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SITUATION - HOPEI REGION

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*China Theatre*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
Research and Analysis Branch  
Detachment 203

~~SECRET/CONTROL~~

SITUATION -- HOPEI REGION -- MID-1945

*3918*

A study of the military  
situation and political  
affairs in Hopei.

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Summary

1. At present the concentration of Japanese Army forces in the Hopei region is not large. But it could be greatly augmented by drawing on units elsewhere in north China, and to some extent reinforcements could be secured from the Kwantung Army in Manchuria. These possibilities would depend on a number of factors, including Allied strategy, the rule of Russia, availability of transport facilities, and local garrison needs. The enemy also has in the Hopei region a group of Manchurian puppet units and some Chinese puppet "group armies"; both of these, and particularly the Chinese puppets, being inferior to the Japanese forces. The current military policy of the Japanese in Hopei appears to be a withdrawal from all districts except those of the cities and the main lines of communication. This result seems to have been induced to a large extent by Communist pressure on the enemy.

2. The Communists in the Hopei region maintain a Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base, divided into districts and sub-districts. Parts of the base have been long established and generally secure from the Japanese. Local and region governments have been in existence there for seven years. At times since the war began, and particularly in 1942, the Eighth Route Army in Hopei was hard pressed by the enemy, and the areas it controlled were contracted. At the present time, however, the Communists have been expanding their areas of control and developing new ones as the Japanese zone has shrunk. The Communist military forces in Hopei have meanwhile been growing. The Hopei region is remarkable for its Communist operations since it is one of the few places where the Eighth Route Army is present in strength on flat terrain. Relative security is possible through systems of underground tunnels and by maintaining high mobility. The Communists by their political and social institutions — as well as by the military protection they have afforded local populations — have won a large measure of popular support.

3. There are almost no non-Communist resistance elements in Hopei. The very few military groups known are small and much weaker than comparable Eighth Route forces in the region. At present their relations with the Communists are not very good, and the central-government guerrillas are in danger of being eliminated. The Chungking government maintains some agents in the Hopei region, for intelligence and for liaison with the puppets.

4. Economic conditions have gradually worsened in north China under Japanese rule. Enemy propaganda has been a failure, and the great majority of people are anti-Japanese in sentiment. All except perhaps a few of the highest-placed collaborationists can be expected to effect a change of sides to the Allies — probably at the earliest time when they would feel themselves safe from Japanese reprisals. Thus when the war has become farther advanced it can be expected that in general the puppet military units and the puppet officials will go over to the Allies. The local puppet forces are already unstable, with some peace preservation corps units going over with their equipment to the Communists. Among the regular puppet forces and at higher levels there is doubtless a fear of the Communists which would not only prevent similar action now but might encourage longer collaboration with the Japanese.

5. Both the Communists and the central government aspire to rule in north China. Chungking hopes for the allegiance of the present puppets, and hopes to move in where the Japanese move out, occupying the cities and communications lines, and then gradually to establish control over the whole region. It would seem that this ambition will be resisted by the Communists, even if the central government has United States support. Similarly, the central government would resist the attempts of the Communists to take over. Thus Hopei appears to be one of the critical regions in China's future, with civil war threatening in the absence of a prior general settlement of the Kuomintang-Communist issue in China. There would be very serious problems confronting an Allied force invading north China because of the incipient domestic conflict.

SITUATION — HOPEI REGION — MID-1945

The area of the Hopei plain in north China invites attention, in military and political terms, on several counts. The area has importance as a terrain over which a major campaign in the war against Japan might be fought. It is the gateway from China into Manchuria, and a transportation centre in which a number of main railway lines and highways converge. The area also contains a concentration of industry — relative to China at large — and possesses some ports of moderate significance.<sup>1/</sup> Additionally, the area is one of political importance. Long holding the capital of China, it never came under the effective control of the Chinese Republic's central government. For a China which will be deeply concerned with international relations on her northwestern and northeastern borders, the Hopei plain is specially important; it is possible that the national capital will return to Peiping rather than Nanking. For China internally, the Hopei plain is an area of political dispute, since — like the rest of north China — the anti-Japanese resistance there is almost exclusively Chinese Communist.

The following report is intended to consider the military situation in the Hopei region, as that is currently determined by enemy dispositions and strategy and by the presence of the Eighth Route Army in the region.<sup>2/</sup> The report is also designed to give some account of political affairs in Hopei.<sup>3/</sup> The region covered is roughly bounded by a line running east from Kalgan to the sea, a line running south from Kalgan to Shihchiachuang, a line running east from Shihchiachuang to the sea, and the sea coast along the Gulf of Chihli.

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<sup>1/</sup> For studies of the strategic value of transportation in north China, see Occupied China Railroads North of the Yangtze River (R and A/KM No. 82, 5 May 1945); The Outflow of Goods from North China (R and A 2504, 10 February 1945).

<sup>2/</sup> The report which follows was compiled on the basis of materials from many sources, a number of them outside of OSS. Included in the latter group are AGAS, G-2 Headquarters China Theatre (including reports of the American Military Observer Section at Yen-an), monitored radio broadcasts, Chinese press translations, interviews with Chinese recently in Hopei.

<sup>3/</sup> The region is shown on the map which accompanies this report.

### The Enemy Military Establishment

The enemy in the Hopei region maintains a moderate military establishment, drawn from several sources. Elements of the Japanese Army, the Army of Manchukuo, and the puppets of both Peiping and Nanking are employed, with varying assignments. In the event of a campaign in Hopei against the Allies, the Japanese could augment their forces very considerably, particularly by drawing on Japanese units now stationed in other parts of north China.

Japanese Dispositions. In the Hopei region, shown on the accompanying map, the Japanese Army has only one division, two independent mixed brigades, and one independent infantry brigade.<sup>4/</sup> These four units probably total not more than 50,000 troops, when allowance is made for supporting artillery and service forces. The 63 Division, with headquarters in Peiping, has its 66 Brigade deployed along the Ping-Han railway between Peiping and Shihchiachuang. Its 67 Brigade is assigned to the rail line between Peiping and Tientsin. The 2 IIB guards the Cheng-Tai line between Shihchiachuang and Tehsien (37:27 N 116:17 E).<sup>5/</sup> The 2 IMB is in the Kalgan vicinity, while the 8 IMB is centered at Tangshan.

However, by re-disposing its forces in north China, the Japanese Army could very considerably augment its strength in Hopei. It would be moved to do this by the threat of a major Allied land offensive, coming via Shantung or from Manchuria. These would seem the most likely routes if Allied invasion of Hopei were ever to take place.

It may fairly be estimated that as the war progresses and particularly if Japan should see the imminence of a China invasion the Japanese Army would withdraw from Honan and southern Shansi.<sup>6/</sup> The withdrawing Japanese units, still largely intact, would then be available for defense of the China coast or defense against invasion of China proper from the northeast or even the northwest. The Japanese forces that would become available in this manner are five divisions (including one armored division), two independent mixed brigades, two independent infantry brigades, and a cavalry brigade.<sup>7/</sup> These units, with allowance

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- <sup>4/</sup> The map accompanying this report shows enemy order of battle, indicating all major units identified in the region.
  - <sup>5/</sup> The 9 IMB, with headquarters at Tehsien in Shantung, garrisons the Tsin-Pu railway to the north toward Tientsin.
  - <sup>6/</sup> Such a retreat would abandon the Ping-Han line of communication, and leave the military forces in south and central China either to function as sacrifice forces or possibly be evacuated east and north to the coast near Shanghai.
  - <sup>7/</sup> A table showing the locations and unit strengths of Japanese forces in north China is contained in Appendix A of this report.  
On 6 June MID estimated Japanese Army forces in north China to total 305,000 (omitting from its count the 65 and 113 Divisions, the 92 IMB, and the 11 IIB).



for supporting forces, can be estimated at 150,000 troops.

Another source of military units with which the Japanese might augment their strength in Hopei is the Shantung region. At the present time the Japanese Army is believed to have there three divisions, two independent mixed brigades, and one independent infantry brigade — forces totalling 85,000 over-all. It is of course possible, if not likely, that the time when need should arise to reinforce Hopei either the same need would be felt with respect to Shantung or the Shantung forces of the Japanese would already have been seriously weakened in campaigning.

A third source of Japanese units in China for Hopei are the border garrison units in north Shansi. These comprise a division, an independent mixed brigade, and an independent infantry brigade. Adding to these three units the 66 IME (unlocated in north China), one obtains an over-all figure of 50,000 troops for the Japanese forces in north China not already accounted for. The extent to which the Japanese units in north Shansi would be available for a Hopei campaign would be influenced (1) by what the Japanese considered the minimum area which they wished to try to hold in north China, with consequent garrison needs possibly in north Shansi, and (2) by the fear of a possible Russian offensive coming through Outer Mongolia.

A final source of Japanese units which might be employed in the Hopei region is the Kwantung Army in Manchuria. This is estimated to number about 600,000. Several factors would operate, however, to reduce its availability. The need for a defending force against Soviet invasion of Manchuria and Korea is assumed to increase as time goes on. At the stage of a Hopei campaign the Kwantung Army might already be heavily engaged or seriously depleted by battle losses. Also it is uncertain to what extent the Kwantung Army has already been diminished by transfers of units, or even cadres, into China; that Army may by now have been substantially weakened through replacements with Manchurians.

In estimating what force the Japanese could concentrate for a campaign in Hopei, other factors need to be considered beside the then military requirements for defense on the continent as those develop with the progress of the war. The continuing availability of transportation to effect large shifts of forces would be one condition for achieving a maximum concentration in Hopei. Another would be the accessibility of military and other supplies for the Japanese Army in the region. One may perhaps make a tentative estimate of that maximum concentration as follows: Japan might be able to put an army of 300,000 into the field in the

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as not being in north China). The Japanese units listed in Appendix A total 213,500. To this number needs to be added a figure, perhaps as large as 50 percent additional, to account for supporting troops. MID placed the Japanese air forces on the ground in north China at 13,000, and the navy ground forces there at 2,000.

Hopei region. This figure assumes the presence of the forces currently there, of the Japanese forces in Honan, Shansi, and Shantung, some reinforcement from the Kwantung Army. This figure excludes the possibility of Japan's bringing to north China units which are now in southeast Asia, south and central China, Formosa, and Japan proper.

To date, the Japanese Army has not moved to build up any such concentration in the Hopei region. With the Allies holding the offensive initiative, the unfolding of Japanese strategy with respect to Hopei, as elsewhere, waits upon Allied operations. For the present, Japanese military needs in the Hopei region are garrison needs, concerned with local resistance forces.

The Manchurian Army. The Manchukuo puppet army is a force which needs to be accounted in a consideration of the Hopei region, particularly since the Japanese have this year moved some of the Manchurian Army into that region. In the southwest defense sector of Manchuria (roughly coterminous with the province of Jehol — according to one report constituting the Fifth Military District of Manchuria's Army) the number of Manchukuo puppet troops appears to be between 50,000 and 75,000.

Elements, at least, of the 8 Brigade, 3, 5, 18, and 25 Mixed Brigades have — probably within the last eight months — been shifted south in Manchuria and into northeastern Hopei.<sup>8/</sup> It seems even probable that the entire units mentioned above have been shifted southward. One source who reported on the movements of the Manchurian Army, for stationing in Hopei and other parts of north China, stated that in Peiping it was believed that these movements were being effected by the Japanese as a precaution against revolt of the puppet troops if they should remain in Manchuria and the war continued to go against Japan. In a potential Hopei campaign perhaps a large part of the Manchurian Army in Jehol and southwestern Liaoning would be available to the Japanese.

The Manchukuo puppet army is largely organized in brigades although one division is reported at Chengte. The units are much smaller than the comparable Japanese units — a brigade having a strength of only 3,000. It is estimated that these units have actual strengths which are approximately the paper strengths. According to one report, the Manchukuo troops are equipped with the same arms as Japanese troops. But, unit for unit, the Manchurian Army must be regarded as considerably weaker than the Japanese.

Current Manchukuo puppet strength in the Hopei region is probably in the neighborhood of 20,000; and by drawing further on southwestern Manchuria might be raised to 50,000.

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<sup>8/</sup> Appendix B of this report contains a list of Manchukuo puppet units stationed in Hopei and in southwestern Manchuria, with approximate locations and strength figures.

Chinese Puppet Troops. There are several kinds of Chinese puppet formations in the Hopei region. The principal variety are units of the North China Pacification Army, under the North China Political Affairs Commission and the direction of the Japanese military authority in north China. The North China Pacification Army is constituted in group armies, which in turn comprise three or four regiments each. Regimental strength is generally estimated at 1,500. The 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 10 Group Armies are believed located in the Hopei region, with a total strength of about 98,000.<sup>9/</sup> These are quite certainly the best Chinese puppet troops in the region, although their equipment must be considered scanty.<sup>10/</sup> It has been the experience of the Communist Eighth Route Army in Hopei that in engagements with units of the North China Pacification Army the casualties in puppet dead are much higher than in actions against local puppet garrisons -- showing more effective organization and better morale.

The Nanking government's national puppet army is represented in Hopei by two engineer regiments, the second and third, which are said to be directly under the jurisdiction of the puppet high command at Nanking. It seems doubtful whether these units, each about 1,500 strong, should be counted as combat effectives.

A unit under the Mongolian Garrison headquarters at Kalgan has been reported stationed at Hsuanhua. This is the Mongolian puppet 2 Group Regiment, with a strength of 2,000.<sup>11/</sup>

In addition to the above categories of Chinese puppet forces in Hopei there are provincial and other local puppets scattered in small garrisons throughout the region.<sup>12/</sup> These troops, often under the title of Peace Preservation Corps, are the most poorly equipped of all enemy forces in Hopei and the least effective. They are given the lowest-grade military assignments, and prove generally unstable. Frequently, not only individual local puppet troops but whole units have gone over to the Eighth Route Army, whose preferential treatment of puppets

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<sup>9/</sup> Chinese puppet dispositions in Hopei are shown on the accompanying map. Puppet battle order in the region is listed in Appendix C.

<sup>10/</sup> A Chinese National Military Council report stated that as of June 1944 the North China Pacification Army had a total of only 12,000 rifles; only about two-thirds of the whole Army is stationed in the Hopei region.

<sup>11/</sup> A Chinese Army report, however, placed the number of troops in this unit at 600, with 500 rifles. The report also differed in locating the regiment at Wuchuan (41:07 N 111:25 E) in Suiyuan.

<sup>12/</sup> A few of these are listed in Appendix C, but none are shown on the map as too few data are available concerning them.

and the course of the war have proved strong inducements. According to one observer, the theoretical distribution of Peace Preservation Corps troops gives one regiment (consisting of three battalions of three companies each) to every hsien. In practice such a regular distribution is probably very rare, even in the strictly occupied areas; and then the units are undoubtedly greatly under strength and very poorly equipped.

Japanese Military Policy. The strategic problem for Japan in the Hopei region has been to secure the maximum economic benefits of occupation and to use the region as the centre for developing a firm political and economic collaboration in north China as part of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. In military terms this has meant the establishment of security and control against Chinese local resistance only, since the initial phase of occupation in 1937. It is possible that in the future a north China campaign against the Allies will eventuate, although it is entirely conceivable that the war against Japan will be won in the absence of such an event. So for the present, the Japanese remain concerned primarily with local opposition — in the form of puppet intrigue, and the increasing power of the Communists.

Earlier in her struggle to dominate east Asia, Japan had aspirations to a deep and not merely superficial control in China. In the Hopei region, as elsewhere in north China, this design was manifested in the first years after 1937 by efforts to extend Japanese and actively collaborationist influence beyond the narrow zones formed by cities and their connecting communications. The Japanese program to subjugate the hinterland was at its height in the anti-Communist warfare of 1940 to 1943. At that period the Japanese organised their own forces and the puppets for thorough "cleansing" operations, and in considerable degree they were successful in reducing and dispersing Communist guerrilla strength. But even the military measures, accompanied by an organised propaganda campaign, failed to achieve definitively the Japanese purpose. Further, the years of garrisoning and "pacification" had been costly in a military sense, with the Japanese forces in north China suffering a gradual attrition.<sup>13/</sup> In 1943 also the tide of the Pacific war had turned, and the Japanese high command probably began to question that Japan could afford to continue the north China policy unchanged, particularly when more immediate military demands arose in the Pacific and in central and south China.

Since 1943 the Japanese occupation in north China has receded, and come to have more limited objectives. At the present time they are the most limited of any period since 1937. The motivation seems partly that of local military economisation and partly that of consolidating currently available forces in the most important zones, against possible invasion and to safeguard minimum strategic interests in the area (i. e., assuring transportation facilities, continuing economic exploitation, etc.).

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<sup>13/</sup> See The Demoralization of the Japanese Army in North China, 28 March 1945 (JICA Serial No. R-919-CH-45 BID No. 1228.0100).

Accordingly, the current enemy policy is to utilise Japanese troops and the better-organised puppet forces for garrisoning the zones of importance. It has been seen earlier how the principal Japanese units in the Hopei region are employed in the cities and along the railroads. Similarly with the group armies of the North China Pacification Army: the 9 Group Army guards the Tientsin-Tangku section of the Pei-Ning rail line, the 7 Group Army garrisons the vicinity of Peiping on its south, and the 6 Group Army is stationed along the Ping-Han railway between Paoting and Chengting. In this system the Japanese keep larger concentrations of their principal forces in such places as Peiping, Tientsin, Tangku, Fengtai, with smaller forces (sometimes as high as 1,500 to 2,000) in lesser points such as Paoting and Shihchiachuang. The latter forces are also intended as reserves which could be used for looting raids or for rural mopping-up operations in case of necessity. The country-side is now left to the local puppets, and any effective action against the Eighth Route Army requires the stiffening afforded by Japanese regulars.

The block house is a very important element in the Japanese defense. Not infrequently several block houses are erected to make a prepared position known as a strong point. In the most vital areas, as around Tientsin and Tangku, strong points have been consolidated to form a fortified zone. Two other areas have also been strongly defended with systems of strong points and individual block houses: (1) the area north of Paiyangtien Lake and the Taching River, doubtless because of its adjacency to Peiping and Fengtai, (2) the area west of Chinghsien and Tsanghsien, probably for the purpose of giving added defense to the Tsin-Pu railway in this area and preventing any linking up between the Central Hopei Military District of the Chin-Cha-Chi Communist base and the Po-Hai District of the Eighth Route Army's Shantung base. In the latter connection it is interesting to note that the enemy built a blockade ditch from Liukochuang to Liuchia-chang in this area, with the same object.

Apart from these fortified zones the strong points have generally been located at county seats, strategic villages, or transport junctions. They have been occupied by Japanese troops, and more recently to a great extent by Pacification Army and Peace Preservation Corps units. The railways of the Hopei region have the protection of single block houses located about every two li along the line; these are generally garrisoned by a dozen or so puppets. Earlier in the war the Japanese constructed trench-and-embankment defenses for the railroads. These are still visible in many places on aerial photographs of the region's lines. But recent observers state that since construction the defenses have weathered a good deal and suffered from depredations of the local people, particularly those in league with the Communists. It is reported that except for the stretch of line between Peiping and Tingsien the physical railroad defenses are not now as good as those of the railroads in Shantung, for example.

By the early spring of 1945 the Japanese had begun to withdraw from substantial areas in central Hopei which they had held for two or more years. These areas lay in the spaces between communications lines. With them the Japanese lost numerous strong points and isolated chains of block houses. The process

was essentially one of attrition. By 1943 the Japanese had largely completed their system of block houses and strong points, with a supporting road network, across the plain in central Hopei. The Eighth Route Army would isolate one point after another on the plain, by cutting the roads that fed it, and then raid the point itself. The Japanese had depended on the system to be sustained with a minimum military investment, and the Communists' tactics required greater expenditure than the Japanese had perhaps expected or at least were now willing to make. To maintain the system of strong points throughout the plain would require frequent and heavily-armed convoys for the waging of continued periodic campaigns to keep the enemy positions supplied and reinforced, or would require the still more ambitious undertaking of making a fortified zone out of the plain — as with the areas around Peiping and Tientsin.

The Japanese chose the cheapest alternative and have been gradually yielding their positions in the area bounded by the Pei-Ning, Tsin-Pu, Cheng-Tai, and Ping-Han railroads. The Eighth Route Army has as a result gained many hsien towns, and may be expected to make further advances. The end consequence of the process, already approached rather nearly in central Hopei, is to leave the enemy with only the rail lines and cities. With respect to highways, the Japanese are left with only those that parallel the rail lines. Other routes, built by 1943 — such as Peiping-Taming, Tientsin-Paoing, and Tsanghsien-Shihchia-chuang — go through stable Communist areas and could be opened by the enemy only at considerable cost. Even before the present period the Eighth Route Army frequently interfered with the Japanese highway network in destroying sections of road.

Japanese Intelligence. Japanese intelligence services appear to be active in the cities of the Hopei region. Plain-clothes operatives of three agencies have been reported. The agents most frequently wear Chinese gowns to avoid the suspicion attaching to western dress. The sung or pine-tree agency is said to have intelligence functions concerning puppet organisations and individuals; the chu or bamboo group to be concerned with Chungking activities in the region; and the mei or plum agency to be directed against the Communists. These agencies are reported to appear to engage in mutual rivalry and intrigue, a procedure probably directed by the Japanese command for improving the intelligence effectiveness of the agencies against the Chinese population; favor and usefulness could frequently be secured by one agency from a Chinese taken into custody by another agency and "released" at the instance of the first. It seems probable that the Japanese are kept generally well informed by their intelligence services, which are evidently efficient organisations. Occasionally agents are seized by the Eighth Route Army in raids on occupied towns or are apprehended in venturing beyond the limits of the firmly-held occupied area.

According to a report received in May 1945, the Japanese are increasing their employment of Chinese intelligence operatives in Hopei. This source estimated that for every 100 Japanese troops the Japanese military command was employing 15 Chinese plain-clothesmen. He stated that in the case of the Japanese gendarmerie it was usual for each gendarme to be supervising three to ten Chinese operatives.

The Japanese intelligence is also reported to be active in trying to suppress the use of short-wave radio sets by Chinese for anti-Japanese intelligence purposes or for receiving non-Japanese-controlled broadcasts. However, it is not believed that the Japanese program of suppression is by any means effective, and it is said that many short-wave radio sets are illegally in use in Peiping and Tientsin. It also seems to be true that long-wave sets can pick up free China stations, such as Chungking and Sian, after midnight.

The Japanese endeavor to maintain a strict system of control on travel between Manchuria and China, although within China the control measures are much less rigorous. Personal and baggage examinations are reported to be made thoroughly at Tientsin, and with the greatest care at Shanhaikuan — by puppet military and civil intelligence, by the Japanese gendarmerie, and by Japanese consular police.

#### The Communist Eighth Route Army

In the Hopei region the Chinese Communists constitute the main obstacle with which the Japanese have to contend. Communist claims and the admissions of the Japanese, puppets, and central-government officials agree in disclosing the Communists in Hopei to be the only extensive and organized resistance to the enemy there. As elsewhere in north China behind the Japanese lines, the Communists have not only an effective system of military forces but a number of local administrations and a central direction of activities.

History of the Communists in Hopei. The Hopei region is part of the oldest Communist anti-Japanese base. In 1937 the Communist 115 Division of the Chinese Army was ordered from Shansi into Hopei for the defense of Nankou pass against the invading Japanese. The pass was captured and other Chinese positions fell before the Division could get to the area. At the end of September the Communists attacked on the enemy flank to embarrass the rapid Japanese offensive into Shansi, and later were themselves outflanked. Rather than attempt to withdraw, the 115 Division stayed in the enemy rear and began the long history of behind-the-lines operations.

These events had all taken place west of the Ping-Han railway. East of the railway, in central Hopei, there remained behind a central-government regiment of Lu Cheng-tsao (part of the army of General Wang Fu-lin). Lu allied himself with the Eighth Route Army, and his force became the Communist nucleus in central Hopei. In May 1938 a large force of the 120 Division entered central Ho-

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14/ Lu Cheng-tsao was later made commander of the Shansi-Suiyuan Military Region of the Communists.

pei, and before its withdrawal to northwestern Shansi substantially augmented guerrilla warfare on the plain. In the spring of 1939 the Communists extended their activities from west and central Hopei to begin a penetration of the areas east and west of Peiping.

In the spring of 1938 the Eighth Route Army undertook an offensive along the Ping-Han railway south of Paoting, as a diversion in favor of the Chinese defenders of Tungshan (Suchow). This move drew Japanese reprisals, including the occupation of the Communist capital, Fouping. In the fall of the same year the Japanese began heavy mopping-up operations around Wutaishan, and started their system of fortification against the guerrillas. The Communists countered this later with the "100-regiment offensive" of August 1940, which was concerted to disrupt Japanese communications in north China, and in the Hopei region was directed at objectives on the Ping-Han and Cheng-Tai railroads and north of Tientsin. Gains temporarily made by the Eighth Route Army were subsequently lost.

In the fall of 1941 the Japanese mounted their largest mopping-up campaign, under General Okamura, which bore most heavily on central Hopei. After this the Communist military program of "simplification" of organization in the region was pushed. The spring of 1942 saw a continuation of the Japanese attempt to cleanse central Hopei of the Communists. It was at this period that the Eighth Route Army began its extensive tunnelling under the plain, to combat the Japanese "nibbling" tactics of building a block-house system interconnected by a road network. The fortunes of the Communists in Hopei were probably lowest in 1942. In the spring of 1943 Communist troops were sent from the area west of the Ping-Han railway into the Shan-Kan-Ning Border Region for protection against a possible attack there by central-government forces under Hu Tsung-nan. Then in 1943 and 1944 the Japanese slacked off their aggressive policy against the Communists, and the Eighth Route Army gradually regained a good deal of lost territory. By the summer of 1944 it was estimated that the Communist situation had been restored to the status of 1941. In the last year Communist progress has been greatly accelerated.

Communist Organisation in the Hopei Region. Early after the start of the war against Japan the Communists began to regularise their activities in the Hopei region. Political formation began in November 1937, when the Communists sent a report of their resistance movement to Yen Hsi-shan, central-government commander of the Second War Area. A congress of Communist, Kuomintang, and independent delegates met at Fouping in January 1938 and elected an administrative committee for the Chin-Cha-Chi (Shansi-Chahar-Hopei) region. This was the first and last Communist regime behind the Japanese lines to receive recognition and approval of the central government of China.

Elections of village magistrates were held throughout the region in 1939; the next year hsien magistrates and hsien people's political councils (for two to three years, with semi-annual meetings planned) were elected. A policy of creating new, composite hsien in the region has been followed, for the purpose of making the political areas correspond as nearly as possible with existing conditions of geography and the military situation. A regional PPC was elected



in Chin-Cha-Chi in 1941, consisting of 538 members. This body did not meet until 1943, owing to enemy activity in the region. So far that session has been the only meeting.

The PPC members are supposed to be elected from the hsien, on the basis of population. The chief function of the Council is legislative, but it also has power to recall the Border Region Government Committee members (a committee which in 1943 succeeded the provisional administrative committee), to recall its own standing committee, and to appoint the chief judge of the region's highest court. The PPC standing committee convenes the Council, arranges for elections, and acts in advisory capacity to the Government Committee, which is the real executive of the region. Several government departments are organized under the direction of the Government Committee members.

The highest court of the region appoints the lower, district courts (after the chairman of the Government Committee has appointed additional judges of the highest court on the recommendation of its chief judge. There is no codification of law in the courts; PPC resolutions have the force of law, and where none are available central-government law is resorted to — subject to interpretation in the light of local conditions. Appeals are allowed. Jurisdiction does not exist where the government is involved officially, and is not asserted over military personnel. There are no juries and no organized bar. Mediation out of court is encouraged.

One further institution in the Communist administration of the Chin-Cha-Chi region is the fen ch'ü organisation. Between the Border Region Government and the hsien government there is the fen ch'ü office, or supervisory district. The chief of these districts is the Chuan Yuan, an appointee of the government. The duty of this official and his supervisory districts is to see that Border Region Government policy is carried out locally; the Chuan Yuan cannot remove hsien officials, but can veto hsien legislation. An analogous supervisory organisation, the ch'ü office, exists between the hsien government and the villages; the ch'ü acts on behalf of the hsien in seeing that its policies are carried out.

Within the above briefly described democratic structure the Communist Party effectively controls the administration. While its members do not have an absolute majority in the governmental organs, they have solidarity and follow a well-marked course. The Party's policy is the driving force behind the government. Its members are selected for the important positions, and in this fashion the Party does control the region; for example, the nine members of the provisional administrative committee were all elected by the PPC in 1943 to positions in the new Government.

Political groups other than the Communist Party are not organized; the Kuomintang members in the region are generally at odds with the Chungking Kuomintang. As late as September 1944, the chairman of the regional administration (Sung Hsiao-wen), the vice chairman (Fu Tien-kuei), and the head of the Department of Industry (Liu Tien-chi) were all Kuomintang members. Despite the central government's recognition of the Chin-Cha-Chi region, Chungking in 1938 appointed provincial governors to both Chahar and Hopei. The claimants, after

making desultory attempts to become installed in their appointive positions, at length failed and left the political scene.

Military organization works closely parallel and often in coincidence with the Communist political organization of the Chin-Cha-Chi region.<sup>15</sup> Both for military and political purposes that region is divided into four military and administrative districts: the Hopei-Shansi, Hopei-Chahar, Hopei-Jehol-Liaoning (Chi-Je-Liao), and Central Hopei. These districts in turn are subdivided into sub-districts, of which there are 18.<sup>16</sup> Military command of the Chin-Cha-Chi base has from the beginning been vested in Nieh Jung-chen, who is also political commissar. Hsiao Ko has been vice commander, and Cheng Tzu-hua chairman of the political department of the Eighth Route Army in this region.

At the disposal of the Chin-Cha-Chi military command are several types of forces. The first to be considered are the Eighth Route Army regulars. At the beginning of 1945 these were estimated at about 18,000 for the Hopei-Jehol-Liaoning military district and 30,000 for each of the other three military districts. The regulars are organized generally into regiments. The Hopei-Shansi district has nine regiments, the Hopei-Chahar eight, the Chi-Je-Liao ten, and the Central Hopei has the 24 Regiment plus 15 "local detachments" with regimental status.<sup>17</sup> In the Central Hopei district, at least, each regimental unit operates normally in a demarked area of one to four hsien, although of course several units may be concentrated by the district headquarters or by a sub-district headquarters for a sizeable operation. Central Hopei also has four "special detachments", named according to the areas in which they operate: the Ping-Nan, Tsin-An, Ching-Ta, and Ching-Tsang-Chiao. These units of specially-picked guerrillas — an outgrowth of the armed working detachments — number about 500 men each. They have the specialised assignment of penetrating the most heavily occupied areas, as in raids at Tientsin, etc.

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<sup>15/</sup> This region includes almost all of the area shown on the map which accompanies this report; it also extends beyond the borders of the map except to the southeast, where the Communists' Shantung Military Region lies.

<sup>16/</sup> At least part of all the sub-districts except the second are shown on the accompanying map.

<sup>17/</sup> The regular strength in the Chin-Cha-Chi region appears to have increased greatly in the past year, by comparing the 1945 estimate of an American observer with the official Communist statement of August 1944 in Yen-an. The increase is doubtless the result of the Eighth Route Army's recruitment drive in 1944-1945. In mid-1944 the Communists did not claim to have any "A-class regiments" in Chin-Cha-Chi; it is not known whether they still regard all of their regiments there as being "B-class" and "C-class".

The armament of Eighth Route troops remains crude and not plentiful. A ratio of two rifles to every three men would be considered fortunate by the Communist military leaders for even the regulars. Some idea of the military equipment possessed by the Eighth Route Army in the Chin-Cha-Chi region may be gained from data secured by an American observer in the Hopei-Shansi military district during 1945; this district is probably the best supplied of those in Chin-Cha-Chi.

Forty percent of the Eighth Route's rifles in this region are 6.5 mm. — about a third of which have been captured from the Japanese and two-thirds manufactured in the Taiyuan arsenal and obtained some years ago from the central government. The remaining 60 percent are 7.9 mm. rifles, of foreign manufacture or local imitations of foreign weapons. The rifles are mostly worn but are well cared for.

About one-third of the light machine guns possessed by the Communists in the region are 6.5 mm. from the Japanese or from Taiyuan. The remainder are 7.9 of Czech design. The heavy machine guns are mostly 7.9 mm., are old and worn. The Communists have some more modern Japanese products, which, however, can only use Japanese ammunition.

The Eighth Route Army has 82 mm. mortars from the Taiyuan arsenal and from Nanking. Only two mortars are allotted to a regiment, because of the shortage of ammunition; in fact, in the Hopei-Shansi district many mortars have been buried since they cannot currently be used. Grenade-throwers, grenade-launchers, grenades, and land mines are locally made, and are in sufficient supply.

Machine-gun and rifle ammunition are short, being in part locally manufactured and in part captured from the Japanese or purchased from the puppets. Allotments of munitions are roughly as follows: four to six hand grenades per soldier, 30 to 50 rounds per rifle, 30 to 40 grenades per thrower, 100 to 300 rounds per light machine gun, 200 to 500 rounds per heavy machine gun, and five to ten rounds per Mauser pistol. The maximum production per month in the Hopei-Shansi district is: 100 rifles, 65 to 70 grenade-throwers, 250 launchers, 250 pistols, 20,000 rounds of 7.9 mm. ammunition (new; 10,000 rounds re-loads), 10,000 rounds of 6.5 mm. ammunition (new; 30,000 rounds re-loads), 200,000 hand grenades; 3,000 rifle grenades, 3,000 grenades for throwers, 3,000 pounds of explosives, 100 pounds of smokeless powder.

In addition to the Communist regular forces in the Hopei region there are guerrilla detachments. These are both hsien guerrilla detachments and ch'ü guerrilla detachments (the latter of 20 to 40 men each). While ordinarily the guerrillas stay in their own districts they may be mobilised to operate with the regular forces. An American observer in February 1945 estimated the number of Communist guerrillas at 40,000 for the Hopei-Shansi district, 16,000 for Hopei-Chahar, 30,000 for Chi-Je-Liao, and 31,000 for Central Hopei. Another observer, who had visited the Central Hopei district, stated that only one-third to one-quarter of the guerrillas were properly armed and trained, and he discounted their military effectiveness — bad discipline in emergencies, etc. There may

thus be a substantial difference in quality between the guerrillas of the Chin-Cha-Chi region and those of other Communist anti-Japanese bases, in which the former compare unfavorably; with respect to some other regions it had been reported that the guerrillas were in part drawn from the regular army, were equipped on a par with regular troops, and for practical purposes had about the same military effectiveness.

The guerrillas, while often operating under regular army orders, are theoretically part of the much larger militia in Chin-Cha-Chi. The militia throughout is a "voluntary" service. It was estimated early in 1945 to total about 900,000 in Chin-Cha-Chi, of which 675,000 were organized in operating units. Beside the guerrillas, the militia was then estimated to have, in self-defense detachments and service detachments, about 300,000 in Hopei-Shansi, 100,000 in Hopei-Chahar, 170,000 in Chi-Je-Liao, and 200,000 in Central Hopei. These units are generally made up of individuals in the 35-55 age span. The militia has been increasing in size; in Central Hopei a goal of 400,00 for the entire militia has been reported set for 1945.

In general the militiamen live at home. Each member is required to perform about three or four days' service a month under ordinary circumstances. The population at large in Communist areas is required to support the militia through labor service or contributions. Since the militia have ordinary civilian occupations for their living, extra services beyond the normal quota are paid for (a trial system in Central Hopei has set the rate at a little less than four pounds of millet a day).

The chief of staff of the Chin-Cha-Chi region (Tang Yen-chieh) is concurrently head of the militia. The militia has subordinate leaders at the levels of the military district, sub-district, hsien, ch'ü, and ts'un.<sup>18/</sup> In this manner the Eighth Route Army and Chin-Cha-Chi administration control and direct the militia despite its theoretical independence. Formally, the militia leaders are chosen by the militia leaders on the next lower echelon; but according to an observer in Central Hopei the elections are free only at the level of the hsien and below. The main militia projects are the digging of tunnels, flood control, entrenchment of cart roads (so that they will permit passage of no larger vehicles than north China carts), destruction of enemy installations, guard duty,

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<sup>18/</sup> Sung Yun-pao is head of the militia in the Central Hopei district.

uniform and arms manufacture. Observers in the Hopei region have stated their opinion that the militia over all is a very valuable adjunct to the Eighth Route Army, especially because of the auxiliary activities just mentioned.

The Conduct of Operations. As between militia and army, it has been seen that the Eighth Route Army generally controls the military and para-military activities in Communist areas. Within the army, however, there remains a good deal of local autonomy. In 1942 and 1943 the pressure of the enemy and the Communist program of "simplification" had brought about a fair degree of military decentralization, at least in the Central Hopei district. This condition has in practice continued despite the recently much improved Communist situation. The commanders of regiments and guerrilla detachments retain the power of deciding on their operations in the great majority of cases. Plans of attack are frequently submitted through channels to higher headquarters, though rarely does this allow for previous approval. Higher headquarters generally follow a policy of non-interference. Reports are submitted, again through channels, after engagements.

There is discernible in Communist military affairs, as these have developed in the Chin-Cha-Chi region, a basic strategy. Nevertheless, tactical considerations have a very close influence on what from week to week is done by the Eighth Route Army in Hopei. It may be appropriate to mention some of these considerations briefly.

Yang Cheng-wu, commander of the Central Hopei district, has stated that the Eighth Route Army does not consider a position worth holding against superior or equal forces unless either the opposition is puppet or special tactical advantages dictate such a course. Yang said that he needed three-to-one superiority to defeat the Japanese decisively, and equal numbers against the puppets. Strong points, when successfully attacked, are generally abandoned after destruction of installations and capture of materiel, in order to forestall Japanese counter-attack. These policies are dictated by the necessity to conserve strength and acquire equipment. The seasons play an influential part in Communist operations — the growing kaoliang and the reed beds of Paiyangtien Lake affording cover.

Perhaps one of the most remarkable features of the Central Hopei district is the ability of the Communists to operate in such plain country. Systems of tunnels are extremely important. The big movement to construct tunnels began when the Communists were hard pressed on the Hopei plain in May 1942. In the 7, 8, and 9 sub-districts of Central Hopei almost every village in the Communist areas has a tunnel system. The 6 sub-district has tunnels in Shen, Shulu, Tsin, and Kaocheng counties. In the 10 sub-district — where the enemy has been relatively strongly concentrated — tunnel construction has begun only in 1945. West of the Ping-Han railway there are reported to be tunnels in at least Wan, Mancheng, and Kuyang counties.

The tunnels have proved of utmost importance to the Eighth Route Army for evasion purposes, and are believed very secure. The Japanese rarely try to enter the tunnels themselves, and their measures to ferret out concealed Eighth Routers have been effectively countered by the Communists for the most part. Many tunnels are fitted with ports and other devices to make them effective fighting

tunnels. Observers report that Japanese raiding parties do not dare remain in a Communist tunnelled village at night because of the danger of ambush after dark. The 1945 Communist program calls for the building of more tunnels and the conversion of more tunnels into fighting tunnels.

Mobility is also an exceedingly important factor in enabling the Eighth Route Army to maintain operations on the Hopei plain. One observer has stated that Eighth Route units can move 27 to 34 miles in a day — without food or sleep, and with an engagement included — carrying all needed equipment. According to his observation, Eighth Route units could leave a village in 20 minutes; no transportation is needed for such an evacuation, as the minimum necessities are carried by individuals, and supplies are anticipated at the next village where a stop may be made. District and sub-district headquarters in Central Hopei rarely remain in one locality more than three or four days at a time. In the 9 sub-district, where the tunnel system is highly developed, headquarters stayed in one village for six weeks during the winter of 1944-1945, though the Japanese built strong points on the edge of the village. The American observer thought that the command functions of the headquarters suffered as result although no casualties were sustained.

Headquarters staff work in Central Hopei is moderately good, according to American observation. Intelligence of the enemy situation before an attack is usually detailed and accurate, and a plan is worked out very carefully. In execution of the attack, however, deviations frequently have to be improvised. In one attack, prepared by the 6 sub-district with special care as a show piece for the American, there were liaison difficulties aggravated particularly by the general's absence from his command post to be up forward. The careful plan could not be followed out and the objective was lost.

Strategy and Military Achievements in the Chin-Cha-Chi region. The basic objectives of the Communists in the Chin-Cha-Chi region are (1) to consolidate and make stronger their military and political position in the areas under their control, (2) to extend those areas and develop new ones in the region, (3) to spread their influence in the no-man's-land between the liberated areas and the strongly-Japanese-held towns and communications lines, and (4) to harass the enemy by raiding those centres and narrow zones. The techniques of military and psychological guerrilla warfare — with organised local popular support — for accomplishing the objectives are familiar.

The Hopei-Shansi district, with the Chin-Cha-Chi capital of Fouping, has been the strongest Communist district in the region — because of its long standing, its favorable defensive terrain, and its more developed economic organization. This base has not, therefore, undergone much change in 1945, remaining relatively secure and stable. Some expansion has occurred in the direction of the Ping-Han railway, and harassing raids have been mounted from the base.

In the Hopei Chahar district fairly spectacular gains have been made by the Eighth Route Army this year. The towns of Laiyuan, Lingchiu (with its airfield) Tzuchingkuan, Chaitang, and Huaian were taken. In the vicinity of these centres the Communists claimed to neutralise Japanese strong points. In view of the latter fact and the fact that administrative authorities were subsequently re-

ported to be moving into the towns it would seem that the Communists expect to hold them and organise them as part of the Hopei-Chahar base.

Another striking advance of the Hopei-Chahar district has been the liberation of a stretch of territory running southwest from Hsuanhua and Chou to Tienchen and Yangyuan, bounded on the south by the Sanghien River. On 18 April 1945 the Yenon radio claimed that since December 1944 the Communists had recovered in this area 1,160 square miles with 327 villages and a population of over 30,000.

The Hopei-Jehol-Liaoning military district, where the Communist hold is probably most precarious in the Chin-Cha-Chi region, has also been the scene of expanding Eighth Route activity. The stable base areas here are relatively small, but have nevertheless been growing. Some expansion into Manchuria has been accomplished — the more an achievement since the Japanese have sedulously sought to keep the infection of resistance confined to China. Not only are Japanese controls of travel between Manchuria and China over the main routes very rigorous, but in 1943 the Japanese are reported to have denuded an area ten miles wide along the Great Wall from Shanhaikuan well into Chahar in order to maintain a real frontier. People and villages were said to have been moved from this band.

In eastern Hopei numerous engagements appear to have taken place this year between the Communists and the Manchukuo puppet garrison troops. The Eighth Route Army has also in hit-and-run guerrilla raids operated as near to Peiping as Tungchou, Kaoliying, Nulanshan, and Chumachuang. These operations appear to have the objectives of materiel capture, demoralisation of the puppets and Japanese troops, and the spreading of Communist influence among people of the countryside — so as to prepare the way for a potential stable base area.

The Central Hopei district in 1945 has been the scene of important Communist expansion and consolidation of a sizeable area growing in strength. The enemy has been compelled and induced to yield most of the plain area inclosed by the four railroads south of Peiping. In 1945 the Communists have occupied the following hsien towns: Hsinchen, Wenan, Jenchiu, Hochien, Hsienhsien, Jaoyang, Anping, Shentse, and Wuchiang (37:59 N 115:51 E). It seems probable that the Eighth Route Army will hold the above points and proceed to liberate others, further pushing out the margins of the Central Hopei Communist-controlled area.

Another success in the Central Hopei district during the spring of 1945 has been the Communist crossing of the Tientsin-Pukou railway to liberate an area of 1,100 square miles south of Tientsin, east of the rail line, and north of the Chiehtsi River. The Eighth Route Army claims as a result to have occupied about 30 miles of sea coast on the Gulf of Chihli and to have linked up with the Po-Hai district of the Shantung Military region on the south.

The efforts of the Communists all through the Chin-Cha-Chi region have resulted in opening the no-man's-land to freer Communist movement in it and in tending to close it to any continuing enemy control. Except for trunk highways parallelling the railways, country roads are not travelled by Japanese forces at night or unless in numbers. The Central Hopei district claims to have re-

duced the number of strong points and block houses in its territory from 1,753 in mid-1943 to 388 in December 1944. Obviously with such a development taking place the areas between Communist stable bases and the heavily occupied zone have fallen out of the Japanese sphere. The Communists now make the claim that if an Allied airman comes down five li or more from a town he will be rescued and kept safe out of enemy hands.

The Eighth Route Army seems in addition to have become more ambitious in its penetration by guerrillas into the strongly held Japanese zone in Hopei. A number of instances of this activity have been reported in the last six months. In December 1944 Communist guerrillas were said to have seized two German consular officials at the Tientsin race track. On the night of 15 November Communist guerrillas were stated to have staged a demolition raid on the Japanese consulate in Tangshan, killing five. Mentoukou, Paoting, and Shihchiachuang have also been the objective of such "deep" raids. On one occasion the headquarters of the 6 Group Army of the North China Pacification Army was the target, with casualties among others to the unit's Japanese advisers. At Mentoukou the Communists are said to interfere with enemy coal shipments. At Peiping they fixed posters on two of the city's gates, calling on the puppet military and government establishments to desert the Japanese.

Ordinarily, the rail lines have been left open to enemy transport and have not been harassed by Eighth Route demolitions. However, in the spring of 1945 the Communists claim to have raided a railway station on the Ping-Han line 54 miles south of Shihchiachuang, and on another occasion to have derailed a troop train at a point six miles farther south. At no time are Communists barred from crossing the railroads, it appears from a number of reports. Japanese measures to isolate the several Communist bases have not been effectual. With small increments of force Eighth Route parties can escort downed Allied air crew across all the major lines, westward toward Yen-an.

Communist Social Institutions. An outstanding feature of the Communist polity wherever found in China is its concern to win enthusiastic popular support. Outside of the strictly military sphere — in which the Communist regime provides protection against the Japanese — and the political sphere — in which for the first time the people are experiencing the procedures of democratic government — the Communists have been assiduous to look after the economic well-being of the local populations. A number of illustrations of this policy are available.

In the summer of 1944 there was a serious flood in the northern part of the Hopei plain south of Peiping, which spoiled the autumn harvest in a substantial area, and endangered the succeeding crop. The Communist administration managed to collect extra grain in other districts to distribute in the flood area and keep the people from starvation. The taking of measures such as this is not left out of account by the populace when the Communists subsequently seek to convert the area into an Eighth Route Army stable base — which the Communists began to do in the spring of 1945.



The land policy of the Chin-Cha-Chi region is a subject which has been given much publicity by the Communists. They point to the land-rent and interest-rate reductions, which began to take effect in 1939 and 1940. They also point to the gradual changes which are taking place in the distribution of land, with the farmers coming into wider ownership at the expense of the landlords. Interestingly enough, the Communists' statements retailing this type of information have stressed the evolutionary character of the change and said that no further "land revolution" would be necessary. They stress the cooperation of the landlords in the region and the latter's acquiescence in a diminished but still capitalist position.

Another economic tenet of the Communists is to organize the people to produce more food. They regard this as necessary to provide against emergencies and for the support of the military establishment. A system of scrip has been instituted in the Chin-Cha-Chi region by which the Eighth Route Army troops can secure food in villages; the scrip is then redeemable in kind at Communist storehouses.

At least in the Hopei-Shansi district of the Chin-Cha-Chi region there are some of the more organized enterprises of a stable community. Near Fouping a well-dispersed chemical factory produces sulphuric and nitric acids, alcohol, ether, glycerine, nitroglycerine, smokeless powder, yellow powder, nitronaphthalene, silver fulminate, and mercury fulminate.<sup>19/</sup> The methods and equipment are reported primitive. Also at Fouping the Communists are said by American air crewmen to have a good hospital with good doctors from the cities of northeast China, but to be hampered by want of supplies. A military academy, for future unit commanders and political officers, is in operation in the Fouping vicinity, giving a six-months' course. One American observer reported his opinion that the training was not very competently carried on, although the academy presented a favorable appearance.

Educational activities in various forms are reported by Americans to be actively conducted under the supervision of political commissars; classes, clubs, dramatic representations, and weekly news summaries are employed. Conferences of various sorts at liberated area centres are also an important psychological instrument of the Communists in obtaining publicity and acclaim. Student conferences and conferences of military "heroes" and "model workers" have been held in the Hopei-Shansi and Chi-Je-Liao districts during the spring of 1945. The kudos of military or agricultural hero status is reported to be seriously regarded by the people and effectually employed by the Communist authorities.

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<sup>19/</sup> In November 1944 the respective monthly production figures for the above products were (in pounds): 12,500; 6,250; 3,750; 1,250; 375; 375 625; 1,875; 375; 50; 25. It was hoped to double production by March 1945.

Observers in the liberated areas have agreed in stating that relations between the local population and the Eighth Route Army or Communist administration are excellent. Americans have also remarked on the consideration with which Eighth Route troops treat the civil populace -- a new experience for the people with Chinese as well as foreign armies. In conclusion on this subject it can only be said that the Communists have scored a great popular success with their social institutions in the Chin-Cha-Chi region.

#### Non-Communist Resistance Elements

Unlike Shantung, the Hopei region contains almost no frankly anti-Japanese elements that are not Communist. At the southeast corner of the region covered by the accompanying map -- and actually for the most part in the province of Shantung -- is an area probably still controlled by central-government guerrillas. This district has been reported as part of a non-Communist pocket in which were located the 6 Peace Preservation Brigade under Chang Tzu-liang (about 3,000 strong) and another peace preservation unit under Liu Ching-liang (5,000); the latter is reported to have been killed in action during March 1945, and the fate of his unit is not known; according to one report the unit continues an independent existence under a new commander. It is not believed that either of these central-government guerrilla groups is very formidable, and their future seems at best insecure in view of their isolation from other non-Communist guerrillas and in view of the Communist pressure on their borders -- virtually encircled as they are by the Eighth Route Army.

The only other non-Communist resistance group known to exist in the Hopei region is one west of Shanhaikuan, with concentrations at Taitouying (40:02 N 119:11 E) and Shuangwang (39:55 N 119:02 E). This is a body claimed by its commander to number 4,000 guerrillas, 2,000 of whom are armed, mostly with rifles. The commander, Wang Ko-i, is a graduate of the Whampoa Military Academy, and later served under General Wang Fu-lin in north China. General Wang's forces, which had been evacuated from Manchuria in 1931, were heavily defeated by the Japanese in 1937 and became largely disorganized. At this time Wang Ko-i is said to have been designated by the National Military Council to organize resistance activities in the triangle Peiping-Tientsin-Shanhaikuan. He managed to recruit two regiments from Wang Fu-lin's army; one of these, however, later deserted the central government.<sup>20/</sup> Wang Ko-i's present force is reported to undertake minor harassing operations against the Japanese, occasionally cutting telephone lines and attacking Japanese patrols. His operations have become constricted by the enemy's heavier guarding of the railroads. Wang does not have any communication with the central-government guerrillas in Shantung. Wang's group was formerly

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<sup>20/</sup> This was the regiment under Lu Cheng-tsao, which joined the Eighth Route Army in Central Hopei.

on good terms with the Communists and cooperated with them. Since 1941, however, there has been hostility, owing to a rivalry over procuring military supplies.

The Chungking regime maintains some other activities in the Hopei region looking toward its eventual re-establishment there. The intelligence service of the Kuomintang Board of Organisation has some agents in the region. Likewise, the Tai Li agency has operatives in Hopei. It does not appear that these central-government representatives carry on any regular propaganda work or foster sabotage against the Japanese. Their main activity seems to be intelligence, carried on actively against the Communists, at least by the Tai Li men; the latter, with their radio sets, are occasionally apprehended by the Eighth Route Army operating on the fringes of Communist base areas.

The Chungking agents probably also maintain liaison with the puppets in Hopei. This connection is obviously an important one for the central government, which hopes later to gain their open allegiance. One report states that Chungking contact is maintained with Tu Hsi-chun, commander of the North China Pacification Army. The visit of some puppet representatives in the winter of 1944-1945 to Chungking from north China was very possibly arranged by central-government agents in Hopei.

#### Puppet Civil Affairs

Since the Japanese occupation in north China began, and particularly in the last year or two, economic conditions in the Hopei region have declined substantially, although one could by no means point to the region as the one of most acute and chronic suffering in China. A number of factors, induced by the war and Japanese controls, have combined to make living harder for the Chinese population: scarcity of commodities only partly relieved by rationing, price rises and recent depreciation of the FRB currency, decline of public utility services, compulsory contributions in aid of Japanese war projects, the closure of schools since 1 April 1945 so that student labor may be obtained for war factories. These are attested and agreed to by a large number of reports on conditions in the north.

The political result is doubtless alienation from the Japanese-dominated rule, regarded at best as a necessary evil in north China. Reports agree that enemy propaganda, including the sponsored Hsin Min Hui, has proved an entire failure. In large part of course the sympathy now felt with the Allied cause is owing to the obvious direction of the war's fortunes. Such sentiments appear to be expressed in north China where there is safety from the Japanese to do so. Illegal listening to non-Japanese-controlled broadcasts seems to be fairly widespread, and the oral tradition of news and rumors is voluminous.

The question may be asked, when will the puppets in north China openly desert the Japanese and actively support the Allies. One high-echelon event of interest in this connection was the resignation of Wang Ko-min in February 1945 from the chairmanship of the North China Political Affairs Commission. Ill health was given as the reason; and this explanation is not impossible in view of Wang's age, since he is over 70 years old. Other circumstances may illuminate

his replacement with an additional explanation. In the two months before Wang resigned, his daughter is reported to have made a trip to Chungking and at that time to have conferred with the Generalissimo. A Chinese observer, in the Chungking government service, who was in Peiping during the period, stated that Wang Ko-min was disinclined to take more active measures of collaboration as the war progressed, and that matters came to a head over the issue of conscription. The Japanese Army in north China is said to have regarded him as lacking vigor for the prosecution of their cause and to have suggested his retirement, through diplomatic channels. The suggestion was quickly accepted. Other Chinese, and Americans, who have known Wang state that he never regarded collaboration too seriously and was looking for an opportunity to withdraw. Wang Ko-min was replaced by Wang Yin-tai, long a member of the Political Affairs Commission and the head of its general affairs department. Reports agree that he is a convinced and more enthusiastic puppet; he has been a member of the Anfu clique, is a returned student from Germany, and has a German wife.<sup>21/</sup>

Perhaps some general conclusions may be offered on the question of puppet turn-over from the Japanese to the Allies. First, with respect to puppet military forces: It can be said that there is very little likelihood that any puppet forces would adhere to the Japanese to the very end and share a complete military defeat with the latter. The more difficult question is the timing of a shift in puppet allegiance and activities.<sup>22/</sup>

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<sup>21/</sup> There have been continuing rumors that the Nanking government would move to Peiping and become in fact consolidated with the northern puppet regime. It is even reported that buildings in Peiping have been set aside for the purpose. The death of Wang Ching-wei and the possible imminence of an Allied invasion of China perhaps tend to support belief in such a move. On the other hand, it can scarcely be expected that the rivalries between Peiping and Nanking — supported respectively by the Japanese military commands in the two areas — have substantially diminished. Two Chinese observers who left Peiping in the spring of 1945 negated the idea that the Nanking regime would move north. In fact, both stated that reports were current of the Japanese Emperor's moving to Manchuria, while Pu I should come to Peiping: "Two suns could not shine in one sky". In this connection it is interesting to note the agreement of reports that 22 hsien in northeast Hopei have not only become a garrison area for Manchurian puppet units but have even been transferred for administrative purposes to the puppet Manchukuo.

<sup>22/</sup> Puppet military units formerly part of the central government's forces can be expected at some time to come over to the anti-Japanese side. This may also turn out to be true of many of the local or provincial puppet units. Some, however, who were military bandit forces (associated with the Japanese or warlords in north China before 1937) may retain for some period an anti-central government or independent position.

As far as puppet military leaders are concerned, it would seem that they would change sides at the earliest moment when they believed a transfer could be effected without exposing the puppets to substantial reprisals or counter-measures. It is to be expected that local puppet leaders will calculate very carefully when they can safely change over in their immediate area. Before that time their strategy would be a "slow-down" manoeuvre to the maximum extent they considered possible, with respect to cooperating with the Japanese, well knowing which way the wind was blowing.

There is little reason to believe that the puppet ranks would revolt against their leaders and set up active anti-Japanese military units before the time when the puppet higher-ups concluded that the strategic moment had arrived. However, the process of the melting-away of puppet forces -- through simple desertions, and occasional going over of groups, with their equipment, to the Eighth Route Army (particularly in the case of local puppets) -- may be expected to continue and even increase. The event of Allied invasion in north China would very possibly serve to accelerate the melting-away in urban areas, where the Japanese system of controls is clearly stronger than in outlying areas assigned to puppet units for garrisoning. In the latter areas the puppet forces could be expected to stay more intact, and as such to change sides openly sooner than in the cities and larger towns.

The above considerations would seem to apply also to puppet civilian officials. Perhaps one qualification should be made here to the above general statements: i. e., in the case of the highest puppet military and civil leaders, such as Wang Yin-tai; these individuals are more tied to the Japanese than those lower down, and they can expect possibly unfavorable treatment from even the Chinese central-government authority in the event of its re-establishment in north China. While it is to be expected that the Chungking attitude toward puppets generally will be very lenient, the administration would be likely to find it politically necessary to mete out some punishment to the most notorious collaborators. Accordingly, some of the highest puppets might be more inclined to adhere longer to the Japanese. This would possibly be more true in the case of civilian officials than of military leaders. Most of the major military leaders among the puppets in north China are former officers in the central-government army; it seems probable that they went over to the Japanese with Chungking acquiescence or later established Chungking rapport. The arrangement whereby they engaged primarily in anti-Communist activities served the purposes of both the central government and the Japanese occupiers. The highest puppet civil leaders, on the other hand, were not generally associated with the central government before 1937, although some of them have undoubtedly made connections with Chungking since that time.

A further complication in the puppet situation of Hopei as elsewhere in north China is the antagonism of the puppets toward the Communists, although this is probably much less on the part of local puppets and at the lower echelons, where fraternisation and other dealings are consistently reported to take place. If it appeared at the time of an Allied invasion of north China that the Communists rather than the Kuomintang were going to be in control there, such a belief on the part of the puppets might well incline some of them to prolong their association

with the Japanese. Conversely, the puppets of a particular area might be inclined to continue with the Japanese and keep up a holding action against the Eighth Route Army if the puppets believed that a little more waiting would see the arrival of central-government forces to take over.

### The Chinese Domestic Conflict

The above discussion has led to the Kuomintang-Communist issue in China, which is of great importance for north China and the Hopei region. As it has been seen, the central government, through guerrilla groups, has little strength in Hopei, while the Communists firmly hold substantial portions of the rural areas. Chungking's hope for securing dominion of the region has to be pinned on the urban zones and communication lines, where effective support may be secured and where central-government forces could move in directly to replace the Japanese without permitting the Communists to get full control. Allied military help, in the form of equipment, campaigning, and the presence of units to back up the central-government administrators moving in, is clearly sought.

Without an over-all settlement between Chungking and Yen-an, some measure of civil war in Hopei can only be expected to ensue. A critical point would be reached at the time when effective Japanese control in the area ceased -- as the result of a general surrender, or of the Japanese being driven from the area by an invading force. The Communists would attempt to take over throughout the region, and would be opposed by many puppets and whatever other power the central government could bring to bear. Similarly, the Communists would oppose to their utmost an attempt of Chungking to step into the space left by the Japanese -- even though the central government were supported by the United States, in all probability.

Thus the problems facing an Allied invading force in Hopei would be very grave. Effective "local" solutions to avoid political involvement in the Chinese domestic conflict would practically be unattainable, since in every act concerning local affairs the Allied command would be regarded by one side as helping the other in the internal struggle. Allied administration, even if practicable from a diplomatic point of view,<sup>23/</sup> would not avert the issue because of the necessity to work with and utilise Chinese elements.

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<sup>23/</sup> Since the Hopei region is recognised as part of China, an Allied nation, an administration other than by the recognised government of China would doubtless not be considered appropriate, in contrast to the case of occupied enemy territory. Clearly, Chungking does not countenance the possibility, but proposes to install its own administration. At the end of June 1945 the central government appointed General Sun Lien-chung to be chairman of the Hopei provincial government.

## APPENDIX A

SECRET//NOFORN

## Japanese Units in North China

UNIT	LOCATION	STRENGTH
# 59 Division	Tsinan (36:41 N 117:00 E)	13,000
* 63 Division	Peiping	13,000
# 65 Division	Tungshan (34:18 N 117:16 E)	13,000
@ 110 Division	Loyang (34:49 N 112:26 E)	20,000
# 113 Division	Laoyao (34:47 N 119:27 E)	13,500
@ 114 Division	Linfen (36:05 N 111:31 E)	13,000
@ 115 Division	Nanyang (33:03 N 112:32 E)	13,500
@ 117 Division	Hsinhsiang (35:19 N 113:53 E)	13,000
& 118 Division	Tatung (40:06 N 113:14 E)	13,000
@ 3 Armored Division	Hsiangcheng (33:50 N 113:28 E)	10,000
@ 1 IMB	Hantan (36:37 N 114:28 E)	6,000
* 2 IMB	Kalgan	6,000
& 3 IMB	Yuanping (38:42 N 112:46 E)	6,000
# 5 IMB	Tsingtao (36:04 N 120:19 E)	6,000
* 8 IMB	Tangshan	6,000
# 9 IMB	Tehsien (37:27 N 116:17 E)	6,000
66 IMB	unlocated in north China	6,000
@ 92 IMB	Hsihsiakou (33:30 N 111:22 E)	6,000
# 1 IIB	Tzuyang (35:36 N 116:54 E)	5,000
* 2 IIB	Shihchiachuang	5,000
& 10 IIB	Yangchuan (37:50 N 113:36 E)	5,000
@ 11 IIB	Yingshan (31:37 N 113:52 E)	5,000
@ 14 IIB	Luan (36:05 N 113:14 E)	5,000
@ 4 Cavalry Brigade	Yencheng (33:36 N 114:02 E)	5,500

\* in Hopei region      # in Shantung region      @ in south Shansi-Honan region  
& in north Shansi region

## Manchurian Units in Hopei Region and Southwest Manchuria

UNIT	LOCATION	STRENGTH
* 3 Mixed Brigade	South of Chengte	3,000
* 5 Mixed Brigade	Northwest of Tangshan	3,000
7 Mixed Brigade	Pingchuan (41:01 N 118:35 E)	3,000
* 18 Mixed Brigade	Tingtu, Tangku	3,000
24 Mixed Brigade	Chinhsien (41:07 N 121:07 E)	3,000
* 25 Mixed Brigade	Northeast of Tangshan, Weichang	3,000
* 26 Mixed Brigade	Chengte	3,000
2 Brigade	Takouchen (41:14 N 116:37 E)	3,000
5 Brigade	Waikoumentzu (41:55 N 116:30 E)	3,000
6 Brigade	Fengning (41:14 N 117:08 E)	3,000
7 Brigade	Chihfeng (42:18 N 119:00 E)	3,000
* 8 Brigade	East of Peiping	3,000
9 Brigade	unlocated	3,000
10 Brigade	unlocated	3,000
1 Hsingan Cavalry Brigade (separate)	Linhsi (43:32 N 118:28 E)	1,400
* Pacification Di- vision	Chengte	5,000

\*shown on accompanying map of Hopei region



## APPENDIX C

SECRET/CONTROL


## Puppet Units in Hopei Region

UNIT	LOCATION	STRENGTH
* 1 Group Army	Macheng	4,000
* 2 Group Army	Paoti-Yutien-Ningho area	4,000
* 3 Group Army	Loting	4,000
* 5 Group Army	Luanhsien	4,000
* 6 Group Army	Paoting	6,000
* 7 Group Army	Yungching	6,000
* 9 Group Army	Tientsin	4,000
* 10 Group Army	Yutien	6,000
Anti-Communist First Route Army	Tzuhsien (36:22 N 114:23 E)	
United Salvation Army	Paoting	
Autonomous Pacifi- cation Army	Paoting	
* 2 Engineer Regiment	Chohsien	1,500
* 3 Engineer Regiment	Luanhsien	1,500
* 2 Group Regiment (Mongolian Paci- fication Garrison)	Hsuanhua	2,000

\* shown on accompanying map of Hopei region

SECRET/CONTROL

SECRET




### SITUATION HOPEI REGION

Compiled and drawn in R&A, OSS, APO 879,  
2 July 1945

#### Legend

- GREAT WALL
- MILITARY DISTRICTS (COMMUNIST)
- SUB-MILITARY DISTRICTS
- ... CENTRAL GOVT. GUERRILLA AREA
- /// COMMUNIST CONTROLLED AREA
- - - PROVINCE BOUNDARY
- ++++ RAILROAD

Scale 1:1,000,000



SECRET