




OPERATION EUFOR RD CONGO



EUROPEAN UNION
OPERATION HEADQUARTERS





3	Welcoming Address	Execution Phase	43
4	History of the DRC The Congo MONUC EUSEC RD Congo EUPOL Kinshasa	Chronology of Events Air Operations Efforts of the EU OHQ Military Intelligence Real Life Support The Liaison Network for EUFOR RD Congo Command Support Finances and Contracts Civil Military Co-operation/ Co-ordination Medical Support Gender Issues EU OHQ Potsdam - Visitors	
11	The Road to EUFOR A need for MONUC assistance Activation of the EU OHQ Potsdam Military Strategic Planning Process		
18	Preparation Phase Military Operational Planning The Initiating Military Directive The Concept of Operations OPLAN and the Decision to Launch the Operation Force Generation The Logistic Concept of EUFOR RD Congo Information Operation Duty travels of the Command Group Human Rights The EU Force Headquarters	End of Mission EU OHQ in Standby again Experiences and way ahead EUFOR RD Congo left the Congo, the EU stayed	64
39	Moving to and from Africa Deployment Re-deployment Strategic Sea-and Air- transport The Multinational Co-ordinated Advance Team The EU OHQ Hand Over Team	Appendix Operation Commander's Biography Force Commander's Biography EU OHQ Potsdam - Full Chronology of Visitors List of Abbreviations	68

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Henning-von-Tresckow-Kaserne
Werderscher-Damm 21-29
14548 Schwielowsee / OT Geltow
Phone: +49 3327/50-2044
Fax: +49 3327/50-2049
e-Mail: einsfuekdobwpiz@bundeswehr.org

Responsible:

Colonel (GS) Martin Braun

Editorial office:

Lieutenant Colonel (GS) Jesko Peldszus
Major Andreas Huth

Layout:

Sergeant David Jany

Print:

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Dear Reader,

Operation EUFOR RD Congo presented the European Union an opportunity, a premiere and a challenge. This operation gave Europe the opportunity to reinforce its efforts in assisting the people of the Democratic Republic of Congo on their way to democracy and stability. Operation EUFOR RD Congo integrated a military contribution into the wider European activities during the critical timeframe of the election process. The operation was from the outset focused and limited to the period of the presidential elections, which included the election of the National Assembly and the Provincial Elections. EUFOR RD Congo also succeeded in using Europe's opportunity to assist the United Nations with their efforts to assist the Congolese. The co-operation worked from the highest political levels down to the tactical military levels on the streets of Kinshasa.

This operation constituted also the premiere for activation and use of the European military headquarters based to the concepts related to EU-led military Crisis Management Operations. For me it was an honour having been selected as the Operation Commander for this operation and a privilege to command the EU Operation Headquarters in Potsdam. This premiere has successfully laid the foundation for the future of EU military operations and contributed also for optimizing the related EU concepts.

The enormous challenge given to the European Union to prepare and conduct this difficult task in the heart of Africa was certainly met. The planning was conducted in a swift and co-ordinated manner between Brussels and the military headquarters, the challenging

generation of the force was achieved in time, the deployment into and out of theatre was achieved in a multinational and co-operative spirit and the execution proved the outstanding reputation of European military forces and their ability to operate jointly and combined.



Lieutenant General Karlheinz Viereck

I have always enjoyed co-operating with the various counterparts I had both in Europe and in Africa. In this respect I would like to mention the different EU institutions, the EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region and the EU nations' embassies in theatre. Finally, I would like to focus your attention on the women and men of EUFOR RD Congo. With rather short preparation everybody contributed at the individual position to the common objective of the operation. My personal appreciation is dedicated to all soldiers in the tactical units, to the personnel in the headquarters and to the contributors on all additional levels participating in Operation EUFOR RD Congo. They made the difference.

What I would like to achieve with this brochure is to present to you an idea of the tasks, the responsibilities and the contributions of EUFOR RD Congo from the point of view of the Operation Headquarters Potsdam.

I thank you for your interest in Operation EUFOR RD Congo and wish you a stimulating read!

I thank you for your interest in Operation EUFOR RD Congo and wish you a stimulating read!

Karlheinz Viereck

Lieutenant General and
Operation Commander EUFOR RD Congo



Early history

The area nowadays known as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was populated as early as 10,000 years ago and settled in the 7th and 8th centuries by Bantus from present-day Nigeria. By about 1000 the Bantu had settled most of the Congo, reducing the area occupied by the Pygmies. In the early second millennium the Bantu had increased considerably in number and were coalescing into states. Some of these states governed large areas and had complex administrative structures. Most of the states were ruled by monarchs, whose authority were checked by a council of high civil servants and elders.



King Leopold II of Belgium

During its history the area has also been known as Kongo, Congo Free State, Belgian Congo and Zaire. Congo was a powerful kingdom that existed from the 14th to the 18th century. It was the dominant force in the region until the arrival of the Portuguese navigator Diogo Cao as the first European to visit this country in 1482. In the 16th and 17th centuries British, Dutch, Portuguese and French merchants used the country for slave trade.

The colonization

The most important events in the history of the area (from the point of view of its current situation) occurred in the 50 years from about 1870, when European exploration and exploitation took place. During this period the area was controlled as private territory by King Leopold II of Belgium. Leopold believed that Belgium needed colonies to ensure its prosperity, and sensing that the Belgians would not support colonial ventures, he privately set about establishing a colonial empire. On 15 November 1908, he formally relinquished personal control of the

Congo Free State and the renamed Belgian Congo came under the administration of the Belgian parliament, a system which lasted until independence was granted in 1960. The educational system was dominated by the Roman Catholic Church and Protestant churches and the curricula reflected Christian and Western values. For example, in 1948 a total of 99.6% of the educational facilities were controlled by Christian missions. There was little regard for native culture and beliefs. Native schooling was mainly religious and vocational. Political administration fell under the total and direct control of the mother country; there were no democratic institutions. Native curfews and other restrictions were not unusual. Following World War II some democratic reforms began to

be introduced, but these were complicated by ethnic rivalries among the native population.

Clearing tropical forests ate away at profit margins. However, ample plots of cleared land were already available. Below is shown how a Congolese farming village is emptied and levelled to make way for a rubber plantation.




Clearing tropical forests in the Congo

The Democratic Republic of the Congo

In 1955, when demands for independence were mounting throughout Africa, Antoine van Bilsen, a Belgian professor, published a "30-Year Plan" for granting the Congo increased self-government. The plan was not accepted by most Belgians, who assumed that Belgian rule in the Congo would continue for a long period. Events proved otherwise.

The First Republic (1960–1965)



Independence Flag
1960 - 1963



Flag of Congo-Kinshasa
1963 - 1971

Following a series of riots and unrest, the Belgians realised they could not maintain control of such a vast country. The Congo was granted its independence on 30 June 1960, adopting the name „Republic of the Congo“ (République du Congo). As the French colony of Middle Congo (Moyen Congo) also chose the

name Republic of Congo upon receiving its independence, the two countries were more commonly known as Congo-Leopoldville and Congo-Brazzaville, after their capital cities. In 1966, Joseph Désiré Mobutu changed the country's official name to Zaire, the new flag was only implemented in 1971.

At the time of independence, the country was in a very unstable state - regional tribal leaders held far more power than the central government - and with the departure of the Belgian administrators there were almost no skilled bureaucrats left in the country. Parliamentary elections in 1960 produced the nationalist Patrice Lumumba as prime minister and pro-Western Joseph Kasavubu as president of the re-named Democratic Republic of the



Joseph Mobutu

Congo. Even from this fleeting moment of independence democracy began to unravel. A military coup broke out in the capital and rampant looting began. To protect Europeans in the country and try to restore order 20,000 UN-peacekeepers were sent to the country. In this same period Congo's second richest province, Kasai province, announced its independence, after Katanga had done that before.

Prime Minister Lumumba turned to the USSR for assistance. Nikita Khrushchev agreed to help, offering advanced weaponry and technical advisors. The United States viewed the Soviet presence as an attempt to take advantage of the situation and gain a proxy state in sub-Saharan Africa. UN forces were ordered to block any shipments of arms into the country. The United States also looked for a way to replace Lumumba as leader. President Kasavubu had clashed with Prime Minister Lumumba and advocated an alliance with the West rather than the Soviets. The USA sent weapons and CIA personnel to aid forces allied with Kasavubu and combat the Soviet presence. In December 1960, with USA and CIA support, Kasavubu and his loyal Colonel Joseph Mobutu overthrew the government. Lumumba was assassinated with the knowledge of Mobutu. After some reverses, UN and Congolese government forces succeeded in recapturing the breakaway provinces of Katanga and Kasai.

The Second & Third Republic (1965–1996)

Unrest and rebellion plagued the government until 1965, when Lieutenant General Mobutu, by then commander in chief of the national army, seized control of the country and declared himself president for five years. Mobutu quickly consolidated his power and was elected unopposed as president in 1970. Embarking on a campaign of cultural awareness, Mobutu renamed the country the Republic of Zaire and required citizens



Flag of Zaire
1971 -1997



to adopt African names. Relative peace and stability prevailed until 1977 and 1978 when Katangan rebels, based in Angola, launched a series of invasions into the Shaba (Katanga) region. The rebels were driven out with the aid of French and Belgian paratroopers.



Late President Joseph Mobutu

During the 1980s, Zaire remained a one-party state. Although Mobutu successfully maintained control during this period, opposition parties, most notably the Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social (UDPS), were active. Mobutu's attempts to quell these groups drew significant international criticism.

As the Cold War came to a close, internal and external pressures on Mobutu increased. In late 1989 and early 1990, Mobutu was weakened by a series of domestic protests, by heightened international criticism of his regime's human rights practices, by a faltering economy, and by government corruption, most notably his massive embezzlement of government funds for personal use. In April 1990, Mobutu declared the Third Republic, agreeing to a limited multi-party system with elections and a constitution. As details of a reform package were delayed, soldiers in September 1991 began looting Kinshasa to protest their unpaid wages. 2,000 French and Belgian troops arrived to evacuate the 20,000 endangered foreign nationals in Kinshasa.

In 1992, after previous similar attempts, the long-promised Sovereign National Conference was staged, encompassing over 2,000 representatives from various political parties. The conference gave itself a legislative mandate and elected Archbishop Laurent Monsengwo as its chairman, along with Étienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba, leader of the UDPS, as prime minister. By the end of the year Mobutu had created a rival government with its own prime minister. The ensu-

ing stalemate produced a compromise merger of the two governments into the High Council of Republic-Parliament of Transition (HCR-PT) in 1994, with Mobutu as head of state and Kengo Wa Dondo as prime minister. Although presidential and legislative elections were scheduled repeatedly over the next two years, they never took place.

The Conflict

By 1996, tensions from the neighboring Rwanda war and genocide had spilled over to Zaire. Rwandan Hutu militia forces, who had fled Rwanda following the ascension of a Tutsi-led government, had been using Hutu refugee camps in eastern Zaire as a basis for incursion against Rwanda. These Hutu militia forces soon allied with the Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ) to launch a campaign against Congolese ethnic Tutsis in eastern Zaire. In turn, these Tutsis formed a militia to defend themselves against attacks. When the Zairian government began to escalate its massacres in November 1996, the Tutsi militias erupted in rebellion against Mobutu.



Flag 1997-2006




Rwandan Genocide 1994

The Tutsi militia was soon joined by various opposition groups and supported by several countries, including Rwanda and Uganda. This coalition, led by Laurent-Desire Kabila, became known as the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL). The AFDL, now seeking the broader goal of ousting Mobutu, made significant military gains in early 1997. Following failed peace talks between Mobutu and Kabila in May 1997, Mobutu went to Morocco, where he died in the same year, and Kabila marched unopposed to Kinshasa on 20 May 1997. Kabila named himself president, consolidated power around himself and the AFDL, and reverted the name of the coun-



try to the Democratic Republic of Congo. Kabila demonstrated little ability to manage the problems of his country. He lost his allies and the Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC), led by the warlord Jean-Pierre Bemba, backed by Rwandan and Ugandan troops attacked in August 1998, soon after Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia sent some form of force into the DRC, with Zimbabwe and Angola supporting the government. While the six African governments involved in the war signed a ceasefire accord in Lusaka in July 1999, the Congolese rebels did not and the ceasefire broke down within months. Kabila was assassinated in January 2001 by one of his bodyguards, and was succeeded by his son Joseph Kabila. Upon taking office Joseph Kabila called for multilateral peace talks to end the war. He partly succeeded in February 2001 when a further peace deal was brokered between Kabila, Rwanda and Uganda leading to the apparent withdrawal of foreign troops.



Jean-Pierre Bemba

ing of the substantial natural resources in the country which are diamonds, copper, zinc, and coltan. The conflict was reignited in January 2002 by ethnic clashes in the northeast and both Uganda and Rwanda then halted their withdrawal and sent in more troops.

First talks between Kabila and the rebel leaders were held in Sun City in April 2002. In June they signed a peace accord in which Kabila would share power with former rebels. The government and both main rebel groups reached an accord in April 2003, when they signed a peace agreement that called for a power-sharing government led by President Kabila, and an interim parliament.



President Joseph Kabila

Despite the peace deal, fighting continued in parts of the Congo, especially between tribal groups in the east. Therefore, the UN Secretary-General called for establishing and deploying a temporary multinational force until the insufficiently established MONUC mission could be reinforced. With Resolution 1484/2003 the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IMEF) to Bunia with the task to secure the airport, protect internally displaced persons in several camps and the civilians in the town.



Post-war charter underpins hopes for a stable future

UN-Peacekeepers arrived in April 2001. For a long time the Ugandans and the MLC held a 200 mile wide section of the north of the country; Rwandan forces and its front, the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) controlled a large section of the east; and government forces or their allies held the west and south of the country. There were reports that the conflict was being prolonged as a cover for extensive loot-




UN - Peacekeepers in Democratic Republic of Congo

It soon broadened to a EU-led mission with France as the framework nation, named Operation ARTEMIS. This operation was launched on 12 June 2003. In the same month the government and rebels agreed on the composition of the new government, which was formally established. Democratic elections were scheduled for 2005. By the time of the government's establishment it was estimated that 3,300,000 people had died, directly or indirectly, as a result of the fighting that began in 1998.



Operation ARTEMIS was successful in stabilizing the situation in Bunia and enforcing the UN presence in the DRC. It was the first autonomous EU military mission outside Europe – an important milestone in development of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). In September 2003, responsibility for the security of the region was handed back to MONUC. The force was subsequently increased to 17.000 soldiers in 2006. The DRC had a transitional government until the last period of election is over. A constitution was approved by vote of the DRC people.

On 30 July 2006 the DRC held its first multi-party elections since independence in 1960. Out of 33 candidates for the presidential election, Joseph Kabila achieved 45% of the votes and Jean-Pierre Bemba took 20%. With this result, these two candidates were called for a run-off and a second round for the presidential elections was required. This second round was held on 29 October 2006, showing Kabila as old and new president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. For the period of the presidential election, the parliamentary and provincial elections EUFOR RD Congo was established and supported the decisive parts of election process. The details of preparing, deploying, executing the support and re-deploying will be described in this brochure in detail.



Flag of the DRC since 2006

MONUC


United Nation Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

After the Democratic Republic of the Congo and five regional States (Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe) signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July 1999, the UN Security Council set up MONUC (Mission de l'ONU en RD Congo) on 30 November 1999, incorporating UN personnel authorized in earlier resolutions (Resolution 1258 of 06 August 1999, that authorized the deployment of the first 90 United Nations military liaison personnel). On 24 February 2000, the Council expanded the mission's mandate and size (up to 5,537 military personnel, including up to 500 observers), on 04 December 2002 authorized the expansion of MONUC to a level of up to 8,700 military personnel in two task forces and finally on 01 October 2004 to a new ceiling of 16,700 in total.

The mandate of MONUC can be broken into four phases: Phase one involved forcibly implementing the ceasefire agreement. Phase two involved the monitoring and reporting of any violations. Phase three is the integration of the DDRR (Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration) process. Phase four includes facilitating the transition towards the organization of credible elections.

MONUC's authorized personnel strength during Operation EUFOR RD Congo was:

- Military personnel: 16,535
- Military Observers 763
- Police personnel: 1,107
- Civilian personnel: 959 international, 2,046 local and 656 United Nations Volunteers, include specialists in human rights, humanitarian affairs, public information, child protection, political affairs, medical and administrative support.



MONUC's military personnel strength

Contributors of military personnel in 2006 were: Algeria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, France, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay and Zambia.

Up to now a total of 98 fatalities have been suffered by MONUC. Among these 98 there were 68 military personnel, 10 military observers, 2 UN police officers, 9 international civilian and 9 local civilian personnel fatalities.

MONUC Force was in 2006 distributed in the Western Brigade and Eastern Division.

The Western Brigade is responsible of troops stationed in Kinshasa and in the Provinces of Bas Congo, Equateur, Bandundu and Kasai Oriental and Occidental. It is composed of three Battalions provided by Ghana, Tunisia and Uruguay. The Brigade and the

Battalions Headquarters are stationed in Kinshasa.

The Eastern Division as the biggest part of MONUC forces is allocated to the eastern part of Democratic Republic of Congo and it is divided in one Division Headquarters in Kisingani and four Brigades: Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu and Katanga brigades. There are some additional forces stationed in the area of Maniema with the headquarters located in Kindu.



MONUC's troops deployment



EUSEC RD Congo

European Security Sector Reform Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Following an official request by the DRC government, the EU decided to establish a EU advisory and assistance mission for security reform in the DRC. EUSEC RD Congo was established by EU Council Joint Action on 02 May 2005 and officially launched on 08 June 2005.

The purpose of EUSEC is advisory and assistance mission for the DRC security reform. The mission, comprising eight experts, provides advice and assistance to Congolese authorities in charge of security. The experts are assigned to key posts within the Congolese administration. The mandate includes the identification of and contribution to the development of various projects and options that the EU and/or its Member States may decide to support in this area. The mission was launched on 08 June 2005.

EUPOL Kinshasa

European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa

EUPOL Kinshasa was established by EU Council Joint Action on 09 December 2004 and officially launched on 12 April 2005. EUPOL Kinshasa is a police mission to provide a framework for and advice to the Congolese Police, in order to guarantee that his actions are in line with international police best practices. The mission is limited to the area of Kinshasa. Its 30 Police Officers monitor, mentor and advise the Integrated Police Unit (IPU). EUPOL Kinshasa was temporarily reinforced by additional 38 Police Officers in order to support the co-ordination of relevant Congo-

lese police units during the electoral period. Thus, a total of 12 nations were part of this mission. EUPOL Kinshasa does not have any executive powers, nor will it substitute for the responsibility of Congolese Police chain of command EUPOL Kinshasa is also ensuring



DRC police officer during mission preparation advised by EUPOL Kinshasa



EUPOL officers in Kinshasa

liaison with EUSEC DR Congo in the field of security sector reform. During the election process of EUPOL Kinshasa co-operated with EUFOR in their common goal to provide security for the electoral process and exchanged Liaison Officers on a permanent basis.


A need for MONUC assistance

The electoral process formed one decisive part of the transition process in the DRC. At the end of 2005 in New York at the United Nations Headquarters, in the light of the elections planned with their first round to include the presidential elections for April 2006, first thoughts were developed on possible ways to safeguard this crucial period leading to a democratically elected Government of the DRC. A further increase in MONUC troop strength given in the existing UN mandate was at that time not a valid option. Therefore, other opportunities were discussed. In this context the United Nations represented by the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations invited the European Union to consider the possibility of deploying a military force to the DRC. This force was intended to assist MONUC during the electoral process. This request to the EU was submitted on 27 December 2005 and formed the starting point of the EU military engagement in the DRC.

It was mutually agreed between New York and Brussels that first of all assessment teams of the European Union would have to go to the DRC and gather needed information. The first Exploratory Missions went out to Kinshasa and also to the UNDPKO in January/February 2006. A key facilitator in this phase was Mr. Aldo Ajello, the EU Special Representative for the African Great Lakes Region. His contacts in the political arena in the DRC as well as in the neighboring countries paved the way for the initial contacts on the military level for the designated OpCdr.

Resulting from the Exploratory Missions findings an Option Paper was drafted in early Feb-

ruary 2006. The Option Paper was considered to represent the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) and to facilitate subsequently the development of the Council Joint Action and the Initiating Military Directive. This Option Paper took the EU efforts already ongoing (EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC RD Congo) into account.



UN Headquarters New York

The Key Elements of the future EU military operation were also already covered in this Option Paper. The request by UNDPKO to provide "a suitably earmarked force reserve that could enhance MONUC's quick reaction capabilities during and immediately after the electoral process" together with the identified possible EUFOR tasks form the core of this paper. Seven tasks were identified and three Military Options outlined. These options differed mainly in the strength

of the force deployed to Kinshasa and the pre-deployment of equipment to the DRC. Speed, effectiveness and cost were considered as factors to compare the options.

It should also be noted that already at that early stage some limitations, like a limited duration of the military operation, exclusion of the northeastern provinces for EUFOR land operations, concentration on specific and limited Points of Application as well as the acting in support of MONUC, were clearly stated.

The timing of the electoral process as the factor determining the presence of the military force, however, did not stay a constant to base planning upon. The planning assumption on adoption of the Option Paper was, that the first round of the Presidential Elections would take place at the end of April 2006. In the end, due to several reasons the first round of the elections was held exactly three months later on 30 July 2006.



Activation of the EU OHQ Potsdam



Aerial photo of the EU OHQ Potsdam

There are basically three options for conducting an EU Crisis Management Operation. Either the EU OHQ at SHAPE using NATO common assets and capabilities can be tasked or the EU Operations Centre co-located with the EU Military Staff in Brussels might be chosen. For EUFOR RD Congo the third option to activate a headquarters provided by an EU Member State was chosen. Germany provided the EU OHQ co-located with the Bundeswehr Operations Command (BwOpsCmd) in Potsdam for the first time in EU history.


The designated EU OHQ in Potsdam faced the challenge to reach Initial Operational Capability (IOC) within five days of designation. The process of activation started with activation of the BwOpsCmd OHQ Key Nucleus on 23 March 2006 and on 29 March 2006 the multinational primary augmentees were called via their respective National Military Representatives to the EU. Arrival was demanded in two priorities. The first group arrived on 04 April 2006 and the second group reported to Potsdam on 12 April 2006. The BwOpsCmd OHQ Key Nucleus used the ORBAT defined in the EU OHQ Manning Guide as a basis for the creation of the Crisis Establishment (CE) of the EU OHQ Potsdam. The size of the CE was tailored to meet the estimated requirements of the still to be planned operation.

The Command Group comprised the Operation Commander (OpCdr) Lieutenant General Karlheinz Viereck, the Deputy Operation Commander (DepOpCdr) Major General Jean-Luc Hotier and the Chief of Staff (COS) Colonel Martin Roland Braun. Directly assigned to the Command Group were the Specialist Staff, including the expertise of Political Advisors (POLAD), Legal Advisors (LEGAD), Media, Cultural and Gender Issues, and furthermore the Liaison Staff, the Special Operations Forces (SOF) Cell and, assigned directly to the COS, the Headquarters Support Staff.

The staff itself was structured in the classical branches CJ1 Personnel, CJ2 Intelligence, CJ3 Operations including the Joint Operation Centre (JOC), CJ4 Logistics including the EU Movement Co-ordination Centre (EUMCC), CJ5 Planning, CJ6 Communication & Information Systems (CIS), CJ7 Training and Lessons Learned, CJ8 Budget and Finance, CJ9 Civil Military Co-operation and CJMed Medical Support plus the Information Operations Cell (InfoOps Cell). The flags on the diagrams indicate the nationality of the respective branch chiefs.

The EU OHQ was supported by a complex support organisation provided by the German BwOpsCmd as the Parent Nation HQ, its assigned Signal Battalion in Potsdam and





Swift establishment of the EU OHQ depended on detailed advance preparations by the Parent Nation HQ. Facilities were available and ready for occupation by a multinational staff. The selection of PA was facilitated by a pool of identified PA, held at appropriate readiness and kept in a specific PA Database in the responsibility of the EUMS. All EU OHQ branches were provided with required qualifications on time for IOC and FOC. In single cases the manning of specialist posts was directly supported by addressed nations.


respective national institutions. There were organic, permanent and non-permanent levels of support.

Once appointed, the Headquarters Commandant (HQ Cdt) adopted a mission-tailored design approach to meet the requirements of the operation. In order to facilitate the preparation and the build-up process, the EUMS provided early in the process relevant information, so that the EU OHQ could start the necessary internal preparation.

The Parent Nation HQ provided the Key Nucleus staff and was reinforced both by multinational Primary Augmentees (PA) and Additional Augmentees (AA). The conduct of the operation required the full manning of the EU OHQ.

Additional Augmentees up to the amount required for the operation joined the EU OHQ within 20 days after designation of the EU OHQ. Their selection was subject of and related to the specific needs of the operation and resulted from the Force Generation Process.

Altogether the EU OHQ manning reached its maximum with 146 personnel on 11 July 2006. Throughout the operation, the branches sustained their experience and routine in staff work regardless large fluctuation of personnel. Until the deactivation of the EU OHQ two ACOS, 49 officers, 26 Non-Commissioned Officers and four civilian personnel have been replaced during the mission.





Military Strategic Planning Process

Close Co-operation between Brussels and Potsdam

Military Strategic Planning for EU Crisis Management Operations (CMO) is laid down in the EU concept for Military Strategic Planning dated 25 September 2001. Planning in that respect has been so far executed three times for real operations (Operations CONCORDIA, ARTEMIS and ALTHEA) before preparing EUFOR RD Congo.

However, this outlined procedure (see diagram) was not always followed while preparing these operations. For CONCORDIA for example there was neither a Military Strategic Option Directive (MSOD), nor a Military Strategic Option (MSO) nor a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and for ARTEMIS only a Crisis Management Concept (CMC) and the Operation Plan (OPLAN) were developed. Operation EUFOR RD Congo was not an exception as the above-mentioned Option Paper replaced the CMC and no MSOD/MSO were developed. However, on the operational level the CONOPS and the OPLAN were developed according to the agreed procedures. This will be covered in a following chapter.

The Option Paper provided the basis for continuing from February on the Military Strategic Planning and formed the framework for

subsequent Military Operational Planning. Only minor adaptations in the guiding principles provided by Brussels were made afterwards. Therefore the OHQ Planning Team,



once officially formed end of March, could perfectly start its work with the given parameters. Among these the most prominent are the EU Political and EU Political-Military Objectives as well as the Military Mission. After intensive discussions within Brussels using the format of the EUMC and the EUMC

L 116/98 EN Official Journal of the European Union 29.4.2006

COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2006/319/CFSP
of 27 April 2006
on the European Union military operation in support of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) during the election process

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

Article 1
Mission

1. The European Union shall conduct a military operation in the DRC in support of MONUC during the election process, named Operation EUFOR RD Congo, in accordance with the mandate set out in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1671 (2006).

2. The forces deployed to that effect shall operate in accordance with the objectives for possible EU support to MONUC as approved by the Council on 23 March 2006.

Article 2
Appointment of the EU Operation Commander


Lieutenant General Karlheinz VIERECK is hereby appointed EU Operation Commander.

Article 3
Designation of the EU Operational Headquarters

The EU Operational Headquarters shall be located at Armed Forces Operations Command (Einsatzführungskommando der Bundeswehr (EinsFüKdo Bw)) in Potsdam.

Article 4
Designation of the EU Force Commander

Major General Christian DAMAY is hereby appointed EU Force Commander.



2006. Continuously the revision of the Initiating Military Directive (IMD) in the context of the drafted UNSCR was undertaken. The harmonization efforts finally resulted in the release of the IMD immediately after the adoption of the Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP on the basis of United Nations Security Council Security Resolution (UNSCR) 1671/2006 as of 25 April 2006. With these documents the political foundation of Operation EUFOR RD Congo was successfully laid. End of March 2006 the electoral timeline had been extended already. Planning assumption at that stage was to

Working Groups (EUMCWG) a Military Advice on the Option Paper could be finalized mid March 2006. The active involvement of nations willing to participate in the operation prepared the ground for subsequent commitments. In addition, the conclusions of the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management were included in the planning process.

reach FOC mid June 2006. The Military Operational Planning, which is going to be described in the next chapter, meanwhile had been conducted since end of March 2006 and was taking the draft documents and the changed timeline into account. The responsibilities during the development of the subsequent planning documents and its chronological sequence is shown in the two diagrams. UNSCR 1671/2006 as a basic document setting the framework for EUFOR RD Congo is displayed on the following two pages.

At that time the decision to activate the EU OHQ at Potsdam prior to an adoption of the Joint Action was prepared. Germany acted as the Lead Nation for this effort. An early activation provides the possibility to provide external support to Brussels according to the respective EU concepts for Crisis Management and to facilitate early preparations on the military level. Simultaneously the preparations to activate a Force Headquarters, with France being the Lead Nation, were progressing. After noting the Military Advice the EU Council approved on 23 March 2006 the Option Paper and the Presidency confirmed the principles for the EU military support to MONUC in a letter of 28 March

EUFOR RD Congo chronological sequence of key documents

▪ Option Paper (representing the Crisis Management Concept)	09 Feb 2006
▪ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1671/2006	25 Apr 2006
▪ Initiating Military Directive (IMD)	27 Apr 2006
▪ Concept of Operations incl. Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CONOPS / CJSOR)	27 Apr 2006
▪ EU Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP	27 Apr 2006
▪ Operation Plan (OPLAN)	29 May 2006
▪ EU Council Decision 2006/412/CFSP	12 Jun 2006



United Nations

S/RES/1671 (2006)



Security Council

Distr.: General
25 April 2006

Resolution 1671 (2006)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 5421st meeting, on
25 April 2006**

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and statements by its President on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in particular resolutions 1565 of 1 October 2004, 1592 of 30 March 2005, 1621 of 6 September 2005 and 1635 of 28 October 2005, and the statement of its President dated 21 December 2005 (S/PRST/2005/66),

Commending the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the successful holding of a referendum on the draft Constitution that entered into force on 18 February 2006,

Underlining the importance of elections as the foundation for the longer term restoration of peace and stability, national reconciliation and establishment of the rule of law in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

Determining that the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Takes note* of the letter addressed by the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the President of the Security Council dated 30 March 2006 (S/2006/203) and of the support of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the temporary deployment of a European Union force ("Eufor R.D.Congo") to support MONUC during the period encompassing the elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

2. *Authorizes*, for a period ending four months after the date of the first round of the presidential and parliamentary elections, the deployment of Eufor R.D.Congo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

3. *Notes* that Eufor R.D.Congo will comprise advance elements concentrated in Kinshasa and other elements held outside the Democratic Republic of the Congo (an "over the horizon" force) with the appropriate capacity;



S/RES/1671 (2006)

4. *Decides* that the authorization for the deployment mentioned in paragraph 2 above shall not exceed the term of MONUC's mandate and will be subject, beyond 30 September 2006, to the extension of MONUC's mandate;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to inform the Security Council of the decision to be taken by the Congolese authorities on the definitive timetable for the holding of the elections;

6. *Stresses* that Eufor R.D.Congo is authorized immediately to take all appropriate steps, including the deployment of advance elements in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in order to prepare its full operational capability;

7. *Invites* the European Union to take all appropriate steps with a view to the well-coordinated disengagement of its force following the completion of its mandate;

8. *Decides* that Eufor R.D.Congo is authorized to take all necessary measures, within its means and capabilities, to carry out the following tasks, in accordance with the agreement to be reached between the European Union and the United Nations:

(a) to support MONUC to stabilize a situation, in case MONUC faces serious difficulties in fulfilling its mandate within its existing capabilities,

(b) to contribute to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence in the areas of its deployment, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

(c) to contribute to airport protection in Kinshasa,

(d) to ensure the security and freedom of movement of the personnel as well as the protection of the installations of Eufor R.D.Congo,

(e) to execute operations of limited character in order to extract individuals in danger,

9. *Notes* that decisions to engage Eufor R.D.Congo on the tasks mentioned in paragraph 8 above will be taken by the European Union upon a request by the Secretary-General, or in emergency cases, in close consultation with MONUC, to fulfil tasks mentioned in subparagraphs 8 (b), (c), (d) and (e);




Military Operational Planning

A premiere for Europe and for the EU OHQ in Potsdam

Military Operational Planning was not invented for preparing Operation EUFOR RD Congo. Generally, planning follows NATO's Guidelines for Operational Planning, which are expected to be common knowledge for everybody joining an EU OHQ. Planning was also prepared through a series of annual EU exercises addressing officers from all EU nations since 2002. In addition, in preparation for Operation ARTEMIS, Military Operational Planning in the EU was once conducted in 2003. As some planners for EUFOR RD Congo had also knowledge of Operation ARTEMIS, their experience of planning and of the country could also be used. However, end of March 2006 time was a rare resource aiming for end of April 2006 with EUFOR being at Full Operational Capability (FOC). In order to save time "Co-operative Planning" (promising to be not as time-consuming as "Parallel Planning") was chosen to conduct

ning", being familiar to most planners and so far exclusively used by the EU and also by NATO planners is, that during Co-operative Planning essentially only one "Concept of Operations" (CONOPS) is developed on the Military Strategic level (EU OHQ) and only one "Operation Plan" (OPLAN) is developed on the operational level (EU FHQ).

When the Multinational Core Planning Team (MNCPT) started the planning process in Potsdam a team of the designated EU FHQ was also present. This team mainly consisted of French planners out of the "Etat Major InterArmées de Force et d'Entrainement" (Joint Force and Training Headquarters) in Creil (France), however also German operational planners coming from the "Kommando Operative Führung Eingreifkräfte" (Bundeswehr Response Force Command) in Ulm (Germany) contributed to the initial planning. In Potsdam in building 58a two planning and briefing rooms were already available while all around this "quite eye of the storm" the EU OHQ was building up in terms of infrastructure and manning.




Collaborative Planning

the planning. This specific process at that time had not been used before. Above "Co-operative Planning" (as of EU OHQ SOP Version 4) is depicted, which in March 2006 was still called "Collaborative Planning" (as then valid EU OHQ SOP Version 3 was still valid). The main difference between the chosen planning process and "Parallel Plan-

During the Orientation Stage the Multinational Core Planning Team under the lead of ACOS CJ5 assessed the Option Paper and was contributing to the drafting of the IMD in the spirit of external support to the planners in Brussels. These planners were mainly provided by the EUMS under the lead of the Chief Crisis Response Planning/Current Op-

erations Branch. This external support was actually executed as a common effort during some drafting sessions in Potsdam and later by commenting the final changes from Potsdam. Lieutenant General Viereck, being the designated but not appointed OpCdr at that time, was present at most of these sessions. With the knowledge of the IMD in its Draft



ence of the procedures in Brussels as well as his planning experience and last but not least with his knowledge of the actors in Brussels. Simultaneously, the EU OHQ had grown to 2/3 of its strength and two Work-Up Staff Trainings have been conducted under the lead of the CJ7 branch to bring everybody up to speed.

The first Draft CONOPS went to Brussels on 11 April 2006 and was finalized in Potsdam on 25 April 2006. In this process the PSC agreed the CONOPS and the EU Council approved the CONOPS. Simultaneously,

Version the Orientation Stage started with drafting the Mission Analysis Briefing (MAB). During this phase an observer team from Spain was present at the planning sessions allowing situational awareness for detailing a possible Spanish contribution to EUFOR. This close co-operation finally resulted in Spain providing a highly mobile infantry company as the "Force Capable of Immediate Reaction" (FCIR). This company was during the execution of the operation the spearhead of EUFOR maneuver elements on the ground.

A major input was contributed by CJ2 for the situation of the conflict parties. In the second part of the MAB the focus shifted on determining the Operations Design. The MAB was conducted on 04 April 2006 and took about 90 minutes. The following Commander's Planning Guidance focused the MNCPT work on examining the staging options for the On-Call Force. In addition, the MNCPT was tasked to brief within the Decision Brief (DB) updates on the Force Estimate, Arrangements for the Reserve at the Strategic Level and proposals for the force's readiness status. When the DB was held on 06 April 2006 the drafting of the CONOPS had already started. In this stage the Liaison Officer of the EUMS played an important role with his big experi-

ly, UNSCR 1671/2006 was drafted and released together with EU Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP and subsequently the IMD. As a parallel effort on 21 April 2006 members of the Council General Secretariat, the EUMS and one staff officer representing the EU OHQ briefed in New York representatives of the UNDPKO on the ongoing EU preparations for the support of MONUC. The final and one very important document to be approved by the EU Council in preparation of an operation is the OPLAN. In long lasting drafting sessions within the EU OHQ under the lead of CJ5 branch and collaboratively with the EU FHQ still located in France the OPLAN was drafted starting end of April. The co-operative approach was still followed. The majority of the co-operation was undertaken through exchanging documents via a secure link and discussing items via secure telephone links. Concurrent with submitting the first Draft OPLAN beginning of May the two Force Generation Conferences (see specific chapter) were conducted and finally on 15 May the 391 pages of the OPLAN were submitted to Brussels. After some few minor adjustments had to be done end of May the PSC agreed and the Council approved the OPLAN.



The Initiating Military Directive

The task-book for the OpCdr

Military Mission

Deploy an advance element to Kinshasa, with an over the horizon force on call, in order to provide timely and sufficient support to MONUC for those situations that may be beyond its capacity.

The IMD essentially provides the OpCdr with the necessary framework to start his Military Operational Planning. Therefore the EU objectives as well as an updated Risk Assessment are provided together with the result of the assessment of the Option Paper. Option 2 with an advance element in Kinshasa comprising the EU FHQ, Force Protection, logistical and medical assets, a maneuver force for immediate reaction and the air assets necessary to move the latter was chosen. This formed the basis for further planning. The on-call element was to be stationed outside the DRC and a Reserve at the Strategic Level (RSL) had to be established in Europe. The Military Mission together with the specific Planning Tasks as well as the Assigned Key Military and Key Supporting Tasks form the core of the IMD.

The further important elements of the IMD leading to the establishment of EUFOR RD Congo are:

- an end-date for the operation NLT four months after the first round of the elections,
- the intention to constitute a force able to address situations beyond MONUC's capabilities,
- the determination of the DRC as the AO while excluding the four north-eastern provinces for the establishment of contingency plans for EUFOR deployment,
- the limitation to support MONUC and to recover personnel at specific geographical points of application,
- the limitation to only evacuate civilians designated persons with special status,
- the retaining of OPCON of the RSL by the EU Member States involved,
- the establishment of an adequate military intelligence architecture,
- the task to formulate a Use of Force policy,
- the requirement of drafting the Rules of Engagement Request (ROEREQ),
- the need for guidance on standards of behavior, gender and human trafficking issues,
- the promotion of close Civil Military Co-ordination,
- the preparation and launching of a Military Information Operations Campaign,
- the preparation of Public Information activities,
- the description of the logistic plan, including measures for Movement and Transportation, Infrastructure and Medical Support,
- the preparation of HNS arrangements,
- the submission of the

Assigned Tasks by Initiating Military Directive

Military Tasks

- Establish an **advance element**, including the FHQ, in KINSHASA,
- Conduct military **information operations** in accordance with the Information Strategy and in close co-operation with MONUC HQ,
- Be prepared to conduct **personnel recovery** of electoral agents, international observers and UN staff involved in the election and who are in imminent danger,
- Be prepared to **support MONUC** stabilisation operations at limited specific geographical points of application,
- Be prepared to contribute to **the protection of N'DJILI airport**.

Key Supporting Task

- **Support MONUC**, when appropriate, with relevant **intelligence**,
- Be prepared to contribute to the **protection of civilians under imminent threat** of physical violence in the areas of deployment, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the DRC.

operational common costs section of the draft budget of the operation,

- the ensuring of appropriate liaison and communication arrangements
- and the ensuring of proper reporting.

During the remainder of the Preparation Phase all depicted planning tasks were fulfilled. The initiation of the deployment of EUFOR units later on marked the transition into the Deployment Phase of Operation EUFOR RD Congo, which naturally overlapped the ongoing preparations.

Planning tasks assigned by Initiating Military Directive

- Activate, augment and run the EU OHQ at Potsdam
- Facilitate the augmentation and activation of the FHQ
- Develop a Draft CONOPS and a CJSOR and present it to PSC and EUMC
- Provide considerations on the establishment of the RSL
- Propose the readiness state for the On-call force and the RSL
- Develop Draft OPLAN after approval of CONOPS incl. C2 structure and ROEREQ and present it to PSC and EUMC
- Initiate Force Generation process when directed
- Initiate Deployment, assume command and direct the FCdr to conduct the EU-led military operation in DRC

Finally, along with the appointment of the OpCdr the appointment of the Force Commander (FCdr) and the location of the EU FHQ are important elements of the IMD.



Major General Christian Damay (FCdr) and Lieutenant General Karlheinz Viereck (OpCdr) at a press conference in Kinshasa



The Concept of Operations (CONOPS)

Foundation for the OPLAN and basis for the Force Generation Process

The CONOPS covers all relevant aspects of an operation. As the document is agreed upon by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and approved by the Council aspects that are to be covered also by the OPLAN its wording cannot be changed later. Similarly, agreed wording of the Option Paper will be found in the CONOPS. The CONOPS was drafted through a truly combined effort. At the time of the drafting the majority of the multinational personnel had arrived in Potsdam, was integrated into the respective branches and brought up to speed through the Work-Up Staff Training.

The CONOPS comprises just 38 pages, already including the cover and the reference page. Therein also the two annexes covering Command Relationship and Military Tasks are integrated. This task list was detailing the tasks to be fulfilled during the execution phase to a certain extent. However, intensive work, mainly conducted by the EU FHQ in cooperation with EU OHQ CJ3 branch, had to be conducted on this basis in order to elaborate the task annex for the OPLAN. The main elements of EUFOR RD Congo CONOPS, in addition to those already covered in the IMD, are summarized in the following:



Flags of Troop Contributors in front of the EU OHQ

- A visible and credible EUFOR able to provide reassurance to the people of the DRC and deterrence to potential spoilers was established as the Strategic Military Center of Gravity.
- Eleven military objectives to be achieved during the operation.
- The OpCdr's intent covering eight aspects of the way to execute the mission was provided forming the basis of the FCdr's ongoing operational analysis.
- The phasing of the operation was introduced following a classic approach determining four phases:
 - Preparation
 - Deployment
 - Execution
 - Re-deployment
- First provisions for forces, resources and capabilities were described.
- Timings of Full Operational Capability and Readiness status of the different EUFOR elements were given.
- Guidelines on operational aspects like Civil Military Co-ordination, Force Protection, Legal Issues, Use of Force, Civil Disturbance Policy and the Information Domain were provided as well as the outline of the Service Support and the Command and Control issues.
- The Area of Operations (AO) was further clarified as the CONOPS determines that no land operations within the four north-eastern provinces were envisaged.
- Several planning assumptions covering operational, logistics, legal and Information Operations aspects.

It has to be stressed again that although both documents have the same date of publication the development of the CONOPS had been executed on the basis of the Draft IMD since the Decision Brief on 06 April 2006. The Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) as the initiating document for the Force Generation Process is covered in the respective chapter.



The Operation Plan EUFOR RD Congo (OPLAN) and the EU Decision to launch the Operation

Paving the path for the execution of Operation EUFOR RD Congo

The OPLAN EUFOR RD Congo is the key reference document for all aspects for the execution of the operation. The document was agreed upon by the PSC and approved by the EU Council. Together with the ROE Request (ROEREQ) the approved OPLAN formed the prerequisite for the EU Council to decide to launch the operation on the 12 June 2006 (see an extract of the copy of the Official Journal of the European Union circulated in the OHQ in Potsdam on the date of publication). This date constituted the end of the Preparation Phase of Operation EUFOR RD Congo.

Agreed CONOPS wording (incl. agreed Option Paper and IMD wording) will again be found in the OPLAN. This applies most prominently for the OPLAN Main Body and the sections covering general aspects within the annexes. OPLAN EUFOR RD Congo comprises 473 pages with the Main Body as the central document comprising just 31 pages. The list of the annexes with the respective headquarters and branches in lead functions in the spirit of Co-operative Planning is displayed on the following page. During the development of the OPLAN the

secure e-Mail connection as well as the telephone wires between Potsdam and Creil were extensively used to ensure maximum co-ordination and coherence between the OpCdr and the FCdr and their respective staffs. Simultaneously, constant co-ordination with the Crisis Action Team within the EUMS took place. In addition to mail and telephone connection a secure VTC link was used nearly daily. These co-ordination efforts even intensified during the first half of May 2006 when the EU Member States comments on the first

L 163/16 EN Official Journal of the European Union 15.6.2006

(Acts adopted under Title V of the Treaty on European Union)

COUNCIL DECISION 2006/412/CFSP
of 12 June 2006
on the launching of the European Union military operation in support of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) during the election process
(Operation EUFOR RD Congo)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP of 27 April 2006 on the European Union military operation in support of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) during the election process⁽¹⁾ and in particular Article 5 thereof,

Whereas:

- (1) The Secretary General of the United Nations by letter dated 18 April 2006 confirmed the principles for the EU military support to MONUC in response to a letter by the Presidency dated 28 March 2006.
- (2) The DRC authorities have welcomed a possible EU military support to MONUC during the electoral process.
- (3) On 25 April 2006, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1671 (2006), authorising the temporary deployment of a European Union force (EUFOR RD Congo) to support MONUC during the period encompassing the elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
- (4) The Independent Electoral Commission of the DRC has announced that the first round of elections in the DRC will be held on 30 July 2006.
- (5) In accordance with Article 6 of the Protocol on the position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Denmark does not participate in the elaboration and implementation of decisions and actions of the European Union which have defence impli-

cations and therefore does not participate in the financing of the operation,

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

Article 1
The EU military operation in the DRC in support of MONUC during the election process (Operation EUFOR RD Congo) shall be launched on 12 June 2006.

Article 2
The EU Operation Commander is hereby authorised with immediate effect to release the activation order (ACTORD) in order to execute the deployment of the forces, prior to Transfer of Authority following their arrival in theatre, and start execution of the mission.

Article 3
This Decision shall take effect on the date of its adoption.

Article 4
This Decision shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.


Done at Luxembourg, 12 June 2006.

For the Council
The President
U. PLASSNIK

Handwritten notes:
OpCdr
OpCdr
POLAD (NAT)
COS
CJ5
CJ5
Union Journal
12.06.06
*5.06.

EUMC decision 2006/412/CFSP (12 June 2006)

Draft OPLAN came in and had to be assessed, evaluated, inserted or rejected with the appropriate justification. During the final days (and nights) of drafting finally a small editing team around EU OHQ ACOS CJ5 incorporated the final adjustments after the OpCdr



when the sun was already rising. Simultaneously, the Force Generation process (see separate chapter) also provided last minute needs for adoptions for the finalization of the OPLAN. In retrospect the effort was worth it, as the OPLAN provided a solid basis for the operation. One OPLAN review was done in September 2006 and resulted in some editorial changes in order to reflect steps taken to make the plan work more efficiently in reality. These changes were published on 19 September 2006.

personally reviewed every single page of the OPLAN. This team will surely not forget long updating sessions with Lieutenant General Viereck , pizza at midnight, endless formatting efforts and returning home

The key messages of the OPLAN are depicted on the slide briefed during an OpCdr update briefing on the development of the OPLAN. Visibility of EUFOR RD Congo was achieved through the

	ANNEX	LEAD	Resp. J-Div
A.	Concept of Operations	OHQ	5
B.	Task Organisation and Command Relationships	OHQ	6
C.	Forces, Missions/Tasks	FHQ	--
D.	Intelligence	OHQ	2
E.	Rules of Engagement	OHQ	3
F.	Maritime Operations	FHQ	--
G.	Land Operations	FHQ	--
H.	Air Operations	FHQ	--
I.	Amphibious Operations	FHQ	--
J.	Force Protection	FHQ	--
K.	Special Operations	OHQ	3
L.	Psychological Operations	OHQ	3
O.	Information Operations	OHQ	3
P.	Electronic Warfare	FHQ	--
Q.	Communications and Information Systems	OHQ	6
R.	Logistics	OHQ	4
S.	Movements	OHQ	4
T.	Environmental Support	FHQ	--
V.	Search, Rescue and Recovery	FHQ	--
W.	Civil-Military Co-operation	OHQ	9
X.	Public Information Policy and Procedures	OHQ	Media
Y.	Conflict Termination and De-escalation (Transition Strategy)	OHQ	5
Z.	SPARE		
AA.	Legal	OHQ	LEGAD
BB.	Training and Mission Rehearsals	FHQ	--
CC.	Command Information Management	OHQ	6
EE.	Engineer Support	FHQ	--
FF.	Financial Support	OHQ	8
GG.	Non-EU Force Procedures	OHQ	3
KK.	Operational Analytical Support	FHQ	--
LL.	Lessons Learned	OHQ	7
ZZ.	Distribution	OHQ	6

OPLAN EUFOR RD Congo Annexes

EU FHQ present in Kinshasa, a company of the Spanish Foreign Legion being the "Force Capable of Immediate Reaction" (FCIR) as well as through operational rehearsals and the deployment of Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance teams (OLRTs) deploying to all Points of Application. Credibility was achieved through the presence of the "On-Call Force" in the strength of two Infantry Task Groups provided by France and by Germany (together with a Dutch platoon), a Reserve at the Strategic Level held in Europe and a robust ROE set, developed from the basis of the Chapter VII Resolution of the United Nations Security Council. Through this visibility and credibility deterrence for potential spoilers of the election process and reassurance for the people of the DRC was achieved.

Force Generation

Two Conferences, tons of paper, millions of discussions and a capable force as a result

Planning for the Force Generation EUFOR RD Congo commenced early in April 2006, when members of EU OHQ CJ5, CJ3 and CJ4 sat together, preparing the first estimate for the number of forces to be deployed in Kinshasa and Gabon. This first estimate was changed several times due to operational reasons, but finally, the first combined solution, the first estimate ended up in the CJSOR, which

formed the basis for discussion at the first Force Generation Conference (FGC). This FGC took place in the EU OHQ Potsdam on 03 May 2006, chaired by OpCdr EUFOR RD Congo.

The invitation to attend was launched to Brussels and all EU Member States and additional potential Third States were invited. Hungary, Malta, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were unable to attend. Turkey participated as a potential Third State. The first FGC was scheduled to ensure that the CJSOR for the EUFOR RD Congo was filled so that the force could be established as planned. Additionally it was aimed to identify those nations, which wished to make offers of forces and assets to the force.

The conference was a success in that all participating Member States contributed in a positive and worthwhile manner throughout. At the end of the conference, the participants were thanked for their given contributions and it was pointed out by the OpCdr that there were a number of critical capabilities that would still have to be addressed by Member States. These had been a lack of the mission essential Tactical Fixed Wing Transport Aircraft and the lack of Tactical Airlift Rotary including Rotary Wing Tactical Air MEDEVAC. On the other hand EU Member States made a number of surplus commitments, which exceeded the number of foreseen personnel by approximately 400.



Presentation of the CJSOR in the EU OHQ Conference Center

Because of the open issues, the OpCdr suggested a number of ways to the participating EU Member States on how to address the critical shortfalls and surplus commitments, which emerged during the conference. The participating Member States were asked, on first instance, to talk to their capitols of the result of the FGC immediately and



Multinational participants during the conference on 03 May 2006

were additionally asked about the holding of bilateral meetings with Member States.

The second FGC was conducted on 10 May 2006. All EU Member States and potential Third States were again invited to attend. Like in the first one, some EU Member States were unable to attend. For the second FGC these had been: Malta, Slovenia, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, Luxembourg, Czech Republic, and Portugal. Turkey, as a potential Third State, attended again.


The OpCdr chaired the conference, which was on the one hand scheduled to ensure that the CJSOR for EUFOR RD Congo was filled so that the force could be established as planned and on the other hand to identify states that wish to make additional offers of forces and assets.

During the FGC some progress was made in addressing shortfalls from the previous conference. However, despite some direct appeals to the Member States a number of critical shortfalls still remained to be filled, if Operation EUFOR RD Congo should be conducted

in accordance with the CONOPS and the Draft OPLAN. Special emphasis was brought to the lack of Tactical Airlift Rotary (including MEDEVAC) and Tactical Fixed Wing Transport Aircraft stationed in theatre. The still existing surplus commitments were not regarded as critical to the mission. Finally the OpCdr stated that he would continue to address the shortfalls and surplus commitments to the participating states.

Following numerous bilateral discussions with EU Member States and Third States, the EU OHQ finally succeeded in getting an adequate number of tactical aircraft and the necessary medical personnel, including the important mobile surgeons, which were finally provided by Finland.

Additionally to this Finish contribution, Switzerland submitted an offer to also provide two surgeons to the Operation. It was proposed that the surgeons would be based at the Role 2 Medical facility in Libreville, Gabon. As EUFOR RD Congo troops would be required to operate in an extremely demanding environment in the DRC they expected to have

 Combined Joint Statement of Requirements			
SE-RIAL NO.	REQUIREMENT	SPECIFIC CAPABILITIES	SUGGESTED SOURCE
1	EUFOR ADVANCE ELEMENTS		
1.10	EU FHQ (<i>Name of Operation</i>)	Provide operational planning, command and control capability. Co-operation with MONUC, DR CONGO GOV, IOs, GOs, NGOs in AO	MN
1.11	JLCHQ	Provide logistic support	MN
1.12	NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CELLS	Provide national intelligence releasable to FHQ	MN
1.13	HQ COY	Provides service support and EOD support to FHQ	MN
1.14	OHQ SIGNAL DET	Provide strategic connectivity from OHQ to FHQ (SATCOM)	MN
1.15	FHQ CIS Detachment	To provide CIS connectivity to subordinate units and liaison elements to MONUC, FARDC and relevant international agencies in the AO.	MN
1.16	PSY OPS DET	Editorial capabilities for MONUC affiliated media, printing capability, mobile loudspeaker capability including manpacks, internet capability.	MN
1.17	CIMIC DET	Liaison and coordination with relevant agencies.	MN
1.18	SECURITY DET	Provide security to FHQ. Night observation capability required.	MN

available the best medical care possible. The provision of effective medical care to the troops deployed in the DRC and Gabon was of paramount importance to the troops on the ground and their commanders, as well as to the EU Member States and Third States involved in the operation, and a precondition for providing forces to EUFOR RD Congo. Notwithstanding the fact that the medical facilities already in place were of the highest standard, it was recommended to Brussels that the offer of two surgeons from Switzerland, another Third State, should be accepted. The contribution was considered of an utmost importance for the operation and so Switzerland was invited to participate in EUFOR RD Congo.



Discussion within the Polish delegation


Even though the Force Generation Process was a long lasting and time-consuming issue, the EU OHQ succeeded in filling the requirements. Interestingly the Force Generation team's original estimate (2154 personnel as of 16 April 2006) turned out to be very close to the final agreed CJSOR (2108 personnel as of 12 July 2006).

Finally a total of 23 states contributed personnel to EUFOR RD Congo, be it through the provision of units, teams or individual soldiers to the force or through the provision of staff personnel to the EU FHQ or EU OHQ. In addition to 21 EU countries two Non-EU states (Turkey and Switzerland) contributed to EUFOR RD Congo.

Ultimately, the Force Generation Process provided the OpCdr with the capabilities he required to conduct an effective and credible operation. The envisaged force setup consisting of the advance element in Kinshasa, the On-Call Force (OCF) in Gabon and

the Reserve at the Strategic Level (RSL) was filled with the appropriate assets. Therefore also the planned division of tasks between these three elements (Immediate Reaction within the DRC, Short-Notice Reinforcement from the neighboring region and Deterrence and Reinforcement from Europe) could be executed as foreseen in the CONOPS.

The troop strength developed during the mission as displayed in the info-box and reached its peak with 2466 troops mid August 2006. The outcome of the process gave EUFOR RD Congo the capabilities to operate effectively throughout the whole AO.




The availability of assets such as the FCIR (Force Capable of Immediate Reaction; Spain), the OCF (Two Infantry Task Groups provided by France, Germany and the Netherlands), the UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles; Belgium), PSYOPSTask Force, Command and Control structure, Medical capabilities, ISTAR (Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance)



sance; Germany), Force Protection (Poland) and logistics were very significant. However, what was extremely vital to the operation was the availability of the Tactical Airlift assets both Fixed Wing and Rotary. These key capabilities allowed EUFOR RD Congo to rapidly maneuver throughout the whole AO in a controlled and flexible manner. The info-box shows the layout of EUFOR both in Kinshasa and Gabon. As in every military operation some operational limitations for some forces were connected to the Transfer of Authority from nations to the OpCdr. These limitations were very well known from the beginning, reflected specific national intentions and could be taken into account for all further preparations. The situation was similar to a match of chess. All figures had their specific strengths and weaknesses. It was then for the commanders to determine the perfect use of these figures maneuvering on the chessboard to optimize the operational outcome.

One of the figures on the chessboard never had to move. However, the presence of the RSL contributed to the success of EUFOR RD Congo and a lot of effort was invested in the preparation of a possible deployment. During the planning phase for Operation EUFOR RD Congo it was identified that while deployed in the AO, a RSL should be available to support EUFOR RD Congo, if the urgent need would arise. The RSL was to be stationed in Europe. In accordance with the CONOPS dated 11 April 2006, together with strategic enablers (i.e. Strategic Airlift, Service Support, Combat Service Support) this reserve was to be kept on a defined state of readiness and would contribute to deterrence and reassurance as the key elements of the operation.

In accordance with its Military Advice on the use of the EU Battle Group (BG) on standby as the RSL for EUFOR RD Congo, the EUMC



EUFOR RD Congo subordinate units

concluded that this arrangement was the only viable solution for the provision of an RSL for this operation. The advice also concluded that identification of the EU BG on standby as a strategic reserve had no significant implications in the EU rapid response capacity. Thereby, France was enabled to provide the RSL for EUFOR RD Congo.

The RSL was held in France under national control. It was prepared to perform its tasks within 20 days. The Notice to Move (NTM) was determined with 7 to 14 days for advance elements and the main body. However, by reducing the NTM due to an evolving situation the RSL could have been deployed with five days. While the RSL was prepared, equipped and trained to conduct the full spectrum of military operations, as described in the EU BG Concept, it was expected that the RSL for EUFOR RD Congo would be employed in the event of a deteriorating situation, and could have been used in either stabilization or extraction operations. The prerequisite for the use of the RSL was that EUFOR in place forces were fully committed to ongoing operations and required reinforcement. The mission of the RSL was to deploy to reinforce EUFOR in place forces already deployed to a POA in support of MONUC, in order

to contribute to the security of the election process. Its main tasks were as follows:

- Demonstrate intent and resolve.
- Reinforce in place EUFOR troops during the election process.
- Reinforce security of N'Djili and N'Dolo airports.
- Protect key points as defined by EU FHQ.
- Assist in the recovery of EU personnel from Kinshasa.
- Assist in the extraction of EUFOR and EU personnel from the DRC.



Antonov 124-100 were used for strategic airlift under the SALIS contract

The deployment of the RSL was to be intelligence led. If deployed the full spectrum of ISTAR assets would have been used to support an operation of the RSL in the DRC. The OpCdr would give the order for the deployment of the RSL following his advice to the CEUMC and approval of the PSC.


The RSL designated for EUFOR RD Congo consisted of two main elements that could be deployed in part or as a graduated response or as a complete unit. The first main element consisted of the BG Core as the maneuver element formed of a Battle Group (BG) HQ, two Infantry Companies as well as Fire Support and Reconnaissance Elements. The second main element consisted of the BG Combat Sup-

port comprising a Fire Support Company, an Engineer Platoon, Electronic Warfare assets, a TCT platoon and a Forward Air Controller Team. In the end, due to the overall calm situation in the AO there was no requirement to deploy the RSL to support EUFOR RD Congo but it was always ready and prepared to be employed if necessary.

The Logistic Concept of EUFOR RD Congo

In EU-led CMOs national and EU military authorities have a collective responsibility for the co-ordination of logistic support. Each nation bears ultimate responsibility for ensuring the provision of logistic support for its forces. The use of multinational logistic structures and forces was sought at the earliest opportunity to minimize the logistic footprint commensurate with the operational need.

Therefore the OpCdr intended to coordinate the deployment of national forces into AO and Gabon, assist in the Reception, Staging and Onward Movement (RSOM) of incoming troops and to seek a collective approach to logistic support through multinationalisation where and when practical.





The key idea was that logistic assets were provided in national responsibility while their use was organized and co-ordinated in a common multinational approach. The key goal was to prevent a duplication of logistical assets in theatre and to have them once for the use of all. Also for common logistic services it was envisaged to establish multinational logistic forces in a Combat Service Support Unit, which was consequently outlined in the CJSOR and positioned in the chain of command of the FCdr.

This multinational approach was realized and proved to be highly successful in a number of crucial areas, for example by:

- Preparing "the ground" in theatre for the incoming troops by establishing a Co-ordinated Advance Team (CAT);
- Co-ordinating Strategic Air- and Sealift by EU OHQ EUMCC in close co-operation with various European and national organizations (e.g. EAC, SCC, SALCC);
- Providing Real Life Support (RLS) by a contracted civilian company;
- Contracting the provision of Air Fuel and Ground Fuel;
- Building up Common used Ammunition Storage Sites.

In the end an effective mixture of a multinational and national approach to Logistics ensured highly economical used logistic resources by always keeping in mind the primacy of operations. Mutual support structures and mechanisms, such as multinational logistic organizations and Host Nation Support (HNS) as well as Third Party Logistic Service Support (TPLSS), were utilized whenever practical and agreed by the Troop Contributors to achieve economies of scale, increase reserve capacity/capability and improve the overall quality of support. Thus the logistic operations took advantage of the benefits of all feasible providers for logistic support to minimize the „logistic footprint“ of EUFOR RD Congo. Still there is space for development of the multinational approach to commonly benefit of its evident advantages. For different reasons the original plan to create a single

channel follow-on-support could not be realized. This remains a challenge and should be envisaged for future EU-led operations.

Information Operations

Winning hearts and minds

The Information Operations (Info Ops) Campaign was conducted according to the directives of the European Union EU information strategy, the Commander's objectives and the Rules of Engagement. Info Ops efforts focused on objectives determined during the Operational Planning.

- Gain and maintain a favorable information environment by convincing the Congolese that EUFOR is really the most capable force able to help them.
- Contribute in a concentrated and focused way with all actors to a successful electoral process. This was achieved by providing details about electoral process, the importance of democracy and to have free elections.
- Assessment of the Info Ops threat and counter hostile InfoOps were a permanent effort. Rumors, for example, were analyzed and specific information were delivered in order to kill them.
- Deterring aggression against EUFOR RD Congo was not so easy but was achieved mainly due to the effect of the messages promoting EUFOR and to the behavior of the European troops.
- Inform key audiences in the provinces through radios and civilian local companies, which disseminated PSYOPS products in different cities.
- Shaping the image of EUFOR RD Congo as part of a full set of responses to establish favorable conditions for the electoral process was demonstrated by promoting EUFOR will and capabilities.

Visibility and credibility were the two main words of the mission. All messages delivered to the Congolese population took them per-

manently into account. All print products, and specially the Newsletter LA PAILLOTTE, were a solution to be visible in the streets and the contents of these products assured the credibility.

The Pre-advanced Information Team

First EUFOR RD Congo operational footprint in Kinshasa



PIT member talking with locals

When the deployment of the forces approached, more and more uncertainty among the population of the DRC appeared concerning the

role that EUFOR RD Congo would play. Rumors and intentionally spread misinformation gained more and more importance and may even negatively impact on the electoral process and EUFOR RD Congo mission. So, EU OHQ decided to deploy a Pre-advanced Information Team (PIT).

The intention was to launch a limited information campaign prior to the deployment of the advance party in order to start the establishment of necessary networks and to start shaping the information domain towards a permissive atmosphere. This limited information campaign was also designed to counter rumors and misinformation by providing accurate information about the mission of EUFOR RD Congo, about external appearance of troops and equipment as well as about impartiality.

Press Information (PI) established contact with international and Congolese media, provided proper information about EUFOR RD Congo political objectives, planning and timelines elaborated press releases and prepared press conferences.

Info Ops established contact with International Organizations, Governmental Organizations and Non Governmental Organizations

in Kinshasa, provided proper information about EUFOR RD Congo political objectives, planning and timelines, established contact with representatives of the Congolese government, leaders of political parties, potential spoilers and others as deemed useful and also co-ordinated PI and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) activities.

PSYOPS established contact with local print facilities and radio stations in order to gain support in terms of contracts and airing time, conducted Target Audience Analysis (TAA) including PSYOPS pre- and post-test procedures in direct contact with reach back capacities, developed PSYOPS products and also recruited locals as translators, editors and technicians to meet future Psychological Operational Task Force (POTF) needs without competing Radio Okapi.

Presentation of Forces Day

EUFOR RD Congo displayed its capabilities



Spanish FCIR at static display

On 20 July 2006 EUFOR conducted the Presentation of Forces Day (POFD). The overall intent was to conduct a static and a dynamic multinational presentation to display a selection

of EUFOR capabilities and to highlight to a very selected high ranking governmental and military personnel the EU commitment in support of the electoral and transition process. Up to 200 guests saw this presentation. During the whole event the Polish Military Police unit ensured area and personnel protection. In the static part the Spanish, Polish, French, German and Dutch contingents displayed selected weapons, equipment and vehicles. Additionally, the medical capabilities were displayed by presenting the German Role 2 Medical Facility built up in N'Dolo. During the dynamic part Special Forces conducted freefalling while enrolling the EU and



as a tribute to the Host Nation the DRC flag. Subsequently, EUFOR forces displayed the recovery of Persons Designated Special Status (PDSS) as one of EUFOR Key Military Tasks by recovering two PDSS out of a bus, protecting them against hostile elements and lifting them into a helicopter.

In the second part the ability to bring in Infantry Forces from all Task Forces and to couple them with in place forces (Spanish FCIR) was displayed by landing French and German elements in one C-130 aircraft each.



German and French infantry displaying their capabilities

Info domain projects

Info Ops took the lead for the realization of an EUFOR RD Congo song and its associated video-clip and for a project supporting Congolese journalists by providing them modern voice recorders labeled with the EUFOR RD Congo logo. All others projects were mainly realized and finalized by the Psychological Operational Task Force (POTF).

Participation in local events

EUFOR RD Congo participated in different local events in Kinshasa. The two most important were:

- The International Fair of Kinshasa (FIKIN)
- A sport event, "sport for peace", organized by the International Olympic Committee

These were good opportunities to show the presence of EUFOR, to have contacts with people, to establish relationships and to discuss about Operation EUFOR RD Congo. Media assured coverage of EUFOR RD Congo involvement and PSYOPS supported these events.

Psychological Operations (PSYOPS)



La Paillotte information stand at the Kinshasa Fair September 2006

The POTF was manned with 23 soldiers, 19 German and four French soldiers and structured in five groups (Command Group, Target Audience

Analysis (TAA), Audio, Print and Tactical PSYOPS Team (TPT)). The main aim of the POTF was to gain and maintain the support of the local population for the EU mission and to influence Target Audiences (TA) expectations and perceptions that EUFOR RD Congo is a capable force that clearly underlines the willingness to support the provision of a safe environment for the elections. The Command Group planned PSYOPS campaigns, administrated and commanded the POTF. TAA was responsible for measurement of effectiveness, polling, surveys, media monitoring, pre- and post-testing of products, reports and analysis. Audio produced 51 radio spots in two languages, French and Lingala. These radio spots were broadcasted normally for one week eight times per day on six Kinshasa-wide and two nationwide radio stations. These radio stations were contracted. Print designed and produced print products (tri-folds, posters, handbills) and novelty items (T-Shirts, caps, wall clocks). In addition the print section produced a weekly newsletter of EUFOR RD Congo, called LA PAILLOTTE. It was produced 17 times for Kinshasa and 63.000 pieces of each issue were distributed. LA PAILLOTTE was also produced for the four POAs (points of application) and Kamina seven times and 25.000 pieces of each issue. TPT conducted face-to-face communication to local authorities in the 24 districts of Kinshasa, religious communities and people on the street. TPT also disseminat-



La Paillotte - a major source of information all over Congo

ed print products and supported the tactical units in case of patrols.

Media and Public Information

Public Information (PI) played an important role in presenting and promoting the credibility and visibility of Operation EUFOR RD Congo. Invariably, media interest in this mission was immense. Especially during the deployment phase initial activities have shaped the environment for the success of the operation. The media reporting about EUFOR RD Congo had a substantial influence on the public support of the operation. PI channels were initially EUFOR’s primary means to pass information about the operation, its task and objectives.



Joint political and military approach for press conferences

Media interest in this EU military operation was significant from the minute discussions began and reached its peak once the decision to launch the operation was taken and military deployment started. A significant number of international and local media was present in the DRC to cover major events and in response to major newsworthy incidents. The Press Information Centres within the EU OHQ and EU FHQ ensured complete, accurate and timely information on the military operation in general, its forces, its commanders and EUFOR activities. The media personnel informed its audience at any time, if and when information was necessary. PI was one of the important military elements to disseminate and translate the overall Information Strategy. EU OHQ- and EU FHQ Press Information Cen-

tre (PIC) supported the following master messages of the Council of the European Union:

- Support for the elections and for the Congolese people at this historic juncture.
- Deterrence.
- Support for, but not substitution of, MONUC and EU-UN co-operation.
- The EU’s commitment to the DRC and its transition process.
- The EU’s comprehensive approach in the DRC.

While other EU actors carried out their respective information activities, increased co-ordination had to be ensured. As a result the



Media interest was huge during the whole operation

messages delivered by the various actors (EU OHQ, EU FHQ, EU Institutions, EU Member States and other Troop Contributors, United Nations) were coherent. The Chief PIO was acting directly under the guidance of the OpCdr. He was most prominently acting as the EU OHQ spokesperson. Additionally, the daily updates on press coverage of the operation provided the OpCdr with necessary background information, including Congolese media reflections. During Operation EUFOR RD Congo the media branch was tightly integrated in the operational planning. On this basis Media direction and guidance were given and supervised from the preparation phase throughout the whole mission. Additionally, the PIO co-ordinated media related activities with all other staff branches. Most importantly, the co-ordination with the InfoOps was achieved through a constant representation to the Information Operations



Co-ordination Board. Their messages for the press based on the master messages were determined.

Duty travels of the Command Group to the DRC and Gabon



EU Special Representative Mr. Aldo Aiello and LtGen Viereck

As a major EU operation in Africa was something completely new for most of the EU Member States and for most of the EU OHQ staff personnel, it was essential (especially in the planning phase of the mission) to have sufficient situational awareness of the theatre. Here the EU Special Representative, his Excellency Ambassador Mr. Aldo Aiello was of special importance as well as throughout the mission.

In the beginning it was the EU OHQ's, the EU FHQ's and the nation's interest to acquire basic data for further planning. This was the phase of the many Fact Finding Teams (FFTs) that dealt with the special issues of their respective branches (Logistics, Intelligence etc).

Beside this, it was a constant task of the OpCdr to co-ordinate and harmonize with the key national and international players in theatre, e.g. with MONUC, EUSEC, EUPOL and the Congolese and Gabonese political and military officials. Good and reliable relations had to be established. In many cases, a personal relationship was established for the benefit of the mission. The resulting trust was a piece of stability for the remaining mission period. This phenomenon was being observed in the DRC and in Gabon and was only possible by face-to-face contacts of the Congolese and Gabonese authorities with the respective EUFOR representatives. From a distant Potsdam or Brussels desk this would have never been possible. For this reason, the OpCdr traveled with a tailored

delegation about monthly into theatre. He primarily spent his nights in the field camps in order to have a profound feeling for the living circumstances of the soldiers. Twice the DepOpCdr traveled on behalf of the OpCdr. During his trips into theatre, the OpCdr always executed a twofold program: The one met the political aspect, organized by the respec-



Meeting with Gabonese Chief of Defence General Ntori

tive embassy. It included meetings with the DRC president Kabila or vice-president Bemba, the chairman of the Independent Electoral Commission Malu-Malu, the chairman of the Media Authority Mutinga and members of the DRC General Staff, e.g. General Kisempia. In Gabon, the CHOD and the ministers of foreign affairs and defense usually were the discussion partners. During nearly all trips a press meeting or press conference with European and with local journalists was also scheduled. Without the excellent support of the embassies and the will for co-operation of the involved international bodies, these successful travels would not have been possible. The second purpose was the military part of the program, organized by EUFOR itself. This part included visits to the several military compounds and talks to the troops in their respective working environment. The OpCdr observed in detail the progress of the building of the seven camps and committed himself personally to many infrastructural, financial and logistical issues. He was invited to many force presentations and displays, where he gained a personal impression on the wide-

spread spectrum of EUFOR's professional capabilities. This was important for the whole operation, when Task Groups or Special Forces had been rotated in and out of the AO.

Human Rights

Mainstreaming of Human Rights across the Operation EUFOR RD Congo



EU OHQ Legal Advisor during Human Rights training

Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) emphasizes the respect for Human Rights as one of the principles the Union is founded on. Article 11 TEU stresses that one of the objectives of the common foreign and security policy is to develop and consolidate the respect for Human Rights. EU guidelines and additional official documents put that policy in concrete terms. The protection of Human Rights was systematically addressed in all phases of Operation EUFOR RD Congo.

Legal Advisers in the EU OHQ and the EU FHQ were assigned to become Human Rights Focal Points (HRFP). The EU OHQ HRFP carried out this task in close co-ordination with Brussels. Meetings with the Personal Representative of the SG/HR for Human Rights, with DGE IV Human Rights, EU Council Secretariat ensured the appropriate professionalism.

The OPLAN showed the respect for Human Rights in its specific directives for EUFOR. A well-considered and efficient reporting system made it possible to control the good conduct

of EUFOR RD Congo and to assess the Human Rights situation in the Area of Operations.

In the preparation phase, the EU OHQ HRFP conducted a Human Rights training for the EU FHQ senior operations staff in Creil, France. Within the Deployment Phase, the EU OHQ HRFP trained EUFOR RD Congo personnel in order to become qualified Human Rights multipliers in Libreville and Kinshasa. Further training of EUFOR by the EU FHQ HRFP, the multipliers and close co-ordination with the respective specialist staff of MONUC ensured the respect for and the promotion of Human Rights during execution and re-deployment. A close co-ordination with the Gender Adviser in the EU OHQ, in Gabon and in the Area of Operations in the DRC started at the operational planning process and was continued across the whole operation, in order to ensure the mainstreaming of Human Rights and Gender Issues across the Operation EUFOR RD Congo.

The EU Force Headquarters

As early as in the Preparation Phase the EU FHQ was established. The process started in March 2006 with the designation of EMIA in Creil (France) as the headquarters tasked to establish the EU FHQ for EUFOR RD Congo. Planners were immediately sent to support the EU OHQ in Potsdam (Germany) and preparations started to receive EU FHQ personnel from other headquarters and units from France and from other European nations willing to contribute to EUFOR RD Congo. A Multinational Core Planning Team at EU FHQ level was established on 10 April 2006 in order to facilitate the collaborative planning process between EU OHQ and EU FHQ.

Concurrent with this planning the augmentees were informed about the upcoming mission, the staff procedures and the working environment to be established in Kinshasa. This Primary Augmentee Induction Training was conducted in two waves in June 2006 in Creil under the lead of the



Force Commander, Major General Christian Damay. A very important factor during this training was the creation of cohesion within the future EU FHQ and within the individual branches. Simultaneously the preparations for deploying the EU FHQ started.

The first Advance Party of the EU FHQ arrived in Kinshasa in May 2006 and was formed by experts from France and Germany. These officers were reinforced until the 14 June 2006 in order to establish the organization necessary for the reception of EUFOR troops. This demanding task was fulfilled with teams in Kinshasa and Gabon, where the On-Call Force was to arrive. Finally, the EU FHQ was fully operational as planned on 29 July 2006. The structure of the EU FHQ followed the European concepts. The EU FHQ comprised a total of 187 officers and non-commissioned


golese authorities, EUPOL Kinshasa, EUSEC RD Congo and other international, national, regional and local authorities proved to be a reliable source of information, an effective means of co-ordination and co-operation and a key to success for EUFOR's task to support the election process. One example was the professional way of handling the developing unrests in Kinshasa in mid August 2006 by showing EUFOR's determination on the one hand and using this communication network in order to defuse the situation and prevent further deterioration during the remainder of the mission.

During the Re-deployment Phase of the operation the EU FHQ maintained an appropriate Command and Control capability in Kinshasa to conduct and co-ordinate the air deployments to Gabon or straight to Europe

and the land movements to the ports of Matadi and Boma as SPOEs. While decreasing EUFOR's strength certain operational capabilities were kept as backups as long as possible. However, with significantly decreased troops strength also the strength of the EU FHQ with the adequate HQ support capabilities decreased. For this purpose a so-called EU FHQ 2 was established on 03 December 2006 and finally from 15 December 2006 a respective EU FHQ 3 (comprising merely very limited capabilities) co-ordinated all remaining issues. Due to this reason last elements of the EU FHQ left the

theatre not earlier than end of January 2007.

Thus the EU FHQ displayed at every point in time of the operation an utmost professional way of managing all operational and tactical challenges of EUFOR RD Congo, from the very first moment of the planning to the very last moment of re-deploying the troops.




officers. Its structure is similar to the EU OHQ structure and is displayed in the information box. During the Execution Phase the tasks of the EU FHQ were even more demanding and ranged from high level political and military consultations conducted by the EU FHQ Command Group to all operational and tactical planning of all missions in theatre conducted by EUFOR. During the operation the established liaison network with MONUC, the Con-



Deployment

The EU OHQ and the EU FHQ in close co-ordination with the Troop Contributors jointly undertook the preparations for the deployment. The EU OHQ shaped the ground by laying the operational foundations and determining the logistical implications. In addition, the European Union Movement Co-ordination Center (EUMCC) in EU OHQ organized the multiple movements by sea and air. The EU FHQ contributed to the detailed requirements for arrival of different capabilities into Kinshasa and Libreville. Movements into theatre and logistics remained a national responsibility. In order to harmonize these multifaceted efforts four conferences were held in Potsdam. During these conferences the Troop Contributors were informed about the strategic, operational and to a certain extent tactical setting in theater, the main content of the Draft OPLAN including the OpCdr's intent, the status of the Force Generation and the way ahead for preparing the Execution Phase of Operation EUFOR RD Congo. Based on this given information the logistical concept of the operation was developed in close co-ordination between EU OHQ, EU FHQ, Troop Contributors and other involved agencies like European Airlift Center (EAC) and Sealift Co-ordination Center (SCC). For example there were discussions on accommodation and Real Life Support for the troops, Strategic Air- and Sealift and Host Nation Support. Wherever possible and agreed by the Troop Contributors the multinational approach in order to minimize the national efforts was established. The deployment was executed with only minor diversions from the initial planning and was concluded in time and on time. All material was in the area to enable the forces to reach FOC at the foreseen date. In total, 133 strategic movements

by air and sea were executed between Europe and the Airports of Debarkation in the DRC (Kinshasa/ N'Dolo and N'Djili) and Gabon (Libreville). In the DRC the ports of Matadi and Boma were used as Seaports of Disembarkation, in Gabon the port of Owendo was used for this purpose.



Re-deployment

Due to the fixed end-date of the mission the planning of EUFOR RD Congo re-deployment had to start early and in fact commenced in late August 2006. The EU OHQ and the EU FHQ in close co-operation with the Troop Contributors provided the operational foundations for an orderly movement of troops and equipment back to Europe. During the first Re-deployment Conference on 20 September 2006 the Troop Contributors provided their intentions for the re-deployment. The strategic movements by sea and air were again organized by the European Union Movement Co-ordination Center (EUMCC) in EU OHQ. The EU FHQ contributed for the detailed requirements for force protection, RLS and medical support within AO and Gabon. Movements out of theatre and logistics remained a national responsibility. However, in order to harmonize

EUFOR RD CONGO




Legend

- Locations related to EUFOR RD CONGO Operations
- ⊕ Port
- Capital
- City > 1 Mio
- City > 100.000
- ▲ Height Point
- Boundary
- Province
- Mainroad
- Road 1st Order
- Road 2nd Order
- Railroad
- River
- Swamp
- Lake

1:9.000.000

Kilometers



Projection: Geographic Coordinate System
Ellipsoid: WGS 1984
Grid: Geographic

- Bundeswehr Geoinformation Service -
GIS "Operations"
Bundeswehr Operations Command, J2 GeoinfoD
Map is derived from GIS Data
Database produced by Bundeswehr Geoinformation Office,
Mar 2006



Overview Map



20°0'0"E

25°0'0"E

30°0'0"E

AFRICAN REPUBLIC

SUDAN

BANGUI

GBADOLITE

Gemena

Isiro

ORIENTALE

EQUATEUR

Kisangani

Butembo 510m

UGANDA

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

NORD-KIVU

KIGALI

RWANDA

BURUNDI

Bandundu

Kindu

Bukavu

Uvira

Kigoma

BANDUNDU

KASAI-OCIDENTAL

KASAI-ORIENTAL

Kalemie

KANANGA

MBUJI-MAYI

Mwene-Ditu

KATANGA

KOLWEZI

Likasi

LUBUMBASHI

Kuito

ZAMBIA

Mufulira

Kitwe

Ndola

20°0'0"E

25°0'0"E


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these multi-faceted efforts four re-deployment conferences had to be held in Potsdam. During these conferences the Troop Contributors informed about the national intentions for re-deploying their forces and equipment. Based on this given information the re-deployment plan was developed in close co-ordination between EU OHQ, EU FHQ, Troop Contributors and other involved agencies like the European Airlift Center (EAC) and the Sealift Co-ordination Center (SCC). During the conferences intra theatre transportation, force protection, real life and medical support within AO and Gabon have been co-ordinated. Wherever possible and agreed by the Troop Contributors a common approach in order to minimize the national efforts was established. For the re-deployment the ports that had been used as Ports of Disembarkation were used as Air- and Seaports of Embarkation (APOE resp SPOE). To bring all material to the seaports, 26 convoys had to be organized in the DRC alone. Also, 48 shuttle flights were executed between Libreville

and Kinshasa to bring people and material to the right APOE and SPOE in time. In total 88 strategic movements (5 by sea and 83 by air) were executed to bring EUFOR back to Europe. Like the deployment the re-deployment was also executed with only minor diversions from the initial planning.



Strategic Sea- and Air-transport

Based on the European Union Concept for strategic movement and transportation for EU-led Crisis Management Operations (CMO) planning of the deployment and re-deployment was co-ordinated by the EUMCC with the Troop Contributors and EU FHQ. For the co-ordination of strategic air- and sealift EAC, Strategic Airlift Co-ordination Center (SALCC) and SCC have been involved. This involvement led to an efficient and flexible way of co-ordinating and using of the strategic transportation assets. As a result of this the deployment and re-deployment were well co-ordinated done on time and in an economic way.

European Union Movement Coordination Centre

- A European Union Movement Co-ordination Centre (EUMCC) was established at the European Union Operation Headquarter (EU OHQ) Potsdam, as the primary point of contact (POC) for Movement and Transportation (M&T) and to co-ordinate, prioritise and de-conflict movements between Europe and theatre, in accordance with the operational requirements.
- Therefore the multi-national detailed deployment plan (MNDDP) had to be created in close cooperation with the TC's. The Allied Deployment and Movement System (ADAMS) was used for this purpose.
- The EUMCC monitored the execution of transportation for deployment, Follow-On-Support and redeployment and provided reports with relevant information on the overall M&T situation, informed the OpCdr in resolving M&T issues, which require decisions from the OpCdr and supported decisions from TC's.
- The EUMCC consisted of 10 posts which were opened in the Force Generation Conferences. During the whole period of EUFOR RD Congo totally 15 soldiers from 7 countries served in the EUMCC.

The Multinational Co-ordinated Advance Team in Libreville

Beginning June 2006 the EU OHQ made history in multinational operations by creating a multinational Co-ordinated Advance Team (CAT) and sending it into Libreville in order to conduct all preparatory measures prior to Full Operational Capability (FOC). The CAT-principle was as simple as it was new. To ensure efficiency and effectiveness in advance operations the EU Headquarters Organization provided a qualified co-ordi-



CAT personnel in Libreville

nation and management capability for the Advance Elements of all incoming troops of all Troop Contributors. EU OHQ and EU FHQ covered especially those qualifications that were crucially needed very early to establish the prerequisites for the deployment of forces, e.g. infrastructure, engineering and contracting. The EU HQ Organization in this manner functioned as a multinational service provider to the Troop Contributors. Not only that the Troop Contributors took immediate profits of the works of the early EU HQ presence in theatre they could also consider those already existing capabilities in the design of their national Advance Elements. Any other cross-sectional capabilities were provided just once by major Troop Contributors to be used by all the participants. For example France offered their medical service already stationed in Libreville and Germany offered their heavy transportation means. The central logic of the CAT-principle on top was that

resources were provided nationally while their use was co-ordinated multinationally. This efficient advance organization in theatre prevented to the utmost the duplication of capabilities. As a matter of fact by this also a considerable increase in speed of advance activities could be achieved, since it was not necessary that each contingent runs through all preparatory steps individually but most of the processes were executed just once for the benefit for all. Meanwhile the CAT principle is a proven concept and well known across Europe.

Multinationality was the gene that made the "CAT" has seven lives and made it always fell on its feet. Effectively within less than two months the CAT turned a bare base environment in Libreville into an operable EUFOR hub. In total five EUFOR RD Congo compounds were established including a field camp for 700 troops, an ammunition depot, a EUFOR RD Congo air base, a logistical support base and a sophisticated military field hospital ("Role 2"). The CAT mastered all this facing numerous challenges. That ranged from providing mobile toilets for the EUFOR troops due to delays in the field camp build-up to discussions with the President of Gabon about the availability of additional and formerly not envisaged compounds.

In the end the CAT in Libreville consisted of an EU OHQ element with co-ordination and infrastructure tasks, an EU FHQ-element and national advance elements of France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Greece, Turkey and Sweden. Additionally, informal members of the CAT came from the Host Nation Gabon, be it Gabonese authorities, especially the liaison officer to the Gabonese Ministry of Defence, or locals that were hired by EUFOR RD Congo, e.g. interpreters and even chauffeurs. With all of these contributions it was possible to fulfil the central operational task – to reach FOC on 29 July 2006! By reaching the FOC of EU FHQ Libreville the CAT handed over their tasks as planned to EU FHQ and closed down its activities.



The EU OHQ Hand Over Team in Libreville

With the EUFOR re-deployment EU OHQ established a special Hand Over Team (HOT). Its tasks were to prepare and execute the hand over of infrastructure used by EUFOR to the respective owners or to local authorities in Libreville and to monitor hand over activities executed by FHQ in Kinshasa.

The HOT was a small team especially designed for the hand over task and consisted of personnel representing a sophisticated mixture of capabilities. This was necessary, since the challenge was of a complex multi-player scenario, several ministries involved. Therefore, next to the mere infrastructural aspect, the HOT's task was primarily a political, legal and a financial one. This task was to achieve a common view between EUFOR and the Host Nation or proprietor on a favourable status of infrastructure at the moment of hand over at minimum effort for EUFOR in time, personnel and money.

Referring to those sites with field camps it had to be considered that the Spanish firm UCALSA was part of the business. Thus the HOT was the interface and mediator between the EU, the Troop Contributors, the Host Nations and an European firm, each of those players having different goals and interests regarding redeployment and finalization of the operation.

The HOT's work ranged from setting and coordinating ambitious time lines and quick hand over procedures, identifying and evaluating damages in the compounds caused by EUFOR up to negotiating with Gabonese ministries and monitoring the dismantling of the field camps. This had to be formalized on the spot to conserve the infrastructural status as commonly observed. The consequent paperwork had to be legally adjusted and aligned to the consent of all the relevant players.

In the end the HOT contributes another

chapter to the operation's success story. Conceptually the deployment of the HOT enabled the EU FHQ in Libreville to focus on the effective conduct of the still ongoing operation in the Re-deployment Phase. At the same time a dedicated team focused on the hand over issue. Thus it could be ensured that the majority of the sites in Libreville had been already handed over when the final re-deployment aircraft left the city.

From the financial point of view the HOT managed to negotiate a very favourable compensation for all EUFOR damages in Libreville that ranged at only 10% of the originally envisaged amount. Negotiating a financial compensation implied also a considerable increase in hand over's efficiency, since EUFOR itself did not have to get involved in any infrastructure repair works. Finally all this was formalized in co-operation with the Host Nation in clear and transparent Technical Arrangements to ensure legal clarity after the mission.

The HOT in Libreville contributed to ensure that EUFOR as a whole will stay in the minds of the Host Nations with the same impression that EUFOR troops formerly had established during the whole operation: Professional, disciplined and well organized. Finally the HOT closed the doors in theatre on 31 January 2007, only four weeks later than the last combat soldier left the DRC and Gabon.



The HOT and EUFOR troops left an identical positive impression in theatre

Chronology of events


The „Startup“ (30 July 2006)



Hoisting the EU flag

On 30 July 2006 the first round of the Presidential Elections together with the Parliamentary Elections were conducted by MONUC and the Congolese Independent Electoral Committee (CEI). Right in time before the election day EUFOR RD Congo had completed the strategic deployment

to the DRC and to GABON. The initial operational set-up of EUFOR comprised the OCF in Gabon and Advance Elements in the DRC. The EU FHQ and the Advance Elements were based in Kinshasa in three EUFOR compounds: Camp N'Dolo 1 and Camp N'Dolo 2 at the Congolese Air Base of N'Dolo and Camp N'Djili at the Kinshasa International Airport. The bulk of the operational and tactical maneuver elements were stationed in Gabon, two Infantry Task Groups (TG1 & TG2) in Libreville and one Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) in Port Gentile. Set on appropriate alert states these troops were ready to deploy to any hot spot in the AO, whenever requested to support MONUC according to the EUFOR RD Congo mandate. Main effort of EUFOR in this Startup Phase



One page of first round of Presidential Elections voting slip

was to achieve credibility by visibility and capability. Addressing political and military key leaders as well as the population, EUFOR's primary goal was to reassure the electorate and to deter any potential spoiler to the electoral process. Due to the assessment that the first round of the Presidential Elections would not achieve any decision on the presidential election, no candidate was expected to win more than 50 % of the casted votes, no major un-




French helicopters employed in Operation 21

rest was expected, EUFOR remained in a highly visible monitoring role. This was achieved mainly by day and night presence missions in Kinshasa, executed by the FCIR, and complemented by ISTAR and Information Operations Assets like PSYOPS, Public Information and CIMIC elements.

Operational Rehearsals - Operation 21 (08 – 16 August 2006)

From 08 Aug 2006 until 16 August 2006 EUFOR RD Congo conducted its first deployment to a provincial capital. The operational rehearsal was named Operation 21 (OP 21). Key activity was the deployment of a Combined Infantry Force, designated as Detachment 21 (DET 21) and a Special Operations Forces Detachment (SOF DET) to Kananga, 840 km east of the capital Kinshasa. The main purpose of this operation was to show visibility of EUFOR outside Kinshasa at a selected potential hot spot. Furthermore it was designed to demonstrate mis-



Scheme of manoeuvre of Operation 21

sion essential capabilities such as timely deployment of a credible force to a remote provincial location somewhere in the DRC. Covered by Information Operations EUFOR addressed political and military key leaders, but also the population in order to convey the EUFOR mission and enhance mutual confidence in the impartial role of the European Union Force. Moreover this type of operation was designed to convey a clear message of deterrence to any potential spoiler, who might endanger the electoral process.

Important was the participation of the EU Ambassador with the FCdr in events like the EUFOR press conference, hosted by the FCdr, and the Mayor's conference hosted by the mayor of Kananga. In the military field OP 21 was the first major opportunity for military leaders and staff to familiarize with the operational environment of Kananga, to revise Contingency Plans for this area and to test interoperability within EUFOR and between the European forces and MONUC. OP 21 originally had been launched as a



French soldier monitoring the clashes in august 2006

test for a series of deployment operations throughout the AO in the DRC. During the ongoing EUFOR employment the strategic and operational focal point shifted more and more to the Capital Kinshasa. Therefore deployment operations in the provinces were replaced by a different operational approach. In order to concentrate on Kinshasa and to save EUFOR

resources, especially the highly valuable but scarce tactical air transport assets, EUFOR turned Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Teams (OLRT) instead of conducting full scale deployment operations like OP 21.

The "August-Clashes" between Kabila's and Bemba's Forces in La Gombe (20 - 22 August 2006)

On 20 August 2006, a Sunday afternoon, an Armoured Republican Guard Detachment (GR Det) surrounded vice president Bemba's residence in Kinshasa's La Gombe quarter, followed by sporadic exchange of fire with Bemba's security force DPP. Inside the residence several high ranking diplomats of the UN and the EU were trapped while visiting Bemba for political talks on the electoral process.

At the same time GR elements seized Bemba's TV and Radio Station in Kinshasa and suspended broadcasting because TV and Radio had spread rumours about the alleged victory of Jean-Pierre Bemba. Backed by a EUFOR FCIR Detachment the

MONUC QRF intervened and recovered the diplomats from the Bemba compound in La Gombe under sporadic exchanges of fire between GR and Bemba's DPP forces. Mediation talks led by MONUC and EUFOR achieved an agreement with the conflicting parties to cease fire and withdraw their troops. During late night and early morning hours of 22/23 August 2006 GR and DPP separated and withdrew to their camps and barracks. This incident proved once again, that EUFOR, after some initial distrust from both political camps, had gained the position of a mutually respected impartial authority from the perspective of both presidential candidates. Under the mediation of MONUC and EUFOR both parties agreed to the daily conduct of Joint Verification Patrols, comprising GR, PNC, DPP, MONUC and EUFOR officers. This confidence building measure again strengthened EUFOR's credibility in the eyes of the conflicting parties as well as in the population.

Deployment of Operational Liaison & Reconnaissance Teams to potential hot spots in the provinces (12 – 30 September 2006)



Multinational OLRT in DRC

In order to best prepare EUFOR operations in support of MONUC the EU FHQ deployed three Operational Liaison & Reconnaissance Teams (OLRT) to provincial capitals, which were considered to be of operational relevance in case of major unrest in the DRC. These OLRTs were sent to Lubumbhi and Kol-

wezi (12–15 September 2006), to Mbandaka (27 – 30 September 2006) and to Mbuji-Mayi (17 / 18 September 2006). Major objectives of the OLRT were to establish contact to the provincial and local authorities and to convey the EUFOR Mission to key leaders as well as to the population. Further purpose of the OLRT was to familiarize EUFOR key leaders with the operational environment and to prepare for possible Contingency Operations in support of MONUC. In summary these OLRT missions were not only a good preparation for potential Contingency Operations, but also an excellent opportunity to facilitate the EUFOR Mission and to contribute to stabilize the provincial security situation.

Bemba's TV and radio station on fire (18 September 2006)

In the evening of 18 September 2006 clouds of smoke over the broadcasting station of CCTV, CKTV and Radio Liberté, all owned by Bemba, caused local unrest in the vicinity of the building. A fire damaged the technical installations and disrupted the broadcasts. Thanks to the firm posture of a small MONUC element, backed by the visible presence of a EUFOR patrol, the security situation around the TV and radio station remained under control. Minor demonstrations of Bemba supporters during the following days did not escalate and situation finally calmed down.

Except for this incident the security situation in Kinshasa remained calm throughout September, while there was an atmosphere of political tension in the city. During September EUFOR enhanced its firm and determined posture through continuous presence missions in Kinshasa. At the same time EUFOR planned and prepared for the decisive phase of its mission, which was the upcoming second Round of the Presidential Elections. The second and third week after the election day (29 October 2006) were expected to be the most exciting period and the decisive phase of EUFOR RD Congo, because this period would reveal winner and loser of the Presidential Elections.



The second and „decisive“ round of the Presidential Elections (29 October 2006)



Sample voting slip of second round of Presidential Elections

Monitored by several hundreds observers from the EU and the African Union (AU) CEI and MONUC conducted the second round of the Presidential Elections. Despite isolated incidents at very few provincial hot spots the elections ran smoothly and successfully. EUFOR remained in a high visibility-monitoring role, concentrating on Kinshasa.

Arms transfer from Gbadolite to Kinshasa (31 October 2006)



MONUC officer with collected weapons in Gbadolite

At the end of October 2006 the security situation in Gbadolite was at risk. Several 100 demobilized soldiers from former MLC units imposed an increasing threat on the UN and CONADER personnel as well as on the UN Military Observer Team. MONUC operatives were afraid that the storage of collected

weapons and ammunition might be taken by the crowd of demobilized soldiers. Due to its high commitment in the transition and stabilization process MONUC requested EUFOR for an immediate transport of the weapons from Gbadolite to Kinshasa in order to neutralize the arms potential in Gbadolite.

On 31 October 2006 a French C-130 aircraft with a EUFOR detachment on board took over 1,183 rifles, machine guns and other arms from MONUC troops in Gbadolite. After an airlift of three flight hours and approx. 1,200 km the EUFOR Air Detachment landed on N'Djili Airport and handed over the weapons to a MONUC unit to be stored in a UN military compound. From a military point of view, MONUC and EUFOR co-ordination and co-operation had been extremely efficient, taking a severe security risk away from the Gbadolite population.

Air / Ground Reconnaissance Kinshasa – Matadi / Boma (02 – 05 November 2006)

While the situation in Kinshasa throughout September 2006 remained calm, EUFOR started its planning process for the strategic re-deployment. In order to facilitate this process, EUFOR conducted a combined air / ground reconnaissance along the land lines of communication to the designated Seaports of Embarkation (SPOE). The reconnaissance team, divided into a ground and an air party, were bound to the seaports of Boma and Matadi. Road conditions, choke points, airfields for AIRMEDEVAC / AIRCASEVAC, staging and holding areas for troops and equipment as well as harbour facilities were reconnoitred by the team in order to gain reliable information for the planning process.

Operation RESOLUTE SENTRY (07 – 30 November 2006)

Everybody expected the results of the second electoral round at least trickling through between 07 and 21 November 2006, even

if the results were not published officially. Both candidates, their political supporters and military guards were waiting in the Congolese capital for the results of this decisive revelation of winner and loser. The overall situation in Kinshasa was calm but tense. Nobody could exactly predict, what kind and extent of reactions would be triggered by the results. Therefore MONUC and EUFOR concentrated their efforts and nearly all available troops on the strategic focal point of Kinshasa. Both missions were well prepared for immediate and determined action in order to stabilize the situation under the responsibility of the UN Mission. Under the nickname of Operation RESOLUTE SENTRY the EUFOR On-Call Forces had been deployed forward to Kinshasa, thus having all maneuver forces, conventional infantry forces and most of the special operations forces, ready to face any of the likely risks. Everything had been done in advance, that seemed necessary to support MONUC if it had to cope with civil unrest from violent adherents as well as with clashes between GR, FARDC and PNC on the one side and vice president Bemba's DPP / MLC forces on the other side. In order to maintain flexibility for the entire AO, one infantry company and certain SOF assets staid in Gabon as operational reserve. This operational reserve could be employed either to reinforce EUFOR in Kinshasa or to deploy to a hot spot of instability somewhere in the provinces. In Kinshasa EUFOR maneuver elements and ISTAR assets continuously monitored the situation in the governmental and diplomatic quarter of La Gombe, thus in close co-ordination with MONUC.

Clashes in La Gombe (11 November 2006)

Civil unrest erupted in La Gombe on 11 November 2006 when MLC adherents claimed the Bemba's victory in the Presidential Elections. In the morning Rapid Intervention Police Units (PIR) of the Congolese National

Police (PNC) tried to disperse an aggressive demonstration on the Boulevard du 30 Juin in the vicinity of Bemba's compound. The situation escalated to a three hours exchange of fire between MLC on the one side, PNC and FARDC on the other side. In the early afternoon exchange of fire was ceased and the violent crowd dispersed. PNC and FARDC succeeded in containing the unrest and regaining the control over the area. During these events MONUC and EUFOR Quick Reaction Forces (QRF) seized positions in the vicinity of the hot in order to monitor the scene and to be ready to act in accordance with the two mandates.

Violent demonstrations at the campus of the Supreme Court of Justice (21 November 2006)

On 21 November 2006 about 200 aggressive UPN supporters gathered in front of the Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ) in Kinshasa's La Gombe quarter. Prior to the demonstration the SCJ had been addressed by Bemba's MLC to institute court proceedings against the provisional results of the second round of Presidential Elections, submitting eight major complaints regarding the elections. When PIR intervened to disperse the crowd, situation escalated to an exchange of fire between PIR and armed elements from Bemba's DPP hiding in the crowd of demonstrators. PIR and a small MONUC guard failed to deny access to some separated UPN/MLC elements, who intruded the reward buildings of the SCJ, devastated the interior and set two buildings



Violent Bemba supporters in front of the Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ)



on fire. The situation came under full control when the MONUC Quick Reaction Force and FARDC units arrived at the spot and dispersed the violent crowd. After PIR and a small MONUC guard element had failed to protect the SCJ complex, MONUC stabilized the situation with its QRF. Although EUFOR was not requested to support MONUC during this event the visible and determined posture of EUFOR troops close to the hot spot proved to be a strong back up for the MONUC QRF, thus indirectly enhancing MONUC efforts to restore security and control.

Congolese pressure on Bemba to withdraw his forces from Kinshasa – Monitoring DPP withdrawal (23 – 30 November 2006)



DPP elements en route to Maluku

The end of the EUFOR Mandate close ahead there was still one unsolved major security problem left in the Congolese capital. The presence of a battalion-sized DPP Unit in the heart of La Gombe turned into an unbearable situation for the capital's security authorities. DPP elements had performed unpredictable and unreliable during the recent periods of unrest and during the execution of Joint Verification Teams. So they were regarded as a permanent risk to the security situation in Kinshasa.

First denying withdrawal, on 23 November 2006 the tense situation was defused by the commence of the re-deployment of

DPP fighters and their families to Maluku camp 60 km east of the capital. Co-ordinated by MONUC, the slow and gradual withdrawal supported by FARDC transport elements and closely monitored by EUFOR.

EUFOR surveillance was conducted by Infantry and UAV assets in close co-ordination and co-operation with MONUC. Thus EUFOR contributed to the enhancement of security in Kinshasa. Once again EUFOR proved to be a reliable backup for MONUC, providing indirect support though a robust EUFOR presence and close surveillance of the scene.

Publication of final results of the Presidential Elections (27 November 2006)

In the evening the Supreme Court of Justice released its decision rejecting all the eight complaints submitted by Bemba's MLC. SCJ validated the provisional results and declared Joseph Kabila to be the winner of the Presidential Elections. No major demonstrations or unrest occurred. PNC and FARDC seemed to have control over Kinshasa. Finally Jean-Pierre Bemba promised in a message called out in Congolese TV on 29 November 2006 to adhere to constitutional means of opposition, although he claimed some irregularities with the elections.

The End of Mandate (30 November 2006)

On 30 November 2006 Kabila visited Bemba in his residence. Kabilas aim of this unexpected visit was to inform Bemba about safety measures concerning the inauguration ceremony. This meeting was essential for the situation especially in Kinshasa after the publication of the final results of the Presidential Elections. Facing a calm and controlled security situation in Kinshasa, EUFOR ended its UN mandated mission at midnight 30 November 2006 / 01 December 2006 and entered the phase of strategic re-deployment according to the Operation Plan.

Message for the Nation from Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Chairman of the "Union pour la Nation"



Jean-Pierre Bemba

I listened to the reading of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice declaring the final results of the presidential election's second round.

Like many of you, I feel a great disappointment and frustration in connection with the way the Supreme Court of Justice dealt with the electoral litigation of the presidential election's second round. The legal action was neither fair nor just in order to restore the polls' transparency and truth. Our grievance about this election remains and we would have reasons enough for disputing the verdict.

But in the name of the nation's superior interest and wanting to preserve peace and to avoid our country sinking into chaos and violence, today I accept – before God, the nation and history - the commitment and the responsibility of conducting – from now on – the fight for change in the framework of a strong and republican opposition, in permanent sympathy with all of you.

I call upon all political and social forces believing in the ideal of a democratic change in our country to unite for this fight in order for us all to assure the new foundation of Congo in a reorganized way.

I thank the Congolese people for the trust they placed in me by massively voting for the political project I suggested to them. Let me remind you that this project consists in defending the legitimate rights of the Congolese people and in giving them back their dignity and their position among the other nations. I also thank the "MLC" militants and staff, the allies of the "Renaco" and the "Union pour la Nation" for the efforts they made in order to support our project for Congo in the long term. I would like to reassure them: our common fight for the coming of a new Congo will go on in a reinforced unity.

Let us remain united, watchful and determined in the superior interest of our nation.

I shall announce, within the coming days, in which form and under which conditions we shall conduct this political opposition.

God bless the Democratic Republic of Congo! All united and with God, we shall overcome!

Thank you.

Jean-Pierre Bemba



Air Operations

A wide spectrum of air operations like Tactical Air Transportation, Air Reconnaissance and Air-to-Air Refueling was executed during Operation EUFOR RD Congo. An advantage of EUFOR aircraft was the night operation capability. Special air assets were kept on specific readiness status to execute Medical (MEDEVAC) and Casualties Evacuation (CASEVAC) missions and Close Air Support, if there would have been the need. The C-130 from Portugal, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Belgium and France and the German C-160 were stationed in Libreville, the German CH-53 in Kinshasa (N'Dolo compound).



German troops leaving a C-130

In the framework of alternation of Task Groups C-130 aircraft executed Tactical Air Transportation missions from Libreville to Kinshasa and vice versa.

They were also key assets for conducting reconnaissance missions and exercises as well as for deploying units in the light of OLRTs and for Operation 21. A total of 895 flight hours contributed to EUFOR RD Congo overall success.

CH-53 helicopters executed transportation missions of EUFOR troops in the wider Kinshasa area. C-160 aircraft and CH-53 MEDEVAC helicopter remained on readiness were available to executing MEDEVAC missions, if required.



CH-53



C-160

F-1CR aircraft executed two times reconnaissance missions along the AO in order to collect information from specified Areas of Interest for EUFOR. The presence and over fly of EUFOR

fighter aircraft in regions of the DRC displayed the decisiveness and readiness of EUFOR RD Congo to fully execute its mission. The F-1CR aircraft were on readiness to execute



F-1CR

Close Air Support missions in case that EUFOR troops needed support using all available systems.



C-135 Tanker aircraft

C-135 Tanker executed Air-to-Air Refueling missions in order to support fighter aircraft during their reconnaissance missions in the DRC.

Efforts of the EU OHQ Military Intelligence

The European Union Operation Headquarters maintained among all other "traditional" military staff disciplines multinationally provided intelligence capabilities. The military intelligence is one of EU OHQ's supports for operational environment understanding, information, security and force protection.

In an OHQ this intelligence work is done at strategic level, which co-ordinates the overall intelligence systems. This work consisted mainly in contributing to establish EU OHQ situational awareness in the Area of Operations and in providing a strong intelligence support to both Brussels and EU FHQ in Kinshasa. It provided current and prospective assessments on the situation in and around the deployment areas, indicators for expected developments and advice concerning the protection of the units and soldiers deployed. In the framework of EUFOR RD Congo, main emphasis was put on political and security issues that might affect the electoral process and the medium and long-term regional stability in the DRC and central Africa. In order to enhance its own intelligence picture, EU OHQ had to manage the intelligence requests

process between the different levels from EU FHQ to EUMS in Brussels. It also encouraged all participating EU Member States to provide EUFOR RD Congo with intelligence through national intelligence assets within the intelligence structure. The situational awareness at all times also required establishing and maintaining links with other international organisations in the field, i.e. the MONUC, and the other European Union missions EUSEC and EUPOL, together with Congolese institutional bodies. This was particularly important since EU OHQ covered the support of all phases of Operation EUFOR RD Congo.



Imagery Intelligence is i.e. provided by the „Unmanned Aerial Vehicle“ (UAV) HUNTER for a detailed real-time picture of an ongoing situation.


The provision of intelligence comprises of elements of almost all different intelligence disciplines. The Collection Co-ordination and Intelligence Requirements Management (CCIRM) was the main element to put all different links together and to distribute requests and results to the appropriate recipients. The information came from elements of Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) or Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) deployed in the DRC under the operational control of EU FHQ. Additionally, EU OHQ covered the field of security and Force Protection for both the operation and the EU OHQ body itself. Its Security (SY) and Counter Intelligence (CI) elements provided information on threats posed by terrorism, espionage, sabotage and subversion to EU OHQ personnel as well as the operation. Protective measures were also imposed and supervised by these elements alongside with other security elements of all EU OHQ branches, i.e. communications and data processing security.

Real Life Support (RLS)



Libreville – Police Academy

One of the intentions of executing EUFOR RD Congo was to minimize the logistical footprint within the AO. As agreed by TC's the co-ordination of the follow-on-support transportation co-ordination was done by the EUMCC. To execute the Real Life Support with all the needed services, e.g. accommodation, food, laundry or canteen a contract with a civilian company was established. UCALSA, a specialized Spanish civilian company, took part in a regular transparent tender



N'Djili Field Camp

process to provide Real Life Support services to EUFOR RD Congo. As a result a contract to build up and operate two tented camps in Kinshasa (N'Dolo and N'Djili airports) and one in Libreville (Police Academy compound) was concluded. UCALSA was working in close co-operation with military engineering and logistic staff in all three locations in order to provide a suitable environment for the soldiers taking part in this mission. Once parts of the infrastructure had been finalized, they were handed over to EUFOR RD Congo. By doing so the camps



N'Dolo Field Camp

developed regarding accommodation, kitchen, dining facilities, sanitary installations, laundry, etc. step by step, day by day.

Beside the contracted field camps a lot of support in and from the Host Nation or third parties was needed. For example during the deployment and the build up of the field camps various hotels and other compounds were used to accommodate the troops. Ammunition Storage Sites were established at different locations (for example at N'Djili Air-




field in Kinshasa or at Camp Kiliba in Libreville) and Fuel provision by local companies was contracted. Many other examples such as translators / interpreter services, guarding compounds could be given. As a prerequisite for operational and logistical intra theater flights a EUFOR Air Base organization was build up on the Libreville International Airport. Therefore a lot of infrastructural work for Container Storage, APRON Markings, LOX Storage, Mess Building, Office Space and a Passenger Transit Area was conducted.

some Troop Contributors sent LNOs to the EU OHQ also.

LNO to EUMS

In the aim of elaborating CONOPS and OPLAN, deploying EUFOR, conducting the operation itself as well as its re-deployment early liaison and co-ordination on a daily basis between EU OHQ and corresponding EU bodies on the political-strategic, political-military and military-strategic level were essential for the success of Operation EUFOR RD Congo.

The Liaison network for EUFOR RD Congo



Therefore the establishment of an LNO to EUMS proved to have been the appropriate measure. In substance the LNO functioned as a single point of contact (POC) for EU OHQ in monitoring the activities conducted in Brussels to Operation EUFOR RD Congo. The primary responsibilities of the LNO were to provide or enhance a well going information flow and understanding in the sense of enhancing transparency and smooth co-operation between EU OHQ and EUMS, more often through suitable networking. The main duty of the LNO was establishing a comprehensive understanding between EU


Situational awareness on all levels of command is crucial for every operation. The liaison structure contributes to this to a high extent. Liaison elements existed from the EU OHQ to the EUMS and to the EU FHQ. During the Planning Phase a EUMS Liaison Officer (LNO) was established at the EU OHQ in Potsdam to work together with the Multi National Core Planning Team (MNCPT). Contact was also established and maintained between the EU OHQ and the UNDPKO in New York and very personally through the OpCdr with the EU SR for the Great Lakes Region. Additionally, the EU FHQ built up an extensive liaison structure to all actors within theatre. Finally,

OHQ and EUMS. This contributed successfully to avoiding frictions in both organisations work. Therefore, the EU OHQ LNO to EUMS represented the views of the OpCdr to EUMS in a proper and accelerated way. Furthermore, the LNO provided military liaison with the Chairman of the European Union Military Committee (CEUMC) and sometimes with his Working Group (EUMC WG). In addition, the LNO attended the European Union Military Committee as well as the Political and Security Committee (PSC), when Operation EUFOR RD Congo was placed on the agenda, and also the Committee of Contributors (CoC). Besides, the LNO had to liaise occasionally

with the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union (GSC), too. Generally speaking, however, he provided a focus for all EU bodies and all actors represented in Brussels. He therefore acted as a principal point of contact, what was instrumental in the proper exchanges of information. This allowed him to provide on a case-by-case basis inputs to EU OHQ OPSUMs and ASSESS-REPs as required. All this meant opening and maintaining access, providing an operational perspective on military planning and operation; particularly with regard to representing the views of the OpCdr on the political-strategic and political-military level and of course forwarding the offered advice by the GSC. Eluding all this, it was extremely important for the OpCdr to have the generated relevant information compiled and analysed in order to make an appraisal of the political situation in Brussels in order that he should be able to act in a prudent manner, supporting the objectives of Operation EUFOR RD Congo. Additionally, the LNO facilitated several visits and not only those of the OpCdr to Brussels (EU bodies and Presidencies respectively Member States). That implied that the LNO had to act on record, write the minutes for the OpCdr and co-ordinate meetings or negotiations.

To carry out the job as EU OHQ LNO to the EUMS it was mandatory to use English in a proper way and to have basic command of French.

EU OHQ LNO to EU FHQ



The LNO's workspace in Kinshasa

Towards the EU FHQ there was one LNO from the EU OHQ. Additionally, the Force Headquarters (FHQ) had a strong liaison organization to MONUC, MONUC's Western Brigade, the FARDC, EUSEC and EUPOL. The envisaged liaison structure to the African Union was not established. The preparation for the liaison job al-

ready started during the beginning of March 2006 in Potsdam, when the nucleus OHQ team met the first time with augmentees from various services and nations to form the MNCPT and develop the Concept of Operations on the Military Strategic Level. In parallel the Liaison Officer EU OHQ to EU FHQ joined the French FHQ nucleus, which was additionally augmented by a team of German planners designated to become EU FHQ personnel in Kinshasa. This fruitful co-operation with the planning team members was the prerequisite for the development of an intimate relationship between the EU OHQ LNO and the EU FHQ personnel. Among the LNO's duties was the maintenance of close co-operation and mutual understanding between commanders and staff in and the enhancement of the information flow between both headquarters. The main focus was on the co-ordination of all operational matters on strategic and operational matters, promoting mutual support as well as enabling collaborative planning and up-speeded decision-making. After the initial co-operation in France the EU OHQ LNO to FHQ left for Kinshasa together with the main body of the EU FHQ on 12 July 2006. Due to the profound experience in international co-operation of the majority of the staff officers the daily work was running mostly without friction. Daily routine for the LNO was the participation in the FCdr's update briefing. Additionally, his presence was required during the VTC's between the COS of the two headquarters in order to write the minutes of these conferences. Non-daily routine was the preparation of various visits to the EU FHQ, the Area of Operations and Gabon.

The LNO acted as the Single Point of Contact (SPOC) of the OpCdr to the EU FHQ. He often had to concentrate on time critical requests for information especially during the last 20 minutes prior the OpCdr's update briefing in Potsdam. In the course of time it was possible to reduce the quantity of information without decreasing the quality. This highlights the key role of the LNO for the Information Management during Operation EUFOR RD Congo.



AU LNO to EU FHQ

The African Union (AU) established liaison to EUFOR RD Congo in order to exchange information between the EU and the AU on military matters related to the military support of safeguarding the election period in the DRC. The LNOs were stationed on EUFOR's compound in N'Dolo and the information exchange was successfully conducted on a regular basis.

Liaison within the EU OHQ



Swedish, Belgian, Austrian and French NLOs in Potsdam

The Troop Contributors also sent Liaison Officers to the EU OHQ. During the mission, National Liaison Officers (NLO) from six Nations worked in Potsdam. These Nations were Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. Responsible for the needs of the NLOs was the OHQ Liaison Co-ordination Officer assisted by one NCO. The Liaison Officers contributed to different working and planning groups within the EU OHQ and attended meetings and update briefings. They made their contributions to the main planning conferences (e.g. Force Generation, Deployment and Re-deployment) and were the direct line between the EU OHQ and the Ministries of Defence of their Na-

tions. The information exchange took place by direct talks between the Liaison Officers and the responsible branches or specialists. In late November 2006 the German LNO was the first one to leave the EU OHQ. The Liaison Elements to Brussels and Kinshasa returned on 12 December 2006. The Liaison Organisation was finally closed on the 19 January 2007.

Command Support


The information lifeline into theatre

The responsibility of Command Support was to ensure continuous connectivity between EU OHQ and EU FHQ from first augmentation till re-deployment of EUFOR. In addition to that connectivity to the EUMS was established and maintained during the entire mission.



Multichannel dish in N'Dolo

Technically, the links provided were mainly based on multichannel satellite communication systems with a first level single channel satellite backup and a second level HF-Backup system (see pictures of the systems at the FHQ location in Kinshasa). Throughout the





mission the multichannel system worked stable and therefore more than 99% availability was achieved. The first and second level backup systems ensured 100% availability. Services provided via the above mentioned technical links consisted of non-secure and secure Voice, non-secure and secure Fax, non-secure and secure Data and secure Video Tele Conference (VTC).



HF Antenna AK451 as backup system

Of exceptional importance was the technical connectivity between the EU OHQ and the EU FHQ without recourse to NATO assets or regulations. In addition to that the connectivity had to be implemented in compliance with the different national and EU IT security regulations. In this perspective implementing the new developed secure EU OHQ OPS WAN (Wide Area Network) made a great improvement. For the first time two different Local Area Networks (LAN) of two Parent Nations on two different continents were linked via satellite. In the end the secure EU OHQ OPS WAN provided not only secure Voice via a Voice over IP (VoIP) system and data exchange with direct e-Mail functionality but it also made the EU FHQ Common Relevant Operational Picture (CROP) available on the EU OHQ level.

As VTC becomes more and more an important command support asset, it was extensively used. During mission time the military-wide used VTC asset was exchanged by state of the art equipment. This equipment in connection with a satellite link run by a dynamic bandwidth system allowed increasing the video and voice quality dramatically. During the operation a lot of improvements were made in the field of multinational Command

Support. With a unique combined effort a reliable information lifeline into theatre was created and provided a stable basis for conducting the EUFOR RD Congo mission successfully.

Finances and Contracts

“To get whatever you want you will need a contract... and in most cases, it will cost money.”

Starting at the preparation phase there were a lot of contracting and budgeting issues at all levels of the mission as EUFOR soldiers had to be accommodated and fed. Additionally, a considerable amount of infrastructure had to be built up.

The related contracting and accounting work had for the very first time to be done for a EU Crisis Management Operation in accordance with the Council Decision 2004/197/CFSP of 23 February 2004 (the so-called “ATHENA Decision”) and the related ATHENA Financial Rules. Additionally, the ATHENA procedures had to be respected.

ATHENA is a mechanism to administer the financing of the Common Costs of any EU operation. Within this mechanism it is assumed that member states themselves have

Scope of operational costs		
“Common Costs”	“Nation Born Costs”	National Responsibility
<p>ATHENA Annex IIIa</p> <p>Headquarters Administration Communications Public Information MEDEVAC + Infrastructure Absolutely needed for the force as a whole to fulfill its mission!</p>	<p>ATHENA Art. 27</p> <p>Accommodation/ Lodging Messing, Food, Bottled water Laundry Utilities (Electricity, Water) Garbage removal Welfare, POL Maps Medical Care</p>	<p>Purely National Funding</p> <p>Everything else e.g. Unloading, loading; Transport of personnel and/or material into and within theatre; Ground handling of aircraft</p>




the ability to finance and govern a military operation. Therefore as a basic principle ATHENA only bears incremental costs for the EU Headquarters. Incremental cost for the force as a whole can only be borne by ATHENA in case of an emergency or if they could not be foreseen and are essential for the operation.

Expenditures not included in the above mentioned Common Costs are, as a basic principle, subject to the rule "costs lie where they fall". However, Article 27 of the above-mentioned Council Decision provides that the administrative management of certain expenditure in relation to an operation, while remaining the responsibility of the Member State, which it concerns, may be entrusted to ATHENA. The ATHENA Special Committee may authorize the OpCdr to enter into contracts on behalf of the Member States, it may authorize ATHENA's budget to pre-finance expenditure by the Member States or decide that ATHENA will collect the necessary funds from the Member States in advance to honor the contracts entered into.

These regulations formed a huge challenge for the budget officers in EUFOR RD Congo. In the beginning the safeguarding of all these issues had not been in the focus of the planning and the necessary number of specialists was not at hand in the beginning. In addition the required knowledge about ATHENA rules and regulations needed training. To safeguard mission success extra audits were conducted as well as a Task Force especially for contracting purposes established. Long-term contracts involved frequent negotiations, in theatre as well as in Potsdam, with the necessity to constantly update these contract issues. For example, numerous contracts were made to buy fuel and computers as well as to rent vehicles or to employ interpreters.

Additionally, there were nearly 200 contracts on infrastructural works concluded in the AO and Gabon. Some of them were worth several hundred thousand Euros. EU FHQ did most of this contracting in theatre while EU OHQ CJ8 monitored and controlled these activities. In accordance with the ATHENA regulations, contracts upwards of 137,000 Euro needed approval by EU OHQ. Additionally, advice and guidance had been given. The final decision was reserved to the OpCdr.



The budget was subdivided into Common Costs (real ATHENA budget) and so called "Nation Borne Costs" (national costs, pre-financed by EU). The budget totaled 23,225,300 Euro, thereof 19,225,300 Euro for Common Costs and 4,000,000 Euro for pre-financing Nation Borne Costs. Appropriations for infrastructure summed up to 5,100,000 Euro. The reference amount describes the payment authorisation to bear common costs before the final decision on the budget had been taken.

When all EUFOR units had returned to their home locations EU OHQ CJ8 works still went on until end of January 2007. Last contracts were executed and the accounts had to be closed, leaving a significant amount of common funds being able to be handed back to the ATHENA Special Committee.

Civil Military Co-operation / Civil Military Co-ordination

CIMIC and CMCO as Force Multipliers

The CIMIC objectives for Operation EUFOR RD Congo could be essentially summarised as developing the co-ordination and liaison structure with all relevant actors to facilitate reassurance and deterrence for the force. CIMIC would in addition consider opportunities in theatre for projects, which would enhance the image of the force and benefit the local population. The earliest task taken up by the CIMIC cell was to identify and establish a suitable liaison architecture which was needed both to provide the insight into the civil environment and to fulfil the information requirements of the OpCdr. The combining of the CMCO role in addition necessitated an additional structure to the other EU partners who were also involved in the AO.

EU OHQ CIMIC branch was one of the smaller multinational branches at the EU OHQ with just three officers representing Germany, France and Ireland. The initial briefings gave an overview of the mission area and the tasks to be accomplished; thereafter the team focused their research on the development of the CIMIC estimate. The initial focus was on establishing a knowledge base of the Congo conflict and to identify the actors with which the EU OHQ could co-operate with and from whom the information deficit could be fulfilled. In this respect the number of UN organizations proved invaluable and early contacts with Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs OCHA assisted in building up a comprehensive picture. One of the unusual aspects of this mission was the dual CIMIC/CMCO roles to be executed in theatre. The distinction between the two being the coordinating role exercised with other EU actors versus the co-operation with the civil actors in theatre.

An additional task, which ran in tandem with the assessment process, was to determine the composition of the EU FHQ CIMIC cell. This

was conducted in close co-operation with the Force Generation section of EU OHQ CJ5 and when completed five members representing three countries formed the CIMIC cell in theatre.



Preparation of the building site overhead shelter

The mission had no dedicated CIMIC budget for Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) and in the absence of such a budget national CIMIC teams were expected to undertake them. Opportune contacts with Brussels lead to an introduction with the EU Commission Delegation office in Kinshasa. Through this introduction a level of co-operation and support developed. This relationship ultimately made available a budget of 110,000 Euros to finance EUFOR QIPs in Kinshasa.



Building site overhead shelter

The funding would have to be in line with the EU Commission Delegations guidelines and with these guidelines the CIMIC team began the Civil Assessment process to meet the criteria guidelines of EU investment in



Finished overhead shelter

the DRC. The CIMIC team set about conducting assessments and in all seven project areas were identified. The team direction focused on the education system in the main but one additional project, which would facilitate 10.000 people daily at the Main Railway Station by providing overhead shelter, was additionally selected. This project cost \$ 39,000 and employed 40 people.

The condition of the Kinshasa schools in general was very poor and the impact of basic renovation improved both the atmosphere and visual impact within the educational establishment. It is hoped that despite the short duration of the mission and the small cost of the investment it will have long impact on the lives of the next Congolese generation in addition to the democratic dividend of the elections.

St.Paul des Filles School was built before Independence and employed 14 teachers for a student population of 2100. The sizable student versus teacher ration is compensated by two school periods each day; morning and afternoon. This situation is not uncommon and is generally practised by almost all schools in Kinshasa. The project here involved the renovation of classrooms and the provision of teaching aids and furniture. The project employed almost 50 workers at a cost of \$20,000

St.Robert School is co-located with St. Pauls and caters for secondary level pupils. It has a teaching staff of 35 with 750 students and

two daily teaching periods. The project cost \$20,000 and consisted of painting, furniture and teaching aids. 25 workers completed the project. St. Boniface, Masina opened in 2002 in a former school building. It has a student population of 650 students aged from four to twelve years; they again have two school periods each day to cater for the numbers and a teaching staff of twelve. The project involved some infrastructural works, painting of classrooms and the provision of school equipment. A total of \$6,000 was invested and 25 workers were employed on the project.

St. Gabriels School Limete is located within a compound of three buildings, two of which provide classrooms for the students. There is a total of 42 staff employed at the school with 1500 students. The project at this school concentrated on the infrastructural works necessary to provide five classrooms at a total cost of \$25,000.



Congolese pupils at schools benefiting from QIPs

Some others QIPs were developed at national level in the domains of education, medical, and road traffic for a total of about \$ 30,000. All these CIMIC/CMCO activities contributed to enhance Force acceptance and in consequence was part of EUFOR's successful Force Protection efforts.

Medical Support

In the DRC and in Gabon a substantial part of Combat Service Support was rendered by Medical Troops in order to secure EUFOR Medical Force Protection, daily treatment of disease and injuries of soldiers and to safeguard "life, limb and eye" of combat casualties as well as daily advice on hygiene and preventive medicine.

Although the Troop Contributing Nations re-



Forwarded Surgical Unit

tained as always the ultimate responsibility for the provision of health and medical support to their forces iaw the Health and Medical Support Concept for Military EU led CMO, medical planning of the EU OHQ ensured a medical force structure, which provided a medical support and health care standard as close as possible to prevailing peacetime medical standards and follows the principles of "best medical practices" and which is acceptable to all TC's. Based on the available intelligence information and the given tasks to EUFOR it was estimated that no battle casualties, 1.35% diseases and 0.05 % non-battle incidents could be expected daily.



Finnish team treading a patient in their FSR

To ensure this and to meet the estimate, a multinational medical support structure was build up as described more in detail below. This structure showed efficiency and economies of scale and reduced the national need for additional medical support, attached to national support elements, to zero. Due to the tropical environment it was recommended to take preventive measures during the operation. All troop commanders were responsible to have control on these measures in order to preserve force strength.

In EUFOR RD Congo, the medical structure was built up with several Role 1, two mobile Role 2 in a Forward Surgical Unit configuration and a medical Task Force including two static Role 2 units and two Tactical MEDEVAC aircrafts. Except of one Role 1 embedded in the FHQ itself, all the other Role 1 were embedded nationally in the units and in charge of direct medical support. It consisted of one doctor, at least one nurse and soldiers. The static and the mobile Role 2 units were EUFOR assets with a surgical capability and in charge of wounded or seriously ill patients. The Tactical MEDEVAC assets also belonged to the Role 2 structure.

The main difficulty of this operation was to plan a medical support efficient enough in a very large country (nearly as big as the whole of Europe). It was EUFOR's mission to assist MONUC not only in Kinshasa but also in a large part of the DRC and especially at the designated PoA. Due to the enormous distances and the need to meet the medical timelines, the consequence was to realize damage control surgery by mobile surgical capability before the tactical evacuation to static Role 2 facilities. Finland has developed this concept with a small unit (10 persons) composed of two teams that were able to work independently of each other and both equipped with materiel easily transportable by air. This Finnish mobile surgical unit was fully operational and displayed all its possibilities during each deployment to the Point of Applications in addition to the Role 1 element embedded in the deployed company. After the damage control surgery the needed air transport was guaranteed by a C-130 stationed on the Point of Applications. Although this aircraft was in fact a CASEVAC it was tuned up to an almost MEDEVAC configuration by comprising monitoring and oxygen equipment and medical personnel of a Casualty Staging Unit skilled in emergency medicine. Of course in case of a fast extraction, the boarded Finish Forward Surgical Team would use the aircraft as an operation "room" to provide damage control surgery. Medical support personnel tailored to



the requirement were always part of the Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Teams deploying multiple times into the territory of the DRC. Tasked to deliver Medical Support to the team, they also contributed substantially to medical information and intelligence products, which were analyzed and staffed by the Combined Joint Medical Branch of the



German Role 2 entrance

EU FHQ. In Kinshasa (where between 850 and up to 1300 soldiers were deployed), the EU Role 2 was established in N'Dolo camp. It was a light version of a German Role 2 with two surgical teams and one operation theatre. Out of this Role 2 it was possible to build up a smaller Role 2 (a so called Immediate Operational Capability; IMOC) consisting of not more than the most essential elements. This version was used during the deployment and re-deployment phases respectively to guarantee the medical support as soon /as long as possible.

For the first time ever in an operational theatre Belgium, France and Poland formed a multinational Role 1. This multinational Role 1 opened in the beginning of November 2006 and provided a technical platform able to be in charge of all emergencies with an exceptional and combined quality. This multinational Role 1 is one of the success stories of this EUFOR RD Congo because Role 1 capabilities are usually a national responsibility.

In Kinshasa, there was also one CH-53 MEDEVAC helicopter of Germany, located in N'Dolo airport, used only in the district of Kinshasa. Its mission consisted to pick up wounded soldiers in Kinshasa and transport them after first medical support on the spot to the Role 2 facility. The second task was to transport wounded or severe ill patients from N'Dolo compound to N'Djili airport for MEDEVAC transport to Europe. Fortunately it was never necessary to use this capability.

In Libreville in Gabon (where between 1250 and 700 soldiers were deployed) the 6th BIMA infirmary (Role 1) supported the two French companies and a German Role 1 was located in both EU compounds in Libreville.

Also in Libreville the second EU static Role 2 was based. Following the German Role 2 concept, this very well equipped and fully operational capability was stationed within a Gabonese barracks near to the military and international airport of Gabon. This Role 2 was composed of 2 surgical teams. One was permanently provided by Germany and the other was provided by Switzerland until 01 September 2006 and from then by the Netherlands.



C-160 MEDEVAC

One dedicated MEDEVAC C-160 of Germany completed the medical layout. This plane was stationed at Libreville airport and allowed flights only between Libreville and Kinshasa (N'Djili). There was also never a need to use this aircraft for MEDEVAC. Prior to the start of the mission on 30 July 2006 an acclimatization program was executed in order to minimize the effects of the climatic conditions on the soldiers.



Inside C-160 MEDEVAC

All deployed EUFOR personnel were also trained in first aid, personal hygiene and were aware about the dangers of local food and water conditions to prevent gastrointestinal (bacterial and protozoan), local infections, mental distress diseases and climate related diseases.


Furthermore all personnel were informed about the cultural differences in forming human relations and in sexual behavior. This included the knowledge of preventive measures against sexual transmitted diseases (i.e. HIV). All medical Personnel were trained in recognizing and the treatment of tropical diseases and mental distress diseases prior to

deployment. During this complex operation, no EUFOR personnel were seriously ill and only one EUFOR soldier was injured during a training event, although it was the first operation in Africa for a high number of European troops. For them Gabon and the DRC represented a new environment rich in medical risks and diseases mostly occurring during the rainy season. It appeared only one case of malaria, one case of sexual transmitted disease, two short periods of small numbers of diarrhea (not more then 70 patient a week) or other tropical diseases due to a permanent awareness of all the medical teams and the advices of the EU Veterinary. Thanks to the acclimatization program and the light tasks in the first week of the mission there were also no cases of dehydration.

For malaria, the fight against the vector and drugs (depending of the national rules) had succeeded to prevent this sometime lethal disease. Otherwise hygienic and environmental problems were the main medical problems of this operation. The lack of specialist in this domain especially in the EU OHQ has been a real difficulty. Different problems were handled successful; the last problem encountered was the development of mould in the UCALSA tents in Libreville and Kinshasa. It was due to the addition of warmth and humidity and the

no-tropicalization of the tents. This important subject induced a great number of laboratory examinations and reports; subsequently the tents were closed.

As the situation allowed, EUFOR Medical Support went out of barracks in order to support Civil Military Co-operation (CIMIC) both in the DRC and Gabon through active participation in vaccination campaigns for the local civilian community. This was achieved through doctors attends in dispensaries, by creating training opportunities for local medical staff and by





selecting appropriate organizations for materiel support. Specialist personnel worked in local Health Care facilities in order to foster good working relationship with the countries' medical community and to promote mutual professional military medical experience.

For EUFOR RD Congo medical care on a standard that reached the peace-time medical standards was ensured and followed the Western European principle of the best medical practice. Despite of language and culture differences, CJMED EU OHQ and the CJMED EU FHQ together with all the medical team completely succeeded in this challenge. At the end the Medical Support in the mission comprised the medical effort of 10 nations working together in the true spirit of EUFOR.

Gender Issues

Gender Mainstreaming inside the Operation EUFOR RD Congo



Meeting in N'Dolo compound of EUFOR and CAFCO, the largest co-ordinating women organization in DRC

On 31 October 2000 the UN decided upon the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 "Women, peace and security". EU Guidelines as the European Union Checklist on implementing UNSCR 1325/2000 and the "European Union Plan for implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the context of ESDP", put the UN Security Council Resolution 1325/2000 into more concrete terms. The integration of Gender was systematically addressed in all phases of Operation EUFOR RD Congo. The EU decided upon to address Gender Issues inside EUFOR

RD Congo by appointing a Gender Advisor to the EU OHQ in Potsdam. The initial phase was about planning and put Gender into the OPLAN. The OpCdr decided upon a Direction and Guidance for Gender Issues, which described "Why", "What" and "How", should be performed inside EUFOR RD Congo when it came to Gender Issues.

The focus of the Gender Work was operational! Working also with a Gender perspective helped to achieve the operational objectives. Working with Gender improved the acceptance of EUFOR and also contributed to the effectiveness and success of the Operation. One example of this was information and intelligence brought to the Operation via the work on Gender.

The local women and Women NGOs were very positive to the fact that the EUFOR Operation took its time to inform local women separately and that they were given the opportunity to express women's assessment and point of view on the situation in the DRC. This was considered to be a good way on empowering local women as stated in UNSCR 1325. This was also a good way on working with as well improve credibility as visibility towards the local female population. A well-considered and efficient weekly Gender reporting system made it possible to control the good conduct and progress of EUFOR RD Congo on integrating a Gender perspective into the operation and to assess the Gender situation in the AO.

As a complement to the EU OHQ Gender Advisor the Legal Advisor at EU FHQ was appointed to be the Gender Officer. 20 Gender Focal Points inside the different units and staff branches in Kinshasa and Gabon were also appointed to be a working network in support of the Gender work. The Gender Focal points and the EU OHQ Gender Advisor worked in close co-ordination trying to find the best ways on integrating a Gender perspective in the different branches and units. In the Preparation Phase, the EU OHQ Gen-

der Advisor conducted a Gender training for the EU FHQ Senior Operations staff in Creil, France. The same training was conducted to EU OHQ personnel in Potsdam. Within the deployment phase the Gender Advisor trained EUFOR RD Congo personnel in order to become qualified Gender training multipliers in Libreville and Kinshasa. In addition to this training there were also special training sessions on the Soldiers Card, which included a part on Gender, and SEA (Sexual Exploitation and Abuse). The Operation especially addressed the part of raising knowledge and understanding on Gender Issues, and this proved to have been well-invested time.

The EU OHQ Gender Advisor carried out the work in close co-ordination with the EU OHQ Command Group and the EU OHQ Human Rights Advisor. The Gender work was also co-ordinated with the work of experts from MONUC and the other existing European Union bodies in Kinshasa. During the Operation there have been many valuable Lessons Identified. As this was the first time that an ESDP Operation worked with integrating a Gender Perspective to a military Operation by performing Gender mainstreaming in real this was considered as a very positive example. The gender work inside EUFOR RD Congo might be a role model for coming ESDP Operations.

EU OHQ Potsdam – Visitors

Together with Information Operations and Maneuver on the ground and in the air promoting EUFOR RD Congo in Europe was another vital part of the operation. A considerable amount of visitors up to the highest political and military levels visited the EU OHQ in Potsdam. For this group of influential personnel information about all aspects of the operation and presentations about the work being done in Potsdam but more importantly in theatre were constantly conducted. These efforts were an important prerequisite for acceptance and support of the operation on the political and military level.

This high interest in EUFOR RD Congo enabled the EU OHQ in Potsdam to welcome a multi-faceted group of visitors from all over the world during the whole operational period. From 24 April 2006 until 04 December



Visit of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union (SG/HR), Mr. Javier Solana



Visit of his Excellency the General Secretary of United Nations, Mr. Kofi Atta Annan accompanied by the German Minister of Defence Dr. Franz Josef Jung



Visit of her Excellency the Chancellor of Federal Republic of Germany, Dr. Angela Merkel accompanied by the German Minister of Defence Dr. Franz Josef Jung



2006 a total of 56 delegations visited the EU OHQ. Special highlights were the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union (SG/HR), Mr. Javier Solana, his Excellency the General Secretary of United Nations, Mr. Kofi Atta Annan and her Excellency the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Dr. Angela Merkel.

The complete chronology of all visits is attached in the annex.

EU OHQ Potsdam in Standby again

After the official termination of the operation and the departure of the staff personnel to their original units the EU OHQ Potsdam went to the standby status again. The Bundeswehr Operations Command's permanent OHQ Key Nucleus was handed back the responsibility for providing the EU OHQ Potsdam as one element of the German commitments to the Helsinki Headline Goal Force Catalogue. The Permanent Key Nucleus will comprise 14 officers and NCOs representing the branches of an EU OHQ. With these personnel the Bundeswehr Operations Command will implement Lessons Identified from Operation EUFOR RD Congo. It will continue to support the further development of EU Crisis Management Concepts and Procedures. In addition further training for personnel earmarked for an future EU OHQ will be conducted on the national as well as on the European level.



The Permanent Key Nucleus will also maintain the ability to re-activate the EU OHQ in Potsdam on short notice. This includes maintaining the availability of the existing infrastructure as well as optimizing the related Information Technology. This includes preparing the workspaces in the offices, maintaining the Mission Net and optimizing the communication capabilities. This ensures that the BwOpsCmd will permanently maintain the capability to serve as a Parent Headquarters for an EU OHQ for any future military EU Crisis Management Operations.

Experiences and way ahead

The major experience of this mission is the ability of the European Union to plan, prepare and conduct a Crisis Management Operation of the size of EUFOR RD Congo. The concept of a dormant OHQ within the responsibility of a Parent Nation to establish this headquarters and the multinational manning has proven to be a benefit for the European military community. The different cultural backgrounds of the participating nations have sometimes added the spice to an interesting and challenging mission. Furthermore the cooperative spirit of the nations and all members of the headquarters and the troops in the end brought EUFOR RD Congo to a success.

By executing the operation and drawing numerous Lessons Identified out of EUFOR RD Congo another important contribution to a developing ESDP has been done. EUFOR RD Congo displayed clearly that EU Crisis Management Operations are not to be seen in contrast or competition to NATO-led operations but complementary to the efforts of other organizations. In order to contribute to peace and stability in the world EU has proven to be a valuable player. Synergic effects were achieved and some of the solutions found within the planning and conduct of EUFOR RD Congo might lead the way to future operations. Despite all challenges met and overcome it has to be underlined that the multi-

national approach clearly worked for the benefit of the operation. In general terms the foundation for future European operations has been broadened and solidified with EUFOR RD Congo and together with other concepts the EU Headquarters Concept is now "mission proven". Key element of this type of operations is the joint EU

political and military approach towards the relevant aspects of the society we were working with. EUFOR RD Congo also in this respect formed a solid basis for future military EU operations.

EUFOR RD Congo left the DR Congo, however, the EU stayed

After the successful conduct of the elections EUFOR RD Congo re-deployed in accordance with the OPLAN starting 01 December 2006. The inauguration of President Kabila constituted the formal end of the Presidential Election Process. The speech held on that occasion is displayed in extracts on the next two pages.

Although the military engagement ended as planned the EU did not leave the DR Congo. The successful missions of EUPOL and EUSEC will continue well into 2007. In addition, the European Commission, having been the main donor providing funding for the electoral process since 2001 (165 million out of a total of 397 million including the logistical costs), launched an initial package of measures in support of governance in the DR Congo following the second round of the presidential elections. As a follow-on effort the Commission was preparing to recommend to the Member States a doubling of the Aid Budget as part of the 10th European Development Fund. This investment in reconstructing the DRC, its capabilities and its basic services will provide the Congolese people to recap the



The inauguration of President Joseph Kabila on 06 December 2006

benefits of reconciliation and democracy.

Moreover, the EU's engagement to assist the DRC on its way towards stability and democracy will stay embedded into the EU's overall engagement in Africa. The EU stands ready to step up its support for the efforts of the AU and Af-

rican sub-regional organizations to promote security and development on the African continent. The EU will for example stay committed to strengthen and replenish the African Peace Facility and further support the undertaking of a comprehensive long term needs assessment.

As military operations like EUFOR RD Congo are supportive for other EU missions and projects, this also applies to the multi-fold non-military activities of the EU in the fields of Human Rights and Governance, Development Assistance, Sustainable Economic Growth, Regional Integration and Trade as well as the Investment in people that will sustainably support the development of Africa. And the younger the people are the longer the effect will remain within the population. EUFOR RD Congo soldiers experienced the friendliness and interest especially of the children. This investment will pay off in the long run as societies are based on the children.



EUFOR RD Congo supported the future of the DRC



Extracts of the speech of President Joseph Kabila during his Inauguration Ceremony on 06 December 2006

Honored Heads of State and Government,
Heads of Delegation,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Distinguished Guests,
My fellow citizens,

On this solemn occasion, on which, in accordance with the will of the Congolese people, I assume the supreme office of the nation, I recognize before God and History the scope of my responsibility to a nation determined to direct its efforts towards the future. Today, the Congolese people experience an historic moment that will embed itself firmly in its memory, as it represents the beginning of a new era which must bring to the people prosperity and development for all. Before all else, I owe thanks to God Almighty, that He has helped me through five hard and uncertain years to achieve the goals I set for myself on the 26th of January 2001. (...)



President Kabila awaiting his inauguration

In this solemn moment I commemorate the millions of Congolese women and men who gave their lives on the battlefield for democracy, and who did not live to experience this happy day.

I want to take the opportunity to thank all of the institutions of the interim government, who despite all other considerations placed the higher interest of the nation foremost, thus ensuring good elections. My thoughts dwell on the Independent Electoral Commission, which carried out its task to the complete satisfaction of the national and international public. I would fail to be complete if I did not salute the remarkable solidarity shown by the International Community during the whole difficult period of transition, which now, thanks to whose moral, diplomatic, financial and material support, is coming to a close.

Finally, I would like to recognize the presence of the Heads of State and Government, and all of the other Heads of Delegation who supported us in our will to rebuild and renew the Congolese Nation. (...)

My role in the new institutional constellation is to rebuild the state and to generate a real electrical shock to make fundamental changes of mentality. To watch over our restored national unity and our rediscovered national cohesion will be the epicenter of my political labors. As the guarantor of the Nation and the Constitution under its Article 69, I will ensure that the public administration and government institutions function correctly while observing the balance between the executive, legislative and judicative. (...)

The challenges of the future we now must confront are much bigger than party politics or the interests of individual politicians. But I remain convinced that democracy holds a place ready for everyone. (...)

In this sense I announce today that recess is over, so that the people can concentrate their attentions on their work, and do this in peace and quiet. With regard to peace and the consolidation of the Nation, I will direct all of my energies towards the fight against intolerance and exclusion; these are no part of our culture, but often the source of conflict. (...)

That is why I would like to emphasize here and now the constitutionality of the Opposition, which must fulfill its role as an institutional counterweight, I believe strongly that it will do so responsibly. I call on all opinion leaders to fulfill their roles in educating the public and sensitizing the people to democratic values and to peace.

Regarding national security, my promise to the men and women of the Congo is that I am determined to eliminate insecurity and urban guerillas of all kinds. The situation with the armed gangs in the East of the country, who have not yet understood that the old times are gone, will be one of my chief concerns.

The highest duty of the Army and the Congolese police, the completion of whose training will be a central aspect of government action, is to give the people security and protection. I will provide every resource for them to be able to do so. (...)

In today's world, which has become one big village, the future of the Democratic Republic of the Congo will depend also upon its international relationships. She must once again assume her proper place at the geo-strategic heart of Africa, so that it can play the role that Africa and the world expect of her. What is why we are now setting out on a diplomacy of development rather than a diplomacy of simple representation. (...)

Today I renew my promise to give primacy to good neighborly relations and peaceful co-existence between our country and her neighbors, and to reinforce our policies of mutual respect and regional and sub-regional integration.

Although this inauguration of an elected president is already one result of the democratization process, it is still just one step on the path to creating new institutions. The creation of a Bureau of the National Assembly and the appointment of a new government will follow. In a second step, provincial assemblies and governments, a Senate, and finally local assemblies will be installed. (...)

I challenge every one of you to contribute to the common weal of the whole people, and to feel yourself as a bearer of hope for posterity. Let us, with God's grace and your native determination work together to build a Congo more beautiful than before. Long live the Democratic Republic of the Congo!

Thank you.



Congolese citizens and international guests listening to President Kabila's speech



Lieutenant General Karlheinz Viereck

Born 09 March 1951 in Kassel (Germany)

Lieutenant General Viereck was the Operation Commander for the EUFOR Operation in the DR Congo.

Career

Lieutenant General Viereck started his military career in the Bundeswehr in 1970. He completed his pilot training in the USA in Sheppard AFB in 1974. Back in Germany he served in the 2nd Flying Squadron in the Reconnaissance Wing in Leck as a combat pilot. He also worked as a operations staff officer in the same squadron until 1982. In the same year he began his General Staff Officer Course at the Bundeswehr Command and Staff College in Hamburg and moved in 1984 on to the Danish Defense College in Copenhagen. In 1985 he started his job as a General Staff Officer at the NATO Headquarters AIR BALTAP in Denmark. After 2 years he went back to Germany to become Deputy Commander and later Commander of the Flying Group of Fighter Bomber Wing 36 "Westfalen" in Hopsten. Between 1990 and 1994 he worked in the German Ministry of Defense (MOD) in Bonn as Operations General Staff Officer at the Air Staff III 3, Staff Officer with the Planning Staff of the Federal Minister of Defense and Deputy Senior Military Assistant to the Federal Minister of Defense. After commanding Fighter Bomber Wing 34 "Allgäu" in Memmingen for 2 years, he returned to Bonn in 1996 where he was appointed Chief of Air Staff Branch III 1. From 1998 to 2000 he worked in the MOD Berlin as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, III Division. In 2000 he left for Norway. There he worked as Deputy Chief of Staff and as Director Operations at the Joint Operations NATO Headquarters North. In 2003 he returned to Germany to become Commander of 4th Air Division in Aurich. In 2005 he assumed the post of Deputy Commander of the Bundeswehr Operations Command. On 16 March 2006, Lieutenant General Karlheinz Viereck became Commander of the Bundeswehr Operations Command in Potsdam.



Awards and Decorations

Bundeswehr Cross of Honour in Silver and Gold

Second class of the Cross of Merit of the Estonian Ministry of Defence.

Effective Dates of Promotion

Second Lieutenant	April	1972
First Lieutenant	June	1974
Captain	October	1977
Major	October	1984
Lieutenant Colonel	October	1988
Colonel	September	1994
Brigadier General	April	1998
Major General	April	2003
Lieutenant General	April	2006



**Major General
Christian Damay**

Born 24 September 1951 in Saint-Germain en Laye, Yvelines (France)

Major General Damay was the Force Commander for the EUFOR Operation in the DR Congo.



Career

Major General Damay started his military career in 1973 with the participation on a platoon leader course in the Infantry Academy in Montpellier. After one year he was assigned to the 3rd Infantry Regiment in Radolfzell (Germany) as a platoon leader. He stayed there until 1976 before he moved to the 1st Airborne Infantry Regiment in Pau. In 1980 he was assigned as an instructor in the Army Non-commissioned Officer Academy in Saint-Maixent. After two years he was assigned as a company commander in the 9th Airborne Infantry Regiment in Toulouse-Pamiers. From 1982 until 1985 he was appointed as a company commanders instructor at the Infantry Academy in Montpellier. In 1985 he moved to the Army Staff. There he worked in the Movement Office. After attending the War College for two years, he became Deputy Commander of the 8th Infantry Regiment in Noyon until 1991. It followed an assignment as Detachment Commander of the 420th Logistical Support in Naqoura (Lebanon). Then he became Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff of the 8th Infantry Division HQ in Amiens. From 1992 until 1994 he served at the Army staff at the Advanced Studies Department – INF/Airborne Cell. In 1994 he got an assignment as the Commander of the 1st Airborne Infantry Regiment in Martignas/Jalle. Two years later he moved to the Army Personnel Directorate in Paris. There he worked for three years as Chief of Infantry Office and two years as Chief of Combat arms office. In 2001 he became Commander 11th Airborne Brigade in Toulouse. He stayed in Toulouse until 2005 but in 2002 he was Commander International Security Force Leclerc Brigade in Kosovo (MNB NE). In 2005 he returned to Paris to serve as Chief of the Management Office for Army Generals in the Ministry of Defence. From the 01 September 2003, Major General Damay is Land Task Force HQ No. 3 Commander in Marseilles.

Awards and Decorations

Officier de la Légion d'Honneur.
Officier de l'Ordre National du Mérite

Effective Dates of Promotion

Second Lieutenant	October	1972
First Lieutenant	October	1974
Captain	October	1978
Major	October	1983
Lieutenant Colonel	October	1988
Colonel	December	1992
Brigadier General	March	2001
Major General	October	2004



- 24.04.2006 Colonel Collot d'Escuries and Captain (N) Bono
25.04.2006 Her Excellency the Secretary of Defence of the Kingdom of Sweden Mrs. Dr. h.c. Leni Björklund
- 08.05.2006 Mrs. Birgit Loeser, EU Council Secretariat DGE IX – Civilian Crisis Management Police Unit
- 09.05.2006 Minister of State at the Federal Foreign Office Mr. Gernot Erler
09.05.2006 LtGen Puga, Commanding Officer of French Special Operations Command
16.05.2006 European Commanders Conference
16.05.2006 Mr. Rainer Arnold, Member of the German Parliament and speaker for defence affair of the SPD fraction
- 17.05.2006 Dr. Albrecht Conze, Deputy Director of Political Affairs MONUC and LtCol David Caulfield, former J5 MONUC
- 23.05.2006 Brigadier General Andreas Safranmüller, Military Attaché to the Austrian Embassy in Berlin
- 23.05.2006 Mr. Johannes Kahrs, Member of the German Parliament
24.05.2006 Colonel (ret) Dr. Elbers and Captain (N) (ret) Dr. Fegert
29.05.2006 Major General Jouke Eickelboom
29.05.2006 His Excellency Dr. Clemens von Goetze, German Ambassador to European Union
- 31.05.2005 His Excellency Reinhard Buchholz, German Ambassador in Kinshasa (DRC)
01.06.2006 General Rolando Mosca Moschini, Chairman European Union Military Committee
- 01.06.2006 Minister of State at the Ministry of Defence, Dr. Peter Wichert
06.06.2006 Colonel Brithous, Chief Combined Joint Special Operation Task Force
07.06.2006 High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union (SG/HR), Mr. Javier Solana, Minister of State at the Ministry of Defence
Mr. Friedbert Pflüger
- 08.06.2006 Personal Representative of the EU Secretary-General/High Representative for Human Rights, Mr. Michael Matthiessen
- 08.06.2006 Brigadier General Jan-Gunnar Isberg
19.06.2006 Special Representative of the Secretary General Ambassador William Lacy Swing
- 20.06.2006 Mrs. Birgit Homburger, Member of the German Parliament and Member of the Defence Committee
- 23.06.2006 Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Frank-Walter Steinmeier
27.06.2006 Deputy Chief of Defence of the German Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Johann Georg Dora
- 29.06.2006 Delegation of Members of the German Parliament, Winfried Nachtwei, Jürgen Trittin and Andreas Körner
- 29.06.2006 Colonel Fernandez-Andreas, Spanish Defence Attaché
10.07.2006 His Excellency the General Secretary of United Nations, Mr. Kofi Atta Annan, his Excellency the Minister of Defence
Dr. Franz Josef Jung
- 11.07.2006 Delegation of Members of the European Parliament chaired by Mr. Armand Franjulien (Head of Unit, Subcommittee on Security and Defence)
- 17.07.2006 Mr. Jürgen Schröder, Member of European Parliament and future Chief of Election Organisation in Kinshasa



25.07.2006	Delegation of the WEU Assembly's Defence Committee
26.07.2006	Her Excellency the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Dr. Angela Merkel and his Excellency the Minister of Defence Dr. Franz Josef Jung
27.07.2006	Mr. Eckart von Klaeden, Member of German Parliament and Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee
15.08.2006	Minister of State at the Ministry of Defence Dr. Klaus-Günther Biederbick
23.08.2006	UN Senior Mission Leaders Course of the Center for International Peace Operations
29.08.2006	His Excellency the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Singapur, Chie Foo Chiang
29.08.2006	His Excellency Georg Boomgarden, Federal Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany
30.08.2006	Major General Manfred Engelhardt, Chief of Staff of the Ministry of Defense of Germany
06.09.2006	His Excellency the Minister for Manpower and Second Minister of Defense of the Republic of Singapore, Dr. Ng Eng Hen
08.09.2006	Her Excellency, Ambassador Ilse Lindemann-Macha of the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Gabun
26.09.2006	Brigadier General Yekelo, Republic of South Africa
01.10.2006	UN Senior Officer Course of the Federal Armed Forces Command and Staff College
06.10.2006	Military Political Advisors of the French, Polish and German Ministries of Defence
09.10.2006	Mr. Magnus Anderson, Deputy Director for European Security Policy Department
19.10.2006	Representatives of the Institute for Security Studies Pretoria
25.10.2006	Chief Operation at the Italian Joint Operations Headquarters, Major General Claudio Graziano
26.10.2006	Major General Bengt Anderson, Director European Security Policy of the Belgian Foreign Ministry, designated OpCdr for the Nordic Battle Group
02.11.2006	Dr. Mary Martin, London School of Economics
06.11.2006	His Excellency the Minister of Development, Humanitarian Affaires and Defense of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Jean-Louis Schiltz
08.11.2006	Rear Admiral Jean-Pierre Teule, Operation Commander of the Joint Center of Planning and Operations of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of France
08.11.2006 –	
10.11.2006	Lieutenant Colonel Helmut Fritsch (DEU), Visiting Defence Fellow, Queens Centre for International Relations, Queen's University Kingston, Canada
15.11.2006	Colonel Michael C.Ryan, US to EU Defense Advisor
15.11.2006	Major Olivier Waché (FRA), Study Group on EU Crisis Management
22.11.2006	Brigadier General de Braquilanges, Chief Organisation of the Joint Centre of Plans and Operations of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of France (CPCO)
04.12.2006	Delegation of the EU-ESDP Seminar of the Goethe Institute
12.12.2006	Chief of Defence of the Czech Republic, General Pavel Stefka
18.12.2006	His Excellency the Ambassador of Italy, Mr. Antonio Puri Purini
20.12.2006	Lieutenant General David Leakey, designated Director General EUMS



LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A

AA Additional Augmentees
ACOS Assistant Chief of Staff
AFDL Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaire

AO Area of Operations
APOE Airport of Embarkation
ASSESSREP Assessment Report
AU African Union
AUT Austria

B

BEL Belgium
BG Battle Group
BwOpsCmd Bundeswehr Operations Command

C

CASEVAC Casualties Evacuation
CAT Co-ordinated Advance Team
CCTV Canal Congo Télévision
CE Crisis Establishment
CEI Congolese Independent Electoral Committee
CEUMC Chairman of the European Union Military Committee
CHE Switzerland
CHOD Chief of Defence
CI Counter Intelligence
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CIMIC Civil Military Co-operation
CIS Communications & Information Systems
CJ Combined Joint
CJSOR Combined Joint Statement of Requirements
CJSOTF Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force
CKTV Canal Kin Télévision
CMC Crisis Management Concept
CMCO Civil Military Co-ordination
CMO Crisis Management Operation
CoC Committee of Contributors
CONOPS Concept of Operations
COS Chief of Staff
CPCO Centre de Planification et de Conduite d'Operations

CROP Common Relevant Operational Picture
CSS Combat Service Support
CYP Cyprus
CZE Czech Republic

D

DDRRR Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement, Reintegration
DepOpCdr Deputy Operation Commander
DET Detachment
DEU Germany
DPP Department de protection personnelle
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo

E

EAC European Airlift Center
EMIA Etat-Major Interarmées
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
ESP Spain
ESVP Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik
EU FHQ European Union Force Headquarters
EU OHQ European Union Operation Headquarters
EU European Union
EUFOR European Forces
EUMC European Union Military Committee
EUMCC European Union Movement Co-ordination Centre
EUMCWG European Union Military Committee Working Group
EUMS European Union Member States
EUPOL Kinshasa European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa
EUSEC RD Congo European Security Sector Reform Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo



F		J	
FARDC	Forces Armées de la Republic Democratic du Congo	JFAC	Joint Forces Air Component
FCdr	Force Commander	JOC	Joint Operation Centre
FCIR	Force Capable of Immediate Reaction	L	
FCR	Forwarded Surgial Unit	LEGAD	Legal Adviser
FFT	Fact Finding Team	LNO	Liasion Officer
FGC	Force Generation Conference	LOX	Liquide Oxygen
FIKIN	International Fair of Kinshasa	LTU	Lithuania
FIN	Finland	LUX	Luxembourg
FOC	Full Operational Capability	M	
FP	Force Protection	MCPT	Multinational Core Planning Team
FRA	France	MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
G		MIB	Mission Analysis Briefing
GBR	Great Britain	MLC	Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo
GR	Republican Guard	MNB NE	Multinational Brigade North East
GRC	Greece	MOD	Ministry of Defence
GSC	General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union	MONUC	Mission de l'ONU en RD Congo
H		MSO	Military Strategic Option
HCR-PT	High Council of Republic-Parliament of Transition	MSOD	Military Strategic Option Directive
HF	High Frequency	N	
HNS	Host Nation Support	N	Navy
HOT	Hand Over Team	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
HQ Cdt	Headquarters Commandant	NBC	Nation Born Costs
HQ	Headquarters	NLD	Netherlands
HR	Human Rights	NLO	National Liasion Officer
HRFP	Human Rights Focal Points	NTM	Notice to Move
HUMINT	Human Intelligence	O	
HUN	Hungary	OCF	On Call Forces
I		OLRT	Operational Liasion and Reconnaissance Team
IMD	Initiating Military Directive	OP	Operation
IMEF	Interim Emergency Multinational Force	OpCdr	Operation Commander
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence	OPLAN	Operation Plan
Info Ops	Information Operations	OpRes	Operational Reserve
InfoOpsCell	Information Operations Cell	OPSUM	Operational Summary
IOC	Initial Operational Capability	ORBAT	Order of Battle
IPU	Integrated Police Unit		
IRL	Ireland		
ISTAR	Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance		
ITA	Italy		



LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

P		SPOC	Single Point of Contact
PA	Primary Augmentees	SPOE	Sea Port of Embarkation
PDSS	Person Designated Special Status	SVK	Slovakia
PI	Press Information	SVN	Slovenia
PI	Public Information	SWE	Sweden
PIC	Press Information Center	SY	Security
PIO	Press Information Officer	T	
PIR	Rapid Intervention Police Unit	TA	Target Audience
PIT	Pre-advanced Information Team	TAA	Target Audience Analysis
PNC	Congolese National Police	TacRes	Tactical Reserve
POA	Point of Application	TC	Troop Contributor
POC	Point of Contact	TCT	Time-Critical Targeting
POL	Poland	TEU	Treaty on European Union
POLAD	Political Adviser	TG	Task Group
POTF	Psychological Operational Task Force	TOA	Transfer of Authority
PRT	Portugal	TPLSS	Third Party Logistic Service Support
PSC	Political and Security Committee	TPT	Tactical PSYOPS Team
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations	TUR	Turkey
Q		U	
QIP	Quick Impact Project	UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
QRF	Quick Reaction Forces	UCALSA	Unión Castellana de Alimentación S.A
R		UDPS	Union pour la Democratie et le Progres Social
RCD	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie	UN	United Nation
Res	Reserve	UNDPKO	United Nation Department of Peacekeeping Operations
RLS	Real Life Support	V	
ROEREQ	Rules of Engagement Request	VoIP	Voice over Internet Protocol
RSL	Reserve at the Strategic Level	VTC	Video Tele Conference
RSOM	Reception Staging and Onward Movement	W	
S		WAN	Wide Area Network
SALCC	Strategic Airlift Co-ordination Center	Z	
SALIS	Strategic Airlift Interim Solution	ZAF	Zairian Armed Forces
SCC	Sealift Co-ordination Center		
SCJ	Supreme Court of Justice		
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse		
SG/HR	Secretary General / High Representative		
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe		
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence		
SOF	Special Operations Forces		

