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MISSION #29 FORMOSA  
17 January 1945

2-5239-59

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Authority *ND 16003*  
By *SP* NARA Date *11/1/05*



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HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH AIR FORCE	
Chief of Staff	
Deputy C. of S. Adm.	
Deputy C. of S. Opr.	

# XX BOMBER COMMAND



# Tactical Mission Report

No. 29

DATE 17 JANUARY 1945

GENERAL OF THE ARMIES H. H. ARNOLD

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11 Feb 45  
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TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
Chief
Staff
Deputy C. of S.
Op.
A. G.

B

TWENTIETH AIR FORCE  
Office of The Deputy Commander, IB and C  
APO 493

11 February 1945

SUBJECT: Report of B-29 Mission, 17 January 1945.

TO : Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force, Washington 25, D.C.

1. Enclosed for your information and files is Tactical Mission Report of the B-29 strike against Shinchiku Airbase, Formosa, on 17 January 1945.

2. Please accomplish original of the attached receipt and return to this Headquarters.

FOR THE DEPUTY COMMANDER:

*Leo I. Herman*

LEO I. HERMAN  
Colonel, Air Corps  
Acting Adjutant General

1 Incl:  
Incl 1 - Tactical Mission Rpt  
No. 29, dtd 9 Feb 45.

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


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TWENTIETH AIR FORCE  
ADJUTANT GENERAL

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:: 9 Feb 45 - *W* ::  
:: Date Initials ::  
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TWENTIETH AIR FORCE  
Office of the Deputy Commander, IB and C  
APO 493

TACTICAL MISSION

REPORT

Field Orders No. 29

Mission No. 29

TARGET: SHINCHIKU AIRDROME

Formosa

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Prepared by:

Intelligence Section  
XX Bomber Command

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\* 9 Feb 45 JH \*  
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TWENTIETH AIR FORCE  
Office of The Deputy Commander IB and C  
APO 493

9 February 1945

SUBJECT: Report of Operations, 17 January 1945.

TO : Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force, Washington 25, D.C.

1. UNITS PARTICIPATING:

The four Bombardment Groups of the XX Bomber Command were directed by Field Orders Number 29 to participate in a daylight attack on the Shinchiku Airdrome, Formosa. A force composed of all fully modified aircraft was to take part. Groups, their locations, and their Commanding Officers were as follows:

<u>Group</u>	<u>Rear Base</u>	<u>Forward Base</u>	<u>Commanding Officer</u>
40th	Chakulia	Hsinching	Col. W.H. Blanchard
444th	Dudhkundi	Kwanghan	Col. A.L. Harvey
462nd	Piardoba	Kiunglai	Col. A.F. Kalberer
468th	Kharagpur	Pengshan	Col. J.V. Edmundson

2. IDENTIFICATION OF MISSION:

a. Attack No. 29.

b. Targets Specified:

(1) Primary Target: Shinchiku Airbase, Formosa, (XX Bomber Command Target No. 91.4-a).

First Alternate Target: Heito Airdrome and Air Arsenal, Formosa, (AAF Target No. 91.6-57).

Second Alternate Target: Einansho Airport, Formosa, (XX Bomber Command Target 91.4-C)

Alternate Radar Target: Main Wharf Area, Takao, Formosa (XX Bomber Command Target 91.6-8A).

(2) Secondary Target: Dock area and shipping in Chinese Coastal Ports.

(3) Last Resort Target: City of Hengyang, China, (26°56'N - 112°32'E).

3. STRATEGY AND PLAN OF OPERATIONS:

a. Importance of Targets Actually Attacked

(1) Primary Target: Shinchiku is one of Formosa's major airbases and is a staging point for aircraft en route to the south. The base possesses complete facilities for maintenance and repair and also shops whose probable function is the assembly of aircraft on a small scale.

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The field is active and a large number of planes will almost certainly be found on this field at any one time. Destruction of the facilities would slow down maintenance and repair, throwing a larger burden on other bases, and would tend to impede the passage of combat aircraft through Formosa to southern battle areas.

(2) Secondary Target: Shipping and harbor installations on the China coast offer an excellent secondary target for a number of reasons. Japanese shipping has always been a target of prime importance. Foochow and Amoy, Chinese coastal ports, are conveniently near the primary target, and are themselves vulnerable and important targets. The probability of finding Japanese vessels in Chinese ports has increased since shipping routes have been compressed more and more into lanes through the Formosa Straits and along the coast.

(3) Last Resort Target: Because of its importance as a link in the Japanese communications system serving troops in South China the town of Hengyang is an excellent target. Held by the Japanese since September, 1944, this town has become increasingly important to them as they develop its transportation facilities. It is on the Hankow - Canton Railroad line and is the origin of a branch line to Kweilin and Linchow.

b. Details of Planning:

(1) Operational Planning:

(a) This attack was planned as the second strike against airfield installations on Formosa in support of operations in the Philippines. On Mission 28 the strike had been diverted, due to weather, from Shinchiku to the alternate targets of Kagi and Heito. Since Shinchiku was still the best air objective on Formosa, it was selected as the primary target for Mission 29.

(b) The striking force was this time divided into "A" wing and "B" wing. "A" wing was to be formed by grouping four 12-plane formations over the wing assembly point at a short interval. These formations were to be the first from each field.

(c) The Group leader of the first formation was to be "A" wing leader. "B" wing was to be formed by the second formations from respective fields with the first Group leader thereof serving as "B" wing leader.

(d) Time of departure from wing assembly point was specified instead of time over target, as had been the case on previous missions. This was done in order to allow the Groups to compute their take-off times to take advantage of the latest weather information.

(e) The same assembly point was to be used by each wing, however, each wing was given a different time to depart from the wing assembly point.

(f) Date of this attack was to be 16 January, allowing 1 day for rest following Mission Number 28. Weather for 16 January, however, indicated that bombing would have to be by radar. The forecast for 17 January appeared favorable and this date was decided upon in order to accomplish visual bombing as well as to meet the requirements of an attack within the required date period.

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By *sw* NARA Date *11/17/05*



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(g) Original plans were to have three groups return from the target to fields in the Kunming area but investigation revealed that XX Bomber Command gas stocks would not permit this. Thus, the plan was discarded and planes were directed to return to their respective Chengtu bases.

(h) At the time Missions 28 and 29 were directed, necessary POL stocks were not available in China to conduct a sizable effort, even against targets as relatively near as those on Formosa. Theater agencies were directed, however, to render full support to furnish Hump lift into the Chengtu area to permit this operation, which was directed from Washington at CINCSIPA'S request for supporting action.

(i) Two weather aircraft were detailed to scout the target area and report cloud amounts to the wing commanders before the scheduled time of departure from the wing assembly point. Wing commanders were to designate the targets to be attacked on the basis of the information obtained for them by the weather scout aircraft.

(2) Determination of Bomb Load:

(a) In an attempt to bomb under favorable weather conditions the plan for weather scout aircraft had been evolved. This necessitated a choice of bombs and fuzings applicable to a number of targets. A bomb load suitable for this type of attack recommended by the Operational Analysis Section was as follows: 2 groups carrying M-26 fragmentation clusters and 2 groups carrying M-47A2 incendiary bombs with the possibility of substituting M-17 aimable clusters for the M-47A2 bombs. Alternate loadings were suggested in an effort to obtain an incendiary effect. Due, however, to a number of circumstances including lack of time, transport, bomb loading facilities, the availability and distribution of bombs, the desired effect was not wholly obtainable. Bomb load was as shown in paragraph 3b(3) this section and in Annex H-V-1.

(b) To reduce the possibility of smoke produced either by enemy smoke generators or the incendiary action of bombs from obscuring the aiming point, an effort was made to concentrate the attack in time. This was done by prescribing a departure time for each wing at the wing assembly point rather than specifying the time over target for each Group.

(3) Bombing Data:

(a) Twelve aircraft of the 40th Group were ordered to carry M-26 fragmentation bombs fused 14 second delay. Other aircraft of the 40th Group were to carry M-64 500-pound general purpose (TNT or Amatol filled) bombs fused .1 second nose and .01 second tail.

(b) All other aircraft were to be loaded with two thirds M-64 500-pound general purpose (TNT or Amatol filled) bombs fused .1 second nose and .01 second tail and one third M-76 incendiary bombs fused instantaneous nose and non-delay tail.

(c) Loading of M-76 type bombs was to be accomplished according to the Field Orders insofar as the available supply would permit. Incendiaries were to be loaded to release last.



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(d) Bombing was to be by two wing formations composed of 4 twelve-plane formations each. Intervalometer settings ordered were minimum train (electrical release).

(e) Bombing was to be accomplished at the following pressure altitudes: 40th Group, 22,000 feet; 444th Group, 24,000 feet; 462nd Group, 23,000 feet; 468th Group, 21,000 feet. Aiming point was the northeast corner of the third hangar from the north end of hangar line.

4. EXECUTION OF THE MISSION (See Annexes A and K):

a. Take-off (See Annex A, Part I):

(1) Times of take off were not specified in the Field Order, but were left to the discretion of the Group Commanders. A departure time from wing assembly point was specified.

(2) Take-off was accomplished as follows:

<u>Group</u>	<u>A/C scheduled for take-off</u>	<u>A/C Airborne</u>	<u>First A/C off</u>	<u>Last A/C off</u>
40th	23	22	2115Z	2208Z
444th	22	22	2058Z	2209Z
462nd	29	27	2121Z	2232Z
468th	<u>21</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>2112Z</u>	<u>2215Z</u>
Total	95	92	2058Z	2232Z

(3) Visibility at bases on take-off was from 3/4 to 2 miles in haze and ground fog. Winds were calm.

b. Route Out (See Annex A, Parts II and III):

(1) The route out was from base to Peishiyi Airfield to individual group assembly points to a common wing assembly point to the initial point at 25°11'N - 119°33'E to the target.

(2) There were 14 deviations from the planned route to the primary target. Of these, 2 aircraft bombed the secondary target, 1 of which landed at Kanshow on return, 5 bombed the last resort target, 2 bombed targets of opportunity, 3 jettisoned bombs and returned early, and 1 aircraft crashed in the vicinity of Hsinching one hour after take-off. The first formation of the 462nd Group flew directly from the Group assembly point to the initial point.

c. Primary Target:

(1) Of the 92 aircraft airborne, 78 were over the primary target with their bomb load. Of these, 77 are credited with bombing the target. A total of 1459 general-purpose bombs (396.78 short tons), 459 incendiary bombs (110.84 short tons), and 210 fragmentation clusters (45.19 short tons) was dropped on the target. The first formation over target at 0157Z was composed of 12 aircraft, one of which had released its bombs prior to reaching the target. This formation was followed by the 4 planes at 0159Z, 6 planes at 0201Z, 11 planes at 0204Z, 10 planes at 0205Z, 1 plane at 0217Z, 12 planes at 0224Z (11 planes bombing), 6 planes at 0224Z, 8 planes at 0224Z, and 9 planes at 0246Z.



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(2) Bombing altitudes ranged from 21,900 to 24,000 feet for the lead aircrafts of the formations bombing. Headings for the lead aircrafts varied from 110 degrees to 270 degrees magnetic.

(3) Weather over the target was clear with 5/10 stratocumulus observed in the vicinity but not affecting the bomb run. Visibility was unrestricted.

d. Secondary Target: Two aircraft bombed secondary targets as follows: aircraft 475 (462nd) at 0222Z visually from 24,300 feet on a heading of 165 degrees magnetic at an indicated air speed of 195 miles per hour; and aircraft 531 (462nd) at 0318Z visually from 23,000 feet on a heading of 272 degrees magnetic at an indicated air speed of 185 miles per hour. Fifty 500-pound general-purpose bombs were dropped.

e. Last Resort Target: Five aircraft hit the target of last resort between 0035Z and 0228Z. All bombing was accomplished visually at altitudes varying from 13,000 to 20,500 feet. Headings of attacks varied from 10 degrees to 285 degrees magnetic and indicated air speeds from 165 to 200 miles per hour. A total of 107 M-64 500-pound general-purpose and 30 M-26 fragmentation clusters were dropped.

f. Targets of Opportunity:

(1) Leiyang (26°29'N - 112°43'E): Aircraft 230 (462nd) bombed a warehouse area in this town visually at 0132Z from 11,000 feet on a heading of 264 degrees magnetic at an indicated airspeed of 170 miles per hour. Bombs dropped totalled 22 M-64.

(2) Foochow (26°05'N - 119°15'E): Aircraft 277 (444th) bombed a bridge in this city visually at 0314Z from 19,000 feet on a heading of 291 degrees magnetic at an indicated airspeed of 190 miles per hour. Bomb load dropped was 18 M-64 general-purpose and 11 M-76 incendiary bombs.

g. Route Back:

(1) Return route was from the target to 24°39'N - 118°39'E to Peishiyi Airfield to the base area.

(2) Scattered clouds covered the base area on return. Visibility ranged from 3/4 of a mile in dust and haze at Pengshan to 5 miles at Kwangan. Winds varied from calm to 8 miles.

5. ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT (See Annex B):

a. Generally meager and inaccurate black and some white heavy antiaircraft fire was encountered by all aircraft over the area from 0200Z to 0255Z. Altitudes varied from 21,000 to 25,200 feet. Unlimited ceiling and visibility weather conditions prevailed. Reports of fire encountered indicate that either or possibly both Predicted Concentration or Continuously Pointed types of fire were used. No damage was suffered by any of our aircraft.

b. Heavy antiaircraft was also encountered at the following locations: Fengyang (26°56'N - 112°28'E) and Lingling (26°12'N - 111°33'E).

c. On the basis of early warning intercepts by RCM observers it is believed that the enemy had one hour's warning of the attack.



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6. ENEMY AIR OPPOSITION (See Annex C): There was no enemy fighter opposition on this mission. A total of 11 enemy aircraft were sighted in the area as follows: 3 in the primary target area, 1 at the last resort target, and 7 within 30 miles of the China coast. One B-29 reported being followed by a single engine fighter from the China coast to Hengyang. Fighters encountered were generally at such distances as to make identification difficult.

7. WEATHER (See Annex D):

a. The weather was excellent for formation flying and high altitude bombing.

b. Metro winds were generally rated as fair.

8. COMMUNICATIONS (See Annex E):

a. Communications for this mission were rated excellent. Good briefing, adherence to tactical doctrine, and good weather conditions were factors contributing to the excellency of communications.

b. One practice message was sent to the aircraft in flight.

c. Thirteen malfunctions of equipment were reported in addition to minor malfunctions repaired in flight.

d. Air-to-air homing was used successfully by all Groups. Lead aircraft transmitted information on ETA and altitude at rendezvous in addition to homing signals.

e. Of the four D/F bearings given, 3 were classed as type II and 1 as type I bearings.

9. RADAR (See Annex F):

a. The prime function of the radar equipment on this mission was as an aid to navigation and bombing. All bombing was visual. Some excellent radar scope photographs were obtained of coastal features in the target area.

b. Radar serviceability was slightly above average.

10. RCM (See Annex G):

a. Seven RCM equipped aircraft took part in this mission. Observers searched for enemy early warning and gun-laying equipment.

b. Early warning intercepts indicated that stations were located in the following areas: Hengyang, Siangsiang, Siangtan, Nanchang, Amoy, and possibly in the Pescadores Island area.

c. As on previous missions to Formosa a number of "CHI" intercepts were made in the China coast and Formosa area.

d. While in the target area an intercept was made, the characteristics of which suggested radar fire control equipment. There was no flak coincident with this intercept.



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e. One aircraft while in the Changsha area reported possible jamming of the "buzzer" type. Ground monitor station and aircraft radio operators again reported Kana Code interference on the 8 megacycle band. Radio operators believed the signal to be maximum between 2 and 3 hours out. Interference was not strong.

11. CENTRAL STATION FIRE CONTROL AND GUNNERY (See Annex H):

a. No enemy air opposition was encountered on this mission, no ammunition, therefore, being expended in combat. Of the 460 turrets on the mission there were 9 malfunctions of fire-control equipment. Six machine gun malfunctions occurred in the 920 machine guns used.

b. A total of 8760 rounds of ammunition was expended in test firing.

12. CAMERAS AND PHOTOGRAPHS (See Annex I):

a. Five K-17 cameras and one K-22 camera with a 40-inch scope attachment were carried on this mission in addition to 69 cameras of the K-18, K-20 and K-22 types. Usable negatives obtained totaled 601. Two cameras failed to photograph for mechanical reasons and 10 for other reasons.

13. LOSSES AND DAMAGE (See Annexes J and M):

a. Known Battle Losses and Battle Damage: None.

b. Known Operational Losses and Damage: One aircraft was lost shortly after take-off when an engine cut out. As the pilot pulled up to go around again after refusing his first landing attempt the propeller on another engine ran away. Bombs were jettisoned from a low altitude and damage to the control cables was sustained as a result of the explosion. The crew bailed out but 4 crew members were lost in unsuccessful bail out attempts. Operational damage was sustained by one other plane when a cylinder blew off damaging the engine and nacelle.

c. Missing Aircraft: None.

14. FUNCTIONING OF EQUIPMENT (See Annexes K and M):

a. Of the 92 aircraft airborne, 11 failed to bomb the primary target for mechanical reasons and 4 because of personnel error.

b. There were 128 engineering malfunctions of equipment in flight (in addition to the 12 malfunctions related to aircraft failure to bomb the primary target) as follows: power plant and accessory section - 8; propellers and governors - 19 (governor-10); oil system - 27 (oil leaks-21); fuel system - 10 (carburetor-5); electrical system - 20 (generators - 10); instruments - 33 (cylinder head temperature gage - 6, tachometer - 5, flux gate compass -5, flight indicator - 5); miscellaneous - 11 (vacuum system - 3).

c. Over-all averages in fuel consumption were: average - 5130 gallons; maximum - 5650 gallons; minimum - 4650 gallons (for an average of 10 hours and 35 minutes of flight). Averages by Groups were: 40th - 5110 (maximum - 5400; minimum - 4700); 444th - 5290 (maximum - 5650; minimum - 4875) 462nd - 5140 (maximum - 5500; minimum - 4730) 468th - 4980 (maximum - 5160; minimum - 4650).



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15. TARGET DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (See Annex L):

a. Damage assessment was accomplished from excellent post-strike photos obtained by the 40th Group on 18 January 1945.

b. Previous raids had caused damage to 331,700 square feet or 54 per cent of the total building area of 610,200 square feet. This attack resulted in additional damage to 99,000 square feet. The total visible damage to the airdrome building area as a result of all attacks shows 430,700 square feet or 70 per cent damage. Of this amount of damage 331,200 square feet or 54 per cent is structural and 99,000 square feet or 16 per cent is superficial.

c. Each of the six hangars shows superficial damage as well as structural damage or collapse. Five large warehouses show structural damage as well as the power plant, radio building, and nine of the ten large barracks buildings. Service aprons and two of the five runways are severely cratered.

FOR THE DEPUTY COMMANDER:

  
IEO I. HERMAN,  
Colonel, Air Corps,  
Acting Adjutant General.



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ANNEX

A

EXECUTION OF THE MISSION

- I - Information on Take-offs
- II - Details of Routes
- III - Track and Vertical Flight Path \*
- IV - Bombing Data \*\*
- V - Bomb Loading
- VI - Disposition of Bombs
- VII - Formations Flown
- VIII - Navigation Report \*

\* Prepared by Staff Navigator

\*\* Prepared by Staff Bombardier

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By *sw* NARA Date *11/17/05*



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I - INFORMATION ON TAKE-OFFS

Mission No. 29

17 January 1945

Group	First A/C Off	Last A/C Off	Elapsed Time	No. of A/C Taking Off	Average Take-off Interval
40th	162115Z	162208Z	53 min.	22	151 sec.
44th	162058Z	162209Z	71 min.	22	203 sec.
462nd	162121Z	162232Z	71 min.	27	164 sec.
468th	162112Z	162158Z	46 min.	20-a	145 sec.
Over-all	162058Z	162232Z	94 min.	91	--

a - Plus A/C 494 which was a late take-off at 162215Z.

Note: Take-offs were on D-day minus 1, Z time.

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II - DETAILS OF ROUTES

Mission No. 29

17 January 1945

A. Planned Routes

Base	40th Hsinching	444th Kwanghan	462nd Kiunglai	468th Pengshan
First Check Point	Peishiyi Airfield (29°30'N - 106°22'E)			
Assembly Point No. 1	24°39'N- 118°39'E	25°08'N- 119°08'E	25°16'N- 118°51'E	25°28'N- 119°17'E
Assembly Point No. 2	Tip of land at 24°53'N - 118°58'E			
Initial Point	Sankiaojih Island (25°11'N - 119°33'E)			
Target	Shinchiku Airdrome (24°49'N - 120°56'E)			
First Return Check Point	24° 39'N - 118° 39'E			
Second Return Check Point	Peishiyi Airfield (29°30'N - 106°22'E)			
Base	Hsinching	Kwanghan	Kiunglai	Pengshan

B. Deviations from Planned Routes

1. Aircraft Bombing Assigned Targets:

	40th	444th	462nd	468th	Total
Bombed S.T.	-	-	2	-	2
Bombed LRT	1	-	3	1	5
	1	0	5	1	7

2. Aircraft Bombing Targets of Opportunity:

- a. A/C 277 (444th) bombed a bridge at Foochow, China.
- b. A/C 230 (462nd) bombed a warehouse at Leiyang, China (26°29'N - 112°43'E).

3. Aircraft Jettisoning Bombs:

- a. A/C 505 (40th) jettisoned bombs at 28°45'N - 108°52'E and returned directly to Hsinching.
- b. A/C 407 (40th) jettisoned bombs at 30°25'N - 104°02'E and returned to Hsinching.
- c. A/C 227 (468th) returned early to base after only 36 minutes of flight due to a broken cylinder. Bombs were jettisoned near home base.

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4. Aircraft Landing at other than Home Base:

- a. A/C 475 (462nd) landed at Kanchow after bombing Secondary Target at Amoy.

5. Other Deviations:

- a. A/C 494 (468th) crashed six miles east of Hsinching approximately one hour after take-off.
- b. The first formation of the 462nd Group proceeded directly from the Group assembly point to the initial point.


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XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

CONSOLIDATED  
SPECIALIST MISSION REPORT  
OF STAFF BOMBING OFFICER

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Auth: CG XX BC  
Date: 22 Jan 45  
Initials: W. A. G.

Date Prepared: 22 January 1945

Date of Mission: 17 Jan 1945  
Mission Number 29

1. Weather over the target for this Mission was CAVU, and excellent bombing results were obtained. Flak was meagre and fighter opposition was nil.

2. Nothing unusual occurred on the bombing runs with two exceptions. One formation of the 40th Group was slightly south of the target in approach and elected to fly past the target and bomb on a reciprocal heading. This worked satisfactorily in this case due to meagre flak and fighter opposition. Airplane number 719 of the 468th Group had a bomb arming in the rear bomb bay after bomb bay doors were open and was forced to jettison bombs approximately 10,000 feet short of the target.

3. Malfunctions of bombing equipment were as follows:

a. 40th Group - None.

b. 444th Group:

(1) #731 - An all electrical ship, jettisoned 6 bombs from rear bomb bay, right side racks failed to release in train or salvo. Bombardier resorted to tripping releases with screw-driver. Cause - undetermined.

c. 462nd Group:

(1) #590 - Four bombs hung in rear bomb bay. Cannon plug had not been inserted.

(2) #393 - Bombs failed to release electrically but were salvoed. Cause - undetermined.

(3) #711 - Two bombs failed to release and check revealed faulty releases.

(4) #461 - Five stations in front and five in rear bomb bay failed. Cause - undetermined.

(5) #873 - Seven stations failed electrically. Salvoed OK. Cause - undetermined.

(6) #230 - Five bombs hung up in right front bomb bay. Jettisoned later. Cause - undetermined.

d. 468th Group:

(1) #275 - Six bombs on right side of rear bay would not release. Malfunction of pneumatic bomb bay doors is believed to have caused this.

(2) #272 - Equipped with pneumatic bomb bay doors, one bomb bay door would not stay closed due to lack of pressure.

(3) #276 - Head trouble keeping rear bomb bay doors closed. This ship is also equipped with pneumatic type doors.

(4) #208 - Four bombs failed to release electrically so were salvoed. Cause - undetermined.

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Mission No. 29

V - BOMB LOAD

17 JANUARY 1953

No Bombs			40th				444th			462nd			468th			Total				Lbs per	Tons per
GP	Inc	Frag	A/C	G.P.	Inc	Frag	A/C	G.P.	Inc	A/C	G.P.	Inc	A/C	G.P.	Inc	A/C	G.P.	Inc	Frag	A/C **	A/C **
		30	11			330										11			330	12912	6.45
18	10		10	180	100					5	90	50	15	270	150					14620	7.31
16	10		1	16	10								1	16	10					13532	6.76
17	11						2	34	22				2	34	22					14559	7.27
18	11						15	270	165				15	270	165					15103	7.55
15	15						1	15	15				1	15	15					15403	7.70
28							2	56					1	28		3	84			15229	7.61
20	9						1	20	9				1	20	9					15225	7.61
21	6									1	21	6	1	21	6					14319	7.15
27							1	27		17	459		13	351		31	837			14685	7.34
26										1	26		1	26		1	26			14141	7.07
25										2	50		2	50		2	50			13597	6.80
10	17									1	10	17	1	10	17					13650	6.82
13	14									1	13	14	1	13	14					13832	6.91
20	7									1	20	7	1	20	7					14259	7.12
23	2									1	23	2	1	23	2					13475	6.73
19	8									1	19	8	1	19	8					14198	7.09
20	8												1	20	8	1	20	8		14742	7.37
17	10												1	17	10	1	17	10		14076	7.03
	27									1		27	1		27					13041	6.52
Total			22	196	110	330	22	422	211	27	641	81	21	506	68	92	1765	470	330	14446	7.22

A-V-1

SECRET

\* Based on aircraft airborne. "GP" indicates a 500-pound general purpose (TNT or Amatol filled) bomb, fused .1 second nose and .01 second tail. "Inc" indicates M-76 incendiary bomb, fused instantaneous nose and non-delay tail. "Frag" indicates M-26 fragmentation bomb fused 14 second delay.  
 \*\* Weights of bomb loads are calculated on actual weight of bombs: G.P. - 548.9#. Inc. - 483.0#. Frag. - 430.4#.

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 Authority: *W.D. Wood*  
 By: *W.D. Wood*  
 NARA Date: 11/17/85



VI - DISPOSITION OF BOMBS

Mission No. 29

17 January 1945

	40th			444th			462nd			468th			Total			Pounds Dropped			Tons Dropped										
	A/C	GP	IncFrag	A/C	GP	IncFrag	A/C	GP	IncFrag	A/C	GP	IncFrag	A/C	GP	IncFrag	G.P.	Inc.	Frag	G.P.	Inc.	Frag								
A/C bombing all tgts and bombs dropped	19	196	110	240	22	416	211	-	27	626	81	-	18	419	68	-	86	1657	470	240	901	242	227	010	103	296	450.62	113.50	51.64
A/C over PT and bomb load carried	18	196	110	210	22	422	211	-	21	479	81	-	17	398	68	-	78	1495	470	210	813	130	227	010	90	384	406.56	113.50	45.19
A/C bombing PT and bombs dropped	18	196	110	210	21	398	200	-	21	473	81	-	17	392	68	-	77	1459	459	210	793	550	221	697	90	384	396.78	110.84	45.19
A/C bombing S.T. and bombs dropped	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2a	50	-	-	-	-	-	-	2a	50	-	-	27	195	-	-	-	-	13.59	-	-
A/C bombing LRT and bombs dropped	1	-	-	30	-	-	-	-	3	81	-	-	1	27	-	-	5	108	-	30	58	741	-	12	912	29.37	-	6.45	
A/C bombing T.O. and bombs dropped	-	-	-	1b	18	11	-	-	1	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	40	11	-	21	756	53	13	-	10.88	2.66	-	
A/C jettisoning bombs	3d	-	-	90	-	6	-	-	-	5d	-	-	3d	81d	-	-	6	92	-	90	500	38	-	38	736	25.01	-	19.36	
A/C returning bombs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10e	-	-	-	6e	-	-	-	16	-	-	47	02	-	-	-	4.35	-	-	
<b>Total</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>196</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>330</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>422</b>	<b>211</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>641</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>506</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>1765</b>	<b>470</b>	<b>330</b>	<b>959</b>	<b>982</b>	<b>227</b>	<b>010</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>032</b>	<b>479.98</b>	<b>113.50</b>	<b>71.00</b>

SECRET  
A-VI-1

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- a - A/C 502 and 475 bombed Amoy.
- b - A/C 277 bombed Foochow.
- c - A/C 230 bombed Leiyang, China.
- d - Bombs jettisoned by A/C - 420, 505, 407 (40th); A/C 731 (444th); A/C 230 (462nd); A/C 494 (468th). A/C 719 (468th) jettisoned its bombs 10 seconds early in the primary target area.
- e - Bombs brought back by A/C 590, 475 and 711 (462nd); A/C 275 (468th).







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Third

X 732

X 270

X 228

X 507

X 376

X 446

No. of aircraft - 6  
No. releasing - 6  
Time of release - 0201Z  
Method - visual  
Altitude - 24,000 ft.

Axis of attack - 130°  
IAS - 185 mph  
Bomb Load - 114 M-64, 59 M-76  
Bombs dropped - 114 M-64, 59 M-76

Fourth

W 579

W 859 W 404

W 739 W 846

W 541 W 740

W 798

W 620

W 374

W 729

No. of aircraft - 11  
No. releasing - 11  
Time of release - 0204Z  
Method - visual  
Altitude - 22,500 ft.

Axis of attack - 270°  
IAS - 195 mph  
Bomb load - 196 M-64, 110 M-76  
Bombs dropped - 196 M-64, 110 M-76

Fifth

Y 454

Y 800

Y 476

Y 459

Y 590\*

Y 473

Y 393

Y 503

Y 838

Y 506

No. of aircraft - 10  
No. releasing - 10  
Time of release - 0205Z  
Method - visual  
Altitude - 23,000 ft.

Axis of attack - 154°  
IAS - 187 mph  
Bomb load - 223 M-64, 44 M-76  
Bombs dropped - 219 M-64, 44 M-76

\* A/C 590 dropped 21 M-64 on PT and brought 4 back

Sixth

Y 786

Time of release - 0217Z  
Method - visual  
Altitude - 23,000 ft.  
Axis of attack - 265°

IAS - 195 mph  
Bomb load - 27 M-76  
Bombs dropped - 27 M-76

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S E C R E T

Seventh

X 580  
X 538 X 411  
X 731\* X 378 X 524  
X 268 X 472 X 485 X 720 X 202 X 277\*\*

No. of aircraft - 12 Axis of attack - 100°  
No. releasing - 11 IAS - 185 mph  
Time of release - 0224Z Bomb load - 237 M-64, 108 M-76  
Method - visual Bombs dropped - 212 M-64, 97 M-76  
Altitude - 24,000 ft.

\* Dropped 21 M-64 on PT and jettisoned 6 M-64  
\*\* Over PT but did not release -- later bombed a bridge at Foochow.

Eighth

Z 542  
Z 691 Z 486  
Z 464  
Z 500 Z 275\*

No. of aircraft - 6 Axis of attack - 115°  
No. releasing - 6 IAS - 190 mph  
Time of release - 0224Z Bomb load - 134 M-64, 30 M-76  
Method - visual Bombs dropped - 128 M-64, 30 M-76  
Altitude - 21,900 ft.

\* A/C 275 dropped 21 M-64 on PT and brought back 6.

Ninth

W 455  
W 233 W 795 W 396  
W 587 W 274 W 522  
Y 474

No. of aircraft - 8 Axis of attack - 128°  
No. releasing - 8 IAS - 195 mph  
Time of release - 0224Z Bomb load - 210 M-26, 25 M-64  
Method - visual Bombs dropped - 210 M-26, 25 M-64  
Altitude - 22,000 ft.

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S E C R E T

Tenth

Y 711\*

Y 480

Y 801

Y 728

Y 232

Y 457

Y 521

Y 463

Y 484

No. of aircraft - 9  
No. releasing - 9  
Time of release - 0246Z  
Method - visual  
Altitude - 23,000 ft.

Axis of attack - 112°  
IAS - 190 mph  
Bomb load - 231 M-64, 10 M-76  
Bombs dropped - 229 M-64, 10 M-76

\* A/C 711 dropped 25 M-64 on PT and brought back 2.

b - Aircraft over S.T.

(1) Over Amoy

Y 475\*

Time of release - 0222Z  
Method - visual  
Altitude - 24,300 ft.  
Axis of attack - 165°

IAS - 195 mph  
Bomb load - 27 M-64  
Bombs dropped - 23 M-64

\* A/C 475 dropped 23 M-64 on ST and brought back 4.

(2) Over Amoy

Y 531

Time of release - 0318Z  
Method - visual  
Altitude - 23,000 ft.  
Axis of attack - 272°

IAS - 185 mph  
Bomb load - 27 M-64  
Bombs dropped - 27 M-64

c - Aircraft over LRT (Hengyang)

	<u>A/C</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Method</u>	<u>Altitude</u>	<u>Heading</u>	<u>IAS</u>	<u>Bomb Load</u>	<u>Bombs dropped</u>
(1)	Y 502	0035Z	visual	15,000'	280°	200	27 M-64	27 M-64
(2)	Z 276	0040Z	visual	20,500'	55°	195	27 M-64	27 M-64
(3)	Y 873	0049Z	visual	15,000'	283°	181	27 M-64	27 M-64
(4)	Y 461	0055Z	visual	19,700'	290°	195	27 M-64	27 M-64
(5)	W 757	0228Z	visual	13,000'	10°	165	30 M-26	30 M-26

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d - Aircraft over Opportunity Targets

<u>A/C</u>	<u>Target</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Method</u>	<u>Altitude</u>	<u>Heading</u>	<u>IAS</u>	<u>Bomb Load</u>	<u>Bombs Dropped</u>
(1) Y 230	Leiyang	0132Z	visual	11,000'	264°	170	27 M-64	22 M-64*
(2) X 277	Foochow	0314Z	visual	19,000'	291°	190	18 M-64 11 M-76	18 M-64 11 M-76

\* Remaining 5 M-64 bombs jettisoned

A-VII-5

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XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

SECRET  
Auth: CG XX BC  
Initials: JW  
Date: 23 Jan 1945

CONSOLIDATED  
SPECIALIST MISSION REPORT  
STAFF NAVIGATION OFFICER

Date Prepared: 22 January 1945

Field Order Number 29  
Date of Mission: 17 Jan 45

1. Navigation accomplished on this mission was excellent. Difficulties encountered near the China coast and target areas on missions #26 and #28 were overcome with the aid of good weather. Complaints that the assembly points were too close together were again registered, but as in missions #26 and #28 the tactical plan involving a possible choice of one of several targets made this necessary. It is recommended that Group Staff Navigators consider the possible use of other than a circular pattern (e. g. elliptical or linear) for forming at the AP's against high winds.

a. Average navigation times out and back and group assembly times follow:

	<u>NAV TIME OUT</u>	<u>NAV TIME BACK</u>	<u>ASSEMBLY TIME</u>
40th	4h 33m	5h 39m	23m
444th	4h 36m	5h 39m	24m
462nd	4h 28m	5h 52m	28m
468th	4h 29m	5h 42m	21m

b. The following navigational aid work was reported.

	<u>CEL LOP'S</u>	<u>CEL FIXES</u>	<u>RADIO FIXES</u>	<u>QDM'S</u>
40th	47	4	14	0
444th	45	3	2	0
462nd *	28	0	36	4
468th	54	6	2	0

\* Deficient in celestial as compared with the other Groups.

c. Forecast winds were reported to be less accurate than usual particularly on the route to the target. Computed winds are as follows:

	<u>ONE HALF OUT</u>	<u>TARGET AREA</u>	<u>ONE HALF BACK</u>
40th	15,000' 318°31K	22,000' 259°68K	15,000' 289°38K
444th	15,000' 304°42K	24,000' 258°65K	15,000' 308°33K
462nd	13,500' 320°25K	23,000' 260°60K	15,000' 275°36K
468th	13,500' 300°24K	21,000' 267°72K	14,500' 290°41K

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- d. Good aid was received by the navigators from their radar operators.
2. Comments by Groups:
- a. 40th Group.
    - (1) Found that lead ship's announcing time of departure over turning points very helpful.
    - (2) Discovered that Hongyang transmitted homing signals on Suichwan's frequency.
  - b. 444th Group. None.
  - c. 462nd Group. None.
  - d. 468th Group.
    - (1) Suichwan Airport is actually on the Suikiang River instead of 8 miles away as it is plotted on the chart.
    - (2) Wu Kung Mountains sectional chart reported to be very poor.

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S E C R E T

ANNEX

B

ENEMY ANTLIAIRCRAFT

\*\*\*\*\*  
\* Prepared by: \*  
\* \*  
\* Flak Officer \*  
\* \*  
\* XX Bomber Command \*  
\*\*\*\*\*

S E C R E T



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\*\*\*\*\*  
SECRET  
By Auth of the C.G.  
XX Bomber Command  
25 Jan 45  
Date Initials  
\*\*\*\*\*

HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
Intelligence Section  
APO 493

\*\*\*\*\*  
NOTICE  
There will be no regular issue of Enemy Antiaircraft  
Defense Bulletins until further notice.  
\*\*\*\*\*

PRELIMINARY REPORT

ANTI-AIRCRAFT OPPOSITION

MISSION NUMBER 29, (DAYLIGHT), 17 JANUARY 1945

Primary Target - SHINCHIKU, Secondary Target - AMOY  
Target of Last Resort - HENGYANG Town

A. ANTI-AIRCRAFT OPPOSITION ENCOUNTERED

1. SHINCHIKU (24°48'N - 120°57'E)

Generally meager and inaccurate black and some white heavy anti-aircraft fire was encountered by all aircraft over the area from 0200Z to 0255Z at altitudes varying from 21,000 to 25,200 feet under CAVU conditions. The following table shows aircraft over the area in relation to time and heavy AA fire encountered:

Formation	Number of A/C	Bomb Release Time	Time Encountered	Altitude	Fire Encountered	Feet Undercast	Heading
1	12	0157Z	0203-05Z	21,000	Meager-Inaccurate	CAVU	110°
2	4	0159Z	0200Z	24-25,200	Meager-Inaccurate	CAVU	145°
3	6	0201Z	0202Z	24-25,000	Meager-Inaccurate	CAVU	130°
4	11	0204Z	0200-06Z	21-23,000	Meager - Moderate Inacc - Accurate	CAVU	270°
5*	10	0205Z	0205-07Z	24-24,300	Meager-Inaccurate	CAVU	154°
6	1	0217Z	0217Z	23,000	Meager-Inaccurate	CAVU	265°
7	8	0224Z	0222-25Z	22-22,200	Meager - Moderate Inaccu - Accurate	CAVU	128°
8	12	0224Z	0223Z	25,200	Meager-Inaccurate	CAVU	100°
9	6	0225Z	0227-30Z	21,000	Meager-Inaccurate	CAVU	115°
10**	9	0246Z	0246-55Z	24-24,200	Meager-Inaccurate	CAVU	112°

\* Reported as directed against Formation #4.  
\*\* Automatic Weapons fire also reported as bursting 6-10,000 feet below the formation.

Following are reports of accuracy, intensity, and deviations. The numbers indicate aircraft reporting in the affirmative while percentages are determined from the total number of reports in one direction as above, level, or below:

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Reports of Accuracy

Struck . . . . . 0 ( 0 percent)  
 Rocked . . . . . 0 ( 0 percent)  
 Within 150' . . . . 5 ( 6 percent)  
 Outside 150' . . . 74 (94 percent)

Reports of Intensity

Intense . . . . . 0 ( 0 percent)  
 Moderate . . . . . 4 ( 5 percent)  
 Meager . . . . . 75 (95 percent)

Reports of Deviations

Above . . . 3 ( 3 percent) Ahead . . 15 (21 percent) Left . . . 46 (66 percent)  
 Level . . 41 (42 percent) Abreast . 13 (18 percent) In Line. . . 4 ( 5 percent)  
 Below . . 53 (54 percent) Behind . 45 (61 percent) Right. . . 20 (29 percent)

From reports of fire encountered it appears that the enemy was using either, or possibly both, Predicted Concentration or Continuously Pointed types. The number of burst observed at any one instant varied from 1 to 12 while the total reported for each encounter was from 3 to 20. No enemy aircraft were reported on the same course and altitude.

This area is known to be defended by 14 heavy AA guns from cover up to 17 January 1945. The new 3 or 4 possible 4 gun site was observed firing by Formations numbered 1, 5, 9 and 10 and was identified on strike photos as located approximately 2 miles northwest of the hangar area at the airdrome.

2. AMOY (24°28'N - 118°08'E)

One aircraft bombed this area at 0318Z from 23,000 feet on a heading of 272° under CAVU conditions, but no AA opposition was encountered.

3. HENGYANG (26°56'N - 112°28'E)

Five lone aircraft bombed this area from 0035Z to 0228Z from 11,700 to 20,500 feet under CAVU and haze conditions, but only 2 aircraft encountered fire as follows:

Formation	Number of A/C	Bomb Release Time	Time Encountered	Heavy AA Fire Encountered	Altitude in feet	Undercast	Heading
1	1	0035Z	-----	None	15,000	CAVU-Haze	280°
2	1	0040Z	-----	None	20,500	CAVU-Haze	055°
3	1	0049Z	0049Z	Meager-Inaccurate	15,000	CAVU-Haze	283°
4	1	0055Z	-----	None	11,700	CAVU-Haze	290°
5	1	0228Z	0228:30- 0229Z	Meager-Inaccurate	13,000	CAVU-Haze	010°

From 3 to 4 black bursts were observed at one instant while the total observed for each encounter varied from 4 to 11. Continuously Pointed fire is believed to have been used against formation #5 at 0228Z while the type could not be determined for formation #3 at 0049Z as only four bursts were observed.

Deviations were generally level, behind, and to the left or right. No enemy aircraft were reported on the same course and altitude.



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4. LINGLING AIRFIELD (26°12'N - 111°33'E)

Meager and inaccurate black heavy antiaircraft fire was encountered by one aircraft at 0010Z at 20,500 feet under CAVU conditions. The total number of bursts observed was 8 with deviations of below, behind and to the left and right, at approximately 500' from the aircraft. No enemy aircraft were reported on the same course and altitude.

B. HIGH-ALTITUDE AND BARRAGE BALLOONS AND GROUND-TO-AIR ROCKETS

None reported.

C. SMOKESCREENS

None observed.

D. DAMAGE FROM HEAVY ANTTIAIRCRAFT FIRE

None.

E. WARNING NETS

Based on early warning radar intercepts by R.C.M. Observers from 110°E to the target, it is probable that the enemy had one hour warning of the attack. No sightings of enemy aircraft were reported prior to 0157Z (the first bombs away time at SHINCHIKU), however, and no fighter attacks were made against any of our aircraft at any time, although AA opposition was encountered as usual.

*Frank L. Scott, Jr.*  
FRANK L. SCOTT, JR.,  
Colonel, Air Corps,  
Chef, Intelligence Section.

B-I-B

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By *sw* NARA Date *11/17/05*







S E C R E T

I. JAPANESE FIGHTER TACTICS - MISSION NO. 29

TARGET: Shinchiku Air Field, Formosa.

TIME: Day Mission.

DATE: 17 January 1945.

Our aircraft met no enemy fighter opposition. Only 11 enemy aircraft were sighted, 3 in the primary target area, 1 at the last resort target and 7 within 50 miles of the China coast. One B-29 reported being followed by a S/E fighter from the China coast to Hengyang. Most of the enemy aircraft did not approach close enough to our formations to be accurately identified. Details of sightings are given in the following table.

<u>Type Enemy Aircraft</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Altitude</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Distance</u>
1 Unidentified	Formosa	24,000	-	Out of gun range
2 Single-engine	Formosa	24,000	-	Out of gun range
1 S/E fighter	Hengyang (IRT)	18,000	0041Z	Several miles
1 S/E fighter	China coast to Hengyang	-	-	-
1 BETTY	30 miles inland from China coast	10,000	-	-
4 Unidentified	24°53'N - 118°58'E	22,000	0202Z	2 miles
1 T/E aircraft	24°53'N - 118°58'E	22,000	0111Z	10 miles

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S E C R E T

ANNEX

D

WEATHER INFORMATION

- I - Weather Information
- II - Chart - Weather as Forecast and as Encountered
- III - Synoptic Map

\* \* \* \* \*  
\* Prepared by: \*  
\* \* \* \* \*  
\* Weather Section \*  
\* \* \* \* \*  
\* XX Bomber Command \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

S E C R E T



SECRET

I - WEATHER INFORMATION

Mission No. 29

17 January 1945

	As Forecast	As Encountered
Base at Take-off	Thin broken altostratus at 15,000'. Visibility 1 mile in haze and light ground fog. Altimeter setting 30.42	<u>HSINCHING</u> : Clear. Visibility 3/4 mile in ground fog. Wind calm. <u>KWANGHAN</u> : Clear. Visibility 1 mile in haze and ground fog. Wind calm. <u>KIUNGLAI</u> : Clear. Visibility 2 miles in haze and ground fog. Wind calm. <u>PENGSHAN</u> : Clear. Visibility 1 mile in ground fog. Wind calm.
Route Out	<u>BASE TO CHINA COAST</u> : Overcast altocumulus, top 11000' over mountain area becoming nil at 109°E. Remainder of route to coast clear except for low stratus and fog in valleys. Haze to 12000' reducing visibility to 15 miles. <u>OVER STRAIT</u> : Broken stratus, top 6000' at coastline becoming overcast enroute to northern target but becoming nil at Formosa coast enroute to southern targets.	1/10 cirrus at 25000' in vicinity of 109°E. Occasional low thin scattered stratus and light ground fog in mountains. Haze restricted visibility to 7 miles from base to China coast. Otherwise conditions were clear.
Target Area	<u>NORTH</u> : 7/10 stratocumulus, top 7,000'. Visibility 30 miles. <u>CENTRAL</u> : Clear. Visibility 30 miles. <u>SOUTH</u> : Clear. Visibility 30 miles. <u>TARGET PRESSURES</u> : <u>NORTH</u> : 30.39 inches <u>CENTRAL</u> : 30.36 inches <u>SOUTH</u> : 30.33 inches <u>MEAN TEMPERATURES</u> : <u>SURFACE TO 22,000'</u> : 1 Deg C. <u>SURFACE TO 25,000'</u> : -1 Deg C.	<u>SHINSEIKU</u> : Clear. 5/10 stratocumulus observed in vicinity but not affecting bombing run. Visibility unrestricted. <u>HENGYANG</u> : Clear. Visibility 10 miles in haze.
Return Route	Stratus in valleys will become fair weather cumulus. Otherwise no change.	Clear. Visibility 5-7 miles in haze over Central China. Top of haze layer at 10,000'.
Bases on Return	Broken altocumulus, base 10,000' top 12,000'. Scattered cumulus at 6,500'. Visibility 3 miles in haze and dust. <u>ALTIMETER SETTING</u> : 30.30	<u>HSINCHING</u> : Clear. Visibility 4 miles in haze. Wind WSW 3. <u>KWANGHAN</u> : Scattered cumulus at 5,000' visibility 5 miles in haze. Wind calm. <u>KIUNGLAI</u> : 2/10 - 4/10 altostratus at 10,000'. Visibility 4 miles in haze. Wind ESE 5. <u>PENGSHAN</u> : 1/10 - 2/10 altocumulus at 6,000'. Visibility 3/4 mile in dust and haze. Wind calm.

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S E C R E T

A. Winds Aloft - Forecast

Altitude	Base	Halfway	Target
5,000'	130 Deg-10K		
10,000'	170 Deg-15K	360 Deg-25K	340 Deg-30K
15,000'	240 Deg-25K	270 Deg-40K	270 Deg-45K
20,000'	270 Deg-45K	270 Deg-50K	265 Deg-55K
22,000'	270 Deg-50K	270 Deg-55K	265 Deg-57K
25,000'	270 Deg-60K	265 Deg-60K	265 Deg-60K

B. Winds Aloft - Encountered

Altitude	110°	112°	114° (Out)	Target	114° (Return)
12,000'			05 Deg-16K		
13,000'	320 Deg-25K		320 Deg-22K		
14,000'					275 Deg-43K
15,000'		320 Deg-35K	318 Deg-31K		289 Deg-38K
21,000'				265 Deg-55K	
22,000'				259 Deg-68K	
25,000'				240 Deg-6K	

C. Temperatures

As Forecast

Altitude	Base	Target
5,000'	-2 Deg C.	
10,000'	-12 Deg C.	
15,000'	-5 Deg C.	-2 Deg C.
20,000'		-8 Deg C.
22,000'		-12 Deg C.
25,000'		-18 Deg C.

As Encountered

Altitude	110°	116°E	Target
13,000'	-5 Deg C.	-12 Deg C.	
21,000'			-17 Deg C
22,000'			-14 Deg C
25,000'			-22 Deg C

D-I-2


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
Authority *NND 160063*  
 By *sw* NARA Date *11/17/05*




SECRET  
 XX Bomber Command  
 WEATHER AS FORECAST



WEATHER AS ENCOUNTERED  
 ROUTE OUT



WEATHER AS ENCOUNTERED  
 ROUTE BACK






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JOINT PHOTO TECH. UNIT

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10TH PHOTO TECH UNIT



S E C R E T

ANNEX

E

COMMUNICATIONS INFORMATION

\* \* \* \* \*  
\* Prepared by: \*  
\* \* \* \* \*  
\* Communications Section \*  
\* \* \* \* \*  
\* XX Bomber Command \*  
\* \* \* \* \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
NND 740120  
By CC/MT NARS, Date OCT 21 1975

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Authority NND 760063  
By sw NARA Date 11/17/05



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.....  
: SECRET  
:Auth: CG XX BC  
:Initials: *RLH*  
: Date: 24 Jan 45  
:.....

HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

CONSOLIDATED  
SPECIALIST MISSION  
REPORT OF

XX BOMBER COMMAND COMMUNICATIONS (RADIO) OFFICER

Date Prepared: 23 January 1945      Field Order No: 29

Date of Mission: 17 January 1945

1. Communications for mission number twenty-nine (29) were excellent. Once again, the main contributing factors toward the success of communications during this mission were: good pre-mission briefing, strict adherence to the provisions of tactical doctrine and good weather conditions.

2. A comparative time study of the message handling time for the dummy message transmitted during this mission is contained in Annex Number One (1) to this report.

3. All traffic required by, and in compliance with, the tactical doctrine was excellent, with no violations being reported in group communication specialists' reports. A compilation of the number of messages handled, as required by tactical doctrine is as follows:

	<u>40th Gp</u>	<u>444th</u>	<u>462nd</u>	<u>468th</u>
a. Aborts:	3	0	0	1
b. Bombs Away:	3	4	7	3
c. Attack:	0	0	0	0
d. Convoy:	4	0	0	0
e. Position:	3	5	9	7

d. The bombs away messages listed above represented 100% of the aircraft airborne, while 87% of the aircraft were accounted for in "YYY" (position) reports.

4. A study of the readability, signal strength, and noise level of the frequencies in use, divided into two (2) hour periods is as follows; time indicated is GMT:

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a. AIRCRAFT TO GROUND STATION:

<u>Frequency</u>	<u>2100-2300</u>	<u>2300-0200</u>	<u>0100-0300</u>
2055 kcs	S3 R3 W2	S3 R3 W2	-- -- --
2807.5 kcs	S4 R4 W3	S3 R3 W4	-- -- --
2900 kcs	-- -- --	S3 R4 W2	S3 R4 W2
2955 kcs	S3 R3 W1	S4 R4 W1	-- -- --
4785 kcs	S3 R3 W2	S3 R3 W2	S2 R2 W2
4825 kcs	-- -- --	-- -- --	S2 R2 W2
8260 kcs	S5 R5 W0	S4 R4 W1	S3 R3 W2
8310 kcs	S2 R3 W3	S5 R3 W3	S3 R4 W2
8495 kcs	-- -- --	S4 R4 W1	S4 R4 W1
8545 kcs	-- -- --	-- -- --	S2 R2 W2
12215 kcs	-- -- --	-- -- --	S1 R1 W4
12285 kcs	-- -- --	-- -- --	-- -- --

<u>Frequency</u>	<u>0300-0500</u>	<u>0500-0700</u>	<u>0700-0900</u>
2055 kcs	-- -- --	-- -- --	-- -- --
2807.5 kcs	-- -- --	-- -- --	-- -- --
2900 kcs	-- -- --	-- -- --	-- -- --
2955 kcs	-- -- --	-- -- --	-- -- --
4785 kcs	S3 R2 W2	S4 R4 W2	S5 R5 W1
4825 kcs	S3 R2 W2	S5 R5 W2	S5 R5 W2
8260 kcs	S4 R4 W1	S5 R5 W0	S5 R5 W0
8310 kcs	S4 R4 W1	S5 R5 W0	S5 R5 W0
8495 kcs	S5 R4 W1	S4 R4 W2	S4 R4 W1
8545 kcs	S5 R5 W2	S5 R5 W2	S4 R5 W2
12215 kcs	S3 R3 W1	S2 R2 W2	-- -- --
12285 kcs	S4 R4 W3	-- -- --	S4 R4 W1

b. GROUND STATION TO AIRCRAFT:

<u>Frequency</u>	<u>2100-2300</u>	<u>2300-0200</u>	<u>0100-0300</u>
2055 kcs	S3 R3 W2	S3 R3 W2	-- -- --
2807.5 kcs	S3 R3 W2	S2 R2 W2	S3 R3 W2
2900 kcs	S3 R4 W3	S4 R4 W3	S4 R4 W1
2955 kcs	S4 R4 W1	-- -- --	-- -- --
4785 kcs	S4 R4 W2	S2 R2 W3	S3 R3 W2
4825 kcs	-- -- --	-- -- --	-- -- --
8260 kcs	S2 R2 W2	S2 R2 W2	S4 R4 W1
8310 kcs	S3 R4 W2	S4 R4 W2	S3 R3 W2
8495 kcs	S4 R4 W2	S4 R4 W2	S3 R3 W2
8545 kcs	-- -- --	-- -- --	S2 R2 W3
12215 kcs	-- -- --	-- -- --	S2 R2 W3
12285 kcs	-- -- --	-- -- --	S5 R5 W1

<u>Frequency</u>	<u>0300-0500</u>	<u>0500-0700</u>	<u>0700-0900</u>
2055 kcs	-- -- --	-- -- --	-- -- --
2807.5 kcs	S3 R3 W2	S3 R5 W2	S4 R4 W1
2900 kcs	S4 R4 W1	-- -- --	-- -- --
2955 kcs	-- -- --	-- -- --	-- -- --
4785 kcs	S4 R4 W2	S4 R4 W3	S5 R5 W2
4825 kcs	-- -- --	-- -- --	-- -- --
8260 kcs	S5 R5 W1	S5 R5 W1	S5 R5 W1
8310 kcs	S4 R4 W2	S5 R5 W2	S5 R5 W2
8495 kcs	S4 R4 W2	S5 R5 W2	S5 R5 W1
8545 kcs	S4 R4 W2	S5 R5 W2	S5 R5 W2
12215 kcs	S4 R4 W2	S5 R5 W2	S5 R5 W2
12285 kcs	S4 R4 W1	S5 R5 W1	S5 R5 W1



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c. A considerable increase in interference was noted throughout the entire mission period on the eight megacycle frequencies. A minor amount of interference was noted on the two and twelve megacycle frequencies. However, communications was not disrupted, as noted in a and b above.

5. The following data was compiled regarding the use of aids to air navigation; all distances are in statute miles.

a. Radio Homing Beacons:

<u>Location</u>	<u>No of a/c Reporting</u>	<u>Average Initial Contact</u>	<u>Extreme Initial Contact</u>	<u>Average Track</u>
Peishiyi (PY)	42	92	250	161°
Suichwan (NW)	44	88	200	165°
Chikiang (KA)	12	153	235	181°
Kanchow (MC)	10	50	75	---
Hsinching (CU)	46	165	300	119°
Kwanghan (LK)	5	115	130	305°
Suining (SI)	1	60	60	290°
Liangshan (LM)	1	75	75	291°
Kiunglai (OD)	4	73	200	---
Pengshan (MV)	5	35	50	360°
Loshan (IF)	1	150	150	320°

b. Radio Ranges:

<u>Location</u>	<u>No of a/c Reporting</u>	<u>Average Initial Contact</u>	<u>Extreme Initial Contact</u>	<u>Average Track</u>
Hsinching (CU)	16	146	163	350°
Kwanghan (LK)	3	128	190	314°
Pengshan (MV)	1	50	50	360°
Peishiyi (PY)	1	100	100	10°
Chikiang (KA)	1	150	150	90°

c. D/F Facilities:

<u>Station</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Type Bearing</u>			<u>Distance</u>
		<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>III</u>	
7D3 (462nd)	8310		1		100°
7D3 (462nd)	8310		1		25°
7D3 (462nd)	8310	1			100°
7D3 (462nd)	8310		1		40°

d. Air-to-air homing:

(1) 40th Group: Aircraft 396 transmitted homing signals on 1130 kcs for a period of twenty-five (25) minutes. All aircraft, except four (4), homed successfully using this means. The remainder homed visually.

(2) 444th Group:

(a) First formation: Aircraft 411 transmitted his ETA and altitude at the rendezvous point for a period of fifteen (15) minutes prior to arrival thereat and transmitted homing signals on 1280 kcs. from 0140Z to 0130Z. Nine (9) aircraft intercepted the ETA and altitude message and the homing signals. The remaining a/c homed visually.



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- (b) Second formation: A/C 732 transmitted his ETA and altitude at the rendezvous point from 0015Z to 0021Z and transmitted homing signals on 1280 kcs for a period of forty-three (43) minutes. Four aircraft intercepted these signals and used this means to effect rendezvous at an average distance of fifty (50) miles. Six other aircraft homed visually, being unable to receive the homing signals.
- (3) 462nd Group: Eight aircraft utilized air-to-air homing to effect rendezvous from distances of twenty-five (25) to seventy-four (74) miles. The remaining aircraft homed visually.
- (4) 468th Group:
- (a) First formation: A/C 425 transmitted homing signals on 1340 kcs for thirty-two minutes while over the assembly point. Eleven aircraft, representing the entire formation, used this means to effect rendezvous.
- (b) Second formation: Air-to-air homing was not used by this formation. The homing frequency was interfering with transmission on 5110 kcs, weather frequency and the formation leader was instructed to discontinue sending homing signals.
6. Malfunctions of equipment:
- (a) 40th Group: - Two (2) aircraft of this group had broken antenna lead-ins to radio compass. One (1) aircraft reported liaison receiver trouble, as it was unable to pick up transmissions.
- (b) 444th Group: - There were two reports of receiver trouble. One liaison receiver was out, and a command receiver was dead. Radio compass difficulties were encountered on two aircraft. One aircraft's radio compass had a faulty indicator, and the other had a broken sense antenna lead-in.
- (c) 462nd Group: Three antennae were broken while in flight, and one loop antenna was torn loose from the aircraft. One liaison receiver malfunctioned. Minor interphone difficulties, which were repaired in flight, were also encountered.
- (d) 468th Group: One fixed antenna and one radio compass antenna lead-in were broken. On one aircraft, both command transmitters went out.



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\*\*\*\*\*  
\* SECRET \*  
\*Auth: CG, XX BC \*  
\*Initials: K. J. \*  
\*Date: 24 Jan 45 \*  
\*\*\*\*\*

HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

ANNEX NO. 1

TO

CONSOLIDATED  
SPECIALIST MISSION  
REPORT ON

XX BOMBER COMMAND COMMUNICATIONS (RADIO) OFFICER

Date Prepared: 23 January 1945      Field Order No. 29

Date of Mission: 17 January 1945.

1. The following is a time study involving message handling time on the practice message sent on mission number twenty-nine (29).

2. The message, filed at 0255Z, was encoded at the Command Post and transmitted to the groups, ready for re-transmittal to the aircraft, being receipted for by the various groups as follows:

<u>40th Group</u>	<u>444th Group</u>	<u>462nd Group</u>	<u>468th Group</u>
0258Z	0301Z	0259Z	0259Z

a. In addition to being transmitted by all group ground stations, the message was sent out by XX Bomber Command Station, 5X5, simultaneously on frequencies 5110, 8130 and 11440 kcs at 0300Z, 0315Z, 0330Z and 0345Z.

b. A time study showing time of receipt, means by which message was received, average group time for those aircraft receiving message, total elapsed time and number of aircraft receiving message follows:

(1) 40th Group:

<u>A/C Call Sign</u>	<u>How Received</u>	<u>Time of Receipt</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
522	Intercept	0320Z	
4579	Intercept	0319Z	
5233	Intercept	0321Z	
846	Intercept	0321Z	
3404	Intercept	0321Z	
729	Intercept	0322Z	
541	Intercept	0322Z	
587	Intercept	0323Z	
396	Intercept	0324Z	
795	Intercept	0315Z	
4620	Intercept	0333Z	
5274	Intercept	0334Z	
798	Intercept	0337Z	
739	Intercept	0455Z	

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Authority NND 160063  
By SW NARA Date 11/17/05



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40th Group (Cont'd)

<u>A/C Call Sign</u>	<u>How Received</u>	<u>Time of Receipt</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
374	Relay	----	
359	Relay	----	
740	Relay	----	
455	Relay	----	

Time of first transmission: 0315Z  
Time of receipt by first A/C: 0315Z  
Time of receipt by last aircraft: 0455Z  
Elapsed Time: 1 hour, 30 minutes.  
Average Time: 20.3 Minutes.

(2) 444th Group

<u>A/C Call sign</u>	<u>How Received</u>	<u>Time of Receipt</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
496	Intercept	0309Z	
202	Intercept	0309Z	
432	Intercept	0314Z	
422	Intercept	0314Z	
723	Intercept	0314Z	
492	Intercept	0314Z	
376	Intercept	0314Z	
268	Intercept	0316Z	
472	Intercept	0316Z	
270	Intercept	0316Z	
507	Intercept	0316Z	
228	Intercept	0316Z	
732	Intercept	0316Z	
580	Intercept	0316Z	
411	Intercept	0316Z	
720	Intercept	0316Z	
538	Intercept	0316Z	
485	Intercept	0317Z	
265	Relay	0317Z	
378	Relay	0318Z	
277	Intercept	0331Z	
444	Not Received		Command and liaison receivers out.

Time of first transmissions: 0306Z repeated on three freqs  
Time of receipt by first A/C: 0309Z at 0314Z and 0319Z.  
Time of receipt by last A/C: 0331Z  
Elapsed Time: 25 minutes.  
Average Time: 9.7 minutes.



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(3) 462nd Group:

<u>A/C Call Sign</u>	<u>How Received</u>	<u>Time Received</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
476	Intercept	0314Z	
800	Intercept	0310Z	
503	Intercept	0350Z	
474	Intercept	0310Z	
457	Intercept	0306Z	
459	Intercept	0332Z	
230	Intercept	0310Z	
873	Intercept	0310Z	
502	Intercept	0314Z	
801	Intercept	0330Z	
484	Intercept	0301Z	
393	Relay	0449Z	
506	Relay	0445Z	
786	Intercept	0307Z	
838	Intercept	0317Z	
232	Intercept	0445Z	
454	Intercept	0446Z	
521	Intercept	0518Z	
711	Intercept	0301Z	
590	Intercept	0435Z	
463	Intercept	0304Z	
480	Intercept	0303Z	
728	Intercept	0512Z	
473	Intercept	0300Z	

Time of first transmission: 0255Z  
Time of receipt by first A./C: 0300Z  
Time of receipt by last A/C: 0449Z  
Elapsed time: 1 hour, 54 minutes.  
Average time: 37.3 minutes.

(4) 468th Group:

<u>A/C Call Sign</u>	<u>How Received</u>	<u>Time Received</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
456	Intercept	0307Z	
542	Intercept	0259Z	
276	Not Received		Receiver out.

Time of first transmission: 0259Z  
Time of receipt by first aircraft: 0307Z

Note: The above aircraft in turn relayed the message to other aircraft in their respective formations. No comparative times were submitted for the aircraft of the group other than those listed above.







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HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 495

SECRET  
Auth: CG XX BC  
Initials JS  
Date 22 Jan 45

CONSOLIDATED  
SPECIALIST MISSION  
REPORT OF

XX BOMBER COMMAND RADAR OFFICER

Date Prepared 22 January 1945 Field Orders No. 29  
Date of Mission 17 January 1945

I - Radar Information

A - Navigation and Bombing

1. Visual bombing was performed entirely on this mission. The primary target, Shinchiku Airfield, although not giving a target signal, was reported easily located by means of the coastal features and the strong signal from the city of Schinchiku. Area bombing of the target could be performed by means of radar.

2. Radar was a secondary aid to navigation.

B - Scope Photography

1. Twenty-eight (28) radar scope cameras were installed with twenty-three (23) cameras completing the mission. Eleven (11) sets of photographs were returned and eight (8) traced the bombing run.

2. The photographs received were satisfactory and provided good identification of the coastal features in the target area.

C - Serviceability

1. Malfunction of the radar systems were comparatively few. Only eight (8) systems were inoperative over the target and four (4) of these failures were due to pressurization.

2. The entire serviceability of the radar systems over the target was slightly above average.

- 1 -

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By sw NARA Date 11/17/05



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II - Radar Tables

A - Bombing Data

Total A/C Bombing - 85  
 Total A/C Bombing Visually - 85  
 Total A/C Bombing Radar - 0

B - Photographic Results

DATA	40th Gp		444th Gp		462nd Gp		468th Gp		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
No. Cameras Installed	7	-	0	-	7	-	8	-	28	-
K-35 Cameras	3	-	0	-	1	-	4	-	8	-
K-24 Cameras	4	-	6	-	6	-	4	-	20	-
No. Cameras in Abort,* Early Ret. & Miss. A/C	2	29	0	0	1	15	2	25	5	18
No. Cameras Completing Mission *	5	71	6	100	6	85	6	75	23	82
No. Cameras in Radar & Camera Malfunc. A/C #	2	40	2	33	0	0	3	50	7	30
Sets Pic. Returned #	2(a)	40	4	67	4(b)	67	2(c)	33	11	48
No. Negatives Returned	32	-	117	-	190	-	22	-	357	-
Sets Pic. Useable **	2	100	3	75	4	100	2	100	10	91
Sets Pic. Tracing Bomb Run **	1	50	2	50	4	100	1	50	8	72

\* Percentage based on cameras installed.  
 # Percentage based on cameras completing mission.  
 \*\* Percentage based on sets pics returned.  
 Pics not yet received: (a), A/C 795, 846; (b), 484; (c), 276.

C - Navigational Ranges

CHECK POINT	40th Gp		444th Gp		462nd Gp		468th Gp		Total	
	Number Reporting	Average Range	Number Reporting	Average Range	Number Reporting	Average Range	Number Reporting	Average Range	Total Number Reporting	Weighted Average Range
Mapping Range	19	44	20	41	22	44	19	37	80	42
Shinchiku (F.T.)	5	29	12	23	8	23	13	22	38	23
China Fort Shipping(SI)	6	48	14	40	9	40	13	36	42	40
Longyang (L.R.T.)	3	23	5	26	12	23	3	20	23	23
Tsochow (T.O.)	-	-	2	32	-	-	-	-	2	32
Bankiaojih Isle (I.F.)	7	32	16	29	18	22	15	23	56	28
Minhai Bay Area (A.F.)	5	28	6	27	3	29	10	31	24	28
Changsha	-	-	2	18	-	-	-	-	2	18
Chungking	3	28	11	27	9	26	5	25	28	26
Chungwa Penninsula	2	28	-	-	-	-	4	31	6	30
Formosa Coast	9	41	8	40	-	-	7	31	24	37
Longshan	2	22	3	28	-	-	-	-	5	26
Longwha Bay	-	-	3	39	-	-	2	35	5	31
Tako Group	-	-	-	-	1	70	-	-	1	70
Sialing Ho	1	20	5	27	1	20	6	20	13	23
Quemoy Island	1	40	2	31	2	28	1	35	6	32
Chiang River	4	23	16	26	9	32	11	25	40	27
Chiangtan	-	-	6	21	-	-	-	-	6	21
Quining River	-	-	2	23	1	25	-	-	3	24
Pakao	-	-	1	60	-	-	-	-	1	60
Changtse River	1	16	10	26	7	23	6	23	24	24



D - Serviceability

Data	40th Gp		444th Gp		462nd Gp		468th Gp		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
/C Airborne	22	-	22	-	27	-	21	-	92	-
/C Reporting	19	-	22	-	26	-	20	-	87	-
BQ-13 Oper. at T.O.*	19	100	20	91	26	100	20	100	85	98
/C Bombing	19	-	22	-	26	-	18	-	85	-
/C Reporting Bombing*	19	100	22	100	26	100	18	90	85	100
BQ-13 Operative Over Target #	18	95	19	86	22	85	18	100	77	90
BQ-13 Failures #										
Completely Inoper.	1(a)	5	3	14	4(b)	15	0	-	8(c)	9
Partially Inoper.	1	5	3	14	0	0	1	5	5	6
Total	2	10	6	27	4	15	1	5	13	15
BQ-13 Rep. in Flight	1	-	0	-	2	-	0	-	3	-
Auxiliary Equipment	0	-	0	-	0	-	0	-	0	-

\* % based on A/C bombing; # % based on A/C reporting bombing.

- a) O.K. below 16,000 feet.
- b) Three of these O.K. below 18,000 feet.
- c) Four of these O.K. at low altitude.

E - Malfunctions

Data	40th Gp	444th Gp	462nd Gp	468th Gp	Total
5 Take-Off					
Completely Inoperative)					
Cable Short in Synchronizer	-	1	-	-	1
No Sweep	-	1	-	-	1
Total	-	2	-	-	2
Between Take-Off & Target					
Completely Inoperative)					
Pressurization	1(a)	-	3(b)	-	4
Modulator	-	1	-	-	1
Transmitter	-	-	1	-	1
Total Completely Inoper.	1	1	4	-	6
Partially Inoperative)					
Low Gain	-	1	-	-	1
Azimuth Stabilization	-	2	-	1	3
Total Partially Inoper.	-	3	-	1	4
Total Partial & Complete	1	4	4	1	10
Between Target & Landing					
Repaired in Flight					
Changed Inverters	1	0	1	0	2
Azimuth Stabilization	-	-	1	-	1
Total	1	-	2	-	3
Auxiliary Equipment	-	-	-	-	-

(a) O.K. below 16,000 feet; (b) O.K. below 18,000 feet.



S E C R E T

ANNEX

G

RCM INFORMATION

\* \* \* \* \*  
\* Prepared by: \*  
\* RCM Section \*  
\* XX Bomber Command \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

S E C R E T

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority *NND 160063*  
By *sw* NARA Date *11/17/05*



S E C R E T

SECRET  
Auth: Dep Com 20th AF.  
Initials: MOP  
Date: 29 January 45

TWENTIETH AIR FORCE  
Office of the Deputy Commander IB and C  
APO 493

29 January 1945

SUBJECT: RCM Report - Combat Mission No. 29, Shinchiku,  
Formosa, 17 January 45 - Daylight.

TO : Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force,  
Washington 25, D. C.

A. General

Seven RCM search aircraft, each with one RCM Observer, participated in this mission. The RCM Observers searched for Early Warning Radar enroute to and from the target area and for Radar Fire Control Equipment while in the target area.

B. Results

1. Radar intercepts on this mission are similar to radar intercepts made in this same area on Mission No. 28:

A. While the search aircraft were in the Changsha salient, the Henyang Radar (Hengchow), the Siangsiang Radar and the Siangtan Radar were all intercepted.

B. The radar site d/f'ed to Nanchang on Mission No. 28 was again intercepted and d/f'ed to the same area, Nanchang.

C. Radar intercepts in the China Coast and Formosa area were again varied and numerous. "CHI", Mk 1 Model 1, Mk 1 Model 2, Mk 1 Model 3, and Mk 2 Model 1 radar types were intercepted in this area.

Following are the main intercepts:

(A) 80 Mc. Amoy radar site intercepted loud and steady but unable to d/f.

(B) Assembly point area, China Coast:

1. Five Mk 1 Model 1 radar sites intercepted, ranging in frequency from 93-102 Mc.

-1-

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By sw NARA Date 11/17/05



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2. Four Mk 1 Model 3 radar sites intercepted, ranging in frequency from 145-160 Mc. One double pulse signal was observed.

(C) A 94/920/18 Mk 1 Model 1 intercept thought to be located in the Pescadore Island Area.

2. Radar sites d/f'ed: The numbers on the enclosure indicate the location of the radar sites determined by d/f cuts and correspond to the numbers listed below.

(1) 101/745/50:

(A) A Mk 1 Model 1 type radar site. One search aircraft, while approximately 60 miles north of Hengyang, took five d/f cuts on this station which locate this site at approximately 112°21'E 26°45'N.

(B) Another search aircraft passed within five miles of Hengyang and while going away from the city, took four d/f cuts which locate this same site at approximately 112°20'E 26°58'N.

(2) 100/790/63:

A Mk 1 Model 1 radar site near Siangtan. Five d/f cuts locate this radar site at approximately 112°51'E 27°50'N.

(3) 71/530/32:

A "CHI" type radar site located near Nanchang. Five good d/f cuts locate this radar site at approximately 115°42'E 28°35'N.

(4) 102/370/60:

A Mk 1 Model 2 type radar site located near Foochow. Six good d/f cuts locate this radar site South of Foochow at approximately 119°15'E 25°40'N.

(5) 198/1000/5:

A Mk 2 Model 1 type radar for naval craft. D/F'ed to the Hoko Channel East of the Pescadores at approximately 119°58'E 23°36'N.

(6) 156/495/7.5:

A Mk 1 Model 3 type radar adapted for naval craft. D/F'ed to the Taiwan Straits at approximately

-2-

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119° 40' E 24° 36' N.

(7) The following d/f cuts are not considered accurate enough to be reliable but the general location of the radar site is indicated.

(A) 77.5/500/27:

A "CHI" type radar site located in the Northern part of Formosa, possibly at Taihoku 121° 32' E 25° 04' N.

(B) 81/500/46:

A "CHI" type radar site located on Formosa. The characteristics are similar to the Amoy radar which may account for the difficulty in obtaining good d/f cuts on the Amoy radar site. Five d/f cuts roughly locate this radar site at 120° 15' E 23° 50' N.

(C) 66.5/500/46:

A "CHI" type radar site. Three rough d/f cuts locate this radar site in the Shinchiku Area.

(D) 98/500/27:

A Mk 1 Model 1 type radar. This intercept may possibly be the Mk 1 Model 1 reported to be located at Schinchiku. Four d/f cuts taken over the tail of the aircraft and one d/f cut at right angle to these roughly locate this radar site at 120° 42' E 24° 33' N.

Exhibits showing the cuts on the radar sites numbered one through six will be included in the monthly Enemy Radar Report.

3. Possible Radar Fire Control Equipment: While in the target area, a 187/1685/3 radar signal was intercepted. The Signal characteristics suggest possible radar fire control equipment. However, there was no flak coincident with this intercept.

C. Enemy Countermeasures

1. One aircraft, while in the Changsha salient area, reported possible jamming on the 8 Mc. band. The Radio Operator described the jamming as being of the "Buzzer" type.

S E C R E T



S E C R E T

2. The Kana Code interference on the 8 Mc. band reported on Mission No. 28 was again reported by the ground monitor station and aircraft radio operators. The latter believed the signal to be maximum between two and three hours out. Interference was not as strong as on Mission No. 28.

D. Equipment

The lead on the transmitter selsyn of an AN/APA-24 D/F Antenna broke during take off and repair was impossible during flight.

For the Deputy Commander:

*Leo I. Herman*

LEO I. HERMAN  
Colonel, Air Corps  
Actg. Adj. General


1 Incl:  
RCM Search Aircraft Track and D/F Cuts

S E C R E T



SECRET

RCM SEARCH AIRCRAFT TRACK AND D/F CUTS



MISSION NO. 29

SECRET

PREPARED BY: X X BOMBER COMMAND  
RCM SECTION



S E C R E T

ANNEX

H

CENTRAL STATION FIRE CONTROL AND GUNNERY

\* \* \* \* \*  
\* Prepared by: \*  
\* \* \* \* \*  
\* Staff Gunnery Officer \*  
\* \* \* \* \*  
\* XX Bomber Command \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

S E C R E T

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Authority *NND 160063*  
By *sw* NARA Date *11/17/05*



SECRET

SECRET

Auth: CG XX BC  
Initials: (W/AM)  
Date: 25 Jan 45

HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

CONSOLIDATED  
SPECIALIST MISSION REPORT  
OF STAFF GUNNERY OFFICER

Date Prepared: 25 January 1945

Field Order Number 29  
Date of Mission: 19 Jan 45

1. On mission No. 29, there were no attacks by enemy aircraft. Returning crews reported sighting two single engine enemy aircraft in the vicinity of the primary target. These fighters stayed at long range and made no attempt to attack our B-29 formations which is typical of missions flown to Formosa.

2. The following statistical data is submitted:

	<u>40th</u>	<u>444th</u>	<u>462nd</u>	<u>468th</u>
Ammunition used test firing	2350	2105	3100	1205
Ammunition used in combat	0	0	0	0
Malfunctions of CFC System	4	2	2	1
Total turrets on mission	110	110	135	105
Malfunctions of cal. 50 MGS	0	0	4	2
Total cal. 50 MGS on mission	220	220	270	210
Total aircraft (included in report)	22	22	27	21
Total percent malfunctions all groups CFC 1.9% cal 50 MGS - Nil				

There were no claims by our gunners.

-1-  
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By *sw* NARA Date *11/17/05*



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ANNEX

I

CAMERAS AND PHOTOGRAPHS

S E C R E T

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Authority *AND 160003*  
By *sw* NARA Date *11/17/05*



17 January 1945

I - CAMERAS AND PHOTOGRAPHS

Mission No. 29

	40th			444th			462nd			468th			Total		
	K-18	K-20	K-22	K-18	K-20	K-22	K-18	K-20	K-22	K-18	K-20	K-22	K-18	K-20	K-22
Cameras airborne	6	14	6	5	3	7	5	5	3	2	5	8	18	27	24
In missing and non-re- porting A/C	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Completing mission	6	14	6	5	3	7	5	5	3	2	5	8	18	27	24
Photographing targets	5	6	5	4	*	5	4	3	2	2	2	7	15	*	19
Failure to Photograph - mechanical	1a	0	1c	0	*	0	1e	0	1g	0	0	0	2	*	2
Failure to Photograph - other reasons	0	8b	0	1	*	2d	0	2f	0	0	3h	1i	1	*	3
Usable negatives	111	46	72	28	*	33	17	0	14	26	69	147	182	*	266

\* Information not available or incomplete

a - Sheared pin in magazine

b - Camera not used

c - Case drive malfunction

d - One film blank and one not yet returned  
to Hsinching

e - Vacuum off

f - Camera out of film in one, and other not used

g - Electrical failure

h - One aboard crashed aircraft and 2 not used

i - Aboard crashed aircraft

NOTE: Five K-17 cameras and one K-22 camera with 40-inch scope attachment were airborne in 462nd Group aircraft in addition to those shown on the chart above. Four K-17 cameras succeeded in obtaining 27 usable negatives. The fifth camera did not get any pictures due to a personnel failure in not removing lens cap. There were 11 usable negatives obtained from the K-22 camera with the 40-inch scope attachment.

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I-I-1

SECRET



S E C R E T

ANNEX

J

AIRCRAFT LOSSES AND DAMAGE

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Authority *AND 160063*  
By *sw* NARA Date *11/17/05*



S E C R E T

AIRCRAFT LOSSES AND DAMAGE

Mission No. 29

17 January 1945

A. Aircraft Losses

1. Known Battle Losses: There were no battle losses on this mission.

2. Operational Losses (1):

a. A/C 494 (468th) took off at 2215Z. Shortly after take-off an engine cut out and the pilot attempted to return to Pengshan at 2300Z, but was unable to line up with the runway. When passing over the field the propeller on another engine ran away. Bombs were jettisoned about 6½ miles NE of Hsinching. Because of the low altitude at which the plane was flying at the time bombs were jettisoned, the resulting explosion damaged control surfaces and possibly severed some control cables. The crew bailed out but due to the low altitude four crew members were killed on impact.

3. Missing aircraft: None

B. Aircraft Damage

For details of battle and operational damage, see Consolidated Mission Statistical Summary, Annex M, Table V.

J-I-1

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Authority *NND 160063*  
By *sw* NARA Date *11/17/05*



S E C R E T

ANNEX

K

FUNCTIONING OF EQUIPMENT

- I - Functioning of Equipment
- II - Performance Data \*

\* Prepared by Staff Flight Engineer

S E C R E T

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Authority *AND 160063*  
By *sw* NARA Date *11/17/05*



S E C R E T

I - FUNCTIONING OF EQUIPMENT

Mission No. 29

17 January 1945

1. A/C Airborne - - - - - 92
2. Less A/C failing to bomb primary target - mechanical - - - 11
  - a. Bombed secondary target (1):
    - (1) A/C 475 (462nd) - prop governor out.
  - b. Bombed last resort target (5):
    - (1) A/C 757 (40th) - oil leak #2 engine
    - (2) A/C 502 (462nd) - oil leak #1 engine
    - (3) A/C 873 (462nd) - blew cylinder #3 engine
    - (4) A/C 461 (462nd) - ruptured expander joint
    - (5) A/C 275 (468th) - fuel transfer out
  - c. Bombed target of opportunity (1):
    - (1) A/C 230 (462nd) #2 engine feathered, oil leak #1 engine
  - d. Jettisoned bombs (4):
    - (1) A/C 505 (40th) - #1 engine failure
    - (2) A/C 407 (40th) - blew exhaust stack
    - (3) A/C 227 (468th) - broken #1 cylinder
    - (4) A/C 494 (468th) - runaway prop
3. Less A/C failing to bomb the primary target - other reasons - 4
  - a. Personnel error (4):
    - (1) A/C 420 (40th) - pilot claimed electrical system inoperative; however, no malfunction found.
    - (2) A/C 277 (444th) - bomb release switch failed to function over target, tank switch off.
    - (3) A/C 531 (462nd) - failed to join formation.
    - (4) A/C 719 (468th) - arming wire came out of tail fuse, bombs jettisoned 10 seconds early
4. A/C bombing primary target - - - - - 77

K-I-1

S E C R E T



SECRET

Secret  
Auth: CG XX BC  
Initials: W/KY/1  
Date: 23 Jan 45

HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

CONSOLIDATED  
SPECIALIST MISSION REPORT  
OF STAFF FLIGHT ENGINEER

Date Prepared: 23 January 1945

Field Order Number 29  
Date of Mission: 17 Jan 45

1. The attached table contains a summary of the performance of the aircraft that bombed the primary target and returned to their own bases.
2. The overall performance was as anticipated.

Attached: 1 Table.

-1-

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Authority AND 160063  
By sw NARA Date 11/17/05



SECRET  
 SUMMARY OF ALL GROUPS  
 FIELD ORDER NO. 29  
 PRIMARY TARGET

GROUP		OVERALL	40th	444th	462nd	468th
*No. of A/C.		78	18	21	21	18
Total Time		10:35	10:45	10:27	10:44	10:26
Time to Target		4:37	4:45	4:43	4:34	4:26
Fuel Burned	Ave.	5130	5110	5290	5140	4930
	Max.	5650	5400	5650	5500	5160
	Min.	4650	4700	4875	4730	4650
Fuel Carried	Ave.	6130	6185	6120	6210	6000
	Max.	6400	6400	6300	6400	6500
	Min.	6000	6100	6100	6100	6000
Burnable Reserve	Ave.	1000	1075	830	1070	1020
	Max.	1500	1500	1225	1470	1350
	Min.	550	800	550	720	800
**Air Miles		2537	2470	2520	2509	2540
Ground Miles		2350	2375	2350	2352	2310
**Gal./Air Mile		2.03	2.07	2.10	1.99	1.96
***Bombing Altitude		24000	22000	24000	22900	21000
Starting	Ave.	133000	133700	133980	133090	132770
Gross Weight	Max.	134959	133919	134800	134959	134048
	Min.	130881	131500	132414	131300	130881
Weight of Bombs	Ave.	14100	13760	14000	14100	14570
	Max.	15250	14310	14930	14720	15250
	Min.	12150	12870	12910	12150	13770
No. of Bombs	M-26	2.7	11.8	0	0	0
	M-76	6	6.1	9.9	3.9	3.8
	M-64	17.7	10.9	17.5	22.8	23.6

\* aircraft that returned to their own bases for which logs were available.  
 \*\* Air Miles are of doubtful accuracy due to methods of determination.  
 \*\*\* Pressure Altitude.



S E C R E T

ANNEX

L

TARGET DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

\* \* \* \* \*  
\* Prepared by: \*  
\* \* \* \* \*  
\* Target Intelligence Unit \*  
\* \* \* \* \*  
\* XI Bomber Command \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

S E C R E T



C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
Intelligence Section  
APO 493

6 February 1945

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT REPORT NO. 40

TARGET: Shinchiku Airdrome, Formosa. (24° 47'N - 120° 58'E).

GENERAL STATEMENT:

This report relates to damage resulting from a daylight visual attack by 77 aircraft of XX Bomber Command on 17 January 1945. A total of 210 M-26 fragmentation clusters, 1470 M-64 500# GPs and 454 M-76 incendiary bombs were dropped. Bombing altitudes were from 21,500 feet to 24,900 feet over the target from 0157Z to 0246Z with CAVU weather. Assessment of damage was accomplished from excellent quality photography, Mission No. 5MF15, obtained by the 40th Bomb Group, XX Bomber Command, on 18 January 1945.

Previous raids had caused damage to 331,700 sq. ft. or 54 percent of the total building area of 610,200 sq. ft. This attack showed a heavy concentration of bombs on the target area resulting in additional damage of 99,000 sq. ft. The total visible damage to the airdrome building area as a result of all attacks, shows 430,700 sq. ft. or 70 percent damage. Of this amount of damage, 331,700 sq. ft. or 54 percent is structural\* and 99,000 sq. ft. or 16 percent is superficial\*.

Each of the six hangars shows superficial damage as well as structural damage or collapse. Five large warehouses show structural damage as well as the power plant, radio building and nine of the ten large barracks buildings. Service aprons and two of the five runways are severely cratered.

\* Structural damage includes damage which involves the replacement of a principal structural or supporting member. Superficial damage covers other types of damage that could be repaired without involving extensive structural replacements.

REFERENCES: (1) Air Facilities of Formosa - Special P.I. Report No. 34, 18th P.I.D., Headquarters Fourteenth USAAF, 4 October 1944.

WEIGHT OF ATTACK: 77 Aircraft  
210 M-26 fragmentation clusters  
1470 M-64 500# GP bombs  
454 M-76 incendiary bombs.

PHOTOGRAPHY: (1) Strike Photos, 5MB29, 17 January 1945, scale varied, quality variable.  
(2) XX Bomber Command Mission 4MFL2, 17 October 1944, scale approximately 1:13,000, quality good.  
(3) XX Bomber Command Mission 5MF, 18 January 1945, scale approximately 1:13,500, quality excellent.

ANNEXES: (1) Damage Plan with "Before" and "After" photos.  
(2) Bomb Fall Plot.

C O N F I D E N T I A L



C O N F I D E N T I A L

DETAILS OF DAMAGE:

For details of damage see Damage Plan, Annex 1.

V. 70y  
FRANK L. SCOTT, JR  
Colonel, Air Corps  
Chief, Intelligence Section

PREPARED BY: TARGET UNIT  
INTELLIGENCE SECTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L



DECLASSIFIED

Authority *AND 160003*  
By *sw* NARA Date *11/17/05*



**LEGEND**

- |         |                                    |         |
|---------|------------------------------------|---------|
| 1 - 6   | HANGARS                            | 37 - 39 |
| 7 - 13  | ADMINISTRATION & SHOPS             | 40 - 48 |
| 14      | CONTROL TOWER                      | 49 - 50 |
| 15 - 25 | ADMINISTRATION, SHOPS & WAREHOUSES | 51 - 53 |
| 26 - 35 | BARRACKS                           | 54      |
| 36      | RADIO & ADMINISTRATION             | 55 - 58 |
|         |                                    | 59      |
|         |                                    | 60 - 62 |






**LEGEND**

37-39	PROBABLE MESS HALLS
40-48	SHOPS & WAREHOUSES
49-50	PROBABLE MESS HALLS
51-53	UNIDENTIFIED
54	WAREHOUSE
55-58	UNIDENTIFIED
59	POWER HOUSE
60-62	PROBABLE SHOPS




**ANNEX I  
D.A. REPORT NO. 40  
SHINCHIKU A/D, FORMOSA**

**TARGET UNIT, XX B.C.**

**CONFIDENTIAL**



**DAMAGE KEY**

	STRUCTURALLY DAMAGED
	SUPERFICIALLY DAMAGED
	UNDAMAGED

**BEFORE**



**AFTER**



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Authority *NND 160003*  
By *SW* NARA Date *11/17/05*



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REPRODUCED BY  
THE PHOTO TECH UNIT

DECLASSIFIED


Authority *AND 160063*  
By *sw* NARA Date *1/17/05*








ANNEX 2  
D. A. REPORT NO. 40  
SHINGHIKU A/D, FORMOSA



TARGET UNIT, XX B.C.

CONFIDENTIAL



STATISTICS

TOTAL BOMBS DROPPED : 1924  
TOTAL BOMBS IDENT. : 1547 - 80.4%

AREA	NO. OF BOMBS	%
0-1000'	268	17.3
1-2000'	537	34.8
2-3000'	215	13.9
3-4000'	137	8.8
4-5000'	145	9.4
5-6000'	118	7.6
6000' PLUS	127	8.2



26

CONFIDENTIAL  
REPRODUCED BY  
104-51000-10000000







S E C R E T

XX BOMBER COMMAND  
CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
Mission Number Twenty Nine  
17 January 1945

S E C R E T  
By Authority of the  
Commanding General:

1-34-45 *AM*  
Date Initials

Table I and II - Aircraft Participating \*

Group	** A/C in Fwd. Area Scheduled For Mission	** A/C Taking Off	Airborne A/C Failing to Bomb Desig. Prim. Target					Time of First Takeoff	Time*** of Latest Return	Average Time of Flight***	
			Total No.	Percent	Reason					A/C Bombing Primary	Airborne A/C Not Bombing Primary
					Mech.	Unknown	Pers.				
40th	23	22	4	18%	3		1	2115Z	0828Z	10:23	4:05
444th	25	22	1	5%			1	2058Z	0825Z	10:27	10:47
462nd	29	27	6	22%	4	1	1	2121Z	0856Z	10:34	6:52
468th	21	21	4	19%	3		1	2112Z	0839Z	10:26	5:50
TOTAL	98	92	15	16%	10	1	4	2058Z	0856Z	10:28	6:05

- \* Mission was run from Forward Area Bases. A/C participating remained there after Mission #28.
- \*\* Field Order #29 required an effort of 96 A/C by the four groups.
- \*\*\* Excludes A/C which landed at other fields.

S E C R E T

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority *AND*  
By *SP-1* NARA Date *11/17/85*



SECRET

XX BOMBER COMMAND  
 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
 Mission Number Twenty Nine  
 17 January 1945

SECRET  
 By Authority of the  
 Commanding General:  
*2345 DM*  
 Date Initials

Table III - Bombing Runs

Group	No. of A/C Bombing	Target Bombed	Time of Release		Altitude of Release		Visual Bomb		Radar Bomb		Blind Bomb		On The Leader			A/C Dropping On							
			Earliest	Latest	Highest	Lowest	A/C Sight- ing For		A/C Sight- ing For		A/C Sight- ing For		Visual	Radar	Blind	AFCE	Manual						
							R&D	Range	R&D	Range	R&D	Range											
40th	18 1	Shinchiku Hengyang	0204Z	0224Z	23000	21500	1	1					16			1 1	17						
			0228Z	0228Z	13000	13000																	
444th	21 1	Shinchiku Opportunity	0159Z	0224Z	24900	23800	3						18			3 1	18						
			0314Z	0314Z	19000	19000	1																
462nd	21 2 3 1	Shinchiku Amoy Hengyang Opportunity	0205Z	0246Z	23000	22200	3						18			3 2 3 1	18						
			0122Z	0318Z	21300	23000	2																
			0035Z	0055Z	19700	15000	3																
			0132Z	0132Z	11000	11000	1																
468th	17 1	Shinchiku Hengyang	0157Z	0216Z	22900	21500	2						15			2 1	15						
			0040Z	0040Z	20500	20500	1																
TOTAL	77 2 5 2	Shinchiku Amoy Hengyang Opportunity	0157Z	0246Z	24900	21500	9	1					67			9 2 5 2	68						
			0222Z	0318Z	23000	23000	2																
			0035Z	0228Z	20500	13000	4	1															
			0132Z	0314Z	19000	11000	2																

Primary Target - Shinchiku  
 Secondary Target - Amoy  
 Last Resort Target - Hengyang



S E C R E T

XX BOMBER COMMAND  
 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
 Mission Number Twenty Nine  
 17 January 1945

S E C R E T  
 By Authority of the  
 Commanding General:

*27 Jan 1945*  
 Date Initials

Table IV - Bomb Loading & Disposal

Group	* Type of Bombs	Bomb Loading on Airborne A/C in F. A.			Average No. Loaded	Total Loaded	On Targets			Bomb Disposal		
		Fusing		Targets of Opportunity			Returned	Jettisoned	Unknown			
		Nose	Rail							Shinchiku	Amoy	Hengyang
40th	500# M-26	14 SD		15.0	330	210		30			90	
	500# M-64	.1	.01	8.9	196	196						
	500# M-76	.1	N.D.	5.0	110	110						
444th	500# M-64	.1	.01	19.2	422	398			18		6	
	500# M-76	Inst	N.D.	9.6	211	200			11			
462nd	500# M-64	.1	.01	23.7	641	473	50	81	22	10	5	
	500# M-76	Inst	N.D.	3.0	81	81						
468th	500# M-64	.1	.01	24.1	506	392		27		6	81	
	500# M-76	Inst	N.D.	3.2	68	68						
TOTAL	500# M-26	14 SD		3.6	330	210		30			90	
	500# M-64	.1	.01	19.2	1765	1459	50	108	40	16	92	
	500# M-76	Inst	N.D.	5.1	470	459			11			

\* 500# G.P. - AN-M 64 - Actual weight 543.9 pounds.  
 500# Bomb Incendiary - FT-1 M-76 - Actual weight 483 pounds.  
 500# Fragmentation cluster M-26 - Actual weight 430.4 pounds.

NOTE: Bomb weight information supplied by Ordnance Section, XX Bomber Command.

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CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
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Table V - Aircraft lost and Damaged

Aircraft Lost

<u>Group</u>	<u>Serial Number</u>	<u>Combat</u>	<u>Operational</u>	<u>Explanation</u>
468th	24494		X	After takeoff one engine cut out. Pilot tried to land at A-7, but was unable to line up with runway. After passing over the field the prop on another engine ran away. Bombs were salvoed and the explosion damaged the control cables on surfaces so that the A/C could not be controlled. Crew was ordered to bail out.
TOTAL			1	

Aircraft Damaged

<u>Group</u>	<u>Serial Number</u>	<u>E/A</u>	<u>A/A</u>	<u>Major Damage</u>		<u>Explanation</u>
				<u>Own Guns</u>	<u>Other</u>	
40th	None					
444th	24472				X	#18 cylinder blown off. Damaged #2 engine and broke skin on top of nacelle.
462nd	None					
468th	None					
TOTAL					1	

Minor Damage

Negative Report

Table VI - Attacks and Passes By Enemy Aircraft

Negative Report

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Table VII - Personnel Losses

Crew Position	Killed				Missing				Seriously Wounded				Slightly Wounded				Total Casualties				Total Participating			
	40	444	462	468	40	444	462	468	40	444	462	468	40	444	462	468	40	444	462	468	40	444	462	468
Pilot																					22	22	27	25
Co-Pilot																					22	22	27	20
Navigator																					22	22	27	21
Bombardier				1													1				22	22	27	21
Flt. Engr.				1													1				22	22	27	21
Radar																					22	22	27	21
Radio																					22	22	27	21
CFC Spec.																	1				22	22	27	21
Right Gnr.				1																	22	22	27	21
Left Gnr.																	1				22	22	27	21
Tail Gnr.																					2			1
R C M																					1			
Photo																					2	4	7	2
Others																								
TOTAL				4													4				247	246	304	237

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Table VIII - Expenditures of Ammunition and Claims Against Enemy Aircraft

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Table IX - Gasoline Loading and Consumption

Group	Average Gross Weight Per Plane Before Fwd Area Takeoff	Average Gals Gas Loaded Per A/C Before Fwd Area Takeoff	* Average Gallons Consumed on Mission		* Average Gallons Remaining in A/C After Mission	
			Per Aircraft Bombing Primary	Per Aircraft Not Bombing Primary	Per Aircraft Bombing Primary	Per A/C Not Bombing Primary
40th	132968	6198	5109	2413	1082	3812
444th	133908	6100	5271	5370	829	730
462nd	133888	6015	5158	3888	856	2132
468th	132753	6003	4965	2917	1038	3083
TOTAL	133403	6078	5133	3324	943	2761

\* Excludes A/C which landed at other fields.

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Table X - Airborne A/C Failing to Bomb Primary Target

<u>A/C</u> <u>Serial</u> <u>Number</u>	<u>Specific</u> <u>Mechanical</u> <u>Malfunction</u>	<u>Other</u> <u>Reasons</u>	<u>Local Action</u> <u>To Prevent</u> <u>Recurrence</u>
<u>40th Gp.</u>			
63505	#1 engine smoking from top of cowling. Cause was an oil leak due to a loose propeller feathering line. Oil was hitting the exhaust manifold.		More rigid inspection of aircraft engines for this.
63420		Pilot claimed electrical system was inoperative, however no malfunction was discovered. Considered as a personnel error.	
63407	Blow a collector ring, upper right forward, segment on #2 engine, necessitating the feathering of the prop. Faulty installation.		The faulty collector ring was replaced.
24757	Bad oil leak from #1 cylinder and from the breather of #1 engine.		Required change due to internal failure. U.R. #45-203 submitted.
<u>444th Gp.</u>			
65277		Personnel error. Bomb release failed to function over target due to tank switches being off.	
<u>462nd Gp.</u>			
65230	Vibrator coil junction box failed causing mags to intermittently ground out in flight.		Coil junction box replaced by former type in accordance with directive of this Hq.
63531		Personnel error. Missed formation.	
24461	Expander joint of induction system ruptured on starting. Possibly caused by backfire.		Repaired induction system.
93873	#14 cylinder on #3 engine blown.		Engine changed. U.R. #45-1 submitted.

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TABLE X - cont'd

A/C Serial Number	Specific Mechanical Malfunction	Other Reasons	Local Action To Prevent Recurrence
-------------------------	---------------------------------------	------------------	--

462nd Gp. - cont'd

63502	#1 engine oil leaks in push rod housing and rocker box covers. Feathered engine with 20 gallons oil remaining.		Put in new gaskets and fittings and tightened them down.
-------	--	--	--

24475		Unknown. Landed at Kanchow.	
-------	--	-----------------------------	--

468th Gp.

65276	Fuel transfer system out.		Fuel transfer pump failed, U.R. #45-49 submitted.
-------	---------------------------	--	---

24719		Arming wire came out of tail fuse. While on bomb run crew decided to jettison bomb load. Considered personnel error.	
-------	--	--	--

65227	#1 cylinder broke two inches above base allowing the induction pipe to separate from the cylinder, fire started, propeller was feathered and the fire extinguisher on #3 engine was released on the fire which extinguished it.		#3 engine change. U.R. #45-48 submitted.
-------	---	--	--

24494		Lost in crash on takeoff. Explanation in Table V.	
-------	--	---	--

Scheduled Aircraft Failing To Become Airborne On Mission

Group	A/C Serial Number	Explanation
40th	63498	Starter burned out.
444th	24724	Dead battery. Put Put inoperative.
	24462	Faulty maintenance.
	24584	Faulty amplifier on #1 Turbo.
462nd	63450	Mag trouble #4 engine.
	63386	#2 Prop Governor out.
468th	NONE	

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CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
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Table XI - Engineering Malfunctions

Part I - Engineering Malfunctions Preventing Airborne A/C From Bombing Primary

		40th	44th	462nd	468th	Total
POWER PLANT & ACCESSORY SECT,	Exhaust System	1				1
	Blown Cylinder			1	1	2
PROPELLERS & GOVERNORS	Feathered Props	1		1	1	3
OIL SYSTEM	Oil Leaks	2		1		3
FUEL SYSTEM	Fuel Transfer System				1	1
	Induction System Joint			1		1
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM	Vibrator Coil Junction Box			1		1
TOTAL		4		5	3	12

NOTE: For details, see Table X - "Summary of A/C Failing to Bomb Primary".

Part II - Engineering Malfunctions Not Preventing A/C From Bombing Primary

		40th	44th	462nd	468th	Total
POWER PLANT & ACCESSORY SECT.	Engine Running Rough		1	1		2
	Engine Running Hot	1				1
	Exhaust System	1				1
	Turbo Supercharger and/or Turbo Control System	1		1		2
	Blown Cylinder		1	1		2
PROPELLERS & GOVERNORS	Weathered Props	3	2	2		7
	Governor		1	8	1	10
	Prop Oil Leak			1		1
	Prop Pitch Switch				1	1
OIL SYSTEM	Oil Leaks	3	7	9	2	21
	Oil Temperature Regulator		1	3	1	5
	Oil Pressure Low				1	1

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TABLE XI - Engineering Malfunctions

Part II - cont'd		40th	444th	462nd	463th	Total
FUEL SYSTEM	Fuel Transfer System				1	1
	Carburetor	2		1	2	5
	Fuel Pressure High				1	1
	Fuel Booster Pumps	1				1
	Fuel Pump		1			1
	Fuel Quantity Gage			1		1
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM	Generators	3	2	2	3	10
	Distributor Oil Leak				1	1
	Circuit Breaker			1		1
	Voltage Regulator		1	1		2
	Landing Lights		1			1
	Magneto		1	1		2
	Starter Relay	1				1
	Electrical System Failure	1				1
	Alternate-Inverter		1			1
INSTRUMENTS	Carb. Air Temp. Gage				1	1
	Cylinder Head Temp. Gage	2		2	2	6
	Nose Oil Press. Gage				2	2
	Oil Press. Transmitter		1			1
	Rear Oil Press. Gage				1	1
	Tachometer	2	3			5
	Radio Compass				1	1
	Flux Gate Compass		1	3	1	5
	Gyro Driftmeter			1		1
	Flight Indicator	2		2	1	5
	AFCE	1		3		4
	Cowl Flap Indicator		1			1
	MISCELLANEOUS	Pressurization	1		1	
Bomb Bay Doors					1	1
Blown Blister				1		1
Oxygen System		1		1		2
Vacuum System		1	1		1	3
Trim Tabs				1	1	2
TOTAL		27	27	48	26	128

NOTE PERTAINING TO BOTH PART I AND PART II:  
Only engineering malfunctions are listed. All other malfunctions, such as radar, are excluded. If one aircraft had more than one engineering malfunction, all malfunctions have been listed.

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 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
 Mission Number Twenty Nine  
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Table XII - Utilization of Useful Load  
 (Based on A/C Bombing P.T.)

Group	Nb. of Ground Miles	Number of A/C Considered	Type of A/C	Av. Gross Weight at Takeoff For Mission	Aver. Basis Weight of A/C	Aver Useful Load	Aver. Number of Bombs Loaded	* Aver Weight of Bombs Loaded	Aver Weight of Gas Loaded at 6 Pounds Per Gal	Average Miscellaneous Weight
40th	2375	18	Center Wing Tanks	133185	74941	58244	500#M-26 11.7 500# GP 10.9 500# Inc 6.1	13895	37183	7166
444th	2350	21	Center Wing Tanks	133907	75339	58568	500# GP 19.2 500# Inc 9.5	15063	36600	6905
462nd	2352	21	Center Wing Tanks	133886	75057	58829	500# GP 22.8 500# Inc 3.9	14269	36086	8474
468th	2310	17	Center Wing Tanks	132761	75000	57761	500# GP 23.4 500# Inc 4.0	14665	36018	7078
TOTAL	2350	77	Center Wing Tanks	133479	75094	58385	500#M-26 2.7 500# GP 19.2 500# Inc 6.0	14486	36468	7431

\* 500# G.P. - AN-M 64 equals 543.9 pounds (actual weight).  
 500# Incendiary - M-76 equals 483 pounds (actual weight).  
 500# Fragmentation Cluster - M-26 equals 430.4 pounds (actual weight).

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SPECIAL GASOLINE STUDY  
 Of Missions 28 & 29

Run 14 & 17 January 1945

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Group	Gallons Loaded Per A/C In Rear Area	Consumed Rear to Fwd. Area	In Tanks On Landing In Fwd. Area	Mission #28		Mission #29		In Tanks For Return To Rear Area	Consumed Fwd To Rear Area	In Tanks On Landing In Rear Area	Total Gas Taken Out of Fwd. Area
				Av. Gas Consumed On A/C Bombing Primary	Av. Gas Consumed On A/C Not Bombing Primary	Av. Gas Consumed On A/C Bombing Primary	Av. Gas Consumed On A/C Not Bombing Primary				
40th	6235	3601	2634	5401	5158	5109	2413	3613	2563	1050	242276
444th	5738	3522	2216	5304	3885	5271	5370	3642	2633	1009	292376
462nd	5261	3495	1766	5324	4881	5158	3888	3251	2577	674	282549
468th	5781	3293	2488	5286	3012	4965	2917	3650	2487	1163	215480
TOTAL	5757	3505	2252	5321	4427	5133	3324	3553	2559	994	1032681

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



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