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MISSION #10

OKAYAMA  
(FORMOSAO)

"AUGMENTATION 1"

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**XXB**OMBER **C**OMMAND  
 MISSION NO **10**  
 DATE **14 October 1944**

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HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

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: By Auth of the CG.:  
: XX Bomber Command:  
: 28 Oct 44 JDG:  
: Date Initials:  
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TACTICAL MISSION  
REPORT

Field Orders No. 10

Mission No. 10

TARGET: OKAYAMA AIRCRAFT PLANT  
OKAYAMA, FORMOSA

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Prepared by:

Intelligence Section  
XX Bomber Command

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:: By auth of the C.G. ::  
:: XX Bomber Command ::  
:: 28 Oct 44 JOG ::  
:: Date Initials ::  
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HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO #493

28 October 1944

SUBJECT: Report of Operations, 14 October 1944.

TO : Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force, Washington 25, D.C.

1. UNITS PARTICIPATING:

All Bombardment Groups of the XX Bomber Command were ordered to participate in a maximum-effort daylight attack on D-day against the Okayama Aircraft Plant, Okayama, Formosa. Groups, their locations, and their Commanding Officers were as follows:

<u>Group</u>	<u>Rear Base</u>	<u>Staging Base</u>	<u>Commanding Officer</u>
40th	Chakulia	Hsinching	Col. W.H. Blanchard
44th	Dudhkundi	Kwangan	Col. A.L. Harvey
462nd	Piardoba	Kunglai	Col. A.F. Kalberer
468th	Kharagpur	Pengshan	Col. T.S. Faulkner

2. IDENTIFICATION OF MISSION:

a. Attack No. 10.

b. Targets Planned:

- (1) Primary Target: Okayama Aircraft Repair and Assembly Plant, Okayama, Formosa (AAF Target No. 91.6-166).
- (2) Secondary Target: Heito Airport and Air Arsenal, Heito, Formosa (AAF Target No. 91.6-57).
- (3) Tertiary Target: Shipping targets of opportunity in Coastal ports of Formosa and China.
- (4) Last Resort Target: Hengyang Airfield, Hengyang (Hengchow), China (26°56'N-112°32'E). XX Bomber Command Target No. 83.4.
- (5) Radar Target: Main Wharf Area, Takao, Formosa (AAF Target No. 91.6-8a).

3. STRATEGY AND PLAN OF OPERATIONS:

a. Importance of Targets:

(1) Primary Target:

(a) The Okayama Aircraft Repair and Assembly Plant is probably devoted primarily to the construction of Nakajima trainers and to the repair and modification of combat aircraft. Associated with the target plant is Okayama Airfield, which is a major airbase and a staging point for the movement of combat planes south to the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies. Because of their strategic location with reference to potential combat areas, the facilities

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at Okayama assume increased importance with the expansion of operations against the enemy in the Pacific.

(b) Successful attack on the Okayama plant should have a certain amount of immediate effect on the enemy's first line fighter strength, as neutralization of this plant would delay modification and repair. Extensive damage to the plant's custom built machine tools would require four to six months for repair or replacement.

(2) Secondary Target:

(a) Heito is one of Formosa's major airbases and staging fields for aircraft moving south to the Philippines and Netherlands East Indies. Associated with the base is an Air Arsenal which not only does repair work but accomplishes the final assembly of fighter planes. The strategic location of this target with reference to present and future combat areas contributes greatly to its importance. While the Air Arsenal is relatively small its destruction should have some rather immediate effect on Japanese first line fighter strength. From four to six months would be required to repair or replace the Arsenal's machine tools.

(b) Between 91 and 127 planes, mostly fighters, have been observed at various times at Heito airport. It is probable that a similar number of planes will be here at any one time and some of them would be either destroyed or damaged by an attack on this target.

(3) Last Resort Target:

(a) Hengyang Airfield was formerly an all weather B-25 field with a 4900' runway, nine hardstands and twenty revetments. Its capture by the Japanese in September of 1944 has provided the enemy with a first class field. Its neutralization for even a short space of time would disrupt the air activity of the enemy's South China campaign. At times staging aircraft will be occupying this airdrome.

(4) Radar Target:

(a) Takao is one of the busiest harbors in the Far East, as it handles not only a large share of Formosa's commercial and military traffic but is an assembly point for convoys moving between Japan, the China Coast, Southeast Asia, and the Netherlands East Indies. Bauxite, oil, aircraft parts, railroad equipment, and shipbuilding materials are imported at Takao, while exports include coal, aluminum, sugar, rice, timber, and alcohol. However, the bulk of the tonnage moving through Takao is probably represented by military traffic. Warehouse space of 3,200,000 square feet, or approximately 70 acres, greatly exceeds ordinary commercial requirements. According to prisoners of war, Takao is one of the principal ports of call and embarkation for troops moving south to battle zones.

(b) Eleven photo reconnaissance missions, flown between 7 November 1943 and 29 August 1944, have revealed an average of 33 merchant ships of 3350 gross tons each or an average total of about 112,000 tons per mission in Takao Harbor. On 29 August there were 32 merchant ships totaling 118,800 gross tons.

(c) The Main Pier at Takao provides practically all the wharfage space for large vessels and can berth 8 vessels at one time. This pier, 4350' x 650', is equipped with railroad spurs, large cranes, fueling facilities, and approximately 830,000 square feet of warehouse space. Successful attack on this target should destroy considerable quantities of military supplies and destroy or damage a number of large ships.



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b. Details of Planning (See also Annex O, Field Orders):

(1) Operational Planning:

(a) On 3 May 1944 the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a directive and this Command was furnished a paraphrase the following day. This directive pertained to support by land-based aircraft of Pacific operations and required augmentation of carrier capabilities by the Command's China-based aircraft against such targets as Formosa and the China Coast. This was to be in addition and without prejudice to the Command's normal operations. An estimate of XX Bomber Command's capabilities was submitted, along with the capabilities of the 10th and 14th Air Forces, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(b) In September 1944 the Command was advised of carrier strikes which would take place in October and of the missions which it was expected to perform in support of these strikes. Originally these support missions were scheduled for the 12th and 14th of October, however, a change from the 12th to the 11th on the first mission (Connecticut) was necessitated by a Navy request that the Command attacks precede and follow their attacks scheduled on the 12th and 13th. The second mission ("Carolina") remained scheduled for the 14th. Primary and secondary targets for these 2 missions were to be principal aircraft repair and modification installations on Formosa. Due to the fact that the Command's operation was to be high level precision bombing against targets unsuitable for radar, it was permitted to select the best weather for attacking with the limitation that it could not attack on the 12th and 13th.

(c) On 10 October 1944 Washington was advised that due to unfavorable weather on the 11th the earliest date the first mission ("Connecticut") could be run was 14 October. This pushed the second mission ("Carolina") back to the 16th, weather permitting.

(d) It was the Command's understanding at this time that the 14th Air Force, which controls the targets that may and should be attacked in Occupied China, desired that airfields along the route be used as last resort targets when there were no available military concentrations or supply points within reasonable distance. Consequently, Hengyang Airfield was chosen as the last resort target for the first mission ("Connecticut").

(2) Determination of Bomb Load:

(a) The field order specified that aircraft equipped with center section wing tanks would carry a minimum of thirty 500 pound M76 Incendiary Bombs. Aircraft not equipped with center wing tanks were directed to carry a minimum of twenty-four 500-pound AN-M64 (TNT filled) G.P. bombs. In view of operational considerations, Operations Analysis Section's original recommendation that the bomb load carried be composed of 50% 500 pound AN-M64 G.P. bombs, 30% 500 pound M76 Incendiary Bombs, 10% M-17 Aimable Clusters, and 10% 260-pound M81 Fragmentation bombs was revised in such a manner that the bomb load released would be approximately 50% 500-pound G.P.'s and 50% 500-pound Incendiary Bombs.

(b) The 500-pound M76 possess exceptionally good ballistic characteristics. From 25,000 feet altitude, a comparison of the AN-M64 and the M-76 indicated only .23 of a second difference in time of flight, and a difference in trail of only 15 mils, or a trail difference of 375 feet. Calculations showed that if the aircraft were traveling at 300 mph True Air Speed or a Ground Speed of approximately 441 ft/second, the M76 could be expected to have a point of impact approximately 274 feet behind an AN-M64 G.P. bomb. Examination of the bombing pattern obtained with the present twelve plane formation releasing on the leader, as well as consideration of the



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probable dispersion pattern of any one aircraft's bomb load, indicated that the individual points of impact of the General Purpose and Incendiary Bombs, except in rare instances would be far enough apart that the detonation of the AN-M64 General Purpose Bomb would have no deleterious effect on the M76 Incendiary Bombs. As a consequence, the bomb loading selected made it unnecessary to load the AN-M64's and M-76's in different formations and insured that no unfavorable results would occur, if, for operational reasons aircraft of one formation attached themselves to another formation prior to the beginning of the bombing approach.

(c) Careful analysis of the various vital installations within the target area with respect to height, type of structure, roof construction and probable contents, indicated that the 500-pound AN-M64 (TNT filled) G.P. bomb should be fused one-tenth (0.1) second nose and one one-hundred (.01) second tail delay. It was calculated that this fusing would permit adequate penetration, maximum downward fragmentation, and effective blast in an area some 8 to 12 feet below the point of entry in the roof. Similar analysis resulted in the recommendation that the 500-pound M76 Incendiary Bomb be fused instantaneous nose and non-delay tail, since with a striking velocity of almost 1000 ft/second this would insure detonation, as a result of activation of either the nose or tail fuse, at a point far enough below the bombs point of entry to provide a high degree of assurance that its contents would be widely dispersed and yet contained within the structure.

(3) Formations Flown: The formation planned was the 12-plane formation as outlined in the Command's Tactical Doctrine (see Annex B. Part VII). Six different assembly points were designated by the field orders, 3 for the 40th and 444th Groups and 3 for the 462nd and 468th Groups. If instrument conditions prevailed at the assigned altitudes at assembly point #1, the aircraft were to assemble at assembly point #2. If instrument conditions prevailed at assembly point #2, aircraft were to assemble at assembly point #3. All turns for assembly were to be made to the left by the leaders and deputy leaders and to the right by all other aircraft.

(4) Bombing Data:

(a) The bomb load per aircraft was designated as a minimum of 30 incendiary 500-pound M-76 bombs for aircraft equipped with center section wing tanks, and a minimum of 24 GP 500-pound AN-M-64 (TNT filled) for aircraft not equipped with center section wing tanks.

(b) Bombing was to be done by 12-plane formations at assigned altitudes and in no case below 23,000 feet true. No aircraft was to attack the target without being in formation with at least 1 other aircraft. The axis of attack for all groups was to be 117° Magnetic, and the bombing altitudes were to be as follows: 40th Group - 24,000 feet true; 444th Group - 26,000 feet true; 462nd Group - 23,000 feet true; 468th Group - 25,000 feet true. Assigned bombing altitudes were to be reached prior to reaching assembly point #3.

(5) Route to be Flown: The route to the target for the 40th and 444th Groups was from the Chengtu Area to Suining Airfield (30°29'N - 105°36'E), to the River Bend at 27°27'N - 112°53'E, to the River Mouth at 23°58'N - 117°43'E to the IP (Diasho Island at 23°11'N - 119°25'E), and then to the target. The route out for the 462nd and 468th Groups was from the Chengtu Area to Peishiyi Airfield (29°25'N - 106°30'E), to the River Bend at 26°50'N - 112°27'E, to 23°35'N - 117°19'E and then to the same IP and target as for the 40th and 444th Groups. The route back, which was the same for all groups, was from the Target to 22°45'N - 119°25'E, to Liangshan Airfield (30°42'N - 107°50'E), and the Chengtu Area.



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(6) Movement of Aircraft: Starting on D-day minus 5 and continuing through D-day plus 1, each group was to move all available combat - operational aircraft to the Chengtu Area prepared for a combat mission. After arriving in the Chengtu Area any aircraft which could not be made combat - operational by D-day plus 2 was to be returned without delay to its India base. Those aircraft which could be made combat-operational by D-day plus 2 were to be prepared immediately for a combat mission on that day.

(7) Fighter Cover for VLR Bases: As in previous missions, The 312th Fighter Wing was to provide fighter cover for the Command's bases in the Chengtu Area.

4. MOVEMENT TO THE FORWARD AREA (See Annex A):

a. With the exception of 2 aircraft all aircraft airborne in the Rear Area completed the movement to the Forward Area. One hundred and twenty-three aircraft successfully made the trip, 89 landing on D-day minus 5, 20 landing on D-day minus 4, 4 landing on D-day minus 3, 5 landing on D-day minus 2, and 5 landing on D-day minus 1. Including 9 combat-operational aircraft in the Forward Area prior to the movement, 132 aircraft (excluding photo reconnaissance aircraft) were available for the mission on D-day.

b. Aircraft airborne from the Rear Area numbered 125. Of these, only 2 failed to reach the Forward Area although 10 aircraft were forced to return to their bases or a base enroute as a result of mechanical difficulty.

5. EXECUTION OF THE MISSION (See Annexes B and L):

a. Take-off:

(1) Times of take-off were planned as follows: 40th Group - 132256Z; 444th Group 132303Z; 462nd Group - 132248Z; and 468th Group - 132255Z. Take-off was accomplished without incident as follows:

<u>Group</u>	<u>No. airborne</u>	<u>First A/C off</u>	<u>Last A/C off</u>
40th	34	2256Z	2338Z (a)
444th	33	2303Z	2358Z
462nd	29	2248Z	2355Z
468th	34	2255Z	2351Z (b)
Over-all	<u>130</u>	2248Z	2358Z (a) (b)

(a) Does not include 2 late take-offs; A/C 457 at 0117Z and A/C 276 at 0026Z.

(b) Does not include 1 late take-off; A/C 208 at 0015Z.

(2) At the time of take-off at Hsinching there were 3 layers of overcast; one of broken stratocumulus between 4000 and 5000 feet, one of stratus between 6000 and 7500 feet and one of altostratus between 10000 and 15000 feet. The overcast at the other bases was generally thinner. Visibility was 5 to 6 miles.

b. Route Out (See Annex B, Parts II and III):

(1) All aircraft were briefed to follow the route to the target as specified in the Field Orders (See Annex O).

(2) Forty-four deviations from the planned route to the primary target and return were made by 37 aircraft as follows: 5 air-



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craft bombed the Tertiary Target, 2 bombed the last resort target, 5 bombed targets of opportunity, 8 jettisoned their bombs, 5 returned early with bombs, 1 crashed, 1 is missing, 5 made material deviations from their briefed course, and 12 landed short of their home bases.

c. Primary Targets:

(1) Of the 130 aircraft airborne, 104 aircraft reached the target area. However, 1 of these 104 aircraft prematurely released its bombs at the time the bomb bay doors were opened due to a short circuit in the co-pilot's release. The first formation (9 aircraft) dropped its bombs at 0347Z and the last at 0502Z. During this interval of 75 minutes, 103 aircraft dropped a total of 1085 M-76 Incendiaries and 1519 AN-M-64 GP bombs, or an approximate weight of 651 tons.

(2) Total possible bomb load of aircraft reaching the target area (104 aircraft) was 1109 Incendiary bombs and 1720 GP bombs. Of this total, 24 Incendiary bombs and 201 GP bombs were not released according to plan. Of these, 28 GP bombs were prematurely dropped due to a malfunction of the co-pilot's release and the remainder hung up due to bomb rack malfunctions. The great majority of these malfunctions were due to the binding of the shackles by the cable adapters which were used for double suspension.

(3) Weather conditions over the target were favorable for visual bombing and returning crews reported a cloud coverage of 2/10 to 5/10 with the base at 3500 feet and tops at 5000 feet. Visibility was 20 to 30 miles.

(4) With the exception of 5 aircraft all aircraft attacked the primary target between 110° and 139°. The briefed axis of attack was 117° Magnetic. Over-all bombing altitudes at the primary target varied between 20,500 feet and 27,500 feet, and the majority of aircraft bombed at an indicated air speed of 190 to 205 mph.

(5) The primary target was bombed by 14 formations which varied in size from 3 aircraft to 17 aircraft.

(6) Returning crews reported observed bombing results as being good to excellent.

d. Secondary Target: No aircraft bombed the secondary Target at Heito, Formosa.

e. Tertiary Target:

(1) Aircraft 276 (40th Group): This aircraft took off late due to mechanical difficulties and was unable to join a formation. It therefore bombed dock installations at Swatow, China. Observed results were poor, although it is possible that 1 or 2 bombs may have hit in the target area.

(2) Aircraft 457 (40th Group): This aircraft became mired in the mud, made a late take-off and was unable to join a formation. What appeared to be a radio or radar installation on Namao Island was bombed from 21,000 feet. The bombs were observed to have been walking toward the Target but it is believed they stopped short of it.

(3) Aircraft 524 (444th Group): The harbor installations and warehouses or ship repair shops at Swatow, China were bombed from 26,000 feet on 2 runs. On the second run 7 incendiary bombs were released with excellent results.



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(4) Aircraft 407 (468th Group): Warehouses and storage areas in the town of Swatow were bombed by this aircraft. Results were unobserved.

(5) Aircraft 365 (468th Group): The docks, warehouses, and storage area at Swatow were bombed by 5 bombs. Two hits were observed on the docks and 1 hit on a small ship. Twelve bombs were salvaged, but they missed the Target.

f. Last Resort Target: Aircraft 522 (40th Group) and aircraft 386 (462nd Group) bombed the last resort target, the Hengyang Airfield. Both chose this target because of mechanical difficulties, and both bombed by radar because of 10/10 undercast. Results were unobserved.

g. Radar Target: No aircraft bombed the radar target at Takao, Formosa.

h. Targets of Opportunity:

(1) Aircraft 510 (444th Group): A small city on the Northwest tip of Nakushu Island (23°37'N - 119°33'E) was bombed by this aircraft with unobserved results.

(2) Aircrafts 355, 356, 454, and 487 (468th Group): These 4 aircraft in formation bombed Taichu Airfield (24°11'N - 120°41'E). Bombs were seen to drop on hangers and buildings at the southern part of the field, starting 2 large fires and several small fires. Smoke was seen to rise to about 5000 feet. Other bombs hit between the buildings, on the airfield and on the runway. (See Annex M of Tactical Mission Report No. 11 for detailed damage assessment).

i. Route Back (See Annex B, Parts II and III):

(1) All aircraft were briefed to follow the same route back, with the exception of those of the 468th Group which were to take a course from the Target to Pei-shi-i and then directly to their base at Pengshan.

(2) Of the 130 aircraft airborne, all but 12 returned to XX Bomber Command bases. Of these 12 aircraft, 7 landed at Liangshan, 1 landed at Chihkiang, 1 at Suichwan, 1 at Pei-shi-i, 1 aircraft crashed, and 1 is missing.

(3) Weather at the bases upon return was varied with an overcast with a base between 3500 and 9000 feet and a lower layer of broken clouds. Visibility was 6 to 8 miles.

(4) Of the 103 aircraft bombing the primary target, the first one landed at 0853Z and the last at 1036Z.

j. Operational Results of the Mission:

(1) From an operational stand point this mission may be considered quite successful. More combat-operational aircraft were in the staging area (132) and more aircraft were airborne (130) than for any previous mission. The percentage of combat-operational aircraft in the Forward Area which were airborne was 98.5, the best record for any mission to date. Seventy-nine per cent of these airborne aircraft bombed the primary target, which although 3 per cent better than Mission No. 9 was not so good as Missions No. 6, 7, and 8 which had 83 per cent, 82 per cent and 83 per cent respectively bombing the primary Target.



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(2) Those aircraft which used the cable adopters for double suspension of bombs experienced malfunctions during release. This materially reduced the total weight of bombs which could have been placed on the various targets.

(3) Two aircraft failed to return; aircraft 513 (40th Group) which crashed in the Changteh area and aircraft 280 (41st Group) which is missing. It is believed both aircraft were operational losses. (See Annex B, Part IX).

6. ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT OPPOSITION (See Annex C):

a. Over the primary target generally meager and inaccurate heavy anti-aircraft fire was reported by 90 per cent of the aircraft (94 out of 104). Altitudes varied from 21,000 to 26,000 feet and times of encounter from 0346Z to 0503Z. No definite statement can be made as to the type of fire encountered as reports were evenly divided between continuously pointed and barrage. If it were continuously pointed fire, it was poorly directed. RCM intercept give indications of possible radar controlled fire.

b. Heavy anti-aircraft fire was also encountered at Takao, Tainan, Heito, a lagoon N.W. of Okayama at approximately 22°52'N - 120°13'E, 5 miles E. of Okayama at 22°47'N - 120°22'E, a possible ship at 22°50'N - 120°08'E, 5 miles S. of Taichu at 24°14'N - 120°38'E and at Hakusha Island, all fire was meager and inaccurate except at Takao and Heito where there were some reports of accurate fire, and at a point 5 miles E of Okayama where the intensity was reported as moderate.

c. One aircraft reported a possible ground-to-air rocket at Okayama at 26,000 feet. No smokescreens were reported, but 3 conventional barrage balloons were observed approximately 5 miles NE of Okayama. Two sightings of high altitude balloons were reported, 1 approximately 15 miles inland from Okayama and 1 approximately 10 miles inland.

d. It is evident that the enemy had prior warning of our approach.

7. ENEMY AIR OPPOSITION (See Annex D):

a. So far as is known no B-29 was attacked by enemy fighters.

b. A total of 13 enemy aircraft was sighted at distances varying from 1500 yards to 5 miles.

8. WEATHER (See Annex E):

a. Low temperatures (56 deg. F) and high humidity (94%) aided in the take-off. In the forty eight hours prior to the mission, 4.9 inches of rain fell. While this made the runway muddy it did not hamper take-offs.

b. On the way out some formations experienced difficulty in keeping together because of the merging cloud layers. Reassembly was not possible in some cases until rendezvous was reached. There were some cases of moderate icing encountered on the climb midway across China.

c. Target weather was favorable for high altitude bombing. Surface winds of 20-25 M.P.H. aided in spreading fires.

d. The forecast of cloud cover and metro winds was rated as good by pilots and navigators.



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9. COMMUNICATIONS (See Annex F):

- a. The procedure of sending bombs-away messages from over the target was resumed, and a new bombs-away code introduced.
- b. Each group handled its own air-to-ground communications for the first time. Each group relayed the messages it received to the Aircraft Control Center, which also stood by on 3 alternative frequencies in case the group facilities ceased to function.
- c. Some difficulty was experienced by the 444th Group in fading of the 8 megacycle primary frequency. It is believed this is a result of the antenna design. The 12 megacycle standby frequency proved effective.
- d. No jamming was reported and the interference that was observed consisted of atmospheric and routine traffic, neither of which was severe enough to interrupt communications.
- e. Of the 12 QDM's given, 11 were considered reliable and 1 was in error, 20 degrees.
- f. Radio beacons again proved the most useful radio aid. Malfunctions of equipment were about the same as previous missions and no violations of cryptographic security was reported. Air-to-air homing was used for the first time on a tactical mission.

10. RADAR (See Annex G):

- a. The radar equipment was used mainly on this daylight mission for navigational purposes. All aircraft bombed the target visually except for 2 aircraft which bombed the last resort target of Hengyang by radar. The radar-bombsight procedure was employed by radar operators following the bombing run to completion.
- b. Serviceability of the radar equipment was excellent, 89 per cent being operational over the target.
- c. Radar scope photography was greatly improved over previous missions. A much higher percentage of pictures were returned and were usable.

11. RCM (See Annex H):

- a. RCM activities were limited to search en route to and from the target. Nine aircraft were engaged in search with frequency assignments varying from 70 to 3300 megacycles. Intercepts of the 70 mc. type were logged en route to the target, of the 100 mc. type in the salient projecting from Changsha toward Kweilin, of the 160 mc. type near Formosa, and the 200 mc. type over the target.
- b. Good records were made of an 80 mc. station and of a 74 mc. station near the coast of China by use of the YR-1600 recorders. No intercepts were made in the 300-1000 mc. band or the 1000-3300 mc. band.
- c. No suspicious signals were intercepted by the monitor station maintained at the forward bases.

12. CENTRAL STATION FIRE CONTROL (See Annex I):

- a. No combat firing was done on this mission.
- b. Of the 605 turrets tested, 2 per cent showed malfunctions.



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and of the 50 cal. machine guns similarly tested less than 1 per cent had malfunctions.

13. CAMERAS AND PHOTOGRAPHS (See Annex J):

a. Cameras installed in aircraft which became airborne numbered 115 (excluding radar cameras). Incomplete reports indicate that of these, at least 9 were in aborting aircraft, 80 completed the mission, and 37 photographed targets, producing 439 usable negatives. The weather was conducive to good photography.

b. A B-29 of the 468th Group flew a photo reconnaissance mission over the target on 15 October. Successful but fair quality K-22 and tri metrogon photos were taken of Takao, Heito, Okayama, Tainan, Kagi and Taichu. The K-18 camera was inoperative.

c. Shipping was observed in the harbors along the west coast of Formosa.

14. BATTLE LOSSES AND BATTLE DAMAGE (See Annex K):

a. At this time there are no losses known to have definitely resulted from enemy antiaircraft or enemy air action. (However, see Operational Losses, Annex B, Part IX).

b. Minor damage was received by 3 aircraft from enemy anti-aircraft fire. There was no damage resulting from enemy air action.

15. FUNCTIONING OF EQUIPMENT (See Annex L):

a. Of the 125 aircraft involved in the movement to the Forward Area, 8 returned to the Rear Area but subsequently became re-airborne and landed in the Forward Area. Two aircraft landed en route and failed to reach the China bases in time for the mission. Of the 130 aircraft becoming airborne for the mission, 16 failed to get over the primary target because of mechanical reasons, 1 aircraft over the PT failed to bomb, and 28 aircraft released only a portion of their bomb load. On the movement forward and the mission 57 aircraft experienced major mechanical difficulties (including bomb release malfunctions).

b. There were 156 minor malfunctions of equipment reported. The most common malfunctions were: inoperative tachometers (27), oil leaks (22), inoperative cylinder head temperature gauges (14), propeller governors (10), and inoperative generators (10).

c. The over-all gasoline consumption was 5310 gallons per airplane or 2.11 gallons per air mile. This is greater than the average for Missions No. 8 and 9 which were respectively 2.06 and 2.07 gallons per air mile.

16. TARGET DAMAGE ASSESSMENT:

a. A study of the details of the XX Bomber Command attack of 14 October reveals that the main weight of attack fell in the Southern part of the works, which considering the axis of attack used (117 M.), was slightly to the right of the target. Damage resulting, however, was heavy destroying 43 buildings and damaging 12 of the 80 large and small buildings comprising the Assembly Works. (For details, Replacement Estimate and Strategic Effects, see Damage Assessment Report, Annex M, Tactical Mission Report No. 11).



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b. Four aircraft of the 468th Group attacked Taichu Airfield at Taichu, Formosa. The main weight of the attack fell in the airfield just W of the hangar area between the hangars and the runway. Two aircraft are believed to have been damaged and two others possibly damaged. At least one and probably two near misses were observed off a large hangar probably damaging the hangar and a barracks building just East. Three hits were scored on the runway. (For details see Damage Assessment Report No. 14. Provisional, Annex M, Tactical Mission Report No. 11).

c. One aircraft attacking Swatow returned with strike photos from which the following was observed: (1) One direct hit on a large warehouse, (2) At least 4 business/residential buildings damaged by a direct hit in the center of the complex. (For details see Damage Assessment Report No. 15 - Provisional, Annex M, Tactical Mission Report No. 11).

*Curtis E. Lemay*  
CURTIS E. LEMAY  
Major General, U. S. A.  
Commanding

- 11 -

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S E C R E T

ANNEX

A

MOVEMENT FROM REAR TO FORWARD AREA

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MOVEMENT FROM REAR TO FORWARD AREA

Mission No. 10

14 October 1944

	40th	444th	462nd	468th	Total
A/C Airborne - Rear Area	35-a	31	29	30	125
Aborting A/C returning to Rear Area	2	2	1	3	0-e
Aborts re-airborne reaching Forward Area before D-day	2	2	1	3	
Aborting A/C landing enroute	1-b	0	1-c	0	2-e
Aborts re-airborne from bases enroute reaching Forward Area before D-day	0	0	0	0	
Landed in Forward Area before D-day	34	31	28	30	123
Combat operational A/C in Forward Area prior to movement	0	3	2	4-a,d	9-a
Total Tactical A/C on hand for Mission No. 10	34-a	34	30	34-a	132-a
A/C landing on D-day minus 5	27	23	22	17	89
A/C landing on D-day minus 4	4	5	4	7	20
A/C landing on D-day minus 3	1	0	1	2	4
A/C landing on D-day minus 2	0	2	0	3	5
A/C landing on D-day minus 1	2	1	1	1	5
Combat operational A/C in forward area prior to movement	0	3	2	4-a,d	9-a
Total tactical A/C on hand for Mission No. 10	34	34	30	34-a	132-a

- a - Does not include A/C 288 (40th), nor A/C 446 (468th), photo aircraft.
- b - A/C 306 landed at Tezgaon and subsequently returned to Rear Area.
- c - A/C 213 landed at Tezpur and did not reach Forward Area for Mission No. 10.
- d - A/C 471, in Forward Area at Kunming, arrived Pengshan on D-day minus 5.
- e - Net number of aborts.

Note: For details of aborts, aborts re-airborne, landings enroute, see Annex L, Functioning of Equipment.

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ANNEX

B

EXECUTION OF THE MISSION

- I - Information on Take-offs
- II - Details of Routes
- III - Track and Vertical Flight Path
- IV - Bombing Data
- V - Bomb Loading
- VI - Disposition of Bombs
- VII - Formations Flown
- VIII - Navigation Report
- IX - Mission Operational Losses
- X - Information on Landings

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I - Information on Take-offs

Mission No. 10

14 October 1944

	First A/C off	Last A/C off	Elapsed Time	No. of A/C taking off	Average take- off interval
40th	2256Z	2338Z(a)	42 min.	32 (a)	79 sec.
44th	2303Z	2358Z	55 min.	33	100 sec.
462nd	2248Z	2355Z	67 min.	29	139 sec.
468th	2255Z	2351Z(b)	56 min.	33 (b)	102 sec.
Over-all	2248Z	2358Z (a)(b)	70 min.	127 (a)(b)	33 sec.

(a) Does not include 2 late take-offs; A/C 457 at 0117Z and A/C 276 at 0026Z.

(b) Does not include 1 late take-off; A/C 208 at 0015Z.

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II - DETAILS OF ROUTES

Mission No. 10

10 October 1944

A. Planned Route

	<u>40th</u>	<u>444th</u>	<u>462nd</u>	<u>468th</u>
Base	Hsinching	Kwanghan	Kunglai	Pengshan
Assembly Point #1	Suining Airfield 30° 29'N - 105° 36'E		Peishiyi Airfield 29° 25'N - 106° 30'E	
Assembly Point #2	River Bend at 27° 27'N - 112° 53'E		River Bend at 26° 50'N - 112° 27'E	
Assembly Point #3	River Mouth at 23° 58'N - 117° 43'E		23° 35'N - 117° 19'E	
Initial Point	Diasho Island (23° 11'N - 119° 25'E)			
Target	Okayama (22° 47'N - 120° 16'E)			
1st return check point	22° 45'N - 119° 25'E			
2nd return check point	Liangshan Airfield (30° 42'N - 107° 50'E)			
Base	Hsinching	Kwanghan	Kunglai	Pengshan

B. Deviations from Planned Route

1. 40th Group:

- a. Aircraft 457 bombed the tertiary target of Namao Island.
- b. Aircraft 276 bombed the tertiary target of Swatow.
- c. Aircraft 522 bombed the last resort target.
- d. Aircraft 579 jettisoned its bombs and returned early due to a blown cylinder head.
- e. Aircraft 297 returned early with its bombs due to a blown intake valve rocker arm.
- f. Aircraft 513 crashed in the Changteh area and its course is unknown.

2. 444th Group:

- a. Aircraft 524 bombed the tertiary target of Swatow (23° 22'N - 116° 41'E), and landed at Liangshan on return.
- b. Aircraft 510 bombed Nakusha Island (23° 40'N - 119° 33'E) as a target of opportunity.
- c. Aircraft 464 jettisoned its bombs due to a burned out

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generator.

d. Aircraft 507 jettisoned its bombs due to loss of manifold pressure and RPM on #2 engine after 4 1/2 hours in the air; turned about at 23° 55'N - 117° 45'E.

e. Aircraft 492 jettisoned its bombs due to excessive oil leak in #1 engine.

f. Aircraft 343 returned with its bombs due to damage to #3 oil tank and throttle controls caused by a bomb fragment.

g. Aircraft 280 is missing and its route unknown.

h. Aircraft 399 left the briefed route back at 23° 58'N - 117° 43'E, flew direct route to Kwanghan using DR and radar. Altitude was 22,500 feet until let down to 3000 feet at 28° 45'N - 109° 30'E.

i. Aircraft 485, 292, 403 and 202 went 100 miles beyond first turning point to 26° 42'N - 114° 35'E, turned and left coast at Amoy, went southwest to final assembly point climbing from 19,000 to 25,000 feet. From the I.P. they went north of target to about 10 miles beyond the target, turned and went over the target on a course of about 210° magnetic. Aircraft 202 landed at Lianshan on return due to engine failure.

j. Aircraft 215 landed at Chihkiang due to engine failure.

k. Aircraft 375 and 307 landed at Liangshan after bombing the primary target.

3. 462nd Group:

a. Aircraft 386 bombed the last resort target due to #1 supercharger becoming inoperative at high altitudes.

b. Aircraft 273 jettisoned its bombs due to a fire in the #4 engine nacelle, and landed at Hsinching instead of its home base at Kunglai.

c. Aircraft 285 and 312 landed at Liangshan on return due to a gasoline shortage.

4. 468th Group:

a. The briefed return route varied from that specified in the field orders in that it called for a course from the target to Pei-shi-i to Pengshan. This variation was made because it was believed the weather prevented Liangshan from being a feasible alternate base, Pei-shi-i had better weather, afforded an equivalent radio check point, and the course was 80 miles shorter. All aircraft of this group followed the briefed course with the exceptions mentioned below.

b. Aircraft 407 bombed the tertiary target of Swatow due to power loss of #1 engine. Its course was from Pengshan to 29° 58'N - 105° 05'E, to Pei-shi-i, to 28° 38'N - 108° 16'E, to Hengyang, to 23° 39'N - 116° 55'E, to 24° 00'N - 116° 26'E, to 26° 08'N - 113° 50'E, to Hengyang, to 28° 05'N - 110° 50'E, to 30° 05'N - 108° 52'E, and back to Pengshan.

c. Aircraft 365 bombed the tertiary target of Swatow. Its course was from Pengshan to Pei-shi-i, to 28° 00'N - 109° 50'E, to 27° 20'N - 111° 25'E, to Hengyang, to Koweikohiko, to Swatow, to Hengyang, to Pei-shi-i where it landed due to a gasoline shortage.

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d. Aircraft 355, 356, 454, and 487 bombed Taichu Airfield (24° 11'N - 120° 41'E) as a target of opportunity. The target was originally believed to have been Kagi Airfield but photo interpretation of the strike photos indicates it to be Taichu Airfield. The course reported is from Pengshan to 29° 25'N - 106° 30'E, to 28° 15'N - 109° 15'E, to 26° 50'N - 112° 27'E, to 25° 10'N - 115° 00'E, to the China Coast, to 23° 45'N - 119° 30'E, searched coast line for target, to 23° 30'N - 120° 25'E, to the Formosa Coast, to the China Coast, to 25° 20'N - 118° 00'E, to 27° 15'N - 114° 00'E, to 27° 47'N - 113° 00'E, to 28° 35'N - 110° 30'E, and back to Pengshan. Aircraft 356 left the formation approximately at Hengyang on return and landed at Suichwan.

e. Aircraft 284 jettisoned its bombs due to power failure of #1 engine, and returned to base after 2 hours and 50 minutes in the air.

f. Aircraft 358 flew the briefed course until 24° 22'N - 116° 33'E where it turned around due to a feathered engine. The return route was 24° 56'N - 115° 13'E, to 27° 33'N - 112° 58'E, to 28° 12'N - 110° 40'E, to 29° 10'N - 108° 50'E, to 29° 47'N - 106° 56'E, to 29° 52'N - 106° 22'E, and back to Pengshan. The bombs were jettisoned.

g. Aircraft 279 and 272 took off, circled while the remainder of the group took off, and landed immediately thereafter. Aircraft 279 had a #1 engine failure and aircraft 272 experienced severe back-firing of the #2 engine. The bombs were brought back.

h. Aircraft 542 returned with its bombs after 1 hour due to a malfunction of the #2 propeller governor.

i. Aircraft 389 landed at Liangshan due to a shortage of gasoline.

j. Aircraft 365 landed at Pei-shi-i due to a shortage of gasoline.

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By Authority of the Commanding  
General

HEADQUARTERS  
XII BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

21 Oct 44  
Date Initials

CONSOLIDATED  
SPECIATEST MISSION REPORT OF  
STAFF BOMBARDIER

Date Prepared: 20 Oct 44

Field Order No. 10

Date of Mission: 14 Oct 44

1. Visibility of the target was reported as CAVU, which permitted visual bombing of the primary target. Formations which followed the first flight reported difficulties finding the aiming point due to fires, smoke and haze from previous bombs. The other targets bombed were CAVU with the exception of the last resort target, which was completely covered with clouds and bombing was accomplished by radar.
2. Comments indicate that the IP was easily located and the primary target could be seen from the IP. Only a slight turn was needed at IP to approach the target on the briefed axis of attack which helped keep the formation intact.
3. No enemy fighter interception was encountered on bombing run. Antiaircraft was meager to moderate and inaccurate, which increased the possibility of a good run.
4. Several bombardiers requested that radar altimeter be reinstalled in aircraft in order to provide a more accurate method of determining bombing altitude.
5. Malfunctions which prevented releases are as follows:
  - a. 40th Group
    - Aircraft #319 one bomb failed to release. Cause: improper tension on select-salvo cable system.
    - Aircraft #587 fifteen bombs failed to release. Cause: faulty A-4 release as well as corrosion in rear bomb-bay relay box. This aircraft has an all-electric A-4 salvo system.
    - Aircraft #295 one bomb failed to release. Cause: improper tension on select-salvo cable system.
    - Aircraft #276 four bombs failed to release. Cause: improper tension on select-salvo cable system.
  - b. 444th Group
    - Aircraft #580 two bombs failed to release. Cause: arming levers were not placed in the A-2 release fingers.
    - Aircraft #378 one bomb failed to release. Cause: shackle was installed backwards.
    - Aircraft #524 two bombs failed to release. Cause: undetermined as yet.
  - c. 462nd Group

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Several bombs from various aircraft failed to release. Cause: the cable adapter used for double suspension slipped up on the B-10 shackle binding the shackle so that it would not release the bombs.

Aircraft #479 three bombs failed to release. Cause: Shackle was installed backwards.

d. 468th Group:

Aircraft #411 dropped short of target cause electrical short-circuit in the co-pilot's release.

Twenty-six (26) bombs from various aircraft failed to release. Cause: the binding of the shackles by the cable adapters used for double suspension.

Prepared by:

Staff Bombardier

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IV - Bombing Data (continued)

A. Times of Bomb Release at PT

Z Time	40th	44th	462nd	468th	Total
0340 - 49	-	-	-	9	9
0350 - 59	-	-	-	-	-
0400 - 09	6	3	-	-	9
0410 - 19	11	-	-	4	15
0420 - 29	11	12	27	5	55
0430 - 39	-	6	-	3	9
0440 - 49	-	1	-	1	2
0450 - 59	-	-	-	-	-
0500 - 09	-	4	-	-	4
Total	28	26	27	22	103

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B. Bombing Altitudes at PT

Altitude (feet)	40th	444th	462nd	468th	Total
20,500 - 20,999	1	-	-	-	1
21,000 - 21,499	1	-	-	-	1
21,500 - 21,999	1	-	2	-	3
22,000 - 22,499	2	-	-	-	2
22,500 - 22,999	5	-	9	1	15
23,000 - 23,499	3	2	16	-	21
23,500 - 23,999	2	-	-	-	2
24,000 - 24,499	12	3	-	4	19
24,500 - 24,999	1	1	-	-	2
25,000 - 25,499	-	2	-	17	19
25,500 - 25,999	-	1	-	-	1
26,000 - 26,499	-	15	-	-	15
26,500 - 26,999	-	1	-	-	1
27,000 - 27,499	-	1	-	-	1
Total	28	26	27	22	103
Briefed Altitudes	24,000'	26,000'	23,000'	25,000'	

C. Indicated Air Speeds over PT

I.A.S. (mph)	40th	444th	462nd	468th	Total
180 - 184	-	2	-	-	2
185 - 189	3	2	-	2	7
190 - 194	4	11	4	-	19
195 - 199	18	8	5	3	34
200 - 204	2	3	11	17	33
205 - 209	1	-	4	-	5
210 - 214	-	-	3	-	3
Total	28	26	27	22	103

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D. Axes of Attack

Degrees	40th (a)	44th (b)	462nd (c)	468th (d)	Total
90 - 94	-	-	1	-	1
110 - 114	1	2	1	2	6
115 - 119	17	9	9	8	43
120 - 124	5	8	7	3	23
125 - 129	3	3	6	9	21
130 - 134	1	-	2	-	3
135 - 139	1	-	1	-	2
210	-	2	-	-	2
220	-	2	-	-	2
Total	28	26	27	22	103

- (a) All but 2 axes were reported as magnetic.
- (b) Not reported whether true or magnetic.
- (c) Reported as magnetic.
- (d) Reported as true.

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V - BOMB LOADING\*

Mission No. 10

14 October 1944

Loads	40th Group			444th Group			462nd Group			468th Group			Total		
	A/C	Inc.	G.P.	A/C	Inc.	G.P.	A/C	Inc.	G.P.	A/C	Inc.	G.P.	A/C	Inc.	G.P.
30 Inc.	-			14	420	-	5	150		5	150		24	720	
31 Inc.	-			-			2	62		4	124		6	186	
32 Inc.	-			-			2	64		3	96		5	160	
33 Inc.	-			-			1	33		-			1	33	
28 Inc. 2 G.P.	8	224	16	-			-			-			8	224	16
27 Inc. 3 G.P.	3	81	9	-			-			-			3	81	9
22 G.P.	-	-	-	-			2		44	-			2		44
24 G.P.	21	-	504	18		432	6		144	-			45		1080
25 G.P.	-	-	-	1		25	1		25	2		50	4		100
26 G.P.	2	-	52	-			4		104	4		104	10		260
27 G.P.	-	-	-	-			1		27	7		189	8		216
28 G.P.	-	-	-	-			5		140	9		252	14		392
Total A/C	34			33			29			34			130		
Total Inc.	305			420			309			370			1404		
Total G.P.	581			457			484			595			2117		
Inc. per A/C	9.0			12.7			10.7			10.9			10.8		
G.P. per A/C	17.1			13.8			16.7			17.5			16.3		

\* Based on aircraft airborne. "Inc." indicates 500-pound M-76 incendiary bomb. "G.P." indicates 500-pound AN-M-64 (TNT filled) General Purpose bomb.

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I - DISPOSITION OF BOMBS

Mission No. 10

14 October 1944

	40th Group			444th Group			462nd Group			468th group			Total		
	A/C	Inc.	G.P.	A/C	Inc.	G.P.	A/C	Inc.	G.P.	A/C	Inc.	G.P.	A/C	Inc.	G.P.
A/C airborne and bomb load	34	305	581	33	420	457	29	309	484	34	370	595	130	1404	2117
A/C over P.T. and bomb load	28	250	476	26	270	409	27	279	484	23	310	351	104	1109	1720
A/C bombing P.T. and bombs dropped	28	236	473	26	267	409	27	275	338	22	307	299	103	1085	1519
A/C bombing TT and bombs dropped	2	0	32	1	30	0	-	-	-	2	0	45	5	30	77
A/C bombing LRT and bombs dropped	1	0	26	-	-	-	1	30	0	-	-	-	2	30	26
A/C bombing T of O and bombs dropped	-	-	-	1	30	0	-	-	-	4	30	72	5	60	72
Jettisoned bombs	1	42-a	18-b	3	90	0	1	1-f	116-g	3	0	102-j	8	133	236
Brought bombs back	1	0	28-c	1	3-e	24	0	3-h	30-i	3	33-k	77-l	5	39	159
Disposition Unknown	1	27	4-d	1	0	24	0	0	0	-	-	-	2	27	28
Total	34	305	581	33	420	457	29	309	484	34	370	595	130	1404	2117
Average No. of bombs per A/C	34	9.0	17.1	33	12.7	13.8	29	10.7	16.7	34	10.9	17.5	130	10.8	16.3

- a. Includes 14 bombs jettisoned by A/C 587.
- b. Includes 14 bombs jettisoned by A/C 457, 1 by A/C 319, and 1 by A/C 587.
- c. Includes 4 bombs brought back by A/C 276.
- d. Includes 1 bomb from A/C 319.
- e. Includes 2 bombs brought back by A/C 380, and 1 by A/C 378.
- f. Jettisoned by A/C 479.
- g. Includes 24 bombs jettisoned by A/C 329; 8 each by A/C 362, 278, 270, 444, 299; 6 each by A/C 338, 827, 382; 4 each by A/C 285, 830; 2 by A/C 209.

- h. Brought back by A/C 479.
- i. Eight bombs each by A/C 346, 311; 4 each by A/C 347, 273; 2 each by A/C 338, 827, 285.
- j. Includes 6 bombs each by A/C 397, 389; 4 by A/C 409; 2 each by A/C 362, 265, 355, 365.
- k. Includes 1 bomb by A/C 442, 2 by A/C 429.
- l. Includes 6 bombs each by A/C 284, 365; 3 by A/C 454; 2 each by A/C 355, 407, 828, 409.

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VII - FORMATIONS FLOWN

Mission No. 10  
14 October 1944

A. Formations Planned

The 12 - plane formation was the basic formation required by the Field Orders. This formation is defined in the Command's Tactical Doctrine as follows:

"1. The element:

a. Three (3) aircraft in a "V" with wing men nose to tail with lead airplane, and at ten (10) foot interval from wing tip to wing tip with lead airplane. Vertical distance between wingmen and lead airplane will be fifty (50) feet. Direction of vertical distance for each wing man (i.e. up or down), will be dependent upon the position of the element in the flight; or if the element is flying individually, the low wing man will be nearest to the sun. When flying in individual elements, the element leader may shift the up and down positions of wing men to offer more effective defensive fire against attacking fighters.

2. The Flight:

a. Twelve (12) aircraft will assume positions as outlined below. Element leaders will maintain correct position with reference to the flight leader.

(1) The lead element will be designated as Element "A". Number two wing man will be in the right position and number three wing man will occupy the left position.

(2) The low center element will be designated as Element "C". The leader will occupy slot between No. 1 and No. 3 of the lead element, and will fly nose to tail with wing men of lead element. Vertical distance between element leader and flight leader will be one hundred fifty (150) feet. No. 2 wing man will fly in right position and No. 3 wingman will fly in left position.

(3) The high right element will be designated as Element "B". Leader will fly one hundred fifty (150) feet vertical distance above leader of Element "A" and forward on line extended from leader of element "C". He will fly in close enough that his No. 3 wing man will be directly above and nose to tail with No. 2 of the lead element. No. 2 wing man will fly the right position and No. 3 wing man will fly the left position.

(4) The low left element will be designated as Element "D". The leader will fly a vertical distance of one hundred fifty (150) feet below, and on line with leader of element "C". He will fly well forward in such manner that No. 3 wing man of Element "C" will partially overlap his No. 2 wing man. No. 2 wing man will fly the right position, and No. 3 wing man will fly the left position.

(5) Aircraft in Elements "A" and "C" will always be stacked away from the sun, within each element. In Elements "B" and "D", aircraft within each element will always be stacked into the sun.

3. Position of Elements

a. The high element (B), will always fly in the high position. If, due to the position of the sun, or due to consistent fighter attacks from the right side of the flight, the leader of element "B" elects to shift his position to the left side of the flight, Element "D" will then move over to the right side, but will remain as the low element. This

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will increase the maximum number of upper turrets uncovered to fighter attacks from above and to the right. Element designations will not change. The high element will always be Element "B".

b. In flying from the IP to the target, and until after photographs are taken, elements will remain in the same position that they were on reaching the IP." (See following diagrams).

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
Authority NND 760063

By JAB NAPA Date 10/13/05



CONFIDENTIAL

15 SEPT., 1944



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
CONFIDENTIAL  
PLAN VIEW



**"CONFIDENTIAL"**

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SIDE VIEW



REAR VIEW



**"CONFIDENTIAL"**

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B. Assembly Points

1. The briefed assembly points were as follows:

Assembly Point No.	Position	Altitudes	
		40th	44th
1	Saining Airfield 30°29'N-105°36'E	8000' I.	6000' I.
2	River Bend at 27°27'N-112°53'E	500' above undercast	2500' above undercast
3	River Mouth at 23°58'N-117°43'E	24000' T.	26000' T.

Assembly Point No.	Position	Altitudes	
		46 <del>2</del> nd	468th
1	Peishiyi Airfield 29°25'N-106°30'E	8000' I.	6000' I.
2	River Bend at 26°50'N-112°27'E	500' above undercast	2500' above undercast
3	23°35'N-117°19'E	23000' T.	25000' T.

2. If instrument conditions prevailed at assigned altitude at Assembly Point #1, aircraft were to assemble in formation at Assembly Point #2. If instrument conditions prevailed at Assembly Point #2, formations were to assemble at Assembly Point #3.

3. All turns for assembly were to be made to the left by the leaders and deputy leaders and to the right by all other aircraft.

4. Some difficulty was encountered in "forming-up" as indicated by mixed formations and the variance in size and type when over the target. The aircraft over the primary formed 14 formations as shown in the following tabulations (see also section C below):

No. of A/C in formation	No. of such formations	No. of A/C
17	1	17
15	1	15
9	2	18
8	3	24
6	1	6
5	2	10
4	2	8
3	2	6
Total	14	104

C. Formations over the Target

1. Formations are shown below as they were at the time of bomb release. The following diagrams are intended to indicate relative position

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only ("W" represents an aircraft of the 40th Group; "X", the 444th; "Y", the 462nd; and "Z" the 468th):

a. Time: 0347Z  
Altitude: 25000'  
Heading: 128° T

Z 471  
Z 546 Z 362  
Z 494 Z 442  
Z 504 Z 265 Z 397 Z 395

b. Time: 0401Z  
Altitude: 24500'  
Heading: 114° M

W 269  
W 237 W 589  
W 503  
W 319 W 541

c. Time: 0407Z  
Altitude: 25000'  
Heading: 124°

X 353  
X 399 X 360

d. Time: 0412Z  
Altitude: 24000 T  
Heading: 117° M.

W 298  
W 396 W 294  
Z 389 Z 525

e. Time: 0418Z  
Altitude: 24000 T  
Heading: 116 M.

W 587  
W 348 W 290  
W 452 W 582  
W 322 W 418  
W 281

f. Time: 0418Z  
Altitude: 25000'  
Heading: 116° T.

Z 469  
Z 828 Z 217  
X 215 Z 429

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g. Time: 0422Z  
Altitude: 23000'  
Heading: 125° M.

Y 346

Y 330 Y 347

Y 329 Y 311

Y 312 Y 209 Y 316 Y 506

W 466 Y 505

X 225 Y 531 X 204\*

W 363

\* Position of this aircraft not certain.

h. Time: 0423Z  
Altitude: 26000' T.  
Heading: 117°

X 340

X 341 X 580

X 472 X 251

X 423 X 375 W 303\*

\*Position of this aircraft not certain.

i. Time: 0424Z  
Altitude: 23000'  
Heading: 117° M.

Y 463

Y 479 Y 475

Y 444

Y 302

Y 461

Y 330 Y 299

Y 581 Y 484

Z 411 Z 409

Y 393 Y 827

Y 285 Y 270

W 295

j. Time: 0426Z  
Altitude: 23000'  
Heading: 122° M.

Y 362

W 331 Y 278

k. Time: 0420Z  
Altitude: 22650 I.  
Heading: 125° T.

W 831

W 508 W 275

W 342

X 267

W 344 W 313

Z 486

Z 390

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S E C R E T

i. Time: 0429Z  
Altitude: 26000' T  
Heading: 114°

X 324

X 370 X 462

X 352

X 300

X 530 X 307

X 262

m. Time: 0434Z  
Altitude: 25000'  
Heading: 120° T.

Z 354

Z 370 Z 353

Z 200

n. Time: 0502Z  
Altitude: 26000'  
Heading: 220°

X 292

X 403 X 485

X 202

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HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

SECRET

Auth: CG, XX BC  
Initials: 7/1/44  
Date: 21 Oct 44

CONSOLIDATED  
SPECIALIST MISSION  
REPORT OF

XX BOMBER COMMAND NAVIGATION OFFICER

Date Prepared: 21 October 1944

Field Order No. 10  
Date of Mission: 14 Oct 44

1. Although the greater portion of the mission was flown over a solid undercast, navigation was accomplished in a commendable manner for the most part. Because of the difficulty of getting drift, many airplanes drifted considerably to the left of their course on the way to the target. One small formation of the 468th Group did not locate the primary target.

a. Turning points on the coast were readily identified by radar.

b. The general criticism noted on Mission No. 9 that the removal of the radar altimeter is a serious handicap to the navigators was brought up again in many reports.

c. Navigators in lead airplanes request that the radar scope camera be installed in other than the lead airplane. The camera interferes with use of the scope as a navigational aid.

d. Average navigation time out and back.

	<u>NAV TIME OUT</u>	<u>NAV TIME BACK</u>
40th	4h 48m	5h 12m
444th	4h 43m	5h 13m
462nd	4h 50m	5h 27m
468th	4h 32m	5h 12m

e. Forecast winds generally were reported to be good in direction but low in velocity. Because of the undercast, computed winds were often difficult to arrive at; radar is not generally considered a good instrument to pick up usually encountered drifts. Average computed winds and altitudes follow:

	<u>ONE HALF OUT</u>	<u>TARGET AREA</u>	<u>ONE HALF BACK</u>
40th	16000' 230°24K	24000' 270°32K	16000' 270°22K
444th	16000' 240°22K	26000' 275°28K	16000' 260°22K
462nd	16000' 225°22K	23000' 270°27K	16000' 265°25K
468th	16000' 250°25K	25000' 270°30K	17000' 260°25K

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f. Following statistical information is presented as a general indication of the extent to which aids are being used by the various Groups:

	<u>CEL</u> <u>LOP's</u>	<u>RADIO</u> <u>LOP's</u>	<u>RADIO</u> <u>FIXES</u>	<u>CEL</u> <u>RADIO FIXES</u>	<u>QDM's</u>
40th	108	5	12	2	0
444th	35	2	6	0	1
462nd	90	14	10	0	14
468th	142	2	18	1	3

2. Comments by Groups:

a. 40th Group. Found incorporating flight engineer's cruise data into navigator's flight plan useful.

b. 444th Group. Relatively small number of celestial LOP's noted.

c. 468th Group. Largest number of celestial LOP's recorded to date on a mission. Group navigator will check logs of all airplanes of the formation which bombed Kagi (23°27'N, 120°26'E).

Prepared by:  
Staff Navigator

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By JAB NAPA Date 10/13/05



S E C R E T

IX - MISSION OPERATIONAL LOSSES

Mission No. 10

14 October 1944

A. Movement from Rear to Forward Area: No aircraft was lost on the movement from the Rear to the Forward Area.

B. Mission staged from Forward Area:

1. A/C 280 (444th): This aircraft took off from its base at Kwanghan at 132313Z. It is believed to have been seen at the time the Group was assembling at Suining (30° 29'N - 105° 36'E). The formation then entered an overcast and aircraft 280 was not seen again. However, between 0900Z and 0920Z the crew of another aircraft from the same Group thought they heard 280 calling Liangshan, but they were not sure. If the aircraft had maintained its briefed course to the target and back it would have been in the general area of Liangshan at this time. Factors indicating that this aircraft was an operational loss are, (a) no other aircraft reported seeing it over the primary target, (b) fighter opposition was nil and anti-aircraft weak to moderate and inaccurate over the primary target, and (c) no bombs-away message was received.

2. A/C 513 (40th): This aircraft took off from its base at Hsinching at 132258Z. A radio from the aircraft indicated that it had bombed a target of opportunity at 0345Z, had one engine out but could not feather and was returning to Hsinching. Later Chungking received a commercial telegram reading as follows, "From Changteh. Notify APO rpt APO 210 Captain Meyers entire crew safe. Walking out. Expect to arrive three weeks. Signed Capt. Charlie Charlie Meyer."

Kunming received a report from Chihkiang as follows, "Chinese net reports that yesterday afternoon at 1324 hours one aircraft crash landed 25 miles north of Changteh. Ten of crew are found. Ship reported to have burned. One crew member still missing and two are injured. Four machine guns were found. Two men in town 20 kilos north of Changteh and 8 men in town 45 kilos north of Changteh."

It is not definitely ascertained that the Chinese report relates to aircraft 513, but the time mentioned (140624Z) and the general area of Changteh is not inconsistent with the message received from Capt. Meyer, the airplane commander.

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By JAB NAPA Date 10/13/05



S E C R E T

X - Information on Landings

Mission No. 10

14 October 1944

A. Landed at XX Bomber Command Bases:

1. Aircraft bombing primary target:

	<u>First A/C down</u>	<u>Last A/C down</u>
a. 40th	0910Z	1015Z
b. 444th	0907Z	1025Z
c. 462nd	0935Z	1036Z
d. 468th	<u>0853Z</u>	<u>0954Z</u>
Over-all	0853Z	1036Z

2. Aircraft failing to bomb primary target:

a. 40th Group:

- (1) A/C 457: 0925Z - bombed tertiary target.
- (2) A/C 297: 2352Z - brought bombs back.
- (3) A/C 579: 0529Z - jettisoned bombs.
- (4) A/C 276: 0920Z - bombed tertiary target.
- (5) A/C 522: 0546Z - bombed last resort target.

b. 444th Group:

- (1) A/C 464: 0551Z - jettisoned bombs.
- (2) A/C 507: 0924Z - jettisoned bombs.
- (3) A/C 492: 0015Z - jettisoned bombs.
- (4) A/C 343: 0216Z - brought bombs back.
- (5) A/C 510: 0950Z - bombed target of opportunity.

c. 462nd Group:

- (1) A/C 386: 0454Z - bombed last resort target.
- (2) A/C 273: 0136Z - jettisoned bombs.

d. 468th Group:

- (1) A/C 487: 0924Z - bombed target of opportunity.
- (2) A/C 454: 0919Z - bombed target of opportunity.
- (3) A/C 355: 0950Z - bombed target of opportunity.
- (4) A/C 407: 0406Z - bombed tertiary target.
- (5) A/C 358: 0842Z - jettisoned bombs.
- (6) A/C 284: 0226Z - jettisoned bombs.
- (7) A/C 542: 0112Z - brought bombs back.
- (8) A/C 272: 0008Z - brought bombs back.
- (9) A/C 411: 0921Z - jettisoned bombs.

B. Landed Elsewhere:

1. 444th Group:

- a. A/C 375: landed at Liangshan.

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- b. A/C 215: landed at Chikkiang at 0820Z due to engine failure.
- c. A/C 307: landed at Liangshan.
- d. A/C 524: landed at Liangshan.
- e. A/C 202: landed at Liangshan due to engine failure.

2. 462nd Group:

- a. A/C 285: landed at Liangshan at 0830Z due to gasoline shortage.
- b. A/C 312: landed at Liangshan due to gasoline shortage.

3. 468th Group:

- a. A/C 356: landed at Suichwan.
- b. A/C 389: landed at Liangshan due to gasoline shortage. Returned to Pengshan 0323Z, 15 October.
- c. A/C 365: landed at Pei-shih-i at 0921Z due to gasoline shortage. Returned to Pengshan 0433Z, 15 October.

C. Losses:

- 1. A/C 513 (40th) - crashed near Changteh.
- 2. A/C 280 (444th) - missing.

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By JAB NAPA Date 10/13/05



S E C R E T

ANNEX

C

ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT OPPOSITION

\*\*\*\*\*  
\* Prepared by: \*  
\* \* \* \* \*  
\* Antiaircraft Officer \*  
\* XX Bomber Command \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

S E C R E T



S E C R E T

I - Enemy Antiaircraft Opposition

Mission No. 10

14 October 1944

(Preliminary Report)

A. Antiaircraft Fire Encountered

1. Okayama (22° 47'N - 120° 17'E):

a. Generally meager and inaccurate heavy antiaircraft fire was reported by 90 per cent (94 out of 104) of the aircraft over the area. Altitudes varied from 21,000 to 26,000 feet and times of encounter from 0346Z to 0503Z. The approximate intensity, accuracy and deviations of bursts were reported as follows:

<u>Reports of Accuracy</u>		<u>Reports of Intensity</u>	
Struck . . .	3 a/c ( 3 per cent)	Intense . . .	1 a/c ( 1 per cent)
Rocked . . .	3 a/c ( 3 per cent)	Moderate . . .	10 a/c (11 per cent)
Missed . . .	88 a/c (94 per cent)	Meager . . .	83 a/c (88 per cent)

Reports of Deviations

(Numbers indicate aircraft reporting in the affirmative, percentages are determined from the total reports of deviations in one direction only, i.e., above, level and below.)

Above . . .	34 (25 per cent)	Ahead . . .	25 (25 per cent)
Level . . .	21 (15 per cent)	Abreast . . .	23 (25 per cent)
Below . . .	79 (60 per cent)	Behind . . .	48 (50 per cent)
		Left . . .	54 (59 per cent)
		In Line . . .	12 (13 per cent)
		Right . . .	25 (28 per cent)

b. Bursts were reported as black in all instances with the exception of 1 formation which encountered both black and white heavy antiaircraft fire. The undercast varied from 5/10 to CAWU conditions.

c. No definite statement can be made as to the type of fire encountered as reports were evenly divided between continuously pointed and barrage. If it were continuously pointed fire, however, it was very poorly directed.

d. No enemy aircraft were reported on the same course and altitude.

e. There were possible indications of radar controlled fire through R.C.M. intercepts of enemy radar signals at 0407Z and 0422Z, at which time heavy antiaircraft fire was reasonably accurate (1 aircraft being struck at 0407Z). These signals could have been from gun-laying radar.

2. Takao (22° 37'N - 120° 18'E): Meager and accurate (1 aircraft was rocked at 0406Z) to inaccurate heavy antiaircraft fire was reported by aircraft at 0406Z and at 0425Z. Undercast was reported as 4/10 and no enemy aircraft were observed on the same course and altitude. All bursts were reported as black. Altitudes varied from 22,000 to 24,000 feet.

3. Tainan (23° 00'N - 120° 13'E): Meager and inaccurate heavy antiaircraft fire was reported by 5 aircraft at 0350Z and 0430Z at altitudes varying from 22,000 to 24,000 feet. Bursts were reported as black and

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undercast as 3/10. No enemy aircraft were reported at the same course and altitude.

4. Heito (22° 40'N - 120° 29'E): Meager and accurate (1 aircraft was rocked at 0425Z) to inaccurate heavy anti-aircraft fire was encountered by 4 aircraft at 0420 and 0425Z at altitudes varying from 21,000 to 24,000 feet. Bursts were reported as black and weather conditions as CAVU. No enemy aircraft were reported on the same course and altitude.

5. Lagoon Northwest of Okayama at approximately 22° 52'N - 120° 13'E: Meager and inaccurate heavy anti-aircraft fire at an altitude of 21,000 feet was reported by 5 aircraft. Bursts were reported as black, and visibility conditions as 4/10. No enemy aircraft were reported on the same course and altitude.

6. Five Miles East of Okayama at 22° 47'N - 120° 22'E: One aircraft reported moderate and inaccurate heavy anti-aircraft fire at an altitude of 21,000 feet at 0420Z. Bursts were reported as black.

7. Possible Ship at 22° 50'N - 120° 08'E: One aircraft out of a formation of 9 aircraft reported meager and inaccurate light colored bursts of heavy anti-aircraft fire at 0438Z at an altitude of 22,000 feet.

8. Five miles South of Taichu at 24° 14'N - 120° 38'E: Three out of 4 aircraft reported meager and inaccurate heavy anti-aircraft fire at an altitude of 25,000 feet at 0414Z. Bursts were reported as 5000 feet below the aircraft. Weather conditions were 2/10 to CAVU conditions and no enemy aircraft were reported on the same course and altitude.

9. Hakusha Island (23° 39'N - 119° 35'E): One aircraft reported meager and inaccurate black heavy anti-aircraft bursts at an altitude of 23,000 feet at 0404Z. Weather conditions were CAVU.

B. Ground-To-Air Rockets

One aircraft out of 25 reported one possible inaccurate ground-to-air rocket at 0424Z at Okayama (22° 47'N - 120° 16'E) at an altitude of 26,000 feet. Two separate black bursts were seen from the same projectile. Undercast was 2/10 to 3/10.

C. Smokescreens

None reported.

D. Barrage Balloons

Three conventional barrage balloons flying at an altitude of about 5000 feet were reported by 1 aircraft at 0430Z approximately 5 miles northeast of Okayama.

E. High Altitude Balloons

1. Two crews reported high altitude balloons. The first observation reported balloons at 24,000 feet approximately 15 miles inland from Okayama. The second aircraft reported balloons, 2 or 3 being over 24,000 feet, and the remainder from 16,000 feet up, approximately 10 miles inland from Okayama. The balloons were described as long, with tails and grey-black in color.

2. Possibly in connection with the observations of high-altitude balloons,

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2 aircraft reported unusual AA bursts in the Okayama area. Both crews stated that these unusual bursts were khaki colored, bursting very slowly, and appearing much larger than ordinary flak bursts and resembling balloons. No other information is available.

F. Warning

It is evident that the enemy had prior warning of our approach. R.C.M. observers intercepted enemy early warning radar signals from approximately 113°E to the target and return. Three sightings were made of enemy aircraft prior to the first bomb release time or from 0330Z to 0339Z, and the first formation over the target encountered heavy anti-aircraft fire (meager and inaccurate) at 0346Z.

C-I-3

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By JAB NAPA Date 10/13/05



S E C R E T

ANNEX

D

ENEMY AIR OPPOSITION

\* \* \* \* \*  
\* Prepared by: \*  
\* \* \* \* \*  
\* Operational Intelligence Unit \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

S E C R E T



S E C R E T

ENEMY AIR OPPOSITION

Mission No. 10

14 October 1944

So far as is known, no B-29 was attacked by enemy fighters. A total of 13 enemy aircraft was sighted at distances varying from a minimum of 1500 yards up to 5 miles. Observation of markings was not possible at these distances. Sightings were made in the area of the primary target and en route to and from the target. Details of sightings are given in the following table.

Table No. 1 - Enemy Aircraft Sightings

<u>Type E/A</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Altitude</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Distance</u>
2 S/E	Primary Target	24,700	0407Z	5 miles
2 OSCARS	Primary Target	23,000	0414Z	3000 yds.
1 S/E	Primary Target	23,000	0410Z	5 miles
1 Uniden.	N of Henyang	15,000	Unr.	Unr.
1 S/E	22°45'N - 119°25'E	19,000	0435Z	1500 yds
2 S/E	23°58'N - 117°43'E	20,000	0339Z	2 miles
1 Uniden.	22°58'N - 120°11'E	On ground	0442Z	-----
1 TONY	23°58'N - 117°43'E	26,000	0330Z	1½ miles
2 Uniden.	23°58'N - 117°43'E	24,300	0335Z	2000 yds.

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S E C R E T

ANNEX

E

WEATHER INFORMATION

- I - Weather Information
- II - Chart - Weather as Forecast and Encountered
- III - Chart - Synoptic Map

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S E C R E T

I - WEATHER INFORMATION

Mission No. 10

14 October 1944

	As Forecast	As Encountered
Base (Take-off)	3000' overcast top 5000'; 6000' overcast top 8500'; 10,000' overcast top 15,000'. Light drizzle. Vsby 1 1/2 miles in light drizzle and light fog. Moderate to heavy rime icing above 10,000	Hsinching: Broken Strato-cumulus, base 4000', top 5000'. Stratus overcast base 6000', top at 7500'. Altostratus overcast, base 10,000', top 15,000'. Vsby 6 miles. Kwanghan: 3000' broken with thin overcast at 9000'. Vsby 5 miles. <b>Kunglai:</b> Overcast at 2500' with scattered scud at 500'. Breaks in overcast. Vsby 6 miles in haze. Wind light and variable. Pengshan: Overcast at 3500' lifting and breaking rapidly. Vsby 5 miles. Wind N. 5 MPH.
Base To 110° E	Similar cloud and icing conditions except occasional cumuli-form clouds in hills, tops at 9000'. Light intermittent drizzle.	Scattered to broken strato-cumulus 2500', top 3000' locally. Stratus overcast base 3500', top 7500' with occasional breaks and which became nil at 106°E but was replaced by broken cumulus or stratocumulus base 4000' top 7000'-8000'. Beyond 108°E broken stratocumulus base 4000', top 5000' becoming scattered stratus or stratocumulus at coast. Second layer was an altostratus overcast, base 10,000', top 14,000' which persisted to 112°E where it was replaced by a scattered to broken layer of altostratus, base 13,000', top 14,000' which in turn became nil at 116.50°E. Between 108 and 116°E there was a broken layer of altostratus, base 9000', tops frequently merging with layer at 10,000'. Another layer of broken to overcast altostratus base 17,000', top 19,000' between 105°E and 114°E. Another layer of scattered to broken cirrus, base 26,000' between 113°E and target.
110° To Coast	Broken stratocumulus becoming cumulus in hill areas, base 3000' tops of stratocumulus 5000'. Tops of cumulus 7000'. Broken altostratus base 7000', tops 8000' becoming nil at coast. Overcast altostratus, base 9000', tops 14,000' lowering gradually to 10,000' at coast. This layer becoming broken at coast. Light intermittent rain.	

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S E C R E T

	As Forecast	As Encountered
Coast To Target	Broken bands of stratus or stratocumulus oriented NW-SE base 3000', top 4000'. Broken altostratus base 9000', top 10,000' becoming nil in middle straits.	Thin scattered to broken cirrus at 26,000'. Variable amounts of cumulus or stratocumulus, base probably 3000' tops 4000' or 5000'. The amounts varied from scattered to overcast but in general were broken.
Target Area	5/10 stratocumulus or cumulus base 3000', top 4000-5000'. No other cloud. Vsby 10 miles. Altimeter setting 30.14 inches.	Estimates of cloud amount ranged from 2/10 to 5/10 stratocumulus or fair weather cumulus, base probably 3500', tops 5000'. Vsby 20-30 miles.
Return Route	Same as Route out.	Aircraft found that top of cloud layers when encountered over China about 200 miles inland, had lowered to 15,000' to 16,000' and gradually lowered along route back to 10,000' over base on return. The clouds were in layers; base of lowest overcast at 5,500'. Msl., (4000' ceiling) with lower scattered at 2500' Msl. vsby 8 miles.
Bases on Return	Overcast 5000', top 7500'. Overcast 10000'. Top 14,000'. Vsby 5 miles.	Hsinching: Overcast at 4000 with lower scattered at 2500'. Vsby 8 miles. Kwanghan: 2500' broken. Overcast 9000' tops at 13,000'. Vsby 7 miles. <b>Kunglai:</b> Overcast 3500' lower scattered at 1500'. Vsby 6 miles. Wind N.W. 5 MPH. Pengshan: Broken to OVC at 4000' with tops at 8000'. Vsby 6 miles.

A. Winds aloft - Forecast

Altitude	Terminal	Midway	Target
5,000'	50° - 12K		
10,000'	120° - 15K	80° - 15K	80° - 15K
15,000'	220° - 20K	230° - 22K	250° - 20K
20,000'	250° - 30K	260° - 28K	270° - 30K
25,000'	270° - 40K	270° - 38K	280° - 35K

E-1-2

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S E C R E T

B. Winds Aloft - Encountered

Altitude	Target
23,000'	270° - 30K
26,000'	270° - 30K

No other observations were available, but pilots and navigators generally agreed that metro winds were as forecast.

C. Target Temperatures

Forecast

Altitude	Temperature
13,000'	0°C
20,000'	-7°C
25,000'	-17°C

Mean temperature Surface to 25,000', +1°C

Encountered

Altitude	Temperature
22,000'	-8°C
25,000'	-17.5°C
26,000'	-17°C

E-I-3

S E C R E T

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
Authority NND 760063

By JAB NAPA Date 10/13/05



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XX BOMBER COMMAND  
MISSION NO. 10  
14th OCTOBER, 1944  
WEATHER FORECAST



14.81

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Authority: MND 760063  
By: [Signature] NAPA Date: 10/18/05



"SECRET"

87

"SECRET"




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
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
WEATHER AS ENCOUNTERED  
ROUTE OUT

MISSION NO. 10

OCTOBER, 1944



XX BOMBER COMMAND  
WEATHER AS ENCOUNTERED  
ROUTE BACK



SECRET



SECRET


78

SECRET



No. 5555

WEST NORTH PACIFIC OCEAN - METEOROLOGICAL PLOTTING CHART - U.S. NAVY



**MAP INSTRUCTIONS**

1. Symbols for surface and upper air observations are given in the key.
2. The symbols for surface observations are given in the key.
3. The symbols for upper air observations are given in the key.
4. The symbols for surface observations are given in the key.
5. The symbols for upper air observations are given in the key.
6. The symbols for surface observations are given in the key.
7. The symbols for upper air observations are given in the key.
8. The symbols for surface observations are given in the key.
9. The symbols for upper air observations are given in the key.
10. The symbols for surface observations are given in the key.
11. The symbols for upper air observations are given in the key.
12. The symbols for surface observations are given in the key.
13. The symbols for upper air observations are given in the key.
14. The symbols for surface observations are given in the key.
15. The symbols for upper air observations are given in the key.

STATION	DATE	TIME	TYPE
Huj	14 Oct 1944	1200Z	Surface
W.H. Miller			Upper Air

16-76

SECRET

Mission No. 10

DECLASSIFIED  
 Authority: **MND 760063**  
 By: **888** NAPA Date: **10/18/05**



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"SECRET"



S E C R E T

ANNEX

F

COMMUNICATIONS INFORMATION

\* \* \* \* \*  
\* Prepared by: \*  
\* \*  
\* Communications Section \*  
\* XX Bomber Command \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
NND 740120  
By CO/MT NARS, Date OCT 20 1975

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Authority NND 760063  
By JAB NAPA Date 10/13/05



S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

: : : : : : : : :  
: SECRET :  
: Auth: CG XX BC :  
: Initials: JDG :  
: Date: 21 Oct 44 :  
: : : : : : : : :

MISSION NUMBER 10 - COMMUNICATIONS CRITIQUE

1. Part I, Section VIII - Communications - Tactical Doctrine as revised under date of 4 October 1944, was put into effect for the first time on Mission Number Ten. In general the procedures were unchanged, except that the practice of sending the "Bombs Away" message from over the target was resumed, and a new "Bombs Away" code introduced.

2. The channels of communication for handling air-ground traffic, however, were entirely foreign to those employed on any previous mission flown from the China Bases. Previously all contacts between aircraft and ground stations were made with the XX Bomber Command Aircraft Control Center (ACC) at Hsinching, with that station standing by on an assigned 8 megacycle frequency for each of the four Groups and on three alternate frequencies. On this mission, however, each Group manned and operated its own air-ground station and relayed all messages received from aircraft to the ACC, with that station standing by on three alternate frequencies in the event aircraft could not contact the Group facilities. As indicated by Radio Operators Interrogation Forms, these new facilities met with the complete approval of using personnel, with the exception of a general complaint on the air-ground frequencies assigned the Groups.

3. This complaint was, in all cases, based on the fact that the 8 megacycle primary frequency assigned for Group use faded when the aircraft was over the target area, in some cases to such an extent that the aircraft were forced to contact the ACC on the 12 megacycle standby frequency of that station, so that messages could be passed. The 444th Group experienced the most trouble with this phenomenon, the majority of the aircraft indicating that the station faded out at about 500 miles. However, aircraft of the other three groups reported receiving their Group station with an S-1 or S-2 signal strength while over the target area, with the ground installation using the same type of equipment, frequency and power as used by the 444th Group. It is therefore believed that a redesign of the transmitting antenna system used by that Group may give their ground station greater range, inasmuch as that part of the system is the one variable between the groups.

4. As much has been said before, the 12 megacycle standby frequency used by the ACC proved to be very effective from over the target area. A 12 megacycle alternate frequency will be procured for each of the Groups for future use. It is also believed that an increase in transmitter power will aid in increasing station range and higher powered transmitters will be procured for the use of each Group in the future.

5. Natural interference again consisted of atmospherics produced by storms, but in no case was it strong enough to disrupt communication. Man-made interference was reported to some extent by three of the Groups, the interference being in the form of CW signals on a frequency nearly adjacent to the assigned

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Group frequencies. What traffic of this nature that was logged by the operators indicates that these strange stations were carrying on traffic of a routine nature and no attempt at jamming was being made. No record was made of what appeared to be deliberate jamming on the part of the enemy.

6. A total of 12 requests for D/F aid were made, divided between the Groups as follows: 444th Group - 2, 462nd Group - 7, 468th Group - 3, 40th Group - 0. Of these 12 requests, 11 were considered as being reliable, the remaining "QDM" being 20 degrees off. While no excuse is offered for the apparent error on the part of the D/F operator, yet it is not apparent why the aircraft asked for D/F aid if the aircrafts position were well enough and positively enough known to ascertain that the "QDM" furnished was 20 degrees off. Airplane commanders are again reminded that the requesting of D/F aid merely to check up on navigation and then the discarding of that information when it disagrees with plotted position is not a good practice. D/F aid should be requested when it is not positive that the plotted position is correct the radio channel should be left free for the use of other aircraft who, perhaps, have more urgent traffic.

7. Radio beacons again proved to be the most used radio aid to air navigation, with beacons reported as being initially picked up at ranges comparable to those obtained on previous missions. No discrepancies regarding beacons or beacon operation were reported.

8. Malfunctions of equipment were in approximately the same number as reported on previous missions, with the malfunctions being almost equally distributed among the various equipments. Groups reported malfunctions as follows: 40th Group - 7, 444th Group - 5, 462nd Group - 6, 468th Group - 7. In addition to this, the 462nd Group reported one aircraft as having noise introduced into its radio system by a faulty fluxgate compass.

9. Air-to-air homing was reported as being used for the first time on a tactical mission by the 462nd Group. A total of ten aircraft used this method to achieve a satisfactory rendezvous.

10. No violation of cryptographic security was reported, but once again operators reported hearing other aircraft break in on transmissions already in progress. Inasmuch as transmissions between aircraft and ground stations are now confined to Group facilities, it is believed that the offending operators may be easily identified and necessary corrective action taken. This practice, which can only occur as the result of carelessness on the part of the radio operator, is the outstanding procedure error now being logged, and its curtailment must be undertaken by all concerned.

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By JAB NAPA Date 10/13/05



S E C R E T

ANNEX

G

RADAR INFORMATION

I RADAR INFORMATION

II RADAR TABLES

\*\*\*\*\*  
\* Prepared by: \*  
\* \* \* \* \*  
\* Radar Section \*  
\* XX Bomber Command \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

S E C R E T



S E C R E T

I - RADAR INFORMATION

Mission No. 10

14 October 1944

A. Radar Bombing

The Last Resort Target of Hengyang was the only target bombed by radar, with unobserved results, in this daylight mission. Two (2) individual aircraft bombed this last resort target, while all other aircraft bombed the primary, tertiary and targets of opportunity visually. Lead Crew Radar Operators reported using the Radar-Bombsight Synchronization procedure until the target appeared visually, where the Bombardier continued the bombing run with the radar operator following through to completion. The radar equipment provided a great aid to bombing on this mission by identifying the initial point and location of the formations on the bombing run previous to visual identification.

B. Radar Navigation

The aid radar equipment provided to navigation was its main use. The initial point was reported readily identifiable at a useable range and also the various check points along the route. The check points along the China Coast and the Coast of Formosa were reported as excellent. The SCR-729 was used to advantage in homing on YJ raccons on the return trip and as an aid in rendezvous and formation flying in conditions of poor visibility.

C. Radar Operator Efficiency

Radar operator efficiency was improved. A larger number of operators identified the check points and the initial point at a useable range, however a large number of operators reported the primary target difficult to identify and the target giving a very poor radar signal. This confusion on the primary target was expected due to the nature of the target. Several operators reported the highways, dams and bridges in the vicinity of the target area, giving very good radar responses. Radar interference from other radar sets in the formation was indicated but identification could be read through this interference by the operator with out a great deal of difficulty.

D. Radar Scope Photography

The photographic results on this mission were much higher than on previous missions. The quantity and the quality of the results were satisfactory. A total of thirty-four (34) cameras were installed, thirteen (13) C-3, fifteen (15) K-35 and six (6) H2X automatic cameras. Twenty-one (21) or sixty-four (64%) per cent of all possible pictures were returned and eleven (11) or fifty-three (53%) per cent were useable.

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E. Radar Serviceability

A total of eighty-nine (89%) per cent of the AN/APQ-13 radar sets were operational over the target based on the number of aircraft over the target area. The unrepairable AN/APQ-13 failures increased with twenty-one (21) sets unrepairable by air maintenance. Failures were due primarily to inverter malfunctions and altitude. There were seven (7) minor failures of the auxiliary radar sets, two (2) for the SCR-729, three (3) for the SCR-718 and one (1) for the SCR-695.

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TABLE I - BOMBING DATA

	40th GP		444th Gp		462nd Gp		468th Gp		Total	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Total A/C Reporting	33		32		29		34		128	
A/C Bombing PT (All Visual)	28	85	26	81	27	93	22	65	103	81
A/C Bombing ST	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A/C Bombing LR (All Radar)	1	3	0	0	1	3	0	0	2	2
A/C Bombing T of O (All Visual)	2	6	2	6	0	0	5	15	9	7
A/C Jettisoning & Misc. Conditions	2	6	4	13	1	4	7	20	14	10

TABLE II - CAMERA RESULTS

SUBJECT	40th Gp	444th Gp	462nd Gp	468th Gp	Total
Cameras Installed (Tot)	9	9	10	6	34
C-5, Cameras	4	3	4	2	13
K-35, Cameras	4	4	4	3	15
H2X, Automatic Camera	1	2	2	1	6
Cameras Airborne	9	9	9	6	33
Pictures Returned	3	8	7	3	21
Useable Pictures	1	6	1	3	11
Pictures tracing bomb run	1	4	1	2	8

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TABLE III - R.A.D.A.R. OPERATOR EFFICIENCY

SUBJECT	40th Gp	444th Gp	462nd Gp	468th Gp	Total
Determined G.S. and Drift by Radar	22	9	7	6	44
Identifying I.P. at Useable Range	17	12	5	9	43
Identifying Target at Useable Range	9	4	2	2	17
Using Sector Scan	16	6	3	8	32
Using Azimuth Stabilization	23	9	5	12	49

TABLE IV - SERVICEABILITY

SUBJECT	40th Gp		444th Gp		462nd Gp		468th Gp		Total	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Total A/C reporting	33		32		29		34		128	
N/APQ-13 Operative at take-off	33	100	32	100	27	93	34	100	126	98
CR-729 Failures *	0	0	1	3	2	7	0	0	3	2
CR-718 Failures *	0	0	0	0	3	10	1	3	4	3
CR-695 Failures *	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
A/C Bombing	31	94	28	88	28	96	27	80	114	89
N/APQ-13 Operative over target #	26	84	27	96	24	86	25	93	102	89
N/APQ-13 Unrepairable Failures #	5	16	8	29	5	18	3	11	21	15
N/APQ-13 Repairable in Flight #	1	-	5	-	0	-	0	-	6	-

\* Percentage Based on A/C Reporting

# Percentage Based on A/C Bombing

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
Authority NND 760063

By JAB NAPA Date 10/13/05




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### RADAR SCOPE PHOTOGRAPHS FORMOSA STRAIT AREA



COURSE 123°11'M (122°00'T)  
SWEEP 20 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 25,400'

23°06'N  
119°39'E



COURSE 119°11'M (118°00'T)  
SWEEP 50 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 25,400'

23°04'N  
119°43'E




COURSE 124°11'M (123°00'T)  
SWEEP 20 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 25,400'

22°58'N  
119°55'E




COURSE 130°  
SWEEP 20 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 25,400'




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23°18'N  
119°22'E




COURSE 121°11'M (120°00'T)  
SWEEP 50 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 25,000'

23°57'N  
118°03'E



COURSE 191°11'M (190°00'T)  
SWEEP 20 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 23,500'

23°55'N  
117°43'E



COURSE 130°  
SWEEP 20 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 25,400'



COURSE 30°  
SWEEP 50 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 25,400'



COURSE 30°  
SWEEP 20 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 25,400'

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
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Authority NND 760063


By JAB NAPA Date 10/13/05



### RADAR SCOPE PHOTOGRAPHS FORMOSA STRAIT AREA



23° 06'N  
119° 39'E




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23°04'N  
119°43'E




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22°58'N  
119°55'E




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ALTITUDE: 25,400'


22°53'N  
120°07'E





23°18'N  
119°22'E



23°57'N  
118°03'E




23°55'N  
117°43'E




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SWEEP 20 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 25,400'

22°50'N  
120°12'E



COURSE 306°11'M (305°00'T)  
SWEEP 50 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 15,000'

28°42'N  
111°31'E




COURSE 301°11'M (300°00'T)  
SWEEP 20 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 11,000'

30°18'N  
108°25'E




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### RADAR SCOPE PHOTOGRAPHS OKAYAMA AREA-FORMOSA




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22°47'N  
120°15'E




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ALTITUDE: 25,000'

22°47'N  
120°16'E




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ALTITUDE: 25,000'

22°36'N  
120°12'E




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SWEEP 50 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 25,000'

22°57'N  
119°56'E




COURSE 114°11'M (113°00'T)  
SWEEP 50 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 25,000'

22°59'N  
119°52'E



COURSE 114°11'M (113°00'T)  
SWEEP 50 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 25,000'

23°00'N  
119°48'E



FORMOSA  
(TAIWAN)

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
By NAB NAPA Date 10/13/05



RADAR SCOPE PHOTOGRAPHS  
OKAYAMA AREA-FORMOSA




22°47'N  
120°15'E




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ALTITUDE: 25,000'

22°47'N  
120°16'E



COURSE 268°11'M (267°00'T)  
SWEEP 20 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 25,000'

22°36'N  
120°12'E




COURSE 265°11'M (264°00'T)  
SWEEP 20 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 25,000'

22°36'N  
120°11'E



22°57'N  
119°56'E




COURSE 262°11'M (261°00'T)  
SWEEP 20 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 25,000'

22°36'N  
120°10'E



22°59'N  
119°52'E




COURSE 266°11'M (265°00'T)  
SWEEP 20 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 25,000'

22°36'N  
120°09'E



23°00'N  
119°48'E



COURSE 266°11'M (265°00'T)  
SWEEP 20 MILES  
ALTITUDE: 25,000'

22°36'N  
120°08'E





S E C R E T

ANNEX

H

RCM INFORMATION

\*\*\*\*\*  
\* Prepared by: \*  
\* \* \* \* \*  
\* RCM Section \*  
\* XX Bomber Command \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

S E C R E T



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SECRET  
Auth: CG, ~~YBC~~  
Initials: MP  
Date: 23 Oct. 44.

HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

23 October 1944

SUBJECT: RCM Report - Combat Mission No. 10  
Okayama, Formosa, 14 October 44 - Daylight.

TO : Commanding General, 20th Air Force, Washington 25, D.C.

A. General

RCM activities were confined to searching for enemy radar stations from take off to target and return. Nine RCM equipped aircraft, each with one RCM observer, participated in the mission. The frequency assignments were as follows:

- 2 - 1000-3300 Mc.  
70-330 Mc. (YR 1600 Recorder)
- 1 - 300-1000 Mc.
- 4 - 70-330 Mc.
- 2 - 70-220 Mc. D/F

B. Results

1. Due to unforeseen complications and AN/APA-24 antenna malfunctions, only one D/F antenna was in operation on this mission. Therefore, the location of the majority of the signals will be the area of the signal intercept. (Refer to resume of intercepts).

2. 70 Mc. Type: Frequent intercepts were made of signals of this type enroute to the target. The strongest was the 80 Mc. signal at the coast of China.

3. 100 Mc. Type: RCM observers place a radar of this type in the salient projecting from Changsha toward Kweilin. It is interesting to note that the Prf. has been lowered to 430 PPS, possibly to increase the range on high flying aircraft.

4. 160 Mc. Type: This type of signal was intercepted near Formosa. Three RCM observers logged a double humped pulse over target. Each pulse was  $2\frac{1}{2}$  Usec. wide with a  $2\frac{1}{2}$  Usec. separation.

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5. 200 Mc. Type: Intercepts of this type were made near and over the target. The association of a 197 Mc. signal with flak suggested radar controlled guns but the inaccuracy on the flak disproves any such control.

6. YR-1600 Recorder: The two RCM observers that manually operated the 1000-3300 Mc. band also used an additional receiver with TU-58-B and the YR-1600 Recorder. Good records were made of an 80 Mc. station and a 74 Mc. station near the coast of China. The sensitivity of the recorder had to be closely guarded to prevent varying intensities of noise from blanking the tape.

7. There were no intercepts in the 300-1000 Mc. band and the 1000-3300 Mc. band.

8. There were no reports of enemy radar or radio jamming.

9. To investigate enemy attempts to interfere with our homing stations and to determine if the enemy bombers use radar or homing aids to navigate enroute to our forward bases, a monitor station is maintained at the forward bases. No suspicious signals were intercepted.

C. Equipment

1. The sensitivity of the SCR-587 is too low for good results with the YR-1600.

2. The YR-1600 should have a dial light so that the RCM observer can observe the tape when the recorder is in the bottom rack.

3. Two O-10/APA-6X became inoperative during the mission. One was repaired during flight by replacing the 6J7.

4. The modified D/F antenna (Electrically driven) operated satisfactorily during flight.

For the Commanding General:

*Leo I. Herman*  
LEO I. HERMAN  
Colonel, Air Corps  
Actg. Adjutant General

1 Incl.  
Resume of signal intercepts.

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Resume of Signal Intercepts

<u>Freq.</u>	<u>PRF</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>Approx. Lat. &amp; Long. and Remarks</u>
67	540	4	27°30'N, 112°20'E Strong
68	520	23	22°40'N, 120°17'E D/F located in vicinity of Takao.
69	540	34	25°06'N, 113°15'E D/F station located in vicinity of Shaochow. Under investigation.
70	542	33	25°45'N, 114°25'E Rotating slowly.
72	498	36	26°50'N, 112°27'E Rotating, strong.
74	500	35	Picked up plane at China coast tracked to IP on return tracked aircraft 100 miles inland.
75	520	25	Tracked from 26°35'N, 114°30'E to 29°N, 110°E.
78	520	40	25°20'N, 116°50'E
80	510	40	Signal strong. Picked up station at China coast and tracked plane to 25°35'N, 115°E. Maximum strength at coast.
95	1000	13	24°12'N, 119°15'E Note small pulse width
98	1100	16.5	33°18'N, 119°14'E Very strong.
99	385	40	27°15'N, 113°15'E Rotating 1/2 RPM.
100	430	51	27°20'N, 113°10'E Changsha salient very strong 2nd & 3rd harmonics received.
104	530	10	A/C circling at rendezvous point 23°58'N, 117°45'E. Tracked plane towards I.P. Strong back lobe.
106	515	12	Tracked A/C over the straits and inland on the return trip.
107	420	55	Tracked from 26°30'N, 114°E to 28°40'N, 110°55'E. Slow sweep at times.
160	515	12	Pulse rate exactly synchronized with 106 Mc. station as though interrogated. Minor lobes.

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
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Resume of Signal Intercepts Cont'd

<u>Freq.</u>	<u>PRF</u>	<u>PI</u>	<u>Approx. Lat. &amp; long. and Remarks</u>
162	518	6	Over target strong double pulse  Flak inaccurate.
164	537	3 $\frac{1}{2}$ , 2 $\frac{1}{2}$	Over target  double pulse, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ usec separation. Flak inaccurate.
180	670	7	Over target, vertical polarized. Very strong. Flak accurate.
197	200	6.6	Over target - weak.
199	1000	34	Strong near Formosa coast.

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S E C R E T

ANNEX

I

CENTRAL STATION FIRE CONTROL AND GUNNERY

\*\*\*\*\*  
\* Prepared by: \*  
\* \*  
\* Staff Gunnery Officer \*  
\* XX Bomber Command \*  
\*\*\*\*\*

S E C R E T



SECRET

HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

CONSOLIDATED  
SPECIALIST MISSION REPORT OF  
STAFF GUNNERY OFFICER

SECRET

AUTH: GG, XX BC  
INITIALS: JAB  
DATE: 21 Oct 44

Date Prepared: 21 October 1944

Field Order No. 10

Date of Mission: 14 Oct 44

1. The Central Fire Control system functioned very satisfactorily in operational tests made on the flight directed by Field Order No. 10. There were 605 turrets reported operationally tested with 2% malfunctions. Cal. .50 machine gun malfunctions were less than 1%.
2. The mission was considered very satisfactory from the gunnery aspect. There were no reports of attacks on our formations by enemy aircraft. Seven enemy aircraft were sighted but were too distant to determine the type, and they made no attempt at interception. No guns were fired in combat and the only ammunition expended was that used in test firing the guns.
3. In conclusion it must be stressed that due to the absence of enemy fighters on this mission that gunners cannot relax vigilance. The gunners' responsibility is to protect the airplane and formation and to accomplish this task requires being constantly on the alert.

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Annex

J

Cameras and Photographs

- I Cameras and Photographs
- II Photo Reconnaissance Aircraft

S E C R E T



S E C R E T

I - Cameras and Photographs

Mission No. 10

14 October 1944

A. 40th Group

	K-18	K-20	K-22	Total
No. cameras installed	7	24	6	37
No. in aborting A/C	1	3	0	4
No. completing mission	6	21	6	33
No. photographing targets	6	*	3	9**
No. usable negatives	42	*	90	132**

\*Not available

\*\*Incomplete

B. 444th Group

	K-18	K-20	K-22	Total
No. cameras installed	6	10	6	22
No. in aborting A/C	1	*	1	2**
No. completing mission	5	*	5	10**
No. photographing targets	5	*	5	10**
No. usable negatives	56	*	13	69**

\*Not available

\*\*Incomplete

C. 462nd Group

	K-18	K-20	K-22	Total
No. cameras installed	7	8	9	24
No. in aborting A/C	1	1	0	2
No. completing mission	6	7	9	22
No. photographing targets	5	2	6	13
No. usable negatives	77	12	113	202

D. 468th Group

	K-18	K-20	K-22	Total
No. cameras installed	8	16	8	32
No. in aborting A/C	0	*	1	1**
No. completing mission	8	*	7	15**
No. photographing targets	3	*	2	5**
No. usable negatives	19	*	17	36**

\*Not available

\*\*Incomplete

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E. Totals.

	K-18	K-20	K-22	Total
No. cameras installed	28	58	29	115
No. in aborting A/C	3	4**	2	9**
No. completing mission	25	28**	27	80**
No. photographing targets	19	2**	16	37**
No. usable negatives	194	12**	233	439**

\*\* Incomplete

Note: For information on radar cameras, see Annex G.

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II - Photo Reconnaissance Aircraft

Mission No. 10  
14 October 1944

A. A single B-29 of the 468th Group flew a reconnaissance mission from the Chengtu Area on 15 October, to make damage assessment photos following Mission No. 10. The aircraft took off at 0010Z and returned at 0825Z.

B. Successful but fair quality K-22 and tri metrogon photos were taken of Takao, Heito Okayama, Tainan, Kagi and Taichu -- all on the island of Formosa. The K-18 camera was inoperative and the unphotographed North Area was obscured by clouds.

C. Meager and inaccurate antiaircraft fire was encountered at Takao, Heito, Okayama, and Tainan. No fire was seen at Kagi and Taichu.

D. The photo mission met no fighter opposition, but observed 6 to 8 single-engine aircraft over Takao.

E. Shipping was observed in the harbors along the West coast of Formosa.

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ANNEX

K

BATTLE LOSSES AND BATTLE DAMAGE

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I - Battle Losses and Battle Damage

Mission No. 10

14 October 1944

A. Battle Losses (0)

1. At this time there are no losses known to have definitely resulted from enemy antiaircraft or enemy air action. However, see the discussion under Operational Losses, Annex B, Part IX.

B. Battle Damage (3)

1. Resulting from Enemy Antiaircraft (3):

- a. A/C 508 (40th) - received burst of flak in #2 propeller breaking approximately 3 inches off one tip. The propeller feathering line was also cut.
- b. A/C 399 (44th) - minor damage to the R.H. elevator trim tab.
- c. A/C 353 (44th) - minor damage to left wing and flap.

2. Resulting from Enemy Air Action: None.

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ANNEX

L

FUNCTIONING OF EQUIPMENT

- I - Summary of Mechanical Failures
- II - Functioning of Equipment
- III - Malfunctions of Equipment - Engineering
- IV - Fuel Consumption Data

Table 1 - Summary of all aircraft Bombing PT  
Table 2 - Summary by Groups

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By JAB NAPA Date 10/13/05



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I - Summary of Mechanical Failures

Mission No. 10

14 October 1944

Aircraft involved in movement	125*
Returned to Rear Area and remaining	0
Returned to Rear Area but re-airborne and subsequently landed in Forward Area	8
Landed en route and did not reach Forward Area	2
Landed en route but re-airborne and subsequently landed in Forward Area	0
Failed to take off on mission	2
Failed to get over PT with bombs - mechanical reasons	16
Over PT but failing to bomb	1
Dropped only a portion of bomb load	28
Total aircraft experiencing major mechanical difficulty	57**

\* Does not include photo aircraft.

\*\* Does not include A/C 513 (40th) which crashed, nor A/C 280 (44th) which is missing.

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II - Functioning of Equipment

Mission No. 10

14 October 1944

A. Details by Aircraft

1. A/C airborne - Rear Area (not including Photo A/C) . . . . . 125
2. Less A/C aborting -- net . . . . . 2
  - a. A/C 306 (40th) - aborted on D-day minus 5. Re-airborne on D-day minus 2, but landed at Tezgaon, subsequently returning to Rear Area.
  - b. A/C 213 (462nd) - Aborted on D-day minus 5, landed at Tezpur.
3. A/C landing in Forward Area . . . . . 123
4. Plus combat operational A/C in Forward Area prior to movement . . . . . 9
5. Combat operational A/C in Forward Area for mission . . . . . 132
6. Less A/C failing to take off on mission. . . . . 2
  - a. A/C 321 (444th) - defective propeller governor on #4 engine.
  - b. A/C 456 (462nd) - malfunction of carburetor.
7. A/C airborne on mission. . . . . 130
8. Less A/C failing to get over primary target with bombs -- mechanical reasons . . . . . 16
  - a. A/C bombing tertiary target (1).
    - (1) A/C 276 (40th) - late take-off due to ignition trouble.
  - b. A/C bombing last resort target (2).
    - (1) A/C 522 (40th) - malfunction of propeller governor #1 engine.
    - (2) A/C 386 (462nd) - #1 supercharger inoperative at high altitude. Could not get to altitude.
  - c. A/C bombing targets of opportunity (1).
    - (1) A/C 510 (444th) - engine failure.
  - d. A/C jettisoning (7).
    - (1) A/C 579 (40th) - blown cylinder head on #18 cylinder of #4 engine.
    - (2) A/C 464 (444th) - #4 outboard generator burned out causing inverter and gun amplidyne to overspeed.

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- (3) A/C 507 (444th) - lost manifold pressure and RPM on #2 engine after 4 1/2 hours flight.
- (4) A/C 492 (444th) - excessive oil leak in #1 engine.
- (5) A/C 273 (462nd) - fire in #4 nacelle.
- (6) A/C 358 (468th) - lost #1 engine.
- (7) A/C 284 (468th) - power failure #1 engine.

e. A/C returning with bombs (5).

- (1) A/C 297 (40th) - blown intake valve rocker arm on #1 cylinder of #3 engine.
- (2) A/C 343 (444th) - bomb fragment cut into #3 oil tank and severed throttle controls. Loss of oil necessitated feathering. Origin of bomb fragment unknown.
- (3) A/C 279 (468th) - internal failure #1 engine.
- (4) A/C 542 (468th) - Malfunction of propeller governor, #2 engine.
- (5) A/C 272 (468th) - severe backfiring #2 engine.

9. Less A/C failing to get over primary target with bombs -- other reasons. . . . . 5

a. A/C bombing targets of opportunity (4).

- (1) A/C 487 (468th) - navigational difficulties.
  - (2) A/C 356 (468th) - navigational difficulties.
  - (3) A/C 454 (468th) - navigational difficulties.
  - (4) A/C 355 (468th) - navigational difficulties.
- Note: These 4 aircraft flew as a formation.

b. A/C bombing the tertiary target (1)

- (1) A/C 457 (40th) - late take-off. Became stuck in mud when taxiing.

10. Less A/C failing to get over primary target with bombs -- reason unreported. . . . . 5

a. A/C bombing the tertiary target (3).

- (1) A/C 524 (444th).
- (2) A/C 407 (468th).
- (3) A/C 365 (468th).

b. A/C bombing Target of Opportunity (1).

- (1) A/C 513 (40th) - Plane crashed. Radio indicates engine failure.

c. A/C failing to return (1).

- (1) A/C 280 (444th) - no definite information.

11. Total A/C getting over primary target. . . . . 104

12. Less A/C over primary target but failing to bomb . . . . . 1

- a. A/C 411 (468th) - bombs released when doors were opened for bomb run due to short-circuit in co-pilot's release.

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13. Total A/C dropping bombs on primary target . . . . . 103

NOTE: The following aircraft dropped only a part of their bomb load on the primary target (mostly due to binding of the shackles by the cable adapters used for double suspension):

1. 40th Group:

- (a) A/C 319 - 23 on PT, 1 jettisoned
- (b) A/C 587 - 15 on PT, 15 jettisoned

2. 444th Group:

- (a) A/C 580 - 28 on PT, 2 brought back
- (b) A/C 378 - 29 on PT, 1 brought back

3. 462nd Group:

- (a) A/C 346 - 20 on PT, 8 brought back
- (b) A/C 347 - 23 on PT, 4 brought back
- (c) A/C 830 - 18 on PT, 4 jettisoned
- (d) A/C 311 - 16 on PT, 8 brought back
- (e) A/C 329 - 2 on PT, 24 jettisoned
- (f) A/C 209 - 26 on PT, 2 jettisoned
- (g) A/C 362 - 16 on PT, 8 jettisoned
- (h) A/C 278 - 16 on PT, 8 jettisoned
- (i) A/C 479 - 27 on PT, 1 jettisoned, 3 brought back
- (j) A/C 382 - 20 on PT, 6 jettisoned
- (k) A/C 270 - 16 on PT, 8 jettisoned
- (l) A/C 285 - 20 on PT, 4 jettisoned, 2 brought back
- (m) A/C 444 - 20 on PT, 8 jettisoned
- (n) A/C 299 - 18 on PT, 8 jettisoned
- (o) A/C 338 - 17 on PT, 6 jettisoned, 2 brought back
- (p) A/C 827 - 14 on PT, 6 jettisoned, 2 brought back

4. 468th Group:

- (a) A/C 362 - 25 on PT, 2 jettisoned
- (b) A/C 265 - 25 on PT, 2 jettisoned
- (c) A/C 442 - 29 on PT, 1 brought back
- (d) A/C 397 - 22 on PT, 6 jettisoned
- (e) A/C 389 - 22 on PT, 6 jettisoned
- (f) A/C 828 - 25 on PT, 2 brought back
- (g) A/C 429 - 28 on PT, 2 brought back
- (h) A/C 409 - 21 on PT, 4 jettisoned, 2 brought back

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III - Malfunctions of Equipment - Engineering

Mission No. 10

14 October 1944

Tachometer inoperative	27	Carburetor air temperature inoperative	3
Oil leaks	22	Flight indicator inoperative	3
Cylinder head temperature guages out	14	Voltage regulator inoperative	3
Bomb release malfunctions	11	Generator relay inoperative	2
Propeller governor malfunction	10	Airspeed indicator inoperative	2
Generator inoperative	10	Flux gate compass inaccurate or inoperative	2
Oil pressure fluctuating or low	9	Vacuum instrument sluggish or inoperative	2
Fuel pressure fluctuating or low	7	Cabin pressure fluctuating	2
Oil temperature regulator inoperative	6	Failure to feather	2
AFCE inoperative or malfunctioning	6	Tail turret dynamotor inoperative	2
Malfunction of turbo controls and waste gate	6	Blister scored by ejected cartridge cases	2
Oil cooler malfunction	5	Rate of climb indicator inoperative	1
Engine running rough	5	Total	167
Fuel transfer system inoperative	3		

Note: For malfunctions of other equipment, see the following:  
radar - Annex G; RCM - Annex H; armament - Annex I.

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IV - Summary of All Aircraft Bombing Primary Target

Flight	Mission #10			
	Over-All	Idrs. Id. Ele.	Idrs. All Ele.	Wing
Formation Position				
*Number of Aircraft	106	13	29	77
Total Flight Time	10:25	10:31	10:30	10:23
Time to Target	4:53			
Fuel Burned	5310	5250	5310	5310
Aux. Fuel Carried	750	---	---	---
Fuel Reserve	840	---	---	---
Air Miles	2520	---	---	---
Ground Miles	----			
Gals/Air Mile	2.11			
Range of Bombing Altitude	19000 to 26000			
Ave. Bombing Altitude	23100			
Reported Gr. Wt.	132750	132750	132750	132750
Weight of Bombs	13560	13740	13130	13820
No. and Type Bombs	16 G.P. 10.9 I.	19.6 G.P. 7 I.	15.3 G.P. 10.7 I.	16.3 G.P. 11 I.

\*For which logs were available.

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 By: NAPA Date: 10/18/05



SECRET

IV - Summary by Groups Mission #10

Group	40th				444th				462nd				468th				
	Over-All	Ldrs. Id. Ele.	Ldrs. All Ele.	Wing	Over-All	Ldrs. Id. Ele.	Ldrs. All Ele.	Wing	Over-All	Ldrs. Id. Ele.	Ldrs. All Ele.	Wing	Over-All	Ldrs. Id. Ele.	Ldrs. All Ele.	Wing	
*No. of Aircraft	28	5	11	17	24	2	5	19	27	2	8	19	27	4	5	22	
Total Flight Time	10:24	10:30	10:27	10:22	10:22	10:50	10:33	10:18	10:45	11:00	10:45	10:45	10:08	10:10	10:05	10:09	
Time to Target	4:53	4:51	4:50	4:54	4:54	---	5:02	4:52	5:02	5:10	5:01	5:02	4:45	---	---	---	
Fuel Burned	Ave.	5350	5240	5300	5390	5200	5290	5190	5200	5470	5260	5470	5470	5210	5240	5150	5220
	Max.	5700				5600				6000				5600			
	Min.	4950				4900				5020				4800			
Aux. Fuel Carried	Ave.	765	700	740	700	605	600	600	605	915	---	---	---	700	700	700	700
	Max.	980				780				1100				700			
	Min.	600				500				800				700			
Fuel Reserve	Ave.	815	860	840	790	805	710	810	805	845	---	---	---	890	860	950	880
	Max.	1340				1100				1250				1300			
	Min.	500				400				575				500			
Air Miles	2525	2535	2590	2400	2600	---	2655	2590	2520	---	2685	2440	2445	---	---	---	
Ground Miles	2420	2510	2440	2410	---	---	---	---	2455	---	2475	2455	2360	---	---	---	
Gals/Air Mile	2.12	2.07	2.05	2.17	2.00	---	1.95	2.01	2.17	---	2.04	2.24	2.13	---	---	---	
Range of Bomb Altitude	21000 to 21000				21500 to 26000				20000 to 22600				19000 to 25000				
Ave. Bomb Alt.	22900				24500				21600				23100				
Take-Off Gross Wt.	Ave.	132300	132450	132450	132100	131900	13770	12100	131800	133500	133950	133800	133600	133000	133000	133000	133000
	Max.	134860				133475				134782				133450			
	Min.	130770				130720				131500				132781			
Wt. of Bombs	13230	13090	13300	13180	13210	12850	13290	13240	13810	14830	13810	13810	14350	14430	14340	14330	
No. and Type of Bombs	G.P.	17	19.6	16	17.6	16	24	14.4	16.5	15.9	14	16.25	15.8	15	20.2	16.2	14.8
	I.	8.9	5.6	10.2	8.1	10	---	12	9.5	11.3	16	11	11.5	13.6	7.8	12.2	13.8

I-IV-2

\* For Which Logs Were Available.



S E C R E T

ANNEX

M

TARGET DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

NOTE: For details of target damage assessment,  
see Annex M, Tactical Mission Reports  
number 11 and 12, XX Bomber Command.

S E C R E T

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Authority NND 760063

By JAB NAPA Date 10/13/05



S E C R E T

ANNEX

N

CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY

\* \* \* \* \*  
\* Prepared by: \*  
\* \* \* \* \*  
\* Statistical Section \*  
\* XX Bomber Command \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

S E C R E T



S E C R E T

XX BOMBER COMMAND  
CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SECTION

Mission Number Ten  
14 October 1944

S E C R E T  
By Authority of the  
Commanding General:

10-24-44 SK  
Date Initials

Table I - Aircraft Participating - Rear to Forward Area

Group	Mission Number	Field Order No.	Combat A/C on Hand In Group	A/C Participating In Mission		A/C Remaining In Fwd Area To Participate In Mission	A/C Airborne In Rear Area For Mission	A/C Arriving In F.A. For Mission						A/C Airborne In Rear Area Failing To Reach Fwd Area	Percent
				Total	% of Aircraft On Hand That Participated			Total	On D-5	On D-4	On D-3	On D-2	On D-1		
40th	10	10	Tact 36	35	97%	0	35	34	27	4	1	0	2	1	2.9
444th	10	10	Tact 36	34	95%	3	31	31	23	5	0	2	1	0	
462nd	10	10	Tact 34 Depot 2	31	92%	2	29	28	22	4	1	0	1	1	3.4
468th	10	10	Tact 34 Depot 1	34	100%	4	30	30	17	7	2	3	1	0	
TOTAL	10	10	Tact 140* Depot 3	134	94%	9	125	123	89	20	4	5	5	2	1.6

\* Excludes aircraft arriving in theater from D-3 to D Day that did not participate in mission.

NOTE: Photo A/C excluded from all tables.

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By: NAPA Date 10/18/05