

Doc. 4011 Evid.

Folder 3

(22)

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 4011

24 May 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Copy, Notes of Discussion Mussolini-Ribbentrop

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PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Relations with US, GE, and USSR

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

1. On page 46349, the imminent signing of the tripartite pact between Germany and Italy is discussed.

2. If Russia's reaction to this pact should be unfavorable, she will be offered, in "a friendly way," a free hand in the fulfillment of all her wishes southwards toward the Persian Gulf or India. (Page 46350)

3. It is hoped to sign the secret military pact with Spain simultaneously with the pact with Japan. Germany, Italy and Spain should put pressure on President Zalazar of Portugal to turn away from England, towards Spain. (p. 46350) Turkey is discussed on page 46351.

4. In connection with the probable strong reaction to the Japanese pact in America, RIBBENTROP informed MUSSOLINI of some documents which could be used against the prestige of Roosevelt. MUSSOLINI agreed that Roosevelt was responsible for the war and agreed also to use the documents. However, he doubted that the publication could prevent the election of Roosevelt. It was then decided to break off the diplomatic relations with America, in a demonstrative manner after the publication of the documents. (Page 46351 and 46352)

5. The rest of the meeting was devoted to the strategic situation in North Africa.

/A.N.: Nurnberg Doc. #1865-PS./

Analyst: C.W.J. Phelps

Doc. No. 4011

Am 23/9

Aufsatzung

Über die Unterredung des Reichsministers mit dem Duce  
in Anwesenheit des Grafen Ciano und des Botschafters von  
Mailand am 22. September 1940 in Palazzo Venezia.

Der RHM informierte zunächst den Duce über den Stand  
der japanischen Verhandlungen durch Verlesung der wesentlichen  
Stellen des Telegramms Nr. 984 vom 21. September aus Tokio.  
Der Duce erklärte sich auch seinerseits einverstanden, daß  
die unter 1 a in dem vorstehenden Telegramm erwähnte frühere  
Fassung ohne Erwähnung des erwähnten Angriffes  
beibehalten würde, und war auch mit der in 1 b für die Differ  
IV vorgeschlagenen Fassung über die Bildung technischer  
Kommissionen zur Durchführung des Paktes einverstanden. Der  
RHM gab der Hoffnung Ausdruck, daß es noch spätestens bis  
Ende der kommenden Woche möglich sein würde, den Mater-Pakt  
gemeinsam mit Graf Ciano in Berlin zu unterzeichnen. Der RHM  
gab seine Absicht bekannt, Serrano Suñer zu der Unterzeichnung  
als Gast einzuladen, ebenso wie die Vertreter der mit der  
Achse befreundeten Länder Ungarn, Bulgarien und Rumänien.  
Graf Ciano äußerte zunächst Bedenken, ob bei Anwesenheit  
eines spanischen Vertreters wegen der bekannt antiliberalen  
Einstellung der spanischen Regierung der Mater-  
Pakt mit Japan nicht eine zu stark antirussische Tendenz  
entwickele, ließ jedoch diese Bedenken wieder fallen, als der  
Duce seinerseits die Anwesenheit Serrano Suñers wegen der  
dadurch unterstrichenen Solidarität Spaniens mit dem drei

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Unterzeichners für recht nützlich erklärte.

Auf eine Anregung des RHM hin wurde bezüglich England in  
Ansehung genannt, zunächst dessen Reaktion auf den Japanpakt  
abzuwarten und in gegebenem Augenblick England in freundschaft-  
licher Form freie Hand in Bezug auf die Erfüllung etwaiger  
Wünsche in der südlichen Richtung des Persischen Golfs oder  
Indiens anzubieten.

Weiterhin informierte der RHM den Duce über den Stand der  
spanischen Verhandlungen. Er erwähnte, daß ein besonderer  
Abgesandter zu Serrano Suñer, der sich augenblicklich in Brüssel  
aufhalte, entsandt worden sei, um ihn gemäß der am Freitag  
zwischen dem RHM und dem Duce getroffenen Vereinbarung mitzu-  
teilen, daß Deutschland und Italien mit Spanien einen Mater-  
pakt abschließen wollten. Serrano Suñer würde diesem Wunsch  
schriftlich dem Generalissimo Franco durch einen Sonderkurier  
mitteilen, und es sei zu hoffen, daß gegen Mitte der Woche eine  
Antwort Francos eintreffe, wobei man ungefähr zum gleichen  
Zeitpunkt wie den Japanpakt auch geheim das Militärabkommen  
mit Spanien würde unterzeichnen können.

In Zusammenhang mit der spanischen Frage kam das Gespräch  
auch auf Portugal und einen von Deutschland, Italien und Spanien  
gemeinsam auszubehenden Druck auf den Präsidenten Salazar in  
Sinn einer Abkehr von England und einer Annäherung an Spanien.  
Ohne sich eindeutig dazu zu äußern, schien der Duce durch diesen  
Gedanken rasch zu sein. Er betonte dabei die Furcht Portugals,  
von Spanien aufgezwungen zu werden.

Auf Grund des Telegramms Nr. 1280 aus Saragossa vom 21.9.  
1940 über die Vorwürfe der Türkei wegen eines russisch-

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türkischen Freundschaftsverträge mit Garantie der türkischen Grenzen durch die Sowjetunion gegen freie Durchfahrt der Meerengen entwickelte sich ein Meinungsaustausch über die Stellung der Ächer zu den Türken. Der RAB wiederholte seine bereits in früheren Unterhaltungen geäußerte Ansicht, daß ein so enges Übereinkommen zwischen der Türkei und Russland nicht im Interesse der Achsenmächte gelegen sei, betonte allerdings, daß die Gefahr eines solchen engen Zusammenschlusses nicht sehr groß sei. Er warf die Frage auf, ob man nicht versuchen solle, auch die Türkei aus dem englischen System herauszuweisen. Auf die Frage nach dem Verhältnis zwischen der Türkei und Italien und gewissen türkischen Befürchtungen erklärte der Duce, daß die Türkei von Italien nichts zu fürchten hätte. Es gäbe keine Territorialforderungen Italiens an dieses Land, sondern es handele sich lediglich um wirtschaftliche Interessen Italiens, von denen die Türkei genau Kenntnis hätte. In dem Maße, wie sich die Position Englands weiter verschlechterte, würde die Türkei ganz von selbst auf die italienische und deutsche Seite herübergezogen werden. Trotz des etwas eigenartigen Staatspräsidenten, der in völliger Verkennung der jetzigen Lage bisher bestrebt gewesen sei, die proalliierte Politik Konstanz fortzuführen.

In Zusammenhang mit dem japanischen Jakt und seiner vornehmlich starken Wirkung in Amerika informierte der RAB den Duce vertraulich über einen weiteren Vorschlag, der möglicherweise auf Grund einiger schwer belastender Dokumente gegen Roosevelt geführt werden könnte. Der Duce stimmte der Ansicht zu, daß Roosevelt der eigentlich Verantwortliche für den jetzigen Krieg sei, dessen Entschcheidung er zur Vertagung

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seiner Innenpolitischen Angelegenheiten, besonders auch mit dem vollständigen Scheitern des New Deal mit allem Ernste geführt habe. Der Duce stimmte diesem Plan eines Vorgehens gegen Roosevelt sehr zu, besonders auch jedoch bezüglich der Wahlabsichten Roosevelt gegenüber, in der Gegenwart würde der Fehler begangen sein, das gleiche Programm wie Roosevelt in der Wahlkampagne vorzuschlagen. Das amerikanische Publikum stehe, so wie die Dinge im Augenblicke liegen, seiner Ansicht nach ziemlich entschlossen hinter Roosevelt, wenn auch bei der hysterischen Verurteilung der amerikanischen Überlegenheit ein Umbruch in letzter Minute durch ein unvermutetes Ereignis durchaus im Bereich der Möglichkeiten liege. Auf die Frage des RAB, ob es nicht vielmehr angebracht wäre, nach Veröffentlichung der Dokumente demonstrativ die diplomatischen Beziehungen zu den Vereinigten Staaten mit der Erklärung abzubrechen, daß man zwar gegen das amerikanische Volk keine Feindschaft habe, aber die Beziehungen zu der Regierung Roosevelt nach der immer bekannt gewordenen ungeheuren Schuld, die diese durch Begünstigung des Jaktens auf sich geladen habe, nicht länger anrecht erhalten wolle. Der Duce stimmte diesem Vorschlag auch deshalb besonders zu, weil nach italienischer Erfahrung die amerikanischen Menschen nicht nur völlig falsche Berichte über die Lage Italiens nach den Vereinigten Staaten schickten, sondern sich auch in ähnlicher Weise als Spione Englands betätigten.

Auf eine Frage des RAB über den Stand der Operationen in Ägypten äußerte sich der Duce, daß der Fortgang der militärischen Ereignisse Ägypten entscheiden würde sei. Die erste

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Etappe der Offensive, die bis 100 Km in das feindliche Gebiet  
vorgeführt habe, sei annähernd abgeschlossen. Für die zweite  
Etappe, die über weitere 100 Km bis nach Marsa Matruh führen  
solle, seien einem Bericht Spagnolis zufolge alle Vorbereitun-  
gen getroffen. Graziani selber würde in den nächsten Tagen  
nach Ben kommen, um mit dem Duce die Einzelheiten dieses zweiten  
Phases der italienischen Offensive gegen Ägypten durchzusprechen.  
Die dritte Phase würde mit der Eroberung Alexandriens abschlie-  
ßen und die Zurücklegung von weiteren 200 Km notwendig machen.  
Auf die Frage des DMM, wann unter diesen Umständen mit dem  
Abschluß der gesamten Unternehmung gegen Ägypten gerechnet  
werden könnte, antwortete der Duce etwas lägernd, dass er hoffe,  
den ägyptischen Feldzug bis Ende Oktober abgeschlossen zu können.  
Nach der Eroberung von Marsa Matruh würde sich infolge der  
italienischen Luftüberlegenheitsmöglichkeiten die britische Flotte  
aus Alexandria zurückziehen müssen und, falls bis dahin  
Gibraltar noch eben in den Händen der Spanier sein  
sollte, möglicherweise einen Durchbruch durch Gibraltar in den  
Atlantik vorführen. Der Rückweg durch den Suezkanal sei zu  
gefährlich, da der Kanal selbst nur in einer Tiefe von 6 St/Km  
durchfahren werden könne. Auf jeden Fall sei mit einem starken  
Widerstand der Engländer in Ägypten zu rechnen, denn der  
Verlust dieses Landes würde möglicherweise den Zerfall des  
gesamten Imperiums nach sich ziehen.

Nachdem der Duce noch eine schriftliche Antwort auf den  
Führerbrief antwortete, fand die Unterredung mit einer herz-  
lichen Verabschiedung ihren Abschluß.

Mus, den 22. September 1940.

Schmidt.

46353

ROM 33/40

Record

of the conversation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs with the DUCE in the presence of Count GIANO and Ambassador von MACKENSEN on 22 September 1940 at the Palazzo Venezia.

The Foreign Minister first informed the DUCE about the State of the Japanese negotiations by reading important items of telegram No. 984 of 21 September from TOKIO. The DUCE also declared himself in agreement, that the earlier formulation mentioned under 1 A in the above telegram should be retained without mentioning the "veiled attack" and also agreed with the formulation suggested in 1B for No. 4 concerning the formation of technical boards for execution of the pact. The Foreign Minister expressed the hope that it would be possible by the end of the next week at the latest to sign the Three Power Pact with Count GIANO in Berlin. The Foreign Minister made known his intention to invite SERRANO SUNER to be a guest at the ratification, and likewise to invite representatives of the countries on friendly terms with the Axis, such as Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania. Count GIANO at first expressed doubts as to whether by the presence of a Spanish delegate, because of the known anti-Bolshevik attitude of the Spanish Government, the Three Power Pact with Japan would not show a too strongly anti-Russian tendency, but dropped these doubts again, as the DUCE declared the presence of SERRANO SUNER rather useful on account of the thereby emphasized solidarity of Spain with the three signatories. On a suggestion by the Reich Foreign Minister the view was taken concerning Russia to wait first for her reaction to the Japan Pact and at the appropriate moment to offer Russia in friendly terms a free hand regarding the fulfillment of any of her desires in the southern zone of the Persian Gulf, or on India. Furthermore, the Foreign Minister informed the DUCE about the state of the negotiations with Spain. He mentioned that a special delegate had been sent to SERRANO SUNER, at present staying in Brussels, to notify him, in accordance with the agreement concluded Friday between the Reich Foreign Minister and the

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DUCE, that Germany and Italy wanted to conclude a three power pact with Spain. SERRANO SUNER would inform Generalissimo FRANCO by special courier of this wish, and it was hoped that a reply would be received from FRANCO by the middle of the week, so that about the time as the pact with Japan the military alliance could also be secretly signed.

In connection with the Spanish question the conversation also turned upon Portugal and pressure to be jointly exerted by Germany, Italy and Spain upon resident ZALAZAR in the direction of a withdrawal from England and a rapprochement to Spain. Without expressing himself unequivocally on this point, the DUCE still seemed to agree with this idea. He stressed in this connection the Portugal's fear of being absorbed by Spain. On the bases of telegram No. 1320 of 29.9.1940 from TARABYA on the proposals of Turkey concerning a Russian-Turkish friendship pact with guarantee of the Turkish borders by the SOVIET UNION in return for the free passage of the straits an exchange of views developed on the attitude of the AXIS to the Turks. The Reich Foreign Minister repeated the opinion already expressed by him in earlier conversations that a too close understanding between Turkey and Russia would not be in the interest of the AXIS-Powers, but emphasized that the danger of such a close cooperation would not be very great. He raised the question whether the attempt should not be made, to pull Turkey out of the English system. To the question about relations between Turkey and Italy and about certain Turkish apprehensions, the DUCE declared that Turkey had nothing to fear from Italy. There were no territorial claims by Italy on that country; but rather was only a question of economic interests of Italy of which the Turks had an exact knowledge. To the extent that England's position became still worse, Turkey would be drawn to the Italians and German side quite of her own accord. In spite of the rather obstinate President of the State, who completely misunderstanding the present situation has been hitherto striving to continue the pro allied policy of KEMAL.

In connection with the Japanese Pact and its presumably strong effect on America,

the Foreign Minister informed the Duce secretly about a further blow which possibly could be directed against ROOSEVELT on the strength of some heavily incriminating documents. The Duce agreed that ROOSEVELT was the really responsible person for this war, the beginning of which he encouraged in every way in order to hush up his domestic political difficulties, and especially during the recent failure of the NEW DEAL. The Duce very much approved of the plan of a step against ROOSEVELT, but was positive regarding ROOSEVELT's chances in the elections, because the rival-candidate WILKIE had committed the mistake of proposing the same program as ROOSEVELT in the election campaign. The American public, as things were at the moment, would, in his opinion, stand more or less solidly behind ROOSEVELT, even if considering the hysterical disposition of the American voting masses a swing in the other direction at the last minute caused by some unforeseen event was completely within the range of possibility. To the question of the Reich Foreign Minister as to whether it would not be much more expedient to break off diplomatic relations with the United States dramatically after publication of the documents with the declaration that there was no animosity felt against the American people, but that relations could no longer be maintained with the ROOSEVELT Government after its enormous guilt in having encouraged this war had recently become known. The Duce was in particular agreement with this idea because from Italian experience the American consuls had not only sent out completely false reports to the United States on Italy's situation, but also have in many cases acted as spies for England.

To the questions of the Reich Foreign Minister as to the state of operations in Egypt the Duce expressed himself very satisfied with the progress of military events. The first stage of the offensive which had penetrated up to 100 kms. into enemy territory, was now concluded. For the second stage, which was to extend for 120 more kilometers to MERRA MATRUH, all preparations had been made, according to a report by GRAZIANI. GRAZIANI himself would come to Rome in the next few days to discuss with the Duce the details of this second phase of the Italian



offensive against Egypt. The third stage would end with the conquest of ALEXANDRIA and would necessitate the completion of another 300 Kilometers. To the question of the Reich Foreign Minister as to when, under these circumstances, the conclusion of the entire enterprise against Egypt could be expected, the Duce replied rather hesitatingly that he hoped to be able to conclude the Egyptian campaign by the end of October. After the conquest of MERSAH MATRUH the British Fleet would have to withdraw from ALEXANDRIA in consequence of the possibilities for the effective use of the Italian Air Force and in case GIBRALTAR should by then already be in the hands of the Spaniards, would, if possible, have to effect a breakthrough past GIBRALTAR into the Atlantic. A retreat through the SUEZ CANAL would be too dangerous because the canal itself could be passed at a speed of only 6 kilometers an hour. In any case a strong resistance by the English in Egypt had to be reckoned with, because the loss of this country would possibly involve the collapse of the entire Empire. After the Duce had announced another written reply to the Fuehrer's letter, the discussion was concluded with a cordial leavetaking.

Rome, 22 September 1940

SCHMIDT

3 May 46

I, JOHN B. ROBINSON, Civ., X-046350, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1865-PS.

JOHN B. ROBINSON

Civ., X-046350

浅井喜次一及部ト。

1865 RS  
供述書

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正式ニ宣誓シテ供述ヲナス

For Production

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主任委員ニシテ著シテ文書課ニ主任ガ

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ナインバーク、前記米國主仕領事公

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書、押收、整理及保存ニ関スル供

述書、題シテ予カ、一九四六年

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カラ押收シタモ、イマハコト

三、前記押收敵原文書、押收後、独逸

席拾空官室

ナインバーク、前記米國主佐領事公

記明書目録

署、文書編纂課ニ依リ、独逸國文

書、押收、整理及保存ニ関スル供

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四、此、供述書、添付セラルレテ居ル記

録書ハ<sup>上ニ</sup>記述シ及参考シタル、彼

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五、前ニ参考ヤル、彼ノ押收セラルレタル敵

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ダブリュ・ガレル・ハート・ジュニア

アイゼン・テイ

Chap. 1

淺井大次郎一編

供述書

予、マイ、ポール、オー、スチ、ツトハ

先づ正式ニ宣誓シ、上供述ヲナス。

予ハ一九二三年ヨリ一九四五年、独逸

共和國、自解スルニ至ルマデ独逸

外務省、主席通譯官ニアリ、

其故ニ自身、独逸政府、要人

ト他國政府ノ代表者トシテ總テノ

重要ナル外務省及其他ノ會議ニ

通譯官トシテ及秘書官トシテ

ハ秘書官トシテ出席シ且從事シタ

For  
Production



独逸

二、前述ノ外務省主席通譯官

アツタ上ニ予ハ又一九三九年後ハ

独逸外務省、主席秘書官

アツタコト而シテ又最後ノ官

位ニ独逸外務省、ニニスタトニニ相当

レテ居タコト

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四、予が作製シタ記録ハ斯ナル會

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コノ記録ノ寫ノ一部ハ前記

独逸外務省ノ秘書官的役

目ヲ勤メタ外務省ノミニスター

一部局ニ保管セラレタコト

斯ナル會合夫々ノ記録ノ寫ノ他一部

ハ外務大臣ノ私設秘書官ニ保

管

サレタコト

斯ナル會合ノ夫々ノ記録ノ寫ノ

第三ハ予ノ許ニ存置セラレタコト

五、前述シテ様ニヤカ作制セシテ記

録ノ關係スル前記諸會合ハ歴

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六、コ、附属書類ハ、茲ニ添付シテ  
提出シタキ、採テ方法ニ依リ、

一九四〇年九月二十二日ベネチヤ

宮殿ニ於テキアノ伯及マツケシゼ

ン大使ノ面前ニ開催ヤラレタ独

逸外務大臣ト首相ノ會談ニ

関シ予カ親ラ作製シタ記録

忠實且正確

系本ノ直接複製寫寫其一部

ニアルコト

七、予カ通譯官トシテ又社書官ヲ

兼ネテ或ハ社書官トシテ上ニ令

述ベタ會談ニ親ラ出席シ從

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類ハ前記ノ會談ニ於テ談サレ

タコト有ツタコトノ中心會員且ニ

確ナル記事ナリ予親ラ作製

シタ記録、真接複寫寫真

ノ一部デアルコト

ハ此ノ供述書又之ニ附屬、書類ハ

日本ノ最爭犯罪人追新ニ使

用セラレルガコウト注登ヲマラレコソ  
事ヲ承知シテキル。而シテ予ハ丹

供述書ヨ拘束ヲ受クルコトナリ

快クニコ供述書ヲ作製セシタコト

トクター、ポール、オー、スチエニフト

一九四九年五月三日独逸國のバーゲン

於テ本官ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ上本供

述書ニ署名ナリ。

スミス、ダブリュ、ブコウント、ヒュルマー、  
リユー、テナント、マロネ、ル、イン、ス、ク、ター  
ヒュ、ネラ、ヒ、テ、ヒ、ト、ナ、ク、ト、

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Folder 4

(19)

*Germany - Foreign Relations*

Doc. No. 4017

Page 1

Excerpt from the Record of the conversation of the German :  
Minister of Foreign Affairs with the DUCE in the presence of  
Count CIANO and Ambassador von MACKENSEN on 22 September 1940  
at the Palazzo Venezia.

. . . The German Foreign Minister made known his  
intention to invite SERRANO SUNER to be a guest at the  
ratification, and likewise to invite representatives of the  
countries on friendly terms with the Axis, such as Hungary,  
Bulgaria and Rumania. Count CIANO at first expressed  
doubts as to whether by the presence of a Spanish delegate,  
because of the known anti-Bolshevik attitude of the Spanish  
Government, the Three Power Pact with Japan would not show  
a too strongly anti-Russian tendency, but dropped these  
doubts again, as the DUCE declared the presence of SERRANO  
SUNER rather useful on account of the thereby emphasized  
solidarity of Spain with the three signatories. . .

Rome, 22 September 1940

SCFMIDT



I. (Orig. in Doc. Rm.)

AFFIDAVIT

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Nurnberg, Germany, and as such have possession, custody and control of the original captured enemy document numbered 1865-EB by said Documentation Division.

2. That said above referred to original document was captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, from German Foreign Office files and Archives.

3. That said original captured enemy document after its seizure and capture was inventoried to, filed with, numbered and processed by the Documentation Division of said Office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nurnberg, Germany in the manner set forth and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dated the 15th of April 1946 and captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture, Processing and Preservation of German Documents", and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of said original captured enemy document above described and referred to.

5. That said above referred to original captured enemy document is being held by me for possible use in connection with the trial of alleged war criminals before the International Military Tribunal, and that a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original document for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ Gerard Schaefer  
Gerard Schaefer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 3rd day of May 1946.

/s/ Smith W. Brockhart, Jr., Lt. Col.  
SMITH W. BROCKHART, JR., IGD  
LT COLONEL, IGD  
0-508524

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 4011

24 May 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Copy, Notes of Discussion Mussolini-Ribbentrop

Date: 22 Sep 40 Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: German

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ( )

Has it been photostated? Yes (x) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL: Marburg Doc. Center

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: OCC, Nurnberg

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Relations with US, GE, and USSR

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

1. On page 46349, the imminent signing of the tripartite pact between Germany and Italy is discussed.

2. If Russia's reaction to this pact should be unfavorable, she will be offered, in "a friendly way," a free hand in the fulfillment of all her wishes southwards toward the Persian Gulf or India. (Page 46350)

3. It is hoped to sign the secret military pact with Spain simultaneously with the pact with Japan. Germany, Italy and Spain should put pressure on President Zalazar of Portugal to turn away from England, towards Spain. (p. 46350) Turkey is discussed on page 46351.

4. In connection with the probable strong reaction to the Japanese pact in America, RIBBENTROP informed MUSSOLINI of some documents which could be used against the prestige of Roosevelt. MUSSOLINI agreed that Roosevelt was responsible for the war and agreed also to use the documents. However, he doubted that the publication could prevent the election of Roosevelt. It was then decided to break off the diplomatic relations with America, in a demonstrative manner after the publication of the documents. (Page 46351 and 46352)

5. The rest of the meeting was devoted to the strategic situation in North Africa.

/A.N.: Nurnberg Doc. #1865-PS./

Analyst: C.W.J. Phelps

Doc. No. 4011

Ex 785 (Agent)

Excerpt from the Record of the conversation of the German Minister of Foreign Affairs with the DUCE in the presence of Count CIANO and Ambassador von MACKENSEN on 22 September 1940 at the Palazzo Venezia.

The German Foreign Minister made known his intention to invite SERRANO SUNER to be a guest at the ratification, and likewise to invite representatives of the countries on friendly terms with the Axis, such as Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania. Count CIANO at first expressed doubts as to whether by the presence of a Spanish delegate, because of the known anti-Bolshevik attitude of the Spanish Government, the Three Power Pact with Japan would not show a too strongly anti-Russian tendency, but dropped these doubts again, as the DUCE declared the presence of SERRANO SUNER rather useful on account of the thereby emphasized solidarity of Spain with the three signatories. . .

Rome, 22 September 1940

SCHMIDT

AFFIDAVIT

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Nurnberg, Germany, and as such have possession, custody and control of the original captured enemy document numbered 1865-F3 by said Documentation Division.

2. That said above referred to original document was captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, from German Foreign Office Files and Archives.

3. That said original captured enemy document after its seizure and capture was delivered to, filed with, numbered and processed by the Documentation Division of said Office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nurnberg, Germany in the manner set forth and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dated the 15th of April 1946 and captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture, Processing and Preservation of German Documents", and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of said original captured enemy document above described and referred to.

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/s/ Gerard Schaefer  
Gerard Schaefer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 3rd day of May 1946.

/s/ Smith W. Brookhart, Jr., Lt. Col.  
SMITH W. BROOKHART, JR., IGD  
LT COLONEL, IGD  
O-508524

CHARGE OUT SLIP

OCT 1 1946

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

EVIDENTIARY DOC. NO. 4011

TRIAL BRIEF \_\_\_\_\_

EXHIBIT NO. \_\_\_\_\_

BACKGROUND DOC. NO. \_\_\_\_\_

INDEXING DOC. NO. \_\_\_\_\_

SIGNATURE R. C. O'Connell

ROOM NO. 314

SIGNATURE \_\_\_\_\_  
ROOM NO. \_\_\_\_\_

CHARGE OUT SLIP

AUG 26 1946


DATE \_\_\_\_\_

EVIDENTIARY DOC. NO. 4011


TRIAL BRIEF \_\_\_\_\_

EXHIBIT NO. \_\_\_\_\_

BACKGROUND DOC. NO. \_\_\_\_\_

SIGNATURE 

ROOM NO. \_\_\_\_\_



2785A  
(Hent)

4011 — 1

一九四〇年九月二十二日バラチオヴエネチアニ於テ  
チアノ伯及フオンマツケンゼン大使立會ニテナサレ  
タ獨逸外務大臣トドウツチエトノ對談ノ記錄

(抜 萃)

獨逸外務大臣ハ批准ノ際ニハセラノ・スニエ氏ヲ來  
賓トシテ招待スルコト、而シテ又ハンガリイ、ブル  
ガリア、ルーマニアノ様々種々交國ノ代表者達ヲ  
モ招待スル意向ヲ告ゲタ。チアノ伯ハ最初、スベ  
イン政府ノ反ボルシエベイキ態度ガ明カデアルタメ、  
スベイン代表ノ出席ニ依ツテ日本トノ三國條約ハ反  
露的傾向ハアマリニ強クハナイカトノ疑惑ヲ表明シ  
タ。然シ、ドウツチエ自身ガ、セラノ・スニエノ列  
席ハ、ソレニヨツテ強調サレルスベインノ三國條約國  
トノ緊密關係ノ故ニ可成リ有利デアルト言明シタ時  
ニ再ビ之等ノ疑惑ハ晴ラサレタ。

× × × × × × × × × ×

一九四〇年九月二十二日羅馬ニテ

シ ミ ツ ト

## 供 述 書

余、ジエラード・シエーファー / GERARD SCHAEFF  
 君 / ハ先ツ正式宣誓ノ上、以下ノ通り証言ス。

一、余ハ在獨逸國、ヌールンベルグ、合衆國、首席檢察官事務局証據書類部長ニツテ、其故ニ該証據書類部ニ依リ *Hossain's* ト番號ヲ標記セラレタル押收敵國文書原本ノ所有、保管及管理ニ當リ居ルモノナル事

二、前記文書原本ハ聯合遠征軍最高指揮官部下ノ軍隊ニ依リテ、獨逸外務省文書集綴中ヨリ、押收セラレタルモノナル事

三、前記押收敵國文書原本ハ右押收後、獨逸國ヌールンベルグニ於ケル前記本國首席檢察官事務局証據書類部ニ引渡サレタル上、同部ニ依リ收綴サレ、番號標記及寫真所理等ノ過程ヲ經タルモノニシテ、其ノ方法ハ、余ガ、一九四六年四月十五日附ヲ以テ作製セル「獨逸文書ノ押收、寫真所理、並ニ保存ニ關スル供述書」ト題スル供述書中ニ掲ゲ且記述シタルモノニシテ、余ハ爰ニ該供述書ノ真正ナルコトヲ証明シ、之レヲ承認シ肯定スルモノニシテ、之レヲ參照スル事ニ依リ本供述書ノ一部トナ



ナスモノナル事

四、本供述書ヲ添附シアル右又替ハ、上掲ノ且照  
合ノ押收敵側又替原本ノ真正、精確ナル寫眞  
複本 \ PHOTOSTATIC COPY \ ナル事

五、上記照合ノ押收敵側又替原本ハ國際軍事裁判  
所ニ於ケル戦争犯罪被告人公判ニ關シ、所要  
ニ應ヤンガ爲、余ノ手許ニ保藏シアルモノニ  
シテ、前述ノ理由ニヨリ、該原本ノ充用不能  
ナルニヨリ、爰ニ該原本ノ寫眞複本ヲ提供シ、  
且ツ之ガ證明ヲ爲スモノナル事、

ジェラード・シエーファー (署名)  
/ GERARD SCHAEFER /

一九四六年五月三日

余ノ面前ニ於テ宣誓且署名セリ

總監部付 01508524

中佐 スミス・ダフリウ・ブルツクハート・ジュニア (署名)

/ SMITH W. BROCKHART, JR.,

LT COLONEL, IQD 01508524 /

(了)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT  
1865-PS, OFFICE OF US CHIEF  
OF COUNSEL

Record

of the conversation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs with the DUCE in the presence of Count CIANO and Ambassador von MACKENSEN on 22 September 1940 at the Palazzo Venezia.

The Foreign Minister first informed the DUCE about the State of the Japanese negotiations by reading important items of telegram No. 984 of 21 September from TOKIO. The DUCE also declared himself in agreement, that the earlier formulation mentioned under 1 A in the above telegram should be retained without mentioning the "veiled attack" and also agreed with the formulation suggested in 18 for No. 4 concerning the formation of technical boards for execution of the pact. The Foreign Minister expressed the hope that it would be possible by the end of the next week at the latest to sign the Three Power Pact with Count CIANO in Berlin. The Foreign Minister made known his intention to invite SERRANO SUNER to be a guest at the ratification, and likewise to invite representatives of the countries on friendly terms with the Axis, such as Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania. Count CIANO at first expressed doubts as to whether by the presence of a Spanish delegate, because of the known anti-Bolshevik attitude of the Spanish Government, the Three Power Pact with Japan would not show a too strongly anti-Russian tendency, but dropped these doubts again, as the DUCE declared the presence of SERRANO SUNER rather useful on account of the thereby emphasized solidarity of Spain with the three signatories. On a suggestion by the Reich Foreign Minister the view was taken concerning Russia to wait first for her reaction to the Japan Pact and at the appropriate moment to offer Russia in friendly terms a free hand regarding the fulfilment of any of her desires in the southern zone of the Persian Gulf, or in India. Furthermore, the Foreign Minister informed the DUCE about the state of the negotiations with Spain. He mentioned that a special delegate had been sent to SERRANO SUNER, at present staying in Brussels, to notify him, in accordance with the agreement concluded Friday between the Reich Foreign Minister and the DUCE, that Germany and Italy wanted to conclude a three power pact with Spain. SERRANO SUNER would inform Generalissimo FRANCO by special courier of this wish, and it was hoped that a reply would be received from FRANCO by the middle of the week, so that about the time as the pact with Japan the military alliance could also be secretly signed.

In connection with the Spanish question the conversation also turned upon Portugal and pressure to be jointly exerted by Germany, Italy and Spain upon President ZALAZAR in the direction of a withdrawal from England and a rapprochement to Spain. Without expressing himself unequivocally on this point, the DUCE still seemed to agree with this idea. He stressed in this connection the Portugal's fear of being absorbed by Spain. On the basis of telegram No. 1320 of 29.9.1940 from TARABYA on the proposals of Turkey concerning a Russian-Turkish friendship pact with guarantee of the Turkish borders by the SOVIET UNION in return for the free passage of the straits an exchange of views developed on the attitude of the AXIS to the Turks. The Reich Foreign Minister repeated the opinion already expressed by him in earlier conversations that a too close understanding between Turkey and Russia would not be in the interest of the

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*Exk 785 (out)*

AXIS-Powers, but emphasized that the danger of such a close cooperation would not be very great. He raised the question whether the attempt should not be made to pull Turkey out of the English system. To the question about relations between Turkey and Italy and about certain Turkish apprehensions, the DUCE declared that Turkey had nothing to fear from Italy. There were no territorial claims by Italy on that country; but rather was only a question of economic interests of Italy of which the Turks had an exact knowledge. To the extent that England's position became still worse, Turkey would be drawn to the Italian and German side quite of her own accord. In spite of the rather obstinate President of the State, who completely misunderstanding the present situation has been hitherto striving to continue the pro-allied policy of KEMAL.

In connection with the Japanese Pact and its presumably strong effect on America, the Foreign Minister informed the Duce secretly about a further blow which possibly could be directed against ROOSEVELT on the strength of some heavily incriminating documents. The Duce agreed that ROOSEVELT was the really responsible person for this war, the beginning of which he encouraged in every way in order to hush up his domestic political difficulties, and especially during the recent failure of the NEW DEAL. The Duce very much approved of the plan of a step against ROOSEVELT, but was positive regarding ROOSEVELT's chances in the elections, because the rival-candidate WILLKIE had committed the mistake of proposing the same program as ROOSEVELT in the election campaign. The American public, as things were at the moment, would, in his opinion, stand more or less solidly behind ROOSEVELT, even if considering the hysterical disposition of the American voting masses a swing in the other direction at the last minute caused by some unforeseen event was completely within the range of possibility. To the question of the Reich Foreign Minister as to whether it would not be much more expedient to break off diplomatic relations with the United States dramatically after publication of the documents with the declaration that there was no animosity felt against the American people, but that relations could no longer be maintained with the ROOSEVELT Government after its enormous guilt in having encouraged this war had recently become known. The Duce was in particular agreement with this idea because from Italian experience the American consuls had not only sent out completely false reports to the United States on Italy's situation, but also have in many cases acted as spies for England.

To the questions of the Reich Foreign Minister as to the state of operations in Egypt the Duce expressed himself very satisfied with the progress of military events. The first stage of the offensive which had penetrated up to 100 kms. into enemy territory, was now concluded. For the second stage, which was to extend for 120 more kilometers to MERSA MATRUH, all preparations had been made, according to a report by GRAZIANI. GRAZIANI himself would come to Rome in the next few days to discuss with the Duce the details of this second phase of the Italian offensive against Egypt. The third stage would end with the conquest of ALEXANDRIA and would necessitate the completion of another 300 kilometers. To the question of the Reich Foreign Minister as to when, under these circumstances, the conclusion of the entire enterprise against Egypt could be expected, the Duce replied rather hesitatingly that he hoped to be able to conclude the Egyptian campaign by the end of October. After the conquest of MERSAH MATRUH the British Fleet

would have to withdraw from ALEXANDRIA in consequence of the possibilities for the effective use of the Italian Air Force and in case GIBRALTAR should by then already be in the hands of the Spaniards, would, if possible, have to effect a breakthrough past GIBRALTAR into the Atlantic. A retreat through the SUEZ CANAL would be too dangerous because the canal itself could be passed at a speed of only 6 kilometers an hour. In any case a strong resistance by the English in Egypt had to be reckoned with, because the loss of this country would possibly involve the collapse of the entire Empire. After the Duce had announced another written reply to the Fuehrer's letter, the discussion was concluded with a cordial leavetaking.

Rome, 22 September 1940

SCHMIDT

3 May 46

I, JOHN B. ROBINSON, Civ., X-046350, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1865-PS.

/s/ John B. Robinson  
JOHN B. ROBINSON  
Civ., X-046350

Bureau

4011-1

Jamniko

Mr. J. J. Jones

B. Jones

Mr. J. J. Jones

一九四〇年九月二十二日ウニホジデア官殿ニ於テチ  
アノ伯及マツケンゼン大使立會ニテナサレタ外務大  
臣ト首相トノ對談ノ

記 録

外務大臣ハ最初、九月二十一日東京發第九八四號  
電報ノ重要課題ヲ讀ンデ日本トノ交渉狀況ヲ報告シ  
タ。首相ハ又、上記電報中ノ一Aノ條ニ記載セラレ  
タ先ノ條文ヲ「獲面ノ攻撃」ト記サズ存置スベキコ  
トニ同意ダト言明シ尙一八ニ第四號ニ對シ提議セラ  
レタル條約運用ノタメノ専門委員會設置ニ關スル條  
文ニモ同意シタ。外務大臣ハ遅クモ次週ノ終マデニ  
ハチアノ伯ト柏林テ三國條約ヲ締結スルコトガ出來  
ルデアロウト希望ヲ述べタ。外務大臣ハ批准ノ際ニ  
ハセラノ。スナー氏ヲ來賓トシテ招待スルコト、而  
シテ又ハンガリイ、ブルガリア、ルーマニアノ様ナ  
樞軸友交國ノ代表者達ヲモ招待スル意向ヲ告ゲタ。  
チアノ伯ハ最初、スペイン政府ノ反ボルシエベイキ  
態度ガ明カデアルタメ、スペイン代表ノ居合ハスコ  
トヲ何ウカト躊躇シタ。日本トノ三國條約ハ反響的  
傾向ヲアマリ強クハ表ハスマイカ。而シテ又、首相  
カ、セラノ。スナーガ居合ハスコト自体ガスペイン  
ガ三締約國ト緊密關係ニ在ルコトヲ強調スルカラ寧  
ロ有利デアルト言明シタ時ニ再び躊躇スル態度ヲ止

Exh 785 (Ident)

メタ。

獨逸外務大臣ノ提言ガアツテ露西亞ニ關シテハ、  
 先ヅ露西亞ノ日本トノ條約ニ對スル反響ヲ待テ、道  
 當ノ時機ニ友好的辭禮ヲ以テ露西亞ニ對シベルシヤ  
 灣ノ南部地帯或ハ印度ニ於ケル彼ノ國ノ慾望ヲ達成  
 スル自由ヲ提供スル意見ガ選バレタ。尙又、外務大  
 臣ハスペイントノ交渉狀況ニ就テ首相ニ報告シタ。  
 彼ハ、現在ブラツセルニ逗留シテキルセラノ・スナ  
 ーニ特使ヲ送ツテ、全日ニ獨逸外務大臣ト首相ノ  
 間デ締約シタ條約ニ依リ、獨逸國ト伊太利國ハスベ  
 イン國ト三國協定ヲ結ビタク思ツテ居ルト告ゲタ、  
 ト話シタ。セラノ・スナーハ特ニ使ヲ立テ、此ノ希  
 望ヲフランコ將軍ニ言ヒ送ルデアロウシ、今週ノ半  
 バ迄ニハフランコカラノ返事モ届クデアロウカラ日  
 本トノ締約頃迄ニハ軍事協定ガ秘密裡ニ署名セラレ  
 得ルデアロウト話シタ。  
 スペイン問題ニ關連シテ話ハポルトガル國及之ニ  
 獨逸、伊太利及スペインノ三國共同デ加フベキ壓迫  
 ニ關ジタ。ガラザール大統領ハ英國カラ引揚ゲル途  
 中デアリスベイント國交ヲ回復シツ、アル。此ノ點  
 ヲ明白ニハ言ハナカッタガ首相ハ此ノ考ヘニ同意ス  
 ルヤウニ見エタ。彼ハ之ニ關連シテポルトガルハス  
 ペインニ併吞セラレル事ヲ恐レテ居ルコトヲ力説シ

タ。海峽自由航行ノ代償トシテソビエツト聯邦ニ依  
 ル土耳其國境ノ安全保障ヲ含ム露土友交條約ニ就キ  
 土耳其ノ提議シタコトニ關スル一九四〇年九月二十  
 九日タラビヤカラノ電報第一三二〇號ニ就テハ樞軸  
 國ノ土耳其ニ對スル態度ニ意見交換ハ發展シタ。獨  
 逸外務大臣ハ、土耳其ト露西亞トノ度ノ過ギタ緊密  
 ナル理解ハ樞軸國家ノ利益ニハナラナイデアロウト  
 云フ從來ノ會話デ既ニ表明シタ彼ノ意見ヲ繰返シタ  
 ガ斯ル緊密ナル協調ノ危險モ大シタコトデハナカラ  
 ウト強調シタ。彼ハ土耳其ヲ英國系カラ引離ス手段  
 ヲ執ルベキデナイカ何ウカ訊ネタ。此ノ質問ニ對シ  
 土耳其ト伊太利トノ國交關係及或ル土耳其ノ不安ニ  
 就テハ首相ハ土耳其ハ何モ伊太利ヲ恐レルコトハナ  
 イト言明シタ。伊太利ニ依ル彼ノ國ノ領土上ノ要求  
 ハ何物モ存在シナカツタ。ガ然シ唯、伊太利ノ經濟  
 的利益ノ問題ガアツタ。是ハ土耳其ノ知悉シテキル  
 コトデアツタ。英國ノ地位ガ尙一層惡化スルニ從ツ  
 テ、土耳其ハ自ツト伊太利及獨逸側ニ接近スルダロ  
 ウ。時代ノ現情勢ヲ益ク誤解シテキテ寧ロ頑迷ナル  
 大統領ガ居ルニモ拘ラズ從來ハケマルノ聯合國親善  
 政策遂行ヲ續ケテ居タノデアル。日本トノ條約及多  
 分米國ニ及ブ強イ其ノ影響ニ關連シテハ外務大臣ハ、  
 或ル深ク責ヲ負フベキ善類ニ基イテル！ズベルトニ  
 更ニ喰ハスコトガ出來ルダロウト思フ痛棒ニ就テ首

相ニ耳打ちヲシタ。首相ハ、ルーズベルトガコノ戦争ニ對シテ實ヲ貢フベキ人物デアルト云フ事ニ同意シタ。彼ハ、國內ノ政治的難問題ヲ鎮靜サスタメニ、特ニニューデイルノ近頃ノ失敗ノ期間ニ在ツテハ、開戦ヲ極力遏ツタ。首相ハ、反ルーズベルト處置ニ就テハ大賛成ダツタ。然シ選舉ニルーズベルトガ見込ミガアルコトハ疑ツテ居ナカツタ。ト云フ譯ハ競争者タル候補者ノウイルキーガ選舉戰ニ於テ、ルーズベルト同様ノ政策ヲ掲ゲルト云フ誤リヲ犯シタカラデアル。ヒステリカルナ性質ノ米國選舉大衆ヲ考慮ニ入ル、時、假令或ル豫測シ得ナイ事柄ニ因ツテ直前ノ瞬間他ノ方向ニ走ルヤウナコトガ全ク可能ノ範圍ニ屬スルトシテモ、其頃ノ情勢ニ在テハ米國國民ハ多少確實ニルーズベルトノ味方ニ立ツデアロウト云フノガ彼ノ意見デアツタ。米國國民ニ對シテハ惡意ヲ感ジテホナイガ、然シ此ノ戦争ヲ煽動シタ政府ノ大キナ罪惡ガ近頃世ニ知ラレテハルーズベルト政府ト外交關係ヲ維持シテ行クコトガ不可能ダト云フ言明ヲ包含シタ書類ヲ公表シタ後米國ト華々シク國交ヲ斷絶シタ方ガ尙一層適當デナイカ何ウカト云フ獨逸外務大臣ノ質問ニ對シテハ、首相ハ、伊太利ノ經驗デハ、米國ノ領事達ハ伊太利ノ事情ニ就テハ虛報ヲ米國へ送ツテホルノミカ多クノ場合英國ノスパイトシテ働イテホルカラ取別ケ此ノ考ヘニハ同意



ダツタ。獨逸外務大臣ノエジプトニ於ケル軍事行動  
 ニ就テノ質問ニ對シテハ首相ハ軍事事件ノ進行ニ就  
 テ非常ニ満足ダト言ツテ居リマシタ。攻撃ノ第一段  
 階一ソレハ敵地ニ百キロメートルダケ進入シターハ  
 今終了シマシタ。第二段階一ソレハメルサ・マトル  
 フノ方向ニ一二〇キロメートル以上進行スル筈ナノ  
 デアルガ一ハクラジアントノ報告ニヨレバ總テノ準  
 備ハ調ツタ。クラジアント自身、伊太利ノエジプト  
 攻撃ノ第二局面ノ詳細ヲ首相ト相談ノタメ一兩日中  
 ニ羅馬へ來ルダロウ。第三段階ハアレキサンドリア  
 ノ征服デ終ルダロウシ、尙ホ其處カラ三〇〇キロメ  
 ーターノ攻路ヲ必要トスルコトニナルデアロウ。斯  
 ル事情ノ下ニ於テ、エジプトニ對スル全計畫ノ終了  
 ハ何時デアロウト云フ獨逸外務大臣ノ質問ニ對シ首  
 相ハ少々躊躇シテ、エジプト軍事行動ハ十月末迄ニ  
 終了スルコトガ出來ルデアロウト答へマシタ。メル  
 サ・マトルフノ占領後ハ、伊太利が空軍力ヲ効果的  
 ニ使用スルコトガ可能ニナルタメ英國ノ艦船ハアレ  
 キサンドリヤカラ餘儀ナク撤退スルコトニナルデア  
 ロウ、ソシテ又ジブラルタルガ其時マデニスペイン  
 人ノ手ニ入りマシタナラバジブラルタルヲ突破シテ  
 大西洋ニ入り得ルコトガ或ハ可能ニナルデアロウ。  
 スエズ。キヤナルヲ通ツテ退却スルコトハ、時速僅  
 カ六キロメートルヲ通過シナケレバナライノデ、

4011-6

危険デアル。何レノ場合ニ於テモエジプトニ在ル英  
軍ニ依ツテ強硬ナ抵抗ガナサレルコトヲ豫想セラレ  
ナケレバナラナイ。ト云フ譯ハ此ノ圖ヲ失フコトハ  
多分至帝國ノ破滅ヲ意味スルコトニナルデアロウカ  
ラ。總統ノ手紙ニ對スル文書ニ依ル他ノ返事ヲ首相  
ガ披露シタ後、懇ロナル別レノ言葉ヲ述ベテ此ノ會  
談ハ閉ヂラレタ。

一九四〇年九月二十二日羅馬ニテ

スチミット

一九四六年五月三日

予、アイ・ジョン・ビー・ロビンソン（シイビイリ  
アン・エクス―四六三五〇）、予ハ英獨兩國語ニ通  
曉シ且前記録ハ一八六五―ピーエスノ書類ノ忠實且  
正確ナル翻譯デアルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス

ジョン・ビー・ロビンソン

シイビイリアン・エツクス―

四六三五〇