

SAN JAC 101 FV JULY 24 -45 1640(-9) K17 12" 7000' KURE AREA HONSHU 34°11'N 132°30'E to 34°13'N 132°32'E



6-V-128 JULY 28-45 1630


CONEC



SAN JAC 106-V-128 JULY 28-45 1630(-9)K18 24" 8500' KURE NAVAL BASE HONSHU 34°12'N 132°32'E CONF



SAN JAC-106-V-128 JULY 28-45 1615 (-9) KIB 24 91500 KURE NAVAL BASE HONSHU 34 10 N 152 57 E CONT.



SANJAC 110FV-135 JULY 30-45 1500(-9) K17 12' ALT. 4,700' AKASHI/F KOBE AREA, HONSHU, 34° 39' N-134° 57' E C




7

NJAC110FV-135 JULY 30-45 1600(-9) K1712" ALT. 2,900' SHIP (FOXUNCLE) KOBE AREA, HONSHU 34° 41' N-134° 53' E CON

The YOKOSUKA Naval Base, TOKYO Area, during the attack on the BB NAGATO, 18 July 1945. This picture, taken at the height of the attack, shows a direct hit on the smoke shrouded battleship. Arrow points to bomb bursting on the port side waterline opposite Number Three turret.

At the pier immediately to the right of the NAGATO, the remains of a destroyer and several small merchant vessels may be seen. Post strike photographs revealed all shipping at this location sunk or damaged beyond repair.

CVL30/A16-3, Serial: 0057,
of 15 August 1945.



An overall view of the YOKOSUKA Naval Base during the afternoon strike of July 18. The BB NAGATO is all but smoke obscured in this photograph. Destroyers and destroyer escorts are seen getting up steam prior to taking possible evasive action.

The large transport moored in the Inner Harbor is the hospital ship, TAGASAGO MARU, whose journey to WAKE and return was escorted by units of Task Force 38 during the early part of the operation.

CVL30/A16-3, Serial 0057,
of 15 August 1945.

X

The large Japanese carrier AMAGI, tied up and camouflaged at MITSUKO JIMA, KURE Harbor, was hard hit by fighter-bombers of the U.S.S. SAN JACINTO, 24 July 1945.

This picture, taken while the strike was still in progress, shows 280 feet of the midships section of the flight deck completely destroyed. Large sections of both the port and starboard sides have been blown away, and the forward part of the flight deck is caved in along a 50 foot rent. Photographs taken four days later show a large bomb hole in the hangar deck.

A sister ship, the CV KASURAGI, seen under camouflage at the opposite end of the island, is as yet undamaged at the time of photography.

CVL30/A16-3, Serial: 0057,
of 15 August 1945.



The KURE Naval base was paid a return call by Task Force 38, 28 July 1945. The experimental battleship-carrier was the target of Task Group 38.1 aircraft, where seen a mass of flames and twisted steel. Although many direct hits were scored, pilots report that secondary and even main batteries kept firing throughout the attack.

CVL30/A16-3, Serial: 0057,
of ~~10~~ August 1945.

15

another object of Task group 30.1. 30.1. 30.1. as the heavy cruiser AOBA. Although still afloat after repeated hits, the AOBA may be considered out of commission for some time to come. Photograph shows the main deck all but broken in two immediately aft of Number Three turret. Pilots believe the stern may be resting on the bottom.

CVL30/A16-3, Serial: 0057,
of 15 August 1945.



A recent view of the BB-XCV HYUGA, sister ship to the ISE, after receiving a typical Third Fleet treatment, 28 July 1945. The entire midships section is underwater, and numerous direct hits have blasted away portions of the main deck.

CVL30/A16-3, Serial: 0057.
of ~~10~~ August 1945.

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Y235/116-3, Serial 0097,
5 July 1945

5

U. S. S. SAN JACINTO



6-21
SANJAC 45K AUG 10-45 0930-9K20 63/8" ALT VAR MAMUROGAWA A/F HONSHU CONF

Low flying SAN JACINTO pilots spotted these excellently camouflaged planes near MAMUROGAWA Airfield, Northern HONSHU, on the morning strikes of August 10, 1945. This photograph, taken from a torpedo plane at minimum altitude, shows two large aircraft parked under trees and almost entirely covered with vegetation.

CVL30/A16-3, Serial: 0057,
of 15 August 1945.

U. S. S. SAN JACINTO




SANJAC 45K AUG 10-45 0930-9K20638 "ACT VAR MAMUROGAWA A/F HONSHU CONF

The painstaking efforts of Jap camouflage artists at MAMUROGAWA proved no match for keen sighted SAN JACINTO pilots. Once the general pattern of concealment had been discovered, thorough searches at low altitudes uncovered over forty aircraft dispersed among the woods surrounding the airfield.

Four single engine aircraft are visible in this photograph along the tree row near the center of the picture. At least two more operational planes were found in the same pine grove.

CVL30/A16-3, Serial: 0057,
of 15 August 1945.

U. S. S. SAN JACINTO



On the afternoon of 10 August 1945, the SAN JACINTO Air Group was selected to lead a concentrated Task Group strike on a return visit to MAMUROGAWA Airfield. In the above photograph, one of the many camouflaged planes is seen burning following a low level strafing attack. Two (possibly three) more aircraft are seen in the foreground.

CVL30/A16-3, Serial: 0057,
of 15 August 1945.

U. S. S. SAN JACINTO



SPN JRC 45K RUE-10-45 0930-9 K10 63/8 "RT VMC MAMUROGAWA/H HONSHU CONF

9-16

Another hidden aircraft goes up in flames. At least twelve planes were destroyed by SAN JACINTO VF and VT alone. MAMUROGAWA Airfield proved to be one of a number of North HONSHU refuges for the hoarding of enemy air strength.

CVL30/A16-3, Serial: 0057,
of 15 August 1945.



2AV-138 AUG. 9-45 1215-(9) K17 153.8mm 5700' MATSUSHIMA AP HONSHU 38° 24' N - 141° 13' E CONF.

6800 EASTMAN TOPOGRAPHIC SAFETY

6800 EASTMAN TOPOGRAPHIC SAFETY



9

SAN JAC 118FV-150 AUG 13-45 1130(9)K17 12"3800' SHIOKA EAST A/FHONSHU 36°12'N-140°18'E CONF



18

SANJACII7FV-148 AUG13-45 0615(-9)K1712"ALT. 5800'K12YUAF, TOKYO AREA, 36°20'N-139°18'E CONF.

1214 EASTMAN TOPOGRAPHIC SAFETY



54

SANJAC HT-FV-148 AUG 13-45 0630 (-9) KIT 12" ALT VAR. KIRYO A/F, TOKYO AREA 36° 20' N - 139° 10' E CONT.

59

SANJAG N7-FV-148 AUG 13-45 0630(-9) K1712" ALT VAR. KIRYU A/F, TOKYO AREA 36° 20' N - 139° 18' E CO.



This photograph shows two of the four single engine aircraft burned on the ground at ISHIOKA EAST Airfield, 13 August 1945, by a four plane section of SAN JACINTO fighters.

CVL30/A16-3, Serial: 0057,
of 15 August 1945.

A pre-strike photograph showing six twin engine planes, well camouflaged with foliage, in the dispersal area north of KIRYU Airfield, Central HONSHU.

CVL30/A16-3, Serial: 0057,
of 15 August 1945,

Four of the twin engines shown in the preceding picture are here seen burning fiercely after strafing attacks by SAN JACINTO VF, 13 August 1945.

CVL30/A16-3, Serial: 0057,
of 15 August 1945.

A fifth plane of the group is accounted for in this oblique view of KIRYU Airfield. Many other operational aircraft were found and destroyed in the dispersal areas adjoining the field.

A total of nine single and eleven twin engine aircraft were destroyed here and at ISHIOKA EAST Airfield by a four plane sweep of SAN JACINTO fighters, a feat for which the Task Group Commander directed the award of the Distinguished Flying Cross to each of the four participating pilots.

CVL30/A16-3, Serial: 0057,
of 15 August 1945.

CVL30/A16-3
Serial: 0057

U.S.S. SAN JACINTO

95/jbd

15 August 1945

S-E-C-R-E-T

RADAR COUNTERMEASURES

PART VI

Window played an important role in this operation as is evidenced by the fact that a total of forty-four cartons were dropped during the twelve missions over enemy territory.

The quantity of window carried by torpedo planes was increased to one carton of either CAFJ 10271 (600) cut to 28.2 inches for jamming 200 megacycles or one of CAFJ 10270A (200) cut to 1.9 inches for jamming 3000 megacycles.

Pilot and aircrewmen all concur in general that window has effectively decreased the efficiency of the enemy's radar controlled guns. Window was dropped from just prior to entering and until leaving range of automatic weapons. It was dropped at intervals of five seconds.

The following is a chronological summary of the window used:

- 10 July #1472 TSUKUBA WEST AIRFIELD, HONSHU, 5 3/4 cartons for 200 mcs and 4 3/4 cartons for 3000 mcs.
- 15 July #2932 OBIHIRO AIRFIELD, HOKKAIDO, 1 1/4 cartons for 200 mc and 2 cartons for 3000 mcs.
- 18 July YOKOSUKA NAVAL BASE, HONSHU, 1 3/4 cartons for 200 mcs and 3 1/2 cartons for 3000 mcs.
- 24 July KURE NAVAL BASE, HONSHU, 2 3/4 cartons for 200 mcs and 3 1/2 cartons for 3000 mcs.
- 28 July KURE NAVAL BASE, HONSHU, 3 1/2 cartons for 200 mcs and 5 cartons for 3000 mcs.
- 30 July #2653 HIMEJI AIRFIELD, HONSHU, 1 1/4 cartons for 200 mcs and 2 1/2 cartons for 3000 mcs.
- 9 August AIRFIELDS, NORTH HONSHU, 1 1/4 cartons for 200 mcs and 1 1/4 cartons for 3000 mcs.
- 13 August TOKYO, HONSHU, 1 1/4 cartons for 200 mcs and 3 1/2 cartons for 3000 mcs.

S-E-C-R-E-T

PART VI

RADAR COUNTERMEASURES

Gulls (radar decoy balloons) were used during this operation on only one occasion. This was in the vicinity of KOBE on the night of July the twenty-fifth. Orders were received to launch four gulls, which was carried out successfully. Results are unknown.

ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES

One installation of electronic counter-measures was completed in a TBM-3E in time to be used on the strikes on 18 July 1945 and all subsequent strikes. Standard policy was to jam on 200 mc except on the strike of 8 August 1945, where 215 mc was jammed. Results are difficult to evaluate due to the fact that other RCM equipment was in use in other planes at the same time. The equipment was turned on twenty miles prior to entering the target area and secured after leaving the target area.

COMMENTS ON USE OF AIRBORNE RCM

In general, information as to the tactical employment of electronic RCM was extremely meagre. The only positive instructions were contained in TFI-2. This publication ordered all airborne jammers set on 200 mc until ordered otherwise by the OTC. This order stood unmodified until 9 August 1945. It is obvious that if all jammers are set on 200 mc, a slight shift in the enemy radar frequency will completely nullify their effectiveness.

There is a definite scarcity of integrated intelligence material as to enemy radar frequencies and frequencies encountered in various target areas. If this information were available, a more intelligent use of airborne RCM could be expected.

A SHORT SUMMARY OF SAN JACINTO COMBAT OPERATIONS
May 3, 1944 - August 15, 1945.

The U.S.S. SAN JACINTO departed Pearl Harbor 3 May 1944 for combat operations in the Forward Pacific Ocean Area and has operated continuously and contiguously as a tactical unit in either the FIRST or SECOND Fast Carrier Task Forces of the THIRD and FIFTH Fleets, U.S. Pacific Fleet in every major operation and engagement in which Fast Aircraft Carrier units have participated to date.

- A. Major Operations Participated in: SEVEN.
- (1) Marianas, 10 June - 27 August 1944.
 - (2) Western Carolines, 31 August - 14 October 1944.
 - (3) Leyte, 10 October - 16 December 1944.
 - (4) Luzon, 12 December - 22 January 1945.
 - (5) Iwo Jima, 15 February - 16 March 1945.
 - (6) Okinawa, 18 March - 27 April 1945.
 - (7) Sustained Strikes against Northern Honshu and Hokkaido, Japanese Empire, 10 July - 15 August 1945.
- B. Task Groups of Carrier Task Forces, THIRD and FIFTH Fleets, U.S. Pacific Fleet in which SAN JACINTO operated and their respective Commanders follow:

3 May to 8 May 1944. Attached to and operated tactically as a unit of Task Group 12.1, a part of Task Force 12, FIRST Fleet, U.S. Pacific Fleet - Rear Admiral W. K. HARRELL, USN, Commander, Carrier Division ONE and Commander, Task Group 12.1.

9 May to 26 May 1944. Attached to and operated tactically as a unit of Task Group 58.6, a part of Task Force 58, FIFTH Fleet, U.S. Pacific Fleet, - Rear Admiral A. E. MONTGOMERY, USN, Commander, Carrier Division THREE and Commander, Task Group 58.6.

27 May to 11 July 1944. Attached to and operated tactically as a unit of Task Group 58.3, a part of Task Force 58, FIFTH Fleet, U.S. Pacific Fleet, - Rear Admiral J. W. REEVES, USN, Commander, Carrier Division FOUR and Commander, Task Group 58.3.

12 July to 18 August 1944. Attached to and operated tactically as a unit of Task Group 58.3, a part of Task Force 58, FIFTH Fleet, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral A. E. MONTGOMERY, USN, Commander, Carrier Division THREE and Commander, Task Group 58.3.

19 August to 10 December 1944. Attached to and operated tactically as a unit of Task Group 38.4, a part of Task Force 58, THIRD Fleet - Rear Admiral R. E. DAVISON, USN, Commander, Carrier Division TWO and Commander, Task Group 38.4.

Enclosure "B" of CVL30/A16-3, Serial 0057.

U.S.S. SAN JACINTO

15 August 1945

11 December 1944 to 31 January 1945. Attached to and operated tactically as a unit of Task Group 38.3, a part of Task Force 38, THIRD Fleet, U. S. Pacific Fleet - Rear Admiral F. C. SHERMAN, USN, Commander, Carrier Division ONE and Commander, Task Group 38.3.

1 February to 22 March 1945. Attached to and operated tactically as a unit of Task Group 58.2, a part of Task Force 58, FIFTH Fleet, U. S. Pacific Fleet - Rear Admiral R. E. DAVISON, USN, Commander, Carrier Division TWO and Commander, Task Group 58.2.

23 March to 27 May 1945. Attached to and operated tactically as a unit of Task Group 58.1, a part of Task Force 58, FIFTH Fleet, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral J. J. CLARK, USN, Commander, Carrier Division FIVE and Commander, Task Group 58.1.

28 May to 17 June 1945. Attached to and operated tactically as a unit of Task Group 38.1, a part of Task Force 38, THIRD Fleet, U. S. Pacific Fleet - Rear Admiral J. J. CLARK, USN, Commander Carrier Division FIVE and Commander, Task Group 38.1.

18 June to (Continuing). Attached to and operated tactically as a unit of Task Group 38.1, a part of Task Force 38, THIRD Fleet, U. S. Pacific Fleet - Rear Admiral T. L. SPRAGUE, USN, Commander, Carrier Division THREE and Commander, Task Group 38.1.

C. Notable Records:

- (a) Air Groups Employed Aboard: THREE.
 - (1) CVL Air Group FIFTY-ONE.
 - (2) CVL Air Group FORTY-FIVE.
 - (3) CVL Air Group FORTY-NINE.
- (b) Aircraft launched 11,677; Recovered 11,769.
- (c) Aircraft Sorties - 11,120.
- (d) Aircraft Offensive Missions - 309.
- (e) Enemy planes shot down by ship's guns - 12.
- (f) Enemy planes shot down by Air Groups - 148.
- (g) Enemy planes destroyed on ground - 256.
- (h) Enemy planes damaged - 296.

U.S.S. SAN JACINTO

15 August 1945.

(i) Enemy shipping sunk:

1 CVL	2 FTD
4 DD	4 SD
2 DD or DE	1 Floating Dry Dock
2 AK	22 Small Craft (Luggers, Barges, Sampans, etc.)
1 FB	

(j) Enemy shipping damaged:

1 BB (Negato)	5 SC
1 BBXCV (Ise)	10 SD
4 CV	1 FA
1 CVE	1 FB
2 CA	1 FTA
1 CL	5 FTC
1 CA or CL	7 FTD
1 DD	1 FU
3 DE	1 MTB
3 AK	1 Tug
4 SA	145 Small Craft
2 SB	

(k) Shore Installations Destroyed:

4 Coastal Defense Guns	18 Hangars
9 Heavy AA Positions	27 Barracks
1 Pill Box	4 Shops
6 Ammunition Dumps	1 Aircraft Assembly Plant (32,000 Square Feet)
1 Fuel Dump	6 Warehouses
1 Radio Station	1 Paper Mill
1 Radio Tower	73 Miscellaneous Buildings
1 Bridge	7 Locomotives
2 Piers	11 Trucks

(l) Shore Installations Damaged:

2 Bridges	1 Warehouse
6 Hangars	9 Miscellaneous Buildings
4 Factories	3 Locomotives
1 Aircraft Factory	

U.S.S. SAN JACINTO

- (m) Days in Forward Area without rehabilitation - 471
- (n) Days at sea - 357
- (o) Days in port - 114
- (p) Miles steamed - 152, 883.
- (q) Number of times fueled at sea from AOs - 86.
- (r) Destroyers received alongside for Mail, Passengers,
and Freight - 218.
- (s) Number of times replenished ammunition from AEs - 19.
- (t) Ammunition delivered against enemy:

(1) Bombs	980 tons
(2) Rockets	5436
(3) Torpedoes	42
(4) 40MM	14,740 rounds
(5) 20MM	19,160 "
(6) 50 Cal.	1,478,750 "
(7) 30 Cal.	22,530 "

U. S. S. SAN JACINTO

CVL-30/A16-3/A9-6
Serial: 0066

10/erc

S-E-C-R-E-T

c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
15 August 1945.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CAG-49 Secret ltr., AG-49/
A16-3/A9-6(OHR:sg), Serial 006,
dated 15 August 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division THREE and Commander
Task Group THIRTY-EIGHT POINT ONE.
(2) Commander Task Force THIRTY-EIGHT.
(3) Commander THIRD Fleet.
(4) Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Aircraft Action Reports, period 10 July through
15 August 1945 - Forwarding of.

1. Forwarded.

2. Attention is especially invited to paragraph 4 in which the Squadron Commander presents opinions and observations on Flak, its analysis, and avoidances. The Commanding Officer fully concurs in the substance of paragraph 4 and wishes to add that from the date of the reporting on board of this Squadron instruction in Flak Analysis has been pursued with vigor and that gratifying results have been obtained. The Air Groups embarked in the SAN JACINTO previous to Air Group FORTY-NINE did not have available to them, the splendid Flak intelligence, Flak analysis and trained Flak Officers, and their losses due to Flak should be reviewed with this knowledge.

Copy to:

MICHAEL H. KERNODLE.

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AG-49/A16-3/A9-6
(GMR:sg)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
AIR GROUP FORTY-NINE

Serial 006

c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Calif.,
15 August 1945

S-E-C-R-E-T

Subject: Aircraft Action Reports--period 10 July through 15 Aug. 1945.

6 6 - - - - -

4. This summarized the observed damage and damage shown in photographic coverage. Many hits in target areas were seen in attacks on airfields where damage was not assessed. The list of damage is, therefore, conservative.

G. M. ROUZEE

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AG-49/A16-3/A9-6
(GMR:sg)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
AIR GROUP FORTY-NINE

Serial 006

c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California
15 August 1945

S-E-C-R-E-T

Subject: Aircraft Action Reports--period 10 July through 15 Aug. 1945.

3.
as follows:

During the period, assessed damage to the enemy was inflicted

(a)	Aircraft destroyed in the air	12
	Aircraft probably destroyed in the air	3
	Aircraft damaged	3
(b)	Aircraft destroyed on the ground	172
	Aircraft probably destroyed on the ground	7
	Aircraft damaged on the ground	97
(c)	Shipping sunk:	
	1 Destroyer Escort	
	2 JMST-Sugar Charlie Love	
	1 JMST-Fox uncle	
	5 JMST-Sugar Dogs	
	1 Landing craft, probably Super type A	
	11 Luggers	
	2 small craft	
	Shipping probably sunk:	
	1 DD Fubuki class	
	Shipping damaged:	
	1 JMST-Sugar Able Sugar	
	1 JMST-Fox Uncle	
	15 JMST-Sugar Dogs	
	1 Submarine	
	8 small craft.	

In addition to the above, Five major hits were scored on the BB-XCV Ise; 2 hits on the CV Amagi; and 1 near miss in the lethal aiming area on the BB Nagato.

(d) Ground Targets destroyed:
3 buildings
3 hangars
1 bridge
8 locomotives

(e) Ground targets damaged:
8 factories
1 radio-radar station
3 buildings
3 hangars
2 bridges
4 trains
2 locomotives

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
AIR GROUP FORTY-NINE

AG-49/A16-3/A9-6
(GMR:sg)

c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California
15 August 1945

Serial: 006

S-E-C-R-E-T

From: Commander, Air Group FORTY-NINE,
(Commanding Officer, FIGHTING SQUADRON FORTY-NINE).
To : Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Via : (1) Commanding Officer, U.S.S. SAN JACINTO
(2) Commander Carrier Division THREE and Commander
Task Group THIRTY-EIGHT POINT ONE.
(3) Commander Task Force THIRTY-EIGHT
(4) Commander THIRD fleet
(5) Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subjects: Aircraft Action Reports--period 10 July through 15 Aug. 1945.

Reference: (a) CominCh Serial 7152 of 29 October 1942.
(b) PacFlt Conf. Ltr. ICL-45 of 1 January 1945
(c) Fast Carrier Task Force Instructions (FC-TFL-2) Pers 5400.
(d) Carrier Division THREE Instructions (CD3I) Pers 5310.

Enclosures: (A) Comments of Commanding Officer, VF-49.
(B through 00) Aircraft Action Reports #29 through 68,
Strikes against Airfields and Installations, Naval
and Merchant Shipping, and coastal objectives in the
Japanese Home Islands.
(pp) VF-49 Ltr VT-49/A16-3/A9-6 serial 003 of 15 August
1945, and endorsements thereto, with enclosures.

1. In accordance with references (a), (b), (c) and (d), Enclosures (A) through (00) are forwarded herewith.

2. The following Operating Statistics summarize the actions reported by VF-49 in the period covered:

Personnel Lost or Wounded	None
Planes lost in combat	None
Planes lost operationally	Four
Planes damaged in combat	Fifteen
Total Target sorties flown	372 *
Total combat hours for these sorties	1,660 *

*In addition, nine sweep and strike planes which took off, for operational reasons did not reach the targets. Also not counted in the above are all Combat Air Patrols in which there was no contact with the enemy, search, ferry and training flights.

VF-49
(GR:sg)
S-I-C-R-E-T

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
FIGHTING SQUADRON FORTY-NINE c/o FPO, San Francisco, Cal.

Comments of Commanding Officer, VF-49 (Cont'd).

5. Many of the flights during this period were made under adverse weather conditions. This squadron was forced to do much of its training on the West Coast under similar conditions and constantly emphasized instrument flying, and was therefore well prepared. Procedure for bad weather operations must be thoroughly planned in advance and rigidly adhered to. Four plane divisions should be trained to stay together under the most adverse instrument conditions. It is desirable if possible, to remain underneath the overcast in which case the number one rule is to always keep enough forward visibility to permit a 180° turn. Flight leaders must be alert to anticipate the weather closing down ahead and initiate the turn early enough, bearing in mind that it takes more room for a formation to turn around than it does a single plane. The necessity of terrain clearance and the desirability of using the hayrake to home frequently require planes to go on top. A squadron doctrine must be developed for all phases of this, with specified throttle settings and speeds for climb and let down. Any attempt to hurry this procedure is extremely dangerous.

6. The old story about radio discipline is just as true as it ever was. One offending air group in a Task Group will tend to cause even well indoctrinated pilots to slack off, with disastrous results. It is felt that many ships are as much at fault as pilots in this respect. There is also a tendency for strike calls to become increasingly complicated, which is very confusing to pilots and further clutters up the circuit.

7. During this operation tail and wing markings were changed from a design to a letter. From a pilot's standpoint this is a change for the worse since the distance at which identification is possible has been greatly reduced.

8. This squadron's experience in combat has emphasized the necessity for a realistic approach in both operational training and squadron training while forming. The following suggestions are submitted:

- (a) Bombing results in combat are not nearly as good as is generally believed, and it is felt that the emphasis in training should be shifted from gunnery to bombing, since the great majority of a fighter squadron's action is now against ground objectives. Furthermore, except for the most elementary stages, training hops should employ high altitude, high speed, and jinking exactly as they will in combat.
- (b) More training should be done with the airplane in the overload position including belly tank and full ammunition, since that is habitually the case in the combat area.
- (c) Pilots must be thoroughly indoctrinated in the use of low RPM and a lean mixture to conserve fuel.
- (d) Rendezvous and break up should be done using the sector system now in use in the fleet. The old type of carrier rendezvous is never used and is not worth practicing.
- (e) All fighter pilots should be progressively indoctrinated in the use of the anti-blackout suit throughout training.

G. M. ROZEE,
Lieut. Comdr., USN.

VF-49/
GMR:sg)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
FIGHTING SQUADRON FORTY-NINE

S-E-C-R-E-T

c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
15 August 1945

COMMENTS OF COMMANDING OFFICER, VF-49

1. During this period a standard strike schedule was employed and this squadron usually flew two 12 plane sweeps and two 8 plane escort missions for 8 or 9 VT. It is felt that these combinations are far from ideal but are a compromise required by the complement of CVL's. Sixteen fighters are desirable for sweeps, and it is doubted that eight fighters are an adequate escort although this Air Group was never attacked by enemy fighters. It is believed that a CVL complement of 36 VF would have been far more efficient, especially since this squadron was employed almost exclusively as fighter-bombers.
2. Tactics used in air to air combat were thoroughly tested on only one occasion when a four plane division working with a division from another carrier was engaged by a superior number of enemy fighters. Our pilots stayed together throughout and protected each others tails. The VF-49 division splashed seven and the other division six plus several damaged, without any damage to themselves. All other airborne encounters were against small numbers and the kill was largely a question of who got the first shot.
3. This squadron advocates bombing and strafing by division, line abreast when the target is wide enough to permit it, which is almost always the case with airfields. This keeps the division together, expedites rendezvous, divides the flak, and helps eliminate the "Tail end Charlie". When ceiling permitted, the initial approach was always at 15,000 feet or higher. From there a high speed approach was made, jinking continuously, so that a speed of 225-250 knots was attained at the peel-off point which was about 8,000 to 10,000 feet. The run was made as steep as possible and the pull-out normally completed by 1,000 feet, with jinking employed until clear of the flak area. After some experiment this command feels that if pull-out is made on the deck the entire approach and run should be made the same way, that is, at absolute minimum altitude taking full advantage of hills, trees, etc., for defilade with the object of attaining tactical surprise, and of being within sight of automatic flak for the minimum length of time. During the latter part of the operation many enemy planes were destroyed on the ground by making continuous minimum altitude runs. This is a dangerous procedure except against very meagre flak defense, but it is felt that the results obtained justified the risk involved.
4. Flak encountered on this operation was probably the best the Japanese have to offer and could never be underestimated. This squadron has nothing but the highest praise for the information put out by the Flak Analysis Officer on CTO 38.1 Staff. On many occasions it was possible to approach and attack heavily defended targets with only meagre opposition by rigidly adhering to the recommended routes. When flak cannot be avoided the best defenses are speed and planned, irregular jinking. Flights which may encounter flak must be completely planned and briefed in advance on several directions of attack. Close coordination of attacking planes is vital. The Japanese are tricky and unpredictable. Sometimes a number of well executed runs can be made on a single target without getting any return fire. But, the instant the pilots get careless and make a sloppy run the enemy will open up with every gun on the place. It must be assumed that flak will be encountered and ALL runs made accordingly.