his sincere regret in this connection when, a few days after the outbreak of the war, the Foreign Minister had reproached him for it.

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Tanaka Ryūichi (seal)

On this 6th day of March, 1947

At Tokyo

Deponent: Tanaka Ryūichi

I, Katō Denjirō, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: Katō Denjirō (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Tokyo
6 March 1947

Page

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF TANAKA, Ryukichi,
by Mr. Lazarus.

29038
29041

* The witness identified and verified exhibit 3206 as his affidavit. * The affidavit stated that at the time of the raid on Tokyo by American fliers in April, 1942, the witness was Chief of the Military Service Section of the War Ministry.

29042

Because school children had been shot and non-military areas bombed during the raid, there were different opinions as to the treatment to be given fliers who became prisoners. The General Staff in Tokyo decided that all decisions as to the trial and treatment of them should be exclusively within its province. As soon as the fliers were captured in China, the General Staff ordered their delivery to Tokyo. Investigations were made in Tokyo, and preparations were made to hold the trial there. One opinion as to the treatment to be given the fliers * was supported by the General Staff, and the other by the War Ministry. Because of these conflicts, the General Staff gave up its intention to hold the trial in Tokyo and ordered it held in China. Orders to such effect were forwarded to the China Expeditionary Army Headquarters, and the fliers were sent to Shanghai.

At that time there were no regulations that fliers could be tried by a military court, and so in Tokyo a new military law as to the treatment of fliers raiding the Japanese homeland and areas under its control was promulgated. A copy was sent to the China Expeditionary Force, with orders that the law would be in effect there also. In this same order was another order to the Expeditionary Army in China that the fliers would be tried under this law there. Since there was no military court in the Expeditionary Forces Headquarters at Nanking, the trial was to be held by the 13th Army at its Shanghai Headquarters.

29043

* When the decision was announced to try the fliers by the new law, the witness protested to General TANABE, Vice Chief of Staff, and told him that in his opinion the fliers should be treated as POWs. TANABE stated that he agreed and that he had received a letter from HATA's Chief of Staff, USHIROGU, that HATA was of the same opinion and desired to treat them as POWs. TANABE stated that nothing could be done because the General Staff had already decided to try them by military law.

Page

According to army practice, the letter USHIROGU wrote to TANABE was never written by the Commander, but always by the Chief of Staff. When the Chief of Staff expresses anything in an official letter, it is the intentions of the Commander-in-Chief. Such a letter would never be addressed to the Chief of Staff, but always to the Vice-Chief.

29044

* When the witness learned that USHIROGU had written a letter containing HATA's views addressed to the Vice-Chief, he knew it was an official letter informing the General Staff of the opinion of the Commander of the Armies in China. HATA. As a result of this letter containing HATA's opinion, Colonel ARISUE was sent by the General Staff to HATA with the orders and desires of the General Staff. It was afraid HATA would not carry out the instructions to put the fliers to trial, and ARISUE was sent to notify HATA to do as he was ordered, and that no theory of his would be accepted by Tokyo with reference to the case. Another apprehension of the General Staff was that even if the China Expeditionary Force tried the fliers, they might have found a decision of not guilty and that HATA would then have released them after trial.

29045

* All orders with reference to the trial were issued by the General Staff in Tokyo, and the trial held by the 13th Army in China. Headquarters of the China Expeditionary Army was merely a channel through which the orders were transmitted to the 13th Army. Expeditionary Force Headquarters had absolutely no discretion or judgment on its part with reference to the trial.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. KEENAN.

29046

*The witness stated that he had personal knowledge with reference to the shooting of school children by the fliers. He did not see them actually shot, but merely received reports.

It was true that there were two different opinions as to the treatment to be given the fliers; one, that they be executed, and the other that they should be treated humanely as POWs. The witness advocated the mild opinion.

Page
29047

The opinion of the General Staff was sent to the * War Ministry and a conference of Bureau Chiefs by the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, SATO. At the conference, War Minister TOJO definitely opposed this view, saying it was wrong. Some junior officers were rather extreme in their views, but since the War Minister said the extreme view was wrong, the witness believed it right to say the view of the War Ministry was that they should be held as POWs and not executed.

The Military Service Bureau was against execution to the end, and did not set its seal on the procedure until the General Staff obtained Imperial sanction. The reason that bureau had to put its seal on the document ordering this procedure was that as it was the agency controlling the Kempei Tai it had responsibility in the case, since the Kempei Tai had investigated the fliers and sent a report.

29048

* The term "extreme view" was a polite expression for execution, or the death penalty. The men who wanted to execute the fliers were General SUGIYAMA, Gen, Chief of the General Staff, * the Vice-Chief, Lieut. Gen. TANABE, who although he first opposed the step later agreed to it, and all the members of the First Department of the General Staff. The Chief of the First Department was TANAKA, Shinichi, but he had forgotten the names of the section chiefs.

29049

29050

The fliers were captured in China the day after the Tokyo raid, and a few days later were returned to Tokyo. It would have been in accordance with ordinary procedure to have the trials take place at the location where the alleged offenses were committed. On this occasion that procedure was departed from. * If they had been tried in Tokyo, the witness would have had nothing to do with the actual trial, but would have been connected with the investigation that would lead up to the trial. He agreed that might have a great deal to do with what occurred at the trial.

29051

* When asked who the subordinates in the War Ministry were who favored execution, the witness stated he had no exact recollection, but there were some junior officers who held extreme opinions. He remembered that members of the Military Administration Section of the Military Affairs Bureau held extreme views, but he had forgotten their names. He agreed that it was a habit at that time and some years previous, that when extreme views about executing and murdering people were held, they were declared to be held only by junior officers.

Page

The witness stated that Defense Headquarters held a very strong opinion in favor of a trial of the fliers. Its head was Prince HIGASHIKUNI. Asked if that view was held by HIGASHIKUNI, the witness stated that since he heard this strong opinion from KOBAYASHI, Chief of Staff of Defense Headquarters, he did not know what HIGASHIKUNI's opinions were personally.

29052

* Asked if HIGASHIKUNI had anything to do with the promulgation of any regulation having to do with the execution of captured fliers, the witness stated that it was the duty of Defense Headquarters to issue laws concerning the Japanese homeland, just as the Commander of the Expeditionary Forces in China received a certain standard from central authorities and promulgated a law relative to the trial of the fliers in China based on that standard. It was Defense Headquarters which in the Japanese homeland issued such orders.

29053

* Regarding subordinates in the War Ministry who favored execution for the Doolittle fliers, the witness recalled that it was a Lieut. Col. OTSUKI, serving in the Military Administration Section, who came to the witness and urged that the fliers should be severely punished. The Head of the Military Affairs Bureau at that time was Colonel NISHIURA.

29054

The violent difference of opinion as to treatment of the fliers arose immediately on receipt of word that the fliers who had bombed Tokyo had been caught in China, the day after the raid. The reasons those who wanted the fliers executed gave was that since they were very afraid of the possibility of American bombing raids on Japan, * if the fliers were executed it would cause the American Air Force to fear their possible fate and desist from bombing Japan. It was a campaign of terrorism.

29055

* Asked why the proceedings could not have been held in Tokyo and why it was necessary to send them back to Shanghai, the witness stated he did not know the exact reasons, since even in his opinion it was wrong for a new military law to be promulgated after the act occurred and the fliers tried on that law, central authorities felt it would not be proper to hold the trial in Tokyo. He thought it could be said that it was the desire of the central military authorities to evade their own responsibility. He supposed they felt that they could get their desires of executing the fliers carried out better by sending them to China.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
September 23, 1947
DEFENSE - HATA
TANAKA - Cross

Page 4542

Page
29056

The witness recalled that the law was promulgated * about the end of July, and the fliers were sent to China on 18 June. The draft plan of the new law had been drawn up long before, but because of violent opposition, promulgation had been delayed.

If HATA had refused to carry out the law, he probably would have been relieved of his post and a new commander sent out, and the witness believed the new commander would have carried out the execution. The witness agreed that the worst that would have happened to HATA would have been that he would be relieved, even assuming that the instructions he received were tantamount to a command.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. LAZARUS.

29057

* The first order that went to HATA was for the trial of the fliers. A later order was that they be severely punished. He thought the order commuting the death sentence of five fliers to life imprisonment came direct from the Emperor, and went through the General Staff. This order stated that the sentence would be carried out against the three whose sentence was not commuted. The

29058

second order * came before the trial was even started, communicated verbally through Colonel ARISUE. The Chief of Staff personally sent ARISUE to HATA and communicated this order. The witness heard from Major General MIYANO that the order was oral.

SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
 26 September 1947
 HATA
 TANAKA - Direct

Page
 29406

* DIRECT EXAMINATION OF TANAKA, Ryukichi
 BY MR. LAZARUS

The witness identified and verified Exhibit 3233 as his affidavit.

29408

* The affidavit stated that the witness knew the accused HATA very well since December 1924 and their relations had been very close. When HATA was War Minister in the ABE and YONAI Cabinets, the witness was in the Military Service Bureau and he knew HATA well and was very conversant with the workings of the War Ministry. The witness knew that HATA was strongly opposed to the Tripartite Pact and this was known in Army circles. The Army was in favor of the Tripartite Pact and because of HATA's opposition * his orders in the War Ministry were not obeyed.

29409

At the time of his fall, HATA was War Minister in name only because a successor had already been decided upon in Army circles. On 14 February 1945 the witness met General ANAMI, who told him he regretted the part he had played in opposing HATA and in bringing about his resignation. ANAMI had been Vice Minister of War in the YONAI Cabinet. There were other reasons why the Army opposed HATA. Hatred and dislike of him persisted from the day he first supported the readjustment plan of the Army when UGAKI was War Minister and increased when he became War Minister in the ABE Cabinet.

29410

* Other incidents served to heighten hatred and dislike for HATA. Another man had been recommended by the Three Chiefs in the ABE Cabinet, but the Emperor ordered that HATA should have the post. Also, HATA was strongly opposed to participation by Army officers in politics and when he became War Minister for the first time, he told the officers in the War Ministry Building that the present Army was not trusted by the Emperor and it was their first duty to endeavor to recover this trust. All military personnel should cease any participation in politics and return to their regular duties of soldiering. In 1939, when HATA learned that a Colonel made a speech attacking the U.S. and Britain, he became

SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
 26 September 1947
 HATA
 TANAKA - Direct

Page 29411 indignant and ordered the witness to have that officer brought to Tokyo. * HATA reprimanded him and transferred him to an outlying post. In the fall of 1939 when HATA was War Minister in the ABE Cabinet, the witness began, under HATA's instructions, negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek for the peaceful settlement of the China Incident. HATA told the witness he wanted to bring about peace by the reduction and then withdrawal of all troops from China. Because of opposition they would have to work under cover and unofficially. Arrangements for the dates and place for the messengers from HATA and from Chiang to meet was a point on which they were to work and the basis of the peace treaty would be the evacuation of all troops from China. HATA said that during negotiations he would show his good faith to the Chinese by reducing troops in China from 900,000 to between 500,000 and 600,000 when he made the next budget. The witness knew that in the 1940 budget he did reduce the number of troops in China * to about 600,000 despite great opposition in the War Ministry and General Staff. It was insisted that Japanese troops should be permanently kept in the Shanghai and North China areas. HATA opposed this and stated they must evacuate all troops and that if they did not evacuate there would be no hope of concluding a peace treaty with Chiang Kai-shek.

29412

The negotiations with Chiang were so secret that at first steps had to be carried out with signal codes. It was difficult to convince Chiang's side that a sincere attempt was being made. Gradually, they were convinced and came to believe that a peace treaty was possible and started deciding on dates and places for future meetings.

29413 * In September 1941, when HATA was Commander in China and when U.S.-Japanese relations were steadily deteriorating, HATA sent his Chief of Staff USHIROGU to Tokyo to see the witness and tell him that HATA wanted to withdraw all troops from China to avoid war with the U.S. HATA asked the witness to help push this plan in the War Ministry. USHIROGU told the witness that HATA instructed him to go to the War Minister, Navy Minister, Chief of Staff and the Premier and give them the same message. After USHIROGU had seen them, he told the witness their answers.

HATA
TANAKA - Direct and Cross

Page

29414

In the spring of 1940 it was proposed to use Chinese prisoners in Japanese coal mines, but HATA opposed it and the plan did not go into effect. In 1942 this question again came up and HATA, who was then Commander of the forces in China, again opposed it and the plan was not carried out. The witness knew that in 1944 Chinese laborers were brought to Japan. This was through the Greater East Asia Ministry. HATA had nothing to do with it and he had no control over it because labor supervision * had been detached from army control and had come under the Greater East Asia Ministry.

29415

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SUTTON

The witness stated that USHIROGU told him after he had met TOJO that TOJO had said that if the U.S. would accept Japanese demands, peace would be secured between the two countries.

29416

After 1939 HATA became Commander of all Japanese forces in China. In 1939 he advocated the withdrawal of troops. From 1 March 1941 to 22 November 1944, he extended the theater of military operations to large portions of China. Troops under his command in 1941 captured Fuchow * and Ichang. In 1942, 1943 and 1944, his troops captured Lungling, Tunchung, Changteh, Chinchow, Loyang, Changsha, Hengyang, Kweilin, and Liuchow.

Reference was made to Exhibits 1590 to 1608; testimony at 13,112; Exhibits 1888 to 1896; 1900 to 1902; 1904; 1907-1909; 1911; 1914; 1915; testimony at 3270, 4614 and 4618.

D. N. Sutton

25 September 1947

Re: TANAKA, Ryukichi
Def. Doc. No. 2637

With regard to that portion of this affidavit which deals with the treatment of prisoners-of-war in China, questions and answers 14, 15 and 16, the Prosecution respectfully draws the attention of the Tribunal to the following portions of its evidence concerning the treatment of prisoners-of-war in those portions of China under General HATA's command:

As to Hongkong and that vicinity, exhibits 1590 to 1608, inclusive, R. 13,162 to 13,185, and the testimony of Barnett, R. 13,112 to 13,147.

As to Shanghai and other parts of China, the following exhibits:

Ex. 1888 - 1896, inclusive,	R. 14,158 - 14,172
Ex. 1900 - 1902, inclusive,	R. 14,178 - 14,184
Ex. 1904 -	R. 14,186
Ex. 1907 - 1909, inclusive,	R. 14,188 - 14,190
Ex. 1911 -	R. 14,191
Ex. 1914 - 1915, inclusive,	R. 14,194 - 14,195

and the testimony of Powell, R. 3,270 to 3,280.

*not in
reference* { As to evidence that Chinese were brought by the Japanese Army to Japan and forced to labor here, we respectfully refer to the testimony of LIU, Yao Hwa, R. 4,614-8 and the testimony of TI, Shu-Tang, R. 4,618-29.

D. N. Sutton

25 September 1947

Re: TANAKA, Ryukichi
Def. Doc. No. 2637

With regard to that portion of this affidavit which deals with the treatment of prisoners-of-war in China, questions and answers 14, 15 and 16, the Prosecution respectfully draws the attention of the Tribunal to the following portions of its evidence concerning the treatment of prisoners-of-war in those portions of China under General HATA's command:

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As to evidence that Chinese were brought by the Japanese Army to Japan and forced to labor here, we respectfully refer to the testimony of LIU, Yao Hwa, R. 4,614-8 and the testimony of TI, Shu-Tang, R. 4,618-29.

Shanghai (a witness - includes all) - in camp near Hatoa common

EX 1888 - 1896	at hp	14158 - 14172
1900 - 1902	at hp	14178 - 14184
1904	at hp	14186
1907 - 1909	at hp	14188 - 14190
1911	at hp	14191
1914 - 1915	at hp	14194 - 14195

Powell - hp 3270 - 3280.

- ① The above is the only evidence tendered by prosecution as to treatment of P.O.W. from Dec 41 - 31 Dec 44 in area under control of Hatoa
- ② The only evidence as to forced labour is contained in EX 1907, 1909, 1915 - constructing rifle ranges, and handling petrol and the for Jap army

~~③~~

Hong Kong [P/W]

[Perak]

EX 1590^{to} 1608, ^{with} at Pt. 13162 - 13184

Barnett Pt 13112 - 13147

EX 1603 - 7 ~~only~~ and Barnett only evidence of
forced labour (reparmy guns, aerodrome construction)

omit

• Areas Commanded by HATA

~~END 1941~~
1941-1942

→ Yarrow Manchurian Border in north to
Indo-Lhassa Border in South.

1943- → Same area but extending further northward
to South of TSINTAO.

1944 → Same as 1943.

Isonaka

What was the reply made
by the War Minister, to
the message from Gen. Hata
sent by Gen. Ushirogouchi?

Action 1938 contorted 41-44

China
Cards in city. 1 Mar 1941 -

22 Nov 44

*with 2206 reported
R29030-37*

THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

This affidavit is objected to as
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

*WH as calling for the opinion, conclusion of the
no 6 opinion evidence, argumentative
no 7 same objection*

Dr. S.

Sworn Statement of
TANAKA, Ryukichi

1. Q: Do you know the accused General HATA?

A: Yes, I have known him very well since December 1924 when I was working on the General Staff and our relations privately and officially have been very close.

2. Q: Did you know General HATA during the time he was War Minister in the ABE and the YONAI Cabinets?

A: Yes, I was Section Chief of the Military Service Bureau in the War Ministry during that period. My duty was to supervise the actions of military personnel and so I knew General HATA well and was very conversant with the workings of the War Ministry.

3. Q: What, if you know, was the position of General HATA with reference to the proposed Tripartite Pact?

A: I know that General HATA was very strongly opposed to it. In fact, it was very well known in army circles that HATA strongly opposed the proposed Tripartite Pact.

4. Q: Do you know whether or not the army agreed with General HATA's position with reference to the Tripartite Pact?

A: I know that the army were in favor of the Tripartite Pact and because of HATA's opposition to the Tripartite Pact, HATA was so strongly opposed by those around him that his orders in the War Ministry were not being obeyed. In fact, at the time of his fall, General HATA was War Minister in name only because a successor had already been decided upon in army circles.

*Conclusion
opinion*

5. Q: How do you know that others in the War Ministry opposed General HATA?

A: On the 14th of February 1945, I met General ANAMI and at that time he told me that he regretted very much the part he had played in opposing General HATA and in bringing about the resignation of General HATA as War Minister in the YONAI Cabinet and he also told me the details of the opposition within the War Ministry against General HATA. General ANAMI had been Vice Minister of War under General HATA in the YONAI Cabinet.

assessing aspect

6. Q. Do you know if there were any other reasons why the army opposed General HATA as strongly as you say you know they did?

calling for opinion of others

A. Yes, there were several reasons. The hatred and dislike of General HATA persisted from the day when he first supported the re-adjustment plan of the army when General UGAKI was War Minister and increased when he became War Minister in the ABE Cabinet, which Cabinet preceded the YONAI Cabinet. Two incidents served to heighten the hatred and dislike for HATA. The first was that another man had been recommended by the Three Chiefs' Council to be War Minister in the ABE Cabinet but the Emperor ordered that HATA should become the War Minister and the post was given to General HATA. A further incident which served to aggravate the antipathy felt by those in high army circles was the following: General HATA was strongly opposed to the participation by army officers in politics and when he became War Minister for the first time, he addressed all the officers in the War Ministry Building. The gist of the speech was as follows:

The present army is not trusted by the Emperor and it is the first duty of the army to endeavor to recover the Emperor's trust. In order to achieve this objective, all military personnel should absolutely cease any participation in politics and return to their regular duties of soldiering.

7. Q. Can you give any example of HATA's enforcing the order of "no politics" by War Ministry officers while he was War Minister?

A. Yes, in 1939 when General HATA learned that a certain colonel made a speech in Sendai attacking the United States and England saying "Down with those countries", he became indignant and ordered me to have that officer brought back to Tokyo. When I had him brought back to Tokyo, General HATA reprimanded him and then transferred him to an outlying post as punishment.

8. Q. While HATA was War Minister and you were a section chief under him, do you know if General HATA took any action with reference to the China Incident?

A. Yes. In the fall of 1939 when HATA was War Minister in the ABE Cabinet, I began, under instructions from General HATA, negotiations with Chiang-kai-Shek for a peaceful settlement of the China Incident. HATA told me that he wanted to bring about peace with China by the reduction and then the withdrawal of all Japanese troops from China. HATA told me that because of the opposition around him to his plan, we would have to work undercover and unofficially. General HATA gave me two points on which to work. One was to arrange the dates and place for the two messengers, one from HATA and one from Chiang-kai-Shek, to meet, and the second was that the basis of the peace treaty would be the evacuation of all Japanese troops from China. HATA told me that while the

Budget // negotiations were going on he would show his good faith to the Chinese by reducing the Japanese troops in China from 900,000 to between 500,000 and 600,000 when he made the next budget as War Minister, and I know that in his 1940 budget he did reduce the number of Japanese troops in China to approximately 600,000. However, there was great opposition from within the War Ministry and the General Staff to any withdrawal of Japanese troops from China. It was insisted that Japanese troops should be permanently kept in the Shanghai and North China Areas. HATA opposed this. He stated that we must evacuate all troops from China. He stated that if we did not evacuate Japanese troops from China there would be absolutely no hope of concluding a peace treaty with Chiang-kai-Shek. The necessary negotiations with Chiang-kai-Shek were so secret that at first the preliminary steps had to be carried out with signal codes. It was very difficult to convince the side of Chiang-kai-Shek that a sincere attempt was being made to bring about peace. Gradually, however, they were convinced and came to believe that a peace treaty was possible and they started deciding on dates and places for future meetings.

9. Q. Was a peace treaty concluded?

A. No, after General HATA suddenly resigned his office, the negotiations ended. *} not read*

10. Q. Do you know what General HATA's position was with reference to the Wang Ching Wei Government in China? *Call for answer*

A. Yes, I do know. I know that General HATA did not approve of it at all because he had been secretly carrying out peace negotiations with the Chungking Government and also because he planned to evacuate the whole of the Japanese troops from China. The preparations and plans for the establishment of the Wang Ching Wei Government had already been decided upon as the national policy during the first KONOYE Cabinet and only the formalities of its establishment took place during the YONAI Cabinet. General HATA had no connections with the establishment of the Wang Ching Wei Government. *out*

11. Q. After General HATA became Commander of the Japanese Forces in China while you were still a Bureau chief in the War Ministry, do you know of any statements made or any actions taken by General HATA with reference to the Pacific War?

A. Yes. In September 1941, when General HATA was commander in China and when relations between America and Japan were steadily deteriorating, General HATA sent his Chief of Staff, Lt. General USHIROGU, to Tokyo to see me and tell me that he, HATA, wanted to withdraw all Japanese troops from China in order to avoid a war with America. HATA asked me to help push this plan of his in the War Ministry.

Suzuyama

Kitawara

12. Q. Then what happened?

A. General USHIROGU told me HATA had instructed him to go to the War Minister, the Navy Minister, the Chief of the General Staff and the Prime Minister and give the same message to each of them.

13. Q. Then what happened?

A. After General USHIROGU had seen them, he came and told me the answers he received from each of these men, before he left for China again, to report to General HATA.

14. Q. At any time while General HATA was War Minister and while you were a section chief under him in the War Ministry, did the question of the use of Chinese prisoners in coal mines in Japan come up?

A. Yes. In the spring of 1940, it was proposed to use Chinese prisoners in the coal mines of Japan. General HATA opposed it and as a result of his opposition the plan did not go into effect.

15. Q. At any later period while you were still a member of the War Ministry as a section chief, did the question of use of Chinese prisoners in coal mines in Japan come up?

A. Yes. In 1942, the question of using those prisoners in the coal mines of Japan again came up and General HATA who was then Commander of the Japanese Forces in China at strongly opposed the plan and because of his opposition the plan was not carried out.

16. Q. Do you know if Chinese prisoners were ever used in the coal mines in Japan?

A. Yes. I know that in 1944 Chinese laborers were brought to Japan and it was through the Greater East Asia Ministry. General HATA had nothing to do with it and he did not have any control over it because the supervision of labor had already been detached from army control and had come under the Greater East Asia Ministry.

On this 25th day of September 1947

At Tokyo

who fed the whole belly
sleep
/s/ TANAKA, Ryukichi (seal)

Look up 2 witnesses

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth without holding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ TANAKA, Ryukichi (seal)

On this 25th day of September 1947

At Tokyo.

I, KANZAKI, Masayoshi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by Deponent who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of the Witness.

On the same date

At the same place.

WITNESS: KANZAKI, Masayoshi (seal)

Tonaka.

~~The Prosecution~~

An affidavit containing substantially all the statements in this affidavit was presented Record A. 29,031 and rejected with directions that it be withdrawn - R 29,037

The present affidavit contains is subject to the same objections urged successfully against the first as containing ^{the} assumptions & conclusions of the witness.

We especially object to ^{the} conclusions
& answers no 4 (and 7 and 10
or ^{argumentative and} calling for & giving the opinions
& conclusions of this witness [as to
the reasons ~~why~~ ~~for~~ ~~certains~~
~~and~~ ~~no~~ ~~10~~ positions taken by Ken Hata]

Cross. Exp. of Taraka

TP-7- Political meddling. Hata, in 3rd meeting of 4th Sec. Budget Committee, said meddling in political affairs is business of War Minister. Since War Minister supervises expressions on political matters, this should be given according to circumstance or situation at time.

AP-3- 5th meeting of Settling Committee (~~1st meeting~~ 7⁵th Dist). Hata said it was their fixed policy that we will go hand in hand with anyone who will cooperate with us for the solution of the demand and we will positively reject anyone who will hinder this. (IPS Doc. 3030-M).

8.

Cross-Ex. Tanaka

Hata on Feb 7, 1940 stated the plan for repletion of armaments formed in view of Internatl situation. Hata refused to reveal operational plans but stated plans were made for two ^{or 3} yrs from now.

IPS Doc. 3030-A.

Hata, in 3rd Meeting of 4th Sec of Budget committee of 75th Session, Imperial Diet, said now is time to mobilize total national power to settle the China Incident. IPS Doc 3030-K.

5th Meeting of Settling Committee, Hata said "Army has no intentions but to proceed whole heartedly to end this Holy War of by following our national policy and the great policy of concluding this incident." (IPS Doc 3030-L)

23 September 1947

Re: HATA, Shunroku
Cross-Examination

Memorandum: China Affairs Board (Ko-A-In)

1. Q. Were you, during your term as War Minister, concurrently Vice-President of the China Affairs Board (Ko-A-In)?

2. Q. Did you attend a meeting of this Board on 1 November 1939?

(If the witness denies, then ask:

2A. Q. May the witness be shown the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun of 2 November 1939?

2B. Q. I direct your attention to an article appearing in that newspaper which purports to give the officials present at a meeting of the China Affairs Board (Ko-A-In), held on 1 November 1939, and ask if that refreshes your memory?

(If the witness still denies his presence:

2C. Q. Do you recognize the newspaper now before you as the Asahi Shimbun of 2 November 1939?

2D. Q. I offer in evidence the Asahi Shimbun of 2 November 1939.

ask cross
2E. Q. I offer in evidence the article therefrom describing the meeting of the China Affairs Board (KO-A-In) held on 1 November 1939, IPS Doc. No.)

3. Q. Did not the China Affairs Board (Ko-A-In) at the meeting on 1 November 1939 outline the principles upon which the new Central Government should be established in China?

4. Q. And did it not prepare an outline of adjustments of relationship between the new Central Government and the existing puppet regimes?

5. Q. And was it not the purpose to establish a new Central Government with WANG CHING-WEI as its center?

6. Q. And did not the members at this meeting prepare an outline of adjustment of the relationship between the Mongolian Federated Autonomous Government and the new Central Government to be established in China?

7. Q. And were not provisions made for the conduct of affairs during the interval between the establishment of the new Central Government and dissolution of the Renovation Government?

8. Q. And was not a plan adopted to guide the new China local political organizations?

9. Q. And did it not provide steps to be taken with regard to the administration of Amoy and in the Hainan Island?

10. Q. And was there not also adopted at this conference a plan of matters to be pledged before the establishment of the new Central Government by its principal proponents toward Japan?

(If he has substantially denied, tender IPS Doc. No. 1685-D.)

11. Q. Were not the policies for the establishment of the new Central Government in China, which had been decided at the meeting of the China Affairs Board on 1 November 1939, approved at a meeting of the Cabinet held on 8 January 1940?

(If he denies, tender IPS Doc. 1814-B -- Management Policy for the Establishment of the new Central Government of China.)

at the cabinet

Other affidavits - 2206

THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al



Sworn Statement of
TANAKA, Ryukichi

1. Q: Do you know the accused General HATA?
A: Yes, I have known him very well since December 1924 when I was working on the General Staff and our relations privately and officially have been very close.
2. Q: Did you know General HATA during the time he was War Minister in the ABE and the YONAI Cabinets?
A: Yes, I was Section Chief of the Military Service Bureau in the War Ministry during that period. My duty was to supervise the actions of military personnel and so I knew General HATA well and was very conversant with the workings of the War Ministry.
3. Q: What, if you know, was the position of General HATA with reference to the proposed Tripartite Pact?
A: I know that General HATA was very strongly opposed to it. In fact, it was very well known in army circles that HATA strongly opposed the proposed Tripartite Pact.
4. Q: Do you know whether or not the army agreed with General HATA's position with reference to the Tripartite Pact?
A: I know that the army were in favor of the Tripartite Pact and because of HATA's opposition to the Tripartite Pact, HATA was so strongly opposed by those around him that his orders in the War Ministry were not being obeyed. In fact, at the time of his fall, General HATA was War Minister in name only because a successor had already been decided upon in army circles.
5. Q: How do you know that others in the War Ministry opposed General HATA?
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A. Yes, in 1939 when General HATA learned that a certain colonel made a speech in Sendai attacking the United States and England saying "Down with those countries", he became indignant and ordered me to have that officer brought back to Tokyo. When I had him brought back to Tokyo, General HATA reprimanded him and then transferred him to an outlying post as punishment.

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negotiations were going on he would show his good faith to the Chinese by reducing the Japanese troops in China from 900,000 to between 500,000 and 600,000 when he made the next budget as War Minister, and I know that in his 1940 budget he did reduce the number of Japanese troops in China to approximately 600,000. However, there was great opposition from within the War Ministry and the General Staff to any withdrawal of Japanese troops from China. It was insisted that Japanese troops should be permanently kept in the Shanghai and North China Areas. HATA opposed this. He stated that we must evacuate all troops from China. He stated that if we did not evacuate Japanese troops from China there would be absolutely no hope of concluding a peace treaty with Chiang-kai-Shek. The necessary negotiations with Chiang-kai-Shek were so secret that at first the preliminary steps had to be carried out with signal codes. It was very difficult to convince the side of Chiang-kai-Shek that a sincere attempt was being made to bring about peace. Gradually, however, they were convinced and came to believe that a peace treaty was possible and they started deciding on dates and places for future meetings.

9. Q. Was a peace treaty concluded?

A. No, after General HATA suddenly resigned his office, the negotiations ended.

10. Q. Do you know what General HATA's position was with reference to the Wang Ching Wei Government in China?

A. Yes, I do know. I know that General HATA did not approve of it at all because he had been secretly carrying out peace negotiations with the Chungking Government and also because he planned to evacuate the whole of the Japanese troops from China. The preparations and plans for the establishment of the Wang Ching Wei Government had already been decided upon as the national policy during the first KONOYE Cabinet and only the formalities of its establishment took place during the YONAI Cabinet. General HATA had no connections with the establishment of the Wang Ching Wei Government.

11. Q. After General HATA became Commander of the Japanese Forces in China while you were still a Bureau chief in the War Ministry, do you know of any statements made or any actions taken by General HATA with reference to the Pacific War?

A. Yes. In September 1941, when General HATA was commander in China and when relations between America and Japan were steadily deteriorating, General HATA sent his Chief of Staff, Lt. General USHIROGU, to Tokyo to see me and tell me that he, HATA, wanted to withdraw all Japanese troops from China in order to avoid a war with America. HATA asked me to help push this plan of his in the War Ministry.

12. Q. Then what happened?

A. General USHIROGU told me HATA had instructed him to go to the War Minister, the Navy Minister, the Chief of the General Staff and the Prime Minister and give the same message to each of them.

13. Q. Then what happened?

A. After General USHIROGU had seen them, he came and told me the answers he received from each of these men, before he left for China again, to report to General HATA.

14. Q. At any time while General HATA was War Minister and while you were a section chief under him in the War Ministry, did the question of the use of Chinese prisoners in coal mines in Japan come up?

A. Yes. In the spring of 1940, it was proposed to use Chinese prisoners in the coal mines of Japan. General HATA opposed it and as a result of his opposition the plan did not go into effect.

15. Q. At any later period while you were still a member of the War Ministry as a section chief, did the question of use of Chinese prisoners in coal mines in Japan come up?

A. Yes. In 1942, the question of using those prisoners in the coal mines of Japan again came up and General HATA who was then Commander of the Japanese Forces in China again strongly opposed the plan and because of his opposition the plan was not carried out.

16. Q. Do you know if Chinese prisoners were ever used in the coal mines in Japan?

A. Yes. I know that in 1944 Chinese laborers were brought to Japan and it was through the Greater East Asia Ministry. General HATA had nothing to do with it and he did not have any control over it because the supervision of labor had already been detached from army control and had come under the Greater East Asia Ministry.

On this 25th day of September 1947

At Tokyo

/s/ TANAKA, Ryukichi (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole
truth without holding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ TANAKA, Ryukichi (seal)

On this 25th day of September 1947

At Tokyo.

I, KANZAKI, Masayoshi, hereby certify that the above
statement was sworn to by Deponent who affixed his signature and
seal thereto in the presence of the Witness.

On the same date

At the same place.

WITNESS: KANZAKI, Masayoshi (seal)

*Rejected in most to be removed
cite P.M.W.*

THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL OF THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ET AL

vs.

ARAKI, SIDAO ET AL

*Object
1st & 2
1st & 3*



#2

Affidavit of

TANAKA, Ryukichi

I have known General Hata very well ever since December 1924, when I was working on the General Staff and our relations privately and officially have been very close. I am one of his friends who knows him best. When in July of 1940 General Hata resigned as War Minister in the Yonai Cabinet, he resigned against his will. Hata had consistently supported the Yonai Cabinet and its policies and it was only because of the receipt of the letter from the Chief of the General Staff requiring him to resign that Hata did resign his post. It was well known in the Army that General Hata was strongly opposed to the Tripartite Pact. At the time of his fall, General Hata was War Minister in name only because a successor had already been decided upon in army circles. So strongly was he opposed by those around him that his orders were not being obeyed. He was opposed and obstructed at every turn. By being boycotted by the army, his position was disregarded.

copy
In the evening of 9 December 1940, I met General Anami who was Vice-Minister of War under General Hata, and we had dinner at a small restaurant called Kensui in Akasaka. The question of the sudden resignation of General Hata from the position of War Minister in the Yonai Cabinet came up and General Anami at that time told me that Hata had resigned in accordance with a demand received by him in a letter from Prince Kanin, the Chief of the General Staff. On the 14th of February 1945, I met General Anami at the Kokuryo. At that time, General Anami with whom I had been very friendly told me, "I regret very much the part I played in forcing General Hata to resign as War Minister of the Yonai Cabinet". *Logans
mist cut*

Hata although he had risen to the high rank of War Minister did not have any group or clique of his own to support him in the War Ministry and with impunity he was isolated by others in the War Ministry even while he held the high position of War Minister. The hatred and dislike of General Hata persisted from the day when he first supported the readjustment plan of the army when General Ugaki was War Minister and increased when he became War Minister in the Abe Cabinet, which Cabinet preceded the Yonai Cabinet. Two incidents served to heighten the hatred and dislike for Hata. The first was that another man had been recommended by the Three Chiefs' Council to be War Minister in the Abe Cabinet, but by special circumstances the position was not given to that officer but instead General Hata became War Minister. A further incident which served to aggravate the antipathy felt by those in high army circles was the following: General Hata was strongly opposed to the participation by army officers in politics and when he became War Minister for the first time, he addressed all the officers in the War Ministry Building. The gist of the speech was as follows: *TADA*

The present army is not trusted by anyone and it is the first duty of the army to endeavor to recover the country's trust. In order to achieve this objective, all military personnel should absolutely cease any participation in politics and return to their regular duties of soldiering.

copy
Furthermore, immediately on his becoming War Minister, Hata ordered the Kempeitai to cease participation in politics. Consequently, he was not popular among them. In 1939, when General Hata learned that a certain Colonel

object
made a speech in Sendai attacking the United States and England and saying, "Down with those countries!", he became indignant and immediately ordered him back to Tokyo and reprimanded him severely and then transferred him to an outlying post.

object
argument
This hatred and dislike of Hata increased more and more because he had forbidden the Army's participation in politics, and those who opposed him were hoping and waiting for an opportunity to have him thrown out of office. His opposition to the Tripartite Pact, his support of the Yonai Cabinet and its policies, and his desire to end the China Incident by the reduction and then the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China intensified the spirit of opposition to Hata and eventually resulted in his downfall by express demands of the Chief of the General Staff himself.

object
Although Hata was a high-ranking officer and a War Minister, as a Japanese he could not have refused to obey the demand of Prince Kanin to resign. Because Prince Kanin was a member of the Imperial House and stood second only to the Crown Prince himself, Hata had no choice as a subject of the Emperor but to bow respectfully to the demand and this was quite natural for a Japanese subject. Although they disliked him very much, they could do nothing to him and they finally succeeded in bringing about his downfall only by use of the office of Prince Kanin. From the morals and customs of the Japanese people, he could not help but obey the words of a member of the family of the household of the Emperor, because to a subject they were regarded as absolute. Prince Kanin was particularly high in his rank because the Emperor Meiji had recommended that Prince Kanin should be the next emperor in the event there should be no one in direct line to succeed the Emperor Taisho. *out*

object
With reference to General Hata's belief that the only way to bring about peace with China was by evacuating the whole of the Japanese troops from China or if that was not possible to withdraw the troops gradually little by little until it was completed, I know that in 1940 when Hata was War Minister despite the opposition of the General Staff he reduced the strength of the Japanese forces in China as the first step in his program from 900,000 to approximately 600,000.

object
Coming to the question of the establishment of the Wang Ching Wei Government, General Hata did not approve of it at all because he had secretly carried out peace negotiations with the Chungking Government and also had planned to evacuate the whole of the Japanese troops from China. The preparations and plans for the establishment of the Wang Ching Wei Government had already been decided upon as a national policy during the First Kono Cabinet and the Hiranuma Cabinet and only the formalities of its establishment took place during the Yonai Cabinet. General Hata had no connections with the establishment of the Wang Ching Wei Government.

object
what
In 1940, when General Hata was War Minister, the question arose of the use of Chinese prisoners of war in the coal mines of Japan. General Hata opposed the plan and because of his opposition it fell through. In 1942, when General Hata was Commander in Chief of the Japanese forces in China, he again opposed successfully the plan which was suggested for using Chinese laborers in the coal mines in Japan. It was not until 1944 that Chinese laborers were brought to Japan and then it was through the Greater East Asia Ministry. General Hata had nothing to do with it and he did not have any control over it, because the supervision of labor had already been detached from army control and had come under the Greater East Asia Ministry. *7/21*

object
what
In the Fall of 1939 when Hata was War Minister in the Yonai Cabinet, I began, in accordance with the desires of General Hata, negotiations with Chang Kai Shek for a peaceful settlement of the China Incident. Because of strong opposition to the way Hata wanted to bring about peace with China, namely by the reduction and then the withdrawal of troops, we had to work unofficially and under cover. General Hata did what he could to start us off properly. A great deal of money was needed to carry on the lengthy negotiations and through my introduction of the wealthy merchant Iwazaki, Seishichi we received the necessary financial backing. General Hata gave me two points on which to

work. One was to arrange the dates and place for the two messengers, one from Hata and one from Chang Kai Shek, to meet and the second was that the basis of the peace treaty would be the evacuation of all Japanese troops from China. To show his good faith, General Hata, as I have previously stated, reduced the number of Japanese troops in China from 900,000 to approximately 600,000 when the next budget was proposed. However, there was great opposition from within the War Ministry and the General Staff to any withdrawal of Japanese troops from China. It was insisted that Japanese troops should be permanently kept in the Shanghai and North China areas. Hata opposed this desire. He believed that we must evacuate all the troops from China. It was his contention that if we did not evacuate Japanese troops from China there would be absolutely no hope of concluding a peace treaty with Chang Kai Shek. The necessary negotiations with Chang Kai Shek were so secret that at first the preliminary steps had to be carried out with signal codes. It was very difficult to convince the side of Chang Kai Shek that a sincere attempt was being made to bring about peace. Gradually, however, they were convinced and came to believe that a peace treaty was possible and started deciding on dates and places for future meetings. If General Hata had remained in office as War Minister, I do not have any doubt that a successful peace treaty would have been concluded. However, not long after General Hata had suddenly resigned his office, the negotiations came to an end. *W. J. G. H. H.*

General Hata, when a young officer, had been sent to study in Germany and as an intelligent man he had soon discovered the defects of Germany and had come to know them very well, while on the other hand he came to acknowledge the merits of America and the British Empire and so he was always opposed to anything which might even suggest a disagreement or a clash with America and the British Empire. It was for that reason that he was so strongly opposed to the Tripartite Pact. In 1941, when he was Commander in Chief of the Japanese forces in China and when it seemed as though relations between Japan and America were steadily deteriorating, Hata sent as his personal emissary General Ushirogu who was his Chief of Staff to Tokyo to express his views on his opposition to any road or action which might lead to trouble with America and the British Empire. Officially, General Ushirogu went to Tokyo on some official matter but privately the real purpose for his trip was to state to the persons in high office at the time General Hata's opposition to any inauguration of war with America or the British Empire. After having made the rounds of all the persons in high positions, General Ushirogu came to me and told me what he had been doing under instructions from General Hata. I tried my best to help carry out the wishes of Hata as expressed by General Ushirogu but from my position as Chief of the Military Service Section there was very little that I could do but I did try my best to express and realize the ideas and opinions of Hata to everyone who would listen. *W. J. G. H. H.*

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

TANAKA, Ryukichi (Seal)

On this 26th day of August, 1947, at Tokyo

Deponent: TANAKA, Ryukichi (Seal)

I, KOKUBU, Tomoharu, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date,
at Tokyo

Witness: KOKUBU, Tomoharu (Seal)

Prepare a statement

expression
NO

Finnish
argument
special last
session

THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL OF THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL

vs.

IRUKI, SIDAIO, ET AL

A committee of fliers

Maybe no objection



letter?
sent without opinion

Affidavit of

TANAKA, Ryukichi

At the time of the raid on Tokyo by the American fliers in April of 1942, I was Chief of the Military Service Section of the War Ministry. Because during the raid school children had been shot and non-military areas had been bombed, there were different opinions as to the treatment to be given fliers who became prisoners. The General Staff in Tokyo decided that all decisions as to the trial and treatment of the captured fliers should be exclusively within the province of the General Staff itself. Hence, as soon as the fliers were captured in China, the General Staff ordered their immediate delivery to Tokyo. All relative investigations were made in Tokyo and preparations were made to hold the trial of the fliers in Tokyo. However, as to the treatment to be given the fliers, there developed two different opinions. One opinion was supported by the General Staff and the other by the War Ministry. Because of these conflicting opinions the General Staff suddenly gave up its intention to hold the trial in Tokyo and ordered that the trial be held in China and an order to that effect was forwarded to the China Expeditionary Army Headquarters and the fliers themselves were sent to Shanghai.

In those days there wasn't any regulations that fliers could be tried by a military court and so in Tokyo a new military law as to the treatment of fliers who raided the Japanese homeland and the area under its control was promulgated and a copy of the new military law was forwarded to the China Expeditionary Force with orders that the same law would be in effect in the areas controlled by the Japanese armies in China also. In the same order containing the information about the new military law just promulgated, was contained an order to Headquarters of the Japanese Expeditionary Army in China that the fliers would be tried under this law in China. The fliers were then flown to Shanghai which was the Headquarters of the 13th Army. Because there was no military court set up in the Headquarters of the China Expeditionary Forces at Nanking, the trial was to be held by the 13th Army at its headquarters in Shanghai.

When the decision was announced that the fliers would be tried by the newly promulgated military law, I protested the decision to General Tanabe, Vice-Chief of the General Staff, and stated to him that in my opinion the fliers should be treated as prisoners of war. General Tanabe stated that he agreed with me and not only was that so but that he had just received a letter from General Ushirogu, General Hata's Chief of Staff, stating that General Hata was of that opinion himself, that he, Hata, desired to treat the fliers as prisoners of war. General Tanabe then stated that nothing could be done about the matter because the General Staff had already made the decision that the fliers must be tried by military law.

According to the practice of the Japanese army, the sort of letter that Ushirogu wrote to Tanabe was never written by the commander himself but it was always written by the Chief of Staff and when the Chief of Staff expresses anything in the official letter that is the expression of the intentions of the Commander in Chief himself, not the opinion of the Chief of Staff. That was the practice in the Japanese army and such a letter is never addressed to the Chief of the General Staff, always to the Vice-Chief of the General Staff. That, too, was the practice of the Japanese army. Therefore, when I learned that Ushirogu had written a

letter containing the views of Hata and the letter was addressed to the Vice-Chief of the General Staff, I knew that it was an official letter in the usual practice of the Japanese army informing the General Staff of the position and the opinion of the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Army in China, General Hata.

As a result of the receipt of this letter from General Ushirogu stating the position of General Hata with reference to the fliers, Colonel Arisue was *dispatched from Tokyo by the General Staff to Hata to give Hata the orders and the series of the General Staff.* The General Staff in Tokyo was afraid that *Hata would not* carry out the instructions of putting the fliers to trial and Colonel Arisue was sent to Hata to notify Hata that he was to do as he was ordered and that no theory or logic on his part with reference to this case would be accepted by Tokyo. Moreover, there was another apprehension among the members of the General Staff that even if the China Expeditionary Force tried these fliers, they might have found a decision of not guilty and that Hata would then have released them after trial and this the General Staff feared.

Thus, as the matter stood, all orders and directives with reference to the trial were issued by the General Staff in Tokyo and the trial was held by the 13th Army in China. Hence, in this trial, General Headquarters of the China Expeditionary Army merely acted as a channel through which were transmitted the orders of the General Staff in Tokyo to the 13th Army where the trial was being held. There was absolutely no room left whatsoever for the use of any discretion or judgment on the part of the members of the Headquarters of the China Expeditionary Force with reference to this trial.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

TANAKA, Ryukichi (Seal)

On this 10th day of September, 1947, at Tokyo

Deponent: TANAKA, Ryukichi (Seal)

I, IIMARI, Taitaro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date,
at Tokyo

Witness: IIMARI, Taitaro (Seal)

Title Affidavit of TANAKA, Ryukichi

Sandusky

19 September, 1947

From Section I

To: Mr. Sandusky

Thru: Mr. Ashton

Translation is free from material errors.

Following errors are noted:

Page	Lines	Now reading:	Should read:
1	before para. 1	insert: Having first duly sworn on oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedures of my country, I hereby depose as follows:	
1	3	since December 1924,	since 1924,
1	6	General Hata	General Hata, Shunroku-----
1	12	----in name only because a successor-----	in name only. By being boycotted by the Army, his position was disregarded, and a successor-----
1	15	delete: By being boycotted	-----disregarded.
1	27-28	" with impunity	
1	31	when General Ugaki was War Minister-----	Minister by General Ugaki
1	32	delete: which Cabinet preceded the Yonai Cabinet	
1	last	Colonel	Lt. Colonel
2	34-35	---he had secretly carried out-----	he had intended to secretly carry out-----
2	37	delete: preparations and	plans for the
2	43	coal mines of Japan.	coal mines of Japan as planned by the planning board.
3	13-14	at first the preliminary steps-----	all communications-----
3	15	was being made to----	was being made by Gen. Hata to----
3	23-24	delete: and had come to know them very well.	
3	36	or the British Empire.	or the British Empire as well as his desire to promote the peaceful relations with them.

Ref

Sandusky

Translation of Defense Document # 2566

Title Affidavit of TANAKA, Ryukichi

18 September, 1947

From Section III

To: Mr. Sandusky

Thru: Mr. Ashton

~~Translation of Defense Document # 2566~~

Following errors are noted:

Page	Lines	Now reading:	Should read:
1	17	supported by the General Staff	supported by the Chief of the General Staff /P. 2, L. 10/
1	19 - 21	Tokyo.....Shanghai.	Tokyo, and deciding to hold the trial in China, sent an order to that effect to the General Headquarters of the China Expeditionary Army and at the same time the fliers were sent to Shanghai. /P. 2, L. 11-13/
1	26 - 28	was promulgated andin China also.	was promulgated. And in China, in addition to sending copies of the new military law to the areas controlled by the Japanese armies, a copy was also sent to the China Expeditionary Army. /P. 2, L. 16, 17/
1	29	an order to Headquarters of the Japanese	an order to the Japanese /P. 2, L. 18/

Handwritten initials or signature

Teraka

After Hata made request 7/13/44
Army to examine whether

Officers could be tried as POW or
under mil. law.

What happened.

He will say request came for more
evidence - to Tokyo -

Jovako -

No 2 where is Gen Anami
(check his file)

Who was the other man
recommended for war medals

What was the special circumstance

Does the 3 Chief Council have to
affair the one recommended by
Chief Personnel Rec.

Who was the col. ~~transferred~~
living?

over

Doc No. 1

Do you know any
circumstance around
the trial.

Do you know what treatment
the flyer received in China
before being brought to Tokyo
incubated in Tokyo

~~Did you see~~

treatment when it was brought
to Tokyo

→
action taken following the
trial.

What the records of the trial
contained.

if instructions given by Hata &
Sawada -
if without Hata with parents & others

Fonds No 1

Exhibit the³ orders -

then there any other
written orders

then there any other
orders

Jonah # 2

Cite A/cw Gwin Aue 2

Esse - that p

Wag ching mei Gout

Cite Hala's interpellation

Advocates Gray 7

China - 1938

W.C. Gale accepted P.W.

as order in chief

China 41-44

41-44

May 23, 1947

DEFENSE - Division IV - Russia TANAKA - Direct

Page

22944

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF TANAKA, RYUKUCHI.

The witness stated that the sign appearing on the right at the summit of the hill and to the left of a large lake indicated Soviet troops, and behind that Soviet tanks. The line indicating Soviet trenches is below what appears to be the summit of the hill, and the one to the right of the summit indicates tanks. The same type of heavy line toward the top of the paper indicates Soviet trenches, and the signs to the left Japanese troops. The crosses indicate where the troops of both sides clashed.

22945

* In referring to the crosses, he was referring to the large cross-marks to the left of the broken line.

CROSS-EXAMINATION by General Vasiliev.

22946

The * witness stated he could not confirm that the clash occurred at which spot, because he was not at the spot at the time. He had spoken as to the meaning of the signs in military language. In accordance with Japanese Army signs on such documents, he had come to the conclusion that that indicates points where troops clashed. * This was practiced in the Japanese Army. * There has been a long custom in the Japanese Army ever since creation of the army in the Meiji era, to indicate with crosses the points at * which Japanese clashed with enemy troops. Up to the Russo-Japanese war, these cross signs were made with markings of sword with the hilt, but in recent times it was simply by "x" marks. They were not decided on by instructions or orders of the Chief of the General Staff or the War Minister. They were employed generally as a custom. In earlier times for studying military tactics, various data was obtained and the results were at one time published in book form. They do not exist as regulations.

22947

22948

22949

22950

22951

22952

When asked what the marks to the left of each of the crosses indicated, the witness stated * that it indicated that there were Japanese troops there belonging to the infantry. * The circle with an arrow through it indicates a control line indicating an elevation. A broken line consisting of a cross and a * dash indicates the border line as the Soviet Union interpreted the Hunchun Agreement. According to the map, the line happens to run on the other side of the heights.

Page

22,958

The witness stated that he said an area marked by crosses did not mean a combat area, but was a sign indicating the point of clash between two forces.

22,960

The witness was handed Exhibit 2648 and stated it was a non-authoritative book published by some publisher to sell in book shops for money purposes. It is purely a civilian enterprise, has no authoritative value, and is not a textbook. * The title of the book is "References on Tactical Practices or Activities," and was published on January 30, 1942. The name of the editor, publisher and printer is MAEDA, Iwataro. On the title it says that it was published by the Society for the Study of Military Science, but the party legally responsible is MAEDA, who was given as editor, publisher and printer. * Legally speaking, MAEDA is the responsible party, but since the seal of the Imperial Library is affixed, he recognized that it was brought from that library.

22,961

22,962

At page 653 he noted the sign of a cross. According to the explanation it is the section of destruction of constructed matter such as railways and bridges and also a section of cut-down trees. At page 660 the cross is also used and its reference is a point of supply other than main supply points. * The witness stated he could not place any credibility in a book published by some book publisher in the city. When asked whether there were any more references to crosses in the book, he said it would take him considerable time to read the whole book.

22,963

Last Friday he testified that the point of clash of two opposing troops was indicated by the crossing of two swords with the scabbard on. In order to simplify the sign, the scabbard was removed and the simple cross sign was used. This was a long established practice. The book does not include all the various signs and markings used. This book was also published * by an irresponsible editor.

Page

22,964

With respect to Exhibit 2642 the witness stated that this sketch map without any scale was drawn by a staff officer out of memory. This map without scale, without compass, shows that the border line passes * through the east side of the hill.

22,965

REDIRECT EXAMINATION by Mr. Furness

22,968

The witness stated that under Japanese law it is required that any book published have printed at the end the name of the person legally responsible for it. His testimony that MAEDA was legally responsible was based on something in the book. It is based on the last page. This book was not a textbook used by army officers, * and the fact that it came from the Imperial Library does not indicate that it has any official status.

22,975

22,976

Exhibit 2649, excerpts from treaties between China and England, the United States, France and Russia, Treaty Bureau, Foreign Ministry, being the Peking Convention of 1924 between the Soviet and China, stated * that the government of the Soviet, in accordance with its policy and declarations of 1919 and 1920, declares that all treaties and agreements * between the former Tsarist Government and any third party affecting the sovereign rights or interests of China are null and void. The governments of both parties declare that in the future neither will conclude any treaty or agreement which prejudices the sovereign rights or interests of either.

The Soviet recognizes that Outer Mongolia is an integral part of the Republic of China and respects Chinese sovereignty. The Soviet declares that as soon as questions for withdrawal of all troops of the Soviet from Outer Mongolia, especially the time limit of withdrawal and the measures to be adopted in the interests of safety, are

Page

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF TANAKA, RIUKICHI,
by Mr. Furness.

22713
22714
22716

* The witness identified exhibit No. 2628 as his affidavit, * and verified it. The affidavit stated * that at the time of the Chang-ku-feng border Incident the witness was commander of the 25th Mountain Artillery Regiment, 19th Division, part of the Korean Army. The clash started because Soviet troops occupied the foot of a hill called Chiang-chunfeng both in Manchukuo under the Hunchun Border Agreement. It was the Japanese contention that the border ran along the western shore of Lake Hassan. The western side of Chang-ku-feng is in Manchukuo even under the Soviet contention that the border ran along the height of land.

22717

The witness arrived at the scene about July 15, two weeks prior to the 29th. He saw the Soviet troops entrenched around the top of the hill. The trenches were about 20 or 30 meters below the summit on the western slope in Manchukuoan territory, even under Russian contention. There were three rows of barbed wire, the first just below the trenches and the lowest about 100 meters below the summit on the western slope. He saw about 200 Soviet troops. * He did not know whether any serious fighting had taken place prior to his arrival, and no fighting occurred at the time of his arrival. He was on the western bank of the Tumen and could see Manchukuoan territory between the river and the summit of the hill. He reconnoitered along the river and could clearly see Soviet troops with his binoculars, as they were only two kilometers away. Since they were informed that Japan wanted to settle the matter peacefully, the witness was ordered back to the town of Ranan in Korea, and he returned with 400 soldiers under his command. He was ordered to return again on the 30th, and arrived at 5 a. m. on the 31. When he arrived, Japanese were attacking the hill.

The witness was not present when the first clash took place, but in the telephonic order of the commanding general of his division he had stated that it took place on the afternoon of the 29th, that the Russians had attacked a Japanese detachment under Lt. Col. TAKAYAMA which was at the foot of the hill on its western side. The order of the Division Commander stated that Soviet troops had repulsed them.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
May 21, 1947
DEFENSE - Division IV - Russia
TANAKA - Direct

Page 3471

Page

22718

After the witness arrived the Japanese troops occupied areas between Chang-ke-feng and Chiang-chun-feng, going only as far as the border contended by the Soviet. Both sides brought up reinforcements and the Japanese maintained their position until noon on the 11th, when fighting stopped for good as a result of the truce agreement concluded by SHIGEMITSU in Moscow. The Kwantung Army was not used in the fighting, although parts of it were concentrated on the border after hostilities began. About 2,000 men were sent by the Kwantung Army to the Korean Army, but they were under the command of the Korean Army. No airplanes were used by the Japanese, and long-range cannon was used only during the morning of the 11th. The Soviets used long-range cannon from July 29 on, and used airplanes and long-range cannon against targets well within the interior of Japanese territory in Korea. Places 120 kilometers within Korea were bombarded by planes.

22719

* They did not confine themselves to military targets. From talks he had with General SUYETAKA, Division Commander, there was no Japanese plan of any kind to provoke the incident to test the Soviet strength. The commanders of the Japanese Army were most anxious to check the incident and to prevent its development into a general war. The Division Commander gave strict orders to the Japanese detachments not to cross the border as contended by the Soviet, and the witness gave this order to the soldiers in his regiment. This area was near the mouth of the Tumen, far from any tactical point. This order was telephonic.

22720

* There was no railway to destroy, and it was distant from Vladivostok. The country of the clash was rough, and the border was not clearly marked by monuments. On exhibit No. 753-A, the witness marked the Chiang-chun-feng hill with the letters "CC".

22725

* He marked the Chang-ku-feng Hill with the letters "CK" and a triangle, and he also indicated where he saw the barbed wire and trenches on the western slope.

Page

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY GENERAL VASILIEV.

- 22728
22729 * The witness said he did not see personally how the Soviet troops captured the area, * but he saw the conditions after capture.
- 22730 * The ridge of Changkufeng Hill is very long, and he personally saw that the ridge was occupied by Soviet troops. He did not witness the actual action of capture, but as the place had been captured by the Soviet troops he conducted a close reconnaissance into the details of the situation at a distance of two kilometers and saw Soviet troops from three or four points. He also saw at a distance of about 20 or 30 meters below the summit entrenchments, and barbed wire entanglements.
- 22731 * When he arrived the events had already started to a certain extent and developed. He had only indicated on the map the results of his observations. He realized that after hostilities began some definite line could have been violated by the parties. Even if the Soviet violated the line at that time, it could have been explained in this way. He merely had said that there were Soviet troops on the summit, and he had seen trenches before the outbreak of the fighting.
- 22732 * The witness and his troops were then on the west side of the Tumen, and the front line of the Japanese troops was parallel to the front line of the Soviet troops. At the time when the first clash occurred, he was about 200 meters in the rear from Changkufeng Hill.
- 22733 Under the Hunchun Agreement, * the boundary passes through the south side of Changkufeng Hill, and the northern half is in Manchuria. The hill is very flat. The summit stretches around about 200 meters. The southern half belongs to Soviet and the northern half is Manchurian. On the map, the border does not pass by the side of * Lake Khasan, but passes through the southern half of Changkufeng Hill. To be absolutely correct, it passes through the center of the summit of the hill.
- 22734

May 21, 1947

DEFENSE - Division IV - Russia

TANAKA - Cross

Page

22735

* The witness had not seen the map before he came to the Tribunal, and he thought the western half was Manchurian and the eastern half Soviet territory. After seeing the map he saw that the line runs from the summit of the hill from southeast to northwest. He had used the terms north and south to enable those who had read the map generally to understand north and south. To be more exact he should say northwest and southeast.

22738

* The line does not pass by west of Lake Khasan but right through the middle of the summit of Changkufeng Hill. The summit of the hill is flat and stretches a distance of about 500 meters. He would like to say that half of the summit belongs to Soviet and the other half to Manchukuo.

May 22, 1947

22740

* The witness stated that although the map showed the boundary passed along the course of the Changkufeng Hill west of the Lake Khasan area, his contention in his affidavit that both hills * were in Manchukuoan territory even under the border agreement as stated in his affidavit, was correct. The map in question was drawn by the Soviet at the time of the Hunchun Treaty. This is the first time the witness saw the map.

22741

22742

When asked whether there were more recent agreements describing the boundary, he has stated all he knew about the treaty, so that after the warfare at Changkufeng it was agreed by both sides that the status quo would be maintained. After the Incident, if he remembered correctly, the border line * was at the top of the hill, but east of it about ten meters. He believed that was where the boundary was decided, about ten meters down the hill being the boundary, just a little different from the boundary shown on the map attached to the Hunchun Agreement.

22743

The witness arrived on the scene July 14. Before that time the 75th Regiment and the Engineer Unit from Kainei were the first to arrive at the spot about July 12, about two weeks prior to the large scale operations starting. He came with his regiment to the Khasan Lake area * on the morning of July 13 under the order of General SUEAKA, commander of the 19th Division.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

Page 3474

May 22, 1947

DEFENSE - Division IV - Russia

TANAKA - Cross

Page

22743

Earlier orders to other units arriving before his were issued about the 11th, when there was a change in command. If his memory was correct, the order for change of commanders was given on July 15. The succeeding commander, NAKAMURA, arrived by plane about the 20th.

22744

Japanese forces started hostilities under the orders of Division Commander SUETAKA. NAKAMURA was displeased with the military operations. After the fighting the witness was shown the telegram received by Division Headquarters on August 1 from NAKAMURA. The first time the witness gave advise to NAKAMURA was about noon on August 13. He told him * since the objective at Changkufeng had been attained he should agree to the withdrawal of troops to the border. This was not considered.

22745

22746

The small scale fighting began with the first shot fired by the Russians, but attack by an infantry regiment on the hill was undertaken by the Japanese Army. Large-scale operations on a wide front with strong forces were begun by the Japanese. The first shots were fired by the Soviet. At first the artillery units of the Japanese Army were two cannons. * From the morning of the 31st it was 14 cannons. They were gradually increased to a total of 37. The cannons were all on the spot and all were used in the fighting. The Soviet, however, possessed over 120 guns, and it was natural that the Japanese should use all of theirs.

22747

The number of shells possessed by the Japanese was very small. If more than a thousand rounds were fired per day, the ammunition would run out. After the end of hostilities, an investigation of rounds shot was made. A total of twelve thousand were fired, not even as much as the Soviet fired in one day. * The witness commanded all Japanese artillery units, and the twelve thousand were fired by all units of the Japanese.

At that time there was an extraordinary mobilization of troops. At the end of hostilities the infantry totalled 8,000, and the artillery 1,000; the total was around 10,000 or less.

Page

22747

At first the reports were made that the Japanese had won a victory, but actually after August 8 fighting was not necessarily in favor of the Japanese. If it had continued without reinforcements, it would have been unfavorable.

22748

* From Lake Khasan to Vladivostok is about 70 kilometers, or twice that. He could not reply unless he saw a map. At his observation post, on a clear day he could see Vladivostok. He knew the importance of Vladivostok to the Soviet. * While it must be admitted that Vladivostok can be seen from Changkufeng, he did not believe that Changkufeng had any strategic value militarily because there were no railroads or roads in the rear and it was not an appropriate base of operation for a back.

22749

22750

When asked whether Vladivostok could be fired on from the top of the hill, * the witness stated at that time Japanese artillery did not have any guns able to fire from the Tumen River to Vladivostok. Perhaps the Soviet had such a gun, but the Japanese guns at that time were under 10,000 meters, and none of the Japanese forces had guns over 20,000 meters. This view was dominating in the Lake Khasan area.

22751

The order to begin hostilities was issued on July 30. The order of July 11 was not a fighting order, but to concentrate on the border. The concentration order was given by Commander SUYETAKA. * He did not see any of the documents directly at Divisional Headquarters, but judging from common military knowledge he would say that the order for concentration was given by KOISO, commander of the army. It was not an order for attack, but an order to concentrate.

It is true that troops are concentrated everywhere for purposes of fighting, but there are cases where they are concentrated for retreat.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. FURNESS.

22752

The witness stated that reconnaissance was done on many occasions. From * the time he arrived on July 16 until the time of the first withdrawal on July 28, he conducted reconnaissance. The first time he saw the barbed wire and trenches there was only one line of barbed wire barricades. They increased to three after July 20.

Page

22752

The top of the hill is level, and the trenches and entanglements were about 20 meters below the summit. * He received his orders to return to Rason on the 28th, and he returned with his troops. At that time one engineer regiment and the 75th Infantry Regiment remained, but all other units were withdrawn. He remembered that after hostilities stopped, there were negotiations for a commission to demarcate the border.

22753

22754

* He knew that a proposal was made, but did not know whether the Commission ever met or settled or not. He knew that there was no definite settlement made, but at the time of the truce the foremost lines were practically facing each other, and this literally became the border line.

After the truce both sides withdrew smoothly, but the Soviet left a part of their troops on the east slope. At the time of the first small-scale fighting as well as the large-scale hostilities, the main strength of the Soviet forces were in Manchukuo. If the border line was fixed as contended by Manchukuo, then all Soviet forces were in Manchukuo. During the night attack on July 31, the fighting took place at the line of the trenches, and it is clear that even if they followed the Soviet contention as to the border, the fighting took place in Manchukuo. At this time, judging by the Soviet contention, then Soviet tanks and artillery were in Soviet territory, but the first line troops were not.

22756

* He saw concentrations of Russian troops, and judging by eyesight the forces were very large. According to later intelligence reports, the Soviet infantry had three divisions in the rear. At the end the Soviet had three infantry divisions, one cavalry division, and one artillery brigade.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
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* Changkufeng dominated the Lake Khasan area, and also the important border railway, the Korean Railway, directly beneath it, and the hill dominated Manchukuoan and Korean territory. It is a very important military strategic point, because it would enable immediate cutting of the railway.

During the actual fighting, the station at Kogi received a concentrated barrage of artillery fire from the Soviets and was blown to pieces. This disrupted transportation of supplies and communications for one day.

22758

* He could not answer accurately the amount of Russian forces, but judging from military common sense the Russians were about 30,000.

These figures were arrived at as a result of questioning POWs captured, and according to information he received, Russian troops occupied the heights of Changkufeng on July 11.

DEF. DOC. 1585

AFFIDAVIT OF

TANAKA, Ryukichi

DATE 2 April 1947

PROGRESS REPORT OF: TANAKA, Ryukichi (KIMURA)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>Partially Completed</u>	<u>Fully Completed</u>
1. Information in the hands of the Investigation Division.	_____	_____ <u>X</u>
2. Statement in application for subpoena as to subject of witness's testimony.	_____	_____ <u>X</u>
3. Examination of case file, if any.	_____ <u>X</u>	_____
4. Cross-reference file on case files in office of Investigation Division.	_____ <u>X</u>	_____
5. Cross-reference card file by subject matter of evidentiary documents in Document Division.	_____ <u>X</u>	_____
6. Reference in evidence to witness or to the subject matter of his testimony.	_____ <u>X</u>	_____
7. Preparation of summary of testimony already given by witness.	_____	_____
8. Memorandum prepared by Mr. Lopez, dated March 11, 1947, relating to decorations awarded to defendants and their witnesses.	_____	_____ <u>X</u>
9. Statement of any other investigation conducted by you.	_____	_____

Pedro Lopez
Capt. James J. Robinson
William E. Edwards

By _____