

EXTRACTS FROM KIDO'S DIARY.

ARITA, Hachiro (Foreign Minister)

Eitar Hyzler
Kido

6.8.40* - Extract.

Foreign Minister ARITA had a talk with me before and after he was received in audience by His Majesty. The gist of the talk was as follows:

- (1) Inviolability Agreement with Thailand shall be concluded and signed formally on the 12th.
- (2) A meeting will be held shortly with Ambassador Grew on diplomatic relations with the United States. Heard the result of meeting with (Francis) Sayre.
- (3) An agreement was concluded for establishment of a border line near Nonmonhan. Following the above, he will conclude the Fishery Treaty and then general political treaties with Russia. Met Premier YONAI before he was received in audience and discussed the following questions:

The new party problem - KUHARA's opinion - Railway Minister MATSUNO's actions. (May not resign after all.)

Arrangements with Wang Government is now in order at last.

A policy will be adopted so as to permit Chungking operation and yet not disturbing the Wang operation.

6.19.40** Extract.

Had a talk with the Foreign Minister before and after he was received in audience and discussed the French Indo-China questions brought up at the four ministers' meeting held yesterday, also on the following two plans:

- (1) A request shall be submitted to French Indo-China to cease giving aid to Chiang Kaishek and should this be refused, force shall be applied.
- (2) Force shall be used without negotiations.

The military ministers wished to adopt the first part of the above item (1) and to decide whether force should be used. With this, the four ministers agreed.

Italy and Germany have been notified that Japan holds serious consideration over the French Indo-China question, both politically and economically. England and the United States will be treated accordingly after securing replies from Germany and Italy.

I met the Grand Chamberlain and reported the problems concerning the Lord Keeper of Privy Seal and Mr. Heikichi OGAWA.

In the afternoon, was received in audience and reported to His Majesty Prince KONOYE's intention of resigning the post of the Lord Keeper of Privy Seal. When I touched on the French Indo-China question, His Majesty said that he would not like to take an action similar to Frederick the Great or Napoleon, to say to an extreme, such as Machiavellian. He

ARITA, Hachiro (continued).

wished to keep in mind the true spirit of "Hakko Ichiu", which is our principle since the age of Gods. I was struck with awe.

6.27.40 * - Extract.

Finance Minister SAKURANCHI called and opinions were exchanged on the strengthening of political situations and other problems.

Chief Secretary of the House of Peers came and consulted on procedure to be taken at the cabinet change.

Foreign Minister ARITA came to the palace and talked as follows:

Ambassador Grew requested the Ministers to have a meeting, stating that he wanted to bring up a proposal for a treaty in maintaining status quo in the Pacific and to avoid any forceful changes. This question was, however, quite delicate and we would not accept it if our operations in Dutch Indies at this time were restricted. Fearing that this might result similar to the Nine Power Treaty it was difficult to agree on the proposal. It might possibly be considered if the question was limited to the islands of Japan and the United States in the Pacific.

7.1.40 * - Extract.

Chief Aide-de-Camp told me the army's opinion on Foreign Minister ARITA's broadcast, which was stirred up in this morning's newspapers.

Then I was received in audience and answered His Majesty's questions on ARITA's broadcast and other matters.

Before attending the luncheon held by the Manchurian Emperor, I had a talk with Foreign Minister ARITA and heard from his own lips about his broadcast.

After the luncheon we met again and the Foreign Minister stated as follows:

- (1) The emergency conditions in Hongkong - actual fact not yet available.
- (2) Concerning the question of the status quo on the Pacific, proposed by Ambassador Grew, he believed that the time was not ripe for negotiations on the territories including those of hostile nations.
- (3) A proposal was submitted by Germany requesting us to withdraw our representatives from Holland, Belgium, Norway and Luxembourg, since these nations actually lost their facilities and to make future negotiations with these countries through our ambassador in Germany. In response to the above, our envoys will accordingly be withdrawn from the above named powers but it was our intention to make negotiations with governments holding actual power as far as the economic questions of French Indo-China are concerned.
- (4) An economic envoy shall soon be sent to French Indo-China and Dutch Indo-China.

EXTRACTS FROM KIDO'S DIARY.

HATA, Shunroku (War Minister)

7.11.40 E - Extract.

I was received in audience and His Majesty talked quite informally on various subjects. He believed that England will refuse our proposal for her suspension of helping Chiang Kaishek and it may result in the occupation of Hong Kong, which will lead to ultimate declaration of war. If so, the United States will start embargo. I replied that our country as well as our people should make up a firm resolution and be prepared against any possible outcome, but at the same time we should study the problem very carefully by holding a Supreme Commanders' Liaison Conference and a Council in the Imperial Presence and be cautious not to be misled by envoys.

His Majesty said also that he anticipated the Chinese incident before it broke out and suggested that the War Minister try to make a compromise with China. The Minister replied that there was no fear about Soviet Russia and China could be settled within a few months. It was His Majesty's intention to consult with Prince KONOYE and decide the policy at a Council in the Imperial Presence. Even this would be, he thought useless if it was opposed by the army. He expressed frankly the present unfavorable turn in the condition.

His Majesty continued stating that he talked with the War Minister yesterday over the Chungking operation, which seemed far from making any progress. Our proposal was refused by Chungking. If this operation failed, Germany will be asked for assistance. In any event, things should be handled carefully and one should not be excited.

At 5.00 P. M., MR. SHIGEMITSU called and expressed his views relating to the movement of political parties and opinions of the Bureau of Military Affairs in the new political system. Lieut-General TOJO was much talked about for War Minister but ANAMI's name was superseding TOJO's for the last few days.

7.14.40* - Extract.

Was received in audience and was asked whether or not an order for heavy artillery mobilization, which was secretly reported by the Prince, the Chief of General-Staff, was fully negotiated with the government. I replied that I would ask the Chief Aide-de-Camp to confirm the relation with the War Minister and if it is not satisfactory I would ask the Premier myself and let His Majesty know the same. It was learned from the War Minister that at the four Ministers' Meeting held on the 12th, it was agreed that the preparation for mobilization shall be started as it would take a month and a half in completing it. The Finance Minister also agreed to the same. It is of course understood a further cabinet decision would be required in case of issuing an order for actual operation. After confirming the above from the Foreign Minister, who was in the same accord with the War Minister, I made a report to His Majesty.

At this time, His Majesty said that he still had confidence in the YONAI cabinet and wished His thoughts be conveyed to Premier YONAI even though the cabinet change might be inevitable.

H.T.A. Shunroku (continued).

7.18.40 E - Extract.

When I was received in audience this afternoon, His Majesty said that the War Minister had just secretly recommended TOJO for War Minister and Tomoyuki YAMASHITA for Supreme Commander of the Air Force. His Majesty thought it strange for Prince KONOYE had not yet accepted TOJO for the post.

Regarding Chungking operation, I was told by His Majesty to the effect that it was favorably developing and if Chiang Kaishek himself was unable to attend the meeting either Ho Ying-Chin or Kung Hsiang-hsi should be sent.

3.4.41 E - Extract.

I was received in audience at 11.20 in the morning. The Emperor told me about General H.T.A.'s own opinion concerning our military policy towards the nations in the South. Then I had a talk with the Chief Aide-de-Camp on General H.T.A.'s opinion. Mr. ANDO, governor of KYOTO prefecture, visited my house at 8.30 in the evening. He brought me information about the Far Eastern Federation. He said, that General MUTO, General TANAKA and General SUZUKI, great functionaries in the Army, had met together lately, and had decided to establish a branch of the Federation at home, a decision which might put the War Minister in a spot.

EXTRACTS FROM KIDO'S DIARY.

HIRANUMA, Kiichiro (former Premier)

6.3.40* - Extract.

This morning Mr. HIROSE called and stated, beside several other questions, that Japan would co-operate with Mr. Wang in the Chungking operation.

At 9.30 AM visited Baron HIRANUMA at his private residence and exchanged opinions. I said that it would not be advisable to make a decision by the Lord Keeper alone at this occasion of a cabinet change. I would like to give my idea as to a means after further consideration.

In view of the present world conflict it will be difficult for the government alone to decide on the European problems as well as our future national policy, so I expressed my opinions to the Baron that we should ask for His Majesty's opinion.

I was received in audience from 10.40 to 11.15 AM and asked by His Majesty the following questions:

- (1) What is the truth about the new political party since the newspapers report that the old parties will be disorganized within a week?
- (2) Will the activities of SUITSUGU and others be possible to develop?

To the foregoing I expressed to His Majesty the recent conditions in detail and asked for his easiness.

His Majesty said that unless there is a change in conditions, it would be wiser to let the YONAI Cabinet continue.

His Majesty further, recollecting the time of the Chinese Incident, said that he called in Chief of the Naval General Staff, His Highness Prince FUSHIMI and SUGIYAMA (T. N. - Chief of the General Staff) at that time in order to camouflage the incident as the Kamchatka problem, and expressed his desire in drawing up a plan for a compromise with China if possible, but it failed to materialize favorably. The army, however, wanted to send out troops to China but being afraid of Russia and the Manchurian border line, they were unable to transfer troops from North Manchukuo. The situation might have been quite different if the necessary adjustment was made in the beginning.

At 11.30 AM met the Imperial Household Minister and discussed matters concerning the Grand Chamberlain's change in post, the relation with the Assistant Grand Chamberlain, the working attitude in the office of the Lord Keeper of Privy Seal, etc.

7.17.40** - Extract.

From 1 PM a meeting for selecting the succeeding premier was held and attended by the President of the Privy Council HARA and former Premiers WAKATSUKI, OKADA, HIROTA, HAYASHI, KONOYE and HIRAMIMA. Their free opinions were requested.

Requested by President HARA as to the true reason why the YONAI Cabinet had to resign, Lord Keeper of Privy Seal outlined roughly that the army thought the present cabinet was not feasible in carrying out satisfactorily the foreign policy under this inconsistent world condition, and it seems to have expressed its intention of political approach with Germany and Italy. The army was also of the opinion that the government was unable to obtain satisfactory results in carrying out internal policies, as it was separated from the public. The army's idea was quite far away from that of the Cabinet and the cabinet was unable to control it.

HIRANUMA, Kiichiro (Continued)

WAKATSUKI first spoke and recommended Prince KONOYE as the most suitable person for the next premier. HARA, HIRAMIMA, HAYASHI and OKADA supported WAKATSUKI's suggestion.

Prince KONOYE, saying that he is not fit for the post wished to recommend someone who is closer to the military. To this suggestion, the Lord Keeper stated that the military leaders seemed to be overwhelmingly in support of Prince KONOYE.

Baron HIRAMIMA regretted the fall of the cabinet because of the War Minister's resignation and that was a bad custom of the past, too. In principle, a cabinet should be able to continue by finding itself a successor to the post of War Minister but since it became customary to depend upon recommendation of the three Chief Military Officers, it resulted in such an undesirable condition as this.

Mr. HIROTA at last supported Prince KONOYE's run for there was no person better fitted than him. The meeting adjourned at 1.30 PM.

The Chief Secretary of the Lord Keeper was despatched to Prince SAIONJI to obtain his opinion on the above decision. But being not only ill but also not being informed of the recent political condition, the Prince regretted his inability to give a definite opinion. Under these circumstances, Prince KONOYE was recommended to His Majesty and was accepted.

Prince KONOYE was called in by His Majesty and an Imperial mandate was issued to him at 8.00 PM.

Prince expressed his idea that today he was going to ask the War Minister to pick his successor who can co-operate with the Navy and the Navy Minister to pick up one who can work smoothly with the army. When these two ministers are decided upon he would add a Foreign Minister, and after confirming the co-operation regarding national defense diplomacy and between navy and army, and also between the supreme command and politics, he would then commence selection of other cabinet members.

At 8.45 PM I was received in audience again and when Prince KONOYE's intention was reported, His Majesty was quite content.

6.21.41** - Full.

Mr. Kakichi IMAI came to my house to see me at 9 PM. At 11.50 PM Foreign Minister MATSUOKA telephoned me to say that the news concerning the interview with the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo was not correct. I was received in an audience by the Emperor from 1.15 AM to 2.05 AM. I heard State Minister OGURA's economic policy at 3 AM. I attended the reception party of Mr. WANG CHIN WEI at the Imperial Hotel at five in the evening. At 6.30 AM I went to the spare residence of Prince KONOYE at Mejiro to dine with Prince KONOYE and Baron HIRANUMA and to exchange our opinions concerning the current problems.

The gist of our talk was as follows: If the war between Germany and Soviet breaks out, it would prove a serious hindrance to the Alliance with Germany, as was the case with the anti-war pact between Germany and Soviet Russia, signed when Baron HIRANUMA was the premier. Prince KONOYE, therefore, said that it would be necessary for the Cabinet to bear the responsibility. I objected to Prince KONOYE's opinion, saying that in case of the HIRANUMA cabinet, Germany signed the anti-war treaty with Soviet, that had long been our hypothetical enemy, before the members of the HIRANUMA cabinet reached a complete agreement as to the opening of war against Soviet; the resignation of Baron HIRANUMA from the post of Premiership was therefore nothing but to shoulder the responsibility for his own lack of sagacity that had come out on account of an unexpected incident, for Baron HIRANUMA had long emphasized the necessity of attacking Russia to the throne; One of the very important

HIRANUMA, Kichiro (Continued)

objects of the alliance with Germany was to promote our diplomatic relations with Soviet, a fact which Germany knew and had a complete understanding; moreover Germany did not show any objection to the neutrality treaty between Soviet and Japan; And the present war between Germany and Soviet was not a surprise attack to our diplomatic policy, for Ambassador OSHIMA had been informed, though it was informally, about the attitude of Germany toward Soviet, thus leaving much time for the government to make up measures to cope with the situation; If the KONOYE cabinet would resign, it would create an undesirable precedent.

Foreign Minister Matsuoka was not clear in his attitude. At the time when this country was facing a critical moment, it was not undesirable for us to incur a split of the cabinet. As for the split of the Cabinet, we should do everything to avoid it, for it would disgrace the honour of this country to get a by-product of other country's movement and to break up the cabinet. The Premier was expected to assume his leading power, if the following three cases should arise:

1. In case of a war between Germany and Soviet.
1. In case of the participation of America in the war.
1. In case of our having an answer from the U.S.A.

I went home at 10 30 AM

11.29.41*E - Extract.

From 2 PM to 3 PM the Emperor asked the ex-premiers' opinions concerning the present political situation.

Mr. WAKATSUKI said that we were equal to a prolonged war with the U.S.A. in spiritual power, but regarding National power we must make a careful study. Admiral OKADA: He had grave doubts as to our supply capacity of war materials in spite of the optimistic view of the government.

Baron HIRANUMA: He agreed with Mr. WAKATSUKI's opinion in the point of our spiritual powers, urging further measures as to the awakening of patriotic sentiment.

Prince KONOYE: It was quite regrettable that our negotiations were going to be a failure in spite of our strenuous efforts of four months. But he was of the opinion that there would be no need to resort to a hasty war just because of the rupture of the negotiations; as we might be able to reach a wise solution in some way or other, while we were continuing our struggle towards better things.

Admiral YONAI: He said that he could not base his opinion on definite data, but it had been his desire that we should be careful not to become poorer by inches in the struggle against our national poverty, losing the little in our hands.

Mr. HIROTA: The diplomatic condition was approaching a serious crisis, but we should have iron nerves in order to reach a true solution of the problems, nerves which could meet courageously a crisis twice or thrice at least.

We should be able to seize an opportunity to solve the pending problems between the two countries even after the declaration of war, if we were sincere enough in our diplomatic effort.

General HAYASHI: As he had no data for his opinion, he could do nothing but to believe the decisions of the Imperial headquarters and the government.

General ABE: According to the government explanation, the negotiations had come to the deadlock in spite of the strenuous effort on the part of our government. He was sure that the government had studied the world

HIRANUMA, Ichiro (Continued)

political situation from various angles with laborious minuteness, and we were thankful for it. But it would be quite necessary to pay much more attention to the attitude of the Chinese people as to the war with the U.S.A., otherwise we would lose the fruits of the Chinese incident.

Mr. WAKATSUKI: The war should be fought to the last, even if there was no chance to win, if it was a defensive one for our national existence and independence, but we should avoid the war if we intended to realize our ideals such as "the Asiatic co-prosperity sphere" or "the stabilizing power in the Asia", because such a war would be very dangerous.

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HIROTA, Koki (former Premier)

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At 8.45 PM I was received in audience again and when Prince KONOYE's intention was reported, His Majesty was quite content.

HIROTA, K. (Continued)

7.16.41** - Full.

I went to my office at 10 PM. I was received in audience by the Emperor from 11 AM to 12 AM. General Norifumi YAMASHITA delivered a lecture in the Imperial Presence. I was allowed to hear it with the Emperor.

At 4 PM Marquis MATSUDAIRA telephoned me to say that the resignation en bloc of the cabinet had been decided at a special cabinet meeting. I had my audience of the Emperor from 4.10 PM to 4.20 PM. Prince KONOYE tendered the general resignation of his Ministry at 9 AM. I proceeded to the palace in response to a summons from His Majesty to receive the Imperial order as to the incoming cabinet as follows: As the premier tendered the general resignation of his Ministry, we ordered the Lord Chamberlain to invite the President of the Privy Council and the ex-premier to gather at the palace and to ask their opinions in order to reply to our question as to who was the suitable person for the post of the premier in the coming cabinet. I talked with the chief Secretary to arrange tomorrow's procedure, and went back home at 10.30 PM. I left for Tokyo by train leaving at 8.44 PM and proceeded to the palace. I met with Mr. HARA, president of the Privy Council, Mr. WAKATSUKI, Admiral OKADA, General ABE, Admiral YONAI, General HAYASHI and Mr. HIROTA at 1 pm. Mr. KANROJI, Vice Lord Chamberlain delivered the Imperial command, and then I expressed my opinion as follows:

The Emperor ordered me to gather your opinions before I should make a reply regarding the Premier of the successive cabinet to the throne. I, therefore, would like to have your frank opinion on this matter as I had in the previous case. Of course as you all know this was not a formal conference and no resolutions would be passed, but I should like to have a heart to heart talk in a friendly atmosphere. And our utterances in this place were expected to be kept in confidence.

The copy of the premier's resignation was circulated for reference. Mr. WAKATSUKI questioned me as to the purpose of the resignation and the diplomatic problems, and the breach of opinions between the premier and Foreign Minister; General ABE stressed the necessity of having Prince KONOYE as premier; Admiral OKADA recommended Prince KONOYE saying that no other person but Prince KONOYE could exercise general control over both the army and political circles; General HAYASHI had the same opinion as General ABE and Admiral OKADA; Mr. HARA had no different opinion from the above mentioned; Mr. HIROTA laid particular stress upon the reinforcement of G.H.Q. and the formation of a military cabinet, but he consented to the opinion of the rest upon my explanation of the establishment of G.H.Q. Admiral YONAI said that Prince KONOYE was the most suitable man to cope with the present difficulty. Mr. WAKATSUKI supported Prince KONOYE though his attitude was not positive. We recommended Prince KONOYE unanimously and closed our meeting at 2 AM. The Emperor and Empress returned to Tokyo from Hayama Villa. I visited the Emperor from 3.20 PM to 4.10 PM to report on the progress of our meeting, while the Lord Chamberlain telephoned to Prince KONOYE to request his presence at the palace. At 5.05 PM Prince KONOYE proceeded to the palace to receive the Imperial command to form a cabinet. Mr. OHASHI, Vice Foreign Minister, visited me at 5.50 PM to explain the compromise bill between the U.S.A. and this country.

HIROTA, Koki (Continued)

10.17.41* - Extract.

11 AM. Mr. MATSUDAIRA, Chief Secretary, visited me to make arrangement for the ex-premiers conference. It was held from 1.10 PM to 3.45 PM. in the west ante-room of the Palace. Those present were Viscount KIYOURA (92 years old), Mr. WAKATSUKI, Admiral OKADA, General HAYASHI, Mr. HIROTA, General ABE, Admiral YONAI, and Mr. HARA, President of the Privy Council. I explained the situation of the general resignation. Mr. WAKATSUKI recommended Gen. UGAKI as the succeeding premier. Gen. HAYASHI recommended the HIGASHIKUNI Cabinet.

I asserted that the most important things were the revision of the decision of the last council in the Imperial presence and the unity of opinion between the Army and the Navy. I offered the TOJO cabinet as a solution of these problems. I met no objection to my proposal, Mr. HIROTA, Gen. ABE, Mr. HARA, giving me positive approval. The meeting broke up at 4 PM. I reported to the Emperor the details of the progress of the ex-premiers conference and talked until 4.15 PM. The War Minister proceeded to the Palace on the request of the Emperor to receive the Imperial order to form a new cabinet. It was followed by the visit of Navy Minister OIKAWA to whom the Emperor gave a speech to the effect that the unity of opinions between the Army and the Navy were very desirable. I delivered to them in an ante-room the Imperial wish as follows: Deep consideration and careful attitude and freedom from the decision of the council on the 6th of September were things wished for in the establishment of the fundamental policy of this country.

11.29.41*E - Extract.

From 2 PM to 3 PM the Emperor asked the ex-premiers' opinions concerning the present political situation.

Mr. WAKATSUKI said that we were equal to a prolonged war with the U.S.A. in spiritual power, but regarding National power we must make a careful study. Admiral OKADA: He had grave doubts as to our supply capacity of war materials in spite of the optimistic view of the Government.

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Prince KONOYE: It was quite regrettable that our negotiations were going to be a failure in spite of our strenuous efforts of four months. But he was of the opinion that there would be no need to resort to a hasty war just because of the rupture of the negotiations; as we might be able to reach a wise solution in some way or other, while we were continuing our struggle towards better things.

Admiral YONAI: He said that he could not base his opinion on definite data, but it had been his desire that we should be careful not to become poorer by inches in the struggle against our national poverty, losing the little in our hands.

Mr. HIROTA: The diplomatic condition was approaching a serious crisis, but we should have iron nerves in order to reach a true solution of the problems, nerves which could meet courageously a crisis twice or thrice at least.

We should be able to seize an opportunity to solve the pending problems between the two countries even after the declaration of war, if we were sincere enough in our diplomatic effort.

General HAYASHI: As he had no data for his opinion, he could do nothing but to believe the decisions of the Imperial headquarters and the government.

HIROTA, Koki (Continued)

General ABE: According to the government explanation, the negotiations had come to the deadlock in spite of the strenuous effort on the part of our government. He was sure that the government had studied the world political situation from various angles with laborious minuteness, and we were thankful for it. But it would be quite necessary to pay much more attention to the attitude of the Chinese people as to the war with the U.S.A., otherwise we would lose the fruits of the Chinese incident.

Mr. WAKATSUKI: The war should be fought to the last, even if there was no chance to win, if it was a defensive one for our national existence, and independence, but we should avoid the war if we intended to realize our ideals such as "the Asiatic co-prosperity sphere" or "the stabilizing power in the Asia", because such a war would be very dangerous.

EXTRACTS FROM KIDO'S DIARY.

MATSUOKA, Yosuke (Foreign Minister)

8.9.40 E - Extract.

I was granted an audience and told the opinion represented by Foreign Minister MATSUOKA yesterday. MATSUOKA is making efforts to unify foreign policy and at the same time trying to avoid diplomatic isolation. It is, however, regrettable to learn that no definite policy has been established regarding the United States.

9.12.40* - Extract.

Prince KONOYE met me before and after he received audience with the Emperor and told me as follows:

Stalmer came recently from Germany and met Foreign Minister MATSUOKA three times, trying to make proposal to conclude a military alliance. When it was discussed at the four Ministers' Conference, the army immediately agreed, while the navy wishes to study it and is going to hold a liaison conference within several days. As this does not permit holding meetings for twenty or thirty times, a decision must be made somehow or other.

9.14.40* - Extract.

At 11.00 AM Foreign Minister MATSUOKA met me before and after he was received in audience and said that he was going to send an ultimatum to French Indo-China.

Following MATSUOKA, both His Highness Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Navy General Staff submitted a report to His Majesty. In this connection, I was received in audience and was told by His Majesty to the effect that Matsuoka's statement and that of the General Staff Office don't seem to exactly coincide, but there would be no other way out but to let the government carry out its policy under the present circumstances. Requested for my opinion, I said to His Majesty that if we let it go without doing anything, the mischief making of England and the United States would become more and more serious and an opportunity might be given to French Indo-China, too, in shaking hands with China. Therefore, I asked His Majesty to permit the government to go into action should it be necessary, provided it is under His Majesty's guidance.

The War Minister TOJO secretly told me that the army and navy had arrived at an agreement concerning the relation with Germany and Italy.

In the evening, Prince KONOYE phoned and asked me what should be done about Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's suggestion of including elder statesmen (Jushin) at the council in the Imperial presence in connection with strengthening of relations with Germany and Italy. I consulted with the War Minister and the Vice-Minister of the Navy Department on the matter, but both were against MATSUOKA's suggestion. Later MATSUOKA phoned me and cancelled his previous idea.

9.19.40* - Extract.

I was granted an audience and told of his Majesty's thought concerning the change of His Highnesses' (Princes') posts.

The Chief Aide-de-Camp came and disclosed secretly about the army's opinion on the above question, the outline of which is as follows:

His Majesty is of the opinion to ask for the retirement of both His Highnesses from the offices of the General Staff and of establishing the

MATSUOKA, Yosuke (Continued)

Board of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals since the present situation is increasingly grave. The offices of the Chief of the General Staff shall then be filled by subject. In connection with this, the Chief Aide-de-Camp consulted both the War and Navy Ministers and the army immediately agreed, while the navy found difficulty, opposing the retirement of His Highnesses. This was reported to His Majesty by the Chief Aide-de-Camp.

The cabinet submitted to His Majesty a plan for council in Imperial Presence, concerning military alliance with Germany and Italy.

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA was of the opinion that the above plan should not be consulted with the Privy Council, but His Majesty wanted to make inquiry of the Privy Council, and if it requires urgency, let the Council discuss the matter all night long. Thus both the Premier and the Foreign Minister became agreeable, and it was decided to hold a Privy Council meeting. The meeting was held for three hours from 3.00 PM.

10.22.40* - Extract.

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, after he was granted an audience, told me the following:

- (1) Hungary will participate in Japan-Germany-Italy alliance and it will quickly be materialized.
- (2) On the question of the alliance with Thailand, he intends to be very careful not to arouse the United States and England.
- (3) Councillor TAJIRI and MATSUMOTO are negotiating with a Chinese envoy in Hongkong on the Chungking operation. Much is expected as Chou Tsuo-min is also said to be going to Hongkong.
- (4) According to recent news it was found that the so-called Chungking operation has not been transmitted to Chiang Kai-shek so far. Chiang's peace proposal is rather severe and it seems as if he wants to bring conditions back to the one previous to the Umesu-Ho Yin-chin Agreement.

11.22.40** - Extract.

I was questioned by His Majesty regarding various foreign affairs. I called the Foreign Minister over the phone and learned as follows:-

Chiang Kai-shek having approved, in principle, MATSUOKA's proposal, wished negotiations to proceed and sent his chief secretary with his own letter to Hongkong by air. Since the materialization of the above will be almost impossible should Wang government be approved, Chiang wanted to postpone the conclusion of treaty. He also wished to keep it strictly secret as internal conditions of Chungking is quite complicated. Chiang further proposed withdrawal of our troops upon conclusion of the negotiation. Our policy will be decided at the Four Ministers' Conference to be held this afternoon and MATSUOKA believes Wang question can be postponed 'til 5th of the next month.

The foregoing report of the Foreign Minister was submitted to His Majesty Prince KONOYE was granted an audience and made a report of the Four Ministers' meeting. After that, discussed with him about Chungking operation, our Soviet Russia policy, establishment of a Minister Without Portfolio, and conclusion of negotiations with the Privy Council.

11.24.40*E - Extract.

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA was received in audience and reported to His Majesty to the effect that as a result of the liaison conference, Chungking

MATSUOKA, (uke (Continued)

operation will be disregarded and the signing of the treaty between ABE and Wang will be performed on the 30th.

1.20.41 E - Extract.

This morning Foreign Minister MATSUOKA reported to the Emperor about the Plan of Japan's mediation, if controversy between Thailand and French Indo-China.

This afternoon I was received in audience by the Emperor and the Emperor told me, that the War Minister called on the Emperor on January 18. Replying to the Imperial question, concerning Japanese operations in China, War Minister answered, that the Army intended to reduce the number of Japanese troops stationed in China. The Army would reduce the present number of over 700,000 to some 650,000, the War Minister replied, further adding, that the reduction would mean the saving of War expenses in China. However, the War Minister expressed his fear, before the Emperor, that with the reduced number, it would be difficult for the Japanese Army to properly maintain the occupied areas in China.

2.28.41 E - Extract.

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA proceeded to the Imperial Palace and reported to the Throne regarding the mediation plan for the settlement of the Thailand-French Indo-China border dispute. I talked with him before and after he had an audience with the Emperor. At eight in the evening MATSUOKA telephoned and informed me, that we had made a slight revision of our proposition to Siam, and negotiations were in progress from this morning, and they would be completed by the day after tomorrow at least. So I telephoned and asked the Chamberlain on duty, to report to the Emperor in private, that the negotiations would be completed soon, in spite of my previous report.

3.3.41 E - Extract.

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA was received in audience by the Emperor at 1.30 in the afternoon. Prince SAIONJI called at my room in the Department at the Imperial Household and he told me about Mr. IWASHITA and Mr. HARADA's visit to the United States.

3.13.41 E - Extract.

The protocol embodying Japan's mediation plan for the settlement of the border dispute between Thailand and French Indo-China was signed this evening. At seven PM I met the Foreign Minister, who had an audience with the Emperor. I left the Palace at 9.30 PM.

4.22.41 E - Extract.

Mr. MATSUOKA, the Foreign Minister, returned home from Europe today. He immediately proceeded to the palace to make a report to the throne. I met him and talked for a while.

5.3.41*E - Full.

I went to my office at 9 PM. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA proceeded to the Palace at 9.30 PM to report to the throne on the commercial treaty between

MATSUOKA, Osuke (Continued)

French Indo-China and this country. At 10 PM I talked with the Chief Aide-de-Camp about the prevailing situation, both in U.S.A. and in Europe. I had a talk with the Lord Chamberlain on the matter of the Imperial presence to the coming social gathering of the Imperial family. At 11 PM I met with Mr. MATSUOKA. I talked with him after his being received in audience by the Emperor. I was received in audience by the Emperor from 11.45 to 12.05 AM. The Emperor talked about what Mr. MATSUOKA had said to him concerning Ambassador NOMURA's asking for instructions regarding his meeting with Secretary of State HULL. Mr. Kamezo NISHIHARA came to my office to talk at 1.30 AM. I went to my office again at 7 AM. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA proceeded to the palace again at 7 AM to report on the progress, and decision of the liaison conference as to the instructions in response to NOMURA's request. I talked with Mr. MATSUOKA after he had receded from the presence of the Emperor. I returned home at 8.30 in the evening.

5.8.41 E - Extract.

I was received in audience by His Majesty, the Emperor, from 1.20 AM to 1.40 AM. He requested my opinion as to his questions to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA. Mr. MATSUOKA proceeded to the palace at two in the afternoon. We met and talked. The Lord Chamberlain called on me at my office at the same time to talk over the mental attitude of His Majesty the Emperor. Mr. TOMITA, the chief secretary to the Cabinet, visited my house to talk with me.

5.12.41 E - Full.

I had a visit from Mr. HAZAMA who made a report on the latest condition of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. At 9 PM Mr. HISATADA HIROSE visited me to give his impression of the investigation trip in the Chinese continent from where he had lately returned. I had a visit from the Director of the clothing depot at 10 PM. I went to my office at 10.30 PM. I was received in an audience by the Emperor from 11.15 PM to 11.20 PM and from 11.30 PM to 12 PM to report chiefly on the subject of our measure towards U.S.A. Prince KONOYE telephoned at 12.15 AM to make previous arrangement as to instruction to Ambassador NOMURA. I had my audience of the Emperor from 1.25 AM to 1.30 AM to report on my conversation with Prince KONOYE. At 1.30 AM I heard from Mr. YAMAZAKI, the Superintendent-General of Metropolitan Police on the latest situation of Public peace. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA proceeded to the Palace at 3.30 and had his audience of His Majesty the Emperor to report that the government had sent instructions to Mr. NOMURA.

5.22.41 E - Extract.

I was received in an audience by the Emperor at 3.40 AM. The Emperor told me about the report of the War Minister and the leakage of the talk between Mr. HULL and Mr. NOMURA. I retired from the Imperial presence at 3.50 AM. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA proceeded to the Palace. I met him at the Palace.

5.30.41 E - Extract.

Prince KONOYE called on me at my office on his way home from the Court dinner. We had a talk on the responsibility of the Cabinet. I was received in an audience by the Emperor from 2.20 PM to 3 PM to report a Domei News

MATSUOKA, Mutsu (Continued)

of President ROOSEVELT's speech. Prince KONOYE telephoned to inform me of the circumstances of Mr. MATSUOKA's speech. I was received in audience by His Majesty the Emperor from 1.20 AM to 1.30 AM to report what I had heard from Prince KONOYE. Mr. MATSUOKA proceeded to the throne, and after his recession from the presence of the Emperor, I had a talk with him.

6.6.41**E - Extract.

At nine in the morning Prince KONOYE telephoned me to say that Ambassador OSHIMA had an interview with Fuehrer HITLER at Berchtesgaden. And according to the report of the Ambassador, it seemed that Germany had at last decided to attack RUSSIA and Fuehrer HITLER had made an indirect demand of the joint front against Russia, though he did not say so positively. Prince KONOYE also said that a liaison conference was held to consider the report of the Ambassador this morning, and he asked me to report what he had said to me to the Throne.

I had my audience of the Emperor to do what I had been asked by Premier KONOYE from 10.20 to 11.05 PM. I proceeded to the palace in response to a summons from His Majesty, and was received in audience by the Emperor to answer the Imperial questions from 10.20 PM to 11.05 PM. I had a talk with the chief aide-de-camp at 11.10 PM and asked him to keep in close touch with me with regard to this subject. Premier KONOYE made Mr. HOSCHAWA, Secretary to the Premier, bring the telegram of Ambassador OSHIMA to me, asking me to study it. I read it and returned it. I was granted an audience to the Emperor from 1.10 AM to 1.30 AM to report on the outline of the telegram. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA proceeded to the Palace, and was received in audience by the Emperor to report on the recognition of Croatia and on the telegram of Ambassador OSHIMA. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA intimated to me his prospect of the relation between Soviet and Germany. According to his opinion, the probability of the outbreak of war was not great in spite of Ambassador OSHIMA's opinion. I had a visit from Viscount MATSUDAIRA, Minister of the Imperial Household Department, from whom I heard that WAN CHING WEI would visit this country at the earliest opportunity and that the change of the Lord Chamberlain would be enacted soon. At three in the afternoon the chief aide-de-camp brought me the opinion of the War Minister concerning the relation between Soviet and Germany, which confirmed the opinion of the Foreign Minister, that the outbreak of War was not so immediate, as expected by Ambassador OSHIMA. I had a talk with Mr. MATSUOKA from 4.45 AM to 5.30 AM. I went to the palace in response to the Imperial summons, and had my audience of the Emperor, to talk over Mr. MATSUOKA's report to the Throne. I returned home at 6.30 AM and went to Restaurant Koyo in Shiba ward Tokyo, to attend the Rokunichi (the sixth day) party.

6.17.41 * - Full.

I went to my office at ten in the morning. I had my audience of the Emperor from 10.10 PM to 11.15 PM. I had a visit from the chief aide-de-camp to the Emperor, who made a report on the declaration of the Foreign Minister in the liaison conference held yesterday that he could not report on the occupation of French Indo-China, which would be a great breach of international faith, and that he would urge the army and navy to reconsider. I had a visit from Mr. HIDAKA, Minister to China, who informed me of the opinion of WAN CHIN WEI regarding the Imperial family. I was received in an audience by the Emperor to report on the proposal of Mr. MATSUOKA in the liaison conference. At 2 AM Mr. Kazuo AOKI proceeded to the palace to report on

MATSUOKA, Mutsuko (Continued)

matters under the jurisdiction of the Finance Department and I was also allowed to hear it.

6.18.41* - Full.

Mr. MIKIMOTO came to my house at nine in the morning. I went to my office. I had a visit from the Premier and the Foreign Minister, who told me that instructions had been sent to Berlin to ask the German Government to negotiate with the Vichy Government on the French Indo-China Problem. At 11.30 WAN CHIN WEI proceeded to the palace to attend the Imperial luncheon. I was also allowed to participate in this luncheon. I was received in an audience by the Emperor from 2.25 AM to 3 AM to report what I had heard from Foreign Minister MATSUOKA. I had a visit from Mr. SUO, with whom I consulted on the matter of Mr. AKIGA, the lawyer.

6.19.41* - Extract.

I was called by Mr. HASHIMOTO, Director of the Police Bureau, who told me about the recent situation of Public peace and order. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA telephoned to report that according to a Reuter telegram from London, Germany had already begun to advance to the Russian front, although this telegram remained to be confirmed yet. I was received in an audience by the Emperor from 1.05 AM to 1.40 AM to report on the telephone message from the Foreign Minister.

6.21.41** - Full.

Mr. Kakichi IMMI came to my house to see me at 9 PM. At 11.50 PM Foreign Minister MATSUOKA telephoned me to say that the news concerning the interview with the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo was not correct. I was received in an audience by the Emperor from 1.15 AM to 2.05 AM. I heard State Minister OGURA's economic policy at 3 AM. I attended the reception party of Mr. WANG CHIN WEI at the Imperial Hotel at five in the evening. At 6.30 AM I went to the spare residence of Prince KONOYE at Mojiro to dine with Prince KONOYE and Baron HIRANUMA and to exchange our opinions concerning the current problems.

The gist of our talk was as follows: If the war between Germany and Soviet breaks out, it would prove a serious hindrance to the Alliance with Germany, as was the case with the anti-war pact between Germany and Soviet Russia, signed when Baron HIRANUMA was the premier. Prince KONOYE, therefore said that it would be necessary for the Cabinet to bear the responsibility. I objected to Prince KONOYE's opinion, saying that in case of the HIRANUMA cabinet, Germany signed the anti-war treaty with Soviet, that had long been our hypothetical enemy, before the members of the HIRANUMA cabinet reached a complete agreement as to the opening of war against Soviet; the resignation of Baron HIRANUMA from the post of Premiership was therefore nothing but to shoulder the responsibility for his own lack of sagacity that had come out on account of an unexpected incident, for Baron HIRANUMA had long emphasized the necessity of attacking Russia to the throne; One of the very important objects of the alliance with Germany was to promote our diplomatic relations with Soviet, a fact which Germany knew and had a complete understanding; moreover Germany did not show any objection to the neutrality treaty between Soviet and Japan; And the present war between Germany and Soviet was not a surprise attack to our diplomatic policy, for Ambassador OSHIMA had been informed, though it was informally, about the attitude of Germany toward

MATSUOKA, Yosuke (Continued)

Soviet, thus leaving much time for the government to make up measures to cope with the situation; If the KONOYE cabinet would resign, it would create undesirable precedent.

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA was not clear in his attitude. At the time when this country was facing a critical moment, it was not undesirable for us to incur a split of the cabinet. As for the split of the cabinet, we should do everything to avoid it, for it would disgrace the honour of this country to get a by-blow of other country's movement and to break up the cabinet. The Premier was expected to assume his leading power, if the following three cases should arise:

1. In case of a war between Germany and Soviet.
1. In case of the participation of America in the war.
1. In case of our having an answer from the U.S.A.

I went home at 10.30 AM.

6.22.41*E - Extract.

At 2 AM Mr. SUZUKI, President of the Planning Board, telephoned saying that the official report of the war between Soviet and Germany had been received. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA telephoned to say that the official report of the war between Soviet and Germany from Ambassador OSHIMA had been received. So I asked Mr. TOKUGAWA, the gentleman in waiting on duty, to consult the Imperial convenience to see me. And I proceeded to the palace at the request of the Emperor at 5.30 AM to have my audience of the Emperor. Before Foreign Minister MATSUOKA had his audience of the Emperor, I was received in audience by the Emperor to present my opinion based on my talk with Prince KONOYE and Baron HIRANUMA as follows: There was a difference between the Premier and the Foreign Minister concerning our foreign policy that we are to follow in case of war between Germany and Soviet. As the war would have a predominant influence upon the future of this country, it was very desirable that His Majesty the Emperor would ask Foreign Minister MATSUOKA whether his opinions were approved by the Premier or not, and if not, prevail upon him to follow Prince KONOYE's opinion, as our policy towards the war would bear a great influence on our future.

At 5.30 AM Foreign Minister MATSUOKA had his audience of the Emperor. After that I was requested to proceed to the palace and was received in audience from 6.40 AM to 6.50 AM. The Emperor asked me if we follow Mr. MATSUOKA's foreign policy would it result in the positive penetration of our army and navy both in South and North; if it were agreed between the Supreme Command and the government; and whether we had enough national power to meet such a preponderant military operation. I, therefore, telephoned to Prince KONOYE to consult with him, but I found he was not at home. Then I telephoned Baron HIRANUMA to say that it was desirable for him to pay careful consideration to the matter. At 9.30 AM I telephoned Prince KONOYE to report the progress of Mr. MATSUOKA's audience of the Emperor and to ask him to arrange a harmonious understanding with Mr. MATSUOKA as to national policy in the liaison conference of the cabinet. At 12.30 PM Prince KONOYE telephoned me to say that he had a visit from Mr. MATSUOKA just now, who explained that what he had reported to the throne yesterday was his prospect of the future and not his thought that should be translated as going into action immediately.

6.26.41 E - Full.

Mr. MATSUI visited me at nine in the morning. The Chief Aide-de-camp to the Emperor called on me at my office to talk about the war of Germany

MATSUOKA, Suke (Continued)

with Soviet and the reinforcement of the Imperial Headquarters. Mr. OKURA, Minister of State, had his audience of the Emperor at 11 PM, after which I had a talk with him. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA proceeded to the palace at 2 AM to explain his perspective on the war between Germany and Soviet. Mr. Ryota WATANABE called on me at my office. I went to the Peer's Club with my wife to attend the party for Mrs. Michiko ITO, who made her first call on her parents after her marriage.

7.4.41 E - Extract.

Mr. Genki ABE visited at 9 AM to express his opinion on the penetration of the Japanese influence into the South. I visited the Emperor from 10.15 AM to 11.30 AM to hear of the progress in the privy council held yesterday. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA had visited the Emperor and after his recession from the Imperial presence I met him. At 3.30 PM TOJO visited the Emperor and I talked to TOJO on his withdrawal from the Imperial presence. I went home at 4.30 PM. At 4.30 PM Mr. NIKAI and at 5.30 PM Mr. Toyosaburo TOMITA visited with his wife.

7.5.41*E - Full.

Mr. SURITATE visited at nine AM. I visited the Emperor from 10.20 to 11.35 AM. The Emperor was pleased to notify me of the complicated elements within the army. Mr. YAMAZAKI, Superintendent-General of Metropolitan Police visited me to report on the public peace and order. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA proceeded to the palace at 2 PM, and we talked about his recession at the Imperial presence. He said the details of the diplomatic parley between France and Japan concerning our occupation in French Indo-China seemed to have leaked into England, for Ambassador CRAIGIE lodged a protest with us through Mr. CHISHI, Vice Foreign Minister, saying that if the understanding reached between France and Japan were true, England would consider it a positive menace to her safety. Therefore the negotiations were postponed and to see the development about this issue for five days. I went home at 4 PM. Mr. Fumihide OKUDA visited at 4.30 PM. I attended the Muika (sixth day) party at Koyohan restaurant at 6 PM. Mr. Fumikichi ITO visited at 9.30 PM. Prince KONOYE telephoned at ten AM to say that an autographed letter from Mr. HULL had come.

7.15.41** - Full.

Mr. MATSUDAIRA visited from Tokyo at eight AM. He came to report on the outcome of his meeting with Premier KONOYE: Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's attitude towards the agreement between the U.S.A. and Japan was uncompromising. Until yesterday the Premier was not without hope that he could make Foreign Minister MATSUOKA consent to the scheme prepared by the Director of Military Affairs and the Director of Naval Affairs after a slight amendment. Although Foreign Minister had no objection to the compromise, he insisted on giving instructions to the Ambassador in Washington to the effect that he should file a protest against the oral statement of Mr. Cordell HULL which, we consider has brought disgrace on this nation. After that he said that he would wire a compromise to Admiral Kichisaburo NOMURA. But Prince KONOYE was of the opinion that our compromise and protest should be wired at the same time, for if we followed MATSUOKA's idea, the parley at Washington would end in failure. As Mr. SAITO, an adviser to the Foreign Office was in favor of Foreign Minister's idea, but the Premier contradicted Mr. SAITO and sent him to Mr. MATSUOKA to obtain his approval towards the Premier's opinion. This was the condition up to 10.50 AM yesterday. At 1.30 AM Prince

MATSUOKA, Yosuke (Continued)

KONOYE telephoned me to say that he had waited long for MATSUOKA's answer in vain so he sent Director TERAZAKI to Mr. MATSUOKA to hold an inquiry into the circumstances with the result that he had sent his instructions by himself and not through the medium of the competent director and that he intended to call on me at Hayama to work out remedial measures.

I had a conference with the chief secretary as to the matter of the resignation en bloc of the Cabinet which was expected under these circumstances. At this time when the tension prevailing over the people regarding the present political situation was so strong that even the higher schools were closed throughout the country lest an unexpected disturbance should arise, the resignation en bloc of the cabinet for some occult reason, unknown to the people, should be avoided by all means. For this purpose we would have to try whatever possible to obtain, first of all, the resignation of Foreign Minister, but we made a resolution to prevail upon the Emperor and issue the Imperial command to form a new cabinet to Prince KONOYE again to tide over the difficult political situation for fear of our failure in our effort to make Foreign Minister resign, and the resignation en bloc of the cabinet as a result of it.

I went to my office at 11 PM. I was received in audience by the Emperor from 1.35 PM to 2 PM to report the above circumstances. Prince KONOYE visited me from Tokyo at 3 PM. We had a talk until 4.20 PM. What I had heard from the premier was almost the same as the information that I had received from Chief Secretary.

I thought it was advisable to urge Mr. MATSUOKA's resignation to avoid the change of the cabinet, but the Premier disagreed with me saying that if it should be done, Mr. MATSUOKA and his party would make a propaganda that the cause which had compelled his resignation was nothing but the oppression on the part of the U.S.A. upon our government, thus leading to the utter failure in the parley at Washington. I went to Zushi after six PM. Mr. TOYOJIRO and his wife visited me to say that the marriage proposal between TAZUMI and NOBUKO, daughter of Marquis KOMATSU was almost decided, as there was no objection to it on the part of Mr. KOMATSUKIKO. TAKAZUMI and TAKAHIKI (KIDO's sons) came at night.

12. 9.41 E - Extract.

Mr. Teisaburo SEKIYA visited me at 11.30 AM. Mr. HARA, President of the Privy Council visited me at noon. At 1.15 PM Mr. Genki ABE visited me. Mr. MATSUOKA visited the Emperor to pay his respects to His Majesty. He was in high spirits. At 3 PM Foreign Minister TOGO visited the Emperor.

EXTRACTS FROM KIDO DIARY.

NAGANO, Osami - Admiral.

(Chief of Naval General Staff.)

6.25.41 E - Full.

Mr. HASHIMOTO, Director of the Police Bureau, came to my house and reported that echoes had been found in responsible quarters in this country. 9 PM I went to Tokyo station to send off Mr. WAN CHIN WEI. After this I had an interview with Prince KONOYE, who said that he had a private talk with WAN CHIN WEI last night, when WAN had expressed his opinion regarding general peace between China and Japan, saying that for that purpose it was quite necessary to have the collaboration of Li Tsung-jen and Haku su ki, as well as the mutual understanding with Chiang Chung-Cheng with the aid of the U.S.A., though it might make the Pro-America politicians gain influence once more; To meet this situation we would have to post our partisans in the government, and as for the adjustment of relations between the Chungking government and that of WAN CHIN WEI, I left it in the hands of Mr. TOYAMA. It was very difficult to carry out our policy on the continent on account of bad liaison between G.H.Q. of Japanese expeditionary force to China and other parts of the army, although the former had a full understanding of our policy. corrupt practices of the army in China could not be too severely criticized.

At 9.20 PM Mr. Karoyu NOMURA paid me a visit to talk with me. From 10.45 PM to 11.35 PM I was received in audience by the Emperor. At 1 AM I consulted with the chief aide-de-camp to the throne as to the place of the liaison conference with other cabinet ministers and on other pending problems. I went home, and then I left home again for the Empress Dowager's palace to offer my congratulations on her birthday. Premier, Chief of the General Staff, and Chief of Naval General Staff proceeded to the palace to report on the decisions of the liaison conference regarding French Indo-China problems, at 4 AM. I met Prince KONOYE at 4.30 AM and had a talk with him for a while. I had my audience of the Emperor from 4.55 AM to 5.10 AM. Towards evening I visited Dr. WATANABE and received his treatment.

7.31.41** - Full.

Mr. HASHIMOTO, the Director of the Police Bureau, visited and reported on the present condition of public peace and order. From 10.15 AM to 11 AM I was received in audience by the Emperor to hear his talk upon the report of Admiral NAGANO concerning the Imperial question as to our policy towards the U.S.A. as follows:

1. His opinion regarding the war was the same with Prince FUSHIMI. He said that we should focus our effort on the endeavour to avoid war as much as possible.
1. He entertained a strong opposition to the triple Alliance, which was, according to his opinion, a great hindrance to restore the friendship between America and Japan.
1. If the restoration of diplomatic relations between the U.S.A. and Japan were impossible, we would be cut off from supplies of oil, our store of which would run out in two years, if we left the matter as it was. And if we opened a war with the U.S.A. the supply of oil would fail in one and a half years. Under these circumstances, he was of the opinion that the bolder course would be the better.
1. According to the report of the Navy Department, the future prospects of the war was not so discouraging, and he was of the opinion that we would gain a victory, if it was not a sweeping

NAGANO, Gami - Admiral (Continued)

victory, as we secured in the Russo-Japanese War. But Admiral NAGANO's opinion concerning the war was quite pessimistic.

1. I was filled with trepidation by the Imperial anxiety that our war against the U.S.A. would be a hopeless one.

My answer to the Imperial speech was as follows:

1. Admiral NAGANO's opinion was too simple.

1. The U.S.A. recognised the existence of the Triple Alliance pact in our previous parley with America and I was very doubtful whether we could deepen the confidence of the U.S.A. for us by the act of annulment of the treaty, as the U.S.A. was a nation which showed a respect for an international treaty. We would only be held in contempt by the U.S.A. We were not quite out of means of the restoration of the friendship between America and Japan. We must deliberate on the matter in a constructive manner. I would demand the Premier's careful consideration on this point. I met with Navy Minister OIKAWA at noon to talk over Admiral NAGANO's report to the throne. The Chief Aide-de-camp to the Emperor visited me at 1 P.M. to talk with me on the same subject. Count KANROJI called on me to deliver Marquis KOMATSU's answer as to the marriage of TAKAZUMI to Miss SUZUKO to the effect that Marquis was very much interested to proceed with the proposal. I was very satisfied with the answer. Prince KONOYE visited me in my office. I talked with him after his retirement from the Imperial presence from 3.40 PM to 4.05 PM. Mr. TERAZAKI, the Director of American Bureau of the Foreign Office, visited me in my house to give me a telegram.

11.30.41*E - Extract.

I visited the Emperor in response to his request at 3.30 PM. The Emperor said that Prince TAKAMATSU had expressed the Navy's pessimistic opinion as to the war to his great anxiety, wishing for the avoidance of the war as much as possible. I advised him to ask the opinions of the Navy Minister and the Chief of the Naval General Staff and the premier, for the situation was really grave. We could not be too prudent in the matter. At 6.30 PM I visited the Emperor in response to his request. The Emperor said that he had ordered the premier to act according to program on account of the affirmative answers of Navy Minister and the Chief of the Navy General Staff concerning the question as to the success of the war.

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EXTRACTS FROM KIDO'S DIARY.

OIKAWA, Koshiro - Admiral (Navy Minister)

and himself: The other day Foreign Minister
MATSUOKA visited Count MAKINO/

6.30.41 E - Full.

Mr. Ippo SURITATE visited me at nine in the morning. I met with Foreign Minister MATSUOKA after he had retired from the Imperial presence at 12.15 AM. The chief aide-de-camp to the Emperor visited me at one in the afternoon to discuss the Soviet problems. I saw and talked with the Emperor from 2.25 AM. to 2.40 AM. The Emperor informed me of Mr. MATSUOKA's report. I telephoned to Prince KONOYE at 2.50 AM to inform him on the matter which Foreign Minister MATSUOKA had reported to the throne. Count KABAYAMA called on me at my office at 3 AM and told me as follows, saying that it was the outline of the conversation between Count MAKINO/and expressed his determination to assume the premiership if it were the Imperial will, though it was his opinion that no one but Prince KONOYE could tide over the present serious situation. At three Navy Minister OIKAWA proceeded to the palace and he visited me after his audience of the Emperor. I talked with him about our measure towards Soviet. The Juichi (eleventh) party was held at six in the evening; those present were Mr. SAKAI, Mr. KOROKEI, Count OKABE, Mr. YANAZISAWA, Mr. URAMATSU and Mr. SASAKI. We discussed the war of Germany with Soviet. Prince KONOYE visited me at 9.40 AM and we discussed keenly our foreign policy to meet the war between Soviet and Germany; the condition of Cabinet liaison conference; our policy towards U.S.A., and the incomprehensible attitude of Mr. MATSUOKA.

7.31.41** - Full.

Mr. HASHIMOTO, the Director of the Police Bureau, visited and reported on the present condition of public peace and order. From 10.15 AM to 11 AM I was received in audience by the Emperor to hear his talk upon the report of Admiral NAGANO concerning the Imperial question as to our policy towards the U.S.A. as follows:

1. His opinion regarding the war was the same with Prince FUSHIMI. He said that we should focus our effort on the endeavour to avoid the war as much as possible.

1. He entertained a strong opposition to the triple Alliance, which was, according to his opinion, a great hindrance to restore the friendship between America and Japan.

1. If the restoration of diplomatic relations between the U.S.A. and Japan were impossible, we would be cut off from supplies of oil, our store of which would run out in two years, if we left the matter as it was. And if we opened a war with the U.S.A. the supply of oil would fail in one and a half years. Under these circumstances, he was of the opinion that the bolder course would be the better.

1. According to the report of the Navy Department, the future prospects of the war was not so discouraging, and he was of the opinion that we would gain a victory, if it was not a sweeping victory as we secured in the Russo-Japanese War. But Admiral NAGANO's opinion concerning the war was quite pessimistic.

1. I was filled with trepidation by the Imperial anxiety that our war against the U.S.A. would be a hopeless one.

My answer to the Imperial speech was as follows:

1. Admiral NAGANO's opinion was too simple.

1. The U.S.A. recognized the existence of the Triple Alliance pact in our previous parley with America and I was very doubtful whether we could deepen the confidence of the U.S.A. for us by the act of annulment of the treaty, as the U.S.A. was a nation which showed a respect for an international

OIKAWA, Koshiro - Admiral (Continued)

treaty. We would only be held in contempt by the U.S.A. We were not quite out of means of the restoration of the friendship between America and Japan. We must deliberate on the matter in a constructive manner. I would demand the Premier's careful consideration on this point. I met with Navy Minister OIKAWA at noon to talk over Admiral NAGANO's report to the throne. The Chief Aide-de-camp to the Emperor visited me at 1 AM to talk with me on the same subject. Count KANROJI called on me to deliver Marquis KOMATSU's answer as to the marriage of TAKAZUMI to Miss SUZUKO to the effect that Marquis was very much interested to proceed with the proposal. I was very satisfied with the answer. Prince KONOYE visited me in my office. I talked with him after his retirement from the Imperial presence from 3.40 PM to 4.05 PM. Mr. TERAZAKI, the Director of American Bureau of the Foreign Office, visited me in my house to give me a telegram.

10.12.41** - Extract.

At 10 AM Mr. KINGO KOYAMA called on me to express deep resentment at the present condition of the political world, urging all possible efforts of the Premier. Major General KATO visited at my house to explain the Military police's interpretation of the present condition. Mr. TOMITA, Chief Secretary to the cabinet, visited me to say as follows: War and Navy and Foreign Ministers were going to hold a meeting in Prince's house at Jgikubo at 2 PM to discuss the adjustment of the diplomatic relation between the U.S.A. and Japan.

War Minister opined that as there was little room for a compromise between these countries, we should determine our attack upon the U.S.A. as soon as possible; Yet as it was not for the Army's own pleasure that they had been expressing their demand for a war, they were quite ready to follow the premier's opinion, if what he would say was convincing enough. Navy Minister said that we should try to avoid war as much as possible. Now this country was standing at a cross-roads, having two ways to choose; One is the restoration of a friendly relationship by diplomatic negotiations; the other the declaration of war on the U.S.A. If the former was our choice, we must bring about a full understanding between the two countries by convincing the U.S.A. of the bona fides of our friendship towards the U.S.A., for a war after a patched-up compromise would be most undesirable. Anyhow the Premier's strong determination was the most urgent matter. The premier expressed his firm conviction on the successful conclusion of the parley, asking their co-operation with his policy. Foreign Minister was of the opinion that he was not quite sure of the outcome of the parley, although he could not flatly deny the completion of the meeting in success. They made the following agreement among themselves on the advice of War Minister: Our demand regarding the stationing of troops should not be altered; the acquired result of the Chinese incident should be secured by all means; We should further our parley on these agreements leaving off our preparation of War.

10.17.41 E - Extract.

11 AM Mr. MATSUDAIRA, Chief Secretary, visited me to make arrangement for the ex-premiers conference. It was held from 1.10 PM to 3.45 PM in the west ante-room of the Palace. Those present were Viscount KIYOURA (92 years old), Mr. WAKATSUKI, Admiral OKADA, Gen. HAYASHI, Mr. HIROTA, Gen. ABE, Admiral YONAI, and Mr. HARA, President of the Privy Council. I explained the situation of the general resignation. Mr. WAKATSUKI recommended Gen. UGAKI as the succeeding premier. Gen. HAYASHI recommended the HIGASHIKUNI Cabinet.

OIKAWA, K. Hiro - Admiral (Continued)

I asserted that the most important things were the revision of the decision of the last council in the Imperial presence and the unity of opinion between the army and the navy. I offered the TOJO cabinet as a solution of these problems. I met no objection to my proposal, Mr. HIROTA, Gen. ABE, Mr. HARA, giving me positive approval. The meeting broke up at 4 PM. I reported to the Emperor the details of the progress of the ex-premiers conference and talked until 4.15 PM. The War Minister proceeded to the Palace on the request of the Emperor to receive the Imperial order to form a new cabinet. It was followed by the visit of Navy Minister OIKAWA to whom the Emperor gave a speech to the effect that the unity of opinions between the Army and the Navy were very desirable. I delivered to them in an ante-room the Imperial wish as follows: Deep consideration and careful attitude and freedom from the decision of the council on the 6th of September were things wished for in the establishment of the fundamental policy of this country.

EXTRACTS FROM KIDO'S DIARY.

SHIMADA, Shigetaro - Admiral (Navy Minister)

11.30 41 E - Extract.

I visited the Emperor in response to his request at 3.30 PM. The Emperor said that Prince TAKAMATSU had expressed the Navy's pessimistic opinion as to the war to his great anxiety, wishing for the avoidance of the war as much as possible. I advised him to ask the opinions of the Navy Minister and the Chief of the Naval General Staff and the premier, for the situation was really grave. We could not be too prudent in the matter. At 6.30 PM I visited the Emperor in response to his request. The Emperor said that he had ordered the premier to act according to program on account of the affirmative answers of Navy Minister and the chief of the Navy General Staff concerning the question as to the success of the war.

EXTRACTS FROM KIDO'S DIARY.

6.23.41* - Full.

SUZUKI, Teiichi - General. (President of Planning Board)

I went to my office at 10 PM. I talked with the chief aide-de-camp to the Emperor concerning the war of Germany with Soviet. From 10.30 PM to 11PM I was received in audience by the Emperor to report that what Mr. MATSUOKA said yesterday was nothing but his prospect as to the future. The Lord Chamberlain called on me at my office at 11.30 PM. I informed him what I had just reported to the throne. At 1 AM the chief aide-de-camp to the Emperor called on me to report the progress of the Chief of the General Staff's audience of His Majesty, the Emperor. Prince KONOYE proceeded to the palace. We talked from 2.40 AM to 4 AM, exchanging our frank opinions on the changed situation caused by the war of Germany against Soviet. I went to my official residence at 4.20 AM, which I had a call from General SUZUKI, President of the Planning Board, with whom I exchanged opinions. He put forth his opinion as to the simplification and reinforcement of the Imperial Headquarters. I agreed on principle but called his attention to his opinion concerning the ratification of the Board of Marshals and Admirals of the Fleet. I had a visit from Mr. YAMAZAKI, the Superintendent-General of Metropolitan Police, from whom I heard of the various influences of the war of Germany with Soviet upon this country. We exchanged opinions.

8.28.41 E - Extract.

Mr. Michinako KUBO visited me at 9.30 AM. Admiral NAGANO visited me at 11.30 AM to explain the details of the measures towards the U.S.A. and England. General SUZUKI, President of the Planning Board, visited the Emperor at 2.30 PM. After his recession from the presence of the Emperor I heard about National mobilization plan from him. War Minister TOJO visited the Emperor, I had a talk with him after his retirement from the presence of the Emperor. Mr. Genkin ABE visited me to talk about the situation at home and abroad.

10.13.41* - Extract.

I talked with the Emperor from 10.35 AM to 11.45 AM, the center of our conversation being our talk with Washington. The Emperor said as follows: Under the present condition, there would practically be no hope of the successful conclusion of the negotiations between the U.S.A. and this country. And we would have to issue an Imperial Proclamation of war on the morrow of our declaration of war upon the U.S.A. As for the attitude of the people towards an Imperial message, there were much to be desired, for they had always ignored his intention to emphasize the world peace and the hearty co-operation of the pen and the sword for that purpose, the intentions which were specially stressed in the message issued on the retirement from the League of Nations and that issued when the Triple Alliance pact had been signed. It was very regrettable that they were interpreting these messages as a challenge to both the U.S.A. and England, refusing to take notice of the real meaning of them. He said that it was his earnest desire that his real intention were materialized in the message of the proclamation of war by the aid of Prince KONOYE and me.

When we were going to make our decisions regarding the war against the U.S.A., we would have to pay much more attention to the European situation. We should use diplomacy to prevent Germany to make peace with England and the Soviet, leading her to co-operate with us in the war against the U.S.A.

SUZUKI, T. Hichi - General (Continued)

It was quite necessary to establish adequate measures to meet the armistice beforehand. For this purpose we should cultivate friendly relations with the Vatican, dispatching our envoy to the Pope.

Prince KONOYE proceeded to the palace and had a talk with the Emperor from 3 PM to 4 PM discussing the American problems. The Foreign Minister visited the Emperor at 5 PM. I talked with him from 5.30 to 6.30 PM. General Suzuki, Director of the Planning Board, visited me at 8 PM to talk about his political views which might contribute in some way to the making of a new turn in our political condition. I expressed my opinion to him. Our conclusion of the talk was this: The Premier should make an effort to promote mutual understanding with the War and Navy Ministers.

10.15.41** - Extract.

Mr. TATE visited me at 9 AM. At 9.30 AM Gen. SUZUKI, Director of the Planning Board, visited me to deliver War Minister TOJO's opinion as follows: If the Premier would not change his attitude the general resignation of the cabinet would not be avoided. And as for the succeeding premier, although the War Minister did not mention the name, he made it essential to the next premier that he could harmonize the Army and the Navy with the Imperial will. When one considered this point, it would be very difficult to find a suitable person among the Japanese subjects. He mentioned Prince HIGASHIKUNI as an example of the next premier. To this I answered that we should be very careful for it was a matter concerned with a price of blood. And if we had to ask the Prince's acceptance of premiership, a common policy between the Army and the Navy should be worked out beforehand; the establishment of an independent policy took the precedence of all others. I asked if War Minister had any reasonable prospects on this point.

I went to the office at 11 AM. Prince KONOYE visited me to ask my opinion regarding the HIGASHIKUNI cabinet suggested by the Army. I answered that it was still under consideration. I requested Mr. MATSUDAIRA, Chief Secretary, that he should study the procedure of the materialization of the HIGASHIKUNI plan. I visited the Emperor from 1.15 PM to 2 PM to report upon the pressing political situation. Prince KONOYE visited me at 4 PM to say that he could not hold his premiership any more, for the breach with War Minister was becoming deeper every day until at last War Minister gave vent to his discontent, saying that he did not like to hold any further conversation with the premier, as he was not sure if he could stifle his feelings. Finally he asked my opinion regarding the proposed HIGASHIKUNI cabinet, so I opined that I did not know whether War Minister had changed his opinion in order to effect a compromise with the Navy or he was intending to put the Prince's shoulder to the wheel, and I had yet to know as to the real intention of War Minister.

I telephoned to the President of the Planning Board to request of his visit.

I visited the Minister of the Imperial Household Department to talk about the HIGASHIKUNI cabinet plan. The astonished Minister strongly objected to this plan. At 4.30 PM Gen. SUZUKI, President of the Planning Board, visited me. I asked him as to the real meaning of the War Minister's intention, but in vain. I urged him to supply me with a definite report on this matter. The premier, who joined our conversation on his recession from the presence of the Emperor, said that the Emperor had not shown any particular objection to the HIGASHIKUNI cabinet, a cabinet which might be said to be an outcome of necessity, not of choice.

SUZUKI Eiichi - General (Continued)

I talked with the Premier until 8.30 PM regarding the political situation. At night Gen. SUZUKI telephoned to report on the result of his conversation with the Premier. According to his report, TOJO's purpose was to establish harmony between the Army and the Navy by the influence of the Prince and not to realize the desired harmony to pave the way for the cabinet. So I objected to the plan. The Prince telephoned to say that he wanted to secure an informal consent of the Prince. I answered that it would be too early to do so, though I had no objection to him so long as his action was in the capacity of premier. At the small hours before dawn the Premier telephoned to say that Prince HIGASHIKUNI asked for a few days consideration on his part and a meeting with War Minister and me. From 5.35 PM to 5.50 PM I made a report to the throne concerning Prince KONOYE's talk and asked the Imperial opinion as to the matter.

10.16.41** - Full.

At 8.30 AM Gen. SUZUKI visited to express his negative opinion regarding the HIGASHIKUNI cabinet, saying as follows:

1. The HIGASHIKUNI cabinet should not be brought into existence until although there was no difference in view between the Army and the Navy, but they were badly in need of the help of a price of blood to forget all that had happened between them.

1. It should be avoided by all means to shuffle every responsibility on the shoulders of the prince, leaving all difficulties unsettled.

1. On the one hand the HIGASHIKUNI cabinet would be a sad sign of a dearth of talent among the subjects, and on the other hand it would make a pretty bad mess of it, if the war with the U.S.A. broke out. In that case the Imperial House would become an object of common hatred. So a strong objection was raised by him to the idea to ask the help of a prince of blood to solve the problem which had some unknown reason to prevent the decision of Prince KONOYE in the council of the Imperial presence.

At 2 PM I talked with Foreign Minister TOYODA.

At 3 PM War Minister Tojo visited me to report on the pressing political situation. I expressed my objection to his idea of the HIGASHIKUNI Cabinet from the same standpoint which I had made clear to Gen. SUZUKI. I emphasized the revision of the resolution of the Council of the Imperial presence and the unity of the Army and the Navy in their policies, two fundamental factors without which no national progress would be expected.

At 4 PM Prince KONOYE telephoned to say that the cabinet was going to resign en bloc. I was astonished by its suddenness. I visited the Emperor at 4 PM to report upon the pending general resignation of the KONOYE cabinet. At 5 PM Prince KONOYE tendered the cabinet ministers resignations to the Throne. I was received in audience by the Emperor from 5.30 AM to 5.45 AM to answer the Imperial question regarding the succeeding cabinet.

EXTRACTS FROM KIDO'S DIARY.

TOGO, Shiganori. (Foreign Minister.)

11.28.41 E - Extract.

At 9 AM Mr. Kenji TOMITA visited me. At 11.20 Foreign Minister TOGO visited the Emperor to explain our policy towards the U.S.A. The situation was becoming more and more serious in character. I saw the Emperor from 1.15 PM to 1.40 PM. At 2.10 PM Mr. HARA, President of the Privy Council, called on me to consult about our measures with regards to the U.S.A., and the meeting of ex-premiers. At 9.30 PM Prince KONOYE visited me to talk about the measures regarding the U.S.A.

12.8.41 E - Extract.

Foreign Minister TOGO telephoned to consult the treatment of the personal telegram of President ROOSEVELT to the Emperor which had been said to be in the hand of Ambassador GREW. I advised him to consult with the premier as regards its diplomatic effect and procedure. I said that as far as the report to the throne, there would be no need of hesitation to do so, for the Emperor would not mind granting an audience even at midnight.

Foreign Minister TOGO proceeded to the palace, which was reported to me; so I went to the office at 2.40 AM to see the Minister. When I was climbing up the Akasaka slope, I saw the rising sun above a building over there. I thought it was symbolic of the destiny of this country that now had entered the war with the U.S.A. and England, the two greatest powers in the world. I closed my eyes and prayed for the victory of our navy planes making an attack upon the Pearl Harbour by that time.

At 7.30 AM I met with the Premier, the chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Navy General Staff. I heard from them of the great news of our successful attack upon Hawaii. I saw the Emperor at 11.40 AM and talked until 12 AM. I was very much impressed by the self-possessed attitude of the Emperor on this day. The Imperial Proclamation of War was issued.

12.9.41 E - Extract.

Mr. Teisaburo SEKIYA visited me at 11.30 AM. Mr. HARA, President of the Privy Council, visited me at noon. At 1.15 PM Mr. Genki ABE visited me. Mr. MITSUOKA visited the Emperor to pay his respects to His Majesty. He was in high spirits. At 3 PM Foreign Minister TOGO visited the Emperor.

12.10.41 E - Extract.

At 1 PM Foreign Minister TOGO visited the Emperor to report on the non-single-peace treaty signed among Germany, Italy and Japan. At 3 PM Mr. Shigeru KURIYAMA visited me to tell his impression of French Indo-China. I rejoiced at the news of our successful attack upon the Prince of Wales and Repulse off the coast of Malay Peninsula.

12.13.41 E - Extract.

At 10 AM Foreign Minister TOGO visited the Emperor. I had a talk with him. At 4.30 Mr. MIHASHI, a secretary, visited me to talk about an Imperial Edict.

EXTRACTS FROM KIDO'S DIARY.

TOJO, Hideki.

7.29.40* - Extract.

At 9.30 AM met Premier KONOYE and talked on material mobilization plan and other questions.

At 11.00 AM War Minister TOJO came up and expressed his intention in making efforts on the following four points:

- (1) Unification of political policy and warfare - correction of the Premier's robot-like position.
- (2) Adjustment of relation between the army and navy.
- (3) Adjustment of relation between the Supreme Commander's Office and the military policy.
- (4) Control over the military.

8.23.40** - Extract.

Learned from the Chief Aide-de-camp concerning his meeting with the Director of the Second Section DOBASHI and Special Service Agent SUZUKI from Hongkong regarding the Chungking operation.

SUZUKI strongly opposed revision of KONOYE statement which was requested by Chiang Kai-shek and Sung Tzu-liang withdrew the request after two days' delay during which time he consulted with Chungking. When SUZUKI asked if there is a counter-proposal, Prince KONOYE's autographed letter was requested. As a result of discussions we came to the conclusion that it might be a good idea to grant their request as long as the text of the letter shows no inconvenience even if it was made public. The Premier agreed to the suggestion made by SUZUKI and the War Minister, and handed over this letter, which said that the negotiation had been carried on since last January and since he understood ITAGAKI, the Chief of Staff, was to meet with Sung Tzu-liang (T.N. - probably Lung Tsu-liang), it would greatly help in promoting Japanese-Chinese friendship.

Regarding the suspension of war, the other party making a compromise, agreed to a meeting between the two representatives at Amoy.

When Suzuki met Sung Tzu-liang the latter requested a change in the phrase "to protect Chiang Kai-shek" as written in KONOYE's letter to, "in order to protect China."

Prince KONOYE phoned at 10.30 PM, saying that the proposed appointment of General KOISO as envoy to French Indo-China had been cancelled.

9.19.40* - Extract.

I was granted an audience and told of His Majesty's thought concerning the change of His Highnesses' (Princes') posts.

The Chief Aide-de-Camp came and disclosed secretly about the army's opinion on the above question, the outline of which is as follows:
His Majesty is of the opinion to ask for the retirement of both His Highnesses from the offices of the General Staff and of establishing the Board of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals since the present situation is increasingly grave. The offices of the Chief of the General Staff shall then be filled by subject. In connection with this, the Chief Aide-de-camp consulted both the War and Navy Ministers and the army immediately agreed, while the navy found difficulty, opposing the retirement of His Highnesses. This was reported to His Majesty by the Chief Aide-de-camp.

The cabinet submitted to His Majesty a plan for council in Imperial Presence, concerning military alliance with Germany and Italy.

TOJO, Hideki. (Continued)

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA was of the opinion that the above plan should not be consulted with the Privy Council, but His Majesty wanted to make inquiry of the Privy Council, and if it requires urgency, let the Council discuss the matter all night long. Thus both the Premier and the Foreign Minister became agreeable, and it was decided to hold a Privy Council meeting. The meeting was held for three hours from 3.00 PM.

1.20.41*E - Extract.

This morning Foreign Minister MATSUOKA reported to the Emperor about the Plan of Japan's mediation, if controversy between Thailand and French Indo-China.

This afternoon I was received in audience by the Emperor and the Emperor told me, that the War Minister called on the Emperor on January 18. Replying to the Imperial question, concerning Japanese operations in China, War Minister answered, that the Army intended to reduce the number of Japanese troops stationed in China. The Army would reduce the present number of over 700,000 to some 650,000, the War Minister replied, further adding, that the reduction would mean the saving of War expenses in China. However, the War Minister expressed his fear, before the Emperor, that with the reduced number, it would be difficult for the Japanese Army to properly maintain the occupied areas in China.

3.27.41 E - Extract.

War Minister TOJO was received in audience and after that he offered explanation of personal administration of the Imperial rule assistance association to me. Premier KONOYE called at my room at 1 PM and told me of the reform of the Imperial rule assistance association. Chief Secretary TOMITA called at my house and reported on current issues, such as the reform of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, and reinforcement and reconstruction of the cabinet. At 4 AM Vice-Minister KOJIMA of the Department of Commerce and Industry.

6.18.41* - Full.

Mr. MIKIMOTO came to my house at nine in the morning. I went to my office I had a visit from the Premier and the Foreign Minister, who told me that instructions had been sent to Berlin to ask the German government to negotiate with the Vichy Government on the French Indo-China Problem. At 11.30 WAN CHIN WEI proceeded to the palace to attend the Imperial luncheon. I was also allowed to participate in this luncheon. I was received in an audience by the Emperor from 2.25 AM to 3 AM to report what I had heard from Foreign Minister MATSUOKA. I had a visit from Mr. SUO, with whom I consulted on the matter of Mr. AKIGA, the lawyer.

6.28.41 E - Full.

Mr. MATSUI visited me at 9 PM. Mr. Tenno KODAMA called on me too. War Minister TOJO proceeded to the palace and after his recession from the presence of the Emperor we had a talk. He explained the following matters: the attitude of Kwantung Army towards the war of Germany with Soviet, which was said to be very calm; various informations from Ambassadors abroad regarding the same war; the latest phase in our disposal of Yen Hsi-shan, Li Tsung-jan and Poi Chung-hai; a plan "to rivet an armour plate on the Imperial G.H.Q.", and a suggestion to meet every day in the palace. I went to

TOJO, Hirohito. (Continued)

the house of Mr. Yasuziro TSUTSUMI at noon to attend a luncheon party. With my mother and Shigeo I attended the rite held for eve of the anniversary of the late Umako HOSHINO at Koyo restaurant.

7.4.41 E - Extract.

Mr. Genki ABE visited at 9 AM to express his opinion on the penetration of the Japanese influence into the South. I visited the Emperor from 10.15 AM to 11.30 AM to hear of the progress in the privy council held yesterday. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA had visited the Emperor and after his recession from the Imperial presence I met him. At 3.30 PM TOJO visited the Emperor and I talked to TOJO on his withdrawal from the Imperial presence. I went home at 4.30 PM. At 4.30 PM Mr. NAKAI and at 5.30 PM Mr. Toyosaburo TOMITA visited with his wife.

8.12.41 E - Extract.

War Minister TOJO proceeded to the Palace at 3 PM. I talked with him after his retirement from the Imperial presence. He made a report on our diplomatic relations with the U.S.A. and with the Soviet, and also on our disposal of Yen Hsi-shan.

8.20.41 E - Extract.

Minister of Justice, Mr. IWAMURA visited me to talk about Imperial amnesty accorded to Mr. TAKANO.

I visited the Emperor at 10.15 AM and talked until 10.45 AM. Foreign Minister TOYODA telephoned to report on the progress of our negotiations with the U.S.A. and England. I talked with the Chief Aide-de-camp to consult about the report of Col. IWAHATA who recently returned from abroad. War Minister visited me after his retirement from the presence of the Emperor to report on our disposal of Yen Hsi-shan.

9.11.41 E - Full.

War Minister TOJO visited me after his retirement from the presence of the Emperor to report on the result of his investigation into the preparation of war against the U.S.A.

Foreign Minister TOYODA visited the Emperor at 2 PM. After his visit to the Emperor we talked on the progress of the negotiations between the U.S.A. and Japan. I visited the Emperor from 2.55 PM to 3.40 PM. Mr. YAMAZAKI, Superintendent-General of Metropolitan Police Board, visited me to report on the condition of the public order and peace.

10.12.41** - Extract.

At 10 AM Mr. KUNIO KOYAMA called on me to express deep resentment at the present condition of the political world, urging all possible efforts of the Premier. Major General KATO visited at my house to explain the Military Police's interpretation of the present condition. Mr. TOMITA, Chief Secretary to the cabinet, visited me to say as follows: War and Navy and Foreign Ministers were going to hold a meeting in Prince's house at Ogikubo at 2 PM to discuss the adjustment of the diplomatic relation between the U.S.A. and Japan.

War Minister opined that as there was little room for a compromise between these countries, we should determine our attack upon the U.S.A. as soon as possible; Yet as it was not for the Army's own pleasure that they had been

TOJO, Keiki (Continued)

expressing their demand for a war, they were quite ready to follow the premier's opinion, if what he would say was convincing enough. Navy Minister said that we should try to avoid war as much as possible. Now this country was standing at a cross-roads, having two ways to choose; One is the restoration of a friendly relationship by diplomatic negotiations; the other the declaration of war on the U.S.A. If the former was our choice, we must bring about a full understanding between the two countries by convincing the U.S.A. of the bona fides of our friendship towards the U.S.A., for a war after a patched-up compromise would be most undesirable. Anyhow the Premier's strong determination was the most urgent matter. The premier expressed his firm conviction on the successful conclusion of the parley, asking their co-operation with his policy. Foreign Minister was of the opinion that he was not quite sure of the outcome of the parley, although he could not flatly deny the completion of the meeting in success. They made the following agreement among themselves on the advice of War Minister; Our demand regarding the stationing of troops should not be altered; the acquired result of the Chinese incident should be secured by all means; We should further our parley on these agreements, leaving off our preparation of war.

10.15.41** - Extract.

Mr. TATE visited me at 9 AM. At 9.30 AM Gen. SUZUKI, Director of the Planning Board, visited me to deliver War Minister TOJO's opinion as follows: If the Premier would not change his attitude the general resignation of the cabinet would not be avoided. And as for the succeeding premier, although the War Minister did not mention the name, he made it essential to the next premier that he could harmonize the Army and the Navy with the Imperial will. When one considered this point, it would be very difficult to find a suitable person among the Japanese subjects. He mentioned Prince HIGASHIKUNI as an example of the next premier. To this I answered that we should be very careful for it was a matter concerned with a price of blood. And if we had to ask the Prince's acceptance of premiership, a common policy between the Army and the Navy should be worked out beforehand; the establishment of an independent policy took the precedence of all others. I asked if War Minister had any reasonable prospects on this point.

I went to the office at 11 AM. Prince KONOYE visited me to ask my opinion regarding the HIGASHIKUNI cabinet suggested by the Army. I answered that it was still under consideration. I requested Mr. MATSUDAIRA, Chief Secretary, that he should study the procedure of the materialization of the HIGASHIKUNI plan. I visited the Emperor from 1.15 PM to 2 PM to report upon the pressing political situation. Prince KONOYE visited me at 4 PM to say that he could not hold his premiership any more, for the breach with War Minister was becoming deeper every day until at last War Minister gave vent to his discontent, saying that he did not like to hold any further conversation with the premier, as he was not sure if he could stifle his feelings. Finally he asked my opinion regarding the proposed HIGASHIKUNI cabinet, so I opined that I did not know whether War Minister had changed his opinion in order to effect a compromise with the Navy or he was intending to put the Prince's shoulder to the wheel, and I had yet to know as to the real intention of War Minister.

I telephoned to the President of the Planning Board to request of his visit. I visited the Minister of the Imperial Household Department to talk about the HIGASHIKUNI cabinet plan. The astonished Minister strongly objected to this plan. At 4.30 PM Gen. SUZUKI, President of the Planning Board, visited me. I asked him as to the real meaning of War Minister's intention, but in vain. I urged him to supply me with a definite report on this matter. The

TOJO, Hideki (Continued)

premier, who joined our conversation on his recession from the presence of the Emperor, said that the Emperor had not shown any particular objection to the HIGASHIKUNI cabinet, a cabinet which might be said to be an outcome of necessity, not of choice.

I talked with the Premier until 8.30 PM regarding the political situation. At night Gen. SUZUKI telephoned to report on the result of his conversation with the Premier. According to his report, TOJO's purpose was to establish harmony between the Army and the Navy by the influence of the Prince and not to realize the desired harmony to pave the way for the cabinet. So I objected to the plan. The Prince telephoned to say that he wanted to secure an informal consent of the Prince. I answered that it would be too early to do so, though I had no objection to him so long as his action was in the capacity of premier. At the small hours before dawn the Premier telephoned to say that Prince HIGASHIKUNI asked for a few days consideration on his part and a meeting with War Minister and me. From 5.35 PM to 5.50 PM I made a report to the throne concerning Prince KONOYE's talk and asked the Imperial opinion as to the matter

10.16.41** - Full.

At 8.30 AM Gen. SUZUKI visited to express his negative opinion regarding the HIGASHIKUNI cabinet, saying as follows:

1. The HIGASHIKUNI cabinet should not be brought into existence until although there was no difference in view between the Army and the Navy, but they were badly in need of the help of a prince of blood to forget all that had happened between them.

1. It should be avoided by all means to shuffle every responsibility on the shoulders of the prince, leaving all difficulties unsettled.

1. On the one hand the HIGASHIKUNI cabinet would be a bad sign of a dearth of talent among the subjects, and on the other hand it would make a pretty bad mess of it, if the war with the U.S.A. broke out. In that case the Imperial House would become an object of common hatred. So a strong objection was raised by him to the idea to ask the help of a prince of blood to solve the problem which had some unknown reason to prevent the decision of Prince KONOYE in the council of the Imperial presence.

At 2 PM I talked with Foreign Minister TOYODA.

At 3 PM War Minister TOJO visited me to report on the pressing political situation. I expressed my objection to his idea of the HIGASHIKUNI cabinet from the same standpoint which I had made clear to Gen. SUZUKI. I emphasized the revision of the resolution of the Council of the Imperial presence and the unity of the Army and the Navy in their policies, two fundamental factors without which no national progress would be expected.

At 4 PM Prince KONOYE telephoned to say that the cabinet was going to resign en bloc. I was astonished by its suddenness. I visited the Emperor at 4 PM to report upon the pending general resignation of the KONOYE cabinet. At 5 PM Prince KONOYE tendered the cabinet ministers resignations to the Throne. I was received in audience by the Emperor from 5.30 AM to 5.45 AM to answer the Imperial question regarding the succeeding cabinet.

10.17.41 E - Extract.

11 AM Mr. MATSUDAIRA, Chief Secretary, visited me to make arrangement for the ex-premiers conference. It was held from 1.10 PM to 3.45 PM. in the west ante-room of the Palace. Those present were Viscount KIYOURA (92 years old), Mr. WAKATSUKI, Admiral OKADA, Gen. HAYASHI, Mr. HIRATA, Gen. ABE, Admiral YONAI, and Mr. HARA, President of the Privy Council. I explained the situation of the general resignation. Mr. WAKATSUKI recommended Gen. UGAKI as the succeeding

TOJO, Hideo (Continued)

premier. Gen. HAYASHI recommended the HIGASHIKUNI cabinet.

I asserted that the most important things were the revision of the decision of the last council in the Imperial presence and the unity of opinion between the Army and the Navy. I offered the TOJO cabinet as a solution of these problems. I met no objection to my proposal, Mr. HIROTA, Gen. ABE, Mr. HARA, giving me positive approval. The meeting broke up at 4 PM. I reported to the Emperor the details of the progress of the ex-premiers conference and talked until 4.15 PM. The War Minister proceeded to the Palace on the request of the Emperor to receive the Imperial order to form a new cabinet. It was followed by the visit of Navy Minister OIKAWA to whom the Emperor gave a speech to the effect that the unity of opinions between the Army and the Navy were very desirable. I delivered to them in an ante-room the Imperial wish as follows: Deep consideration and careful attitude and freedom from the decision of the council on the 6th of September were things wished for in the establishment of the fundamental policy of this country.

10.24.41 E - Extract.

I visited the Emperor from 2.30 PM to 2.40 PM to report on Premier TOJO's proposal to enact an age-limit law for the Board of Marshals and Admirals of the Fleet, to which the Emperor objected, saying that the law would run counter to the spirit of the Board. I agreed with the Emperor. Mr. TOMIYAMA, Superintendent-General of Metropolitan Police Board visited at 2.40 PM.

10.31.41 E - Extract.

At 10 AM I met with Mr. Shigeru YOSHIDA at Marquis MATSUDAIRA's to consult about our negotiations with the U.S.A. I saw the Emperor again from 3.45 PM to 4 PM to report on the decision of the liaison conference. At 4.40 PM Premier TOJO proceeded to the palace and after his recession from the presence of the Emperor I talked with him. He said that the decisions of the conference were going to be discussed again from tomorrow.

11.2.41*E - Extract.

At 8 AM Prince TAKAMITSU telephoned asking the progress of our negotiations with the U.S.A. At 8.15 AM the Premier telephoned to report on the conclusion of the liaison conference, saying that there had been no resolution passed, for Foreign Minister, and Finance Minister wanted some time to consider the matter on account of its seriousness. At 5 PM Premier TOJO, the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Navy General Staff visited the Emperor to report on the progress of the liaison conference, and after their recession from the presence of the Emperor, I heard from the premier of the outline of the conference.

11.14.41 E - Extract.

I had lunch with Premier TOJO and talked on various subjects. At 1.30 PM I visited the Emperor to report privately on the contents of Premier TOJO's administration policy. It was followed by Foreign Minister TOGO and Finance Minister KAWA who came to report on the contents of their speeches in the Diet.

12.5.41 E - Extract.

At 10 AM Mr. KAROKU NOMURA visited me. At 11 AM Mr. INADA, Chief Secretary to the cabinet, visited me to talk about the Imperial Proclamation of war.