

3542

NOTICES

OF

"THE NECESSARY EXISTENCE OF GOD."

"I consider Mr Gillespie's work on the argument, *a priori*, a valuable addition to the science of Natural Theology."—HENRY LORD BROUGHAM, *Author of "A Discourse of Natural Theology," &c. &c.*

"I do not, I can assure Mr Gillespie, mean to flatter him, in saying, I consider his work, on the *Necessary Existence of God*, among the very ablest specimens of speculative philosophy which this country has latterly exhibited."—SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, Baronet, *Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh.*

"The author evinces a very intimate acquaintance and familiarity with this most perplexing topic; and, in dealing with it, manifests an apparent ease which might sometimes almost be mistaken for passive indifference and want of interest in his subject. The style, too, is remarkably clear, natural, and perspicuous; approaching as nearly, perhaps, to a perfectly colourless and diaphanous simplicity, as the very nature of the difficult and general terms, which enter so largely into the texture and composition of the argument, would admit. It bears no inconsiderable resemblance to the concise, simple, and manly manner and models of the school in which it has obviously been formed—that of Locke, of Clarke, and of Butler; with a little affectation, too, of the same antiquity. Nor is it by any means inconsistent with this commendation, that there should appear, in one or two passages, some degree of intricacy or obscurity: the singular circumstance, and one which, in the course of a careful perusal, often struck us, we confess, with some surprise is, that Mr Gillespie should have found it possible to crowd so much, on so abstruse a subject, into the compass of so few words, and to remain, notwithstanding, in any measure intelligible. The only considerable fault which we have to find with the style of the treatise, if indeed, on a point of such metaphysical nicety, and requiring so much of profound and passionless abstraction, it be a blemish, is the want of animation and enlivenment. It

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NOTICES.

would seem as if the thoughts and very language of the treatise had reposed so long in the stillness of the author's mind, as to have clarified gradually to the last degree of pure and perfect transparency, but had acquired, withal, some degree of insipidity by stagnation."—PATRICK C. MACDOUGALL, *Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh.*

"The subject to which Mr Gillespie's work relates is truly profound, and the manner in which Mr Gillespie has treated it, reflects great honour on him. His work is most useful, not only by the direct instruction it imparts respecting the Foundation of all Religion, but by the thoughts it suggests to every intelligent reader.

"Mr Gillespie has rendered good service in a cause so intimately connected with the best, the highest, the most enduring interests of man. His work has already been most useful."—Rev. D. DEWAR, D.D., LL.D., *Principal of the Marischal College, and University, Aberdeen.*

"The remarkable argument of Mr Gillespie, as a specimen of *a priori* speculation, certainly claims to be ranked along with anything in British philosophical literature."—Rev. JOHN TULLOCH, D.D., *Principal and Primarius Professor of Theology, St Mary's College, St Andrews.*

"Mr Gillespie's book I have read with great interest, as a new form of an argument on the most profound of all subjects, the being of a GOD. It is a work of deep thought, and no common research.—Mr Gillespie's book is the production of an ingenious and a well-exercised mind.

"Mr Gillespie is at perfect liberty to use my opinion in any way he thinks proper, for I have written nothing which I do not sincerely believe."—The Right Rev. M. RUSSEL, D.D., *Bishop of Glasgow, Author of "The Connection of Sacred and Profane History," &c. &c.*

"I have no hesitation in saying, that I consider Mr Gillespie's work as one of the ablest, most ingenious, and best reasoned works, which have appeared, on the subject of Natural Religion—and that it is an important and seasonable addition to the many valuable illustrations we possess of those ultimate truths in Theology on which the whole fabric of Revealed Religion rests."—Rev. JOHN BROWN, D.D., *Professor of Exegetical Theology in the United Presbyterian Church.*

THE
NECESSARY EXISTENCE
OF
G O D

The Russel Edition.

THE
NECESSARY EXISTENCE
OF
G O D.

BY
WILLIAM HONYMAN GILLESPIE, ESQ.,
OF TORBANEHILL

— —
FOURTH EDITION.
— —

LONDON;
HOULSTON & WRIGHT
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
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—Ο ΘΕΟΣ ὁ ποιήσας τὸν κόσμον καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, οὗτος οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς Κύριος ὑπάρχων, οὐκ ἐν χειροποιήτοις ναοῖς κατοικεῖ, οὐδὲ ὑπὸ χειρῶν ἀνθρώπων θεραπεύεται προσδεόμενός τις, αὐτὸς διδούς πᾶσι ζωὴν καὶ πνοὴν καὶ τὰ πάντα· ἐποίησέ τε ἐξ ἑνὸς αἵματος πᾶν ἔθνος ἀνθρώπων, κατοικεῖν ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ πρόσωπον τῆς γῆς, ὀρίσας προστεταγμένους καιροὺς καὶ τὰς ὁροθεσίας τῆς κατοικίας αὐτῶν· ζητεῖν ΤΟΝ ΘΕΟΝ, εἰ ἄραγε ψηλαφήσειαν αὐτὸν καὶ εὕροιεν, καίτοιγε ΟΥ ΜΑΚΡΑΝ ΑΠΟ ΕΝΟΣ ΕΚΑΣΤΟΥ ΗΜΩΝ ΥΠΑΡΧΟΝΤΑ. ΕΝ ΑΤΤΩ ΓΑΡ ΖΩΜΕΝ ΚΑΙ ΚΙΝΟΥΜΕΘΑ ΚΑΙ ΕΣΜΕΝ. ὡς καὶ τινες τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς ποιητῶν εἰρήκασι·

Τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν.

Γένος οὖν ὑπάρχοντες ΤΟΥ ΘΕΟΥ, οὐκ ὀφείλομεν νομίζειν χρυσοῦ ἢ ἀργύρου ἢ λίθου, χαράγματι τέχνης καὶ ἐνθυμήσεως ἀνθρώπου, ΤΟ ΘΕΙΟΝ εἶναι ὅμοιον. — ST PAUL.



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THE
EPISTLE DEDICATORY.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

Lord Brougham and Vaux.

46, MELVILLE STREET,
EDINBURGH, *July 17, 1863.*

MY LORD,

T may be in your Lordship's recollection, that your Lordship once favoured me with a communication relating to my work, "The Necessary Existence of GOD."—Your Lordship, like some others distinguished in the field of theology, pronounced an opinion regarding the treatise of a highly gratifying description.

From an address, "To the Reader," in the accompanying volume, your Lordship will learn what is the character and design of that Edition of the work in question, which is now to be presented to the public.

In considering the subject of a Dedication, I had no great difficulty in arriving at the conclusion, that such an Edition, of such a work, should be ushered into public notice under distinguished patronage; and the name of your Lordship, as that of the right man to whom to apply, did at once—I might almost say naturally—occur to me.

For, in the first place, your connection, through the celebrated "Preliminary Discourse," with the noble subject of Natural Theology, is matter of that history which will not die.

In the next place, it is to be considered that, the present Edition being destined for the Working Classes, no patron of the work could be more the right man in the right place than the long-tried friend of those classes. Who does not know of the invaluable services which your Lordship has bestowed in this direction?

Who among us is ignorant of what you have done in the cause of Educational improvements?—in the cause, indeed, of the elevation of the condition of the great body of the people, in all varieties of ways?

But a third reason remains—a valid one, though it refers not to a particular, so much as a general consideration. You are one of our very great men. If your Lordship be unaware of the fact, only one of Her Majesty's subjects can be in such ignorance. In the amazing multitude of your life-long pursuits—in the thoroughness with which you have prosecuted departments, each of which (as, *ex. gr.*, the improvement of our Legal Code) might have occupied the days of any ordinary man; in a word, in your wondrous versatility of genius, in combination always with the power of reaching to the bottom of a subject—your Lordship has had no compeer. In short, that your Lordship is one of the few very great men of our age, has been received as a historical fact. The nation has enshrined you in her great heart, as one of those men, who will stand out of the canvas, by reason of greatness, through all future time.

Could I, then, taking everything into account, apply to a more suitable person than your Lordship, in looking around for the individual to whom this fourth and popular Edition of my work, on the Necessary Existence of GOD, should be dedicated?

I remain,

MY LORD,

Your Lordship's most obedient

and very humble Servant,

WILLIAM GILLESPIE.

TO THE READER.

ALL the legal public, and a large portion of the general community, are aware that there was a long and keenly contested litigation, between the lessees of certain minerals in the estate of Torbanehill,—Messrs James Russel, & Son, of Blackbraes, and Arnotdale,—on the one hand; and, on the other, the proprietors of the said estate of Torbanehill, Mr and Mrs Gillespie. The world rang with the contest about the celebrated Torbanehill Mineral. This singular substance itself went everywhere, and with it went the rumours of the famous law-pleas about it.

But all these law-pleas came to an end. They were ended by a compromise entered into by the litigants. The agreement alluded to was finally arranged on the 11th January 1860.

At this time, Mr James Russel, Junior, of Arnotdale, (for Mr Russel, Senior, had died some two years pre-

viously) and Mr Gillespie, of Torbanehill, were resolved that the past should be by them buried in oblivion, an endeavour being made to go on in all harmony, for the future. A resolution which Mr Gillespie can vouch was, on the part of his former opponent, adhered to most faithfully and honourably. In all subsequent intercourse, by correspondence, or otherwise, Mr Gillespie had no reason to regret, but much reason to rejoice, that Mr Russel and he had become friends. A correspondence of a very interesting kind took place between these gentlemen, regarding the improvement of the dwellings, and general condition, of the miners employed in the mines in Torbanehill; and Mr Gillespie can sincerely declare, that Mr Russel agreed, in the most friendly and cordial manner, to all that was suggested on that score. Mr Russel wrote to Mr Gillespie, in a way which shewed that he was far from insensible to the well-being of that mining population, and had, indeed, carefully considered the matter in some of its special bearings. But Mr Russel's lamented death, which took place ere the year 1860† expired, put an end to the carrying into effect of the proposals mutually entertained.

But a special fact shews the nature of the relation, which, thenceforth, was to subsist between those two

† Mr Russel, Junior, died on the 31st October, 1860.

gentlemen — A fact which also shews how near to Mr Russel's heart was the idea of acting for the benefit of the working classes. At the time of the compromise, the third edition of Mr Gillespie's work, "The Necessary Existence of GOD," was all but out of print. Mr Russel knew this, and, in the most courteous and kind manner, he conveyed to Mr Gillespie the welcome information that he would be happy to be at the cost of an Edition of the work in question; and the following words were added in the letter, to denote the precise destination of the sum thus handsomely laid aside. "To be applied in such a way as you (Mr Gillespie) may think best calculated to attain the object in view,—namely, *the bringing out of a good readable Edition, at a cheap price, FOR THE WORKING CLASSES.*"

Let but the commons hear this testament—†

Let the working classes, in general — let the mining population in the Torbanehill district, in particular — ponder, and deeply reflect on this generous and noble consideration of Mr Russel for their welfare, in matters relating to their best interests, in this age of the dissolution of old systems of thought, and of universal inquiry

† Weigh this place in the memorable speech of Mark Antony, in Shakespeare's *Julius Cesar*. The quotation is truly apposite.

into the reasons of all doctrines; and they will be satisfied that they should receive the memory of Mr Russel into their hearts, as one of their great benefactors.

EDINBURGH,
15th May, 1863.

ADVERTISEMENT

THE FOURTH EDITION.

No vital difference, going to the root of the matter, exists between the original exhibition of the "Argument, *a priori*," and that exhibition of it which is given in the present volume. But although no such vital difference exists, some non-essential differences there are, nevertheless. And that our readers may never be at a loss to know where they stand, in reference to that precedent demonstration; there is subjoined, in an Appendix, the demonstration in question, exactly as it appeared in the first edition of the "Argument." See "GENERAL APPENDIX to the EXAMINATION."

Some points of distinction will be readily observed, on comparison of the two—the original, to wit, and the present—exhibitions of the demonstration.

The differences, whether in matter or in manner—but in the manner rather than in the matter—will be found to be specifically adverted to, or virtually comprised, in the following summary.

First of all, to advert to the departure from the ancient title. The old title was, "An Argument, *a priori*:" whereas, the present exhibition of the demonstration is denominated, "THE Argument, *a priori*," to the exclusion, as it were, of all other *a priori* methods. Whatever it might have been which suggested the unfortunate employment of the *indefinite*; † the *truth of things* really requires the adoption of the *definite*, article. "There can be, substantially, *but one way* of exhibiting the demonstration." ‡

Again, the title, in the old exhibition of the demonstration, ran, "Argument, *a priori*, for the Being and Attributes of GOD:" whereas, the present title is in these words, "The Argument, *a priori*, for the Being and Attributes of A GREAT FIRST CAUSE." Whatever induced me to make the alteration now adverted to, || it will, I believe, be conceded, that the words, "The Being and Attributes of A Great First Cause," as I have employed the words, compose unobjectionable phraseology.

† I believe it was modesty. A very false modesty it was.

‡ We would here direct attention to the sections which introduce our Review of Dr Samuel Clarke's well-known "Demonstration." Consider, in particular, § 3.

|| Viewing things from a certain stand-point, a sufficient reason for the substitution exists. The reason might be gathered from a single consideration. According to respectable etymologists, *God* signifies *Good*—namely, the *Good One*.¹ And therefore, there is (according to such etymological view) a sort of tautology in the phrase, "*Attributes of God*:" The term *God* would convey the idea of the principal attribute. For Goodness involves—

¹ It would seem that Horne Tooke took good care to advance nothing on the subject. The following is all I can find in the last edition (1860) of his notorious "Diversions." "*Ge-owed* perhaps *Gowed*, written and pronounced *GOOD*, which the Scotch pronounce "and write *GUDE*."—P. 357.

Besides those changes in the language which our readers will perceive, on comparing the portions of the "Argument," cited in the "Examination," (and, of course, given at length in the "General Appendix" thereto,) with the corresponding places in that "Argument," as in the present edition; there are changes of another description, which it may be well to specify here.

What is now named a "Division," received, in the original edition, the title of "Book."

The "Sub-Proposition" in Part I., and the "Sub-Proposition" in Part II., both in "Division I.;" were, severally, "Scholium I.," Part I., and "Scholium II.," Part II., in "Book I." The "General Scholium" of the new exhibition appeared formerly as "Scholium II.," Part I. And the present "Corollary from Sub-Proposition" corresponds to what was "Scholium I.," Part II.

The passages which are distinguished as *Prolegomena*, at least, according to a certain school of philosophers, and theologians—Goodness involves, and at bottom comprehends in it, all Moral, or, at any rate, all relative Moral Perfections.¹ Certain thoughtful men, if in possession of that particular etymology, might therefore urge, that we must distinguish then: And when we would speak of demonstrating the Being and the Attributes, we must select a farther expression which does not imply the principal of the very Attributes to be demonstrated.

For a (hesitating) repudiation of the derivation of *God* from *Good*, and for the suggestion of other possible—or impossible—etymons, see a very learned article (Art. I.) in the *Edinburgh Review*, for October, 1851.

¹ "It was the Opinion of the Wisest of the Philosophers, * * * That there is also in the Scale of Being a Nature of *Goodness* superior to *Wisdom*, which therefore measures and determines the *Wisdom* of God, as his *Wisdom* measures and determines his *Will*, and which the ancient Cabalists were wont to call כתר, a *Crown*, as being the Top, or Crown, of the Deity."—Cudworth's *Eternal and Immutable Morality*. Book I. chap. iii.

Demonstrations, Scholia, &c., were run together in the first exhibition. The ground for the distinction existed in the language, without the application of any distinctive terms.

The Scholium coming after the demonstration in Part I., and the Scholium coming after the demonstration in Part III., both in Division II., are new.†

With these notifications mastered, no reader can be astray.

’Twas mentioned, in the “Advertisement” to the preceding edition, that I had advanced to a branch of the subject not entered upon in the original; namely, to *the great Attribute of GOODNESS*, which, also, was, at length, demonstrated.‡ I wish I could mention, here, (or any where,) that I am quite ready to publish the full results of my much pondering on the proper ultimate form for the strict *a priori* determination of THE GREAT MORAL ATTRIBUTES OF JUSTICE—*implying* TRUENESS, or perhaps rather TRUTHFULNESS—or, RIGHTEOUSNESS, AND OF HOLINESS.

† The latter of those two Scholiums is peculiar to this Edition. With regard to the former of the Scholiums, the “Advertisement to the Third Edition,” stated, that “the Scholium” “appears for the first time.”

‡ See *Advertisement to Third Edition*, (p. 125.)

GENERAL PREFACE.†

IT is ten years since the “Argument, *a priori*, for the Being and Attributes” first met the public eye: And it is three years since the issuing of the first edition of the “Examination,” which is a diffusion and defence of certain portions of the reasoning occurring in its predecessor.

From the many highly favourable opinions, expressed by persons whose authority is entitled to much weight, which have been communicated to the author, he feels very confident as to the ultimate result of his undertaking, to establish *the necessary existence of GOD*. Whatever misgivings the author may have had as to the *reception* which his mode of treating his subject might meet with; he never allowed himself to have any misgivings as to the *goodness* of his cause, generally or particularly: generally, or as to the being of a GOD; particularly, or as to the applicableness and validity of

† This *General Preface* is given, here, almost word for word as it appeared in the 3rd edition (1843.) A few alterations, there are indeed;—several of which the reader, at a glance, will perceive.

a priori reasonings in reference to that momentous topic. The age we live in is certainly the age of a certain kind of superficialness. Much ground is indeed gone over, but then little of the ground is thoroughly explored; men rather knowing that there are many sciences, and having at command a few commonplaces with regard to each, than caring to be complete proficient in any one branch of knowledge. But notwithstanding this circumstance, the author has now no uneasiness as to the fate of his production. The age is superficial, but there are many, and there are brilliant, exceptions to the general rule: And it is very fortunate that no age receives those impressions which are to be lasting, and to influence the sentiments of posterity, from any but the more profound thinkers. The skimmers over the surfaces of things may make various noises, of various loudnesses, as they pass along, but in a short while all trace of them is vanished.

The author, then, anticipates that ere long a great change will take place in the public mind*, in relation to the question of the *fitness* and *value* of the species of reasonings employed in this volume. 'Tis beyond all question, that *a priori* reasonings on subjects out of the mathematical sciences have descended to a low point in the general estimation, though it is equally certain, that at a former period such reasonings used to occupy a very high and conspicuous position. But there are

signs that better treatment is awaiting argumentation from the necessity of the case for a Great First Cause.†

The immediate consequences, or rather the concomitants, of a change so ardently desired, would be the following—to specify no more at present. First, a sudden stop in the tune of your mere *a posteriori* men. We should no longer have thrust into our hands whole volumes of *anatomy, botany, natural history, astronomy,* and what not? called, in virtue of an exceedingly small sprinkling of other matter, treatises on *Natural Theology*; we should no longer, I say, have such thrust upon us as containing the only sound arguments to be met with, for proving the first grand article of all religion. We should no longer, therefore, be told that the *infinity*‡ and the *unity* of the Divine Nature cannot be made out. A second consequence, or concomitant, would be the quick disappearance of speculative, or avowed, atheism. A consummation, however devoutly to be wished for, which has never been brought about under the long, presumptuous reign of the oracular-response-uttering Magnates (the true *Dii Majores*) of the Experimental School.

Who does not at once perceive of what mighty consequence it were to have the mouth of avowed specu-

† The author is firmly persuaded, that that good time prophesied of in the text has come. The dark day was long, but light has shone forth at last.—How much of the alteration in the state of things is due to these labours, it is not for us to say.

‡ This word is here taken in the *popular*, that is, the *loosest*, acceptation.

lative atheism closed for ever? Have not the very bad kinds of *practical* atheism too often been prone to seek shelter under the wings of *theoretical* atheism? To live in all respects as if there were no GOD: Therefore, to wish most anxiously that there were no GOD: Therefore, to confirm one-self in saying that there is no GOD:—Are not these not unfrequently bound together as links in the same dreadful chain?

There are too many persons among us who are not properly aware of the alarming progress which Infidelity, Infidelity of the deadliest kind, even downright Atheism, is making in the British Isles, and throughout our numerous and vast Colonies; in the United States of America; and, in short, wherever the English language is spoken, or the British peoples are spread: To say nothing of the deplorable state of matters on the Continent of Europe, and indeed throughout the civilized—that is, the intelligent and reflecting—portion of the world generally.

And I cannot forbear adverting pointedly to the circumstance, that the age we live in is witness to the existence of “a monstrous species of men,” who live in spite, as ’twere, of nature, they are so very odd a sort of compound: “I mean the zealots in atheism.” One might beforehand have prophesied, with a lively assurance of prophesying correctly, that zeal in behalf of so utter a

negation as Atheism,† were a sheer impossibility. An Atheistic Propagandist seems a nondescript monster, created by nature in a moment of madness.

“ But so it is,” says Addison, in a paragraph needing almost no alteration to render it suitable to the aspect of present affairs : “ But so it is, that infidelity is “ propagated with as much fierceness and contention, “ wrath and indignation, as if the safety of mankind “ depended upon it. There is something so ridiculous “ and perverse in this kind of zealots, that one does “ not know how to set them out in their proper colours. “ They are a sort of gamesters who are eternally upon “ the fret, though they play for nothing. They are “ perpetually teasing their friends to come over to them, “ though at the same time they allow that neither of them “ shall get any thing by the bargain. In short, the zeal “ of spreading atheism, is, if possible, more absurd than “ atheism itself.” †

“ BUT SO IT IS.” —————

† “ What has atheism to teach but mere negations?—that there is *no* “ First Cause, *no* Creator, *no* intention in all the beautiful and beneficial “ arrangements of nature; that there is *no* such thing as mind or spirit “ in the universe ; *no* God, *no* angel, *no* hereafter for man, *no* future “ judgment, *no* heaven or hell, *no* rewards for virtue or punishments for “ vice beyond this life. Its object is, in fact, to teach men to *disbelieve* “ what all ages have believed.”—*Lectures on the Atheistic Controversy*, by the Rev. B. Godwin. Lect. VI. (Published 1834.)

‡ *Spectator*, No. 185.

The various pieces which compose this volume were never before brought together within one pair of boards. Each piece or work is complete in itself: nevertheless, the works may be said to have a relation to each other. They severally handle the different departments of the subject. The one follows the other in a regular order: And the consecutive treatises may, not without reason, be held to constitute an entire compact body of information respecting the *a priori*, or synthetic, method of arguing for the existence of GOD.

First of all, there are exhibited the defects of mere *a posteriori* arguments for the Being and Attributes of A DEITY. And the inherent imperfections of the *a posteriori* plan are exposed for this reason principally,—that an impression favourable to the pretensions of the rival method may be begotten. The value of the one mode of arguing shall be enhanced, by the radical inferiority of the other being established.

In the next place, the reader is presented with the failures of my predecessors in the field of *a priori* argumentation: manifesting, as those failures do, the room and the need there is for something better; should it be possible to supply the *desideratum*. Amongst the circumstances which have brought the synthetic method into discredit, not the least prominent place ought to be reserved for the inefficiency of the labours of former demonstrators. The whole method generally has been

charged with an impotence *which is exclusively chargeable on the attempts of certain patrons, who purposed better things than their fates enabled them to accomplish. To point out the errors of former reasoners is to proceed one step in the right direction.

Thirdly, the reader is shown the connection betwixt necessary existence and infinite extension ; in order that an argument which makes infinite extension an attribute of the Being it seeks to reach, may be viewed with a favourable eye by all those who admit the existence of a necessary Being, the Intelligent Author of the universe. Infinite extension—a necessarily existing Mind, the cause of all the things of nature: if these are inseparably related, he who allows the one, cannot reject the other. In short, the third work is a sort of *argumentum ad hominem*, to be used with the generality of Theists.

It is obvious, that none of the three treatises already referred to, can be considered as adapted to the case of Atheists, as Atheists.

In the fourth place, “The Argument, *a priori*, for the Being and Attributes of A GREAT FIRST CAUSE,” comes in sight.

And, *fifthly and lastly*, in the “Examination” of *Antitheos* there is a defence, against the assaults of the chosen champion of Atheism, of one of the two precisely similarly situated foundations of the “Argument.”

Since the talented and skilful author of the “Refuta-

tion" is unable to reply to our "Examination;† it may be confidently predicted, that no atheist, be he who he may, will ever be capable of doing so successfully. In fine, by means of the "Examination," the "Argument, *a priori*," is shown to be, in very deed, an *irrefragable demonstration*. The *desideratum* (alluded to above) will be perceived to be supplied.

— The "Examination" contains within it two sub-treatises. One of these gives, within the limits of a Part, a full proof of the "non-infinite divisibility of extension and of matter." The other, though it takes the humble guise of a digression running through several Parts, is, in reality, a complete and separable treatise, "Of the sentiments of philosophers concerning Space." A disquisition which will perhaps be reckoned not the least valuable—as it is likely to be the most generally interesting—portion of the work wherein it occurs.—

• It need hardly be said, that those two productions, the "Argument," to wit, and the "Examination," are to be held as especially intended for Atheists. Without doubt, some classes of Theists might read the works with profit to themselves, were the truths insisted on to be sufficiently pondered, and duly digested. Nevertheless, the works are adapted and addressed to Atheists, primarily.

† See "Postscript to the Third Edition," p. 388.

— It is our fervent prayer, that, by the perusal and consideration of those productions, many who are Infidels, as touching the Great Fundamental Doctrine of ONE INFINITE and ETERNAL BEING, *the Cause of all the Phenomena and of all the Matter in the Universe*; may be converted from the error of their portentous disbelief.—

The sort of relation which those various works bear to each other is, by this time, apparent. They are consecutive: and the order of their actual sequence could not be altered without infringing upon the order of the natural or suitable sequence.

We have demonstrated the *All-powerfulness*, the *Entire Freeness*, and the *Perfect Goodness* of the Supreme Being.† Whence, then, *evil*? for the existence of evil is admitted on all hands: Whence evil? physical evil, and moral? or, to put things after a better order, moral evil, and physical? How comes it that evil exists in a world, the work of a Being “All-powerful,” “Entirely Free,” and “Perfectly Good?” This is the question of questions, the mystery of mysteries.

No doubt, that, in connection with the *a priori* proof

† See “The Argument, *a priori*,” Div. II. Part II. and Part III. Div. III. Sub-Prop.

of the Perfect Goodness of an All-powerful and Entirely Free Author of nature, that question must arise in the mind of every person. However feeble may be the powers of reflection, the question cannot be absent, or evitaded. No doubt, that, in connection with such a proof, some relative solution of the grand riddle, the enigma of the universe, is reasonably to be expected.

However, the only answer to be afforded at present is a general one; (one, notwithstanding, which would be satisfactory, even were a more particular one not to be gotten;) taken from the prince of modern Sceptics, if not the prince of modern Atheists also. A more full solution of the difficulty, we propose, indeed, to put forth, some time or other: perhaps, in some connection with the *a priori* proof of the GOODNESS, JUSTICE, or RIGHTEOUSNESS, and other Attributes, of the Divine Being. But, meanwhile, the public must rest satisfied with one to the following effect:—If the Perfect Goodness of the Supreme Being is *demonstrated*——But let us hear David Hume himself. He speaks by the mouth of his representative, Philo.

“ Let us allow, that, if the *goodness* of the Deity (I mean a goodness like the human†) could be established on any tolerable reasons *a priori*, these phenomena, however *untoward*, would not be sufficient to subvert that principle; but might easily, in some unknown

† Philo means, by *like*, of the same generic character as.

“manner, be reconcilable to it.”—*Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. Part XI.*

And in a former place of the same masterly performance, Philo, that is to say, Hume himself, had laid down the same thing, by means of a more extended principle. “There are many inexplicable difficulties in the works of Nature, which, if we allow a perfect author to be proved *a priori*, are easily solved, and become only seeming difficulties,” &c.—*Part V.*

In conclusion: It cannot be too often repeated, that the being of a God constitutes the fundamental point of all religion. To the doctrine of human immortality and future retribution, Theism is a necessary preliminary. The Christian faith does not lay, but it builds on, this foundation—*There is A GOD.* And therefore, to set out the proof for the existence of GOD, is the first step to the demolishing of Infidelity, of what description soever the Infidelity may be.

AN
INQUIRY INTO THE DEFECTS
OF
MERE *A POSTERIORI* ARGUMENTS
FOR
A GOD.

By this method of reasoning, you renounce all claim to infinity in any of the attributes of the Deity. For, as the cause ought only to be proportioned to the effect, and the effect, so far as it falls under our cognizance, is not infinite; what pretensions have we, upon your suppositions, to ascribe that attribute to the Divine Being?—*David Hume.*

AN
INQUIRY INTO THE DEFECTS
OF
A *POSTERIORI* ARGUMENTS.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE ARGUMENT FROM EXPERIENCE.

§ 1. 'Tis evident, on the slightest reflection, that there can be no more than two ways of proving the being and attributes, or any of the attributes, of the DEITY. If it be possible to establish his existence at all; 'tis possible to prove, either, merely, that *he is*; or, that, besides being, *he must be*. The reasonings which would *demonstrate* his being, are called *a priori*: Those which give *probable evidence*, only, for his being, *a posteriori*.

§ 2. The more common *a posteriori* argument may be called, the argument from *experience*. Not that experience can discover a GOD; but this argument infers the existence of a GOD, by a process similar to that by which we conclude, that certain appearances have been preceded by a cause, which we have discovered almost as often as we have set out in the search. This argument takes a survey of the uni-

verse,—and examines, more minutely, one of its parts; asserts, it there discovers *marks of design*; and, from these marks of design, infers the existence of a designer, or an intelligent cause. It is level to all men's capacities. And unless men resolve to shut their eyes, and stop the operation of their understanding, they cannot avoid coming to the conclusion, that the phenomena of nature imply the existence of a cause of them.

§ 3. But, though the *a posteriori* argument be good, so far as it goes, yet its discoveries reach only a certain way. If we confine ourselves merely to its evidence, we shall, inevitably, find ourselves surrounded by many serious difficulties,—difficulties which will oppress, if they do not discourage, the minds of the more inquisitive.

§ 4. But before taking notice of the disadvantages attending this argument, if the aid of the other sort of reasoning is nowise introduced, let it be premised, that we are not, in any way, to enter upon the merits of that argument, but shall take the validity of it, so far as its evidence reaches, entirely for granted: the object, here, being only to point out the defects it labours under, admitting its inference to be irresistible.

§ 5. FIRST, One of the disadvantages, then, or, rather, a class of disadvantages, attending mere *a posteriori* reasonings, is, that they can never make it appear, that *infinity* belongs, in any way, to GOD.

§ 6. First, The *a posteriori* argument can only entitle us to infer the existence of a Being of finite extension: for by what rule known in philosophy, can we deduce, from the existence of an effect finite in extent, (and nothing is plainer than that the marks of design which *we* can discover, must be finite in their extent,) the existence of a cause of infinity of extension?

§ 7. What becomes, then, of the omnipresence of the DEITY, according to those who are content to rest satisfied with the reasonings from experience? Those who seek not the aid of the other species of reasoning must let their system of Theism preserve a cautious silence upon, so unaccountable a matter. It will be vain to talk of the DEITY being present by his energy, although he may not be present by his substance, to the whole universe. For, 'tis natural to ask, not so much how it is proved, that GOD can be virtually present, though not substantially present, in every part of nature, as what can be meant by being every where present by mere energy?

§ 8. Add to this, that, even admitting the foolish distinction in question, *a posteriori* reasoning can no more make out, that the DEITY is omnipresent by his virtue, than that he is omnipresent as to his substance. Admit the distinction: 'tis of no service.

§ 9. And from the inaptitude of the reasoning under consideration, to show that immensity or omnipresence belongs to GOD, it will be found to follow, directly and immediately, that his wisdom and power cannot be shown to be more than finite, and that he can never be proved to be a free agent.

§ 10. *First*, It is very plain, that omnipresence (let it be only by energy) is absolutely necessary in a Being of infinity† of wisdom. And, therefore, the *a posteriori* argument is unable to evince that the DEITY is in possession of this attribute.

§ 11. *Secondly*, It, likewise, plainly follows, from the inaptitude of this argument to show that GOD is omnipresent, that, thereby, we cannot prove infinity of power to belong to

† The terms *infinity*, *infinite*, and others, are frequently employed, in the course of this "Inquiry," in their popular, lax sense.

him. For, if the argument cannot make out that the Being it discovers is every where present, how can it ever make out that he is every where powerful? By careful reflection, too, we may perceive, that omnipotence of another kind than power which can exert itself in all places, requires the existence of immensity.

§ 12. *Thirdly*, Without calling in the aid of subtle reasoning to prove, that, if the argument *a posteriori* cannot show that GOD is omnipresent, it can never evince that he is a free agent; let those who may contend that, by the reasonings from experience, it can be made to appear, the DEITY is a free agent, be pleased to tell us, what is that logical process by which they deduce, from the premises they have obtained, such a conclusion. Of what nature is the middle term, which puts beyond doubt the agreement of subject and predicate in the proposition, that the GOD whom the argument from experience doth reveal is entirely free?

§ 13. But, indeed, without having been at pains to show, that, if we cannot prove the immensity or omnipresence of the DEITY, we can, for that reason, never show that he is omniscient—that he is omnipotent—that he is entirely free: It had been sufficient simply to say, that if the DEITY cannot be proved to be of infinity in any given respect, it would be nothing less than absurd to suppose that he could be proved to be of infinity in any other respect.

§ 14. *Secondly*, Not to lay any weight on the truth just announced, that if we cannot prove GOD to have a particular infinite attribute, we can never show that infinity of any kind whatever belongs to him: or, not here to insist on this point, that we shall never be able to make out that there is an eternal being, if we be not able to make out that there is an immense being; the eternity of a being as much implying his immensity, as his immensity would evidently infer his

eternity: (Truths these most unquestionable:) The *a posteriori* argument can do no more than prove, that, at the commencement of the phenomena which pass under its review, there existed a cause exactly sufficient to make the effects begin to be. That this cause existed from eternity, the reasonings from experience can, by no means, show. Nay, for aught they make known, the designer himself may not have existed long before those marks of design which betoken his workmanship.

§ 15. And, because reasoning of the kind in question cannot prove, that the GOD whom it reveals has existed from all eternity, therefore, for any thing it intimates, GOD may, at some time, cease to be; and the workmanship may have an existence, when the workman hath fallen into annihilation. For, of that being only, who never had a beginning, the non-existence implies a contradiction.

§ 16. Concerning the topics alluded to, the argument leaves us quite at a loss. It gives some little information, and then is found inadequate to extend our knowledge the least way farther.

§ 17. It would be worse than useless to expend many words in showing, that the argument *a posteriori* cannot prove that GOD is of infinite goodness, and justice, and all other infinite moral perfections. Without insisting that there must be infinite natural attributes as a foundation whereon to build infinite moral attributes: (A thing certain:) 'Tis evident, that the same reason which prevents us from proving the first, will for ever prevent us from proving the second.

§ 18. SECONDLY, Another defect that mere *a posteriori* reasonings labour under, is, perhaps, still weightier than their inability to prove that infinity, in any way, belongs to GOD. How can such reasonings ever assure us of the *unity* of the DEITY? 'Twill be granted that the question as to the unity

of GOD, involves a point of much importance: the point, perhaps, of greatest moment connected with our speculations as to his existence. But, whether there be but one GOD, or not, the argument from experience doth, by no means, make clear. It discovers marks of design in the phenomena of nature, and infers the existence of *at least one* intelligent substance sufficient to produce them. Farther, however, it advances not our knowledge. Whether the cause of the phenomena be one GOD, or many gods, it pretends not to determine, past all doubt.

§ 19. The contrivances we observe in nature, may establish a unity of *counsel*: how can they establish a unity of *substance*?

§ 20. In the phenomena that surround me, I see certain means adapted to certain ends. Without hesitation, I conclude, there was a designer. But did this designer create the *matter* in which the design appears? Of this, the argument *a posteriori* cannot convince us. For that argument does no more than infer a designing cause from certain appearances; in the same way as we would infer, from finding some well contrived machine in a desert, that a human being had left it there. But point out marks of design, certain means adapted to certain ends, in *gross*, untractable matter itself?

§ 21. Now, because this reasoning cannot convince us of such a creation, it cannot convince us that there is not a plurality of deities, or of the causes of things. As thus: If the designer whom this argument discovers, did not create the matter containing the design, but that was created by some superior agent, then here is a complete destruction of the unity of GOD. If matter was not created at all, then we are involved in the supposition of that strange plurality of gods, in which there is, at least, one physical substance,

and that, it may be, the more ancient member of the Ditheism.

§ 22. But even though we hold, that the designing cause of the phenomena we see, created the matter in which they appear, (an opinion for which the argument in question gives us no evidence,) what the nearer are we to a real proof of the unity of GOD? Did he who created and fashioned an inconsiderable part of the universe, create and fashion universal nature? Perhaps he did not. Then, we have no proper evidence for the doctrine of his unity.

§ 23. Besides, to insist on no other topic, if we cannot prove the eternity of GOD, it is not possible that we can prove the unity of GOD. To say that, for any thing we know to the contrary, he may not have existed from all eternity, being much the same thing as saying, that, for anything we know to the contrary, there may be another god, or many gods, besides.

§ 24. We see, then, what the argument *a posteriori* amounts to. That, at the commencement of the phenomena, or designs, which do appear, there existed, as the cause, an intelligent substance, or several intelligent substances, of sufficient extension, wisdom, power, and freeness,—goodness, justice, and other moral qualities,—to make the effects begin to be: this is all that that species of reasoning can make known. And if we think that, without assistance from another source than the reasonings from experience, we shall be enabled to ascend higher in our investigations, we but weakly impose upon ourselves, and mistake, for the exercise of the understanding, the uncertain flights of the fancy.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE ARGUMENT FROM MIRACLES.

§ 1. There are some who would prove the existence of GOD, by showing that *miracles* have happened: a miracle affords evidence that there is a GOD.

§ 2. There are two distinct kinds of Atheists. First, Those who contend that it is *impossible there can be* a GOD. And, secondly, those who only go the length of saying, that there *is no* GOD. Perhaps, this latter class of Atheists may be properly sunk in another class, namely, those who do but maintain that, as yet, they have seen no proper evidence adduced to establish the existence of a DEITY.

§ 3. The system of Epicurus, in ancient times; in modern, the system of Spinoza, fall to be ranged along with those of the first sort. And many other species of Atheism, by how few shades soever they differ from the systems specified, or from each other, might be pointed out as belonging to the same class.† All the systems of Atheism which would go to show, there can be no GOD, may be reduced to the following opinion: that there has been a succession, or, rather, have been successions, from eternity, of dependent beings, in which are included all things that are, or ever were, in the universe.

§ 4. Now, a miracle pre-supposes a GOD: at least, if a miracle prove the existence of GOD, it must, beyond all contradiction, also pre-suppose that existence. Does it not indeed establish, by first assuming, the being of a DEITY?

† In this century, Shelley, one of the greatest of English poets, published a work entitled, *The Necessity of Atheism*.

§ 5. What sort of an error, then, in logic, do they commit who would ask an Atheist, of the first class, to believe in a miracle: that is, to believe in a thing which would pre-suppose the existence of what he reckons an impossibility?

§ 6. Besides, if chance, or necessity, or any other word, can account for so much, what hinders it to account for a little more? If it sustain, whether or not it caused, the universe and all things therein, is it incapable of making the further slight exertion of bringing an uncommon, or hitherto unknown, event to pass, suppose the visible antecedent to be any thing whatever?

§ 7. With regard to the other kind of Atheists, or those who have not yet seen evidence sufficiently strong to compel them to admit there is a GOD: we may demand of him who hopes to convert such men by adducing the testimony in favour of miracles, Does the whole visible creation contain no evidence, or not as good evidence as it is possible there could be, of the existence of a DEITY, that you resort to miracles, in search of proof for this? What is the ground of the preference? None is apparent. 'Tis granted, that a miracle affords evidence of a being much superior to man: but do not the works of nature afford proof equally worthy of being relied on, to the same purpose? Do you throw the *permanent* phenomena of nature aside, as utterly insignificant; and pause till you can establish a miracle, before you venture to assert the existence of DEITY?

§ 8. After all, we may despair of bringing, by miracles, to the belief of a DEITY, the man who is incapable of being convinced of the being of a DEITY, by the phenomena that surround him. If, in these, he see no marks of a designer, think you, that an event with a new and unexpected antecedent, must force him into the belief of a being endowed

with power and other excellencies, far beyond the human? Why should this be so?

§ 9. But there is another consideration, which should be carefully kept in mind. Miracles are thought to be clogged with difficulties of a most peculiar character. The proof against miracles, from the nature of the case, ('tis argued,†) is as complete as any proof, from testimony, in their favour, can possibly be. Then, would you have men suspend their belief in a GOD, till they get past this preliminary difficulty? This were any thing but making the road to Theism shorter and less difficult.

§ 10. Even let it be supposed that miracles answer the purpose for which they are thus brought forward: the proof by this method of the being of a GOD, is attended with all the defects and disadvantages which attend that argument *a posteriori*, which is in more general use.

§ 11. Which of the two,—the argument in general use, or the one drawn from miracles, for the existence of a DEITY,—gives us the more enlarged, exalted, and correct ideas of that Being, would constitute a question, which, if it be as important as it is difficult, should be followed out by the exclusive supporters of either method of proving so fundamental a doctrine.

† In this connexion, it is superfluous to name David Hume, the sceptical metaphysician of Scotland, and of Europe, and the followers in his train, in that crusade against Miracles which rests on so abstract a consideration.

REVIEWS
OF
THE DEMONSTRATIONS,
BY
MR LOCKE, DR SAMUEL CLARKE,
' THE REV. MOSES LOWMAN,
BISHOP HAMILTON,
AND OTHERS,
OF
' THE EXISTENCE AND ATTRIBUTES
OF
A DEITY.

If ever so many of these proofs should fail, and be found not so conclusive as they pretend to be, they can fail only for themselves.—*Bishop Hamilton.*

A REVIEW
OF
MR LOCKE'S DEMONSTRATION
OF THE
EXISTENCE OF A DEITY.

§ 1. It admits not of being called in question, that, among the causes of speculative or theoretical atheism, there fall to be ranked not a few of those arguments which have been employed, because supposed, to evidence demonstratively the being of DEITY. The reasonings composing the arguments which we have in view, are of so faulty a description, that it need not surprise us if they have tended, sometimes, to make those doubt who never doubted before.' A weak imperfect proof of the existence of GOD, when it does not leave the attentive mind in the exact condition in which it was found, will incline it—if any direct effect whatever be produced—to take the first step in the road to atheism. And the reader need not be told, that a bad argument, for a Great First Cause, must confirm and encourage the atheist in his disbelief.

§ 2. On these accounts, there will be no impropriety, but the reverse, in examining some of those *a priori* arguments

which have been more or less relied on as establishing the primary truth of religion, and in pointing out, succinctly but clearly, wherein they offend against the laws of right reasoning. The doctrine of a GOD is too well founded to be damaged by an exposure of the weakness of the efforts which have been made by some of its friends.

§ 3. The first of the arguments, supposed to be demonstrative, which we shall consider, is the celebrated one excogitated by the master-mind of John Locke.

§ 4. This distinguished philosopher prefaces his reasoning in the following manner.—“Though GOD has given us no
 “innate ideas of Himself; though He has stamped no
 “original characters on our minds, wherein we may read His
 “being;” [At least, such is Locke’s opinion.] “yet having
 “furnished us with those faculties our minds are endowed
 “with, He hath not left Himself without witness; since we
 “have sense, perception, and reason, and cannot want a clear
 “proof of Him, as long as we carry ourselves about us.
 “Nor can we justly complain of our ignorance in this great
 “point, since He has so plentifully provided us with the
 “means to discover and know Him, so far as is necessary,
 “to the end of our being, and the great concernment of our
 “happiness. But though this be the most obvious truth
 “that reason discovers, and though its evidence be (if I mis-
 “take not) equal to” [he does not say identical with]
 “*mathematical certainty*; yet it requires thought and
 “attention, and the mind must apply itself to a regular
 “deduction of it from some part of our intuitive knowledge,
 “or else we shall be as uncertain and ignorant of this as of
 “other propositions, which are in themselves capable of *clear*
 “*demonstration*.”—“Essay concerning Human Understand-
 “ing,” Book IV. chapter x. § 1.

§ 5. Now come we to the proof itself. The *first* step in which, is the assumption, that *man knows he himself is*. Theist and atheist are agreed as to this.

§ 6. The *second* step in Locke's ratiocination may be said to be composed of the maxim, *Nothing cannot produce a being*. This, too, the atheist grants, at least in words, as readily as the theist.

§ 7. The *third* step is constituted by the use made of the maxim, which, when taken in connection with the assumption, leads Mr Locke (as my Lord Brougham has noticed†) to the inference, *that from eternity there has been something*. The proof of the legitimacy of the inference is to this effect: *What was not from eternity, had a beginning; and, What had a beginning, must be produced by something else*—In other words, Whatever begins to be must have a cause. This third step, likewise, will be admitted by atheists.

§ 8. The second step consists of the minor premiss, and the third of the conclusion, of an epichirematic hypothetical syllogism. Or, the third step may be considered as consisting of the major proposition itself,—*If nothing cannot produce the being which is, from eternity there has been something; since what was not from eternity, had a beginning, &c.*

§ 9. Or, what we have made out to be the second and third steps may be considered as but one, constituted by the syllogism whose three propositions we have denoted. It is certain that Locke has made but one step of our two. But readers may judge in this matter for themselves. The whole passage in Locke is as follows:—

† See passage cited in § 39, below.

		§ 10. " In the <i>next</i> place, man
		" knows by an intuitive certainty,
		" that bare nothing can no more
		" produce any real being, than it can
	<i>Minor.</i>	" be equal to two right angles. If a
		" man knows not that non-entity, or
		" the absence of all being, cannot be
		" equal to two right angles, it is im-
		" possible he should know any de-
		" monstration in Euclid. ¹ If there-
	¹ <i>Consequence.</i>	" fore we know ² there is some real
	² <i>Assumption.</i>	" being, and that ³ non-entity cannot
	³ <i>Maxim.</i>	" produce any real being, it is an
		" evident demonstration, that ⁴ from
	⁴ <i>Consequent.</i>	" eternity there has been something;
		" ⁵ since what was not from eternity,
	⁵ <i>Proof of the Major.</i>	" had a beginning; and what had a
		" beginning, must be produced by
		" something else."—§ 3.

§ 11. With the *next* step in the reasoning begins the sophistry; which as soon as ever we point out, the thing will be obvious enough to every reader. We shall not leave it to any atheist to put his finger on the weakness of the reasoning, and to triumph over a bad argument, as if he had triumphed over the cause which the argument seeks to support.†

§ 12. The ratiocination is contained in these words:—
" Next, it is evident, that what had its being and beginning

† "To discover," says Dr Fiddes, "the weakness of any argument in particular which may be brought to prove a fundamental article of religion, is not, as some pious men have too much suspected, to do religion disservice, but only shows it does not stand in need of any artifices, and has nothing to fear from a fair, ingenuous, and free examination."—" *Theologia Speculativa*, or a Body of Divinity," chap. vi. of Book I. Part II.

“from another, must also have all that which is in, and belongs to its being from another too. All the powers it has must be owing to, and received from, the same source. This eternal source, then, of all being, must also be the source and original of all power; and so this eternal being must be also the most powerful.”—§ 4.

§ 13. “What had its being and beginning from another, must also have all that which is in, and belongs to its being from another too.” Not perhaps too perspicuous; but it is granted.

§ 14. “All the powers it has must be owing to, and received from, the same source.” Granted, likewise.

§ 15. “This *eternal source*, then, of *all being*, must also be the *source and original of all power*; and so THIS ETERNAL BEING must be also the most powerful.” Here lies the sophism, and a mighty sophism it is. Mr Locke, in the first place, *assumed*, that I am conscious of my own existence. In the second place, laid down the *maxim*, Nothing cannot be the cause of an existence. In the third, *inferred*, that from eternity there has been SOMETHING. The nature, however, of the something was not determined: Something indeed there was proved to have always been, but it was only *a vague something*. But in this fourth step, the vague something is secretly held to be NOT *a succession, from eternity, of things or beings*, but an “eternal source” of all other beings, or, in other words, an “eternal being” the cause of all other existences. Before, however, the author could have legitimately arrived at such an eternal source or being, it behoved him to have demolished the hypothesis of the infinite successions of things,—the grand hypothesis of atheism, the hypothesis, we may say, into which all atheism must run at last.† Dr Clarke’s argumentation (as my Lord Brougham

† “All Atheism must in its account of most things * * terminate

has hinted†) sets off in pretty much the same track as Mr Locke's. And the Doctor (witness what is said under his second proposition) saw clearly the necessity of his getting over infinite successions before he could have the truth shining out, "that there must needs have always been *some Independent Being*, some one at least." ‡

§ 16. The reasoning in the *fifth* step of Locke's proof is of the same vicious description as the reasoning of the preceding step, and by the aid of the key which the reader must now be possessed of, he will have no difficulty in detecting the latent fallacy.

§ 17. "Again, a man finds in himself perception and knowledge. We have then got one step farther; and we are certain now, that there is not only some being, but some knowing intelligent being in the world."—§ 5.

§ 18. Who could at first sight have supposed, that under "some being," Locke has an *eternal being*; and that under "some knowing intelligent being," he has an *eternal knowing intelligent being*? But it is certainly the case. For otherwise, there is no force in the passage. If Locke do not secretly mean us to have in our minds an eternal knowing intelligent being, as the cause of man's "perception and knowledge," then the human race itself, for any thing shown to the contrary, has existed from all eternity. Locke's taking no notice of the hypothesis of the eternal succession of men, and passing on at once to some one eternal intelligent being, the cause of man; this is the prodigious sophism.

§ 19. The author of the Essay next proceeds to say:—"There was a time then, when there was no knowing being, in it." So says the great Rector of St James's, (under Proposition II.) whose undertaking forced the truth often on his notice.

† See below, § 39.

‡ First marginal note to Prop. II.

“ and when knowledge began to be ; or else, there has been “ also a knowing being from eternity.” But is there no third thing which can be supposed? is it impossible to conceive an eternal succession of knowing beings such as men? or, at any rate, an eternal succession of worlds, or systems of worlds?† Whether the conception be possible or not, it is

† “ Though we allow, that the argument which proves that the *effects* “ with which we are surrounded must have been *caused*, and thus leads us “ up through a chain of subordinate causes to one First Cause, has in it a “ simplicity, an obviousness, and a force, which, when we are previously “ furnished with the idea of GOD, makes it at first sight difficult to conceive, “ that men, under any degree of cultivation, should be inadequate to it; “ yet, if the human mind ever commenced such an inquiry at all, it is “ highly probable that it would rest in the notion of an *eternal succession* of “ causes and effects, rather than acquire the ideas of creation, in the proper “ sense, and of a Supreme Creator.”—*Richard Watson*: “ *Theological Institutes*,” page 301, vol. i. third edition.

Thus the expounder of *Methodist* Divinity. Listen, next, to the founder of *Methodism* himself. “ After carefully heaping up the strongest arguments “ I could find in either ancient or modern authors, for the very being of a “ God, and (which is nearly connected with it) the existence of an invisible “ world, I have wandered up and down, musing with myself: ‘ What, if “ all these things which I see around me, this earth and heaven, this “ universal frame, has existed from eternity? What, if that melancholy “ supposition of the old poet be the real case,—

Οἴη περ φύλλων γενεή, τοιγῶδε καὶ ἀνθρώπων;

“ ‘ What, if the generation of men be exactly parallel with the generation “ of leaves? if the earth drops its successive inhabitants just as the tree “ drops its leaves? What, if that saying of a great man be really true?—

“ ‘ *Post mortem nihil est, ipsaque mors nihil* :

“ ‘ Death is nothing, and nothing is after death.

“ ‘ How am I sure that this is not the case ; that I have not followed cun- “ ningly-devised fables?’—And I have pursued the thought till there was “ no spirit in me, and I was ready to choose strangling rather than life.”—*Wesley's Works*, vol. vi. p. 356.

It is true, that John Wesley was but a young man, when he mused with himself after such a manner. 3, 542

certain, that atheists have told us that the thing itself is not only possible but probable, not only probable but indubitable. How, then, came this acute reasoner to overlook so entirely the hypothesis of eternal successions? Just because he was by no means deeply skilled in the atheistical controversy: and this was, because there were few atheists, comparatively, in Locke's time, and because with the writings of the few that were, Locke had too little acquaintance.† Atheism would want all serviceable backing, but for her gratuitously furnished eternal successions of things.

§ 20. "If it be said," continues Locke, "there was a time when no being had any knowledge, when that eternal being was void of all understanding; I reply, that then it was impossible there should ever have been any knowledge." Granting the secret assumption (one the author had no right to make till he had established his claim to it—a thing he never did—) which lies hid in these words, namely, that there is an eternal being, the cause of all things else; if this being was at one time void of all understanding, then the conclusion, that no knowledge, or understanding, could ever be, is irrefragable: Because, the conclusion just depends upon this axiom, That what is not of intelligence cannot make intelligence begin to be—An axiom which is incapable of proof, and incapable of being doubted.

§ 21. What follows in the Essay is most unexceptionable, and let those deniers of a GOD (they are a pitiful minority even of atheists) who ascribe all the intelligence which is in the universe to mere accident, or chance, or hap-hazard, look to it.

§ 22. "It being as impossible that things wholly void of knowledge, and operating blindly, and without any per-

† "I am not so well read in Hobbes and Spinoza, as to be able to say,"—&c. &c.—Mr Locke's third letter to the Bishop of Worcester.

“ception, should produce a knowing being; as it is impossible, that a triangle should make itself three angles bigger than two right ones. For it is as repugnant to the idea of senseless matter, that it should put into itself sense, perception, and knowledge; as it is repugnant to the idea of a triangle, that it should put into itself greater angles than two right ones.”—§ 5.

§ 23. Mr Locke then sets himself to give the substance of what he had advanced. “Thus,” says he, “from the consideration of ourselves, and what we infallibly find in our own constitutions, our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth, that there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing Being; which, whether any one will please to call GOD, it matters not.” (§ 6.) It matters not, indeed, whether an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing Being, be *called* GOD, or not; except as testing the worthiness, or the perverseness, of men: but it certainly matters, and matters very much, whether the existence of an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing Being, has been proved. That Mr Locke, with all his reasoning powers, has not proved it in the passages which we have examined, will now be perfectly obvious to all attentive readers. Mr Locke has taken no notice whatever of the greatest difficulty in his way. If there was any obstacle more weighty than another in the case, that obstacle he has never once regarded. He has not unloosed the knot; neither has he cut it: he never saw it.

§ 24. After briefly adverting to Des Cartes' argument for the existence of a GOD—which, by the way, could be no favourite with the implacable enemy of innate principles, of whatever so much as bordered on the region of innate principles, or bore the most distant resemblance to them;—after adverting to Des Cartes' argument, Locke proceeds in

this manner: "Though our own being furnishes us, as I have shewn, with an evident and incontestable proof of a DEITY; and I believe nobody can avoid the cogency of it, who will but as carefully attend to it, as to *any other demonstration* of so many parts; yet this being so fundamental a truth, and of that consequence that all religion and genuine morality depend thereon, I doubt not but I shall be forgiven by my reader, if I go over some parts of this argument again, and enlarge a little more upon them."—§ 7.

§ 25. Our author then repeats, and dilucidates, the truth, that SOMETHING (*be the thing what it may*) has always been.

§ 26. Next, he divides all things into two classes, to wit, "such as are purely material," and such as are "sensible, thinking, perceiving beings," or, "*incogitative*," and "*cogitative*" beings; "which," he observes, "to our present purpose, if for nothing else, are perhaps better terms than *material* and *immaterial*."—§ 9.

§ 27. Mr Locke afterwards proceeds: "If then there must be SOMETHING eternal, let us see what sort of being *it* must be. And so that, it is very obvious, to reason, that *it* must necessarily be a cogitative being." (§ 10.) Of what character the sophism is which runs through this passage, he who reflects on the contents of the fifteenth section of this review will be at no loss to comprehend. Something is eternal: this Locke proved. But the question is, WHAT is the *something*? And Locke assumes it, without any proof, to be one being, and *not* a succession of beings, or things. If it has been determined, that *some one definite* being must be eternal, it is very well to enter on the question whether it is cogitative, or incogitative: But till the SOMETHING be proved to be *not* a succession of beings, but, on the contrary, only one being, it is rather premature to inquire whether the *one* (the "*it*") thinks or no.

§ 28. What in the Essay immediately succeeds the words which we last cited, is intended to evince, that the purely incogitative, alone, can never be the cause of cogitative substance. *This*, indeed, is shown most triumphantly. The passage, the incontrovertible passage, cannot be too often repeated in the hearing of those persons who are chargeable with the stupidly credulous folly of conceiving, or rather with the sin of saying they can conceive, that Matter, considered as altogether unintelligent, did, by some chance-accident or other, cause the first thinking that ever was to start into existence. As we have a wider object in view than that of merely considering the merits of Locke's demonstration, we need make no apology for introducing so long a quotation as the one which our reader is about to run over. 'Tis a splendid passage: The argument none the worse for having been evolved by both metaphysicians and theologians before our author's time, and since.

§ 29. "It is as *impossible to conceive* that ever bare incogitative matter should produce a thinking, intelligent being, as that nothing should of itself produce matter. Let us suppose any parcel of matter eternal, great or small, we shall find it, in itself, able to produce nothing. For example; let us suppose the matter of the next pebble we meet with, eternal, closely united, and the parts firmly at rest together; if there were no other being in the world, must it not eternally remain so, a dead, inactive lump? *Is it possible to conceive* it can add motion to itself, being purely matter, or produce anything? Matter, then, by its own strength, cannot produce in itself so much as motion: the motion it has, must also be from eternity, or else be produced, and added to matter, by some other being more powerful than matter; matter, as is evident, having not power to produce motion in itself. But let us suppose

“ motion eternal too; yet matter, incogitative matter and
 “ motion, whatever changes it might produce of figure and
 “ bulk, could never produce thought: knowledge will still
 “ be as far beyond the power of motion and matter to pro-
 “ duce, as matter is beyond the power of nothing, or non-
 “ entity, to produce. AND I APPEAL TO EVERY ONE’S OWN
 “ THOUGHTS, WHETHER HE CANNOT AS EASILY CONCEIVE
 “ MATTER PRODUCED BY NOTHING, AS THOUGHT TO BE PRO-
 “ DUCED BY PURE MATTER, WHEN BEFORE THERE WAS NO
 “ SUCH THING AS THOUGHT, OR AN INTELLIGENT BEING
 “ EXISTING? Divide matter into as minute parts as you
 “ will (which we are apt to imagine a sort of spiritualizing, or
 “ making a thinking thing of it), vary the figure and motion of
 “ it as much as you please; a globe, cube, cone, prism, cylin-
 “ der, &c., whose diameters are but 1,000,000th part of a
 “ gry,† will operate no otherwise upon other bodies of pro-
 “ portionable bulk, than those of an inch, or foot diameter;
 “ and you may as rationally expect to produce sense,
 “ thought, and knowledge, by putting together, in a certain
 “ figure and motion, gross particles of matter, as by those
 “ that are the very minutest, that do any where exist. They
 “ knock, impel, and resist one another, just as the greater do,
 “ and that is all they can do. So that, if we will suppose
 “ nothing first, or eternal, matter can never begin to be: if
 “ we suppose bare matter, without motion, eternal, motion
 “ can never begin to be: if we suppose only matter and
 “ motion first, or eternal, thought can never begin to be.”

† “ A gry is one-tenth of a line, a line one-tenth of an inch, an inch one-
 “ tenth of a philosophical foot, a philosophical foot one-third of a pendulum,
 “ whose diadroms, in the latitude of 45 degrees, are each equal to one second
 “ of time, or one sixtieth of a minute. I have affectedly made use of this
 “ measure here, and the parts of it, under a decimal division, with names to
 “ them; because, I think, it would be of general convenience, that this
 “ should be the common measure, in the commonwealth of letters.”

§ 30. The proposition which follows, though joined to the citation just made by the causal "for," has in reality no connection, of the kind the particle was intended to denote, with that which precedes. The sentences already quoted by us go to show, that bare matter cannot be the free cause of a thinking substance:† The sentence which succeeds in the Essay touches on a very different topic, the impossibility, to wit, there is that matter should have been, from all eternity, in necessary hypostatical union with thought. The fact we state seems to have eluded the observation of Locke's critics, who are not always blessed with perfect perspicacity:‡ Indeed, the fact seems to have entirely escaped the notice of Locke himself. Let our readers now judge whether what we advance be not well-founded.

§ 31. "FOR it is impossible to conceive that matter, " either with, or without motion, could have originally in, " and from, itself, sense, perception, and knowledge, as is " evident from hence, that THEN sense, perception, and know- " ledge, must be a property *eternally inseparable* from " matter, and every particle of it."

§ 32. Our author continues thus: "Not to add, that " though our general or specific conception of matter makes " us speak of it as one thing, yet really all matter is not one " individual thing, neither is there any such thing existing as

† We may take this opportunity of remarking, that, however excellent the sentences alluded to in the text are in themselves, they had no business to make their appearance where they are. Locke is inquiring whether the eternal being he speaks of must be supposed cogitative or not: and not whether incogitative matter, supposing incogitative matter eternal, could have produced intelligence.

‡ To instance in living critics: Mr J. A. St John speaks of the Essay's "rigorous demonstration of the existence of a GOD."—*Introductory Essay to Mr Locke's "Reasonableness of Christianity."* And for another, and a very similar opinion, see § 39 of the text.

“one material being, or one single body, that we know or can conceive.”

§ 33. “And therefore,” proceeds Locke, “if matter were the eternal first cogitative Being”—What eternal [first cogitative] Being did Locke mean? The one eternal Being whose existence he had assumed, without, as it happened, any proof for the same. For unless he meant that, he was writing beside his purpose. “And therefore if matter were the eternal first cogitative Being, there would not be one eternal infinite cogitative Being, but an infinite number† of eternal finite cogitative beings, independent one of another, of limited force, and distinct thoughts, which could never produce that order, harmony, and beauty, which are to be found in nature.” There seems to be (in one view, at all events, of the affair) some, and no slight, confusion of thought in this place. The *proposition* is a hypothetical one. In the *antecedent*, (*i. e.* “if matter were the eternal first cogitative Being,”) *matter* is for the time identified with Locke’s one eternal [first cogitative] Being—got at as this was by very unjustifiable means—and, so, the *matter* is invested with *unity*; we mean, is considered as composing *one whole*: while, in the *consequent*, this procedure is secretly held as revoked, and the same *matter* is viewed as a *congeries* of things, each of which, like so much quicksilver, would be ready to break up into parts upon parts, as soon as one should attempt to lay a finger on’t.—Besides: In the previous sentence, Locke had told us (falsely enough, we believe) that there neither is, nor can be, “Any such thing *existing* as ONE material being, or ONE

† As to the absurdity involved in “an infinite number,” in the strict sense of the terms, see Locke himself in Book II. ch. xvii. § 8, § 13.—From these sections, two passages are quoted in the “Examination:” Appendix to Part iv. § 6.

“SINGLE body.”† How, then, can there be, and he supposes there can be, “an infinite number,” or at least any *possible* number, of material beings, that is, of bodies? Since there cannot be *one*, there cannot be *many*.

§ 34. Our author concludes the department of the subject he is upon, thus: “Since, therefore, whatsoever is the first eternal Being,”—whose existence is unwarrantably assumed,—“must necessarily be cogitative;” (of which Locke gave you such proof as he thought proper;) “and whatsoever is “FIRST OF ALL THINGS, must necessarily contain in it, and “actually have, at least, all the perfections that can ever “after exist; nor can it ever give to another any perfection “that it hath not, either actually in itself, or at least in a “higher degree: it necessarily follows, that the first eternal “Being cannot be matter.” (§ 10.) Take the two positions which are here given as premises, take them, we say, *as a whole*, and they can by no means be gainsayed; but the misfortune is that the atheist (and the author, in this place, is to be held as dealing with atheists only)—the atheist will never be induced to grant that there is a “*first of all things*,” in the sense in which Locke understands the words. Were an atheist to admit Locke’s original thing, the free cause of all else, he would be no longer an atheist. To be a *cause*, in the proper sense of the term, implies to be *intelligent*.‡ •

§ 35. The author of the Essay prosecutes his subject in this way: “If therefore it be evident, that *something* neces-

† The third part of our “Examination” sets at rest, it is trusted, the question, whether or no there is *one* material being, that is, *one* body, in existence.

‡ “Upon an accurate analysis of the meaning of words,” [At least, upon an accurate analysis of the nature of ideas,] “it will be found that the idea “of an *efficient* cause implies the idea of *Mind*.”—*Dugald Stewart: Encyclopædia Britannica*; “Preliminary Dissertation,” p. 266.

“sarily must exist from eternity, it is also as evident that “that *something* must necessarily be a *cogitative* Being.” It is not even evident, at least atheists say it is not evident, that the eternal *something* must be a Being, in contradistinction to a succession, or related successions, of beings. The *unity* must be proved before the author can legitimately advance to the *cogitateness*—otherwise, little to his purpose can be accomplished.—But we interrupted Mr Locke, who was saying, that his “*something* must necessarily be a “*cogitative* Being: FOR” (mark the transition to the proof) “it is as impossible, that incogitative matter should produce “a cogitative Being, as that nothing, or the negation of all “being, should produce a positive being or matter.” (§ 11.) It is impossible, that nothing, or negation, should produce any thing: and it is impossible, that incogitative matter should produce cogitation: But neither of these two true propositions, nor yet both together, do prove that Locke’s ETERNAL SOMETHING is not a succession, or successions, of things, or that the said ETERNAL SOMETHING must be supposed cogitative. Points, these, which he who carefully ponders the affair in all its bearings, will perceive by abundance of irresistible evidence. 3, 542

§ 36. Two things Locke undertakes to do. The one is, to demonstrate “the necessary existence of an eternal mind:”† the other, to make clear, that GOD is not material. Having gone over the proof adduced as to the necessary existence of an eternal mind, we are arrived at the place where the author begins to unfold a separate proof on the point of immateriality. A separate proof, I say; for these two topics, the existence of GOD, and the immateriality of GOD, are, to some extent, mingled together, in portions of the ground we have

† These words are taken from § 12 of the Essay.

passed.† But inasmuch as the validity of the first of the proofs would require to be assumed, ere we could be properly enabled to weigh the intrinsic force of the second; 'tis not our intention to follow Locke any farther. Since we have been at some pains to expose the inconclusiveness of the first demonstration, we shall by no means take for granted now, that it is irrefragable.

§ 37. We may notice that there is a third distinct point which Locke endeavours to establish. The third position is to the effect that matter is not co-eternal with an eternal mind. But throughout the attempt to prove the new proposition, the author assumes (what we cannot well assume), that all the precedent reasonings are unimpeachable.

§ 38. By way of conclusion, we shall bestow a slight consideration on a passage which occurs in the work of a famous living author. Lord Brougham has the following paragraph in the fourth section of his "Discourse of Natural Theology."

§ 39. "The tenth chapter of Mr Locke's fourth book does not materially differ, in its fundamental position, from the 'Demonstration of the Being and Attributes.' The argument is all drawn from the truth, assumed as self-evident, 'Nothing can no more produce any real being than it can be equal to two right angles.' From this, and the knowledge we have of our own existence, it is shown to follow, that 'from eternity there has been something;' and again, 'that this eternal being must have been most powerful and most knowing,' and 'therefore GOD.' The only difference between this argument and Dr Clarke's is, that Mr Locke states, as one of his propositions, our knowledge of our own existence. But this difference is only in appearance; for Dr Clarke really has assumed what Mr Locke

† See, for instance, § 34, above.

“has more logically made a distinct proposition. Dr Clarke’s first proposition, that something must have existed from all eternity, is demonstrated by shewing the absurdity of the supposition that ‘the things which now are were produced out of nothing.’ He therefore assumes the existence of those things, while Mr Locke more strictly assumes the existence of ourselves only, and indeed states it as a proposition. The other arguments of Mr Locke are more ingenious than Dr Clarke’s, and *the whole reasoning is more rigorous*, although he does not give it the name of a demonstration, and scarcely can be said to treat it as proving the DEITY’S existence to be a necessary truth. Were it to be so considered, the objections formerly stated would apply to it. Indeed, if Dr Clarke had stated the different steps of his reasoning as distinctly as Mr Locke, he would have perceived it to be inconclusive beyond a very limited extent, and to that extent *inductive*.”†

§ 40. Such are the words of a writer who has made out, to his own satisfaction, that Natural Theology is but a branch of *inductive* science.

§ 41. Whether Mr Locke’s “whole reasoning” be as “*rigorous*” as Lord Brougham has represented it to be, our readers can now settle for themselves.

§ 42. Mr Locke “*does not give*” “the name of a demonstration” to his reasoning: So Lord Brougham would have us understand. But that Mr Locke *does* consider his reasoning to be truly demonstrative, the words cited in the

† “See particularly Mr Locke’s PROOFS of his first position.—(*Hum. Understanding*, IV. x. sec. 2.)”

Mr Locke’s first position is, *Man knows that he himself is*. Mr Locke’s “PROOFS” of this position may do every thing *but prove it*. Proofs to me, that I am conscious of thinking, were proofs where proofs should not be. To prove to myself, that I am, were to doubt it: And not to prove it, is to believe it.

twenty-fourth section put past all doubt. But to make assurance doubly sure: In the Essay, Book IV., chapter iii., § 21, it is said, "we have * * * a demonstrative knowledge of the existence of a GOD." And in the second section of the ninth chapter of the same Book, this affirmation occurs: "I say then, that we have the knowledge * * * of the existence of GOD, by demonstration."

§ 43. And that Mr Locke was not unwilling to give his reasoning the name of a demonstration, just because he deemed it to have the nature of a real one, is made sufficiently obvious by the sentence wherein he insinuates, that the evidence of his argument will be found equal to mathematical certainty.† Is not mathematical evidence demonstration?

§ 44. Mr Locke "scarcely can be said to treat" his reasoning "as proving the DEITY'S existence to be a necessary truth." Lord Brougham asserts this, but the assertion is directly contrary to the fact; for, in the very chapter where the reasoning in question occurs, the author of the Essay alludes to it as constituting a "discovery" of "the necessary existence of an eternal mind."‡

§ 45. Had not kind Heaven decreed otherwise, it would have been a sad day for the fundamental truth of all religion, when his Lordship wrote all that is within the boards of his volume, evincing, to his own contentment, that Natural Theology is no more than one of the branches of Experimental Philosophy.

† See § 4, above.

‡ These words will be found in § 12, as a previous note made the reader aware.

A REVIEW
OF
DR SAMUEL CLARKE'S "DEMONSTRATION
OF THE
BEING AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.
MORE PARTICULARLY
IN ANSWER TO MR HOBBS, SPINOZA,
AND THEIR FOLLOWERS,"

§ 1. Nothing appears to be more unaccountable, than that, if there be a necessarily existing Being, there can be no way of proving it. To say so, seems absurd. And if there be any way of proving, there is a necessarily existing Being, it must, of course, be by arguments drawn from the necessity of the thing. Reasonings *a posteriori* can show what may be, or, is: they cannot show what must be. To hold, therefore, that *a priori* reasoning in the matter can never turn to any account, is to hold, that we can never prove a necessarily existing Being. Indeed, if *a priori* reasoning in the matter can never turn to any account, what does this show but that it is impossible, there can be a necessarily existing Being? And for one to believe what he can have no proof for, and what is impossible, is surely extravagant.

§ 2. Nay, must we not suppose, that if there be, indeed, a necessary Being, the demonstration of this existence must be very easily reached, and, when set down, irresistible? If a necessarily existing Being is not one whose being is a SINE QUA NON, and must be supposed as a SINE QUA NON, of every thing else, what can be understood by such? And if we must suppose that Being as a SINE QUA NON of every other thing, surely, the proof of the existence of that Being is not difficult to be attained to, or rather, is impossible to be avoided.

§ 3. And, as, if there be a necessary Being, it would appear, that the proof must be close within our reach, so, there can be, substantially, but one way of exhibiting the demonstration. For a necessarily existing Being is one whose Being is a SINE QUA NON of every other thing. We can know of his existence only by his modes: His modes, therefore, of existing must be the SINE QUA NON of all else. We, surely, may easily see what things are the SINE QUA NON of every other existence. There are two things,† and two only, which are the SINE QUA NON of every other existence. And 'tis attempted to be demonstrated,‡ that, from these two, we must infer the existence of a necessarily existing Being, the intelligent cause of all things.

§ 4. Dr Clarke, in his "Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God," "in answer to Mr Hobbes, Spinoza, and their followers," hath not sufficiently attended to this, that, if there be a necessary Being, his existence must be deduced, if deduced at all, from those things that are the SINE QUA NON of all else; those things being the modes of his existing. And, accordingly, the Doctor's Demonstration is no more than a pretended one. It is wholly, and evidently, inconclusive.

† *I. e.* Extension and Duration.

‡ *Viz.* in "The Argument, *a priori*," &c.

§ 5. The whole of that Demonstration hangs upon the second proposition. This Dr Clarke virtually acknowledges:—"Either there has always Existed some one Unchangeable and *Independent* Being, from which all other Beings that are or ever were in the Universe, have receiv'd their Original; or else there has been an infinite Succession of changeable and *dependent* Beings produced one from another in an endless Progression, *without* any Original Cause at all. Now this latter Supposition is so very absurd, that tho' all Atheism must in its Account of most things (as shall be shown hereafter) terminate in it, yet I think very few Atheists ever were so weak as openly and directly to defend it." Here he confesses that all Atheism must, in its account of most things, terminate in the supposition of an infinite succession of dependent beings. It is incumbent on him, therefore, to get over that barrier. And this he has, in the place in question, undertaken to do. So that, if the reasoning in this second proposition be sophistical, the whole fabric must fall to pieces, of itself.

§ 6. How, then, does this Author attempt to prove his proposition, that *there has existed, from eternity, some one unchangeable and independent Being?* Let us admit the goodness of his dilemma: Let us observe how he establishes the first member, and disproves the second. This he does not do by demonstrating the existence of a Being with the supposition of whose existence the supposition of an infinite succession of dependent beings, is utterly incompatible: But he attempts to do it by *first* considering and demolishing the hypothesis of infinite succession; and the second member of the dilemma being (he thinks) removed out of the way, the first remains as true.

§ 7. We must, then, carefully examine how he proceeds to demolish infinite succession. And to be enabled to weigh

accurately the validity of the process of reasoning which he uses, it must be premised, that an infinite succession is an eternal succession, and an eternal succession is a necessary succession of dependent beings. An infinite succession means a succession of infinity of duration,† and this is convertible with an eternal succession. If an eternal succession be not a necessary succession, what were a necessary succession? or, why were an eternal not a necessary succession? Let it just be added, it is plain enough, that an eternal, or a necessary succession, is one that has not, that cannot have,

† Indeed, *an infinite succession* is an expression most improper. This may be drawn from the following passage in Locke. The author is more particularly considering one of the kinds of infinity, but the spirit of the remarks is, of course, as applicable to infinity of duration, or what is of infinity of duration, as to infinity of space.—

“*Difference between infinity of space, and space infinite.*—Though our idea of infinity arise from the contemplation of quantity, and the endless increase the mind is able to make in quantity, by the repeated additions of what portions thereof it pleases; yet I guess we cause great confusion in our thoughts, when we join infinity to any supposed idea of quantity the mind can be thought to have, and so discourse or reason about an infinite quantity, viz., an infinite space, or an infinite duration. For our idea of infinity being, as I think, an endless growing idea, by the idea of any quantity the mind has, being at that time terminated in that idea (for be it as great as it will, it can be no greater than it is,) to join infinity to it, is to adjust a standing measure to a growing bulk; and, therefore, I think it is not an insignificant subtilty, if I say, that we are carefully to distinguish between the idea of the” [Strictly, perhaps even the *the* should not be here.] “infinity of space, and the idea of a space infinite. The first is nothing but a supposed endless progression of the mind, over what repeated ideas of space it pleases; but to have actually in the mind the idea of a space infinite, is to suppose the mind already passed over, and actually to have a view of all those repeated ideas of space which an endless repetition can never totally represent to it; which carries in it a plain contradiction.”—*Essay concerning Human Understanding*, B. IV. chap. xvii. § 7.

When, therefore, an infinite succession, or series, or similar phrases are here used; the use being improper, 'tis in compliance merely with the language of the proposition which is analyzed.

a cause.—We are, now, prepared to inquire into the justness of Dr Clarke's reasoning.

§ 8. "If we consider," says he, "such an infinite Progression as *One* entire Endless *Series* of *Dependent* Beings; 'tis plain this *whole Series of Beings* can have no Cause *from without*, of its Existence; because in it are supposed to be included *all Things* that are or ever were in the Universe." We may add another reason why an infinite progression can have no cause from without: Simply, because it can have no cause at all. *Ex hypothesi*, it is without a cause.

§ 9. Dr Clarke goes on: "And 'tis plain it can have no Reason *within itself*, of its Existence; because no one Being in this Infinite Succession is supposed to be Self-existent or *Necessary*, (which is the only Ground or Reason of Existence of any thing, that can be imagined *within the thing itself*, as will presently more fully appear,) but every one *Dependent* on the foregoing." Here an especial reason is given, why an endless series can have no reason within itself of its existence: as if it were not enough to say, that an endless series can have no cause within itself, because it can have no cause at all. That succession must sink its pretensions to being infinite, which has, which can have, a cause, let the cause be from without, or within itself,†

§ 10. "Where *no Part* is necessary, 'tis manifest," continues Dr Clarke, "*the Whole* cannot be necessary." How comes it that we here meet with the parts, with the whole, of an infinite succession? The applying to what is infinite of these terms, of all terms taken from the category of

† Does any meaning lie in the words, A thing has the cause of its existence within itself, other than this, The thing is its own cause? And that which is the cause of itself, existed before it existed. And that a thing should be while it is not, contradicts, Whatever is, is.

quantity, if they are used otherwise than as mere figures of speech, is absurd, in the last degree: unless, (for we must limit the assertion,) what is infinite can be finite. It may be safely allowed, that the words, Where no part is necessary, the whole cannot be necessary, would be to the purpose were the question, *Is the succession infinite or necessary, or is it not?* For, 'tis certain, no such reasoning; 'tis certain, no reasoning whatever, can prove a necessary succession is not a necessary succession; else, a thing might both be and not be at once.

§ 11. An explanation of *absolute necessity* succeeds: "Absolute Necessity of Existence, not being an *extrinsic*, " *relative*, and *accidental* Denomination; but an *inward* " and *essential* Property of the Nature of the Thing which " so Exists." Could it be supposed, after what has been urged, that these words lay in the way, the first labour would properly be confined to the humble task of discovering fully their meaning. But whatever they are intended to bring out concerning absolute necessity, they cannot lie in the way: for as long as it holds good, that whatever is, is, a necessary succession must continue a necessary succession.

§ 12. Then follows the conclusion, at which Dr Clarke arrives by virtue of the foregoing reasoning: "An infinite " Succession therefore of merely *Dependent* Beings, with- " out any Original Independent Cause; is a *Series* of Beings, " that has neither Necessity, nor Cause, nor any Reason or " Ground *at all* of its Existence, either *within itself* or *from* " *without.*†" That it required any proof (as the illative particle intimates) to show, that a succession or series which can

† Wherein is the cause of a thing a whit behind the reason or the ground of it? Let this be pointed out.

And is an infinite or a necessary series, in truth a series that has no necessity?

have no cause, has no cause, must, under leave, be altogether denied.* With the illative particle, or without it, the passage, by itself, is faultless; unless an identical proposition be something faulty.

§ 13. Having proved, as he thinks, that an infinite succession of dependent beings has no cause: "That is," he adds, "'tis" (to wit, an infinite series is) "an express Contradiction and Impossibility;" [why?] "'tis a supposing *Something* to be *caused* (because 'tis granted in every one of its Stages of Succession, *not* to be *necessarily* and of *itself*;) and yet that, in the whole, 'tis caused *absolutely* *by Nothing*." So that the whole of this argumentation at last resolves itself into this, that a succession which has no cause is an impossibility, for the reason that it has no cause!

§ 14. The next sentence proceeds thus: "Which" (namely a supposing something to be caused that is not caused) "every Man knows is a Contradiction to imagine *done in Time*;" [Nothing more certain.] "and, because *Duration*, in this case makes no Difference, 'tis equally a Contradiction to suppose it done *from Eternity*." Was it not unnecessary to assign a reason, why it is a contradiction, supposing something to be caused from eternity, that is not caused? A reason, nevertheless, is given: Because supposing something to be caused that is not caused, is a contradiction in relation to time.

§ 15. No wonder, that by such close and exact reasoning, this author should have succeeded so well in demolishing an infinite succession of dependent beings!†

† The reader may be edified, and seriously amused, by the treatment which *eternal succession* has received from a more modern hand.

"As to the idea which some atheists have pleaded for, of an eternal succession of finite beings, such as we witness at present, without supposing any original uncaused Being, it is evidently inconsistent with reason, and

§ 16. In a word, the sophistry, the plain sophistry, lies in assuming that a succession which can have no cause, must have a cause. If we but remember what infinite succession means, Dr Clarke's reasoning will appear nothing more than ingenious trifling. How far one might succeed in shewing, that a succession of dependent beings cannot be infinite, just because it is a succession of dependent beings, needs not here be inquired. 'Tis certain, that, once grant, a succession is infinite, eternal, necessary, it will never do to retract the admission, and argue as if the succession were not infinite, or eternal, or necessary: which you do, most decidedly, by assuming that it must have a cause.

§ 17. To the same purpose as the preceding examination of what Dr Clarke advances in his second proposition, are the

“with itself. For it affirms that to be true of *the part*† which it denies with respect to *the whole*:† every particular being in the series, upon that supposition, depends upon a preceding one, yet *the whole*† depends upon nothing; as if it were affirmed that there could be a chain infinitely long, each link of which was supported by the next, and so on, in each instance, and yet the whole absolutely depended upon nothing.‡ The difficulty of supposing a being beginning to exist without a cause, is not at all lessened by supposing an eternal succession of such beings; for unless there be some first Being, on whom all the rest depend, it is evident *the whole series hang upon nothing*, which is altogether as impossible as that any one in particular should. HENCE *it is evident*, there must have always been some one intelligent Being, whose existence is uncaused and absolutely eternal, unchangeable and independent.”—*Rev. Robert Hall's Works*, vol. v. page 4.

A shred of the mantle of the great Rector of St James's has been caught (too surely!) by his successors in one of the by-paths in theology. It has descended, like an heir-loom, in the family of the demolishers of *that infinite progression which has a limit somewhere*.

† See § 10 of the text.

‡ From Wollaston to Hall of Leicester every destroyer of the eternal progression of finites has hung himself in chains over against that chain which, infinitely long in itself though it be, has yet a point of suspension. and a topmost link.

following remarks of Mr Hume: "In tracing an eternal succession of objects, it seems absurd to inquire for a general cause or first author. How can any thing, that exists from eternity, have a cause, since that relation implies a priority in time, and a beginning of existence?"

"In such a chain, too, or succession of objects, each part is caused by that which preceded it, and causes that which succeeds it. Where then is the difficulty? But the WHOLE, you say, wants a cause. I answer, that the uniting of these parts into a whole, like the uniting of several distinct countries into one kingdom, or several distinct members into one body, is performed merely by an arbitrary act of the mind, and has no influence on the nature of things. Did I show you the particular causes of each individual in a collection of twenty particles of matter, I should think it very unreasonable, should you afterwards ask me, what was the cause of the whole twenty. This is sufficiently explained in explaining the cause of the parts."—*Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*, Part IX.

§ 18. Dr Clarke was not so well satisfied with the manner in which he had succeeded in destroying infinite succession, but that he twice renews the attack; but what has been offered will furnish a key to open up the secrets of the sophistry which may be contained in what he farther advances.

§ 19. As we are considering the "Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God," let us, before leaving the subject, attend to the proposition by virtue of which the author was entitled to advance to the one which has been examined. The faulty reasoning which we have observed, is an essential defect; a defect, therefore, for which no correctness throughout the rest of the argument could atone: And yet, there is something more that is objectionable.

§ 20. In his first proposition, Dr Clarke undertakes to

prove, that something always was, from the postulate, something is. He does not lay it down as an axiom, Whatever begins to be must have a cause: by means of which he might have demonstrated, most strictly, that something always was. But without the help of this axiom he, magnanimously, sets about proving, that something always was, if he is but granted the premiss, something is. He is cautious enough, however, to say, that there is little need of being *particular* in the proof.

§ 21. "For since Something now Is, 'tis evident" (it is thus he argues) "that Something always Was: Otherwise "the Things that Now Are, must have been produced "out of Nothing, absolutely and without Cause: Which is "a plain contradiction in Terms. For, to say a Thing is "*produced*, and yet that there is no *Cause* at all of that "production, is to say that Something is *Effected*, when it "is *Effected by Nothing*; that is at the same time when it "is *not Effected at all*."

§ 22. There cannot be a better reply to this way of speaking than what Hume furnishes: "Whatever is produced "without any cause is produced by *nothing*; or, in other "words, has nothing for its cause. But nothing can never be "a cause, no more than it can be something, or equal to two "right angles. By the same intuition, that we perceive no- "thing not to be equal to two right angles, or not to be "something, we perceive, that it can never be a cause; and "consequently must perceive, that every object has a real "cause of its existence.

"I believe it will not be necessary to employ many words "in shewing the weakness of this argument.———
"———"Tis sufficient only to observe, that when we exclude "all causes, we really do exclude them, and neither suppose "nothing nor the object itself to be the causes of the exist-

“ence; and consequently can draw no argument from the
 “absurdity of these suppositions to prove the absurdity of
 “that exclusion. If every thing must have a cause, it follows,
 “that, upon the exclusion of other causes, we must accept
 “of the object itself or of nothing as causes. But
 “’tis the very point in question, whether every thing
 “must have a cause or not; and therefore, according to
 “all just reasoning, it ought never to be taken for
 “granted.”—*Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I. Part iii.
 Section 3.†

§ 23. In short, it is impossible ever to set about proving, that whatever begins to be must have a cause, without being guilty of taking for granted the very thing to be proved. If we do not lay down that proposition as an axiom, there is no alternative but universal scepticism: Tho’, ’tis true, that very scepticism destroys itself.‡

† See the second note on § 64, of Part III. of our “Examination.”

‡ “Scepticism is *unavoidably* destructive of itself.” (Warburton: *Divine Legation*.) Sir James Mackintosh shall supply us with the reason. “Universal scepticism involves a contradiction in terms. IT IS A BELIEF THAT THERE CAN BE NO BELIEF.”—“Dissertation on Ethical Philosophy,” in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 8th edition, vol. i. p. 370.

A REVIEW
OF THE
REV. MOSES LOWMAN'S "ARGUMENT
TO PROVE THE
UNITY AND PERFECTIONS OF GOD *A PRIORI*."

§ 1. It may be naturally enough supposed, that an *a priori* argument to prove the Unity and Perfections of GOD, is one which must, in strictness, be held to take the Existence of GOD for granted. The Unity and Perfections of GOD cannot be evinced, unless GOD is.

§ 2. But 'tis certain, that the Unity and Perfections of the DEITY cannot be assuredly reached, if the Being of DEITY have not been previously established.

§ 3. From what station ought we to look at the Rev. Moses Lowman's Argument *a priori*?

§ 4. In all probability, the station wherefrom GOD'S Existence appears, not as a thing to be assumed, but as a thing to be made out.

§ 5. Because, though we are told, at the threshold,† that an Argument *a priori* is that which proves Attributes from Natures, secondary qualities from primary qualities; Unity

† See below, §§ 7, 8.

being subsumed to be no more than an Attribute, yea, no more than a secondary quality:† yet, the demonstration itself begins with a foundation so low down as “the possibility of Existence in general.”‡

§ 6. From what position soever the Argument we are now concerned with ought to be viewed, *five* separately laid down Definitions, and *three* separately laid down Axioms, will attract the earliest attention of the observer.

§ 7. The *first* Definition gives information as to what an Argument *a priori* is, in the estimation of the definer.

§ 8. “An Argument *a priori*, is”—so it is written—“what proves the Attributes, the secondary qualities, or effects of Beings, from their Natures, primary qualities, or definitions.”

§ 9. Proves the effects of Beings from definitions! Then, to prove any effect we desire to have proved, we have no more to do than define so as to bring the proposed effect about.

§ 10. The *second* Definition shall be passed over without comment. For, in the first place, that Definition relates to “An Argument *a posteriori*,” and we meddle not here with any *a posteriori* affair: In the second, the author, though he lays down, never uses, the Definition in question.

§ 11. The *third* Definition is as follows:—

“Possible Existence is what may be, or whose Existence is not an Impossibility or contradiction.”

§ 12. Thus, possible existence may be in existence: pos-

† “Proposition VII.—*The Unity of GOD may be proved by an Argument a priori.*”

“For it is proved from its Nature, and primary attribute of its existence, that is necessary Existence; which is an argument *a priori*, according to the first Definition.”

‡ See below, § 34.

sible existence is not an impossible existence: possible existence is not contradictory to its own existence. •

§ 13. If great good do not result from the third Definition; at least, there is no want of truth in the affirmations involved. Indeed, the whole proposition is surcharged with truth.

§ 14. Definition IV. is composed of these words:—

“*Necessary* Existence is what must be, and cannot but be; or such Existence as arises from the Nature of the “thing itself.”

§ 15. We are now aware, that necessary existence must be, and cannot but be, in existence. And in the same way, that which must be, and cannot but be, in existence, is necessary existence.

§ 16. If the Rev. Moses Lowman's proof should fail, the circumstance can hardly be traced to the assumption of too much in a part of the fourth Definition.

§ 17. The *fifth*, and last, Definition, is constituted by the following affirmation.—

“*Contingent* Existence is such as may be, or may not be.”

§ 18. In like manner, that which may be, or may not be, in existence, is contingent existence.

§ 19. The last Definition wants not a certain kind of merit.

§ 20. It is not so plain, how the last, or *fifth*, Definition is to be distinguished from the *third*, in any fundamental regard but a numerical one.

§ 21. But we are arrived at the author's Axioms.

Of which the *first* is:—

“All Effects must have a Cause.”

§ 22. Every effect involves a cause, *effect* and *cause* being things relative to each other. But perhaps the Rev. Moses Lowman meant his Axiom to be equivalent to this proposition, *Whatever begins to be must have a cause.*

§ 23. No one can gainsay the *second* Axiom, but one who could gainsay the position of identity itself.† The second Axiom being:—

“Every thing is where it acts,” or is acting.

§ 24. The *third*, and the last, Axiom affirms,

“Nothing has no Affections, or Attributes.”

§ 25. The only objection which we have to urge against this Axiom is a very trifling one, flowing from this consideration, that “nothing” is spoken of too positively. *Nothing* is treated as if ’twere almost *something*. ’Tis not altogether proper to say, Nothing has, or has not, any one thing. In short, the Axiom would have been more unobjectionable had it run in these terms, Nothing is—nothing.

§ 26. But the *a priori* proof, itself, is in sight, and should the building beyond be in accordance with the vestibule we have traversed, it may be found advantageous to let in a little daylight. A lion is in our way: But it is an ass which fills the lion’s skin.

§ 27. The demonstration consists of *twelve* Propositions, the *first* of these being,

“*Existence is possible.*”

§ 28. The existence of what? The existence of heaven above? or the earth beneath? Or, of a new heaven? or a new earth?

§ 29. Or, is it abstract existence itself which is possible? existence well defecated from all the extraneous adjuncts of modes, substances, and relations.

§ 30. Nay, for such abstract existence is highly impossible. As the author himself says, under the very Proposition we are weighing: “All Existence is the Existence of Something”—“the Existence of Nothing is no Existence.” And abstract existence is nothing in the world.

† *Viz.* Whatever is, is.

§ 31. Therefore, the first Proposition (*Existence is possible*) is tantamount to this position, *The existence of something is possible*; and, as the existence of something is nought apart from the something itself, to this other also, *Something, or some one thing, is possible*.

§ 32. True. As a relative Scholium observes of the equivalent proposition: "This Proposition seems very evident."

§ 33. "It is," continues our Divine, snuffing the smell of a truism, "It is no more than this, that whatever is *not impossible* is *possible*," &c.

§ 34. The concluding portion of the Scholium is deserving of our most serious approval. "What proves the POSSIBILITY of Existence IN GENERAL, will prove ALL Existence POSSIBLE, that does NOT appear IMPOSSIBLE, or "a contradiction."

§ 35. ————— But enough, perhaps too much, of this gallimatia, this most rare logomachy. Our readers must be heartily tired of verbiage, for once, and we shall not long defer a farewell which, under present circumstances, must be so ominous.

§ 36. To make a long story short; the Reverend gentleman's proof, *a priori*, is a war of words, words, words. Even though the digladiation were cunningly conducted; like the passages in the poet's "Long Story," it *leads to nothing*. A hundred such demonstrations could not reach even a shadow's shadow. Critically contemplate Lowman's Argument, and you perceive it to stand forth an unrelieved gallimatia.

§ 37. The Rev. Dr Pye Smith penned a preface to an edition of our Divine's "Argument," "an exact century" after the publication of the same.

§ 38. Concerning the treatise the Doctor edits, he writes thus: "It eminently merits to be reprinted, and so to

“ be again placed within the reach of reading and thinking persons.” The republication of the tract, it is thought, will shew more clearly the solid foundations on which the first truths of moral science stand.” The Doctor esteems the performance, and would have the public esteem it: and this must form our apology, to *thinking persons*, for having entered on this criticism.

§ 39. Dr Smith says farther: “ I may be allowed to express my opinion, that the chain of reasoning (usually called the *a priori* Argument) from the first principles of human knowledge, has been, of late and in our own country, too much overlooked.”

§ 40. Why? A good reason is not far to seek. You will find what might be the germ of one in the preceding page. “ Since atheistical objections have been and are ostentatiously displayed, those who love truth must submit to the patient toil of meeting anew those objections”—and so on.

§ 41. Well; on the whole, what is to be done? We are to turn to “the pure and simple enunciation of Lowman.”† But, alas!

Non tali auxilio, nec defensoribus istis,
Tempus eget.

§ 42. Our Reverend Doctor felt sure, that “ the republication of this rare tract will add to the instruments of intellectual exercise.”‡ With good reason. Moses Lowman's argumentation is consigned, from henceforth, to our readers' dialectical gymnasium.

† “ I venture to think that if Lord Brougham had turned from the somewhat disadvantageous form in which the argument was presented by Dr Samuel Clarke, to the pure and simple enunciation of Lowman, he would have raised higher his valuation of it.”—(*Dr Smith's Preface*.) Lowman is preferred to Clarke, and there's no use in disputing as to tastes.

‡ The republication in question appeared in 1836: it formed one of T. Clark's series of “Scarce and Celebrated Tracts.”

A REVIEW
OF
HUGH HAMILTON, BISHOP OF OSSORY'S
"EXISTENCE AND ABSOLUTE PERFECTION
OF THE
SUPREME UNORIGINATED BEING,
PROVED IN A CONCISE AND DEMONSTRATIVE MANNER."

§ 1. In an "Introduction to the Essay on the Existence and Attributes of God," are contained Bishop Hamilton's reasons for proposing, in a new form, an Argument for proving that Existence, and those Attributes. The sum of the reasons are these: that each one of the Arguments made use of by our theologian's recognised predecessors† in the same field was, in some important respect or other, inconclusive or imperfect‡; that, hence, there existed a desideratum, whether it could be supplied or no; that it was possible to supply the desideratum; and that, in point of fact, the desideratum could be supplied by a process of ratiocination known to the mind of the Bishop.‡

† Of whom (with Dr Pye Smith's leave) the Rev. Moses Lowman was not one.

‡ When "the Essay on the Existence," &c., first came before the public, the author was Dean of Armagh. The Bishop of Ossory being dead, his

§ 2. "On considering the subject" (of "the being and perfections of GOD") "I was soon satisfied," writes our author, near the end of his Introduction, "that the truths relating to it were to be ranked among those that are in their nature capable of demonstration." The Bishop animated by such a conviction; no wonder, he actually attempted "to prove this most important truth, this first article of our creed and foundation of all our faith," (that there is "one only underived, unoriginated Being, GOD *the Father Almighty*,† the original fountain of all existence,") "in a demonstrative manner."—*Introduction*, "Works," vol. ii. page 77.

§ 3. And, in the second Corollary from the second Proposition, our theologian does more than hint, that human knowledge, exerted legitimately in relation to the *nature and attributes of an unoriginated Being*, might be made to appear "perfectly demonstrative;" "and that this branch of learning, natural theology, which relates to the most important of all truths, might at length be placed where every one" [at least, every right-minded one] "would wish to see it, at the head of the sciences."

§ 4. The Bishop of Ossory informs his readers, at the end of what he delivers in connection with his first Proposition, that he proposed it to himself "as a Problem, to determine what must be the *nature and attributes of a Being who exists without a cause*. For some time I thought," he tells us, "this problem hopeless, as it is so

eldest son published an edition of his works: among which you find the Essay in question, with emendations.

† Bishop Hamilton gives his readers to understand, that, in his treatise, he does not use the word "GOD" in any other sense than that which denotes the person of *God the Father*, the only supreme unoriginated Being.—*Works*, vol. ii. p. 31-2.

“very simple, that it affords but a single *datum* to proceed upon; however I have given,” he goes on, “what I apprehend to be a solution of it, in the next five propositions”—*viz.* Propositions II. III. IV. V. VI.

§ 5. The single *datum* afforded by the problem which the Bishop is to solve gives, “a *Being who exists without a cause.*” The *datum* is afforded by the problem: but is it equally easily afforded by the demonstration itself? What must be the nature and attributes of a Being who exists without a cause? forms one question. But, must there be such a Being? composes another, a distinctly different, a naturally prior, interrogation. This latter introduces a topic we are under a necessity of investigating in conjunction with our demonstrator. With respect to him, the affair will become portentous.

§ 6. How, then, was the single *datum*, afforded by the very simple problem, obtained?

§ 7. Unfortunately, by the most illegitimate means.

§ 8. The *datum* in question was obtained, that is, it was supposed to be obtained, in virtue of the argumentation occurring in connection with the first Proposition. The first Proposition, itself, runs thus:—

“There must be in the universe some one Being, at least, whose non-existence is impossible, whose existence had no cause, no beginning, and can have no end.”

§ 9. Before proceeding to the reasonings adduced in support of this affirmation, it may be noticed, that if they should be perceived to be some of the weakest, and to compose the phantasm, rather than the substance, of a demonstration; a *sufficient reason* may perhaps be discovered elsewhere. The Bishop having been of opinion that the position, “That there must necessarily exist some one Being, at least, which is eternal and self-existent or unoriginated * * * is

“ usually considered as almost self-evident, and *there has hardly ever been any dispute about it.*”†—“ Introduction,” page 42.

§ 10. The demonstration of the truth of our author's Proposition commences as follows:—“ If there is NO ONE BEING in the universe but such as might possibly have *not existed*, it would follow that there might possibly have been no existence at all.”—Now, though there were *no one Being* but such as might have not existed; it would not follow, that there might have been no existence at all: unless, there were *no one series of beings*, either, but such as might have not existed. In fine, the Bishop's hypothetical proposition subsumes, silently, indeed, but surely, that there has been no eternal succession of things: And therefore, it does not become self-evidently true, till a certain clause be introduced; as thus, “ If there is NO ONE BEING”—AND NO ONE SERIES OF BEINGS—“ in the universe but such as might possibly have *not existed*,” &c. The *antecedent* being amended after this manner, the *consequent*, that “ there might possibly have been no existence at all,” is rendered indubitable. Otherwise, it is by no means, as has been suggested, necessary, and the entire Proposition may be false, for any thing shewn to the reverse.

§ 11. The proof goes on: “ And if that (that there might possibly have been no existence at all) could be so, it would be also possible that the present existence might have arisen from total *non-existence*, which is absurd.”—Absurd indeed.—“ Therefore it is not possible that there might have been no existence at all.”—Well drawn, from

† If our theologian had Theists in his eye, the assertion is true, but irrelevant. If Atheists, it is relevant, but untrue. See what the Bishop, himself, admits below, in sections 20, 21, 25. See, too, our Review of Dr Clarke's *Demonstration*, § 5.

the premiss.—“Consequently, an impossibility of *not existing* must be found somewhere, that is, there must be some “Beings, or at least, some one Being, whatever and wherever it is, whose non-existence is impossible.”—Admitted, that “an impossibility of *not existing* must be found somewhere;” but denied, that the admission is simply equivalent to this, that “there must be some Beings, or at least, some “one Being, whatever and wherever it is, whose non-existence is impossible.” An impossibility of not existing must be somewhere; but may not the impossibility be with respect to a succession of beings, considered simply as a succession?

§ 12. Our theologian’s argumentation is continued in these words: “And as this impossibility of his (the one “Being’s) *not existing* is absolute, or unconditional, and “depends not on any supposition, it must be immoveable, “and at all times the same: so that this Being never *was* “nor can *become* non-existent, but has an existence without “a beginning, and without a possibility of ending.”—All which is very innocent, and, no doubt, had been mightily to the purpose, had the previous matter been altogether unobjectionable.

§ 13. The sentence we subjoin forms a *note* in connection with the passage just quoted. “This argument, which “proves there is *some one Being* at least, whose non-existence is impossible, depends not on any relation that such “Being may have to others, or on any previous condition or “supposition whatever; it is deduced entirely from this “truth, *that something does now exist*, which is indisputable, and is *prior*, in the order of our thoughts, to all “other truths.”

§ 14. It is, indeed, an indisputable truth, that something does now exist; but it is very disputable, and, in sooth, to be disputed, that from that truth is deduced, by the Bishop of

Ossory, this other position, that there is some one Being whose non-existence is impossible. Something does now exist, but, for aught our author has manifested to the contrary, the something may be but a world—or no more than an item of a world—in a succession of worlds, emerging, one by one, from the depths of eternity.

§ 15. The next position in our demonstrator's *text* will be perceived to have the advantage of a secure foundation. Nevertheless, our view must be limited to the immediate basis, since, to take the matter very deep would be to overturn the whole affair.

§ 16. "And as no *cause* could have *determined* that this "Being" (whom the immediately preceding context had invested with "an existence *without a beginning*";†) "should exist, rather than not, or have *given* to him that existence "which it is impossible but he must always have had; he "must be *unoriginated*, and have a principle of existence in himself independent on any cause, or be self-existent."

§ 17. That a Being having "an existence without a beginning" is "unoriginated;" is as certain a point as that an unoriginated Being is one who has an existence without a beginning.

§ 18. The text flows on: "Thus it is proved, that there "must be, at least, some one Being, whatever it is, who "cannot but exist, whose existence had no cause, no beginning, and can have no end."—THUS *it is proved*, that there must be *some one Being* who had no beginning, no cause: And the precise value of a proof of the sort, we have estimated, not without some care.

§ 19. And that Bishop Hamilton, himself, notwithstanding he speaks so bravely, did not, after all, estimate the value

† See above, § 12.

of his proof at the highest possible rate, is rendered sufficiently apparent by certain supplementary matter. For, to the demonstration of his first Proposition, there succeeds an "Observation" that labours with the hypothesis which lay so much in his path, and which he did not remove.

§ 20. "Two hypotheses only,"—in this way the *Observation* begins,—“and these directly contradictory to each other,† have been contrived to shew that we can conceive the universe might possibly have existed, *without any one original, independent Being*, from whom all others have derived their existence.

§ 21. "The ancient atheistical hypothesis was," proceeds the Observation, "that the universe consists entirely of derived and dependent Beings, each of which owed its existence to the power and efficiency of the one that immediately preceded it, in an infinite series or succession without a beginning, and without an original underived cause at **THE HEAD** of the series."

§ 22. The ancient atheistical hypothesis was, and, if we mistake not, the principal modern atheistical hypothesis is, that of "an infinite series or succession," that is, a series or succession "without a beginning." But what cunning atheist, either in ancient or in modern times, ever talked of the head of the series or succession? When one fits a head upon an infinite series, he steals much more than the tail away; and one must decapitate the succession, if he would restore the infiniteness. To be "without a beginning," is to be without a "head," when it is a succession or series of things we speak of.

§ 23. But the grand point is, not whether an infinite series, a succession without a beginning, must be without a

† This *cum grano salis*. Weigh the contents of § 32, below.

head too, but how the series or succession (headless or not), is to be disposed of. The Bishop has raised a somewhat from *the sink of Atheism*, and the question is, What is he to do with it? Is he able to render it for ever useless for service against his party? We shall see.

§ 24. "Several writers have shewn," our theologian declares, "the weakness and inconsistency of this hypothesis," the hypothesis to wit, which he had called "the ancient atheistical hypothesis." And, in a note, he particularizes Dr Clarke's Demonstration.†

§ 25. The note afterwards makes mention of the circumstance, that "some learned writers have objected to the arguments used by Dr Clarke," "as insufficient to overthrow the old atheistical hypothesis, and have thought it could be confuted only by considerations drawn from an infinite series." "Mr Hume, at the ninth part of his Dialogues, has defended," the note goes on to say, "this atheistical hypothesis, and objected to the arguments brought against it."‡ Mr Hume defended the old atheistical hypothesis: "I have therefore proposed," the Bishop of Ossory* informs us,

† In the Introduction to his Essay, Bishop Hamilton makes his readers aware, that Dr Clarke "proves, in the usual manner, that there must have been some existence from all eternity, and then shows the absurdity of supposing that there might have been an eternal succession of dependent Beings, each deriving its existence from the preceding one, without any original, independent, and underived cause at the head of the series. Hence he very justly concludes," the Bishop assures us, "that there must be at least some one Being, whose existence is underived, and independent on all causes whatever," &c. page 50. On the point of the validity of the Doctor's proof, intended to show the absurdity of supposing that there might "have been an eternal succession of dependent Beings," we beg leave to refer our readers to what is advanced in our Review of the Doctor's Demonstration; in particular, to sections 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, &c.

‡ Mr Hume certainly defended the atheistical hypothesis thus far: he objected to the arguments brought, in (what was then) "the usual manner," against it. See our Review of Dr Clarke's *Demonstration*, § 17.

“ a refutation of it, which is not liable to any of the former objections, and saves the trouble of going into the consideration of an infinite series.”

§ 26. The affair now thickens, while we hasten to the Bishop's text, and the unobjectionable, and trouble-saving refutation.

“ I believe it will be sufficient to say,”—a refutation which will be found so stupendous, is couched in these terms,—“ that according to this hypothesis, there is *no* Being in the universe that has not been once *non-existent*, and whose existence therefore had not a beginning and a cause, which is contrary to what is demonstrated by the foregoing proposition.”

§ 27. Now here is the very jugglery of a demonstration conducted, in a certain weighty respect, “ in the usual manner.” The hypothesis which accounts for things by series or successions from eternity is to be left without a vestige of footing. It stands right between the demonstrator and the secure possession of the doctrine of “ one original, independent Being, from whom all others have derived their existence.”† It must, therefore, be got out of the road somehow. And how does our theologian propose to remove the obstruction? By looking away from it; leaving it as much in the way as ever it was. An illicit, rather than a novel, method of getting quit of the difficulty.

§ 28. But, of a truth, it is the Bishop's method. For, observe, that, to demolish all infinite series, the *observation* founds on “ what is demonstrated by the foregoing proposition;” while the *proposition* (managed with that superfluity of sagacity which is consistent with a deficiency in forethought) neither demonstrated, nor pretended to demonstrate, the

† § 20, above. The reader may consult here our Review of Locke's *Demonstration*, § 15.

non-existence of any infinite series, though it quietly subsumed the non-existence of every infinite series whatever.

§ 29. So, "it is but like a monkey shifting his oyster from one hand to the other."† Our theologian, at his setting out, assumes, noiselessly but potently, that the hypothesis of a universe all made up of series or successions is entirely groundless. And when he comes to lay low, in a separate effectual way, the eternal series or successions, he takes for his fulcrum the righteousness of his assumption—or, at least, argumentation where, to all intents and purposes, the righteousness of the assumption is taken for granted. Verily, this is the perfection of demonstration-juggling. The "proposition" never once doubts, that there has *not* been any series from eternity: and the "observation" (not to be behind with a good thing) never once doubts, that the "proposition" had "demonstrated" what involves that there has *not* been any series from eternity. In short, our author first gratuitously assumes the principal thing he had to prove, and then, by way of seriously proving that principal thing, founds upon his own gratuitous assumption. Truly, "it is but like a monkey shifting his oyster from one hand to the other."

§ 30. The Bishop's final movement is no better than a random stroke. "The argument here used cannot be evaded by saying that it is supposed there is nothing *con-tingent* in this series, but that each Being acts *necessarily* when it produces the subsequent one," &c. &c. It is possible—let it be granted, at any rate—that the argument alluded to cannot be evaded by saying what the author has set down. But you may depend upon it, the argument can at any time be evaded, easily and effectually evaded, by a production of such considerations as have been placed before our readers. And this is the winding up of our criticism on

† The simile is from Locke's *Essay*, B. IV. ch. viii. †

one department of a demonstrative proof, carried on throughout too much "in the usual manner."

§ 31. There is no occasion that we should follow the Bishop of Ossory any farther, or even so much as touch upon what he gives out in relation to Spinoza's *hylo-theistic* scheme, which is designated "the *other* hypothesis." With the hypothesis of *but one substance in nature, and that one matter*, we have no present business.

§ 32. — Yet, there may not be great impropriety in noticing, that all our author says regarding Spinoza's hypothesis is perhaps not very wisely said. With the Bishop, the hypothesis of *infinite successions*, and that of *but one substance*, are "directly contradictory to each other."† Again, he makes the scheme of the apostate Jew, who certainly embraced the latter, to declare, that, "no *Being in the universe hath derived its existence from another*, but "every Being or substance * * * is necessarily existent, "eternal, and uncreated or unoriginated."‡ All which will appear in opposition to truth, when the true genius of the old hypothesis, and that of Spinoza's pantheism are weighed and compared. In witness whereof, list to the words of Spinoza himself. "*Corpus motum, vel quiescens, ad motum vel quietem determinari debuit ab alio corpore, quod etiam ad motum vel quietem determinatum fuit ab alio, et illud iterum ab alio, ET SIC IN INFINITUM.*"|| ["A body which is in motion, or at rest, must have been determined to move or to be at rest by some other body, which, in its turn, had been determined to move or to be at rest by another body, and this, in like manner, by still another, AND SO ON TO INFINITY."] Again:—"Unaqueque volitio non potest existere, neque ad operandum determinari, nisi ab alia causa determinetur, et hæc

† § 20, above.

‡ Observation.

|| *Par. II. Prop. xiii. Lemma iii.*

“*rursus ab alia; et sic porro IN INFINITUM.*”† [“Every volition had a cause, which, itself, had a cause, and so on INFINITELY.”] Now, let it just be considered, that “the ancient atheistical hypothesis”‡ does not recognise (what no scheme of atheism can recognise) a succession of new substances—new, even as to the ultimate atoms—but only a succession of new modifications of old substances,—that is, new arrangements of the primeval atoms. The two hypotheses, that, to wit, of infinite successions, and that of but one substance, are, therefore, *not* “directly contradictory to each other;” nor, with the Bishop’s leave, do they seem to be contradictory at all.||

§ 33. To conclude: We have manifested, that Bishop Hamilton’s “Attempt to prove the Existence of the Supreme unoriginated Being” is, at the very threshold of the undertaking, chargeable with a fundamental fallacy. And no amount of coherence in the superstructure (even if such coherence there be) can atone for an essential flaw in the groundwork of the fabric.

† *Par. I. Prop. xxxii.*

‡ Above, § 21. *

|| The citations from Spinoza in this section are taken from his posthumous work, entitled, “*Ethica, ordine geometrico demonstrata,*” [“Ethics, demonstrated in geometrical order,”] and, in particular, from the First Part, headed, “*De Deo,*” [“Of Deity,”] and the Second Part, headed, “*De Natura et Origine Mentis,*” [“Concerning the Nature and Origin of Mind.”]—“Ethics, demonstrated in geometrical order”—not, observe, demonstrated in a geometrical manner, or, shortly, demonstrated geometrically. The first is by no means the same as the second. But even if Spinoza’s work on Ethics had been said to be *demonstrated in a geometrical manner*, or (like Mr Richard Jack’s work on Theology)¹ “*geometrically demonstrated;*” what would it have mattered? For, supposing our apostate Jew—as Spinoza unquestionably was—had really sought to apply Geometrical reasoning to Ethical, including Theological, subjects; he would but have done so acting from the right side: Geometrical reasoning, used to prove the truth of Atheism, would be no worse than *an absurdity to prove a falsity*; or, an absurd junction of desperate disparates.

¹ See our next Review.

A REVIEW
OF
MR RICHARD JACK'S WORK,
ENTITLED
"MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THEOLOGY,
OR
THE EXISTENCE OF GOD GEOMETRICALLY DEMONSTRATED."

§ 1. In the Rev. Moses Lowman's work, we had a specimen of riotous Metaphysics, run to seed. In the work to be now criticised, the reader will find a specimen of impure Mathematics, gone deplorably out of their road. The author of the volume in question (for it is a goodly volume—not, like Lowman's *tractatus*, a slim pamphlet) has joined Ontology to Geometry in a union which could be productive, of good to neither. He has joined together those two discrepant, and by doing so has disfigured both Geometry and Ontology. By thus attempting to apply geometrical reasoning to the proof of a GOD, Mr Jack has succeeded in making a vile amalgam of the science of Magnitude and Theology, and has, once for all, inflicted all possible disgrace upon the latter, at least, of the constituents.

§ 2. And this may be the best place to refer my readers to what I have written elsewhere, on the topic of the impossi-

bility—not the mere futility, but the utter impossibility—of the application of geometrical or mathematical reasoning to any theological, or, indeed, any general, subject. See *Examination of Antitheos*: Part I. § 47 *et seq. usq. ad* § 56.

§ 3. In reviewing these “Mathematical Principles of Theology,” ’tis not my intention to produce you any criticism of my own. The thing has been well done without me. A gentleman, who will hereafter figure very prominently before my readers, has laid Mr Richard Jack upon his back so artistically, and so unquestionably, that nothing remains to be done by my hand. The atheistical champion, Antitheos—whose great abilities cannot be disputed at this time of day—has devoted a chapter† to the “Fallacies of Mr Richard Jack.” The chapter in question constitutes (in my humble opinion) one of the happiest of Antitheos’s efforts. I confess, however, that I have more reasons than one for introducing the exposure, by my own skilful opponent, of the misapplied and fallacious reasonings of our geometrical ontologist.

§ 4. At the outset, I must take the precaution to enter this general *caveat*, that I am on no account to be held as endorsing all that may fall from Antitheos’s pen, in those cases where I may fail to protest that there is aught wrong. My concern lies only with Antitheos’s very successful attempt to overturn Mr Richard Jack, as a theologian demonstrating a GOD by the apparatus of A’s and B’s, and lines, and squares, and circles—and such like.

§ 5. Before leaving the champion of the atheists to speak for himself, it may be as well to give the title of the work he criticises in full. The name and description, then, of the

† It is Chapter IV. of the “Refutation” to be afterwards particularized.

performance in question, as given on the title-page, are as follows:—

“Mathematical Principles of Theology, or, the Existence of God Geometrically Demonstrated. In three books. Wherein is proved, The Existence of God from Eternity to Eternity; his Self-existence, Independency, and Unity. That God is infinite in Wisdom, Power, Knowledge, &c. Also, That Matter is a temporary being; that God is the cause of its existence, and of the existence of all other beings, that ever did, or can exist; and upon God the continuation or termination of their existence depends.—By Richard Jack, Teacher of Mathematicks.”

§ 6. One word more, and then Antitheos shall appear *in propria persona*, to go on uninterruptedly. I candidly acknowledge, that I have corrected my author, in a few instances;—just as a careful press-reader might have done, in transcribing his copy for the printer.

ANTITHEOS'S

“FALLACIES OF MR RICHARD JACK.”

“It would be a fearful task to toil through the dreary wanderings of this ungainly author. In perusing his work, one would imagine he had been born with theorems in his head, and a rule and compasses in his hands;—and were it not that he himself tells us of certain misfortunes which befel him on his flight from the Scottish capital, and its rebel occupiers, in the memorable year forty-five,† we should scarcely have thought him susceptible of human passions, or capable of taking a share in the concerns of those stirring times. His performance is entitled, ‘Mathematical Prin-

† Viz. 1745. See Note A at end of this Review.

ciples of Theology, or, the Existence of God geometrically demonstrâted. In three books.' (*London*, 1747. 8vo. pp. 328.)—Perhaps I ought not to notice the work at all: it is of a character so prosing, formal, and roundabout. The tactician draws his lines of circumvallation at so great a distance from the fortress he purposes to reduce; his approaches are made so tardily, and with so little energy, that we are apt to lose patience at his over-precaution, and waste of pains as well as time. If all this were a suræ precursor of success, we should have nothing to complain of; but even his closing positions are so ill chosen, as either to be perfectly harmless, or to lie entirely at the mercy of the enemy. The book is, nevertheless, a great curiosity. It furnishes the finest specimens anywhere to be found, of strict mathematical reasoning as applied to theology.† It may therefore be amusing, if not instructive, to touch upon a few of the author's happiest efforts (and those upon the most important points of the discussion,) were it only to show the effect even of the purest logic," [for purest logic, we should have been supplied with the *absurdest application of the machinery of geometry*,] "when pressed into the service of the argument *a priori* for the being and attributes of a god.

"The first book, consisting of forty-five propositions and theorems, is taken up in proving the self-existence of an independent being. In the second, an attempt is made to demonstrate that that being cannot be matter; for all visionaries must have a fling at this untractable impediment to their motions—this desperate eye-sore to all their speculations. Mr Jack says, (*prop.* 41, *theor.* 40, †)—'Matter is a dependent being. Because that being, which can have any change or mutation, made on any of the powers or proper-

† See Note B.

‡ In Book II.

ties it possesses, is a dependent being; but a change or mutation can be made on some of the powers or qualities that matter, or any material being possesses: Therefore, matter is a dependent being; which was to be demonstrated.'—It is to be observed, that a dependent being had been previously defined,† 'a being whose existence is the effect of some other being;' so that this syllogism purports to be a demonstration of matter having been created out of nothing! How is this? By what magic is so rare a case made out? I say at once, by the shallow, paltry trick of equivocation. The subject of the major premiss, which ought to have been identical with the predicate of the definition of a dependent being previously given, is totally different from it. The definition, it is true, as applied to matter, involves an impossibility. Besides taking for granted the existence of some agent, unknown and undescribed, its power of bringing all material things into existence is assumed. But if the definition in question falls, the conclusion that matter is a dependent being, reaches to its forms only, leaving its independence as to existence untouched.

"Well; but this is theological demonstration. Demonstration, certainly, much more easy, and infinitely better adapted to the subject in hand, than the vexatious and troublesome process of induction; by which we are bound to produce an agent, and prove the extent of its powers and mode of operation—and that too by experience—before we can legitimately ascribe to it any effect whatever. Here, nothing further is necessary than to frame a hypothesis—nothing more than to

'Call some spirit from the vasty deep;'

invest it with the attributes in which popular prejudice has

† Viz., In Definition xxvii., Book I.

arrayed the object of its adoration, and, by the flourish of a conjuring wand, bid matter begone into its assumed original nothingness. Mighty magicians! If our reasoners *a priori* [the author means, reasoners, *a priori*, of Mr Jack's stamp] could but tell us where they get the creative power of which they speak so much, independent of the thing they go about to destroy, they would render their argument somewhat more tangible. If they could even tell us of a single change effected in matter by means of their pretended agency, the information would both be new and directly to the point.—But, alas for them! how should they know anything of a being necessarily prior to the existence of the material world,—or (supposing such a being) its essence, or *modus operandi*?† In any of the numberless changes effected upon material bodies, do we see any thing operating except other bodies of the same kind? Can we even *conceive* of any other than material agency?‡ If aught else than substance operates in the mutations observed in physical phenomena, Nature, by denying the fact, betrays and belies its god, and science and philosophy are left with a heavy account of heresy to answer for.

“After having demolished the self-existence of matter, Mr Jack proceeds to prove that it owes its existence to his own ‘independent being.’ As the argument he employs on this occasion affects to demonstrate the intelligence of the thing referred to in the first book, and is the only one which touches upon this highly momentous point, it is the more worthy of attention. It is as follows:—

“‘The self-existing and independent being does possess a self-determining power, or volition, and that self-determining power, or volition, is the cause of the existence of the first temporary being.’—(Book II. prop. 32, theor. 31.)

† See Note C.

‡ See Note D.

“ Let A represent the self-existing and independent being, B the first temporary being: I say, the self-existing and independent being A, is possessed of a self-determining power or volition, and that self-determining power, or volition, is the cause of the existence of the first temporary being B. For because the existence of the first temporary being B, is the effect that arises from the exertion of some of the powers or qualities of the self-existing and independent being A, and the cause of the exertion of any power or quality of the self-existing and independent being, is a self-determining power, that the self-existing and independent being does possess; therefore the cause of the exertion of that power or quality of the self-existing and independent being A, which does produce the existence of B, is a self-determining power or volition that A does possess, and will be the cause of B's existence; consequently the self-existing and independent being A, does possess a self-determining power, or volition, which self-determining power, or volition, is the cause of the existence of the first temporary being B's existence. Therefore, *the self-existing and independent being does possess a self-determining power, which self-determining power is the cause of the existence of the first temporary being*; which was to be demonstrated. •



“ Who can doubt, after so luminous and strictly geometrical a demonstration, that the creation of a mathematician's mind possesses intelligence; that by the simple act of its volition it has called all things into existence? What signifies it, although the latter be assumed as the effect of the former? What, at least, does it signify, that the introduction of one of the factors into the theorem is gratuitous? Surely no one can expect that so trivial an affair as the creation of a temporary being by a self-existent one should

be proved. Do we not see that that fact is brought in as a proof of the self-determining power of A, and that this power is next made out, in the clearest manner, to be the cause of the existence of B? What more than this beautiful circle of reasoning does the captious infidel want? Descartes boastfully exclaimed, in the style of Archimedes,—‘Give me matter and motion, and I will make you a universe;’ but, with much scantier materials, our new-fangled theorists† perform a great deal more,—only give them A and B, and they produce you both the universe and its creator!

“The greatest part of Mr. Jack’s theorems, problems,‡ &c. &c., consisting of upwards of a hundred in number, is taken up in proving what stands in no need of proof,—sometimes even of self-evident propositions—(such as that ‘a being cannot act before it exists;’§ ‘the existence of the cause of any effect is antecedent to the existence of that effect:’|| ‘a being cannot be instrumental in its own existence;’¶ ‘a being cannot act after its existence is terminated,’†† and so forth;)—while the most arbitrary and fanciful notions are made the bases of doctrines the most important in the whole argument. This, verily, is straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel. But we have done with him. If the ‘Mathematical Principles of Theology’ be destined to escape oblivion, they may afford grounds for curious speculation respecting that bias toward absurdity which is too frequently found to beset the human mind. One of our finest critics has described it to be natural: but if so, it has, in the present instance, received no inconsiderable addition from the hand of education.

† See Note E.

‡ See Note F.

§ Book I, *Proposition i.*

|| *Ibid.*, *Prop. ii.*

¶ Book I, *Prop. iii.*

†† *Ibid.*, *Prop. xxxii.*

“On this particular, a word here may not be out of season. We have often heard it, as it were, oracularly declared, that a mathematical education is of great value, were it for nothing more than this,—that it habituates the mind to the closest investigation, and the most unyielding rules of deduction. If, however, we are to judge from the examples before us, we must adopt an opinion vastly different. The gentlemen who have availed themselves of their mathematical acquirements in establishing the first principles of their faith, have doubtless been deeply learned in the science,—and yet, what have they effected? Nothing to the purpose;—nothing but a perversion of the truly estimable wisdom of the schools from its proper end and use, to the furtherance of that which begins in weakness and ignorance, and terminates in folly. The unskilful may frequently be diffuse and indirect in the conducting of an argument, and often at a loss to find the nearest and most efficient way of bringing it to a close; but the learned—who seem to have cared but too little for the respect due to their classical distinctions,—for them it was reserved to confound the objects of totally different branches of study. Their error appears to be of the same class with that of the Abyssinian doctor, celebrated for his treatment of elephantiasis, who grew so full of his profession, that he judged of every thing by its rules—estimating the talents and moral character, as well as the diseases of men, by the thickness of their legs.” †

† See Note G.

NOTES TO REVIEW

OF

JACK'S "MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THEOLOGY."

NOTE A.

In the Preface, page xxv., the author gives this spicy piece of information:—"I have been obliged in some places to cite *The Doctrine of Proportion Geometrically Demonstrated*, which I intended to have published at Edinburgh before the present work; but the late wicked (!) and unnatural (!!) rebellion having forced me to leave my native country, and the rebels having pillaged my house, the manuscript of that book was, with my other effects, taken away, or destroyed. I hope therefore the reader will excuse my citing that "manuscript," &c.

NOTE B.

Is this said seriously? or is it merely a grave instance of one of "the finest specimens anywhere to be found" of the most polished irony? Did Antitheos know of any other case, than Mr Richard Jack's, of the strict application of mathematical reasoning to theology?

NOTE C.

To know, that there is necessarily a Being, who existed prior to the material world,—is one thing: And to know the essence (in Antitheos's sense), or *modus operandi*, of that Being,—is another, and quite different, thing. The one truth I hope we know: Nay, I hope the truth is really demonstrated in another place in this volume. The other knowledges, however, we may never attain to.

NOTE D.

For an answer to this question, see my "Examination" of this very author, in various places. See, for example, Part xii. § 16, and following sections.

NOTE E.

Is Mr Richard Jack, writing, or at least publishing, in 1747,—smarting yet from Prince Charlie's, and the Clans', raid and ravages,—not entitled to be reckoned an old-fangled theorist? What antiquity would our author insist on? A theory of more than 100 years' standing seems to me to have claims to be considered rather old-fashioned. Jews, only, have a right to despise things no older than the Norman conquest: the ancient people reckon by thousands, not hundreds, of years.

NOTE F.

There are, in Mr Jack's volume, very few problems. One only have I been able to discover. Namely, the Problem constituting Proposition V., in Book II. The Proposition, which is also the Problem, in question, is couched in the following words:—"Two beings, possessed with powers of the same kind: One of which by the exertion of the power it possesses in, a given time, produces a given effect; it is required to find the time, the other will take to produce an effect equal to the effect given."

One might suppose that this problem needed no proof to work it out: it is so plain; and the answer, according to the single *datum*, is so unavoidable. Nevertheless, the demonstration is filled with A's and B's, and C's and D's, and E's and F's and G's, which again refer to lines—no less than five lines—and a circle (with a point in it) and a square.

NOTE G.

With what the author delivers in this last paragraph, I most unreservedly coincide. The truth is stated, and it is very well put. Perhaps, nevertheless, Antitheos, when he speaks of "the truly estimable wisdom of the schools," may be designing to praise the professors of logic and dialectic, and not the proficients in the mathematics, with their technical acquirements. Could I employ stronger language than Antitheos has employed, to condemn the monstrous *confounding* of "the objects of totally different branches of study," I would reprobate the confounded confounding in the stronger language.

NECESSARY EXISTENCE

IMPLIES

INFINITE EXTENSION.

An absolutely necessary Being must exist every where.—*Bishop Butler.*

NECESSARY EXISTENCE

INFINITE EXTENSION.

§ 1. SUPPOSING, that there is a necessarily existing Substance, the intelligent cause of all things, it may be easily shown, that that Substance is infinitely extended.

§ 2. For there are but three hypotheses which can possibly be framed in reference to the extension of the necessarily existing Substance. The *first* is: That that Substance is of *no extension* whatever. The *second*: That that Substance is of *finite extension* only. The *third*: That that Substance is *infinitely extended*. And, as these hypotheses are all that can be made upon the subject; therefore, one of them must be true.

§ 3. As to the *first* hypothesis, that the necessarily existing Substance has no extension whatever: Can there be conceived a greater absurdity than the assertion, that a substance, cogitative or incogitative, necessarily existing or not necessarily existing, may be without any extension whatsoever? To believe this indeed defies human nature. If reason can, with certainty, pronounce any thing, it may pronounce this decision, that extension and existence are so necessary to each other, that there can be no existence without extension. Talk of a

substance which has no extension; you present us with *words of amusement*.

§ 4. If there be a subject on which *authority* should be of weight, such a subject, 'tis plain, is found in the debate, whether we must conceive, that to deny extension is to deny existence. And 'tis well that, in behalf of the position, that existence cannot be without extension, there are as great authorities, in speculations of this nature, as can any where be found.

§ 5. "Perhaps," * * * says Locke, "it is near as hard to conceive any existence, or to have an idea of any real being, with a perfect negation of all manner of expansion; as it is to have the idea of any real existence, with a perfect negation of all manner of duration."—*Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Book II. Chapter xv. § 11. And to have the idea of any real existence with a perfect negation of all manner of duration is, surely, impossible.†

§ 6. The Cartesians make mind and matter to be different in their essence; and make extension (the correction of Des Cartes' opinion, is, solid extension‡) to be the essence of matter: Consequently, with them, a thinking substance cannot be extended. Locke wrote at a time when these Cartesian opinions were generally received. But yet, we see, he held, that, without extension, it is impossible to conceive existence.

§ 7. "Extension does not belong to *Thought*," these are the words of Dr Samuel Clarke, "because *Thought* is not a Being; But there is a *Need* of Extension to the Existence of every *Being*, to a Being which has or has not Thought,

† In the thirty-ninth section of the third Part of the "Examination," will be found another extract from the Essay, bearing to the same point.

‡ This correction is by Dr Isaac Watts. See his *Philosophical Essays*, Essay II.

“ or any other Quality whatsoever.”—Second Letter to Joseph Butler, afterwards Bishop of Durham.

§ 8. 'Tis true, that, in these words, Dr Clarke does not say, that he *cannot conceive* the existence of a being without extension, but that, 'tis certain, is what he means.

§ 9. Upon the whole, one can have no hesitation in saying of those who contend that the necessarily existing Substance has no extension whatsoever, and no relation whatever to space; that, if they be not but uttering words all but incomprehensible; they deny not so much the existence, as the possibility of the existence, of such a Substance.

§ 10. As to the *second* hypothesis, that the necessarily existing Substance is of finite extension only: From this it follows, *in the first place*, that that Substance has a figure, for figure is just extension with limits.

§ 11. But shape is utterly inconsistent with necessary existence. Can any one hope to be thought knowing who shall contend, that the necessarily existing Substance is triangular, or square, or hexagonal, or circular, or cubical, or globular;—or of what other figure soever you choose? We shall search the world in vain, for a greater absurdity than what such a position sets forth.

§ 12. From this hypothesis it follows, *in the second place*, that the necessarily existing Substance is divisible: for a limited substance (unless it be an ultimate atom, or an indivisible monad†) may be conceived to be divided, to wit, the parts of it may be conceived to be removed to different parts of space.

§ 13. Now, to predicate divisibility of a substance, is equal to saying, it has no necessary existence. For 'tis as clear as

† And an ultimate atom, or an indivisible monad, can be in no more than one point in the universe at once: and such a localized occupier of one only point cannot be, we must think, the necessarily existing Being.

any truth can be, that to suppose a substance divided, is no less than to suppose it annihilated as one substance. And nothing is so impossible as this, that the necessarily existing Substance should be annihilated. For that this Substance may be made to cease to be, is a position which amounts to this, that a substance, to suppose the non-existence of which is a contradiction, may yet be supposed non-existent. Which absurdity following from the hypothesis, that the necessarily existing Substance is of finite extension only; 'tis plain, that hypothesis must be absurd.

§ 14. But, indeed, it were needless to show, by all that is implied in the existence of a substance of finite extension only, that the supposition of such a substance necessarily being, is an absurdity. For the supposition, without the least regard to what it implies, is, itself, as absurd as any thing can be. This cannot be better shown than in Dr Samuel Clarke's words. "To suppose *Matter*, or any Other Substance, *Necessarily-existing* in a *Finite determinate Quantity*; in an Inch-Cube, for instance; or in *Any* certain number of Cube-Inches, and *no more*; is exactly the same Absurdity, as supposing it to exist *Necessarily*, and yet for a *Finite Duration* only: Which every one sees to be a plain Contradiction."—Third Letter to Joseph Butler, afterwards Bishop of Durham.†

† The system of the Anthropomorphites, which gives to the necessarily existing Substance the figure of a man, because it is, somehow, supposed, that that substance must be of some form, and a human figure is esteemed the most perfect,—at least, the best adapted for a necessary Substance: this system, besides that it is chargeable with all the absurdities which follow from the hypothesis, that the necessarily existing Substance is of finite extension only; is attended with absurdities which seem peculiar to itself. These not being consequences of that hypothesis *merely*, they with no propriety fall to be considered here.

The absurdities which are alluded to, some, at least, of these absurdities,

§ 15. The third hypothesis, then, must be true: the necessarily existing Substance must be infinitely extended.† To deny, therefore, that there is an infinitely extended Substance, is to deny, that there is a necessarily existing Substance, the intelligent cause of all things.

are, *first*, That the necessarily existing Substance is *material*. For, can pure spirit have the form of a man?¹ And new absurdities follow from the absurdity which makes the necessary Substance a material substance in human form.² But to what purpose the labour of bringing them to light? *Secondly*, It seems to be urged with force, that the human form evinces marks of design. And 'tis a good inference, surely, that because man exhibits, in his shape, marks of design, therefore a substance, not a man, but *like a man*, contains also marks of design. This inference valid, a substance of that nature, so far from being the first cause, would afford evidence that itself was *created*; and we might rationally set about inquiring into the cause of the existence.

† The common doctrine of Theologians, that the necessary Substance is, at the same time, in every point of space, and every atom of matter, *entire*, is just this third hypothesis, that the necessary Substance is infinitely extended: Though, 'tis true, all extension is denied to that Substance. For to say that the *same* substance is in different parts of extension, *at once*, without being³ extended, is no more absurd than to say, extension, itself, is not extended. Perhaps, therefore, our position should be qualified, and we ought to advance, that the common doctrine of Theologians is just this third hypothesis, *so far as the doctrine is intelligible at all*.

¹ Baron Swedenborg, a remarkable seer and theologian of these later ages, the founder of a New Church, intended to be the glory of all churches, the doctrines of which New Church are, for the most part, built on the narrow basis of pure Anthropomorphism; Baron Swedenborg answers, we confess, that question in the affirmative. He maintains, that the necessary Being *was* a pure spirit in human form. But since his disciples shun an encounter with such weapons as reason can supply, and betake themselves, in the absence of more suitable arms, to their favourite's "memorable" ecstasies; it is impossible for us to combat their anthropomorphic imagination. What the trances of the learned and most worthy Swede revealed, is not to be opposed by a profane appeal to the clear decision of human understanding.

² However absurd the system, that the necessary Being is a material substance in human form, may be, yet true it is that our modern theologues, the Mormonites, have given in their adherence to the system.

§ 16. Since such is the sad consequence of denying that the necessarily existing Substance, the intelligent cause of all things, is infinitely extended, is there not good reason that men should pause before they express a doubt upon the matter? Strange things may, at first, be thought to attach themselves to the doctrine: But nothing tends so effectually to destroy a prejudice as inquiring into its foundation.

THE
ARGUMENT, *A PRIORI*,
FOR
THE BEING AND ATTRIBUTES
OF
A GREAT FIRST CAUSE.

— τὸν οὐδέποτε ἄνδρες εἴωμεν

Ἄρρητον μεσταὶ δὲ Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγυιαί,
Πᾶσαι δ' ἀνθρώπων ἀγοραί, μεστή δὲ θάλασσα,
Καὶ λιμένες· πάντα δὲ Διὸς κεχρήμεθα πάντες·
Τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν.

Aratus.

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THE
ARGUMENT, A *PRIORI*,
FOR
A GREAT FIRST CAUSE.

DIVISION I.

PART I.

PROPOSITION I.

Infinity of Extension is necessarily existing.

§ 1. Even when the mind endeavours to remove from it the idea of Infinity of Extension, it cannot, after all its efforts, avoid leaving still there, the idea of such infinity. Let there be ever so much endeavour to displace this idea, that is, conceive Infinity of Extension non-existent; every one, by a reflex examination of his own thoughts, will find, it is utterly beyond his power to do so.

§ 2. Now, since even when we would remove the notion of Infinity of Extension out of our minds, we cannot but leave the notion of it behind; from this, it is manifest, Infinity of Extension is necessarily existing: For, *every thing the existence of which we cannot but believe, is necessarily existing.*

§ 3. To deny, therefore, that Infinity of Extension necessarily exists, is to utter a downright contradiction.

§ 4. Infinity of Extension is, then, *necessarily existing*.

PROPOSITION II.

Infinity of Extension is necessarily indivisible.

PROLEGOMENA.

§ 1. To say, Infinity of Extension is necessarily indivisible, is as much as to say, *the parts* of Infinity of Extension are necessarily indivisible *from each other*.

§ 2. *Indivisible*, in this Proposition, means indivisible *either really or mentally*: For there can be no objection to a *real*, which would not apply to a *mental* divisibility; and a *mental* divisibility, we must suppose, would imply an *actual* divisibility, of Infinity of Extension.

§ 3. The Proposition, then, is to the effect, that the parts of Infinity of Extension are necessarily indivisible from each other *really, or mentally*.

DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. That which is divisible *really*, may be divided *really*: and a thing which is actually *divided* from another must have *superficies* of its own, every way, and be *removed* or *separated* from that other thing, be it by ever so little a distance. If any one should say that things *really* divided from each other have not real *superficies* of their own, every way; to be able to believe him, we must first be able to believe this, that a thing can be, and not be, at the same time, and in the same place: And if any one should say that things which are *really* divided from each other, which have real *superficies* of their own every way, can possibly be conceived as without a certain distance, however little,

being between them; as this, it could as soon be believed that in a good syllogism of the first figure, the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises. Being really divided, and being really separated, mean, thus, the same thing.

§ 2. Now, divisibility meaning possibility of separation: As it is an utter contradiction to say, Infinity of Extension can be separated; that is, *a part of Infinity of Extension separated, by a certain distance, from Infinity of Extension; there remaining Infinity of Extension after part of it is taken away*: the part of Infinity of Extension so removed, being removed *from* the remaining parts *to* these very same parts; *the part, thus, being at rest while it is taken away*: the part so, moved away, being moved away *from itself*; *it still remaining*, inasmuch as there is necessarily Infinity of Extension;^a that is, though moved away, being not moved away: Which could not be, unless it be false, that whatever is, is, where it is, and when it is. As it is, thus, an utter contradiction to say Infinity of Extension can be separated, so it is an utter contradiction to say it is not indivisible.

§ 3. Infinity of Extension is, then, *necessarily indivisible*.

SCHOLIUM.

The parts of Infinity of Extension being necessarily indivisible from each other; it is a *necessary consequence*, that the thing, the parts of which are *divisible from each other*, is not Infinity of Extension; nor any part of it: *part*, in the sense of partial consideration only, for otherwise Infinity of Extension can have no parts.^b

^a Prop. I. § 2.

^b Prop. II. Dem. § 2.

COROLLARY FROM PROPOSITION II.

Infinity of Extension is necessarily immoveable.

PROLEGOMENA.

§ 1. Infinity of Extension is necessarily immoveable: This is equal to saying, *the parts* of Infinity of Extension are necessarily immoveable *among themselves*.

§ 2. And *immoveable*, in the Corollary, means immoveable *either really or mentally*.

§ 3. The Corollary, therefore, lays down, in effect, that the parts of Infinity of Extension are necessarily immoveable among themselves really or mentally.

DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. *Motion* of parts supposes, of necessity, *separation* of the parts. He who does not see that motion of parts supposes, of necessity, separation of the parts, need never be expected to see that because every A is equal to B, therefore some B is equal to A. And, Infinity of Extension being necessarily incapable of separation,^a is, therefore, necessarily immoveable, that is, its parts are necessarily immoveable among themselves.

§ 2. Infinity of Extension is, then, *necessarily immoveable*.

SCHOLIUM.

The parts of Infinity of Extension being necessarily immoveable among themselves; it is a *necessary consequence*, that the thing, the parts of which are *moveable among themselves*, is not Infinity of Extension; nor any part of it: *part*, in the sense of partial consideration only, for otherwise Infinity of Extension can have no parts.^a

^a Prop. II. Dem. § 2.

PROPOSITION III.

There is necessarily a Being of Infinity of Extension.

§ 1. Either, Infinity of Extension subsists, or (which is at bottom the same thing) we conceive it to subsist, without a support or substratum: or, it subsists not, or (which is the same thing) we conceive it not to subsist, without a Support or Substratum.

§ 2. First, If Infinity of Extension subsist without a substratum, then it is a *substance*. And if any one should deny, that it is a substance, it so subsisting; to prove, beyond contradiction, the utter absurdity of such denial, we have but to defy him to show, *why* Infinity of Extension is not a substance, *so far forth as it can subsist by itself, or without a substratum.*

§ 3. As, therefore, it is a contradiction to deny that Infinity of Extension exists,^a so there is, on the supposition of its being able to subsist without a substratum,^a a *substance* or *being* of Infinity of Extension necessarily existing: Though Infinity of Extension, and the being of Infinity of Extension are *not different*, as standing to each other in the relation of mode and subject of the mode, but *are identical.*

§ 4. Secondly, If Infinity of Extension subsist not without a Substratum, then, it being a contradiction to deny there is Infinity of Extension,^a it is a contradiction to deny there is a Substratum to it.

§ 5. Whether or not men will consent to call this Substratum *Substance* or *Being*, is of very little consequence. For, 'tis certain that the word *Substance*, or *Being*, has never been employed, can never be employed, to stand for any

^a Prop. I. § 3.

thing better entitled to the application of the term than the Substratum of Infinity of Extension. But to refuse to give such Substratum that name, *being a thing obviously most unreasonable*, let us call the Substratum of Infinity of Extension, by the name *Substance* or *Being*.

§ 6. There is, then, necessarily, a *Being* of Infinity of Extension.

PROPOSITION IV.

The Being of Infinity of Extension is necessarily of unity and simplicity.

§ 1. Because Infinity of Extension is necessarily indivisible,^a therefore it is of the *truest unity*. For to affirm that though it is necessarily indivisible, even so much as by thought, yet it is not of the truest unity, is to affirm what is no more intelligible than would be the assertion, *that a circle*, this being a figure contained by one line, with every part of that line or circumference equally distant from a certain point, *is not round*.

§ 2. And as Infinity of Extension is necessarily of the truest unity, so it is necessarily of the *utmost simplicity*. For what more can be included in simplicity than is implied in unity caused by a thing being necessarily indivisible, we can have no conception.

§ 3. And as, on the supposition that Infinity of Extension subsists by itself, there is necessarily a being of Infinity of Extension,^b so, this supposed, that being is necessarily of unity and simplicity.

§ 4. If Infinity of Extension subsist not without a Substratum; that we cannot, without an express contradiction,

^a Prop. II. Dem. § 2.

Prop. III. § 3.

deny, that the Substratum is of the truest unity, and utmost simplicity, may be most easily demonstrated. *

§ 5. For it is *intuitively evident*, that the Substratum of Infinity of Extension can be no more divisible than Infinity of Extension itself. And if any one should affirm that though Infinity of Extension is necessarily indivisible, yet that its Substratum can be considered as divisible, we could no more assent to the proposition than we could believe that a subject can never be truly predicated of itself. And, therefore, as Infinity of Extension is necessarily indivisible,^a so is its Substratum.

§ 6. And Infinity of Extension being necessarily of unity and simplicity because necessarily indivisible,^b its Substratum is so likewise, for the same reason.

§ 7. And as, on the supposition that Infinity of Extension subsists not without a Substratum, there is necessarily a Being of Infinity of Extension,^c so, this supposed, that Being is necessarily of unity and simplicity.

§ 8. The Being of Infinity of Extension is, necessarily, then, of *unity* and *simplicity*.

COROLLARY.

The Substratum of Infinity of Extension being necessarily indivisible,^d that is, its parts being necessarily indivisible from each other: it is a corollary, that its parts (*parts*, in the sense of partial consideration only,^d) are necessarily immoveable among themselves: For the same reason that the parts of Infinity of Extension are necessarily immoveable among themselves, because necessarily indivisible from each other.

^a Prop. II. Dem. § 2.

^b § 1. & 2.

^c Prop. III. § 4 & 5.

^d Prop. IV. § 5.

SCHOLIUM.

On the whole, therefore, the thing, the parts of which are divisible from each other, is not the Substratum of Infinity of Extension, nor any part of it: And, the thing, the parts of which are moveable among themselves, is not the Substratum, nor any part of it: *Part*, in the sense of partial consideration only.^a

SUB-PROPOSITION.

The Material Universe is finite in extension.

§ 1. If, then, it should be maintained, that the Material Universe is the Substratum of Infinity of Extension; (which will be maintained, as is most evident, if it be contended that the Material Universe is a thorough *plenum* of Infinity of Extension;) to put to the proof, whether or not the Material Universe can be such Substratum, we have but to ask, Are the parts of the Material Universe divisible from each other? and, Are they moveable among themselves? For, if they be so divisible, if so moveable, then the Material Universe cannot be the Substratum of Infinity of Extension.^b

§ 2. Now, we know, of a certainty, that some parts of the Material Universe are *divisible from each other*; and, as far as we know, every part of it to which our minds could be directed is as divisible, as are the parts which we certainly know are divisible: and this is the conclusion to which, by the rules of philosophy, we are entitled to come.

§ 3. Therefore, the Material Universe cannot be the Substratum of Infinity of Extension.

§ 4. Again, we are certain, that some parts of the Material Universe are *moveable among themselves*; and, that every

^a Prop. IV. § 5.

^b Schol. under Prop. IV.

part of it to which our minds could be directed is as moveable, as are the parts which we certainly know are moveable, is (here, as in the other case) what we are entitled to conclude.

§ 5. Therefore, again, the Material Universe cannot be the Substratum of Infinity of Extension.

§ 6. And, if, because the parts of the Material Universe are *divisible from each other*, it is proved that it is not the Substratum of Infinity of Extension; then, because the parts of the Material Universe are *divisible from each other, and moveable among themselves*, it is proved, *much more*, (if that were possible,) that the Material Universe is not the Substratum of Infinity of Extension. It is proved that the Material Universe is not the Substratum of Infinity of Extension; nor any part thereof, for the Substratum of Infinity of Extension can have no parts but in the sense of partial consideration:^a that is, that the Material Universe is finite in extension. For were it of Infinity of Extension, it would be the Substratum thereof. But it being not that Substratum: Therefore, it is not of Infinity of Extension.

§ 7. The Material Universe, then, is *finite in extension*.

GENERAL SCHOLIUM.

§ 1. The parts of Infinity of Extension, or of its Substratum, if it have a Substratum, being necessarily indivisible from each other,^b and immoveable among themselves:^c and the parts of the Material Universe being divisible from each other, and moveable among themselves: and it therefore following, that the Material Universe is not the Substratum of Infinity of Extension, but is finite in extension: Here are two sorts of extension. The one sort, that which

^a Prop. IV. § 5.

^b Prop. II. Dem. § 2, & Prop. IV. § 5.

^c Coroll. from Prop. II. Dem. & Coroll. under Prop. IV.

the Material Universe has: And the other, the extension of Infinity of Extension. And *as* Infinity of Extension is necessarily existing,^a *and as* the extension of the Material Universe must exist, if it exist, in the extension of Infinity of Extension; a part of this, or of its Substratum, if it have a Substratum, (*part*, but in the sense of partial consideration;^b) must *penetrate* the Material Universe, and every atom, even the minutest atom, of it.

§ 2. It will be proper, therefore, to distinguish between these two kinds of extension. And, accordingly, let us confine to *matter*, namely, to the distance of the extremities of matter from each other, the name *extension*; and apply to the extension of Infinity of Extension, a part of which (*part*, in the sense of partial consideration only,^c) penetrates all matter to the minutest atom, the name *Expansion*.

§ 3. And, therefore, every thing which hath been proved to be true in relation to that extension which matter has not, must be true with regard to Expansion.

PROPOSITION V.

There is, necessarily, but one Being of Infinity of Expansion.

• § 1. Infinity of Expansion either subsists by itself, or it subsists not without a Substratum.^d In both cases there is necessarily a Being of Infinity of Expansion.^e Now, we are under a necessity of inferring from the existence of such a Being, that there is *but one such Being*.

§ 2. For, as 'tis evident, *there can be but one Infinity of Expansion*, so, on the supposition that it subsists by itself,

^a Prop. I. § 2.

^b Prop. II. Dem. § 2, & Prop. IV. § 5.

^c Prop. II. Dem. § 2.

^d Prop. III. § 1, compared with Gen. Schol. § 3.

^e Prop. III. § 3-4, 5, & Gen. Schol. § 3.

and so is a being,^a there can be but one being of Infinity of Expansion. And, as 'tis evident *there can no more be more than one Substratum* of Infinity of Expansion (whatever that Substratum is) than there can be more than one Infinity of Expansion; and as, therefore, 'tis evident, there can be but one Substratum of Infinity of Expansion: so, on the supposition that Infinity of Expansion subsists not without a Substratum, or Being,^b there can be but one Being of Infinity of Expansion.

§ 3. And, therefore, any one who asserts he can suppose two or more necessarily existing beings, each of Infinity of Expansion, is no more to be argued with than one who denies, Whatever is, is. The denying of this proposition cannot, indeed, be regarded as more curious than the affirming of the other.

§ 4. There is then, necessarily, *but one* Being of Infinity of Expansion.

PART II.

PROPOSITION I.

Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, existing.

§ 1. The truth of this is evident from the same sort of consideration as shows there is necessarily Infinity of Extension; to wit, that even when we endeavour to remove from our minds the idea of Infinity of Duration, we cannot, after all our efforts, avoid leaving this idea still there. Endeavour

^a Prop. III. § 3, & Gen. Schol. § 3.

^b Prop. III. § 4, 5, & Gen. Schol. § 3.

as much as we may to displace the idea, that is, conceive Infinity of Duration non-existent, we shall find, after a review of our thoughts, that to do so is utterly beyond our power.

§ 2. And since, even when we would remove the conception of Infinity of Duration from the mind, we necessarily leave the conception behind; 'tis manifest, that Infinity of Duration necessarily exists: Because, *every thing the existence of which we cannot but believe, is necessarily existing.*

§ 3. Infinity of Duration is, then, *necessarily existing.*

PROPOSITION II.

Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, indivisible.

PROLEGOMENON.

This Proposition is equivalent to another: to-wit, *The parts of Infinity of Duration are necessarily indivisible from each other; and indivisible really or mentally.*

DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. As was laid down before, what is divisible may be divided; and that which is *divided* from something else must have *superficies*, every way, and be *separated* from the other thing, be the distance ever so small:—There is no difference between being divided and being separated.

§ 2. Then, divisibility meaning possibility of separation: Because the parts of Infinity of Duration are necessarily inseparable, they are necessarily indivisible.

§ 3. Infinity of Duration is, then, *necessarily indivisible.*

COROLLARY FROM PROPOSITION II.

Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, immoveable.

PROLEGOMENON.

The Corollary is tantamount to this proposition, *The parts of Infinity of Duration are necessarily immoveable among themselves, really or mentally.*

DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. *Motion* of the parts of Infinity of Duration, would necessarily involve *separation* of its parts. And its parts being necessarily incapable of separation,^a are, therefore, necessarily immoveable among themselves.

§ 2. Infinity of Duration is, then, *necessarily immoveable.*

PROPOSITION III.

There is, necessarily, a Being of Infinity of Duration.

§ 1. Either, Infinity of Duration exists, or is conceived to exist, without a substratum; or, it exists not, or is conceived not to exist, without a Substratum.

§ 2. First, If Infinity of Duration exist by itself, it is a *substance*. For should any one deny that it is a substance, if it so exist; we shall prove, past contradiction, the absurdity of the denial, by just demanding the reason *why* Infinity of Duration is not a substance, *if it exist without a substratum, or by itself.*

§ 3. And therefore, as there is necessarily Infinity of Duration,^b there is, supposing it to exist by itself, a *substance*, or *being* of Infinity of Duration necessarily existing: Infinity

^a Part II. Prop. II. Dem. § 2.

^b Part II. Prop. I. § 2.

of Duration and the being of Infinity of Duration *being identical not different*.

§ 4. Secondly, If Infinity of Duration exist not without a Substratum, there is a *Substance* or *Being* of Infinity of Duration. For the word *Substance* or *Being* can never, it is certain, stand for anything having a better claim to the application of the term than such Substratum.

§ 5. And as Infinity of Duration is necessarily existing,^a so there is necessarily a Substance or Being of Infinity of Duration, on the supposition that it exists not without a Substratum.

§ 6. There is necessarily, then, a *Being* of Infinity of Duration.

PROPOSITION IV.

The Being of Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, of unity and simplicity.

§ 1. As Infinity of Duration is necessarily indivisible,^b so it is necessarily of the truest *unity*. For, if what is necessarily indivisible, even by thought, be not of the truest unity, what unity consists in is altogether unintelligible.

^c § 2. And since Infinity of Duration is necessarily of the truest unity, it is, also, of the utmost *simplicity*. Because, we can have no conception of what is in simplicity that is not in unity caused by a thing being necessarily indivisible.

§ 3. And as there necessarily is a being of Infinity of Duration, on the supposition that Infinity of Duration exists without a substratum,^c so, this supposed, the being is necessarily of unity and simplicity.

^a Part II. Prop. I. § 2.

^b Part II. Prop. II. Dem. § 2.

^c Part II. Prop. III. § 3.

§ 4. If Infinity of Duration exist not without a Substratum; that the Substratum is of the truest unity and utmost simplicity, is a thing not difficult to be demonstrated.

§ 5. For, that the Substratum of Infinity of Duration is no more divisible than Infinity of Duration, is a *self-evident* truth. Therefore, because Infinity of Duration is necessarily indivisible,^a so is the Substratum.

§ 6. And Infinity of Duration, because necessarily indivisible, being necessarily of unity and simplicity,^b its Substratum, for the same reason, is so likewise.

§ 7. And as there necessarily is a Being of Infinity of Duration, on the supposition that Infinity of Duration exists not without a Substratum,^c so, this supposed, the Being is necessarily of unity and simplicity.

§ 8. The Being of Infinity of Duration is, then, necessarily of *unity* and *simplicity*.

SCHOLIUM I.

The Substratum of Infinity of Duration being necessarily indivisible,^d that is, its parts being necessarily indivisible from each other; it is a *necessary consequence*, that the thing, the parts of which are *divisible from each other*, is not such Substratum, nor any part thereof.

COROLLARY.

It is a corollary from the proposition, The parts of the Substratum of Infinity of Duration are necessarily indivisible from each other, that they are necessarily immoveable among themselves: Just as Infinity of Duration is necessarily immoveable, because necessarily indivisible.

^a Part II. Prop. II. Dem. § 2.

^b § 1 & 2.

^c Part II. Prop. III. § 5.

^d Part II. Prop. IV. § 5.

SCHOLIUM II.

And the parts of the Substratum of Infinity of Duration being necessarily immoveable among themselves; it is a *necessary consequence*, that the thing, the parts of which are *moveable among themselves*, is not such Substratum, nor any part thereof.

SUB-PROPOSITION.

The Material Universe is finite in duration.

§ 1. If, then, it should be held, that the Material Universe is the Substratum of Infinity of Duration, or a part thereof; (which will be held, if it be alleged that the Material Universe is of itself of Infinity of Duration: Just as it will be maintained, that the Material Universe is the Substratum of Infinity of Extension, if it be contended that the Material Universe is a *plenum* of Infinity of Extension.) Should it be held, that the Material Universe is the Substratum of Infinity of Duration, or a part thereof; to put to the proof whether or not the Material Universe can be such Substratum, or a part thereof, we have but to ask, Are the parts of the Material Universe divisible from each other? and, Are they moveable among themselves? For if they be so divisible and moveable, the Material Universe cannot be the Substratum of Infinity of Duration, nor any part thereof,^a the Substratum having no parts in the sense of capability of separation.^b

§ 2. Now, we know, certainly, that some parts of the Material Universe are *divisible from each other*; and that every part of it to which our minds could be directed is as

^a Part II. Schol. I & II. under Prop. IV.

^b Part II. Prop. IV. § 5.

divisible, as are the parts which we certainly know are divisible, is the conclusion to which the rules of philosophy entitle us to come.

§ 3. Then, the Material Universe cannot be the Substratum of Infinity of Duration, nor any part thereof.

§ 4. Again, we know, certainly, that some parts of the Material Universe are *moveable among themselves*; and that every part of it to which our minds could be directed is as moveable, as are the parts which we certainly know are moveable, is (in this, as well as in the other case) the conclusion to which we are entitled to come.

§ 5. Then, again, the Material Universe cannot be the Substratum of Infinity of Duration, nor any part thereof.

§ 6. That is, the Material Universe is finite in duration. For, were it of Infinity of Duration, it would be the Substratum thereof, or, at least, a part of the Substratum. But it being not that Substratum, nor any part of it: Therefore, it is not of Infinity of Duration.

§ 7. The Material Universe is, then, *finite in duration*.

COROLLARY FROM SUB-PROPOSITION.

Every succession of substances is finite in duration

§ 1. Should it, now, be asserted that any succession, or successions, of substances finite in extension; *finite in extension*, for a succession of substances of Infinity of Extension were we know not what: Should it be asserted, that any successions, or any one succession, of substances—say, of animals, or vegetables, or minerals, or all together, or of worlds, or of systems of worlds, or germs of worlds—is of Infinity of Duration; the falsity of the assertion is, immediately and abundantly, apparent. For, seeing that the

whole Material Universe, itself, is finite in duration,^a every succession of substances which are in the Material Universe (and, of course, there can be no substances finite in extension which are out of it) must, therefore, be finite in duration, too.

§ 2. Every succession of substances is, then, *finite in duration*.

PROPOSITION V.

There is, necessarily, but one Being of Infinity of Duration.

§ 1. Infinity of Duration either exists without a substratum, or, it exists not without a Substratum:^b And in either case, there necessarily is a Being of Infinity of Duration.^c And we are under the necessity of inferring from the existence of such a Being, that there can be *no more than one such Being*.

§ 2. Because 'tis manifest *there can be but one Infinity of Duration*, therefore, on the supposition that it exists without a substratum, and, so, is a being,^d there can be but one being of Infinity of Duration. And because 'tis as manifest *there can be but one Substratum of Infinity of Duration* (whatever the Substratum is), as that there can be but one Infinity of Duration; and because, therefore, 'tis manifest there can be but one such Substratum: therefore, on the supposition that Infinity of Duration exists not without a Substratum, or Being,^e there can be but one Being of Infinity of Duration.

§ 3. There is, then, necessarily, *but one Being of Infinity of Duration*.

^a Sub-Prop. preced.

^b Part II. Prop. III. § 1.

^c Part II. Prop. III. § 3 & 5.

^d Part II. Prop. III. § 3.

^e Part II. Prop. III. § 4.

PART III.

PROPOSITION I.

There is, necessarily, a Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration.

§ 1. This will be demonstrated, if it be proved, that the necessarily existing Being of Infinity of Expansion, and the necessarily existing Being of Infinity of Duration, are not different Beings, but are identical.

§ 2. Now, either, Infinity of Expansion subsists by itself, and, then, it is a being:^a and, Infinity of Duration exists by itself, and, then, it is a being.^b

§ 3. Or, Infinity of Expansion subsists not without a Substratum, or Being:^c and, Infinity of Duration exists not without a Substratum, or Being.^d

§ 4. To take the former alternative. Every part of Infinity of Expansion being in every part of Infinity of Duration, every part of the being of Infinity of Expansion is in every part of the being of Infinity of Duration. And every part of Infinity of Duration being in every part of Infinity of Expansion, every part of the being of Infinity of Duration is in every part of the being of Infinity of Expansion. *Part*, in all the cases, in the sense of partial consideration only.

§ 5. To-wit, The whole of Infinity of Expansion being in the whole of Infinity of Duration, the whole of the being of

^a Part I. Prop. III. § 1 & 3, compared with Gen. Schol. § 3.

^b Part II. Prop. III. § 1 & 3.

^c Part I. Prop. III. § 1 & 5, and Gen. Schol. § 3.

^d Part II. Prop. III. § 1 & 4.

Infinity of Expansion is in the whole of the being of Infinity of Duration. And, The whole of Infinity of Duration being in the whole of Infinity of Expansion, the whole of the being of Infinity of Duration is in the whole of the being of Infinity of Expansion. *Whole*, in every instance, but as a *figure*.

§ 6. And this being, most manifestly, impossible, if the being of Infinity of Expansion and the being of Infinity of Duration be different; it necessarily follows, that they are identical.

§ 7. That is, Infinity of Expansion is Infinity of Duration, and Infinity of Duration is Infinity of Expansion. Which conclusion being plainly absurd; and it necessarily following from the supposition, that *Infinity of Expansion subsists by itself*, and that *Infinity of Duration subsists by itself*, it is proved, that the supposition itself is absurd. Therefore, Infinity of Expansion *cannot* exist by itself, and Infinity of Duration *cannot* exist by itself.

§ 8. Then, to turn to the other alternative, Infinity of Expansion subsists not without a Substratum, or Being: and Infinity of Duration subsists not without a Substratum, or Being.

§ 9. And, as every part of Infinity of Expansion is in every part of Infinity of Duration, therefore, every part of the Substratum of Infinity of Expansion is in every part of the Substratum of Infinity of Duration. And, as every part of Infinity of Duration is in every part of Infinity of Expansion, therefore, every part of the Substratum of Infinity of Duration is in every part of the Substratum of Infinity of Expansion. *Part*, but in the sense of partial consideration.

§ 10. That is, The whole of Infinity of Expansion being in the whole of Infinity of Duration, the whole of the Substratum of Infinity of Expansion is in the whole of the Substratum of Infinity of Duration. And, The whole of Infinity of

Duration being in the whole of Infinity of Expansion, the whole of the Substratum of Infinity of Duration is in the whole of the Substratum of Infinity of Expansion. *Whole*, in all the cases, used *figuratively*.

§ 11. And this being, most manifestly, impossible, if the Substratum, or Being, of Infinity of Expansion, and the Substratum, or Being, of Infinity of Duration, be different, it follows necessarily, that they are identical: To-wit, the Substratum, or Being, of Infinity of Expansion is, also, the Substratum, or Being, of Infinity of Duration.

§ 12. And this being proved, it is demonstrated, there is, necessarily, a Being of Infinity of Expansion, and Infinity of Duration.^a

§ 13. There is, then, necessarily, a *Being* of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration.

PROPOSITION II.

The Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, of unity and simplicity.

§ 1. The Being of Infinity of Expansion is, necessarily, of unity and simplicity.^b And, the Being of Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, of unity and simplicity.^c And these two being not different, but identical,^d it follows, that the Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, of unity and simplicity.

§ 2. The Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration is, then, necessarily, of *unity and simplicity*.

^a § 1. ^b Part I. Prop. IV. § 8, compared with Gen. Schol. § 3.

^c Part II. Prop. IV. § 8.

^d Part III. Prop. I. § 11.

PROPOSITION III.

There is, necessarily, but one Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration.

§ 1. There is, necessarily, but one Being of Infinity of Expansion.^a And the Being of Infinity of Expansion being also the Being of Infinity of Duration,^b it follows, that there is, necessarily, but one Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration.

§ 2. There is, necessarily, then, *but one* Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration.

^a Part I. Prop. V. § 4.

^b Part III. Prop. I. § 11.

DIVISION II

PART I.

PROPOSITION.

The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, is, necessarily, Intelligent, and All-knowing.

§ 1. For intelligence either began to be, or it never began to be.

§ 2. That it never began to be, is evident in this, that if it began to be, it must have had a cause; for *whatever begins to be must have a cause*. And the cause of Intelligence must be of Intelligence; for, *what is not of Intelligence cannot make Intelligence begin to be*. Now, Intelligence being, before Intelligence began to be, is a contradiction. And this absurdity following from the supposition, that Intelligence began to be, it is proved, that Intelligence never began to be: to-wit, is of Infinity of Duration.

§ 3. And as Intelligence is of Infinity of Duration, and supposes a *Being*: And no succession of substances, or beings, is of Infinity of Duration:^a It necessarily follows, that there is one Being of Infinity of Duration which is of *Intelligence*. And as there is but one Being of Infinity of Duration:^b and this Being is of simplicity:^c and is also of

^a Div. I. Part II. Coroll. from Sub-Prop.

^b Div. I. Part II. Prop. V. § 3.

^c Div. I. Part II. Prop. IV. § 8.

Infinity of Expansion:^a It follows, that the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration is necessarily of Intelligence.

§ 4. And that this Being is *All-knowing*, is no inference from the proposition, that the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration is necessarily of Intelligence, for it is, indeed, implied by such proposition: A Being of Intelligence who is of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, is convertible with an All-knowing Being. •

§ 5. The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, is, then, necessarily *Intelligent*, and *All-knowing*.

SCHOLIUM.

The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, being Intelligent,^b is a Mind, a Mind conscious of itself. An intelligent being who is not a mind, being all the same as an intelligent being who is not, in any proper sense of the term, *intelligent*: And a mind which is not conscious of itself, being just a mind which is not deserving of the name of *mind* at all.

^a Div. I. Part III. Prop. I. § 11.

^b Div. II. Part I. § 3.

PART II.

PROPOSITION.

The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, is, necessarily, All-powerful.

§ 1. This must be granted, if it be shown, that the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, *made matter begin to be.*

§ 2. Then, as the Material Universe is finite in duration,^a or began to be, it must have had a cause; for, *whatever begins to be must have a cause.* And this cause must be, in one respect or other, the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing; inasmuch as, what being, or cause, independent of that Being, could there be? And therefore, that Being made matter begin to be.

§ 3. And this being shown, it must be granted, that that Being is, necessarily, All-powerful.^b

§ 4. The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, is, then, necessarily, *All-powerful.*

^a Div. I. Part II. Sub-Prop.

^b § 1.

PART III.

PROPOSITION.

The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, and All-powerful, is, necessarily, entirely Free.

§ 1. This will be evinced, if it be manifested, that the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, and All-powerful, *made motion begin to be.*

§ 2. Now, of all the substances in motion, none of them belongs to a succession of Infinity of Duration, every succession of substances being finite in duration.^a And the moving substances being all finite in duration, or having begun some time to be, they must have had a cause; for, *whatever begins to be must have a cause.* And no first cause can be assigned, or even thought of, other than the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, and All-powerful. Therefore, this Being made moving substances, or motion, begin to be.

§ 3. And this being manifested, it is evinced, that that Being is, necessarily, entirely Free.^b

§ 4. The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, and All-powerful, is, then, necessarily, *entirely Free.*

^a Div. I. Part II. Coroll. from Sub-Prop.

^b § 1.

SCHOLIUM.

As the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, and entirely Free, was the cause of all substances that move,^a or, in other words, all successions of substances, or beings, (for 'tis plain, that successions of beings, *as successions*, are moved;) therefore, that Being was the cause of the particular successions, or succession, of men. To express the same thing otherwise,—The Being in question made the succession, or successions, of those intellectual and moral beings denominated *men*, begin to be.

DIVISION III.

PROPOSITION.

The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, and entirely Free, is, necessarily, completely Happy.

§ 1. *Every position which we cannot but believe is a necessary truth.* But we cannot but believe, that the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, and entirely Free, is completely Happy. Therefore, that this Being is completely Happy, is a necessary truth.

§ 2. Before we could righteously predicate unhappiness of the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of

^a Prop. preced. § 2, 3.

Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, and entirely Free, we would require to know of some *sufficient reason* for the predication. But we can know of none. For every kind, and degree, of unhappiness must proceed, or be resolvable into what proceeds, from some natural defect, or imperfection: And what imperfection can that Simple Being be subject to, who, only, is of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, and entirely Free?

§ 3. And as we can have no sufficient reason for ascribing unhappiness to that Being; so, on the other hand, there is a sufficient reason why we cannot help ascribing to it Happiness the most complete. For, the Being is a Mind,^a conscious of itself: that is, it perceives its own attributes, or perfections, and is conscious of the thoughts whereby it perceives them. How could a Mind conscious of perceiving, as appertaining to itself, such attributes as Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, All-powerfulness, entire Freeness, be supposed otherwise than as most consummately Happy?

§ 4. Truly, therefore, we cannot but believe, that the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, and entirely Free, is completely Happy.

§ 5. The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, and entirely Free, is, then, necessarily, *completely Happy*.

^a Div. II. Part I. Schol.

SUB-PROPOSITION.

The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, and completely Happy, is, necessarily, perfectly Good.

§ 1. On the supposition, that the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, and completely Happy, created intellectual and moral beings—indeed, any animal natures whatever; the only motive, or, if you think there were more motives than one, one of the motives, to create, must be believed to have been, a desire to make happiness besides its own consummate Happiness begin to be. And should there be assigned any additional motive, it cannot be believed to have been incompatible with such desire. The reason being very plain: A being labouring with incongruous motives cannot be happy.

§ 2. But 'tis the case, that the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, and completely Happy, created intellectual and moral, or, to employ a most comprehensive term, sentient, substances or beings.^a

§ 3. Therefore, the only motive, or, at least, one of the motives, to create, must have been, a desire to produce creaturely happiness.

§ 4. The consequentially necessary connection between the consummate Happiness of the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, and entirely Free; and its desire to communi-

^a Div. II. Part III. Schol. & Div. III. Prop. § 4.

cate happiness, all possible happiness (for there is no *sufficient reason* why we should suppose the amount of happiness to be bestowed on the creatures, as creatures, to be less than it might be:) the necessary connection, we say, is *intuitively evident*. By no stretch of imagination can we conceive, that the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, and completely Happy, could be the Free Cause of misery, or aught but happiness, to its creatures: Unless we can conceive, that happiness, as happiness, can give birth to its opposite; the cause being wholly disproportionate to the effect.

§ 5. Now, to produce, in consequence of desire to produce, all possible creaturely happiness, is to be perfectly Good.

§ 6. From all which, it is most obvious, that the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, and completely Happy, is, necessarily, perfectly Good.

§ 7. The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, and completely Happy, is, then, necessarily *perfectly Good*.

AN EXAMINATION
OF
ANTITHEOS'S "REFUTATION
"OF THE
"ARGUMENT *A PRIORI* FOR THE BEING AND
"ATTRIBUTES OF GOD."

Did it plainly appear that *Space* and *Duration* were *Properties* of a *Substance*, we should have an *easy way* with the Atheists: For it would at once prove demonstrably an *Eternal, Necessary, Self-existent* Being; that there is *but One* such; and that he is *needful* in order to the existence of all other things.—*Bishop Butler*.

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EXTRACTS †

FROM THE

“ADVERTISEMENT TO THE THIRD EDITION”‡

OF THE

“EXAMINATION.”

“The present edition does not differ very widely from the preceding one. *Alterations* have been made; but they are by no means very numerous, or essential: And there occur several not unimportant *additions*.

“Although a new edition of the ‘*Argument, a priori*,’ appears in this volume, we go by that edition which was in Antitheos’s hands when he set himself to the task of answering. There is, indeed, no fundamental difference between the old edition, and the new: but we always walk by the words of the old, in order that our antitheist may not have the shadow of a pretext for alleging that any undue advantage has been taken.

“No vital difference exists: This, however, must be understood with one notable qualification. In the new edition of the ‘*Argument*,’ we have advanced to the demonstration of THE GREAT MORAL || ATTRIBUTE OF GOODNESS; a branch of the subject not entered upon in the old edition. But, *so far as the latter goes*, there is no radical difference, and there is not a shade of disagreement.”¶

“To the former edition of the ‘*Argument*,’ there was prefixed an

† Other portions—altered, perhaps, or modified—have been incorporated with the matter of the “Advertisement to the Fourth Edition.”

‡ With regard to these extracts, the same arrangement of parts and words, as was in the original “Advertisement,” has not been slavishly followed. But—shortly—all departures from the original are indicated, in one way or another.

|| The word “*Moral*” is here used in a certain wide sense.

¶ “Some non-essential differences, nevertheless, there are.” As to the non-essential differences, see “Advertisement to the Fourth Edition.”

‘Introduction,’ which the readers of this volume will in vain search for under that designation. By turning to the sixth and seventh sections† of Part V. [of the ‘Examination,'] the absence of the ‘Introduction’ will be found to be satisfactorily accounted for. It appears now in a different guise.—The matter which composed that ‘Introduction’ has undergone revision. Increase, here: Retrenchment, there: Improvement, on the whole: And yet, after all, but slight change, if you take it in the lump.”

“That our readers may have the satisfaction of observing for themselves, that we have not dealt unfairly by Antitheos; there is given, in a General Appendix, the whole of that Chapter in the ‘Refutation’ to which the greatest part of our animadversions are directed. The Chapter is the one in which that gentleman confronts the first three Propositions of the ‘Argument.’‡ By surveying with rigorous minuteness the manner in which we act towards our author, our readers will confer a favour. And let them be assured, that our conduct has been uniform. We have been as conscientious in the rest of our animadversions.—So much with a reference to topics suggested by the ‘Examination’ itself.

“The *Preface* thereto has undergone, and it admitted, but slight modification. One change only requires specification.

“Previous editions intimated, that we proposed to ourselves, in connection with the discussion waged with the *Zetetic Society*, ‘to meet and ‘to remove every metaphysical difficulty which atheists can possibly ‘start;’ and, in a word, to ‘entirely exhaust the subject, to the complete and everlasting confusion of the deniers of a God.’ But the champion of the Zetetics, of the Atheists of Scotland, having laid down his arms, and, in a manner, confessed himself to be vanquished; another field must be chosen: other atheists must gird themselves for battle. This controversy is at an end.”||

† “It may be proper to mention on what principle the *sectioning* proceeds. A section-mark (§) occurs at the beginning of every *paragraph*; the section-marks being used for the sake of reference merely. In short, they denote *topical* as opposed to *logical* divisions.”

‡ In quoting from Antitheos, I may occasionally leave out, for brevity’s sake, or perspicuity’s sake, words which make nothing to the point as to which the passage is adduced. With regard to every such case, I most willingly leave it to others to decide, whether I have, to the *least* extent, misrepresented my author.

|| “See Postscript to this Edition.”—(Now, “Postscript to the Third Edition.” See page 338.)

P R E F A C E
TO
EXAMINATION OF ANTITHEOS'S "REFUTATION."†

It seems to be a duty which is due to the public in general, to give some account of the circumstances which led to the present controversy. Antitheos's production was "called forth" in consequence of a challenge, sent by the author of the "Argument, *a priori*, for the Being and Attributes of God," to a society of professed atheists in Glasgow, "to answer and refute the reasonings contained in the aforesaid work." The letter containing the challenge gave a detail of those incidents which had conducted to it. And for this reason, and for another to be subsequently alluded to, that letter shall be inserted here, word for word.

" To the Society of Atheists which calls itself 'The Arcopagus,'
" or, 'The Zetetic Society,' Glasgow.

" Before proceeding to the proper business of this letter, it may be
" but proper to give you a short account of the manner in which I was
" led to think of addressing you.

† [This *Preface*, including the notes,¹ appeared in the first entire edition—or the edition containing all the works in one volume. (See the "General Preface.") The volume in question, which was published in 1843, comprised the *third* edition of the *Examination of Antitheos*. These circumstances will account for some things herein pertaining to dates.

—This present Preface differs, however, from the Preface as it originally stood, in wanting a couple of (concluding) paragraphs—one of which is now placed elsewhere²—and, besides, in several immaterial alterations.]

¹ [There are some notes which, like this one, are peculiar to this (4th) edition. For distinction's sake, these notes are, as in the present case, included within brackets.]

² [It forms a note (note 1) in the "Advertisement to Third Edition," page 136.]

“Some months ago, seeing, in the window of a small book-shop in a conspicuous street in this city, a newly printed copy of Paine’s ‘Age of Reason,’ I determined on speaking to the person who sold the work, in order to know whether he believed the book to be infamous, and sold it merely for the sake of gain, or whether he was, in every sense, a patron of so infamous a publication.†

“In the book-shop to which I allude, I saw a person who gave me to understand, there was a society of Atheists in Edinburgh, who met on the Sunday evenings, for the sake of confirming each other in infidelity.‡ Subsequently, I met a member of the Society, (who is said to be one of their best hands,) who, indeed, made no secret of his sentiments. He told me, that there neither was, nor could be, in the universe, any being greater than himself;|| that his body and brain (for he positively assured me, he had no soul but his brain) had been produced by *unintelligent necessary causes*; and that, after his death, the particles of his body and brain might compose a cloud or a dung-hill, but could never, by any chance, compose, again, *the person* — —, for so *this (by no means fortuitous) concurrence of atoms* was called.

† The sight of infidel works in a public shop, was quite new to me six years ago. Matters are so much altered since about the beginning of 1837, that sheets and volumes of infidelity, much more hideous than Paine’s, may be seen, any day, in any town, vended in a manner enough public.

‡ An atheistical society is no rarity to me now.¹ And that there are societies of atheists, and that the societies are studded, thickly studded, over the country, every one has been aware ever since the House of Lords, through the Bishop of Exeter, (thanks to his Lordship!) directed attention to the subject of the progress of infidelity among us.²

|| All that was here meant to be conveyed was this: That the person spoken of asserted, there neither was, nor could be, in the universe, a being of a species superior to the human. Surely I *never could intend* to convey, that the atheist in question had maintained, it was a downright impossibility that there should be a cleverer man than he in the world. And that, for *very obvious reasons*,

¹ [See note †, above.]

² [The Bishop of Exeter, who still lives to govern his diocese, made the celebrated speech on the extent and spread of infidelity, which electrified the House of Lords, and the country at large, in the year 1840. May his venerable Lordship be yet longer spared to adorn his cathedral, and be of farther service to the cause of his true branch of the Church Catholic;—neither of which—nor branch nor stem—shall ever fall on earth.]

“ — — — undertook to answer, with ease, any thing that could
 “ be urged in favour of Theism. I challenged him, and, through him,
 “ all his atheistical associates, to refute my ‘Argument, *a priori*,’ &c.
 “ A copy of which had been forwarded to the body. I was soon in-
 “ formed, that — — — did not hesitate for a moment to engage to
 “ refute me. With regard to the proposed refutation, I imposed on
 “ him two conditions only. 1st, That the answer should be *on paper*.
 “ And 2ndly, That it pointed out some (alleged) *specific fallacy* in my
 “ alleged demonstration. After waiting long for the promised refuta-
 “ tion, I was, at length, made aware, by a friend of — — —’s, that
 “ the said — — — could not answer it. However, to make up for
 “ my disappointment, I was told, that there was a society of Atheists
 “ in Glasgow, more numerous, more clever, and more learned, and that
 “ there neither was, nor could be, any ground to doubt that the
 “ ‘Areopagus’ would, on being challenged, step forward and (endeavour
 “ to) overturn my reasonings.

“ Shortly after receiving this piece of news, I came to the deter-
 “ mination of challenging you, each of you and all of you: As, accord-
 “ ingly, I now hereby do challenge you to answer and refute the
 “ reasonings contained in the aforesaid work. Two copies of which
 “ are herewith sent to you.

“ You challenge the world to prove, to you, that there exists an
 “ *Intelligent Great First Cause*. The work in question professes to
 “ demonstrate that matter by the *most rigid* ratiocination. It asks you
 “ to grant no proposition but those propositions which constitute the
 “ starting points of your Atheism, to-wit, *that there is Infinity of*
 “ *Duration, and that there is Infinity of Extension*,—be that extension
 “ *of matter merely, or of space merely, or of matter and space together*.
 “ How plain must those truths be which are insisted on by all sound
 “ Theists, (I might have said by all men sound in their minds,) and are
 “ the primary assumptions in Atheism itself.

“ We shall soon see whether you are able to do all that you profess

“to have a capacity for,† or whether, like the Edinburgh Atheists, you must be altogether dumb before one of that class of persons who are (in your opinion) so weak and foolish as to believe in a necessary Being who contains within himself all possible perfections.

“I have to lay down to you the same conditions which I imposed on the Atheists here. The conditions are (in one respect) not hard. I am, being very truly desirous of your attaining to a better mind,

(Signed) “WILLIAM GILLESPIE.”

“Edinburgh, 21st August 1837.”

To this letter and challenge, a letter, dated Glasgow, 28th August 1837, was received in answer, in which it is said: “What you say of — — denying to any one in the universe, an iota of superiority to himself in the scale of intelligence, is not exactly the mode in which atheists commonly express themselves. * * * It has frequently been said, that we know of no intelligence superior to that of man (and I think any one is warranted in so saying).”

The concluding paragraph, &c., are as follows: “Relative to your challenge, it is hereby accepted upon your own terms. A reply to your ‘Argument’ will be commenced forthwith; but as the writer has not much time to spare, it cannot be expected to proceed very rapidly. But as the Society intend publishing it at their own charges, and are anxious that the thing should be proceeded with, you may rely on no time being lost. A copy will be forwarded to you as soon as it comes out of the press. I have the honor to be,” &c.

(Signed) “—————.”‡

“To William Gillespie, Esq.”

† Certainly I formed an estimate of atheistical talent from what I had seen of the metropolitan atheists. But, it must be confessed, the western antitheists can command talents and acquirements very superior to what the easterns have at their service. A certain piece of information alluded to in this challenge was quite correct.

‡ [See note to § 2 of the Postscript to this edition. (Page 390.)]

About the middle of April 1838, I was put in possession, by the writer of that letter, according to his promise, of a copy of his reply. It is entitled, "Refutation of the Argument *a priori* for the Being and Attributes of GOD; showing the Irrelevancy of that Argument, as well as the Fallacious Reasoning of Dr Samuel Clarke and others, especially of Mr Gillespie, in support of it. By ANTI THEOS."†

I have hinted, that there was another reason for giving a copy of the letter which contained the challenge. My adversary alleges in his Preface, that the letter was guilty of "containing passages which could by no means militate in favor of the writer." After asserting this, need it have been added that my respondent wished to take no advantage of the "passages?" What ever operates more to one's prejudice than to say that the conduct of one has been faulty in some instance, but the informant is too charitable to communicate the impropriety? But of the matter before us, the public have now been constituted the proper judges.

"Mr Gillespie," * * * says Mr Gillespie's opponent, "had been disappointed, it seems, in finding an antagonist elsewhere,‡ notwithstanding his anxious endeavours to provoke opposition.● The gauntlet was thrown down, but no one was fully prepared to take it up." (Preface.) If Antitheos had in his eye, as his words may tend to lead his readers to suppose he had, any thing besides the affair with the Edinburgh Atheists, (who certainly, though they had taken up the gauntlet, had not been "fully prepared" for the combat;) he might have been informed, had he made inquiry, that very soon after the appearance of the "Argument," the author thereof found an antagonist (though he did not call himself so,) an unchallenged antagonist, an antagonist of very considerable and acknowledged metaphysical abilities,

† Published for the *Glasgow Zetetic Society*, 1838.

‡ Mr Gillespie had been disappointed—not in *finding*, as Antitheos has it, but—in *not finding* an atheistic antagonist. See the narration in the challenge, (pp. 123-129 hereof.)

an antagonist who wrote laborious strictures on the work as long as the work itself.†

The "Refutation" gives very satisfactory evidence that its author is a person of no mean talents, and is, to a very respectable extent, acquainted with his subject. But for which circumstance, indeed, the *Examination* of that performance would never have been set on foot.

† [No longer can there be any adequate reason for withholding the information, that the real antagonist referred to was Patrick C. Macdougall, the present Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh. This respected gentleman's strictures on the "Argument," occupy some 65 pages of an octavo volume, which the reader will find described in a note in our "Examination." (See page 317.)]

EXAMINATION
OF
ANTITHEOS'S "REFUTATION
"OF THE
"ARGUMENT *A PRIORI*."

PART I.

THE RELEVANCY OF *A PRIORI* ARGUMENTATION
FOR A REAL EXISTENCE.

§ 1. There are two things which the author of the "Refutation" has undertaken to do. One of them is, to shew that the *a priori* mode of procedure is directed wide of the mark when applied to the question of the being of A GOD; and the other is, to overturn the particular reasonings of those who have adopted that method of argumentation.

§ 2. The first chapter of that work is devoted to the former, and the remaining chapters are occupied with the latter undertaking.

§ 3. Our atheist begins by being very merry on the subject of the *irrelevancy* of *a priori* argument for the existence of DEITY. "To hear of the existence of a GOD†

† We have given capitals to certain of the words used by Antitheos, on which he had not bestowed one capital letter. [This applies to the body of

“being made the subject of demonstration by argument, “is,” he remarks, “altogether astounding. The announcement on the other hand,” he adds, “sounds so *oddly*, as to mitigate the effect of the first impression, if not to excite “ridicule at the wonderful discrepancy between the end in view, and the means laid out for the attainment of it.” (Chapter I. paragraph 1.)

§ 4. But when the laugh is over, and it becomes time to serve us up something more substantial, we are disappointed at the meagreness of our fare. Such as it is, we shall probe every piece of it.

§ 5. It being *granted*, argues our author, that “a GOD “* * must be held as a real being,” “argument” (he means *a priori* argument) “appears quite out of place.”—Now for the *proof*, Sir, if you please?—“It would never do to talk “of proving the existence of the man in the moon by “argument; neither would it be of any avail to employ a “syllogism or a sorites to demonstrate the existence of a “navigable channel between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, “through the arctic regions of America.”—All that is here meant may be quite unobjectionable. Our author goes on:—“If the reasoning under review be relevant, these must be “so too. If an *a priori* argument be capable of proving the “existence of one thing, another may be proved by the same “* * process.” (Par. 2.) The proof, the proof of this, where is it to be found?

§ 6. Passing over two pages and a half, where *not a word* on the subject occurs, we come, in the eighth paragraph, to something that looks as if it would turn out to be

the “Examination,” though not to our Appendix where Antitheos is cited at length. There, his work is quoted just as he published it.] That he is so desirous of degrading, so far as he can, certain collocations of letters, is a good evidence of *something*.

what we want. "The truth is, the argument in question" (the argument *a priori*) "is nothing else than an attempt "to establish the application of *mathematical*" (this word should be *metaphysical*†) "reasoning to what it has nothing "in earth or heaven to do with,—namely, real existences."—The proof?—"How vain and preposterous the attempt!"—This metal will not pass.—"As well might it be maintained, "that as the whole is in the abstract a perfect quantity, it "must contain within itself all the qualities of the different "parts of which it is composed; that, as some of these parts "are small and some large, some round and some square, "some black and some white; it must be white and black, "and square and round, and large and small at the same "time!"—Neither will this do. Where is the proof of the AS WELL *might it be maintained, &c.*? the proof of the analogy between the cases? It is to seek. Well, we have had nothing like *proof* as yet. But we approach a syllogism, and Antitheos does not deny, that "every sound argument is capable of being reduced to the syllogistic form." We may hope then to get some satisfaction at length.

"Whatever necessarily possesses absolute perfections is
"GOD;

"Metaphysical abstractions possess absolute perfections;—"

"Therefore, metaphysical abstractions are GOD." •

§ 7. "If this be not," says Antitheos, "a fair statement of "the *whole argument in the most logical form*, I am at a "loss to know what is."—But I am not.—"Should it be any "way wrong, and should some ardent disciple of the meta- "physical school of theology deign hereafter to take a part "in this discussion, it would be well were he to consult the "Stagyrite and correct it." (Par. 9.) I mean to correct it,

† See below, § 47, and following sections.

though I do not know that the Stagirite here will be of vast service,* for the principal fallacy to be pointed out is not of a strictly logical character.

§ 8. Passing over the major proposition, the minor is, "Metaphysical abstractions possess absolute perfections." What are metaphysical abstractions? They compose a certain class of thoughts. The minor proposition therefore amounts to this; A certain class of our thoughts, to-wit, metaphysical abstractions, possess absolute perfections.—But by the bye, this minor proposition omits a word, to us a very necessary word. Antitheos should have known that the Stagirite does not allow the middle term as it occurs in the major, to contain a complete element not to be found in the middle term when it appears in the minor. This instance of high treason against the Prince of Logicians cannot be suffered to pass. Supplying the word which has been kept back, we have, "Metaphysical abstractions" "necessarily" "possess absolute perfections"—Do they indeed? Metaphysics have been in very bad repute for a good while. Berkeley and Hume, not to mention any other metaphysician, have (it seems) brought them into everlasting disgrace with the majority of people. But behold how far Antitheos runs in an opposite direction. He is downright in love with metaphysics. Metaphysical abstractions, he has it, necessarily possess absolute perfections. The metaphysical abstractions which this gentleman has been conversant with, must be *very superior indeed* to the generality of those with which other people have been brought into acquaintance in these days.†

† Antitheos may say, that the absurdity of this minor proposition is not to be fathered upon him, he doing no more than putting a certain collection of words into the mouths of your metaphysical theists. The more shame to him! To write sheer nonsense is bad enough. But to write

§ 9. After having said so much about the minor, we hardly need to draw the conclusion, the full and proper conclusion, to the premises set down by our author. It runs thus: Therefore, a certain class of our thoughts, to-wit, metaphysical abstractions, is GOD. The conclusion, like the minor, speaks for itself.

§ 10. Having thus paved the way, I proceed to do what was promised, and shall now *correct* Antitheos's syllogism. I do not mean to say, it will be unobjectionable even in a corrected form. But if one make the best that can be made of it, he shall do very well. Here then it comes as corrected.

Whatever necessarily possesses absolute perfections is
GOD.

But *that about which certain of our metaphysical abstractions are employed* necessarily possesses absolute perfections.

Therefore, *that about which certain of our metaphysical abstractions are employed* is GOD.

§ 11. Antitheos next proceeds to say: "Our reasoners *a priori* have either to acknowledge the absurdity here set forth in mood and figure, or deny that they appropriate abstract reasoning to questions of ontological science." These reasoners will not deny that they appropriate abstract reasoning to questions of ontological science, but they will acknowledge the *absurdity there* set forth in mood and figure, and that even as has been shewn.

§ 12. We go on to the words which succeed: "If their GOD be a real being—an agent, he cannot be a heap of sheer nonsense, and call it other people's reasoning, is neither more nor less than—what Antitheos has done. But let him keep what is his own, and nobody's else.

“abstractions,” that is, a heap of our thoughts, for abstractions are thoughts of ours.—True, He cannot.—“If made up of abstractions,” or men’s thoughts, “He cannot be an agent.”—Most true.—“No reasoning imaginable can make Him both.”—Surely.—“Yet to nothing short of working out this impossibility does the argument aim.” How was that made out? By the syllogism? Oh, then, as I have *corrected* the syllogism—I say no more.

§ 13. Well: no great things *as yet* in the way of proving, that if a GOD be a real being, *a priori* argument is quite out of place. Perhaps we shall alight on the thing we are in search of, at last. Of a truth, the proof (such as it is) which we are seeking we come up to at the twelfth paragraph, but the reasonings which constitute the proof are not Antitheos’s own, nor yet those of the Reviewer who is cited, they having been employed by David Hume, and being very ancient indeed.

§ 14. “The character of irrelevancy here laid at the door of the *a priori* argument, is not unwarranted by the authority of good judges among the religious themselves. Abundance of quotations might be adduced, but I shall content myself with an extract from the *Edinburgh Review* for October, 1830, (vol. lii. p. 113,) in an article upon Dr Morehead’s ‘Dialogues on Natural and Revealed Religion.’ That the reviewer reasons upon theistical principles is evident from the allusion he makes to ‘the will of the Creator,’ to which, I may remark in passing, he allows the most orthodox latitude.” (Why, does Antitheos suppose, he may meet an atheist at every corner he can turn?) “Relative to our argument *a priori* he observes:—“ ‘The truth is, it involves a radical fallacy which not only renders it useless but dangerous to the cause it is in-

“ ‘ tended to support. The question as to the being of a GOD,
 “ ‘ is purely a question of fact: HE either exists or HE does
 “ ‘ not exist. But *there is an evident absurdity in pre-*
 “ ‘ *tending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by*
 “ ‘ *argument a priori; because nothing is demonstrable,*
 “ ‘ *unless the contrary implies a contradiction, and this*
 “ ‘ can never be predicated of the negative of any propo-
 “ ‘ sition which merely affirms or asserts a matter of fact.
 “ ‘ *Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive*
 “ ‘ *as non-existent, and consequently there is no being’ * **
 “ ‘ *whose non-existence implies a contradiction, or, in*
 “ ‘ other words, *whose existence is a priori demonstrable.*
 “ ‘ This must be evident to every one who knows what
 “ ‘ demonstration really means. It is a universal law, that
 “ ‘ all heavy bodies descend to the earth in a line directed
 “ ‘ towards its centre. But the contrary of this may easily
 “ ‘ be conceived, because it involves no contradiction; for
 “ ‘ bodies might have fallen upward, if we may so express
 “ ‘ it, as well as downward, had such been the will of the
 “ ‘ Creator. But we cannot conceive the opposite of one
 “ ‘ of the demonstrated truths of geometry—as, for example,
 “ ‘ that the three angles of a triangle should be either
 “ ‘ greater or less than two right angles—because this
 “ ‘ implies a contradiction. The distinction, therefore, be-
 “ ‘ tween necessary or demonstrable truths and matters of
 “ ‘ fact, consists in this,—that the contrary of the former
 “ ‘ involves a contradiction, whereas that of the latter does
 “ ‘ not. But there is no contradiction implied in con-
 “ ‘ ceiving the non-existence of the DEITY; and therefore
 “ ‘ His existence is not a necessary truth, *a priori demon-*
 “ ‘ *strable.*”†

✱

† The reader may consult, here, a note to § 33 of Part VI.

§ 15. Of this extract from the *Edinburgh Review*, the words which are *here* put into *italic* characters are precisely the words of Mr Hume, as they are to be met with in the ninth Part of his "Dialogues concerning Natural Religion." We shall present our reader with the passage in the "Dialogues" in which those words are to be found. An original, generally, is preferable to a copy.

§ 16. "There is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any arguments *a priori*. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. Consequently there is no being, whose existence is demonstrable."

§ 17. Hume has emphatically added: "*I propose this argument as entirely decisive, and am willing to rest the whole controversy upon it.*"—"Dialogues," Part IX.

§ 18. These words of David Hume contain all that is *argument* in the citation made by Antitheos from the *Edinburgh Review*. All the rest of the citation is mere illustration or repetition.

§ 19. Our author thus comments on the passage he has quoted: "To add any thing to the foregoing reasoning of the reviewer were perhaps superfluous. It is clear and satisfactory." (Par. 13.)

§ 20. Clear and satisfactory the reasoning referred to I believe to be, with regard to what the first users of such ratiocination had *in their view*. But whether it be so clear and satisfactory in *every* case, we shall presently see.

§ 21. For reasons already hinted, I shall address myself

to the ratiocination as contained in Hume's words rather than in those of the Reviewer.

§ 22. It may be remarked, that since Hume rests the whole controversy upon that argument, our atheist may be thoroughly assured, that if it turn out to be the very reverse of clear and satisfactory, his cause is a mighty bad one. Up to this stage of the business, our atheist's faith and trust in the argument are boundless.

§ 23. "There is," says David Hume, "*an evident absurdity* in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or "to prove it by any arguments *a priori*." *Because Hume has said so*, many take the existence of the absurdity for granted, who perhaps have never seriously weighed the evidence of its reality. The Sceptic's argument against any *a priori* argument for any matter of fact, is happily *very easily* answered. And for the reason already brought out,† if it can but be shewn, that it is weak and most unsatisfactory, we have his authority for the good sense there is in pretending to *demonstrate* at least one matter of fact.

§ 24. He opens his argument in the following manner. "Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction." Both these propositions are granted to, the fullest extent. But that which follows,—"Whatever we conceive as existent, *we can also conceive as non-existent*,"—is most completely to be denied. He appeals to the constitution of the human mind: "Whatever WE conceive as existent, WE can also conceive as non-existent."

† Neither, in the "Dialogues on Natural Religion," nor in any other quarter of his writings, is there offered any other argument against the possibility of a valid *a priori* argument for the being of A. DEITY.—The same argument substantially, a little differently set out, occurs again in the "Inquiry concerning Human Understanding." Sect. XII. part iii.

Now, what this constitution is, in reference to the point at issue, let us call in a few witnesses to depose.

§ 25. "I demand of any one to *remove* any part of *pure space* from another, with which it is continued, even so much as *in thought*." — "I would fain meet with that thinking man, that can, *in his thoughts*, set any bounds to *space* more than he can to duration; or, by thinking, hope to arrive at the end of either."—*Locke's "Essay,"* B. II. ch. xiii. § 13, 21.

§ 26. *Ut partium Temporis Ordo est immutabilis, sic etiam Ordo partium Spatii. Moveantur hæc de locis suis, et movebuntur (ut ita dicam) de seipsis.* ["As the Order of the parts of Time is *immutable*, so also is the Order of the parts of *Space*. To remove these from their places, were (as I may say) to remove them from themselves."]—*Newton's "Principia," Schol. ad Defin. 8.*

§ 27. "He that can suppose Eternity and *Immensity* * * * removed out of the Universe; may, if he please, as easily remove the Relation of Equality between twice two and four."—*Dr St. Clarke's "Demonstration,"* under Prop. III.

§ 28. "We find within ourselves the idea of infinity, *i. e. immensity* and eternity, *impossible, even in imagination, to be removed out of being*. We seem to discern *intuitively*, that there *must and cannot but be* somewhat, external to ourselves, answering this idea, or the archetype of it."—*Butler's "Analogy,"* Part I. ch. vi.

§ 29. "We cannot conceive *space* possible to be created, since *we cannot conceive it as non-existent* and creatable, which may be conceived concerning every created being. Nor can we conceive it properly as *annihilated* or *annihilable*."—*Dr I. Watts' "Philosophical Essays,"* Essay I. Sect. iv.

§ 30. "We find that we can, with ease, conceive how all other beings should not be. We can remove them out of our minds, and place some other in the room of them: but *Space* is the very thing *that we can never remove, and conceive of its not being.* * * * It is *self-evident, I believe, to every man, that Space is necessary.*"—*Jonathan Edwards' "Notes."*†

§ 31. "We see no absurdity in supposing a body to be annihilated; but the *space* that contains it remains; and to suppose that annihilated, seems to be absurd."—*Dr Reid's "Essays,"* Essay II. chap. xix.

§ 32. "It is certain that where the notions of magnitude and figure have once been acquired, the mind is immediately led to consider them as attributes of *space* no less than of body: and (abstracting them entirely from the other sensible qualities perceived in conjunction with them) becomes impressed with an *irresistible conviction that their existence is necessary* and eternal, and that it would remain unchanged if all the bodies in the universe were annihilated."—*Dugald Stewart's "Elements,"* Vol. II. chap. ii. § 3 & 3.

§ 33. Now, here we have, just by way of specimen, eight individuals of the utmost veracity and intelligence, asserting in express terms, or in terms from which the inference is necessary, that they *cannot conceive the non-*

† The passage in the text is taken from Edwards' "Notes on Natural Science." These Notes, or Remarks, or Comments, are not to be found in any late edition of the Reverend, and the President, Jonathan Edwards's Works: in fact, they occur in none of the common editions consulted with a view to present affairs. But one can meet the Notes in question in "The Life" of the President, by Sereno E. Dwight: New York, 1830. In this bulky volume, specimens of the Notes are given in pages 34-39; and, in one of the Appendices in the volume, "the whole of this collection of Notes" (p. 39) is supplied to the reader.

existence of space. To those authorities, we shall add only one more.

§ 34. "The first proposition,—'*Infinity of extension is NECESSARILY existing,*'—it would be *absurd* in the extreme "to deny. No more can we imagine any limit prescribable "to extension, than we can imagine the outside of a house to "be in the inside of it."—*Antitheos*: "Refutation," Chap. VI. par. 3.

§ 35. "What, now, is the utmost value we can set upon "the argument *a priori* for the being and attributes of "GOD? Does it possess any value whatever? If it does, "it has yet to be shown, for in the hands of the great "Rector of St James's, it only proves that something must "have existed from all eternity; and in those, of a learned "and eminent logician of our northern metropolis, nothing "more than *the necessary existence of infinite space and "duration: none of which propositions were [or was] "ever disputed.*" — *Antitheos*: "Refutation," Chap. XIII. par. 1.

§ 36. "To add any thing to the foregoing" authorities, "were perhaps superfluous." They are "clear and satisfactory." Hume, therefore, is entirely wrong in appealing to our mental constitution, when he says: "Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent." We cannot conceive *space* as non-existent. His proposition, therefore, must undergo this modification at least,—whatever, with the exception of space, we conceive to exist, we can also conceive not to exist. The conclusion from his argument,— "Consequently there is no being, whose existence is demonstrable,"—must therefore be limited to this extent, (if no farther;) consequently there is no being, except space, or, if space be not a being, the being which it necessarily supposes, whose existence is demonstrable.

§ 37. Now as that exhibition of the *a priori* argument for the being of A DEITY which we are concerned to defend† lays hold on space as its foundation, or groundwork; if infinite space be a property, or mode of existence, as theologians express themselves, of a *Supreme Mind*, then, unless we cannot ascend from *the* property to *the* substance invested with it, the being of a Supreme Mind is a thing *demonstrable*, is a *necessary* truth, OUR ATHEIST HIMSELF BEING JUDGE.

§ 38. What has become now of Hume's argument against any *a priori* argument for any matter of fact? It has turned out to be indeed the farthest thing possible from being clear and satisfactory. And no wonder, when such a one as OUR ATHEIST APPEARED AS AN EVIDENCE AGAINST IT.

§ 39. So much has this gentleman turned the tables upon himself by venturing to appropriate the reasoning which to him seemed so irrefragable, and upon which he shewed no disinclination to peril his cause. What will he do now? It is easy to see what he *should* do.

§ 40. Although the "reasoning of the reviewer" appeared to our author to be "clear and satisfactory," yet he follows it up by a remark of his own, which we shall notice. "Men have often been made to suffer severely—on some occasions to the loss of life—for denying the being of a GOD. * * * But was ever any one put to death, or sent to the pillory, for denying that twice two make four? The idea, indeed, is ridiculous; but wherefore should it be so? Simply because *it is not possible* there should be any difference of opinion about the matter." (Par. 13.) Surely it is possible to deny, that twice two make four; though it is not possible to conceive the denial to be correct. And 'tis not

† It is the only proper exhibition. And on this subject we would refer to our Review of Dr Clarke's "Demonstration," § 3, &c.

to be *taken for granted, without proof*, that no one ever denied that twice two is four: Things as absurd have been said.†

§ 41. There may be assigned another reason why the civil magistrate in no country ever put any one to death for telling a certain lie, and denying that two and two are four: which reason is this,—a lie of that kind could injure no one's morals; it could only shew the already wretched morals of him who uttered it. A denial of that arithmetical* truth could go no way to undermine and loosen the foundations of civil society, *as some other denials have been supposed to tend to do*‡. In fine, to say that twice two is not four, can never inflict a wound either on public or private morality.

§ 42. It must be granted to Antitheos, that *it is not possible* to conceive the denial of the proposition, that twice two make four, to be correct. But at the same time we must take care to remember this, that there are truths, as well as that arithmetical one, which, to use Antitheos's language, "it is *not possible* there should be any difference of opinion about." To instance in the case of the truth, There is infinite space; that there is necessarily such, "is one of the first and most natural conclusions, that any man, who thinks at all, can frame in his mind: And no man can any more doubt of this, than he can doubt whether twice two be equal to four. 'Tis possible indeed a man may in some sense be ignorant of this first and plain truth, by being utterly stupid, and not thinking at all: (For though it is absolutely impos-

† See Part XII. note C.

‡ "—Those whose principles dissolve the first bonds of association, and society, the ATHEISTS and *despisers of GOD and religion*."—Warburton's "Divine Legation of Moses," B. II. sect. iv. With reference to the subject before us, consult the whole of Books I. II. III. of that stupendous work.

“sible for him to imagine the contrary, yet he may possibly neglect to conceive this: Tho’ no man can possibly think that twice two is not four, yet he may possibly be stupid, and never have thought at all whether it be so or not.)”†

§ 43. I grant all this, Antitheos will say. But what of that? I was insinuating, not that the propositions concerning two and two making four, and concerning the existence of space, were not on a footing as to real undeniableness, but that the former of the propositions, and the one affirming the being of a GOD, are not on such a footing.

§ 44. The following is the reply which is to be made to what Antitheos has been supposed to advance:—Though it may require some thought and painstaking to rise *from* the truth, that space is necessary, *to* the doctrine of the Being who is, so to speak, the substratum, or, as logicians would say, the subject of inhesion, of space, and *to* the other properties or attributes of that Being; still, if we can so ascend, by legitimate ratiocination, then the proposition affirming the being of a GOD is on the same footing as to true undeniableness with that maintaining two and two are equal to four,—Antitheos being to judge, for, as we have seen, he has lent his hand to constitute, and make firm for ever, the pillar which sustains the weight of the edifice. The steps in the reasoning may be many; the demonstration long: but the length of a demonstration is not allowed to be a presumption against its validity in mathematical affairs:

† These words are from Clarke’s “Demonstration,” under Proposition III. They are here used only as *accommodations*. What the Doctor has in *view*, is somewhat different from what I am upon. But I could not think of words better adapted to express my meaning in this place than those of his.

Is there any reason why it should be so here? The truths of mathematics are not all intuitive or self-evident. To demonstrate the greatest mathematical certainties, requires much thought, labour, and time, for the demonstrations can be effected only by means of perhaps some thousands of intermediate ideas.

§ 45. Our atheist, after making the observation we have thus noticed, proceeds in this way: "If, however, the dogmas of theology, or even say the primary one," (which is the one that maintains the necessary existence of space,) "were capable of demonstration as mathematical doctrines are, there could be no difference in the respect due to doubts and denials in either case; or rather, it would be impossible to find doubters and deniers in the one more than in the other." A sentiment this with which we must entirely agree. If the primary dogma of theology be not capable of being demonstrated, it is because it is rather of the class of self-evident truths, and so stands in need of no demonstration: as we adduced eight witnesses, *and one over and above*, to depose to.

§ 46. So much for the "irrelevancy of the argument." But the chapter treats of something more; it considers "the character" of the argument.

§ 47. "The argument in question," says Antitheos, "is nothing else than an attempt to establish the application of *mathematical* reasoning to * * real existences."† This is the character Antitheos gives of the argument: It employs *mathematical* reasoning, says he. How ridiculous a misapplication of a word! *Mathematical!* What can any branch of the mathematics have to do in the case? Arithmetic or Algebra? You jest! Geometry? Nonsense! How can lines

† These words have been already adduced. See above, § 6. Our purpose now is different.

and angles and segments come this way? "How vain and preposterous the attempt," indeed, to apply mathematics to the proof of real existencies!

§ 48. It may be mentioned, that this curiously odd mis-application of the word "mathematical" is to be found not only several times in this chapter, but very frequently throughout the "Refutation."†

§ 49. If Antitheos will point out *one line, only one line*, wherein mathematical reasoning is employed to prove a real existence, in the whole of Dr Clarke's "Demonstration," or of the "Argument, *a priori*, for the Being and Attributes of GOD;" I shall hold myself as wholly and for ever *refuted*, and reduced to so desperate a condition by my rout, as to be incapable of ever again taking up a weapon in the cause.

§ 50. I cannot do better than here quote a passage from the *Quarterly Review* for February, 1836. The article is on Lord Brougham's Preliminary Discourse. "It is quite absurd to apply the phrase 'mathematically impossible' to a matter of fact." "Clarke might believe, that the existence of DEITY is as certain, by *metaphysical* evidence, as any proposition in Euclid is by mathematical evidence; but to speak of the existence of the Maker of the universe as mathematically possible or impossible, is of all incongruities the most extravagant and ridiculous."—P. 401.‡

† See our Review of Jack's "Mathematical Principles of Theology." See also below, § 57—also, Part VIII. § 9, and Part VI. § 2.—&c.

‡ *All men err at times*: And Clarke himself, in a moment of forgetfulness, lost his sense of the FITNESS, or rather UNFITNESS, (not of things—for he never forgot that—but) of words, for he speaks of the "Mathematical certainty, which in the main Argument was there easy to be obtained."—*Evidences*: near beginning.

The simple truth is, this great man should have spoken, not of "mathematical certainty," but of a certainty equal in naked demonstrative force to mathematical,—of a certainty which, as well as mathematical certainty,

§ 51. The truth is, to give the truth in one word, our atheist has mistaken *metaphysical* reasoning for *mathematical*.

§ 52. One great distinction between these two species of reasoning is the following. Metaphysical reasoning may be exerted, to some extent, on almost any subject: Mathematical, that is, geometrical, reasoning, is applicable to one subject only.

§ 53. Geometry is the science of abstract magnitude, or, of *partial considerations* of bare extension. In one sense, it respects not any thing really existing; for the points, and lines, and superficies, and figures, from which it starts, can nowhere be found in the domain of nature: they exist only as conceptions—But indeed we really have no ideas corresponding to a line without breadth, and a point without magnitude—And so on.†

§ 54.—1. No reasoning can be mathematical which does not refer to what we may call the *subjects* of the science, the angles, the triangles, the squares, the circles, &c. &c. &c.

flows from, yet always rests on, what Stewart would designate “an ultimate and essential law of human thought.”—(See *Philosophical Essays*. Essay II. ch. ii. sect. 2.)

↪ But though Clarke gave, once, a wrong character to his Demonstration, this, in sooth, has no mathematics in it. Begging pardon of the Archbishop of Dublin for saying so: for this accomplished Logician speaks of “the *futility*” (better, if he had spoken of the *non-existence*) “of the attempt of Clarke * * to demonstrate (in the MATHEMATICAL sense) the existence of a DEITY.”—*Logic*, B. IV. ch. ii. § 1. (Sixth Edition.)

Dr Whately, who writes so much about “ambiguous terms,” may set one word more among his number, in the next edition.

† This assertion may seem odd, and may shock a mathematician’s ears. But it is true. And not much reflection will be required to shew that it is so. Of course, there is no need to prove here the truth, or, if you will, the falsehood, of the assertion. The matter between me and Antitheos has nothing to do with that.

2. And no reasoning, even though occurring in a professedly geometrical book, can be mathematical, unless it *works* by means of some of those subjects.

§ 55. Metaphysical reasoning, not unfrequently, is to be met with in mathematical authors. Many instances of this might be given,† were these at all necessary. And a metaphysician may occasionally turn mathematician. But the boundaries of the two sciences remain always well-defined. No two things can be more distinct than the two species of reasoning.

§ 56. Thus have we examined what our author has advanced on the “character and irrelevancy of the argument.” There are various other topics touched upon in the first chapter, which shall all be considered *in the proper places*. On one only of these topics shall we say something at present.

§ 57. “Here, indeed, the grand secret, in managing the argument before us lies. It affixes a partial and out-of-the-way meaning to words, especially those upon which the whole question turns, and so, misconstrues and misapplies general language. *Necessity*, for instance, which

† *Ex. gr.* Take the first note (the note on the first definition) in Wallace’s Playfair’s Euclid’s “Elements.” (Eighth Edition.) The reasoning is pitiable: And the Grecian Geometer’s definition, in spite of the Commentator’s assault on it, has as much propriety as ever.

Who could have suspected it? But the *reasoning* in the note in question might be employed, with some success too, in behalf of the doctrine of unextended human spirits,—as well as in behalf of other vagaries, as wild, (but hardly any wilder,) and accompanied by still worse results.

How often one falls upon Mathematicians out of their road! And the grand misfortune is, your *genuine* mathematicians never go out of their road, but to be busied about what is sure to land in mischief. If the scales and compasses drop down from their hands, and an ill wind should blow any thing past problems and theorems up into their heads; then let us look to the consequences.

“ by the way is the key-stone of the structure, is different from what it is found to be any where else, except, perhaps, in some other region of mere speculation. In the premises, it is attenuated to the utmost fineness of its mathematical” (metaphysical) “acceptation, although the weight of its common and real meaning is essential to the validity of the conclusion.” (Par. 11.)

§ 58. A single remark here in passing. Our atheist will find that *necessity*, and all the cognate words, are used, by his opponent, always in the same sense; in the premises they mean what they mean, and nothing more than they mean, in the conclusion. Let him detect me in an inconsistency in this matter, let him seize me falling fairly asleep between my premises and my conclusion, and forgetting when I awaken and proceed to the latter, the sense in which I had used my words in the former; and I shall grant that *the day is his*.

§ 59. It will be a good thing to take the present opportunity to inform my opponent, once for all, what, and what only, is to be understood by *necessity*, and by *necessary existence*. In settling these points, we shall be affording the materials for answering the question, What is, in propriety, to be understood by an *a priori* argument for the being of A DEITY? A question which here to decide is of the utmost importance, for a reason that will be immediately gathered.

§ 60. When Antitheos says: “Up starts the logician of the new school * * It is irrefragably to be proved, not only that a GOD *does* exist, but that he *must* exist, and that too as necessarily as that two and two make four;— that his non-existence, in short, cannot even be conceived.” * * * “A being existing by necessity is sought for; that is (according to the new logic) one whose non-existence

“ it is not in the power of man to imagine.”† When, I say, Antitheos writes in this manner, he gives the true state of the case, he words it as if he knew well enough what ought to be understood by an *a priori* argument.

§ 61. But when, no more than three pages down, he quotes, with the utmost approbation, a writer who, as we observed,‡ states the question in this way: “ The question “ as to the being of a GOD, is *purely* a question of fact: HE “ either *exists* or HE *does not exist*.”§ When, I say, Antitheos does this, he seems to have forgotten what he himself had laid down. By forgetting the *necessity*, he has suddenly lost his knowledge of what an *a priori* argument is. In fine, his own representations are quite inconsistent with each other.

§ 62. Since, therefore, our atheist's views of an *a priori* argument seem so confused and inconsistent, seem

“ Neither sea,
“ Nor good dry land,”

it becomes highly necessary to attempt setting him in the way to bring congruity and order out of the chaos. The disorder which exists among his ideas affects the very vitals of the subject in controversy.||

† Paragraphs 5 and 6.

‡ Above, § 14.

§ In the very second paragraph (as we have quoted therefrom) the same sort of representation occurs. Indeed, throughout the “ Refutation,” sometimes the one sort of representation, sometimes the other, is to be met. A singular confusion of ideas! or, a singular way of making a *present* point good! Whatever be the *cause*, the confusion does no insignificant service to our atheist. But its services he must henceforth dispense with: The *consequences* of the confusion *are not* to be allowed.

|| It is not a singular thing not to have clear conceptions as to what *a priori* argumentation for a real existence is. Nay, to labour under a sad delusion upon this subject is not an uncommon case. Many persons know

§ 63. What, then, is necessity? In what direction is it that we are to look for necessity?

§ 64. If *necessity* do concern things in themselves, *necessity* is yet no predicate of a thing, any farther than it expresses a certain quality of our conceptions regarding the existence of the thing. In fine, necessity lies not so much in the *objective* reality, as in the *subjective* mind.

§ 65. To illustrate this doctrine by an example taken from the science of magnitude. That the three interior angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles, is a truth which, if the demonstration has been followed, cannot *but be believed, when the subject is thought on*. It is therefore pronounced a *necessary* truth. But the necessity that is in the case is not to be found anywhere but *in the mind* of the demonstrator. One very good proof of which is, that—not the visible representatives of the mathematical lines, and angles, and triangles, but—the real mathematical lines, and angles, and triangles themselves, can exist nowhere but in our conceptions.†

§ 66. In the next place, What are we to understand by a necessarily existing *being*? A necessary being is one whose existence is *necessarily believed by us*;—a being, in a word, whose non-existence *we cannot conceive*. But is this all that is meant by a necessary being? It is indeed all: any thing more is inconceivable.

not what is the proper meaning of the thing. And finding absurdities in their conceptions regarding it (no mighty matter, perhaps, after all), they fall to arguing, and to railing, against the production of their own fancy. But let them only banish the ugly thing that distracts them, and they may be presented with a more sightly shape. What that is which those persons have poured their wise contempt upon, they perhaps do not yet best know.

† As above, § 53.

§ 67. It will now be very obvious what an *a priori* argument, that is, an argument from the necessity of the case, is. It is an argument drawn from those conceptions of the human mind of which it cannot be divested. In its essential parts, it founds on nothing but those ideas which arise in the mind in the very act of thinking, those ideas which are the *sine quâ non* of all other ideas, or—to express it a little differently—those ideas which correspond to the *conditiones sine quibus non* of all other things, ideas included,—yea, themselves, respectively, also.†

§ 68. I shall conclude what I have to say on this topic, by an extract from an article in the *Quarterly Review*, to which we have been already indebted. “The arguments which have been adduced by theologians in favour of DEITY, have been generally considered to be of two kinds, viz. arguments *a priori*, and arguments *a posteriori*. In the strictly logical [or rather, etymological] sense of these terms, neither of these modes of reasoning is applicable to the question. For to reason *a priori* is to argue from the cause to the effect: this evidently is to assume the cause, the existence of which is the very point which is here to be proved. To reason *a posteriori*, is to argue from the nature of the effect to that of the cause. But this argument, if applied to the question, would assume the world to be an effect, a point equally necessary to be proved before the argument can be legitimately applied. Though this is the strict and logical [etymological]

† If this should appear to be mysterious, the reader may turn back to “The Argument, *a priori*,” Division I., Part iii. He may likewise look forward to various places in the Disquisition on Space, such as the grand passage from John Locke, in § 17, Part viii.

“ meaning of the terms, they are often employed, *the former to denote speculative or abstract reasoning, the latter, that which is founded on facts or experience.*”—
P. 399-400.†

† See APPENDIX.

PART II.

THE "ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, FOR THE BEING AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD," AN IRREFRAGABLE DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. Having considered the relevancy of *a priori* argumentation, when directed to the most important of all matters of fact, (the most important fact, if it be a fact at all,) we proceed to examine whether Antitheos has been at all successful, or signally unsuccessful, in his attempt to exhibit any *specific fallacy* in the "Argument, *a priori*, for the Being and Attributes of GOD." Unless we mistake the matter very much, it will be discerned, both, easily and obviously, that the gentleman in question has failed, failed in the most egregious manner, with regard to what he undertook to accomplish.

§ 2. "Mr Gillespie's argument, * * * * " our atheist assures us, "is perhaps as well as can be expected of a work of *the sort*, and may probably supersede every thing of the kind that has gone before it."† Of *the sort*, says he: willing to hint, the best of *any kind* is bad enough. If Antitheos is disposed to see no force in *a priori* reasonings for A GOD, he is, if any thing, less inclined to set value on the *a posteriori* method. "The argument *a posteriori*," he remarks, "relies on experience, and deduces causes from their effects. This process, however, is quite illogical. * *

† Chap. V. par. 1.

"It takes for granted the *existence* of an agent *capable* of producing the *effects* contemplated as the source of the argument—which of course is begging the principle."† There can be nothing worse in argument, than to take for granted the principal thing to be proved. In fine, "the approval of the argument *a priori* by * * * the most erudite and enlightened—of the Christian world,"‡ makes it evident, that the strength of the cause is held (by the best judges) to lie in the direction, not of the *a posteriori* method, but of the other. And since this is so, it is to the latter quarter that atheists must point their most formidable artillery.—Upon the whole, we may not unnaturally expect to find that our antagonist has brought all his powers to bear against Mr Gillespie's exhibition of the *argument a priori for the existence of DEITY*.

§ 3. It is in his fifth chapter that the author of the "Refutation" begins to consider his present opponent's work. Antitheos is, in that place, in a sort of rambling vein, and he stumbles over a good many matters, in a way that shall draw none of our attention at this time. There is, however, a certain thing propounded in the chapter referred to, which it will be well to take the opportunity now presented to set forth.

§ 4. "Our metaphysical opponents," says our antitheist, "are always for *stealing a march* upon us. * * * * If Mr Gillespie had even told us what he meant by the word *being*, which he so frequently makes use of, we should have been able to say whether it could be proved necessarily to exist or not."||—The truth in this affair is, that

† Chap. I. par. 4. See, to the same effect, Chap. II. last par.

‡ Chap. I. par. 1.

|| The same sort of thing is iterated in another place.—"Mr Gillespie talks of a substance, it is true, a *being* of infinity of expansion, &c.; but

Mr Gillespie† *has* told what he meant by the word *Being*, and that as soon as ever he made use of it.‡ “If a mere “abstraction,” viz. a mere thought of your mind, or of mine,|| “is represented by it, we can have no quarrel with any “kind of demonstration about it he pleases. * * *”—And no wonder.—“Should it, on the contrary, refer to an agent “of any kind—something possessing power—something “that acts—a thing, in short, having a real existence, in “the same sense as that in which we apply reality of existence to common objects, there can be no objection to his “free use of the term. The author’s *subsequent* reasoning “involves the latter construction (*which construction, I “may mention once for all, I shall UNIFORMLY adopt.*)”

Par. 4. Who now is the stealer of marches? Mr Gillespie, in Book II., seeks to prove, that the Being treated of in Book I. is necessarily an Intelligent, an All-powerful, and a Free Being. To give it in Antitheos’s words. “This “grand argument is laid out in two books. In the *first*, “the metaphysico-theologian endeavours to prove that some “being exists which is the *sine quâ non* of every other “thing in existence. It consists of three parts, or series “of propositions, maintaining, first, that Space is this “being; second, that Duration is also a being of the same “kind; and, third, that these are not different, but identical.* “The *second* book ascribes to the subject of the fore-men-

“why has he neglected to tell us of what sort this substance” [*or being*]
“is?” Chap. XII. par. 2.

† We shall occasionally speak of Mr Gillespie in the *third* person, to avoid the too frequent recurrence of a certain personal pronoun, and perhaps to steer clear of inconvenient circumlocutions in addition to the appearances of an offensive monosyllable. The separate, or the conjoined, presence of some third reason at times, may be detected. The reader is to determine.

‡ See Part XI. § 15, note.

|| See Part I. § 8.

"tioned proofs, the Divine attributes of *omniscience*, unlimited power, and freedom of agency."† And could Mr Gillespie assume, that the Being he treats of is a Mind, possessing power, and freeness, *before* he had said one word by way of proof? How would this have been consistent with that "precision of purpose and exactness of arrangement" which Antitheos found to be present in the work we have him now commenting on?‡ No: Mr Gillespie proceeded not to his business so illogically. • But, quoth our atheist, I shall argue, ay, and *uniformly* too, against my opponent, as if he *had* done a thing so illogical, as if he *did* "refer to * * * something possessing power—something that acts"—before he had offered aught towards proving the possession of power and of agency. Is not this stealing a march with a vengeance? If Antitheos be entitled to steal such a march, then one entertaining the whimsical wish to find flaws in Euclid's demonstrations, may accuse the Elements for not assuming the third book in the second, or the last in the first; one desirous of catching Aristotle at a disadvantage, may censure the Analytics because they do not take for granted the doctrine concerning valid syllogisms ere that of single propositions has been gone over. Antitheos had truly good reasons for calling his production a *refutation*, if his opponent "makes intelligence, and power, and freedom of agency, part of his argument,"|| before producing any reasons for what he does.

§ 5. The secret is this: Our atheist is quite unable to overturn Mr Gillespie's "Argument," and therefore, as he must needs overturn it, he *turns it over*, and places the tail of it where the head should be. But as often as we find

† Chap. VI. par. 1.

‡ See Chap. V. par. 1.

|| Chap. V. par. 4.

Antitheos busying himself at this play, we shall run to the rescue, and lose no time in setting things in their natural positions.

§ 6. The paragraph in Chapter V. from which we have been quoting, concludes as follows, the words being connected with the passage we have cited at large. "For the tenability of his position, however, respecting the necessary existence of such a being, according to his own view of necessity, I would refer him to what has been stated in the first chapter of this Refutation." Here he refers to something supposed to be established in a previous portion of his work. And in our turn, we would point to what the reader will find advanced in relation to that portion in Part I.

§ 7. "It is more easy to censure an argument in general terms, than to meet all its particular parts on fair and open grounds."† So says Antitheos, and we shall not quarrel with what he says. It may be *more easy* to do one thing than another, while to do, with propriety, either the one thing or the other, is very far from being easy. In Part I. we have considered the general censure, and our present business is to inquire whether or not our atheist has met, on fair and open grounds, the *particular parts* of the "alleged demonstration." That the grounds on which he has met these are any thing but *fair*, will, we are confident, be very apparent by and bye. But we shall have, or we are mistaken, but little to complain of on the score of the grounds not being *open* enough.

§ 8. "We shall take," says our author, "the most laborious, and, at the same time, least advantageous way‡ of combat-

† Chapter I. last paragraph.

‡ Why the "least advantageous way"? (Would any way have been advantageous?) Has Antitheos his own defeat in view, and is there a willingness on his part to make us anticipate it?

"ing Mr Gillespie's principles,—book by book, and proposition by proposition. This course is *the more necessary*, as the argument *a priori*, unlike that derived from experience, depends upon a chain of reasoning,—not upon the pointed putting of a single case, or the tautological repetition of a thousand."† "This labour, * * " he informs us in another place, "I cheerfully undertake, that there may be nothing left to suppose on the score of disingenuousness," &c.‡ Because the argument *a priori* depends on, or rather consists of, a *chain* of reasoning; this appears of itself a sufficient reason why it should be examined *link by link*. But Antitheos had assigned another reason for his doing that which leaves nothing to be supposed on the score of disingenuousness. "Authors," he had remarked, "are peculiarly jealous of their privileges, and tetchy and froward with regard to any freedom used in the treatment of their expressions."|| Especially—(it is worth while to notice it—) where the freedom used extends so far as to turn the end round upon the beginning.¶

§ 9. Our atheist is now come to the first of Mr Gillespie's Propositions.—"The first Proposition,—'Infinity of extension is necessarily existing,'—it would," Antitheos declares, "be absurd in the extreme to deny," &c. &c.††

§ 10. But let us analyze that Proposition, and view attentively what it affirms, or, at least, involves. It lays down, there is necessarily infinity of extension. And in laying down that, it virtually lays down, there is extension. To which we would direct very particular notice.

§ 11. Thus Antitheos admits, to the fullest extent, the truth of Proposition I. To me, this is a most important

† Chap. VI. par. 2.

|| Chap. VI. par. 2.

†† See Part I. § 34.

‡ Chap. I. par 14.

¶ See above, § 5.

admission. For if that Proposition is granted (and who can rationally deny it?) I undertake to make out all the rest, *by necessary consequence*. The other Propositions are necessarily true, if this one is so.

§ 12. As, therefore, the first Proposition is of such vital importance, we shall adduce what is said in connection with it in the "Argument."

§ 13. "PROPOSITION I. *Infinity of Extension is necessarily existing*. For even when the mind endeavours to remove from it the idea of Infinity of Extension, it cannot, after all its efforts, avoid leaving still there, the idea of such infinity. Let there be ever so much endeavour to displace this idea, that is, conceive Infinity of Extension non-existent; every one, by a review, or reflex examination of his own thoughts, will find, it is utterly beyond his power to do so.

§ 14. "Now, since even when we would remove Infinity of Extension out of our mind, we prove, it must exist by necessarily leaving the thought of it behind, or by substituting, (so to speak,) Infinity of Extension for Infinity of Extension taken away; from this, it is manifest, Infinity of Extension is necessarily existing: For, every thing the existence of which we *cannot but* believe, which we *always suppose*, even though we *would not*, is necessarily existing.

§ 15. "To deny that Infinity of Extension exists, is, therefore, an utter contradiction. Just as much a contradiction as this, 1 is equal to 1, *therefore* 1 is *not* equal to 1, but to 2; 2 not being identical with 1.† As thus: Infinity of Extension is ever present to the mind, though we desire to

† "A contradiction which we can *no more* believe than that 1 is equal to 1, *therefore* 1 is not equal to 1, &c." Note in "Argument."

"banish it; therefore, it can be removed from the mind. "This is just an *application* of the greatest of all contradictions, A thing can be, and not be, at the same "time."

§ 16. Antitheos, then, allows the full truth of Proposition I. "The same *unqualified assent*, however, cannot," he alleges, "be accorded to proposition the second; namely, that 'Infinity of Extension is necessarily indivisible.'"†

§ 17. We shall immediately proceed to examine whether he has offered any thing of worth to support this assertion. For a moment, we turn rather aside, to say something as to the *importance* of the second Proposition, as a step in the reasoning.

§ 18. "It would be of *no great consequence*," our atheist maintains, "although the second proposition were as irrefragable as the first." Why so? "For it bears upon nothing at all applicable to any being, whether real or imaginary."‡ Bravely said. Let the reader note the reason well. 'Tis natural to demand, What is the proof which Antitheos has given of his bold allegation? When we mention, that he has not even attempted to offer a single word of proof, we imagine the surprise into which our readers shall be thrown. The second Proposition of no great consequence! No? Why, we have but to turn over a few pages of the "Refutation" to perceive that it, subsequently, rose to be of no little consequence, *even in our atheist's eyes*. "The *fourth* proposition of this 'Argument'—that 'the Being of Infinity of Extension is necessarily of unity and simplicity,'—"is founded upon * * extension" (it should be "infinity of extension,"||) "being indivisible,"¶ &c. *i. e.* is founded upon

† Chap. VI. par 3.

|| See below, § 23.

‡ Chap. VI. par. 6.

¶ Chap. VII. par. 1.

Proposition II., &c. Is Proposition IV., too, of no great consequence? If so, May not every Proposition' in the alleged demonstration be of no great consequence, in like manner? And a convenient mode of setting aside the whole argument, *in an easy way*, be at once happily fallen upon?

§ 19. The truth is, a *great part* of the reasoning in the "Argument" is built upon the second Proposition, in spite of its being now pronounced to be of no great consequence. The Proposition in question is founded on, to prove, not only that "the Being of Infinity of Extension is necessarily of *unity and simplicity*," but that—But to go over all that it is founded on to prove, would be to introduce no small portion of the work referred to; as the reader may easily satisfy himself by turning it over, and glancing at the references occurring at the bottoms of the pages.

§ 20. Thus much as to the relative importance of Proposition II. Antitheos saw proper to be but brief with his objections to it. And his having seen that to be proper, might be the reason why he has chosen to say, its consequence is not great. An insignificant matter had no right to detain him long.

§ 21. And next for the objections themselves. We shall find them to be poor indeed: as weak as they are brief. But the brevity, great though it be, is out of proportion, when compared with the want of strength.—However, by reason of a certain interposed discussion, (with which Part III. shall be entirely occupied,) and because our antitheist has, in a small space, done a great deal to involve matters in confusion, (an easy undertaking, since 'twas rightly gone about,) a considerable time must elapse before we get to the end of those objections. It may be thought incumbent on us to unravel the whole perplexed clew,—and it cannot be so simple a business

to get Antitheos's reader clear of the labyrinth, as it was for Antitheos to weave it for him.

§ 22. That the reader may be able, the more readily to pass just judgment upon those objections, we shall present him with what the "Argument" offers under the second Proposition. The great consequence, too, of the Proposition, (under Antitheos's leave be it spoken,) affords a warrant which would not otherwise exist for making the citation.

§ 23. "PROPOSITION II. *Infinity of Extension is necessarily indivisible.* That is, its parts are necessarily indivisible from each other.

§ 24. "*Indivisible* in this proposition means indivisible *either really or mentally*: For there can be no objection to a *real*, which does not apply to a *mental* divisibility; and a *mental* divisibility, we are under the necessity of supposing, implies an *actual* divisibility, of Infinity of Extension.

§ 25. "The parts, then, of Infinity of Extension are necessarily*indivisible from each other really or mentally.

§ 26. "For that which is divisible really may be divided really: and a thing which is actually *divided* from another must have *superficies* of its own, every way, and be *removed* or *separated* from that other thing, be it by ever so little a distance. If any one should say that things really divided from each other have not real superficies of their own, every way; to be able to believe him, we must first be able to believe this, that a thing can be, and not be, at the same time: And if any one should say that things which are really divided from each other, which have real superficies of their own every way, can possibly be conceived without a certain distance, however little, being between them; as this, it could as soon be believed that in a good syllogism of the first figure, the conclusion does not neces-

“sarily follow from the premises. Being really divided, and being really separated, mean, thus, the same thing.†

§ 27. “Now, divisibility meaning possibility of separation: As it is an utter contradiction to say, Infinity of Extension can be separated; that is, a *part* of Infinity of Extension separated, by a certain distance, *from* Infinity of Extension; *there remaining Infinity of Extension after part of it is taken away*: the part of Infinity of Extension so removed, being removed *from* the remaining parts to these very same parts; *the part, thus, being at rest while it is taken away*: the part so moved away, being moved away *from itself*; *it still remaining*, inasmuch as there is necessarily Infinity of Extension;‡ that is, though *moved away*, being *not* moved away: Which could not be, unless it be false, that *whatever is, is*. As it is, thus, an utter contradiction to say Infinity of Extension can be separated, so it is an utter contradiction to say it is not indivisible.”

§ 28. It will not be amiss to adduce the authority of a name than which there is none greater among metaphysicians; as to the propriety of the doctrines insisted on (we speak not of the truth *demonstrated*) in the passage which has just been quoted from the “Argument.”

§ 29. “The parts of pure space are inseparable one from the other; so that the continuity cannot be separated,

† “A division by *mathematical lines*, (which are lines of length without breadth,) of the *real existence* of Infinity of Extension, does not infer a greater absurdity than a division of a mathematical line by something *really existing*: if the division by mathematical lines mean any thing *more than a partial apprehension or consideration* of Infinity of Extension: which is allowed to be possible, just as it is possible to consider length *without breadth*, or depth *without breadth or length*.” — Note in “Argument.”

‡ “Prop. I.” Note in “Argument.” See above, § 14.

" *neither really nor mentally.* * * * To divide and separate actually, is, as I think, by removing the parts one from another, to make two superficies, where before there was a continuity: and to divide mentally, is to make in the mind two superficies, where before there was a continuity; and consider them as removed one from the other; which can only be done in things considered by the mind as capable of being separated; and by separation of acquiring new distinct superficies, which they then have not, but are capable of: but *neither of these ways of separation*, whether real or mental, is, as I think, *compatible* to pure space.

§ 30. "It is true, a man may consider so much of such a space as is answerable or commensurable to a foot, without considering the rest, which is, indeed, a *partial consideration*, but not so much as mental separation or division: since a man can no more mentally divide without considering two superficies, separate one from the other, than he can actually divide without making two superficies disjoined one from the other: but a *partial consideration is not separating*."—"Essay concerning Human Understanding." Book II. chap. xiii. § 13.

§ 31. Again: "*Expansion* and duration have this farther agreement, that though they are both considered by us as having parts, yet their parts are not separable one from another, no not even in thought."—*Ibid.*, chap. xv. § 10.

§ 32. "Here," it is thus that Antitheos unmasks his battery, the author has given up his abstract necessity, and looks for something like experiment as alone capable of satisfying him: for, (the proof we shall see is very notable,) notwithstanding some unmeaning talk, intended to explain away this desertion of his own principles, he evidently insists upon a real division—an actual separation of parts. with some distance, however little, between them, as that

“which he means by divisibility.”† *Unmeaning talk*: That’s complimentary. *Unmeaning talk, to explain away the desertion of my own principles*: Better and better: The compliment, like a rolling snow-ball, grows as it advances. Why is Mr Gillespie to be brought in guilty of uttering unmeaning talk? Because he cherished the felonious intent of explaining away a desertion of his own principles. But what is the evidence of the felonious intent? Because he gives up abstract necessity, and looks for experiment. How is it proved that he does so? The answer is truly marvellous. Mark it closely. “He evidently insists upon a real division—“an actual separation of parts,” &c. “as that which he “means by divisibility.” Where, in the name of wonder, does he perpetrate such an offence? *Insists, EVIDENTLY insists, upon divisibility meaning real division—actual separation!* In what words does the author of the “Argument” attempt to set forth so remarkable a paradox? Present them to us, and we shall leave him to enjoy his paradox, undisturbed by any suggestions of common sense. It was thought, by excellent judges, that Des Cartes uttered a bold enough paradox, when he laid down, that omnipotent will could change a tree into a syllogism—a syllogism into a tree. But this paradox of the metaphysical theist, that bare divisibility means an actual separation of parts, with some distance between the parts, is, every inch of it, as original and striking as that of the ingenious Frenchman. If Antitheos had said, Mr Gillespie insists on a real divisibility as that which he means by a real divisibility, or on a real division as that which he means by a real division, (and it may be mentioned, that Mr Gillespie knows of no divisibility but a real, that is, a true, divisibility, and of no division but a real, or true, division;) Antitheos had not spoken so far amiss.

† Chap. VI. par 4.

§ 33. No: Mr Gillespie never did insist, either evidently or secretly, on any such paradox. And his adversary might have known that well, had it pleased him to know it. As the reader is by this time fully aware; what the former insists on, and that evidently enough, is this: "That which is *divisible* really, *may be* divided really:" And this: "A thing which is *actually divided* from another must * * * * "be *removed* or *separated* from that other thing, be it by "ever so little a distance."† With Mr Gillespie, in a word, divisibility is divisibility and not division; and to be actually divided, is something more than a mere capacity of being divided. Antitheos's cranium, we need have no doubt, is divisible into two. Is it therefore really divided, actually separated? If so, we may continue the "Examination," but there will be no Antitheos to read what shall be written. But notwithstanding the divisibility of his encephalon, we have hopes of obtaining him for a critic.

§ 34. Our author's next words are the following: "If Mr Gillespie pleads not guilty to this charge;" the charge, to-wit, of evidently insisting upon a real division as that which he means by divisibility, and, as a *consequence*, of giving up abstract necessity, and looking for something like experiment to satisfy him. Of this reasoning, the major, or the suppressed proposition,—To insist evidently upon a real division being meant by divisibility, is to give up abstract necessity, &c. The minor,—Mr Gillespie evidently insists upon a real division being meant by divisibility: The conclusion,—*Ergo*, he gives up abstract necessity, &c. :—Are all Antitheos's own. Nobody but our atheist can claim them. Grant, argues Antitheos, that Mr Gillespie gives not up his favourite necessity. Yea, and it shall be granted.

† See above, § 26.

§ 35. Did our atheist not understand what he read? or is it that he only pretends not to have comprehended? 'Tis difficult to say. For that his opponent gives not up necessity, must be as manifest as any thing can be, to him who at all weighs the words which have been quoted from the "Argument." These words contain the following reasoning:—Divisibility is another expression for capability of division. That which is actually divided from another, must be removed, or separated, from that other thing: To be really divided being the same thing as to be really separated. Now, therefore, since it is proved, that the parts of Infinity of Extension are necessarily inseparable, it is proved, that those parts are necessarily indivisible: That is, that the Infinity of Extension has, no parts in the sense of capability of being divided.

§ 36. The proof that the parts of Infinity of Extension are necessarily inseparable, the reader has had above, in the twenty-seventh section.

§ 37. And, by the way here, Antitheos has not ventured to breathe a syllable tending to call that proof in question. On the contrary, (and it is worthy of remark in this place,) he avows his belief in the entire validity of the proof. "In the discussion of his second proposition, the author," says our antitheist, "makes manifest the absurdity of supposing space really divisible." Chap. VII. par. 4.

§ 38. I must own, in passing, that I cannot, by any means, reconcile the passage which has just been quoted, wherein it is admitted, that it is *absurd* to suppose space divisible, with what the author of the "Refutation" has advanced elsewhere, namely, that it is *not* to be accorded, infinity of extension, or space, is necessarily indivisible.† Let him who can, recon-

† See above, § 16.

cile the two statements. I must confess, that, to me, they look exceedingly like an arrant contradiction.

§ 39. Our author, I repeat, has not called in question what goes to prove, infinity of extension cannot be separated. By the very nature of *infinity* of extension, divisibility, or the possibility of division, is excluded. If infinity of extension were divisible, really or mentally, it would not be infinity of extension. "Indeed, that *divisibility* implies *finiteness* in extension, in the very notion of it, will be evident to every one who considers the relations of his clear ideas."—"Argument, *a priori*," &c. Prop. II. § 7.

§ 40. To return. Divisibility implies capacity of separation: Therefore, infinity of extension is, of necessity, indivisible. This is the reasoning which, Antitheos alleges, renounces abstract necessity, and appeals to experience—to prove (I fancy) the necessary indivisibility of infinity of extension. Verily if this be so, 'twould be hard to say what keeping by abstract necessity, and looking in another direction than to experiment, could be, when one would prove, that "Infinity of Extension is necessarily indivisible," or that "its parts are necessarily indivisible from each other."

§ 41. When Locke argued as follows: "To divide and separate actually, is, * * by removing the parts one from another, to make two superficies, where before there was a continuity; and to divide mentally, is to make in the mind two superficies, where before there was a continuity; and consider them as removed one from the other." * * * Therefore: "The parts of pure space are inseparable one from the other; so that the continuity cannot be separated, neither really nor mentally."† When, I say, the author of the "Essay concerning Human Understanding," argued in

† See above, § 29.

that manner, did the idea ever enter his mind, (and we all know, how preciously fond he was of every sort of idea) that he was looking "for something like experiment as alone capable of satisfying him" as to the necessary inseparableness of the parts of pure space?

§ 42. When our atheist said: "The author" (of the "Argument") "makes manifest the absurdity of supposing "space really divisible, SINCE that would be to suppose the "parts separated without having any space between them."† (The force of the reason shall be examined afterwards.‡) That is, when our atheist employed this enthymeme: to suppose space really divisible, is to suppose its parts separated, &c.; therefore, to suppose space really divisible is absurd: The suppressed premiss of which expression of reasoning, being, To suppose the parts of space separated, &c. is absurd:—Did it *really* enter his *brain*, to fancy he was looking "for something like experiment as alone capable of satisfying him," that 'tis absurd to suppose space is really divisible?

§ 43. If, in Proposition II., there is any appeal made to experience, is the appeal made for the purpose of proving, that infinity of extension is *necessarily* indivisible? Nonsense this would be. If to experience any appeal be directed, it is only for the sake of getting an explanation of *divisibility, divided, division*. And to what other quarter than experience, or use, one could go for an explanation of what is understood by certain English words, it would be difficult to say. It would be impossible to say, with any sense.

§ 44. We have considered the *antecedent* of the hypothetical proposition: "If Mr Gillespie pleads not guilty to this charge." We now pass on to the *consequent*: "(If Mr Gillespie pleads not guilty to this charge,) I would ask him

† Chap. VII. par. 4.

‡ See Part IV. § 15.

"how mathematicians have always regarded the smallest particle of matter divisible to infinity?"† Here he asks me to account to him for a thing alleged to be a fact. But the fact itself deserves to be looked into. *Mathematicians* very rarely condescend to treat of *matter*. It is not the pure Mathematician, but the Natural Philosopher, who considers the question, Is *matter* divisible infinitely? The question which the mathematician undertakes to decide is this, Are the parts of *bare extension* infinitely divisible? The two questions are commonly confounded. Very unfortunately. For thence no small portion of the confusion into which the subject has been thrown. The questions differ in most material respects.

§ 45. The great majority of natural philosophers have determined that *matter is* divisible infinitely. And all mathematicians are of opinion, that bare extension *must be* divisible infinitely. We take upon us, to *make* MANIFEST, in opposition to both, that *matter is not*, and that mere extension *cannot be*, infinitely divisible—A bold undertaking, considering the overwhelming majority in the one case, and the entire unanimity in the other. To run counter to a thing which has, again and again, been demonstrated, and is received almost as an axiom, by mathematicians, needs some courage. To boast that they shall be utterly overthrown by our opposition, seems to be the height of towering temerity. But patience:—the task will be easy and successful in proportion to the apparent difficulty of the enterprise.‡

† Chap. VI. par. 4.

‡ It may be well to let the reader know, beforehand, what a celebrated author, in one of his latest works, has pronounced concerning the enterprise in question. Dr M'Cosh informs his reader, that Mr Gillespie's view, in Part III. of this *Examination*, "is developed with great acuteness."—*Intuitions of the Mind*, &c., Book II. chap. ii.—Dr M'Cosh advocates the true doctrine in the text, and, in a note, gives Mr Gillespie as the authority.

PART III.

THE NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY OF EXTENSION
AND OF MATTER.

§ 1. The propositions, then, which we have undertaken to establish are these:—That matter *is not* divisible to infinity: And, That extension *cannot be* divisible to infinity. In the one case we have to do with the men of experiments. In relation to the other, we have to engage with those who confine themselves to the properties of bare extension. We shall take the second proposition first in hand.

§ 2.—I. “No priestly *dogmas*, invented on purpose to tame and subdue the rebellious reason of mankind, ever shocked common sense more than the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of extension, with its consequences; as they are pompously displayed by all geometricians * *, with a kind of triumph and exultation. A * * quantity infinitely less than any finite quantity, containing quantities infinitely less than itself, and so on *in infinitum*; this is an edifice so bold and prodigious, that it is too weighty for any pretended demonstration to support, because it shocks the clearest and most natural principles of human reason.” *Inquiry concerning Human Understanding*. Sect XII. part ii. So says David Hume, and who can refuse his assent to every word? “But,”

continues he, and at this point the sceptic and we diverge into different routes, "what renders the matter more extraordinary is, that these seemingly *absurd opinions* are "supported by a chain of reasoning the clearest and most "natural; nor is it possible for us to allow the premises "without admitting the consequences." (*Ibid.*) What! absurd opinions supported by the clearest and most natural reasoning! the clearest and most natural premises leading to the most absurd conclusion! Well might the sceptic when contemplating a matter so *extraordinary* (the epithet how appropriate!) as that which here filled his view, proceed to infer: "Reason here seems to be thrown into a "kind of amazement and suspense, which, without the "suggestions of any sceptic, gives her a diffidence of herself, "and of the ground on which she treads. She sees a full "light, which illuminates certain places; but that light "borders upon the most profound darkness. And between "these she is so dazzled and confounded, that she scarcely "can pronounce with certainty and assurance concerning "any one object."—*Ibid.*

§ 3. It admirably suited the sceptic to speak thus; to involve, and to lose, the whole subject in the *most profound darkness*. "His aim," as says a much admired writer, "was," at all times was, "not to *interrogate* Nature, "with a view to the discovery of truth, but by a *cross-examination* of Nature, to involve her in such contradictions, as might set aside the whole of her evidence as "good for nothing." "Philosophical Essays," by Dugald Stewart. Essay II. chap. i. And therefore, it was quite in accordance with Hume's object, to make one part of our nature jar with the other, and, by way of illustrating the contradictiousness of the decisions to which our *faculties*

come, to make a proposition shocking and prodigious, follow, by necessary consequence, from propositions most clear and natural. This, we say, was in perfect harmony with Hume's grand purpose, and excites no surprise: but to find those who profess no scepticism, staid and sober mathematicians, rule-and-compasses-men, to find them backing the strongest effort of the sceptic, assisting him to lay the foundation for universal doubt; this, this is the matter for marvel. And it is matter for great marvel.


§ 4. But what can we do? However absurd the opinion be, that extension is infinitely divisible, still David Hume contends, it is supported by a clear and natural chain of reasoning, and the Mathematicians make their appearance to assure us, that it is even as he maintains. It is fortunate for us, that they bring their demonstrations along with them. For this circumstance puts it in our power to see whether or not common sense and our powers of reasoning are here to be set by the ears, as the Sceptic would have it, and as his supporters the Mathematicians seek not to hinder him from having.

§ 5. Now sundry demonstrations have been offered by geometricians in proof of the divisibility of extension to infinity. We shall select the demonstration propounded by the celebrated Euler. This demonstration requires no previous mathematical knowledge. It is simple and plain. And it is easy to see, that if it be not a good demonstration of the problem, how to divide extension infinitely, there cannot be a good demonstration any where else. In fine, 'tis the best that could be had for our purpose.

§ 6. "In geometry," said that eminent mathematician, "it is always possible to divide a line, however small, into two equal parts. We are likewise, by that science, in-

“structed in the method of dividing a small line, as ai ,
 “into any number of equal parts at pleasure, and the con-
 “struction of this division is there demonstrated beyond the
 “possibility of doubting its accuracy.

§ 7. “You have only
 “to draw a line AI paral-
 “lel to ai of any length,
 “and at any distance you
 “please, and to divide
 “it into as many equal
 “parts $AB, BC, CD, DE,$
 “&c., as the small line
 “given is to have divi-
 “sions, say eight. Draw
 “afterwards, through the
 “extremities $A, a,$ and $I, i,$



“the straight lines $AaO, IiO,$ till they meet in the point O :
 “and from O draw toward the points of division $B, C, D, E,$
 “&c., the straight lines $OB, OC, OD, OE,$ &c., which shall
 “likewise cut the small line ai into eight equal parts.

§ 8. “This operation may be performed, however small
 “the given line $ai,$ and however great the number of parts
 “into which you propose to divide it. True it is, that in
 “execution we are not permitted to go too far; the lines
 “which we draw always have some breadth, whereby they
 “are at length confounded, as may be seen in the figure
 “near the point O ; but the question is not what may be
 “possible for us to execute, but what is possible in itself.
 “Now in geometry lines have no breadth, and consequently
 “can never be confounded. Hence it follows that such
 “division is illimitable.

§ 9. “If it is once admitted that a line may be divided
 “into a thousand parts, by dividing each part into two it

“ will be divisible into two thousand parts, and for the same
 “ reason into four thousand, and into eight thousand, with-
 “ out ever arriving at parts indivisible. However small a
 “ line may be supposed, it is still divisible into halves, and
 “ each half again into two, and each of these again in like
 “ manner, and so on to infinity.

§ 10. “ What I have said of a line is easily applicable to
 “ a surface, and, *with greater strength of reasoning*, to a
 “ solid, endowed with three dimensions, length, breadth, and
 “ thickness. Hence it is affirmed that all extension is divi-
 “ sible to infinity, and this property is denominated *divisi-*
 “ *bility in infinitum.*”—“ Letters to a German Princess.”
 Dr H. Hunter’s translation. Vol. II. Letter viii.

§ 11. So we have had a *demonstration* of the infinite
 divisibility of extension, a demonstration referring to a
 diagram, according to wont. But whatever Euler may have
 imagined, there *is* a possibility of doubting the accuracy, not
 of the *construction* of the figure indeed, but of the statement
 of connection between the construction and the thing to be
 shewn thereby.

§ 12. “ *You have ONLY,*” says the demonstrator, “ to draw
 “ a line A I, parallel to *a i*”, (A I being) “ of any length, and
 “ at any distance” (from *a i*) “ you please, and to DIVIDE it
 “ into as many equal parts AB, BC, CD, DE, &c., as the
 “ small line given is to have DIVISIONS, say eight.” *To*
divide a line into eight parts, is to make eight lines of one
 line, each of the eight being *removed* or *separated* from the
 rest, be it by ever so small a distance.† Without removal
 or separation of parts, there can be no division of one line
 into eight lines: *there can be nothing but the partial con-*
sideration of so much of the line to the exclusion of the rest,

† See Part II. § 26, and § 29.

eight times. Euler, for all mathematicians, has said: "In geometry lines have no breadth." How then can geometrical lines divide anything? since division implies some breadth or interval between the things divided. Where there is no breadth or distance between things, there is no division of the things. They are one and the same thing: That is, we were mistaken when we said, there were more things than one. In short, *a i* "the small line given" has no divisions at all. How then can it have eight? The demonstration of infinite divisibility, has never touched *one instance* of division, and, to speak plainly, is no demonstration at all of the proposition with which it is connected.

§ 13. But mathematicians are to be held as busying themselves not with real, but with mental divisions. But still the same sort of objection falls to be made to a demonstration of the infinite divisibility of extension, when a mental divisibility only is concerned, as falls to be made to a demonstration of such divisibility, when a real divisibility is spoken of. To divide a line mentally into eight parts, is to conceive eight lines made out of one line, each of the eight being considered as separated from the rest. And as geometrical lines have no breadth, they cannot be conceived as dividing any thing. And since they cannot be conceived as dividing any thing, they cannot be conceived as dividing "the small line" *a i*.

§ 14. So much for Euler's demonstration. We shall now demonstrate, in our turn, that the extension with which mathematicians have to do, is not divisible to infinity, and that for this plain reason, that it is not divisible at all. Our demonstration must have one quality which Euler's has not.

§ 15. Were the lines and figures of which the geometrician treats, some more some less elastic and compressible, no dependence could be placed on his science. Take an example

for illustration. If in any right-angled triangle, the side subtending the right angle were compressible, then a square described on that side *might or might not* be equal to squares described upon the sides which contain the right angle: For it has not been proved that if the *hypotenuse* of the triangle be compressible, the *base* and *perpendicular* are, in proportion to the respective length of each, equally so, that is, it has not been proved, that equal spaces in the base and perpendicular are compressible in the same degree as equal spaces in the hypotenuse are. The lines and figures of geometry, then, are not elastic or compressible. But all matter is compressible. The extension, therefore, on which mathematicians superstruct their science is not such extension as matter has. What extension can it be then?

§ 16. In answering this question, we shall be under the necessity of forestalling, in some degree, what we have to say in another place; but there appears to be no help for it, and a good thing will bear to be told oftener than once. The reader has had it shewn, that there is necessarily infinity of extension,† and has had it proved, that the parts of infinity of extension are necessarily indivisible.‡ Now the parts of matter, or the material universe, are divisible from each other. Then, the parts of infinity of extension being necessarily indivisible from each other; and it being *intuitively evident*, that the substratum of infinity of extension, if it have a substratum, can be no more divisible than infinity of extension itself; and the parts of matter being, on the contrary, divisible from each other; and it, therefore, following that the material universe is not the substratum of infinity of extension, but is finite in extension:—(For were it truly of infinity of exten-

† See Part II. § 13, and following sections.

‡ See Part II. § 23, and following sections.

sion, it would, unquestionably, be the substratum thereof:† But it being not that substratum, therefore it is not of infinity of extension:—) Here are two sorts of extension. The one sort that which matter has: And the other, the extension of infinity of extension. And as infinity of extension is necessarily existing, and as the material universe exists in the extension of infinity of extension; a part of this (*part*, but in the sense of partial consideration, for otherwise infinity of extension can have no parts,‡) must *penetrate* the material universe, and every atom, even the minutest atom, of it.

§ 17. It will be proper, therefore, to distinguish between those two kinds of extension. And accordingly, confining to *matter*, namely, to the distance of the extremities of matter from each other, the name *extension*; let us apply to the extension of infinity of extension, the name *expansion*, or *space*.||

§ 18. In answer then to the question, What is the extension on which geometry is superstructed? the reply is, it is the extension of space, the extension which is of infinity. For we know of no other sort of extension but that of matter, and that of space; or at least if we know of any other, it is altogether beside the purpose. Space, then, is the extension on

† “Upon the hypothesis of substance being infinitely extended, we may regard it as ‘the substratum of infinity of extension.’”—*Refutation*. Chap. VIII. par. 3.

‡ See Part II. § 27.

|| “To avoid confusion * * , it were possibly to be wished, that the name ‘extension were applied only to matter, or the distance of the extremities of particular bodies; and the term expansion to space in general, with or without solid matter possessing it, so as to say, space is expanded, and body extended. But in this every one has liberty; I propose it only for the more clear and distinct way of speaking.”—Locke’s “*Essay*,” B. II. ch. xiii. § 27. See also Ch. xv. § 1.

which Geometry is superstructed.† But the parts of Space are indivisible.‡ Therefore, mathematical extension is indivisible.

§ 19. Thus have we accomplished what we took in hand, and proved, in opposition to the Mathematicians, that mere extension, or space, *cannot* be infinitely divisible. There is no "strength of reasoning," greater or less, in *their* demonstrations. And, in the next place, we have positively, rigidly, irrefragably, made manifest the contrary.

§ 20. Should it be argued, that when our mathematician speaks of *divisions*, in demonstrating the infinite divisibility of extension, he does not mean divisions at all, but only partial apprehensions or considerations, which are not so much as mental divisions: as if he had said, it is demonstrable that extension is capable of being partially considered, in the way of consideration of so much extension, and then of cou-

† "A point," says Euclid, in the first Definition, Book I., "a point is that which hath no parts, or which hath no magnitude." A definition, this, of a point by what it has not: a positive definition of a thing by very negative negations. The definition does almost amount to this: A point is—nought—but a—purely mathematical point. A definition which has certainly one merit.

Later geometers have altered the old Definition, but without improving it. Far from it: since they have spoiled Greek Euclid's Definition altogether. Let us, passing over, this time, Wallace's Playfair's "Euclid," and such large tomes, take up some smaller affair—say, "Plane Geometry, according to Euclid; with several Improvements and Additions," forming one of "Chambers's Educational Course."¹ Well, how stands the Definition in question therein? Thus: "A *point* is that which has position, but not magnitude." Position: but where? That is not mentioned. So, for anything said to the contrary, it may be in Swift's *terra australis incognita*:² The point may be supposed to have position—in that precise location. Does Euclid's Definition, *thus amended*, fall under the head of the "Improvements?"

In truth, (after all,) the very first words of Euclid's "Elements," as presented to us by all those later geometers, posit the fact of Space—the great fact without which the pure Mathematics (as well as all the impure Mathematics) could have no existence, or position, anywhere.

‡ See Part II. § 27, and above, § 17, comparing the places.

¹ Edited (in 1851) by W. & R. Chambers.

² "Tale of a Tub:" Sect. IV.

sideration of so much of that extension, and so on, *in infinitum*, or rather, without ever coming to any stage where the process of diminishing the extension by considerations must stop: Should this be argued, the reply is two-fold.

§ 21.—1. If our mathematician thought, that the divisibility of extension *in infinitum*, is an empty chimera, and never intended to demonstrate any such divisibility, his words are exceedingly bad indices to his thoughts, but his thoughts are good, as we have made manifest. If he, as standing for all mathematicians, take the divisibility of extension *in infinitum* to be a vain fancy, the point is given up in our favour, and we are entirely agreed with him.

§ 22.—2. If Euler's demonstration is to be viewed as a demonstration, that we can consider partially, by, considering and again considering, so much extension, without ever being under a necessity of arriving at any termination to the process; in this case, his demonstration must stand good, for any thing we have to advance against it. We never engaged to do aught requiring that we should find a flaw in any demonstration of such a kind. What we took upon us to do was, to make manifest, that extension cannot be *divisible* to infinity.† It may be, or it may not be, that Euler has strictly demonstrated the possibility of partial considerations of so much extension, *in infinitum*: But as we did not undertake to throw our authority, such as it is, or our arguments, upon either side of that topic, so we shall not now do what we never promised to do.‡

† See Part II. § 45, and above, § 1.

‡ Perhaps, had it been our business to try to discover flaws in Euler's demonstration, considered as a demonstration of the possibility of partial considerations of a certain extension infinitely, we could have stumbled against enow. We shall drop only this one hint. No number of mathematical lines, laid alongside each other, can compose what has any breadth. Take the smallest line we can *draw* (for it would be taking too much for granted; here, to say, the smallest line we can *conceive*). Conceive that

§ 23. One thing, however, we shall permit ourselves to say upon that subject. Whether or not we can consider partially, by considering, and again considering, so much extension, without being obliged to terminate the process somewhere; this very plainly seems to be capable of a test *at least as good* as any to be had in virtue of a *mere geometrical demonstration*. The test referred to is the testimony of our powers of conception, applied *immediately* to the subject; applied in asking an *immediate* answer to the question, Can we, or can we not, consider a certain extension without coming to any point where we must halt in the business of considering, and again considering, and considering yet again, and again, and again? We either can, or we can not, have considerations and sub-considerations without end, and to appeal, for the decision of the affair, somewhere else than to a diagram, and a relative demonstration, seems at least as natural a course as any other. *As natural*, did we say? Nay, (since we are upon the subject,) may we not, with all safety, affirm, that it is a very unnatural, and a very unexpected, mode of going to work, to set out to *demonstrate*, by the interposition of a *geometrical construction*, that our minds can have considerations and sub-considerations of a certain extension, without limit? And it may be worth while for one who is presented with a geometrical demonstration that we can consider so much extension partially, without ever halting with the diminutions, to ask this question, Is the *pertinency* of a geometrical demonstration in the case to be admitted, without proof?

line crossed by only a million of mathematical lines,—for we shall be moderate with our number. Does that enable us to consider, in the smallest line we can draw, a million of different, distinct parts? If not, does the interposition of any number of mathematical lines go any way to help us to consider partially, *in infinitum*, the least extension we can draw? We might prosecute, with some advantage too, the hint, which we have thus dropt, but having opened up the road, we refrain from following it out.

§ 24. To him who should happen to be presented with a demonstration of that nature, (we cannot help saying it,) we would suggest, that there is another question which he might advantageously ask himself; which is this, *Admitting* the pertinency of a demonstration of such a character, does not the thing demonstrated run counter to the testimony which my mind bears as to what it can do? And if consciousness gives the lie to the *conclusion* to which the demonstrator reaches, what can his demonstration be good for?—But these are matters that lie entirely out of our way here.—

§ 25.—Much of what has here been urged in relation to a mathematical demonstration of the possibility of *partial considerations*, infinitely, of so much extension, might be advanced concerning a mathematical demonstration of the possibility of *mental divisions*, and indeed of *divisions simply*, of extension, *in infinitum*.—

§ 26.—II. We come now to the consideration, and the proof, of the first of the two propositions, the proposition which asserts, that matter is not divisible to infinity.

§ 27. There are two great arguments which are constantly employed, when the opinion of those who deny the infinite divisibility of matter, is attempted to be reduced to an absurdity, or a contradiction. And as those arguments may rightly be pronounced the chief *causes* of the prevalence of the doctrine maintaining the infinite divisibility of matter; if we can succeed in entirely breaking their force, or rather in exposing their want of all force, we shall be paving the way for a cordial reception to a doctrine of an opposite description. To bring into complete discredit what has been mainly relied on as giving support to the sentiment we dissent from, is by no means to attain to the position we would reach, but it is to remove an obstruction lying in the way.

§ 28. We shall make the distinguished author of the "Letters to a German Princess" furnish us with that exhibition of the arguments referred to on which we shall comment. The mode of stating those arguments may be a little different when it is another than Euler who brings them forward, but we may always recognise the pith of the arguments under any covering.

§ 29. But ere we encounter the two arguments as exhibited by Euler, it is necessary to admit, there are sufficient grounds for thinking, that this writer, when he uses the words which shall all before long be quoted, supposes that he is treating concerning that extension the divisibility of which to infinity he had *demonstrated* (in such a way as we have seen). For those words immediately succeed to the *demonstration*, in which he was busied about geometrical extension; and in the letter which follows the one containing the *demonstration*, he expressly considers "whether *this* divisibility *in infinitum*" (such divisibility as geometrical extension was *demonstrated* to have) "takes place in existing *bodies*;" *existing*, for Euler held the strange, the monstrous opinion, "that simple extension, as considered in geometry, can have *no real existence*," it being "merely a chimerical object, formed by abstraction."† True, when we compare this with what is subsequently advanced, that "as geometry is, beyond contradiction, one of the most useful of sciences, its object cannot possibly be a mere chimera;" that "there is a necessity, then, of admitting, that the object of geometry is at least the same apparent extension which those philosophers allow to body."‡ He is alluding to the monadists; who, it seems, gave to body no more than a *quasi*, or *as-it-were* extension, affirming that bodies are not extended, but have only an appearance of extension. When, I say, we compare

† Letter IX.

‡ Letter X.

the assertions together, we find ourselves at a loss what to make of Euler. The one declaration seems to contradict the other. First, that extension which is the object of geometry has no real existence; it is a mere chimera. Next, the object of geometry cannot possibly be a mere chimera; the object being at least the same extension which the monadists allowed to body. It is a pity that the author of the Letters should have left us under the necessity of groping, in so much darkness, for his real opinion: his words (we say not his sentiments) contradicting each other. But when we have pondered the matter a good while, and considered the thing on all sides, we begin to perceive that probably Euler's opinion at bottom was this:—The object of geometry can have no real existence as a separate entity: The notion of it is gotten by abstraction, and in this sense it is a chimerical, or a *shadowy* object: But tho' the object of geometry exists not separately, it has a true existence, as true an existence as the extension of body, which undoubtedly exists, tho' it exists not by itself. This statement concerning what Euler's sentiments at bottom were, derives strength, or perhaps it becomes certain, when we consider other passages which are to be found in the Letters. “All general notions are as much abstract beings as geometrical extension.” “Extension is undoubtedly a general idea, formed in the same manner as that of man, or of tree in general, by abstraction; and as man or tree in general exists not, no more does extension in general exist. You are perfectly sensible, that individual beings alone exist, and that general notions are to be found only in the mind.”† General notions, if we would speak with modern propriety, should not be designated *abstract beings*, nor beings of any kind. They have being, but they are not beings. To have being, and to be a being, are by no

† Letters VII. & IX.

means identical. All states or operations, all modes or qualities, have being, but, notwithstanding, none of them constitutes a being.† — *Extension* is not undoubtedly a *general idea*, nor is it an idea at all. Of extension, undoubtedly, we have an idea; whether the idea be a general idea, or not. But the idea, and that about which the idea is employed, the extension to-wit, are very different.—I cannot be even so much as positive *that we have* the idea of man, or of tree, *in general*. How, then can I be positive how the idea is *formed*?—Though extension *in general* exists not externally, still extension exists externally.—I am certain, not only that “general notions” are only in the mind, but that what Euler‡ and others call “individual notions” are to be found nowhere else.—These remarks, in connection with the citations last made, appeared to be necessary, before saying, as we now say, that to Euler’s sentiments as we have explained them, his own words enforcing the explanation, we can give our most cordial assent. The object of geometry is an object having a real existence. The object is extension. But mere extension cannot exist separately.|| The object of geometry is, then,

† It must be conceded, that some of the older authors were accustomed to apply, on certain occasions, the term *being* to a *mode* or *property* as well as to a *substance*. Dr Watts and Dr Berkeley may be given as instances. See Part XI. §§ 34, 36, and note to § 40. Yet “few writers,” the first (not in importance) of these Doctors is constrained to admit, “allow mode to be called a being in the same perfect sense as a substance is.”—*Logic*, Part I. ch. ii. sect 1. A substance is a being: But to say that a mode is a being, is about all one with saying that a mode is a—substance, or a—something more than a mode.

‡ See his seventh Letter.

|| “To me nothing seems more absurd, than that there should be extension without anything extended.” Dr Reid’s *Essays*, Essay II. ch. xix. The Doctor is speaking of extension, having matter in his eye. But it may be demanded: Out of matter, as well as in it, can bare extension exist without anything extended?

only a *mode*. These are exactly our sentiments.—To return from this digression, which will not be without its use: Though it is supposed by Euler, that in the words about to be quoted, he is treating of the extension the divisibility of which to infinity he had demonstrated, still he is to be held as speaking rather of the extension of bodies, *i. e.*, of matter. The words in which he expresses himself in the passages to be cited, refer far more naturally and properly to the extension of bodies than to that of space. For instance: To speak of “*particles*”, attained by dividing a thing, and of the “*division of an inch*”, surely savours much more of what relates to matter than of what relates to pure expansion. And true it is that Euler’s passing continuously from the extension of space to the extension of matter, without remarking any transition, will not appear at all so wonderful when we consider, that at times he expressly confounds the two kinds of extension. For example, he says: “The object of geometry is at least *the same apparent extension* which those philosophers,” the monadists, “allow to body.”†—We said, he confounds the two species of extension *at times*. For on other occasions he speaks thus: “The object of geometry, therefore, is a notion,‡ *much more general than that of body*, as it comprehends not only bodies, but all beings simply extended without impenetrability, if any such there be.”||—The author of the Letters, we repeat, sometimes quite confounds the two species of extension. And therefore when, on an occasion, he is dealing with the one species, he may well think he is also dealing with the other, But tho’ Euler has confounded the exten-

† As above.

‡ The object of geometry is *not* a notion. The object of geometry is space. See above, § 18. We have a notion of the object of geometry, but space is not a notion.

|| Letter VII.

sion of matter with that of space, there is no good reason why we should imitate his example.

§ 30. But even though Euler's words be held as being properly applicable to the simple extension of geometry; what matters it? 'Tis not of the least consequence to us on what principle they *ought*, as they stand in the Letters, to be construed. If they apply to the extension of space more naturally than to that of matter, all that our readers have to do, is to consider them in the light in which we have represented them. When set in that light, they contain the marrow of the two arguments which are so much relied on by Natural Philosophers, on behalf of their favourite dogma of the infinite divisibility of matter. And it is with these arguments that our business lies.

§ 31. *First* argument. "Whoever is disposed to deny "this property of extension," (matter,)—the property denominated, divisibility *in infinitum*,—"is under the necessity "of maintaining, that it is possible to arrive at last at parts "so minute as to be unsusceptible of any farther division, "because they ceased to have any extension. Nevertheless "all these *particles* taken together must reproduce the "whole, by the division of which you acquired them; and "as the quantity of each would be a *nothing* or *cypher* 0, "a combination of cyphers would produce quantity, which "is manifestly absurd. For you know perfectly well, that "in arithmetic, two or more cyphers joined never produce "any thing.

§ 32. "This opinion that in the division of extension, or "of *any quantity whatever*, we may come at last to *particles* "so minute as to be no longer divisible, because they are so "small, or" (which is far from being the same thing) "*because quantity no longer* exists, is, therefore, a position "absolutely untenable." Letter VIII.

§ 33. I am "disposed to deny" the infinite divisibility of matter, and am "under the necessity of maintaining, that "it is possible to arrive at last at parts so minute as to be "unsusceptible of any further division;" "that * * we "may come at last to particles so minute as to be no "longer divisible;" but I do not allow this is, "*because* "they ceased to have any extension," "or *because* quantity "no longer exists." Those who deny the infinite divisibility of matter, are under no necessity of assigning any such reason for their doctrine. Euler, for those whose sentiments he would represent, and does misrepresent, covertly assumes, that what is not extended is not divisible. For the causal proposition, Certain particles are unsusceptible of division, because they have not any extension; involves the principle, that what has no extension is not divisible. Which principle is indeed to be admitted. But though we admit the principle, we cannot allow that it is at all applicable in this case: We cannot grant, that the reason why the minute particles are no longer divisible is because they have no quantity. In other words, we admit the truth of the major, we deny the truth of the minor premiss, of the syllogism: We deny, that certain particles have not any extension.

§ 34. It is to be granted, we repeat, that what has no extension is not divisible. And for this simple reason; what has no extension is *nothing*.

§ 35. On this subject we shall cite a passage from the "Introduction" to the "Argument." We have nothing better to say now. "Can there be conceived a greater "absurdity than the assertion, that a substance, cogitative "or incogitative, * * * may be without any extension "whatsoever? To believe this indeed defies human nature. "If reason can, with certainty, pronounce any thing, it may

“ pronounce this decision, that extension and existence are
 “ so necessary to each other, that there can be no existence
 “ without extension. Talk of a substance which has no
 “ extension: you present us with words of amusement.

§ 36. “ If there be a subject on which *authority* should
 “ be of weight, such a subject, 'tis plain, is the debate,
 “ whether we must conceive, that to deny extension is to
 “ deny existence. And, 'tis well, that, in behalf of the posi-
 “ tion, that existence cannot be without extension, there are
 “ two as great authorities, in speculations of this nature, as
 “ can any where be found.

§ 37. “ ‘ Perhaps, * * * ’ (says Mr Locke,) ‘ it is near
 “ ‘ as hard to conceive any existence, or to have an idea
 “ ‘ of any real being, with a perfect negation of all manner
 “ ‘ of expansion; as it is to have the idea of any real
 “ ‘ existence, with a perfect negation of all manner of
 “ ‘ duration.’ *Essay concerning Human Understanding*,
 “ B. II. ch. xv. § 11. And to have the idea of any real
 “ existence with a perfect negation of all manner of duration
 “ is, surely, impossible.

§ 38. “ The Cartesians make mind and matter to be
 “ different in their essence; and make extension (the cor-
 “ rection of Des Cartes’s opinion is, solid extension,†) to be
 “ the essence of matter: Consequently, with them, a thinking
 “ substance cannot be extended. Mr Locke wrote at a time
 “ when these Cartesian opinions were generally received.
 “ But yet, (we see,) he held, that, without extension, it is
 “ impossible to conceive existence.”

§ 39. We shall here introduce a sentence from a different
 part of Locke’s work. “ He that considers *how hardly*
 “ sensation is, in our thoughts, *reconcilable* to extended

† “ This correction is by Dr Isaac Watts. See *Philosophical Essays*.”—
 Note in “ Introduction.”

“ matter; or *existence to anything that hath no extension at all*, will confess, that he is very far from certainly knowing what his soul is. * * * On which side soever he views it, *either as an unextended substance*, or as a thinking extended matter; *the difficulty to conceive either*, will, whilst either alone is in his thoughts, still drive him to the contrary side.”—B. IV. ch. iii. § 6.

§ 40. (Ought not the difficulties attending the hypothesis of unextended substance, or of thinking matter, have driven John Locke, not from the one side to the other, from Scylla to Charybdis, alternately, but to a third hypothesis attended with no apparent inconvenience? The difficulties attending either of those hypotheses—difficulties, do we call them? the utter absurdities rather. Sure, there is no proper difficulty at all accompanying the opinion of unextended substance; for no man can possibly conceive such a thing. And if the thing cannot be, it cannot have any consequences. Ought not the impossibility of believing either of those hypotheses, have made the author of the *Essay concerning Human Understanding* to renounce both, and come over to the doctrine, that the soul, being really a substance, is extended, and, being a thinking substance, is immaterial?) We return to our “Introduction.”

§ 41. “ ‘Extension does not belong to *Thought*,’ (these are the words of Dr Samuel Clarke,) ‘because *Thought* is not a Being; But there is *Need* of Extension to the Existence of every *Being*, to a Being which has or has not Thought, or any other Quality whatsoever.’ Second Letter to Joseph Butler, afterwards Bishop of Durham.

§ 42. “ ’Tis true, that in these words, Dr Clarke does not say, that he *cannot conceive* the existence of a Being without extension, but that, ’tis certain, is what he means.”

Division III.

§ 43. To these authorities, but for one reason, I might add another; the authority of Euler himself. In the passage last quoted from the "Letters," he assumes that to be unextended is to be nothing. His words are: "The quantity of each," to-wit, of the "particles," "would be a *nothing*." Why? "They ceased to have any extension." With Euler, then, to cease to have any extension, is to cease to be any thing, is to become nothing.

§ 44. The reason why we cannot safely add Euler to those authorities is this: Though in that passage, as well as in many other passages, he reasons as if to be unextended were to be nothing, or have no existence, still in other places, he speaks of real existencies on which he bestows not the attribute of extension. To give just one instance: "*Monads*," says he, "*having no extension, must be considered as points in geometry, or as we represent to ourselves spirits and souls.*"† In spite of all that the panegyrists of Euler have ever said, he is, on many occasions, anything but a consistent reasoner, he is, too often, guilty of consequentially contradicting his own positions. But there is an excuse for him in the present affair. When he reasons as if there can be no existence without extension, he is *off his guard*. But when he talks of substances which have no extension, he is in a situation which must prove dangerous to a weak reasoner, he is a partisan of a favourite hypothesis, the foolish, the absurd, hypothesis of unextended spirit.

§ 45. What has no extension, then, is nothing. And nothing cannot be divisible. So, what is unextended cannot be divisible.

§ 46. When Euler gives *as the reason why* the minute particles are no longer divisible, the position, The particles have no extension; he may be giving what the fol-

† Letter XIV.

lowers of the famous Leibnitz, in particular his distinguished disciple Wolff, the partizans of unextended *monads*, (things which made so much noise in their day,) gave as the reason why the minute parts of bodies are unsusceptible of division beyond a certain point; but he is very far from giving the reason why any rational supporter of the doctrine of ultimate particles holds, that bodies are not divisible *in infinitum*.

§ 47. To speak of dividing extension into two non-extensions, that is, something into two nothings, is to mount to the highest pinnacle of absurdity. And it is precisely for this reason we deny, that the minute parts which we contend are no longer divisible, have ceased to have any extension. We cannot, then, by any process of division arrive at last at particles that have ceased to have any extension. And if we cannot arrive at them, if, in other words, they cannot exist, they cannot be unsusceptible, any more than they can be susceptible, of division. Upon the whole, the absence of extension can never be the reason why any particles are no longer divisible.

§ 48. Agreeing with Euler, we grant it is "*manifestly absurd*" to suppose, that a combination of nothings can produce something, or that a combination of non-extension with non-extension can produce extension. And this is just the reason, only viewed from a station different from that which it was viewed from before, why the minute particles which with us are unsusceptible of farther division are not altogether unextended.

§ 49. In fine, to be indivisible and to be unextended, are not admitted to be necessarily convertible. Every thing unextended is; *for that reason*, indivisible. But every thing indivisible is not *therefore* unextended: At least this has not yet been shewn. And it has not been proved

that there is *any other reason* why every thing indivisible is unextended.

§ 50. No doubt, the advocates of the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of body, are in the habit of taking for granted, that what admits of no farther division has no extension. "Let us suppose," says Euler, "a line of an *inch* long, *divided* into a thousand parts, and that these *parts* are so small as to admit of no farther division; *each part, then,* would no longer have any length, *for*" [the proof is just the thing to be proved, in a different expression,] "*if it had any, it would be still divisible.*"† What is indivisible is unextended. Why? Because, whatever is extended is divisible. But this is exactly equivalent to the point that was to be proved. And how is this, in its turn, to be proved? Because, what is indivisible is unextended. And this is the convenient circle in which the advocates of that doctrine go round. They reduce indivisibility to unextendedness, and prove unextendedness by indivisibility. That, then, which they are in the habit of assuming, to-wit, that nothing can admit of no farther division but what has no extension, we must deny their right to assume, till they produce a better title to the right than they do when they take for granted a thing precisely equivalent to the point to be proved.

§ 51. But in discussing the proof given of the assumption, that what is indivisible must be without extension, we have been betrayed into something like an anticipation of the consideration of the *second* argument: which is the following. "*Finally,*" says the author of the Letters, "however far you *may* have already carried, in imagination, the division of *an inch,* it is always possible to carry it still farther; and *never* will you be able to carry on your subdivision so far.

“ as that the last parts shall be absolutely indivisible. These parts will undoubtedly always become smaller, and their magnitude will approach nearer and nearer to 0, but can never reach it.” Letter VIII.

§ 52. The former argument consisted of the assignation of a false ground for the doctrine of ultimate particles: (*Non causa pro causâ.*) This is composed of an entire begging of the question: (*Petitio principii.*) The thing in debate is, whether is the division *always* capable of being carried farther? And this argument says: “It is *always* possible to carry it still farther.” The question under discussion is, *whether* do the parts always become smaller? And this argument declares: “These parts will *undoubtedly* always become smaller.” This argument, then, takes entirely for granted, the thing that was to be proved.

§ 53. We shall indulge ourselves so far as to give, in addition to Euler’s exhibition of this argument, the vulgar method of stating it. The man of Natural Science usually speaks after this manner: “*Certainly* every portion of matter, however minute, must have two surfaces at least, and then * * it follows *of course* that it is divisible; that is, the upper and lower surfaces may be separated.” Rev. J. Joyce’s “Scientific Dialogues,” p. 5. So convincing is this reasoning esteemed, it is all that is said on the subject; so plain is it held, it is the pupil, and not the preceptor, who falls in with it. The question for resolution is, has every portion of matter, surfaces that are divisible? The resolution is: To have surfaces *does imply* being divisible. The question is, has every particle an upper and an under surface separable from each other? The resolution says: To have an upper and an under surface *does imply* having separable surfaces. Why, the resolutions do no more than barefacedly assume the very positions which the opponent

of the dogma of infinite divisibility would ask proof for. The best that can be said on behalf of that sort of argument which begs the question is, that it is at hand in every case, and therefore can never be utterly overcome, as

When a battle's won
The war's as far from being done.†

§ 54. Having thus removed an obstruction that lay between us and the position we would reach; an obstruction which, indeed, we might have made a circuit round, or have stepped over, but still an obstruction; we shall evince, that as by the two arguments which have been considered, it *has not* been proved that in dividing a body we may proceed *in infinitum*, so it *will never be* proved that we can go on to infinity, a satisfactory proof of the contrary being to be had.

§ 55. The question, *Is matter, to-wit, any particular piece of matter our thoughts may be occupied about, divisible to infinity?* may be more conveniently, not to say more properly, stated in another way: Can we divide any particular particle without coming to any point in our divisions and subdivisions where we must stop? Which question may be divided into two branches. The question which the first of the two composes is this: In dividing any particle by a real process, is it true that we can carry on the process without ever arriving at any point beyond which it is impossible for us to go? The second question is the following: If there be indeed a limit past which we cannot *perceive* any division of a body, cannot we *conceive*, at any rate, the divisions and subdivisions to go on, without our coming to any termination in the business?

§ 56. The answers which are to be given to those questions will determine the controversy, whether matter is

† *Hudibras*, Part III. Canto iii.

infinitely divisible. We have seen that philosophers have made the attempt to determine it otherwise than by appealing to what may be really perceived, or at most imagined,—in other words, otherwise than by appealing to facts and experience. But such an attempt is vain in the extreme. If it be not competent to the senses, or at least to the imagination, to decide the controversy, then the decision of it falls under the cognizance of no tribunal that we know of. The topic, without doubt, is to be discussed on no very abstract grounds, if we are to discuss it with any properly founded hopes of bringing it to a determinate conclusion.

§ 57. Now as far as the topic is to be decided on by an appeal to observation, there will be very little difficulty in the case. We may boldly pronounce, without fear of any contradiction, that no one ever perceived the division of any piece of matter carried beyond a certain point. Our senses conduct us to fixed limits in our divisions and subdivisions. Observation, then, so far as it goes, does the very contrary to establishing the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of matter.

§ 58. For the sake of those who are disposed to be more moved by authorities, than by any appeal to facts, we adduce the following testimonies.

§ 59. “There is a limit beyond which we cannot perceive any division of a body. The parts become too small to be perceived by our senses.”—Reid’s “Essays.” Essay II. ch. xix.

§ 60. “We must allow that there are physical points, that is, parts of extension, which cannot be divided or lessened, either by the eye or”—&c.—Hume’s “Inquiry concerning Human Understanding.” Sect. XII. Part ii. Note.

§ 61. “In speaking of the divisibility of body, we must carefully distinguish what is in our power, from what

“is possible in itself. In the first sense, it cannot be denied, that such a division of body as we are capable of, must be very limited.”—“After having, for example, divided an inch into a thousand parts, these parts are so small as to escape our senses, and a farther division would to us, no doubt, be impossible.”—Euler’s “Letters.” Vol. II. Let. xi. & viii.

§ 62. The first question, thus, falls to be answered in the negative. In really dividing any particle of matter, we are unable to go on with the process past a certain stage.

§ 63. But though there is a limit beyond which we cannot perceive any division, can we not, at all events, conceive of divisions and subdivisions without end? We shall make Hume’s words answer this interrogatory for us.

§ 64. “The imagination * * may raise up to itself an idea, of which it cannot conceive any subdivision, and which cannot be diminished without a total annihilation. When you tell me of the thousandth and ten thousandth part of a grain of sand, I have a distinct idea of these numbers and of their different proportions; but the images which I form in my mind to represent the things themselves, are nothing different from each other, nor inferior to that image, by which I represent the grain of sand itself, which is supposed so vastly to exceed them.† * * * Whatever we may imagine of the thing, the idea of a grain of sand is not distinguishable * * into twenty, much less

† We may have distinct enough, or it may be confused enough, ideas of any two or more numbers, or sets of numbers, and of their relative proportions; say, of ten, as standing for the parts of an inch, and of the 1,000,000th, and 1,000,000,000,000th parts of the 10th of an inch. And is not the mistaking these ideas for the ideas of something pertaining to an actual inch, a wide cause of the vain supposition, that we can frame images of real things as minute as the millionth and billionth part of the tenth of an inch?

“into a thousand, ten thousand, or an infinite number of different ideas.”—“’Tis therefore certain, that the imagination reaches a *minimum*.”—“Treatise of Human Nature.” B. I. Part ii. Sect. 1.†

§ 65. ’Tis true, that there are equally strong assertions on the other side of the question. And were the assertions simply given, were a direct appeal made to consciousness for the truth, we should be obliged to admit, there were no alternative for it but to let each one declare himself for that side of the question he beforehand was inclined to adopt. Even, however, in the case contemplated, one view only of the matter (be this remembered) could be just. But there is this difference between the opposing assertions. Whatever Mr Hume may have done in other places, whatever inconsistency he may be guilty of in the affair; the words we have

† In quoting from the “Treatise of Human Nature,” a few remarks are necessary. That work was the first of Hume’s publications. In the Advertisement prefixed to the “Inquiry concerning Human Understanding,” the Sceptic says: “Most of the principles and reasonings contained in this volume were published in a work in three volumes, called *A Treatise of Human Nature*. * * * He (the author) cast the whole anew in the following pieces; where *some negligences in his former reasoning*, and more in the expression, are, he hopes, corrected. * * * Henceforth the Author desires, that the following Pieces may *alone* be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments and principles.” Hume himself, thus, disowned the reasonings of the “Treatise.” No one need condemn what is repudiated by its author. To do so, were to challenge an enemy who confesses himself already vanquished. But should I be pleased with a particular passage in the “Treatise,” what harm can there be in citing it, to convey my sentiments? Sometimes there’s no great necessity for speaking for ourselves when words that are at our hand express exactly what we have to say. What a certain writer says of *volumes*, is much truer with regard to *sentences*. “A writer often does more good by shewing the use of some of those many volumes which we have already, than by offering new ones; though this be of much less advantage to his own character.”—Law’s Preface to King’s “Origin of Evil.”

but now cited from the "Treatise," and we, in making them the vehicles of what we had to convey, do simply appeal to what consciousness testifies on the subject; and we are content to leave the matter there, without seeking to go any farther: While those who range themselves on the opposite side do not lay down their position as any thing like self-evident. They do not say, we can conceive divisions and subdivisions without end, and this fact is decisive of the point at issue. But they offer proof *why we must be able* to conceive the thing: Which is a very different matter. Could they think, that their position needed no evidence to support it, when they set out in search of proof? And if their position needed proof, it cannot altogether be a fact testified immediately by consciousness. The plain testimony of consciousness, *as to what falls within its proper province*, is the strongest and the most direct, as well as the most easily reached evidence we can have.

• § 66. To refer to Euler. When he said: "However far you may have already carried, in imagination, the division of an inch, it is always possible to carry it still farther; and never will you be able to carry on your subdivision so far, as that the last parts shall be absolutely indivisible," &c.† When he said that, was he contented with the evidence to be had *intuitively* of the proposition which he brought forward? Not to insist on this, that he gives elsewhere, as we have seen,‡ a detailed argument to prove, that it must be always possible for us to carry the division forward, or on any consideration of that nature; the author of the Letters produces you an especial reason, when he thinks the proper time is come, to show that by the imagination "the division of an inch" may always be carried still farther. "After having, for example, divided an inch into a thousand parts, * * *

† See above, § 51.

‡ See above, § 31, & 32.

"you have only," says he, "to look at this thousandth part of an inch through a *good* microscope, which magnifies, for example, a thousand times, and each particle will appear as large as an inch" [does] "to the naked eye; and you will be convinced of the possibility of dividing each of these particles again into a thousand parts: the same *reasoning* may always be carried forward, without limit and without end." Letter VIII.

§ 67. We have little or nothing to do with Euler's proof, that the imagination shall never be able to carry on its subdivisions so far, as that the last parts shall be absolutely indivisible. Our attention just now is engaged with something else. It is only with the fact of there being a proof that our present business lies. Nevertheless, we shall say one word upon the proof, in passing.

§ 68. The reason why the imagination can always carry still farther than it has yet done, the division of an inch, is that a microscope which magnifies a thousand times will make the thousandth part of an inch appear as large as an inch does to the naked eye. The microscope, with Euler, enlarges our imaginative powers. But, in reality, the microscope only enlarges the rays of light that flow from each particle. It is not the rays, it is the rays dilated, that we see by the aid of the microscope. Does the microscope make the thousandth part of an inch to be an inch? As the microscope is, beyond contradiction, one of the most useful of curious instruments, it is not the cause of so amazing an absurdity, as the making of an inch out of the thousandth part of one. That instrument by no means enables us to perceive a less *extension* than we can see by the naked eye. It does not destroy, it does not at all affect, the minuteness of any particular extension. To spread a ray of light out to a greater extent than the ray filled according to our unassisted powers of

vision; to make a thousandth part of an inch look as if it were an inch; is very far from making the least perceivable extension to be more extended than it was perceived to be: The possibility of so spreading out a ray of light, is the farthest thing possible from being a *datum* by help of which any natural philosopher can make out, that we can conceive the divisibility of matter *in infinitum*. In conceiving the division of the rays of light flowing from the thousandth part of an inch, as seen through a microscope the magnifying power of which is a thousand times, we are, after all, only conceiving the division of an inch of extension.

§ 69. We shall next refer to the procedure of another author who declares himself an advocate for the doctrine of infinite divisibility. "The parts," these are Dr Reid's words, "become too small to be perceived by our senses; but we cannot believe that it [the body] becomes then incapable of being farther divided, or that such division would make it not to be a body.

§ 70. "We carry on the division and subdivision in our thought far beyond the reach of our senses, and we can find no end to it: Nay, I think we plainly discern, that there can be no limit beyond which the division cannot be carried.

§ 71. "For if there be any limit to this division, one of two things must necessarily happen: Either we have come by division to a body which is extended, but has no parts, and is absolutely indivisible; or this body is divisible, but as soon as it is divided, it becomes no body. Both these positions seem to me absurd, and one or the other is the necessary consequence of supposing a limit to the divisibility of matter."—Dr Reid's "Essays:" Essay II. ch. xix.

§ 72. We may just notice, in our way, that the first of the two alternatives, namely, that we come to a body extended

but indivisible, is no consequence whatever of the doctrine, that in dividing any body we may come to bodies extended but indivisible. This alternative is the doctrine itself: And he who puts it does little else than say, If there be any limit to the division of a body, there is a limit to the division of a body. As for the other alternative, namely, that by dividing a certain body, the body becomes *no body*, whether or not it be any consequence of the doctrine, that in dividing a body we may arrive at indivisible *bodies*, it must be granted, to be quite as absurd as it appeared in Dr Reid's eyes. Reid's second alternative is just tantamount to Euler's first argument.†

§ 73. "We carry on," says the Doctor, "the division and subdivision *in our thought* far beyond the reach of our senses, and *we can find no end to it.*" Well, *if* consciousness say so, should not the matter be allowed to rest there? Certainly: otherwise there would be a necessity for a proof, that the thing which consciousness testifies is, must be. But is the matter allowed to rest there, in token of consciousness saying so? By no means. "Nay," continues the Doctor, "I think we plainly discern, there *can be* no limit beyond which the division cannot be carried." And then follows the proof. From all which, you see how ill satisfied the Doctor was with the unsupported testimony of consciousness, if consciousness said, we can find no end to the division and subdivision: Although Consciousness was, as all know, a great favourite with him, it being exalted in his system of mental philosophy to the rank and dignity of a separate and original power of the mind. So, he did not intend, any more than Euler did, to appeal to Consciousness for a favourable answer to the question, Can we divide and sub-

† See above, § 31.

divide in our thoughts, without finding any end, "in wandering mazes lost."

§ 74. There was, indeed, this reason for giving a proof why it is necessary that in our thoughts we can find NO *end* to the division and subdivision,—that, in point of fact, in our thoughts we can find, can shortly find, AN *end* to the division and subdivision.

§ 75. And, of a truth, if it had not been for the *reason* of the absence of an end to the divisions, we should never have heard of the *absence itself* of an end. (On this account it was that we entered on the two arguments commonly employed in behalf of the dogma we have opposed.) Had it not been, we say, for the *must be*, the *is* had never reached our ears. For every one has it in his power to satisfy himself, that in conceiving the division of a particle of matter, the imagination will ultimately reach an image which cannot be lessened, which to lessen would be to annihilate.

PART IV.

THE "ARGUMENT, *A PRIORI*, FOR THE BEING AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD," AN IRREFRAGABLE DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. After so extensive an incursion into the territory of the Mathematician, and that of the Natural Philosopher; to which we were invited by having had the dogma of infinite divisibility cast in our teeth; we return with good will to the words of the "Refutation." We introduced, and have most fully answered, Antitheos's question: "I would ask * * *how* mathematicians" (natural philosophers) "have always regarded the smallest particle of *matter* "divisible" to infinity?"† It is thus Antitheos follows up that question: "Do they ever contemplate actual separation of parts *in such cases*?"‡ Most assuredly they do. In such a case as where Natural Philosophers are considering the division, or even but the divisibility—whether to infinity, or

† As our author seems to favour the doctrine affirming the infinite divisibility of matter, he should have stood aloof from the *smallest* particle of "matter," which, unfortunately for him, he has fallen in with. For what is the smallest particle of matter? That which cannot be diminished, that which cannot be divided into smaller particles. But if, with such a one as Antitheos, any particle of matter is so small as that it cannot be diminished, or divided into smaller particles, if, in other words, there is a *smallest* particle; is the divisibility of matter *in infinitum*, in no danger of disgrace? Yea, it runs imminent risk of being maltreated, past remedy, by its friends, and should cry out lustily, Murder! my advocates are for putting me beyond the pale of existence.

‡ Chap. VI. par. 4.

to finity, is of no consequence—of any piece of matter; to a certainty, they cast an eye on actual separation, or at all events capacity of actual separation, of parts. But how does our author reply to the question, Do mathematicians, or at least natural philosophers, contemplate actual separation, or rather capability of actual separation, of parts, when they are discussing the topic whether matter be divisible *in infinitum*? “No,” says he boldly; “but parts * * * in the sense of partial consideration *only*.” Now were a geometri-
cian, or a man of natural science, who was instructing a pupil in the sublime, as well as curious, doctrine of the infinite divisibility of matter, proceeding to illustrate the *first approaches* to the infinity† by directing the pupil’s attention to the divisibility of a New-York pippin into two; where is the necessity of there being halves “in the sense of partial consideration ONLY?” What, if the philosopher, to cut the knot for our atheist, (for he would have us believe it is a real Gordian one,) were to slice the apple through the middle, and present one-half to his pupil in order* to being divided again, and eat the other himself? As Antitheos himself has said elsewhere, (whether with entire propriety or not, is another question,‡) “If it be of any *specific* body “we speak,” a New-York pippin for instance, “we can, in “reality, separate one part from another.”|| What good reason, nay what specious reason, can be assigned why philosophers should not ever contemplate parts in any sense but the sense of partial consideration *only*, even parts in the sense of capability of actual separation, when they are regarding the *divisibility*, the infinite, or the finite, divisibility, of any piece of matter? Is the piece of matter not capable of having its parts actually separated from each other? Or are the philosophers obliged to choose to confine

† See APPENDIX.

‡ See below, § 7.

|| Chap. VII. par. 4.

themselves to partial considerations which are not so much as mental divisions? If this be so, whence the obligation? Let us know its source, that we may be put into a condition to see a little farther into so strange a thing.

§ 2. In giving our author's reply to his question, several words were omitted, as the asterisks denoted. "Parts—," the passage runs in this way, "as Mr Gillespie himself has "it—in the sense of partial consideration only." When Mr Gillespie speaks of parts in the sense of partial consideration only, he has something in his view very different from the parts of matter, which all, so far as not already divided, are divisible, or may be conceived as divisible, from each other, which, therefore, are parts in another sense than by partial consideration *only*; he has in his view the parts of the extension which is of infinity, which parts, both really and mentally, are necessarily indivisible, and, so, are parts *only* in the sense of partial considerations or apprehensions. Of this no one who has perused the "Argument" can be presumed ignorant, and therefore our antitheist must be supposed to have known of it well when he penned the words upon which we are animadverting. What judgment, then, are we to pass on Antitheos's mode of speaking? Is it calculated to convey a correct representation of matters? In giving a misrepresentation of the case, can our atheist be reckoned perfectly honest?

§ 3. After replying to his own question, in his own way, Antitheos puts another interrogatory. "When they," the antecedent is, mathematicians, "When they," asks he, "speak of the hemispheres of the earth, divided either by "the plane of the equator, or that passing from the meridian "of Greenwich to the 180th degree of longitude,—are they "necessarily guilty of speaking unintelligibly?" By no means, answer we. But nevertheless, if mathematicians, geographers

rather, speak of hemispheres of the earth, of hemispheres *divided* by an *imaginary* plane which they denominate the *equator*, or by a plane passing through the first meridian and the 180th degree of longitude, a plane every square foot of which is as *ideal* as any foot in the plane of the equator; if, in other words, geographers employ the term *divided* in one, and that perhaps not the best, of its *second intentions*;† they can as readily, and quite as rationally, speak of their being able to conceive the earth as divided into two by a real process, of the earth as being divisible in the sense of actual separability of parts. Geographers speak, we grant, of halves and divisions of the earth when they mean no more than considerations of so much of it to the exclusion of the rest for the time. And geographers have a sufficient right to use, when they please, any word in a technical sense, in a sense of their own, *if* they but use the same word always in the same sense. This qualification is necessary for a good reason: To be consistent with regard to the language we employ, as it is a great, so it is an indispensable step towards being completely intelligible. Geographers, we repeat, talk of divisions, when they do not mean divisions strictly speaking; but then they can also talk, to good purpose it may be, of divisions in the *proper* sense of the term.

§ 4. To render the distinction between geographical divisions and true and real divisions yet plainer, by a familiar illustration. Let a plane, called, if you choose, a

† We would recommend to Antitheos's attention, first and last, (and our recommendation he may turn, if he likes, to some advantage, for the future,) a caution given by a very eminent Logician. "The utmost care is requisite," in these words the present Archbishop of Dublin warns us, "to avoid confounding together, either the first and second intentions, or the different second intentions with each other." See Whately's "Elements of Logic." Book III. § 10. (Ed. 6th.)

geographical plane, about six feet long and some two feet deep, and of *no breadth*, be passed through the middle of a living human body. And indeed—if this consideration will enable one to transmit the plane more easily—anatomists and physiologists are accustomed to treat of the halves of the human frame, when they tell us that as a whole it is symmetrical, the one-half forming in the main a counterpart to the other. What if we were to designate the transmission a *dividing*? Would he who was subjected to the act eat his next meal at all the worse for it? Would he breathe less, or walk less, or sleep less? Would any function be destroyed, or impaired in the smallest? That gives us an idea of the geographical mode of dividing. But were one to turn to *division* of the right sort, and threaten in good earnest to divide in a real manner a living man into halves; the well-founded and salutary laws of the land would be apt to interfere, and shew how wide they regard the difference to be between a merely geographical method of dividing any oblong solid, and a mode of dividing, at least somewhat similar to that which, *so far down*, was practised by numbers of our heavy-handed dragoons when they were last in the Netherlands.†

§ 5. Proper divisions, in short, are *toto cælo* different from geographical ones. Geographical divisions are indeed partial considerations. But the grand distinction (let us not

† When these words were first written, the author was obliged to turn, for an apt illustration, to the red field of Waterloo. But since then, other plains have been flooded with human gore, shed in deadly fight. To pass over Affghan, Punjaub, Crimean, Bengalese, and Milanese battle-fields, as well as others rivalling them, and to approach those scenes of yesterday which eclipse them all in horrors,—most horrible as many of them were;—what unutterable atrocities, disgracing the name of Christianity, and even that of humanity, has not this sun beheld (GOD grant for the last, as for the first, time!) perpetrated by "American" brethren upon each other?

by any means lose sight of it) between geographical partial considerations and our partial considerations of infinite extension, lies in this, that whereas we can make the ordinary subjects of the former kind of considerations undergo divisions in our thoughts after another sort than that effected by bare partial apprehension; it is quite out of our power to subject the parts of that extension which is of infinity to any other divisions by the mind than such as we denote by *partial apprehensions or considerations*. It is with no propriety, as I have frequently observed, that we bestow the name of *division* upon a mere partial apprehension.

§ 6. If geographers are not guilty of speaking unintelligibly when they say, that the equator divides the globe into the northern and southern hemispheres, &c., "How is it," demands our atheist, "that *extension* is necessarily indivisible?" I really do not know. I never pretended to be able to tell why extension is necessarily indivisible. I never said even so much as that it was so. The "Argument" says no more than that "*Infinity* of Extension is necessarily indivisible." And really one would think, that any extension, unless it compose part of the extension which is infinite, is divisible to all intents and purposes, so far from being necessarily indivisible. If the author of the "Refutation" should incline to urge, that by "extension" he meant *infinity of extension*, when he asked how it is that extension is necessarily indivisible; then we would refer him, for an answer to his question, to Part II. § 27, and to his own comment on the proof there occurring, as the said comment is to be met in the 37th section of the same Part.† Nay, demonstration apart, is it not a truth *immediately self-evident*, that infinity of extension, or space, is necessarily indivisible? Let Anti-

† Consider, also, § 15, &c., below.

theos answer this question. "I grant," admits he, "that we "may conceive of an absolute separation," and therefore separability, "of substance generally, which we cannot do in "the case of extension."† Here by "extension" he means infinity of extension, or space. Else, where the sense of the antithesis between "substance" and "extension?" Not to say that the context binds "extension" to that meaning. We might have allowed Mr Locke to reply to that question; who, whenever he has informed us what division implies, lays it down as a truth *intuitively perceivable*, not by deduction necessary, that pure space is indivisible even so much as in thought. Pure space, with him, is the extension distinct from the extension of matter, is the extension which is of infinity.‡

§ 7. Antitheos proceeds: "It may be said, perhaps, that although matter is, *mentally*, easy enough to divide"—Doubtless one would think it is easy enough to divide matter mentally. But by the bye, we must not forget, that 'tis easy enough to divide much that falls under the description of matter otherwise than only by the mind. Our atheist has observed (as we noticed before:) "If it be of *any* specific "body we speak, we can, *in reality*, separate," or divide, "one "part from another." Now this is going even farther than we feel disposed to go. Is the Dog-star a specific body? It will probably be allowed by Antitheos that it is so, as no present object is to be attained by a denial,—at least no object at all worth the cost of a shamefully obvious falsehood. *Can we separate or divide one part of the Dog-star from another, in reality?* Ah, no. Sirius is too distant, and too big, *for us* to split it into pieces.—To sum up what we have advanced: If it be of any specific body we speak, we can

† Chap. VII. par. 4.

‡ See Part II. § 29, & 41.

in reality, or, if not in reality, at least in imagination, divide the parts from each other.—But possibly, or probably, Antitheos, by “*any specific body,*” meant any specific body upon this earth? If so,—let him take out a patent for his discovery, that men “*can, in reality,*” or by manual instrumentality, “*separate one part from another.*”

§ 8. Our author has often reasons for his forms of expressions. And he happens to have an excellent reason for declaring, that it is easy enough to divide matter *mentally*. The reason makes its appearance in a subsequent chapter. We may gather what it is from the following assertion. “That matter is divisible, (*on a certain and special construction of terms,*) no one will deny; but that it is absolutely so, is not true.”† What that certain and special construction of the term *divisible* is, when we say with truth, matter is divisible, we may learn from words occurring in the same paragraph. “We can divide substance,” Antitheos informs us, “by abstraction;” that is, I humbly apprehend, by a partial consideration, which happens to be no true division at all. But we can do more than divide substance by abstraction. For again: “We may conceive of an absolute separation,” and, *a fortiori*, separability or divisibility, “of substance generally.”‡ Words which richly deserve to be weighed most attentively. With our antitheist, *substance* and *matter* mutually exhaust each other, that not being admitted, by him, into the rank of substance which is not material. What that certain and special construction is, we may learn also, may we not? from the words which, in our regular progress, we are examining—“*Matter is, mentally,* easy enough to divide.” According to our atheist, then, the reason why it is easy enough to

† Chap. VII. par. 4.

‡ Above, § 6.

divide matter *mentally* is, that it is difficult enough, indeed altogether impossible—not for us only, but—for any *power*, or (if Antitheos would prefer another word) for any *chance* or *accident*, *absolutely* to divide matter, at least matter “generally.” And, in truth, it must be confessed, that the position, Matter “generally” is divisible *only mentally*, is a good consequence from the position, Matter “generally” is divisible, but is *not* divisible *absolutely*: a good consequence, at all events, on the supposition, (the only one possible, if we would preserve Antitheos’s character for never being without a meaning,) that “*absolutely*” as contradistinguished from “*mentally*,” means *not mentally*. If matter generally is divisible at all, and be not divisible *out of* the mind, it is wonderfully probable, that it is divisible *in* the mind. Our atheist’s reasoning, in fine, may be admitted, with considerable safety, to be a good *reason*, if it constitute a good and a true *position in itself*. But is it true, that matter generally, or, *as a whole*—for this, I conceive, is what Antitheos means when he says, “We may conceive of an absolute separation of substance,” or matter “*generally*”—Is it true, that matter as a whole is not divisible absolutely, or out of the mind?

§ 9. What if absolute divisibility (we say not absolute division—far from it—) follows from the admission, fortunately so liberally furnished by our author, of mental divisibility? If we can divide all that is matter by a mental process, how can any one make it appear, it is impossible in the nature of things that all matter should be divided by a real process? Can we, in this case, infer the existence of an impossibility outwardly, from the existence of a possibility inwardly? an impossibility in things, from a possibility in our conceptions regarding the things? Nay, what criterion of possibility, and impossibility too, can we have but that

which arises from our conceptions?† What we conceive to be possible, is possible. Which, indeed, is virtually saying nothing more than this, What *we* conceive to be possible, is possible *to us*. And this proposition, in its turn, may be transmuted into another, even into this most undeniable, yet important proposition, Whatever we conceive to be possible, we really do conceive to be possible. We conceive a thing to be possible in reality: We judge a thing to be possible in reality: The thing is possible in reality: What are these but different ways of setting forth the same position? The grand element in the affair, in each of the three expressions, is, the conception of real possibility. Whatever, then, we clearly conceive to be possible in reality, is possible in reality.‡ And therefore as we do (having Antitheos's leave) clearly conceive matter as a whole to be susceptible of division absolutely, or in reality, we cannot be wrong in affirming, that

† "We can judge," says Archbishop King, "of things no otherwise than from our conceptions."—*Origin of Evil*, Chap. I. Sect. ii. &².

‡ Perhaps Hume never wrote a better passage than the following, whether we regard the acuteness or the cogency of the reasoning. "Whatever can be conceived by a clear and distinct idea, necessarily implies the possibility of existence; and he who pretends to prove the impossibility of its existence by any arguments derived from the clear idea, in reality asserts that we have no clear idea of it, because we have a clear idea. 'Tis in vain to search for a contradiction in any thing that is distinctly conceived by the mind. Did it imply any contradiction, 'tis impossible it could ever be conceived."—*Treatise of Human Nature*, B. I. Part ii: Sect. 4. See the second note to § 64, Part III.—It will be observed, that the author of the *Treatise* goes further than we have gone. We aver, Whatever we conceive to be possible, is possible: He avers, Whatever we conceive, is possible. But perhaps the latter maxim differs very slightly at bottom from the other. The learned Cudworth says: "Whatsoever is possible, that is, whatsoever is conceivable * *; the very essence of possibility being no other than conceivability."—*True Intellectual System of the Universe*, Book I. ch. v. Birch's Edit. Page 647.—As Hume's is the *greater*, ours the *less*, if his maxim be true, ours must *therefore* be so too.

matter as a whole is capable of being divided absolutely, in reality, as in itself.

§ 10. So much as to that divisibility which matter is subject to. A topic upon which our author (in his seventh chapter, as well as in his sixth,) has gone *wrong altogether*, confounding as he does, in grand style, divisibility with division (things usually the same with Antitheos,†) separability with separation, the conception of a vacuum with the existence of a vacuum externally, and drawing inferences from these *indifferently*, sometimes to his own inexpressible comfort and satisfaction, and sometimes, and as frequently, at the expense of landing himself, and us, were we not sufficiently reluctant to let him be our conductor whithersoever he would, amidst the turnings and windings of a worse than Cretan labyrinth.

§ 11. At length we shall permit our atheist to terminate the sentence in the middle of which we broke in, hoping as we do that for what of rudeness there may have been in the interruption, the weightiness of that which we had to deliver will be accepted as an apology. "It may be said, perhaps, "that although matter is, mentally, easy enough to divide, "it is impossible to apply the same process to *extension*."‡ For my part, I see no impossibility in the case; unless by "extension" be meant the extension, or part of the extension, which is infinite. And indeed we may opine with much probability, that such extension was that which was in Antitheos's view; for the very next sentence uses "*space*" to stand for the "*extension*" of its predecessor. "But is not "the *space* occupied by the earth,—or say, its useful little "representative, a twelve or a twenty-inch globe,—as easily "conceived to be divisible," or perhaps divided, "by a

† See Part II. § 32.

‡ Parag. 5.

“mathematical plane, as the globe itself, which is not really, “but only mentally divided?” In answer to which question:—1. Why is the globe, the little globe, or

The great globe itself,

“not really * * divided?” Not because it is not really divisible. For that it is really or in the nature of things divisible, is sufficiently proved by our being able to conceive the thing possible.†—2. As to whether the space occupied by

The great globe itself,

Yea all which it inherit,

or by a representative of it twelve inches, or it may be twenty inches, in diameter, (it is right to be exact with an admeasurement;) I say, as to whether *that* space can be conceived divided, or, even, if you please, but divisible, by a mathematical plane: let us ask, What is a mathematical plane? Our author informs us correctly; though he has encumbered his information with a good deal of inanity. “A mathematical point,” he advances to the information thus, “has no dimensions,‡ *because* whatever possesses dimensions must possess “figure, and *that* which has figure cannot be a point.” That which has figure cannot be a point. But why? The “Refutation” supplies not the reason. So that, as to why a point has no figure or dimensions, we are left within a little of where we began. Our author had spoken better, if he had simply said, A mathematical point has no dimensions, because that which has no dimensions is the *definition* given by mathematicians of a point. “In like manner,” he goes on, “a “plane cannot have thickness, since whatever is of the smallest thickness is not a plane but a solid.”§ Could he not just have said, A plane is *defined* to be a surface having length and breadth but no thickness: as that which has the

† See above, § 9.

‡ Why discard *magnitude*, the usual word?

§ Parag. 5.

three dimensions is *defined* to be a solid?—"A plane," then, "cannot have thickness:" "whatever is of the smallest," or *of any*, "thickness is not a plane." How, then, can we conceive the space Antitheos speaks of, or indeed any space whatever, divided, or divisible, by a mathematical plane? A division by a mathematical plane is no division at all. That which divides matter, or space, or anything our atheist likes, must have some thickness, tho' the thickness should be "of the smallest." But as touching this, an ample sufficiency has been already set before the reader.†—In fine, the space filled by the earth, or its "little representative," is not as easily conceived to be divided, or divisible, as the great globe, or any small one, can be conceived to be divided, or divisible. For that space cannot be conceived to be divided or divisible at all.

§ 12. "In dividing space by abstraction," or by a partial consideration, "therefore, there is no *necessity*, as our author "would have us believe, of falling into the *absurdity* of space "divided by actual separation of the parts, leaving no space "between them."‡ As our author would have us believe, says Antitheos. Now the author alluded to would have no one believe any thing by the sixtieth part of a degree so absurd. How could, and where did, the author of the "Argument," in treating of partial considerations of infinite extension, expansion, space, which he, after the example of John Locke, allows to be quite possible; how could he, and where did he, in granting that we may for a time consider so much space to the exclusion, as it were, of the rest, fall into the "absurdity" (word well chosen) of supposing space divided by actual separation of parts, *when the very thing which, with all his might, he DEMONSTRATES TO BE IMPOS-*

† See Part II. § 26, and note—§ 29, & Part III. § 12, &c.

‡ Parag. 5.

SIBLE, *is this very thing, to-wit, that the parts of infinite extension, or space, are susceptible of actual separation?*

§ 13. Our atheist concludes what he has to urge in opposition to Proposition II. in this way. "If Mr Gillespie's indivisibility be understood in an abstract sense, his proposition is not true; if, in reference to actual experiment, he may be applauded for having recourse to inductive instead of *a priori* reasoning, but he need not so soon have neglected the principles upon which he started, without intimating some ground for the change."† After what has been so fully advanced in Part II. the reader needs no guide to lead him through this maze. Mr Gillespie recognises but one kind of proper divisibility, (and who ever heard of any other?) and has demonstrated, that infinity of extension is not divisible, in the proper sense of the word. Therefore, "his proposition IS * * true."

§ 14. And that we have great authority to vouch for the validity of Mr Gillespie's demonstration, EVEN THE AUTHORITY OF OUR ATHEIST HIMSELF, shall now be evinced *past the possibility of room for doubt.*

§ 15. "In the discussion of his second proposition," says Antitheos, as before we heard,‡ "the author makes manifest the absurdity of supposing space really divisible, since that would be to suppose the parts separated without having any space between them." We agree with Antitheos, that the author of the "Argument" makes manifest the absurdity of supposing space, or rather "infinity of extension," which is all one with infinity of space,|| to be really divisible; but we can never grant, that it is absurd to suppose space is really divisible for the reason which Antitheos assigns. The reason given by this gentleman why there is absurdity in supposing

† Parag. 6.

‡ See Part II. § 37, and § 42.

|| See Part III. § 17.

space really divisible is this, to suppose space really *divisible* would be to suppose the parts *separated* without having any space between them. Now, to say that to suppose space really divisible is to suppose the parts thereof separated, or divided, is to confound two things which are entirely different, divisibility and division. We have seen that our atheist charges Mr Gillespie with confounding these two distinct things,† and here Antitheos exposes why he was so ready to charge such a procedure on another: Antitheos confounds the two things himself. The cloven foot has made its appearance.

§ 16. Our author has quite reversed matters. He who supposes, if any one can suppose, (as it is certain no one can,) that the parts of space are separated, or divided, *presupposes* the separability, or divisibility, of the parts. But he who supposes (and the person who supposes must just be nobody at all) the divisibility of space, by no means thereby supposes, either first or last, the division of space.

§ 17. In a word, we agree with our atheist as to the fact, we differ from him as to the reason of the fact, that under the second Proposition of the "Argument" is made manifest the absurdity of supposing‡ infinite extension, or space, to be divisible. Had Antitheos said that Proposition II. manifests the absurdity of supposing space really divisible, since to

† See Part II. § 32, and § 34.

‡ We use the words *supposing* or *suppose*, here and elsewhere, in the same sense as that in which Mathematicians speak, when, in a proper *reductio PER IMPOSSIBILE ad absurdum*, they ask us to draw an absurd consequence from a supposition which is to be set aside. The supposition in one sense, and that one the best of senses, is really impossible. We cannot clearly conceive the truth of it to be a possible thing, and this even before the contrary to it is *established* in due geometrical style. But the case is argued, *as if* the impossible supposition *were conceived* to be true. We may deduce an inference from a supposition which we can make only *relatively*, as we may say.

suppose it really divisible is to suppose its parts separable, we should have agreed with him as to the reason of the fact too: so far at least as the absurdity of the supposition, that the parts of space are separable, is a reason of the absurdity of the supposition, that space is really divisible: for, in truth, the suppositions look as if they were no more than barely tantamount to each other.

§ 18. We shall turn our antitheist's admission on all sides, and make every conceivable supposition, to shew that viewing the admission in what light one pleases, it is all that our hearts could wish. Should the author of the "Refutation" be inclined to allege, that by "divisible" he meant *divided*, never intending to admit more than that the "Argument" had manifested the absurdity of supposing that space is really divided; then, as we shall leave him no door to creep out by, away from us, we have these two considerations to urge. They will be found adamant impediments to an escape. 1. The first consideration will have respect to the *good faith* in which an *allegation* of that description could be offered. Antitheos is speaking in relation to the "second proposition," and the second Proposition, as it occurs in the "Argument," runs thus: "Infinity of Extension" (which is the same as Space) "is necessarily *indivisible*." It does not run this way: Infinity of Extension is really *undivided*. But to pass over the faith in which such an allegation would need to be made, as a circumstance of *trifling moment*, we have to say, that the thing alleged, were it alleged, to be meant by our antitheist, would be altogether as acceptable as the sign of his meaning. For 2. If Mr Gillespie manifested no more than, or rather so much as, the *absurdity* of supposing that space is really divided, if, in other words, he *demonstrated* that space is really not divided, how could he have done so but by demonstrating that space *cannot be* really divided?

We *demonstrate* that a thing is not, only by proving that it cannot be. And if Mr Gillespie demonstrated that space cannot be really divided, he must have demonstrated that space is really indivisible. For to say, that space cannot be divided, and to say, that it is indivisible, are one and the same. So that, if Mr Gillespie demonstrated that space is really not divided, he has demonstrated that space is really indivisible. And therefore even if "*divisible*" in the passage in question, be to stand for *divided*, and our atheist be to be held as admitting nothing more than that Proposition II. manifests the absurdity of supposing that space is really divided; we have, contained virtually in an admission to that effect, his authority for it that Mr Gillespie has demonstrated the real indivisibility of space.

§ 19. To conclude this part of the subject, let the admission of our antitheist be regarded in any sense one likes, to a certainty, we have, as we affirmed, his authority to vouch for the validity of the demonstration, that infinity of extension, or space, is indivisible.

§ 20. And since the author of the "Refutation" has passed his word in sincerity for the truth of Proposition II., let us rest contented, without bearing him any grudge for what besides may have fallen from his pen. What matters it, though he cried out, at the first glimpse of the affair, "unqualified assent * * cannot be accorded to proposition "the second," if, on second thoughts, (second thoughts are better than first,) he saw a sufficient reason for declaring, that his opponent "makes manifest the absurdity of supposing space really divisible," his opponent's *highest aim* being to demonstrate that space, infinite space, is really indivisible? Whatever difficulties Antitheos asserted to be in the way;—if ultimately he proclaims that the road is thoroughly clear, we may know he was only making as if he

would cause us a little, a very unnecessary, affrightment. However it comes about that the second Proposition is true, it suffices that it is so.

§ 21. We can now proceed to judge in a certain affair, with capital authority at our elbow for the decision we shall pronounce. At the beginning of Chapter VII. Antitheos says: "The *fourth* proposition * * is founded upon the *baseless fabric* of extension" (he should have said, "infinity of extension") "being indivisible," &c.; and in the fifth paragraph of Chapter VI. he had more than merely hinted, that Proposition II. constitutes a *gratuitous fallacy*. Whether the necessary indivisibility of infinite extension be a baseless fabric, whether the declaration that "infinity of extension is necessarily indivisible," be a gratuitous fallacy, admits not now of the possibility of a doubt. We have had our atheist's word for it, that the "Argument" has demonstrated, infinity of extension is really indivisible, and what more could be necessary to show that the indivisibility of infinite extension is no "baseless fabric"? that the position which affirms infinity of extension to be necessarily indivisible, is never to be reckoned in the number of "gratuitous fallacies?"

§ 22. So far, then, as we have gone yet, all is well. "It would be absurd in the extreme to deny" Proposition I. And, in spite of himself, Antitheos has accorded "the same unqualified assent" to Proposition II.

§ 23. The words which next occur in the "Refutation" bring us to a new subject. "A corollary is here introduced, asserting the immoveability of *extension*."† There happens to be no corollary of the kind in the "Argument." A Corollary there is indeed. But it is in the following

† Chap. VI. par. 7.

terms. "COROLLARY from Proposition II. Infinity of *Extension* is necessarily immoveable." A matter this, widely different from what Antitheos represents it to be. "It is true," proceeds he, "that either finity or infinity of extension can never be supposed capable of motion." Bare finity of extension is not capable of motion; but then every thing of finity, of finity only, in extension, is so. "Space cannot," continues our atheist, "be carried out of itself." Very true. That is equivalent, so far as it goes, to what the Corollary declares. "Nor," adds he, by way of illustration, "can those parts of it occupied by Mont Blanc, for example, and the Peak of Teneriffe, ever be imagined to change places." Precisely so. But the Mountain and the Peak, themselves, may be imagined to change places. And the distinction well deserves observation. "To the truth of what is here maintained, therefore," concludes he, "we must give unreserved assent, independent of its nominal connection with the *false* doctrine immediately going before."† The "false doctrine" is that which sets forth that "Infinity of Extension is necessarily indivisible." That false doctrine we have witnessed the author of the "Refutation" transforming into a perfectly true one.‡ The "connection," which is called a "nominal" connection, (for what reason it is easier to search than to find,) is established, under the "Corollary," in the following manner. "Infinity of Extension is necessarily immoveable. That is, its parts are necessarily immoveable among themselves. For, motion of parts supposes, of necessity, separation of the parts. He who does not see that motion of parts supposes, of necessity, separation of the parts, need never be expected to see that because every A is equal to B, therefore

† Chap. VI. par. 7.

‡ See above, § 15, &c.

“ some B is equal to A. And Infinity of Extension being
“ necessarily incapable of separation, is, therefore, necessarily
“ immoveable, that is, its parts are necessarily immoveable
“ among themselves.”

§ 24. The connection we speak of is set forth by Mr Locke in these words. “The parts of pure space are *immoveable, which follows from their inseparability*; motion being nothing but change of distance between any two things: but this cannot be between parts that are *inseparable; which, therefore, must needs be at perpetual rest* one amongst another.”—*Essay*, B. II. ch. xiii. § 14.

§ 25. We were finding some fault in our author's conclusion, but since, according to it, “unreserved assent” “must” be given to the truth maintained in the Corollary, we need, after all, have no quarrel with any thing that accompanies the unconditional admission.

PART V.

THE "ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, FOR THE BEING AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD," AN IRREFRAGABLE DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. "But we now come," such are the words which follow those last quoted from the "Refutation;" "But we now come to a proposition which may be said to carry with it *all the strength*, if it has any, as well as *the weakness*, of Mr Gillespie's 'Argument.'"† 'Tis well that Antitheos attaches some importance to the Proposition he has now in his eye; for the preceding one was treated as if it were "of no great consequence." The Proposition which, as our author will have it, has *all* the strength, or the weakness, of the "Argument," "is," that gentleman correctly remarks, "the third in number, and announces that 'There is necessarily A BEING of Infinity of Extension.'"†

§ 2. "If we had not *already seen*," continues Antitheos, "that the author's reasoning leads us to conclude that his 'Being is to be regarded as something substantial'"—Where did we see what, in his own sense of it, Antitheos says we have seen? Nowhere else but in the fourth paragraph of Chapter V., where we saw it stated (the statement being according to truth) that Mr Gillespie's 'SUBSEQUENT reasoning' 'makes intelligence, &c., part of his argument;' and where we saw our atheist lay down a determination to hold

† Chap. VI. par. 8.

Mr Gillespie as making intelligence, &c., part of his argument *ab ovo usque ad mala*—‘UNIFORMLY.’† We promised to run to the rescue whenever Antitheos was detected turning matters upside down, and this is the first opportunity we have had of making good our promise. We should not regret if we never had a second. But things do not always fall out according to one’s wishes. And our wishes in this respect, run a great chance of being disappointed: Antitheos threatened us with *uniformity* as touching the affair of *putting things topsy-turvy*.

§ 3. So much as to where Antitheos and his reader had seen that Mr Gillespie’s reasoning leads to the conclusion, that his Being is *substantial*, in our antitheist’s sense of “substantial,” as it occurs in the passage we are criticising. As it occurs in that passage, we say; For our author is not always consistent in his procedure, he being accustomed to use *substantial*, and its cognate, *substance*, in more senses than one. For example, at one time, “*substance*,” with him, is that only which “possesses attraction,” which “is observed under a thousand varieties of figure, density, colour, motion, taste, odour, combustion, crystallization, &c.,” which is capable of being “weighed,” and “analyzed,” and of having “its elements reduced to gas.”‡ While, in the case before us, “*something substantial*,” with our attheist, stands for *nothing more* than “an agent of any kind—something possessing power—something that acts”—something that has “intelligence, and power, and freedom of agency.”|| *Nothing more*: For there is no mention of attraction, figure, density, colour, motion, taste, odour, combustion, crystallization, &c., weight, gaseousness, &c., as among the essential acts, properties, or capacities, of that which is *substantial*.

† See Part II. § 4.

‡ See Part XII. § 1, 4.

|| Compare Chap. VI. par. 9, with Chap. V. par. 4.

§ 4. No doubt, Antitheos would say, were the question put to him, that every thing which has "intelligence, and power, and freedom of agency," can attract and be attracted, has figure, density, would have colour if exposed to the rays of the sun, moves, may be supposed to have a certain taste, and a certain smell, may be set on fire, may be crystallized, and weighed, and analyzed, and reduced to elementary gases. Such, however, is not the matter for consideration here. That composes the question respecting *local conjunction*, the question as to what qualities are inseparably associated in the same subject. It may be, or it may not be true, that intelligence, and power, and freeness, are never to be found but in a subject having figure, and density, and colour, and motion, and taste, and odour, &c. &c.; but whether that be true, or whether it be false, concerns us not at present. On the contrary, the following are the questions which arise out of our atheist's procedure, as we have noticed it. Is that which possesses attraction, &c. &c., a substance; a substance *because* it has the capacity of attracting, and of being attracted? And again: Is that which has intelligence, &c., to be pronounced a substance; to be pronounced a substance *just because* it has the property of intelligence? Is that which is of intelligence, *therefore* to be denominated a substance; without our waiting to determine the point as to how many properties or qualities must keep company with intelligence as mutual occupiers of the subject of inhesion? Which Antitheos decides in the affirmative.†

§ 5. When I observed, our author would hold, that every thing having intelligence, &c., can attract, and has figure, density, &c. &c. &c., I bore in mind what he in one place says: "It (extension) is also conceivable as one of the properties, if not the *only indispensable* property of matter."‡

† See preceding section.

‡ Chap. VIII. par. 3.

By which if the unwary reader should understand that Antitheos means to make even "a very clever approach" (to employ our author's racy language†) to the Cartesian doctrine, that extension is the essence, itself, of matter,‡ the reader would be much mistaken indeed. What our atheist means, *in spite of his own words*, amounts only to this: that whereas a particular piece of matter may be without *some one* quality which some other piece has; for instance, the book called "Refutation" may well be supposed to be without that *weight* which even one *solid* Argument would impart to it; that whereas, in fine, *each* of the other properties ever found in matter may be absent, *one after another*, from a thing, and matter yet remain behind: we cannot take away all extension, without taking away all matter too. The sentence itself from which those words are taken, commences thus: "Although extension may be conceived of *as a pure abstraction*:" that is, I fancy, as existing separately, or by itself; as in the case of pure space. From which clause we see how very far Antitheos was from going into the doctrine of Des Cartes.—After all, it must perhaps be granted, that it is *no easy task* to reconcile the beginning and end of this sentence: "Although extension may be conceived of as a *pure abstraction*, it is also conceivable as one of the properties, *if not the only indispensable property* of matter." If extension can, and our antitheist says it can, exist by itself, without thereby being matter, how can extension make any approach, unless a stupid one, to being the *only indispensable property* of matter? In short, there is "a very clever approach" to a contradiction. The end of the sentence and the beginning can never exist together in perfect harmony; the sooner, therefore, they separate for ever, the better.—We

† Last Chapter, ninth paragraph.

‡ See Part III. § 38.

have only farther to remark, that tho' in this passage Antitheos speaks of extension as perhaps being the only indispensable property of matter, yet the whole scope of his book, where it at all bears on the topic of what matter is, runs counter to that sentiment. The exception to the general strain is a solitary one.

§ 6. But not only have we "already seen" in the "Refutation," that Mr Gillespie's reasoning leads to the conclusion that his Being is "something *substantial*," but, the author of that production throws out, we may see the same thing in a different quarter altogether. "If," says he, "we refer to the "third Division of his Introduction, we find him contending "that the necessary Being must be of the character now ascribed to that subject. At the twenty-third section," &c. &c.† Now what is this that we have here? The "Argument, a *priori*, for the Being and Attributes of GOD," "professes to "demonstrate that matter by the *most rigid* ratiocination."‡ To be complete in itself, is one of the necessary prerequisites of a demonstration. The work alluded to, accordingly, never refers to the "Introduction"—Which is so distinct from the "Argument," that this might have received—and may yet receive, (for the special benefit of refutation-makers, now that Antitheos has put into my head the propriety of letting it receive,—) publication separately, and be, notwithstanding, a finished treatise, wanting nothing necessary in order to the presence of the most perfect unity of execution.|| The "Introduction," in a word, is in no respect any part of that which the Society of Atheists which fixed on our author

† Chap. VI. par. 9.

‡ See Preface hereto.

|| The "Argument" has actually received "publication separately." It has gone forth without an *Introduction*. The pieces which, in the former edition, went under the name of "Introduction," appear, in this volume, as so many distinct treatises. See § 7 of the text. [Note in immediately preceding edition.]

as its champion, was challenged to answer and refute. Doubtless, I might have challenged that Society, had I liked, to overturn the reasonings which compose the three Divisions of the "Introduction." And it may be noticed, that no proof has been adduced to evidence that, if it had been so challenged, it could, by means of this champion, or of any champion, have successfully overturned any of those reasonings. But as the case is, the Society was challenged to do no more—and no less—than answer and refute the reasonings contained in the "Argument, *a priori*," &c.†

§ 7: To enable our readers, the more perfectly to understand with what grace Antitheos in his "Refutation" of the "Argument, *a priori*," &c., brings in quotations from the "Introduction," to find of what character the "Argument" makes the necessary Being it discourses of to be; we shall enumerate the topics of which the "Introduction" consists. "DIVISION I. An Inquiry into the Defects of mere *a posteriori* Arguments, for the being of A DEITY. Chapter I. "Of the Argument from Experience. CHAPTER II. Of the "Argument from Miracles." "DIVISION II. A Review of "Dr Samuel Clarke's Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of GOD." "DIVISION III. Necessary existence implies infinite extension." The first section of which division commences thus: "SUPPOSING, that there is a necessarily existing substance, the intelligent cause of all things." Division III., so far from being taken up in an attempt to do aught towards proving a necessarily existing substance, the intelligent cause of all things, sets out with the EXPRESS SUPPOSITION that there is such; and is wholly employed in endeavouring to deduce a certain consequence from that supposition. In fine, the contents of the Division we speak

† See Letter and Challenge in Preface hereto.

of, are truly summed up in what may be drawn from its title: *If* necessary existence be *supposed*, then that is supposed which implies infinite extension. Marvellously good indeed is the grace with which our atheist, at the place where he stands, and for the purpose which he has to serve, quotes from "the third Division" of the "Introduction."

§ 8. Well then; here we have our antitheist "going out of the record," to use a legal phrase which he has adopted.† We referred lately to his determination to turn matters upside down, or rather, to turn the end round upon the beginning.‡ With regard to the case before us, we can acquit him of any charge of placing the tail where the head only should be. His conduct now is of a different character from what it was in the former instance: At present, he is seeking to introduce into the beginning, neither end nor middle, but only something entirely distinct, alike from beginning, and from middle, and from end. But we shall not copy the bad example, nor follow our atheist through those sentences, vicious as at the present stage they must be, which respect something avowed in the third "Division." "Not that there is any thing contained in those sentences, nor any thing about them, except the confusion which follows in their train, that we need to fear: As might easily be shown, were this a fit opportunity. But anxiously do we desire, we acknowledge, to keep clear of the confusion which very naturally would result from a present consideration of the sentences under notice. In short, Antitheos had his reasons for what he has done. And we have ours for reprobating his exceedingly unwarrantable procedure.

§ 9. *If* we had not already seen that the author's reasoning leads us to conclude that his Being is to be regarded

† In "Preface" to "Refutation."

‡ See above, § 2.

“as something substantial”—Well, what follows from such a supposition? “We should have been at a loss what to make of the *subject* of the above *predicate*. As a logician “would say, it is not distributed.”† The non-distribution of a subject can never be any reason why one should be at a loss what to make of it. A non-distributed subject is, “as a logician would say,” a subject made to stand for a part only of its significate. And did ever any logician worthy of the name, assert that we should be at a loss what to make of a subject because it is taken in a part only of its extent? Logicians are quite as fond of undistributed, as of distributed subjects. And as an evidence, there are in the field of logic as many *particular* propositions as there are *universal* ones: The non-distribution of the subject being that which fixes the particularity of the proposition. But our aim is not to rectify Antitheos’s logic, except where the badness of his logic is made a prop to the goodness of his cause; and to pass over a matter which, after all, is of little moment in the present business: Antitheos’s logic in the preceding portion of the passage, finds me totally at fault. What does he make the *subject* to be, to-wit, in the Proposition, “There is necessarily a Being of Infinity of Extension?” The word *Being*. But how “Being” can be regarded as the subject, our atheist has not condescended to declare, neither is he at all able to declare. To me indeed it appears, that “Being” in that Proposition is *syncategorematic*, *i. e.*, constitutes a part only of the complex term composing the subject: which I take to be, “A Being of Infinity of Extension:”—“there is necessarily,” being the predicate, or, if you will, the *copula* and the predicate together. But to settle what is the right subject, and,

† Parag. 9.

by consequence possibly, what is the right predicate, of the Proposition, is, as well as the other thing, but a mere trifle, not worth vexing ourselves about; as shall be perceived in the 11th section. Though Antitheos has called things by their wrong names, it may turn out that the slip in logic will not afford him even a semblance of support.

§ 10. "Relative," says the author of the "Refutation," after presenting us with the sentences which respect something avowed in "Division III." of the "Introduction;" "Relative to a Being of this sort, *then*,"—that is, relative to a Being of the character spoken of in that "Division," to-wit, "a necessarily existing substance, the intelligent cause of all things."† But here we can have nothing to do with the *assumed* Being which "Division III." treats of. Our atheist himself seems to have had his misgivings as to the propriety of the "*then*," for he immediately goes on to say: "At all events, relative to a substantial being"—a substantial being! Why not a being (*i. e.* an existing) substance? Is not a substance identical with a being? Why distinguish them? What is an unsubstantial being? "A shadow that proceeds not from any substance is not more a non-entity than an unsubstantial being. A substantial being is a substantial—substance; or a being that has—being. What nothingness has a non-being substance which an unsubstantial being has not?"

§ 11. "Relative to a (substantial) being, the truth of the *predicate*," Antitheos proceeds, "is what we have now to try."‡ As he made "Being" to be the *subject*, so now he takes "Infinity of Extension" to be the *predicate*, in Proposition III. Our atheist would represent *Being* as something already got at, and the aim of that Proposition to be, to in-

† See above, § 7.

‡ Parag. 11.

vest the Being with infinite extension. Quite contrary to the truth: *A Being* is not something which the "Argument," as yet, holds us in possession of. The object of the Proposition, in fact, is neither more nor less than *to arrive at a Being*; a Being, indeed of infinity of extension: but the Proposition by no means considers "Being" and "Infinity of Extension," first *separately*, afterwards proceeding to work out a *conjunction* of them. In a word, "Infinity of Extension" is *not* the predicate. "The truth of the predicate is what we have now to try," says Antitheos. The truth of Proposition III., *at any rate*, he is going to try. And that is sufficient comfort for us.

§ 12. We shall make it our business to examine every item and iota of the ordeal: Because, the Proposition, if successfully established, goes near to be decisive, in our favour, of the whole controversy; and if objected to, on sufficient grounds, the whole demonstration, the whole of the merely pretended demonstration, must go for nothing. Our atheist rightly holds the Proposition in question to be of very high importance in the affair; whether or not it carries with it ALL the strength of the "Argument."

§ 13. "The evidence in support of the *third* proposition is stated," our author remarks, "in the form of a *dilemma*."† And then he quotes § 1, and part of § 2,‡ and § 4. The words he has quoted are as follows.

§ 14. "*Either*, Infinity of Extension subsists, or, (which "is the same thing,) we conceive it to subsist, without a support or substratum; *or*, it subsists not, or we conceive it not to subsist, without a support or substratum.

§ 15. "First, if Infinity of Extension subsist without a

† Parag. 11.

‡ Antitheos does not signify, he has omitted any thing.

"substratum," [or, if it have *not* a substratum,] "then it is
 "a *substance*." * * * * *

§ 16. "Secondly, If Infinity of Extension subsist not with-
 "out a Substratum," [that is, if it *have* a Substratum,]
 "then, it being a contradiction to deny there is Infinity of
 "Extension,† it is a contradiction to deny there is a Sub-
 "stratum to it."

§ 17. "The conclusion deduced from the *latter* alterna-
 "tive," says Antitheos, "besides appearing *lame* and *im-*
 "*potent*, is somewhat *laughable*.‡ But allowing its logic to
 "pass, it may be worth while, if only for *amusement*, to try
 "the force of this, the negative horn of the dilemma, by
 "ascertaining what it is made of."|| Why is *this* pronounced
 to be the *negative* horn? 'Twould require more than an
 Aristotle to tell how it could properly be pronounced to
 be so. But though Aristotle could not, yet possibly An-
 titheos can inform us, why "*this*" is pronounced to be the
negative horn. 'Tis perhaps probable, that Antitheos calls
 the alternative spoken of, "the *negative* horn of the dilemma,"
because that alternative contains the word "*not*." At least,
 I cannot think of any better reason he could have. With
 regard, then, to the question, whether the word "*not*" causes
 the member in which it occurs to be truly negative: the
 word "without," in the alternative, appears to be a negative
 one, to all intents and purposes. And if so, the alternative
 will be affirmative, so long as two negative words ("not," and
 "without")—*which affect the same thing*—are equal to a
 positive.—Be "this" horn of what sort it may, it is a horn
 which Antitheos would get quit of, if he but could.¶¶ But

† "Prop. I."—Note in "Argument."—See Part II. § 15.

‡ See Part XII. § 8.

|| Parag. 12.

¶¶ See Part XI. § 21.

however negative the horn may be, 'tis a positive truth that Antitheos has been *fairly stuck upon it*, and can by no struggling take himself off. We shall observe, in good time, how he winces.

§ 18. But whether "*this*" be the negative horn, or not, let us witness in what manner the force of it is tried. "The *primary* signification of the word *substratum* is, a thing lying under something else. Supposing, for instance, a bed of gravel to lie under the soil, gravel is the substratum of that soil; if there be sandstone below that, the sandstone is the substratum of the gravel; if coal be found beneath the rock, coal is the substratum of it, and so on as far as we can penetrate. To say, therefore, that space must have a substratum, is nothing less than saying that it must have something to rest upon; something to hold it up. That is,—Space must have limits; and there must be something in existence beyond its limits to keep it from falling—out of itself! If this be not the acme of absurdity, a ship falling overboard, as our sailors' jest goes, is no longer a joke; and the clown who boasted that he could swallow himself boasted of nothing that he might not be reasonably be† expected to perform."‡ These are capital jests. And had they but come in at a proper place, we should have "laughed consumedly." The misfortune is, they are not in season.

§ 19. "The *primary* signification of the word *substratum* is," our philologist informs us, "a thing lying under something else." So it is. *Substratum* is a participle from the verb *substernor*, *Anglicè*, to be strowed or strewed under. But, alas! the primary signification of the word *substance* is

† One of these is an error of the press. But to say which, would be to interfere with the *style*.

‡ Parag. 12.

very similar to that of the word *substratum*. The primary signification of *substance*, is *standing under*: it being nothing but a derivation from the participle *substans*.† But Antitheos is remarkably enamoured of the word *substance*, and therefore he has a respect for *its* primary signification, never bringing this in sight. But then he bears (with ample reason too) *substratum* a terrible grudge, and thinks nothing of exposing *its* primary signification to *well-merited derision*.

§ 20. A fine affair truly here. Strange work, work "passing strange," might our atheist make of our English tongue, were he to go on at this rate. At what point in its history could any language bear to pass through the primary-signification-alembic? Because the meaning of a word, considered as to its etymon, is *so*, THEREFORE it is just the *same so* now—clean contrary perhaps to the incontestable fact: Is not that a grand conclusion to come to?

§ 21. But Antitheos is not alone in the world, in the use of such *reasoning*. Before him, a very celebrated philologist and free-thinker went very far in the primary-signification-track.

§ 22. "TRUE," says John Horne Tooke, "is also a past participle of the verb ΤΡΑΝΑΝ, Τρεοpan, confidere, "To Think, To Believe firmly, To be thoroughly persuaded of, "To Trow."

† From the neuter plural, Horne Tooke maintains, in his famous work, so singularly characteristic of the man.—It is curious, or perhaps it is not curious, that the two words in our language corresponding to *sub* and *stans*, to-wit *under* and *standing*, should, when joined in one word, constitute a term denoting what is very usually reckoned the superior portion of the mind. Our materialist would busy us about *substance* as not reaching to aught beyond *body*. So that there is some necessity for our refusing to quit the English, for the Latin preposition. And accordingly, we are resolved to stick by the *understanding*. Surely, *it*, in good English, does not so *naturally* mean *body*, as *substance* may stand for *mind*.

§ 23. "TRUE, as we now write it; or TREW, as it was formerly written; means simply and merely—That' which is TROWED. And, instead of its being a rare commodity upon earth; except only in words, *there is nothing but TRUTH in the world.*

§ 24. "That every man, in his communication with others, should speak that which he TROWETH, is of so great importance to mankind; that it ought not to surprise us, if we find the *most extravagant and exaggerated praises* bestowed upon TRUTH. But TRUTH supposes mankind: *for whom and by whom alone the word is formed, and to whom only it is applicable.* If no man, no TRUTH. There is THEREFORE" [Save the mark! THEREFORE!] "no such thing as eternal, immutable, everlasting TRUTH; unless mankind, *such as they are at present,*" [and, of course, unless "TRUTH," "the third person singular of the Indicative TROW,"] "be also eternal, immutable, and everlasting. Two persons may contradict each other, and yet both speak TRUTH: for the TRUTH of one person may be opposite to the TRUTH of another. To speak TRUTH may be a vice as well as a virtue: for there are many occasions where it ought not to be spoken."—*Diversions of Purley.* Part II. Chap. v.

§ 25. "RIGHT is no other than RECT-tum (*Regitum*), the past participle of the Latin verb *Regere.*"

§ 26. "In the same manner our English word JUST is the past participle of the verb *jubere.*"

§ 27. LAW "is merely the past tense and past participle *Laꝝ* or *Læꝝ*, of the Gothic and Anglo-Saxon verb **LAIFGAN**, *Leczan*, ponere: and it means (something or any thing, *Chose, Cosa, Aliquid*) *Laid down.*"

§ 28. "A RIGHT and JUST action, is, such a one as is
"ordered and commanded."

§ 29. "It appears to me highly improper to say, that
"GOD has a RIGHT: as it is also to say, that GOD is JUST.
"FOR" [mark the—*reason!*] "nothing is ordered, directed
"or commanded concerning GOD."

§ 30. "I follow the LAW of GOD (what is laid down by
"him for the rule of my conduct) when I follow the LAWS
"of human nature; which, without any human testimony,
"we know must proceed from GOD: and upon these are
"founded the RIGHTS of man, or what is ordered for man."
Part II. Chap. i.

§ 31. "Those sham Deities FATE and DESTINY—*aliquid*
"*Fatum, quelque chose Destinée*—are merely the past parti-
"ciples of *Fari* and *Destiner*."

§ 32. "CHANCE ("high Arbitrator" as Milton calls him) and
"his twin-brother ACCIDENT, are merely the participles of
"*Escheoir, Cheoir, and Cadere*." "To say—'It befell me
"by CHANCE, or by ACCIDENT,'—is absurdly saying—'It
"fell by falling.'" *Ibid.* Chap. ii.

§ 33. But what need to multiply quotations? though
"Horne Tooke," as one not incorrectly says, "has furnished
"a whole magazine of such weapons for any Sophist" [wise
"man, etymologically,] "who may need them."—Whately's
"Logic," B. III. § 8.

§ 34. Now hear the opinion of one who was no bad judge
in an affair like that to which he is addressing himself.
"It is in this literal and primitive sense alone," we are
citing the words of Dugald Stewart, "that, according to
"him, (Mr Tooke,) a philosopher is entitled to employ it,
"(any word,) even in the present advanced state of science;
"and whenever he annexes to it a meaning at all different,
"he imposes equally on himself and on others. To me,

“ on the contrary, it appears, that to appeal to etymology
 “ in a philosophical argument, (excepting, perhaps, in those
 “ cases where the word itself is of philosophical origin)
 “ is altogether nugatory; and can serve, at the best, to
 “ throw an amusing light on the laws which regulate the
 “ operations of human fancy.” — “ Philosophical Essays.”
 Essay V. ch. ii.

§ 35. We might favour our readers with a good many passages from Stewart which have no tendency to withdraw from the literal-and-primitive-sense-method any portion of the respect which is due to it. But we decline to put this philosopher upon the task of further, and in detail, as it were, *slaying the slain*. It is only necessary to state some things, to render a fuller refutation than the statements themselves contain *in gremio*, wholly a work of supererogation.

§ 36. The author of “The Diversions of Purley,” at the end of his First Part, assures his readers: “I know for ~~what~~ building I am laying the foundation: and am myself well satisfied of its importance.” It must on all hands be admitted, that to work in the dark as to the result of one’s *edification* (to pay in coin that should pass here, if any where,) is not the most pleasant thing in the world, even though what we are building be *castles in the air*.

§ 37. Thus much as to Horne Tooke’s extravagancies. And thus much indirectly, at the same time, as to Antitheos’s argument derived from the “primary signification of the word *substratum*.” The thing is verily nothing less than “the acme of absurdity.”

§ 38. But our atheist knew well enough what he was about. He understood assuredly that the “Argument,” which maintains that “INFINITY of extension,” or space, “is *necessarily existing*,” did not afford any premiss from

which it could be inferred, by any stupidity, that "Space must have *limits*;" and that "there must be something in existence *beyond its limits*." Antitheos was distinctly aware, that he could advance nothing stronger than a rush to beat down the reasoning under Proposition III.: and therefore, (like many dishonest sophists, in circumstances so far analogous,) *precisely because* he could do nothing in the way of refuting, he raises a—a—primary signification—a—man of straw, that no one could have imagined was ready for the occasion, and laughs heartily, he pretends, at the effect this appearance has on him, calling on his readers to laugh too.

Spectatum admissi risum teneatis amici?

PART VI.

THE "ARGUMENT, *A PRIORI*, FOR THE BEING AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD," AN IRREFRAGABLE DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. We shall suppose that the merriment, whoever joined in it, has subsided. And truly with Antitheos it lasted not long. The words which we next come to in the "Refutation" are far from laughing themselves, whatever the very gravity of some of them may force us to. The words alluded to, whenever we enter upon them, expose the fact, that, so little satisfied was Antitheos with the argument from "the primary signification of the word *substratum*," the ground he had taken is deserted as utterly untenable.

§ 2. "Should it be contended that the *term* ought to be "understood in its *secondary* acceptation,"—the only acceptation, we may mention once for all, the author of the "Argument" ever thought of putting upon it, as Antitheos must have been thoroughly assured,—“and that the substratum of the infinity of extension subsists within itself, “as any material body is said to be the substratum of its own extension:—I would remark, that we know of nothing “possessing extension except matter,—nothing else that “can stand as an object to which extension may be ascribed “as a *property*; and that matter, not existing by *mathematical*” [the word should be *metaphysical*†] “but only

† See Part I. § 47, and following sections.

"by *physical necessity*, cannot be the substratum referred to"†. Matter, says our atheist, exists by *physical necessity*, that is, it exists *because* it exists. But such necessity is no necessity at all, as might be evident even to the understandings of *asses*‡; and therefore, there is no real necessity that we should dwell upon the point. It perfectly suffices us, that matter does *not* exist by metaphysical necessity, to-wit, in the sense of it being a contradiction to suppose it not to exist. "We know of nothing possessing extension except matter,"—we were informed,—"nothing else that can stand as an object to which extension may be ascribed as a property." "Material bodies," as the next sentence has it, (there being many of Antitheos's sentences that serve as a chorus,) "material bodies, comprising all that we *do* know, or *can* know of Being." All easily said. None of it so easily proved nevertheless. And whether easily proveable or not, the assertions *assume the very thing to be proved*. But has not Antitheos offered us evidence of his right to make the assumption, *that* we know of nothing but matter which has the property of extension, or *that* we know of no Being but a material body? Not a jot of evidence does he even pretend to afford. Then, the thing remains a barefaced assumption of the best part of the whole matter in debate,

† Chap. VI. par. 13.

‡ "Manifest even to asses," was a phrase employed by the Epicureans, on a certain occasion. From the authority of Proclus, it appears that "the Epicureans derided" the 20th and 21st Propositions of Euclid's first Book, as needing no demonstration. (See, in Simson's celebrated "Elements of Euclid," the Notes upon those Propositions). And, with submission be it said, the Epicureans might have derided, as being manifest even to great asses, some other mathematically demonstrated propositions, also—the truth of which might well be laid down as being too plain to admit of demonstration; as being, in fact, truly axiomatic in character.

remains, to use an expression of his own, nowhere more applicable, "an unproved extravagance."†

§ 3. "Hence it is evident," continues our atheist, "that, in material bodies, comprising all that we *do* know, or *can* know of Being, it is *impossible* to find any thing that will serve Mr Gillespie's purpose."‡ Mr Gillespie will cheerfully admit, that because "matter * * cannot be the substratum referred to" by him, it is *quite impossible* to find any thing that will suit his purpose in material bodies. And it is the business of a certain part of his work to *demonstrate* the *impossibility*. His *first* Scholium being partly taken up with proving, that "the Material Universe cannot be the Substratum of Infinity of Extension:" *Supposing* the material universe to exist, for the Scholium does not assume the thing, except in the case (a common—but not a universal—case||) where it is admitted; the Scholium beginning thus, "If, then, it should be maintained, that the Material Universe is the Substratum of Infinity of Extension"—And it cannot be maintained that the material universe is that substratum, or any substratum, or any thing, unless it be first assumed that matter exists.

§ 4. "Even this impossibility overlooked, however," Antitheos goes on, "what is it that next meets our view?—One substance occupying infinite extension, and another occupying part of this extension, if not also the whole of it; in other words, two things at the same time occupying the same space. Theology always entangles its advocates in

† Chap. II. par. 15.

‡ Parag. 13.

|| Few, indeed, and those few *atheists*, or, at best, but *half-theists*, contend for the existence of matter, in the sense which Antitheos puts upon *matter*: who, by *matter*, means something which is *in no sense dependent for its existence on mind*.

"inextricable absurdities."† To the same purpose our author writes, "farther on. "The real existence of matter brings along with it what he," Mr Gillespie, "is so much afraid of" [*when* there is a good reason]—"namely, the absurdity of two beings at the same time occupying the same space. On this ground let it be remembered that it is not requisite we should demonstrate the infinite extension of the material universe. In so far as it *does* extend, it occupies space; and, the infinitely extended substance occupying, of course, the whole of space, must occupy that of the material universe as well as any other,—if any other there be."

§ 5. "Let us suppose for a moment," our antitheist continues in the chapter from which we are now quoting, "the being of a substance of infinite expansion, the intelligent agent in the production of all things—and all this is contended for in the 'Argument'" [at the proper time and place]—"—what was it to do when performing the * * feat of creating ~~the~~ universe out of nothing? Was it to annihilate so much of its own substance as would be necessary to make room for matter, in order to give it verge and scope enough?‡ If not, either matter could not be brought into being, or we must suffer ourselves to be driven to the conclusion already shown to be necessary in admitting the very palpable doctrine of the actual existence of matter." Chapter IX. paragraphs 10, 11.

§ 6. From the work of a very celebrated atheist, cited as it is on one occasion, and borrowed from on many more, by Antitheos, we shall extract a sentence or two which exactly chime with the passages which we have just set before the reader. "I shall inquire," says the author of the famous

† Parag. 13.

‡ Give ample room and verge enough.

Gray's "Bard."

Système de la Nature, "if matter exists; if it does not at least occupy a portion of space? In this case, matter, or the universe, must exclude every other being who is not matter, from that place which the material beings occupy in space." Vol. II. ch. ii. Again: "Matter certainly occupies a part of space, and from that part, at least, the Divinity must be excluded." "Appendix" to the "System of Nature." Chap. xx.†

§ 7. In all these passages, whether those of Mirabaud or rather D'Holbach, or those of Antitheos, it is *coolly taken for granted*, that it is absurd to have (in the words of the first of the passages from the "Refutation") "two things at the same time occupying the same space." But this which is so conveniently assumed, happens to be the very thing which lay—yea, and still lies—at our atheist's door to be proved. To evince it by arguments which would place it beyond the reach of rational question, is absolutely necessary if atheism be to stand.

§ 8. We shall at once admit "the absurdity" (we quote again from Antitheos) "of two beings at the same time occupying the same space," *in the same respect*. For this would be all one with *two* beings which were but *one* being: the duality and unity being *confounded*. A great enough absurdity truly.

§ 9. But that two things may occupy the same space at the same time, *in different respects*, is, I hope, very far from being absurd to suppose. But be it what it may, it is nothing less than what the "Argument" has undertaken to *demonstrate*.

§ 10. But the "Argument" does not set about demonstrating that, till it has gotten the length of the *second*

† See APPENDIX hereto.

Scholium under Proposition IV. And Antitheos himself, as we have seen,† gives the "Argument" credit for "precision of purpose and exactness of arrangement." And therefore, if we, who are standing over against nothing farther on than Proposition III., now let our readers know how the work in question demonstrates that two substances may fill the same space, at the same time, but in different respects, it is not because we are under any strong necessity of doing so, but only because there is nothing to hinder us from following out a thing which our atheist has started, out of season as it happens, and in an evil hour for himself.

§ 11. The secret, indeed, has already been divulged: and of a truth it will never be easy to make a secret of that which must stare one in the face if he but opens his eyes and turns them in the proper direction. But in place of repeating the words which our reader has been presented with in Part III. § 16, we shall here cite the *ipsissima verba* of the Scholium to which reference has just been made.

§ 12. "SCHOLIUM II. The parts of Infinity of Extension, " or of its Substratum, if it have a Substratum, being " necessarily indivisible from each other † * * *: and the " parts of the Material Universe being divisible from each " other * * *: and it, *therefore*, following that the Mate- " rial Universe is not the Substratum of Infinity of Exten- " sion * * *: Here are two sorts of extension. The one " sort, that which the Material Universe has: And the other, " the extension of Infinity of Extension. And AS Infinity of " Extension is necessarily existing,|| AND AS the extension of " the Material Universe must exist, if it exist, in the exten- " sion of Infinity of Extension; a part of this, or of its Sub- " stratum, if it have a Substratum, (*part*, but in the sense of

† See Part II. § 4.

‡ See Part II. § 27, and Part III. § 16.

|| See Part II. § 14; also, § 9.

“partial consideration;) must PENETRATE the Material Universe, and every atom, even the minutest atom, of it.”

§ 13. So, we see how it is easily and very palpably demonstrable, that two things must fill the same space at the same time, if matter exist. The two things fill the same space in different, in very different respects. They fill the same space, the one by *penetrating*, the other by *being penetrated*: this, (to discriminate nicely, and not too nicely,) by filling or occupying the space, that, by constituting it.

§ 14. When Antitheos lays down, that it is absurd to have in our view “two things at the same time occupying the same space,” he makes no mention of the doctrine of penetration. If he *took care* to make no mention of it, he may justify his silence by pointing to an excellent reason which was in existence: all the absurdity, if there was any, disappears whenever penetration is introduced. There cannot be complete penetration without two things filling the same space at one and the same time.

§ 15. Antitheos, we repeat, takes no notice of the doctrine of penetration. He did this, either advisedly, or because he could not help it.

§ 16. If he could not help what he has done, or rather what he has not done; in this particular matter, he was not so clear-sighted as was an author whose ideas are not seldom turned to good account in the “Refutation.” “They (the theologians) will * * insist,” remarks D’Holbach, “that their GOD, who is not matter, *penetrates* that which is matter.” “System of Nature.” Vol. II. ch. ii.

§ 17. [Our readers may naturally, and very laudably, be desirous of being informed what objections the French atheist has to urge against the doctrine of the DEITY’S penetrating matter. It is all the more proper to supply the information, that our British atheist, so far from objecting to the doc-

trine, does not so much as think it right to notice it. In fine, we may, with some advantage bestow a little consideration on what the foreigner has advanced in opposition to our tenet.

§ 18. *Objection.* "It must be obvious, that to penetrate matter, it is necessary to have some correspondence with matter, consequently to have extent; now to have extent, is to have one of the properties of matter."—

§ 19. *Reply.* But is it proved anywhere in the "System of Nature," that *because* extension is one of the properties of matter, *therefore* whatever has extension—extension, which is a true *sine quâ non* of every substance—attributed to it, is material? No indeed. Has a vacuum (and D'Holbach speaks of a vacuum as quite a possible, if not also a really existing thing;) has a vacuum extent? Then, according to the *leaning* of the objection, a vacuum is a plenum!

§ 20. *Objection.* "If the DIVINITY penetrates matter, then HE is material."—

§ 21. *Reply.* Any reason given? None. Then there is ~~none~~ to be examined. The assertion itself may very correctly be designated, in Antitheos's nervous language, "an unproved extravagance." Why, if matter is perfectly penetrated by a *distinct* substance, the presumption, till something to the contrary be established, seems all to be in favour of the penetrating substance being *immaterial*.

§ 22. *Objection.* "By a necessary deduction HE is inseparable from matter."—

§ 23. *Reply.* HE is not separated from matter, of course, so long as HE penetrates it, that is, so long as it continues in existence. But no longer. Matter has not been proved to have *necessary existence*.

§ 24. *Objection.* "Then if HE is omnipresent, HE will be in every thing. This the theologian will not allow."—"System of Nature." Vol. II. ch. ii.

§ 25. *Reply.* The theologians of D'Holbach's book may not allow it; but, for all that, every consistent theologian, and, what is more, every rational man, will allow the necessity of the *consequent*.

§ 26. And thus we have gone over, and, on his own ground, replied to all that the French atheist has objected to the DEITY'S penetration of matter. No mighty things verily those objections. But since they are all that so ingenious and so zealous an objector could bring forward, we may depend on't they constitute the full strength of his bad cause.

§ 27. I am led to make a reflection, which seems to arise, not altogether so unnaturally, out of the consideration with which we have just been occupied. What indeed, but a *passion* for atheism, should incite certain to inveigh so mightily against the doctrine of penetration in general! And as we are upon the subject, it may not be amiss to observe, that it can but ill become modern natural philosophers to incline determinately to look with an unfavourable eye on the doctrine of the penetration of one substance by another, even though this latter should be, if any thing, *immaterial*: Modern Natural Philosophers, none of whom has yet proved, while many of them are confident, it is not proveable, that *light* itself is material: Modern Natural Philosophers, whose experiments and investigations have led them to a full belief, that the *electric fluid* is a substance *most intimately pervading every material substance*. Let Antitheos, in the character of a natural philosopher, represent the whole body of the philosophers spoken of. Hear him discourse of the electric fluid.

§ 28. "Should it be demanded—as it is always commendable to do on such occasions—what *the substance* is which we deem to be present in what is usually denominated

" a vacuum,—we may reply—the *electric fluid*. No substance is capable of excluding it. As water seeks its level, the fluid in question presses every where, that it may be every where present; and with this tendency, IT PENETRATES, in a manner the most irresistible, every thing that can be opposed to its course." Chap. VII. par. 6.

§ 29. The substance recognised by the name of the *electric fluid* penetrates every material substance. Does not this lead the way to help us somewhat to conceive how, as it were, it may be that a part of the Infinite Extension, OR of its Immaterial Substratum, penetrates every substance, *light* and the *electric fluid* with the rest, which can in any manner fall under the cognizance of sense?]

§ 30. Whether or not Antitheos saw, 'tis nothing very wonderful that he speaks—he *does* speak—as if he saw not, how it is that two things may, without any absurdity, be held to occupy the same space at the same time. The demonstration of the penetration of matter, where matter exists, is the very Hercules for his Lernæan Hydra. Not to see that demonstration in the "Argument," or altogether to forget its being there, though the demonstration figures in a scholium of its own; either of these is bad enough.

§ 31. And there is something else which is as bad; very likely, worse: *The doctrine of the PENETRATION of matter, is deducible, by UNDENIABLE CONSEQUENCE, FROM OUR ATHEIST'S TENETS,* as they are given by himself. Unfortunate Antitheos! though one door was somehow shut, (at least Antitheos does not *say*, he saw it open,) to have the enemy enter by another, which is not to be closed so easily.

§ 32. We shall produce our antitheist's tenets, and afterwards address ourselves to the necessary consequence of them as associated.

§ 33. In the *first* place, then, as specimens of one class of tenets, take the following. "Infinity of extension is **NECESSARILY** existing,—it would be *absurd* in the extreme "to deny." *Etc. &c.*† Again: "Take away matter, and you effect the taking off of every thing of which we can form the slightest idea. *All is annihilated except space and duration.*"‡ Ch. II. par. 26. Again: "Matter may be regarded as eternal and space infinite. **WE MUST, it is true,** award both attributes to the latter." Ch. III. par. 8. To the like effect: "We have * * a something * * * * "WHOSE NON-EXISTENCE, * * * and so forth, **CANNOT BE CONCEIVED:** a something, in short, that answers to our notions of *space.*" *Ibid.* par. 12. To the same purpose: "It is not necessary—*not absolutely necessary*—that even extension, or *space,* should have any substratum or support to its existence whatever." Ch. IX. par. 2. Also: "To

† See Part I. § 34.

‡ This passage *leads* me to quote a sentence from a Review of *the Argument, a priori,*" which made its appearance in a Number of "The United Secession Magazine." [Now superseded by a periodical with a different name. In fact, the United Secession Church, itself, is now superseded by a Church, or rather Churches, with a different name. The *United Secession* has vanished from the face of the earth: it is merged in, or swallowed up by, the *United Presbyterian* body—an amalgam of Churches.] "Were our minds," says the Reviewer, "to make the most extravagant of all possible suppositions, and compass the idea of all the material universe, and even (*let it be said with deep reverence*) **GOD** himself being annihilated;¹ still we know it is certain that 'infinity of extension and infinity of duration' would continue to exist." "Both these are, in their very nature, independent of all being, even of **GOD** himself." The author of which may write "**ATHEIST**" on his forehead, as soon as he can, without running any risk of writing a logical lie. If we can conceive **GOD** Himself—to speak with *sense*, for *reverence*, in present circumstances, is altogether out of the question—to be *annihilated*; if, in other words, it infer *no contradiction* to say, **HE** exists not; and if there be any one thing which exists quite

¹ Behold another Reviewer harping on the same string in Part I. § 14.

"make sure of the *necessity* so much desired, Mr Gillespie "lays hold of the only two things to which it can at all be "made applicable—duration and *space*." Ch. XIII. par. 4. Finally, take this: "The NECESSARY existence of *infinite space* and duration: none of which propositions were" [or was] "ever disputed." See Part I. § 35.† Thus, infinity of extension, infinite space, is plenary admitted by our author to have necessary existence.

§ 34. We shall, in the *second* place, bring forward a set of passages that speak a very different language. Accept first: "A being existing by *necessity* is sought for; that is * * * *independently* of GOD; what is there in Theology worth caring about? Theology itself becomes a phantasm.

As another suitable opportunity of noticing that criticism may never fall in my way, and as assuredly 'tis worth nobody's while to search for one, I shall not quit this disagreeable subject till I deliver something of my mind concerning the performance generally.

Two remarks could not miss occurring to every sensible reader of that deplorable Article. The first is, that the Reviewer sticks at no dishonesty, however gross. Taking the thing as it is printed, the most shameful *misquotations* are never boggled at; even though the want of all good faith should shine clearly through. The other is, that the writer has no head (any more than a heart) equal to such discussions. Every one who has a capacity for topics of that nature, will make the discovery, ere any two sentences be read, that, whoever has, the wretched critic has not.

There can be no good reason, now, for withholding the information, that the author of the Review in question was the late Reverend Robert Morison, of Bathgate, the father of the founder of our *Morisonians*, who, as a whole, prefer to call themselves by the name of *the Evangelical Union*.

A College in one of the Northern States, of the now Dis-United States of North America, (our newspapers designate it "the Adrian College, Michigan,") found time, on 18th June last (1862), viz. in the midst of the toils of the most tumultuous, and desolating, and desecrating Civil War known to history, to confer the degree of Doctor of Divinity upon the founder of, and (naturally) the Professor of Theology to, those who have developed themselves into that "Evangelical Union."

† See, also, "Refutation," Chap. X. par. 7.

“ one whose non-existence it is not in the power of man to
 “ imagine * * * * * To seek *in nature* for such a being;
 “ to ransack the *whole universe* for it WERE VAIN. Among
 “ real and known existences it was NOWHERE TO BE
 “ FOUND.”† Next take: “ If such a condition as *necessary*
 “ or *self-existence* really exists, * * Why can it *not* be
 “ made applicable to the material universe”?‡ To a similar
 effect: “ Matter does *not* exist by that necessity which alone
 “ is admitted in the argument *a priori*.”|| And this: “ We
 “ may as well go into the HYPOTHESIS of a *vacuum* at once
 “ * * * What, then, is a vacuum? It is space, I presume,
 “ without any matter being present at all.”¶ Once more:
 “ It is *as easy* to conceive of the non-existence of the thing
 “ supposed,” (to-wit by Dr Clarke,) “ *as to conceive of the*
 “ non-existence of that of which we are ourselves made up,
 “ together with the world we inhabit, and the countless suns
 “ and systems occupying space in all directions.”†† Again:
 “ Gods and devils, angels and spirits, heaven and hell,—sup-
 “ posing them all to exist—could have no claim to necessary
 “ existence, since it *implies no contradiction to imagine*
 “ *them not to exist.*”‡‡ And in fine: “ WE CAN CONCEIVE
 MATTER NOT TO EXIST.”||| Thus, matter is by our atheist
 completely deprived of true necessary existence.

§ 35. To collect into a focus the very dissimilar, yet
 congruous rays, emitted by that body of light, the “ Refuta-
 tion,” which sends forth no clearer beams than are here: In
 the one set of positions, we have an extension which is *neces-
 sary*; in the other set, an extension *not necessary*.

† Chap. I. par. 6.

‡ Chap. II. par. 21.

|| Chap. V. par. 5.

¶ Chap. VII. par. 5.

†† Chap. XIII. par. 3.

‡‡ Chap. II. par. 20.

||| Chap. II. par. 20. Consider, likewise, Chap. II. par. 24, Chap. VI.
par. 13, and Chap. IX. par. 10.

§ 36. We hasten to the consequence resulting from the conjunction of the two kinds of positions. We have an extension which is NECESSARY, and we have an extension which is NOT NECESSARY. WE HAVE, THEREFORE, TWO EXTENSIONS WHICH CANNOT BE THE SAME. TWO EXTENSIONS THE ONE WHEREOF CANNOT BE ANY PART OF THE OTHER. But a non-necessary extension cannot by its presence annihilate any portion of a necessary extension. AND, THEREFORE; matter—which has the non-necessary extension—existing along with, if not *contained in*, the extension which is of infinity—the necessary extension; the infinite extension, or space, must PENETRATE; matter must BE PENETRATED, *tota, et totalitèr*.

§ 37. Such, then, is the conclusion to which we are compelled to come by Antitheos's express tenets. And wherein does that conclusion differ from the conclusion of "Scholium II.?" Not in any point at all.

§ 38. Let the reader give his utmost attention to what we have here been urging. For, the doctrine of penetration demonstrated, *atheism falls down, dead as a stone*. And Antitheos knows this, else he knows but little of any moment in the affair. And the best of all, is—never let us forget it—the doctrine of penetration necessarily follows from his own principles.

§ 39. So that, to speak in allusion to our atheist's words, as they occur in the first of the passages on which we have been animadverting, Theology has not entangled its advocate in an inextricable absurdity. There is no absurdity in the case, but one; which is this, that our author should stand up for the *atheistical* hypothesis, and hold principles from which the first grand principle which conducts to *Theism*, and to nothing else, follows by complete necessity.

§ 40. After the words referred to in the preceding section,

Antitheos goes on thus: "A religious friend who has corresponded with me upon this point, alleges that the substance of the substratum of infinite extension is *not material*."† To be religious according to our atheist's mode of reckoning, nothing more is requisite than to be a theist. On this understanding, I can easily help him to another religious friend (a friend in the very best sense) who alleges the same thing, namely, that the substance of the substratum of infinite extension is immaterial. And this friend is no other than the Author of the "Argument" himself, *who*, though, to speak truth, he has not alleged that the substance of the substratum of infinite extension is not material, has, if he be not sadly mistaken, done *much more than merely allege* that which implies the immateriality of the substance of the substratum in question; and *who* will persist in thinking he has done so, till some one shall evince, by truly valid arguments, that the thought is erroneous. As for the "Refutation," of arguments, except those which are "a very clever approach" to shockingly bad ones, it contains none. The Author of this production, himself, shall witness for us, that the "Argument" has undertaken to demonstrate what involves the immateriality of the substratum of infinity of extension, or expansion. "Admitting his (Mr Gillespie's) substratum of space * * * No reason can be assigned why infinity of expansion * * * should have *an immaterial* something to keep it in existence, that *would not prove*"—&c. &c.‡ Here it is tacitly assumed, that the "Argument" seeks to reach an immaterial substratum of infinity of expansion. So that the "religious friend" introduces Antitheos to the front of what may be held, in a certain and a good sense, and to his opprobrium, alas! as the very *asses' bridge* of the demonstration. Observe, then,

† Chap. VI. par. 14.

‡ Chap. VII. par. 13.

Antitheos's "footing" and bearing, as he prepares to make the leap, and pass the bridge. Get clear of it he must; or else it will roll over on him, and crush his atheism into powder. Observe, I repeat, how the passage is to be effected. Behold, he springs aloft—"But this is mere *babble*." Immediately I hear all my readers loudly accuse me of having omitted something. But I assure you, not one word has been missed. Then surely something follows. True; but what is to come you will not think mends the matter.—"This is mere *babble*; something he has been taught to repeat,—not the dictate of his sounder judgment."—And why so?—"Substance and matter are the same. The words are synonymous and convertible"—in the sense of the words mutually exhausting each other, Antitheos means. Yes, the words *are* convertible in that sense, IF the barely assuming the thing our atheist had to prove, the mere uttering of an "unproved extravagance," be all that is necessary to be done in the affair.† "When," our antitheist proceeds, "used otherwise" (than, to-wit, as merely convertible words) "they become *unintelligible*; *inasmuch as* we might then "talk of an unsubstantial substance and immaterial matter."[‡] *Un*-substantial substance; namely, substance that is *not* substance! *Im*-material matter; to-wit, matter which is *not* matter! Unintelligible indeed. And as such we hand them over to our materialist's tender mercies.

§ 41. (One word in relation to the latter unintelligibility. There is no opinion, however extravagant, but has had its advocates in the world, no assertion so wild as not to have been made by some *philosopher*.|| Antitheos holds (and

† See above, § 2.

‡ Parag. 14.

|| *Nihil est tam absurdum quod non aliquis à Philosophis asserat.*—TULLY.
—The same maxim, as we may call it, and in precisely, or nearly, the same words, occurs several times in the course of Cicero's writings. Thus, the

who is he who will think, Antitheos does not rightly hold?) that to talk of *im-material matter* is to talk unintelligibly. But attend. A very celebrated maintainer of the *materiality of mind*, had also been an advocate for the *immateriality of matter*. Dr Priestley, in his "History of Discoveries relating to Vision, Light, and Colours," declares for the "*scheme of THE IMMATERIALITY OF MATTER, as it may be called.*" And we shall not take upon us to say, that he so declares himself with less reason on his side than he has when he appears, and he appears throughout his "Disquisitions on Matter AND *Spirit*," as a sworn friend to the *materiality of mind*. From *matter*, this Doctor says, in the latter work, (vol. i. p. 144, 2d edit.) he has "wiped off the *reproach*" [a long standing one] "of being * * absolutely incapable of intelligence." Which *perhaps* he had accomplished all the more easily, if matter be immaterial.)

sentiment takes, in another quarter of the Ciceronean horizon, this form:
Nihil tam absurdum dici potest ut non dicatur a Philosopho.

PART VII.

THE "ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, FOR THE BEING AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD," AN IRREFRAGABLE DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. The next paragraph in the "Refutation" commences thus: "But, to refer to the *first* Proposition,—has it not been demonstrated that infinity of extension exists necessarily?—that it exists, *per se*, by the most abstract and "metaphysical necessity?"† By the way, here we have the *right* word, *i. e.* "metaphysical": Though no farther back than the thirteenth paragraph, we had "mathematical," the *wrong* one.‡ Antitheos in a certain place speaks of a "magic rod" possessed by "the reasoners for the being of a "GOD according to the argument *a priori*;" who are said to "work miracles with" "*necessity*," which is the name of the rod.|| A *magic* rod it must be: and no mistake. But I am of opinion, that our author's magical powers, whether they are centered in a rod or no, should be presumed, notwithstanding his confirmed distaste to the supernatural, to be nowise inferior to those resident in the rod of the *a priori* reasoners noticed. To turn, when one likes, what is *metaphysical* necessity into "mathematical," and the *mathematical* back again into "metaphysical necessity"; implies, methinks, a stretch of power equal, and indeed superior, to the virtue ascribed by him to our magic rod.

† Chap. VI. par. 15.

‡ See Part VI. § 2.

|| See last Chapter, sixth paragraph.

We, he says, "work *miracles*." Whereas, he works an *impossibility*, and that's more than a miracle.

§ 2. It *has* been demonstrated, that infinity of extension exists necessarily. So the first question is answered. It *has not* been, and what is more, it never will be, demonstrated that infinity of extension exists *per se*. So Antitheos has his second question replied to, but not affirmatively. "The *first Proposition*" maintains the necessary existence of infinite extension; but determines nothing concerning the topic whether that extension exists by itself or not. In the language of the note upon Proposition I.: "The proposition affirms that there is Infinity of Extension, *but affirms nothing more*." See "Appendix" to the "Argument."†

§ 3. After putting the two interrogatories which we have answered in so satisfactory a manner, our atheist asks: "In what sort of predicament, *then*, must that reasoning appear, which gives up a leading and universally admitted truth by placing it in a questionable position?" The reasoning that does so must appear, and, which is more, must really be, in an ill predicament indeed. This much may be held as settled. But the "then;" the significant particle which insinuates that "that reasoning" is Mr Gillespie's;—"there's the rub." But we come to the proof of the justness of the insinuation. "Mr Gillespie's dilemma recognises, at least, the possibility of infinite extension requiring a substratum to support it—infinite extension, which is itself necessary!" Yea: Mr Gillespie's dilemma, or disjunctive proposition, does recognise such a possibility; and, what is a longer journey in the same direction, the first Proposition of Part III. is, *inter alia*, taken up in

† Weigh the note to § 89, Part X.

demonstrating that "Infinity of Expansion" or Extension "cannot exist by itself," that, on the contrary, "Infinity of Expansion subsists not without a Substratum or Being." Mr Gillespie, then, in his dilemma, and out of it too, fully "recognises, at least, the possibility of infinite extension," "which is itself necessary," "requiring a substratum"—We shall not say a "substratum to support it," that is, a substratum to be a substratum. Infinite extension is itself necessary. But then, it is not necessary that infinite extension exist *per se*: At least, this has not been shown to follow from the other position; or, moreover, from any thing else. The positions, Infinity of extension exists necessarily, and, Infinity of extension exists *per se*; though it has pleased Antitheos to treat them as if they expressed much about the same thing, are positions of a widely different character. The latter one is no more necessarily true because the former is so, than it is necessary, that *because* there are such things as vain assertions cemented together so as to form weak arguing, *therefore* the vain assertions should exist *per se*. Only conceive vain assertions that never proceeded from any idle tongue, or unfortunate pen! that never existed, consequently, but by themselves! hanging in the pure *per se* state—wherever you please! without even a *Refutation* to reside in! The

Words congeal'd in northern air,†

are not so badly off, though they must submit to be heard at the thaw, as those assertions must be. Words frozen in the atmosphere must first have been uttered. And yet, though there cannot be vain assertions that never were made, it is

† *Hudibras*, Part I. Canto i.—Butler took this capital piece of fun from Rabelais, the common fount of so many prime jokes. It would not be easy, indeed, to say which of our great wits and humourists has not been indebted to the creator of Pantagruel and Panurge.

perfectly true there is an abundance of the commodity in the world—to try our patience. Some very vain assertions are not so far to seek either; although we mention no place.

§ 4. “Mr Gillespie’s dilemma recognises, at least, the possibility of infinite extension requiring a substratum to support it—infinite extension, which is itself necessary! “How is this?” I think, we have told him. And, for his comfort, he shall be told yet farther.

§ 5. “Was it found,” demands our antitheist in continuation, “that although *space* possessed a few of the Divine attributes, *it* did not possess all, nor any thing like all that were deemed needful to constitute a respectable deity? “Notwithstanding appearances, I should hope not. But, at any rate, we are again landed in a quagmire of absurdity—the absurdity of supposing a thing to be dependent and independent at the same time. If *space* must be conceived *a priori* necessary, to talk of a substratum being necessary in the same sense of the word is nonsense.”† What does Antitheos here understand by the word “space?” Without an accompanying word, or phrase, to determine the exact sense it is to bear, *space* always is rather an ambiguous term. Different schools of philosophy have employed it to stand for very different things.

§ 6. And it will be of singular use in clearing matters, if we present an enumeration of the different things understood by philosophers when they are treating of *space*.—In explaining the various ideas which have been entertained, one thing shall be carefully attended to: We shall take pains not to represent those opinions from which we dissent through the medium of our own belief on the subject. The inquiry is to be, What do philosophers mean by *space*? And should

† Parag. 15.

we presuppose, at least should our exposition assume, that *space* stands for some particular thing exclusively, the representation of the sentiments of certain could hardly be given with fairness. In fine, though we have a fixed bias in this matter, we shall endeavour, while we deliver what others think, to proceed as if we had no preconceived notions at all.

§ 7. A few remarks, also, shall be thrown out, intended to show that of the various opinions some approach nearer to the truth than do others. Where notions are most completely opposed, the object viewed by the minds in possession of them cannot possibly be the same, or, if there be not more objects than one, the sentiments cannot possibly all be correct. 'Tis certain enough, that the reports brought us, as to what space is, disagree in the most fundamental points.—With regard to the *exposition*, we shall not take *space* to stand for any one thing more than for any other. But when we pass to the *animadversions*, we shall, on the contrary, by all means assume that space is nothing more than space; that space is nothing more than space, and nothing less. An assumption which, doubtless, we are well entitled to make: And one that will be found to carry a great deal with it—A thing you may naturally incline to consider as remarkable.* But true it is, that so simple an act as holding so many of the conceits concerning space up to the light of the axiom, space is space, is to lay bare their extreme emptiness.—The digression as a whole, in short, will be useful, inasmuch as it will go to determine whether there be in nature space without matter, and, if there be, what space without respect to body is. And besides the general purpose it is designed to serve, parts of the digression (we seek not to conceal it) will be attended with no inconsiderable collateral advantage to our cause.

OF THE SENTIMENTS OF PHILOSOPHERS CONCERN-
ING SPACE. — M. DES CARTES, MRS COCKBURN,
PRESIDENT EDWARDS, AND OTHERS.

§ 8.—I. Some philosophers have considered Space to be a *substance*. These may be divided into two classes. *First*; those who hold Matter and Space to be the same. *Second*; those who contend that Space is a substance, and is distinct from Matter.

§ 9.—1. Des Cartes having defined extension to be the essence of matter, and thus made extension and matter to be the same, could admit of no space void of body, could not admit, in other words, of there being space which is not material. A consequence of the definition is, that the material universe is^o infinitely extended: The idea of the infinity of extension no man who reflects on the subject can get quit of; and, therefore, if extension be matter, matter is without bounds. “*Puto*,” says Cartesius, “*implicare contradictionem, ut mundus sit finitus*.” [“I take it to involve a contradiction to say, the material universe is finite,” *i. e.*, in extent.] *Epist. 69. Partis primæ*. And to reduce the position, Matter is finitely extended, to a contradiction, this ingenious theist had nothing but his own vain definition, namely, Matter is extension, and extension is matter. What else under the sun, or above, could he have?

§ 10. We shall introduce a passage from a rather ingenious author. “Some (I mean Des Cartes and his followers) “confounding the ideas of *extension* and *body* have by

“ this * * * been led to assert the absolute infinity even
 “ of the material universe; tho’ they could not but at the
 “ same time be sensible that their hypothesis in some sense
 “ rendered matter or body a necessary being, by depriving the
 “ DEITY both of the power of creating a finite whole at the
 “ first, and of afterwards annihilating any part.”—“ An Im-
 “ partial Enquiry into the Existence and Nature of GOD,” &c.
 By S. C. (S. Colliber.) B. II. part ii. ch. 2.—I add, that if
 extension, or space, and matter are to be confounded, matter
 must have been, as well as must be, eternal, and is also neces-
 sary in the sense of it inferring a contradiction to say, it does
 not exist; unless we will have it, that all extension began
 sometime to be, and can be imagined not to be at all.
 There can be space without matter, or body: else, body is
 eternal, nay necessarily existing, that is, cannot be supposed
 non-existent.

§ 11.*—2. The opinion has been entertained by some, that
 there is Space apart from matter, and that Space without
 matter is, *itself*, a substance. “ *Substantiæ sunt,*” says
 Gravesande, “ *aut cogitantes, aut non cogitantes; cogitantes*
 “ *duas novimus, DEUM et Mentem Nostram. * * * Duce*
 “ *etiam substantiæ, quæ non cogitant, nobis notæ sunt, Spa-*
 “ *tium et Corpus.*” [“ Substances are either cogitative, or
 “ incogitative; the cogitative are two-fold, GOD and Human
 “ Minds. * * * Incogitative substances are likewise two-
 “ fold, Space and Body.”]—*Introd. ad Philosophiam*, § 19.—
 Under this head, we may next notice, in the *first* place,
 their notion who tell us, that Space void of body is a kind
 of intermediate substance; neither body nor mind, but a
 something between the two. And, in the *next* place, the
 sentiment of those who are willing to be held as maintain-
 ing, that Space is GOD.

§ 12.—(1.) The notion that Space is a peculiar sort of

being, a substance between body and spirit, has been adopted by divers writers of no very remote period. A distinguished female metaphysician expresses herself in the following manner. "I see no absurdity in supposing, that there may be other substances, than either spirits or bodies. * * * * * There should be in nature some being to fill up the vast chasm betwixt body and spirit. * * * * * What a gap betwixt *senseless material* and *intelligent immaterial* substance, unless there is some being, which, by partaking of the nature of both, may serve as a link to unite them, and make the transition less violent? And why may not Space be such a being? Might we not venture to define it, an *immaterial un intelligent substance, the place of bodies, and of spirits, having some of the properties of both?*"—Mrs Cockburn's Works. Birch's Edit. vol. i. p. 390-1.†

§ 13. This lady writes as if body and spirit were two distinctly different kinds of substance, and as if *intelligence* was the *peculiar* attribute of Spirit. *Senseless* material substance, and *intelligent* immaterial substance; thus she distinguishes: And alluding as she does to the violence of that transition which passes from the one substance to the other, she represents the substances as being separated by

† Mrs Catherine Cockburn was the author of "A Defence of Mr Locke's Essay," and other acute and excellent performances. The Defence was much prized by the incomparable author defended. She was also in high favour, on account of her writings, with Dr Thomas Burnet, Bishop of Salisbury, and the giant-minded Warburton:—Each of these Prelates supplied a preface to a production of her pen. Dr Thomas Sharp, Archdeacon of Northumberland, carried on a controversy with Mrs Cockburn, as to the true foundation of morality. She surely was an honour to her sex. — The words quoted in the text, occur in her "Remarks upon some writers in the Controversy concerning the Foundation of Moral Virtue and Moral Obligation."

a mighty and irremovable gulf. She, good woman, had not learned the secret (it was yet—possibly it still is—undivulged) how to wipe off from matter the reproach of being miserably ill qualified for sustaining the heavy burden of thought.† Her distinction and representation we are disposed to commend. And as for her ignorance of the secret;—probably she was wiser without the knowledge.

§ 14. But now to what is to us the important part in the quotation, the statement, to-wit, of her opinion, that *space is a substance, an unintelligent substance, yea an im-material substance.* (Of a truth, that space *void of matter*—which is what she means by space—is *im-material*, none can deny.) By what arguments does Mrs Cockburn pretend to evince, that her opinion has foundation in the nature of things? I find only one argument in that passage, and no more than one other in all her writings.

§ 15. The argument occurring in the passage quoted, infers the truth of the hypothesis embraced, from the advantage attending it. Space, argues Mrs Cockburn, “by partaking “of the nature of both” “senseless (or unintelligent) material, “and intelligent immaterial substance”——

§ 16. But we must break in, to remark how it comes about that Space is invested with “some of the properties of both” *spirit* and *body*. Why is Space thus invested? Because it is *immaterial* and *unintelligent*. Had it been said, that, seeing Space is not matter, and is destitute of intelligence, an attribute this of spirit, Space is not body and lacks a property of spirit; there had been nothing very objectionable. But as the lady’s words stand, the only ‘property’ bestowed on spirit is *im-materiality*—a cold negation; and the only ‘property’ thrown over to body is *un-intelli-*

† See Part VI. § 41.

gence—a mere privation too. To return from this interruption, which, we may say, was forced upon us, and for which we humbly beg pardon of Mrs Cockburn:—

§ 17. She argues, we repeat, that Space, by partaking of the nature of both unintelligent material, and intelligent immaterial substance, is useful in the realm of nature, inasmuch as it serves as a connecting link, and takes off all that can be taken from the violence of the transition, between substances separated by such a “vast chasm.”—Space, in short, connects intelligence and non-intelligence, matter and not-matter. But if there be a connecting link between matter and no matter, intelligence and no intelligence; why might we not extend the principle, and introduce a connecting link between existence in general, itself, and non-existence; by way of rendering the transition from the one to the other *less violent*? Put shall we indeed be ever able to say, without violence to truth, that the great gulf betwixt non-existence and existence

Tamely endured a bridge of wondrous length?†

§ 18. The other argument to which allusion was made, is not, indeed, intended to evidence, that Space is an unintelligent substance: and as for immateriality, space without matter is immaterial all the world over. This second argument is intended to evidence no more than that Space is a *substance*. But then, if it really render this much apparent, it will do a great deal. The argument in question is contained in these words: “The idea of space is not the idea of extension, but of *something extended*.”‡ “Remarks.”

† Milton’s “Paradise Lost.” B. II.

‡ Who shall decide, when doctors disagree?

And who shall decide, when Doctors differ from ladies? “If *Space* and “*Duration* * * * be not (*as ’tis plain they are not*) themselves *substances*.”—Dr Sl. Clarke’s Ans. to 5th Letter.

§ 19. Now if this argument be to go for any thing at all, it will obviously go for something very weighty. Thus it deserves our serious consideration.

§ 20. *Space*, the argument implies, is *not extension*, but something, that is, a substance, extended.

§ 21. But if *Space* be an extended substance, *Duration* may be, on the same ground, an enduring substance. The two things are in the same predicament. *Space* and *Time* are each a *sine quâ non* of every thing else. The non-existence of either cannot be conceived. They are both limitless. They are, in fine, on a footing of equality in every essential respect. And if bare *space* be a substance, it will be necessary to assign a sufficient reason why bare *duration* is not. It will be consequentially necessary, and absolutely impossible.

§ 22. This is an argument from *the consequencé*. The next shall be an argument from *the state of the fact*.

§ 23. *Space* is a substance having extension: This the lady's argument involves. Now the hypothesis, that extension is an attribute of *space*, takes, of necessity, cognizance of two things,—the substance extended, and the extension thereof. But though the hypothesis does so, *do we?* This is an appeal to consciousness, and as the court applied to is competent to take the case in hand, so, it need scarcely be said, no other tribunal is qualified. Do we (I say) in conceiving *space*,—as we conceive a thing *being*, do we conceive, in addition, a thing *having*, extension? How, and wherein, is *space*, the substratum extended, distinguishable from extension, the property of *space*? The plain and simple truth is, *space*, the substratum, and extension, the property, are not distinguishable at all. We conceive only one extension, only one *space*.

§ 24. So much for the argument from *the fact*. Now for an argument from *the word*.

§ 25. *Space* just means *extension* or *expansion*. "The words *Space*, *Extension*, *Amplitude*, and *Expansion* are," says the author of the "Impartial Enquiry," "nothing different, neither in their genuine signification nor in their original use"—"whatever distinction is wont to be assigned is merely arbitrary." See his Discourse concerning the Nature of Space.

§ 26. *Space*, then, is merely another term for *extension*. And therefore, to say, *Space* is something which is extended, or which is extension, is all one with saying, *Extension* is something which is space. Which propositions are indeed nothing more than the truth, in one view of matters, *viz.* that in which the propositions are beheld as *truisms*: But, according to our lady's mode of reckoning what are equivalents, are tantamount to these propositions:—*Space* is something (in the former equivalent proposition it ran, *which is*—but now it becomes) *which has*, or *possesses*, extension; and, *Extension* is something (formerly, *which is*—at present) *which has*, or is *invested with*, space. But if simple space (in short) be not only extension, or space, but likewise a something or a substance possessing space; then, assuredly, simple space is something *more than* simple space. And we have already arranged, that we are not to permit any person to depart from us with the impression, that space is any thing more than space.†

§ 27. It may be remarked, in approaching the termination of this department of the subject, that space or extension without any matter filling it, may by all means *be connected with* a substance. But if it be, the circumstance will not make out, that mere space is, of itself, a substance. The very reverse, indeed. Space supposing a substance, is another thing, truly, from space being one.

† See above, § 7.

§ 28. Space, then, so far forth as it is space only, cannot be a substance. To elevate it to the rank of substance, is to change its identity. Before the dignity attaching to the nature of *substance* will sit easy upon space, we must metamorphose that which is space into that which space resides in.

§ 29. We have, in all this, confined ourselves to one line of arguing. But the reader may consider, at this point, something which occurs in the third section, above.

§ 30.—(2.) As the notion which we have just considered regards Space as unintelligent, so the opinion next to be noticed views it as an *intelligent* substance.

§ 31. Dr Samuel Clarke has an observation on “the weakness of such, as have presumed to imagine Infinite Space to be a *just representation* or adequate idea of the *Essence* of the Supreme Cause.”† The observation occurs under his 4th Proposition: Which runs thus:—“What the *Sub-*

† Is there no confounding here of the objective and subjective? of space and our idea of it? To fail in preserving the distinction between object and subject, was no uncommon thing in the Doctor's age. The full consequences of the failure were rendered very apparent in the age which preceded ours. But though the Doctor sometimes unfortunately lost his *ideas in things*, and changed, in spite of nature, things into ideas, yet, set him upon it, he could condemn all confusion in regard to the external and internal. The following passage may be admired, consistently, by the most finical stickler for the metaphysics which proceed “on the principles of Common Sense.”—“The principal occasion or reason of the *confusion and inconsistencies*, which appear in what most writers have advanced concerning the nature of *Space*, seems to be this: that (unless they attend carefully,) men are very apt to neglect that necessary distinction, (without which there can be no clear reasoning,) which ought always to be made between *Abstracts* and *Concretes*, such as are *Immensitas* and *Immensum*; and also between *IDEAS* and *THINGS*, such as are the *notion* (which is within our own mind) of *Immensity*, and the real *Immensity actually existing without us*.”—Correspondence with Leibnitz. Note in 5th Reply.

stance OR *Essence*† of that Being," [or "Substance,"‡] "which is Self-Existent, or Necessarily Existing, is; we have "no idea, neither is it at all possible for us to comprehend "it." The proposition lays down, that of the substance of GOD we have no idea: The observation sets an eye on those who, contrariwise, imagined that we have an idea of such substance;—that our idea of infinite space—not infinite space itself, as Clarke has it—is the idea of the substance of GOD. The great Rector of St James's, then, knew of persons who laboured in trying to represent *space* to be the substance of the Divine Being.

§ 32. "Some," says Leibnitz, "have believed it (real absolute space) to be GOD himself."—Third Paper to Clarke, 3.

§ 33. And Bishop Berkeley, good Bishop Berkeley,|| no bad judge he of the sentiments of others, and no lover of language deficient in precision, speaks of "that dangerous *dilemma*, to which several, who have employed their "thoughts on this subject, imagine themselves reduced; "to-wit, of thinking either *that real space is GOD*, or else

† The Doctor employs these two words as perfectly synonymous, and entirely convertible. This will be very plain to him who reads what is under this 4th Proposition. In which, the Doctor, when speaking in relation to GOD—the Self-Existent, Necessarily-Existing—Supreme Being—Substance—Cause,—uses, no less than five times, (as we have denoted,) *substance* and *essence* as expressing exactly the same thing: To say nothing of his employing, more than once, the two words indifferently, when treating concerning other things or beings. So that we may cite, as completely applicable to the present case, a marginal note in his Preface to "The Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion."—"In this whole question, the word "*Essence* is not to be taken in the proper metaphysical sense of the word, "as signifying *that by which a thing is what it is*. * * * But *Essence*, "is all along to be understood, as signifying here the same with *Substance*."

‡ See Part V. § 10.

|| To Berkeley, every virtue under heaven.

Pope—"Epilogue to the Satires."

“ that there is something beside GOD which is eternal, un-
 “ created, infinite, indivisible, iramutable.”—“ It is certain,”
 continues the Bishop, “ that not a few divines, as well as
 “ philosophers of great note, have, from the difficulty they
 “ found in conceiving either limits or annihilation of space,
 “ concluded it must be *Divine*,” viz. a *Divine Substance*:
 for, observe, his view here is directed to those who put forth,
 “ that real space is GOD.” “ And some of late have set
 “ themselves particularly to shew, that the *incommunicable*
 “ *attributes* of GOD agree to it.” “ Principles of Human
 Knowledge,” Sect. CXVII. Thus far Bishop Berkeley.

§ 34. But the following words of a great writer are very
 explicit, in every way. “ This Infinite and Omnipresent
 “ Being cannot be solid. * * * Space is this necessary,
 “ eternal, infinite, and omnipresent Being. * * * It is
 “ self-evident, I believe, to every man, that Space is neces-
 “ sary, eternal, infinite and omnipresent. But I had as good
 “ speak plain: I have already said as much as that Space is
 “ GOD. And it is indeed clear to me, that all the Space
 “ there is, not proper to body, all the Space there is without
 “ the bounds of creation, all the Space there was before the
 “ creation, is GOD Himself; and no body would in the least
 “ pick [peck?] at it, if it were not because of the gross con-
 “ ceptions that we have of Space.”—Jonathan Edwards’s
 “ Notes on Natural Science.”†

† See note to § 30, Part I. hercof.—The passage in the text is repeated,
 in Chapter IV. of “The Life of President Edwards,” by S. E. Dwight, where
 it occurs as a *specimen* of the “Notes.” A note, by the writer of *The Life*,
 informs us, that the assertion, that “Space is God,” “was written [by
 Edwards] at 15 or 16 years of age,” (*Life*, p. 45.) Well: what of that?
 Jonathan Edwards, even at sixteen, must have been an intellectual giant.
 It is not for common-place men to talk of the immature youth of men
 of genius, and great parts.—However, in the Appendix, we are told that
 “it is not improbable” that the piece was written “while the author was a
 “tutor in College.” Page 702.

§ 35. We shall seize this favourable opportunity, to vindicate the memory of a writer not so much known how as once he was. Against the respectable author whom we have in our eye, has a serious accusation been brought by Dr Isaac Watts. A great lover of truth was the Doctor: And if he be detected making a wrong statement, we can have no difficulty in ascribing the false representation to the true source, and may rest most thoroughly contented that he knew no better himself.

§ 36. The charge which the Doctor's pen was trusted to drop flows in this manner:—"Mr Raphson, a great mathematician, has written a book on this theme, *De Spatio Reali*,† wherein he labours to prove *that this space is GOD Himself*, going all along upon this supposition, that space is and must be something real; and then his reason cannot find an idea for it below GODHEAD."—"Philosophical Essays." Essay I. Sect. iv.

§ 37. But this testimony is not borne out by the fact; Mr Raphson's book neither labours to prove, nor so much as simply affirms, a thing so very absurd as the assertion, that space is GOD. The 13th proposition in Mr Raphson's demonstration concerning space is: "*Spatium est attributum (viz. immensitas) Primæ Cause.*" ["Space is an attribute (or it is the immensity) of the First Cause."] See *Cap. V.* And it is not in one place only of his book, this *great mathematician* maintains, that space, infinite space or immensity, is nothing more than an attribute of the Supreme Being.‡ So very far was he from giving any countenance

† Published at London, in MDCXCVII.

‡ The following words occur in the Dedication:—"De Spatio Reali * * * subsequens tractatus agit * * * quatenus * * * Supremi Entis infinitum sit et æternum Attributum." ["The following work treats * * of Real Space * * * as it is an infinite and eternal Attribute of the Supreme

to the monstrous position with which Dr Watts has connected his name.†

§ 38. Before losing sight of our mathematician, and of our metaphysician, we shall note, by way of setting matters farther right, that the Reverend accuser (at least during one stage of his life,‡) went nearer than Joseph Raphson did, to making space to be GOD. In the very same paragraph wherein the mathematician's sentiment is misrepresented, the metaphysician hath these words: "Indeed, if space be a real thing existent without us, it appears to be fair for DEITY." See also the title to the Essay||

"Being."] In *Cap. vi.* these passages are to be found: "*Spatium reale et infinitum, seu invisibilem illam et incorpoream τὸν Infiniti extensionem, ipsam immensitatem esse Præmæ Cause,*" &c. ["That the immensity of the First Cause is constituted by real and infinite space, which are just other words to express the invisible and incorporeal extension of the Infinite One," &c.] "*Amplitudo extensionis infinita, immensam in Prima Causa essendi diffusionem, seu infinitum illius, verèq; interminatam, essentiam, exprimit.*" ["In relation to the First Cause, infinity of extension is but another expression for diffusion to immensity, or infinite and truly interminable essence."]

† Watts has fallen into another mistake: and as we are in the way of rectifying blunders at any rate, we shall not leave his readers on a wrong scent as to a second notorious misconception in relation to Raphson's book. Wherein, affirms the Doctor, the author goes "*all along* upon this supposition, that space," to-wit, space distinct from matter, "is and must be something real." But what is the truth? Hear Mr Raphson speak for himself. The title of "*Cap. IV.*" is as follows: "*Spatium reale à materiâ distinctum in rerum naturâ dari, rationibus à naturâ mundi materialis, &c. petitis, demonstratur.*" ["That there is real space distinct from matter, is demonstrated, by reasons deduced from the nature of the material world, &c."] And the chapter commences in this manner: "*Hiscæ præmissis, ad rem ipsam (scil. spatium reale à materiâ distinctum) evincendam tandem venimus.*" &c. &c. ["Having premised this much, we come at length to evince the thing itself (to-wit, that there is real space distinct from matter") &c. &c.]

‡ See Part X. § 57.

|| See Part X. § 10. See, also, § 24 and § 34 of the same Part.

§ 39. —All this trouble, a desire to do justice, and a regard to truth, compelled us to take.

§ 40. We have shown that Space cannot be a Substance.† If Space cannot be a Substance, it cannot be a substance in possession of intelligence. All that we shall now do, is, to add something additional, upon the topic of the impossibility of Space having intelligence, or being GOD.

§ 41. By GOD,—at the very least we must mean, if we mean any thing, an intelligent, moral Being, or a Being with the attributes of intelligence, wisdom, goodness, holiness, &c. &c. How, then, can Space be GOD? how can Extension without matter, be wise and good? Space, for aught that has been proved, or that appears, to the contrary, may COEXIST with those attributes: It may be the *mode* of a Substance, of which they are *modes* too. But how can space, extension void of body, vacuum, be intelligent, and wise, and good, and holy? To say, that space is intelligent, wise, good, holy, is to say what virtually implies, that space, and intelligence, and wisdom, and goodness, and holiness, are COEXISTING things, but it is not to say what implies any thing more—if the assertion is to be supposed to have really any proper meaning. Space is NOTHING BUT SPACE. But intelligence is SOMETHING WHICH IS NOT SPACE. *Therefore*, if space itself were intelligence, space would not be space. Though Space and Intelligence may well be allowed to be coexistences, you cannot *sink and lose* the one in the other, without absurdity. But you sink and lose them in each other, whenever you make them more than coexistences. And they are more than coexistences, if space is intelligence. And Space is Intelligence, if it be true that space is intelligent, true, in any other sense than that involved in the position, They are coexistences.

† See above, § 21, and following sections, to § 29 inclusive.

§ 42. "Space," observes Clarke, "is not a Being, an eternal and infinite Being, but a property, or a consequence of the existence of a Being infinite and eternal. Infinite Space, is Immensity: But Immensity is not GOD: And therefore Infinite Space, is not GOD." Third Reply to Leibnitz, 3. Again. "Infinite Space, is nothing else but abstract Immensity or Infinity; even as Infinite Duration is abstract Eternity. And it would be just as proper, to say that Eternity is the essence," [or substance,†] "of the Supreme Cause; as to say, that Immensity is so." Demonstration: under Prop. IV.—These observations are deserving of being pondered, and with the reflections to which such observations should give birth, we cannot be too familiar.

§ 43. In connection with what we have said, that, for aught which has been shewn, or appears, to the contrary, space—we shall here say, infinite space—may *co-exist* with intelligence, wisdom, &c.; we are desirous of answering a question put forth by Antitheos, whom, in the mean time, we would not forget altogether. "How infinite extension," these are Antitheos's words, "or infinite duration, or a compound of both—if a compound of this nature can be imagined—" (I am sure it cannot)—"or how even a substratum of these *abstractions*‡—supposing such substratum—can afford a medium for the existence of *intelligence*, power, and freedom of agency, passes all understanding."—"Can we describe," demands our atheist, "how it is possible *for intelligence to pervade all space*—?"
 * * * * * Mr Gillespie talks of a substance,

† See above, the second note to § 31.

‡ The word in the "Refutation" is "attractions;" obviously a misprint. The sense (perhaps the nonsense—see Part I. section 8) requires *abstractions*.

“ it is true, a *being* of infinity of expansion, &c.”——† To Antitheos’s question, How can intelligence pervade all’space? I shall respond by a counter interrogation. But first, I must set down two or three words of his own, by way of a sort of fulcrum, whereby and wherefrom to loosen the foundations of his *materialism*, or, should these remain unshaken, it will be because his *atheism totters to its base*. “ Intelligence * *, speaking generally, is,” asserts Antitheos, “ nothing more than an accidental *property of matter*.”‡ Now my question is this: Does matter possess extension? *No doubt*,—Antitheos has already informed us.∥ Wherefore, intelligence being a property of what has extension, intelligence pervades what has extension. For how can intelligence be a property of matter, but by pervading matter? The thing is clear enough. But what is meant by pervading matter, is, co-existing with matter.

§ 44. Then—(I see Antitheos tremble for his atheism, as well he may—) if intelligence can co-exist with matter, or solid extension, why, why can intelligence not pervade, or co-exist with, extension without solidity, with pure space? Certain it is, the *solidity* does indeed seem to be no furtherance, but an impediment rather, to *thought*.

§ 45. Will Antitheos be disposed to allege, that it is the *infiniteness* of space which presents the barrier in the way of the co-existence of Space and Intelligence? If he will, then we shall let Leibnitz furnish the ground-work for an unanswerable reply. “ Supposing the *sensorium* (of the “ soul) to be extended, * * * the question returns, “ Whether the soul be diffused through the whole extension, be it great or small. For, more or less in bigness, “ IS NOTHING TO THE PURPOSE here.” Fifth Paper, 98.—In

† Chap. XII. par. 1 & 2.

‡ Chap. XI. par. 4.

∥ See Part VI. § 2.

fine,* why may not intelligence *pervade all space*, as well as all a brain, or all of any portion of a brain?

§ 46. We shall finish what we have to urge in relation to the opinion, that pure space is a substance, as well as, indeed, in relation to our first head generally, by putting before our readers two passages in Locke.† And had these passages, or such passages as these, been sufficiently *digested* (and Bacon himself could not point to much that was worthier of undergoing the whole process,‡) we should never have heard of such a fantastic hypothesis as that which maintains that space is a substance—an unintelligent substance, or an intelligent one—For neither branch of the hypothesis is one whit more ridiculous than the other. “Space, considered barely in length between any two beings, without considering any thing else between them, is called distance; if considered in length, breadth, and thickness, I think it may be called capacity; the term extension is usually applied to it in what manner soever considered.” Essay, B. II. ch. xiii. § 3. “Whether we consider, in matter itself, the distance of its coherent solid parts, and call it, in respect of these solid parts, extension; or, whether considering it as lying between the extremities of any body in its several dimensions, we call it length, breadth, and thickness; or else considering it as lying between any two bodies, or positive

† The passages referred to (for that matter) might be quoted, and not to bad purpose either, in relation to any of our great heads,—nay, in relation to almost any part of this digression. So that, if the reader will carry the contents of the passages about in his mind, till he get to the end of what we have to say regarding space, he will do what will oblige us, and be useful to himself.

‡ The allusion is to a well-known place in one of Lord Bacon's so famous Essays. The place might (without offence) be compared with the language of a noble Collect, in the nation's Book of Common Prayer, (Coll. for Sec. Sund. in Adv.)

“ beings, without any consideration whether there be any
“ matter or no between, we call it distance. However named
“ or considered, IT IS ALWAYS THE SAME UNIFORM SIMPLE
“ *idea of SPACE* ——— whereof having settled ideas in our
“ minds, we can revive, repeat, and add them one to another,
“ as often as we will, and consider the space or distance so
“ imagined, either as filled with solid parts, so that another
“ body cannot come there without displacing and thrusting
“ out the body that was there before; or else as void of
“ solidity, so that a body of equal dimensions to that empty
“ or pure space, may be placed in it without the removing
“ or expulsion of any thing that was there. *Ibid.* § 27.

PART VIII.

OF THE SENTIMENTS OF PHILOSOPHERS CONCERNING SPACE.—NEWTON, CLARKE, BUTLER, PRICE, LOCKE, ADDISON, TILLOTSON, MILTON, AND OTHERS.

§ 1. — II. Other philosophers mean by Space nothing more than *a mode, property, quality, affection*, of a substratum or substance. The philosophers we now speak of may be ranged into two divisions. The *first* division may consist of those who allow of no vacuum in nature, who, in other words, hold matter to be infinitely extended. The *second* will be composed of those who maintain the existence of vacuum, or space without matter.

§ 2.—1. As to those philosophers who fall to be ranked under the first division: These, in affirming matter to be limitless, not having it to say, (they being no Cartesians,) that matter, because the same with extension, cannot be conceived to be finite; have one only decent pretext for their conduct. Their pretext is this,—they *please arbitrarily* to make the affirmation. Now, because they have no better reason to give, we are inclined to believe, their assertion agrees not with the nature of things. That, *in point of fact*, matter is infinitely extended,—that, *in point of fact*, there is no such thing as vacuum any where amidst bodies,† or beyond all matter, (there being no *beyond* in relation to all matter,) as to so gratuitous an assertion, it is

† See APPENDIX to this Part: APPENDIX A.

nowise necessary that we give it a farther consideration. Our readers shall have dwelt upon the subject long enough, by the time they have fully comprehended the elements constituting the assertion.

§ 3.—2. We, therefore, pass on to the philosophers of the second class, the philosophers who admit that there is Space distinct from matter, considering this Space to be no more than a mode or property of a substance or substratum.

§ 4. "DEUS * * *," says the great Newton in his celebrated Scholium, "*Non est æternitas vel infinitas, sed æternus et infinitus; non est duratio vel spatium, sed durat et adest. Durat semper, et adest ubique; et existendo semper et ubique, durationem et spatium, æternitatem et infinitatem constituit.*" ["THE DEITY * * * is not eternity nor infinity, but HE is eternal and *infinite*; HE is not duration nor *space*, but HE endures, and *is expanded*.† HE endures always, and *is present everywhere*; and by existing at all times and in all places, HE makes duration and *space*, eternity and *infinity*, to be."†]—*Princip. Mathematic. Schol. General. sub finem.*

§ 5. Those who are acquainted with Clarke's Demonstration, and his Letters to Butler, are well aware what his sentiment is.‡ We shall select a passage from a different quarter of his writings. "Space void of body, is the *property* of an

† "Sir Isaac Newton, in his famous Scholium, * * supposes GOD to be "*extended*," or expanded. Dr Watts' Inquiry concerning Space. Sect. v.—"Sir Isaac Newton thought, that the DEITY * * * *constitutes* * * *space*." Dr Reid. See Part IX. § 17.

‡ § 1. "They" ("Eternity" and "Immensity") "*seem both to be but modes of an Essence or Substance.*" Demonstration, under Prop. IV.—"*Space, is a property, or mode, of the self-existent Substance.*" "The self-existent Substance * * is itself (if I may so speak) the *Substratum* of "*Space*." Ans. to the 3rd Letter.

§ 2. "Though his" [Dr Clarke's] "*adversaries* (see Chev. Ramsay, book i. prop. 8. Schol.) charged him with adopting the Diffusive Ubiquity, he

“*incorporeal Substance.*” Again: “By *void Space*, we never mean *Space void of every thing.* * * In all *void Space*, GOD is *certainly present,*” &c. &c. Papers which passed between Leibnitz and Clarke: Clarke’s 4th Reply, § 8 & 9. A hundred quotations to the same effect might be made.

* § 6. “We seem,” these are the words of Butler, “to discern intuitively, that there must and cannot but be something, external to ourselves, answering this idea,” “the idea of infinity, *i. e.*, immensity and eternity,” “or the archetype of it. And from hence (for *this abstract*, as much as any other, implies a *concrète*) we conclude, that there is, and cannot but be, an infinite, an immense eternal Being existing.”—*Analogy of Religion Natural and Revealed.* Part I. chap. vi.

§ 7. “It is,” says Dr Price, “a maxim which cannot be disputed, that time and place are necessary to the existence of all things. Dr Clarke,” continues Dr Price, “has made use of this maxim to prove that infinite space and duration are the *essential properties* of THE DEITY, and I think he was right.”—For other citations from this once much heard of Doctor’s works, or, at any rate, his master-piece, see the APPENDIX to this Part: APPENDIX C.

§ 8. If I dared to introduce the author of the “Argument”

“is,” says Henry Lord Brougham, or Sir Charles Bell, or say both, “*plainly not* subject to this observation.” *Illustrative Note* on the 9th paragraph of Chapter xxiv. of Brougham and Bell’s Paley’s Natural Theology.

§ 3. Amazing assertion! How can Clarke make immensity, or boundless space,¹ to be a *mode* of GOD’S Substance: How can Clarke maintain THE DEITY to be the *Substratum* of Space: Unless Clarke do adopt diffusive ubiquity,² and be, *very PLAINLY* too, subject to the charge brought against him by the Chevalier?

¹ “To say that *immensity* does not signify *boundless space*, * * * * is (I think) affirming that *words* have no *meaning.*”—Clarke’s 5th Reply to Leibnitz.

² What is ubiquity which is not diffusive? The same thing that unextended extension is. See APPENDIX to this Part: APPENDIX B. § 10, 11, &c.

among such illustrious company, I should notice that his sentiment is the same as theirs, and that he has attempted to *demonstrate* (what, by the bye, none of the others ever thought of doing) that space, infinity or immensity, or what you will, is only *an attribute or mode*. See Part VII. § 3.

§ 9. After these references to the opinion of Clarke and Butler, &c., we shall be able duly to appreciate the *justness* of something put forth by Antitheos, almost at his outset. "It could not," this gentleman declares, "escape observation among minds of an abstract and reflective turn, that *space* possesses some of the *attributes commonly ascribed to DEITY*, such as infinity, and, *of course*, omnipresence;† immateriality, and so forth: that duration cannot be sup-

† § 1. If we would speak with strict correctness; to be infinitely extended and to be omnipresent,—to have infinity, *viz.* of extension, and to have omnipresence,—are the same. Omnipresence is *no consequence* (Antitheos would have it a consequence) of infinity, or infinite extension. Omnipresence is just infinite extension, and infinite extension is just omnipresence.

§ 2. It is not very correct to say (though Antitheos says) that infinity, to-wit, of extension, or space, is an attribute of space: Unless a thing may be an attribute of itself. Space is infinite: and infinite space is no attribute of infinite space.

§ 3. This is a fit place to notice, that some writers, who are not antitheists, nor even atheists, do, indeed, make a distinction between immensity (=infinite extension) and omnipresence. Thus the Rev. Dr Dick writes as follows:— "A distinction is made between the immensity, and the omnipresence or ubiquity of God. When we call his essence immense, we mean that it has no limits; when we say that it is omnipresent, we signify that it is wherever creatures are. These propositions are not the same, *unless creation be infinite.*" [Then follows the Doctor's—very inconsequential, yea totally gratuitous—proof of the finiteness of the creation.] "Immensity is an absolute perfection; it belongs to his essence, which, as it necessarily exists, is necessarily infinite. Omnipresence is a relative perfection; for, to say that he is present with all things, supposes that other things exist besides himself."—*Lectures on Theology*, by the Rev. John Dick, D. D.,

“ posed to have had a beginning, or to be within the possibility of ever coming to an end. It must thus have appeared to the *metaphysical* theist, exceedingly desirable to bring these *idle and unappropriated* attributes into more useful play, and in a manner the most advantageous to the *common* faith. Clarke and Butler, and all their *followers*,

Professor of Theology to the *United Secession Church*.¹ Lecture XIX. (Vol. I. page 334.)²

§ 4. It is in that manner that Professor Dick distinguishes between the two words; making *immensity* refer to the limitless essence of God, and *omnipresence*, to the presence of that essence with the creature. But the distinction is vain: at bottom, it is vain in the extreme. It has no foundation in the words,—unless, indeed, you take the distinction to them, in place of bringing it from them: and if the distinction has no foundation in the words, still less foundation has it in the nature of the Supreme Being. If a local, or a localized, God were a possibility—as to the *a priori* reasoner, and the Biblical student, alike, there is no such possibility;—then, a God present to this world, yet not at the same time, and in the same way, present elsewhere, might be supposed, and, so, the distinction of writers of that school might have place.

§ 5. The distinction, I say, is vain. No great reflection required to see through the vanity of it. Accordingly, Dr Dick, himself, follows up the words last quoted by these: “At the same time, this statement [of the distinction] is so far inaccurate, as it may seem to imply that immensity and omnipresence are different; for *they are, in truth, the same perfection under different aspects*. Omnipresence is merely the relation of immensity to the universe; and all that we assert is,” &c. &c.

§ 6. No doubt, any one is at liberty to distinguish as he pleases; or to use words in what senses he likes. One may, if he chooses, take the word *immensity* to refer to God, as in Himself, and take the word *omnipresence* to refer to God, as in relation to His presence with the finitely extended creation considered by itself. But, after all, such a distinction would relate much more to the difference between the Creation and the Creator, than to aught else. The difference in question might, indeed, be the foundation for a good distinction between immensity, as being held to relate to God simply, and between omnipresence, as being held to relate to God as the Creator of this Creation, and present with it, *taken for granted* to be

¹ See second note to § 33, Part VI.

² Those *Lectures* were published, Edinburgh, 1824.

“ have accordingly talked much of these matters, and evinced
 “ a strong predilection for them in selecting examples where-
 “ withal to illustrate the absolute and infinite perfections of
 “ the Divine nature. These *metaphysicians*, in short,” [ob-
 serve, it is “metaphysicians,”] “have made *space* and dura-
 “ tion *usurp the station and dignity of a Divine Being*.
 “ They have taken this empty and inanimate fabrication, and
 “ set it up in a newly-erected shrine of curiously *mathema-*
 “ *tical* construction, and fallen down to it as *the God* of their
 “ idolatry.”† (The “mathematical” shrine,—not the “meta-
 physicians,”‡ but—our *magician* must have constructed.
 Newly erected is the shrine: and if suddenly erected, no
 wonder, since it arose by magic.||) With Clarke and Butler,
 and their followers as to this affair, infinite space and infinite
 duration are *no more than modes or properties* of the exist-
 ence of GOD. With Antitheos—Clarke and Butler, and
 finite in extent. And this may be nearly all that was really meant to be
 conveyed by our Professor. But, after every thing which could be urged,
 it would remain true that such a distinction—namely, one drawn from
 ‘GOD,’ and from ‘GOD plus a finite Creation’—is taken to the words *immensity*
 and *omnipresence*, not drawn from them. And the Professor opens the sub-
 ject (as we have seen) with reference to the distinction of the words, or the
 things represented by them, alone; and without reference to the creature,
 assumed to be limited: it is only after the author has been arguing in de-
 fence of the distinction, that he has to so bring in “the creatures,” or the
 “creation,” or “the universe.”

§ 7. In fine, Dr Dick would have done unexceptionably, had he simply
 said: ‘I use the term “immensity” to mean *so*, and the term “omnipresence”
 ‘ to mean *so and so*. I define my words *thus and thus*, as I have a right to
 ‘ do, if I please.’ And there the matter would have ended—as it began:
 with an author’s right to employ his own words, in his own senses, who can
 dare to interfere? But, unquestionably, the course actually taken by our
 Professor of Theology was of a different character: what he really did, and
 what he might have done, must be carefully distinguished.

† Chap. I. par. 7.

‡ Law notices “the *great confusion* caused by a jumble of *Mathematics*
 and *Metaphysics* together.”—Notes to King. Note (6.)

|| See Part VII. § 1.

their followers, make space and duration to be GOD Himself. As arrant a piece of nonsense as could be put into their mouths. And we know *how honestly* put.

§ 10. The same sort of thing is set forth in other places too. For instance:—In Chapter VI. paragraph 15, our atheist speaks, as we have heard, as if Mr Gillespie had represented space to be DEITY.† And in Chapter XII. paragraph 2, Antitheos hints broadly enough, (and falsely enough,) that the same gentleman “makes *space* into a God altogether.” Read, also, the 12th paragraph of Chapter III.

§ 11. We shall in this place take notice of John Locke, who seems undetermined—not so much what to think, as—what to say, as to whether *space* be a substance or a mode. This solid thinker believed the material universe to be finite. “If,” he says, “body be not supposed infinite, *which, I think, no one will affirm,*” &c. Essay, B. II. ch. xiii. § 21. And the like in numerous places. And as he believed matter to be finite, so he believed, and could not but believe, space to be infinite: “This,” he declares, “is certain, that whoever pursues his own thoughts, will find them sometimes launch out beyond the extent of body, into *the infinity of space or expansion.*” *Ibid.* Ch. xv. § 4. To the same effect he speaks in many passages. Locke believed, we say, that body is finite, and space infinite: Consequently, that there is space without matter. And though he determines not, at least does not determine explicitly, whether space void of body be a *substance*, or only the *property* of one;—(*space void of body, or beyond body, can be no third thing; it cannot be a relation of bodies to each other;*)—he shows a decided leaning to the sentiment, that such space is no more than a *mode*.

† See Part VII. § 5.

§ 12. This most judicious philosopher gives no obscure intimation of what was his opinion, in the following passages. “ Whatever men shall think concerning the existence of vacuum, this is plain to me, that we have as clear an idea of space, distinct from solidity, as we have of solidity, distinct from motion, or motion from space. We have not any two more distinct ideas; and we can as easily conceive space without solidity, as we can conceive body or space without motion, though it be never so certain, that neither body nor motion can exist without space. But whether”——after all he *had* said to evince, that *motion proves a vacuum* to be in the neighbourhood of bodies,† and that there is a *vacuum, infinite vacuum, beyond the utmost bounds of body*; after all he had said,‡ in a word, (and before all he had to say)§ to make clear, that there is extension *independent of matter*——“ Whether any one will take *space* to be only a relation resulting from the existence of other beings at a distance, or whether they will think the words of the *most knowing* King Solomon, ‘The heaven, and the heaven of heavens, cannot contain THEE;’ or those *more emphatical* ones of the *inspired* philosopher, St Paul, ‘IN HIM we live, and move, and have our being,’ are to be understood in a *literal* sense, I leave every one to consider;¶ only our idea of space is, I think, such as I have mentioned, and *distinct* from that of body.” B. II. ch. xiii. § 27. Again: “ It is true, we can easily, in our thoughts, come to the end of solid extension; the extremity and bounds of all body, we have no difficulty to arrive at; but when the mind is there, it finds nothing to hinder its progress into this endless expansion; of that it can neither find nor conceive any end. *Nor let any one say, that beyond the bounds of*

† See APPENDIX A.

‡ See B. II. ch. xvii. § 4; *Etc. etc.*

§ See B. II. ch. xiii. § 21. *Etc.*

¶ See APPENDIX B.

“*body, there is nothing at all, UNLESS he will confine GOD*
 “*within the limits of matter. Solomon, whose understand-*
 “*ing was filled and enlarged with wisdom, seems to have*
 “*other thoughts, when he says, ‘Heaven, and the heaven of*
 “*heavens, cannot contain THEE;’ and he, I think, very much*
 “*magnifies to himself the capacity of his own understanding,*
 “*who persuades himself, that he can extend his thoughts*
 “*farther than GOD exists, or imagine any expansion where*
 “*HE IS NOT.”* *Ibid.* ch. xv. § 2. Again: “GOD * * fills
 “eternity; and it is hard to find a reason, why any one
 “should doubt that HE likewise fills *immensity*. His *infi-*
 “*nite BEING* is certainly as boundless one way as another;
 “and methinks it ascribes a little too much to matter, to
 “say, where there is no body there is nothing.” *Ib.* § 3.
 Again: “—The boundless invariable oceans of duration and
 “expansion; which comprehend in them all finite beings,
 “and *in their full extent*, belong only to THE DEITY.”
Ib. § 8. Again: “Motion cannot be attributed to GOD, not
 “because he is an immaterial, but because HE is an *infinite*,
 “spirit.” B. II. ch. xxiii. § 21. . Again: “GOD IS * * EVERY-
 “WHERE.”—*Ib.* ch. xxvii. § 2.

§ 13. See also, to the same purpose, B. II. ch. xvii. § 20,
 B. II. ch. xxiii. §§ 33, 34, 35, 36. *Etc. etc.*

§ 14. Why this great philosopher did not speak out still more unequivocally in this case, reasons might be assigned. That he had something in his mind as to which he did not, for certain causes, speak fully out, we may see (as from the two first citations in the twelfth section above, so) from certain rather mysterious words in the passages to be presently cited from the *Essay*: Words which do hint, not too darkly either, that this wonderful man had the solid *foundations* of the *a priori* argument *from* Space and Time—or Immensity and Eternity—to the existence of GOD, settled and firmly

fixed in the deep recesses of his mind. To which conclusion we shall be the more led, when we reflect that Locke, in his correspondence with his friend Limborch, distinctly states his belief, that the Unity of DEITY is completely proveable *a priori*.

§ 15. "*Je crois,*" so writes Locke to that correspondent, "*que quiconque réfléchira sur soi-même, connoîtra évidemment sans en pouvoir douter le moins du monde, qu'il y a eu de toute éternité un Être INTELLIGENT. Je crois encore qu'il est évident à tout homme qui pense, qu'il y a aussi un Être INFINI. Or je dis qu'il ne peut y avoir QU'UN Être infini, & que cet Être infini doit être aussi l'Être ÉTERNEL; parce que, ce qui est infini doit avoir été infini de toute éternité, car aucuns additions faites dans le tems, ne sauroient rendre une chose infinie, si elle ne l'est pas en elle-même, & par elle-même, de toute éternité. Telle étant la nature de l'infini qu'on n'en peut rien ôter, & qu'on n'y peut rien ajouter. D'où il s'ensuit que l'infini ne sauroit être séparé en plus d'un, ni être qu'un.*"

§ 16. "*C'est-là, selon moi, UNE PREUVE A PRIORI QUE L'ÊTRE ÉTERNEL INDEPENDENT N'EST QU'UN: & si nous y joignons l'idée de toutes les perfections possibles, nous avons alors l'idée d'un DIEU éternel, infini, omniscient, & tout-puissant, &c.*"† From Locke's letter to Limborch of 21st May, 1698. Consult also Locke to Limborch of 29th Oct. 1697, and of 2d April 1698.

† "I believe that whoever makes use of his reflection, will know it to be a most evident and unquestionable truth, that there has been from all eternity an INTELLIGENT Being. I believe also that it is evident to every thinking man, that there is likewise an INFINITE Being. Now I say that there can be BUT ONE Infinite Being, and that the Infinite Being must be also the ETERNAL Being; because what is infinite must have been infinite from all eternity, since no additions made in time, could render that infinite, which was not so in itself, and by itself, from all eter-

§ 17. The very important passages to which we referred so recently† are the following. “To conclude: *expansion* and *duration* do mutually embrace and comprehend each other; every part of *space* being in every part of *duration*; and every part of *duration* in every part of *expansion*.‡ *Such a combination* of two distinct ideas is, I suppose, *scarce to be found* in all that great variety we do or can conceive, and *may AFFORD MATTER TO FARTHER SPECULATION.*” B. II. ch. xv. § 12. And again: “The idea whereof,” *viz.* “infinity of *space or expansion*,” “is distinct and separate from body, and all other things: WHICH MAY (TO THOSE WHO PLEASE) BE A SUBJECT OF FARTHER MEDITATION.”—*Ib.* § 4.

§ 18. However, we shall not get leave to keep Locke of our party, without a struggle. But as the very name of the author of the “*Essay concerning Human Understanding*” will frighten many of the timid and weak philosophers over to the side he espouses; will enable not a few among the irresolute philosophers to make up their minds with whom to range themselves; and will be sure to throw a damp over any ardour which opposing philosophers may possess: we shall make good our right to retain Locke among our numbers, by the irresistible force of fair means.

“nity. The nature of infinity involving that nothing can be taken from it, nothing added to it. Whence it follows that infinity cannot be divided, nor be more than one thing.

“This is, as I think, A PROOF A PRIORI THAT THE ETERNAL INDEPENDENT BEING IS BUT ONE: and if we join the idea of all possible perfections, we have the idea of one GOD, Eternal, Infinite, All-knowing, and All-powerful, &c.”

† See above, § 14.

‡ “*Cum unaquæq; Spatii particula sit semper, & unumquodq; Durationis indivisibile momentum ubique*”—[“Since each particle (or point) of *Space* is *always*, and each indivisible moment of *Duration* is *everywhere*—”] Sir Isaac Newton, *Schol. Generale*.

§ 19. Reid it is who disputes our claim to Locke's authority in the present case. "Locke," remarks the Doctor, "has reduced all things to three categories, *viz.* substances, modes, and relations. In this division, time, *space*, and number, three great objects of human thought, are," the Doctor declares, "omitted."—Analysis of Aristotle's Logic, Chap. II. sect. ii.

§ 20. Does Dr Reid put forward anything to support the declaration? No. Then that is so far well: We have not to set out to overturn aught given as proof of his assertion; consequently, there's nothing to prevent our proceeding straightway to the proof of our own, *viz.* that the immortal author of the matchless Essay took pure space to be a mode of existence.

§ 21.^o Reid is quite correct in saying, that the profound reasoner he mentions reduces all things, all the objects of thought, to the three categories, *substances, modes, and relations.* The subject of Modes is taken up by Locke first of all. The Chapter (it is Chapter xiii. of Book II.) in which he begins to treat of modes, is occupied with "the simple modes of space." A great portion of the Chapter is occupied in proving: "*Extension and body not the same*"—(§ 11—) "*A vacuum,*" or, as he elsewhere calls it, "*pure space,*" "*beyond the utmost bounds of body*"—§ 21.) *Etc. etc. etc.*† So that if the author of the *Essay* omitted to place among modes pure space, that great object of human thought at sundry times, and of Dr Reid's when he set *space* betwixt *time* and *number* (as above;) it was not because Locke had not brought modes and pure space into the closest juxtaposition. Further, if it had been omitted to class *pure space*, and *duration*, (or *time*, as Reid has it,) with modes, Locke could hardly fail to observe the omission, considering that 4 chapters are

† See above, §§ 11, 12—also, Part II. § 29, & 30.

mostly taken up in treating of those two things; 4 chapters, not one of which is one of Locke's short ones; 4 chapters, which together constitute no inconsiderable part of the whole *Essay*. And if he had noticed any omission of the kind, he would certainly (for John Locke was an honest man) have done something to remedy the mighty defect in the *principle* or the *application* of his classification. But if so very palpable an omission as the omission must have been, if it existed at all, were made and were not observed, it is far, far indeed, from being what one would have reasonably expected from so capacious and observing a mind.

§ 22. But not to insist solely on these considerations, convincing though they are, we shall hear Locke speak for himself, *directly on the subject of what Space is*: for with *Space* only we have here to do.—Remember, that our controversy at this time is with Dr Reid: who has asserted, that Mr Locke neglected to put *space* under any of his three *predicaments*,—say, under either of the two predicaments, *Substance* and *Mode*.†

§ 23. After having (in the 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, & 16th sections of the thirteenth chapter of Book Second) distinguished *pure* or *simple* space from body, by and bye (§ 17) he puts this question into the mouth of an objector:—“If it be demanded (as usually it is) whether this space, void of body, be *substance* or *accident*?” Here is a question which, of itself, furnishes an *experimentum crucis* for the determination of the point whether or not Locke inclined to take *space* for an *accident*, that is a *mode*. When that acute philosopher made space to have an existence *distinct from matter*, he saw, and he must have seen, that the question would be raised, *What is pure space?* How then does the author of the *Essay* answer the very natural interrogatory?

† See above, § 13.

By saying that space is not a substance, and not a mode? BY NO MEANS. But here was an opportunity of the fairest kind he could ever have, to declare that space was *not* a mode or accident, and *not* a substance, *if he took it to be neither*. How answers he, then, the question, Is space, void of body, substance or mode? "I shall readily answer," he replies, "*I know not*"—I know not which. For he does not say: I know not whether pure space be any thing at all—And indeed how could he? SINCE he *expressly* declares that space void of body is NOT nothing at all. "Nor let any one say," is his *caveat*, "that beyond the bounds of body there is nothing at all," &c. &c.† To the same purpose is the following: "When men pursue their thoughts of space, they are apt to stop at the confines of body, as if space were there at an end too, and reached no farther. Or if their ideas, upon consideration, carry them farther, yet they term what is beyond the limits of the universe, *imaginary space; as if it were NOTHING, because there is no body existing in it.*"‡ B. II. ch. xv. § 4; *Etc. etc.*—But the reply has not yet been all given, and what is to come is the better portion: "I know not: nor shall be ashamed to own my ignorance, TILL they that ask, shew me a *clear distinct* idea of *substance.*" Then I shall tell them, whether space void of body be a *substance*: Substance or mode *pure* space must be, as it is certainly a something.

§ 24. I know that an exception will be taken to what has just been urged, and that the two sections of the Essay which do all but immediately succeed the words last quoted, will

† As above, § 12.

‡ "The Ancients did not call *all* Space which is void of bodies, but only *extramundane* Space, by the name of *imaginary* Space. The meaning of which, is not, that such Space is *not real*; but only that we are wholly ignorant *what* kinds of things are *in that Space.*"—Clarke's 3rd Reply, 2.

be especially appealed to by those who may be anxious to tear this great philosopher from the company of those with whom pure space is a *mode*, or *accident*, of a substance. In those sections it is said:—“*Substance and accidents of little use in philosophy.*—” (§ 19.) “Were the Latin words “*inhærentia* and *substantia*, put into the plain English ones that answer them, and were called sticking on, and underpropping, they would better discover to us the very great clearness there is in the doctrine of substance and accidents, and shew of what use they are in deciding of questions in philosophy.” (§ 20.) *Etc.*

§ 25. Locke is ridiculing something here. It is granted. But what is that which he ridicules? Not *substances*.† Not *modes*, or *accidents*, if this word be preferable. For he makes all things, “as they are *in themselves*,” (b. ii. c. xxv. § 1,) to be either substances or modes, *i. e.*, accidents.‡ A good jest indeed it would be, to behold Locke ridiculing, here or there, substances and modes! or the ideas (for Locke was particularly fond of the ideas) of substances and modes! Locke divides all things, as in themselves, into modes and substances—and ridicules modes and substances! Incredible. Impossible.

§ 26. But of a certainty, Locke is ridiculing something. What he ridicules, there are words within the boundaries of

† This is declared by Locke himself, in his second Reply (or third Letter) to the Bishop of Worcester.

‡ See above, § 19, and 21. “The adequate division of *being* comprehends “but these two members,” *i. e.*, “*substance*” and “*mode*.”—Bayle: Crit. Dict., p. 3083. “Unquestionably, whatsoever is, or hath any kind of “entity, doth either subsist by itself, or else is an attribute, affection, or “*mode* of something, that doth subsist by itself.” Cudworth’s “Intellectual System.” Chap. v. Birch’s Edit., p. 769. Again: “What is neither Substance nor Modification of a Substance, is a pure non-entity.”—Cudworth’s “Eternal and Immutable Morality.” B. IV. ch. iv. 9. See Part X. § 16, and the relative note.

those two sections which will show us. And it is well we are not left to mere inference, but have evidence 'of the express sort. "They who first ran into the notion of "accidents, as a sort of real BEINGS, that needed something "to *inhere in*, were forced to find out the word *substance*, "to *support* them. Had the poor Indian philosopher (who "imagined that the earth also wanted something to bear it "up) but thought of this word *substance*, he needed not to "have been at the trouble to find an elephant to support it, "and a tortoise to support his elephant; the word *substance* "would have done it effectually." (§ 19.) *Etc.*

§ 27. Here you have the key to expose what Locke laughs at: which is, The notion of accidents as beings having a real existence, distinct from substances. The *illustration* shews this clearly: Locke secretly (yet manifestly) compares the Indian philosopher's *earth* to an *accident*, and his *elephant* to a *substance*; while, again, the elephant and the tortoise being viewed in relation to each other, *elephant* is transformed into *accident*, *tortoise*, at the same time, stepping into the elephant's shoes, and becoming *substance*. But the earth is notoriously a distinct thing from the elephant

With Atlantean shoulders fit to bear
The weight of mightiest monarchies;

and the elephant is different from the tortoise. Therefore accident,—set forth by the earth and the metamorphosed elephant,—is an entity separable from substance,—represented by the first elephant and the tortoise. But this is absurd. And also very ridiculous. So John Locke, a tolerably grave (he was a very vivacious) gentleman in general, takes a hearty laugh at it. And we may well join him in his merriment, for the "notion of accidents, as a sort of real beings," having the same relation to substances that the earth has to the Indian philosopher's elephant, or the ele-

phant to the tortoise, may provoke a smile from the severest countenance.

§ 28. In accordance with what we have now said, Dr Isaac Watts writes:—"Mr Locke has happily refuted that unreasonable notion of substance in general, which makes it to be some real thing in nature, different from all the united qualities, the supposed properties and powers† of body or spirit, and he has exposed it to a just ridicule, as in Book II. chap. xiii.," *et cetera*. Once more: Mr Locke would seem to exclude and abandon any general notion of substance, *as another real physical distinct being*, provided to support all its real or supposed accidents or qualities, and seems to banter it by the Indian's * * tortoise—which supports the elephant—which supports the world."—*Philosophical Essays*: Essay II. sect. i.‡

§ 29. Finally, I would just ask any one to lay his hand upon his—*head*, and, for Dr Reid, to reconcile the words of Mr Locke, as quoted in the twelfth section, above, with any other hypothesis than that which makes endless expansion, or space, to be a mode of the existence of GOD.

§ 30. But indeed the thing is very clear. And what could have induced the author of the "Analysis of Aristotle's Logic" to trust to the world so unguarded and groundless an

† Why *supposed*? are they *only supposed*? are they not *true* and *real* properties and powers?

‡ Prudence dictates that I should use the *precaution* of begging it to be borne in mind, that I am not to be held as doing more than agreeing with Watts upon the point as to which he is cited. Watts thinks that: "As *solid extension*"—"(*solidity* and *extension* considered in body, are *but as one thing*"—Essay II. sect. iv.—) "and a *power of thinking* have this one character of substance, that they are sufficient supports for qualities, modes or accidents; so they have the other property of substance also, *viz.*, that they subsist of themselves, independent of any created being."—(Essay II. sect. ii. And see that Essay throughout.) Now all this seems to me to be very absurd; especially the latter part. Is *power* not a

assertion as that which we have been weighing, it would not be easy to discover: unless it were that he really thought as he wrote, and could not help it.

§ 31. Before quitting the philosophers who consider pure space to be the property of a substance, we shall gratify our readers with a paragraph from the pages of our worthily admired Addison.

§ 32. "If," says this sensible and elegant writer, in one of his Essays on the nature of the Supreme Being, "If we consider HIM (our Maker) in HIS omnipresence, HIS *being* *passes through*, actuates, and supports the whole frame of nature. HIS creation, and every part of it, is full of HIM. There is nothing HE has made that is either so distant, so little, or so inconsiderable, which HE does not *essentially inhabit*. HIS *substance* is *within* the substance of every being, whether material or immaterial, and as intimately present to it as that being is to itself. It would be an imperfection in HIM, were HE able to remove out of one place into another, or *to withdraw HIMSELF* from any thing he has created, or *from any part of that space which is diffused and spread abroad to infinity.*" Spectator, No. 565. See the remainder of that most beautiful paper.†

relative thing? can a power of thinking really subsist of itself? Ability, capacity,—power,—seem unavoidably to imply a subject of them.

"I have never," says Watts, "seen sufficient ground to abandon all his (Des Cartes's) scheme of sentiments of the nature of mind or spirit,"—&c. Essay V. sect. i. See *Preface* to his Essays: especially the 5th paragraph.

"*Nullò * **," writes Locke, with his eye directed toward Des Cartes's scheme as to mind, "*Nullò * * modo mihi in animum inducere possum cogitationem per se existere, sed rem vel substantiam, cogitantem,*"—&c. ["I cannot conceive cogitation existing by itself, but I can conceive a substance cogitating,"—&c.] Letter to Limborch, of 4th and 18th Oct. 1698.

In the same strain Reid declares: "We take it * * as a first principle * * * that thinking supposes a being that thinks."—Essay I. ch. ii.

† See, likewise, No. 571.

§ 33. Tillotson, as a Divine, was held in warm admiration by Addison. But that is not the only reason why we shall bring forward a sentence from the Archbishop: who was, according to the opinion of Dr Samuel Clarke,—himself no mean judge in such matters,—“of far better understanding and judgment” than the generality of the *Schoolmen*.

§ 34. “By the immensity of GOD, I mean,” Archbishop Tillotson tells us, “that HIS *being* hath no bounds or limits, “but doth EVERY WAY SPREAD AND DIFFUSE ITSELF beyond “what we can imagine—The presence of another being, “even of a body, which is the grossest substance, doth not “exclude HIM; the whole world doth not confine HIM; but “HE FILLS ALL THE SPACE which we can imagine beyond this “visible world, and infinitely more than we can imagine.”—Sermon CLIV.: on the immensity of GOD.

§ 35. I shall finish this head with the words of England’s immortal Epic Bard: who

Rode sublime

Upon the seraph-wings of Extasy,

The secrets of th’ Abyss to spy.

He passed the flaming bounds of Place and Time.†

The esoteric philosophical theology of the following passage in the *Paradise Lost* is not a whit behind the best in all the world.

—Thou, my Word, begotten Son, by thee
This I perform; speak thou, and be it done!
My overshadowing Spirit and might with thee
I send along; ride forth, and bid the deep
Within appointed bounds be heaven and earth;
Boundless the deep, BECAUSE I AM, who fill
Infnitude; NOR VACUOUS THE SPACE,
Though I, uncircumscribed myself, retire,
And put not forth my goodness.

Book VII.

† Gray’s “Progress of Poesy.”

PART IX.

OF THE SENTIMENTS OF PHILOSOPHERS CONCERNING SPACE.—ANTITHEOS, REID, STEWART, GLEIG, GASSENDI, EPISCOPIUS, LEIBNITZ, AND OTHERS.

§ 1.—III. Thus far as to those who will have Space to be a Substance, and those who take it to be only a Mode. The third grand hypothesis is that of such as lay down, that *space is space*, or what is tantamount to such proposition. The philosophers we are now come to, are inclined to allow, that there is Space, without matter, in the universe: And while they do not allege that Space is aught less than Space, they will not suffer more to be affirmed concerning it, than that it exists where body exists not. As a matter of course, therefore,—maintaining, as they do, that Space is neither a substance nor the property of one, but is, notwithstanding, a somewhat really existing,—they are for making it out, to be some third thing. Though indeed, to speak truth, these philosophers do not so much assert that space belongs to some third class of entity, (*viz.* something distinct from substance, and from property,) as virtually refuse to proclaim what Space is. In short, the fair amount of their notion, so far, at least, as they let it come before the world, is contractible to this, Space is Space.

§ 2.—1. The philosopher of this class whom we shall advert to first, is Antitheos himself.

§ 3. This gentleman admits, in the most distinct manner, and to the fullest extent, that there may be space without matter. Of this our readers are perfectly aware. According to Antitheos, we can conceive the non-existence of the whole material universe.† But though we conceive matter away, we cannot, our atheist largely, and satisfactorily, insists, conceive the non-existence of Space.‡ Pure space, or vacuum, then, is, with our antitheist, a *possible* thing.

§ 4. To advance to a second admission:—"I grant," says Antitheos,—and the admission has already been referred to as being of the utmost importance,—|| "I grant that we "may conceive of an absolute separation of substance" [by *substance* he means *matter*] "generally," or *as a whole*.|| Now, as often as we conceive an absolute separation of matter, as a whole, so often do we conceive *that* matter is finite;—separability, and, *a fortiori*, separation, implying finiteness;¶—and *that*, consequently, there is pure space in nature. Whenever, in fine, we conceive a separation of matter absolutely, we conceive what involves the existence of pure space. But we can easily conceive a separation of matter absolutely. We can *easily*, therefore, *conceive* that vacuum exists.

§ 5. But not only does Antitheos contend that we may conceive—and that we may easily conceive what involves—the co-existence of the absence of body and the presence of space: he is of opinion that perhaps there *has always been* a vacuum in nature. "We cannot prove," he correctly observes, "that it" ("matter") "is infinitely extended. "The fact is, we cannot say whether matter be infinitely "extended or not."†† And therefore, we cannot be sure

† See Part VI. § 34. ‡ See Part VI. § 33. || See Part IV. § 8.

¶ See Part II. § 39.

†† Chap. V. par. 7.

but that there now is, in point of fact, extramundane space. If the world is finitely extended, (and Antitheos grants, we cannot be certain that it is not,) there is empty space beyond its limits. "If the material universe is * * finite; there cannot but be actual * * extramundane "space."† For our atheist, like a reasonable man, admits it is absurd, to suppose, all extension itself to be bounded.‡ According to our atheist's doctrine, then, *it may be* that vacuum is a *really existing* thing.

§ 6. But what need to speak of our antitheist's making vacuum to be possible, or conceivable,—nay easily conceivable, or very possible—perhaps a real existence? For do not his explicit principles imply all these things, and amount, besides, to a great deal more? "Infinite space," (the reader will find in Part VI. § 33,) "is plenarily admitted by our author to have *necessary existence*." "Matter is," (as we have seen in § 34 of the same Part,) "by our atheist completely deprived of true necessary existence." Thus according to Antitheos's principles, "we have an extension" [*which is, and*] "which is NECESSARY, and we have an extension" [*which is, but*] "which is NOT NECESSARY."|| But that necessary extension is composed of vacuum, or pure space. Therefore, pure or simple space has real existence, yea necessary existence, in our atheist's universe: An existence which by this time must have given, and which (irreversible Fate has decreed it) will continue to give, our atheist, the sorest, and a quite unbearable, annoyance.

§ 7. "All Atheists," said one who was well acquainted with antiquity, and who knew right well how to turn his skill in the false, as well as in the true, philosophy of the

† Clarke's 5th Reply: Note.

‡ See Part I. § 34, 35, &c.

|| See Part VI. § 36.

ancients, to good account against the enemy: "All Atheists are mere Corporealists, that is, acknowledge no other substance besides body or matter. For as there was never any yet known, who, asserting incorporeal substance," [or what implies incorporeal substance,] "did deny a DEITY; so neither can there be any reason, why he that admits the former should exclude the latter. Again, the same dull and earthly disbelief or confounded sottishness of mind, which makes men deny a GOD, must needs incline them to deny all incorporeal substance" [and all that implies incorporeal substance] "also. Wherefore as the physicians speak of a certain disease or madness, called *hydrophobia*, the symptom of those that have been bitten by a mad dog, which makes them have a monstrous antipathy to water; so all Atheists are possessed with a certain kind of madness, that may be called *Pneumatophobia*, that makes them have an irrational but desperate abhorrence from spirits or incorporeal substances," [or whatever implies as much,] "they being acted also, at the same time, with an *Hylomania*, whereby they madly doat upon matter, and devoutly worship it as the only *Numen*."—Cudworth's "Intellectual System." Chap. III. and xxx. (Birch's Edit. p. 135.)

§ 8. True, the Democritic and Epicurean atheists did indeed admit the existence of space or vacuum, as a nature really distinct from body. But not very consistently with the general spirit of—we do not say, their philosophy, but—their atheism. Accordingly, "other Atheists there were," observes Cudworth, "who * * * were sensible of the inconvenience of making space thus to be a thing really distinct from body, (from whence it would follow unavoidably, that it was an affection of incorporeal substance.)" (Chap. V. page 770.)

§ 9. And thus much as to the annoyance, or the inconvenience, which space hath caused, and will yet cause, our antitheist to experience.

§ 10. To repeat something we have said: In Antitheos's universe, pure or simple space has real existence. Our next business must lie with the question, What does Antitheos make simple space to be? And we shall find, that, with him, simple space is simple space: neither more nor less.

§ 11. "We know," as we have heard our atheist declaring,† "of nothing *possessing* extension except matter,— "nothing else than can stand as an object to which extension may be ascribed as a *property*." With Antitheos, then, simple or pure space does not *possess* extension: in other words, extension is not a mode of Space.

§ 12. And as extension is not a mode of Space, so Space (*i. e.* Extension) is made by Antitheos to be itself no mode of a substance. Why? "Material bodies,"‡ Antitheos is ready to answer, "comprising all that we do know, or *can* know of Being," that is, Substance.† IF bodies be the only substances possessing the attribute of extension, it is very plain that pure space cannot be the attribute of any substance.

§ 13. In fine: Our Atheist's decision being this, That simple space is not a substance, and not a mode,—and not a relation of bodies to each other, (because, with our atheist, simple space is necessary, whereas bodies are not:||) Simple space remains, then, simple space.¶ And that, let me tell Antitheos, is saying, contrary to what one might beforehand fancy, not a little but a great deal.††

† See Part VI. § 2.

‡ Are there anywhere immaterial bodies?

|| See above, § 6.

¶ Read the 9th par. of the concluding chap. of the "Refutation."

†† See above, § 6, 7.

§ 14.—2. With no impropriety, but perhaps for one reason, may we bring Dr Reid's opinion under this head. The Doctor says: "We call it (space) immense, eternal, immoveable, and indestructible. But it is only an immense, eternal, immoveable, and indestructible *void* or *emptiness*."—"Essays." Essay II. ch. xix.—To say, Space is void or emptiness, that is, void or empty of every thing—but space, or what space or extension supposes, if it supposes aught: to say, we repeat, that space is void or empty of every thing—but space; what is this essentially more than saying, Space is Space?†

§ 15. With which agrees, sufficiently, the passage in the "Analysis" already made use of by us.‡ If Space be not a *substance*, and be not a *mode*, and be not a *relation*, (as that passage implies,) pray, what can Space be—but Space? •

§ 16. The reason why perhaps we cannot properly reduce Reid's opinion to this class, shall be perceived whenever we recite a paragraph occurring in the Chapter "Of Duration."

§ 17. "Sir Isaac Newton thought, that THE DEITY, by existing everywhere, and at all times, constitutes time and space, immensity and eternity. This probably suggested to his great friend Dr Clarke what he calls the argument *a priori* for the existence of an immense and eternal Being. Space and time, he thought, are only abstract or partial conceptions of an immensity and eternity, which forces itself upon our belief. And as immensity and eternity are not substances, they must be the attributes of a Being who is necessarily immense and eternal. These are the speculations of men of superior genius. But whether they be as solid as they are sublime, or whether they be the wanderings of imagination in a region beyond the limits of human

† See Part X. §§ 41, 47.

‡ See Part VIII. § 19.

“ understanding,† *I am unable to determine.*”—Essay III. ch. iii.

§ 18. Of course, as Reid is unable to determine whether or no the sentiment of Sir Isaac Newton and Dr Clarke, that immensity, or boundless space, is the attribute of an immense Being, be a solid one; he must be supposed unable to determine, that space is not an attribute, or mode, of a substance. And space cannot be, in every sense, void or empty, if it is full of a substance.

§ 19. Upon the whole, with regard to the sentiments of the Professor of Moral Philosophy, concerning space, we may safely take the following words (they are his own) as a satisfactory compendium. “ We are at a loss to what category or class of things we ought to refer them,” *i. e.*, *time* and *space*. (Chapter “ Of Duration.”) Well might Reid say so.

§ 20.—3. The declarations of another Professor of Moral Philosophy deserve our attention in this place. The Profes-

† *Quæritur*: When my imagination, or that within me which conceives, does wander in a region whither my understanding, with the aid of that which conceives, whither, in other words, my imagination *cannot* wander; whither has imagination gone? by what instrumentality was the journey accomplished? how does imagination employ itself in its new quarters? how long will imagination stay away? and will it communicate, on its return, what it has seen in its travels? and, if it does, will not such conduct amount to a betrayal of secrets?

What lies beyond the sphere of human understanding is that which is destitute of a foundation in intelligibility. No subject that we can think of, properly lies beyond the sphere of our understandings; but to utter unintelligibilities, we may easily do. There are some philosophers who do solemnly caution us to beware of going beyond the reach of our faculties: to beware of exceeding our faculties, *by our faculties*. The caution is to be wondered at, and neglected. There is no great danger in the matter; there's only an impossibility. In the same hour in which men receive power to sink below themselves, they will (I prophesy) receive power to soar above or *beyond* themselves. At least there is a high probability.

sor about to be introduced was, from first to last, an admiring disciple in the school of Dr Reid. Even with regard to the present affair, Dugald Stewart's philosophy coincides pretty closely with that of the Glasgow Professor. At one particular point, indeed, there seems a too slavish concurrence. After the "candid acknowledgment from Dr Reid,† " I need not be ashamed," says Mr Stewart, "to confess my own doubts and difficulties on the same question." Now, the truth is, there is no want of dogmatism: The want is, consistency in the dogmatism. The Edinburgh Professor's assertions run in the teeth of each other.

§ 21. "That space is neither a *substance*, nor an *accident*, nor a *relation*, may be *safely granted*." (Dissertation on the Progress of Metaphysical Philosophy. Note Y Y.) In accordance with which: "Is it not evident, that of things which are *unique* (such as *matter, mind, space, time*) no classification is practicable?" (*Ibid.* Note I.)

§ 22. Space, then, is not a substance, not an accident, or mode, not a relation. Indeed, it cannot be classified: it is unique. In fine, all that can be safely said of Space is, that it is—Space.

§ 23. But the matter stops not here. We must attend to Dugald Stewart while he flatly contradicts himself, in the course of one and the same work.

§ 24. "I think it must be granted that there is something peculiarly wonderful and overwhelming in those conceptions of immensity and eternity, which it is not less impossible to banish from our thoughts, than the consciousness of our own existence. Nay, further, I think that these conceptions are very intimately connected with the fundamental principles of Natural Religion. For when once we have established, from the evidences of

† See above, § 17.

“ design everywhere manifested around us, the existence of
 “ an intelligent and powerful *cause*, we are unavoidably led
 “ to apply to this *cause* our conceptions of *immensity* and
 “ *eternity*, and to conceive *Him* as filling the infinite extent
 “ of both with *His* presence and with *His* power. Hence we
 “ associate with the idea of GOD, those awful impressions
 “ which are naturally produced by the idea of *infinite*
 “ *Space*.”—Dissertation: Part Second: Section 3.

§ 25. If we unavoidably apply, to that *cause*, immensity, conceiving it as filling the infinite extent of immensity,† or infinite space; do we not unavoidably make infinite space to be an “accident,” a property, a mode, thereof?

§ 26. Thus, with Dugald Stewart, *Space is not a mode*, and yet *Space is a mode*. Allowing that the predications neutralize, the one the other; we have, as a *residuum*, the subject itself. And if we take *Space* for predicate as well as subject, (which no Logic can hinder us from doing,) we obtain the fundamental position, *Space is Space*.

§ 27.—4. Under this head, we may notice, also the words of a *Bishop of Stirling*.

§ 28. In the Chapter treating of “*Space and its modes*,” in our Bishop’s treatise, the following is the title which serves for the exponent of several paragraphs: “*Space nothing but the possible existence of body*.” And in a succeeding paragraph, these words occur: “We consider
 “ pure space as a mere notion relative to the existence of
 “ corporeal substance, as in truth nothing more than the
 “ absence of body, WHERE body is possible.” *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 7th Edit. Art. “*Metaphysics*.” Thus Bp. Gleig.

§ 29. Pity, if the Bishop did not bear in mind, that “WHERE” supposes, and perhaps presupposes, *space*.

† The infinite extent of immensity, is much the same tautology as the immensity of infinite extent, or space.

§ 30. Pure space is "a mere notion," says the Bishop. To which had he stuck, we should have been obliged to have set down his words elsewhere, even amongst those of the *idealists* of the affair.† But the second clause seems intended to be exegetical of the first, and the Bishop drowns (and that pretty successfully) his *notion* in the 'boundless invariable ocean,' as Locke would call it, of *absence of body*.

§ 31. Now though Space were reduced to nothing but the possibility of body, nothing more than the absence of body (IN SPACE, observe you,) *where* body is possible—still, one may venture to hope, Space may turn out to be Space.

§ 32.—5. Gassendi's hypothesis, likewise, has a good claim to be ranged under this third great head.

§ 33. Gassendi, or (in the Latin form) Gassendus, who was the restorer of the Epicurean philosophy, or—if Epicureanism were too *soundly asleep* to be resuscitated—who at least strove to palliate the dogmas of Epicurus; the celebrated Gassendi, we say, chose to maintain, that Space is not Spirit and not Body, is not Substance and not Accident. Here is a description by negatives, with a vengeance. What Space is, seeing it is neither mind nor matter, neither substance nor property, I cannot tell. Only I fancy, Space still is Space. Shade of the learned Gassendi! what less, what more; what else, can Space be than Space?

§ 34. A certain *middle* nature; something perfectly distinct from corporeal substance, and yet not an incorporeal substance either—a somewhat between substance and accident: this is what space is, would the shade respond, were Gassendi's shade to be faithful. *Space* a middle nature! a real somewhat, neither spiritual nor material, neither a substance nor a mode! Then, a—we know not what!‡ In

† See Part X.

‡ "Some Accident without a Substance, * * or some other I know not what." Leibnitz, 5th Paper, 119. But an *accident* without a *substance* is

short, a *nothing*. Nothing, to-wit, but *space*. In fine, Space would continue to be Space, even though Space were ascertained to be nothing more than the certain middle nature.†

§ 35. Bayle characterized—and we cannot say, altogether without justice—Gassendus's procedure in the following manner: "Gassendus * * * chose to plunge himself into "the most hideous abyss of conjecturing, that," &c. &c.‡ Whatever Gassendus's *conjecture* is, of this we are confident, that Gassendus's *space* seriously constitutes a *most hideous abyss*. One into which we are desirous not to *be plunged*,—now, or at any future time. To contemplate a flight into "the vast immeasurable abyss"|| of infinite space, is always dreadful enough. But a survey of the secrets of space, the middle nature, would be, methinks, more awful still. But only—honesty compels me to confess—upon one condition, viz. that space, the middle thing, be anything at all.

§ 36. To every follower of Gassendi we say, accommodat- ing certain words of Bishop Berkeley to our use: "You "may, *if so it shall seem good*, use the word" [*space*] "in "the same sense that other men use *nothing*, and so make "those terms convertible in your style."—"Principles of Human Knowledge." Section LXXX.

§ 37.—6. We shall take notice of one other hypothesis, as falling to be classed with those assemblages of letters which are tantamount to the position, *Space is space*.

in rather better plight than a somewhat neither accident nor substance, nor anything else.

† See the words of Gassendi in his "*De Rebus Naturæ Universæ*." See, particularly, his "*Physicæ*," Sect. I., lib. ii., cap. 2, 3, &c.

‡ The third edition of Bayle's *Crit. Dict.* (Rotterdam, 1720,) has these— which we may call original—words:—"Gassendi s'est bien gardé de recourir "à une hypothèse si absurde; il a mieux aimé s'enfoncer dans un abîme "très afreux qui est de conjecturer, que tous les êtres," &c. &c. Page 2915.

§ Milton, *Par. Lost*, Book II.

§ 38. That *space* is an *external nothing*, we have, we can say, the authority of a Divine, and no less a one than Episcopius. "*Totum atque omne illud spatium, quod EXTRA hunc mundum esse dicitur, nihil omnino reale est, sed pure putè imaginarium, & PRORSUS NIHILUM.*"—*Instit. Theolog. Lib. iv. cap. xiii.*—The space which is said—ay, and (under Episcopius's leave) which is thought†—to be BEYOND the material universe, is ALTOGETHER NOTHING: this Episcopius has given out as his serious decision. And the grounds of his judgment, we, of course, need not seek to impugn, provided we be permitted to write after it a mere iota, which must be subscribed to, though it is not adscribed. Having, then, added an element entirely inconsiderable, we would exhibit Episcopius's declaration. *All and every part of that Space which is said, and which is thought, to exist BEYOND this world is * * * * * ALTOGETHER NOTHING — BUT SPACE.* The addition is, no doubt, quite harmless, and, from the nature of the case, 'tis impossible you can take any exception to it, justly. So great a Divine, then, being judge, Space is nothing but Space. And so Space yet is Space.

§ 39.—IV. Other opinions have been entertained, at least other forms of speech have been adopted, on the subject of Space. The opinions, or at any rate the expressions, now lying in view, are only two in number: Though the smallness of the number is the least part of the evil. But it will be perceived, after a slight examination, that each of those opinions (supposing each set of words to stand for an opinion,) falls to be resolved into one or other of the THREE hypotheses which we have gone over.

† See Part VIII. § 11, 12, &c.

§ 40. A fourth set, then, of words maintain that Space is nothing but the *relation*, or rather the *relations*, of the bodies in the universe to each other; considered as existing together. The name of the learned Leibnitz is conspicuous among those who hold this opinion. An opinion which has become pretty common with persons who speak the language, if they do not meditate the truths, of philosophy. The doctrine may perhaps be pronounced the *fashionable* one, regarding Space. For what reasons, and by what means, it has become so prevalent among modern theologians, and certain descriptions of philosophers, is by no means perhaps so very obvious a thing.

§ 41. But at all events, common and fashionable the doctrine is.† And therefore, 'tis of consequence that it be well analyzed. Without any possibility of being mistaken, we shall witness it resolving itself (with, to be sure, a special bad grace,) into the magnificent declaration, Space is space: An axiom resting on the most indisputable basis—and as true as any other truism of them all. But this is rather forestalling matters.

§ 42. We shall deliver the doctrine of the most distinguished advocate, as well as in a manner the first setter forth, of the dogma, in the words of Dr Samuel Clarke's translation, a translation which was "made with great exactness, to prevent any misrepresentation of Mr Leibnitz's sense." See "Advertisement" prefixed to the "Collection of Papers which passed between the late learned Mr Leibnitz and Dr Clarke, in the years 1715 and 1716."‡

§ 43. "As for my own opinion," Leibnitz writes, "I have

† For my own part, I do not think that the doctrine referred to is by any means so prevalent and fashionable as it was. Has there not been, indeed, a great change in the opinions of metaphysical theologians, since the words in the text were first given to the public?

‡ London; MDCCXVII.

“said more than once, that I hold *Space* to be something “merely relative, * * that I hold it to be an order of COEXISTENCES — * * For *Space* denotes, in terms of possibility, an order of things which exist at the same time, considered as existing TOGETHER; without enquiring into their manner of existing. And when many things are seen TOGETHER, one perceives that order of things among themselves.” Third Paper, 4. To the same effect, see Fifth Paper, 29, &c. &c.

§ 44. Elsewhere, Leibnitz says: “*Space* is that order, which renders bodies capable of being situated,” &c. Fourth Paper, 41. And when Clarke, in his answer, observed: “What the meaning of these words is; An order, (or situation,) which makes bodies to be situable; I understand not,” &c.,† Leibnitz rejoined: “I don’t say that *Space* is an order or situation, which makes things capable of being situated: This would be nonsense.” And hard upon this announcement, there follows the method by which the learned German chose to get quit of the nonsense. “I don’t say, * * that *Space* is an order or situation, but an order of situations,” &c.—Fifth Paper, 104.‡

† Fourth Reply, 41.

‡ Would the reader like to see how a modern Leibnitzian shall express himself?

“Is it perfectly certain,” asks an able Reviewer of the “Argument, *a priori*,” in one of the numbers of “The Presbyterian Review,” “Is it perfectly certain that there is no other class of ideas to which our notions of *space* and time could, by possibility, be supposed to belong, than those of substances and the properties of substance? Have we not ideas of RELATION which are ideas neither of substance nor of any property of a substance? Is it intuitively evident, that the notions in question, particularly*the notion of time, cannot possibly be of this sort? It is well known, that some metaphysicians of distinguished eminence have thought that they are,—especially the latter of the two.”

Such is a specimen of the manner in which a Leibnitzian of our age looks

§ 45. Before analyzing the doctrine of those passages, in order to see what it is reducible unto, it may be well to take a look in the direction of *results*. To these we shall pay a regard which hardly could be bestowed, were we, in the first instance, to lay bare what the Leibnitzian dogma exactly amounts to. On the other hand, if the consequences inspire with horror—or with delight—the analysis will be followed with the intensest attention.

matters in the face. You perceive, by several tokens, that the Presbyterian critic is not so sure about space, as he is about time, being no more than a beggarly *relation*.

The "Presbyterian" was an excellently-meant Review, but it has been defunct for a good while. The author of the article quoted from does, however, still flourish. And there cannot be any thing wrong in stating, that the author of that article is, Patrick C. Macdougall, erst the "Professor of Moral Philosophy, New College, Edinburgh," now Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of that city.

The reader may be informed, or reminded, that the article in question constitutes part of a volume, published in 1852, entitled "Papers on Literary and Philosophical Subjects: including a Selection from Contributions to Various Periodicals." Those Papers, it is more than hinted in a Preface, were given to the public as evidence of the Professor's (—unquestionably great—) mental powers and accomplishments. Yet, as it must in honesty be admitted, the same Preface hints, there was a temptation in the author's mind "to add new matter and new views."

It ought to be mentioned, that in the edition of the article on the *a priori* argument, contained in the volume, there are variations. In particular, with regard to the place quoted above, there is a variation of which I must take notice. For the concluding words, "*especially* the latter of the two," in the last sentence, ["It is well known, that some metaphysicians of distinguished eminence have thought that they are,—*especially* the latter of the two,"] the edition in the volume has it "*especially* that the latter of the two really is so." And the whole sentence, therefore, runs: "It is well known, that some metaphysicians of distinguished eminence have thought that they are—*especially* that the latter of the two really is so." (Page 197.) Now, to appreciate the force of the qualification, let us turn to matter in the very next page of Professor Macdougall's volume, in which page we have this sentence: "If the mode in which

§ 46. Two things necessarily follow from the supposition, that 'Space is "something merely relative," i. e., to bodies, "an order of coexistences," i. e., of coexisting bodies. *Bodies*, we say. For should we ask a follower of Leibnitz, Why may not Space be the order of spirits (as well as of bodies) "existing together?" the Leibnitzian is ready with his reply, That spirits have no extension, and, by themselves, have therefore nothing at all to do with space.† There are two things, we repeat, which follow necessarily from the supposition, that Space is merely relative to bodies, an order of coexisting bodies.

"the existence of a Being of infinite duration is inferred from our idea of time be discovered to be unsound and inadmissible, this circumstance will of itself render it highly probable, that the inference of an infinitely extended Being from our idea of extension is equally illegitimate; even although, in the latter case, separately considered, we should be unable to point out the error so clearly. (Page 198).

Said I not well in saying that the critic "is not so sure about space, as he is about time, being no more than a beggarly relation"?

† "There is nothing *simple*, in my opinion, but true *monads*, which have "neither parts nor extension." Leibnitz's Fifth Paper, 24. And that a spirit or soul is a true monad: "Every simple substance, soul, or true monad." *Ibid.* 91. Again: "Thought and extended substance have no connection with each other, and are *beings* that differ *toto genere*."—*Theodicea*, p. 172. See also, Third Paper, 12, and Fifth Paper, 48.

* Spirits have no extension: nothing to do with space. Was this the chimaera that led the way to another of the wonderful births in the Leibnitzian philosophy, namely, that there can be no spirits but what are associated with bodies, however subtile; although a spirit is a *simple substance*? "There are," so says our distinguished German, "there are no created substances wholly destitute of matter. * * * Angels or Intelligences, and souls separated from a gross body, have *always* subtile bodies, though "they themselves be incorporeal." Fifth Paper, 61. See also Third Paper, 9. And verily, if souls (to let angels alone) have no extension, they stand in some need of being *attended with matter*, in order that they may not hopelessly elude our minds' perceptions, and conceptions too. See Part III. § 34, and following sections. See, also, APPENDIX to Part VIII., APPENDIX B. § 24.

§ 47.—1st. It is thence deducible, that body or matter is infinitely extended. If matter is finite, there is *extra-mundane* or *bodiless* space, or extension; inasmuch as 'tis absurd to suppose bounds set to all extension. And if there be no space but what is relative to bodies, body or matter must be infinite in extent. It must be granted that space, of some kind, is infinite.

§ 48. It may be observed, that even though matter be made boundless, it would not be *therefore* completely infinite: Complete infinity including *fulness*. Although matter have no general boundaries, it may have particular interstices. To give it in Clarke's language: "Though *matter* had no limits, yet it might have within itself any assignable "vacuities." Dem. under Prop. VI.

§ 49. But if Space be the relations of bodies, matter is infinite, and infiniteness flowing from such a source *cannot be* of the complete kind. How can matter be completely infinite, if there is Space (and Leibnitz contends there is), and if Space is *different* from Matter? "I don't say that Matter and "Space are the same thing. * * However, these things, "though *different*, are inseparable." Fifth Paper, 62.

§ 50.—2nd. The second consequence from the supposition in question, is: that as it follows that matter is without bounds, so it follows that matter could have had no beginning, and can have no end; in fine, that matter is necessarily existing.† For according to the supposition we go upon, the non-existence of matter would involve the non-existence of all space. And no man ever did conceive, no man shall ever be able to conceive, the non-existence of all space.‡

† The reader may consider what will be found in Part VII. § 10, as being suitable to present circumstances. The two cases are so far on one footing.

‡ See Part I. § 25, and following sections.

§ 51.—3rd. We may add, that there is a third consequence resulting from the supposition, that Space is merely the order of co-existing *bodies*. The consequence is this: Were there only one body in the universe, the body would be necessarily immoveable: And, The material universe as a *whole* is necessarily immoveable. If space be no more than a relation of *bodies*; no bodies, no space—no space, if but one body. And if there were no space, how could the *sole* body be moved? how could the material universe be moved?

§ 52. (The doctrine of *absolute space* infers that of the possibility of *absolute motion*. On the other hand, to deny the possibility of absolute motion, is to deny that there can be absolute space. And to deny the possibility of absolute motion, that is, to contend that *all* motion is merely *relative*, is to get (by another route) at the position that if there were but one body, it would be immoveable.

§ 53. “It doth not appear to me,” says the Bishop of Cloyne, “that there can be any motion other than *relative*: “so that to conceive motion, there must be at least conceived two bodies, whereof the distance or position in regard to each other is varied. *Hence*, if there was one “only body in being, it could not possibly be moved.” *Principles of Human Knowledge*. § CXII.)

§ 54. These consequences, it is not to be doubted, will stagger those theists who have embraced Leibnitz’s notion, and have any consistency left.

§ 55. But then, the positions characterized as consequences will be greedily hailed by

the atheist crew. †

From which we may perceive how wise it was in our theo-

† Milton, Par. Lost, Book VI.

logers to embrace the dogma out of which they arise. And as for the atheists, it will be time enough for them to glory in the notion, when they shall have made out the correctness of it—Which is something more than the theists who have inconsistently gloried in it have ever done. Before the atheists can push the dogma in our way, as an obstacle, they must be able to refute (and that not in the way of a mere "*Refutation*") all—but, for their comfort, no more than all—the *first* Part of the *first* Book of the "*Argument*;" especially the two Scholia therein;† as well as be in a capacity to turn aside the edge of ——— But we were going to anticipate what we have to advance.

§ 56. We are now arrived at the place where we must put down our crucible, and set our face, right earnestly, towards an analytic process. Our design is, to try whether the Leibnitzian thing be precious metal or no: And shall not our friends have good reason to congratulate us, if, immediately upon its being dropt into the vessel, it melts, and evaporates, and escapes in an unknown gas; or, at best, turns out to be one of those worthless *trifles*‡ with which (as we must have observed ||) certain elderly children are,—to the discredit of their instructors *and others*,—but too fond of sporting themselves?

§ 57. When Leibnitz defines Space, "An order of co-existences," or "of things which exist at the same time, considered as existing TOGETHER;" what are we to understand by CO-, and TOGETHER? Nothing having respect to

† These references relate, of course, to the first edition of the "*Argument, a priori*," which Antitheos had undertaken to answer, and which is now given in a part of our APPENDIX.

‡ Locke has a Chapter on "*Trifling Propositions*." The "*purely identical propositions*" receive the honour of being first noticed. The honour is not undeserved.

|| See above, § 28, and following sections, § 38, and others.

Time, for "time" is referred to in a clause of its own. What then? We must by all means understand them as having regard to Space, which they suppose, or perhaps rather presuppose. And then, the definition becomes equivalent to this,—Space is an order of things * * * * considered as existing *together* IN SPACE. A description which certainly looks more like banter than something designed to instruct us.

§ 58. But to pass from this element in the description. What is space? I ask a Leibnitzian. A mere *relation* or *order* of bodies co-existing, he replies. But tell me, further, I insist, what you particularly mean by "relation" and "order?" Take them severally.—And first as to *relation*. When Space is said to be "something merely relative" to bodies, that, will the genuine disciple of Leibnitz rejoin, is as much as to say, Space is nothing but the mere *distance* of bodies. And as to *order*: "Order," in like manner, just means *distance*. "*Men observe in things a certain order of co-existence, according to which the relation of one thing to another is more or less simple. This order, is their situation or distance.*" Leibnitz's Fifth Paper, 47. Space, then, is the distance of bodies from each other.

§ 59. Space is distance. But distance is space. And what more does either of these positions amount to than this, Space is space? "*Space,*" says Locke, "considered barely in *length*, between any two beings, without considering any thing else *between* them, is CALLED *distance.*" B. II. ch. xiii. § 3. "But *however* NAMED or considered, it is always the same uniform simple idea of *space.*" *Ib.* § 27. To maintain, then, that space is distance, is virtually just to hold that space is space. And therefore, the Leibnitzian dogma is reducible to the edifying proposition which composes our THIRD *great head*.

§ 60. We shall now sum up what we have to say in reference to the passage quoted in § 43, above. "When many things are seen TOGETHER, one perceives that ORDER of things among themselves:" THIS IS THE CYPHER. When many bodies are seen together IN SPACE, one perceives that DISTANCE of bodies among themselves, which is SPACE: AND THIS IS THE KEY.

§ 61. Before leaving this department of the subject, 'twill be better to notice, that the further explanation or emendation (or whatever it be) of Leibnitz's doctrine, consisting of these words, "Space is" "an order of situations,"† makes things much worse, if worse be possible, than it found them. *Order*, we have seen, is tantamount to *distance*, *distance* to *space*. And *situations* obviously suppose or presuppose *space*. So that the emendation amounts to this, Space is a space of spaces.

§ 62. How long will it be ere the numerous followers of Leibnitz consent to learn, that they cannot deny the existence of *real absolute space* (as it has been called) without assuming *in their denial* the very thing they would deny! Men cannot speak of aught which does not involve Space, even Absolute Space. Space is a SINE QUA NON condition of all else.

§ 63. In the observations which we have thus made in direct relation to the Leibnitzian doctrine, we have not (the reader is requested now to reflect) advanced one step beyond the words, or what is implied by the bare words, in which the doctrine is conveyed. But what if we were to advance beyond the words?

§ 64. Space is the relation, the order, the distance, the space, of, or between, bodies. But does not the space constituted by the distance of any two bodies from each other,—

† See above, § 44.

the distance, let it be, of the Sun from the Moon, or, to pass beyond our solar system, the distance of the North Pole star from any star in the constellation of the Pleiades,—appear to the human mind to be capable of existence though those bodies were away? That is, does it not seem to us to be a false assertion, That space is *merely* a relation or order of bodies, or the distance or space between them? As touching this, however, we have merely to refer the reader to many previous portions of this work: to all those places which set forth the NECESSARY existence of *Space*, and the NON-NECESSARY existence of *Matter* or *Body*.

§ 65. It is false, then, that Space is a mere relation of bodies. Space, unlike body, exists necessarily. What Space *in itself* is,—whether it be a substance, or a mode, or—space,—forms an inquiry which has received, we trust, a most satisfactory investigation in the course of this long Digression.

§ 66. There is perhaps no doctrine which has done more to embarrass a plain matter, than this doctrine, that Space is nothing but the relation of bodies to each other. And on this account, we must have cleared away a deal of cloudiness from affairs, by showing that Leibnitz's dogma naturally resolves itself into a proposition which is so very *simple*, and so very free from *all ambiguity*.

§ 67. Before passing on to the last opinion concerning Space, we shall give a specimen of Lord Brougham's inanities, occurring in the Section, "Of the argument *a priori*," in his famous performance on Theology, the *Preliminary Discourse*. We have heard of Leibnitz's "distance," and submit to the temptation which seduces us to listen to a few particulars relating to Brougham's. The British *distance*, to the disgrace of our country, will be found to be *greatly inferior* to the German.

§ 68. "Is *distance*, that is, the supposed movement†, of a point in a straight line *ad infinitum*, a quality? It must be so if infinite space is. Then of what is it a quality? If infinite space is the quality of an infinite being, infinite distance must be the quality of an infinite being also. But can it be said to be the quality of the same infinite being? Observe that the mind can form just as correct an idea of infinite distance as of infinite space, or, rather, it can form a somewhat more distinct idea. But the being to be inferred from this infinite distance cannot be exactly the same in kind with that to be inferred from space infinite in all directions."

§ 69. Observe, that throughout this passage his Lordship *distinguishes*, and with no little care either, between *infinite space*, and what he is pleased to call *infinite distance*. He *distinguishes*, we say, between them: without hinting however at *the ground* for the distinction. *Reasons* are sometimes only difficultly got at—And in certain cases become dangerous to those who employ them (as elephants in an Indian army have been known to turn upon their own troops:) Wherefore, a degree of caution may be necessary in producing them. But what infinite distance can be, if (so far as the question, Can infinite distance be said to be the quality of the same infinite being of whom infinite space is the quality? is concerned,) if, I say, it be not the *very same* as infinite space, passes all comprehension. "Space infinite in ALL directions" swallows up *every* "infinite distance." *Infinite distance* stands in the same relation to *space infinite in all directions*, that any other less does to the greater which contains the less.—Infinite distance "cannot be exactly the same in kind," indeed, with space infinite in all directions; but then this is because the one is *the part of a thing*,

† Distance is not a supposed movement.

of which the other is *the whole*. Postulate space infinite in *all* directions—and you cannot avoid postulating, at the very same time, space (or distance, if you will) infinite in *this*, or in *that* direction.

§ 70. The mind, says his Lordship, can form “a somewhat *more distinct* idea” of infinite distance than of infinite space. This is bringing matters to the very *top of their bent*. For, in truth, *infinite distance*, after all that can be said about it, is a perfect contradiction. That to constitute *distance*, at least two fixed points, or (if you prefer it another way) two points considered as fixed, are necessary; is a point which may be considered to be as fixed as either of the poles of the universal heaven.† Infinite distance is an infinity that is finite, and a distance in which there are no distant things.

† “Considering *space* as lying between *any two* bodies, or positive “beings * * we call it *distance*.”—*Locke, Essay, B. II. ch. xiii. § 27.* See also *ibid.* § 3. See Part VII. § 46.

PART X.

OF THE SENTIMENTS OF PHILOSOPHERS CONCERNING SPACE. — LAW, WATTS, BROUGHAM, KANT, BERKELEY.

§ 1.—V. We hasten to the fifth and last opinion, or rather class of opinions: And shall make our notices with becoming brevity; except some case requiring a longer consideration present itself.

§ 2. We have seen, and we have conquered, the foe in their *outposts*: the remainder resolve to defend themselves in the *citadel*. We have been upon the ground wherefrom Space, specially Space in the distance, appears an *external nothing*; and it is our present misfortune that we approach a territory, from which, if Space does not disagreeably resemble an *internal nothing*, 'twill be because it is covered by a *conceit*, perfect in its way.

—Multo nebulae circum Dea† fudit amictu,
Cernere ne quis—

The *peculiarity* of this case, is, that a concealment is effected as entire as that of the ostrich, when it hides its *head* from its pursuers. Not to keep the reader too long in suspense (we can imagine, and do excuse, his anxious uncertainty;)

† The Goddess who must be understood *here*, is, without doubt, *Dulness*, “the mighty mother” whom the *Dunciad* sings. Under the influence of whose yawn,—whether or not sometimes

Metaphysic calls for aid on Sense,¹—

Metaphysics never call on Common-sense, but to say, How much we despise you! and every thing as natural as you!

¹ Book IV. l. 646.

The *opinion* which is now to be admitted to a hearing, modestly yet distinctly and firmly whispers, that *space* is a *mere idea of the mind*.

§ 3. An idea of the mind: Then, upon my word, I think Space will turn out to be a Mode; for an idea, as it is not a substance, so is very usually taken to be a condition or quality of one.

§ 4. But to descend to particulars, and submit to the drudgery of eyeing Space as it appears in the shape of this or that man's idea:—

§ 5.—(A.) *Bishop Law*.—The following passages are taken from the Notes to Archbishop King's "Origin of Evil." "There are * * *ideas*, and *simple* ones too, which have "nothing *ad extra* correspondent to them, *no* proper *ideatum*, "*archetype*, or *objective reality*, and I don't see why that of "*space* may not be reckon'd one of them." Chap. I. sect. I, Note (3.) "—Pure extension, which is an *abstract idea*, "form'd by the mind itself, and, as such, has no foundation "anywhere else." "—Absolute Space, which exists only in "the mind." Note (6.) Consult also Note (7.) *etc. etc.* And as to Law's opinions farther, regarding Space, we beg leave to refer the curious reader to the "Enquiry into the Ideas of Space, Time, Immensity, and Eternity."† A work this, not seldom named and quoted by writers of that period, and subsequently, but now scarcely to be met with.

§ 6. According to our Annotator, then, *space* is never an external existence, never an objective reality: It exists only in the mind: It is, in short, an abstract idea.

§ 7. And what, according to Edmund Law, is an abstract idea? at least, what is that abstract idea which composes, or is composed by, Space?

† Cambridge; 1734. The author of this work had not, at that time, been advanced to a seat on the bench of Bishops.

§ 8. An idea; an idea, even in the most unfavourable event. And Law agrees with Locke, in making *idea* stand for "every thing about which the mind is conversant, or "which can be the object of perception, thought or understanding." Note (2.) But we shall not pretend particularly to declare here, what Locke took an *idea* to be. His "*ideas*," 'tis well known, are, upon the whole, the most perplexing words in his book: Sometimes, signifying one thing; at other times, another; and frequently, a third. But thus much we may safely remark,—and it suffices, we do remark,—that, whatever Locke took *idea* to be, *in rerum natura* he knew but of Substances, Modes, and Relations. *Idea*, therefore, must be one of these three.†

§ 9.—(B.) *Dr Watts*.—We shall be a little particular with the Doctor, as it has been said, that he "has with great "ingenuity discussed *all* the several opinions about *space*." Mrs Cockburn's "Remarks." (Vol. I. p. 390.) This which has been said, is generally thought.

§ 10. Watts' Essay on Space is entitled, "A fair inquiry "and debate concerning *space*, whether it be something "or nothing, GOD or a creature."—*Philosophical Essays: Essay I.*

§ 11. The Essay in question falls naturally to be divided into two well-defined parts: In the first of which the author shows that "*space* cannot be merely an existence in the mind," &c. (Sec. II.) In the other, he labours to make out "the *nihility* of *space*" (sect. xi.); Space being "nothing real, but a mere abstract idea." (Sect. XII.)

§ 12. 'Tis altogether unnecessary that we should minutely regard all that, in propriety, appertains to the *former* portion. We believe, most people may easily see, that in vain

† See Part VIII. §§ 19, 21, 25.

does Dr Watts attempt, in the second portion, to invalidate what, in the first, he advances on the topic of the external existence of space.

§ 13. But to detail. Section I. *explains the subject in general.* "Void space," says Watts, "is conceived by us as scattered through all the world between bodies, as interspersed through all the pores of bodies, and as reaching also beyond all the worlds that GOD has made, and extended on all sides without bounds. * * * The grand inquiry is, What is this space?"—"Space is," concludes the Doctor, "either something or nothing: if something, it is either a mere idea in the mind, or something existing without. If it exist without us, it is a substance or a mode; if a substance, it is created or increated."†

† § 1. With which agrees, so far, Dr Clarke's summary of *conceptions.* "All the conceptions (I think) that have ever been or can be framed concerning Space, are these which follow. That it is either absolutely *nothing*, or a mere *idea*, or only a *relation* of one thing to another, or that it is *body*, or some other *substance*, or else a *property* of a substance." Note in 5th Reply. Between the two Doctors, the agreement at bottom would seem to be complete as to fundamentals, but in one particular. The dissenting Doctor alludes not to the conception, in virtue of which space is *only a relation*, &c. But he had it in his power to assign a good reason for the omission. Elsewhere, he maintains that the *fancy* of space being only a relation, is UNINTELLIGIBLE. "Some philosophers, particularly Mr Leibnitz, have fancied Space," these are our Doctor's words, "to be a sort of relative mode, and call it the order of co-existent beings or bodies, which order is their general situation or distance——Thus, after a manner which is *unintelligible* to me, they go on to explain their idea of Space." Sect. III. (Dr Watts has been followed in his decision as to Mr Leibnitz's *fancy.* "As for the point here in dispute, I must own, that it does not seem to me a fit subject for argument; inasmuch as I cannot even form a conception of the proposition contended for by Leibnitz." *Dugald Stewart: Dissertation First.*

§ 2. Our own general division, and minor divisions, include (as the reader is by this time aware) all the members in Watts' divisions, and all the members in Clarke's division to boot. It may be to some purpose,

§ 14. In Section II. the author makes plain, "that Space cannot be a mere nothing," but, on the contrary, is a "sort of something:" that it "cannot be a mere idea," but is "something without us."

§ 15. In Section III. he endeavours to make it appear, that *space* is a *substance*.

§ 16. "If Space be something which has an existence without us, it must be either a substance itself, or a mode or property of some substance; for it is *most evident*, that it must either subsist by itself, or it must subsist in or by some other thing which does subsist by itself. There can be no medium between subsistence in and by itself, and subsistence in and by another." In all this, we think the Doctor is perfectly right. See Part V. § 14.—And Part VIII. § 25.†

§ 17. But in what follows, we think he is perfectly wrong. Space cannot, he maintains, be a *mode* of a substance. "That space cannot be a mode or property," he seeks to prove, by such arguments as these:—

§ 18. (1.) "If *space* be a mode, *where* is the substance in which it is," &c.?—*Answer*. The substance is where the mode is, to be sure.

to present, once for all, a *table* of our division, and subdivisions,* of the opinions anent¹ Space. See FRONTISPIECE.

† "Is this *vacuum*, this immoveable, indivisible, and penetrable extension, a substance or a mode? It *must* be one of the two."—*Bayle*, Crit. Dict. vol. x. p. 269. Folio edit. London, 1741. Bayle means a vacuum, said by *others* to exist. He means, that vacuum must be either *substance* or *mode*, if it be at all.—If "Space is a nature distinct from body, and positively infinite, it follows undeniably, that there must be some incorporeal substance, whose affection its extension is." "True Intellectual System of the Universe," p. 769-70. In the second note to the twenty-fifth section of Part VIII. hereof, Cudworth gives one-half of the reason.

¹ This word is set among David Hume's *Scotticisms*.

§ 19. (2.) *Wherein does the substance differ from the mode?*—*Answer.* In this: whereas the mode is *merely* space or extension, the substance has extension *and* duration *and* many other modes. See Part VII. § 41.—Part VIII. § 17.—*Etc.*

§ 20. (3.) That Space is not an *absolute mode*, the Doctor would fain prove, and would prove thus:—"Space neither "wants any subject to *inhere in*," &c., "it wants no other "being that we can conceive to make it exist."—*Answer.* Whether this be truly so, or no, depends on what lies under "*Space.*" See Part VII. § 5. Also, Part XI. §§ 1, 2, 3, 5, 7.

§ 21. Other arguments, as we may say, are spoken of. But they seem far too wretched for serious notice. What, for instance, need one reply to such an argument as that which the next section shall set forth? Remember, the thing to be proved is, that *infinite* space is a substance.

§ 22. (4.) "*Space* wants no *created* being to support its "existence."—*Answer.* We dare say, not.

§ 23. The Section closes with these words: "All the arguments that ever I read to disprove *space* to be a substance, "carry no force at all with them, and seem to be mere assertions, not only without reason, but contrary to it." On which subject, see Part VII. § 21, and the following sections, to § 29, inclusive.

§ 24. Section IV. It having been proved—in the manner which we have witnessed, but to the Doctor's satisfaction—that Space is a substance, he shows that "surely it cannot be a created substance." IF SO, no doubt "it appears to be GOD Himself."

§ 25. Section V. evinces that "Space cannot be GOD." And in this we entirely concur with Isaac Watts.† But

† See Part VII. §§ 40, 41, 42, 46, &c.

we're not sure, that he and we would agree, as to the arguments by which the mutually received proposition should be established.

§ 26. The Doctor's arguments are such as the following:—

§ 27. (a.) "If Space be GOD Himself, then all bodies are "situated in GOD, as in their proper place—" &c. One might answer: This cannot properly be an objection to the doctrine: 'tis the doctrine itself.

§ 28. (b.) "If space were GOD, then the divine Being, "though in its whole it be unmeasurable,"—[Mark that—] "yet hath millions of parts of itself, really distinct from "each other, measurable—" &c. If one bear in mind, that Space hath no separable parts (what Watts proceeds to glance at,) and that finite can bear *no proportion* to infinite, he might well admit the strength of the position in the objection. For this position, also, is the doctrine itself.

§ 29. (c.) A third "consequence of supposing Space to be "GOD, is this: Then every part of this divine space will "contain Divine Perfections in it complete, or only some "part of each of them."—And so on. For a reply to which, we shall turn to a place in Dr Samuel Clarke's Answer to a sixth Letter. "The individual Consciousness "of the One Immense Being, is as truly *one*; as the present "moment of time is *individually one*, in all places at once. "And the one can no more properly be said to be an *ell* or "a *mile* of Consciousness, (which is the sum of" [Dr Watts'] "objection,) than the other can be said to be an *ell* or a "mile of Time. This suggestion seems to deserve *particular* consideration." We are confident that this constitutes a basis for a triumphant reply.

§ 30. (d.) If infinite space were GOD, GOD is infinitely

extended. But GOD "is the most perfect spirit." And "a spirit is not extended." In reference to the *first* of which propositions, consider Part VII. §§ 40, 41, 42, 46, *etc.*—And in reference to the *third*, consider Part III. § 34, with the following sections—Also, of Part VIII. Appendix B. § 24.—And Part IX. Note to § 46.

§ 31. The Section concludes thus: "The strongest arguments seem to evince this, that *space* must be GOD, or "it must be *nothing*." The strongest arguments seem to evince, as you, good Doctor, saw yourself in your second Section, that Space cannot be *nothing*. And if any arguments evince, or even seem to evince, that Space must be GOD, they are (we may depend on't) removed from the strongest arguments by *the whole diameter of being*.

§ 32. One reason why we deemed it to be expedient to go over those four arguments intended to show, that Space cannot be GOD, the reader may gather, if he ponders the words instantly to be quoted. They occur in the same Section. The remark contained in them appears to be in all respects just. "Most of the inferences which I drew from the supposition of Space being GOD, are just and natural, if Space "be GOD's immensity," &c.

§ 33. In Section VI. the Doctor gives "a review and recollection of the argument."

§ 34. Well was he entitled to proclaim: "We enter into "the abyss of space, infinite and eternal space, and *our thoughts are lost and drowned* in it." What he thus declared, reviewing as he was the first half of the way, he might *as truly* have cried out at any subsequent stage of his journey. At the very beginning of this Essay, the author had said: "Would any one imagine, that so familiar an idea as "that which we have of *space*, should be so abstruse and "mysterious, so difficult and unaccountable a thing, as that

“ it should be doubtful and undetermined to this day, among the philosophers even of this knowing age, what *space* is; whether it be a substance or mode, GOD or a creature, something or nothing.” And in the *Preface* he had written to this effect: “ It is strange that philosophers, even in this enlightened age, this age of juster reasoning, should run into such wide extremes in their opinions concerning *space*; that while some depress it below all real being, and suppose it to be mere nothing; others exalt it to the nature and dignity of GODHEAD.” Dr Watts, we say, had so written; and, of a truth, even by the time he had gotten the length of Section VI., well was he entitled to demand: “ After all our *philosophy*” [Something like half the word would have done.] “ and toil of *reasoning*,” [Such as it is, even with *toil* thrown into the scale, to make *heavy weight*.] “ shall it be said that we know not whether *space* be a mere *nothing*, or whether it be the true and eternal GOD?”— “ Are the eternal GOD and a mere *empty nothing*, so near akin to one another, that we cannot see the difference between them—that we are not able to tell whether *space* be GOD, or whether *space* be *nothing*?” Indeed, Reverend Doctor, appearances look threatening: And the very worst may be dreaded, *unless* some third road is before us (if we will but look for it,) by which we may escape from paths so fraught with *deceit* and *danger*. Meanwhile, we heartily join in your prayer, that the shadows of your *thick darkness* may be scattered, and that you may be led out of the labyrinth of *gross ignorance and mistake*, and helped to make your way through the *abyss of night*—and so on.

§ 35. There appears to be, in the 7th Section, *nothing* worth our notice; if one *nothing* be excepted. Space, 'tis now darkly surmised, may ultimately turn out to be “ a mere non-entity or nothing.” The Proteus, after going through

all his shapes, may "fix at last," and submit to exist without any shape at all, ay without even the shadow of a shape. And hereabouts lies the *mystery*.

§ 36. The 8th Section compares Space to *shadow or darkness*. "Is not *darkness extended beyond* the utmost bounds "of the material creation?"—"We can no more assign the "limits of *darkness*, than we can the limits of *space*. Again, "as *darkness* hath a seeming *immensity* belonging to it, has "it not an eternity also?" Suppose that *darkness* is extended, infinitely extended, and is eternal: What can be inferred? That extension or space is mere non-entity or nothing? Nay, nay.

§ 37. But has darkness, in reality, extension, and duration? No: Darkness by itself is not long, nor broad, nor deep; and as *extent* is not an attribute of darkness, so neither is *time*. The *thing* which is dark may have, or rather must have, these attributes or conditions. If you suppose darkness and absence of body to co-exist, then you have *dark space*.†

§ 38. In Section IX. the Doctor tries to take courage from the hint, that *space*—or bodiless extension—may be nothing but the absence of body—or bodiless extension,—that is, that extension without body may be extension without body; as shade—or the absence of light—is the absence of light: and to raise some efforts of reasoning, "to prove *space* to be nothing real."‡ *Space* is *inactive and impassive*: Therefore, argues this Logician, it cannot be GOD nor a creature. *Space* cannot be GOD nor a creature: And therefore, *Space* must be "non-entity or nothing." Such is

† See Part IX. § 31.

‡ "Or no real being," adds the Doctor. But I hope, that there is a medium between *no real Being*, and *nothing real*; as I would not wish my thoughts to be nothing real—which yet, are not real Beings.

Watts' reasoning. We answer: We are not at all disposed to dispute either the premiss or the conclusion of the first enthymeme. But with regard to the second, while we go in with the premiss, we must cast out the conclusion, as well as (therefore) that premiss which the conclusion subsumes, *viz.*, 'That what is not GOD Himself, nor a creature, is non-entity or nothing.

§ 39. Section X. is "a re-examination whether Space has any real properties."

§ 40. The *first* consideration advanced here may be said to be, that space is "*emptiness*, or *absence* of body or matter"—&c. And as touching this, see Part IX. § 14, and § 31.

§ 41. The *second* consideration says, in reference to Space's *supposed* "*capacity* to receive bodies into it," "that *space* is no otherwise *capable* of receiving body into it than "as the *emptiness* of a vessel makes it *capable* of receiving "liquor"—&c. Which is cordially granted. Emptiness is either space without matter, or space with *thin and subtle matter*.† Verify, Space is no otherwise capable of receiving body into it than as the space within an empty vessel (vacuum, for all practical purposes,) makes the vessel capable of receiving any sort of substance which is no larger than the space. Space, in fine, is no otherwise capable of receiving body, than as space is capable of receiving body.

§ 42. The *third* consideration consists of this: "Space can never *penetrate* matter * * wheresoever matter is, "there Space is not."—"Space is no more, and is entirely "lost, when body is placed in the room of *emptiness*." Re-

† "As when we say that a vessel is empty, we do not mean empty in "the sense of the natural philosopher, who denies the existence of absolute "emptiness, but we merely mean that the vessel contains no water, wine, "oil, or other liquor."—*Cicero on Fate* (*Bohn's edit.*)

latively to the topic of *penetration*, consult Part VI. § 12, and down to the end of § 36.

§ 43. The *fourth* consideration may be said to be: The infinity of *space* is not an infinity of *fulness*. As to which, weigh what occurs in Part IX. § 64; and other places.

§ 44. *Fifth* consideration: Infinite space is really *divisible*, and indeed *divided*, by the bodies situated in it. This is the same sort of consideration as the preceding. Space is *not full*, because there are bodies in it: Space is *divided*, because there are bodies in it. The considerations resting on the same bottom; to remove the bottom from the one, is to remove the bottom from the other.

§ 45. *Sixth* consideration. "The true reason why *space* appears to want no cause, is not that it has such a real and substantial essence as is *too big* to be produced by any cause, but that it is such a *subtile, tenuous, unessential, or imaginary* thing, that has *not essence, nor existence, nor reality* enough to want a cause, or to be produced, or caused." We are happy at leaving this exactly as we found it.

§ 46. *Seventh* consideration. Space has not *necessary* existence: it can be annihilated. The reader has had too much on this subject in the course of our work, to leave it anywise necessary to add aught in this place.

§ 47. The rest of the Section is taken up in *illustrating a parallel* between *space* and *emptiness*. And as emptiness involves space, we can have no objections to offer to the institution of the comparison.—There may also be *as much analogy* between space and shade, that is, dark space, as ever the Doctor likes.

§ 48. In the 11th Section is answered an objection against the *nihility* of space.

§ 49. The objection amounts to this: "20 miles of space between" any "two bodies"—or, if you please, 20 nonillions

of miles of space between any two points—"cannot be mere nothing." For if the miles of space be nothing, the bodies,—or points,—are "close together, or touch one another." Rather a shrewd objection indeed, and 'tis not so easy to see how it is to be got decently over.

§ 50. The reply consists of "a round denial" of the truth of the *consequence* in the proposition, If there be *nothing* between the bodies, or points, then they are close together: Were the miles nothing, the bodies, or points, would not therefore touch. Emptiness would be between. Emptiness, that is Space. But Space is nothing.—Nothing would be *between*. But what would the BETWEEN be? Nothing. Therefore, *between* the bodies or points, there would be a nothing which was a nothing.

§ 51. Alas! we have nothing to bring against the *round denial*, unless it were something not very unlike the square or the cube of the miles of space. But the calamity to which we are subjected is, that space, or emptiness, is of no use in such a case: Except to keep bodies from dashing against each other, when a better preventive of collision is not to be had.

§ 52. The *nihility* of Space having been so satisfactorily established, the 12th and last Section evidences (in the best possible way,) that *space* is "nothing real." Well: This tallies with its *nihility*. But the rubric immediately goes on to do more than merely insinuate, that Space is "a mere abstract idea." Indeed! And is a mere abstract idea, an abstract idea, an idea, nothing real? nihility?

§ 53. But not to be in too great a hurry. "After all these "debates, wherein we," such are the first words of the Section, "have been endeavouring to prove *space* to be nothing "real without us, yet perhaps we may allow it to be an "abstracted idea of the mind."† Nothing real *without us*:

† See Essay II. Sect. iv. par. 9. Essay V. Sect. i. par. 4. And other places.

This, then, was what we had to understand by non-entity, or nothing, or nihility. Space is a non-entity, or nothing, or nihility, as far as *without us* is concerned. But as far as *within us* is concerned, Space is “an abstracted idea of the mind.” Well for us, if after so much tossing by winds from all the quarters of the compass, we are now wafted into secure anchorage.

§ 54. Dr Isaac Watts presently repeats and answers the arguments which, in the beginning of the Essay, he had used to disprove Space to be a mere idea.

§ 55. The *first* argument, as now noticed, is: Space is without bounds, and therefore is not a mere idea in *our* minds. A capital argument, in sooth! And the answer? 'Tis this: “We can form an idea of infinite space of the *ever-growing kind*, and it *may be* a mere idea still. Our idea, “indeed, is not actually infinite”—Good: very good: For an answer, it were capital; *were it not*, that, however true the matter of the answer is, it is (by ill-luck) nothing to the point. That we can form an idea of Space, does not—surely—prove, that Space is an idea, or that our idea is Space. Who but such dreamers as the worthy Doctor ever dreamt that our ideas of Space might run riot when they had *lost and drowned* themselves in the abyss,—enlarging and contracting themselves as Space *grew* from less to more, and *shrank* from more to less?

§ 56. The *second* argument now mentioned, as proving that Space cannot be a mere idea, is as follows: Space “seems to have a *necessary* and obstinate *existence*.”† The answer being to this effect: Space has hardly so much external existence as certain mathematical truths, which the Doctor, who has a worthy object in view, calls **EXTERNAL truths**; and, asks he in fine consistency, Have these *ex-*

† See APPENDIX to this Part: APPENDIX A.

ternal truths, which are nothing besides ideas, any real existence *extraneous* to the minds that conceive them? After all that we have written, we may safely leave it to the reader, to place himself between the argument and the answer, and judge which of them has the better cause by the hand.

§ 57. "To conclude," says Dr Isaac Watts, in the last paragraph of his Essay, "after the *laborious* searches of "thought, reasoning and reading in SEVERAL *stages* of my "life past, these are the best conceptions and sentiments "that I can frame of space."—The conceptions and sentiments bear *very evident* marks of having been *framed*, not only in several stages of his life, but in several, and totally opposite, states of his mind.—He proceeds: "I grant there "may^e be some *difficulties* yet remaining, and some *dark-* "nesses which yet may hang over the subject. Learned "men have laboured hard to scatter them in former ages, "and in the present too, without full success; yet, perhaps, "in future time there may be a way found out for adjusting "all these difficulties to the more complete satisfaction of "some following age."—I must, of course, leave it to my readers to decide, whether I have not *adjusted all the diffi-* *culties* touching *space*; but certain, at all events, I am of this, that there must be a way, to those who can find it, whereby to set right every thing that is wrong.

§ 58. If the Doctor, by "difficulties" and "darknesses," means, in the most distant manner, *difficulties* and *dark-* *nesses* of an *incomprehensible* cast, we have unquestionably a remark to offer. 'Tis the height of absurdity to fancy, that the human mind can conjure up difficulties of the incomprehensible kind, which the human mind can neither solve, nor take a single step towards solving. How could the mind know the incomprehensibilities *to be incomprehensibili-*

ties, unless it had comfortable glimpses of that higher region, wherefrom the incomprehensible things appear indeed to be things incomprehensible? To comprehend that certain things are of an incomprehensible character, is *at least* to comprehend the things, which are *afterwards* found to be incomprehensible. And comprehending the things—is not that incompatible with the things being not at all of a comprehensible character?†

§ 59. With Dr Watts, thus, space is “an abstracted idea of the mind.”

§ 60. And that he counts all abstracted ideas of the mind, and all ideas whatever, to be *modes* of a substance, the reader of his second Essay will perceive, by abundance of evidence. Referring to each of the four sections of that Essay, in particular, and to passages scattered through his volume of Essays, in general—we shall content ourselves with citing these four words: “*Abstracted ideas* OR *MODES*.” (Essay II. Sect. ii.)

§ 61. Space is an abstracted idea of the mind. An abstracted idea of the mind is the *mode* of a substance. Therefore Space is a Mode. Thus Dr Isaac Watts. And therefore we are under the painful necessity of sending him over to those who will have Space to be a Mode, and nothing more, and nothing less. The Doctor will agree with his company, so far as *antimodists* are concerned. But the moment an investigation takes place with regard to the nature of the *modality*, Dr Watts, and those of his way of speaking, must retire within themselves, the rest of the company being all the while at liberty to expatiate over the whole field of nature, and even to wander beyond

the solar walk or milky way.‡

§ 62.—(C.) *Lord Brougham*.—In the “Preliminary Dis-

† Weigh § 7 of Appendix to Part IV.—also, note to § 17, Part IX.

‡ Pope: “*Essay on Man*,” Ep. I.

course," and in the Section already referred to,† the following words are to be found. "To argue from the existence of *space* and *time* to the existence of any thing else, is assuming that those two things have a real being *independent of our conceptions* of them: for the existence of *certain ideas* in our minds cannot be the foundation on which to build a conclusion that any thing *external* to our minds exists. To infer that *space* and *time* are qualities of an *infinite* and *eternal* being is surely assuming the very thing to be proved, if a proposition can be said to have a distinct meaning at all which predicates *space* and *time* as *qualities* of anything. What, for example, is *time* but the *succession of ideas*, and the *consciousness* and the *recollection* which we have of that succession"?—&c.

§ 63. In this passage it is not obscurely hinted, that his Lordship takes Space and Time to be *conceptions* or *ideas* in our minds. And, of course, Space and Time cannot be "qualities of any thing," *i. e.*, "any thing external to our minds," if Space and Time be no more than conceptions or ideas—namely, conceptions or ideas of Space and Time. On Lord Brougham's hypothesis, which (forget not) makes Space and Time conceptions or ideas, that is, *internal* affections,—it is verily vain to speak of Space and Time as being *qualities* (or any thing else) of any object *external* to our minds. Our conceptions, in one word, cannot be external to us.

§ 64. We have little to do with his Lordship's imaginings about Time, but as "time" is introduced, we shall throw out a hint, which may have some claim to a brief consideration.

§ 65. *Time*, says his Lordship, is the *SUCCESSION of ideas*. But is not *Time* (Dr Price led the way, long ago, to the

† See Part IX. § 67.

remark†) *presupposed* by, or in, *Succession*?‡ . What were a succession that occupied no time, that had no duration? A succession which will never succeed—in gaining any wise man's good opinion. The position, Time is a Succession, is, so far as this question is concerned, exactly the same as the position, Time is Time. And that, by the bye, is as true as the position, Space is Space.

§ 66. But Time not only is the succession of ideas, it is the *consciousness* and *recollection* of the succession. Time is Time, and not only so, for Time is the recollection of Time.

† “The idea of *Duration* is an idea accompanying all our ideas, and included in every notion we can frame of reality and existence. What the observation of the train of thoughts following one another in our minds, or the constant flux of external objects, suggests, is *succession*; an idea which, in common with all others, PRESUPPOSES that of *duration*; but is as different from it as the idea of motion, or figure.” Thus Dr Price.

This passage—not unique in the author—is taken from the justly celebrated “Review of the Principal Questions in Morals,” the greatest of Dr Richard Price's works. The passage occurs in the 2nd section of Chapter I.

‡ “We may measure duration by the succession of thoughts in the mind, as we measure length by inches or feet; but the notion or idea of duration must be antecedent to the mensuration of it, as the notion of length is antecedent to its being measured.” Thus Dr Reid. (*Essays on the Intellectual Powers: Essay III. ch. v.*) Writes he not well?

Sir William Hamilton has no note on the place; though a good note might have been required by his peculiar philosophy. Of which we have a specimen at the foot of the next column, where we are informed (in accordance with the sublime teaching of this philosophy of the conditioned, and *this alone*,) That TIME (OR DURATION) AND SPACE are *neither without limits, nor limited*. Hamilton's Reid: Edin. [M'Lachlan, Stewart, & Co.] 1846. (The passage is in page 349.) Such information is after the manner of the absurd “Antinomy” of Kant's *Critique*,¹ in which this kind of philosophizing largely figures. The assertion, *that Space and Time are neither infinite nor finite*, is ominously false. Or, if not so, 'tis because of its unspeakable absurdity. See Part I., § 25, &c., and many other places in this work.

¹ The Antinomy in question is the first “Antinomy of Pure Reason.” The place more especially referred to is in the “Proof” of “the Antithesis.”

Perhaps our readers may be more able than we are, to help out his Lordship at a *dead lift*.

§ 67. It may be noticed, in connection with what is stated in the words under our examination, that they are *amazingly inconsistent* with what is conveyed at the conclusion of the Section wherein they occur. Remember that space and time, and, by consequence, infinite space and infinite time (or duration), that is, *immensity* and *eternity*, are ideas and conceptions "in our minds," and therefore are *not* any things "*independent* of our conceptions:" and "cannot be the foundation on which to build a conclusion that any thing "*external* to our minds exists:" And then weigh the following *particular* "*eminent use*" of "the argument *a priori*":—"The fact of those ideas of *immensity* and "*eternity*, forcing themselves, as Mr Stewart expresses it, "upon our belief, seems to furnish an additional *argument* "for the existence of"—a mind in which "those *ideas*," or, as the other passage calls them, "conceptions," are? That is not said. But (and pray mark it——) "*an Immense* "and *Eternal Being*." And so on.

§ 68. Space with Lord Brougham is a conception or an idea. And gives he out aught as to what the conception or idea is? The conception Space is *not* "independent of our conceptions." The idea Space is an idea "in our minds." So would his Lordship reply. And perhaps there might be good reasons why we should not press the subject farther.

§ 69. Throughout this disquisition on Space, it has been my aim to confine myself, for the most part, to English writers. My principal ground being, that the specifically English, or British, domain represents that philosophy which is greatly a result, *on the practical side*, of other philosophies, especially metaphysical philosophies. But altho' such my aim, still this enumeration of modern opinions would

be vastly incomplete if it contained no reference to the ideas entertained among our Teutonic brethren, the metaphysical speculators of Europe and our era. A reference of the nature indicated will, however, be sufficiently accomplished by my setting forth the sentiments, upon the subject in hand, of the unapproachably transcendental speculator Immanuel Kant. For not only does he stand foremost in dignity among the metaphysicians of Germany, but he stands also in the more important character of the representative of all the metaphysical philosophers of the German fatherland. 'Tis indeed fact, that the philosophy of the metaphysician of Königsberg includes in it, not the mere germs only, but likewise the essentials, in the shape of the groundwork foundations, of every mental system which has made its appearance subsequently to the phenomenon of the Critical Philosophy. Therein, as in an inexhaustible storehouse, you have the primordial anticipations—less or more perceptible—of the after philosophemes of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, and, in fine, all the unsightly brood of *egoists* (though *egoistics*, or *egoisms*, as being more uncommon, and even outray, might be the better word), as they successively developed their wonderful idealistic schemes. It cannot be doubted that those subsequent philosophies (to their credit shall it be acknowledged?) were all vivid exhibitions of the most glaring, though possibly not the most genuine, idealism.

§ 70.—(D.) *Kant*.—The Father, then, of *Critical Philosophy* (who, by the way, outlived all its *genuine* disciples) makes Space, pure Space, to be a *form of our sensibility*—the *original use of understanding* itself—one of the *rules of the transcendental aesthetic*—only the *original synthesis of the homogeneal*, &c.†—That space, says the Professor of

† For the benefit of those among our readers who may not be familiar with the Kantean, or Kantian, terminology—as well as with what it stands

Königsberg, in which all motion must be, (which itself is therefore absolutely immoveable,) is named *pure* or *absolute* space. Again:—We conceive an *absolute* immoveable, intransposable *space*, to which we in thought refer, at last, all motion.—The conception of an absolute immoveable space has itself *no object*: Pure space is an empty *object-less* intuition—an “*ens imaginarium*.” Absolute or pure space, in fine, is BUT AN IDEA.† And so on.

for (when it stands for any thing;) and who, therefore, have never gone as far, or

as high,
As metaphysic wit can fly;

I beg leave to say, by way of a premonishment, that the Kantian terminology is *all of a piece*. As in Chinese paintings there is no shading, each object being highly coloured; so, with regard to the Transcendental nomenclature, every phrase, nay every term, is swollen to the utmost possible dimensions.

† § 1. Does pure or absolute Space, in which, according to Kant, all motion must be, *contain* the material universe? If matter be *contained* in an idea, is not matter too an idea?—Could any of the disciples of the Professor of Königsberg be so blind as not to see that broad way by which Critical Philosophy leads to Scepticism?

§ 2. One of Kant's own pupils observed, and endeavoured to meet, the difficulty. “It may be * * objected,” remarks F. A. Nitsch, “that, if there “be no external space, there is also no external world. But this is,” he asserts, “concluding by far too much * * * If there be no external space, “it will follow, that we are not authorised to assign *extension* to external “things, but there will follow no more.”¹

§ 3. But has there not followed enough? Divest external things of all extension, and what do you leave? Solidity, we shall say. But solidity involves extension. So, abstracting all extension, you leave nothing. External things without extension, without any existence in an external space, were, after all that could be said, extremely curious curiosities. Things are external with respect to me, by there being space between me and the things. Take away the space, they cease to be external. In one word: “External” supposes, or presupposes, Space.—Consider § 62, Part IX.

¹ “A General and Introductory View of Professor Kant's Principles,” &c.—London, 1796.

§ 71. Yet we must not neglect to notice, that though Kant thus takes Space to be nought except an idea or a conception, he can turn a new leaf, and write in a quite different strain.

§ 72. I ('tis Immanuel Kant who speaks) by all means have a conception of Space and a conception of Time. Space and Time themselves are however *not conceptions*, though I have conceptions of them. Again:—I have a conception of *wood*: so have I too conceptions of *space* and *time*. But as wood itself is no conception, Space and Time are likewise *no conceptions*. And so on.

§ 73. In the first place, then, Space *is a conception*. But, in the second place, Space *is not a conception*—It is an external existence: wood exists externally.

§ 74. After all this, it is almost a pity to be under the necessity of bringing a third philosopheme of Kant's before the reader's eyes. A pity, I say—For the philosopheme next to be introduced, if it does not succeed in swallowing up the other two things,—'twill not be on account of any lack of good intentions—The attempt at any rate will be made.

§ 75. Our Professor has several kinds of *nonentities* or *nothings*. One of them is the Nonentity or Nothing—the "*nihil privativum*"—which has not the original use of understanding, *reality*, for a foundation. Such is the conception of empty or pure space.†

† I have not thought it necessary to cite the names of any of Kant's works. No doubt, one might easily assign places in *The Critic of Pure Reason*, and *Religion within the Sphere of Reason*,—&c.,—as authorities for the various positions fathered, in the text, upon the philosopher of Königsberg. Indeed, his own very words, or their equivalents, are sometimes retained: At some other times, they have been translated into faithful English. What good purpose would be served, should one cite volume and page in Kant, for the merest tritest Kantism? Kant's metaphysic is like Aristotle's

§ 76. How these three *seeming contradictions* are to be reconciled, we cannot stay to inquire. Should the matter be taken pretty deep, perhaps they cannot be reconciled at all.†

§ 77.—(E) *Bishop Berkeley*.—But we come, in the last place, to a writer who had fully as much reason as any of them had, or could have had, to make Space to be an *idea*.

§ 78. “All extension,” says the good Bishop, “exists only in the mind.” *Principles of Human Knowledge*. Sect. LXVII. “The philosophic consideration of motion doth not imply the being of an *absolute space*, distinct from that which is perceived by sense, and related to bodies: which that it cannot exist without the mind, is *clear* upon the same principles, that demonstrate,” &c. *Ibid.* Sect. CXVI. But to multiply quotations to the same purpose, would be, in all conscience, altogether a work of supererogation.‡

logic: the moments or elements in Kant’s metaphysics are too well known, by all metaphysicians and theologians, to leave the necessity for special citation. Specific authorities, by page and line, were superfluous authorities.

It is to be recollected, too, that I have here written with a view to a British audience. • And I have been much more anxious to convey clearly to my countrymen the genuine character of Kant’s *thoughts*,¹ than I have been anxious to convey a transcription of Kant’s *terminology*. To the uninitiated, a truly formidable terminology. Kant required a dictionary for himself; and his hard words did obtain glossaries devoted to themselves. A whole army of *asses’ bridges* the Kantian terms and phrases loomed, through the transcendental mist, to discomfited students, who had not been educated to master your Kantian explications of those philosophic words. Kantian Dictionaries of philosophic terms, *with their meanings in plainer German*, were true desiderata. Yet the thoughts, could one but get at the meanings, were not so fathomlessly profound, after all!

† See APPENDIX to this Part: APPENDIX B.

‡ “It is this circumstance that will be found, on examination, to be the principal stumbling-block in the Berkeleyian theory; and which distin-

‡ This use of the word “thoughts” leads me to notice that in places of the text I have subjected myself to the charge of using certain words according to a most Un-Critical, and almost Anti-Kantian, use. Right English, and excellent, uses nevertheless, for all that!

§ 79. Space exists in the mind. Space, extension, is in the mind “*only by way of idea.*” “Principles.” Sect. XLIX. And elsewhere the same. Therefore Space, with Berkeley, is an idea.

§ 80. And what does the Bishop of Cloyne take the idea to be? A mode. But no; not a mode, though certainly something very like it.

§ 81. The following passages might lead us to suppose *ideas* were modes or properties. “The former (*spirits*) are “active, indivisible, substances: the latter (*ideas*) are inert, “fleeting, dependent beings, which *subsist not by themselves*, “but are *supported* by, or exist in, minds or spiritual substances.” “Principles.” Sect. LXXXIX. “A spirit has “been shown to be the only substance or *support*, wherein “the unthinking beings or ideas can exist.” *Ibid.* Sect. CXXXV. “I know what I mean, when I affirm that there is “a spiritual substance or *support* of ideas, that is, that a “spirit knows and perceives ideas.”—*Third Dialogue.*— “That there is no substance wherein ideas can exist beside “spirit, is to me evident.” *Ibid.* Many are the similar passages.

§ 82. Now what is a support but a substratum or substance? And what is a thing supported but a property or mode?

§ 83. But yet though Space is made an idea, and an idea is seen to be a thing supported, and Space, thus, is repre-

“guishes it from that of the Hindoos, and from all others commonly classed “along with it by metaphysicians; that it involves the annihilation of *space* “as an external existence; thereby unhinging completely the natural concep- “tions of the mind with respect to a truth, about which, OF ALL WITHIN THE “REACH OF OUR FACULTIES, we seem to be the MOST COMPLETELY ASCER- “TAINED; and which, accordingly, was selected by Newton and Clarke, as “the ground-work of their argument for the necessary existence of GOD.”—Dugald Stewart’s “Philosophical Essays.” Essay II. chap. ii. sect. 2.

sented as *very similar* to a property; Space is rather in danger of being taken for a property or mode, than of being in reality a mode or attribute.

§ 84. "Those qualities (extension and figure) are in the mind only as they are perceived by it; that is, *not by way of mode or attribute,*" &c. "Principles." Sect. XLIX. Look you, Hylas, when I speak of objects as existing in the mind * * * * My meaning is *only*, that the mind comprehends or perceives them; and that it is affected from WITHOUT,† or by some being DISTINCT† from itself."—*Third Dialogue.*—And the same sort of thing in other places.

§ 85. Thus have we treated of every distinct opinion which can be entertained regarding Space. If any person can righteously add a member to our General Division, or can with the least propriety subdivide farther our subdivisions, he will cause it to be clearly understood, that we have not gone over all the various opinions. We have no objection to oppose, should any one desire to put upon trial what we have written, and subject it, in every possible respect, to the severest examination.

§ 86. Before losing sight of our very long Digression, and turning once more towards the "Refutation," we shall improve the present opportunity, and remark one or two things which could not perhaps be more conveniently noticed elsewhere.

§ 87. *Space* being made by philosophers to stand for so many different things, the word being, therefore, of so ambiguous a description, the "Argument" never employs

† No assumption of *Space* here? Weigh § 3 of the second note to § 70, above.

it,—but in one place, which is the “Appendix.”† The passage is as follows. *.

§ 88. “‘Infinity of Extension is necessarily existing.’
“ Proposition.—

§ 89. “Let the extension be of space *merely*, or of matter
“ *merely*, or of space and matter *together*.” *Etc.* See Part
VII. § 2.‡

§ 90. Then—I hear an inquirer demand—if the term be so very ambiguous, how comes it to be used, so freely used, in the *first* Part hereof? The brief, the sufficient, reply is, that *space*, in that Part, is employed in no technical sense whatever—At least, if it ever occur in a truly technical sense, any other sense would, all things being considered, answer to the full as well. Let a man affix what idea to *space* he pleases, the grand purport and object of what is advanced in the Part we speak of, will not, in truth and reality, be at all affected thereby. We challenge our inquirer to make the experiment.

§ 91. Nay, substitute for “space,” on every occasion, (and the same observation applies to “magnitude,” and “immen-

† Consider the second note in connection with § 55 of Part IX.

‡ § 1. It did not suit our purpose, *to take for granted* (even so little, or—if you please—so much, as) the separate existence of pure space, *i. e.*, space without matter. The “Argument” sets out from the thing denoted by the unambiguous word *extension*, infinite extension; not caring of what nature the extension is. That there is expansion, *viz.*, pure space, infinite expansion, or pure space, *distinct* from the extension of matter; it is the business of the second Scholium under Prop. IV. Part I. to demonstrate.

§ 2. In fact, had the first Proposition in the demonstration (in place of being, “Infinity of EXTENSION is necessarily existing,”) been in these terms—*Infinity of SPACE is necessarily existing*;—it might have been objected: That it was—unwarrantably, for without proof—assumed, that in nature there is space where there is no matter—A position, without doubt, of vast consequence, as against atheism (*see part ix.* § 6, 7, 8): and by no means to be laid hold of, before a right to possession be established.

sity,") the word *extension*—the sense may require it to be, infinite *extension*—a word attended by no*particular ambiguity; and the meaning and force of the passage, properly understood, will remain untouched.

§ 92. In fine, all that Part I. requires at bottom to be admitted is, that something is necessarily existing, be the something space, or magnitude, or immensity, or simply extension.

§ 93. But I hear another inquirer address me. In the 29th section of the same Part (so is the second inquiry prefaced) Dr Isaac Watts is brought in, saying, that we cannot conceive Space non-existent, &c. But subsequently, he denied the necessary existence of Space.† In these circumstances, was it fair and altogether right, to apply the Doctor to that use which we find him forced to be of in that 29th section?—My answer is quite at hand. 'Tis two-fold.

§ 94. I ran upon Dr Watts the FIRST; and with Dr Watts the SECOND, we had there nothing whatever to do.‡ We have had indeed a good many things to say to Dr Watts the Second,|| but certainly the occasion had not arrived when we were no farther on than Part I. § 29. Perhaps a deal of remarkable attention has atoned for any delay which may have taken place in paying our respects to the last-mentioned Doctor, to-wit, the Doctor, in his last-alluded-to character.

§ 95. But, *again*, tho' it be true, Dr Isaac Watts, at a later stage of his life, denied that *space* has necessary existence—meaning, by *space*, an external something, distinct in every respect from matter;—still he does not, so far as I remember, exactly deny any where the necessary

† See above, § 46, and § 56, &c.

‡ See above, § 11, 12, 57.

|| See above, § 35 to § 57.

existence of extension of some kind. He nowhere affirms of all extension whatsoever, that we can conceive it to be entirely blotted out of existence. And in the 29th section of Part first, *extension*—all extension—would have done as well as “space.”†

† As see above, § 91.

PART XI

THE "ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, FOR THE BEING AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD," AN IRREFRAGABLE DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. We must now request our reader to retrace his steps, and consider a second time the words quoted from Antitheos in the *fifth* section of our *seventh* Part. Taking for granted that the reader has reverted to those words, we repeat our interrogation, What does Antitheos understand by the word *space*, as it occurs in that passage?

§ 2. We have seen, that Space is Space, and neither more nor less, with our atheist.† Is the "space" with which at present we are concerned, to be held as denoting *merely bare space or extension*? If so, "to talk of a substratum being necessary," even "*a priori* necessary," to *space*, is, I should hope, very far from being nonsense. Nay, that there is a Substratum to infinite space or expansion, is, as we observed, demonstrated in "Part III." of the "Argument."‡

§ 3. If, contrariwise, by "space" Antitheos means the substance which *space* supposes, if it supposes such; it is indeed nonsense to talk of a substratum to *space* being necessary *a priori*, or in any other sense of the word *necessary*: For, in the case contemplated, it is nonsense to

† See Part IX. § 10, and following sections.

‡ See Part VII. § 3.

talk of a substratum at all. 'Tis assuredly nonsense to talk of the substance to the substance, or of the substratum to the substratum, of Space. If *space* stands for substance, it stands for substratum.

§ 4. Our atheist does not inform us, in so many words, in which sense he uses the term. But from the circumstance of his making "*space*" take the place which "*infinite extension*" occupied, we are entitled to conclude, he employed the term in the former of the two senses. The *connection*, in short, may be held to determine, that "*space*" stands for *bare space*.

§ 5. Besides, is not as much as this indicated by the words which follow in the "Refutation?" "On the other hand," says our author, "if it (*space*) stands in need of a substratum, the foundation-stone of this great *argument* must crumble into dust, and be unfit to serve as a substratum to any thing." As to which: If Space stands in need of a *substratum*, this must be because Space is a *property*. And if Space is a property—to give it a substratum (of which it will stand in need,) will indeed cause the foundation-stone of an argument to crumble into dust, but the argument will be, not the "Argument * * for the Being * * of GOD," but *the argument for the being of a Refutation.*† A word in Antitheos's ear, as to the foundation-stone of the *great argument* (by whomsoever handled) from Space, to the existence of DEITY;—The pillars of the world may shake, and fall too—(no contradiction is involved in supposing that—) but, though the pillars of the world fall, and the universe of matter be as if it had never been,—the foundation-stone of that great argument *standeth sure*.

§ 6. A remark of somewhat the same nature as the

† See Part XII. § 7, with note A, and § 8.

remarks which our antitheist has in the 15th paragraph of Chapter VI., (all of which paragraph we have now gone over,) we meet towards the end of his volume. In his "retrospective and concluding remarks," he concentrates "into one view the chief features, the shortcomings, and "anomalies of" Mr Gillespie's "extraordinary attempt to "prop up, upon rational principles, what has nothing to do "with such principles, but which must for ever remain a "mere matter of faith."†—Ponder this ere proceeding farther, —'tis our antitheist's assurance we have for it, that Mr Gillespie's attempt to call in rational principles to his aid, has failed.

§ 7. In Mr Gillespie's case, "there is," says Antitheos, now about the work of *concentration*, "there is an odd "forgetfulness of first principles."‡—Wherein consists the oddness?—"Infinite extension and infinite duration are "either necessary OF THEMSELVES—absolutely so, or they "are not."—Hitherto the ground is firm. Nothing can be more solid.—"If necessary OF THEMSELVES, then is the "introduction* of Mr Gillespie's substance or substratum "gratuitous and absurd."—All firm footing as yet.—OF THEMSELVES is pretty much the same, is it not? as if we should say PER SE (in the plural.) If infinite extension and infinite duration necessarily exist PER SE—that is, without substrata—then we cannot, without absurdity, introduce substrata, or even a substratum. All is well, then, up to this point. To go on with Antitheos's words:—"If not necessary,—"—But where is the OF THEMSELVES now? Oh!

† Chap. XIII. par. 1.—Lo! the Atheist licks up the spittle of the Sceptic:—Antitheos's sneer is couched under language which forbids our not remembering Hume's—"Our most holy religion is founded on *Faith*, not on Reason."—*Essay on Miracles*. Part ii.

‡ Chap. XIII. par. 4.

it was not convenient to carry about the PER SE any longer. Not for you, Antitheos! who have to conjure up *shortcomings* and *anomalies* in Mr Gillespie. But for me, who have to do nothing of the kind, who have to execute no greater a task than to exhibit such shortcomings and anomalies as the "Refutation" abounds with—of which the present anomaly and shortcoming (of two small Latin words, or the corresponding ones in English) is a very fair specimen:—For me, I say, it is quite convenient to keep the OF THEMSELVES in mind. I must have consistency in the matter of the PER SE. Well then:—"If not necessary,—" OF THEMSELVES,—"the primary propositions in the *argument* are "false and groundless."† What *argument*? It cannot be the "Argument, a priori," &c., because, in it, the primary propositions do not concern themselves at all with the affair of PER SE.‡ But take the passage in the way Antitheos has it, (reading, simply, "If not necessary,") and nothing can be more indisputable than that "the primary propositions in the" "Argument, a priori," "are false and groundless." But infinite extension or space, and infinite duration, are far from *being* NOT necessary: They ARE necessary. And what settles the point is, that we have Antitheos's authority for it.|| But let us ever bear in mind, that though infinite space and infinite duration are necessary, it is not necessary that they exist PER SE. The farthest from it imaginable.—And this finishes our business, at this time, with the Chapter entitled "Retrospective and Concluding Remarks."

§ 8. The 16th paragraph of Chapter VI. commences thus:—"But if we are dissatisfied with the author's substratum,"—[And Antitheos, unless so dissatisfied, could be no

† Chap. XIII. par. 4.

‡ See Part II. § 13, &c., Part VII. § 2, 3, and note to § 89, Part X.

|| See Part I. § 35.

atheist—] “we are not much better situated with the alternative left us; for according to the *dilemma he has imposed upon us*, we are obliged to conclude that infinity of “*extension is itself a substance.*” Yea: And a DILEMMA to Antitheos it will remain. If infinite extension *stand in need* of no substratum, why then it can stand by itself. And if it can stand by itself, why then—however horrified Antitheos may be—it is a substance. But in reference, further, to this, see below § 21, and the subsequent sections, to the end of the Part.

§ 9. We shall at all times be ready to grant, that *infinity of extension* makes but an awkward substance—a very prodigy among monsters. But at *whose* door would the folly of creating such a substance lie, if it lay at any body’s? Not at Mr Gillespie’s, for the “Argument” only says, “IF Infinity of Extension subsist without a substratum, THEN, “it is a *substance*”†—never saying, that Infinity of Extension subsists without a substratum, saying as it does the very reverse.‡ But the folly of making a substance out of infinity of extension, lies, (as is, indeed, evident enough, and as will be farther evinced below||)—lies, we repeat, at *his* door with whom infinite extension subsists without any substratum, quite by itself in nature—only *nature* repudiates such a subsistence—And therefore, that piece of folly will likely be found near Antitheos’s threshold, since he is so “dissatisfied” with the substratum of infinite extension.

§ 10.—In reflecting on “the dilemma” which is “imposed,” do not forget how sad a one it is for antitheists.

§ 11. “I had thought,” continues our atheist, “infinity a “mere nominal adjunct allowed to space, from the circumstance of our being unable to conceive limits to its

† See Part V. § 15—and below, § 15.

‡ See above, § 2.

|| See below, § 21, and following sections.

"extent—" Here he makes infinity an *adjunct*, a mere nominal adjunct, to space. Elsewhere, he says infinity is an *attribute* thereof. We noticed, how incorrect this latter saying is.† And probably the former one is still more objectionable. But it is not worth our while to write another syllable on the subject. I had thought so, quoth he,—“but the theist, it seems, thinks otherwise. Infinity, with him, must be a substance.”—Only, IF infinity exist *per se*.—“On the same ground,”—Antitheos goes on,—“we might contend that finity is a substance too.”—To be sure. If infinity can exist *per se*, why may not finity, likewise, exist *per se*? If bare infinity be a substance,—on precisely the same ground, bare finity may be a substance too. In this, between the theist and the anti-theist there is, for once, a happy unanimity—and indeed the thing seems quite incontrovertible. “Supposing, however,” proceeds Antitheos, “that space infinitely extended is what he means,”—by what? by *infinity*, I take it—“all that we can say is, that if it” (“space infinitely extended”) “be a substance it is no longer space, or extension, or any thing else than,—just a substance;—unless it may be both extension and substance at the same moment. But these are profane thoughts.”—They are, at all events, very empty words. As for *thought*,—whatever of this commodity is in them, is hardly equal to the task of *rising* to the profane. “If it,” *i. e.*, “space infinitely extended,” “be a substance, it is no longer space”—Good. And, in like manner, if Antitheos, finitely extended, be a substance, he is no longer Antitheos. *This* every one at a glance sees to be—just nonsense. Again: “If it,” *i. e.*, “space infinitely extended,” “be a substance, it is no longer * * * any thing else than—just a substance.”—

† See § 2 of the first note to § 9, Part VIII.

So, if the finite thing called a "*Refutation*" be a substance, it is no longer any thing else than—just a substance. *This*, however, is any thing but nonsense, for it is sense, and good sense, and—just a truism;—"unless" (indeed) the "*Refutation*" "may" [not] "be both" a "*Refutation*" "and substance at the same moment."—Certainly, Space cannot be "both extension and substance at the same moment," if *extension* means (extension and nothing more,) and if *substance* means something more than (extension and nothing more.) But, this can with difficulty be accounted a discovery.

§ 12. "Perhaps"—our atheist prosecutes the matter thus—"according to the new school of theology, not only "may a book be a substance, but its extension may also be "a substance, its weight another, its colour a third, and so "forth." *Surely*,—IF the extension can exist *per se*, IF the weight can exist *per se*, IF the colour can exist *per se*. And this, not only according to the new school of theology, but according to the old school of logic.

§ 13. "Let us hear, however," (these are Antitheos's next words) "how the divine theory of infinity of extension being "a substance is to be sustained.—Mark with what boldness "of reasoning it is brought out. The infidel must look well "to his *footing* and points of defence, lest he be laid prostrate by its overwhelming force."† Then Antitheos proceeds to quote from "Proposition III." The quotation we shall give, but we shall give, at the same time, what immediately precedes in the "Argument," that our reader may the better understand whereabouts he is. Part of the passage he has had before‡—but no matter.

§ 14. "*Either*, Infinity of Extension subsists, or, (which "is the same thing,) we conceive it to subsist, without a

† Parag. 16.

‡ *Viz.* in Part V. §§ 14, 15,—also, in § 9 above.

" support or substratum: *or*, it subsists not, or we conceive it not to subsist, without a support or substratum.

§ 15. "First, IF Infinity of Extension subsist without a substratum, THEN, it is a *substance*. And" [now comes the portion cited by Antitheos] " 'IF any one should deny, ' that it is a substance, it so subsisting;' (that is, without a support or substratum; †) ' to prove, beyond contradiction, ' the utter absurdity of such denial, we have but to defy ' him to show, WHY *Infinity of Extension is not a substance*, SO FAR FORTH AS IT CAN SUBSIST BY ITSELF, OR ' WITHOUT A SUBSTRATUM.' " ‡

§ 16. This, then, is what our atheist points to as *boldness of reasoning*. It must chagrin him, that he cannot find the weak side of the *reasoning*;—though certainly none can

† Observe the parenthesis is Antitheos's.

‡ § 1. The following paragraph is the one which follows, in the "Argument."

§ 2. "As therefore, it is a contradiction to deny that Infinity of Extension exists,¹ so there is, *on the supposition* of its being able to subsist *without a substratum, a substance* or BEING of Infinity of Extension necessarily existing: Tho' Infinity of Extension and the being of Infinity of Extension, are *not different*, as standing to each other in the relation of mode and subject of the mode, but are identical."

§ 3. If now my readers will turn to Part II. and § 4, they shall find our atheist insinuating, that his opponent never told what he meant by the word *being*. (Look, also, at the 2nd paragraph of Chapter XII. of the "Refutation.") In the passage just cited, that opponent (this being the first occasion of the Argument's using *being*,) makes BEING to be the same as *substance*, and a *substance* to be *what subsists without a substratum*. Is not this telling what is meant? We have yet to learn that Antitheos could tell any thing better on the subject. Be this as it may, he has done the very thing Mr Gillespie has done,—he has given *existing by itself* as a good enough explanation of *substance*. (See below, § 44.) But *present ends*, you see, must be answered. If an inconsistency turns out to have been committed—why, in the circumstances of the case, it could not very well have been avoided.

† "Prop. I."—Note in "Argument." See Part II. § 15.

hinder him from being highly offended at its *boldness*. The boldness, and the reasoning to the bargain, he would sneer down. But the reasoning, whatever becomes of its boldness, will never hang its head.

§ 17. It is thus Antitheos follows at the heels of the passage cited by him:—"A new era has thus dawned upon logic. A grand discovery is on the eve of rendering her power irresistible, and her reign everlasting and glorious. It is to be henceforth no longer necessary for us to prove an affirmative: *assert what we may*, no one dare deny our assertions. For to prove beyond contradiction the utter absurdity of such denial, we have only to put *a brave face* on it, and throw a defiance *in the teeth* of our opponent to prove the negative."† And in the Chapter wherein are concentrated "into one view the chief features" of Mr Gillespie's "extraordinary attempt,"‡ our atheist, writing in a similar strain, hath this sentence:—"He (Mr Gillespie) can only insist *dogmatically* upon duration and extension being recognised as substances, and in self-satisfied proof, *challenges* any one, in the most braggart and imperious tone, to show why they are not to be regarded as substances!" Parag. 5.

§ 18. Mr Gillespie maintained, (and he yet maintains,) that, to prove the utter absurdity of a *certain* denial, we have but to defy the denier to point to any sufficient reason for his denial. What is there that has not been denied by some one?|| Should the correctness of this algebraic expression be denied $(a+a) : 2a :: (2a-a) : a$, what better could be

† Parag. 18.

‡ See above, § 6.

|| We have atheistical authority for it. "Hobbes says, that if men found their interest in it, they would doubt" [no—but they would *say* they doubt] "the truth of Euclid's *Elements*." This composes one of Diderot's notes to D'Holbach: The note being commendatory. See § 1 of *Appendix to Part VI*. And if Hobbes ever spoke as Diderot makes him speak, we have

done than *challenging* the denier, (not in a braggart imperious tone, but in a gentlemanly manner,) to produce a valid reason for his assertion, and thereby go far to show us, that, like Hudibras,

For every why he had a wherefore?

Mr Gillespie, of a truth, had thought, *that* if all men had agreed on giving a certain name to each of the objects or things in which were fulfilled certain conditions; no person could reasonably refuse to suffer the appellation to be bestowed on any one of the objects: and *that* if a man was found so exceedingly singular as to recede entirely from common language, and universally received notions, the *onus probandi* (to take a phrase from the law) lay on him to make good the new and unheard-of position. That all men were at one as to the propriety of calling that a *substance* which exists without a substratum, Mr Gillespie had verily esteemed a circumstance sufficiently entitling him to call upon him who should decline to permit the term to be applied to that which does so exist, to call upon him (I say) to assign some ground for his refusal. No! exclaims our atheist, such a circumstance is not sufficient to entitle Mr Gillespie to "throw a defiance," ("dogmatically," of course,) at the refuser, to show why a thing existing without a substratum is not to be designated a substance. No, indeed! exclaims our atheist, for that would be (here lies his mistake) to usher in the day of a grand discovery—the dawn of a new era—in logic. And there's no room for any grand discovery in logic: A new era would come too late. No! no! exclaims

two atheists testifying at once. And we readily admit the atheistical *authority* to be high, in the present instance. It's extremely likely the pair have spoken the truth. None better fitted to know what lengths *certain* men will go to, when they *think* their interests are at stake.

—Men may *mistake* their true interests.

our atheist. But *why* does he so? After the chiding we have got, we dare never so much as think of defying him, but we politely ask him, *Why?* He should be able, and willing too, on every occasion, to *give a reason* for the principle on which he acts.

§ 19. Mr Gillespie contended, that we have only to defy any one (an atheist, for example,—and let the atheist be such a one as Antitheos, if this gentleman likes—) to point to some good ground for denying the proposition, “IF Infinity of Extension subsist without a substratum, THEN, it is “a *substance*”; in order to make manifest the absurdity of a denial. And from this particular case, Antitheos has drawn, as a specimen of Mr Gillespie’s logic, (which is the *unrighteous* part of the affair,) the universal proposition, To prove *any* affirmation, we have no more to do than, with “a brave face,” to “throw a defiance in the teeth” of all opponents to prove a negative: Hurl your defiance at a negative, and, lo! the affirmative is proven. The author of the “Argument” speaks of a *special instance*, and the author of the “Refutation,” by a *skilful* manœuvre, *forces* his opponent to speak as if he inclined to hold the special instance as the representative of any case whatsoever: as if he inclined to employ that procedure on *every* occasion, which he used on *one only* occasion, because no better could be done. This is the height of disingenuousness. This is wretched sophistry. But it is fortunate, that the sophistry is as obvious as it is miserable. There is no mistaking it.

§ 20. But after all: To lay down a thing, and defy all and sundry to show a good cause for asserting the contrary,—though it may not be a commendable method, must at least be granted to be an allowable method, of starting towards the determination of any controversy whatever. Every thing which begins to be must have a sufficient reason for its

existence. Every affirmation, and every negation that ever was, began sometime to be. And if a person deny a position, without being able to assign a proper cause, we may be assured that the denial is improper, if not absurd. It must always be admitted, that the mere hurling of a defiance at an opponent, is not *by itself* sufficient to establish a doctrine: It is sufficient *only when conjoined with* the opponent's *inability* to furnish any *just evidence* for the truth of a contrary proposition.

§ 21. But, all this while, we have been *assuming*, that men universally have consented to denominate that a *substance* which has been decreed to subsist by itself, without a substratum, or subject of inhesion: Men universally, with the exception of *certain* of the "atheistick gang,"† who perceive themselves to be under the necessity of *either* contending that infinite extension, or space, exists barely by itself, without any substratum, *or* granting that infinite extension exists only by reason of the existence of something else *quite irreconcilable with their atheism*. And 'tis high time that we present our readers with the evidence of our *title* to make the *assumption*.

§ 22. Our *authorities* shall be selected from the list of those who are, among us, the best known and received as writers on such topics. Our authors, in short, must be in common and good repute.

§ 23. The first authority we shall adduce is John Locke, and as he is the first, so he will be the greatest.‡

† These are Cudworth's words.

‡ An excellent judge of the amount of fame which authors have, decides, that "in intellectual philosophy, Locke's celebrated work" leaves "ALL competitors behind by the common consent of mankind." So says Lord Brougham,—in one of his valuable and very splendid "Dissertations." Vol. ii. p. 113-14. Much in this 2nd vol.—how unlike much in the 1st!

§ 24. "The ideas of *substances* are such combinations of simple ideas, as are taken to represent distinct particular things *subsisting by themselves*."—"Essay concerning Human Understanding:" Book II, Chapter xii., § 6.

§ 25. *Modes*, on the other hand, he defines thus: "Modes * * * contain not in them the supposition of *subsisting by themselves*, but are considered as dependencies on, or affections of, substances."—*Ibid.*, § 4.

§ 26. In the 23rd Chapter (same Book,) which expressly treats of our "ideas of substances," he hath these words: "The idea then we have, to which we give the general name *substance*, being nothing but the supposed, but unknown support of *those qualities* we find existing, *which*, we imagine, *cannot exist* SINE RE SUBSTANTE, without something to support them, we call that support *substantial*"—§ 2.

§ 27. And in his letter to the Bishop of Worcester, he owns that his account of *substance* is on the same footing with that of Burgersdicius, Sanderson, "and the whole tribe of logicians," who, he informs us, define a *substance* to be, "ens, or *res per se subsistens*."

§ 28. But indeed we could accumulate so much from Locke on this subject, that we must be content with the specimen given, and with referring the reader to a great part of the Chapter on "Substances," and to his *Letter* and second *Reply* to Dr Stillingfleet.

§ 29. We do not feel ourselves under any necessity of adducing a host of Aristotelians, in the shape of Peripatetics and Schoolmen,† of whose song the constant burden is, *Substantia est ens per se subsistens, & non inhærens in alio*,

† Antitheos cannot reject their testimony: At any rate, he speaks of "the truly estimable wisdom of the schools"—Chap. IV. par. 9. (See our Review of Jack's Work; last paragraph.)

Substance is that which subsists by itself, and has itself no subject: Because we believe that Locke was an honest man, and an able; and because (luckily for our readers' patience) he has spoken for "the WHOLE tribe of logicians."

§ 30. Our next authority in this matter shall be the celebrated author of the *True Intellectual System of the Universe*: of which Sir James Mackintosh declares, "It is a work of stupendous erudition, of much more acuteness than at first sight appears," &c. &c.—*Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy*.†—The words which we are about to adduce, we have made use of already, but the occasion was different.‡

§ 31. "Unquestionably, whatsoever is, or hath any kind of entity, doth either *subsist by itself*, or else is an attribute, affection, or *mode of something*, that doth subsist by itself." Here he opposes a Mode to that which subsists by itself, that is, to a Substance. From the whole context of the passage, it is indisputably evident that he uses to subsist by itself, and to be a Substance, as completely convertible. See also, of the same great work, Chapter II. & vii. viii.

§ 32. Our third author shall be Archbishop King, whose "Essay on the Origin of Evil" has lost comparatively little of its fame. "By *Substance* I here understand," says the Archbishop, in the second page of Bishop Law's translation, "a thing which the Mind can conceive by *itself* as *distinct* and *separate* from all others: For that Thing, the Conception of which does not *depend* upon another, nor

† The passage occurs in Sect. 5, under the head "Oudworth." See the whole of the highly laudatory, yet discriminative, character of this great English Platonist in page 138, &c., of the 2nd edition. (A. & C. Black, 1853.)

‡ See the second note to § 25, Part VIII.

“include or suppose any other, is to us a *Substance*; and “*accordingly we distinguish it by that Name*; But that “which implies *dependence* in the conception of it we call a “*Mode, or Accident.*”

§ 33. Dr Isaac Watts is an author who, in one shape or other, has passed through most people's hands, and whose authority, in matters of logical and ontological science, used to be none of the most inconsiderable. Be his authority, in metaphysical subjects, exactly what it may, *now*, we may very safely take his opinion upon the question before us. We need not require, and, did we require, we might fail in obtaining, a better judge, as to the propriety of bestowing a certain name on a certain thing.

§ 34. In his “Brief Scheme of Ontology” there are these words: “Every thing is considered, either as *subsisting of itself* * * * and then it is called *substance* * * * or it “is considered as subsisting by virtue of some other being “in which it is, or to which it belongs, and then it is called “a mode.”—Chap. XVI.

§ 35. In the second of his “Philosophical Essays,” and in the third Section, the following sentence is to be seen. “If we can lay aside all our prejudices in this point, I “am persuaded solid extension would appear substantial “enough to be called a *substance*, since even mere empty “space, or extension without solidity, hath been by some “philosophers esteemed substantial enough to *subsist by* “*itself*, and to deserve the honour of this name?”—To-wit, the name of *substance*. From this passage it appears, that the Doctor reckoned that thing which *subsists by itself* to be deserving of the name of *substance*. To this extent at least, he agrees with the philosophers he alludes to. Whatever difference there might be between the Doctor and the philosophers, otherwise; he evidently

doubts not, for one moment, that "to subsist by itself" is to be "substantial enough." And by the bye, as he takes "mere empty space" into account, the quotation speaks to our point, to a hair. Read, likewise, of the first Section of the same Essay, the second paragraph, and it will be found to speak no ambiguous language about that which the *subsisting by itself* makes a thing to be.—*Etc. etc.*

§ 36. In his "Logic" he says: "Every being is considered either as *subsisting in and by itself*, and then it is called a *substance*; or it subsists in and by another, and then it is called a *mode*"—Part I. ch. ii. sect. 1. See also, to the same effect, the first paragraph of the following section:—*etc. etc.*

§ 37. See ESPECIALLY § 16 of Part X.

§ 38. We shall next produce a philosopher whose speculations savoured strongly of *common sense*, and that in more than one respect. For which reason, possibly, he is none the worse for our purpose.

§ 39. "Things which may *exist by themselves*, and do not necessarily suppose the existence of any thing else, are called *substances*; and with relation to the qualities or attributes that belong to them, they are called the *subjects* of such qualities or attributes."—Dr Thomas Reid's "Essays."† Essay I. chap. ii.—The chapter, this, in which the author *points out*, "some of those things" which he is to "take for granted, as first principles," principles "common to philosophers and to the vulgar," "common principles, which are the foundation of all reasoning, and of all science," principles which "are such as all men of common understanding know; or such, at least, as they give a ready assent to, as soon as they are proposed and understood."

† "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man;" By Thomas Reid, D.D., &c., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow.

§ 40. But the truth is, there would be no end to the quoting of authorities, on this subject, were we not to cut the matter short:—which here we do, as far as authors of one species are concerned.†

§ 41. But no farther.—For as we have had our theistical kind of authorities, so we shall let the reader have a taste of a-theistical authority too,—in relation to the very important point which is before us—A point in the decision regarding which, so very much is involved.

§ 42. What says Spinoza on the subject? for we naturally turn in his direction, he having been the most celebrated (most justly celebrated) atheist of Dr Samuel Clarke's time,‡ and there not having arisen his equal in atheism since. "*Per Substantiam intelligo*," says Spinoza, "*id, quod in se est, et per se concipitur; hoc est, id cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei, a quo formari debeat.*" ["By Substance I understand that which is *in itself*, and "which we conceive (to exist) *by itself*; it is that the con-

* † Were it lawful to quote, in an affair of this kind, a writer who had the bad fortune to get, for all time to come, an ill name, one, there is no doubt, much worse, by far, than he deserved; we might have added, to the authors in the text,—Berkeley: who says—"Thing or being is the most general name of all; it comprehends under it two kinds entirely distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common but the name, to-wit, *spirits* and *ideas*. The former are * * *substances*: the latter are * * *dependent beings*, which *subsist not by themselves*, but are supported by, or exist in, minds or spiritual *substances*." "Principles," Sect. LXXXIX. (See Part X. § 81.) And: "It is acknowledged on the received principles, that extension, motion, and in a word all sensible qualities, have need of a *support*, as not being able to *subsist by themselves*. But the objects perceived by sense, are allowed to be nothing but combinations of those *qualities*, and consequently cannot *subsist by themselves*. THUS FAR IT IS AGREED ON ALL HANDS." Sect. XCI. See, likewise, Section LXXIII., and other places of his works, for the same sort of thing.

‡ "Spinoza, the most celebrated Patron of Atheism in our time."—*Dem.*

"ception of which does not stand in need of the conception of aught else, in order to (the conception of) its existence."—*Ethic. Par. I. Def. iii.*—As these words constitute the third of the six *Definitiones* going before all the *Propositiones* of *Pars I.* of the "*Ethices*;" as, therefore, they may be said to compose one of the main pillars of the whole edifice; it may be deemed to be altogether unnecessary to cast about in the great work of the mighty atheist in question for any second passage to the same effect.

§ 43. To all these authorities, which, there is no denying, are so entirely satisfactory, we shall add a single other one. The author now to be ushered into notice is worth them all put together, for he sets the matter in debate *quite at rest*. 'Tis ANTITHEOS HIMSELF, I speak of. To bring *him* in, when any matter of more moment than ordinary is to be decided on, is our wont.†

§ 44. "I would ask"—these are Antitheos's words—"what intelligence is? Is it a *being*—a SUBSTANCE—a thing that EXISTS BY ITSELF? Or is it not, on the contrary, a characteristic property—"‡ Here, *substance* is given as another word for *being*, and existence by itself is the exegesis of *substance*. With Antitheos, then, a *substance* is that which *exists by itself*.

§ 45 Should it be argued, (for we must provide against every thing which can possibly be objected,) *that* all, or—if not all—so many of my authorities, when they say, What subsists by itself is a *substance*, had——(if they had not, others, when speaking to the same effect, have had ——) *finite things* ONLY in view; and *that* it is impos-

† See Part I. § 34 & § 35. Part IV. § 14, & following Sections. Part VI. from § 31 to § 37.

‡ Chap. XI. par. 4. See Part XII. § 14.

sible in the nature of things, that there can be an infinite substance:—Then, my reply is, that Spinoza, the prescriptive head of atheists, shall be allowed to settle this particular department of the controversy, for us. As a matter of course, theistical evidence is to be had in abundance, but I shall be content to limit myself to the evidence of atheists themselves.

§ 46. “*Omnis† substantia,*” these are Spinoza’s words, “*est necessariò INFINITA.*” [“*Substance is of necessity INFINITE.*”]—*Ethic. Par. I. Prop. viii.*—Again: “—*Substantiam corpoream, quæ non nisi INFINITA, non nisi unica, et non nisi indivisibilis, potest concipi,*”‡—&c. [Which, so far as it concerns our present purpose, may be translated thus:—“*Corporeal substance is necessarily conceived to be INFINITE.*”]—*Ibid. Prop. xv. Schol.*—To which may be added, with (possibly) the greatest propriety, the following words, which make up the sixth Definition in the *Ethics*: whatever ‘*Deus*’ may really stand for in this pantheistic philosophy of Spinoza’s. “*Per Deum intelligo ens absolute INFINITUM, hoc est, substantiam constantem infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque æternam et INFINITAM essentiam exprimit.*” [“*By GOD, I understand being absolutely INFINITE, that is, a substance having infinite attributes, of which each one involves the eternal and INFINITE essence.*”]

§ 47. Thus Spinoza. But I shall be more liberal than I promised to be—And to Spinoza’s authority I shall again subjoin that of ANTITHEOS HIMSELF. “*Matter, indeed,*

† The word “*omnis*” goes, *here*, for nothing—A position, I cheerfully submit to the judgment of those that are versed in such matters. And did I dare to defy gainsayers, I should accompany what I hand over, with *something*.

‡ Is not the syntax of this passage obscure? If the critic should startle at the (apparently) *bad grammar*; let him remember that the “*Ethics*” of Benedict De Spinoza was a posthumous production.

" may," he alleges, " be *infinite*."† Again: he observes, " We cannot say whether MATTER BE INFINITELY EXTENDED OR NOT. In so far as our experience goes, and our observation can carry us, we find SUBSTANCE completely occupying *every part of space*."‡ With Antitheos, *matter* is *substance*, indeed all that we have for *substance*. And this gentleman has no difficulty to throw in the way of matter's infinity. That is, *he has no difficulty to throw in the way of INFINITE substance*.

† Chap. III. par. 3.

‡ Chap. V. par. 7

PART XII.

THE "ARGUMENT, *A PRIORI*, FOR THE BEING AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD," AN IRREFRAGABLE DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. "But WAIVING,"—such are the words which succeed the passage quoted, from Chapter VI. of the "Refutation," in § 17 of the preceding Part—"But WAIVING, in the meantime, our plea of want of evidence for the affirmative, "a simple man would say in relation to the case before us, "that *substance* possesses attraction, which *extension* does "not; that it is observed under a thousand varieties of figure, "density, colour, motion, taste, odour, combustion, crystalli- "zation, &c., which neither *extension* nor *infinity* ever is, or "can in its nature be. He might, in his deplorable ignor- "ance, ask if ever *infinity* was weighed, or *extension* ana- "lyzed and its elements reduced to gas?† This would, I "dare say, only evince in the eyes of the theologian, that "such a person had no idea of the very convenient *art* of "applying metaphysical language to things physical; where- "by a mere *abstraction*, or at most a *property* of something "else, can so easily be charmed into a *reality*. His shewing "why *infinity of extension* is not a *substance*, therefore, "would be set down as grovelling, and common-place, and, "by consequence, useless."—Par. 19.

† The preceding passage was had in view, when we were in the 3rd section of Part V.

§ 2. Antitheos speaks of an *art* whereby an *abstraction*, that is, a *thought* of the mind,† can be charmed into a *reality*. Now one would have imagined that no *art*—still less, an *art* backed by a *charm*—was necessary, or even admissible, for the purpose; and this, simply because *thought* had all along been held to compose one of the classes of *realities*. Perhaps the decision was erroneous, and a discovery of Inductive Science, has, in the hands of some fortunate Modern, made it plain that our thoughts are to be dismissed, for the future, to the dismal region of *un-reality*: where, if *un-reality* has any *where*, we might expect, with the brightest and certainly the best-founded hopes, to behold sights stranger

Than fables yet have feign'd,

—in short, the very same place (at least according to some)

Where entity and quiddity,

The ghosts of defunct bodies, fly.

§ 3. Antitheos speaks of an *art*, "whereby a mere abstraction, or at most a PROPERTY of something else, can so easily "be charmed INTO a reality."—"That it should come to "this!"‡ Is a *property* of something in need of an *art* possessed of a *charm* which, being used, behold! a *property* starts into a *reality*. The *property*, then, was *no reality* before. "That it should come to this!"‡

§ 4. Our atheist waives the plea of want of evidence for the *affirmative* side in regard to the proposition, IF Infinity of Extension subsist without a substratum by itself, THEN, it IS a substance; only so far as is compatible with his bringing forward reasons for the *negative*. He insinuates, that it is *essential*|| to a *substance* to attract and be attracted, to have a certain figure, and density, and colour, and motion, and

† See Part I. § 8.

‡ Shakespeare: *Hamlet*.

|| See Part V. § 3.

taste, and odour, to be susceptible of combustion, crystallization, &c., and of a process whereby it should be reduced to some gas; and is not this to adduce a reason on the *negative* side?

§ 5. It is an attempt at it, at all events: likely, the best which could be made. It is to adduce something, however,—any way you take it. When our atheist, (passing over in his hurry, by the bye, the *exact nature* of the *defiance* altogether,) insinuates to that effect, he is flagrantly guilty of a *petitio principii*, of begging the question to be proved, he is to be held as having uttered, once more, “an unproved extravagance.”—Observe the concluding words: “His,” the simple man’s, “*shewing why* infinity of extension is not a “substance, *therefore*, would be set down as grovelling and “common-place, and, by consequence, useless.” Antitheos had been insisting, tho’ secretly, that, to be a *substance*, a thing *must* possess attraction, figure, density, &c. &c. And here he pleasantly concludes *as if his simple man had actually proved* that infinite extension is not a substance, BECAUSE he had found it could not be weighed, nor reduced to gas, &c. &c. Verily, verily, *his* simple man, if he had made any such thing follow from such a cause, is no such simpleton after all, but—unless we mistake the matter much—is *more of a knave than a fool*.

§ 6. We advance to the next paragraph. “After all, “however, how does the notable proposition stand, that “there is necessarily a Being of infinity of extension? “The principle of the argument brought up in support “of it—the *dilemma*, in short—gives way on every side. “It stands without a vestige of backing, except from the “vain and swelling words of a blustering defiance,”— [elsewhere called a “ridiculous bravado” †—] “the value

† Last par. of “Refutation.”

"of which no one but a *fool* could be at a loss to estimate."†—"I thank thee — for teaching me that word."‡
 —By the bye, although the *dilemma* is said to have given way "on every *side*," never a word was said by Antitheos to show it gave way in the *middle*. Antitheos has never breathed one syllable against the *dilemma*, as a *dilemma*, or disjunctive proposition. He has never questioned the *connexion* of the members composing the disjunction,—the propriety of proposing the one alternative when the other is rejected. The *dilemma*, then, is in our atheist's eyes unobjectionable. But the *members*—look at them, says he. And so we shall. The *one* is: "It (Infinity of Extension) subsists not, or we conceive it not to subsist, without a support or substratum." Well, what have you to say to that, Antitheos?—I own myself to be "*dissatisfied*" with your substratum, Antitheos replies.¶—The *other* member is: "Infinity of Extension subsists, or, (which is the same thing,) we conceive it to subsist, without a support or substratum." What say you, Antitheos, to that?—As I am entirely "*dissatisfied*" with any substratum, infinite extension is left to stand by itself: and this, says Antitheos, I tell you seriously.¶
 THEN, Antitheos, I tell you, (and the information—shall it increase your seriousness?—) you, and all the antitheists in the world, that infinite extension is made to be a substance.††

§ 7. Now come we to the concluding paragraph of the Chapter before us: which paragraph opens thus: "The author himself, indeed, seems not half sure of having made good the doctrine he has announced; for after having done all he could do, by the foisting in of a substratum upon *extension*"—[he should have said, *infinite extension*—]

† Parag. 20.

‡ Shakespeare: *Merchant of Venice*.

¶ See Part XI. § 8.

¶ See, also, Part IX. §§ 10, 11, 12, 13.

†† See Part XI. § 21, & following sections.

After having foisted in a substratum upon infinite extension: Who or what did that? Not Proposition III., which foists in nothing but a dilemma, a disjunctive proposition, and a conclusion deduced from either member or alternative thereof. But to see a little farther into Antitheos's views:—"The foisting "in of a substratum upon" [infinite] "extension to the destruction of its necessary existence"—He that foists in a substratum upon infinite extension, by no means destroys the necessity of this latter. Infinite extension has not been proved to be not a *mode* only, of existence, † and to give it a Substratum or Substance in which it inheres, if it is a property only, is surely not to destroy, but, were that possible, to make more indestructible, its necessary existence. ‡ After the author of the "Argument" had, by Antitheos's way of it, foisted in the substratum, "—he," we are next assured, "comforts himself with the reflection, that it is of very little consequence whether men will or will not CONSENT TO CALL "this *substratum* by the name of *being* or *substance*, because"—And then Antitheos cites a passage from the "Argument." The passage we shall produce, but the context shall be cited likewise. The first portion whereof the reader has had before him, already.||

§ 8. "Secondly, IF Infinity of Extension subsist not without a Substratum, THEN, it being a contradiction to deny "there is Infinity of Extension, ¶ it is a contradiction to deny "there is a Substratum to it."—[The *conclusion* here, is the *conclusion* which Antitheos declared to be *lame* and *impotent*, and, as if that were not enough, *laughable*. †† The ground for merriment, I confess I do not see. But Antitheos may have a keener perception of the ludicrous. Can it be,

† See Part VII. § 3, &c.

‡ See Notes to this Part: Note A.

|| See Part V, § 16.

¶ "Prop. I." Note in "Argument."

†† See Part V. § 17.

that he laughs when he should be rather weeping?† At all events, he should not have been so close, and kept the source of the jest all to himself: Had he but revealed where the cause for the merriment lay, others might have participated in the amusement.]—

§ 9. "Whether or not men will CONSENT TO CALL this Substratum *Substance* or *Being*, is of very little consequence. "For," [The passage cited by Antitheos follows.] "'tis certain that the word *Substance*, or *Being*, has never been employed, can never be employed, to stand for any thing more, at least, than the Substratum of Infinity of 'Extension.'"—The next sentence, in the "Argument," Antitheos does *not* quote. 'Tis as follows: "But to refuse to give such Substratum that name, *being a thing obviously most unreasonable*, let us call the Substratum of Infinity of Extension, by the name *Substance* or *Being*." Prop. III. §§ 4, 5.

§ 10. It is in this way that our atheist writes after giving the quotation from the "Argument":—"It is, of course, of no manner of importance whether men consent to do what they always have done and must continue to do, or whether they will not."—Exactly so. Antitheos lays down a *general* rule, applicable to any case, and Mr Gillespie gave the *particular* instance.‡—"But *how far*," our atheist next proceeds to ask, "is the *because*" [or the "*for*"] "and its certainty consistent with the lurking suspicion of the honoured name of *Being* or *substance* being *refused* to his unsupported substratum?"—How far? Very far indeed. As far as any one can see. Men often both say and do very perverse things, when they think it is for their interest. || May not one see it to be, somehow, necessary, that there

† See Note B.

‡ Above, § 9.

|| See Note C.

should be a Substratum to infinite extension, who yet, for some whimsical, or for some atheistical reason, refuses to accord to the Substratum the *name* Substance or Being? Much more wonderful phenomena may be witnessed every day. Mankind not unfrequently develope the possibility there is, that human passions, and even fancies, may suffice to bring the *tongue* over to their side, in opposition to all the sound dictates of the understanding. There are those who will not be hindered by so paltry a difficulty as the *obvious unreasonableness* of a thing, from doing the thing. To refuse to bestow a *name*, is as easy, in one respect, as to see the propriety of the bestowment. I think, that by this time the most inattentive reader must have remarked, how very few the *insuperable obstructions* are that lie in an atheist's path.

§ 11. Antitheos goes on thus: "Yet, on the very heels of this misgiving, he concludes,—'There is, *then*, NECESSARILY, a Being of Infinity of Extension.'"—Yes: Hard upon the heels of the *lurking suspicion* and *misgiving* as to whether some men may not act very unreasonably, by refusing a *name* to a thing which deserves it,—or, to deliver it more after Antitheos's manner, hard upon the heels of the "lurking suspicion" and "misgiving" as to whether certain men, having a certain object in view, will "consent to do" what they always have done, and must continue to do," in other, and *similar*, circumstances—*when no present interest warps their perceptions all awry*; the Author of the "Argument" thinks that by Proposition III. it is made out, for ever, There is, NECESSARILY, a Being of Infinity of Extension. And I shall venture to say, I am persuaded my reader must think so too.

§ 12. Our atheist concludes his Chapter, and what he has to say in relation to Mr Gillespie's *third* Proposition,

with these words:—"The *worthy old father* of the church, " who declared his belief of a Christian dogma *because it was impossible*, is not far from having a *logician* of the " *mathematical* school to keep him in countenance. Mr " Gillespie frames a most absolute conclusion with his " premises *dubiously faltering on his lips*."—Mr Gillespie does indeed frame a most absolute conclusion, but that he does so with his premises dubiously faltering on his lips, is *one of those many untruths* which the reader has seen dropping from Antitheos's pen. And his is *no faltering* pen, on an occasion. It executes no dubious characters, when a handsome misrepresentation is necessary for the writer's cause.

§ 13. A *logician* of the *mathematical* school may be, for aught known to the contrary, a very proper person to keep company with one who has arrived at a "second childishness."† But whether worthy or unworthy, old or young, fathers or sons, of the Church, are more prone than *certain other* descriptions of persons, to believe *in proportion to the incredibility* of the creed, to act as if their maxim were CREDIMUS, QUIA IMPOSSIBILIA SUNT; this is a matter which may admit of doubt, and is open for fair investigation.

§ 14. "Is it (intelligence) a being—a substance—a thing " that exists by itself? Or is it not, on the contrary," demands Antitheos, "a characteristic *property* of a certain " order of beings, dependent upon the exercise of their " external senses, and, by consequence, their organization? " *We cannot even conceive* how it should exist, independent " of these circumstances. 'To have intelligence, it is neces- " sary to have ideas; to have ideas, it is necessary to have " senses: and to have senses, it is necessary to be material.'‡

† Shakespeare: *As you like it*.

‡ See Note D.

“*Intelligence*, THEREFORE, speaking generally, is *nothing more than an ACCIDENTAL property of matter*.”† Chapter XI. parag. 4.

§ 15. Now this which Antitheos says, that intelligence, speaking either generally or particularly, is *nothing more than an ACCIDENTAL property of matter*: that is, that such a *thought of our minds* as is denoted by the word *accident*—or *chance*—(for is it not plain, that *accident*—or *chance*—can be no real, *separate* existence in the world of *external*, independent realities, and that “the honoured name of *Being* or *substance*” suits no such thing as the *letters* c-h-a-n-c-e—or a-c-c-i-d-e-n-t—can ever denote?) I say, that such a *thought of ours* should, some time or other, have added *thinking* (*ourselves* thus adding *ourselves*‡) to certain collocations of matter||—(or was the matter not brought together previously?—) *this*, to a truly “simple man,” is—surely—as wild and monstrous a creed as any “worthy old father of the church” ever set himself down to frame, in the height of his zeal to be, *above measure*, mysterious and “divinely dark.”¶ THIS, THIS IS INCREDIBLE.

§ 16. And because it is so, we would have our readers consider, and evermore bear in mind, that the point now before our view touches somehow on the borders of that question to which the *whole atheistic controversy* may well be reduced:†† To-wit, Is it more credible that Mind *caused* Matter, than that Matter *caused* Mind?—*To believe* that Matter (necessarily, or accidentally) caused Mind to come

† See Note E.

‡ Thought thus *acting before* thought existed.

|| ‘Matter’s collocations,’ was a favourite phrase with that great man the Rev. Dr Chalmers.

¶ Dunciad, B. iv. l. 460.

†† See Note F.

into existence, IS IMPOSSIBLE.† *Then, ATHEISM IS INCREDIBLE.*

§ 17. And as it is impossible to believe, that Matter was the sole cause of Mind, so, WITH ANTITHEOS, IT IS A CREDIBLE THING, THAT MIND WAS THE SOLE CAUSE OF MATTER. Which we shall prove.

§ 18. Our medium of proof shall be this: *With Antitheos, the Creation of Matter was a possible thing.‡*

§ 19. Antitheos certainly jeers sufficiently at the doctrine of the Creation of Matter.—“Like the dogma of all things being created out of nothing,” [or, being created at all,] “* * * * the thing seems *impossible*”—Ch. I. par. 6. “The creation or annihilation of matter,—either of “which is an *impossibility*.” Ch. V. last par.—“The miraculous and *incomprehensible feat* of creating the universe out “of nothing,” [or, creating the universe at all.]—Ch. IX. par. 11. “—The *gross and profoundly irrational* dogma of “creation. This is not precisely the place to detect and lay “bare all the *absurdities* of that dogma (which could easily “be done to its inmost core)—Ch. XII. par. 5. “He (the “theologian) takes for granted the *astounding fact* of the “material universe having been created out of nothing”—[or created at all.] Last Chap. par. 9.

§ 20. But notwithstanding all Antitheos’s jeers, on this *fruitful* subject, he says: “WE CAN CONCEIVE MATTER NOT TO EXIST.” See also other passages, the same in effect, from our atheist, (no atheist in this,) above, in Part VI. § 34.

§ 21. Now—assuredly—he that can conceive Matter not to be, or not to have been, can conceive Matter to have had a beginning. Lay together these two positions: To-wit, *Matter is*, and, *Matter can be conceived not to have been*: And

† See Note G.

‡ See Note H.

you have the conception of the Creation of Matter; the possibility that Matter may have begun to be.

§ 22. And as with our atheist (no atheist here,) Matter may have begun to be, *the Creation of Matter is, with him, a possible thing.*†—So that now we have, in FIRM KEEPING, our medium of proof.

§ 23. And I fancy, it will not be denied (at least with a grave face,) that if Matter, all Matter, began to be, *Mind*, or *nothing*, must have produced it: That is, if Matter began to be, Mind must have been the cause.‡

§ 24. So that—putting one thing by the side of another—it appears, that, WITH ANTITHEOS, AT THE BOTTOM OF HIS HEART,|| WE CAN BELIEVE, THAT MIND CAUSED MATTER.—And this was the thing to be proved.¶

§ 25. — — — — *Antitheos* should call himself "*Antitheos*"—no, not for another hour.

§ 26. And here must be terminated our present Examination. To advance farther now, would be improper in a high degree. We have weighed what Antitheos has said in reference to "Proposition I.": We have examined every atom of an argument urged against "Proposition II.": And we have gone over *word by word, and in order*, each syllable written in opposition to the evidence of "Proposition III."—*On these three, (and on the corresponding three,)†† hang all the rest.* If those Propositions be granted, or are fully estab-

† See Note I.

‡ See Note J.

|| Or rather, perhaps, *at the top of his head.* (See § 29 of Part VIII.)

¶ See above, § 17.

†† To-wit, Prop. I., II., III., Part II.

lished (whether they be granted or no,) Antitheos may as soon cause the heavens to depart by a frown, as he can get quit of the proof for the Being of A GOD. *If* those three positions are necessarily true, there lies close to our hands the *demonstration* of An Intelligent First Cause of all the phenomena, and of all the matter, in the universe. And that they *are so*, we have no doubt, each one of our readers is by this time most thoroughly convinced.†—In short, all the remaining positions in the "Argument, *a priori*, for the Being and Attributes of GOD," are *mere deductions*—doctrines evolved from the doctrines laid down in those preliminary Propositions.‡

§ 27. And on the other hand, if the truth of these Propositions have not been made luminously to appear, 'tis quite needless to proceed beyond them. The *Zetetics* were challenged to point out some—some one—"specific fallacy" in my Demonstration. Antitheos, in the character of their avowed champion, alleges, he has detected *A specific fallacy* in the *third*, that vital, Proposition. If he be right,—at that point he should have stopped—It was mere supererogation to go over an inch of more ground—One of the two foundation-stones of this *great argument crumbles into dust*—And the whole "fabric of the Argument *a priori* comes lumbering down along with it."||

§ 28. — That Antitheos resolved on *sinking deeper* into the slough of his own objections, is evidence of any thing but his own contentment with the result of his preliminary operations. He enters upon new ground, and de-

† *Whatever* certain readers may say.

‡ Of the truth of which, a slight inspection of that work may satisfy one. Weigh § 19, Part II.

|| "Refutation," Ch. X. last par. These words are used as *accommodations*.

means himself as if the region he had passed over were not territory fully conquered.

§ 29. We shall come to a halt then—to see whether or no “Theology must be sorely distressed for standing ground, *if* “THIS be its strongest position—its fortress—its rock—its “high tower.”—“*Refutation*”: *last paragraph*.

§ 30. To go on, we should have to subsume the unquestionable truth of a proposition to which my antagonist has fairly—I mean, openly—objected. To take for granted against atheists, the truth of the 3rd Proposition: “this will we do, if GOD permit.”† *But not now will we*. In the mean time, Antitheism is afforded an opportunity of acknowledging what, we are bold to say, all our readers must have perceived.—

• ——— “I PAUSE FOR A REPLY.” ———

§ 31.—I conclude, in the words of the penetrating Dr Samuel Clarke.—“Infinite *Space*, is Infinite *Extension*: “and *Eternity*, is Infinite *Duration*. THEY ARE THE TWO “FIRST AND MOST OBVIOUS AND SIMPLE IDEAS, THAT EVERY “MAN HAS IN HIS MIND”—*Answer to Sixth Letter*.

† I am not arguing with an antitheist, at present.

POSTSCRIPT

TO

THE THIRD EDITION.

§ 1. Three years have now elapsed since this Examination was first given to the public; and as Antitheos has not brought out any reply, it may be presumed, 'tis intended that no reply shall appear.

§ 2. Indeed, in a private communication to the author of the Examination, "Antitheos," in so many words, lets it be understood, that he does not purpose to publish any reply.

§ 3. In the communication referred to, "Antitheos," writing "in the contemplation of a *second edition* of his work," admits, in consequence of Mr Gillespie's labours, that he "would have to alter" his reasoning "with respect to the "indivisibility of extension." "No one, I presume," writes "Antitheos," "ever thought of denying the applicability of "infinitude, either to SPACE or duration, or OF IMAGINING "THE SEPARABILITY OF THEIR PARTS."

§ 4.—On the contrary, no less a one than Antitheos himself did speak as if *he imagined the separability of the parts of space*, when he gave birth to his *refutation* of Mr Gillespie's demonstration of the inseparability of those parts.† It is perfectly true, that Antitheos does not continue to imagine the separability of the parts of Space; the reasonings of the "Examination" having forced the conviction

† See Part II. § 16, and other places. Besides: "Antitheos" "would have to alter" "with respect to the indivisibility of extension," or space.

upon him, that "the same unqualified assent"† which was accorded to Proposition the first,‡ must, after all, "be accorded to Proposition the second."†

§ 5. And here we cannot help reminding our readers, that "a great part of the reasoning in the 'Argument' is built upon the second Proposition," and that "to go over all that it is founded on to prove, would be to introduce no small portion of the work referred to."|| This being kept in mind, the admission in Antitheos's letter will appear very valuable, in reference to the "Argument, *a priori*." 'Tis, for us, a most happy admission.

§ 6. In a subsequent letter, Antitheos unwittingly reveals what he feels the "Examination" has effected, with regard to the attack, in the "Refutation," on the third Proposition of the "Argument." The third Proposition "is," writes he, "any thing but WELL established." Not a word, however, in support of the assertion.

§ 7. In short, the silence of Antitheos before the public is expressive; it informs us, as well as any words could inform us, of his inability to controvert the reasonings of the "Examination." No question but that so keen a controvertist would have replied, had a passable reply been reckoned at all practicable.

§ 8. This controversy may, therefore, be viewed as closed. The champion of the Zetetics having retired disgraced from the lists may be *proclaimed recreant*. The Atheists of Scotland have cried, through the medium of their representative's silence:

"HOLD, ENOUGH"

† Part II. § 16.

‡ See Part II. § 9.

|| Part II. § 19.

POSTSCRIPT

TO THE

FOURTH (OR PRESENT) EDITION.

§ 1. In an Appendix to the 2nd edition of the "Examination of Antitheos's 'Refutation,'" it was stated that *the Zetetic Society* had ceased to exist. At least, it had ceased to exist as the Zetetic Society, or as a particular Society, professing, distinctly, and distinctively, Atheistical Principles.†

§ 2. The 3rd edition of the "Examination" contained nought—certainly, nothing new—about that Society, of which Antitheos had been, as the skilfullest reasoner, the chief ornament. The Society of Atheists had become defunct. It falls to this (fourth) edition to record the sad fact of the death of my exceedingly clever opponent himself. He died several years after the appearance of that third edition of the work in question.‡

§ 3. He had, as we have seen, planned in his mind a new edition of his able work against the "Argument, a priori."

† It may be mentioned, here, that the Atheists of Scotland never pursued the controversy farther, in any way.

‡ On some other occasion, it may be my sorrowful duty to enlighten the public as to who *Antitheos*, as a man in this real world, was, and to give, in addition, some interesting particulars of his private history. I understand, that he was as good, in his own way, as he may be said to have been great, in many ways.

But, alas! who is not liable to the application, in his individual case, of our Scottish prophet-poet's saying, that

The best-laid schemes o' mice and men
Gang aft a-gley?

The "Refutation" by Antitheos never appeared therefore in a second edition; and it never will appear. On the dismal Infidel assumptions, the man whose daring *nomme de guerre* was "*Antitheos*," became a little dust,† and was, for ever, resolved into the self-acting principles he had proceeded from—the primal elementary atoms of matter, attracted and repelled, as they were and are, by reason of their own laws, produced by their own selves, from all eternity. According to the brighter Christian premises, my great opponent in argument returned unto the dust, and he rests in his grave, till the Archangel's trumpet shall summon him, and all that are in the graves, to the judgment. But, taking it either way, the world shall see no other edition of that remarkable production, the "Refutation of the Argument *a priori* for the Being and Attributes of GOD." Antitheos, as well as great Pan,‡ is dead.

† 'Ολίγη δὲ κεισόμεσθα
κόνις, ὅστίων λυθίντων.—*Απακρον.*

‡ See Rabelais' incomparable work, Book iv. Chap. xxix.

NOTES TO PART XII.†

NOTE A.

“*Space and Duration* being evidently *necessary*, and yet themselves not *substances*, but *properties* or *modes*; show evidently that the Substance, without which these Modes could not subsist, is itself *much more* (if that were possible) *necessary*.”—Dr St. Clarke’s 3rd Ans.—“Which (*Space*) we evidently see to be *necessarily-existing*; and yet which (not being itself a *substance*,) at the same time *necessarily pre-supposes* a *Substance*, without which it could not exist; Which *substance* consequently, must be itself (much *more*, if possible,) *necessarily-existing*.”—Fourth Ans.

NOTE B.

Antitheos may hold in admiration the ancient sect of Stoics, or perhaps he may be lineally descended from the Danes, from whom so many of us islanders, Scotch as well as English, are sprung, by virtue of an original descent more or less pure.‡—“On receiving mortal wounds in battle, they were so far from uttering groans and lamentations, or exhibiting any marks of fear or sorrow, that they comonly began to laugh and sing.”—Henry’s *History of Great Britain*, B. II. ch. 7.

† These larger notes are brought together in this separate way, in order that the text of Part XII.—so important as constituting the winding up of the affair; requiring therefore to be read so continuously—might not be too much interrupted.

‡ See a clever work on “Ethnology,” by my excellent friend Mr J. W. Jackson, in which he destroys, as far as he can destroy, the purity of our much-prized Anglo-Saxon and Danish descent, by grafting us English and Lowland Scotch on the Celtic, or original British, stock. The work, newly come out, is published by Trübner & Co., London.

NOTE C.

We have, as we noticed before, atheistical authority touching upon something hereabouts. (See note to § 18, Part XI.) And as we have atheistical authority, so we shall treat ourselves to theistical, too. "We believe that to be true, *which some have affirmed, that were there any interest of life, any concernment of appetite and passion, against the truth of geometrical theorems themselves, as of a triangle's having three angles equal to two right, whereby men's judgments might be clouded and bribed, notwithstanding all the demonstrations of them, many would remain, at least sceptical about them.*"—Cudworth: in Preface to *Intellectual System*.

NOTE D.

I do not know exactly whence Antitheos took this sentence. The same sentiments abound, of course, in the *Système de la Nature*,—and every atheistical work.

— — —

"This passage of a modern writer [Hobbes], *We worms cannot conceive, how GOD can understand without brains, is vox pecudis, the language and philosophy rather of worms or brute animals, than of men.*"—Cudworth's "System," P. 841.

NOTE E.

Antitheos, it thus appears, was the result of ACCIDENT. The concurrence of atheistical atoms mentioned in our Preface was produced by NECESSITY. *Doctors differ, and so, we see, do atheists.* Both hypotheses agree in one respect. Antitheos, as well as that concurrence of atoms, sprang from A WORD, or, at most, A THOUGHT—his own? or a neighbour's? (See § 15 of the text.)—Or do I see an explanation of the enigma? Antitheos's ultimate-particle-body was the product of NECESSITY, "physical necessity," but his *intelligence, or mind, that is, his*

organized body, was the result of ACCIDENT: Is this what Antitheos would deliver? If so, *half* (and not the worse half) of him came by *accident*, but the other gentleman was, every inch of him, the result of "NECESSARY CAUSES." So still the pair differ. But is there any harm in that?

— However, after all: "Blind *fate* and blind *chance* are at bottom *much the same thing*, and one no more intelligible than the other."—Berkeley's "Siris." Section 273.

NOTE F.

It is not an ill observation which Clarke makes, that the main question between us and the atheist lies in the Proposition, (his 8th,) "The Self-existent and Original Cause of all things, must be an Intelligent Being."

NOTE G.

See Appendix to Part VIII., Appendix B, § 24, and the places therein cited.

"*I appeal*," exclaims John Locke, "to every one's own thoughts, whether he cannot as easily conceive *matter* produced by *nothing*, as *thought* to be produced by *pure matter*, when before there was no such thing as thought, or an intelligent being, existing?"—B. IV. ch. x. § 10. —See the whole of the unanswerable passage in our Review of Locke's demonstration, § 29.

I shall add a parallel passage from Cudworth.—"As no man can be so sottish, as to conceive himself, or that which thinketh in him, his own soul or mind, and personality, to be no real entity, whilst every clod of earth is such; so it is certain, that mind can never be generated out of dead and senseless matter or body, nor result, as a modification thereof, out of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, and therefore must needs be a thing really distinct from it, or substance incorporeal."—*Intellect. System*, P. 749.

— Those passages are brought forward not as *authorities*, but as solemn appeals to the Court of Consciousness.

NOTE H.

The creation of Matter, but *not out of nothing*: For that, strictly, is absurd nonsense. The proper notion of Creation is—not the bringing *something* OUT OF *nothing*, but—the making something begin to be which before was not.

Let him who can, reduce this to a *contradiction*—*i. e.*, render manifest that to conceive it is impossible.

Colliber says: “I confess, if any man could be found so absolutely stupid and void of understanding, as to affirm that the DEITY in Creating the World had * * produce’t it out of nothing as out of a preëxistent subject * * * such a notion of it might have some right to the character of a Contradiction. But since by Creation there can no more be meant than the causing to be what was not *before*, or the producing something where *once* was nothing, this is evidently no more a Contradiction than”—&c. “Impartial Enquiry.” Book I. ch. ix.

And Clarke: “To say that something which once was not, may since have begun to exist; is neither directly, nor by any consequence whatsoever, to assert that That which *is not*, can *be*, while it *is not*; or that That which *is*, can *not be*, while it *is*.” Dem. under Prop. X.

NOTE I.

I am happy at being able to add Locke’s authority to that of Antitheos, on the topic of the possibility of the Creation of Matter. “Possibly, if we would emancipate ourselves from vulgar notions, and raise our thoughts as far as they would reach, to a closer contemplation of things, we might be able to aim at some *dim and seeming conception* HOW *matter might at first be made, and begin to exist*.” Essay, B. IV. ch. x. § 18. It will be observed, Locke goes farther than Antitheos, by one step. With Antitheos, the Creation of Matter is possible: While Locke conceives, not merely that Matter began to exist, but *how* matter might begin to exist.

NOTE J.

“ Man knows by an *intuitive certainty*, that *bare nothing* can no more produce any real being, than it can be equal to two right angles.”—
 “ This being of all *absurdities* the greatest, to imagine that *pure nothing*, the perfect negation and absence of all beings, should ever produce any real existence.”—*Locke*, B. IV. ch. x. §§ 3, 8.

We hesitate not to adopt, as pertinent here, one of *Epicurus's* maxims, as it was understood by the Sect.

Nullam rem e nihilo gigni Divinitus unquam.—*Lucret. Lib. I.*

If there was no Divinity, as they supposed there was not, why then—*nothing* could not cause any thing.

We shall even go so far as to adopt the theorem as stated by another Poet.

De nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti.—*Persii Satir. III.*

Nothing cannot be the cause of anything, nor reduce anything to nothing.—*Nothing* cannot be a cause at all.

—“ It had long ago been received as an indisputable doctrine, if not an axiom in philosophy, that out of *nothing* no thing can come; and it has never yet been shown to be essentially incorrect.” *Refutation*. Ch. II. par. 25. Antitheos is right:—The doctrine, or the axiom, is correct, *essentially*,—and *substantially* too.

APPENDIX

TO THE

EXAMINATION OF ANTITHEOS.

APPENDIX TO EXAMINATION.

APPENDIX TO PART I.

§ 1. It is of importance that it should be distinctly known what in truth *a priori* argumentation for Deity is, as a serious misunderstanding is abroad: a misunderstanding which, indeed, has operated as one of those causes which have sunk that species of argumentation in public opinion. It has been thought right, therefore, to add, to the citation of the admirable passage in the Quarterly Review,† the following just and sensible observations. It may be proper to mention, that the writers we quote from are by no means to be regarded as authorities on every subject. One at least (the second) of them, is, on some occasions, as *un-orthodox* as possible.

§ 2. “Many pious and ingenious persons, though perfectly satisfied with the proofs for the existence and absolute perfection of the supreme Being, drawn from the works of the creation, have thought themselves well employed in devising arguments, drawn from other topics and considerations, which might lead to the same conclusion, and might prove it perhaps in a still more forcible manner, and might obviate the metaphysical objections of atheistical writers. Hence arose another way of reasoning on this subject, usually called the *argument a priori*. The terms *a posteriori* and *a priori* were introduced by the Schoolmen to distinguish the two methods of

† Quoted in Part I. § 68.

“arguing, one from the nature of effects to the nature of their cause, the other from the nature of a cause to the nature of its effects. The argument *a priori*, taken in this sense, cannot be applied to the present subject; for we cannot argue from any thing considered in the light of a *cause*, when we mean to prove the existence or the attributes of that Being who is the first cause of all things.† Therefore when we speak of proving the being and attributes of GOD *a priori*, we must understand that term in its original and more comprehensive sense, as it denotes the common *synthetic* method of arguing, which is applicable to this as well as to other subjects, particularly to the proof of mathematical theorems. In this method we lay down some evident principles or axioms, and from thence deduce other truths that are more complex. And as the principles from whence we begin are *first* known to us, and in the order of our thoughts are *prior* to the truths deduced from them, we are said in this case also to argue *a priori*. This way of reasoning has been used by several authors, and it has been acknowledged that if demonstration can be attained on this subject, it must be by pursuing this method of reasoning.”—Bishop Hamilton: “Introduction to the Essay on the Existence and Attributes of God.”

§ 3. “The reader should attend,” says the Bishop, in a note, “to the distinction here made between the two ways of arguing *a priori*; one from a cause to its effects, which is the philosophical way, the other from axioms or first principles, which is the * * demonstrative way of arguing.”

§ 4. What a pity, that the “two ways of arguing *a priori*,” are, where the reference is to a God, so often confounded, or rather, that the one way is mistaken for the other, the wrong way for the right!

§ 5. “There are two general ways of Reasoning, called Arguments *a Priori* and *a Posteriori*, or according to what Logicians commonly style the *Synthetical* and *Analytical* Method: The former lays down some evident *Principles*, and then deduces the several *Consequences*

† To argue from any thing considered in the light of a *cause*, when we mean to prove the existence or the attributes of that Being who is the First Cause of all things; has been well described, by Dr Waterland, as arguing *a priori* in “the GROSS SENSE” of the word.¹ To demonstrate *a priori*, in the *gross sense*, “is,” as Cudworth says, “impossible and contradictory.”²

¹ Dissertation annexed to Bishop Law's “Enquiry.” (See p. 98.)

² Preface to “Intellectual System.”

“ necessarily resulting from them: The latter begins with the *Phænomena* themselves, and traces 'em up to their *Original*, and from the known properties of these *Phænomena* arrives at the Nature of their Cause. Now the former of these is evidently preferable, where it can be had, since the latter must depend upon a large Induction of Particulars, any of which, when failing, invalidates the whole Argument, and spoils a Demonstration.”—Bishop Law: Preface to Archbishop King's “Origin of Evil.” †

† Sometimes, my authorities are quoted from original, and old, editions, (as in the instance to which this note more immediately relates): Sometimes, they are taken from modern editions, (if not from modern works,) and, so, have been modernized in the style of the printing, &c. Hence, the differences to be discerned in the citations: as, *cr. gr.*, in this very Appendix to Part I. An observation which fully applies to many of the authorities occurring throughout the body of our work.

APPENDIX TO PART IV.

§ 1. We are about to bid a final adieu to the infinite divisibility of matter, and to infinite divisibility of every kind. But ere we take our flight from the Cimmerian darkness of that uncomfortable region, we shall do what lies in our power to display the doctrine of infinite divisibility in those colours in which it will be seen to most advantage. And, in truth, it requires to be placed in the most favourable light, if we would fit it to be brooked at all, it being but a monster at best. Many of the partisans of that doctrine have represented it as a very Gorgon. A Gorgon indeed it is: But then these gentlemen, with true Grecian mendacity,† have bestowed upon it more snakes and tusks than it was obliged to carry on

The very *head* and *front* of [its] offending.

In short, our statement shall be much to the credit of the dogma of infinite divisibility; and if its patrons do not give us their thanks, it will be because there is no gratitude in their bosoms, not because we have not done any of them a service.

§ 2. Matter, that is, every part of matter, is divisible *in infinitum*: What are we to understand by that?

§ 3.—1. We shall, in the first place, lay down what that doctrine does not mean. It cannot mean that any portion of matter contains an infinite number of parts.

§ 4. It must, we confess, be admitted, that not a few of those who have treated of the subject, not a few friends as well as foes, have represented the position, Matter is divisible infinitely, as convertible with

† ——— *Quicquid Græcia mendax
Audet* ———

See Juvenal's tenth Satire.

the position, Matter contains, or consists of, an infinite number of parts. There is no necessity for our producing the willing testimony of friends, and the invective of enemies, to bear out what we affirm. What we affirm we suppose to be nothing but what is well known.—I am not sure, that Hume, in a passage which has been quoted, (in § 2 of Part III.) may not have intended to set out the dogma we treat of under such a representation. Certain it is, that in a note upon the place he speaks twice of *an infinite number*. In order to finding absurdities in that dogma, there is no need first to misrepresent it, or even to state it at all unfavourably.

§ 5. But from the *infinite*, or, if we would be rather more correct with our word, the *eternal*, divisibility of any particle of matter, (WERE THE DIVISIBILITY POSSIBLE,) we can by no means rationally infer the existence of an infinite number of parts therein. For *an infinite number* is a contradiction in terms. The thing is very obvious. When one speaks of the possible infinity of numbers, *infinity* in this case signifies merely the power of always adding units to the sum we before had, and when any one determinate number is pronounced to be *infinite*, the word ceases to possess any meaning. What is of infinity in any respect, cannot be made greater in that respect. And were any one absolutely determinate number infinite, we could make an infinite number greater, if we could conceive a unit added to it, as it is most certain we could. To speak, then, of an infinite number is to utter a contradiction. And therefore, even were every particle of matter eternally divisible, all the matter in the universe could not be supposed to constitute an infinite number of parts.

§ 6. "The infinity of numbers," says Locke, "to the end of whose addition every one perceives there is no approach, easily appears to any one that reflects on it; but how clear soever this idea of the infinity of number be, there is nothing yet more evident, than the absurdity of the actual idea of an infinite number." "Let a man frame in his mind an idea of any * * number, as great as he will; it is plain, the mind rests and terminates in that idea, which is contrary to the idea of infinity, which consists in a supposed endless progression."—*Essay*, B. II. ch. xvii. § 8.—Again: "Though it be hard, I think, to find any one so absurd as to say, he has the positive idea of an actual infinite number; the infinity whereof lies only in a power still of adding any combination of units to any former number, and that, as long, and as much, as one will," &c. &c.—*Ibid.* § 13.

§ 7. With reference to those persons who have accustomed themselves to speaking of *an infinite number* of parts, as the cause, or the consequence, or the concomitant, of the infinite divisibility of matter, and whose speculations have ever been found to be shrouded in mists sufficiently opaque to stand in the way of clear views; besides what Locke has here already conveyed, conveyed to them if they like, we would recommend the study of the following passage, provided we be allowed to make one alteration upon it. "The great and inextricable difficulties which perpetually involve all discourses concerning *infinity*, whether of space, duration, or *divisibility*, have been the certain marks of a defect in our ideas of infinity, and the disproportion the nature thereof has to the comprehension of our narrow capacities."—*Essay*, B. II. ch. xvii. § 21.—We propose, by way of amendment, to say, that the difficulties which involve many, perhaps nearly all, discourses concerning *infinity*, in particular concerning *infinity*, when *divisibility to infinity* is spoken about, *have been the certain marks of a defect in many men's ideas as to what the word infinity means*, and of the disproportion between the true meaning thereof and the confused comprehensions of the meaning by certain narrow capacities. Were this amendment suffered, John Locke, himself, would deal in better sense. PRAY, IF WE CAN RISE SO HIGH AS TO SEE THAT THERE ARE DEFECTS IN OUR IDEAS OF INFINITY, WHAT SHOULD HINDER US TO SOAR AWAY FROM THE DEFECTS ALTOGETHER? IF WE CAN SPRING SO FAR ALOFT AS TO DESCRY THOSE DEFECTS AS UNDER OUR SUPERINCUMBENCY, IS NOT THIS A SURE SIGN THAT THE DEFECTS ARE, IN THE BEST OF SENSES, BENEATH OUR NOTICE?

Quandoque bonus dormitat Homerus.†

§ 8.—2. In the next place, we shall mention distinctly what is to be understood by the dogma of the divisibility of matter to all eternity. As the capacity of every particle of matter to be divided everlastingly, (BE SUCH CAPACITY AN ODD CHIMERA, OR BE IT NOT,) does not entitle us to infer that matter contains an infinite number of parts, so, on the other hand, it forces us to draw this conclusion, that no portion of matter, *viz.* that no body, consists of any *definite* number of parts at all. He who alleges that matter is eternally divisible, must maintain, that there is no body which is made up of truly *ultimate* particles; no body which, with any propriety, can be said to contain *aliquot* parts;

† *Ars Poetica*.

in fine, no body which consists of parts *component* in any other sense than *proportional*, as halves, quarters, &c. &c. What are those parts of a body which are not ultimate? which are not aliquot? but which are only proportional? But to sum up every question in one; what are those parts of a body which are of no fixed, definite number?

§ 9. These consequences, or these concomitants, are admitted, or, at least, what involves them all is allowed, by those who ought to know something of the affair, and who would not, for the world, unnecessarily allow any thing to the prejudice of the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of every portion of every body.

§ 10. "He who maintains divisibility *in infinitum*," says a stout defender of the divisibility he speaks of, "*boldly* denies, therefore, the existence of the ultimate particles of body;" "it is a manifest contradiction, to suppose at once ultimate particles and divisibility *in infinitum*."—"With all your might, then, resist this assertion: every compound being is made up of simple beings; and though you may not be able directly to prove the fallacy," &c. Euler's "Letters." Vol. II. Let. xii. & xvi. And the same in other places.

§ 11. "If it is admitted, that the divisibility of matter has no limit," thus speaks another warm advocate of the dogma of never-ending divisibility, "it will follow, that no" [one] "body" [*however minute*] "can be called one individual substance. You may as well call it two, or twenty, or two hundred" substances, or twenty times two hundred substances, or two hundred times two hundred *nonillions* of substances. See Reid's "Essays." Essay II. ch. xix. We thus represent a nonillion in figures:—

1,000000,000000,000000,000000,000000,000000,000000,000000,000000.

§ 12. Think of the nonillionth part of a mote in a sunbeam being as much a body as the huge luminary in whose rays the mote dances! Yet such a part of such a thing is as much a body as the sun, according to Dr Reid's principles. And verily 'tis even so, *if one small circumstance be true*: IF SUCH A PART OF SUCH A THING BE NOT A NON-ENTITY. And when you have cogitated upon that, sufficiently: Think of an extension *but* the nonillionth part of the extension of a mote in a sunbeam as really existing *in rerum natura*, and afterwards of the first of these extensions, that is, the nonillionth part of the extension of a mote in a sunbeam, being divisible to all eternity! These are the high mysteries into which those plunge who will have it, that the divisibility of matter has no limit.

§ 13. To conclude; When one says that matter is divisible *in æternum*, he must be understood as saying neither more nor less than that any particle, however small, can be divided without the possibility of ever coming to an end with the divisions. And to render his assertion a proveable one, he must be held as maintaining further, that, in point of fact, when we divide and subdivide *any* portion of a body, we find, that at no time can we give a righteous termination to the business.

APPENDIX TO PART VI.

§ 1. The words quoted in the passage to which this Appendix has reference, are taken from the New-York "Free Enquirers' Family Library Edition" of the *System of Nature*. (MDCCCXXXVI.) There are notes, said to be by Diderot. The translation of the notes is said to be by one H. D. Robinson. In the *Advertisement*, we are informed, that "the *Systeme de la Nature* was first attributed to Helvetius, and then to "Mirabeau," (p. iv.) and that it may now be attributed, with truth, to the Baron D'Holbach. (Pp. v. vi. vii.)

§ 2. Of the "System of Nature" Lord Brougham says, in "Note IV": "It is the only work of any consideration wherein atheism is openly avowed and preached—avowed, indeed, and preached in terms. (See, particularly, part ii., chap. ii.)" Like many assertions of Brougham's, this one is deficient in a certain good quality. "As to Atheists," said one who knew what he was speaking about, "these so *confident exphoders* of them are both UNSKILLED IN THE MONUMENTS OF ANTIQUITY,† "and"—&c. Will his Lordship take quietly this hint, for want of a reproof, from his favourite Cudworth?‡—One of the atheistical monu-

† Unskilled in the monuments of antiquity! Read Brougham's Notes VI. VII. VIII., and then deny, if you can, that

 This, this was the unkindest cut of all

‡ The hint occurs in the *Preface* to what Warburton, that colossal man, has so well called "one immortal volume." ("Preface" to the 1st Ed. of Books iv. v. vi. of the "Divine Legation of Moses.")

ments of antiquity is the "*De Rerum Natura*" of Lucretius, who sings:—

Omnis, ut est, igitur, per se, Natura, duabus
Consistit rebus; nam Corpora sunt, et Inane——

Præterea nihil est, quod possis dicere ab omni
Corpore sejunctum, secretumque esse ab Inani,
Quod quasi tertia sit rerum natura reperta.——

—Præter Inane, et Corpora, tertia per se
Nulla potest rerum in numero natura relinqui——LIB. I.

—— Natura videtur

Libera continuo, Dominis privata superbis;
Ipsa sua per se sponte omnia Diis agere expers.†——LIB. II.

Naturam rerum haud Divina mente coortam.‡——LIB. III.

And Lucretius sings not unfrequently to the same tunes.—But perhaps, my Lord, the atheists of ancient times were of *no consideration*? Or perhaps, they did not avow and preach their atheism *openly*? Or, if they did it openly, perhaps they did not do it *in terms*?—Your Lordship may be ill to please with atheism. *Ex. gr.* To affirm, with Spinoza, "*Substantiam corpoream, quæ non nisi infinita concipi potest, nulla ratione Natura Divina indignam esse dici posse.*" [*I. e.* "That corporeal substance (or matter,) which is necessarily conceived to be infinite, must be allowed to be not unworthy of the Divine Nature." Which may, very properly, be reduced to this proposition,—Matter is infinite,

† Epicurus, and therefore Lucretius, *speaks*, it is true, of Gods, or a Divinity. But what says Tully of the Epicureans? *VERUMS ponunt, RE tollunt Deos.*—"As Epicurus, so other Atheists in like manner have commonly had their vizards and disguises. * * * Yet they, that are sagacious, may *EASILY* look through these thin veils and "disguises."—Cudworth's *System*, Ch. II. & ii.

Cicero very well puts it, That, while the Epicureans allow the Gods *in words*,—*in reality*, their philosophy leaves no room for Gods. And Cudworth has somewhere noticed, that the Gods of the Epicureans are spectrous men in the air, or clouds, rather than Gods.

Epicurus had his reasons for *speaking* of Gods. 1. The Greeks of his day, who were only besotted Heathens, were not prepared to permit one whom they esteemed such a monster as an atheist to exist in peace. 2. Epicurus took no small delight in making fools of the more unthinking common-people.—One would be apt to suppose that even the common-place philosophers of those times might always have appreciated such notable irony as the following:

Tenuis enim natura Deum, longeque remota
Sensibus a nostris, animi vix mente videtur.—*Lucret. LIB. V.*

The majority of Atheists, in all ages, have seen it fit to delude the vulgar, and afterwards to mock them.

and there cannot be any God besides matter.† To affirm that, may not altogether satisfy your Lordship that the writer is an open, and avowed atheist, in terms. Your Lordship—I shall repeat it—may be ill to please with atheism: So very ill to please, indeed, that if such an one as your Lordship will be at the trouble to read, of the “System of Nature,” and of the second Part, the 9th chapter, (the title of which asks, “Do there exist Atheists?”—) he may come to think—not that there has been peradventure *one*, but that—there never was a truly atheistical work at all.

§ 3. “There is,” says Brougham, “no book of an atheistical description which has ever made a greater impression than the famous *Système de la Nature*.”

§ 4. “It is impossible to deny the merits of the *Système de la Nature*. The work of a great writer it unquestionably is.” And accordingly, his Lordship has devoted a long Note (it is Note IV.) to the performance.

§ 5. Of the merit of the “System of Nature,” it is thus that Lord Brougham speaks:—“Its merit lies in the extraordinary eloquence of the composition, and the skill with which words substituted for ideas, and assumptions for proofs, are made to pass current, not only for arguments against existing beliefs, but for a new system planted in their stead. As a piece of reasoning, it never rises above a set of plausible sophisms—plausible only as long as the ear of the reader being filled with sounds, his attention is directed away from the sense. The chief resource of the writer is to take for granted the thing to be proved, and then to refer back to his assumption as a step in the demonstration, while he builds various conclusions upon it, as if it were complete. Then he declaims against a doctrine seen from one point of view only, and erects another for our assent, which, besides being liable to the very same objections, has also no foundation whatever to rest upon. The grand secret, indeed, of the author goes even further *in petitione principii* than this; for we oftentimes find, that in the very substitute which he has provided for the notions of belief he would destroy, there lurks the very idea which

† Of course, Spinoza abounds with matter to the same effect. The First Part of his Ethics, in particular, overflows with such matter. See, for example, what is under the fifteenth Proposition of that Part.

“ he is combating, and that his idol is our own faith in a new form, but masked under different words and phrases.

§ 6. “ The truth of these statements,” continues his Lordship, “ we are now to examine.” But into the examination we cannot follow his Lordship.

§ 7. His Lordship’s volume having crossed the Atlantic, and fallen into the hands of the New-World atheists; the compliment to the author of the book called the *System of Nature* is repaid, with interest. “ Henry Lord Brougham,” * * say the Transatlantic infidels, “ in his recent Discourse of Natural Theology, has mentioned this extraordinary treatise, but with what care does he evade entering the lists with this distinguished writer! He passes over the work with a haste and sophistry that indicates how fully conscious he was of his own weakness and his opponent’s strength.” — The western free-thinkers part from his Lordship in this manner: “ It is with a few pages” [The pages are as near to being *sixteen*, of the closer printed ones, as need be.] “ of * * empty declamation that his Lordship attacks and condemns this eloquent and logical work.” See “ Advertisement:” mentioned in § 1, above.

§ 8. “ ALL Christian writers on Natural Theology,” so write the American atheologists, “ have studiously avoided even the mention of this masterly production:† knowing” [Here is the *cause*] “ their utter inability to cope with its powerful reasoning,” [Then follows the *effect*] “ they have wisely‡ passed it by in silence.” *Advertisement*. The whole assertion *says* (to employ the mild language of *Honyhnhnm*) *the thing which is not*. But whether it be an ethical lie, or merely a logical one,—a lie of malice, or only of mistake,—I shall not take up time in endeavouring to determine. The assertion is false, whatever be the reason of the circumstance. And did I deem it at all necessary to do so, I should set down the names of several writers on Natural Theology, the writers being Christians, who not only have not avoided mentioning the *System of Nature*, but who have examined it, rather fully. And as it is false, that the production has been passed by in silence by all Christian writers on Natural Theology; so it is not true, that these writers were in the knowledge of their utter inability to cope with the

† These gentlemen subsequently except Brougham.

‡ There were good reasons for the wisdom. See below, note to § 9.

Anti-Christian writer on (what I hope is Un-Natural, as well as) A-Theology. The *effect* has no existence: Is it any wonder, that the *cause* has therefore none!

§ 9. I, for one, in place of *studiously avoiding even the mention* of the "System of Nature," have, as the reader of my sixth Part is well aware, done the very reverse, and mentioned the production, when I could have "avoided even the mention" of it, without being very studious as to how I should effect the avoidance, and without subjecting myself to be righteously found fault with, on account of the avoidance. I have mentioned the production: Nay more, I have quoted from it, and have commented on the citations. It may be but right to notice, that the citations are made from the chapter which forms, as Brougham truly declares, "by far the most argumentative part" of the Frenchman's book. (Note IV.) With what success I have encountered the Goliath of Infidels,† let the attentive reader determine. Whether or no I display an *utter inability to cope with* a man so mighty among atheists—so far as matters between us have gone—there has been at least no *wise passing him by in silence*. But though I have not passed by that author, I must certainly have passed by his "powerful reasoning," for, to the best of my recollection, I met with none of it. But let us not despair. We may yet fall in with the *powerful reasoning* which is so rife (according to report) in "this masterly production." In a word, we may have better fortune the next time. And the reader may take my word for it, that I shall not lose any opportunity at all suitable, should such offer, of attempting (at any rate) to cope with this paragon of Philosophers, and even—to make use of a fine figure in the genuine *bathos*‡—of Infidels.

† "We have commenced the library with a translation of Baron d'Holbach's System of Nature, because it is estimated as one of the most able expositions of theological absurdities which has ever been written." Again: "Let those read this work who seek to come at a 'knowledge of the truth.'" But farther: "If the most profound logic, the acutest discrimination, the keenest and most caustic sarcasm, can reflect credit on an author, then we may justly hail Baron d'Holbach as THE GREATEST AMONG PHILOSOPHERS, and an honour to infidels." In short: "We have no apologies to make for republishing the System of Nature at this time; the work will support itself, and needs no advocate; it has never been answered, because, in truth, it is, INDEED, UNANSWERABLE." *Advertisement*, already mentioned.

‡ To-wit, the *Anticklax*.

APPENDIX TO PART VIII.

APPENDIX A.

“ *Motion proves a vacuum.*—But not to go so far as beyond the utmost
 “ bounds of body in the universe * * * to find a vacuum, the
 “ motion of bodies that are in our view and neighbourhood, seems to
 “ me *plainly to evince it.* For I desire any one so to divide a solid
 “ body of any dimension he pleases, as to make it possible for the solid
 “ parts to move up and down freely every way *within the bounds of that*
 “ *superficies,* if there be not left in it a void space, as big as the least
 “ part into which he has divided the said solid body. And if, where
 “ the least particle of the body divided is as big as a mustard-seed, a
 “ void space equal to the bulk of a mustard-seed be requisite to make
 “ room for the free motion of the parts of the divided body within
 “ the bounds of its superficies; where the particles of matter are
 “ 100,000,000 less than a mustard-seed, there must also be a space
 “ void of solid matter, as big as 100,000,000 part of a mustard-
 “ seed: for if it holds good in one, it will hold in the other, and
 “ so on *in infinitum.*” [Not *in infinitum,* or any thing like it:
 But *for a good while,* perhaps till our minds can minish the particles
 no longer. See Part III. § 26, and following sections.] “ And let
 “ this void space be as little as it will, it destroys the hypothesis of
 “ plentitude. For if there can be a space void of body, equal to the
 “ smallest separate particle of matter now existing in nature, it is
 “ still space without body, and makes as great a difference between
 “ space and body, as if it were *μίγα χάσμα,* a distance as wide as
 “ any in nature. And, therefore, if we suppose not the void space

“ necessary to motion, equal to the least parcel of the divided solid matter, but to $\frac{1}{17}$ or $\frac{1}{1077}$ of it, the same consequence will always follow of space without matter.”—Locke’s *Essay*. Book II. Chap. xiii. § 23.

Locke recurs to this topic in a subsequent chapter. “ Of such a void space we have not only the idea, but I have proved, as I think, from the motion of body, its” [consequentially, or hypothetically] “ necessary existence.” “ It is impossible for any particle of matter to move but into an empty space.” B. II. Ch. xvii. § 4.

This demonstration by Locke of the existence of vacuum, will suggest, to the classical reader, Lucretius’s exhibition of the argument for the impossibility of motion in a perfect plenum.

————— Iocus est intactus, INANE, vacansque.
 Quod si non esset, nulla ratione moveri
 Res possent; namque, officium, quod Corporis extat,
 Obficere, atque obstarę, id in omni tempore adesset
 Omnibus: haud igitur quidquam procedere posset,
 Principium quoniam cedendi nulla daret res.
 At nunc per maria, ac terras, sublimaque coelę,
 Multa modis multis varia ratione moveri
 Cernimus ante oculos; quę, si non esset INANE,
 Non tam sollicito motu privata carerent;
 Quam genita omnino nulla ratione fuissent:
 Undique Materies quoniam stipata quiescet.—*Lib. Prim.*

To the English reader—

—Take it in the very words of Creech. †
 A Void is Space intangible: Thus prov’d.
 For were there none, no Body could be mov’d;
 Because where e’er the pressing motion goes,
 It still must meet with stops, still meet with foes,
 ’Tis natural to bodies to oppose.
 So that to move would be in vain to try,
 But all would fixt, stubborn, and moveless lie;
 Because no yielding Body could be found
 Which first should move, and give the other ground.
 But every one now sees that things do move
 With various turns in Earth and Heaven above;
 Which, were no Void, not only we’d not seen,
 But th’ Bodies too themselves had never been:
 Ne’er generated, for Matter all sides prest
 With other matter would for ever rest.

† Pope: *Imitations of Horace*—6th Ep. of E. I.

Or in those of Dr James Mason Good.

And know this VOID IS SPACE UNTOUCHED AND PURE.†

Were SPACE † like this vouchsaf'd not, nought could move:

Corporeal forms would still resist, and strive

With forms corporeal, nor consent to yield;

While the great progress of creation ceas'd.

But what more clear in earth or heav'n sublime,

Or the vast ocean, than, in various modes,

That various matter moves? which, but for SPACE, †

'Twere vain t'expect: and vainer yet to look

For procreative power, educing still

Kinds from their kinds through all revolving time. †

Our readers will perhaps pardon us, if we now present them with a demonstration of the position, that the motion of any body proves there is an immoveable space. The demonstration shall be from an old author,—a modern, however, should you mention him in the same breath with the Latin Poet.

The following axioms are laid down, at the outset. They are said to be true, and to carry the evidence of their truth within themselves.

“Primum est, *Nullius corporis superficies, quiescente corpore, moveri potest, nec, moto corpore, quiescere.*

“Secundum, *Nullum corpus ad aliud corpus quiescens proprius accedere, nec ab eo recedere, potest sine motu locali.*

“Tertium, *Nullius corporis potest fieri motus localis, nisi transeundo per aliquod Extensum.*

“Quartum & ultimum, *Omne corpus, localiter motum, movetur adæquate per illa loca, quae motu suo acquirit.*” ||

Then follows the demonstration itself. It is as follows:—

“*Esto jam pro Cylindro, duas vel tres uncias alto, & super terram immotam, ut jam supponemus, posito, Circulus H K M H, Polusq; illius Axis (circa quem movetur) superior & inferior A A. Manifestum est, quod superficies Cylindri extrema separat se a superficie concava ambientis aeris, per partes, puta H I, a concava parte H I, pergitq; ad I K, & sic de reliquis. Unde plane apparet totam superficiem convexam Cylindri (& eadem ratio est de planis) moveri in orbem; ac proinde quod totus Cylindrus in orbem movetur,*


† The capitals are the translator's.

† The last line in the quotation from Lucretius is not so evidently translated by Mason Good, as one could have wished.

|| This last axiom does not appear to be used in the demonstration. But surely its nature is such that it can do no harm, although it be left in.

per Axioma primum. Sed nullum corpus movetur, nisi transeundo per aliquod Extensum: Ergo Cylindrus transit per aliquod Extensum, per Axioma tertium. Sed per nullum Extensum transit extra ambitum H K M H. ERGO PER EXTENSUM INTRA ILLUM AMBITUM TRANSIT. Sed per suam ipsius Extensionem non transit; circumferitur enim cum ea simul. QUID IGITUR RELIQUUM EST PRÆTER INTERNUM SUUM LOCUM, SIVE SPATIUM, QUOD OCCUPAT, PER CUIUS PARTES TRANSIRE POSSIT, nempe ab H A I ad I A K, &c? Quod oportebat demonstrare.

“Rursus, supponamus, in eodem Cylindro majori H K M H, sex foramina Cylindræca, B, C, D, E, F, G, æqualia, totidemq; minores Cylindros eisdem foraminibus, insertos, superficiebusq; concavis horum foraminum æquatos et contiguos: Ponaturq; aliquod corpus quiescens extra majorem Cylindrum, sitq; corpus P. Moveatur jam



denuo major Cylindrus H K M H circa axem A A secundum ordinem litterarum H I K, &c. Dico, tametsi minores Cylindri superficies suas non separent immediate, nec a superficiebus foraminum suorum, nec a superficie aeris majorem Cylindrum ambientis, quod nihilominus moventur localiter. Nam dum major Cylindrus movetur ab H ad I, Cylindrus B recedit a corpore P quiescente; Cylindrus vero E proprius ad illud accedit. Nullum autem corpus ad aliud corpus quiescens propius accedere potest, vel ab eo recedere, sine motu locali, per Axioma secundum: nec omnino moveri localiter, nisi transeundo aliquod Extensum, per Axioma tertium. Sed Cylindrus B per nullum Extensum extra Cylindrum majorem pertransit, nec penetrat ipsum corpus Cylindri C, cum ad C pervenit. Igitur Cylindrus B succedit tantum in cylindræcum spatium C, & Cylindrus C in spatium cylindræcum D, et singuli Cylindri successive spatia cylindra-

cea, sive locos internos precedentium Cylindrorum, occupant. Quod erat demonstrandum." Etc.—"Enchiridion Metaphysicum." Per H. M. (Henricus Morus) Londini, 1671.

The following translation of the preceding may not be unuseful to many of that large class of readers for whom the present edition is principally intended. The translation has been made purposely to be somewhat free; and it aims at being, at the very least, Queen's English.

"*First Axiom.* While a body is at rest, its superficies cannot be moved; nor, while the body is in motion, can the superficies be at rest.

"*Second Axiom.* No body can approach to another body which is at rest, nor recede from the body at rest, without there being at the same time local motion of the body approaching or receding.

"*Third Axiom.* There cannot be local motion of any body, except by the body passing through some extension or other.

"*Fourth and last Axiom.* Every body, locally moved, is adequately moved through those spaces which it acquires by its proper motion." [This is the axiom which (as already stated) does not appear to be used: and perhaps it was better that it should be unused, for every sort of reason.]

The demonstration is the following:—

"Imagine a Cylinder, two or three inches deep, and placed upon the earth, considered as immovable, to be represented by the circle H K M H: Let, too, the Pole of its Axis (around which of course it moves) be represented by the higher and lower A, A.† It is plain, that the outer surface of the Cylinder separates itself from the surrounding air, which, in relation to the Cylinder, constitutes a concave or hollow superficies: the Cylinder separates itself, I say, or moves, by its parts successively; say, H I of the Cylinder separates itself from the concave air or atmosphere, also represented by the same H I, and proceeds to I K; and so of all the rest of the parts. Whence it clearly appears, that the whole convex superficies of the Cylinder (and the same would hold with regard to a mere circular plane, considered simply as such) is moved round in a circle; and consequently, or according to Axiom first, the whole Cylinder is moved in a circle. But no body can be moved except by passing through some extension or other: Therefore, or by Axiom third, the Cylinder passes through a

† The two A's do not appear in the diagram. One of them is necessarily left to the imagination of the pupil.

certain extension. But the Cylinder passes through no extension beyond its boundary $H K M H$: Wherefore, the Cylinder passes through a space within the boundary $H K M H$. But it is manifest the Cylinder does not move through its own extension; since the extension of the Cylinder, and the Cylinder itself, are carried round together. Nothing remains besides, but the Cylinder's internal place, or, in other words, the space which the Cylinder occupies or fills: through the parts of which space, accordingly, the Cylinder has passed, namely, from $H A I$, to $I A K$, &c.—Which was the thing to be demonstrated.

“Again, imagine, within the same large Cylinder $H K M H$, the six small Cylinders B, C, D, E, F, G , all supposed to be similar. Moreover, imagine, a certain body, supposed to be at rest, to be situated beyond the great Cylinder, and let the body in question be represented by P . Imagine, next, the large Cylinder, or $H K M H$, to be moved around its foresaid axis A, A , according to the order or course of the letters $H I K$, &c. It is manifest, that the small Cylinders B, C, D , &c., are moved locally. That is to say, that, while the large Cylinder is moved from H to I , the small Cylinder B recedes from the body P ; in like manner, the Cylinder E approaches to the same body P . For, by the second Axiom, no body can approach to, or recede from, another body, which is at rest, except by means of the local motion of the body approaching, or receding: in other words, there cannot be local motion, unless there be a passing through some extension or other, as is laid down by the third Axiom. But the Cylinder B passes through no extension without the boundary of the large enclosing Cylinder; neither does it penetrate the Cylinder C , in moving along. Therefore, the Cylinder B only passes into the space which the Cylinder C had occupied: and the Cylinder C only passes into the space which the Cylinder D had occupied: and, so, all the small Cylinders, one by one, come to occupy the places which the other small Cylinders had previously occupied.—Which, again, is just the thing that was to be demonstrated:”—namely, that there is vacuum, or an immoveable space, in nature; and, therefore, that there truly is a space really distinct from the extension of bodies.

The demonstrator follows up those two parts of his demonstration by others. But possibly our readers will be of our mind that those two demonstrations do not require to be accompanied by any others. The proof adduced is clearly of a most convincing character.

The citation is from the 6th Chapter of the “*Manual of Metaphysic.*”

APPENDIX B.

§ 1. "The * * opinion * * " that "God is present every where by an *infinite extension of His essence*," "appears most in harmony with the Scriptures; though the term *extension*, through the inadequacy of language, conveys too material an idea."—"Theological Institutes," by Richard Watson. Part Second. Chap. III. (Third Edition.)—Such is the deliberate sentiment of this Theologian: and it will not be easy to name many works, each of them containing much more talented sober theological discussion.

§ 2. "We conceive of HIM," the "Intelligent, Self-existent, First Cause," "as existing in all duration, and *in all space*. This is precisely the idea which we form of the existence of GOD; *exactly the view which the Bible gives us of HIM*."—Rev. B. Godwin's "Lectures on the Atheistic Controversy." Lect. II. (P. 53.)

§ 3. "— He who upholds all things by his power, may be said to be every where present.

§ 4. "This is called a *virtual presence*.† There is also what metaphysicians denominate an *essential ubiquity*: and *which idea the language of Scripture seems to favour*." So says Dr Paley, in Chapter XXIV. of his *Natural Theology*.

§ 5. Lord Brougham has a note in reference to this passage of the Doctor's.‡ In which his Lordship informs us: "The three doctrines are—ubiquity by *diffusion*, *virtual ubiquity*,|| or that of power only, and *ubiquity of essence*."

§ 6. The sensible and rather shrewd Paley gives us *two* sorts of presence, or omnipresence;¶ without hinting there was a third. Paley's

† It may be laid down as one of those truths which admit of no contradiction, that, with regard to the uncreated substance at least, virtue cannot be without substance. Speaking of this substance, Sir Isaac Newton hath these words: "*Omnipræscens est non per virtutem solam, sed etiam per substantiam: nam virtus sine substantia subsistere non potest.*" Newton. *Princip. Mathemat. Schol. General. sub finem.*

‡ See § 2 of note to § 5, Part VIII.


|| " 'Tis natural to ask, not so much how it is proved, that God can be *virtually present*, though not substantially present, in every part of nature, as what can be meant "by being every where present by mere energy?"

¶ Properly, it is of omnipresence he is treating.

Annotator loses not a moment in presenting us with *three* DOCTRINES (it is out of his power to present us with *three* SPECIES) of omnipresence: the third doctrine being that of ubiquity of essence as opposed to ubiquity by diffusion, or that of ubiquity by diffusion as opposed to ubiquity of essence; whichever way his Lordship pleases.

§ 7. His Lordship, in entering upon his Note, forewarns us that the subject he is to touch is “confessedly abstruse.” Those that *create* the abstruseness (well, if not the obtuseness) of a subject, ought by all means to confess what the thing grew to under proper management. But it is not so right to represent their own handiwork as something they found *ready made*.

§ 8. The Author of the “Natural Theology” presents us with two divisions, as not only exhausting the subject, but being in fair antithesis. In fair antithesis the members of the division could not be, if the “essential ubiquity” were two-fold: the one species of *essential ubiquity* being “ubiquity of essence,” the other, “ubiquity by diffusion.” This matter may perhaps be rendered plainer by the following *Schema*.



Here one of the *species* is neither more nor less than the *genus* itself. And, pray, what is the other *species*, in contradistinction to its fellow-member, and the *genus* of both? Tell us, and then we shall see whether the genus—essential omnipresence—can in its two-fold nature be *fairly* opposed to the other great member of the division—virtual omnipresence.

† *Virtual presence*: these words might have been, and possibly may yet be, met with often in the writings of the Socinian, and our Unitarian, writers on Theological subjects. *Virtual presence*—of what?

§ 9. The Author of the "Natural Theology," in short, recognises no distinction of the kind introduced by the Noble Annotator. The Archdeacon of Carlisle had too much of a "natural predilection" for what by due care may be "level to all comprehensions," to be smitten with the love of unadulterated nonsense. If our Archdeacon had no talent and no taste for metaphysical speculation even though of the genuine cast, as is noticed by his Illustrator;† far less, had he any regard for vile bastard metaphysics.—Which it would be well to remember.

§ 10. Lord Brougham speaks of "the Diffusive Ubiquity."‡ What can *non-diffusive* ubiquity be? Verily, the distinction between "ubiquity by diffusion"—namely, of essence, or substance, (or, else, diffusion of what?—) and, "ubiquity of essence;" is a distinction without a difference. How can there be ubiquity of essence but by everywhere-diffusion of essence? What is ubiquity, if not diffusion everywhere? Something inexpressibly absurd. Ubiquity, then, is just ubiquity by limitless diffusion. What else can it be?

§ 11. What is ubiquity of essence which is not ubiquity of essence by diffusion without bounds? Did we pretend not to know, 'twould, after all, be a shame. The nonsense has been fully consecrated: For no inconsiderable period has it been the fashionable theology.|| Ubiquity of essence which is not ubiquity of essence by boundless diffusion, is—let the reader be prepared—THE UBIQUITY OF THE ABSENCE OF EXTENSION, or INEXTENSION, as 'twas usually expressed. The ubiquity or universal extension, in question, is the universal extension which has no extension at all. The *every-where-ness* under notice, is, in plain and honest English, just *no-where-ness*.

§ 12. We shall dwell a little upon the topic of the (once) fashionable theological whimsey.

§ 13. The Author of the "Argument" has the following passage. "The common sentiment of Theologians, that the necessary substance, is, at the same time, in every point of space, and every atom of matter, *entire*, is, SO FAR AS THE OPINION IS INTELLIGIBLE AT ALL, just

† "His," our own English Paley's, "limited and unexercised powers of abstract discussion, and the *natural predilection* for what he handled so well—a practical argument *level to all comprehensions*—appear not to have given him any taste for metaphysical speculations." Note in "Section III." of the "Preliminary Discourse."

‡ See § 2 of note to § 5, Part VIII.

|| Like another fashionable doctrine, (See note to § 41, Part IX.) the theological doctrine in question may perhaps not be by any means so fashionable, and so prevalent, as it once certainly was.

“this third hypothesis, that the necessary substance is infinitely extended: Though, 'tis true, all extension is denied to that substance. For to say that the *same* substance is in different parts of extension, *at once*, without being extended, is no more absurd than to say, extension, itself, is not extended.” Note to § 28 of Division III. of “Introduction.” (Consider § 7, Part V.)

§ 14. “*Qui autem,*” says the (undeservedly) almost-forgotten Raphson, “*præsentia illa, vere essentialis, & cunctis, quæ sunt, intima, per INEXTENSIONIS hypothesin sine manifesta contradictione (quæcunq; tandem fuerit verborum collusio) explicari possit, nondum constitit, neq; unquam constare poterit: Vere enim locis, etiam diversis, & a se invicem distantibus, per essentiam adesse, exempli gratia, globi terrestri, & lunari, spatiisq; omnibus intermediis, quid aliud est, quam ipsissima ratio formalis τὸν extendi?*” From “*Cap. VI.*”

[“How that presence, or rather omnipresence, which is essential, involving most intimate presence to, and in, all things, and every thing,—how, I say, that essential presence can—with or without manifest contradiction—be explained by the hypothesis of IN-EXTENSION (whatever such foolish words may aim at meaning) does not appear, and will never be rendered evident to—even the Epicureans’ asses. For, indeed, to be present, by essence, in places diverse, and distant from each other; say, for example, in places so distant from each other as are this terrestrial ball, and the lunar orb, (to say nothing of the intermediate spaces): what else is such essential presence but the very reality, in most emphatic form, of THE EXTENDED THING ITSELF?”]

§ 15. We shall next hear the sentiments of S. Colliber: A writer of some celebrity once, and of, undoubtedly, considerable parts, and great good sense, in not a few respects.

§ 16. “This opinion,”—“the opinion of [the Deity’s] *Inextension,*”—“being once entertained, 'tis scarce conceivable what a train of riddles and paradoxes it drew after it. For thence the Platonists and the rest of Anaximander’s Commentators first began to infer what is usually called His *Indistance*. For distance being only a relative conception of Space, consequently it could not, as they rightly concluded, be conceived in a being who was, as they imagined, absolutely without amplitude and dimensions.

§ 17. “Thus far they proceeded in absurdity, their next step was impiety. For since they found it impossible to conceive a being

“without amplitude and dimensions any otherwise than as a mere mathematical * * point; they began to speak of the Deity in the like diminutive terms, and, in effect, imprisoned the Great Creator “within the smallest dust of His creation.” [Less, infinitely less, so to speak, than the *smallest dust*: The smallest dust is always something: but a ‘mathematical point’ has no *magnitude*.] “But * * * * * they quickly solved the difficulty with a mystery, and gravely concluded that it was no impossibility for * * an Infinite Being to exist ENTIRE, tho’ in a certain atomical manner, not only in one but IN EVERY individual particle of the universe AT ONCE. For this worthy discovery we are particularly indebted to Plotinus, one of Plato’s disciples, who obliged the world with two whole books to demonstrate that one and the same being may be all of it entirely in each distinguishable part of the world.

§ 18. “This Philosopher it seems had found the secret of producing more Deities out of one than the fruitful fancies of all the Poets in their Theogonies could ever make. * * * *

§ 19. “But fearing, good man! lest this discovery of his should be thought inconsistent with the unity of God, he made bold to stretch the mystery a little farther by concluding not only that it’s the property and privilege of the absolutely Infinite Being to exist whole in every particle of the world, but that he has an undoubted prerogative of existing whole in the whole of it too; so as to be *one individual innumerable universal Deity*. All which Platonical mysteries were afterwards received as articles of faith by the Schoolmen, and are comprised in that vulgar maxim of theirs, *viz., Deus est totus in toto, et totus in qualibet parte mundi*, GOD is whole in the whole, and whole in every part of the world, Mysteries that require a degree of faith beyond that of miracles; a faith which can transform contradictions into arguments with a *Credo quia impossibile est*.”

§ 20. Listen, for a moment, by the way, to the “*Treatise of Human Nature*,” speaking in reference to the Schoolmen’s maxim:—“That scholastic principle which, when crudely proposed, appears so SHOCKING, of *totum in toto, et totum in qualibet parte*: which is much the same as if we should say, that a thing is in a certain place, and yet is not there.” Book I. Part iv. Sect. 5.—Consult second note to § 64, Part III.

§ 21. We now go on with S. C.—“Though ’tis next to impossible to speak of such *extravagances* as these, and, at the same time, to pre-

“serve that gravity which is so necessary in discourses of this nature; yet I conceive it may not be amiss to have observed thus much, to the end it may be seen how strangely the name of Learning has been misapplied to *whimseys* of this kind, and how profanely the sacred name of GOD has been abused to consecrate the MOST EGREGIOUS NONSENSE.” *Impartial Enquiry*, &c. Book II. Part ii. ch. 4.

§ 22. Permit, ye upon whom the mantle of the *madmen amongst* the Schoolmen hath fallen! permit a word of reproof, for the past, and of warning as to the future. Has not the *egregious nonsense* alluded to by the author from whom we have this instant parted, been one, and a very fruitful cause of the birth, and growth, of Atheism in modern times? has it not been one of the great nursing-mothers of the atheist-monster? a nursing-mother actively at work, though in some respects

remote from public view?

§ 23. Let us call in evidence on the point.—“The partizans of spirituality believe they answer the difficulties they have themselves accumulated, by saying, ‘The soul is entire, is whole under each point of its extent.’ If an absurd answer will solve difficulties, they have done it; for after all it will be found, that this *point*, which is called *soul*, however insensible, however minute, must yet remain something.” Thus writes D’Holbach. *System of Nature*, Part I. ch. vii. And the following is Diderot’s note on that passage. It is with what is set forth in the note that our present business most lies.—“According to this answer an infinity of unextended substance, or the same unextended substance repeated an infinity of times, would constitute a substance that has extent, WHICH IS ABSURD; for, according to this principle, the human soul would then be as infinite as GOD, since it is assumed that GOD is a being without extent, who is an infinity of times whole in each part of the universe—and the same is stated of the human soul; from whence we must necessarily conclude that GOD and the soul of man are equally infinite, unless we suppose *unextended substances of different extents, or a GOD without extent more extended than the human soul*. Such are, however, the rhapsodies which SOME of our theological metaphysicians would have thinking beings believe!” &c.†

§ 24. (A single word on a collateral topic. What has rendered the doctrine of the *immateriality of the soul* so much out of vogue

† See § 1 of Appendix to Part VI.

now-a-days, and another name with many for a monster of absurdity? The saying that that soul which is immaterial, is altogether destitute of extension, occupying not even a point of space. That is just the reason: *Because*, what has no extension is nothing; or to give it in Hobbes' words, "Substance without dimension" are words which "do flatly contradict one another."†—*And because*, it is repugnant to the dictates of our unsophisticated faculties to consider gross matter (ay, or subtile matter, if you go to that) as the only cause of all thought.‡)

§ 25. ——— And as the hypothesis of *inextension* is well calculated to foster atheism, so the hypothesis of *infinite extension* is admirably adapted to extinguish atheism.

§ 26. In the first place, this latter hypothesis distinguishes *two different sorts* of extension.|| And this of itself destroys the most plausible of the atheistic hypotheses: to-wit, the hypothesis of an absolute *material plenum*, and *but one substance* in nature.

§ 27. And in the second, if it be established that there is an incorporeal, or immaterial, or spiritual *expansion* which *pervades* the material universe, it is worth no atheist's while to contend against the position, that that *expansion* is a *mode* of an *Intelligent Spirit*.——

§ 28. We shall draw this Appendix to a conclusion with one other piece from the "Impartial Enquiry."

§ 29. "—— The opinion of the *Nullibists*.

"Tis well known that Weigelius was the reviver of this extravagance among Christians. For one assertion of his (among divers others relishing of the height of enthusiasm and distraction) was that *spiritual beings* (since conceived to be unextended or without dimensions) *are no where and yet every where*. But the chief patron of this profound mystery of Nullibism was Des Cartes. A philosopher that has rendered himself remarkable for these three confident assertions, *viz., That whatever thinks is immaterial; That whatever is extended, or has dimensions, is material; and That whatever is unextended, or without dimensions, is nowhere.*¶ Which last assertion (perhaps the

* † *Tripes*: Discourse First, concerning *Human Nature*; chap. xi.—Molesworth's Hobbes: English Division, vol. iv. p. 61.—See Part III. § 34, and following sections,—and other places.

‡ See Part III. § 39 and § 40,—and other places.

|| See Part III. § 17,—and other places.

¶ The author of the "Impartial Enquiry" betrays gross ignorance in making the able Philosophical Reformer he mentions a patron of the absurdity of Nullibism. What

“truest) is no other in effect than a frank confession of what the “*Schools* laboured to conceal under an insignificant and arbitrary distinction between the *Locus* of a Body and the *Ubi* of a Spirit; which “it seems the less metaphysical Cartesians find themselves unable to “comprehend.”—*Ibidem*.

§ 30. Unable to comprehend: no marvel. Would any amount of metaphysics—short of metaphysics run mad—enable Cartesians (to say nothing of others) to comprehend, in all its latitude, the scholastic distinction between *locus* and *ubi*? Take, upon the point, the witness of two famous men. “If it be said by any one, that it (the soul) cannot “change place, because it hath none, for spirits are not in *loco*, but “*ubi*; I suppose”—witnesseth John Locke—“that way of talking will “not now be of much weight to many in an age that is not much dis- “posed to admire, or suffer themselves to be deceived by, *such*, “UNINTELLIGIBLE ways of speaking.” Essay, B. II. ch. xxiii. § 21.— “The Schoolmen’s distinctions about Spirits existing in *Ubi*, and not “in *Loco*; are”—saith the second witness—“mere empty sounds, “without any manner of signification.” Dr Samuel Clarke’s Ans. to 6th Letter.

§ 31. No less a man than Dr Watts, the Divine, and so respectable a one as Isaac Watts, the Metaphysician, harped mightily, *in his own way*, upon this string, the distinction, to-wit, between the *locus* and the *ubi* of a Spirit. Well, if he had been helped to go back and destroy the empty distinction, by means of an observation of his own, which partly serves to bring up the rear, composing as it does one of his concluding (they are deeply pious) reflections on “Spirits — being in a “place and removing from it,” &c.—(Essay VI.) “The best thing we “can do,” observes he, “is, to guard against those ideas of spirits which

better known in the philosophic world than the fact, that Des Cartes was at surprising pains to discover *the seat of the soul*? At length the point was determined, and, thenceforth, the soul was to be confined within the minute limits of the *pineal gland*. The immortal author of the “Meditations concerning the First Philosophy” was hugely wronged by S. C., but wronged, sans doubt, unwittingly. To conjecture: S. C. was led astray by Dr Henry More, who, during a laugh—of which, not Renatus Descartes, but Henricus More should have been the object—comes out with this, that ‘the chief author and leader of the Nullibists, seems to have been the *pleasant wit*, Renatus Descartes,’ and more of the same sort of exceedingly *ill-directed* jocularity.

But ‘tis no matter to us *who the chief patron* of Nullibism was. Whoever he was, he must have been a *profound one*, after the manner of the authors and propagators of some, and indeed many, other *profundities*, which have astonished the world, both in ancient times, and in these dregs, and miserable *tatter-day* runnings, of the ages.

“have any GROSS ABSURDITIES in them.” (“Conclusion” to Sect. V.) Excellently said, Dr Isaac Watts! I assure you—And completely disregarded by yourself.

APPENDIX C.

The title, at full length, of the master-piece referred to in the text (Part VIII. § 7) is as follows:—“A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals. Particularly those respecting the Origin of our Ideas of Virtue, its Nature, Relation to the DEITY, Obligation, Subject-matter, and Sanctions. The Third Edition corrected, and enlarged by an Appendix, containing Additional Notes, and a Dissertation on the Being and Attributes of the DEITY.” †

The *Advertisement*, prefixed to the volume, informs the world, that the *Review* “was first published thirty years ago”—namely, thirty years prior to 1787, the year of the publication. “It was then”—the information proceeds—“the Author’s first production, and contained the result of some of his earliest thoughts. A careful revisal has now made it,” the informant declares, “the result of his latest and maturest thoughts.” The next paragraph takes care to state, that “the Dissertation on the Being and Attributes of the DEITY” “has been always intended for this Treatise.”

To pass over the ten Chapters of those “Principal Questions in Morals,” and to come at once to the appended “Dissertation on the Being and Attributes of the DEITY,” which is, in some respects, the quintessence of Dr Price’s thoughts on that foundation-topic which is the grandest of all the topics to which the Doctor’s writings relate. In some introductory remarks, we find our author declaring, that the argument he has in view “is the same with Dr Clarke’s; but it will be,” he tells us, “a little differently represented, and pursued farther. Intimations of it have been given,” he says, “in several parts of the preceding work. I will,” he adds, “here state it more *distinctly*.” These introductory remarks are closed with this assurance: “The whole is an appeal to calm and patient reflection,” &c.

The first passage to which we shall direct our readers' notice is the following:—

“The *necessity* of God's existence implies that it is necessary, not merely as an efficient cause of other existence, but to the very *conception* of all other existence. Were there any beings to the conception of whose existence this being is not necessary, such beings might be conceived to exist *alone*; that is, they might be conceived to exist *without* Him, which is the same with conceiving Him not to exist, and consequently, with the *possibility* of His non-existence. The conception of the *separate* and *independent existence* of any beings, is the same with the conception of the non-existence of all *other* beings. Could we conceive this visible world to exist by itself; were there no conception of the Necessary Being required to the conception of its existence; it would follow that there is no such being. This itself would be conceiving His non-existence. We can, for instance, very well conceive of *Space* and *Time* without pre-supposing, in that conception, the existence of a *material world*; and this is conceiving it not to exist; and therefore, proves it to be contingent. And could we, in the same manner, conceive of the Material World *without* SPACE and TIME, these themselves would appear to be contingent.

“There can, therefore, be no difficulty in finding out the *DEITY*. If we are at a loss here, the reason must be some great mistake and prejudice. We have Him continually in our thoughts. We see Him every where and in every thing. He is the *power* by which we act, the *intelligence* by which we understand, and the *time* and *place* in which *we live and move and have our beings*. In order to obtain an actual sense of His existence, we have nothing to do but to consider what there is that answers to the account now given of the necessity of His existence. Do we not find it particularly in *abstract duration* and *space*? These are necessary to the conception of all existence. They cannot in thought be destroyed. Annihilation being a removal from them, their own annihilation is a contradiction.”

A page or two further on, we have these passages:—“A being existing necessarily cannot be *omnipresent* by existing *in* Space as all contingent beings do; because, on this supposition, we might conceive of immensity *without* him, and there would be the same reason for requiring a cause of his existing in *all* rather in any *part* of it, that there would be, were he limited in this respect, to require a cause

“of that limitation. In short; a being whose existence does not constitute infinite space can no more exist *every where* without a cause, than he can *any where*. And the like is true of his eternity, and of every attribute and perfection that we can apply to him.” Again:—“He (the being existing necessarily) is therefore WISDOM, rather than *wise*; and REASON, rather than *reasonable*. In like manner; He is ETERNITY, rather than *eternal*; IMMENSITY, rather than *immense*, and POWER, rather than *powerful*. In a word; He is not *benevolent* only, but BENEVOLENCE; not absolutely *perfect* only, but absolute PERFECTION itself; the root, the original, (or to speak after Dr Clarke, who [a note informs us] “has applied this language only to the *eternity* and *immensity* of the Deity”,) “the *Substratum* of all that is great and wise and good and excellent.”

Once more:—“God is always present with all beings, not merely by His *notice* and *influence*, but by His *essence*.” “The belief of His existence is unavoidable, and implied in the very act of endeavouring to suppose its annihilation. So *real* is it as to be the ground of all reality, and of the *conception* of all reality. There is nothing so intimately united to us.”——“And for this very reason we overlook Him. We cannot believe that He is so near to us as He is; and because *every thing*, He becomes *nothing* to us. Wonderful, indeed, “are the conceptions of some learned men” [and of some men, who are *certainly not learned*] “on this subject. Rather than recognise His nature in what they [the learned men] know to be necessarily existent, eternal, and infinite, they run into contradictions, and will not allow existence to any thing except what exists after the manner of *contingent* beings and *second* causes. They speak of His *immensity*, but *immensity* (that is, infinite space) is *nothing*; and, therefore His existing *every where* must be the same with His existing *no-where*. In like manner, they speak of His existing through all *duration*, and of His knowledge as extending to all *knowables*, and His power to all *possibles*; but *duration*, *knowables*, and *possibles* (however presupposed in every notion of intelligence, efficacy, and existence) *are nothing*”—that is, according to the “conceptions” of those “learned men,” whose conceptions are, in truth and reality, so “wonderful,” and, indeed, *prodigious*.

Lastly:—“In short; there are numberless beings who *occupy* Duration and Space; but there can be only *one* being whose existence *constitutes* Duration and Space.—There are numberless beings who

“participate of perfection in an infinite variety of degrees; but there
“can be but one being who is absolute Perfection *itself*. There are
“numberless beings who are powerful, wise and benevolent; but there
“can be *but One* Being of whose nature, Power, Wisdom and Benevo-
“lence, in necessary union and forming one idea, are THE ESSENTIAL
“ATTRIBUTES.”

I would not have made so many extracts from Dr Price, had the book been less scarce a one. My readers, who are unacquainted with so excellent an author, will thank me for introducing them into his company.

APPENDIX TO PART X.

APPENDIX A.

I.

§ 1. "Space 'seems to have a *necessary* and obstinate *existence*:"—These words are quoted, in the place whereto this Appendix relates, as constituting an *argument* (to prove that Space cannot be a mere idea) which Dr Isaac Watts is to *answer*.

§ 2. The whole passage, in the Doctor's work, is as follows: "*It is said, space cannot be a mere idea, because it seems to have a necessary and obstinate existence, whether there were any mind or no to form an idea of it.*" There is no questioning that Watts, by "any mind," meant the *mind of any man*, or, at most, of any "created being."

§ 3. That Space has necessary existence, we are firmly persuaded. And therefore, that Space would continue to exist, although every mind, that ever began to be, ceased to exist, we can easily believe. These are points we hold as settled.

§ 4. But there is a controversy which may be raised. Can any person be quite sure, that Space would be, were there NO MIND WHATSOEVER to conceive Space? How could one be sure of that?

§ 5. To be plain in stating our own sentiment:—We are quite convinced, that IF THERE WERE NO MIND TO FORM AN IDEA OF SPACE, there would be no Space. That is to say, the *suicidal† supposition‡* of NO SPACE, is not more self-destructive than the supposition of NO MIND.

† Consider Part II. § 14, &c., along with § 1 of note to § 89, Part X. Consider, also, Part III. §§ 16, 17.

‡ Weigh the note to § 17, Part IV.

§ 6. Space is not an idea; not a mind: But is not Space that about which ideas are employed? is not Space an object of our conceptions?† And is not the object of a conception inseparably related to a conception? To think of any thing—is not that to have an object of thought? Is object of thought not relative to mind? In fine, Is not Space relative to a mind cognising it?

§ 7. If so, 'tis sufficiently evident, that there could be no^sSpace, were no Mind in existence.

§ 8. Does not it follow from this, that, seeing *Space* is *necessary*, *Mind* is *necessary*?

The next Appendix (B) shall be engaged with Kant: and, such a thing as Kantism being in view, I cannot be wrong in noting, even before I am arrived at the end of the present Appendix, which is concerned with the reality of things, and not with the meaning of words,—I cannot, I say, be wrong in noting, that certain words occurring in this Appendix are not employed in any Kantian, or other unusual, sense. On the contrary, the words in question are used in a wholly untechnical, and good old English way. The words referred to are such as *conceive*; *conception*, *cognising*, &c., and these words, or their equivalents in the German characters, are to be met with very frequently in Kant's writings, and in all writings after the model presented in the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, the *Prolegomena zu jeder künftigen Metaphysik*, and the *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft*.‡

II.

§ 9. If, then, Space is necessary, Mind is necessary. But Space is necessary. And, therefore, *Mind* is *necessary*.

† Kant would not admit this. That is, he would not admit *the truth* to be clothed in these words: for he refuses to *Space* the application of the word *conception*. He allows, however, that *Space* is an *intuition*, &c. &c. &c.

‡ It is singular, that Mr Semple, in his "List of Works comprising Kant's System," in his volume specified in the course of the next Appendix (Appendix B), gives the title of the last of these works thus:—*Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der reinen Vernunft*—(*Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der reinen Vernunft*.) Kantians make such a work about their master's terminology being tenderly respected! But to change the term *bloßen* for *reinen* is such a daring interference with a man's own words, even tho' those terms be quasi-equivalents; and, above all, the change was not to have been expected to emanate from a reverential disciple.

§ 10. It may be well to give an authority on the subject. I may quote, therefore, a passage from that admirable writer on Morals to whom I have devoted the whole of a preceding Appendix,† as a passage relating to an intimately allied topic; the topic, to wit, of the implication of mind by truth: Eternal truth involves eternal mind. But Dr Price shall speak for himself.

§ 11. "There is nothing so intimate with us, and one with our natures, as GOD. He is included, as appears, in all our conceptions, and necessary to all the operations of our minds: Nor could He be necessarily existent, were not this true of Him. For it is implied in the idea of necessary existence, that it is fundamental to all other existence, and pre-supposed in every notion we can frame of every thing.— In short, it seems very plain, that Truth having always a reference to MIND; Infinite, Eternal Truth implies an Infinite, Eternal MIND: And that, not being itself a substance, nor yet nothing, it must be a mode of a substance; or the essential wisdom and intelligence of the One Necessary Being."—"Principal Questions in Morals:" Chapter V.

§ 12. To that able British author, I shall add the authority of one second to no philosopher the New World has produced—second, indeed, to no modern metaphysician of either hemisphere of our globe: I mean President Edwards. The work from which the citations shall be made has been used already by us. See Part I., § 30, together with the Note, and Part VII., § 34, and the Note.

§ 13. "A state of absolute nothing is a state of absolute contradiction. Absolute nothing is the aggregate of all the contradictions in the world: a state, wherein there is neither body, nor spirit, nor space, neither empty space nor full space, neither little nor great, narrow nor broad, neither infinite space nor finite space, not even a mathematical point, neither up nor down, neither north nor south, (I do not mean, as it is with respect to the body of the earth, or some other great body,) but no contrary points, positions or directions, no such thing as either here or there, this way or that way, or any way. When we go about to form an idea of perfect Nothing, we must shut out all these things: we must shut out of our minds both space that has something in it, and space that has nothing in it. We must not allow ourselves to think of the least part of Space, be it ever so small. Nor must we suffer our thoughts to take sanctuary in a mathematical point. When we go to expel being out of our

“ thoughts, we must be careful not to leave empty space in the room of it; and when we go to expel emptiness from our thoughts, we must not think to squeeze it out by any thing close, hard and solid; but *we must think of the same that the sleeping rocks do dream of*;† and not till then, shall we get a complete idea of Nothing.

§ 14. “ When we go to enquire, Whether or no, there can be absolutely Nothing? we utter nonsense, in so enquiring. The stating of the question is nonsense; because we make a disjunction where there is none. Either Being, or absolute Nothing, is no disjunction; no more than whether a triangle is a triangle, or not a triangle. There is no other way, but only for there to be existence: there is no such thing, as absolute Nothing. There is such a thing, as Nothing, with respect to this ink and paper: there is such a thing, as Nothing, with respect to you and me: there is such a thing, as Nothing, with respect to this globe of earth, and with respect to this Universe. There is another way, beside these things, having existence; but there is no such thing, as Nothing, with respect to Entity, or Being, absolutely considered. We do not know what we say, if we say, that we think it possible in itself, that there should not be Entity.

§ 15. “ And how doth it grate upon the mind, to think that Something should be from all eternity, and yet Nothing all the while be conscious of it. To illustrate this: Let us suppose that the World had a being from all eternity, and had many great changes, and wonderful revolutions, and all the while Nothing knew it, there was no knowledge in the Universe of any such thing. How is it possible to bring the mind to imagine this? Yea, it is really impossible it should be, that any thing should exist, and Nothing know it. Then you will say, If it be so, it is, because Nothing has any existence but in consciousness: No, certainly, no where else, but either in created or uncreated consciousness.

§ 16. “ Suppose there were another Universe, merely of bodies, created at a great distance from this; created in excellent order, harmonious motions, and a beautiful variety; and there was no created intelligence in it, nothing but senseless bodies, and nothing but God knew anything of it. I demand where else that Universe would have a being, but only in the Divine Consciousness? Cer-

† Has any poet ever caught this thought? How much true philosophy is here, imbedded in a conception worthy of the finest poetry!

“ tainly, in no other respect. There would be figures, and magnitudes, and motions, and proportions; but where, where else, except in the Almighty’s Knowledge? How is it possible there should?—But then you will say, For the same reason, in a room closely shut up, which nobody sees, there is nothing, except in God’s knowledge.—I answer, Created beings are conscious of the effects of what is in the room: for, perhaps, there is not one leaf of a tree, nor a spire of grass, but what produces effects, all over the Universe, and will produce them, to the end of eternity.† But any otherwise, there is nothing in a room so shut up, but only in God’s consciousness. How can anything be there, any other way? This will appear to be truly so, to any one who thinks of it, with the whole united strength of his mind. Let us suppose, for illustration, this impossibility, that all the spirits in the Universe were, for a time, deprived of their consciousness, and that God’s consciousness, at the same time, were to be intermitted. I say the Universe, for that time, would cease to be, of itself; and this not merely, as we speak, because the Almighty could not attend to uphold it; but because God could know nothing of it. It is our foolish imagination, that will not suffer us to see it. We fancy there may be figures and magnitudes, relations and properties, without any one knowing of it. But it is our imagination hurts us. We do not know what figures and properties are.”—Pages 706, 707.

† Again, one of the grandest of thoughts: But the thought, in part at least, is not infrequent. Indeed, this whole passage, from Edwards, is full of matter: there is always the best philosophy; and sometimes the richest vein of poetical sentiment. In truth, the highest philosophy and the best poetry tend always to run into each other: of which fact, this place in the metaphysician of the New World is an instance, and a proof.

APPENDIX B.

I.

§ 1. I have been told, that I should give the places in Kant on which I have founded. It has been insinuated, if not said, that, seeing I am so careful in citing the chapter and verse of my authorities in the other cases, I should do the like in this case also: Otherwise, I do not prevent its being thought, that I have no passages to rest upon.

§ 2. 'Tis true, that I have offered a reason why I did not think it necessary to cite the places in the works of Kant which authorised that abstract of his sentiments, or assertions, which I have brought forward in the text: Kant's metaphysical common-places are known to all philosophers. (See note to § 75, Part X.) But it has been more than dimly hinted, that my friendly Kantian critics, desiderate better authority than any such general reference, and are indeed resolved to be contented with no less than special references to places in Kant's works themselves.†

§ 3. Accordingly, sitting down face to face with the excavator of the "*tremendous*"‡ Transcendental Philosophy, I seriously commenced

† For instance, a letter, from an eminent gentleman, connected with a certain University, (dated, London, January 7th, 1863,) contains the following:—"What I have to say regarding Kant, I can say in a sentence." "Treat *him* as the author treats the other philosophers, whom, I observe, he usually *quotes*, in cases of difficulty. "There can be no harm in the world in *quoting* Kant, either from the original (which is of course the best source to go to'), or from an English translation of one or other of his writings. I might readily refer you to many passages in his writings, but any body almost can do that. It is a man's *own words* that always acquit or condemn him. Kant's doctrine on Space is by no means ambiguously laid down in his works. In these I think you will get what you seek—*unassailable accuracy as to what Kant maintained.*"

‡ Mr Meiklejohn (see below, note to § 12) declares: "it may be asserted that there is not a single English work upon Kant which deserves to be read, or which can be read

! But surely not the best source to come from, in order to be understood by a non-German speaking, or reading, people.

my re-investigation. Of course, the *Critique of Pure Reason* was at once in my hands. As the "*Critic*" was the first, so it is the most comprehensive, and the most profound—in short, immeasurably the greatest—of the writings of the great Teutonic metaphysician, the controller of the future age of the philosophy of all Germany, if not all Europe. That famous work served for the foundation, and all the important parts, of the entire metaphysical (and peculiar terminological) structure.

§ 4. Very soon, however, I discovered, in proceeding through the volume in question, that the passages, which would serve as authorities, were so numerous that they would amount to a little volume, if collected together. Even the authorisations for one only of the topics, would be equal to the bulk of a moderately sized pamphlet. Now, I thought so much additional matter, on such a subject, would never do—at least for my readers. I considered that these sensible persons, having arrived at, or nearly at, the end of a goodly volume, filled (I humbly hope) with the *winged words*† of solid thoughts, would not be content to add to their *ingesta* an unpalatable dose, in the shape of something bigger than a meagre duodecimo. The actual sum of a possible treatise, made up of the unsolid verbiage which constitutes a war of words, would be more than enough, and provoke a nauseous surfeit—ending unfit for me to contemplate.

§ 5. It is to be borne in mind, too, what my object was. It was not at all to convey the Kantian Transcendentalism in the Kantian Terminology; but to convey clearly, in sound English, the true character of that Transcendentalism itself,—speaking concerning the nature of Space.‡ And, after all, whether I succeeded in doing so, or not, must be decided—not by my adducing verbal authorities, *for the appositeness of which I am the authority*, but—by the decision which shall be pronounced upon my attempt, to bring the metaphysician of Königsberg, as he really was, before the British public,—the decision, I say, which shall be pronounced by those philosophers who determine (as the Catholic Church always does determine in matters of theology) what is

† with any profit, excepting Semple's translation of the 'Metaphysic of Ethics.'—(Melklejohn's Preface to translation of Kant's "Critique.") And Mr Semple says: "Common sense, then, so far from being lost sight of by Kant, is the very soul and principle of his investigation; and this I point at those who talk of the 'tremendous apparatus of the German school.'"—"Introduction," page xxvi.

‡ Ἔστι κρείσσειντα.—*Iliad* I.

‡ See note to § 75, Part X.,—&c.

true, and what is false, in philosophy. There is a court of last resort, from which there is no appeal, and the tribunal in question consists of the general body of philosophers.

§ 6. But let there be no mistaking the matter: I have no wish to shrink from an investigation of any kind. I shall, therefore, go over the ground taken in the text of Part X., from Section 69 to Section 76; and I shall impose upon my reader an array of authorities from the father, and from a certain son, or certain sons, of the Critical Philosophy.

§ 7. In the first place, then, it is asserted (§§ 70, 73, &c.), that Kant decrees Space to be something merely ideal: Space is a mere idea in the mind of man.

§ 8. Now, it is allowed, by adequate Kantian authority, that I am quite right on this subject. See, farther down in this Appendix, the *imprimatur* of a sufficiently able exponent of this Critical Philosophy.†

§ 9. No doubt, I, by way of a variation, render the meaning by the word "conception:" Making, *Space is a mere idea in the mind*, equal to, *Space is a conception of the mind* (§§ 70, 71, &c.) But this rendering Professor Veitch, the authority referred to in the preceding section, alleges is quite wrong; for, speaking for his master, he will not allow that a mere idea can be rendered by a mere conception. To which my rejoinder is, that, whatever may be the case within the domain of Transcendental phraseology, it is the fashion with good English to hold the phrases as very fair equivalents.‡ And, therefore, if Kant held Space to be purely ideal, (as is fully admitted,) he held Space to be, after all, simply a conception.

§ 10. We must take good care of falling into a merely verbal controversy, which could soon run into a worthless logomachy. Now, all this being so, what good could be gotten from my citing a dozen, or a hundred, authorities in the *Critique*, and the other pieces of Kant, for the purely ideal character of Space? The thing would be admitted at once, without any authority at all: but, unfortunately, the admission would go no way to get for me the leave of Transcendental Critics to use "conception" to express the same idea. Though the term "concep-

† Below, § 29.

‡ For the truth of which, I might make my Lord Brougham the voucher, were there any need for specific authority. In treating of this very subject of the nature of Space, his Lordship, in a passage cited by us, (§ 62, Part X.,) does most distinctly give "conceptions" and "ideas" as precisely equivalent terms. But indeed the general equivalence of those English words is notorious.

tion" would express the meaning in unexceptionable English—and will continue to do so, in spite of the disallowance of these German-fangled philosophers, or, rather, terminologists;—what of that?

§ 11. To put the position (that Space is an idea in our minds, and nothing more,) past all manner of doubt, all followers of Immanuel Kant out of the question, let me set down a passage, taken from the so famous *Critique of Pure Reason*.

§ 12. "Time and Space, with all phænomena therein, are *not* in themselves *things*. They are *nothing but representations*, and CANNOT EXIST OUT OF AND APART FROM THE MIND." This specimen passage, taken from the Sixth Section of the Chapter entitled "The Antinomy of Pure Reason," will be found in page 307 of the translation mentioned in the note.† Many other places, in support of the ideality of Space, might be cited. See, for example, a passage in page 185, where "the *pure ideality* of space and time" is delivered. Indeed, a hundred, or a thousand, kindred passages might be brought forward. But, of a truth, there is no necessity to refer to any special sentence in the volume, in behalf of the non-external character of Space; for all the pages in the Part ("Part First") devoted to the "Transcendental Æsthetic" [Pp. 22 to 44,] are full of such matter: while the whole Section "Of Space," in that Part, is made up of nothing else.

§ 13. But, secondly, I have alleged that, according to Kant, Space is not a conception (§§ 71, 72, 73, &c.): I have alleged, moreover, that, as Kant decreed *wood* to be no conception, but an external existence, so, too, he decreed Space to be no conception, but an external existence likewise (§ 72 & § 73.)

§ 14. The Transcendental Critics will admit—alas! too readily—that their master made Space to be *no conception*. See, below, what Mr Veitch says.‡ But attend to the reason. Kant maintained, indeed, that Space is no conception; but only because he would not permit the *application*, in this matter, of the *word*. And Kant's followers (if one could but catch any of Kant's true followers!) would stoutly deny, that Kant anywhere puts *Space* and "*wood*," or "*stone*," on a level, by

† My citations from the "Critique" shall be made from the translation by J. M. D. Meiklejohn, published by Bohn, in his "Philosophical Library," 1860. A volume which may be in every one's hands.

That translation sets out with four or five pages of a Preface, which nobody can characterise as being meek and modest. My readers may think, they have had an instance of the want of great modesty even already. (Above, note to § 3.)

‡ § 29.

|| See § 70, Part X.

making Space to have as real an existence, externally, as the wood, or the stone. No, they declare, with infinite emphasis: "Wood, stone, &c."† are "objects of sense,"‡ and exist as external objects; they are, in short, material bodies: but Space (altho' it should be the very Space in which the wood and the stone exist—nay, altho' the Space should be the very Space in which the whole of the bodies in our Solar system do exist—) Space must be content with being *called* 'an intuition,' 'a form of the sensibility,' 'a law of the understanding,' or, 'of our consciousness,' 'a singular notion,'‡ and with being *deemed to be* a something *within*, and a nothing *without*. Space is, in fine, an idea. An idea, observe; not, by any license, a conception. This is what Space *is not*: and that is what Space *is*.

§ 15. Now, in answer to that,

And twice as mickle's a' that,||

I beg leave to be allowed to state, that 'tis clear that—waiving the point whether Space exists externally—Space has external existence, if it has as much external existence as the "wood, stone, &c.," and if the wood, and the stone, and the other bodily materials covered by the *et cetera*, have external existence. That, then, these, and all material objects, have external existence, or existence outwardly in the world, and, in short, have a right to have the Transcendental Category, *Reality*, fitted upon them; is most abundantly clear from Kant's writings. It is clear, both generally and particularly; and, therefore, the point needs not to be much insisted on, except for the benefit of those who have not had the advantage of instruction in Transcendental Philosophy.

§ 16. The system of the metaphysician of Königsberg was not a system of scepticism, that is, as to material things. He expressly says, it was not: and he praises himself as being the enemy, and conqueror, of "material" scepticism.¶ In plain English, Kant, as the founder of the Critical Philosophy, is pleased to allow the existence of material objects, or of an external world.

§ 17. Such, *generally* speaking, is the aspect of the affair. But, to speak *particularly*, the father of that philosophy fits, in the most exact manner fits, the important Category, *Reality*, upon the objects of our senses in the outward world.†† And this stamps those objects with

† See, below, § 29.

‡ See, for some other names, § 70, Part X.

|| Burns.

¶ See Note Aa, p. 443.

†† See Note Bb, p. 447.

external existence. I say, this fitting the Category, "Reality," upon the "wood, stone, &c.," and the other objects of sense, stamps them with the mark of existence, externally,—or, in the world of——
Realities.

§ 18. The only question with me is, therefore, Does Kant really grant to Space *the same* outness, and external reality, which he allows to those material objects? This is *the* question; and, as I will not allow a march to be stolen upon me, I will not allow that question to be changed for any other. Much less will I allow the real question to be (illicitly, and in secret) changed for some merely verbal, and idle, controversy, in the region of vain logomachies. Did Kant grant—inadvertently, or not, no matter—to Space *the same* outness, and external reality, which he allows to material objects?

§ 19. On this topic, therefore, I shall favour my reader with some authorities—though, I own, the difficulty of selection was the great difficulty. Where every couple of pages might have supplied an authority, it could not be so very easy to get along.

§ 20. In citing here, I mean, however, to bring forward the passages selected, simply as they lie in the volume; without seeking, in the most distant way, any arrangement, far less precise classification, of the places,—other than, perhaps, a passing notice of the character, or a feature in the character, of the proof.

§ 21.

1. "*Motion of an object in Space* does not belong to a pure science, consequently not to geometry; because, that a thing is moveable cannot be known *a priori*, but only from experience." Page 95.—Here, the Object in Space, and the Space, are obviously on the same footing. 'Tis plain, as plain can be, that *the same outness or externality*, is accorded to the one as to the other.—The proof, in this case, is *indirect*.

2. The "Theorem" under the "Refutation of Idealism," is couched in these words: "The simple but empirically determined Consciousness of my own existence proves *the existence of external objects in Space.*" Pages 166, 167.—Here, the Objects, which are "external," are also "in Space." The externality, and the space, are, evidently, inseparable.

3. "Every beginning is in Time, and all limits to extension are in Space. But Space and Time *are in the world of sense.*" P. 325.—This is a *direct* proof. There is no mistaking what it amounts to.

4. "All figures are possible only as different modes of limiting in-

“finite Space.” P. 356.—Is it not clear, that “figures ;” say, *ex. gr.*, the globular figure called the *Earth*, and the globular figure called the *Sun*, and the one between these two called the *Moon* ; do limit Space only by being in it ?

§ 22. Besides these citations, some of the passages already, or elsewhere, cited by us, though, it may be, in some different connection or other, might now be adduced, and may, at any rate, be thus generally referred to. Some of the passages would be quite to our present purpose.

§ 23. I may go on to adduce some instances, in which Kant seems to proceed *a step farther*.

1. “If we take away by degrees from our conceptions of a body all that can be referred to mere sensuous experience—colour, hardness or softness, weight, even impenetrability—the Body will then vanish ; but the Space *which it occupied* still remains, AND THIS IT IS UTTERLY IMPOSSIBLE TO ANNIHILATE IN THOUGHT.” P. 4.

2. “We may and ought to grant, in the case of Space, that division or decomposition, to any extent, never can utterly annihilate composition (that is to say, the smallest part of space must still consist of spaces) ; otherwise Space would entirely cease to exist—WHICH IS IMPOSSIBLE.” P. 326.

3. “Space is the primal condition of all forms, which are properly just so many different limitations of it ; and thus, although it is merely a principle of sensibility, *we cannot help regarding it as an ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY AND SELF-SUBSISTENT THING.*” P. 380.

§ 24. In the third and last place : As I have alleged, that Kant decreed Space to be an idea, or a conception† ; as I have alleged, that Kant decreed Space to be, nevertheless, no conception, but, like wood, an external existence‡ ; so, too, did I make another assertion, (§§ 74, 75, Part X.,) namely, that Kant reduces Space to nothing at all. He sinks it in that bottomless, shoreless, universal grave of nonentity, which swallows up ideas, and the more than ideas, and, in a word, all else—only to devour itself also. What an abysmal womb nihility must have ! In fine, Kant decrees Space to be a——*nothing*.

§ 25. Now, as to this third topic, there will be no difficulty at all, since a remarkable passage (the only one of the kind indeed) can be brought forward from this so prolific “Critique of Pure Reason,”

† See above, § 7, *et seq.*

‡ See above, § 13, *et seq.*

which (to forestal a little) can travail with “the conception of *something*,” as well as with “the conception of *nothing*.” O most fertile womb! The passage in question treats precisely of—not only that one particular sort of Nothing, but—all sorts whatever of Nothings. For sooth to say, tho’ strange to say, there are at least as many kinds of Nothings as there are quarters of the compass. These are cardinal points: but those are no points at all—not even mathematical points.†

§ 26.

“As the Categories are the only conceptions, which apply to objects in general, the distinguishing of an object, *whether it is something or nothing*, must proceed according to the order and direction of the Categories.

“1. To the categories of Quantity, that is, the conceptions of All, Many, and One, the conception *which ANNIHILATES ALL*, that is, the conception of *none* is opposed. And thus the object of a conception, to which no intuition can be found to correspond, is=Nothing. That is, it is a conception without an object (*ens rationis*), like noumena, which cannot be considered possible in the sphere of reality, though they must not therefore be held to be impossible,—or like certain new fundamental forces in matter, the existence of which is cogitable without contradiction, though, as examples from experience are not forthcoming, they must not be regarded as possible.

“2. Reality is *something*; negation is *nothing*, that is, a conception of the absence of an object, as cold, a shadow (*nihil privativum*).

“3. The mere form of intuition, without substance, is in itself no object, but the merely formal condition of an object (as phenomenon), as pure Space and pure Time. These are certainly something, as forms of intuition, but are not themselves objects which are intuited (*ens imaginativum*).

“4. The object of a conception which is self-contradictory, is nothing, because the conception is nothing—is impossible, as a figure composed of two straight lines (*nihil negativum*).

“The table of this division of the conception of *nothing* (the corresponding division of the conception of *something* does not require special description,) must therefore be arranged as follows :

† The reader may consult (if he like) the note to § 55, Part I., and the first note to § 18, Part III.

NOTHING.

As

1.

Empty conception without object,
ens rationis.

2.

Empty object of a conception,
nihil privativum.

3.

Empty intuition without object,
ens imaginarium.

4.

Empty object without conception,
nihil negativum.

“We see that the *ens rationis* is distinguished from the *nihil negativum* or pure nothing by the consideration, that the former must not be reckoned among possibilities, because it is a mere fiction—though not self-contradictory, while the latter is completely opposed to all possibility, inasmuch as the conception annihilates itself. Both, however, are empty conceptions. On the other hand, the *nihil privativum* and *ens imaginarium* are empty *data* for conceptions. If light be not given to the senses, we cannot represent to ourselves darkness, and if extended objects are not perceived, we cannot represent Space. Neither the negation, nor the mere form of intuition can, without something real, be an object.”—Pages 207, 208.

NOTE Aa.

§ 1. In a Section of the “Critique” already made use of, the author informs us, regarding his doctrine concerning “every thing intuited [*Anglicè*, perceived] in Space and Time,”† “This Doctrine I call *Transcendental Idealism*.”‡ “It would,” he declares, “be unjust to accuse us of holding “the long-decried theory of *empirical idealism*, which, while admitting the “reality of Space, denies, or at least doubts, the existence of *bodies* extended

† I do not always follow the printing of Bohn’s edition. Sometimes, I give capital letters; sometimes, *italics*; where there are none in my authority. I might have made this observation before.—I am afraid, the enunciation of my misdeeds, in this direction, might be extended. But, nevertheless, I never take upon me to alter any word in the translation, nor even to alter the pointing. See Note † next page.

‡ Kant has a note, in which he says: “I have elsewhere termed this theory *formal Idealism*, to distinguish it from *material Idealism*, which doubts or denies the existence of external things.”

“in it, and thus leaves us without a sufficient criterion of reality and illusion.” A little farther down in the same page, Kant proceeds thus: “Transcendental Idealism allows that the objects of external intuition—as intuited in Space, and all changes in Time—as represented by the internal sense,† *are real*. For, as Space is the form of that intuition which we call external, and without objects in Space,† no empirical representation could be given us; *we can and ought to regard extended bodies in it as real.*”‡ In fine: “The empirical truth of phenomena in Space and Time *is guaranteed beyond the possibility of doubt*, and sufficiently distinguished from the illusion of dreams or fancy—although both have a proper and thorough connection in an experience according to empirical laws.”||

§ 2. Yea, in another part of the volume Kant expressly gives a “Refutation of Idealism;” meaning, he tells us, by “Idealism,” “*material*¶ Idealism.”†† Under that “Refutation of Idealism,” there is a “THEOREM,” enouncing what that is which “*proves the existence of external objects in Space.*”‡‡ Then follows the “PROOF” itself,‡‡ with its *Remarks I., II., III.,*||| and other matter, kindred, or allied by some connection or other. As a result, “the game which Idealism plays, is retorted upon itself,”‡‡ and is shewn to be, on the whole, a bad, and very losing, game, for the players thereof. Could any other result have been looked for, with him of Königsberg for the master of the ceremonies?

§ 3. To those authorities, I may add a reference to the “Preface to the Second Edition,” which was given to the world in 1787. The book was first published in 1781: So that there had been abundant time to chew the *Critical* cud. If the ruminating improved matters, good and well. Some questioned,¶¶ and others do still question, the improvement. Well then: In the Preface specified, and in the longest foot-note therein, we find the following:—“The only addition, properly so called—and that only in the method of proof—which I have made in the present edition, consists of a “*new Refutation of Psychological Idealism,*” [Simply, our old friend *Empirical, or Material, Idealism,* with a new face.] “and a strict demonstration—the only one possible, as I believe—of the *objective reality of external intuition*. However harmless Idealism may be considered—although in “reality it” [namely, that particular kind of Idealism] “is not so—in regard to the essential ends of metaphysics, it must still remain a scandal to

† Mr Meiklejohn’s punctuation does not appear to be always the best: though, to prevent the possibility of the charge of misrepresentation, I follow it, nevertheless.

‡ All those quotations are made from page 307.

¶ P. 308.

¶¶ “In opposition to *formal* or *critical*” [or *transcendental*] “idealism—the theory of Kant:” these are the words, in a note at the place indicated, of the modest translator.

†† P. 166.

‡‡ P. 167.

||| Pp. 167, 168, 169, &c.

¶¶¶ In evidence, see various places in that *Preface*.

“philosophy and to the general human reason to be obliged to assume, as an article of mere belief, the existence of things external to ourselves (from which, yet, we derive the whole material of cognition even for the internal sense), and not to be able to oppose a satisfactory proof to any one who may call it in question. As there is some obscurity of expression in the demonstration as it stands in the text”—that is, the “Critique of Pure Reason,” itself—“I propose to alter the passage in question.” Then follows the alteration, and, I hope, amendment. With which, however, we have nothing to do; our business being with *the fact* of the proof, and not with the goodness (or badness) of the proof. After the “*new*” proof, the author proceeds to notice what might (and I suppose may still) be urged in opposition to this proof, proof, to wit, of the externality of things, or “the existence of things external to ourselves.” After which comes, of course, Kant’s answer in refutation of the presumed opposing argument. Kant, then, was far from being contented with his Prefatory “proof.” And I do not wonder.

(1.) Truth compels me to confess, that those protests, against the common Idealism, by the creator of the *Critical* apparatus, seem to be too strong, because too little in accordance with what is laid down directly, and indirectly, and every way, not once, but again, and again, and again, as lying at the very foundation, or at least as being part and parcel, of the Critical philosophy. If Kant’s system be radically and irremediably sceptical, as to Matter or Bodies, as well as as to the Space (and the Time) in which the bodies exist; there is no help for it, but to take those protests at what they are worth, and no more. Now, that the system in question is, in truth, really and unalterably out-and-out sceptical, is only too apparent to the attentive, and very critical, student of the same. Such an assertion will be tremendously shocking to all genuine disciples of Kantianism, (if they exist;†) yet, it can easily be made good by the aid of the philosopher of Königsberg himself.

(2.) “Time and Space”—these are Kant’s words—“*with all phenomena therein, are—nothing but representations, and cannot exist out of and apart from the mind.*”‡ What is this doctrine but the most thorough-paced ordinary scepticism! Again: In another place, Kant speaks of “an *indirect* proof of the Transcendental *ideality* of “*phænomena*, if our minds were not completely satisfied with the “*direct* proof set forth in the ‘Transcendental *Æsthetic*.’ The “proof” [that is, the “indirect” proof] “would proceed in the

† See what is said in Part X. § 70.

‡ This passage has been already quoted, though in a (slightly) different connection. See § 12 of the text of this Appendix.

“ following dilemma. If the world is a whole existing in itself, it
 “ must be either finite or infinite. But it is neither finite nor
 “ infinite.”—“ Therefore the world—the content of all phænomena—
 “ is not a whole existing in itself. It follows that phænomena are
 “ *nothing, apart from our representations.* And this is what we mean
 “ by Transcendental *ideality.*”† Kant immediately adds: “ This
 remark is of some importance.” True: If the remark, if, to wit, that
 “ indirect proof,” be valid at all, it is of vast importance; for it
 clearly seeks to make out, that “ the world,” AS CONTAINING *all the*
things of which we can ever have experimental knowledge, is nothing
 apart from my mind!

(3.) To go now to another quarter. As to the “ direct proof ” said
 to be in that part of the book taken up with the Transcendental
 Æsthetic; we would not need to suffer under any penury of proba-
 tive matter, were more than a specimen necessary. The penultimate
 section (§ 9) of that Transcendental Æsthetic, entitled “ General
 Remarks,” &c., commences thus:—“ In order to prevent any mis-
 “ understanding, it will be requisite, in the first place, to recapitulate,
 “ *as clearly as possible,* what our opinion is with respect to the *fundâ-*
 “ *mental nature of our sensuous cognition* in general. We have
 “ intended, then, to say, that all our intuition is nothing but the
 “ representation of phænomena; that the things which we intuite,
 “ are not in themselves the same as our representations of them in
 “ intuition, nor are their relations in themselves so constituted as they
 “ appear to us; and that if we take away the subject, or even only
 “ the subjective constitution of our senses in general, then not only
 “ the nature and relations of objects in Space and Time, but even
 “ Space and Time themselves *disappear;* and that these, as phæno-
 “ mena, *cannot exist in themselves, but only in us.*”‡ Does not this
 involve sufficient?—Once more, however. Another head, or obser-
 vation, begins thus:—“ In confirmation of this theory of the *ideality*
 “ *of the external as v:ll as internal sense,* consequently of *all objects of*
 “ *sense,* as mere phænomena, we may especially remark,” &c. &c.||
 But enough, and more than enough. If such doctrine do not amount
 to Scepticism, (call it Protagorean, or Eleatic, Scepticism, or what
 you like,) I know not what Scepticism is; nor have you, either, the
 least notion of what Scepticism can be. 'Tis as clear as the sun at
 noon-day, that Kantism is Scepticism, and the acme thereof.

(4.) Finally, this enumeration may be closed with these words:—
 “ The common, but FALLACIOUS HYPOTHESIS of the *absolute reality* of
 “ phænomena.”¶

† P. 316.

‡ Pp. 35, 36.

|| P. 40.

¶ P. 332.

(5.) ——— If those sets of citations, this series and the former series, cannot be reconciled with each other;—that is not my fault. The series seem, indeed, to be in irreconcilable conflict with each other—that set with this set;—but who can now help it?—I shrewdly suspect that I might extend the field of this remark: the Kantian horizon is wide.——

§ 4. On the whole, then; Is that true—or is it untrue—which is said in the “Preface to the Second Edition,” that “CRITICISM alone can strike a blow at the root of Materialism, Fatalism, Atheism, Free-thinking, Fanaticism, and Superstition, which are universally injurious—as well as of Idealism and Scepticism?”† We have seen: seen have we.

NOTE Bb.

In page 64 we have a “Table of the Categories,” which is said to contain “four classes of conceptions of the understanding.”‡ The second class is headed “Of Quality;” the first Category under which is “Reality.”§ Again, in the place which treats of “The Postulates of Empirical Thought,”¶ one of these postulates (the second) is made out to be this—“That which coheres with the *material* conditions of experience (sensation), is *real*.”|| A page or two farther on, we have this: “As far as concerns *reality*, it is self-evident that we cannot cogitate such a possibility *in concreto* without the aid of experience; because *reality* is concerned only with *sensation*, as the matter of experience,” &c.†† Again, as touching the same *Reality*, we have: “The postulate concerning the cognition of the *reality* of things requires *perception*, consequently *conscious sensation*,”‡‡ &c. &c. Lastly, take this short, but pregnant, passage: “the *real* in *Space*—that is, *matter*.”§§

† Page xxxvii. ‡ P. 67. § P. 64. ¶ P. 161. †† P. 164. ‡‡ P. 165.

||| P. 259. Many other passages could be cited, or referred to;—as, *ex. gr.*, some of those in Note Aa, § 1.

II.

§ 27. As supplementary to the preceding analysis of a certain portion of the content of the *Critical Philosophy*, the following comment, alike on Kant and on your humble servant, may be introduced to the reader's notice.

§ 28. Mr Veitch, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics, St Andrews, the able Translator of Des Cartes, and the Joint-Editor of Sir William Hamilton's celebrated (posthumous) Lectures on Logic and Metaphysics, in returning to me the proof-sheet, which embraced the sentiments of Kant on Space, [Part X. Sections 70 to 76 inclusive,] favoured me with a letter containing the following observations—very valuable as coming from a talented expositor of Continental Philosophies. It will be observed, that I have intercalated an observation or two.

§ 29. "I hardly think you have fairly represented Kant's views on the subject of space, though you have stated what is substantially his conclusion, that space is merely an idea or form of human consciousness, not an independent or objective reality. The contradictions which you appear to have found in Kant's *doctrines* on the point, seem to me to arise from misapprehension to some extent of the meaning of the Kantian *terms*. To put the doctrine of Kant regarding space simply, it should be looked at from two points of view,—the psychological, and the metaphysical. Psychologically:—Space, according to Kant, is an original and necessary *form* or *law* of ~~our~~ consciousness, as manifested in perception. In virtue of this form or law, we are constrained to represent to ourselves the materials presented to us,—the impressions on the senses,—as extended—as in space. Space, further, while thus a form under which we represent all the objects of sense, is not nevertheless a *notion* or *conception*—like our ideas of wood, stone, &c.—but an *intuition* or *singular idea* (*Anschauung*.)"

[*I. e.*—The thing is admitted: the words affirming the thing in good English, are refused us. As Mr Veitch has remarked (on the margin of proof-sheet), "*Intuition* is Kant's term, which "is different from *conception*, or *notion*, in his use of the words. "*Intuition* is a singular idea; *notion*—a general: *Wood* is a

“general notion; *space*, an intuition, or singular notion.”—Very good: but I was aiming at giving my readers a view of Kant’s real thoughts or sentiments in genuine English, and not at giving an exposition of the way in which Kant was pleased to use certain words, derived from the Latin, or Mæso-Gothic, or some other source.]

§ 30. “The second point in Kant’s doctrine of space is the *metaphysical*, involving the question about the independent reality of space. “This independent reality, he denies. Every object of knowledge or consciousness is, in his view, a composite made up of an element contributed by the mind or conscious subject, and of an element contributed from without. No object, therefore, of our knowledge has a reality by itself or *per se*. It is a phenomenon—not an absolute being or reality.† It has an existence in fact only within our experience. In perception, for example, the element contributed by the mind is the intuition *space*, which, therefore, is wholly subjective. We perceive or represent to ourselves things as in space, but we are not therefore entitled to say that things *considered in themselves*—out of—and above our perception—*are* in space,—or that space is a reality, existing apart

† Is not this a new way of putting it as to the meaning of Kant, regarding *per se*, or *in themselves*? The truth is, that, by Noumena, or things as “in themselves,” as contra-distinguished from Phenomena=“representations,” Kant understands (frequently, or most frequently) neither more nor less than things in the non-sensible, or spiritual region, or—to vary the phrase—the suprasensible (or supernatural) world. Accordingly, God is, with Kant, a pure Noumenon.

“—The conception of a Noumenon is,” says Kant, “problematical, that is to say, it is the notion of a thing of which we can neither say that it is possible, nor that it is impossible, inasmuch as we do not know of any mode of intuition besides the sensuous, or of any other sort of conceptions than the categories—a mode of intuition and a kind of conception neither of which is applicable to a non-sensuous object. We are on this account incompetent to extend the sphere of our objects of thought beyond the conditions of our sensibility, and to assume the existence of objects of pure thought, that is, of Noumena, inasmuch as these have no true positive signification.” Etc.—“Critique,” page 205.¹

Again, the author of the *Critique* declares:—“The conception of a *Noumenon*, that is, of a thing which must be cogitated not as an object of sense, but as a *thing in itself*.—Nay, further, this conception is necessary to restrain sensuous intuition within the bounds of *phenomena*, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensuous cognition; for *things in themselves*, which lie beyond its province, are called *Noumena*, for the very purpose of indicating that this cognition does not extend its application to all that the understanding thinks. But, after all, the possibility of such Noumena is quite incomprehensible, and beyond the sphere of Phenomena,

¹ The passage quoted occurs under the sub-head of “Remarks on the Amphiboly of the Conceptions of Reflection.” (P. 194.)

“from our perception.† Beyond being a law or form of our consciousness, space has no meaning or reality. Space is merely something in so far as it regulates our perceptions,—is their law.

§ 31. “It would thus appear that, whatever may be thought of the truth of Kant’s doctrine, there is no ground for charging it with contradiction,—at least in its speculative aspect.” [Indeed!] “The point which the doctrine raises is a fundamental one in human knowledge—being nothing less than the inquiry which Locke specified in regard to the relations of human consciousness and reality. The question about the independent reality of space, is but a single aspect of a more general question, and must be decided on general grounds.”

[Exactly. But can Space have less reality than the material objects necessarily conceived as existing in Space? This is the question when such a wide field is in view.]

§ 32. Mr Veitch is pleased to add: “I am much interested to find that you are bringing out a new edition of your most able work. I read the first edition some years ago—with great pleasure and profit.” This is a most gratifying assurance.

III.

§ 33. I promised my reader an array of authorities, not only from the father, but from certain sons of the Critical Philosophy (above, § 6); and I proceed now to redeem my promise, regarding another, and a more ancient, son of the kind in question.

§ 34. The authority to which I would now direct attention, is one of those mentioned (in terms not too commendatory) by Mr Meiklejohn in the Preface to his translation of the *Critique*. My authority is called, on the title-page, “The Principles of Critical Philosophy, Selected from the works of Emmanuel Kant, member of,” &c. &c.; “and Expounded by James Sigismund Beck, extraordinary Professor in the University of Halle: Translated from the German,” &c.‡

“all is for us a MERE VOID,” &c., &c. Pp. 186, 187. But, indeed, the whole of the Chapter entitled “Of the Ground of the Division of all objects into *Phænomena* and *Noumena*,” (from which chapter the last citation is made;) may be referred to, as showing that Kant, by “*in themselves*,” (or “*per se*,”) meant something very different from that which Professor Veitch, speaking for Immanuel Kant, means.

† Has any object (according to this expositor) an existence apart from our perception?
‡ London, Edinburgh, and Hamburg; 1797.

And it is thus Mr Meiklejohn speaks with reference to the volume. "The translator of 'Beck's Principles of the Critical Philosophy,' while "pretending to give, in his 'Translator's Preface,' his own views of "the Critical Philosophy, has *fabricated* his Preface out of selections "from the works of Kant." Thus keeping there too near his author. This is severe on that *translator*: but nothing is said against "Beck's Principles" itself. There is (implied) praise; because no fault is found—where evidently fault-finding, with every body else, in the shape of translator (saving Mr Semple), of commentator or *expounder*, or even of ordinary critic, was the order of the day. (This is borne out by the rest of the note in Mr Meiklejohn's own "Translator's Preface," from which the preceding passage was taken. See, also, the place quoted in note (§) p. 435 hereof.)

§ 35. I have stated, that sometimes I have given Kant, in Kant's own words.† And if James Sigismund Beck be a correct transcriber of the words, or the meaning, of his master, then I think it will be found that I have steered very close to the wind. Compare my description of Kant's sentiments, or terms, on Space, in my 70th section, Part X., with the following sentences from J. S. Beck, and it will be seen how cautiously I have followed in the wake of the disciple. We print just as in the original.

"Space which is itself moveable, is called *material* or also *relative* "space; that, in which all motion must, at last, be thought, (which is "therefore itself, absolutely immovable) is named *pure* or *absolute* "space."———"We conceive an absolute immovable, intransposable "space, to which we refer, at last, in thought, all motion. Is this "absolute fixed space something, or is it nothing? *Pure* space is only "the original synthesis of the homogenous. The *existent* space is only "the empirical and moveable space, and the conception of an absolute "immovable space is but an idea, that has itself no object." Pp. 94, 95.

Read now what is in § 70, and there will be obvious any thing but a perversion.

§ 36. The following are the words of my 72nd section:—

"I ('tis Immanuel Kant who speaks) by all means have a concep- "tion of Space and a conception of Time. Space and Time themselves "are however *not conceptions*, though I have conceptions of them. "Again:—I have a conception of *wood*: so have I too conceptions of

† My words were: "his own very words, or their equivalents, are sometimes retained." Note to § 75, Part X.

“*space and time.* But as wood itself is no conception, Space and Time are likewise *no conceptions.* And so on.”

These sentences seem to agree with the words of Beck, the selector, to a wonderful extent, if the latter had not been before the author of the former. One could hardly speak by the card closer. Beck thus:—“I, by all means, have a conception of Space and of Time. Space and Time themselves are however *not conceptions*, though I have conceptions of them. Space and Time are pure intuitions.” P. 76.—“The metaphysical exposition of these conceptions teaches, that—Space and Time in this are in the same relation, as all other objects. As I have a conception of *wood*, so have I too conceptions of space and of time. But as wood itself is no conception, Space and Time are likewise *no conceptions.*” P. 77.†

§ 37. In sections 74, 75, Part X., I discourse of the *nothingness* of Space, as according to the great Critical Philosopher. In § 26 of this Appendix, I have cited the one grand authoritative passage from the “*Critique.*” And there may be no harm in my now adding, to Kant himself, the version of the subservient follower. The version will be discovered to be instructive on its own account,—as well as confirmatory of the ground taken by me.

“—The conception of a *nonentity*, i. e., of nothing, according to the table of the Categories.

“*Nothing* is, *first*, that which is neither one, nor many, nor all, i. e., to which no original use of understanding, *greatness*, corresponds (an *ens rationis*). Such is the conception of a noumenon, that is neither in space nor in time, and to which, however, existence must belong.

“*Nothing* is, *secondly*, that which has not the original use of understanding, *reality*, for a foundation (a *nihil privativum*). Such is the conception of empty space.

“*Nothing* is, *thirdly*, that whose conception does not rest on the original use of understanding in the original positing of a permanent in space (an *ens imaginarium*). Such is the conception of a mathematical figure.

“These three conceptions do not run counter to the original use of understanding; they are therefore not *counter-intelligible*. But they are *unintelligible*, as the analytical unity, which is thought in them, cannot be carried back to any original synthetic objective unity.

† The selector adds: “This exposition [of the conceptions of Space and Time] says further, that we can, by no means, conceive that space and time are not, though we may easily think, that no objects are to be found therein.”

“*Nothing* is also, *fourthly*, that whose conception runs counter to the original use of understanding (a *nihil negativum*). Such is the conception of a rectilinear figure of two sides; the conception of a substance, which is present in a space, yet without filling it; the conception of a creation of matter.”—Pp. 67, 68.

§ 38. So ends this “Transcendental exposition” (p. 67); and thus the Kantean† *Nothings* retire from us with a hard hit at a part of the true faith of a Christian. Worthy of a Rationalist, of the genuine caste!

§ 39. Having, in this manner, backed my Kantean positions, in §§ 70, 72, 75, Part X., by the support of so distinguished a disciple (under leave of J. M. D. Meiklejohn) of the great master; I may, in the next place, glance, in a casual way, at the preceding portion of this Appendix (Nos. I. and II.) in the light reflected from this Beck-an selection of Critical Principles.

§ 40. By way of a commencement, in this new direction, let us hear James Sigismund Beck’s praise of Kantean† Idealism.

“The *Critic* infers from this theory of Space and Time, that Space and Time, by no means, represent properties of any things in themselves whatever, but that they are mere forms of all phænomena. It infers that all our cognition is cognition of the phænomena, but not of the things in themselves, and, for this reason, names its doctrine the *critical, formal, or transcendental idealism*, which it distinguishes, however, from the *dogmatical or material idealism*. There is nothing which we wish to inculcate so much, as the assurance that our Critical Idealism consists in the assertion, that the understanding synthesises and schematises originally in its categories, and that all conjunction which we place in the objects, (*e. g.*, in the judgment, Every reality is an intensive greatness), is only for this reason objective, because we synthesise originally in the Categories. The intelligibility of all our conceptions lies in this point. The Material Idealism neglects this, and is always dogmatical, as it never quits the station of mere conceptions. The Critical has so little in common with the Dogmatical Idealism, that the whole insignificance of the latter is discovered in “the first.” Pages 81, 82. See, likewise, a long passage, beginning on p. 163, wherein the two idealisms are compared, much to the disadvantage of the “dogmatical,” “empirical,” or “material,” *Idealism*. I am not sure but that the passage now alluded to is a fine instance

† It may be observed that the word is always spelled with an *e*, and not with an *i*, (not Kantian, but Kantean) by our author.

of a thing made more obscure, by continuing to write about it, and about it.

§ 41. To turn, next, to the important Category, "*Reality*," or "*Actuality*,"—for, in page 142, we have "the category, actuality." In the following pages, among others, this Category of "*Reality*" is treated of. Page 50 makes known, that, in virtue of "*Reality*," we say "of matter, of a stone, [the stone again,] of a plant,—these objects *exist*," &c. &c. In page 80, we have this important sentence:—"The category, *reality*, as original use of understanding, is also identical with the *empirical* or *material intuition*." But no less valuable this:—" 'Tis the original use of understanding, *reality*, to which *Dynamic* carries back the conception of *matter*. This *Reality* is the same with that of *filling* a space, and 'tis only necessary to turn all one's attention to the original use of understanding and to transpose one's self to it. This consists in the original synthesis of sensations."—Page 103. Or these:—"Every *reality* in Space, that is, *matter*, is a composite, and consists of parts." "These ideas are the category *reality* extended even to the unconditional."—Page 172.

§ 42. We must not give the go-by to the question, What is a Nounenon? A topic started somewhere in our No. II. That question is answered—as in other places, so—in pages 53, 54, where we are told such things as: That "the conception of a *nounenon* is the conception of an object, that we represent to ourselves in an attribution, which has no original use of understanding for a basis." That "as the predicate, *existence*, which we add to objects, rests on the original use of understanding, *existence*, in the Category of *Relation*, and is therefore (which expresses the same) a predicate of the objects of experience only; so the question, Whether nounena exist? has no meaning."

§ 43. A *Nounenon* starts its co-relative *Phenomenon*. It is—or is not—consolatory to be informed:—"It is, therefore, very erroneous to interpret the *Critic*, as if it taught, that the *things in themselves* in a manner hide themselves from us, but that notwithstanding they discover their existence, by their action upon our sensitive faculty. This aspect transforms the *critical* idealism into a dogmatical system, as the categories are therein considered from the station of mere conceptions. The *phænomena* are the objects of our cognition; they are real existing objects, and it is not illusion, but truth, when we say of our representations of them, that objects correspond to them.†

† Compare—and perhaps contrast—this with what is under (3.) in page 446, above.

“The *Critic*, in its Transcendental Æsthetic, names the phænomena “themselves *representations*.”—Pages 83, 84.

§ 44. Last of all, let us hear what might well be looked at as the conclusion of the whole *Critical* matter, upon the most important of all subjects, the being of a God. Let us hear the great conclusion to which the master himself came, as the result of a half century of hard study;—the conclusion, as the true doctrine is delivered by that devoted disciple. The original must be followed, in this case, *verbatim, & literatim, & punctatim*.

§ 45. But ere we be presented with the doctrine, let us have the author of the same well limned. The following glowing description of the philosopher is taken from that “Translator’s Preface,” which another translator (who also writes a Preface†) finds to be so objectionable.‡ “—The able and worthy Kant, the generous benefactor of “mankind, and founder of this vast system” [= the *Critical* system] “(the harvest of some fifty years *constant labour*,) which not only leads “to, but gains, *the summit of ALL HUMAN CULTURE*.”|| With which agrees admirably what is said in other places. For example, in another page of the same Preface, Kant is called *the* “father of modern philosophy.”¶ In the same style, though the feature is by a different hand, is this: “The *Critical* philosophy is *the only true* philosophy.”—J. S. Beck’s Preface: page lix.†† Would it be wrong to say, that this is unmeasured pægyric, if such were possible?

§ 46. “This is by no means a theoretical, but a pure, moral belief. “The conceptions, by which God is therein thought, do not determine “this Being. They are the mode, in which the virtuous man thinks “the reaching of the aim of all his aspirations. *He thinks God according to the analogy* with his own intelligent nature, but *concludes* “not, according to analogy, from the latter upon the attributes of “God. The true, moral faith is nothing but the confidence of the “good-minded man, that he will attain the end, to which his whole “exertion is directed.”—Page 264.

§ 47. “This,” namely, the Kantean “moral proof,” from “*practical reason*,” of a God, is, thus,—————What?

† See above, note t, p. 435.

‡ See above, § 34.

|| Page ix.

¶ Page lvii.

†† In which page, we learn that “the epithet *critical* points at a philosophy which is not critical.” A thing we might not have known, but for information displaying critical acumen, with the reverse of—acumen, which is not critical.

ADDENDUM

TO

APPENDIX B. TO PART X.

As this sheet was passing through the press, I received a long communication from Professor Veitch, regarding the foregoing Appendix, especially Appendix B, I.

The communication consists of many particulars; though, possibly, the items might be classified under not many heads. But I can find time and space to notice only two topics.

The first is, that the Professor still maintains, and very strongly, that I have failed to master Kant, and because of my not yet understanding aright the mysteries of the Kantian vocabulary. "I must be "pardoned for saying," so writes Mr Veitch in his letter, "that I do "not think you have established your charges of inconsistency against "Kant's doctrine of Space—or in truth that you have quite apprehended Kant's point of view in that doctrine. As I said before, this "arises, as appears to me, from want of sufficient general acquaintance "with Kant's most precise terminology, and its true import."

The letter admits, however, that "Kant's theory of Space, and of "material existence, is one open, of course, to difference of opinion; "and it is always good," the letter adds, "to have any interpretation, "if it is put clearly and vigorously—as is the case with yours—whether "one chances to think it correct or not."

The second head is—but I can give it entirely in the words of Mr Veitch himself. "It would be as well," this is written by him on the proof-sheet with reference to my § 9, "not to identify me with Kant "in any way. I am no Kantist."

I felt I could not do less than make these things known.

GENERAL APPENDIX
TO THE
EXAMINATION OF ANTITHEOS.

GENERAL APPENDIX, No. I.

AN ARGUMENT, *A PRIORI*,
FOR
THE BEING AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

BOOK I.

PART I.

PROPOSITION I. *Infinity of Extension is necessarily existing.*

§ 1. For even when the mind endeavours to remove from it the idea of Infinity of Extension, it cannot, after all its efforts, avoid leaving still there, the idea of such infinity. Let there be ever so much endeavour to displace this idea, that is, conceive Infinity of Extension non-existent; every one, by a review, or reflex examination of his own thoughts, will find, it is utterly beyond his power to do so.

§ 2. Now, since even when we would remove Infinity of Extension out of our mind, we prove, it must exist by necessarily leaving the thought of it behind, or, by substituting, (so to speak,) Infinity of Extension for Infinity of Extension taken away; from this, it is manifest, Infinity of Extension is necessarily existing: For, every thing the

existence of which we *cannot but* believe, which we *always suppose*, even though we *would not*, is necessarily existing.

§ 3. To deny that Infinity of Extension exists, is, therefore, an utter contradiction. Just as much a contradiction as 'this, 1. is equal to 1. therefore, 1. is *not* equal to 1. but to 2.: 2. not being identical with 1.† As thus: Infinity of Extension is ever present to the mind, though we desire to banish it; therefore, it can be removed from the mind. This is just an *application* of the greatest of all contradictions, A thing can be, and not be, at the same time.

PROPOSITION II. *Infinity of Extension is necessarily indivisible.*

§ 1. That is, its parts are necessarily indivisible from each other.

§ 2. *Indivisible* in this proposition means indivisible *either really or mentally*: For there can be no objection to a *real*, which does not apply to a *mental* divisibility; and a *mental* divisibility, we are under the necessity of supposing, implies an *actual* divisibility, or Infinity of Extension.

§ 3. The parts, then, of Infinity of Extension are necessarily indivisible from each other really or mentally.

§ 4. For that which is divisible really, may be divided really: and a thing which is actually *divided* from another must have *superficies* of its own, every way, and be *removed* or *separated* from that other thing, be it by ever so little a distance. If any one should say that things really divided from each other have not real superficies of their own, every way; to be able to believe him, we must first be able to believe this, that a thing can be, and not be, at the same time: And if any one should say that things which are really divided from each other, which have real superficies of their own every way, can possibly be conceived without a certain distance, however little, being between them; as this, it could as soon be believed that in a good syllogism of the first figure, the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises. Being really divided, and being really separated, mean, thus, the same thing.‡

† A contradiction which we can *no more* believe than that 1. is equal to 1. therefore 1. is not equal to 1. &c.

‡ A division by *mathematical lines*, (which are lines of length without breadth.) of the *real existence* of Infinity of Extension, does not infer a greater absurdity than a

§ 5. Now, divisibility meaning possibility of separation: As it is an utter contradiction to say, Infinity of Extension can be separated; that is, a part of Infinity of Extension separated, by a certain distance, from Infinity of Extension; *there remaining Infinity of Extension after part of it is taken away*: the part of Infinity of Extension so removed, being removed from the remaining parts to these very same parts; the part, thus, being at rest while it is taken away: the part so moved away, being moved away from itself; it still remaining, inasmuch as there is necessarily Infinity of Extension,^a that is, though moved away, being not moved away: Which could not be, unless it be false, that *whatever is, is*: As it is, thus, an utter contradiction to say Infinity of Extension can be separated, so it is an utter contradiction to say it is not indivisible.

§ 6. The parts of Infinity of Extension being necessarily indivisible from each other; it is a necessary consequence, that that, the parts of which are *divisible from each other*, is not Infinity of Extension; nor any part of it: *part*, in the sense of partial consideration only, for otherwise Infinity of Extension can have no parts.^b

§ 7. Indeed, that *divisibility* implies *finiteness* in extension, in the very notion of it, will be evident to every one who considers the relations of his clear ideas.

COROLLARY from Proposition II. *Infinity of Extension is necessarily immoveable.*

§ 1. That is, its parts are necessarily immoveable among themselves.

§ 2. For, *motion* of parts supposes, of necessity, *separation* of the parts. He who does not see that motion of parts supposes, of necessity, separation of the parts, need never be expected to see that because every A. is equal to B. therefore some B. is equal to A. And Infinity of Extension being necessarily incapable of separation,^c is, therefore, necessarily immoveable, that is, its parts are necessarily immoveable among themselves.

division of a mathematical line by something really existing: if the division by mathematical lines mean any thing more than a *partial apprehension or consideration* of Infinity of Extension; which is allowed to be possible, just as it is possible to consider length without breadth, or depth without breadth, or length.

^a Prop. I. § 2.

^b § 5.

^c Prop. II. § 5.

§ 3. The parts of Infinity of Extension being necessarily immoveable among themselves; it is a *necessary consequence*, that that, the parts of which are *moveable among themselves*, is not Infinity of Extension; nor any part of it: *part*, in the sense of partial consideration only, for otherwise Infinity of Extension can have no parts.^a

§ 4. Indeed, if this, that *divisibility* implies *finiteness* in extension, in the very notion of it, will be evident to every one who considers the relations of his clear ideas; ^b *motion implying divisibility*,^c it is evident that *motion* must imply *finiteness* in extension, in the very notion of it, to every one who considers the relations of his clear ideas.

PROPOSITION III. *There is necessarily a Being of Infinity of Extension.*

§ 1. For, *either*, Infinity of Extension subsists, or, (which is the same thing,) we conceive it to subsist, without a support or substratum: *or*, it subsists not, or we conceive it not to subsist, without a support or substratum.

§ 2. First, If Infinity of Extension subsist without a substratum, then, it is a *substance*. And if any one should deny, that it is a substance, it so subsisting; to prove, beyond contradiction, the utter absurdity of such denial, we have but to defy him to show, *why* Infinity of Extension is not a substance, *so far forth as it can subsist by itself, or without a substratum*.

§ 3. As, therefore, it is a contradiction to deny that Infinity of Extension exists,^d so there is, on the supposition of its being able to subsist without a substratum, a *substance* or *being* of Infinity of Extension necessarily existing: Tho' Infinity of Extension and the being of Infinity of Extension, are *not different*, as standing to each other in the relation of mode and subject of the mode, but *are identical*.

§ 4. Secondly, If Infinity of Extension subsist not without a Substratum, then, it being a contradiction to deny there is Infinity of Extension,^d it is a contradiction to deny there is a Substratum to it.

§ 5. Whether or not men will consent to call this Substratum *Substance* or *Being*, is of very little consequence For, 'tis certain that the

^a Prop. II. § 5.

^b Prop. II. § 7.

^c § 2.

^d Prop. I. § 3.

word *Substance* or *Being*, has never been employed, can never be employed, to stand for any thing *more*, at least, than the Substratum of Infinity of Extension. But to refuse to give such Substratum that name, *being a thing obviously most unreasonable*, let us call the Substratum of Infinity of Extension, by the name *Substance* or *Being*.

§ 6. There is, then, necessarily, a *Being* of Infinity of Extension^a

PROPOSITION IV. *The Being of Infinity of Extension is necessarily of unity and simplicity.*

§ 1. Because Infinity of Extension is necessarily indivisible,^a therefore it is of the *truest unity*. For to affirm that tho' it is necessarily indivisible, even so much as by thought, yet it is not of the truest unity, is to affirm what is no more intelligible than would be the assertion, *that a circle*, this being a figure contained by one line, with every part of that line or circumference equally distant from a certain point, *is not round*.

§ 2. And as Infinity of Extension is necessarily of the truest unity, so it is necessarily of the *utmost simplicity*. What more can be included in simplicity than is implied in unity caused by a thing being necessarily indivisible, we can have no conception.

§ 3. And as, on the supposition that Infinity of Extension subsists by itself, there is necessarily a being of Infinity of Extension,^b so, this supposed, that being is necessarily of unity and simplicity.

§ 4. If Infinity of Extension subsist not without a Substratum; that we cannot, without an express contradiction, deny, that the Substratum is of the truest unity, and utmost simplicity, may be most easily demonstrated.

§ 5. For it is *intuitively evident*, that the Substratum of Infinity of Extension can be no more divisible than Infinity of Extension itself. If any one should affirm that tho' Infinity of Extension is necessarily indivisible, yet that its Substratum can be considered as divisible, we could no more assent to the proposition than we could believe that a subject can never be truly predicated of itself. And, therefore, as Infinity of Extension is necessarily indivisible,^a so is its Substratum.

^a Prop. II. § 5.

^b Prop. III. § 3.

§ 6. And Infinity of Extension being necessarily of unity and simplicity because necessarily indivisible,^a its Substratum is so likewise, for the same reason.

§ 7. And as, on the supposition that Infinity of Extension subsists not without a Substratum, there is necessarily a Being of Infinity of Extension,^b so, this supposed, that Being is necessarily of unity and simplicity.

§ 8. The Being of Infinity of Extension is necessarily, then, *of unity and simplicity*.

§ 9. The Substratum of Infinity of Extension being necessarily indivisible,^c that is, its parts being necessarily indivisible from each other: It is a corollary, that its parts (*parts*, in the sense of partial consideration only,^c) are necessarily immoveable among themselves: For the same reason that Infinity of Extension is necessarily immoveable because necessarily indivisible.

§ 10. Therefore, that, the parts of which are divisible from each other, is not the Substratum of Infinity of Extension, nor any part of it: And, that, the parts of which are moveable among themselves is not the Substratum, nor any part of it: *Part* in the sense of partial consideration only.^c

SCHOLIUM I. — § 1. If, then, it should be maintained, that the Material Universe is the Substratum of Infinity of Extension; (which will be maintained, as is most evident, if it be contended that the Material Universe is of Infinity of Extension;) to put to the proof, whether or not the Material Universe can be such Substratum, we have but to ask, Are the parts of the Material Universe divisible from each other? and, Are they moveable among themselves? For, if they be so divisible, if so moveable, then the Material Universe cannot be the Substratum of Infinity of Extension.^d

§ 2. Now, we know, *of a certainty*, that some parts of the Material Universe are *divisible from each other*; and, as far as we know, every part of it to which our mind could be directed is as divisible, as are the parts which we certainly know are divisible: and this is the conclusion to which, by the rules of philosophy, we are entitled to come.

^a § 1 & 2.

^b Prop. III. § 5.

^c § 5.

^d Prop. IV. § 10.

§ 3. Therefore, the Material Universe cannot be the Substratum of Infinity of Extension.

§ 4. Again, *we are certain*, that some parts of the Material Universe are *moveable among themselves*; and, that every part of it to which our mind could be directed is as moveable, as are the parts which we certainly know are moveable, is, (here, as in the other case,) what we are entitled to conclude.

§ 5. Therefore, again, the Material Universe cannot be the Substratum of Infinity of Extension.

§ 6. And, if, because the parts of the Material Universe are *divisible from each other*, it is proved that it is not the Substratum of Infinity of Extension; then, because the parts of the material Universe are *divisible from each other, and moveable among themselves*, it is proved, *much more*, (if that were possible,) that the Material Universe is not the Substratum of Infinity of Extension. It is proved that the Material Universe is not the Substratum of Infinity of Extension; nor any part thereof, for the substratum of Infinity of Extension can have no parts but in the sense of partial consideration:^a that is, that the Material Universe is finite in extension. For were it of Infinity of Extension, it would be the Substratum thereof. But it being not that Substratum: Therefore, it is not of Infinity of Extension.

§ 7. The Material Universe, then, is finite in extension.

SCHOLIUM II.—§ 1. The parts of Infinity of Extension, or of its Substratum, if it have a Substratum, being necessarily indivisible from each other,^b and immoveable among themselves:^c and the parts of the Material Universe being divisible from each other, and moveable among themselves: and it, therefore, following that the Material Universe is not the Substratum of Infinity of Extension, but is finite in extension: Here are two sorts of extension. The one sort, that which the Material Universe has: And the other, the extension of Infinity of Extension. And *as* Infinity of Extension is necessarily existing,^d and *as* the extension of the Material Universe must exist, if it exist, in the extension of Infinity of Extension; a part of this, or of its Substratum, if it have a Substratum, (*part*, but in the sense of partial considera-

^a Prop. IV. § 5.

^b Prop. II. § 5, & Prop. IV § 5.

^c Coroll. from Prop. II. § 2, & Prop. IV. § 4.

^d Prop. I. § 2.

tion;^a) must *penetrate* the Material Universe, and every atom, even the minutest atom, of it.

§ 2. It will be proper, therefore, to distinguish between these two kinds of extension. And, accordingly, let us confine to *matter*, namely, to the distance of the extremities of matter from each other, the name *extension*; and apply to the extension of Infinity of Extension, a part of which, (*part*, but in the sense of partial consideration,^b) penetrates all matter to the minutest atom, the name *Expansion*.

§ 3. And, therefore, every thing which hath been proved to be true in relation to that extension which matter has not, must be true with regard to Expansion.

PROPOSITION V. *There is necessarily but one Being of infinity of Expansion.*

§ 1. For Infinity of Expansion either subsists by itself, or it subsists not without a Substratum.^c In both cases there is necessarily a Being of Infinity of Expansion.^d Now we are under a necessity of inferring from the existence of such a Being, that there is *but one such Being*.

§ 2. For, as 'tis evident, *there can be but one infinity of Expansion*, so, on the supposition that it subsists by itself, and so is a being,^e there can be but one being of Infinity of Expansion. And, as 'tis evident *there can no more be more than one Substratum* of Infinity of Expansion, (whatever that Substratum is,) than there can be more than one Infinity of Expansion; and as, therefore, 'tis evident, there can be but one Substratum of Infinity of Expansion: so, on the supposition that Infinity of Expansion subsists not without a Substratum, or Being,^f there can be but one Being of Infinity of Expansion.

§ 3. And, therefore, any one that asserts he can suppose two or more necessarily existing beings, each of infinity of Expansion, is no more to be argued with than one that denies, Whatever is, is. The denying of this proposition cannot, indeed, be regarded as more curious than the affirming of the other.

§ 4. There is then, necessarily, *but one Being of Infinity of Expansion*.

^a Prop. II. § 5, & Prop. IV. § 5.

^c Prop. III. § 1, compared with Schol. II. § 3.

^e Prop. III. § 3, & Schol. II. § 3.

^b Prop. II. § 5.

^d Prop. III. § 3—4, 5, & Schol. II. § 3.

^f Prop. III. § 4, 5, & Schol. II. § 3.

PART II.

PROPOSITION I. *Infinity of Duration is necessarily existing.*

§ 1. The truth of this is evident from the same sort of consideration as shows there is necessarily Infinity of Extension; to wit, that even when we endeavour to remove from our mind the idea of Infinity of Duration, we cannot, after all our efforts, avoid leaving this idea still there. Endeavour as much as we may to displace the idea, that is, conceive Infinity of Duration non-existent, we shall find, after a review of our thoughts, that to do so is utterly beyond our power.

§ 2. And since, even when we would remove Infinity of Duration from the mind, we necessarily leave the thought of it behind, or substitute, (as it were,) Infinity of Duration for Infinity of Duration taken away; 'tis manifest that Infinity of Duration is necessarily existing: Because, (as already said,) every thing the existence of which we *cannot but believe*, which we *always suppose*, even though we *would not*, is necessarily existing.

PROPOSITION II. *Infinity of Duration is necessarily indivisible.*

§ 1. To wit, its parts are necessarily indivisible from each other: *indivisible really or mentally.*

§ 2. For, (as laid down before,) what is divisible may be divided; and that which is *divided* from something else must have *superficies*, every way, and be *separated* from the other thing, be the distance ever so small:—There is no difference between being divided and being separated.

§ 3. Then divisibility meaning possibility of separation: Because the parts of Infinity of Duration are necessarily inseparable, they are necessarily indivisible.

COROLLARY from Proposition II. *Infinity of Duration is necessarily immoveable.*

§ 1. To wit, its parts are necessarily immoveable among themselves.

§ 2. For motion of the parts of Infinity of Duration, necessarily supposes separation of its parts. And its parts being necessarily incapable of separation,^a are, therefore, necessarily immoveable among themselves.

PROPOSITION III. *There is necessarily a Being of Infinity of Duration.*

§ 1. For, *either*, Infinity of Duration exists, or is conceived to exist, without a substratum: *or*, it exists not, or is conceived not to exist, without a substratum.

§ 2. And if Infinity of Duration exist not without a substratum, this, itself, exists without a substratum: For which no other reason need be assigned but this, that what can be meant by the substratum of the Substratum of Infinity of Duration, is quite beyond our comprehension.

§ 3. First, If Infinity of Duration exist by itself, it is a *substance*. For should any one deny that it is a substance, if it so exist; we shall prove, past contradiction, the absurdity of the denial by just demanding, what is the reason *why* Infinity of Duration is not a substance *if it exist without a substratum, or by itself*.

§ 4. And, therefore, as there is necessarily Infinity of Duration,^b there is, supposing it to exist by itself, a *substance* or *being* of Infinity of Duration necessarily existing: Infinity of Duration and the being of Infinity of Duration *being identical, not different*.

§ 5. Secondly, If Infinity of Duration exist not without a Substratum, there is a *Substance* or *Being* of Infinity of Duration. For the word *Substance* or *Being* can never, it is certain, stand for any thing *more*, at least, than such Substratum.

§ 6. And as Infinity of Duration is necessarily existing,^b so there is

^a Part II. Prop. II. § 3.

^b Part II. Prop. I. § 2.

necessarily a Substance or Being of Infinity of Duration, on the supposition that it exists not without a Substratum.

§ 7. There is necessarily, then, a *Being* of Infinity of Duration.

PROPOSITION IV. *The Being of Infinity of Duration is necessarily of unity and simplicity.*

§ 1. As Infinity of Duration is necessarily indivisible,^a so it is necessarily of the truest *unity*. For, if what is necessarily indivisible, even by thought, be not of the truest unity, what unity consists in is altogether unintelligible.

§ 2. And because Infinity of Duration is necessarily of the truest unity, it is, also, of the utmost *simplicity*. We can have no conception, (as has been already said,) of what is in simplicity that is not in unity caused by a thing being necessarily Indivisible.

• § 3. And as there necessarily is a being of Infinity of Duration, on the supposition that Infinity of Duration exists without a substratum,^b so, this supposed, the being is necessarily of unity and simplicity.

§ 4. If Infinity of Duration exist not without a Substratum; that the Substratum is of the truest unity and utmost simplicity, is a thing not difficult to be demonstrated.

§ 5. For that the substratum of Infinity of Duration is no more divisible than Infinity of Duration, is a *self-evident* truth. Therefore, because Infinity of Duration is necessarily indivisible,^a so is the substratum.

§ 6. And Infinity of Duration, because necessarily indivisible, being necessarily of unity and simplicity,^c its substratum, for the same reason, is so likewise.

§ 7. And as there necessarily is a Being of Infinity of Duration, on the supposition that Infinity of Duration exists not without a Substratum,^d so, this supposed, the Being is necessarily of unity and simplicity.

§ 8. The Being of Infinity of Duration is, then, necessarily of *unity* and *simplicity*.

^a Part II. Prop. II. § 8.

^c § 1 & 2.

Part II. Prop. III. § 4.

Part II. Prop. III. § 6.

§ 9. The Substratum of Infinity of Duration being necessarily indivisible,^a that is, its parts being necessarily indivisible from each other, it is a *necessary consequence*, that the thing, the parts of which are *divisible from each other*, is not such Substratum, nor any part thereof.

§ 10. It is a corollary from the proposition, The parts of the Substratum of Infinity of Duration are necessarily indivisible from each other, that they are necessarily immoveable among themselves: For the same reason that Infinity of Duration is necessarily immoveable, because necessarily indivisible.

§ 11. And the parts of the Substratum of Infinity of Duration being necessarily immoveable among themselves; it is a *necessary consequence*, that the thing, the parts of which are *moveable among themselves*, is not such Substratum, nor any part thereof.

SCHOLIUM I.—§ 1. If, then, it should be contended, that a Succession of Beings finite in extension; *finite in extension*, for a Succession of Beings of Infinity of Extension were we know not what; is the Substratum of Infinity of Duration, or any part thereof; (which will be contended, if it be maintained that any Succession of Beings is of Infinity of Duration. For, if any Succession of Beings be of Infinity of Duration, then, Infinity of Duration *cannot be without the succession*. And, 'tis utterly impossible to conceive any reason why *we can have come* to the conclusion, that Infinity of Duration cannot be without a Succession of Beings, but this, because the Succession is the Substratum thereof, or, at least, a part of the Substratum.) If it be contended that a Succession of Beings is the Substratum of Infinity of Duration, or a part thereof; to put to the proof whether or not such a Succession can be that Substratum, or any part of it, we have but to ask, Are the parts of the Succession divisible from each other? and, Are they moveable among themselves? For if they be so divisible and moveable, then the Succession cannot be the substratum of Infinity of Duration, nor any part thereof,^b the Substratum having no parts in the sense of capability of separation.^c

§ 2. Now, 'tis as clear as any thing can be, that the parts of a succession of beings are not only divisible, but are *divided, from each other*.

^a § 5.

^b Part II. Prop. IV. § 9 & 11.

^c Part II. Prop. IV. § 5.

§ 3. Then, no succession of beings can be the Substratum of Infinity of Duration, or any part of it.

§ 4. Again, 'tis clear, that the parts of a succession of beings are not only moveable, but *moved, among themselves.*

§ 5. Then, no succession of beings can be the Substratum of Infinity of Duration, or any part of it.

§ 6. That is, no succession of beings is of Infinity of Duration. For were a succession of beings of Infinity of Duration, it would be the substratum thereof, or, at least, a part of the substratum. But it being not that Substratum, nor any part of it: Therefore, it is not of Infinity of Duration.

§ 7. Every succession, then, of beings is finite in duration.

SCHOLIUM II.—§ 1. Again, should it be contended that the Material Universe is the Substratum of Infinity of Duration, or any part thereof; (which will be contended, if it be maintained that the Material Universe is of Infinity of Duration: For the same reason that it will be contended, that a Succession of Beings is the Substratum of Infinity of Duration, or a part thereof, if it be maintained that any Succession of Beings is of Infinity of Duration.) Should it be contended that the Material Universe is the Substratum of Infinity of Duration, or a part thereof; to put to the proof whether or not the Material Universe can be such Substratum, or a part thereof, we have but to ask, Are the parts of the Material Universe divisible from each other? and, Are they moveable among themselves? For if they be so divisible and moveable, the Material Universe cannot be the Substratum of Infinity of Duration, nor any part thereof,^a the Substratum having no parts in the sense of capability of separation.^b

§ 2. Now, we *know, certainly*, that some parts of the Material Universe, are *divisible from each other*; and that every part of it to which our mind could be directed is as divisible, as are the parts which we certainly know are divisible, is, (as already said,) the conclusion to which the rules of philosophy entitle us to come.

§ 3. Then, the Material Universe cannot be the Substratum of Infinity of Duration, nor any part thereof.

§ 4. Again, we *know, certainly*, that some parts of the Material Uni-

^a Part II. Prop. IV. § 9 & 11.

^b Part II. Prop. IV. § 5.

verse are *moveable among themselves*; and that every part of it to which our mind could be directed is as moveable, as are the parts which we certainly know are moveable, is, (in this, as well as in the other case,) the conclusion to which we are entitled to come.

§ 5. Then, again, the Material Universe cannot be the Substratum of Infinity of Duration, nor any part thereof.

§ 6. That is, the Material Universe is finite in duration. For, were it of Infinity of Duration, it would be the substratum thereof, or, at least, a part of the substratum. But, it being not that Substratum, nor any part of it: Therefore, it is not of Infinity of Duration.

§ 7. The Material Universe is, then, finite in duration.

PROPOSITION V. *There is, necessarily, but one Being of Infinity of Duration.*

§ 1. For, Infinity of Duration either exists without a substratum, or, it exists not without a Substratum, which itself exists without a substratum:^a And in either case, there necessarily is a Being of Infinity of Duration, which exists without a Substratum.^b And we are under the necessity of inferring from the existence of such a Being, that there can be *no more than one such Being*.

§ 2. For, because, 'tis manifest *there can be but one Infinity of Duration*, therefore, on the supposition, that it exists without a substratum, and, so, is a being,^c there can be but one being of Infinity of Duration. And because 'tis as manifest *there can be but one Substratum of Infinity of Duration*, as that there can be but one Infinity of Duration, and because, therefore, 'tis manifest there can be but one such Substratum: therefore, on the supposition that Infinity of Duration exists not without a Substratum, or Being,^d there can be but one Being of Infinity of Duration.

§ 3. But, suppose, that from the truth, that there is one necessarily existing Being of Infinity of Duration, which exists by itself, or without a Substratum, it did not follow, that there can be *but one* such Being. Now, this supposition, would amount to this; *that there is one*

^a Part II. Prop. III. § 1 & 2.

^c Part II. Prop. III. § 4.

^b Part II. Prop. III. § 4 & 6.

^d Part II. Prop. III. § 5.

necessarily existing Being of Infinity of Duration which exists without a Substratum, to wit, without any other Being *as a substratum*—and if without any other Being as a Substratum, then, much more, (if that be possible,) without any other Being, *if this be not* the substratum: that is, without any other Being *at all*: to wit, without the *necessity* of any other Being *at all*: But, *that* there may be another necessarily existing Being of Infinity of Duration which exists without a Substratum, to wit, without any other Being as a substratum—and if *without* any other Being *as a substratum*, then, much more, (if that be possible,) without any other Being, *if this be not* the substratum: that is, without any other Being, *at all*: to wit, without the *necessity* of any other Being *at all*: And so on: Which would be, in effect, saying, there is *not* a necessarily existing Being of Infinity of Duration *at all*;—tho' there *is* a necessarily existing Being of Infinity of Duration. And this contradiction following from the supposing, that from the proposition, there is one necessarily existing Being of Infinity of Duration, which exists by itself, or without a substratum, it did not follow, that there can be but one such Being; it is proved, that the supposition is absurd.

§ 4. There is, then, necessarily, *but one* Being of Infinity of Duration.

PART III.

PROPOSITION I. *There is, necessarily, a Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration.*

§ 1. This will be made out, if it be proved, that the necessarily existing Being of Infinity of Expansion, and the necessarily existing Being of Infinity of Duration, are not different Beings, but are identical.

§ 2. Now, either *first*, Infinity of Expansion subsists by itself, and, then, it is a being:^a and, Infinity of Duration subsists by itself, and, then, it is a being.^b

§ 3. Or, *secondly*, Infinity of Expansion subsists not without a Substratum, or Being:^c and, Infinity of Duration subsists not without^a a Substratum, or Being.^d

^a Part I. Prop. III. § 1 & 3, compared with Schol. II. § 3.

^b Part II. Prop. III. § 1 & 4.

^c Part I. Prop. III. § 1 & 5, & Schol. II. § 3.

^d Part II. Prop. III. § 1 & 5.

§ 4. First. Every part of Infinity of Expansion is in every part of Infinity of Duration: That is, every part of the being of Infinity of Expansion is in every part of the being of Infinity of Duration: *Part*, in all the cases, in the sense of partial consideration only.

§ 5. To wit, the whole of the being of Infinity of Expansion is in the whole of the being of Infinity of Duration: *whole*, but as a *figure*.

§ 6. And this being, most manifestly, impossible, if the being of Infinity of Expansion and the being of Infinity of Duration be different; it necessarily follows, that they are identical.

§ 7. That is, *on this supposition*, Infinity of Expansion is Infinity of Duration, and Infinity of Duration is Infinity of Expansion. Which conclusion being plainly absurd; and it necessarily following from the supposition, that *Infinity of Expansion subsists by itself*, and that *Infinity of Duration subsists by itself*, it is proved, that the supposition itself is absurd. Therefore, Infinity of Expansion *cannot* exist by itself, and Infinity of Duration *cannot* exist by itself.

§ 8. Then, secondly, Infinity of Expansion subsists not without a Substratum or Being: and Infinity of Duration subsists not without a Substratum or Being.

§ 9. And, as every part of Infinity of Expansion is in every part of Infinity of Duration, therefore, every part of the Substratum of Infinity of Expansion, is in every part of the Substratum of Infinity of Duration: *part*, but in the sense of partial consideration.

§ 10. That is, the whole of the Substratum of Infinity of Expansion is in the whole of the Substratum of Infinity of Duration: *whole*, but as a *figure*.

§ 11. And this being most manifestly impossible, if the Substratum, or Being, of Infinity of Expansion, and the Substratum, or Being, of Infinity of Duration, be different, it follows necessarily, that they are identical: To wit, the Substratum, or Being, of Infinity of Expansion is, also, the Substratum, or Being, of Infinity of Duration.

§ 12. And this being proved, it is made out, there is necessarily, a Being of Infinity of Expansion, and Infinity of Duration.^a

§ 13. There is, then, necessarily, a *Being* of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration.

PROPOSITION II. *The Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, of unity and simplicity.*

§ 1. For the Being of Infinity of Expansion is, necessarily, of unity and simplicity.^a And, the Being of Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, of unity and simplicity.^b And these two being not different but identical,^c it follows, that the Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, of unity and simplicity.

§ 2. The Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration is, then, necessarily, of *unity and simplicity*.



PROPOSITION III. *There is necessarily but one Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration.*

• § 1. For there is, necessarily, but one Being of Infinity of Expansion.^d And the Being of Infinity of Expansion being also the Being of Infinity of Duration,^e it follows, that there is, necessarily, but one Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration.

§ 2. There is, necessarily, then, *but one* Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration.

^a Part I. Prop. IV. § 8, compared with Schol. II. § 8.

^b Part II. Prop. IV. § 8.

^c Part III. Prop. I. § 11.

^d Part I. Prop. V. § 4.

^e Part III. Prop. I. § 11.

BOOK II.

PART I.

PROPOSITION. *The one, simple, Being of Infinity of Expansion and Duration is, necessarily, Intelligent, and All-knowing.*

§ 1. For *there is Intelligence.* And Intelligence either began to be, or it never began to be.

§ 2. That it never began to be, is evident in this, that if it began to be, it must have had a cause; for *whatever begins to be must have a cause.* And the cause of Intelligence must be of Intelligence; for *what is not of Intelligence cannot make Intelligence begin to be.* Now, Intelligence being, before Intelligence began to be, is a contradiction. And this absurdity following from the supposition, *that Intelligence began to be,* it is proved, that Intelligence never began to be: To wit, is of Infinity of Duration.

§ 3. And as Intelligence is of Infinity of Duration, and it supposes a *Being*: And no succession of Beings is of Infinity of Duration:^a It necessarily follows that there is one Being of Infinity of Duration which is of *Intelligence.* And as there is but one Being of Infinity of Duration:^b and this Being is of simplicity:^c and is also of Infinity of Expansion:^d It follows, that the one, simple, Being of Infinity of Expansion and Duration is necessarily of Intelligence.

§ 4. And that this Being is *All-knowing,* is *no inference* from the proposition, that the one, simple, Being of Infinity of Expansion and Duration is necessarily of Intelligence, for it is, indeed, *implied* by such proposition: A Being of Intelligence who is of Infinity of Expansion and Duration, is convertible with an All-knowing, or All-wise Being.

§ 5. The one, simple, Being of Infinity of Expansion and Duration, is, then, necessarily *Intelligent, and All-knowing.*

^a Book I. Part II. Schol. I. § 7.

^c Book I. Part II. Prop. IV. § 8.

^b Book I. Part II. Prop. V. § 4.

^d Book I. Part III. Prop. I. § 11.

PART II.

PROPOSITION. *The one, simple, Being of Infinity of Expansion and Duration, that is of Intelligence, or is All-knowing, is, necessarily, All-powerful.*

§ 1. This will be made out, if it be proved, that the Being of Infinity of Expansion and Duration *has some power*, and if there can be nothing external to this Being to restrain his acting.

§ 2. It will be proved, that that Being has some power, if it be proved, that he *made matter begin to be*.

§ 3. Then, as the Material Universe is finite in duration,^a or began to be, it must have had a cause: for, *Whatever begins to be must have a cause*. And as this cause must be the one, simple, Being of Infinity of Expansion and Duration, that is of Intelligence, or is All-knowing: Therefore it is proved, this Being has some power.^b And, it is most clear, there can be nothing external to that Being to restrain his acting.

§ 4. And this being clear, and it being proved that the one, simple, Being of Infinity of Expansion and Duration, that is of Intelligence, or is All-knowing, has some power; it is made out, that this Being is, necessarily, All-powerful.^c

§ 5. The one, simple, Being of Infinity of Expansion and Duration, is, then, necessarily, *All-powerful*.

PART III.

PROPOSITION. *The one, simple, Being of Infinity of Expansion and Duration, that is of Intelligence, or is All-knowing, and All-powerful, is, necessarily, Free.*

§ 1. This will be made out, if it be proved, that the Being of Infinity of Expansion and Duration *made motion begin to be*.

§ 2. Motion implies a substance moved. Now, 'tis obvious that a substance of Infinity of Extension is immoveable. Therefore, a sub-

^a Book I. Part II. Schol. II. § 6.

^b § 2.

^c § 1.

stance which is moved must be finite in extension. There are substances now in motion: *Whatever begins to be must have a cause*: No Succession of Substances is of Infinity of Duration:^a The Material Universe is finite in duration:^b Therefore, the moving substances began to be; and so, must have had a cause. And this cause must be the one, simple, Being of Infinity of Expansion and Duration, that is of Intelligence, or is All-knowing, and All-powerful: And, therefore, this Being made moving substances, or motion, begin to be.

§ 3. And this being proved, it is made out, that that Being is, necessarily, Free.^c

§ 4. The one, simple, Being of Infinity of Expansion and Duration, that is of Intelligence, or is All-knowing, and All-powerful, is, then, necessarily, *Free*.

APPENDIX.

“Infinity of Extension is necessarily existing.”—Proposition I.

Let the extension be of space *merely*, or of matter *merely*, or of space and matter *together*. The proposition affirms that there is Infinity of Extension, but affirms nothing more.

“*What is not of Intelligence cannot make Intelligence begin to be.*”—In § 2 of Part i., Book II.

This is laid down as an axiom. But it will not be true *if* Intelligence be the result of figure and motion. And will *this* be true *if* matter, as matter, be intelligent?

o Even supposing Intelligence to be the result of figure and motion; and that all matter thinks: If matter, and figure and motion, be not of Infinity of Duration, they must, themselves, have had a cause, for *Whatever begins to be must have a cause.*

^a Book I. Part II. Schol. I. § 6.

^b Book I. Part II. Schol. II. § 6.

^c § 1.

GENERAL APPENDIX, No. II.

EXTRACT FROM THE "REFUTATION."

"CHAP. VI.

"*Fallacies of Mr Gillespie—'The Argument.'*"†

[1.] "THIS grand argument is laid out in two books. In the first, the metaphysico-theologian endeavours to prove that some being exists which is the *sine qua non* of every other thing in existence. It consists of three parts, or series of propositions, maintaining, first, that Space is this being; second, that Duration is also a being of the same kind; and, third, that these are not different, but identical. The second book ascribes to the subject of the forementioned proofs, the divine attributes of omniscience, unlimited power, and freedom of agency.

[2.] "We cannot afford time—much less can it be expected that others should afford patience—both to make a general analysis of this argument, and examine the reasonings brought up in support of the different parts of it. As, therefore, authors are peculiarly jealous of

† Antitheos did not number his paragraphs. As, when I quote his words, I give not only the chapter but the paragraph; it is requisite that I number his paragraphs for him. To preserve intact, however, the distinction between what is Antitheos's, and what is mine, the figures, now supplied, are enclosed within brackets.

I may seize this opportunity to mention, generally, that, in order that I might not inadvertently on my opponent's words to good purpose, in my reader's eyes, I have always assigned the particular places themselves, wherever they were: the reader, therefore, who wishes to look at the passages in the various chapters of the "Refutation" itself, must turn to the chapters, one after the other, and count the paragraphs for himself.

their privileges, and tetchy and froward with regard to any freedom used in the treatment of their expressions, we shall take the most laborious, and, at the same time, least advantageous way of combating Mr Gillespie's principles,—book by book, and proposition by proposition. This course is the more necessary, as the argument *a priori*, unlike that derived from experience, depends upon a chain of reasoning,—not upon the pointed putting of a single case, or the tautological repetition of a thousand.

[3.] “The first proposition,—‘*Infinity of extension is necessarily existing*,’—it would be absurd in the extreme to deny. No more can we imagine any limit prescribable to extension, than we can imagine the outside of a house to be in the inside of it. The same unqualified assent, however, cannot be accorded to proposition the second; namely, that ‘*Infinity of extension is necessarily indivisible*.’

[4.] “Here, the author has given up his abstract necessity, and looks for something like experiment as alone capable of satisfying him: for, notwithstanding some unmeaning talk, intended to explain away this desertion of his own principles, he evidently insists upon a real division—an actual separation of parts, with some distance, however little, between them, as that which he means by divisibility. If Mr Gillespie pleads not guilty to this charge, I would ask him how mathematicians have always regarded the smallest particle of matter divisible to infinity? Do they ever contemplate actual separation of parts in such cases? No; but parts—as Mr Gillespie himself has it—in the sense of partial consideration only. When they speak of the hemispheres of the earth, divided either by the plane of the equator, or that passing from the meridian of Greenwich to the 180th degree of longitude,—are they necessarily guilty of speaking unintelligibly? If not, how is it that extension is necessarily indivisible?

[5.] “It may be said, perhaps, that although matter is, mentally, easy enough to divide, it is impossible to apply the same process to extension. But is not the space occupied by the earth,—or say, its useful little representative, a twelve or a twenty-inch globe,—as easily conceived to be divisible by a mathematical plane, as the globe itself, which is not really, but only mentally divided? A mathematical point has no dimensions, because whatever possesses dimensions must possess figure, and that which has figure cannot be a point. In like manner, a plane cannot have thickness, since whatever is of the smallest thickness is not a plane but a solid. In dividing space by

abstraction, therefore, there is no *necessity*, as our author would have us believe, of falling into the absurdity of space divided by actual separation of the parts, leaving no space between them.

[6.] "It would be of no great consequence although the second proposition were as irrefragable as the first; for it bears upon nothing at all applicable to any being, whether real or imaginary. But we need not always allow even gratuitous fallacies to escape. The exposure, at least, shows the badness of the cause that renders the adoption of them necessary. If Mr Gillespie's indivisibility be understood in an abstract sense, his proposition is not true; if, in reference to actual experiment, he may be applauded for having recourse to inductive instead of *a priori* reasoning, but he need not so soon have neglected the principles upon which he started, without intimating some ground for the change.

[7.] "A corollary is here introduced, asserting the immoveability of extension. It is true, that either finity or infinity of extension can never be supposed capable of motion. Space cannot be carried out of itself, nor can those parts of it occupied by Mont Blanc, for example, and the Peak of Teneriffe, ever be imagined to change places. To the truth of what is here maintained, therefore, we must give unreserved assent, independent of its nominal connection with the false doctrine immediately going before.

[8.] "But we now come to a proposition which may be said to carry with it all the strength, if it has any, as well as the weakness, of Mr Gillespie's 'Argument.' It is the third in number, and announces that '*There is necessarily a BEING of infinity of extension.*'

[9.] "If we had not already seen that the author's reasoning leads us to conclude that his Being is to be regarded as something substantial, we should have been at a loss what to make of the subject of the above predicate. As a logician would say, it is not distributed. But if we refer to the third division of his introduction, we find him contending that the necessary being must be of the character now ascribed to that subject. At the twenty-third section he avows, that 'It may be laid down as one of those truths which admit of no contradiction, that 'with regard to the uncreated substance, at least, virtue [meaning power, I presume,] cannot be without substance. Speaking of this substance,' the author goes on to say, 'Sir Isaac Newton hath these words,—which may be rendered—'Omnipresence is not by power alone, but also by substance; for *without substance, power cannot possibly subsist.*'

[10.] "Not only, however, is the necessary being of Mr Gillespie said to be a substance, and therefore, by his own and Sir Isaac Newton's showing, possessed of virtue or power, but it has already been designated, 'the intelligent cause of all things.' I am quite aware, that neither intelligence nor power can be demonstrated of any thing *a priori*, which we shall see when this author's reasoning upon those attributes falls in our way. We may, nevertheless, in endeavouring to bear in mind the description of Being, of whom so great things are predicated, avail ourselves of any expression of opinion respecting it, that may be scattered throughout the work. It is only on this account that I have at present alluded to these after-considerations at all.

[11.] "Relative to a Being of this sort, then,—at all events, relative to a substantial being, the truth of the predicate is what we have now to try. The evidence in support of the third proposition is stated in the form of a dilemma. 'Either infinity of extension subsists, or, (which is the same thing), we conceive it to subsist, without a support or substratum; or, it subsists not, or we conceive it not to subsist, without support or substratum. First, If infinity of extension subsist without a substratum, then it is a substance.—Secondly, If infinity of extension subsist not without a substratum, then, it being a contradiction to deny there is infinity of extension, it is a contradiction to deny there is a substratum to it.'

[12.] "The conclusion deduced from the latter alternative, besides appearing lame and impotent, is somewhat laughable. But allowing it logic to pass, it may be worth while, if only for amusement, to try the force of this, the negative horn of the dilemma, by ascertaining what it is made of.—The primary signification of the word substratum is, a thing lying under something else. Supposing, for instance, a bed of gravel to lie under the soil, gravel is the substratum of that soil; if there be sandstone below that, the sandstone is the substratum of the gravel; if coal be found beneath the rock, coal is the substratum of it, and so on as far as we can penetrate. To say, therefore, that space must have a substratum, is nothing less than saying that it must have something to rest upon; something to hold it up. That is,—Space must have limits; and there must be something in existence beyond its limits to keep it from falling out of itself! If this be not the acme of absurdity, a ship falling overboard, as our sailors' jest goes, is no longer a joke; and the clown who boasted that he could swallow himself, boasted of nothing that he might not be reasonably be expected to perform."

[13.] “Should it be contended that the term ought to be understood in its secondary acceptation, and that the substratum of the infinity of extension subsists within itself, as any material body is said to be the substratum of its own extension:—I would remark, that we know of nothing possessing extension except matter,—nothing else that can stand as an object to which extension may be ascribed as a property; and that matter, not existing by mathematical, but only by physical necessity, cannot be the substratum referred to. Hence it is evident that, in material bodies, comprising all that we *do* know, or *can* know of Being, it is impossible to find anything that will serve Mr Gillespie’s purpose. Even this impossibility overlooked, however, what is it that next meets our view?—One substance occupying infinite extension, and another occupying part of this extension, if not also the whole of it; in other words, two things at the same time occupying the same space. Theology always entangles its advocates in inextricable absurdities.

[14.] “A religious friend who has corresponded with me upon this point, alleges that the substance of the substratum of infinite extension is not material; but this is mere babble; something he has been taught to repeat,—not the dictate of his sounder judgment. Substance and matter are the same. The words are synonymous and convertible. When used otherwise they become unintelligible; inasmuch as we might then talk of an unsubstantial substance and immaterial matter.

[15.] “But, to refer to the first proposition,—has it not been demonstrated that infinity of extension exists necessarily?—that it exists, *per se*, by the most abstract and metaphysical necessity? In what sort of predicament, then, must that reasoning appear, which gives up a leading and universally admitted truth by placing it in a questionable position? Mr Gillespie’s dilemma recognises, at least, the possibility of infinite extension requiring a substratum to support it—infinite extension which is itself necessary! How is this? Was it found that although Space possessed a few of the divine attributes, it did not possess all, nor any thing like all that were deemed needful to constitute a respectable deity? Notwithstanding appearances, I should hope not. But, at any rate, we are again landed in a quagmire of absurdity—the absurdity of supposing a thing to be dependent and independent at the same time. If Space must be conceived *a priori* necessary, to talk of a substratum being necessary in the same sense of the word is nonsense: on the other hand, if it stands in need of a substratum, the

foundation stone of this great argument must crumble into dust, and be unfit to serve as a substratum to anything.

[16.] "But if we are dissatisfied with the author's substratum, we are not much better situated with the alternative left us; for according to the dilemma he has imposed upon us, we are obliged to conclude that infinity of extension is itself a substance. I had thought infinity a mere nominal adjunct allowed to space, from the circumstance of our being unable to conceive limits to its extent; but the theist, it seems, thinks otherwise. Infinity, with him, must be a substance. On the same ground, we might contend that finity is a substance too. Supposing, however, that space infinitely extended is what he means, all that we can say is, that if it be a substance it is no longer space, or extension, or any thing else than,—just a substance;—unless it may be both extension and substance at the same moment. But these are profane thoughts. Perhaps according to the new school of theology, not only may a book be a substance, but its extension may also be a substance, its weight another, its colour a third, and so forth. Let us hear, however, how the divine theory of infinity of extension being a substance is to be sustained.—Mark with what boldness of reasoning it is brought out. The infidel must look well to his footing and points of defence, lest he be laid prostrate by its overwhelming force.

[17.] "If any one should deny that it is a substance, it so subsisting, [that is, without a support or substratum;] 'to prove beyond contradiction the utter absurdity of such denial, we have but to defy him to show why infinity of extension is not a substance, so far forth as it can subsist by itself or without a substratum.'

[18.] "A new era has thus dawned upon logic. A grand discovery is on the eve of rendering her power irresistible, and her reign everlasting and glorious. It is to be henceforth no longer necessary for us to prove an affirmative: assert what we may, no one dare deny our assertions. For to prove beyond contradiction the utter absurdity of such denial, we have only to put a brave face on it, and throw a defiance in the teeth of our opponent to prove the negative.

[19.] "But waiving, in the meantime, our plea of want of evidence for the affirmative, a simple man would say in relation to the case before us, that substance possesses attraction, which extension does not; that it is observed under a thousand varieties of figure, density, colour, motion, taste, odour, combustion, crystallization, &c., which neither extension nor infinity ever is, or can in its nature be. He might, in

his deplorable ignorance, ask if ever infinity was weighed, or extension analysed and its elements reduced to gas? This would, I dare say, only evince in the eyes of the theologian, that such a person had no idea of the very convenient art of applying metaphysical language to things physical; whereby a mere abstraction, or at most a property of something else, can so easily be charmed into a reality. His showing why infinity of extension is not a substance, therefore, would be set down as grovelling and common-place, and, by consequence, useless.

[20.] "After all, however, how does the notable proposition stand, that there is necessarily a Being of infinity of extension? The principle of the argument brought up in support of it—the dilemma, in short—gives way on every side. It stands without a vestige of backing, except from the vain and swelling words of a blustering defiance, the value of which no one but a fool could be at a loss to estimate.

* [21.] "The author himself, indeed, seems not half sure of having made good the doctrine he has announced: for after having done all he could do, by the foisting in of a substratum upon extension to the destruction of its necessary existence,—he comforts himself with the reflection, that it is of very little consequence whether men will or will not consent to call this substratum by the name of being or substance, because 'tis certain that the word substance or being, has never been employed, can never be employed, to stand for anything more, at least, than the substratum of infinity of extension.' It is, of course, of no manner of importance whether men consent to do what they always have done and must continue to do, or whether they will not. But how far is the because and its certainty consistent with the lurking suspicion of the honoured name of Being or Substance being refused to his unsupported substratum? Yet, on the very heels of this misgiving, he concludes,—'There is, *then*, NECESSARILY, a Being of infinity of extension.' The worthy old father of the church, who declared his belief of a christian dogma because it was impossible, is not far from having a logician of the mathematical school to keep him in countenance. Mr Gillespie frames a most absolute conclusion with his premises dubiously faltering on his lips."

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