

DRAFT BRIEF

NAME:

IKEDA (Seihin)

FILE: 209

Age 78  
Interrogated Yes

COUNTS OF INDICTMENT:

OUTLINE:

1933-1936 Managing Director of Mitsui Partnership  
 1937 Governor of Bank of Japan  
 1937-1945 Cabinet Councillor and Advisor to  
 Finance Minister  
 Minister of Finance and concurrently  
 Minister of Commerce and Industry  
 1941 Oct 29 Privy Council

YEAR	INCI- DENT	PARTICULARS	WITNESS	DOCU- MENT	INTERRO- GATIONS
1933 Sept 1936 Apr		Managing Director of Mitsui Partnership			
1934		Syndicate of Japanese Bank (including Mitsui) floated a loan to the Manchukuo Govt (loan not guaranteed by Japan)			20 Feb P 4
1937 Feb 1937 July		Governor of Bank of Japan			20 Feb P 1
1937		Cabinet Councillor			
1937 Dec 1945 Dec		Advisor to Finance Ministry			20 Feb P 1
1938 May) 1939 Jan)		Minister of Finance and concurrently Minister of Commerce and Industry			20 Feb P. 3
	29,30 31,32-	Incidents 29,30,31,32 occurred			
1938 Dec 16		Vice Pres of China Affairs Board ex-officio as Finance Minister			

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>INCI-DENT</u>	<u>PARTICULARS</u>	<u>WITNESS</u>	<u>DOCU-MENT</u>	<u>INTERRO-GATION</u>
1939 Jan 1940 Aug		Cabinet Councillor			1 Mar P 5
1940 Oct 1941 Oct		Cabinet Councillor			1 Mar P 5
1941 Oct 29)	) 57,61,62 ) 63,64	Privy Council			20 Feb P 5
1941 Dec 8 )		Incidents 57,61,62,63,64 occurred			
		Declaration of War-placed before Privy Council for approval. War was already in progress when approved.			20 Feb P 6

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

CASE NO: 209

IKEDA, Seikiu

CASE NO: 112

NAKAJIMA, Chikuhel

8 March 1946

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF

Henry A. Hauxhurst

An error was made in the first report in designating IKEDA as Minister of War when he was in fact Finance Minister as well as Minister of Commerce and Industry in the first Kenyo Cabinet. General Sugiyama and General Itagaki were the Ministers of war in that Cabinet, General Itagaki becoming such in June 1938.

Attention should be called to the fact that IKEDA joined the Cabinet in May 1938 while Nakajima was Railways Minister during the entire existence of the Cabinet. Both IKEDA and Nakajima were in favor of settling the China matter and were against the military. Their efforts to control the military, however, were unsuccessful and they went along.

Nakajima was interested in one of the largest aircraft plants which he established in 1917. He retired as an officer and director in 1931 after he became a member of the Diet. The business of this company grew as the aggression in China progressed. It had no plants located in Manchukuo.

Perhaps the case against Nakajima is stronger than the one against IKEDA because Nakajima was in the Cabinet when the China Incident

occurred. It seems doubtful whether either of them can be convicted on a trial, and it may be they are properly classified as war criminals for the reason that they were members of the first Kenoye Cabinet, and for the additional reason, so far as IKRDA is concerned, of his membership in the Privy Council in 1941.

Henry A. Hanthorn

\*\*\*\*\*

REPORT OF HENRY A. HAUXHURST

Case No. 209

7 March 1946

IKEDA, Seihin

Report of Closing of Interrogation

IKEDA, Seihin connected with Mitsui and Governor of the Bank of Japan for a short time in 1937. At the time KONOYE'S first Cabinet was reorganized in May 1938 (almost a year after the China Incident), Mr. IKEDA became Minister of War and Minister of Commerce and Industry concurrently. His joining the Cabinet was conditioned upon General UGAKI becoming Foreign Minister in the hope that they would be able to help in settling matters with China. He was not clear whether aggression in China constituted a violation of Japan's treaties' obligations. He was a member of the Privy Council and attended the meeting on December 8, 1941, which approved the Declaration of War on the United States. He did not attend the meeting of the Privy Council held earlier in December. If not a defendant he may be a good witness against General ITAGAKI. Mr. IKEDA is 79 years of age and is at home under house arrest.

By virtue of his membership in the first KONOYE Cabinet and his membership in the Privy Council, Mr. IKEDA should be classified as a War Criminal.

Henry A. Hauxhurst

---

---

EXTRACTS FROM KIDO'S DIARY

IKEDA, Seibin

6.29.40 Prince Konoye's political actions.

DOCUMENT NO.

TANAKA #1

I N D E X

	Page
Aikawa.....	2, 3
Doihara.....	2, 3, 5
Finance.....	5
Hashimoto.....	2, 3
Hata.....	6
Ikeda.....	8 ✓
Itagaki.....	4, 9
Manchurian Incident.....	1
Minami.....	2
Narcotics.....	3, 4, 5, 6
Satomi.....	6, 8

8 March 1946

MEMORANDUM TO: Executive Committee  
FROM : Lt. Colonel W. T. Hornaday  
SUBJECT : Summary of Evidence Obtained in Interrogations  
of General TANAKA, Ryukichi

1. Regarding murder of Marshal CHANG Tso-lin, 3 June 1928, and actions of Japanese causing Manchurian Incident, 18 September 1931:

a. Marshall CHANG Tso-lin was murdered 3 June 1928 through the action of a Colonel KOMOTO, Daisoku, reported located now in Taiyuan, Shansi Province, China. At the time of the murder, he was senior member of the General Staff of the Kwantung Army and an officer of the Japanese Engineer Corps. He murdered Marshal CHANG Tso-lin, or caused him to be murdered, exactly as reported in the Lytton Commission report. The purpose of the murder was to get rid of Marshal CHANG and to start the action of the Kwantung Army in taking over all of Manchuria. Had the conspiracy been successful, the Manchurian Incident would have started then rather than in 1931.

Other officers connected with the murder were Captain OZAKI, Yoshiharu, then a member of the staff of the Kwantung Army, whose part was to mobilize a force to begin military action immediately following the murder of Marshal CHANG. He was actually mobilizing the forces necessary to carry out the plan of Colonel KOMOTO when General SAITO, Ko, then Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, who had not learned of the facts, reached the spot where Captain OZAKI was assembling the force and called to him: "You fool, stop this nonsense." Another officer concerned was a First Lieutenant KANDA (first name unknown).

General TANAKA states: "I heard (these facts) directly from Colonel KOMOTO's mouth. Colonel KOMOTO was discharged from the service on account of that incident because the Emperor became angry over (it). There was a record of the incident at Kempei Tai headquarters." It should be noted that in an interrogation of SATOMI, Hajime on 6 March 1946 this report was partially confirmed. At that time SATOMI was a newspaper man at Peking, and he states that although he does not know all the facts, he learned that it was Japanese



TANAKA, Ryukichi (Cont'd)

officers who committed the murder, and that immediately thereafter Colonel KOMOTO was removed from his office and transferred to the Reserve.

General TANAKA also states that shortly afterward when he was assigned to the Personnel and Disciplinary Section, Imperial General Staff, Tokyo, he made an investigation of the circumstances and learned officially that these were the facts.

b. The Manchurian Incident of September 18, 1931 was the culmination of the conspiracy between HASHIMOTO, Kingoro; CHO, Isamu, then a Captain, and at the time of his death Chief of Staff of the Okinawa forces (killed last year); ITAGAKI, Seishiro, who was then Chief of the Second Section, General Staff, Kwantung Army; ISHIHARA, Kanji; and TATEKAWA, Yoshitsugu, now dead. HASHIMOTO and CHO were the main planners.

When DOHIHARA, Kenji, came to Tokyo from Mukden about September 10, 1931 to report on his investigation of the alleged murder of Captain NAKAMURA, which was the incident used by the Kwantung Army as an excuse to stir up trouble, TATEKAWA, then on the Imperial General Staff, was dispatched to Mukden with definite orders from War Minister MINAMI to General HONJO to stop the action which was then planned to be started by the above named officers. TATEKAWA arrived in Mukden on September 18th a few hours before the fighting broke out. This is confirmed by the Lytton Commission report and by General DOHIHARA. TANAKA states that TATEKAWA knew all about the plans for the start of the fighting that night and was entirely in sympathy with them. ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA, knowing TATEKAWA's fondness for women, suggested that if TATEKAWA should spend the night in a tea-house without delivering the order from MINAMI to HONJO, the fighting would begin that night and it would be too late to deliver the order. TATEKAWA agreed and stayed in the tea-house. As the result, the incident did begin that night. TANAKA states that TATEKAWA later gave him this story in person. He also learned it from the Geisha girl with whom TATEKAWA slept that night, at least to the extent that TATEKAWA did spend the night in the tea-house and that the girls in the house were very impressed with his bravery when artillery shells began landing in the city close to the house. However, he calmed them by telling them not to worry, his friends knew he was in the house and it was safe. A request for the apprehension of ISHIHARA and ITAGAKI has already been made.

In one of the interrogations of AIKAWA by Mr. Horowitz AIKAWA stated that in 1936 while he was conferring with ISHIHARA

TANAKA, Ryukichi (Cont'd)

at Mukden, ISHIHARA stated that he and ITAGAKI had planned the Manchurian Incident so that they could have the kind of industrial enterprise they wanted in Manchuria for the Kwantung Army. AIKAWA later retracted most of this statement to Horowitz in a written statement he submitted.

DOHIHARA denies that he knew anything of such plans and denies that there were any plans. TANAKA confirms DOHIHARA's statement that he knew nothing about the plans in advance because DOHIHARA was both distrusted and disliked by the officers concerned in the conspiracy. However, TANAKA states that DOHIHARA unquestionably learned all about the conspiracy after the event occurred.

TANAKA states: "My investigation as the head of Personnel and Discipline Section reveals that the one who actually performed the act (of blowing a section out of the South Manchurian Railway track, and also of leading either Japanese or Chinese troops in firing on the patrol referred to in the Lytton Commission report, led by then Lieutenant KAWAMOTO (first name unknown), thought to be still alive, which was on night maneuvers was then Major, later Brigadier General, IMADA, Shintaro." Requests for apprehension of IMADA and KAWAMOTO have been made.

TANAKA states further that the October 31 Incident is tied in closely with the Manchurian Incident. HASHIMOTO and CHO knew that because of the attitude prevailing in the Government and the War Ministry at the time, the Manchurian Incident could not be a success without a change in personnel and policy therein. They first planned to carry out the incident before starting action in Manchuria, but realizing that if this failed action would never start, they decided first to start the fighting in Manchuria, then bring about the incident, and in any event, the fighting having been started it would have to be carried through. They failed in the October Incident, according to TANAKA, because a Lieutenant Colonel NEMOTO double-crossed them and tipped off the authorities, and HASHIMOTO was arrested.

HASHIMOTO, in one of his own interrogations, admits planning a revolution to start in October, but he claims that he approached General ARAKI with the proposal that he head the new ministry after the successful conclusion of the revolution, but ARAKI was opposed and caused the Kempei Tai to arrest HASHIMOTO.

2. Regarding violations of the international narcotics conventions by the Japanese in occupied China:

TANAKA, Ryukichi (Cont'd)

a. The General's evidence on the opium and narcotics question should be prefaced by pointing out that as Chief of the Personnel and Disciplinary Section, Imperial General Staff, Tokyo, he took an interest in investigating the activities in that field of the Japanese military forces in China because he claims he was opposed to it.

b. With reference to a report from the U. S. Treasury Attache of Shanghai, which is in the Narcotics Brief, that the Hung Chi Shan Tang of Shanghai organized seven licensed large central opium hong, of wholesale houses, each having to make a \$200,000 deposit to obtain its license, said \$200,000 deposit being placed in the Bank of Taiwan, and that the receipt for each deposit was signed by the Minister of Finance, Tokyo, as guarantor, he states that his own investigation confirms that report exactly in all details; that employees of the Formosa Bank, now "detained" in Formosa, will know all about this matter.

c. "Revenue derived from the opium and narcotics traffic was chief source of income for the Manchukuo Government to such extent that without it Manchukuo Government would not be able to function." The announced purpose of the opium control system established was to supply opium to confirmed addicts and to prohibit creation of new addicts. The actual purpose and actual result was exactly to the contrary and to the effect that the addiction in use of opium and narcotics was tremendously encouraged and increased. This entire program was under the direct control of Japanese officers and officials.

d. During the first years of control of Manchuria by the Japanese, until the 12th year of Showa, the Tokumu Kikan (Japanese Special Service Organization) completely controlled the opium and narcotics traffic. They were backed by Lieutenant General ANDO, Rinzo, now dead, then the head of the Tokumu Kikan at Harbin. ITAGAKI, Seishiro, Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, Major YAMAOKA, Michitake and TANAKA, then a Lieutenant Colonel and on the General Staff of the Kwantung Army, bitterly opposed control of the traffic by the Tokumu Kikan and recommended to UEDA, Kenkichi, then commanding the Kwantung Army, that control of same be taken away from the Tokumu Kikan, which had perverted the situation into a racket for their own benefit, and turned over to the Manchukuoan Government for control. The three were successful, and as a result ANDO was removed from his office and the Tokumu Kikan began to lose its power in controlling politics and economic matters of the Manchurian Government,

TANAKA, Ryukichi (Cont'd)

although specifically stated to be run there still by the Japanese Government officials.

From that time on a Japanese official by the name of NAMBA, Vice Minister of Finance, Manchukuoan Government, headed the "Manchukuo Monopoly Administration", and ran the opium traffic. This NAMBA later, until the end of the war, controlled the collection of scrap metals in Japan for the War Material Supplies Bureau, now known as Commerce and Industry Ministry. A request for his apprehension has been through our Investigation Division. This change of control is confirmed by a report of the U. S. Treasury Attache at Shanghai dated 22 May 1936 (Tab 20d) in the Narcotics Brief. That same report states that the military budget of Manchukuo for the maintenance of Manchukuo forces, Kwantung Army, and the general defense of the puppet state, is approximately 200,000,000 yen per annum, part of which comes from Japan, and the balance from the Manchukuo salt and opium monopoly. TANAKA states: "I say that report is correct."

During most of this period DOHIHARA was Chief of the Tokumu Kikan for the southern half of Manchuria, with headquarters at Mukden. Although he may not have personally directed the operations of all his small units in opium and narcotics, he undoubtedly knows everything there is to know connected with it. (In one of the interrogations of DOHIHARA, he flatly denies having any knowledge of any connection between Tokumu Kikan and opium and narcotics traffic or any knowledge of the existence of opium and narcotics traffic.)

Referring to another one of the Attache's reports in the Narcotics Brief, TANAKA states: "Until the end of this war, I know the revenue from opium traffic was the biggest item of income from Manchukuo. Not alone that, but opium supply from Manchukuo alone was not sufficient to meet the need in Manchukuo and opium was imported from Persia as well as from China."

e. Referring to another Treasury Attache report in the Brief, dated 25 November 1935, (Tab 9c) TANAKA states that the Japanese Tientsen, China garrison, where Lieutenant General OZAKO, Mitsusada, now living in Kagoshima, was Chief of the Tokumu Kikan, attempted to create a revolution against the Nanking Chinese Government by collecting some 500 Chinese rogues and ignorant coolies, mostly narcotics addicts, in the Japanese concession to create trouble in various parts of Tientsen, especially in the Chinese city, where demonstrations

TANAKA, Ryukichi (Cont'd)

were carried on in the interests of the "independent regime." They were paid one small package of heroin and twenty or thirty copper coins daily. Other Japanese authorities refused to cooperate in stopping such activities. The Treasury report states this was done under the direction of General DOHIHARA. However, TANAKA states that the report referred to is true except that the incident was premeditated by the Japanese Tientsen garrison and under the direction of Lieutenant General OZAKO. General TODA, Hayao, now in Sugamo Prison, was Commanding General of the forces at Tientsen at that time.

f. Tab 5a of the Narcotics Brief, report dated 21 March 1938, states that General HARA, Shunoku, now in Sugamo Prison, upon replacing General MATSUI as Commander of the Japanese forces in the Shanghai area, directed a reorganization of the opium traffic upon taking command. TANAKA states he does not believe HATA had anything personally to do with the traffic, but probably his subordinates did. He mentions HARADA, Kumokichi, as adviser to HATA's command, and suggests he was the one who did it. Interrogation of SATOMI, Hajimo, now in Sugamo Prison as a material witness, reveals that his first appointment as head of the opium purchasing and sales agency of the Japanese military forces in Shanghai was made by order of then Colonel HARADA, Kumokichi, who was then Chief of the Tokumu Bu, which was the political control agency of the Japanese Supreme Command in China. Both TANAKA and SATOMI state that the Japanese chain of command was such that HARADA could not have taken action without the complete knowledge and express approval of General HATA.

g. Questioning TANAKA about Captain IKIGAMI (first name unknown), alleged by the Treasury Attache in a report dated in 1937 to have been the Commanding Officer, First Department Japanese Gendarmerie at Tientsen and the protector of heroin factories there, TANAKA states: "His name could be spelled I-k-e-g-a-m-i and I know him. He was head of the military police at Tientsen, so if you search for him through Demobilization Bureau you can find out his whereabouts. This man was a very dangerous man."

h. TANAKA gave the information by which I was able to locate and apprehend the notorious SATOMI, Hajimo.

i. In questioning TANAKA about KITAOKA, Tatsuo, alleged by the Attache in a 1939 report to have been a member of the Tokumu Kikan at Shanghai, adviser to the "Shanghai City Government," and very active in the opium and narcotics trade, TANAKA

TANAKA, Ryukichi (Cont'd)

states he knows him well, that he reached the grade of Admiral, was active in the Navy section of Tokumu Kikan, and is now in To-kyo. He states: "If the man referred to is the Tatsuo KITAOKA I mean, he must have represented the Navy in opium-traffic there, but KITAOKA's connection with opium traffic is really news to me. I didn't know that he was connected with it." He suggests the man should be contacted and questioned.

j. TANAKA states: "Most of the activities of Japanese in China have some connection with narcotics traffic, and almost all of the stores with drug store signs handled narcotics." He criticised the manner in which Japanese police in Tientsen are alleged by common report to have confiscated large quantities of heroin, substituted white baking flour for it, burned the flour to make a show of complying with Japanese law to destroy confiscated heroin by burning, and then converted the heroin to their own use for sale and their own enrichment.

k. He told a story which had been reported to him by a Tokyo newspaper reporter named EGUCHI, Wateru, that at the time of the surrender by Japan in August 1945 a number of officials in the Foreign Ministry, Tokyo, embezzled and divided between themselves 300,000,000 yen which had been appropriated as loans to the puppet Nanking Government and deposited in the Yokohama Specie Bank at Yokohama. He produced Mr. EGUCHI for me, and I questioned that man. The interrogation report is now in the file room. EGUCHI states that while he investigated the thing as a newspaper man and could not definitely ascertain all the facts, the story he learned was that during the TOJO Cabinet several loans, each totalling more than 100,000,000 yen, were appropriated for the puppet Nanking Government, the total being in excess of 300,000,000 yen. All of this loan was appropriated from profits from the opium and narcotics traffic controlled by the Japanese in the Shanghai-Nanking area. The money was placed on deposit apparently in the names of some of the men concerned and never delivered to the puppet government. At the time of the surrender, one of the men of the group went to Yokohama Specie Bank, withdrew all the money, and it was split between the members of the group concerned. This group included. SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru; AOKI, Kazuo; ISHIWATARI, Sotaro; TOGO, Shigenoru; ABE, Nobuyuki; TANI, Masayuki. (In the 1 March 1946 roster of prisoners at Sugamo Prison, of this group only ACKI is listed as being in prison.)

TANAKA, Ryukichi, (Cont'd)

l. Ko-A-In, the Greater East Asia Development Board, controlled all the policies on opium and narcotics traffic in China. The branch office of that organization at Peking was headed by General SHIOZAWA, Kiyonobu. This man was the most favored protege of General TOJO and very intimate with SATOMI. SHIOZAWA was reported by Major General SENDA, Seiji, who served under him, to have sent money from the profits in the opium and narcotics traffic regularly by airplane to TOJO while the latter was Premier. SENDA gave this story to TANAKA two different times, and states it is the reason why he resigned from Ko-A-In. When the TOJO Cabinet was ousted, SHIOZAWA was forced out of Ko-A-In and was made a Division Commander. His present grade is Lieutenant General, and TANAKA states he can be located through the Demobilization Bureau.

m. SATOMI was removed as the head of the Hung Chi Shan Tang at Shanghai, the great Japanese opium purchasing and distributing agency, toward the end of the war. (This is confirmed by SATOMI.) KODAMA, Yoshio, took charge. (SATOMI denies this, stating he presided over the liquidation of Hung Chi Shan Tang, resigning about February 1944.) KODAMA is in Sugamo Prison now. He has not been interrogated as yet.

n. It should be noted here that in the interrogation of SATOMI on 6 March 1946 he stated positively that the Ko-A-In (Greater East Asia Development Board) was created as the result of an agreement between the Foreign Ministry, War Ministry, Navy Ministry and Finance Ministry, and perhaps one or two other ministries. One of its main functions was to control all matters of policy concerned with opium and narcotics traffic conducted by the Japanese, not only in China but in Burma, Thailand, French Indo-China, Malaya, Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines, which is the first information received to date that anything along the opium and narcotics line was done by the Japanese in any area other than China.

o. TANAKA states that the report of U. S. Consul General Butrick of Shanghai in 1940, included in the Narcotics Brief, which states that Major General (now Lieutenant General) KUSUMOTO (first name unknown) and Admiral TSUDA (first name unknown), both members of Ko-A-In, controlled the Hung Chi Shan Tang and the entire opium monopoly set-up in Shanghai is completely true. He states they gave their full support to SATOMI for his activities in narcotics traffic, which helps to explain SATOMI's success therein. Both these officers can be located through the Army and Navy Demobilization Bureaus.

TANAKA, Ryukichi, Cont'd)

3. Regarding national societies:

a. General TANAKA states flatly that most of the so-called national societies active from the Manchurian Incident to the end of the war were terrorist and blackmail organizations that they did at times force Government officials to go along with ultra-nationalist and Fascist and aggressive policies and tendencies by threats of force and violence and by actual assassinations. He states that different such societies were back of all of the incidents, such as the October Incident, Ketsumu-Dan, 5/15, 2/26, and all others. He mentions that IKEDA, one of our top list of probable defendants, now being interrogated by Mr. Hauxhurst, supported the radical Taika-Kai, which was back of the 2/26 Incident, with funds over several years, and he gave funds to KITA, Ikki for publication of his book mentioned in Evidentiary Document No. 12, and that this is all proved in the court records concerning the 2/26 Incident. He also stated in an interrogation yesterday that Lieutenant General ARISUE, Seizo, now a high official in the Central Liaison Office, and one time Military Attache in the Japanese Embassy at Rome, influenced ITAGAKI, then War Minister, to support the first abortive effort to bring about the Tri-Partite Pact. He used the Toho-Kai, Kinno-Makato-Masuhi and Dai Nippon Seisanto Societies to make threats against the life of Vice Admiral YAMAMOTO, Isoroku, then Vice Minister of the Navy, because he opposed the efforts to accomplish the Tri-Partite Pact. He states that HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, knows all these facts if he will talk about them.

WM. T. HORNADAY  
Lt. Colonel, Infantry