

RESTRICTED

TR 512 - page 3

CO-ORDINATED TRANSLATION CENTER
CHUNGKING

23 FEB 1945

of secondary foods. UCHIDA (内田), the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, once said when inspecting the market: "This is a ration for birds!" If he had taken a look at the conditions in the schools recently he would have certainly exclaimed: "This is a ration for crickets!" No one cares that the students and pupils do not get enough to eat, although the teachers take a great interest in the thoughts of the students and pupils whose letters to their parents and brothers are examined closely. These students and pupils who are evacuated to the country are compelled to write and report that they are living quite satisfactorily. This aroused severe criticism from the parents and elders of the students and pupils. The ASAHI SHIMBUN commented on 5 October 1944: "If this is the case, it would be better to have the letters printed and just ask the students and pupils to fill in their names and date. Would that not be more economical?"

RESTRICTED

Typist: Szetu, Cheh

For C.T.C.

T.H.B.



SPECIAL WAR INFORMATION DIVISION
MAY 10 1945

39481 *Miss Bradshaw*
Please send copies to War, Navy, etc.

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Moscow, U.S.S.R., April 3, 1945

SECRET

DIVISION OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
APR 26 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
APR 25 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

No. 1599

Subject: Transmitting Memorandum of Conversation With a Former Attache of the Rumanian Legation at Tokyo.

2 wa 22A
1 Mary
2 Coss
2 3 test
2 CA
MAY 7 1945

The Ambassador has the honor to enclose a copy

of a memorandum of conversation with a former Attache of the Rumanian Legation at Tokyo. The informant left Tokyo early in January and subsequently spent approximately one month and a half in North Manchuria en route to the Soviet Union. The intelligence which he provided was not detailed but serves to present what is believed to be a fairly accurate and comprehensive picture of the situation in Japan and North Manchuria at the beginning of 1945.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
APR 28 1945
DC/L
LIAISON OFFICE
1/

Note
240.004 P.W.

IC&G
Recording Desk

file
MAY 1 1945
KC
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

394.00/4-345 CS/LE

Enclosure:

1/ Memorandum of Conversation.

100

JD/aiw

Original in ozalid to Department.

MAY 1 6 1945
DIVISION ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT
REPRODUCTION SECTION
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DCR - EUB Unit
Anal. *CC*
Rev. *AC*
Dist.

894.00/4-345
COMPLETED FILE

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Moscow, March 31, 1945

Present: Victor Gutzulesco
F. B. Stevens
J. Davies, Jr.

Mr. Gutzulesco was formerly attache to the Rumanian Legation at Tokyo. He states that he left Japan early in January 1945, traveling directly by way of Korea to Harbin where he stayed for one month. From Harbin he proceeded to Manchuli where he remained for two weeks before crossing the border with the help of the Soviet Consul and certain Chinese. He hopes to leave Moscow in the immediate future for Bucharest. Because of his difficult position as a former Rumanian diplomat, Mr. Gutzulesco requests that the information which he provided be restricted to only American officials.

Most of the information obtained from Mr. Gutzulesco is already in American possession. It provides, however, useful support of what has previously been reported.

American Air Raids. Mr. Gutzulesco witnessed the Doolittle raid on Tokyo. His comment was that this raid had little effect on the Japanese beyond possibly heightening their anti-American feeling. He was in Tokyo during the early B-29 raids which he believed to have had little more than nuisance value. Fires were started but he was not informed as to the full damage done. Foreigners were not permitted to approach industrial areas so he was unable to see the damage done in those sections of Tokyo. He did see one burned out residential section.

Tokyo air raid precaution measures were inadequate, Mr. Gutzulesco observed. Fire-fighting equipment was insufficient with the result that the Japanese were forced for the most part to permit the fires to burn themselves out. Air raid shelters were unsatisfactory. During the early B-29 raids most of the population did not trouble to seek shelter. Mr. Gutzulesco stated that the populace was given about forty-five minutes warning of approaching American aircraft.

While the initial B-29 attacks did not serve to shake Japanese morale, Mr. Gutzulesco surmised that the subsequent heavy attacks by fleet carrier aircraft and reinforced B-29 formations must have seriously affected the Japanese.

Invasion Defense. The Japanese people now anticipate a landing on Japan at any time, Mr. Gutzulesco stated. School youths have therefore been conscripted. He said that one sees quite a few young men in Tokyo who have been inducted into the Home Army. They were dressed in summer

- 2 -

uniforms and he believed that they were inadequately equipped with arms. Asked about coastal defenses, Mr. Gutzulesco replied that foreigners were prohibited from visiting coastal areas so he had no information on that score. He had no doubt that the Japanese would fight hard in the defense of their home islands but did not feel that they were well equipped for such defense.

SWP
American Prisoners. Mr. Gutzulesco stated that he saw American prisoners in the Tokyo railway station moving freight. He remarked that while they did not appear to be in good physical condition, nevertheless his impression was that they were no worse off, certainly, than the Japanese. For one thing, American prisoners received supplementary food through the Red Cross and therefore were probably fed better than the ordinary Japanese. The Japanese press, Mr. Gutzulesco stated, reported that a large number of American prisoners were killed at Mukden during an American air raid on that city.

Mr. Gutzulesco declared that eight American prisoners of war are working in the Tokyo radio broadcasting station. He said that he did not know whether they were officers or enlisted men, nor did he know their names.

War in General. While Japan was winning, Mr. Gutzulesco observed, Japanese propaganda maintained that there was no connection between the Pacific war and the German war. When the United Nations began to advance in the Pacific, Japanese propaganda pointed out that the two wars were interrelated and implied that Japan might expect to derive help and benefit from a forthcoming German victory. However, with German reverses becoming more apparent, the Japanese propaganda line has again shifted back to the line that there is no connection between the war in the Pacific and the war in Europe.

After the American landing on Saipan the Japanese began openly to admit the danger of an invasion of Japan Proper.

Asked about the possibility of Japan's suing for peace, Mr. Gutzulesco stated that the first rumors were that after the fall of the Philippines Japanese peace feelers might be put out. Later his Japanese contacts suggested that peace proposals might be made after the fall of Germany or after American landings on Japan.

The Japanese up to the time of his departure still professed to be confident of their ability to defend their home islands. They declared that if the capture of so small an island as Saipan presented the difficulties which it did to the Americans, successful invasion of Japan would be an impossible task for the Americans.

- 3 -

When questioned regarding possible friction between the Japanese army and navy, Mr. Gutzulesco replied that he had heard of none. He added, however, that the navy was said to be desirous of seeking American peace terms but that the army had up to the date of his departure successfully blocked the navy's wishes in this respect.

Morale and Propaganda. The enemy population, Mr. Gutzulesco said, believed their government's propaganda. They were convinced that defeat meant annihilation. They believed that Americans were savages and bent on the destruction of the Japanese people. While there was no evident breach in Japanese unity, Mr. Gutzulesco was of the opinion that the people were undoubtedly war weary and desired a termination of the hostilities. He heard no comment to the effect that Japan's militarists were responsible for the plight in which the Japanese people found themselves.

While Mr. Gutzulesco was permitted by the enemy authorities to keep his short-wave radio and so was enabled to hear American broadcasts, the Japanese people were prohibited from having any short-wave sets. They were therefore unable to listen to American propaganda.

Food and Clothing. Food and clothing conditions in Japan, Mr. Gutzulesco declared, are "ten times worse than in Moscow". Acute food shortages, he said, have caused obvious malnutrition among the Japanese people. The Government attempted to explain the shortage with statements that foodstuffs were being stored in Japan. This explanation was not generally credited. In reply to a query as to what categories are most affected, Mr. Gutzulesco indicated that the deficiencies appeared to be general. He remarked that there was a shortage of even tea, the Japanese people being told that the Russians had gone without tea and that therefore they should be able to drink hot water and like it.

The enemy population, Mr. Gutzulesco stated, does not have enough clothing. Each person is given a ration of one fiber suit a year. The fiber material is very poor and a suit is usually worn out in about one month.

Production and Transportation. Mr. Gutzulesco had little information regarding production. He did not believe that Japanese factories were being moved to Manchuria. He said that Japanese industry was to a considerable degree dispersed in home industries.

Rail transportation, Mr. Gutzulesco remarked, appeared to be in fairly good condition. He believed that communication lines would prove to be profitable air bombing targets.

- 4 -

Enemy shipping had admittedly suffered heavy losses. Mr. Gutzulesco saw little shipping at Shimonoseki. His impression was that this port was used principally for passenger vessels. The same was true of Fusan.

Motor vehicles, he said, were powered by a gasoline-alcohol mixture or by charcoal gas.

Coal and other fuels were short. Electric power was strictly rationed in Tokyo.

Government. Mr. Gutzulesco's impression was that the Japan militarists were still firmly in the saddle up to the time of his departure. He said, however, that there had been open criticism in the press of the government. In his opinion the present government could not attempt to make peace with the United Nations. A civilian government which had no connection with the militarists or the war would have to be formed to enter into peace negotiations.

Korea. Mr. Gutzulesco passed through Korea without any stopover and therefore was able to form only a fleeting impression. He stated that Korea struck him as being in about the same condition as Japan Proper. In response to an inquiry regarding traffic which he observed on his train trip through Korea, Mr. Gutzulesco said that he saw no unusual movement.

Manchuria. While he was in Manchuria during January and February Mr. Gutzulesco gained the impression that conditions there were considerably better than in Japan. The Japanese in Manchuria had enough to eat. The Kwantung army appeared to be well clothed, well fed and well equipped. Rail traffic appeared to be about normal.

The Chinese population was, Mr. Gutzulesco observed, worse off than the Japanese. He said that the Chinese still bitterly hated the Japanese. For the time being, however, they were lying low and expecting that after the American invasion of Japan the Soviet Union would occupy Manchuria. Interestingly enough, Mr. Gutzulesco remarked that the Chinese did not appear to believe that the Russians would have to fight for Manchuria. His interpretation of Manchurian-Chinese opinion was that following the American conquest of Japan, Japanese control in Manchuria would disintegrate, enabling the Russians to enter that territory without meeting organized resistance. Mr. Gutzulesco stated that Chinese had remarked to him that they were waiting for this development with pleasurable anticipation and were looking forward to the liquidation of all Japanese in Manchuria.

It must be borne in mind, however, that the Chinese to whom Mr. Gutzulesco talked were presumably those in Harbin and Manchuli and were therefore more conscious of

-5-

Soviet power than those in South Manchuria.

The position of the White Russians in Manchuria, Mr. Gutzulesco stated, was worse than that of the Chinese. He remarked that the White Russians did not seem to be seeking or receiving Soviet protection.

JD/aiv

Original in ozalid

Copy to: Embassy, Chungking.
Office of the Political Advisers,
Headquarters, USF, China Theater,
APO 879, c/o Postmaster, N.Y., N.Y.

DC/R

April 7, 1945

file 4-11

894.00/4-745

Dear Jim,

Following our conversation yesterday when you inquired about the names of certain Japanese officials, Mr. Benninghoff of the Department talked with Mr. Duffield of your staff, and we understand you wanted a list of Japanese statesmen who would be classified as "moderates".

Such a list is attached. If this is not exactly what you want or if you desire additional information along this or similar lines, please do not hesitate to let me know.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) E.R. Stettinius, Jr.

ER Stettinius Jr

The Honorable
James V. Forrestal
Secretary of the Navy

S:HR:EG

DOE - NE Unit	
Encl.	<i>m.S.</i>
Rw.	<i>m.N.</i>
Out.	<i>BRT.</i>
Dist.	

A true copy of the signed original *MM*

894.00/4-745

(Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no. 290, April 11,
1945 from American Embassy, Chungking, China.)

TR 399

CO-ORDINATED TRANSLATION CENTER
CHUNGKING

31 MAR 1945

TRANSLATION: O.W.I./GUO DA

ACTION: O.W.I. (24)
INFO: Embassy (6)
G-2 (2)
FileFROM: "JIKYOKU JOHO" (Information on Current Events)
Published in TOKYO, 10 December 1944

THE TWO "POLITICAL FORMULAS" -- Comments on the System of
Cabinet Advisors and the Composite Planning Board
By: SUMIMOTO TOSHIO (住本利男)

The Speed of Politics

By the term "political formula" is meant the fundamental method to be adopted for the manipulation of the national affairs and the development of the nation's policies. It reflects, however, clearly the character of the Cabinet and the situation of the time. This is especially true of the political formula in war time, which, with a view to meeting the demands of military operations, quite different from that in peace time, has to concentrate the power at one point while at the same time maintain the character of being mobile. The political formula adopted by the TOJO Cabinet since the outbreak of the GREATER EAST ASIA WAR is one good example of this category. The "prerogative administrative power", the "Cabinet advisory system", the "administrative supervisory system", and a lot of other reforms of the administrative organizations adopted thereafter one after another, are following in the same line.

Likewise, the KOISO Cabinet takes its own independent and peculiar formula. Unlike his predecessor, General TOJO, Premier KOISO is not a military man in active service. The first thing he intended to realize was the establishment of the formula aiming at the tightening of the relationship between the control and the affairs of the state. This is shown in the formation of the Supreme War Directing Council. The Council has become the prop of the Cabinet and has been manipulated actively. The step taken following that is the listening to the view points of learned people regarding various phases of the situation which has been considered by Premier KOISO ever since the beginning of the formation of his Cabinet. The fundamental motive for these steps must have been based on the lessons learned from the criticism directed to the former Cabinet. As has been said frankly by the Premier himself:

"At a time of such significance, a human being like my humble self, on whom is being conferred the Imperial Mandate, is trembling by day and by night as to how shall I be able to fulfill my duty. I am deeply impressed by the need of listening to the opinions of senior gentlemen with high character and intelligence to make up for my own defects so that my responsibility may be realized."

Thus, plans concerning the formation of consultory organizations have since been frequently disclosed by governmental authorities. Not only that, the political world has been advocating their needs and giving advices to the government. It might rather be said that it was their demands which accelerated the resolution of the

CO-ORDINATED TRANSLATION CENTER
CHUNGKING

TR 399 - P. 2

31 MAR 1945

government. There has been criticism from long ago that the present Cabinet does not possess any sources with regard to the enforcement of policies and planning of projects. There have been no other methods than depending on the creations and planning of the various ministries. Moreover, the principle in deciding government policies, in reality, has been the consideration of the various ministries; nevertheless the consensus thinks this is not sufficient. Thus, in addition to the method of strengthening the political power by means of the great personalities, the establishment of a consultory organization in connection with the devising of policies has become the problem of the day.

In connection with the establishment of a consultory organization, we might trace this back to the beginning when, before the appointment of TANAKA (田中) as the chief secretary, Mr. MIURA (三浦), Director of the Bureau of Legislation, together with SAKOMI HISATSUNE (迫水久常), then Cabinet Councillor, drafted the "Scheme for Consolidating War Efforts" which was aimed at shrinking the Planning Board. This "Scheme" was passed on to TANAKA, the chief secretary. With regard to this first proposal, there were pros and cons amongst the Cabinet colleagues. The "scheme" had to be made concrete, and after passing through a series of complications during a period of three months, it was finally brought into shape and was called the Bill of Cabinet Policy Bureau. This was further changed to be called the Bill of Composite Planning Board when it was submitted to the Privy Council for consultation. To go side by side with the consultory organization, the system of Cabinet Advisors, which was an assistant organization in the war-time economy, was revised. This was widened and made into a political advisory organization which was likewise taken into consideration by Premier KOISO. Both of these should have taken a certain shape and should have been realized before the Diet session on the 7th of September. But even after the Diet session, the matter was still subject to procrastination. Eventually the System of Cabinet Advisors was inaugurated on the 27th of October and the Composite Planning Board on the 1st of November. In this connection, taking into consideration the slow manner of moving of the Cabinet, there arose the criticism about the lack of adroitness in the enforcement of Cabinet policies. Both the Cabinet advisors and the Composite planning board are assistant organizations to the Premier and do the fundamental construction work of the Cabinet. They have been conceived ever since the formation of the Cabinet; nevertheless, they have been dragging on for two or three months. It is quite natural that public opinion should remark about the slowness in taking actions. The appearance all-together of the Supreme War Directing Council, the Cabinet Advisors and the Composite Planning Board, would mean, then, the eventual establishment of the formula towards the politics of war of decision on the part of the government. Military operations, however, have already been developing at a terrible speed of late. The war of decision now going on around the PHILIPPINES has been intensified deeper and deeper with the elapse of days. Military operations, thus, demand speed in politics.

Characteristics of the New Cabinet Advisors

Characteristics of the new system of Cabinet Advisors lie firstly in its political straits and secondly in its manipulation.

CP-ORDINATED TRANSLATION CENTER
CHUNGKING

TR 399 - P. 3

31 MAR 1945

The Cabinet Advisory system created by the TOJO Cabinet dealt exclusively in war-time economy and did not transgress this line of limitation. As it was set up to cope with the emergency tasks at the time of rapidly increasing the production, so experts and experienced men in such departments as aeroplanes, shipping, finance, heavy industries and coal, were chosen as advisors. The new system of Cabinet Advisors has removed such limitations. These advisors have been made as political advisors to the Premier. In government organization, they have likewise been stipulated "to participate in the confidential function of the manipulation of political affairs of the Prime Minister of the Cabinet in time of the war of GREATER EAST ASIA."

Thus, these advisors have been chosen widely from the various phases of interior affairs, foreign affairs, culture and education and economics. There are four who are retained from former advisors, these are: YUKI TOYOTARO (結城豊太郎), YAMASHITA KAMESABURO (山下龜三郎), AIKAWA GISUKE (鮎川義介) and TOYODA SADAJIRO (豊田貞次郎). The usual advisory system has been closely connected with the supervision of administration. From the fact that the supervisory commissars were usually appointed out of Cabinet ministers of Cabinet advisors, we can see that the two systems are closely connected one with the other. The system of supervisory commissars is to be continued as it is, and the new system of advisors does not lose its connection on this point. As far as conditions permit, it was the intention of the Prime Minister to preserve as many as possible the former advisors. If Mr. GOKO KIYOSHI (郷古潔) who retired later on is to be included, then about half of the former advisors remain in the new system. Besides, ARITA HACHIRO (有田八郎) from the diplomatic circles, Admiral (?) ONO SANENOBU (尾野善信) and General SUEMATSU NOBUMASA (末次信正) from the Navy and Army respectively, Dr. ANDO KOTARO (安藤廣太郎) from Agriculture, Dr. KOIZUMI SHINZO (小泉信三) from cultural and educational circles, SHORIKI MATSUTARO (正力松太郎) from circles of public speech, KOIZUMI MATAJIRO (小泉又次郎) from the Assistance Political Association, FURUTA SHUNNOSUKE (古田俊之助) from SUMITOMO in place of GOKO KIYOSHI, and the like, have been chosen from quite a wide sphere of variegated personnel who have been enjoying a good reputation. The two with the deepest color as political advisors are Mr. ARITA HACHIRO and General SUEMATSU NOBUMASA. Mr. ARITA has been very close to General KOISO and Admiral YONAI and has not been grudging with his support from under cover to the Cabinet. He is now taking advantage of the occasion to come to the surface, and is collaborating with General SUEMATSU to serve as the core of the advisors. Messrs. YUKI, AIKAWA and SHORIKI are full of opinions and so we think they will work energetically.

The other characteristic of the new system lies in its manipulation. It does not take the working process of regularly scheduled conferences as has been the case hitherto, but will be called at any time necessary. Besides, with the exception of some of the conferences in which all the advisors are to be invited, the Premier will call up any advisor at any time to ask for opinion; while on the other hand, if any advisor has any advice to present, it is not necessary for him to stick to specified procedures. The first interview took place on the

TR 399 - P. 4

CO-ORDINATED TRANSLATION CENTER
CHUNGKING

31 MAR 1945

5th of November, and it has since been not necessary to set in motion the organization particularly. The Premier has been receiving the advisors quite freely while the advisors themselves are calling up conferences once every week to hear the explanation of the situation given by the government authorities. The Cabinet councillors at the time of the KONOYE Cabinet were eventually reduced into functionally useless existence. Judging by this instance, the life or death of such assistant organizations depends entirely upon how they will be manipulated.

Speeding up the Enforcement of War-time Policies

The Composite Planning Board is a consultory organization to the Premier in connection with the enforcement of policies. With the abolition of the former "Planning Board", affairs related to the General Mobilization Law were transferred to be handled by the Ministry of Military Supplies. The composition and adjustment of policies were brought under the care of the Cabinet in which an office of Cabinet Councillors was inaugurated. The present Composite Planning Board reflects such history of the past, that is to say, it is something walking in the middle between the former "Planning Board" and the Office of Cabinet Councillors. Compared with the Cabinet chief secretary, who occupies the post as the number one foreman of the Cabinet taking charge of political affairs, the Director of the Composite Planning Board occupies the post of the so-called chief of staff in connection with the speeding up of the enforcement of war-time policies. The function of the Board as a consultory organization to the Prime Minister deals with the coordination of enterprises connected with important national policies, the adjustment of affairs of the various ministries, and the composite consideration and investigation. By enterprises connected with important national policies are meant those connected with every phase of the internal affairs with the exception of those connected with military affairs and foreign diplomacy. By the adjustments of affairs of the various ministries are meant the unitary composition within the Cabinet of the much diversified affairs of the various ministries at the present; while by the composite consideration and investigation are meant those jobs such as the investigation of administrative affairs, examination of past administration, investigation of conditions of operation of the affairs of the various bureaus, and the like, which are indispensable for making perfect the penetration of the war-time administration. What is worth our attention here is the trying out of the so-called "test drilling" (演練). This is the method whereby, in case we don't know whether or not we will be able to reap best results if we put into practice a whole measure, then instead, we just put one part of it into practice and try it out.

From the time of the start, the government has been adopting the principle that in the enforcement of policies the independent originality and design of the various ministries are to be counted upon to the utmost. This signifies the intention of the Cabinet, from the Premier to the chief secretary of the Cabinet, to avoid adopting the method of devising policies by themselves and then asking the various ministries to have them materialized. This intention of the Premier passed on to the character of the "Composite Planning Board" itself. As a planning board, it is

TR 399 - P. 5

CO-ORDINATED TRANSLATION CENTER
CHUNGKING

31 MAR 1945

quite natural that from its function it would devise and contemplate policies. This does not mean, however, that it will confine itself within the realm of "contemplation" and will not seek to have the policies decided upon and put into execution. Moreover, it does not mean that the contemplated policies are to be forced on the various ministries by high pressure. After all, the idea is nothing else than to cooperate with the various ministries, to give perfect life to the originality and design of the various ministries and to speed up the enforcement of the policies.

The maintenance of an important and substantial relationship with the Supreme War Directing Council may be taken as a great character of the Planning Board. The Supreme Council is not an organization from the standpoint of the governmental organizational system. On the other hand the Planning Board is an organization responsible directly to the Prime Minister in the governmental organization system. Accordingly there is no direct relationship between the two. Nevertheless as the national policies decided upon on the Supreme Council are brought back by the Premier to the Cabinet where they are to be materialized, so naturally they will be touched by the hands of the Planning Board which is the consultory organization to the Premier. On the other hand, national policies which the Planning Board considers as necessary are reflected on the Supreme Council by the Premier. Under this sense, the plans are attributed with substantial relationship with the Supreme Council and the role they play in this connection must be of importance.

Side by side with the Cabinet chief secretary, the President of the Cabinet Information Bureau, and the Director of the Legislation, the Director of the Composite Planning Board helps form a circle surrounding the Premier. In a sense quite different from that of the Cabinet ministers, he exercises a role as the "focus" of politics surrounding the Cabinet. Most of the Cabinet colleagues were advocating that the post should be held concurrently by the Chief Secretary TANAKA, nevertheless Mr. HANIBA TETSUZO (植場鐵三), Vice-President of the CENTRAL CHINA DEVELOPMENT COMPANY was eventually chosen for the job. HANIBA was once Director of the Bureau of Industries (殖産局) at the time when Premier KOISO was the Minister and Chief Secretary TANAKA was the Vice-Minister of Oversea Affairs. He is a man who has entered the company of KOISO and TANAKA since long ago. The functions of the Board are divided into the first department (planning), the second department (readjusting) and the third department (investigating), and are shared by fifteen councillors. Besides, fifteen participants, and a number of vice-participants and the like have been picked up from among experienced and learned men of the people. Already MATSUDA YOSHISUKE (松田令輔), Director of the Bureau of General Affairs of the Ministry of Finance, has been appointed as Director for the first department; ASAKA TOKUNARI (安積得也), Magistrate of TOCHIGI Prefecture, has been appointed as Director for the second department; and SUGANAMI YAJI (菅波彌事), Director of the Department of Coal of the Ministry of Military Supplies, has been appointed Director for the third department. At the same time a number of councillors have been appointed. Participants and vice-participants from among the people will be

CO-ORDINATED TRANSLATION CENTER
TR 399 - P. 6 CHUNGKING

31 MAR 1945

appointed in the near future, although the work has already begun. Judging from the personnel chosen it will be seen that they are men capable of cooperating with the various ministries. We might well say that the characters of the new Board are not only expressed in its functions, but are vividly shown in its personnel as well. The problem whether the expected functions will be realized or not does not rely on the shoulders of HANIBA, the new Director of the Board, and of all the members of the Board alone; but will also depend on the supporting power of all the Cabinet members beginning with the Premier.

Typist: Yang Chang-tsun

For C. T. C.

T. H. B.

(Enclosure no. 2 to despatch no. 290, April 11,
(1945 from American Embassy, Chungking, China.)

CO-ORDINATED TRANSLATION CENTER

TR 375

CHUNGKING

26 MAR 1945

TRANSLATION: F.B.A./HUGH CHEN

ACTION: O.W.I.
INFO: Embassy
G-2
File

FROM: TAIRIKU SHIMPO (Continental Newspaper),
Published in SHANGHAI, 22 December 1944.

NEW GOVERNOR

TOZUKA Kyuichiro (戸塚 九 一 郎) Appointed--Governor of FUKUOKAKEN (福 岡 縣), concurrently head of the KYUSHU District Bureau of Mines, head of the MOJI (門 司) Bureau of Oceanic Communication (海 運 局), and Supervisor of Military Supply (T.N. Local representative of the Ministry) of the Ministry of Military Supply. TOZUKA is 54 years old. He was governor of HOKKAIDO (北 海 道) from September 1939 to June 1942. He is a graduate of the Law College of the TOKYO Imperial University. He had in the past served as governor of YOMAGUCHI (山 口), MIYAGI (宮 城), and TOKUSHIMA (徳 島).

Typist: Szetu, Cheh

For C.T.C.

T.A.B.

(Enclosure no. 3 to despatch no. 290, April 11,
(1945 from American Embassy, Chungking, China.)

TR 390

CO-ORDINATED TRANSLATION CENTER
CHUNGKING

29 MAR 1945

TRANSLATION: F.E.A./HUGH CHEN

ACTION: F.E.A. (18)
INFO: EMBASSY (6)
G-2 (2)
FileFROM: HUAPEI SHINPAO (North China Newspaper) (In Chinese)
Published in TAIYUEN (太原), 7 January 1945THE BUDGET OF THE "MONGOLIAN GOVERNMENT"

The Political Congress (政務院) of the "Mongolian Government" has approved the budget for the Chingchi 740th fiscal year (1945 fiscal year). This year, the Government's main effort will be on the prosecution of the war and the budget has been prepared so as to be able to meet all eventualities. The expenditures for this fiscal year have been estimated to run to 276,750,000 yuen (元). Compared with the expenditures for the last fiscal year, which were 147,979,000 yuen, the expenditures for this year will be almost doubled. (The rest of the article is blurred.) The income from taxation has increased 34,618,000 yuen . . . The Government will issue high way bonds (公債) T.N. The X looks like the word "road" (路) amounting to 180,000,000 yuen. . . .

Typist: N. Y. Chen

For C. T. C.

T.M.B.

(Enclosure no. 4 to despatch no. 290, April 11,)
 (1945 from American Embassy, Chungking, China.)

CO-ORDINATED TRANSLATION CENTER
 CHUNGKING

23 MAR. 1945

TR: 374

TRANSLATION: O.W.I. / GUO DA

ACTION: O.W.I. (4)
 INFO: Embassy
 OSS Stevens
 G-2
 File

FROM: GEIFANG RHBAO (The Emancipation Daily).
 Published in YENAN, 5 February 1945.

JAPANESE NEW FASCIST PARTY IN THE FERMENTATION STAGE.

--Composite Report of the Editing Board--

The problem of a "New Japanese Party" has been in the fermentation stage for some time and is approaching the stage of ripening. According to a comment made by an expert in Japanese political situation dating as far back as to the time of the TOJO Cabinet at the beginning of the year 1943 when the Japanese 81st Diet was in session, one portion of the moderates, under the slogan of "concentrating all the political forces", was already advocating the reorganization of the Assistance Political Association. The move was taken in opposition to the despotic and arbitrary rule of TOJO. Some of them advocated that the Assistance Political Association should establish its local branches while others demanded that the said Association should be amalgamated with the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. Either of these two assertions came from elements of the defunct political parties and aimed at the restoration of the former political parties and aimed influences of the various political positions or political under the protection of legality. At that time, however, there was nothing definitely decided within the Assistance Political Association. Moreover, in April of the same year, a partial reorganization of the TOJO Cabinet took place. OABA TADA0 (大森 唯男), standing secretary of the Assistance Political Association (member of the defunct MINSEITO), and YAMAZAKI TATSUNOSUKE (山崎 達之輔) (member of the defunct SHOWA Society), were invited by TOJO to join the Cabinet, with a view to making use of their historical relationship with the defunct political parties to accommodate and to pacify their dissatisfactions. As a result, the shout for the reformation of the Assistance Political Association was silenced down. When the TOJO Cabinet collapsed, members of the defunct political parties thought that the time was ripe, so the old tune was played once again. Up to last October, they had not been able to acquire the consensus of the great majority within the Assistance Political Association. They only succeeded in reaching the decision to recruit more local members and to absorb local officials and staff members of the province, metropolitan prefecture and prefecture headquarters of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association to join the "Assistance Political Association". Since the opening of the present Diet session, the shout for the organization of a new political party has become the more

CO-ORDINATED TRANSLATION CENTER
CHUNGKING

TR: 374 - Page 2

23 MAR. 1945.

noisy. Under the sign-board of "setting up a national system for the invincible victory", the Assistance Political Association organized a special committee, with KATSUDA EIKICHI (勝田永吉), member of the defunct MINSEITO, as its president, aiming at the studying of concrete proposals for organizing new parties. On 12 January, the committee decided on their fundamental program as the so-called "inauguration, under the leadership of His Majesty the Emperor, of a political association of all the comrades in the country, taking as their object the fulfilment of the war, to unite all the efforts of people to resolutely put into effect strong policies". On the 17th of the same month, after discussing the various projects, the said committee decided that the "Assistance Political Association should be dissolved" to organize a new political party. This was also unanimously voted and passed after a discussion by the Highest Staff Conference of the Assistance Political Association on the 19th (in which standing secretaries led by President KOBAYASHI KIZO and various department heads were present). Then the said proposal was submitted to the Diet for discussion. Premier KOISO, likewise, expressed his approval for the formation of the new party and announced that he was prepared to reorganize the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and Youth Brigade of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association into "subsidiary administrative organs" of the Government so that they will not handicap the organization of the new party. In a conference of the secretaries of the Assistance Political Association on the 30th, the majority approved the intention of the Government. From the attitude of KOISO to support the proposal of the Assistance Political Association, it is quite possible that this "new political party" will soon be realized.

The Imperial Rule Assistance Association, because of its bureaucratic leadership, has not been able to carry through its mobilization of the people. On the other hand, the Assistance Political Association was established only for the control of the Diet and had no relationship with the masses of the people. At a time when it has become necessary for the Japanese Fascists to mobilize all the people to carry on its desperate struggle, the old mechanism has long become useless. Consequently, here arises the demand for the coming into being of the "new political party". Notwithstanding the fact that, as a result of the internal conflicts of the Japanese ruling classes, the formal inauguration of the "new political party" will have to wait for a series of ugly internal struggles and compromises among themselves, and that the form of the "new party" has yet to be decided, yet, as there is the possibility for elements of the defunct political parties to regain their former positions and influences, the "new party" will be comparatively useful in cheating and stupefying the masses of people and thereby may possibly recruit a comparatively larger number of masses for the Japanese Fascists. Thus, the development of the "new party" is still worth our attention.

Typist: James Lew

For C. T. C.

T.H.B.

(Enclosure no. 5 to despatch no. 290, April 11,)
(1945 from American Embassy, Chungking, China.)

RESTRICTEDU.S. USE ONLY

TR 389

CO-ORDINATED TRANSLATION CENTER
CHUNGKING

30 MAR 1945

TRANSLATION: O.W.I./GUO DA

ACTION: O.W.I.
INFO: Embassy
OSS, Stevens
G-2 (2)
FileFROM: "GIEFANG RHBAO" (The Emancipation Daily),
Published in YENAN, 5 February 1945.ADVOCACY OF JAPANESE DIET MEMBERS FOR THE "NEW PARTY".

--Composite Report of the Editing Board--

In the following, we are introducing the opinions of Japanese Diet members, NAKAJIMA Yadanji (中島 彌 園 次), MATSUMURA Kenzo (松村 謙 三) and KIGURASHI Budayu (木暮 武 大 夫), for the organization of a new Fascist party. Both NAKAJIMA and MATSUMURA were once members of the defunct MINSEITO, while the latter, particularly, has been the chairman of the Political Affairs Investigation Committee of the Assistance Political Association. KIGURASHI was a member of the defunct SEIYUKAI. The political inclinations of these three men are all comparatively moderate and their opinion can be taken as the representative of the general opinion of the Assistance Political Association.

NAKAJIMA Yadanji: "The organization of the Assistance Political Association is like a flock of variegated feathers. It comprises not only Diet members but also persons of other circles. What is more is, these people do not collaborate one with the other. It hasn't got any root, for it hasn't got any branches. On the other hand, although the Imperial Rule Assistance Association has a footing, and although it is making use of the prefecture magistrates as mediums to communicate with the lower strata, it hasn't got any skeleton. It hasn't got any head, for its head has been merged amidst the officials. Its head and feet take actions on their own accord. . . . If there isn't a union of comrades, there isn't certainly a way out of the present political dilemma." (Cf. Oriental Economics New Gazette, 29 July 1944.)

MATSUMURA Kenzo: "A union of comrades should be set up and made to be united with the masses of the people. If there are people who have different motives and opinions, they should also be allowed to be formed into organizations. There would be nothing more stupid than to think it dangerous to allow such people to be organized during time of war. . . . Let us grant the right to be organized to every one. In this way, birds of the same feather will flock together. A clear distinction will thus be made between black and white. Should there be elements of anti-war inclination among them, it would be easy for us to swoop down upon them at one stroke." (Cf. ASHI SHIMBUN, Western Part, 23 September 1944.)

KIGURASHI Budayu: "As the hands and feet of the defunct political parties in the past were extended directly into the local cities, towns and villages; so they were able to effect a thorough communication in transmitting the sentiments of the people to those on the top and thereby were able to seize the popularity of the people. . . . The political power of the Assistance Political Association should be resolutely strengthened with a view to re-establishing a national political organization capable of

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

TR 389 - page 2

CO-ORDINATED TRANSLATION CENTER
CHUNGKING

30 MAR 1945

commanding the popularity of the people." (Cf. DIAMOND Magazine, 1 August 1944.)

Likewise, the ORIENTAL ECONOMICS, a magazine representing the viewpoint of the Japanese bourgeois classes, said: "The Imperial Rule Assistance Association was firstly started to be a political party for Prince KONOYE. It got astray and changed its form and turned into a semi-government organization. . . . It began its life as a still born baby which died when it was still in its mother's womb. The former TOJO Cabinet went further to reduce its organization to make it more feeble than ever. It would be better if the new Cabinet would dissolve it resolutely. The Assistance Political Association might be said, so to speak, a child adopted because of the death of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. It is but a substitute. The political thinking of one political party for one government is absolutely intolerant to our national polity. This explains the sad history of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. For this same reason the Imperial Rule Assistance Association should not be allowed to live long. . . . It would be better to dissolve it to organize a new and lively political party. Of course, such political party to be formed is not necessarily to be confined to only one in number. Let us form several of these organizations of comrades really united." (Cf. Editorial, ORIENTAL ECONOMICS, 5 August 1944.)

Typist: Szetu, Cheh

For C.T.C.
T.H.B.RESTRICTED

~~LI~~
 DC/R
 Please "file with" despatch no.290
 of April 11, 1945 from Chungking, file no.
 894.00/4-1145

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF RESEARCH & PUBLICATION
 FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS UNIT
 JUL 16 1945

7/17/45
 JUL 20 1945
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

J.M. Perkins
 RE-206

~~TS~~
~~OA~~
~~INT~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 JUL 16 1945
 DIVISION OF
 RESEARCH AND PUBLICATION

RP (Mr. Perkins), Will
 reference to our phone talks
 of July 5, would LI like
 to file these, or should they
 go to DCR? Either way is
 OK with me
 A. S. Chase (CA)

*No to economy hospitals
will be put with files. 290
inter # 4/32*

TR 494 April 11, 1945 *turn change*
CO-ORDINATED TRANSLATION CENTER
CHUNGKING

14 MAY 1945

TRANSLATION: O.W.I./M.L.Chien

ACTION: O.W.I. (24)
INFO: OSS Stevens (8)
Embassy (6)
G-2 (2)
File

DIVISION OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
JUN 30 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*2 to Wan
1 to Navy
1 to OSS
6/12/45*

FROM: KEIZAI MAENICHI (Daily Economics)
Published 1 January 1945, in TOKYO

THE URGENT INSTALLATION OF UNDERGROUND FACTORIES FOR PROTECTION AGAINST AIR RAIDS

International Information
Division

The Future of "Air-defensive" Factories

JUL 13 1945

Recently, enemy air raids on the Japanese homeland have become frequent. Up to now, their attack has been limited to sporadic bombings from reconnaissance planes, but from now on, we must be prepared to witness some real bombing of our military establishments, essential munitions factories, and metropolitan cities by enemy bombers based on the CHINA continent, SAIPON, Northern territories, or aircraft carriers. It is also to be expected that the same type of blanket bombing as seen in GERMANY will be repeated here in our land.

Under such circumstances, it is obvious that by depending upon the evacuation of factories from the cities alone, as is now generally practiced, the perfection of our defensive structure can hardly be attained. The prevalent scheme adopted consists of the dispersion of plant equipment and buildings from concentrated or inadequately protected districts into far distant localities. However, no particular significance seems to be attached to this policy, as we really do not know where safety is, judging from recent bombing experiences. In the case of factories, the damage from air raids will not be limited to those parts that receive direct hits, but will extend, to a lesser degree to all surrounding buildings, and even to equipment. With the present difficulty of procuring supplies and materials, the task of recovery will not be an easy one.

Viewed from these stand points, future evacuated factories or new installations must be located in places which are both convenient to transportation facilities as well as absolutely safe from air raids. Therefore, it is urgently hoped that the existance of underground factories situated in favorable environment will be realized at the earliest possible moment. This applies not only to the factories, but also to important structures in the big cities, with the result that underground cities may even come into being. In previous national defense schemes, underground factories and cities such as these were not contemplated. Nevertheless, their evacuation to the underground has become the most essential subject for consideration today. Even in Germany which may be termed the headquarters of planning, the realization of underground factories is only a very recent affair, i.e., after her reverses at Stalingrad and the Allies' bombing of Hamburg and other cities. It is reported that Germany, together with the execution of her factory evacuation schemes is devoting her entire energy to the installation of the so-called tunnel factories. Although we are not entirely aware of the details, we understand, according to an explanation by the Tachibana (立花) railway chief, that comparatively shallow tunnels are dug there in level ground wherein essential machinery only can be housed. All other installations for public welfare, such as dining halls, change rooms, and lavatories for the workmen, as well as buildings for business use, are left on the surface. Accordingly, the strange scene of ventilators and chimneys sticking their heads out unexpectedly above the ground in the midst of meadows can often be seen.

TK 494 - Page 2

CO-ORDINATED TRANSLATION CENTER
CHUNGKING

14 MAY 1945

The Maginot line, penetrated by the German forces at the beginning of the present European War, is also a type of underground factory. We need comment no more about how safely deep underground work might be conducted in it under air bombing conditions. Moreover, the fact, that our soldiers at Rabaul have recovered from enemy bombings amounting to 700,000 tons (sic) for the duration of half a year and are still keeping up their resistance bravely against enemy attack, is also chiefly due to the gift of underground factories.

Another instance of underground city may be found in Moscow where underground railways have since early days been built in the earth formations. Disregarding profit considerations, and aiming intently at the attainment of a high safety factor against air bombing, the Russians refused assistance from technicians of other countries and completed the hard task by their own painstaking exertions. The Russian capital may be said to be favored by nature in having under it a stratum of hard shale most suitable for digging tunnels. If this is fully utilized, an underground city with accommodations for 2 to 3 hundred thousands of people can be built.

The existence of underground factories and cities, and several-story underground buildings is not only necessary for the maintenance and increase of production at present, but will also be found useful in time to come.

Three important benefits stand out in the construction of underground factories and cities. Firstly, the protection of essential installations from air raids as above mentioned can be realized. Secondly, viewed from the strategical stand point military burdens for the protection of important cities and factories as at present can be alleviated. Air planes, for instance, hitherto assigned to defense work may be partly diverted to the front. Thirdly, vacant grounds, which have suddenly increased recently, may be turned into farms for the production of more food stuffs. Other beneficial points besides the present objectives may make themselves evident with the progress of the work.

The Technique of Underground Factories

Whether in Berlin or in London, it seems that a certain amount of accomplishment has been made in the way of underground factories. It is said that 5 to 15 meters will be considered safe as far as underground depth is concerned. However, with the development of the explosive power in bombs, no one can be sure that these depths are absolutely free from danger. Therefore, underground installations should be built with as thick a cover as possible. In underground work, not all places are suitable; investigations on the locality, geology, and underground water table should be first made to determine the feasibility of the particular location concerned. Moreover, favorable conditions for housing the factory alone are not the only criterion, as convenient and spacious grounds will be needed for the construction of accessories such as living quarters for staffs and workmen, offices, store-rooms, and transportation layouts. In the case of the aircraft industry, in order to concentrate a great many of its subsidiary industries, specializing on individual parts, it is necessary to house all related factories in the same belt underground which would give the appearance of a tunnel city. These elaborate plans should be fully considered in our main city and national defense plans. The urgent subject confronting us today is the transfer of important workshops on surface to underground.

CO-ORDINATED TRANSLATION CENTER
CHUNGKING

14 MAY 1945

TR 494 - Page 3

Anyway, from engineering considerations, the geology and underground water need, first of all, be investigated. Localities where the underground water table is deep-seated will be preferred. The effect of the height of underground water level often depends upon the height of underground structures, but according to UJIIE FUMIYA (内家文彌), it is only necessary to dig about ten meters below the surface in the case of shallow structures of the open-cut type, and in the case of deep installations like the tunnel type, it will be advisable to go to a depth of from 20 to 30 meters beyond the penetrating depth of the bombs. The tunnel type forms the most perfect type for "air-defensive" factories. Its breadth is naturally limited, but it is said that under favorable geological and topographical conditions, a width as much as 12 meters can be safely constructed.

Next, regarding the nature of the ground, it may be generally stated that the harder the better. However, granite structures are too hard to dig in and will not answer the requirement of speed for emergency work. The big valley stone (大谷山) as found in Tociken (栃木) Prefecture is of strong and tenacious texture and lends to economy both in men and materials. The soft rocky mountains often seen along the sea coasts or the hard sedimentary formations, ordinarily known as "dotanban", or the limestone beds are most suitable. It is said that tunnelling can also be efficiently driven in the soft red, brownish clay strata such as the loams of the Kanto (関東) district. It is generally thought that, judging from the underground water level, topographic conditions, geological structures, and transportation facilities, there are innumerable locations in the country suitable for the erection of underground factories. Particularly, in one part of a certain prefecture, everything fits admirably into these requirements and large areas are available for the realization of underground cities. As these belts possess ample space for accomodating many installations underground, they are regarded as excellent sites for either evacuated or newly constructed plants.

For reference, the following table is taken from FUJIDA KINICHIRO's (藤田金一郎) book on "Underground Factories and Surface-sealed Plants":

Depth of Earth-cover and Size of Underground Openings

(Unit in meters)

Nature of Surface Layer	(Unit in meters)		
	Ordinary red earth	Hard clay 二升	Rocky formation
Minimum Earth Cover	(1st Kind) 30	20	10
	(2nd Kind) 20	13	7
Maximum Width of Opening	1 - 1.5 2 - 3 (with supports)	5	Varies with type of rock
Maximum Height of Opening	23	5	- ditto -
Minimum Spacing of Partition walls between openings	(1st Kind) 40	30	20
	(2nd Kind) 25	20	12

TR 494 - Page 4

CO-ORDINATED TRANSLATION CENTER
CHUNGKING

14 MAY 1945

According to FUJIDA, the relation between the tunnel type of underground factories and geology is roughly indicated in the above table. Of course, depending upon geological conditions and the ways of application, there will probably arise in practice many cases much more difficult to deal with than those cited in the table. FUJIDA has explained that the first kind indicated in the table is applicable to the accommodation of essential supplies or installations, and the maximum length of a single opening should not be over 50 meters, and in any case no longer than necessary. To suit the requirements of storage or of the flow-sheet of operations, branch tunnels may be provided where necessary. The branch tunnels may be laid out at right angles with the main openings, or at two or more right angle turns as the nature of the operations may call for. In case where right angle bends are hard to make, protection walls with crooked passages may be built instead. Shield walls should be provided at all entrances and exits. If constructed of consolidated earth, protection walls should have a thickness of 1.2 meters; in the case of earth bags, or tamped sand-filled partitions, they should be over 0.8 meters. Timber supports are necessary to guard against the collapse of earth embankments, both inside the tunnels and at the mouths of openings. Side ditches should be dug to drain any underground spring water naturally into the open ground outside. Moreover, ventilating shafts must be bored to afford natural ventilation inside the tunnels. Where necessary, mechanical blowers for the partial or complete regulation of underground air, and suitable means for the prevention of the formation of dew may be adopted.

Installation of Underground Equipments:

As human beings are to stay and work underground, it becomes essential that the problems of light and air must be considered. The installation of artificial sun-light lamps is now possible and a certain structure in Tokyo today has already been so equipped. With respect to ventilation, if vent holes are provided in the ceiling and underground structures, tunnels, and entrances are made to facilitate the passing of air currents, not only will ventilation be accomplished through the force of the wind, but natural ventilation may also be realized from the difference in temperature between underground and surface airs. In addition, there are the methods of ventilation by mechanical blowers and ozone generation. Water supply and drainage problems underground are easily solved. In the event of attack from poisonous gas, underground factories can be comparatively easily protected through air-tight arrangements at all openings communicating with the outside, while, on the other hand, surface structures would be entirely vulnerable. For the transportation of supplies and products either into or out of the ground, inclines or car and passenger lifts can be constructed without any difficulty.

According to UJIE, expenditure for the engineering operations varies with the type of factories. But, where as ordinary wooden structures having a minimum safety factor in strength cost from 600 to 700 yen per Tsubo (1 Tsubo equals 36 square feet, Japanese), underground tunnels can be driven at a approximate cost of 650 yen per Tsubo. The former requires much timber, while the latter uses lots of cement.

TR 494 - Page 5

CO-ORDINATED TRANSLATION CENTER
CHUNGKING

14 MAY 1945

From the above discussions, it will be seen that there are many favorable points in underground factories. Everything depends upon the determination of the government. TACHIBANA, the railway head, has voiced the opinion that rather than let individual factories carry out their own reconstruction work, it would be better to organize a "syndicate of tunnel factories" and expedite the work through government assistance. Anyway, the investigation of this problem by the government is urgently called for.

As mentioned before, the thorough transfer of industries such as the aircraft manufacture to the underground will not be a easy task. Heavy industries, too, will meet with difficulties. However, it will be entirely feasible with the machine industries, or the telegraphic, telephonic, and radar industry, the precision instruments, industry, and the chemical industry, which yield no gas or dust. If ventilation and damp-prevention devices are provided, those industries that require low humidity can also be installed underground. The only drawback is that the workmen will become gloomy because of being barred from sunshine the whole year around. But as the temperature underground is practically constant for all the seasons, the environment is most suitable for precision industries, and cool Summers and warm Winter will also contribute to the pleasantness of work. Factories engaged in the manufacture of motors of airplanes and their parts, for instance, should be removed underground without delay.

Thus, when large plants in considerable numbers are completed under ploughed fields or forests and the work of production is conducted silently day or night, it goes without saying that the strength it represents will indeed be very great. This should be the future trend for all factories and cities.

Typist: N. Y. Chen

For C. T. C.

T. A. B.

To Department
L
RR

TR 458

CO-ORDINATED TRANSLATION CENTER
CHUNGKING

28 APR 1945

TRANSLATION: O.S.S./C.W.TU & GROUP

ACTION: F.E.A. (18)
INFO: Embassy (6)
G-2 (2)
FileFROM: SHANSI HWA PEI HSIN PAO (SHANSI NORTH CHINA Newspaper,
(in Chinese),
Published in TAIYAUN, SHANSI, 30 January 1945.NEW JAPANESE ECONOMIC POLICY IN CHINA WILL BE REALIZED SOON.

The 'CHINA Problem' was discussed spiritedly in the 68th session of the Japanese Diet. SHIGEMITSU, the Minister of the Greater East Asia Ministry, had explained the new Japanese economic policy towards CHINA in detail to the members of the Diet on the 21st of this month and made a statement to the effect that this new policy shall be put into effect very soon. This matter has received the closest attention of all those concerned. This is because the inflation of currency in SHANGHAI has reached such a dangerous stage that adequate measures must be taken to stop this. In answering the questions raised by Mitsugu TANAKA (田中實) SHIGEMITSU has said the following:

"The resources of CHINA have very important direct connection with the present war and consequently the Government of JAPAN must take drastic steps to achieve the complete control not only of the resources but also of the inflation problem which has close relationship with the smooth execution of the new policy in CHINA. In doing so the economic bond between JAPAN and CHINA will be further strengthened. The Government intends to form a Supreme Council to supervise the purchasing and control of all resources and the council is to be formed by the delegates of the various Japanese organizations in CHINA."

Local authorities in various parts of CHINA have received this piece of news gravely. For example, SHIGEMITSU's statement was published in head lines by the HSIN CHUNG KUO PAO (New CHINA Daily) on January the 25th. The Council so formed will have the function of an economic strategic office and it will serve as an important weapon of JAPAN in the centralized control of production, purchasing, distribution and transportation of resources in CHINA. This Council will work in close collaboration with the Price Committee of the SHANGHAI Japanese Economic Council. This new economic policy will be put in force as soon as Minister HORIUCHI (堀内) returns to CHINA.

Typist: Szetu, Cheh

For C.T.C.
T.H.B.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

APR 18 1945

28615

file
4-19-46
DR

MJW-1005
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

London
Dated April 12, 1945
Rec'd 8:10 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington
3732, April 12, 7 p.m.

Office of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 17 1945
Department of State

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
achv. 4/16 EHC
APR 13 1945
J
HF

Following summary of political background material contained in this week's Far Eastern directive of British PWE is interesting as showing combined thought on recent events in Japan of Foreign Office, Ministry of Information and military.

While the denunciation of the Russo-Japanese neutrality pact has probably come at a very inconvenient moment for the Japanese, there is no evidence that it contributed directly to the fall of the Koiso cabinet, but the probability that some such action might be taken before the end of April may well have been influential. It is believed that the Suzuki cabinet should be considered to represent the facade believed appropriate for external and internal presentation by the "statesmen around the throne". Suzuki can be considered a "grand old man" having the ear of the Emperor and who commands the loyalty of orthodox Japanese. A nice balance has been struck in the cabinet itself

between

894.00/4-1245

Confidential File

Note
261-9411
894.002
740.0011PW

DCR - EUR Unit			
Anal.	Rev.	Cat.	Dist.

-2- #3732, April 12, 7 p.m. from London

between all shades of Japanese opinion and it has been chosen to meet any possible turn in events. As occasion demands Suzuki could be represented as the embodiment of the Samurai principle or as the friend of high-placed British and Americans who was a near martyr to democracy in 1936 when his murder was attempted by military extremists. In the same way Togo, as Foreign Minister, could be shown either as a friend of Germany and thus no man to sue for peace, as a participator in the negotiation of the Russo-Japanese neutrality pact and a reputed friend of Russia, or as a career diplomat who only follows orders. The inclusion of Minami, the elderly extremist, insures close association between the government and the great Japan political association. Big business, the civil service, and the two former main political parties are all represented, and the army and navy members are competent service men. It is believed that a concession to jingoistic opinion may have been made by the appointment of Doihara as director general of military education. While many members of the new cabinet are relatively unknown as politicians, they may well appear to the Japanese as competent persons ready to carry out the necessary tasks. There is reason to suppose that Suzuki's cabinet is a government which will continue the struggle grimly enough and the appointments of

Sugiyama

-3- #3732, April 12, 7 p.m. from London

Sugiyama and Hata support this belief.

Allison now attends London PWE weekly Far Eastern meetings and can send similar summaries in future if desired. London office of OWI sends one copy of complete directive to George Taylor, OWI, Washington, which may be available to Department. Please instruct.

WIN:NT

RB

RECORDED & INDEXED

TELETYPE UNIT

APR 13 1945

APR 13 1945

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

DIVISION OF
RECEIVED

Handwritten initials/signature

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
SECRET X
CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTED
CLEAR

Charge Department:

Department of State

Charge to

Washington,

SECRET

APR 18 1945

3 P.M.

telegrams
closely paraphrased
being communicated
to anyone.
SECRET

AMEMBASSY,

LONDON, (ENGLAND).

3013

The summary of British combined thought on Far Eastern matters contained in your 3732, April 12, 7 p.m., was interesting and useful and we would appreciate the Embassy's continuing to send similar telegraphic summaries whenever in its opinion the information would be of service to the Department.

894.00/4-1245

RECEIVED
DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICE

APR 18 7 13 07

ROOM
RELEASES DESK

DCR - EUR Unit	
EA	
TC	
7	
Dial	

Stettinius (JMB) gmb

Confidential File

894.00
~~844.00~~/4-1245

JA:ERDickover:MP
4-16-45

Handwritten initials

RB RB
FE

Handwritten signature

APR 18

OR ✓

894.00/4-1245
CS/MAJ
SENT

44448



EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Moscow, U.S.S.R., April 12, 1945.

No. 1618

OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
DISTRIBUTION
MAY 1 1945

Subject: Soviet Press Article on Japanese Internal Political Situation.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
LIAISON OFFICE
APR 30 1945
DC/L

APR 26 AM 9 34

OFFICE OF ECONOMIC SECURITY CONTROLS
file
MAY 12 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

155
12A
12A
2ES
20A
muc
Copy in IM

UNRESTRICTED

The Ambassador has the honor to enclose a translation of an article by E. Zhukov, entitled "The Internal Political Situation of Japan". The article appeared in the Army daily, "Red Star", on February 4, 1945. Zhukov is the foremost author on Japan in the Russian press.

Although this article appeared some months ago it is still of interest because of its rather comprehensive and dispassionate analysis of the domestic Japanese political scene.

Of current interest are the comments on the psychological changes which are occurring in the Japanese people now that their military reverses are being brought home to them.

Zhukov likewise emphasizes the serious and interrelated food and production problems now confronting the Japanese. He points out that drawing on Korean and Chinese labor to remedy the manpower shortage does not diminish the burden of the war on the Japanese people. He concludes that the war is now definitely unpopular with the Japanese people.

Note
740-0011EW

894.00/4-1245

Enclosure:

Translation of article on political situation in Japan.

JD:is

Original and hectograph to the Department.
Copies to: 1) Embassy, Chungking.
2) Office of the Political Advisers, Headquarters, USF, China Theater.

DCR - EUR Unit
Anal *fc* *sw*
Rev.
Cat.
Dist.

MAY 15 1945

DCR - EUR Unit
Anal
Rev.
Cat.
Dist.

894.00/4-1245
CS/MAD
St. K.

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch
No. 1618, dated April 12, 1945,
from American Embassy, Moscow.

(Translation)

SOURCE: Red Star, February 4,
1945. Moscow.

THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION OF JAPAN
By E. Zhukov.

In the course of the Pacific war substantial changes have occurred. Anglo-American armed forces are undertaking great offensive operations on almost all fronts of the Pacific theater of war. The Allies are moving forward in Burma. The troops of General MacArthur are broadening their base of operations in the Philippine Islands. American B-29 long-range bombers are systematically attacking industrial targets in Japan.

The activization of military operations in the Pacific ocean and the approach of the war to the shores of the Japanese islands has sharpened the attention of international observers to the internal political situation of Japan.

The Japanese press gives little material upon which to form an opinion on internal political shifts and moods. Official information in Japan, even in the years of relative flourishing of parliamentary policy, was distinguished by its extraordinary one-sidedness and incompleteness. Only by a collation of various indirect indications is it possible to make a general evaluation of the direction and perspective of the political development of Japan.

In the summer of 1944 a change in the Japanese government took place. This event exerted a considerable influence on the political atmosphere in Japan. The forced resignation of General Tojo, the recognized leader of militaristic circles, showed that the idea of a military-fascist dictatorship does not have support even in the highest circles in Japan. General Tojo, whose government in December 1941 was the initiator of the unleashing of war in the Pacific Ocean, in many respects copied the ill-fated European fascist leaders. In the foreign press suggestions were even made that Tojo would not mind playing the role of a Japanese "fuehrer". There is no doubt that circles close to General Tojo were really imbued with pro-Hitlerite "ideas". All more or less independent people, known for their liberal or simply moderate views, were mercilessly driven out of the government apparatus. Those few officials who survived that "purge" owed their survival exclusively to the fact that they belonged to or were close to court circles.

Great

- 2 -

Great hopes arose in parliamentary circles in Japan in connection with the resignation of Tojo. The Parliament in Japan formally exists and functions as it did before the war. It was not abolished or forbidden to function, but the fascist "infection" poisoned in practice the application of the Japanese constitution, which had existed unchanged since 1889. During the years of the emergence into the political limelight of fascist officers and bureaucrats, the relative importance of the Japanese Parliament was greatly decreased. The authority of the Parliament was always based in the past on its ability -- although to a limited degree -- to express public sentiment. The struggle of various political parties, finding its reflection within the walls of Parliament, created an impression of a certain "independence" and an ability, sometimes at least, to serve as a sounding board for the public opinion of the country.

In 1940, parliamentary political parties in Japan were dissolved. Any kind of criticism of the militaristic and pro-fascist policy of Japanese cabinets was recognized as inadmissible. An attempt was made to unify the political life of the country through the creation of a "united" organization, able to absorb or subordinate to itself all public and cultural organizations of the country. Such an organization was the Taisei Iokusankai or "Association for Aid to the Throne". The structure of the association proved extraordinarily complicated and unwieldy. At its head was placed the prime minister himself, and expenditures for the maintenance of the association were included in the state budget, which from the very beginning gave it the features of a clearly government enterprise. Governors headed local branches of the association. The central staff of the association, filled up with retired generals and admirals, was overgrown with numerous sections, bureaus, committees and sub-committees. This gave to the new organization a purely bureaucratic appearance. The absence of a mass membership strengthened such an impression.

Fearing the activity of the popular masses, not having sufficient flexibility to "condescend" to the level of the ranks of the electors, the Association for Aid to the Throne did not have the capacity or the ability to replace the former political parties. The leaders of the Association soon proved to be generals without an army.

But Parliament, transformed into a voiceless gathering of people deprived of the opportunity to criticize the actions of the government, ceased to play an active political role.

The initiators of the creation of a "new political structure" -- as the beginning of a reorganization to a new fascist order in Japan was called -- soon became convinced that the prohibition of political parties and the creation

of

- 3 -

of the unified Association for Aid to the Throne had not achieved its purpose. The "national unity" of which Japanese reactionary circles dreamed had not been realized. In particular the deputies in Parliament grouped themselves as formerly according to the principle of prior allegiance to this or that political party. The Association for Aid to the Throne proved powerless to hinder this.

On May 15, 1942, a new organization, Iokusai Seijikai or "Political Association for Aid to the Throne", was created. It was to unite all deputies of Parliament and all members of the dissolved political parties on the basis of a certain compromise. Parliamentary groups were granted the facade of organizational independence within the framework of allegiance to a unified war program. The parliamentary "Political Association for Aid to the Throne" was declared formally independent and equal in rights with the first, that is, the bureaucratic Association for Aid to the Throne, remaining "outside politics". This showed that even General Tojo recognized the impossibility of realizing the original plan of absolute fascist unification of the whole political life of Japan.

The bankruptcy of the military-political course of Tojo and the creation in the summer of 1944 of a new governmental combination in which prominent representatives of former parliamentary groups were included, revived the hopes of leaders of the old bourgeois-landowner parties of Japan for the possibility of their full legalization. In distinction from its predecessor, the Tojo government, the cabinet of Koiso-Yonai cannot be called openly pro-fascist. Soon after the coming to power of Koiso, the Japanese press began to discuss plans for the "re-creation" of parliamentary parties, and the new cabinet of Koiso-Yonai made a series of gestures which were interpreted as promises along this line. The sphere of the Association for Aid to the Throne was narrowed. The new government refused to give the support to this unpopular, un-unified party that it had formerly enjoyed. General Abe resigned from the post of President of the Political Association for Aid to the Throne and was succeeded by Admiral Koyayashi. (In Japan a tradition has become established according to which naval men are supposed to be distinguished by greater "liberalism" than army men. Thus, this shift was interpreted as a sign of a favourable attitude toward parliamentary circles). This impression was further strengthened after the recent designation of Kobayashi -- as the representative of the Parliamentarians -- to the post of Minister without Portfolio. In this connection, the crisis of such a clearly semi-fascist organization as the "Union of Youth" of Japan was aggravated. The tendency of the leaders of the organization -- prominent figures of the rightist camp,

the

- 4 -

the retired General Tatekawa and the retired Colonel Hashimoto, -- to attain autonomy of this organization and to grant to it special rights transforming it not only into a war reserve, but to an independent channel of ideological-political inculcation of the population with a fascist spirit, failed. This failure again evidenced the lowering of the influence of pro-Hitlerite forces in Japan. Parliamentary circles in Japan plainly are demanding not only limitation of the rights of the reactionary "Union of Youth" but even the disbanding of this organization. This has called forth sharp protest from some Japanese military circles. But the immediately following resignation of General Tatekawa from the post of leader of the youth union, and of Colonel Hashimoto from the leadership of its organization in Tokyo, show that the influence of parliamentary circles has somewhat increased. The new chief of the "Union of Youth" is a "civilian" -- the chairman of the Japanese Information Bureau, Ogata.

The course of the Pacific war undoubtedly is strengthening the disappointment of the Japanese people in the policy of aggression and the promises connected with it which were liberally given out at one time by pro-fascist politicians of the Tojo type. Undoubtedly, this has been evidenced by increasing attention to Parliament as a constitutional organ, able to a certain extent to reflect the sentiments of certain social groups.

The 86th session of the Japanese Parliament, now in session, works in an atmosphere of growing alarm occasioned by the sharp worsening of the military-political situation of Japan. The major speech of Prime Minister General Koiso, given at the 86th session of the Parliament, abounded with very frank admissions. Koiso stated that Japan has been in a most serious situation since the beginning of the war ... and actually stands on the brink of a crisis, on the outcome of which depends its rise or fall". Koiso stated that Japan has already become "a field of battle" and may meet with still worse trials. The Japanese government introduced for the consideration of the 86th parliamentary session over 30 legislative bills, mainly connected with attempts for the solution of pressing problems of wartime. The most urgent and difficult problems put forward at the session in the speeches of Koiso and other ministers were the following: Increase in plane production, the development of industry on the continent and the destruction of the "barrier" between Japan and the "overseas territories", the decentralization of war plants and establishing some of them underground, the maximum mobilization of manpower, and the increase in ocean transport with a simultaneous replacement of a part of ocean haulage by land transport (the development of the chief railway lines in Japan and Korea).

The

- 5 -

The Parliamentary session, having listened to the alarming speeches of Koiso and other ministers, did not allow itself to criticize the government openly. However, the Japanese press was marked by quite definite symptoms of disappointment mixed with alarm, and even dissatisfaction with the activity of the cabinet of Koiso-Yonai. The source of this dissatisfaction lies not only in the strategic failures of Japan, but in the fact that the government of Koiso, although it is different from its predecessor, has not found in itself the strength completely to break with the former reactionary political course.

Parliamentary circles are disappointed with the constant manoeuvring of the Koiso government, which has not decided to legalize the main bourgeois-landowner political parties. Reflecting this disappointment, the newspaper "Tokyo Shimbun", as early as January 6th indicated that "the people are feeling a certain dissatisfaction in regard to the measures of the government." On January 18th this same paper criticized the half-way, compromise character of the government policy. As is clear from reports in the Japanese press, Parliamentary circles are particularly dissatisfied by the parallel existence of the "Political Association for Aid to the Throne", the "Association for Aid to the Throne" (although with curtailed functions), and the notorious "Youth Union" with its pro-Hitlerite tendencies. The discord between these three organizations, formally called on in an equal degree to serve as a "support" for the government, has even evoked projects for merging them in one "powerful" union under the title "All-Japanese Political Society". Part of the Japanese press has supported the demand for such unification with proposals that this time the leading role in a united organization shall be played not by pro-fascist figures with shady reputations but by Parliamentary politicians. It is doubtful, however, that any one new organization which might be created on the basis of the three different unions existing at present, could really control or "dissolve" without trace the reactionary forces which continue to exert a very strong influence on the internal political life of Japan.

Japan has waged war for a long time. The Japanese ruling classes in 1931 were the first to start on the road of violent repartition of the world after the first world war. But down to 1941 the aggressive actions of Japan with few exceptions did not require too much effort on her part. The sacrifices made by Japan during the time from the autumn of 1931 until the moment of the coming of the crisis in the course of the Pacific War, that is until the beginning of 1944, were comparatively small. Under these conditions the Japanese man in the street was much more easily subject to military pro-fascist propaganda which had inculcated faith in the military invincibility of Japan and in the absolute "superiority" of the Japanese spirit. Only comparatively recently did Japan gradually begin to know the bitterness

of

- 6 -

of defeat. Now, this feeling of weakness before superior and constantly growing forces of the enemy inevitably must exert and already is exerting influence on Japanese psychology. The Japanese press is already unanimously remarking that the former success of the high-throne chauvinistic propaganda with the inevitable declamations on the "superiority of the Samurai spirit" is losing its influence. The fact that the Japanese capital is subject to frequent raids of American bombers of course seriously affects the mood of the population. This is indicated by the frequent complaints of the Japanese press about all kinds of "insidious rumours", which undermine the people's spirit of resistance.

The logic of the development of military events and in particular the economic consequences of the prolonged war are reflected in the attitudes of the population. In spite of the high degree of mobilization of Japanese industry for war needs, factories are not coping with growing war orders. The recent dismissal of the Japanese Minister of Armaments -- the prominent industrialist Fujiwara, and his replacement by Yosida, a representative of bureaucratic circles, aroused a certain perplexity and even agitation among a certain part of the Japanese bourgeoisie. Food difficulties are also making themselves felt. Japan always imported a considerable part of her food requirements. Under war conditions this import has proved very difficult, not only because of the sharp decrease in means of transport (chiefly shipping) but because of the approach of military operations on the sea and in the air to the Japanese islands.

At the beginning of January 1945, the Japanese newspaper "Asahi" noted with alarm that "with the increase in intensity of the war, the relationship between demand and supply of rice and also of other food products will become still more strained this year... Prospects for the rice harvest in Korea are unfavourable; prospects for the import of rice from Formosa are also unfavourable owing to difficulties with transport." In the rationed supply of the urban population of Japan, the chief place has hitherto been occupied by rice. The negligible quantity of fish (75 grammes per week) and the almost complete absence of other products, especially fats and meat, is making rice the only means of nourishment in the ration of the average Japanese. If now Japan is deprived of the possibility of importing rice from the territories temporarily controlled by her, this may have very severe consequences for her.

The problem of the utilization by Japan of the manpower and material resources of other eastern Asiatic countries determines to a large extent the formation of a correct judgement on the ability of Japan to withstand further prolonged war stresses. The Japanese prime minister General Koiso has repeatedly emphasized in his public speeches that the present war has forced Japan to extend the law on military

service

- 7 -

service to Korea and Formosa. Korean and Chinese workers have been brought into Japan in large number to fill out the lack of manpower both in industry and agriculture. The utilization of this imported labour force and the calling up for the army of a part of the colonial population of the Japanese Empire means, however, a diminution of the burden of war borne by the population of the mother country. In Japan itself, as early as the middle of October of 1944, a law was adopted on the calling up into the army of 17 year old youths. This indicates the considerable strain of the Japanese situation in regard to manpower reserves. The Japanese press therefore already is giving special attention to the necessity of military training for the whole Japanese population. This openly indicates the approach of real danger of enemy landing operations on Japanese territory.

Undoubtedly the war, having turned its unpleasant side to the Japanese, is ceasing to be popular. Already the sonorous phrases on the "sacred war" and the "sphere of joint flourishing", etc., have lost their former magnetic influence. A sizable portion of the population of Japan, evidently, already is beginning to perceive such declamation as a "brilliant" verbal shell, concealing bitter kernels of reality.

The unpopularity of the war in Japan is already so evident that Japanese government figures are persistently proving that this war was forced on Japan and that it bears, they say, a purely defensive character. In the government declaration published in connection with the anniversary of the adoption of the so-called "Greater East Asia Charter", the following is stated: "The present war is a war of self-defence, a war for the preservation of our national policy, a war which Japan was forced to wage". These same notes were sounded in the speeches of the Japanese Prime Minister Koiso and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Shigemitsu at the 86th Parliamentary Session. The general course of military events in the Pacific Ocean is eloquent evidence of the fact that this is only the result of the changing relationship of forces of the combatants, and of the natural desire to get rid of responsibility for the war, which Japan will not win.

JOH:is

30892

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MF-1929

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

Moscow via Army

Dated April 15, 1945

Rec'd 11:20 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1172, Fifteenth.



PRAVDA for April 13 published article by A. Semenov entitled "Military-political difficulties of Japan".

Summary follows:

Change of government in Japan must be viewed in light of military and political situation of country. Fires of war are relentlessly approaching Japanese islands and have already reached their inner defense lines. Intensification of air bombardment may be expected. American observers believe that recent fleet operations off Japanese coasts foreshadow big combined operations on approaches to Japan. Capture of Iwo Jima and landing on Okinawa are important events. Japan has been forced to concentrate min forces in Japan itself and Japanese press predicts invasion of Japan. During war, Japan's economic difficulties have mounted and country cannot compete with enemies in war production.

894.00/4-1545

740 0011 Pw/4-1545

File
M. H.
APR 17 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DISTRIBUTION OFFICE

DCR - EUR Unit
Anal. _____
Rev. _____
t. _____
Dist. _____

Japanese militarists

APR 19 1945

FILED

-2- #1172, Fifteenth, from Moscow via Army

Japanese militarists plans for blitzkrieg have collapsed. Results of this miscalculation are apparent.

Japanese people cannot fail to see seriousness of situation. Most difficult trials for Japan are still ahead. Koiso cabinet did not solve any of urgent problems left to it by Tojo. Koiso undertook many measures to prepare to repulse enemy invasion, such as law on general labor mobilization, et cetera, but these measures can scarcely produce any substantial effect.

Japanese official circles are attempting to ameliorate situation by maneuvers designed for external and internal consumption. These include, in particular establishment of new political party and dissolution of "association for aid to throne" political association for aid to throne. Above associations were established after virtual suppression in 1940 of bourgeois parliamentary parties. They were designed to serve as bases of political structure of German type, taking into account peculiarities of state structure of Japan. "Now sharp changes in the international situation have impelled the Japanese leaders to give up such organizations and to form, as a beginning at any rate, one party". Apparently initiators of this plan counted on creating appearance of abandonment of Fascist political system.

Furore connected

-3- #1172, Fifteenth, from Moscow via Army.

Furore connected with establishment of new party indicates attempts to distract attention of population from serious defeats.

Former Prime Minister Koiso approved idea of founding new party. At same time he tried to strengthen government by including persons without direct responsibility of war in Pacific and capable of assuring necessary contact with industrial world. Some of new cabinet members were sharply criticized by Fascist-minded circles.

Koiso cabinet proved powerless to alter unfavorable development of military events in Pacific. Newspaper ASAHI has written that danger may arise of destruction of Japanese people.

Japan has entered most difficult period of war.

"A significant influence on her position is being exerted by the general international situation, characterized by inevitable and imminent downfall of Hitlerite Germany."

HARRIMAN

NPL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

34200

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

7.7

RS-754
This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone other than a Government Agency. (RESTRICTED)

Moscow via Army
Dated April 18, 1945
Rec'd 8:35 a.m.

DJK

feli

Secretary of State
Washington

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
APR 19 1945
g H g

1227, April 18, 9 a.m.

"Worsening of Japan's Military and Political Situation" by A. Arkadyev is title of article appearing in WAR AND WORKING CLASS on April 1. Written prior to Soviet denunciation of non-aggression pact with Japan, this article is on the whole objective in tone. General argument is that Koiso's Cabinet has failed to solve its inaugural problems of improving war situation, raising production, increasing food supply and restoring Japanese morale. Author points out that under Koiso Japan's military position has seriously deteriorated with American victories in Philippines, carrier based raids on Tokio, capture of Iwo Jima and concentrated air bombardment of Japan's largest industrial centers; that simultaneously Japan's economic situation is growing very tense as result of under production in war industry and acute shortages of

894.00/4-1845

APR 25 1945

RECEIVED

Note
740.0011 PAW/4-1845

M.F.
4/19/45
Q.H.
(Sadd)
LIAISON OFFICE
STATE

D & EVR Unit
ai
Anal
Rev
Dat

-2-#1227, April 18, 9 a.m. from Moscow via Army shortages of labor and food; and that "alarming processes" are taking place in Japan's internal political life as Japanese people becomes increasingly aware of inevitability of defeat. (Sent to Department as 1227 repeated to Chungking as 27).

Of interest is interpretation placed upon proposed formation of new Japanese political party with concomitant dissolution of imperial rule assistance association and imperial rule assistance political association. Author states that these associations were expression of so-called "new political structure", i.e. fascization of Japan for purpose of pursuing a war policy. Formation of new political party is to be first step in liquidation of this Nazi type political structure, which no longer suits certain Japanese leaders "under the new conditions". Some members of Parliament and Government officials are trying by these means "to create semblance of return to constitutional parliamentary institutions, which, in their opinion, may prove useful in forthcoming difficult period".

Article states in conclusion that "root of acute military and political crisis into which Japan has entered must be sought in fundamental change that has taken place

73

-3-#1227, April 18, 9 a.m. from Moscow via Army

taken place in entire international situation, in bankruptcy of Axis, and in rapidly approaching collapse of Hitlerite Germany." This line of reasoning is noteworthy as advancing major premise for possible future argument that Russian deserves a major share of credit for outcome of Pacific war as result of its overwhelmingly decisive role in bringing about "bankruptcy of Axis" and "collapse of Hitlerite Germany".

KENNAN

WFS

894.00/4-1945

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Transmitting article by Sir Robert Craigie concerning
significance of Suzuki Government's accession to power.

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See #22494
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated April 19, 1945 From London
To

File No. 740.0011 PW/4-1945
eme

894.00/4-1945

894.00/4-2045

CROSS-REFERENCE FILE

NOTE

SUBJECT

Clippings enclosed relative to reaction of Indian Nationalist press in Bombay to Japan's abandonment of 'Greater Asia' Policy.

894.00/4-2045

For the original paper from which reference is taken

See #1989
(Despatch, telegram, instruction, letter, etc.)

Dated April 20, 1945 From Bombay
To XXXXXXXX

File No. 845.00/4-2045
eme

42319

JA
DCL

UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER
FOR GERMANY

AIR MAIL



Paris, April 20, 1945

DCIR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
LIAISON OFFICE
MAY 2 - 1945
DC/L
CN

RESTRICTED

No. 270

SUBJECT: JAPANESE DOCUMENT REPORT.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose a copy of a Japanese Document Report of April 11, 1945, regarding conditions in Japan, issued by the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, SHAEF.

Respectfully yours,

Robert Murphy
Robert Murphy.

SERVICES

1945 APR 25 PM 4 55

DC/R
CORDS BRANCH

Enclosure:

Japanese Document Report of April 11, 1945.

✓ 20

800
RM:co

DCR - EUR Unit	
Anal
Rev.
Cat.
Dist.

MAY 2 1945

FILED

894.00/4-2045

CS/D 894.00/4-2045

Serial CD/028

RESTRICTED

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
 ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
 Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

MAIN HEADQUARTERS

11 April 1945

JAPANESE DOCUMENT REPORT

SUBJECT: Japan, Conditions In

1. Identification of document:

a. Description:

Report.

2. Captured:

(date) April, 1945 (place) Frankfurt A/M, Germany
 (by) Japanese Section, G-2, SHAF.

3. Received from: Director, Lurgi Gesellschaft original X.
 für Chemie u. Huttenwesen.

4. Contents:

This nine page document covers the general economic and political impressions of an engineer sent to Japan by Lurgi who was in that country between March 1941 and September 1942. The above report is quoted below:

Eindrücke von einem Aufenthalt in Japan

"Im Auftrage meiner Firma hielt ich mich in der Zeit vom 10. März 1941 bis 29. Sept. 1942 in Japan auf. Während der ersten vier Monate war ich auf Kjuschu, der südlichen Insel des japanischen Mutterlandes, tätig, wo ich eine Anlage zur Gewinnung von Koks, Teer und Oel aus Hokke in Betrieb setzte. Während der übrigen Zeit hatte ich meinen Wohnsitz in Yokohama und bearbeitete in dem Büro unserer japanischen Vertretung einschlägige Projekte auf dem Brennstoffgebiet.

Die Beurteilung der einzelnen Probleme kann keinen Anspruch darauf erheben, vollkommen und allgemein zu sein, da einer näheren Kenntnis der japanischen Verhältnisse die rassische und staatsbürgerliche Einstellung des Japaners und weiter die Schwierigkeiten seiner Sprache und Schrift entgegenstehen. Er bringt dem Weissen ein sehr starkes Misstrauen entgegen und lässt sich nur in seltenen Fällen auf ein Gespräch über seine eigenen staatlichen Verhältnisse ein. Während meines Aufenthaltes hatte ich Gelegenheit, ausser mit ansässigen Deutschen auch mit Japanern in Gedankenaustausch zu kommen, soweit dies bei der japanischen Mentalität möglich ist. Mit neutralen Ausländern habe ich absichtlich keinerlei Beziehungen unterhalten. Die Gründe hierfür sind im folgenden dargelegt. Meine Ausführungen sind nur als eine Wiedergabe meiner eigenen subjektiven Eindrücke zu werten.

Bei meiner Ankunft in Japan befand sich das Land seit Jahren im Konflikt mit China und hatte blutige Auseinandersetzungen mit Russland an den mandschurischen Grenzen gehabt. Es hatte also bereits beträchtliche Truppenkontingente im besetzten China bzw. an der mandschurischen Grenze zu unterhalten. Dies und der wachsende wirtschaft-

RESTRICTED

Serial CD/028

liche Druck Nordamerikas führten bald zu Einschränkungen und Rationierungen gewisser Verbrauchsgüter. Später wurden die Rationierungen auf weitere Artikel ausgedehnt, wobei man sich weitgehend an das deutsche Vorbild hielt. Direkte und indirekte Steuern wurden erhöht. Das Volk hatte also allmählich gewisse wirtschaftliche Mehrbelastungen zu übernehmen. Dazu kam die verstärkte Einberufung männlicher Arbeitskräfte und ein rigoros durchgeführter Ausbau der zivilen Luftschutzorganisationen, die die noch zu Hause befindlichen Familienmitglieder aufs stärkste beanspruchten.

Ich habe von keinem Japaner ein Wort der Unzufriedenheit gehört oder gar des Zweifels an den Massnahmen der Regierung. Jede Anordnung der Führung ist unfehlbar und wird kritiklos durchgeführt und jeder Einzelne ist sich der bedingungslosen Unterordnung unter den Staatsgedanken bewusst. Diese seelische Grundausrichtung bestimmt Denken und Handeln jedes Japaners über Parteien und religiöse Sekten hinweg. Sie ist begründet in der schintoistischen Weltanschauung des Ahnenkults und der Berufung des Tenno, sein Volk zur Weltherrschaft zu führen. Dies gilt allgemein für die Masse des Volkes; einige wenige, die von der amerikanischen Zivilisation oder der bolschewistischen Lehre angekränkt sind, fallen nicht ins Gewicht. Entsprechend ist die Einstellung des Durchschnittsjapaners den Erfordernissen des Krieges gegenüber. Er rechnet mit ihm als einer gegebenen, staatsnotwendigen Sache und zieht mit einer uns Europäern nahe unfasslichen Selbstverständlichkeit die ketzten Konsequenzen.

Wird der Soldat eingezogen, so nimmt er von der Familie für immer Abschied, da er mit dem Tode rechnet, der ihn zum Helden macht. Entsprechend ist die Einstellung der Heimat, wo jede Urne mit der Asche eines Gefallenen und jeder Verwundete auf der Strasse gegrüsst wird. Führt ein Verwundeten-Transport durch einen Bahnhof, so bleibt alles entblüsstes Hauptes stehen, bis der Zug vorbei ist.

Der Krieg ist auch in Japan nicht populär, aber das ganze Volk glaubt ebenso an seine Notwendigkeit wie an sein siegreiches Ende.

Der 8. Dez. 1941 war für das japanische Volk genau so überraschend wie für uns. Irgendein stärkerer Einfluss auf das zivile Leben war zunächst nicht feststellbar. Schliesslich bedeutete die Kriegserklärung nur eine Erweiterung des bereits bestehenden Kriegszustandes im ostasiatischen Raum auf die den Weissen gehörenden Schutzgebiete. Dementsprechend betrachtet der Japaner diesen Krieg als eine Angelegenheit Ostasiens, die, wie die Zeitung schrieb, "vom europäischen Krieg nicht ganz getrennt werden kann." Die innere Anteilnahme an Erfolgen des deutschen oder italienischen Verbündeten, erscheint mir nicht so gross, wie man in Deutschland annimmt. Ein Grund liegt sicherlich in dem korrekten Verhältnis Japan-Russland. Neben dem deutschen Wehrmachtsbericht, der auf den ersten Seiten der Zeitungen gebracht wird, stehen Meldungen aus Moskau und Kubit-schew. Trotzdem hat der Japaner die Kämpfe an der mandschurischen Grenze nicht vergessen und sieht in Wladiwostok die grösste Gefahr für sein Imperium. Auffallend ist eine im vergangenen Sommer einsetzende Aktion, die den Bau und Ausbau von Luftschutzräumen zum Ziel hat und die mit fieberhaftem Eifer betrieben wird. Da mit einem grösseren Angriff von See her kaum zu rechnen ist, dürfte es sich vorwiegend um Sicherungsmassnahmen gegen Angriffe vom Festland handeln.

Die grossen militärischen Erfolge der ersten Monate führten zu einer gewissen Ueberheblichkeit gegenüber der weissen Rasse allgemein. Der Japaner kann natürlich Deutsche, Engländer und Amerikaner nach dem Aussehen nicht voneinander unterscheiden. Der rassische Unterschied zwischen gelb und weiss ist zu gross, als dass sich in abschbarer Zeit eine gefühlsmässige Annäherung der weissen Achsenmächte und der Japaner anbahnen könnte. Grosse Schautafeln in den Fenstern der Zeitungen zeigen das Verhältnis der Versenkungen von feindlichen Kriegsschiffen zwischen Japan, Deutschland und Italien, wobei natürlich der Japaner bei weitem am besten ab-

RESTRICTEDSerial CD/028

schneidet. Der Krieg ist dann zu Ende, wenn japanische Truppen in London und New York einmarschieren, verkündete die Presse, und als auf einer Freundschaftstagung zwischen HJ und japanischer Jugend die Frage der Befriedigung der Welt aufgeworfen wurde, erklärte ein Japaner, dazu müsse erst der Tenno von der ganzen Welt als Kaiser anerkannt sein. Derartige Aussagen dürfen natürlich nicht ohne weiteres verallgemeinert werden, sind aber für die Grundeinstellung charakteristisch. Auf der anderen Seite habe ich tiefe Sympathie für Deutschland und besonders für den deutschen Soldaten feststellen können, der nach japanischer Auffassung der zweitbeste der Welt ist, d.h. dem japanischen Soldaten nahezu gleichkommt.

Japan kämpft um die Schaffung eines neuen Gross-Ostasien unter seiner Führung. Alle militärischen und politischen Operationen richten sich ausschliesslich auf dieses Ziel.

Der in Japan lebende Ausländer, besonders der Weisse, wird von der japanischen Polizei ausserordentlich scharf überwacht. Dabei wird grundsätzlich kein Unterschied zwischen den einzelnen Nationen gemacht. Ueber jeden einzelnen wird genau Tagebuch geführt. Dazu tragen nicht nur die Polizeiorgane selbst, sondern auch Hausangestellte, Büroangestellte und sonstige Japaner, mit denen der Weisse häufiger in Berührung kommt, bei. Unangenehm wird diese Überwachung besonders auf Reisen, wobei man häufig und nicht immer in geschickter Art kontrolliert wird. Selbst für Fahrten zwischen Yokohama und Tokyo sind besondere Reiseausweise erforderlich.

Während früher der Weisse nach englishchem und amerikanischem Vorbild im Auftreten und Lebensstil den Herrenmenschen spielte, wird ihm besonders seit dem Kriegseintritt Japans mehr und mehr die Rolle eines geduldeten Gastes zugewiesen. Der Japaner gibt sich heute bewusst den Anschein, als könne er auf allen Gebieten auf die Leistungen der weissen Rasse verzichten. So glaubt er besonders in der Technik den Vorsprung des Weissen eingeholt zu haben. Dazu kommt eine recht skrupellose Ausnutzung wissenschaftlicher und technischer Forschung im japanischen Interesse. Vor einem Jahr wurden nicht nur die wichtigsten wissenschaftlichen Werke der Feindstaaten kopiert und vertrieben, sondern auch deutsche Bücher, vor allem technischen Inhalts, ohne Erlaubnis der Verlage nachgedruckt.

Ein besonderes Kapitel ist Sprache und Schrift. In Anbetracht der Schwierigkeiten sind auch heute noch eingehende Kenntnisse der Sprache unter den Weissen sehr selten. Der heutige Japaner steht aber auf dem Standpunkt, dass ebenso wie er in Amerika oder Europa die Landessprache beherrschen muss, der Weisse sich in Japan die nötigsten Kenntnisse der japanischen Sprache anzueignen hat. So verschwinden heute in der japanischen Öffentlichkeit, z.B. auf Bahnhöfen, die lateinischen Schriftzeichen immer mehr, sodass der Ausländer auf die Kenntnis wichtiger japanischer Schriftzeichen und Zahlen angewiesen ist.

Der Japaner ist sehr empfindlich gegenüber Kritik, die an seinem Land und seinen Lebensgewohnheiten geübt wird und leider gibt es einen nicht unerheblichen Prozentsatz unter den Weissen, die nur die negativen Seiten des Volkes sehen. Hieraus resultiert dann letztendendes ein wachsendes beiderseitiges Missverständnis. Der Europäer und besonders der seit Jahren ansässige Resident misst auch heute noch die japanischen Einrichtungen und Dinge vielfach mit dem Massstab seines eigenen Landes. Er wird sich jedoch im Laufe der nächsten Jahre zu der Einsicht bequemen müssen, dass der Japaner in Japan und schliesslich in ganz Ostasien nach eigenem Gutdünken schalten und walten kann. Dies würde wesentlich zu einem besseren Verständnis beitragen.

Von den z.zt. in Japan ansässigen Weissen stellen die Deutschen den stärksten Prozentsatz. Eine Vertiefung der persönlichen freundschaftlichen Verhältnisse ist nicht feststellbar. Dem stehen

RESTRICTEDSerial CD/028

wohl die Verschiedenheit der Lebensgewohnheiten und vor allem die Auffassung über die Stellung der Frau entgegen. Einen Verkehr zwischen deutschen und japanischen Familien gibt es überhaupt nicht. Während früher Heiraten zwischen Deutschen und Japanerinnen nicht selten waren, wird dies heute von beiden Seiten energisch unterbunden. Grosse Anerkennung bringt der Japaner den Taffentaten des deutschen Soldaten entgegen. So wie der Tenno die japanische Staatsidee verkörpert, ist der Name des Führers für den Japaner das Symbol der deutschen Macht.

Der Deutsche wird ebenso wie jeder andere Ausländer polizeilich überwacht. Besonders seine persönlichen Beziehungen zu Angehörigen der neutralen Staaten werden peinlichst geprüft. Leider ist dieses Misstrauen nicht ganz unbegründet, da auch hier der Deutsche dazu neigt, geheimzuhaltende Vorgänge auszulaudern. Von den Neutraleen sind die Schweizer insofern interessant, als sie nach Ansicht der Japaner aufgrund einer gewissen wirtschaftlichen Abhängigkeit für England Spionage betreiben. Eine engere Berührung mit Angehörigen fremder Nationen ist tunlichst zu vermeiden.

Eine besondere Stellung nehmen die Staatenlosen ein, von denen die Weissrussen den stärksten Anteil bilden. Ein Teil von ihnen hat wohl bereits die japanische Staatsangehörigkeit angenommen. Leider treten immer wieder Fälle auf, in denen ausgebürgerte Deutsche sich der feindlichen Spionage zur Verfügung stellen.

Die Behandlung der internierten Briten und Amerikaner war, soweit ich beobachten konnte, sehr anständig. Die Botschaftsangehörigen lebten in einem sehr schön gelegenen Hotel, hatten sogar die Freiheit, Ausflüge in die Umgebung zu machen. Am Wochenende war hier häufig der russische Botschafter zu sehen.

Ueber die Rüstungsindustrie können keine konkreten Angaben gemacht werden, da kaum ein Ausländer Einblick in die Rüstungswerke und deren Produktionsziffern bekommt. Nach beendeter Inbetriebsetzung des Schwelwerkes wurde mir ein nochmaliges Betreten der Anlage unter allerlei fadenscheinigen Gründen unmöglich gemacht. Interessant ist immerhin, dass auf dem Treibstoffgebiet grosse Anstrengungen gemacht werden, die in Japan, Mandschukuo und Nordchina geförderten Rohstoffe, hauptsächlich also Kohle, in gesteigertem Masse für Oelgewinnung heranzuziehen trotz des Oelreichtums der eroberten ostindischen Gebiete.

In Bezug auf seine Industrie und besonders seine Rüstungsindustrie führt der Japaner das Gebot der Geheimhaltung hundertprozentig durch. In wichtige Betriebe bekommt kein Ausländer Einblick, gleichgültig, ob er einer befreundeten oder neutralen Nation angehört, es sei denn, er bringt neue Konstruktionen oder Verfahren mit. Gerade diesem Punkt sollte in Deutschland grössere Beachtung geschenkt werden. Der Japaner versteht es meisterhaft, die Entwicklungsarbeit aller Staaten auf technischen Gebieten mit oder teils gegen deren Einverständnis seinem Volke dienbar zu machen. Ich halte es daher für angebracht, den Japaner in Deutschland ebenso vorsichtig zu behandeln, wie wir Deutsche in Japan behandelt werden, vor allen Dingen aber ihm nur solche technischen Betriebe oder Verfahren zugänglich zu machen, deren Aufbau und Anwendung in Japan für uns von wesentlichem wirtschaftlichen oder kriegswirtschaftlichem Interesse ist.

Der Kampf Japans um die Führung im ostasiatischen Raum ist der letzte Schritt zur völligen Gleichstellung mit der weissen Rasse. Die Voraussetzungen für die Durchführung dieses Kampfes sind durch den europäischen Krieg gegeben. Unter diesem Gesichtspunkt sieht der Japaner sein Bündnis mit Deutschland und Italien. Die weissen Nationen werden in Ostasien in diesem Kriege alle ihre Vorrechte verlieren, seien es solche territorialer, sprachlicher oder kultu-

RESTRICTEDSerial CD/028

roller Art. Dies ist das Ziel des japanischen Imperialismus und dafür ist das japanische Volk bereit, alle Opfer zu bringen."

For the A C of S, G-2.

Francis P. Miller

FRANCIS P. MILLER
Colonel, GSC
D/Chief, Special Sections

DISTRIBUTION:-

A C of S, G-2, War Department
D.M.I., War Office
D.N.I., Admiralty
C.N.O., Navy Department
A.C.A.S., Air Ministry
S.O. (I), ANCXF
COMNAVEU, Intelligence Officer
ComNavFor France, Intelligence Officer
Political Officers:
 Mr. Steel (British)
 Mr. Rober (American)
G-2 Division:
 Documents Section
 Economic Section.

In reply refer to
FC

May 15, 1945

MEMORANDUM

SECRET

TO: Lt. Colonel Edward H. Miller,
Liaison Officer with the State Department,
Military Intelligence Division,
War Department.

FROM: Frederick B. Lyon, Chief, Division of Foreign
Activity Correlation

SUBJECT: Translation of Japanese International Who's Who.

In accordance with your request, there is enclosed herewith a photostat copy of a Japanese International Who's Who which is believed to contain valuable information regarding Japanese liberals. It is understood that the book contains in large part biographic information on Japanese left wing individuals, although it includes as a cloak, information on other prominent Japanese persons, Europeans and Americans. It is felt that the book has important possibilities and may present information on names which may be very useful to this Government in its operations in Japan. It is felt that a secret classification should be given the matters connected with the work.

It will be appreciated if the possibilities can be explored within the War Department looking to the translation of appropriate sections of this work. If this can be done, the Department of State would like 8 copies of such a translation. It is assumed that the Navy Department would be interested in receiving a number of copies and it appears certain that the information elicited by such translation would be of great value to the War Department itself. Any distribution beyond

State,

Anal	ms
R	ms
Cat	ms
Dist	

Confidential File

894.00/5-1545

CS/894.00/5-1545

-2-

State, War and Navy Departments should, however, be cleared through the Department of State.

It may be added that the comments concerning non-Japanese or clearly non-political Japanese figures, such as athletes and actors, need not be translated.

Enclosure:

As stated.

FC:RDLongyear:AP

A true copy of
the signed orig-
inal. *AL*

RD

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

~~DIVISION OF WORLD TRADE INTELLIGENCE~~
Division of Economic Security Control
Political Biographic Section

May 13, 1945


To: FC - Mr. Longyear

From: Hendrik van Oss

Subject: Translation of Japanese Who's Who

I am enclosing a copy of an "International Who's Who" of Japanese liberals presented to this Division by Mr. Dooman, FE. According to Mr. Dooman, the book contains in large part biographic information on Japanese left wing individuals, although it includes as a cloak, information on other prominent Japanese persons, Europeans and Americans. Mr. Dooman feels that the book has important possibilities and may present information on names which will be very useful to this Government in its operations in Japan. Mr. Dooman requests that a high security classification be given to this work.

I should appreciate your presenting this to the appropriate section of the War Department. If it is possible for the translation to be done in the War Department, it would be well to arrange for a specific number of copies for the Department's use. Any distribution outside the War Department or the Department of State should be cleared through Mr. Dooman. The comments concerning non-Japanese, or concerning non-political figures (i.e., athletes, actors, etc.) need not be translated.



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE:


TO : Mr. Houghgear

FROM : H. W. O. S.

SUBJECT:

Sorry that I couldn't
get this to you this morning
as we had arranged. I hope the
late delivery won't inconvenience
you.

H. W. O. S.



C
O
P
YSECRET

June 6, 1945

A-D - Mr. Dooman:

Subject: Return of Japanese Who's Who

Dear Gene:

I return herewith the famous Japanese Who's Who concerning which the War Department takes such a dim view. You may be interested in the most recent publication on Japanese personalities of which I understand Miss Hadley in CD has a copy. It is put out by the Federal Communications Commission, Federal Broadcasting Intelligence Service and entitled as follows:

Radio Report on Far East, No. 73
Special Report on Who's Who in
Japan - dated May 25, 1945.

I am told that extra copies can be obtained by calling EXecutive 3620, extension 129, which is the Office of the Chief of the Far Eastern Division of the FCC.

Robert D. Longyear

FC:RDL:AP

In reply refer to
FC

May 19, 1945

MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: Lt. Colonel Edward H. Miller,
Liaison Officer with the State Department,
Military Intelligence Division,
War Department.

FROM: Frederick B. Lyon, Chief, Division of Foreign
Activity Correlation

SUBJECT: Request for Who's Who in Japan.

It would be appreciated if inquiry could be made whether the following described document is available for distribution to the State Department and if so, whether three copies could be supplied:

Who's Who in Japan and Japanese Occupied Territories. Prepared by the Intelligence Division of the Far Eastern Bureau, British Ministry of Information, New Delhi.

Part A. Japan, fourth edition, January 8, 1945.

It is understood that this is a Joint Intelligence Agency CBI document (Confidential) probably available through the JICA panel. Further identifying particulars are an apparent JICA number, 0112375, and a notation that the document was apparently received in Shipment No. 225 with a SN designation, R-392-D-45.

The foregoing information has been provided by Miss Hadley of the Commodities Division who requests a copy for the use of that Division in connection with its current studies on Japanese industry. The additional

DCR - NE Unit	copies
Anal mH	
as mH	
LT	

894.00/5-1945

CS/LF

894.00/5-1945

-2-

copies are desired for the files of (1) the Division of Economic Security Controls and (2) the Division of Foreign Activity Correlation.

If later sections of this work beyond Part A, referred to above, have become available, a similar number of copies of each would be useful to the Department of State.

FC:RDLongyear:AP

A true copy of
the signed
original. *OB*

Page

CONFIDENTIAL

Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUN 21 1945
Department of State

FC/ADL
CD
FEJA
ED
ACK

RECORDED
INDEXED
JUL - 4 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECORDS BRANCH

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

28 May 1945

COMMODITIES DIVISION
MAY 31 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM FOR FREDERICK B. LYON, ESQ., CHIEF, DIVISION OF FOREIGN ACTIVITY CORRELATION, DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR WHO'S WHO IN JAPAN

Referring to your memorandum of 19 May 1945, inquiry has disclosed that the document requested is not available in Washington, either through the War Department or the British Military Mission. It has been suggested that the most expeditious way for you to obtain this document would be through the American Diplomatic Mission in New Delhi from JICA there. Our information is that this document was apparently only distributed in the field.

E. H. Miller

EDWARD H. MILLER
Lieutenant Colonel, GSC.,
Liaison Officer with the State Department.

HE
DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
JUL 2 1945

894.00/5-2845

5-30-45
to CD for action
ref. Miss [unclear] memo to FC
RD [unclear] 5/17/45
MAY 30 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DCR - NE Unit
Anal. *ms*
Rev. *ms*
Cat. *LF*
Dist. _____

CS/LF

894.00/5-2845

JUL 5 1945
FILED



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALWAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

28 May 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR FREDERICK B. LYON, ESQ., CHIEF, DIVISION OF
FOREIGN ACTIVITY CORRELATION, DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR WHO'S WHO IN JAPAN

Referring to your memorandum of 19 May 1945, inquiry has disclosed that the document requested is not available in Washington, either through the War Department or the British Military Mission. It has been suggested that the most expeditious way for you to obtain this document would be through the American Diplomatic Mission in New Delhi from JICA there. Our information is that this document was apparently only distributed in the field.

EDWARD H. MILLER
Lieutenant Colonel, GSC.,
Liaison Officer with the State Department.**CONFIDENTIAL**

RARE BOOKS

AUTOGRAPHS

Robert W. Lull

1 Chapel Street

TELEPHONE CONNECTION

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
 JUN 17 1945
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 JUN 18 1945
 NEWBURYPORT, MASS.

Hon. Joseph C. Grew.
Washington. D.C.

June. 11. ,1945.

My dear Sir-

Last week in buying a collection of autographs I obtained a large cabinet photograph of Baron Tanetaro Negata or Magata. March. 18. 1921. The photograph was taken in London.

Am wondering if the Baron is playing any part in the present War?

From his photo, one would judge he was a keen, kind, business man, not one that would cut your throat or mine.

Will appreciate any data you may be able to give me about the Baron.

Sincerely,

Robert W. Lull

Stamp enclosed.

DCR - NE Unit	
Anal.	<i>ms</i>
Rev.	<i>ms</i>
Out.	<i>ms</i>
Dist.	

JUN 19 1945

FILED

894.00/6-1145

CS/LE

894.00/6-1145

25

June 18, 1945

In reply refer to
JA

My dear Mr. Lull:

Mr. Grew has referred to me your letter of June 11 regarding "Baron Tanetaro Megata or Megata", photograph of whom you recently purchased.

I believe that the photograph is probably that of Baron Tanetaro Megata. According to an article in the New York Times of September 11, 1926, Baron Megata died on September 10, 1926. I am enclosing a transcription of biographical data regarding the Baron contained in Who's Who in Japan, 1919. As there is a gap in the Department's collection of these biographical volumes, I am unable to furnish you with a sketch covering the last few years of his life.

I hope that the information being furnished you will be of some use and I am sure that you will realize that the Department can assume no responsibility for the accuracy of the biographical data as it was compiled by another source.

The stamp you enclosed with your letter is returned herewith.

Sincerely yours,



Erle R. Dickover
Chief
Division of Japanese Affairs

Enclosures

1. Biographical data, Tanetaro Megata.
2. Three cent stamp.

JUN 18 1945 CR Mr. Robert W. Lull,
1 Chapel Street,
Newburyport, Massachusetts.

JA:BRJohansen:KMB
6/16/45

DOR - NE Unit

Anal mY
Ret mY
Out
Dist

FW 894.00/6-1145

Excerpt from Who's Who in Japan, 1919

(unofficial)

Megata, Tanetaro. Baron (cr.1906); Mem.House Peers, b.20 July 1853; 1st s. of Kosuke Megata, a samurai; m. Itsu, adopted sister of Count Katsu. Educ.: graduated from the Harvard Univ. studying economics. After his return home served Judge, Secretary of the Financial Dept. and the State Council in addition, Revenue Officer, Councilor of the Finance, Director of the Revenue Bureau, Director of the Experimentary Brewery Laboratory; sent to Europe and America as superintendent of government students; in 1904, he was employed by the Korean Government as its Financial Adviser, holding the post till Oct. 1907 when the new Japan-Korean agreement was concluded; nominated Member of the House of Peers, 1904; created Baron in recognition of meritorious service during the Russo-Japanese War. Went to U.S.A. as Chief Commissioner of Finance and Economy in 1917. Has been decorated with the 2nd Order of Merit. Address: No. 27, Hara-machi, Koishikawa-ku, Tokyo.

A true copy of
the original
document.

No. 216 (AMERICAN EMBASSY, CHUNGKING, JUNE 28, 1945)
(FORWARDED TO DEPARTMENT WITHOUT COVERING DESPATCH)



DIVISION OF FINANCIAL AFFAIRS

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Second Secretary on detail at

Sian, Shensi, June 13, 1945

SEP 12 1945

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RESTRICTED

AUG 23 1945

Subject: Information, principally in regard to information supplied by a Chinese student recently returned from that country.

Stamps: DIVISION OF CULTURAL COOPERATION, noted 9TB, JUL 19 1945, NOV 1 1945, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The honorable major general Patrick J. Hurley, American Ambassador, Chungking.

Stamps: COMMODITIES DIVISION, DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS, JUL 13 1945, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr:

I have the honor to transmit herewith a memorandum containing miscellaneous information in regard to present-day Japan. This information was supplied me by a young Chinese who states that he last autumn completed three years of study there. While in Japan, he says, he studied industrial engineering at a college named the 工業大學, the chancellor of which was a Dr. Yan (八木秀次). The informant himself left Japan in October, 1944; in regard to more recent developments there he quotes fellow-students who left Japan this spring and with whom he talked in north China. In summary, it might be stated that the informant presents a picture of a people whose diet has been lowered to or below the minimum necessary to the maintenance of health, whose middle-school and college students have ceased their studies and have gone to work or into the armed forces, and whose national resources have almost completely been mobilized for war. He also reports raw material shortages some of which--notably those of coal and oil--are exerting a paralyzing influence on the nation's economy.

Like a couple of recent informants who had come here from Manchuria, the present informant voiced disappointment over what he considered a contrasting absence of mobilization for war in China.

Respectfully yours,

Edward E. Rice

Edward E. Rice
Second Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure: Memo of June 13, 1945

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUG 11 1945

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUG 27 1945
Division of Economic Development

ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT
AUG 29 1945
REPRODUCTION SECTION

894.00/6-1345

CS/S/MM

894.00/6-1345

Second Secretary on detail at
Sian, Shensi,
June 13, 1945

MEMORANDUM

RESTRICTED

Subject: Information, principally in regard to Japan, supplied by a Chinese student recently returned from that country.

Rationing: When the informant left Japan, in October, 1944, foodstuffs were scarce and were subject to strict rationing. Civilians were divided into three categories for purposes of rationing. The basic rice ration was 273 grammes per person; a manual laborer, however, received 50% more than this basic ration. In the course of a month the average person also got a few ounces of meat and fish and a limited quantity of vegetables.

Rationing of clothing, on a point basis, was also in effect. Until last year a man was allowed 100 points a year for clothing, but last year this was cut to fifty points for a man under fifty years of age and to forty points for older men. In order to encourage marriages, an additional 100 points were allowed couples getting married. The informant states that fifteen points were needed in order to buy a shirt and sixty points for a suit of clothes.

Diet and Public Health: Rice on the market is ~~is~~ unpolished, has mixed with it 10% of corn (or, in winter, of potatoes) and is not easily digested by the Japanese. Such flour as is available is very dark. Seafood is not plentiful, and many persons become ill as a result of eating spoiled fish. Vegetables available on city markets are insufficient in quantity--thus one cucumber might be the only vegetable a city family of three might get for a three-day period. A very little sugar was still available--perhaps half a cup per person each month.

As a result of inadequate diet, night blindness had become common. The Chinese students in Japan found the amount of food allowed insufficient for themselves and surmised that the health of the Japanese must be suffering.

Raw Material Shortages: When the informant left Japan, raw material shortages were numerous. The materials which were short included leather, cotton, wool, salt, matches, soap, paper, metals, rubber, oil and coal. As a result of the leather shortage, no leather shoes had been available to civilians for several years; small pieces of leather could still be purchased for reinforcing the bottoms of shoes or for stitching together to make belts. No cotton goods (excepting cotton substitutes) and but a few poor woolens were on the market. Metals have disappeared from the Japanese scene with a completeness which is probably almost unrivalled: metal objects have disappeared from shops, have been surrendered by households, and have been removed wherever found--clothing hooks and hatracks from trains, the mechanisms of barber chairs, metal bells everywhere and the metal of doors and windows.

The rubber ~~shortage~~ shortage is interesting; at first the Japanese believed that they would have more rubber than they could use as such and they accordingly converted some of it into liquid fuels and then later they found they could not transport it from Malaya in the expected quantities and they began to make artificial rubber. Probably the most serious shortages are those of oil and coal.

-2-

coal. Thus the shortage of fuel oil prevents the full use of fishing boats which might bring in much needed foodstuffs. In order to save gasoline all civilian motor vehicles have been converted to the much less efficient burning of charcoal; due to lack of adequate transport some fruits have rotted in the countryside. The shortage of coal limits the amount of electric power which can be generated therefrom, and this is particularly serious in the dry season, when less waterpower is available. (The informant had not heard reports, very prevalent in China, of the Japanese storing coal under water along the Japanese coast.) The coal shortage has also led to a shortage of products requiring substantial amounts of coal in their manufacture--such as glass and chinaware. Thus some shortages lead to other shortages, exerting a paralyzing influence on the nation's life.

Taxation and Sale of National Loan Certificates: The informant is not able to present any but an incomplete picture of Japanese taxation. He says, however, that taxation of various sorts there is high. Thus cigarettes which formerly sold for ten sen a package now cost sixty sen, the added fifty sen representing added taxation. There is an entertainment tax of 100% on theater tickets and similar items and a 200% tax is levied on luxury items.

A substantial proportion of salaries is deducted for the compulsory purchase of national loan certificates--bonds due perhaps three years after the date of issue. The informant says the family in the home of which he roomed had a monthly income of a little less than 200 yen from which sixty yen were deducted each month for such purposes. The certificates are on sale everywhere--in stores, in railway stations, etc.

(It was stated by the informant that when he left Japan late last year the price level was about 80% above that of September 18, 1931--most of the rise having occurred since Pearl Harbor.)

Some Apparent Effects of the War on the Life of Civilians: The effect of shortages of foodstuffs has been noted above. The war, as also noted elsewhere in this report, has also resulted in the closing of schools above the primary grade. (The informant, incidentally, describes Japanese students as generally reluctant to enter the armed services.) Elevators, because of a power shortage, have stopped running. Because of this and in view of a scarcity of consumer goods, department stores have moved remaining goods to the lower floors and have closed off the upper floors. Fewer newspapers with fewer and smaller editions are being published (because of a shortage of paper). There also is less light to read by, electric current being rationed; accordingly most people, having nothing better to do, go to bed early. Travel is restricted: when one wishes to make a trip he must apply to the police station in his precinct for a permit to buy a railway ticket.

Employees in factories now are largely women. Some women having spouses ~~xxx~~ or fiancées in the armed forces, the informant alleges, are having illicit relations with men remaining behind. Several years ago, he says, a law was passed--in an attempt to keep up the birth-rate, perhaps--attempting to place illegitimate children on a basis of legal equality with other children (an illegitimate child now ~~xxx~~ may take its mother's surname and may inherit property from her).

People in the cities were, when the informant left Japan, worried about air-raids. Fire-lanes had been constructed and many slit-trenches (but few air-raid shelters) had been dug.

The

-3-

The military appear still to be optimistic about the war but some civilians (and especially the members of the wealthier merchant class) have become pessimistic and some of them expect a large-scale invasion of the main islands. (Two Kuomintang underground workers from north China say the Japanese there are comparing the present with the period of China's Yuan dynasty when the Japanese faced the threat of a Mongol invasion, that local officials in that country now command militia units made up of local residents not in the regular forces and that the Japanese are talking of village-to-village resistance in case of invasion. One of these informants says he not long ago read an article by a Japanese newspaperman named ~~李~~ 李 who wrote ~~李~~ advising the people to build airplanes and yet more airplanes and describing Japanese soldiers he had witnessed in the Philippine islands as each night looking in vain for the arrival of warplanes from the homeland.)

Destruction of mulberry groves: Almost all mulberry groves in Japan have been cut down in order to provide additional land for growing rice and other foodstuffs. (Silk could still be purchased when the informant left Japan, so the Japanese assumably have adequate supplies of this material for military uses.)

Treatment of Seriously Wounded Soldiers: I have heard persistent reports that Japanese soldiers in China commonly are killed by their officers or medical men if they are so seriously wounded that it appears they would not be able to recover sufficiently to again become military effectives. I therefore asked the informant whether he had seen any crippled soldiers in Japan. He said he had seen an exhibition of about 100 who had lost legs and had been provided with metal limbs. When he saw them they were all bicycling through the streets together, demonstrating to the public the extent to which they were able to function like other persons. He also occasionally saw soldiers, who had lost an arm or a leg, in public--but he says he understands they are employed in factories and do not generally appear on the streets. Those he saw were still in uniform and wore armbands with red crosses on them.

Employment of Prisoner-of-war Labor: The informant says he saw a foreign prisoner whom he took to be an American soldier working as a baggage coolie at the Tokyo central station. He knew the prisoner to be English-speaking because he heard him saying, "Excuse me" while passing through the crowds. A Japanese gendarme at the station was keeping watch on the prisoner.

According to press reports, military prisoners were being used as farm laborers in the Japanese countryside.

War and Education in Japan: When the informant left Japan almost everybody between the ages of 16 and 40, except for some students, was in military service. In October, 1944 all study of law, political science, economics and similar studies (文科, or the humanities) ended, the students entering the armed forces. The three-year science course at the universities was, at that time, telescoped into a one-year course. The informant states that according to Japanese press reports which he saw in April, 1945, all except the eight-year primary course has now been suspended there and the other schools have been completely closed.

Chinese Students in Japan: Last year about 130 Chinese were studying in the school which the informant attended; the total student body of this school was about 1,000. Chinese then studying at Tokyo Imperial University ~~numbered~~ numbered only twenty-odd and were mostly the children of important puppet officials. Tokyo Imperial University, he says, did not welcome Chinese students. In this and in other things Chinese students were made to feel

-4-

that they were distrusted and discriminated against. (This of course seems natural to a westerner, but the informant seemed to resent the fact rather than to feel such treatment to be natural.) He quotes fellow-students who left Japan this spring as saying Chinese felt particularly ill-at-ease during air-raid alerts, when they were often followed by the secret police and feared that they might be assassinated. On the ferry trip from Japan to Korea, on his way home, the informant (as a non-Japanese) had to sit in a special section (特別席) reserved for persons like himself and for Japanese traveling in custody of the authorities (assumably criminals).

Return Trip from Japan: The informant went from Shimoroseki to Fusan in a passenger ferry named the 崑崙丸, which he says is a vessel of about 3,000 tons capable of carrying about 2,000 passengers. Curtains were drawn and passengers were forbidden to look out during periods each of about an hour at the commencement and again at the conclusion of the voyage. The informant says he noted escorting vessels and an air patrol plane during the trip. The vessel took a zig-zag course, so that the trip took ten hours, as compared to the former time of eight hours. All passengers had to wear life-preservers and during the trip a boat-drill was held; some of the passengers thought the ship was under attack and grew panicky--the informant heard that several small children were crushed to death as a result, but he did not himself ~~see~~ see them.

From Fusan the informant took a train, via Mukden, to Peking at which city he arrived ninety-six hours after leaving Japan.

Information in regard to Railways on the Continent: When the informant traveled over that line last autumn the Fusan-Mukden line was being double-tracked and necessary new bridge installations were in the process of being made.

In north China the informant heard that locomotive repair shops there were busy day and night but still were behind with their work on locomotives which had been damaged in air attacks. On a trip he made from Peking to Taiyuan, beginning April 19, he had often to descend from the train, the locomotive spending much time in tunnels because of air alarms.

ER

E. E. R.

80

PCR file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JAPANESE
DIVISION OF ~~EASTERN~~ AFFAIRS



July 24, 1945

U - Mr. Grew

JAPAN

Political Association to Hear Report on Emperor's Health and on Foreign Affairs. A Tokyo broadcast of July 24 in Japanese to Greater East Asia reports that "in order to set the present mental attitude of the government and the people for a decisive war" the Great Japan Political Association will meet tomorrow morning at the Diet Building in Tokyo.

Scheduled on the agenda will be "a talk on the latest state of His Majesty's health" by Dr. Shimomura, President of the Board of Information, and a report "on the details of the international situation" with an explanation of the "government's foreign policy" by Foreign Minister Togo.

Comment: While this will probably be a meeting to bolster morale against possible serious developments at the Potsdam conference, with advance notice of the important topics on the agenda given to draw popular attention, another possibility seems worth bearing in mind. Should the Japanese be preparing to surrender, the frail state (whether real or feigned) of the emperor's health would be about the only excuse which could be advanced to end resistance with convincing "saving of face".

As regards the emperor's health, one confidential report early in 1945 stated that the emperor was on the verge of a nervous breakdown and there have been recent wholly unsubstantiated rumors from Europe allegedly based on information from Tokyo that an attack had been made on his life. On the other hand, Radio Tokyo has reported that within the last ten days he has held six audiences with Premier Suzuki, Foreign Minister Togo and Munitions Minister Toyoda.

894.00/7-2445

OS/LE

894.00/7-2445

JA:HKullgren:MP

Routing slip with handwritten initials: *WJ*, *WJG*, *BF*, *J.W.B.*

JUL 25 1945

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



Serial 01541516

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM for Mr. Frederick B. Lyon

Attention: Mr. J. K. Emmerson
Office of Far Eastern Affairs

Subject: AKAMATSU, Saburo, et al -- Request for
information re

In compliance with your request for information on Japanese individuals listed in your letter of 23 July 1945, the enclosed summaries are forwarded herewith.


Wallace S. Wharton
Wallace S. Wharton
Captain, U.S.N.R.

Mr. Frederick B. Lyon
Attention: Mr. J. K. Emmerson
Office of Far Eastern Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

Enc. (HW)

- (1) Summary of information on Saburo AKAMATSU
- (2) Summary of information on Toru MATSUMOTO
- (3) Summary of information on Hachiro YUASA
- (4) Summary of information on Kakutaro INOUE
- (5) Summary of information on Eitaro ISHIGAKI
- (6) Summary of information on Haru MATSUI
- (7) Summary of information on Ryoichi FUJII
- (8) Taiji HASEGAWA - No Record.

CONFIDENTIAL



894.00/s-445

CONFIDENTIAL

AKAMATSU, Alfred Saburo, Reverend
Japanese Methodist Church
323 108th Street
New York, New York

Subject, according to his own statement, was born in Momoshima, Japan on 3 November 1904. He came to the United States as a permanent resident in 1923 with his parents who resided at Walnut Grove, California. In 1930, AKAMATSU went to Southern Methodist University, from which he graduated in 1933. During the following year, he attended Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia, and in the same year, went to New York where he attended Union Theological Seminary until graduation in 1936. That fall, AKAMATSU entered the Graduate School of Philosophy at Columbia University. In October 1938, he obtained part-time employment with the New York office of the SOUTH MANCHURIAN RAILWAY, a Japanese semi-governmental agency. In 1939, AKAMATSU was recommended for appointment as a regular member of that company. He was reported to have stated that he could not reconcile this appointment with his church ambitions, and in March 1940, became pastor of the Japanese Methodist Church, which position he still holds.

AKAMATSU was reported in 1935 to be general secretary of the JAPANESE STUDENTS' CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION in North America, located at 347 Madison Avenue, New York City, and in 1936, President of the Executive Board of that organization.

Subject claimed membership in only one Japanese association, the JAPANESE ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, which he stated he joined in 1940 since he felt it a requirement of a Japanese minister as a community leader interested in welfare work among the Japanese in New York.

AKAMATSU reportedly admitted extensive lecture work in the United States on various phases of Japanese life and Japanese-American relations. In 1941, he spent a few weeks on the West Coast, gathering data for a vocational survey of the Nisei.

Subject was apprehended on 8 December 1941, but was ordered paroled on 3 February 1942.

In October 1944, it was reliably reported that subject had formed a Japanese Language School at his church because of the military need for Japanese-Americans knowing Japanese.

CONFIDENTIAL

Em (1)

CONFIDENTIAL

MATSUMOTO, Toru
3 Boston Post Road
Larchmont, New York

Subject was born in Hokkaido Prefecture, Japan on 14 September 1913. He is a graduate of MEIJI GAKUIN, a Christian School in Tokyo, formerly operated by the Reformed and Presbyterian Churches. MATSUMOTO first entered the United States in 1935; attended Union Theological Seminary in New York where he received a Bachelor of Divinity degree in 1938.

MATSUMOTO made a short trip to France in 1938; to Japan in 1940, the later trip to renew his visa, according to subject's statement. He also testified that he has relatives in Japan, and a brother teaching in a U.S. Army Intelligence School.

As an internee for a short time in 1942, MATSUMOTO is reported to have refused repatriation.

For several years, MATSUMOTO has been associated with the JAPANESE STUDENTS' CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION under the auspices of the Y.M.C.A., and has filled various speaking engagements. He also is concerned with the re-settlement of Japanese-Americans. On 10 February 1944, subject was ordained into the ministry of the Reformed Church in America.

A report of 30 September 1941 states that Tsuyoshi MATSUMOTO, c/o Trinity School, Athens, Alabama, reported to be Toru's brother, first arrived in the United States about eight years ago; that he made at least one trip to Japan since that time. In 1938, Tsuyoshi was married to a Japanese-French girl, Eniko, who has since returned to Japan to live. Tsuyoshi was reported to have been a student at the University of Southern California and while there to have been a feature writer for the RAFU SHIMPO as well as chief contact man for the JAPANESE CULTURAL CENTER of Southern California, a registered propaganda agency. In September 1941, Tsuyoshi left to take a position as music teacher in the Negro Trinity School at Athens, Alabama. However, articles submitted to the RAFU SHIMPO since his residence in Alabama have criticized the treatment given the negroes in the South and the racial prejudice found there.

A report dated 19 March 1942 states that one Tsuyoshi MATSUMOTO, Athens, Alabama, previously taken into custody, was ordered released by the Attorney General on 26 January 1942.

CONFIDENTIAL

Enc (2)

CONFIDENTIAL

YUASA, Hachiro, Dr.
Japanese Methodist Church
323 108th Street
New York, New York

Subject, about 55 years of age, was born in Japan. He worked on California farms as a boy, studied at Kansas State College, the Universities of Illinois, Chicago and Cornell, and received a Ph.D. in entomology from the latter. His foreign education is said to have included a year in universities in Germany, France and Italy. In 1934, according to a news item, YUASA was called to Japan to become President of Doshisa University, but in 1938 was reportedly "exiled" to the U.S.A. because of disagreement with the Japanese military. He arrived in the United States in 1939.

In November 1944, on the request of the Federal Churches of Christ in America, YUASA was reported to be making a tour of six Japanese relocation centers, where he was scheduled to hold a series of meetings. As of the above date, subject was associated with the New York CHURCH COMMITTEE for Japanese-Americans.

CONFIDENTIAL

Enc (3)

CONFIDENTIAL

INOUE, Kakutaro
142 West 77th Street
New York, New York

Subject was born on 27 December 1900 at Yoichi, Hokkaido, Japan. According to his own statement, INOUE graduated from Waseda University in 1921; from Kyoto Imperial University in 1924; studied at Heidelberg University in Berlin, Germany, and in Basel, Switzerland at various times from 1930 until 1935.

INOUE has stated that he resided in London from 1933 to 1940, and in 1936-1937 spent about ten months in Tokyo. Subject first entered the United States in October 1937; his last entry was in October 1940.

INOUE's wife, Helene, was born in Austria, and is apparently a Caucasian.

Subject admits membership in the Y.M.C.A. in Japan, in the CHRISTIAN STUDENT MOVEMENT in Great Britain, and in the JAPANESE-AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR DEMOCRACY. The latter is a left-wing organization formally started in 1940, with membership offered to "all loyal citizens of Japanese ancestry and Japanese residents loyal to the United States" and whose alleged purpose is "to establish better understanding between Japanese residents and the American public and to promote the economic, social and cultural status of the Japanese community."

As of May 1944, INOUE was a graduate student in Economics at Columbia University, New York, where he first began his studies in June 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

Ec (4)

CONFIDENTIAL

ISHIGAKI, Eitaro
219 West 14th Street
New York, New York

Subject, about 45 years of age, was born in Japan; alien registration receipt #5290590. He is the husband of Haru MATSUI (See summary on Mrs. Eitaro ISHIGAKI.). ISHIGAKI is reported to have arrived in the United States in 1910.

As of February 1943, subject was employed by the NEW ART SCHOOL at 567 Sixth Avenue, New York City, as a visiting instructor.

ISHIGAKI has been reported to be affiliated with Communist sympathizers.

CONFIDENTIAL

Enc (5)

CONFIDENTIAL

ISHIGAKI, Eitaro, Mrs. (Ayako)
(also known as Haru MATSUI)
219 West 14th Street
New York, New York

Ayako ISHIGAKI, nee TANAKA, professionally known as Haru MATSUI, was born on 21 September 1903 in Tokyo, Japan. She was admitted to the United States at San Francisco on 4 September 1926, as a servant of one T. SATO, Japanese Embassy, Washington, D.C., for a period of three years. However, subject abandoned this employment in December 1926.

Mrs. ISHIGAKI has studied at George Washington University, Washington, D.C. and Columbia University, New York City. Since 1917, she has been employed as a writer and lecturer, and is the author of RESTLESS WAVE, reportedly an autobiography.

Subject is reported to have married Eitaro ISHIGAKI in December 1929. She reportedly claims to be opposed to the military regime in Japan, and to have lectured on behalf of China and United China Relief. Some evidence exists that subject and her husband, within the past ten years, have been associated with persons and groups of Communistic affiliations, principally the JAPANESE-AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR DEMOCRACY. This is a left-wing organization formally started in 1940, with membership offered to "all loyal citizens of Japanese ancestry and Japanese residents loyal to the United States" and whose alleged purpose is "to establish better understanding between Japanese residents and the American public and to promote the economic, social and cultural status of the Japanese community."

The father of subject, Sanshiro TANAKA, is reported to be a retired professor; her brother, Masumi TANAKA, an official of a Japanese Government tobacco monopoly. She also is said to have two sisters, two aunts, and several cousins residing in Japan.

CONFIDENTIAL

Encl 6

CONFIDENTIAL

FUJII, Ryoichi
Formerly 577 South Central Avenue
Los Angeles, California

Subject was born on 15 May 1905 in Nishijin, Kyoto, Japan. He attended grade and middle schools in Kyoto from 1912 until 1922 and Oberlin University in Ohio from 1929 until 1933. He holds a B.A. and M.A. degrees in Philosophy and Religion. According to subject's statement, he entered the United States in 1923, speaks, reads and writes Japanese and English, and reads German.

CONFIDENTIAL

Enc (7)

CONFIDENTIAL

HASEGAWA, Taiji

No record.

CONFIDENTIAL

Enc (8)

AIRGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
85
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTED

Department of State

NO. A-364

TIME _____

Washington,

Sept. 7, 1945

894.00/8-3145

AMEMBASSY

MOSCOW (RUSSIA).

Reference Embassy's telegram no. 3127, August 31, 1945.

The Department would appreciate receiving by air mail a translation of the complete text of Sokolov's article entitled QUOTE Ruling Classes of Japan UNQUOTE printed in August 30, Red Fleet.

Acheson (SPD)

Acting

Acheson

894.00/8-3145

JA:HL:mls

9-6-45

FE
JMS

SEP 7 1945

894.00/8-3145

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

INFO: S U EUR FE DC/L-C SWP-2 FC-14 OPI PL INI A-M SPA IS SA SA/M-2

MLM-1933 -H This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone other than a Government Agency. (RESTRICTED)

Moscow via Army 83 Dated August 31, 1945 Rec'd 7:35 p.m.

Secretary of State, Washington,

3127, August 31, 6 p.m.

The clearest Soviet dissertation yet published on Japanese political system appeared in article by Sokolov entitled "Ruling Classes of Japan," printed in August 30 RED FLEET. (To Department; repeated Chungking

Office of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS SEP 7 1945 DIRECTOR Department of State

Sokolov examines and condemns Japanese political structure piece by piece. Japanese constitution he first says is patterned on and even more reactionary than obsolete Prussian constitution of 1850. It is designed to maintain interests of greater landlords and capitalists. Parliament too reflects "interweaving of imperialism and feudal remnants." As for Privy Council it is composed of representatives of former feudal lords.

Two political parties said by Sokolov to be connected with and subsidized by big business and hence unrepresentative.

RESTRICTED

OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS SEP 6 1945 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS SEP 6 1945 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FILED SEP 13 1945

894.00/8-3145

File on m 9-2-45 OWI (Doob)

RESTRICTED

-2- #3127, August 31, 6 p.m., from Moscow via War

unrepresentative. Appearance of non-party individuals in government. Their influence "was and remains tremendous."

Sokolov concludes that Japanese ruling circles represent "bloc of great landlords, business concerns and militarists - all links of fascistized Japanese imperialism" and that surface distinctions between groups will not mislead an attentive observer.

Embassy feels that foregoing provides a working outline of Soviet political allergies in Japan and that it may prove useful in attempting to forecast Soviet reactions on forthcoming civil administration of the islands.

HARRIMAN

DM

RESTRICTED

y

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION-EE

INFO:

S HK-630 -C

U

EUR-3

FE-3

DC/L-C

SWP-2

PC-14

OPI

PL

INI

A-M

SPA

IS

SL

SL/GN

SL/M-2

EUR-X

PLAIN

Moscow via War

Dated September 3, 1945

Rec'd 11:40 a. m.

OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
DISTRIBUTION
SEP 4 1945

Secretary of State,

Washington,

3142, Third.

*3 copies to John W. Jackson
Spec. Asst. to Attorney General,
2/11/54 by SCA. WMC.*

Office of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
SEP 6 1945
DIRECTOR
Department of State

Pravda August 31 carries tass despatch New York summarizing article by Owen Lattimore on craftiness Jap policy. Lattimore warns that Japs are resorting to special maneuvers to divide ranks Allies. According Lattimore Japs are especially trying to use Emperor as means of upsetting unity. In addition Japs hope to use other weapons to drive wedge between USSR and China.

*Wms
9/4/45
Out (Doubt)*

Pointing out that Jap radio tries to represent Japan as symbol of liberation Asia from imperialist domination and that Jap Premier proposes to march hand in hand with China, Lattimore states that this clearly bears witness to renewal of Jap efforts to achieve union between Japan and rightist elements China. Lattimore quoted saying that this maneuver pursues aim of obstructing improvement

Soviet

Form with fields for 'Anal', 'Dis', and routing information. Includes stamp 'DOR - EUR 11-11' and handwritten initials 'Co' and 'ai'.

FILED
SEP 10 1945

894.00/9-345

-2-3142, Third, from Moscow

Soviet-Chinese relations and show desire of Japan to utilize instructions which recently were given Jap troops by Chungking, namely, to retain arms for maintenance order which signifies that Chinese people will remain helpless. So long as China, Russia, America and England do not implement single policy Japs will have opportunity to display political initiative. Preservation Emperor helps Japan in this respect. Sent Department 3142, Repeated Chungking 138..

MESSAGE UNSIGNED

RR

AIRGRAM

86

10

FROM: Moscow

DATE: September 22, 1945

REC'D: Oct 4, 8 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL -3

ACTION:EE

INFO:

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

A-245, September 22.

Rome's airgram No. A-666 August 31, 1945 was of great interest to this Embassy as it contained information not hitherto received from any other source.

By way of background we would say that last year Okano stated to American observers at Yenan that because it was necessary realistically to recognize the attachment of the Japanese masses to the Emperor and the institution of Emperorship, the Japanese Communist Party, although it opposed permanent retention of the Emperor, did not demand his immediate removal nor did it intend in the near future to attack the institution of the Emperorship. His more recent statement on the Emperor quoted by L'UNITA represents, therefore, a reiteration of a previously declared policy.

It should be observed, however, that although L'UNITA article was published after the Japanese capitulation and the American decision to retain the Emperor, Okano's statement quoted therein was made last May.

It is significant in this connection that the Soviet press has made no statement which might be interpreted as supporting the retention of the present Emperor or the institution of Emperorship. To the contrary, the Soviet press has by inference criticized the American action in retaining the Emperor. It seems to us unlikely that Soviet foreign policy would swing over to support of the Emperor so long as American policy in Japan continues along its present lines.

The Japanese Communist Party would therefore seem to be confronted on the issue of the Emperor with a dilemma so familiar to Communist Parties outside of the USSR - a conflict between the demands of Soviet foreign policy and the necessities of a realistic national policy.

Future statements by Okano and the Soviet press may give a clue as to how this dilemma will be resolved.

*37C
3 copies to war
2-8-46
Dawson White*

*KR
761.94*

OFFICE OF THE
ATTACHÉ
OCT 4 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE


DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 15 1945
DC/L

DCB - EUR Unit
JD/alw
Anal
Rev.
Jat.
Dist.

KENNAN
OCT 16 1945
FILED

894.00/9-2245

EE
~~*DJR*~~
DJR
file



From: Moscow
Date: September 24, 1945
Rec'd: OCT 1, 8 p.m.

Wm
10-6-45
115
ag
com
76A

UNRESTRICTED

Secretary of State,
Washington.
A-247, September 24, 1945.

Summary follows major article entitled "Japanese Country-side" published Red Star September 22:

Idea of natural shortage of land in Japan was intensively propagated by Japanese imperialists in course of preparation for aggression. "Continental policy" was Japanese version of German "Drang nach Osten" policy. Poverty-stricken Jap peasant was told: "You are poor because Japan has little land". On this basis millions of Japanese were indoctrinated with spirit of predatory militarism.

Facts, however, are as follows. Between 1922 and 1940 there was no increase in amount of cultivated land in Japan. However, this cannot be explained by natural causes since not over two-thirds of cultivatable soil was actually brought under cultivation. Existence of several millions of hectares of unworked cultivatable land reveals falsity of Japanese propaganda concerning "natural shortage of land". Fact that huge areas in Japan are not cultivated is explained by further fact that agricultural production in Japan is extremely backward in technical sense. This in turn is to be explained not by geographical factors but by agrarian relations which exist in Japan. About 150,000 land owners, 3.2 percent of total number, possess over 40 percent of all sown areas, including best irrigated lands. Land owners rent small plots out to peasants. Peasants pay land owners on average over half of their harvest in rent. Portion of cost of agricultural production taken away in form of rent does not return to agriculture. This is chief cause of backwardness of agricultural production and extremely low level of agricultural technique. Japanese peasant is not only unable to introduce improvements in agricultural technique but is hard put to feed his own family. Hundreds of thousands of Japanese peasants are forced to sell their own daughters and wives to textile factories and brothels in order to make ends meet. In this fashion Japanese peasantry becomes inexhaustible reservoir of cheap labor power for industrialists.

Desperate

- ACTION:
- INFO:
- S
- ESC
- EJR-3
- IR-3
- IR/L-A
- IRP
- CP
- ILH
- S/P-2
- PC-14
- OIC
- IMI
- OPI
- PL
- A-8
- A-11
- SA
- SA/GS
- SA/R

XR
84450

DCR - EUR Unit

Anal
Rev.
Dist

ad

894-00/9-2445

-2- A-247, September 24, 1945, from Moscow.

Desperate condition of Japanese peasantry has constantly been discussed in Japanese press and government circles. But neither Japanese Parliament, in which land owners and rice speculators play prominent role, nor Japanese fascized militarists had desire or ability to help peasant. Millions of peasants went into army to seize foreign lands and thus became co-participants in bloody deeds of Japanese militarism. Only "serious land reform" can lead Japanese agriculture out of blind alley into which it has fallen as result of semi-feudal exploitation of peasantry. Such reform will radically undermine spirit of militarism and aggression in which Japanese people have been trained during past 50 years and will bring about real rather than formal democratization of state life in Japan.

Carbon copy to American Embassy, Chungking.

RGT:ok

DISPATCH

SEP 24 1945

KENNAN
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY

*EA/KA
JAL*

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

CONFIDENTIAL *JA*

AC/REC

28 September 1945

MEMORANDUM for Mr. Frederick B. Lyon
Subject: Japanese Liberation League

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
OCT 3 - 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

894.00/9-2845

The enclosed memorandum is forwarded for
your information and retention.

Wallace S. Wharton
Wallace S. Wharton
Captain, U.S.N.R.

Mr. Frederick B. Lyon
Chief, Division of Foreign Activity Correlation
Department of State
Room 114
Washington, D.C.

DIVISION OF FOREIGN ACTIVITY CORRELATION
file
OCT 2 - 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Enc. (HW)
(1) DIO 14ND conf. ltr. to Activities Listed, same
subject, dated 11 September 1945.

FBI, MIS cognizant.

OCR Unit
[Handwritten initials]

CONFIDENTIAL

OCT 10 1945

894.00/9-2845

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
District Intelligence Office
Sixth Floor, Young Hotel
Honolulu, Hawaii

14ND/A8-5

HM/y

CONFIDENTIAL

11 September 1945

From: District Intelligence Officer, 14ND
To: Activities Listed.

Subj: Japanese Liberation League

Encl: (A) Draft outlines covering general principles of subject organization.
(B) Draft of by-laws of subject organization

1. Enclosures are forwarded because of their intelligence interest. Subject organization has headquarters at Yen-an, Chinese Communist capitol, and is founded upon Communist principles. Its leader is Susumu OKANO, who was formerly connected with the Comintern.

H. S. Burr
H. S. BURR
Acting

ONI (4)
G2(CID)Hon (1)
AAFPac (Counter-Intelligence) APO 500 (4)
JICPOA (1)
Midpac Military Gov't. Sec, G-1
(Attn: Col. Duff) (1)
Commander, Philippine Sea Frontier (2)
ComNavGroupChina (2)

Enclosure (1)

From:
Japanese Liberation League
February, 1944.

DRAFT OUTLINES COVERING GENERAL PRINCIPLES
OF THE JAPANESE LIBERATION LEAGUE
(NIPPON JINMIN KAIHO RENMEI KORYO SOAN)

- - - - -
(Conclusion of War and Peace)

I - Our military and munition capitalists have derived enormous profits from the Manchuria incident, China Incident, and Far Eastern War, but our people as well as the other Eastern races have had to undergo innumerable sacrifices. And the longer this war is protracted, the larger our difficulties and ruptures will be.

Therefore we anticipate that:

- (a) Immediate cessation of war.
- (b) The withdrawal of Japanese troops and warships from all occupied territories.
- (c) A conclusion of a just peace with warring nations, thus bringing about the revival of a secure life for our people as soon as possible.

(Everlasting Peace)

II - During the last fifty years, the wars in East Asia have for the most part, been caused by our country's military and its confederates.

Therefore we anticipate that:

- (a) Those responsible for the Manchuria incident, Chinese Incident, and Far Eastern War, be strictly dealt with.
- (b) Sweep away military influence from within the government of our country.
- (c) The defense of our home-land be set as the maximum limit; armaments be reduced to conform to this limit, abolish conscription and enlistment system to be adopted.
- (d) Carry out a consistent foreign policy as regards peace measures.

- (e) Participate in post war international peace and peace structures (new league of nations) and thus prevent the recurrence of war. Establish friendly relations with other races on the basis of peace, independence, equality and live and let live.

III - (Economic Plans for Prosperity)

Our country is extremely weakened by the long, large-scale warfare.

Therefore:

- (a) Reduce military expenses to the minimum, and apply the major portion of our national income to the revival and development of economy and the raising of the standard of living for the people.
- (b) Continue and strengthen national control over banks and other enterprises (monopolies).
- (c) Develop our machinery and precision industry to a high degree on the basis of our present heavy industries. Mechanize agriculture.
- (d) Establish land regulations so as to enable the best profitable use of lands to bring about prosperity to the country.
- (e) Promote foreign trade on the principles of "minister to each other's wants."

Thus plan for the independence and prosperity of our country and anticipate the carrying out of an economic policy which will further the prosperity of our people.

IV - (Overthrow of Military Dictatorship)

From the Meiji Restoration up to today, the military and its confederates have carried on unlimited dictatorship and abuses in our country.

Therefore:

- (a) Strip the military of all its special rights. (Direct appeals to the Emperor, military ministers, Regulations covering service men.)
- (b) Prohibit the interference of the military as regards government economy, education and culture. Furthermore,

- (c) Dissolve all organizations under the leadership of the military. (Taisei Yokusan Kai, Yokusan Seiji Kai, Yokusan Sonen Dan, various "patriotic organizations", etc.)

We thereby anticipate the clarification of the government of our country.

V - (Free and Democratic Government)

The rights and freedom of our country have been completely transgressed on by the military.

Therefore, we anticipate:

- (a) The abolishment of all evil laws such as national mobilization laws, requisition orders, special war-time criminal code, peace maintenance laws, etc.
- (b) Release political criminals who were arrested on the charges of opposing the injustice of society or who opposed the military and war.
- (c) Abolish limitations pertaining to occupation, residence and movements.
- (d) Realize complete freedom of speech, publications, assembly, contract, and religion.
- (e) Grant voting rights to men and women over twenty years old.
- (f) Firmly establish democratic system of government, and
- (g) Convoke national assembly for the purpose of revising the constitution.

Thus we anticipate the construction of a new Japan based on freedom and democracy.

VI - (Improving Living Conditions of the People)

The military calls our country a "first rate power" from the point of armed might, but our people (homeland and territorial residents) have been living a life below that of a "third rate power." Furthermore, the protracted warfare has thrust the people into a condition of extreme hardships.

Therefore, we anticipate:

- (a) Lower the price of daily commodities; lighten taxes for the workers; abolish illegal various obligations

(compulsory savings, donations, material contributions, and labor service.)

- (b) Abolish the regulation controlling wages for workers and wage-earners; establish a just wage system; shorten working hours; revive and improve factory laws, and revive workers' unions.
- (c) Abolish the system of compulsory buying up of farm products from farmers and 作附制限令 /control of products regulation/. Set a just rental on land and prohibit the deprivation of lands. Supply cheap and abundant fertilizers. Revive farm unions.
- (d) Guarantee the freedom of scientific research; abolish students' labor service and military training; revive progressive students' societies.
- (e) Devise effectual methods for the revival and relief of middle and small industrialists.

Besides this, we anticipate the raising of standards of living as well as cultural levels for our countrymen through all other possible means.

(Guarantee of Security for Families of Sailors and Soldiers)

VII - The most miserable life is that of a discharged soldier or a soldier called for /to/ duty. And there is no other army in the world who disregards human rights as does our army.

Therefore we:

- (a) Guarantee the security of the soldier's family as well as the surviving family.
- (b) Raise the salary of soldiers and sailors; strictly prohibit illtreatment and "binta" (slapping faces); grant freedom of leaves, correspondence, reading and assemblies. Grant them voting rights; give them immediate discharge upon fulfilment of their time; and prohibit re-recruiting.

Thus we anticipate that an improvement of conditions be effected and that security of living be given to the victims of war.

(Organization of Peoples' Government)

- VIII - The above items constitute the heart-felt requests of all our people in all classes. But the present military and large capitalists are doing their utmost to suppress and obstruct the realization of these items.

Therefore, we anticipate the overthrow of this wartime government. And we also anticipate the organization of a peoples' government made up of federations, various branches and various progressive parties, all representing the peoples' will and well being, thereby bringing about the attainment of the common aim for all people.

- End -

DRAFT OF THE BY-LAWS OF THE JAPANESE LIBERATION LEAGUE
/Nippon Jinmin Kaihō Renmei/

Article I (Title). This League shall be called the Japanese Liberation League.

Article II (Purpose). The purpose of this League is to carry out the principles of the League.

Article III (Terms of membership). Any individual or organization approving the spirit of the principles of this League can become a member.

Article IV (Highest Organ). The highest organ of this League shall be the Representatives' General Meeting /Daihyōsha Sōkai/ which shall be held annually. However, an emergency meeting may be held, if deemed necessary by the Central Committee or if requested by a majority of the League members.

The General Meeting shall be composed of representatives elected from the Regional Councils and affiliated organizations. The method of election and ratio of representation shall be determined by the Central Committee.

In case it is impossible for the representatives to assemble and hold the General Meeting, the combined resolutions of each Regional Council and affiliated organization may be used to take the place of the General Meeting.

Article V (Central Executive Organ). The Central Committee shall be selected at the General Meeting.

The Central Committee shall direct the activities of the League until the next session of the General Meeting and shall represent the League.

The Central Committee shall elect the chairman, the vice-chairman and the standing committee from within its own members.

The Standing Committee shall carry out the daily activities of the League and may establish committees for various projects depending on the necessity.

Article VI (Lower Organizations). The structure of the lower organizations of this League shall differ according to individual membership or group membership and to the legal or illegal status /of the party/.

The organizational structure for individual membership and group membership is as follows:

<u>Central Committee of the League</u>		
<u>Organizations</u>	(Example: North China Regional Council)	<u>Regional Council Chihō Kyōgi Kai</u>
	# (Example: Shansi District Committee)	<u>District Committee Chiku Iin Kai</u>
	(Example: Taikang Branch)	<u>Shibu Branch</u>

Note: A District Council is organized when there are two or more Branches. When only one Branch exists in a district, it shall be attached directly to the Regional Council.

The above is primarily the organizational principle for regions where activities can be carried on legally, but in a region where activities can only be carried on illegally, this can be changed according to the situation in that region.

Article VII (Regional Council /Chihō Kyōgi Kai/). The Central Committee shall determine the establishment of a Regional Council in specific regions. In conformity with the policies of the Central Committee, the Regional Councils shall direct the activities of the League in the areas within their jurisdiction. The manner of organization of the Regional Councils will be stipulated later.

Article VIII (Affiliated Organizations). In regard to the activities of this League, the Affiliated Organizations shall follow the policies of the Central Committee, but the organization and activities within the said organizations can be determined independently in so far as they do not run counter to the spirit of this League.

Article IX (Accounts). The expenditures of this League shall be financed by dues and by donations. The amount of the dues shall be stipulated later.

Article X (Amendment of By-Laws). These by-laws cannot be amended without the approval of the General Meeting or of an equivalent organ.

By-Laws of North China Regional Council of the
Japanese Liberation League
/Nippon Shimmin Kaihō Remmei Kahoku Chihō Kyōgi Kai/

Article I (Purpose and Duties). The purpose of this North China Regional Council shall be to carry out the principles of