Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

10 June 2006

To:

BASERDAH, YASEEN MUHAMMAD

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BASARDAH, YASIM MUHAMMED

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee was recruited by Jamat Tabligh, an extremist religious group that recruits young and often troubled men for jihad in Afghanistan.
 - 2. The detainee attended meetings sponsored by Jamat Tabligh for two months.
- 3. While on a pilgrimage to Mecca, Saudi Arabia the detainee was influenced by a sheikh who discussed that a jihad was being waged in Afghanistan, and that is was an obligation for Muslims to fight at least one jihad in their lifetimes.
- 4. Sheikh Hamud al-Uqqla was a Saudi mufti, a specialist in Islamic law authorized to issue a fatwa. Al-Uqqla issued a fatwa calling for jihad in Afghanistan. Al-Uqqla also condoned the 11 September 2001 attacks and continued to raise money for Usama bin Laden until his death in Saudi Arabia in 2001.
- 5. The detainee traveled from Yemen to Dubai, United Arab Emirates. He traveled from Dubai, United Arab Emirates to Karachi, Pakistan and then on to Afghanistan.
- 6. The detainee fought on the front lines in Taloqan, Afghanistan where he was burned on his chest. The detainee was treated for his burn and went back to the Taloqan guest house. After recovering from his injuries the detainee returned to the front lines.
 - 7. The detainee obeyed an order from Usama bin Laden that all Arab fighters should go to Tora Bora.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BASARDAH, YASIM MUHAMMED

8. The detainee attempted to enter into Pakistan but was captured by the Pakistani military on the Pakistan/Afghanistan border and taken to a prison near Parachinarin, Pakistan.

b. Training

- 1. The detainee attended the al Farouq training camp for approximately one month in April 2001. He received training in the use of numerous weapons.
- 2. The detainee attended the Institute of Islamic Studies in Kandahar, Afghanistan for approximately one month. The detainee claimed that the Institute supported the fatwa issued by a sheikh.
- 3. Arabic language and studies of the Koran were taught at the Institute. Usama bin Laden visited the Institute at least three times for general visits and to speak of the importance of education.
- 4. The detainee was identified as someone who claimed to be an al Qaida poisons and explosives expert who worked for Usama bin Laden.

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee stayed at the Nebras Arab guest house that was used by fighters headed to training at al Farouq and by Usama bin Laden.
- 2. The detainee met and listened to Usama bin Laden speak words of encouragement and enthusiasm to the fighters at the Nebras guest house.
 - 3. The detainee went to the Haj Habash safe house in Kandahar for three days.
- 4. The al Nebras guest house was for the new comers where all new recruits reported. The Hajji Habbash guest house was for the very important people.
- 5. The detainee made visits to the al Wafa office in Kabul, Afghanistan including dropping off injured fighters for treatment.
 - 6. Al Wafa is a terrorist exclusion list designee.
- 7. While in the prison near Parachinarin the detained conspired with other prisoners to lie about fighting in Afghanistan and to develop a cover story about teaching the Koran, teaching orphans, finding a wife, and helping the poor.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BASARDAH, YASIM MUHAMMED

- d. Other Relevant Data
- 1. The detainee has been imprisoned eight times in Saudi Arabia for stealing motorcycles and cars, and for illegal entry. At the end of 1995 the detainee was exiled from Saudi Arabia.
 - 2. The detainee has a history of drug use.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee states he had no prior knowledge of plans to attack the USS Cole, the 11 September 2001 attack on New York City, or any current or future plans for attacks on the United States.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

23 May 2006

TO:

AL ANSARI, FARIS MUSLIM

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ANSARI, FARIS MUSLIM

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment

The detainee fought in Afghanistan periodically since the mid-1990's. He was arrested by Turkish authorities (the date unknown) while trying to cross into Turkey on his way to fight in Chechnya. He was turned over to Saudi officials but eventually managed to get back to Afghanistan to fight.

- b. Training
- The detainee was a heavy weapons specialist who attended training at Khalden Camp in 1995.
- 2. The detainee said that his father fought against the Russians and had weapons at home. The detainee stated it was how he knew about the Kalashnikov rifle.
 - c. Other Relevant Data
- 1. The detainee carried the Kalashnikov rifle and a rocket propelled grenade launcher. The detainee fired the weapons when attacked by Afghani soldiers.
- 2. The detainee served as a helper at various guest houses in Afghanistan and operated an anti-aircraft gun in Tora Bora, Afghanistan.

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- 3. The detainee was captured with money in possession. The detainee related that he received 100 United States Dollars from his father and 500 Saudi Riyals from a neighbor traveling with him.
- 4. The detainee crossed into Pakistan through a small unidentified Pakistani village where he was detained by Pakistani soldiers.
 - 5. The detainee was captured near Cheknawar, Afghanistan.
- 6. The detainee stated that he was taken to Peshawar, Pakistan. Once in Peshawar, he was incarcerated for two additional weeks before being handed over to United States Forces.
- 7. The detainee stated that during his time in Cuba he had claimed false citizenship and had given a false name. The detainee stated he had provided false information to protect his family in Saudi Arabia.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee denied ever being in the Tora Bora mountains of Afhganistan.
- b. The detained denied having any prior knowledge of the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, and also denied any knowledge of any rumors or plans for future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
 - c. The detainee denied having received any military training or knowledge of weapons.
- d. The detainee denied being a Taliban fighter and receiving any training to become a fighter.
 - e. The detainee denied using any weapons to fight the Americans.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board, this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any matter.

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Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

2 July 2006

TO:

HUSAYN, MUHAMMED ALI

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HUSAYN, MUHAMMED ALI

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. The detainee went to Afghanistan to teach the Koran in Arabic, however, he says he did not actually teach the Koran.
- 2. Initially, the detainee stated he lost his passport at the guest house he was staying at in Kabul, Afghanistan; then the detainee admitted to giving his passport to the manager of the guest house for safe keeping.
- 3. The detainee was at the guest house on 11 September 2001 when he heard about the attacks. He was concerned about retaliation by the Americans and wanted to get out.
- 4. Prior to Ramadan 2001, the manager of the guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan arranged for the detainee to travel to Logar, Afghanistan, and then to Khost, Afghanistan. The detainee stayed at the home of an Afghan. After staying at the house for about one and a half weeks, the detainee decided to leave with a group of five Arabs and an Afghan guide.
- 5. The Afghan guide took the detainee and five other Arabs through the mountains by foot where they met another 19 fleeing men and joined their group.
- 6. The group continued to the Pakistan border where they were detained by authorities, jailed for approximately two weeks and handed over to United States authorities.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HUSAYN, MUHAMMED ALI

- 7. On 3 January 2002, the detainee was transferred from Pakistani control to United States military custody.
 - b. Connections/Assiociations
- 1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan with a person that had previously spent time in Afghanistan and offered to help the detainee with his travel.
- 2. The detainee stayed in a guest house in the Karti-Barwan area of Kabul, Afghanistan. The manager of the guest house arranged transportation for guests to a Taliban training area 35 minutes north of Kabul, Afghanistan.
 - c. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was captured with 8,530 Pakistani Rupee Notes.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee claimed he was not in Afghanistan to participate in jihad.
 - b. The detainee claimed that he did not have a weapon while in Afghanistan.
 - c. The detainee denied being associated with the Taliban while in Afghanistan.
- d. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.
- e. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
- f. In reference to the 11 September 2001 attacks, the detainee stated that he felt it was a crime and that it was wrong that so many innocent people were killed.
- g. If released, the detainee would return to Yemen and marry a cousin who has been betrothed to him and never leave again.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

31 January 2006

TO:

HATIM, SAID MUHAMMED SALIH

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HATIM, SAID MUHAMMED SALIH

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. The detainee stated he became interested in Russia's war in Chechnya because he witnessed the oppression on the television. The detainee said he was outraged about what the Russians were doing to the Chechans and he decided to travel there to fight jihad alongside his muslim brothers. The detainee was motivated by his religion and the call, so he began preparing for his trip.
- 2. The detainee admitted to being part of Said Central Station, which he described as a group of 15 Arabs positioned on the Kabul line.

b. Training

- 1. The detainee served in the Yemeni National Service/National Guard in 1994-1995. The detainee was trained at the Elem military camp as a policeman for the military. From 1995 through 1998, the detainee was unsuccessful in enrolling at a university, so he did not do much else.
- 2. The detainee received approximately one month of military training, including small arms training, at the al Farouq training camp.
- 3. Al Farouq was a known training camp. The four-phase training program included small arms training, physical training, map reading, topography and explosive devices.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HATIM, SAID MUHAMMED SALIH

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee's name and contents of his trust account were found on different files recovered from various computers seized during raids against al Qaida associated safe houses in Rawalpindi and Karachi, Pakistan.
- 2. The detainee stayed at the Taliban House in Quetta, Pakistan for approximately 1-2 days. The detainee recalled this was a special place for students, but he received no briefings about jihad and did not see any weapons at the house.
- 3. The detainee traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan and stayed at a guest house known as the Haja House for approximately one week. The detainee said he used this time to understand what it was they were asking him to do; for example, to fight jihad.
- 4. All Arabs who stayed in the Hajji Habbash guest house were mainly Yemeni Arabs traveling to and from Kandahar.
- 5. The detainee stated that the first Arab guest house he stayed at in Kabul, Afghanistan was called Carte Birwan and he stayed there for approximately 40 days.
- 6. The next Arab guest house in Kabul that the detainee stayed for one month was called Gholam Batcha.
- 7. From June or July 2001 to early November 2001, the detainee mentioned that he stayed at the Hamza Qaiti guest house in the Wazir Akbar Khan area of Kabul.
- 8. The Hamza Qaiti guesthouse is one of four known safe houses to be owned and operated by al Qaida in and around Kabul. The Hamza Qaiti guest house was primarily used by Saudi Arabians and Yemeni al Qaida members.
- 9. The detainee stated that he got money from anonymous friends. The detainee would not elaborate where the money came from, he simply stated that he would find money on his bed from time to time.

d. Intent

- 1. The detainee went to Afghanistan to obtain training at the al Farouq camp before going to Chechnya. The detainee wanted to refine his shooting skills at the camp and possibly learn to shoot a rocket-propelled grenade.
- 2. At Said Central Station, on occasion the detainee would check out a Kalashnikov rifle from the warehouse and take the 30-minute ride to the front lines. The detainee would bring food to the Taliban soldiers on the front lines fighting against the Northern Alliance. The

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HATIM, SAID MUHAMMED SALIH

detainee advised that the Kalashnikov was for his protection and he did not take part in the fighting. The detainee stressed that he only brought food to the front line Taliban fighters, never weapons, ammunition or clothing.

3. The detainee left al Farouq early because it was not what he expected. To get out early, the detainee faked a fever telling the people he was ill and needed to seek medical care. The detainee said that he wanted to leave earlier, but could not think of a good excuse. The detainee stated that the trainers were always yelling at him, the food was terrible, and he was forced to sleep on the ground. The detainee stated that he did not like anything about the training and wanted to quit on the first day.

e. Other Relevant Data

The detainee has never held a job for more than six months and has always relied upon his father and older brother for financial support.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated he did not want to partake in the war in Afghanistan because it was a civil war in which muslims were fighting other muslims. The detainee decided to put his decision to fight in Chechnya on the back burner for a while.
- b. While in Kabul, the detainee thought of getting married and finding a job. The detainee also mentioned that he does not know if he ever met people associated with al Qaida, adding that these things were never discussed in his presence.
- c. The detainee stayed at the Said Central Station approximately three weeks playing soccer, reading, and riding horses. The detainee stressed that he did not deliver food to the front lines.
- d. The detainee reports that he was not given any responsibility while he was in Kabul. When asked how he could be evaluated if he was given no responsibility, the detainee did not have an answer. In addition, the detainee had no answer why he would be paid for doing nothing.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

13 January 2006

To:

AL RADAI, RIYAD ATIQ ALI ABDU AL HAJ

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RADAI, RIYAD ATIQ ALI ABDU AL HAJ

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
 - 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
 - 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 - 1. The detainee met a man at a mosque and was recruited to go to Afghanistan.
 - 2. The detainee was told by his recruiter that the Taliban would take care of him and find him a bride.
 - 3. The detainee's recruiter assisted the detainee in obtaining the money necessary to purchase the plane tickets to Pakistan.
 - 4. The detainee traveled voluntarily from Yemen with his recruiter in route to Afghanistan.
 - 5. The detainee and his recruiter stayed in a Taliban guesthouse in Quetta, Pakistan.
 - 6. The detainee and his recruiter left a Taliban guesthouse with other unknown Arabs after the Taliban made arrangements to take the group to Qandahar, Afghanistan for approximately 10 to 14 days.
 - 7. The detainee left the Qandahar guesthouse with the unknown group of Arabs in a pickup truck and was taken to another guesthouse located in the Wazir Akbar Khan District of Kabul, Afghanistan for approximately six to seven days where he talked with others about the "front line".
 - 8. The detainee desired to go to Kabul because he wanted to find out what the Taliban was really all about.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RADAI, RIYAD ATIQ ALI ABDU AL HAJ

- 9. The detainee left the guesthouse in Kabul to go to the "front line" towards Bahgram, Afghanistan.
- 10. After seeing what was going on and seeing that the Taliban was trying to serve Islam, the detained decided to serve the Taliban in any manner except for fighting.

b. Training

- 1. After arriving at the "front line", the detainee was issued a Kalishnikov rifle and one 30 round magazine of ammunition. The detainee spent approximately one month on the "front line".
- 2. The detainee was identified as having a lot of experience because of the long time he spent at Camp Farouq and on the front line fighting the Northern Alliance.
- 3. The detainee taught others how to train people in various advanced things such as tanks and explosives.

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee's name was on a list of captured Mujahidin found on a hard drive associated with a known al Qaida operative and was seized in a raid.
- 2. The detainee used additional aliases of Al-Sharqawi, a.k.a. Al-Hajj, which are identifiable with a Pakistani facilitator. The detainee was in charge of providing passports for foreigners and had a relationship with a known Terrorist Organization.

d. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee was captured by Pakistani authorities while attempting to cross the Pakistan border on foot through the mountains.
- The detainee was identified as Riyadh Al-Taizee from Yemen, whose alias was Habib and who was one of the old senior guys in Afghanistan that was a Commander with a lot of responsibility.
- 3. The detainee was identified as a leader of 10 to 15 men and drove a Toyota pick-up truck that was used to haul supplies to the front lines.
- 4. The detainee was identified as being in Tora Bora and was in charge of delivering food supplies to the fighters and also delivered approximately \$3,000 United States Dollars to the Emir at Tora Bora.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RADAI, RIYAD ATIQ ALI ABDU AL HAJ

- 5. The detainee admitted to using the alias "Habib" while in Afghanistan and stated that all Arabs were using aliases, so he did too.
- 6. The detainee was identified as being on the Taliban front lines in Kabul Afghanistan during late 1999 and early 2000.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denied information that placed the detainee in Tora Bora delivering food and supplies and giving money to an Emir. The detainee stated that he never delivered anything to anyone. The detainee stated that he was not in Tora Bora and did not deliver supplies.
- b. The detainee stated that he never met or observed Usama Bin Laden while he was in Afghanistan.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 August 2006

TO:

ABDALLAHYIV, UMAR BIN HAMZA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDALLAHYIV, UMAR BIN HAMZA

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. In December 2001, the Pakistani police found several books and manuals in a bag that the detainee had in his possession. These books and manuals were written in Russian and were found to contain information relating to explosives, chemical and poison weapons.
- 2. When arrested by the Pakistani Police, the detainee had handwritten documents bearing the names of Mujahideen fighters and weapon serial numbers.
 - b. Training
 - 1. The detainee had in his possession, a letter of introduction written in Arabic.
- 2. The journals reveal the detainee had studied at a Madrassa for at least a year under the Taliban.
- 3. Some training topics covered in the journals include: how to travel to an unknown area and blend into the local population, poison a village water system, blow up petroleum tanks and sabotage electrical and water systems. Also, in the journals was a topic about preparing a terrorist cell using counterintelligence techniques.
- 4. The detainee states he had hand-written copy from a book dealing with military matters. The book was copied from the book given to him because the book was old. When the detainee moved to Takhar, Afghanistan the detainee burned the original books.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDALLAHYIV, UMAR BIN HAMZA

- 5. The detainee did not copy from already produced materials, such as training manuals or documents taken from the Internet. The journals were created while the detainee was a student.
 - c. Connections/Associations
 - 1. In 1995, the detainee and his family moved to Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.
 - 2. The detainee was at the Sakheer Refugee Camp in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.
- 3. Nahzat-Islami was a Tajik Islamic Fundamentalist group that fought against the Russian backed government of Tajikistan. In 1995, Nahzat-Islami heavily recruited in a Tajik refugee camp in Afghanistan called Sakheer. Members of Nahzat-Islami ran the camp and enlisted all males at the camp into Nahzat-Islami.
- 4. One of the journals contains references to meetings with a leader in the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, as well as unidentified Taliban figures.
- 5. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is a coalition of Islamic militants from Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states opposed to Uzbekistani President Islom Karimov's secular regime. Although the primary goal remains to overthrow Karimov and establish an Islamic state in Uzbekistan, IMU political and ideological leader is working to rebuild the organization and it appears to have widened the IMU's targets to include all those he perceives as fighting Islam. The IMU generally has been unable to operate in Uzbekistan and thus has been more active in Kyrgystan and Tajikistan.
- 6. The detainee acknowledged having in possession a black pocket-sized notebook and he states it contains phone numbers and a Pashtu-to-Tajik translation dictionary. Also in the detainee's possession was a list of Mujahideen and Nahzat Islami fighter names. The detainee acknowledged the items are in his handwriting.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee said he was never recruited or served as a member of the Taliban, al Qaida or any other organized group.
- b. The detainee denied having been to any terrorist training camp to include any al Qaida training camps.
- c. The detainee denied he was associated with or a member of Taliban or al Qaida. The detainee said he had nothing against America.
- d. The detainee said he had no knowledge of any individuals who are associated with any terrorist group or organization.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDALLAHYIV, UMAR BIN HAMZA

- e. The detainee said he knew of Usama bin Laden but never saw him and was not aware of Usama bin Laden's fatwa.
- f. If released the detainee does not wish to return to Tajikistan, Pakistan or Afghanistan, stating that all of these governments were not good. The detainee related he would find his mother then seek asylum in whatever country would take him.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 February 2006

TO:

AL NUKHAYLAN, NAYIF ABDALLAH IBRAHIM

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL NUKHAYLAN, NAYIF ABDALLAH

IBRAHIM

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee attended a lot of mosques in Saudi Arabia. When it was time to pray, he would stop at the nearest one. An imam named Ibnothemin told the class the detainee was attending that they should be the ones going to Afghanistan to fight for jihad. A student gave the detainee 4,000 riyals to go to Afghanistan.
- 2. The detainee left Saudi Arabia via bus to Kuwait. The detainee then flew to Syria. The detainee then flew to Iran and then took a bus to Afghanistan. The detainee paid for the trip with the funds he received from the student at the mosque.
- 3. The detainee met with a man who was in charge of the Arab guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The man told the detainee that he had to go to camp for training prior to participating in jihad. He took the detainee's passport.
 - b. Training
- 1. The detainee went to al Farouq, Afghanistan for about 15 days. The detainee received training on the Kalashnikov rifle, PK machine guns, and rocket-propelled grenade systems. The detainee said that he received training only on these weapons.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL NUKHAYLAN, NAYIF ABDALLAH IBRAHIM

- 2. The detainee knew that al Farouq, Afghanistan belonged to Usama Bin Laden, and the detainee realized upon arrival that al Farouq was a terrorist training camp with political motivations, not religious goals.
- 3. After the detainee left al Farouq, Afghanistan he proceeded to the Moroccan camp in Jalalabad as the detainee thought the Moroccans could assist him to get to Peshawar, Pakistan, and then onto Saudi Arabia. He stayed for three months at the Moroccan camp in Jalalabad. At this camp he observed individuals talking about artillery training but did not observe any weapons.
- 4. On the matter of the Moroccan training camp, the detainee first denied having any such training, then admitted to maybe training for one or two days on mortars. However, the detainee stated that he did not complete the training there either.

c. Other Relevant Data

- 1. An individual identified the detainee as being present at the City Tactics course.
- 2. The detainee stated that he was injured in the Moroccan Camp by a United States air strike. The detainee suffered injuries to his face, arms, hands, thigh, and ear, which still bother him. He was taken to an Afghanistan hospital in Jalalabad where he remained in a coma for a while.
- 3. At one point in an interview the detainee became angry and accused the interviewers of torture. He then related a dream he had which he described as a vision from the prophet Mohammed. In this vision, the Prophet appeared to him and told him that Mohammed saw all that was happening and all those responsible for keeping the detainee in Cuba are going to burn in a big fire in hell with the devil and will suffer forever. He also said that Jesus agreed with Mohammed.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detained denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
- b. The detainee was queried regarding any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Detention Facility with negative results.
- c. The detainee explained that jihad is not killing of innocent women and children and stealing. The detainee said that terrorism and jihad are two different things.
- d. When the detainee found out that the goal of al Farouq was to train persons for suicide and terrorists missions, it was not the detainee's style or his goal and it was his time to leave the

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camp. The detainee began arguing with his instructors and told them that he wanted to leave the training.

- e. The detainee said that he wanted to participate in jihad for religious purposes and to help people in need of food distribution. The detainee said this would strengthen his relationship with God. The detainee said that his goal was to help for two months and then return home.
- f. The detainee was told that another individual identified him as being present during the City Tactics course outside of Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee was asked if he received this training. The detainee said that he was not present at this training and the other detainee must be mistaking him for someone else.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 March 2006

TO:

HINTIF, FADIL HUSAYN SALIH

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HINTIF, FADIL HUSAYN SALIH

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 - 1. The detainee was asked to go to Syria in 1999 by a family member.
- 2. The detainee and his family member traveled to Sanaa, Yemen and then to Damascus, Syria.
 - 3. While the detainee was in Damascus, he met an individual and they traveled to Iran.
- 4. The detainee and the individual traveled from Damascus, Syria to Tehran, Iran and then on to Meshut, Iran.
- 5. The detainee and the same individual left Meshut and went back to Tehran, Iran. The detainee then traveled back to Sanaa, Yemen alone where he went to live with his family and work on their farm.
- 6. The detainee stayed and worked his family's land for several years before he left for Sanaa, Yemen.
 - 7. The detainee traveled from his hometown of al Jouf, Yemen to work in Sanaa, Yemen.
- 8. While in Sanaa, Yemen, the detainee met with an individual who invited him to attend religious services at a mosque.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HINTIF, FADIL HUSAYN SALIH

- 9. While at the mosque in Sanaa, Yemen, an individual questioned the detainee about going to Afghanistan to help poor Afghans. The detainee felt this would be a chance to do something good in memory of his deceased father, so he thought it was a good idea.
 - 10. The detainee informed his family of his intention to go to Afghanistan.
- 11. The detainee sold his automobile and used some of that money to fund his travels to Afghanistan.
- 12. The detainee received some money from his brother to help fund his trip to Afghanistan.
 - 13. The detainee obtained a visa to travel to Afghanistan.
- 14. The detainee traveled from Sanaa to Hadramout, Yemen. From Hadramout, the detainee traveled to Karachi, Pakistan. From Karachi the detainee went to Quetta, Pakistan.
- 15. Once the detainee was in Quetta, Pakistan he traveled to a house outside of Quetta close to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
- 16. The detainee left that house and went to the Afghanistan border. From there, the detainee traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan and eventually to Kabul, Afghanistan.
- 17. In Kabul, Afghanistan, the detainee began living with an individual who previously taught the Koran in Afghanistan.
- 18. The detainee asked the Koran instructor how he could help the Afghanis. The Koran instructor told the detainee that he could either work with the Afghani Red Crescent or he could help distribute food supplies. The detainee decided he wanted to work with the Afghani Red Crescent.
- 19. The detainee traveled from Kabul, Afghanistan to the Lowgar province of Afghanistan with the Koran instructor. The Koran instructor rented a house in Lowgar.
- 20. The detainee and the Koran instructor stayed in this house which was located in the Lowgar province of Afghanistan.
 - b. Other Relevant Data
- 1. The detainee traveled from the Lowgar province of Afghanistan to Jalalabad, Afghanistan once the Northern Alliance arrived in Kabul, Afghanistan.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HINTIF, FADIL HUSAYN SALIH

- 2. After some time in Jalalabad, an Afghani man arrived and told the detainee that he would bring him over the border to Pakistan.
- 3. The Afghani man took the detainee to the mountains and then told him to walk the rest of the way. On the way, another Afghani joined the journey.
- 4. The detainee eventually arrived at the Pakistani border and saw the Pakistani police; the detainee surrendered to them. The Pakistani police then took the detainee to a detention facility in Peshawar, Pakistan where he was later transferred to a larger facility in Kohat, Pakistan. The detainee was eventually turned over to the Americans.
- 5. The detainee's name was on a document, which was recovered from a safe house raid associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.
- 6. The detainee was captured while in possession of a Casio watch model that has been used in bombings linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist groups with improvised explosive devices.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.
- b. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
- c. The detainee denied any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility.
- d. The detainee has stated that he was aware of the Taliban prior to leaving Yemen but knew nothing of al Qaida prior to his arrival in Cuba. The detainee claimed that he did not know that the guest houses he stayed in were associated with al Qaida.
- e. The detainee went to Afghanistan to do charity work for God to honor his father who is dead. The detainee did not go there to fight the jihad.
- f. The detainee did not receive any training in Afghanistan. The detainee did not fight in Afghanistan because he was not convinced of the causes that were being fought for. The detainee felt that the groups there were fighting for power, and that was no reason to fight a jihad.
- g. The detainee claims that he is unaware of any fatwas or clerics/scholars who issued fatwas authorizing jihad in Afghanistan.

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- h. The detainee has denied any knowledge of training camps in Afghanistan. However, the detainee could not explain his association with other Arabs at the guest houses he stayed in or their purpose in Afghanistan.
- i. The detainee claims that he has never heard of the al Nebras al Ansari guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
 - j. The detainee claims that he has never heard of Tora Bora.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

13 September 2006

TO:

AL DOSARI, JUMA MOHAMMED ABDUL LATIF

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL DOSARI, JUMA MOHAMMED ABDUL LATIF

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee stated that in October 2001 he traveled to Afghanistan to inspect seven mosques in Kabul. The detainee stated that he was asked to go to Afghanistan by his local Iman in Deman, Saudi Arabia.
- 2. The detainee stated that an acquaintance provided him 3000 United States Dollars and instructed him to meet an individual in Iran. The detainee first traveled to Bahrain where he obtained a Bahrain passport and subsequently traveled to Mashad, Iran.
- 3. Once in Mashad, Iran, the detainee purchased a room at the Atlas Hotel. The next morning, the detainee met the individual referred to him by his Iman in Saudi Arabia. They both traveled by taxi into Afghanistan.
- 4. The detainee and his companion stayed in Kabul, Afghanistan for approximately three weeks before traveling to another house owned by his companion in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The detainee stayed in Jalalabad for approximately one month but could not provide additional information regarding his time there.
- 5. After leaving Jalalabad, Afghanistan, the detainee walked to the Pakistan border where he was arrested and detained by the Pakistan authorities. The detainee did not have his passport in possession when he was taken into custody. The detainee stated that his companion had taken his passport while they were in Jalalabad.

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b. Training

The detainee attended the al Siddeek camp. The al Siddeek camp was located near Khowst, Afghanistan. The detainee received training on the Kalashnikov rifle and physical exercise.

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee stated that a sheik from Dammam, Saudi Arabia offered to pay his rent and provide him with 7,000 to 10,000 Saudi Riyals if he would agree to journey to Bosnia to fight. The detainee traveled to Bosnia in 1995.
- 2. An al Qaida operative stated that the sheik may have supported the Wafa Al-Igatha Al-Islamia, aka Wafa Organization, during the Chechnyan conflict. The al Qaida operative also stated that the sheik was a supporter of the Mujahedin.
- 3. The detainee traveled to Mecca, Saudi Arabia to meet an individual who was a direct descendant of the prophet Mohammed.
- 4. The detainee was invited to Chechnya to fight by this individual, but the detainee stated that he had no money for the trip. The individual gave him 3,000 to 4,000 Saudi Riyals in addition to travel expenses.
- 5. The detainee stayed at an Arab safe house that was a staging area for Arabs traveling to Chechnya to fight.
- 6. The detainee traveled to Bahrain and went to the United States Embassy and received a five-year tourism visa. The detainee's father gave him 19,000 Saudi Riyals for his trip to the United States and he flew from Bahrain to Istanbul, Turkey and then to the United States. The detainee was picked up at the airport and taken to an Islamic Center.
- 7. The detainee went to another Islamic Center and was there for approximately two months before returning to Saudi Arabia to visit his sick father. After eight months in Saudi Arabia, the detainee returned to the United States and made other trips in the United States.
- 8. The detainee said that he traveled to the eastern United States after speaking with an acquaintance and was introduced to a Muslim community and gave a lecture on the importance of keeping the tradition of prayer.
- 9. The detainee says he gave a speech during a Friday service in 2001 at a mosque that upset the elder religious leaders.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL DOSARI, JUMA MOHAMMED ABDUL LATIF

- 10. The detainee stated that he was shocked to learn that his acquaintance was involved with al Qaida and jihadist activity. The detainee also said that it seemed illogical that his acquaintance and Jamaat Tabligh could be so involved because violence nor the use of weapons were ever advocated.
 - 11. The detainee was identified as being a cook in Tora Bora, Afghanistan.
- 12. According to a source, the detainee spent time in Saudi prisons. The detainee was imprisoned for being a member of Al Motoaien, also known as al Mujahedin, and for participating in the USS Cole bombing.
- 13. Al Motoaien is a network in Saudi Arabia involved in document forgery, weapons and poisons smuggling.
- 14. The detainee decided to return to Saudi Arabia. The detainee flew to Bahrain and was arrested by Saudi Intelligence officials under suspicion stemming from the Khobar Towers bombing and his foreign travel. The Saudi government held him for approximately three months, but his passport was revoked for one-and-a-half-years.
- 15. The detainee stated that he spent time in prison in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The detainee was eventually released and returned to Dammam, Saudi Arabia but his passport was revoked for five years.
- 16. The detainee's name was found on a computer media listing of Mujahedin, which was seized during raids against al Qaida associated safe houses. The list identifies each individual's trust account and the contents of the detainee's trust are listed as a passport and identification card.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee denied ever participating in any armed conflict while in Afghanistan.
- b. The detainee says that he is not a radical fundamentalist Muslim and claimed he has never taken part in or encouraged anti-American activities.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

1 August 2006

TO:

AL WAFI, ABDULLAH ABD AL MUIN

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL WAFI, ABDULLAH ABD AL MUIN

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. The detainee believes that he left Saudi Arabia for Afghanistan about three weeks after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC.
- 2. The detainee flew from Mecca, Saudi Arabia to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, then on to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. From Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, the detainee drove a rented car to Bahrain and then he took a plane to Iran. Once at the Iranian/Afghanistan border, the detainee had a driver take him to Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee crossed the border into Afghanistan with just his Saudi passport and no other documentation.
- 3. The detainee used this route through Iran because it was the easiest way to slip undetected into Afghanistan.
- 4. The detainee stated that once he crossed into Afghanistan from Iran he showed his passport to border guards. The detainee told them he had come to Afghanistan to assist in humanitarian efforts. The border guards informed him about a group called al Wafa and advised him to join the group if he wished to help the poor.

b. Training

1. The detainee was identified as an experienced fighter who allegedly fought against the Russians in Afghanistan and Bosnia. A source claimed that the detainee attended the Khalden Training Camp, where he received training in small arms and rocket-propelled grenades.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL WAFI, ABDULLAH ABD AL MUIN

2. The Khalden Training Camp was co-managed by two senior al Qaida operatives. The training program at the Khalden Training Camp was six months long and included instruction in light weapons, heavy weapons, explosives, topography and tactics.

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee stated that after two weeks in Kabul, Afghanistan, he was told by the Afghanis that they had to leave because there was a problem with the Arabs. The al Wafa organization provided the detainee with directions on how to leave Afghanistan.
- 2. The detainee states that he hired a taxi along with three other detainees and drove to the Khowst area of eastern Afghanistan. In Khowst, the detainee and his group met an Afghani man who allowed them to stay in his house for about a month. The detainee and his group left the Khowst area traveling to the Pakistan border by way of Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
- 3. A source stated that the detainee was well known by clerics and Imams in Saudi Arabia as a recruiter and fundraiser for jihad. The source further stated that the detainee told him he had lied to interrogators at the Kandahar, Afghanistan prison, claiming to work for the relief organization al Wafa rather than admitting to fighting in the jihad.
 - 4. A source stated that the detainee was ranked high in al Wafa.
- 5. A source stated that the detainee, along with others from Mecca, Saudi Arabia that were called the Mecca Group, ate with Usama bin Laden while at Tora Bora, Afghanistan. The source described the meeting as a leader boosting the morale of the troops and not a personal meeting.
- 6. According to another individual, he and the detainee, along with approximately nine other individuals, traveled from Jalalabad, Afghanistan to Tora Bora, Afghanistan.
- 7. The detainee's name, alias, country of origin, and phone numbers were on a list of names of captured Mujahedin found on a hard drive associated with a known al Qaida operative, seized on 1 March 2003 in Pakistan.
- 8. The detainee's name, alias, and country of origin were also part of a list of names found on a computer recovered by Allied personnel in a suspected al Qaida safe house in Pakistan. The data appears to have been recorded some time between 31 March 2001 and 22 January 2002.
- 9. The detainee's name, alias, country of origin, and family phone number were part of a list of names for Mujahedin fighters captured in Pakistan.
 - 10. A source stated that the detainee was in Bosnia with a known al Qaida operative.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL WAFI, ABDULLAH ABD AL MUIN

- 11. An individual stated that the detainee told him that several of the 11 September 2001 terrorists stayed at his house during Haj, possibly in 1999. The detainee claimed he did not know of their plans while they were at his house but was proud they stayed with him. The detainee felt they were martyrs in heaven.
- 12. The detainee and a group of nine men decided to flee Tora Bora, Afghanistan in late November 2001 to Pakistan, where they were captured and imprisoned.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detained denied having served in any military or having participated in any military training. The detained claimed that he has no prior arrests. The detained claimed that he decided to travel to Afghanistan to help his Muslim brothers by providing food to the poor.
- b. The detainee did not go to fight a jihad or to provide assistance to the Taliban or al Qaida groups. The detainee claimed that he had no idea a war was being fought in Afghanistan. The detainee insists that he was not recruited nor was he advised to go to Afghanistan. The detainee paid all of his expenses and made all his own arrangements. The detainee planned on staying in Afghanistan for only thirty days.
- c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
- d. The detainee was unaware of any plans for internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Detention Facility.
- e. The detainee said he had not heard of al Wafa prior to arriving in Afghanistan nor did he know the group was affiliated with any terrorist organization, the Taliban or al Qaida.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

30 April 2006

TO:

SULTAN, ASHRAF SALIM ABD AL SALAM

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

SULTAN, ASHRAF SALIM ABD AL SALAM

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. In 1994 the detainee left Libya because he felt he might be arrested based on his actions as an activist. His father gave him 500 United States Dollars for the trip.
- 2. The detainee traveled from Darna, Libya to Cairo, Egypt and stopped at Yenbul (port of call), Egypt. He traveled from Yenbul to Jordan. From Jordan, he traveled to the Saudi Arabian border. He crossed the border to Halet Ammar, Saudi Arabia. From Halet Ammar, the detainee traveled to El Medina, Saudi Arabia.
- 3. In El Medina, the detainee stayed at a mosque during Ramadan. During his stay at the mosque, young men provided monetary donations of approximately 7,000 Riyals to the detainee. The detainee stayed in El Medina for approximately three weeks.
- 4. The detainee eventually traveled from Damascus, Syria to Khartoum, Sudan. Once in Khartoum, he contacted a Libyan national who also lived in Egypt before living in Sudan. The detainee stayed in Khartoum with his Libyan friend for four months. The detainee became frustrated due to his inability to find employment. The detainee then decided to return to Saudi Arabia.
- 5. Eventually, the detainee received a false Yemeni passport (with an alias), visa, and airlines tickets to Pakistan. He traveled from Sudan to Doha, Qatar; Karachi, Pakistan; and then to Peshawar, Pakistan. The detainee went to Islamabad, Pakistan to apply for United Nations

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political asylum but had no valid identification. The Pakistanis began pressuring Arabs to leave their country so the detainee decided to move to Jalalabad, Afghanistan to stay with an Algerian.

6. The detainee eventually found employment as a teacher at a school in Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee then moved his family to the Tayman suburb of Kabul. The detainee taught Arabic, history, and geography.

b. Training

The detainee stated he received training while in high school on the Kalashnikov, a Belgium handgun, and hand grenades, which was mandated by the Libyan government.

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. In June 1995 the detainee traveled from Khartoum, Sudan to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; then Medina, Saudi Arabia; and then Mecca, Saudi Arabia to the Grand Mosque. The detainee stayed there approximately four to five weeks before returning to Jeddah. The detainee was stopped enroute by Saudi authorities to check his passport and documentation. The detainee's visa had expired and the detainee was arrested. The detainee requested to be sent back to Syria rather than Libya due to fearing for his life and the well-being of his family. He was sent back to Syria in July or August 1995 and remained in Syria until June or August 1996. The detainee then went from Damascus to Khartoum, once again moving in with his friend for one year.
- 2. The detainee identified a friend from the detainee's village of Darna, Libya. The friend was a well-known character from Darna due to his public displays of drunkenness and lack of respect for authorities. The detainee's friend escaped from jail in Libya after being sentenced for the sale of narcotics and public lewdness in 1992.

d. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee initially went to the United Nations in Pakistan for help, but the detainee was arrested because he was wanted by the police in Libya for purportedly fitting a specific religious profile.
- 2. After the United States bombing began in Kabul in 2001, the detainee sent his wife, child, and wife's family to Pakistan. The detainee went to Jalalabad, Afghanistan where he once again stayed with a friend. The detainee hired an Afghan guide to take him to Pakistan. Upon arrival to Pakistan, the detainee and an associate were arrested and taken to a temporary prison before being turned over to the American Forces. Upon being turned over to the Americans, the detainee originally identified himself as a Moroccan to avoid being turned over to Libya.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SULTAN, ASHRAF SALIM ABD AL SALAM

- 3. On 18 December 2001 the Pakistani police arrested the detainee. Neither the detainee nor the men he was with had weapons. The detainee and the men he was with were subsequently turned over to United States Forces.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detained denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
- b. The detainee was queried regarding any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo facility, with negative results. The detainee was also queried about travel to the United States by himself, family members, or acquaintances, with negative results.
- c. The detainee wanted to apply for political asylum so he traveled to the United Nations located in Islamabad, Pakistan in late 1999 or early 2000 and filled out the appropriate paperwork.
- d. During this time, the President of Pakistan ordered all Libyans out of the country. The detainee supported this statement by stating four Libyans were arrested as they were applying for political asylum and sent them back to Libya. All four men were killed in Libya.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

18 April 2006

TO:

AL BADDAH, ABDUL AZIZ ABDUL RAHMAN ABDUL AZIZ

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BADDAH, ABDUL AZIZ ABDUL RAHMAN ABDUL AZIZ

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. The detainee was identified as an individual who collected 4.5 million Saudi Riyals (1,199,876 U.S. Dollars) for al Wafa in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. The money was collected under the cover of al Haramayn, and the detainee's two cousins assisted him with the money collection.
- 2. A man named al Jarbi, who claimed he worked for a relief agency, urged the detainee to travel to Afghanistan and fulfill the charity obligation of Islam.
- 3. Al Jarbi facilitated the travel to Afghanistan of the detainee and his two cousins. They left Saudi Arabia on 12 October 2001 and traveled through Damascus, Syria to Tehran, Iran. They crossed into Afghanistan from Zabul, Iran.
- 4. Once in Kabul, the detainee, his cousins, and Al Jarbi stayed at the al Wafa office. They met Abdul Aziz, the man in charge of the office. The detainee gave his passport and money to Abdul Aziz for safekeeping.
- 5. Due to the U.S. bombing of Kabul, Abdul Aziz, the detainee, and his two cousins left Kabul and traveled to Logar, Afghanistan. They all stayed in Logar at an al Wafa house for seven to eight days. They attempted to return to Kabul to retrieve their passports, but it had fallen to the Northern Alliance.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BADDAH, ABDUL AZIZ ABDUL RAHMAN ABDUL AZIZ

b. Training

- 1. Al Matrafi also provided military training for newly arrived recruits in anticipation of the American attack. The training was conducted in al Wafa's offices in Kabul, Afghanistan and consisted of familiarization with light weapons such as the Kalashnikov rifle and rocket-propelled grenades.
- 2. The detained visiting any military training camps in Afghanistan or receiving any military training. The detained denied going to Afghanistan to participate in a jihad against the Northern Alliance or the United States.

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. Al Matrafi admitted he had negotiated for a long range weapons of mass destruction-capable weapon with a Pakistani arms dealer. Fearing Kabul's fall, he planned to have the weapon sent to Kandahar. Kabul fell, and prevented him from completing the purchase.
- 2. The names of the detainee and both his cousins were found on an Arabic-language computer file listing them as Mujahedin who had come to Afghanistan in December 2001, but who had not completed their training and therefore were not ready to fight in the war.
- 3. The names of the detainee and both his cousins were found on a chart in Arabic listing the names of captured Mujahedin. The information was found on a hard drive, which was associated with Khalid Shaykh Muhammad.
- 4. The detainee's and his cousins' names were identified as part of a group of Taliban and al Qaida fighters who were captured at the border in Nangarhar Province by Pakistani forces. During the capture one of the prisoners disarmed a guard and a breakout ensued. Ten prisoners and six Pakistani guards were killed.
- 5. The detainee and his cousins were also listed in a computer file recovered from a suspected al Qaida safe house in Islamabad, Pakistan listing 78 associates incarcerated in Pakistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The Saudi government seized terrorist funds between 2001 and 2005 which included the detainee's funds.
- 2. Al Wafa and al Harmain are specially designated global terrorist entities as per Executive Order 13224.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BADDAH, ABDUL AZIZ ABDUL RAHMAN ABDUL AZIZ

- 3. The detainee stated that the multiple 100 U.S. Dollar bills he had in his possession at the time of his capture were brought with him to Afghanistan from Saudi Arabia.
 - 4. The detainee hand-carried the equivalent of 7,000 United States Dollars to Afghanistan.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee stated that prior to arriving in Afghanistan, he had not heard of al Wafa.
- b. The detainee stated that he and his two cousins worked as volunteers for al Wafa, bringing items such as milk, sugar, rice and clothes to the people living in villages near Kabul.
- c. The detainee does not believe in supporting jihad against America. America and Saudi Arabia have some problems between them but they get along well enough that there is no reason to attack America.
- d. The detainee denied being present during the firefight that resulted in the death of prisoners and a Pakistani guard.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 February 2006

To:

AL HARBI, TARIQ SALAH HUSAN

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HARBI, TARIO SALAH HUSAN

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee decided to go to Afghanistan because he heard a fatwa from a sheik calling Saudi men to go to Afghanistan to fight a jihad against the Northern Alliance.
- 2. The sheik was a Saudi Mufti who issued fatwas and encouraged people to fight jihad in Afghanistan. The sheik condoned the 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States and helped raise money for Usama bin Laden until the sheik's death in Saudi Arabia in 2001.
- 3. With his father's help, the detainee acquired a passport in Medina, Saudi Arabia. The detainee's father helped pay for the passport and a one-way airline ticket to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
- 4. The detainee traveled through Dammam, Saudi Arabia to al Sharega, United Arab Emirates where he stayed in a two to three story hotel.
- 5. The detainee flew from Abu Dhabi airport in the United Arab Emirates to Karachi, Pakistan. In Karachi, the detainee traveled for less than one hour to an unidentified hotel where he remained for less than one week.
- 6. The detainee traveled to an unidentified hotel in Quetta, Pakistan where he stayed for less than a week.

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- 7. In Quetta, Pakistan, the detainee met some members of the Taliban on the street. They led the detainee to a guesthouse in Kandahar where he was questioned for a week and was then sent to the al Farouq camp for training.
- 8. While at the resthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan, the detainee told unidentified individuals that he wanted to fight with the Taliban. The detainee states that he was told the Taliban would not accept him until he had received the proper training.
- 9. After the detainee left the al Farouq training camp he went to Kandahar and stayed with the same Arabs who initially took him to al Farouq. He stayed at the guesthouse for one to two weeks. He continued to inquire about the Taliban. When the detainee found the Taliban he inquired about becoming a member, but was rejected by the Taliban because he was too young.

b. Training

- 1. The detainee cannot recall the names of the men who drove him to the al Farouq camp. The detainee stayed at the al Farouq camp for approximately twenty days.
 - 2. Al Farouq was a training camp funded by al Qaida.
- 3. At the al Farouq training camp, he received training on the Kalashnikov rifle and pistols.
 - 4. The detainee recalled the name of the administrator of the al Farouq camp.
 - c. Connections/Associations
- 1. The detainee's name was on a list of names of captured Mujahidin found on a computer associated with a senior al Qaida member. The computer was seized on 1 March 2003 in Pakistan.
- 2. The detainee's name was found on a file recovered from a computer seized in a suspected al Qaida safehouse in Pakistan. His name was part of a list of Arabs incarcerated in Pakistan. The data was recorded sometime between 31 March 2001 and 22 January 2002.
- 3. The detainee's name was found on a document retrieved in Afghanistan in March 2002. The document listed the names of al Qaida martyrs, those missing in action, those imprisoned, and those who had escaped to Pakistan.
- 4. A translation of a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from safehouse raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan contained the detainee's name, nationality and passport.
 - d. (U) Other Relevant Data

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HARBI, TARIQ SALAH HUSAN

- 1. Pakistani police apprehended the detainee when he attempted to cross the Pakistani border. He was then transferred to United States custody.
- 2. The detainee was captured with a Casio F-91W watch. This model has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.
- 3. The detainee was a major participant in the Voluntary Total Fast (VTF), missing up to one hundred and four meals in the second half of the VTF.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee ended his training at al Farouq early because he disagreed with the training.
- b. The detained denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
 - c. The detainee claims that he trained with the Taliban militia, but never fought.
- d. The detainee claimed to have no knowledge of terrorist matters or have any association with al Qaida.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

16 March 2006

TO:

AL HATAYBI, ABDUL RAHMAN NASHI BADI

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HATAYBI, ABDUL RAHMAN

NASHI BADI

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. After failing the military entrance exam, the detainee was immediately contacted by a recruiter for al Qaida.
- 2. The detainee was recruited to train at the al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan. All expenses for the detainee's travel to Afghanistan were paid by the recruiter or by contacts provided by the recruiter. The detainee trained at the al Farouq training camp and stayed at the abu Zubair safehouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan. Both the camp and the safe house are associated with al Qaida.
- 3. The recruiter provided a travel itinerary to the detainee. The detainee traveled from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to Dubai, United Arab Emirates to Karachi, Pakistan and to Kabul, Afghanistan, and he attended the al Farouq Training Camp.

b. Training

1. The detainee provided specific information on al Farouq to include location of buildings within the camp, the name of the camp commander, names of instructors, and its curriculum.

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- 2. The detainee had light weapons training on the Kalashnikov [AK-47], Makarov pistol and M-16 rifle. The detainee was taught how to shoot from sitting, kneeling and standing positions. The detainee learned how to crawl fast and how to dig trenches.
 - Connections/Associations
 - 1. The detainee is a member of Jamat al Tabligh.
- 2. Jamat al Tabligh, a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization, is being used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists including members of al Qaida.
- 3. The detainee's name appears in a list of 76 Muslim brothers who were fighting with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance and were captured in Pakistan.
- 4. The detainee's name was found on documentation confiscated from a Mujahedin who entered Croatia from Bosnia.
- 5. The detainee's name was found on a computer hard drive recovered in a suspected al Qaida safe house. The list contained personnel incarcerated in Pakistan.
- 6. One of the detainee's known aliases was on a list of captured al Qaida members that was discovered on a computer hard drive associated with a senior al Qaida member.
- 7. The detainee's name, hometown and telephone number were found in a translation of an Arabic-language computer file listing contact points and telephone numbers for al Qaida Mujahedin in Pakistan.
- 8. The detainee's name and hometown appears in a list of Arab Afghans jailed in Pakistan that had been handed over to the United States.
- 9. The detainee's name was listed on a document that contained information regarding the capture of Taliban and al Qaida fighters who had crossed the Pakistan border after the 11 September 2001 retaliatory attacks by the United States.
- 10. The detainee's name was found in a handwritten letter recovered, along with materials linked to al Qaida, by allied personnel. The letter lists the names of the incarcerated Arabs, their aliases and countries of origin.
 - 11. The detainee was identified as a member of al Qaida by a foreign government service.
 - d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was arrested by Pakistani police near the Afghanistan border.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HATAYBI, ABDUL RAHMAN NASHI BADI

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated that he traveled to Pakistan for the sole purpose of providing missionary work to those individuals in need of assistance.
- b. The detainee claims a Pakistani police intern tortured him, and forced him to say he was part of al Qaida and that he had traveled to Afghanistan for the purpose of jihad. The detainee claims he lied because he wanted the torture to stop.
- c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.
- d. The detainee claims to have done missionary work in Karachi and Lahore, Pakistan. The detainee claims to have never set foot in Afghanistan.
- e. The detainee claims not to have owned a weapon and claims not to have had any type of weapons training.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

29 May 2006

To:

AL QARANI, MUHAMMAD HAMID

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QARANI, MUHAMMAD HAMID

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. The detainee wanted to leave Saudi Arabia because there were no opportunities available to him there. He heard that he could learn about computers and English in Pakistan.
- 2. The detainee paid 500 Saudi Riyals at the Chad Embassy in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, for a fraudulent passport that incorrectly stated his name and birth date. He then obtained a five to six month visa to Pakistan at the Pakistan Embassy.
- 3. The detainee flew from his home in Medina, Saudi Arabia to Karachi, Pakistan, via Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. He paid for his trip using money he saved over four to five years selling prayer mats and beads. He arrived in Pakistan with 8,000 to 10,000 Saudi Riyals.
- 4. The detainee met two men, at a hotel in Karachi, Pakistan, and also shared a room with them.
- 5. One man agreed to help the detainee register for computer and English courses, but was unable to locate any schools accepting new students. The man suggested that the three do missionary work while they waited for school vacancies, and the detainee agreed.
- 6. Approximately five months after arriving in Pakistan, the detainee lost his passport. He went to a police station to report the loss and was arrested.

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7. After approximately one month, the detainee was turned over to the Americans at Kandahar, Afghanistan.

b. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee's name was found on a list of 78 incarcerated al Qaida associates on a computer recovered from a suspected al Qaida safe house in Islamabad, Pakistan.
- 2. The detainee's name was found on a list of 68 probable al Qaida members incarcerated in Pakistan. This handwritten letter was recovered with other materials linked to al Qaida.
- 3. The detainee's name was found on a list of Mujahedin that had come to Afghanistan in December 2001 that was seized from an al Qaida safehouse in Pakistan.
- 4. The detainee's name and telephone number were listed on a chart of captured Mujahedin found on a computer connected to a known al Qaida operative.
- 5. The detainee's name was found in a handwritten phone directory taken from two individuals who admitted to being involved in alleged al Qaida sponsored suicide operations.
- 6. A veteran jihadist with multiple al Qaida associations saw the detainee in the al Ansar guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan. A member of the London al Qaida cell mentioned that the detainee was also associated with that cell.
- 7. The detainee is known to have ridden in a pickup truck from Khowst, Afghanistan to the Afghan-Pakistan border.
- 8. A senior al Qaida operative commented that the detainee had traveled to Afghanistan after 11 September 2001 and had received basic training, mainly usage of the Kalashnikov rifle.
- 9. The detainee is known to have traveled from the al Farouq training camp to Kandahar, Afghanistan and on to Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee was also seen at Tora Bora, Afghanistan.

c. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee claims that after he was arrested, he was bound, electrically shocked, placed in a dark room, blindfolded, and beaten. The police drove the detainee to several different prisons in Karachi, Pakistan for approximately one month. He was beaten at each prison.
 - 2. The detainee admitted lying about having been beaten.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QARANI, MUHAMMAD HAMID

- 3. A large discrepancy was discovered between the amount of money the detainee had when he arrived in Pakistan, his claimed earnings, and the cost of his trip. When confronted with the discrepancy, the detainee was unable to explain it, refused to acknowledge it, and became very angry.
- 4. The detainee was captured with the same Casio watch as those given to graduates of the al Farouq training camp.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee claims to have had no weapons training.
- b. The detainee believes that Usama bin Laden is not a good muslim because he killed innocent people in the attacks on America.
- c. The detainee stated that he had never heard of al Qaida until an American soldier mentioned it. He claims he has never had any type of military training and does not know how to fire any type of weapon.
- d. The detainee claims that he does not know of anyone who issued a fatwa to carry out a jihad against America or American interests, nor does he know anyone who participated in the attacks on America.
- e. The detainee indicated that he never traveled to Afghanistan and did not interact with anyone connected with al Qaida.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 March 2006

TO:

AL BAHUTH, ZIYAD SALIH MUHAMMAD

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BAHUTH, ZIYAD SALIH

MUHAMMAD

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. The detainee traveled from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to Kabul, Afghanistan with 90,000 Saudi Riyals (approximately \$24,000 United States Dollars) and claimed to do so to help the poor and needy.
- 2. The detainee took a bus from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to Damascus, Syria and then traveled by plane to Tehran, Iran, from which he took a bus to Meshad. The detainee then boarded a bus that traveled to Herat, Afghanistan and finally to Kabul, Afghanistan.

b. Training

The detainee spent one and a half months at a Taliban training center located outside Kabul, Afghanistan where he received one week of training with a Kalashnikov (AK-47) rifle.

- c. Connections/Associations
 - 1. The detainee spent his time in Kabul with a known Taliban member.
- 2. The detainee thinks the Taliban member gave the detainee weapons training in order to get him to join al Qaida.

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- 3. The detainee's name was found on a computer recovered from raids of a suspected al Qaida safe house.
- 4. One of the detainee's known aliases was on a list of captured Mujahedin members that was discovered on a computer associated with a senior al Qaida member.
- 5. The detainee's name was found on a computer seized from members of a suspected al Qaida terrorist cell involved in an attack on United States Marines on Faylaka Island in October 2002.
- 6. The detainee's name, nationality and his possession of a Saudi passport was found on a document recovered from the raid of a suspected al Qaida safe house in Karachi, Pakistan.
- 7. An al Qaida associate identified the detainee as arriving in Afghanistan in 2000 and fighting in the Omar Saif Center north of Kabul.
 - d. Other Relevant Data
- 1. The detainee was captured by the Pakistani government after crossing the border in the Nangahar province in December 2001.
- 2. The detainee stopped his voluntary fasting on 3 January 2006, after missing 30 meals since 25 December 2005. The detainee did not reply when asked why he was missing meals.
- 3. The detainee offered no information of intelligence value during a 45-minute interview held on 3 March 2006. The detainee refused to look up at his interrogators.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee said he did not join the Taliban, al Qaida or any relief organization.
- b. The detainee said he would not sacrifice anything for Usama bin Laden, al Qaida, the Taliban or any relief organization.
- c. The detainee said Usama bin Laden is wrong for the terrorist acts for which he is responsible.
- d. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the terrorist attacks on the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or Unites States interests.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BAHUTH, ZIYAD SALIH MUHAMMAD

Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

2 February 2006

TO:

AL NASIR, ABD AL AZIZ MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL NASIR, ABD AL AZIZ

MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

A family friend recruited the detainee to go to Afghanistan. The detainee, along with some relatives, started their trip to Afghanistan on 12 October 2001. The trip included a taxi to Jiddah, air travel to Damascus, air travel to Tehran, and bus travel to Zabul. After walking across the border, the group traveled to Kandahar by bus and then took a taxi to Kabul. In Kabul, the group worked for al Wafa.

b. Connections/Associations

- 1. A senior member of al Wafa explained how funds were collected in Saudi Arabia for the al Wafa organization under the cover of al Haramayn. The member explained that the detainee assisted his relatives in transferring money; approximately 4.5 million Saudi Riyals (1.2 million United States Dollars) were collected in one month, from the al Haramayn charity boxes for the al Wafa organization.
- 2. The detainee was identified as a member of the al Irata section of al Wafa. This section of al Wafa has been identified as Mujahidin fighters. The detainee was also specifically identified as a fighter at Tora Bora.
 - 3. The detainee has met a senior member of al Wafa.
 - 4. The senior member of al Wafa was a leader of the al Irata Arabs in Afghanistan.

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- 5. The publication al Quds al Arabi published a story, on 11 January 2002, about the selling of 160 prisoners by the Pakistani Intelligence Service to the United States. The story listed the names of the Mujahidin that were captured. The detainee's name was on the list. Also included on the list was a senior member who has assisted the Taliban and al Qaida.
- 6. The senior member was a leader and trainer at multiple terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. He also agreed to take over the leadership of a group of fighters at the request of Usama Bin Laden.
- 7. The detainee's name was found on a 79-page document printed from an Internet site on 20 July 2002. The Internet site contained information regarding the capture of Taliban and al Oaida members.
- 8. The detainee's name was found on a computer used by suspected al Qaida members. It contained a list of 78 associates incarcerated in Pakistan.
- 9. The detainee's name was found on a list published by a London based organization. This document indicated that the list contained the names of 76 members who were fighting with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance.
- 10. The detainee's name was found on an English language translation of an Arabic chart listing the names of captured Mujahidin. The information was found on a hard drive, which was associated with a senior al Qaida operative.
 - c. Other Relevant Data

A foreign government service indicated the detainee was on its high priority list.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee claimed that he has never made any trips for religious purposes and denied having ever been to a military training camp. The detainee claimed he has never carried a weapon.
- b. The detainee denied ever being in Tora Bora, and he did not know why anyone would think they had seen him there.
- c. The detainee did not know how or why his name would be found on any hard drive or discs belonging to suspected al Qaida members.
- d. The detainee did not recall ever meeting anyone who he believed or suspected of being affiliated with al Qaida. The detainee firmly believed that al Wafa was only a charity

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organization. He stated that he went to Afghanistan to assist with the charity effort, though he does not feel that he actually worked for al Wafa.

- e. A source stated that neither the detainee nor any of the detainee's family members ever conducted charitable work for al Haramayn.
- f. The detained denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
 - g. The detainee believes America is a charitable place.
- h. On 11 September 2001, the detainee was at his home in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia watching television when he saw pictures of a plane crashing into one of the towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. He could not believe it was real. He thought it was madness and sadness.
- i. When asked about his attitude towards the United States, the detainee said that he has no problems with the United States Government.
- j. According to the publication al Quds al Arabi, the original interviews with the captured Mujahidin did not reveal incriminating evidence against any of the Mujahidin who were questioned.
- k. An individual indicated the detainee was working for a Non Governmental Organization by providing food after 11 September 2001.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against your continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 February 2006

TO:

AL-SUMAYRI, BADR AWAD BAKRI

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-SUMAYRI, BADR AWAD BAKRI

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee spent an undetermined amount of time as a reserve in the front line in Afghanistan. He fled the front line to a location near Jalalabad, Afghanistan where they dug trenches and waited. The detainee then fled on foot to Pakistan after many received injuries. The detainee received medical treatment and was arrested.
- 2. The detainee stated he was on the front line in Afghanistan and fired his Kalashnikov rifle during the day for practice. He stated he was hit by shrapnel during a bombing raid while fighting on the front line against the Northern Alliance and taken to a hospital in Jalalabad for treatment during Ramadan. The detainee said he fired his weapon as he was retreating from the airport in Bagram.
- 3. The detainee stated that if he read any sort of religious decree, which stated that an attack on the United States was needed for the sake of Islam, he would follow it. He also stated that it is the duty of true Muslims to defend Islam against infidels, and that everyone must either become a Muslim, pay a fee for not converting, or be put to death.
- 4. The detainee stated that he would buy weapons to fight anyone who would have alliances to the United States. When asked about the attacks on 11 September 2001, he replied that some times, terrorist people have to die.
 - b. Training

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 1 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-SUMAYRI, BADR AWAD BAKRI

- 1. The detainee worked as a civilian armed guard.
- 2. The detainee attended a month of basic training with the Navy. After this month of training, the detainee became ill and spent two months in a naval hospital before being discharged.
 - 3. The detainee stayed at a villa for five days, where he fired the Kalashnikov AK-47 rifle.
- 4. The detainee also received training on weapons assembly and disassembly, the firing of a pistol and the German-made G-3 rifle.

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee's name was found on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida.
- 2. The detainee's name was on a list that was found on a computer in an al Qaida safe house. The list includes the detainee's passport and safety deposit box number.

d. Intent

During his first of two trips to Pakistan, between 1421 and 1422 in the Hijri calendar (between 2000 and 2001 Gregorian) the detainee admitted that the purpose of this trip was to purchase hashish at low prices for his own consumption and for resale in Saudi Arabia.

e. Other Relevant Data

The detained deserted from the Navy, he was not discharged as noted in his file.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee claims to have gone to Afghanistan for the sole purpose of sightseeing, and was told that the best place to sightsee was on the frontline. The detainee claims he didn't know who was fighting or the cause for which they were fighting. He also claims he never picked up a weapon during the two months he spent on the front line. Additionally, the detainee claims to have gone to Lashkar-e-Tayyiba for the purpose of charity.
 - b. The detainee denies being a member of al Qaida.
- c. The detainee stated that he has nothing against the United States, and that he would not participate in a fatwa, even if issued by the Saudi government. He also would not participate if a non-government organization issued a fatwa because he does not feel negatively about the United States.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-SUMAYRI, BADR AWAD BAKRI

- d. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

3 February 2006

TO:

JAHDARI, ZIAD SAID FARG

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JAHDARI. ZIAD SAID FARG

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee was designated a high priority target and placed on a foreign government's watch list for his trip to Chechnya.
- 2. The detainee traveled from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Dubai, United Arab Emirates to Karachi, Pakistan. From Karachi he went to Quetta, Pakistan. The detainee then departed Quetta for Kandahar, Afghanistan. After a short stay in Kandahar, the detainee arrived in Kabul, Afghanistan.
 - 3. The detainee stood guard duty at an Afghan and Arab guesthouse.
 - b. Training

The detained with a Kalishnikov for one day. He fired his weapon approximately twelve times.

- c. Connections/Associations
- 1. The detainee's name was found on a list of al Qaida Mujahidin recovered from various computer media in al Qaida safehouses.
 - 2. Another detainee claims the detainee was at al Faroug, Kabul and Tora Bora.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JAHDARI, ZIAD SAID FARG

d. Intent

The detainee admitted he went to Afghanistan to fight the Northern Alliance.

e. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was on the second line of defense for approximately three months. At one point, the detainee and four or five other fighters moved from the second line to the front line for one day. While on the front line the detainee fired the Kalishnikov once in the direction of what he believed was the location of the enemy. He did not actually see any of the enemy troops.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated that if he knew the Americans would become involved in Afghanistan, he would have left immediately. The detainee repeated that he went to Afghanistan to teach the Koran and assist the Taliban in its fight against the Northern Alliance. He claims to have had no desire to fight Americans.
- b. The detainee claims that if given the opportunity to return to his home he would get married, obtain a job, and live with his mother and father. As far as employment, he does not have a specific trade, but would be willing to do any type of work to assist him in living a normal life.
- c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 February 2006

TO:

SAYAB, MUTIJ SADIZ AHMAD

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAYAB, MUTIJ SADIZ AHMAD

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee traveled from Algeria to Damascus, Syria and then to Champignie, France.
- 2. In France, the detainee met an individual that convinced the detainee to travel to Afghanistan.
- 3. The detainee was instructed that he would have to travel through London prior to going to Afghanistan.
- 4. The detainee eventually left France and traveled to London, United Kingdom using a forged Belgian passport he had purchased for 2500 Francs.
- 5. While in London, the detainee gave money to another individual so that the other individual could purchase a plane ticket for the detainee to travel to Islamabad, Pakistan as well as purchase a Pakistani visa for the detainee.
- 6. While the detainee was still in London another individual provided the detainee with a point of contact in Islamabad.
- 7. According to the detainee, he stayed in London for only a short period while he was waiting to travel to Pakistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAYAB, MUTIJ SADIZ AHMAD

- 8. Once in Pakistan the detainee was picked up and taken to the Afghan border. At the border, the detainee was dropped off and the detainee crossed the border by foot and then traveled to Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
- 9. When the detainee arrived in Jalalabad he went to an Algerian guesthouse. The detainee stayed at this guesthouse for approximately three to four months.
- 10. The detainee left Jalalabad around the time of the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001. The detainee then traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan and stayed there for one to two months.

b. Training

The detainee admits receiving small arms training on the assembly and disassembly of the Kalashnikov rifle near Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

c. Other Relevant Data

- 1. After the Tora Bora bombing campaign began and the Northern Alliance pushed through Kabul and Jalalabad, the detainee escaped into Pakistan. Pakistani Forces captured the detainee in Pakistan; the detainee was subsequently turned over to United States Forces based at Kandahar, Afghanistan.
 - 2. The detainee has been identified as someone who stayed at the guesthouse in Jalalabad.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. According to the detainee, he did not participate in jihad in Algeria and was neither a member of the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, GSPC, nor the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, GIA.
- b. According to the detainee, he does not know anything about Usama bin Laden except from what the detainee had seen on the al-Jazeera satellite station.
 - c. The detainee has stated that he would not sacrifice his life for an al Qaida member.
- d. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.
- e. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
- f. The detainee denied any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAYAB, MUTIJ SADIZ AHMAD

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

7 March 2006

TO:

BEL BACHA, AHMED BIN SALEH

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BEL BACHA, AHMED BIN SALEH

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. The detainee traveled to France from Algeria on an Algerian passport in his own name. Upon arriving in Paris, the detainee went to the Barbes District of the city to obtain a false French passport.
- 2. The detainee was given the passport name of Salim Antar and a date of birth of 7 June 1971. The cost for this false passport was 3,000 French Francs. Once the detainee had the French passport in his hand, he left Paris and flew directly to London.
- 3. Once the detainee arrived in London, he stayed in the Finsbury Park Mosque where he attended prayer services and lectures conducted by Abu Hamza who was the man in charge of the mosque.
- 4. The Finsbury Park Mosque was under the supervision of the Egyptian fundamentalist Abu Hamzah al Masri who raised a lot of controversy with his speech entitled Call and Combat after the 11 September 2001 events and his talks about jihad and martyrdom.
- 5. The detainee was recruited at the Finsbury Park Mosque in London by a man that informed the detainee that Afghanistan was an easy country to enter and documents were not necessary. The detainee's recruiter coordinated for the detainee to be met in Pakistan and taken to Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BEL BACHA, AHMED BIN SALEH

- 6. The detainee's recruiter helped the detainee obtain a travel visa and airline ticket from London to Pakistan on his false French passport.
 - 7. The detainee stayed at a Jalalabad guest house called the guest house for Algerians.
- 8. The House of Algerians was a staging point or safe house for Europeans and North Africans traveling to and from training.

b. Training

- 1. The detainee was drafted into the Algerian Army in 1990. The detainee had basic training for forty-five days, which included instruction on the 7.62-MM Kalashnikov assault rifle and the 7.62-MM SKS/Type 56 rifle.
- 2. While staying in Jalalabad at the Algerian House, the detainee received training on small arms, that included the Kalashnikov rifle and Simonov machine gun.
 - 3. The detainee stated he received training to become a jihad member around the world.

c. Connections/Associations

- The detainee attended prayer and lectures at Finsbury Park that was conducted by Abu Hamza.
- 2. Abu Hamzah along with his deputy commander who is a member of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) recruited and brainwashed Muslim youth by issuing fatwas in the name of the honorable Islamic faith.
- 3. The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) is a designated foreign terrorist organization and an Islamic extremist group. The GIA aims to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state. The group uses assassinations and bombings, including car bombs, and it is known to favor kidnapping victims and slitting their throats.
- 4. The detainee stated that during his time in Kabul and Jalalabad, Afghanistan, he met and stayed with three al Qaida members.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee stated that the person in charge of the guest house told everyone in the guest house to pack up a few things and leave very quickly because the opposition forces were quickly advancing towards Jalalabad.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BEL BACHA, AHMED BIN SALEH

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee indicated that he did not want anything to do with the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) because they were terrorists and very bad people.
- b. The detained denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the Unites States or United States interests.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

29 May 2006

TO:

KHANTUMANI, ABD-AL-NISR MOHAMMED

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHANTUMANI, ABD-AL-NISR

MOHAMMED

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. The detainee was identified by a foreign government service as a radical terrorist who fights with Usama bin Laden forces.
 - 2. The detainee was identified as being a Mujahedin fighter by three other individuals.
- 3. The detainee was reported to have been in Tora Bora and to have been proficient at using a rocket propelled grenade launcher.
- 4. The detainee was involved in a revolt against a Pakistani police force during the early days of confrontation in Afghanistan, when some prisoners were being transported by Pakistani authorities. A senior al Qaida operative stated that the detainee was rumored to have led the revolt.
 - 5. The detainee has been named as a leader in camp and part of the Islamic court.

b. Training

- 1. The detainee was identified by a foreign government service as receiving several military courses at al Qaida camps.
 - 2. The detainee was reported to have been experienced in handling explosives.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHANTUMANI, ABD-AL-NISR MOHAMMED

- c. Connections/Associations
 - 1. The detainee was named as a member of the Abu al-Zarqawi group.
- The detainee's name was included in a computer file used by suspected al Qaida members.
- 3. The detainee owned a house next door to a known al Qaida/Taliban guest house and worked in the guest house.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated that he never worked for the Taliban nor did he ever provide assistance to the Taliban. He and his family left Syria because of the way people acted and the way the Afghanistan people were more religious.
- b. The detainee stated that he was never required to join the Taliban and that he never joined the Taliban.
 - c. The detainee stated he was never approached by al Qaida and was never part of al Qaida.
 - d. The detainee denied being a longtime Mujahedin fighter and aiding the Palestinians.
 - e. The detainee stated he has never supported or been affiliated with the Mujahedin.
- f. The detainee was described as a simple man trying to migrate to Afghanistan with his family.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

5 May 2006

TO:

ABD AL SATTAR, MUIEEN A DEEN JAMAL A DEEN ABD AL FUSAL

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF

ABD AL SATTAR, MUIEEN A DEEN JAMAL A DEEN ABD AL FUSAL

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee has a Pakistani passport and originally went to Pakistan on vacation in September 2001.
- 2. The detainee paid for his own ticket from his salary from the Private Holy Koran School in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.
- 3. The detainee indicated that he thought if he traveled to Afghanistan that he would get credit from God and that since the trip was only going to be for a week, there would be no harm in going.
 - 4. The detainee claims to have participated in the Dawa in Afghanistan.
- 5. The detainee was convinced by a friend to go to Afghanistan and teach the Five Pillars of Islam.
- 6. The detainee was captured with 2,000 Afghanistan Dinars, 1,000 United States Dollars, and 1,000 Saudi Arabian Riyals.
 - b. Training
- 1. The detainee was identified as a trainer at the al Farouq training camp in Afghanistan. He was trying to become a Kuwadir, a more specialized trainer.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABD AL SATTAR, MUIEEN A DEEN JAMAL A DEEN ABD AL FUSAL

- 2. The detainee was in Towr Khom, Afghanistan for one month then moved to Tora Bora and camped in Towr Khom because he had orders to stay there. Usama bin Laden visited Towr Khom for one or two days.
- 3. When the detainee went to Tora Bora he was in Abdul Qadas al Bahraini Camp, which was later taken over by Ibn Sheikh al Libi.
 - c. Connections/Associations
- 1. The detainee met a Syrian male, dressed in Pakistani clothes, whom he called Abdul al Moaz, while both were in a restaurant in Karachi, Pakistan.
- 2. The detainee stated that he believes al Moaz was a trader of some type because he kept containers of honey and perfume at his apartment.
- 3. Al Moaz took the detainee to a valley and introduced him to an individual named Juheina.
- 4. The detainee was given a Kalashnikov rifle by Juheina for his personal safety because the Northern Alliance was attacking the valley.
 - d. Other Relevant Data
- 1. The detainee advised that if he saw al Moaz again, he would be very upset with him and would want to do him physical harm for getting him into so much trouble.
- 2. The detainee was a fighter in Tora Bora who moved around encouraging people to fight and be religious. People listened to the detainee, because he was educated in Saudi Arabia by Sheikh Muhammad al Shingeti at the Islamic University in Medina.
- 3. A source reported that the detainee tells fellow detainees to not cooperate and encourages them to cause disturbances.
- 4. The detainee preaches to those on the block about wanting to kill all Americans to include men, women, children, and babies.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee indicated he was never in the Tora Bora area, just in the valley area and said that if he had known Abdul Moaz and Juheina were al Qaida he would have left right away.
 - b. The detainee stated he had no knowledge of al Qaida and had never heard of them.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABD AL SATTAR, MUIEEN A DEEN JAMAL A DEEN ABD AL FUSAL

- c. The detained denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or U.S. interests.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

25 March 2006

TO:

AMEZIANE, DJAMEL SAIID ALI

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AMEZIANE, DJAMEL SAIID ALI

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee paid 20,000 Austrian Shillings for a Dutch passport and driver's license, both of which were already altered with the detainee's picture on them.
 - 2. In late 1995, the detainee traveled to Canada from Austria with a fake passport.
 - 3. In late 2000, the detainee paid 800 Canadian Dollars for a stolen French passport.
- 4. In October-November 2000, the detainee flew from Montreal to London, England and then to Tehran, Iran. From Tehran, the detainee traveled by taxi to the Iran/Afghanistan border and to Kabul. The detainee presented his fraudulent passport to the Iranian border guards and purported to be a French Muslim traveling to Afghanistan for personal reasons.
- 5. The detainee assigned himself his first alias, Abdul Rahim, while living in a guest house in Afghanistan. The detainee gave the second alias to Pakistani military authorities upon his arrest to prevent them from discovering he was Algerian. The detainee continued to use this second alias and false place of birth when interviewed by United States authorities in Afghanistan and at Camp X-Ray until approximately 23 March 2002.
 - b. Connections/Associations
 - 1. The detainee attended the Al Umah Mosque in Montreal, Canada.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AMEZIANE, DJAMEL SAIID ALI

- 2. In late 2000, while attending the Al Umah Mosque, the detainee met a Tunisian who gave the detainee approximately 1,200 to 1,500 Canadian Dollars and told him to go to a guest house in Kati Parwan, Afghanistan.
- 3. Upon arriving in Kabul, the detainee went to the guest house in Kati Parwan, a neighborhood of Kabul. The detainee stated that the majority of boarders in the house were Taliban fighters there awaiting training or resting after returning from the front lines, but others were just immigrants.
- 4. In February 2001, the detainee took a taxi to Jalalabad asking for the Arab guest house in the Intelligence neighborhood of Jalalabad, named for the Taliban Intelligence headquarters located there.

c. Intent

The detainee decided while in Canada that he wanted to go to Afghanistan because he believed the Taliban had created the only country which was truly Islamic, and the detainee wanted to live somewhere with only Sharia Law.

d. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee was captured by Pakistani military in a village mosque, loaded into trucks and confined to an army barracks for the night.
- 2. The following day, the detainee was loaded onto a bus with many others. Suddenly, the bus erupted in shouting and gunfire. The detainee allegedly dove to the floor and crawled to the middle aisle. Allegedly, many people fell on top of the detainee, breaking his left arm. The detainee then crawled out of a window of the bus and hid under a nearby small bridge. The detainee was again arrested and taken to a nearby prison in Kohat, Pakistan.
- 3. After five to seven days at the prison in Kohat, the detainee was transferred to a hospital for his broken arm, where he remained for approximately two weeks. The Pakistani military eventually turned over the detainee and the other prisoners to the United States who then flew them to Kandahar.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. While in Afghanistan, the detainee stated that he did not receive any military or terrorist training and did not see any fighting.
- b. The detainee was living in Jalalabad when he learned of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. The detainee stated that he was shocked when he learned of these attacks. The detainee denied having any advance knowledge of these attacks and denied having heard any rumors of any such attacks prior to 11 September 2001.

Page 2 of 3

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AMEZIANE, DJAMEL SAIID ALI

- c. The detainee denied ever having participated in any fighting or terrorist activity and denied that he had any intention of participating in such activity if he is released. The detainee denied any knowledge of any future planned terrorist attacks in the United States and denied knowledge of the locations of any terrorist training camps or the identity of any individuals affiliated with al Qaida or other terrorist organizations.
- d. The detainee stated that he was not even thinking of jihad when he moved to Afghanistan. The detainee decided to flee Afghanistan because the non-Taliban and opposition were killing Arabs.
 - e. The detainee stated that he was not a member of al Qaida.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 February 2006

TO:

FARHI, SAIID

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FARHI, SAIID

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

The detainee entered Italy illegally in 1997. While in Rome the detainee purchased a French Passport from Algerian robbers in the name of Oliver Jean Christian Marie Joseph Bayart.

b. Training

- 1. The detainee was conscripted into the military in 1981. The detainee served with a construction service unit that was assigned to military bases. The detainee's military specialty was construction: roads, plumbing, buildings and painting. The detainee received two months of basic training with the Kalashnikov and Seminov rifles. The detainee spent one week in a military prison because of a fistfight with an officer. The detainee received an honorable discharge in 1983.
 - 2. The detainee went to the Bagram front where he received some weapons training.
- 3. Another detainee identified the detainee as an individual who trained with him at the Algerian Camp and they eventually traveled to Kandahar.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee saw Usama bin Laden shortly after 11 September 2001. Usama bin Laden was attending a funeral in Kabul. The detainee and a friend happened to be passing by on the street and stopped to attend the funeral. The cemetery was on the outskirts of Kabul.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF FARHI, SAIID

- 2. Another detainee identified the detainee as someone he saw at a safe house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
- 3. The detainee admitted to the authorities of a foreign government that he fought on the front lines.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detained denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
- b. The detainee never heard of al Qaida until after 11 September 2001. The detainee described al Qaida as a platform or foundation. The detainee did not carry any weapons while in Afghanistan. The detainee is against fighting. If the detainee wanted to fight, he said he would have done it in Algeria. The detainee ran away from those types of problems years before and did not want to encounter them again.
- c. The detainee was asked about his Jihad intentions and he related that he did not go to Afghanistan to fight, he went to marry. The detainee stated that he was a peaceful person and reiterated that he wants to live a good life.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

29 May 2006

TO:

KHANTUMANI, MUHAMMAD

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHANTUMANI, MUHAMMAD

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. The detainee stated in 1999 his father left his family to go work in Saudi Arabia. In 2001 the detainee's mother received a letter from her husband stating that he wanted the family to join him in Afghanistan.
- 2. The detainee stated that his family and relatives traveled from Syria to the border of Tayebat, Turkey. They next traveled by sea to the Iranian border, then to Tehran, Iran, and finally to Mahad, Iran.
- 3. The detainee has stated that upon arriving in Mahad, his mother contacted the detainee's father's sister to inform her that the family had arrived. The father's sister would then contact the father with this information.
- 4. The detainee's father met the family at the Tayebat/Gumruk border. They then traveled to Herat, Afghanistan and to their new residence in Kabul, Afghanistan.
- 5. The detainee states that he, his family, and relatives stayed in Kabul, Afghanistan for several months and then moved to Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
 - 6. The detainee and his family stayed for one month in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
- 7. The detainee and his family traveled from Jalalabad, Afghanistan to the Tora Bora region in Afghanistan where they eventually split up.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHANTUMANI, MUHAMMAD

b. Training

1. The detainee has been identified as being involved with al Qaida and having trained at al Farouq. The source also states that the detainee was at al Farouq during late April 2001 and that he trained on Kalashnikov rifles, pistols, light weapons, grenades and other explosives.

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee's name was found encrypted on a computer that belonged to a senior al Qaida lieutenant that indicated that he had received advanced al Qaida training.
- 2. Several senior al Qaida members and captured terrorist-affiliated items have positively identified the detainee as an associate of al Qaida.

d. Other Relevant Data

- 1. When the situation in Jalalabad, Afghanistan escalated, the detainee stated that his father suggested leaving and that the family try to make it to the Pakistan border. The family split up and the detainee traveled with his father while the rest of the family traveled separately.
- 2. The detainee and his father traveled through the Afghanistan mountains and arrived at a village called Parachinar, Pakistan. It is in this town where the detainee and his father were captured and handed over to the Pakistani police.
- 3. According to an undated letter, the detainee is listed as a probable al Qaida member who was incarcerated in Pakistan.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee states he has no specific knowledge of the Taliban or al Qaida organizations. The detainee also claims not to have been a combatant in Afghanistan.
- b. The detainee has stated that he has no problems with the United States or any Arab government.
- c. The detainee has denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.
- d. The detainee has also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHANTUMANI, MUHAMMAD

- e. The detainee has denied any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

17 May 2006

TO:

DOKHAN, MOAMMAR BADAWI

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF DOKHAN, MOAMMAR BADAWI

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee traveled from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan with the stated intention of joining the Taliban.
- 2. The detainee served as a rear-echelon guard and manned an observation post in the area of Bagram, Afghanistan.
 - 3. The detainee carried a rifle while on duty at the observation post.
 - b. Connections/Associations
- 1. The detainee's name was contained on a list of incarcerated associates found on a computer used by suspected al Qaida members in Pakistan in early 2002.
- 2. The detainee's name was contained on a list of captured Mujahedin found in Pakistan on a hard drive associated with a high-ranking al Qaida operative.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee denies ever having been in Afghanistan.
- b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF DUKHAN, MOMMUR EDAWI

- c. The detainee denied knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Detention Facility.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

5 May 2006

TO:

BIN SAAD, RAMI

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN SAAD, RAMI

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. The detainee first learned of jihad through unfortunate stories of women and children in Chechnya. The detainee continued to learn about the jihad in Chechnya and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Also, people were preaching jihad in the mosques.
- 2. The detainee decided to visit Afghanistan during college summer break. The detainee sought information and visited a Taliban internet website.
- 3. The detainee had discussed the trip with a friend who had traveled to Afghanistan the previous year. The detainee was provided with the phone number of a person in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
- 4. The detainee stated he arrived in Afghanistan about one month prior to the attacks of 11 September 2001.
- 5. The detainee was met at the Karachi, Pakistan airport by an individual who assisted him in going to Quetta, Pakistan. After a few days in a Taliban guest house in Quetta, he was sent to Kandahar, Afghanistan where he stayed at another guest house for three weeks.

b. Training

In one interview, the detainee stated that he trained in all Faroug camp for four days. The detainee later claimed that he viewed videotape of the camp at the safe house in Kandahar. The

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detainee also stated that he received Kalashnikov training from his father, who kept a rifle at his home in Saudi Arabia.

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee's name was found on an Arabic computer file, that listed points of contact and telephone numbers for al Qaida Mujahedin in Pakistan.
- 2. The detainee's name was listed in a translation of an Arabic document, that associates him with Muslim brothers fighting with Taliban against the Northern Alliance.
- 3. The detainee's name was on a document recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan. The list identified the detainee by name, nationality, and also in possession of a Saudi passport.
- 4. According to a foreign government service, the detainee was listed among reported members of al Qaida.
- 5. The detainee was identified by others as being in the same group in al Farouq as well as Tora Bora.
- 6. In late June 2002, a foreign government designated the detainee as being high priority. The detainee was identified by the foreign government as having traveled to Chechnya.

d. Detainee Actions and Statements

During an interview on 04 Nov 2002, the detainee told the Arabic translator that the interviewers are pigs and animals, and also that the Arabic translator is his enemy and if given the opportunity the detainee would kill him. The detainee stated that Afghanistan will rise again and be Muslim along with the entire world. The detainee stated that the Taliban would return to power in Afghanistan.

e. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee was captured by the Pakistanis and was placed in the second of three busses headed for the jail.
- 2. The detainee stated some of the villagers who arranged the prisoner's surrender had promised that a policeman, native to their village, planned to smuggle the prisoners to freedom while being transported. The detainee stated that the prisoners on the bus managed to overpower the guards when they heard that they were being taken to an alternate jail as opposed to where they had been first told.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN SAAD, RAMI

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated that having been the only son, and by Saudi fatwas that had been previously issued, he was not obligated to go to jihad. This was the main reason why he was convinced not to join jihad in Afghanistan.
- b. The detainee advised he traveled to Afghanistan during the summer break as a tourist and only intended to stay for forty-five days. The detainee stated he wanted to observe the Taliban and its implementation of Islamic Law. The detainee insisted he did not go to Afghanistan to fight as a soldier.
 - c. The detainee attempted to leave and return to Saudi Arabia but was unsuccessful.
- d. The detainee went to the Iranian border at Herat where he was also prevented from crossing.
- e. The detainee stated the prisoners overpowered the guards, took over some weapons, and the resulting firefight left a number of guards and prisoners dead. The detainee claims that he ran off and hid until he was arrested some 12 hours later.
- f. The detainee claims he had nothing to do with the bus incident and denies any affiliation with Usama bin Laden and al Qaida.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter..

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

31 January 2006

To:

SAID KUMAN, AHMED YASLEM

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID KUMAN, AHMED YASLEM

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 - 1. The detainee followed a fatwa for Jihad in Afghanistan.
- 2. The detainee was seen at a guesthouse on the Taliban front lines in Kabul, Afghanistan during late 1999 early 2000 and was identified as suspected al Qaida.
- 3. The detainee traveled from Yemen to Quetta, Pakistan and then to Kandahar, Afghanistan to fight.
- 4. After his training, the detainee traveled to the Taliban Center in downtown Kabul. The detainee asked to go to the fighting at the front lines. The detainee was sent to a bunker for three months to guard the airport.
- 5. The detainee was identified as the bus driver for a guesthouse in Kandahar in April 2001. The detainee was seen in Tora Bora, in the Talout region, where he was a fighter and had the following weapons with him: Kalashnikov rifle, PK machine gun and a rocket propelled grenade.

b. Training

The detained at Al Farouq then participated in advanced commando training in Kandahar, Afghanistan. Commando training consisted of rappelling and instruction in the areas of kidnapping, assassinations, poisons and explosives.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID KUMAN, AHMED YASLEM

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee was identified as suspected al Qaida due to his association with the Kandahar Airport group.
- 2. The detainee was identified as having served on the front line and as having been a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden.
- 3. The detainee's name appeared on a computer disk from an alleged al Qaida safe house on Tariq road in Karachi, Pakistan.
- 4. The detainee's name appears on a list of al Qaida Mujahidin and the contents of his trust account was found on a computer recovered from al Qaida associated safe houses in Rawalpindi, Pakistan.
- 5. The detainee claimed he was personal friends with Usama bin Laden's son and that Usama bin Laden treated the detainee like one of his own sons. The detainee claimed he had access to Usama bin Laden at anytime because of this relationship. The detainee used to live at the Kandahar Airport Complex.
 - 6. The detainee claimed that Usama bin Laden was like a father to him.

d. Intent

The detainee has made statements expressing his desire to continue Jihad against the United States.

e. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee was in possession of a Casio model F-91W watch at the time of capture.
- 2. The Casio model F-91W watch has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist used to make improvised explosive devices.
- 3. When the American planes started bombing the detainee traveled to Jalalabad, which fell to the Northern Alliance. He was captured on the 29th day of Ramadan and handed over to the American Forces.
- 4. The detainee was captured by Pakistani Forces in the Nangarhar Province as part of a group of Taliban and al Qaida fighters fleeing from Afghanistan to Pakistan after 11 September 2001.

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID KUMAN, AHMED YASLEM

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee denies knowledge of al Qaida and claims he did not fight against the United States.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

29 May 2006

To:

AL BARAKAT, KHALID HASSAN HUSAYN

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BARAKAT, KHALID HASSAN HUSAYN

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee stated when he was 16 years old he went to Afghanistan and trained at the al-Siddiq Camp west of Khost, Afghanistan. He was inspired by the mosque sermons to do his duty in defending Muslims from the Soviet Union.
- 2. The detainee left his home in Mecca, Saudi Arabia in June of 2001 to work for the al Wafa organization in Afghanistan to provide food and blankets to the Afghan refugees.
- 3. The detainee traveled with 3,000 U.S. Dollars, 5,000 Riyals and his Saudi passport. The detainee stated donating the money is a major part of the Dawa.
- 4. The detainee traveled from Jiddah, Saudi Arabia to Qatar by airplane. From Qatar he traveled to Doha. From Doha, he traveled by airplane to Lahore, Pakistan. The detainee stated, when he landed in Pakistan, there were people all around the airport looking for others who were there for the Dawa. They were offering rides and he received a ride to the Markez al Dableg, which was the center of the Dawa.

b. Training

- 1. The detainee was identified as a fighter that received training at al Farouq.
- 2. The detainee was trained on the Kalashnikov rifle at the al Siddiq training camp.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BARAKAT, KHALID HASSAN HUSAYN

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee related in a March 2004 interview that he landed in the Lahore airport and was welcomed by Jama'at al Tabligh members who transported him and others to the Jama'at al Tabligh.
- 2. When the detainee arrived in Lahore, Pakistan, he stayed at the center for Dawa, run by Haji Abdu al Wahab.
- 3. Jama'at al Tabligh is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.
- 4. The detainee contacted an Afghani man who sat next to him in Mecca as he was praying. The Afghani man picked the detainee up at the center. The detainee stated they traveled to Lahod, the city the Afghani man lives in. The detainee stayed with the Afghani man for four days. He and the Afghani man traveled to a mosque in a city called Gougren Wal. The detainee stayed there for two days for the Dawa. While there, they met a Pakistani named Abdul Rahim (original spelling source document: Abdel).
 - 5. Abdul Rahim was in charge of the Gujranwala branch for the center for Dawa.
- 6. The detainee and the Afghani man left Lahore, Pakistan. Rahim also left and met up with them at the bus stop near the border. From Lahore, the detainee and the Afghani man traveled by bus to the Afghanistan border. At the bus stop they met up with Rahim. The three men traveled into Afghanistan by taxi to Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
 - 7. The detainee stated that the Afghani man suggested they travel to Kabul.
- 8. The detainee said, from Jalalabad, he and the Afghani man traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan by taxi.
- 9. While in Kabul, Afghanistan the detainee assisted a group called Mounzema Wafk (al Wafa).
 - 10. The detainee stated he met an employee who works in the Kabul branch of al Wafa.
- 11. According to a foreign government service, as of early August 2002, the nongovernmental organization Wafa, officially named al Wafa al Igatha al Islamia, and headquartered in Saudi Arabia, was believed to have had connections to Usama bin Laden and Afghan Mujahedin.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BARAKAT, KHALID HASSAN HUSAYN

- 12. The detainee wanted to see the Kandahar branch of al Wafa. He and the Afghani man traveled from Kabul to Kandahar by taxi. The detainee stayed at the Kandahar branch of al Wafa for three or four days.
- 13. The detainee stated, while he was in Kabul, he met a Pakistani man who invited him and the Afghani man to stay with him.
- 14. The detainee stated the Northern Alliance attacked Kabul and the Taliban fled. He was told that if the Northern Alliance saw any middle easterners, they would kill them. The Pakistani man introduced the detainee to two men. The two men were to take the detainee to Jalalabad, Afghanistan and then to Pakistan.
- 15. The detainee traveled by bus with the two men to Jalalabad, Afghanistan. When they arrived they stayed at a house.
- 16. The two men told the detainee that the Northern Alliance was coming to Jalalabad, Afghanistan and they must leave.

d. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee was identified along with person who was in a different group at al Farouq, however they were in the same group in Tora Bora. The detainee was identified as being in charge of his group at Tora Bora for one month during Ramadan.
- a. The detainee stated they could not cross the border because the Pakistani military blocked the borders. They traveled to a village outside of the border. They stayed at the village for two weeks. They again had to leave because of the advancement of the Northern Alliance.
- 2. The detainee stated that the two men and he walked through the mountains for five days and crossed the border into Pakistan. They came to another village and were captured by the Pakistani military.
- a. The Pakistani government captured 84 Mujahedin fighters that crossed the border in Nangarhar Province. A published list of prisoners printed from the Alneda Internet site on 20 July 2002 contains information regarding the capture of Taliban and al Qaida fighters. The detainee's name is on this list.
- 3. A file found on a computer used by suspected al Qaida members contains a list of 78 associates incarcerated in Pakistan. This information was found on a computer server hard drive recovered by Allied personnel in a suspected al Qaida safe house in Islamabad, Pakistan. The detainee's name appears on this list.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BARAKAT, KHALID HASSAN HUSAYN

- 4. The detainee's name appears on a document containing a list of names, safety-deposit boxes and contents found on a floppy disk recovered from raids of a suspect al Qaida safe house.
- 5. The detainee's name and information of his "Trust" account(s) appears on a computer file found during a raid against al Qaida associated safe houses in Pakistan.
- 6. The detainee's name appears on a computer file found during a raid against al Qaida associated safe houses in Pakistan. According to the file, these Mujahidin were among a group who had come to Afghanistan but who had not completed their training and therefore were not ready to fight in the war.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee thought about going to Pakistan for the Dawa to teach others the true meaning of Islam.
- b. The detainee left his home in Mecca, Saudi Arabia in June of 2001 to work for the al Wafa organization in Afghanistan to provide food and blankets to the Afghan refugees.
 - c. The detainee stated donating the money is a major part of the Dawa.
- d. The detainee stated the Afghani man asked him if he wanted to visit Afghanistan. The detainee told the Afghani man he would visit Afghanistan but he did not wish to visit places of war.
 - e. While in Kabul the detainee wanted to help feed the poor and build mosques.
- f. The detainee stated he wanted to see Bamian because the Taliban destroyed the idols. He could not understand why the Taliban would do such a thing.
- g. The detainee denied having any association with the Taliban or al Qaida. He did not serve in the military and denied having used any weapons during his travels.
- h. The detainee denied having ever seen UBL during his travels through Afghanistan. The detainee has never traveled to the United States and has no friends, relatives or contacts in the United States.
- i. The detainee stated that he traveled to Khost for training to fight Jihad. He realized this was a sin and never picked up a weapon again.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BARAKAT, KHALID HASSAN HUSAYN

Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

13 November 2006

TO:

AL SABRI, MASHUR ABDULLAH MUQBIL AHMNAD

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SABRI, MASHUR ABDULLAH MUOBIL AHMNAD

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee was influenced by a fatwa issued by an Islamic Imam that encouraged men to go to Afghanistan to assist the Taliban. In the summer of 2000 the detainee traveled to Afghanistan.
- 2. A member of Jamaat al Tabligh helped the detainee to Afghanistan by providing contacts, a plan and a route.
- 3. The detainee purchased a round-trip ticket on Tunisian Air and flew from Sanaa, Yemen to Quetta, Pakistan.
- 4. Once in Quetta, the detainee went by taxi to the Taliban offices before crossing the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
 - 5. While in Quetta, Pakistan, the detainee stayed at a Taliban guest house.
- 6. From the village of Boldak, Pakistan, the detainee was taken to Kandahar, Afghanistan to an Arab guest house and stayed for two weeks.
 - 7. The detainee traveled to Jalalabad, Afghanistan via Kabul, Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-SABRI, MASHUR ABDULLAH MUQBIL AHMNAD

- 8. While in Kabul, Afghanistan, the detainee stayed at an al Qaida safe house on two separate occasions. The first time was for two days and the second was for a week.
 - 9. The detainee arrived in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, where he lived for one year.
- 10. While living in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, the detainee was introduced to a small arms weapons dealer.
- 11. In the later part of the year the detainee would travel to Bagram to assist Taliban fighters in their efforts against the Northern Alliance fighters.
- 12. While in Bagram the detainee would stay in Kabul at the guest house of a Taliban fighter, who had been in charge of a defensive fighting line outside of Bagram.
- 13. The detainee would travel to the front line near Kabul, Afghanistan, where there was fighting going on.
- 14. The detainee was reported as being in Kandahar, Afghanistan in early 2001 and was living in a guest house.
- 15. In May 2001, the detainee was working at two guest houses and helped new arrivals or fighters travel from another guest house to the airport or to Kabul. The detainee assisted them by making reservations for auto or air transportation and identified weapons and weapons dealers for those interested in purchasing them.
- 16. The detainee was observed at one guest house carrying messages and moving people around town.
 - 17. The guest house was for new people who were being sent to training camps.
- 18. The detainee worked for Usama bin Laden and was observed doing administrative and organizational duties, signing in new recruits and facilitating their moves to the front lines.
- 19. The detainee was believed to have sworn Bayat to Usama bin Laden because the detainee and the people around the detainee knew Usama bin Laden's travel dates and routes.
- 20. A source stated the detainee was a member of al Qaida because the detainee was following Usama bin Laden's orders to keep the guest house up and running.
- 21. The detainee was said to facilitate the transfer of weapons and other supplies to the frontlines and was believed to have transferred approximately 20,000 United States Dollars to the airport, where training was being held around September 2001.

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- 22. A source stated the detainee was in Tora Bora around September 2001 and was wearing a commonly issued military vest and carrying a Kalashnikov rifle.
- 23. A source stated that when Usama bin Laden would come back from Tora Bora the detainee would also return.
- 24. The detainee was well known and respected as an administrator in the guest houses. The detainee was allowed to travel without any travel documents and/or without permission.
- 25. The detainee was reported to be involved in the transport of large sums of money around Afghanistan. The detainee was to deliver a large sum of money to Usama bin Laden but was unable to complete this transaction because the war had started.
- 26. The detainee left Jalalabad, Afghanistan after Kabul, Afghanistan fell and headed for Peshawar, Pakistan, where he turned himself into authorities.

b. Training

While in Taiz, Yemen, the detainee learned about weaponry from his paternal uncle. The detainee was taught to fire the Kalashnikov rifle and a pistol.

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detainee contacted the Daftar Taliban office to get assistance arranging for travel over the border to Kandahar, Afghanistan.
- 2. The detainee became interested in receiving military training after a discussion with a friend who previously received this military training.
- 3. While in Yemen, the detainee rented a five-bedroom house with 9 other men in the house, including Hassan al Khamari.
 - 4. Hassan al Khamari was killed while bombing the USS Cole.
- 5. The individuals who were visiting the house the detainee was renting were involved in a car theft ring that led to the house being raided. The detainee was arrested for a nine month period.
- 6. The detainee's facilitator and contact in Jalalabad, Afghanistan knew each other from when they fought in Afghanistan for the Taliban.

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d. Detainee Actions and Statements

- 1. The detainee stated the vehicles stolen from within the vehicle theft ring would be sold in Saudi Arabia, and the proceeds were used to purchase weapons. The goal was to violently free a convicted murderer from prison in Sanaa.
- 2. The detainee stated the vehicle theft ring had other plans, including kidnapping other tourists to use them as leverage and for negotiating the release of the imprisoned associate.

e. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee's name was on a list of names, aliases and nationalities recovered from a raid of a suspected al Qaida safe house.
- 2. The detainee's money was taken from his safety deposit boxes and added to the alleged al Qaida budget.
- 3. The detainee stated he did not know anybody involved in terrorist activities against the United States. The detainee attempted to rationalize that the individuals involved in the bombing of the USS Cole did nothing wrong.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee hoped he would be allowed to return to Yemen if he turned himself in at the border.
- b. The detainee went to Afghanistan to see what it was all about. The detainee heard a lot about the purely Islamic government there and the safety of Afghanistan. The detainee denies fighting against anyone in Afghanistan.
- c. The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan to find a wife and denied going to escape any involvement with the planning of the attack on the USS Cole.
- d. The detainee stated he would like to get married when he leaves Guantanamo Bay and is willing to go back to Yemen or any other country upon release.
- e. The detainee stated he was not involved in the USS Cole attack or any other terrorist attack.
- f. The detainee denied any involvement or connection to al Qaida and terrorist activities. The detainee denies receiving any terrorist training or attending a terrorist training camp.

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- g. The detainee stated he was not a member of al Qaida. The detainee acknowledges he was approached about joining al Qaida, but he refused the offer because he does not believe in jihad.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 May 2006

TO:

AHJM, AHMED ADNAN

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHJM. AHMED ADNAN

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee claimed that he read about the Taliban state and wanted to see it for himself.
- 2. The detainee flew from Damascus, Syria to Tehran, Iran and then to Zahedan, Iran. From there the detainee traveled by taxi into Kandahar, Afghanistan.
 - b. Training
- 1. The detainee's name was included on a list of personnel scheduled to attend an al Qaida tactics course.
- 2. The detainee would not confirm or deny that he had ever been to the al Qaida tactics course for which he was listed.
 - c. Connections/Associations
 - 1. The detainee stayed at a legal college in Afghanistan owned by Usama bin Laden.
 - 2. The detainee lived in a Syrian guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan for over one year.
- 3. The house was located in a district of Kabul, Afghanistan which is controlled and inhabited by al Qaida personnel.

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- 4. The detainee was regularly provided money during his stay in the Afghanistan guest house.
 - 5. The detainee worked for al Wafa.
- 6. Al Wafa is a Terrorist Exclusion List designee. This facilitates the United States Government's ability to exclude aliens associated with al Wafa from entering the United States.
- 7. When the fighting neared Kabul, Afghanistan, the detainee fled with a group to the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan.
 - d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was captured while trying to cross the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution.
- b. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on United States interests.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

2 May 2006

TO:

SHAABAAN, ALI HUSAIN MUHAMMAD

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHAABAAN, ALI HUSAIN

MUHAMMAD

- 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
- 1. The detainee wanted to immigrate to an Islamic state and became aware of Afghanistan after watching television in Syria.
- 2. The detainee learned about the route to Afghanistan from a television broadcast featuring a sheikh who gave directions for travel to Afghanistan.
- 3. On 3 July 2000 the detainee left Syria to travel to Afghanistan. He traveled by bus from Damascus to the Turkish border, where Turkish authorities inspected them, and continued on to Tehran, Iran.
- 4. From Tehran, the detainee and his companions traveled to Zahedan, Iran. They continued by taxi from Zahedan to Kandahar, Afghanistan, which took approximately ten days.
- 5. It cost 1,500 Syrian Lira to get smuggled into Afghanistan from the Iranian border. The detainee claims the smuggling was not prearranged.
- 6. After arriving in Kandahar, the detainee told the driver to take them to a house where the Arabs live. They stayed at the Haji Habash guest house for three months.
- 7. The detainee then went to Kabul, Afghanistan. He lived in a Syrian guest house in the Wazir Akbar Khan region for thirteen months.

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- 8. The Syrian house was reportedly located in the al Qaida enclave area of Wazir Akhbar Khan.
- 9. Every two or three months the detainee received an envelope with his name on it containing money. He was not really sure where the money came from.
- 10. After completing al Farouq, the detainee fought on the front lines near Bagram, Afghanistan.
 - 11. The detainee carried a heavy machine gun while in Tora Bora.

b. Training

- 1. The detainee has had training on the Kalashnikov (AK-47) in Syria.
- 2. The detainee received a week of Kalashnikov training in the Syrian house in Wazir Akhbar Khan District. He claims it cost nothing and no other training took place.
 - 3. The detainee attended military training at the al Farouq Training Camp.
- 4. The al Farouq Training Camp was funded by al Qaida and therefore was more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. The detained he mainly studied Islam on his own and read the Koran, the Hadith, and other religious books at the guest house in Kabul. He and others in the house would refer questions to a sheik.
- 2. Reporting indicates the sheik provided a two-week training school at the sheik's residence in Kabul for Syrians and other Arabs who trained at the Usama bin Laden camps. He would teach the rules of jihad, that Americans were non-believers, and that it is justified to kill them.

d. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The detainee denied ever saying that an American pilot was held in Syria for two years and that the pilot was treated well. The detainee said he did not have any first hand evidence concerning Syrian or Islamic treatment of westerners.
- 2. The detainee later admitted that he made the comment and explained he heard about the American pilot and the circumstances surrounding treatment and release of the pilot from the

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHAABAAN, ALI HUSAIN MUHAMMAD

International Committee of the Red Cross during an International Committee of the Red Cross mail delivery.

- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee claims that he is not affiliated with al Qaida or any terrorist network.
- b. The detainee claims he does not want to be returned to Syria for fear of being put in jail upon his return.
 - c. The detainee claims that he would like to live a normal life and raise a family.
- d. The detainee stated that the people involved in the 11 September 2001 attacks should be punished.
- e. The detainee claims that he would not take action against the United States if he were asked to fight.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

7 April 2006

TO:

MOHAMED, AHMED

SUBJECT:

UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMED, AHMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

- 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
- 3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

- 1. In Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan the detainee told one of his neighbors that he wanted to get in shape and receive military training. The neighbor told the detainee about the camp at Tora Bora, got the detainee visas for Iran and Pakistan, and got the detainee a plane ticket from Bishkek to Iran for 300 United States Dollars.
- 2. In November 2000 the detainee traveled to Mashhad and Zahedai, Iran and then to Quetta and Peshawar, Pakistan before crossing into Afghanistan.
- 3. The detainee stayed in a Uighur house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan and then went to Tora Bora, Afghanistan where the detainee received training at a Uighur training camp.
- 4. The detainee went from Kyrgyzstan to get military training in Afghanistan because he had always wanted to be a soldier in the military but did not want to be in the Chinese military.
- 5. When asked the purpose of the training at Tora Bora, the detainee said that if something happened in the Uighur homeland, those who had been trained could take up arms against the Chinese government to save the Uighur nation.

b. Training

1. Typical camp training consisted of teaching from the Koran and other Islamic studies as well as a small portion of weapons training. Typical camp training included how to use a variety

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of weapons including the Kalashnikov rifle, the Seminov pistol, the DSHK heavy machine gun, and an unknown type of shoulder-fired rocket.

- 2. Since the detainee already knew how to pray and had studied the Koran, he chose to learn about the Kalashnikov rifle, hand guns, and an unidentified bolt-operated rifle.
 - 3. The detainee served as a weapons instructor at the Uighur camp.
- 4. The detainee also taught Uighurs at the camp some martial arts and physical fitness techniques.

c. Connections/Associations

- 1. The professed leader of the East Turkistan Movement visited the camp on two occasions during the detainee's stay.
- 2. The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is one of the most militant of the ethnic Uighur separatist groups pursuing an independent Eastern Turkistan, which would include Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Xinjiang. The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement and other overlapping militant Uighur groups are linked to the international Mujahedin movement, and to a limited degree al Qaida.
- 3. Another person identified the detainee as Abdul Jabar, an al Qaida member with the Islamic Movement of Turkistan (IMT).
- 4. The detainee was seen a few times at the Aashara guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan and the guest house located in Shakardara, Afghanistan. The detainee and his troops stayed at the guest houses but had their own group, Islamic Movement of Turkistan. The Islamic Movement of Turkistan fought with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance. The Uighurs did this to receive training from the Taliban and a promise from the Taliban that they would assist them in their fight to free themselves from Chinese oppression.
- 5. The detainee believed that the Taliban helped finance the Uighur training camp near Tora Bora.

d. Other Relevant Data

- 1. The first night of the United States bombing campaign destroyed the Uighur training camp. Uighurs that survived the bombing campaign fled to Tora Bora after the bombing campaign.
- 2. The Uighurs saw some Arabs leaving in the direction of the Pakistan border and took the opportunity to follow them. The Uighurs lost sight of the Arabs and found themselves in Parachinar Village, Pakistan. The villagers turned the Uighurs over to the Pakistan authorities.

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- 3. The detainee told the Pakistani authorities he was a member of the Taliban so they would send him to an American prison instead of being turned over to the Chinese government.
- 4. The detainee spent six months in a Kandahar, Afghanistan jail in United States custody. From Kandahar, the Uighur detainees were flown to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
- 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee claimed he does not know anything about a group called the Islamic Movement of Turkistan. When asked who Abdul Jabar was, the detainee said it was the name of a Uighur teacher who was at the Tora Bora camp.
- b. The detainee denied that he had any knowledge of who was funding the Uighur camp. The detainee stated that he had thought the Americans funded the camp. The detainee laughed when he was told that the camp might have been funded by al Qaida.
 - c. The detainee advised that he did not belong to any Uighur organizations.
- d. The detainee claimed that the Uighurs did not participate in any way with the Taliban or al Qaida.
- e. Until his experience in camp, the detainee held the United States in the highest regard, viewing the United States as the only saviors of the suppressed Uighur people. Uighurs from age 7 to 70 know that America is the sole advocate for human rights and democracy in the world and they expect sympathy from Americans.
- f. The detained denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.