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# SEGRET O

# CINERAL HEADQUARTERS 6-2 AR EAST COMMAND

G-2 ADMIN

CINCFE OPNS PLANS

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Operation Plan CINCFE No. 100A General Headquarters
Far East Command
Tokyo, Japan
30 August 1950

Chart or Map References: Annex "B"

#### Task Organization:

- a. Naval Forces Far East
- b. Far East Lir Forces
- c. Eighth Army
- d. X Corps
- e. Japan Logistical Command
- f. 187th AB RCT
- g. 3rd Inf Div

Vice Admiral Joy, USN

Lt Gen Stratemeyer, USAF

Lt Gen Walker, USA

Maj Gen Ilmond

Maj Gen Weible, USA

Brig Gen , USA

Maj Gen, USA

For assignment of forces to X Corps, see innex "i".

- L. This Operation Plan covers Phase III of the continuing operations to support the ROK in clearing ROK of North Korean Forces.
  - a. Enemy Forces: ...nnex "B".
  - b. Friendly Forces: CINCL and CINCPLC support this command.
  - c. Assumptions:
    - 1) That the NK ground advance into ROK will be stopped in time to permit the build-up of our forces in southern Korea (Phase I).
    - (2) That our forces in southern Korea will be build up to the point where they are capable of mounting effective offensive operations against NK forces opposing them (Phase II).
    - (3) That we retain air and naval supremacy in the area of operations.
    - (4) That NK ground forces do not receive major reinforcement from the USSR or CC.
    - (5) That there is no major change in the basic disposition of NK forces.

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
Porces of the FEC and assigned forces of the United Nations will land on D-Day in the KUNSAN area, advance on and seize TAEJON in conjunction with a continuation of the attack from the PUSAN area along the TAEGU-KUMCHON-TAEJON axis in order to cut off and destroy NK forces south of the KUM river.

# 3. a. Naval Forces Far East will!

- (1) Continue current missions.
- (2) Provide designated naval forces.
- (3) Provide 1st Mar Div (reinf) to X Corps.
- (4) Provide cover and support as required.
- (5) Transport landing force to KUNSAN area.
- (6) Seize, occupy and defend a beachhead in the KUNSAN area.
- (7) Transport and land follow-up troops in the KUNSAN area beachhead.
- (8) Transport and land, if directed, 187th .B RCT and 3rd Inf Div in the KUNSAN area.
- (9) After CG X Corps has assumed control ashore, the Attack Force shall be dissolved and reconstituted as the Naval Support Force which shall provide air, NGF and initial logistical support to X Corps until relieved by Commander-in-Chief, Far East.

# b. Far East Lir Forces will:

- (1) Continue current missions.
- (2) Support the landing at KUNS. N as follows: D-15 to D-1, inclusive:
- (a) Provide photographic coverage of the objective area as directed by CINCFE.
- (b) Destroy enemy troops, supplies and defensive installations within the objective area as part of the overall air campaign directed against such targets.



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(c) Destroy communications leading into the objective area as requested by COMNAVFE and approved by this headquarters.

# D-Day until disestablishment of objective area air boundary by CINCFE


- (a) Continue to provide photographic coverage as directed.
- (b) Isolate the objective area to the maximum practicable extent without depriving Eighth Army of essential air support.
- (c) Be prepared on emergency request of officer in tactical command in the objective area to provide maximum fighter support for air defense of the objective area.
- (d) Be prepared to conduct maximum area bombardment in the objective area on request of COMN.VFE as approved by this headquarters.
- (3) Be prepared to transport, provide cover for, and drop 187th AB RCT in pre-selected drop zones on order of CINCFE, and to provide aerial resupply.

#### c. Eighth Army will:

Continue the offensive in southern KOREA making the main effort to the northwest along the TAEGU-KUMCHON-TAEJON axis with the objective of destroying NK forces and effecting a junction with X Corps at TAEJON.

# d. X Corps will:

- (1) Load in shipping assigned by COMNLVFE in accordance schedule established by CG X Corps.
- (2) Land on designated beaches in the KUNSAN area.
- (3) Advance on, seize and secure the rail and road center of TAEJON.
- (4) Prepare for further operations:




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- (a) To block NK movement away from Eighth Army, or
- (b) To assist the advance of Eighth irmy.
- (5) Develop KUNS...N and T.EJON airfields for use by fighter and transport type aircraft.

#### e. Japan Logistical Command will:

- (1) Continue current missions.
- (2) Provide designated .. rmy forces to CG X Corps.
- (3) Prepare and move forces provided above to POEs in accordance with schedule established by CG X Corps and when requested assist in loading of designated elements of X Corps.
- (4) Provide logistical support for X Corps in accordance with Annex "F".

# f. 187th AB RCT will be prepared to:

- (1) Execute airdrop on order CINCFE in pre-selected drop zones in the KUNSAN-TAEJON area to support the amphibious attack or subsequent operations of X Corps,
- (2) Move by sea to KUNSIN area to reinforce X Corps, or
- (3) Move by air transport to KUNS.N or TAEJON airfields
  to reinforce X Corps.
- g. 3rd Inf Div, in theater Reserve, be prepared to embark on orders CINCFE and move to PUSIN or to KUNSIN to reinforce Eighth army or X Corps.
  - x. (1) Operating zones, bombing and attack restrictions will be promulgated by this headquarters in dispatch notices.
    - (2) Coordination of air operations and naval air operations: Annex "D"
    - (3) D-Day is the east longitude date on which the initial landing at KUNSAN will be made. Tentative



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date is 15 September. Exact date and hour will be designated by the Attack Force Commander and promulgated by dispatch.

(4) This plan effective for planning purposes upon receipt. The execution of the major component operations will be directed by separate dispatches.

#### 4. Administrative:

- a. Logistics: innex "E".
- b. Personnel: Annex "F".
- c. Civil Affairs: Annex "G".
- . Command Relations: innex "H".
  - b. Headquarters and Command Post Installations:

CINCFE Tokyo

COMNAVFE

COMM.VFE Tokyo

FELF

Eighth Army Taegu-Kumchon-Taejon

X Corps
Tokyo-Kunsan-Taejon

CG Japan Logistical Command Yokohama

Attack Force AGC 7

- c. Communications: Annex "I"
- d. Use Zone I time in the date-time group of all intratheater communications.

#### ANNEXES:

- A Assignment of Forces to X Corps: Annex A Op Plan 100B (Not Attached)
- B Intelligence
- C General Concept of the Operation
- D Coordination of hir Operations and

Naval Air Operations

- E Logistics Plan: Annex E Op Plan 100B (Not Attached)
- F Personnel Plan: Annex F Op Plan 100B (Not Attached)
- G Civil Affairs Plan: Annex G Op Plan 100B (Not Attached)
- H Command Relations
- I Communications (To be issued separately)

#### Distribution:

CINCFE,	Copies	1 -	- 3			
NAVFE	11		- 18			
FEAF	tf	19 -	- 20	G-1.	Copies	36 - 37
8th Irmy	11	21 -	- 23		ÎI .	
X Corps	11	24 -	. 33	G-3		40 - 42
Japan Log	istical			G-4	11	43 - 54
Command	11	34 -	35	JSPOG		54 - 75

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By SNARA Date 12-19-11

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Annex B, Intelligence Operation Plan CINCFE No. 100 A General Headquarters Far East Command Tokyo, Japan 15 August 1950

Maps: KOREA, 1:250,000, AMSL-551

#### 1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION

- a. See Daily Intelligence Summaries, G-2, GHQ, FEC, Spot Reports, and Intelligence Estimate, Far East, 1 Dec 49.
- b. See Appendix 1 (to follow), "Enemy Situation and Capabilities with Respect to the Kunsan Area."


#### 2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

- a. Will the enemy reinforce his forces in the amphibious-airborne objective area by withdrawing troops from the front of EUSAK or by committing his local reserves? Which units will be employed, and what routes will they use?
- b. Will the enemy reinforce the combat zone with additional divisions not now identified in the battle area? If so, are these divisions newly mobilized, or are they CCF or Soviet units? What routes will they take to the combat zone, and when will they arrive?
- c. Will the enemy continue to stand down his rapidly diminishing air force, or will air reinforcements arrive in time for a desperate, final enemy air effort?
- d. Will the lucrative target provided by a major amphibious assault, coupled with the prospect of a tactical defeat in Korea. tempt the USSR to intervene overtly with air or submarine attacks?
- e. Will the enemy opposition change from organized military operations to a general collapse followed by intensified guerrilla activities against UN forces in Korea?

#### 3. INTELLIGENCE MISSIONS FOR MAJOR COMMINDS

# a. Naval Forces Far East will:

(1) Continue to accomplish the intelligence missions assigned



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in Intelligence Annex to Operations Instructions No. 1, and missions assigned in para 3a(3) and (4) of Intelligence Annex to Operations Instructions No. 4.

- (2) Conduct reconnaissance and render reports as required by Theater Strategic Reconnaissance Plan, 10 August 1950.
- (3) Prior to the time command ashore is passed to the landing force, report the strength, dispositions, and activities of enemy troop concentrations and the strength, composition, direction and rate of movement of enemy forces within the area assigned to NAVFE for the coordination of air operations in Korea.

#### b. Far East Air Forces will:


- (1) Continue to accomplish the intelligence missions assigned in para 3b(1), (2), (4), and (5) of Intelligence Annex to Operations Instructions No. 1.
- (2) Conduct reconnaissance and render reports as required by Theater Strategic Reconnaissance Plan, 10 August 1950.

#### c. Eighth U.S. Army in Korea (EUSAK) will:

- (1) Continue to accomplish the intelligence missions assigned in para 3a(1) and (5) of Intelligence Annex to Operations Instructions No. 2, and missions assigned in para 3b(1), (3), (4), and (5) of Intelligence Annex to Operations Instructions No. 4.
- (2) Report strength, composition, direction and rate of movement of enemy forces along the following axes: ANDONGHAMCHANG-KUMCHON-KOCHANG-CHINJU; ANUI-CHONJU; SUNCHON-NAMWONCHONJU; KUMCHON-TAEJON-NONSAN; and YONGJU-CHUNGJU-CHONGJUKONGJU.

#### d. GHQ Reserve (after assumption of command ashore) will:

(1) Report identification, strength, composition, and activity of enemy forces encountered in your zone of operations.




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
- (2) Report strength, composition, direction and rate of movement of enemy forces along the following axes: KWANGJU-CHONGUP-CHONJU-NONSAN-KONGJU-CHONAN; CHONJU-KUNSAN-HONGSONG-CHONAN; CHUNGJU-CHONGJU-KONGJU.
- (3) Report location and activitiy of Soviet or Chinese Communist air, ground, or naval personnel or units engaged against forces under your control.
- (4) Report acts of sabotage or subversive activities in psychological support of the North Koreans or Chinese Communists.
- (5) Report indications of morale of enemy forces.

### e. mirborne RCT will:

- (1) Report identification, strength, composition, and activity of enemy forces encountered in your zone of operations.
- (2) Report location and activity of Soviet or Chinese Communist air, ground, or naval personnel or units engaged against forces under your control.
- (3) Report acts of sabotage or subversive activities in psychological support of the North Koreans or Chinese Communists.
- (4) Report indications of morale of enemy forces.
- f. For intelligence missions to other major commands see Intelligence Annex to Operations Instructions No. 1.
- 4. INTELLIGENCE MISSIONS TO SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE ..GENCIES
  - a. See Intelligence Annexes to Operations Instructions No. 2 and 3.
- b. Conduct missions and render reports required by Theater Strategic Reconnaissance Plan, 10 August 1950.
- 5. MEASURES FORH NDLING PRISONERS, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND ENEMY
  MATERIAL
  - a. Prisoners, Refugees, and Captured and/or Confiscated Documents:
    - (1) See Cir. No. 62, GHQ, FEC, 2 Jun 1950 and para 5a, Intelli-



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gence Annex to Operations Instructions No. 2.


- (2) Interrogation (beyond the division and corps phase ) of enemy ground, naval, and air prisoners captured by elements of GHQ Reserve will be accomplished by LDVATIS at EUSAK after the juncture of forces.
- (3) Interrogation reports will place special emphasis on the inclusion of Korean characters (HANMUN or UNMUN) relating to names, rank, military units, bases, or other installations, place names, and information linking North Korean units or personalities with Chinese Communists or the USSR. A copy of all interrogation reports will be forwarded to Translator-Interpreter Service, GHQ, FEC, in Tokyo for reproduction and distribution.
- (4) Documents captured or confiscated by the GHQ Reserve in conjunction with Naval Forces Far E.st will be evacuated, prior to the juncture of GHQ Reserve and EUSAK, as a matter of urgency direct to Translator-Interpreter Service, GHQ, FEC in Tokyo.

#### b. Enemy Material:

- (1) See para 5b, Intelligence annex to Operations Instructions
  No. 4.
- (2) Specific information desired includes the vulnerability of North Korean armored vehicles to all types of weapons, and frequency and type of modulation (AM or FM) of radios with which North Korean forces are equipped.
- (3) .Staff officers of the technical services will act as the collecting agencies for technical intelligence in the absence of specific technical intelligence detachments.

#### 6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

a. Reference Ltr GHQ, FEC, AG 300.01 (10 Jul 50) GB, subject:
"Security of Military Information," dated 10 July 1950.



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b. Military censorship may be imposed at the discretion of major subordinate commanders for periods of time and to the degree required by military operations.


- c. The lack of complete and continuous civil and military consorship throughout the Far East Command requires concerted efforts in the education of all personnel with respect to their moral obligations to safeguard military information. The following policy guidance is established with reference to the discussion of military information with personnel whose duties do not require additional information:
  - (1) No information concerning planned activities.
  - (2) No information concerning the effectiveness of specific types of enemy or UN equipment or weapons.
  - (3) No identification concerning the location or activities of friendly or enemy units except where continuous contact actually exists.

#### 7. MAPS AND AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS

- a. See para 7, Intelligence annux to Operations Instructions No. 4.
- b. The date for the conversion from the existing World Polyconic grid on tactical and strategic maps to the Universal Transverse Morcator system has been tentatively set as 15 September 1950.

#### 8. REPORTS

- a. See para 8, Intelligence Annexes to Operations Instructions
  Nos. 1 and 4.
- b. A terrain study of the objective area and a defense overprint will be disseminated to action addressees in quantities sufficient for planning purposes not less than 20 days prior to the contemplated operation.



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ANNEX "C" - Concept of Operations

Operation Plan CINCFE No. 100A General Headquarters Far East Command Tokyo, Japan 30 August 1950

## 1. Accomplishment of Tasks


a. Mission: In accordance with a resolution of the Security
Council of the United Nations, approved 25 June 1950, the JCS has
directed CINCFE to provide the fullest possible military support to
ROK to clear South KOREA of NK forces. While the military defeat of
NK forces in the ROK and their ejection would accomplish the immediate
objectives of the UN, the existence of an effective military force
north of the 38th parallel would contribute to the difficulties of
achieving a lasting solution of the KOREAN problem which would be satisfactory from the standpoint of the United Nations. It is concluded,
therefore, that operations should be so conducted as to achieve the utmost destruction of enemy forces in south KOREA.

In consonance with this objective a wide envelopment into enemyheld territory is to be made in conjunction with a major offensive to be
mounted from the PUSAN area. The objective of the envelopment which is
initiated by an amphibious operation is the communications center of
TAEJON in rear of the main strength of the enemy forces. The purpose is
to cut the enemy's principle line of communications to his troops in
front of the Eighth army to prevent their resupply and reinforcement
and to block their movement away from the Eighth army.

#### b. Limiting Factors

The weather, the forces available, and logistic considerations are limiting factors. As regards weather, the operation should be completed during the months of Sept-Oct-Nov which are favorable from the standpoint of temperature and rainfall. After this period cold weather and relatively less favorable flying weather may be expected.

The total of available forces is limited. The allocation of sufficient forces to Eighth Army to mount an effective offensive along



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the T.EGU-KUMCHON-T.EJON axis reduces the number available for the waterborne envelopment to the point where the capabilities of the force for subsequent employment are limited. The beachhead which can be held against strong resistance is not extensive and the distance troops can operate outside of the beachhead in the face of effective opposition is limited.

The limited port facilities and the poor character of the beaches in the objective area constitute logistical limitations which can be overcome in part by careful planning for and the efficient execution of logistic support operations.

# c. Mounting Points for Major Units

1st Mar Div

2nd Eng Spl Brig

7th Inf Div

187th AB RCT

Corps Troops (Hq, Engrs, arty, incl in Bn)

3rd Inf Div

Kobe-Osaka and Pusan

Yokohama

Yokohama

Ashiya AFB


Yokohama

Sasebo

#### 2. Phases of Accomplishment

#### a. Preliminary Operations:

- (1) By air and naval operations the continuing isolation of enemy forces in South KOREA is maintained to the maximum practicable extent.
- (2) Air and beach reconnaissance in the objective area is limited to that which is absolutely necessary.
- of beach defenses in the proposed landing area tactical surprise rather than neutralization of enemy positions will be sought. The pre-D-Day bombardment will be omitted and pre-H-Hour bombardment will be conducted only if active reconnaissance confirms the existence of enemy forces



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or enemy positions capable of interfering with the approach of the Attack Force or the assault landing.

#### b. Supporting Operations:


- (1) On or before D-Day Eighth Army launches a sustained offensive, driving along the KUMCHON-TAEJON axis to destroy enemy forces and effect a junction with X Corps.
- (2) Beginning D-Day the objective area is isolated by air interdiction.

#### c. The issault

- (1) If the presence of enemy forces capable of interfering with the approach of the Attack Force or the assault landing has been confirmed, these are neutralized by pre-H-Hour bombardment.
- (2) 1st Mar Div (Reinf) lands in assault and establishes the initial beachhead conducting further operations in accordance with the plan of CG X Corps. The 2nd Engr Brig lands following the combat and service elements of the Div and establishes a Joint Shore Party to furnish shore party support for X Corps.
- (3) 7th Inf Div and remaining elements X Corps land in follow-up through the established beachhead.

#### d. Tactical Exploitation

- (1) Following the establishment of the beachhoad, X Corps penetrates inland about 50 miles to TAEJON probably against increasing opposition. It may finally become heavily engaged. It must be prepared to protect its own flanks and sustain its own axis of supply from the beaches and/or from the port of KUNSAN.
- (2) Upon the seizure of T.EJON, X Corps will be pre-



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
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the direction of KUMCHON in order to facilitate the junction with Eighth army, to participate in clearing operations to the south of the TAEJON-TAEGU axis, to attack to the north on the TAEJON-SEOUL axis or to rembark for a second major waterborne envelopment.

- (3) In the event the 187th AB RCT is not employed in conjunction with the assault operations it will be available for employment in conjunction with the exploitation.
- (4) The 3rd Inf Div in theater reserve may be committed to reinforce Eighth ...rmy or the X Corps. In the latter event, the capabilities for exploitation of the penetration will be greatly enhanced.

# 3. Development of the Objective

- a. Initial Development: Cargo handling and transportation facilities are landed in the beach area; hards are developed.
- b. <u>Subsequent Development</u>: An operating base is established in the beachhoad and airfields at KUNSAN and TAEJON are placed in operational status.
- 4. Coordination and Command Relationships
  See Annex "I" and "D" to Op Plan



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ANNEX "D" - Coordination of Air .

Operations and Naval Air Operations

Operation Plan

CINCEE No. 100 A


General Headquarters Far East Command Tokyo, Japan 30 August 1950

- 1. Appendix I defines the initial limits of the objective area for the KUNSAN landing. Within this area, COMNAVFE, through appropriate commanders and agencies, controls all air operations including air defense and troop support during the period from 0000 D-Day until relieved therefrom by orders of CINCFE.
- 2. FEAF controls the operation of all aircraft outside of the objective area with the exception of aircraft operating in:
  - a. Execution of missions assigned by CINCFE to COMNAVFE and
- b. Naval missions including Naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare and the support of Naval tasks such as amphibious operations.
- 3. Requirements for Pre-D-Day air operations generated in connection with the KUNSAN landing will be submitted by COMNAVFE to CG FEAF.
- 4. Requirements for air operations in the objective area which exceed the capabilities of COMNAVFE during the period 0000 D-Day until disestablishment of the objective area will be submitted by the latter to CG FEAF.
- 5. In emergency, the officer in tactical command in the objective area may submit requests for air support direct to CG 5th AF (Adv).
- 6. In the event of inability of FEAF to provide support in the amount requested by COMNAVFE without undue interference with other missions as assigned by this headquarters, CG FEAF will so report to CINCFE.
- 7. CG FEAF will coordinate with COMNAVFE approach and retirement routes for troop carrier aircraft and escort employed in airborne operations.

APPENDIX I: Objective Area.



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ANNEX "H" - Command Relations

Cperation Plan
CILCEE No. 100 A

General Headquarters Far East Command Tokyo, Japan 30 August 1950

- 1. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is the Commander-in-Chief of all UN Forces assisting the ROK.
- 2. CG 8th Army commands all ground forces in KOREA with the exception of those to be employed in amphibious/airborne operations in the KUNSAN area.
- 3. COMNAVFE, through appropriate task force commanders, commands all forces engaged in the amphibious assault at KUNSAN until command of operations ashore is passed to CG X Corps.
- 4. CG FEAF, through appropriate commanders, controls the 187th AB RCT during air movement to the objective. Following its drop or air landing, the 187th AB RCT reverts to control of CinC or passes to control of Landing Force Commander, or X Corps, depending upon the circumstances and as announced at that time.
- 5. Control of Landing Force troops will pass from Commander, Attack
  Force to Commander, Landing Force at such time as the Landing
  Force has been landed ashore, the beachhead secured, and Commander,
  Landing Force informs the Commander, Attack Force that he is ready
  to assume responsibility for further operations ashore.
- 6. Control of X Corps troops will pass from Commander, Attack Force to CG X Corps at such time as the latter has landed ashore and informed the Commander, Attack Force he is ready to assume responsibility for further operations ashore.
- 7. After assumption of command ashore, the CG X Corps Troops will operate directly under the CinC until the junction with 8th Army is effected.

APPENDIX 1: Diagram of Command Relations

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By NARA Date 1999

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GENERAL HELDQUARTERS FAR EAST COMMAND

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1. Attention is invited to memorandum for Distribution List, a con of which is attached for your information and retention. By this action copies of Operation Plan 100 A are distributed as follows:

	٦		2
CINCFE, copies			3
NAVFE, "	4	-	18
FELF, II.	19	-	20
8th army, "	21	-	23
X Corps, "	24	-	33
Japan Logistical	+		
Command, "	34	-	35
G-1, "	36	-	37
G-2,	38	-	39
G-3,	40	-	42
G-4,	43	-	54
JSPOG,			75

2. All recipients will take special measures to safeguard the security aspects of this plan.

3. JSPOG will monitor the continuing development of this plan, supporting plans and plans for other objective areas as indicated in the memorandum cited at paragraph 1, above.

4. G-4 is requested to make distribution to technical services section representatives. Extra copies are included for this purpose.

1 Incl. Memo for Dist List w/incl.

Distribution:

2 copies

" (includes cys for GHQ Tech Serv Sec)

Authority 841506

By NARA Date 12/29/11

Secret JCM/mok-1908-75-39

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
APO 500

30 August 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution List

SUBJECT:

Operational Planning

- 1. Attached is a draft operation plan which is forwarded to addressees at this time for planning purposes only.
- 2. Security Measures: Addressees will take special precautions to safeguard the security aspects of this plan. Recipients will maintain a roster of individuals by name who are authorized to have knowledge of the target date and objective area specified in the plan.
- 3. Direct contact between commands concerned is authorized for purposes of preparing supporting plans. It is requested that the preparation of supporting plans be expedited and that report of progress be made to Chief, Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group, GHQ.
- 4. Additional plans for other objective areas with varying target dates are in preparation. These plans may be used for cover, diversion or major operations. By separate action you will be notified of the relative planning emphasis which will be placed on each of the plans.

1 Incl Draft Op Flan 100 A

Distribution:


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Sth Army, " 21 - 23
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G-1, " 36 - 37 G-2, " 38 - 39 G-3, " 40 - 42 G-4, " 43 - 54 JSFOG, " 55 - 75 Major General, General Staff Corps
Chief of Staff

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SAMES A. BUNDY CAPT. EA



SECRET

DO NOT DETACH G-2, GHQ, FEC

SUBJECT: Operations Plan 100A

FROM: JSPOG

ro: G-2

31 Aug 1950

AC of S, G-2 Deputy, G-2 Ex O, FEC Ex O, SCAP Ex O, Admin Spec Asst Adm Spec Asst Th/Intell Spec Asst CI/Div Spec Asst Fiscal Spec Asst Fiscal Spec Asst Fiscal Spec Asst JSOB Spec Asst MIS Div Spec Asst Historical Spec Asst PSB Japanese Liaison Admin Officer	( ) Theater Intelligence ( ) Operations ( ) PDM ( ) P & E ( ) Foreign Mil Liaison ( ) Targets Branch ( ) Spec Projects Br ( ) Geographical Br ( ) Operations ( ) JSOB ( ) Coll & Pub ( ) 441st CIC ( ) MIS DIV ( ) ATIS ( ) TID ( ) Historical Div ( ) Public Safety Div ( )	
Personnel	) Signature () Draft Reply ( ) Initials () Info for reply(	一 ( - ) - (
File ( Comment (	) Note & file( ) Brief (_	_)

(Date all comments)


Two Copies Received:

1 Attached

1 Held for distrib.

Note: Roster required of all those seeing this plan

COMMENT:





Authority 8/35/62

By ECNARA Date 1/0/12