


Aircraft Action Reports

2-d (43) USS Makin Island

Enclosure "C"



NO. 235 DASH

UNIT

DASH ACI

SUB

.....
.....
.....

.....
.....

NO. *236* DATE *MAR 10 1945*


UNIT. *U. S. S. MAKIN ISLAND*

MADE FOR *ACI*

SUBJECT

OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPH
NOT TO BE USED FOR PUBLICATION
WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF
THE CHIEF OF THE BUREAU
OF AERONAUTICS

IWO JIMA



NOV 11 1945

ad. 27

U. S. S. MAKIN ISLAND

7-11

11-11

O C C U P A T I O N O F I W O J I M A

A C T I O N R E P O R T

I-N-D-E-X

PART I	Background and Concept.....	1
PART II	Chronological Action.....	5
	Summaries.....	32
PART III	Ordnance Performance.....	44
PART IV	Battle Damage.....	46
PART V	Comment and Recommendations:	
	(a) Air Operations.....	48
	(b) Radar Fighter Direction.....	54
	(c) Communications.....	60
	(d) Aerology.....	60
	(e) Engineering.....	62
PART VI	Casualties and Personnel Performance:	
	(a) Comment on Personnel.....	63
ENCLOSURES	Section:	
	(A) ACA-1 Aircraft Action Reports Nos. 22 through 92 of VC-84.	
	(B) Photographic Section.	
	(C) Navigational Track Charts of U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND, 10 February 1945 to 11 March 1945.	
	(D) Map of Iwo Jima.	

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE-93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Serial: 002

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer.
To : Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) Commander Carrier Division TWENTY-SIX (~~CTU 52.2.3~~).
(2) Commander Escort Carrier Force, United States Pacific Fleet.
(3) Commander Fifth Fleet.

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima (10 February 1945 to 11 March 1945).

References: (a) Article 874(6), U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920.
(b) PacFlt Conf. Ltr. 1CL-45.
(c) CTF 51 Operation Plan #A25-44.
(d) Comdr. Fifth Fleet Operation Plan #13-44.

Enclosures: (A) ACA-1 Aircraft Action Reports Nos. 22 through 92 of VC-84.
(B) Photographic Section.
(C) Navigational Track Charts of U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND, 10 February 1945 to 11 March 1945.
(D) Map of Iwo Jima.

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), Action Report of this vessel in connection with the Occupation of Iwo Jima, is submitted herewith.

2. Throughout this report Time Zone -10 (KING), and East Longitude dates are used.

PART I

1. The objective of this large scale amphibious operation was the seizure of Iwo Jima in the Kazan (Volcano) Group of the Nanpo Shoto Islands. The capture of the heavily defended island, strategically situated midway between the Marianas and the Japanese homeland, represented a long step towards the isolation and destruction of the enemy in his home waters and islands. From the tactical standpoint, the prime advantage to be gained from the operation was the utilization of Iwo's air facilities to provide fighter cover for our heavy bombing attacks on the Empire.

2. This vessel was assigned to Task Unit 52.2.2 (Support Carrier Unit 2), which was under direct command of Rear Admiral Calvin T. Durgin, and served as his **Flagship**. Other vessels of this sub-division of Task Group 52.2 were; U.S.S. LUNGA POINT (CVE 94), U.S.S. BISMARCK SEA (CVE 95), and the U.S.S. ANZIO (CVE 57), together with a screen of three DD's and 5 DE's.

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

Task Unit 52.2.1, (Support Carrier Unit 1), commanded by Rear Admiral C.A.F. Sprague consisted of five CVE's; U.S.S. SARGENT BAY (CVE 83), U.S.S. MATOMA BAY (CVE 62)(F), U.S.S. WAKE ISLAND (CVE 65), U.S.S. PETROF BAY (CVE 80), and U.S.S. STEAMER BAY (CVE 87), together with an escort of two DD's and four DE's.

Task Unit 52.2.3, (Support Carrier Unit 3), under Rear Admiral George Henderson, USN, included U.S.S. SAGINAW BAY (CVE 82)(F), U.S.S. RUDYARD BAY (CVE 81), and an escort of two DD's and two DE's. (U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND, with the other components of TU 52.2.2 were under tactical command of CTU 52.2.3 from 19 February - 8 March).

Task Unit 52.2.4 (Support Carrier Unit 4), was made up of the U.S.S. SARATOGA, and the U.S.S. ALASKA; these vessels joined Task Group 52.2 on D+2 Day.

Summary of vessels by types assigned in accordance with original operation plans to Task Group 52.2 follows:

COMPOSITION OF TASK GROUP 52.2.

CV	-	1
CB	-	1
CVE	-	11
DD	-	7
DE	-	11
	TOTAL VESSELS	<u>31</u>

After 21 February 1945, when the U.S.S. SARATOGA was damaged by suicide attacks, her place was taken by the U.S.S. ENTERPRISE. Various screening vessels of the ENTERPRISE - ALASKA group, organized as TU 52.2.5 including cruisers, are not listed in the schedule above.

3. In accordance with Commander Fifth Fleet's OpPlan No. 13-44, detailed routing schedules and movements of each group were carefully planned so as to coordinate all necessary action prior and subsequent to the landing of the attack forces on Dog Day, (19 February 1945). Each group fitted into the overall plan - minesweeping, heavy support, escort carriers and attack forces.

4. As a component of TG 52.2, the primary mission of the U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND was to furnish cover to our formations enroute to the objective area as well as air support in all its forms to friendly forces off the Iwo Jima beach-heads. Anti-submarine patrol, local and target combat air patrol, searches, support, photographic, scouting and special missions were all listed as

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE-93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

tasks to be accomplished by aircraft of VC-84, based on this ship. Until land-based planes could obtain a foothold on local air strips at Iwo Jima the CVE planes of TG 52.2 were counted upon to furnish a substantial portion of the air support necessary for the success of a major amphibious operation.

5. The MAKIN ISLAND sortied from ULITHI ATOLL, Western Caroline Islands, 10 February 1945 in company with other units of Task Group 52.2, setting a northerly course for Saipan, where anchor was dropped on the morning of 12 February 1945. After embarking two OY-1 Marine artillery spotting planes, the MAKIN ISLAND took departure from Saipan, 13 February 1945, conducting routine air operations during that day in the Saipan area, and fueling. At 1000, 14 February 1945, a course was set for Iwo Jima.

6. While enroute to the objective area the MAKIN ISLAND, in company with the CVE's of Task Unit 52.2.2 and 52.2.1, supplied air cover for vessels of Admiral Blandy's Amphibious Support Force as well as for the CVE formation. The objective area was reached before dawn of 16 February 1945, without special incident or contact with the enemy.

7. The ship operated in designated areas off Iwo Jima from 16 February to 8 March, participating in the support of Marine Corps action on the island as well as supplying planes for anti-submarine patrol, combat air patrol, and various other missions. During this twenty-one day period in the combat area, 877 sorties left the deck (averaging 41.7 daily) totalling 2725.6 flying hours, as against 601 sorties (comparable daily average 37.6) and 1785.3 flying hours during the Lingayen operation. For the period 10 February - 11 March, including flights enroute to and returning from objective area, sorties totalled 985; flying hours 3028.1. No pilots were lost; one aircrewman was wounded.

The nature of the terrain and its defenses made difficult, for the most part, a detailed assessment of damage inflicted on the enemy by VC-84 aircraft, but frequent expressions of appreciation from ground troops and CSA indicated that a particularly thorough and efficient job was done in providing direct support for our forces. The Squadron's Acting Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Douglas K. English, USNR, and the Senior Fighter Pilot, Lieutenant George Shaw-Corthorn, USNR, were especially commended by Commander Support Aircraft for excellent work as Air Coordinators.

8. The ship carried out assigned air schedules, maintained a high level of plane availability throughout the operation and, in general, contributed to the full extent of its means to the success of our combined forces at Iwo Jima.

9. During the evening of 21 February, Task Unit 52.2.3, of which this ship was a part, was subjected to a concentrated suicide air attack, during

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation Of Iwo Jima.

which the BISMARCK SEA (CVE 95) was sunk and the LUNGA POINT (CVE 94) narrowly escaped serious damage. This was the only occasion on which the formation was under attack.

10. MAKIN ISLAND, in company with LUNGA POINT, RUDYARD BAY, NATOMA BAY and eight screening vessels, took departure from operating area west of Iwo Jima at 1800 9 March for Ulithi.

11. An uneventful voyage to Ulithi was completed by early evening 11 March 1945.

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

PART II

A chronological account of the operations of this ship and the aircraft of its embarked squadron, VC-84, from the date of its sortie from Ulithi Atoll on 10 February 1945, to its return to Ulithi on 11 March 1945 is outlined below. For detailed reports of contact with the enemy by planes of VC-84, reference will be made by number to ACA-1 Aircraft Action Reports (Enclosure (A), which are attached hereto). The Summary Section of Part II includes schedules of own and enemy losses, plane availability, daily sorties, ordnance expenditures and other data concerning air operations.

10 FEBRUARY 1945 - D-9 DAY

WEATHER: Sunrise 0702. Ulithi Atoll Area. Good flying conditions all day with thin, broken alto-stratus and alto-cumulus sheet of clouds at 12,000 feet. Three to five tenths swelling cumulus at 1500 feet. NE surface winds 16-24 knots. Light swells in Ulithi Anchorage, becoming moderately rough at sea. Moderate sea all day. Good visibility. Steady barometer. Weak tropical front oriented ENE-WSW 60 miles south of Ulithi with over-running air, giving middle clouds. No precipitation. Sunset 1845.

Underway from Ulithi Atoll for Saipan at 1223, in company with other vessels of Task Group 52.2. There were no flight operations, but extensive AA gunnery exercises were held. The day passed uneventfully.

POSITIONS

2000 Lat. 10-28.0 N
Long. 140-38.0 E

11 FEBRUARY 1945 - D-8 DAY

WEATHER: Sunrise 0642. Enroute to Marianas. Good flying conditions. Surface winds steady from ENE moving into NE at noon. Winds averaged 16 knots with highest hour 20 knots. Three to four tenths scattered cumulus at 1000-1200

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93)

c/o Fleet Post Office

San Francisco, California

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

feet. Thin broken overcast of middle clouds. Good visibility. Moderate sea with moderate NE swells. Rising barometer at ship preceded northward. Sunset 1827.

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND enroute for Saipan. Air operations consisted of routine CAP flights over the CVE formations and friendly preceding groups. Anti-submarine and search sorties were also conducted with negative results. Passed Guam at 1600. Two VT courier planes were sent in to Iseley Field No. 2 at Saipan.

POSITIONS

0800	Lat. 11-50.0 N.	1200	Lat. 12-22.0 N.	2000	Lat. 13-37-5 N.
	Long. 142-54.5 E.		Long. 143-46.0 E.		Long. 144-25.0 E.

12 FEBRUARY 1945 - D-7 DAY

WEATHER: Sunrise 0642. Saipan Area. Continued good flying conditions. Cold front had passed thru area during the night with intermittent showers. Three tenths cumulus 1200-1500 feet. Visibility 12 miles. Winds increased to an average of 20 knots with maximum hourly average of 26 knots, from ENE. Moderately heavy sea and swells. Sunset 1821.

Anchored in Saipan Harbor, Marianas Islands at 0837. During the day two VO Marine Observation Aircraft were loaded, and Commander W. T. Tompkins, (MC)(A1), USNR, of the staff of Commander Fifth Fleet came aboard with three Hospital Corpsmen and 4,000 pounds of pre-mixed DDT insecticide concentrate. Commander Tompkins, who has had considerable experience in handling this insecticide, has done much to develop its use from the standpoint of military effectiveness. Sprayed over land areas from low flying planes, the concentrate, diluted to 10% solution in fuel oil, destroys mosquitoes, other disease-bearing insects and their larvae, combatting diseases such as malaria and dengue fever at their source. Excellent results were obtained from DDT at Palau and it is expected that the same protection for our troops will be effected at the present objective. Using carrier-based planes as sprayers has the advantage of covering the area, in many cases, days before special non-combat land-based planes could take over the task. The MAKIN ISLAND is the only CVE carrying DDT in this operation.

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

POSITIONS

0800	Lat. 15-07.0 E.	1200 - Saipan	2000 - Saipan
	Long. 145-40.0 E.		

13 FEBRUARY 1945 - D-6 DAY

WEATHER: Sunrise 0643. Marianas Area. Excellent flying conditions. Visibility unlimited. Scattered middle clouds with two to six-tenths of cumulus at 1500 feet. Winds averaged 19 knots with gusts to 30 knots. Barometer falling slowly. Moderate sea and swells. Sunset 1821.

Underway from Saipan Harbor, Saipan, at 0658 passing through torpedo net at 0718. The ship was fueled at sea (see Enclosure B-B) and routine flight operations were conducted in the Marianas Area. The day passed uneventfully.

POSITIONS

0800	Lat. 15-08.5 N.	1200	Lat. 14-55.0 N.	2000	Lat. 15-15.0 N.
	Long. 145-39.0 E.		Long. 146-24.0 E.		Long. 146-22.0 E.

14 FEBRUARY 1945 - D-5 DAY

WEATHER: Sunrise 0643. Marianas Area. Excellent flying conditions. Visibility unlimited. Two to six-tenths scattered cumulus at 1500 feet. Winds averaged 15 knots from ENE. Slight sea with low swells. Weak cold front passage early in evening. Weak high pressure system to north of ship's path. Sunset 1821.

At 1000 course was set for Iwo Jima. Twenty-five sorties were flown, sixteen TCAP over TG 52 groups in the van, and nine search missions. Training exercises were held in Damage Control and in Target Tracking.

This day was without enemy contact or other special incident.

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

POSITIONS

0800	Lat. 15-19.0 E	1200	Lat. 15-40.0 N.	2000	Lat. 17-19.0 N.
	Long. 145-03.0 E		Long. 144-46.0 E.		Long. 144-00.0 E.

15 FEBRUARY 1945 - D-4 DAY

WEATHER: Sunrise 0709. Enroute to Iwo Jima. Excellent flying conditions all day with steady light ESE winds which averaged 7 knots. Unlimited visibility. Light sea with low swells. Few scattered cumulus at 1200 feet. Ship passing thru small high pressure cell. Sunset 1830.

This was another uneventful day. Sixteen LCAP sorties were launched with no enemy contact. Drills for the repair parties, various other exercises for the ship's company and briefings of VC-84 pilots and aircrewmembers were continued in anticipation of early arrival at the objective area.

Two escort vessels were fueled during the day.

During the afternoon CTU 52.2.2, directed that all preparations be made for a special fighter sweep of Chichi Jima and Haha Jima in the Bonins Area at dawn, 16 February, with primary targets designated as aircraft and shipping.

POSITIONS

0800	Lat. 19-58.0 N.	1200	Lat. 20-45.0 N.	2000	Lat. 22-10.0 N.
	Long. 142-54.5 E.		Long. 142-34.0 E.		Long. 142-05.5 E.

16 FEBRUARY 1945 - D-3 DAY

WEATHER: Sunrise 0709. Operating area (west of Iwo Jima) in cold air, modified cPk with center of wave on cold front passing directly south of station on ENE path. Undesirable flying conditions with overcast skies; broken alto-stratus at 10,000 feet, 5 to 10 tenths strato-cumulus at 800-1200 feet, lowering during

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

afternoon. Intermittent rain. NW surface winds averaged 14 knots; highest hourly average 18 knots. Visibility 8 miles, reduced to 3 miles in rain. Moderate sea with low northerly swells. Sunset 1830.

This was the first day of full scale air support operations directed against the objective. A heavy flight schedule had been planned, which was, to a large degree handicapped by the very unfavorable weather conditions prevailing during the greater part of the day. Nevertheless, forty-four sorties were launched and some positive results achieved.

The first flight was the fighter sweep on Chichi Jima and Haha Jima in the Bonins Group, approximately 150 miles north of Iwo; while enroute, visibility closed down to practically zero, forcing the planes to turn back.

At 0815 however, Lieutenant Thomas Sedaker's fighter division made contact with two enemy luggers, bound for Iwo, carrying fully equipped troops, and bearing 330° (T), 20 miles distant from Mount Suribachi on the southern tip of Iwo. In spite of the overcast, successful rocket and strafing runs from low altitudes were made on these craft, which were estimated to be one hundred foot Sugar Charlies, setting them on fire and leaving them dead in the water, settling evenly. The majority of the troops aboard were cut down. On instructions from CSA, who indicated that he was sending a DD to the scene to pick up POWS, our planes did not molest the thirty odd survivors who managed to get into the water, although Lieutenant (jg) M. J. Simpson, Jr. did drop his empty wing tank on one Jap soldier who had put a small boat over the lugger's side, capsizing the boat. For details of this action see ACA-1 Report No. 22 and Enclosure (A) Photo X.

At 1007 one of the screening vessels, U.S.S. HUTCHINS reported a sound contact 6000 yards off the ship's starboard bow. Emergency turns were initiated and the contact faded.

During the day, MAKIN ISLAND planes over the target area attacked AA and other enemy positions near the eastern perimeter of Mount Suribachi. Weather conditions made it almost impossible to observe the results of these attacks, although some decrease in the intensity of AA was noted after the runs. (ACA-1 Report No. 23).

At 1444 sounded General Quarters as bogies were approaching the formation. The planes proved friendly and General Quarters were secured at 1455.

Air operations were completed by 1815.

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report -- Occupation of Iwo Jima.

POSITIONS

0800 Lat. 24-25.0 N.
Long. 140-38.0 E.

1200 Lat. 24-26.0 N.
Long. 140-29.0 E.

2000 Lat. 24-07.5 N.
Long. 140-15.0 E.

17 FEBRUARY 1945 - D-2 Day

WEATHER: Sunrise 0708. Iwo Jima Operating Area (west of Iwo). Average flying conditions with cloudy skies, six-tenths to ten-tenths during the day. Eight-tenths strato-cumulus at 2000 feet becoming two-tenths after noon, broken clouds at 3500 and 8000 feet. Good visibility; 12 miles. WNW winds averaged eight knots; highest hourly average 13 knots. Broken overcast at 1500 feet over Bonin Islands with average visibility during early morning strike. Smooth sea with low N. swells. Sunset 1830.

Forty sorties were flown during this second day of full operations in the objective area. The majority of the planes were sent out on either TASP or LCAP missions; ten, however, flew over Iwo and four MAKIN ISLAND VF were launched on a special fighter sweep over Chichi Jima and Haha Jima in the Bonins.

This latter mission was more fortunate in the weather than was Lieutenant Shaw's division yesterday, managing to reach Chichi shortly after 0800. The four VF from this ship, (Lieutenant Earl Attebury's division), with divisions from each of the LUNGA POINT and BISMARCK SEA, strafed grounded aircraft at Susaki Airfield, Chichi, making hits in the face of intense and accurate medium AA. (Enemy aircraft, however, did not burn). Our planes observed the destruction of a Jap ammunition barge by LUNGA POINT and BISMARCK SEA fighters just to the west of Chichi.

A medium-sized ship, believed to be an oiler, was strafed and rocketed in Higashi Minato Cove, northeast Haha Jima, and eight to ten small craft were also attacked through heavy AA in the Okimura area of southwestern Haha Jima. Two VF suffered slight damage from enemy gunfire.

Following the return of this mission at 0930 information regarding weather, enemy shipping and AA was passed on in time to be used by strikes launched later in the day on the same objectives from other CVE's of TG 52.2. (See ACA-1 Report No. 24)

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

On instructions from CSA our TCAP divisions over Iwo carried out strafing attacks on ground targets, driving home through varying degrees of AA fire along the southeast and southwest beaches and on enemy strong points located in the north central section of the island. One VF's fuselage was holed by a probable 7.7 MM hit, but damage was slight and did not prevent the plane from continuing its mission.

A Sugar Dog was strafed at Kita Iwo Jima by Lieutenant (jg) Wilbur Ege. (For details of these actions see ACA-1 Reports Nos. 25 to 29).

Flight Operations were completed at 1840.

The DALY (DD-519) was fueled at noon.

The ship operated to the west of Iwo Jima throughout the day without special incident.

POSITIONS

0800	Lat. 24-51.45 N.	1200	Lat. 24-57.05 N.	2000	Lat. 24.47.0 N.
	Long. 140-25.0 E.		Long. 140-20.0 E.		Long. 140-49.0 E.

18 FEBRUARY 1945 - D-1 DAY

WEATHER: Sunrise 0708. Iwo Jima Area. Area in high pressure system, cold air, in back of early morning secondary cold front passage. Flying conditions in the Bonins and Volcanos were bad during the morning, becoming average during the afternoon. Intermittent drizzle during morning, with six-tenths strato-cumulus at 1200 feet, precipitation ceiling zero. Broken layers of cloud at 3500 and 8-9000 feet. Four-tenths strato-cumulus and six-tenths alto-stratus during afternoon. Winds averaged 10 knots; highest hourly average 15 knots. Slight sea with continued low swells. Visibility increased from two miles in drizzle to 10-12 miles during afternoon. Sunset 1831.

Forty-nine sorties were launched today, including another special fighter sweep directed against the Bonins, which was again forced back by adverse weather conditions before reaching the target.

A series of flights over Iwo, however, strafed, bombed and rocketed varied targets in the Suribachi sectors. Three and one-half tons of bombs, one-hundred and eighty-four five inch HE rockets and eight napalm tanks (only

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93)

c/o Fleet Post Office

Serial: 002

San Francisco, California

SECRET

Subject Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

four of which were seen to ignite), were expended on enemy positions with results which were not clearly observed through the smoke, dust and thick weather.

One MAKIN ISLAND TBM, J-12, on a support mission over Iwo was struck by AA, type unknown, at 1515 and, as a result of engine damage, was forced to make a water landing about 3,000 yards off the northwest tip of the island; the pilot, Lieutenant (jg), H.A. Hughes, USNR, and his aircrewmen, SMITH, Duncan C. Jr., AMM3c and HAAS, Donald "A", ARM3c were shortly thereafter picked up by U.S.S. PAUL HAMILTON (DD-590). (See ACA-1 Report No. 33).

Another MAKIN ISLAND VT was hit by probable 13.2 fire in the port wing but only minor damage was sustained.

Anti-aircraft fire appeared to be particularly intense in the area to the south and east of Airfield No. 2 and at the northern tip of Airfield No. 1. Reports were made by the returning support planes to the effect that the enemy's southern AA positions between Mount Suribachi and Airfield No. 1 appeared to have been silenced. ACA-1 Reports Nos. 30-32 and 34 cover these actions in detail.

The ship operated in its designated area during the day without special incident.

POSITIONS

0800	Lat. 24-28.5 N.	1200	Lat. 24-28.0 N.	2000	Lat. 24-07.0 N.
	Long. 140-47.45 E.		Long. 140-46.0 E.		Long. 140-49.0 E.

19 FEBRUARY 1945 - DOG DAY

WEATHER Sunrise 0707. West of Iwo. Average flying weather early in the morning with six-tenths strato-cumulus clouds at 1500 feet; four-tenths alto-stratus at 10,000 feet. Weather improved to excellent after noon with few scattered cumulus from noon until midnight. A wedge of high pressure was over the area. Surface winds were steady from the NE, averaged nine knots. Good visibility except for scattered patches of drizzle at 0600. Smooth sea with low northerly swells. Sunset 1831.

Assault landings on the south eastern beaches of Iwo Jima, scheduled for 0900 today, were carried out according to plan by the Fourth and Fifth Marine Divisions. Photographs taken from VC-84 planes show in detail

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

the progress of these amphibious operations towards the beaches. (See Enclosure B).

Forty-four VC-84 sorties were flown, of which all but sixteen LCAP were in the target area. Air coordinators from this ship, Lieutenants D. K. English, USNR, Acting Squadron Commanding Officer and George Shaw-Cor-thorn, USNR, Senior Fighter Pilot in VT and VF respectively, were over the target for the better portion of the day directing heavy strikes on targets selected for the CV forces which had come into the area early this morning.

Support work by our own planes was limited to only a few bombs and rockets. TCAP were directed, for the most part, to maintain patrol over orbit points during the fast carrier strikes, and were not called upon for the usual strafing runs prior to returning to base. For details on aircraft actions see ACA-1 Reports Nos. 35 and 36.

As in the past, the ship's company was kept as fully advised as possible of the situation developing on Iwo Jima. At intervals throughout the day special announcements were made over the public address system regarding the results of specific missions launched from the ship, and a running account of activities on and over the beach by the Air Observers was channeled through the loud speaker system. Maps of the objective area were also posted at key spots throughout the ship, and it is believed that the general interest thus engendered proved to be an important factor in maintaining efficiency and morale at highest levels.

The ship operated normally throughout the day.

POSITIONS

0800	Lat. 24-25.5 N. Long. 140-32.0 E.	1200	Lat. 25-58.0 N. Long. 141-03.5 E.	2000	Lat. 24-52.5 N. Long. 142-15.0 E.
------	--------------------------------------	------	--------------------------------------	------	--------------------------------------

20 FEBRUARY 1945 - D+1 DAY

WEATHER: Sunrise 0707. West of Iwo. Undesirable flying conditions with three-tenths cumulus increasing to eight-tenths during the day. Ceiling 1500 feet decreased to 1000 feet with cold front passage between 1500 and 1600. Rain between 0900 and 1100 and again with frontal passage. 12 mile visibility became

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

six miles in afternoon; two-three miles in rain. Winds veered from SE to SW prior to frontal passage; veered to N with front. Winds increased from twelve knots to twenty-three knots. Moderate sea with low swells. Alto-stratus overcast all day at 8-9000 feet. Sunset 1832.

Forty sorties were flown today, of which twenty-four were over the target on various missions. Enemy mortar positions to the north and northwest of our lines were bombed and rocketed by our planes with good effect. Troop positions in the Mount Suribachi Area were strafed. See ACA-1 Reports 37-39.

Some of our pilots, on returning from the target area, were of the opinion that under unfavorable weather conditions currently prevailing, there were too many planes in the area to be handled effectively; this several times necessitated return of planes to base carrying original bomb loads.

Air groups from the large carrier formations continued strikes in considerable strength against enemy positions, but the unfavorable weather developing during the afternoon limited the usefulness of air support.

The ship's routine for the day was uneventful.

POSITIONS

0800	Lat. 24-47.5 N. Long. 141-53.0 E.	1200	Lat. 24-53.5 N. Long. 141-44.5 E.	2000	Lat. 24-55.0 N. Long. 142-10.0 E.
------	--------------------------------------	------	--------------------------------------	------	--------------------------------------

21 FEBRUARY 1945 - D+2 DAY

WEATHER: Sunrise 0706. West of Iwo. Area was in wedge of cold air with warm front approaching from the west. Flying conditions were average with alto-stratus overcast at 8,500 feet; five to eight-tenths strato-cumulus at 1,500 feet. Drizzle between 0920 and 0930. Moderate sea with moderate northerly swells. Sunset 1832.

The day began with pre-dawn flight operations at 0530 followed by the routine dawn alert from 0604 to 0704. The ship's schedule was then followed in the normal manner until late afternoon.

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

Forty-eight sorties were launched, including twenty-two LCAP (eight of these a scramble), and sixteen TCAP. Lieutenant English coordinated heavy CV strikes on Jap artillery positions and shore batteries near the northern perimeter of Mount Suribachi, spotting targets by firing rockets from 1200 feet into the designated objectives. As usual, it was difficult to appraise damage with any accuracy. (See ACA-1 Reports Nos. 40-41).

(Lieutenant English and Lieutenant Shaw-Corthorn have both been commended several times recently by CSA for the excellence of their work in coordinating strikes).

At 1707, OTC (CTU 52.2.3) ordered Flash Red - Control Yellow when reports were received that Carrier Force Four (U.S.S. SARATOGA and the U.S.S. ALASKA), approximately 30,000 yards northeast of this formation, was under attack by enemy aircraft. A group of some fifty enemy planes had appeared on the screen at eighty-miles, bearing NNE from this formation, and closing slowly.

General Quarters was sounded immediately, ushering in a period of approximately three and one half hours during which the CVE group (TU 52.2.3) was subjected to concentrated enemy air attack.

At 1710, all available fighter planes and pilots on this vessel were placed in Condition II.

At 1715, with enemy aircraft closing our formation from various bearings, eight VF were launched to make interception and to reenforce CAP already airborne. (More than sixty CVE planes, including those returning from missions were in the air at this time). Speed was increased to sixteen knots.

At 1720, while MAKIN ISLAND was steering a course of 030° (T), a column of black smoke was observed off the port bow, caused by fires on the SARATOGA, which was, according to reports of SARATOGA F6F (N) pilots who landed aboard this vessel after sunset, struck by Jap suiciders shortly before this time. (CIC reports to the bridge indicated that SARATOGA and CVE VF had failed to intercept at forty miles).

At 1723, bogies approached this formation on various bearings to within twenty-three miles.

At 1734 a single "Betty" circled to within visual distance of our screening vessels and was driven off by gunfire. It was now approximately one hour before sunset; the atmosphere was hazy; low, six-tenths cloud cover at 1500 feet, with overcast at 8,000 feet, temperature was falling. The support ships off the beach at Iwo were firing heavily, presumably at bogies over their formations. Tracers were clearly visible over the horizon, as were the black bursts of five-inch shells at varying altitudes.

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

At 1750 screening vessels closed up on the CVE's for purposes of concentrating AA fire.

At 1803 commenced landing aircraft.

At 1830, two minutes before sunset, CIC reported bogies at forty-three miles and shortly thereafter at twenty-nine miles, bearing 293° (T). Another bogie bearing 055° (T), fifteen miles distant, proved friendly.

At 1845, with visibility decreasing rapidly, the Japanese planes who had been shadowing the carrier group made a coordinated suicide attack on the carrier formation.

From 1845 to 1856 a series of actions occurred, following one another so closely that it is almost impossible to enumerate separate incidents in sequence.

Planes were heard and dimly seen coming towards our ships, flying full-out very low over the water from diverse sectors. Those observed from this ship were making runs on the formation from starboard to port; these were immediately taken under fire by screening vessels. Two, possibly three, exploded and hit the water in flames, illuminating adjacent areas. All planes were apparently single-engine.

New targets penetrated the screen. At 1846 MAKIN ISLAND's forward batteries opened up and, for some minutes thereafter there was heavy and continuous firing from the vessels of the carrier formation.

At 1851, an enemy plane flying through intense fire was observed to crash into the after end of the BISMARCK SEA (CVE 95), 3500 yards off the starboard bow of the MAKIN ISLAND, whose position at that time was Latitude 24°36'00"N Longitude 141°48'00"E.

To personnel on this vessel it appeared that the BISMARCK SEA had been struck either in the five-inch gun sponson, on the fantail or in the pyrotechnic locker. The initial explosion was very heavy, probably caused by the blowing up of the crash plane. Almost immediately the entire after portion of the vessel was in flames and a series of short, sharp explosions (suggestive of ready ammunition) were heard. Fire appeared to spread rapidly to the hangar and flight decks aft, while the planes spotted topside went up, feeding the conflagration.

The LUNGA POINT (CVE 94), ^{3.5} four thousand yards off MAKIN ISLAND's port bow was, simultaneously, under attack by four planes. Reports indicate that at 1846 a coordinated torpedo - suicide runs were made on her by four planes, two of which were shot down after launching near-miss torpedoes.

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

A third plane flew a few feet over the flight deck and disappeared, while number four was hit by gunfire when about 200 yards from the ship, smashed its right wing into the starboard after portion of the island structure and, burning, skidded across the flight deck into the sea fifty yards from the ship on the port beam. Portions of the latter plane picked up in the catwalks identified it as a Jill.

At 1856 an emergency nine turn to course 310°, speed fifteen, was executed. A heavy internal explosion was heard on the stricken BISMARCK SEA.

At 1903 formation executed nine turn, speed twelve to 220°. Sporadic firing of automatic weapons by ship's batteries continued.

At 1906 the BISMARCK SEA was shaken by two additional heavy internal explosions, possibly torpedo warheads and magazines. She had appeared to be making some progress in controlling the fire up to that time, but now she developed a heavy list to starboard and her crew were seen abandoning ship, while escort vessels stood by illuminating the water with searchlights.

At 1908 turn eighteen to course 040° was executed and all aircraft recalled. Homing and deck lights were put on and planes, including SARATOGA F6F's began coming aboard.

By approximately 1950 the BISMARCK SEA had capsized and sunk. Rescue operations were proceeding with Captain Pratt of the BISMARCK SEA in charge.

Firing gradually died out as the enemy planes withdrew from the area. At 2030 General Quarters were secured.

Planes continued to land until 2230; in addition to our own fighters, five F6F-5 (N) pilots from the SARATOGA night squadron came aboard. (See Part II Summary Section of this report for details concerning SARATOGA pilots).

Two VC-84 fighter pilots did not return to the ship, but word was received during the course of the evening that both were safe; Lieutenant Kent had landed safely on the SARATOGA, while Lieutenant (jg) K. B. Finka had been picked up off Iwo by a destroyer after making a water landing.

The Landing Signal Officer and flight deck personnel turned in a competent piece of work while bringing in these planes at night under adverse conditions. Comments of the L.S.O. regarding functioning of equipment and related matters are included in Part V of this report, under Air Operations.

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

For relative position of vessels during this night's action,
and track of MAKIN ISLAND see Navigational Track Chart, Enclosure (C).

POSITIONS

0800	Lat. 24-51.0 N Long. 141-51.0 E	1200	Lat. 24-47.0 N Long. 141-52.0 E	2000	Lat. 24-52.5 N Long. 141-52.5 E
------	------------------------------------	------	------------------------------------	------	------------------------------------

22 FEBRUARY 1945 - D+3 DAY

WEATHER: Sunrise 0707. Iwo Operating Area. Low pressure system was approaching the area with warm front weather in vicinity of Iwo. Average weather between 0600 and 0900 deteriorated to undesirable by noon and became bad by 1400. Late afternoon ASP hop was cancelled due to weather. Light rain was recorded intermittently during the morning; continuous heavy rain during the afternoon. Winds were steady eighteen knots SE to NE. Eight miles visibility during the morning became one-two miles during the afternoon. Three-tenths strato-cumulus at 1200 feet became 4-500 feet overcast afternoon. Other layers of clouds at 3500 and 8000 feet. Moderate sea and swells. Sunset 1837.

This was a comparatively uneventful day excepting for several false alerts occasioned by bogies which soon proved to be friendly aircraft.

Forty-three sorties were flown, of which twenty-five were over the target on TCAP or support missions. Gun positions in the Suribachi area were bombed and rocketed and Lieutenant D. K. English, Acting VC-84 Squadron Commander, received another "well done" from CSA for a particularly cool and thorough piece of work as coordinator of a CV group strike. (ACA-1 Reports Nos. 42-44).

During the afternoon weather conditions were so bad as to render flying hazardous. Pilots were brought safely aboard with no mishaps in a driving rainstorm with visibility near zero.


At 1805, on orders of CTG 52.2, MAKIN ISLAND set a southerly course to make an early morning fueling rendezvous arranged for 23 February.

POSITIONS

0800	Lat. 24-56.0 N Long. 141-50.0 E	1200	Lat. 24-56.0 N Long. 141-50.5 E	2000	Lat. 24-21.5 N Long. 141-59.0 E
------	------------------------------------	------	------------------------------------	------	------------------------------------

Enclosure "C"

-- NIGHT ACTION 21, FEBRUARY 1945 --



NO. 233

MAR 10 1945

UNIT..... U. S. MAKIN ISLAND.....

MADE FOR H C L

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93)

c/o Fleet Post Office

Serial: 002

San Francisco, California

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima

23 FEBRUARY 1945 - D:4 DAY

WEATHER: Sunrise 0706. * Fueling area - 150 miles South of Iwo. Good flying conditions, with broken strato-cumulus clouds at 1500 feet. A low pressure system had passed to the south of the area with winds at the surface backing to NNE. Winds were steady and averaged 20 knots. Good visibility. Moderately rough sea and swells. Sunset 1844.

The ship made rendezvous at 1040 with U.S.S. ESCALANTE (AO-70) south of Iwo Jima today. Fueling operations commenced at 1159 and were completed at 1458 after receiving 390,000 gallons of fuel oil and 27,400 gallons of aviation gasoline.

At 1502 launched two F6F's, piloted by Lieutenant C. Denby - Wilkes and Ensign J. M. Hurley, for flight to Saipan and eventual transfer to the SARATOGA, from which vessel they had taken off on 21 February, later landing on MAKIN ISLAND. (Denby-Wilkes and Hurley, escorted by a PBM, arrived safely at Saipan at approximately 1900).

During the afternoon six replacement VF and one VT were flown aboard from U.S.S. TULAGI.

The squadron had a quiet day, flying only nine LCAP and four LASP.

The ship's day was uneventful. A northerly course was set during the afternoon and evening for designated operating areas to the east of Iwo Jima.

POSITIONS

0800 Lat. 21-50.0 N
Long. 139-56.0 E

1200 Lat. 21-22.0 N
Long. 139-28.0 E

2000 Lat. 22-32.0 N
Long. 140-13.0 E

24 FEBRUARY 1945 - D:5 DAY

WEATHER: Sunrise 0703. Operating areas east of Iwo Jima. Continued good flying conditions in the area with a high pressure system moving in from the west. Winds were N to NNE averaged 20 knots. Unlimited visibility. Low broken clouds at 1500 feet became scattered after 1000. Moderate sea and swell. Sunset 1834.

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

Before dawn the ship took station to the north east of Iwo Jima after proceeding on a northerly course ^{DURING} the night from the fueling area. Air operations during the day were the heaviest undertaken by this vessel during any period of action against the enemy; fifty-eight sorties were launched, forty-one of which were over the target area.

Results of support strikes were highly satisfactory. Lieutenant D. K. English on duty as air coordinator scored a bullseye at 1635 by dropping ten one-hundred pound G.P. bombs into cave positions believed to be sheltering enemy troop concentrations in an area approximately 1200 yards northwest of the No. 2 airfield.

At about the same time rocket and strafing attacks, led by Lieutenant (jg) W. L. Scott, on enemy troops reported to be forming for an assault on our lines were reported successful by our own ground forces, who stated to CSA that they were very pleased with the strike. This action took place in an area directly south of the east-west runway of the No. 2 airstrip.

Another air support group consisting of four VT bombed concrete structures in an area on the ridges east of the east west runway of No. 2 airstrip. (ACA-1 Reports 45-52).

The flight returning late in the afternoon brought back the encouraging information that our tanks, in some strength, had pushed forward to the intersection of the two runways on the No. 2 field. Friendly troops were also in that vicinity.

The ship was alerted several times during the day as the result of the presence of bogies in the vicinity, but none approached the ship and no attacks were made on the formation.

POSITIONS

0800	Lat. 25-44.25 N	1200	Lat. 25-06.7 N	2000	Lat. 24-52.0 N
	Long. 141-48.0 E		Long. 141-57.5 E		Long. 142-20.0 E

25 FEBRUARY 1945 - D+6 DAY

WEATHER: Sunrise 0702. Iwo operating area. Excellent flying conditions with low and middle scattered clouds and good visibility. Easterly winds averaged seventeen knots. Winds veered to ESE late in the afternoon as a low pressure system approached the area from the west. Moderate sea and swells. Sunset 1834.

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

This was another heavy day from the standpoint of sorties, fifty-one being flown, all but eleven of which were over the target area. Three and one-half tons of bombs and one-hundred-and-forty 5" rockets were expended on enemy troops, gun positions and vehicles. Results were for the most part unobserved, although the target areas were well covered. A group of targets, however, to the northwest of No. 2 airfield was struck with good effect according to the air coordinator on station. (ACA-1 Reports Nos. 53-56).

The U.S.S. EVANS (DD-552) was fueled from 0705 to 0825.

At 1346 Lieutenant (jg) H. B. Finka, the VC-84 fighter pilot who had been picked up by a DD off Iwo on the evening of 21 February after a water landing, was returned to the vessel by U.S.S. HYMAN (DD-732).

The ship operated in its assigned sector to the east of Iwo Jima and, although alerted several times by bogies, (most of which proved to be B-29 formations returning from Tokyo strikes), no visual contact was made with the enemy.

POSITIONS

0800 Lat. 24-43.0 N
Long. 142-08.0 E

1200 Lat. 24-45.5 N
Long. 141-58.5 E

2000 Lat. 24-39.0 N
Long. 143-00.5 E

26 FEBRUARY 1945 - D+7 DAY

WEATHER: Sunrise 0701. Iwo operating area. Average flying conditions during the morning, became undesirable by 1000. Cold front passage between 1400-1500. Five-tenths strato-cumulus became eight-tenths at 800 feet with front. Broken overcast alto-stratus at 9000-10,000 feet. Winds shifted from SSW to NW with front and increased from thirteen to twenty-five knots. Heavy showers with front. Planes recalled to ships by 1400. No later flights scheduled by MAKIN ISLAND. Visibility reduced to four-six miles during the morning because of haze; reduced to two miles in showers; increased to eight-ten miles after frontal passage. Moderate sea and swell. Sunset 1835.

Today's air operations were limited by weather which closed down during the afternoon and kept several flights on deck.

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

Forty-one sorties were launched, however, of which thirty-three were over the target on TCAP or support missions. Direct bomb hits were scored on gun positions, caves and supply areas east of No. 2 airfield and reported rocket launching sites were strafed during the morning by VC-84 fighter planes. (See ACA-1 Reports Nos. 57-58).

The ship operated in its designated area without special incident.

POSITIONS

0800	Lat. 24-58.5 N	1200	Lat. 24-48.0 N	2000	Lat. 24-55.0 N
	Long. 141-46.0 E		Long. 142-11.5 E		Long. 142-32.0 E

27 FEBRUARY 1945 - D+5 DAY

WEATHER: Sunrise 0701. East of Iwo Jima. Good flying conditions as high pressure system moved in, in back of cold front. Low pressure system had moved to the north of the area. Visibility unlimited. Scattered to broken strato-cumulus clouds at 2,500 feet. Steady, strong, NE winds, averaged nineteen knots. Moderate sea with moderately strong swells. Rising barometer. Sunset 1836.

Only eighteen of a total of forty-one sorties were over the target area today, the majority of flights being either LCAP or ASP.

One of the TCAP missions, after completing its patrol, was instructed to strafe Kama Rocks, which are approximately one thousand yards off the northwest end of Iwo. No enemy activity, however, was observed at Kama.

Lieutenant D. K. English, as air coordinator, led a combined VT, VF strike against enemy mortar positions northwest of the No. 2 airstrip. Details of air action in ACA-1 Reports Nos. 59-64.

At 1533 Lieutenant W. C. Hughes of VC-84 made the three thousandth landing aboard this ship in TBM-3.

At 1715 one of the two OY-1 Marine Corps artillery spotting planes which had been taken aboard at Saipan, was launched for the beach, piloted by 2nd Lieutenant E. W. Hull, USMCR.

The ship operated throughout the day without incident.

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

POSITIONS

0800 Lat. 24-44.0 N
Long. 142-06.0 E

1200 Lat. 24-45.5 N
Long. 141-58.5 E

2000 Lat. 24-40.5 N
Long. 142-25.5 E

28 FEBRUARY 1945 - D+9 DAY

WEATHER: Sunrise 0700. Iwo operating area. Good flying conditions. Two to four-tenths of strato-cumulus and cumulus at 2,500 feet. Steady NE winds averaged seventeen knots. Area in high pressure system. Unrestricted visibility. Moderate sea with moderately strong NE swells.

Forty-seven sorties left the deck today, twenty-two over Iwo and the balance on LCAP and LASP and various missions.

Mobile artillery positions along roads in the northern part of the objective area were strafed, as were troop positions to the north of No. 2 airstrip.

Various other strafing and coordinator assignments were carried out as per schedule. (ACA-1 Reports Nos. 65-69).

At 1110 launched the second (and last) OY-1 for the beach, pilot 2nd Lieutenant C. E. Fitzpatrick, USMCR.

From 1515 to 1545, two specially equipped VT's sprayed Iwo Jima from Suribachi to a line north of the No. 1 airfield with DDT solution. The pilots, Lieutenant (jg) M. L. Doliana and Ensign G. A. Terry, flew at one-hundred twenty five feet, the two planes covering a six-hundred foot swathe on each run. Commander W. T. Tompkins, (MC), USNR, accompanied Lieutenant (jg) Doliana and a hospital corpsman rode with Ensign Terry. Five-hundred gallons of the solution were expended and approximately one-thousand acres were covered. Excellent cooperation was given by authorities at objective who restricted gunfire in the sector sprayed for thirty minutes, and Commander Tompkins stated that the equipment worked perfectly. He has been informed that the number of flies on Iwo is rapidly increasing, probably as a result of the presence of unburied corpses. The spraying operation will be repeated in the near future.

Admiral C. T. Durgin, USN, left the ship at 0710, going aboard U.S.S. EVANS (DD-552) for transportation to Iwo, returning aboard at 1810.

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

The ship operated in its assigned area without special incident.

POSITIONS

0800	Lat. 24-46.5 N	1200	Lat. 24-42.0 N	2000	Lat. 24-47.5 N
	Long. 141-52.5 E		Long. 141-53.5 E		Long. 142-25.5 E

1 MARCH 1945 - D+10 DAY

WEATHER: Sunrise 0659. Iwo Operating Area. Excellent flying conditions. Few scattered cumulus at 2000 feet. Unrestricted visibility. Steady NE winds averaged 16 knots. Moderate sea and swells. High pressure system continued over area. Sunset 1837.

Forty-five sorties were launched today, including twenty-two over Iwo.

Lieutenant G. Shaw-Corthorn acting as air coordinator led attacks on reported troop and gun positions on the north coast; these missions were stated by CSA to have been very successful. In the afternoon, Lieutenant D. K. English, directed strikes on troop positions in the highly fortified and rugged area on the coast directly east of the No. 2 airstrip, receiving a "well done" from CSA for results achieved. (For details of this day's actions see ACA-1 Reports Nos. 70 to 74).

Aside from a "Red Flash" at 1809, the ship's routine during the day was uneventful.

POSITIONS

0800	Lat. 24-34.0 N	1200	Lat. 24-47.5 N	2000	Lat. 24-44.0 N
	Long. 141-47.5 E		Long. 142-01.0 E		Long. 142-24.5 E

2 MARCH 1945 - D+11 DAY

WEATHER: Sunrise 0655. Iwo Operating Area. Good flying conditions. became

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

average with weak cold front passage at 1500. Winds strong; averaged twenty-five knots, with gusts to thirty knots with front; direction ENE. Few scattered cumulus became eight-tenths strato-cumulus at 1800 feet with front. Tops of clouds at 7000 feet. No precipitation. Visibility unlimited. Sunset 1835.

Forty-seven sorties were made today. Twenty-three of these were over the target and were made up of twenty TCAP, two coordinators, and 1 Photo hop. The coordinators, Lieutenants D. K. English and G. Shaw-Corthorn, together with the strike groups with they led, produced results that were described as highly satisfactory by ground observers.

A camouflaged artillery position which had been giving our troops on the right flank to the eastern end of the No. 2 airstrip a great deal of trouble was wiped out by rockets, intended primarily for designation of the target, fired by Lieutenant English and two accompanying VF from the strike. (ACA-1 Reports Nos. 75-77).

Front line positions were being slowly pushed up towards the northern and eastern parts of the objective, resulting in narrowing sectors for air support activities. The margin of safety between the positions of our own troops and potential targets has been cut down considerably in the past few days.

The ship was fueled by the U.S.S. GUADELUPE (A032) from 1105 to 1320, taking on 187,000 gallons of fuel oil, 34,000 gallons of aviation gasoline, and 300 gallons of diesel oil.

The ship operated in its designated area without special incident beyond executing emergency turns at 1955 after sound contact had been made by screening vessel. Contact quickly faded.

POSITIONS

0800 Lat. 24-49.0 N
Long. 142-14.2 E

1200 Lat. 24-48.0 N
Long. 142-51.0 E

2000 Lat. 24-45.0 N
Long. 143-07.0 E

3 MARCH 1945 - D+12 DAY

WEATHER: Sunrise 0654. Iwo Operating Area. Good flying conditions. Intense low pressure system located to the north of the operating area. Ship was in

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

the warm sector of that system. The weak cold front had passed out of the area to the north as a quasi-stationary front. Visibility reduced to 6-8 miles because of haze caused by the warm air over the cooler ocean surface. Winds steady, SSE averaged 13 knots. Falling barometer all day. Few scattered low clouds. Sunset 1835.

Thirty-two sorties were made today, sixteen of which were over the target. Six tons of bombs plus sixty-nine 5" high explosive rockets were expended by two morning strike groups from the MAKIN ISLAND. Blockhouse, artillery, and troop positions were bombed, rocketed and strafed with good effect, according to ground observers who reported results to CSA.

The second strike, which went in at 1100 on the difficult coastal area, east of our right flank anchor positions was led by Lieutenant (jg), M.R. King, to whom the coordinator turned over the lead. CSA remarked that King and his group accomplished an excellent piece of work. For details of these actions, see ACA-1 Reports Nos. 78 and 79.

Aside from one false alert during the early afternoon, the ship's day was completed without incident.

POSITIONS

0800	Lat. 24-45.5 N	1200	Lat. 24-17.0 N	2000	Lat. 24-06.0 N
	Long. 141-51.0 E		Long. 142-04.0 E		Long. 142-14.0 E

4 MARCH 1945 - D+13 DAY

WEATHER: Sunrise 0653. Iwo Operating Area. Good flying conditions until 1100 when occluded cold front passed through area at which time flying became bad until 1500; average after that time. Haze limited visibility to eight miles prior to front; visibility was two miles in rain during frontal passage and eight-ten miles after 1500. Clear skies during the morning with low, middle and high clouds moving in rapidly ahead of the front. Ceiling was 800 feet ~~with the front~~ with a precipitation ceiling of 200 feet. Winds were SSW ahead of the front, and veered to NE in a small high pressure area in back of the front. Slight sea with low easterly swells. Flights were cancelled from 1100-1500
Sunset 1837.

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93)

c/o Fleet Post Office

Serial: 002

San Francisco, California

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

The weather curtailed air operations today to twenty-seven sorties, the majority being combat air patrol. No attacks were made on enemy positions, but a DDT spraying mission of two VT was successfully completed during the afternoon.

At 1813 U.S. Mail was delivered to the ship by U.S.S. PATTERSON (DD-392).

The ship operated without special incident.

POSITIONS

0800	Lat. 24-38.0 N	1200	Lat. 24-53.0 N	2000	Lat. 24-30.0 N
	Long. 142-00 04 E		Long. 142-13.5 E		Long. 142-20.0 E

5 MARCH 1945 - D+14 DAY

WEATHER: Sunrise 0652. Iwo Operating Area. Good flying conditions with ~~conditions~~ with scattered cumulus at 1000 feet, three to four-tenths alto-stratus at 10,000 feet. Unlimited visibility. Northerly surface winds, averaged eleven knots, increasing from five-six knots to seventeen knots during the afternoon. Area in small high pressure system. Slight sea became moderate, low swells. Sunset 1836.

Forty-three sorties left the ship today, thirty-one of which were over the target. Ten tons of bombs plus one hundred thirty-three five inch rockets were expended and excellent results were obtained by support missions which bombed, rocketed, and strafed mortar positions to the north and east of our front lines.

Two MAKIN ISLAND VT piloted by Lieutenant (jg) D. E. Glasgow, and Ensign H. D. Harper, were struck by light anti-aircraft fire and made emergency landings on Iwo airfield number 1 at 1155 and 1220. (Pilots and aircrewmembers, with the exception of Galotta, E. J., ARM2c (T), aircrewman of Ensign Harper's crew, were returned to the ship by a destroyer on 6 March. Galotta suffered severe wounds in the legs, but his condition was described as favorable. CASU unit at Iwo reported that they were working on one of the two planes and would try to have it back in repair prior to the ship's departure from the area).

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima

During the morning, rocket heads and motors were taken aboard from the U.S.S. STOCKTON (DD-646), which had picked up this ordnance from an ammunition ship at the beach. (See ACA-1 Reports 80-81-82-83).

POSITIONS

0800	Lat. 24-28.4 N Long. 141-54.0 E	1200	Lat. 24-21.0 N Long. 142-12.5 E	2000	Lat. 24-42.0 N Long. 142-23.0 E
------	------------------------------------	------	------------------------------------	------	------------------------------------

6 MARCH 1945 - D+15 DAY

WEATHER: Sunrise 0650. Iwo Operating Area. Good flying conditions with clear skies. Haze limited visibility to eight-ten miles. Steady SSE WINDS averaged twelve knots. Slight sea with low swells.

Thirty-seven sorties were made today, sixteen of them over the target area. Successful rocket and strafing attacks were made on strong enemy gun positions in support of a push begun by the Marines at 0900 this morning. (See ACA-1 Reports Nos. 84-86).

A group of four officers representing the staff, ship and squadron, spent the day on Iwo Jima and reported that the Marines were placing more and more reliance on close air support to enable them to crack the elaborate Japanese defense positions. Opportunity was also taken during the day by these officers to study the workings of the CSA unit established on the island, and a great deal of valuable information was obtained as to the problems encountered by the officer directing our aircraft. (It is recommended that, whenever possible, the squadron personnel, particularly Division leaders, be given the chance to have direct contact with the CSA organization).

From 1420 to 1507 the MAKIN ISLAND fueled the U.S.S. DENNIS (DE-405).

At 2126 a possible sound contact was reported by one of the escort, U.S.S. BAGLEY, and emergency turns were executed. Sound contact proved negative. General Quarters were held at 2133 when a bogie, bearing 280 (T), five miles, appeared on the screen. Plane proved friendly and General Quarters was secured at 2145.

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93)
c/ Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

POSITIONS

0800	Lat. 24-38.0 N	1200	Lat. 24-53.0 N	2000	Lat. 24-30.0 N
	Long. 142-00.04 E		Long. 142-13.5 E		Long. 142-20.0 E

7 MARCH 1945 - D+16 DAY

WEATHER: Sunrise 0650. Iwo Operating Area. Undesirable flying conditions, at 820 feet, became six-eight-tenths broken at 1,000 feet after that time when flying conditions became average. Visibility six-eight miles in light rain, ten miles otherwise. Light WNW winds averaged nine knots. Sunset 1837. *until 0900. Ceiling*

There were only twenty-nine sorties today as the result of the unfavorable weather conditions. A support group led by Lieutenant (jg) R. E. Hooks, strafed gun and troop positions along the east central coast of the island. Three of the MAKIN ISLAND VF on this strike dropped napalm bombs from altitudes of fifty to seventy-five feet, but only one of these three was seen to ignite. The same VF also strafed reported gun positions on Kangoku Rock, fifteen hundred yards off the northwest end of Iwo. No enemy activities, however, were observed.

The MAKIN ISLAND fueled the U.S.S. EVANS (DD 552) at noon.

The day passed without further incident.

POSITIONS

0800	Lat. 24-51 N	1200	Lat. 24-47.3 N	2000	Lat. 24-46.00 N
	Long. 142-04 E		Long. 142-05 E		Long. 142-23.30 E

8 MARCH 1945 - D+17 DAY

WEATHER: Sunrise 0649. Iwo Operating Area. Good flying conditions with low broken cumulus at 2,000 feet, four-six tenths; scattered middle clouds. Good visibility. WNW 15 knots winds shifted to NNW with weak secondary cold front at 1500. Visibility ten-twelve miles. Moderate sea with moderately rough swells. Sunset 1839.

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

Thirty-nine sorties left the deck today, twenty-nine of which were over the target. In this last day of the MAKIN ISLAND's participation in the Iwo Jima support operations effective bombing, strafing, rocket and napalm attacks were made against front line positions and gun emplacements in close proximity to our own troops.

Lieutenant E. R. Attebury led a series of rocket and strafing runs on mortar launchers on the east coast and Lieutenant F. A. Noll and Ensign W. T. Worden, dropped, between them, twenty one-hundred pound bombs on gun positions, obtaining eighteen hits on the target.

Lieutenant G. Shaw-Corthorn's performance in leading similar attacks with RUDYARD BAY and SAGINAW BAY squadrons brought a "very well done", from CSA.

In the last strike of the day, Lieutenant D. K. English, as air coordinator, took in a group of eight P-51 Army Mustangs with excellent results. (For details on these actions see ACA-1 Reports Nos. 88 to 92).

During the day four VF and one VT were transferred to the SAGINAW BAY.

At 1800 the MAKIN ISLAND together with LUNGA POINT, RUDYARD BAY, NATOMA BAY, PETROF BAY and eight screening vessels took departure from the Iwo Jima operating area and, on orders of CTG 52.2, set a southerly course for Uli-thi.

After eight o'clock reports the Executive Officer, Commander J. H. Kuhl, read to all hands over the P.A. system the following communication from Rear Admiral C. T. Durgin to CTU 52.2: "Outstanding performance of the ships and squadrons under your leadership and direction is a record that you and all of those under you may well be proud. It has been an extended and difficult operation not only for us but for the marines ashore. Your willing determination to see it through with cheerfulness and thoroughness has won a "well done" from all the marines ashore. I too am personally proud of the splendid performance of your officers and men. You have written another excellent chapter in Support Carrier history."

POSITIONS

0800 Lat. 24-44.6 N
Long. 142-04.0 E

1200 Lat. 24-42. N
Long. 142-18.5 E

2000 Lat. 24-31.45 N
Long. 142-04. E

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE 93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

9 to 11 MARCH 1945

WEATHER: Enroute to Ulithi Atoll. Good flying conditions. Partly cloudy skies with low cumulus at 2,000 feet. Strong NE winds sixteen-twenty-one knots. Good visibility. Moderately rough sea. Moderate swells.

These days passed without particular incident. Routine LCAP and ASP missions were flown without enemy contact.

So far as possible both squadron and ship's personnel were given opportunity to relax from the tension of the past month's operation; equipment was inspected and repaired and general field days held.

On the afternoon of 11 March the MAKIN ISLAND dropped anchor in Ulithi Atoll after completing its part in the Iwo Jima operation.

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE-93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

PART II.

SUMMARY SECTION

During the period 10 February to 10 March 1945, 985 sorties (640 VF, 345 VT) were flown by embarked squadron, VC-84, for a total of 3028.1 hours, as compared with corresponding figures of 601 sorties (431 VF, 170 VT) and 1785.3 hours flown during the Lingayen Gulf Operation. A breakdown of sorties by date and type plane follows:

DATE	SORTIES		HOURS		TOTALS	
	VF	VT	VF	VT	SORTIES	HOURS
Feb. 10	0	0	0	0	0	0
11	16	12	58.8	39.6	28	98.4
12	0	0	0	0	0	0
13	9	14	23.9	28.3	23	52.2
14	16	9	54.5	27.9	25	82.4
15	16	0	53.5	0	16	53.5
16	28	16	89.9	46.1	44	136.0
17	21	20	72.5	61.1	41	133.6
18	28	21	88.3	66.0	49	154.3
19	29	13	92.3	47.3	42	139.6
20	26	20	89.5	63.0	46	152.5
21	39	9	111.6	31.3	48	142.9
22	28	15	85.5	39.7	43	125.2
23	15	5	26.8	12.9	20	39.7
24	40	18	111.9	58.8	58	170.7

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE-93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

SUMMARY SECTION
(Continued)

DATE	SORTIES		HOURS		TOTALS	
	VF	VT	VF	VT	SORTIES	HOURS
Feb. 25	35	16	115.3	48.6	51	163.9
26	32	9	87.2	26.7	41	113.9
27	29	12	98.0	42.1	41	140.1
28	33	14	110.9	51.0	47	161.9
March 1	33	12	109.3	43.9	45	153.2
2	33	13	117.2	46.8	46	164.0
3	20	13	70.1	43.5	33	113.6
4	20	7	49.1	16.6	27	65.7
5	28	15	92.5	47.3	43	139.8
6	22	20	66.2	50.4	42	116.6
7	15	16	44.0	38.3	31	82.3
8	25	14	81.1	35.0	39	116.1
9	0	0	0	0	0	0
10	4	12	4.0	12.0	16	16.0
TOTALS -	640	345	2003.9	1024.2	985	3028.1

* - A few miscellaneous flights for 11 March 1945 are not included in above.

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE-93)
 c/o Fleet Post Office
 San Francisco, California.

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

SUMMARY SECTION
 (Continued)

For the twenty-one days of combat air operations in the Iwo Jima area, from 16 February (D-3) to 8 March (D+17), a summary of sorties, pilot and plane hours is submitted, together with comparable figures for the Lingayen Gulf campaign of 1 January - 20 January 1945:

	<u>IWO JIMA</u>			<u>LINGAYEN</u>		
	<u>VF</u>	<u>VT</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>VF</u>	<u>VT</u>	<u>Total</u>
Total Sorties	579	298	877	431	170	601
Total Flying Hours	1809.2	916.4	2725.6	1264.8	520.5	1785.3
Aver.Sorties per Pilot*	26	16.5	21.9	19.6	9.5	15
Aver.Hours per Pilot*	82.2	50.9	68.1	57.5	28.9	44.6
Aver.Flying Hours per Plane ^{**}	106.4	83.3	97.3	79.5	47.3	66.1

* - Based on average availability of 22 VF and 18 VT Pilots for both operations.

** - Based on average availability of 17 VF and 11 VT for Iwo Jima, and 16 VF and 11 VT for Lingayen.

Breakdown of Sorties by Type Mission

<u>DATE</u>	<u>AVAILABILITY</u>		<u>AT TARGET</u>		<u>CAP</u>	<u>SEARCH</u>		<u>SHIPS</u>	<u>A.S.P.</u>		<u>OTHER</u>	
	<u>VF</u>	<u>VT</u>	<u>STRIKES & SWEEPS</u>			<u>VF</u>	<u>VT</u>		<u>VF</u>	<u>VT</u>	<u>VT</u>	<u>VT</u>
			<u>VF</u>	<u>VT</u>								
2-10-45	16	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2-11-45	16	13	-	-	8	-	8	8	-	4	-	2
2-12-45	16	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE-93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

SUMMARY SECTION
(Continued)

DATE	AVAILABILITY		AT TARGET		CAP	SEARCH		SHIPS CAP	A.S.P.		OTHER	
	VF	VT	STRIKES & SWEEPS	VT		VF	VT		VF	VT	VF	VT
2-13-45	16	13	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	4	-	11
2-14-45	16	13	16	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	-	-
2-15-45	16	13	-	-	-	-	-	16	-	-	-	-
2-16-45	16	13	20	16	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	-
2-17-45	16	13	5	1	8	-	-	8	-	19	-	-
2-18-45	16	12	24	20	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	1
2-19-45	16	10	1	1	16	-	-	12	-	7	-	5
2-20-45	16	11	14	16	-	-	-	12	-	4	-	-
2-21-45	15	11	1	1	16	-	-	22	-	7	-	1
2-22-45	15	11	-	9	16	-	-	12	-	5	-	1
2-23-45	12	12	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	4	6	1
2-24-45	18	13	13	9	19	-	-	8	-	7	-	-
2-25-45	18	13	11	12	16	-	-	8	-	-	-	4
2-26-45	18	12	8	8	16	-	-	8	-	-	-	1
2-27-45	18	12	1	1	16	-	-	12	-	10	-	1
2-28-45	17	13	1	1	20	-	-	12	-	10	-	3
3-1-45	17	12	1	1	20	-	-	12	-	10	-	1

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE-93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

SUMMARY SECTION
(Continued)

DATE	AVAILABILITY		AT TARGET		CAP	SEARCH		SHIPS CAP	A.S.P.		OTHER	
	VF	VT	STRIKES & SWEEPS			VF	VT		VF	VT	VF	VT
			VF	VT								
3-2-45	17	13	1	1	20	-	-	12	-	9	-	3
3-3-45	17	11	8	8	-	-	-	12	-	2	-	3
3-4-45	18	11	-	1	12	-	-	8	-	4	-	2
3-5-45	18	9	16	14	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	1
3-6-45	18	10	12	7	-	-	-	8	-	11	-	4
3-7-45	17	10	7	-	-	-	-	8	-	11	-	5
3-8-45	12	9	13	7	-	-	-	12	-	3	-	4
3-9-45	12	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3-10-45	12	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	12
TOTALS -		173	134	203	0	17	251	0	131	10	66	

: :
OWN LOSSES AND RESCUE OPERATIONS

DATE	: TIME OF : :LAUNCHING:	TYPE	: BUREAU : : NUMBER :	CIRCUMSTANCES, PLACE AND CAUSE OF LOSS	: PILOTS		: AIRCREW	
					:LOST	SAVED	: LOST	SAVED
2-17-45	0803	FM-2	73656	Landing accident. Damaged beyond re- pair. Jettisoned after salvaging usable parts.	0	1	0	0
2-18-45	1231	TBM-3	23051	While on support mission over Iwo Jima plane struck by AA, type unknown. Time 1515(K). Lt.(jg) Hughes, USNR, made successful water landing under power. Picked up 3000 yds. off NW tip Iwo Jima by USS PAUL HAMILTON(DD590).	0	1	0	2
2-18-45	1530	FM-2	73742	Landing accident. Damaged beyond re- pair. Engine and usable parts sal- vaged. Plane jettisoned.	0	1	0	0
2-20-45	1233	FM-2	73758	Landing accident. Damaged beyond re- pair. Usable parts salvaged. Jettisoned.	0	1	0	0
2-21-45	1714	FM-2	56730	Plane and pilot landed safely on SARATOGA while this formation under at- tack. Not yet returned aboard this vessel.	0	1	0	0
2-21-45	1715	FM-2	73550	Plane lost in water landing off Iwo Jima necessitated by lack of fuel. Carrier under attack preventing land- ing aboard. Rescued by DD.	0	1	0	0
3-5-45	0932	TBM-3	23409	Forced landing on Iwo Jima as result damage sustained from enemy fire at 1000 ft. during support mission. Plane further damaged by collapse of tail wheel on landing. Under repair at Iwo.	0	1	0	2*

OWN LOSSES AND RESCUE OPERATIONS
(Continued)

DATE	: TIME OF : LAUNCHING:	TYPE	: BUREAU : NUMBER :	CIRCUMSTANCES, PLACE AND CAUSE OF LOSS	: PILOTS :		: AIRCREW :	
					LOST	SAVED	LOST	SAVED
3-5-45	0934	TBM-3	23442	Forced landing Iwo Jima as result damage sustained from enemy fire at 1000 ft. during support mission. Plane damaged beyond repair. Usable parts salvaged by CASU.				

* - 1 Aircrewman seriously wounded, but making good recovery. Left at Iwo.

SUMMARY

Jettisoned	3
Lost operationally away from ship	1
Landed aboard SARATOGA, not yet returned	1
Enemy action	<u>3</u>

Total planes lost . . . 8

Non-flyable duds aboard(1 VF,1VT) . . 2

GRAND TOTAL PLANE CASUALTIES . . 10

Pilots lost 0

Aircrewmen lost 0

Aircrewmen wounded 1

PERSONNEL CASUALTIES . . . 1

TABLE OF BOMBS, ROCKETS, TORPEDOES, AND MINES DROPPED AT THE TARGET BY STRIKE

STRIKE NO.	DATE	TIME OF LAUNCH	TARGET	ATTACKED		SORTIES AT		BOMBS, ROCKETS		FUZING	
				GENERAL	SPECIFIC	VF	VT	NUMBER	TYPE	NOZE	TAIL
2	2-16-45	0645	Iwo Jima			4	4	24 RM	3.5"		
								24 RB	5.0"		
7	2-16-45	1450					4	6 RM	3.5"		
								6 RB	5.0"		
8	2-16-45	1545				4	4	35 RM	3.5"		
								35 RB	5.0"		
								1 B	500#	Inst.	.01
								18 B	100#	Inst.	
2	2-17-45	0645					6	23 RM	3.5"		
								23 RB	5.0"		
6	2-17-45	0930					1	6 RM	3.5"		
								6 RB	5.0"		
								10 B	100#	Inst.	
1	2-18-45	0630				4		8 RM	3.5"		
								8 RB	5.0"		
2	2-18-45	0645				4	4	24 RM	3.5"		
								24 RB	5.0"		
3	2-18-45	0800				4	4	24 RM	3.5"		
								24 RB	5.0"		
5	2-18-45	1100				4	4	48 RM	3.5"		
								48 RB	5.0"		
								3 B	500#	Inst.	.01
								2 B	100#	Inst.	
6	2-18-45	1230				4	5	40 RM	3.5"		
								40 RB	5.0"		
								4 B	500#	Inst.	.01
								20 B	100#	Inst.	
7	2-18-45	1530				4	4	48 RM	3.5"		
								48 RB	5.0"		
								4 B	500#	Inst.	.01
								20 B	100#	Inst.	
4	2-19-45	0700					1	1 B	100#	Inst.	
8	2-19-45	1230				1		6 RM	3.5"		
								6 RB	5.0"		
2	2-20-45	0700					4	17 RM	3.5"		
								17 RB	5.0"		
4	2-20-45	0930				4		14 RM	3.5"		
								14 RB	5.0"		
								10 B	100#	Inst.	
							4	4 B	500#	Inst.	.01
6	2-20-45	1230				4		11 RM	3.5"		
								11 RB	5.0"		
							4	2 B	500#	Inst.	.01

TABLE OF BOMBS, ROCKETS, TORPEDOES, AND MINES DROPPED AT THE TARGET BY STRIKE

STRIKE NO.	DATE	TIME OF LAUNCH	TARGET ATTACHED	SORTIES AT	BOMBS, ROCKETS, TORPEDOES			FUZING	
					VF	VT	NUMBER	TYPE	NOZE
8	12-20-45	1500	Iwo:Jima	2	4	2 Napalm Bombs			
						32 RM	3.5"		
						32 RB	5.0"		
3	12-21-45	0700			1	4 RM	3.5"		
						4 RB	5.0"		
						2 B	100#	Inst.	
8	12-21-45	1230			1	6 RM	3.5"		
						6 RB	5.0"		
3	12-22-45	0700				2 RM	3.5"		
					1	2 RB	5.0"		
						10 B	100#	Inst.	
3	12-22-45	0700				26 RM	3.5"		
					4	26 RB	5.0"		
						6 B	500#	Inst.	.01
2	12-24-45	0700			4	24 RM	3.5"		
						24 RB	5.0"		
					4	24 RM	3.5"		
						24 RB	5.0"		
						20 B	100#	Inst.	
						3 B	500#	Inst.	.01
5	12-24-45	1300			3	18 RM	3.5"		
						18 RB	5.0"		
7	12-24-45	1430				8 RM	3.5"		
					1	8 RB	5.0"		
						10 B	100#	Inst.	
7	12-24-45	1430				24 RM	3.5"		
					4	24 RB	5.0"		
						19 B	100#	Inst.	
						4 B	500#	Inst.	.01
8	12-24-45	1600			6	36 RM	3.5"		
						36 RB	5.0"		
4	12-25-45	0930			4	24 RM	3.5"		
						24 RB	5.0"		
					4	24 RM	3.5"		
						24 RB	5.0"		
						20 B	100#	Inst.	
						4 B	500#	Inst.	.01
5	12-25-45	1100			4	20 RM	3.5"		
						20 RB	5.0"		
					4	24 RM	3.5"		
						24 RB	5.0"		
						20 B	100#	Inst.	
						4 B	500#	Inst.	.01

TABLE OF BOMBS, ROCKETS, TORPEDOES, AND MINES DROPPED AT THE TARGET BY STRIKE

STRIKE NO.	DATE	TIME OF LAUNCH	TARGET	ATTACKED	SORTIES AT		BOMBS, ROCKETS		FUZING	
					VF	VT	NUMBER	TYPE	NOZE	TAIL
7	2-25-45	1400	Iwo:Jima		3		18 RM	3.5"		
							18 RB	5.0"		
						4	32 RM	3.5"		
							32 RB	5.0"		
							9 B	100#	Inst.	
							6 B	500#	Inst.	.01
4	2-26-45	0930			4		24 RM	3.5"		
							24 RB	5.0"		
						4	22 RM	3.5"		
							22 RB	5.0"		
							10 B	100	Inst.	
5	2-26-45	1100			4		24 RM	3.5"		
							24 RB	5.0"		
3	2-27-45	0700				1	6 RM	3.5"		
							6 RB	5.0"		
8	2-27-45	1230			1		6 RM	3.5"		
							6 RB	5.0"		
3	2-28-45	0700			1		6 RM	3.5"		
							6 RB	5.0"		
8	2-28-45	1230				1	8 RM	3.5"		
							8 RB	5.0"		
							9 B	100#	Inst.	
3	3-1-45	0700			1		6 RM	3.5"		
							6 RB	5.0"		
8	3-1-45	1230				1	8 RM	3.5"		
							8 RB	5.0"		
							10 B	100#	Inst.	
3	3-2-45	0700			1		6 RM	3.5"		
							6 RB	5.0"		
8	3-2-45	1230				1	4 RM	3.5"		
							4 RB	5.0"		
							10 B	100#	Inst.	
2	3-3-45	0700			4		23 RM	3.5"		
							23 RB	5.0"		
						4	8 RM	3.5"		
							8 RB	5.0"		
							20 B	100#	Inst.	
							8 B	500#	Inst.	.01

TABLE OF BOMBS, ROCKETS, TORPEDOES, AND MINES DROPPED AT THE TARGET BY STRIKE

STRIKE NO.	DATE	TIME OF LAUNCH	TARGET GENERAL	TARGET SPECIFIC	SORTIES AT		BOMBS, ROCKETS, TORPEDOES			FUZING	
					VF	VT	NUMBER	TYPE	NOZE	TAIL	
4	3-3-45	0930	Iwo	Jima	4		22	RM	3.5"		
							22	RB	5.0"		
						4	16	RM	3.5"		
							16	RB	5.0"		
							20	B	100#	Inst.	
							8	B	500#	Inst.	.01
2	3-5-45	0700			4		21	RM	3.5"		
							21	RB	5.0"		
						4	16	RM	3.5"		
							16	RB	5.0"		
							17	B	100	Inst.	
							8	B	500	Inst.	.01
4	3-5-45	0930			4		24	RM	3.5"		
							24	RB	5.0"		
						4	16	RM	3.5"		
							16	RB	5.0"		
							20	B	100#	Inst.	
							8	B	500#	Inst.	.01
6	3-5-45	1230			4		24	RM	3.5"		
							24	RB	5.0"		
						4	8	RM	3.5"		
							8	RB	5.0"		
							20	B	100#	Inst.	
							6	B	500#	Inst.	.01
8	3-5-45	1530			4		22	RM	3.5"		
							22	RB	5.0"		
						2	8	B	500#	Inst.	.01
2	3-6-45	0930			4		22	RM	3.5"		
							22	RB	5.0"		
5	3-6-45	1400			4		24	RM	3.5"		
							24	RB	5.0"		
6	3-6-45	1530			4		23	RM	3.5"		
							23	RB	5.0"		
3	3-7-45	0930			3		3 Napalm bombs				
5	3-7-45	1400			4		4 Napalm bombs				
3	3-8-45	0830			3		15	RM	3.5"		
							15	RB	5.0"		
					1		1 Napalm bomb				
						2	16	RM	3.5"		
							16	RB	5.0"		
							20	B	100#	Inst.	

TABLE OF BOMBS, ROCKETS, TORPEDOES, AND MINES DROPPED AT THE TARGET BY STRIKE

STRIKE NO.	DATE	TIME OF LAUNCH	TARGET ATTACKED		SORTIES AT TARGET		BOMBS, ROCKETS		FUZING	
			GENERAL	SPECIFIC	VF	VT	NUMBER	TYPE	NOZE	TAIL
4	3-8-45	0930	Iwo	Jima	1		6 RM	3.5"		
							6 RB	5.0"		
5	3-8-45	1100			3		17 RM	3.5"		
							17 RB	5.0"		
					1		1 Napalm bomb			
						2	16 RM	3.5"		
							16 RB	5.0"		
							19 B	100#	Inst.	
7	3-8-45	1400			4		22 RM	3.5"		
							22 RB	5.0"		
						2	15 RM	3.5"		
							15 RB	5.0"		
							18 B	100#	Inst.	
8	3-8-45	1530			1		8 RM	3.5"		
							8 RB	5.0"		

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE-93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Serial: 002.

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

PART III

ORDNANCE PERFORMANCE

Performance of Own Ordnance Material and Equipment

(a) All ordnance equipment on board with the exception of napalm bombs performed very satisfactorily. Aircraft material and ship's batteries operated with very few and small casualties.

(b) Nineteen napalm bombs were made up and flown off the ship, but twelve of these were jettisoned by reason of unfavorable weather conditions or malfunctioning release gear over the target, necessitating on several occasions violent maneuvering on the part of the pilot to jettison his load prior to returning aboard. Only seven were expended against enemy personnel or positions and of these, no more than four were seen to ignite. The bombs themselves were carefully prepared in accordance with regulations and drops were made from altitudes of fifty to four hundred feet. Nevertheless, a minimum of accuracy was achieved and the failure of the bombs to take fire was evidently caused by faulty igniter mechanisms. It is apparent that the efficiency of this weapon under conditions prevailing at Iwo Jima is very low, and should be improved prior to further large scale use. More efficient igniters, releasing gear and casings are urgently needed. Marine Officers at Iwo were of the opinion that under present conditions best results could be obtained by a low release (approximately 300 feet).

(c) It is suggested that the feasibility of holding fire of automatic weapons during darkness be kept in mind. These weapons disclose the position of ships at a time when a fast moving attack plane probably would have difficulty in spotting the target ship. The decision to hold fire would be made by the OTC at some time after dark, approximately 45 minutes, at which time it became apparent that the advantages of a dark ship would over-balance the doubtful value of use of non-radar-controlled weapons.

(d) A schedule of bomb, rocket, and ammunition expended daily is attached hereto.

Performance of Enemy Ordnance Material and Equipment

(a) The ship did not come under enemy fire.

(b) Enemy AA fire over the target may be described as Light and Medium; Moderate; Varying accuracy.

BOMB, ROCKET AND AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE SCHEDULE

'Date	'100# GP'350# Bomb		Depth'500# GP'Rocket		'Cal. .50'Cal. .50'Cal. .30'		Napalm Bombs						
	'AN-M-30'		'AN-M-64'	'Bodies'	'Ammuni- 'MK-1 '5" HE 'VF & VT	'Ammuni- 'tion 'Test 'VF & VT		'Ammuni- 'tion 'VT					
	E	J	E	J	E	J	E	J					
2-11-45													
2-12-45							136	75					
2-13-45							205	22					
2-14-45							70	50					
2-15-45							280						
2-16-45	18	2			4	59	6	8787	450	525			
2-17-45	10					39		4050	1197	295			
2-18-45	42				11	196		10013	380	45	4	4	
2-19-45	1		3				6	1475	952	55			
D-Day										3 smoke tanks jettisoned			
2-20-45	10			3	6	90		4948	550	35		4	
2-21-45	2					10		2040	751	155	40		
2-22-45	10				6	28		1322	965	225	55		
2-23-45									405				
2-24-45	49				8	134		12470	1777	315	125		
2-25-45	49				14	142		8275	727	110	85		
2-26-45	10					70		7475	592		35		
2-27-45						12		10630	862		150		
2-28-45	9					14		9745	502		150		
3-1-45	10					14		11920	1412		150		
3-2-45	10			3		10		3652	1055	100	50		
3-3-45	40				16	69		4575	902	1420	180		
3-4-45									853	160	50		
3-5-45	57				30	132		8014	550	500	65		
3-6-45				3		69		9750	620		400		
3-7-45								1990	870		375	3	4
3-8-45	54	3				115		5555	220		425	2	
Total E	381		3		95	1209		126,676		2985		7	
Total J		5		9			6						12
Total													
Test									17,284		3457		
Grand Total	386		12		95	1215		143,960		6442		19	

Notes:

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. E - Expended on Enemy | 5. Practice firing 10 February 1945
2923 40MM HET
2332 20MM
29 5" 38 Cartridges |
| 2. J - Jettisoned | |
| 3. 3 Smoke Bombs jettisoned | |
| 4. 6 3 1/2" Solid head rockets jettisoned | |
| 6. Practive Firing 11 March 1945 not included. | 7. Night Action 21 February 1945
180 40MM HET
120 20MM
1 5" 38 Sp. Proj.
1 5" 38 Cartridge |

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE-93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

IV.

DAMAGE

1.

Battle Damage to Own Units

- (a) To ship - None.
- (b) To planes - Moderate - 3 TBM lost as direct result enemy AA. (See ACA-1 Reports Nos. 33 and 81). Additional planes sustained minor damage from AA.

2.

Battle Damage to Enemy Units

- (a) By the ship - None.
- (b) By VC-84 planes -
- (1) Two Sugar Charlies, loaded with military personnel, were strafed and rocketed by VF, left dead in the water and burning fiercely - probably sunk - at 0815 16 February 1945. Position 20 miles distant, bearing 330°(T) from Mt. Suribachi. (See ACA-1 Report No. 22).
- (2) Damage to a medium sized oiler and 8 to 10 small craft was probably inflicted by VF at Haha Jima on 17 February 1945. Possible damage was also inflicted during the same mission on several grounded enemy aircraft at Susaki Airfield, Chichi Jima. (See ACA-1 Report No. 24).
- (3) It is believed that considerable loss and damage were inflicted upon Japanese military personnel, installations, and equipment at Iwo Jima during the course of extended support operations from 16 February - 8 March 1945. The above statement is based to a large extent upon comments and commendations frequently expressed by trained observers, ground forces and CSA in respect to the results of specific strikes. In several instances a particular target, such as a pillbox or gun position, was known to have been definitely destroyed. For the most part, however, circumstances rendered it almost impossible to make a close or accurate assessment of damage done, and no attempt will be made in

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE-93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

DAMAGE
(Continued)

Battle Damage to Enemy Units
(Continued)

this report to present such a detailed picture.

General areas and skillfully concealed, practically invisible strong points were attacked with bombs, rockets, strafing and napalm. Pillboxes, mortars, AA, artillery, and rocket launching positions, blockhouses, caves, trenches, tanks and personnel - all these were among the targets assigned to the squadron, and excellent results were obtained against them in strikes which again and again earned "Well done" from the Marine personnel handling the vicious fighting on the ground. There can be no doubt that the destruction of many enemy installations, as well as personnel, is definitely attributable to VC-84 support aircraft.

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE-93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

PART V

COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1.

Air Operations

(A) General.

The operations during the occupation of Iwo Jima were much more smoothly and efficiently executed than in the Lingayen Gulf campaign. The primary factors militating against 4.0 efficiency, as discussed in this ship's Lingayen action report (001 of 1945) were still noticeable, namely, shortage of personnel in the Engineering and Ordnance Divisions of the Air Department.

It is felt that the long lay-off of 18 days between operations, while necessary for rest and replenishment of ship and aircraft supplies, was a detriment to the pilots inasmuch as no facilities were available for flying and carrier landing practice. Every effort should be made to have facilities to allow a few planes at a field during this interim period. The interim period at Ulithi, with the pilots and planes aboard ship, contributed to a definite drop in performance for the first week of operation, which resulted in much minor damage to the planes and created an excessive load of engineering work in the early stages of the Iwo Jima action.

It is recommended, therefore, that, if it is found impossible to base a few planes ashore, the scheduling of a day or two of operations at sea for refresher landings, just before going out for the actual operation, would eliminate much of this trouble and still permit two or three days to get the planes back into top condition.

While MAKIN ISLAND has as criteria for the type flying required of the CVE's only the experiences of Lingayen and Iwo Jima, it appears obvious that an increase in fighter pilots must be added to the present complement of the squadron.

To operate safely on the schedules required over the extended periods of time that we have had in the last two operations it is estimated that at least eight (8) additional VF pilots are required to safely maintain pilot efficiency. Again let it be emphasized that merely flying aboard re-

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE-93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(Continued)

Air Operations
(Continued)

placement aircraft does not solve the problem of pilot and ship personnel fatigue. It is believed that by increasing both pilots and maintenance personnel less replacement aircraft would be required. When continuous operations for more than a two weeks period are anticipated, sufficient pilots should be available to allow one division of pilots the whole day off about every fourth or fifth day. On this day off the pilots would not have to report to the Ready Room at all, but could eat, sleep and rest as they so desired. If such a schedule could be set up, operations, from a pilot's standpoint, could be practically continuous.

The present schedules under which this ship has been operating do not indicate a proper division of torpedo planes and fighters. With the present division of 18 fighters and 12 torpedo planes the average flying time per plane was in the proportion of 4 VF hours to 3 VT hours. It is believed that the schedules could be more completely and satisfactorily met if this complement was 20 fighters and 9 torpedo planes.

It is realized that the operating conditions often necessitate awkward schedules. It is suggested, however, that schedules should be arranged so as to avoid the necessity for recovering planes on one item and launching them 30 minutes later. Even though enough planes are available to have the planes completely serviced and armed for the launching flight, the delay of getting planes aboard makes it very improbable that the schedule can be maintained, and it is impractical to call consistently for items with such short periods of time between landings and take-offs. Such a short interval as one-half hour could hardly be maintained under even the most ideal conditions, and after a few days of operations, together with the combination of unfavorable weather and the rough-riding characteristics of CVE's, the conditions are far from ideal.

Pilots indicated their preference for a schedule so arranged that on any given day one ship has all the housekeeping duties, such as ASP and CAP, and rotate this day's duty between the carriers. This set-up would

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE-93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(Continued)

Air Operations
(Continued)

mean that for one day in four or five they could count on having this monotonous work, rather than be bothered with it during days when they have strike missions. The arrangement would also be to the advantage of the ship's personnel in that different types of bombs and depth charges would not have to be broken out on the same day.

(B) Comments of Landing Signal Officer.

There is one point on wind which it is believed would ease a load on the Landing Signal Officer and the pilot; that is, to have thirty knots of wind across the deck whenever possible. During this operation our average wind across the deck was twenty-five knots, the formation reducing speed as the wind increased, at time enough to have poor steerage-way and an erratic, yawing deck when a plane was in the groove. It is recommended that a minimum of thirty knots across the deck for landing operations whenever there is enough wind available and no unnecessary strain is placed on the engines. Planes can be landed faster, smoother and more safely, with less strain.

A word on color for Landing Signal Officers and resultant benefits to pilots: Of the standard fluorescent satin clothes that are now available, arc yellow was preferred by all pilots for paddles, and stated the easiest to see. For late afternoon, dusk and dark days, a "zoot-suit" was used. This was made from a pair of ordinary flight deck coveralls, faced on the legs, chest and arms with eight inch wide strips of arc yellow satin. The suit met with high approval of all pilots and enabled them to pick up the L.S.O. at maximum distances.

Planes were landed regularly (in fact, it became standard practice) while refueling from a tanker, or with DD's on the starboard side. These ships did not disturb either pilot or L.S.O. as long as they were alongside and not straggling behind in the groove.

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE-93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(Continued)

Air Operations

(Continued)

There were six night landings; one FM-2, and five F6F's from the SARATOGA. Of the F6F's, two were safe landings, two were minor barriers, and the last one a culmination of errors by L.S.O., pilot, and C.I.C. The final pilot landed with his hook up, dove for the deck, bounced into the air and landed on his back in the barriers. Incidental to this, Landing Signal Officers should know the approach-light, tail-hook combination, if there is one, of all carrier planes. In the last case the plane had no approach light burning, although the Signal Officer called the pilot by VHF and told him the light was out. This made no connection with the tail-hook in the pilot's mind, nor did it in the L.S.O.'s mind for that matter. C.I.C. had previously been instructed to call all planes and give them the tail-hook, wheels-down, flaps-down routine, but this was not positively checked in this case. There were no injuries to any personnel, however, two F6F's were damaged beyond repair and jettisoned.

The visiting pilots highly praised the night equipment. This consisted of a "zoot-suit" covered in fluorescent cloth, canary yellow and pink, alternated in two inch stripes, covering arms, legs and chest. The black light is the three bulb model by Keese Engineering Co.; a superior light.

The Landing Signal Officer cannot drill his squadron too much on the importance of correct pattern, altitude, and speed. Pilots will forget the fundamentals even though they make landings every day. If the Signal Officer relaxes and lets his pilots make a sloppy pattern, approach or landing, he is in for trouble. It is easier to keep them all in line by accepting nothing but the best, than to break bad habits formed by carelessness.

(C) DDT Spraying.

The aerial spraying of DDT by carrier-based planes was first scheduled for the late afternoon of 22 February (D+3) but, as a result of bad weather and operating reasons, was delayed until 28 February.

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE-93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(Continued)

Air Operations
(Continued)

On that date two TBM's, equipped with spray apparatus, covered approximately the southern third of Iwo Jima. Details of these flights are covered in Part II, Chronological Section, 28 February (D+9).

It was originally intended that diesel oil should be used as the vehicle for disseminating the DDT, but as the result of a temporary shortage, Navy Special Fuel Oil was used for the early missions. Because of the asphalt base in this oil, unsatisfactory results were obtained, damaging some of the spray equipment. Diesel oil was then obtained, and used, with thoroughly satisfactory results. It is therefore recommended that only Diesel Oil be used in future operations. The 3,100 gallon storage capacity for diesel oil on CVE's should be ample for the purpose, provided that the operations are not too extensive between fueling periods.

The spray equipment has, in general, been most satisfactory. Some difficulties were encountered with the solenoid switches, but were readily corrected, and have given no further trouble. It should be noted, that in installing the auxiliary fuel tanks in the bomb-bay, the air vents must be clear since the relatively high viscosity of the DDT solution makes filling of the tanks somewhat difficult.

The result of the spraying has been reported as satisfactory, and contributing to the health and comfort of the troops ashore. A memorandum from the Medical Officer in Charge of the Epidemiological Unit, dated 7 March 1945, read, in part, as follows:

"The coverage so far has been excellent; the flying wonderful. Toxic effects have been quickly manifest and persistent. The most prevalent problem is fly breeding (common house fly and green bottle type). We have found one mosquito (adult - Culex, fatigans), but fortunately or unfortunately, the spray has apparently eradicated the breeding, at least we can't find it. The proof of the pudding lies in the fact that from our divisions and corps, not one fly-borne disease, or insect borne disease has been evacuated and this is D+16, a hitherto untied record as far as we are concerned. We have found bacillary (Flexner's) dysentery among the P.O.W., so the problem could be serious.

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE-93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(Continued)

Air Operations

(Continued)

"As far as we are concerned, the Air Spray is the only answer to frontline mosquito and fly control."

It is hoped that the comments above may be helpful to carriers handling DDT solution in future operations.

(D) F6F-5(N) Landings.

On the evening of 21 February during and after the attack on this formation, (see Part II Chronological Report) five F6F-5(N) from the SARATOGA's VFN-53 were landed aboard this vessel. The SARATOGA had been struck by crash divers at approximately 1710 the same evening, and her airborne planes were instructed to come aboard the carriers in the CVE formation.

The names of the pilots with their designation, file numbers and landing times are as follows:

				<u>Time of Landing</u>
Lt. C. Denby-Wilkes, Al,	129887,	USNR		2000
Lt.(jg) C. W. Horn, Al,	325838,	USNR		2020
Ensign J. M. Hurley, Al,	351824,	USNR		2023
Ensign J. E. Wall, Al,	363777,	USNR		2049
Ensign L. T. Skreba, Al,	326354,	USNR		2115

The circumstances of the landings of the SARATOGA's planes is described in the Landing Signal Officer's comment in Part V (B). The two planes which were damaged as a result of the barrier crash on the last landing were jettisoned. Two of the remaining three F6F were returned to Saipan and the third to the ENTERPRISE.

Prior to coming aboard at 2020, Lt.(jg) Horn had shot down a "Zeke". The time of this encounter was 1735, approximate position 50 miles

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE-93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(Continued)

Air Operations
(Continued)

bearing 330° (T) from Iwo Jima, altitude 5,000 feet. Action Report on the encounter will be forwarded through usual channels by VFN-53.

2.

Radar and Fighter Direction

(A) Equipment.

The performance and operation of the radar, radio and allied equipments was excellent throughout this operation. The only breakdown of any equipment was a transformer on the BL interrogator on 14 February. No spares for such transformers are on the allowance list and none was available among the carriers of this task group. However, the ESTES did have a spare transformer which was made available and installed on 15 February, D-4 Day. A blower motor on one TDQ transmitter was replaced. Other than those two instances, the equipment required only routine maintenance.

The TBS2 radio was insulated and no longer interferes with the SK radar or BL interrogator. However, the TBS1 now interferes with the SK radar to some extent and also feeds into the VHF radios. At the beginning of the operation the TBS1 antenna was raised and then it caused considerable interference with the VHF radios, but this interference decreased to a marked degree when the antenna was put back to its original position.

The R.C.M. equipment blanks the SK PPI scope when tuned to receive on 160 mc. but does not completely blank the A scope.

During the operation we began the installation of two ARC 1 VHF radios, which have 10 channels, in place of the 4-channel ARC 5 equipments with which the ship was originally equipped. This adds greatly to the flexibility of the communications facilities in C.I.C.

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE-93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.

Serial: 002.

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(Continued)

Radar and Fighter Direction
(Continued)

A greater spread in frequencies on VHF channels was possible under the communications plan in this operation and interference between channels was almost entirely eliminated. The operating station of the TBS2 radio was removed from C.I.C. This eliminated the confusion which had previously resulted therefrom.

The lack of communications between Air Plot, which is now equipped with most of the Flag's voice radio circuits, and Flag Plot, and other stations on the Flag's M.C. circuit, makes it necessary to use the Flag's M.C. outlet in C.I.C. for communications between Air Plot and the other stations on that circuit. This still causes some confusion and distraction in C.I.C., as well as inconvenience to the Staff personnel stationed in Air Plot.

Recommendations

- (1) Since it appears from our own experience, and the experience of other similar ships, that equipment failures occur due to casualty to parts for which no spares are allowed, it is recommended that a spare parts pool be established in each escort carrier division which would contain at least one unit of each part of radar spares not on the regular spare parts allowance list.
- (2) The TBS1 radio should be insulated as the TBS2 now is to prevent interference with the SK radar. Its interference with the VHF radio channels near the second harmonic of its frequency is probably due to proximity of the antennae, but is not so intolerable as to indicate a relocation of the antennae.
- (3) It is recommended that all CVE's replace ARC5 and/or ARC4 radios with ARC1 equipments, if possible.

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE-93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.

Serial: 002.

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(Continued)

Radar and Fighter Direction

(Continued)

- (4) It is urgently recommended that an outlet for the Flag's M.C. circuit be installed in Air Plot. This would be a tremendous boon, both to the Staff and to C.I.C.

(B) Operation - (a).

During the approach and preliminary bombardment phases of the operation the MAKIN ISLAND was the Flagship of CTU 52.2.2, and as such was the fighter director ship for the task unit. On and after D-Day this duty was performed by the SAGINAW BAY, Flagship of CTU 52.2.3, who became OTC of the task unit to which the MAKIN ISLAND was attached. However, the MAKIN ISLAND remained the Flagship of CTG 52.2 and as such was charged with the duty of keeping informed of the status of all aircraft launched and recovered by the task unit with which she operated. Also she was kept in condition to assume primary fighter direction duty at any time. Consequently, no radar guards were assigned to the MAKIN ISLAND, but a continuous scan on both surface and air search radars was maintained at all times, on all ranges and bearings. The duties thus imposed made it necessary to double the watches of enlisted personnel during the daylight hours and whenever aircraft were in the air. Normally four officers, including T.G. F.D.O. were kept on watch in C.I.C. throughout the day.

Visual fighter directors were required by CTU 52.2.3 to be furnished by four ships at the same time during the initial phase of his command. Later this number was reduced to two and finally to one. These were required regardless of weather or visibility when Combat Air Patrol was airborne.

Observations and Recommendations.

- (1) The employment of more than one visual fighter director officer at a time in a task unit or group, when tactically organized, is considered a waste of manpower. The efficacy of a visual fighter

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE-93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.

Serial: 002.

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(Continued)

Radar and Fighter Direction
(Continued)

director under most circumstances is extremely doubtful. His ability to see planes, especially in small numbers, is limited. By the time he could identify planes as enemy it would be too late to do anything about it unless the VF were to be kept in hot pursuit through our AA fire. However, for the one case in a thousand in which he might be of some use, the stationing of one visual fighter director in each unit might be justified. But there is no useful purpose served in keeping him on station when visibility is reduced to one mile, as was sometimes done.

- (2) The enlisted personnel of C.I.C. stood watch and watch during daytime and watch in four at night. During their off hours they were permitted to sleep in their compartment. They stayed fresh and showed no signs of fatigue in spite of the length of the operation.
- (3) The failure to intercept the bogie before the attack on the task unit on 21 February was due in large measure to the lack of any accurate altitude determination. When cloud conditions are such as those described it is very difficult to make interceptions unless the friendly planes can be placed at or near the same altitude at which the enemy is flying. Again the lack of altitude determining radar on CVE's may have contributed greatly to the loss of a ship.
- (4) The air schedules frequently called for CAP flights of four and one-half hours. It is believed this is at least on hour and one-half too long. Air schedules should be revised to prevent this as the effectiveness of VF is reduced, both from lack of sufficient fuel and pilot fatigue, to a point at which they are of little value to the fighter director.

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE-93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.

Serial: 002.

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(Continued)

Radar and Fighter Direction
(Continued)

(B) Operation - (b).

As stated in Part II, Chronological Section, under date of 21 February, two MAKIN ISLAND VF were not recovered by the ship after the action which resulted in the loss of the BISMARCK SEA. It is believed that a brief discussion of this incident, which, fortunately, resulted in no loss of life, might be timely, and of value in preventing similar occurrences.

These two planes had been among the group of eight scrambled at 1715, at which time it was believed that an attack was imminent.

At approximately 1840 (sunset 1832) all CAP had been recovered aboard their respective ships with the exception of three (3) MAKIN ISLAND VF, piloted by Lt. Robert Kent, Lt.(jg) Harold Finka, and Ensign Henry Wardenga. These planes, which had been sent on an interception about 40 miles from the ship, were returning to base after receiving instruction to prepare to land, and at this time (1840) were bearing 070° (T) ten miles from the ship.

As a result of the appearance of new bogies close to the formation, the Force Fighter Director instructed that these same three planes, as the only ones available, be vectored out to make interception.

Within a very few minutes (1845) the enemy planes commenced the attack which sank the BISMARCK SEA (1851) and damaged the LUNGA POINT.

At approximately 1850, during the actual attack, MAKIN ISLAND F.D.O., acting under instructions of the Force Fighter Director, ordered the planes to orbit beyond gunfire range until such time as it was possible to bring them in.

Sporadic fire from the ships continued after the BISMARCK SEA had been struck, and as it was still impossible to land aboard and Lt.(jg) Finka's fuel was dangerously low, it was decided to send the planes in to the

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE-93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.

Serial: 002.

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(Continued)

Radar and Fighter Direction
(Continued)

beach to permit Finka to make an emergency water landing in the vicinity of the ships off shore.

Shortly afterwards, approximately 1900, while the planes were enroute to the beach, word was received from CSA that the beach area also was under attack and that the planes should not attempt to approach. By this time, however, Finka's fuel supply was too low to return and, continuing towards Iwo, he ditched his plane successfully, at about 1920, near Suribachi and was picked up by an escort vessel.

Kent, who had accompanied Finka in to the beach, landed on the SARATOGA, at 2000, whose position at that time was between Iwo Jima and the MAKIN ISLAND.

Wardenga received the word not to go in to the beach, and, having sufficient fuel, turned back. At approximately 1920, with the screen clear of bogies, his IFF functioning perfectly and his recognition lights on, Wardenga was directed by MAKIN ISLAND F.D.O. to land. He thereupon made an attempt to enter the formation, but was fired upon by several ships and forced to withdraw. Wardenga immediately reported to MAKIN ISLAND by VHF radio that he was being fired upon and requested further instructions.

The Commanding Officer of MAKIN ISLAND then warned over TBS that one of our VF was attempting to land and requested that firing be held until the plane was recovered. Word was then passed to Wardenga to re-enter the formation. Again he was fired upon and had to withdraw. Finally, at 1941, on the third attempt, he was taken aboard.

Observations and Recommendations.

- (1) It is apparent that in such instances as this sufficient gunnery control should be exercised either in the vicinity of the forma-

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE-93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(Continued)

Radar and Fighter Direction
(Continued)

tion or at the beach(if there is one), to permit planes to land on board the parent ship or to make safe water landings near escort vessels off the beach.

No lives and only one plane were lost, but the incident might very well have turned out less fortunately.

3.

Communications

Generally speaking, communications throughout this entire operation were excellent.

Continuous increase in traffic on the TBS-2 circuit emphasizes again the need for an additional TBS transmitter and receiver unit to be used as a spare only. In order to effect even minor repairs to TBS-1 (maneuvering circuit) or TBS-2 it is necessary to completely secure the circuit. Heretofore, the repairs have been minor and occasioned only a short period of time off the air, however, if they had become necessary during an emergency, such as an air raid, it might have been very serious. It is highly recommended a spare TBS be added to the allowance list for CVE's.

Circuit discipline has been rigidly enforced and volume of administrative traffic held to a minimum. The Task Force Common circuit has been utilized to effect delivery of traffic within the task force, greatly speeding up the dissemination of important information.

4.

Weather Summary
15 Feb.-8 March

The weather encountered during the Iwo Jima operations was typical tropical winter weather near the eastern coast of a continent. No unusual

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE-93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(Continued)

Weather Summary

(Continued)

weather phenomena were observed. The weather was characterized by rapid changes in wind direction, cloud cover, and precipitation, as low and high pressure systems moved through the area. Cold, warm, and occluded frontal types were experienced. Flying conditions for the entire operation were average, although flying for individual days ranged from bad to excellent.

The weather summary as given in the Operations Plan proved to be accurate and complete and was borne out by the actual weather recorded during the period.

At no time during the operations were flights cancelled for an entire day; however, during the early days of the operation, strikes at Haha Jima, Chichi Jima and the target area were hampered by low ceilings and poor visibility. The worst weather encountered was over the area three days prior to and three days immediately after Dog Day. Dog Day, however, was excellent in the afternoon, good during the morning, with desirable surf conditions, few scattered clouds and light winds. The period from 23 February to 8 March was generally good with little interference to flying except on 4 and 7 March, on which days cold fronts moved across the area giving average to bad flying conditions.

Surface wind: Moderate winds were recorded for the most part, with but one day with average winds above 20 knots (2 March) - average wind 25 knots for the day. Maximum gusts were 35 knots. Average wind for the entire period was 14 knots. Northeast winds were observed most frequently (one-third of observations) but winds from every quadrant were recorded.

Winds aloft: Winds aloft generally followed the rapidly shifting surface winds, in the lower levels (up to 5000 feet). Prevailing winds above 5000 feet were westerly. No extraordinarily high winds were recorded below 10,000 feet.

Weather: During the 22 days of operation, there were 4 clear days, 7 partly cloudy days, and 11 cloudy days. Precipitation was recorded

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE-93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(Continued)

Weather Summary
(Continued)

on 9 days; the types were drizzle, rain, and showers. Predominate cloud forms were strato-cumulus at an average altitude of 1200 feet, and alto-stratus at 8000-10,000 feet.

Temperature: Temperatures ranged from 63 deg. F. to 74 deg. F. On 15 February, the day prior to entering the operating area, the temperature reached a maximum of 84 deg. F.

Sea and swell: Moderate sea and swell conditions were found for the most part, following in general the moderate surface winds. As a result, there was a minimum of landing accidents due to rolling and pitching decks.

Weather information was received daily from NPM, Weather Central, Pearl Harbor and NPN, Weather Central, Guam. Information received included: Surface reports, submarine reports, airplane flights including reports from B-29 flights to Japan, synoptic analyses, pilot balloon reports, area forecasts, and surf condition forecast for the Iwo Jima beaches for Dog Day. This information was correlated with local observations, ceiling balloon and pilot balloon observations, and used as a basis for daily regular and special flight forecasts.

5.

Engineering

The engineering plant functioned satisfactorily throughout the operation with no material or personnel casualties.

Engineering personnel carried out their duties in a very satisfactory manner.

CVE-93/A16-3/A9

U.S.S. MAKIN ISLAND (CVE-93)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.

Serial: 002

SECRET

Subject: Action Report - Occupation of Iwo Jima.

PART VI.

CASUALTIES AND PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE

1. Casualties

The facilities of the Medical Department were not called upon during the operation except for routine illness. The records of the one casualty sustained during the operation, Galotta, E. J., ARM3c, are being held temporarily until official word is received as to his location. (Information was received that Galotta was being moved from Iwo by ship).

2. Personnel - General Comment

The performance of personnel during this operation was entirely satisfactory, with less sign of fatigue and generally less noticeable tension than during the previous campaign. The reaction can be attributed to less frequent alerts, together with a feeling of confidence engendered by the experience of the Lingayen operation. There is a need for additional personnel on combat carriers to man the guns properly and to supply adequate personnel to the Air Department. A complement of not less than 800 men is recommended with the increase being primarily in seamen and aviation ratings.

W. B. WHALEY,
Captain, U.S.N.