

MEMOIRS

OF THE

HISTORY OF FRANCE

DURING THE REIGN OF
NAPOLEON,

DICTATED BY THE EMPEROR

AT SAINT HELENA

TO THE GENERALS WHO SHARED HIS CAPTIVITY;

AND PUBLISHED

FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPTS

CORRECTED BY HIMSELF.

VOL. II.

DICTATED TO GENERAL GOURGAUD,
HIS AIDE-DE-CAMP.



LONDON:

PRINTED FOR HENRY COLBURN AND CO.
AND MARTIN BOSSANGE AND CO.

1823.

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possible Spectateur du

Combat!

(*) L'amiral Villeneuve est brave et bon marin en ce qui demande la
 raison de cette singulière conduite. Il attendait des ordres. On assure
 que l'amiral lui donna celui d'appareiller mais que la fumée l'empêcha
 de l'apercevoir. Mais fallait-il donc un ordre pour prendre part au
 combat et secourir ses camarades ??? L'Orient a sauté à 11 heures.
 Depuis ce temps jusqu'à 2 heures après midi c'est-à-dire pendant 13 heures
 s'est battu. C'est alors Villeneuve qui commandait, mais
 a-t-il rien fait ? Villeneuve était d'un caractère irré- et sans
 énergie.

de l'ordre l'amiral Villeneuve a dit
 pour se justifier, qu'il attendoit
 le signal de l'amiral; on assure
 qu'il ne fut donné
 que les fumées empêchèrent le signal
 d'être vu mais faut-il donc des ordres
 pour prendre part au combat et
 secourir ses camarades ? D'ailleurs d'ordres
 furent donnés à onze heures du soir. Depuis
 ce moment jusqu'à deux heures après
 midi Villeneuve commandait
 l'armée. il ne manquait pas
 d'expérience de la mer, mais il
 manquait de résolution et de vigueur.

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I.—NEGOTIATIONS, 1800.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL Count Saint-Julien arrived at Paris, on the 21st of July, 1800, with a letter from the Emperor of Germany to

the First Consul. He represented himself as a plenipotentiary charged to negotiate, conclude, and sign preliminaries of peace. The Emperor's letter was explicit, and conferred powers, for it contained these expressions: "*You will give credit to what Count Saint-Julien will say to you on my behalf, and I will ratify all his acts.*" The First Consul directed M. de Talleyrand to negotiate with the Austrian plenipotentiary; and the preliminaries were drawn up and signed in a few days. It was thereby agreed that peace should be established on the conditions of the treaty of Campo-Formio; that Austria should receive, in Italy, the indemnities granted to her by that treaty, in Germany; that until the signature of the definitive treaty of peace, the armies of the two powers should remain in the positions they then occupied, both in Italy and in Germany; that the levy *en masse* of the insurgents of Tuscany should not be increased, and that no foreign troops should be landed in that country.

The high rank of the plenipotentiary, the Emperor's letter which he brought, the instructions he declared himself to be charged with, his confident manner, every circumstance, in short, concurred to induce the public to consider the treaty of peace as already signed; but in

August intelligence arrived from Vienna: Count Saint-Julien was disclaimed and recalled: Baron Thugut, the Austrian minister for foreign affairs, declared that by a treaty concluded between England and Austria, the latter had engaged not to treat for peace separately from England, and that the Emperor could not, therefore, ratify Count Saint-Julien's preliminaries; but that his Imperial majesty and the English government were equally desirous of peace, as was proved by the letter written by Lord Minto, the English minister at Vienna, to Baron Thugut. His Lordship said, that England was ready to send a plenipotentiary to negotiate, jointly with the minister for Austria, a definitive peace between those two powers and France.

Under these circumstances the best course for the Republic was to re-commence hostilities. The First Consul, however, was unwilling to neglect any chance of restoring peace with Austria and England; and with that view consented, 1st, to overlook the affront which the Cabinet of Vienna had just offered to the Republic, by disclaiming the preliminaries which had been signed by Count Saint-Julien; 2dly, to admit English and Austrian plenipotentiaries to the congress; and 3dly, to prolong the armis-

tice existing between France and Germany, provided England would consent to a naval armistice; since it was not just that France should treat with two allied powers, whilst a suspension of arms existed with one of them, and hostilities were proceeding with the other.

II.—NAVAL ARMISTICE.

A courier was despatched to M. Otto, who resided at London, as French commissioner for the exchange of prisoners. On the 24th of August, he addressed a note to Lord Grenville, informing him that Lord Minto having declared the intention of the English government to take part in the negotiations about to be opened with Austria, for the conclusion of a definitive peace between Austria and France, the First Consul was willing to admit the English minister to the negotiations; but that this measure would make the work of pacification more difficult; that the interests to be discussed being rendered more numerous and complicated, the negotiations would unavoidably be prolonged; and that it was not consistent with the interest of the Republic, that the armistices concluded at Marengo and Bayarsdorf should be further continued, unless a naval armistice

should also be established by way of compensation.

Lord Minto's despatches had not reached London; and Lord Grenville, much surprised at the receipt of this note, sent the principal of the transport-office to request M. Otto, to furnish the documents on which it was founded; who immediately complied with this request. But the courier of the Cabinet of St. James's soon afterwards arrived from Vienna. Lord Grenville replied to M. Otto, that the idea of an armistice applicable to naval operations was new in the history of nations. He declared, however, that he was ready to send a plenipotentiary to the place which should be specified for holding the congress; and intimating that ~~this~~ plenipotentiary was to be his brother, Thomas Grenville, requested passports to enable him to proceed to France. This was evading the question; but M. Otto, on the 30th of August, demanded a positive answer, before the 3d of September; considering that hostilities were to recommence in Germany and Italy, on the 10th. Lord Grenville, on the 4th, requested to have a proposal in writing, because he did not perfectly understand what was meant by an armistice applicable to naval

French government formally drawn up. The principal stipulations were the following: 1st, ships of war and merchant vessels of both nations shall enjoy free navigation, without being subjected to any kind of visitation; 2dly, the squadrons now blockading the ports of Toulon, Brést, Rochefort, and Cadiz, shall return to their respective ports; 3dly, the maritime fortresses of Malta, Alexandria, and Belle-Isle, shall be placed on a footing with the fortresses of Ulm, Philipsbürg, and Ingolstadt; and all French and neutral vessels shall accordingly be at liberty to enter freely into those ports.

On the 7th of September, Lord Grenville replied, that his Britannic Majesty admitted the principle of a naval armistice, although contrary to the interest of England; that it would be a sacrifice on the part of his Majesty, made for the sake of peace, and for the advantage of Austria, his ally; but that none of the articles in the French proposals were admissible; and he wished the négociations to be founded on a counter-proposal, which he sent. This counter-proposal specified: 1st, Hostilities shall cease by sea; 2dly, the fortresses of Malta, Alexandria, and Belle-Isle, shall be allowed to be supplied with provisions for fourteen days at a time, according to the

number of men of which their respective garrisons may consist; 3dly, the blockade of Brest and the other ports of the French and Allies shall be raised; but none of the ships of war therein shall sail therefrom during the continuance of the armistice; and the English squadrons shall remain in sight of those ports.

The French commissioner, on the 16th of September, replied, that his government left it to the option of his Britannic Majesty, either to let negotiations be opened at Luneville, and the English and Austrian plenipotentiaries be admitted to treat together, the war continuing by land and sea during their negotiations; or to establish an armistice by land and sea; or, finally, to let an armistice be concluded with Austria, and the negotiations at Luneville be carried on with that power only; whilst a peace with England might be treated for at Paris or London, and the maritime war be continued at the same time. He observed that the naval armistice was requisite to indemnify France for what she was losing by the prolongation of the armistice on the continent, during which Austria was recruiting her armies and providing her stores, whilst the impression of the defeats of Marengo and Moeskirch, was at the same time wearing off from the

minds of her soldiers; that during this prolongation, the kingdom of Naples, lately a prey to every species of dissension and calamity, was recovering itself and raising an army; and, lastly, that it was under the protection of the armistice that levies of men were making in Tuscany, and in the marquisate of Ancona.

The victor had conceded all these advantages to the vanquished, only on their formal promise to conclude a separate peace without delay. The benefit France was to derive from a naval armistice, could not consist in supplying the ports of the Republic, which was by no means deficient in internal channels of intercourse, but in the restoration of her communications with Egypt, Malta, and the Isle of France. On the 20th of September, Lord Grenville required fresh explanations; and M. Otto informed him, on the following day, that the First Consul consented to modify his first proposal; that the French and allied squadrons should not be allowed to change their positions during the continuance of the armistice; that, with respect to Malta, no further communications should be authorized than would be necessary to furnish fifteen days' supply of provision at a time, at the rate of ten thousand rations *per diem*; and that Alexandria, not

being blockaded by land, and having provisions in sufficient abundance even to send them to England, France should be at liberty to despatch six frigates from Toulon to Alexandria, which should sail and return without examination, having on board an English officer with a flag of truce.

These were the only two advantages which the Republic could derive from a maritime suspension of arms. These six frigates armed *en flute* would have been able to carry a reinforcement of 3600 men; no more sailors than were absolutely necessary would have been put on board, and they might even have carried some thousands of musquets, and a great quantity of ammunition and other stores for the of Egypt.

The negotiation being thus entered into, Lord Grenville thought proper to authorize Mr. Hammond, under-secretary of state, to confer with M. Otto, in order to ascertain whether any opening for conciliation existed. Mr. Hammond saw M. Otto, and proposed to him that the French army should evacuate Egypt, as a consequence of the treaty of El-Arisch, concluded on the 24th of January, and broken on the 18th of March, on reception of the decision of the English government refusing

to recognise this convention. Such a proposal required no answer; nor did Mr. Hammond urge it. After a few days discussion, the two commissioners agreed on every point, except the sending of the six French frigates to Alexandria. On the 25th of September, M. Otto declared the sending of these six frigates to be the *sine quâ non*; and on the 9th of October Mr. Hammond wrote to apprise him of the rupture of the negotiations.

III.—NEGOTIATIONS OF LUNEVILLE.

In the conferences which had taken place, it had been clearly perceived, at an early period, that the English cabinet only wished to gain time, and would never consent to make any sacrifice, or grant any advantage to the French Republic, to indemnify her for the losses she must sustain from the prolongation of the armistice with the Emperor of Germany. The generals commanding the armies of the Rhine and of Italy, had accordingly received orders to give notice on the 1st of September, of the expiration of the armistice, and to resume hostilities without delay. Brune had succeeded Massena, as commander-in-chief of the army of Italy, the latter not being able to agree with the

government of the Cisalpine Republic. General Moreau, who commanded the army of the Rhine, had his head-quarters at Nymphenburg, a country-house near Munich, belonging to the Elector of Bavaria. On the 19th of September, he commenced hostilities. In the mean time Count Lerbach, who had arrived on the Inn, eagerly solicited the continuation of the armistice, promising that his master would sincerely enter into negotiations for peace; and, as a guarantee of the sincerity of his intentions, he consented to give up the three fortresses of Ulm, Philipsburg, and Ingolstadt. In consequence of these proposals, the armistice was prolonged for forty-five days, by a convention at Hohenlinden, on the 20th of

The insincerity of the Court of Vienna was evident; it was only anxious to gain the rainy season, in order to have the whole winter for recruiting its armies. But the possession of these three fortresses by the French army was considered highly important; they secured this army's position in Germany, by affording points of support. Besides, it was considered, if Austria should employ the interval of the armistice in recruiting and refitting her armies, France, on the other hand, would use every

exertion to raise new armies ; and the numerous populations of Holland, France, and Italy, would allow of her making greater efforts than were in the power of the House of Austria. During this truce of forty-five days, the army of Italy would compel the submission of Rome, Naples, and Tuscany, which, not being comprised in the armistice, would be left to defend themselves. The subjection of those countries, which might annoy the rear and flanks of the army, was equally useful.

The minister Thugut, who swayed the Austrian cabinet, was under the influence of England. He was accused of political and military errors, which had formerly hazarded and still endangered the existence of the monarchy. Through his policy, the return of the Pope, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and the King of Sardinia, to their states, had been impeded, by which the dissatisfaction of the Czar had been carried to the highest pitch. This minister had concluded a treaty for subsidies, with the Court of St. James's, at a moment when it was easy to foresee that Austria would be compelled to make a separate peace. The disasters of the campaign were attributed to his plans ; he was blamed for having made the army of Italy the principal army ; it was said that he ought

to have assembled the main forces of the Empire on the Rhine. In adopting the contrary course, his object had been to please the English, who wanted to burn Toulon, and thereby ensure the failure of the expedition to Egypt. Finally, he had just compromised the dignity of his sovereign, by sending him in person to his armies on the Inn, to give the disgraceful order for surrendering the three bulwarks of Germany. Thugut was dismissed from the ministry. Count Cobentzel, who had negotiated for Austria at Campo Formio, was raised to the dignity of Vice-chancellor of state, which, at Vienna, is equivalent to that of prime minister. Every thing that tended to raise a hope of the restoration of peace was highly agreeable to of Vienna, and sure of the support of public opinion.

Count Cobentzel assumed the character of the friend of peace, and the partizan of France; he was extremely proud of having negotiated the treaty of Campo Formio, and of the confidence with which he was honoured by the First Consul, to which, in fact, he owed the important place he occupied. Things were now to be as they had been in 1756, those glorious times when Maria Theresa dragged France after her car, one of the most brilliant periods

of the Austrian monarchy. Count Cobentzel informed the Cabinet of the Tuileries, that Count Lerbach was about to proceed to Luneville. Shortly after, he intimated that he was unwilling to delegate so important a mission to any one, and left Vienna with a numerous legation. He travelled, however, slowly. When he reached Luneville, he took advantage of the pretext that the French plenipotentiary was not arrived, in order to proceed to Paris, and pay his respects to the first magistrate of the Republic. He cared not what he did to gain time. He was presented at the Tuileries, and treated in the most distinguished manner. But being called on, the following day, by the Minister for foreign affairs, to produce his powers, he stammered an excuse. It was thenceforth evident that it had been his object to amuse the French government, and that his court, notwithstanding the change of ministry, persisted in its old system. The First Consul had appointed Joseph Bonaparte, as plenipotentiary to the congress at Luneville, Count Laforet to be his secretary of legation, and General Clarke, commandant of Luneville and the department of La Meurthe. He insisted that the negotiations should be opened without delay. The plenipotentiaries proceeded to Luneville,

and their powers were exchanged on the 6th of November. Those of Count Cobentzel were simple, and were admitted. But, on the opening of the protocol, he declared he could not treat without the concurrence of an English minister. Now an English minister could only be received at the congress on condition of his admitting the principle of the extension of the armistice to naval operations. Several couriers were exchanged between Paris and Vienna; and as soon as the duplicity of the Austrian cabinet was perfectly manifest, the generals commanding the armies of the Republic received orders to notify the expiration of the armistice, and to commence hostilities immediately; which was done by the army of Italy, on the 17th of November, and by that of the Rhine on the 27th. In the mean time the plenipotentiaries continued to meet, signed some protocol every day, and gave mutual entertainments.

IV.—AFFAIRS OF ITALY, 1800.

The Bishop of Imola, Cardinal Chiaramonti, had been placed by the Sacred College in the chair of St. Peter, at Venice, on the 18th of March, 1800. But the House of Austria, then mistress of all Italy, had pursued the same line

of policy with regard to the Pope, which it had adopted towards the King of Sardinia. Satisfied with keeping him at Venice, under its immediate influence, it had constantly refused to re-establish him in possession of the city of Rome. It was not until after the battle of Marengo, that Baron Thugut, perceiving that he was losing his influence in Italy, sent the Pope to Rome; but Ancona and Romagna remained in the power of the Austrians, who had a body of troops there. The English army of 20,000 men, formed in the Isle of Mahon, to second the operations of Melas, in 1800, was, at length, assembled; but the victories of the French had frustrated this plan. The convention of Marengo, by which Genoa was surrendered to the French, left this English army wholly inactive. The treaty by which England and Austria were united, and engaged not to make peace with France except jointly, maintained the alliance of those powers. Austria accordingly required that her army of Italy, should be aided by the army of Mahon; and it was agreed that the latter should land in Tuscany, and occupy Leghorn, which would operate on the French army as an important diversion. In the convention of Marengo, nothing had been agreed on respecting Tuscany:

but it had been stipulated that the Austrians should retain Ferrara and its citadel. The authority of the Grand Duke had been restored in that country, where the Austrian General Sommariva commanded an Austrian division, and all the Tuscan troops.

The whole of the two months of August and September were employed in forming the Tuscan army and that of the Pope. The different battalions were commanded by Austrian officers; the English granted subsidies; and a party of emigrants, which was attached to the English corps intended to act against Provence, with Willot at its head, was embodied in the Tuscan army. The armistice existing between the French and Austrian armies during July, August, and September, did not allow the English to effect their landing in Tuscany, since that would inevitably have caused a rupture, and put an end to all hopes of peace. Besides, the Emperor was deeply interested in protracting the armistice as long as possible; because, whilst it continued, his armies were reorganizing, and forgetting their defeats in Italy and Germany.

On the 7th of September, Brune announced the resumption of hostilities; but the suspension of arms concluded at Hohenlinden, on the

20th of September, having been extended to Italy, General Brune signed, on the 29th, the armistice of Castiglione. In the mean time the concentration of the whole army of Italy, on the left bank of the Po, had rendered it necessary to recall General Pino's division on Bologna, from the line of the Rubicon which it occupied. Under these circumstances the troops of the Pope, those of Tuscany and the insurgents of Ferrara, spread themselves into Romagna, and established communications between Ferrara and Tuscany. General Dupont, being informed of this invasion, repassed the Po; the insurgents were attacked in Romagna; beaten, in several directions, by Generals Pino and Ferrand; and pursued to the vicinity of Ferrara, Arezzo, and the passes of the Apennines. The national guards of Ravenna, and of the other principal towns, seconded the movements of the French and Cisalpine troops.

IV.—INVASION OF TUSCANY, 1800.

In the mean time the insurgents still maintained their ground in Tuscany. This state of affairs lasted till October, when Brune, persuaded that the Court of Vienna was not sin-

cerely desirous of peace, and seeing that there were no longer any hopes of a naval suspension of hostilities, required General Sommariva to cause the Tuscan levy *en masse* to be disarmed. On his refusal, General Dupont entered that country on the 10th of October; on the 15th he occupied Florence; and on the 16th General Clement entered Leghorn. General Monnier made an unsuccessful attempt to take Arezzo, the principal seat of the insurrection, on the 18th; but the following day this town was taken by assault, after an obstinate resistance, and almost all the insurgents who defended it were put to the sword. General Sommariva and the Austrian troops retired on Ancona. The levy *en masse* was disarmed and disbanded, Tuscany wholly conquered and subdued, and all English merchandize confiscated wherever it could be found. In this expedition great malversations were committed, which produced keen remonstrances.

The Tuscan hostages, who had been a twelve-month in France, were sent home. They had been very well treated, and the sentiments with which they returned into Tuscany were highly favourable to the French. But the court of Naples continued to recruit its army; and in November, it was enabled to send a division

of eight or ten thousand men under the command of M. Roger de Damas, to cover Rome, jointly with General Sommariva's Austrian corps. The greatest anarchy prevailed in the states of the Pope; they were abandoned to every species of disorder.

V.—POSITIONS OF THE ARMIES, 1800.

Hostilities had been suspended for five months, during which time Austria had received sixty millions of money from England, which she had employed to advantage. She had now in the field 280,000 men under arms, including the contingents of the Empire, of the King of Naples, and of the English army: that is to say, 130,000 men in Germany, under the command of the Archduke John; the insurgents of Mentz, Albin's corps, and Simbschen's division, amounting to 20,000 men, on the Mein; the corps on the Danube and Inn, 80,000 men; that of the Prince de Reuss, in the Tyrol, 20,000 men. There were 120,000 men in Italy, under the command of Field Marshal Bellegarde, that is to say, the army of Davidowich in the Italian Tyrol, 20,000; the corps cantoned behind the Mincio, 70,000; in Ancona and Tuscany, 10,000; the Neapo-



litan troops, the Tuscan insurrection, &c. 20,000. There was an English army of 30,000 men, commanded by General Abercromby and General Pulteney, in the Mediterranean, on board transports, and ready to proceed to any point.

France had 175,000 men in the field in Germany; that is to say, the Gallo-Batavian army, commanded by General Augereau, 20,000 men; the grand army of Germany, commanded by General Moreau, 140,000 men; the army of the Grisons, commanded by General Macdonald, 15,000. In Italy the French had 90,000 men, under General Brune, and the corps of observation of the South, under General Murat, 10,000 strong. The effective strength of the armies of the Republic amounted to 500,000 men; but 40,000 were in the East, at Malta, and in the colonies; 45,000 were *gend'armes*, veterans, or fencibles; and it was calculated that there were 140,000 in Holland, on the coasts, in the garrisons of the interior, in the depôts, and in the hospitals.

The Court of Vienna was struck with consternation when it heard that the French generals had given notice of resuming hostilities. It had flattered itself that they would not undertake a winter campaign in so severe a cli-

mate as that of Upper Austria. The Aulic Council determined that the army of Italy should remain on the defensive, behind the Mincio, with its left supported on Mantua, and its right at Peschiera; whilst the army of Germany should operate offensively, and drive the French beyond the Lech.

The First Consul was resolved to march on Vienna, in spite of the inclemency of the season. He wished to take advantage of the misunderstandings which had arisen between Russia and England: the inconstant character of the Emperor Paul made him apprehensive of a change before the next campaign. The army of the Rhine, under the command of General Moreau, was intended to pass the Inn, and to march on Vienna by the valley of the Danube. The Gallo-Batavian army, commanded by General Augereau, was to act on the Mein and the Rednitz; as well to oppose the insurgents of Westphalia, led by Baron Albin, as to act as a reserve in all unforeseen cases, to alarm Austria for the safety of Bohemia, whilst the army of the Rhine should be passing the Inn, and to secure the rear of the left of the last-mentioned army. It

composed of all the troops which could be drawn from Holland, the season now securing that country from all danger of invasion.

It was through a disbelief of the real strength of the army of reserve, that the house of Austria had lost Italy at the battle of Marengo. A new army with staffs for six divisions, although consisting of only 15,000 men, was assembled in July at Dijon, under the title of Army of reserve. It was commanded by General Brune. This officer afterwards took the command of the army of Italy, and was succeeded by General Macdonald, who, towards the end of August, commenced his march, crossed Switzerland, and proceeded with the army of reserve into the Grisons country, occupying the Vorarlberg with his right, and the Engadine with his left. The attention of all Europe was directed to this army, which was thought to be meant to strike some fatal and unexpected blow, like the first army of reserve. It was thought to be 50,000 strong; and it held in check two Austrian corps consisting of 40,000 men.

The army of Italy, under the command of General Brune, who succeeded General Massena as before stated, was to pass the Mincio and the Adige, and direct its march upon the Noric Alps. The army commanded by General Murat, which had originally borne the name of *Corps of grenadiers and troopers*, afterwards of *Troops of the camp of Amiens*, and of *Grand army*

of reserve, at length took that of *Corps of observation of the South*. It was destined to act as a reserve to the army of Italy, and to flank its right.

Thus two great and two small armies were about to advance on Vienna, forming a total of 250,000 combatants under arms, whilst a fifth was in reserve in Italy, to oppose the insurgents and Neapolitans.

The French troops were well clothed, well armed, furnished with a numerous artillery, and enjoying the greatest abundance; the Republic had never possessed a military establishment so truly formidable. It had been more numerous in 1793, but the greater part of the troops were then ill-clothed recruits, unaccustomed to war; and part of the forces were employed in la Vendée and the interior.

VI.—ACTION OF BURG-EBERACH.

The Gallo-Batavian army was commanded by General Augereau, to whom General Andreossy was adjutant-general. General Treillard commanded the cavalry; General Macors the artillery. This army consisted of two French divisions, those of Barbou and Duhesme, and of the Dutch division of Dumonceau, making

20,000 men in the whole. At the end of November the head-quarters were at Frankfort.

The army of Mentz, commanded by Baron Albini, was composed, 1st, of a division of 10,000 insurgents of the States of the Elector of Mentz and the Bishopric of Wurtzburgh, which troops were increased or diminished according to circumstances and the public spirit of those countries; 2dly, of an Austrian division of 10,000 men under the command of General Simbschen. There were therefore 20,000 men, although bad troops, opposed to the Gallo-Batavian army, whose General gave notice, on the 2d of November, of his intention to recommence hostilities on the 24th. Baron Albini, who was at Aschaffenburg, wished, previously to retreating, to surprise the corps opposed to him. He passed the bridge at two o'clock in the morning; but, after a momentary advantage, was repulsed. The French head-quarters were advanced to Aschaffenburg, on the 25th. Albini retreated on Fulde, Simbschen on Schweinfurth; Dumonceau's division entered Wurtzburg on the 18th, and surrounded the garrison, who shut themselves up in the citadel. Simbschen's army, reduced to 13,000 men, took up a fine position at Burg-Eberach, to cover Bamberg. On the 3d of December

Augereau advanced against him. General Duhesme attacked with the intrepidity he has so often shewn; and, after a warm resistance, the enemy effected their retreat on Forsheim. Baron Albin remained on the right bank of the Maine, between Schweinfurth and Bamberg, in order to act as a partisan. On the following day the Gallo-Batavian army took possession of Bamberg, passed the Rednitz, and pushed some advanced parties on Ingolstadt to form a communication with the flankers of the grand army. On the same day, the 3d of December, the army of the Rhine gained the victory of Hohenlinden. General Klenau, with an army of 10,000 men, which had not engaged in the battle, was detached to the Danube to cover Bohemia; at Bamberg he joined Simbschen's army, and then marched with 20,000 men against the French army, in order to force it to fall back beyond the Rednitz. He attacked Barbou's division whilst Simbschen attacked that of Duhesme; the action was brisk. Throughout the 18th of December the French troops made up for the inferiority of their number by their intrepidity, and frustrated all the attempts of the enemy, maintaining themselves on the right bank of the Rednitz, and in possession of Nuremberg. But

on the 21st, Klenau having continued his movement, General Augereau repassed the Rednitz without fighting. After these events, Klenau's army being recalled into Bohemia, the Gallo-Batavian army re-entered Nuremberg, and resumed its old positions, where it received intelligence of the armistice of Steyer.

Thus did General Augereau, with 20,000 men, of whom 8000 were Dutch, occupy all the country between the Rhine and Bohemia, and disarm the insurgent forces of Mentz. Independently of Simbschen's force, he held Klenau's division in check, which weakened the Archduke John's army by occupying 30,000 men; whilst that commander was at the same time compelled to detach 20,000 men from his left into the Tyrol, under the command of General Hiller, to oppose the army of the Grisons. Hence the grand French army had 50,000 men the less to contend with: instead of 130,000 men, the Archduke John opposed Moreau with only 80,000.

VII.—ARMY OF THE RHINE, 1800.

The grand army of the Rhine was divided into four corps, each consisting of three divisions of infantry and a brigade of cavalry; the

heavy cavalry composed a reserve. General Lecourbe commanded the right, consisting of the divisions of Montrichard, Gudin, and Molitor: the General-in-chief in person commanded the reserve, composed of the divisions of Grandjean (afterwards Grouchy), Decaen, and Richepanse; General Grenier commanded the centre, formed of the divisions of Ney, Legrand, and Hardy (afterwards Bastoul, subsequently Bonnet); General Sainte-Suzanne commanded the left, formed of the divisions of Souham, Colaud, and Laborde; General d'Hautpoult commanded all the cavalry; General Eblé the artillery. The whole effective force was 150,000 men, including the garrisons and men in the hospitals. Of these 140,000 were disposable, and actually under arms. The French army was therefore more numerous than that of the enemy by one third; it was also very superior in the character and quality of the troops.

Hostilities commenced on the 28th of November; the army marched on the Inn. General Lecourbe left Molitor's division at the debouchés of the Tyrol, and proceeded to Rosenheim with two divisions. The three divisions of the reserve directed their march by Ebersberg; that is to say, General Decaen on Roth, General Richepanse on Wasserburg, and General Grandjean

in reserve on the Mühldorf road. The three divisions of the centre marched as follows: that of Ney by the side of the Mühldorf road, that of Hardy in reserve, and that of Legrand by the vale of Issen. Colonel Durosnel, with a body of flankers consisting of two battalions of foot and several squadrons of horse, took up a position at Wils-Biburg, before Landshut; the three divisions of the left, under Lieutenant-general Sainte-Suzanne, concentrated themselves between the Altmühl and the Danube. Thus Moreau was advancing on the Inn with eight divisions in six columns, and leaving his four other divisions to observe his flanks, the Tyrol, and the Danube.

On the 28th of November all the advanced posts of the enemy fell back; Lecourbe entered Rosenheim; Richepanse drove all he fell in with to the right bank of the Inn, or into Wasserburg; but he failed in his attempt to carry that *tête-de-pont*. Legrand's division dislodged a vanguard of the Archduke's from its post at Dorfen, at the debouché of the Issen. Lieutenant-general Grenier took up a position on the heights of Ampfingen, with Ney on the right, Hardy in the centre, and Legrand on the left, a little in the rear: the camp extended 3000 toises. These eight divisions of the French

army occupied a space of fifteen leagues on the left bank of the Inn, from Rosenheim nearly to Mühldorf. Ampfingen is fifteen leagues from Munich, which place the Inn approaches within ten leagues. The left of the French army, therefore, had its flank exposed to the river for a space of five leagues. It was a very delicate and dangerous undertaking to approach the river in this manner, in order to pass.

The Archduke John had removed his headquarters to Oetting; he had ordered Condé's corps, reinforced by some Austrian battalions, to defend the right bank from Rosenheim to Kuffstein, and to keep up his communications with General Hiller, who was in the Tyrol with a corps of 80,000 men. He had stationed General Klenau with 10,000 men at Ratisbon, in order to support the army of Mentz, which was not sufficiently strong to oppose Auge-reau's march. His plan was to debouch with the rest of his army (amounting to 80,000 men) by Wasserburg, Crayburg, Mühldorf, Oetting, and Braunau; which places had good *têtes-de-pont*, to take the offensive part and attack the French army. He passed the Inn, wheeled to the right on the *tête-de-pont* of Mühldorf, and drew up in line of battle, his left on Mühldorf,

and his right on Landshut on the Iser. General Kienmayer, with his flankers of the right, attacked Colonel Durosnel, who retreated behind the Iser. The Austrian head-quarters were successively transferred to Eggenfelden and Neumarkt on the Roth, half-way between Mühldorf and Landshut. By means of this movement, the Archduke's army occupied a line perpendicular to the extreme left of the French army; the extremity of his right was at Landshut, twelve leagues from Munich, being nearer by three leagues than the left of the French, which was fifteen leagues from that place. It was by his right that he wished to manœuvre, debouching by the valleys of the Isère, the Roth, and the Iser.

On the 1st of December, at break of day, the Archduke deployed 60,000 men before the heights of Ampfingen, and attacked Lieutenant-general Grenier, who had only 25,000 men, in front; whilst another of his columns, debouching by the bridge of Crayburg, marched to the heights of Achau, in the rear and on the right flank of Grenier. General Ney was at first obliged to yield to the superior numbers of the enemy, but rallied, returned to the attack, and broke eight battalions; but the enemy continuing to deploy his numerous forces, and

debouching by the valleys of the Issen, Lieutenant-general Grenier was compelled to retreat. Grandjean's division of the reserve advanced to his support: at night, Grenier took up a position on the heights of Haag. Great alarm prevailed in the French army; the General-in-chief was disconcerted. He was taken *in flagrante delicto*: the enemy, in a powerful mass, was attacking his separate scattered divisions: General Legrand, after sustaining a very brisk action in the valley of the Issen, had evacuated Dorfen.

The manœuvre of the Austrian army was a very fine one, and this first success augured others of great importance. But the Archduke did not know how to profit by these circumstances; he did not make a vigorous attack on the corps of Grenier, who only lost a few hundred prisoners and two pieces of cannon. On the following day, the 2d of December, he made only petty movements, did not pass Haag, and gave the French army time to rally and recover from its first surprise. He paid dearly for this error, which was the principal cause of the catastrophe of the following day.

Moreau, having had the whole of the 2d to reconnoitre his forces, began to hope that he should have sufficient time for all his divisions

to join. He sent orders to Sainte-Suzanne, whom he had unluckily left on the Danube, to proceed with his three divisions on Freisingen; where they could not arrive before the 5th: to Lecourbe, to march all day on the 3d, to approach him on the right, and take up the positions which Richepanse occupied at Ebersberg, in order to mask the débouché of Wasserburg; he could only reach his destination in the course of the 4th: to Richepanse and Decaen, to proceed to the débouché of the forest of Hohenlinden, at the village of Altenpot; they were to effect this movement in the night, in order to anticipate the enemy; the former had only two leagues to march, the latter only four. Grenier's corps took up a position on the left of Hohenlinden: Ney's division supported its right on the road, Hardy's division was in the centre, Legrand's division observed Lendorf and the débouchés of the Issen; Grandjean's division, of which General Grouchy had taken the command, intersected the road, supporting the left on Hohenlinden, and refusing the right along the outskirts of the wood. According to these dispositions General Moreau would have had, on the 4th, eight divisions in line; on the 5th he would have had ten. But the Archduke John, although he had committed the capital

error of losing the whole of the 2d, did not fall into that of losing the 3d also. At break of day he began to move, and the dispositions made by the French general to effect the junction of his army became useless; neither Lecourbe's corps nor that of Sainte-Suzanne could take part in the battle; the divisions of Richepanse and Decaen fought separately; they arrived too late on the 3d to defend the forest of Hohenlinden.

The Austrian army came on in three columns; that of the left, consisting of 10,000 men, between the Inn and the Munich road, directing its march on Albichengen and Saint-Christopher; that of the centre, 40,000 strong, proceeded by the road leading from Mühldorf to Munich, by Haag towards Hohenlinden; the grand park, the waggons and baggage took this road, the only one which was firm. The column of the right, 25,000 strong, commanded by General Latour, was to march on Bruckrain; Kienmayer, who, with his flankers of the right, constituted part of this corps, was to proceed from Dorfen on Schauben, to turn all the defiles, and place himself in a situation to debouch in the plain of Amzing, where the Archduke expected to encamp that evening, and to wait

for Klenau's corps, which was proceeding thither up the right bank of the Iser.

The roads were much cut up, as is usual in the month of December; the columns of the right and left marched by almost impracticable cross-roads; the snow fell heavily. The column of the centre, followed by the parks and baggage, having the advantage of the high road, soon distanced the others; its head penetrated into the forest without impediment. Richepanse, who was to have defended it at Altenpot, was not arrived; but this column was stopped at the village of Hohenlinden, which was the *appui* of Ney's left, and the station of Grouchy's division. The French line, which had thought itself covered, was at first surprised; several battalions were broken, and some disorder prevailed. Ney hastened up; a terrible charge carried death and consternation into the head of a column of Austrian grenadiers; General Spanochi was taken prisoner. At that moment the vanguard of the Austrian right debouched from the heights of Bruckrain. Ney was obliged to gallop to his left in order to face them; his efforts would have been insufficient had Latour supported his vanguard; but he was two leagues distant from it. In the mean time the divisions

of Richepanse and Decaen, which ought to have arrived before daybreak at the debouché of the forest, at the village of Altenpot, being embarrassed in the midst of the night in dreadful roads, and the weather being tremendous, were wandering a great part of the night on the edge of the forest. Richepanse, who marched at their head, did not reach Saint-Christopher's till seven o'clock in the morning, where he was still two leagues from Altenpot. Convinced of the importance of the movement he was operating, he accelerated his march with his first brigade, leaving the second considerably in the rear. When the Austrian column of the left reached the village of Saint-Christopher's, it cut him off from his second brigade; General Drouet, who commanded it, deployed. Richepanse's situation became frightful; he was half-way between Saint-Christopher's and Altenpot; he resolved to continue his movement in order to occupy the debouché of the forest, if it should not be in the possession of the enemy; or to retard his march, and to concur in the general attack by throwing himself on his flank if the Archduke should have already penetrated into the forest, as every thing seemed to indicate that he had. On arriving at the village of Altenpot, with the 8th, the 48th of

the line, and the 1st chasseurs, he found himself in the rear of the enemy's parks, and of all his artillery which had defiled. He passed through the village, and drew up in line on the heights. Eight squadrons of the enemy's cavalry, which formed the rear-guard, deployed; the cannonade commenced; the 1st chasseurs charged, and were repulsed. The situation of General Richepanse became more and more critical; he was speedily informed that he was not to depend on Drouet, whose progress had been arrested by considerable forces; and of Decaen he had no intelligence. In this dreadful predicament he took a desperate resolution; leaving General Walter with the cavalry, to keep the cuirassiers of the enemy in check, he entered the forest of Hohenlinden at the head of the 48th and 8th of the line. Three battalions of Hungarian grenadiers, forming the escort of the parks, formed; they advanced on Richepanse with the bayonet, taking his soldiers for an irregular force. The 48th overthrew them. This petty engagement decided the fortune of the day. Disorder and alarm spread through the convoy: the drivers cut their traces and fled, abandoning eighty-seven pieces of cannon and three hundred waggons. The confusion of the rear spread to the van.

Those columns which were far advanced in the defiles fell into disorder; they were struck with the recollection of the disastrous campaign of the summer; besides which they were in great measure composed of recruits. Ney and Richempanse joined. The Archduke John retreated with the utmost confusion and precipitation on Haag, with the wreck of his corps.

General Decaen had extricated General Drouet. He had kept the left column of the enemy in check at Saint-Christopher's with one of his brigades, whilst with the second he had advanced into the forest to complete the rout of the battalions which had taken refuge there. Of the whole Austrian army, only the column of the right, commanded by General Latour, now remained entire; it had joined Kienmayer, who had debouched on his right by the valley of the Issen, ignorant of what had passed in the centre. This column marched against Lieutenant-General Grenier, who had with him the divisions of Legrand and Bastoul, and General d'Hautpoult's cavalry. The action was extremely obstinate; General Legrand drove Kienmayer's corps into the defile of Lendorf, on the Issen; General Latour was repulsed, and lost some cannon; he commenced his retreat, and abandoned the field of battle as soon as he was informed of the disasters

which had befallen the principal corps of his army. The left of the Austrian army repassed the Inn over the bridge of Wasserburg, the centre over the bridges of Crayburg and Mühl-dorf, the right over the bridge of Oetting. General Klenau, who had put his troops in motion to approach the Inn, fell back to the Danube to cover Bohemia, and to threaten and engage the Gallo-Batavian army. The evening after the battle, the head-quarters of the French army were transferred to Haag. In this battle, which decided the success of the campaign, six French divisions, composing half the army, alone engaged almost the whole of the Austrian army. The forces on the field of battle were nearly equal, being about 70,000 men on each side. But the Archduke John could not possibly have assembled a greater number, whilst Moreau might have brought twice as many into the field. The loss of the French army was 10,000 men, killed, wounded, and taken, either at the actions of Dorfen and Ampfingen, or at the battle of Hohenlinden. That of the enemy amounted to 25,000 men, exclusively of deserters. Seven thousand prisoners, amongst whom were two generals, one hundred pieces of cannon, and an immense number of waggons were the trophies of this day.

VIII.—ARMISTICE OF DECEMBER 1800.

LECOURBE, who had not arrived in time to take part in the battle, returned to Rosenheim, from which place he was only two leagues distant. Decaen marched on the *tête-de-pont* of Wasserburg, which he strictly blockaded; Grouchy remained in reserve at Haag; Richpanse advanced to Romering opposite the bridge of Crayburg; Grenier with his three divisions passed the Issen, and proceeded on the Roth in pursuit of Latour and Kienmayer, who had retreated on the lower Inn. General Kienmayer occupied the intrenchments of Mühl-dorf, on the left of the Inn; General Baillet Latour established himself behind Wasserburg and Riesch, on the road from Rosenheim to Salzburg.

On the 9th of December (six days after the battle) Lecourbe threw a bridge across, two leagues above Rosenheim, at the village of Neupeuren, passed down the right bank with Montrichard's and Gudin's divisions, and arrived opposite Rosenheim, where Condé's corps, which had been increased to 12,000

talions, was posted before Rarsdorf, supporting the right on the Inn, opposite Rosenheim, and the left on the lake of Chiemsee. Gudin's division manœuvred on Endorf, to turn their left, which determined this corps to retire behind the Alza. Decaen's and Grouchy's divisions, which had passed the Inn by the bridge constructed by Lecourbe, arrived and fell in, in the middle of the day. Decaen took the left of the line, Grouchy remained in reserve, Lecourbe continued to follow the enemy by the road of Sebruck, Traunstein, and Teissendorf; Grouchy followed his movement; Richepanse and Decaen at first marched on the high road of Wasserburg, and by facing to the right, advanced on Lauffen, where they passed the Salza on the 14th. Richepanse had constructed a bridge of boats opposite Rosenheim, and passed the Inn in the course of the 11th. Grenier entered the *tête-de-pont* of Wasserburg, which the enemy had evacuated, crossed the Inn, and made for Altenmarkt. The parks, the reserve of cavalry, and the two divisions of the left, passed over the bridge of Mühldorf in the course of the 10th, 11th, and 12th; for as soon as the enemy saw that the barrier of the Inn was forced, they hastily abandoned its banks, to concentrate themselves between the Ems and Vienna.

On the 13th Lecourbe proceeded to Seebruck, passed the Alza, and advanced to the gates of Salzburg. Opposite that town he fell in with the rear-guard of the enemy, 20,000 strong, the greater part of which was cavalry. He attacked them, but was repulsed with a loss of 2000 men, and obliged to fall back on the left bank of the Saal. The Austrians were preparing to follow him; but General Decaen having passed the Salza at Lauffen, Moreau marched on Salzburg by the right bank, which compelled the enemy to abandon that river, and to retreat with all possible speed to cover the capital. On the 15th General Decaen entered Salzburg; General Richepanse proceeded from Lauffen towards Herdorf on the 16th, and reached the Vienna road by a forced march. Lieutenant-General Grenier marched by the road from Braunau to Ried. Lecourbe, continuing to form the right, advanced by the mountains. On the 17th Richepanse overtook the Archduke's rear-guard at Frankenmarkt; he was engaged with them the whole evening. On the 18th another action took place at Schwanstadt. This day the enemy's rear-guard did not proceed above a league and a half; it attempted to pass the night in that position, but was attacked with the greatest impetuosity,

and overthrown; it lost 200 prisoners. On the 19th General Decaen, now forming the van-guard, attacked General Kienmayer at Lambach, overthrew him, and took General Mezzery and 1200 men prisoners. It was with great difficulty that the baggage and parks passed the bridge; they were long exposed to the fire of the French batteries. The enemy were so briskly pushed that they had not time to burn the bridge, although it was constructed of wood, and they had covered it with combustibles. Decaen's division advanced in the night on Wels, where it overtook a corps of the enemy retreating on Linz, and made several hundred prisoners. Richepanse's division passed the Traun at Lambach, and marched on Kremsmünster, where Lecourbe and Decaen arrived in the evening of the 20th. Grouchy's division, and the head-quarters of the army, proceeded to Wels; Grenier's corps, after having passed the Salza at Lauffen and Burkhausen, and blockaded Braunau with Ney's division, arrived at Ebersberg. Prince Charles had just taken the command of the army; the opinion of the whole public, civil, and military, loudly called him to the aid of the monarchy, but it was too late.

In the mean time General Decaen had de-

feated the rear-guard commanded by Prince Schwartzenberg, at Kremsmünster, taking a thousand prisoners. On the 21st he entered Steyer; and General Grouchy, Ems. The army passed the Ems on the same day; the advanced posts were stationed on the Ips and Erlaph; the light cavalry advanced as far as Mölk. The head quarters of the army were established at Kremsmünster. On the 25th of September a suspension of arms was signed, in the following terms:

ARTICLE I. The line of demarcation between the position of the Gallo-Batavian army in Germany under the command of General Augereau, in the circles of Westphalia, the Upper Rhine, and Franconia, as far as Bayarsdorf, shall be specifically determined between that general and the commander of the Imperial and Royal army opposed to him. From Bayarsdorf this line passes through Herland, Nuremberg, Neumarck, Parsberg, Laver, Stad-tam-Lof, and Ratisbon, where it crosses the Danube, along the right bank of which it runs to the Erlaph, up which it proceeds to the source of that river, passes to Marckgamingen, Kogelbach, Goulingen, Hammox, Mendleng, Leopoldstein, Heissemach, Vorderenberg, and Leoben; then along the left bank of the Muhr

to the point where that river crosses the road from Salzburg to Clagenfurth, which road it follows to Spritat, then runs up the Verona road by the Inenz and Brixen as far as Botzen; thence passes to Maham Glurens and Sainte-Marie, and thence by Bormio into the Valteline, where it connects with the army of Italy.—ARTICLE II. The map of Germany by Chauchard shall serve as a rule in any discussions which may arise on the above line of demarcation.—ARTICLE III. The cutting down or preservation of the bridges, on the rivers which will separate the two armies, shall be regulated by particular arrangements, according as it may appear useful, either with respect to the armies, or to commerce; the commanders in chief of the respective armies will confer on these subjects, or will delegate the arrangement thereof to the generals commanding the troops at the respective points. The navigation of the rivers shall remain free both for the armies and the country.—ARTICLE IV. The French army shall not only occupy exclusively all the points of the line of demarcation above specified, but more effectually to place a continued interval between the two armies, the line of advanced posts of the Imperial and Royal army shall, throughout its extent (with

the exception of the Danube), be at the distance of one German mile, at least, from that of the French army.—ARTICLE V. Except escorts, or police guards, which shall be left in or sent into the Tyrol by the two armies respectively in equal numbers, but in as small numbers as possible (which shall be determined by a particular agreement), no troops of his Imperial and Royal Majesty shall remain within the compass of the line of démarcation: those which are at this moment in the Grisons, the Tyrol, and Carinthia, shall forthwith retreat by the Clagenfurth road on Pruck to join the Imperial army of Germany, and none of them shall be directed on Italy; they shall commence their march from their present stations immediately on receiving notice of the present convention; and their march shall be fixed at the rate of a German post and a half per day. The General-in-chief of the French army of the Rhine is authorized to satisfy himself of the execution of this article, by sending commissioners to follow the march of the Imperial armies as far as Pruck. The Imperial troops which may have to retreat from the Upper Palatinate, Suabia, or Franconia, shall take the shortest road without the line of demarcation. The execution of this article is not to be delayed.

longer than may be necessary, with regard to the distances.—ARTICLE VI. The forts of Kufstein, Schoernitz, and all the other places of permanent fortification in the Tyrol, shall be placed in the hands of the French army, to be restored in the condition they are now in, at the conclusion and ratification of peace, if it succeed this armistice without any resumption of hostilities. The debouchés of Fientlermünz, Naudert, and other field fortifications in the Tyrol, shall be placed at the disposal of the French army.—ARTICLE VII. The magazines in that country belonging to the Imperial army shall be at its disposal.—ARTICLE VIII. The fortress of Wurtzburg in Franconia, and the place of Braunau, in the circle of Bavaria, shall likewise be surrendered to the French army, to be restored on the same conditions as the forts of Kufstein and Schoernitz.—ARTICLE IX. The troops, both of the Empire, and of his Imperial and Royal Majesty, occupying fortified places, shall evacuate them, that is to say, the garrison of Wurtzburg, on the 6th of January 1801 (16th Nivose year IX); that of Braunau, on the 4th of January 1801 (14th Nivose, year IX); and that of the forts of the Tyrol, on the 8th of January (18th Nivose.)—ARTICLE X. All the garrisons shall march out with the

honours of war, and shall repair, with their arms and baggage, by the shortest road, to the Imperial army. They shall not carry off any part of the artillery, ammunition, military stores, or provisions of any kind, in such fortresses, except the provisions necessary for their subsistence until they shall have passed the line of demarcation.—ARTICLE XI. Commissioners shall be nominated on both sides to report the state of the places in question; but the time occupied in their mission is to cause no delay in the evacuation.—ARTICLE XII. The extraordinary levies ordered in the Tyrol shall be immediately disbanded, and the inhabitants sent home to their dwellings. The order and execution of this disbanding are not to be retarded under any pretext whatever.—ARTICLE XIII. The General-in-chief of the army of the Rhine being desirous to give his Highness the Archduke Charles an unequivocal proof of the motives which have induced him to demand the evacuation of the Tyrol, declares, that with the exception of the forts of Kufstein, Schoernitz, and Fientlermünz, he shall confine himself to having in the Tyrol the escorts or police-guards mentioned in Article V. to secure the communications. He will at the same time give the inhabitants of the Tyrol every facility

in his power for securing their subsistence; and the French army will in no respect meddle with the government of that country.—

ARTICLE XIV. The portion of the Empire and States of his Imperial Majesty, lying in the Tyrol, is placed under the safeguard of the French army, to see that property is respected and the present forms of government maintained. The inhabitants of that country are not to be molested on account of services rendered to the Imperial army, or of political opinions, or of having taken an active part in the war.—**ARTICLE XV.** On condition of the above arrangements, there shall be between the Gallo-Batavian army in Germany, that of the Rhine, and the army of his Imperial Majesty and his allies of the German empire, an armistice and suspension of arms for at least thirty days. At the expiration of that term, hostilities shall not be recommenced without fifteen days' notice, reckoned from the hour in which the notification of the rupture shall have come to hand, and the armistice shall be indefinitely prolonged until such notification.—

ARTICLE XVI. No corps or detachment, either of the army of the Rhine or of that of his Imperial Majesty, in Germany, shall be sent to the respective armies in Italy, as long as

there shall be no armistice between the French and Imperial armies in that country. The breach of this article shall be regarded as an absolute rupture of the armistice.—ARTICLE XVII. The general-in-chief of the army of the Rhine shall, with all possible expedition, communicate the present convention to the generals-in-chief of the Gallo-Batavian army, of the army of the Grisons, and the army of Italy, with the most urgent solicitation, particularly to the general-in-chief of the army of Italy, to conclude a suspension of arms on his part also. All possible facilities shall at the same time be afforded for the passage of such officers and couriers as his Royal Highness the Archduke Charles shall think proper to send, either to the places to be evacuated, or to the Tyrol, and in general into the countries comprised within the line of demarcation, during the armistice.

At Steyer, 25 December, 1800 (4th Nivose, year IX).

(Signed) V. F. LAHORIE, Count de Grune,
WAIROTH-DE-VETAL.

The army remained in its positions until the ratification of the peace of Luneville, signed on the 9th of February, 1801. In execution

of that treaty, it evacuated the hereditary States within ten days after the ratification, and the Empire within twenty days after the ratifications were exchanged.

IX.—CAMPAIGN OF GERMANY, 1800.

OBSERVATIONS.

Plan of the Campaign.—The plan of the campaign, adopted by the First Consul, combined every advantage. The armies of Germany and Italy were each intrusted to one commander; the Gallo-Batavian army was made independent, because it was only a corps of observation, which was not intended to suffer itself to be separated from France, and was always to remain in the rear of the left of the Grand army, to enable General Moreau to concentrate all his divisions, and to unite forces sufficiently numerous to manœuvre independently of the success or failure of this corps of observation.

The army of the Grisons, the second army of reserve, threatened at the same time both the German and Italian districts of the Tyrol. It occupied the whole attention of General Hiller and General Davidowich, and allowed General Moreau to draw in his right, and

General Brune his left. It was also necessary that it should be independent, as it was intended to be auxiliary both to the army of Germany and to that of Italy, to menace the left of the Archduke's army, and the right of that of Marshal Bellegarde.

These two corps of observation, which together amounted only to 35,000 men, occupied the attention of the army of Mentz, and of the corps of Simbschen, Klenau, Reuss, and Davidowich, amounting to 70,000 men; and consequently allowed the two grand French armies, which were intended to enter the hereditary states, to keep all their forces in junction.

Augereau.—General Augereau executed the duty assigned to him. His instructions were to keep constantly in the rear, that he might not run the risk of being attacked by a detachment of the Archduke's army. His engagement at Burg-Eberach, on the 3d of December, the very day of the battle of Hohenlinden, is very honourable to him, as are the actions in which he afterwards fought before Nuremberg, when he had superior forces to contend with. But had he been more thoroughly master of the part he was destined to perform, he would have avoided any engagement, which he might

easily have done, by not passing the Rednitz. His ardour, nevertheless, proved very serviceable, by obliging the Archduke to detach Kleinau's corps for the purpose of supporting the army of Mentz.

Moreau. — General Moreau's march on the Inn was blameable; he ought not to have approached the Inn on six points, and on a line of from fifteen to twenty leagues. When the army opposed to you is covered by a river, on which it has several *têtes-de-pont*, you ought not to approach it in front. This disposition scatters your army, and exposes you to be cut off. You must approach the river you wish to pass in columns in echelon, so that there may be but one column, that which is most advanced, which the enemy can attack without exposing his own flank. During this time your light troops will reach the bank; and when you are fixed on the point at which you intend to pass,—which point should always be remote from the head division, the better to deceive the enemy,—you should advance on it with rapidity, and construct your bridge. The observation of this principle was very important on the Inn, the French general having made Munich his pivot point. Now it is only ten leagues from Munich to the nearest part of this

river, which runs obliquely, constantly increasing its distance from the capital; so that when it is wished to throw a bridge across, lower down, the flank must be exposed to the enemy. General Grenier accordingly found himself much exposed in the action of the 1st of December; he was for two days compelled to contend with an enemy of double his numbers.

If the French general wished to occupy the heights of Ampfingen, he could only do so with his whole army. It was necessary for him to unite Grenier's three divisions, the three divisions of the reserve, and General d'Hautpoult's cavalry, placing Lecourbe in echelon on the right. Had the French army been thus drawn up, it would have run no risk; it would have beaten the Archduke, and driven him into the Inn. The dispositions that were made would have been dangerous, even with a superior army. Landshut is the place to set out from, to march upon the Inn.

Whilst the fate of the campaign was deciding in the fields of Ampfingen and Hohenlinden, Sainte-Suzanne's three divisions, and Lecourbe's three divisions,—that is to say, half the army,—were no longer on the field of battle. What is the use of having troops, without the art of

making use of them on important occasions? The French army consisted of 140,000 men on the field of operations; that of the Archduke, of 80,000 men only, because it was weakened by having sent two detachments against the Gallo-Batavian army and that of the Grisons. Nevertheless, the Austrian army equalled its adversaries in number at the battle of Hohenlinden, and had thrice their number at the action of Ampfingen.

The victory of Hohenlinden was a fortunate chance; the campaign was there won without any calculation or contrivance. The enemy had a better chance of success than the French; and yet the latter were so superior in number and quality, that had they been conducted with prudence and according to rule, every probability would have been in their favour. It has been said that Moreau had ordered the march of Richepanse and Decaen on Altenpot, to take the enemy in flank; but that is incorrect: all the movements of the French army during the 3d were defensive. It was Moreau's interest to remain on the defensive on the 3d; because on the 4th General Lecourbe was to reach the field of battle, and on the 5th another powerful reinforcement was to be received, that of Sainte-Suzanne. The object of this movement

of Decaen and Richepanse was to prevent the enemy from debouching in the forest during the third; it was purely defensive.

If the object of the manœuvre of these two divisions had been to fall on the left flank of the enemy, it would have been contrary to the rule according to which large detachments ought not to be made on the eve of a battle. The French army had only six divisions joined; it was running a great risk to detach two of them on the eve of the action. It was possible that this detachment might not meet the enemy, because the latter might have manœuvred on their right, or have already carried Hohenlinden before its arrival at Altenpot. In this case the insulated divisions of Richepanse and Decaen could have been of no assistance to the four other divisions, which must have been repulsed beyond the Iser; and this would have occasioned the destruction of the two divisions which had been detached.

Had the Archduke caused his right division in echelon to march forward, and not entered the forest until General Latour had been engaged with Lieutenant-general Grenier, he would have found at Hohenlinden only Grouchy's division. He would have got possession of the forest, intersected the army in the

centre, and turned Grenier's right, whom he would have driven beyond the Iser; the two divisions of Richepanse and Decaen, insulated in a difficult country, amidst ice and mud, would have been driven back to the Inn; the French army would have suffered a decisive defeat. It would have been very bad management to run these risks; Moreau was too prudent to expose himself to such a chance.

The movement of Richepanse and Decaen was intended to be completed by night; but it would have been necessary for these two divisions to march in junction. On the contrary, they were separated, and at a great distance from each other, in a country destitute of roads and full of impediments; they wandered about the whole of the night. At seven in the morning of the 3d, when Richepanse, with the first brigade, arrived in front of Saint-Christopher's, he found himself cut off from his second brigade, the enemy having placed themselves at Saint-Christopher's. Ought this general to have marched on, or returned to the aid of his second brigade? There can be no doubt on the subject; he certainly ought to have returned. He would have extricated that brigade, and joined General Decaen, after which he might have marched

forward in great force. He had reason to expect to meet one of the Archduke's columns, much stronger than his troops, at the village of Altenpot: what chance could he have had in that case? he would have been attacked in the van and rear, with the Inn on his right flank. In his situation the rules of war required that he should march in junction not only with his second brigade, but even with Decaen's division. Twenty thousand men have always some influence over fortune, and at all events they have always time to gain the night, and extricate themselves. General Richepanse was, therefore, guilty of a piece of imprudence; this imprudence had a fortunate result, and the success of the battle is chiefly to be ascribed to it: for, on both sides, it depended on the merest trifle; and the fate of two great armies was decided by the encounter of a few battalions.

The Archduke John.—It was an error in the Archduke John to take the offensive side, and to pass the Inn. His army was too much disheartened; it contained too many recruits; besides, the forces with which it was to engage were too numerous, and were manœuvring in a season when those who remain on the defensive have every advantage.

He began the action of the 1st of December very well, but conducted it with little vigour; he occupied the whole day in deploying. These movements require much time, and the days are very short in December; it was no time to parade. He should have attacked by the left and centre, and charged headlong on the right in columns. Thus availing himself of his great superiority in numbers, he would have broken and routed Ney's and Hardy's divisions.

The following day he should have closely pushed the French, and followed up the pursuit with unremitting perseverance; instead of which he had the folly to rest, and thus gave Moreau time to recover and reunite his forces. His movement had completely taken the French army, which was scattered, by surprise; he ought not to have given it time to take breath and recover itself. But unless the Archduke had been fortunate enough to have gained a great victory, the French army, driven beyond the Iser, would have rallied there, and would still have totally defeated him.

His dispositions for the battle of Hohenlinden were very well conceived; but he committed errors in their execution. The nature of his movement required that his army should march in echelon, the right in front; and that

the right, commanded by General Latour, and General Kienmayer's flankers, should be joined and engaged with Lieutenant-General Grenier's corps, before the centre should enter the forest. During this movement the Archduke should have remained in line with the centre even with Altenpot, ordering a division to scour the forest, to assist General Latour's march. Grenier's three divisions, commanded by Legrand, Bastoul, and Ney, being engaged with Latour, the Archduke would have found nobody but Grouchy at Hohenlinden, who could not have held out for half an hour. Instead of this he marched with his centre forward, without considering that his right and left, which were advancing by cross roads in a country covered with ice, could not follow him; so that he found himself alone, engaged in a forest, where numerical superiority is of little importance. He repulsed, however, Grouchy's division, and threw it into disorder; but General Latour was two leagues behind. Ney, who had no enemy before him, hastened to meet the Archduke and support Grouchy; and when the Austrian wings came up several hours after, it was too late. It was contrary to the usages of war, to engage unnecessarily, more troops than the ground would

allow to be deployed, and still more so to plunge his parks and heavy artillery into a defile of the opposite end of which he was not in possession. In fact, they eventually incumbered him in retreating, and he lost them. He should have left them in position at the village of Altenpot, under a proper guard, until he was master of the debouché of the forest.

These errors of execution afford reason to suspect that the Archduke's army was ill organized. But the idea of the battle was good; it would have succeeded on the 2d of December; nay, it would even have succeeded on the 3d, had not the execution been defective.

An attempt has been made to persuade the world that the march of the French army on Ampfingen, and its retreat on Hohenlinden, were a *ruse de guerre*: but this does not merit a serious refutation. If General Moreau had premeditated this march, he would have kept the six divisions of Lecourbe and Sainte-Suzanne within reach of the movement; he would have kept Richepanse and Decaen joined, in the same camp, &c. &c. Doubtless the battle of Hohenlinden was most glorious to General Moreau, and to the other French generals, as well as the officers and troops; it was one of

the most decisive of the whole war; but it ought not to be ascribed to any manœuvre, combination, or military genius.

Final observation.—General Lecourbe, who formed the right, had not engaged in the battle; he ought to have thrown a bridge over the Inn, and passed that river on the 5th at latest. The whole army ought to have been on the right bank in the course of the 6th; it was not there until the 12th. The head-quarters, which might have reached Steyer on the 12th, did not arrive there until the 22d. This loss of seven days enabled the Archduke to rally, to take up a position behind the Alza and Salza, to organize a good rear-guard, and to defend the ground, step by step, as far as Ens. But for this inexcusable tardiness, Moreau would have avoided several actions, taken an enormous quantity of baggage, and straggling prisoners, and cut off divisions which had not rallied. On the day succeeding the battle of Hohenlinden, he was much nearer Salzburg than the Archduke, who had retreated by the lower Inn. Had Moreau marched rapidly in the proper direction, he might have driven him to the Danube, and arrived at Vienna before the wreck of the Austrian army.

The slight check which Lecourbe sustained

before Salzburg, and the resistance of the enemy in the plain of Vocklebruck, arose from the deficiency of cavalry in the van-guard. But General d'Hautpoult's reserve should have been marched to the van, and not kept in the rear. It is the province of the cavalry to follow up the victory, and to prevent the defeated enemy, from rallying.

X.—ARMY OF THE GRISONS.

THE army of the Grisons had attracted the attention of the Cabinet of Vienna; for this it was chiefly indebted to its first denomination of army of reserve. Melas and his staff had reproached the Aulic Council with having suffered itself to be deceived respecting the formation and march of the first army of reserve, which had cut off the rear of the Austrian army, and conquered all Italy at the battle of Marengo. Hence the most anxious attention was now employed in ascertaining the force, and watching the march, of this second army of reserve. The former had been thought weaker than it was; this was supposed to be stronger. The French government adopted every expedient to lead the Austrian agents into error. General Macdonald, well known by his cam-

paign of Naples, and by the battle of Trebbia, was appointed to the command of this army. It was composed of several divisions, and a belief was easily created that it amounted to 40,000 men, whilst it consisted in reality of only 15,000. The corps of Parisian volunteers, the raising of which had attracted the attention of idlers, and which was composed of young men of good families, was sent thither. With respect to mere military operations, this army was useless, and would have been more serviceable had it composed only a single division, and been placed under the command of Moreau or Brune. But the Austrians had retained such an impression of the former army of reserve, that they imagined this second army was intended to manœuvre like the first, and to fall on their rear either in Italy or Germany. Thus apprehensive, they placed a considerable corps in the debouchés of the Tyrol and Valteline, in order to keep it in check, whether it should be directed on Germany or on Italy. It had, therefore, the good effect of paralysing nearly 40,000 of the enemy, either of the army of Germany or of that of Italy. Thus it may be said that this second army of reserve contributed much more effectually to the success

of the French arms in Germany, by its name, than by its actual force.

The battle of Hohenlinden having totally decided the affairs of Germany, the army of the Grisons received orders to operate in Italy, to descend into the Valteline, and to penetrate into the heart of the Tyrol; by debouching on the high road at Botzen. General Macdonald executed this operation slowly, and displayed but little resolution; whether he was dissatisfied at seeing General Brune, with whom he was on bad terms, at the head of so fine an army as that of Italy; or whether an expedition of this nature was not suitable to this general's character. Such an operation, had it been conducted by Massena, Lecourbe, or Ney, would have produced the most important results. The passage of the Splugen was undoubtedly attended with some difficulties; but the winter is not the most unfavourable season for the passage of lofty mountains. The snow is then firm, the weather settled, and there is nothing to fear from the avalanches, the real and only danger to be apprehended in the Alps. On those high mountains there are often very fine days in December, of a dry cold, with extreme calmness in the air.

It was not until the 6th of December that the army of the Grisons at length passed the Splügen, and arrived at Chiavenna. But instead of directing its march by the upper Engadine on Botzen, this army formed a second line in the rear of the left of the army of Italy. It produced no effect, and did not contribute in the slightest degree to the success of the campaign; for Baraguey d'Hillier's corps, detached into the upper Engadine, was too weak. Its march was stopped by the enemy, and it did not penetrate to Botzen until the 9th of January, that is to say, fourteen days after the battles which had been fought by the armies of Italy on the Mincio, and six days after the passage of the Adige by that army. General Macdonald reached Trent on the 7th of January, after the enemy's army had been driven from that place by the left of the army of Italy, which was proceeding to Roveredo under the command of Moncey and Rochambeau. The armistice of Trevisa, concluded on the 16th of January, 1801, by the army of Italy, included the army of the Grisons, which took up a position in the Italian Tyrol, its head-quarters being fixed at Trent.

XI.—ARMY OF ITALY.

In the course of November 1800, General Brune, who commanded the French army in Italy, gave notice of concluding the armistice, to General Bellegarde; and recommenced hostilities accordingly on the 22d of November. The river of the Chiesa, as far as its junction with the Oglio, and the latter from that point until it falls into the Po, formed the line of the French army. This army was in fine condition, and very numerous; it was composed of the army of reserve, and the old army of Italy united. It had been five months re-established in the beautiful plains of Lombardy; it had been considerably reinforced, both by recruits arrived from France, and by numbers of Italian troops. General Moncey commanded the left, Suchet the centre, Dupont the right, Delmas the vanguard, and Michaut the reserve; Davoust commanded the cavalry, and Marmont the artillery, which consisted of two hundred pieces well horsed and abundantly supplied with stores. Each of these corps was composed of two divisions, making a total of ten divisions of infantry and two of cavalry. One brigade of the vanguard was detached to head-quar-

ters, and was called the head-quarters' reserve. Thus the van-guard was composed of three brigades.

General Miollis commanded in Tuscany; he had from 5 to 6000 men under his command, the greater part of whom were Italian troops. Soult commanded in Piedmont, and had 6 or 7000 men, mostly Italians. Dulauloy commanded in Liguria, and Lapoype in the Cisalpine. The general-in-chief, Brune, had near 100,000 men under his command, of whom more than 80,000 were actually in the field, and in junction.

The army of the Grisons, commanded by Macdonald, engaged the attention of several Austrian corps in the Engadine and Valteline. This army may therefore be considered as forming part of that of Italy. It increased the strength of the latter by 15,000 men; making, therefore, in all, little less than 100,000 men under arms, serving on the Mincio and the Adige.

At the time of the resumption of hostilities, on the 22d of November, General Brune remained on the defensive; he waited for his right, which was in Tuscany, under the command of General Dupont. On the 24th it passed the Po at Sacca, stationed itself behind

the Oglio, with its van-guard at Marcaria. The enemy likewise remained on the defensive. Although Brune received orders to act with vigour, he still hesitated to commence offensive operations.

General Bellegarde, who commanded the Austrian army, was not a formidable general. His instructions were to defend the line of the Mincio; the house of Austria considering it important to maintain that river, both for the purpose of communicating with Mantua, and for that of preserving it as a boundary when peace should be concluded. The Austrian army, 60 or 70,000 strong, had the Po for the *appui* of its left; it was also supported by Mantua, and covered by the lake, on which it had gun-boats. Peschiera and the lake of Garda formed the *appuis* of the right; a numerous flotilla secured the possession of the lake. There was a detached corps in the Tyrol, occupying the positions of Mount Tonal, and those opposite the debouchés of the Engadine and Valteline. The Mincio, the course of which extends twenty miles, or nearly seven leagues, from Peschiera to Mantua, is fordable in several places in dry weather; but at the season in question is never so in any part. The Austrian general had, moreover, closed every channel by

which the water is usually carried off from this river. But notwithstanding these circumstances it was but a feeble barrier; it is not above twenty toises wide, and its two banks alternately command each other. The point of Mozembano commands the left bank, as does that of Molino della Volta; the positions of Salionzo and Valleggio, on the left bank, have a great command over the opposite side. General Bellegarde had caused the heights of Valleggio to be strongly occupied; he had repaired the remains of an ancient castle, which was adapted to serve as a *reduit*; it commands the whole country on both banks. Borghetto had been fortified, and formed, as it were, a *tête-de-pont* under the protection of Valleggio. The wall of the little town of Goïto had been repaired, and its defences increased by the waters. Bellegarde had also caused four fraised and palisaded redoubts to be raised on the heights of Salionzo; they were brought as near as possible to Valleggio. When he had taken care of his principal defences on the left bank, he extended them to the right. He caused the heights of La Volta, a position commanding the whole country, to be occupied with strong works; but these were nearly a league from the Mincio, and a league and a half from Goïto

and Valleggio. Thus the Austrian general had, within a space of fifteen miles, five points strongly intrenched; that is to say, Peschiera, Salionzo, Valleggio, Volta, and Goïto.

On the 18th of December the French army passed the Chiesa; the head-quarters were fixed at Castagnedolo. On the 19th and 21st, the whole army marched on the Mincio in four columns; the right, under Dupont, directed its course on the extremity of the lake of Mantua; the centre, led by Suchet, marched on La Volta; the van-guard, whose object it was to mask Peschiera, advanced on Ponti; the reserve and the left wing marched on Mozembano. Dupont, in the right wing, repulsed the garrison of Mantua beyond the lake, with his right division. The second division (Vatrin's) drove them into Goïto. Suchet, in the centre, marched cautiously on Volta. He expected a movement of the Austrian army to support the head of its line. But the enemy no where shewed themselves; they were probably apprehensive of being cut off from the Mincio, and they abandoned their positions. The fine eminence of Mozembano, which commands the Mincio, was not disputed. The French took possession of all the positions on the right bank, except Goïto and the *tête-de-*

pont of Borghetto. When the enemy discovered that they had to deal with the whole French army, they feared a general engagement, and fell back on the left bank of the Mincio, preserving, on the right, only Goïto and Borghetto. The total loss of the Austrians, throughout their line, was from five to six hundred men, taken prisoners. The French head-quarters were established at Mozembano.

It was necessary to throw bridges over the Mincio, pass the river, and pursue the enemy, on the same day. A river so narrow as this is but a slight obstacle, when one is master of such a position commanding the opposite bank, that the grape-shot of the batteries from that position sweeps far beyond the other side. At Mozembano, and at the mill of La Volta, the artillery can play on the opposite bank for a great distance, whilst the enemy can find no advantageous position for establishing his batteries. The passage is therefore a mere nothing; the enemy cannot even see the Mincio, which, like a fosse in fortification, covers the batteries from all attacks.

In the warfare of sieges, as well as in the field, the cannon plays the principal part, and has made a total revolution. High ramparts of

masonry have necessarily been abandoned for grazing fires covered by masses of earth. The custom of intrenching every day, by forming a camp, and seeking safety behind a few bad palisades planted in a row, has also been necessarily relinquished.

The moment one is master of a position which commands the opposite bank, if it be sufficiently extensive to allow of placing a considerable number of pieces of cannon, one acquires great facilities for passing the river. Nevertheless, if the river be from two to five hundred toises in width, the advantage is much less; because your grape-shot not reaching the opposite side, and the distance allowing the enemy to make his troops defile with facility, the troops which oppose the passage have time to earth themselves in trenches, which shelter them from the fire of the opposite bank. If the grenadiers, ordered to cross to protect the construction of the bridge, succeed in surmounting this obstacle, they are crushed by the fire of the enemy's grape, who being placed two hundred toises from the debouché of the bridge, is enabled to keep up a most destructive fire, and is at the same time at four or five hundred toises distance from the batteries of the army endeavouring to pass; so that the

whole advantage of cannon is entirely on his side. And in this case it is impossible to effect the passage until the enemy can be completely surprised, and the army endeavouring to pass can avail itself of an intermediate isle, or a deep re-entering angle, which allows of the establishment of batteries crossing their fires on the gorge. This isle, or re-entering angle, then forms a natural *tête-de-pont*, and gives the attacking army all the advantages of artillery.

When a river is less than sixty toises in breadth, the troops which are despatched to the other side, being protected by a great superiority in artillery, and by the great command which the bank it is placed upon ought to possess, have such an advantage, that if the river do but form a re-entering angle, it is impossible to prevent the establishment of the bridge. In this case the most able generals have contented themselves, when they have been able to foresee their adversary's plan, and reach the point of passage with their army, with opposing the passage of the bridge, which is a true defile, by placing their force in a half circle round it, and by defiling from the fire of the opposite bank to three or four hundred toises from its heights. This was the

manœuvre put in practice by Vendôme, to prevent Eugene from availing himself of his bridge of Cassano.

The French general determined to pass the Mincio on the 24th of December, and chose the points of Mozembano and Molino della Volta, two leagues from each other, for effecting his passage. On these two points, the Mincio being nothing, there is but the general plan of the battle to consider. Was it judicious to divide the force between Mozenbano and Molino? The enemy occupied the eminence of Valleggio and the *tête-de-pont* of Borghetto. The junction of the troops, after they had effected the two passages, might therefore be attended with some difficulty and uncertainty. The enemy might themselves make a sortie by Borghetto, and frustrate one of these attacks. It was therefore more conformable to the rules of war to pass at a single point in order to be certain of always keeping the troops in junction. In this case, which of the two passages was preferable?

That of Mozembano had the advantage of being nearer Verona; the position was much better. When, therefore, the army should have passed at Mozembano, over three bridges at two or three hundred toises distance from

each other, it would have no grounds for apprehension with respect to its retreat, because its right and left would be constantly supported by the Mincio, and flanked by the batteries which could be established on the right bank. But Bellegarde, who had perfectly comprehended these circumstances, had occupied the two points of Valleggio and Salionzo with a strong redoubt. These two points, situate in the elbow of the Mincio, form an equilateral triangle with the point of passage of 3000 toises on each side. The Austrian army having Valleggio for the *appui* of its left, and Salionzo for that of its right, thus occupied the chord, and its right and left were perfectly supported. It could not be turned; but its line of battle extended 3000 toises. Brune could therefore only hope to penetrate its centre, an operation which is often difficult, and requires great vigour, and the junction of many troops.

The point of Molino della Volta was less advantageous. In case of a defeat there, the retreat would have been more difficult; for Pozzolo commands the right bank. But in this position the enemy would not have possessed the advantage of having his wings supported by works of fortification.

In effecting a passage at Mozembano, the

French general would have had the heights of Valleggio on his right, which were strongly intrenched, and on his left those of Salionzo, which were likewise occupied by works of strength. When the French army came to debouch, it would have found itself in a re-entering angle, exposed to the converging fires of the enemy's artillery, and with the Austrian army in its front, supported on its right and left by the two strong positions already mentioned. At the same time, the corps which was passing at La Volta would have had its right a league and a half from Goïto, a fortified place on the right bank ; and Borghetto and Valleggio, a league distant on its left.

It was nevertheless determined that the right wing should pass at La Volta, whilst the rest of the army should be passing at Mozembano.

General Dupont, having arrived at Molino della Volta at break of day, constructed bridges, and caused his divisions to pass. He took possession of the village of Pozzolo, where he established his right; and his left, supported on the Mincio, was stationed opposite Molino, and protected by the fire of the artillery of the heights of the right bank, which command the whole plain. The position of the left was further strengthened by a dyke. At the time of

the passage the enemy was not numerous. About ten o'clock General Dupont learned that the passage intended to have been effected by General Brune before Mozembano was postponed to the following day. General Dupont should have instantly caused the mass of his troops to repass to the right bank, leaving on the left only a few battalions to establish a *tête-de-pont* under the protection of his batteries. The position was, moreover, such that the enemy could not approach the bridge. This operation would have had all the advantages of a false attack, and divided the enemy's attention. At break of day the line from Valleggio to Salionzo might have been forced before the whole of the enemy's army could have joined there. General Dupont, however, remained in his position on the left bank. Bellegarde, availing himself of the advantage of his intrenched camp of Valleggio and Salionzo, marched with his reserves against the right wing. On this point there was much hard fighting; General Suchet and General Davoust hastened to the aid of General Dupont; and a most sanguinary conflict, in which the troops displayed the greatest valour, took place on this spot, between from 20 to 25,000 French, and from 40 to 45,000 Austrians, in a field of

battle, around the centre of which, within thirty square leagues, they were 80,000 French against 60,000 Austrians. The sharpest action took place at the village of Pozzolo; the left, protected by the fire of the artillery of the right bank, and by the dyke, was more difficult to attack. Pozzolo, alternately taken and retaken by the Austrians and French, finally remained in the power of the latter. But it cost them very dear; they lost the flower of three divisions, and suffered at least as severely as the enemy. The valour of the French was ill employed; and the blood of these brave men served only to remedy the errors of the general-in-chief, and those caused by the inconsiderate ambition of his lieutenant-generals. The general-in-chief, whose head-quarters were but two leagues distant from the field of battle, suffered his whole right wing, which he knew to have passed to the left bank, to engage, without making any disposition to succour them. Such conduct requires no comment.

It is impossible to explain how Brune, who knew that his right had passed and was fighting with the enemy, could omit to hasten to its assistance, and send his pontoons to construct another bridge. Since he had adopted the plan of passing at two points, why did he not

at least choose Mozembano, taking advantage of the movement in which the Austrian army was engaged, to gain possession of Salionzo and Valleggio, and fall on the rear of the enemy? Suchet and Davoust came to Dupont's assistance wholly of their own accord, consulting only the necessity of the case.

On the 25th, General Marmont placed his batteries of reserve on the heights of Mozembano, in order to protect the construction of the bridges: this was wholly useless. The enemy knew better than to place themselves in a re-entering angle 3000 toises long, for the purpose of disputing the passage of a river only twenty toises in width, commanded by a height, opposite which its artillery, however numerous, could not have maintained itself in battery above a quarter of an hour. The passage being effected, Delmas, with the van-guard, marched on Valleggio; Moncey with Boudet's division, and Michaut with the reserve, supported him. Suchet remained in reserve before Borghetto; and Dupont, with the right wing, remained at Pozzolo. The troops had to sustain cross fires from Valleggio and Salionzo; but the Austrian general had already prepared to retreat, considering the river as passed, and after the attack he had sustained the

day before, notwithstanding his immense superiority in numbers, he thought it best to endeavour to gain the Adige. He had merely retained garrisons in the works of Salionzo and Valleggio, in order to be able to effect his retreat in safety, and to carry off his wounded. Brune allowed him time to do so. During the 25th, he proceeded no farther than Salionzo and Valleggio; that is to say, he marched 3000 toises. On the following day, the redoubts of Salionzo were surrounded; 1200 men and several pieces of cannon were taken there. It must be supposed that it was through an error of the Austrian staff that these garrisons did not receive orders to retreat on Peschiera. At all events, it is difficult to justify the conduct of this general.

The French made an ineffectual attack in attempting to carry Borghetto: the brave 72d demi-brigade, to which it was confided, lost the best of its men. A brisk cannonade of this post, and a few howitzers thrown in, would have been sufficient; for Borghetto cannot be entered without first gaining possession of Valleggio; and when once this latter point is obtained, all that is in Borghetto is taken. In fact, shortly after the attack of the 72d, the garrison of Borghetto surrendered prisoners;

but then the lives of four or five hundred men of this brave demi-brigade had been wantonly thrown away.

XII.—PASSAGE OF THE ADIGE.

In the course of a few days the army advanced; the left to Castelnovo, the right between Legnano and Verona. A detachment had been sent to mask Mantua; and two regiments had been stationed on the banks of the lake of Garda, to cut off all communication by the Mincio between Mantua and Peschiera, which Dombrowski's division was to invest.

The French army passed the Adige on the first of January, that is to say, six days after the passage of the Mincio; an able general would have passed it the following day. This operation was effected, without any obstacle, at Bussolingo. At that season the lower Adige is nearly impracticable. On the following day the enemy evacuated Verona, leaving a garrison in the castle. Rochambeau's division had marched from Lodron on the Adige, by Riva, Torgoli, and Mori. This movement had obliged the Austrians to evacuate La Corona. On the 6th of January they were driven from the heights of Caldiero; the French entered Vi-

cenza ; Moncey's corps was at Roveredo. On the 11th the French army passed the Brenta before Fontanina. During these movements, the army of observation of the South entered Italy : on the 13th it arrived at Milan. In another direction, Macdonald, with the army of the Grisons, had entered Trent on the 7th of January, and pursued the Austrians into the valley of the Brenta ; and, on the 9th, found himself in communication with the army of Italy, by Roveredo. The Austrian army, on the contrary, daily grew weaker. It was, at the opening of the campaign, inferior by one-third to the French army ; and it had, moreover, sustained great losses since that time. The action of Pozzolo had cost it many men killed and wounded ; and its losses in prisoners amounted to 5 or 6000 men. The garrisons the Austrians had left in Mantua, Peschiera, Verona, Ferrara, and Porto Legnano, had greatly reduced it. All these losses disabled it from maintaining any line against the French army. When once the Adige was passed, the Austrian army was obliged to send part of its forces to guard the debouches of the Tyrol ; and these troops were kept in action by the army of the Grisons, which was arriving in line. General Baraguey d'Hilliers was at

Botzen. The news of the arrival of the army of the Rhine at the gates of Vienna were now added to all the other grounds of discouragement of the Austrian army. In short, this army must have been very weak and very much disheartened, since it did not keep the heights of Caldiero, but suffered the French army to clear all the points which it might have disputed. As soon as the French had passed the Brenta, General Bellegarde renewed the request of an armistice.

General Marmont and Colonel Sebastiani were intrusted by the General-in-chief to negotiate this armistice. The First Consul's orders most positively forbade the conclusion of any such convention, until the French army should be on the Isonzo, in order to cut off the Austrian army from Venice, which would have obliged it to leave a strong garrison in that city, the inhabitants of which were not well disposed towards the Austrians. This circumstance might have procured the French army new advantages. But, above all, the First Consul had insisted that nothing should be concluded before the fortified city of Mantua should be taken. The French general shewed little talent in this negotiation; and he signed the armistice at Treviso, on the 16th of January.

Brune, of his own accord, declined demanding Mantua, which was the only political question. He contented himself with obtaining Peschiera, Porto Legnano, Ferrara, &c. The garrisons of these places were not made prisoners of war; they carried off with them their artillery and half the stores of the fortresses: the flotilla of Peschiera, which belonged of right to the French army, was not even given up.

The convention of Treviso proved beyond question the weakness of the negotiators who concluded it. It is evident that all the conditions were in favour of Austria. In consequence of the advantages which the French army had obtained, and on account of its superiority in numbers and spirit, Peschiera, Ferrara, &c., were places taken: this, therefore, was restoring to a vanquished enemy garrisons amounting in the whole to 5 or 6000 men, artillery, provisions, and a flotilla. The only place capable of holding out long enough to assist Austria in supporting a new campaign, was Mantua; and this fortress was not only suffered to remain in the power of the enemy, but a circuit of eight hundred toises was allowed it, with liberty to receive more provisions than were necessary for the garrison and inhabitants.

The First Consul was dissatisfied, not only on account of the numerous errors committed in this campaign, but at seeing his orders transgressed, the success of the negotiations endangered, and his situation in Italy rendered precarious. He immediately informed Brune that he refused to recognize the convention of Treviso, ordering him to announce that hostilities would recommence unless Mantua was given up. The First Consul caused the same declaration to be made to Count Cobentzel, at Luneville. That minister, who at length began to be convinced of the necessity of treating with sincerity, and whose pride had stooped under the catastrophe with which his master was threatened, signed an order to deliver up Mantua to the French army, on the 26th of January. This surrender took place accordingly, on the 17th of February, and on these conditions the armistice was continued. This campaign of Italy shewed the limits of Brune's talents, and the First Consul never more employed him in important commands. Although this general had evinced the most brilliant valour, and great decision, at the head of a brigade, it appeared that he was not formed to command an army.

The French had, nevertheless, been con-

stantly victorious in this campaign, and all the fortresses of Italy were in their hands. They were masters of the Tyrol, and of three-fourths of the terra firma of the territory of Venice; the line of demarcation of the French army extending along the left bank of the Livenza, from Sally to the sea, the ridge of the mountains between the Piave and Zeliné, and running down the Drave as far as Lintz, where it joined the line of the armistice of Germany.

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XIII.—ARMY OF OBSERVATION OF THE SOUTH.

General Miollis, who had remained in Tuscany, commanded a body of from 5 to 6000 men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery; the greater part of which troops were Italian. The garrisons he was compelled to leave in Leghorn, Lucca, the castle of Florence, and other places, left him a disposable force of only 3500 or 4000 men. General de Damas, with a body of 16,000 men, of whom 8000 were Neapolitans, had taken up a position on the confines of Tuscany, after having crossed the states of the Pope. He was to combine his operations, in Romagna and the Ferrarese, with some insurgent troops driven from Tus-

cany by the national guard of Bologna, and by a moveable column which General Brune had detached to the right of the Po. The retreat of the Austrian army, which had been successively forced to pass the Po, the Mincio, the Adige, and the Brenta, had disconcerted all the schemes of the enemy with regard to the right bank of the Po. General Miollis, established at Florence, preserved order in the interior; and the batteries raised at Leghorn kept the English ships at a distance. The Austrians, who had shewn themselves in Tuscany, had retired; part on Venice, to reinforce the garrison of that city, and part on Ancona.

On the 14th of January, General Miollis, having learned that a division of 5 or 6000 men of the corps of Damas had marched on Siena, and excited the populace to insurrection, felt the necessity of striking a blow calculated to prevent and stop the insurrections which were ready to break out in several other directions. He took advantage of the error which General Damas, an officer devoid of all military talent and merit, had just committed, in detaching a part of his force to so great a distance, and marched against this corps with 3000 men. General Miollis fell in with the Neapolitans and

them back on that city, broke down the gates with cannon and the axe, and put to the sword all he could find in arms. During several subsequent days he caused the remains of these bands to be pursued, and drove them out of Tuscany, the tranquillity of which country he thus restored and maintained.

In the mean time, fresh forces had marched from Naples to reinforce the army of M. de Damas.

General Murat, commander-in-chief of the third army of reserve, which had just received the denomination of *Army of observation of Italy*, and the head-quarters of which were fixed at Geneva, passed the little Saint-Bernard, Mount Genevre, and Mount Cenis, in the beginning of January, and reached Milan on the 13th. This army continued its route on Florence; it was composed of the divisions of Tarreau and Mathieu, and of a division of cavalry. One of the articles of the convention of Treviso purported that the fortress of Ancona should be surrendered to the French army. General Murat consequently received orders to take possession of that fortress, to drive the Neapolitan troops out of the states of the Popè, and even to threaten them in the interior of the kingdom of Naples. This general, having arrived at Flo-

rence on the 20th of January, despatched General Paulet, with a brigade of 3000 men of all arms, to take possession of Ancona and its forts. The latter passed at Cesena on the 23d of January, and on the 27th took possession of the town and forts of Ancona. The First Consul had, however, directed that the greatest respect should be paid to the Pope. General Murat had even written from Florence, on the 24th of January, to the Cardinal, his Holiness's first minister, to inform him of the First Consul's intentions, and of the entrance of the army of observation into the states of his Holiness, in order to occupy Ancona, in pursuance of the convention of the 16th; and to restore to his Holiness the free government of his states, by forcing the Neapolitans to evacuate the castle of Saint-Angelo and the territory of Rome. He also apprised the Cardinal, that he had orders to approach Rome only in case the Pope should think it necessary.

The French general, immediately on his arrival in Tuscany, had written to M. de Damas, calling on him to explain the motives of his offensive movement in Tuscany, and informing him that he must immediately evacuate the Roman territory. General Damas had sent him an answer from Vitetbo, stating that the

operations of the corps under his command had always been intended to combine with those of M. de Bellegarde's army; that when General Miollis had attacked his van-guard at Siena, twenty-six miles from his main body, he was about to retreat on Rome, in imitation of the movement of the Austrian army on the Brenta; but that, as an armistice had been concluded with the Austrians, the troops which he commanded, being those of a court in alliance with the Emperor, considered themselves also in armistice with the French,

General Murat immediately replied, that the armistice concluded with the Austrian army did not in any respect concern the Neapolitan forces; that it was therefore indispensable that they should abandon the castle of Saint-Angelo and the states of the Pope; that the First Consul's respect for the Emperor of Russia was the only thing that could protect the King of Naples; but that neither the armistice nor the Cabinet of Vienna could afford him the least assistance. At the same time General Murat put his little army in motion. The two divisions of infantry were directed, on the 28th of January, by the Arezzo road; on Foligno and Perruvio, where they arrived on the 4th of February. General Paulet had orders to pro-

ceed with two battalions from Ancona to Foligno, through Macerata and Tolentino. During these movements, the artillery, which was on its way to Florence by the debouché of Pistoia, received orders to continue its route by Bologna and Ancona. Thus the corps of observation was marching without its artillery; an error that never can be excused, unless the roads by which the army is marching be absolutely impracticable for cannon. Now that from Bologna to Florence is not so, being passable for carriages. As soon as the Neapolitan army received intelligence of the march of the corps of observation, it fell back, with all possible speed, on the walls of Rome.

General Paulet, on his arrival at Ancona, had immediately caused the authority and colours of the Pope to be restored there; which excited the gratitude of the Pontiff, who immediately caused Cardinal Gonsalvi to write to General Murat, on the 31st of January, to express to him “*the lively regard which he felt for the First Consul; on whom,*” said he, “*depends the tranquillity of religion, as well as the happiness of Europe.*”

On the 9th of February the French army was stationed on the Neva, extending to its junction

with the Tiber, and to the confines of the states of the King of Naples.

At length, after several conferences, General Murat, out of consideration for Russia, consented, on the 18th of February, at Foligno, to sign an armistice of thirty days between his corps and the Neapolitan troops. According to this armistice they were to evacuate Rome and the states of the Pope. On the 1st of March, in consequence of the arrival at Naples of Colonel Beaumont, General Murat's aide-de-camp, an embargo was laid on all the English ships in the ports of that kingdom. All the English were expelled the country, and the Neapolitan army returned to its native territories. On the 28th of March following, a treaty of peace was signed at Florence, between the French Republic and the Court of Naples, by Citizen Alquier and the Chevalier Micheroux. According to one of the articles of this treaty, a body of French troops was, whenever the King of Naples should require it, to be placed at his disposal, to secure that kingdom from the attacks of the English and Turks. By virtue of this same article, General Soult was sent, on the 2d of April, with a corps of from 10 to 12,000 men, to occupy Otranto,

Brindisi, Tarento, and the whole extremity of the peninsula, in order to establish more easy communications with the army of Egypt. This corps reached its destination about the 25th of April. In the course of that month, Tuscany was placed in the power of the King of Etruria, conformably to the treaty of Luneville, and to that concluded between France and Spain. The English, however, still occupied the Isle of Elba. On the 1st of May, Colonel Marietty, having sailed from Bastia with six hundred men, landed near Marciana, in that island, to take possession thereof according to the treaty concluded with the King of Naples. On the following day he entered Porto Longone, after having dispersed a considerable assemblage of armed peasants, English, and deserters. Here he was joined, on the following day, by the General of division Tharreau, who had embarked at Piombino with a French battalion and three hundred Poles. These troops immediately marched together to surround Porto-Ferrajo, which was summoned to surrender. Thus all that part of the isle ceded by the treaty of Florence was placed in the power of the French.

OF NEUTRAL POWERS.

I. Of the law of nations observed by belligerent states in war by land; and of that which is observed by them in maritime war.—II. Of the principles of the maritime rights of neutral powers.—III. Of the armed neutrality of 1780, the principles of which, being those of France, Spain, Holland, Russia, Prussia, Denmark, and Sweden, were in opposition to the claims of the English at that period.—IV. New claims of England successively brought forward during the war of the Revolution, from 1793 to 1800. America acknowledges these pretensions; consequent discussions with France.—V. Opposition to these claims on the part of Russia, Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia. Ensuing events. Convention of Copenhagen, in which, notwithstanding the presence of an English fleet of superior force, Denmark acknowledges none of the pretensions of England, the discussion thereof being adjourned.—VI. Treaty of Paris between the French Republic and the United States of America, by which the differences which had arisen between the two powers, in consequence of the submission of the Americans to the claims of England, are terminated. France and America solemnly proclaim the principles of the maritime rights of neutrals.—VII. Causes of the Emperor Paul's dissatisfaction with England.—VIII. Russia, Denmark, Sweden, and Prussia, proclaim the principles acknowledged by the treaty of the 30th of September between France and America. The Convention, called the *Armed Neutrality*, signed on the 16th of December, 1800.—IX. War between England, on the one side,

and Russia, Denmark, Sweden, and Prussia, on the other; which proves that these powers were as far from acknowledging the claims of the English, as France, Holland, America, or Spain.—X. Battle of Copenhagen, April 2d, 1801.—XI. Assassination of the Emperor Paul I.—XII. Russia, Sweden, and Denmark desist from the principles of the armed neutrality. New principles of the rights of neutrals acknowledged by these powers. Treaty of June 17, 1801, signed by Lord St. Helen's. These new principles binding only on the powers who have acknowledged them by treaty.

I.

THE law of nations, in barbarous ages, was the same by land as by sea. Individuals of belligerent nations were made prisoners, whether they were taken in arms, or were private inhabitants; and they could only avoid slavery by paying a ransom. Moveable, and even landed property, was wholly or partly confiscated. Civilization rapidly developed its effects, and has entirely altered the law of nations in war by land, without having had the same effect in that which is carried on by sea: so that, as if there were two kinds of right and justice, affairs are regulated by two different laws. The law of nations in war by land, no longer allows of the plundering of individuals, or of any alteration in their personal condition. War operates only against govern-

ments. Thus property does not change hands; the warehouses of merchants remain untouched, and individuals continue personally free. None are considered prisoners of war, but those who are taken with arms in their hands, and who belong to military bodies. This alteration has greatly diminished the evils of war. It has rendered the conquest of a nation more easy, and made war less sanguinary and less calamitous. A conquered province takes an oath, and, if the victor requires it, gives hostages and delivers up its arms: the public contributions are received by the conqueror for his own profit, who, if he deems it necessary, decrees an extraordinary contribution, either to provide for the support of his army, or to indemnify himself for the expenses to which he has been put by the war. But this contribution has no reference to the value of goods in store; it is merely a proportionable increase, greater or less in amount, of the ordinary contributions. This contribution seldom amounts to so much as the annual taxes received by the prince of the country, and it is laid on the whole of the state, so that it never produces the ruin of any individual.

The law of nations, which regulates maritime war, has remained in all its pristine barbarity.

cated; persons non-combatant are made prisoners. When two nations are at war, all the ships of both parties, whether at sea or in port, are subject to confiscation, and the individuals on board such ships are made prisoners of war. Thus, by an evident contradiction, an English ship (supposing a war between England and France) being in the port of Nantes, for instance, shall be confiscated the moment war is declared; the men on board shall be prisoners of war, although non-combatant and private citizens: whilst a warehouse of English merchandize, belonging to Englishmen living in the same town, shall neither be sequestrated nor confiscated, and the English merchants travelling in France shall not be made prisoners of war, but shall receive their itinerary and necessary passports to quit the territory. An English vessel at sea, seized by a French ship, shall be confiscated, although its cargo belong to private persons; the individuals found on board this vessel shall be prisoners of war, although non-combatant: and yet a convoy of a hundred waggons of merchandize belonging to English subjects proceeding through France, at the moment of the rupture between the two powers, shall not be seized.

In war by land, not even the territorial pro-

erty possessed by foreigners is subject to confiscation: it can at most be sequestered. The laws which regulate war by land are therefore more consistent with civilization and the welfare of individuals; and it is to be wished that a time may come when the same liberal ideas may extend to maritime war, and the naval armies of two powers may fight without occasioning the confiscation of merchant ships, or making merchant seamen and civil passengers prisoners of war. Commerce would then be carried on, at sea, between belligerent nations, as it now is by land, amidst the battles fought by opposing armies.

II.

The sea is the domain of all nations; it extends over three fourths of the globe, and forms a connexion between the different nations. A ship laden with merchandize, sailing on the sea, is subject to the civil and criminal laws of its sovereign, as if it were in the interior of his states. A ship at sea may be considered as a floating colony, in the sense that all nations are equally sovereign at sea. If the merchant vessels of the belligerent powers could sail freely, there could, *à fortiori*,

be no inquest to exercise over neutrals. But as it is become a principle that the merchant-ships of belligerent powers are liable to confiscation, a right necessarily resulted hence for all ships of war of belligerent powers to satisfy themselves of the flag of any neutral ship they meet with; for, if it should belong to the enemy, they would have a right to confiscate it. Thence results the right of search which all powers have acknowledged by different treaties; thence the right of belligerent vessels to send their boats on board of neutral merchant-ships, to demand inspection of their papers, and thus satisfy themselves of their flag. In treaties, it has been stipulated that this right should be exercised with all possible consideration, that the armed ship should keep out of the range of cannon, and that only two or three men should board the ship visited, in order that there should be no appearance of force or violence. It has been agreed that a ship belongs to the power whose flag it bears, when it is provided with regular passports and certificates, and when the captain and half the crew are natives of that country. Every power has engaged, by various treaties, to prohibit its neutral subjects from carrying on a contraband trade with

belligerent powers; and they have designated as contraband the trade in ammunition of war, as powder, bullets, shells, firelocks, saddles, bridles, cuirasses, &c. Every vessel having these articles on board is considered to have transgressed its sovereign's orders, the latter having engaged to prohibit his subjects from carrying on this trade; and the contraband articles are confiscated accordingly.

Thus the search made by cruisers became no longer a mere visit to satisfy themselves of the flag; and the cruiser exercised, even in the name of the sovereign under whose flag the vessel that was visited sailed, a new right of search, to ascertain whether the ship did not carry contraband goods. The men of the hostile nation, but the military men only, were assimilated to the contraband effects. Thus this inspection did not derogate from the principle that the flag covers the goods.

A third case soon occurred. Neutral vessels presented themselves to enter places besieged and blockaded by hostile squadrons. These neutral vessels did not carry military stores, but provisions, wood, wines, and other goods likely to be of service to the place besieged, and to prolong its defence. After long discussions between the different powers, they

agreed, by various treaties, that whenever a place should really be blockaded, so that it would evidently be dangerous for any ship to attempt to enter it, the commander of the blockade might forbid the neutral ship to enter such place; and if, notwithstanding such prohibition, it should employ force or stratagem for the purpose of introducing itself, he should be at liberty to confiscate it.

Thus the maritime laws are founded upon the following principles: 1st, The flag covers the merchandize. 2dly, A neutral ship may be visited by a belligerent vessel, to ascertain its flag and cargo, so far as to be satisfied that it carries no contraband goods. 3dly, Contraband goods are considered to be military stores only. 4thly, Neutral ships may be prevented from entering a place that is besieged, if the blockade be real, and the entrance be evidently dangerous. These principles form the maritime law of neutrals, because the different governments have, freely, and by treaty, engaged to observe them, and cause them to be observed by their subjects. The different maritime powers, Holland, Portugal, Spain, France, England, Sweden, Denmark, and Russia, have, at different periods successively contracted these engagements with each

other, and they have been proclaimed at the general treaties of pacification, such as at those of Westphalia in 1646, and Utrecht in 1712.

III.

England, in the American war of 1778, pretended, 1st, that materials adapted for building ships, such as timber, hemp, tar, &c. were contraband; 2dly, that although a neutral ship had a right to go from a friendly port to an enemy's port, it could not traffic between one hostile port and another; 3dly, that neutral ships could not sail from the enemy's colony to the mother-country; 4thly, that neutral powers had no right to have their merchant-ships convoyed by ships of war; and that, if they did so, this would not exempt them from search.

No independent power would submit to these unjust claims. In fact, the sea being the dominion of all nations, no one has a right to regulate the legislation of what passes there. Ships carrying a neutral flag are only allowed to be searched, because the sovereign himself has permitted it by treaty. Military stores are only contraband, because it has been so

determined by treaty. Belligerent powers have a right to seize them, only because the sovereign under whose flag the neutral vessel sails has himself engaged not to allow this kind of commerce. You are not, it was said to the English, to augment the list of contraband goods at your pleasure; and no neutral power has engaged to prohibit the trade in naval stores, such as timber, hemp, tar, &c.

As to the second claim, it was added, it is contrary to received usage. You ought not to interfere in the operations of commerce, except to satisfy yourselves of the flag, and that no contraband articles are carried. You have no right to know what is done in a neutral ship, because that ship, on the high seas, is at home, and by right out of your power. She is not covered by the batteries of her country, but she is so by the moral power of her sovereign.

The third pretension has no better foundation. The state of war can have no influence on neutrals; whatever, therefore, they could do in peace, they may do in war. Now, in time of peace, you would have no right to prevent or object to their carrying on the commerce between the mother-country and its colonies. If foreign ships are prevented from carrying on

this commerce, it is not in pursuance of the law of nations, but by a municipal law; and whenever a power has chosen to allow strangers to trade with its colonies, no one has any right to oppose it.

With respect to the fourth claim, it was answered, that, as the right of search only existed for the purpose of ascertaining the flag and searching for contraband goods, an armed ship commissioned by the sovereign was a much better proof of the flag and cargo of the merchant-ships in its convoy, as well as the rules relative to contraband trade decreed by its master, than the search of the papers of a merchant-ship could be; that the result of this claim might be that a convoy, escorted by a fleet of eight or ten seventy-four-gun ships, belonging to a neutral power, might be subjected to search by a single brig or cruiser of a belligerent power.

At the time of the American war, in 1778, M. de Castries, the Minister of the Marine of France, caused a new regulation relating to the commerce of neutrals to be adopted. This regulation was drawn up according to the spirit of the treaty of Utrecht and the rights of neutrals. The four principles above asserted were therein proclaimed; and it was de-

clared that it should be executed for six months, after which it should cease to be in force with respect to those neutral nations which should not have induced England to respect their rights.

This conduct was just and politic ; it satisfied all the neutral powers, and threw a new light on this question. The Dutch, who then had the most considerable trade, being annoyed by the English cruisers, and the decisions of the Admiralty of London, had their convoys escorted by ships of war. The English advanced this strange principle, that neutrals cannot escort their own merchant convoys ; or, at least, that their doing so does not exempt them from search. A convoy, escorted by several Dutch ships of war, was attacked, taken, and carried into English ports. This event filled Holland with indignation, and she soon afterwards united with France and Spain, and declared war against England.

Catherine, Empress of Russia, took part in these important questions. The dignity of her flag, the interest of her empire, the commerce of which chiefly consisted in articles proper for ship-building, induced her to come to a resolution to form an armed neutrality with Sweden and Denmark. These powers declared they

would make war on any belligerent power which should infringe the following principles:—1st, That the flag covers the cargo (except contraband goods);—2dly, That the search of a neutral ship by a vessel of war should be made with all possible respect;—3dly, That military stores only, cannon, powder, shot, &c. are contraband articles;—4thly, That every power has a right to convoy its merchant-ships, and that in that case the declaration of the commander of a ship of war is sufficient to justify the flag and the cargoes of the ships under convoy;—5thly, and lastly, That a port is only blockaded by a squadron, when it is evidently dangerous to enter it; but that a neutral ship cannot be prevented from entering a port which has been blockaded by a force no longer present before the port, at the moment when the ship presents itself, whatever may be the cause of the removal of the blockading force, whether arising from the state of the wind, or the necessity of obtaining supplies of provisions.

This neutrality of the North was signified to the belligerent powers on the 15th of August, 1780. France and Spain, whose principles it solemnly asserted, eagerly adhered to it. England alone testified extreme displeasure; but,

not daring to brave the new confederation, she contented herself with relaxing in the execution of all her claims, and did not give room for any complaint on the part of the neutral confederate powers. Thus, by not carrying her principles into execution, she virtually renounced them. Fifteen months after, the peace of 1783 concluded the maritime war.

IV.

The war between France and England began in 1793. England soon became the soul of the first coalition. Whilst the Austrian, Prussian, Spanish, and Piedmontese armies were invading our frontiers, she used all possible means to effect the ruin of our colonies. The capture of Toulon, where our squadron was burnt, the insurrection of the provinces of the West, in which so great a number of seamen perished, annihilated our navy. Upon this, England no longer set bounds to her ambition. Thenceforth, preponderating and unrivalled at sea, she thought the moment was come when she might, without danger, proclaim her subjugation of the seas. She resumed the pretensions she had tacitly renounced in 1780, that is to say, 1st, That materials for ship-building are contraband;—2dly, That neutrals have no

right to have their trading vessels convoyed; or, at least, that the declaration of the commander of the convoy does not annul the right of search;—3dly, That a place may be blockaded, not only by the presence of a squadron, but even when the squadron is removed from before the port by tempests, or the necessity of taking in water, &c. She went still farther, and brought forward these three new pretensions:—1st, That the flag does not cover the merchandize, but that the merchandize and property of an enemy, in a neutral bottom, are liable to confiscation;—2dly, That a neutral ship has no right to carry on trade between colonies and their mother-country;—3dly, That although a neutral ship may enter an enemy's port, she cannot go from one hostile port to another.

The government of America, seeing the maritime power of France annihilated, and fearing, on its own account, the influence of the French party, which was composed of the most violent characters, thought it necessary for its own preservation to conciliate England; and submitted to all that was prescribed to it by that power, for the purpose of incumbering and injuring the commerce

The altercations between France and the United States became warm. The envoys of the French Republic, Genet, Adet, and Fauchet, urgently demanded the execution of the treaty of 1778; but they had little success. Various legislative measures analogous to those of the Americans were consequently taken in France; several disputes occurred at sea, and the differences arose to such a pitch of animosity, that France was, in a manner, at war with America. The former of the two nations, however, came triumphantly through the struggle which menaced her existence; anarchy disappeared before order and a regular government. The Americans then felt the importance of conciliating France. The President himself was sensible how much that power was in the right, in protesting against the treaty which he had concluded with England: and, in his heart, he was ashamed of an act which nothing but the force of circumstances had induced him to sign. Messrs. Pinckney, Marshal, and Gerry, charged with the full powers of the American government, arrived at Paris at the end of 1797. Everything encouraged the hope of a speedy reconciliation between the two Republics; but the

treaty of 1794, and the relinquishment of the rights of neutrality, were essentially injurious to the interest of France; and there could be no hope of inducing the United States to return to the execution of the treaty of 1778, or to remember what they owed to France and to themselves, except by effecting a change in their internal organization.

In consequence of the events of the Revolution, the federalist party had gained the ascendancy in that country; but the democratic party was, nevertheless, the most numerous. The Directory thought to strengthen it by refusing to receive two of the American plenipotentiaries, because they were attached to the federalist party, and by acknowledging the third only, who belonged to the opposite party. The Directory farther declared that it could enter into no negotiation until America should have made reparation for the injuries of which the French Republic had to complain; and, on the 18th of January, 1798, solicited a law from the councils, purporting that the neutrality of a ship should not be determined by its flag, but by the nature of its cargo; and that every ship, laden, wholly or in part, with English goods, might be confiscated. The law was just towards America, as

being only in reprisal for the treaty which that power had signed with England in 1794; but it was, nevertheless, impolitic and ill timed; it was subversive of all the rights of neutrals. - It was declaring that the flag no longer covered the goods; or, in other words, declaring that the seas belonged to the strongest party. It was acting according to the views and interest of England, which power beheld, with secret joy, France proclaiming English principles, and authorizing English usurpation. The Americans were then, undoubtedly, nothing more than the factors of England; but municipal laws, regulating the commerce of France with the Americans, would have destroyed an order of things contrary to the interests of the French; the Republic might have declared, at most, that English goods should be contraband, under those flags which acknowledged the new pretensions of the English. The result of this law was disastrous to the Americans. The French cruisers made numerous prizes; and according to the letter of the law, they were all good. If an American ship had a few tons of English merchandizè on board, it was enough to condemn the whole cargo. At the same time, as if there were not already sufficient causes of irritation and disunion

between the two countries, the Directory caused an application to be made to the American envoys for a loan of forty-eight millions of francs ; grounding their request on the loan formerly made by France to the United States, to enable them to shake off the yoke of England. The intriguing agents, of whom the ministry for exterior relations was full at that period, insinuated that this loan would not be insisted on, provided a sum of twelve hundred thousand francs were paid, which money was to be divided between the Director B * * * * * and the minister T * * * * *.

This intelligence was received in America in the month of March ; the President communicated it to the Chamber on the 4th of April. Men of all parties rallied around him ; the independence of America was even thought to be menaced. All the gazettes and newspapers were full of the preparations which were making in France for the expedition to Egypt ; and whether the American government really apprehended an invasion, or whether it affected to apprehend it, in order to excite the public mind still more powerfully, and to strengthen the federalist party, it caused the command of the army of defence to be intrusted to General Washington. On the 26th

of May, an Act of Congress passed, authorizing the President to order the commanders of American ships of war to capture every vessel found near the coasts with the intention of committing depredations on shipping belonging to citizens of the United States, and to retake such of the latter ships as might be captured. On the 9th of June, all commercial relations with France were, by a new Bill, suspended. On the 25th, the treaties of 1778, and the Consular Convention of the 4th of November, 1788, were declared void by a new Bill, purporting that the United States were discharged and exonerated from the stipulations of the said treaties. The motives of this Bill were stated to be—1st, That the French Republic had repeatedly violated the treaties concluded with the United States, to the great detriment of the citizens of that country; by confiscating, for instance, merchandize belonging to the enemies of France on board American ships, notwithstanding it was agreed that the vessel saved the cargo; by fitting out privateers, against the rights of neutrality, in the ports of the Union; and by treating American sailors, found on board hostile ships, as pirates, &c.;—2dly, That France, notwithstanding the wish of the United States

to set on foot an amicable negotiation, and instead of making reparation for the damage occasioned by such flagrant injustice, had dared, in a haughty manner, to demand a tribute, in the shape of a loan or otherwise. Towards the end of July, the last American plenipotentiary, Mr. Gerry, who had until then remained at Paris, set out for America.

France had just been humbled; the second coalition had gained possession of Italy, and attacked Holland. The French government caused some advances to be made by its minister in Holland, M. Pichon, to the American envoy to the Dutch government. Overtures were made to Mr. Adams, the President of the United States. At the opening of Congress, he stated the attempts which had been made by the French government to renew the negotiations, saying, that although it was the wish of the United States not to come to an absolute rupture with France, it was nevertheless impossible to send the new plenipotentiaries thither without degrading the American nation, until the French government should first give proper assurances that the sacred rights of ambassadors should be respected. He concluded his speech by recom-

American nation was far from coinciding in opinion with Mr. Adams, with respect to war with France. The President yielded to the general opinion, and, on the 25th of February, 1799, appointed Messrs. Ellsworth, Henry, and Murray, ministers plenipotentiary to the French Republic, to terminate all differences between the two powers. They landed in France in the beginning of 1800.

The death of Washington, which happened on the 15th of December, 1799, gave the First Consul an opportunity of making known his sentiments towards the United States of America. He put on mourning for that great citizen, and directed all his army to wear it likewise, by the following order of the day, dated the 9th of February, 1800:—*Washington is dead! That great man fought against tyranny, and established the liberty of his country: his memory will always be dear to the French people, as well as to all freemen in both hemispheres, and especially to French soldiers, who, like him and the soldiers of America, fight for equality and liberty.* The First Consul further ordered, that for ten days all the colours and standards of the Republic should be hung with black crape.

V.

On the 9th of February, a ceremony took place at Paris, in the *Champ-de-Mars*. The trophies won by the army of the East were carried on this occasion in great pomp; new honours were paid to the American hero; whose funeral oration M. Fontanes pronounced before all the civil and military authorities of the capital. These circumstances banished from the minds of the envoys from the United States all traces of doubt with respect to the success of their negotiation.

The treaty of 1794, between England and America, had been a complete triumph to England; but it had been disapproved of by the neutral powers of Europe. On every occasion, Denmark, Sweden, and Russia, were eager to proclaim the principles of the armed neutrality of 1780.

On the 4th of July, 1798, the Swedish frigate the *Troya*, escorting a convoy, was met by an English squadron, which compelled her to go into Margate with the vessels under her convoy. As soon as the King of Sweden was informed of the circumstance, he gave orders to the commandant of the convoy to proceed to his destination. But a short time afterwards,

a second convoy, from the ports of Sweden, under the escort of a frigate (the *Hulla Fersen*), commanded by Captain Cederstrom, was treated in the same manner as the former. The King of Sweden had the two commanding officers of the convoy frigates brought before a council of war; Captain Cederstrom was condemned to death.

At the same period an English ship seized a Swedish vessel, and took her into Elsinore; but being soon afterwards blockaded in that port by several Danish frigates, she was compelled to restore her prize. In the course of the two succeeding years, the dispute grew warmer. The destruction of the French squadron at Aboukir, and the misfortunes of France in the campaign of 1799, inflated the pride of the English. About the end of December 1799, the Danish frigate the *Hanfene*, Captain Van Dookum, was escorting merchantmen of that nation, when, as she was entering the straits, she fell in with several English frigates. One of them despatched a boat to inform the Danish captain that his convoy was to be searched. The latter replied that the convoy was of his nation, and under his escort, that he would guarantee their flag and cargoes, and would not suffer them to

be examined. An English boat immediately made up to one of the ships convoyed, in order to search her. The Danish frigate fired, wounded an Englishman, and seized the boat; which, however, Captain Van Dockum released, on the threat of the English to commence hostilities immediately. The convoy was carried to Gibraltar.

In a note dated the 10th of April, by which Mr. Merry, the English envoy at Copenhagen, demanded the disclaimer, apology, and reparation, which the British government was entitled to receive, he said: "The right of visiting and searching neutral vessels on the high seas, to whatever nation they may belong, and whatever may be their cargo or destination, is considered by the British government as the incontestable right of every belligerent nation; a right which is founded on the law of nations, and has been generally admitted and acknowledged." To this note M. Bernstorff, the Danish minister, replied, that the right of searching ships under convoy had never been acknowledged by any independent maritime power, and that they could not submit to it without degrading their own flag; that the conventional right of searching a neutral merchant-ship had only been allowed to bellige-

rent powers to enable them to satisfy themselves of its title to the flag it sails under; that such title is much better established when it is certified by a ship of war of the neutral nation; that were it otherwise, the consequence would be that the greatest squadrons, escorting a convoy, would be liable to the insult of having it searched by a brig, or even by a privateer. He concluded by saying that the Danish captain, who had repelled an act of violence which he had no reason to expect, had only done his duty.

The Danish frigate the *Freya*, escorting a merchant convoy, fell in with four English frigates, at the entrance of the Channel, on the 25th of July, 1800, about eleven o'clock in the morning. One of them sent an officer on board of the *Dane* to inquire whither she was bound, and to give notice that they should search the convoy. Captain Krapp answered that his convoy was Danish; shewed the English officer the papers and certificates proving his instructions, and declared that he would oppose any search. An English frigate then bore down upon the convoy, which was immediately ordered to rally to the *Freya*. At the same time another frigate approached the latter, and fired on a merchantman. The

Dane returned her fire, but in such a manner that the ball passed over the English frigate. About eight o'clock the English commodore arrived with his ship, near the Freya, and repeated his demand to search the convoy without opposition. On Captain Krapp's refusal, an English sloop bore down on the nearest merchantman. The Dane gave orders to fire on the sloop; upon which the English commodore, who lay alongside the Freya, poured in his whole broadside upon her. The latter returned his fire, and engaged the four English frigates for an hour; but at length, despairing of victory over such superior forces, struck her flag. She had received thirty shot in the hull, and a great number in her masts and rigging. She was taken, with her convoy, into the Downs, where she was anchored alongside the admiral's ship. The English had the Danish flag hoisted on board of the Freya, where they placed a guard of English soldiers unarmed.

In the mean time great exasperation prevailed. Denmark, Sweden, and Russia, equipped their squadrons, and loudly declared their determination to maintain their rights by arms. Lord Whitworth was sent to Copenhagen, where he arrived on the 14th of July, with the

necessary powers for endeavouring to effect an amicable arrangement. This negotiator was supported by a fleet of twenty-five ships of the line, under the command of Admiral Dickenson, which appeared, on the 19th of August, before the Sound. All were in arms on the coast of Denmark; the commencement of hostilities was every moment expected. But the allied fleets of Sweden and Russia were not ready. Those powers had entertained hopes that threats would suffice; and not having expected so sudden an attack, they had formed no treaty on the subject. After long conferences, Lord Whitworth and Count Bernstorff signed a convention on the 31st of August. It was therein stipulated; 1st, That the right of searching ships sailing without convoy should be considered in a future discussion; 2dly, That his Danish Majesty, to avoid such occurrences as that of the frigate the Freya, should dispense with convoying any of his merchant-vessels, until a definitive convention could be effected by means of ulterior explanations on the subject; 3dly, That the Freya and her convoy should be released; and that the frigate should be supplied,

necessary for her repairs, and that according to the custom of friendly and allied powers.

It is evident that England and Denmark were both merely seeking to gain time. Denmark, by means of this convention made under the cannon of a superior English fleet, escaped an imminent danger which threatened her; she acknowledged none of the claims of England, but merely sacrificed her just resentment, and the atonement she had a right to demand, for the insults offered to her flag.

As soon as the Emperor of Russia, Paul I., was informed of the entrance of an English fleet into the Baltic, with hostile intentions, he put a sequestration on all the English ships in his ports, amounting to several hundred. He also caused a declaration to be delivered to the captains of all ships sailing from Russian ports, purporting that the search of any Russian vessel by an English ship would be regarded as a declaration of war.

VI.

The First Consul appointed the counsellors of state Joseph Bonaparte, Rœderer, and Fleurieu, to treat with the ministers of the United States. The conferences took place

successively at Paris and at Morfontaine : many difficulties arose. Had the two Republics been at war or at peace ? Neither of them had made any declaration of war ; but the American government had, by its Bill of the 7th of July, 1798, declared the United States exonerated from all the rights which France had acquired by the treaty of the 6th of Feb. 1778. The envoys would not consent to repeal this Bill ; yet there are only two ways in which a nation can lose rights acquired by treaties, namely, by her own consent, or in consequence of war. The Americans demanded indemnity for all the losses they had sustained from the French privateers, and from the law of the 18th of January, 1798. They agreed, on their part, to indemnify French commerce for the losses it had suffered. But the balance of these indemnities was greatly in favour of America. The French plenipotentiaries proposed the following dilemma to the American envoys : “ We are either at war or at peace. If we are at peace, and our present situation is merely a state of misunderstanding, France ought to make good all the damage her privateers may have done you. You have evidently lost more than we, and it is incumbent on us to pay you the difference. But in that case

things ought to be restored to the state they previously stood in, and we ought to enjoy all the rights and privileges we enjoyed before 1778. If, on the contrary, we are at war, you have no right to require indemnity for your losses, and we have no right to insist on privileges granted by treaties which the war has broken off."

The American ministers were much embarrassed. After long discussions, a middle course was adopted; it was declared that the question, as to which of these two situations the two nations should be considered to stand in, should be decided by an ulterior convention. When once this difficulty was removed, it only remained to stipulate for the future; and the principles of the rights of neutrals were fairly entered into. The animosity which existed between the Northern powers and England, the different actions which had already taken place, the various causes which had operated on the temper of the Emperor Paul, the victory of Marengo, which had changed the aspect of Europe, in short, every thing conspired to prove that a clear and liberal declaration of the principles of maritime rights would be of the greatest importance to the interests of all nations. It was

expressly declared, in the new treaty; 1st. That the flag covers the lading: 2dly, That contraband articles can only be understood to be military stores, cannon, firelocks, powder, balls, cuirasses, saddles, &c.: 3dly, That the search of a neutral ship to ascertain its flag, and that it carries no contraband articles, can only be made out of gun-shot of the ship of war that makes the search; that two or three men, at most, should be allowed to go on board the neutral; that in no case should the neutral be obliged to send on board the searching ship; that every ship should carry a certificate to justify its flag; that the mere inspection of this certificate should be sufficient; that a ship carrying contraband goods should only be subject to the confiscation of such contraband articles; that no ship under convoy should be subjected to search; that the declaration of the commander of the escort of a convoy should be sufficient; that the right of blockade ought only to apply to places really blockaded, into which an entrance could not be effected without evident danger, and not to those considered to be blockaded by cruisers; that the property of an enemy is covered by a neutral flag, just as neutral merchandizes,

fate of those ships, except always during the first two months after the declaration of war; that the ships and privateers of the two nations should be treated; in the respective ports, as those of the most favoured nation.

This treaty was signed by the ministers plenipotentiary of the two powers, at Paris, on the 30th of September, 1800. On the 3d of October following, M. Joseph Bonaparte, President of the Commission intrusted with the negotiation, gave an entertainment at his estate of Morfontaine, to the American envoys; the First Consul was present. The principal events of the war of American independence were commemorated in ingenious emblems and appropriate inscriptions; the arms of the two Republics were seen united on all sides. During dinner the First Consul gave the following toast: "*To the manes of the French and Americans who fell in the field of battle, fighting for the independence of the New World.*" The Consul Cambaceres gave, "*To the successor of Washington.*" The following was Lebrun's, "*To the union of America with the Northern powers to enforce respect to the freedom of the seas.*" On the next day, the 4th of October, the American minis

lowing passages were remarked in their speeches:—That they hoped the Convention signed on the 30th of September would be the foundation of a permanent friendship between France and America, and that the American ministers would take every proper step to make it so. The First Consul replied that the differences which had existed were now terminated; that no traces of them ought to be suffered to remain, any more than of a family quarrel; that the liberal principles declared in the Convention of the 30th of September, on the article of navigation, ought to be the basis of the intimate connexion of the two Republics, as well as of their interests; and that, under the then existing circumstances, it was become more than ever important to both nations to adhere to them.

The treaty was ratified on the 18th of February, 1801, by the President of the United States, who suppressed Article 2 thereof, which ran in these terms.

“The ministers plenipotentiary of the two powers, being unable, at present, to come to an agreement, with respect to the treaty of alliance of the 6th of February, 1778, the treaty of amity and commerce of the same

November, 1788; and with respect to the indemnities mutually due or claimed; the parties shall arrange these matters, by ulterior negotiations, at a suitable time; and until they shall be agreed on these points, the said treaties and Convention shall have no effect, and the relations between the two nations shall be regulated in manner following:" &c.

The suppression of this article, at once put an end to the privileges which France had possessed by the treaty of 1778, and annulled the just claims which America might have made for injuries done in time of peace. This was exactly what the First Consul had proposed to himself, in fixing these two points as equiponderating each other. Without this it would have been impossible to satisfy the merchants of the United States, and to banish from their memory the losses they had suffered. The First Consul's ratification of this treaty was dated July 31st, 1801, and declared that it was to be clearly understood that the suppression of Article 2 annulled all claims for indemnity, &c.

It is not usual to modify ratifications. Nothing can be more inconsistent with the object of every treaty of peace, which is to restore harmony and good understanding.

Ratifications ought therefore to be clear and simple; the treaty ought to be transcribed in them without the slightest alteration, in order to avoid entangling the questions in difficulties. If this occurrence could have been foreseen, the plenipotentiaries would have made two copies, the one with Article 2, and the other without it; all would then have proceeded regularly.

VII.

The Emperor Paul had succeeded the Empress Catherine. Half frantic with his hostility to the French Revolution, he had performed what his mother had contented herself with promising; and engaged in the second coalition. General Suwarrow, at the head of 60,000 Russians, advanced in Italy, whilst another Russian army entered Switzerland, and a corps of 15,000 men was placed by the Czar at the disposal of the Duke of York for the purpose of conquering Holland. These were all the disposable forces the Russian empire had. Suwarrow, although victorious at the battles of Cassano, the Trebbia, and Novi, had lost half his army in the Saint-Gothard, and the different valleys of Switzerland, after the battle of Zurich, in which Korsakow had

been taken. Paul then became sensible of all the imprudence of his conduct; and in 1800, Suwarrow returned to Russia with scarcely a fourth of his army. The Emperor Paul complained bitterly of having lost the flower of his troops, who had neither been seconded by the Austrians nor by the English. He reproached the Cabinet of Vienna with having refused, after the conquest of Piedmont, to replace the King of Sardinia upon his throne; with being destitute of grand and generous ideas, and wholly governed by calculation and interested views. He also complained that the English, when they took Malta, instead of reinstating the order of St. John of Jerusalem, and restoring that island to the Knights, had appropriated it to themselves. The First Consul did all in his power to cherish these seeds of discontent, and to make them productive. A little after the battle of Marengo, he found means to flatter the lively and impetuous imagination of the Czar, by sending him the sword which Pope Leo X. had given to l'Ile Adam, as a memorial of his satisfaction, for having defended Rhodes against the infidels. From eight to ten thousand Russian soldiers had been made prisoners in Italy, at Zurich, and in Holland: the First Consul proposed

their exchange to the English and Austrians, both refused; the Austrians, because there were still many of their people prisoners in France; and the English, although they had a great number of French prisoners, because, as they said, this proposal was contrary to their principles. What! it was said to the Cabinet of Saint James's, do you refuse to exchange even the Russians, who were taken in Holland, fighting in your own ranks under the Duke of York? And to the Cabinet of Vienna it was observed, How! do you refuse to restore to their country those men of the North to whom you are indebted for the victories of the Trebbia, and Novi, and for your conquests in Italy, and who have left in your hands a multitude of French prisoners taken by them! Such injustice excites my indignation, said the First Consul. Well! I will restore them to the Czar without exchange; he shall see how I esteem brave men. The Russian officers who were prisoners immediately received their swords, and the troops of that nation were assembled at Aix-la-Chapelle, where they were soon completely new clothed, and furnished with good arms of French manufacture. A Russian general was instructed to organize them in battalions and regiments. This blow

struck at once at London and at Saint-Petersburg. Paul, attacked in so many different directions, gave way to his enthusiastic temper, and attached himself to France with all the ardour of his character. He despatched a letter to the First Consul, in which he said, "Citizen, First Consul, I do not write to you to discuss the rights of men or citizens; every country governs itself as it pleases. Wherever I see at the head of a nation a man who knows how to rule and how to fight, my heart is attracted towards him. I write to acquaint you with my dissatisfaction with England, who violates every article of the law of nations, and has no guide but her egotism and interest. I wish to unite with you to put an end to the unjust proceedings of that government."

In the beginning of December 1800, General Sprengporten, a Finlander, who had entered the Russian service, and who in his heart was attached to France, arrived at Paris. He brought letters from the Emperor Paul, and was instructed to take the command of the Russian prisoners, and to conduct them back to their country. All the officers of that nation, who returned to Russia, constantly spoke in the highest terms of the kind treatment and

attention they had met with in France, particularly after the arrival of the First Consul. The correspondence between the Emperor and Napoleon soon became daily; they treated directly on the most important interests, and on the means of humbling the English power. General Sprengporten was not instructed to make peace; he had no powers for that purpose; neither was he an ambassador; peace did not exist. It was, therefore, an extraordinary mission, which allowed of this general's being treated with every distinction calculated to gratify the sovereign who had sent him, without the possibility of the occurrence of any inconvenience from such attentions.

VIII.

Admiral Dickenson's expedition, and the foregoing convention of Copenhagen, which had been the consequence thereof, had disconcerted the schemes of the three maritime powers of the North, to oppose the tyranny of the English by a league. The English continued to violate all the rights of neutrals; they said, that since they had been able to attack and take the Freya frigate, and carry her into an English port, with her convoy, without Denmark's ceasing to be the ally and friend of

England, the conduct of the English cruiser must have been lawful, and Denmark had thereby acknowledged the principle that she could not convoy her shipping. Nevertheless, the latter power was far from approving of the insolence and pretensions of England. When taken alone, and unprepared, she had yielded; but she was in hopes that under cover of the ice, which would shortly close the Sound and the Baltic, she should be able, in concert with Sweden and Russia, to compel the observance of the rights of neutral powers. Sweden was offended at the conduct of the Cabinet of Saint James's, and as to Russia, we have already made known her motives for animosity towards the English. The treaty of the 30th of September, between France and America, had now proclaimed anew the principles of the independence of the seas: the winter was come; the Czar openly declared for those principles which, as early as the 15th of August, he had proposed to the Northern powers to recognize.

On the 17th of November 1800, the Emperor Paul decreed by an ukase, that all the English property and merchandize, which had been attached in his states, in consequence of the embargo which he had laid on English shipping, should be collected in a mass, to liqui-

date what should be found due to the Russians by the English. He appointed mercantile commissioners to carry this decree into effect. The crews of the ships were considered prisoners of war, and sent into the interior of the empire. At length, on the 16th of December, a convention was signed between Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, to support the rights of neutrality. A short time after, Prussia joined this confederacy. This convention was called the quadruple alliance. Its principal points were, 1st, The flag covers the goods; 2dly, Every ship under convoy is exempt from search; 3dly, No articles can be considered contraband, except military stores, such as cannon, &c.; 4thly, The right of blockade can only be applied to a port really blockaded; 5thly, Every neutral ship ought to have its captain and half its crew of the nation whose flag it bears; 6thly, The ships of war, of each of the contracting powers, shall protect and convoy the merchant-ships of the two others; 7thly, A combined squadron shall be assembled in the Baltic, to secure the execution of this convention.

On the 17th of December the English government ordered a cruise against the Russian shipping; and on the 14th of January 1801, in reprisal of the convention of the 16th of De-

ember 1800, which it called an infringement of its rights, it ordered a general embargo on all the shipping belonging to the three powers who had signed the convention.

As soon as that convention was ratified, the Emperor Paul despatched an officer to the First Consul to communicate it to him. This officer was presented to him at Malmaison on the 20th of January 1801, and delivered his sovereign's letters. On the same day the Consuls published a decree, prohibiting all cruising against Russian ships. There was no occasion to extend this decree to Swedish and Danish vessels, France being at peace with those powers.

On the 12th of February, the Court of Berlin gave notice to the English government of its accession to the convention of the powers of the North, calling upon England to revoke and raise its embargo laid on Danish and Swedish shipping, in opposition to a general principle; distinguishing what related to those two powers from what concerned Russia only.

On the 4th of March, the Swedish minister in England gave in a note to the British Cabinet, in which he communicated the treaty of the 16th of December 1800. He expresses his astonishment at the assertion of England,

that Sweden and the Northern powers were attempting an innovation, when, in fact, they were only supporting the rights established and acknowledged by all powers in preceding treaties, and particularly by England herself in those of 1780, 1783, and 1794. Sweden and Denmark entered into a similar convention; England did not protest, and even looked indifferently on the warlike preparations of those powers to support that treaty. She did not then pretend that such treaty and preparations were an act of hostility; but she was now conducting herself in a different manner: this difference, however, did not arise from any addition made by other powers to their demands; it was only the consequence of a maritime principle which England had adopted, and wished to make other powers adopt in the present war. Thus a power, which had boasted of having taken up arms for the liberty of Europe, was now contriving the subjugation of the seas.

His Swedish Majesty recapitulates the unpunished offences committed by the commanders of English squadrons, even in Swedish ports; the inquisitorial visits to which they had compelled Swedish vessels to submit; the

offered to the Swedish flag before Barcelona; and the refusal of justice, of which the English tribunals had been guilty. His Swedish Majesty did not seek revenge, but only to secure the respect due to his flag. In the mean time, in reprisal for the embargo laid by the English, he placed one on all the English shipping in his ports, which he would raise whenever the English government would make satisfaction for the stoppage of the convoys in 1798, the affair before Barcelona, and the embargo of the 14th of January 1801.

The tenor of the convention of the 16th of December, evidently shews that Sweden entered into no other question than that of the rights of neutrals, and intermeddled in no other dispute. The Danish minister concluded by demanding his passports.

Lord Hawkesbury, in reply to this note, stated that his Britannic Majesty had several times made known his invariable right to defend those maritime principles which the experience of several years had shewn to be the best calculated to secure the rights of belligerent powers. To restore the principles of 1780 at this time, was to commit an act of hostility. The embargo on the Swedish vessels would be continued as long as his Swedish

Majesty should continue to form part of a confederacy tending to establish a system of public law incompatible with the dignity and independence of the English crown, and the rights and interests of his Britannic Majesty's subjects. It may be seen by this answer of Lord Hawkesbury's that the right claimed by England is posterior to the treaty of 1780. It was, therefore, incumbent on him to shew the treaties subsequent to that period, by which other powers had acknowledged the new principles of Great Britain with respect to neutrals.

IX.

Thus war was declared between England on the one side, and Russia, Sweden, and Denmark on the other. The ice rendered the Baltic innavigable; English expeditions were sent to capture the Danish and Swedish colonies in the West Indies. In the course of March 1800, the islands of Santa-Cruz, Saint-Thomas, and Saint-Bartholomew, fell into the power of the English.

On the 29th of March, the prince of Hesse, commanding the Danish troops, entered Hamburg, in order to cut off British commerce from the Elbe. In this general's proclamation, Denmark urges the necessity of adopting

all means of annoying England, and finally compelling her to respect the rights of nations, and of neutral powers in particular.

The Cabinet of Berlin caused Hanover to be occupied, and thus closed the mouths of the Ems and Weser against the English. The Prussian general, in his manifesto, justifies this measure on the ground of the outrages perpetually committed by England against neutral nations, the losses consequently sustained by the latter, and, in short, on the new maritime laws which England was endeavouring to enforce.

A convention was entered into on the 3d of April, between the regency and the Prussian ministers, by which the Hanoverian army was disbanded, and the fortresses surrendered to the Prussian troops. The regency thereby engaged to obey the Prussian authorities. Thus the King of England lost his estates of Hanover; but what was of much more consequence to him, the Baltic, the Elbe, the Weser, and the Ems, were closed against him, as well as France, Holland, and Spain. This was a terrible stroke to the commerce of the English, the effects of which were such, that its continuation alone would have obliged them to renounce their system.

In the mean time the maritime powers of the North were arming with activity. Twelve Russian ships of the line were anchored at Revel, seven belonging to Sweden were ready at Carlscrona ; which, added to a like number of Danish ships, would have formed a combined fleet of from twenty-two to twenty-four ships of the line, which would have been successively increased, the three powers being able to augment it to thirty-six, or perhaps forty ships.

Great as were the naval forces of England, a fleet like this was formidable. England was obliged to keep a squadron in the Mediterranean, to prevent France from sending forces to Egypt, and to protect the English trade. The disaster of Aboukir was partly repaired, and there was a squadron of several vessels in Toulon roads. The English were likewise obliged to keep a squadron before Cadiz, to watch the Spanish ships, and hinder the French divisions from passing the straits. There was a French and Spanish fleet in Brest. England was likewise obliged to have a fleet before the Texel ; but in the beginning of April, the Russian, Danish, and Swedish fleets had not joined, although they might have done so in the beginning of March. It

was on this delay that the English government founded its plan of operations, for successively attacking the three maritime powers of the Baltic, exerting all its efforts, in the first instance, against Denmark, to oblige that power to secede from the convention of the 16th of December 1800, and to receive English shipping into her ports.

X.

An English fleet of fifty sail, including seventeen ships of the line, under the command of Admiral Parker and Admiral Nelson, sailed from Yarmouth on the 12th of March; it contained 1000 men intended to land. On the 15th it was dispersed by a violent storm. A seventy-four, the *Invincible*, struck on a sand-bank, and was totally lost. On the 20th of March signals were made that this fleet was in the Cattegat. On the same day a frigate proceeded to Elsinore, with the commissioner Vansittart, instructed, jointly with Mr. Drummond, to give in the ultimatum of the English government. On the 24th they returned on board of the fleet, bringing intelligence of all that was passing at Copenhagen and in the Baltic. The Russian fleet was still at B...

English were fearful of their junction. Their government had instructed Admiral Parker to detach Denmark from her alliance with the two other powers, by means of threats, or, if necessary, by a bombardment. When Denmark should be thus neutralized, the combined fleet would be greatly diminished, and the English would have free entrance to the Baltic. It appears that the Council hesitated whether to enter the Sound, or the Great Belt. The Sound, between Cronenberg and the Swedish coast, is 2300 toises wide; its greatest depth is 1500 toises from the batteries of Elsinore, and 800 from the coast of Sweden. If, therefore, the two shores had been equally armed, the English ships would have been under the necessity of passing at the distance of 1100 toises from these batteries. Those of Elsinore and Cronenberg were lined with upwards of one hundred pieces of cannon and mortars. The damage which a squadron must sustain in such a passage, as well by the loss of masts and yards, as by accidents from the bombs, may easily be conceived. At the same time the passage of the Belts was very difficult, and the officers who were against that plan, asserted that it would enable the Danish fleet to

from Copenhagen, and to join the French and Dutch fleets.

Admiral Parker, however, decided for this passage, and, on the 26th of May, the whole fleet made sail for the Great Belt. But a few light vessels, which acted as scouts, having grounded on the rocks, the fleet resumed its anchorage on the same day. The Admiral then resolved to pass by the Sound; and after having satisfied himself of the intentions of the Commandant of Cronenberg to defend the passage, the fleet, taking advantage of a favourable wind on the 30th, sailed for the Sound. The flotilla of bomb-vessels approached Elsinore, to effect a diversion by bombarding the town and castle; but the fleet having speedily discovered that the Swedish batteries did not fire, neared the shore, and passed the strait out of the reach of the Danish batteries, which threw a shower of balls and shells. All the shot fell above 100 toises from the fleet, which did not lose a single man.

The Swedes, to justify their treacherous conduct, have alleged that during the winter it was not possible to raise batteries, or even to increase that of six guns which they had; and besides, that Denmark had not seemed to

wish it, probably fearing lest Sweden should renew her old claims to half the duties which Denmark levies from all ships which pass the strait: their number is from 10 to 12,000 annually; which brings in a yearly revenue of between 2,500,000 and 3,000,000. These reasons are evidently futile. A few days only were requisite for placing a hundred guns in battery, and the preparations which England had for several months been making for this expedition, as well as the presence of the fleet for several days in the Cattegat, had given Sweden much more time than was requisite.

On the same day, the 30th of March, the fleet anchored between the Isle of Huen and Copenhagen. The English admirals and principal officers immediately embarked in a schooner, for the purpose of reconnoitring the position of the Danes.

After passing the Sound, ships do not immediately enter the Baltic. At a distance of ten leagues from Elsinore stands Copenhagen. On the right of that port is the Isle of Amack, and two leagues from that isle, in front, is the rock of Saltholm. It is necessary to pass into this strait, between Saltholm and Copenhagen, to enter the Baltic. This pass is again divided into two canals, by a bank called the Middle

Ground, which is situate opposite Copenhagen; the royal canal is that which passes under the walls of that city. The pass between the Isle of Amack and Saltholm is good only for 74 gun ships; three deckers cannot easily clear it, and are even obliged to be lightened by taking out part of their artillery. The Danes had placed their line of defence between the bank and the town, in order to oppose the anchoring of the bomb-vessels and gun-boats which might have passed over the bank. The Danes imagined that by these measures they had secured Copenhagen from bombardment.

The night of the 30th was employed by the English in sounding the bank; and, on the 31st, the admirals went on board of a frigate, with the artillery-officers, in order to reconnoitre the enemy's line again, as the anchorage for the bomb-vessels. It was agreed that, in case the enemy's line of defence could be destroyed, bomb-vessels might be placed to bombard the town and port; but that, as long as the line of defence should exist, that measure would be impracticable. The difficulty of attacking this line was very great. The fleet was separated from it by the bank of the Middle Ground, and the shallowness of

the water which remained above the bank did not allow of its being cleared by first-rate ships. There was, therefore, no possibility of success, otherwise than by doubling the bank, and afterwards returning, coasting it to star-board, and taking up a station between the bank and the Danish line,—a most hazardous operation. For, 1st, The shape and length of the bank were not perfectly known, and there were none but English pilots on board, who had never sailed in these seas except in merchantmen: it is also well known, that the ablest pilots are guided in such cases only by the buoys, but these the Danes had very properly removed, or purposely misplaced:—2dly, In doubling the bank, the English ships would be exposed to the whole fire of the Danes, until they should have formed their line of battle:—3dly, Every disabled ship would be a ship lost, because it would strike on the bank, and that under the fire of the Danish line and batteries.

The most prudent people thought it not advisable to undertake an attack which might end in the destruction of the fleet. Nelson thought otherwise, and got them to adopt the plan of attacking the line of defence and gaining possession of the crown-batteries, by

means of 900 soldiers. Supported on these isles, the bombardment of Copenhagen would be easy, and Denmark might thenceforth be considered as subdued. On the 1st of April, the Commander-in-Chief having approved of this plan of attack, detached Nelson, with twelve ships of the line and all the frigates and bomb-vessels. The latter anchored in the evening off Draco Point, near the bank which separated him from the enemy's line, and so near it, that the mortars of the Isle of Amack, which made a few discharges, threw their shells into the midst of the squadron at anchor. On the 2d, the weather being favourable, the English squadron doubled the bank, and, coasting it to starboard, formed in line between the bank and the Danes. One English 74 grounded before it could double the bank, and two others struck after doubling it. These three vessels, in this position, were exposed to the fire of the enemy's line, and received a great number of balls.

The Danish line of defence was supported, on its left, on the crown-batteries, artificial islands, 600 toises from Copenhagen, armed with 70 guns, and defended by 1500 picked men; and its right extended on the Isle of Amack. To defend the entrance on the left of

the Three Crowns, four ships of the line had been stationed, two of which were completely armed and equipped.

The object of the line of defence was to secure the port and city from bombardment, and to preserve the command of all that part of the roads comprised between the Middle Ground and the Town; this line had been placed as near as possible to the bank. Its right was far advanced before the Isle of Amack; the whole line was upwards of three thousand toises in length, and was formed of twenty ships. They were old vessels cut down, carrying not more than half their artillery, or frigates and other ships formed into floating batteries, carrying a dozen guns. For the effect it was intended to produce, this line was strong enough, and perfectly well placed; no bomb-vessel or gun-boat could approach it. For the reasons above stated, the Danes were not apprehensive of being attacked by first-rate ships. When, therefore, they perceived Nelson's manœuvre, and comprehended what he was about to attempt, their astonishment was extreme. They then discovered that their line was not sufficiently strong, and that they ought to have formed it, not of hulls of ships, but, on the contrary, of the best vessels in their squadron;

that it was too much extended for the number of ships it contained; that the right was not sufficiently supported; that if they had placed this line nearer Copenhagen, it would not have been more than from 1500 to 1800 toises wide; that the right could have been supported by strong batteries, raised on the Isle of Amack, which would have played in advance of the right, and flanked the whole line. It is probable that, in that case, Nelson would have failed in his attack, for it would have been impossible for him to pass between the line and the shore thus lined with cannon. But it was too late; these reflections were unavailing; and the Danes now thought of nothing but making a vigorous defence. The first success that attended them, in the wreck of three of the strongest ships of the enemy, encouraged them to form the most sanguine hopes. But the want of these three vessels compelled Nelson, in order to avoid disseminating his forces too much, to weaken his extreme right. The principal object of his attack, which was the capture of the Three Crowns, was thenceforth abandoned. As soon as Nelson had doubled the bank, he approached within 100 toises of the line of defence, and finding four fathoms water, his pilots anchored. The cannonade

had commenced with extreme vigour; the Danes displayed the greatest intrepidity, but the English had double their weight of metal.

A line of defence is an immoveable force opposed to a force that is moveable; and it can only surmount this disadvantage by deriving support from the land-batteries, particularly with regard to the flanks. But the Danes, as already remarked, had not flanked their right.

The English, therefore, pressed the right and centre, which were not flanked, silenced their fire, and forced this part of the line, which was not flanked, to strike, after a firm resistance of above four hours. The left of the line, being well supported by the crown-batteries, remained unbroken. A division of frigates, in hopes of proving an adequate substitute for the ships which ought to have attacked these batteries, ventured to engage them, as if it had been supported by the fire of the ships. But it suffered considerable loss, and, in spite of all its efforts, was obliged to relinquish this enterprise and sheer off.

Admiral Parker, who had remained with the other part of the fleet, without the bank, seeing the active resistance of the Danes, conceived that the greater part of the English ships would be disabled through so obstinate

a conflict ; that they would be unable to manœuvre, and would strike on the bank, which expectation was partly fulfilled. He made a signal to desist from the action, and to take up a position in the rear ; but even this was become very difficult. Nelson preferred continuing the battle. He was soon convinced of the prudence of the Admiral's signal, and, at length, made up his mind to weigh anchor, and retire from the engagement. But, seeing that part of the Danish line was vanquished, he conceived the idea of sending a flag of truce, previously to taking so decisive a step, to propose an arrangement. With this view, he wrote a letter, addressed to the Danes, the brave brothers of the English, in these terms : " Vice-Admiral Nelson has orders to spare Denmark, if the resistance is not prolonged. The line of defence, which protected its shores, has struck to the English flag ; cease then the firing, and allow him to take possession of his prizes, otherwise he will blow them up in the air, with their crews who have so nobly defended them. The brave Danes are the brethren, and will never be the foes of the English." The Prince of Denmark, who was at the seaside, received this note, and in order to obtain explanations respecting it, sent Adjutant-general

Lindholm to Nelson, with whom he concluded a suspension of arms. The firing speedily ceased in all directions, and the wounded Danes were carried ashore. Scarce was this armistice concluded, when three English ships, including that in which Nelson himself was, struck on the bank. They were in the jaws of destruction, and could never have escaped if the batteries had continued their fire. They therefore owed their safety to this armistice.

This event saved the English squadron. Nelson went ashore on the 4th of April. He traversed the town, amidst the outcries and threats of the populace; and after several conferences with the Prince Regent, the following convention was signed: "There shall be an armistice of three months and a half between the English and Denmark; but solely with respect to the city of Copenhagen and the Sound. The English squadron, at liberty to proceed wherever it may be thought expedient, is to keep at the distance of a league from the coast of Denmark, from the capital to the Sound. Notice is to be given of the rupture of the armistice fifteen days before the resumption of hostilities. In all other respects every thing is to remain exactly in *statu quo*, so that there is nothing to

prevent Admiral Parker from proceeding to any other point of the Danish possessions, towards the coasts of Jutland, or those of Norway; the English fleet, which is by this time most probably in the Elbe, is to be at liberty to attack the Danish fortress of Gluckstadt; and Denmark is to continue to occupy Hamburg, Lubeck, &c."

In this battle the English lost 943 men, killed and wounded. Two of their ships were so much injured, that it was impossible to repair them; Admiral Parker was obliged to send them to England. The loss of the Danes was reckoned a little higher than that of the English. The part of the line of defence which fell into the power of the latter, was burnt, to the great dissatisfaction of the English officers, whose interest suffered thereby. At the time of the signature of the armistice the bomb-vessels and gun-boats were in position to take up a line to bombard the city.

XI.

The result of the affair of Copenhagen did not entirely fulfil the intentions of the British government, which had hoped to detach and subdue Denmark, and had only succeeded in

getting that power to conclude an armistice by which its forces were paralyzed for fourteen weeks.

The Swedish and Russian squadrons were arming with the greatest activity, and constituted considerable forces. But all military preparations were rendered useless, and the confederation of the northern powers was dissolved by the death of the Emperor Paul, who was at once the author, the chief, and the soul of that alliance. Paul I. was assassinated in the night of the 23d of March; and the news of his death reached Copenhagen at the time of the signature of the armistice.

Lord Whitworth was ambassador at his court; he was intimately connected with Count P * * * * *, General B * * * * *, and the S * * * * s and O * * * * s, authentically known to be the authors and perpetrators of this horrible parricide. This monarch had exasperated part of the Russian nobility against himself by an irritable and over-susceptible temper. His hatred of the French Revolution had been the distinguishing feature of his reign. He considered the familiar manners of the French sovereign and princes, and the suppression of etiquette at their court, as one of the causes of that Revolution. He,

therefore, established a most strict etiquette at his own court, and exacted tokens of respect by no means conformable to our manners, and which excited general discontent. To be dressed in a frock, wear a round hat, or omit to alight from a carriage when the Czar, or one of the princes of his house, was passing in the streets or public walks, was sufficient to excite his strongest animadversions, and to stamp the offender as a jacobin, in his opinion. After his reconciliation with the First Consul, he had partly given up some of these ideas; and it is probable that had he lived some years longer, he would have regained the alienated esteem and affection of his court. The English, vexed and even extremely irritated at the alteration which had taken place in him in the course of a twelvemonth, took every means of encouraging his domestic enemies. They succeeded in causing a report of his madness to be generally believed, and, at length, a conspiracy was formed against his life. The general opinion is that * * *

* * * * *

The evening before his death; Paul, being at supper with his mistress and his favourite, received a despatch, in which all the particulars of the plot against him were disclosed.

put it into his pocket, and deferred the perusal to the next day. In the night he was murdered.

This crime was perpetrated without impediment; P * * * * * had unlimited influence in the palace; he passed for the sovereign's favourite and confidential minister. He presented himself, at two o'clock in the morning, at the door of the Emperor's apartment, accompanied by B * * * * *, S * * * * *, and O * * * * *. A faithful Cossack, who was stationed at the door of the chamber, made some difficulty of allowing them to enter; he was instantly massacred. The noise awakened the Emperor, who seized his sword; but the conspirators rushed upon him, threw him down, and strangled him. It was B * * * * * who gave him the last blow, and trampled on his corpse. The Empress, Paul's wife, although she had much reason to complain of her husband's gallantries, testified deep and sincere affliction; and none of those who were engaged in this assassination, were ever restored to her favour.

. Many years after, General Benigsen still held his command.

XII.

This horrible event, however, petrified all Europe with horror; and every one was particularly shocked at the dreadful openness with which the Russians stated the whole particulars at every court. The situation of England, and the affairs of the whole world, were altered by this circumstance. The difficulties attendant on the commencement of a new reign

 changed the direction of the policy of the Russian court. On the 5th of April, the English sailors, who had been made prisoners of war, in consequence of the embargo, and sent into the interior of the country, were recalled. The commission, which had been charged with the liquidation of the monies due from the English traders, was dissolved. Count Pahlen, who still remained first minister, informed the English admirals, on the 20th of April, that Russia acceded to all the demands of the English cabinet; that it being the wish of its sovereign to terminate all differences in an amicable manner according to

hostilities would cease until the arrival of an answer from London. The desire of an immediate peace with England was loudly declared, and every thing announced the approaching triumph of that power. After the armistice of Copenhagen, Admiral Parker had proceeded to the Isle of Mona to watch the Russian and Swedish fleets. But Count Pahlen's declaration satisfied him in this respect; and he returned to his moorings at Kioge, after having communicated to the Swedes that he should allow their merchant-ships to pass unmolested.

Denmark, however, continued to put herself in a state of defence. Her fleet remained entire, and had sustained no loss; it consisted of sixteen ships of war. The preparations for its armament, and the works necessary for putting the crown-batteries and those of the Isle of Amack in the best possible state of defence, wholly occupied the Prince Royal. But the negotiations were continued with the greatest activity both at London and Berlin, and Lord Saint-Helen's left England for St. Petersburg, on the 4th of May. The Elbe was soon opened to English commerce. On the 20th of May, Hamburg was evacuated by the Danes, and Hanover by the Prussians.

Nelson, who succeeded Admiral Parker in

the command of the squadron, proceeded on the 8th of May to Sweden, and wrote to the Swedish admiral, that if he came out of Carlsrona with his fleet, he would attack him. He then with part of the squadron made for Revel, where he arrived on the 12th. He was in hopes of meeting with the Russian squadron, but it had left that port on the 9th. There is no doubt but that if Nelson had found the Russian fleet in that port, the batteries of which were in a very bad condition, he would have attacked and destroyed it. On the 16th, Nelson left Revel and joined his fleet on the coast of Sweden. That power opened its ports to the English on the 19th of May. The embargo was taken off the British shipping in Russia on the 20th of May. Prussia had been in communication with England from the 16th. Lord St. Helen's arrived at St. Petersburg on the 29th of May; and on the 17th of June, signed the famous treaty which put an end to the differences which had arisen between the maritime powers of the North and England. On the 15th, Count Bernstorff, ambassador extraordinary from the Court of Copenhagen, arrived at London, to treat on the part of his sovereign; and on the 17th Denmark raised the embargo laid on the English shipping.

Thus, in three months from the death of Paul, the confederacy of the North was dissolved, and the triumph of England secured.

The First Consul had sent his aide-de-camp Duroc to Petersburg, where he arrived on the 24th of May; his reception was highly satisfactory, and every protestation of good-will was made to him. He had endeavoured to impress the fatal importance of the least act of weakness to the honour and independence of nations, and the prosperity of the powers of the Baltic; and maintained that no such act would be justified by the state of affairs. England, he said, had the greater part of her land forces in Egypt, and needed several squadrons to cover them, and prevent the fleets of Brest, Cadiz, and Toulon from carrying succours to the French army of the East. England required a squadron of forty or fifty ships to watch Brest, and more than five and twenty ships in the Mediterranean; she was likewise under the necessity of keeping considerable forces before Cadiz and the Texel. He added, that Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, could bring more than thirty-six well-armed ships against the English; that the result of the battle of Copenhagen had only been the destruction of a few hulks, and had in no re-

spect diminished the power of the Danes ; that far from changing their sentiments, it had only increased their to the highest pitch ; that the ice would soon compel the English to quit the Baltic ; that during the winter it would be possible to effect a general pacification ; that if the Court of Russia was resolved to conclude peace, as it appeared to be, from the steps already taken, it would, at least, be advisable to make only temporary sacrifices, and to avoid making the slightest change in the acknowledged principles of the rights of neutrals and the independence of the seas ; that Denmark, when menaced by a numerous squadron, and contending singly against it, had, in the preceding August, consented not to have her ships convoyed, until the subject should have undergone discussion ; and that Russia might adopt the same course, gain time by concluding preliminaries, and renouncing the right of convoy, until definitive terms of conciliation could be arranged.

These arguments expressed in several notes, seemed, at one time, to have had some effect on the young Emperor. But he was himself under the influence of a party which had been guilty of a great crime, and which, to divert attention from themselves, wished, at any

price, to enable the Baltic to enjoy the blessings of peace, in order to cast additional odium on the memory of their victim, and to cheat public opinion.

Europe witnessed with astonishment the ignominious treaty which Russia signed, and which Denmark and Sweden were consequently obliged to adopt. It was equivalent to a declaration of the slavery of the seas, and a proclamation of the sovereignty of the British parliament. This treaty was such, that England had nothing more to wish for, and that a third-rate power would have blushed to sign it. It excited, too, the more surprise, because England was involved in such difficulties that she would have been satisfied with any convention that would have extricated her from them. It was therein declared: 1st, That the flag no longer covered the cargo; that the property of an enemy might be confiscated on board of a neutral vessel: 2dly, That neutral ships under convoy should be subject to search by the cruisers of the belligerents; although not by privateers and letters of marque; which, far from being a concession on the part of England, was wholly for her interest, because the French, being so inferior in strength, had nothing but privateers at sea.

Thus the Emperor Alexander consented to allow one of his squadrons of five or six seventy-fours, escorting a convoy, to be turned from its course, to lose several hours, and to suffer an English brig to carry off part of its convoy. The right of blockade alone was well defined: the English thought it of little importance to prevent neutrals from entering a port, when they were allowed to stop them any where, on declaring that the cargo belonged wholly or in part to a merchant of the enemy's country. Russia wished to have it understood as a concession in her favour that naval stores were not comprised among the contraband articles! But the distinction of contraband is a nullity, when every thing may be considered so by suspicion of the proprietor; every thing is contraband when the flag does not cover the goods.

We have said in this chapter that the principles of the rights of neutrals are: 1st, That the flag covers the cargo: 2dly, That the right of search relates solely to ascertaining ^{the} flag, and that there is nothing contraband on board: 3dly, That the only contraband articles are military stores: 4thly, That every merchant ship, convoyed by a ship of war is

relates exclusively to ports really blockaded. We have added that these principles had been defended by all lawyers and all powers, and recognized in all treaties. We have proved that they were in force in 1780, and were respected by the English; that they were still so in 1800, and were the object of the quadruple alliance signed on the 16th of December in that year. It may, at this time, be truly said, that Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, have acknowledged different principles.

We shall see, in the war which succeeded the treaty of Amiens, that England went farther, and disregarded this last principle which she had acknowledged, by establishing the blockade commonly called a blockade upon paper.

Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, declared, by the treaty of the 17th of January, 1801, that the seas belonged to England; and they thereby authorized France, a belligerent power, to acknowledge no principle of neutrality on the seas. Thus at the very time when private property and individuals are respected in warfare by land, private property is seized, in maritime war, not only under the flag of the hostile nation, but even under neutral colours; which affords reason to believe

that if England alone had laid down the laws of war by land, she would have established the same principles as she has by sea. Europe would in that case have relapsed into barbarity; and the effects of individuals would have been liable to seizure in the same manner as public property.

NAVAL BATTLE OF ABOUKIR.

1. Reports at London respecting the expedition preparing in the ports of France.—2. Movement of the English squadrons in the Mediterranean, in May, June, and July.—3. Chances for and against the French and English naval armaments, if they had met on the way.—4. The French squadron receives orders to enter the old port of Alexandria.—5. It moors in Aboukir roads.—6. Napoleon learns that it remains at Aboukir. His astonishment.—7. The French squadron is reconnoitred at its moorings by an English frigate.—8. Battle of Aboukir.

I.

Intelligence was received in England, from various quarters at the same time, that considerable armaments were preparing at Brest, Toulon, Genoa, and Civita-Vecchia; that the Spanish squadron of Cadiz was fitting out with great activity; and that numerous camps were forming on the Scheldt, on the coasts of the Pas-de-Calais, of Normandy, and of Bretagne. Napoleon having been appointed general-in-chief of the Army of England, was

inspecting all the coasts of the ocean, and visiting every port. He had assembled about him, at Paris, all that were left of the old naval officers who had acquired reputation during the American war, such as Buhor, Marigny, &c.; but they did not justify their celebrity. The intelligence which France maintained with the United Irishmen, could not be kept so secret but that the English government should hear something of it. The first opinion of the Cabinet of St. James's was, that all these preparations were directed against England and Ireland; and that France wished to take advantage of the peace, which had just been re-established on the Continent, in order to terminate this long struggle by a war hand to hand. That cabinet conceived that the armaments which were making in Italy, were merely intended to mislead; that the Toulon fleet would pass the Straits, and effect its junction with the Spanish fleet at Cadiz; and that the two fleets would arrive before Brest, and carry one army to England, and another to Ireland. In this uncertainty the English admiralty contented itself with hastily fitting out a new squadron; and as soon as it heard that Napoleon had sailed from Toulon, it despatched Admiral Rogers with ten ships of

war, to reinforce the English squadron before Cadiz, where Admiral Lord Saint-Vincent commanded, who, by this , found a fleet of twenty-eight or thirty ships under his orders. There was another squadron of equal force before Brest.

Admiral Saint-Vincent had in the Mediterranean, a light squadron of three ships, cruising between the coasts of Spain, Provence, and Sardinia, in order to collect information and to watch that sea. On the 24th of May he detached ten ships from before Cadiz, and sent them into the Mediterranean, with orders to join those commanded by Nelson, and thus to form for that Admiral a fleet of thirteen ships, to blockade Toulon, or to follow the French squadron if it should have sailed from that port. Lord Saint-Vincent remained before Cadiz with eighteen ships to watch the Spanish fleet, being chiefly apprehensive that the Toulon squadron would escape Nelson and pass the Straits.

In the instructions sent by this Admiral to Nelson, which have been printed, it appears that every thing had been foreseen, except an expedition against Egypt. The cases of the French expedition's proceeding to Brazil, the Black Sea, or Constantinople, were provided

for. More than 150,000 men were encamped on the coast of the ocean, which produced agitation and continual alarm throughout England.

II.

Nelson was cruising between Corsica, Provence, and Spain, with the three sail detached by Lord Saint-Vincent, when, in the night of the 19th of May, he suffered from a gale, which damaged his ships, and dismasted that in which he sailed. He was obliged to be towed. It was his design to anchor in the Gulf of Oristagni, in Sardinia; he could not succeed in this, but made the roads of Saint Peter's Isles, where he repaired his damage.

On the same night, the 18th, the French squadron sailed from Toulon; it arrived before Malta on the 10th of June, after doubling Cape Corso and Cape Bonara. Nelson having been joined by Lord Saint-Vincent's ten ships, and appointed to the command of this squadron, was cruising off Toulon on the 1st of June. He did not then know that the French squadron had left that port. On the 15th he reconnoitred the roads of Tagliamone, on the coast of Tuscany, which he supposed to be the rendezvous of the French expedition. On the 20th he ap-

peared before Naples, where he was informed by the government, that the French squadron had landed its troops at Malta, and that Garat, the ambassador of the Republic, had stated, that the expedition was intended for Egypt. On the 22d Nelson arrived off Messina. The intelligence of the capture of Malta by the French expedition was confirmed to him; and he also learnt that it was making for Candia. Upon this he passed the Faro of Messina, and proceeded to Alexandria, where he arrived on the 29th of July.

The French squadron received the first intelligence of the presence of an English fleet in the Mediterranean, off Cape Bonara, from a ship that fell in with it; and on the 25th, whilst the squadron was reconnoitring the coast of Candia, it was joined by the frigate *La Justice*, which had been cruising off Naples, and which brought positive news of the presence of an English squadron in these latitudes. Napoleon then gave orders that, instead of steering directly for Alexandria, the squadron should manœuvre so as to make Cape Aza, in Africa, twenty-five leagues from Alexandria; and should not appear before Alexandria until farther intelligence should be obtained.

On the 29th, the coast of Africa, and Cape

Aza were descried. Nelson was then just arrived before Alexandria; having gained no intelligence of the French squadron, he steered for Alexandretta, and from thence made for Rhodes. He then scoured the Isles of the Archipelago, reconnoitred the entrance of the Adriatic, and, on the 18th, was obliged to anchor at Syracuse to take in water. Up to this time he had obtained no information respecting the course of the French squadron. He sailed from Syracuse, and on the 28th of July anchored off Cape Coron, at the extremity of the Morea. It was there that he was first informed that the French army had landed in Egypt a month before. He supposed that the French squadron must have already effected its return to Toulon; but he proceeded to Alexandria in order to be able to furnish his government with positive intelligence, and to leave the necessary forces before that place for the purpose of blockading it.

III.

When the French squadron left Toulon it was composed of thirteen sail of the line, six frigates, and a dozen brigs, sloops, and cutters. The English squadron consisted of thirteen sail,

74. They had been fitted out very hastily, and were in bad condition. Nelson had no frigates. In the French squadron there were one ship of 120 guns, and three of 80. There was a fleet of several hundred sail under the convoy of this squadron, and particularly under the protection of two 64-gun ships, four Venetian-built frigates of 18 guns, and about twenty brigs and sloops. The French squadron, availing itself of its great number of light vessels, obtained intelligence from a great distance; so that the convoy had nothing to fear, and in case of falling in with the enemy, could easily take up the most advantageous position for remaining at a distance from the engagement. Every French ship had 500 old soldiers on board, with a company of land artillery amongst them. Twice a day, during the month they had been on board, the troops had been exercised in the manœuvres of the guns. In every ship of war there were generals of experience, accustomed to stand fire, and to the chances of war.

The supposition of an engagement with the English was the general subject of conversation. The captains of ships had orders, in that case, to consider it as a permanent and constant signal, to take part in the action, and

Nelson's squadron was one of the worst that England had ever fitted out of late years.

IV.

The French squadron received orders to enter Alexandria; this was necessary for the army, and for the success of the ulterior plans of the commander-in-chief. When the Turkish pilots declared they could not carry 74-gun ships, much less those of 80 guns, into the old port, much astonishment was excited. Captain Barré, a very distinguished naval officer, being ordered to examine the soundings, positively asserted the contrary. The 64-gun ships and frigates went in without difficulty; but the Admiral and several naval officers persisted in considering it necessary to take new soundings previously to risking the whole squadron. As the ships of war had the artillery and ammunition of the army on board, and the breeze was pretty strong, the Admiral proposed to land the whole at Aboukir, declaring that thirty-six hours would suffice for that purpose, whereas he should need five or six days for effecting this operation, whilst remaining under sail.

When Napoleon left Alexandria to advance to meet the Mamelukes, he repeated to the

dria; and in case he should consider that impossible, to proceed to Corfu, where he would receive from Constantinoplè the orders of the French minister Talleyrand; or in case there should be much delay in the arrival of those orders, to proceed from Corfu to Toulon.

The squadron might have entered the old port of Alexandria. It was allowed that a ship drawing twenty-one foot of water, might enter without danger. Seventy-fours, which draw twenty-three feet, would, therefore, only have had to be lightened to the extent of two feet; 80-gun ships, drawing twenty-three feet and a half, would have been lightened by two feet and a half; and three deckers, drawing twenty-seven feet water, must have been lightened six feet. The ships might have been lightened in this manner without any inconvenience, either by throwing the water into the sea, or by taking out some of the guns. A 74 may be reduced so as to draw only feet water merely by taking out her water and provisions, and to draw only feet by taking out her artillery. This method was proposed by the naval officers to the admiral. He replied that if all the thirteen ships had been seventy-fours, he would have adopted this expedient; but, as one of them car-

the risk, when once in the port, of not being able to get out again, and of being blockaded by a squadron of eight or nine English ships; because it would be impossible for him to put the *Orient* and the three 80-gun ships in a condition to fight, if reduced to the draught of water requisite for passing the channel. This objection was of little weight; the winds which prevail in those latitudes render a rigorous blockade impracticable, and the squadron needed only twenty-four hours, after clearing the passage, to complete its armament. There was also a natural expedient; namely, to construct, at Alexandria, four floating half-butts, adapted to raise 80-gun ships two feet, and ships of 120 guns four feet: the construction of these floating butts for so trifling a rise, would not have required much labour. The *Rivoli*, built at Venice, came out of the *Malamoko* completely armed, on a floating butt, which raised her seven feet, so that she only drew sixteen feet water. A few days after her launch, she fought extremely well against an English frigate and sloop. There were ships, frigates, and 400 transports in Alexandria, which would have furnished all the materials that could have been wanted. There was also a great number of

naval engineers; amongst others M. Leroy, who had passed his whole life in the dock-yards.

When the officers commissioned to examine Captain Barré's report had completed that operation, the Admiral sent their report to the Commander-in-chief; but it could not reach him in time to obtain an answer, because the communications were cut off for a month previous to the taking of Cairo. Had the general-in-chief received this report, he would have repeated the order to enter the port by lightening the ships, and ordered the works necessary at Alexandria to facilitate the squadrons getting out to sea again. But after all, as the admiral had orders, in case he should be unable to enter the port, to proceed to Corfu, he was a competent judge and umpire of his own conduct. Corfu had a good French garrison, and magazines of biscuit and meat for six months; the admiral might have touched on the coast of Albania, whence he might have drawn provisions; and finally, his instructions authorized him to proceed thence to Toulon, where there were five or six thousand men belonging to the régiments in Egypt. They were soldiers returned by permission, or

of the expedition. Admiral Brueis did nothing of the kind ; he moored his squadron in line in Aboukir roads, and sent to Rosetta for rice and other provisions. There are many opinions with respect to the motives which induced the admiral to remain in those bad roads. Some people have thought that, after having judged it impossible to effect the entrance of his squadron into Alexandria, he wished, previously to quitting the Grand Army, to be assured of the taking of Cairo, and to be free from all anxiety respecting the situation of the army. Brueis was much attached to the general-in-chief ; the communications had been intercepted, and, as is usual in such cases, the most alarming rumours prevailed in the rear of the army. The admiral had, however, heard of the success of the battle of the Pyramids, and the triumphal entrance of the French into Cairo, on the 29th of July. It seems that having waited a month, he still wished to wait a few days, in order to receive direct news from the general-in-chief. But the orders which the admiral had were positive, and such motives were insufficient to justify his conduct. In no case ought he to have remained in a situation in which his squadron was unsafe. He might have satisfied himself

with respect to the anxiety he felt from the false reports which were spread relative to the army, and at the same time fulfilled his duty to his squadron, by cruising between the coasts of Egypt and Caramania, and by sending to obtain intelligence from the Damietta shore, or any other point from which news from the army and Alexandria might be obtained.

V.

As soon as the Admiral had landed the artillery, and what he had on board belonging to the land forces, which was an affair of about forty-eight hours, he should have weighed anchor, and got under sail, whether he waited for fresh information to enter the port of Alexandria, or whether he waited for news from the army, previously to quitting these seas. But he entirely mistook his situation. He spent several days in rectifying his line of moorings; he supported his left behind the little Isle of Aboukir, where, thinking it unassailable, he placed his worst ships, the Guerrier and the Conquerant. This last, the oldest ship in the whole squadron, carried only eighteen-pounders in her lower tier. He had the little Isle occupied, and a battery of two twelve-pounders constructed. He placed his best ships, the Orient,

the Franklin, and the Tonnant, in the centre, and at the extremity of his left the Genereux, one of the best and best-commanded ships in the squadron. Being fearful for his left, he had it sustained by the Guillaume Tell, his third 80-gun ship.

In this position, Admiral Brueis entertained no apprehension of any attack on his left, which was supported by the Isle; he was more solicitous respecting his right. But had the enemy advanced against it, he must have lost the wind; in that case it seems to have been the intention of Brueis to make sail with his centre and left. He considered this left so completely sheltered from attack, that he did not think it necessary to protect it by the fire of the Isle. The feeble battery he established there was merely intended to prevent the enemy from landing. Had the admiral understood his position better, he would have placed on this Isle twenty thirty-six pounders and eight or ten mortars; he would have moored his left near it; he would have recalled the two 64-gun ships from Alexandria, which would have made two excellent floating batteries, and which, drawing less water than the other ships, could have approached nearer the

have distributed amongst his ships to reinforce their crews. He had recourse, it is true, to this expedient, but not until the last moment, after the commencement of the action, so that it only increased the confusion. He completely deceived himself with respect to the strength of his line of moorings.

VI.

After the action of Rahmanieh, the Arabs of Bahire intercepted all the communications between Alexandria and the army; nor did they submit until the news of the battle of the Pyramids, and the taking of Cairo, alarmed them with respect to the resentment of the French. On the 27th of July, the second day after his entrance into Cairo, Napoleon received, for the first time, despatches from Alexandria, and the admiral's correspondence. He was extremely surprised to find that the squadron was not in safety, that it was neither in the port of Alexandria, in that of Corfu, nor on its voyage to Toulon; but in Aboukir roads, exposed to the attacks of an enemy of superior strength. He despatched his aide-de-camp Julien from the army to the admiral, to inform him of his great dissatisfaction, and order him to get sail immediately.

He reminded him that all naval ordinances forbid the receiving battle in an open road. The chief of squadron Julien set out on the 27th, at seven in the evening; he could not have arrived before the 3d or 4th of August; the battle took place on the 1st and 2d. This officer had reached Teramea, when a party of Arabs surprised the jerm in which he was, and the brave young man was massacred whilst courageously defending the despatches of which he was the bearer, and the importance of which he well knew.

VII.

Admiral Brueis remained inactive in the bad position he had placed himself in; an English frigate, which had been detached twenty days before, by Nelson, of whom she was now in search, presented herself before Alexandria, and went to Aboukir to examine the whole line of moorings, which she effected with impunity; not a ship, frigate, or brig, was under sail. Yet the admiral had above thirty light ships with which he might have covered the sea; they were all at anchor. The principles of war required him to remain under sail with his whole squadron, whatever might be his ulterior plans. But he ought, at

least, to have kept under sail a light squadron of two or three men of war, and eight or ten frigates and sloops, to prevent any light English ship from watching his motions, and to obtain the earliest intelligence of the enemy's approach. But destiny impelled him.

VIII.

On the 31st of July, Nelson detached two of his ships, which reconnoitred the French line of moorings without molestation. On the 1st of August, the English squadron appeared towards three o'clock in the afternoon with all sails set. A fresh gale of the wind usual at that season was blowing. Admiral Brueis was at dinner; part of the crews were on shore; the decks were not cleared in a single ship. The admiral immediately made the signal to prepare for action. He despatched an officer to Alexandria to demand the seamen of the convoy; shortly afterwards he made a signal to prepare to get under sail; but the enemy's squadron came up so rapidly, that there was scarcely time to clear the decks, which was done with extreme negligence. Even on board the *Orient*, the admiral's ship, some cabins, which had been constructed on the new plan,

passage, were not destroyed; they were left full of mattresses and buckets of paint and tar. The Guerrier and the Conquerant each cleared only one tier of guns for action; the side towards the land was encumbered with all that had been cleared out from the opposite side, so that when the ships were turned those tiers could not fire. The English were so much astonished at this that they sent to reconnoitre the reason of this inconsistency; they saw the French flag wave without a gun being fired.

The men who had been detached from the different crews had scarcely time enough to return on board. The admiral, judging that the enemy would not be within gun-shot before six o'clock, supposed that he would not attack until the following day, more particularly as he only observed eleven 74-gun ships; the two others had been detached on Alexandria, and did not rejoin Nelson until eight in the evening. Brueis did not think the Admiral would attack him the same day, and with only eleven ships. It is imagined that he thought at first of getting under way, but that he deferred giving the order, until the sailors, whom he expected from Aboukir, should be embarked. The cannonade then commenced, and an English vessel struck on the Isle, which gave Brueis fresh con-

confidence. The sailors demanded at Alexandria did not arrive till towards eight o'clock, when the cannonade was already brisk between several ships. During the tumult and darkness, a great number of them remained on shore, and did not embark. The English admiral's plan was to attack ship after ship; every English ship anchoring astern, and placing herself athwart the head of a French ship; accident altered this disposition. The Culloden, intending to attack the Guerrier, and endeavouring to pass between the left of that ship and the Isle, struck. Had the Isle been supplied with a few pieces of cannon, this ship would have been taken. The Goliah, which followed her, manœuvring to anchor athwart the head of the Guerrier, was carried away by the wind and current, and did not anchor until she had passed and turned that ship. Perceiving then that the larboard tiers of the Conquerant did not fire, for the reasons explained above, she placed herself alongside of that vessel, and soon disabled her. The Zealous, the second English ship, followed the movement of the Goliah, and anchoring alongside the Guerrier, which could not return her fire, speedily dismasted her. The Orion, the third English ship, executed the same manœuvre, but was retard-

ed in her movement by the attack of a French frigate, and anchored between the Franklin and the Peuple Souverain. The Vanguard, the English admiral's ship, cast anchor athwart the Spartiate, the third French ship. The Defence, the Bellerophon, the Majestic, and the Minotaur, followed the same movement, and engaged the centre of the French line as far as the Tonnant, the eighth ship. The French admiral and his two seconds formed a line of three ships, very superior to those of the English. The fire was terrible; the Bellerophon was disabled, dismasted, and compelled to strike. Several other English ships were obliged to sheer off; and if, at that moment, Admiral Villeneuve, who commanded the right wing of the French, had cut his cables and fallen on the English line, with the five ships under his command, the Heureux, Timoleon, Mercure, Guillaume Tell, Genereux, and the Diane and Justice frigates, it would have been destroyed. The Culloden had struck on the Bequieres bank, and the Leander was engaged in endeavouring to bring her off. The Alexander and Swiftsure, two other English ships, seeing that our right did not stir, and that the centre of the English line was hard pressed, made towards it. The Alexander took the

place of the *Bellerophon*, and the *Swiftsure* attacked the *Franklin*. The *Leander*, which until then had been engaged in righting the *Culloden*, perceiving the danger in which the centre stood, hastened to reinforce it. The victory was still far from being decided. The *Guerrier* and *Conquerant* no longer fired, but they were the worst ships in the squadron; and, on the side of the English, the *Culloden* and *Bellerophon* were disabled. The centre of the French line had, by the great superiority of its fire, occasioned the ships opposed to it much more damage than it had sustained. The English had only seventy-fours, and those of a small rate. It was to be presumed that the fire being thus kept up all night, Admiral Villeneuve would at last get under way in the morning, and the greatest success might yet be expected from the attack of five good ships which, as yet, had neither fired nor sustained a single cannon shot. But, at eleven o'clock, the *Orient* took fire, and blew up. This unforeseen accident decided the victory. The dreadful explosion of this ship suspended the action for a quarter of an hour. Our line, undismayed by this shocking spectacle, recommenced firing. The *Franklin*, *Tonnant*, *Peuple Souverain*, *Spartiate*, and *Aquilon*, maintained the action till three o'clock in the morning. From three to

five o'clock the firing slackened on both sides. Between five and six it redoubled, and became terrible. What would it have been if the *Orient* had not been blown up? In short, the battle was raging at noon, and was not over before two o'clock. It was not until then that Villeneuve seemed to awaken, and to perceive that the fleet had been fighting for twenty hours. He cut his cables, and stood out with the *Guillaume Tell*, his flag-ship, the *Genereux*, and the *Diane* and *Justice* frigates. The three other ships of his wing ran ashore without fighting. Thus, notwithstanding the terrible accident of the *Orient*, and the singular inactivity of Villeneuve, which prevented five ships from firing a single gun, the loss and confusion of the English were such, that twenty-four hours after the battle the French flag was still flying on board the *Tonnant*; and Nelson had no ship in a condition to attack her. Not only the *Guillaume Tell* and *Genereux* were not pursued by any English ship, but the enemy, in the disabled state they were in, were glad to see them make off. Admiral Brueis obstinately defended the honour of the French flag; although he had received several wounds he would not go down to the cock-pit

Casabianca, Thermard, and Du Petit-Thouard, acquired glory on this unfortunate day. Rear-Admiral Villeneuve, according to Nelson and the English, might have decided the victory even after the explosion of the Orient. Even at midnight had he got under way, and engaged in the action with the ships of his wing, he might have annihilated the English squadron. He remained a peaceful spectator of the battle. As Rear-admiral Villeneuve was a brave and good seaman, one has to ask what was the cause of this singular conduct? He waited for orders! It is positively asserted that the admiral made the signal for him to weigh anchor, but that the smoke prevented him from seeing it. But was there any need of an order to take part in the battle and assist his comrades?

The Orient blew up at eleven o'clock; from that time till two in the afternoon, that is to say, for fifteen hours, the fight was continued. It was then Villeneuve who commanded; why did he do nothing? Villeneuve was of an irresolute character, destitute of energy.

IX.

The crews of the three ships which grounded, and those of the two frigates, landed

on the beach at Aboukir. A hundred men escaped from the *Orient*, and a great number of sailors from the other ships took refuge on land, at the moment of the decision of the battle, availing themselves of the disorder of the enemy. The army thus obtained 3500 recruits; a nautical legion, three battalions strong, was formed of part of these men, to the number of 1800. The rest recruited the artillery, infantry, and cavalry. The salvage was actively performed; many pieces of artillery, much ammunition, several masts and other pieces of timber were preserved, which became useful in the arsenal of Alexandria. We still had in the port the two ships *the Gausse* and *the Dubois*, four Venetian built frigates, three French built frigates, all the light vessels and transports. A few days after the battle, Nelson set sail, and quitted the shores of Alexandria, leaving two ships of war to blockade the port. Forty Neapolitan transports solicited and obtained, from the commandant of Alexandria, leave to return home; the commander of the English cruisers collected them round him, took out the crews, and burnt the vessels. This violation of the rights of nations proved prejudicial to the English; the crews of the Italian and French

transports saw that they had no resource but in the success of the French army, and took their measures accordingly with resolution. Nelson was received with triumph in the port of Naples.

The loss of the battle of Aboukir had great influence on the affairs of Egypt, and even on those of the world. Had the French fleet been saved, the expedition to Syria would have met with no obstacle; the battering-train could have been safely and easily conveyed beyond the Desert, and Saint-Jean d'Acre would not have stopped the French army. But the French fleet being destroyed, the Divan took courage and ventured to declare war against France. The army lost a grand support; its position in Egypt was totally changed, and Napoleon was obliged to renounce the hope of establishing the French power permanently in the East, by the results of the expedition to Egypt.

X

Since the least ships of the line have been seventy-fours, the naval armaments of France, England and Spain, have never been composed of more than thirty ships. There have never-

time, been more considerable. A squadron of thirty ships of the line is equal to a land army of 120,000 men. An army of 120,000 men is a grand army, although there have sometimes been forces of still greater strength. A squadron of thirty ships contains at most a fifth part of the number of men in an army 120,000 strong. It carries five times more artillery, and of a very superior calibre. The expense of the *matériel* is very nearly the same. If the *matériel* of the whole artillery of 120,000 men, of their waggons, provisions, and hospitals, be compared with that of thirty ships, the expenses of both are equal, or nearly so. If we calculate 20,000 cavalry, and 20,000 artillery and waggon-train for the land force, the support of the army is incomparably more expensive than that of the navy.

France might have three fleets of thirty sail as well as three armies of 120,000 men.

War by land generally destroys more men than maritime war, being more perilous. The sailor, in a squadron, fights only once in a campaign; the soldier fights daily. The sailor, whatever may be the fatigues and dangers attached to his element, suffers much less than the soldier.

or thirst, he has always with him his lodging, his kitchen, his hospital, and medical stores. The naval armies, in the service of France and England, where cleanliness is preserved by discipline, and experience has taught all the measures proper to be adopted for the preservation of health, are less subject to sickness than land armies. Besides the dangers of battle, the sailor has to encounter those of storms; but art has so materially diminished the latter, that they cannot be compared to those which occur by land, such as popular insurrections, assassinations, and surprises by the enemy's light troops.

A general who is commander-in-chief of a naval army, and a general who is commander-in-chief of a land army, are men who stand in need of different qualities. The qualities adapted to the command of a land army are born with us, whilst those which are necessary for commanding a naval army can only be acquired by experience.

Alexander and Condé were able to command at a very early age; the art of war by land is an art of genius and inspiration; but neither Alexander nor Condé, at the age of twenty-two years, could have commanded a

or inspiration, but all is positive and matter of experience. The marine general needs but one science, that of navigation. The commander by land requires many, or a talent equivalent to all, that of profiting by experience and knowledge of every kind. A marine general has nothing to guess; he knows where his enemy is, and knows his strength. A land general never knows any thing with certainty, never sees his enemy plainly, nor knows positively where he is. When the armies are facing each other, the slightest accident of the ground, the least wood, may hide a party of the hostile army. The most experienced eye cannot be certain whether it sees the whole of the enemy's army, or only three fourths of it. It is by the eyes of the mind, by the combination of all reasoning, by a sort of inspiration, that the land general sees, commands, and judges. The marine general requires nothing but an experienced eye; nothing relating to the enemy's strength is concealed from him. What creates great difficulty in the profession of the land commander, is the necessity of feeding so many men and animals; if he allows himself to be guided by the commissaries, he will never stir, and his expeditions

fined ; he carries every thing with him. A naval commander has no reconnoitring to perform, no ground to examine, no field of battle to study ; Indian ocean, Atlantic, or Channel, still it is a liquid plain. The most skilful can have no other advantage over the least experienced, than what arises from his knowledge of the winds which prevail in particular seas, from his foresight of those which will prevail there, or from his acquaintance with the signs of the atmosphere ; qualities which are acquired by experience, and experience only.

The general commanding by land never knows the field of battle on which he is to operate. His *coup-d'œil* is one of inspiration, he has no positive data. The data from which a knowledge of the localities must be gained, are so contingent, that scarcely any thing can be learnt from experience. It is a facility of instantly seizing all the relations of different grounds, according to the nature of the country ; in short, it is a gift called *coup-d'œil militaire*, which great generals have received from nature. Nevertheless, the observations which may be made on topographical maps, and the facilities arising from education and the habit of reading such maps, may afford some assistance.

A naval commander-in-chief depends more on the captains of his ships, than a military commander-in-chief on his generals. The latter has the power of taking on himself the direct command of the troops, of moving to every point, and of remedying false movements by others. The personal influence of the naval commander is confined to the men on board his own ship; the smoke prevents the signals from being seen. The winds change, or may not be the same throughout the space occupied by his line. Of all arts, then, this is the one in which the subalterns have the most to take upon themselves.

Our naval defeats are to be attributed to three causes: 1st, To irresolution and want of energy in the commanders-in-chief; 2dly, To errors in tactics: 3dly, To want of experience and nautical knowledge in the captains of ships, and to the opinion these officers maintain that they ought only to act according to signals. The action off Ushant, those during the Revolution in the Ocean, and those in the Mediterranean in 1793 and 1794, were all lost through these different causes. Admiral Villaret, though personally brave, was wanting in strength of mind, and was not even attached to the cause for which he fought. Martin was

a good seaman, but a man of little resolution. They were, moreover, both influenced by the Representatives of the People, who, possessing no experience, sanctioned erroneous operations.

The principle of making no movement, except according to signal from the admiral, is the more erroneous, because it is always in the power of the captain of a ship to find reasons in justification of his failure to execute the signals made to him. In all the sciences necessary to war, theory is useful for giving general ideas which form the mind; but their strict execution is always dangerous; they are only axes by which curves are to be traced. Besides, rules themselves compel one to reason in order to discover whether they ought to be departed from.

Although often superior in force to the English, we never knew how to attack them, and we allowed their squadrons to escape whilst we were wasting time in useless manœuvres. The first law of maritime tactics ought to be, that as soon as the admiral has made the signal that he means to attack, every captain should make the necessary movements for attacking one of the enemy's ships, taking part in the action,

This was latterly the principle of English tactics. Had it been adopted in France, Admiral Villeneuve would not have thought himself blameless at Aboukir, for remaining inactive with five or six ships, that is to say, with half the squadron, for twenty-four hours, whilst the enemy was overpowering the other wing.

The French navy is called on to acquire a superiority over the English. The French understand building better than their rivals, and French ships, the English themselves admit, are better than their's. The guns are superior in calibre to those of the English by one fourth. These are two great advantages.

The English are superior in discipline. The Toulon and Scheldt squadrons had adopted the same practice and customs as the English, and were attempting as severe a discipline, with the difference belonging to the character of the two nations. The English discipline is perfectly slavish ; it is patron and serf. It is only kept up by the influence of the most dreadful terror. Such a state of things would degrade and debase the French character, which requires a paternal kind of discipline, more founded on honour and sentiment.

In most of the battles with the English which we have lost we have either been in-

ferior in strength, or combined with Spanish ships, which, being ill organized, and in these latter times degenerate, have weakened our line instead of strengthening it; or, finally, the commanders-in-chief, who wished to fight while advancing to meet the enemy, have wavered when they fell in with him, retreated under various pretexts, and thus compromised the bravest men.

NOTES ON MALTA.

FIRST NOTE.

The Isles of Malta, Gozo, and Cumino are three small neighbouring isles. Few countries are so barren. They contain scarcely any thing but rock; earth is rarely seen, except what is brought from Sicily, to promote cultivation and make gardens. The principal production of these isles is cotton: it is the best of the Levant, and is here produced to the amount of several millions. Every necessary of life is brought from Sicily. The population of the three isles is 100,000 souls; but they could not support ten thousand. The port is one of the finest and safest in the Mediterranean. The capital, Valetta, is a city containing 30,000 souls, with handsome houses, wide streets, magnificent fountains, quays, warehouses, &c. The fortifications are good, and very considerable, but piled one upon another, in freestone. Every thing is casemated and bomb-proof. Cafarelli-Dufalga, who commanded the engineers, said, on reconnoitring these works, "It is well we have found some one within to open the gates to us." He alluded to the great number of ditches which must have been crossed, and the scarps which must have been climbed. The grand-master's house is not very remarkable; it is like that of an individual of 100,000 livres a year on the continent. There are some very fine orange-trees, a great number of inferior gardens and houses belonging to the bailies, commanders, &c. The grapes to

SECOND NOTE.

The Order of Malta possessed property in Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, and Germany. On the suppression of the Order of the Templars, that of Malta inherited the greater part of their wealth. The origin of this wealth was the same as that of the property of the monks, donations made by the faithful to the hospitallers of St. John of Jerusalem, and to the Knights of the Temple, charged to escort pilgrims and protect them from the outrages of the Arabs. The intention of the donors was that this property should be employed against the infidels. If the Order of Malta had fulfilled this intention, and if all the wealth it possessed in the different Christian states had been employed in making war against the Barbary powers, and in protecting the coasts of Christendom against the pirates of Algiers, Morocco, Tunis, and Tripoli, the order would have been more serviceable to Christendom, at Malta, than in the war of Syria and the Crusades. It was able to maintain a squadron of eight or ten seventy-fours, and a dozen good frigates and sloops, and could have constantly blockaded Algiers, &c. and kept Morocco in check. There can be no doubt but that those Barbary states would have ceased their piracies, and satisfied themselves with the gains of commerce and the culture of the country.

Malta would have been peopled by veterans, whose life would have been passed in the profession of arms, and by a numerous and warlike youth. But instead of this, the Knights imagined, like so many other monks, that all this wealth had only been given them for their private benefit. Throughout Christendom there were baillies, commanders, &c. who employed all the riches of the order in maintaining a grand

life. They applied the remainder to the enriching of their families. The monks at least said masses, preached, and administered the sacraments; they cultivated the Lord's vineyard; but the Knights did nothing at all. Thus this immense property was applied to the advantage of a few individuals, and became a provision for the younger sons of great families. Out of all these revenues very little came to Malta, and the Knights who were bound to reside two years in that island for their caravans, lived there in inns which bore the name of their nation, and were by no means well off there.

The order had no squadron; four or five galleys only continued to sail up and down the Mediterranean every year, anchoring in the ports of Italy, and avoiding the Barbary ships. These ridiculous cruises, in vessels totally inadequate to engage the frigates and large corsairs of Algiers, had no other result than the giving of a few fêtes and balls in the ports of Leghorn, Naples, and Sardinia. There was neither dock-yard nor arsenal at Malta; but there was a crazy sixty-four gun ship, and two frigates, which never went to sea. The young knights had made their caravans without having fired a single cannon, or so much as seen an enemy. At the time of the Revolution, when the goods of the monks were decreed national, a legislative measure which took place also in Italy as fast as the French administration extended itself there, there was not a single protest in favour of the order, even from the sea-ports of Genoa, Leghorn, or Malta. There were more in favour of the Chartreux, Benedictines, and Dominicans, than of this order of knighthood, which was of no service.

It is difficult to conceive how the popes, who were the superiors of this order, and the natural conservators of its statutes, -- who were its reformers, and particularly interested in maintaining it, because their own coasts were ex-

posed to the pirates—it is difficult to conceive how they could neglect to make this order perform the duties for which it was founded. Nothing can more clearly shew the declining state in which the court of Rome itself was at that period.

NOTE ON ALEXANDRIA.

Alexandria was built by Alexander. It had become, under the Ptolemies, so considerable a city as to excite the jealousy of Rome. It was, unquestionably, the second city in the world. Its population amounted to several millions. In the seventh century it was taken by Amru, in the first year of the hegira, after a siege of fourteen months. The Arabs lost 28,000 men in this siege. The walls of Alexandria were twelve miles round; the city contained 4000 palaces, 4000 baths, 400 theatres, 12,000 shops, and above 50,000 Jews. The walls were raised in the wars of the Arabs and the Roman empire. This city remained, ever after, in a state of decline. The Arabs erected a new wall, that which still exists; it is not more than 3000 toises round; but even that extent denotes a large city. The whole city is now on the isthmus. The Pharos is no longer an island; the present town is on the isthmus which joins it to the continent. It is enclosed by a wall which bars the isthmus, and is only 600 toises long. It has two good ports, the new and old. The old port can shelter squadrons of men-of-war, however numerous, from the weather or a superior force. The Nile now only reaches Alexandria at the period of the inundations. Its waters are preserved in vast cisterns by the an-

wall is covered by Lake Mareotis, which extends nearly to the tower of the Arabs; so that Alexandria is now only assailable on the Aboukir side. Lake Mareotis also leaves a part of the city walls uncovered, beyond that of the Arabs. Pompey's column, situate without the Arabs' wall, and 300 toises from it, was formerly in the centre of the city.

The General-in-chief passed several days in laying down the principles of the fortifications of the city. All his orders were executed with the greatest intelligence by Colonel Cretin, the most skilful engineer officer in France. The general ordered all the Arabs' wall to be restored; the labour was not very great. This wall was supported by the occupation of the triangular fort which formed its right, and which still exists. The centre and the Aboukir side were each supported by a fort. They were erected on little mounts of rubbish which commanded all the country from an elevation of twenty toises behind the Arabs' wall. The wall of the present town was restored as a reduct; but it was commanded in front by a great mount of rubbish. This was occupied by a fort, to which the name of Cafarelli was given. This fort and the wall of the present town formed a complete system, susceptible of a long defence, even after the rest should have been taken. It required artillery to occupy these heights with promptitude and solidity. The conception and direction of these works were confided to Cretin.

In a few months he formed three inexpugnable forts, without much labour; he established ramparts of masonry, presenting scarps of eighteen or twenty feet, which placed the batteries quite out of the reach of an escalade, and he covered these works of masonry with profiles which he contrived in the height; so that they were not seen from any part. It would have required millions of money, and years

of labour to have strengthened these forts so effectually, under a less skilful engineer. Towards the sea, the tower of Marabou, and the Pharos, were occupied. Strong side batteries were constructed, which produced a wonderful effect as often as the English presented themselves to bombard the town. Pompey's column strikes the imagination like every thing that is sublime. Cleopatra's needles are still on the same spot. In searching the tomb in which Alexander was interred, a little statue in *terra-cotta* was found, ten, or twelve inches high, dressed in the Greek fashion; the hair was curled with great art, and the locks meet on the nape of the neck; it is quite a masterpiece. There are, at Alexandria, large and handsome mosques, convents of Copts, and some houses in the European style belonging to the consuls.

It is four leagues from Alexandria to Aboukir; the ground is sandy and covered with palm-trees. At the extremity of the promontory of Aboukir is a fort built of stone; there is a little isle at the distance of 600 toises. A tower and thirty guns in this island would secure the anchorage for several ships of war, nearly as at the isle of Aix.

The way to Rosetta passes Lake Maadieh at its junction with the sea, which is 100 toises wide; ships of war, drawing eight or ten feet water, can enter it. One of the seven branches of the Nile formerly fell into this lake. To go to Rosetta without passing the lake, it must be turned, which increases the distance by three or four leagues.

E G Y

I. The Nile.—II. Its inundations.—III. Ancient and modern population.—IV. Division and productions of Egypt.—V. Commerce.—VI. Alexandria.—VII. Of the different races by which Egypt is inhabited.—VIII. The Desert and its inhabitants.—IX. Government and importance of Egypt.—X. Policy of Napoleon.

I.

THE Nile rises in the mountains of Abyssinia, flows from South to North, and falls into the Mediterranean, after passing through Abyssinia, the deserts of Nubia, and Egypt. It runs eight hundred leagues; of which extent its course through the Egyptian territory forms two hundred. It enters Egypt at the isle of Elfilah or Elephantina, and fertilizes the arid deserts through which it runs. Its inundations are regular and productive; regular, because they are caused by the tropical rains; productive, because these rains, falling in torrents on the mountains of Abyssinia, covered

with wood, carry with them a fertilizing slime, which the Nile deposits on the lands. The North winds prevail during the rise of the river, and promote its productive effects by keeping back the waters.

It never rains in Egypt. The earth, in that country, is only rendered fertile by the regular inundation of the Nile. When it is high, the year is abundant; when it is low, the harvest is ordinary.

It is a hundred and fifty leagues from the isle of Elephantina to Cairo, and this valley, watered by the Nile, is on an average five leagues in width. Beyond Cairo the stream separates into two branches, and forms a sort of triangle which it covers by overflowing. The base of this triangle is sixty leagues, from the Arabs' tower to Pelusium; and the sides are fifty leagues in length, from the sea to Cairo; one of these arms falls into the Mediterranean near Rosetta; the other near Damietta. In ancient times this river had seven mouths.

The Nile begins to rise at the summer solstice; the inundation increases till the equinox, after which it gradually decreases. It is, therefore, between September and March that all agricultural labours must be performed.

The landscape is then delightful; it is the season of flowers and of harvest. The dyke of the Nile is cut at Cairo in the course of September, and sometimes in the beginning of October. After the month of March the earth gets so completely soaked, that it is dangerous to cross the plains on horseback, and excessively fatiguing to do so on foot. A burning sun, which is never tempered by clouds or rain, burns up all the herbs and plants, except those which can be watered. Hence the salubrity of the stagnant waters, which are preserved in this country in the low grounds. In Europe, such marshes would cause death by their exhalations; in Egypt they do not even occasion fevers.

II.

The surface of the valley of the Nile, such as it has just been described, is equal to a sixth part of ancient France; which would not imply, in a state of prosperity, above four or five millions of population. Yet the Arabian historians assure us that at the time of the conquest by Amru, Egypt contained twenty millions of inhabitants and upwards of twenty thousand cities. In this calculation, however, they included not only the valley of

the Nile, but the Oases,* and the deserts belonging to Egypt.

This assertion of the Arabian historians cannot be classed amongst those ancient traditions which judicious criticism disallows. A good administration, and a numerous population, might greatly extend the benefits of the inundation of the Nile. Undoubtedly, if the valley presented a surface of the same nature as our lands in France, it would be incapable of feeding more than four or five millions of people. But in France there are mountains, sands, heaths, and uncultivated lands, whilst in Egypt every thing is productive. To this consideration it must be added that the valley of the Nile, fecundated by the waters, the mud, and the warmth of the climate, is more fertile than our best lands, and that two thirds, or perhaps three fourths, of France produce but little. There is, moreover, reason to believe that the Nile fertilized several Oases.

Supposing all the canals which draw water from the Nile and carry it over the lands, to be ill kept up, or stopped, the course of the river would be much more rapid, the inunda-

* The Oases are parts of the desert where a little vegeta-

tion would be less extensive, a greater mass of water would reach the sea, and the culture of the lands would be much diminished. But supposing, on the contrary, all the canals made for the purpose of irrigation to be kept in the best state, and as numerous, long, and deep as possible, and directed by art so as to water the greatest possible extent of desert in all directions, it may be conceived that a very small quantity of the waters of the Nile would be lost in the sea, and that the inundations fertilizing a greater extent of territory, cultivation would increase in the same proportion. Now there is no country in which government has more influence on agriculture, and consequently on population, than Egypt. The plains of Beauce and Brie are fecundated by a regular watering from the rains; government has, in this respect, no influence there. But in Egypt, where the irrigations can only be artificial, government is every thing. If good, it adopts the best police regulations relative to the direction of the waters, the maintenance and construction of the irrigatory canals. If bad, partial, or weak, it favours localities or particular properties, to the detriment of the public interest, is unable to repress the civil

are to be opened, or, finally, allows them all to go to ruin; the consequence is, that the inundation is diminished, which lessens the extent of the lands capable of cultivation. Under a good administration the Nile gains on the Desert; under a bad one the Desert gains on the Nile. In Egypt, the Nile, or the genius of good, and the Desert, or the genius of evil, stand constantly opposed to each other; and it may be said that property there does not so much consist in the possession of a field, as in the right established by general rules of government, of having the benefit of the inundation, at a certain period of the year, and by a certain canal.

Egypt has been continually declining for two hundred years. At the time of the French expedition, this country still contained from 2,500,000 to 2,800,000 inhabitants. If it continues to be governed in the same way, it will not contain above 1,500,000, fifty years hence.

By constructing a canal to draw the waters of the Nile into the great Oasis, a vast kingdom was acquired. It is reasonable to admit that in the times of Sesostris and the Ptolemies, Egypt was able to feed from twelve to

fifteen millions of inhabitants, by agriculture alone, without the aid of commerce.

III.

This country is divided into Upper, Middle, and Lower Egypt. The Upper, which is called Saide, forms two provinces, namely, Thebes and Girgeh; Middle Egypt, named Vostanieh, forms four, namely, Benisouf, Siout, Fayoum, and Daifih; Lower Egypt, called Bahireh, has nine, Bahhire, Rosetta, Garbieh, Menouf, Damietta, Mansoura, Sharkieh, Kelioubieh, and Ghizeh.

Egypt likewise includes the Great Oasis, the valley of the Sea Without Water, and the Oasis of Jupiter Ammon.

The Great Oasis is situate parallel to the Nile, on the left bank; it is a hundred and fifty leagues in length. Its remotest points from this river are at a distance of sixty leagues; its nearest only twenty leagues from the Nile.

The valley of the Sea Without Water, near which are the Natron-lakes, the source of a considerable branch of commerce, is fifteen leagues from the Rosetta branch. This valley was formerly fertilized by the Nile. The Oasis of Jupiter Ammon is eighty leagues distant, on the

The Egyptian territory extends towards the frontiers of Asia, as far as the hills which are found between El-Arisch, El-Kanones, and Refah, about forty leagues from Pelusium, whence the line of demarcation crosses the Wilderness, passes by Suez, and along the shore of the Red Sea, as far as Berenice. The Nile runs parallel to this sea; its remotest points are fifty leagues from it, its nearest thirty. One of its elbows, indeed, is but twenty-two leagues distant from the Red Sea, but then it is separated from it by impassable mountains. The square superficies of Egypt is two hundred leagues in length, by a breadth varying from one hundred and ten to one hundred and twenty leagues.

Egypt produces abundance of wheat, rice, and pulse. This country was the granary of Rome, and is at present that of Constantinople. It also produces sugar, indigo, senna, cassia, nitre, flax, and hemp; but has neither wood, coal, nor oil. It is also destitute of tobacco, which it obtains from Syria; and of coffee, with which Arabia supplies it. It feeds numerous flocks, independently of those of the Desert, and a multitude of poultry. The chickens are hatched in ovens, and an enormous

This country serves as an intermediate district between Africa and Asia. The caravans arrive at Cairo like ships on a coast, at the moment when they are least expected, and from the most remote countries. Signals of their arrival are made at Ghizeh, and they approach by the Pyramids. At that spot they are informed of the place at which they are to cross the Nile, and where they are to encamp near Cairo. The caravans thus announced are those of pilgrims or traders of Morocco, Fez, Tunis, Algiers, or Tripoli, going to Mecca, and bringing goods to barter at Cairo. They are usually composed of several hundred camels, sometimes even of several thousands, and escorted by armed men. Caravans also come from Abyssinia, from the interior of Africa, from Tagoast, and the places in direct communication with the Cape of Good Hope and Senegal. They bring slaves, gum, gold dust, elephants' teeth, and in general all the produce of those countries, which they exchange for the merchandize of Europe and of the Levant. In short, caravans come from all parts of Arabia and Syria, bringing coals, wood, fruits, oil, coffee, tobacco, and in general, all that is supplied by the interior of India.



IV.

Egypt has at all times served as the mart for the commerce of India. It was anciently *carried on by way of the Red Sea*. The goods were landed at Berenice, and transported on the backs of camels for eighty leagues, as far as Thebes, or were sent up by water from Berenice to Cosseir; which lengthened the navigation by eighty leagues, but reduced the carriage to thirty. On arriving at Thebes they were embarked on the Nile, to be afterwards spread throughout Europe. Such was the cause of the great prosperity of Thebes with her hundred gates. Goods were also conveyed beyond Cosseir, as far as Suez, whence they were transported on the backs of camels as far as Memphis and Pelusium, that is to say, for the space of thirty leagues. In the time of Ptolemy, the canal from Suez to the Nile was open. From thence, therefore, there was no land carriage of merchandize; it reached Baboust and Pelusium, on the banks of the Nile and Mediterranean, by water.

Independently of the commerce of India, Egypt has a domestic trade of her own. Fifty years of a French administration would increase her population in a great proportion.

She would afford such a market for our manufactures as would produce a great benefit in every branch of our industry; and we should soon be called upon to supply all the wants of the inhabitants of the deserts of Africa, Abyssinia, Arabia, and a great part of Syria. These people are destitute of every thing; and what are Saint-Domingo and all our colonies compared to such vast regions?

France, in return, would obtain from Egypt wheat, rice, sugar, nitre, and all the productions of Africa and Asia.

If the French were established in Egypt, it would be impossible for the English to maintain themselves long in India. Squadrons built on the coasts of the Red Sea, victualled with the productions of the country, manned and filled with our troops stationed in Egypt, would infallibly render us masters of India, at the moment when England least expected it.

Even supposing the commerce of that country free, as it has hitherto been, between the English and French, the former will be in no condition to stand the competition. The possibility of the reconstruction of the canal of Suez being a problem resolved, and the labour it would require being of little importance, the

by this canal, and with such a saving of capital, that the French might appear in the markets with immense advantages: the trade of India, by way of the ocean, would be annihilated.

Alexander distinguished himself more by founding Alexandria, and by the plan of transporting thither the seat of his empire, than by his most striking victories. That city was calculated to be the capital of the world. It is situated between Asia and Africa, with access to Europe and the Indies. Its port is the only anchorage on a coast of five hundred leagues, reaching from Tunis, the scite of ancient Carthage, to Alexandretta; it is on one of the ancient mouths of the Nile. All the fleets in the world might lie there; and in the old port they are safe from the winds and from every attack. Ships drawing twenty-one feet water have entered that port without difficulty. Those drawing twenty-three feet might do so; and by means of works which would not be very considerable, the entrance might be rendered easy, even for three-deckers. The First Consul had had twelve seventy-fours, drawing only twenty-one feet water, built at Toulon, upon the English plan; and there was no reason to complain of their sailing,

when they were placed in our squadrons. They are, however, less fit for service in India, because they carry less water and provisions.

The dilapidation of the canals of the Nile prevents its waters from reaching Alexandria. They no longer arrive there except in the time of the inundation, and it is found necessary to have cisterns to preserve them. By the side of the port of this town is Aboukir road, which might be rendered safe for a few ships; if a port were constructed on Aboukir island, they would be as safe there as at the Isle of Aix.

Rosetta, Bourlos, and Damietta, can only receive small vessels, there being only six or seven feet water over the bars. Pelusium, El-Arisch, and Gaza, can never have had ports; and the lakes of Bourlos and Menzaleh, which communicate with the sea, can only be entered by ships which do not draw above six or seven feet of water.

VI.

At the period of the expedition to Egypt, that country was inhabited by three races of men; the Mamelukes or Circassians, the Ottomans or Janissaries, and Spahis, and the

These three races differ in principles, manners, and language. They have nothing in common but their religion. The usual language of the Mamelukes and Ottomans is Turkish; the natives speak the Arabic language. At the time of the arrival of the French, the Mamelukes governed the country, and possessed all wealth and power in it. They had for their chiefs twenty-three Beys, equal and independent of each other; that is to say, subject only to that one, who, by his talents and bravery could obtain all their suffrages.

The household of a Bey is composed of from four to eight hundred slaves, all horsemen, each of whom has two or three fellahs to attend him. They have several officers for the honorary duty of their houses. The Kiaschefs are the lieutenants of the Beys, under whom they command this militia, and are lords of the villages. The Beys have estates in the provinces, and a house at Cairo. One large building serves for their lodging and their harem; around the courts are those of the slaves, guards, and domestics.

The Beys can only recruit their numbers in Circassia. Young Circassians are sold by their mothers, or stolen by people who make

it a trade, and sold at Cairo by the merchants of Constantinople. Blacks and Ottomans are sometimes admitted, but these exceptions are rare.

The slaves forming part of a Bey's household are adopted by him, and compose his family. They are intelligent and brave, and rise successively from rank to rank until they attain that of Kiaschef, or even of Bey.

The Mamelukes have few children, and those they have do not live so long as the natives of the country. They very seldom continue their race beyond the third generation. The sterility of their marriages has been attributed to an antiphysical inclination. The Arabian women are fat and clumsy; they affect inactivity, can scarcely walk, and remain whole days motionless on a divan. A young Mameluke of fourteen or fifteen, supple and active, displaying admirable grace and address in exercising a beautiful courser, excites the senses in a different manner. It is certain that all the Beys and Kiaschefs had been subjected in youth to the vices of their masters, and afterwards pursued the same course with their handsome slaves; they do not deny it themselves.

The Greeks and Romans were accused of

the same vice. Of all nations, that which has been least addicted to this monstrous inclination, is undoubtedly France. This is ascribed to the fact that there is no country in which the women are more captivating, by the lightness and elegance of their figures, their vivacity, and grace.

There were in Egypt about 60 or 70,000 individuals of the Circassian race.

The Ottomans established themselves in Egypt at the time of the conquest by Selim, in the sixteenth century. They form the corps of Janissaries and Spahis, and have been increased by the addition of all the Ottomans inrolled in these companies, according to the customs of the empire. They amount to about 200,000, constantly debased and humbled by the Mamelukes.

The Arabs compose the mass of the population; their chiefs are the grand scheiks, the descendants of those of the Arabs, who in the time of the prophet, at the beginning of the Hegira, made the conquest of Egypt. They are at once the chief nobility and the doctors of the law; they possess villages and a great number of slaves, and never travel but on mules. The mosques are under their inspec-

scheiks. It is a kind of Sorbonne, which decides all religious questions, and even serves as an university. The philosophy of Aristotle, and the history and morals of the Koran are taught there; it is the most renowned school in the East. Its scheiks are the principal ones of the country; the Mamelukes feared them; and even the Porte was cautious in its conduct towards them. It was only through them that the country could be influenced and excited. Some of them descend from the prophet, as the scheik El Bekry; others from the second wife of the prophet, as the scheik El Sadda. If the sultan of Constantinople were at Cairo, at the period of either of the two great festivals of the empire, he would celebrate it at the house of one of these scheiks. This sufficiently shews the high respect in which they are held. It is such that there is not a single instance of the infliction of an infamous punishment on one of them. When the government considers the condemnation of one of them indispensable, it causes him to be poisoned, and his funeral is performed with the honours due to his rank, and as if his death had been a natural one.

fellahs are Arabs,—not that all their progenitors came at the commencement of the Hégira, with the army that conquered Egypt; it is supposed that not above 100,000 settled in Egypt through the conquest; but as all the natives of the country, at that period, embraced the Mahometan faith, they became mingled in the same manner as the Franks and Gauls. The scheiks are the men of law and religion; the Mamelukes and Janissaries the men of power and government. The difference between them is greater than that which exists in France between the military and the priesthood; for they are entirely distinct races and families.

The Copts are Catholics; but do not acknowledge the Pope; there are nearly 150,000 of them in Egypt. They enjoy the free exercise of their religion. They descend from families which remained Christian after the conquests of the caliphs. The Syrian Catholics are few in number. Some insist that they are the descendants of the crusaders; others that they spring from natives of the country, who, like the Copts, professed Christianity at the time of the Conquest, and who have preserved some differences in their religion. This is

or Greeks. The Patriarch of Alexandria, who is the chief of the latter, considers himself equal to the Patriarch of Constantinople, and superior to the Pope. He lives in a convent at Old Cairo, in the manner in which the head of a religious order in Europe would live, with 30,000 livres per annum. The Franks are not numerous; they consist of English, French, Spanish, or Italian families, settled in the country for purposes of trade, or of persons sent thither in the service of European houses.

VII.

The Deserts are inhabited by tribes of wandering Arabs, who live under tents. Of these tribes there are about sixty, all dependent on Egypt, and forming a population of about 120,000 souls, capable of furnishing from 18 to 20,000 cavalry. They command the different parts of the Deserts, which they look upon as their property, and where they possess a great quantity of cattle, camels, horses, and sheep. These Arabs often make war amongst themselves, on account of differences respecting the limits of their tribes, the pasturage of their cattle, or other matters. The Desert alone cannot feed them, for it produces nothing. They possess some Oases, like isles, in the

midst of the Desert, which furnish fresh water, grass, and trées. These they cultivate, and retire to at certain seasons of the year. Nevertheless, the Arabs in general are in a state of wretchedness, and constantly stand in need of Egypt. They come every year to cultivate the borders of the country, sell the produce of their flocks, let their camels to carry burthens in the Desert, and employ the profit which they derive from this traffic in the purchase of the articles for which they have occasion. The Deserts are plains of sand, without water or vegetation, the monotonous aspect of which is varied only by hillocks, mounts, or banks of sand. It is, however, uncommon to travel twenty or four and twenty leagues in the Desert without finding a spring of water; but they afford only a scanty supply, are more or less brackish, and almost all of them exhale an alkaline odour. Great quantities of bones of men and animals are found in the Desert, which are used for making fires. Gazelles are also seen there, as well as flocks of ostriches, which look, at a distance, like Arabs on horseback.

There exists no trace of roads; the Arabs are accustomed, from infancy, to guide their course by the sinuosities of the sand hills or

banks, by the accidents of the ground, or by the stars. The winds sometimes displace the mounts of moving sand, which renders marching in the Deserts very laborious, and often dangerous. Sometimes the ground is firm; at others it sinks beneath the feet. It is uncommon to meet with trees, except around the wells, where a few palm-trees are found. There are marshes in the Deserts, where the waters settle and remain for a longer or shorter period. Near these fens some thorns grow, to the height of a foot, or eighteen inches, which serve to feed the camels; this is the rich part of the Deserts. Disagreeable as it is to travel in these sands, people are often obliged to cross them, in order to communicate between the south and north of Egypt; as the distance would be tripled by following all the windings of the course of the Nile.

VIII.

There are tribes of Arabs of 1500 or 2000 souls, which have 300 horsemen, and 1400 camels, and occupy a hundred square leagues of ground. They had formerly an excessive dread of the Mamelukes. One of the latter would put ten Arabs to flight, because the Mamelukes had not only a great military su-

periority over them, but a moral superiority also. Besides, the Arabs had reason to be cautious in their conduct towards them, as they wanted them to purchase or hire their camels, to supply them with grain, and to allow them to cultivate the border of Egypt.

If the extraordinary situation of Egypt, whose prosperity depends upon the extent of the inundations, require a good administration, the necessity of keeping in awe 20 or 30,000 thieves, who are independent of justice, because they take refuge in the immensity of the Desert, no less urgently requires an energetic administration. In modern times they have carried their audacity to such a pitch, as to come and plunder villages, and kill the Fellahs; and yet this did not occasion any regular pursuit. One day, Napoleon, being surrounded by the divan of the grand-scheiks, was informed that the Arabs of the tribe of Osnadis had killed a fellah, and carried off some flocks; he appeared highly indignant, and, in an animated tone, ordered a staff officer to march immediately into the Bahireh, with 200 dromedaries and 300 horsemen, to obtain reparation, and punish the guilty parties. The scheik Elmodi, who witnessed this order, and the emotion of the General-in-chief, said to him, with a laugh, " Was

this fellah thy cousin, that his death excites so much anger in thee?"—"Yes," replied Napoleon, "all whom I command are my children." "*Taib!*" said the scheik, "that is spoken like the prophet himself."

IX.

Egypt has, in all ages, excited the jealousy of the nations who have governed the world. Octavius, after the death of Antony, united this country to the empire. He would not send a proconsul to it, but divided it into twelve prætorships. Antony had drawn upon himself the hatred of the Romans, by giving rise to suspicions of an intention to make Alexandria the capital of the republic. It seems probable that Egypt, in the time of Octavius, contained from 12 to 15,000,000 of inhabitants. Her wealth was immense; her territories were the true canal of the commerce of India; and Alexandria, from its situation, seemed destined to become the seat of the empire of the world. But several obstacles prevented this city from attaining all the greatness of which it seemed capable. The Romans were apprehensive that the national

spirit of the Arabs, a brave people, inured to fatigues, who were free from the effeminacy of the inhabitants of Antioch or Asia Minor, and whose immense cavalry had enabled Hannibal to triumph over Rome, might make their country a centre of revolt against the Roman empire.

Selim had still greater reason to dread Egypt. It was the holy land; the natural mother country of Arabia, and the granary of Constantinople. An ambitious Pacha, favoured by circumstances, and by a bold enterprising character, might have restored the Arabian nation, and struck terror into the Ottomans, already threatened by that immense Greek population, which forms the majority of the inhabitants of Constantinople and its environs. Accordingly, Selim was unwilling to intrust the government of Egypt to one Pacha only. He was even fearful that the division of the country into several pachaships would not be a sufficient guarantee; and endeavoured to ensure the submission of this province, by confiding its government to twenty-three Beys, each having a household of from 400 to 800 slaves. These slaves were to be their sons, or natives of Circassia, but never of Arabia or of the country. By these means he created a

militia completely foreign to Arabia. He established in Egypt the general system of the empire, Janissaries and Spahis, and placed at their head a Pacha, representing the Grand Signor, with the authority of a viceroy, over the whole province, but who, being restrained by the Mamelukes, could not carry into effect any plan for rendering himself independent.

The Mamelukes, thus called to the government of Egypt, sought for auxiliaries. They were too ignorant and too few to perform the duties of collectors of the revenues; but they were unwilling to intrust those duties to the natives of the country, whom they feared, through the same spirit of jealousy which made the Sultan fear the Arabs. They chose the Copts and Jews. The Copts are, it is true, natives of the country, but of a proscribed religion. As Christians, they are out of the protection of the Koran, and can only be protected by the sabre; they could therefore give no umbrage to the Mamelukes. Thus did this soldiery of 10 or 12,000 horse engage, as their agents and men of business, the 200,000 Copts who inhabit Egypt. Every village had a Coptic receiver: all the business of finances and administration was in the hands of the Copts. The tolerancé which prevails throughout the

Ottoman empire, and the species of protection afforded to the Christians, are the result of ancient views. The sultan and the policy of Constantinople like to defend a class of men from which they have nothing to fear, because these men form a feeble minority in Armenia, Syria, and all Asia Minor; because, moreover, they are in a state of natural opposition to the people of the country, and could not, in any case, league with them to re-establish the Syrian or Arabian nation. This, however, will not apply to Greece, where the Christians are superior in number. The sultans have committed a great error in leaving so considerable a number of Christians collected together. Sooner or later this circumstance will produce the ruin of the Ottomans.

The moral situation resulting from the different interests and different races that inhabit Egypt did not escape Napoleon's observation; and it was upon this that he built his system of government. The French had little inclination to undertake the administration of justice in this country, nor could they have effected it if they had been willing. Napoleon intrusted it to the Arabs, that is to say, the Scheiks, and gave them the whole preponderance. Thenceforth he addressed the people through the me-

gium of these men, at once the nobility and doctors of the law, and thus interested the national Arabian spirit, and the religion of the Koran, in the support of his government. He made war against the Mamelukes alone, and them he pursued with the utmost rigour; after the battle of the Pyramids there was but a wreck of them left. By the same policy he endeavoured to conciliate the Copts. These latter were connected with him by similarity of ~~of~~ and were exclusively versed in the administration of the country. But even had they not possessed that advantage, it would have been the policy of the French general to give it them, that he might not depend exclusively on the native Arabs, or have to struggle, with 25 or 30,000 men, against the force of the national and religious spirit. The Copts, seeing the Mamelukes destroyed, had no choice but to attach themselves to the French; and thus our army had, in every part of Egypt, spies, observers, comptrollers, and financiers, independent of the natives, and hostile to them. As to the Janissaries and Ottomans, policy required that the Grand Signor should be respected in their persons; the standard of the Sultan waved in Egypt, and Napoleon was persuaded that

stantinople, and that negotiations respecting Egypt had been opened with the Porte. Moreover the Mamelukes had made a point of humbling, reducing, and disorganizing the Janissary soldiery, who were their rivals: from the humiliation of the Ottoman militia had arisen a total disregard of the Pacha and of the authority of the Porte, which had arrived at such a pitch, that the Mamelukes often refused the *miry*; and these warriors would even have declared themselves entirely independent, but for the opposition of the Scheiks, or doctors of the law, which attached them to Constantinople by a religious sentiment as well as by inclination. The Scheiks and the people preferred the influence of Constantinople to that of the Mamelukes; they even frequently sent complaints thither, and sometimes succeeded in mitigating the arbitrary sway of the Beys.

Since the commencement of the decline of the Ottoman empire, the Porte has often sent expeditions against the Mamelukes, but they have always had the advantage in the end; and these wars have always concluded by an arrangement which has left the Mamelukes their power. An attentive perusal of the history of the events which have taken place in Egypt during the last two hundred years, will shew,

that if power, instead of being intrusted to 12,000 Mamelukes, had been confided to a Pacha, who, like the Pacha of Albania, had recruited his forces in the country, the Arabian empire composed of a nation entirely distinct, with its peculiar spirit, prejudices, history, and language, and comprising Egypt, Arabia, and part of Africa, would have become independent like that of Morocco.

EGYPT.—BATTLE OF THE PYRAMIDS.

I. March of the army on Cairo.—II. Despondency and complaints of the soldiers.—III. Position and forces of the enemy.—IV. Manœuvre of the French army.—V. Impetuous charge of Murad-Bey repulsed.—VI. Taking of the intrenched camp.—VII. French head-quarters at Gizeh.—VIII. Taking of the Isle of Rodah.—IX. Surrender of Cairo.—X. Description of that city.

I.

THE evening after the action of Shebreis, (July 13, 1798) the French army lay at Shabur. This day had been arduous; the troops marched in order of battle and in quick time, in the hope of cutting off some vessels of the enemy's flotilla. In fact the Mamelukes were obliged to burn several. The army bivouacked at Shabur, under some fine sycamores, and found the fields full of battechs, a species of water-melons, furnishing a wholesome and refreshing nourishment. We met with them continually, as far as Cairo; and the soldier expressed how agreeable this fruit was to him,

by naming it, like the ancient Egyptians, the *holy battech*.

On the following day the army began its march very late; some meat had been procured, which it was necessary to distribute. We waited for our flotilla, which could not ascend the current before the North wind had risen, and we slept at Kounscheric. The following day we arrived at Alkam. At that place General Zayoucheck received orders to land on the right bank, with all the dismounted cavalry, and to advance on Menouf and the point of the Delta. As there were no Arabs there, he was at liberty to make what movements he pleased, and was of great assistance in procuring us provisions. He took position at the head of the Delta, called *the cow's belly*.

On the 17th the army encamped at Abou-Neshabe, on the 18th at Wardan. Wardan is a large place; the troops bivouacked there in a great forest of palm-trees. The soldiers began to understand the customs of the country, and to dig up the lentils and other pulse which the fellahs are accustomed to bury in the earth. We made short marches, on account of the necessity of procuring provisions, and in order to be always in a condition to receive the enemy. We often took up a posi-

tion by ten o'clock in the morning, and the first care of the soldier was to bathe in the Nile. From Wardán we went to lie at Omedinar, whence we perceived the Pyramids. All the glasses in the army were instantly levelled at these most ancient monuments in the world. They might be taken for enormous masses of rock, but the regularity and right lines of the angles betray the hand of man. The Pyramids border the horizon of the valley on the left bank of the Nile.

II.

We were approaching Cairo, and were informed, by the people of the country, that the Mamelukes, combined with the troops of that city, and with a considerable number of Arabs, Janissaries, and Spahis, were waiting for us between the Nile and the Pyramids, covering Gizeh. They boasted that our success would end there.

We halted a day at Omedinar. This repose served to get our arms in readiness, and to prepare us for battle. Melancholy and sadness prevailed in the army. As the Hebrews, wandering in the wilderness, complained, and angrily asked Moses for the onions and flesh-pots of Egypt, the French soldiers constantly

regretted the luxuries of Italy. In vain were they assured that the country was the most fertile in the world, that it was even superior to Lombardy; how were they to be persuaded of this when they could get neither bread nor wine? We encamped on immense quantities of wheat, but there was neither mill nor oven in the country. The biscuit brought from Alexandria had long been exhausted; the soldiers were even reduced to bruise the wheat between two stones, and to make cakes, which they baked under the ashes. Many parched the wheat in a pan, after which they boiled it. This was the best way to use the grain, but after all it was not bread. The apprehensions of the soldiers increased daily; and rose to such a pitch, that a great number of them said there was no great city of Cairo; and that the place bearing that name was, like Damanhour, a vast assemblage of mere huts, destitute of every thing that could render life comfortable or agreeable. To such a melancholy state of mind had they brought themselves, that two dragoons threw themselves, completely clothed, into the Nile, where they were drowned. It is, nevertheless, true that though there was neither bread nor wine, the resources

meat, and sometimes pigeons, furnished the army with food of some kind. But the evil was in the ferment of the mind. The officers complained more loudly than the soldiers, because the comparison was proportionately more disadvantageous to them. In Egypt they found neither the quarters, the good tables, nor the luxury of Italy. The General-in-chief, wishing to set an example, used to bivouac in the midst of the army, and in the least commodious spots. No one had either tent or provisions; the dinner of Napoleon and his staff consisted of a dish of lentils. The soldiers passed the evenings in political conversations, arguments, and complaints. *For what purpose are we come here?* said some of them; *the Directory has transported us.* Caffarelli, said others, *is the agent that has been made use of to deceive the General-in-chief.* Many of them, having observed that wherever there were vestiges of antiquity, they were carefully searched, vented their spite in invectives against the *savans*, or scientific men, who, they said, *had started the idea of the expedition in order to make these searches.* Jests were showered upon them, even in their presence. The men called an ass *a savant*; and said of Caffarelli, *Dufalca*, alluding to his wooden leg

He laughs at all these troubles; he has one foot in France. But Dufalga and the savans soon regained the esteem of the army.

III.

On the 21st we marched from Omedinar at one in the morning. This was to be a decisive day. At dawn, for the first time since the action of Shebreis, a Mameluke vanguard of 1000 horse shewed itself; but it retreated in order without attempting any thing; a few balls from our vanguard kept it in check. At ten o'clock we perceived Embabeh, and the enemy in line. Their right was supported on the Nile, where they had constructed a large intrenched camp, lined with forty pieces of cannon, and defended by about 20,000 infantry, janissaries, spahis, and militia from Cairo. The Mamelukes' line of cavalry rested its right on the intrenched camp, and extended its left in the direction of the Pyramids, crossing the road to Gizeh. There were about nine or ten thousand horse, as nearly as could be estimated. Thus the whole army consisted of 60,000 men, or thereabouts, including the infantry troops and the foot soldiers who attended every horseman. Two or three thousand Arabs kept the extreme left, and oc-

cupied the space between the Mamelukes and the Pyramids. These dispositions were formidable. We knew not what sort of a stand the janissaries and spahis of Cairo would make, but we knew and were impressed with a full sense of the skill and impetuous bravery of the Mamelukes. The French army was drawn up in the same order as at Shebreis, the left resting on the Nile, the right on a large village. General Desaix commanded the right, and it took him three hours to form to his position, and rest a little. The intrenched camp of the enemy was reconnoitred, and it was soon ascertained that it was merely sketched out. It was a work which had only been begun three days previously, after the battle of Shebreis. It was composed of long *boyaux*, which might be of some service against a charge of cavalry, but not against an attack by infantry. We also perceived with good telescopes, that their cannon were not upon field carriages, but were only great iron pieces, taken from the vessels and served by the crews of the flotilla. As soon as the General-in-chief had satisfied himself that the artillery was not moveable, it was evident to him that neither it nor the infantry would quit the in-

come forth, it would be without artillery. The dispositions for the battle were to be made in consequence of these data; we resolved to prolong our right, and to follow the movement of that wing with our whole army, passing out of the range of the guns of the intrenched camp. Through this movement we had only the Mamelukes and the cavalry to deal with; and we placed ourselves on ground where the enemy's infantry and artillery could be of no service to him.

IV.

Murad-Bey, who was Commander-in-chief of the whole army, saw our columns put themselves in motion, and quickly guessed our purpose. Although this chief had no experience in war, nature had endowed him with a natural greatness of mind, with undaunted courage, and a quick and discerning eye. The three affairs which we had had with the Mamelukes already served him as experience. He comprehended, with a degree of skill that could hardly have been expected in the most consummate European general, that the fortune of the day depended on preventing us from executing our movement, and on his availing himself of his numerous cavalry to

attack us on our march. He advanced with two-thirds of his cavalry (6 or 7000), leaving the rest to support the intrenched camp and encourage the infantry; and came up at the head of this troop, to attack General Desaix, who was advancing by the extremity of our right. The latter was for a moment compromised; the charge was made with such rapidity that we thought the squares were falling into confusion: General Desaix, on his march at the head of his column, had entered a grove of palm-trees. However, the head of the corps of Mamelukes, which fell upon him, was not numerous. The mass did not arrive for some minutes; and this delay was sufficient. The squares were perfectly formed, and received the charge with coolness. General Regnier supported their left; Napoleon, who was in General Dugua's square, immediately marched on the main body of the Mamelukes, and placed himself between the Nile and Regnier. The Mamelukes were received with grape, and a brisk fire of musquetry: thirty of the bravest died near General Desaix; but the mass, by an instinct natural to the horse, turned round the squares, and this frustrated the charge. In the midst of the fire of grape and ball, of the dust, the cries, and the smoke,

part of the Mamelukes regained their intrenched camp, according to the natural impulse of the soldier to retreat towards the place whence he set out. Murad-Bey, and the most expert, directed their course towards Gizeh. Thus this Commander-in-chief found himself separated from his army. The division of Bon and Menou, forming our left, then advanced on the intrenched camp; and General Rampon, with two battalions, was detached to occupy a kind of defile, between Gizeh and the camp.

V.

The most horrible confusion prevailed at Embabeh; the cavalry had thrown itself upon the infantry, which, not relying upon it, and seeing the Mamelukes beaten, rushed into the jerns, kaiks, and other boats, to repass the Nile. Many effected the passage by swimming; the Egyptians excel in this exercise, which the peculiar circumstances of their country render very necessary to them. The forty pieces of cannon which defended the intrenched camp did not fire two hundred shot. The Mamelukes, quickly perceiving that their retreat was in the wrong direction, wished to regain the Gizeh road, but were unable. The

two battalions placed between the Nile and Gizeh, and supported by the other divisions, drove them back on their intrenched camp. Many of them fell there, and many more were drowned in attempting to pass the Nile. The intrenchments, artillery, pontoons, and baggage, all fell into our power. Of this army of above 60,000 men, not more than 2500 horse escaped with Murad-Bey; the greater part of the infantry got off by swimming, or in boats. The number of Mamelukes drowned in this battle has been estimated as high as 5000. Their numerous bodies carried the news of our victory, in a few days, to Damietta and Rosetta, and all along the banks.

It was at the beginning of this battle that Napoleon addressed to his soldiers those words which afterwards became so celebrated: *From the tops of those Pyramids forty centuries look upon you!*

It was night when the three divisions of Desaix, Regnier, and Dugua, returned to Gizeh. The l-in-chief fixed his headquarters there, in Murad-Bey's country-house.

VI.

The Mamelukes had sixty vessels on the Nile laden with all their riches. Seeing the

unexpected result of the battle, and our cannon already placed on the river beyond the outlets of the Isle of Rodah, they lost all hopes of saving them, and set them on fire. During the whole night we perceived through the volumes of smoke and flame, the forms of the minarets and buildings of Cairo, and the City of the Dead. These columns of flame gave so much light that we could even discern the Pyramids.

The Arabs, according to their custom after a defeat, rallied far from the field of battle, in the Desert beyond the Pyramids.

For several days the whole army was engaged in fishing for the bodies of the Mamelukes; their valuable arms, and the quantity of gold they were accustomed to carry with them, rendered the soldiers very zealous in this search.

Our flotilla had not been able to follow the movement of the army, the wind having failed. If we had had it, the action would not have been more decisive, but we should probably have made a greater number of prisoners, and taken all the wealth which fell a prey to the flames. The flotilla had heard our cannon, notwithstanding the North wind, which blew with violence. As it grew calmer, the sound

of the cannon continued to increase, so that at last it appeared to have come nearer them, and the seamen, in the evening, thought the battle lost; but the multitude of bodies which passed near their ships, and which were all Mamelukes, soon restored their confidence.

Not long after his flight, *Murad-Bey* perceived that he was only followed by part of his people, and discovered the error his cavalry had committed by remaining in the intrenched camp. He tried several charges, in order to re-open a passage for it; but it was too late. The Mamelukes themselves were struck with consternation, and acted supinely. Fate had decreed the destruction of this brave and intrepid soldiery, unquestionably the flower of the Eastern cavalry. The loss of the enemy on this day may be reckoned at 10,000 men left on the field or drowned, including Mamelukes, Janissaries, militia of Cairo, and slaves to the Mamelukes. A thousand prisoners were made; and eight or nine hundred camels and as many horses were taken.

VII.

About nine in the evening, Napoleon entered the country-house of *Murad-Bey* at

to our chateaux. We found it difficult to make it serve for our lodging, and to understand the distribution of the different apartments. But what chiefly struck the officers, was a great quantity of cushions and divans covered with the finest damasks and silks of Lyons, and ornamented with gold fringe. For the first time we found the luxury and arts of Europe in Egypt. Part of the night was passed in exploring this singular mansion in every direction. The gardens were full of magnificent trees, but without alleys, and not unlike the gardens belonging to some of the nunneries in Italy. What most delighted the soldiers (for every one came to see the place,) were great arbours of vines covered with the finest grapes in the world. The vintage was soon over.

The two divisions of Bon and Menou, which had remained in the intrenched camp, also enjoyed the greatest abundance. Amongst the baggage had been found a great number of canteens full of preserves, pots of confectionary, and sweetmeats. We every moment found carpets; porcelains, vases of perfumes, and a multitude of little elegancies used by the Mamelukes, which excited our curiosity.

The army then began to be reconciled to

VIII.

The next morning, at daybreak, Napoleon proceeded to the river, and seizing some barks, caused General Vial, with his division, to pass into the Isle of Rodah, which was taken after a few musquet-shot. The moment we had taken possession of the Isle of Rodah, and placed a battalion in the Mekias, and sentinels along the canal, the Nile might be considered as passed; there was nothing further to divide us from Boulac and Old Cairo but a large canal. The walls of Gizeh were inspected, and the closing up of the gates was immediately commenced. Gizeh was surrounded by a wall sufficiently extensive to inclose all our establishments, and strong enough to keep off the Mamelukès and Arabs. We impatiently awaited the arrival of the flotilla; the North wind was blowing as usual, and yet it did not arrive! The Nile being low, there had not been sufficient water for it, the vessels were aground. Rear-Admiral Perré sent word that we must not reckon upon him, and that he could not name any day for his arrival. This was a great disappointment, for it was necessary to take Cairo in the first moment of stupor, instead of leaving the in-

habitants time to recover from their alarm, by a delay of forty-eight hours. Fortunately it was not the Mamelukes alone who had been defeated in the battle; the Janissaries of Cairo, and all the brave men under arms in that city, had engaged in it, and were in the greatest consternation. All the reports of this affair represented the French in a light approaching the marvellous.

IX.

A dragoman was sent by the General-in-chief to the Pacha and Cadi-scheik, iman of the grand mosque, and the proclamations which Napoleon had published on his entrance into Egypt were disseminated. The Pacha had already set off, but he had left his Kiaya. The latter thought it his duty to come to Gizeh, as the General-in-chief declared it was not against the Turks, but against the Mamelukes, that he made war. He had a conference with Napoleon, who persuaded him it was, moreover, the best thing this Kiaya could do. By yielding to Napoleon, he preserved the hopes of acting a distinguished part, and making his fortune. By refusing, he would have been hastening to destruction. He,

mander-in-chief, and engaged to persuade Ibrahim-Bey to retire, and the inhabitants of Cairo to submit. In the morning a deputation of the scheiks of Cairo came to Gizeh, and brought intelligence that Ibrahim-Bey had already left the city, and gone to encamp at Birketel-hadji; that the Janissaries had assembled and resolved to surrender, and that the scheik of the grand mosque of Jemilazar had been charged to send a deputation to treat for a surrender, and to implore the clemency of the victor. The deputies remained several hours at Gizeh, where all means that were thought most efficacious were employed to confirm them in their good intentions, and to inspire them with confidence. The following day General Dupuy was sent to Cairo as commandant, and possession was taken of the citadel. Our troops passed the canal, and occupied Old Cairo and Boulac. The General-in-chief made his entrance into Cairo on the 26th of July, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. He went to lodge in the square of El-Bekir, in the house of Elphi-Bey, whither he removed his head-quarters. This house was situated at one of the extremities of the town, and the garden communicated with the country.

X.

Cairo is situate half a league from the Nile; Old Cairo and Boulac are its ports. A canal which crosses the city, is usually dry, but fills during the inundation, at the moment when the dyke is cut, an operation which is never performed until the Nile is at a certain height, when it becomes the occasion of a public festival. The canal then distributes its waters amongst numerous channels; and the square of El-Bekir, as well as most of the squares and gardens of Cairo, is under water. All these places are traversed in boats, during the flood. Cairo is commanded by a citadel placed on a hill, which overlooks the whole city. It is separated from the Mokattam by a valley. An aqueduct, which is a remarkable work, supplies the citadel with water. For this purpose there is at Old Cairo, an enormous and very high octagonal tower, inclosing the reservoir, to which the waters of the Nile are raised by an hydraulic machine, and from which they enter the aqueduct. The citadel also draws water from Joseph's well, but it is not so good as that of the Nile. This fortress was not in a state of defence, but neglected

diately commenced, and regularly carried on from that time. Cairo is surrounded with high walls, built by the Arabs, and surmounted by enormous towers; these walls were in a bad state, and falling through age; the Mamelukes never repaired any thing. The city is large; half its wall abuts on the Desert, so that dry sands are met with on going out by the Suez gate, or those which are towards Arabia.

The population of Cairo was considerable, being estimated at 210,000 inhabitants. The houses are built very high and the streets made narrow, in order to obtain shelter from the sun. From the same motive the bazaars, or public markets, are covered with cloth or matting. The beys have very fine palaces of an Oriental architecture, resembling that of India rather than ours. The scheiks also have very handsome houses. The okels are great square buildings with very large inner courts, containing whole corporations of merchants. Thus there is the okel of Seur rice, the okel of the merchants of Suez, and of Syria. On the outside and next the street, they have each a little shop of ten or twelve feet square, in which is the merchant with samples of his goods. Cairo contains a multitude of the

finest mosques in the world; the minarets are rich and numerous. The mosques in general serve for the accommodation of pilgrims, who sleep in them; some of them occasionally contain as many as 3000 pilgrims; amongst these is Jemilazar, which is said to be the largest mosque in the East. These mosques are usually courts, the circuit of which is surrounded by enormous columns supporting terraces; in the interior is found a number of basins and reservoirs of water, for drinking or washing. In one quarter, that of the Franks, are a few European families; a certain number of houses may be seen here, such as a merchant of 30 or 40,000 livres a year might have in Europe; they are furnished in the European style with chairs and beds. There are churches for the Copts, and some convents for the Syrian Catholics.

Close to the city of Cairo, towards the Desert, is the City of the Dead. This city is larger than Cairo itself; it is there that every family has its place of burial. A multitude of mosques, tombs, minarets, and domes, keep up the memory of the great who have been buried there and who have had them built. There are attendants to many of the tombs who

EGYPT.—RELIGION.

- I. Of Christianity.—II. Of Islamism.—III. Of the difference in the spirit of these two religions.—IV. Hatred of the Caliphs against Libraries.—V. Of the duration of Empires in Asia.—VI. Polygamy.—VII. Slavery.—VIII. Religious Ceremonies.—IX. Feast of the Prophet.

I.

THE Christian religion is the religion of a civilized people, and is entirely spiritual; the reward which Jesus Christ promises to the elect is that they shall see God face to face. In this religion every thing tends to mortify the senses, nothing to excite them. The Christian religion was three or four centuries in establishing itself, and its progress was slow. It requires much time to destroy, by the mere influence of argument, a religion consecrated by time; and still more when the new religion neither serves nor kindles any passion.

The progress of Christianity was the triumph of the Greeks over the

had subdued all the Greek republics by force of arms; and the Greeks conquered their victors by the arts and sciences. All the schools of philosophy and eloquence, and all the practice of the arts in Rome, were confined to the Greeks. The Roman youth did not consider their education complete unless they had been to Athens to finish it. There were yet other circumstances which proved favourable to the propagation of the Christian religion. The apotheosis of Julius Cæsar and that of Augustus were followed by those of the most abominable tyrants: this abuse of polytheism recalled men to the idea of one only God, the Creator and Ruler of the Universe. Socrates had already proclaimed this great truth: the triumph of Christianity, which borrowed it from him, was, as we have already mentioned above, a re-action of the philosophers of Greece upon their conquerors. The holy fathers were almost all Greeks. The morality they preached was that of Plato. All the subtilty which is found in the Christian theology is derived from the refinements of the sophists of his school.

The Christians, like the votaries of paganism, thought the rewards of a future life insufficient to repress the disorders, vices, and crimes

which spring from the passions ; they formed a hell entirely physical, and sufferings wholly corporeal. They went far beyond their models, and even gave so much preponderance to this dogma, that it may justly be said that the religion of Christ is a threat.

II.

Islamism is the religion of a people in the infancy of civilization ; it arose in a poor country, destitute of the necessaries of life. Mahomet appealed to the senses ; he would not have been comprehended by his countrymen had he appealed to the mind. He promised his followers odoriferous baths, rivers of milk, fair black-eyed houris, and groves of perpetual shade. The Arab, thirsting for water, and parched by a burning sun, sighed for shade and coolness, and was ready to do any thing for such a recompense. Thus it may be said that the religion of Mahomet, in opposition to that of Christ, is a promise.

Islamism especially attacks idolaters ; there is no other God but God, and Mahomet is his prophet : this is the foundation of the Musulman religion ; it consecrates the great truth announced by Moses and confirmed by Jesus

known that Mahomet had been instructed by Jews and Christians. The latter were a sort of idolaters in his sight. He did not well understand the mystery of the Trinity, which he expounded as an acknowledgment of three Gods. Nevertheless, he persecuted Christians with much less fury than Pagans. The former might be redeemed on paying a tribute. The doctrine of the Unity of God which Moses and Jesus Christ had spread, was carried by the Koran into Arabia, Africa, and to the extremity of India. Considered in this point of view, the Mahometan religion is the successor of the two others; all three together have outrooted paganism.

III.

Christianity arose amongst a corrupted, enslaved, oppressed people, and preached submission and obedience, in order to avoid opposition from sovereigns. It sought to establish itself by means of insinuation, persuasion, and patience. Jesus Christ, a simple preacher, exercised no power on earth: *My kingdom is not of this world*, said he. He preached this doctrine in the temple, and to his disciples in private. He bestowed on them the gift of tongues, wrought miracles, never revolted

against established power, and died on a cross, between two thieves, in execution of the sentence of a mere prætor, who was an idolater.

The Mahometan religion, which originated in a free and warlike nation, preached intolerance, and the destruction of infidels. Unlike Jesus Christ, Mahomet became a king! He declared that the whole universe ought to be subjected to his sway, and ordered his followers to use the sabre to destroy the idolater and the infidel, to kill whom was a meritorious work. The idolaters of Arabia were soon converted or destroyed. The infidels in Asia, Syria, and Egypt, were attacked and conquered. As soon as Islamism had triumphed at Mecca and Medina, it served as a rallying point to the different Arab tribes. They were all imbued with the fanatical spirit, and a whole nation precipitated itself upon its neighbours.

The successors of Mahomet reigned under the title of caliphs. They bore at once the sword and the censer. The first caliphs preached daily in the mosque of Medina, or in that of Mecca, and thence sent orders to their armies, which already covered part of Africa and

the caliph Omar sleeping in the midst of a crowd of mendicants on the threshold of the mosque. When Omar afterwards went to Jerusalem, he travelled on a camel which carried his provisions, had only a tent of coarse canvass, and was distinguished from other Musulmans only by his extreme simplicity. During the ten years of his reign he conquered forty thousand cities, destroyed fifty thousand churches, and built two thousand mosques. The caliph Abubekir, who took from the treasury only three pieces of gold daily for his household expenses, gave five hundred to every mossen who had fought under the Prophet at the battle of Bender.

The progress of the Arabs was rapid; their armies, impelled by fanaticism, at once attacked the Roman empire and that of Persia. The latter was speedily subjugated; and the Musulmans penetrated to the banks of the Oxus, got possession of innumerable treasures, destroyed the empire of Chosroes, and advanced as far as China. The victories they gained in Syria, at Aiquadiah and Dyrmonk, put them in possession of Damascus, Aleppo, Amasia, Cesarea, and Jerusalem. The taking of Pelusium and Alexandria rendered them

Coptic, and decidedly separated from Constantinople through heretical discussions. Kaleb, Derar, and Amru, surnamed the Swords of the prophet, met with no resistance. All obstacles were unavailing before them. In the midst of assaults and battles those warriors saw the fair houris with black or blue eyes, covered with chaplets of diamonds, who called them with outstretched arms; their souls were fired at the sight, they rushed on blindly, and sought the death which was to place those beauties in their power. It was thus that they made themselves masters of the fine plains of Syria, of Egypt and of Persia: it was thus that they subdued the world.

IV.

It is a prejudice widely spread and yet contradicted by history, that Mahomet was an enemy to the sciences and arts, and to literature. The caliph Omar's expression, when he caused the library of Alexandria to be burnt, has often been quoted: If this library contains what is in the Koran, it is useless; if it contains any thing else, it is dangerous. A fact like this, and many others of the same

stantly extending the sphere of human knowledge; and embellishing society by the charms of their literature. It is nevertheless possible, that the successors of Mahomet were, at first, apprehensive that the Arabs might suffer themselves to be enervated by the arts and sciences, which were carried to so high a pitch in Egypt, Syria, and the Lower Empire. They had before their eyes the decline of the empire of Constantine, partly owing to perpetual scholastic and theological discussions. Perhaps this spectacle had prejudiced them against most libraries, which, in fact, were principally filled with books of this kind. However this may be, the Arabs were, for five hundred years, the most enlightened nation in the world. It is to them we owe our system of numeration, organs, solar quadrants, pendulums and watches. Nothing can be more elegant, ingenious, or moral than Persian literature, and in general every thing that flowed from the pens of the writers of Bagdad and Bassora.

V.

Empires have a shorter duration in Asia than in Europe, which may be attributed to geo-

by immense deserts, whence, every third or fourth century, rush warlike populations, which overthrow the most extensive empires. Thence came the Ottomans, and afterwards Tamerlane and Gengis Khan.

It appears that the sovereigns who have given laws to these nations, always made it a point to preserve their national manners and aboriginal character. Thus they prevented the Janissary of Egypt from ever becoming an Arab, and the Janissary of Adrianople from changing into a Greek. The principle which they adopted, of opposing all innovation in customs and manners, made them proscribe the sciences and arts. But this measure is neither to be attributed to the precepts of Mahomet, to the religion of the Koran, nor to the Arabian character.

VI.

/// Mahomet limited the number of wives that each Musulman was permitted to marry, to four. No Oriental legislator had ever allowed so few. It may be asked why he did not suppress polygamy, as the Christian religion had done; for it is very certain that the number of women, in the East, is nowhere su-

fore, have been natural to allow only one, in order that all might be supplied.

This contrast between Asia and Europe is still a subject of meditation. Amongst us, legislators allow but one wife; Greeks, Romans, Gauls, Germans, Spaniards, Britons—all nations, in short, have adopted this custom.

In Asia, on the contrary, polygamy was always allowed. Jews and Assyrians, Tartars and Persians, Egyptians and Turcomans, were always permitted to have several wives.

Perhaps the reason of this difference is to be sought in the nature of the geographical circumstances of Africa and Asia. These countries were inhabited by men of several colours; polygamy is the only means of preventing them from persecuting each other. Legislators have imagined, that in order to prevent the whites from being enemies to the blacks, the blacks to the whites, and the copper-coloured to both, it was necessary to make them all members of one identical family, and thus to oppose that inclination inherent in man, to hate whatever is not himself. Mahomet thought four wives sufficient for the accomplishment of this purpose, because every man could have a black one, a white one, a

colour. It was also, undoubtedly, agreeable to the nature of a sensual religion, to gratify the passions of its sectaries; in which respect policy and the prophet agreed.*

Whenever it is wished to emancipate the blacks in our colonies, and establish perfect equality there, the legislator must authorize polygamy, and allow every man to have one white, one black, and one Mulatto wife, at the same time. Thenceforth the different colours, each forming part of the same family, will obtain equal consideration from others; without this, no satisfactory result will ever be obtained. The blacks will be more numerous or better informed, and then they will hold the whites in subjection; and *vice versa*.

In consequence of this general principle of the equality of colours, established by polygamy, there was no difference between the individuals composing the household of the

* It is, perhaps, difficult to comprehend the possibility of having four wives in a country where there are no more men than women. The fact is, that eleven twelfths of the population have only one, because they can only support one, or obtain only one. But this confusion of races, colours, and nations, produced by polygamy, existing in the upper ranks of a nation, is sufficient to establish union and perfect equality throughout it.

Mamelukes. A black slave, bought by a Bey from an African caravan, might become a *kiáschef*, and be equal to the handsome white Mameluke, born in Circassia; nor was it even suspected that this could be otherwise.

VII.

Slavery neither is, nor ever was, in the East what it was in Europe. In this respect, manners have remained as they appear in scripture. The maid servant marries the master.

The law of the Jews supposed so little distinction amongst them, that it prescribed regulations for the case of a servant who marries her master's son. Even at present, a Musulman buys a slave, brings him up, and if he thinks proper, unites him to his daughter and makes him the heir of his fortune, without acting in any respect contrary to the customs of the country.

Murad-Bey and Aly-Bey had been sold to some of the Beys at a tender age, by merchants who had purchased them in Circassia. They at first performed the meanest offices in their master's households. But their personal beauty, their dexterity in bodily exercises,

raised them to the principal situations. It is the same with the pachas, viziers, and sultans. Their slaves are promoted in the same manner as their sons.

In Europe, on the contrary, whoever was impressed with the seal of slavery, remained for ever in the lowest rank of domestic society. Amongst the Romans, the slave might be freed, but he retained a despised and base character; he was never considered equal to a free-born citizen. The slavery of the colonies, founded on the difference of colours, is still much more severe and degrading.

The consequences of polygamy, the manner in which the natives of the East consider slavery and treat their slaves, differ so widely from our manners and ideas on slavery, that we can scarcely conceive what is done amongst them.

It was, in the same manner, a long time before the Egyptians could understand that all the French were not the slaves of Napoleon; and after all, it was only the most enlightened amongst them who could comprehend it.

Every father of a family, in the East, possesses an absolute power over his wife, children, and slaves, which he exercises in the

cannot modify. Being himself a slave to the grand-signor, he exercises at home the despotism to which he is subject abroad; and there is no instance of a pacha or other officer having penetrated into a house to interrupt the master in the exercise of his authority over his family; such a thing would do violence to the national customs, manners, and character. The Orientals consider themselves masters in their own houses; and every agent of power who has to exercise his functions towards them, waits until they come abroad, or sends for them.

VIII.

The Mahometans have many religious ceremonies, and a great number of mosques, in which the faithful go and pray, several times in a day. The feasts are celebrated by grand illuminations in the temples and streets, and sometimes by fireworks.

They have also feasts on their birthdays, their marriages, and the circumcision of their children; it is this last which they celebrate with the greatest joy. They are all conducted with more pomp than ours. Their funerals are majestic, and their tombs in a magnificent

At the appointed hours the Musulmans say their prayers, wherever they happen to be; the slaves spread carpets before them, and they kneel with their faces towards the East.

Charity and alms are recommended in every chapter of the Koran, as the means of being most agreeable to God and his prophet. To devote part of one's fortune to public establishments, particularly to dig a canal or a well, or to erect a fountain, are works of supereminent merit. The establishment of a fountain or a reservoir, is frequently connected with that of a mosque; wherever there is a temple, there is abundance of water. The prophet seems to have placed this element under the protection of religion. It is the first of necessities in the Desert, where it must be collected and preserved with care.

Ali has few followers in Arabia, the Turkish empire, Egypt, and Syria. We found there none but the Mutualis. But all Persia, as far as the Indus, is of this caliph's sect.

IX.

The General-in-chief went to celebrate the feast of the Prophet, at the house of the scheik El-Bekir. The ceremony was begun by the

of Mahomet from his birth to his death. About a hundred scheiks sitting in a circle, on carpets, with their legs crossed, recited all the verses, swinging their bodies violently backwards and forwards, and all together.

A grand dinner was afterwards served up, at which the guests sat on carpets, with their legs across. There were twenty tables, and five or six people at each table. That of the General-in-chief and the scheik El-Bekir was in the middle; a little slab of a precious kind of wood, ornamented with mosaic work, was placed eighteen inches above the floor, and covered with a great number of dishes in succession. They were pilaws of rice, a particular kind of roast, entrées, and pastry, all very highly spiced. The scheiks picked every thing with their fingers. Accordingly water was brought to wash the hands three times during dinner. Gooseberry-water, lemonade, and other sorts of sherbets, were served to drink, and abundance of preserves and confectionary with the dessert. On the whole, the dinner was not disagreeable; it was only the manner of eating it that seemed strange to us.

In the evening the whole city was illuminated. After dinner the party went into the

square of El-Bekir, the illumination of which, in coloured glass, was very beautiful. An immense concourse of people attended. They were all placed in order, in ranks of from twenty to a hundred persons, who, standing close together, recited the prayers and litanies of the prophet with movements which kept increasing, until, at length, they seemed to be convulsive, and some of the most zealous fainted away.

In the course of the year the General-in-chief often accepted invitations to dine with the Scheik Sadda, the Scheik Fayon, and others of the principal Scheiks. These days were festivals throughout the quarter. The same magnificence prevailed at all these entertainments, which were conducted nearly in a similar manner.

EGYPT.

CUSTOMS, SCIENCES, AND ARTS.

- I. Women; Children.—II. Marriages.—III. Clothing of the men and women.—IV. Harness of Horses.—V. Houses; harems.—VI. Arts and Sciences.—VII. Navigation of the Nile and canals.—VIII. Carriage, Camels, Dromedaries, Asses, and Horses.—IX. Institute of Egypt.—X. Labours of the Scientific Commission.—XI. Hospitals; different diseases, &c.—XII. Plague.—XIII. Works executed at Cairo.—XIV. Anecdote.

I.

WOMEN, in the East, are always veiled; a piece of cloth covers their nose, and particularly their lips, and only allows their eyes to be seen. When any of the Egyptian women found themselves, by accident, surprised without their veils, and covered only with that long blue shift which forms the clothing of the fellah's wives, they used to take up the lower part of the shift to hide their faces, preferring the exposure of any other part

The General-in-chief had several opportunities of seeing some of the most distinguished women of the country, to whom he granted audiences. They were either the widows of Beys or Kiaschefs, or their wives, who, in their absence, came to him to implore his protection. The richness of their dress, their noble deportment, their little soft hands and fine eyes, a noble and graceful carriage, and very elegant manners, distinguished them as women of education and rank superior to the vulgar. They always began by kissing the hand of *Sultan Kabir*,* which they then placed on their foreheads, and afterwards on their stomachs. Many of them stated their requests with perfect grace, and an enchanting tone of voice, displaying all the intelligence and sweetness of the most accomplished women of Europe. The propriety of their demeanour, and the modesty of their dress, gave them additional fascinations; and the imagination delighted in guessing at charms of which they did not even allow a glimpse.

Wives are sacred amongst the Orientals; and in their intestine wars, they are always

* The Arabs gave this name to Napoleon; the word *Kabir* signifies *Great*.

spared. Those of the Mamelukes stayed in their houses at Cairo, whilst their husbands were carrying on the war against the French. Napoleon sent Eugene, his son-in-law, to compliment the wife of Murad-Bey, who had under her command about fifty slaves belonging to this Mameluke chief and his Kiashefs. It was a sort of convent of religious females, of which she was the abbess. She received Eugene on her grand divan, in the harem, to which he was admitted by special exception, and as the envoy of Sultan Kabir. All the women wished to see the young and handsome Frenchman, and the slaves found it very difficult to restrain their impatience. The wife of Murad-Bey was a woman of fifty, with the beauty and grace suitable to that age. She had coffee and sherbets served up, according to custom, in very rich plate, and in a sumptuous style. She took from her finger a ring worth a thousand louis, which she presented to the young officer. She then addressed various requests to the General-in-chief, who preserved her villages for her, and always protected her. She passed for a woman of distinguished merit. Women decay early in Egypt: and there are more of them brown

coloured, and they have a tinge of copper colour. The most beautiful are Greeks or Circassians, with whom the bazars of the merchants who carry on this trade, are always abundantly provided. The caravans from Darfur and the interior of Africa, bring a great number of beautiful negresses.

II.

Marriage takes place without either party's having ever seen the other; sometimes the wife may have seen the husband, but the latter has never beheld his betrothed, or at least the features of her face.

Those of the Egyptians who had rendered services to the French, sometimes the Scheiks themselves, would come and request the General-in-chief to grant them in marriage a person whom they pointed out. The first request of this kind was made by an Aga of Janissaries, a sort of police-agent, who had been very useful to the French, and who wished to marry a very rich widow; this proposal appeared singular to Napoleon. "But does she love you?"—"No."—"Will she?"—"Yes, if you command." In fact, as soon as she was informed of the will of Sultan

riage was solemnized. Similar transactions often took place afterwards.

The wives have their privileges. There are things which their husbands cannot refuse them without passing for barbarians and monsters, and enraging every body against them; such, for instance, is the privilege of going to the bath. These are vapour-baths, where the women assemble, and where political and other intrigues are contrived, and marriages planned. General Menou having married a lady of Rosetta, treated her in the French fashion. He gave her his hand to enter the dining-room; the best place at table, the best bits at dinner were always for her. If she dropped her handkerchief, he ran to pick it up. She related these circumstances in the bath at Rosetta, and the other women, in hopes of a change in the national manners, signed a request to Sultan Kabir, that their husbands might be obliged to treat them in the same manner.

III.

The dress of the Orientals bears no resemblance to ours. Instead of a hat, they cover their heads with a turban, a much more elegant

susceptible of great variety in form, colour, and arrangement, discovers the differences of nations and ranks at the first glance. Their necks and limbs are not confined by bandages or garters; a native of the East may remain a month in his clothes without feeling fatigued by them. The different nations and classes are, of course, differently dressed; but they all agree in wearing wide pantaloons, large sleeves, and every other part of their dress full and ample. To screen themselves from the sun, they wear shawls. A great quantity of silks, Indian stuffs, and Cachemires, is introduced in the dresses both of men and women. They wear no linen. The fellahs are covered only with a blue shirt, tied about the middle. The Arab chiefs who traverse the deserts in the intense heat of the dog-days, are covered with shawls of all colours, which protect the different parts of their bodies from the sun, and which they fold over their heads. Instead of shoes, both men and women wear slippers, which they leave on the edge of the carpet when they enter an apartment.

IV.

The harness of the horses is extremely ele-
 ment. The dress of the French staff is

the magnificence of Europe, appeared to them mean, and were eclipsed by the Oriental clothing. Our hats, our tight breeches, our close coats, and the stock which strangles us, were objects of laughter and aversion to them. They have no occasion to change their dress for riding; they use no spurs, and place their feet in large stirrups which render boots unnecessary, and spare them the trouble of dressing on purpose for this exercise, as we are obliged to do. The Franks or Christians who inhabit Egypt, ride on mules or asses, unless they are persons of elevated rank.

V.

The architecture of the Egyptians bears more resemblance to that of Asia than to ours. All the houses have terraces, on which people walk; on some of them they even bathe. They are several stories high. In the ground-floor there is a sort of parlour, where the master of the house receives strangers, and gives refreshments. In the first-floor is usually the harem, to which there are only private staircases. The master has a little door in his apartment which leads to the harem. There are other little staircases of this kind for the servants. A

The harem consists of a large room in the form of a cross; opposite this runs a corridor, in which there are a great number of chambers. Round the saloon are divans more or less rich, and in the middle a little marble basin with a fountain playing in it. These fountains often throw out rose-water or essences, which perfume the apartment. All the windows are covered with a kind of lattice, in trellis-work. There are no beds in the houses; the natives of the East sleep on divans or carpets. When they have no strangers with them, they take their meals, sleep, and pass their leisure hours in the harem. As soon as the master arrives, all the women hasten to wait on him; one presents him his pipe, another his cushion, &c. Every thing is there for the master's service.

The gardens have no walks, they are arbours of great trees, where one may take the air, and sit smoking. The Egyptian, like all the Orientals, spends great part of the day in this amusement: it serves him for occupation and excuse.

VI.

The arts and sciences, in Egypt, are in their infancy. At Jemil-Azar they teach the philosophy of Aristotle, the rules of the

language, writing, and a little arithmetic; the different chapters of the Koran are explained and discussed; and that part of ~~the~~ history of the caliphs which is necessary for understanding and judging of the different Mahometan sects is taught. But the Arabs are completely ignorant of the antiquities of their country, and their notions on geography and the spheres are very superficial and erroneous. There were a few astronomers at Cairo, whose knowledge went no farther than to enable them to make out the almanack.

In consequence of this state of ignorance, they have little curiosity. This quality exists only amongst nations sufficiently informed to distinguish what is natural from what is extraordinary. Our balloons did not produce such an effect upon them as we had expected. The Pyramids interest them only because they have observed the interest they excite in foreigners. They know not who built them, and the people in general, except the best informed, look upon ~~them~~ them as a production of nature; the most enlightened amongst them, seeing us attach so much importance to them, imagined they were raised by some ancient nation from which the Franks were descended. It is thus that they account for the curiosity of

the Europeans. The science which would be most useful to them is hydraulic mechanics. They are almost destitute of machines: yet they have one of a very ingenious kind for pouring water from a ditch or well upon higher ground, the prop of which is also the arm. They have none but horse or hand mills; we did not find a single water-mill or wind-mill in Egypt. The use of the latter kind to raise the waters would be a grand acquisition for them, and might be productive of important results in Egypt. Conté constructed one for them.

All the artisans of Cairo are very intelligent; they executed every thing they saw done very completely. During the revolt of that city they cast mortars and cannon, but in a clumsy manner, similar to that in which they were made in the thirteenth-century.

They knew the use of frames for weaving cloth; they even had them for embroidering Mecca carpeting. These carpets are magnificent, and made with great art. One day when the General-in-chief dined with Scheik El-Fayoum, they were talking of the Koran: "It contains all human knowledge," said the Scheiks. "Does it tell us how to cast cannon and

replied they; "but then you must know how to read it!" A scholastic distinction, of which all religions have made use, more or less.

VII.

The traffic on the Nile is very brisk; the navigation very easy; they go down the river with the current, and sail up it by the aid of the north wind, which at a certain season blows constantly. When the south wind prevails, it is sometimes necessary to wait a long time. The vessels that are used are called Jermes. Their masts and sails are higher than usual, nearly by one-third, which arises from the necessity of catching the wind over the mounts which enclose the valley.

The Nile was constantly covered with these jermes, some carrying goods, others passengers. They are of different sizes. Some float in the great canals of the Nile; others are constructed to enter the small. The river, near Cairo, is always covered with a great number of sails, going up and down. The staff-officers who used the jermes in carrying orders, often met with accidents. The Arab tribes at war with us used to wait for them at the turns of the river, where the wind failed them. Sometimes also, the boats would get aground in

coming down the river, and the officers they carried were massacred. Kaiks are little sloops, or light narrow pinnaces, which serve to pass the Nile, and sail not only on the canals, but over the whole country as far as it is overflowed. The number of light vessels on the Nile is greater than on any river in the world, owing to the circumstance that during several months of the year, people are obliged to make use of these boats to pass from one village to another.

VIII.

There is neither coach nor cart in Egypt. Water-carriage is so abundant and so easy, that coaches are, perhaps, less necessary there than in any other part of the world. A carriage which Ibrahim-Bey had received from France was thought a very remarkable thing.

Horses are used for traversing the city by all but lawyers and women, who ride on mules or asses. Both are surrounded by a great

* Cæsar Napoleon's coachman, astonished the Egyptians by his dexterity in driving his carriage with six fine horses, in the narrow streets of Cairo and Boulae. This carriage crossed the whole desert of Syria, as far as St. Jean d'Acree :

it was one of the curiosities of the country.

number of officers and servants in liveries, and holding great staves in their hands.

Camels are always used for burthen; and serve also for riding. The lightest sort, with only one hump, are called dromedaries. The animal is trained to kneel when his rider wishes to mount. The latter sits on a kind of pack-saddle, with his legs across, and guides the dromedary with a bridle attached to a ring passed through the nostrils of the animal. This part of the camel being very sensitive, the ring produces the same effect on him as the bridle on the horse. He takes a very long step; his ordinary pace is a long trot, which produces the same effect on the rider as the rolling of a ship. In this manner the camel will travel twenty leagues in a day with ease.

There are usually two panniers placed on each side of the camel, which receive two persons besides luggage. This is the way in which women usually travel. In every caravan of pilgrims there is a great number of camels equipped for them in this manner. These animals can carry half a ton; but their usual burthen is six hundred weight. Their milk and flesh are good nourishment.

The dromedary, like the camel, drinks little, and can survive a long time without water.

He finds, even in the driest places, something eatable. He is made for the Desert.

There is an immense quantity of asses in Egypt; they are large, and of a fine breed; at Cairo they in some measure supply the place of hackney coaches: a soldier could hire one for a whole day, for a few paras. At the time of the expedition into Syria there were above eight thousand with the army: they were extremely serviceable.

The horses in the Deserts contiguous to Egypt are the finest in the world: the stallions of this race have improved every breed in Europe. The Arabs bestow great pains on the preservation of the purity of the race; they have the genealogy of their stallions and mares. The chief distinction of the Arabian horse is the swiftness, and particularly the ease and gentleness of his paces. He drinks only once a day, seldom trots, and almost always either walks or gallops. He can stop suddenly on his hind legs, which it would be impossible to get our horses to do.

IX.

The Institute of Egypt was composed of members of the French Institute, and of the men of science and artists of the commission

who did not belong to that body. They assembled and added to their number several officers of the artillery, and staff, and others who had cultivated the sciences or literature.

The Institute was placed in one of the palaces of the Beys. The grand hall of the harem, by means of some alterations, became the place of their sittings, and the rest of the palace served for the habitation of the members. Before this building there was a very extensive garden, which adjoined the country, and near which the fort called De l'Institut was erected on a mount.

A great number of machines, and physical, chemical, and astronomical instruments, had been brought from France. They were distributed in the different rooms, which were also successively filled with all the curiosities of the country, whether of the animal, vegetable, or mineral kingdom.

The garden of the palace became a botanical garden. A chemical laboratory was formed at head-quarters: Berthollet performed experiments there several times every week, at which Napoleon and a great number of officers attended.

The establishment of the Institute excited great curiosity amongst the inhabitants of

Cairo. Understanding that these meetings were not held for any purpose connected with religion, they persuaded themselves that they were assemblies of alchemists, for the purpose of endeavouring to discover the art of making gold.

The simple manners of the scientific men, their constant occupations, the respect which the army paid them, their usefulness in the works of art and manufactures, respecting which the artists of the country had to communicate with them, soon gained them the good will and respect of the whole population.

X.

The members of the Institute were also employed in the civil administration. Monge and Berthollet were appointed commissioners to the grand divan, and the mathematician Fourrier to the divan of Cairo. Costaz was made the principal editor of a journal; the astronomers Nourris and Noel visited all the principal points of Egypt to fix their geographical positions, particularly that of the ancient monuments. It was wished by such means to reconcile the ancient and modern geography.

Lepeyre, the engineer of bridges and roads,

was instructed to take the levels and draw the plans for the canal of Suez; and the engineer Gerard to study the system of navigation of the Nile.

One of the members of the Institute had the direction of the mint of Cairo. He had a great quantity of paras, a small coin of the country, made. This was a profitable operation; the treasury gained sixty per cent. by it. The paras circulated, not only in Egypt, but in Africa and the deserts of Arabia; and instead of impeding circulation and injuring the exchange, the disadvantages of copper money, these promoted them. Conté established several manufactures.

The ovens for hatching chickens, which Egypt has possessed from the remotest antiquity, strongly excited the attention of the Institute. In several other practices which were traditionally handed down in this country, traces were recognized which were preserved with the utmost solicitude as useful to the history of the arts, and capable of leading to the recovery of many lost arts of antiquity.

General Andreossy was charged with a scientific and military mission to reconnoitre Lakes Menzaleh, Bourlos, and Natron. Geoffry employed himself on natural history. The

draftsmen Dutertre and Rigolo made drawings of every thing calculated to give an idea of costumes and monuments of antiquity. They drew the portraits of all those natives who had devoted themselves to the General-in-chief, which distinction flattered them greatly.

At the Institute, General Cafarelli and Colonel Sukolski often read curious memoirs, which had been collected amongst the members of that society.

Upon the conquest of Upper Egypt, which was not effected until the second year, the whole scientific commission proceeded thither to prosecute their researches on Antiquities.

These various labours gave rise to the magnificent work on Egypt, written and engraved during the first fifteen years of this century, at an expense of several millions.

XI.

The climate of Egypt is universally healthy ; nevertheless one of the first subjects to which the government turned its attention was the formation of hospitals. For this purpose every thing was to create. The house of Ibrahim-Bey, situate on the bank of the canal of Rodah, a quarter of a league from Cairo, was appropriated as the grand hospital. It was

rendered capable of accommodating five hundred sick. Instead of bedsteads, large wicker panniers were used, on which mattresses of cotton or wool were placed, with palliasses made with wheaten and maize straw, which is very plentiful there. In a short time this hospital was abundantly supplied in every respect. Similar establishments were formed at Alexandria, Rosetta, and Damietta, and the regimental hospitals were greatly extended.

The French army in Egypt was much incommoded by diseases of the eyes; more than half the soldiers were attacked by them. These disorders arise, it is said, from two causes; from the salts which exist in the sand and dust, and necessarily affect the sight, and from the irritation produced by the check of the perspiration in very cold nights succeeding burning days. Whether this explanation be correct or not, this ophthalmia evidently results from the climate. Saint-Louis, on his return from his Oriental expedition, brought back a multitude of blind; and it was this circumstance that gave rise to the establishment of the hospital of the *Quinze-Vingts* at Paris.

XII.

The plague always comes from the coasts, and never from Upper Egypt. Lazarettoes are placed at Alexandria, Rosetta, and Damietta; a very fine one was also constructed in the Isle of Rodah; and when the plague appeared, all the sanitary precautions of Marseilles were adopted. These precautions proved extremely beneficial. They were wholly unknown to the inhabitants, who at first submitted to them with repugnance, but eventually became sensible of their utility. The plague occurs during the winter, and disappears entirely in June. It has been much disputed whether this disorder be endemic to Egypt. Those who maintain the affirmative, think they have remarked that it manifests itself at Alexandria, or on the coast of Damietta, in those years distinguished by the uncommon occurrence of rain in these countries. There is, moreover, no instance of its ever having commenced in Cairo or Upper Egypt, where it never rains. Those who conceive that it comes from Constantinople, or other parts of Asia, also ground their opinion on the fact that the first symptoms always manifest

XIII.

At Elphi-Bey's house, in the square of El-Bekir, occupied by the General-in-chief, several works were executed for the purpose of adapting it to our use. The first was the construction of a grand staircase leading to the first story, the ground-floor having been left for offices and the staff. The garden, also, underwent alterations. It had no walks, but a great number were made, as well as marble basins and *jets d'eau*. The natives of the East are not fond of walking; to walk when one might be sitting, appears to them an absurdity which they can only account for from the petulance of the French character.

Some projectors established a sort of Tivoli in the garden of Cairo, in which, like that of Paris, there were illuminations, fire-works, and promenades. In the evening it was the rendezvous of the army and people of the country.

A causeway was constructed, communicating between Cairo and Boulac, which was passable at all times, even during the flood. A theatre was built, and a great number of houses were arranged and adapted to our

customs, like that of the General-in-chief. Scavengers were appointed.*

At the extremity of the Isle of Rodah, several windmills were erected for making flour; and others had begun to be employed for raising the water and watering the lands. Several sluices had been made, and every thing necessary for commencing the works of the canal of Suez had been prepared; but the fortifications and military buildings occupied all the strength and activity of the army during this first year.

XIV.

Napoleon often invited the Scheiks to dinner. Although our customs were very different from theirs, they thought chairs, knives and forks, very convenient. After one of these dinners, he one day asked Scheik El-Mondi, "What is the most useful thing I have taught you, in these six months that I have been amongst you?" "The most useful thing you have taught me," replied the Scheik, half in jest and half in earnest, "is to sit at my dinner." The Arabs never drink until their meal is ended.

* The Egyptians heat their ovens partly with reeds and partly with the dung of camels and horses, which, when dried in the sun, serves for fuel.

NOTE ON SYRIA.

ARABIA is, in form, a trapezium. One of its sides, bounded by the Red Sea and the Isthmus of Suez, is five hundred leagues in length. That which extends from the straits of Babel-Mandel to the cape of Razelgate, is four hundred and fifty. The third, which extends from Razelgate across the Persian Gulf and the Euphrates to the mountains near Aleppo, on the borders of Syria, is six hundred leagues in length, being the longest side. The fourth, which is the least, is one hundred and fifty leagues from Raffa, the boundary of Egypt, to beyond Alexandretta and the mountains of Rosas; it separates Arabia from Syria. In this last country, throughout the extent above-mentioned, the cultivated lands run thirty leagues in width, and the Desert, which forms part of it, extends thirty leagues, as far as Palmyra. Syria is bounded on the North by Asia Minor, on the West by the Mediterranean, on the South by Egypt, and on the East by Arabia; thus it is

junction with which it forms a large isle comprehended between the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the Euphrates. Syria differs totally from Egypt, in population, climate, and soil. The latter is a single plain, formed by the valley of one of the largest rivers in the world; the other is the assemblage of a great number of valleys. Five sixths of the land are hills or mountains, a chain of which crosses all Syria, and runs parallel with the coast of the Mediterranean for a distance of ten leagues. To the right, this chain pours its waters into two rivers, which run in the same direction as itself, the Jordan and the Orontes. These rivers rise in Mount Lebanon, which is the centre of Syria, and the most elevated point of this chain. The Orontes takes its course between the mountains and Arabia, from South to North, and after running sixty leagues, falls into the sea near the Gulf of Antioch. As this river runs very near the foot of the mountains, it receives but a small number of tributary streams. The Jordan, which rises twenty leagues from the Orontes on the Antelebanon, runs from North to South. It receives about ten smaller streams from the chain of mountains which crosses Syria. After

a course of sixty leagues, it is lost in the Dead Sea.

Near the sources of the Orontes, on the Balbec side, two minor rivers arise. One, called the Baradee, waters the plain of Damascus, and spends itself in the lake of Bahar-El-Margi; the other, the course of which extends thirty leagues, likewise rises in the heights of Balbec, and falls into the Mediterranean near Sour, or Tyre. The country of Aleppo is washed by several rivulets, which rise in Asia Minor and run into the Orontes. The Koik, which passes Aleppo, is lost in a lake near that city.

It rains in Syria almost as much as in Europe. The country is very healthy, and affords the most agreeable spots. As it is composed of valleys and small mountains, very favourable to pasture, a great quantity of cattle is bred there. Trees of all kinds abound,—particularly great numbers of olives. Syria would be very suitable to the cultivation of the vine; all the Christian villages make excellent wine.

This province is divided into twelve pachaships; that of Jerusalem, which comprises the ancient Holy Land; and those of Acre, Tripoli,

Damascus, and Aleppo. Aleppo and Damascus are, beyond comparison, the two largest cities. On the hundred and fifty leagues of coast which Syria presents, there are the following towns:—Gaza, situate a league from the sea, without a trace of roads or a port, but with a fine level, two leagues in circumference, which points out the site of this city in the times of its prosperity: it is now of little importance:—Jaffa, or Joppa, the nearest port to Jerusalem, from which it is fifteen leagues distant; besides the port for shipping it has an open road:—Cæsarea presents only ruins. Acre has an open road, but the town is inconsiderable; it contains ten or twelve thousand inhabitants. Sour, or Tyre, is now a mere village. Said, Bairout, and Tripoli, are small towns. The most important point of all this coast is the Gulf of Alexandretta, situate twenty leagues from Aleppo, thirty from the Euphrates, and three hundred from Alexandria. It affords anchorage for the largest squadrons. Tyre, which commerce formerly advanced to so high a pitch of splendour, and which was the mother-country of Carthage, seems to have been partly indebted for her prosperity to the trade of India, which was carried on by sailing

up the Persian Gulf and the Euphrates, passing Palmyra and Amasia, and proceeding at one period to Tyre, at another to Antioch.

The most elevated point of all Syria is Mount Lebanon, which is but a mountain of the third order, and is covered with enormous pines; that of Palestine is Mount Tabor. The Orontes and Jordan, the largest streams of these countries, are both little rivers.

Syria was the cradle of the religions of Moses and Jesus; Islamism arose in Arabia. Thus the same corner of the earth produced the three religions which have destroyed polytheism, and carried to every part of the globe the knowledge of one only God, the Creator of the universe.

Almost all the wars of the Crusaders of the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries were carried on in Syria; and St. Jean d'Acre, Ptolemais, Joppa, and Damascus, were the principal scenes of action. The influence of their arms, and their residence, which was protracted for several ages, have left traces, which may still be perceived.

There are many Jews in Syria, who come from all parts of the world to die in the Holy Land of Japhet. There are also many Chris-

Crusaders ; and others are indigenious families, who did not embrace Mahometanism at the time of the conquest by the Arabs. They are confounded together, and it is no longer possible to distinguish them. Chefamer, Nazareth, Bethlehem, and part of Jerusalem, are peopled by Christians only. In the pachaships of Acre and Jerusalem, the Christians and Jews together are superior in number to the Musulmans. Behind Mount Lebanon are the Druses, a nation whose religion approaches nearly to that of the Christians. At Damascus and Aleppo, the Mahometans form a great majority ; there exists, however, a considerable number of Syriac Christians. The Mutualis, Mahometans of the sect of Ali, who inhabit the banks of the river which runs from Lebanon towards Tyre, were formerly numerous and powerful ; but at the time of the expedition of the French into Syria they had greatly declined ; the cruelty and oppression of Gezzar Pacha had destroyed a great number of them. All who remained, however, rendered us great services, and distinguished themselves by extraordinary intrepidity. All the traditions we possess relating to ancient Egypt, carry its population very high. But Syria cannot, in this respect, have exceeded

the proportions known in Europe; for there are in that country, as in those which we inhabit, rocks and uncultivated lands.

Syria, however, like every part of the Turkish empire, presents, on almost all sides, little but heaps of ruins.

NOTE

ON THE MOTIVES OF THE EXPEDITION INTO SYRIA.

THE principal object of the French expedition to the East was to check the power of the English. The army which was to change the destiny of India, was to march from the Nile. Egypt was to supply the place of Saint-Domingo and the Antilles, and to reconcile the freedom of the blacks with the interests of our manufactures. The conquest of this province would have produced the ruin of all the English establishments in America and the Peninsula of the Ganges. Had the French once become masters of the ports of Italy, Corfu, Malta, and Alexandria, the Mediterranean would have become a French lake.

The revolution of India was likely to be

more or less near, according as the chances of war should prove more or less fortunate, and the inhabitants of Arabia and Egypt should be more or less favourably disposed, in consequence of the policy the Porte should adopt under these new circumstances : the only object to be immediately attended to was to conquer Egypt and to form a solid establishment there ; and the means of effecting this were all that had been provided. All the rest had been considered as a necessary consequence ; the execution only had been anticipated. The French squadron refitted in the ports of Alexandria, victualled and manned by experienced crews, would have sufficed to keep Constantinople in awe. It could have landed a body of troops at Alexandria, if it had been thought necessary ; and we should have been, in the same year, masters of Egypt and Syria, the Nile, and the Euphrates. The happy issue of the battle of the Pyramids, the conquest of Egypt, achieved without any sensible loss, the good will of the inhabitants, the zeal of the chiefs of the law, seemed at first to ensure the speedy execution of these grand projects. But a short time only had elapsed, when the destruction of the French squadron at Aboukir, the countermanding of the expedition to Ire-

land by the Directory, and the influence of the enemies of France over the Porte, rendered success much more difficult.

In the mean time two Turkish armies assembled, one at Rhodes, and the other in Syria, to attack the French in Egypt. It appears that they were to act simultaneously in the month of May, the first by landing at Aboukir, and the second by crossing the Desert which divides Syria from Egypt. In the beginning of January news arrived that Gezzar Pacha had been appointed Seraskier of the army of Syria; that his vanguard, under the command of Abdalla, had already arrived at El-Arisch, had occupied that place, and was engaged in repairing the fort, which may be considered as the key of Egypt on the Syrian side. A train of artillery of forty guns, served by 1200 cannoners, the only troops of that kind in the empire that had been trained in the European manner, had landed at Jaffa: considerable magazines were forming in that town; and a great number of transports, part of which came from Constantinople, were employed for this purpose. At Gaza, stores of skins to hold water had been formed; report said there were enough of them to enable an army of 60,000 men to cross the Desert.

If the French had remained quiet in Egypt, they would certainly have been attacked by the two armies at once; it was also to be feared that the Turks would be joined by a body of European troops, and that the attack would be made at a moment of internal troubles. In this case, even if the French had been victorious, it would have been impossible for them to have profited by their conquest. By sea, they had no fleet; and by land, the Desert of seventy-five leagues, which separates Syria from Egypt, was not passable by an army in the height of the hot season.

The rules of war, therefore, required the French general to anticipate his enemies, to cross the great Desert during the winter, to possess himself of all the magazines which the enemy had formed on the coast of Syria, and to attack and destroy the troops in succession as fast as they collected.

According to this plan, the divisions of the army of Rhodes were obliged to hasten to the aid of Syria, and Egypt remained quiet, which allowed us to march the greater part of our forces into Syria. The Mamelukes of Murad- and Ibrahim-Bey, the Arabs of the Desert of Egypt, the Druses of Mount Lebanon, the Mutualis, the Christians of Syria, and the

whole party of the Scheik of Ayer, in Syria, might join the troops when masters of that country, and the commotion would communicate to every part of Arabia. The provinces of the Ottoman empire in which Arabic is spoken, heartily prayed for a change, and waited for a leader. We might, if fortunate, have been on the Euphrates by the middle of the summer, with 100,000 auxiliaries, who would have had a reserve of 25,000 French veterans, some of the best troops in the world, with a numerous train of artillery. Constantinople would then have been menaced; and if an amicable connexion could have been formed with the Porte, we might have crossed the Desert, and marched on the Indus by the end of autumn.

NOTE ON JAFFA.

JAFFA, a town containing from seven to eight thousand inhabitants, which was the portion of the Sultana Valida, is situate sixteen leagues from Gaza, and one league from the little river of Maar, which, at its mouth, is not fordable. The wall, on the land side, is formed by a half

hexagon; one of the sides looks towards Gaza, another towards the Jordan, a third towards Acre, and a fourth runs along the sea-side in the form of a concave half-circle. There is a port for small ships, in a bad state, and tolerable open roads. On the Koich is the convent of the Fathers of the Holy Land (the Recollets Chaussés), stewards of Nazareth, and proprietors of several other communities in Palestine. The fortifications of Jaffa consist of great walls flanked with towers, without ditches or counterscarps. These towers were lined with artillery, but the range of the batteries had not been well understood, and the guns were unskilfully placed. The environs of Jaffa consist of a valley full of gardens and orchards; the ground affords many opportunities of approaching within a pistol-shot of the ramparts without being perceived. Above a cannon-shot from Jaffa is the rideau which commands the country; the line of counter-vallation was traced there. This was the proper place for the army to encamp in; but as it was far from the water, and exposed to the scorching heat of the sun, the rideau being open, the troops preferred stationing themselves in some groves of orange-trees, and having the military positions guarded by posts.

Mount Carmel is situate on a promontory of the same name, three leagues from Acre, forming the extreme left of the bay. It is steep on every side; at its summit there is a convent and fountains, and a rock on which there is the print of a man's foot, which tradition states to have been left by Elijah when he ascended into heaven.

This mount commands the whole coast, and ships steer by it when they are making for Syria. At its foot runs the river Caisrum, the mouth of which is seven or eight hundred toises from Caiffa. This little town, situate on the sea-shore, contains three thousand inhabitants; it has a small port, a wall in the ancient style, with towers, and is commanded by the heights of Carmel at a very short distance. The way to Acre from the mouth of the Caisrum runs along the sands on the sea-shore for a league and a half, when it meets the mouth of the Belus, a little river which rises on the hills of Chefamer, and the waters of which scarcely flow. This river is marshy down to its mouth, and falls into the sea about fifteen hundred toises from Acre. It passes within a musquet-shot of the height of Richard Cœur de Lion, situate on its right bank, six hundred toises from Saint-Jean d'Acre.

NOTES

ON THE SIEGE OF SAINT-JEAN D'ACRE.

THE siege of Saint-Jean d'Acre may be divided into three periods.

First period. It began on the 20th of March, the day on which the trench was opened, and ended on the 1st of April.—During this period our battering-train consisted of one thirty-two pounder carronade, which Major Lambert had taken at Caiffa, by seizing the long boat of the Tiger by main force; but it was not possible to make use of it with the carriage belonging to the boat, and we were destitute of balls. These difficulties speedily vanished. In twenty-four hours the park of artillery constructed a carriage. As for balls, Sir Sidney Smith took upon himself to provide them. A few horsemen or waggons made their appearance from time to time; upon which the commodore approached and poured in an alternate fire from all his tiers; and the soldiers, to whom the director of the park paid five *sous* per ball, immediately ran to pick them up. They were so much accustomed to this manœuvre that they would go and fetch them in the midst of the cannonade, and the shouts of laughter it

occasioned. At times, also, a sloop was brought forward; the construction of a battery was pretended to be begun. Thus we obtained twelve and thirty-two-pounder balls. We had powder, for the park had brought some from Cairo, and more had been found at Jaffa and Gaza. On the whole, the total of our means, in the way of artillery, including our field-pieces; consisted of four twelve-pounders, provided with 200 rounds each, eight howitzers, a thirty-two-pounder carronade, and thirty four-pounders.

The engineer General Samson, being ordered to reconnoitre the town; declared positively on his return that it had neither counter-scarp nor ditch. He said he had reached the foot of the rampart, in the night, and received a musquet-shot there by which he was severely wounded. His report was incorrect; he had in fact reached a wall, but not the rampart. Unfortunately measures were taken according to the information he had given. A hope was entertained of taking the town in three days. It is not so strong as Jaffa, it was said; its garrison is only between 2 and 3000 men, while Jaffa, with a much more limited space to defend, had 8000 men when it was taken.

On the 25th of March, the carronade and

the four twelve-pounders made a breach in the wall, in the course of four hours, which was deemed practicable. A young officer of engineers, with fifteen sappers and twenty-five grenadiers, was charged to mount to the assault, to clear the foot of the tower, and Adjutant-commander Laugier, who was stationed in the place of arms, a hundred toises from the spot, waited for the completion of this operation, to rush upon the breach. The sappers, on coming out from behind the aqueduct, had but thirty toises to go, but they were stopped short by a counterscarp of fifteen feet, and a ditch which they estimated at several toises in width. Five or six of them were wounded, and the rest, pursued by a dreadful fire of musquetry, regained the trench precipitately.

A miner was immediately sent to work to blow up the counterscarp. In three days, that is to say on the 28th, the mine was ready; the miners declared that the counterscarp might be blown up. This difficult operation was performed under the fire of all the ramparts and of a great quantity of mortars, directed by excellent gunners, furnished by the English ships, which scattered shells in all directions. All our eight-inch mortars and

fine pieces which the English had taken, now strengthened the defence of the place. The mine was sprung on the 28th of March, but it did not succeed well; it had not been dug deep enough, and overthrew only half the counterscarp, above eight feet of which remained. The sappers, however, asserted that it was entirely destroyed. The Staff-officer Mailly was consequently sent with a detachment of twenty-five grenadiers to support an officer of engineers who advanced to the counterscarp with six sappers. They had taken the precaution to provide themselves with three ladders, with which they descended it. As they were annoyed by the musquetry, they fixed the ladders to the breach, and the sappers and grenadiers preferred mounting to the assault to clearing the foot of the breach. They gave notice to Laugier, who was ready to second them with two battalions, that they were in the fossé, that the breach was practicable, and that it was time to support them. Laugier hastened up to them at a running step; but on reaching the counterscarp he met the grenadiers returning, who said that the breach was too high by some feet, and that Mailly and several of their comrades had been killed.

When the Turks saw this young officer fastening the ladder, terror seized upon them; they fled to the port, and Gezzar himself had got on board ship. But the death of Mailly frustrated the whole operation; the two battalions dispersed themselves in order to return the enemy's fire of musquetry. Laugier was killed, and some loss was incurred without producing any result. This event was very unfortunate, for this was the day on which the town ought to have been taken; reinforcements arrived by sea daily from that time.

Second period. From the 1st of April to the 27th.—A new well was now sunk for a mine, intended to blow up the whole counterscarp, in order that the fossé might no longer be any impediment. What had already been done was found useless; it was easier to make a new approach. Eight days were requisite for the miners. The counterscarp was blown up, the operation succeeded perfectly. On the 10th, the mine was continued under the fossé in order to blow up the whole tower. There was now no hope of getting in at the breach, the enemy having filled it up with all sorts of combustibles. The approaches were carried on for six days more. The besieged perceived what was doing, and made a sortie in three

columns. That of the centre was headed by 200 English; they were repulsed, and a captain of marines was killed at the shaft of the mine.

It was during this period that the actions of Canaam, Nazareth, Saffet, and Mount Tabor, were fought. The first took place on the 9th, the second on the 11th, and the others on the 13th and 16th. It was on the latter day, the 16th of April, that the miners calculated that they were under the axis of the tower. At this period Rear-admiral Perré had arrived at Jaffa, with three frigates, from Alexandria; he had landed two mortars and six eighteen-pounders at Tintura. Two were fixed to play upon the little isle that flanked the breach, and the four others were directed against the ramparts and curtains by the side of the tower. It was intended, by the overthrow of this tower, to widen the breach which it was supposed the mine would make; for it was apprehended that the enemy might have made an internal retrenchment, and isolated the tower, which was salient.

On the 25th the mine was sprung, but a chamber under the tower disappointed us, and only the part which was on our side was blown up. The effect produced was the burying of two or three hundred Turks and a few pieces

of cannon, for they had embattled and occupied every story of the tower. It was determined to take advantage of the first moment of surprise, and thirty men accordingly attempted to make a lodgement in the tower. Being unable to proceed, they maintained themselves in the lower stories, whilst the enemy occupied the upper, until the 26th, when General Devaux was wounded. It was then resolved to evacuate the place, in order to use the batteries against this tottering tower, and to destroy it altogether. On the 27th Cafarelli died.

Third period. From the 27th of April to the 20th of May.—During this period the enemy felt that if they remained on the defensive they were lost. The countermines they had formed did not make them feel secure. All the battlements of the walls were destroyed, and the guns dismounted by our batteries. A reinforcement of 3000 men, which had entered the place, had, however, compensated for all these losses.

But the imagination of the Turks was struck with terror, and it was no longer possible to induce them to remain upon the walls. They supposed every spot to be undermined. Phe-

lippeaux* formed lines of counter-attack; they began at Gezzar's palace, and the right of the front of attack. He also dug two trenches, resembling two sides of a triangle, which took all our works in flank. The numerical superiority of the enemy, the great number of labourers in the city, and the quantity of bales of cotton with which they formed the epaulements, materially expedited the works. In a few days they flanked the whole tower on the right and left, after which they raised cavaliers, and lined them with twenty-four-pounders; their counter-attack and batteries were several times carried and overthrown, and their guns spiked; but we were never able to maintain these works, because they were so entirely commanded by the towers and the wall. The order was then given to proceed against them by sap, so that their workmen and ours were only separated by two or three fathoms of ground, and were marching directly against each other. Fougasses were also established, which afforded means of entering the enemy's boyau, and destroying all who were not on their guard.

* A French emigrant, officer of engineers.

It was thus that, on the 1st of May, two hours before daybreak, possession was obtained of the most salient part of the counter-attack without any loss. Twenty volunteers endeavoured, at the first peep of dawn, to effect a lodgement in the tower, the defences of which our battery had entirely razed. But at that moment the enemy made a sortie on their right, and their balls striking behind the detachment, which was endeavouring to lodge itself under the ruins, obliged it to fall back. The sortie was briskly repulsed; five or six hundred of the besieged were killed, and a great number driven into the sea. As the tower was totally destroyed, it was resolved to attack a portion of the rampart by mining, in order to avoid the retrenchment which the enemy had constructed. The counterscarp was blown up. The mine was already carried across under the ditch, and was beginning to extend under the scarp, when, on the 6th, the enemy debouched by a sap covered by the fossé, surprised the mask of the mine, and filled up the well.

On the 7th, the enemy received a reinforcement of fresh troops, amounting to 12,000 men. As soon as their arrival was announced by signals, it was calculated that according to the state

of the wind they could not land for six hours. In consequence of this a twenty-four-pounder, which had been sent by Rear-admiral Perré, was immediately brought into play; which battered down a piece of the wall to the right of the tower which was on our left. At night the troops attacked all the enemy's works, filled up the trenches, killed all they met with, spiked the guns, mounted the breach, made a lodgement in the tower, and entered the place; in short we were masters of the town, when the troops which had landed appeared in formidable numbers, to renew the battle. Rambaut was killed; 1500 men fell with him, or were taken; Lannes was wounded. The besieged sallied forth by every gate, and took the breach in rear; but there was an end of their success: our troops marched against them, and after driving them back into the town, and cutting off several columns, regained the breach. Seven or eight hundred prisoners were taken; they were armed with European bayonets, and came from Constantinople. The enemy's loss was enormous; all our batteries fired upon him with gràpe, and our success appeared so great, that on the 10th, at two in the morning, Napoleon ordered a new assault. General Debon was killed in this last action.

There were 20,000 men in the place, and Gezzar's house and all the others were so thronged with defenders that we could not pass beyond the breach.

Under these circumstances what was the General-in-chief to do? On the one hand Rear-admiral Perré, who had returned from a cruise, had for the third time landed artillery at Tintura. We were beginning to have sufficient artillery to entitle us to hope to reduce the town. But, on the other hand, the prisoners informed us that new succours were leaving Rhodes when they embarked. The reinforcements received and expected by the enemy might render the success of the siege problematical; remote as we were from France and Egypt, we could not afford fresh losses: we had at Jaffa and in the camp 1200 wounded; the plague was in our hospital. On the 20th the siege was raised.

EGYPT,

MARCH, APRIL, AND MAY, 1799.

BATTLE OF ABOUKIR.

I. Insurrection against the French.—II. Murad-Bey leaves the desert of Nubia, and advances into Lower Egypt.—III. Mustapha Pacha lands at Aboukir, and takes the fort.—IV. Movement of the French army.—V. Napoleon advances to Alexandria.—VI. Junction of the army at Birketh; Napoleon marches against the Turkish army. Battle of Aboukir, 25th July, 1799.

I.

DURING the expedition into Syria, the inhabitants of Egypt conducted themselves as if it had been a province of France. Desaix, in Upper Egypt, continued to repulse the attacks of the Arabs and to secure the country from the attempts of Murad-Bey, who made incursions from the desert of Nubia into different parts of the valley. Sir Sidney Smith, forgetting what he owed to the character of the French officers, had caused a great number of circulars and libels to be printed, which he sent to the generals and commandants remaining in Egypt, proposing to them to return

to France, and guaranteeing their passage, if they chose to do so, *whilst the Commander-in-chief was in Syria.* These proposals appeared so extravagant, that it became the general opinion of the army that the commodore was mad. General Dugua, commanding in Lower Egypt, prohibited all communication with him, and indignantly rejected his insinuations.

The French forces in Lower Egypt were daily increased by the arrival of men from the hospitals, who reinforced the third battalions of the corps. The fortifications of Alexandria, Rosetta, Rhamanieh, Damietta, Salahieh, Belbeis, and the different parts of the Nile, which it had been thought proper to occupy with towers, went on constantly during these three months. General Dugua had only to repress the incursions of the Arabs, and some partial revolts; the mass of the inhabitants, influenced by the scheiks and ulemas, remained submissive and faithful. The first event which attracted the General's attention was the revolt of the Emir-Hadji.* The privileges and emoluments attached to this place were very considerable. The General-in-chief had authorized the Emir-Hadji to establish himself in Sharkieh,

* Prince of the Caravan of Mecca.

to complete the organization of his household. He had already 300 armed men; but he wanted 8 or 900 to form a sufficient escort for the caravan of the pilgrims of Mecca. He was faithful to Sultan Kabir until the battle of Mount Tabor; but Gezzar having succeeded in communicating with him coastwise, and informing him that the armies of Damaseus and the Naplousains were surrounding the French at the camp of Acre, and that the latter, weakened by the siege, were irremediably lost, he began to despair of the success of the French, and to listen to Gezzar, endeavouring to make his peace by rendering him some service. On the 15th of April, having received more false intelligence from an emissary of Gezzar, he declared his revolt by a proclamation published throughout Shar-keh. He asserted that Sultan Kabir had been killed before Acre, and the whole of the French army taken. The mass of the population of the province remained deaf to these insinuations. Five or six villages only displayed the standard of revolt, and his forces were only increased by 400 horse, belonging to a tribe of Arabs.

General Lanusse, with his moveable column, left the Delta, passed the Nile, and marched

against the Emir-Hadji; after several slight affairs, and various movements, he succeeded in surrounding him, attacked him briskly, put all who defended themselves to death, dispersed the Arabs, and burnt the most guilty village as an example. The Emir-Hadji escaped with four other persons, through the Desert, and reached Jerusalem.

During these occurrences in Sharkieh, others of greater importance were transacting in Bahireh. A man of the Desert of Derne, possessed of a great reputation for sanctity amongst the Arabs of his tribe, took it into his head, or attempted to persuade others, that he was the angel Elmody, whom the Prophet promises, in the Koran, to send to the aid of the elect, in the most critical circumstances. This opinion gained ground in the tribe; the man had all the qualities adapted to excite the fanaticism of the populace. He succeeded in persuading them that he lived without food, and by the special grace of the Prophet. Every day, at the hour of prayer, and before all the faithful, a bowl of milk was brought to him, in which he dipped his fingers and passed them over his lips; this being, as he said, the only nourishment he took. He formed himself a guard of 120 men of his tribe, well

armed and completely infatuated with zeal. He repaired to the Great Oasis, where he met with a caravan of pilgrims, consisting of 400 Maugrebins from Fez; he announced himself as the angel Elmody, they believed and followed him. These 400 men were well armed, and had a great number of camels; he thus found himself at the head of between 5 and 600 men, and marched to Damanhour, where he surprised 60 men of the nautical legion, killed them, and took their musquets and a four-pounder. This success increased the number of his partisans; he then visited all the mosques of Damanhour and the neighbouring villages, and from the pulpit, which is used by the readers of the Koran, announced his divine mission. He declared himself incombustible and ball-proof, and assured his hearers that all who would follow him would have nothing to fear from the musquets, bayonets, and cannon of the French. He was the angel Elmody! He convinced, and enlisted 3 or 4000 men in Bahireh, amongst whom there were 4 or 500 well armed. He armed the others with great pikes and shovels, and exercised them in hrowwing dust against the enemy, declaring that this blessed dust would frustrate all the efforts of the French against them.

Colonel Lefebvre, who commanded at Rhamanieh, left 50 men in the fort, and set out with 200 men to retake Damanhour. The angel Elmody marched to meet him; Colonel Lefebvre was surrounded by the superior forces of the angel. The action commenced, and when the fire was briskest between the French and the angel's armed followers, some columns of Fellahs outflanked the French, and passed to their rear, raising clouds of dust. Colonel Lefebvre could do nothing; he lost several men, killed a greater number, and took up a position at Rhamanieh. The wounded and the relations of those who were killed murmured, and loudly reproached the angel Elmody. He had told them that the balls of the French would not hit any of his followers, yet a great number had been killed and wounded! He silenced these murmurs by means of the Koran and of several predictions; he maintained that none of those who had rushed forward full of confidence in his promises had been either killed or wounded; but that those who had shrunk back had been punished by the Prophet, because they had not perfect faith in their hearts. This event, which ought to have opened their eyes to his imposture, confirmed his power; he reigned absolute

at Damanhour. There was reason to fear that the whole of Bahireh, and by degrees the neighbouring provinces also, might revolt; but a proclamation from the Scheiks at Cairo arrived in time, and prevented a general revolt.

General Lanusse speedily crossed the Delta; and from the province of Skarkieh, proceeded to the Bahireh, where he arrived on the 8th of May. He marched on Damanhour, and defeated the troops of the angel Elmody. All those who were unarmed, dispersed and fled to their villages. He fell on the fanatics without mercy, and shot 1500 of them, amongst whom was the angel Elmody himself. He took Damanhour, and the tranquillity of Bahireh was restored.

On the news that the French army had re-passed the Desert, and was returning into Egypt, a general consternation prevailed in the East. The Druses, the Mutualis, the Christians of Syria, and the partisans of Ayer, could only effect their peace with Gezzar by making great pecuniary sacrifices. Gezzar was less cruel than formerly; almost all his military household had been killed at Saint-Jean d'Acre, and this old man survived all those whom he had brought up. The plague, which was making great ravages in that town,

also increased his troubles, and gave the final blow to his power. He did not go out of his pachaship.

The pacha of Jerusalem resumed possession of Jaffa. Ibrahim-Bey, with 400 Mamelukes that he still had left, took up a position at Gaza; there was some parleying and some skirmishing with the garrison of El-Arisch.

II.

Elphi-Bey and Osman-Bey, with 300 Mamelukes, a thousand Arabs, and a thousand camels, carrying their wives and their riches, went down through the Desert, between the right bank of the Nile and Red Sea, and reached the Oasis of Sebaiar in the beginning of July; they waited for Ibrahim-Bey, who was to join them at Gaza, and thus united they wished to induce all Sharkieh to revolt, to penetrate into the Delta, and advance on Aboukir.

Brigadier-general Lagrange left with one brigade and half the dromedary regiment; he arrived in presence of the enemy in the night of the 9th of July, and manœuvred so skilfully that he surrounded the camp of Osman-Bey and Elphi-Bey, took their thousand camels and their families, and killed Osman-Bey, five or six kiaschefs, and a hundred

Mamelukes. The rest dispersed in the Desert, and Elphi-Bey returned to Nubia. Ibrahim-Bey, being informed of this event, did not quit Gaza.

Murad-Bey, with the rest of the Mamelukes, amounting to between 4 and 500 men, arrived in the Fayoum, and thence proceeded by the Desert to Lake Natron, where he expected to be joined by between 2 and 3000 Arabs of Baireh and the Desert of Derne, and to march on Aboukir, the place appointed for the landing of the great Turkish army. He was to take camels and horses to this army, and to aid it by his influence.

General Murat left Cairo, reached Lake Natron, attacked Murad-Bey, and took a kiaschef and fifty Mamelukes. Murad-Bey briskly pursued, and having, moreover, no news of the army which was to have landed at Aboukir, but was delayed by the winds, turned back, and sought safety in the Desert. In the course of the 13th, he reached the Pyramids; it is said that he ascended the highest of them, and remained there part of the day, gazing with his telescope on the houses of Cairo, and his fine country-seat at Gizeh. Of all the power of the Mamelukes, he now retained only a

few hundred men, disheartened, fugitive, and miserable !

As soon as the General-in-chief heard of his presence there, he instantly set out for the Pyramids ; but Murad-Bey plunged into the Desert, making for the Great Oasis. A few camels and some men were taken from him.

III. ;

On the 14th of July, the General-in-chief heard that Sir Sidney Smith, with two English ships of the line, several frigates, and Turkish men-of-war, and from a hundred and twenty to a hundred and fifty sail of transports, had anchored in Aboukir roads on the 12th, in the evening. The fort of Aboukir was armed, victualled, and in good condition ; the garrison amounted to 400 men, with a commander who might be depended on. Brigadier-general Marmont, who commanded Alexandria and the whole province, undertook to defend the fort during the time necessary for the army to come up. But this General had committed a great error ; instead of razing the village of Aboukir, as the General-in-chief had ordered him to do, and increasing the fortifications of the fort, by constructing a glacis, a covered way,

and a good demi-lune in masonry, General Marmont had taken on himself to preserve the village, which contained good houses, and which seemed to him necessary for the cantonment of the troops; and he had got a redoubt of fifty feet on each side, constructed by Colonel Cretin in advance of the village, near 400 toises from the fort. This redoubt seemed to him a sufficient protection for the fort and village; from the narrowness of the isthmus, which at that point is not above 400 toises over, he thought it impossible to pass and to enter the village without gaining possession of the redoubt. These dispositions were faulty, because they rendered the security of the important fort of Aboukir, which had a scarp and counterscarp of permanent fortification, dependent on a field-work which was not flanked, or even palisaded.

Mustapha-Pacha sent his boats into Lake Maadieh; seized the ferry-boat, which was used in the communication between Alexandria and Rosetta, and effected his landing on the banks of that lake. On the 14th, the English and Turkish gun-boats entered Lake Maadieh, and cannonaded the redoubt. Several field-pieces, landed by the Turks, were placed so as to answer the four pieces which defended

this work, and when it was thought to be sufficiently battered, the Turks surrounded it, kangiar, in hand, mounted to the assault, carried the work, and took or killed the 300 French stationed there by the commandant of Aboukir, who was killed. They then took possession of the village; there remained in the fort but 100 men and a bad officer; these, intimidated by the immense forces which surrounded them, and by the taking of the redoubt, had the cowardice to surrender the fort: this unfortunate event baffled all calculation.*

In the mean time as soon as Napoleon was informed of the landing of the Turks, he proceeded to Gizeh, and despatched orders to all

* The village of Aboukir surrounds the fort; it is at the extremity of the peninsula. At the distance of four hundred toises from the fort rises a little hill, which commands it. The breadth of the peninsula, at this place, is not above four hundred toises at most. It was there that Marmont had a redoubt constructed. The village is a considerable one; the houses are of stone. The fort of Aboukir was closed by a rampart, with a fossé cut in the rock; in the interior it had large towers, and a vaulted magazine, the remains of very ancient buildings. It is surrounded on all sides by rocks which stretch out into the sea, and render it impossible to approach it directly by the open sea. A few hundred toises off is a little isle, where a fort might be established, which would protect several ships of war.

parts of Egypt. On the 15th he slept at Wardan, on the 17th at Alkàm, on the 18th at Shabur, and on the 19th at Rhamanieh, thus performing a journey of forty leagues in four days. The convoy, of which signals had been made at Aboukir, was considerable, and there was every reason to suppose that there was not only a Turkish but an English army; in the uncertainty of the case the General-in-chief reasoned as if it had been so.

The divisions of Murat, Lannes, and Bon, marched from Cairo, leaving a good garrison in the citadel and the different forts; Kleber's division marched from Damietta. General Regnier, who was in Sharkieh, had orders to leave a column of 600 men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, including the garrisons of Belbeis, Salahieh, Cathieh, and El-Arisch, and to march on Rhamanieh. The different generals who commanded the provinces advanced with their columns, and what disposable force they had, on that point. General Desaix had orders to evacuate Upper Egypt, to leave the guarding of the country to the inhabitants, and to come to Cairo with all possible speed; so that, if it should be necessary, the whole army, amounting to 25,000 men, including above 3,000 excellent cavalry, and sixty well-horsed pieces of

cannon, was in movement to join before Aboukir. The number of troops left at Cairo, including the sickly, and those of the depôts, was not above 8 or 900 men.

The General-in-chief was in hopes to destroy the army which was landing at Aboukir, before that of Syria, if a new one had been raised during the two months which had elapsed since he had quitted that country, could arrive before Cairo. It was known, through our vanguard, which was at El-Arisch, that none of the troops, of which such an army would have been composed, had yet arrived at Gaza; it was, however, necessary to act as if the enemy, whilst he was landing at Alexandria, had an army marching on El-Arisch; and it was important that General Desaix should have evacuated Upper Egypt, and arrived at Cairo, before the army of Syria (if any such army existed, and would venture to pass the Desert) should reach that place.

Under these circumstances the Scheiks of Genil-Azar issued proclamations to inform the people respecting the movements which were operating, and to prevent their imagining that the French were evacuating Egypt; on the contrary, they declared that this country was still the constant object of Sultan Kabir's solici-

tude. This had induced him to pass the Desert for the purpose of destroying the Turkish army, which was coming to ravage it; and now that another army had arrived at Aboukir, by sea, he was marching with his usual activity to oppose its landing, and to preserve Egypt from the calamities with which a country that is the theatre of war is usually afflicted.

V.

On his arrival at Rhamanieh, Napoleon received, on the 20th of July, news from Alexandria, which gave the particulars of the enemy's landing, the attack and taking of the redoubt, and the capitulation of the fort. It was stated that the enemy had not yet advanced, and was labouring on intrenchments consisting of two lines: one joining the redoubt to the sea by intrenchments; the other three quarters of a league in advance, having the right and left supported by two sand-mounts, one commanding Lake Maadieh, and the other extending to the Mediterranean: that the inactivity of the enemy, during the five days which had elapsed since his taking the redoubt, arose, according to some, from his waiting for the arrival of the English army, which he expected from Port Mahon; accord-

ing to others, from the refusal of Mustapha to march on Alexandria without artillery or cavalry, knowing that place to be fortified and defended by an immense quantity of artillery: that he expected Murad-Bey, who was to bring him several thousand cavalry and several thousand camels: that the Turkish army was estimated at from twenty to twenty-five thousand men: that about thirty cannon were seen on the strand, of French make, and like those taken at Jaffa: that he had no artillery horses, and that his whole cavalry consisted only of two or three hundred horses belonging to the officers, which had been formed into companies to furnish guards for the advanced posts.

The events which had befallen Murad-Bey disconcerted all the enemy's schemes; the Arabs of Bahireh, amongst whom we had many partisans, feared to expose themselves to the vengeance of the French army; they did not seem to feel much confidence in the success of the Turks, whom they observed, moreover, to be destitute of artillery horses, and cavalry.

The fortifications which the Turkish army was making on the peninsula of Aboukir, gave reason to think that it wished to make this point its centre of operations: it could march thence either on Alexandria or Rosetta.

The General-in-chief thought proper to fix on Birketh for the centre of his movements. He sent General Murat thither, with his vanguard, to take up a position: the village of Birketh is at the head of Lake Maadieh. From thence we could fall on the right flank of the enemy's army, if he should make for Rosetta, and attack him between Lake Maadieh and the Nile, or fall on his left flank if he should march on Alexandria.

Whilst all the columns were effecting a junction on Rhamanieh, the General-in-chief proceeded to Alexandria: he was satisfied with the good condition in which he found that important place, which inclosed such quantities of ammunition, and such considerable magazines; and he rendered, in public, due testimony to the talents and activity of Colonel Cretin of the engineers.

The enemy's proceedings gave probability to the report spread by his partisans, that he was waiting for the English army; it was therefore important to attack and defeat him before its arrival. But the march of the General-in-chief had been so rapid, and the distances were so great, that there were still not more than 5 or 6000 men in junction. From twelve to fifteen days more were

therefore requisite for assembling the whole army, except Desaix's division, which required twenty days.

The General-in-chief resolved to advance with what troops he had, and to reconnoitre the enemy; the latter having neither cavalry nor moveable artillery, could not engage him in a serious action. His plan was, if the enemy should prove numerous and well posted, to take up a position parallel to theirs, supporting the right on Lake Maadieh, and the left on the sea, and to fortify himself there by redoubts. By this method, he calculated that he should keep the enemy blockaded in the peninsula, prevent his having any communication with Egypt, and be in a situation to attack the Turkish army when the greater part of the French army should have arrived.

Napoleon set out from Alexandria on the 24th, and proceeded to Puits, half way across the isthmus, where he encamped, and was joined by all the troops that were at Birketh.

The Turks, who had no cavalry, could not watch his movements; they were held in check by the grand guards of hussars and chasseurs, which the garrison of Alexandria had sent forth immediately after the debarkation. Some hopes of surprising the enemy's

army were therefore entertained. But a company of sappers, escorting a convoy of tools, having left Alexandria very late on the 24th, passed the fires of the French army, and fell in with those of the Turkish army at ten o'clock in the evening. As soon as these sappers perceived their mistake, the greater part of them fled, but ten were taken, and from them the Turks ascertained that the General-in-chief and the army were opposite them. They passed the whole night in making their final dispositions, and we found them, on the 25th, prepared to receive us.

The General-in-chief then changed his first plan, and resolved to attack instantly, if not to gain possession of the whole peninsula, at least to oblige the first line of the enemy to fall back behind the second, whereby the French would be enabled to occupy the position of the first line and intrench themselves there. The Turkish army being thus hemmed in, it would be easy to overwhelm it with shells, howitzers, and balls; we had immense resources in artillery at Alexandria.

General Lannes, with 1800 men, made his dispositions to attack the left of the enemy; Destaing, with a like number of troops, prepared to attack the right; Murat, with all the

cavalry and a light battery, divided his force into three corps, the left, right, and reserve. The skirmishers of Lannes and Destaing soon engaged with those of the enemy. The Turks maintained the battle with success, until General Murat, having penetrated through their centre, directed his left to the rear of their right, and his right to the rear of their left, thus cutting off the communication between the first and second lines. The Turkish troops then lost all confidence, and rushed tumultuously towards their second line. This corps consisted of between 9 and 10,000 men. The Turkish infantry are brave, but preserve no order, and their musquets have no bayonets; they are, moreover, deeply impressed with an opinion of their inferiority to cavalry in the plain. Encountered in the midst of the plain by our cavalry, this infantry could not join the second line; their right was driven into the sea, and their left into Lake Maadieh. The columns of Lannes and Destaing, which had advanced to the heights recently quitted by the enemy, descended them at the charge, and vigorously pursued him. An unprecedented spectacle was then seen. These 10,000 men, to escape from our cavalry and infantry, threw themselves into the water; and whilst our

artillery poured grape-shot upon them; they were almost all drowned there. It is said that only twenty men succeeded in getting on board the sloops. This extraordinary success, obtained with so little loss, gave us hopes of forcing the second line. The General-in-chief went forward with Colonel Cretin to reconnoitre. The left was the weakest part.

General Lannes had orders to form his troops in columns, to cover the intrenchments of the enemy's left with skirmishers, and under the protection of his whole artillery to proceed along the lake, turn the intrenchments, and throw himself into the village. Murat, with all his cavalry, placed himself in close column in the rear of Lannes, for the purpose of repeating the same manœuvre as that against the first line, and, as soon as Lannes should have forced the intrenchments, to get in the rear of the redoubt on the left of the Turks. Colonel Cretin, who was perfectly acquainted with the localities, was appointed to direct his march. General Destaing was instructed to make false attacks, to occupy the attention of the enemy's right.

All these dispositions were crowned with the most brilliant success. Lannes forced the intrenchments at the point of their junction

with the lake, and made a lodgement in the first houses of the village; the redoubt and the whole right of the enemy were covered with skirmishers.

Mustapha-Pacha was in the redoubt; as soon as he perceived that General Lannes was on the point of reaching the intrenchment and turning his left, he made a sortie, debouched with four or five thousand men, and thereby separated our right from our left, which he took in flank at the same time as he placed himself in the rear of our right. This movement would have stopped Lannes short; but the General-in-chief, who was in the centre, marched with the 69th, checked Mustapha's attack, made him give ground, and thereby restored the confidence of General Lannes's troops, who continued their movement; the cavalry, having then debouched, got in the rear of the redoubt. The enemy, finding themselves cut off, instantly fell into the most frightful disorder. General Destaing advanced at the charge on the intrenchments of the right. All the troops of the second line then tried to regain the fort, but they fell in with our cavalry, and not one Turk would have been saved, had it not been for the village, which a considerable number had time enough

to reach. Three or four thousand Turks were driven into the sea. Mustapha, all his staff, and a body of from 1200 to 1500 men, were surrounded and made prisoners. The 69th were the first that entered the redoubt.

It was four in the afternoon: we were masters of half the village, and of the whole camp of the enemy, who had lost from fourteen to fifteen thousand men. He had three or four thousand left, who occupied the fort, and barricaded themselves in a part of the village. The fire of musquetry continued throughout the day. It was not thought possible to force the enemy in the houses he occupied, protected as he was by the fort, without risking an enormous loss. A position was taken, and the engineer and artillery officers reconnoitred the most advantageous points for placing cannon of heavy calibre, to raze the enemy's defences without hazard of greater loss.

Mustapha-Pacha had not surrendered until after making a valiant defence. He had been wounded in the hand. The cavalry had the greatest share in the success of this day. Murat was wounded by a tromblon shot in the head; the brave Duvivier was killed by the thrust of a kangiar. Cretin was shot dead by a musquet-ball, whilst he was conducting the

cavalry. Guibert, aide-de-camp to the General-in-chief, was struck by a ball in the breast, and died shortly after the battle. Our loss amounted to near 300 men. Sir Sidney Smith, who did the duty of major-general to the Pacha, and who had chosen the positions occupied by the Turkish army, narrowly escaped being taken, and had great difficulty in reaching his sloop.

The 69th had behaved ill in an assault at Saint-Jean d'Acre, and the General-in-chief, dissatisfied with them, had commanded and inserted it in the order of the day, that they should cross the Desert with their arms reversed, and escorting the sick ; by their noble conduct at the battle of Aboukir they regained their former reputation.

APPENDIX OF DOCUMENTS.

LETTER FROM GENERAL BONAPARTE to the EXECUTIVE DIRECTORY.

Cairo, 6 Thermidor, year VI. (24th July, 1798).

ON the 19th of Messidor the army left Alexandria. It reached Damanhour on the 20th, suffering greatly in passing this Desert from the excessive heat and the want of water.

ACTION OF RAHMANIEH.

On the 22d we came to the Nile at Rahmanieh, and joined General Dugua's division, which had come by way of Rosetta by several forced marches.

General Desaix's division was attacked by a corps of 7 or 800 Mamelukes, who, after a pretty brisk cannonade and the loss of some men, retreated.

BATTLE OF SHEBREIS.

In the mean time I was informed that Murad-Bey, at the head of his army, composed of a great quantity of cavalry, with eight or ten gun-boats, and several batteries on the Nile, was waiting for us at the village of Shebreis. On the 24th, in the evening, we marched to meet him. On the 25th, at daybreak we were in sight of him.

We had but 200 cavalry; many of our horses were disabled, and all fatigued with the march; the Mamelukes had a magnificent body of cavalry, covered with gold and silver, armed with the best London carbines and pistols, and the best sabres of the East, and mounted, perhaps, on the best horses of the Continent.

The army was drawn up so that each division formed a square battalion, with the baggage in the centre and the artillery in the intervals between the battalions. The battalions were drawn up with the second and fourth divisions behind the first and third. The five divisions of the army were placed in echelon, flanking each other, and flanked by two villages which we occupied.

Citizen Perré, chief of division in the navy, with three gun-boats, a xebeck, and a half-galley, went to attack the enemy's flotilla. The action was extremely obstinate. There were above fifteen hundred cannon-shot fired on both sides. The chief of division Perré was wounded in the arm by a cannon-ball, and by his able dispositions and his intrepidity succeeded in retaking three gun-boats and the half-galley which the Mamelukes had taken, and in setting fire to their Admiral's ship. Citizens Monge and Berthollet, who were in the xebeck, shewed great courage at the critical moments. General Andreossy, who commanded the marines, conducted himself in the most creditable manner.

The cavalry of the Mamelukes soon inundated the whole plain, outflanked all our wings, and sought on all sides, on our flanks and in our rear, a weak point to enable them to break our line; but they found the line every where equally formidable, opposing them with a double

fire from flank and front. They tried several times to charge, but could not make up their minds to it. A few of the bravest came and skirmished; they were received by the fire of companies of carbineers placed in advance of the intervals between the battalions. At length, after remaining great part of the day within half cannon-shot, they effected their retreat and disappeared. Their loss may be reckoned at 300 men killed and wounded.

We marched for eight days destitute of every thing, and in one of the most scorching climates in the world.

On the 2d of Thermidor, in the morning, we perceived the Pyramids.

In the evening of the same day we were within six leagues of Cairo; and I found that the twenty-three Beys, with all their forces, had intrenched themselves at Embabeh, and that they had lined their intrenchments with upwards of sixty pieces of cannon.

BATTLE OF THE PYRAMIDS.

On the 3d, at daybreak, we met with their vanguards, which we repulsed from village to village.

At two in the afternoon we came in sight of the enemy's intrenchments and army.

I ordered the divisions of Generals Desaix and Reynier to take up a position on the right between Gizeh and Embabeh, so as to cut off the enemy's communication with Upper Egypt, which is his natural retreat. The army was drawn up in the same manner as at the battle of Shebreis.

The instant Murad-Bey perceived the movement of

General Desaix he resolved to charge, and sent one of his bravest Beys with a body of picked men, who charged the two divisions with the rapidity of lightning. They were allowed to approach within fifty paces, when they were greeted with a shower of ball and grape, which stretched a great number of them on the field of battle. They threw themselves into the interval formed by the two divisions, where they were received with a double fire, which completed their overthrow.

I seized the favourable moment, and ordered General Bon's division, which was on the Nile, to march to the attack of the intrenchments; and General Vial, who commands General Menou's division, to place himself between the corps which had recently charged and the intrenchments, so as to accomplish the triple object

Of preventing the corps from returning to them;

Of cutting off the retreat of the troops which occupied them;

And, finally, if necessary, of attacking these intrenchments by the left.

The instant Generals Vial and Bon were within the proper distance, they ordered the first and third divisions of each battalion to draw up in columns of attack, whilst the second and fourth kept their position, still forming the square battalion, which was now only three deep, and advanced to support the columns of attack.

General Bon's columns of attack, commanded by the brave General Rampon, rushed on the intrenchments with their usual impetuosity, in spite of the fire of a

at full gallop. Our columns had time to halt, front on every side, and receive them with fixed bayonets and a shower of balls. The ground was instantly strewed with them. Our troops soon carried the intrenchments. The flying Mamelukes instantly precipitated themselves in a crowd on their left. But a battalion of carbineers, under whose fire they were obliged to pass within five paces, made a dreadful slaughter of them. A great number threw themselves into the Nile, and were drowned.

Above 400 camels, loaded with baggage, and fifty pieces of artillery, fell into our power. I reckon the loss of the Mamelukes at 2000 men, all picked cavalry. A great proportion of the Beys were killed and wounded. Murad-Bey was wounded in the check. Our loss amounts to 20 or 30 men killed, and 120 wounded. During the night the city of Cairo was evacuated. All their gun-boats, sloops, brigs, and even a frigate, were burnt; and on the 4th our troops entered Cairo. During the night the populace burnt the houses of the Beys, and committed several excesses. Cairo, which contains above 300,000 inhabitants, has the vilest populace in the world.

After the great number of engagements and battles in which the troops I command have fought against superior forces, I should not dwell on the praise of their courage and coolness on this occasion, if this new sort of service had not actually required on their part a degree of patience scarcely compatible with French impetuosity. If they had given way to their ardour they would not have

gained the victory, which could only be obtained by extraordinary coolness and patience.

The cavalry of the Mamelukes displayed great bravery. They were defending their fortune, and there was not one of them on whom our soldiers did not find three, four, or five hundred louis d'or.

All the magnificence of these people was exhausted on their horses and arms. Their houses are contemptible. It would be difficult to find a more fertile land, or a people more miserable, ignorant and brutalized. They prefer one of our soldiers' buttons to a six-francs piece; in the villages they do not know the use of a pair of scissors. Their houses are built of mud. Their whole furniture is a straw mat and two or three earthen pots. They eat or consume, in general, very little. They are unacquainted with the use of mills, so that we have bivouacked amongst immense quantities of wheat, without being able to procure any flour. We lived only on pulse and cattle. The little grain the natives convert into flour, they bruise with stones; although in some large villages there are mills which are turned by oxen.

We have been much harassed by clouds of Arabs, who are the greatest thieves and villains in the world, assassinating both Turks and French, and all that fall into their hands. Brigadier-general Muireur, and several other aides-de-camp and staff officers, have been murdered by these wretches. They lie in ambuscade behind the dykes and in the ditches, on their excellent little horses, and woe to him who straggles a hundred yards from the columns. General Muireur, notwithstanding the remonstrances of the grand guard, through a fatality which I

have often observed to attend those whose last hour is at hand, would go alone to a mount about two hundred paces from the camp. Behind it were three Bedouins, who assassinated him. His death is a great loss to the Republic; he was one of the bravest generals I ever know.

The Republic could not have a colony more within its reach, or of a more fertile soil than Egypt. The climate is very healthy, because the nights are cool. Notwithstanding a march of fifteen days, and fatigues of all kinds, the privation of wine, and even of every refreshment to alleviate fatigue, we have no sick. The soldiers found a great resource in the battechs, a sort of water-melons, that are very plentiful here.

The artillery has particularly distinguished itself. I request you to advance the general of division Dommartin to the rank of brigadier-general. I have promoted to that rank the chief of brigade Desaing, commanding the fourth division; general Zayonscheck has conducted himself extremely well in several missions with which I have intrusted him.

The muster-master Sucey had embarked in our flotilla on the Nile, in order to be more conveniently situated for sending us provisions from the Delta. Seeing that I accelerated my march, and wishing to be by my side at the battle, he threw himself into a gun-boat, and regardless of the danger he was about to incur, separated from the flotilla. His boat grounded; he was attacked by a great number of assailants. He shewed the greatest courage, and although very dangerously wounded in the arm, succeeded in animating the crew by his exertions,

and extricating the boat from the dangerous situation into which she had got.

We have had no news from France since our departure.

I shall very shortly send you an officer with all the information that I can obtain respecting the economical, moral, and political situation of this country.

I shall likewise communicate the fullest particulars of the conduct of those who may have distinguished themselves, and the promotions I have made.

I solicit you to grant the rank of rear-admiral to citizen Perré, chief of division, one of the naval officers most distinguished for intrepidity.

I likewise request you to pay a gratification of 1200 francs to the wife of Citizen Larrey, surgeon-in-chief to the army. He has rendered us the greatest services in the midst of the Desert by his activity and zeal. He is the fittest officer of health that I know, to be at the head of the hospitals of an army.

(Signed,)

BONAPARTE.

GENERAL BONAPARTE TO ADMIRAL BRUEYS.

Cairo, 12 Thermidor, Year VI. (30 July, 1798.)

I HAVE just received, together, all your letters from the 25th Messidor, to the 8th Thermidor. The news I receive from Alexandria respecting the success of the soundings, leads me to hope that by this time you have entered the port. I also think that the *Causse* and the *Dubois* are fitted out in such a manner that they might be placed in the line, in case you were attacked; for,

after all, two additional ships are not to be neglected.

Rear-admiral Perré, will long be wanted on the Nile, with which he begins to be acquainted. I see no impropriety in your giving the command of his ship to Citizen Do what is proper in this respect.

I wrote to you on the 9th, with copies of all the orders I have given for the victualling of the squadron; I think the fifty vessels laden with provisions must have arrived by this time. We are excessively busy here; never was there such a chaos to disentangle and organize. We have wheat, rice, and pulse in plenty. We are in search of money, and begin to find it; but it is a business full of labour, trouble, and difficulty.

You will find annexed an order for Damietta; forward it by an advice-boat, and direct the bearer to ascertain whether our troops are there, before he enters the port. They set out for that place three days ago, in boats on the Nile: thus they ought to have arrived before you will receive this letter; send one of the sub-commissioners of the squadron to superintend the execution of this order.

I am about to despatch thirty more ships laden with wheat for your squadron.

The whole proceedings of the English tend to shew that they are inferior in number, and that they content themselves with blockading Malta, and preventing the arrival of provisions. However this may be, you must get into the port of Alexandria very speedily, or victual your ships with all despatch, with the rice and corn I send you, and proceed to the port of Corfu; for it is indispensable that you should remain in a situation to

overawe the Porte, until all these affairs are settled. In the latter case you will take care that all the ships and Venetian and French frigates, which may be of use to us, remain at Alexandria.

(Signed,)

BONAPARTE.

GENERAL BONAPARTE to the EXECUTIVE DIRECTORY.

Cairo, 2d Fructidor, Year VI. (19 Aug. 1798.)

On the 18th of Thermidor I ordered General Reynier's division to proceed to Elkhankah, to support General Leclerc's cavalry, who were fighting with a multitude of Arabs on horseback, and peasants of the country, whom Ibrahim-Bey had prevailed upon to revolt. He killed about fifty peasants and some Arabs, and took up a position at the village of Elkhankah. I also ordered the division of General Lannes, and that of General Dugua, to march.

We proceeded by long marches on Syria, constantly driving Ibrahim-Bey, and all the forces he commanded, before us.

Before we reached Belbeis, we delivered part of the caravan of Mecca, which the Arabs had carried off and were driving into the Desert, into which they had already penetrated two leagues. I had it conducted to Cairo, under a good escort. At Koureyn we found another part of the caravan, all composed of merchants, who had first been stopped by Ibrahim-Bey, and then released and plundered by the Arabs. I collected the wreck of the party, and had it likewise conducted to Cairo. The booty got by the Arabs must have been considerable; one merchant alone assured me that he had

lost in shawls and other Indian goods to the amount of two hundred thousand crowns. This merchant had all his women with him, according to the usage of the country. I provided a supper for them, and procured them camels for their journey to Cairo. Several of the females appeared to be of a tolerably handsome figure; but their faces were covered, according to the custom of the country; to which custom the army finds it more difficult to habituate itself, than to any other part of the national manners.

We reached Salahieh, which is the last inhabited place in Egypt where there is good water. The Desert, which divides Syria from Egypt, begins there.

Ibrahim-Bey, with his army, treasure, and women, had just set out from Salahieh; I pursued him with the little cavalry I had. His immense baggage filed off before us. A party of Arabs, of 150 men, who were with them, proposed to charge with us, and share the booty. Night was approaching; our horses were excessively fatigued; our infantry far distant; we carried off the two pieces of cannon which they had, and about fifty camels loaded with tents and various effects. The Mamelukes sustained the charge with the greatest courage. The chief of squadron d'Estrée, of the seventh regiment of hussars, was mortally wounded; my aide-de-camp Shulkouski received seven or eight sabre-cuts, and several shot. The mounted squadron of the seventh hussars and twenty-second chasseurs, and those of the third and fifteenth dragoons, conducted themselves in the best manner. The Mamelukés are extremely brave, and would form an excellent corps of light cavalry; they are richly clothed,

armed with the greatest care, and mounted on horses of the best quality. Every staff officer and every hussar was engaged in single combat. Colonel Lasalle, of the twenty-second, dropped his sabre in the midst of the charge; he was expert and fortunate enough to alight and remount in time to defend himself, and attack one of the most intrepid of the Mamelukes. General Murat, and Major Duroc, my aide-de-camp, citizen Leturcq, citizen Colbert, and adjutant Arrighi, having been hurried too far by their impetuosity into the thickest of the conflict, were in the greatest danger.

Ibrahim-Bey is at this moment crossing the Desert of Syria; he was wounded in this action.

I left General Reynier's division and the engineer officers at Salahieh, to construct a fortress; and set out on the 26th Thermidor, on my return to Cairo. I had not proceeded above two leagues from Salahieh, when General Kleber's aide-de-camp brought me intelligence of the battle which our squadron had sustained on the 14th of Thermidor. The communications are so difficult, that he had been eleven days on his journey.

I send you the report which Admiral Gantheaume has made to me on this subject. I write to him by the same courier, to Alexandria, desiring him to make you a more particular report.

On the 18th of Messidor I left Alexandria. I wrote to the Admiral to enter the port of Alexandria within twenty-four hours; and in case his squadron should be unable to enter, to land all the artillery and effects belonging to the army, and to repair to Corfu.

The Admiral thought he could not complete the land-

ing where he lay, being at anchor in the port of Alexandria on rocks, and several ships having already lost their anchors; he went to Aboukir, which place affords a good anchorage. I sent officers of engineers and artillery, who agreed with the Admiral that the land could afford him no protection, and that if the English appeared within the two or three days he would be obliged to remain at Aboukir, either to land his artillery or to sound and mark the pass of Alexandria, - he could only cut his cables; and that it was of the utmost importance to remain as short a time as possible at Aboukir.

I left Alexandria in the firm belief that in less than three days the squadron would have entered the port of Alexandria, or sailed for Corfu. From the 18th Messidor to the 6th Thermidor, I received no intelligence either from Rosetta, Alexandria, or the squadron. A multitude of Arabs, flocking from all parts of the Desert, were constantly within five hundred toises of the camp. On the 9th of Thermidor, the report of our victories and different dispositions re-opened our communications. I received several letters from the Admiral, from which I learned, with astonishment, that he was still at Aboukir. I immediately wrote to him, to impress on his mind that he must not lose an hour in entering Alexandria, or sailing for Corfu.

The Admiral informed me, by a letter dated the 2d of Thermidor, that several English ships had been reconnoitring his squadron, and that he was fortifying himself to await the enemy, moored in a line of defence at Aboukir. This extraordinary resolution caused me the greatest alarm; but it was already too late, for the letter

which the Admiral addressed to me on the 2d Thermidor did not reach me till the 12th. I despatched my aide-de-camp, citizen Jullien, to him, with orders not to leave Aboukir until he had seen the squadron under sail. As he set out on the 12th, he could not possibly have arrived in time; but he was killed on the road by a party of Arabs, who stopped his bark on the Nile, and massacred him and his escort.

On the 8th Thermidor the Admiral wrote to inform me that the English had withdrawn, which he attributed to the want of provisions. I received this letter by the same courier as the former, on the 12th.

On the 11th he wrote me word that he had at length just heard of the victory of the Pyramids and the taking of Cairo, and that a passage had been found to enter the port of Alexandria by; I received this letter on the 18th.

In the evening of the 14th the English attacked him: the moment he perceived the English squadron, he despatched an officer to me to inform me of his dispositions and plans: but this officer perished on his way.

It appears to me that Admiral Brueys was unwilling to go to Corfu, until he was certain of the impossibility of entering the port of Alexandria, and that the army, of which he had heard nothing for a long time, was not in a situation to need to retreat. If he committed errors on this fatal occasion, he has expiated them by a glorious death.

The fates have in this instance, as in many others, shewn us that if they have granted us a great preponderance on the continent, they have given the empire of the seas to our rivals. But this reverse cannot be ascribed

us : far from that, it has favoured us, throughout these operations, more than ever. When I arrived before Alexandria with the squadron, and learnt that the English had been there in superior force, some days before ; in spite of the dreadful tempest that prevailed, I threw myself on shore at the risk of being wrecked.

I recollect that at the moment when preparations for landing were making, the signal was made that a ship of war was seen in the offing ; it was *La Justice*. " Fortune," I exclaimed, " wilt thou forsake me ? only give me five days !" I landed in the course of the day ; I marched all night ; I attacked Alexandria at daybreak with only 3000 men, harassed with fatigue, destitute of cannon, and almost without cartridges ; and in the five days I was master of Rosetta and Damanhour, that is to say, already established in Egypt. In those five days the squadron ought to have been out of the power of the English forces, whatever numbers they might bring. Far from that, however, it remained exposed during all the remainder of Messidor. In the beginning of Thermidor it received from Rosetta a supply of rice for two months. The English shewed themselves in these seas, in superior numbers, for ten days. On the 11th of Thermidor the army receives intelligence of our entire possession of Egypt and our entrance into Cairo ; and at length, when fortune perceives that all her favours are lavished in vain, she abandons our fleet to its fate.

(Signed,)

BONAPARTE.

LETTER FROM GENERAL BONAPARTE TO CITOYENNE
BRUEYS.

Cairo, 2d Fructidor, year VI. (19th Aug. 1798.)

YOUR husband has been killed by a cannon-shot, while fighting on his deck. He died without pain, and by the best death, and that which is thought by soldiers most enviable.

I am keenly sensible to your grief. The moment which severs us from the object we love is terrible; it insulates us from all the earth; it inflicts on the body the agonies of death; the faculties of the soul are annihilated, and its relations with the universe subsist only through the medium of a horrible dream, which alters every thing. Mankind appear colder and more selfish than they really are. In this situation we feel that, if nothing obliged us to live, it would be much best to die; but when, after this first thought, we press our children to our hearts, tears and tender feelings revive the sentiments of our nature, and we live for our children; yes, madam, see, in this very moment, how they open your heart to melancholy: you will weep with them, you will bring them up from infancy—you will talk to them of their father, of your sorrow, of the loss which you and the Republic have sustained. After having once more attached your mind to the world by filial and maternal love, set some value on the friendship and lively regard I shall always feel for the wife of my friend. Believe that there are a few men who deserve to be the hope of the afflicted, because they understand the poignancy of mental sufferings.

(Signed,)

BONAPARTE.

INSTRUCTIONS given to CITIZEN BEAUVOISIN, Chief of Battalion, on the Staff, Commissioner to the Divan of Cairo.

Cairo, 5 Fructidor, year VI. (Aug. 22, 1798.)

CITIZEN Beauvoisin will repair to Damietta, where he will embark in a Turkish or Greek ship, and proceed to Jaffa; he will carry the letter I sent you to Achmet-Pacha, before whom he will demand to present himself, and will repeat to him verbally that the Musulmans have no truer friends in Europe than ourselves; that I have heard, with pain, that it was believed in Syria that it was my intention to take Jerusalem, and to destroy the Mahometan religion; that such a scheme is as contrary to our wishes as to our intentions; that he may feel himself perfectly secure; that I know him by reputation as a man of merit; that he may rest assured that if he will behave as he ought towards men who do not meddle with him, I will be his friend, and that our arrival in Egypt, far from proving detrimental to his power, will only increase it; that I know that the Mamelukes, whom I have destroyed, were his enemies; and that he must not confound us with the rest of the Europeans, since, instead of making slaves of Musulmans, we deliver them: and, finally, he will relate to him what has passed in Egypt, and whatever may have a tendency to cure him of all inclination to arm and interfere in this quarrel. If Achmet-Pacha is not at Jaffa, Citizen Beauvoisin will proceed to Saint-Jean d'Acre; but he will first take care to see the European families, and principally the French Vice-Consul, to obtain information of what is passing in Constantinople, and what is doing in Syria.

(Signed,)

BONAPARTE.

GENERAL BONAPARTE to ACHMET-PACHA*, Governor
of Seid and Acra (Saint-Jean d'Acra.)

Cairo, 5 Fructidor, year VI. (22d Aug. 1798.)

IN coming into Egypt to make war upon the Beys, I have done what was just, and conformable to thy interest, since they were thy enemies. I did not come to make war against the Musulmans. Thou must know that my first care on entering Malta was to set at liberty 2000 Turks, who had for several years groaned in slavery. On my arrival in Egypt, I encouraged the people, protected the Muphtis, Imans, and Mosques; the pilgrims to Mecca were never treated with more attention and friendship than by me, and the feast of the Prophet has just been celebrated with more splendour than ever.

I send thee this letter by an officer who will inform thee by word of mouth, of my intention to live in harmony with thee, and that we should mutually render each other all the services which commerce and the welfare of states may require; for the Musulmans have no better friends than the French.

(Signed,)

BONAPARTE.

LETTER FROM GENERAL BONAPARTE to the GRAND-
VIZIER.

Cairo, 5th Fructidor, year VI (22d August, 1798.)

THE French army, which I have the honour to command, has entered Egypt to punish the Mameluke Beys for the insults which they have incessantly offered to French commerce.

* The same is the celebrated Gezzar-Pacha.

Citizen Talleyrand Perigord, Minister of Exterior Relations at Paris, has been named, on the part of France, Minister to Constantinople, in the room of Citizen Aubert Dubayet; and he is provided with the necessary powers and instructions, on the part of the Executive Directory, to negotiate, conclude, and sign, whatever may be necessary to remove the difficulties arising from the occupation of Egypt by the French army, and to consolidate the ancient and necessary friendship which ought to exist between the two powers. But as it is possible that he may not have yet reached Constantinople, I hasten to inform your Excellency of the intention of the French Republic, not only to continue the ancient good understanding, but to procure the Porte the support which she may need against her natural enemies, who, at this moment, have just entered into a league against her.

The Ambassador Talleyrand Perigord ought to have arrived. If by any accident he should not have reached you, I entreat your Excellency to send hither (to Cairo) some person possessing your confidence and furnished with your instructions and full powers, or to forward me a firman, so that I may, myself, send an agent to settle the fate of this country unalterably, and to arrange the whole to the greater glory of the Sultan and of the French Republic, his most faithful ally, and to the eternal confusion of the Beys and Mamelukes, our common enemies.

I request your Excellency to believe me to be, with sentiments of friendship and high consideration, &c.

(Signed,)

BONAPARTE.

LETTER FROM GENERAL BONAPARTE TO VICE-ADMIRAL
THEVENARD.

Cairo, 18th Fructidor, year VI. (4th September, 1798.)

YOUR son has been killed by a cannon-ball, on his quarter-deck; I fulfil, Citizen Admiral, a melancholy duty in communicating this event to you; but he died honourably and without suffering. This is the only consolation that can mitigate the grief of a father. We are all devoted to death; are a few additional days of life worth the glory of dying for one's country? Can they be any compensation for the affliction of seeing one's self stretched on a bed, surrounded by the egotism of a new generation? are they worth enduring the humiliations and sufferings of a long sickness for? Happy are they who die on the field of battle! they live for ever in the memory of posterity. They have never inspired the compassion or pity which is excited by decrepit age or the anguish of acute diseases. You have grown grey, Citizen Admiral, in the career of arms; you will regret a son worthy of you and of the nation; but whilst with us you accord some tears to his memory, you will say, that his glorious death is enviable.

Believe that I participate in your grief, and doubt not the esteem I feel for you.

(Signed,)

BONAPARTE.

FROM GENERAL BONAPARTE TO GENERAL KLEBER.

Cairo, 24th Fructidor, year VI. (10th September, 1798.)

A SHIP like the Franklin, General, which had the Admiral on board, the Orient having blown up, ought not

to have surrendered at eleven o'clock. I think, moreover, that the officer who surrendered this ship is extremely culpable, because it is proved by his own proce-verbal that he took no measures to wreck the ship, and render it impossible to bring it to ; this will be an eternal disgrace to the French navy. It is not necessary to know much of manœuvres, or to possess extraordinary talents, to cut a cable and run a ship aground ; besides, these measures are specially prescribed in the instructions and ordinances given to captains in the navy. As for the conduct of Rear-admiral Duchaila, it would have become him to have died on his quarter-deck, like du Petit-Thouars.

But what deprives him of every chance of restoration to my esteem, is his base conduct amongst the English since he has been a prisoner. There are men who have no blood in their veins. He will hear the English, then, drink to the disgrace of the French navy every evening, whilst they intoxicate themselves with punch. He will be landed at Naples, then, as a trophy, for the lazaroni to gaze at ; it would have been much better for him to have remained at Alexandria, or on board ship, as a prisoner of war, without ever wishing or asking for any thing. When O'Hara, who, nevertheless, was a very common character, was made prisoner at Toulon, and was asked by me, on the part of General Dugommier, what he wished for, he answered, "*To be alone, and not to be indebted to pity.*" Attentions and courtesy are honourable only to the victor ; they do no credit to the vanquished, whom reserve and haughtiness best become.

(Signed,)

BONAPARTE.

GENERAL BONAPARTE to the Army.

Cairo, 1st Vendemiaire, year VII. (22d Sept. 1798.)

SOLDIERS,

WE are celebrating the first day of the 7th year of the Republic.

Five years ago, the independence of the French people was threatened : but you took Toulon, which was the presage of the ruin of our enemies.

A year after, you beat the Austrians at Dego.

The next year you were on the summit of the Alps.

You besieged Mantua two years ago, and gained the celebrated victory of Saint-George.

Last year you were at the sources of the Drave and the Isonzo, returning from Germany.

Who would then have thought that you would now be on the banks of the Nile, in the centre of the ancient Continent ?

From the Briton, celebrated in the arts and commerce, to the hideous and ferocious Bedouin, you fix the attention of all mankind.

Soldiers, your destiny is noble, for you are worthy of your deeds and of the reputation you have acquired. You will die with glory like the heroes whose names are inscribed on yon pyramids ; or you will return to your country, covered with laurels, and with the admiration of all nations.

During the five months that have elapsed since we quitted Europe, we have been the perpetual objects of the solicitude of our countrymen. This day, forty millions of citizens are celebrating the era of representative

governments; forty millions of citizens are thinking of you. They all say, it is to their labours, to their blood, that we are indebted for a general peace, for repose, the prosperity of commerce, and the benefits of civil liberty.

(Signed,)

BONAPARTE.

LETTER from GENERAL BONAPARTE to the EXECUTIVE
DIRECTORY.

Cairo, 27th Frimaire, year VII. (17th Dec. 1798.)

I HAVE despatched an officer in the army to you, with orders to remain only seven or eight days at Paris, and to return to Cairo.

I send you different accounts of minor occurrences, and several articles that have been printed.

The organization of Egypt is commenced.

A ship which arrived at Suez brought an Indian, who had a letter for the commander of the French forces in Egypt: this letter has been lost. It appears that our arrival in Egypt has excited a great idea of our power in India, and produced an effect very unfavourable to the English. There is a war in that country.

We are still without news from France; not a courier since Messidor. This is unprecedented, even in the colonies.

My brother, the muster-master Sucy, and several couriers whom I have despatched to you, must surely have arrived.

Send us some ships to Damietta.

The English had assembled about thirty small vessels,

and were at Aboukir: they have disappeared. They have three ships of war and two frigates before Alexandria.

General Desaix is in Upper Egypt, pursuing Murad-Bey, who, with a corps of Mamelukes, is flying before him.

General Bon is at Suez.

The fortifications of Alexandria, Rosetta, Damietta, Belbeis, Salahieh, Suez, and Cairo, are proceeding with the greatest activity.

The army is in the best state, and has few sick. There are some assemblages of Turkish forces in Syria. If I had not been separated from them by a desert of seven days' journey, I would have called them to an account before this time.

We have plenty of goods, but money is very scarce, and the presence of the English annihilates commerce.

We are impatient for news from France and Europe: this is an urgent want to our hearts; for if the national glory required our presence in our country, we should be inconsolable at not being there.

(Signed,)

BONAPARTE.

LETTER FROM GENERAL BONAPARTE TO TIPPOO SAIB.

Cairo, 6th Pluvisé, year VII. (25th Jan. 1799.)

You have already been informed of my arrival on the banks of the Red Sea, with an innumerable and invincible army, desirous to free you from the iron yoke of England.

I am now anxious to acquaint you with my desire to receive intelligence from you, by way of Mascat and Moka, of the political situation in which you stand. I should even be glad if you could send some able man, possessed of your confidence, to Suez or Grand-Cairo, in order that I might confer with him.

(Signed,)

BONAPARTE.

GENERAL BONAPARTE to the EXECUTIVE DIRECTORY.

Cairo, 22d Pluviose, year VII.. (10th Feb. 1799.)

A RAGUSAN ship entered the port of Alexandria on the 7th Pluviose, having on board Citizens Hamelin and Liveron, proprietors of the cargo of the ship, consisting of wine, vinegar, and cloth. By this ship, I received a letter from the Consul of Ancona, dated the 11th of Brumaire, which gives me no other information but that all is quiet in Europe and in France. He sends me a series of the *Journal of Lugano*, from No. 36 (Sept. 3) to No. 43 (Oct. 22), and a series of the *Courier de l'Armée d'Italie*, which is printed at Milan, from No. 219 (14th Vendemiaire) to No. 230 (6th Brumaire).

Citizen Hamelin left Trieste on the 24th of October, put into Ancona on the 3d of November, and went to Novarino, whence he sailed on the 22d Nivose.

I interrogated Citizen Hamelin myself, and he deposed to the facts annexed:—

The news is contradictory enough: from the 18th of Messidor I have received no intelligence from Europe.

Memoirs,—VOL. II.

On the 1st of November my brother set sail in an advice-boat. I had ordered him to go to Crotona or the Gulf of Tarento; I think he must have arrived.

The Muster-master Sucey set out on the 26th of Frimaire.

I despatch you above sixty ships of all nations, and by all ways: thus you cannot fail to be well informed of our situation here.

The Ramadan, which commenced yesterday, has been celebrated on my part with the greatest pomp. I have performed the same functions as were fulfilled by the Pacha.

General Desaix is above a hundred and sixty leagues from Cairo, near the Cataracts. He has explored the ruins of Thebes. I expect, every moment, the official details of an action he is understood to have had with Murad-Bey, who, it is said, has been killed, and five or six Beys taken prisoners.

Adjutant-general Boyer has discovered, in the desert towards Fayoum, some ruins which no European had ever seen before.

General Andreossi and Citizen Berthollet are returned from their tour to the Natron Lakes and the Convents of the Copts. They have made most interesting discoveries; they have found excellent natron, which the native searchers were too ignorant to discover. This branch of Egyptian commerce will thereby become more important. By the first courier I shall send you the plan of the Canal of Suez, the vestiges of which are in perfect preservation.

It is necessary that you should supply us with arms, and that your military and diplomatic operations should be so combined as to allow you to send us reinforcements of troops. We lose men by the natural course of events.

"A contagious disorder has prevailed at Alexandria for the last two months; 200 men have fallen victims to it. We have taken measures to prevent its spreading; we shall conquer it.

We have had many enemies to contend with in this expedition: deserts, inhabitants of the country, Arabs, Mamelukes, Russians, Turks, and English.

If, in the course of March, Citizen Hamelin's report should be confirmed to me, and France should be at war with the Kings, I should return into France.

I will not indulge, in this letter, in any reflection on the affairs of the Republic, because I have had no news for ten months.

We have all entire confidence in the wisdom and energy of the resolutions you will adopt.

(Signed,)

BONAPARTE.

GENERAL BONAPARTE to the SCHEIKS, ULEMAS, and other inhabitants of the provinces of Gaza, Ramleh, and Jaffa.

Jaffa, 19th Ventose, year VII. (9 Mar. 1799.)

God is forgiving and merciful!

I write the present letter to inform you that I am come into Palestine to drive out the Mamelukes and the army of Gezzar-Pacha.

By what right has Gezzar extended his oppression into the provinces of Jaffa, Ramleh, and Gaza, which are no part of his pachaship? Or by what right did he send his troops to El-Arisch? He has provoked me to war, I have brought it to him; but it is not on you, inhabitants, that I intend to inflict its horrors.

Remain quiet in your homes; let those who have quitted them through fear, return to them. I will grant to every one the property he possessed.

It is my intention that the Cadis shall continue their functions as usual, and dispense justice; that religion, in particular, shall be protected and revered, and that the mosques shall be frequented by all good Musulmans: it is from God that all good things come; it is he who gives the victory.

It is proper that you should know that all human efforts are useless against me, for all that I undertake is destined to succeed. Those who declare themselves my friends prosper; those who declare themselves my enemies, perish. The example of what has just occurred at Jaffa and Gaza ought to teach you that if I am terrible to my enemies, I am kind to my friends, and, above all, benevolent and merciful to the poor.

(Signed,)

BONAPARTE.

LETTER FROM GENERAL BONAPARTE TO GEZZAR PACHA.

Jaffa, 19th Ventose, year VII. (9 Mar. 1799.)

SINCE my entrance into Egypt, I have several times informed you that it was not my intention to make war against you, but that my only object was to drive out

the Mamelukes ; you have not answered any of the proposals I have made to you.

I apprised you that I wished you to remove Ibrahim-Bey from the frontiers of Egypt ; but far from doing so, you have sent troops to Gaza, collected great magazines, published, on all sides, that you were about to enter Egypt ; and at length carried this invasion into effect, by sending 2000 of your men to the fort of El-Arisch, six leagues within the territory of Egypt. It then became incumbent on me to set out from Cairo, and bring home to you the war which you seem to provoke.

The provinces of Gazá, Ramleh, and Jaffa, are in my power. I have treated those of your troops who placed themselves at my mercy, with generosity ; I have treated those who had violated the laws of war with severity ; I shall march in a few days on Saint-Jean d'Acre. But why should I deprive an old man whom I do not know of a few years of life ? What signify a few leagues more, by the side of the countries I have conquered ? And since God gives me the victory, I will, like him, be forgiving and merciful, not only towards the people, but towards the great also.

You have no real reason to be my enemy, for you were the foe of the Mamelukes. Your pachaship is separated from Egypt by the provinces of Gaza and Ramleh, and by immense deserts. Become my friend once more, be the enemy of the Mamelukes and English, and I will do you as much good as I have done and can do you harm. Send me your answer by a man furnished with full powers and acquainted with your intentions. Let him present himself to my vanguard with a white flag ;

I give an order to my staff to send you a safe conduct, which you will find annexed.

On the 24th of this month, I shall march against Saint-Jean d'Acre; I must therefore have your answer before that day.

(Signed,)

BONAPARTE.

LETTER FROM GENERAL BONAPARTE to the EXECUTIVE
DIRECTORY:

Jaffa, 23d Ventose, year VII. (13th March, 1799.)

ON the 5th of Fructidor, I sent an officer to Gezzar-Pacha, of Acre, who used him ill, and sent no answer.

On the 29th Brumaire, I wrote him another letter; he cut off the bearer's head.

The French at Acre were arrested, and treated in a cruel manner.

The provinces of Egypt were inundated with firmans, in which Gezzar avowed his hostile intentions, and announced his arrival.

He went farther still, and invaded the provinces of Jaffa, Ramleh, and Gaza. His vanguard took up a position at El-Arisch, where there are some good wells and a fort, situate in the Desert, ten leagues within the territory of Egypt.

I had no longer any choice; I was provoked to hostilities, and thought it incumbent on me to carry the war to the enemy without delay.

General Reynier, on the 16th of Pluviose, joined his vanguard, which was under the command of the inde-

fatigable General Lagrange, stationed at Catieh, three days' journey in the Desert, where I had collected considerable magazines.

On the 18th Pluviose, General Kleber arrived from Damietta on lake Menzaleh, where several gun-boats had been constructed, landed at Pelusium, and proceeded to Catieh.

ACTION OF EL-ARISCH.

General Reynier marched from Catieh with his division, on the 18th of Pluviose, to proceed to El-Arisch. It was necessary to march for several days across the Desert, where no water could be found. But difficulties of every kind were overcome: the enemy was attacked and forced, the village of El-Arisch carried, and the whole of the enemy's vanguard blockaded in the fort of El-Arisch.

NOCTURNAL ATTACK.

In the mean time the cavalry of Gezzar-Pacha, supported by a body of infantry, had taken up a position in our rear, at the distance of a league, and was blockading the besieging army.

General Kleber caused General Reynier to make a movement; at midnight the enemy's camp was surrounded, attacked, and carried, one of the Beys was killed. Arms, baggage, and effects of every kind were taken: most of the men had time to escape; several of Ibrahim-Bey's Mamelukes were made prisoners.

SIEGE OF THE FORT OF EL-ARISCH.

Trenches were opened before the fort of El-Arisch ; one of our mines had been counterworked and the miners dislodged. On the 28th of Pluviose, a breaching battery was constructed, as well as two batteries of approach : the cannonade was kept up throughout the 29th. On the 30th, at noon, the breach was practicable ; I summoned the commandant to surrender, which he did. We found at El-Arisch three hundred horses, much biscuit and rice, five hundred Albanians, five hundred Maugrabins, two hundred men from Adonia and Caramania : the Maugrabins entered into our service, and I made an auxiliary corps of them.

We left El-Arisch on the 4th of Ventose ; the vanguard lost its way in the Desert, and suffered much for want of water : our provisions failed us, and we were obliged to eat horses, mules, and camels.

On the 6th we were at the columns placed on the boundaries of Africa and Asia ; we lay in Asia that night.

The next day we marched on Gaza : at ten in the morning we discovered three or four thousand cavalry marching towards us.

ACTION OF GAZA.

General Murat, commanding the cavalry, caused it to pass the different torrents which were in sight of the enemy, by movements executed with precision.

Kleber's division advanced by the left on Gaza ; General Lannes, with his light infantry, supported the

movements of the cavalry, which was drawn up in two lines. Each line had a squadron of reserve behind it; we charged the enemy near the height which overlooks Hebron, and where Sampson carried the gates of Gaza. The enemy did not await the charge, but fell back; he had some men killed; amongst others the Pasha's kiaya.

The twenty-second light infantry behaved extremely well; they followed the cavalry, running, although many days had elapsed since they had made a good meal or drunk their fill of water.

We entered Gaza, where we found 1500 pounds weight of powder, abundance of military stores, shells, implements, upwards of 200,000 rations of biscuit, and six pieces of cannon.

The weather became dreadful; there was much thunder and rain; previously to this we had not seen a storm since our departure from Europe.

We slept on the 10th at Eswod, the ancient Azot.

On the 11th we slept at Rameh: the enemy had evacuated the place so precipitately that he left us 100,000 rations of biscuit, a still greater quantity of barley, and 1500 water-skins which Gezzar had prepared in order to pass the Desert.

SIEGE OF JAFFA.

Kleber's division first invested Jaffa, and afterwards proceeded to the river of the Hhayah, to cover the siege; Bon's division invested the right fronts of the houses, and Lannes's division the left.

The enemy unmasked about forty pieces of cannon on all points of the walls, with which he kept up a brisk and well-sustained fire.

On the 16th two batteries of approach, the breaching battery, and a mortar battery, were in a condition to open. The garrison made a sortie; a crowd of men in various costumes, and of all colours, were then seen marching on the breaching battery; Maugrabins, Albanians, Kurds, Natolians, Caramanians, Damascenes, natives of Aleppo, and blacks from Tekrour: they were briskly repulsed, and returned with more expedition than they would have wished. My aide-de-camp Duroc, an officer in whom I have great confidence, particularly distinguished himself.

At break of day, on the 17th, I caused the governor to be summoned; he had my messenger's head struck off, and sent no answer. At seven the fire commenced; in an hour I judged the breach practicable. General Lannes made the dispositions for the assault. The adjutant-general's assistant, Netherwood, and ten carbineers were the first that mounted the breach, and were followed by three companies of grenadiers of the 13th and 69th demi-brigades, commanded by adjutant-general Rambaud, for whom I solicit the rank of brigadier-general.

At five o'clock we were masters of the town, which was for twenty-four hours given up to pillage and to all the horrors of war, which never before seemed to me so hideous.

Four thousand of Gezzar's soldiers were put to the sword; eight hundred of them were cannoneers: part of the inhabitants were massacred.

In the course of a few days several ships arrived from Saint-Jean d'Acre with military stores and provisions; they were taken in the port; they were astonished to

find the town in our power; it had been thought that it would stop us for six months. Abd-Oullah, Gezzar's general, had the address to conceal himself amongst the people from Egypt, and to come and throw himself at my feet.

I sent to Damascus and Aleppo more than 500 persons of those two cities, as well as between 4 or 500 persons to Egypt.

I pardoned the Mamelukes and Kiaschefs whom I took at El-Arisch; I pardoned Omar-Mackram, Scheik of Cairo; I was merciful towards the Egyptians, as well as towards the people of Jaffa, but severe towards the garrison which suffered itself to be taken in arms.

We found at Jaffa fifty pieces of cannon, thirty of which, forming the train of field-pieces, were of European make; stores consisting of above 400,000 rations of biscuits, 2000 quintals of rice, and some stores of soap.

The artillery and engineer corps distinguished themselves.

General Cafarelli, who conducted these sieges, and has fortified the different places in Egypt, is an officer whose activity, courage, and extraordinary talents, render him worthy of recommendation.

Colonel Samson of the engineers, commanded the vanguard which took possession of Catieh, and has on all occasions rendered the greatest services.

Captain Sabatier of the engineers was wounded at the siege of El-Arisch. Citizen Aimé was the first man who entered Jaffa, through a vast subterraneous passage, leading into the interior of the place.

Colonel Songis, director of the park of artillery, had

great difficulties to surmount in bringing up the guns; he commanded the principal attack of Jaffa.

We have lost Citizen Lejeune, colonel of the twenty-second light infantry, who was killed at the beach: this officer was deeply regretted by the army; the men of his corps wept for him as for their father. I have appointed in his stead Lieutenant-colonel Magni, who was severely wounded. These different affairs have cost us fifty men killed and two hundred wounded.

The forces of the Republic are masters of all Palestine.

(Signed,)

BONAPARTE.

PROTESTS AND EXPLANATIONS

RESPECTING

FACTS STATED

IN THE PRECEDING VOLUMES.

PROTESTS AND EXPLANATIONS.

MARSHAL COUNT JOURDAN TO GENERAL GOURGAUD.

Paris, Feb. 12, 1823.

MONSIEUR LE GENERAL,

IN the first volume of Napoleon's Memoirs, of which you are the Editor, I have read, at page 67, *Bernadotte, Augereau, Jourdan, Marbot, &c. who were at the head of the plotters of this society, (that of the Manége), offered a military dictatorship to Napoleon; and at page 86, Jourdan and Augereau came to Napoleon at the Tuileries, &c.* I was ignorant that the *Société du Manége*, which was dissolved long before Bonaparte's arrival, had played a part in the events of the 18th Brumaire. However that may be, I affirm, upon my honour, that I never was a member of that society, that I never was present at any of its sittings, and that I did not go to seek Napoleon at the Tuileries.

About the 10th of Brumaire, I presented myself, alone, at General Bonaparte's house; not finding him at home, I left a card. The next day he sent his compliments to me, by his aide-de-camp, General Duroc; shortly after he invited me to dine with him on the 16th. I had reason to feel flattered by the reception I experienced from him; on leaving table we had a conversation which will be published one day with other documents relative to the 18th of Brumaire; it will then be seen that if my name was entered a few days afterwards in a list of pro-

scription, it was precisely because, foreseeing how the General would abuse the supreme power, I declared I would not lend him my support unless he would give positive guarantees for public liberty, instead of vague promises. Had I proposed a military dictatorship, which is a kind of unlimited power, I should have been more favourably treated.

I request, General, that you will have the goodness to insert this protest in the second volume of Napoleon's Memoirs.

I have the honour to be, with the most perfect consideration,

Monsieur le General,

Your most obedient humble Servant,

(Signed,)

MARSHAL JOURDAN.

GENERAL GOURGAUD to MARSHAL JOURDAN,
in answer to the preceding.

Paris, Feb. 13, 1823.

MONSIEUR LE MARECHAL,

I HAVE received the letter you did me the honour to address to me, relative to an article in which you are concerned, in the 1st volume of Napoleon's Memoirs which I am publishing, (the chapter of the 18th Brumaire.)

I was too young, at the time of the events in question, to have been able, when at Saint-Helena, to rectify any errors of memory into which the Emperor may have fallen. I shall take care to insert your protest in the second volume, which will speedily appear.

You affirm, Sir, that you never belonged to the *Société du Manège*, too positively to allow any doubt to be

raised on the subject; but the Emperor, as you yourself know, had a very sure memory; and I shall make it my business to endeavour to find out, from the journals and writings of the time, what circumstance can have given rise to this mistake.

As to the proscription you speak of, Sir, it appears that it was not of long duration; since, a few months after the 18th Brumaire, the First Consul appointed you Minister of the French Republic to the Piedmontese Government. [See page 306 of the Memoirs.]

Accept, Monsieur le Maréchal, the homage of the profound respect with which I have the honour to be,

Your very obedient humble servant,

Baron GOURGAUD.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL de GERSDORFF to GENERAL
GOURGAUD, at Paris.

Dresden, Feb. 25, 1823.

GENERAL,

You and your comrades have published some very interesting Memoirs, and thereby deserved a just tribute of gratitude from your countrymen. What adds great additional value to your labours is, that with the impartiality of an historiographer, you give free scope to protestations against statements which are doubtful, or capable of being rectified. This is what now encourages me to protest against a passage in the Notes and Miscellanies, which is a serious attack upon the honour of the Saxon troops.

Memoirs.—VOL. II.

As Head of the Staff of the Saxon corps attached to the French army in 1809, the commander of that corps being no more, I consider myself as entitled to address myself to you; flattering myself, at the same time, that you have not forgotten our acquaintance in the year 1813.

In the first part of the Historical Miscellanies, page 228, is the following passage:—

The Saxons gave way, both on the morning of the battle of Wagram, and on the evening before: they were the worst troops in the whole army.

I cannot do better than relate the events of those two days, as far as the Saxon troops are concerned.

We formed, in junction with the very weak division of Dupas, the fourth *corps d'armée*; we passed the Danube on the 5th of July, towards noon, to operate on the left bank. Our first task was to take the village of Ratzen-dorff, which Steindel's brigade executed smartly, whilst the main corps was marching to its destination, which was to form the left wing of the army. All the Saxon cavalry was drawn up in the plain of Breiterled; and although its force was pretty considerable, it was, nevertheless, not in proportion to that of the enemy's cavalry opposed to it. The Prince of Ponte-Corvo, however, ordered an attack (it might be five or six o'clock in the afternoon). I myself was the bearer of this order, and I found General Gerard, the head of the Prince's Staff, already on the ground. The necessary dispositions were made, and I believe there never was a more glorious moment for the Saxon cavalry. The enemy, who awaited our attack without moving, was entirely overthrown, and had

many men wounded and taken prisoners. A battalion of Clairfait's, posted there to support them, lost its flag, and a great number of men. From that moment we remained masters of the plain, and the enemy's cavalry made no farther attempt that day, except by sending his flankers, against whom we made our advance.

In the mean time the Prince's *corps d'armée* had experienced some vexatious alterations. Dupas's division had been ordered to join Marshal Oudinot's corps; two battalions of grenadiers had been left to guard the Isle of Lobau, and Prince John's regiment of light horse had been placed under the command of Marshal Davoust. The Prince complained bitterly of all these alterations, and sent several officers to claim his troops. All was unavailing, until at length, towards night, three squadrons of the light horse returned, the fourth having been retained to cover a battery.

All these vexations affected the Prince. He saw with grief that the Emperor's sentiments towards him were manifested on this occasion, and that the Prince of Neuchâtel was acting according to the humour of his master. The character of the Prince, as well as his wounded pride, made him anxious to end this day as gloriously as possible: for this purpose the village of Wagram was to be taken. The Prince accordingly ordered his troops to move still farther to the left, and sent to inform the Emperor of this design, requesting him to take care that he should be vigorously supported.

I stop here a moment to notice the position of the enemy. The Archduke Charles had sent orders, by several couriers, to the Archduke John, to pass the

March, and to put himself in communication with the left wing of the Austrian army, by Untersiebenbrunn. This movement was to be executed on the 6th at dawn, and in this expectation the Archduke Charles weakened his left wing. Already, on the 5th, the dispositions had been made to reinforce the right wing beyond Wagram, and it was thus intended to cut off the French army from its communications with the Danube. But to accomplish this it was necessary to maintain possession of Wagram, at any expense. This was the pivot of the enemy's position; it was thither that the Archduke had hastened, and, after distributing his orders towards midnight, was waiting there until day.

Under these circumstances, an attack on Wagram, even supposing it had been made with a much more considerable number of troops, would never have succeeded. But the Prince had only 7000 infantry; he nevertheless attempted the attack several times, succeeded in posting himself at the other extremity of the village, but was each time obliged to yield to the violent efforts of all the united forces of the Austrians. Whoever has been in such engagements must be aware of the inevitable disorder into which the bravest troops are thrown for the moment, and which the darkness of night only increases. Such was our situation. Our troops, after many repulses, got scattered; but the Saxon officers remedied the evil with so much promptitude and intelligence, that at midnight the Saxon brigades had rallied near Aderkla, and were perfectly in a state to act upon any contingency. -

It is known that on the 6th the enemy commenced his

attack by his right on our left wing. He had been reinforced by Collowrath's division and the grenadiers. Our corps had retrograded a little to place itself in line. It appeared that all the enemy's forces were united here; but he could only extend them very slowly towards Aspern, and even on Esslingen. The Saxon cavalry made several charges, and the infantry was obliged to form, by degrees, *en potence*, because the enemy continued to extend themselves towards Enzersdorff. There was not the slightest disorder: the Prince, with troops which had been much weakened, and with only twenty-seven pieces of cannon, the greater part of which were successively dismounted, manœuvred as if it had been on a chess-board. The situation of the left wing, although Marshal Massena had hastened up to support it, at nine o'clock was very critical; but, at ten, the Emperor himself arrived. He went and reconnoitred the enemy's position; ordered a new attack, declared his satisfaction, and charged me to tell the Saxons from him to stand firm, and that affairs would soon be altered. He then hastily took another view of the enemy, saying, "They are mine, however!" and with these words he set off at full gallop, to go to the right wing.

In fact, every thing changed from that moment. The left wing of the Austrians had in vain awaited the arrival of a corps d'armée in the direction of the March; it was forced to yield to the reiterated attacks of Marshal Davoust; and the Archduke Charles, seeing the considerable movements that were making against his centre, felt that his whole position was menaced. The advantages of his right wing were lost. The Prince of Ponte-Corvo

and Massena, in the greatest order, took a retrograde position, in order to make way for the Bavarians. At the same time General Lauriston arrived, with the most terrible battery that ever was used, the hundred cannon of the guards, and swept all before him.

Who is there amongst those who witnessed these transactions, that will dare to say a single man of the Saxon corps left the field of battle otherwise than as wounded? Who will deny that the Saxon artillery and cavalry had been extremely active ever since day-break; and that the infantry shewed the greatest *sang froid* throughout the time that they were riddled with the enemy's shot? A hundred and thirty-two officers, part of them severely wounded, and the rest killed, out of a corps of such limited numbers, are a sufficient proof that it did its duty on these two days. I call on General Gerard, a very competent judge, for his testimony with respect to the veracity of my narration; I am persuaded that he has not forgotten the Saxons of the 5th and 6th of July.

The Prince himself foretold the fate that awaited us: "I wished," said he, "to lead you to the field of honour, and you had nothing but death before your eyes; you have done every thing I had a right to expect from you, nevertheless justice will not be done to your exertions, because you were under my command." The next day, at six in the morning, he expressed nearly similar sentiments, and, unless I am mistaken, it was to Count Mathieu Dumas, whom he earnestly requested, at the same time, to report these very expressions to the Emperor. The Prince and General Gerard did not quit us

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EGYPT.

- I. The Nile and its inundations.—II. Ancient and modern population.—III. Division and productions of Egypt.—IV. Commerce.—V. Alexandria.—VI. Of the different races by which Egypt is inhabited.—VII. The Desert and its inhabitants.—VIII. Government and importance of Egypt.—IX. Policy of Napoleon.

I.

THE Nile rises in the mountains of Abyssinia, flows from South to North, and falls into the Mediterranean, after passing through Abyssinia, the deserts of Nubia, and Egypt. It runs eight hundred leagues; of which extent its course through the Egyptian territory forms two hundred. It enters Egypt at the isle of Elfilah or Elephantina, and fertilizes the arid deserts through which it runs. Its inundations are regular and productive; regular, because they are caused by the tropical rains; productive, because these rains, falling in torrents on the mountains of Abyssinia, covered

with wood, carry with them a-fertilizing slime, which the Nile deposits on the lands. The North winds prevail during the rise of the river, and promote its productive effects by keeping back the waters.

It never rains in Egypt. The earth, in that country, is only rendered fertile by the regular inundation of the Nile. When it is high, the year is abundant; when it is low, the harvest is ordinary.

It is a hundred and fifty leagues from the Isle of Elephantina to Cairo, and this valley, watered by the Nile, is on an average five leagues in width. Beyond Cairo the stream separates into two branches, and forms a sort of triangle which it covers by overflowing. The base of this triangle is sixty leagues, from the Arabs' tower to Pelusium; and the sides are fifty leagues in length, from the sea to Cairo; one of these arms falls into the Mediterranean near Rosetta; the other near Damietta. In ancient times this river had seven mouths.

The Nile begins to rise at the summer solstice; the inundation increases till the equinox, after which it gradually decreases. It is, therefore, between September and March that all agricultural labours must be performed.

until a few days after. The remembrance of them is indelibly fixed in the hearts of the Saxons, and in mine particularly, because, as head of the staff, I was doubly connected with them.

The Prince was of opinion that we had deserved from him the sentiments which he expressed in the order of the day he left us. It was disapproved of at head-quarters, and the Prince was wished to withdraw it. "I give full power to do so," he replied, "to any man who will prove that what I have said is untrue."

After these events, the Saxons were placed under the command of his Royal Highness the Viceroy of Italy, who was detached towards Hungary. At the passage of the March the Saxons proved to his Royal Highness that they were no less worthy to serve under his command.

You see, General, that I have only related well known facts so far as they concern my country and my comrades. I only wished, by these means, to refute a hasty judgment, and to direct attention to the motives which may lead even a great man into error. I am not acting as the panegyrist of the Prince of Ponte-Corvo, for he does not need one. I have not elevated the military actions of the Saxons higher than they deserved to be placed. All troops have their unfortunate moments; but this was not the case at Wagram with the Saxons.

You will surely find means, General, to impart my just protestation to your countrymen, as I shall take measures to make it known in Germany. You are too much a man of honour, not to take under your protec-

tion every thing in which honour is concerned. You will thereby justify the high opinion which I have of your character and merit.

Accept, Monsieur le General, the assurance of my most distinguished consideration.

DE GERSDORFF,

Lieut.-General, formerly Head of the
Staff of the Saxon army, &c.

GENERAL GOURGAUD to LIEUT.-GEN. DE GERSDORFF,
in answer to the preceding.

Paris, March, 1823.

GENERAL,

I HAVE received the letter you have done me the honour to write, dated the 25th of February last, on the subject of a note dictated by the Emperor Napoleon, relative to the battle of Wagram, inserted in the Memoirs which I am publishing with Count Montholon. I hasten to inform you that, agreeably to your wishes, I shall publish your protest in the next part of the same work.

It is not for me to pronounce on what the Emperor says respecting the Saxon troops; I shall merely request you to observe that you yourself admit, in your account, that these troops were several times repulsed and thrown into disorder in the action of the 5th, and that in the battle of the 6th they were likewise obliged to give ground to the enemy.

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I know not, General, what has led you to think that the Emperor entertained, in 1809, sentiments inimical to the Prince of Ponte-Corvo; well known facts attest the contrary. After having intrigued against Napoleon, at the period of the 18th Brumaire; after having conspired against him under the consulate, General Bernadotte was, nevertheless, never visited with any prosecution. At a later period he was even made a marshal of the empire, a prince, &c., and yet his only title to such high favours was his marriage with the sister-in-law of one of the Emperor's brothers. He had never held any important command, he had gained no victories; and it may be said that the reputation he had acquired, was owing rather to that species of ingenuity anciently attributed to the people of his province than to his real merit. How did he prove his gratitude?

At the battle of Jena he refused, under the most frivolous pretences, to support Marshal Davoust's corps, which was attacked by three fourths of the Prussian army; he thus caused the death of 5 or 6000 Frenchmen, and hazarded the success of the day. You will confess, General, that so culpable an action deserved exemplary punishment; the laws condemned him, ——— he experienced only a short disgrace! After that, does it become this General to say to the Saxon troops at the time of the battle of Wagram, "*That justice would not be done to them because they were under his command?*"

In war, you know, General, the valour of troops often depends on the ability of their commander; these same Saxons soon afterwards deserved the eulogies of the Em-

peror, when under the command of Prince Eugene : a certain proof that if they did not perform what was expected of them at Wagram, it was not their fault, but that of the chief who then commanded them.

The Prince of Ponte-Corvo, you say, does not need a panegyrist ; that may possibly be the case, General, amongst foreigners, but in France it would be very difficult for him to find one. The French have not forgotten the mischief he did them in Russia ; they have not forgotten the battles of Gros Beeren, Juterboch, and Leipsic, where, at the head of foreign soldiers, he shed the blood of his countrymen, his old companions in arms, fighting against the man who, instead of giving him up to the rigour of the laws, had loaded him with favours ; a line of conduct as contrary to policy as to gratitude, as opposite to his personal interest as to honour ; a line of conduct truly criminal, and which neither the fury of unbounded jealousy, nor the blindness of excessive self-love, can excuse.

The Emperor Napoleon was partial to the King of Saxony ; the remembrance of his constancy and fidelity often brought comfort to the soul of the exiled hero, which so many instances of ingratitude had chilled ! If in a note rapidly dictated, he has used an expression respecting the Saxons which has hurt your feelings, remember Leipsic ! and you will not find it too harsh, in his mouth.

I cannot conclude this letter, General, without congratulating myself on your kind recollection of the intercourse we had together in 1813 ; it had already enabled

me to appreciate the qualities and talents by which you are distinguished; in now answering the observations which honour and patriotism have dictated to you, I am happy to have a new opportunity of offering you the assurances of my most distinguished consideration.

(Signed,)

BARON GOURGAUD,
Formerly General and Aide-de-Camp
to the Emperor Napoleon.

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME
OF MEMOIRS.



LIST OF PLATES, &c.

TO THE SECOND VOLUME OF MEMOIRS.

Fac-Simile of the Page of the Manuscript dictated to General Gourgaud. . . .	} to face the Title.
Theatre of a War in Germany, in 1800 Theatre of the War in Italy, in 1800 and 1801	} at the end of the Volume.
Attack of Copenhagen by an English Fleet, April 2, 1801	
Naval Action of Aboukir, Aug. 1, 1798	


TO THE SECOND VOLUME OF HISTORICAL MISCELLANIES.

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PASSAGE of the MINCIO
25 Dec. 1800.


English Miles.
1 2 3 4 5 10 15

French Leagues.
1 2 3 4 5

Theatre of the War
in
ITALY,
in 1800 & 1801.


English Miles.
5 10 20 30 40 50

French Leagues.
5 10 15 20 25



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