

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD_NUMBER: 124-10193-10031
RECORD_SERIES: HQ
AGENCY_FILE_NUMBER: CR SEE TITLE

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: MAJOR, D. G.
TO: STUKEY, D. E. II
TITLE: CR 105-379908-75

DATE: 01/23/1990

PAGES: 9

SUBJECT: LHO, RP, MNO, SOVIET PERMISSION, RETURN TO US

DOCUMENT_TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

ORIGINAL
CLASSIFICATION: Secret

NEW
CLASSIFICATION:

REVIEW_DATE: 01/13/1999

UPDATE_DATE: 02/12/2001

STATUS Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

JFK Act 6 (1)(C)

COMMENTS: 46 OF 55 PAGES NAR, INC RPT

Memorandum



- Exec AD Adm. _____
- Exec AD Inv. _____
- Exec AD LES _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. _____
- Crim. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Insp. _____
- Intell. _____
- Lab. _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Off. Cong. & Public Affs. _____
- Rec. Mgnt. _____
- Tech. Servs. _____
- Training _____
- Off. Liaison & Int. Affs. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director's Sec'y _____

SECRET

To : Mr. D. E. Stuker II

From : *[Signature]* D. G. Major

Subject : FLASH RUN DEBRIEFING REPORTS FCI-SU

[Handwritten: CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT as sanitized 11/2/98]

1/23/90

[Handwritten: w/attached info.]

This communication is classified "Secret" in its entirety.

PURPOSE:

To provide CI-1 Section with the most significant reporting from FLASH RUN during debriefings from 1/9/90 to 1/12/90 (S)

[Handwritten in circle: 4, 5, 7, 9, 11, 16, 19, 21, 23, 24, 26, 28, 30, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 47, 48, 52, 54]

RECOMMENDATIONS:

That copies of the attached report be disseminated to the CIA and certain friendly foreign intelligence services as appropriate (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

M

[Handwritten: DeLu WAG]

[Handwritten: 05-RMB/mde 3-17-94 (JFK) 2-8-94 Classified by 9803-RAD/mde Declassify on: OADR JFK Only Cover pages and Endl pages 35+36,37.]

27-ENCLOSURE

105-New

ENCL BEHIND FILE

- 1 - Mr. D. E. Stuker II (Attn: Mr. J. A. Swanda)
- 1 - Mr. D. G. Major (Attn: Mr. T. J. Booth)
- 1 - Mr. J. J. Berkin
- 1 - Mr. J. P. Milburn

JPM:cms (5)

[Handwritten: (S) 105-379908-75]

SECRET
Classified by 942
Declassify on: OADR

[Handwritten: 5-Berkin 9/12/98 11/2/98]
CLASSIFIED BY: 5608-36/mde
REASON: 15 (C, d)
DECLASSIFY ON: X (1)(b)(JFK)
[Handwritten: Only Cover Pages and Endl pages 35, 36, 37]

SECRET

Memorandum from D. G. Major to Mr. D. E. Stukey II

Re: FLASH RUN DEBRIEFING
REPORTS
FCI-SU

2EJ/S
BEL

DETAILS:

FLASH RUN, a recent KGB defector from the Second Chief Directorate (SCD), has been providing considerable information on KGB recruitments of foreign nationals and attempts to penetrate foreign diplomatic establishments in the USSR. The CI-3A Unit has prepared debriefing reports on these KGB operations for appropriate dissemination to the CIA and foreign intelligence services.

The attached reports are based on debriefings conducted with FLASH RUN during the period 1/9/90 to 1/12/90. It is recommended that these reports be disseminated to the CIA and certain foreign intelligence services as appropriate.

SECRET

- 2 -



Exec AD Adm. _____
 Exec AD Inv. _____
 Exec AD LES _____
 Asst. Dir.:

- Adm. Servs. _____
- Crim. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Insp. _____
- Intell. _____
- Lab. _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Off. Cong. & Public Affs. _____
- Rec. Mgnt. _____
- Tech. Servs. _____
- Training _____
- Off. Liaison & Int. Affs. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director's Sec'y _____

Memorandum

SECRET

To : Mr. D. E. Stukely *Stukely* Date: 1/23/90

From : D. G. Major

Subject : FLASH RUN DEBRIEFING REPORTS (S)
FCI-SU

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT.
As Sanitized 11/2/98
Waters
Gow.

This communication is classified "Secret" in its entirety.

4, 5, 7, 9, 11, 16, 19, 21, 23, 24, 26, 28, 30, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 47, 48, 52, 54

PURPOSE:

To provide CI-1 Section with the most significant reporting from FLASH RUN during debriefings from 1/9/90 to 1/12/90. (S)

RECOMMENDATIONS:

That copies of the attached report be disseminated to the CIA and certain friendly foreign intelligence services as appropriate. (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

05-208/ndc 3-17-94 (JFK)
2-8-94
 Classified by *9803-Rdd/hude*
 Declassify on: *OADR (JFK)*
Only Cover Pages and End pages 35, 36, 37

27- ENCLOSURE

9/17/98 11/2/98
 CLASSIFIED BY: *5068-SWS/ndc*
 REASON: 1.5 (C, d.)
 DECLASSIFY ON: *X (C) (d) (JFK)*
Only Cover Pages and End Page 35, 36, 37

(CONTINUED OVER)

105-New

- 1 - Mr. D. E. Stukely II (Attn: Mr. J. A. Swanda)
- 1 - Mr. D. G. Major (Attn: Mr. T. J. Booth)
- 1 - Mr. J. J. Berkin
- 1 - Mr. J. P. Milburn

JPM:cms (5)

[105-379908-75] (S)
S-B

SECRET
 Classified by *942*
 Declassify on: *OADR*

copy
4-17-90
MWS

SECRET

Memorandum from D. G. Major to Mr. D. E. Stukey II

Re: [FLASH RUN DEBRIEFING
REPORTS
FCI-SU] (S)

DETAILS:

[FLASH RUN, a recent KGB defector from the Second Chief Directorate (SCD), has been providing considerable information on KGB recruitments of foreign nationals and attempts to penetrate foreign diplomatic establishments in the USSR.] (S)
The CI-3A Unit has prepared debriefing reports [on these KGB operations] for appropriate dissemination to the CIA [and foreign intelligence services.] (S) (S)

[The attached reports are based on debriefings conducted with FLASH RUN during the period 1/9/90 to 1/12/90.] (S)
It is recommended that these reports be disseminated to the CIA [and certain foreign intelligence services as appropriate.] (S) (S)

SECRET

- 2 -

SECRET

[SIGNIFICANT SCD OPERATIONS
(Debriefings of FLASH RUN from January 9-12, 1990)] (S)

9/17/98
CLASSIFIED BY: 5668-54/mde
REASON: 1.5 (c,d)
DECLASSIFY ON: X (U)(G)(JFK)
(Only Pages 1, 35, 36, 37 were reviewed)

This document is classified "SECRET" in its entirety.

WARNING: THIS INFORMATION IS DERIVED FROM A SOURCE OF EXTREME SENSITIVITY. DISCLOSURE OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN MAY REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO LEAD TO DISCLOSURE OF THE SOURCE'S IDENTITY, AND TO THE LOSS OF THE SOURCE. NO ACTION ON OR FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE MADE WITHOUT FBIHQ AUTHORITY.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

3-17-94
Classified by 65-RMB/mde
Declassify on: OADR JFK
(Only page 1, 35 + 36 were reviewed)

SECRET

Classified by: X 42
Declassify on: X OADR

SECRET

LEE HARVEY OSWALD AND WIFE MARINA OSWALD

USR

The source discussed the Lee Harvey OSWALD case with former instructors at the Minsk KGB Higher School of Counterintelligence. (S)(U)

Following his defection to the USSR, OSWALD was resettled in Minsk, outside of Moscow. He was placed under full surveillance by the regional or territorial KGB in Minsk. KGB officers from the Second Directorate of the White Russian KGB were in contact with Oswald and considered him an agent because he would provide them with some information on his past. Marina was also considered an agent.

Oswald resided very close to Victory Square and the KGB Higher School in Minsk. His apartment was very nice by Soviet standards.

Oswald was also interrogated several times by KGB officers in Moscow. The source does not know what type of information OSWALD provided to the KGB in Minsk or Moscow.

OSWALD fell into deep depression in the USSR. He was homesick and wanted to return to the United States. He eventually received Soviet permission to return to the United States with his wife Marina.

His KGB handlers did consider passing OSWALD to the First Chief Directorate to be handled by a KGB residency in the United States. This proposal was ultimately rejected, however, because OSWALD was considered too unstable. According to the source, the KGB did not handle OSWALD in the United States and had no further contacts with him.

Marina was considered an agent, but she did not like to cooperate with the KGB. She was interested in OSWALD, but even more interested in getting away from the Soviet Union and poverty.

The KGB instructors who told the source about OSWALD were Colonel Torchuk, Colonel Sluzer, and Colonel Schlobochekov. These individuals used to be members of the White Russian KGB. SCD officers Aleksey YEGOROV and Leonid GOLUBOVSKIY also told him about this operation. The stories were all consistent. (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Classified by
Declassify on: OADR

SECRET

SECRET

According to the source, [each one of these officers] (S)(U) told him that the KGB did not handle Oswald after his defection to the United States, and the KGB did not give any tasks to OSWALD. They also said that the KGB never gave OSWALD a task to kill President Kennedy.

The source said that rumors in the West suggesting the KGB was involved in KENNEDY's assassination were absurd. According to the source, the KGB would never risk the scandal of assassinating a major world leader.

DEBRIEFER'S COMMENTS:

Needless to say, we will go back over his knowledge of OSWALD in an effort to acquire any additional information.

REFERENCES:

1. January 12, 1990, Debriefing. Tape #2A. Counter #240-341. (S)

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

YURIY NOSENKO

~~Yuriy NOSENKO~~ spent much of his career in the Sixth Department of the KGB's Second Chief Directorate (SCD), which was responsible for tourists. He spent only a short time of his career in the First Department, SCD, which was responsible for American officials at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

NOSENKO had excellent family connections because his father was Minister for the Shipbuilding Industry in the USSR. That is how NOSENKO managed to become a security officer for the Soviet delegation which traveled to Geneva, Switzerland, for arms control talks. He defected to the United States from this position.

The SCD was quite pleased when U.S. intelligence began to believe NOSENKO was not a bona fide defector. They were particularly pleased when he was harshly interrogated by the CIA.

According to the source, NOSENKO was not sent to the United States to be a false defector. The source said that it is against KGB policy to send an intelligence officer as a false defector. Also, the KGB would never have selected him for such a mission because his father is a high-level Party official.

The source doubts that NOSENKO ever saw OSWALD's file. According to the source, NOSENKO was not higher than a Captain or Major when he defected to the United States. The source believes that NOSENKO may have tried to show himself more valuable to the CIA than he really was. At the time of his defection, NOSENKO was mixing in high circles of Moscow golden youth. The source believes he defected for material gain.

REFERENCES:

1. January 12, 1990, Debriefing. Tape #2A. Counter #342-432. (S)

SECRET