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Vol. 22

Congress of the United States

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Report of Proceedings

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Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

---

December 12, 1945

Washington, D. C.

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Vol. 22

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C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF

PAGE

MARSHALL, General George C., (Resumed)

3615

E X H I B I T S

NUMBER

PAGE

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

*International Prosecution Section  
# 5.6*



S. Con. Res. 27

- - -

Wednesday, December 12, 1945

- - -

Congress of the United States,  
Joint Committee on the Investigation  
of Pearl Harbor Attack  
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at  
10:00 a.m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office  
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,  
and Ferguson.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,  
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel;  
Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten,  
of counsel, for the joint committee.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

General Marshall is back, and Congressman Keefe was in process of examining General Marshall. Are you ready to proceed?

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

(Resumed)

Mr. Keefe: Yesterday, General Marshall, during the short hearing when I had to stop questioning, we had gotten up to the alert of June 17, 1940, and I asked you to ascertain and produce here, if you would, the specific information that prompted you to issue that alert of June 17, 1940.

General Marshall: On my return to the War Department I started an investigation to obtain the data to which you have just referred.

I regret to state to you that it has not yet been completed. We have brought General Strong into the matter. They told me this morning they worked on the various documents throughout the night. It involves a number of different factors, I understand, and will take some little time to get all of them together. They are in the process of doing that, Mr. Keefe, and the report will be brought in as soon as it is obtained, and General Strong also will be available as a witness. In the meantime



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 what is already in evidence, I believe, pertaining to  
3 that specific question of yours --

4 Mr. Keefe: Before we get to that, General Marshall,  
5 I am quite familiar with page 13.

6 General Marshall: That is what I was going to read  
7 an extract from.

8 Mr. Keefe: I would like to approach that in just  
9 a little different way.

10 General Marshall: That is agreeable to me, sir.

11 Mr. Keefe: You anticipate that some time during the  
12 day, at least, you will be able to bring that data to the  
13 committee?

14 General Marshall: I do not know whether I can do it  
15 today or not, sir, because it involves newspaper articles  
16 and involves a great many different factors, they tell  
17 me.

18 They have been engaged in it, it seems, all night,  
19 and they have got General Strong, who has been retired  
20 from the War Department, and they have brought him in now.

21 I think they will do the best they can. I cannot  
22 promise you it will be here during the day. I myself per-  
23 sonally, have not had the opportunity of going into it,  
24 but I have very capable people doing it.

25 Mr. Keefe: Whatever the circumstances were, you were



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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1 convinced they were of sufficient importance to justify  
2 the issuance of the alert message to General Herron under  
3 date of June 17, 1940?  
4

5 General Marshall: Yes, sir, and in that communication  
6 you were going to produce, that is very pertinent to that  
7 question, - at any rate it would have been foolhardy not  
8 to take special precautions.

9 Mr. Keefe: Now, on the 26th of June, 1940, you wrote  
10 a memorandum to General Strong, which reads as follows: --  
11 and it appears in this exhibit of communications between  
12 the War Department and General Herron concerning the 1940  
13 alert, on page 11 --

14 "It seems to me I should write to both Van Voorhis and  
15 Herron something of what led up to our emergency radios of  
16 the other day; that is, if you think we can trust to air-  
17 mail for such a confidential message. Personally, I  
18 think it is reasonably safe.

19 "Will you have somebody make a rough draft of what I  
20 should say."

21 Who is Van Voorhis?

22 General Marshall: He was the then commander in Panama.

23 Mr. Keefe: All right.

24 Now, in answer to that letter, or communication, General  
25 Strong wrote you on June 27, as appears on page 12 of this



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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exhibit, and he says:

"1. Reference to your memorandum of June 26, with reference to writing General Van Voorhis and General Herron in regard to the background for our emergency radios; I am inclined to think that developments of the last 10 days, as reflected in the press, have given both all the background necessary.

"2. Another point to be considered is that airmail may be tampered with, any reference in the matter covered in your secret code might jeopardize that code.

"3. However, if you think that you should write them, I suggest that the communication go by registered mail. Drafts of suggested remarks herewith.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2           General Strong refers in this letter to certain develop-  
3 ments of the last ten days as reflected in the press. He  
4 says that he thinks that that has given to Herron and VanVoorhis  
5 all the background necessary.

6           Is that what you referred to this morning, General Marshall,  
7 when you referred to the fact that some search had to be made  
8 of the press, and so on?

9           General Marshall: Yes, sir.

10          Mr. Keefe: Well, you did not order this alert by virtue  
11 of what appeared in the newspapers, did you?

12          General Marshall: No, sir. The second sentence of the  
13 letter which you said you would approach later says:

14          "Briefly, the combination of information from a number  
15 of sources led to the deduction that recent Japanese-Russian  
16 agreement to compose their differences in the Far East was  
17 arrived at and so timed as to permit Japan to undertake a  
18 trans-Pacific raid against Oahu, following the departure of  
19 the U.S. Fleet from Hawaii."

20          Mr. Keefe: In other words, General Strong wrote a  
21 proposed explanation to be sent to VanVoorhis and Herron?

22          General Marshall: Yes, sir.

23          Mr. Keefe: Of what the facts were?

24          General Marshall: Yes, sir.

25          Mr. Keefe: That never was sent, was it?



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1           General Marshall: The records show that was not sent.

2           Mr. Keefe: Now in this, as you have just read, appearing  
3 on page 13 of the exhibit referred to, it appears that the  
4 combination of information from a number of sources "led to  
5 the deduction that recent Japanese-Russian agreement to compose  
6 their differences in the Far East was arrived at and so timed  
7 as to permit Japan to undertake a trans-Pacific raid against  
8 Oahu, following the departure of the U.S. Fleet from Hawaii."

9           Did the Fleet depart from Hawaii in June, 1940?

10          General Marshall: I do not know, sir.

11          Mr. Keefe: Were you not, as Chief of Staff, advised by  
12 the Chief of Naval Operations that he had ordered the Fleet  
13 away from Pearl Harbor in June, or on June 17, or thereabouts?

14          General Marshall: If that was the fact I am quite certain  
15 he would have advised me to that effect. My answer was I do  
16 not recall right now what happened then. Whether or not the  
17 Fleet was ordered away is a matter of fact, first, which can  
18 be easily determined.

19          Mr. Keefe: This proposed communication to you from Herron,  
20 which was not sent, refers to the departure of the U.S. Fleet  
21 from Hawaii, does it not?

22          General Marshall: Yes, sir. I do not think I made myself  
23 clear, Mr. Keefe. I am not casting any doubt on whether the  
24 Fleet was or was not ordered from Hawaii, I am merely endeavor-  
25



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Keefe: We are advised very definitely and reliably that there was such an order issued, and that it is in the Navy Department. Now I will ask if you have that order here now?

Mr. Mitchell: We have no such order.

Mr. Keefe: Now, General Marshall, when that alert order was issued in 1940 you followed, from day to day, what was going on out there, did you not, during the period of that alert, through communications with General Herron?

General Marshall: Yes, sir. Not every day, of course.

Mr. Keefe: Did you know that the Fleet had left Pearl Harbor at that time?

General Marshall: You again have me back on something that I do not recall at the moment, sir.

Mr. Keefe: General Marshall, I call your attention, if you will, to page 8 of this exhibit. In it General Herron sends you a secret report reading as follows:

"In interpreting your cable consideration is given to the fact that Navy here has nothing from Navy Department regarding alert. Navy now turning over to Army inshore aerial patrol in accordance with existing local joint agreement. Will not modify Army air and anti-air alert before Monday except on further advice from you."

On the next page, in answer to that communication, and

Larry  
follows  
10:15

W. D. KOTCHINEAW, JUDGE & DRAW



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 ing to state that I do not recall at the moment just what  
3 the Fleet movements were. That, of course, is a matter of  
4 record which the Navy and which Admiral Stark can testify to.

(2) 5 I am assuming that I understood thoroughly what those  
6 movements were at that particular time. I might go a little  
7 further to say, Mr. Keefe, that I have not had an opportunity,  
8 since you went into this question, to go into the various  
9 factors involved in this particular thing, so it has been  
10 beyond my capability to do that. I am giving you the best  
11 answers I can as to my recollection at that time.

12 Mr. Keefe: I appreciate that, General Marshall. I will  
13 reiterate I am simply seeking to get these facts, and it is  
14 very difficult at times to get them, as you find it is diffi-  
15 cult for you to get the facts.

16 General Marshall: That is correct.

17 Mr. Keefe: I will ask counsel at this time if they will  
18 undertake a search and request the Navy to produce, during  
19 the day, the order which was issued by Admiral Stark to the  
20 Commanding Officer of the Navy, Admiral Richardson, directing  
21 that the Fleet be taken away from Pearl Harbor on or about  
22 June 18 or 19, 1940, and proceed to an unknown and secret  
23 destination or hide-out.

24 Will the counsel do that, please?

25 Mr. Mitchell: If there was such an order we will find it.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 on June 22, you wired Herron as follows:

3 "In view of present uncertainty instructions for the Navy  
4 other than local Navy Forces have not been determined. Con-  
5 tinue your alert in accordance with modifications directed in  
6 War Department Number 434."

7 Now, does that refresh your recollection of the fact  
8 that the main Fleet, except the local Fleet in Hawaii, had  
9 left Hawaiian waters?

10 General Marshall: Mr. Keefe, you have refreshed me more  
11 than the message that apparently it had. I don't recall offhand  
12 myself. That would indicate some move of that sort but that,  
13 I believe, sir, is a matter of fact easily determined.

14 Mr. Keefe: I am simply probing, General, to find out  
15 what you know. I don't know as much as much as you do about  
16 this.

17 General Marshall: I undoubtedly knew about it at the time.  
18 I am trying to tell you what I remember now.

19 Mr. Keefe: This telegram would indicate that perhaps  
20 you did know about it?

21 General Marshall: I assume that I knew about the movements  
22 of the Fleet at the time.

23 Mr. Keefe: You would naturally be in communication with  
24 your Chief of Naval Operations, wouldn't you?

25 General Marshall: Daily.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Keefe: And it is to be assumed that if the Fleet was ordered out you perhaps knew of it at the time?

3

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General Marshall: I would say it is almost certain I knew about it.

5

6

Mr. Keefe: All you mean to say is that you do not recollect?

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General Marshall: I don't recall the incident.

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Mr. Keefe: I am calling your attention to this wire because it impresses me that under those circumstances it clearly indicates that you did have knowledge at that time of the fact that in view of the present uncertainty instructions for the Navy other than local Forces had not been determined.

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: The local Forces were perhaps kept there but the main body of the Navy was away and you are advising Herron in this telegram that instructions to the Navy other than the local Forces has not been determined but he is to continue in accordance with the modifications directed in War Department Number 434.

General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Well, now, I don't want to press you, General Marshall, for something that you don't know, and I don't want to get mere hearsay, that sort of thing, in the record. If you don't remember and don't know, why, I shall be not



AL-7

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 surprised, with the volume of stuff that has come through  
3 your mind since that time.

4 But I assume that it is a fact, from information that I  
5 have at hand, that the Navy was ordered at the time of that  
6 1940 alert, the main body of the Navy was ordered away from  
7 Pearl Harbor?

8 General Marshall: It would appear that something of  
9 that sort was going on.

10 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

11 Do you presently have any recollection as to the events  
12 of that period which would enable you to state why it was  
13 that the Fleet was ordered away at the time of the 1940 alert?

14 General Marshall: No, sir, I do not. There was almost  
15 a continuing discussion if not a debate regarding the placing  
16 and the movement of the Fleet throughout this period.

17 I might add this --

18 Mr. Keefe: Well, General Marshall -- pardon me. Go ahead.

19 General Marshall: I might add this, which has no bearing  
20 on the Fleet, but it does have a bearing on what my recollection  
21 is as to this particular alert. The part I remember quite  
22 distinctly is my concern over the continuation of the alert  
23 because a long or protracted alert was very apt to result in  
24 a gradual laxity on the part of the many individuals concerned  
25 in it through fatigue and to the fact that nothing particular



AL-8

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 happened. But I had a still more deep concern at the time  
3 because the Air, as I clearly recall, reported to me that we  
4 were wearing out the engines of these planes in these various  
5 reconnaissance. So I became quite personally concerned as  
6 to the duration of the alert, how long we would be justified  
7 in maintaining it and particularly what might be done in order  
8 to satisfy the requirements as to security and still not cause  
9 our resources, meaning particularly the engines of the re-  
10 connaissance airplanes.

11 Those are the things regarding which I am most clear in  
12 my mind and which I think were at the bottom of a great many  
13 of the backs and forths which occur in this correspondence.

(2) 14 Mr. Keefe: General Marshall, I call your attention to  
15 the letter from General Herron to you on page 21 of this  
16 same exhibit. This follows quite a number of letters back  
17 and forth appearing in this exhibit indicating the progress  
18 of the alert and what was taking place and what the effect  
19 was on the materiel and equipment and tax on the motors and  
20 how the public reacted and how the personnel of the Army  
21 reacted.

22 Then comes this letter dated September 6, 1940 in which  
23 General Herron says, among other things, the second paragraph:

24 "My absolutely frank and honest opinion is that 'the  
25 alert' as now carried on here does not dull the keen edge, or



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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exhaust the morale. I think that our real power accumulates  
and that now that the season of individual target practice  
and instructions is about over, the maneuvers of numerous  
small units camped along the beaches will build up naturally  
and easily the effectiveness of the alert.

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"The presence of the Fleet here and its frequent putting  
to sea with absolute secret destinations and periods naturally  
eases the situation very much."

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12  
Now, you knew as a result of that letter on September 6th  
as it now appears that the Fleet had been putting to sea  
secretly and for absolutely secret destinations.

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Did you know that during this period that that was what  
was taking place?

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General Marshall: Yes, sir; I must have known it.

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Mr. Keefe: Now, does that tend to refresh your recollection  
of the fact that the orders for the Fleet to go out to these  
secret destinations and leave Pearl Harbor took place about  
coincident with the issuance of the order for the alert on  
the 17th of June 1940?

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General Marshall: It doesn't stimulate my memory, sir.  
I assumed that would be going on. I assumed, in any event,  
the Fleet would be going out and coming back right along in  
the way of practice if for nothing else.

25  
Mr. Keefe: Was it considered in your discussions with



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Admiral Stark that in the event of a threat to Hawaii that it was the proper thing to get that Fleet out to sea?

3

4 General Marshall: I recall no such discussion, sir.

5 Mr. Keefe: I will say to counsel I have been searching  
6 through these intercept messages and I don't find any intercepts  
7 in the file of 1940. Have we got those?

8 Mr. Mitchell: We have never printed them.

9 Mr. Keefe: Those intercepts ought to show, shouldn't  
10 they, the information that came to the War and Navy Departments  
11 as to the necessity for this 1940 alert?

12 Mr. Mitchell: We have gone through them for that purpose  
13 and they do not show anything of the kind. We examined them --  
14 not always knowing exactly what the members of the committee  
15 might be interested in -- but we didn't find anything of that  
16 nature. We can produce any intercepts you want for any date,  
17 I think.

18 General Marshall: Those are the files that are now  
19 being searched in the War Department, Mr. Keefe.

20 Mr. Keefe: I see. And is it anticipated that before  
21 you leave that material will be available, General Marshall,  
22 so that we can make some inquiry in reference to it?

23 General Marshall: I would assume so. I don't know, sir.

24 Mr. Keefe: Well, the alert of 1940 gradually tapered  
25 off, didn't it?



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Until the fall of 1940.

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And the situation out there in Hawaii resumed a normal routine?

General Marshall: Yes, sir; but, General Herron can testify to this, but I rather think some of the dispositions thereafter remained a little on the alert basis. But he can tell you that positively.

Mr. Keefe: Now, during this situation things were getting pretty critical in Europe and in the Atlantic, were they not?

General Marshall: Very critical.

Mr. Keefe: And on September 4, 1940 Congress passed the Selective Service Act, do you remember?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And on September 27, 1940 Germany, Japan and Italy signed the Tri partite -- the treaty of Berlin, at Berlin, the 10-year military treaty; promising to help each other in the event of war with the United States.

You, of course, immediately became aware of that?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: That didn't tend to ease the tension and situation between the United States and Japan, did it?

General Marshall: Quite the contrary.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Keefe: It accentuated the difficulties, did it not, General Marshall?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And things gradually were getting more and more critical in the diplomatic situation between the two nations?

General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe: You could see in that a distinct threat to the United States?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Now, we had pretty well determined that, in this country, late in 1940, that we were not going to permit these ruthless aggressors to carry on as they had been, we were going to furnish some aid to those who were fighting, you recall that, do you not?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And on the 10th of January 1941 the Lease-Lend Bill was introduced in the Congress; on March 11, 1941 that became law and we immediately began to give supplies under that to England and our other later Allies, did we not?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Hook follows

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 Mr. Keefe: When did we start giving aid to China,  
3 material aid, if you remember?

4 General Marshall: I do not recall the exact figures.

5 I remember particularly our maneuvering to get the  
6 planes for the air force out there operated under General  
7 Chenault.

8 Mr. Keefe: General Chenault was a former officer in  
9 the United States Air Corps, was he not?

10 General Marshall: Yes. He had resigned, I believe.

11 Mr. Keefe: Resigned, and went over and became Air  
12 Chief fo Chiang Kai-Shek.

13 General Marshall: In the service of the Chinese Govern-  
14 ment.

15 Mr. Keefe: He recruited a good many Americans to go  
16 over to fly planes under his command?

17 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Keefe: And planes were furnished to him by the  
19 United States Government?

20 General Marshall: I don't remember the arrangements  
21 as to financing, but I know that I personally initiated the  
22 procedure, and proposed details which were followed out.

23 Mr. Keefe: We perhaps loaned money to China and they  
24 then bought our planes. Is that what it was?

25 General Marshall: I would prefer not to answer that.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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1  
2 Mr. Keefe: I see.

3 Well, we began shipping lease-lend supplies to Europe.

4 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Keefe: And the Japs instituted a submarine war  
6 which became very critical?

7 General Marshall: Do you mean the Japanese or the  
8 Germans?

9 Mr. Keefe: The Germans, and sank a lot of ships?

10 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Keefe: We were determined that those supplies were  
12 going to get over there to aid England, were we not?

13 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Keefe: Now, in order that the background of this  
15 thing can be properly appraised, events leading up to  
16 this period, there has been placed in evidence a memorandum  
17 of a conversation by the Counselor of the Embassy in Berlin,  
18 a Mr. Dooman, which was held or conducted on February 14,  
19 1941, and it appears as an official state document in the  
20 volume entitled "Foreign Relations of the United States -  
21 Japan, 1931-1941," Volume II, on page 138.

22 This memorandum was sent to the State Department by  
23 Ambassador Grew with his full and complete approval. The  
24 State Department incorporated it as an official state paper  
25 in the volume just referred to.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 Now, in this report, which Mr. Dooman made to Mr.  
3 Ohashi, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, he stated  
4 that he had just returned from the United States, having  
5 been on furlough, and I quote:

6 "I replied that my furlough in the United States coin-  
7 cided with one of the most significant and important periods  
8 in the history of our country, and that if he had time,  
9 I would be glad to tell him briefly of what I had seen and  
10 heard while at home. \* \* \*

11 "I gave Mr. Ohashi a fairly long account of the trends  
12 in opinion with regard to the war in Europe as they developed  
13 during the election campaign. I dwelt on the remarkably  
14 swift crystalization of opinion at home with regard to  
15 the question of American aid to England, which I attributed  
16 in large part first to the disclosure on the part of the  
17 British that they were rapidly approaching the end of the  
18 resources in dollar exchange, and second, to the belief  
19 that the effects on Britain's capacity to produce aircraft  
20 and other munitions of German bombing raids had been more  
21 serious than British communiques would lead one to suppose.

22 \* \* \*

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 And he further said, and I quote:

3 "I said that although the large majority of the  
4 American people abhorred the idea of American involvement  
5 in war, the fact was that an equally large majority of  
6 the American people believed that there was one consider-  
7 ation which transcends even that of avoiding involvement  
8 in the war, and that is helping England to the limit of  
9 our capacity.

10 "I said that all this was not without direct bear-  
11 ing on relations between the United States and Japan.  
12 I had found that American opinion is pretty clearly  
13 opposed to the taking of action by the United States  
14 which would make war with Japan inevitable."

15 Now, General Marshall, from your broad experience and  
16 knowledge of the events that transpired during the summer  
17 and fall of 1940, during the period which was covered by  
18 Mr. Dooman's furlough visit to the United States, do you  
19 think that is a fair appraisal of the situation?

20 General Marshall: It seems to me so.

21 Mr. Keefe: Now, Mr. Dooman further says:

22 "Nevertheless Mr. Ohashi could readily understand  
23 that the American people, being an eminently practical  
24 people, are quite aware that an adequate supply of air-  
25 planes and other munitions is not the only prerequi-

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1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 site to a British victory; the supply to England of  
3 foodstuffs and raw materials by the British dominions  
4 and colonies and the maintenance of British commerce  
5 with the outside world are equally essential to a  
6 British victory."

7 Did you share that same opinion at that time and is  
8 that a fair statement?

9 General Marshall: I think that is a fair and correct  
10 statement.

11 Mr. Keefe: Then Mr. Dooman further said, and I quote:

12 "It would be absurd to suppose that the American  
13 people, while pouring munitions into Britain, would  
14 look with complacency upon the cutting of communi-  
15 cations between Britain and British dominions and col-  
16 onies overseas. If, therefore, Japan or any other  
17 nation were to prejudice the safety of those communi-  
18 cations, either by direct action or by placing herself  
19 in a position to menace those communications, she would  
20 have to expect to come into conflict with the United  
21 States."

22 Did you share that view at that time and is that a  
23 fair statement of the United States opinion and position?

24 General Marshall: I would say that is too broad a  
25 statement.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Mr. Keefe: I beg pardon?

General Marshall: I would say that is too broad a statement of the reactions of the American people at that particular time because he is referring to all British communications all over the globe. American opinion as I recall it at that time was centered on the movements of convoys out of the northern part of the United States into the western approaches of the British Isles. I do not recall that at that time there was an American public opinion of the nature he describes as to all portions of the globe in relation to British communications.

Mr. Keefe: Well, leaving out of consideration the question as to what American public opinion was, was he reflecting the government's opinion, the diplomatic, Army and Navy opinion?

General Marshall: Whether he was reflecting government opinion or the diplomatic opinion or, in other words, the high level opinion, I am not the person to testify. So far as the Army opinion, the opinion of the War Department, General Staff and myself is concerned, we viewed with great concern the severance of British communications in various portions of the world because we knew their maintenance of an adequate defense to prevent the occupation of the British Isles by the Germans depended in a very important measure



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 on those communications.

3 His references to Japan in relation to American reac-  
4 tions I think are broader than the state of affairs in the  
5 public mind, and he speaks of the people here, at that time.

6 Mr. Keefe: Of course, what concerns me, General Marshall  
7 shall, in reading these matters, this is an official docu-  
8 ment incorporated in the State Department's list of official  
9 documents and apparently has the approval of the State De-  
10 partment. There is nothing in the book that would indicate  
11 any disapproval. It certainly had the full and complete ap-  
12 proval of our Ambassador Grew because he so states in his  
13 communication sending it and the further communications in  
14 reference to it which also appears in the same volume.

15 Now, I am wondering whether or not in view of the fact  
16 that this bears the seal of approval, apparently, of the  
17 State Department, whether of the higher levels in Washington,  
18 Mr. Dooman when he made that statement to Mr. Ohashi was not  
19 in fact reflecting the then current opinion of the higher  
20 levels of thought in the government.

21 General Marshall: I would say that Mr. Dooman and Mr.  
22 Grew would have to testify as to that, sir.

23 Mr. Keefe: All right.

24 General Marshall: I cannot.

25 Mr. Keefe: All right. Then he further says (Reading):



1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 "There are many indications of the Japanese moving  
3 down slowly toward Singapore and the Netherlands East  
4 Indies. The United States cannot but be concerned by  
5 the various initiatives taken by the Japanese in Indo-  
6 China and elsewhere, for the reason that if Japan were  
7 to occupy these strategically important British and  
8 Dutch areas, it could easily debouch into the Indian  
9 Ocean and the South Pacific and create havoc with es-  
10 sential British lines of communication. The United  
11 States for its part was well aware that an alternative  
12 source of supply for Japanese purchase of petroleum and  
13 certain other products of the United States is the  
14 Netherlands East Indies, and for that reason it has been  
15 reluctant to impose embargoes on the sale to Japan of  
16 commodities of which it has a surplus; but the Japanese  
17 must clearly understand that the forbearance of the  
18 United States in this respect springs from a desire not  
19 to impel Japan to create a situation which could lead  
20 only to the most serious consequences. I recalled the  
21 axiom in geometry that two bodies cannot occupy the  
22 same space at the same time: However greatly Japan's  
23 security might be enhanced by occupying the Netherlands  
24 East Indies it must be realized by Japan that any such  
25 move would vitally concern the major preoccupation of the



1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 United States at this time, which is to assist England  
3 to stand against German assault."

4 Now, then, General Marshall, at the time this communi-  
5 cation was had and this report by Mr. Domman to Mr. Ohashi  
6 we had not yet entered into these so-called A-B-C agreements  
7 and A-B-C-D agreements; they came later?

8 General Marshall: Yes, sir. There was no A-B-C-D  
9 agreement, sir.

10 Mr. Keefe: I beg your pardon?

11 General Marshall: There was no A-B-C-D agreement.

12 Mr. Keefe: Well, conversations.

13 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Keefe: Pardon me. There is a distinction.

15 General Marshall: There is quite a difference, sir.

16 Mr. Keefe: We want to observe protocol exactly here.

17 There was an A-B-C agreement which was approved?

18 General Marshall: There was an A-B-C agreement approved  
19 by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy and not by  
20 the President. The A-B-C-2 made with Canada was formally  
21 approved by the President.

22 Mr. Keefe: The A-B-C-D was merely a conversation or  
23 report?

24 General Marshall: They were conversations, the report  
25 of the conversations on which Admiral Stark and I in a joint



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 memorandum distributed.

3 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

4 General Marshall: And I was asked the other day if I  
5 could not recall what my reaction was and I thought it was  
6 in the naval memorandum signed by me and signed by Admiral  
7 Stark.

8 Mr. Keefe: Well, in any event, during this time when  
9 Mr. Dooman was talking with Mr. Ohashi conversations began  
10 to take place between the British and the Dutch and the  
11 Canadians and the United States to get ready for something,  
12 to lay some plans anyway?

13 General Marshall: Yes, sir. I think this particular  
14 month that we had our first, - January and February, in which  
15 we had our very first conversations with the British and the  
16 Canadians.

17 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

18 General Marshall: Certainly with the British.

19 Mr. Keefe: Now, you as Chief of Staff were besieged  
20 and beset by the grave currents of events on both sides of  
21 the continent?

22 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Keefe: When did we enter into this hemispheric  
24 defense plan?

25 General Marshall: You mean when did we become committed



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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to boards like the one with Mexico and the one with Canada?

Mr. Keefe: Well, there was such a plan, wasn't there?

General Marshall: There was developed an agreement with the Canadians as to certain things that jointly related to in a defensive way, there was developed an agreement, or at least the conversations, with Mexico of the same nature and there was brought into Washington on an ascertainable date representatives from many of the Latin-American countries, their military representatives, to discuss matters in relation to our joint security in the Western hemisphere, and I personally, I think in the fall of 1940, maybe the late summer, brought different Chiefs of Staff of all the Latin-American countries as my guests, entertained them, talked to them, sent them about the United States.

Mr. Keefe: Well, there was an actual war plan, L-52, was there not, a Western Hemisphere defense plan?

General Marshall: There probably was, sir, I do not remember the designation.

Mr. Keefe: You do not recall that plan specifically?

General Marshall: I know there would be a plan but I just do not recall specifically what it was.

Mr. Keefe: Well, General Marshall, the record appears to be that on March 27, 1941 a proclamation declaring an unlimited emergency was issued. That was in line with the



1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 general current of conditions as they were developing?

3 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

4 Mr. Keefe: Do you recall that?

5 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

6 Mr. Keefe: And on June 6, 1941 the President approved  
7 an Act of Congress taking over foreign ships lying idle  
8 in United States ports. Do you remember that?

9 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Keefe: So it is apparent from these actions, ship-  
11 ments of Lease-Lend material, the declaration of an unlimited  
12 emergency, legislation taking over foreign owned ships in  
13 United States ports, that things were beginning to get more  
14 and more critical?

15 General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

16 Mr. Keefe: On both fronts, both the Atlantic and the  
17 Pacific?

18 General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

19 Mr. Keefe: Then in July 1941 we started to improve  
20 the Panama Canal defenses, did we not? Do you remember that?

21 General Marshall: You mean the additional series of  
22 locks?

23 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

24 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Keefe: Congress appropriated the money to build



1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 another set of locks and that went into action down in Panama  
3 and it provided for the installation of other defenses, did  
4 it not, General Marshall?

5 General Marshall: I think so, yes, sir.

6 Mr. Keefe: In an attempt to prepare the defenses of  
7 Panama. That was in, I believe, as I remember, July 1941.  
8 So we in all these actions were looking toward the possibili-  
9 ties that might come in the future with the gradually grow-  
10 ing disintegration of the relations on both sides of the  
11 hemisphere, is that a fair statement?

12 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Keefe: And then in July 1941 we seized Japanese  
14 assets in the United States and froze their assets, do you  
15 recall that?

16 General Marshall: I do.

17 Mr. Keefe: Were you in on the conversations that led to  
18 that action on the part of this government?

19 General Marshall: I do not recall, sir.

20 Mr. Keefe: That was tending to further intensify the  
21 growing strain on relations, in your opinion, was it not?

22 General Marshall: Yes, sir, it was.

23 Mr. Keefe: I am asking these questions to get the back-  
24 ground for the actions which you as Chief of Staff were  
25 particularly concerned with, General Marshall, during those



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 very trying times.

3 Now, these conversations were started in the summer of  
4 1941, as I recall, between the Japanese Ambassador and Mr.  
5 Hull looking toward the possibility of some solution of this  
6 growing series of difficulties that were being encountered  
7 and the gradual disintegration of our diplomatic relations  
8 and one of the things they were complaining about was what  
9 they called the encirclement of Japan. Do you remember that?

10 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Keefe: And they referred to this agreement which  
12 specified certain lines of latitude and longitude and cer-  
13 tain economic pressures that were being applied to them and  
14 they were spouting off about that, weren't they?

15 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Keefe: And then on August 4, 1941 we banned the  
17 export of aviation gasoline to them, do you remember that?

18 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Keefe: The public were demanding it, weren't they?

20 General Marshall: I believe so, sir.

21 Mr. Keefe: Well, I remember sitting in the Halls of  
22 Congress and hearing day by day almost daily speeches on the  
23 subject that were being made, pretty insistent demands.

24 Following this condition, through the knowledge obtained  
25 from these intercepts it indicated that Japan was getting



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 pretty agitated, isn't that true?

3 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

4 Mr. Keefe: The public in Japan were being inflamed by  
5 the war lords and that was disclosed by these intercepts, was  
6 it not?

7 General Marshall: Yes, sir. I think also in the press.

8 Mr. Keefe: Also in the press, yes. And on the 4th of  
9 August 1941 all shipping to the United States was suspended  
10 by Japan, do you remember that?

11 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

12 Mr. Keefe: Trade ceased in August of 1941 so far as  
13 commercial trade was concerned, isn't that true?

14 General Marshall: I think that is approximately correct,  
15 sir.

16 Mr. Keefe: That is about the time when you left and  
17 went out to join the conference at sea with the President and  
18 Winston Churchill?

19 General Marshall: The latter part of August.

20 Mr. Keefe: August 3 I believe was the date the Presi-  
21 dent left.

22 General Marshall: August 3rd? Well, I left the same  
23 time.

24 Mr. Keefe: You left the same time. Did you accompany  
25 the President?



1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 General Marshall: No, I don't think I left at the same  
3 time. He went to some other point for the week-end, I be-  
4 lieve, and I joined him somewhere in the waters around New  
5 York, near New York.

6 Mr. Keefe: Yes. Well, I think the newspapers reported  
7 as of a date I have before me, as I gathered together this  
8 mass of material to get it chronologically in order.

9 General Marshall: Yes, sir. That is approximately cor-  
10 rect.

11 Mr. Keefe: That he left New London, Connecticut.

12 General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

13 Mr. Keefe: On the Warship Potomac as far as the public  
14 was concerned, on a week-end cruise, and you met him some  
15 place and you went out to sea?

16 General Marshall: Yes. He boarded the Augusta.

17 Mr. Keefe: Well, I do not intend to go into that situa-  
18 tion, but at the time you went out there to attend this At-  
19 lantic conference conditions were certainly in a pretty  
20 strained condition so far as our relations with Japan were  
21 concerned at that time, weren't they?

22 General Marshall: I think they were, sir.

23 Mr. Keefe: Do you recall having any discussions while  
24 you were out there about what was liable to happen, what the  
25 plans were to be, and so on, and so forth, with anybody?



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2           General Marshall: There were no discussions with the  
3 President on the political factors, on what our plans were.  
4 There were no instructions, as I recall, of any kind from the  
5 President as to the nature of our conversations, that is,  
6 Admiral Stark, General Arnold and myself, with the British  
7 Chiefs of Staff. The meeting went right ahead and we were  
8 left, so far as I can recall, largely to our own judgment  
9 as to what to discuss.

10           Mr. Keefe: Well, in any event you came back when, -  
11 about the 14th of August or thereabouts?

12           General Marshall: Well, I do not recall, sir, but I  
13 came back on the Augusta part way down the coast and then  
14 embarked at sea on a seaplane and flew into Newport, Rhode  
15 Island.

16           Mr. Keefe: Now, I note that on the 15th of September  
17 1941 the Secretary of the Navy Knox, speaking to the Ameri-  
18 can Legion convention said, and I quote:

19                   "Beginning tomorrow the American Navy will provide  
20 protection as adequate as we can make it for ships of  
21 every flag carrying these aid supplies between the  
22 American continent and the waters adjacent to Iceland.  
23 These ships are ordered to capture and destroy by every  
24 means at their disposal Axis controlled submarines or  
25 surface raiders encountered in those waters. This is



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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our answer to Hitler's declaration that he will try to sink every ship his vessels encounter on the route leading from the United States to British ports."

Now, things were getting pretty critical at that time, were they not?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And I assume, General Marshall, that it is a fair statement that you as Chief of Staff were very worried about the situation in the Pacific and what might happen?

General Marshall: Very much so.

Mr. Keefe: You knew at that time that we were not prepared for a war in the Pacific, didn't you?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And you tried to make that clear, did you not, all along?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: You wanted any possibility of a war in the Pacific to be held off and stalled, I believe you used the word "stalled" in your testimony, as long as possible?

General Marshall: I probably did.

Mr. Keefe: That was your attitude, wasn't it?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And it was the attitude of Admiral Stark too, was it not?



1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 General Marshall: According to statements I recollect  
3 of his that was his attitude.

4 Mr. Keefe: Well, you had frequent discussions back and  
5 forth and were on terms of intimacy almost daily with him?

6 General Marshall: I am not saying he did not, sir. I  
7 said according to statements that he made that I heard that  
8 was his attitude.

9 Mr. Keefe: General Marshall, you may have had private  
10 conversations back and forth that are not reflected in  
11 statements. What I am trying to get is the actual state of  
12 mind.

13 General Marshall: I think I confused you, Mr. Keefe.  
14 I was merely endeavoring not to testify for Admiral Stark.  
15 What I said was that according to statements I heard him make  
16 that was his attitude.

17 Mr. Keefe: He made those statements to you?

18 General Marshall: Either to me or in my presence.

19 Mr. Keefe: I see. Well, then, a constant revision of  
20 war plans was going on all this time, wasn't there?

21 General Marshall: I would have to qualify that somewhat,  
22 sir. The war plans had been formally agreed upon so far as  
23 our own government was concerned. What we were concerned with  
24 at those times was the means for implementing the war plans.

25 Mr. Keefe: Yes.



1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 General Marshall: The distribution of materiel and the  
3 distribution of personnel.

4 Mr. Keefe: You had to get supplies and you were faced  
5 with the dilemma of the allocation of those supplies, were  
6 you not?

7 General Marshall: That was the great dilemma through-  
8 out all of this period.

9 Mr. Keefe: Where they should go.

10 General Marshall: Where they should go.

11 Mr. Keefe: There was an insistent demand for supplies  
12 to be sent to the Allies on the European front?

13 General Marshall: Very insistent.

14 Mr. Keefe: And likewise you knew that there had to be  
15 some supplies, too, at strategic points in the Pacific?

16 General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

17 Mr. Keefe: And you were trying to take whatever avail-  
18 able supplies there were and to make the best use of them and  
19 see that Panama and Hawaii and MacArthur out there at Manila  
20 got whatever it was possible to send them?

21 General Marshall: Those were the critical decisions that  
22 I had to make at that time.

23 Mr. Keefe: Well, did any person influence your decision  
24 as to the distribution of these supplies?

25 General Marshall: Well, I could not say that, sir.



1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Pressure was brought on to me from numerous directions, in-  
3 side the government, outside the government and a little free  
4 handed advice.

5 Mr. Keefe: You were being hit from all sides, weren't  
6 you?

7 General Marshall: Yes, sir. That had been going on for  
8 about a year and a half and it reached a peak at this time.  
9 All the commanders, of course, every commander wants all that  
10 he can possibly use for his own interests in carrying out his  
11 own mission and, naturally, they were making their pressures,  
12 as well as the Russian Government and the British Government  
13 and the people of the Netherlands East Indies and the Chinese  
14 Government. They were to me direct, they were to the State  
15 Department I am quite certain, they were to the President,  
16 they were to any influence they thought might achieve the re-  
17 sults they desired.

18 Mr. Keefe: You were convinced, were you not, as early  
19 as August 1941 that if the current of events continued as  
20 they had up to that time we would inevitably be drawn into a  
21 war with Japan as a matter of necessity?

22 General Marshall: Yes, sir. It was my reaction at that  
23 time.

24 Mr. Keefe: Yes. Can you state whether it was as the re-  
25 action of Admiral Stark?



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

General Marshall: I could not testify as to that, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Did you ever discuss that situation with him?

General Marshall: That specific factor I do not recall. It is probable that I did.

Mr. Keefe: Did you ever discuss it with Mr. Stimson?

General Marshall: Yes, sir, I am quite certain I did.

Mr. Keefe: Was he of the same opinion from the expressions that he gave to you?

General Marshall: I hesitate to try to recall just what his opinions were. He was deeply concerned. He regarded the situation as critical and it was a daily, almost hourly, trouble in his mind as to what was the proper course of this government.

Mr. Keefe: Now, General Marshall, you well knew the character of the Japanese during this whole period?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And the double talk that they were engaged in, did you not?

General Marshall: I assume that you have to read all diplomatic exchanges of theirs with a grain of salt.

Mr. Keefe: Well, maybe that is a bad expression, double talk, but as I look at this correspondence I can think of nothing that more aptly describes it. You were getting their



1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 talk from their intercepts and then you had what they were  
3 telling Mr. Hull openly in these negotiations?

4 General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

5 Mr. Keefe: And you knew that it was double talk, did  
6 you not, at that time?

7 General Marshall: That was my impression except that  
8 there is one message there, in their magic, I have forgotten  
9 the particular message, it is in the latter part of November,  
10 where they go into the matter, I think, of the date, the  
11 limiting date of November 25th.

12 Mr. Keefe: Yes. Well, we will get to that.

13 General Marshall: When they use the expression "to  
14 make impossible further diplomatic relations."

15 Mr. Keefe: Yes. Now, the War Department and the Navy  
16 Department, I gained the impression from the conversation up  
17 to date, were called upon to implement the diplomatic rep-  
18 resentations. Did you so understand it?

19 General Marshall: I do not believe I would put it quite  
20 that way, sir. We were notified of the diplomatic conversa-  
21 tions and it was left to us to find what should be done to  
22 back them up. Also, we were consulted as to whether we were  
23 prepared to back up the possible consequences of certain  
24 diplomatic moves should they be made.

25 Mr. Keefe: Well, did you advise the State Department



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 that you were not prepared?

3           General Marshall: I advised Mr. Hull, I think personal-  
4 ly, some time in September that December 5th was the earliest  
5 date that I could figure when we would be reasonably prepared,  
6 particularly in the Philippines.

7           Mr. Keefe: And Admiral Stark, I believe you testified  
8 the other day, thought some time in February?

9           General Marshall: He mentioned along the 1st of Febru-  
10 ary, I think, from the viewpoint of the Fleet.

11           Mr. Keefe: And that the Fleet was not prepared at what  
12 time to meet reasonably eventualities in the Pacific?

13           General Marshall: Yes, sir.

14           Mr. Keefe: And you figured if things came along as you  
15 planned you perhaps could get things out there to reasonably  
16 prepare our defenses in the Pacific by the 5th of December?

17           General Marshall: I thought we would have the troops,  
18 and particularly the planes.

19           Mr. Keefe: And you were very concerned particularly to  
20 see that diplomatic negotiations did not cause a break before  
21 that time, so that you could be prepared?

22           General Marshall: Yes, sir.

23           Mr. Keefe: Well, all this time this great mass and vol-  
24 ume of communications as evidenced by all this mass of  
25 exhibits was taking place?



1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

3 Mr. Keefe: But fundamentally and reduced down to a  
4 thing that the man on the street can understand, you were con-  
5 cerned with getting our defenses ready in the Pacific to meet  
6 the situation which you were convinced as early as August  
7 was inevitable and you thought that if you could stall this  
8 thing along until the 5th of December you could get those  
9 defenses fairly ready to meet what you could see coming,  
10 is that a fair statement?

11 General Marshall: Roughly that, sir, with this addition:  
12 I had thought that if we could build up and might have been  
13 able to build up by December 5th our defenses in the Philip-  
14 pines it might discourage the Japanese from any hostile ac-  
15 tion because it would be too hazardous.

16 Mr. Keefe: Because from all the indications that you  
17 could see they were moving down south?

18 General Marshall: That their purpose was a southern cam-  
19 paign.

20 Mr. Keefe: And the Philippines were on their flank?

21 General Marshall: And the Philippines were on their  
22 flank.

23 Mr. Keefe: And if you could build up the defenses in  
24 the Philippines sufficiently you thought it would deter them  
25 from proceeding along down the course you thought they had been



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 pursuing?

3 General Marshall: Yes, sir. I thought it would deter  
4 them from any overt act.

5 Mr. Keefe: Did you think that the development of the  
6 defenses in the Hawaiian area would deter them?

7 General Marshall: I thought the existing defenses in the  
8 Hawaiian Department would deter them from an effort directed  
9 at Hawaii.

10 Mr. Keefe: Was it your opinion in the summer of 1941  
11 that the very presence of the Fleet out there at Hawaii  
12 would act as a deterrent?

13 General Marshall: I thought that that had a deterrent  
14 effect.

15 Mr. Keefe: Now, as the events progressed, General Mar-  
16 shall, all through the summer of 1941 and in the fall of 1941  
17 there was no evidence so far as the Japs were concerned that  
18 they were being deterred by the presence of the Fleet, was  
19 there?

20 General Marshall: The Japs continued throughout that  
21 period to make moves which were unopposed at that time, of  
22 course, due to the inability of the Indo-China people and the  
23 Eastern Thailand people to oppose them and the Chinese them-  
24 selves to oppose them, so they continued definitely with their  
25 various moves throughout that period. I might add that in



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1 speaking of building up the defenses of the Philippines suf-  
2 ficient to cause the Japanese to hesitate, if not to give up  
3 the idea of an overt act, I still assumed that they would  
4 take as much as they could get, you might say, for nothing  
5 by their various infiltration moves that were then in progress  
6 in Indo-China specifically.  
7

8 Mr. Keefe: Do you know Stanley Hornbeck?

9 General Marshall: Yes, sir, I know him.

10 Mr. Keefe: You knew he was counsellor to the State De-  
11 partment?

12 General Marshall: I was aware of that fact, sir.

13 Mr. Keefe: You were in conferences in which he partici-  
14 pated, were you not, during this period?

15 General Marshall: I do not specifically recall his  
16 presence. He may have been present. I do not recall any  
17 discussion with him personally myself.

18 Mr. Keefe: Did you ever get any confidential memorandum  
19 from him?

20 General Marshall: I may have. I do not recall right  
21 now, sir.

22 Mr. Keefe: I have before me what appears to be some  
23 memoranda prepared by Mr. Hornbeck on December 1 of 1941,  
24 which Harmon Duncombe, Lieutenant Colonel, says he understood  
25 were addressed to the Army and Navy.



1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Now, I have asked, I will say, of counsel for all those  
3 communications. I have been furnished with two. Will the  
4 counsel make a further statement now if he can find the com-  
5 munications that passed from Mr. Hornbeck?

6 Mr. Gesell: We are making that search and the State  
7 Department has communicated with Mr. Hornbeck in the Nether-  
8 lands directly. We have furnished the committee so far with  
9 the memos that have been located.

10 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman  
11 yield for one question so that I may ascertain something from  
12 counsel?

13 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

14 Senator Ferguson: Is it true, counsel, that the Army re-  
15 cords show that there are no -- or the Navy records show that  
16 there are no Hornbeck statements in their records? Is that  
17 what you said?

18 Mr. Gesell: They have so reported.

19 Senator Ferguson: Yes. So that as we now understand  
20 it, the committee counsel are unable to get any of the Horn-  
21 beck statements from the Navy?

22 Mr. Gesell: That is correct.

23 Senator Ferguson: And from the Army other than those  
24 that have been distributed?

25 Mr. Gesell: That is correct.



1 Senator Ferguson: Have they been distributed generally?

2 Mr. Gesell: No. We are trying to get all of them to-  
3 gēther before we distribute them.

4 Senator Ferguson: They haven't been distributed then?

5 Mr. Gesell: I think we gave them to Mr. Keefe when they  
6 came in because it was his request and I think Mr. Keefe has  
7 the ones that have come from the Army.

8 Mr. Keefe: I have them before me.

9 Senator Ferguson: I am sorry to interrupt but I wanted  
10 to get that on the record.

11 Mr. Keefe: I have a letter, photostatic copy of a let-  
12 ter dated December 1st, 1941, addressed to the Honorable Henry  
13 L. Stimson, Secretary of War, signed by Stanley K. Hornbeck,  
14 in which it says (Reading):

15 "I send you herewith for your strictly personal and  
16 strictly confidential information -- but for whatever use  
17 you may care to make of the thought contained, without  
18 quotation or attribution -- a copy of a memorandum of  
19 date November 5 which was made immediately after a con-  
20 ference the participants in which were the Secretary of  
21 State, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Opera-  
22 tions, the author of this memorandum being present."

23 Do you recall that conversation?

24 General Marshall: No, sir.

25 Mr. Keefe: It was on November 5, 1941, General Marshall,



1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 according to Mr. Hornbeck's letter to the Secretary of War.

3 Now, this memoranda reads as follows, and I quote:

4 "There are two points in particular to which, in my  
5 opinion, the War Department and the Navy Department, in  
6 their estimate of the Far Eastern situation and its  
7 problems do not give sufficient consideration."

8 Now, to interject at this point, who was this man Horn-  
9 beck and what was his business?

10 General Marshall: I think you said he was the counsellor  
11 of the State Department.

12 Mr. Keefe: Was he giving orders to the Army and Navy?

13 General Marshall: I do not think so, sir.

14 Mr. Keefe: I recall some testimony of Admiral Richardson  
15 that he seemed to think that he was being ordered around by  
16 Hornbeck instead of the Secretary of the Navy.

17 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, is that a question?

18 The Chairman: The chair does not know.

19 Mr. Keefe: If you will keep still a minute you will be  
20 able to ascertain from what I say, Mr. Murphy.

21 Now, General Marshall, I take it that you did not believe  
22 that Mr. Hornbeck was giving any orders to the Chief of Staff,  
23 did you?

24 General Marshall: No, sir, I did not.

25 Mr. Keefe: But he might have been giving advice, we will



1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 put it that way.

3 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

4 Mr. Keefe: He is presently over in the Netherlands,  
5 isn't he, the United States Minister at the Netherlands?

6 General Marshall: I heard that said a moment ago.

7 Mr. Keefe: Well, being as how you are going to be our  
8 new Ambassador to China maybe you will get acquainted with  
9 him after a while. I call your attention to him.

10 Now, this is what he says, continuing this quote:

11 "First: There actually is going on in the Pacific  
12 a war: Japan and China are at war. The Chinese-  
13 Japanese war is a part of the world conflict between on  
14 the one hand powers which are engaged in aggression and  
15 on the other hand powers which are resisting aggression."  
16 Just to interject, this is news and information that he  
17 is giving to Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War. He fur-  
18 ther said:

19 "Japan is a power which is engaged in aggression in  
20 one part of the world and is an ally of powers which are  
21 engaged in aggression in another part of the world. The  
22 Chinese are resisting Japan in one part of the world  
23 and they regard themselves as being morally and in gen-  
24 eral objective an ally of powers which are actively re-  
25 sisting Japan in another part of the world and are pas-



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 sively resisting Japan in regions adjacent to the theater  
3 of Japanese-Chinese hostilities. The Chinese would be  
4 shocked at a concept that there is at present 'peace'  
5 in the Pacific and that the problem of the United States  
6 and Great Britain in the Pacific is that of seeing that  
7 there continues to be peace in that area.

8 "Second: A termination of Japanese-Chinese hostil-  
9 ities in the not distant future and certainly before Ger-  
10 many is defeated is not inconceivable. Suppose that,  
11 either by virtue of a breakdown in Chinese morale fol-  
12 lowed by a negotiated peace between Japan and China, or  
13 by virtue of a breakdown in Chinese capacity to make  
14 armed resistance which might come from a closing of the  
15 Burma Road and general insufficiency of material aid from  
16 outside, Chinese resistance to Japan were to cease. Japan  
17 would then be relieved of the entanglement of her 'U'hina  
18 Incident' and would be in a position to turn her fleet  
19 and whatever else she still possesses of capacity for  
20 military adventuring into new moves either southward  
21 or northward or eastward. Should it not be a constant  
22 object of British and American political, economic and  
23 military strategy to keep China's moral and material ca-  
24 capacity to resist Japan at a high enough point to ensure  
25 against a termination of Chinese resistance."

Did you ever see that message?

General Marshall: Not to my knowledge.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 Mr. Keefe: Well, he states that that is the result of  
3 the conversations had with the Secretary of State, the  
4 Chief of Staff, Chief of Naval Operations, at which he was  
5 present.

6  
7 General Marshall: I understood that was his reaction  
8 following the conversations.

9 Mr. Keefe: That was made immediately after the confer-  
0 ence of November 5.

1 Do you remember that conference at all?

2 General Marshall: I know there was a conference on  
3 November 5, at which I was present, but the details of it  
4 at the moment, I cannot recall. I did not recall even that  
5 Mr. Hornbeck was present.

6 Mr. Keefe: Well, this profound memorandum which dis-  
7 closes the existence of a state of war over there between  
8 the Japs and Chinese did not impress you very much, did it,  
9 General Marshall?

10 General Marshall: Throughout all of this period, from  
11 the spring of 1940 straight through up to the actual entry  
12 of the United States into the war, I always found that the  
13 individual who was concerned with the particular theatre  
14 or area quite naturally put the conditions of that area  
15 to the forefront, and our great problem was balancing  
16 all these forefronts, if I may put it that way, in obtaining  
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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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the general picture of what was the proper thing, or what was the proper attitude for this Government.

In that particular memorandum Mr. Hornbeck is representing the critical situation of China and the effect of the collapse of China on the general situation in the Pacific.

There were many others, as I recall, but not specifically the names, who were intense in their desire to have more done for China and more consideration of the Chinese factors. We were aware of those, and our problem was to balance them against this whole plot, as to what might be the proper thing to do.

Mr. Keefe: You were perfectly aware of that situation as Chief of Staff, General Marshall?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: You were just as anxious for the Chinese in this particular war as anybody in the Government?

General Marshall: That remained our policy to the end.

Mr. Keefe: That has been the policy from the start to the finish, has it not?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: It was simply a question of how much supplies you could make available to them, and that you could deliver to them?



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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General Marshall: Largely that, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Well, now, General Marshall, the evidence is replete with records of intercepts, conferences between the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations, with the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the President, and the State Department, all during this period, during September and October of 1941, and we have a mountain of exhibits here dealing with the situation as it existed during that period of time.

You are aware of that, aren't you?

Mr. Murphy: May I inquire --

Mr. Keefe: No, I do not yield.

Mr. Murphy: Just as to whether the whole memorandum was read?

The Chairman: The Congressman did not yield.

Mr. Murphy: I just made an inquiry as to whether all the memorandum was read.

Mr. Keefe: Well, of course, Mr. Chairman --

Mr. Murphy: I have never seen it. I was just wondering whether it was all read.

The Chairman: The Chair cannot answer the question.

Mr. Keefe: Of course, I would not think of reading the letter into the record unless I read it all, as it has been furnished to me.



1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 The Chairman: Proceed.

3 Mr. Keefe: It is not a letter to start with. It is  
4 a memorandum submitted to the Secretary of War, and I read  
5 it all, Mr. Murphy.

6 Mr. Murphy: Thank you.

7 Mr. Keefe: For what it is worth. I did not think it  
8 was worth much myself.

9 Mr. Murphy: I thought there was a part omitted.

10 Mr. Keefe: I could not conceive anybody writing such  
11 tripe as that to anybody unless there was some conclusion,  
12 or unless there was more substance in it than what appears.

13 The Chairman: Let us proceed.

14 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, may we have a little levity  
15 in this proceeding? Otherwise, it is too stale.

16 The Vice Chairman: The whole report has been furnished  
17 to you and not to the other members of this committee.

18 Mr. Keefe: It is right here and you can look at it.

19 The Chairman: If we are unable to finish with General  
20 Marshall before Mr. Hornbeck's time expires in the Nether-  
21 lands, we may ask him about it.

22 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

23 Now, General Marshall, these wily Japs finally delivered  
24 the note to Mr. Hull, the note of the 20th of November;  
25 you remember that, do you not?



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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1  
2 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

3 Mr. Keefe: In which they laid down certain points.

4 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Keefe: That is the note that Mr. Hull says was  
6 the Japanese ultimatum to America. The record discloses  
7 that after that note was delivered, there was a lot of  
8 discussion between the 20th and 26th of November between  
9 Mr. Hull and the Japanese envoys, and a lot of discussion  
10 between all the upper levels in the Government, and as  
11 nearly as I can get at it, it was suggested that an answer  
12 to that Japanese note of the 20th be prepared, and the Japs  
13 in their note of the 20th had asked for some concessions.  
14 Do you recall that?

15 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Keefe: Whether they were honest or not in it is  
17 beside the question. They asked for certain concessions  
18 and they made certain demands, and so the top level got  
19 together and talked the thing over, "Now, what are we  
20 going to do?"

21 Now, this is as I see it, and I want you to correct  
22 me if I am wrong, because I am not going into all this  
23 mass of detail:

24 As far as you and Admiral Stark were concerned, you  
25 were trying to stall these Japs along so there would not



1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 be a final break, weren't you?

3 General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

4 Mr. Keefe: So there was a discussion of a modus  
5 vivendi.

6 General Marshall: Yes, sir, and that was talked over  
7 with Lord Halifax, wasn't it? He came into the discussions,  
8 did he not?

9 General Marshall: I believe it was, sir.

10 Mr. Keefe: Weren't you present at any discussions  
11 at which he was present?

12 General Marshall: It would be a matter of record. I  
13 do not recall it.

14 Mr. Keefe: Well, I think it fairly appears that the  
15 matter was discussed by all interested parties. We were  
16 working in pretty close association at that time with the  
17 Chinese, the British, and Dutch, weren't we?

18 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Keefe: And anything that was done, was considered  
20 to be a joint action at that late date, was it not?

21 General Marshall: I do not know as that would be  
22 the correct way to state it, sir.

23 Mr. Keefe: Well, it would be action taken after joint  
24 conversations; put it that way. Did not you so understand  
25 it?



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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General Marshall: I would not say even that was a correct statement, sir.

I think there was a very general interchange of views, opinions, and desires among the representatives of these various governments. But to what extent that would have been considered binding on our Government, meaning Mr. Hull, in his dealings, as to whether or not he dared do this, or dared do that without a formal consultation or agreement with the British or Dutch, I do not know, sir.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 Mr. Keefe: Well, in any event, there were a lot of  
3 discussions and the President participated in them?

4 General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

5 Mr. Keefe: And there is evidence when they came to draw-  
6 ing up the reply to the Japs the President wrote some memorandum  
7 and made some suggestions as to certain points that should be  
8 incorporated in that memorandum. You perhaps have not seen  
9 that, but it is here in the evidence.

10 General Marshall: I cannot recall it.

11 Mr. Keefe: I cannot put my hand on it immediately, but  
12 I think, Mr. Counsel, I am correct in that, that the President  
13 made a memorandum. I have forgotten the exhibit number.

14 Mr. Gesell: There is a memorandum contained in the  
15 modus vivendi exhibit. I think it is Exhibit 18.

16 Mr. Keefe: Exhibit 18. I have it before me.

17 As a result of these conversations you were supplied,  
18 and so was the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, with  
19 a copy of the proposed message as it was finally drafted, or  
20 the proposed reply, and you looked it over, did you not?

21 General Marshall: My recollection is -- I can refresh  
22 my memory here -- I was not present at the discussion. General  
23 Gerow represented me. Admiral Stark may have been present,  
24 I don't know.

25 Mr. Keefe: I thought you prepared a joint memorandum,

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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that you made some suggestions.

3

(A document was handed to General Marshall.)

4

General Marshall: Are you speaking of the meeting of

5

November 24 or November 21?

6

Mr. Keefe: Well, I am speaking of what took place with

7

respect to your knowledge and what your recommendations were

8

with respect to this message from which the modus vivendi was

9

finally deleted, and sent on the 26th.

10

General Marshall: May I read that?

11

Mr. Keefe: Yes.

12

General Marshall: This is a memorandum to me, dated

13

November 24, 1941.

14

"Subject: Far Eastern Situation."

15

It is signed by General Gerow. He says:

16

"A conference was held in the State Department at 9:45

17

a.m., November 21, 1941. Present: Secretary Hull, Dr.

18

Hornbeck, Mr. Hamilton, Admiral Stark and General Gerow.

19

Secretary Hull requested the Army and Navy representatives

20

to express their informal views from a military standpoint on

21

a draft of a tentative outline of a basis for agreement with

22

Japan. (Tab A). He explained that the outline was in a

23

formative stage and had not been adopted by the State Depart-

24

ment."

25

Is this all right, for me to read this?



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Keefe: It is all right if you want to. It identifies it in your mind, does it not?

3

4

General Marshall: Yes.

5

Mr. Keefe: It answers my question.

6

7

General Marshall: This was handed to me on my return to Washington here on the 24th. Attached to it was a copy of the memorandum which I believe is called the modus vivendi.

8

9

Mr. Keefe: Did you go over it at that time?

10

General Marshall: I went over it at that time.

11

12

Mr. Keefe: Did you prepare or help to prepare the modus vivendi?

13

14

15

16

General Marshall: I agreed with General Gerow's statements in regard to it, that the comments of Admiral Stark and General Gerow were acceptable, but I felt that General Gerow's statement regarding the portion of Admiral Stark's memorandum that made reference to the Army Forces in provision A-1, as to restrictions that should be placed on the Army's preparations to make the Philippines secure, was not acceptable.

17

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In other words, the modus vivendi as drawn up, from a military point of view, we interposed no objections to, except as to a statement that Admiral Stark probably indirectly became involved in in his memorandum, that implied that we could not go ahead with the further strengthening of the garrison in the Philippines, and to that I was not agreeable.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Keefe: Well, so far as the modus vivendi was concerned, you were willing to agree to that?

General Marshall: Willing to agree to that, sir.

Mr. Keefe: You think if that was submitted to the Japs it might have had the effect of stalling the negotiations along a little bit longer?

General Marshall: I found a note somewhere here, and I don't know whether I am speaking from the note or speaking from memory, that we thought the terms were too stiff and they would not accept it.

Mr. Keefe: You personally thought that the terms were too stiff and they would not accept it anyway?

General Marshall: I think that is right.

Mr. Keefe: Even with the modus vivendi?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Let me get that straight. Do I understand after reading this over, after it was submitted to you by General Gerow on, I believe, the 24th, on your return, you concluded that the message was too stiff even with the modus vivendi in it, and that they would not accept it?

General Marshall: That was my guess at it.

Mr. Keefe: Did you talk with Admiral Stark about that?

General Marshall: I do not recall that, sir.

Mr. Keefe: But with the suggested changes and modifications



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 which were contained in General Gerow's letter, from a purely  
3 Army situation you were willing that it should be sent?

4 General Marshall: Shall I read General Gerow's memorandum,  
5 in which I concurred?

6 Mr. Keefe: You do not have to, as far as I am concerned.

(8)  
7 General Marshall: "War Plans Division has made a hasty  
8 study from a military viewpoint of your tentative 'Outline of  
9 Proposed Bases for Agreement Between the United States and  
10 Japan,' and perceives no objection to its use as a basis for  
11 discussion. The adoption of its provisions would attain one  
12 of our present major objectives -- the avoidance of war with  
13 Japan. Even a temporary peace in the Pacific, would permit  
14 us to complete defensive preparations in the Philippines and  
15 at the same time insure continuance of material assistance  
16 to the British -- both of which are highly important.

17 "The foregoing should not be construed as suggesting  
18 strict adherence to all the conditions outlined in the proposed  
19 agreement. War Plans Division wishes to emphasize it is of  
20 grave importance to the success of our war effort in Europe  
21 that we reach a modus vivendi with Japan.

22 "War Plans Division suggests the deletion of Par. B-5.  
23 The proposal contained in that paragraph would probably be  
24 entirely unacceptable to Russia."

25 I will not read any further on that.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 "The paper has been considered as a whole. If major  
3 changes are made in its provisions, it is requested that the  
4 War Department be given an opportunity to consider the military  
5 aspects of such changes.

6 "The Chief of Staff is out of the city and consequently  
7 this paper has not been presented for his consideration. War  
8 Plans Division believes that he would concur in the views  
9 expressed above."

10 Which I did.

11 Mr. Keefe: Well, now, General Marshall, from evidence  
12 already in in the statement of Secretary Hull, it appears that  
13 this proposed draft which you saw, and subject to the modifi-  
14 cations contained in General Gerow's memorandum, which you  
15 approved, especially the modus vivendi, that was sent through  
16 Lord Halifax over to London to get their reaction.

17 There appears here a message from the Former Naval Person  
18 in Exhibit 23 which reads:

19 "Your message about Japan received tonight. Also full  
20 accounts from Lord Halifax of discussions and your counter-  
21 project to Japan on which Foreign Secretary has sent some  
22 comments. Of course, it is for you to handle this business  
23 and we certainly do not want an additional war. There is  
24 only one point that disquiets us. What about Chaing Kai-Shek?  
25 Is he not having a very thin diet? Our anxiety is about



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 China. If they collapse our joint dangers would enormously  
3 increase. We are sure that the regard of the United States  
4 for the Chinese cause will govern your action. We feel that  
5 the Japanese are most unsure of themselves."

6 Signed "Winant".

7 When you went over this did it occur to you that the  
8 proposed message would provide a very thin diet for Chaing  
9 Kai-Shek?

10 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Keefe: You had the same opinion, did you?

12 General Marshall: I had the same opinion, but we could  
13 not figure out any other method of handling the matter at the  
14 time.

15 Mr. Keefe: You were willing to take a chance?

16 General Marshall: We were forced to take a chance.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 Mr. Keefe: Were you made aware of the protest which  
3 followed from Chiang Kai-Shek to the Chinese Ambassador?

4 General Marshall: Yes, sir, I was.

5 Mr. Keefe: They protested very vigorously against  
6 sending this message with the modus vivendi in it, did they  
7 not?

8 General Marshall: Yes, sir, they did.

9 Mr. Keefe: They were not willing to concede to Japan  
10 anything, and virtually said they would get out of the war,  
11 and it would create a breakdown of the Chinese morale  
12 if you sent such a message.

13 General Marshall: Roughly that.

14 Mr. Keefe: That is a rough statement. Never having  
15 been in the State Department service, General Marshall,  
16 I sometimes speak a little roughly. But generally speaking  
17 that is the situation?

18 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Keefe: Well, now, were you consulted by Mr. Hull  
20 or the President, or anybody else after you got this message  
21 from Gerow and expressed your approval of it, with certain  
22 reservations, did you have any further conversations about  
23 sending this message?

24 General Marshall: I think there was a meeting at the  
25 White House about the time of my return. I believe it was

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 on the 24th. I will check that in just a moment.

3 I participated in a meeting at the White House at  
4 12:15 p. m. on November 25 with the Secretary of State,  
5 the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and  
6 Admiral Stark.

7 Mr. Keefe: What happened there?

8 General Marshall: I beg your pardon, sir?

9 Mr. Keefe: What happened at that conference?

10 General Marshall: I do not recall the details of the  
11 meeting. It is possible, and I believe it was brought up  
12 the other day, that I can find a reminder, and some definite  
13 facts from Mr. Stimson's testimony based on his diary  
14 at the time.

15 Mr. Keefe: Do you have any present recollection as  
16 to what that conference was about?

17 General Marshall: No, sir. I imagine it was in regard  
18 to this message. That might or might not be exact.

19 Mr. Keefe: Then you do not, as I understand it, have  
20 any present recollection about that?

21 General Marshall: No, sir, I do not.

22 Mr. Keefe: As to what this conference was on the 25th  
23 at the White House?

24 General Marshall: No, sir. I merely got the impres-  
25 sion, in line with all these other occurrences, that that



1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 must have been the basis of the discussion.

3 Mr. Keefe: Do you now have any present recollection  
4 as to what the determination was as the result of that  
5 conference?

6 General Marshall: I have not, sir.

7 Mr. Keefe: Were you advised at that time, or at any  
8 time later, before this message was finally sent on the  
9 26th, as to the deletion, or proposed deletion of the modus  
10 vivendi?

11 General Marshall: I do not recall that, sir.

12 Mr. Keefe: When did you first learn that Mr. Hull  
13 had sent this message of the 26th, after deleting the  
14 modus vivendi proposal?

15 General Marshall I assume I learned that on the 28th,  
16 on my return to Washington.

17 Mr. Keefe: After you came back from the maneuvers?

18 General Marshall: Yes, sir. My assumption is based  
19 on the fact of a recollection I think, of Mr. Stimson in  
20 his testimony where he said he did not learn until the  
21 morning of the 27th regarding exactly what had happened.  
22 But that is a matter of fact, and there is not much point  
23 in my commenting on it.

24 Mr. Keefe: Well, you were very much concerned when you  
25 heard that the message had been sent without the modus

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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1  
2 vivendi, weren't you?

3 General Marshall: I do not recall my reaction, sir.

4 I was busy trying to get things together in every way  
5 I could.

6 Mr. Keefe: Did not you send a message to the President  
7 about the 27th?

8 General Marshall: We sent a joint memorandum, Admiral  
9 Stark and myself, to the President on the 27th, in appre-  
10 ciation of the situation in the Far East, and with certain  
11 recommendations.

12 Mr. Keefe: When you sent that message, did you have  
13 knowledge that Secretary Hull had sent his message of the  
14 26th?

15 General Marshall: My recollection is that Admiral Stark  
16 and myself made our comments regarding the preparation of  
17 such a message of the 26th. I do not know, but I gather  
18 the impression here that the War Department, at least Mr.  
19 Stimson, did not know of the dispatch of the State Department  
20 message of the 26th until the 27th. That being the case,  
21 we would not have known at the time the basis of that  
22 memorandum was prepared that the message had or had not been  
23 sent.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 Mr. Keefe: Now, I would like to get this thing clear  
3 in my mind and see if we can pin it down.

4 You had a conference at the White House on the 25th?

5 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

6 Mr. Keefe: You do not recall what that conference was  
7 about, but you assume that involved a discussion of this  
8 reply to the Jap message of the 20th?

9 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Keefe: But you are unable to give us any of the  
11 details of that conversation?

12 General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

13 Mr. Keefe: Prior to that time you had discussions as  
14 to the message that was proposed embodying the modus  
15 vivendi?

16 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Keefe: You did not learn from that meeting, as I  
18 understand your testimony, that the Secretary of State pro-  
19 posed to delete the modus vivendi from the message?

20 General Marshall: I have no such recollection.

21 Mr. Keefe: All right.

22 Now, did you prepare, as a result of that meeting,  
23 a joint statement with Admiral Stark?

24 General Marshall: I was trying to find whether in the  
25 record of the Joint Board on the morning of the 26th there



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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1  
2 was a definite statement on the preparation of this parti-  
3 cular memorandum. There appears to be no reference in  
4 it, so I will have to depend on my memory, which is not  
5 at all good on this particular memorandum.

6 Mr. Keefe: Now, General Marshall, let's see if we  
7 can get this pinned down.

8 You left on the afternoon of the 26th, didn't you,  
9 for maneuvers, didn't you?

10 General Marshall: At one p.m.

11 Mr. Keefe: So, if you had any discussions with Admiral  
12 Stark, you must have had them after the meeting at the  
13 White House on the 25th or the morning of the 26th?

14 General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

15 Mr. Keefe: Am I correct in assuming that this memorandum  
16 for the President, which is dated November 27, 1941, and  
17 apparently is signed by Stark and Marshall, was, in fact,  
18 prepared before you left for the maneuvers on the afternoon  
19 of the 26th?

20 General Marshall: I do not think the expression "was  
21 in fact prepared" would be quite correct, because I rather  
22 imagine that the preparation was started at that time,  
23 the completed memorandum was ready on the 27th, and I must  
24 have signed it on the morning of the 28th.

25 Mr. Keefe: You signed it on the morning of the 28th?



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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 General Marshall: I must have signed it on the  
3 morning of the 28th.

4 Mr. Keefe: You signed it on the morning of the 28th?

5 General Marshall: I wasn't here the 27th, and the  
6 memorandum is dated the 27th.

7 Mr. Keefe: Well, would anybody else sign your name  
8 to it?

9 General Marshall: I don't believe so, sir.

10 Mr. Keefe: The memorandum is dated the 27th?

11 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

12 Mr. Keefe: What you were talking about was the proposed  
13 reply to the Japanese message of the 25th in this memoran-  
14 dum, isn't that true?

15 General Marshall: (Reading)

16 "If the current negotiations end without agreement,  
17 Japan may attack: The Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya; the  
18 Netherlands East Indies; The Philippines; The Russian  
19 Maritime Provinces."

20 Then it goes into a discussion of the various probabili-  
21 ties, and it ends up with the definite recommendations:

22 "Prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforce-  
23 ment, military counter-action be considered only if Japan  
24 attacks or directly threatens the United States, British,  
25 or Dutch territory as above outlined;



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 "In case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan  
3 be warned by the United States, the British, and the Dutch  
4 Governments that advance beyond the lines indicated may  
5 lead to war;

6 "Prior to such warning, no military opposition be  
7 undertaken;

8 "Steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with  
9 the British and Dutch for the issuance of such warning."

10 The memorandum is dated the 27th. I was absent from  
11 Washington on the 27th. I returned and was in the office  
12 early on the morning of the 28th.

13 Mr. Keefe: Where is the original document? Is that  
14 here? A photostat of the original, counsel?

15 Mr. Gesell: The November 27th memorandum?

16 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

17 Mr. Gesell: Yes. That is downstairs in our files.

18 Mr. Keefe: Can you get it, please?

19 Mr. Gesell: Certainly.

20 Mr. Keefe: At the time this memorandum was discussed  
21 or prepared, did you know that Secretary Hull had deleted  
22 the modus vivendi, and had sent his message of the 26th?

23 General Marshall: I have no specific recollection.  
24 I would rather imagine I did not.

25 Mr. Keefe: Well, you have told us, General Marshall,



1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 that when you read the proposed message, you were of the  
3 opinion that even with the modus vivendi in it, it was so  
4 stiff that the Japs wouldn't accept it?

5 General Marshall: I thought the terms were too stiff.

6 Mr. Keefe: When did you first learn that the message  
7 had been sent and the modus vivendi proposals were eliminated?

8 General Marshall: I think that must have been on the  
9 morning of November 28th, from the Secretary of War.

10 Mr. Keefe: That is when you came back?

11 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

12 Mr. Keefe: Did you talk with the Secretary of State  
13 after that to ascertain why he had sent this message and  
14 eliminated the modus vivendi?

15 General Marshall: I recall no such discussion.

16 Mr. Keefe: Did he ever tell you that the diplomatic  
17 negotiations were all over, and from now on, it is up to  
18 the Army and the Navy to run the show, or words to that  
19 effect?

20 General Marshall: I testified previously, and I have a  
21 very clear recollection of this specific statement by Mr.  
22 Hull to me, or to Admiral Stark and myself: "These fellows  
23 mean to fight," --  
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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Keefe: When was that?

General Marshall: I haven't completed the statement.

Mr. Keefe: I beg pardon.

General Marshall: "These fellows mean to fight, you will have to watch out", or words to that effect. "These fellows mean to fight", I have a clear recollection of his using those exact words. Just what was the meeting, when was the meeting, at which he said that, I don't recall, but I think it was one of the last meetings, probably the last meeting before the actual break of December 7.

Mr. Keefe: Well, was that the last meeting? When you say last meeting do you mean the meeting before he sent his message of the 26th?

General Marshall: I stated I don't recall at which one of these discussions he stated that. I am quite certain, thought, that it was after the Japanese Envoys came to Washington.

Mr. Keefe: General Marshall, I confess that my mind is indistinct -- maybe we agree on that, both of us -- as to the events of the particular period, and it is very important that we try to get these facts as clearly as possible.

Now, I realize that you left here at 1:00 o'clock on the 26th of November. You went down to maneuvers -- in North Carolina?



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: You came back when?

General Marshall: I came back -- I think my plane landed sometime after 8:00 o'clock on the evening of the 27th.

Mr. Keefe: When you got back to your office on the morning of the 28th you found this Gerow report to you, did you?

General Marshall: I think so; yes, sir, that is the probability.

Mr. Keefe: Now, what concerns me is the fact that here is your memorandum for the President, which is dated November 27, 1941, the time when you were down in North Carolina; you can't give us any clear recollection now as to when this memorandum was prepared?

General Marshall: No, sir, I cannot, but I imagine General Gerow can tell you specifically, as he prepared it, working with the Naval opposite.

Mr. Keefe: Did Gerow prepare this memorandum of the 27th?

General Marshall: That would be a joint matter between General Gerow and his assistants and the Naval opposite and that man's assistants.

Mr. Keefe: Then I understand you personally didn't discuss this matter with Admiral Stark?

General Marshall: No, sir; I said the preparation of



1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 the memorandum. I didn't say the discussion.

3 Mr. Keefe: Well, I will pass that over. Let General  
4 Marshall look at it and see if that is his signature. I don't  
5 know!

6 Is that your signature on the photostatic copy of this  
7 message of November 27?

8 (A document was handed to General Marshall.)

9 General Marshall: I would say that it was, sir.

10 Mr. Keefe: Then it is apparently signed.

11 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

12 Mr. Keefe: You couldn't have signed it on the 27th?

13 General Marshall: No, sir.

14 Mr. Keefe: Because you were in North Carolina. Do you  
15 have any recollection now of when you did sign it, after  
16 looking at the message?

17 General Marshall: No, sir. I was looking for some office  
18 mark on here to see the date of delivery but I don't get that.

19 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, will the Congressman  
20 yield for a question?

21 Mr. Keefe: Yes, sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: I will ask counsel, does this photo  
23 show that it is the original of the White House file?

24 Mr. Gesell: No. Just the original signed copy. It is  
25 from the White House files.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Senator Ferguson: Does it show any stamp anywhere of receipt?

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Mr. Gesell: No. We have examined it for that very carefully and have not found any. I see nothing on there that shows when it was received by the President.

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Mr. Keefe: What was that, Mr. Gesell?

Mr. Gesell: I see nothing on there that shows when it was received by the President.

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Mr. Keefe: Is that message which has been produced, the photostat copy, is that taken from the White House files?

Mr. Gesell: Yes.

Mr. Keefe: I thought it said on the face of it from Navy files.

Mr. Gesell: On the corner it says "Navy folder", which is the folder of the White House files in which it was placed.

Mr. Keefe: This is the original message that was delivered to the White House?

Mr. Gesell: This document was made available to us by Miss Grace Tulley from the files of President Roosevelt. It is the original.

Mr. Keefe: That clearly identifies it.

Mr. Gesell: I would like to call the Congressman's attention to the fact that it is on the stationery of the Navy Department, which suggests that it was actually typed



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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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at the Navy Department. We had in mind asking Admiral Stark, if he gets on the stand, or Admiral Turner, more concerning it.

Mr. Keefe: I expect to ask some questions too about it when Admiral Stark gets on the stand, but here is one of the joint signers of the document that is now on the stand. So that we may get as much information as we can as we go along is why I am asking these questions of General Marshall.

General Marshall, am I correct in the assumption that you had a meeting on the 25th of November at the White House?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1 Mr. Keefe: What time of day was that meeting?

2 General Marshall: Twelve-fifteen p. m.

3 Mr. Keefe: How long did it last?

4 General Marshall: I do not know, sir.

5 Mr. Keefe: In any event, you had a meeting at the  
6 White House at which Admiral Stark was present?

7 General Marshall: A meeting at which Admiral Stark  
8 was present, and also the Secretary of State, Secretary  
9 of War, Secretary of the Navy, and myself.

10 Mr. Keefe: That must have been a fairly important  
11 meeting, with all those top flight men there.

12 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Keefe: Wouldn't you say so?

14 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Keefe: But you can't tell us of any independent  
16 recollection, anything that took place at that meeting?

17 General Marshall: But you can't tell us of any inde-  
18 pendent recollection anything that took place at that meet-  
19 ing?

20 General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

21 I am told by Assistant Counsel here, that the meeting  
22 lasted an hour and a half, according to Mr. Stimson's  
23 diary.

24 Let me have that diary.  
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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Keefe: There is set forth in Mr. Stimson's diary what took place. If you don't have any present recollection as to what took place, I don't care for any guesses about it, General; I would be glad to have you read from Mr. Stimson's diary if that will refresh your recollection.

General Marshall: (Reading)

"There the President brought up the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as -- perhaps next Monday, for the Japs are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. We conferred on the general problem."

That does not stimulate my memory other than what I have told you that undoubtedly we were talking about what should be done regarding Japan.

May I say also, Mr. Keefe, at the risk of being unduly repetitious, that you gentlemen are bringing up things to me that have been, to a large extent, rubbed out by four years of global war. I have not investigated these things to refresh my memory until the past few days, and so I think it is not unduly remarkable that I would not remember the detailed conversations and the frequency of conferences at which one we discussed this, and at which one we discussed



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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that.

At the time, of course, I would have had a lively recollection. But there are some rather great events that have intervened. I think I have a fair memory, and I am giving you the best I can under the circumstances.

Mr. Keefe: General Marshall, I don't want anything said here, or any questions I have asked to be taken as indicating that I am critical. I appreciate as well as any other citizen of this country the tremendous responsibility that you had at that time and subsequent.

But this is a very important matter to this committee to get this chain of events pinned down, if we can, some place.

Now, is it your recollection -- you have no recollection of what took place. There then appears, after this memorandum signed and dated -- I don't say signed, but dated the 27th of November, addressed to the President -- there must have been some reason for you making that memorandum. I am trying to discover the relationship between that memorandum and the proposal of Mr. Hull to send a reply to the Japanese message without a modus vivendi.

Can you help this committee on that subject?

General Marshall: I think of nothing other than what I have already said, sir.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Keefe: In order that I may not be misled, do I understand your testimony to be that very likely General Gerow actually prepared this memorandum of November 27 during your absence?

General Marshall: I said very likely General Gerow and his Naval opposite who would have been, in that case, I believe, Admiral Turner, and their assistants, worked on the preparation of a draft to be submitted to Admiral Stark and myself. That was the usual course in such matters.

Mr. Keefe: Then, because the message delivered to the President actually bears your signature, it is apparent that it wasn't signed by you at least until the morning of the 28th?

General Marshall: That would appear to be the case, sir. My guess is that Admiral Stark signed it, it was typed on the Navy side, it was sent over to the War Department -- I was not here -- and I presume it was left until the morning of the 28th, when I signed it.

Mr. Keefe: That was some considerable time after Mr. Hull had decided to delete the modus vivendi out of his November 26th message and send that message, hand it to the Japanese envoys?

General Marshall: That is correct, sir.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 Mr. Keefe: So, up to the time that this message  
3 was prepared, or memorandum was prepared, for the President,  
4 you cannot state that you had any knowledge that Mr. Hull  
5 was going to send his reply to the Japs without the modus  
6 vivendi?

7 General Marshall: My own knowledge of that would come  
8 through what Mr. Stimson told me at the time, and we have  
9 read his diary on those statements. He was my informant.

10 Mr. Keefe: You do not have an independent recollection?

11 General Marshall: No, sir, I do not.

12 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Stimson will have to speak for himself.

13 Well, in any event, General Marshall, when you got  
14 notice that that message had gone out, you were alarmed,  
15 weren't you?

16 General Marshall: I don't recall that particular  
17 reaction, sir. I was in a state of great concern through-  
18 out this period, and increasing concern every day.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1 Mr. Keefe: Well, you have already told us that you  
2 thought the Japs couldn't possibly accept the message even  
3 with the modus vivendi in it and it would be rejected.

4 Now, you people got busy with the idea of alerting our  
5 overseas theaters right at that time, did you not?  
6

7 General Marshall: That is correct.

8 Mr. Keefe: Was that prompted by the fact that you knew  
9 the Japs would turn this proposal down?

10 General Marshall: The alert message was prompted by  
11 the feeling that the diplomatic, at least diplomatic relations  
12 between the United States and Japan, were trembling on the  
13 verge of rupture, with the possibility that it would mean  
14 actual war.

15 Mr. Keefe: So you felt that the overseas departments  
16 ought to be immediately alerted on a war basis?

17 General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

18 Mr. Keefe: That is why you sent that alert message out  
19 to MacArthur and to Panama and to the West Coast and to  
20 Hawaii?

21 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

22 Mr. Keefe: I don't want to read that telegram into the  
23 record again. It has been read in 17 or 18 times. We are  
24 quite familiar with the terms of that message.

25 The Chairman: It is 12 o'clock. We will have to recess  
here until 2:00 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, a recess was taken until  
2:00 o'clock p.m. of the same day.)  
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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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AFTERNOON SESSION

2:00 p.m.

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The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

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Congressman Keefe, are you ready to proceed?

5

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

6

(Resumed)

7

Mr. Keefe: General, I understand that you have not been able to get the information which I had previously requested, namely, the reasons for the alert of June 17, 1940.

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General Marshall: I was in the process of assembling that, Mr. Keefe. I asked them at the noon hour if they have completed, and they said they had not. They are doing the best they can.

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Mr. Mitchell: Mr. Congressman, do you want the message we dug up this noon in the Navy Department?

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Mr. Keefe: Yes.

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Mr. Mitchell: About the orders to Admiral Richardson to make a movement of the Fleet?

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Mr. Keefe: Yes, I would like to see it if you have it, please.

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Mr. Mitchell: I am going to read it into the record. There is some material in it that, for secrecy reasons, are not material here. We would rather not read it.

24

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Mr. Gesell: Mr. Mitchell refers to some code designation terms that we do not think should go into the public record,

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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that is all. I will show them to you.

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(The document was handed to Mr. Keefe.)

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Mr. Keefe: This morning, General Marshall, I asked you some questions with respect to the June 17, 1940 alert, and I asked you whether you had information as to whether the Fleet was maintained at Pearl Harbor during the period of that alert.

9

10

My recollection is that you did not recall the circumstances with reference to the disposition of the Fleet.

11

General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

12

Mr. Keefe: At that period.

13

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

14

Mr. Keefe: Do I so understand your testimony up to now?

15

General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

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Mr. Keefe: To refresh your recollection as to the events at that time I want to read into the record a direction from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet, entitled, "Secret. To be acknowledged." That appears in writing in the right-hand corner. It bears no date, but in the letter from the Navy transmitting it to Mr. Mitchell, the counsel, Mr. John Ford Baecher, Lieutenant Commander, U.S.N.R., states:

"1. In response to your request that the Navy Department furnish a copy of the orders issued from Admiral Stark to



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Admiral Richardson directing the Fleet to leave Pearl Harbor and proceed to an unknown destination there is disclosed a photostatic copy of the dispatch from Opnav to Cincus designated 'Secret. To be acknowledged'.

"2. It is noted that the dispatch is not dated, but by its position on the microfilm roll and the numerals contained in the time group number it is presumed that the dispatch originated on 19 June, 1940."

Now this dispatch reads as follows:

"Reliable sources persistently report any movement in force by major Fleet units toward Atlantic will occasion extensive sabotage in Canal. Army there informed and in alert status. I desire you make test on or about 24 June by having a major portion of Fleet in company put to sea without previous announcement but you arranging for leak to effect that probable destination is Canal, and this not denied by authorities Proceed toward Canal for approximately two days when return Hawaiian ports. Maintain radio silence exercising at your discretion. Anticipate ordering you to Washington for conference on your return."

Then down below on this message, in writing appears this notation:

"20 June shown to General Marshall. He sent warning" - I do not know whether that is "warning" or not -- well, he

(2)

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2     see what appears to be "msg to Canal Zone".

3             Then below that in quotation marks "Fleet may proceed  
4 to Atlantic. Possibility of sabotage continue about accord-  
5 ingly."

6             Now that notation on here indicates that you saw this  
7 message, General Marshall. Do you recall it?

8             General Marshall: Yes, sir. I do not recall the specific  
9 message. I do now recall the movement order of the Fleet for  
10 that purpose, as indicated in that message.

11             Mr. Keefe: What was the purpose of taking the Fleet  
12 out of Pearl Harbor then at the time of that alert, on June  
13 16, 1940?

14             General Marshall: I think that is explained in the  
15 message, sir.

16             Mr. Keefe: Will you look at the message and give what  
17 you conceive to be the explanation?

18             (The document was handed to General Marshall.)

19             General Marshall: "Reliable sources persistently report  
20 any movement in force by major Fleet unit towards Atlantic  
21 will occasion extensive sabotage in Canal."

22             Mr. Keefe: Now stop right there. What report does that  
23 refer to, if you know?

24             General Marshall: I do not know offhand, sir.

25             "Army there informed"- that is the Canal - "and in alert



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 status." We already have that in the record. "I desire  
3 you make test" - that was the purpose of the Fleet movement,  
4 I understand - "on or about 24 June by having a major portion  
5 of Fleet in company put to sea without previous announcement  
6 but you arranging for leak to effect that probable destination is  
7 Canal and this not denied by authorities."

8 In other words, the Chief of Naval Operations desired  
9 Admiral Richardson to make a test on or about the 24th by  
10 doing what was directed in this message.

11 Mr. Keefe: A test of what?

12 General Marshall: Whether or not the enemy, the Japanese  
13 at that time, would attempt sabotage in the Canal. The Army  
14 was already alerted in the Canal.

15 Mr. Keefe: Was it sabotage, if you know? That the  
16 dispatch of this message and the deployment of the Fleet in  
17 that manner would encourage the Japs to commit sabotage out  
18 in the Canal? Was that the purpose of it?

19 General Marshall: "Reliable sources persistently report  
20 any movement in force by major Fleet units toward Atlantic  
21 will occasion extensive sabotage in Canal." That is pretty  
22 plain, it seems to me. Now the Chief of Naval Operations  
23 directed that a test be made of that, knowing at the time  
24 that the Army was already alerted in the Canal, and it would  
25 seem from this note at the bottom here in quotation marks that



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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it probably refers to a message sent by me, I assume, to the Canal Commander of the Army at the time in connection with this message, so in addition to the alert he would also be aware of this bluff move.

LaCharity follows

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 Mr. Keefe: Now, would it be a fair interpretation of  
3 that message, General Marshall, to conclude that instruc-  
4 tions were given to Admiral Richardson that if he proceeded  
5 toward the Atlantic, and that would be toward the Panama  
6 Canal, wouldn't it?

7 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Keefe: He might expect extensive sabotage, and  
9 for him to go away from Pearl Harbor, to hide himself  
10 where he wouldn't be seen; isn't that what that message  
11 tells him to do?

12 General Marshall: Not in my understanding at all, sir.

13 "Reliable sources persistently report a movement in  
14 force by major fleet units toward Atlantic will occasion  
15 extensive sabotage in Canal."

16 Mr. Keefe: Well, it wouldn't be expected then that  
17 he would sail the Fleet toward the Canal in the face of  
18 those directions that if he did extensive sabotage would  
19 take place.

20 General Marshall: He is told to proceed toward the  
21 Canal for approximately two days. That is a very small  
22 portion of the distance.

23 Mr. Keefe: Well, in any event, General Marshall --

24 I would like, Mr. Counsel, to have that offered as an  
25 exhibit.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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General Marshall: Shall I turn it over?

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Mr. Gesell: We will first have to mimeograph it.

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Mr. Keefe: I have no objection to the deletion of those words which don't have anything to do with it, and are very secret code.

4

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6

Mr. Mitchell: We will get a mimeographed copy with those words deleted.

7

8

Mr. Keefe: I would say, Mr. Chairman, so far as I am concerned, I concur with counsel in this matter, and I suppose it is up to the committee to say whether there shall be any deletion from that message or not.

9

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The Chairman: The Chair will ask if there is any objection to the counsel having this message mimeographed with the omission of the code words, that have no relationship.

13

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Mr. Keefe: That is right.

17

The Chairman: Without objection, that will be done and counsel will prepare mimeographed copies with those symbols eliminated.

18

19

Mr. Keefe: General Marshall, to get back to the events around the 26th and 27th of November, 1941, as I understand the testimony, and if I am incorrect up to date, you correct me please -- you had no part in the first preparation of the November 28 message -- I understood that was prepared by General Gerow, the alert message sent on the 28th?

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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General Marshall: I had no part other than I may and probably did give instructions for the preparation of this message before my departure at one p. m. on November 26.

Mr. Keefe: I wanted to know whether I am correct in the assumption that when you learned that Mr. Hull had sent his message on the 26th to Japan that you at that time knew that war was inevitable, except as to the time of the actual strike.

General Marshall: I did not know on November 26th that Mr. Hull had sent his message.

Mr. Keefe Did you know on the 28th?

General Marshall: I assume that the Secretary of War told me on the 28th what he had learned from Mr. Hull on the 27th.

Mr. Keefe: Well, in Mr. Stimson's testimony, to refresh your recollection, appearing in the report of the Army Board, with respect to the meeting of the 25th of November at the White House --

Mr. Gesell: What page, Congressman, please, so that we can show it to the General.

Mr. Keefe: Page 51.

Mr. Gesell: Thank you.

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3700

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 Mr. Keefe: This is the United States News copy that I  
3 am referring to:

4 "The War Council met with Mr. Hull on the 25th of November,  
5 1941."

6 This is the statement of the Board.

7 "The tentative U.S. proposals to the Japanese were so  
8 drastic and harsh that Mr. Stimson testifies that when he read  
9 it his diary shows this was his contemporaneous impression  
10 of it:

11 "'Hull showed me the proposal for a three-months truce  
12 which he was going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow.  
13 It adequately safeguarded all our interests, I thought, secured  
14 it, but I don't think that there is any chance of the Japanese  
15 accepting it because it was so drastic.'"

16 You have testified here this morning that you were of  
17 the same opinion.

18 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Keefe: That is correct, is it not?

20 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Keefe: Then the Board says:

22 "Apparently the Secretary of War, in the light of his  
23 long experience with the Japanese, with whom he dealt ex-  
24 tensively when he was Secretary of State to this Government,  
25 was concerned at the situation, for his diary continues:



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 "We were an hour and a half with Hull, and then I went  
3 to the Department, and I got hold of Marshall."

4 "Thus the Secretary of War felt the situation that was  
5 to be precipitated by the action of the Secretary of State,  
6 Hull, necessitated his informing the Chief of Staff immediately  
7 of the threatened difficulty."

8 Do you recall him doing that?

9 General Marshall: Not specifically. He told me of  
10 practically every meeting he had. His custom was to come into  
11 my room which adjoined his.

12 Mr. Keefe: Do you have any present recollection, General  
13 Marshall, of Secretary Stimson getting in touch with you after  
14 he talked with Hull and Hull told him that he was going to  
15 send this message of the 26th?

16 General Marshall: I do not.

17 Mr. Keefe: You would leave that to Mr. Stimson and his  
18 diary?

19 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

20 Mr. Keefe: Then the Board says:

21 "Next, the Secretary of War attended a meeting at the  
22 White House. His diary describes it:

23 "Then at 12 o'clock I went to the White House where we  
24 were until nearly half past one. At the meeting were Hull,  
25 Knox, Marshall, Stark and myself. There the President brought



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 up the relationship with the Japanese. He brought up the  
3 event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as --  
4 perhaps next Monday, for the Japs are notorious for making  
5 an attack without warning, and the question was what we should  
6 do. We conferred on the general problem."

7 Then the Board says:

8 "Apparently, at that time no decision was reached and  
9 the entire matter was left for further consideration.

10 "On the following day, November 26, 1941, the Stimson  
11 diary continues:

12 "Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he  
13 had about made up his mind not to make the proposition that  
14 Knox and I passed on the other day (the 25th) to the Japanese,  
15 but to kick the whole thing over and tell them that he had  
16 no other proposal at all."

17 Then the Board says:

18 "Apparently on the 26th, in the morning, Mr. Hull had  
19 made up his mind not to go through with the proposals shown  
20 the day before to the Secretary of War containing the plan  
21 for the 'three-months truce'.

22 "Evidently the action 'to kick the whole thing over' was  
23 accomplished by presenting to the Japanese the counter-proposal  
24 of the 'ten points' which they took as an ultimatum."

25 Now, General Marshall, you were here the morning of the



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 26th, you left about 1:00 o'clock that day?

3 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

4 Mr. Keefe: Did you talk with Secretary Stimson that morn-  
5 ing of the 26th with reference to his conversation with Hull?

6 General Marshall: I have no recollection of it. The  
7 probability is I talked to Mr. Stimson that morning. Whether  
8 I talked with him before he went to the State Department or  
9 whether I talked after his return I don't know, but it is quite  
10 a possibility that the Joint Board meeting lasted up until the  
11 time I left, nearly 1:00 o'clock.

12 Mr. Keefe: Do you have any present recollection of Mr.  
13 Stimson calling you and telling you that Hull was going to  
14 send this message on that day, the 26th, or hand it to the  
15 Japanese here in Washington?

16 General Marshall: I think I have a recollection of Mr.  
17 Stimson using that phrase "to kick the whole thing over".  
18 That is confused with the amount I have read about it since  
19 and I don't know whether my recollection is hindsight or of  
20 the day. I am quite certain Mr. Stimson talked to me because  
21 he talked to me every day and frequently each day during this  
22 period. I think the notes of the Joint Board will show that  
23 it was a rather lengthy meeting and there is a possibility  
24 that I left directly from the Joint Board for the plane. In  
25 that event it would have meant my seeing Mr. Stimson before