

Witness Inglis

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1 to 100 feet of the water), and from very short distances,
2 aiming for the battleships berthed on the southeast side
3 of Ford Island. All the outboard battleships, namely, the
4 NEVADA, ARIZONA, WEST VIRGINIA, OKLAHOMA, and CALIFORNIA,
5 were effectively hit by one or more torpedoes. Strafing
6 was simultaneously conducted from the rear cockpits. A
7 recovered unexploded torpedo carried an explosive charge
8 of 1,000 pounds.

9 During the second of these attacks, the OKLAHOMA was struck
10 by three torpedoes on the port side and heeled rapidly to
11 port, impeding the efforts of her defenders to beat off the
12 attackers.

13 The third attack was made by one torpedo plane which
14 appeared from the west and was directed against the light
15 cruiser HELENA and the minelayer OGLALA, both of which were
16 temporarily occupying the berth previously assigned to the
17 battleship PENNSYLVANIA, flagship of the Pacific Fleet.
18 One torpedo passed under the OGLALA and exploded against the
19 side of the HELENA. The blast stove in the side plates
20 of the OGLALA. Submersible pumps for the OGLALA were ob-
21 tained from the HELENA, but could not be used since no
22 power was available because of damage to the ship's
23 engineering plant.

24 The fourth wave of five planes came in from the north-
25 west and attacked the seaplane tender TANGIER, the target

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2 ship UTAH, and the light cruisers RALEIGH and DETROIT.
3 The RALEIGH was struck by one torpedo, and the UTAH received
4 two hits in succession, capsizing at 8:13 a.m. At first
5 it was feared that the RALEIGH would capsize. Orders were
6 therefore given for all men not at the guns to jettison all
7 topside weights and put both airplanes in the water. Extra
8 manila and wire lines were also run to the quays to help
9 keep the ship from capsizing.

10 The UTAH, an old battleship converted into a target
11 ship, had recently returned from serving as a target for
12 practice aerial bombardment. As soon as she received her
13 torpedo hits, she began listing rapidly to port. After
14 she had listed to about 40 degrees, the order was given
15 to abandon ship. This order was executed with some diffi-
16 culty as the attacking planes strafed the crew as they went
17 over the side. Remnants of the crew had reached Ford Island
18 safely. Later knocking was heard within the hull of the
19 UTAH. With cutting tools obtained from the RALEIGH a
20 volunteer crew succeeded in cutting through the hull and
21 rescuing a fireman second class who had been entrapped in
22 the void scape underneath the dynamo room.

23 An interesting sidelight on Japanese intentions and
24 advance knowledge is suggested by the fact that berths F-10
25 and F-11 in which the UTAH and RALEIGH were placed were

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1
2 designated carrier berths and that a carrier was frequently
3 moored in nearby F-9.

4 The DETROIT and TANGIER escaped torpedo damage, one
5 torpedo passing just astern of the DETROIT and burying itself
6 in the mud. Another torpedo passed between the TANGIER and
7 the UTAH.

8 It is estimated that the total number of torpedo planes
9 engaged in these four attacks was 21.

10 In the eight dive bomber attacks occurring during Phase
11 I, three types of bombs were employed; light, medium, and
12 incendiary.

13 During the second of these attacks, a bomb hit exploded
14 the forward 14-inch powder magazine on the battleship ARIZONA
15 and caused a ravaging oil fire, which sent up a great cloud
16 of smoke, thereby interfering with anti-aircraft fire. The
17 battleship TENNESSEE in the adjacent berth was endangered
18 seriously by the oil fire.

19 The WEST VIRGINIA was hit during the third of these
20 attacks by two heavy bombs as well as by torpedos. Like
21 the CALIFORNIA, she had to be abandoned after a large fire
22 broke out amidships. Her executive officer, the senior
23 survivor, dove overboard and swam to the TENNESSEE, where
24 he organized a party of WEST VIRGINIA survivors to help
25 extinguish the fire in the rubbish, trash and oil which

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1 covered the water between the TENNESSEE and Ford Island.

2
3 The total number of dive bombers engaged in this phase
4 is estimated at 30. While a few fighters were reported
5 among the attackers in the various phases, they were no-
6 doubt confused with light bombers and accordingly are not
7 treated as a distinct type.

8 Although the major attack by high-altitude horizontal
9 bombers did not occur until Phase III, 15 planes of this
10 type operating in four groups were active during Phase I.

11 Most of the torpedo damage to the Fleet had occurred
12 by 8:25 a.m. All the outboard battleships had been hit by
13 one or more torpedoes; all the battleships had been hit
14 by one or more bombs with the exception of the OKLAHOMA
15 which took four torpedoes before it capsized and the PENNSYL-
16 VANIA which received a bomb hit later. By the end of the
17 first phase, the WEST VIRGINIA was in a sinking condition;
18 the CALIFORNIA was down by the stern; the ARIZONA was a
19 flaming ruin; the other battleships were all damaged to a
20 greater or lesser degree.

21 Although the initial attack of the Japanese came as
22 a surprise, defensive action on the part of the Fleet was
23 prompt. All ships immediately went to general quarters.
24 Battleship ready machine guns likewise opened fire at once,
25 and within an estimated average time of less than five minutes

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1
2 practically all battleship and anti-aircraft batteries
3 were firing.

4 The cruisers were firing all anti-aircraft batteries
5 within an average time of about four minutes. The des-
6 troyers, although opening up with machine guns almost
7 immediately, averaged seven minutes in bringing all anti-
8 aircraft guns into action.

9 During this phase of the battle there was no movement
10 of ships within the harbor proper. The destroyer HELM,
11 which had gotten under way just prior to the attack, was
12 outside the harbor entrance when at 8:17 a submarine con-
13 ning tower was sighted to the right of the entrance channel
14 and northward of buoy No. 1. The submarine immediately
15 submerged. The HELM opened fire at 8:19 a.m. when the
16 submarine again surfaced temporarily. No hits were observed.

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PHASE II - 8:25 - 8:40 A.M. - Lull in Attacks

This phase is described as a lull only by way of comparison. Air activity continued during this phase although somewhat abated, with sporadic attacks by dive and horizontal bombers. During this phase an estimated total of 15 dive bombers participated in five attacks upon the ships in the Navy Yard, the battleships Maryland, Oklahoma, Nevada and Pennsylvania, and various light cruisers and destroyers.

Although three attacks by horizontal bombers occurred during the lull, these appear to have overlapped into Phase III and are considered under that heading.

At 8:32 A.M. the battleship Oklahoma took a heavy list to starboard and capsized.

During Phase II, there was still relatively little ship movement within the Harbor. The ready-duty destroyer Monaghan had received orders at 7:51 A.M. (Pearl Harbor time) to "proceed immediately and contact Ward in defensive sea area." At about 8:37, observing an enemy submarine just west of Ford Island under fire from both the Curtiss and Tangier, the Monaghan proceeded at high speed and at about 8:43 rammed the submarine. As the enemy vessel had submerged, the shock was slight. The Monaghan thereupon reversed engines and dropped two depth charges.

The Curtiss had previously scored two direct hits on

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1
2 the conning tower. This submarine was later salvaged for
3 inspection and disposal. The Monaghan then proceeded down
4 the channel and continued her sortie. At the same time that
5 the Monaghan got underway, the destroyed Henley slipped her
6 chain from Buoy X-11 and sortied, following the Monaghan
7 down the channel.

PHASE III - 8:40 - 9:15 A.M. - Horizontal Bomber Attacks.

8
9 The so-called "lull" in the air raid was terminated by
10 the appearance over the Fleet of eight groups of high-altitude
11 horizontal bombers which crossed and recrossed their targets
12 from various directions, inflicting serious damage. Some
13 of the bombs dropped were converted 15 or 16 inch shells of
14 somewhat less explosive quality, marked by very little flame.
15 According to some observers, many bombs dropped by high
16 altitude horizontal bombers either failed to explode or
17 landed outside the Harbor area.

18
19 During the second attack (at 9:06 A.M.) the Pennsylvania
20 was hit by a heavy bomb which passed through the main deck
21 amidships and detonated causing a fire, which was extinguished
22 with some difficulty.

23
24 The third group of planes followed very closely the
25 line of battleship moorings. It was probably one of these
planes that hit the California with what is believed to have
been a 15-inch projectile equipped with tail vanes which

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penetrated to the second deck and exploded. As a result of the explosion, the armored hatch to the machine shop was badly sprung and could not be closed, resulting in the spreading of a serious fire.

Altogether, 30 horizontal bombers, including nine planes which had participated in earlier attacks, are estimated to have engaged in Phase III. Once more it was the heavy combatant ships, the battleships and cruisers, which bore the brunt of these attacks.

Although Phase III was largely devoted to horizontal bombing, approximately 18 dive bombers organized in five groups also participated.

It was probably the second of these groups which did considerable damage to the Nevada, then proceeding down the South Channel, and also to the Shaw, Cassin, and Downes, all three of which were set afire.

During the fifth attack, a Japanese dive bomber succeeded in dropping one bomb on the seaplane tender Curtiss which detonated on the main deck level, killing 20 men, wounding 58, and leaving one other unaccounted for.

During this same phase, the Curtiss took under fire one of these bombers, which was pulling out of a dive over the naval air station. Hit squarely by the Curtiss' accurate gunfire, the plane crashed on the ship, spattering burning

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gasoline and starting fires so menacing that one of the guns had to be temporarily abandoned.

Considerable ship movement took place during Phase III. At 8:40 A.M. the Nevada cleared berth F-8 without assistance and proceeded down the South Channel. As soon as the Japanese became aware that a battleship was trying to reach open water, they sent dive bomber after dive bomber down after her and registered several hits. In spite of the damage she had sustained in the vicinity of Floating Drydock No. 2 and although her bridge and forestructure were ablaze, the ship continued to fight effectively. At 9:10, however, while she was attempting to make a turn in the channel the Nevada ran aground in the vicinity of buoy #19.

Meanwhile the repair ship Vestal, also without assistance, had gotten underway at about 8:40, had cleared the burning Arizona, and at about 9:10 anchored well clear northeast of Ford Island.

Soon after the Nevada and Vestal had cleared their berths, tugs began to move the Oglala to a position astern of the Helena at 10-10 Dock. The Oglala was finally secured in her berth at about 9:00, but shortly thereafter she capsized.

At 8:42, the oiler Neosho cleared berth F-4 unaided and stood toward Merry Point in order to reduce fire hazard to her cargo and to clear the way for a possible sortie by the battleship Maryland.

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Next, Phase IV, from 9:15 to 9:45, Dive Bomber Attacks.

The Chairman: Under the program of the committee, 12 o'clock having arrived, I think we should now recess until 2 p. m., and complete your testimony then.

Admiral Inglis: Mr. Chairman, if I may have thirty seconds longer, I could finish this particular part.

The Chairman: Just a moment. You might as well come back at 2.

(Whereupon, at 12:00 M, the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2:00 o'clock p. m., of the same day.)

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AFTERNOON SESSION

2:00 p.m.

The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

Admiral, you may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL T. B. INGLIS AND

COLONEL BERNARD THIELEN (Resumed)

Admiral Inglis: In this morning's portion of the presentation I finished Phases I, II and III. I propose now to take up the story with Phase IV, which lasted from 9:15 to 9:45 and was characterized by dive bomber attacks.

During Phase IV an estimated 27 dive bombers conducted 9 strafing attacks directed against ships throughout the entire Harbor area. In all probability the planes were the same ones that had conducted previous attacks. These attacks overlapped by about ten minutes the horizontal bomber attacks previously described in Phase III.

PHASE V - 9:45 - Waning of Attacks and Completion of Raid.

By 9:45 all enemy planes had retired. Evading our aerial searches, both shore-based and from carriers at sea, the Japanese striking force retired to its home waters without being contacted by any of our units. (For summary of Japanese planes participating in attack see Item 11 in the white folder.)

The foregoing has been a discussion of the attack phase only. The details of our aircraft and anti-craft action will be given later.

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SUMMARY OF PERCENTAGE PERSONNEL MUSTERED ON STATION.

Fleet orders at the time of Pearl Harbor directed that one-fourth of the officers and one-half of the enlisted personnel be on board at all times.

Excerpts from a summarized report of personnel actually on board at the commencement of the attack on 7 December 1941 are as follows:

	<u>On Board</u>
Commanding Officers of Battleships	5 out of 8
Commanding Officers of Cruisers	6 out of 7
Commanding Officers of Destroyers	63%
Damage Control Officers of Battleships	6 out of 8
Average percentage of officers	
Battleships (Approx.)	60-70%
Cruisers, Battle Force (Approx.)	65%
Destroyers, Battle Force (Approx.)	50%
Average percentage of men	
Battleships	95%
Cruisers, Battle Force	98%
Destroyers, Battle Force	85%

There were ample personnel present and ready to man all naval shore installations.

I will ask Colonel Thielen to take up from here.

Witness Thielen

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Colonel Thielen: In presenting the Army's story of the attack, I propose to describe what happened at the each of the three major air fields, Hickam Field, Wheeler and Bellows, and after that to describe the action taken by our ground forces, and our Coast Artillery command in response to the attack.

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Our planes on Hickam Field at the time of the attack were lined up on the warming-up aprons three or four abreast, with approximately ten feet between wing tips, and approximately 135 feet from the tail of one plane to the nose of another.

If you will note the plan of the Hickam Field as displayed on the easel, you may be able to distinguish the aircraft on the warming-up apron. They are actually drawn to scale. They may not be legible. However, each member of the committee has a photograph of the plan of each of these air fields.

Hickam Field observers report that the first indication of an attack was at 7:55 a.m. when nine enemy single-engine, low-wing monoplanes, carrying torpedoes, were observed southeast of Hickam Field hangar line, flying at an altitude of about 50 feet toward Pearl Harbor. They were in two echelons, five planes in the first and four in the second. These airplanes did not attack Hickam Field.

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At almost the same time, however, nine dive bombers attacked the Hawaiian Air Depot buildings and Hickam Field hangar line from the south, and three additional planes attacked the same objectives from the northwest. Several minutes later nine additional dive bombers bombed Hickam Field hangar line from the southeast. Immediately thereafter, seven additional dive bombers attacked the Hickam Field hangar line from the east. All planes dived at approximately 45 to 50 degrees from altitudes of 3,000 to 5,000 feet. Bombs were released at about 1,000 feet with the planes pulling out of dives from 800 to approximately 300 feet. Machine gun fire was employed before and after bomb release. This attack lasted about ten minutes.

The second attack on Hickam Field occurred at about 8:25 a.m., when between six and nine planes approached from the south and attacked No. 1 Aque System, which is a hydrostatic pass for the fuel pumping system, and also the technical buildings, immediately the hangar lines, and the Consolidated Barracks. These planes when first observed were flying level and released their bombs from level flight at an altitude of about 150 feet. During and immediately after this bombing attack our planes on the parking apron were attacked with gun fire. About one minute later (8:26) a formation of five or six planes bombed the baseball diamond

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2 from a high altitude, possibly believing the gasoline
3 storage system to be in that area. The second attack lasted
4 between ten and fifteen minutes.

5 The third attack at Hickam occurred about 9:00 a.m.,
6 when six to nine planes (presumably those that had previous-
7 ly bombed from level flight at 150 feet at 8:25) attacked
8 with machine gun fire the technical buildings behind the
9 hangar lines and certain planes which by then were dis-
10 persed.

11 These attacks came from four directions almost simul-
12 taneously. At the same time a formation of from seven to
13 nine planes, flying in "V" formation at an altitude estimated
14 at 6,000 feet approached from the south, releasing bombs
15 which struck the Consolidated Barracks, the parade ground
16 and Post Exchange. The third attack lasted about eight
17 minutes. All enemy planes observed at low altitudes were
18 single engine, low-wing monoplanes. The type of high alti-
19 tude bombers was not definitely established. Largest bombs
20 used were believed not to exceed 600 pounds. Gun ammuni-
21 tion was identified as 7.7 and 20 mm ammunition.

22 At Wheeler Field, our planes were parked in the space
23 between the aprons in front of the hangars, generally in a
24 series of parallel lines approximately wing tip to wing tip,
25 the lines varying from 15 to 20 feet apart.

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2 About 25 Japanese planes approached at 8:02 a. m.,
3 generally from the southeast, at about 5,000 feet altitude.
4 They passed well to the east of the field, circled counter-
5 clockwise, losing altitude and approached for attack from
6 the north at about 3,000 feet, generally perpendicular to
7 the hangar line. The formation of the entire group was
8 roughly a "V"-- with five sections of four planes each
9 forming the "V" formation -- that is indicated on the chart
10 and on the photographic reproductions thereof -- with a
11 fourth plane extending the right leg of the "V".

12 A single odd plane flew slightly to the rear of the
13 formation. They dived at an angle of about 45 degrees and
14 struck the hangar line and vicinity over a length of about
15 900 yards, starting from the engineering hangar which is
16 at the extreme southwest of the hangar line. Out of approxi-
17 mately 35 bombs dropped, four were about 600 pounds, three
18 were about 250 pounds, eight were about 100 pounds, and the
19 remainder were smaller, some of them appearing to be oil
20 or other type incendiary bombs. Machine gun fire was em-
21 ployed during the dive bombing attack. Practically all
22 bombs struck the hangar line and points in the rear and
23 were released at altitudes of 200 and 250 feet. After
24 releasing bombs, the planes continued to dive for a short
25 distance and pulled out at about the same angle as at the

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1
2 start of the dive.

3 After the first dive bombing the formation broke,
4 apparently in all directions, with individual planes con-
5 tinuing gun fire without regard to the possibility of
6 collision. This phase of the attack was carried on from
7 altitudes of approximately 200 feet and the only semblance
8 of order appeared to be that planes circled counter-clock-
9 wise. Principal targets for this gun fire were our planes
10 on the hangar line and buildings, and personnel in the
11 immediate vicinity. All planes in the first attacking
12 formation appeared similar and were single-engine, low-wing
13 monoplanes. While not positively established, it is pre-
14 sumed from evidence of 20mm fire that this attack included
15 fighters in support of dive bombers. The entire attack
16 lasted approximately 15 minutes.

17 Another attack struck Wheeler Field a few minutes
18 after 9:00 a.m. This attack consisted of seven enemy planes
19 which approached from the south, flying roughly in line at
20 an altitude of about 500 feet. They fired machine guns
21 at planes being taxied onto the airdrome but it is believed
22 that no plane fired more than 25 to 50 rounds. All seven
23 planes were single engine, low-wing monoplanes, two-seaters.
24 They withdrew to the north. The whole second attack lasted
25 less than five minutes and could very reasonably have been

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2 made by a group of planes expending the remainder of their
3 ammunition.

4 During the first raid at Wheeler Field, personnel
5 were employed in rescuing the wounded, fighting the numer-
6 ous fires and in removing airplanes from danger. As soon
7 as undamaged aircraft had been rolled away to a safe place,
8 the crews began arming them.

9 On Bellows Field at the time of the attack the P-40's
10 were parked in line at 10-15 feet intervals. The recon-
11 naissance planes were also parked in a line at slightly
12 greater intervals.

13 I might point out that those aircraft on the white
14 squares represent the original formation as it was at the
15 time of the first attack. We have also represented
16 aircraft in blue squares dispersed over the field. Those
17 are the same aircraft represented as being initially in
18 line. After the first attack they were over the field.

19 A single Japanese fighter plane initiated the attack
20 at approximately 8:30 a.m. It came directly from the
21 east and employed machine gun fire on the tent area ap-
22 parently expending all its ammunition in this one attack.

23 At about 9:00 a.m., the nine fighters attacked Bellows
24 Field from the north in three groups of three planes each
25 in "V" formation. This attack lasted about 15 minutes and

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1
2 consisted of gun fire only. It was initiated with a diving
3 attack of all nine planes, after which the three formations
4 of three each peeled off and attacked from various direc-
5 tions. The anti-aircraft defense during this attack on
6 Bellows Field consisted of small arms fire by elements of
7 the 298th Infantry.

8 After the single plane, tent-area attack, one of the
9 B-17 's which had arrived from the mainland and which had
10 been unable to land at Hickam Field, attempted to land at
11 Bellows Field but rolled off the run-way. And that can
12 be seen on the chart in the orange circle, the approximate
13 position of the list of the run-way. This plane was
14 repeatedly machine-gunned by the nine attacking planes.

15 The attack at Bellows Field appeared to be well planned,
16 rehearsed and well executed. One plane was reported shot
17 down by the Infantry troops defending the area but no
18 part of it was recovered from the sea for identification.

19 At Haleiwa -- you might point that out, Captain, on
20 the big map -- the planes of the 47th Pursuit Squadron
21 were parked in the open in close formations. However,
22 Haleiwa Field was not attacked.

23 In all these attacks on Oahu airfields, strafing planes
24 came down to a very low altitude. They used 50 calibre
25 7.7 mm and 20 mm ammunition. Rigid flight discipline was

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demonstrated by the enemy and accurate bombing was evidenced. Such attacks could not have been performed without numerous and detailed rehearsals. Every movement was well executed. The evidence indicates that the attacks on the airfields were made by a maximum of 105 airplanes; the number may have been less since some of the planes may have taken part in more than one attack.

After 9:45 a. m., 7 December, there were no further attacks on Oahu installations. Despite numerous false reports, no landings were attempted.

A few bombs were dropped in Epanolulu, but probably this was the result of individual planes clearing their bomb racks before departing. There was some strafing and a few bombs were dropped on Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter. Several bursts of machine gun fire were delivered at targets other than military objectives.

When the first bombs were dropped and machine gun fire commenced, practically all observers were so surprised that for a few minutes the real situation was not grasped. Perhaps three or four minutes elapsed before General Short was informed by his Chief of Staff that an attack was in progress. General Short immediately directed that all troops be turned out under Alert No.3. This alert required all units to occupy battle positions shown on this map --

Witness Thielen

which I will explain in a moment -- in the shortest possible time and to defend Oahu. All troops accordingly moved to their prescribed positions. The Advance Command Post of the Hawaiian Department was operating in Aliamano Crater by 8:45 a.m. with limited personnel, and the Advance Command Posts of the 25th Division and of the Hawaiian Air Force by 11:00 a.m. Rear echelons remained at their normal locations, -- which, for the Department, was Fort Shafter; for the Division, Schofield Barracks.

At Schofield Barracks, Brigadier General Durward S. Wilson, commanding the 24th Division, first heard the sounds of an attack at about 8:05 a.m. Within a few minutes his Chief of Staff had issued instructions to the units to get their machine guns into the anti-aircraft positions, to increase the standing guard and to send patrols throughout the Division sector -- which was the northern half of the Island -- to observe the beaches. Before he had left his quarters, General Wilson heard some of our machine guns in operation. About 8:50 a.m. the Division received word from Department Headquarters that Alert No. 3 would go into effect at once. Approximately 90 percent of the 24th Division troops were present for duty on the morning of 7 December, according to a report made shortly after by the Hawaiian Department. The Division was in position in

Witness Thielen

the North Sector by 5 p.m. with ammunition except for the 240's, 240 millimeter howitzers.

The disposition of the Division, 24th Division, as shown on the map, can be picked up by the crossed rifles for Infantry positions, by the cannon for Field Artillery battalions, and the main line of resistance on the east coast can be seen following the ridge line of the Koolau Range on the east and the Waianae Range on the west.

Mahor General Maxwell Murray, commanding the 25th Infantry Division, stated that the attack began about 7:53 a.m. Some machine guns were in firing positions on the roofs within ten minutes. Alert No. 3 was placed in effect at about 9 o'clock. Some ammunition -- other than high explosive -- had been moved into the barracks which meant that most of the men had as much as 30 rounds. About 85 percent of the 25th Division troops were reported present for duty at the time of the attack. By 4 p.m., on the 7th all units of the 25th Infantry Division were in war positions in the South Sector with ammunition, except for the 240 mm howitzers. Map shows sectors and sub-sectors of responsibility in the South Sector.

The yellow squares, the anti-aircraft, which I will discuss in a moment, of course, were not under Division control. Again, the crossed rifles indicate the Infantry

Witness Thielen

1
2 and the wheel cannon the Field Artillery, indicating the
3 disposition under Alert No. 3.

4 Under Alert No. 1, the Harbor Defense troops of the
5 Coast Artillery Command were at their gun positions while
6 the anti-aircraft units remained at their home stations
7 and guarded against sabotage. On December 7, some of the
8 AA units got into position in 15 or 20 minutes, but others
9 had to go to the other side of the island and were not in
10 position until afternoon. A detailed account of the move-
11 ment of anti-aircraft units is given on pages 11 and 12
12 of the Army Exhibit. An estimated 87 percent of the Coast
13 Artillery personnel were present for duty at 8:00 a.m., 7
14 December. No Coast Artillery Command officers were reported
15 absent at the time of the attack except one who was killed
16 trying to get back to his place of duty.

17 Maps captured from planes shot down in the attack indi-
18 cated that the enemy had complete and up-to-date information
19 concerning the exact dispositions of military forces, depots
20 and engineering establishments.

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22 A summary of a report compiled by the Adjutant General
23 of the Hawaiian Department indicates that at least 85 percent
24 of the officers and men were present with their units at
25 8:00 a.m., 7 December.

Witness Thielen

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2 Now, going back to the subject of aircraft, and the
3 results of the attack, also the condition of aircraft before
4 the attack, at the time of the attack the Hawaiian Air
5 Force, in common with other units of the Hawaiian Department,
6 was operating under Alert No. 1. General Martin, commanding
7 the Hawaiian Air Force, had informed his subordinates that
8 it was a real and not a practice alert. He had further in-
9 structed that aircraft would not be dispersed and that all
10 units would continue training under condition "Easy 5."

11 "Easy" being phonetic for "E2."

12 "Easy 5" -- E-5 under the Standing Operating Procedure --
13 meant that all aircraft would continue to conduct routine
14 training operations, with none in readiness for combat
15 operations, and with four hours' time allowed for the
16 first plane of each unit to be in the air, armed and prepared
17 for combat.

18 Page 10 of the Army Exhibit shows when and in what
19 numbers planes took off from Oahu Army airfields after the
20 attack, and page 9 of the same exhibit shows the status of
21 all combat planes before and after the attack as reported
22 by the Hawaiian Air Force. In this connection attention
23 is invited to the fact that final reports to the War Depart-
24 ment show that total plane losses was somewhat greater than
25 initially reported. In explanation of the disparity it

Witness Thielen

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2 should be stated that to meet the emergency created by the
3 attack certain damaged planes which normally might have been
4 repaired were stripped for parts and destroyed.

5 The attention of the committee is invited to the chart
6 which has just been placed on the easel and which is a blow-
7 up of the exhibit previously referred to, the status of com-
8 bat planes before and after the attack. The color code is
9 applied to the number of planes in each column. The blue
10 indicating planes in commission, the buff out of commission,
11 and finally the total on hand, and at the head of each column
12 where the numerical designation of the plane is given, if
13 that designation is on the green background, that plane was
14 considered obsolete by the Air Force.

15 The yellow code, which occurs only in the columns after
16 attack, indicate those aircraft which were destroyed.

17 At Hickam Field, prior to the attack, six heavy bombers
18 -- B-17, -- 20 non-modern medium bombers -- B-18 -- and
19 five modern light bombers -- A-20 -- were in commission but
20 were not ready for immediate use because they were not loaded
21 with bombs and ammunition. The following planes were on
22 hand but out of commission for reasons indicated:

23 Six B-17's - engine repair, fuel tank repair, 50-hour
24 inspection, 200-hour inspection, and carburetor repair;

25 12 B-18's, overhaul, damaged landing gear, damaged

Witness Thielen

1
2 elevator, and first echelon maintenance;

3 Seven A-20's - damaged wing flaps, repair and first
4 echelon maintenance.

5 First echelon maintenance is maintenance of a nature
6 which can be performed by the crew of the plane; 50 hour
7 inspection is an inspection and overhaul of each plane
8 which is required to be made after each 50 hours of flight;
9 and 200-hour inspection is a more thorough overhaul made
10 after 200 hours of flight.

11 After the attack, eight B-17's were on hand of which
12 four were usable; 20 B-18's were on hand of which ten were
13 usable; ten A-20's were on hand with five usable. Eighteen
14 of our combat planes were lost on Hickam Field. It was
15 11:27 a.m. -- as shown in another exhibit -- when the first
16 four A-20's took off from the field for combat.

17 At Wheeler Field and Haleiwa prior to the attack, the
18 following planes were in commission but not ready for im-
19 mediate use since they were unarmed; 82 pursuit (52 P-40's,
20 20 P-36's, ten P-26's); two medium bombers (1 B-12A,
21 1 B-18); two light bombers (A-12); five reconnaissance
22 (1 O-47, 1 OA-8, 3 OA-9's); and three advanced trainers
23 (AT-6), which are not shown on the chart, the chart including
24 only combat aircraft.

25 On hand, but out of commission for maintenance work were

Witness Thielen

1
2 these additional planes: 2-B-12's, 35 P-40's, 19 P-36's,
3 4 P-26's and 1 AT-6 -- not shown on the chart.

4 After the attack, the number of usable planes by type
5 were as follows: 27 out of a total of 57 P-40's, 16 out of
6 35 P-36's, 4 out of 8 P-26's, 1 B-18, 1 out of 3 B-12's,
7 1 of 2 AT-6's, 1 O-47, 1 OA-8 and 1 OA-9. Forty-two combat
8 planes were lost in the attack in this airdrome. At 8:30
9 a.m. the first aircraft, four P-40's and two P-36's, took
10 off for combat.

11 Planes assigned to the 47th Pursuit Squadron, which was
12 in training at Haleiwa airfield -- and they have been included
13 in this Wheeler chart -- consisted of 17 pursuit (13 P-40's,
14 2 P-36's, 2 P-26's) and one medium bomber (B-12). That is
15 the table of organization strength of the unit.

16 The exact number of planes at Haleiwa on the morning
17 of 7 December is not known. The field was alerted at 8:15
18 a.m. Between 8:15 and 10:00 a.m. two flights were made
19 each consisting of four P-40's and one P-36. Four enemy
20 planes were downed by the first flight while the second
21 flight downed three. One pilot was lost over Schofield
22 Barracks.

23 At Bellows Field 12 pursuit planes (P-40) and six
24 reconnaissance planes (4 O-47's, 2 O-49's) were in commis-
25 sion prior to the attack. However, none of these were ready

Witness Thielen

1
2 for immediate use because their weapons were not loaded with
3 ammunition. An additional two reconnaissance planes (O-47)
4 were located at Bellows Field but were out of commission
5 for engine change. It was 9:50 a.m. before the first O-47
6 took off. Three of our combat aircraft were destroyed on
7 this field.

8 After the attack on December 7, about 11:40 a.m., four
9 A-20's and two B-17's took off. Also at 3:20 p.m., three B-17's
10 were dispatched, as a result of a request of the Navy, to search
11 for an enemy carrier. The search was unsuccessful and they
12 returned at 6:25 p.m.

13 As for the anti-aircraft their activities subsequent
14 to the attack, as previously mentioned pages 11 and 12 of
15 the Army Exhibit show the time required for the various units
16 of the 53rd Coast Artillery Brigade (Anti-aircraft) to take
17 battle positions after the attack of December 7 and the extent
18 to which they engaged the enemy.

19 Under Alert No. 1 only a limited amount of ammunition
20 was in the hands of troops of the Hawaiian Department. The
21 Coast Artillery Command had previously been authorized to
22 draw, and had drawn, ammunition for its fixed positions only,
23 including anti-aircraft. However, at these installations,
24 the shells were kept in boxes in order to keep the ammunition
25 from damage and deterioration. The ammunition for the

Witness Thielen

1
2 mobile guns and batteries was in storage chiefly at
3 Aliamanu Crater and Schofield Barracks. The Infantry and
4 Artillery units of the 24th and 25th Divisions had only a
5 small amount of machine-gun and rifle ammunition. All divi-
6 sional artillery ammunition, grenades and mortar shells were
7 in the Ordnance storage depots, principally at Schofield
8 Barracks.

9 The 3-inch Anti-aircraft gun issued to units in
10 Hawaii at that time had a maximum effective range of about
11 10,000 yards. It had a minimum effective range of about
12 2,000 yards.

13 The 37 mm Anti-aircraft gun had a maximum horizontal
14 range of 9,300 yards, and a maximum vertical range of
15 approximately 6,300 yards.

16 This concludes the Army's story of the attack.

Schf. fls.

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Witness Inglis:

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2 Admiral Inglis: Turning now to the Navy's aircraft and
3 state of readiness of aircraft and anti-aircraft guns, the
4 committee will find in Item 12 of the white folder the lo-
5 cations, squadrons, numbers of planes in commission, types,
6 numbers available, numbers in operating condition, readiness
7 in operating condition, readiness of crews, numbers partici-
8 pating in combat and service assigned to land based naval
9 and marine planes in the Hawaiian area.

10 Item 13 of the white folder contains this information sum-
11 marized on a chart showing location of the fields and sta-
12 tions.

13 The planes in flight at the time of the attack on Pearl
14 Harbor were armed for combat as follows:

15 The 7 patrol flying boats in the air, 3 from Kaneohe and
16 4 from Ford Island, all carried machine guns and were fully
17 supplied with ammunition. In addition to machine guns and
18 ammunition, the three planes from Kaneohe searching the fleet
19 operating areas south of Oahu were armed with two depth
20 charges each for use against submarines. These planes were
21 working with the destroyer WARD. One of these aircraft
22 dropped one depth charge in an attack on a submarine in the
23 Defensive Sea Area off Pearl Harbor at 6:45 Hawaiian time.
24 Utility Squadron 3, stationed at Naui Airport, which was the
25 new Naval Air Station at Puunene, seems to have had some

Witness Inglis:

1
2 planes in the air prior to 7:50, Hawaiian time, on the day
3 of the attack. These planes are not combat planes and do
4 not normally carry armament. Available reports do not indi-
5 cate the state of armament of the scout bombers from the
6 ENTERPRISE that arrived over Pearl Harbor during the attack.
7 As they engaged the enemy, it appears that machine guns were
8 equipped and ammunition provided.

9 Next, Anti-aircraft:

10 There were no naval anti-aircraft shore batteries in or
11 around Pearl Harbor at the time of the Japanese attack. All
12 naval anti-aircraft batteries were ship-based, and were com-
13 posed of the following types and number of guns:

14

15 GUN TYPES	NUMBER	MAX. RANGE Ceiling- Feet	MAX. RANGE	MAX. EFFEC- TIVE RANGE
16 5 inch, 38 caliber AA	136	37,200	15,900 yds.	12,000 yds
17 5 inch, 25 caliber AA	96	26,300	13,500 yds	7,000 yds
18 3 inch, 50 caliber AA	121	21,700	11,000 yds	5,000 yds
19 AA Machine Guns from 20 1.1" to 30 21 caliber	427	Effective ranges of 500 to 2500 22 yds		

23 Effective range is that range at which fire should be
24 opened with reasonable chance that fire would produce damage
25 on the target.

1 Witness Inglis:

2 Anti-aircraft guns by ship classes and types of guns is
3 shown in Item 14 of Navy folder.

4 Official reports indicate that all naval anti-aircraft
5 batteries were in operating condition. The number of tempor-
6 ary gun stoppages during action was so low as to be negligi-
7 ble and when such momentary stoppages occurred, except as
8 guns were knocked out in battle casualties, they were quickly
9 remedied.

10 All ships had the full service allowance of ammunition on
11 board except in a few cases where removal was necessary be-
12 cause of repairs in progress.

13 All ships had ready ammunition at the guns in accordance
14 with existing directives. Battleships and cruisers had 15
15 rounds per gun for two guns of the 5" anti-aircraft battery
16 and 300 rounds per gun for half of the .50 caliber machine
17 guns. The destroyers present all had .50 caliber ammunition
18 available and some 5" ammunition. Although the initial at-
19 tack was launched as a surprise, ready machine guns opened
20 fire at once and all batteries except those on ships under-
21 going overhaul took up the fire within approximately seven
22 minutes after the attack was initiated.

23 The considerable amount of ammunition available is shown
24 by a tabulation of all rounds expended.

25 There were 1,665 rounds of 5"/38 caliber anti-aircraft

Witness Inglis:

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2

ammunition fired.

3

There were 1,523 rounds of 5"/25 caliber anti-aircraft
ammunition fired.

4

5

There were 1,741 rounds of 3"/50 caliber anti-aircraft
ammunition fired.

6

7

There were 275,807 rounds of machine gun ammunition fired.

8

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At the time of the attack, roughly one-fourth of all
shipboard anti-aircraft guns were manned, and within seven to
ten minutes, all anti-aircraft batteries were manned and fir-
ing.

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Ready anti-aircraft machine guns opened fire immediately
and within an average estimated time of under five minutes
practically all battleship anti-aircraft batteries were fir-
ing; cruisers were firing all anti-aircraft batteries within
an average time of four minutes; and destroyers, though open-
ing up with machine guns almost immediately, averaged seven
minutes in bringing all anti-aircraft guns into action.
Minor combatant types had all joined in the fire within ten
minutes after the beginning of the attack.

21

22

23

24

25

Turning next to the question of sabotage, there is no re-
cord of any sabotage during the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Next the subject of First Aid:

The dead and wounded were handled by a number of naval
medical activities; battle dressing stations and sick bays of

1 Witness Inglis:

2 the warships; hospital ship SOLACE; U.S. Naval Hospital;
3 dispensaries of the two Naval Air Stations; Marine Corps Air
4 Station at Ewa; Defense Battalions of the Fleet Marine Force;
5 Navy Yard dispensary; Section Base dispensary; Ammunition
6 depot dispensary, and at a "field hospital" which was set up
7 in the Officers' Club of the Navy Yard shortly after the at-
8 tack.

9 Three Hundred thirty dead and 1,113 wounded were brought
10 to Naval Hospital Stations during the period 7-10 December.
11 Many others died who were trapped in capsized or sunken
12 ships.

13 Colonel Thielen will take up from here.
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Witness Thielen:

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2 Colonel Thielen: As to the miscellaneous subjects of
3 hostile agents, sabotage and civilian protection I have a few
4 remarks.

5 Prior to the attack, all known Japanese, Italian and Ger-
6 man agents had been listed by Army G-2, Federal Bureau of
7 Investigation, and Naval Intelligence. Within a few hours
8 after the attack the Japanese agents were being apprehended
9 and assembled in the Immigration Station, Honolulu. All
10 agents were subsequently assembled in the Quarantine Station
11 on Sand Island, the total being 370 Japanese, 98 Germans and
12 14 Italians.

13 There are no proven instances of sabotage before, during nor
14 after the attack, although the jamming of radio frequencies
15 which occurred immediately after the attack and which made
16 communication difficult may have been due, in part, to sabo-
17 tage.

18 By noon the roads were becoming jammed with traffic going
19 in every direction. Under the direction of Mr. Addison Kirk
20 and his Civilian Relief Committee, the Honolulu Rapid Transit
21 Company, which operates a large number of busses, immediately
22 moved into Hickam Field and Fort Kamehameha, and started
23 evacuating civilians from these areas. All during Sunday
24 afternoon and the following day the evacuation of civilians
25 continued, most of them being quartered in schools and homes

1 Witness Thielen:

2 throughout the city. At Fort Shafter, where the headquarters
3 of the Interceptor Command was being constructed in a spur of
4 the Koolau Mountains, the women and children of Fort Shafter
5 and a few from Schofield Barracks were accommodated. Slit
6 trenches were being dug at all the posts and in parks, school
7 grounds, and all open places accessible to civil communities.

8 Admiral Inglis will take on from here.

1 Witness Inglis:

2 Admiral Inglis: With respect to damage to Navy ships, a
3 general description of the damage to Naval vessels has been
4 given in the narrative. In Item 15 of the Navy folder the
5 members of the committee will find a complete detailed de-
6 scription of this damage, with the first sheet being a sum-
7 mary.

8 Item 16, Navy folder, describes the loss of 87 non-airborne
9 naval aircraft, and the loss of five airborne planes from
10 the carrier ENTERPRISE, for a total of 92 planes, and item-
11 izes also the damage to installations at Ford Island Naval
12 Air Station, Kaneohe Naval Air Station, and the Marine Air
13 Base at Ewa.

14 Now, turning to the damage to Japanese, it was estimated
15 that the Japanese lost a total of 28 planes, most of which
16 were dive bombers and torpedo planes, due to Navy action.

17 Three Japanese submarines of 45 tons each and carrying two
18 torpedoes were accounted for; two were destroyed by Navy
19 action and one was grounded off Bellows Field and recovered.

20 From reports available to the Commander-in-Chief, it is
21 estimated that the Japanese lost, due solely to Navy action,
22 a minimum of 68 killed. An estimate of wounded cannot be
23 made. One officer, an Ensign, was taken prisoner when he
24 abandoned the small submarine which grounded off Bellows
25 Field.

1 Witness In :lis:

2 The above report on the Japanese damages or losses does
3 not include operational losses, only losses in combat.

4 With respect to efforts to track the Japs after the at-
5 tack, air searches to track the Japanese Striking Force were
6 ordered and carried out without result.

7 Colonel Thielen will take over now.

Witness Thielen:

Colonel Thielen: As to the Army casualties and the damage suffered by Army installations, on page 13 of the Army exhibit there is a list of Army casualties in the Hawaiian Department on 7 December 1941. They were:

Killed in Action	194
Wounded in Action	360
Missing in Action	22
Died - Non-battle	2
Declared Dead (Public law 490)	1
Died of Wounds	<u>21</u>
TOTAL	600

In addition to the extensive damage to installations on airfields shown by the various photographs submitted herewith, final reports show that 96 Army planes were lost as a result of enemy action on 7 December. This figure includes aircraft destroyed in depots and also those damaged planes which were stripped for parts.

As to the damage done to Japanese, General Short reported that eleven enemy aircraft were shot down by Army pursuit planes and anti-aircraft fire.

Admiral Inglis.

1 Witness Inglis:

2 Admiral Inglis: The Navy and Marine Corps suffered a
3 total of 2,835 casualties, of which 2,086 officers and men
4 were killed or fatally wounded. Seven hundred and forty-
5 nine wounded survived. None were missing.

6 Next with respect to the conduct and behaviour under
7 fire of the personnel.

8 In the accounts of some 90 ships under attack, commanding
9 officers have recorded hundreds of acts of heroism in keep-
10 ing with the highest traditions of the Naval Service. No
11 instance is recorded in which the behavior of crews or in-
12 dividuals left anything to be desired.

13 References to individual valor are replete with such acts
14 as:

15 (1) Medical officers and hospital corpsmen rendering aid
16 and treatment while they themselves needed help.

17 (2) Officers and men recovering dead and wounded through
18 flame and from flooded compartments.

19 (3) Fighting fires while in actual physical contact with
20 the flames.

21 (4) Handling and passing ammunition under heavy fire and
22 strafing.

23 (5) Repairing ordnance and other equipment under fire.

24 (6) Remaining at guns and battle stations though wounded
25 or while ships were sinking.

912

Witness Inglis:

1

2

(7) Reporting for further duty to other ships after being
blown off their own sinking vessels.

3

4

For deeds of extreme heroism on 7 December, 15 Medals of
Honor have been awarded and 60 Navy Crosses.

5

6

Colonel Thielen will now take over.

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S13

Witness Thielen:

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Colonel Thielen: On the Army side, too, acts of heroism were numerous. Five Distinguished Service Crosses and 65 Silver Stars were awarded to Army personnel for heroism displayed during the 7 December attack.

That concludes the Army's narrative of the attack.

Admiral Inglis: That also includes the Navy's formal presentation.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

S14

Witness Inglis:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1
2 Mr. Mitchell: Admiral, the Navy had the 14th Naval Di-
3 strict and the Pacific Fleet. This story you have developed
4 covered both?

5 Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir. As I pointed out, the 14th
6 Naval District in this particular instance was under the com-
7 mand of the Commander-in-Chief and the presentation that I
8 have given covers the activities of both the forces afloat
9 and the forces ashore in the 14th Naval District.

10 Mr. Mitchell: Well, as I understand it, the Navy commands
11 had for anti-aircraft defense only the anti-aircraft guns
12 based on the ships?

13 Admiral Inglis: That is correct, sir.

14 Mr. Mitchell: You said something about marines on shore
15 setting up machine guns. I was not so clear about that.

16 Admiral Inglis: The marines that I mentioned ashore as
17 firing back at the Japanese planes during the attack were the
18 personnel of the Marine air squadrons at Ewa and those machine
19 guns, I think in most cases, were stripped from the -- per-
20 haps not stripped, but taken from the armory and comprised
21 the guns which normally would be used by the aircraft them-
22 selves.

23 Mr. Mitchell: Well, then, the only other defense the
24 Naval command had when under attack was in the airplane de-
25 fense?

Witness Inglis

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1
2 Admiral Inglis: That is correct, to the best of my know-
3 ledge.

4 Mr. Mitchell: And those planes, as I understood you, were
5 carrier planes that came in and became land based at Ford
6 Island as their carriers came into port, except for some
7 that were on the cruisers, two or three per cruiser?

8 Admiral Inglis: The planes that I mentioned from the car-
9 riers were en route, -- no, I take that back. They were sent
10 out by the ENTERPRISE on search and then when the attack de-
11 veloped they were diverted in an attempt to repel the Japanese
12 attack.

13 Mr. Mitchell: Could you sum up and state how many Naval
14 planes of the fighter type capable of fighting enemy planes
15 got into the air before the attack was over?

16 Admiral Inglis: Before the attack was opened --

17 Mr. Mitchell: Over.

18 Admiral Inglis: Oh, before the attack was over?

19 Mr. Mitchell: Yes, after it commenced and before it
20 ended. I am not interested in those which got into the air
21 after it was over.

22 Admiral Inglis: I have a table here which I think will
23 give you the information that you asked for.

24 At the Naval Station, Ford Island, there was a total of 70
25 planes before the attack started. Of these 19 were destroyed,

S16

Witness Inglis

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

14 were damaged and 37 were left undamaged. Of those 37 planes, 31 were utility planes, not designed for combat, 4 were the patrol planes already in flight and 2 were in the shop under repairs, so that there were no planes at Ford Island available to engage in combat except the four which were already in flight. That is from the Ford Island Station.

Mr. Mitchell: And you say none of them got into the air at all?

Admiral Inglis: None except four which were already in the air. They were in the air before the fight started.

Mr. Mitchell: They were in the air before the fight started?

Admiral Inglis: Yes.

At Kaneohe 37 planes were attached to the air station. 28 of those were destroyed, 6 were damaged, 3 were undamaged and those 3 which were undamaged were in the air before the attack.

At Ewa 44 Marine planes were based at that Naval Air Station and of those 49, 33 were destroyed and 16 damaged, leaving none in operating condition.

At Maui there were a total of eight planes but all of those planes were utility planes and not designed for combat operations. None of those, of course, were damaged.

At Johnston Island there were two PBV's undamaged. I have

S17

Witness Inglis

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

no information on the employment of those, but Johnston Island is a long way from Hawaii.

Mr. Mitchell: A PBX is an observation plane?

Admiral Inglis: The PBX is a long range airplane.

Mr. Mitchell: Not a fighter?

Admiral Inglis: Not a fighter, no, sir, but equipped with fairly respectable armament.

At Midway there were 12 PBX's. None of these 12 was damaged, of course, because Midway was not attacked, but these planes were on the search, as has already been described.

Now, in addition to that the Northampton, a heavy cruiser, launched two of her observation planes which are not very efficient as fighters but, nevertheless, they did succeed in shooting down one Japanese plane off the Island of Nehau.

That is about the extent of my information in answer to your question, sir.

S18

Witness Thielen

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1 Mr. Mitchell: Colonel Thielen, as I understand it, the
2 Army exhibit, in accordance with the statement on page 10,
3 covers that information from the Army standpoint, does it?
4 Is that complete?
5

6 Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir, that is complete to the best
7 of my knowledge and belief.

8 Mr. Mitchell: According to that, on Hickam Field the first
9 plane that got into the air was at 11:27?

10 Colonel Thielen: That is correct.

11 Mr. Mitchell: The attack was over by that time?

12 Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir, the attack was well over.

13 Mr. Mitchell: At Wheeler Field you got some P-40's up at
14 8:34?

15 Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Mitchell: That is a fighter group?

17 Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir. I believe that is a signifi-
18 cant point. The airplanes at Hickam Field were bombers and
19 those at Wheeler Field were pursuit ships as they called them
20 in those days, fighters as we call them now, which did get
21 up all right.

22 Mr. Mitchell: You got some up at 8:20, some at 8:55, an
23 hour after the attack started, some at 9:15 and some at 9:30.
24 Those were all the planes at Wheeler Field that had gotten
25 into the air?

Witness Thielen

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1
2 Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir, since 9:35 is taken as the
3 definite termination of the attack.

4 Mr. Mitchell: What are those at 7:47 at Bellows Field
5 and that one that you say got up at 9:15?

6 Colonel Thielen: Those are observation airplanes.

7 Mr. Mitchell: Have you a summary of your figures to show
8 how many planes of fighting type the Army forces had in com-
9 mission and how many of them got into the air before the at-
10 tack was over? Could you secure that for us? Could you sum
11 that up for us without too much trouble?

12 Colonel Thielen: I think the exhibit on the preceding
13 page, taken in connection with that which you cited, sir, on
14 page 10 do tell a complete story. The exhibit on page 9 is
15 that which I have displayed on a chart. I will be glad to
16 recall the chart.

17 Mr. Mitchell: No. I thought maybe you had a total.
18 Well, that is satisfactory; the committee can see it.

19 Will the committee inquire?

20 The Chairman: Senator George?

21 Senator George: I have no questions.

22 The Chairman: Congressman Cooper?

23 The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Chairman, I would like to inquire
24 briefly.
25

Witness Inglis

1 The Vice-Chairman: Admiral, as I understood you, on De-
2 cember 7, 1941 the Pacific Fleet was about three-fourths the
3 size of the Atlantic Fleet, but I understood you to say the
4 Pacific Fleet was more modern and stronger or had larger
5 vessels? Is that correct?
6

7 Admiral Inglis: That is correct, Mr. Congressman, except
8 that the figure was two-thirds.

9 The Vice-Chairman: Two-thirds?

10 Admiral Inglis: Rather than three-fourths.

11 The Vice-Chairman: And I also understood you to say that
12 there were no searches made on December 6, 1941 by aircraft.

13 Admiral Inglis: That is not correct. We have no written
14 record of any searches except the search from the ENTERPRISE
15 which is shown on the chart.

16 The Vice-Chairman: Were there any searches made the day
17 before that anywhere near this approximate time?

18 Admiral Inglis: I am not prepared to answer that speci-
19 fically. I might hazard an opinion that there were.

20 The Vice-Chairman: Then one other question, if I may, .
21 while along the line of General Mitchell's inquiry.

22 According to item 11 of the Navy exhibit presented here,
23 it is shown that the Japanese aircraft participating in this
24 attack totaled 105. Is that correct? Item 11 of your white
25 exhibit here, the second page of that, it shows there, total

Witness Inglis

number of planes making attack, including those which repeated, and out at the right hand column, "Total 156." Then under that, "Total number of planes, exclusive of those which repeated," it totals 105.

Admiral Inglis: I have those figures now, sir. I must say that that number, - that is the number of planes which repeated their attacks and, therefore, are counted as more than once in the first figure, is necessarily an estimate but our best estimate, according to the records that we have available, is 105 as the total number of planes which actually attacked.

The Vice-Chairman: As far as the Navy and Army can ascertain --

Admiral Inglis: No, these are only Navy figures.

The Vice-Chairman: Well, I understood the Colonel to give the same figure in his statement. You agreed on that. So far as the Army and Navy knew at that time there were 105 Japanese planes that participated in the attack?

Admiral Inglis: That is correct, sir.

The Vice-Chairman: Now, then, are you prepared to tell us what the United States air strength in Hawaii was at that time?

Admiral Inglis: I can tell you what the Navy air strength was. That is contained in one of the exhibits.

Witness Inglis:

In Item 12 in the Navy folder you will find a table giving, among other things, the number of planes attached to the various squadrons and stationed at the various naval air stations.

The Vice-Chairman: I have examined that, Admiral, in an effort to get the information I am now requesting. At least, it is not put up in the same form as the Jap planes and I was wondering what the total was.

Admiral Inglis: I would have to qualify any answer that I might make to your question by pointing out that a large number of those planes given in Item 12 are utility types and not suitable for combat.

For instance, all of those marked "VJ" are utility type planes and that takes out a large proportion of the total as being suitable for combat operations. Those planes are used for towing target sleeves for anti-aircraft fire and for transport and things of that nature, duties other than combat.

The Vice-Chairman: Well, in an effort to not detain you unduly as I am sure other members of the committee want to inquire, could you gentlemen give me a figure that would compare with the 105 Jap planes which made the attack?

Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir, if you will bear with me just a moment while I add them up. I come out with the answer 52.

Mr. Gosell: What is Navy planes.

Witness Inglis:

Admiral Inglis: Those are Navy planes.

The Vice-Chairman: Navy planes 52?

Admiral Inglis: 52 Navy planes comparable in design to the Japanese planes which made the attack. That excludes the utility planes and the PBY's.

The Vice-Chairman: In other words, this 52 would be the number of combat Navy planes?

Admiral Inglis: That is correct, sir.

The Vice-Chairman: All right.

Admiral Inglis: I think I should add, to make the story complete, that that does not include the planes from the carriers, that is, the ENTERPRISE and LEXINGTON. These are only the planes based on Hawaii.

The Vice-Chairman: Well, how many carrier planes were in a position that they could have been used?

Admiral Inglis: The ENTERPRISE was two hundred miles away from Pearl Harbor at the time and any planes that she might have had available to participate in the attack would have been nearly at the extreme limit of their radius of action. However, there were eighteen ENTERPRISE planes which did get into the general area of the attack.

The Vice-Chairman: Eighteen?

Admiral Inglis: So if you cared to you could add the 18 to the 52, making a total of 70.

1 Witness Inglis:

2 The Vice-Chairman: Now, at what stage of the attack did
3 these eighteen get into it?

4 Admiral Inglis: Those planes took off from the ENTERPRISE
5 shortly after six A.M. The attack was launched at 7:55 A.M.
6 and three of the planes landed at 9:40 and ten at 10:15.
7 I would gather from that that the ENTERPRISE planes reached
8 the scene of the attack at an estimated time of perhaps nine
9 o'clock.

10 The Vice-Chairman: Would that be during the time the at-
11 tack was in progress?

12 Admiral Inglis: That is correct, sir.

13 The Vice-Chairman: Were there any other carrier planes
14 that were available there, such as you have described about
15 the ENTERPRISE?

16 Admiral Inglis: No, sir, no other carrier planes.

17 The Vice-Chairman: And no others that did participate?

18 Admiral Inglis: The only other planes that we have not
19 already covered were the two planes from the Northampton
20 and, again, those planes are not of combat type. They were
21 observation planes but they did shoot down one Japanese plane
22 in spite of their comparative weakness.

23 The Vice-Chairman: Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to
24 ask the Colonel for the same type of information so far as
25 the Army is concerned.

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Witness Thielen:

Colonel Thielen: First, sir, I would like to correct what I believe is your impression that only 105 planes were involved in attacks on both Army and Navy installations. Is that correct?

The Vice-Chairman: That is the way I understood it.

Colonel Thielen: I want to say that is not the Army view. We consider that 105 airplanes, that is our estimate of the number that were involved in the attacks only on Army installations and I believe it is a mere coincidence that the Navy has the same figure.

The Vice-Chairman: Well, the figure is the same in both statements. Does that mean, then, that there were just exactly 105 planes that attacked the Army and just exactly 105 planes that attacked the Navy?

Colonel Thielen: I am not prepared to say how many attacked the Navy, but our estimate is 105 aircraft attacking Army installations only.

Mr. Mitchell: We will give you later the Japanese story showing how many planes they sent. This is only confusion and guesswork, these figures that are given here.

Colonel Thielen: It is purely an estimate. It is obtained by adding up the total number of aircraft reported by observers at the three Army fields attacked. It is entirely possible that there is considerable duplication, as no one

Witness Thielen:

was in a position to observe more than one airplane at a time.

The Vice-Chairman: Well, I had this figure. I had just assumed from what I heard you both say that there were 105 Japanese planes engaged in the attack and I had assumed that that was the total number of Japanese planes.

Colonel Thielen: As I say, the Army considers that 105 aircraft attacked Army installations.

The Vice-Chairman: What do you have to say about that, Admiral?

Admiral Inglis: I have the same thing, Mr. Cooper. The figure of 105 is just an estimate.

The Vice-Chairman: I understood that.

Admiral Inglis: It is just impossible to arrive at a precise figure because, as you know, there was a great deal of confusion at that time and this is just the best that we can make of the reports that we have and the estimate is 105 planes engaged in the attacks against Naval ships and Naval shore installations.

You remember that in answer to your question I tried to bring out that these were Navy figures. These presentations that the Colonel and I have been making were made up separately. There is no, if I may use the term, collusion between us except in so far as we have arranged for certain portions

Witnesses Inglis and Thielen:

of the presentation to go to the Army side and then certain portions to go to the Navy side, but we have not tried to reconcile our figures.

The Vice-Chairman: It had not occurred to me, Admiral, that there was any collusion but I was rather in the position of hoping to congratulate you gentlemen if the Army's estimate of the number of Jap planes and the Navy's estimate of the number of Jap planes happened to be the same. I thought you were doing remarkably good estimating if you were both estimating the same.

Admiral Inglis: I am afraid in all modesty I will have to admit that that is a pure coincidence.

The Vice-Chairman: What I was trying to find out was how many Jap planes were attacking us.

Admiral Inglis: As Mr. Mitchell has said, Mr. Cooper, a later presentation will give the Japanese side of the story and I think we will get much more accurate figures from that.

The Vice-Chairman: All right. I was hoping to ascertain, so far as you could tell us, the number of Jap planes that were attacking us.

Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir.

The Vice-Chairman: And the strength of the United States aircraft in Hawaii at that time, combat planes that might have been used in meeting or repelling that attack.

Witnesses Inglis and Thielen:

Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir.

The Vice-Chairman: That is what I was hoping to get.

Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir. I think you have the whole figure. It is 70 in the case of the Navy.

The Vice-Chairman: 70 in the case of the Navy?

Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir, and our best estimate of the Japanese planes that were making the attack, that is, from the American point of view, without the Japanese intelligence before us, was 105 against Naval targets.

The Vice-Chairman: Now, let me see if I can get some help from you, Colonel.

Colonel Thielen: I would like to point out first that no aircraft were armed and equipped for combat against these Japanese, but of the pursuit aircraft in commission on Oahu at the time of the attack we had 94 pursuit aircraft before the attack and 53 after the attack.

The Vice-Chairman: 94 before the attack?

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir.

The Vice-Chairman: And your total number was what, Admiral?

Admiral Inglis: My total was 52 shore based planes, plus the 18 from the ENTERPRISE, making 70.

The Vice-Chairman: That is 164 for the Army and Navy.

A question to both of you gentlemen. Are you prepared to

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Witnesses Inglis and Thielen:

give us some estimate of the number of Japanese planes that attacked both Army and Navy installations?

Admiral Inglis: The only way I could answer that would be to add Colonel Thielen's figures to mine and that would be 210, but there again, Mr. Cooper, we must qualify that by saying that some of these reports have been duplicated. Perhaps the same plane attacked both a Navy ship and an Army air station.

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Witness Inglis

Questions by: Senator George
Senator Lucas

The Vice Chairman: I can well understand that. I would expect that to be the best guess.

Admiral Inglis: I would say the best estimate we can come out with would be 210.

The Chairman: Senator George would like to ask a question.

Senator George: Admiral, I believe you stated this morning that U.S. shipping along the northern route had been discontinued as of November 25, 1941. Is that correct?

Admiral Inglis: That is correct, sir.

Senator George: Did you assign any reason for that order for discontinuing the shipping on that route?

Admiral Inglis: This presentation that we have made has omitted all reference to any reasons for action taken.

Senator George: I merely wanted to get clear in my mind what you said. You did not assign any reasons?

Admiral Inglis: I did not, no, sir.

The Chairman: All right, Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas: Admiral, in the earlier part of your testimony you gave to the committee some facts with respect to the reconnaissance planes which took off on the morning of December 7. I am not sure that I thoroughly understood just why the delay existed there, or whether the evidence, or the records of the Navy disclose the reason for that hour's delay of these planes taking off for reconnaissance work.

Admiral Inglis: That, as I recall it, was the case of the planes taking off from Midway --

Senator Lucas: No, not from Midway.

Admiral Inglis: You remember, Senator Lucas, I corrected that word "sunrise" to make it read "dawn". The plan was to have these planes take off at dawn which is usually considered as one hour before sunrise. That was the standing order, that they were to take off at dawn, which was 5:27.

However, these planes did not actually take off until about 6:40, which is even more than an hour late. Those were the three patrol planes from Kanoeha Air Station.

Senator Lucas: That is right. Are there any records which disclose the reason for the delay in taking off?

Admiral Inglis: There again, Senator, in our presentation we have purposely avoided --

Senator Lucas: (Interposing) I am not asking for your conclusion, I am asking you whether or not you have discovered any records in the Navy Department giving or disclosing any reasons why these three reconnaissance planes were over an hour late in taking off on the dawn patrol.

Admiral Inglis: No, sir, I do not know the reason.

Senator Lucas: One other question with respect to those reconnaissance planes. Do the records disclose the distances that these reconnaissance planes covered on their usual dawn

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Senator Lucas

patrol flight?

Admiral Inglis: Those patrol planes were described in the exhibit which is number -- do you remember the zebra stripes?

Mr. Mitchell: Item 10.

Admiral Inglis: Item 10. Item 10 in the Navy folder, you will find the horizontal stripes due south of Oahu. As I recall it that distance was 120 miles.

Senator Lucas: 120 miles?

Admiral Inglis: 120 miles.

(2) Senator Lucas: Now one other question. Do the records disclose as to how long that patrol had been in existence previous to December 7?

Admiral Inglis: I cannot answer that question, sir. I do not know whether they do or not.

Senator Lucas: Will counsel please take these questions that I am asking and supply, if he can, the answers for the record?

You also discussed the sighting of the submarine at 3:50 in the morning on the morning of December 7. You also stated that the Commander of that ship notified the Commander of the destroyer Ward that at 3:57 he had sighted the periscope of the submarine.

It is my understanding of your testimony that the Ward

Witness Inglis

questions by: Senator Lucas

opened fire at 6:45 on that submarine, after sighting it at 6:40, and then the Commander of the Ward reported to the Commanding Officer at 6:54 that the submarine had been sunk.

Now who was the Commanding Officer at that time?

Admiral Inglis: The name of the Commanding Officer of the Ward?

Senator Lucas: Yes, the name of the Commanding Officer of the Ward -- or, I mean the name of the Commanding Officer to whom the Commander of the Ward reported.

Admiral Inglis: The Ward sent the dispatch to the Office of the Commandant, 14th Naval District.

Senator Lucas: Who was in charge of it at that time?

Admiral Inglis: The dispatch was delivered to the District Duty Officer, who was Lieutenant Commander Harold Kaminski.

Senator Lucas: It was delivered to Lieutenant Kaminaki, but who was in charge of the 14th Naval District at that time?

Admiral Inglis: The Commandant of the 14th Naval District was Admiral Bloch.

Senator Lucas: Do the records show where Admiral Bloch was at the time this message was delivered?

Admiral Inglis: To the best of my knowledge and belief, he was in his quarters.

Senator Lucas: Do the records show whether or not he

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Senator Lucas

was notified by Lieutenant Commander Kaminski with respect to the sinking of this submarine?

Admiral Inglis: I am afraid I cannot answer that question.

Senator Lucas: Do the records show who Kaminski -- or whatever his name is -- notified about the sinking?

Admiral Inglis: Kaminski was notified and he in turn passed the message to the headquarters of the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet.

Senator Lucas: Who received that message at the headquarters?

Admiral Inglis: I haven't got that information. I can get it for you.

Senator Lucas: I wish you would get it. Admiral Kimmel, of course, was the gentleman in charge of the Fleet at that time.

Admiral Inglis: Admiral Kimmel was Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet and the Pacific Fleet.

Senator Lucas: Does the record show whether or not Admiral Kimmel received the message at any time before the attack?

Admiral Inglis: I cannot answer that question either, sir.

Senator Lucas: According to your testimony the attack took place at 7:55.

Admiral Inglis: That is correct, sir.

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Senator Lucas

Senator Lucas: The submarine was sunk by the Ward at 6:54. I should like to know whether or not, during that hour's time, Admiral Bloch or Admiral Kimmel received any direct notice of the sinking of that submarine.

Now of course we will ask the officer who made the report on the sinking of the submarine to have it with him in the morning, to see what importance was attached to the sinking of this submarine, as far as the attack on Pearl Harbor is concerned.

Admiral Inglis: Senator, I would not expect that any of those authorities or officials would have received the report that the submarine had been sunk, because the report of the Ward was "We have attacked" --

Senator Lucas: Whatever the report was, - I do not care for the report itself, but whatever the report was that went in.

Admiral Inglis: I will get that information for you.

Senator Lucas: I want to know why it happened, and if they made a report on it, and whatever the report is, and to whom it went, and especially would I like to know at what time -- if there is any time -- that Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel received that report.

Admiral Inglis: We will get that information and insert it in the record, if it is available.

Senator Lucas: One other question and then I will be

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Senator Lucas

through.

When you say that the 14th Naval District was under the Commander in Chief, you mean the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir, Admiral Kimmel.

Senator Lucas: That is all.

The Chairman: Congressman Clark.

Senator Lucas: May I ask one more question, Mr. Chairman, before you go to Congressman Clark?

(4) Do the records disclose as to whether or not those on patrol duty around Pearl Harbor looking for submarines discovered at any time previous to the morning of December 7 anything that would direct their attention that submarines were in that area previous to the morning of December 7?

Admiral Inglis: No, sir, the records on that subject are completely negative.

Senator Lucas: That is up to that time, up to the morning of December 7, as far as the record is concerned, there is no record that shows that there was any danger from the standpoint of looking for submarines, or a submarine attack, even though they were on guard and the boys were looking for submarines?

Admiral Inglis: That is correct, to the best of my knowledge.

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Clark

Senator Lucas: That is all, Admiral Inglis.

The Chairman: Congressman Clark.

Mr. Clark: Admiral, you showed a diagram this morning on the extent of the plane patrol. The impression I gained was the extent of the patrol immediately after the attack is shown in red.

Admiral Inglis: That is right, sir.

Mr. Clark: Would you mind having that map put back?

Admiral Inglis: Commander Barrett, will you put up the chart showing the patrols.

Mr. Clark: Now what I was trying to get clear in my own mind, if the red diagram there shows the extent of the patrols by the planes around Pearl Harbor subsequent to the attack -- is that right?

Admiral Inglis: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Clark: Is that a larger or a smaller area of patrol than had been the case immediately prior to the attack?

(The roll call buzzer sounded.)

The Chairman: I might say to the committee that that is a roll call vote in the Senate on the substitute offered by Senator Byrd to the amendment offered by Senator Donnell to the Reorganization Bill. The committee has been excused from attendance during the hearing here.

Senator Ferguson: Without waiving my right to examine the

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Clark

Witness, might I be excused just long enough to vote on that?
I think it is an important matter.

The Chairman: Yes, if the Senator wishes to, and if any other Senators wish to vote I think they may also be excused.

Senator Lucas: I am willing to give you one vote here.

The Chairman: What is the wish of the committee?

Senator Brewster: I am willing to stay here and allow Senator Ferguson to go.

Senator Ferguson: That is a very important vote. That is the only reason why I ask to be excused.

The Chairman: The Senator may be excused. The Chair will ask the Vice Chairman to take the Chair while he goes and votes.

The Vice Chairman: The committee will please be in order.

You may proceed, Mr. Clark.

Mr. Clark: You have my question.

Admiral Inglis: I believe your question was: Did the patrol which was ordered immediately after the attack cover a greater area than that which had normally been covered before the attack?

Mr. Clark: Yes.

Admiral Inglis: To the best of my knowledge, the answer to that question is "yes".

Mr. Clark: Now you gave us a very graphic picture of Pearl Harbor, and the military establishment there, including

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Clark
Mr. Murphy

everything on the airport and so forth. I am interested to know, and I assume you would be the proper witness to ask, how that establishment on the Hawaiian Islands, the military establishment, compares with any other base or military establishment we may have had in the Pacific Area at that time, including the Philippine Islands, as to size and strength and equipment, and munitions of war.

Admiral Inglis: You wish me to compare Hawaii with any other United States base or establishment, military installation?

Mr. Clark: In the Pacific Area.

Admiral Inglis: In the Pacific Area?

Mr. Clark: Yes, sir.

Admiral Inglis: Of course that perhaps is a matter of opinion, but my opinion is that it was by far the strongest United States base in the Pacific Area.

Mr. Clark: That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman: Senator Brewster.

Senator Brewster: I will waive questions at this time.

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania.

Mr. Murphy: Admiral, in answer to Mr. Clark's question as to whether or not the patrol afterward, after the attack, was larger than before, your answer was, in your opinion, "yes".

Isn't it true that the black lines indicate the patrol before and the red, which includes the area of the black, was

afterwards, and therefore the necessity much larger than it was before?

Admiral Inglis: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Murphy: All right. Now then, it is my understanding that you and Colonel Thielen are prepared only to discuss the details of the attack and not to go into the whys and wherefores.

Admiral Inglis: That is correct, sir, speaking for myself.

Colonel Thielen: I concur in that.

Mr. Murphy: I would like to know from someone in the Navy, and I assume you are not the one, I would like to record to show that I want to know whether or not there was any inspection order within a week prior to Pearl Harbor, the effect of which would be to put the ships out of commission.

One member of the committee has intimated that such an inspection was ordered. I would like to meet it squarely just as soon as we possibly can.

Admiral Inglis: I cannot answer that question, but perhaps I can throw a little light on your inquiry, and that is this, that a careful study of the damage sustained by the ships at Pearl Harbor on that day was made by some competent officers in the Bureau of Ships, and as a result of that study they concluded that the California was the only ship where the opening of compartments had any effect or was in any way a contributing factor to the damage suffered by the ship.

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Murphy: Now then, so far as the other ships are concerned, they were not under a condition of inspection that would call for open compartments and other conditions that would disable them in case of combat, is that right?

(5)

Admiral Inglis: No, sir, I did not intend to give that impression in my answer. I do not know the answer to that specific question. All I can say is any openings did not contribute to the spread of the damage or the flooding of the ships, except on the California.

Mr. Murphy: May I indicate to counsel on the record, and to the Navy, that I hope some witness will be called who will be able to give any details of what inspection, if any, was ordered within a week of December 7; what effect, if any, that had on the ships on the morning of December 7, 1941.

Mr. Mitchell: I would say, Mr. Congressman, that we are hard at work on that now.

Mr. Murphy: All right.

Mr. Mitchell: We haven't the story here today because we haven't gotten to the bottom of it.

Mr. Murphy: All right.

Mr. Mitchell: We are cutting out of this statement anything that has not been definitely established.

Mr. Murphy: All right.

Mr. Mitchell: That very point is under inquiry now.

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 We have some information about it, but it is not complete.

2 Mr. Murphy: My next question, Admiral, is that in your
3 exhibit you have given a list of the ships that were sunk,
4 damaged and capsized. That was Exhibit No. 1?

5 Admiral Inglis: That is Item 15.

6 Mr. Murphy: Item 15. That contains a list of battleships,
7 light cruisers, destroyers, repair ships, mine layers, seaplane
8 tenders and miscellaneous auxiliaries.

9 The Navy did make a public statement, did they not,
10 through Secretary Knox, within a few days subsequent to December
11 7, 1941, as to the damage to ships at Pearl Harbor, including
12 those sunk and those damaged?

13 Admiral Inglis: I believe that is correct, sir.

14 Mr. Murphy: I would like to have some witness from the
15 Navy testify on the record as to how the list given today
16 compares with the public notice given immediately after Pearl
17 Harbor.

18 Admiral Inglis: I will have to get that for you, sir,
19 and insert it in the record.

20 Mr. Murphy: The next thing I would like to ask, Admiral,
21 and I would like to ask of you, Colonel Thielen, and that is
22 what reconnaissance was ordered by Admiral Kimmel or by
23 General Short subsequent to the messages received by them on
24 November 27 down to and including December 7, 1941, and I
25

Witnesses Inglis and Thielen

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 assume that neither of you are prepared to answer those
3 questions at the present time.

4 Admiral Inglis: I cannot answer.

5
6 Colonel Thielen: I cannot give a definitive answer, I
7 can only point out the condition of alert that was placed in
8 effect at that time, which did not envisage the possibility
9 of attack from without.

10 Mr. Murphy: I would like to have a specific answer.
11 In addition to the fact that alert number 1 as to sabotage
12 was ordered, I would like to have a specific answer as to
13 what reconnaissance, if any, was ordered by the Navy and
14 Army immediately subsequent to November 27 and prior to the
15 morning of December 7, 1941.

16 Mr. Mitchell: We have other witnesses that are going
17 to be brought on that will cover that, Mr. Congressman.

18 Mr. Murphy: All right. Now then, the two figures of
19 105, they, of course, would make 210, but neither of you, as
20 I take it, would attempt to say that the planes that were used
21 in the Army attack were not also used in the Navy attack?

22 Admiral Inglis: Speaking for myself, I see no way of
23 unscrambling those figures.

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Witness Inglis

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson would be next but he has been temporarily excused. Mr. Gearhart of California.

Mr. Gearhart: Admiral Inglis --

The Vice Chairman: Here is Senator Ferguson. He is your turn, Senator Ferguson. Will you defer, Mr. Gearhart?

Mr. Gearhart: I defer.

The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson: Admiral, can I inquire as to when you first knew that you were to be the witness to give these facts?

Admiral Inglis: At 3 o'clock last Friday afternoon, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And up to that time, what did you have to do with assembling the facts? Up until 3 o'clock Friday, what did you have to do in relation to assembling the facts?

Admiral Inglis: As Acting Chief of Naval Intelligence, my officers had been engaged for perhaps a week before that in getting up this presentation.

Senator Ferguson: From whom did you get your instructions as to what was desired by the Committee?

Admiral Inglis: The instructions were relayed to us through the Judge Advocate General's Office.

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Witness Inglis

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Are they in writing?

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Admiral Inglis: Are they what, sir?

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Senator Ferguson: Are they in writing?

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Admiral Inglis: I believe not, sir.

5

Senator Ferguson: What were the instructions you were given by the Judge Advocate General's Office?

6

Admiral Inglis: The instructions were to be prepared to make a presentation before the committee of the factual evidence concerning the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7.

7

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Senator Ferguson: Were you instructed to give no conclusions, or no orders?

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Admiral Inglis: Those instructions evolved in the course of time. I don't believe that they were specifically stated in that form when the instructions were first passed along to us.

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Senator Ferguson: When did you first get the instructions not to draw any conclusions or not to give any orders; that is, to cite any orders?

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Admiral Inglis: We were given an outline of the subjects which were to be covered.

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Senator Ferguson: Will you give us the outline? Was it in writing?

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Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir. Do you wish me to read it off, sir?

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Witness Inglis
Witness Thielen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Yes.

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Admiral Inglis: It is two pages.

4

Mr. Mitchell: That is the same outline we gave the
committee.

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Senator Ferguson: Could I see it?

7

Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir.

8

(A copy was handed to Senator Ferguson)

9

Admiral Inglis: The Senator may keep that copy if he
wishes.

10

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Senator Ferguson: You have others?

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Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir.

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Senator Ferguson: Who selected you, Admiral, to be the
spokesman?

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Admiral Inglis: The Vice Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Edwards, gave me the directive.

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Senator Ferguson: Can I inquire from the Colonel as
to when he first learned that he was to be a witness?

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Colonel Thielen: I didn't receive positive information
until just before the past week-end, Friday or Saturday. I
had been told before that time that I might be called upon
to actually present the story.

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Senator Ferguson: Now, when did you first know that
you were to present the story?

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Colonel Thielen: As I say, I was informed positively

Witness Thielen
Witness Inglis

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 on Friday or Saturday last.

3 Senator Ferguson: Who drew up your presentation?

4 Colonel Thielen: I belong to a section of the Opera-
5 tions Division, War Department General Staff, which is con-
6 tinuously engaged in research of this type, in examination
7 of after-action reports, and other such first sources, to
8 prepare digests similar to this. We work together. We
9 have a procedure whereby a number of researchers, both
10 officers and enlisted personnel, are given their task, and
11 the material is assembled and edited.

12 Senator Ferguson: When was your report assembled?

13 Colonel Thielen: The first draft, a week or six days
14 ago.

15 Senator Ferguson: A week or six days ago. When did
16 you first furnish counsel of the committee with a copy of
17 your draft?

18 Colonel Thielen: No such copy has been furnished to
19 this time, to the best of my knowledge.

20 Senator Ferguson: Up until the present time. Admiral,
21 when did you first furnish the committee or any counsel
22 with a copy of your draft?

23 Admiral Inglis: I beg pardon?

24 Senator Ferguson: When did you first furnish the com-
25 mittee or counsel with a copy of your draft?

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Witness Inglis
Witness Thielen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Admiral Inglis: I don't believe I have given the counsel
3 a copy of the draft. I have given the committee, I mean
4 the counsel, copies of the exhibits, but as far as I know,
5 not of the draft of this script.

6 Senator Ferguson: Of what you read to the committee?

7 Admiral Inglis: I don't believe so, no, sir.

8 Senator Ferguson: I noticed one conclusion that you
9 drew, and that was in relation to the radar, that the man
10 was practicing after seven o'clock.

11 Admiral Inglis: No, that was the Army.

12 Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: Colonel, will you give us what informa-
14 tion you have on that?

15 Colonel Thielen: Would the Senator care to have me
16 repeat the story?

17 Senator Ferguson: No, I don't want the story repeated.
18 I would like to have what information was given to you that
19 he was actually practicing. Who told you that?

20 Colonel Thielen: You mean my sources on that, sir?
21 This copy is documented. The fact that these two enlisted
22 men picked up an indication of hostile aircraft by radar
23 at 7:02 a. m. on the morning of December 7 comes from the
24 Roberts report, page 116, affidavit of Private McDonald.

25 Senator Ferguson: Do I understand that you examined

Witness Thielen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h6

1
2 the Roberts report in order that you might give us this sum-
3 mary?

4 Colonel Thielen: That is correct.

5 Senator Ferguson: What other reports did you examine?

6 Colonel Thielen: I have a rather long list here,
7 Senator. I did not examine that all personally. It so
8 happens I did examine the Roberts report personally. I
9 examined the Grunert report personally, and various other
10 sources. There is a list of some 74 documents which were
11 examined by the various members of the Section of which I am
12 a part.

13 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, when you examined these
14 various reports, were they in conflict with the reports on
15 the items which you have given us?

16 Colonel Thielen: None came to my attention, sir. I
17 was not looking for any conflicts. I was deliberately
18 omitting any conflicts or controversial subjects from my
19 report.

20 Senator Ferguson: Will you tell us if these witnesses
21 testified in any other hearing besides the Roberts, as to
22 whether or not this man was actually practicing?

23 Colonel Thielen: I don't believe I am the best witness
24 on that, sir. I don't know. I am not authority on all of
25 the various reports.

Witness Thielen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: Why would you give us the conclu-
3 sion out of the Roberts report when you know that that was
4 a cursory report?

5 Colonel Thielen: Because there is, apparently, no
6 conflict, as far as our researchers were able to determine.

7 Senator Ferguson: You say there is no conflict at all
8 on that question?

9 Colonel Thielen: Apparently not, sir.

10 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, do I understand your
11 statement is hearsay on that?

12 Colonel Thielen: Everything that I have said today is
13 hearsay, sir.

14 Senator Ferguson: Everything that you have said here
15 today is hearsay?

16 Colonel Thielen: That is correct, and none of this
17 material -- I was not present at Pearl Harbor, nor was I
18 in the War Department on December 7.

19 Senator Ferguson: How much comes out of the Roberts
20 report on Elliott's training?

21 Colonel Thielen: On his training?

22 Senator Ferguson: On Elliott being in training at that
23 particular moment.

24 Colonel Thielen: I believe merely the statement.

25 Senator Ferguson: To whom did he telephone?

Witness Thielen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Colonel Thielen: I won't say to whom Elliott tele-
3 phoned. I will say, as I said in the script, that the
4 telephone report was made by the Opana Radar Station to
5 Lieutenant Kermit Tyler, the watch officer at the informa-
6 tion center, Fort Shafter.

7 Senator Ferguson: What was his title at that time?

8 Colonel Thielen: He was known as the watch officer.

9 Senator Ferguson: At what particular station?

10 Colonel Thielen: At the information center for the
11 various radar stations.

12 Senator Ferguson: Do you know how many people were
13 present at that community center on that morning?

14 Colonel Thielen: No, sir, I do not.

15 Senator Ferguson: Does the Roberts report show, or
16 any other report that you examined?

17 Colonel Thielen: I have no recollection of that being
18 given.

19 Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether the Navy had
20 a watch there at that time?

21 Colonel Thielen: I do not know.

22 Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether or not either
23 Tyler or Elliott, or the other man with Elliott knew that
24 B-17's were coming in that morning?

25 Colonel Thielen: No, sir, I don't know what the extent

Witness Thielen
Witness Inglis

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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1
2 of their knowledge was.

3 Senator Ferguson: Did you give us the exact plan of
4 what was shown on the radar design plan?

5 Colonel Thielen: It was a copy, as faithful as we
6 could make it. It was not a mechanical reproduction. It
7 was done by an artist. It was as good a copy as we could
8 make of the so-called historical plat.

9 Senator Ferguson: Have you the original?

10 Colonel Thielen: I have an original.

11 Senator Ferguson: Will you produce it for the committee?

12 Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir.

13 (The document was handed to Senator Ferguson.)

14 Senator Ferguson: Do you know who made this original?

15 Colonel Thielen: It is authenticated by an officer
16 named Murphy.

17 Senator Ferguson: Back to the Admiral, now. I have
18 to keep skipping back and forth.

19 Admiral, you said that about two-thirds of our fleet
20 was in the Pacific; is that correct?

21 Admiral Inglis: No, sir. I said that the numerical
22 strength of the Pacific Fleet was two-thirds that of the
23 Atlantic Fleet. The Pacific Fleet was smaller than the
24 Atlantic Fleet.

25 Senator Ferguson: I beg your pardon. One third was

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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in the Pacific and two-thirds in the Atlantic?

Admiral Inglis: No, sir. We still haven't got our fractions right, sir.

Senator Ferguson: What is that?

Admiral Inglis: We still haven't got our fractions right.

Senator Ferguson: Well, how many capital battleships were in the Atlantic?

Admiral Inglis: In the Atlantic Fleet were 6 battleships. In the Pacific Fleet were 9 battleships. Six in the Atlantic and 9 in the Pacific.

Senator Ferguson: And eight out of the nine were destroyed, or damaged?

Admiral Inglis: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: How many were?

Admiral Inglis: Well, I have to distinguish between damaged and destroyed.

Senator Ferguson: How many were hit. Put it that way.

Admiral Inglis: Well, the Colorado, of course, was the ninth one, and she was not present at Pearl Harbor.

Senator Ferguson: Were all the others hit?

Admiral Inglis: All the others were hit to a greater or lesser degree.

Senator Ferguson: Then there was only one battleship

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

in the Pacific that was not hit?

Admiral Inglis: That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, how many battleships were in the Atlantic?

Admiral Inglis: Six.

Senator Ferguson: Well, I read from Battle Report, Pearl Harbor to Coral Sea, which is supposed to be an official record, page 6:

"In the Atlantic there were eight battleships."

Reading from page 6.

Admiral Inglis: I can't recognize that book as being official. I have here a list of the specific ships --

Senator Ferguson: I read you the first part of this book. "Notes on the background and writing of this book. When the authors of this book were directed by the Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox to begin a preparation, a few months before his death, the instructions were brief and to the point," indicating that he had something to do with the preparation of this Battle Report, and the Navy officers that wrote this book.

It says. "Prepared from official sources by Commander Walter Kerrig, and Lieutenant Welbourn Kelley."

Admiral Inglis: I personally still don't recognize that as being official, except what you have told me now,

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h12

1 but, if I may, Senator Ferguson, I will read the list of
2 ships that were in the Atlantic Fleet, and the list of
3 those in the Pacific Fleet.

4 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

5 Admiral Inglis: In the Atlantic were the NEW YORK,
6 the IDAHO, MISSISSIPPI, NEW MEXICO, ARKANSAS, and TEXAS.

7 In the Pacific, the PENNSYLVANIA, CALIFORNIA, WEST
8 VIRGINIA, ARIZONA, NEVADA, OKLAHOMA, TENNESSEE, COLORADO,
9 and MARYLAND.

10 Senator Ferguson: Were you familiar with the Secretary
11 of the Navy Knox's memorandum or report that he drew up
12 or had drawn up at the time of -- after the incident?

13 Admiral Inglis: You mean immediately after the attack?

14 Senator Ferguson: No. Did you use anything from that
15 report in making up your report here?

16 Admiral Inglis: No, sir.

17 Senator Ferguson: He gave a report at that time, did
18 he not?

19 Admiral Inglis: I read such a report in the newspapers.
20 You mean about a month after Pearl Harbor?

21 Senator Ferguson: Yes. Didn't you try to get that
22 as a part of your source?

23 Admiral Inglis: Well, I am not too familiar with the
24 sources that were used by my researchers, but I don't
25

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h13

believe that was used.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether the report the President used sometime after was used in making up this report?

Admiral Inglis: I am not familiar with the President's report.

Senator Ferguson: How are we going to check the accuracy of this report?

Admiral Inglis: All I can say is that my presentation was made from the official reports, not those that were prepared for the President, but from the original reports of the Roberts inquiry, and the Murfin Board inquiry, and documents of that nature. Wherever possible, they were documents that contained sworn testimony.

Senator Ferguson: How many battleships did we have in December, 1941?

Admiral Inglis: Fifteen, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Fifteen.

Admiral Inglis: Fifteen that were attached to the Fleets. There were two or three that had just been completed, or were on their shakedown duty.

Senator Ferguson: Where were they?

Admiral Inglis: It is my recollection that the Washington and New Mexico were on shakedown duty in the Atlantic.

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Witness Inglis

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h14

One of those ships, I am sure, from personal observation was in the Navy Yard at New York, Brooklyn.

Senator Ferguson: Two of those then were in the Atlantic, even though on hakedown duty?

Admiral Inglis: That probably accounts for the discrepancy between the six and eight.

Senator Ferguson: That would indicate that this book was a little more accurate than your figures.

Admiral Inglis: That would indicate my figures contain the number of ships attached to the Atlantic Fleet and the number attached to the Pacific Fleet.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know how long after the attack came at Pearl Harbor, it came at the Philippines? Will you name the attacks that were had by the Japs on the date of the 7th, or if it was across the international date line, on the 8th, and give us the hours of those attacks?

Admiral Inglis: I have confined my studies to the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands. I can get that information for you.

Senator Ferguson: Would you get us that? Get us the hours of the attacks.

Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, have you any knowledge of what reconnaissance there was on or about December 1st, from Pearl

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Witness Inglis

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

to Johnston to Midway?

Admiral Inglis: No, sir, I have nothing earlier than December 6th readily at hand.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know that on or about the 3rd that there was some reconnaissance from Wake to Midway to Pearl, arriving on the 5th?

Admiral Inglis: No, sir, I have no information readily at hand earlier than the 6th of December.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know each flight was with at least one squadron and 12 PBY's?

Admiral Inglis: No, sir. I have no information readily at hand earlier than the 6th of December.

Senator Ferguson: On the 5th or 6th, did the Lexington proceed to Pearl from Midway?

Admiral Inglis: The Lexington was enroute to Midway from Pearl.

Senator Ferguson: Yes. Who was in charge of the Lexington?

Admiral Inglis: The Lexington was in a task group commanded by Admiral Newton.

Senator Ferguson: What did Halsey have charge of, Admiral Halsey?

Admiral Inglis: Just a minute, sir. I want to be sure I have got those correct.

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h16

Senator Ferguson: Did he have the Enterprise?

Admiral Inglis: The Lexington group was under Admiral Newton.

Senator Ferguson: It was going from Pearl to what? Midway?

Admiral Inglis: It was going from Pearl to Midway with a squadron of Marine Corps scout bombers.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether they did any reconnaissance?

Admiral Inglis: I understand because of the additional Marine Corps planes on board, the flight deck was so cluttered that they weren't able to launch any.

Senator Ferguson: So there was no reconnaissance from that?

Admiral Inglis: Not from the Lexington.

Senator Ferguson: Was there from the Enterprise?

Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: What reconnaissance was there from the Enterprise?

Admiral Inglis: As given in the presentation, the Enterprise launched a squadron of 18 planes to scout through a sector of 110 degrees immediately forward of the ship's course to a distance of 150 miles.

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Witness Inglis

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: How far south would that be of the line where the Jap planes were supposed to have been?

Admiral Inglis: The Japs what, sir?

Senator Ferguson: Planes, the carriers of the Japs.

Admiral Inglis: You mean the carriers?

Senator Ferguson: Yes. How far would this reconnaissance be south of that?

Admiral Inglis: That will come out in the Japanese presentation, but I would say about 200 miles, sir.

Senator Ferguson: About 200 miles.

Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did you ever read the article in the Saturday Evening Post by Lieutenant Richardson about his orders?

Admiral Inglis: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: From the Enterprise?

Admiral Inglis: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know anything about those orders?

Admiral Inglis: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know what caused the delay in having the planes leave the ground on the various occasions that you have mentioned, that they were an hour or two late, they were also late at Midway?

Admiral Inglis: No, sir, I do not know the reason.

Witness Inglis

questions by: Senator Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: Did you look it up or try to find out?

Admiral Inglis: I didn't personally. Perhaps some of my researchers may have.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether any transports left our West Coast on the 6th?

Admiral Inglis: In answer to that question -- whether they left the West Coast of the United States?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Admiral Inglis: No, sir, I don't.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether one had left and came back because of the assault on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Inglis: I have no positive knowledge of that.

Senator Ferguson: Will you find out?

Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Senator George asked you about why the traffic was diverted from the north route. Have you that data or did you ever see it?

Admiral Inglis: I haven't got it, no, sir.

Senator Ferguson: From whom did you get your information that it was diverted on the 25th?

Admiral Inglis: I have got the source right here, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Will you give us the source?

Admiral Inglis: Yes, sir. That was a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations dated 25 November 1941.

Witness Inglis

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: I didn't hear you.

Admiral Inglis: That source is a dispatch originated by the Chief of Naval Operations on the 25th of November, 1941, carrying the reference number 252203.

Senator Ferguson: That was Admiral Stark?

Admiral Inglis: Admiral Stark was the Chief of Naval Operations at that time, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: That came out in Washington, is that true?

Admiral Inglis: That is true.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether a copy of that was ever sent to the Admiral in charge of the 14th District?

Admiral Inglis: I am practically certain that it was addressed to him among other, but I am not positive of it.

Senator Ferguson: Have you the order with you?

Admiral Inglis: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Will you get me the order?

Admiral Inglis: I will, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Why did you use that in your report and not bring us the order?

Admiral Inglis: The material from which this presentation was made is tremendously bulky. I haven't got it all here.

Senator Ferguson: Who determined to put that in?

Admiral Inglis: Who determined what?

Witnesses Inglis and Thielen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Who determined to put that item in the report?

Admiral Inglis: That was presented to me by the researchers and I made the decision to include it in the presentation. I felt that it was quite pertinent.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know who gave the orders for the B-17's to leave Hamilton Field, San Francisco?

Admiral Inglis: No, sir, I do not know. That is an Army activity.

Senator Ferguson: Going back to the Colonel, do you know who gave the orders for the B-17's to leave Hamilton Field, Colonel?

Colonel Thielen: No, sir, I do not.

Senator Ferguson: Did you look into that?

Colonel Thielen: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know when the orders were given?

Colonel Thielen: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know what time they left?

Colonel Thielen: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: What time?

Colonel Thielen: At 9:30 p.m., 6th December, San Francisco time.

Senator Ferguson: And what field were they destined for?

Colonel Thielen: They were destined for the Philippines

Witness Thielen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

by way of Oahu.

Senator Ferguson: What was their destination at the Hawaiian Islands?

Colonel Thielen: I could only guess that it would be Hickam Field, the biggest field, a bomber field, and therefore suitable for B-17's.

Senator Ferguson: Were they equipped with radio?

Colonel Thielen: I can't answer that definitely. Presumably they were.

Senator Ferguson: Have you any information that they had been in touch with any radio station on the Islands prior to the flight of Japs coming in?

Colonel Thielen: I have only the negative information that they flew without contact with Hawaii.

Senator Ferguson: Were they flying blind or without contact?

Colonel Thielen: Apparently they were, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know why?

Colonel Thielen: No, sir, I do not.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know why they were unarmed at that time?

Colonel Thielen: They were being ferried to the Philippines. They were not on a combat mission.

Senator Ferguson: Do I understand from that that all

Witness Thielen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 planes not on combat missions are unarmed? Have you any
3 personal knowledge of that, Colonel?

4 Colonel Thielen: That is a rather broad generalization,
5 sir. A state of war did not exist at the time of their de-
6 parture. They were on a ferrying mission. In time of peace
7 it would be normal for them to be unarmed.

8 Senator Ferguson: I will ask you why it was that on the
9 ENTERPRISE that, as the Lieutenant says, they had war orders?

10 Colonel Thielen: I have no knowledge.

11 Senator Ferguson: That was just 200 miles west of the
12 Hawaiian Islands. Can you tell why the B-17's didn't have
13 any orders and those from the ENTERPRISE did have orders?

14 Colonel Thielen: No, sir, I cannot.

15 Senator Ferguson: Will you look that up and try to find
16 out?

17 Colonel Thielen: I believe that is outside my scope,
18 but I will be glad to do it.

19 Senator Ferguson: Do you mean that you are limited in
20 what information you will be able to get for the committee?

21 Colonel Thielen: I have not been designated by the War
22 Department to coordinate all witnesses who are to appear before
23 the committee.

24 Senator Ferguson: I am not asking you that. I am asking
25 you to get that particular order, if you can, why one didn't

Witness Thielen

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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have and one did have.

Colonel Thielen: Very well, I will make an effort to get that order.

Mr. Mitchell: I might say we have witnesses on the list for all these things.

The Chairman: We have reached the hour of 4:00 o'clock.

Senator Ferguson: I have considerable more, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: I think, in view of the fact that we cannot finish with these witnesses this afternoon, we might as well recess until 10:00 o'clock tomorrow morning.

Mr. Gesell: Senator, I have something for each member of the committee before we break up.

(Documents were handed to the committee.)

The Chairman: Very well.

(Whereupon, at 4:00 o'clock p.m., the committee recessed until 10:00 o'clock a.m., Friday, November 16, 1945.)

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