

Doc. 2250 Evid.

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Ex-232

Araki, Sadao

Case #58

#2250

Transcript of original notes
on interrogation of subject by Mr.
Hyde & Col. Morrison

7 Feb 46

2250

INTERROGATION OF

Sadao Araki

Date and Time: 7 February 1946, 1000-1215 Hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present : Sadao Araki
Colonel T. H. Morrow, Interrogator
Elton M. Hyder, Jr., Interrogator
D. Kildoyle, Interpreter
Ruth P. Anderson, Stenographer

Questions by : Colonel Morrow and Mr. Hyder

BY COLONEL MORROW: Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English, as may be required of you, in this proceeding?

BY MR. KILDOWLE: I do.

BY COLONEL MORROW: Why, I understand, of course, that between the 13th of December 1931, and the 23rd of January 1934, you were the Minister of War and between the 26th of May 1938 and the 30th of August 1939 you were Minister of Education, and I want to ask you how often the Cabinet met when you were Minister of War?

A. Yes, this is correct. Usually the Cabinet met once a week.

Q. Was that also the case when you were Minister of Education?

A. Yes, for both.

Q. Were there ever any special meetings called when you were a member of the Cabinet?

A. When special meetings were called, only those ministers attended who were concerned with matters to be discussed. The Premier would call these special meetings.

Q. Were foreign relations discussed by the full Cabinet at these meetings?

A. Foreign relations were discussed very seldom at these meetings. Foreign relations were usually taken up at special meetings attended usually by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, War and Navy Ministers, and the Minister of Finance.

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- Q. Then I understand that when you were Minister of War you attended these meetings, but when you were Minister of Education later you did not attend the meetings concerning foreign affairs?
- A. During my tenure of office as War Minister there were very few of these meetings to the best of my recollection. During the time I held office as Minister of Education, these matters were usually discussed at the usual Cabinet meetings held once a week.
- Q. But if foreign affairs were discussed when you were Minister of War, it was your duty to be present at these special meetings where that was done?
- A. Yes, it would be my duty to attend.
- Q. Now, was it the custom when a statement was made public to the world by the foreign office that that statement was concurred in by the members of the Cabinet that had met at a special meeting?
- A. Yes.
- Q. That is the case?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And if any members of the Cabinet made a public statement about foreign relations, was it not true that that statement had been approved by this special meeting of Cabinet members before the statement was issued?
- A. Any statement by a member of the Cabinet would have been approved at the special meetings or the ordinary meetings of the Cabinet, however, matters concerning a certain department only would be issued independently by that department and often was the cause of controversy later. These independent statements were usually issued by younger, irresponsible elements in various departments and were later disavowed by the departments concerned.
- Q. I was referring for instance to a statement that might be made by, well, for instance by you when you were War Minister. I assume that would represent the views of the Cabinet?
- A. Of course, naturally.
- Q. And you remember that Mr. Crew was the Ambassador to Japan in 1932 and until the war commenced with America, no doubt?

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- A. I have met him many times and I know this to be true.
- Q. And also I assume that if you made a statement to the Supreme War Council that was made public by the president that that would represent the views of the Cabinet?
- A. The Supreme War Council would not publish anything. Matters would be referred to the Supreme War Council for deliberation and discussion and advice would be tendered to the Cabinet or departments concerned, and if the matter was of a purely military nature, the information would be published independently by the War Ministry or any other department concerned.
- Q. However, I have reference to an instance where it appears that a statement of yours to the Supreme War Council was in the hands of the press which published it and that is what I refer to. I will read it to you later on.
- A. As I was War Minister some fifteen years ago, I do not recollect everything, but I wish to point out that interviews were given weekly to the press, at which time ministers would answer questions propounded by the correspondents and answers would be written up to suit themselves and published in the press.
- Q. I assume though that at those interviews the minister concerned was always careful to state what he knew to be the view of the Cabinet which represented the government and of which he was a member? Is that not so?
- A. Yes, usually, but at the same time, it must be realized that members of the Cabinet were appointed from different parties and held different views, however, views on national policy were usually unanimous. During the INUKAI Cabinet and the SAITO Cabinet, when I was War Minister, the views of the Finance Minister TAKAHASHI prevailed. He was the most influential member of the Cabinet.
- Q. What I wanted to call your attention to was this, to get the background of it. I have here a statement which was a telegram sent by Mr. Grew to our government June 23, 1932 at 5 P.M., and I will just read it:
- "The Embassy is informed that the press has cabled to America the statement of General Araki before the Supreme Military Council on the 22nd to the effect that the resolutions of the League of Nations and statements made by Japan in regard to Manchuria before the establishment of Manchukuo can no longer be considered as binding on Japan. Araki has not made public any statement regarding the particular resolutions and statements to which he refers but the implications are that Japan will not withdraw its troops into the railway zone in compliance with the League resolutions and its own agreements and does not recognize the authority of the League of Nations Inquiry Commission to recommend solutions of the Manchurian problem."

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Now, that is what I want to bring your attention to. I want to ask you about the background of that.

- A. Actually what I intended to convey was that it was impossible at that time to carry into effect the resolutions of the League of Nations Commission, and it was not a desire not to recognize the resolutions. The Manchurian Incident broke out before I became War Minister, and when I was War Minister, Manchuria became the scene of a war.

(Colonel Morrow hands to Mr. Araki the book containing the above quoted telegram. Mr. Araki attempts to read it.)

It is no use, I can not make it out.

- Q. I will have it written out in Japanese and give it to you later on.

- A. That will be all right.

- Q. Then you could study it later on.

- A. The object we strove for was peace and order in Manchuria to be achieved at the earliest possible moment. This disorder in Manchuria can be ascribed to the Anti-Japanese work of Chang Hsuehliang. At that time the Japanese soldiers in Manchuria totalled only ten thousand, of which about five thousand only were effective. Confronting these Japanese troops were two hundred thousand Chinese troops under Chang Hsuehliang. Japan had experienced several massacres as a result of a passive policy, namely the Nikolaevsk, when Japanese troops, also men, women, and children, were massacred. Then at Nanking. Here it was not only Japan that was concerned. The United States, Great Britain, and France were also subjected to Chinese violence, as a result of the passive policy. Another incident was the Seinan Incident, all resulting in the loss of Japanese lives. With all these incidents as a background, it was not thought possible to localize the incident by withdrawing to the railroad zone. I think even to this day, quick and forceful measures were required in an endeavor to localize and definitely settle the incident to prevent its spreading throughout China.

- Q. Do you remember any discussion in the Cabinet about this statement that I read to him, either before or after he made it?

- A. No, I do not recollect. If it had been an important matter it would have come up for discussion. After the Shanghai Incident, Japanese troops were completely withdrawn by June. I believe this indicated and showed to the world a desire to settle things amicably. I feel sure that Mr. Grew himself in connection with this incident realized our intentions.

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- Q. Now, my question was whether - I don't think that is in answer to my question.
- (Question re-read by stenographer.)
- A. No. I will answer no to it.
- Q. Did that statement of yours, in your opinion, represent the view of the Cabinet at that time and the government?
- A. Yes, of course.
- Q. It did? Now, on December 22, 1931. That is before this time. Premier INUKAI, according to Ambassador Forbes who preceded Crew, telegraphed to his government at Washington "I was assured by INUKAI that never would Japan allow such a situation to arise and never would Chinese sovereignty be impaired. He re-iterated that Japan merely desired the protection of Japanese persons and interests." I want to ask you if you remember that statement by your Premier shortly after he became a cabinet member and whether that represented the views of the Japanese government?
- A. This has been Japan's policy for many years and I think Premier INUKAI who held the concurrent post of Foreign Minister, expressed his views to Mr. Forbes in that capacity. I do not recollect this statement having been made.
- Q. Or discussed in the Cabinet?
- A. I do not think this was discussed in the Cabinet. I think Mr. INUKAI expressed his views to the various Ambassadors soon after his appointment as Foreign Minister.
- Q. He was as I understand, INUKAI was Premier and Foreign Minister concurrently?
- A. Yes, he was both.
- Q. Well, did he express that as Foreign Minister and also as Premier, that statement?
- A. I would not call this a statement. I think it should be called a statement of views at an interview. I would not call it an official statement.
- Q. You said you would not call it an official statement?
- A. Yes. What I mean is that everything that the Foreign Minister says can't be taken as an official statement. He has to talk sometimes.

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Q. Of course, as a matter of fact, the Japanese troops did occupy practically the whole of Manchuria within a short time, and then set up the state of Manchoukuo and recognized the same?

A. Actually, I would not say that the state had been set up. There was a nucleus of people in Manchoukuo who desired an independent state, and Japan helped in the formation. At one time a Privy Council had been organized in Manchuria and the decision of this council was that Manchoukuo would be a republic with Henry Pu-yi as president. Actually there were no Japanese plans regarding an independent state of Manchoukuo. It can be classed as a somewhat spontaneous movement.

Q. Did you and the Foreign Minister and those members of the Cabinet who met to take up foreign affairs discuss the claims of the European countries and the United States that Japan was violating the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Treaty by the Japanese course in Manchuria about this time?

A. I do not remember the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, but I do remember the Nine Power Treaty. I have no recollection of this ever having come up for discussion in the Cabinet. Our main concern was the quick settlement of the Manchurian affair. Individual members of the Cabinet may have had their own ideas, but these were never expressed.

BY MR. HYDER: General, we are going on a campaign. (Mr. Hyder hands map to Mr. Araki.) Will you please tell me what cities the Japanese occupied from December 11, 1931, up to January of 1934? And the dates that each were occupied?

(Because of the differences in English, Japanese, and Chinese translations of the names it is impossible for Mr. Araki to name these cities from this map.) (Map marked Exhibit "A" and attached hereto.)

A. I have marked off the approximate area occupied from December 11 to the time of the Tangku Truce, and after that Japan and China exchanged ambassadors.

Q. Would you circle the area occupied by Japan up to December 13, 1931?

A. (Circles area on map) I think that is it approximately.

Q. For the record, General, you marked the smaller circle with checks and the larger outside circle with slanting lines?

A. Yes.

Q. General, you ordered the extension of the Japanese occupation in Manchuria from the time you became Minister of War?

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- A. By causing Chang Hsuehliang to give up his anti-Japanese attitude and
- A. After a policy has been decided by the government, orders for operations would be issued by the Chief of the General Staff, The War Minister has no right to issue orders in connection with operations. In other words, policies would be decided by the government and the carrying out of this policy would be effected by the General Staff, and the policy was to bring peace and order to territory under Chang Hsuehliang.
- Q. Who decided that policy?
- A. The policy would be decided by the government.
- Q. By the government, General, do you mean the Cabinet or the War Ministry?
- A. The Cabinet.
- Q. At what time did the Cabinet decide on this policy?
- A. This was decided at the time it was decided to request an increase in expenditures.
- Q. What date?
- A. It was in December. I do not remember.
- Q. 1931?
- A. Yes.
- Q. While you were War Minister?
- A. Yes. Until this time there had been no fixed policy, and it was realized that the absence of policy would result in the spreading of hostilities. It had been decided that the three provinces comprising Chang Hsuehliang's territory required passification, but a statement by Chang Hsuehliang to the effect that his jurisdiction extended over four territories expanded the scene of activities to Jehol. Chang Hsuehliang was originally at Ching Chow. He later withdrew to Jehol from where he conducted his government.
- Q. Then, in December 1931, the Cabinet decided to passify those four provinces under General Chang?
- A. Yes.
- Q. General, how did you intent to passify those four territories?

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- A. By causing Chang Hsuehliang to give up his Anti-Japanese attitude and attempting to have a stable, friendly government established by Chang Hsuehliang or any one else that was capable.
- Q. General, how did you plan to cause General Chang to give up his Anti-Japanese attitude? What steps were you going to take?
- A. By diplomatic means, if possible, but this was complicated by the fact that hostilities were in progress. Or by the intervention of the League of Nations. Even Chang Hsuehliang would have been acceptable to us as head of a stable, friendly government if he had renounced his Anti-Japanese attitude.
- Q. General, how did the fact that you say hostilities were in progress affect a diplomatic means of settlement?
- A. Diplomatic negotiations and fighting are not consistent, and the two do not go together. I, myself, thought that diplomacy would be the quickest means of obtaining peace.
- Q. Did you try diplomatic means?
- A. I think that Japan's foreign office was inefficient and the diplomatic means were not taken full advantage of.
- Q. So, as far as you can recall now, Japan did not undertake settlement by diplomatic means?
- A. I do not know what went on in the Foreign Office at the time. There was no Foreign Minister, as such, as the Prime Minister was acting temporarily in that capacity.
- Q. General, what would the intervention of the League of Nations have to do with your settlement by passific means?
- A. I believe that the objects for which the League was formed are excellent but the Liten Commission spent most of its time in Manchuria and North China and in my opinion, the report of the Liten Commission was not fair and impartial. Japanese diplomacy was at a low ebb at this time also, and I believe was very ineffective. In October 1933, I advocated a world peace conference at which all outstanding differences could be discussed. This was widely quoted in the newspapers here.
- Q. But at this time, General, you wanted Japan to settle her differences with China? Is that not true?

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- A. While the policy of the League was excellent, they were blind to the actual state of affairs, taking the Liten report as a basis for their statements.
- Q. General, have you read the Liten Report?
- A. Yes, I read it at the time.
- Q. You agreed with what the report stated, did you not?
- A. No.
- Q. With what did you disagree?
- A. It did not take into account the actual state of affairs.
- Q. It did state what actually happened though, did it not?
- A. I do not remember well what it contained, but I think it was something to the effect that it was not a case of self-defense on Japan's part. I am not sure about whether it was called aggression.
- Q. Did you not agree at the time you read it that it contained an accurate statement of what actually happened?
- A. I met Liten, I think, twice when he was here in Japan. He seemed to appreciate our position at that time.
- Q. General, you have not answered my question. I asked, did you not agree at the time you read the report that it stated accurately what actually happened?
- A. Without seeing the report at this time, I am unable to state whether it is accurate or not.
- Q. General, going back to your policy decided by the Cabinet in December 1931, were all the members of the Cabinet there when the decision was made?
- A. They were all there.
- Q. You suggested this in the Cabinet at its meeting? You suggested the idea for this policy at the Cabinet?
- A. For the making of the peace and order, I put the proposal forward as War Minister. Before this policy had been decided, there was no fixed policy. If left as it was, the consequences would have been disastrous.

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- Q. General, as a part of that policy to bring peace and order to the territory under General Chang, was it not also the policy to set up Manchuria as an independent nation?
- A. Any steps in this direction were taken as a result of a policy which did not favor government by the military in Manchukuo. They could have left the Japanese military in the government in Manchuria, but any government but a military government is what they hoped to have.
- Q. By that you mean an independent state of Manchuria?
- A. I would not say exactly an independent state, as at its inception it would not be able to stand alone and would require help.
- Q. From the Japanese Government?
- A. Yes, from the Japanese government. I would not call the head of this independent state a puppet. It took on the shape of an independent state after the establishment of the Privy Council which had decided on a republican form of government. Talking about puppets, Europe is full of puppets today.
- Q. General, will you please tell us the four provinces under General Chang at that time?
- A. I believe the following are the Japanese names of the provinces under Chang, Hsuehliang: Mukden, Heilungkiang, Tsitsihar, and Jehol. (Mr. Araki writes these names on slip of paper in Japanese.)

1215 HOURS

Certificate of Interpreter

I, D. Kildoyle, a civilian, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of ten pages, are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this ____ day of February, 1946.

Colonel T. H. Morrow
Duly Detailed Investigating Officer
International Prosecution Section
GHQ, SCAP

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Certificate of Stenographer

I, Ruth F. Anderson, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Certificate of Interrogators

We, T. H. Morrow, Colonel, ASN O-140286, and Elton M. Hyder, Jr., a civilian, certify that on the 7th day of February, 1946, personally appeared before us Sadao Araki, and according to D. Kildoyle, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

original shorthand notes of Mrs. R. F. Anderson

Tokyo, Japan

T. H. Morrow, Colonel

7 day of February, 1946

Elton M. Hyder, Jr., Civilian

FILE NO. 58

SERIAL NO. 90

The original transcript of this interrogation will be found in our EXHIBIT FILE as EXHIBIT # 232 The original shorthand notes of Miss R. J. Anderson on this interrogation will be found in our EXHIBIT FILE as EXHIBIT # 233

FILE NO. 58

SERIAL NO. 20

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

26 June 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. JOHN DARSEY

FROM : Calhoun W. J. Phelps, Asst. Chief,
Document Division

SUBJECT : Re-numbering of Interrogations of ARAKI,
Sadao.

1. Due to the necessity of presenting to the Tribunal single copies of each interrogation, in the original, the following system of numbering of such interrogations has been set up and cross-reference should be made to your document numbers (10,001 to 10,008):

<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Date of Interrogation</u>
2249	8 Feb 46
2250	7 Feb 46
2251	15 Feb 46
2252	13 Feb 46
2253	19 Feb 46
2254	11 Feb 46
2255	8 Mar 46
2256	21 Feb 46
2257	7 Mar 46

2. It is suggested that subsequent to the initial presentation of these interrogations, you refer to them by the Tribunal exhibit number.

Calhoun W. J. Phelps
CALHOUN W. J. PHELPS

6 CC: 1-Mr. Eugene Williams
1-Capt. Salmons
1-Lt. Alexander
1-Miss Brunner
1-S/Sgt. Overfelt
1-Mr. Buckho
(9)-1 cy. ea. file.

CHARGE OUT SLIP

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EVIDENTIARY LOC. NO. 2250

TRIAL BRIEF _____

EXHIBIT NO. 187-C

BACKGROUND LOC. NO. _____

SIGNATURE Lockett

ROOM NO. 378

*Original presented
in Court*

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2250

Date 26 June 46

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Transcript, Interrogation of
ARAKI, Sadao

Date: 7 Feb 46 Original () Copy () Language: Eng.

Has it been translated? Yes () No ()

Has it been photostated? Yes () No ()

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Doc Div.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: I.P.S. (see our Case File #58)

PERSONS IMPLICATED: ARAKI, Sadao

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Interrogation of ARAKI by Mr.
Hyder and Col. Morrow.

Analyst: CW Phelps

Doc. No.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2248 to 2257 inclusive

26 June 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Interrogation of ARAKI, Sadao

Date: See below Original Copy Language:
English

Has it been translated? Yes No

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Document Division

PERSONS IMPLICATED: ARAKI, Sadao

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Date of Interrogation</u>	<u>Exhibit No.</u>
2248	12 March 1946	290
2249	8 February 1946	230
2250	7 February 1946	232
2251	15 February 1946	290
2252	13 February 1946	290
2253	19 February 1946	290
2254	11 February 1946	290
2255	8 March 1946	290
2256	21 February 1946	290
2257	7 March 1946	290

Analyst: C.W.J. Phelps

Doc. Nos. 2248 to 2257
inclusive