

Doc. 3102 Evid

Folder 2

(46)

DATE	TEL. NO.	TITLE (If Note or Memo)	FROM	TO	IPS NO.
When Mr. NOMURA was appointed	O	Matter concerning the guidance of newspapers in connection with the appointment of new Imperial ambassador to the United States.			
After the Japanese troops' advance into French Indo-China	O	Outline of our foreign policies of the day with the policies concerning America as the center.	Drafted by American Bureau		
Oct. 14, 1940		America's steps against Japan and draft of our counter-measures			
	O	Matters to be kept in mind and steps to be taken regarding Ambassador NOMURA's start for the new post.			
<u>Scay</u> Nov. 25, 1940		Instruction to the Ambassador	Drafted by American Bureau		
		Announcement by the Board of Information (in English)			
Oct 6, 1941		Instruction to the Ambassador re. the American proposal			

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TEL. NO.</u>	<u>TITLE (If Note or Memo)</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>IPS NO.</u>
Oct 7, 1941		Opinion re the change made by NOMURA in our proposal			
Oct 6, 1941	draft no number 0	withdrawal of NOMURA's telegram NO 773 instructed	Foreign Minister TOYODA	Ambassador NOMURA	
Oct 6, 1941	draft no number	Regarding the telegram NO. 637	TOYODA	NOMURA	
no date	no number	Re. the Imperial government's statement of Aug. 28 (a part missing)	TOYODA	NOMURA	
Oct 6, 1941	no number	Re. the telegram NO. 637	TOYODA	NOMURA	
		Draft policies of negotiations by the heads of the two countries to improve Japan-America relations			
Aug 28, 1941		Principles of Japan-America negotiations			
Aug 28, 1941		Some items to be changed and investigated in our tentative draft of July 15.			
		Regarding the America proposal of September			
May 9, 1941	no number 0	Re. OSHIMA's telegram NO. 494	Foreign Minister MATSUOKA	Ambassador OSHIMA	

DATE	TEL. NO.	TITLE (If Note or Memo)	FROM	TO	IPS NO.
May 7 1941	NO. 494	asking for the information about Japan - U.S. agreement	OSHIMA MATSUOKA		
		Regarding the giving in secrecy of information concerning Japan - U.S. agreement to the German and Italian governments on 4 May.			
April 24, '41		Re. the telegram No. 247	apparently from TOYODA to NOMURA		
		Observations re. Japan - America understanding			
		Opinions re Japan - America joint declaration draft.			
		Questions regarding the formalities concerning Japan - America understanding			
		American proposal appeared in the Arita-Grew conversations in June - July of last year, and the basic note of the present proposal			

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TEL. NO.</u>	<u>TITLE (If Note or Memo)</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>IPS NO.</u>
April 22, '41	No number 0	Re. your telegram NO. 234	MATSUOKA	NOMURA	
May 14, '41	No number 0	Re. your Telegram NO. 305	MATSUOKA	NOMURA	
May 9, 1941	6	Basic conditions and items to be considered in concluding Japan- America understanding			
May 20, 1941	NO. 77	Re. America's communistic paper's Tone of speech.	Consul- general MUTO in San Francisco	MATSUOKA	
May		Halifax's telegram to Foreign Ministry Eden dated 17 May			
		Re. Roosevelt's Fireside Chat of May 27			
		Our amendment Plan for the American draft			

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 JAPANESE FILE NO. 2
 PERIOD COVERED Sept 5/1941 -

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TEL. NO.</u>	<u>TITLE (If Note or Memo)</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>IFS NO.</u>
		Contents of the Foreign Minister's Telegram to our Ambassador in America dated September 5.			
July 23, 1941	NO. 397	Re. your telegram No. 545	TOYODA	NOMURA	
July 14, 1941	No number	Re. the oral statement	MATSUOKA	NOMURA	
		Copy of the telegram sent from the Minists TOYODA & Ambassador NOMURA on Aug. 20			
Aug. 21, 1941		Re. the joint defence of French Indo-China			
Sept. 4, 1941		Draft of Joint Declaration (in English)	TOYODA	NOMURA	
		Message from Prince KONOYE & President Roosevelt (in English)			

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TEL. NO.</u>	<u>TITLE (If Note or Memo)</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>IPS NO.</u>
Aug 10 1941	no number	Re. Roosevelt-Churchill conversation	NOMURA	TOYODA	
		The Imperial government's statement re. the note given to the Japanese Ambassador on August 17.			
		Some memo regarding our foreign policy			
August 8, 1941	NO. 672	Re. the President's proposal (in English)	NOMURA	NOMURA	
Aug. 26, 1941		Our answer to America's reply	NOMURA	NOMURA	
Aug 26, 1941		KONOYE's message to the President	NOMURA	NOMURA	
		Draft Telegram to the Ambassador in Washington data to be referred to in answering their questions regarding northern problems.	NOMURA MATSUOKA	MATSUOKA NOMURA	

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TEL. NO.</u>	<u>TITLE (If Note or Memo)</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>VPS NO.</u>
		Draft proposal to the U.S. regarding the military ^{by force} control of Russia's Far Eastern Territories X and X.			
		Draft telegram from Premier KONOYE to the American President			
		The Imperial government's statement after receiving the note handed to the Jap. Ambassador on Aug 17, 1941.			
Aug. 25, 1941		Draft of our answer to America's reply			
Aug. 1941	No number	Re. the request to the U.S. concerning the restraining of aid-Soviet commodities shipped to Vladiv. stock.	TOYODA	NOMURA	

DATE	TEL. NO.	TITLE (If Note or Memo)	FROM	TO	IPS NO.
Sept 7, 1941		Copy of NOMURA's Telegram to TOYODA received on 7 Sept.	NOMURA	TOYODA	
no date	no number	Re. the last item of the Telegram NO. 524	TOYODA	NOMURA	
Sept 2, 1941		Re. Japan-America negotiations			
Sept 17, 1941		Re ^{some} the items of and ^{of} the joint Declaration			
		Note to Ambassador ^{grew} (in English)			

~~SECRET~~

Draft instructions to Ambassador NOMURA... 25 Nov. 1940

1. Explanation re Fundamental Principles of our Foreign Policy.

Hitherto the determination and real strength of our Empire have not been correctly grasped by the U.S.A. Our attitude towards the U.S.A. must bear the blame ^{for its} to some degree. You are requested ^{always} to express our line of policy and determination frankly and uncompromisingly, regarding our fundamental policy of establishing a new world order with the AXIS as the basis. JAP-AMERICAN friendship is of no significance to our Empire, if it is not based thereon.

2. Explanation re CHINA Problem

You are requested to clarify the fundamental differences between JAPAN and the U.S.A. regarding this issue, and explain concrete problems arising therefrom and their ^{possible} future developments. JAPAN and the U.S.A. should then examine between themselves if there is any possibility of adjusting fundamental differences between the two countries, and if the examination ---

/ Here the document ends. Clearly some pages are missing /

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

DEFENSE DOCUMENT SERIES A

ANALYSIS No. 28

30 April 1947

DEF Doc. No. 558

Ct. Exh. No.

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Book, "Report of the Japan-Manchukuo-China Economic Consultation Society"

Date: Nov 1938

Language: Japanese

Original processed in full () Excerpts only

PERSONS IMPLICATED: KAYA, Okinoru; NAGAI, Yatsuji

INCIDENT, PHASE OR CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

An extract used as Defense Doc. No. 558 is a lecture delivered by the Vice-Head of the Industrial Department of Manchukuo. He said that the goal set in the original Five-Year Plan was found to be too low so a revised plan with a higher goal has been set. (pp 182-184)

The book contains also speeches delivered by various Japanese and Manchurian officials. Some are as follows:

KAYA, Okinori (chairman of the Japan-Manchukuo-China Economic Consultation Society) said, "Needless to say, the great aim of the attack of the Imperial Army is to destroy the political power of CHIANG Kai-Shek who does not understand the position of the Chinese people and the real meaning of their mission in East Asia....."

For establishing the foundation of peace in East Asia, a firm international union of Japan, Manchukuo and China must be fixed beyond the extent of friendship and coalition. This is no doubt the dawn of a new East Asia and it may be said that this period will be the days of the establishment of a new East Asia. As a stabilizing power of the Far East, we must establish a strong military power and a strong economic power to support it for the accomplishment of that purpose....."

Analysis No. 28

Page 1

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 3102

Date: 15 October 1947

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Found file in folder, "Negotiations with America" (TAI PEI)

Date: Various dates Original (x) Copy () Language: Jap in 1941.

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL
Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:
Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED: NOMURA, Kichisaburo; TOYODA, Teijiro;
MATSUOKA, Yosuke.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Japanese-American Negotiations; Censorship and Propaganda for War.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Item 1. Matters concerning the guidance of newspapers in connection with the appointment of the new Japanese Ambassador to the United States.

States that NOMURA was sent because he was a man of the first rank who would command respect from the Americans. This, it states, showed the importance attached to the relation with America by Japan. It further stated, "The spirit of the Tripartite Pact has already been clearly shown. We will endeavor to establish the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and will cooperate with any country that understands our real intention."

Item 2. Outline of Our Present Foreign Policies Revolving around America.

(Drafted by the America Bureau).

Doc. No. 3102
Page 1

This outline lists various measures taken by America against Japan as the results of the aggravation of Japanese-American relations following the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact and the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China. Toward these measures, it is stated that Japan will take the following counter-measures:

Japan's counter-measures:

The Empire will endeavor to take diplomatic advantage of the Tripartite Pact and, at the same time, to make the U.S. take a second look at the world situation.

By preventing Japan-U.S. war, Japan shall complete the establishment of the new order in East Asia and the settlement of the China Incident, all of which is the fixed policy of Japan.

(1) Japan shall pay constant attention to American plans for East Asia. On the other hand, Japan shall keep a calm and firm attitude and restrain herself from taking any action which will excite America.

(2) Japan shall declare that she hopes to make each nation live peacefully together in the Greater East Asia Sphere and to establish a fair peace in the whole world in line with the true meaning of the Tripartite Pact and the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

(3)

(3) (2) will be declared to Latin America also.

(4) Japan shall take a sincere attitude toward many questions existing between Japan and U.S., (mainly matters concerning the China Incident) and gradually find opportunity for negotiating for an all-out settlement of the problems between Japan and U.S.

If, in spite of our above efforts, the U.S. still obstructs Japan in the establishment of Greater East Asia and the settlement of the China Incident, the Empire shall make America fully know our final resolution that we cannot but take the way of self-defense for our own preservation.

(5) As there is a fear that America might bring U.S.S.R. in line with her, it is necessary for us to readjust the relation between Japan and U.S.S.R. We shall conclude a Japan-U.S.S.R. non-aggression treaty for that purpose.

(6) Japan shall promote her preparations to cope with the U.S. in the event Japan-U.S. relations become worse.

(7) If America offers to hold a conference on the problems of East Asia or Pacific area, Japan will not give an immediate reply. It is important to consider the number of participating countries, the contents of the matter in question, etc.

Item 3: U.S. Dispositions Toward Japan and Japan's Counter-measures.

(14 October 1940)

Various measures taken by the United States against Japan and Japan's counter-measures to these are listed. The Japanese counter-measures are as follows:

1. Not to excite the U.S. unnecessarily if the matter is not too urgent.
2. To negotiate with Russia along the Axis pact to prevent closer U.S.-Soviet relationship.
3. To start propaganda explaining the true meaning of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and the Tripartite Pact to the U.S. and the South American countries.
4. Not to make an immediate reply to U.S. proposal for a conference. Firstly, its subject matter must be made clear.
5. To speed up the preparation, as far as we are concerned, for a "turn to the worse" in negotiations.

Item 4: Matters to be Kept in Mind and Steps to be Taken Regarding Ambassador NOMURA's departure for his New Post.

America is wondering why Foreign Minister MATSUOKA recommended NOMURA, a pro-American former naval officer who refused to take a ministerial post two times. Americans may think it is a sign of Japan's start toward a pro-American policy, and may develop confidence in her "get-tough" policy toward Japan.

Doc. No. 3102 - Page 4 (Summary Cont'd)

If the above possibility becomes a fact, the appointment of Ambassador NOMURA will constitute a great failure in Japan's policy toward the U.S.

Therefore, we must take all necessary precautions against such a situation.

Counter-measures for Japan.

We must prevent the newspapers from writing about his /NOMURA/ personal connections and his fame among the Americans.

We must make the press emphasize the fact that the dispatching of a high-class character like NOMURA is the last chance of Japan to request America's reconsideration by diplomatic showdown.

Attendants shall be selected from men who can transmit Japan's firm requirement to America softly and skillfully.

His words and actions from the start shall be made to remove the above American misunderstanding.

It is natural that the U.S. expects Japan to take some steps to surmount the situation.

So, Japan shall make a diplomatic showdown. This shall be done by showing the maximum of Japan's policy instead of minimum, i.e., to clarify the concrete contents of the East Asia New Order, or Japan's policy for China and the Southern Area.

Mission of New Ambassador.

(1) To undertake diplomatic showdown.

(2) To make Americans recognize that their "get-tough" policy for Japan will cause war between America and Japan, keeping in mind that American authorities have the following knowledge of Japan:

(a) Japan is a military dictatorship. The civilians obey the military blindly.

(b) The military in the battle-fields wields a strong authority and the orders of the central authorities are not carried out.

(c) The military in China is acting to drive away the rights of America and England from China.

Doc. No. 3102 - Page 5 - (Summary Cont'd)

(d) Japan's financial breakdown is at hand.

(e) If America takes a "get-tough" policy toward Japan, Japan would not be able to advance into French Indo-China, Singapore and the Philippines.

(f) Appeasement policy for Japan will only leave a lasting regret.

Item 5: Basic Conditions and Items to be Considered in Concluding a Japan-U.S. Understanding.

(9 May 1941)

(A.N.-The following extract may be of interest).

Matters to Which Japan Must Pay Special Attention.

It is evident that U.S. and British ^{air} by use of this proposal want to check Japan's military advance into the southern area until the end of the British crisis. But this draft is also convenient for us to reestablish the world as stipulated in the Tripartite Pact, or to establish the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. So even if we accept this proposal, no one can say that we fall into the enemy's trap. Moreover, the situation is so acute that the collision of the two countries is unavoidable unless we take some steps to surmount the situation.

Analyst: 1st Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa

Doc. No. 3102
Page 5

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INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 3102

Date 15 October 1947

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Bound file in folder, "negotiations with America" (TAI BEI)

Date: ~~1947~~ ^{Various dates in 1941} Original (X) Copy () Language Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes () No (X)

~~Has it been photostated? Yes () No ()~~

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (~~also WITNESS if applicable~~)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED: NOMURA, Kichisaburo; TOYODA, Teijiro; MATSUOKA, Yosuke;

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Japan - American negotiations; Censorship and Propaganda for War

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (~~with page references~~)

Item 1. Matters concerning the guidance of newspapers in connection with the appointment of the new Japanese ambassador to the United States.

States that NOMURA was sent because he was a man of the first rank ^{who would command} respect from the Americans. This, it states, showed the importance

Analyst: _____

Doc. No. 3102

attached to the relation with America by Japan.
It further stated, "The spirit of the Tripartite
Pact has already been clearly shown. We will endeavor
to establish the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere
and will cooperate with any country ^{that} ~~which~~ understands
our real intention."

Item 2. Outline of Our Present Foreign Policies
Revolving Around America

(Drafted by the America Bureau.)

This outline ^{lists} ~~lists~~ various measures taken by
America against Japan as the results of the aggravation
of Japanese-American relations following the conclusion
of the Tripartite Pact and the Japanese occupation of
French Indo-China. Toward these measures,
it ^{is} stated that Japan will take the following ^{counter measures} ~~countermeasures~~.

(Footnote: Start from page 5, portions in
brackets only.)

Doc. No. 3102.

H. Okazaki¹.

Title of item: Inquiry into the draft of the agreement between Japan and U.S.A.

Important points of contents:

This draft seems to be the final gesture of U.S.A. facing the worst situation, so that Japan must save the situation quickly from the large view of things. We must accept this proposal with the following emergency measures:

- 1) U.S.A. shall devise, ^{at least} an expedient means to import a certain amount of oil of high octan value;
- 2) We shall propose peace ^{at adequate chance} to England and Germany in the names of Japan and U.S.A. in order to exclude the misunderstanding that Japan conclude this agreement ⁱⁿ violating the international faith;
- 3) Japan shall understand previously the substantial guarantee regarding

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the support and cooperation of U.S.A. for obtaining the products of natural resources in Southern Area, and other measures of pro-Japanese cooperation;

4) Japan shall make representation to U.S.A. that ~~the~~ idea or advocacy of Japan concerning the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere ~~is not~~ ^{will remain} ~~unchanged~~ ^{as it was.} (about this draft)

And the following questions will be excluded the above-mentioned emergency measures:

- 1.) Whether this settlement of agreement made easy the pro-England activities of U.S.A., because it would ease the tension in ^{the} Pacific or, not;
- 2.) Whether it would arouse suspicions to violate the international faith to Germany and Italy or not,

- 3) Whether U.S.A. had intention to expand the sets-up against Germany with the surmount strength from the moderation of atmosphere in the Pacific or not;
- 4) Whether Japan would be blamed for separating from the Axiom States Group and being subject to the English and American Finance States Group or not.

o Matter concerning the guidance of newspapers
in connection with the appointment of the new
Imperial ambassador to the United States

1. We are attaching great importance to the relation
between Japan and America, so it is a very
natural thing to dispatch a new ambassador to U.S.

2. Spirit of the Tripartite Pact has been already
indicated clearly. We will endeavor to secure the
stability of
The Greater East Asia Coprosperity sphere, and
will cooperate with any country which understands
our real intention.

3. To make America understand the above Japan's
standpoint, it is necessary to send a man of
the first rank for whom American government
and the Americans ^{can} have a high respect. It is
why NOMURA ^{was} appointed to the new ambassador,
and it is a good evidence that the Imperial
government is fully well aware of the
importance of Japan-American relations.

o Outline of our foreign policies of the day with the
policies concerning America as the center

Drafted by the American Bureau

1. Aggravation of the Japan-American relations

The conclusion of the Tripartite Pact and
the advance of Japanese troops into French-Indo-
China took place lately. The Japan-American

relations thus seem to come to the maximum of the seriousness.

2. America's measures for Japan

1) Strengthening of the cooperation with USSR

America is planning to make USSR play the role of checking the Japan's advance to the south area and the Japan's policy for China.

2) Strengthening of the cooperation with England and her dominion

America is planning the British-American joint defense for their interests in the East Asia by that.

3) American navy will visit Singapore and Australia with the object of demonstrating the British-American co-operation to Japan.

4) America will strengthen the economic oppression on Japan by alone or with England.

5) America will oppress the Japanese and the Japanese firms in U.S., and will make Latin America take the same measure.

6) America will strengthen the assistance on the Chiang regime, and will make England & USSR take the same measure.

7) U.S. may issue a counter-statement or will make more pronounced proposal for Japan's policy on China, French-Indo-China, and Dutch-East-Indies.

8) U.S. may recall the ambassador in Tokyo to the homeland

7) There is a possibility of rupture of the diplomacy between Japan and U.S.

10) Among the above measures, 4), 6), 7), 12), have a fear to be exercised easily.

↑↑↑↑↑
Begin
here

9. Japan's counter-measures

The Empire will endeavor to ~~make her~~ ^{take} diplomatic advantage of ~~standpoint~~ ^{of} profitable by the Tripartite Pact and, at the same time, to make ^{the} U.S. ~~see~~ ^{take a} ~~her~~ ^{second} look at ~~her~~ ^{look at} cognition on the world situation.

By ~~thus~~ preventing Japan-U.S. war, Japan shall enforce the completion ^{the establishment} of the new order in East Asia and the settlement of the China Incident, all of which ~~is~~ the fixed policy of Japan.

(1) Japan shall pay ~~the~~ constant attention ^{to} ~~what~~ American plans for East Asia ^{on one} ~~hand~~ ^{and}, ^{on} the other hand, Japan shall hold a calm and firm attitude and restrain ~~herself~~ ^{from taking any} the action which ^{will} excite America.

(2) Japan shall declare that she hopes to make each nation ^{peacefully together} live in the Greater East Asia ^{Sphere} and to establish ~~the~~ ^a fair peace in ^{the} whole world in line with the true meaning of the Tripartite Pact and the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

(3) (2) will be declared to ~~the~~ Latin America, ~~also~~ ^{also}.

(4) Japan shall ^{take a} hold sincere attitude ^{toward} ~~for~~ the many questions existing between Japan and U.S., (mainly matters concerning the China Incident) and gradually find out ~~the~~ opportunity ^{for} ~~proper~~ negotiations for ^{an} all-out settlement of the problems between Japan and U.S. - 5 -

(Subject: This comes in between Item 2 and Item 4.)
(pp 6)

Item 3. U.S. Dispositions toward Japan and Japan's counter-measures.
(14 October 1940)

- Various ~~U.S. Dispositions~~ measures taken by the United States against Japan and ~~counter-measures~~ to these ^{are listed}. The Japanese counter-measures are as follows:
1. Not to ~~stimulate~~ ^{excite} the U.S. ~~unnecessarily~~ ^{unnecessarily} if the matter is not too urgent.
 2. To negotiate with Russia along the Axis just to prevent closer U.S. - Soviet relationship.
 3. To start propaganda ^{explaining the true meaning} ~~against the U.S.~~ of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and the Tripartite Pact to the U.S. and ~~to~~ the South American countries.
 4. Not to make an immediate reply to ~~the~~ U.S. proposal for a conference. Firstly, its subject matter must be made clear.
 5. To ~~prepare~~ ^{speed up the preparation}, as far as we are concerned, for ~~the worst~~ ^{a "turn to the worse"} in ~~the~~ negotiations.

If the above possibility ^{becomes a} ~~turns to the~~ fact, the appointment of Ambassador NOMURA ~~itself~~ will ^{constitute} ~~become~~ a great failure of Japan's policy ^{toward the U.S.} ~~for the U.S.~~

Therefore, we must take ~~the~~ all necessary steps for precautions ^{against} such a situation.

Guidance of our newspapers regarding the report of his appointment is also very serious, because if it is misguided, the trend of the mistaken cognition of Americans on Japan will be increased more and more.

2. Counter-measures ^{of} Japan

We must ^{prevent} ~~guide~~ the newspapers ~~not~~ to writing ^{about} his/NOMURA personal connections and ^{his} ~~the~~ fame among the Americans.

We must make ^{the press} ~~them~~ emphasize ^{the fact} that the dispatching of ^a ~~the~~ high class character like ^{NOMURA} ~~him~~ is the last ^{change} ~~card~~ of Japan to request America's reconsideration by ~~the~~ diplomatic show-down. (selected from)

Attendants shall be ~~the~~ men who can transmit Japan's firm requirement to America softly and ~~skillfully~~ Skillfully.

His words and actions ^{from} ~~before~~ the start shall be made ^{to remove the} ~~keeping the breaking of~~ above American ^{misunderstanding} ~~mistake~~ in mind.

3. Expectance of U.S. for appointment of new ambassador and our policy to utilize it

It is naturally that ^{the} U.S. ^{expects} ~~has a~~ ~~expectance~~ that Japan will ^{to} take some steps to ^{overmount} ~~take over~~ the situation ^{positively} ~~by that~~.

So, Japan shall make a diplomatic show-down, squeezing that mental state. This shall be ~~made~~ ^{done} by showing the maximum of Japan's policy instead of minimum, i.e., to clarify the concrete contents of the East Asia New Order, or Japan's policy for China and the Southern Area.

4. Latest U.S. trend and its relation with the appointment of new ambassador

Roosevelt has to show clearly by some concrete action that he has no heart to change his diplomatic policy. Therefore he will do some "gesture" for Japan before or after the appointment of new ambassador. If it is realized, Japan will emphasize that though we fear such American disposal might impair our national dignity as compared with our effort, the Japanese and Americans must exercise the statesmanship and prevent unfortunate situation till last.

5. Mission of New Ambassador

- 1) To ~~do~~ ^{undertake} the diplomatic show-down.
- 2) To make Americans recognize that their "get-tough" policy for Japan will cause ~~a~~ war between America and Japan, keeping in mind that American authorities have such cognition ^{the following knowledge} of Japan: as follows:
 - (a) Japan is a ~~military~~ ^{military dictatorship} country, and civilians obey the military blindly.

(b) ^{the} Military in the battle-fields ^{rights} has a strong authority ~~power~~ and the orders of the ^{central} authorities are not carried out.

(c) ~~The~~ Military in China is acting ~~to~~ to drive away the rights of America and England from China.

(d) Japan's financial break down is at hand.

(e) If America takes a ^{"get-tough"} ~~regressive~~ policy ^{toward} for Japan, Japan would ~~have no space~~ ^{not be able} to advance into ~~the~~ French-Indo-China, Singapore, and ~~the~~ Philippines.

(f) Appeasement policy for Japan will only leave ~~the~~ ^{lasting} regret. ~~for ever~~.

o Withdrawal of NOMURA'S telegram No. 773 instructed

From Foreign Minister TOYODA to
Ambassador NOMURA

Telegram draft Oct. 6, 1941

omit
It is instruction for the withdrawal of NOMURA'S
Telegram No. 773 in order to rearrange the reports.

^{The English sentence of}
the TOYODA'S telegram No. 503 shall be proposed
to America as it is, instead of telegram No. 773

~~Re~~ Re. OSHIMA'S telegram No. 494

From Foreign Minister MATSUOKA to
Ambassador OSHIMA, Hiroshi.

American government ^{to us} gave in the arrangement
of Japan-U.S. relation, and we are dealing with it
very carefully, so even the American ambassador in
Tokyo knows nothing about that.

But in that case, the leaking of the matters is can not be helped. ^{Moreover,} we consider that it will be kept in secrecy even in American side.

Therefore, please let me know its disposal by American side, because it is necessary for our discussion about this matter.

Re your Telegram No. 305

From MATSUOKA to Ambassador NOMURA

14 May 1941

I fully understand the meaning of your telegram.

As the understanding draft, we can not but make some amendments because we found our defects in it. So, regarding the telegrams already dispatched, I would like it to be dealt as instructed.

(continue)
type:

Item 5 Basic conditions and Items To Be Considered in Concluding a Japan-U.S. Understanding (9 May 1941)
(The following extract may be of interest)

1. China Problem

Japan has to settle the China Incident morally on the basis of the three principles declared by the KONOE statement. Besides, America will offer the following problems in case of Japan-American negotiation.

Respect on the dependence and sovereignty of China, ie, withdrawal of the Japanese troops, Open-door problems, retrocession of the occupied properties, etc.

We will require to America the following in that case:-

Suspension of her assistance for the Chiang regime and approval of the special economic relation of Japan in China and East Asia.

2. Marine transportation, navy and air forces in Pacific

But Foreign Minister made the German and Italian Ambassadors know this contents observing Japan's faith for both countries. This draft seems as America wants to pour her whole power to the assistance for England, after stabilizing the situation of Pacific area. So, we want to eliminate or amend such items as have a fear to cause the above. We believe we can check the America's participation in war by this draft, and can display the mission of the Tripartite Pact. Besides, we consider the peace in the Pacific is the first step of the ^{recovery of} the peace in the Europe.

From that point of view, we decided to make negotiations ^{with U.S. on the basis of this draft} in spite of the opposition of Germany and Italy.

This is to be reported to only the Presidents and the Foreign Ministers of Italy and Germany and the special care should be taken as not to leak out to outside.

○ Asking for the information about Japan-U.S. agreement

From Ambassador OSHIMA to MATSUOKA
Telegram No. 494 7. May 1941

By which OSHIMA wanted to know some information about Japan-U.S. agreement because it is rumoured among the newspaper-men of the third country in Germany that negotiation of concluding some political agreement is being made between Japan & U.S.

omit

○ Regarding the giving in secrecy of information concerning Japan-U.S. agreement to the German and Italian governments
SAKAMOTO, chief of the European and Asiatic Bureau, visited the Italian and German ambassadors and notified them of the following information. ^{on 4 May} ^{through NOMURA}

1) American government gave in ^{the secret understanding} draft aimed at adjusting of Japan-U.S. relations, on 16 April.

2) Main point of this draft is to recover the friendship between U.S. and Japan and to prevent the war as not ^{to} extend to the Pacific.

3) MATSUOKA has some suspicion that America wants to pour her whole power to the assistance for England by stabilizing the situation in the Pacific.

But, at the same time, he believes that it is possible to check America's participation in war by its proper dealing, so to make it meet the original object of the Tripartite Pact. ^{of the draft}

4) There are some more days till the cabinet decision, so we made NOMURA transmit our oral statement to HULL and sound the America's intention by the offer of Neutral Pact Draft as the private draft of NOMURA.

5) This information should be kept in secrecy except to be reported to the Presidents and Foreign Ministers.

○ Re your telegram No. 234

From MATSUOKA to Ambassador NOMURA

22 April, 1941

In view of the importance of the memorandum of the ^{in the telegram No. 234} matters which you sent, I think it should be consulted by the Privy Council in advance.

omit

in spite of our above efforts,
If the U.S. still obstructs Japan in the establishment
of Greater East Asia and the settlement of the China
Incident, ~~which are the vital problems for us~~, the Empire
shall make America fully know our final resolution
that we can not but take the way of self-defense for
our own maintenance preservation.

5) As there is a fear that America ^{might} bring USSR into
line with her, it is necessary for us to readjust the
relation between Japan and U.S.S.R. We shall
conclude a Japan-U.S.S.R. non-aggression treaty for
that purpose.

6) Japan shall promote her preparations to cope with
the U.S. ~~in the worst case~~ ^{in the event} of Japan-U.S. relations ~~become worse~~ ^{become worse}.

7) If America ~~will~~ ^{offers to hold} a conference regarding
the problems of East Asia or Pacific area, Japan
will not give an immediate reply. It is important to consider
shall consider the problems discussed, and the
countries taking part in, not accepting an offer
~~immediately~~ ^{the number of the participating countries, the contents}
of the matter in question, etc.

Item 4. Matters to be kept in mind and steps to be taken
regarding Ambassador NOMURA's ^{departure} ~~start~~ for his
New Post

~~Observation of U.S. government regarding the
appointment of Ambassador NOMURA~~

America is wondering why Foreign Minister
MATSUOKA recommended NOMURA, ~~who is~~ ^{who} a pro-American
former naval officer, ~~and~~ ^{and} refused to take a ^{ministerial} post two
times. Americans may think it is a ~~sign~~ ^{sign} of
Japan's start to ~~turn~~ ^{develop confidence} ~~to~~ ^{develop confidence} the pro-American policy, and may
have a self-confidence in her "get-tough" policy ~~toward~~ ^{toward} Japan.

Typist: Ito 3 will go in here. See another
pg 6A.

3. Co-operation of Japan - U.S. commerce and monetary circulation

1) Moderation of economic oppression on Japan

This is such a vital problem for us as we can say it is the most important cause to make Japan agree to the conclusion of this understanding. So at least the following items should be solved at the same time of the conclusion of this understanding.

1. Moderation of application of the export permission system on Japan

2. The most favoured nation treatment on the Japan's ships and the imports from Japan

4. Economic activities of Japan and America in the South-Western Pacific

5. Measures of Japan and U.S. regarding the economic stability of the Pacific area

Continued

6. Matters ^{to} Which Japan ~~has to pay~~ ^{Must Pay} Special ^{Attention} regard

It is evident that, U.S. and Britain, ^{by use of this proposal,} want to check Japan's military advance into the southern area and ~~to blockade Japan's attack on America until the dissolution of the British mainland's crisis.~~ ^{by this draft.} But this draft is also convenient for us to reestablish the world ^{as} stipulated in the tripartite Pact, or to establish the East Asia Coprosperity Sphere. So even if we accept this proposal, ~~no one~~ ^{no one} can ~~not~~ say ^{that} we fall into the enemy's trap. Moreover, the situation is so acute that the collision of ^{the} two countries is unavoidable unless we take some steps to ~~take~~ ^{surmount} the situation.

Analyst: 1st Lt Fred F. Pruzanski

Doc no 3102