

NISHIO - 46 - 47

29 January, 1946.

Q. According to rumors would you say these men were young men or old men?
A. I believe they were younger men.

Q. They would hold what rank, General?
A. I believe they were generally people below the rank of Lt. Colonel.

Interrogation concluded at 1600 - 1/29/46
To be continued.

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5 February, 1946.

- Q. What was your relations with MUTO?
A. When General MUTO was Chief of the Department of Military Training, I was a colonel and served under him for about two-and-one-half years as Chief of a section.
- Q. What years?
A. I think it was from about 1927 to 1929.
- Q. Did you serve with General MUTO during the 1930's?
A. Not after the dates previously mentioned.

51-18

31 January, 1946.

- Q. General, you arrived in Manchuria sometime in 1934 as Chief of the General Staff of the Kwantung Army that is true, isn't it? What month was that, General?
- A. Yes. It was in March of 1934. It was Chief of Staff, not Chief of the General Staff of the Kwantung Army.
- Q. And you continued as Chief of Staff of this army until what time, General?
- A. Until March, 1936.
- Q. From a military point of view were things quiet in Manchuria at the time you arrived there?
- A. When I arrived there banditry was rife all over Manchuria. Their actions included opposing the Japanese Forces and destruction of railroads and other such things.
- Q. And before you arrived, General, Manchukuo had been recognized as a state by Japan. Isn't that true?
- A. Yes.
- Q. A government had been set up in Manchuria at that time, isn't that true?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Wasn't that government able to cope with such matters as banditry?
- A. Manchukuo being a newly formed state, her forces were insufficient to cope with the bandits. The small forces at her disposal were for the greater part composed of reformed bandits who were poorly trained and it was incumbent upon the Japanese forces to maintain peace and order.
- Q. By what right, General, did Japan have to go into another state which had been recognized, to quell activities of bandits?
- A. When Manchukuo was established as a state an agreement was made whereby the protection and maintenance of peace and order in Manchukuo would be undertaken by Japanese and Manchukuo forces, for the defense of the country.
- Q. Japanese forces did not enter Manchukuo at that time as a result of any agreement with the then Government of China?
- A. No, we were not on good terms with Chiang Kai-Shek's government.
- Q. General, will you describe the situation in Manchuria when you arrived in 1934, from a military point of view?
- A. Generally along the railway lines, peace and order prevailed, but some distance from these lines banditry was rife. As a result jurisdiction of the Manchurian government was effective only along these railway lines and it was the desire of the Manchukuo government and the Japanese army to bring peace and order throughout Manchuria. The country west of the

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31 January, 1946.

DARIEN-MUKDEN and HARBIN railway line and north of this line was sparsely settled, but to the east of the line, the region was mountainous and more populated. Bandits used the mountains as refuges and operated from bases maintained in the mountains.

31 January, 1946.

- Q. According to the TANGKU agreement Japan was ordered to withdraw troops and so was China. Japan did withdraw and isn't it reasonable to assume that China pursuant to the terms of the truce also withdrew its forces?
- A. While the Chinese troops did withdraw they also continued infiltrating in the guise of police troops. However, I am not well acquainted with matters in China and these are merely suppositions.
- Q. Then, General, as I understand it you do not know the details regarding that truce and as to whether and how it was carried out?
- A. I don't know the details and I don't know whether the agreement was adhered to.
- Q. Let us discuss now, General, the situation in Manchuria when you arrived there. What I would like to know is the number of troops that the Japanese had in Manchuria at that time; where they were stationed, and something about the relationship between Japan and the government of Manchukuo regarding military, civil and political matters. That is a large question and I think it might be advisable if you would state chronologically or in narrative form the substance of the question just asked.
- A. About the time I returned from Manchuria there were approximately four divisions, Japanese divisions, stationed there and six brigades approximately. These brigades were used for railway protection and as railway lines increased, brigades were increased and I think there were about six. The four divisions were stationed in the following places - one division at HARBIN, and one division at MUTANCHANG, and one division in the region between MUKDEN and JEHOL. With reference to the six brigades these brigades were scattered and I can only give you the location of the headquarters. These were in the following places, TSITSIHAR, HARBIN, MUTANCHANG, KAIRIN MUKDEN, and one west of Mukden, the name of which place I cannot recall at the moment. The divisions I think were composed of about 10,000 men each, and the brigades of about 4,000 men each.

The development of railways and road construction were considered of prime importance, in addition to development of industry, and the maintenance of peace all over Manchukuo would have been facilitated. Also, with a view to possible trouble with the Soviet these were considered necessary as a part of the defenses and great efforts were expended to perfect these. Other objectives were the development of coal fields, of steel production, agricultural developments, forestry and lumber. Great efforts were made to have CHANG HSUEH LIANG give up his anti-Japanese attitude.

NISHIO

17 January 1946

Q. Between January 1, 1931 and the present time will you state what positions you held in the Japanese army?

A. In 1931 I was connected with the Investigation Section of the War Office.

In 1932 I was Chief of the 4th Section of General Headquarters.

I was Chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarters in 1934.

I was Assistant Commandant of the General Headquarters in Tokyo in 1936.

I was Commandant of the Konoe Regiment -- that is the Imperial Guards -- in 1937.

Also in 1937 I was Commander of the Second Army in North China.

In May 1938 I was Inspector General of the Department of Military Training.

In September 1939 I was Commander-in-Chief of the Expeditionary Forces in China.

In March 1941 I became a military counsellor and returned to Tokyo.

In May 1943 I left the active service and was placed in the reserves.

In July 1944 I became Governor of Tokyo-to in a civilian capacity.

And in August 1945 I resigned from this position.

That is all.

Q. General, as a member of the Investigation Section of the War Office in 1931 will you briefly describe what your duties were?

A. In this Investigation Section my duties comprised supervision over military thought and also I controlled the section that was liaison between the military and the press.

Q. Will you explain just what you mean when you say that you had control of the thought of the military?

A. Rather than controlling thoughts it was investigating the thoughts that prevailed amongst the military as this would have some effect on the education of the military.

17 January 1946.

- Q. What kind of thinking were you interested in ascertaining?
- A. One of the principal things was the gradual spread of communistic ideas in Japan.
- Q. Was there a communistic society or party in Japan at that time?
- A. There was nothing on the surface, but communistic ideas infiltrated into the army. They were not numerous, but they were there.
- Q. In what respect would this communistic thinking be detrimental to the welfare of the army?
- A. By infiltrating into the army and working on the weaker elements within the army the communists would be able to undermine the unity and the discipline under which the army operated. And eventually their ideas were to promote rebellion or a revolution in Japan. And the object of my efforts was to lead these weaker elements in the right path so they would not be misled by the communists.
- Q. You stated that these members of the army who were communistic sought a revolution against the government. Is that true?
- A. Yes. I knew that these people with communistic ideas had revolution as their final objective and to lead these people away from communistic tendencies -- to educate them was my main objective.

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- Q. During 1932 Japan had an army in China. Isn't that true?
- A. I think there were some soldiers in the vicinity of Peking and Tientsin.
- Q. Could you give us an approximation of how many?
- A. I think there were two or three battalions -- not more.
- Q. How many men in a battalion?
- A. Around a thousand. That is only my guess.
- Q. What were the soldiers doing in those places at that time -- during 1932?
- A. They were there for the protection of communications between Tientsin and Peking and protection of the Japanese nationals.
- Q. Had there been a dispute between China and Japan prior to the time these men arrived in those two cities?
- A. These soldiers were sent to that district in the year 1900 as a result of the Treaty entered into with China and, as a result, Japan - as one of the co-signers with the other nations - sent a certain number of soldiers to that district.
- Q. Had there been Japanese troops in any other part of China during 1932?
- A. This was the year in which the Manchurian Incident started and there were soldiers in Manchuria but outside of that I do not think there were other Japanese soldiers.
- Q. Could you give us an approximation as to the number of Japanese soldiers in Manchuria during 1932?
- A. I think there were in Manchuria at the time one division plus one brigade.

INTERROGATION OF

General Toshizo NISHIO

Date and Time: 17 January 1946, 1445-1640 hours
Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan
Present : General Toshizo NISHIO
Mr. Joseph F. English, Interrogator
Mr. Denis Kildoyle, Interpreter
Miss Claire Farrell, Stenographer

The interpreter was sworn in by Mr. English.

Questions by Mr. English:

Q. - What is your name?

A. - Toshizo NISHIO.

Q. - General, where were you born?

A. - I was born in Tottori City of Tottori Prefecture.

Q. - In what year?

A. - I was born on October 31, 1881.

Q.- Have you been an army man all of your adult life?

A. - Yes.

Q. - Have you been engaged in any activity other than military activities?

A. - No.

Q. - Between January 1, 1931 and the present time will you state what positions you held in the Japanese army?

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17 Jan. 46

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- A. - There was nothing on the surface, but communistic ideas infiltrated into the army. They were not numerous but they were there.
- Q. - In what respect would this communistic thinking be detrimental to the welfare of the army?
- A. - By infiltrating into the army and working on the weaker elements within the army the communists would be able to undermine the unity and the discipline under which the army operated. And eventually their ideas were to promote rebellion or a revolution in Japan. And the object of my efforts was to lead these weaker elements in the right path so they would not be misled by the communists.
- Q. - You stated that these members of the army who were communistic sought a revolution against the government. Is that true?
- A. - Yes. I knew that these people with communistic ideas had revolution as their final objective and to lead these people away from communistic tendencies -- to educate them was my main objective.
- Q. - What was the government doing that these communists in the army didn't like?
- A. - They were treated the same as the other soldiers who had caused trouble and their superiors were requested to take them in hand and to show them the right path. And no special steps were taken against them. These matters were kept rather secret. If it was a case of one man, his superiors would know about it but this matter was not broadcast generally throughout the army or to other regiments.
- Q. - As I understand it then, these communists in the army had certain grievances against the government?
- Q. - What I would like to know ^{is,} what were those grievances?
- A. - Outside of the general grievances that communists have against any government I do not think that they had special grievances and objections.
- Q. - Did these communists have any objection to the manner in which the army was conducting affairs?

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- A. - Insofar as the Emperor was considered the center of loyalty of the Japanese and the communists were against the Imperial institution I consider that the communists were against the army.
- Q. - Were you Chief of the Investigation Section?
- A. - I was Chief of both sections -- the press and the military thought.
- Q. - As Chief of the Investigation Section of the War Office, did you have occasion to discipline any of the communists within the army or recommend that such persons be disciplined?
- A. - The Investigation Section has no authority to discipline soldiers. The Investigation Section is merely a section for investigations and recommending to the army bureaus concerned, and the punishing of individuals was not one of my duties.
- Q. - Did you, at any time, in furtherance of your duties as Chief of the Investigation Section of the War Office, discuss with any individuals this question of communism in the army? And as a result of that discussion recommend disciplinary action against these individuals - if any?
- A. - I have never talked directly with so-called communists nor have I ever heard of a communist being disciplined.
- Q. - Did your investigations carry you into China during 1931?
- A. - No. My work was confined to here. The activities were confined to Japan and comprised investigations from reports and information received from other sources. No investigators were ever sent out for any purpose while I was Chief of the Section.
- Q. - What were your duties as Chief of the 4th Section of the General Headquarters?
- A. - One of the duties while I was there was the planning of the annual maneuvers; also the grand maneuvers at which the Emperor was present.
- Q. - Where did these maneuvers take place while you were Chief?

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- A. - There were two grand maneuvers while I was Chief; one in the vicinity of Osaka and the other in Fukui Prefecture.
- Q. - While you were Chief did any of the maneuvers take place near China?
- A. - No. Only in the main islands.
- Q. - During 1932 Japan had an army in China. Isn't that true?
- A. - I think there were some soldiers in the vicinity of Peking and Tientsin.
- Q. - Could you give us an approximation of how many?
- A. - I think there were two or three battalions -- not more.
- Q. - How many men in a battalion?
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- Q. - What were the soldiers doing in those places at that time-- during 1932?
- A. - They were there for the protection of communications between Tientsin and Peking and protection of the Japanese nationals.
- Q. - Had there been a dispute between China and Japan prior to the time these men arrived in those two cities?
- A. - These soldiers were sent to that district in the year 1900 as a result of the Treaty entered into with China and, as a result, Japan - as one of the co-signers with the other nations - sent a certain number of soldiers to that district.
- Q. - Had there been Japanese troops in any other part of China during 1932?
- A. - This was the year in which the Manchurian Incident started and there were soldiers in Manchuria but outside of that I do not think there were other Japanese soldiers.
- Q. - Could you give us an approximation as to the number of Japanese soldiers in Manchuria during 1932?
- A. - I think there were in Manchuria at the time one division plus one brigade.

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- A. - These were not on a war footing and were therefore only at one-half or at most two-thirds strength.
- Q. - Are you familiar with the background of the so-called Mukden Incident?
- A. - The Chinese armies were stationed near the South Manchuria Railway Lines and several bombing incidents and destruction of the rail lines occurred and in an effort to stop these actions the Japanese assigned to guard the railway came into action with the Chinese forces.
- Q. - General, were you Chief of the 4th Section of General Headquarters at that time?
- A. - Yes, I was Chief of that section. I was not in this section at the time of the Mukden Incident. I was still in the Investigation Section.
- Q. - What was the numerical strength during 1931 and 1932 of a Japanese division and brigade?
- A. - In the home islands a division comprised 10,000 men and a brigade 3 to 4,000.
- Q. - How many would there be in a division or brigade that would be sent into Manchuria or China?
- A. - In case of a mobilization these figures would be just about doubled.
- A. - In peace times it was generally the custom to send about two-thirds of a division to China. The other one-third remained in Japan.
- Q. - During 1931 and 1932 what was the strength of the division and brigade at or near Manchuria?
- A. - Before the incident I think there must have been about 6,000 in a division. At that time the brigade in Manchuria was not of the type usually attached to a division. It was a special brigade and I think this also comprised about 5 to 6,000 men.
- Q. - Was this division and brigade augmented or increased immediately after the Mukden Incident?
- A. - I am not certain but I think this division and brigade retained its previous strength and other forces were sent to Manchuko on account of the spreading of trouble.

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Q. - What forces were sent?

A. - I was not concerned with this matter at this time and at this late date it would be very difficult for me to make a guess at the figures. As the incident progressed I heard rumors of the forces having been increased by two or three divisions but nothing very specific.

Q. - At the time or within a short time after the Mukden Incident did fighting between Japanese and Chinese forces break out at any other place in Manchuria?

A. - At Shanghai.

Q. - When was that?

A. - I don't remember well but it was either in 1931 or 1932. Hostilities broke out all along the South Manchuria Railway

Q. - Line.

Q. - Between what points?

A. - Immediately after the Mukden Incident fighting broke out in Changchung and it gradually spread to Harbin, Tsitsihar - and fighting also broke out a little later along the Tientsin-Peking Railway Line, and also at Mutanchiang.

Q. - General, did you say that hostilities broke out simultaneously at the places just mentioned?

A. - No, not at the same time. I think it took about one year for hostilities to spread over this district.

Q. - Starting with the Mukden Incident, will you tell us the time that hostilities broke out, or occurred, at the various places just mentioned?

A. - Without referring to records I am unable to guess dates.

Q. - Well approximately in terms of hours, days, weeks, months?

A. - I think that the fighting spread to Harbin and Tsitsihar north of Mukden around August of 1931 and to Tientsin about October or November of the same year. And in Mutanchiang I think fighting broke out in the early part of 1932. I am not sure about these dates but I am basing it on the fact that there was snow on the ground, etc. from which I remember.

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- Q. - What progress did the Japanese forces make during the first week of hostilities? What direction did the drive take?
- A. - They did not go after the Chinese troops in any special direction. When the Chinese lost a battle they generally dispersed so there was no direction in which they advanced generally. It was a case of continually repulsing the Chinese and then the Chinese would reform somewhere else and come back. There would be another battle. They would be beaten again, disperse and the whole thing would move on again.
- Q. - Didn't the Japanese army attempt to go beyond Mukden or the surrounding territory?
- A. - The Kwantung Army was in charge of these operations and therefore I do not know the details and in my opinion the main object of the Kwantung Army was to protect and guard the rail lines.
- Q. - General, how long did it take to send a division of fully equipped troops from Japan to Manchuria during 1931 or 1932 or 1933?
- A. - From the time they leave their barracks I think about ten days or two weeks.

I, Denis Kildoyle, Civilian,
being sworn on oath, state that I truly
translated the questions and answers given
from English to Japanese and from Japanese
to English respectively, and that the above
transcription of such questions and answers,
consisting of eight pages, are true and
accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(Signature)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this ___ day
of January 1946.

(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP

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I, _____, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

I, Joseph F. English, Civilian, certify that on the 17th day of January, 1946, personally appeared before me General Toshizo NISHIO, and according to Denis Kildoyle, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Place

Name and Rank

Date